THE POLITICAL DYNAMICS OF ETHNIC CLEANSING IN THE BALKANS
WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
IN THE 1990s

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ABSTRACT

This thesis sheds light on the causes and consequences of ethnic cleansing in the 20\textsuperscript{th} century Balkans with particular reference to the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s. It suggests that although the causes of the expulsion of targeted ethnic minorities may be thought to be multifarious in so far as they may be traced inductively in past history, fear, security dilemmas, and ethnic nationalism – these correlations were not necessarily deterministic. This thesis argues that ethnic cleansing in the region was primarily a top down phenomenon and that it occurred when political leaders espoused it as a strategy of nation-state building.

The politics of ethnic cleansing at the national level were intrinsically linked with the delineation of borders, control of territory and other resources, national security and the political organisation of the state with the view to granting rights and protections exclusively to the members of the dominant nation. Wars of ethnic cleansing were not autonomous but instead an instrument of policy – the state being central in their organisation and execution. Their central feature was coercion. Hence, military operations relied not on direct combat with opponents but on the demonstrative capacity of violence, which was intended to compel the targeted peoples to leave.

Although the Western powers' reaction to the expulsion of ethno-national minorities in the course of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century has been inconsistent, the use of military means by the Western Alliance to reverse ethnic cleansing in Kosovo suggests that the policy of ethnic cleansing may no longer be countenanced, at least, in the European state system.

In questioning the feasibility of creating states based on ethnic affinity as well as the validity of 'population transfers' and the partition of territory as viable tools of conflict resolution, the thesis establishes an agenda for policy making and future research.
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# TABLE OF CONTENT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Pages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abstract</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acknowledgements</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapters' contents</td>
<td>4-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List of acronyms</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter I: Introduction</td>
<td>8-32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.1 Why a thesis on ethnic cleansing?</td>
<td>8-14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.2 A note on the record of ethnic cleansing</td>
<td>14-20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.3 What my argument is not about</td>
<td>20-24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.4 Thesis’ questions, hypothesis and methodology</td>
<td>24-32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter II: Anatomy of Ethnic Cleansing</td>
<td>33-66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.1 Defining ethnic cleansing</td>
<td>33-38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.2 Supportive definitions and conceptual distinctions</td>
<td>38-43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.3 Ethnic cleansing: A euphemism for genocide?</td>
<td>43-56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.3.1 Genocide defined</td>
<td>44-50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.3.2 Comparing ethnic cleansing with genocide</td>
<td>50-56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.4 Ethnic cleansing and ethnocide</td>
<td>56-60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.5 The practice of ethnic cleansing</td>
<td>60-65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.6 Concluding remarks</td>
<td>65-66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter III: The legacy of Ethnic Cleansing in the Balkan Region during the 20th Century</td>
<td>67-129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III.1 Introduction</td>
<td>67-69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III.2 The Balkan Wars and the Great War</td>
<td>70-81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III.3 Post World War I population ‘transfers’</td>
<td>81-90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III.4 The First Yugoslavia and its aftermath</td>
<td>90-103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III.4.1. Ethnic cleansing in Kosovo</td>
<td>92-98</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
III.4.2 Ethnic cleansing in the Independent State of Croatia (NDH) 98-104

III.5 The case of the Turkish minority in Bulgaria – 1989 104-109

III.6 Ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s 109-126

III.7 Conclusions: What can be learned? 127-129

Chapter IV: Debating some Causal Explanations for Ethnic Cleansing in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s 130-174

IV.1 Introduction 130-132

IV.2 The role of history 132-141

IV.3 ‘Ancient ethnic hatreds’ 141-146

IV.4 Fear 147-155

   IV.4.1 The range of fears 147-152
   IV.4.2 The functionality of fear 152-155

IV.5 The security dilemma and securitisation 156-161

IV.6 The role of nationalism 162-172

   IV.6.1 Nationalism: Its meaning and potential for violence 162-168
   IV.6.1 Ethnic cleansing a clash of ethnonational identities? 168-172

IV.7 Conclusions 173-174

Chapter V: The Politics of Ethnic Cleansing 175-231

V.1 The concept of politics 175-177

V.2 The legitimation crisis and the politics of identity 178-187

V.3 Drawing new borders: Making the polity congruent with the nation 187-195

V.4 Wars of ethnic cleansing 196-207

V.5 The impact of the Western-led international involvement 1991-1995 207-218

V.6 Ethnic cleansing in Kosovo: What is the difference? 218-229

V.7 Conclusion 229-231
Chapter VI: Ethnic Cleansing and the Provision of In/Security 232-256

VI.1 Introduction 232-234
VI.2 The meaning of security in the context 234-238
VI.3 State building, ethnic cleansing and security as a legitimating mechanism 238-244
VI.4 In/security of states and peoples 244-255
VI.5 Summary 255-256

Chapter VII: Conclusion 257-278

VII.1 The argument in brief 257-259
VII.2 Criminalising ethnic cleansing in its own right 259-266
VII.3 The need to rethink humanitarian intervention 266-273
VII.4 Implications for conflict resolution 273-278

Bibliography 279 – 309
LIST OF ACRONYMS

CIA  Central Intelligence Agency
CSCE  Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe
EC  European Community
EU  European Union
EOKA  National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters
FRY  Former Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)
FYROM  Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
HDZ  Croatian Democratic Community
HV  Croatian Army
HVO  Croatian Defence Council
HSP  Croatian Party of Rights
HOS  Croatian Defence Union
ICJ  International Court of Justice
ICTR  International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
ICTY  International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
IMF  International Monetary Fund
JNA  Yugoslav People's Army
KLA  Kosovo Liberation Army
MUP  Serb Ministry of Internal Affairs
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NDH  Independent State of Croatia
OSCE  Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
OS RSK  Armed Forces of the Republic of Serbian Krajina in Croatia
SAOs  Serbian Autonomous Regions
SDS  Serbian Democratic Party
SOFA  Status of Forces Agreement
TMT  Turkish Defence Organisation
TOs  Territorial Defence Forces
UN  United Nations
UNHCR  United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNPROFOR  United Nations Protection Force
UNSC  United Nations Security Council
VJ  Yugoslav Army
VMRO  International Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation
VRS  Bosnian Serb Army
I. Introduction

I.1 Why a thesis on ethnic cleansing?

Ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s has occasioned renewed interest in a phenomenon with deep roots in history: the expulsion of assorted minorities from their homelands which, although may have had ulterior reasons as a motivating force, ultimately has been undertaken on religious, ethnic, or national grounds. Traditionally, the related terminology has been blurred, using ‘mass expulsions’, ‘deportations’ and ‘forced population transfers’ as descriptive terms. Mass expulsion has been legally defined as resulting ‘from the use of coercion, including a variety of political, economic and social measures which directly, or even indirectly, force people to leave or flee their homelands for fear of life, liberty and security ...’.¹ Mass expulsion is a broad category, which may incorporate as a special case ethnic cleansing – the expulsion of indigenous people who are usually in a minority and/or non-dominant position.² Yet mass expulsion is distinct from ethnic cleansing, for there are several notorious cases of the former which do not fall in the category of the latter. The 1972 expulsion of about 50,000 Asians from Uganda, for example, although a clear instance of mass expulsion is not necessarily a clear-cut case of ethnic cleansing since the Asians were not indigenous and, at least financially, they were hardly in a non-dominant position.³ Similarly, the

² ‘Indigenous people’, in the context of this thesis, refers to those communities who have historically continued to live in ancestral territories of their forebears for several generations. For a reasoned definition of ethnic cleansing and other supportive definitions see Chapter II.
³ The Asians were brought to Uganda – in the first two to three decades of the 20th century – under the encouragement and protection of the British colonisers. They were placed in positions of control – mainly in the economic sector – acting as middlemen between the colonisers and the Africans. When the British left following decolonisation, however, the Asians came to take the blame for the former exploitative colonial system serving as a scapegoat to the regime of Idi Amin, set on the appropriation of their assets. The question of their citizenship was a complicated one. About two-thirds of Asians (circa 50,000) opted for British passports whereas one-third of them either continued to be citizens of India or Pakistan, or opted for Ugandan citizenship although in the latter case Amin’s regime refused to process thousands of
expulsion of more than 30,000 Albanian workers from Greece in 1993-1994, although a case of mass expulsion is not necessarily a case of ethnic cleansing because the expelled Albanians were not an indigenous group in Greece. On the other hand, while both deportation and forcible population transfers relate to the involuntary evacuation of individuals from the territory in which they reside, customary international law differentiates between the two: deportation presumes transfer beyond state borders, whereas forcible transfer relates to displacement within a state. The new term, 'ethnic cleansing' – which gained currency in the 1990s – incorporates both acts of deportation (the removal of the Albanians in Kosovo as well as that of the Serbs in the Krajina region of Croatia), and also acts of forced population transfer (such as those involving the Bosnian Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina). Although the new term expresses more forcefully the grim reality of the expulsion of ethno-national minorities – and despite its wide use – ethnic cleansing is neither recognised as a separate legal category nor prohibited as such in international criminal law. Hence, ethnic cleansing stands in need of being defined precisely and outlawed explicitly in international law.

In an age of human rights awareness, the reason that ethnic cleansing so shocks the consciousness of mankind and warrants intervention by the international community is that acts that constitute this inhumane phenomenon are not isolated, random acts based on examination of individual behaviour but result instead from a deliberate policy

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applications on the ground of missing the deadline. Officially, it was the ‘British’ Asians who were the target of expulsion from Uganda but other Asians were forced out of the country as well. See Thomas and Margaret Melady, ‘The Expulsion of the Asians from Uganda’, *Orbis*, Vol. 19, 1976, pp. 1600-1620.


6 The term ‘Kosovo’ is used throughout this thesis because it is the form used in the English language. The majority of the province’s population uses the term ‘Kosova’.

7 Throughout this thesis ‘Bosnia and Herzegovina’ and ‘Bosnia’ are used interchangeably.

8 See Chapter II, pp. 60-65.
which targets indiscriminately a civilian population so as to induce its flight. Ethnic cleansing, therefore, operates as a punitive measure against members of an ethnic community, violating among others the basic right of the individual to be judged on his/her own merit and not be condemned by association.

Being so central to the conduct of armed conflicts, ethnic cleansing has become a pressing political issue of burning contemporary significance. As the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict pointed out, most conflicts at the end of the 20th century relied on strategies of ethnic expulsions. More civilians were killed than soldiers (by one estimate at the rate of about nine to one), and belligerents used strategies and tactics that deliberately targeted women, the poor and the weak. Given the widespread occurrence of this phenomenon, there is ground to fear that ethnic cleansing may replace genocide. Indeed, in our time it seems more likely for tyrannical leaders to engage in ethnic cleansing than genocide. As General Hector Gramajo, army commander and defence minister of Guatemala for much of the 1980s, put it: ‘Before, the strategy was to kill 100 percent ... But you don’t need to kill everybody to complete the job ... There are more sophisticated means’. He went on to mention that his regime instituted what they called ‘civil affairs’ (in 1982) which, was to provide development for 70 per cent of the population while the army was busy in killing and maltreating the remaining 30 per cent. He was not boasting without cause: the Guatemalan conflict produced much bloodshed in addition to the displacement of thousands of people. The

11 Between 1951 and 1996 Guatemala was ravaged by a civil war. The conflict started in early 1950s when the Guatemalan government - influenced by the Communist Party - initiated an agrarian reform, which included confiscation of American fruit companies, triggering in turn an U.S. intervention. The leftist government was replaced with a pro-American regime whose legitimacy was challenged by an insurgent movement, which launched sporadic attacks against the new government. In mid-1970s, the
same can be said about the conflicts in Iraq,\textsuperscript{12} Kashmir,\textsuperscript{13} Palestine,\textsuperscript{14} Sri Lanka,\textsuperscript{15} Sudan,\textsuperscript{16} as well as the former Yugoslavia.

There is therefore a desperate and urgent need to understand the nature of ethnic cleansing in order to comprehend conditions that might discourage its recurrence. Prevention requires addressing the root causes of the conflict. In the end, lack of comprehension for the causes of crimes, and lack of empathy for the context which fashions them, may be more dangerous than the crimes themselves.

rebels moved into regions that were mainly populated with indigenous people (Mayan) where they reorganised and sustained attacks on a limited scale. The government, however, retaliated with ruthless military campaigns against civilians, mostly Mayan villagers. The conflict reached its peak between 1981 and 1984 when three-quarters of a million people were internally displaced, a-quarter-of-a-million fled the country, 100,000 people were killed and 440 villages destroyed. Over 80 percent of the victims of human rights abuses were Mayan. The guerrillas were significantly weaken by mid-1980s but the excessive use of force against civilians by the Guatemalan government earned the rebels sympathy from various political groupings in North America and Western Europe. A peace process was initiated in mid-1980s that finally ended the conflict in 1996. See Norwegian Refugee Council Global IDP Project, ‘Profile of Internal Displacement: Guatemala’, http://www.db.idpproject.org/Sites/idpProjectDb/idpSurvey.nsf/wCountries/Guatemala/$file/Guatemala+March+2003.pdf.


\textsuperscript{13} Since the late 1980s Indian officials in Kashmir have been fighting an ongoing Muslim insurgency aided by Pakistan. In the course of the struggle for control of the province more than 30,000 people have been killed, and virtually the whole Hindu population of the Valley of Kashmir (about a quarter of a million) have fled their homes. See Sumit Ganguli, The Crisis in Kashmir: Portents of War, Hopes for Peace, Washington D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Centre Press, 1997, pp. 107-108, 133, 152-156.

\textsuperscript{14} See below p. 18.

\textsuperscript{15} A power struggle between Tamils and Sinhalese has led to violent conflict in Sri Lanka, in which more than 50,000 people have been killed, whereas about half a million of the 3.2 million Tamils have left the country in the 1980s and 1990s. See Josephine C. Naidoo, The Tragedy of Sri Lanka: Ethnic Conflict and Forced Migration, Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University, 1998.

\textsuperscript{16} Official attempts to control an oil-rich region in south Sudan since the 1980s have subjected the Dinka minority to persistent repression and hardship with the view to forcing them to leave. See David Keen, ‘Sudan: Conflict and Rationality’, in Frances Stewart and Valpy Fitzgerald and Associates, War and Underdevelopment, Vol. II, Country Experience, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001, especially pp. 236-239. At present it is Western Sudan that has become the hottest site of ethnic cleansing. From February 2003 till May 2004 more than a million civilians of the African Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa ethnic groups have been expelled from some of the most fertile lands in the region by militias sponsored by the Sudanese government. See Darfur Destroyed – Ethnic Cleansing by Government and Militia Forces in Western Sudan, Human Rights Watch Report, May 2004, http://www.hrw.org/reports/2004/sudan0504.
Although widely discussed, ethnic cleansing remains an under-analysed and insufficiently problematised phenomenon. Marxism may indeed be the first social theory to raise key normative and sociological questions about social exclusion, but giving class exclusion the pride of place, it neglects other modes of exclusion which are grounded on ethnicity, gender and race. In other words, Marxism does not consider social exclusion – the closure of social relationships, and monopolisation of opportunities and resources – evolving around ethnicity, in addition to class.\(^\text{17}\)

Certainly, the fate of ethno-national minorities was never the main preoccupation of Marxist inquiry.

If Marxism fails to provide a comprehensive theory, the most pervasive paradigm of International Relations – Realism/Neorealism – is scarcely any more satisfying. For though it does provide important clues about the behaviour of states in the international arena, by drawing a sharp distinction between the domestic and international realms, by assuming that domestic politics does not necessarily condition a state's international political behaviour, and by perceiving state policy to be a function of the need to maximise power in the international arena,\(^\text{18}\) it leaves crucial questions about ethnic cleansing and its by-product – refugees – unanswered. In the realist conception, ethnic cleansing may be seen as an inevitable consequence, but not necessarily as a cause, of conflict and insecurity. By contrast, it is the contention of this thesis that ethnic cleansing in the Balkans – more often than not – has resulted from national (i.e. domestic) policies. International wars or the nature of international interventions may


have facilitated ethnic cleansing but this is not to say that the latter factors were chiefly responsible for the expulsion of the targeted minorities. An analysis of ethnic cleansing, therefore, attests to the futility of attempting to separate domestic and international factors in the study of politics.

The objection of ethnic cleansing implies a critique of the nation-state model in which the state is conceived to belong to and serve solely the dominant nation to the detriment of ethno-national minorities. Ethnic cleansing as a means of building homogenous polities reflects the inability of the governments concerned to work out models of peaceful coexistence between different people in a given state. As Inis Claude has pointed out: 'The quest for ethnic homogeneity implie[s] capitulation to a nationalist philosophy which deny[s] the essential unity of humanity, a philosophy in which the nation … [is] ranked as a supreme and eternal value, and in which the individual [is] degraded to an appurtenance of the nation to which he [is] supposed to belong'. There is therefore a need to consider the conception of the relevant unit of the state – the nation – grounded on civic criteria which provide for the inclusion of ethno-national minorities in the life of the state.

One more reason for writing a thesis on ethnic cleansing can be articulated in terms of the necessity to challenge the official *raison d'être* for the expulsion of the assorted minorities. As will be shown, especially in chapters III and VI of this thesis, the ostensible justification for ethnic cleansing has been pronounced in terms of the preservation of peace and provision of security, the underlying assumption being that

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the peace and security of the state are best secured by striving for homogeneity. Hence
the expulsion of unreliable, uncontrollable ethno-national minorities. This assumption,
nevertheless, is profoundly problematic in terms of the costs incurred and precedents
set. This thesis, therefore, suggests a revisitation of the conception of state security and
its relation with the security of the people.20

1.2 A note on the record of ethnic cleansing

Ethnic cleansing is an historical problem of long standing whose consistent
documentation has been particularly challenging. Although this thesis focuses on the
twentieth century Balkans21 it may be useful at this initial stage to provide a
compendious historical account of this phenomenon. In this short section I purport to
alert the reader about some of the recorded cases of ethnic cleansing, which although
falling beyond the purview of this thesis, suffice to emphasise the pervasive nature of
this phenomenon whilst setting my case studies in a context.

The Assyrians, who during the years 883-59 BC and 669-27 BC are reported to have
resettled up to 4.5 million people in order to crush their resistance and disloyalty, have
been accredited with initiating forceful expulsion of people as a state policy.22 Before
the Middle Ages expulsion was used as a tool to ensure control over alien or recently
conquered territories. Its dynamics were mainly economic. In the Middle Ages,
however, ethnic cleansing was perpetrated also on religious grounds and hostility was

20 Refer to Chapter VI.
21 The term 'Balkans' is normally used to include Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Romania, countries that
constituted the former Federation of Yugoslavia (i.e., Bosnia, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia
and its two autonomous regions Kosovo and Vojvodina, and Slovenia), and that part of Turkey which
borders directly Greece and Bulgaria. Romania and Slovenia may well be left out of the region, however.
A glance at the map suffices to convince one that, from a geographical point of view, the peninsula
sustains itself without these two countries bordering its north-east and north-west respectively.
directed against minorities who did not subscribe to the established religion. This
tFeature persisted throughout to the eighteenth century: in 1290 the Jews were expelled
from England;\(^{23}\) in 1492 the Jews were expelled from Spain;\(^{24}\) in the second half of the
seventeenth century Irish Catholics were expelled from Ireland;\(^{25}\) from 1609 to 1614
Moriscos (Muslims who had previously converted to the Christian faith under duress)
were expelled from Spain;\(^{26}\) in 1685 Huguenots (Protestants) were expelled from
France;\(^{27}\) and in 1731-2 from Salzburg;\(^{28}\) in 1744 the Jews were expelled from
Bohemia.\(^{29}\) The common denominator of these expulsions was the perception that
religious minorities were a threat to the unity of the polity and undermined the capacity
of the rulers to control their subjects and build cohesive entities.

In the era of European colonialism many indigenous peoples became victims of ethnic
cleansing as colonisers sought to secure strategic control of the occupied territories. In
North America the forced removal of indigenous peoples from their traditional
homelands went on gradually for almost three centuries as the British and French
colonisers sought to secure complete control of the new territory and its resources.\(^{30}\)

\(^{24}\) Heather Rae, *State Identities and the Homogenisation of Peoples*, Cambridge: Cambridge University
\(^{25}\) Sean O’Callaghan, *To Hell or Barbados – The Ethnic Cleansing of Ireland*, Dublin: Brandon, 2000,
especially chapters 3-6.
\(^{26}\) Rae, *State Identities*, pp. 74-81.
\(^{27}\) Ibid., pp. 83-123. It was this event that gave rise to the first use of the word ‘refugee’ although the term
did not appear in international treaties until the second quarter of the 19\(^{\text{th}}\) century. See Michael Marrus,
8-9.
\(^{28}\) Maria Grossmann, ‘The Expulsion of the Salzburgers in 1731 and 1732’, *Harvard Library Bulletin*,
\(^{29}\) Alfred M. de Zayas, ‘A Historical Survey of Twentieth Century Expulsions’, in Anna C. Bramwell, ed.,
*Refugees in the Age of Total War*, London: Unwin Hyman, 1988, p. 16.
\(^{30}\) N. F. Dreisziger, ‘Redrawing the Ethnic Map in North America: The Experience of France, Britain and
Canada, 1536-1946’, in Steven Béla Vârdy and T. Hunt Tooley eds., *Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth-
Century Europe*, Boulder: Social Science Monographs Distributed by Columbia University Press, 2003,
The same fate befell Aborigines in Australia and the Maori in New Zealand. Christopher Coker suggests that the confrontation between the indigenous people and the white settlers exemplified a clash between two people with different capabilities in that whites possessed both the technology to master the wild environment as well as the will to do so. Their ambitions were materialised at the expense of the indigenous people who stood in their way.

From the nineteenth century onwards ethnic cleansing retained its strategic motivation but the emergence of the nation-state model provided further incentives for the expulsion of ethno-national minorities. The practice of ethnic cleansing in the modern era, nonetheless, was not necessarily different from that of the pre-modern one. What differed, however, was the scale. If the consolidation of monarchies in Europe produced refugees in thousands or tens of thousands, the formation of new states in the nineteenth and especially twentieth century produced flows of refugees measured in hundred of thousands or even millions. In many places where the idea of the nation-state was transposed, there existed not only one nation upon which the state was designed to be built but also many other ethno-national groups. Not rarely in such cases ethnic cleansing was a means by which new governments strove to establish control and cohesion in their polities.

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33 In Africa alone, there are about 800 ethnic groups and 1,000 distinct languages whereas a typical African state might contain dozens of such groups. Alan Dowty, ‘Emigration and Expulsion in the Third World’, *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 8, No. 1, 1986, p. 153.

In the twentieth century this practice was further facilitated by the occurrence of numerous wars. What was peculiar to the practice of ethnic cleansing in the first half of the twentieth century was not merely its sheer scale but also its conception as a facilitator of peace and security, since it provided a better fit between the state boundaries and the people living within its territory. It was on this ground that ethnic cleansing was in fact condoned by the great powers. This was the case, for instance, of the expulsion of 14 million Germans from various central European countries following the end of World War II. Similarly, large-scale ethnic cleansing undertaken by Stalin in the former Soviet Union from 1937 through to 1949 was conveniently overlooked by the Western powers. More than three million people from thirteen ethno-national groups including Balkars, Chechens, Inguish, Kalmuys, Karachays, Khemshils, Kurds, Meskhetians Turks, Tatars, Soviet Koreans, Germans, Greeks and Finns were stripped off their property and sent to punitive exile in Siberia, Kazakhstan and Central Asia on the ground of their alleged disloyalty to the Soviet state. Moreover, the various agreements on population ‘transfers’ that were concluded in Europe in the wake of the second World War – between Czechoslovakia and Hungary (February 1946), Poland and the Soviet Union (July 1945), Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union (July 1946), Hungary and Yugoslavia (September 1946) – amount in effect to ethnic cleansing since these exchanges were compulsory and were carried out chiefly under threat of force.

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35 Refer to Chapter III in this thesis.
The idea of population ‘transfers’ was embraced in practice as an alleged tool of conflict resolution also in the case of Palestine/Israel, India/Pakistan and Cyprus. An Arab-Jewish population ‘exchange’, was first contemplated in a 1937 report of the British Royal Commission on Palestine and was based on the ‘instructive precedent’ of the Greko-Turkish population ‘exchange’ of 1922-3. Following the adoption of the Partition Plan by the United Nations General Assembly on November 29, 1947, the Palestinian Arabs – who opposed the Plan – launched a series of attacks against the Jews which were met with decisive force by the vastly superior Israeli military resulting in the exodus of tens of thousands of Arabs. The war that commenced on 15 May 1948 between the new state of Israel, on the one hand, and Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Syria and Transjordan (who eventually occupied Palestine), on the other, provided fertile grounds for the en masse expulsion of the Palestinian Arabs. By the time a truce was reached in 1949, more than 600,000 of them had become refugees whilst nearly 400 of their villages (or half of the total) were razed to the ground by the Israeli troops. The struggle for consolidation of the Israeli state and its expansion has been accompanied by gradual ethnic cleansing resulting on some four millions Palestinian refugees by 2004.

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40 Benny Morris, The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. Morris maintains that the causes of the Arab exodus are multi-layered: some of the Arabs left out of fear, some – who resided in areas of Arab military deployments – were even encouraged by their leaders to leave, others left due to Jewish attacks. Although the author insists that no pre-war plan to expel the Arabs from Palestine has been found, he accedes that the Jewish army was involved in the expulsion of the Arabs in the course of war, that Jewish political and military leaders sought to construct a state with an overwhelming Jewish majority in a mostly Arab-populated area, and that the Israeli officials were determined to prevent Arab refugees from returning home at all costs. See especially Conclusion.

41 This figure is quoted from ibid, p. 1.
Similarly, the division of the colonial India was premised on a ‘divide and quit’ British policy. Upon the retreat of the British colonisers and a decision to divide the subcontinent into a Muslim and a Hindu state in 1947, the ‘transfer’ of Hindu from Pakistan to India and of Muslims from India to Pakistan was accelerated. In total, some 15 million people left or fled. In the course of 1971, Pakistani government’s efforts to crush by force an insurgency movement in East Pakistan which opposed the military regime in Karachi and demanded independence for the majority Bengalis led an estimated 10 million people – Muslims and Hindus alike – to flee to India.

Ethnic cleansing in Cyprus was of smaller scale but, nonetheless, a consequence of the division of territory. A former British colony, Cyprus became independent in 1960 but two out of its three political movements (the National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters [EOKA] and the Turkish Defence Organisation [TMT]) sought unification of the island with Greece and Turkey respectively. In what can be described conflict by proxy, these movements’ clashes resulted in the establishment of a ‘Green Line’ between Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities in Nikosia initially supervised by the British and then the United Nations. Eleven years of skirmishes and finally Greek-supported, pro-unificationist attacks on the Cypriot presidential palace prompted Turkey to occupy northern Cyprus in 1974. In the course of the war some 180,000 Greek Cypriots and 37,000 Turkish Cypriots fled their homes. In the aftermath of the war a further massive

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44 West Pakistani forces eventually failed in defeating opposition and irregulars in East Pakistan vindicating, in turn, the independence of the new state: Bangladesh. See, Schaeffer, Warpaths, pp. 234-239.
population ‘swap’ took place: 20,000 Turkish Cypriots went north whilst some 200,000 Greek Cypriots headed south.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 240-244. Michael Stephen, \textit{The Cyprus Question}, London: Northgate, 2001, especially pp. 21-51.}

So widespread have been cases of ethnic cleansing in the past century that the twentieth century may well be called an ethnic cleansing century. One of the sad peculiarities, nevertheless, was that large scale ethnic cleansing in that period began and ended in the Balkans, associating the region infamously with the expulsion of the targeted ethno-national communities. A thesis cannot of itself suffice to give a comprehensive analysis of the subject since many significant details and correlations would be omitted given that ethnic cleansing has become a problem of global proportions. The account of ethnic cleansing in the Balkans provided in this thesis, however, is premised on the assumption that a deeper understanding of the subject may serve to lessen its occurrence and mitigate its consequences.

\section*{1.3 What my argument is not about}

Given the wide scope of the phenomenon of ethnic cleansing and arguments offered to account for it, it might be useful at the outset of this thesis to state what my argument is not about. My account of ethnic cleansing in the Balkans departs from the \textit{Zeitgeist} of the 1990s which casts the conflict predominantly in religious / cultural / civilisational lines. The conflict analysis in the 1990s has been influenced – to a great extent – by the work of the Harvard Professor, Samuel Huntington, who claimed that the end of the Cold War had cleared the scene for more fundamental and possibly more violent conflicts grounded on the clash of values or cultures which he distinctively grouped
under the term 'civilisations'. Indeed, Huntington saw the war in Bosnia as symptomatic of the conflict between 'the West' and 'Islam'.

No less a luminary than Henry Kissinger, U.S. Secretary of State (1973-77), embraced a ‘fault-line’ conception of the conflicts that followed the dissolution of Yugoslavia. For Kissinger war in Kosovo – as in Bosnia – was a conflict waged at the ‘dividing line between the Ottoman and Austrian empires, between Islam and Christianity…’.

Conceptualisation of these conflicts on religious terms echoed the rhetoric of the Serb leadership, and to a lesser extent their Croat counterpart, as well as some elements of the international community. The Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić, for instance, argued that the struggle was along the fault lines of faith: ‘We realise’ – he said – ‘that we are completely alone and that only God is with us, although we are defending Christianity against militant fundamentalism’. Some have interpreted what they perceived as combat along religious cleavages to reflect the broader force of religious nationalism that threatened to attract the intervention of ‘kindred’ countries or adherents from therein. Others, like Robert Kaplan, have tended to ‘essentialise’ violence, that is, to treat it as inherent in Balkan cultural features; a corollary of which

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49 Cited in ibid., p. 45.

was the thesis of 'ancient ethnic hatreds'. The proponents of such interpretations saw violence as a result of anomie (i.e., cultural and social alienation) and moral poverty of the collectivities involved, ethnic cleansing reflecting the anomic collapse of rational values. Violence, in this account, was perceived as essentially irrational and senseless.

This thesis does not adhere to the above lines of reasoning. Huntington’s argument may be seductive but, nevertheless, it tends to be simplistic, reductionist and therefore misleading. Being over-preoccupied with prescription – outlining what he saw as a desirable response to the new wave of ‘cultural’ conflicts – Huntington has overlooked aetiology, dealing with the root causes of the conflict and its dynamics. In any case, the evidence does not suggest that, in the Balkans, conflict has been caused by religious cleavages. Indeed, religious institutions in Croatia, or those of the Bosnian Croats and Muslims, or Kosovar Albanians do not appear to have supported either openly or tacitly the fighting. Although the Serbian Orthodox Church backed up Belgrade’s policies, at least in propaganda terms, the church’s role was to justify the war and ethnic cleansing rather than initiate them. Moreover, the massive number of refugees, the vast majority nominally if not particularly religious Muslims, eschewed their presumed civilisational

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proclivities and sought refuge and protection in Western (Christian) countries rather than Islamic ones.

The portrayal of such violence as 'irrational' or 'senseless', on the other hand, appears to be confirmed when one focuses exclusively on the conflict's consequences. Its cost in terms of loss of human lives and destruction of property has been so colossal that it is inviting to dismiss the hostilities as 'sheer madness', the implication being that its understanding and explanation belong to the realm of psychology and psychiatry rather than political science.\(^5^5\) However, as is implied throughout this thesis, the expression 'senseless violence' is misconceived -- in effect divorcing violence from its context.\(^5^6\) Consequently, this thesis seeks to understand and explain ethnic cleansing in utilitarian terms by taking seriously the functionality of the violence. By so doing, it seeks to question an assumption that was widely held by policy makers during the first half of the 1990s conveniently justifying international inaction, and argues that ethnic cleansing is neither senseless nor irrational but an activity subject to the control and direction of the people who planned and performed it.

Accordingly, one underlying assumption of the unfolding analysis is that ethnic cleansing does not necessarily represent the values of the collectivities involved. The following chapters will show that the violence in effect, was primarily top-down, mobilised by political leaders for political and/or economic reasons. If some civilians embraced violence as a means of enforcing the expulsion of minorities, they were


generally responding opportunistically to events, which they neither instigated nor determined. This is not to justify their actions, but only to emphasise that ethnic cleansing was not primarily a grass root phenomenon. A corollary to this assumption is the preposition that responsibility for wartime atrocities and mass expulsion of targeted peoples rests with political leaders who devised the policy and the military who implemented it rather than with whole nations or communities.

Ultimately, this thesis conceives aggravated conflict – such as war and ethnic cleansing – to be related to conscious control. This, however, reveals a problem with the very terminology of conflict, which is often cast in ethnic terms. Hence, the assumption that violence was 'ethnically inspired'. Such a phrase, not unlike 'senseless violence', nonetheless, is a misnomer without reasoned appeal. Conflict may display ethnic features by involving two or more ethnic groups, but this, in itself, is insufficient to suggest that ethnicity has caused it. What comes under the label of 'ethnic conflicts' are in fact conflicts that are largely about control – for example, of state governance, territory, resources, and people – in which ethnicity becomes an instrumental mean rather than an end. Given that 'ethnic conflict' has now become a widely used term, demanding its disuse may be unrealistic but it is important nevertheless to acknowledge that it does not revolve primarily around ethnicity.

1.4 Thesis’ questions, hypothesis and methodology

The theme of this thesis is that of causes and consequences of ethnic cleansing in the Balkans with particular reference to the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s. The dynamics

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of ethnic cleansing in the region have so far been insufficiently explored, in that, although often discussed they remain unsystematically analysed. Hoping to fill such a gap, this thesis poses a question that is consequential to the political and social life of regional societies and beyond, namely: Why did ethnic cleansing occur in the Balkans? This main question raises a number of subsidiary questions: What precisely may ethnic cleansing be taken to mean and how it is to be differentiated from genocide and ethnocide? To what extent, if any, was ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia of the 1990s a legacy of history and conditioned by previous regional instances? How did collective fears and national security dilemmas feed into the practice of ethnic cleansing? Was ethnic nationalism the cause of, or a pretext for the expulsion of targeted minorities? How far was ethnic cleansing a national movement instigated from below or the product of the ambitions of the national, political leaders? If the latter, to what extent were such ambitions realised? Did international intervention undermine or paradoxically buttress the practice of ethnic cleansing? If national leaders conceived the expulsion of assorted minorities as a means to security, was security achieved as a result of ethnic cleansing?

My hypothesis is that ethnic cleansing in the region occurred because the national leaders espoused it as a strategy of nation-state building – the nation-state model being considered by them as a supreme value. The expulsion of the targeted ethno-national minorities was designed to serve the control of the state, its territory and resources by the majority nation – rights and protections sought exclusively for its members. The analysis shows that the correlation between ethnic cleansing, on the one hand, and past history, fear, security dilemmas, and ethnic nationalism, on the other, was not deterministic. The latter factors may have played a facilitating role but, in themselves,
were insufficient to cause ethnic cleansing. Although a causal link between the
expulsion of minorities and the consolidation of a nation-state has not escaped the
attention of other scholars in the field, since I contend that no systematic study of
ethnic cleansing in the Balkans, on these grounds, has been completed so far, this thesis
is intended to make a significant contribution to the literature dealing with conflict
analysis in general and Balkan area studies in particular.

Causation in International Relations, however, is elusive and downplayed, despite the
fact that many scholars in the field – even if not directly – have worked with various
types of causes, such as material causes (Marxists), structural causes (neo-realists), or
ideational causes (idealists, liberals and realists) although these boundaries are by no
means clear cut. Despite the negligence of causation in International Relations, this
thesis is premised on the assumption that the study of a phenomenon cannot be
separated from the study of its causes and consequences. Furthermore, it takes seriously
the fact that a valid causal analysis impacts positively in the way in which problems are
dealt with.

A cause can be considered as a thing that makes another thing happen. Michael Scriven,
for instance, defines a cause simply as that which so tips the balance of events as to
produce a result. Sometimes ‘cause’ and ‘condition’ are used interchangeably, though
they are by no means synonymous and a mere condition is not necessarily a cause. A

58 Recall for instance Claude’s citation in Section I.1, pp. 13.
59 One notable exception is Michael Nicholson’s Causes and Consequences in International Relations – A
Conceptual Study, London: Pinter, 1996. Nicholson, nevertheless, is not neutral in the debate. His study is
intended to defend what he calls ‘the social scientific school’ which takes economics and natural sciences
as a conceptual model for addressing international relations' problems.
60 Michael Scriven, ‘Causes, Connections and Conditions in History’, in William H. Dray ed.,
Philosophical Analysis and History, pp. 216-217.
mere condition can exist both when the phenomenon in question occurs and when it does not: oxygen exists in the air both when there is fire and when there is not. Security dilemmas among individuals and groups exist both in times of peace and in times of war. For a condition to qualify as a cause, nonetheless, it has to make the difference between what normally happens in the human environment (e.g., the absence of unwanted fire, peace) and what has happened therein on a particular occasion under consideration (e.g., fire, war). The dropping of a lighted cigarette on a pile of paper makes such a difference and therefore may be a cause of fire. An aggressive government intent on expansionism may be a cause of war. On the other hand, smoke and ash are consequences of fire; casualties and destruction are consequences of war.

To seek a cause of a phenomenon, generally speaking, is to ask 'what 'makes it happen', what 'produces', 'generates', 'creates' or 'determines' it, or more weakly what 'enables' or 'leads' to it'. In providing answers to causal questions, on the other hand, in saying that 'X causes Y', one assumes three things: 1) that X exists independent of Y; 2) that X precedes Y in time; and 3) that but for X, Y would not have occurred. In other words, in saying that governments which embraced aggressive policies of homogenising states caused large-scale ethnic cleansing, I am assuming that: 1) such governments existed independent of ethnic cleansing i.e., ethnic cleansing was not a prerequisite for their existence; 2) such governments preceded ethnic cleansing in time; and 3) had it not been for such governments ethnic cleansing would not have happened.

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In natural science causation is a fundamental concept, which derives from the principle that something never comes from nothing. In the case of natural phenomena, however, logical regularities (when A then B) may render the task of revealing causation easier than in social science, where regularities, although indicative of the causes 'out there', do not suffice to determine them. The understanding of the underlying causes of a phenomenon in social science needs to be grounded not only on regularities but on qualitative, hermeneutic and historical evidence as well, conditions that by increasing the number of factors involved increase accordingly the complexity of the task at hand. Moreover, there is the problem of a degree of relativity to context, i.e., when different observers identify various causes for a particular case and rank these differently, they may only increase uncertainty about causal relations. Yet despite the uncertainty that stems from competing conceptions of causality, and the fact that the margin of error in social science may be higher than that in natural science, there is no need to avoid attempts at causal inference, no matter how imprecise.  

As a causal inquiry, the subject of this thesis is addressed by means of explanatory inference grounded on historical evidence of the many and wide ranging cases of ethnic cleansing in the Balkan region in the 20th century. Explanatory inference here is taken to mean a critical analysis of the empirical facts with the view of inferring causal relations from the available data. Its central objective is to explain changes in the state-system that account for the inception of ethnic cleansing as a state policy and its eventual execution. In the process, the way in which actors defined related issues and

alternatives, their perceptions of each other, and what they aimed to achieve have been taken into account as far as possible.

Asking why an act happened requires an explanation i.e., making intelligible the goals and purposes for which the action was taken. 'Explanation', however, is sometimes contrasted with 'understanding'. Hollis and Smith, for instance, draw a distinct line between the two. For them there are always two stories to tell in International Relations: one explains international politics by inquiring into the causes; the other, leaning towards hermeneutics, understands international politics by inquiring into the meanings that motivate actors in their actions. Not only does their approach leave unanswered the question of 'how can a meaning be a motive?' but it also blurs the fact that the distinction between 'explanation' (finding causes) and 'understanding' (putting order as to motivating forces) is neither necessarily profound nor very appealing. A good International Relations' story requires simultaneously 'explanation' and 'understanding', and this thesis assumes that 'explanation' and 'understanding' are complementary and mutually reinforcing.

A reminder on the relationship between explanation and description may be useful at this juncture. As King, Keohane and Verba have pointed out, social science research involves the dual goal of describing and explaining. Convincing causal explanation requires good description whilst the relationship between the two is an interactive one: sometimes explanation leads one to look for more description; at other times,

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67 I owe this point to Geoffrey Stern. Conversation with the author, 17 May 2004.
description leads one to new causal explanations. In other words, description has a central role in explanation its virtue being inference: i.e., learning about unobserved facts on the basis of the facts observed or available data; and distinguishing between the systematic and nonsystematic features of the observed facts.\textsuperscript{68}

My research in preparation for writing this thesis aimed to cover the major available English literature dealing with conflict analysis in the Balkans, especially the break-up of the Yugoslav federation in the early 1990s and the ensuing wars. My findings suggest that ethnic cleansing was primarily a policy sanctioned by the state. Though the national level of analysis takes a prominent part in my contemplations, the analysis also dwells on the international level given the preoccupation of this thesis with the consequences of ethnic cleansing including the international community’s reaction to it. The argument is accumulative and is build incrementally from one chapter to another. The following is the chapters’ synopsis:

Chapter II deals with definitions and conceptual distinctions. It defines ‘ethnic cleansing’ and sheds light on its practice, and it compares the term with ‘genocide’ and ‘ethnocide’. The purpose of this chapter is to prepare the ground for the argument to be developed in the following chapters.

Chapter III identifies major cases of ethnic cleansing in the Balkans namely those associated with the Balkan Wars of 1912-13; those of the First World War; the ‘Population Transfers’ between Bulgaria and Turkey, Bulgaria and Greece, and especially Greece and Turkey in the 1920s; those of the Second World War and post

\textsuperscript{68}King, Keohane and Verba, \textit{Designing Social Inquiry}, p. 34.
World War II cases, primarily those of the Turks in Bulgaria in the late 1980s and my core case study – the former Yugoslavia (mainly Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo) in the 1990s. By exploring the contexts in which ethnic cleansing occurred, this chapter provides a basis for a comparative analysis.

Chapter IV evaluates some of the standard explanations of ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s, which attribute the expulsion of ethno-national minorities to past history, ‘ancient ethnic hatred’, fears and security dilemmas, nationalism and diverging ethno-national identities. Finding these arguments deficient as primary explanations for ethnic cleansing, the analysis identifies state leadership as the agent with prime responsibility for choosing and implementing ethnic cleansing as a policy of dealing with ‘undesired’ ethno-national minorities.

Chapter V argues that the policy of ethnic cleansing in the 1990s was bound primarily with efforts of the Serb leadership to re-organise the Serb polity on the basis of ethnic criteria. This inevitably implied redrawing borders so as to include in the new state Serb inhabited territories situated in Bosnia and Croatia. Ethnic cleansing became a means to such an end. Ethnic cleansing in Kosovo is contrasted with the case of Bosnia by emphasising commonalities and differences in relation to their causes but also with regard to the external actors’ reaction to them.

Chapter VI questions the official *raison d’être* often proffered for the expulsion of assorted minorities. It suggests that *the pursuit of security cannot be self-referential*. Ethnic cleansing as a policy intended to provide national security is profoundly problematic because by undermining the security of particular peoples it put in jeopardy
the security of others too. Whilst state security is an important value, its acquisition may no longer be justified independent of the means.

Chapter VII concludes by pointing out the need for criminalising ethnic cleansing in its own right. Considering implications for international intervention and conflict resolution it argues that humanitarian intervention should not be based on a negative conception of peace, whereas conflict resolution should not rest on the misplaced assumption of the superiority of the homogenous nation-state but rather recognise the need for human diversity and cultural pluralism.
II. Anatomy of Ethnic Cleaning

'The elucidation of the language of political science is by no means an idle exercise in semantics, but in many instances a most effective way to solve substantive problems of research'.

Before entering into a detailed analysis of the dynamics of ethnic cleansing in the Balkans, a reasoned definition of the term is needed so that it becomes clear what is one talking about. This chapter deals with the terminology of ethnic cleansing. It examines whether ethnic cleansing is a mild expression used to cover the horrors of genocide or whether it is instead a notion in its own right used to express situations different from those of genocide. This chapter questions the adequacy of the interchangeable use of 'ethnic cleansing' with 'genocide' and argues for the recognition of ethnic cleansing as a separate criminal offence. In addition, it elucidates related concepts such as 'nation', 'state', 'nation-state', 'ethnic community', 'ethnicity' and 'ethnocide'. Subsequently, some of the most notorious acts employed in the course of conduct of ethnic cleansing will be pointed out.

II.1 Defining ethnic cleansing

The term 'ethnic cleansing', unlike the practice it represents, is of relatively recent origin. Nevertheless, as yet, no coherent interpretation on the derivation of the term exists. Mary Kaldor, for instance, has asserted that the term 'ethnic cleansing' was first used to describe the expulsion of Greeks and Armenians from Turkey in the early 1920s. But John McGarry and Brendan O'Leary argue that 'ethnic cleansing' is a

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chilling expression coined by the Serbs to describe forced mass-population transfers, that is the physical transplantation of one (or more) ethnic community which is (are) consequently compelled to live somewhere else.³ Veljko Vujačić for his part, traces the first use of the term in the late 1980s when the Serbs complained of the alleged Albanian ethnic cleansing of Serbs from Kosovo.⁴ Whereas Dražen Petrović has suggested that the expression 'ethnic cleansing' has its origin in the Yugoslav military vocabulary of the 1990s - 'ethnic cleansing' being a literal translation of the expression 'etničko čišćenje' in Serbo-Croatian.⁵

The word ‘cleansing’, however, has been in use in the Balkan region for much longer. Philip Cohen states that during the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913 the term cleansing was used explicitly to describe Serbia’s method of acquiring territories,⁶ whilst Norman Cigar indicates that the term was used during the Second World War to connote the homogenous nature of the people inhabiting a given territory, particularly so in the framework of the fighting between Serbian nationalists of the Chetnik movement and Croatian nationalists of the Ustasha movement of the time and their efforts to forge their respective homogenous nation-states.⁷ The addition of the age-old adjective ‘ethnic’ indicates that people targeted for cleansing belong to ethnic communities other than those of the perpetrators.⁸

Ethnic cleansing is not what lawyers call 'a term of art', i.e., it lacks both legal definition and a body of case law. It is instead a term used by soldiers, journalists, sociologists, social scientists, etc., to describe a phenomenon which is not defined by law. That said, a general agreement on a precise meaning of 'ethnic cleansing' is so far lacking. However, the Commission of Experts charged by the United Nations' Security Council with investigating war crimes in the former Yugoslavia defined ethnic cleansing as 'rendering an area ethnically homogeneous by using force or intimidation to remove from a given area persons of another ethnic or religious group'. This definition, nonetheless, evades the question of the perpetrators, their intent, and the systematic character of ethnic cleansing.

UN Special Rapporteur Tadeusz Mazowiecki – Prime Minister of Poland between 24 August 1989 and 14 December 1990 – defined ethnic cleansing as 'the elimination by the ethnic group exerting control over a given territory of members of other ethnic groups'. In his later considerations, the UN Special Rapporteur added that 'ethnic cleansing' may be equated with a systematic purge of the civilian population based on ethnic criteria, with a view to forcing it to abandon the territories where it lives. Tadeusz Mazowiecki has provided important qualifications of ethnic cleansing. Nevertheless, when using terms such as 'elimination' and 'purge' it is not clear whether

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9 I am grateful to Professor Christopher Greenwood of the Law Department of the London School of Economics and Political Science for revealing this point to me during our conversation of 20th June 2000.
he implied killing or the removal of the targeted group(s). In addition, he does not specify ethnic cleansing as a policy of the perpetrators.

Andrew Bell-Fialkoff has argued that: ‘...ethnic cleansing can be understood as the expulsion of an ‘undesirable’ population from a given territory due to religious or ethnic discrimination, political, strategic or ideological considerations, or a combination of these’. This definition, however, does not stress the fact that ethnic cleansing is a deliberate action committed by using force and/or intimidation, does not qualify the perpetrators and extends the range of the targeted group(s) beyond the ethnic, religious and national criteria.

Finally, Dražen Petrović describes ethnic cleansing as ‘a well defined policy of a particular group of persons to systematically eliminate another group from a given territory on the basis of religious, ethnic or national origin’. Although avoiding some of the flaws of the previous definitions, Petrović’s definition appears somehow ambiguous given that the characterisation of the perpetrators as ‘a particular group of persons’ is rather vague and consequently not adequate.

It can be deduced, however, that the consistency among these definitions lies in the recognition that in ethnic cleansing campaigns the bone of contention is territory, which is defined by the perpetrators in ethnic terms: the quest for territory inhabited by the perpetrators’ own people being the *modus operandi* of ethnic cleansing operations.  

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Consequently, ethnic minorities that inhabit contested territories are deemed by the perpetrators to impair the homogeneity of the dominant nation/ethnic community, and are, hence, compelled to flee their homelands.

Although these definitions do a useful service in pointing out some important characteristics of ethnic cleansing, none of them on its own is sufficient in defining the phenomenon in all its complexity. Based on the above considerations, I propose that the following be kept as the working definition of ethnic cleansing for the purposes of this thesis:

Ethnic cleansing is a deliberate policy designed by and pursued under the leadership of a nation/ethnic community or with its consent, with the view to removing an ‘undesirable’ indigenous population of a given territory on the basis of its ethnic, national, or religious origin, or a combination of these, by using systematically force and/or intimidation.

It should be pointed out that, although the perpetrators of ethnic cleansing constitute a collectivity, this is not to imply that each and every member of the perpetrators’ community participates directly in the acts or even agrees with the policy. Instead, what makes ethnic cleansing a collective endeavour is that it is perpetrated under the directives of the leaders of their nation/ethnic community or at least with the leadership’s consent, and that the perpetrators have also the backing of a significant section of their nation or ethnic community, though many might be coerced into bowing to the official policy.¹⁶

¹⁶ Although statistics for all areas that underwent ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia are missing, a few researchers have provided some data about the size of the collectivity of perpetrators and their supporters. Peter Maass, for example, suggests that in Banja Luka, about 30 per cent of the Serb community opposed ethnic cleansing, while 60 per cent of them were confused and supported it overtly or tacitly. The latter went along with the 10 per cent who actually had the guns and controlled the television tower. Peter Maass, Love thy Neighbour: A Story of War, New York: Alfred A. Knopf Inc., 1996, p. 107. These statistics are supported also by Anthony Oberschall’s research. See his article ‘The Manipulation of Ethnicity: from Ethnic Co-operation to Violence and War in Yugoslavia’, Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol. 23, No. 6, 2000, p. 986. In Serbia, during the last months of 1991, 50,000 people had signed a petition for peace and an estimated 50,000 reservists were in the hiding from the call-up. The latter number had risen
In addition to qualifying ethnic cleansing as a deliberate course of action, i.e., a policy supported by the authorities of the perpetrators’ community, the proposed definition emphasises that the character of this phenomenon. Furthermore, the traits that — apparently — make the targeted population ‘undesirable’ and therefore subject to removal are one or a combination of the ethnic, national or religious background(s) of the victims. Last but not least, the removal of people from the territory in which they traditionally lived is obviously not based on the voluntary principle. Hence, the perpetrators use force and/or intimidation to compel the targeted people to leave.

II.2 Supportive definitions and conceptual distinctions

The term ‘ethnic cleansing’ — as defined above — is intrinsically bound up with other related terms such as ‘ethnic community’, ‘nation’, ‘state’, ‘nation-state’, and ‘leadership’. For this reason, elaborating on the latter concepts may serve to throw in sharper relief the proposed definition of ethnic cleansing. On the other hand, defining such terms as ‘ethnic community’ and ‘nation’, entails certain difficulties, which have to do with the intangible nature of the entities in question. Moreover, inherent in the task of definition are difficulties that have to do with delineation, i.e., drawing the line between entities that to some extent overlap.

Let me start by considering the meaning of ‘ethnic community’. The compounding adjective ‘ethnic’ derives from the ancient Greek noun *ethnos*, originally meaning...
heathen or pagan. In French, the Greek noun *ethnos* survives as *ethnie*, and it is from here that this word is borrowed and used in English to connote an 'ethnic community'. Max Weber – among the first classical theorist to grant attention to ethnic groups – defined them ‘those human groups that entertain a subjective belief in their common descent because of similarities of physical type or of customs or of both, or because of memories of colonisation and migration...’.

Weber did emphasise some crucial elements of an ethnic group such as common traditions or ways of life, shared memories of a common past, and attachment to a homeland. In addition, he acknowledged the important role that history, myths and symbols play in shaping the ethnic group and sustaining the life of the community. Weber, however, maintained that shared physical or cultural characteristics are insufficient to qualify a group as an ethnic one. Instead, it is the *belief* in these shared characteristics, regardless of whether such belief has any objective foundation (and not only by those who share them but also by those who react to them), which has community-forming powers. By extension, he did not think that common descent alone could lead to group formation. In his view, the most effective means of bringing the community into being was political action.
Recently, Anthony Smith has offered a more comprehensive definition of an ethnic group or an ethnec. In his opinion, an ethnec is 'a named human population with myths of common ancestry, shared historical memories, one or more elements of common culture, a link with a homeland and a sense of solidarity among at least some of its members.' It follows, therefore, that both the perception and the shared belief of common descent between the members of the community, shared memories of a common past, attachment to a motherland, common cultural elements (such as language, religion, laws, customs, dress, music, crafts, architecture, food, etc.,) and a degree of solidarity and consciousness of the collectivity are important qualifying criteria of an ethnic group.

Ethnic groups/communities are usually smaller in size than the nation with which they cohabit. In the context of the Balkans, the term ethno-national groups/minorities is used to indicate the presence of not only ethnic communities without a state such as the Roma, for instance, but also national groups who have, or have had, a mother country outside a given republic (for example, the Croats and Serbs in Bosnia, the Albanians in Kosovo, etc). Nevertheless, international law, thus far, provides no universally accepted definition of a minority. However, a minority may be defined by certain objective and subjective attributes such as its distinctiveness from other groups within the state in terms of ethnicity, culture and history; being numerically inferior and in a non-dominant position to the rest of the population of the state; as well as having a sense of community and a wish to preserve and develop their distinctive culture and traditions.


24 See Malcolm N. Shaw, 'The Definition of Minorities in International Law', in Yoram Dinstein and Mala Tabory eds., *Protection of Minorities and Human Rights*, Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,
‘Ethnicity’ is a term that is often used in conjunction with ‘ethnic community’. ‘Ethnicity’ is a very recent term, its first usage being attributed to the American sociologist David Reisman in 1953.\(^{25}\) Paul Spoonley maintains that the term emerged in order to discard the concept of ‘race’ and its sense of biological determinism. Ethnicity came to be used by ‘sociologists and others to acknowledge ‘the positive feelings of belonging to a cultural group’."^{26} Chapman et al., on the other hand, suggest that ‘ethnicity’ implies the quality of belonging to an ethnic community and it can mean the essence of an ethnic group or ‘what it is you have if you are an ‘ethnic group’...’; this usually being so, in ‘a context of relativities’.\(^{27}\) It is in this latter connotation that the meaning of ethnicity will be referred to in this thesis.

An important factor, which must be taken into account in any discussion of ethnicity is the difference between the ethnicity claimed by the people themselves and that attributed to them by others. Guibernau and Rex maintain that in either case the perception of ethnicity will not rest upon some scientific sociological truth but on a subjective interpretation which might vary greatly in attitude between what group members think about themselves and how others regard them. In other words, the criteria applied for classification and therefore interpretation might be different between members of the group and those who classify them from outside.\(^{28}\) In the Balkan region...
this is a point of great relevance as the outside perceptions of what Balkan people are and their own perceptions of themselves have varied widely. Suffice to remember that often and till this very day many outsiders speak of Balkan tribes and Balkan tribal rifles.

A nation[^9] has all the attributes of an ethnic community, but in addition it is definitely attached to a clearly demarcated territory, has not only a common past but also a common vision for the future and, most importantly, it has acquired statehood. The term 'nation' is often used interchangeably and misleadingly with 'state' which refers to a political formative unit and which has a much longer life than that of 'nation'. In legal terms, a state is considered to be a political formation which normally consists of a permanent population, a defined territory, a government, and capacity to enter into relations with other states.[^10] A nation-state is a specific case of a state in which the permanent population consists of a single nation which in turn controls the government of the state, including its apparatus of law, the economy and military power.

Lastly, in the framework of this thesis 'leadership' means high-ranking governmental officials and military echelons, high-ranking members of political parties, and prominent members of scientific, artistic and religious institutions. In the course of

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analysis, ‘leaders’ and ‘elites’ are used interchangeably but refer to the meaning of ‘leadership’ stated above.

II.3 Ethnic Cleansing: A Euphemism for Genocide?

In the context of the 1990s conflict in the Balkans, ‘genocide’ and ‘ethnic cleansing’ have often been used interchangeably in order to describe events in the former Yugoslavia, and not only by lay people but by political practitioners, scholars of politics and international relations, and journalists as well. Let me cite a few examples.

Genocide was recognised in Article 4 of the Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991 (hereinafter referred to as the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia – ICTY), established by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter in May 1993.\(^{31}\) UN General Assembly Resolution 47/121 of 18\(^{th}\) December 1992 states in paragraph 9 of the Preamble that: ‘... the abhorrent policy of ‘ethnic cleansing’ is a form of genocide ...’.\(^{32}\) In April 1995, a hearing before the Commission on Security and Co-operation in Europe of the US Congress was entitled ‘Genocide in Bosnia-Herzegovina’.\(^{33}\) From the very first week of the NATO bombing campaign against Serbia in March 1999, the U.S. State Department explicitly raised the possibility of genocide being under way in Kosovo,\(^{34}\) as did the German Defence Minister Rudolf

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31 The ICTY was established by the UN Security Council Resolution 827, adopted on 25 May 1993, under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. This Tribunal is empowered to prosecute persons committing or ordering to be committed grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, genocide, crimes against humanity and violations of the laws or customs of war. The Statute of the ICTY is printed in Adam Roberts and Richard Gueff, eds., *Documents on the Laws of War*, 3rd edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, pp. 569-570.


Scharping. Hälsö Watch was the first non-governmental organisation to pronounce that its findings, at the very least \textit{prima facie}, provided evidence that genocide was taking place in the region. Amongst academics, Professor Rudolph J. Rummel of the University of Hawaii had no doubt that the Bosnian Serb massacre of Bosnian Muslims was genocide. The same view was disseminated by Professor Helen Fein in her public lecture 'Denying Genocide: From Armenia to Bosnia' at the London School of Economics on 22nd January 2001. Amongst journalists, Roy Gutman was awarded the 1993 Pulitzer Prize Winning Dispatches for his book \textit{A Witness to Genocide} and Norman Cigar published in 1995 a book entitled \textit{Genocide in Bosnia: The Policy of 'Ethnic Cleansing'}. Christopher Bennett surveying the latest events in the region has argued that ethnic cleansing, in fact, is a euphemism for genocide. But is it? Is ethnic cleansing indeed a mild expression used to cover the horrors of genocide or is it a notion in its own right used to express situations different from those of genocide? And, is it legitimate to use the two terms interchangeably?

II.3.1 \textbf{Genocide Defined}

As a way of considering the above questions let me first comment on the meaning of 'genocide'. Originally, the term – a synthesis of the Greek word \textit{genos}, which means 'race', and the Latin word \textit{cide}, which means 'to kill' – was coined by Raphael Lemkin in his 1944 book, \textit{Axis Rule in Occupied Europe}, to describe the Holocaust. Four years

\footnotesize{35 Ibid.
36 \textit{War Crimes in Bosnia and Herzegovina, A Helsinki Watch Report, Human Rights Watch, August 1992} (referred to as \textit{Helsinki Watch 1st Report}). In addition, \textit{Helsinki Watch 2nd Report (War Crimes in Bosnia and Herzegovina)}, Helsinki Watch, A Division of Human Rights Watch, April 1993, maintains that 'what is taking place in Bosnia-Herzegovina is attempted genocide – the extermination of a people in whole or in part because of their race, religion or ethnicity'.
38 Christopher Bennett, 'Ethnic cleansing in former Yugoslavia' in Guibernau and Rex eds., \textit{The Ethnicity Reader}, p. 122.}
later the legal definition of genocide was codified in Article 2 of the 1948 United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide (which entered into force in 1951), as follows:

...genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: (a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.\(^{39}\)

According to the UN definition, genocide is characterised by two legal ingredients, namely, the material element constituted by one or several acts enumerated above, known in legal parlance as \textit{actus reus}, and the mental factor known in legal terminology as \textit{mens rea}, which consists of the special intent (or \textit{dolus specialis}) to destroy in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, or religious group, as such. The \textit{dolus specialis} applies to all genocidal acts mentioned in Article 2(a) to (e) above, that is, all the enumerated acts must be part of a wider plan to destroy the group as such.\(^{40}\) It is this special intent (\textit{dolus specialis}) of the perpetrators/genocidaire to destroy a group in whole or in part that sets

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{39} Roberts and Guelff, eds., \textit{Documents on the Laws of War}, p. 181. Some scholars, however, have attempted to define genocide in different terms than those of the United Nations Genocide Convention. For example, Horowitz defines genocide as 'a special form of murder: state-sanctioned liquidation against a collective group, without regard to whether an individual has committed any specific and punishable transgression'. See, Irving Louis Horowitz, \textit{Taking Lives: Genocide and State Power}, New Brunswick, New York Transaction Books, 1980, pp. 1-2. Helen Fein, for her part, has offered the following definition of genocide: 'Genocide is a series of purposeful actions by (a) perpetrator(s) to destroy a collectivity through mass or selective murders of group members and suppressing the biological and social reproduction of the collectivity'. Helen Fein, \textit{Genocide Watch}, New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1992, p. 3. Chalk and Jonassohn, on the other hand, have proposed the following definition: 'Genocide is a form of one-sided mass killing in which a state or other authority intends to destroy a group, as that group and membership to it are defined by the perpetrator'. Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn, \textit{The History and Sociology of Genocide: Analyses and Case Studies}, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990, p. 23. Despite these contributions, which have the merit of pinpointing at least two important features of genocide, namely that genocide is 'state-sanctioned' and 'a form of one-sided mass killing' the most widely accepted definition of genocide, nonetheless, remains that of the UN Genocide Convention.}

genocide aside from any other crime. As observed by the representative of Brazil during the travaux préparatoires of the Genocide Convention

'genocide [is] characterised by the factor of particular intent to destroy a group. In the absence of that factor, whatever the degree of atrocity of an act and however similar it might be to the acts described in the convention, that act could still not be called genocide.'

While addressing the theoretical interpretation of genocide both the United Nations' International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (hereinafter referred to as 'ICTR') and the United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) have held that the crime of genocide does not necessarily imply the actual extermination of the targeted group in its entirety. Nor, according to the International Law Commission, does it require the complete annihilation of a group from every corner of the globe. Both Tribunals maintained that the geographical zone in which an attempt to eliminate a group is made may be limited in size (i.e., it can be a region or even a municipality). This, however, raises the question beyond what threshold could the crime be qualified as genocide?

The phrase 'in whole or in part' was understood by both Tribunals to mean the destruction of a significant portion of the group from either a quantitative or a

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44 Quoted with approval by the ICTR in *Prosecutor v. Clément Kayishema and Obed Ruzindana*, ibid.

qualitative standpoint. Subsequently, genocidal intent may be manifested in two ways: it may consist of desiring the extermination of a large majority of the targeted group, in which case it would constitute an intention to destroy the group en masse; or it may consist of the destruction of a more limited number of persons, such as the leadership of the group, chosen by the perpetrators for the impact that their disappearance would have upon the survival of the group as such. 45

The definition of genocide, nevertheless, remains ambiguous for two reasons. The first has to do with the difficulty of determining the intent of the perpetrators and secondly, the targeted ‘group’ is not quantified. Indeed, the genocide definition does not indicate what constitutes a ‘group’; in other words, what size should the targeted ‘group’ have for the crime to classify as genocide? Can it be the population of a district, a city, a town or even a village? In many ways, the confusion on the meaning of ‘ethnic cleansing’ is a corollary of the vagueness of the meaning of ‘genocide’. Of course, it is only large scale ethnic cleansing that strikes a chord with genocide. To some extent, whether one decides to qualify ethnic cleansing as genocide depends on whether one chooses to atomise the ‘group’ to the level of the town or the village, in which case it may be easier to prove the intent of the perpetrators.

Indeed, while it might be difficult to prove that the Serbs had the intent to commit genocide against the whole community of Bosnian Muslims or Kosovar Albanians, it might be less difficult to do so should one focus discretely at particular villages or towns like Prijedor in Bosnia, for instance, where by June 1993 over 43,000 of nearly

45 Prosecutor v. Goran Jelisić, paragraph 82, at note 40 above. The cited paragraph at pp. 686-687.
50,000 Muslims had been expelled or been killed.\(^{46}\) In terms of speed, of course, the most relevant example is that of Srebrenica where between 13 and 19 July 1995 as many as 7,000-8,000 men of military age were systematically massacred while the remainder of the Bosnian Muslim population present in the town, some 25,000 people, were expelled.\(^{47}\) The Trial Chamber in the Krstić case stated that it was ‘convinced beyond any reasonable doubt that a crime of genocide was committed in Srebrenica’.\(^{48}\)

However, the Trial Chamber also acknowledged that the central objective of the 1992-95 conflict between the Bosnian Muslims, Serbs and Croats was ethnic cleansing, by which it understood the use of military means to terrorise the civilian population with the aim of forcing their flight.\(^{49}\) In addition, the Trial Chamber suggested that apart from the high numbers of people that were executed, methodologically speaking, Srebrenica was no different from some other parts of Bosnia Herzegovina.\(^{50}\) The Krstić judgement indicates also that the strategic location of the enclave, situated between two Serb territories, may explain why the Bosnian Serb forces did not limit themselves to expelling the Bosnian Muslim population.\(^{51}\) The judgement states that:

The Bosnian Serbs’ war objective was clearly spelt out, notably in a decision issued on 12 May 1992 by Momčilo Krajišnik, the President of the National Assembly of the Bosnian Serb People. The decision indicates that one of the strategic objectives of the Serbian people of Bosnia Herzegovina was to reunite all Serbian people in a single State, in particular by erasing the border along the Drina which separated Serbia from Eastern Bosnia, whose population was mostly Serbian.\(^{52}\)

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\(^{49}\) Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstić, Part III, paragraph 562, at note 47.

\(^{50}\) Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstić, Part II, Findings of Fact, paragraph 94, at note 47 above.

\(^{51}\) Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstić, Part III, paragraph 597, at note 47.

\(^{52}\) Ibid., paragraph 562.
This was confirmed also in *Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstić* Appeals Judgement wherein it was inferred that:

… Srebrenica (and the surrounding central Podrinje region) were of immense strategic importance to the Bosnian Serb leadership. Without Srebrenica, the ethnically Serb state of Republica Srpska they sought to create would remain divided into two disconnected parts, and its access to Serbia proper would be disrupted. … Control over the Srebrenica region was consequently essential to the goal of some Bosnian Serb leaders of forming a viable political entity in Bosnia …

Both Krstić judgements indicate that the Trial Chamber has opted for the atomisation of the ‘group’ showing once more that the UN definition qualifies a situation as genocide or not depending upon one’s interpretation of the word ‘group’. Nevertheless, should one decide to atomise the ‘group’ to the level of the town or village, one might run the risk of opting for countless genocides, which would look too pale when compared to the Holocaust, and the Armenian and the Tutsi genocides. In addition, should one atomise the ‘group’ in this way, one will be faced with a number of violent conflicts which in their totality do not qualify as genocide and yet contain in themselves one or more cases of genocide, the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s being a recent case in point. In my opinion this is not useful in analytical and conceptual terms and it might be better, therefore, when considering whether a situation qualifies as genocide or not, to look at the whole picture of the conflict and avoid atomising the (targeted) ‘group’ to the level

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53 *Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstić*. Appeals Judgement of 19 April 2004. Case No. IT-98-33-A. Paragraph 15. [http://www.un.org/ictv/krstic/Appellatejudgement/index.htm](http://www.un.org/ictv/krstic/Appellatejudgement/index.htm). The first Krstić judgement concluded that genocide had taken place in Srebrenica and sentenced general Krstić to 46 years in prison. Both the defence and prosecution appealed. The defence argued that the interpretation of the UN genocide definition had been misleading and that what happened in Srebrenica did not amount to genocide. In the defence’s view Krstić sentence was far too harsh and it ought to have been reduced to 20 years imprisonment. The prosecution, on the other hand, suggested that general Krstić, being responsible for genocide in Srebrenica, should have been sentenced to life imprisonment. The Appeals Chamber reiterated that genocide had taken place in Srebrenica but curiously reduced Krstić sentence to 35 years imprisonment. This, however, may be seen as a contradiction in terms since having gone at lengths to make the case for the most heinous crime in Srebrenica the Appeals Chamber gave the defendant a reduction in the term of imprisonment. On the other hand, irrespective of whether one considers this case as genocide or not the severity of Srebrenica massacre is so high as to warrant life imprisonment for the general who oversaw its execution.
of a town or a village. This will allow for a conceptual consistency and also for an acknowledgement of a hierarchy of crimes in which genocide stands at the top.

II.3.2 Comparing ethnic cleansing with genocide

At a first glance, the genocide definition may suggest that ethnic cleansing and genocide are coterminous. This can be attributed to the similarities of the *actus reus* ingredient of both phenomena. Indeed, the genocidal acts enumerated in the genocide definition can be present in ethnic cleansing campaigns although not in the same measure. By the same token, the discriminatory character of both genocide and ethnic cleansing is conspicuous. In point of fact, both genocide and ethnic cleansing reject the egalitarian proposition that all humans are equal and therefore should be so treated. As opposed to this, their mission is to eliminate part of the population based on discriminatory grounds defined by the membership of individuals in a particular ethno/national group. Consequently, both genocide and ethnic cleansing have served as political strategies which seek to eliminate ethnic differences within a given state and reinforce the hegemony of the perpetrators and their community. In this sense, both genocide and ethnic cleansing are forms of 'politicide', in so far as they involve politically motivated killing.\(^{54}\)

Although by no means modern occurrences, both genocide and ethnic cleansing have assumed modernist traits: they are almost always sanctioned by the perpetrators' state. In turn, both genocide and ethnic cleansing have served as instruments of nation-state

\(^{54}\) The term 'politicide' is introduced by Barbara Harff to differentiate between socially and racially motivated killing, on the one hand, and politically motivated killing, on the other. Barbara Harff, 'Recognising Genocides and Politicides', in Helen Fein ed., *Genocide Watch*, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1992, pp. 27-8. This distinction is rarely clear cut, however. As this thesis shows, ethnic cleansing is very much a political enterprise, accompanying on occasions the process of nation-state building. Similarly, no case of genocide can be detached form a given political context.
creation or nation-state consolidation.\textsuperscript{55} Hitler – as he himself affirmed in his work \textit{Mein Kampf} – had aspired for a ‘pure’ German state that was to ‘embrace all Germans’\textsuperscript{56}

Similarly, Milošević aspired for a state of the Serbian nation and Tudjman aspired for a state of the Croatian nation.\textsuperscript{57} (By pointing out this similarity, however, I am in no way drawing a sign of equality between these three figures). In employing ethnic cleansing and genocide to pursue the ideal of the homogenous ‘nation-state’, these governments followed a path beset with both danger and immorality. At the same time, they sought an ideal that could not be fully achieved. Hence, the success of genocide and ethnic cleansing has rarely been absolute. Indeed, despite the drastic efforts made to get rid of the targeted ethnic minorities, such minorities continue to exist in Serbia and Croatia, just like racial purification of Germany in the aftermath of the Holocaust had failed to be reached.

Andrew Bell-Fialkoff has pointed out that both ethnic cleansing and genocide are forms of what he calls ‘population cleansing’, where ‘cleansing’ is a euphemism that camouflages the ugly truth i.e., the human suffering of the targeted groups.\textsuperscript{58} Genocide may include ethnic cleansing when extermination of a people requires their physical

\textsuperscript{55} It should be pointed out, nevertheless, that although, by design, the beneficiary of the Holocaust, for instance, was meant to be the German nation, Hitler did not undertake his grand endeavour in the name of the German nation but instead in the name of the Aryan race. He had come to realise that the concept of nation ‘could have only transient validity’. In his own words, his aim was ‘to get rid of this false conception and set in its place the conception of race...’ Indeed, his new order was to be conceived in terms of race and nations were to be fused into this higher order. See, Alain Finkielkraut, \textit{In the Name of Humanity: Reflections on the Twentieth Century}, translated by Judith Friedlander, New York: Columbia University Press, 2000, p. 51. Ethnic cleansing in the Balkans, on the other hand, has not been motivated by grand fantasies of racial purification. Indeed, with so much intermingling and so many mixed marriages in the region the notion of ‘racial purification’ sounds but a contradiction in terms. Instead, the campaigns of ethnic cleansing were carried out in the name of this or that nation, and for the benefit of this or that nation-state.


\textsuperscript{57} This was explicitly expressed in the Serbian and Croatian constitutions. See extracts from respective constitutions in Robert M. Hayden, ‘Imagined communities and real victims: self-determination and ethnic cleansing in Yugoslavia’, \textit{American Ethnologists}, Vol. 23, No. 4, 1996, p. 791.

displacement (e.g., Holocaust) but ethnic cleansing does not necessarily equate with genocide. While both these phenomena are concerned with getting rid of a targeted population, genocide constitutes an extreme case while ethnic cleansing a milder one, in so far as ethnic cleansing is more concerned with the removal of people i.e., dispossession, while genocide is concerned with their physical extermination. That said, ethnic cleansing does not necessarily require the killing of people, although this does not imply that killing is not bound to happen especially in case where the targeted people strongly resist such removal. Ethnic cleansing that followed in the aftermath of the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913, for instance, did not encounter large scale killing. This was particularly the case of the so-called population transfers that were conducted between Bulgaria and Turkey, Bulgaria and Greece, and Greece and Turkey.59 Similarly, the case of ethnic cleansing of the Turkish minority in Bulgaria in 1989 is another case in point. More than 300,000 ethnic Turks were expelled from the country that consequently fled to Turkey, but large-scale killing was not involved.60

Nevertheless, in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s one might argue that ethnic cleansing acquired a genocidal element given that the killing, torture, rape, etc., spread such fear and insecurity as to compel the community of victims to take flight. Yet, despite this, the death tolls that resulted from this case do not compare with those that have resulted from the three genuine cases of genocide of the twentieth century, namely that of the Armenians by the Young Turks in 1915, that of Jews by the Nazis in 1939-1945, and that of the Tutsis by the Hutu in Rwanda in 1994.61 Killing can be viewed as

59 See discussion in Chapter III, pp. 81-90.
60 Refer to Chapter III, pp. 104-109.
61 Using the UN definition of genocide and placing it within the context of the larger category of crimes against humanity, Alain Destexhe has suggested that in the course of the twentieth century only the three above mentioned cases qualify as genuine examples of genocide. Alain Destexhe, Rwanda and Genocide in the Twentieth Century, Translated by Alison Marschner with Foreward by William Shawcross, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995.
a differentiating factor of the two phenomena: in genocide killing is an end in itself, while in ethnic cleansing killing is rather a means to an end. Subsequently, from a moral standpoint, the scale of extermination can be viewed as a measure of difference between ethnic cleansing and genocide.²²

By extension, the targeted groups of ethnic cleansing, particularly in the case of the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s, have not proven to be completely defenceless. While it is impossible to argue for equivalency of action between the perpetrators and the victims, it is nevertheless the case that, in self-defence but not exclusively so, the targeted groups have also retaliated in kind. Indeed, a number of multiple conflicts took place following the disintegration of the federation of the former Yugoslavia. Serbs fought against Croats, Bosnian Muslims and Kosovar Albanians and the latter three groups were able to engage in both defensive and offensive war against Serb forces. Moreover, in Bosnia armed confrontations between Bosnian Muslims and Croats emerged in 1993. In all these cases war crimes and other human rights violations were not confined to one side, in stark contrast to the Holocaust, the Turkish genocide of

²² In the three cases of genocide referred to above, a large majority of the targeted groups were physically exterminated. It has been estimated that around six million Jews were killed by the Nazis, around one million Armenians were killed by the Young Turks and at least eight hundred thousands Tutsis were killed in Rwanda, the latter at a rate three times faster than that of the Jews during the Holocaust. In the former Yugoslavia, on the other hand, the scale of human destruction has been of smaller proportions with around 200,000 victims in Bosnia (of all nationalities) and 10,000 Albanians in Kosovo. As pointed out in the ICTR hearings in the Kayishema and Ruzindana judgement, the scale of extermination measured with the number of dead victims from the targeted group can be an important factor to prove the intent of the perpetrators of the crime. The Prosecutor v. Clement Kayishema and Obed Ruzindana, paragraph 93, at note 42. That said, the scale of killing may serve as an indicator of the intent of the perpetrators to remove a targeted group from a given territory as opposed to the intent to destroy such group, or vice-versa.

Armenians and also the Rwandan genocide, which were one-sided mass killings sanctioned by their respective states with the aim of physically destroying the targeted group(s).

Although genocide acquires a territorial component in the sense that in its aftermath the perpetrators are likely to have greater control over the territory and its resources, the bone of contention in genocide is the (targeted) people who usually do not exercise sovereign claims over the territory. By contrast, in the case of ethnic cleansing, what is perceived to be primarily at stake is territory, particularly when attempts are being made to redefine frontiers, when contending parties dispute their respective rights over given territories. In the case of the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s any one of the conflicting groups was a party in the territorial dispute(s). The threat of territory changing sovereigns tied in to the population that inhabited the contested territory. So long as a substantive number of people from an ethno/national community lived in the disputed areas, such group would have, perceptively, some legitimate basis for its territorial claims. Hence, from the point of view of the perpetrators of ethnic cleansing an efficient way to undermine the legitimacy of competing territorial claims was the removal of as many members of the rivalling group(s) as possible. Indeed, given that in the case under consideration the aggressors were Serbs and that Serbs in contested territories were not a majority, strategic dictate had it that they resort to ethnic cleansing rather than genocide. Hence, their tactics were to engage in the type of violence that would cause the targeted people to leave.\footnote{54}

\footnotetext{54 For an endorsement of this view see Genocide in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Hearing before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 104th Congress, Testimony of Professor M. Cherif Bassiouni, April 4, 1995, at note 46 above.}
Some analysts, nonetheless, have claimed that naming events in the former Yugoslavia as ethnic cleansing rather than genocide has to do with the reluctance to comply with the obligations put forward in the Genocide Convention.\textsuperscript{64} Despite the fact that the initial unwillingness of the West to address the situation cannot be denied, one need not relate this only to whether the situation qualified as genocide. Although the Western reaction to the conflict was gradual, given the long term commitment of international troops in Bosnia and the extent of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation members’ involvement in Kosovo in 1999, it is imprudent to say that the West was not prepared to back up its responsibilities in the region. On the other hand, the nature of genocide in Rwanda was not contested and yet the intervention there was so slow to come.

In sum, although \textit{prima facie}, ethnic cleansing and genocide might appear synonymous, mainly due to the \textit{actus reus} ingredient of both phenomena, similarities between them should not blind one to their differences. In particular, three differences between ethnic cleansing and genocide demand attention: whereas genocide is primarily concerned with the extermination of the targeted people, ethnic cleansing is concerned with the removal i.e., dispossession of the targeted groups from contested territories; although more often than not killing accompanies ethnic cleansing, the scale of victimisation during its campaigns tends to be much smaller than in the case of genocide; and, while 20\textsuperscript{th} century genocides have involved one-sided mass killings, in ethnic cleansing of the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s the targeted groups have retaliated in kind, although not in the same measure.

\textsuperscript{64} See, for instance, Cigar, \textit{Genocide in Bosnia}, pp. 115-116, 118.
Most importantly, what sets genocide apart from ethnic cleansing and indeed from any other crime, is the special intent (*dolus specialis*) to destroy targeted people in whole or in part. Although ethnic cleansing is a deliberate activity, the intent of its architects and perpetrators is bound up with the removal of the targeted people rather than their extermination. Consequently, to use genocide and ethnic cleansing interchangeably does not render justice to either term: genocide would be devalued and cheapened while the nature of ethnic cleansing would be obscured rather than explained. Hence the need to bring the language in line with facts and develop an accurate concept that captures the essence of ethnic cleansing adequately.

II.4 Ethnic cleansing and ethnocide

Apart from ‘genocide’, another term that connotes certain similarities with ‘ethnic cleansing’ is that of ‘ethnocide’, a relatively new notion used to describe an old phenomenon associated with acculturation of a people. Although social science literature has been using ‘ethnocide’ fairly extensively for more than thirty years, the term does not as yet have a legal definition. The word apparently emerged first in 1970 in the work of the French anthropologist Robert Jaulin. Generally speaking, the term refers to the intentional destruction of the culture (or crucial cultural elements) of a community of people without necessarily destroying the people that belong or adhere to that particular culture. The following seeks to show that ethnic cleansing in general,

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67 ‘Ethnocide’ or ‘cultural genocide’ as it is sometimes referred to is an ambiguous notion not least because ‘culture’ itself has proved a difficult term to define. Indeed, A. L. Kroeber and Clyde Kluckhohn found close to 300 different definitions of the term ‘culture’ in the early 1950s. A. L. Kroeber and Clyde Kluckhohn, *Culture: A Critical Review of Concepts and Definitions*, Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Museum, 1952.
and in the region of the former Yugoslavia in particular, has a strong ethnical dimension. What is there in ethnic cleansing that links it to ethnocide?

As pointed out, the bone of contention in ethnic cleansing campaigns has been territory, and in particular rural territory. Consequently, the primary targets of ethnic cleansing have been rural communities, which are generally land-based given their inclination to identify themselves primarily with their particular homeland. Generally speaking, for any nation or ethnic community, the territory to which the collectivity is attached does not constitute merely a geographical feature: it is also a component of the ethno-national identity. Indeed, for any land-based community, territory has a unique value as the community’s culture and way of life is linked closely to it. Land is not only an economic factor of reproduction, a principle source of livelihood but it is also the basis of cultural and social identity of the community. As Stavenhagen puts it, for indigenous people ‘land is habitat, territory, the basis for social organisation, cultural identification, and political viability; frequently associated with myth, symbols, and religion. Land is the essential element in the cultural reproduction of the group’.\(^6^8\) The attachment people have to their homeland as a source of material, spiritual and cultural life, and the protective attitudes humans exhibit towards their places find expression in the term ‘territoriality’. In addition to the attachment and protection, territoriality implies also control of the landscape including its resources and the people who inhabit it.\(^6^9\)

classifying a situation as ethnocide, the question of how to identify and qualify that intent has raised considerable controversy. For ethnocide see, Marc A. Sills, *Ethnocide and Interaction Between States and Indigenous Nations: A Conceptual Investigation of Three Cases in Mexico*, Ph.D. Thesis, University of Denver, 1992.


\(^6^9\) Robert Sack conceived territoriality as ‘the attempt by an individual or group to affect, influence, or control people, phenomena, and relationships, by delimiting and asserting control over a geographic
In particular, land-based people have a fundamental relationship with their territory: the main qualitative factors of such relationship lying both in the cultural, spiritual, and traditional value that a particular land has for the community. As Al-Khasawneh and Hatano point out:

For the majority of indigenous peoples, survival of their cultural and national identity, preservation of their unique way of life and spiritual heritage, political autonomy and economic self-sufficiency depend on the possibility of living on their traditional lands and controlling the use and exploration of their natural resources. Loss of land threatens their very [cultural] existence... From its very inception, the 1990s conflict in the former Yugoslavia has been about re-allocation of territory and its resources while forcefully expelling the targeted indigenous groups from their homeland. For the targeted communities, therefore, it is precisely the possibility of living on their traditional land and subsequently the use and exploration of its natural resources that is ruled out by the perpetrators of ethnic cleansing. The traditional bond between the indigenous people and their homeland as a source of not only material life, but also a source of cultural and spiritual one is broken up, threatening the cultural existence of the community. Therefore, it is the land factor that, primarily, ties together ethnic cleansing and ethnocide.

Other elements in common between ethnic cleansing and ethnocide include the attacks on monuments of major cultural importance or sites of cultural heritage such as, territory'. For the meaning and definition of territoriality see Robert Sack, Human Territoriality: Its Theory and History, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986, p. 19. The Relation of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: The human rights dimensions of population transfer, including the implantation of settlers. Preliminary report prepared by Mr. A.S. Al-Khasawneh and Mr. R. Hatano on 6 July 1993. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/17, paragraph 207. Although, as pointed out, culture is not an easy term to define, most anthropology in our days starts with the assumption that ‘culture’ is an integral notion which includes not only explicit elements such as language, religion, art, etc., but also implicit elements such as territory, natural resources, political, economic and administrative organisation, etc. Sills, Ethnocide, p. 44.
mosques, churches, libraries, schools, etc. Such destruction represented not only an attack on the culture of the targeted communities but also an intimidation campaign to compel a permanent flight of the targeted ethnic groups. By extension, the attacks on the native languages of the targeted ethnic groups, sometimes reaching the extent of denying their use in public services constitutes another characteristic element of ethnocide. In addition, mass rape, this sinister component of ethnic cleansing campaigns, had also an ethnoidal dimension, given the reproductive capacity of women and their role in cultural transmission due to their key position in the family structure.

This is not, however, to say that ethnic cleansing and ethnocide are synonymous. Although ethnocide can serve as a means of ethnic cleansing, ethnic cleansing goes further than ethnocide as the latter does not necessarily require that targeted people be

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72 Bosnia's national library, for instance, was shelled and burned in August 1992 by Serb forces. 90 per cent of the Library’s 1.5 million volumes, including over 150,000 rare books and manuscripts, 100 years of Bosnian newspapers and periodicals and the collection of the University of Sarajevo went up in smoke. This constituted the largest single act of book burning in recorded history. See the testimony of Andras Riedmayer before the Commission on Security and Co-operation in Europe, 104th U.S. Congress, 4th April 1995, http://www.csce.gov/pdf/040495.pdf. Similarly, two-thirds of Kosovo's 180 libraries have been destroyed between 1990-1999 including over 900,000 books. Jolyon Naegele, 'Kosovo's Libraries Cleansed of Albanian Books', wysiwyg://main.l/http://www.bosni...at.cfm?articleid=702&reportid=146. In addition, almost all mosques in Banja Luka were reportedly blown up in 1993. UN Doc. E/CN.4/1994/47, Fifth periodic report on the situation of human rights in the territory of the former Yugoslavia submitted by Mr. Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, pursuant to paragraph 32 of Commission resolution 1993/7 of 23 February 1993, November 1993, paragraph 98. At the same time 21 per cent of Roman Catholic constructions have been partially destroyed and a further 25 per cent damaged in Banja Luka again. UN Doc. E/CN.4/1994/110, paragraph 13, at footnote 12 above. By January 1993 all mosques (about 50) in Prijedor had been destroyed. UN Doc. E/CN.4/1993/50, Report on the situation of human rights in the territory of the former Yugoslavia submitted by Mr. Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, pursuant to Commission resolution 1992/S-1/1 of 14 August 1992, February 1993, paragraph 26. While on November 9, 1993, the historical Ottoman bridge in Mostar (listed with UNESCO as a monument of major cultural importance) was destroyed by military action. UN Doc. E/CN.4/1994/47, paragraph 69. In addition, a State Department report of December 1999 estimated that more than 40 churches and monasteries have been destroyed or damaged in Kosovo since NATO forces arrived in the province in June of the same year. http://www.nytimes.com/library/world/europe/121099kosoovo-deaths.html.

73 This was the case in Kosovo from 1989 when the autonomous status of the province was abolished till 1999 when Serb forces retreated from the province following the NATO bombing.

74 For mass rape as a weapon of ethnic cleansing see below pp. 63-4.
removed from their homeland. In other words, ethnocide may not necessarily be accompanied by ethnic cleansing. Indeed, when in the era of colonisation, the Europeans set out to convert indigenous Latin Americans and Africans to Christianity, the removal of the natives from their homelands was not contemplated. In our days, many underdeveloped countries, while struggling for development, are said to be threatened by ethnocide as new technologies and practices generally filtered from abroad gradually set root in their territories. Yet, their peoples, ethnic minorities included, are not necessarily either removed from their homelands, or threatened with such removal.

II.5 The practice of ethnic cleansing

The coercive uprooting of a people from their homeland cannot be conducted in a humane manner since it is bound to involve a high degree of intimidation and/or violence. But its tempo can differ from one instance to another. It can involve a dramatic expulsion carried out en masse during a short period of time as is the case of the Kosovar Albanians during the winter of 1998-9, but it may be also a gradual, low-intensity process, carried out incrementally and stretched over a longer period of time. The expulsion of Greeks from Turkey, for instance, that started early in the 1910s ended only in the 1950s.

As a practice, ethnic cleansing can consist of a range of different measures with a view to creating an atmosphere of growing fear and insecurity that leads to the flight of the targeted ethnic population. As well as forcing a people into exile there may be a more

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75 Although the practice of ethnic cleansing in the Balkans has not changed substantially in the course of the twentieth century, it is only ethnic cleansing in the 1990s that has been systematically documented. For this reason, it is the acts of this case of ethnic cleansing that will be primarily referred to below.

76 Norman M. Naimark, 'Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth Century Europe', p. 29.
gradual process involving measures such as harassment, intimidation and discrimination; the denial of the means of employment, education, health care, public services, and public administration; the prohibition of ethnic association combined with discriminatory and repressive legislation, etc.\textsuperscript{77}

However, in the Balkan region, ethnic cleansing has been connected, more often than not, with times of war. Indeed, in the course of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century, all the major cases of ethnic cleansing have been associated with armed conflicts such as the Balkan Wars of 1912-13, the two World Wars as they affected the region and the regional wars of the 1990s.\textsuperscript{78} While in principle ethnic cleansing can be a consequence of war, in the case of the former Yugoslavia of the 1990s most analysts agree that war was initiated and carried out as a \textit{means} of ethnic cleansing, with the primary objective of the fighting being the establishment of ethnically homogenous regions. In this case, rather than being a by-product of war, ethnic cleansing constituted war's most significant purpose.\textsuperscript{79}

In the course of war severe and violent measures have been employed during the conduct of ethnic cleansing including: outright expulsion of targeted ethnic communities from their places of residence (sometimes at gun point); shooting at their

\textsuperscript{77} Jackson Preece, 'Ethnic Cleansing as an Instrument of Nation-State Creation', p. 822. Such indirect and milder measures have been employed deliberately in Kosovo, for instance, from 1989 when the autonomous status of the province was stripped off by Milošević till 1999 when Serb forces were forced out of the province in the aftermath of NATO's intervention. Similar measures were adopted by Tudjman's regime towards the Serb community in Krajina following the independence of Croatia in 1992.

\textsuperscript{78} For an historical overview of ethnic cleansing in the Balkan region during the 20\textsuperscript{th} century see Chapter III.

homes and properties or blowing them up with explosives; looting and burning of the schools, medical facilities, churches, mosques etc., to ensure that the targeted people do not return; arbitrary mass arrests and detention of civilians to provide a pool of prisoners for exchange, forced labour purposes, and/or use of detainees as human shields; taking of hostages; forceful transfers of ethnic groups; deliberate torturing and other forms of cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment; summary execution; etc.

The siege, including the shelling of and sniper attacks on population centres and the cutting off supplies of food and other essential goods, as well as the blocking of humanitarian aid was another tactic frequently used to force the targeted ethnic groups to flee. In particular, major cities, such as Sarajevo, Mostar and Vukovar, were shelled on a regular basis in a deliberate attempt to spread terror among the civilian population. Another method of attacking civilians with a view to compelling their
flight were threats or actual implementation of environmental disaster. Examples include the mining of the hydroelectric power station at Bijelo Polje in Mostar and the systematic shelling by Serb forces of the chemical plants in Tuzla in winter 1993/4.\textsuperscript{84}

More prominently, landmines (mostly anti-personnel ones) were widely used affecting particularly locations of strategic significance such as border areas, roads, mountain trails, cities, towns, villages, water-ways, industrial plants, etc., situated in the contested territories. In some areas remining was practised and mines were also used as booby traps as a means of strengthening control over territory or hampering supply efforts. In the course of ethnic cleansing all sides employed landmines both for defensive and offensive purposes. Subsequently, landmines have continued to pose a serious risk to human life, impeding farming, transport and commerce, etc.\textsuperscript{85}

Amongst the most heinous features of ethnic cleansing campaigns, particularly in Bosnia and Kosovo, were offences against women. Sexual abuse and in particular mass rape of women, including minors, were widely used as a weapon in the systematic campaigns of ethnic cleansing.\textsuperscript{86} While rape has often been associated with armed conflicts, in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s the systematic character and the scale


\textsuperscript{85} Following the rupture with the Soviet Union in 1948 and, preoccupied with thoughts of a Soviet invasion, Tito encouraged the growth of military industries, including the production of landmines with its main production centres located in Bosnia and Croatia which are believed to have continued mine production during the 1990s conflict. Many of the landmines produced and deployed in the region are amongst the world's most difficult to detect, non-metal types, making demining a very complicated and costly process. According to the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), whose mandate includes collection of information on minefields and coordination of mine clearance, an estimated four to six million landmines may have been deployed by Serb, Croat and Muslim forces throughout Bosnia and the contested areas of Croatia. For the use of landmines in Croatia and Bosnia see Shawn Roberts and Jody Williams, \textit{After the Guns Fall Silent: The Enduring Legacy of Landmines}, Washington, D.C.: Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation, 1995, pp. 181-205.

of mass rape indicates that soldiers were licensed to rape, in order to humiliate, shame, degrade and terrorise the whole ethnic group spreading thus a climate of fear, panic and insecurity that would force the entire group to flee. Because crimes of gender violence frequently remain under-reported due to the cultural stigma and shame attached to the victims, it is impossible to detail the precise number of such offences. Some tentative estimates have been made, however, which indicate the large scale of this problem in the region.

In general, two aspects of violence employed against civilians has attracted attention, namely the instrumental and expressive dimension – ethnic cleansing being seen by some as the most grisly form of symbolic violence. Whereas the instrumental aspect of violence is technical and involves expediency and the relation between means and goals, the expressive aspect of violence is symbolic and communicative; it involves meaning, what do these practices ‘say’, what do they express? The practice of ethnic cleansing was clearly expressive, communicative. Acts of violence employed in its course: killing of men, rape of women, burning of houses, and destruction of cultural...
monuments presented a warning to the rest of the ethnic community; by inspiring fear and setting an example they delivered the message to the targeted groups 'leave'. Identifying the expressive aspect of ethnic cleansing and arguing that violence can be understood in terms of symbolic action does not imply, however, that ethnic cleansing is 'symbolic' violence. Rather the emphasis here is that the effective use of physical force in the course of ethnic cleansing campaigns depended on its symbolic form; it was a function of the way in which it was carried out; it relied on the message. Pointing out the expressive dimension of such violence should not translate, nevertheless, as negligence towards its instrumental component. As Christopher Coker asserts these two aspects of violence 'are closely related; they form a continuum'. In other words, while discerning the expressive aspect of violence employed in the course of ethnic cleansing one should not lose sight of its instrumental dimension, i.e., violence as a means to an end, as part of a strategy in service of a political project that sought to acquire and control ethnically homogenous territories. The expressive aspect of violence should not be seen as an independent, autonomous element but rather as a complementary one that reinforced its instrumental dimension.

II.6 Concluding remarks

This chapter has shed light on the analysis of ethnic cleansing with reference to its definition, terminology, and practice. Despite the fact that ethnic cleansing has often been used interchangeably with genocide, a comparative analysis of the two terms suggests that ethnic cleansing is not necessarily a euphemism for genocide. From a conceptual point of view, it is useful to acknowledge a hierarchy of crimes, where

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91 Refer to Block, *Honour and Violence*, p. 108.
genocide would constitute the most heinous of all crimes, while ethnic cleansing would consist of milder ones. This suggestion is premised on the assumption that while genocide is concerned with the extermination of a targeted people, ethnic cleansing is concerned with their removal. Ethnic cleansing, however, is accompanied by ethnocide given that the removal of people from their homeland threatens directly their cultural identity, although the reverse is not always the case.

The coercive uprooting of people from their homeland cannot be a humane experience. Indeed, a wide range of violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms, and even war, have been employed as a means of ethnic cleansing. The two aspects of violence – instrumental and expressive – employed in the course of ethnic cleansing were interdependent and complementary serving both the aim of the expulsion of the targeted communities as a means of acquiring and consolidating ethnically homogenous territories.

Having defined the phenomenon which is the subject of investigation of this thesis, I now turn to explaining it. The next chapter considers under what circumstances did large-scale ethnic cleansing take place in the twentieth century Balkan region.
III. The legacy of ethnic cleansing in the Balkan region during the twentieth century

"The very existence of a range of common problems within a distinct (if sometimes disputed) geographical region binds the Balkan states together and allows for the acceptance of 'the Balkans' in conceptual terms."¹

"Stable security can only be achieved by people and groups if they do not deprive others of it..."²

III.1 Introduction

The range of common problems that have befallen the Balkan states simultaneously at various stages in the past century include economic deprivation, internal strife, war, foreign interference and domination, (humanitarian) intervention, post-conflict reconstruction and reconciliation. One of the saddest problems, however, has been that of ethnic cleansing, which though not associated exclusively with the Balkans,³ has scarcely in any other region – especially in the twentieth century – occurred with such a sickening frequency.

This chapter considers ethnic cleansing as a shared regional problem in the Balkan peninsula in the course of the past century. It shows that ethnic cleansing in this region has been primarily a top-down phenomenon associated with official policies designed to construct homogenous polities over contested territories inhabited by multi ethno-national communities. As such, ethnic cleansing was an organic part of the process of nation-state building.

³ Refer to Chapter I, pp. 14-20.
The term ‘state building’ is used here to refer to those governmental policies aimed at the accumulation, consolidation and centralisation of state power. In principle, state building encompasses the objectives of reaching societal cohesion and political stability within the territory of a given state. Historical experience shows that when a state comprises a multi-ethnic population, societal cohesion has been sought in one of the following three ways: by balancing ethnic demands with state interests; by assimilating ethnic minorities into the dominant nation; or by excluding ethnic minorities from the state. Of these three policies, the first is the most feasible, although the most challenging. The second, albeit inclusive, becomes problematic especially when assimilation is unwanted by the targeted group(s) and may consequently lead to various degrees of conflict, whereas the third has produced a catalogue of tragedy. Indeed, ethnic cleansing – like genocide – is a profoundly problematic way of seeking societal cohesion since it involves coercion and the negation of rights of the targeted people. This is not to deny the importance of societal cohesion as a contributing condition to a state’s political stability but it is to question the feasibility of ethnic cleansing as a means towards such an end.

Historically, war has been ‘a great state-building activity’, providing ‘the chief occasions on which states expanded, consolidated, and created new forms of political organisation’. Not only does war indirectly create conditions for the mass movement of people but it can be employed by a government directly as a means of ethnic cleansing

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4 The meaning of power is elaborated in Chapter V, pp. 175-177.
as in the 1990s former Yugoslavia. Moreover, state building has been intrinsically linked to state security, especially during the early stages of state formation when boundaries are drawn and state makers seek to impose order and secure exclusive control of people. The legitimating ideology for the exclusion of the assorted minorities has been primarily that of ethnic nationalism, i.e., the idea that the state should be exclusively of and for a particular nation – a *raison d'être* working to the detriment of ethno-national minorities.⁸

Each section of this chapter considers a major case of ethnic cleansing in the Balkan region by analysing the motives of the actors who espoused such a policy, their legitimating reasons and also the international responses, while taking into account the commonalities and differences between them. Although ethnic cleansing can be a gradual, low-intensity process, carried out incrementally over a long period of time, the following analysis concentrates mainly on large-scale cases of ethnic cleansing, that is, cases in which the number of uprooted people is measured upwards by tens of thousands. Such cases, in the region, have been most of the time associated with the phenomenon of war; ethnic cleansing taking place either during war or in its aftermath. Such was the case with ethnic cleansing that accompanied the Balkan Wars of 1912-3, forced population ‘transfers’ in the aftermath of the First World War, and ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia in the course of the Second World War and in the course of the regional wars of the 1990s. An exception to this rule was the case of the Turkish minority in Bulgaria in 1989 when, in peacetime, nearly three hundred thousands ethnic Turks were expelled to Turkey. The following proceeds to consider these cases in turn.

⁸ For the facilitating role of nationalism see Chapter IV, pp. 162-172.
III.2 The Balkan Wars and the Great War

The ethnic cleansing that accompanied the Balkan Wars and the Great War was part of the process of nation-state establishment in the region. The emergence of the Balkan states was a gradual process that stretched from early 19th century till early 1910s, facilitated by the decline of the Ottoman Empire which had ruled the region for nearly 500 years claiming its 'legitimacy on the basis of dynastic loyalty, not ethnicity'. By rejecting the Ottoman rule, nationalist leaders of the nascent states rejected also any form of state organisation enshrined in the Ottoman model and embarked on searching for a new concept upon which to base their state's political organisation. Balkan leaders departed from the concept of a state in which many nationalities with differing languages, cultures, and religions occupied the same geographic space and embraced the idea that one people with one language and religion should have virtually exclusive possession of a given territory. This logic implied that the state ought to be congruent with the nation; a state's territory encompassing all one's nationals.

The sympathy for national homogenisation, however, neglected the intertwined multicultural Balkan setting, which was, obviously, menacing to the new enterprise. In view of the mixed demography of the region, obtaining an exact fit between the

9 Greece was the first Balkan state to gain independence from Turkey in 1830, the Greek war of independence being supported directly by Britain, France and Russia. The Congress of Berlin (1878) granted full independence to Serbia, Romania and Montenegro, and affirmed the sovereignty of Bulgaria although reducing the size of her territory previously decided by the San-Stefano Treaty (1877). Under the terms of the Congress of Berlin Bosnia-Herzegovina, Albania and Macedonia remained officially under Ottoman suzerainty.


12 The criteria for identifying a nation were not clear-cut, however. Language and religion were the main determinants but, often, boundaries were blurred since it was common for people of the same religion to speak various languages, or for people who spoke the same language to have different religions. This suggests that one's belief on one's identification and the role of political action had an important impact on national consolidation.
physical borders of a state and the cultural identity of its inhabitants was a formidable task. Given the aspirations of the national elites to achieve their own nation-state which was to encompass all the nation, it comes as no surprise that most of the newly born Balkan states were essentially irredentist in character. They were committed to the recovery of their ‘unredeemed’ national territories, that is, lands inhabited (in part) by their own people but not actually incorporated within the national boundaries of the state. Given the mixture of the peoples in the region many territories became the subject of redemption by more than one state, setting thus the stage for multiple confrontations. Ethnic cleansing which followed was a consequence of such irredentist thinking which assumed that if peoples of other ethnic origins were to be removed their claims on territory would be forfeited and the risk of future confrontation(s) would be diminished. In addition, this assumption was an underlying theme of much of the warfare that affected the region during the past century.

The first Balkan war was fought by Bulgaria, Greece, Montenegro and Serbia (in coalition) against the Ottoman Empire, in the name of national liberation from Ottoman rule and was supported tacitly by the Great Powers, which loathed the Ottoman

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13 The term ‘irredentism’ derives from the Italian word ‘irredenta’, meaning those territories, Trente, Dalmatia, Trieste, Fiume, which although culturally Italian remained under Austrian or Swiss rule and thus unredeemed after the Italian unification (1861). In modern political usage the term refers to territorial claims, usually supported by historical arguments — made by one state to lands within another. Unlike secession, whose success depends to a large extent upon group sentiment and loyalty, irredentist claims are fostered from above and are usually utilised by governments as a mobilisation instrument, especially at times when support is particularly desired. See James Mayall, *Nationalism and International Society*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990, pp. 57, 59, 61, 63.

14 A classic example is Macedonia whose territory was contested between Greece, Serbia and Bulgaria. From the 1870s onwards Bulgarian, Serb and Greek Orthodox churches vied with each other to persuade the Slav Macedonians that they were Bulgarians, Serbs or Greeks respectively. In 1906 due to Greko-Bulgarian antagonism in Macedonia an anti-Greek movement in the Bulgarian Black Sea and the Maritza valley area sprung up, as a result of which some 35,000 Greeks were forced to seek refuge in Greece. Stephen P. Ladas, *The Exchange of Minorities: Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey*, New York: Macmillan, 1932, p. 121. Stevan K. Pavlowitch, *A History of the Balkans 1804-1945*, London and New York: Longman, 1999, p. 183.

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presence in Europe. The Balkan armies won a quick victory. Outnumbered by two to one, still at war with Italy and Libya, denied the use of sea lanes by the Greek fleet, and hampered by Sultan Abdulhamid II’s lack of military preparedness, the Ottoman Empire was easily defeated by its former vassals. Excesses in this war, nevertheless, were multifarious and no distinct efforts were made to differentiate between Ottoman military forces and the Muslim population who lived in the region. Not only were the Ottoman forces defeated but roughly 100,000 Turks were forced to flee from the region before the armies of the Balkan countries during less than four weeks of the war. The unity of the Balkan allies, nonetheless, laid in the choice of a common opponent. Once that opponent was defeated the irredentist agendas and territorial pretensions of the Balkan states were bound to clash. Although most peoples in the Balkans perceived themselves better off without the Ottoman domination, the ensuing territorial rivalries did not render the region a more stable and peaceful place.

The affirmation by the Great Powers, in 1912-3, of the Albanian state frustrated the hopes of Serbia, Greece and Bulgaria that all Albanian inhabited territories could be divided between them. Although the support of Austro-Hungary and Italy ensured the recognition of the new state, the Great Powers were not in accord regarding Albania’s frontiers. Austro-Hungary and Italy – supporting the Albanian request – argued that

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15 Hostilities were opened on 8 October 1912 by Montenegro but by 18 October all other Balkan countries had declared war against the Ottoman Empire. An armistice was signed on 3 December 1912 and peace negotiations commenced in London on 13 December. The state of war continued to exist between Turkey and Greece, however, because the former would not cede the fortress of Janina (Joannina). Montenegro, whilst officially at peace after 3 December, continued bombardments at Scutary (Shkodra) in the north of Albania. See Ernst Christian Helmreich, The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars 1912-1913, New York: Russell & Russell, 1969, chapters VII and X.
17 Ladas, The Exchange of Minorities, p. 15.
borders of the new state should include all Albanian inhabited territories while Russia and France – who supported Serb and Greek claims – resisted the stance of Austro-Hungary and Italy. The end result was a compromise: while establishing an Albanian state, the Great Powers at the same time amputated Albanian inhabited territories: Kosovo was assigned to Serbia to compensate her for lost access into the Adriatic sea whilst Chameria (Epirus) was assigned to Greece in compensation for her territorial claims to southern Albania. Consequently, more than half of the Albanian people remained outside the Albanian state against their wishes. While in the long-term such a settlement subjugated a substantial part of the Albanian population to foreign rule and strained relations between Albania and her neighbours, in the short run it enticed Bulgaria to seek compensations in Macedonia, in the hope that she could achieve a swift military victory.

The contest over the Macedonian territory was the rationale behind the second Balkan War (29 June – 30 July 1913), initiated by Bulgaria on Serbia. The aspirations of Bulgaria were thwarted swiftly, however, as Serbia and Greece fought in coalition and emerged as victors, dividing Macedonia between them. So brutal were the Balkan

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19 Ibid., Chapter X. Helmreich, *The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars*, Chapters XIII and XV.
20 The drawing of Albanian frontiers was based on the presumption that preserving peace in Europe should take precedence over considerations of ethnic composition of territories. As the British Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey stated to the House of Commons on 12 August 1913, the basic objective of the agreement on Albanian borders was to satisfy the Great Powers, but many criticisms could be raised by anyone who really knew Albania and viewed the issue from the country’s viewpoint. In his words, ‘... in the course of the efforts to find a solution, the main goal has been to preserve intact the agreement among the Great Powers and if the decision on Albania has attained this, then it has performed the most important duty to the benefit of peace in Europe’. Cited in Miranda Vickers, *Between Serb and Albanian: A History of Kosovo*, London: Hurst, 1998, p. 84.
23 The territory of Macedonia was divided as follows: Greece annexed Aegean Macedonia (51 percent of the Macedonian territory), Serbia got Vardar Macedonia (39 percent) while Pirin Macedonia (10 percent) went to Bulgaria. The national composition of Macedonia was complex. In principle nationality was
Wars that the members of the International Commission of Enquiry set up by the Carnegie Endowment asserted in their report that 'there is no clause in international law applicable to land war and to the treatment of the wounded, which was not violated, to a greater or a less extent, by all the belligerents'. Bulgarian action in Macedonia is recorded to have been particularly harsh towards the Greeks, Muslims and Serbs. Reportedly, the Serb and Greek troops committed even greater excesses in turn. Although the Serbian army entered northern Macedonia and the Greek army southern Macedonia amid cries of jubilation from the population, this initial enthusiasm for the liberators soon gave way to doubts, then to disenchantment and finally to despair. The Carnegie Endowment Commission noted that the majority of the population in Macedonia was Bulgarian at the time and was so called by the Greeks. Serb authorities, on the other hand, introduced the category of 'Slav Macedonians' in order to conceal the existence of Bulgarians in Macedonia. Initially the leaders of the community and clerics of the Bulgarian church were expelled to Bulgaria, and then the population was directly approached and urged to proclaim themselves as Serbs or Greeks. The Serb authorities treated the population of Vardar Macedonia as 'rebels in a perpetual state of determined by religion. A Macedonian listed in Turkish registers as a member of the Greek Church was considered a Greek, a Macedonian listed on the Exarchate's (Bulgarian national church) roll was considered a Bulgarian while a Macedonian registered as a member of the Serbian Church was considered a Serb. But this delineation was neither firm nor final. Frequently, Macedonians peasants would declare themselves first as followers of the Greek Patriarchate, and then of the Exarchate or of the Serb Church depending on the circumstances and the promises made to them if they changed affiliation. As Dzambazovski points out, political pressure was exerted on Macedonians to declare themselves as Greeks, Serbs, or Bulgarians. Besides the church, were the schools in which the Greek, Serbian and Bulgarian languages were used not only to educate, but also to indoctrinate people. See ibid., p. 216.


25 In Poutnik, for instance, the Serb forces during one night attack of June 29/30 are said to have suffered 3,200 casualties, most of them being killed after surrender. Ibid., p. 140. See also, Z. Duckett Ferriman, Greeks, Bulgars and English Opinion, London: Bonner and Co., 1913, pp. 33-4.

26 The Other Balkan Wars, p. 50.

27 Ibid., p. 158. The term 'Slav Macedonians' is used in this thesis to refer to the people of Macedonia who are of Slav descent as opposed to Albanian descent, Greek descent, Turkish descent, etc.

28 Ibid., pp. 53, 165.
revolt'. 'The ordinance did not have in view isolated criminals. To punish the culprit? That was not enough while his family remained; his family must be deported and the friends who were unwilling to 'denounce' the culprit, his 'associates' who seized the opportunity of 'setting him at liberty' when he was 'under surveillance, guard or escort' by officials or public employees – they must be deported too'. In Aegean Macedonia this scenario was repeated down to the smallest detail. The only difference, the Carnegie Commission observed, was that the techniques of ethnic cleansing – including looting, rape of women and burning of villages – were here pursued even more systematically and with less human sentiment.

A Serb policy of oppression was put in place towards Kosovar Albanians as well. In Prizren, Gjakova, Dibra and Ohri, Albanians organised insurrections, all of which were eventually defeated by the Serbs. Consequently, some 25,000 Albanians took flight whereas many of those who remained suffered at the hands of the Serb soldiers. The Serbo-Montenegrin soldiery are known to have used excessive force 'with a view to the entire transformation of the ethnic character of regions inhabited exclusively by Albanians'. Leon Trotsky, who reported the Balkan Wars in the Western press, was shocked by the gamut of atrocities perpetrated in the course of these wars against people of Muslim faith, clashing with Balkan national censorships but also with the Russian press for their conspiracy of silence about the atrocities committed by the Slavs in the Balkans.

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29 Ibid., p. 162.
30 Ibid., p. 186.
31 Ibid., pp. 151, 181.
By January 1914, the Bulgarian government estimated that about 132,000 refugees had fled to Bulgaria whereas about 100,000 Greeks had left Bulgaria for Greece. Only about 2,400 refugees from Vardar and Aegean Macedonia were repatriated. The Serb and Greek governments, on the other hand, disputed the number of the Slav minority in Greece — the Serbian sources putting their number at 260,000, while the Greek authorities reducing it to 120,000. This ‘battle of numbers’ in the region was to continue until recently as is evidenced in the case of Albanians in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Traditionally, ethnic communities perceived their numbers to be proportionate to their power and often exaggerated them to back their territorial claims or group rights. Governments, on the other hand, saw the threat posed by minorities as proportionate to their size: the larger their numbers, the greater the threat. Hence, the official attempts to undermine the cohesion of particularly large minorities in one way or another.

In the wake of the Balkan wars, Greece and Serbia, in particular, emerged with significant gains in terms both of territory and population. In the case of Greece, the new territories were a 70 per cent addition to the kingdom, whose population increased from 2.8 million to 4.8 million. According to Greek sources, Greeks made up 43 per cent of the acquired population (with 39 per cent Muslim, mostly Turks, 10 per cent Slavs and 8 per cent Jewish). By the same token, Serbia roughly doubled its territory.

33 The Other Balkan Wars, p. 154.
34 Ibid., p. 195.
35 Throughout the 1990s the government in Skopje insisted that Albanian minority made up less than 20 percent of the country’s population whereas representatives of the Albanian community claimed that their share in total population run up to 30 percent. The last census result — publicised on 1st December 2003, a year after the eventual conduct of the census — cut an average figure of 25 percent. http://www.balkan-info.com/html2/english/031202-W.MI-002.htm.
and increased her population from 2.9 million to 4.4 million.\textsuperscript{37} Likewise, the smaller Montenegrin state roughly doubled its territory although not all her irredentist aspirations were fulfilled.\textsuperscript{38} But this aggrandisement in people and territory brought about more ethnic heterogeneity, an unwelcomed feature that state administrations took measures to reduce. In Serbia, for instance, Kosovo and Vardar Macedonia were renamed as ‘Old Serbia’ and ‘Southern Serbia’ respectively.\textsuperscript{39} Moreover, Kosovo Albanians were placed under a regime of military occupation: about 20 thousand of them being killed by the end of 1913, while Muslim families were forced to convert in large numbers, those who refused being tortured or shot.\textsuperscript{40} On the other hand, in Macedonia a consistent policy of assimilation was put in place and military authorities sanctioned the dismissal of school teachers, priests, and local officials who were not willing to declare themselves Serbs.\textsuperscript{41} The Muslim minority that Montenegro acquired due to its inland expansion, mainly in the Sandžak region, was also subjected to harsh repression; about 13,000 Muslims were forced to leave for Bosnia while a comparable number of them were converted to Orthodoxy under duress.\textsuperscript{42}

The idea of the nation-state as an ideal form of political organisation was embraced not only by the new Balkan states but also by the Young Turks following the Ottoman

\textsuperscript{37} John R. Lampe, \textit{Yugoslavia as History – Twice there was a country}, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 94.
\textsuperscript{38} In fact, over one-quarter of the Montenegrin army died during the unsuccessful attempt to seize Scutary (Shkodra) in northern Albania. In the process, Serb and Montenegro fighters burned whole Albanian villages including their inhabitants. Their brutality has been vividly portrayed in the eyewitness accounts of M. Edith Durham, a British war correspondent and nurse, who administered care to Montenegrin soldiers. M. Edith Durham, \textit{The Struggle for Scutary}, London: Edward Arnold, 1914.
\textsuperscript{40} Two thousand Muslim families were estimated to have been forcefully converted in May 1913 in the Kosovo region of Peja (Peć) alone. This policy was pursued in order to strengthen the diplomatic case of the Serb government for the right to incorporate Albanian inhabited lands in Serbia. Noel Malcolm, \textit{Kosovo: A Short History}, New Updated Edition, London: Papermac, 1998, pp. 254-5.
\textsuperscript{41} Lampe, \textit{Yugoslavia as History}, p. 94.
\textsuperscript{42} Ibid., p. 95.
defeat in the first Balkan war. In 1914 they sought to rid themselves of national minorities and construct a homogeneous Turkish state shifting control of the economy to Turkish hands and establishing a Turkish clientele that would provide support for their policies. In the framework of this plan, attempts were made to persuade the Turkish minorities in the Balkan countries to emigrate to Turkey. It is estimated that in 1914 about 115,000 Muslims left Greece, and 135,000 the other Balkan states, for Turkey. On the other hand, in the same year some 265,000 Greeks were driven out of Turkey while 85,000 of them were deported to the interior of Asia Minor.

For the remaining Turkish population in the region, the Young Turks sought a population ‘exchange’, the first provision of which was made in a Protocol annexed to the peace treaty between Bulgaria and Turkey signed at Constantinople in September 1913. It provided for the ‘authorised reciprocal exchange’ of the Bulgarian and Turkish populations within fifteen kilometres of the entire common border between the two countries. Nonetheless, given the scale of the uprooted people, the legal provision of the ‘exchange’ appeared to confirm the reality and compel the remaining inhabitants of Bulgarian and Muslim villages in Turkey and Bulgaria respectively to transfer their residence to the other side of the frontier. Until October 1914, when Turkey entered the First World War, some 48,570 Turks from Bulgaria were ‘exchanged’ with 46,764 Bulgarians from Turkish Thrace.

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46 Ibid, p. 20. But the Turkish exodus continued thereafter. It has been estimated that between 1923 and 1939 around 200,000 Turks left Bulgaria and sought refuge in Turkey coerced by legislation enacting property taxation. Ali Eminov, *Turkish and Other Muslim Minorities in Bulgaria*, London: Hurst, 1997, p. 79. With the Turks leaving the country in large portions and the influx of the Bulgarian refugees...
The Turkish officials intended to extend the practice of population 'exchange' with Greece and in May 1914, the Turkish Minister at Athens had suggested to the Greek Prime Minister Eleftherios Venizelos the exchange of the Greek rural population of the region of Smyrna (Izmir) against the Turks of Greek Macedonia. Subsequently, the Greek Prime Minister had given his consent and a preliminary agreement was reached in the same month, but the First World War interrupted these plans – if only temporarily.

In Balkan terms, the Great War was a continuation of the Second Balkan War. Taking advantage of the World War, Bulgaria who supported the Axis powers, sought to revise the situation with the view of gaining the Macedonian territories she had lost in the Second Balkan War. Indeed, she succeeded in occupying most of Vardar Macedonia and eastern Aegean Macedonia, an act which, as Hugh Poulton points out, appeared to have been popular with the majority of Slav Macedonians since most of them identified themselves as Bulgarians at that time. The Bulgarian army, however, subjected the local population to harsh repression: pillage, massacre of civilians and rape of women were wide spread. The population of eastern Macedonia was reduced by 30,000 people who died due to famine produced deliberately by the Bulgarians, while about 42,000 inhabitants of the area were deported to Bulgaria.

moving in from neighbouring countries, the degree of national homogeneity in Bulgaria was increased; the population rose from 4.3 million in 1910 to 6.3 million in 1934, 86.7 per cent of the latter being Bulgarian speakers. Pavlovitch, A History of the Balkans, p. 286. Roudometof, Nationalism, Globalisation, and Orthodoxy, p. 190.

Cases of ethnic cleansing in the context of the First World War have been recorded also in Bosnia and Kosovo. Following the outbreak of the Great War, Croatia and Bosnia, on the one hand, and Serbia, on the other, found themselves on opposing sides of the war; Bosnia and Croatia fighting on the side of Austro-Hungary while Serbia fighting on the sides of Allies. But this schism was not necessarily as clear cut amongst their people. Indeed, enrolled in the Austro-Hungarian army were not only Croats and Muslims but also Serbs. Similarly, although the majority of volunteers from Bosnia in Serbian and Montenegrin armies were Bosnian Serbs, some Muslims did serve as volunteers in the Serbian army as well and there were also Croats who owed their sympathies to Belgrade. This notwithstanding, the majority of people of Bosnia remained loyal to the Austro-Hungarian state as they did not wish to see their country dominated by Serbia in some form of post-war arrangement. Following the outbreak of the Great War, a Croat Serb division in the Austrian army (headed by the military governor of Bosnia) was deployed to fight in Serbia where they encountered the resistance of many Serbs from Bosnia. This latter fact seems to have prompted authorities in Bosnia to take harsh action against Bosnian Serbs, although the intention of some Croat officials in Sarajevo to incorporate Bosnia into Croatia – an idea opposed by the Bosnian Serbs – may have played a role as well. Serbs from eastern Bosnia were resettled in the west of the country ‘for fear of fifth-column activities’, while thousands of others were held in internment camps in Bosnia or Hungary or otherwise forced to flee into Serbia or Montenegro.

51 Malcolm, *Bosnia*, pp. 157-163. Lampe, *Yugoslavia as History*, pp. 106-7. Figures however differ. Malcolm mentions that up to 5,500 Serbs were kept in internment camps while roughly 5,000 Serb families were driven into Serbia or Montenegro, while Lampe claims that by mid-1917 the number of Serbs deported or confined in concentration camps approached one hundred thousand.
Kosovo, on the other hand, was occupied in the north by Austro-Hungary and in the south by Bulgaria. While life for Albanians in the north improved as Austrians were generally sympathetic to them, the conditions of life under Bulgarian rule in the south were significantly worse. The Bulgarian policy of assimilation towards the Serbs and Slav Macedonians – mirroring the policy of Serbianisation in Kosovo and Macedonia carried out by the Serbs between 1913 and 1915 – was particularly brutal. Nonetheless, when in fall of 1918 the occupying forces in Kosovo suffered defeat and Serbian troops returned to the province, they took their revenge against the Albanians causing heavy casualties particularly in the Western part of Kosovo, where many towns and villages were razed to the ground.

III.3 Post World War I population ‘transfers’

The aftermath of the First World War saw the resumption of the idea of population ‘transfers’ initiated in the wake of the Balkan Wars. Its underlying premise was the official believe that minorities were *ipso facto* alien elements, ‘anomalies within the nation-state’, a factor ‘which weakened and divided it’. At the Paris Peace Conference the representatives of the Great Powers thought that one of the ways of achieving a more durable peace in areas where the population was ethnically intermingled would be to disentangle them by reciprocal migration. Article 56, paragraph 2, of the Treaty of Peace between Allied and Associated Powers and Bulgaria, signed at Neuilly-sur-Seine on 27 November 1919, provided that ‘Bulgaria undertakes to recognise such provisions as the Principal Allied and Associated Powers may consider opportune with respect to

the reciprocal and voluntary emigration of persons belonging to racial minorities'. A special Convention concerning Reciprocal Emigration was signed on the same day by the Greek and Bulgarian plenipotentiaries and subsequently ratified on 9 August, 1920. The Greek government of the Prime Minister Eleftherios Venizelos viewed the Bulgarian minority in Greece – numbering about 139,000 persons in 1919 – as a threat to permanent peace between Greece and Bulgaria so long as this minority remained in that part of Greece which Bulgaria considered as an ‘unredeemed’ portion of her territory. The above mentioned convention was signed with a view to removing such a threat. Even though the agreement was intended to make it easier for ethnic minorities to join their national state, initially this agreement did not have a significant impact; until June of 1923 only 197 families from Greece and 166 from Bulgaria had applied for emigration.

In the aftermath of World War I, Greece did not consider her territorial aspirations to be satiated. Inspired by the *Megali Idea* – the Great Idea of a Greece on two continents and five seas (Europe and Asia; Ionian, Aegean, Mediterranean, Marmara and Black Sea) – and apparently encouraged by Great Britain, France and United States of America – the government of Venizelos declared war on Turkey on 15 May 1919. As Arnold

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56 Ibid. Ladas, *The Exchange of Minorities*, pp. 13, 38, 43. De Zayas suggests that the Greko-Bulgaro ‘exchange’ of population between 1923-1928 was ‘relatively humane’ and based on a ‘voluntary basis’, but he has not considered the internal developments in Greece and the impact of the Greko-Turkish war. See below, pp. 85-88.
58 The Greek offensive aimed at grabbing territory from Turkey and was intended to thwart Italian attempts to annex the fertile coast of Anatolia since Italian colonial aspirations in Africa were by and large frustrated. For the political and economic rationale behind Greek expansionism in Anatolia and the reaction of Western powers on this issue see Arnold J. Toynbee, *The Western Question in Greece and Turkey: A Study in the Contact of Civilisations*, London: Constable and Company Ltd., 1922, chapter III; and Misha Glenny, *The Balkans 1804-1999: Nationalism, War and the Great Powers*, London: Granta Books, 1999, pp. 378-382.
Toynbee has pointed out, in any war with Turkey, Greece could not feel herself the aggressor. In invading Ottoman territory she was simply recovering what she regarded as her own; she claimed to be waging a war of liberation, a morally defensive war, although she took the offensive.\(^5^9\) However, despite its initial success, the Greek offensive did not endure. In August 1922, the Turks launched a counter-offensive, which drove out the Greek army and with it thousands of Greek civilians.\(^6^0\) Upon their retreat, the Greek army – and many of the local Greeks who had been armed by it at the beginning of the war – applied a ‘scorched earth’ policy burning Turkish villages and destroying all that was in their way.\(^6^1\) An armistice was brokered at Lausanne in November 1922 and a peace treaty was signed on 30 January 1923, under whose terms the Greek and the Turkish governments agreed on the compulsory exchange of Turkish and Greek minorities.\(^6^2\) Only the Greeks of Istanbul were exempted from the provisions of the Lausanne Treaty, apparently under some pressure from Western countries that sought to protect their commercial interests in the city. The same exemption applied to the Turks of Greek Thrace. As a result, about 100,000 Turks were left in Greece and the same number of Greeks were left in Turkey.\(^6^3\)

\(^{59}\) Toynbee, *The Western Question*, p. 137.  
\(^{60}\) Not unlike the case of the Serbs in Krajina (Croatia) and Kosovo in the 1990s, the Greek minority in Turkey was compromised by the presence of the Greek army. Greeks in Turkey had welcomed and supported the Greek army wholeheartedly and their protectors were not convinced that if their kinsmen remained in Turkey they would be spared from reprisals. The departure of the Greek minority therefore had both a voluntary and coercive nature. See ibid., pp. 241-2.  
\(^{62}\) At the meeting of 1\(^{st}\) December 1922 of the Territorial and Military Commission of the Conference of Lausanne, it was declared that the four Great Powers (France, Great Britain, Italy and Japan) endorsed the proposal of exchange of populations, believing ‘that to unmix the populations of the Near East will tend to secure the true pacification of the Near East and because they believe an exchange of populations is the quickest and most efficacious way of dealing with the grave economic results which must result from the great movement of populations which has already occurred’. Cited in Ladas, *The Exchange of Minorities*, p. 338.  
The ‘exchange’ of Greek and Turkish populations affected more than two million people. Some 1.3 million adherents of the Orthodox faith were expelled from Turkey to Greece, while nearly 800,000 Muslims travelled in the opposite direction. The criterion of the exchange was agreed to be religion: Turkish-speaking Orthodox Christians, who had more things in common with the Turkish than the Greek way of life, had to abandon Asia Minor whereas Greek-speaking Muslims had to leave Greece and move to Turkey where most of them felt strangers. These refugees were attached to their country of birth by many ties and resented the idea of being forbidden to return there. Moreover, the exchange did not have any orderly character; on the contrary, it was brutal and occasioned a great deal of human misery.

Reflecting upon the rationale of the Lausanne Convention one analyst has opined that this convention was a result of Turkey’s declaration that it would refuse to repatriate over a million Greeks exiled from Turkey between 1912 and 1922, so as to prevent the Greek community in Turkey from becoming a weapon in the hands of foreign governments and from being utilised for subversive purposes. Thus the convention simply acknowledged an accomplished fact, although its terms also allowed Greece to rid herself of her Turkish minority. However, as Arnold Toynbee suggests, Greece proved as incapable as Turkey in governing well a mixed population containing an alien majority and a minority of her own, and like the Turkish government, it was influenced

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64 Glenny, *The Balkans*, p. 392. Out of this huge number about 150,000 Greeks in Turkey and 400,000 Turks in Greece left their country of origin after the Convention of Lausanne was signed in 1923. Ladas, *The Exchange of Minorities*, p. 17. Figures differ. Pentzopoulos maintains that in the aftermath of the Greko-Turkish war, 354,647 Muslims left Greece and 339,094 Greeks arrived in Greek Macedonia from Anatolia. Pentzopoulos, *The Balkan Exchange of Minorities*, pp. 69, 107. The fact that the vast majority of people were uprooted before the signing of the Convention suggests that the Treaty acknowledged a fait accompli.


by the idea of the nation-state and pursued national homogeneity with vigour and wanton rapidity without considering how to modify it according to their specific circumstances. The historical record shows that the logic of increasing state security by means of national homogenisation does not rest exclusively with Turkey. Greece adopted the same logic when it sought to ‘exchange’ its minority with Bulgaria, when it expelled Turks and Albanians to Turkey in the aftermath of the Greko-Turkish war, when it expelled Albanian Chams to Albania at the end of the Second World War and when it expelled Slav Macedonians in the course of the Greek civil war (1946-9) and its aftermath. The idea of attaining homogeneity by expelling minorities is in fact reflexive, a mirror image of an exclusivist logic adopted both by Turkey and Greece, a testimony of their incapability of finding ways of accommodating their minorities.

The Greek debacle in Asia Minor and the subsequent Lausanne Convention impacted directly on the Greek attitude towards the Bulgarian minority in Greece and Greek compliance with the Neuilly Convention of 1919. As already noted, although the terms of the latter convention provided for the voluntary exchange of population between Greece and Bulgaria in the first three years of its enforcement only about 250 families had applied to leave from both Bulgaria and Greece. Faced with the enormous task of sheltering a large influx of refugees following the defeat of the Greek army in Asia Minor, it became a matter of expediency for the Greek government that population transfers with Bulgaria (and Turkey) be accelerated using coercion if necessary.

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68 - For the case of Albanian Chams and Slav Macedonians refer to pp. 86-7 and p. 104 respectively.
69 - As the Greek Prime Minister admitted to Henry Morgenthau in November 1923, the Greek government considered of imperative importance, in particular, hastening the ‘exchange’ of population with Turkey given that Turkish landlords occupied many thousands of acres of the most fertile lands in Aegean Macedonia and Thrace and if these lands could be promptly vacated they would immediately provide farms and homes for Greek refugees. Henry Morgenthau, *An International Drama*, London: Jarrolds, 1930, p. 86.
Several thousand Bulgarians were expelled to Bulgaria or fled in order to avoid expulsion whilst their homes were taken over by Greek refugees. An exchange that had been designed as voluntary in theory became compulsory and coercive in practice. It was evident from the beginning that if carried out on a voluntary basis, the exchange would have been a failure given that comparatively few were prepared to avail themselves of the Convention voluntarily. Under duress, however, about 50,000 Bulgarians left Greece for Bulgaria whereas around 25,000 Greeks left Bulgaria and settled in Greece.  

By extension, the influx of Greek refugees from Turkey impacted hard on the Albanian community living in Greece. The Greek authorities, nonetheless, distinguished between Orthodox Albanians and Muslim Albanians residing in Greece. The former were officially considered as Greeks; they were allowed to stay but were subjected to assimilation policies. It is the latter who were subjected to ethnic cleansing; they were either included in the forced population ‘transfers’ with Turkey or expelled to Albania. This was particularly the case of the Albanians of Chameria, many of whom were

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70 Macartney, *National States*, p. 440. Figures differ. Pentzopoulos suggest that 30,000 Greeks left Bulgaria and 53,000 Bulgarian left Greece. Pentzopoulos, *The Balkan Exchange of Minorities*, p. 60. While Ladas mentions that 46,000 Greeks and 64,000 Bulgarians were ‘exchanged’. Ladas, *The Exchange of Minorities*, p. 721. The remaining Slavs in Greece (about 82,000 in 1928) opposed the implementation of the Neuilly Convention under the influence of the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation (VMRO) which struggled to maintain the Slav minority in Greece in order to sustain its claims over Greek Macedonia. Macartney, *National States*, pp. 439, 441. Elizabeth Barker, *Macedonia: Its Place in Balkan Power Politics*, London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1950, p. 30.


72 A large body of the Albanian community – about 200,000 – were Christian Orthodox who spoke both Greek and Albanian, many of them being educated in superior Christian schools provided dignitaries for the Greek society. Pavlowitch, *A History of the Balkans*, p. 171.

landlords and resented the land appropriation plans undertaken by the Greek government. Initially, they were included in the Greek-Turkish exchange of population, and terror and violence was purportedly used against them in order to compel them to leave either for Turkey or for Albania so as to make space for the Greek refugees. In May 1924 alone, 38 Albanian villages (about 30,000 people) were emptied, their inhabitants expelled to Turkey. The expulsion of the Albanians was carried out openly until December 1924 when the Turkish government refused to accept them under pressure from its Albanian counterpart. As a result, the ethnic composition of Greek Macedonia was completely changed. By 1928 Greeks accounted for 88.8 percent of the population in Aegean Macedonia, as compared to about 24 percent of their share just before the first Balkan war.

In sum, the Lausanne Treaty simply acknowledged an accomplished fact: it legalised a situation in which thousands of refugees were denied permission to return to their homeland against their wishes. The exchange of respective minorities between Greece and Turkey had a knock-on effect on the treatment of Bulgarian and Albanian communities in Greece. Faced with the arduous task of accommodating hundred of thousands of Greek refugees from Turkey, Athens responded with a policy of ethnic cleansing of her own, targeting her Albanian and Slav minorities. The most disturbing fact of this period is that ethnic cleansing was not only permitted as a practice but also considered legitimate as a policy given that international treaties were sanctioned to

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75 Naska, *Dokumë të Ballkanit*, p. 97, 101, 241, 397, 406-8, 434-6. The last wave of ethnic cleansing of the Albanians from Greece occurred in the immediate aftermath of World War II, when about 20,000 Albanian Chams were expelled to Albania allegedly for siding with the Axis forces during the war. Hugh Poulton, *Minorities in Southeast Europe: Inclusion and Exclusion*, London: Minority Rights Group, 1998, p. 9; Roudomentof, *Nationalism, Globalisation, and Orthodoxy*, p. 190.  
legalise it. Not only did the European powers fail to condemn ethnic cleansing but they even considered it a success. Although ethnic cleansing produced a greater degree of national homogeneity and arguably more security for Greece, Turkey and Bulgaria, it also set a dangerous precedent for the future offering a vicious model for those seeking territorial divisions along ethnic lines in the region and beyond.

Curiously, at that time, only a handful of politicians realised the dangerous precedent that was being set. As Alfred de Zayas points out, the compulsory ‘exchange’ of minorities between Greece and Turkey ‘...was not seen by the international community as the brutal uprooting of hundred of thousands of persons from their homelands; instead it was hailed by many as legal measure intended to bring peace on the basis of an international treaty and under the auspices of the League of Nations’.78

Hitler himself embraced with zeal the idea of population transfer and became one of its leading advocates and practitioners seeking to populate the occupied territories with German kin.79 Unfortunately, although denouncing Hitler’s policies, the Western powers embraced the same idea when they advocated expulsion of as many as 14

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77 The British Prime Minister Sir Winston Churchill himself was sympathetic to the Greko-Turkish experiment and advocated it as an example for ‘solving’ the German minority problem in Europe in the aftermath of World War II. On 15 December 1944, in his speech before the House of Commons he stated that: ‘... expulsion is the method, which so far as we have been able to see, will be the most satisfactory and lasting. There will be no mixture of populations to cause endless trouble. ... A clean sweep will be made. ... The disentanglement of populations which took place between Greece and Turkey ... was in many ways a success, and has produced friendly relations between Greece and Turkey ever since ...’. Combined quote from Inis L. Claude, Jr., National Minorities – An International Problem, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1955, p. 97 and Alfred M. de Zayas, Nemesis at Potsdam – The Expulsion of the Germans from the East, 3rd edition, Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 1988, p. 11.
79 In October 1939 Hitler announced to the Reichstag his plan for ‘a new order’ consisting on a resettlement of Germans so that better dividing lines could be obtained. The process commenced with the signature of the German-Estonian Protocol (15 October 1939) but was extended later – by means of agreement or occupation – to Latvia, Russia, Italy, Romania and Poland. German citizenship was offered to those who claimed German descent and who had no (known) hereditary disease. Half a million Germans from Eastern Europe had moved to Germany by March 1941. See Hedwig Wachenheim,
million Germans from central and eastern Europe at the end of World War II. But the idea of population transfer has been extended further afield. As noted in Introduction, a scheme for an Arab-Jewish ‘exchange’ of population was put forward in 1937 by the British Royal Commission on Palestine based on the ‘instructive precedent’ of the Greco-Turkish exchange. This idea has also set a precedent for displacement in India, Pakistan and Bangladesh amongst others. In the Balkans the model of forced population ‘transfer’ was advocated by Četnik and Ustaša movements during the Second World War, by Radovan Karadžić, Franjo Tudjman and their followers in the 1990s and even by some members of the Macedonian Academy of Science as well as the former prime minister of FRY of Macedonia Ljubco Georgievski who advocated in May 2001 and April 2003 respectively the exchange of minorities between Macedonia and Albania.

The practice of population ‘transfer’ is vast and painful but it becomes so much more disturbing given the influence it has exercised on some journalists and academics who advocate such practice as a technique of conflict resolution. Whatever benefits might result from forced population ‘transfers’, however, such practice must be weighed against both the tangible and intangible losses involved. Intangible effects may be significant given that the displacement of people involves psychological distress and has

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80 See De Zayas, *Nemesis at Potsdam*.
81 See Chapter I, p. 18.
82 Refer to Chapter I, p. 19.
serious human and social consequences, reducing the cultural inventory of the victims, weakening their community networks, undermining their traditions, social mores, ethics and value systems.\(^5\) As the Bishop of Chichester argued before the House of Lords in 1946, forced population ‘transfers’, ‘entail an appalling amount of misery and hardship’, and ‘represent neither a model of humanity nor a model of wisdom’.\(^6\) They involve a tragic human rights trade-off and significant, tangible and intangible, losses, which render the endorsement of such a practice profoundly problematic.

III.4 The First Yugoslavia and its aftermath

The creation of a South Slav (Yugoslav) state in 1918 was a matter of expediency. While the Serbs saw in such a state an opportunity to unite all their peoples in an expanded Serbia, Croats and Slovenes – unable to secure their independence – perceived a Yugoslav state as a source of diplomatic and military leverage against Austro-Hungary and Italy both of which laid claims to Croatian and Slovenian territories. Moreover, Serbs, Croats and Slovenes had an economic incentive to favour the idea of a unified state because it promised a large, integrated economy.\(^7\)

However, the ideal of creating a nation-state out of the South Slav mosaic, to be brought about along the lines of the Italian Conte Massimo d’Azeglio – ‘We have made Italy,


\(^{6}\) Cited in De Zayas, Nemesis at Potsdam, p. 12.

now we have to make the Italians\textsuperscript{88} proved to be a Herculean task, given the abundant mutual fear and misperceptions by various national groups in the country. The Serbian domination in state structures became a source of resentment for the other national constituencies, particularly for the Croats, who were the most frustrated nation in the Kingdom.\textsuperscript{89} Whereas the Serb elite viewed the existence of Yugoslavia as an expansion of Serbia into Habsburg lands, the Habsburg Slavs, especially the Croats, viewed the new state as a federation of independent units. As a result, throughout the inter-war period political conciliation was not forthcoming: Croat politicians sought decentralisation while the Serb government opted for centralisation, a contradiction that in turn became the primary reason for the gradual delegitimisation of the state.\textsuperscript{90} As ethnic relations worsened the state was gradually undermined by sabotage and violence. Not only was assimilation a recurrent theme of Serbian policy towards the rest of ethnic groups in the Kingdom, but it gradually degenerated to ethnic cleansing. Initially this was the case of Albanians in Kosovo but once the Second World War expanded to the region, hardline nationalist leaders pressed their irredentist claims and the struggle for territory produced more ethnic cleansing in the (puppet) Independent State of Croatia (Nezavisna Država Hrvatska, NDH). This section considers these two cases separately.

\textsuperscript{88} D'Azeglio's famous remarks were pronounced at the first sitting of the Italian parliament in 1861. Cited in E. J. Hobsbaum, \textit{Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality}, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990, p. 44.

\textsuperscript{89} In the first twenty-four Yugoslav governments (1918-1929), Serbs held the post of prime minister 97 per cent of the time; defence minister, 100 per cent of the time; interior minister, 92 per cent; foreign minister, 83 per cent; and justice minister, 87 per cent. By the eve of World War II, out of 165 generals in the Royal Yugoslav Army 161 were Serbs or Montenegrins. Philip J. Cohen, \textit{Serbia's Secret War}, pp. 8-9.

\textsuperscript{90} Roudometof, \textit{Nationalism, Globalisation, and Orthodoxy}, p. 195.
III.4.1 Ethnic cleansing in Kosovo

The Kosovo Albanians were the only ethnic group who were virtually unanimously against their inclusion in the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes and rejected the legitimacy of Serbian or Yugoslav rule over Kosovo. Indeed, they challenged Serb rule as early as 1918 through the activities of ‘the Committee for the National Defence of Kosovo’ (led by Hasan Prishtina) and the Kaçak Movement (led by Azem Bejtë (Galica) and his wife Shota). Although recognised as a language group, Albanians were not initially recognised as a national minority by Serb authorities. A 1929 statement drawn up by the Yugoslav delegation at the League of Nations in response to Albanian criticism stated: ‘Our response has always been that in our southern regions ... there are no national minorities. That position is still our last word on the question of recognition of minorities in Southern Serbia’. Denying Albanian national identity, Serb authorities regarded the Albanians of Kosovo as Albanian speaking Serbs, a thesis that was entrenched in the official ideology to justify first the Serbian conquest of the province and then its submission.

Responding to the Albanian resistance to Serb domination, Belgrade sanctioned the expulsion of hundreds of thousands of Albanians from Kosovo across the border into Albania proper. The Albanian-speaking population of the province fell from upwards

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93 Cited in Malcolm, Kosovo, p. 268. The ‘southern regions’ in addition to Kosovo included Macedonia, whose people’s identity was also suppressed. The Macedonians were not recognised as a distinct people either; instead they were regarded as an ‘unformed’ ethnic group that could be easily assimilated as Serbs. Lampe, Yugoslavia as History, p. 101. As was the case in Kosovo, Serb language was forcibly imposed on the population of Macedonia and names of people were changed to Serbian forms. Henri Pozzi, Black Hand over Europe, London: Francis Mott Company, 1935, pp. 180-81. But, unlike the case of Albanians in Kosovo, Serb policy towards Macedonians focused on assimilation rather than ethnic cleansing.
800,000 to 439,657 in time for the first pan-Yugoslav census (1921). In addition, given that 90 percent of the Albanian population in the first Yugoslavia lived in villages and that their main source of living was the land, the Serbian government embarked on a programme of colonisation that sought to expropriate the land from Albanian villagers with the view to forcing them to leave Kosovo. In turn Serb officials planned to settle Slav-speakers in Albanian areas and therefore change the ethnic composition of the province in favour of the Serbs. By 1928 about 12,000 families of Serb colonists totalling up to 70,000 people were settled in almost half of the arable land of Kosovo. From 1935 onwards, the intensification of land confiscation from the Albanians was based on the pretext that they had no documents proving their title to ownership. The whole population of 23 villages in upper Drenica were dispossessed in 1938 alone. The government allowed these villagers only 0.4 hectares per family member which, as acknowledged by a Serbian policy document, was ‘below the minimum needed for survival’. The document went on to elaborate: ‘But that is and has been our aim: to make their life impossible, and in that way to force them to emigrate’.

Although initially Serbia had refrained from compulsory population transfers like those practised earlier by Greece, Bulgaria and Turkey she did embrace this idea in earnest by 1926 when the Belgrade government asked Turkey to take 300,000–400,000

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96 Serb authorities had other goals in pursuing the policy of colonisation, namely: they aimed to stop the outflow of people from Serbia and Montenegro that were emigrating to North America by offering them grants of free land closer to home; they sought to punish Kaçaks by confiscating their property (and then allocate it to settlers); and they sought to attend to security concerns by concentrating new settlers in strategically important locations. Hajredin Hoxha, ‘Elemente të presionit ekonomik ndaj Shqiptarëve në Yugoslavinë e vjetër’, (Elements of the economic pressure towards the Albanians in the old Yugoslavia’), *Perparimi*, Pristina, Vol. XVI, No. 4, Prill 1970, pp. 324-326. Malcolm, *Kosovo*, pp. 278-284.
Albanians. From 1933 onwards there were serious talks between the Yugoslav and Turkish governments regarding the deportation to Turkey of large numbers of Kosovo Albanians, whom Yugoslav officials described as ‘Turks’. On 11 July 1938 an inter-governmental agreement was signed according to which 40,000 families — defined as ‘blood relations living under one roof’ — were to leave Kosovo for Turkey, while their land would become state property. The expectation was that the agreement would be implemented over a six-year period: 1939-1944. However, the death of Ataturk and the fall of the Stojadinović government that had concluded the agreement, the lack of financial means and particularly the outbreak of World War II hindered the completion of the planned expulsion of the Albanians.

In addition, the idea of removing the majority Albanian population from Kosovo was discussed frequently by the ‘Serbian Cultural Club’, an influential intellectual group in the political life of Belgrade, especially between 1937-9. One of the most influential members of the group and a former plotter of the assassination of Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo on 28 June 1914 — Vasa Ćubrilović — argued that Albanians could not be

100 The Yugoslav-Turkish Convention on Deportation of Albanians (1938) is published in ibid, pp. 43-56 in the French language.
101 Islami, ‘Kosova’s demographic ethnic reality’, p. 31. The idea of altering the ethnic composition of Kosovo by inducing Albanians to emigrate to Turkey was embraced again, however, in the aftermath of World War II by the Communist regime. Tito’s break with Stalin and Yugoslavia’s expulsion from the Cominform (June 1948) bode ill for the Kosovo Albanians since Albania’s communist alliance with the Soviets made them suspect due to their kinship ties with Albania. In order to weaken their national consciousness the Yugoslav authorities promoted a policy of ‘Turkification’, which not only encouraged Albanians to be educated in the Turkish language but also to emigrate to Turkey. Consequently, a new Yugoslav-Turkish agreement intended to effect Albanian emigration to Turkey was signed in 1953. Under the pretext of fighting Albanian nationalism, the secret police headed by Aleksander Ranković (Vice President of Yugoslavia from 1963-66) pursued a campaign of intimidation against the Albanians and as a result of the pressure to emigrate between 1953 and 1957 some 195,000 Albanians are reported to have left for Turkey. By 1966, the number of Albanians who left Yugoslavia exceeded 230,000, whilst simultaneously a new wave of Serb and Montenegrin colonisers were settled in the province. Anton Logoreci, ‘A Clash Between Two Nationalisms in Kosova’ in Arshi Pipa and Sami Repishti, eds., Studies on Kosova, Boulder: East European Monographs distributed by Columbia University Press, 1984, p. 188. Biberaj in Stevan K. Pavlowitch and Elez Biberaj, The Albanian Problem in Yugoslavia: Two Views,
repulsed by means of gradual colonisation alone and that the only efficient way to cope with the Albanians was their eviction *en masse*. His policy paper entitled ‘Iseljavanje Arnota’ (The Expulsion of the Albanians) – dated March 7, 1937 – argued that Hitler’s discriminatory policies against the Jews and Stalin’s re-location policies affecting millions of people in Russia implied that a plan sanctioned by the Belgrade government to render lives of Albanians so miserable that they would leave for Albania or Turkey would be tolerated by the international community and its success assured.

Prompted by scarcity of arable land in Montenegro which could not sustain a population that was increasing steadily (16 percent from 1912 to 1931), Ćubrilović argued for the settlement of Montenegrins in Kosovo:

The increase in the Montenegrin population has brought poverty, which has recently led to incessant social-political movements detrimental to the authority of our state and somewhat dangerous for future law and order. It is not in our interests to offer these people maize and pensions. The only solution is to move them to the fertile regions of Kosovo and Metohija because they are close to the Albanians in mentality and temperament.  

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102 Vasa Ćubrilović, ‘The Expulsion of Albanians’, *Kosova Historical/Political Review*, No. 3, Tirana: Eurorilindja, 1994, p. 41. Ćubrilović’s thesis resurfaced again in 1950s when he authored a report entitled ‘The Minority Problem in the New Yugoslavia’, which was addressed to the senior Yugoslav leadership including Tito, Milovan Đilas and Aleksander Ranković, where he re-activated his pre-war views on the necessity of expelling Albanians from post-war Yugoslavia because of the strategic importance of holding on to Kosovo. See Vasa Ćubrilović, ‘The Minority Problem in the New Yugoslavia’, *Kosova Historical/Political Review*, no. 1, Tirana: Eurorilindja, 1993. As Mark Almond asserts, for all his devotion to the Serbian cause, Ćubrilović was an extraordinary political chameleon. He survived the First and Second World War and entered Tito’s government, still advocating the expulsion of the Kosovar Albanians. Living to a ripe old age (dying in 1990) Ćubrilović was one of the spiritual fathers of the revival of Serbian nationalism after Tito’s death. A prominent member of the Serbian Academy, Ćubrilović’s influence was an essential prerequisite for the Academy’s Memorandum of 1986. Almond, *Europe’s Backyard War*, pp. 89, 194-5. See also below p. 110.

Čubrilović lamented the fact that Albanian inhabited territories impaired Serb expansion in the south and prevented the direct connection between Serbia and Montenegro, and Macedonia. In his geo-strategic thinking:

Until the connection of Serbia and Montenegro with Macedonia along the whole of its extent from the Drin River to Southern Morava is re-established, we will not be secure in our possession of this territory. From the ethnic standpoint the Macedonians will fully unite with us only when they enjoy true ethnic support from the Serbian motherland, which they have lacked to this day. This they will achieve only through the destruction of the Albanian block.¹⁰⁴

Čubrilović argued that the eviction of Albanians could be secured by a range of multiple means: generation of fear among Albanian masses; implementation of a policy of divide and rule by winning over men of influence; applying legal pressure in order to render the existence of Albanians in Kosovo as bitter as possible through the imposition of fines, arrests, ruthless collection of taxes, harassment of the clergy, ploughing graveyards, burning down Albanian villages and town quarters, etc. He suggested also that Četnik operations should be licensed in Kosovo and that Serb colonists should be given arms; massive clashes should be provoked with the Albanians and if necessary should be put down by blood engaging colonisers and Četniks.¹⁰⁵ In the event, as a result of the repressive policies embodied in the colonisation programme or through direct pressure put on the Kosovo Albanians, more than 100,000 of them left the province between 1918 and 1941.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰⁶ The figure estimated by Malcolm is between 90,000 and 150,000. Malcolm, Kosovo, p. 286. Vickers puts the figure between 200,000 and 300,000. Vickers, Between Serb and Albanian, p. 119. Biberaj mentions more than half a million. Biberaj in Pavlowitch and Biberaj, The Albanian Problem in Yugoslavia, p. 25.
This pattern of ethnic cleansing was reversed from April 1941 until the latter months of World War II when most of Kosovo had fallen under Italian rule and was eventually joined to Italian-occupied Albania. On April 1941, the northern tip of the province had been occupied by Germany while the eastern part of Kosovo together with Macedonia were annexed by Bulgaria which repeated the repressive policy for the region adopted during World War I. The Albanian leaders in the north of the province were preoccupied with the idea of removing Serb and Montenegrin colonists from the province and recovering the confiscated land that had been given to them, an idea which the Germans endorsed. During the first two or three months of occupation, up to 20,000 Serbs and Montenegrins were driven out of Kosovo while as many as 10,000 houses were burned. By April 1944, the chief German political officer in Belgrade, Hermann Neubacher, calculated that since 1941 around 40,000 Serbs and Montenegrins had been expelled from Kosovo. Many of these expelled Serb and Montenegrin colonists did not return to Kosovo at the end of the Second World War; about 4,000 colonist families moved in other parts of Yugoslavia; more than half of these were settled in Vojvodina in the homes of the Germans and Hungarians expelled by the post-war Communist regime.

It can be surmised from the above that ethnic cleansing in Kosovo was conditioned by concerns of a political (consolidating control in the province), economic (redistributing provincial resources to fellow Slavs), geo-strategic (securing direct links between Serbia and Montenegro, and Macedonia), security (furnishing the belief that only that ‘country

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which is inhabited by its own people can be sure of its security\textsuperscript{110}, and demographic 
tilting the ratio of the population in favour of the Serbs) nature. The changing sides of 
the perpetrators and victims during World War II, should be understood not merely in 
terms of revenge on the side of the Albanians but more importantly in terms of the 
Albanians’ lifetime repression and exclusion in the Yugoslav state. In addition, the 
latter suggests that ethnic cleansing can have an opportunist dimension provided by its 
nexus with the occurrence of war.

III.4.2 Ethnic cleansing in the Independent State of Croatia (NDH)

As noted, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was plagued by an early crisis 
that stemmed from the diverging expectations and attitudes of its constitutive peoples 
towards the new state. While the new administration dominated by Serbs opted for a 
centralised state that sought a ‘fusion’ of the South Slav ‘tribes’ it became increasingly 
difficult for non-Serbs to distinguish between Yugoslavism and greater Serbian 
nationalism.\textsuperscript{111} Political co-operation especially on the part of the Croats was not 
forthcoming and political murder was employed by the Serbs to settle scores with 
political opponents, one of the most notorious being the assassination of the Croat 
Peasant Party’s leader, Stjepan Radić, during a session of the parliamentary assembly in 
the capital – Belgrade – on 20 June 1928 following which political co-operation 
between Croats and Serbs virtually ceased.\textsuperscript{112}

\textsuperscript{110} This quote comes from Ćubrilović, ‘The Expulsion of Albanians’, Kosova Historical/Political Review, 

\textsuperscript{111} Roudometof, Nationalism, Globalisation, and Orthodoxy, p. 192.

\textsuperscript{112} For an account of this event see Glenny, The Balkans, pp. 409-412.
Radić's death was a 'disaster for Yugoslavia' since it came to justify complete rejection of the state in minds of many Croats. The political quarrels between the Serbs and Croats paved the way for and justified the following Royal Dictatorship. On January 1929 King Aleksandar Karađorđević seized power, suspended the constitution and changed the name of the state from the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes into the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. Yet, as Mark Almond has pointed out, however much the King might posture as sovereign of the newly named 'Yugoslavia', his rule remained essentially Serbian and his police took brutal measures against any threat to the integrity of his kingdom which might be posed by non-Serb political or intellectual forces. In the meantime, Ante Pavelić, the Vice-President of the Croatian Bar Association and a former delegate to the Parliament in Belgrade, established Ustaše-Hrvatska Revolucionarna Organizacija (Ustaša-Croatian Revolutionary Organisation), the name Ustaša derived from ustatī, meaning to stand up. The ultimate goal of the Ustaša movement was the establishment of an independent Croatian state and by 1930 several hundred Ustaša émigrés had set up paramilitary training camps in Italy under the patronage and control of Mussolini. In a belated attempt to reorganise the Yugoslav Kingdom, in August 1939 an agreement was reached between the Prime Minister Cvetković and the leader of the Croatian Peasant Party Vladko Maček, known as the Cvetković- Maček Sporazum (Agreement) which set up a self-governing province of Croatia that encompassed roughly 30 percent of Yugoslav territory and population (4.4 million, including 866,000 Orthodox Serbs and about 164,000 Muslims). But this endeavour failed to appease the Ustaša who objected to the borders of the new entity in that they failed to include all Bosnia, which the Ustaša claimed to be historical Croatian

113 Almond, Europe's Backyard War, p. 123.
114 Ibid., p. 124.
The membership of the Ustaša movement, however, remained low, popular support for it did not exceed 10 percent of the population.\textsuperscript{117}

The support of Italy, however, enabled the Ustaša to proclaim the Independent State of Croatia (Nezavisna Država Hrvatska, NDH) on April 10, 1941 (barely four days after Italy’s annexation of the country). The new state included present-day Croatia and Bosnia. The NDH’s official propaganda adopted the line that Serbs and Croats could not live together and consequently set out to create an ethnically pure Croatian state from which Serbs, but also Jews and Roma, would be permanently excluded. The latter groups were denied citizenship in the NDH, a measure designed to speed up the sequestration of their assets. Upon attaining power the Ustaša began executing suspected opponents and encouraging the local militias to evict Serb families to Serbia. The Serbs were purged from government service, the military, mass media, business, and other professions, and the use of the Cyrillic alphabet was banned.\textsuperscript{118} Bosnian Muslims also suffered discrimination and some persecution despite the fact that Pavelić regarded them as the purest Croats, the ‘flower of the nation’. Whereas a minority of Bosnian Muslims supported the Ustaša movement, the majority of them appear to have remained either opposed to or neutral toward it and tried to stay clear of the fighting.\textsuperscript{119}

The main concern of the NDH’s authorities, however, lay with the large Serb minority whose presence in the view of Ustaša leaders ‘endangered Croatian existence’. In order


\textsuperscript{117} Figures vary and a study put this figure as low as 1 percent of the Croat population. For the upper limit see Lampe, Yugoslavia as History, p. 204, for the lower one see Philip J. Cohen, Serbia’s Secret War, pp. 195-6 (footnote).


\textsuperscript{119} Philip J. Cohen p. 101. For an analysis of the position of the Bosnian Muslims in NDH see Malcolm, Bosnia, pp. 185-92.
to solve the Serb question in the NDH, the Ustaša claimed that a third of about two million Serbs living there would be expelled; a third would be assimilated through conversion from Orthodoxy to Catholicism; and a third would be killed.¹²⁰ Widespread acts of terror against the Serbs began in May 1941 while expulsion commenced the following month. Ustaša militias deployed throughout Bosnia and the Krajina region of Croatia first tried to conglomerate as many Serbs as possible into camps for expulsion to Serbia. Although individual resisters were killed, John Lampe suggests that it was only when expulsion became increasingly difficult, that the Ustaša resorted to mass killing in villages and dispatchment of the prisoners to the death camps. Lampe asserts that 'by July 1941, German authorities in Serbia had recorded nearly 140,000 people pushed across the border, with perhaps another 40,000 unrecorded. The German military command in Belgrade responded by cutting the number of authorised border crossings to two, then to one, and by autumn to none'.¹²¹ This point unleashed mass killing and forced conversion of the Serbs. Buttressed by pseudo-historical propaganda that claimed that the Serbs of Bosnia and of the old Military Border in Croatia were actually Croats or Vlachs that were forcefully proselytised into Orthodoxy in Ottoman times or the interwar period, the Ustaša regime launched a campaign of coerced conversion under which, during 1941-2, about one-quarter million Serbs were catholicised.¹²² The number of Serbs killed on the territory of the NDH during this period remains controversial. In the 1990s Serb sources alleged that more than 700,000 Serbs were murdered whilst their Croatian counterparts put the figure down to tens of thousands.¹²³

¹²³ For accounts of this controversy and its political manipulations see Mark Almond, Europe’s Backyard War, pp. 3-7. Phillip J. Cohen, Serbia’s Secret War, pp. 106-112. Robert M. Hayden, ‘Recounting the
The NDH’s excesses not only jeopardised Ustaša relations with Italy given that they undermined Italian control in the country, but also gave way to open action in the NDH of Četniks who took revenge against the civilian population, most of whom happened to be Muslim rather than Croat.\(^{124}\) The Četnik movement took shape during the initial months of World War II. The name Četnik, chosen by the leader of the Movement Draža Mihailović, originated from the word Ėta used initially by upland guerrilla bands that opposed the Ottoman rule in Montenegro, Herzegovina and northern Albania and eventually in all central Balkans at the beginning of the 20\(^{th}\) century.\(^{125}\) Though the Četnik bands did not have many fighters, (in the initial months of the war only about 10,000), they had enough to persuade many Serbs that active resistance was under way.\(^{126}\)

Četnik ideology was expounded in a memorandum entitled ‘Homogenous Serbia’ (dated 30 June, 1941) written by a leading Četnik ideologue Stevan Moljević,\(^{127}\) who reckoned that the primary and essential duty of Serbs was:

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\begin{align*}
to create and organise a homogenous Serbia which must encompass the entire ethnic territory where Serbs live, and to secure for Serbia all necessary strategic and communication lines and centres as well as economic regions that would forever enable its free economic, political and cultural development. These strategic and communication lines and centres are necessary for the security, life, and survival of Serbia, and if in some regions today we do not have a Serbian majority, those regions must serve Serbia and the Serbian people... Transfers and exchanges of population, especially of Croats from Serbia and of Serbs from the Croatian areas, is the only way to arrive at their separation and to
\end{align*}
\]

\(^{124}\) The worst killings took place in the Foča-Čajniče region where at least 2,000 Muslims were killed by Četniks and local Serbs in August 1942 and in February 1943 more than 9,000 were massacred. Malcolm, Bosnia, p. 188. Lampe, Yugoslavia as History, pp. 206, 209, 210. Glenny, The Balkans, pp. 494-5.

\(^{125}\) Pavlovitch, A History of the Balkans, p. 315.


\(^{127}\) Moljević’s memorandum was an extension of a recurrent theme of the Serbian political discourse. In fact it echoed an earlier memorandum of Ilija Garašanin of 1844, titled ‘Nacertanije’ (The Outline), that had propagated the assimilation of the various non-Serbian peoples living within the envisioned Greater Serbia. Almond, Europe’s Backyard War, p. 68. Cohen, Serbia’s Secret War, pp. 3-4. For an analysis of the main objective of the Četnik movement see Tomasevich, War and Revolution, pp. 166-69.
create better relations between them, and thereby remove the possibility of a repetition of the terrible crimes ... in the entire area in which Serbs and Croats live intermixed ...  

In the summer of 1941, the Belgrade Četnik Committee proposed that, in order to make Greater Serbia purely Serbian in composition, large-scale population ‘shifts’ would be necessary – specifically: some 2,675,000 people would have to be expelled (including one million Croats and half a million Germans), and that 1,310,000 Serbs would be brought into the newly annexed areas. No figures were given for ‘shifts’ of Muslims, although it was acknowledged that ‘in the Serbian unit the Muslims present a grave problem and if possible it should be solved in this phase’. A Četnik directive of December 20, 1941, specified their goals to create an ‘ethnically pure’ Greater Serbia, consisting of Serbia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Vojvodina, ‘cleansed ... of all national minorities and non-national elements’. This directive provided also for ‘cleansing the Muslim population from the Sandžak and the Muslim and Croatian populations from Bosnia and Herzegovina’.  

Četnik plans for the homogenisation of Serbia may have been a reaction to the massacres of the Ustaša against the Serbs in the NDH but at the same time they also represented an extension of a theme with deep roots in the Serbian political culture. Nonetheless, both Četnik and Ustaša failed in their objectives not least because both movements lacked a sound political and military organisation, a compelling ideology,  

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and a sufficiently popular base. Yet even though neither Četnik nor Ustaša succeeded in implementing their plans in full scope and scale, ethnic cleansing became a significant feature of this multiple war, which was to be utilised later in order to manipulate events in the 1990s.

III.5 The case of the Turkish minority in Bulgaria – 1989

The post World War II era, from 1945 till the late 1980s, saw far less ethnic cleansing in the Balkans than before although large scale cases of ethnic cleansing in the context of warfare or its aftermath can still be identified. Such was the case of the Germans, around half a million of whom were expelled from Yugoslavia alone in the second half of the 1940s, and the Slav Macedonians during the Civil War in Greece (1946-49) about 50,000 of the latter being ethnically cleansed allegedly for supporting the Greek communists. At first sight, however, ethnic cleansing of the Turkish minority in Bulgaria in the late 1980s appears to be a sort of oddity, not only because it lacked association with war but also because the region had seemingly departed from such an experience for good.

133 The ultimate beneficiaries of the struggle between Ustaša and Četniks were the communists who emerged as winners at the end of the war and established for a second time a Yugoslav state. As Serbs fled from Ustaša they joined either the Četniks or the partisans, but their allegiance often switched back and forth between the two depending on whose strength prevailed locally. Cohen, *Serbia’s Secret War*, p. 95.
134 This may be attributed to the fact that most of the region fell into the Communist block whose official policy did not emphasise the ethno-national difference. Moreover, the Cold War tended to hinder internal conflict.
135 The expulsion of the Germans from Yugoslavia was an episode of ethnic cleansing of as many as 14 million Germans from Central and Eastern Europe sanctioned by the Great Powers following Nazi defeat. For the rationale of the latter expulsion see Chapter VI pp. 241-242. Refer also to footnote 77 above.
136 The oppression of the Slav Macedonians continued during the 1950s; the use of Slavonik names was forbidden, the use of the Macedonian language was banned and in the border regions with Yugoslavia, Macedonian peasants were not allowed to move from their villages. Due to such repressive measures many of them emigrated to Australia or Canada. Since the end of the Greek Civil War, the official denial of the existence of a Slav Macedonian minority continues to be a constant of the Greek government. Hugh Poulton with MLIHRC, ‘Minorities in the Balkans’, pp. 30-31.
In order to understand how ethnic cleansing of the Turks of Bulgaria came about it is useful to consider some relevant features in the relations between the Communist Bulgarian authorities and the Turkish minority in the years preceding 1989 when the Bulgarian Turks fled *en masse* to Turkey. The nation-state building efforts in Bulgaria indicate that ethno-national minorities were often viewed by officials with distrust and considered a factor that undermined Bulgarian national cohesion; this being particularly the case of the Turkish minority, the biggest in the country (in the 1990s comprising some 900,000 individuals, or about 10 percent of the total population).

One of the central aims of the Bulgarian Communist regime was the construction of a one-nation Bulgarian state, the official view among many Bulgarian administrations being that the population of the state had to be or to be made into ‘Bulgarian’ that is, Eastern Orthodox in religion and Bulgarian-speaking in language. The hardest stumbling block in the accomplishment of this policy was the existence of a large Turkish minority. At various times, Sofia had reached agreement with Ankara in order to facilitate the emigration of Bulgarian Turks to Turkey, the largest emigration being recorded between 1949-51. In August 1950 the Bulgarian government claimed that a quarter of a million Turks had applied to leave the country. The Turkish government for its part was reluctant to accept such mass immigration and in November 1950 closed the country’s border with Bulgaria due to illegal crossing. In January 1951 the two governments agreed that only Turks in possession of a Turkish entry visa could enter Turkey. But in November 1951 Turkey closed its border again on the ground that

137 Roudometof, *Nationalism, Globalisation, and Orthodoxy*, p. 190.
138 This emigration wave grew out of the Turkish minority’s anxieties over the 1946 nationalisation of Turkish schools and the confiscation of the minority’s private property. For a detailed account of 1949-51 emigration see Bilan N. Şimşir, *The Turks of Bulgaria (1878-1985)*, London: K. Rustem & Brothers, 1988, pp. 167-81.
Bulgarian officials had forged Turkish entry visas in order to rid itself of as many Turks as possible. It has been estimated that about 155,000 Turks left Bulgaria for Turkey in this period. In 1968 another agreement was reached which provided for the departure in the following ten years (1968-78) of close relatives of those who had left in the period 1944-1951. Some 60,000 Turks left Bulgaria under the terms of the latter agreement.\textsuperscript{139}

It has been suggested that the 1974 Turkish invasion of Cyprus provoked worries in Bulgaria due to its sizeable Turkish minority. Fearful of repetition of the Cypriot scenario on its own soil, the Bulgarian state closed down most Turkish schools, newspapers, and journals.\textsuperscript{140} Moreover, the government adopted a policy of negating the identity of the Turkish minority: according to the Bulgarian officials there were no Turks in Bulgaria, but only ‘Turkified Bulgarians’. During the 1970s there were repeated cases of ethnic Turks being pressured to exchange their names for Bulgarian ones and renounce their own religion. Adherence to Islamic faith was seen by the authorities as inhibiting the loyalty of the Communist government. This was set out in a 1977 article published in an official publication (\textit{Filosofsk\=a Misul}) in Sofia, which stated:

\begin{quote}
It was clear to the Bulgarian Communist Party that the Bulgarian Mohammedan problem was, above all, of social origin. That is why ... (the Party) set as its objective the elimination, above all, of the social roots of Islam in the Rhodope ... (to) heal the wounds and traumas in (the) spirituality of Islamicised Bulgarians ... (to) emancipate the Bulgarian awareness in them, dulled and concealed in the course of centuries, and to accelerate their joining of the Bulgarian socialist nation.\textsuperscript{141}
\end{quote}

Nonetheless, according to Amnesty International, until late 1984, forced assimilation of ethnic Turks was not pursued by the Bulgarian authorities on a consistent basis. But in


\textsuperscript{140} Mary Neuburger, ‘Bulgaro-Turkish Encounters and the Re-Imagining of the Bulgarian Nation (1878-1995)’, \textit{East European Quarterly}, Vol. XXXI, No. 1, 1997, pp. 5-6.

\textsuperscript{141} Cited in \textit{Bulgaria: Imprisonment of Ethnic Turks}, p. 5.
the latter months of that year there was a shift in the official policy; in December 1984, the Bulgarian authorities initiated a countryside campaign to change forcibly the names of all Turks of Bulgaria. Among the reasons cited for such a shift in policy have been the following:

- A demographic imbalance in terms of population growth of the Bulgarian majority and Turkish minority – the growth rate of the former declining while that of the latter rapidly increasing. It appears that the demographic imbalance between the Albanians and the Serbs in Kosovo and the attendant problems for the Yugoslav authorities presented a warning sign for the Bulgarian government.

- Economic insecurity in view of the fact that important agricultural areas vital for Bulgaria’s valuable tabacco exports and major wheat production areas were becoming increasingly populated by minorities, especially the Turks.

- Adherence to Islamic faith was perceived by the authorities as impairing communist cohesion in the country.

- Fear of the influence of Muslim fundamentalism from neighbouring Turkey.

- A national census scheduled for December 1985 seemed to have increased the authorities’ anxieties to claim, at least on paper, transformation of Bulgaria into a one-nation state.

- Officially, assimilation policies were premised on modernisation of the country. The Bulgarian Communist Party claimed that, led by the ideology of Marxism-Leninism, Bulgaria was to become a modern industrial state in which all citizens spoke the same language and shared the same customs. The presence of a large minority, living in concentrated areas, speaking a different language and having

In early 1985 the Bulgarian officials stated that ethnic Turks were in fact descendants of Slav Bulgarians who had been forcibly converted to Islam during the Ottoman rule and that these ‘Slav Bulgarians’ were ‘voluntarily’ and ‘spontaneously’ requesting new Bulgarian names as an indication of their ‘rebirth in the Bulgarian nation’.\footnote{\textit{Bulgaria: Imprisonment of Ethnic Turks}, pp. 9, 20, 24-5.} By the end of March 1985 the name-changing campaign had apparently been completed and Stanko Todorov, Chairman of the National Assembly, reported on 28 March that the ‘resumption’ of Bulgarian names by citizens with ‘Turkish-Arabic’ names had been completed safely. Bulgaria was a ‘one-nation state’ and that in the ‘Bulgarian nation there are no parts of any other peoples and nations’.\footnote{Ibid., p. 9.}

Nevertheless, the Bulgarian official claim that the entire Turkish population of Bulgaria voluntarily chose to exchange their Turkish/Muslim names for Bulgarian/Slavic ones, to give up their Turkish language and renounce their Turkish customs and rituals is hardly credible. Despite the Bulgarian official stance there is abundant evidence that intimidation and even violence were used to a large extent to compel the Turkish minority to comply with this state sponsored assimilation policy.\footnote{For such evidence see \textit{Bulgaria: Imprisonment of Ethnic Turks}, pp. 9-14. Hugh Poulton with MLIHRC, ‘Minorities in the Balkans’, pp. 9-22. Hugh Poulton, \textit{The Balkans: Minorities and States in Conflict}, London: Minority Rights Publications, 1991, Chapters 10 and 11.}
Whereas initially the name-changing campaign was met with sporadic small scale protests by the Turkish minority, by 1989 a Turkish civil rights group was formed and mass protests started, including hunger strikes and demonstrations. As a result the authorities increased their pressure and begun expelling initially mainly Turkish activists to Turkey. Soon thereafter this took the form of an exodus, with at least 60,000 refugees crossing the border during the first half of the year. By late August the number climbed to 300,000.\(^\text{146}\) The exodus of the Turks provoked condemnation by international organisations such as the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) – then known as the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) – and the United Nations, as well as individual countries such as Turkey, United States of America and other Western and Islamic countries, under which pressure following the demise of Todor Zhivkov’s regime at the end of December 1989, the Bulgarian government revoked the assimilation campaign and allowed the Turkish minority to return to their homes.\(^\text{147}\) This was the first instance in the Balkan region when ethnic cleansing was reversed.

III.6 Ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s\(^\text{148}\)

Ethnic cleansing in the 1990s accompanied a process of state disintegration and reformation, as the federation of Yugoslavia became inoperative and new states emerged in the wake of its disintegration. A policy of decentralisation unleashed by the 1974 Constitution that loosened the federal structure and expanded the autonomy of the

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\(^{146}\) Poulton, The Balkans, p. 153.

\(^{147}\) Ibid., pp 160-1. Hugh Poulton with MLHRC, ‘Minorities in the Balkans’, p. 22. Darina Vasileva points out, however, that while over 150,000 Turks returned to Bulgaria, more than 200,000 chose to remain permanently in Turkey. Darina Vasileva, ‘Bulgarian Turkish Emigration and Return’, International Migration Review, Vol. 26, No. 1, 1992, p. 348.

\(^{148}\) This section presents a sketch of the key events in the chain of causes and consequences of ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s. For a detailed analysis see Chapter V.
provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina had alienated Serb nationalists who perceived the latter arrangement as the carving up of Serb territory into three parts (Serbia proper and the autonomous provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina). Not only did they protest against what they perceived as the partition of Serbia but also against the alleged federal government’s discriminatory policy vis-à-vis the Serb Republic in the economic field and against alleged anti-Serb policies pursued by Kosovo Albanian ‘separatists’. Their complaints were spelled out in a manifesto issued in 1986 by Belgrade’s leading Serbian intellectuals known as the ‘Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Science and Arts’, a document that portrayed Serbs as the most victimised people in Yugoslavia, suggesting that the Serbs’ suffering demanded compensation: the borders of the Serb Republic should be redrawn so that all Serbs throughout Yugoslavia could live in an expanded Serbia.

This platform was adopted by the new Serb leader Slobodan Milošević who pressed for further centralisation of the federation and in March 1989 abolished the autonomous status of Kosovo and Vojvodina, in addition to deposing the leadership in Montenegro with a view to securing its control. Centralising tendencies coupled with the

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149 Roudometof, Nationalism, Globalisation, and Orthodoxy, pp. 214-5.
150 In Kosovo Serb nationalists commonly complained that they were being compelled to leave the province by Albanian pressure. But facts do not support this allegation. While about a quarter of a million of Kosovo Albanians were forced to leave the province from 1945 till 1966, the exit of Serbs from Kosovo began only after the mid-1960s. In October 1988 statistics showed that in the previous 15 years 25,661 Serbs left Kosovo against 250,000 Albanians. James Gow, Legitimacy and the Military: The Yugoslav Crisis, London: Pinter, 1992, p. 69. Unemployment statistics illustrate the severe disadvantage of Kosovar Albanians – they were over three times more likely to be unemployed than the average Yugoslav. Although they made up four-fifths of the working age population in the province, Albanians held only about 40 percent of the jobs. By contrast, Serbs and Montenegrins held a third of all jobs – more than twice their proportion in the population. See Almond, Europe’s Backyard War, p. 205.
152 While these moves were relatively swift and easy in Vojvodina and Montenegro given that a large section of the population there were Serbs, the coup in Kosovo was secured as a result of a huge military clampdown against Kosovo Albanians opposition and the removal of all political and cultural rights from them, a move that initiated two decades of conflict and a rapid decline in the values of life. Alex J.
economic crisis and the unequal burden such crisis imposed on different republics led to debates about Yugoslavia's future. Slovenia and Croatia, and later Bosnia and Macedonia, aimed to loosen the federal arrangements while Serb officials favoured strengthening a centralised federation. As Slovene and Croat politicians sought a shift of authority from federation to national republics, Milošević's response was that if there were any attempts to replace the federal structure of Yugoslavia with some looser arrangement, he would seek to annex whole areas of Croatia and Bosnia inhabited by Serbs. Milošević championed the idea of a centralised state in which all the Serbs lived. Claiming that at issue were state borders and the unity of the Serbs, and the rights of the Serb minorities in Croatia and Bosnia, he used such claims as a propaganda theme for launching aggression. The brief encounter of hostilities between Slovene and Federal armies (26 June – 3 July 1991) following the declaration of independence of Slovenia (25 June 1991) can be attributed not only to the well planned resistance on the part of Slovenes but also to the absence of a Serb minority in Slovenia and lack of common borders between the two republics. This short war was, nevertheless, a prelude to war in Croatia just like the latter became a prelude to war in Bosnia.

The government of Franjo Tudjman that came to power in Croatia in May 1990 emphasised the Croat identity by adopting a range of ethnic symbols such as the

135 See Lenard J. Cohen, Broken Bonds: Yugoslavia's Disintegration and Balkan Politics in Transition, 2nd edition, Boulder: Westview Press, 1995, pp. 228-9. Similarly, the existence of too few self-identifying Serbs in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) may have been one of the reasons why there were no military confrontations between Belgrade and Skopje. Moreover, since FYROM could not form an alliance with either Athens or Sofia, it co-operated with Belgrade apparently providing the chief conduit for breaking the economic sanctions imposed on Belgrade. See Almond, Europe's Backyard War, p. 208.
traditional coat of arms, flag and national anthem as the official insignia of the republic; making the Latin script the official alphabet; and transforming the character of civil services into an exclusively Croatian one by dismissing Serbs and replacing them with Croats.\textsuperscript{156} Although the local Serbs made up only 12 percent of Croatia’s population, their contribution to the police, up till this time, was estimated at over 60 percent, most of the Serbs being recruited from rural areas such as Krajina. Given Belgrade’s opposition to Croatia’s intention of independence and the decision of the federal army’s General Staff in Belgrade (April 1990) to transfer all weapons of the Croatian Territorial Defence Forces (Teritorijalna Odbrana – TOs) from republican hands into the custody of the Yugoslav People’s Army (Jugoslovenska Narodna Armija – JNA), it is hardly surprising that Croatia’s Serbs were considered politically suspect by the new government in Zagreb.\textsuperscript{157} Tudjman’s policies raised fears among the Croatian Serbs regarding their future status in the new state and stimulated their mobilisation around a Serb nationalist programme. Having formed paramilitary units and staged an armed rebellion, in summer 1990 Croatian Serbs in the Knin area conducted their own referendum on the issue of autonomy, and proclaimed themselves an autonomous region (the so-called Krajina Republic), doing in fact exactly what Serbian authorities were denying the far more numerous Albanians in Kosovo. Supported by the Belgrade regime, the Croatian Serbs proclaimed themselves to be ‘the Serbian region of Krajina in Croatia’ on 4 January 1991 and a part of Serbia in March 1991, eventually preceding the declaration of independence by Croatia (25 June 1991).\textsuperscript{158}

\textsuperscript{156} Cohen, \textit{Broken Bonds}, p. 131. Almond, \textit{Europe’s Backyard War}, p. 15. \\
\textsuperscript{157} Milan Vego, ‘The Croatian Army’, \textit{Jane’s Intelligence Review}, May 1993, p. 203. The Territorial Defence Forces (TOs) were established in the Yugoslav republics in the 1970s as a result of the ‘Generalised Popular Defence System’ following the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. They were intended to provide a citizens’ army in waiting premised on the assumption that all citizens would act in case of a foreign invasion. \\
Following their retreat from Slovenia the next target of the federal army troops became Croatia, which they attacked on 22 July 1991. Milan Vego, a military analyst, suggests that the federal army intended to seize two-thirds of Croatian territory and topple the government in Zagreb, but failed in its objective. Croatian resistance proved to be much more robust than expected and the four month long siege of Vukovar provided time for Croats to enhance their defences and strengthen their fragile Croatian Army (Hrvatska Vojska – HV) established only in late September 1991.

Ostensibly intervening to separate the local Serb militias and the Croat troops, the JNA’s aim then shifted to delineate borders of the new Serb state so as to include the Serb inhabited territories of Croatia. By late August the situation had escalated into full scale-war. It is at this early stage of the conflict in Croatia that it became apparent that the war was in fact an instrument of ethnic cleansing. As Mark Almond points out:

> Only when television pictures were shown, not only of columns of the surviving defenders of Vukovar being marched off to an obscure fate, but also of Croatian civilians, women and old men predominantly, equally disappearing under Serb guard, did many Westerners realise that the war was not just about conquering territory but also about removing its unwelcome peoples.

The Serb army and paramilitary troops in Croatia aimed to intimidate Croats as a whole and at the same time to consolidate the various pockets of Serb populated territory by linking them up by means of driving out the Croats through terror and intimidation.

The war in Croatia formally ended on 3 January 1992 resulting in some 30 percent of

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159 By now the federal army had in fact become predominantly Serb given that most of its personnel from the other republics had left to join their own national armed forces.


161 Almond, Europe’s Backyard War, p. 226.

Croatian territory being occupied by the JNA and Serbian irregulars. Some 20,000 people were killed – more than half of whom civilians – and, some 200,000 became refugees. More than 200,000 buildings, one-third of all Croatian highways, 500 historic cultural monuments, 50 bridges, thousands of vehicles, and 250 post offices were destroyed. Direct and indirect war damage to Croatia’s economy was estimated at $20 billion. The peace settlement that was negotiated by the UN representative Cyrus Vance declared the occupied territory a ‘UN-protected zone’, the long-term status of which remained for the moment undecided, freezing albeit temporarily, the outcome of ethnic cleansing of the Croats from Krajina.

Whilst the federal army was engaged in ethnic cleansing and war in Croatia, preparations were made, on the side of the Serbs, to secure strategic control of territory in Bosnia. The federal army established itself in the Bosnian countryside and major communication points; its very presence greatly encouraging local Serbs to challenge the government in Sarajevo. UN sources suggest that while the war was still going on in Croatia, the Bosnian Serbs were receiving arms secretly delivered from Serbia and that their actions were co-ordinated from Belgrade. As war receded in Croatia, the Yugoslav army and Serb paramilitary troops which had been functioning since 1990 in the Serb held regions of Croatia transferred their operations to Bosnia, aiming to secure control over a great arc of contiguous territory connecting the majority Serb rural areas.

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163 These figures are quoted from Milan Vego, ‘The Croatian Army’, p. 206.
164 Gow, ‘One Year of War in Bosnia and Herzegovina’, p. 7.
The strategy again was to link up various pockets of Serbian settlement by driving out non-Serb residents, Muslims and Croats, through terror and intimidation.

Meanwhile, the Bosnian Serbs, led by the Serbian Democratic Party (Srpska Demokratska Stranka – SDS, the same name as that of the Serb party in Krajina) embarked upon what can be described as a policy of creating faits accomplis. Between September and November 1991, they established six autonomous regions (Srpske Autonomne Oblasti; SAOs) – comprising some sixty municipalities, many of which had only a relatively small Serbian population – which, for all practical purposes, were independent from the government in Sarajevo. In a referendum held on 9 and 10 November 1991, Bosnian Serbs voted to establish an independent Serb Republic within the borders of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Having announced that the republic of Bosnia no longer existed, in January 1992 the Bosnian Serb leaders declared the ‘Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina’ to be a part of the rump Yugoslavia. The Bosnian Croats led by the Croatian Democratic Community (Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica – HDZ) responded, in turn, by establishing their own communities: on 12 November 1991 they set up the so-called ‘Croatian Community of Bosnian Sava Valley’ in Bosanski Brod; six days later ‘the Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia’; whilst on 27 January 1992 ‘the Croatian Community of Central Bosnia’. The establishment of these Croatian communities, although somehow different from SAOs in so far as they lacked executive and legislative bodies, reflected, nevertheless, the tacit

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166 Ostensibly a response to the National Assembly’s decision to hold a referendum on Bosnia’s sovereignty and independence, the latter Serb action ignored the fact that they were not prevented from holding their own referendum in November 1991. The referendum on Bosnia’s independence, which was boycotted by the Serbs, was held on 29 February and 1 March 1992 and produced a unanimous response in favour of independence. For the above mentioned events see Milan Andrejevich, ‘Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Precarious Peace’, Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) Research Report, Vol. 1, No. 9, 28 February 1992, pp. 9-13. Milan Vego, ‘The Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina’, Jane’s Intelligence Review, February 1993, p. 63.

agreement between the Serb and Croat leadership of that time to partition the Bosnian republic.\textsuperscript{168}

It was at this stage (early 1992) that, for all intents and purposes, the practice of ethnic cleansing that began earlier in Croatia was extended to Bosnia, whilst preparations for war in the republic were well under way.\textsuperscript{169} The Serb strategy of driving out the non-Serb population in order to ensure the strategic control of territory became clearly evident with the continued expulsion of Croats from the occupied territories in Croatia (even though under UN protection), and especially so in the course of the Bosnian war.

The Bosnian war was bound to be an asymmetrical one. Not only had the Serb military been concentrating in the republic for months but the Serbian dominated General Staff had ordered in June 1991 that the Bosnian Territorial Defence Forces (TOs) be placed under the control of the former federal army in Belgrade.\textsuperscript{170} These measures left the Bosnian government stripped of the means to defend the country and its population. The political leadership in Sarajevo, however, underestimated the growing threat posed by the Serbs to the republic’s territorial integrity, and was too slow in organising popular resistance against attacks by the local Serb paramilitaries and the federal army.\textsuperscript{171}

Indeed, the Bosnian presidency declared a state of war only on 26 June 1992 by which time two-thirds of Bosnian territory had already fallen to Serbian control. The lack of governmental action is said to have induced some local Muslim leaders to take the

\textsuperscript{168} See Chapter V p. 193.


\textsuperscript{170} Some of the Croatian TOs in the western Herzegovina, however, defied the General Staff’s orders and kept hold to their weapons. Milan Vego, ‘The Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina’, p. 63.

\textsuperscript{171} The reason for this can be attributed to a disbelief that Serb nationalists and the JNA would eventually go to war, and a wish to avoid provocative action.
initiative and organise paramilitary groups in some parts of the republic where the Muslims comprised a majority of the population.\(^{172}\)

The Bosnian Croats, aided by Zagreb, were faster in organising their defences. The Croatian Defence Council (Hrvatsko Vijeće Odbrane – HVO) was set up by local representatives of the Croatian President Franjo Tudjman’s Croatian Democratic Community (HDZ) in summer 1991, whilst arms distribution began in early 1992. The HVO also incorporated troops from the Croatian Defence Union (Hrvatski Odbranbeni Snage – HOS), a paramilitary organisation set up by the ultra-right Croatian Party of Rights (Hrvatska Stranka Prava – HSP), a militia which was formally disbanded in August 1992. Within the ranks of the HVO were also many Bosnian Muslims (20-30 percent of total troops), whose preference for joining this formation rather than local Muslim militias was informed by the HVO’s ability to provide weapons.\(^{173}\) All HVO operations, nevertheless, were controlled (and financed) by the staff of the Croatian Army (HV) in Zagreb and as many as 15,000 HV soldiers are reported to have fought in the Bosnian war.\(^{174}\)

The first clashes between the Serbs, and Muslims and Croats in Bosnia took place in late February 1992, whereas full scale hostilities had broken out by 6 April.\(^{175}\) The


\(^{175}\) The beginning of war, however, has no clear-cut date. Many sensed the looming war through summer to winter 1991 whilst Slovenia and Croatia eagerly sought their independence. See Almond, Europe’s Backyard War, pp. 8-9. Glenny mentions 22 March 1992 as the start of the war. Glenny, The Fall of Yugoslavia, p. 167. Gallagher suggests that war in Bosnia erupted on 2 April 1992. Tom Gallagher, The Balkans after the Cold War – From tyranny to tragedy, London: Routledge, 2003, p. 88. Kaldor, and
military offensive against Bosnia and Herzegovina occurred amid calls from Serbian leaders of SAOs to protect Serbian communities in Bosnia. As in Croatia, the federal Yugoslav army claimed that it was ‘defending Yugoslavia’ and was engaged in ‘peacekeeping’. However, by 18 April 1992, that is, in just two weeks of fighting, the number of refugees, mainly Muslims and Croat, had topped the 150,000. In the first six weeks of the war the federal army and its paramilitary adjuncts had carved out more than 60 percent of the entire territory of Bosnia. The speed with which Serb operations were carried out and the high level of their co-ordination leaves little doubt that they were carefully pre-planned.

From the commencement of the war in Bosnia until February 1993, Bosnian Muslim and Croat forces co-operated against the Serbs. But the conflict took a new turn in early February 1993 when the Muslim-Croat alliance broke down and for a year or so Bosnian Muslims and Croats engaged in fighting each other for creation of their own homogenous territories. On 5 July 1992, the hardline Bosnian Croat leadership of Mate Boban supported by Tudjman’s regime had proclaimed a Croatian state within Bosnia – the Croat Union of Herzeg-Bosna with its centre in Mostar. Like the Serb Krajina (in Croatia) Herzeg-Bosna claimed authority over its police, army, currency (the Croat Kuna) and education (which adopted the Croat curriculum and language). The Croat-Muslim hostilities were a bonanza for the Serb army which under the military leadership of Ratko Mladić (the former Yugoslav army commander in Kosovo, Knin

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176 James Gow, ‘One Year of War in Bosnia and Herzegovina’, pp. 7-8.


179 For the rationale of the Croat-Muslim fighting see Chapter V, p. 216-217.
and Sarajevo) sought to secure an open road between Belgrade, Banja Luka and Knin, a highway known as 'Operation Koridor'. As large numbers of Muslim refugees expelled by Serbs in Eastern Bosnia moved in southern regions, previously with a substantial Croat population, the relations between Muslims and Croats deteriorated further prompting the Croats to accuse the Muslims and their leaders of trying to change the ethnic composition of those regions.  

Following the massacre on 22 April 1993 by the Croatian troops of Muslim inhabitants of the village of Ahmići fierce fighting between the Croats and Muslims broke out with the Croats losing heavily. The most intense battle was that for the capture of Mostar, cleansed of its Serb minority in June 1992 when the town was seized under the banner of the Croat Defence Council (HVO). The struggle for Mostar ended indecisively, the city being divided along ethnic lines into two homogenous parts: Croat and Muslim. It is estimated that more than 20,000 Croats and Bosnian Muslims were killed during the Croat-Muslim war of 1993-4. By the beginning of 1994 almost half of the pre-war Croat population of Bosnia (about 750,000) had left their homes.

The Washington Agreement (signed under the auspices of American diplomacy in February 1994) that ended the Croat-Muslim war led to a decisive reversal in the fortunes of the Serbs, the military balance shifting slowly in favour of the Muslim and Croat forces. The corrosion from within of the Krajina Republic of Serbs in Croatia, transformed as it was into a garrison society with little or no sustainable economic life,

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182 For the Washington Agreement see Silber and Little, *Yugoslavia*, Chapter 25.
coupled with manifested weaknesses of the Serb troops in Bosnia provided an advantage to the Croatian army which the latter did not miss. The ease with which the Croatian army succeeded in May 1995 to recover a targeted part of the Croatian territory occupied by the Serbs – an offensive known as Operation Flash – stimulated a second, more decisive attack in August 1995 – Operation Storm – which recovered the rest of the Croatian territory formerly under Serbian control. Operations Flash and Storm produced yet more ethnic cleansing, the Krajina region being virtually depopulated of its Serb inhabitants who retreated with the Serb army. Moreover, the Serb exodus had knock-on effects across borders. Many of the Croatian Serb refugees moved into Bosnia, particularly in the Banja Luka region, as a consequence of which some 20,000 Muslims and Croats were expelled; their homes being appropriated by Serb refugees. Many Bosnian Croats, in turn, moved to Croatia and took over deserted Serb houses.

The most infamous episode of ethnic cleansing was that of Srebrenica – a United Nations ‘safe area’ – which occurred in the summer of 1995. Following the overrunning of the enclave by the Serbs on 11 July some 7,000–8,000 Muslim men and boys were slaughtered while tens of thousands of refugees (mainly women and children) were expelled from the enclave. The fact that this tragedy happened in the presence of UN

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183 Glenny points out that 90 percent of the Serb army in Krajina were local people. Glenny, *The Fall of Yugoslavia*, p. 29.
185 There are parallels to be drawn between the Serb exodus in Krajina (1995), and in Kosovo (1999), and the Greek exodus in Asia Minor (1923) following the end of the Greko-Turkish war. While the coercive element is present in all three instances, the case can also be made that many locals chose to leave fearing revenge of their former neighbours whom they had driven away and whose houses they had looted.
peace-keeping troops meant a serious loss of prestige for the world organisation and was one significant factor that stirred the international community into a more robust and decisive action to end the violence resulting in the Dayton Agreement (signed in November 1995) which eventually ended the war in Bosnia. The merits of Dayton, however, remain disputed and some criticise the Accord for *de facto* partitioning Bosnia and legitimising ethnic cleansing given that it provided for two distinct entities (the Muslim-Croat federation holding 51 percent of the territory and Republika Srpska holding the remaining 49 percent) and for three separate armies Muslim, Croat and Serb, while the provisions of the agreement for the return of the refugees have been slow to materialise.\(^{187}\)

In addition, Dayton failed to address the question of the Serb repression in Kosovo and this led many Kosovo Albanians to question the efficacy of their policy of peaceful resistance and seek instead alternative forms of action. Indeed, the emergence of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA – *Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës*) affirmed that peaceful resistance had failed to dent Milošević's oppressive policies, although the very presence of KLA enabled the Serb leader to accelerate and justify his regime’s ethnic cleansing of Albanians in the province, at least before his constituencies. Despite the fact that Serb forces employed counterinsurgency techniques to confront the KLA, Milošević might have questioned the possibility of defeating it through such techniques given the growing strength and popularity of the KLA with the Kosovo Albanians. The appointment of Vojislav Šešelj – the leader of the Serbian Radical Party, whose paramilitary groups were responsible for some of the most terrible atrocities in Bosnia

and whose political programme since 1991 included the expulsion of Kosovo Albanians — as Vice-Prime Minister in the Serb Government in February 1998, benefited Milošević’s own position following the start of the campaign against the KLA.\textsuperscript{188} Towards the end of 1998 Milošević is reported to have put into effect a plan — dubbed Operation Horseshoe — by means of which he sought simultaneously to eradicate the KLA and permanently change the ethnic composition of Kosovo by expelling her Albanian inhabitants. As Daalder and O’Hanlon explain:

The central idea of the plan ... involved employing Mao’s favourite guerrilla tactic of draining the sea in which the fish swam; in the case of Kosovo, this meant emptying the villages of their Albanian population in order to isolate KLA fighters and supporters. The coordinated attack would involve a broad swath of territory in the shape of a horseshoe, moving from the northeast down to the west and back to southeast of Kosovo along the Albanian and Macedonian border.\textsuperscript{189}

By October 1998, more than 300,000 Kosovo Albanians had been driven from their homes, 50,000 or so being vulnerable while hiding in the hills — one of the world’s five largest crises of the time involving refugees and internally displaced people.\textsuperscript{190}

Diplomacy was given a chance to resolve the crisis. Peace talks were convened by the Contact Group (France, Germany, Russia, U.K. and U.S.) at Rambouillet and in Paris in February and March 1999 with a view to preventing the escalation of the conflict and reaching an agreement for an interim self-administration in Kosovo that could


accommodate both the insistence of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on its territorial integrity and the expectation of the oppressed majority of the province. In the end, the Albanian delegation accepted the terms whilst their Serbian counterparts rejected them. Among the terms of the draft-agreement, controversy has centred on Annex B (the Status of Forces Agreement – SOFA) to Chapter 7 regarding the military implementation provisions of the Accords, which provided for the movement of Western troops throughout the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia – making no distinction between the province of Kosovo and the rest of the state. Paradoxically – as the UK Deffence Committee pointed out – by virtue of the Western governments’ efforts to use language which underlined the sovereignty of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, an element of imprecision was engendered which could have allowed the SOFA to be read as a charter for NATO’s ‘occupation’ of Serbia although the Alliance denied any such intention and the co-ordinators of the peace talks (U.K. and France) conceded that SOFA could have been amended. Curiously, although SOFA has been used extensively as part of the Serb propaganda campaign in the course of Operation Allied Force, during the peace talks the Serb delegation did not raise it as an obstacle to the agreement to the Accords, and Belgrade rejected the political part of the draft Accords (which provided for interim self-administration in Kosovo) before the SOFA ever became the subject of detailed discussion. This may suggest that Milošević had decided to put NATO’s credibility to the test before the peace talks began and that he approached the peace negotiations entirely in bad faith disbelieving that NATO would

carry out its threats and consequently seeing no reason for attempting to find a
diplomatic solution to crisis.\textsuperscript{192}

The failure of peace talks prompted the Western Alliance to resort to military action. Nonetheless, NATO’s bombing campaign of Spring 1999 had the unintended consequence of accelerating the very action it had sought to end. Rather than capitulate when faced with NATO’s action, Milošević escalated the situation as foreseen in Operation Horseshoe.\textsuperscript{193} He saw NATO bombing not only as a problem but also as an opportunity to ethnically re-engineer Kosovo especially since the Alliance was not considering the option of deploying ground troops. By 5 May 1999, the UNHCR had estimated that one million and a half Kosovo Albanians had been forcibly displaced; over 600 settlement had been partially destroyed, including 300 villages completely razed; furthermore, summary executions were reported in over 70 towns, and as many as 50,000 Kosovo Albanians were still unaccounted for.\textsuperscript{194}

Although NATO initially failed to stop ethnic cleansing of the Kosovo Albanians or limit Serbia’s ability to carry it out, to attribute this case of ethnic cleansing to NATO’s bombing campaign is disingenuous. Some analysts, nonetheless, have suggested that NATO is responsible for ethnic cleansing of the Albanians in Kosovo because only after the bombing started the expulsion of the Albanians was speeded up. In their view, NATO’s intervention was unnecessary and the presence of the OSCE’s Kosovo

\textsuperscript{192}Ibid. See also Marc Weller, ‘The Rambouillet Conference on Kosovo’, \textit{International Affairs}, Vol. 75, No. 2, April 1999.

\textsuperscript{193}Daalder and O’Hanlon, \textit{Winning Ugly}, pp. 92, 115. See also comments of Dame Pauline Neville-Jones in Select Committee on Foreign Affairs, Fourth Report, at note 188.

\url{http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/rpt_9905_ethnic_ksvotoc.html}.
Verification Mission monitors on the ground would have been enough to restrain Belgrade from the policy of ethnic cleansing.\textsuperscript{195} Their view, however, is not unproblematic. As Ivo Daalder has persuasively argued, to blame NATO for ethnic cleansing in Kosovo is to ignore basic historical facts, not least the increase of Serbian military forces in the province, long-term suppression of the Albanians under Milošević’s regime, the incremental depopulation of Kosovo of her Albanian inhabitants, the continuation of Serb attacks while the European civilian monitors were present in the province, the repetitive pattern of the conflict in Kosovo with those in Croatia and Bosnia, and the concern of Belgrade to deprive the KLA of its base of support and cover.\textsuperscript{196} Daalder is also right to point out that blaming NATO for ethnic cleansing in Kosovo implies confusion of pace with intent. The pace with which Serbian forces acted against the Albanians increased in the course of NATO’s bombing campaign, but their purpose remained the same. If prior to the commencement of the air campaign Serbian forces had paced themselves in the believe that – as a Serb diplomat reportedly put it – ‘a village a day keeps NATO away’, once the bombing started and the prospect of using NATO ground troops had been publicly ruled out there were no incentives to restrain the Serbian action.\textsuperscript{197}

Albanians did not leave their homes because of NATO bombs but because of a systematic Serb policy of terror and intimidation. NATO bombs might have accelerated the pace of the expulsion of Albanians but Milošević’s government was committed to


\textsuperscript{197} Ibid.
ethnically cleanse Kosovo of its Albanian population, on one scale or another. The policy of ethnic cleansing was conceived not only to serve a military purpose – the destruction of the KLA – but also a political objective in restoring Kosovo to complete Serb control, altering its ethnic composition, making available land for Serb refugees from other parts of the former Yugoslavia and destabilising neighbouring countries. Although the fact that some tens of thousands of Serb refugees were settled in the province in the 1990s does not seem extraordinary, its significance becomes apparent when viewed in the context of the scale of Albanian emigration mentioned above and the context of the poverty of the province, the poorest in the former Yugoslavia with a stable unemployment rate of about 80 percent.

NATO’s intervention made possible the reversal of ethnic cleansing of Kosovo Albanians; in the wake of the withdrawal of the Serbian army and paramilitary troops from the province virtually all Albanians returned home. Although it is regrettable that following the withdrawal of the Serb military, Kosovo Serbs became the victims of their own former victims, the Serb exodus was not so much the result of a policy as was the brutal and systematic expulsion of the Albanians. Although not all Kosovo Serbs may be responsible for the maltreatment of their Albanian countrymen, those who offered logistical support to Belgrade’s policies and took part in the expulsion of the Albanians and the looting of their homes had tied their fate to that of Milošević’s security forces.

\[198\] It is illuminating to remember that a milder form of ethnic cleansing has been going on in Kosovo since 1989 when the autonomous status of the province was removed and Albanians were fired en masse from jobs and deprived of health services and education. By 1993 some 400,000 Kosovo Albanian men of military age were forced to leave Kosovo (mainly for Western countries) in order to avoid recruitment into the Yugoslav army and being sent to fight in Bosnia. Whereas by fall of 1998 some 300,000 Kosovo Albanians were displaced from their homes as a result of sustained Yugoslav attacks, which included shelling of cities and villages. Figures quoted from Independent International Commission on Kosovo, pp. 47, 74.

III.7 Conclusions: What can be learned?

The historical experience of ethnic cleansing in the Balkans and the conclusions that can be drawn from it are far from comforting. Balkan leaders were so attached to the nation-state model of the political organisation that they considered it as a supreme value, as the only model to be followed in building up and consolidating their own state. As Arnold Toynbee observed in the 1920s, they applied the idea of the nation-state hastily and without due consideration in an environment that lacked a past history or present local institutions which might have modified it in accordance with their specific multinational setting. The goal of creating homogeneous nation-states backed by an ethnic conception of nationalism conflicted with the reality of complex demographic compositions and set the stage for ethnic cleansing.

Not only has ethnic cleansing in the Balkans been bound with the process of nation-state building but, more often than not, it has been associated with the phenomenon of war. Indeed, war provided propitious conditions for the implementation of irredentist agendas and the mass expulsion of peoples, ethnic cleansing being at times a war aim (e.g., the Second Balkan War and regional wars of the 1990s in the former Yugoslavia) whereas at other times its consequence (e.g., the Second World War as it affected the region). Whenever the case, territorial aggrandisement achieved through warfare brought with it more heterogeneity which national leaders sought to minimise either by assimilation or, if that failed, through outright expulsion. One cannot help but notice the selective ethics of ethnic cleansing; different criteria being adopted to justify official action as opposed to that of minorities, with the government favouring its nation while depriving ethnic minorities the kind of rights or privileges it claimed for its own kin.

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The exclusivist membership in the majority nation has strengthened the political relevance of ethno-national identities making it easier for leaders to present justification for their exclusivist policies in terms of a discourse of conflicting identities. However, as it will be argued in the next chapter, although ethnic cleansing has been validated on the ground of defining and protecting the national ‘self’ against the infidel ‘other’, this simplified discourse defies the fact that the salience of ethno-national identities was enhanced in the course of and in the aftermath of violence and ethnic cleansing. National identity does not necessarily capture the nature of ethnic cleansing in its full complexity.

This chapter has suggested that ethnic cleansing in the Balkans has been primarily a top-down phenomenon; its main causes being political. In virtually all cases, what was at issue was either territory i.e., the delineation of borders or sovereign rights over territory, or perceived incompatible political/economic rights between the majority nation and ethnic minorities. Furthermore, the fact that ethnic cleansing was time and place specific renders its occurrence a function of the quality of political leadership.

On the national plane, a political culture which has allowed for marginalisation of minorities and their exclusion from the political life of the country has been conducive to ethnic cleansing. Moreover, internal opposition by resistance movements towards the purge of ethnic minorities has been insufficient to influence policy. On the other hand, the Western powers’ reaction towards ethnic cleansing in the region has been inconsistent: they overlooked it during the Balkan Wars of 1912-13 and during the Second World War in the former Yugoslavia; they condoned it in the aftermath of the

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201 See Chapter IV pp. 168-172.
First World War in the form of forced population ‘transfers’ between Greece, Bulgaria and Turkey; they initially overlooked it in Croatia and Bosnia in the early 1990s and then faced with *faits accomplis* they institutionalised it at Dayton in 1995; they pressed for its reversal in Bulgaria in 1989 and intervened militarily to reverse it in Kosovo, ten years later, in 1999. Although the responsibility for expulsion of million of peoples in the region does not lie with Western powers, the latter might have, even if unintentionally, become accomplices in this inhumane phenomenon either by dint of their indifference or through their lack of resolve and limited involvement to prevent ethnic cleansing or reverse it.

In sum, ethnic cleansing in the Balkans reflects the incompatibilities of territorial expansionism and the official perception of minorities as a threat that undermines the cohesion of the dominant nation. As part of the process of nation-state building, it is a testimony of the failure of governments to accommodate inclusively ethnic minorities. Although the rationale for ethnic cleansing has been often interpreted in terms of promoting state security by increasing its homogenisation the proportionality of such an act is questionable. Homogenisation might contribute to mitigate the danger of ethnic strife but this relation is not necessarily deterministic. The costs of increasing the degree of national homogeneity by means of ethnic cleansing in terms of human suffering, infliction of unrest in the neighbouring countries and the precedent set have been tremendously high, rendering the feasibility of this enterprise deeply problematic.

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202 See Chapter VI.
IV. Debating some causal explanations for ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s

'History is a highly usable commodity, since it [helps] a political elite to formulate its ideas and regulate its political discourse'.

'...the relevance of the security dilemma in explanation is greatly reduced because it no longer looks unavoidable...'.

'I can only regret that awareness of my nationality came to me in such a painful way, through death, destruction and the suffering of people, and through reduction, accusations, suspicions and extreme homogenisation.'

IV.1 Introduction

Having elaborated on the occurrence of ethnic cleansing as a shared problem in the Balkan peninsula in the twentieth century, I consider in the present chapter some possible causal explanations for ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s. Like no other case in recent times, this one has attracted the attention of scholars – giving rise to a growing body of literature as a result.

Yet the kinds of explanations proffered have been varied each focusing on specific features of ethnic cleansing or on the propensities of actors to behave in certain ways under certain conditions. The ‘certain conditions’ are usually subsumed under various concepts, such as ‘history’, ‘ancient ethnic hatreds’, ‘fear’, ‘security dilemmas’, ‘(ethnic) nationalism’, and may be categorised as ‘explanations by concept’. Such a list of the explanations by concept is not necessarily all-inclusive. It could be extended, of

course, to include politics, which because of the prominence of this factor, will form the basis of next chapter. It could be extended also to include the collapse of the Yugoslav federation. However, it is assumed here that while this latter factor may have acted as a catalyst for the conflict it does not necessarily explain ethnic cleansing. Susan Woodward is right when she points out that ‘there would have not been war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, if Yugoslavia had not first collapsed’. In principle, the beginning of a course of events might be spoken of as in some sense essential; but as Oakeshott asserts ‘a mere beginning explains nothing, is logically neutral and cannot take the place of a cause’. Indeed, although the disintegration of the Yugoslav Federation might have been a necessary condition for both war and ethnic cleansing, it is not a sufficient one for either. Other states such as Czechoslovakia and the former Soviet Union have disintegrated in the aftermath of the Cold War but none have experienced ethnic cleansing and large scale war. Another approach regards conflict in general as stemming from the failure to fulfill basic human needs. Here a fundamental weakness is that different people may have different needs and a hierarchy of needs has so far not been established. In any case, although inadequate provision of necessities might act as a catalyst for conflict, it does not necessarily lead to violent conflict – ethnic cleansing included. Yet, although this theory is not that powerful in explaining violent conflict, it is worth consideration in a study of conflict resolution.

This chapter considers some of the most pertinent explanations for ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s. Given the recurrent expulsion of ethnic minorities

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5 For considerations on the crises that crippled the Yugoslav federation see Chapter V, pp. 178-184.
in the region one is inclined to inquire whether history played a role in the incidence of ethnic cleansing in the 1990s. Some accounts of the latest conflicts in the former Yugoslavia contend that violence was conditioned by bitter historical memories that have produced a culture of ethnic hatred. Real or perceived conflicting historical representations and memories coupled with, at times, hostile attitudes between different nations or ethnic communities, it is argued, have produced a climate of mutual fears. But, how far does the existence of fear and security dilemmas contribute to ethnic cleansing? The following analysis examines these propositions and evaluates the extent to which they are valid. A further approach for consideration depicts (ethnic) nationalism as the evil of our time and places the blame for several wars and ethnic conflicts on it. The last section of this chapter considers the extent to which nationalism has explanatory purchase in the context of ethnic cleansing.

IV.2 The Role of History

History for a historian can be what nature is for a scientist i.e., the realm of his/her inquiry. Many analysts scrutinise history in hope of revealing some trends which would help make more sense of events and build a mental scheme or charter for them. A successful outcome would have meant first of all less exercise for the mind. Events would be chained historically and any present or future event would be understood in terms of past ones. Present and future would repeat the past. History would repeat itself. The fallacy of such an endeavour, nevertheless, stems from lack of appreciation of the different nature of ‘nature’ and ‘history’. Alas, this is not the predominant view of history. Indeed, some scholars have realised the ‘stubbornly enigmatic’ nature of history.
and have suggested that 'history reveals flashes of coherence and moral meaning, but no clear patterns'.

But, when it comes to Balkan history, very little of it seems enigmatic, as many observers tend to read the present in terms of the past. William W. Hagen, for instance, writing at the close of the millennium, has argued that 'today's tensions are the result of the region's absorption into the Ottoman Empire, which led to the extraordinary dispersion and intermixture of ethnic groups' in the Balkans. While George F. Kennan, for his part, traces the origin of the conflict even further back in history. He contends that the recent Balkan conflict 'is a problem with very deep historical roots. Those roots reach back, clearly, not only into the centuries of Turkish domination but also into the Byzantine penetration of the Balkans even before that time...'. Are we therefore to conclude, by induction, that war and ethnic cleansing have been ever present in the region? Did, then, Robert Kaplan get it right when he concluded that 'today's events are nothing more than the sum total of everything that has gone before'?

As a way of considering the validity of such claims let me start by asking 'what is history?'. Michael Oakeshott, for instance, points out that for a historian history should be 'thinking about the past for the sake of the past; it is a way of thinking about the past

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free from all extraneous interests'.\textsuperscript{13} This he called 'the historical past', i.e., the past for its own sake, different from the present and independent of it.\textsuperscript{14} But the past which he took to be the most important and distinguishable from 'the historical past', is what he termed 'the practical past':

'Wherever the past is merely that which proceeds the present, that from which the present has grown, wherever the significance of the past lies in the fact that it has been influential in deciding the present and the future fortunes of man, wherever the present is sought in the past, and wherever the past is regarded as merely a refuge from the present – the past involved is a practical past, and not a historical past. This practical past will be found, in general, to serve either of two masters – politics or religion.'\textsuperscript{15}

In other words, in practical experience, the past is designed to justify, to make valid practical beliefs about the present and the future. It constitutes an argument the form of which disguises its real content and cogency; the language is that of history, while its thought is that of practice.\textsuperscript{16} In this sense, 'the past in history varies with the present, rests upon the present, is the present'.\textsuperscript{17} For this reason, history as René Descartes suggested, could not claim truth, for events never happened exactly as described in history books.\textsuperscript{18}

Implicit in the above is the idea of historical selection bias, which is often instrumental in so far as it aims to promote a particular position or standpoint. As Thomas Smith

\textsuperscript{14} Oakeshott, \textit{Experience and its Modes}, pp. 102, 106.
\textsuperscript{15} Ibid., p. 103.
\textsuperscript{16} Ibid., p. 105.
\textsuperscript{17} Ibid., p. 107. For a similar view see also Benedetto Croce, \textit{History as the Story of Liberty}, New York: Norton, 1941, p.19.
\textsuperscript{18} For Descartes at issue was the idea of: historical pyrrhonism – historical narratives are not trustworthy accounts of the past; anti-utilitarian idea of history – untrustworthy narratives cannot really assist one to understand effectively the present; and the idea of history as fantasy-building – the way in which historians distort the past is by making it appear more splendid than it really was. R. G. Collingwood, \textit{The Idea of History}, Revised edition. Edited by Jan Van der Dussen, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993, pp. 59-60.
acknowledges ‘history is ripe for partisan selection and interpretation’.

Indeed, history offers a wide range of cases upon which one may choose what to remember and what to forget. Take, for example, the oft quoted battle of Kosovo of June 1389 – a historical event kept alive in Serbian national memory. Although the outcome of such battle is often portrayed as a defeat for the Serbs such depiction is disputed as historical data suggests that the outcome of the battle in fact was a draw. Indeed, the Serbian state lived another seventy years before it gave way to Ottoman rule. The great losses incurred in the battle and the death of Prince Lazar – a posthumous Serbian martyr – may have been sufficient to stimulate Serbian national awareness about the particularity of such an event. However, the claim that Serbs alone fought the Ottoman invaders of Europe is myth, for other peoples of the region fought alongside Serbs, as like the Serbs they had a vested interest in confronting the Ottoman occupiers.

Similarly, Tore Bogh has also contended that ‘the portrayal of the Serbian people as the historical bulwark against Islam is a delusion’. He supports this view with another example from fourteenth century history: the so-called battle of Nikopol (Bulgaria) – a crusade against the Turks organised by the French, German and Hungarian rulers – which took place in September 1396, thus, only seven years after the battle of Kosovo of 1389. Against expectations, the battle ended in victory for the Ottoman forces thanks to about 1,500 warriors that came to rescue the Turkish leader Bajasid [Bayezid].

19 Thomas Smith, History and International Relations, p. 3.
21 Fine Jr., The Late Medieval Balkans, pp. 568-577.
Irony is that the warriors in question were Christian Serbs led by Prince Lazar’s son and successor, Stefan.\textsuperscript{23}

It is interesting, therefore, to notice the choice made by the Serbian nationalists to remember and mythicise the battle of Kosovo of 1389, which subsequently became allegiance forming and to disregard or even forget the battle of Nikopol of 1396. In the same vein, political entrepreneurs of the 1990s, while preparing the ground for new wars and new campaigns of ethnic cleansing, conspicuously chose to remember the atrocities of the Second World War and to forget the recent 45 years of more or less peaceful interethnic coexistence. Once again the highlighted memories became allegiance forming while suppressed ones passed into oblivion.

Acknowledging the link between the past and the present raises the question of how far the present draws from the past. Does the past perhaps condition, or even dictate, the present or is it the present that affects perceptions of the past. The answer to this question is succinctly given by Michael Ignatieff. In his words: ‘it is not how the past dictates to the present, but how the present manipulates the past that is decisive’. Applying this in the case of the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s, he continues that in order to mobilise for war, nationalists had to convince neighbours and friends that in reality they had been massacring each other since time immemorial ...(although)... history has no such lessons to teach... The Balkan peoples had to be transformed from neighbours into enemies, just as the whole region had to be turned from a model of interethnic peace into a nightmare from the pages of Thomas Hobbes.\textsuperscript{24}


\textsuperscript{24} Michael Ignatieff, 'The Balkan Tragedy', New York Review of Books, 13 May 1993, pp. 3-5, at p. 3.
The selective recall of history also found expression in the propaganda war, which emerged in the late 1980s and early 1990s about the numbers of the dead during the civil war of 1941-45 with Serbian nationalists arguing that more than 700,000 Serbs were murdered by Ustaša forces while Croatian nationalists putting this figure down to only tens of thousands.\(^\text{25}\)

The validity of historical memory can be questioned, however, particularly when the events involved belong to a far distant past. In principle, as Fred Halliday points out, what has happened in living memory is what should matter: 'it is not the most ancient that is valid, but the most recent'.\(^\text{26}\) That said, unlived (for the majority of the population) memories associated with the atrocities of the Second World War needed not supersede the living memories of more than four decades of peaceful interethnic coexistence. For the people of the former Yugoslavia are no more haunted in perpetuity by their past history than any other people. That they have been encouraged to dwell in the past 'misdeeds' of their neighbours is a testimony of the instrumental twisting of historical memory in order to buttress present policy preferences and present political interests. It also testifies to the 'value added' interpretation of history. In this view, history is endowed with 'value esteeming' i.e., it does not have value in itself, according to its nature, but instead, at times, it has been given value by elites to serve political ends.\(^\text{27}\) The story of the battle of Kosovo, for instance, became legendary because so it suited Serbian clerical and nationalist elites.\(^\text{28}\) Similarly, the revival in the 1990s of the

\(^{25}\) For the Serbo-Croat conflict of 1941-1945 refer to Chapter III, pp. 98-103.


\(^{27}\) Christopher Coker, War and the 20\(^{th}\) Century, p. 98. The author refers to Nietzsche’s interpretation of history. Emphasis in original.

\(^{28}\) Central to the story of the battle of Kosovo is the role of the assassin, Miloš Obilić, one of Tsar Lazar’s paladins, whose loyalty was doubted by his lord. His disappearance on the eve of the battle seemed to confirm the suspicion against him, but in fact he had crossed over to the Turkish camp in order to kill the
memories of previous atrocities was a matter of the elite choosing to evoke these specific historical values at that particular time, in order to reinforce national antagonisms, incite hatred and vengeance, and stimulate new atrocities.²⁹ Indeed, manipulation of history was a crucial device in emphasising differences and creating ethnic polarisation. As Tom Gallagher points out:

In the absence of racial and linguistic differences ... manipulation of the past may have been the obvious route to take for elites intent on widening group differences. The past was turned into a contemporary political resource by reviving old conspiracies or inventing new ones, emphasising past wrongs, asserting historic rights, and promoting stereotypical images of neighbouring peoples.³⁰

On the other hand, that present political considerations render leaders selective in their treatment of past history does not mean that the study of history is futile. In principle, history is there for scholars to learn from and draw lessons notwithstanding that ‘...lessons are sometimes wrongly learnt, or the wrong lessons learnt...’³¹ The problem is not that history has no function, or mission, or use, but rather that history is almost always prone to subjectivity and the predilection of those who write or interpret it.

Steven Majstorović, for instance, has argued that history constrains ‘the options that leaders exercise...’. He maintains that historical constraints are particularly applicable

Sultan. Despite this suicidal act, the Turks managed to capture Tsar Lazar and then executed him. However, it was not the noble Lazar’s preference for a heavenly crown instead of earthly subjection which lived most vividly in the Serb folk memory, but Miloš Obilić’s cunning murder of the Sultan. Mark Almond rightly suggests that the glorification of this act by nineteenth-century writers helped stimulate the cult of political murder at the beginning of the twentieth. ‘The grand futility of Obilić’s act became its fascination’. Mark Almond, *Europe’s Backyard War — The War in the Balkans*, London: Mandarin, 1994, p. 191.

²⁹ See ibid., especially pp. 3-7, 135.
for the Serbs: ‘the Serbs, more than the Croats and Muslims, are shackled by their view of history and may not be able to escape what they see as an apocalyptic destiny ... to defend Christianity from the mounting forces of Islam’. Moreover, he argues that not only Milošević but any Serbian democratic alternative would be constrained by history. At least two problems, however, can be identified with this argument. First, before the conflict erupted – as indeed during its course and also in its aftermath – there was no convincing evidence of ‘mounting Islamic forces’ in the region. In point of fact, although the largest ethnic group in Bosnia and the majority of the population in Kosovo were Muslims both societies were largely secular. Secondly, Majstorović’s argument does not make clear why history needed to constrain Milošević (or some democratic alternative) to the extent of waging war and undertaking ethnic cleansing of other ethnic groups. While the perception of history might affect one’s understanding of particular events, history determines neither choices nor actions.

One does not have to obscure the fact that in the course of history there have been clashes between Serbs, Croats, Bosnian Muslims and Albanians. But, conflict between them – war and ethnic cleansing included – has not been a permanent factor of interethnic relations but rather situational i.e., occurring at a particular time and a particular place as opposed to all times and all places. That said, previous cases of violent conflict in the former Yugoslavia needed not condition ethnic cleansing in Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo in the 1990s. Indeed, previous conflict could have well

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served as a deterrent to rather than as a precedent for the latest campaigns of ethnic cleansing and its accompanying wars.

The presumption that ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s was determined by the history of past conflicts ignores a wide range of factors that may well have contributed more directly and vigorously to the emergence of the latest conflict. In particular, it disregards the selective use of history which the elites employed in a bid to legitimise their political aims and interests. In addition, it fails to explain why past history motivated the 1990s conflict in the former Yugoslavia but did not do so in the rest of the world. As Michael Brown has pointed out, 'other (ethnic) groups ... have historical grievances of various kinds' but those 'have not led to violent conflict in the 1990s'.

History is not set in a linear motion that would lead us from the past straight up to today's events in some recognisable pattern. People are not necessarily either haunted or bounded by history. Past history does not have to determine the present. The main problem with the view that embraces any form of historical determinism is that by exempting leaders from moral responsibility for their actions it leaves no room for agency. As Reinhold Niebuhr wrote:

Even when the historic situation is [a] tragic ... one, and when a careful estimate of historic probabilities is bound to lead to more pessimistic than optimistic conclusions, we have no right to speak of 'inevitabilities' in history. Men are always agents, and not merely the stuff, in the historical process.

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34 Thomas Smith, History and International Relations, p. 154.
35 Niebuhr wrote this in the framework of the Cold War but his conclusion fits just fine in our context as well. See, Reinhold Niebuhr, 'A Protest Against a Dilemma's Two Horns', World Politics Vol. II, No. 3, 1950, pp. 338-9. Isaiah Berlin is another outstanding personality that denounced historical inevitability in general. Historical determinism, in his view, stems from 'a desire to resign our responsibility, to cease from judging provided we be not judged and above all be not compelled to judge ourselves, from a desire
In other words, leaders' options have had choices and when they make the wrong decisions the responsibility for this does not have to lie with history. In the case of the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s, it was not past history and its memory that constrained the options that leaders exercised but rather their present political interests and considerations.

IV.3 'Ancient Ethnic Hatreds'

In conjunction with the view that considers conflict in the former Yugoslavia as historically determined there is another explanation for the conflict that takes its starting point from a pessimistic reading of history. Looking only upon the past regional conflicts, this view attributes recent wars and ethnic cleansing in the Balkans to 'the bestial vice' of 'ancient ethnic hatreds' that allegedly permeates the region. The assumption here is that the tradition of enmity in the region has been so powerful that 'it has thrust itself in the genetic makeup of the region's inhabitants'\(^\text{36}\) — hatred itself being part of the so-called Balkan temperament.

Such an assumption may seem discredited today, nonetheless, it held sway especially in the first years of the conflict, even amongst policy-makers who, perhaps, should have known better. Foreign Ministers from the European Community sent to Yugoslavia in 1991 to resolve the crisis alluded to the 'Balkan temperament, a south Slavic predisposition — either cultural or genetic — toward fratricide'.\(^\text{37}\) Former British Prime Minister John Major when commenting upon the events in the former Yugoslavia in

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1992 spoke of 'those people, wrapped in their 'ancient hatreds'...' Similarly, speaking at a news conference in February 1993, the former U.S. Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, stated that:

The death of President Tito and the end of communist domination of the former Yugoslavia raised the lid on the cauldron of ancient ethnic hatreds. This is the land where at least three religions and a half-dozen ethnic groups have vied across the centuries. It was the birthplace of World War One. It has been a cradle of European conflict, and it remains so today.

In March of the same year, President Clinton also depicted the conflict between Serbs, Croats and Bosnian Muslims in terms of hatred: 'the hatred between all three groups ... is almost unbelievable. It's almost terrifying, and it's centuries old. That really is a problem from hell ...'. Moreover, this line of reasoning was quite common amongst journalistic accounts of the conflict. A frequently quoted journalist, Robert Kaplan, contended that in the Balkans 'men have been isolated by poverty and ethnic rivalry, dooming them to hate'. While communism kept the processes of history and memory in the region on hold for forty-five years, upon its collapse 'the lid was taken off' and millennial conflicts exploded with all their extraordinary hatred. Even academics promulgated such a view. Mearsheimer and Van Evera, for instance, write of Kosovo as being 'consumed by a war that stems from hatreds born of great cruelties that Albanians and Serbs have inflicted on each other in the past'. While William Hagen observed

38 Cited in Misha Glenny, Balkans, p. xxiv.
that 'the war in Kosovo has reinforced the Balkans' image as a cauldron of ethnic hatred'.

Nor is there anything novel in the notion of the revival of 'ancient hatreds' in the Balkans. It is interesting, for instance, to read in a 1913 Carnegie Report on the regional conflicts associated with the Balkan Wars that the 'fading away of the Turkish Empire meant that the accumulated hatred of centuries were unleashed...'. The origin of the ethnic hatreds in the former Yugoslavia, nevertheless, remains a matter of dispute, some observers insisting on their age-old character; others arguing that hatred is not ancient but instead modern. Noel Malcolm, for instance, argues that 'the idea that differences should be a basis for hatred is, historically, a recent innovation, brought in by intellectuals and politicians in the 19th century when they tried to impose the theory of the homogenous state on their very heterogeneous homelands...'. Other scholars suggest that ethnic hatreds are of even more recent origin and are associated with the World War Two massacres. Yet, others argue that hatred was manufactured, mobilised and manipulated by scrupulous leaders intent to serve their own political interests and garner popular support while preparing the ground for conflict and also during its course. That hatred accompanies fighting and atrocities is hardly a revelation, but this is not to say that collective hatred is a constant and uniform occurrence.

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45 The Other Balkan Wars, at n. 3, p. 71. This view, however, is contradicted by other data represented in this report. A letter of a Greek soldier, for instance, printed in page 148 of the report states: 'We are - such is the order - to burn the villages, massacre the young, and spare none but the old people, children and minors'; implying therefore that the violence was a top-down one and not the result of accumulated hatreds. In addition, one reads in this report that war could have been avoided by imperative orders from Athens, Belgrade and Sofia (p. 73), thus testifying to the political origin of the Balkan Wars.


A closer examination of the assumption that attributes ethnic cleansing to the re-awakening of ancient hatreds suggests that it is an empirically flawed argument. To start with, the ancient hatred view is reductionist and a simplistic one as it remains unreflective of fundamental contemporary causes of the conflict. Moreover, it represents a static view of reality as it fails to take into account considerable periods in history during which ethnic groups coexisted peacefully aside each other. Adherents of this approach, therefore, can be criticised of being 'guilty of selection bias'. Indeed, they eschew the fact that the pattern of amity and enmity between different ethnic groups and nations in the region did not follow a linear trajectory but rather shifted at times with amity and enmity being mobile qualities. Reducing the causes of ethnic cleansing to the simple formula of 'ancient hatred' or the 'Balkan temperament' means reading history the wrong way. As Russell Hardin emphasises 'if [ethnic hatred] systematically underlies history' -- as this approach would have us believe -- '[such hatred] must be systematically evident'. But, history does not support this claim, as for the most part the relations between the peoples of the region have been smooth.

Similarly, Aleksandar Fatić suggests that in the late 1990/1 when the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) began to disintegrate, there was no overwhelming hatred between its constituent nations and national minorities. SFRY was a fairly prosperous country with some understandable mutual animosities, dating back to the Second World War, but there were by no means glaring, and were certainly not a major political and security threat. They were no more pronounced than similar animosities in other countries of the region'. Aleksandar Fatić, Reconciliation via the War Crimes Tribunal?, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000, p. 17.


Bogdan Denitch, for example, maintains that except for communal massacres associated with the Second World War, Serbs and Croats have lived together more or less tolerably for four centuries. See Denitch, Ethnic Nationalism: The Tragic Death of Yugoslavia, revised edition, Minneapolis, London: University of Minessota Press, 1996, p. 62. Noel Malcolm also points out that while prior to 1878 -- the year of the Congress of Berlin that ended the Ottoman occupation of Bosnia -- violence was not associated with ethnic conflict but rather it was sparked by agrarian conflicts between serfs and landowners, from 1878 onwards (with the exception of the two World Wars) interethic relations have been generally good. Noel Malcolm, 'Seeing Ghosts', p. 85. And although the Serb and Albanian communities in Kosovo have
By the same token, if ancient ethnic hatred was so pervasive, how would one account for the ever-increasing number of inter-ethnic marriages in the region? In Yugoslavia, in the 1980s, more than 3 million people out of a population of around 22 million were products of ethnically mixed marriages or were married to someone of a different ethnic group. In Bosnia by the late 1980s, 30% of marriages in urban areas were mixed marriages. Moreover, ethnonational relations in workplaces and neighbourhoods were generally good. The Yugoslav Survey of the 1990, for instance, reveals that 36 percent of the respondents characterised ethnonational relations in workplaces as 'good', 28 percent 'satisfactory', and only 6 per cent said 'bad' or 'very bad'. According to the same source, relations in neighbourhoods were considered to be 'good' by 57 percent of the interviewees, 'satisfactory' by 28 percent of them, and only 12 percent chose to describe such relations 'bad' or 'very bad'.

The contention that ancient hatred motivated the latest conflict and aggravated it to the extent of ethnic cleansing is largely grounded on untypical moments of history. With the exception of the 1990s, ethnic violence in the former Yugoslavia tended to be contingent on external – regional or global – conflicts such as the Balkan Wars or the two World Wars rather than self-generated. Furthermore, concentration on conflicts between ethnic groups conceals the divisions within them. Indeed, the Serbs of Croatia may have had more in common with their Croat neighbours than with their Serb

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brethren in Serbia. Similarly, Serbs, Croats, and Muslims in Bosnia may have had far more in common with each-other than they did with either Serbs from Serbia or Croats from Croatia. In conditions of war and ethnic cleansing hatred exists, but rather than being the cause of violence it may well be its consequence.

In sum, the ancient hatred thesis lacks explanatory power and misses the essential nature of the recent ethnic cleansing campaigns and the conflict in general. Its main function has been to obscure the understanding of the conflict particularly by blaming all parties equally for the situation and reducing attacker and defender to the same status. Indeed, 'one bundle of hatred could be no better and no worse than another'. Consequently, the adherence to the ancient hatred proposition rationalised inaction or, at best, limited involvement on the part of the Western powers on the ground that intervention in such an irrational quarrel would be counterproductive trapping the Western armies in a permanent quagmire with no exit in sight. In addition, the ancient hatred assumption distracts attention from the fact that it was national elites that stimulated, mobilised and utilised hatreds for their own political ends. For leaders, this was a means to polarise society and mobilise support as a way of gaining and consolidating power. Indeed, depicting the conflict in terms of hatreds made it easier for the national leadership to legitimise policies of ethnic cleansing, i.e., the homogenisation of the nation from 'the hateful other(s)'.

55 Noel Malcolm, 'Bosnia and the West: A Study in Failure', The National Interest, No. 39, Spring 1995, pp. 5-6. For some the blame was an orphan. As Lord Carrington, the EC negotiator, declared after few weeks of the initial Serb attack on Bosnia (March 1992): 'Everybody is to blame for what is happening in Bosnia and Herzegovina and as soon as we get the cease-fire there will be no need to blame anybody'. While in an interview of December 1994, he declared: 'I don't think any [of the three parties is] particularly in the wrong. They are all in the wrong. And all have some right on their side'. Cited in the same source.

IV.4 Fear

Other scholars, when tracing the causes of wars and ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia, adopt yet another approach, which pivots on the mutual fears and insecurity of the conflicting parties. In the view of David A. Lake and Donald Rothschild, for instance, intense ethnic conflict is most often caused by collective fears of the future. When individuals and groups fear for their safety, security dilemmas with their potential for violence abound. It is this context of fear and insecurity that in turn becomes conducive to elites’ efforts to polarise and mobilise society.\(^\text{57}\) This ‘bottom-up’ view has attracted attention of a number of analysts who contend that fear was a crucial element in bringing about violence.\(^\text{58}\) The following seeks to evaluate the extent to which ethnic fears, i.e., collective fears of contending ethnic groups, contributed to the incidence of ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia during the 1990s. First, I ask what was feared and by whom, then I consider the utility of fear from the leadership perspective.

IV.4.1 The range of fears

Post World War Two Yugoslavia was not a fear-free environment. In the immediate aftermath of the war some still feared the return of wartime atrocities, whereas after 1948 Tito’s break with Stalin the fear of a possible retaliatory strike by the Soviet Union was wide spread. Moreover, the fear of Great Serbian restoration did not disappear among non-Serbs while Serbs for their part feared that the non-Serb fellow Yugoslavs would conspire to undermine Yugoslav unity and secure their own states in two of

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which — Croatia and Bosnia — Serbs would become persecuted minorities. Nevertheless, there is no reason to suspect that the existence of collective fear set the former Yugoslavia apart from other communist countries of Eastern Europe. Aleksa Djilas’ depiction of the communist Yugoslavia as a system based on fear (in the sense that to challenge it often meant the loss of job or even imprisonment) is real but such depiction could just as reliably have been applied to any other former communist country. Yet, this background of fear was not unimportant since it provided a ground conducive to the rise and manipulation of new fears.

As the Yugoslav federation began to disintegrate the institutions designed to provide law, order and stability were undermined creating, in turn, a situation in which uncertainty and insecurity were pervasive. In such a setting, groups were bound to fear for their own future. While Serbian nationalists made exaggerated claims with regard to the ‘threats’ to the Serbs in Kosovo and then also to those in other republics, the non-Serb peoples of the federation fearing the implications of Serbian protective nationalism reacted with their own heightened nationalism, thereby generating a vicious spread of interrelated fears encompassing majorities and minorities alike.

In the context of uncertainties over the new state boundaries an evident anxiety was the fear of loss of territory. This fear was in particular associated with the Serbs, 40 percent of whom lived outside Serbia proper, mainly in Bosnia and Croatia. Nonetheless, the

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60 Djilas, ‘A Profile of Slobodan Milošević’, p. 87.
61 Barbara Walter has identified, in general, five fear-producing environments namely: the government collapse; geographical isolation or vulnerability of ethnic minorities; shifts in the political balance of power; redistribution of resources; and, forced or voluntary disarmament in the aftermath of a peace treatise. Coincidentally, in the case of the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s, her last four fear-producing environments can in fact be viewed as a function of the first one i.e., the federal government collapse. See Walter, ‘Introduction’, in Walter and Snyder, eds., *Civil Wars*, pp. 4-8.
widespread territorial distribution of the Serbs in Yugoslavia proved to be an asset on which the Serb nationalist leaders were able to capitalise in their bid to create a ‘Greater Serbia’ that would include Croatian Krajina and Bosnia. Fear of lost territory on the part of the Serbs was only aggravated by purposeful misuse of state propaganda and media. Historical memories and national myths associated with the contested territories were rekindled and the nationalist rhetoric portrayed territory as sacred, ‘something that cannot be lost under any circumstance’. A zero-sum conception of territory implied that at stake were Croatian Krajina and the whole of Bosnia.

Given that all republics of the former Yugoslavia (with the exception of Slovenia) were multinational, fear of secession by minorities was very pronounced among majorities, especially given that dissenting minorities (with the exception of Bosnian Muslims) had a mother country in one of the adjacent states, which were legitimately concerned with the welfare of their kin. Fears of secession among the Croatian, Bosnian and Serbian leadership respectively were heightened as elites of the Serb minority in Croatia, Serb and Croat community in Bosnia and Albanians in Kosovo claimed repeatedly their intentions to secede. Once the Serbian minority in the Krajina region of Croatia had declared its self-styled independence and seized control over about a third of Croatia’s

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63 Although not completely controlling all media outlets, Milošević had under his supervision the state television station whose director and key staff he appointed and replaced as necessary. Newspapers (and magazines) were not influential because few people afforded buying them; still, Milošević controlled the three largest of them. Mark Thompson, Forging War: The Media in Serbia, Croatia Bosnia and Herzegovina, Revised Edition, Luton: University of Luton Press, 1999. Peter Maass, Love Thy Neighbour – A Story of War, New York: Alfred A. Knopf Inc., 1996, especially p. 227.
territory, and the Serbs of Bosnia had declared their Republika Srpska, fears of the loss of territory had been confirmed as secession had become in fact *faits accomplis.*

On the other hand, *fear of becoming a minority* was perceptually equated with becoming a victim in a foreign state, given that in the region minorities had been usually dominated by majority groups. In the Yugoslav federation, nationalities other than Serbs came to see themselves in a disadvantageous position, given the dominant role of Serbs particularly in the army, state and communist party structures. This might well have been one of the key reasons for the disintegration of the federation especially in the case of Slovenia and Croatia. But once the federation was no more, there was no reason for Macedonia either to remain within the contour of the rump Yugoslavia. As Gligorov put it (presumably addressing a Serb): ‘Why should I be a minority in your state when you can be a minority in mine?’

In regions where minorities were disproportionally large minorities, fear of becoming demographically overrun by another ethnic community was quite pronounced. As George Schöpflin points out, ‘where the demographic reproduction rates of the two communities are ... disparate ... one group concludes that the massive growth in size of the other means that it has lost the ethnic game [and] that its ability to ensure its cultural reproduction has been undermined’. This fear had been looming large in Serb minds since Kosovar Albanians maintained a majority in increase within the province.

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65 Republika Srpska remains in place as to-date although within the borders of Bosnia, while the Serbian move in Krajina has been reversed. The Albanians of Kosovo declared their independence in July 1991 but have not, so far, received international recognition.

66 This saying has been attributed both to the former president of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Kiro Gligorov and his son Vladimir Gligorov. Steven Majstorović, ‘Ancient Hatreds or Elite Manipulation?’, p. 172 attributes this to the former whereas *Unfinished Peace: Report of the International Commission on the Balkans,* with a foreward by Leo Tindemans, Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1996, p. 32 attributes this to the latter.

Similarly, the Serbs were worried about their numerically disadvantageous position in the contested areas of Croatia and Bosnia. While Bosnian Muslims did not have an absolute majority, Serbs in Bosnia were hardly a minority either. In such a demographic setting, as Susan Woodward has pointed out, the rhetorical support from Zagreb and Belgrade to Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Serbs respectively were sufficient to make Bosnian Muslims feel like a vulnerable minority, while Sarajevo’s insistence on an integral and independent Bosnia made Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Serbs feel vulnerable on their part. Voting along ethnic lines meant, therefore, that Serbs and more so Croats would *de facto* be a minority in Bosnia should a system of majority rule – as in Croatia and Serbia – be adopted.

Understandably, this spectrum of fears translated into *the fear of loss of security* both in its economic and political aspects. Loss of territory would have meant fewer natural and man-made resources and consequently loss of property, jobs, etc. Whilst, politically, loss of territory would have meant diminution of state sovereignty. Moreover, fear of becoming a minority may not only have been perceived in terms of assimilation (which would have amounted to loss of cultural identity), or in terms of discrimination and persecution but, perhaps also as a threat to physical existence at the level of the individuals and group. This fear was aggravated especially by the activated memories of past atrocities and inflated figures of casualties associated with inter-ethnic fighting during the Second World War as both Croatian and Serbian nationalist leaders ‘engaged

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68 According to the 1991 census, Bosnian Muslims constituted 43.7 percent (up from 39.5 percent in 1981) of Bosnia’s population; Serbs 31.4 percent; while Croats constituted 17.3 percent. There figures are cited in Susan Woodward, ‘Bosnia and Herzegovina: How Not to End Civil War’, in Walter and Snyder, eds., *Civil Wars,* p. 82.

69 Ibid.
in a war of numbers sought to provide victimhood and justification for a pre-emptive strike'.

On the basis of the above it may be concluded that prior to the occurrence of ethnic cleansing in the 1990s, as well as during its course, fear was not an ephemeral emotion but continuous and persistent. The conditions of dissolving the federal state were highly conducive to a variety of fears, which may have induced ethnic groups to consider providing for their own security as the crippling federation failed to offer reliable protection. These fears were not utterly without foundation and may help one to understand, for instance, why war and ethnic cleansing were to some extent supported by the community of the perpetrators. Nevertheless, although the role of fear should not be overlooked, its functional character should not be missed out.

IV.4.2 The functionality of fear

The remaining of this section asks whether fear conditioned behaviour to the extent of ethnic cleansing. Were reactions of the perpetrators permeated wholly by distrust and fear with no room for rationality and calculation? Was fear the driving motivation for ethnic cleansing or was it used to legitimise policies and actions of the perpetrators instead?

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71 Among the first to study fear as an emotion – a negative emotion – was Aristotle, who saw it as 'a kind of pain or disturbance resulting from the imagination of impending danger ...' and '...attended by a certain expectation of undergoing some destructive experience'. Aristotle's interest in fear, however, is that of the orator who only seeks to produce or control it. He, therefore, does not attempt to offer an account of the relation between fear and human behaviour as such. See Aristotle, The Art of Rhetoric, Translated with an Introduction and Notes by H. C. Lawson-Tancred, London: Penguin Books, 1991, pp. 153-156.
Although the impact of fear on human behaviour is not the focus of this discussion, it is relevant since like other emotions, it influences perceptions of others and 'especially how ambiguous actions and situations are interpreted'. Fear also can affect cognition, for as a familiar saying has it: 'the way one knows is the way one feels'. In fact, more often than not, fear tends to impair careful cognition rather than enhance it. As Arne Ohman points out, fear is threat focused in that the fearful is biased towards discovering threat and also inclined to build hostile images of those that s/he perceives as a source of fear and threat. At the same time, the presence of fear tends to promote memories of past threatening situations even when the present setting is considerably different from the past. Nonetheless, the effect of fear on behaviour through perception, cognition, image, etc., tends to be unintentional, and not necessarily dire in its consequences. For, as American vice president Lyndon Johnson once said: 'Every damn place you go there's fear', yet, not in every place there is war and/or ethnic cleansing.

Figueiredo Jr. and Weingast have cogently argued that for politically frail leaders who seek to maintain power by inducing massive change in their societal environments fear holds the key to success. The success of such a strategy, whose costs are borne by masses, requires that the average citizen be engaged and approves the policy of leaders who, in turn, skilfully manufacture and play upon ambiguous situations. Fear proves indispensable for the architects of this strategy as they use the fears imbued in people in

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order to garner their support. Overwhelmed by fear for their lives, livelihoods, and families, citizens become more willing to support extremist state policies.\textsuperscript{75}

The Serbs under the rule of Slobodan Milošević provide an instructive example. Since the early stages of his career he had 'sensed an opportunity in Serbian fears' and encouraged and exploited them as a means towards his political ends.\textsuperscript{76} As Aleksa Djilas points out, Milošević 'succeeded because he understood the power of fear and knew how to use it for his own purposes'. Fear became his faithful ally in manipulating Serbian masses, in winning party cadres and securing support of the military and paramilitary forces.\textsuperscript{77} Not only did his leadership employ ruthless criminals to create a climate of interethnic fear and suspicion\textsuperscript{78} but, aided by state propaganda and newsmedia, it also promoted fear as a source of conflict.\textsuperscript{79} In turn, fear became instrumental at the hands of manipulative leaders as part of their efforts to increase the receptivity of their arguments. Indeed, abundance of fear facilitated their persuasive appeals.

This was a tactic that delivered results as far as mobilisation of citizens was concerned. As George Schöpflin puts it: 'People can be 'stirred up' if they feel that there is something to which they might respond, like fears as to the future of the community;

\textsuperscript{76} Ivo Banac, 'The Fearful Asymmetry of War', p. 151.
\textsuperscript{77} Aleksa Djilas, 'A Profile of Slobodan Milošević', pp. 87, 95-96.
\textsuperscript{78} See for instance Susan Woodward, \textit{Balkan Tragedy}, p. 238. The notorious campaigns of mass rape, plunder and killing led by the Serb warlord Željko Ražnatović – known as Arkan – are a case in point. Although such campaigns were public knowledge, the Serb leader Slobodan Milošević considered Arkan to be a Serb patriot. See Vesna Perić Zimonjić, 'My Conscience is Completely Clear, Milošević Declares', \textit{The Independent}, 13 December 2000, p. 17. Similarly, the former Bosnian Serb leader Biljana Plavšić kept Arkan in her company for most of the 1990s and publicly declared him a 'hero'. See Maggie O’Kane, 'Court Comes of Age with Her Surrender', \textit{The Guardian}, 12 January, 2001, p. 13.
mobilisation must have resonance if it is to work.\textsuperscript{80} In terms of the nationalist mission, therefore, fear served to provide the necessary cohesion and resonance needed to secure popular support. In addition, from the leadership perspective, fear had the positive effect of distracting the attention of the masses from the logic of conflict and its evidence. At the same time, by spreading fear, elites were also facilitated in their endeavour to propagate the thesis of ethnic hatreds and dehumanise the targeted others. Furthermore, like hatred, fear was particularly useful when implanted amongst soldiers and paramilitary troops as this exhorted them to be fiercely ruthless and act with courage against demonised ethnic groups.

This is to suggest that the role of fear in the occurrence of ethnic cleansing was not deterministic. Instead of pushing actors into confrontation, fear could have played an accommodative role, serving as an incentive to resolve the situation peacefully. That this was not the case was a matter of choice: leaders elected to act otherwise and use fear as a self-serving tactic, i.e., as a means of garnering support and legitimising their exclusivist policies. In particular, fear of loss of territory was skilfully exploited by nationalist elites of the dominant group(s) to argue that all measures – ethnic cleansing included – were legitimate to prevent loss of contested areas. Although a permissive factor, fear alone can not be blamed as a cause of ethnic cleansing in the sense that the expulsion of targeted minorities was not bound exclusively with its (fear's) existence. It may, however, provide clues as to why citizens, at least some of them, were somehow willing to support exclusive policies of ethnic cleansing planned by their leaders.

\textsuperscript{80} Schöpflin, \textit{Nation, Identity, Power}, p. 258.
IV.5 The security dilemma and securitisation

Fear as a function of uncertainty, threat and insecurity has been considered, particularly by the realist school of International Relations, to be at the heart of the security dilemma.Crudely, the gist of the security dilemma is that each actor by striving to increase its own security inadvertently provokes fears and countermeasures that reduce the security of others. Realists have employed the security dilemma to analyse state behaviour in conditions of anarchy i.e., the absence of a world sovereign. While the impetus of the security dilemma is fear, the preconditions of the security dilemma include rational, defensively motivated actors that strive for security in an anarchical environment characterised by first-strike advantages and the indistinguishability of means of defence and offence. In addition, uncertainty about the intentions of others, which can easily evolve into fears is another requirement for the security dilemma.

This latter requirement suggests that what is important in a situation of security dilemma is one's perception of the intentions of others and one's belief about them rather than the true intentions of others.

The application of the security dilemma in analysing ethnic conflict, however, is a recent enterprise of mainly the 1990s, Barry Posen being amongst the first scholars to apply this approach. The essence of Posen's argument is that when the state is in process of disintegration, the different nations and ethnic groups that once lived under

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82 Melander, Anarchy Within, pp. 21-23.
its umbrella are left to fend for their own security. In taking steps to defend themselves, members of any given group threaten inadvertently the security of other groups, which lead them to take measures in order to bolster their own security and diminish that of their adversaries. Driven by perceptions of threats and insecurities ethnic groups get caught on cycles of security dilemmas which, in turn, lead to violence.84

Since Posen wrote his article in 1993, a number of scholars have embraced the view that security dilemmas are useful in understanding wars and ethnic cleansing that befell the former Yugoslavia during the 1990s.85 One of the most pertinent studies of the security dilemma especially in relation to the Bosnian conflict is that of Erik Melander, who investigated the role of the security dilemma in the eruption of the war between Serb nationalists and Croat nationalists, and the war between Serb nationalist faction and the Bosnian Government.86 Following a compelling analysis of the military balance Melander concludes that the logic of security dilemma provides a plausible explanation for the eruption of war and ethnic cleansing in the first case. In his view, it was strategically advantageous for the Serbs to avoid or postpone a confrontation with the Croat nationalist faction over Bosnia and concentrate on defeating the Bosnian Government first. This would have allowed the powerful Serb military to deal with its adversaries one at a time and prevent the Croats and Muslims from combining their

84 Erik Melander distinguishes between ethnic security dilemmas and other security dilemmas as, for instance, those between states, the main difference being that whereas states are separated by borders, actors in ethnic conflict(s) that get caught in security dilemmas are not insulated from each-other by borders but instead are more or less intermingled. In addition, the type of military and intelligence resources at the disposal of actors is substantially different in the two cases, i.e., in the case of ethnic security dilemmas intelligence resources are relatively unsophisticated while armed forces are mainly based on infantry. Melander, Anarchy Within, p. 37.


86 Melander, Anarchy Within, Chapters 6 and 7.
strategic assets so as to obtain maximum synergy. Had they defeated the Bosnian Government first, the Serbs would have been in a more advantageous position to confront the Croats since their lines of communication would have been safer and more strategic positions secured to lend credence to a successful strike. The reason why this scenario did not materialise, Melander argues, is that the Serbs were hinged by the lack of trust that their Croat counterparts would refrain from co-operating with the Muslims, leading instead to an acute security dilemma that in turn induced the Serbs to try and strike a crippling preemptive blow against the Croat nationalist forces. In contrast, Melander concludes that the security dilemma is redundant as an explanation for why the Serb nationalists initiated large scale war and ethnic cleansing against the Bosnian Government and its supporters. The reason for this is that the leadership of the Serb nationalist faction was aggressively revisionist in the sense that these leaders were willing to go to war in order to extract a revision of the status quo at a time when the Bosnian Government harboured no hostile intentions and lacked the military capability to strike first and initiate war against the vastly superior Serb forces.

Melander's analysis is compelling and provides many important insights. Nonetheless, the security dilemma does not necessarily provide a valid explanation for the initiation of war even in the case of the Serbs versus the Croats. Although better armed than the Bosnian Muslims, it is doubtful whether Croat forces possessed the military capability to strike a serious first blow against the superior Serb forces, at least in 1991-1992.

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87 Ibid., Chapter 6. In many ways, this lack of trust on the part of the Serbs was something of their own doing. It was the Serbs who following the declaration of independence of Slovenia and Croatia waged war briefly against the former and then against the latter for six whole months, in the course of which the Croat inhabitants of Krajina were ethnically cleansed and a third of the Croatian territory occupied. Moreover, the Serb nationalist faction started to concentrate its military arsenal in Bosnia in preparation for war since late 1991. See Chapter III, pp. 112-114 and Chapter V, pp. 196-197. It follows, therefore, that any expectation on the Serb side for Croatian trust might have well been unrealistic.

88 Melander, Anarchy Within, Chapter 7.
Moreover, the other precondition of the security dilemma, namely the indistinguishability of means of defence and offence, was missing in every instance of war and ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia. Given that the target of ethnic cleansing were civilians, who of course were defenceless, the offence had its upper hand and it was clearly distinct from defence. In addition, considering both cases as part of one larger war of the dissolution of Yugoslavia may provide important clues for the Serb nationalist policies. As Melander accepts in the last page of his study, what was at stake in the former Yugoslavia were ‘demands for ethnic unmixing by foremostly the Serb nationalist faction’ and this was ‘a major contribution to the break down of interethnic trust’. Had the Serb leadership demonstrated a ‘genuine commitment to democracy and minority rights’ the bloodshed could have been avoided. It is the ‘undemocratic policies which contribute[d] to demands for independence or union with another state’ that ‘trigger[ed] fears of ending up on the wrong side’ of the borders and gave way to a security dilemma. Unlike Serb demands for ethnic ‘unmixing’, the security dilemma was not the cause of war and ethnic cleansing.

Whereas the security dilemma did not cause war and ethnic cleansing, its presence, nonetheless, might have been important in inducing people to participate in the events directed by the elites. Furthermore, it might have been useful for the elites to manipulate security concerns among the grassroots and create security dilemmas, or exacerbate or take advantage of the already existing ones, as a means of intensifying group solidarity and mobilising popular support for a confrontational course of action which had nothing to do with the safety and well-being of their followers but instead served leadership

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89 Ibid., p. 236.
parochial interests.\textsuperscript{90} For objective or subjective reasons, the security dilemma is widespread. Indeed, as Morgan’s quote at the beginning of this chapter suggests, the relevance of the security dilemma in explanation may be greatly reduced not least because it (i.e., the security dilemma) may be unavoidable.

A related explanatory argument appears to be that of \textit{securitisation} which may be applied to understand the ways in which labelling an issue as a security problem gives that problem a special status and legitimates the extraordinary measures taken by state representatives to deal with it.\textsuperscript{91} The most serious security problems involve threats to state survival, i.e., to sovereignty.\textsuperscript{92} But, societal threats that emerge when nation and state do not correspond neatly, associated with claims of secession – when a group claims it own sovereignty; or irredentism – when a part of the population and the territory it inhabits is claimed by another state; pose no less serious threats to a state demanding in turn governmental action.\textsuperscript{93} According to Buzan and Waever, securitisation – the presentation of an issue as an existential threat and the acceptance of such a claim by the audience – demands the use of extraordinary measures to deal with the perceived existential threat(s).\textsuperscript{94} Translated to the case of former Yugoslavia in the 1990s, the logic of securitisation means that once a government or an elite has presented an ethnic group/minority as an existential threat to the well being of the dominant community, and once such a claim is somehow accepted by the latter, than the elites’ decision to ethnically cleanse the group that posed the threat may seem legitimate. This


\textsuperscript{93} Ibid., p. 153.

is precisely why securitisation is problematic, however, unless one is speaking from the point of view of the perpetrators of the crimes. Indeed, the logic of securitisation appears thoroughly deterministic. By not allowing for other alternative forms of action, the concept of securitisation provides no theoretical ground for disputing ethnic cleansing in the first place.

Nevertheless, securitisation may be important in understanding how some governments securitise issues in order to justify the use of extraordinary measures. In this respect, Buzan and Waever have picked up a significant moment in the securitisation continuum, but they have not problematised either the government who does securitisation, or its homogenising project(s), or the extraordinary means such a government may employ to deal with the alleged threat(s). In addition they have left unanswered some important questions: why in some cases securitisation produces more insecurity than security? May not the means i.e., use of the extraordinary measures undermine the end i.e., the provision of security, the elimination of the threat(s)? Are not the alleged existential threats heavily prejudged? Why aren’t alternative responses considered? In short, securitisation is a one-sided explanation since it tells the story from the point of view of the architects and perpetrators of ethnic cleansing and by making no allowance for alternative forms of action it appears to rationalise the use of extraordinary measures to deal with the perceived threat(s).
IV.6 The Role of Nationalism

Much of the intellectual curiosity about nationalism stems from its apparent association with conflict. Yet, few scholars have tried to connect the two phenomena together.⁹⁵ As James Mayall has pointed out, the reason why nationalism has been somehow neglected in International Relations may have to do with the fact that the focus of the discipline has been, and remains, intertwined with the consequences rather than the causes.⁹⁶ Nonetheless, given the theme of this thesis, it is appropriate to consider the extent to which nationalism can explain violence and ethnic cleansing – a question that this section addresses. Accordingly, the following will elucidate the concept of nationalism and its potential for violence. Then, the proposition that views the divergence of ethnonational identities as a source of ethnic cleansing will be examined.

IV.6.1 Nationalism: Its meaning and potential for violence

As with concepts, such as ‘nation’, ‘ethnic community’ or ‘ethnicity’ there is no agreed definition of ‘nationalism’. As pointed out in Chapter II⁹⁷ the difficulty of defining such terms lies with the intangible nature of the entities they are supposed to define and also with the problems inherent in delineation, i.e., how to draw a dividing line between

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⁹⁵ Amongst the few to explore the connection between nationalism and war, Barry Posen has argued that states act purposefully to produce nationalism because of its utility in mass mobilisation warfare. Indeed, nationalism increases the intensity of warfare and the ability of the state to mobilise the creative energies and the spirit of self-sacrifice of its warriors. Barry R. Posen, ‘Nationalism, the Mass Army, and Military Power’, in John L. Comaroff and Paul C. Stern, eds., Perspectives on Nationalism and War, p. 136. Considering the connection between war and nationalism, Stephen Van Evera has predicted that nationalism will pose large risks in Eastern Europe where politically frail elites engage in chauvinist mythmaking, where there is no consolidated tradition of respect for minority rights and where borders lack legitimacy and correspond poorly with ethnic boundaries. Stephen Van Evera, ‘Hypothesis on Nationalism and War’, International Security, Vol. 18, No. 4, 1994, pp. 33-34.


⁹⁷ Chapter II, p. 38.
overlapping phenomena. Most scholars, nevertheless, agree that nationalism is a modern phenomenon that emerged in the last two hundred years in the aftermath of the French and American revolutions and is therefore associated with the existence of the modern state. G. de Bertier de Sauvigny suggests that 'nationalism' appeared first in literature in 1789 and did not appear again until 1830. From then until the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries this word was not used extensively. In the 1930s, Carlton J. H. Hayes considered nationalism to be a modern fusion of two very old phenomena – nationality and patriotism. Although Hayes' definition has not survived widely in our days, it does have a useful purpose, as it is one of the pioneering qualifications that differentiate between nationalism and patriotism. Walker Connor has also emphasised this distinction. Connor maintains that 'nationalism and patriotism refer to two quite distinct loyalties: the former to one's national group; the latter to one's state (country) and its institutions'. He contends that in the case of ethnically homogenous (or nearly so) states, nationalism and patriotism become indistinguishable. But, in the case of multiethnic states nationalism and patriotism are in conflict with each-other and when such conflict is perceived irreconcilable in the sense that people feel they must chose between them, nationalism customarily proves more potent. The disintegration of Yugoslavia, in his view, can be seen in this light, as the Albanian, Bosnian Muslim, Croatian, Macedonian, Serbian and Slovenian nationalism has each proven more potent than a Yugoslav patriotism.

100 For Hayes nationality was an attribute of human culture and civilisation, nationalities being groups of people who speak either the same language or closely related dialects, who cherish common historical traditions, and constitute or think they constitute a distinct cultural society. Patriotism, on the other hand, referred to the love of country or native land. Carlton J. H. Hayes, Essays on Nationalism, New York: The Macmillan Company, 1937, pp. 6, 12, 29.
Because nationalism is multifaceted, the task of its definition is uncommonly difficult. Ernest Gellner, for example, argues that ‘nationalism is primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent’, and that ‘...nationalism requires that ethnic boundaries should not cut across the political ones.’

In contrast, Anthony Giddens stresses the psychological/emotional character of nationalism, ‘the affiliation of individuals to a set of symbols and beliefs emphasising commonality among the members of a political order’, and, therefore, he undermines the political character of nationalism. Exclusive reliance on the psychological/emotional character of nationalism is, however, problematic, not least because it poses an handicap in understanding and explanation. Indeed, it is not clear why emotion alone should condition behaviour. If nationalism is wholly emotional, and conflict and violence is attributed to it, why does violence erupt in some places, at certain times, but not others? This indicates that mass violence may not be inherent in the national sentiment and that there is more to nationalism than mere emotion.

Michael Freeden has suggested that nationalism is characterised by five core elements. First, the prioritisation of the nation as a key constituting and identifying framework for human beings, nationhood being the condition in which this occurs. Second, a positive valorisation of one’s own nation, whose interests and values take priority over all other values and interests. Third, the urge to give political and institutional expression to the nation, sometimes conceived as the possessor of the state. Fourth, space and time are considered crucial determinants of national identity. Fifth, there is a sense of belonging

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and membership in which sentiment and emotion play an important role.\textsuperscript{104} While acknowledging the emotional dimension of nationalism, this conceptualisation concedes that nationalism is primarily a political phenomenon, the first four core elements depending on a political elite which formulates them and devises a strategy for their fulfilment.\textsuperscript{105}

Nationalism has traditionally been a salient contributor to state building and the formation and consolidation of the national identity. Its political components are sufficiently amorphous to allow for various interpretations, enabling thus the elite to utilise nationalism as a legitimating tool for their policies. The psychological component of nationalism, on the other hand, can serve as a useful tool to persuade people to support the elites and their political platforms and therefore contributes towards fostering socio-political ties.

In principle, all ideologies carry emotional attachments to their particular conceptual configurations because human values excite emotional and rational support and also because ideologies constitute mobilising ideational systems to change or defend political practices.\textsuperscript{106} The distinction of nationalism, nonetheless, is that it institutionalises and legitimates emotion as a motive force of political life. As Micheal Freeden puts it: 'In nationalism, the role of emotion becomes an overriding consciously desired value – which is why it contains such useful sets of ideas when recruitment to


\textsuperscript{105} This is not to deny the fact that the elite needs the support of the masses, it is rather to emphasise the elite dependent nature of nationalism. As Lord Acton said early in the past century: 'The few have not strength to achieve great changes unaided, [but] the many have not wisdom to be moved by truth unmixed'. John Emerich Edward Dalberg-Acton (Lord Acton), 'Nationality', in \textit{The History of Freedom and Other Essays}, edited by John Neville Figgis, London: Macmillan, 1919, p. 272.

\textsuperscript{106} Freeden, 'Is Nationalism a Distinct Ideology?', p. 754.
the flag and sacrifice are predominant political ends'. Therefore, it follows that the emotional component of nationalism has political overtones, in so far as it is influenced by political agendas and allows for political exploitation.

The acknowledgement that nationalism was a strong component of war and ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia is almost commonplace. Indeed, the ‘return of the repressed’ idiom borrowed from Sigmund Freud and applied in the scholarly rhetoric with reference to ‘ancient ethnic hatreds’ and historical memories, has been extended further to include also the ‘return of the repressed’ nationalism and ethnonational identities. The essence of the latter account is that nationalism and ethnonational identities were rooted in pre-communist history but were then suppressed by the communist regime. With the collapse of communism this gloom-and-doom perspective views the region as a seething cauldron of violence due to the forceful return of suppressed nationalism. Rogers Brubaker has considered the above view with reference to Eastern Europe and argues that nationalism flourished in the 1990s largely because of the policies of the communist regimes which although repressed nationalism, at the same time institutionalised territorial nationhood and ethnic nationality as fundamental social categories, thereby creating a political field conducive to nationalism. Nevertheless, not all analysts consider nationalism to have been frozen during the reign of the communist regime and some disagree on its timely origin. Susan Woodward, for instance, is among those who argue that nationalism was not repressed in the former Yugoslavia; instead it was institutionalised by the federal system. For William

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107 Ibid.
109 Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, p. 45.
Hagen, on the other hand, nationalism does not appear to have been a new development. He argues that ‘to a historian, today’s Balkan crisis are rooted in, above all, the crippling dependence of all Balkan peoples on the ideology and psychology of expansionist nationalism’ which in the case of Serbia, for instance, ‘has defined the country’s political culture since Napoleon’s days’.  

Cathie Carmichael has argued that ethnic cleansing in the Balkans is tied to the ideology of nationalism (as defined by Gellner) that spread in the region following the collapse of the Ottoman and Habsburgh empires in the 19th century and the collapse of Yugoslavia in the late 20th century. Attributing ethnic cleansing to nationalism, she concludes that: ‘Nationalism has had more power over individuals’ lives in the Balkans than any other political force in the last two hundred years. Nationalism will continue to determine the fate of the individual, whether he or she believes in its truth’. The direct relation she depicts between ideology and human action is, however, not unproblematic. Ideology may motivate behaviour but it is not clear whether it determines it. Moreover, ideology appears both as a rationalisation of certain forms of political action and as an instrument of such action and it is precisely this double-edged role which ideology plays in political movements, both promoting and ‘reflecting’ those movements, that makes it difficult to provide any causal analysis of the relationship between political ideology and political action.

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112 Ibid., p. 110.
113 For this last point see John Breuilly, *Nationalism and the State*, p. 383.
Considering the role of ideology one should avoid the risk of overemphasising ideas to the detriment of agency. Indeed, ideas cannot do much when left to themselves. It is the elite who primarily determines what is done with ideas, how they are interpreted and implemented. Consequently, the understanding of the occurrence of ethnic cleansing is bound with the agenda of the elite who conceived and presented the nation as constituted in certain ways, rationalised national values and interests, and made the case for their political and institutional expression. Whether nationalism relies on a subjectivist and voluntarist conception of nation (civic nationalism) or adopts a conception of nation that is based on lineage (ethnic nationalism)\(^\text{114}\) is primarily a function of political leadership. Whether the state is conceived as a nation-state or multiethnic is, again, dependent on the elite’s policies. So are the means embraced to achieve either of these goals. Nationalism is contingent of the quality of political leadership. The connection between nationalism and (violent) conflict may not only be mediated but also determined by the leadership and its policies.

IV.6.2 *Ethnic cleansing a clash of ethnonational identities?*

Some have argued that ethnic cleansing and its accompanying wars in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s are a result of conflicting ethnonational identities. Daniel Byman, for instance, contends that the collapse of the Yugoslav federation is ‘the most poignant recent reminder of the bloodshed and turmoil that can occur when national identities fail to coalesce’, implying, therefore, that when ethnonational identities are divergent any ethnonational group that falls under the political control of another nation

is exposed to danger, ethnic cleansing included.\textsuperscript{115} Similarly, Vivienne Jabri attributes conflicts that prevailed in the 1990s predominantly, if not solely, to identity differences.\textsuperscript{116} By the same token, in his 1997 account of the Bosnian conflict, Steven Majstorović argued that ‘the subjective and historically experienced nature of ethnic identity is ... precisely what drives ethnic conflict in Bosnia’.\textsuperscript{117} He maintains that history (at least since the time of conversion to Islam) provides fertile ground for primordial divergent and conflicting identities between Serbs, Croats and Muslims in Bosnia, as the unconsolidated Bosnian Muslim identity remained ‘a tug of war between Serbian, Croatian and Muslim interpretation of history’ .\textsuperscript{118} If, however, conflicting identities were constantly underlying conflict between these groups – as Majstorović suggests – conflict then should have been manifest all the time because, as he argues, identities were divergent all the time. Following this logic, therefore, his argument leaves unanswered the question: ‘where were divergent ethnonational identities in times of peace?’ – that is the majority of the time span since conversion to Islam which constitutes the starting point of his argument. Moreover, if divergent ethno/national identities underline conflict, how would one account for some curious alliances that emerged in the course of the 1990s wars. At times, the Bosnian Serb Army depended heavily on the supply of fuel from the Croat forces, a practice that continued even after the signing of the Federation agreement between the Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian


\textsuperscript{117} Majstorović, ‘Ancient Hatreds’, p. 173.

\textsuperscript{118} Ibid., p. 176.
Croats in early 1994. Furthermore, there have been even recorded cases when one side rented tanks from the other side.

But, of course, there are other problems with the proposition that ethnic violence in the former Yugoslavia stemmed from non-coalescing ethnonational identities. To start with, such a view tends to consider ethnonational identities as given, static, and immutable rather than historically contingent and dynamic. Instead, ethnonational identities are relational qualities that exist only in a context of relativities. It is in this relational context that the dynamic of identities evolve. This context does not have to be hostile and exclusivist, instead it can be co-operative and harmonious as members of different communities, while preserving their distinctiveness, borrow certain features of others although selectively. The situation in the former Yugoslavia is not an exception to this.

In addition, those that emphasise differences of ethnonational identities overlook the fact that especially in times of conflict and war, leaders traditionally have been keen to reinforce the ethno/national identity because of its potency as a military resource and because of its potency as a source of popular mobilisation. Moreover, the perspective that views ethnic cleansing as stemming from conflicting identities underplays the

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121 In spite of pointing that ethnonational identity is continuously reformulated and therefore flexible, Majstorović for instance, maintains that this is so only within the framework that does not threaten the constraints imposed by myth and memory, although he refrains from considering the ways in which myths and memory emerge as well as their objectivity. See, Steven Majstorović, 'Ancient Hatreds', p. 171. Despite being cautious in the use of language, ethnonational identity in his view seems to be static in so far as the boundaries set by myth and memory are static.

manipulation and instrumentalisation of ethnonational identities by political leaders for their own interest. In point of fact, ethnonational differences were ‘politicised, distorted, and exploited as additional powerful weapons of division and as explanation and justification for barbarities’ by the respective elites. The strenuous efforts of elites in Zagreb and Belgrade to construct two different national languages out of a previously single one are a case in point.

Viewing ethnic wars and campaigns of ethnic cleansing as rooted in conflicting ethnonational identities misses another important point, namely, that it was war and ethnic cleansing that increased the significance of ethnonational differences and reinforced collective identity. Similarly, it was in the aftermath of the atrocities that the national sentiment became stronger and the salience of differences was overemphasised. The comment of a Bosnian Muslim in charge of transport for the Bosnian army in the Travnik region during the Bosnian war exemplifies this point: ‘I never thought of myself as a Muslim. I don’t know how to pray. I never went to a mosque. I’m European like you. ... But now I have to think of myself as a Muslim, not in religious way, but as a member of a people...’ While in the decades prior to the 1990s, individuals in the Yugoslav federation might have not identified themselves in the first place by ethnic criteria, with the eruption of violence they had no option but to identify with their own ethnic kin if protection was to be secured.

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124 Although written in different alphabets, for many linguists differences between Serbian, Croatian and Bosnian dialects were less pronounced than the difference between American and British English. See Bogdan Denitch, Ethnic Nationalism, pp. 28-29.
125 See David Turton, ‘Introduction: War and Ethnicity’, p. 3.
127 This was particularly the case given that national leaders appealed to their nations in terms of arguments about survival, arguing that the fate of the individual depended on the fate of the group and that the role of the group for the individual and the role of the politician for the group was protection. See
Given that ethnic cleansing is about ethnic purification of territory it is obvious that ethnic cleansing does acquire an identity component. Indeed, the expulsion of people from their homelands affects their individual and collective identity by detaching them from the physical base that provides a sense of identity. But, differences of ethnonational identities, in themselves, were insufficient to produce this inhuman phenomenon. The attachment to the homeland, native language, ideals, values, traditions and symbols – elements that constitute the ethno/national identity – do not require a people to reject or even dislike such traits in other people. By the same token, maintaining that these characteristics define a people as ‘different’ from others does not imply that such difference need necessarily be antagonistic. After all, difference does not always entail conflict and even if it does, the conflict need not be violent. The ‘us’ – ‘others’ dichotomy does not have to be confrontational. As Russell Hardin points out individuals can identify with a particular nation or ethnic community without having an out-group against whom to be hostile. In sum, there is nothing inherent in diverging ethnonational identities that leads necessarily to violence. As barely any state is truly a nation-state, diverging ethnonational identities are to be found in any country and yet practices of ethnic cleansing are not experienced in most of them. Identity difference may be exacerbated by exploitative power relations and asymmetrical material conditions which may in turn lead to conflicts of various degrees, but the appearance of non-coalescing ethnonational identities as a cause of violent conflict is misleading.


128 Russell Hardin, One for All, pp. 151-2.
129 For the context of the 1980s see Chapter V, pp. 178-187.
IV.7 Conclusions

This chapter has examined critically some of the more widely accepted schools of thought purported to explain the expulsion of ethno/national minorities in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s. Although a direct causal relation between ethnic cleansing on the one hand, and past history, fear, security dilemmas and nationalism on the other, was not found, an indirect, facilitating relation has been at play.

It is argued here that ethnic cleansing was not determined by the history of previous violent conflicts between the contending parties, although this is not to say that history did not have an influencing role. Indeed, the reactivated memories of past conflicts, especially those associated with the Second World War, contributed in forming peoples’ fears that the past might be repeated and increased the opportunity for politicians to influence the setting in which ethnic cleansing took place. Nevertheless, overemphasising past history and elevating its role to constraining leaders’ options to the extent of ethnic cleansing means denying that other options were available. In addition, it means an abdication of moral responsibility on the part of the perpetrators and also a justification for non-intervention or belated intervention on the part of the international community.

Although ‘ancient ethnic hatreds’ became a catch-all explanation for ethnic cleansing among many circles of Western politicians and journalists, especially in the early 1990s, this approach misses the complex nature of ethnic cleansing. Yet again, its main function has been to legitimise policies of inaction or limited involvement on the part of Western powers. In the context of national politics its function has been to polarise society and justify exclusive nationalist policies.
Moreover, the relevance of fear and security dilemma as causes of ethnic cleansing is greatly reduced due to the fact that they are omnipresent and therefore unavoidable. They did, however, act as an instrument of policy aiding leaders to mobilise support and legitimise their exclusive agendas.

The attribution of ethnic cleansing to nationalism is also problematic. As shown in the Introduction, the phenomenon of ethnic cleansing long preceded the nationalist ideology. Furthermore, the connection between violence and nationalism is not only mediated but also determined by policies set out by the elite. Whether nationalism takes a militant or a benign form is a function of political leadership. Similarly, non-coalescing ethnonational identities are not inherently violent. They not of themselves fed into the flames of ethnic cleansing but instead the politicisation and manipulation of such identities by national elites.

The above analysis has identified the decisive role played in the occurrence of ethnic cleansing by the political leadership as the sole agent responsible for choosing and implementing the exclusive policies in dealing with ethnic minorities. The action of the political elite intended to bring about national homogenisation takes a central place in this causal inquiry not only because it represents the main cause of ethnic cleansing but also because when the question arises as to how far back the cause(s) of ethnic cleansing in the post-Cold War Yugoslavia should be traced – the political leadership of the 1990s may be regarded as a limit. The following chapter proceeds to consider the politics of ethnic cleansing in the closing decade of the twentieth century.

\[130\] See, Introduction, pp. 14-16.
V. The Politics of Ethnic Cleansing

'As President (of the Presidency) of Bosnia Herzegovina, I am sorry that in this situation I must talk for the Muslim people. I solemnly state that the Muslims will not attack anyone. However, just as solemnly I state that the Muslims will defend themselves with great determination and survive'.

'We have to secure unity in Serbia if we want, as the biggest and most numerous republic to dictate events ... These are questions of frontiers, essential questions of state. And frontiers, as you know, are dictated by the strong, not the weak ... [If we need to fight, we'll really fight. We may be no good at working or trading but at least we know well how to fight].

'We have everything. We now control 70% [of the territory of Bosnia Herzegovina]. But we claim only 64%. All we need now is a negotiated settlement.

'Feeding or evacuating the victims rather than helping them resist aggression makes us accomplices as much as good Samaritans'.

V. 1 The concept of politics

Political activity, J. D. B. Miller has opined, arises out of disagreement and is concerned with the use of government to resolve conflict. Politics is about policy, and policy is a matter of either the desire for change or the desire to protect something against change. Disagreements in political situations evolve over the distribution of available resources, which almost always are insufficient to meet all the demands of each claimant thereto. The term 'resources' is here understood in a broad sense, including anything which is an

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1 Alija Izetbegović, the former President of the Presidency of Bosnia, addressing the Bosnian Assembly on 14 October 1991, after the Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić had threatened that the Muslims will 'disappear' should Bosnia opt for independence. Cited in Laura Silber and Allan Little, Yugoslavia – Death of a Nation, Revised and Updated Edition, London: Penguin, 1997, p. 215.

2 Slobodan Milošević, the former Serb President, addressing a meeting with local council leaders in March 1991. Cited in Marcus Tanner, Croatia – A Nation Forged in War, New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1997, p. 243.


4 Margaret Thatcher, the former British Prime Minister. Cited in Peter Maass, Love Thy Neighbour – A Story of War, New York: Alfred A. Knopf Inc., 1996, p. 269.

5 This is not to say that agreement never appears in politics; indeed resolution of conflict into some kind of agreement is one of the principal aims of political activity. The point Miller makes is that politics, to be distinguished as a recognisable activity, demands some initial disagreement between parties or persons and the presence of government as a means of resolving disagreement. J. D. B. Miller, The Nature of Politics, London: Gerald Duckworth, 1962, pp. 14, 16, 21.
of desire or need, such as food, raw material, monetary wealth, territory.\(^6\)

Possession of resources, on the other hand, is the typical means of attaining power. At the individual level of analysis, the power one has indicates one’s ability to produce intended effects upon the surrounding environment and to realise one’s purposes within it.\(^7\) Power is always relational; it is the ability to influence or control the actions of others, to get them do what one wants them to, and what they would otherwise not have done.\(^8\) In addition to being relational, power is also structural, that is to say, the relative differences of power between people are to a large extent the result of social arrangements. As David Beetham argues, central to the social organisation of power are processes of exclusion, typically embodied in rules, which prohibit general access to key resources, and which determine who may require the use and possession of them, and by what means. Resources become a means of power in so far as people can be systematically excluded from access thereto. If everyone had access to means of production and subsistence, and to instruments of physical force; if everyone controlled socially necessary activities and possessed the skills associated with their performances; if everyone occupied positions of authority; then resources would not constitute a basis for power relations.\(^9\) Because power relations involve negative features of exclusion, restriction, and compulsion, power arrangements stand in need of justification if the powerful are to enjoy moral authority as opposed to merely \textit{de facto} power, or validity.


\(^{7}\) Abilities here refer not to things which happen to one but instead to things which one does. Abilities, in this sense, are conditional dispositional properties that depend on the actor activating them, one necessary condition for exercising an ability being the actor’s will, his choice, to do so. In this conception, power is not concerned with affecting something (altering something, or impinging on something) but is concerned with effecting something (i.e., bringing something about, or accomplishing something). Peter Morriss, \textit{Power: A Philosophical Analysis}, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1987, esp. pp. 12, 19, 25, 29.


under a given system of law. The centrality of disagreements over distribution of resources as a means to power has popularised the expression ‘power politics’ indicating the intrinsic connection between the two terms. Indeed, the meaning of the one cannot be separated from that of the other. Hence a wide held conception of politics is a Weberian one that conceives politics as ‘striving to share power or striving to influence the distribution of power either among states or among groups within a state’.

This chapter deals with the politics of ethnic cleansing i.e., disagreements regarding official policies - at national as well as international level - that impacted on the exclusion of national minorities in Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo. The analysis starts with considerations about the collapse of Yugoslavia emphasising the legitimation crises and the emergence of identity politics which accompanied it. The claims to state power on the basis of ethno-national identity divided society along ethnic lines and facilitated efforts for organisation of political units on the basis of ethnicity. Accordingly, this chapter explores attempts by the Croatian and Serbian leadership to redraw borders in order to make their new polities congruent with their respective nations. Failing negotiation, war became a means to such an end, and the chapter proceeds to consider the contributing role, or otherwise, of war itself in state building efforts. The analyses, then, takes on board the nature of the international community’s response to ethnic cleansing.

10 Ibid, p. 57.
V. 2 The Legitimation Crisis and the Politics of Identity

Ethnic cleansing did not occur in a vacuum, and conditions that allowed for the expulsion of minorities were not created overnight. They were instead part of a gradual process that can be traced in the legitimation crisis which plagued the former Yugoslavia during the 1980s and the emergence of the ‘identity politics’ that filled the void created by the erosion of a system devoid of its former ideological base and effectiveness. The reason for considering the legitimation crisis is that it challenged what had previously justified the existence of the Yugoslav federation and released an intolerant spirit, which enabled claims to power on the basis of ethno-national identity to take place. The latter, known as the ‘politics of identity’, was important for the inception of ethnic cleansing due to the exclusivistic attitude in which such politics was premised and enacted.

Crisis, in general, refers to a crucial stage or a ‘turning point’ in a sequence of events. Jürgen Habermas has argued that in social scientific terms ‘crisis arise when the structure of a social system allows fewer possibilities for problem solving than are necessary to the continued existence of the system’. In his opinion, crisis in social systems is not produced through accidental changes in the environment but through incompatible structural imperatives that cannot be integrated in a hierarchical way. Crisis occurs due to persistent problems that ‘cannot be resolved within the range of possibility that is circumscribed by the organisational principle of society’.

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The nature of crisis that crippled socialist Yugoslavia was multi-layered with strong economic and political/constitutional dimensions. The Yugoslav federation was held together by a complex balancing act at international level and an extensive system of rights and overlapping sovereignties provided for in the constitution. But with Yugoslavia’s international status diminishing as the Non-Alignment Movement lost its significance and the Cold War neared its end, and with the gradual economic decline, the checks and balances that ensured the existence of the federation became increasingly non-operational. Throughout the 1970s an ‘artificial prosperity’ was achieved by a combination of rapid modernisation and readily available foreign credits, but this came to an end in 1980 when the terms of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for granting loans to Yugoslavia became more rigorous. The measures advocated by the IMF Recovery Plan including dinar devaluation, real interest rates and free movement of prices were unsuccessful. Toward the end of the decade, unemployment approached 20%, foreign debt reached US$ 23 billion and the monthly inflation rate was 2,500 percent. The gap in economic development between various regions in the Federation widened further. In 1987, for instance, the net personal income per worker in Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia and Macedonia was respectively 70%, 58%, 55% and 44% that of Slovenia. In particular, Kosovo – always Yugoslavia’s poorest region – became proportionately poorer vis-à-vis the country’s richer areas, in 1984, for example, the province’s wealth being only one-sixth of that of Slovenia.

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18 Gow, *Legitimacy and the Military*, p. 68.
Such economic conditions created serious tensions in the federal-republic relationship. Although republican governments were, in principle, economically independent, the constitution provided for taxation of richer republics in order to support funds not only for the federal budget but also for development of poorer regions, a provision increasingly rejected by Slovenia and Croatia. Conflict amongst republican leaders over economic resources, economic and political reform and debt repayment became constitutional conflicts and then a crisis of the state itself as politicians were unwilling to compromise. The heated debates over the political and economic re-organisation of the federation exemplified the tension between the option of centralisation and decentralisation of the federation, themes that had surfaced with vigour also in the interwar crisis. Not unlike then, political leaders of the wealthier regions, namely Slovenia and Croatia, favoured greater decentralisation of power coupled with economic and political liberalisation, and investment in their respective economies, whereas the southern regions, particularly Serbia and Montenegro, preferred centralisation of power and a command economy along with the redistribution of wealth and resources. Deprived of the support of the richer states, the federal government became increasingly paralysed, laws were not made and implemented, and societal cohesion was at risk. In a gradual fashion, the central government received less and less support from the citizenry and increasingly failed even to be the target of their demands because the people knew that it was incapable of providing supplies. The on-going

19 Woodward, *Balkan Tragedy*, p. 40. The Slovenes and Croats had put great hopes in an early entry into the European Community (EC) as a way of liberating their economies from the negative pull of Serbia and the South. 'Europe now' was one of the most potent slogans in the campaign leading up to the referendum in December 1990, and the Euro-flag fluttered over many buildings in Slovenia alongside the national flag. Mark Almond, *Europe’s Backyard War – The War in the Balkans*, London: Mandarin, 1994, p. 16.


21 Refer to Chapter III, pp. 91, 98-99.

crises threatened the principles which had legitimated the socio-political organisation of Yugoslavia producing in turn a need for alternatives, a need for re-legitimation.\textsuperscript{23}

Legitimacy is normally used to imply justification or validation of a practical activity. Thomas Frank has imaginatively conceived legitimacy as a property, which exerts a pull towards compliance on those addressed.\textsuperscript{24} The urge for legitimacy is a constant in the political life. As Inis Claude has pointed out ‘politics is not merely a struggle for power but also a contest over legitimacy, a competition in which the conferment or denial, the confirmation or revocation, of legitimacy is an important stake’.\textsuperscript{25} Legitimacy, therefore, is inherent in power relationships in so far as it justifies and renders them acceptable.\textsuperscript{26} Power and legitimacy are complementary and for statesmen, in particular, legitimacy is a highly desired property not least because it makes them more secure in the possession of power and more effective in its exercise.\textsuperscript{27} Crucial moments for legitimacy are times of change – transitional periods from an old to a new system, times of conflict and war – when criteria of legitimacy are challenged and contested.

James Gow, one of the few analysts to consider the issue of legitimacy in the context of the crisis in the former Yugoslavia, has offered a normative conception of legitimacy,


\textsuperscript{27} Claude points out that despite overlapping use of legitimacy, on the one hand, and law and morality, on the other, and although the latter are both important legitimacy principles they do not, however, exhaust the notion of legitimacy. The problem of legitimacy has a political dimension that goes beyond its legal and moral aspects, the process of acquiring legitimacy being ultimately a political phenomenon that may not be wholly determined by legal norms and moral principles. Claude, ‘Collective Legitimation’, p. 368.
conceiving it as a *crasis* i.e., a combination of three elements: environmental support, effectiveness and the (ideological) base of legitimacy, each of which being a necessary element that works on the others in a contingent way. However, Gow’s conception of the term and its application in the case of the former Yugoslavia reveal adherence to a historical or empirical approach rather than a normative one. The problem with a normative conception of legitimacy lies in the fact that even if agreement were to be reached on a set of criteria, fulfilment of which renders an activity legitimate, any effort to establish such condition means evaluating discretely only a specific moment (or period) of time when these criteria are satisfied. Adopting such approach defies the fact that legitimacy is a property of the legitimation process which requires evaluation. It is more useful, therefore, to speak of ‘legitimation’ as an activity or process that seeks ‘legitimacy’ rather than speaking of the property of ‘legitimacy’ in itself.

The work of Rodney Barker is illuminating when dealing with the conception of legitimacy or, for that matter, the impossibility of vesting such term with precise meaning. Barker distinguishes between ‘legitimacy’ as an abstract, ascribed quality of a government (or a political system in general) and ‘legitimation’ as an activity in which governments characteristically engage, the making of claims. If legitimacy is a fiction, an abstract political resource, a metaphor employed to describe circumstances where people accept claims made by the rulers, legitimation is an observable activity, a contested political process that involves creation, modification, innovation, and

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28 Gow, *Legitimacy and Military*, p. 20. David Beetham also speaks of legitimacy in a normative way. He identifies three criteria of legitimacy: (i) legal validity or conformity to rules, (ii) justifiability of rules in terms of shared beliefs, and (iii) legitimation through expressed consent. See David Beetham, *The Legitimation of Power*, p. 20.

29 While ‘legitimation’ and ‘legitimacy’ are used throughout this chapter, the above distinction is borne in mind whenever doing so.
transformation.\textsuperscript{30} Gow's analysis remains valid, nonetheless, so long as his term 'legitimacy crisis' is substituted by 'legitimation crisis', implying that what is analysed is a process, a governmental activity, its various ways and the degree of success for claiming legitimacy – which is what, in fact, he does.

Resurrecting the conception of legitimation as a \textit{crastical} activity, in the instance of the former Yugoslavia in the 1980s the case can be made that none of its three components (environmental support, effectiveness and ideological base) were providing general satisfaction. As mentioned above,\textsuperscript{31} economic crises of huge proportions and political/constitutional disagreements rendered the operationality of the central government ineffective. Simultaneously there was little faith in or support for the authorities' attempts to rescue the economy. At the same time, poor performance was eroding the ideological capital. Confidence in the Communist Party, for instance, fell from 49.8 percent in 1980 to 22.9 percent just two years later.\textsuperscript{32} Given the creeping paralysis of the federal government, legitimacy, as a government resource, devolved gradually to republican level, such devolution being \textit{de facto} formalised in 1990 with holding at the republican level of multi-party elections, the first of this sort since before the second World War.\textsuperscript{33} In the process, nationalism offered a partial, transitional basis for relegitimation. It supplanted the old ideological legitimation base provided by communist ideas and acted as a survival strategy for ambitious leaders keen to secure popular backing for their exclusivist policies.

\textsuperscript{31} Refer to pp. 179-180.
\textsuperscript{32} Gow, \textit{Legitimacy and Military}, pp. 21, 64.
\textsuperscript{33} Ibid, p. 122.
The devolution of legitimacy to the republican level brought about a new distribution of power and a new configuration of power relationships. The republics became sovereign entities but this did not imply that their respective new governments were able (or even intended) to satisfy all groups in their society. Indeed, as evidenced from developments during the 1990s, virtually in all republics the state was conceived as the sovereign state of the dominant nation, making other ethnic groups feel neglected, affronted, alienated, and excluded. Moreover, given the scarcity of resources, economic discrimination or privilege along ethno-national lines facilitated the politicisation of such identities giving ethnic difference political relevance. It is this political relevance attached to identity that in academic discourse has given way to the widely used term ‘identity politics’ or its equivalent ‘the politics of identity’.

Gaining currency in the 1990s, the politics of identity signalled a ‘shift in the grammar of political claim making’. Not only did ethno-national groups demand recognition but they also demanded resource allocation from the state in order to advance their interests and agendas. In other words, identity politics refers to claims to power on the basis of a given communal identity. This implies that identity politics is not necessarily about

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34 This was particularly the case in Croatia and Serbia with regard to the Serb and Albanian minority respectively. See Chapter III pp. 111-112, and below p. 219.
35 This conception of the nation-state was expressed explicitly in the constitutions of the new polities. See, Robert M. Hayden, ‘Constitutional nationalism in the formerly Yugoslav republics’, Slavic Review, Vol. 51, No. 4, 1992. The atmosphere of dissatisfaction that surrounded ethnic groups in the newly created states resembled to a considerable extent the situation of the republics in the immediate years preceding disintegration. In both instances this sense of alienation and neglect led to resistance and opposition.
38 Kaldor, New and Old Wars, p. 6.
identity *per se*, but rather about the use of identity to achieve certain goals; it is about the instrumentality of identity, the use of identity as a means to an end.\(^{39}\)

When embraced at the governmental level, 'the politics of identity' affects the social character of the state, the boundaries that the state sets between insiders and outsiders, and the kind of rights that the state grants to its citizens to the detriment of outsiders. The politicisation of identity that proceeded the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia and its immediate aftermath was primarily about strategic use of identity in order to win or defend rights and resources to the exclusive benefit of a particular group. It is the exclusivist spirit in which politics of identity was based and enacted that is important for the understanding of the inception of ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia. Politicisation of identity in this case may be understood as a response to perceived *power relations* that were deemed unjust and discriminating and as a *concerted* effort to resist them, rather than being simply about identity or difference *per se*. It is this conception of the 'politics of identity' that has explanatory purchase in relation to the eruption of violence and its escalation to large scale ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia.

The politicisation of ethno-national identity in such a case was facilitated by a number of structural conditions such as previous constitutional arrangements that had in fact institutionalised ethno-national difference.\(^{40}\) Moreover, the economic crisis that led to economies of shortage and competition for resources following the disintegration of

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\(^{39}\) Refer to Chapter IV, pp. 168-172.

\(^{40}\) The process was initiated with the 1974 constitution, which devolved considerable power to the republics. Since then the process did not reverse. See George Schöpflin, *Nations, Identity, Power - The New Politics of Europe*, London: Hurst, 2000, pp. 338, 356-7. For institutionalisation of the national identity in the successor states see Robert M. Hayden, 'Constitutional nationalism'.

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federal structures provided a conducive environment in which political relevance of identity could be nurtured. In addition, a weak civil society coupled with weak state structures guaranteed a shift towards the ‘ethnicisation of politics’ – the exercise of power by ethnic criteria. Ultimately, the politicisation of identity was manipulated by the political leadership. Indeed, the application of the ‘politics of identity’ in the case under consideration was a highly elitist process. This was so, because in order to legitimate themselves and their special power position, the elites couched their appeals in terms of collective identity in order to increase their claims’ credibility. Kinship itself was utilised as a form of social capital to establish relations of trust even where they previously did not exist.

Identification with a nation or ethnic community became a mechanism for political differentiation. The role played by the conception of enemies – the targeted ‘outsiders’ – was functional in marking community boundaries, first in ideological and then in physical terms. The virtual community boundaries nurtured among masses by the mediation of the leadership and the means of communication which the latter controlled and manipulated, gave way to real physical boundaries when the ‘politics of identity’ translated into appeals for self-determination on the part of nations that claimed intrinsic and unique rights to territory by virtue of their national identity. The putative new

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41 Kaldor, *New and Old Wars*, p. 79.
46 The principle of self-determination is ambiguous and its interpretations vary. Indeed, it is paradoxical that the same principle of self-determination that served as the rationale for the foundation of the Yugoslav Federation in 1945, was invoked in the 1990s as the basis for the disintegration of that
V. 3 Drawing New Borders: Making the Polity Congruent with the Nation

The dissolution of the Yugoslav federation obviously implied the creation of new political units but the underlying question of this process was what type of such units? First, would the new states be confined within the administrative borders of the former federal republics or would new borders be redrawn if necessary by force? Second, would the new states be based on egalitarian principles granting all citizens equal rights and protection; or would they be defined on parochial terms in which the state is conceived to belong to the majority nation to the detriment of ethno-national minorities? As the unfolding events showed, however, the predominant elite conception of the state was ethnic in character: a given state was sought to belong to a given nation. Initially, nonetheless, the Serb leaders (both political and military) appeared to resist the idea of disintegration of the federation, realising that the federation was the best way to protect their interests and dominant position while at the same time enabling all Serbs to live in one single state.\(^47\) In spite of that, given the resistance of Slovenia and Croatia to the Yugoslav federal organisation, the Serb leadership came to eventually accept the idea of the disintegration of the Federation, although in its (Serb) own terms.

The dissolution of Yugoslavia was bound to be a complex affair. The old federal constitution had provided for the equality of each and every constituent nation (narod) of the federation and although Serbs (and Croats) lived in various republics where they

did not constitute a majority, they did not consider themselves a minority either since they were a founding nation of the federation. This arrangement would no longer exist, however, should the federal republics gain sovereign status. Clearly, should administrative republican borders of the federation be legalised, the notions of 'majority' and 'minority' would shift to render former preponderant groups – such as Serbs – to a minority status in the most of new polities. The Serb president, who came to power by promising protection of the Serbs throughout Yugoslavia, was adamant that he would not tolerate the drawing of borders on the premise of uti possidetis, a principle of international law under which new states emerging from the fracturing of larger ones are recognised within their federal administrative borders. Challenging this international principle and with it territoriality as the basis of claims to statehood in the society of states, the Serb leadership strove to redraw borders so as to incorporate all Serbs in one greater Serbian state.

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48 Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, p. 32.
49 The Serbs constituted the largest nation in Yugoslavia but in late 1980s more than 2.5 million of them (out of 8.1 million) lived outside the administrative boundaries of the Serb republic, mainly in Bosnia and Croatia. These figures come from Lenard J. Cohen, Broken Bonds: Yugoslavia’s Disintegration and Balkan Politics in Transition, 2nd edition, Boulder: Westview, 1995, p. 126.
The core argument of the Serb president was that if Yugoslavia was to dissolve, only nations – not republics – had the right of self-determination and therefore of secession from the federation.\textsuperscript{52} In face of Slovene demands to self-determination, Milošević made it clear that Belgrade did not intend to oppose Slovene independence but wanted in turn the recognition of such a right for the Serbs as well; that is, all Serbs should have the right to live in a state of their own. In a meeting with students and academics of the University of Belgrade in March 1991, referring to Croatian demands to leave the federation, Milošević stated:

> It has not occurred to us to dispute the right of the Croatian nation to secede from Yugoslavia, if that nation decides of its own free will in a referendum ... but I want to make it completely clear that it should not occur to anyone that a part of the Serbian nation will be allowed to go with them.\textsuperscript{53}

The rationale of the Serb leadership for the redrawing of borders and their claim to govern assigned territories were couched in terms of the so-called ‘historical rights’ i.e., that such territories had been bequeathed by history in that the claimed areas had been part of an earlier Serb state, the Serbs had been largely indigenous in such territories and held legal title to a significant portion of these lands.\textsuperscript{54} Indeed, the Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić claimed the right of national sovereignty of no less than 64 percent of Bosnian territory where he alleged Bosnian Serb households held legal title to land and farm.\textsuperscript{55} Attempting to bolster their argument, the Serb leadership vested its claims

\textsuperscript{53} Cited in Silber and Little, \textit{Yugoslavia}, pp. 113, 131.
\textsuperscript{54} Arguments based on ‘historical rights’, however, are not associated exclusively with the Serbs, or with them only during the 1990s. The ‘historical rights’ logic has been part of the rationale for the acquisition of Kosovo by Serbia in 1912 and the control of the province since then. ‘Historical rights’ provided the bases for Zagreb’s territorial pretensions on Bosnia in the early 1990s, justified this time by the existence of the Independent State of Croatia during World War II, which included present Croatia and Bosnia. Moreover, ‘historical rights’ provided justification for the Greek official opposition to the international recognition of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in the early 1990s; Greece arguing that Macedonian territory had been Greek long before Slavs entered the Balkans. See, Woodward, \textit{Balkan Tragedy}, pp. 212-3.
with 'democratic' nuances by organising referenda in their communities in Croatia and Bosnia with entirely predictable results.\textsuperscript{56} Susan Woodward terms this as the 'democratic principle' of the national rights to territory – which she attributes mainly to the Serbs.\textsuperscript{57} Such terminology, however, is misleading not only because it camouflages the fact that the logic behind the Serb claims to territory was ethnically exclusivist, but also because it misrepresents democracy. Woodward misses the point that it is the elites who propose platforms and set out agendas. In a democracy the citizenry do not determine the issues they are called to decide upon; do not formulate and asks questions that they themselves have to answer; nor do they establish when the decision(s) should be arrived at.\textsuperscript{58} Indeed, the type of questions (and the way in which they are) asked are contingent on the elite and when the wrong questions are asked it is imprudent to expect right answers given by the people. As Offe asserts:

\begin{quote}
It is democratically impossible for the people to decide or (re)define who belongs to the people ... either by excluding parts of the population from the citizenship (for example, through ethnic cleansing) or by unilaterally incorporating collectivities that are outside the 'given' political community ... [T]erritorial borders cannot be changed in obviously democratic ways.\textsuperscript{59}
\end{quote}

The reason for this is that it is not likely to get generally agreed answers to the following questions: which constituency is to decide on secession – the majority of the separatist group, the whole, or concurrent majorities of both constituencies? And which constituency is to decide in the highly likely event of a second order conflict over these procedural alternatives?\textsuperscript{60} The Serb rationale for the re-drawing of borders cannot be

\textsuperscript{56} Refer to Chapter III, pp. 112, 115.

\textsuperscript{57} Susan Woodward, \textit{Balkan Tragedy}, pp. 212-3.


\textsuperscript{59} Offe, ‘‘Homogeneity' and Constitutional Democracy', pp. 116-7.

\textsuperscript{60} Ibid., p. 117.
interpreted in terms of democracy or democratic processes: it had instead to do with the
elite vision of the political organisation of the Serb State. The justification for the Serb
claim to territory, be it based on 'historical rights', or legal title to land and farm, or the
protection of Serb communities that would become minorities in Croatia and Bosnia
loosing thus protection provided by previous constitutional provisions, reinforced the
definition of territory on ethnic, exclusivist terms and validated the Serb attempts to
redraw borders even by means of force.

The politics of force, discernible in Milošević's statement at the beginning of this
chapter, were implemented with considerable success initially in Croatia, almost one-
third of whose territory was occupied by Serb troops by autumn 1991, marking thus,
even if temporary, the forceful alteration of borders. Although in late November 1991,
Milošević agreed to the deployment of international peace-keeping troops in Croatia,
such deployment was consistent with his central war aims which included partitioning
of Croatia into Serb and Croat entities, redrawing of borders between Croatia and new
Yugoslavia and eventual secession of Serb inhabited territories in Croatia and their
joining rump Yugoslavia. Milošević was aware that in an internationally recognised
Croatian state Serb troops would be considered as a foreign army invading another
country, so it was better for the Serbs to get the United Nations troops to freeze the
existing lines of confrontation, which would in time, Milošević might have hoped,
transform into de facto international boundaries.

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61 Silber and Little, Yugoslavia, p. 188. Gow, The Serbian Project, p. 152.
But the ethnic definition of territory posed an existential threat especially to Bosnia given its multiethnic composition and geostrategic importance as a gateway to a greater Serbia and a greater Croatia. The initial goal of the Serb leadership with regard to Bosnia was that the republic should remain within Yugoslavia regardless of whether Croatia and Slovenia were to secede from the federation. Given that Bosnia could not be prevented from seeking independence, the fall back position became the partitioning of the republic so that areas claimed by the Serbs could be joined with rump Yugoslavia. The Croatian policy in relation to Bosnia was more ambiguous, however, because the Croats’ opinions about Bosnia’s future were divided. The mainstream membership of the ruling HDZ and that of the Croatian army, concerned with the peace and territorial integrity of the republic of Croatia, maintained that Croatia could not insist on restoring its own territorial integrity if it conspired to undermine territorial integrity of another internationally recognised state (Bosnia). Moreover, this faction saw Bosnian Muslims as a natural ally against a common Serb opponent. Bosnian Croats of Sarajevo, Tuzla and other Bosnian towns supported Bosnian independence as well. On the other hand, the Herzegovinian Croats – known as the Herzegovinian lobby – who were well represented in the Croatian government, in the leadership of the ruling HDZ, among Tudjman’s advisors and Croatian diaspora – aspired to detach areas of western Herzegovina, and as much of Bosnia as possible, and link them up with Croatia.

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63 This position was shared also by the Serb military which was convinced about the importance of acquisition of Bosnian territories. As the Federal Defence Secretary General Veljko Kadijević maintained while the Yugoslav People’s Army began a process of manoeuvre and mobilisation across Bosnia whilst war in Croatia was still going on: ‘[Bosnia] by its geographical position and size [is] one of the key stones for the formation of a common state for all Serb people’. See James Gow, *Triumph of the Lack of Will – International Diplomacy and the Yugoslav War*, London: Hurst, 1997, pp. 33-4.


Although, in theory, the independence of Bosnia became imperative for the Croat leadership following the end of war in Croatia (in order to ensure that Bosnian Croats did not remain in the rump Yugoslavia), the said leadership did not desist from its territorial pretensions in Bosnia but conspired to divide the republic along ethnic lines.

The idea of division of Bosnia between Croatia and Serbia remained fundamental to both Serbian and Croatian policy considerations. Indeed, given their territorial pretensions, Milošević and Tudjman convened a series of meetings to discuss the partitioning of the Bosnian republic. Reportedly inaugurated in March 1991 with a meeting in Karadjordjevo (a town in Vojvodina) they were to continue in secret on various levels during the course of war.\(^6^6\) The disregard for the Bosnian Muslims was justified on the part of Belgrade and Zagreb by their allegation that Bosnian Muslims were either Serbs or Croats.\(^6^7\) Ethnic cleansing as a strategy of creating homogenous territories was contemplated right at the outset of these talks. Both Tudjman and Karadžić proposed a discussion on ‘population transfers’ or ‘resettlement of populations’ as a means of achieving ethnic homogenisation.\(^6^8\) This was no surprise. It

\(^6^6\) The first in the series of such meetings following the outbreak of the war, took place in the Austrian town of Graz in the end of February 1992. Here, the Serbs and Croats reportedly agreed in principle, on a division of Bosnia which would give Croats 20 percent, the Serbs 65 percent, and Muslims 15 percent of Bosnia’s territory. The Graz accord failed, however, because Radovan Karadžić and Mate Boban who led the Serb and Croat delegations respectively could not agree on a number of issues including who should control Mostar. Patrick Moore, ‘Endgame in Bosnia and Herzegovina’, p. 19. S. P. Ramet, *Balkan Babel*, p. 205. Glenny, *The Fall of Yugoslavia*, p. 193.

\(^6^7\) Milošević and Tudjman even argued to an European audience that an independent Bosnian state would bring to Europe the threat of Islamic fundamentalism, claiming that just as Serbs and Croats had protected Europe from Ottoman horde, so Serbia and Croatia remained Europe’s ultimate line of defence against the Muslim danger from the East. Woodward, *Balkan Tragedy*, pp. 217-8.

\(^6^8\) Silber and Little, *Yugoslavia*, pp. 220, 306-7. The language of expulsion permeated political discourse in the course of the Bosnian war. A case in point is the leader of the Party of Serbian Unity and head of the paramilitary group ‘Tigers’ that perpetrated war crimes and ethnic cleansing in Bosnia and Kosovo, Željko Ražnatović, known by his *nom de guerre* Arkan, who formed an alliance with Milošević in the December 1993 legislative elections. Describing the programme of his party Arkan claimed that he would work for the ‘unification of all Serbian lands ... Serbs will never tolerate citizens loyal to another entity [as part] of their country ... [T]hose who look to Tirana, Budapest and Iran should pack their bags’. ‘Democracy’ he said in a campaign rally ‘was created in Serbia centuries before America was even discovered’. Cited in Lenard J. Cohen, *Broken Bonds*, p. 354. Similarly, Vojislav Šešelj, the leader of the
was but a logical consequence of the ethnic definition of territory and the political attempts to secure ethnically homogenous territories on the basis of 'historical rights' to land.

It should be emphasised, nevertheless, that the problem with 'historical rights' arguments that purported to justify nationalist policies in Belgrade and Zagreb, and their respective counterparts in Bosnia, is that being based on selective interpretations of history, they were incompatible and exclusivist and therefore could provide no basis for agreement. In any case, if Serbs and Croats had 'historical rights' over Bosnian territory, so had the Bosnian Muslims. If Serbs claim 'historical rights' over Kosovo, such claim can be made with equal force also by Kosovar Albanians. In addition, by appropriating the terminology of 'rights' the 'historical rights' arguments suggest entitlement, i.e., possession of a given territory by a group to the detriment of any other group or person who reside in that territory. Moreover, being couched in terms of the collectivity, the 'historical rights' arguments take – exclusively – as the unit of 'rights' the ethno-national community, the implication being that any other community or individual outsider is considered devoid of the right to live in such territory. Furthermore, not only are 'historical rights' views based on flimsy historical evidence, they can also serve as rhetorical justification for claims made for other purposes, and be a cynical cover for the promotion of material interests – acting as instruments of political mobilisation in the domestic arena, or as 'catch-all' explanations to convince a sceptical international community about the righteousness of a given national policy.69

The evocation of 'historical rights', in addition to providing justification for the redrawing of borders, served also to bolster arguments for the protection of the rights of Serb communities who would otherwise become a minority in Croatia and Bosnia and lose protection provided by previous constitutional arrangements. It bears emphasising, however, that it is not that concerns for minority rights were illegitimate but, the means employed to this end, war and ethnic cleansing, were deeply problematic. In addition, the degree of inconsistency with which the Serb leadership claimed protection of its own kin was appalling. The Serb leadership demanded rights for Serbs outside Serbia but had no intention of offering such rights to minorities within Serbia. It was ironical that Milošević demanded protection of Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia at a time when he imposed a system of apartheid towards Albanians in Kosovo and repressed the Hungarian minority in Vojvodina and the Muslims of Sandžak. But double standards characterised also the Tudjman's regime, which while paying lip service to Bosnia's integrity conspired to reach an agreement on its territorial division. Moreover, while demanding the status of 'constituent nation' for the Croats in Bosnia, Tudjman denied such a status to the Serb minority in Croatia. The inconsistency and exclusiveness involved in Serb and Croat claims to territory and protection of their own kin, in effect, denied negotiations that might have led to generally acceptable solutions, giving way to the alternative of war as continuation of politics by other means. The casus belli was the redrawing of borders.


71 Silber and Little, Yugoslavia, p. 292.
V. 4 Wars of Ethnic Cleansing

Form the point of view of the state, borders – as demarcation lines – are important for what they contain inside i.e., the people, as well as economic and geostrategic resources. Whereas economic and geostrategic resources are important factors for the strength of the state, it is within the state borders that national identities are moulded and it is through them that the state attempts to transform *de jure* sovereignty into *de facto* control.\(^2\) The notion of control and its relation to the homogenous composition of the population is of significance here, given the common held assumption that the more homogenous a population, the easier is for a government to control and rule it. This logic appears to have been an important part of the Serb calculus for ethnic cleansing especially in Bosnia.

The establishment of ethnically homogenous territories was a goal that could not be achieved on a voluntary, peaceful basis. Given the degree of ethnic complexity in Bosnia, the unmixing of people was a recipe for war. The Serb president, however, appears to have been enthusiastic about the prospects of military confrontations and was ‘well-prepared to accept war as a solution to the Yugoslav problem’.\(^3\) In preparation for war a major reorganisation of the armed forces took place. Following the cessation of hostilities in Croatia, most of the forces of the Yugoslav People’s Army (Jugoslovenska Narodna Armija – JNA) that had been fighting there withdrew to Bosnia. In early 1992 there were some 100,000 JNA troops in Bosnia with over 700 tanks, 1,000 armoured personnel carriers, 100 planes and 500 helicopters, all under the


\(^3\) Glenny, *The Fall of Yugoslavia*, p. 38. See also Cigar, ‘Serb War Effort’, p. 205.
personnel carriers, 100 planes and 500 helicopters, all under the command of the General Staff of the JNA in Belgrade. Between March and May 1992, there were several attacks and take-overs by the JNA of areas that constituted main entry points into Bosnia or where situated on major logistics or communication lines, coupled with shelling, sniping and rounding up of non-Serb civilians in the attacked areas. In July 1991, on instructions from head-quarters in Belgrade, the JNA seized all documentation relating to conscription from Bosnia’s Secretariat for Defence and Republic’s municipalities, ensuring that conscription process was exclusively in the hands of the JNA which, in turn, assured that only Serbs were recruited into the armed forces. In addition, Belgrade undertook to arm the local Serbs, a technique that had been practised earlier in Croatia and was to feature also in Kosovo. The plan ‘RAM’ (‘the Frame’ - implying borders of the future Serb state) that Belgrade had initiated with the complicity of the JNA to secretly arm local Serbs in Croatia was extended to fulfil the same function in Bosnia.

Territorial Defence units (Teritorijalna Odbrana – TOs) in predominantly Muslim areas of Bosnia were disbanded and disarmed by the JNA as far as possible in late 1991 and early 1992. TOs of the Serb populated areas, on the other hand, were substantially re-equipped and in the course of the Bosnian war they reportedly operated in tandem with

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75 Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić. Opinion and Judgement of 7 May 1997, at note 51 above. Paragraphs 125-6 at p. 317. The composition of the military industry in Bosnia provided for a particularly fierce fighting. After the fall out with Stalin in 1948, Tito concentrated the military industry and installations in the Bosnian mountainous heartland. Over 60 percent of Yugoslavia’s military industries were based in Bosnia, and over 60 percent of these were situated in Croat and Muslim regions. Glenny, The Fall of Yugoslavia, p. 151.
the JNA. It should be pointed out that whilst the JNA was a powerful army, equipped with all the conventional weapons and equipment that modern European armies possess, TOs were equipped with essentially infantry weapons, rifles, light machine-guns, some small calibre artillery, mortars and anti-personnel mines. The JNA’s pre-emptive action to disarm TOs in Muslim and Croat regions, nonetheless, reinforced Serb military superiority by cementing a military imbalance in favour of Serb troops. Clearly, Muslims were in the most precarious position having been left on their own, whereas Bosnian Croats received support from Zagreb (who vigorously sought buying weapons from suitable markets in Europe, the Middle East, and the Far East), even though not on the scale Bosnian Serbs were assisted from Belgrade. Although a Bosnian army was announced to have been founded in May 1992, it had no centralised command until autumn 1993, and even then as many as half of the troops were reportedly unarmed.

May 1992 is an important moment in the re-organisation of the JNA. With secession of the non-Serb republics and the admission by Serbia and Montenegro that the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia no longer existed, the JNA’s operations in the republic of Bosnia could be viewed as aggression in a foreign country. Recognising that the JNA was not a neutral participant in the conflict, on 15 May 1992 the UN Security Council passed resolution 752 demanding that all interference from outside Bosnia by units of

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80 The JNA was reputed to be the fourth most powerful army in Europe. Glenny, The Fall of Yugoslavia, p. 134.
the JNA cease immediately and that those units either be withdrawn, be subject to the
authority of the Government of the Republic of Bosnia or be disbanded and disarmed.  

In order to appease the international community and at the same time retain in Serb hands control of substantial portions of Bosnia, a redistribution of the JNA personnel was organised: all Bosnian Serb soldiers serving in the JNA units elsewhere were transferred to Bosnia while Serb soldiers not from Bosnia were assigned to Serbia and Montenegro. This ensured a seeming compliance with international demands while effectively retaining large Serb armed forces in Bosnia. With effect from 19 May 1992, the latter were renamed the Bosnian Serb Army (Vojска Republike Srpsке – VRS) which was placed under the command of General Ratko Mladić, the former Commander of the 2nd Military District of the JNA based in Sarajevo, whereas the remainder of the former JNA was to become the Yugoslav Army (Vojска Jugoslavије – VJ).  

It is worth emphasising that the purported withdrawal of the JNA from Bosnia was not voluntary. It was in fact a ruse, a calculated move to give the impression of compliance with Security Council Resolution 752 while assuring that military operations it had already begun in Bosnia were successfully continued. Ultimately, the decision to divide the JNA was a deceptive measure to sow confusion over the nature of the armed conflict in Bosnia, obscure Belgrade’s responsibility for war, and allow observers as well as Serb political leaders to say that Belgrade and the JNA were not

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83 See UNSC Resolution 752 at http://www.ess.uwe.ac.uk/comexpert/752.htm.
85 The withdrawal of the JNA from Bosnia bears similarities with that from Croatia. The Armed Forces of the Republic of Serbian Krajina in Croatia (Oružanje Snage Republika Srpska Krajina – OS RSK) remained in effect proxies of Belgrade. Not only had the Krajina Serbs inherited from the JNA a military capability and command and control structures, but their armed forces retained vital linkages with Belgrade, including membership of a common officer corps, whereas OS RSK officers remained on the Belgrade military payroll. Gow, The Serbian Project, pp. 76.
involved in the war in Bosnia and that the armed confrontations constituted a civil
war.\textsuperscript{86} The announced JNA withdrawal was fictional. The VJ air crews and aircraft
remained in Bosnia and worked with VRS throughout 1992 and 1993; the VRS
inherited JNA’s weapons and equipment; the same officers and commanders; largely
the same troops; the same logistic centres and suppliers; the same infrastructure; the
same goals and missions, tactics and operations. All active duty members of the VRS
continued to receive their salaries from the Government of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) while the VRS Main Staff maintained direct
communication on a daily basis with the VJ General Staff via a communications link
from Belgrade.\textsuperscript{87}

Moreover, Serb fighting capability was enhanced by thousands of criminals released
from Serbian prisons who were then integrated into paramilitary units and covertly
instigated by the state to perform atrocities.\textsuperscript{88} The organisation of paramilitary units was
another deceptive measure that served the purpose of strategic ambiguity, whereby
seemingly independent forces could be blamed for atrocities and the appearance of
chaos could be maintained in the field. In operational terms paramilitary units
performed the function of infantry ‘shock troops’ carrying out tasks that regular army
could not perform such as close combat, street-to-street fighting or acts of ethnic

\textsuperscript{86} Milan Vego, ‘Federal Army Deployments in Bosnia-Herzegovina’, \textit{Jane’s Intelligence Review}, October
\textsuperscript{87} \textit{Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić}. Opinion and Judgement of 7 May 1997, at note 51 above. Paragraphs 115,
118, 606 at pp. 315, 316, 410. See also Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Gabrielle Kirk
McDonald Regarding the Applicability of Article 2 of the Statute printed in André Klip and Göran Sluiter
deds., \textit{Annotated Leading Cases of International Criminal Tribunals}, Volume I, \textit{The International criminal
\textsuperscript{88} Michael Ignatieff, \textit{The Warrior’s Honour – Ethnic War and the Modern Conscience}, New York:
cleansing including rape, torture, terrorisation, mutilation and murder. This Serb military superiority is said to have induced Milošević to think that war in Bosnia would be short and easy, a miscalculation reflected not only in the rush with which Belgrade started the war but also in the absence of a strategy to terminate it.

The Serb war aim in Bosnia was acquisition of territory that was deemed crucial in strategic and/or demographic terms and rendering it ethnically homogenous in order to facilitate its control. In a conspicuously asymmetrical conflict in which Serb troops enjoyed military superiority – not only in heavy weapons and material, but also in command, control, communication, intelligence and logistics – while facing small, badly equipped and unorganised armies, the Serbs were well placed to exploit the tactical advantage of offence especially in the initial stages of the fighting. By the end of summer of 1992, Serb forces had under their control about two-thirds of Bosnia’s territory whereas nearly one million civilians – mostly Muslims – had been displaced from their homes. The most intense battles were fought in the north for the vital east-west corridor that would provide contiguous Serb territory linking Banja Luka (and therefore Serb held territory in Western Bosnia and Croatia) with Serbia proper. These areas were also crucial for controlling JNA bases and weapon stores. Up to the summer of 1995 when Muslim and Croat forces organised a counter offensive following the Washington agreement, little territory changed hands.

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89 Gow, *The Serbian Project*, p. 79.
91 See, for instance, Norman Cigar, ‘Serb War Effort’; and Gow, *The Serbian Project and its Adversaries*.
However, the acquisition of territory was easier than its control given the mixed demographic composition of the region and the fact that the Serbs were in a minority in most of the newly acquired territories. The strategy of ethnic cleansing might have been useful for the perpetrators in order to acquire territory, but was much more so in order to control it. After summer of 1992, by which time the Serbs had acquired their preferred boundaries, the conflict was transformed into an attritional, low-intensity one: battles were rare whereas the civilian population became increasingly the target of violence. According to a CIA report, which was leaked in early 1995, Serb forces and paramilitary troops had committed 90 percent of the acts of ethnic cleansing up to this time. As a commentator put it: ‘to those who think that parties are equally guilty this revelation is pretty devastating ... the scale of what the Serbs did is so different. But more than that, it makes clear, with concrete evidence, that there was a conscious, coherent, and systematic Serb policy to get rid of Muslims, through murder, torture and imprisonment’. ⁹⁴

Based on observations regarding the dynamics of violence in the former Yugoslavia, some analysts have argued that wars of ethnic cleansing were distinct from wars which occurred prior to the 1990s, and that a fundamental restructuring in the nature of organised violence is taking place. For Mary Kaldor, for instance, wars in Bosnia marked a departure from traditional, Clausewitzian wars, being the ‘archtypal example, the paradigm of the new type of warfare’, primarily about ‘identity politics’, in which civilians are the main target of violence. ⁹⁵ Michael Ignatieff as well has pointed out that wars of ethnic cleansing differ from conventional warfare not least because their

⁹⁵ Kaldor, New and Old Wars, pp. 6, 8, 31.
fighting units were not only regular armies or police forces, but also paramilitary and mercenary groups, local warlords, and criminal gangs. He points out that the irregulars of the 1990s Balkans are historically distinct, in that instead of being co-opted and tamed by the state, they were covertly instigated by states – Serbia and Croatia – to perform atrocities. Ignatieff goes on to confirm that irregulars were created to allow the state to officially deny ethnic cleansing. The war was franchised to private enterprise, in order to dispense with any of the moral accountability associated with professional soldiery. David Keen, for his part, has argued that war aims in our days are centred around profit; war itself being the continuation of economics by other means. In our case, Keen’s argument would imply that wars of ethnic cleansing were about territory and its resources as well as about appropriation of humanitarian aid or other international material assistance.

Although providing a dynamic and an imaginative comprehension of violence, the above interpretations do not necessarily make a convincing case that the wars of ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia were so profoundly different that they departed altogether from previous warfare. Kaldor’s emphasis on the ‘highly decentralised’ nature of the fighting units in the Bosnian wars, or Ignatieff’s assertion that war ‘used to be fought by soldiers … is now fought by irregulars’ appear to be exaggerated – at least in the context of our case study. The report of the UN Commission of Experts, the evidence emerging from the Hague trials, and a number of serious studies provide

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98 Kaldor, *New and Old Wars*, pp. 8, 47-50.
ample evidence that paramilitary and other irregular Serb units operated in collaboration with the JNA and the full knowledge and support of Belgrade. The same applies for their Croat counterparts.\textsuperscript{100} On the other hand, the fit between war and profit, pointed out by Keen, is of course a real one, but this is not to say that economic incentives for war are either new or distinct. Indeed, they can be found to be a significant rationale for waging war in all times and places. The acquisition of resources may not necessarily be an end in itself but rather a means to an end, and it is the latter that is insufficiently explored by Keen’s argument. In other words, economic incentives do not exhaust the gamut of the motivations for waging war.

In so far as the attitude towards civilians is concerned, the wars that followed the disintegration of Yugoslavia in the 1990s were not necessarily distinct from previous wars experienced in the region, such as the Balkan Wars (1912-3), or those fought under the cover of the two World Wars.\textsuperscript{101} In all these cases irregular units have been involved in warfare and civilians have been persistently the target of violence. The practice and the official rationale for expulsion of people have not changed significantly in the course of the past century, nor have the consequences. Technical aspects may have advanced, however, in order to increase efficiency and the speed of the expulsion.\textsuperscript{102}


\textsuperscript{101} Refer to Chapter III, pp. 70-79, 98-103.

What cannot be emphasised enough is the fact that the state remained central in the organisation and execution of wars of ethnic cleansing. While wars in the former Yugoslavia might have not been fought in full adherence to Clausewitz, the presence of irregular units being an obvious deviation, that these units served the state interest; that wars of ethnic cleansing were an instrument for the attainment of state objectives; and that these wars make sense as extensions of official policies remains an obvious fact for many. It is the centrality of the state in the planning and execution of warfare that precludes one from deducing that wars of ethnic cleansing marked a full departure from Clausewitzian warfare. Indeed, in adherence with Clausewitz, the wars of ethnic cleansing had political objectives; they were not autonomous but an instrument of policy. They did not happen in a vacuum; they had goals and reasons. Moreover, wars of ethnic cleansing, especially in Bosnia, did not suspend the political intercourse of the warring parties or change it into something entirely different. And again, in accordance with Clausewitz, the shape and character of these wars was a function of the nature of war aims and of situations which gave rise to them.103

At the centre of the wars of ethnic cleansing was coercion i.e., the exertion of strength upon a targeted subject in order to induce an intended response. As noted above, although enjoying superiority in heavy weapons, Serb forces lacked sufficient manpower to press the full advantages of their arsenal. As a result, their military operations relied not on direct combat with opponents but on the demonstrative capacity of violence which was intended to compel the targeted populations to leave, a feature that could be observed also in the course of the Croat-Muslim war of 1993-1994.104

Conditioned by a mountainous territory that provided little routes of manoeuvre for large land armies and few lines of attack for supporting air forces, in strategic terms, the Bosnian conflict had two main components: limited manoeuvring to seize and control the heights and lines of communication, and siege warfare. The heights around the cities were important due to the superiority they gave to those who controlled them, either to attack or to defend cities below. Cities, on the other hand, were important strategically as junctions of lines of communication and supply. Different forms of war have diverse purposes, but siege warfare is one form of war which aims exclusively at control of territory, an aim that includes having a population in place that supports the political agenda of the ruling side. The Serb siege tactics against Bosnian cities not only cut off food, water and power in an indiscriminate manner but repeatedly enlarged the target to include non-combatants as a primary target. Strategic bombardment – a persistent element of the siege warfare in Bosnia as well as in Croatia – had two intended aims. First, by reaching behind the enemy’s forces and exerting pressure on the enemy population, the strategic bombardment sought to turn the people away from supporting their armed forces and their government and thus undermine the will of the side under bombardment to continue the war. Second, and most importantly, strategic bombardment aimed at producing mass flight of the population of the cities and their defenders so as to make possible for the besiegers to take over the territory.

As indicated in the previous section, from the policy standpoint, wars of ethnic cleansing were a result of clashing state projects that had incompatible claims over territory and sought diverging forms of political organisation. For the warring parties,

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106 See ibid.
the use of force was a continuation of politics by other means, the ‘politics’ of any one side being irreconcilable with those of the rest. The use of force, however, was neither irrational nor senseless, at least from the perspective of the perpetrators. Instead, it was an integral part of the legitimation process of such state projects. As Roberto Cipriani has argued:

... the outbreak of war ... unleashes a series of processes of legitimation, starting with the first skirmishes, preparatory for the explosion of the conflict, and later arriving at the justification of mobilisation, as well as the acceptance of the strategic choices made by the leaders. Final victory is undoubtedly a triumph of legitimation: but even defeat can give rise to an ‘explanation’ which avoids the invalidation of a regime or political formula.\textsuperscript{107}

Wars of ethnic cleansing legitimated the ethnic definition of territory by all means available ranging from partition of territory at the negotiating tables to the most grisly forms of violence employed on the ground. In the process, these wars served also the purpose of legitimating those who devised and pursued such state projects, i.e., political leaders and army commanders, their policies, tactics and values – even if temporarily.

V. 5 The Impact of the Western-led International Involvement 1991-1995

As noted at the beginning of this chapter, political activity arises out of disagreement and is concerned with the use of government to resolve conflict. At the national level of analysis, ethnic cleansing and wars that accompanied it were a result of incompatible claims over territory and diverging visions of the political organisation of the Serb, Croat and Bosnian states as they emerged from the dissolution of Yugoslavia. In dealing with such disagreements, government policies reflected the irreconcilability of respective nationalist projects, leading ultimately to the most fiercely war, in the post-1945 Europe, over the dismemberment of Bosnia. Such was the degree of organised

\textsuperscript{107} Cipriani, ‘The Sociology of Legitimation’, p. 4.
violence employed in the course of this war that ethnic cleansing was almost complete by 1995 and the division of Bosnia along ethnic lines had become a matter of fact. As Karadžić’s quote at the beginning of this chapter suggests, the perpetrators of ethnic cleansing were simply hoping to receive international recognition and cement their war gains. An analysis of the politics of ethnic cleansing, therefore, would be incomplete if one refrains from considering the Western powers’ reaction to it not least because such reaction – at times – appeared to have worsened the situation on the ground. This section elevates the level of analysis to the international arena by critically examining the Western response to the Yugoslav crises and their escalation with a particular focus on the West’s reaction to ethnic cleansing up to December 1995 when fighting in Bosnia was halted. It argues that the measures employed by the Western led international community were a poor substitute for more decisive and forceful action to prevent or curb the unfolding horrors of ethnic cleansing.

Western involvement in the Yugoslav conflict has been for the most part disappointing. The West appears to have failed to fully comprehend the nature of the conflict, i.e., that this was a conflict about political reorganisation of states on the basis of ethnic criteria, in which war became a means to redraw borders and homogenise territory. Lacking a political understanding of the nature of the impasse and preoccupied with the developments in the former Soviet Union, the West, initially, sought to stick to the basics: press for the territorial integrity and unity of the Yugoslav federation. Although in November 1990, the personnel of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had warned the first Bush administration that Yugoslavia will fall apart, probably accompanied by

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acts of violence, they could not get the attention of their principals. Similarly, the French, British and Germans were dismissive of the CIA warnings. In early 1991, the State Department even sent over officials to Belgrade to express support for the unity, independence and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia. One of the key reasons for the European Community's intention to preserve the federation – as Mark Almond has pointed out – had to do with anxieties about the US $16 billion owed by Yugoslavia. 'No Federation, no repayment' seems to have been the Community's thinking. The irony is that by pressing for the preservation of the federation in 1991, the Western policy only reinforced the Yugoslav deadlock. Because Belgrade felt supported by the West when seeking to retain the federation, the federal army had little incentive for restrain. Indeed, in the ensuing war in Croatia, the support offered by the federal army to the Krajina Serbs in the form of artillery cover, logistical back-up, intelligence and aerial power, as well as ethnic cleansing of the Croats was overlooked by Western powers.

In the space of a few months, nevertheless, the West reversed its policy and eventually recognised Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia by early 1992. Although lacking sufficient

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109 Almond, *Europe's Backyard War*, chapter 2, especially pp. 43-7. For a fascinating analysis of the analogies between flaws of the British reaction to the Yugoslav crisis in the early 1990s and the Ottoman crisis in the Balkans in the late nineteenth century see the same source pp. 91-101. In both cases, the Western powers, initially, sought to maintain the status quo i.e., preserve the Ottoman empire in the late nineteenth century and the Yugoslav federation in the early 1990s, whilst misunderstanding the nature of the crisis and the stakes of the parties involved.


112 See Gow and Freedman, 'Intervention in a Fragmenting State', p. 108.

113 Croatia and Slovenia were recognised by the EC on 15 January 1992. Bosnia was recognised by the EC on 6 April 1992, whereas by the United States the next day. The Serb attacks in Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia, and the accompanying atrocities – some of which hit the headlines in the West – may have
guarantees regarding the protection of ethnic community rights, the recognition in itself was not so much the cause as the trigger of the Serb aggression in Bosnia. Serb actions had been planned earlier and the carve-up of the republic was already under way by the time of Bosnia’s recognition. But once violence erupted, the scale of Western misperceptions became increasingly obvious. Their most widely known were those based on bogus historical analogies that propounded the thesis of ‘ancient ethnic hatreds’ and that all sides were responsible for the violence and could, therefore, be blamed equally. A further problem was that the first Bush administration being more apprehensive about developments in the former Soviet Union and viewing no imminent threat to its own interest from the Balkan crisis, took a low-key position in the management of the conflict and let the European Community (EC) take the lead. But the EC proved incapable of handling the situation effectively; whereas the bloodshed might have been averted by massive preventive deployment of an international force with a mandate to neutralise Serb military superiority, this was not an option because no country was prepared to commit the necessary troops and resources.

From the very start of the conflict in Yugoslavia, the British Foreign Secretary, Douglas Hurd, and his colleagues at the Ministry of Defence, had cited the precedent of the British deployment of troops to Ulster after 1969 as a reason for avoiding intervention

induced the first Bush administration and its West European counterparts to shift their policy and recognise these republics. See Almond, *Europe’s Backyard War*, p. 248-9.

114 Over the previous year the Bosnian Serbs had declared their autonomy in large tracts of Bosnia, arms delivery had been made to Karadžić’s supporters, a Bosnian Serb state was declared in October 1991, key logistic points were controlled by the JNA and artillery troops surrounded Sarajevo in the winter months. Malcolm, ‘Bosnia and the West’, p. 13. James Gow, *Triumph of the Lack of Will*, pp. 34-5. And, as pointed out above talks for the partition of Bosnia were under way since early 1991. See above p. 191.

115 See Chapter IV, pp. 141-147.


Whereas recalling the Vietnam analogy at the beginning of August 1992, President Bush asserted: ‘I do not want to see the United States bogged down in any way into some guerrilla war. We lived through that once’. Moreover, neither Britain nor United States was willing to spend the cash in a time of recession compounded for President Bush by imminent elections whilst the British government was faced with a deficit of about fifty billion pounds. The European Community, for its part, not only appeared as a not very unified diplomatic actor – on several occasions speaking with no unified voice – but, also it had a vastly underdeveloped military force depending constantly either on the US or NATO troops.

The Western reluctance to use force was exploited accordingly by the Serbs, and is likely to have been a factor in the original Serb planning for war. As Milošević stated in a speech in the Serbian parliament in early 1991: ‘I believe and assess ... that the great powers will not intervene in Yugoslavia. The great powers will find it difficult to intervene in any European country, especially not in a country in which their personnel could die’. The international community’s failure to act forcefully earlier towards the JNA attacks against Slovenia and Croatia, or at critical moments such as the sieges of Vukovar and Dubrovnik (in the course of the Croatian war), might have reinforced Milošević’s opinion that international reaction would not be a significant obstacle to Serbia’s political goals and war aims. Hence, his assumption that war would be short and easy.

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118 Almond, Europe's Backyard War, p. 254.
119 Ibid., p. 255.
120 Ibid., pp. 252-3.
122 Cited in Cigar, ‘Serb War Effort’, p. 207. The JNA also cherished such thoughts. See James Gow, Triumph of the Lack of Will, p. 33.
123 Cigar, ‘Serb War Effort’, p. 207.
Similarly, the EC did not foresee a lasting armed conflict. The president of the EC Council of Foreign Ministers, Hans van den Broek asked Lord Carrington, who took on the task of bringing peace to Yugoslavia in September 1991, to work towards a comprehensive peace settlement ‘within two months’.\(^{124}\) Even when violence erupted, the EC does not appear to have considered military intervention. Instead, as a consequence of the misperception that attributed to all sides equal responsibility, Western European powers opted for an impartial standing. The stated aim of the Western response became reduction of the quantity of weapons entering the war zone. Accordingly, UN Security Council Resolution 713 (26 September 1991) imposed an arms embargo against all of former Yugoslavia. Although Bosnia was recognised as an independent state in April 1992, the embargo was not lifted against her, effectively undermining her right to self-defence. However, unintentionally, far from maintaining impartiality and non-intervention, the Western powers did in fact intervene decisively to entrench the massive military superiority of the Serbs. Although the embargo was applied to Serbia as well as its proxy forces in Bosnia, the Serbs were not affected by it since they enjoyed the stockpiles of the fourth largest army in Europe. In the long run, the effect of the embargo in Bosnia was to prolong rather than reduce the fighting.\(^{125}\) The West’s policy in Bosnia demonstrates that impartiality can be an illusion when aggressors and civilians are treated equally and an arms embargo is applied in the same manner to the weak and the strong. Impartiality proved a particular embarrassment for the Western powers in the case of the July 1995 massacre in Srebrenica – declared a United Nations ‘safe area’ by UN Security Council Resolution 819 (16 April 1993) –

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\(^{124}\) Silber and Little, *Yugoslavia*, p. 190.

when the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) did nothing to stop the murder of some 7,000-8,000 Muslim men and boys.  

Srebrenica exposed also the flaws of the safe-areas policy, and the lack of international commitment to defend them. About 35,000 troops were required to protect the ‘safe areas’, but UN member countries contributed a mere 7,000. Moreover, protection of safe areas was a job for combat-capable, peace-enforcement operations while the UN troops on the ground were given only a peace keeping mandate – a strategic incompatibility, in fact, since there was no peace to keep and civilians were increasingly the target of violence. Srebrenica, Sarajevo, Tuzla, Bihać, Žepa and Goražde were declared ‘safe’, but in practical terms, there was no possibility of rendering them safe because the United Nations was reluctant to abandon its position of impartiality. Having been established without the consent of the parties and without any credible military deterrent, the ‘safe areas’ were not safe in any military meaningful sense except for UNPROFOR troops.

Moreover, international aid agencies often found themselves unwittingly contributing to ethnic cleansing. In July 1992, for instance, aid workers of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) escorted 7,000 Muslims cleansed from north western Bosnia to the Croatian city of Karlovac assured by the local Bosnian Serb authorities that these Muslims were leaving voluntarily. Similarly, in March 1993 workers of Médecins Sans Frontières and UNHCR assisted the evacuation of several

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128 Silber and Little, Yugoslavia, p. 246.
thousand of Muslims from the isolated enclave of Srebrenica ‘under the sardonic gaze of the Serbs, who could not have hoped for more’. Clearly, impartiality became morally problematic, as failure to take sides inescapably resembled complicity. Indeed, the failure to protect victims appeared as a kind of tacit intervention on the side of those who inflicted human rights infringements.

In addition to being morally problematic, impartiality was also a source of strategic incoherence. As long as the West adhered to the claim of impartiality a settlement of the conflict proved virtually impossible to achieve. The shifting of the configuration of forces on the ground to the detriment of the Serbs was made possible by a Croat-Muslim coalition, which was facilitated mainly by the United States. Although the strategic calculation for forging such a coalition is difficult to be disputed, the American green light for the Croat offensive to recapture Serb held territory has provoked controversy in light of ethnic cleansing of the Croatian Serbs that accompanied or followed the offensive, an act which contradicted the humanitarian objectives of the UN troops stationed in Croatia. On the other hand, the facilitation of a belated defeat of the Serb military does not necessarily justify either Western passivity in the previous years or its inability to curb ethnic cleansing.

129 François Jean, ed., *Life, Death and Aid*, pp. 93, 94.


The Western powers’ misunderstanding of the Bosnian conflict and their initial commitment to impartiality reflected a confusion about the classification of the conflict as civil war or international aggression. Problematising the Bosnian conflict as a civil war was to eschew intervention, whereas problematising it as international aggression would have mandated intervention under Chapter VII of the UN Charter as a threat to regional peace and security. The Serb/Yugoslav government argued that fighting in Bosnia amounted to civil war while at the same time supporting the Serb war effort there both materially and politically. Until the last year of the conflict, the West acquiesced in such a judgement, consequently severely limiting its involvement.

Furthermore, the EC, and its successor the EU, committed another crucial mistake by resorting to an international peace process that sought dismemberment of Bosnia along ethnic lines. In the comprehension of the Western mediators, the way to deal with the conflict was to reach a compromise between community leaders, which in effect implied taking on board the very perception of the conflict that nationalists wished to propagate. Whereas paying lip service to the preservation of a multi-ethnic Bosnian society, the West was unprepared to back such claim, and adhered instead to the presumption that ethnic separation could lead to peace. Moreover, since partition invoked the ethnic homogenisation of territories, pursuing such path inevitably meant endorsing ethnic cleansing.

A number of partition plans were negotiated with the help of Western mediators: the Cutilheiro Plan (Spring 1992), the Vance-Owen Plan (January 1993), the Joint Action

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133 See pp. 196-200 above.
134 Kaldor, New and Old Wars, p. 58.
Plan (put forward by the US, Russia, France, the UK and Spain in May 1993), the Owen-Stoltenberg Plan (summer 1993), the European Action Plan (end of 1993), the Contact Group Plan (initiated by France, Germany, Russia, the U.K., and the U.S. in summer 1994), and finally the Dayton Agreement that, under US auspices, succeeded in ending the fighting in December 1995. What was not agreed upon initially was the ratio of the proposed division of Bosnia, though the principle itself was not disputed. While all plans sought partition of the country in three parts corresponding to the three ethnic communities, the Vance-Owen Plan had the distinction of suggesting the division of Bosnia into ten provinces: four with a Muslim majority, three with a Serb majority, two with a Croat majority, whereas Sarajevo, the tenth province, was to retain power-sharing between all three groups.

The interpretations of the Vance-Owen plan vary, with some arguing that it sought to deny Serbs contiguous and ethnically pure territories, resist attempts to forcefully change borders and provide for a decentralised and demilitarised Bosnian state. However, the fact that the plan rewarded Croats not only with what they had previously wanted but also with some areas traditionally with a Muslim majority is said to have

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136 The Vance-Owen Plan is the name of the peace plan designed by the EC Special Envoy, David Owen, and the UN Secretary-General's Special Envoy, Cyrus Vance, which was presented in January 1993 and negotiated through to May of the same year, when the plan was eventually rejected by the Bosnian Serb parliament. This plan – likewise the Dayton Agreement – was, nevertheless, openly supported by Milošević despite the disagreement of local Serb leaders. The latter, including Karadžić and Babić, did not disagree with the Serb president over his ultimate goal of unifying all Serb-populated lands into a Greater Serbia. Rather, frictions arose over Milošević’s piecemeal strategy for creating a Greater Serbia which involved giving up some control or influence over Serb conquered lands temporarily possibly in order to gain more later. See Stan Markotich, 'Serbian President Focuses on Creating a Greater Serbia', esp. p. 16.

given Croats an incentive to ethnically cleanse Muslims in the latter areas, which they
did in the course of the Croat-Muslim war of 1993-1994.\textsuperscript{138} In addition, the Serbs did
not cease their ethnic cleansing of the Muslims; 5,000 Muslims from the town of Tuzla
and another 4,000 from the town of Trebinje are reported to have been expelled by the
Serbs following the announcement of the Vance Owen Plan.\textsuperscript{139} The general problem
with the partition plans was that the proposals for the division of territory created ‘new
ethnic minorities’, at the same time stimulating ethnic cleansing as a strategy for their
removal. Thus, though seeking to diminish violence, proposals for partition merely
legitimated and encouraged the expulsion of ethnic minorities.

When the final plan was agreed upon at Dayton, ethnic cleansing in Bosnia was almost
complete; the plan itself coming close to what Milošević and Tudjman had discussed in
Karadjordjevo in March 1991.\textsuperscript{140} While maintaining the territorial integrity of the
country, the Dayton Agreement provided for the internal partition of Bosnia into
statelets organised on the basis of ethnicity.\textsuperscript{141} Although succeeding in ending the war,
Dayton embraced a policy failure of a sort given that the international community
lacked the political will to act forcefully to punish aggression and curb ethnic
cleansing.\textsuperscript{142}


\textsuperscript{141} In terms of the Dayton Agreement, Bosnia would continue to exist within its internationally recognised borders, but it would consist of two distinct entities: the Muslim-Croat Federation (51 percent of the territory) and Republica Srpska (49 percent). Despite provisions for the return of minorities, to-date, the slow rate of returns coupled with an uncooperating stance of Republika Srpska have effectively hampered the integration of the country in one whole.

\textsuperscript{142} The failure of the Western powers in Bosnia, however, was primarily political, not humanitarian. Hundred of thousands of lives were saved and millions of people were fed by the UN peace keeping operations, with UNPROFOR’s annual budget spiralling above $1billion in 1994 alone. See Christopher Bennett, \textit{Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse – Causes, Course and consequences}, London: Hurst, 1995, p. 4; and James Mayall, ‘The Concept of Humanitarian Intervention Revisited’, p. 272.
Whereas partition along ethnic lines was not a Western creation, it is sadly ironic that the Western powers embraced and enacted a strategy of conflict resolution that eventually aligned the West with the political reasoning of the Serb, and to a less extent Croat, leadership that favoured the dismemberment of the country. While denouncing expulsion of ethno-national minorities as a practice the Western powers backed its outcomes, negotiating a peace that rewarded ethnic cleansing and ratified its results. Furthermore, the negotiation of the terms of peace with war criminals, who bore responsibility for ethnic cleansing, raised the profile of such individuals and undermined the pursuit of justice. In many ways, the current problems regarding the implementation of the Dayton Agreement are a stark reminder of the old dictum that the way wars end determines the kind of the ensuing peace.

V. 6 Ethnic Cleansing in Kosovo: What is the Difference?
The previous section considered the international dimension of the politics of ethnic cleansing in the first half of the 1990s with particular focus on Bosnia. It suggested that disagreement in governmental policies over responses to the Yugoslav crisis counted for the Western powers initial low-key attitude. Warfare and ethnic cleansing gradually attracted the attention of the great powers but their humanitarian response to a political and military problem was by and large insufficient. The present section extends the international level of analysis to the case of ethnic cleansing in Kosovo in late 1990s. The occurrence of ethnic cleansing can be seen as failure of prevention, but nowhere was this lesson more obvious than in Kosovo as the international community failed to address persistent human rights abuses in the province throughout the 1990s.

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Unlike the case of Bosnia or Croatia, which had not experienced ethnic cleansing since the Second World War, in Kosovo, the case can be made that low-scale ethnic cleansing was going on throughout the 1990s. In effect, as the Independent International Commission on Kosovo has asserted ‘from the 1980s onward, Kosovo exhibited all the signs of a catastrophe waiting to happen’. Since the early 1990s, ‘Serbianisation’ of Kosovar institutions was speeded up by means of replacing Albanian with Serb workers in civil services, radio and TV, newspapers and magazines, schools and hospitals, raising the rate of unemployment among the Albanians to record levels. Education in the Serbian language became mandatory, cities and villages and their streets were given Serb names. Many Albanians were evicted from their homes and apartments and a vast portion of the Albanian population had to depend for food supplies on international aid organisations. Inevitably, the trend among Kosovar Albanians was to leave the province.

Faced with Serb oppression, the Albanians embraced a policy of peaceful resistance hoping to receive support from the international community, which in turn failed to respond in a satisfactory way to the evidence of their ‘good behaviour’. The relatively low level of violence in Kosovo during the first half of the 1990s – at least by comparison with Bosnia and Croatia – induced the international community to push the Kosovo issue further to the back of their policy agenda. The decision to exclude Kosovo from Dayton negotiations, at a time when Republika Srpska – a creation of ethnic cleansing – was recognised as a separate entity within Bosnia led many Albanians to

believe that violence was the only way to attract international attention. Moreover, the international recognition of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1996 without any substantive provision for the protection of minority rights or any precondition for the restoration of the autonomy of Kosovo reinforced the Kosovar Albanians’ perception of violence as an attractive alternative.\(^\text{146}\)

The emergence of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) in 1997 marked a shift in the Kosovar Albanians resistance policy towards the Serbian rule, the new movement being determined to fight against the subjugation of the Albanians.\(^\text{147}\) Although ostensibly a reaction to the KLA, the Serbian action in Kosovo was intended to use the pretext of the insurgency to carry out ethnic cleansing of Kosovar Albanians with the view to securing long-term control of the province.\(^\text{148}\) The rising level of violence in early 1998 belatedly directed Western attention to the situation in the region. However, the U.S. Special Representative for the implementation of the Dayton Agreement, Robert S. Gelbard, who visited Belgrade on February 23, 1998, reflected a position favourable to the Serb stance and branded the KLA ‘a terrorist group’.\(^\text{149}\) The implication of such a depiction was that it induced Serb officials to believe that they could act ruthlessly in Kosovo without encountering Western interference.\(^\text{150}\) Indeed, Belgrade resorted to


\(^{148}\) See Gow, \textit{The Serbian Project}, Chapter 8.


\(^{150}\) When General Wesley Clark visited Milošević in October 1998, the Yugoslav leader tried to convince him that Belgrade was able to solve the crisis by itself: ‘... he said you know General Clark ... we know how to handle problems with these Albanian killers. I said, well how do you do that? He said, we have done this before, I said when, he said Drenica 1946. I said how did you handle it? He said we kill them,
unproportional measures to deal with the KLA sponsoring massacres that outraged the international community.\textsuperscript{151}

Some analysts question whether Milo\v{S}evi\'c intended to desist from his offensive in Kosovo even while the peace talks were convened in France in February and March 1999 with the view to end the violence in the province. They argue that the Serb leader was instead using the negotiations to buy time in order to prepare for the next round of Serb military attack on Kosovar Albanians.\textsuperscript{152} While tens of thousands of refugees were displaced from their homes, Serb forces in Kosovo were augmented at high speed increasing from about 22,000 in November 1998 to more than 50,000 by March 20, 1999. They were drawn primarily from the VJ armed forces as well as from the units of the Serb Ministry of Internal Affairs (Ministarstvo Unutrašnjih Poslova – MUP). The former were involved in border areas and provided artillery and gunship support to MUP units that operated in the interior of Kosovo carrying attacks against the KLA and perpetrating ethnic cleansing of the Albanians. In addition, the VJ and MUP forces were complemented by paramilitary units which were intended for close quarter killing missions. During the NATO’s air campaign all Serb forces operated as one integrated force with a single integrated command, under general Nebojša Pavkovi\'c, commander of the 3\textsuperscript{rd} Army (and later to be Chief of Staff of the VJ).\textsuperscript{153}

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\textsuperscript{151} Two notorious massacres include the murder of 58 members of Adem Jashari’s family, a well known KLA leader, on March 5, 1998 in Prekaz and the massacre of 45 Kosovar Albanians in the village of Ra\v{c}ak on January 15, 1999, the latter being broadcasted to the world by the OSCE head of mission, William Walker.


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In disregard of these facts, some observers argue that the responsibility for ethnic cleansing of the Albanians in Kosovo rests with NATO. Such an accusation relies on the assumption that had NATO not intervened, the Serbs would have ended their killings and forced expulsion of the Albanians. The problem with such reasoning, however, is that it ignores the record of the Milošević’s regime. Four hundred thousands Kosovar Albanians had been displaced from their homes while some 500 had been killed in the year leading up to NATO’s action alone. Given the Serb augmentation of heavy weaponry and military personnel in the province it is not unreasonable to surmise that in the absence of NATO bombing many more Albanians would have been killed and permanently ethnically cleansed. Indeed, many analysts recognise that the commencement of the bombing on 24 March 1999 was simply chosen by Belgrade as a trigger to accelerate the expulsion of the Albanians and that the responsibility for ethnic cleansing lies with Milošević’s regime.

The Alliance’s war against Serbia was premised on the presumption that due to the systematic abuse of human rights of Kosovar Albanians the Serb authorities had forfeited the right to political and territorial control over Kosovo and the right to be the representative of that very population. After the Bosnian war, it was clear that to end Serb oppression of the Kosovar Albanians, to terminate this conflict and protect the victims, it was necessary for the West to take sides. Standing passively in the face of

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Belgrade’s scorched-earth campaign of ethnic cleansing was no longer tenable. Hence, NATO was finally prepared to will the means – commit whatever level of air power – to halt Serb repression of the Albanians.

NATO’s action to reverse ethnic cleansing in Kosovo was motivated by a combination of various factors among them the desire to avert an impending humanitarian catastrophe, secure regional peace and stability, punish the Serb authorities for their behaviour in Kosovo, and elevate Western values and norms. Other considerations such as the credibility of the Alliance searching for a new role in the post Cold War era and the prospect of large numbers of refugees on a permanent basis in the European countries influenced the Western policy agenda as well. Although NATO’s action in Kosovo was not solely humanitarian in character, the concern for the protection of human rights and the reversal of ethnic cleansing figured prominently in the rationale for intervention.

NATO’s Operation Allied Force started as a low scale bombing campaign – in terms of target numbers and force size – that was intended to be of a short duration, but which escalated into a more aggressive air campaign that went on for 78 days. Although NATO’s air strikes were unable to halt Serb ethnic cleansing of the Kosovar Albanians

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159 Both British Prime Minister Tony Blair and American President Bill Clinton justified NATO action over Kosovo in terms of defending the values of liberty, the rule of law, human rights and open society as well as lessons learned in Bosnia. As President Clinton put it: ‘[I]n the Balkans, inaction in the face of brutality simply invites more brutality. ... If we and our allies were to allow this war to continue with no response, President Milošević would read our hesitation as a license to kill’. See http://www.crimesofwar.org/archive/archive-humaninter.html and http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/intemational/jan-june99/blair_doctrine4-23.html.
before it had been virtually completed, they did succeed in reversing it. Barely a month after the cease fire only about 50,000 displaced Albanians were awaiting repatriation, whereas more than a million of them had already returned home. Conducting the most precise air war in history, NATO emerged from the conflict with zero casualties while at the same time as far as possible minimised the human suffering of their opponents. Nonetheless, the Alliance’s operation had its limitations.

Despite its accomplishments, NATO’s air war suffered from a flawed strategy. In particular, the way Operation Allied Force commenced violated two of the most enduring axioms of military practice: the importance of achieving surprise and the criticality of keeping the enemy unclear as to one’s intentions. Indeed, the ruling out of a ground threat from the very beginning and the incremental escalation of the air strikes provided the Serbs with the time and conditions they needed to accelerate ethnic cleansing. In addition, critics charge that the air campaign was initiated on the assumption that the bombing would not last more than a few rounds. This suggests that a false conclusion had been drawn from Bosnia in so far as the Alliance underestimated how far the bombing would lead to an intensification of the barbarities against Kosovar Albanians although it had received warning beforehand by the Director of the CIA – George Tenet.

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163 Lambeth, *NATO’s Air War for Kosovo*, p. xxii.
NATO’s action in Kosovo was impeded by a questionable reading of the history of the Bosnian war including a lack of appreciation of the differences between Bosnia and Kosovo. NATO’s over confidence that air power alone would force Milošević to yield on Kosovo reflected a wrong analogy between Operation Deliberate Force conducted in Bosnia prior to the Dayton negotiations and Operation Allied Force designed for Kosovo. It is generally acknowledged that the former was rather a limited operation that sought to end the siege of Sarajevo unlike the latter which had more ambitious aims including, bringing Milošević back to the negotiating table, reversing ethnic cleansing and restoring the rights of the Albanians. In addition, Operation Deliberate Force was combined with a ground effort by Muslim and Croat forces in Bosnia and a successful offensive (in military terms) by Croatian forces in Krajina, while some 10,000 NATO troops had been deployed in Bosnia prior to the onset of bombing. In the case of Kosovo, on the other hand, the KLA, despite the strength gained by the end of Operation Allied Force, remained a small, not well armed and organised army that was no match for the Serb troops.\(^\text{165}\) Moreover, the West seems to have underestimated the fact that Kosovo was crucial to Milošević’s political survival. He had built his career since 1987 on a Kosovo agenda claiming to be the protector of the Serbs in their contest with the Albanians and it should have been anticipated, therefore, that Milošević’s behaviour in Kosovo would be more recalcitrant than in Bosnia. Although not fatal, these miscalculations impaired the efficiency of NATO’s action and may explain the opportunity costs that the Alliance incurred due to the anaemic start of Operation Allied

Force without an accompanying ground threat; the prolongation of the campaign; and the acceleration of ethnic cleansing of the Kosovar Albanians by the Serb troops.

In addition, NATO’s reluctance to accept the risk of casualties has raised some controversial moral questions. NATO’s decision to fly its aeroplanes at high altitudes of 15,000 feet and its refusal (at least initially) to deploy ground troops may have conveyed a moral message that assumed an asymmetrical valuing of human life: the lives of NATO personnel were considered of a greater value than the lives of Kosovar Albanians that the Alliance was protecting or the lives of other civilians in Kosovo and Serbia. However, the logistical difficulties in mounting a major ground operation should not be overlooked. Given that the Greek government declined to make available the port of Thessaloniki whereas Albania and Macedonia had unsuitable terrain and poor infrastructures which the speedy build-up of Serb forces in Kosovo did not allow time to reconstruct, the air campaign was the most attractive option. Although it was a tactical mistake to openly exclude the option of ground troops beforehand, exposing the weakness of the Alliance and thus playing in the hands of its opponents, a ground war would have meant more casualties on all sides of the conflict.

Similarly, the charge of selectivity – intervening in Kosovo but not in other instances of massive human rights abuses – does not necessarily undermine NATO’s intervention in the province. Whilst a particularistic achievement is no match for a universalistic one, it is undoubtedly better than no achievement at all. The inability to reverse ethnic cleansing everywhere does not justify inaction in situations where action can be mobilised to reverse mass expulsion of a victimised people. As Christopher Coker asserts, NATO went to war on Serbia ‘in defence of the ‘moral minimum’: the fact that
ethnic cleansing could no longer be countenanced in the European state system'. Of course, our world would be a better one if ethnic cleansing is rejected everywhere, however, in the absence of that, this 'moral minimum' is by itself a significant achievement.

Kosovo has also exposed the gaps in international law regarding the legality of intervention, laying bare the stand off between incompatible principles: those safeguarding the territorial integrity of states and prohibiting the non-defensive use of force on the one hand, and those seeking to protect the human rights of vulnerable populations within these states, on the other. In particular, the veto system of the UN Security Council’s members has stirred controversy about the legality of Operation Allied Force since Russia’s and China’s reluctance to sanction NATO's action made the UN authorisation of it impossible. In such circumstances, the Alliance justified the use of force in terms of the existing Security Council Resolutions (1160, 1199 and 1203) passed under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, in which the Security Council had determined that the deterioration of the situation in Kosovo threatened regional peace and security, and had demanded that Serb forces stop the unfolding humanitarian tragedy. The defeat (by 12 votes to 3) of a Russian draft resolution condemning

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166 Coker, ‘Globalisation and Insecurity’, p. 77.
168 The opponents of NATO’s intervention over Kosovo take the view that NATO’s air campaign was illegal since it had no explicit authorisation by the UN Security Council to act against a sovereign state. See, for instance, Christine M. Chinkin, ‘Kosovo: A ‘Good’ or ‘Bad’ War?’, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 93, No. 4, 1999; and Jonathan I. Charney, ‘Anticipatory Humanitarian Intervention in Kosovo’, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 93, No. 4, 1999. Both articles are also available at http://www.asil.org/ajil/kosovo.htm. Surely, the authorisation by the UN Security Council is the best way to provide a legal basis for the use of force for humanitarian purposes, but when such authorisation cannot be obtained should massive human rights violations be tolerated for the sake of the veto of one or two members of the UN Security Council, or for the sake of respecting the sovereignty of a state which oppresses persistently some of its own peoples? Refer to Chapter VII, pp. 268-271.
NATO's action, tabled in Security Council two days in the bombing, added validity to the Alliance's intervention. Some international lawyers have interpreted the UN Security Council Resolution 1244 that finalised the cessation of hostilities as a tacit acceptance that NATO's action was not unlawful in the specific circumstances. Although the Security Council did not endorse NATO's intervention in advance, by rejecting a resolution condemning it the UNSC eventually engaged in a form of 'retroactive validation' of NATO's action.

Even if NATO's intervention may be considered illegal given that it contravened the UN Charter's prohibition on the unauthorised use of force, the Alliance's operation was still legitimate. The reason for this lies with the fact that diplomacy failed to mitigate a conflict that threatened to destabilise the Balkan region giving way to the option of either doing nothing or mounting a military intervention under NATO's auspices. Although Operation Allied Force produced a temporary and severe worsening of the conditions of life for the Kosovar Albanians, the intervention made possible the reversal of ethnic cleansing in addition to dismantling the oppressive Serb police and paramilitary structures and liberating the majority population of Kosovo from a long period of harsh repression. In this sense, NATO's action reflected the spirit of the UN Charter in so far as it related to the protection of vulnerable people subjected to gross abuse. The legitimacy of NATO's intervention, likewise its proportionality, should be

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171 This was the view of Independent International Commission on Kosovo, p. 4. See also U.K. Select Committee on Foreign Affairs, Fourth Report, 'Did NATO misjudge Milošević's likely response in Kosovo to the bombing campaign?', http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm199900/cmselect/cmfaff/28/2811.htm.
viewed from the prism of what is likely to have happened had NATO’s operation not taken place. Had NATO not intervened, Kosovo would have remained under Serb oppression and ethnic cleansing would have been permanent with flows of refugees destabilising already poor and unstable neighbouring countries. Although NATO’s failure to prevent the Serb exodus at the end of the bombing campaign certainly detracts from the humanitarian outcome of the intervention, it does not invalidate its achievements. After all, NATO did remedy a gross injustice at the expense of a smaller one.

V. 7 Conclusion

This chapter has traced the politics of ethnic cleansing in the official disagreements over the nature of the organisation of the new states – namely, Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia – that emerged from the dissolution of the Yugoslav federation. The contest evolved over the following issues:

- State borders – would administrative boundaries of the old federation gain international status or would new borders be drawn by means of force?
- Distribution of strategic and economic resources – a process, which was conceived by parties in zero-sum terms.
- The kind of state governance – was the state to belong to the majority nation to the detriment of ethno-national minorities or otherwise?
- Minority rights and their protection – where minorities to be inclusively accommodated or excluded from the new states?

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Ethnic cleansing was premised on the ethnic definition of territory. Its architects and perpetrators sought to secure possession of the state by the majority nation, as well as, distribution of resources, and granting of rights and protections, exclusively to the members of the said nation.

Embraced as a strategy of nation-state building, primarily by the Serbian government in Belgrade, and to a lesser extent by its Croatian counterpart, ethnic cleansing was ostensibly justified by a variety of arguments including ‘historical rights’ and protection of one’s own kin. It was ironical, nevertheless, that a legitimate issue such as that of the treatment of Serbian minorities was undermined by their very own government which while claiming protection of its own kin resorted to a criminal official strategy that degraded, humiliated and excluded other ethnic minorities.

The Western powers reaction to ethnic cleansing has been inconsistent, overlooking the expulsion of the Croats by the Serbs in Croatia in 1991 and then condoning ethnic cleansing of the Serbs by Croats in 1995, whereas their response to ethnic cleansing in Bosnia and Kosovo vacillated from passive action to active response but damage limitation on the side of intervenors remained throughout the order of the day. In particular, the Western reaction to the Bosnian conflict was confused and painfully slow; their humanitarian response to a political and military conflict being by and large inadequate. Deploying a peacekeeping force where there was no peace to keep, announcing ‘safe areas’ while the necessary troops and resources for their protection were not provided, declaring impartiality in face of humanitarian and human rights abuses against civilians, imposing an arms embargo that enhanced the military
superiority of the aggressors, and negotiating with nationalist leaders who planned and enacted the expulsion of minorities were inappropriate responses to ethnic cleansing.

The occurrence of ethnic cleansing can be seen as failure of prevention but nowhere was this lesson more obvious than in Kosovo since the international community failed to address human rights abuses in the province throughout the 1990s. Prevention having failed, however, the Western reaction to ethnic cleansing in the province was qualitatively different from that in Bosnia, as the Atlantic Alliance willed the means – high level of air power – to halt the exclusion of the Albanians. Although suffering from a flawed strategy (over-reliance on air power whereas ground troops, at least initially, were ruled out) and hampered by legal contradictions (such as the impasse in the UN Security Council regarding the sanctioning of the intervention), NATO’s intervention in Kosovo was the first instance ever when military force was used to reverse ethnic cleansing of a population that had been for long oppressed by its own government. Despite its controversy, the Western intervention was an important factor in frustrating the hopes of the aggressors for the implementation of an exclusivist nation-state model.

The security and stability of the region in the long run, however, remain, in part, a function of the Western powers’ long-term commitment in order to facilitate reconstruction of societies and states in ways that will ensure against the recurrence of ethnic cleansing.
VI. Ethnic Cleansing and the Provision of In/Security

Security, of course, saturates the language of modern politics. Our political vocabularies reek of it and our political imagination is confined by it. The hypocrisy of our rulers ... consistently hides behind it.¹

VI.1 Introduction

Implicit in the analysis of the previous chapter, as well as of chapter III, has been the assumption that ethnic cleansing was rationalised by the respective governments and their higher military echelons on the grounds of security. The belief that the more homogenous a state the more secure it is, and that homogeneity must be secured at all costs, justified ethnic cleansing as a means of providing desired security.

Security, of course, has been traditionally one of the principal issues of politics and an essential interest of every state. Especially in the modern era, security has become the central dynamic in governmental rationality to the extent that it is said that we live in "a society of security", in which practices of national security ... structure intensive and extensive power relations, and constitute the ethical boundaries and territorial borders of inside/outside, normal/pathological, civilised/barbaric..."² As the citation at the opening of this chapter suggests, security has come to permeate the language and practice of modern politics. Indeed, modern understanding of politics is generally reliant, foundationally, upon security.³ In other words, politics and security are intrinsically linked. There can be no understanding of politics disentangled from security, and security can not be conceived dissociated from politics.

³ See Dillon, Politics of Security, p. 10.
It is this intrinsic connection between security and politics that in the context of this thesis necessitates a separate chapter on security with the aim of making explicit some implicit assumptions inherent in the previous chapters III and V. The inherent assumptions, it may be recalled, were that concerns for state security were used by the respective governments to justify the suspension of civil liberties, the forceful redrawing of borders, the expulsion of targeted minorities, and the waging of war. In addition, concerns for national security worked to silence domestic opposition (lest an opposing person be branded an enemy of the nation) and enabled power holders to exploit the ‘threat’ of ethno-national minorities for domestic purposes and claim a right to handle such a threat with less democratic control and constraint.\(^4\)

This chapter problematises such a conception of security. It contends that the issue is not that state security is not important, but that the means employed to secure national security – ethnic cleansing – were deeply flawed. The importance of security, however, should not suggest that state security is either an absolute value or an end in itself. Rather, state security should be seen as a means to an end, the end being security of peoples. In terms of the thesis’ question, this chapter addresses more directly the sub-question whether ethnic cleansing occurred because of concerns for state security. It argues that although the expulsion of assorted minorities was justified in terms of the provision of state security, its unfortunate consequence was insecurity of states and peoples – including the very state and nation on whose interest ethnic cleansing was carried out.

\(^4\) Refer to securitisation, Chapter IV, pp. 160-161.
The argument of this chapter evolves as follows: the next section considers the meaning of security in the context. Section VI.3 reflects on the utilisation of ethnic cleansing as a state building strategy on the grounds of national security. Pointing out some disparities between state's security and people's security in political and legal practice, section VI.4 argues that unless state security provides for the security of peoples it becomes counterproductive and it undermines the very entity – the state (and, conventionally, the nation) – which it seeks to protect.

VI.2 The Meaning of Security in the Context

As students of security are well aware, a general, all-encompassing, definition of security is not possible to provide because the concept has many dimensions and it can be applied simultaneously to various analytical levels. Hence, the purpose of this section is to identify some qualifications of the concept of security that may facilitate the understanding of security policy in relation to ethnic cleansing. An intuitive meaning of security centres around the absence of threats, fears, and anxieties, the latter implying a sense of insecurity. Security and insecurity are inter-linked; the need for security being conditioned by the presence of insecurity. Indeed, in the absence of insecurity one would be out of the business of security, since security in such a case would be guaranteed. Security, thus, is a relative value which is a function of the degree of threats – the more threats faced the less security and vice-versa.5

In International Relations literature an often referred to conception of security is that of Arnold Wolfers who conceives security as the absence of threats to acquired values. Buzan et al have also emphasised security-threat connection depicting security as 'survival in the face of existential threats', where existential threats refer to those that threaten a collectivity's identity, state's sovereignty, excessive environmental degradation, etc., and which are accompanied, in turn, by calls for emergency responses, including the employment of coercive means.

Security can be understood in an objective or subjective sense. Security, in an objective sense, refers to the absence of threats to acquired values; in a subjective sense, the absence of fear that such values will be attacked. Both the objective and subjective sense of security imply that perception is an important factor in the actor's conclusion about the presence or absence of a threat. Hence, sometimes actors may overestimate their threats whereas in other times they may underestimate them perceiving themselves secure when in fact they are not.

Crucial qualifications of security have to do with some aptly pointed questions by David Baldwin: Security for whom? Security for which values? From what threats? By what means? At what cost? In what time period? Depending on the research problem at hand these questions may generate varying answers. 'Security for whom?' can have as an answer 'the world', 'a continent', 'a region', 'a state', 'a nation', 'an ethnic

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9 Baldwin, 'The Concept of Security'.
community’, ‘an individual’, ‘humankind’. Values to be protected can be many: territorial integrity or independence of the state (traditionally included in the concept of national security), multiculturalism, welfare, etc. Threats to be averted can be multiple varying from aggression to recession, from ballistic missiles to a secessionist movement of an ethnic group. Means by which security may be attained can also be variable differing from peaceful to coercive. Costs can be low to high and the time range may be short to long term. In a word, questions that can be raised in relation to security are many and the possibility of answers multiple. Hence, the impossibility of providing an all-encompassing definition of security.

Traditionally, however, security has been defined in terms of security of the state(s), and this remains a principal usage of the term to date. In this conception, security is understood in terms of threats to state sovereignty and territory that suggest protection through coercive power and deterrence of external military threats. Hence, the concept of security is closely related to the concept of ‘emergency’ and ‘the exceptional’. The context in which states strive for security is usually considered to be an anarchical, self-help one which determines the behaviour and attitudes of the units (states) irrespective of changes which may occur inside them. Moreover, priorities and needs of states at national (domestic) level are usually perceived to be a function of the needs of states to survive and increase their power in the anarchical international state system. In this context, ethnic cleansing and its by-product – refugees – are conceived as an inevitable consequence, but not necessarily a cause, of conflict and insecurity. This line of

reasoning in security thinking, that has been associated with the intellectual hegemony of neo/realism, prevailed throughout the Cold War era.

Form the 1980s onwards, nonetheless, there has emerged a non-traditional usage of the term ‘security’ which includes non-military aspects such as human (people), economic and environmental ones.\(^\text{12}\) This has been called the ‘broadening’ of the conceptualisation of security.\(^\text{13}\) Simultaneously, there has been a deepening of the conceptualisation of security, a process which Ken Booth describes as ‘investigating the implications and possibilities that result from seeing security as a concept that derives from different understandings of what politics is and can be all about’.\(^\text{14}\) Consequently, the field of security studies has been complemented by considerations of security of individuals and groups rather than focusing simply on the traditional conception of security as military defence of state interests and territory.

The reappraisal of security has generated, therefore, a wide range of referents (i.e., what is to be secured); some being more traditional (e.g., ‘the state’, ‘international’, ‘regional’) and others more new (e.g., ‘societal’ (referring to people conceived as individuals and groups), ‘the environment’, ‘economic’, or even ‘food’, ‘health’, and ‘culture’).\(^\text{15}\) The broadening and deepening of security studies, however, is still in a


\(^{15}\) The latter five referents were suggested in the United Nations Development Programme report of 1994 (in addition to ‘personal’, ‘community’, and ‘political’ security) to supplement a vague concept of
state of flux, and important definitional and empirical questions remain either unanswered or unsatisfactorily answered.\(^6\)

Despite the debate about what/who should be the focus of security, crucial to any analysis of security are two referents: states and peoples. The analyses of security in connection with other referents can serve either of these two key referents or both of them. In normal circumstances, nevertheless, when the state provides (or strives) for security of its people – the nation and minorities alike – the dichotomy between state security and people’s security is not a salient one. In such cases, by and large, state security and its people’s security coincide. The dichotomy becomes real, however, when the state fails to provide for security of all its peoples. People who are made insecure by deliberate state policies can not conceive their security to coincide with that of their state. It is this nexus between security of the people on the one hand, and security of the state on the other, that in the framework of this chapter provides the central focal point of the analysis of security policy vis-à-vis ethnic cleansing.

**VI.3 State Building, Ethnic Cleansing and Security as a Legitimating Mechanism**

The concept of security has been intimately linked to the process of nation-state building. The latter is by definition a highly political enterprise having to do with redistribution of power in a given society in order to empower the nation and disempower

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As such nation-state building is inherently an exclusive enterprise. At the centre of the process stands the national government, whose elite’s world views and belief systems may serve to rationalise various strategies of homogenisation ranging from assimilation to the extreme case of ethnic cleansing, or even genocide.

As Chapter III demonstrated, the national elites’ perception of ethnic minorities as a threat to state security has been a rather persistent feature in the 20th century Balkan history. The presence of minorities made it more difficult for statesmen to construct polities that emulated a nation-state model based on the congruence between the state and the nation. From the Balkan Wars, to the Greko-Turkish war, the two World Wars and the wars of the 1990s in the former Yugoslavia the recurrent theme has been that of the homogenisation of peoples as a security creation mechanism. The underlying assumption was the more homogenous the people the more secure the state.

State formation in the Balkans emulated the logic of the nation-state, which had previously served as a concomitant rationalisation of the state building process in the West. As Charles Tilly has pointed out, the presence of a culturally homogenous population lowered the cost of state building by making uniform administrative arrangements feasible, promoting loyalty and solidarity of the subject population, putting ready-made communication systems at the disposal of the rulers, increasing the likelihood of unity against external threats, and increasing the prospect of success for centralised policies of resource extraction and control. Thus the incentive of state-

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makers to homogenise their constituencies was primarily a pragmatic one, conceived in terms of pay offs from coercive centralised policies which aimed at the consolidation of their own power.

The national idea – the idea that ‘the nation is the only proper basis for a sovereign state and the ultimate source of governmental authority’ – provided the international legitimacy of the rulers’ efforts to homogenise populations from the French and American revolutions onwards.19 With the rise of the nation-state as a model of state organisation, national identity was made central to the modern political life – shared national identity was assigned sole political validity and made the exclusive basis of political allegiance.20 Moreover, the modern state defined by the idea of sovereignty – the idea that the government has an exclusive right to govern over its territory and population – gave a free hand to rulers to decide on the distribution of membership in their political community, thus, minimising the choices available to ethnic minorities.

The justification for ethnic cleansing in terms of an exclusive conception of sovereignty has provided a crucial enabling condition for the expulsion of minorities. Although in the 20th century, the national ideal and an exclusive conception of sovereignty conflicted with the new emerging norm of national minority rights and their protection embodied in the work of the League of Nations and the United Nations, their world-wide entrenchment ensured that when ethnic minorities came to conflict with the state, it was them that would have to move out.21

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As noted in the introduction of this thesis, ethnic cleansing as a means of creating homogenous polities is not associated exclusively with the Balkans, although scarcely any other region in the twentieth century experienced this phenomenon with such a sickening frequency. Embraced primarily as a tool of policy and facilitated often by the occurrence of war, ethnic cleansing in the Balkans began to set a precedent for ethnic cleansing in the twentieth century continental Europe with the idea of compulsory ‘exchange’ of minorities providing the basis for the expulsion of up to 14 million Germans from east central Europe in the immediate aftermath of the second World War alone. As Alfred de Zayas asserts: ‘State interests were given priority over human rights and mass expulsion gained international respectability as a legitimate solution of demographic problems; in fact, the principle of compulsory population transfers was seen by many as a panacea, a final solution to the troublesome minority problem’. Whereas the Allies detested the genocide and ethnic cleansing perpetrated by the Nazis they accepted the logic that homogenous nation states are preferable to multi-cultural ones on the ground of security. Indeed, the justification for such policies was underpinned by the assumption that the security of the state is the greatest value. Coupled with preoccupation for state security, was a concern for the interests and rights of the majority nation conceived as the unit that holds the exclusive right to the nation-state, a unit that legitimises the state and in turn is served by the state. Hence, according to this reasoning, the nation had a legitimate right, and interest, to make the state secure even at the expense of the expulsion of ethnic minorities. The Czech leader Eduard Beneš made this view public when he stated that ‘before we begin to define the rights of minorities we must define the rights of majorities and the obligations of minorities’.

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22 Refer to Chapter III, p. 88, footnote 77.
Once again, the underlying assumption was the perceived necessity of the nation-state as the dominant form of political organisation, ethnic homogeneity being considered as a value in itself and sought to be achieved by means of ethnic cleansing. The expulsion of ethno-national minorities in the Balkans and elsewhere was justified by the sweeping proposition that all members of the minority group(s) were potentially subversive and unreliable, that they collaborated with foreign powers collectively, and that national security could be secured only by rendering the state free from ethnic minorities.

The rationalisation of ethnic cleansing in the Balkans, especially in the late twentieth century, was couched predominantly in (nation) state building terms. As noted, the Bulgarian authorities justified the expulsion of Bulgarian Turks in the late 1980s as a consequence of ‘progressive’ policies of modernisation whereas the Serb President in the 1990s, similarly, couched his arguments on state building in terms of effective centralisation and unity of his nation. While championing ‘a unified and strong Serbian state’ Milošević’s interpretation of such a state was grounded on the bases of achieving the convergence between the political and national boundaries by expelling ethnic groups whose political allegiance he could not guarantee and putting in place a centralised authoritarian state administration. His aim was to secure the control of the preferred boundaries, the territory and the resources it encompassed, and the control and compliance of the subject population in order to ensure that no hostilities or armed insurgency would be faced again in the future.

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25 See Chapter III, pp. 107, 111.
26 Refer to Chapter V, pp. 187-207.
However, whereas the expulsion of ethnic minorities may, arguably, serve to construct the social bond and unify the dominant nation, the same cannot be said about its external effects. Whilst ethnic cleansing may have been perceived as a means of easing tensions with neighbouring states by diminishing the threat of secessionist claims and future wars over territory, in fact, at the same time, it held the potential to do exactly the opposite by menacing the peaceful coexistence between neighbouring countries and even act as a prelude to war.

What failed to be appreciated by political elites who engaged in ethnic cleansing in the late twentieth century was the fact that their circumstances of state building were so different from those of early modern Europe as to make attempts of justifying such contemporary practices, in terms of previous ones, futile. The normative structure of international society with its relatively (in historical terms) strong emphasis on human rights and accountable governance has rendered the early practices of state building by means of ethnic cleansing obsolete. At the same time, the tremendously high humanitarian costs of such a process – in terms of death, suffering and loss of rights – although belatedly, has come to breach the boundaries of the acceptable.

The historical experience suggests that the political meaning of ethnic cleansing has evolved gradually in the course of history. While it was perceived as a natural concomitant of the process of state building in pre-modern times and viewed with sympathy as a tool of security up to the first half of the 20th century, by the end of the same century it came to be viewed increasingly with scepticism and disdain. Underlying

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this evolution is the questioning of the assumption that there is a single standard model of state building exemplified in the utilisation of ethnic cleansing as a means of securing cohesion of the political community, and the search for other alternative trajectories of political development that pay attention to the inclusion and human rights of ethnic minorities. Whilst state security remains an important value, its acquisition may no longer be justified independent of the means.

VI.4 In/Security of States and Peoples

The analysis so far leaves little doubt as to who is more or less privileged in the security policy and practice. The privileging of the state as a referent object of security is normally premised on the normative claim, which holds that states are the agents that provide citizens with security. As already noted, when a state's security policy advances the wellbeing of its citizens, the state security and people's security are positively correlated and security interests of the state and its people may well coincide. Indeed, in normal circumstances, the state – as an aggregation of capabilities and resources – is the most structurally capable actor to provide security for its people.28

This privileging of the state in terms of security is enshrined in international law, in which context security denotes security of the state. In the national level, for instance, it is the state’s government which defines security problems and devises strategies to deal with them. Foundational international principles – such as sovereignty and non-intervention – give states a free hand to deal with security threats at the domestic level, at times, preventing needy civilians from receiving aid or protection offered by external

28 This is not to suggest that the state provides full security but rather that the state creates conducive conditions in which relative security may be provided.
parties. In the international level, on the other hand, the law of the United Nations Charter grants certain competencies to the member states of the Security Council in situations where international peace and security may be threatened and requires them to take measures to deal with such threats accordingly.

Given their privileged status, it comes as no surprise that states have drawn heavily on the security concept to win acceptance for a wide range of questionable policies ranging from arbitrary arrest, internment without trial, censorship and the withdrawal of travel documents to waging wars. Curiously, prioritisation of state security in terms of international law has, in various instances, provided justification for drastic measures against people. For instance, according to Chichele professor of international law, Ian Brownlie, the expulsion of 14 million Germans in the aftermath of the Second World War ‘may be justified as a part of the sanctions and measures of security imposed by the principal members of a coalition which had fought a lawful war of collective defence against Nazi Germany’. In his view, the act of expulsion was justified because the allied powers sought to prevent future threats to peace and security. Although the employment of extraordinary measures in service of security – at times – is questionable, the above example illustrates the dubious use of the concept of security in states’ interests.

Arguably, a recent example of the dubious use of security in the state’s interest can be found in the policies of Israel. From early 2003 till the present the Israeli government has been building a 437 mile barrier of trenches, fences, wire and concrete walls around

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and within the West Bank ostensibly as a necessary measure of security designed to defend Israelis against suicide bombers and other Palestinian attackers. Although Israel has legitimate security concerns, many governments and international lawyers, however, think that the barrier is illegal. In September 2003 the UN General Assembly issued a report condemning the barrier as 'an unlawful act of annexation' and demanded that Israel reverse its construction.\(^\text{31}\) Moreover, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in its advisory opinion of 9 July 2004 ascertained that the construction of the barrier by Israel is contrary to international law and recommended that its construction should cease forthwith whereas parts already constructed should be dismantled.\(^\text{32}\) The Israeli Government, nevertheless, considers the ICJ opinion as politically motivated and intends to contemplate only the re-routing of a 20-mile section of the planned barrier.\(^\text{33}\)

The Israeli's claim that the barrier is solely a means of combating terrorism has been thrown into doubt, nonetheless, by the fact that by reaching deep into occupied territory, sometimes even encircling entire Palestinian towns and villages, the barrier – built on agricultural land or otherwise land cleared by demolishing houses – would disrupt the lives and violate the human rights of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians, forcing many of them to move out and possibly resulting in the annexation of more territory by Israel.\(^\text{34}\)

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Another example of the ambiguity of law provisions vis-à-vis security is the case of the exception clause in Article 49 of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of August 12, 1949 – known as the Fourth Geneva Convention – and Article 17 of Protocol II (1977) to the same Convention which provide for a total or partial evacuation of the population ‘if the security of the population or imperative military reasons so demand’. The interpretation of these exceptional clauses can be murky, for instance, allowing for different interpretations of the same situation by peoples involved on the one hand, and state authorities on the other. This, in turn, warrants concern over the possible use of terms such as ‘security of the population’ or ‘imperative military reasons’ as a basis for limitation or restriction of rights and freedoms of individuals and groups. For instance, when strategic borders are targeted – as in the case of Bosnia and Palestine – is the removal of population justified on security grounds? Or, does such removal instead serve the purpose of the acquisition of territory? When a population supports an insurgency organisation, is it legitimate to expel it on the ground of ‘imperative military reasons’? Or, do attempts to expulsion provide for broadening of the basis of the insurgency? In other words, dilemmas of security allow for multiple interpretations of the exception clauses. Indeed, the breadth with which ‘security’ and ‘imperative military reasons’ could be interpreted raises doubt.

35 Although prohibiting ‘individual and mass forcible transfers’, Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention states that: ‘...the Occupying Power may undertake total or partial evacuation of a given area if the security of the population or imperative military reasons so demand’. The Fourth Geneva Convention is printed in Adam Roberts & Richard Guelff eds., Documents on the Laws of War, 3rd Edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, pp. 301-369, Article 49 at pp. 317-318. Article 17 of Protocol II states that ‘The displacement of the civilian population shall not be ordered for reasons related to the conflict unless the security of the civilians involved or imperative military reasons so demand’. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflict (Protocol II) is printed in Roberts & Guelff eds., Documents on the Laws of War, pp. 483-512, Article 17 at p. 491.
as to the *de facto* protection Article 49 and Article 17 provide suggesting that these exception clauses may be used to give forced removals of people a legal basis.\(^{36}\)

It is abundantly clear therefore that the concern for state security has been a concomitant justification of ethnic cleansing. In the Balkans – not unlike elsewhere – ethnic cleansing has been rationalised by its architects and perpetrators on the grounds of security arguments ranging from grand ones such as securing strategic borders, unity of the nation and future peace, to more cynical ones like those which sought to justify rounding up of Bosnian Muslim men in concentration camps for purposes of screening for war crimes (after their identity documents had been destroyed!), or *en masse* expulsion of Kosovar Albanians ostensibly on the bases of their support for a ‘terrorist’ organisation (KLA).\(^ {37}\) In each and every case the definition of security threats and strategies to deal with them was provided by the state. That is to say that ‘the grammar of security’ was viewed as ‘inherently statist’ according the state a high, if not the highest, value in itself.\(^ {38}\) Put differently, the value of state security relative to other values was conceptually prejudged.

The term ‘security’ has conventionally been associated with the interests of collectivities, primarily states but also nations who legitimise these entities. The asymmetrical and paternalistic manner in which security is used in the discourse of


politics and international law to privilege the state suggest that security is not a neutral label which can be used in the same way for states and the individual or groups of individuals short of nations. Nevertheless, modern international law has extended beyond the regulation of interstate relationships to embrace security demands of individuals as exemplified in a growing body of human rights law, refugee law and humanitarian law which seek to pacify the individual against the exercise of power by the state and also oblige the state to protect individuals subject to its power.39

In reaction to the growing visibility of individual human rights, some scholars have suggested that the individual – not the state – should be made the main referent object of security. One of the most prominent proponents of this view is Ken Booth who argues that states are not suitable to be prime referents of security because (1) whereas some states are in the business of security others are not; (2) even those states that are in the business of security represent the means and not ends; and (3) states are so diverse in their character that they cannot serve as the basis for a comprehensive theory of security.40 To privilege the state, in this view, is illogical because it implies privileging the security of the means as opposed to the security of the ends.41 Indeed, at the turn of the century, it looks like individuals and groups of individuals are set to be increasingly central in security thinking – legally, ethically, and politically.42 Some even argue that individual and collective human security do no longer depend overwhelmingly on the state.43

41 Ibid.
43 See, for instance, Martin Shaw, Global Society and International Relations – Sociological Concepts and Political Perspectives, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994, p. 110; and Alex J. Bellamy and Matt
However, this dichotomy of the level of analysis – security of the individual as opposed to security of the state – is not necessarily unproblematic. This is so because, conceptually, it does not cater for the enormous differences in power and autonomy between the state and the individual. Not only do states possess the power to define and defend their own security interests, they also usurp the power to define the security interests of individuals (sometimes they defend them at others violate them). The individual, on the contrary, has minimal voice in security discourse whereas his autonomous power to defend his own security interests is extremely limited. So, while one cannot help but agree with Booth in that security should be primarily about humans and that states are means and not ends, the conclusion that security of humans does not depend overwhelmingly on the state may well be misleading. As already pointed out, states are the best suited actors to provide for security in terms of powers they possess and privileges accorded to them in the international system. Whereas the security of the individual is a clearly identifiable level of analysis it remains, nevertheless, subordinate to other levels, primarily that of the state and international system.

This verity, again, is enshrined in international law. For instance, the 1969 American Convention on Human Rights states in Article 32(2), which addresses the issue of personal responsibilities, that: ‘The rights of each person are limited by the rights of others, by the security of all, and by the just demands of the general welfare, in a

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44 See Gregor Noll, ‘Securitising sovereignty?’, p. 280.

Similarly, Article 27(2) of the 1981 African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights makes an analogous opposition between individual rights and collective security. So, the issue is not to deny the centrality of the state as the main provider of security but to reorient the state structures in ways which provide for security of the individual and groups of individuals in recognition that state security and people's security are closely inter-linked. Hence the growing awareness that the state is the entity with prime responsibility to protect its citizens as the fundamental and ultimate function of sovereignty.

Blaming some states for ethnic cleansing, as this thesis has done, does not mean, however, that all states (and at all times) can be regarded as inevitable culprits in depriving individuals and groups of their security. It is only those states that engage in massive violations of human rights that are likely to have their privileges suspended. Indeed, there is an increasing awareness in that a government which forces its citizens to leave or creates conditions which induce them to leave internationalises its internal actions and should expect others to intervene in its internal affairs. Large-scale conflicts – including ethnic cleansing – that result on massive numbers of refugees and human suffering bring about the option of humanitarian intervention. Although international responses to humanitarian crises, so far, have been overall reactive, self-interested and on ad-hoc basis, there is growing international awareness on the linkage

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47 Article 27(2) states that: 'The rights and freedoms of each individual shall be exercised with due regard to the rights of others, collective security, morality and common interest'. The African Charter on Human and People's Rights is printed in Steiner and Alston, *International Human Rights in Context*. Article 27(2) in p. 1454.


between global, regional, and state security, on the one hand, and protection of human
rights (at the individual and collective level) on the other. Intervention in Kosovo, for
instance, may be viewed as a manifestation of such an interconnectedness at work.
Interpretations of this case vary, however, with some arguing that NATO’s response to
Kosovo’s crisis was an expression of the pursuit of human security.50 Others, on the
other hand, argue that the Alliance’s intervention was self-interested and the protection
of peoples was merely a by-product of a reactive response, which sought primarily to
protect Western interests.51 Whilst emphasising one particular rationale for intervention,
these two interpretations underplay the fact that intervention in Kosovo was a more
nuanced enterprise that involved a wider range of motivating factors.52 What the case of
intervention in the Balkans in the 1990s demonstrates, however, is that states have the
prime responsibility for protection of people. And, even when a state does not fulfil this
obligation, but instead engages in massive violations of human rights, the responsibility
for safeguarding subjugated people falls with the international community of states.

A decade of war and ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia has confirmed that the
urge for security is not an illegitimate one, but one that, nonetheless, does not render
security above all else. Although politics offer some opportunities for immoral action
for which ‘state security’ can serve as a convenient cloak, the interpretation of what
constitutes ‘national security’ and how much value should be attached to it is a moral
question which rests on value judgements i.e., balancing of security with other desired

50 This was the view of the former Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy. See Lloyd Axworthy,
Axworthy, the Kosovo crisis shows how individuals are the main victims and targets of state-sponsored
aggression. It should be remembered, nonetheless, that ethnic cleansing is a collective crime – the victims
are targeted as members of a collectivity although the underlying motives are profoundly political. While
humanitarian imperative triggered Allied intervention, the protection of the individual may have been a
corollary of the protection of a collectivity targeted as such.
52 Refer to Chapter V p. 223.
values such as welfare, freedom and good neighbourliness. A governmental policy designed to provide security has a normative character being concerned as it is with the questions of what should and should not be conceived as a threat and why, and what means should be used to avert such a threat. This implies that security, like other goals, may be purchased by a variety of means, but some means of which ethnic cleansing is one are profoundly problematic – undermining the security of particular peoples. But when one people is endangered, that puts in jeopardy the security of others too. This suggests that the pursuit of security cannot be self-referential. The value of security purchased at the price of insecuring ethno-national minorities might not be very high after all. A zero-sum conception of security which assumes that more security for a state (or nation) means less security for other states and/or peoples, can lead to a situation in which a state is surrounded by insecure states and peoples inviting the reasonable question whether insecure neighbours are good neighbours at all.

The experience of ethnic cleansing in the Balkans shows that the whole peninsula, in fact, has suffered as a consequence of ethnic cleansing in an adjacent state or region. Usually it is the direct costs of ethnic cleansing that are more often brought forward i.e., the number of dead, burnt houses, razing of villages, destruction of infrastructure, refugees and the burden of providing for them by the neighbouring countries and international community. But a greater part of the human costs of ethnic cleansing may well result ‘indirectly’ from the casualties due to destruction of entitlements, that is, lack of access to food, housing, health facilities, education, employment, and other resources, in addition to negative psychological effects involving the grieve for a lost

\[^{53}\text{The term ‘entitlements’ – connoting forms of human command over resources – comes from A. K. Sen,} \]

home and anxieties for an uncertain future. Sadly, many of the victims of ethnic cleansing face unique impediments to their recovery and are unable to move forward without the closure that comes from knowing with certainty what has happened to their family members and properly grieving for them. Srebrenica, in particular, has lent its name to 'Srebrenica syndrome', a new pathology category, a post-traumatic syndrome displayed by the survivors of Srebrenica who ever since July 1995 have no news from their loved ones and live haunted by their memories.54

The irony is that ethnic cleansing may have not secured either the state or the people on whose name it was carried out. Serbia in the 1990s, for example, has suffered the most dreadful impoverishment in its history. At the end of 1996, for instance, the total production of the Former Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY – Serbia and Montenegro) was only 48 percent of the production achieved in 1989, whilst the industrial output amounted to 37-38 per cent of the 1989 level. Real wages of those employed in the social sector in the FRY dropped by mid-1996 to only 25 percent of the 1990 wages. In 1994, 35.6 per cent of Serbia’s population were below the poverty line.55 The scale of plundering Serbia has been awesome with up to $4 billion being spirited out of the country during the 1990s apparently to outset the effect of the UN sanctions but substantial amounts ending up in private bank accounts owned by Milošević’s cronies in Cyprus, Switzerland, Russia, Greece and Israel to name some of the most favoured destinations.56 In 1996, FRY – Serbia and Montenegro – was the country with the highest number of refugees in Europe hosting more than half a million registered Serb

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refugees from Bosnia and Croatia in addition to about 100,000 unregistered ones. Unlike any other time in her history, Serbia is faced with strained diplomatic relations with neighbouring countries who are rendered poorer and less secure by her policy of ethnic cleansing. If, initially, ethnic cleansing as a means to security was conceived on zero-sum terms, its end result can be described as negative-sum having impacted adversely on almost everyone and led to severe consequences for the foreseeable future.

VI. 5 Summary

The argument of this chapter can be summarised as follows:

- The meaning of security is open to argumentation because the concept has many dimensions and can be applied at once to various analytical levels. In the gamut of referents of security, nevertheless, two stand out: the state and the people. State security and people's security are, normally, positively correlated but they are bound to clash when the state employs deliberate policies that become a source of insecurity of the people.

- The state is privileged in security policy and practice. Ambiguous legal provisions and insufficiently precise terms (including 'national security' and 'imperative military reasons'), at times, have enabled interpretations that give ethnic cleansing a legal basis on the ground of security.

- Ethnic cleansing as a means to national security, however, is deeply problematic because by undermining the security of particular peoples it puts in jeopardy the security of others too.

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- By seeking security to the expense of others rather than the benefit of the whole, ethnic cleansing cannot guarantee stability; instead it is bound to disturb peace and good relations among states and peoples.

- Although conceived on zero-sum terms, the end result of ethnic cleansing has been negative-sum reducing security of both states and peoples.
VII. Conclusion

VII.1 The argument in brief

This thesis has shed light on ethnic cleansing in the twentieth century Balkans with particular reference to the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s. The central question ‘Why did ethnic cleansing occur in the Balkans?’ has been addressed by means of explanatory inference grounded on a historical evidence of the large scale cases of ethnic cleansing in the region, primarily those associated with the Balkan wars of 1912-1913, the Greko-Turkish war of 1923, the first and second World Wars as they affected the region, the Bulgarian crisis of 1989, and the regional wars of the 1990s.

My analysis shows that although the origins of ethnic cleansing may be conceived to be multifarious in so far as they may be traced inductively in past history, fear, security dilemmas, and nationalism – as manifested in the region – these correlations, nevertheless, are neither direct nor deterministic. Such factors may have facilitated the occurrence of ethnic cleansing; however, the large-scale expulsion of targeted minorities has been primarily a matter of deliberate policy. Furthermore, the fact that ethnic cleansing was time and place specific renders its occurrence a function of the quality of political leadership. Consequently, this thesis has argued that ethnic cleansing in the region occurred because it was espoused as a strategy of nation-state building, the nation-state model being perceived by the national leaders as a supreme value. Ethnic cleansing was premised on ethnic definition of territory and was purported to serve control of the state, its territory and resources by the majority nation and the granting of rights and protections exclusively to the members of the said nation. Moreover, concerns for state security have been concomitant justifications of ethnic cleansing. Curiously, ambiguous legal provisions and insufficiently precise terms (such as
'imperative military reasons'), at times, have enabled interpretations that give ethnic cleansing a legal basis on the ground of security.

Virtually all cases of ethnic cleansing analysed in this thesis reflect the incompatibilities of territorial expansionism and the official perception of minorities as a threat that undermined the cohesion of the dominant nation. The practice and the official rationale for the expulsion of the targeted communities have not changed significantly in the course of the past century although technical aspects may have advanced in order to increase efficiency and the speed of expulsion.

The politics of ethnic cleansing at the national level has been intrinsically linked with the delineation of borders, control of territory, national security and the political organisation of the state (i.e., the nature of state governance and its 'ownership', and granting of rights and their protection). So high was the perceived importance of these issues in the aftermath of the dissolution of the Yugoslav federation in the 1990s that war itself became a means of ethnic cleansing. Wars of ethnic cleansing were not autonomous but instead an instrument of policy – the state being central in their organisation and execution. Furthermore, the shape and character of these wars was a function of the nature of war aims and of situations that gave rise to them. Since the central feature of wars of ethnic cleansing was coercion, military operations relied not on direct combat with opponents but on the demonstrative capacity of violence which was intended to compel the targeted peoples to leave.

If the practice and the official rationale for ethnic cleansing have not changed as such, the reaction of the international community towards such a policy has. Historical record
shows that ethnic cleansing has come to be perceived as an illegitimate policy, which violates established and emerging human rights standards and norms. Although the Western powers’ reaction to the expulsion of ethno-national minorities in the course of the twentieth century has been inconsistent – condoning or overlooking it some times while pressing for its reversal at other times – the use of military means by the Western Alliance to reverse ethnic cleansing in Kosovo may suggest that ethnic cleansing can no longer be countenanced, at least in the European state system.

The tragedy of ethnic cleansing and the wars that accompanied it, especially in the 1990s, has placed the Balkans at the centre of the stage in which issues – whose importance transcends the region – are rethought and reconsidered. Ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia may provide a sad opportunity to shed light and develop a new crime in international humanitarian law. Moreover, not only the establishment of the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) develops further the international legal framework concerned with humanitarian law but the intervention in Kosovo may represent a normative shift in the reconceptualisation of humanitarian intervention and state sovereignty. Furthermore, the why and how ethnic cleansing was carried out in the closing decade of the twentieth century has raised important questions regarding conflict resolution and the political organisation of states. It is to these three issues that the rest of this conclusion now turns.

VII.2 Criminalising ethnic cleansing in its own right

Although the protection of civilians during armed conflict, nowadays, may be considered an elementary notion inscribed in various legal documents, in the beginning of the twentieth century it could not be predicted that ethnic cleansing would become so
central to armed conflicts. Indeed, the Hague Convention IV concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, as originally adopted in 1899 and revised in 1907, contains no explicit mentioning of the practice of forced removal of civilians, probably because such a practice was regarded, at that time, ‘to have fallen into abeyance’.\(^1\) Even the occurrence of the Balkan Wars (1912-1913) and the two World Wars in which civilian casualties were horrendous did not affect profoundly the political and legal imagination of their times. Moreover, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1948 and the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights did not address explicitly the offence of expulsion as such.\(^2\) A reason for this can presumably be found in the political circumstances of the time given the Western powers’ preoccupation to deal with the German ‘menace’ by means of expulsion.\(^3\)

The emerging culture of human rights, however, took on board, gradually, the issue of expulsion although no mentioning of ethnic cleansing as such can be found in hard law. In our days, it is widely believed nonetheless that acts of ethnic cleansing are in breach of customary and conventional humanitarian law and constitute a violation of basic principles of conventional and customary international and human rights law.\(^4\) Indeed, by expelling its own nationals a Government violates all rights that are, to any extent,


\(^3\) Refer to Chapter III, p. 88, footnote, 77 and Chapter VI pp. 241-242, 245.

dependent for their full and effective enjoyment on the person’s being able to live in his/her own country.  

Ethnic cleansing, as a special case of mass expulsion, may be considered illegal on the ground of *arbitrariness* (the absence of due process) and *discrimination* (the expulsion of a group of people on the very ground of belonging to that specific group) — whose prohibition appears in a great many human rights conventions and declarations. A discriminatory and arbitrary mass expulsion — including ethnic cleansing — violates the letter and spirit of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the European and American Human Rights Conventions, as well as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to mention a few examples. The work of the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) attests to the fact that the offence of ethnic cleansing has, at last, been recognised by the international community as an international crime for which respective political leaders and their military echelons are liable and should not be offered impunity.

Despite the evolutionary process of international law, however, legal opinion is divided as to the adequacy of the existing legal provisions regarding mass expulsion in general, and ethnic cleansing, in particular. Henckaerts, for instance, believes that the legal

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provisions dealing with mass expulsion are sufficient and no new convention is needed, although he acknowledges that ‘a specific treaty on mass expulsion would have the advantage of establishing specific enforcement procedures’. De Zayas, similarly, opines that ‘the norms and the jurisprudence on the illegality of forced population transfers are consistent’, although he admits that ‘there is no proper mechanism of implementation and no sanctions for enforcing compliance’. He advocates, however, a convention on mass expulsion.

The Working Group on Mass Expulsion convened by the International Institute of Humanitarian Law in 1983 concluded, nevertheless, that there are many gaps in the law and suggested that an appropriate international instrument should be considered and that the problem of mass expulsion should be examined anew. Similarly, assessing whether the existing legal principles afford adequate protection against population transfers, the UN Special Rapporteurs Al-Khasawneh and Hatano argued that there are gaps in legal protection and that ‘the development of law on this global human rights problem of war and peace is long overdue’. Moreover, the 90th Inter-Parliamentary Conference, held in Canberra from 13-18 September 1993, called for the elaboration of a convention against expulsion and displacement of populations complementary to the 1948 United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of

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9 Henckaerts, Mass Expulsion, p. 197.
Genocide, effectively banning such displacements and making them punishable under international law.\textsuperscript{13}

The dissatisfaction with the existing legal provisions stem from the fact that although mass expulsion / population transfers / ethnic cleansing violate established principles of fundamental human rights, there is no legal code that universally prohibits them as such. Moreover, the existing hard law provisions are not specific enough to relate directly to the problem of expulsion. Hence the need for legal clarification. In the first instance, legal clarification is needed in the field of definitions in order to name and categorise specific crimes for what they are rather than use terms loosely and interchangeably by lumping a wide range of crimes in one vague category. Some had hoped that the Rome Treaty of July 1998 adopted by the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court would cater for this. However, although the International Criminal Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction began as a longish list of crimes, it was disappointing that it ended up as a detailed specification of only four international law crimes: genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression.\textsuperscript{14} Due to this restriction, the Rome Treaty does not mention ‘ethnic cleansing’ or ‘mass expulsion’ although it stipulates that deportation or forcible transfer of population constitutes crimes against humanity under Article 7 and war crimes under Article 8 of the Statute.\textsuperscript{15}


Gaps and ambiguities in the law demand attention. As pointed out in Chapter VI, one of the key legal provisions in relation to ethnic cleansing in war time is rather ambiguous in so far as the exception clause is concerned.\textsuperscript{16} Although Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention was drafted with the intention to prohibit and thereby prevent expulsion of civilians in times of armed conflict, at the same time, it sanctions such transfers when ‘imperative military reasons so demand’. The exception clause leaves states with large margin of discretion to use ‘military necessity’ (likewise ‘national security’) as justification for forcefully removing people. Moreover, as the UN Special Rapporteurs pointed out, because the law is not sufficiently specific violations occur as protection against population transfer practices have to be inferred from human rights and other international legislation related to the practice. Non-ratifying states claim exemption, while some ratifying states exonerate themselves by conjuring up extenuating reasons why, in their case, particular legal rules should not apply.\textsuperscript{17} Moreover, gaps in legal protection exist in non-international armed conflict and conflictive situations not involving use of arms, in which cases forced removal of peoples can be ‘insidious, incremental and thus ‘hidden’, allowing the transferring agent (the State) to assert plausible deniability before charges of unlawful action’.\textsuperscript{18} This is suggestive in the light of the insistence of the Serbian government in the 1990s, that Bosnian war was a civil war rather than an interstate one.\textsuperscript{19} It is also telling with regard to the Bulgarian government’s absurd justifications for ethnic cleansing of the Bulgarian Turks – in peace time – in the late 1980s.\textsuperscript{20} These inadequacies in the law suggest that

\textsuperscript{16} Refer to Chapter VI, pp. 247-248.
\textsuperscript{18} Ibid., paragraph 368.
\textsuperscript{19} See Chapter V, pp. 198-200.
\textsuperscript{20} Refer to Chapter III, pp. 106-108.
there is need to review in greater detail arguments used to justify ethnic cleansing and inscribe the law in more specific terms.

In the opinion of this author, remedies in the law are needed for it to be stronger and at the same time more specific with the view to criminalise ethnic cleansing explicitly. To this end, either a new convention on mass expulsion – which considers ethnic cleansing as a special case – may be negotiated and adopted by the UN General Assembly, or an appropriate protocol may be added to one of the related treaties such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights or the Rome Treaty. The existing soft-law relevant to this purpose such as the International Law Association Declaration of Principles of International Law on Mass Expulsion, the Draft Declaration on Population Transfer and the Implantation of Settlers, the Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, and the International Law Commission’s Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind may be used as a legal background to make the transcendence into hard law.

The consequences of not doing so will be the continuation of a weak and unspecific law in relation to ethnic cleansing (and mass expulsion in general) and a misleading analogy between ethnic cleansing and genocide – given the tendency for an expansive interpretation of the definition of genocide as stipulated in the Genocide Convention –

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21 See note 5 above.
to the extent that genocide will be devalued and cheapened whereas the nature of ethnic cleansing will be obscured rather than explained.\textsuperscript{25}

Advocating the need to strengthen the law and make it more specific vis-à-vis ethnic cleansing should not mean to suggest that the law will be a panacea for serious human rights infringements. In our world the law is bound to depend on its master: politics. This, nevertheless, does not imply that legal devices are irrelevant. On the contrary, being an expression of what is right and what is wrong, law can be instrumental in bringing about the desired normative change.

VII.3 The need to rethink humanitarian intervention

A great part of the strength and attraction of International Relations stems from the fact that it is interdisciplinary. Indeed, its thinking is not influenced only by related subjects such as history, law and philosophy but also by distant subjects such as physics. Concepts such as complementarity, complicity, and complexity that have emerged in the contemporary jargon of International Relations as key ethical questions have been instrumental to the innovative thinking of physicists throughout the twentieth century, in challenging the traditional Newtonian mechanics and establishing new ways of thinking about the physics of particles.\textsuperscript{26} Just like the observation changed what a physicist can measure about a particle, so observation is changing what we think about human rights infringements and how should we respond to them.

\textsuperscript{25} Refer to Chapter II, pp. 44-56.
Observing on our TV screens staggering numbers of refugees, the slaughter of civilians, children left orphaned, destruction of towns and villages, stimulates a reaction which demands on the part of the observer that something should be done to stop the tragedies. In our time, doing nothing about civilians who are subjected to appalling cruelty by their own governments is widely viewed as being morally diminishing not least because it makes us feel complicit in atrocities. The normative context vis-à-vis human rights infringements has evolved gradually and significantly during the second half of the past century and onwards. The evolving nature of the response towards ethnic cleansing in the Balkans attests to the fact that rights – as reasons to treat people in certain ways – have changed depending on the circumstances and the time frame. This suggests that the toleration of ethnic cleansing in the past cannot be a justification for the toleration of ethnic cleansing in the present. By the same token, the inability to reverse ethnic cleansing everywhere should not be an excuse for not reverting it where this is possible.

The tragic story of ethnic cleansing in the Balkans has enormous significance for the way peoples think and act in relation to human rights infringements. As the case of Bosnia and Kosovo show, humanitarian intervention – the use of force across state borders by a state (or a group of states) aimed at ending widespread and grave violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms of individuals other than its own citizens\(^\text{27}\) – becomes the last resort because opportunities are missed for preventive action. Unfortunately, the international community is still not ready to accept and act on the logic of prevention, given the implication this holds for politically sensitive issues of sovereignty, the needed resources and the lack of broadly supported political interest in

conflict prevention. Although intervention is cheaper before anything resembling ethnic cleansing, the international community reacts only when a crisis has broken out despite the counter-intuitiveness of this. Yet even a belated intervention aimed at stopping massive human rights infringements has not, so far, escaped controversy. The reason lies primarily on its impact on what is perceived as the most fundamental principle of the society of states – sovereignty.

It bears emphasising, nevertheless, that non-intervention remains the norm in normal circumstances and that humanitarian intervention challenges the relevance of sovereignty only in exceptional situations when a government engages in large-scale violations of human rights of its population, or a part thereof. Sovereign states are expected to act as guardian of their citizens' security but – as Nicholas Wheeler asks – what happens if states behave as gangsters towards their own people, treating sovereignty as a license to kill? In the latter circumstances, what moral values attach to the rules of sovereignty and non-intervention? Should sovereignty of such a state be respected?

Although no universally agreed answers to the above questions so far exist, there is a growing consensus that in such extreme cases there is a moral duty to intervene forcibly in order to end large-scale human suffering. This growing consensus is premised on the assumption that governments who seriously violate human rights undermine the one

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reason that justifies their political power, and therefore should not be protected by international law. As Fernando Tesón argues: ‘...to the extent that state sovereignty is a value, it is an instrumental, not an intrinsic value. Sovereignty serves valuable human ends, and those who grossly assault them should not be allowed to shield themselves behind the sovereignty principle. Tyranny and anarchy cause the moral collapse of sovereignty’. This is to suggest that sovereignty should not be conceived as an amoral attribute and that the traditional precedence of sovereignty over respect for human rights should be questioned. It also implies that what goes on inside the borders of a sovereign state is not necessarily disconnected from international politics, and that the legitimacy of social and political arrangements at the national level is not just a domestic matter for a given state. Put differently, a state should not be able to claim the prerogatives of sovereignty unless it meets internationally agreed responsibilities which include protecting the human rights of and providing security to all those within its jurisdiction. As Francis Deng asserts sovereignty should be conceptualised as responsibility: states failing to exercise their sovereignty responsibly – for instance, by abusing human rights of their citizens in a large scale – should lose it temporarily (until the capacity of the state to protect its people is restored). In such circumstances the international community has not only a legitimate right but even an obligation to override state sovereignty through military intervention.

The responsibility for protecting the lives and promoting welfare of citizens lies, however, first and foremost, with individual sovereign states. Sovereignty as

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34 Refer to Chapter VI, p. 252.
responsibility is premised on complementarity that is, only when there is a responsibility deficit—only when a state is unable or unwilling to protect its own citizens or is the perpetrator of violence against them—does the responsibility to protect targeted peoples fall with other states. The failure to react to massive human rights violations of peoples by their own governments, and respect for sovereignty of such states, imply complicity.

Complicity has important implications especially for political leaders of powerful states so that they consider how their decisions affect the lives of other peoples in other countries. This is particularly the case for the Western states given that those with the greatest capacity to act have the greatest responsibility to act. It is natural therefore, that in times of humanitarian crises the deliberations of the UN Security Council attract the attention of the whole of the world. The dilemma of humanitarian intervention in Kosovo, however, suggests that to demand that the UN Security Council must give its consent to international intervention for humanitarian purposes, at times, is to risk policy paralysis by subjecting the agenda to any obstructionist permanent member(s) determined to use the veto clause. Although the United Nations Security Council remains the most appropriate body to sanction humanitarian intervention, in exceptional cases when massive human rights infringements occur it is desirable—for the sake of saving human lives—that the permanent members of the Council consider restrictions on the use of the veto clause. However, as the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty pointed out, should the Security Council fail to act in face of ethnic cleansing and genocide, support for military action for humanitarian purposes should be sought from the majority in the UN General Assembly, or alternatively the
matter should be delegated to a regional organisation acting within its defining boundaries.35

One fundamental lesson from humanitarian intervention in Bosnia and Kosovo is that intervening parties should commit themselves not just to the cessation of hostilities but to the long-term stabilisation and pacification of societies affected by violence. Anything less risks undermining whatever levels of initial success in conflict management and even resort to arms on the part of the interveners. As James Mayall points out, the protection of the victims and the relief of suffering can be viewed as ends in themselves at the point of intervention, however, over the long run, it is necessary to reconstruct society in ways that will ensure against a recurrence of the initial hostilities.36 Humanitarian intervention, therefore, should be coupled with a long-term engagement in order to address causes of the conflict through a commitment to conflict resolution and social reconstruction.37

The evidence suggests that there is a tendency in moving in this direction, however, such a move – so far – has not been decisive. Although minority returns in Bosnia give reason for optimism38 it is unfortunate that financial resources needed to boost and sustain returns have been faltering steadily. With an estimated cost for the reconstruction of Bosnia running up to US$ 30 billion, disbursement of some US$ 5

37 Wheeler, Saving Strangers, p. 306.
38 More than a million victims of ethnic cleansing had returned home in Bosnia by the end of February 2004. Out of these 436,238 were minority returns, i.e., persons returned to their pre-conflict municipalities, currently dominated by another community. http://www.unhcr.ba.
billion during the four years following the Dayton Agreement should not be seen as the job done. While the interest in refugee returns has grown since the year 2000, the funding required to rebuild homes and attend to the needs of returnees has reduced sharply. Time, nonetheless, has not yet come to factor out the international vigilance over the peace process in Bosnia. There is still an acute need for long-term programmes, which strengthen institutions and provide economic bases for reconciliation and peace building.

Moreover, the eruption of violence in Kosovo in March 2004 highlights the fragility of socio-political structures and relationships in the province. Despite the initial success to reverse ethnic cleansing of the Albanians by the Serbs in 1999, the intervention does not seem to have gone far enough given the failure of interveners to prevent the attacks of the Albanians against Kosovo Serbs. This incidence of hostilities alerts to the dangers of indecisive commitment on the part of the interveners. The political and economic conditions of the province and the perceived deficiencies of the international administration of Kosovo provide important clues about the recurrence of the conflict. Five years after the secession of hostilities no agreement on the status of Kosovo has been reached, neither a deadline set for such an agreement. The province is drawn in severe poverty with official unemployment levels at 60 percent. Likewise in Bosnia, the international financial aid needed to boost the economy and the process of peace

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40 This appears to have encouraged the Serb official claims for the ethnic partition of the province — a position that is opposed by the majority Albanian population of Kosovo.
building has been insufficient whilst the deployment of UN peace keeping troops –
especially so the American contingent – has been continuously reduced.\textsuperscript{41}

The Balkans experience suggests that humanitarian intervention should not be based on
a negative conception of peace. In the one European region in which neither peace nor
stability is yet guaranteed, the Western powers should neither disavow their strategic
interests nor shirk their responsibilities lest they risk undermining their previous
commitments and prospects for democratic peace. Coping with the consequences of
ethnic cleansing will be a continuing challenge for many years to come. The
international presence and support – in the next few years – remains a crucial factor for
peace and stability to take firm hold in the Balkan region.

\textbf{VII.4 Implications for conflict resolution}

Ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s has brought to the fore not only
the question of the external intervention but also the question of what sort of states
ought to exist and how should they be constructed. Some analysts subscribe to the view
that homogenous states are more desirable, in comparison to other forms of political
organisation, because they provide more stability. Recently, David Goodhart, for
instance, has argued that the nation-state remains irreplaceable as the site for democratic
participation. He maintains that solidarity and diversity are conflicting values, on which
basis he questions the compatibility between an ethnically diverse society and a welfare
state.\textsuperscript{42} Dahrendorf and Miller, also, defend the nation-state model, and the congruence
of the state and nation embodied in it, on the ground that it provides social solidarity

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{42} David Goodhart, ‘Discomfort of Strangers’, \textit{Prospect}, February 2004. Published also in \textit{Guardian}, 24
\end{flushright}
and collective benefits needed to maintain redistributive practices — which, of course, favour nations.\textsuperscript{43}

In spite of \textit{prima facie} validity of the proposition that homogeneity implies stability, such an assumption is not, however, supported by the evidence. As the cases of Afghanistan, Algeria, Cambodia, Nicaragua, Sierra Leone and Somalia demonstrate ethnic homogeneity is no guarantee of internal harmony.\textsuperscript{44} Moreover, arguing — as Goodhart does — that negotiating the tension between solidarity and diversity runs through an acute dilemma underpinned by a reluctance to sharing, appears to be a justification for existing power relations between ‘the haves’ and ‘the have-nots’ at the national level. Dahrendorf and Miller, on the other hand, overlook the fact that even in Western Europe, the congruence of the state and the nation is not necessarily the norm. Ethno-national minorities exist in every state and this will be the case also in the future. The proponents of the nation-state neglect the fact that cohesion of the nation-state purchased at the price of alienating ethno-national minorities can be counterproductive sowing the seeds of long-term conflict. Moreover, the feasibility of such a cohesion can be challenged on the grounds of ethical selectivism and the injustice provided to the excluded minorities.

The defence of the homogenous nation-state as a supreme form of political organisation has important political implications not least because of the impact it has on the nature of the relationship between the state and people — who inhabit it — other than the nation. Such a defence seems to suggest that it is the people who should fit the state rather than


the state fit the people. Furthermore, this assumption of the superiority of the homogenous nation-state has prompted some analysts to consider sympathetically the exchange of populations and the division of contested territories as a way of solving intractable conflicts, despite the tragic human consequences of such practices in history. Citing a few scattered episodes from the past and based on a superficial reading of their evidence the advocates of this position come up with some disturbing policy prescriptions which effectively amount to recommendations for the international community’s supervision of ethnic cleansing and proscription of its reversal.

Referring to the stability of Poland and Czechoslovakia following ethnic cleansing of their German minorities after World War II, Benjamin Schwartz concludes that ‘the most stable and lasting solutions to ethnic and nationalist conflicts has been ethnic cleansing and partition’. He does not contemplate, however, why and how stability of these two states can be explained by a single factor such as ethnic cleansing. Can it be instead that their stability is an attribute of other factors including alliance politics and protection offered by a superpower (USSR) rather than the expulsion of deprived minorities? More disturbing, nevertheless, the implication of Schwartz’s logic for external intervention is that the United States has only two options: Washington can


either ‘await the time when mutual exhaustion or the triumph of one group over another will create an opening for intervention in a purely peacekeeping capacity’ or, alternatively, ‘the United States can effectively intervene, not by building civil societies or pacifying such conflicts but by helping one side impose its will on the other …’.

Robert Hayden’s prescription for intervention differs slightly but the outcome would be the same. Considering the partition of Bosnia as inevitable, Hayden blames ethnic cleansing on the international community who refused to accept the agreed partition of the country by the Serbs and Croats and refused to impose such a division on the Bosnian Muslims, who, in his view, may have then acceded to an exchange of populations. Clearly, Hayden is neither troubled by the immorality of his case, nor by taking sides with the perpetrators of ethnic cleansing. Furthermore, it does not seem to have occurred to him that allowing Serbs and Croats to keep territories gained by means of aggression would have permitted morally outrageous conduct appear triumphant.

The central problem with the above prescription is that not only partition of territory and forceful population transfers violate human rights and fundamental freedoms but the underlying premise of their workability is not necessarily valid. Indeed, to argue that population exchanges and division of territory bring about peace and stability is to misconstrue the course of events. Surveying a variety of cases, Radha Kumar concluded that the history of partition is a troubled one. Kumar argued that the partition of Cyprus, India, Palestine, and Ireland rather than separating irreconcilable ethnic groups,

\[47\text{Ibid.}, \text{p. 67.}\]

fomented further violence and forced mass migration.\textsuperscript{49} Another major study on causes and consequences of partition in the twentieth century found that partition is a failed policy. Far from being conducive to peace and security, the forced division of nations has repeatedly led to 'the displacement of indigenous populations, the disenfranchisement of ethnic and secular minorities, the frustration of empowered majorities, internecine social conflict, and interstate war'.\textsuperscript{50} This conclusion is supported by Nicholas Sambanis' statistical analysis of 125 civil wars between 1944 and 2000 which found that ethnic partition neither helps reduce the risk of war recurrence nor resolves the problem of ethnic antagonism.\textsuperscript{51}

The focus of conflict resolution in our era should not rest on the misplaced assumption of the superiority of the homogenous nation-state but rather recognise the need for human diversity and cultural pluralism. The findings of Lord Acton in the early twentieth century provide a fundamental prerequisite for conditions of long-lasting peace and stability and it is worth quoting here:

> If we take the establishment of liberty for the realisation of moral duties to be the end of civil society, we must conclude that those states are substantially the most perfect which ... include various distinct nationalities without oppressing them. Those in which no mixture of races has occurred are imperfect; and those in which its effects have disappeared are decrepit. A State which is incompetent to satisfy different races condemns itself; a State which labours to neutralise, to absorb, or to expel them, destroys its own vitality; a State which does not include them is destitute of the chief basis of self-government'.\textsuperscript{52}

The inadequacy of the nation-state idea in a world characterised by ethnic heterogeneity has been obvious to many other thinkers including C. A. Macartney, E. H. Carr, R. M.

\textsuperscript{51} Nicholas Sambanis, 'Partition as a Solution to Ethnic War: An Empirical Critique of the Theoretical Literature', \textit{World Politics}, Vol. 52, No. 4, 2000, pp. 464-482.
MacIver, Inis Claude and Andrew Linklater. Surely, they are right to think that in the context of highly diverse, multi-ethnic societies, the nation-state model is not a feasible idea on the ground that by alienating minorities it cannot provide for sustainable peace, and equal rights and freedoms. Population transfers as a technique of conflict resolution represent a negative approach to the reality of a world characterised by ethno-national diversity and can amount to ethnic cleansing given the reluctance of people to abandon their homes. Conflict resolution must not endorse exclusion but rather problematise it. The starting point for resolving conflicts should be the acceptance of ethno-national diversity as a fact of life, as a value on its own right, as an enrichment of each and every society. The challenge is to amend the traditional conception of the nation as the state-forming core of a polity and reconceptualise it on pluralist terms so that it can encompass ethnic diversity without obliterating it. World peace and stability, to a large extent, may depend on this.

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279


281


286


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293


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