DOMESTIC STRUCTURES AND EVERYDAY LIFE IN THE COMMUNICATION OF HEGEMONIC DISCOURSES: THE CASE OF GLOBALISATION IN GREECE AND IRELAND

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ABSTRACT

The thesis explores the interplay between hegemonic discourses and domestic institutional arrangements. The purpose of the study is twofold. First, to use primary and comparative material in order to shed light on what is a hegemonic discourse, what it does, and how it does it. Second, to examine the role of different political economies and different domestic structures and institutional arrangements in the dissemination and materialisation of hegemonic discourses. To do so the thesis develops a theoretical framework, a 'hegemonic-discourse-communication model', that allows the questions about the nature and the function of hegemonic discourses to be addressed in the framework of comparative institutional analysis.

For the purposes of the above research globalisation is taken as an instance of a hegemonic discourse, and Greece and Ireland are selected as countries belonging to different models of political economy (the Mediterranean/Continental and the Anglo-Saxon models respectively). Within this framework the thesis scrutinises the impact that globalisation had on the discourses and policies of key institutional actors, such as political parties, workers' unions, employers' associations, the press and the church, in the two countries, during the 1990s.

The thesis concludes that understanding and studying hegemonic discourses entails moving beyond the general categories of models of political economy and institutional arrangements to case and spatiotemporally specific characteristics that affect the dynamics between the 'hegemonic' and the 'publics' of the 'international'. Furthermore, the thesis suggests and evaluates the potentials of a Hegemonic Discourse Approach (HDA) in the study of change and continuity in world politics and economics.
Acknowledgements

Relatives and friends supported, colleagues generously helped and academic teachers inspired me throughout the course of this project. I would like to start by thanking from my heart, Bodossaki Foundation for believing in me and financially supporting my doctoral studies, and Professor Loukas Tsoukalis, my supervisor for 2000-2001, a university teacher with a unique ability to mark and remark on the substance of things. His sharp and focused feedback in the early stages of my thesis have been invaluable and instrumental in setting my research project on track.

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<tr>
<td>AFETT</td>
<td>Association for European Training of Workers on the Impact of New Technology</td>
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<td>EESC</td>
<td>European Economic and Social Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>EPL</td>
<td>Employment Protection Legislation</td>
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<td>ETUC</td>
<td>European Trade Union Confederation</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>FDI</td>
<td>Foreign Direct Investments</td>
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<td>FF</td>
<td>Fianna Fail</td>
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<tr>
<td>FG</td>
<td>Fine Gael</td>
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<tr>
<td>GI</td>
<td>The <em>A. T. Kearney/Foreign Policy</em> ‘Globalisation Index’</td>
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<tr>
<td>GSEE</td>
<td>The Greek General Confederation of Labour</td>
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<td>HDA</td>
<td>Hegemonic Discourse Approach</td>
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<td>IBEC</td>
<td>Irish Business and Employers Confederation</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICTU</td>
<td>Irish Congress of Trade Unions</td>
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<tr>
<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labour Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>INE</td>
<td>Institute of Labour (in Greece)</td>
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<td>IPE</td>
<td>International Political Economy</td>
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<tr>
<td>IR</td>
<td>International Relations</td>
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<tr>
<td>KKE</td>
<td>Communist Party of Greece</td>
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<tr>
<td>LP</td>
<td>Labour Party (in Ireland)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MES</td>
<td>The Main Economic Section of <em>The Irish Times</em></td>
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<td>MNC</td>
<td>Multinational Corporations</td>
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<td>MPS</td>
<td>The Main Political Section of <em>The Irish Times</em></td>
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<td>ND</td>
<td>New Democracy</td>
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<td>NESC</td>
<td>National Economic and Social Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>OKE</td>
<td>The Economic and Social Council of Greece</td>
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<tr>
<td>PASOK</td>
<td>Panhellenic Socialist Movement</td>
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<td>PD</td>
<td>Progressive Democrats</td>
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<td>PR-STV</td>
<td>Proportional Representation – Single Transferable Vote</td>
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<td>The Federation of Greek Industries</td>
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<td>Synaspismos</td>
<td>Coalition of the Left and Progress</td>
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<td>TIT</td>
<td>The Irish Times</td>
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<td>UNICE</td>
<td>Union des Industries de la Communauté Européenne (The Union of Industrial and Employers' Confederations of Europe)</td>
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<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organisation</td>
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INTRODUCING THE THESIS

Introduction

Over the last two decades, two issues have (re-)emerged in the agenda of Political Science: on the one hand the importance of institutions, and on the other hand the importance of knowledge, ideas and discourse. The respective bodies of literature have generated important insights in the study and understanding of world politics and economics. The research project conducted here is based on these theoretical developments. It subscribes to the statement that if one wants to understand international relations/international political economy (ir/ipe) one cannot exclude the study of institutions and ideas. But the great challenge is not to recognise the importance of institutions and ideas but rather to develop an analytical framework capable of studying the conditions of their co-existence and the nature of their interaction.

To this end, the concept of hegemonic discourses is proposed. The latter are conceptualised as sets of practices and meanings that dominate world politics and economics during particular historical periods. The aspiration of this project is to explicate the conditions of existence of hegemonic discourses, and the relationship developed between these discourses and national social milieus. Through such an investigation two important research goals are met: first, to explore the nature of the interplay between hegemonic discourses and national institutional arrangements, and to assess the role of the latter in the communication of hegemonic discourses; second, to shed light on the nature of hegemonic discourses, and their validity as an analytical tool for studying change and continuity in world politics.

1 The acronyms 'IR/IPE', in capital letters, are referring to the respective academic disciplines. The acronyms 'ir/ipe', in small letters, are referring to the everyday reality of world politics/international political economy.
The issue of hegemonic discourse communication by states, is Janus-faced. One face is internal/national, and mainly concentrates on the domestic political arena and the game played therein. The other is external/international, and searches for the causes of the domestic game beyond national borders\(^2\). This thesis will try to exemplify that these two faces are inexorably related, and that their essence is common: social life, and how it is produced, reproduced and changes. It is within this context that the thesis introduces ‘everyday life’ as a key level of analysis that allows the question about the function of hegemonic discourses to be addressed in the context of comparative institutional analysis. Along these lines, Chapter 1 relates hegemonic discourses to the (re)production of everyday life within the international.

This introductory chapter has five main targets: (a) to present the research questions, the theoretical challenge, and the aims of the thesis, (b) to explicate the research strategy adopted by the project, (c) to offer short definitions of the key concepts, (d) to introduce the broader academic chessboard on which the research project is taking place, and (e) to present the chapters of the thesis.

**The Theoretical Puzzle and the Aims of the Thesis**

The research project proposed here attempts to scrutinise the nature of the interplay between hegemonic discourses and national institutional settings. In particular, it focuses on the post-Cold War period, and asks *how did the hegemonic discourse of globalisation emerge into two different national politico-economic systems, that of Greece and Ireland (a Mediterranean and an Anglo-Saxon political economy respectively)*\(^3\). To do so it compares and contrasts the discourses and strategies of key, national institutional actors (e.g. political leaders and political parties, employers, workers, the church, the press) in the two countries during the period 1995 – 2001. The purpose is to answer two research questions:

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\(^2\) For this tradition of thought see the seminal article of Gourevitch (1978), ‘The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic Politics’.

\(^3\) This choice is justified in Chapter 2.
(a) whether and how different political economies and different domestic structures and institutional arrangements result in different ways of communicating and materialising hegemonic discourses; and

(b) what the above (potential) differences or similarities tell us about the nature of hegemonic discourses and their conditions of existence and change.

Hence, the theoretical puzzle of the thesis is as follows: there is a common hegemonic discourse (globalisation) that at a certain point in time appears to be external to two states (early 1990s). Furthermore these two states are characterised by different types of political economy (Anglo-Saxon vs. Mediterranean). At a later point in time, however, this hegemonic discourse appears to dominate in both states (late 1990s). How did this change take place? What was the impact — if any — of the different domestic institutional arrangements of the two countries in the communication of the hegemonic discourse? What conclusions can be drawn about the nature of hegemonic discourses, and the interplay between the hegemonic/international and the public/domestic?

These questions, and in general the study of the nature of the hegemonic, have gained additional weight in the post-Cold War period, where the US has emerged as the sole superpower. Where do the practices and meanings that dominate world politics and economics come from? How does this domination take place? Do states have a choice with regard to their policy options? Does the hegemonic discourse of globalisation have a core? What are the (pre)conditions for the reproduction or change of a hegemonic discourse? These are important questions, both conceptually and politically, for they attempt to put under scrutiny the concept of the hegemonic and the notion of hegemony in international relations, rather than take them for granted. They are questions that attempt to re-examine the ways in which world politics and economics are governed and reproduced. Thus, they are questions that invite new thinking on the social condition of world politics, and aspire to reflect on alternative ways of living and participating in the international. We hope the findings of this thesis speak to these questions and generate a number of hypotheses with
regard to the nature of the hegemonic and the conditions of its reproduction and change – even if conclusive answers would require further research.

**In positivistic terms:** The above research cannot be accurately described in positivistic terms. In the project domestic structures and institutions are treated as the independent variable, and national discourses and policies as the dependent ones. The purpose of the project is to conceptualise how the independent variable links hegemonic discourses with the dependent variable, and how the nature of this linkage influences the formation of domestic social spheres and the direction of national policies (dependent variables).

Based on the above, the thesis aspires:

(a) to test and sharpen existing hypotheses in comparative and international politics and economics on the role of domestic structures and institutions in discourse communication. In particular the main hypothesis of the above literature is that different domestic structures lead to different and distinctive ways of communicating discourses. Would the empirical evidence of the thesis verify this hypothesis? If yes, what is the relationship between particular types of domestic structures and modes of communicating discourses? Thus the proposed research project joins a second wave in institutional theorising that has shifted the focus of the analysis from the question of whether institutions matter to the question of how they matter.

(b) to suggest a specific way of approaching and studying the dissemination and communication of hegemonic discourses. To do so it develops a theoretical framework, a hegemonic-discourse-communication model, that allows the questions about the nature and the function of hegemonic discourses to be addressed in the framework of comparative institutional analysis/comparative domestic structure analysis. Furthermore, based on the analysis of the case studies the thesis suggests and evaluates the potential and usefulness of a Hegemonic Discourse Approach (HDA) to the study of change and continuity in world politics and economics.
(c) to create new hypotheses on the conditions of existence and change of the international. Indeed the comparative method adopted by the thesis does not only aim to verify or falsify a hypothesis, but to present new evidence that will help us to reflect on new working hypotheses about, and new conceptualisations of, the international⁴.

**The Research Strategy: Capturing and Analysing Hegemonic Discourses**

This section presents the strategy followed in order to capture and study the communication of the hegemonic discourse of globalisation in Greece and Ireland. This can be divided into two steps.

*First Step: Identifying Actors*

As is argued in Chapter 1, the communication of a hegemonic discourse is an integral part of the domestic ideology-production processes. Thus, the identification of the actors engaged in these ideology-production processes is the first and one of the most important steps in the process of capturing hegemonic discourses and studying their communication.

Two factors determine the selection of these actors⁵. First, is the nature of the domestic structures and institutional arrangements. Thus for instance one would focus on different actors to study the case of a secular-democratic and a theocratic or a military regime; or, a presidential and a parliamentary democracy. In our case, both Greece and Ireland are characterised by stable, secular, democratic regimes based on parliamentary systems. This general consideration of the nature of the domestic regime must be combined with a more focused analysis on the institutional arrangements that define each country's domestic mechanisms of ideology production.

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⁴ For the distinction between ‘hypothesis-generating’ and ‘theory-confirming’ or ‘theory-infirming’ comparative studies see, Lijphart, 1971: 691-693.

⁵ We derive these criteria from the existing literature on ideas communication. See. Hall, 1989a,b.
In our case, the elaboration of these case-specific characteristics takes place in Chapter 2, where the cases of Greece and Ireland are analysed.

The second factor that determines the selection of actors has to do with the nature of the discourse under examination. If a thematic discourse is selected for study, e.g. a discourse on armaments or Keynesianism (see Hall, 1989a), then certain social actors and groups would gain primacy in the investigation, e.g. in the case of a discourse on armaments, the Ministry of Defence, the army, the defence industry etc. Yet, as is demonstrated in Chapter 1, hegemonic discourses do not have an authoritative source of definition; they are not limited within or produced by an epistemic or otherwise specific community; they concern the conditions of social life reproduction and thus have an all-pervasive societal effect.

To tackle the all-encompassing nature of hegemonic discourses the thesis employed the criterion of inclusion. Therefore an effort has been made to include all the institutional actors with a considerable role in ideology production, in the public discourses of Greece and Ireland. These actors include the main political parties and their leaders, the workers, the employers, the church and the press. It needs to be stressed here that these actors and their interaction do not by any means exhaust the complexity of ideology production within their respective institutional settings. Yet, we consider that the 'signals' one gets from this set of actors, spread as they are through the body politic, are representative of the trends and changes underway in the everyday of these two institutional settings. Put differently, the range of the institutional actors examined is significant, for it is wide enough to capture social trends and changes that exceed the confines of elite-level phenomena. To use a metaphor from the natural science world, the thesis treats the actors under examination as meter stations that record the time, intensity, epicentre and behaviour of globalisation. These stations have many problems and shortcomings but remain the best option we have.

The next important step with regard to our research strategy is how to study these actors and their involvement in the communication of the hegemonic discourse of globalisation, i.e. how the above mentioned signals can be collected and 'decoded'?
Second Step: Capturing the Communication Effect at the National Level

The main difficulty with the study of hegemonic discourses is that the key actors involved in their communication process are numerous and thus the primary material that is needed to be collected and studied almost unlimited (including official documents, speeches, interviews, statistical data etc.). In order to tackle this problem the following strategy was followed.

First, the research was limited to the period between 1995-2001. The rationale for this choice has two elements. First, in general this was the period in which the 'globalisation of the globalisation discourse' (Beck, 2001) took place in most countries around the world. Two milestones define this period; the creation of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 1995 and the anti-globalisation protests in Seattle, during the 'Millennium Round' of the same organisation, in November and December 1999. This general context was then combined with domestic, country-specific (historical) junctures and events. The purpose was to explore how the globalisation discourse was implicated in the discourses and strategies of domestic forces that attempted to redefine the public discourses of their countries. We expand on this issue in the chapters that focus on Greece and Ireland. It is also important to stress here that the rise of a globalisation discourse in the 1990s became possible only after the collapse of the Cold War, i.e. the system (practices and meanings) that defined world politics and economics throughout the post-WWII period until 1989-1990.

Second, the analysis was based on primary material, mainly official publications and speeches, in which the actors summarised, publicised and/or justified their annual activities and their positions and policies. This does not pretend to be an exhaustive strategy, nor does it apply strictly to all actors (e.g. the press). But it was used as an objective criterion for the collection of the primary material. The chapters on Greece and Ireland offer specific information on the nature and the rationale of the selected material for each and every actor examined.
Third, the use of interviews. A number of interviews (see Appendix A at the end of the Thesis) were conducted with institutional actors that had a strategic role in the reproduction and change of their domestic discourses e.g. newspapers' editors, presidents of workers' and employers' associations etc. It is important to note here that these interviews were used more as a way of double-checking the conclusions derived from the above primary material. Moreover, these interviews were used as a means of inquiring how key actors in the ideology production at the national level were themselves thinking about how ideology is produced at the national level, what is globalisation, and how the various social forces at the national level reacted to it.

Fourth, globalisation as a word vs. globalisation as a world and a 'practice' in the analysis of the primary material; i.e. how do we study hegemonic discourses through documents? The thesis, conceptualising globalisation as a hegemonic discourse, did not enforce a narrow a priori definition of globalisation on the research project. Thus, it left the actors to speak for themselves, taking globalisation as whatever these actors are referring to, or expressing, when they use the term globalisation. It is through this methodology that the thesis attempted to trace and capture the hegemonic discourse of globalisation in the examined documents. The main questions were: When did the term globalisation enter into the vocabulary of the actors? How did the frequency of its usage evolve? What was the context in which it was used? What was the purpose of its usage and what was its content (i.e. positive or negative)? The strongest advantage of this methodology is its 'blind' objectivity. What was, and what was not, globalisation did not rest with the researcher's judgement but with the social actors. Nonetheless, such a research strategy has a number of grey areas. Most importantly, what if globalisation in Greece or Ireland had a different name? Or more generally, what if the debates, attitudes and practices in one country also existed in the other but appeared absent due to superficial differences in language? And in this case, what difference did the language used make, and how did this difference affect our analysis of hegemonic discourses?

As is developed in Chapter 1, a hegemonic discourse concerns the production of social identities and life. In this regard language is very important. It is through language that reality becomes intelligible; it is through language that practices and meanings come to be constituted as such. Yet there is a huge gap between these
assumptions and an instrumental analysis of language through *content analysis*, or in the case of this project, between the study of globalisation discourse and a plain study of references to globalisation. The thesis addressed this problem by placing the quantitative methodology of *content analysis* within a qualitative analytical framework, based on comparative institutionalism and discourse theory. Thus the focus of the research was not on the word globalisation itself but on the (re)production of institutional identities and through them on the production of meaning and ideology at the national level. This focus allowed us to go beyond the (important in other regards) ‘vessel’ of the word globalisation. It allowed us for instance to see a non-ideological space in the Irish politico-economic life. It also allowed us to trace and capture the Irish Celtic Tiger discourse (an Irish-specific globalisation discourse) and contrast it with aspects of the globalisation discourse in Greece.

These examples aim at making it clear that even though the concept of globalisation was the driving force of the research, every possible effort was made in order: (a) not to impose the concept where it did not exist, and (b) not to reduce the analysis to a meaningless quantification exercise. Three points are of particular importance here: (i) The selection of the sources (i.e. what the thesis has taken to be a representative and encapsulating piece of the actors’ voices within the public discourse), was not influenced by the existence or not of references to globalisation. Thus the overall research design was not based on a globalisation selection bias. (ii) The referent ‘globalisation’ was used as a tool to trace emerging or changing practices and policies associated with globalisation by the social actors themselves. Thus the concept/word ‘globalisation’ was used as a means to trace and monitor *policies and practices of globalisation*. (iii) The reading of the selected material was not exclusively globalisation-driven. To this end, a second reading of the material, independent of the term globalisation, was adopted. Thus the question of where the term globalisation was located within the various institutional discourses, and how this term was used, was always balanced/qualified with the question of what were the dominant objects (including themes, practices, policies, rationalities) of these

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6 Two exceptions apply here. The ‘press sample’ and the speeches of party leaders. Yet in these cases a ‘selection bias’ does not really apply as a problem, as the purpose was to find how these actors understood and communicated the concept of globalisation.
discourses irrespective of the term/concept globalisation. Furthermore, the dominant objects that came to the surface through this second reading were contrasted with the various dominant objects of the globalisation discourse itself (e.g. flexibility, liberalisation, deregulation, speculative capital) to find out whether there was a relationship between them or not. It was through the above strategy that this thesis tried to bring together the words and the worlds of the research, outlining, even faintly, an integrated Hegemonic Discourse methodology.

To conclude, the purpose of the adopted research strategy was not to find repetitive isolated themes and references, but to capture changing self-conceptualisations, emerging rationalities and identities, changing power relationships and changing organisation structures. This quest was based on the conceptualisation of globalisation as a hegemonic discourse, i.e. as an ordering power that comes 'from below' or 'from within' (see Chapter 1) to enforce its terms on the prevailing – in terms of social life organisation – national institutional apparatuses. Thus what the thesis aimed at monitoring/capturing was not static institutional discourses, but hegemonic re-orderings materialised through the reproduction of everyday life, and expressed in changing policies, rationalities, vocabularies, identities and societal ordering principles.

Table 1 summarises the actors and material studied in both countries. More resources were mobilised when available and necessary at a country or institutional level. For instance in the case of Greece we traced and classified the books that were published on globalisation during the period 1990-2001, while in the case of Ireland, the newspaper Irish Independent was frequently used to complement the analysis of The Irish Times.

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7 The only exception to this 'double-reading methodology' was the analysis of the press sample. Even in this case, however, the quantitative factor (i.e. references to globalisation) was combined with qualitative factors such as the identity of the authors of the references, or the section of their publication.
### TABLE 1. ACTORS AND SOURCES STUDIED

#### A. ACTORS: Political Parties and their Leaders

**MATERIAL:** Electoral Manifestos, Speeches of Party Leaders.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GREECE</th>
<th>IRELAND</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK)</td>
<td>Fianna Fail (FF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Democracy (ND)</td>
<td>Fine Gael (FG)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist Party of Greece (KKE)</td>
<td>Labour Party (LP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coalition of the Left and Progress (Synaspismos)</td>
<td>Progressive Democrats (PD)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### B. ACTORS: The Main Social Partners

**MATERIAL:** Annual Reviews, Annual Conference Proceedings, Monthly Newsletters, Chairpersons Speeches, Specialised reports or publications.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GREECE</th>
<th>IRELAND</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Greek General Confederation of Labour (GSEE)</td>
<td>Irish Congress of Trade Unions (ICTU)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Federation of Greek Industries (SEV)</td>
<td>Irish Business and Employers Confederation (IBEC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Economic and Social Council of Greece (OKE)</td>
<td>National Economic and Social Council (NESC)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### C. ACTOR: The Church

**MATERIAL:** Speeches of the Head of the two Churches, and relevant references in the press.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GREECE</th>
<th>IRELAND</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Greek Orthodox Church</td>
<td>Catholic Church</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Archbishop Christodoulos)</td>
<td>(Cardinal Connell)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### D. ACTOR: Press (a sample)

**MATERIAL:** All the published articles that made a reference to the term globalisation throughout the period 1996-2001.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GREECE</th>
<th>IRELAND</th>
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</table>

The next section moves on to introduce three key ‘categories’ of the thesis: ideational factors/discourses, domestic structures and institutions, and everyday life. The purpose is twofold: first, to survey how these categories are conceptualised in the IR/IPE literature, and second, to present the working definitions adopted in this project.
Definition of Key Concepts

a. Ideas in World Politics and Economics: Diverse Understandings and Competing Concepts

The category of ideas is not a single, solid category in the IR/IPE literature. Hence, under the key-word ideas one can find many different things, such as norms, discourses, paradigms, theories, beliefs, world views, preferences or simply ideas. What follows is first a survey of how these different concepts are defined, and second an analysis of where this thesis stands in regard to this category.

Goldstein and Keohane (1993) define ideas as beliefs held by individuals. They furthermore argue that there are three types of beliefs: worldviews, principled beliefs and causal beliefs. Finnemore (1996), argues that a distinction must be made between ideas and norms. The former are held by individuals, the latter are intersubjective. Furthermore, Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) argue that norms can be defined as standards of appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity. They further distinguish between two types of norms: the constitutive, which create new actors, interests or categories for action, and the regulative norms that order and constrain actors’ behaviour (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 891). Checkel (1997) subscribes to the definition of ideas by Goldstein and Keohane. Hence he attributes ideas to individuals, but with Finnemore and Sikkink, he distinguishes between ideas and norms. He argues that norms and ideologies are historically constructed and often embedded in organisational structures or other shared collectivities. Jacobsen (1995) adopts a different stance by defining economic ideas as ‘shared beliefs’. He furthermore distinguishes between (a) consensual social beliefs that shape the

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8 To reach this definition they borrow from the works of Katzenstein, 1996: 5; Finnemore, 1996: 22; and Klotz, 1995. Along the same lines Krasner (1983: 2) defines norms as standards of behaviour defined in terms of rights and obligations. Finally, as Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) observe, where political scientists use the concept of ‘norms’, sociologists and other social scientists many times use the concept of ‘institutions’ to prescribe the same phenomenon.

9 The distinction between constitutive and regulative rules has been established in IR by constructivist scholars. The most powerful statements in this regard are the Rules, Norms, and Decisions, published by Kratochwil (1989), and the World of Our Making, published by Onuf (1989). These works defined the parameters for the rule-oriented constructivism in IR. See also Kratochwil and Ruggie, 1986, and Ruggie, 1998.
legitimate ends of economic activity and (b) economic ideas that are the means for reaching socially approved ends. Bernstein (2000) in a rather different manner refers to ideas as proposals for new norms, whether the latter are meant to be ideologies, worldviews or principled beliefs. In this line of reasoning an idea can become a norm if it provides an orientation to action and gain collective legitimation.

Campbell (1998) in an insightful article, combining historical and organisational institutionalism, identifies four types of ideas: (a) Paradigms, defined as cognitive background assumptions that constrain action by limiting the range of perceivable alternatives. (b) Public sentiments, defined as normative background assumptions that constrain action by limiting the range of acceptable and legitimate alternatives. (c) Programmes, defined as cognitive concepts and theories that facilitate action. (d) Frames, defined as normative concepts that are used to legitimise these programs. Furthermore he argues that the first two types are second-order concepts, constituting the underlying ideas upon which the other two first-order concepts rest.

Hall (1986) uses the term ideology to refer to a well-developed network of ideas that prescribes a course of economic or political action. Moreover he defines policy paradigms as the overarching framework of ideas that structures policy-making in a particular field (Hall, 1990). An often-quoted definition of ideology is that given by Freeden (1996) who conceptualises ideologies as systems of political thinking, loose or rigid, deliberate or unintended, through which individuals and groups construct an understanding of the political world they, or those who preoccupy their thoughts, inhabit, and then act on that understanding. Moravcsik (1997) on the other hand proposes the concept of state preferences. He argues that societal ideas, interests and institutions shape state preferences, defined as the fundamental social purposes that underline the strategic calculations of governments.

Last to be mentioned here is the concept of discourse. The latter is often loosely used in the literature to define a set of policy ideas, e.g. the discourse of neoliberalism or the discourse of human rights. Schmidt (2000, 2001, 2002) has pushed this conceptualisation further defining discourse as both a set of policy ideas and values, and an interactive process of policy construction and communication. The concept of discourse has also been used to define a variety of different phenomena and levels.
For instance, Schmidt (2000) uses the concept of *public discourse* to refer to the sum of political actors' accounts of the polity's purposes, goals and ideals which serve to explain political events, to justify political actions, to develop political identities, to reshape and/or reinterpret political history, and, all in all to frame the national political discussion. Yet the concept of discourse is nowhere more dominant than in post-structural political analysis (see Milliken, 1999). Within this tradition Laclau and Mouffe (1985: 105) define discourse as a *structured totality* based on an articulatory practice; that is, a practice establishing such a relation among different elements that their identity is modified as a result of it. Foucault (1972: 49) in his well-quoted definition argues that discourses are practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak.

This thesis argues that the majority of the literature that deals with ideational factors fails to capture a whole set of ideational phenomena concerning the mode of production and reproduction of social life (see Chapter 1). To address this gap, the project builds on Michel Foucault's conceptualisation of discourse, proposing the concept of hegemonic discourses. Hegemonic discourses are construed as social technologies – i.e. sets of social practices and meanings – that determine specific modes for the production and reproduction of everyday life within the international (ibid.). Yet, this working definition of hegemonic discourses remains to be scrutinised and tested through the examination of the effect of globalisation in Greece and Ireland. In this examination the role of the domestic structures and institutional arrangements of these two states are of central importance. The definition of these concepts is the subject of the next section.

*b. Conceptualising Domestic Structures and Institutional Arrangements*

In this thesis the concept of the *domestic structures* of a state is defined in terms of (a) the nature of political institutions, (b) the structure of civil society, (c) the nature of state-society relations and (d) the values and norms embedded in the political system (political culture). This definition mainly draws from Katzenstein (1977a,b) and has been advanced by Risse-Kappen (1991: 486, 1994: 187). With slight differentiations

The concepts of *institutional arrangements* and *institutions* are used by the thesis almost in an interchangeable manner with the concept of domestic structures. Nonetheless, as it is shown below, these concepts have slightly different focus\(^\text{10}\). One of the most widely used definitions of institutions is that of Douglass North. North (1990) defines institutions as the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, the humanly devised constraints, formal or informal, that shape human interaction and structure human incentives. Thus, institutions reduce uncertainty by providing a structure to everyday life. One more widely used approach is that of James March and Johan Olsen (1984), proposed in their seminal article, ‘The New Institutionalism: Organisational Factors in Political Life’. In particular the authors use the term *political structure* to include almost everything. They argue that the term signifies a collection of institutions, rules of behaviour, norms, roles, physical arrangements, buildings, and archives that are relatively invariant in the face of turnover of individuals and relatively resilient to the idiosyncratic preferences and expectations of individuals (ibid.: 741). Hall (1986) in a rather different way defines institutions as the historically formed formal rules, compliance procedures and standard operating practices that bind the components of the state together and structure its relations with the society. He thus excludes from his definition informal rules, procedures and practices.

Based on the above approaches, as well as on the historical institutionalist approach as outlined by Hall and Taylor (1996: 937-942)\(^\text{11}\) this thesis construes institutions/institutional arrangements as the formal and informal procedures, practices, routines, norms and conventions which are embedded in the organisational structure of any polity/political economy and shape/re-shape and structure/re-structure both human interactions and the aforementioned organisational structure itself.

\(^{10}\) For a thoughtful analysis of how different strands of institutional analysis focus on different levels of reality see, Hollingworth, 2000: 600-623; see also Ikenberry, 1988: 226-229.

\(^{11}\) Hall and Taylor (1996: 938) write: ‘[historical institutionalists] define...[institutions]...as the formal or informal procedures, routines, norms and conventions embedded in the organisational structure of the polity or political economy’.
The above sections have briefly surveyed the literature on ideas/discourses and domestic structures and institutional arrangements. They have also specified how this project conceptualises and mobilises these concepts. The next section moves the analysis on to the category of everyday life. The latter is not only a significant part of the definition of hegemonic discourses, but also offers a most significant plane for analysing the interplay between hegemonic discourses and domestic institutions. We return to this issue in Chapter 1. Below we offer a brief overview of the contemporary development of the category of everyday life in social sciences.

c. Everyday Life as a Social Science Category

The everyday has occasionally been in the spotlight of social science theorising in the second half of the twentieth century, but, at least in politics broadly construed, it has never managed to secure a stable position on the research agenda. We see the golden age of everyday life theorising from the mid-1950s to the 1970s; a product of the various social and intellectual movements which emerged at that time. Special reference in this regard should be made to the ‘Situationist International’ (SI), a movement consisted of a small group of avant-garde artists and intellectuals that was organised around the magazine *Situationiste Internationale* (founded in 1957), which was at the heart of the events of May 1968. For Situationists the fulfilment of ‘revolutionary possibilities’ was to happen through the reinvention of everyday life. They furthermore suggested that such a ‘reinvention’ could take place through the creation of situations in the everyday that would have a transformative effect on people’s lives and beliefs. The most influential text within the Situationist movement remains Guy Debord’s *Society of Spectacle*, originally published in 1967.

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12 For instance see Guy Debord’s, ‘The Situationists and the New Forms of Action in Art and Politics’ (Debord, 1963). For the foundation of the Situationist movement see also Michèle Bernstein, 1964. The policy of their magazine, *Internationale Situationniste*, is indeed interesting: ‘All texts published in *Internationale Situationniste* may be freely reproduced, translated and adapted, even without indication of origin’. Most, if not all the texts published by Situationists are available on line at their website: http://www.cddc.vt.edu/sionline.
Raoul Vaneigem’s *The Revolution of Everyday Life* is also considered one of the most important texts produced by Situationists\(^\text{13}\).

Nevertheless, the author that was to exercise the widest and most lasting influence on everyday life as a subject-matter of study was the French social theorist Henri Lefebvre. Lefebvre was part of the fermentations taking place in Paris in the mid 1960s\(^\text{14}\), but his first important work on everyday life dates back to 1947. The book was entitled *Critique of Everyday Life*\(^\text{15}\). Lefebvre argued that the most significant social changes take place in ‘the unmysterial depths of everyday life’. Therefore he was suggesting that history, psychology and social sciences ‘must become a study of everyday life’ (Lefebvre, 1991 [1958]: 137). Work, family/private life and leisure activities were proposed as the defining elements of the everyday, and Marxist theory was worked out and presented as a ‘critical knowledge of everyday life’ (ibid. 148-175). Finally, the last chapter of the book proposed the concept of the *possible* as an integral ontological element of social reality, which needs to be taken into consideration along with the categories of the ‘past’ and the ‘present’, when studying social action and social change (ibid.: 228-252). Lefebvre continued to work on and sharpen the subject-matter of everyday life and in 1968 he published a book entitled, *Everyday Life in the Modern World* (see, Lefebvre, 1971 [1968]). He has proposed three interrelated concepts: daily life (*la vie quotidienne*), the everyday (*le quotidien*), and everydayness (*quotidiennete*).

Let us simply say about daily life that it has already existed, but permeated with values, with myths. The word everyday designates the entry of daily life into modernity: the everyday is the object of programming, whose unfolding is imposed by the market, by the system of equivalences, by marketing and advertisements. As to the concept of ‘everydayness’, it stresses the homogenous, the repetitive, the fragmentary in everyday life (Lefebvre, 1988: 87).

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\(^{13}\) Guy Debord was the central personality and self-proclaimed leader of Situationist International. Raul Vaneigem was one of the movement’s strongest voices and a frequent editor of its magazine. Along with the above mentioned official SI website, a well-organised and clearly documented on-line source for the personalities, texts and images related with the SI can be found at: http://www.nothingness.org/SI.

\(^{14}\) For the relationship between Lefebvre and the Situationists see Elden, 2004 and Gardiner, 2000: 102-126.

\(^{15}\) The 1947 edition was followed by a second revised edition in 1958, in which Lefebvre added an extensive foreword.
In addition to the work of Lefebvre, the work of Michel de Certeau\textsuperscript{16} is also formative in the evolution of everyday life as a subject matter. Of particular importance here is his book \textit{The Practice of Everyday Life} and a collective work that published as volume two of this book, under the same title (Certeau et al, 1998). As Gardiner (2000: 157-179) notes, Certeau extends the Situationists’ and Lefebvre’s analyses by exploring everyday life through concrete daily practices, e.g. the appropriation of city-space for walking, living etc. In this way Certeau shifts the analysis of everyday life from a more abstract and holistic level to more concrete everyday practices and procedures\textsuperscript{17}.

With regard to IR/IPE it can be said that the themes of everyday and everyday life are not new. The effort to bring everyday life to the forefront of the study of world politics started in the 1980’s, and was led by post-structuralist (e.g. Walker, 1986a) and feminist (e.g. Enloe, 1989) scholars. Critical IPE has also been very active in this regard (e.g. Gill, 1995; Sinclair, 1999; Harms, 2001, 2002; Langley, 2003), including the organisation of panels during the annual conferences of the International Studies Association (e.g. ‘Globalisation as Everyday Life’ at ISA 1997 in Toronto) and the British International Studies Association (e.g. ‘Global Finance in the Everyday’ at BISA 2002 in London). In addition to these dynamics, a new wave of theorising on the everyday seems to emerge either inspired by thinkers like Henri Lefebvre, Maurice Blanchot and Michel De Certeau (see for instance Davies and Niemann, 2002), or by the recent biopolitical turn in politics based, among others, on Antonio Negri and Giorgio Agamben.

For this thesis everyday life is a key-concept for it is both the object and the subject of hegemonic discourses (see Chapter 1 and Epilogue). It is the object of hegemonic discourses because it constitutes the social body on which hegemonic discourses invest and are enacted – for, hegemonic discourses concern the governance of everyday life. But, it is also the subject of hegemonic discourses because it is what

\textsuperscript{16} Certeau was Director of Studies at the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, in Paris.

\textsuperscript{17} Here it is worth noticing that Gardiner’s book \textit{Critiques of Everyday Life} offers a most interesting and insightful introduction to critical approaches to everyday life and their intellectual history (Gardiner, 2000).
reproduces and changes these discourses – for, hegemonic discourses exist and change only through the myriad transactions that take place at the realm of the everyday. The examination of the various institutional actors in Greece and Ireland aims at giving us a representative sample of the production of the everyday in these two countries, and an insight on the nature and function of hegemonic discourses.

Before closing this section, we would like to note a similarity between the Foucaultian approach adopted in this project, and the aforementioned work of Lefebvre. Lefebvre sees the everyday as the entry of daily life into modernity; a process materialised through the transformation of the everyday into an object of programming. Foucault on the other hand, notes in a similar manner that the emergence of the era of bio-politics in the 18th century marked ‘the entry of life into history, that is the entry of...the life of the human species into the order of knowledge and power, into the sphere of political techniques’ (Foucault, 1978: 141-142, emphasis added). Thus both thinkers bring to the core of their analysis the moment at which life becomes an object of administration and justified political intervention aiming at its (i.e. life's) investment with particular manners and mannerisms.

The above research project takes place on a broader academic chessboard. Having defined the theoretical puzzle and the key categories of this thesis, the next section moves on to unfold this chessboard, i.e. to present how the existing literature treats the relationship among ideas, interests and material factors.

**Background Academic Debates**

The study of the communication and dissemination of hegemonic discourses is mainly related to two literatures; one concerning ideational factors and knowledge, and the other concerning domestic structures and institutional arrangements. These two aspects/literatures are often treated as opposite, i.e. ideational considerations vs. interests and material factors.
Ideas, Interests and Material Factors

Ideas and ideational factors have always constituted an integral part of the study of world politics and economics; from the Peloponnesian War, and the importance that Thucydides paid to the ideologies of the Athenian and Spartan regimes, to positivistic models of conflict resolution. Of course, the importance that is ascribed to ideas by the different approaches diverges considerably. Furthermore, there have been periods in which the study of ideas was rather marginal in the academic circles of IR/IPE, as for instance during the behaviouralist revolution of the 1960s, and periods in which ideas were at the forefront, as during the post-behaviouralist era or the period from the late 1980s until the present (Jacobsen, 1995: 283-284; Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 889-891)\(^\text{18}\).

The aim here is not to offer an account of the history of the study of ideas in IR/IPE. The following paragraphs are confined to delineating two broad debates about ideas, which are of particular interest for this thesis. Of course these debates are neither completely independent one from the other nor are they only about ideas. They must be conceptualised as two intersecting axes along which overlapping debates on the relationship among ideas, interests and power are taking place. Thus the contrasting tendencies within each debate should be conceptualised as different ways of approaching socio-political reality; as different lenses of observing and understanding politics, in its broader sense. What follows is an outline of these debates.

The First Debate: Ideas and Reality

The first and more abstract debate concerns the ontological status of ideas in the world. On the one extreme of this axis one finds the thesis that ideas simply mirror the world; they are mere epiphenomena based on power relationships; or in a softer version, they are responses to the evolving needs of social life. An example of this soft version can be found in the study of the development of Social Sciences

\(^{18}\) For the reasons of this recent 'return of ideas' in IR/IPE see: Goldstein and Keohane, 1993: 4; Majone, 1996; Blyth, 1997.
(Wiitrock and Wagner, 1996: 91), whereas instances of the stronger version can be found in the study of regimes (Strange, 1983) or in the analysis of the concept of sovereignty as organised hypocrisy (Krasner, 1999). Crude historical materialism is also to be included in this latter version. Hence, this tradition of thought gives supremacy to a material conceptualisation of the social world and to factors related to power and interest. Ideas constitute epiphenomena which are based on and/or reflect material social reality, and power relationships exist therein. We refer to this approach as ‘ideas, only on the surface’.

At the other extreme of the axis one finds the view that ideas do not (simply) reflect the world, they (rather) constitute it. Hence, ideas are not epiphenomena but rather constituent elements of the substratum of social reality. Here the influence of the post-positivist and post-structuralist sociological traditions is apparent. Instances of this approach can be found in relation to the construction of national identities, and to the construction of anarchy (Wendt, 1992) or of the European Union (Thomas Christiansen et al, 2001). This tradition gives primacy to the ideational and cognitive nature of reality. Beyond mirroring social reality, ideas construct a reality on their own. Foucault, responding to critics of this approach, developed a knowledge/power approach (Wiitrock and Wagner, 1996: 92), elaborating on how power produces knowledge and ideas, and how knowledge and ideas presuppose and at the same time constitute power relations (Foucault, 1977). For this extreme of the debate the label ‘ideas, all the way down’ is proposed.

The Second Debate: Ideas and Policy

The second interrelated debate refers to what ideas do in relation to policy. The logic of this axis is not different from the first one. On the one extreme one finds theorists arguing that ideas function as the washing powders on the shelves of supermarkets. Politicians pick and choose the one that justifies better their choices and their policies. Put differently ideas function as ‘hooks’, in a sense that competing elites seize on ideas to propagate and legitimise their interests (Shepsle, 1985: 231-237, quoted in Goldstein and Keohane, 1993: 4). Therefore this extreme assumes that ideas participate in politics only as instruments of justification; they do not have a causal
role in the policy process, and they do not influence policy, at least in any substantial way. As Krasner puts it, it is new political practices that create a need for legitimating rationales; not the other way round (Krasner, 1993, and in particular: 261-264).

On the other extreme one finds people arguing that ideas do influence policy. The range though of this influence, and the way in which this influence takes place, is rather a matter of disagreement (see the contributions in Hill and Beshoff, 1994). Keohane and Goldstein, in an attempt to organise this part of the debate, distinguish among three ‘causal pathways’ through which ideas can influence policy outcomes. In the first, ideas function as *road maps* that increase actors’ clarity about goals or ends/means relationships. In the second, ideas function as *focal points*, providing cooperative solutions in situations where no unique equilibrium exists, or function as *coalitional glue*, facilitating and enhancing cohesion within particular groups. Finally, through the third causal pathway ideas influence policy by becoming *embedded in political institutions*, independently of how and why these ideas originated (Goldstein and Keohane, 1993: 3-30). Yet, this analysis is limited by its rather rationalistic approach to ideas. In a constructivist or/and symbolic interaction perspective, the facts and the cognitive framework of policy process, or the way in which the policy process per se is conceptualised, are context-specific and constitute or are based on intersubjective understandings (Yee, 1996: 95-96; Kratochwil, 1989; Wendt, 1992: 392, 1995; Ruggie, 1998: 12; Finnemore, 1996; Onuf, 1989; Dessler, 1989; Colin and Watson, 1999; Bernstein, 2000; Charon, 1998: 44-46).

In summary two broad tendencies can be distinguished. The first places significant emphasis on the importance of power/material capabilities and interests. Ideas do not matter on their own; they have no causal influence in politics or policy. They are used by power (i.e. powerful actors/states) to serve specific interests and justify specific choices. The second tendency adopts the exact opposite stand. It holds that ideas and ideational factors do matter and do have a standing on their own.

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19 Along the same lines Keohane (1984) argues that regimes reduce the transaction costs of international politics, and Stein (1983) that they provide solutions to co-ordination problems. In addition Hall (1989b), studying the impact of Keynesian ideas argues that the latter: (a) introduced a new set of concepts in macroeconomic theory, (b) provided a rationale for more active government management of the economy and (c) argued for a particular set of policy prescriptions.
Nevertheless, within this tendency, the claims about the degree of ideas’ importance and their actual role in policy and politics vary. Therefore for some researchers ideas may only function as ‘road maps’, but for others they are the foundation of politics and social reality.

The thesis subscribes to the position that neither ideas, nor interests or power can alone explain our world. Therefore the distinction between ideas, interests and power/material capabilities is useful in so far as it is conceptualised as just an analytical distinction. At the level of social reality, ideas, interests and power are inexorably related. Ideas include and express interests and power; interests include and express ideas and power, as far as power includes and expresses ideas and interests. The difference of this position from that sceptical towards ideas is the following: ideas may be inexorably related to interests, preferences and power factors, but they are not reducible to these factors. They constitute a structural property of the social reality, along with interests and power, and as such they have a standing of their own. Yet, as stressed above, none of these three elements (i.e. ideas, interests or power) can be studied meaningfully in separation from each other. That is why we need to develop analytical frameworks and theories able to account for social reality in its richness and totality. This thesis attempts to make a small contribution in this respect.

The Chapters of the Thesis

In the first chapter the theoretical framework of the research project is developed. Here we define the concept of hegemonic discourse and suggest a hegemonic-discourse-communication model. The proposed framework is based on a synthesis of comparative institutionalism and discourse theory, and is focused on the interaction between the hegemonic and the national public discourses. This chapter acts as a conceptual map that brings together and unites in a single research project the elements of the thesis, as presented above. The final part of this chapter discusses why the thesis focuses on globalisation, and what does it mean to approach globalisation as a hegemonic discourse.
The second chapter introduces the case studies of the thesis, i.e. Greece and Ireland, and their rationale, and explores the theoretical potentials of the comparison of the two countries. The next two chapters focus on the communication of the hegemonic discourse of globalisation in Greece and Ireland. These chapters serve a double aim. First they present in detail the empirical findings of the thesis, concerning the effect of globalisation discourse on the two countries. Here the thesis, rather than assuming globalisation to be everywhere in the late 1990s, attempts to shed light on when, by whom and how globalisation discourse emerged in the two national contexts. The second aim of these empirical chapters is to offer a concrete example of how hegemonic discourses can be captured and analysed. In this regard the empirical part of the thesis has a most important methodological and theoretical standing on its own. It is on the ‘empirical details’ of these chapters that the proposed conceptualisation of hegemonic discourse is based, and against which its validity and usefulness is tested.

Chapter five sums up and juxtaposes the findings from the Greek and Irish cases. Hence, rather than offering separate summaries-of-findings at the end of the two case-study chapters, the thesis offers a single, comparative summary. In doing so we aim to subject the comparison of the two cases to both a vertical and a horizontal angle of analysis. Thus while the main research material is organised in chapters 3 and 4 vertically, i.e. the key category is that of the state, the recapitulation of this material is organised horizontally, i.e. the focus is on the various domestic institutions (e.g. political parties, employers, workers, etc.) rather than on states. Through this combination of comparative methods we aim to cross-examine and double-check our research material and its interpretation. The juxtaposition of the two cases reveals that while the same hegemonic discourse prevailed in both countries during the 1990s, the way in which it was communicated and materialised at the national level was fundamentally different. Indeed we can talk about two different facets of the hegemonic/globalisation; political in the case of Greece, and apolitical in the case of Ireland.

Chapter six offers insights and conclusions on the nature and the determinants of the hegemonic discourse communication process. Here the thesis evaluates the role of the political economy and the domestic institutional arrangements in the communication and materialisation of hegemonic discourses, and attempts to
elucidate what part of the observed differences in Greece and Ireland was due to these factors (i.e. the model of political economy and the domestic institutional arrangements) and what part was not. We then use this analysis to draw broader conclusions regarding the communication of hegemonic discourses. These conclusions are suggested by the thesis as new working hypotheses in the literature of comparative and international politics and economics. Chapter six closes with an overall evaluation of the research project and the potentials for the development of a new Hegemonic Discourse Approach for the study of change and continuity in the international. Finally an Epilogue aims to recover the broader and historically enduring sociological and philosophical debates upon which the thesis touches.
CHAPTER 1
COMMUNICATING DISCOURSES: THE 'PUBLIC' THROUGH THE 'HEGEMONIC' AND THE 'HEGEMONIC' THROUGH THE 'PUBLIC'

Introduction: Domestic Structures, National Institutional Arrangements and the Communication of Hegemonic Discourses

The aim of this chapter is to offer a theoretical framework for studying and understanding hegemonic discourses and their function and effects. It is suggested that the domination of a hegemonic discourse signifies a complex communication process that directly involves national discursive realities, domestic institutional arrangements and agents/subjects. Therefore what is under scrutiny in the chapter is this communication process itself, in order to illustrate what this process signifies, how it should be conceptualised, what are its constitutive elements, and how concepts such as change and continuity should be interpreted in this context. In real terms the thesis proposes the concept of hegemonic discourse as an analytical framework for studying the conditions of production, reproduction and change of social life within the international.

Most political scientists would agree that discourses (loosely defined as sets of policy ideas, e.g. deregulation) are diffused into national politico-economic systems. But what is the nature of this diffusion and how does it take place? For sure, there are
international institutions that act as powerful channels for the generation and surveillance of these discourses. But still this does not say very much about how these discourses are introduced and communicated at the national level, or what is the nature of the relationship between these discourses and the public/domestic sphere. This problem becomes even more acute if we shift our focus from sets of policy ideas onto systems of political or politico-economic governance (e.g. liberal democracy and capitalism), or onto what we have defined in the Introduction as hegemonic discourses. There seems to be a black box in the stage of national communication of either policy ideas or hegemonic discourses which needs to be opened; and indeed it is this observation that constitutes the point of departure of this research.

This Chapter offers a way of analysing the interplay between hegemonic discourses and national institutional arrangements. The main claim here is that the dissemination of hegemonic discourses should be conceptualised as an interaction process between two discursive realities: the hegemonic discourses on the one hand, and the public discourses on the other. In order to do so two bodies of literature are combined: comparative institutionalism and discourse theory. The aim is to propose an understanding of hegemonic discourse communication as an integral part of national ideology-production mechanisms. The term integral is crucial here. The aforementioned two discursive realities (the 'hegemonic' and the 'public') are conceptualised as parts of a single discursive ensemble; their relationship is a relationship of mutual presupposition; and their analytical separation aims at stressing and clearly delineating this mutual presupposition, rather than obfuscating or denying it. For, as is analysed, the hegemonic forms the outside (for the public), but it lies within.

The purpose of combining comparative institutionalism and discourse theory is to capture the dynamic relationship between institutions and discourses. It can be assumed that without institutions, there would be no discourses, but also that without discourses, institutions would only exist in disarray, if they existed at all. Put differently discourses offer a cognitive level of institutionalisation which allows the diverse elements of a polity to hang together. Hence it is argued that in order to

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1 For an elaboration of such a relationship see Deleuze, 1988: 70-93.
understand hegemonic discourses, what they are and what they do, one has to study and understand the nature of the relationship between the institutional and the discursive. Such an approach shares a lot with the Gramscian tradition. As Gramsci (1971: 177) argued 'it is the problem of the relations between structure and superstructure which must accurately be posed and resolved if the forces which are active in the history of a particular period are to be correctly analysed and the relation between them determined'. In many regards it is this Gramscian tradition that the theoretical framework suggested here aims to push further by studying the interplay between a biopolitical approach to politics (i.e. the study of the production of human/social life itself), and a traditional analysis based on a who-gets-what-when-and-how analysis.

To develop our theoretical framework first we elaborate on the weakness of the existing literature to account for a wide range of discursive phenomena. Then we focus on the concept and the function of hegemonic discourses, and we suggest what their dissemination signifies and how it should be conceptualised and studied. Lastly, we reflect on how the concept of hegemonic discourses can be operationalised for the research purposes of this project.

The Ideas Literature, Hegemonic Discourses and the (Re)production of Life

Ideas-Do-not-Float-Freely vs. Discursive Formations

The thesis aims to contribute to the existing body of literature of Comparative Politics, International Relations and International Political Economy that deals with ideas and discourse communication (among others, Hall, 1989, 1992; Risse-Kappen, 1991, 1994, 1995; Evangelista, 1995; Wittrock and Wagner, 1996; Czarniawska and Joerges, 1996; Checkel, 1997; Blyth, 1997; Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998; McNamara, 1998; Hay, 1998, 2001; Kjær and Pedersen, 1998; Rosamond, 1999, 1999a; Banchoff, 1999; Risse-Kappen et al, 1999; Hay and Rosamond, 2000; Schmidt, 2000, 2001, 2002). The (re)emergence of the importance of the study of ideas in IR/IPE has indeed produced an important body of literature, generating several hypotheses on how specific ideas and discourses have been disseminated and produced policy.
changes. Therefore, insightful research – albeit not as extended as one would expect – has been done on the role of particular actors in the dissemination of ideas/discourses. Such actors include epistemic communities (Haas, 1992), advocacy coalitions (Sabatier, 1998; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993), advocacy networks (Keck and Sikkink, 1998), think-tanks (Stone, 1996; Stone et al., 1998, 2004) and transnational networks (Risse-Kappen, 1994, 1995; Evangelista, 1995).

Moreover there is a relatively developed literature on how and why common ‘external’ challenges (ideas could also be included here) produce different national responses. Put differently, why do different states respond differently to common incentives (see for instance Katzenstein, 1977, 1984; Hall, 1986, 1989; Ikenberry, 1988; Kjær and Pedersen, 1998; Garrett and Lange, 1999; Risse-Kappen, 1991, 1994, 1995; Campbell, 1998; Banchoff, 1999; Schmidt, 2000, 2001; Wittrock and Wagner, 1996). Finally, there is a more specialised literature on how particular technical international norms, such as those produced by the International Standardization Organisation (e.g. ISO 9000), have been internalised into different national contexts (see, for instance, Casper and Hancke, 1999).

It is within the above debates that institutions and ideas talk to each other within IR/IPE, and even though an integrated framework of analysis remains to be developed, important contributions towards this aim have been made (see for instance Hall, 1989; Risse et al., 1999; Campbell, 1998; Hay 2001a). It is also within the above debates that the study of discourse managed gradually to acquire attention, leading recently to a new strand of institutional analysis, called discursive institutionalism (see for instance Schmidt, 2000, 2001, 2002; Kjaer and Pedersen, 2001; Schmidt and Radaelli, 2004, 2004a, 2005). Yet the terms in which the study of discourse has been developed within most of the above literature have important limitations. Laffey and Weldes (1997) have argued that most of the ideas literature reproduces a set of rationalistic bias and assumptions of which is supposedly a critique. In particular, they argue that: (i) the mainstream ideas literature treats ideas and interests as rival explanations. As a result, the investigation of the social construction of interests is in practice disavowed because it is assumed...that interests are given and can be determined in isolation from ‘ideas’” (ibid.: 200). (ii) Within this body of literature ideas are in fact conceived as causal factors in a conventional neo-
positivist sense. As a result, only certain ideational factors ‘pass the test’ of what is to be studied: ‘the important questions concern not the broad conditions of possibility [e.g. alternative socio-economic systems or world orders] which are conceptualised in such a way that they do not seem directly to affect or ‘cause’ policy, but concern instead the impact of the narrower ‘causal’ beliefs, which do’ (ibid.: 201). (iii) Ideas are treated as *individual possessions* (usually as beliefs or shared beliefs), and their analysis is based on an understanding of ‘ideas as commodities’. Thus ideas are constructed as discrete objects, which in order to be causally effective they require political entrepreneurs – an analysis which not only reproduces the ideas/interests dichotomy, but is also ‘symptomatic of the difficulties in treating social phenomena in individualist terms’ (ibid.: 206). To overcome these bias and limitations Laffey and Weldes present a thoughtful analysis of how to move ‘beyond beliefs’ to an understanding of ideas as ‘symbolic technologies’. Along similar lines Campbell (1998: especially Epilogue) criticises the positivistic bias found in the way in which mainstream constructivist approaches have appropriated the concepts of ‘culture’ and ‘identity’. Within these approaches, he argues, ‘culture’ is figured as no more than that which is not material, the ideas and beliefs that make up the domestic domain, which can be isolated as variables possessing at least some causal autonomy’ (ibid.: 218). This analysis then evolves in one of the following ways: Either ‘policy makers...are regarded as being engaged in a sort of conscious and deliberate construction of reality’, as if they were located outside of the domain of social constitution, or, the factor language or culture ‘becomes an omnipotent force so deterministic that ‘it’ acts as the governing subject such that all accounts of human agency are expunged’ (ibid.: 219). Campbell then exemplifies how this analysis reproduces the idealist/materialist dichotomy and its problems, failing to engage with the issue of the materiality of discourse. This Chapter aspires to enrich the above critique by delineating a range of very important discursive phenomena, that the ideas literature does not seem capable of conceptualising and addressing. The following paragraphs elaborate on this point.

An underlying assumption of the ideas literature is that *ideas do not float freely* (Risse-Kappen, 1994). The discourses of disarmament, of ozone depletion, of

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2 For a critique of the contemporary ideas literature from a different standpoint, see also Hay, 2004.
Keynesianism, of neoliberalism, of human rights, of globalisation, to mention a few examples found in the literature, had not floated freely, and actually (the argument goes) they could not have done so. Ideas cannot exist without agents even though they are not reducible to them (see Adler’s analysis on social facts (1997). In this thesis I do not aim to challenge this assumption. I want to argue however that this assumption, in relation to certain type of discourses may be a misleading one. The existing literature, in response to the aforementioned underlying assumption (i.e. ideas do not float freely) has tried to find the (potential) ‘carriers’, the agents that carry the ideas. Such attempts refer – as already mentioned – to epistemic communities, advocacy coalitions, advocacy networks, think-tanks and transnational networks. I would like to argue, however, that the idea of the carrier is not the only possible response to the assumption that ideas do not float freely. The diffusion and function of discourses into societies cannot always be understood and studied in terms of a carrier. I do not mean to simplify the aforementioned approaches or to downgrade their diversity. In this manner reference to a carrier should not be interpreted as signifying a single agent (collective or not), or a single channel. The carrier in most of the aforementioned approaches is a network (rather than a single agent), and each approach attributes different characteristics to this network. For instance, it can be a knowledge-based network, as in the case of epistemic communities and the ozone depletion discourse, or a winning coalition of domestic and transnational actors, as in the case of transnational networks and the arms control discourse. Nevertheless, all the above approaches prescribe a critical channel/network/agent in the communication of ideas/discourses.

I should like, however, to argue that there is a type of discourse which cannot comfortably fit in the above models of ideas/discourse communication. In this type of discourse, there is no critical channel, network or agent involved in its communication/dissemination/diffusion. Rather, this type of discourse, which is defined here as hegemonic, has an all-pervasive multilevel societal effect. Its general and all-encompassing nature does not allow its communication in societies to have an authoritative sourcing of definition. In these cases, rather than the discourse to be characterised by privileged objects, such as ozone depletion and supply-side economics, it is characterised ‘by the way in which it forms objects that are in fact highly dispersed’; by its capacity to ‘give birth simultaneously or successively to
mutually exclusive objects, without having to modify itself (Foucault, 1972: 44). This is a point that is missing from, or is not clearly addressed in, the existing literature, and thus there is a gap in the conceptualisation and study of this type of discourses, their communication and their effects. In these cases the communication type escapes from the carrier model and takes a more complex and social-constructivist form (see also Campbell, 1998; Laffey and Weldes, 1997). In these cases it can be argued that the assumption that ideas do not float freely is rather a misleading one. For, the metaphor of floating leads to the concept of a carrier. If ideas do not float on their own, then somebody or something has to carry them in order to be disseminated.

This thesis argues that in order to understand and study these cases, one must escape from the metaphor of ideas floating, and adopt a more complex and dispersed logic and approach based on the discursive formation of objects, processes and thus of realities and of life itself. Such a study ceases to be a study of ideas-held-by-individuals, and turns out to be a study of the role of the ideational in the constitution of the subject. In fact, following this route, one has to abandon the vocabulary of ideas, and move from the category of the ideational to that of the discursive.

The next section attempts to develop a framework of analysis suitable for addressing this gap in the ideas literature. To do so first we define the phenomenon of hegemonic discourses, and we argue that in order to study these discourses, a political and a biopolitical approach to politics need to be combined. Then we move to the issue of how hegemonic discourses are communicated and materialised. The focus of the analysis is on what this process of hegemonic discourse communication signifies and how it can be conceptualised and studied. Here the thesis explores what makes a discourse hegemonic, and in doing so it brings into the analysis the concept of the public discourse. It is suggested that the hegemonic is the social technology of the public’s reproduction, i.e. the biopolitics of the public.

3 In an insightful article Milliken (1999) argues that three theoretical claims constitute the common denominator of the various approaches found in the category of the discursive: First, that discourses are structures of signification which construct social realities. Second, that discourses are productive/reproductive of the things which they define. Third, that all discourses are unstable grids requiring work to ‘articulate’ and ‘rearticulate’ their knowledges and identities, and thus are constantly open to change (see also Howarth and Stavrakakis, 2000; Howarth, 2000).
Conceptualising Hegemonic Discourses

The conceptualisation of hegemonic discourses in this thesis comes from a post-structural tradition (indicative works within IR include, Walker, 1986, 1993; Ashley, 1987; Hoffman, 1988; Shapiro and Der Derian, 1989; George, 1989, 1994; George and Campbell, 1990; Ashley and Walker, 1990; Campbell and Dillon, 1993; Der Derian, 1990; Devetak, 1995; Dillon, 1996, 2000; Smith, 1997). In particular, hegemonic discourses are conceptualised as historically specific, *overarching social technologies, concerning the (re)production of (everyday) life within the international.* Along these lines one could distinguish among two hegemonic discourses in the post-WWII period. First, the *Cold War* discourse which dominated and defined the conditions of production of social life in the international from the end of the WWII until the end of the 1980s, and second the *neoliberal globalisation* discourse that replaced in the 1990s the hegemonic discourse of Cold War as the dominant mode of social life production. Certainly this change in the conditions of reproduction of the international was a gradual one. Thus, as we analyse below, elements of the hegemonic discourse of globalisation were well in place since the late 1970s.

Some conceptual clarifications are necessary here. The 're' in the term *reproduction* is put in parenthesis in the above definition in order to signify that new modes of production of social life can only take place through the already existing social subjects, i.e. through the reproduction of social life. In this context, reproduction should be understood as a continuum of ever anew-activated productions. The term *everyday* in the definition is in parenthesis to signify the tension between the *social* and the *subjective*, inherent to the human condition. Thus a hegemonic discourse is a certain mode of everyday life reproduction. Yet this realm, i.e. the realm of everyday, is the realm where human beings are constituted as social subjects. Thus, bracketing the term everyday aims to signify that a certain mode of everyday life reproduction is a certain mode of producing social subjects; therefore, in essence, a hegemonic discourse is about the production of social subjects. Finally, the concept of *social technology* draws from the Foucaultian tradition. Thus a social technology is conceptualised as as a set of meanings and practices concerning the *mode* in which
social life is organised and reproduced (Foucault, 1972: 49; see also Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 105). To sum up, in this thesis the concept of hegemonic discourse signifies the historically-specific set of practices and meanings that dominate in the (re)production of social life in the international. Therefore, the level-of-analysis found in the study of hegemonic discourses is that of the production and reproduction of everyday life. Along these lines Gill (1995), for instance, analyses globalisation as the civilisation of the market, Sinclair (1999) attempts to develop the international political economy of the commonplace, whilst feminist scholars have attempted to exemplify the ways in which 'the personal is political' (e.g. Enloe, 1989; Hutchings, 1994).

The most important reason for mobilising the Foucaultian tradition in the definition of hegemonic discourses is that it carries the legacy of power/knowledge analysis. The benefit of the latter is that it provides an analytical framework which is able to capture the 'trinity' of social reality, i.e. the unity of ideas/knowledge, interests and power. Knowledge and power in this tradition of thought are intrinsically related, for power is one of the conditions of knowledge, and knowledge is one of the conditions for power (Foucault, 1977: 27). Following such a line of reasoning hegemonic discourses are not conceptualised as neutral, abstract ideologies. They are not ideational constructs independent from interests and power relationships. But neither are they reducible to them. They are intrinsically bio-political in the sense that they concern the (re)production of human life. Power within this context (i.e. bio-power) 'is not so much a matter of imposing constraints upon citizens as of 'making up' citizens capable of bearing a kind of regulated freedom. Personal autonomy is not the antithesis of political power, but a key term in its exercise, the more so because most individuals are not merely the subjects of power but play a part in its operations' (Rose and Miller, 1992: 174). Along these lines Foucault also argues that power must produce truth as it produces wealth, and specifically 'it must produce truth in order to produce wealth in the first place' (1980: 93-94).

A clarification of the concept of biopolitical is important here. The concepts of biopolitics and biopower have been central in the archaeology of the subject of Michel Foucault, i.e. his attempts to discover and analyse how the modern subject has come to constitute itself as such. In the first volume of his work on the history of
sexuality, he argues: 'For a long time...[t]he sovereign exercised his right of life only by exercising his right to kill, or by refraining from killing...The right which was formulated as the 'power of life and death' was in reality the right to take life or let live...Since the classical age [however] the West has undergone a very profound transformation (1978: 135-136) ... Now it is over life, throughout its unfolding, that power establishes its dominion; death is power's limit, the moment that escapes it (ibid.: 138) ... The old power of death that symbolised sovereign power was now carefully supplanted by the administration of bodies and the calculated management of life...marking the beginning of an era of "bio-power" (ibid.:139-140). Foucault's intellectual trip, which is impossible to meaningfully fit into a short paragraph, created a biopolitical tradition of thought in social sciences, followed in different ways (and among others) by Deleuze and Guattari (1988), Butler (1997), Agamben (1998), and Hardt and Negri (2000). Within this context, Hardt and Negri (2000: 23-24) define biopower as a 'form of power that regulates social life from its interior, following it, interpreting it, absorbing it, and rearticulating it. Power can achieve an effective command over the entire life of the population only when it becomes an integral, vital function that every individual embraces and reactivates of his or her own accord...Biopower thus refers to the situation in which what is directly at stake in power is the production and reproduction of life itself’ (emphasis added).

Following this analysis the emphasis put by this thesis on the biopolitical nature of hegemonic discourses serves two purposes. First, is to stress the point that what is at stake in these discourses is the (re)production of social life, i.e. hegemonic discourses are not only about the production of wealth and power relationships, but also about the production of subjects, peoples and societies. Second, is to stress the fact that the reproduction or change of these discourses depends on the actions or reactions of social subjects, i.e. hegemonic discourses not only produce subjects and societies, but are also produced by them. In this manner the biopolitical is used by this thesis as a

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4 This work led Foucault to a latter stage of his work to a research project on 'governmentality' (Foucault, 1991), and the political technology of individuals; how 'we have been led to recognise ourselves as a society...' (Foucault 1998b: 146). Integral to this project was the study of the technologies of self that permit 'individuals to effect by their own means...a certain number of operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, and way of being...’ (Foucault 1998a: 18); a study that constitutes a ‘history of how an individual acts upon himself’ (ibid.: 19).

5 See also Rose, 1999; Dean, 1999. For a critique of the way in which the concepts of biopolitics and biopower have been mobilised by Negri and Agamben, see, Rabinow and Rose, 2003.
means for bringing everyday life and the subject to the forefront of the analysis of world politics and economics.

A story from the writings of Cornelius Castoriadis would be enlightening here⁶. Castoriadis on many occasions presented his ideas, on the centrality of the factory in the reproduction of capitalism, to workers. He found however that the workers ‘had little to say and appeared disappointed’. Their main problem was that they were hearing boring and uninteresting things about the importance of their everyday life, rather than things that ‘really mattered’, such as the dynamics of overproduction/underconsumption and the law of the falling rate of profit. ‘It seemed unbelievable to them that the evolution of modern society is determined far more by the daily movements and gestures of millions of workers in factories all over the world than by some great and mysterious hidden laws of the economy discovered by theoreticians’. For Castoriadis the ‘idea that workers have that how they live, what they do, and how they think ‘doesn’t really matter’ is...the gravest manifestation of ...[an] ideological enslavement ... For ... [the current system]⁷ can survive only if people are persuaded that what they themselves do and know is a private little matter of their own that does not really matter, and that really important matters are the monopoly of the big shots and specialists in various fields of endeavour’ (italics in the original).

The above analysis is suggestive both of the importance of discourse and biopolitics in understanding hegemonic discourse communication, and the negative implications of their marginalisation from the mainstream approaches to IR/IPE. In particular the attempt by the mainstream IR/IPE to confer pariah status on post-structural approaches (see Campbell, 1998: 210), led discourse theory for a long period to the margins of international studies theorising. Indeed there was, and still is in many scholars and researchers, a negative prejudice towards whatever has to do with discourse; the main charges being that discourse and post-structural theory are ‘self-referential’, ‘self-righteous’, ‘unscientific’ and ‘bad IR’ (see the review of the opinions of Rosenberg, Keohane, Ruggie and Mearsheimer in Campbell, 1998: 210-212); or that discourse theorists are no more than methodological anarchists,

⁶ All quotations are from Castoriadis, 1998.
⁷ Here, Castoriadis refers to capitalism.
relativists and armchair theorizers (see Howarth, 2000: 6). This has created a clear dividing line between researchers employing discourse theory and those who do not. This situation does not serve the study of world politics and economics. Ideas and institutions alone are able to tell only half of the story about the politics of hegemony and discourse at an international level. Following traditional approaches to politics, these bodies of literature focus on powerful states, and interests. They inquire who has the power to determine the structures and the rules of the game of world politics and economics. By focusing on who gets what, when and how they locate the core of hegemony in powerful states and dominant interests, thus uncovering underlying power relations at act in the international.

On the other hand, biopolitical approaches to politics emphasise that, to focus on how power structures the ‘game’ (e.g. the social universe, world politics, life itself, etc.), is to externalise power from the ‘game’. Thus, before and beyond the structuring of the rules of the game, one has to consider the concept of the game itself, and the conditions of its existence; and power is one of those. In such an inquiry the subject (human being) comes to the forefront. The subject acquires its existence through, and can only be self-identified against, the ‘game’. Furthermore the game does not exist beyond the subject; and change in the game and its terms can only be conceptualised as part of the process of subject’s reproduction, part of the process of everyday life reproduction. Therefore this tradition of thought, which is based on the writings of thinkers such as Michel Foucault, Gilles Deleuze, Antonio Negri, Giorgio Agamben, locates ‘hegemony’ at the level of the (re)production of life itself; locates hegemony at the level of the subject. Furthermore, this approach suggests that a new form of sovereignty has been emerging, which – in contrast to the traditional understanding of sovereignty that was grounded on the concept of nation-state – is grounded on a global network of power ‘composed of a series of national and supranational organisms [that are] united under a single logic of rule’ (Hardt and Negri, 2000: xii).

Thus, in contrast to the traditional form of sovereignty, the new form ‘does not rely on fixed boundaries or barriers. It is a decentered and deterritorializing apparatus of rule that progressively incorporates the entire global realm’ (ibid.; emphasis in the

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8 Indicative recent applications in IR include, Dillon, 1995; Dillon and Reid, 2000, 2001; Edkins, 2000; Edkins, Jenny, Pin-Fat, Véronique and Shapiro, Michael, 2004.
original). It is the contention of this thesis that in order to study hegemonic discourses one has to consider and build upon both of these approaches to politics and sovereignty. The question of ‘who gets what when and how’ must open itself to the question of what are the conditions of existence, reproduction and change of this who-gets-what system. Put more abstractly, the question who gets what hegemonic discourse, when and how, must open itself to the question who is what part of a hegemonic discourse, when and how; and for this target to be met comparative institutionalism and discourse theory have to speak to each other.

The next sections aim at elaborating further on the characteristics of hegemonic discourses and proposing a framework for conceptualising and studying their communication/materialisation.

**Conceptualising Hegemonic Discourse Communication: the Bio-Politics of the ‘Public’**

*Hegemonic Discourses: from Origins to Function and Communication*

One should start here with the question what makes a discourse hegemonic? Is it the scale of its dissemination, or are there structural elements, specific properties of the discourse itself? Put differently, does a discourse become global because it is hegemonic, or it is hegemonic because it becomes global? Which condition comes first? That is, what is the essence of the epithet ‘hegemonic’?

The thesis contends that what makes a discourse hegemonic is not its scope of dissemination but its structural relationship with particular interests and modes of social organisation and production, dominant at a certain historical moment. Thus, a discourse acquires a ‘hegemonic status’ on the basis of its relationship with dominant ‘material’ forces, and therefore the emergence of hegemonic discourses is part of the ‘story’ of wealth and knowledge production in world politics and economics (see below). In this regard, for instance, the emergence of globalisation discourse cannot be separated from the internationalisation of production by multinational enterprises and the integration of financial markets since the early 1980s. Moreover the
integration of financial markets at an international level would hardly become possible without new technological breakthroughs, such as the Internet. Yet, two important caveats are in order here.

First, is that a hegemonic discourse and its effects cannot be reduced to any particular conditions or category (for instance the MNCs, the USA, the financial capital or the ‘economic’ in the above example). A hegemonic discourse meets a condition of universality. But precisely because it meets this condition of universality, it can only be through the non-universal, it can only be through the particularistic, the national, the ‘public’. To paraphrase, or rather to use, Deleuze (1988), the ‘hegemonic’ neither sees nor speaks. But precisely because it does not itself speak and see, it makes the public/’us’ do so. It comes from below. Thus, although the formation of hegemonic discourses can be traced to particular interests and conditions, during their communication hegemonic discourses acquire an independent dynamic, which not only cannot be reduced to, but in fact transforms the initial interests and material conditions which gave birth to them in the first place. This independent effect of the hegemonic discourse is central to the conceptualisation proposed here of hegemonic discourse communication. This process may create new subjectivities and cleavages, give rise to new dynamics, define new zones of contestation, new political projects and new possibilities for domination and resistance. In this way, ‘politics’ and ‘life’ are equal components of the communication process of hegemonic discourses.

The second caveat refers to the ‘materialistic’ point of departure of hegemonic discourses. Interests and power relationships are to be found at the point of origin. Are then hegemonic discourses superstructures? It is here that the dichotomy between the ‘material’ and the ‘discursive’ cannot but be problematised. Considering that the level of analysis is the reproduction of social life, at no point in time, is any ‘material’, in terms of interests and power, extra-discursive, that is outside, beyond or independent from a hegemonic discourse. For, as already argued, hegemonic discourses are not understood as ‘ideological systems of meaning that obfuscate and

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9 Here I borrow from the debate among J. Butler, E. Laclau and S. Zizek (2000:3). ‘All three of us, however, maintain that universality is not a static presumption, not an a priori given, and that it ought instead to be understood as a process or condition irreducible to any of its determinate modes of appearance’. For a Gramscian analysis on the issue of universality, see Laclau, 2000.
naturalize uneven distributions of power and resources' as the classical Marxist tradition would have it (see Howarth, 2000: 4fc), but as social orders concerning the production and reproduction of social life itself\textsuperscript{10}. Thus the interests and power relationships that are found at the point of origin of hegemonic discourses are not externally formed but are both a part and a product of the process through which social life reproduces itself. To use Foucault (1972: 45), the hegemonic\textsuperscript{11} 'does not pre-exist itself...but it exists under the positive conditions of a complex group of relations... These relations are established between institutions, economic and social processes, behavioural patterns, systems of norms, techniques, types of classification, modes of characterization; and these relations...do not define its [i.e. hegemonic discourse's] internal constitution, but what enables it to appear'. In this regard, and for the second half of the twentieth century, Hardt and Negri (2000) note: ‘Capital has indeed always been organised with a view towards the entire global sphere, but only in the second half of the twentieth century did multinational and transnational industries and financial corporations really begin to structure global territories biopolitically’ (ibid.: 31). Hence, ‘along with the global market and global circuits of production has emerged a global order, a new logic and structure of rule’ (ibid.: xi). Hence it can be argued that the relationship of a hegemonic discourse with dominant interests cannot explain the nature and function of a hegemonic discourse.

In order to understand the concept of hegemonic discourse one has to move from the question of the \textit{origins}, to the question of the \textit{function} of this discourse. Hence, a discourse is hegemonic when the practices and meanings on which it is based, and which it constructs/produces, start to restructure our everyday understanding of social relations and the world, the life-in-the-international, as a whole. This is what the epithet hegemonic really signifies: the fact that the discourse enforces its terms on the reproduction of social life, both in an individual and a universal sense. In this manner, a hegemonic discourse does not form objects and processes from a 'zero point', but rather (re-)orders dispersed phenomena towards a dynamic new totality which empowers her own identity as a totality, and (trans)forms the social reality in its own terms.

\textsuperscript{10} Increasingly not only the 'social', but also the 'biological' human life is at stake (if such a distinction makes any sense). See Rose, 2001.

\textsuperscript{11} Foucault refers to the 'object of the discourse'.
This analysis may give the impression that the establishment of hegemonic discourses
is a linear process with clearly distinguished stages: firstly we have interests and
‘material’ factors, secondly we have a set of favourable conditions, thirdly the
hegemonic discourse, and fourthly its dissemination. Yet, as we have argued above,
technological, material and cognitive changes are taking place in tandem, and can
only be conceptualised as an integral part of the process of the reproduction of social
life. In this framework, change is only possible through repetition and reproduction\textsuperscript{12}.
Therefore the above ‘stages’ should not be understood as different historical moments.
In real terms each stage encompass and cannot be detached from the others, and in
this regard all stages are present in each single stage. On this basis it is also claimed
that a hegemonic discourse is materialised through its communication, and therefore
communication and materialisation should be conceptualised as a single process in
the case of hegemonic discourses.

Along the above lines it is clear that the establishment of a hegemonic discourse is
not a process that is external to the subject; but a process that is implicated and takes
place at the level of the subject, influencing its self-understanding and defining the
social technology of its production, reproduction and change. The use of the term
communication, rather than diffusion or dissemination, was preferred in regard to
hegemonic discourses in order to stress this constitutive relationship between the
hegemonic and the subject. Yet a study of the subject and its reproduction cannot but
take place through the study of its sociality, i.e. through a study of the social
interactions that dominate in its production/reproduction; and although the
organisation of social life is characterised by various organisational and institutional
layers, it can be argued that the single most important layer for the organisation and
reproduction of social life since the dawn of modernity is the nation-state. It is at this
point where the issue of the role of domestic structures and national institutional
arrangements emerges. It is also at this point that the domestic, the social context,
enters the picture of hegemonic discourse communication as a ‘black box’, in much

\textsuperscript{12} As Butler (2000: 41) notes, an ‘established discourse remains established only by being perpetually
re-established’ thus risking ‘itself in the very repetition it requires’.
of the respective IR/IPE literature. What happens at this level, and how is this level to be related with that of the *hegemonic*?

In order to address these questions this thesis suggests that we must *open* the 'domestic' and emphasise the terms of its communication with the 'hegemonic'. Indeed each 'domestic' delineates a discursive, particularistic reality on its own, which is characterised by different structures of signification, different historical institutional arrangements and mechanisms of ideology production, different ways of relating with the 'hegemonic'. This domestic social sphere is referred to here as *public discourse*\(^{13}\), and is defined as a social sphere which is produced and reproduced through social interactions within a specific space/territory (the nation-state in this case), and at the same time gives meaning to, orients and structures these interactions, i.e. it evolves through a structuration process (Giddens, 1984; see also Cerny, 2000)\(^{14}\). Along these lines it can be argued that the public discourse is what makes the diverse and disparate elements of a polity hang together, by creating a distinctive level of institutionalisation. Thus the concept of public discourse in this thesis includes both organisations and institutions (e.g. political parties, interest groups, electoral systems, and systems of democratic governance, such as presidential and parliamentary ones), and what makes these institutions hang together, delineating a distinctive social sphere (the historical co-evolution of these institutions, a common and society-specific symbolic universe, a common and society-specific regime of truth). Thus, the concept of public discourse, which will be used interchangeably here with the term *public*, aims at capturing the social interactions' game through which a society constitutes and reproduces itself as a distinctive social sphere\(^{15,16}\).

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\(^{13}\) The use of the term discourse aims at underlining the dynamic and inherently inconclusive nature of the institutional arrangements and social processes which define the 'public'.

\(^{14}\) It needs to be stressed here that in this structuration process not all the actors have the same role, position or power. For this point see, Mouzelis, 1991: chapter 4.

\(^{15}\) One can find in the literature several ways of conceptualising the social sphere that is defined by the 'domestic/inside'. Relevant to our project examples include the following: Deutsch (1966) has tried to develop a theory of peoples/nations as communities of social communication. He argues that peoples/nations 'are held together 'from within' by what he defines as communicative efficiency (a concept which includes complementary habits, vocabularies and facilities, approximating an anthropological definition of culture) (Ibid: chapter 4). Berger and Luckmann (1967) in their classical book *The Social Construction of Reality* refer to the concept of 'symbolic universes' defined as the matrix of all socially objectivated and subjectively real meanings. Thus these symbolic universes serve to integrate the meanings already attached to disparate institutional processes. Finally Foucault uses the concept of 'regimes of truth'. He argues that '[e]ach society has its regime of truth, its 'general politics' of truth: that is the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the means by
Based on the above, it is claimed that the key for the understanding and the analysis of hegemonic discourse communication is a thorough analysis of the interplay between the hegemonic and the publics, i.e. the public discourses of the different countries. In the Introduction it was argued that the ‘public’ and the ‘hegemonic’ are parts of the same discursive ensemble, and exist in a relationship of mutual presupposition. Here we would like to push this position further by arguing that it is not only the case that the ‘public’ does not exist independently from the ‘hegemonic’ but also that the ‘hegemonic’ cannot exist but through the ‘public’. The hegemonic is the condition of the production, reproduction and change of the ‘public’. Thus it is suggested that the ‘hegemonic’ is, and should be conceptualised as, the biopolitics of the ‘public’, i.e. the technology of the publics’ reproduction and change. Therefore, the focus of the hegemonic-discourse-communication model proposed here is on the reproduction of the public discourses. Whether this will prove to be a valid model, or how useful such an approach is to study change and continuity in world politics and economics, remain to be seen in our analysis of the globalisation discourse in Greece and Ireland.

Conceptualising the interplay between the hegemonic and the public in the above terms puts our traditional understanding of the inside/outside relationship under stress. Although the hegemonic lies within the publics (i.e. it speaks and is materialised through the social agents), it also forms a concrete ‘outside’ for them. This ‘outside’ should be conceptualised both in cognitive and non-cognitive terms. In the case of globalisation discourse for instance, the experience of this ‘outside’ included both the experience of the actual internationalisation of production by multinational enterprises, and the creation of a new ‘cognitive map’ about how one should function in this ‘new era’.

which each is sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true’ (Foucault, 1980: 131).

Within this framework it can also be said that the public discourse offers the social space and institutional underlying framework for the emergence of ‘public sphere’, as conceptualised by Habermas (1991). The latter argues (1991: 398): ‘By ‘public sphere’ we mean first of all a domain of our social life in which such a thing as public opinion can be formed...When the public is large, this kind of communication requires certain means of dissemination and influence...newspapers...radio and television are the media of the public sphere’. In a similar manner, Bennett and Entman (2001: 2-3) argue that ‘public sphere is comprised of any and all locations, physical or virtual, where ideas and feelings relevant to politics are transmitted or exchanged openly’.

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In the above process of hegemonic discourse communication the role of international institutions/regimes and global media must separately be underlined. A complete reference to these powerful communication mechanisms/channels is beyond the purposes of this project, not least because, as has already been argued, the analysis of these channels does not contribute decisively to our understanding of what really happens at the domestic level. As Friedman (2000) for instance argues with regard to the global media ‘[o]ne needs to be more specific about the actual social processes involved...The fact that the media are concentrated among certain...firms...does not suffice to generate the transformation described. One has to explain their resonance, the conditions under which ideas can be consumed and appropriated by the rest of the world if this is indeed the case’ (see also Butler, 2000).

Furthermore the model of knowledge production – what Strange (1994) has termed *knowledge structure* – is also an important and integral element in the process of hegemonic discourse communication. Two issues are really important here, with reference to the contemporary world. On the one hand the trend towards the ‘privatisation of knowledge’ (see Mitelka, 2000) and the transfer of knowledge-authority from states to non-state, in general, and private, in particular, actors, and on the other hand the changing role of intellectuals. With regard to the latter it has been noted that ‘the new hegemonic representations are produced by the university academics and cultural elites themselves and thus [are] immediately perceived as critical and progressive according to the self-definition of these elites’ (Friedman, 2000, based on Bourdieu and Wacquants, 1995). Along these lines of argumentation Cox (1996: 24), for instance, with regard to globalisation and globalism notes that ‘[t]hey emerged first in the advanced capitalist societies and with the knowledge, prestige, and resources present in these societies they were disseminated as objective truth among these societies’ subordinate classes and to peoples in the rest of the world’. This thesis suggests that these changes in knowledge production and

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17 Harindranath (2000), in an interesting literature review on global media and cultural imperialism, distinguishes between two main theses. On the one side Hamelink who argues that the ‘out there’ influence the ‘in here’, on the basis of Wallerstein’s centre/periphery analysis; and on the other side Liebes, Katz and Gillespie who argue that it is wrong to assume uncritical acceptance of dominant ideologies.
knowledge authority constitute instances of the new conditions for the reproduction of social life, generated by the emergence of the hegemonic discourse of globalisation.

The above analysis and conceptualisation of hegemonic discourses could trigger the criticism of 'discourse reification' and 'circularity' (i.e. impossibility of change). This would indeed be the case if the level of analysis of the suggested theoretical framework would be the states, social classes, international organisations or other static categories that would not allow for their transcendence. Yet, the choice of the thesis to give primacy to the level of social-life-reproduction makes the above criticism rather irrelevant. If one focuses on the level of social life and how this is reproduced at the everyday, one faces a grand continuity, the continuity of social life itself. Hegemonic discourses indeed mark changes in the ways/modes of this reproduction. Yet it is through the 'reification' of a hegemonic discourse (i.e. when it succeeds in forcing its own terms in the reproduction of social life) that its change and transcendence become possible. The redefinition of interests, preferences and identities that a hegemonic discourses carries with it creates new dynamics and new relationships which set the conditions for a new hegemonic discourse. Thus, in a Bergsonian way being-in-the-international should be understood as an ever evolving becoming, for, the 'social' itself is a condition of perpetual becoming. Therefore the moment of discourse reification cannot but be a moment of social change (or the end of social life), i.e. the stage of reification for a hegemonic discourse cannot but be the moment of its transcendence, cannot but signify the initiation of its end/change (or the end of social time). Thus, by focusing on the reproduction of everyday life, the 'problem' of reification turns out to be an integral part and a condition of change in the longue durée of the reproduction of social life. Finally, it needs to be stressed that such an approach does not neutralise the politics of the hegemonic, in terms of who gets, what, when and how, i.e. in terms of winners and losers. It rather makes this politics inevitable, as new political projects and new opportunities for domination or resistance are inherent in the reproduction of social life.

To recapitulate, it was claimed that in order to understand and study hegemonic discourse communication, we need to (a) open the public to the hegemonic, and study the terms of their communication, and (b) focus on the changes in the production and
reproduction of social life at the level of the public, for it is through the latter that the hegemonic is materialised.

But how can one examine the public? How one can capture those discursive instances (including changes in the language, the social practices, the institutions, the self-understandings and the understanding of structural constraints/opportunities, the balances of power), which signify a change in the production and reproduction of the public and the social life within it? It is at this point where comparative institutionalism is introduced to the analysis of hegemonic discourses. The following section offers thoughts on how hegemonic discourse communication can be operationalised.

Operationalising the Communication Process

Comparative institutionalism focuses on the analysis of domestic structures and national institutional arrangements (see Katzenstein, 1977; Risse-Kappen, 1991: 486, 1994: 187; see also Evangelista, 1995: 9; Krasner, 1995: 258). Thus, it allows us to disaggregate the public, and examine its organisational structure and institutional composition; and by doing so it allows us to examine the rules of the game of its reproduction and change. Through, comparative institutionalism, therefore, we can map who has a voice within a public, how these voices are articulated, what are their power relationships, and how they lie on each other? That is why comparative institutionalism is important for this thesis. For, if public discourses are social spheres which are produced and reproduced through social interactions, then in order to study the change of these social spheres, one has to study the rules of these social interactions and the power relations existed therein.
The proposed investigation needs to take into account a number of existing studies on domestic structures, such as those by Katzenstein (1977)\textsuperscript{18}, Risse-Kappen (1991, 1994)\textsuperscript{19}, Evangelista (1995)\textsuperscript{20}, Tsebelis (1995)\textsuperscript{21}, Garrett and Lange (1996)\textsuperscript{22}, Schmidt (2000, 2001, 2003)\textsuperscript{23}. But it also needs to transcend these studies in terms of discursive formation and ideology production at the national level. It needs to take on board the importance that these studies place on domestic structures and institutions as independent and/or intervening variables. But it needs to go beyond a static approach to domestic structures and institutions, and underline their discursive nature; their inherent dynamism and

\textsuperscript{18} Katzenstein (1977) has argued that the domestic structures of the nation-state are a critical intervening variable, without which the interrelation between international interdependence and the diversified national strategies cannot be understood. In particular he claims that the centralisation of state and society and the differentiation between them determine the nature of domestic structures and thus constitute the underling factor for understanding different states' responses to common external incentives. Finally, he argues that four different categories of states, with regard to their domestic structures, exist: (a) countries which are highly centralised in both their society and state (e.g. Japan), (b) countries with low centralised state, but highly centralised society (e.g. former W. Germany, Italy), (c) countries with a highly centralised state, but low centralised society (e.g. France, Britain) and (d) countries with low centralisation in both their society and state (e.g. USA).

\textsuperscript{19} Risse-Kappen (1994) has argued that the ability of transnational alliances or knowledge communities to promote ideas to states is conditioned by the domestic structures of the target states. In particular domestic structures determine both the channels into the political system and the domestic partners that the transnational alliances have at their disposal. Finally he distinguishes among three models of domestic structures: (a) the state-controlled (e.g. USSR), (b) the society-dominated (e.g. USA) and (c) the democratic-corporatist model (e.g. Germany. See, also Risse-Kappen, 1991: 486).

\textsuperscript{20} In a similar manner to Risse-Kappen, Evangelista (1995) has argued that centralised, hierarchical, bureaucratic states may effectively resist access to new ideas at first, but are able to implement the respective policies effectively once these ideas have been adopted. On the other hand, ideas can easily gain access to decentralised, fragmented states, but these states have difficulties in achieving the implementation of new policies.

\textsuperscript{21} Tsebelis (1995) has used the concept of veto player in order to study the capacity of policy change in different political systems. He suggests that this capacity depends upon: (a) the number of veto players in the system (b) the congruence of veto players, defined as the difference in their political positions, and (c) the cohesion of veto players, defined as the similarity of policy positions which exist within each veto player. Based on this analysis he distinguishes between systems with one veto player (for instance Westminster systems and dominant party systems) and systems with multiple veto players (such as presidential or federal systems, or parliamentary systems with coalition governments). He finally concludes that the capacity for policy change decreases when the number of veto-players, the lack of congruence among them and the lack of cohesion within each of them increase.

\textsuperscript{22} Garrett and Lange (1996) have analysed how formal political institutions intervene in the relationship between societal preferences and political outcomes. Borrowing from Tsebelis, they argue that the responsiveness of a government to changes in the domestic preference depends on the regime-type of the political system. In particular two issues are underlined as important: (a) the number of veto points in the political system and (b) the degree of bureaucratic autonomy. They argue that both are inversely correlated to the responsiveness of government to given changes in societal preferences.

\textsuperscript{23} Schmidt (2000, 2001) in a similar manner to Tsebelis, Garrett and Lange, has distinguished between single-actor systems, (such as Britain and France), and multi-actor systems (such as Germany and Sweden). Based on this distinction she argues that the process of ideas communication in the single-actor systems focuses on the attempt of key policy groups to persuade directly the public about the necessity and appropriateness of their ideas. On the other hand, in multi-actor systems the focus is on the attempt of policy groups to agree among themselves. Thus, Schmidt argues that in multi-actor systems the policy groups/social partners act as a filter between ideas and the public, whereas no such mechanism exists in the case of single-actor systems.
incompleteness. It needs not only to take into account the veto points in the political system, but also to study this system in structural power terms; in terms of how preferences and political agendas are formed and how societal consensus or dissent are produced, broken and change (see Strange, 1994: 24-25; Lukes, 1974: 21-25). In order to study the communication of hegemonic discourses one needs to examine the mechanisms of ideology production at the national level; the ways in which actors and institutions produce and enforce discourses and agendas. Furthermore, one needs to focus on the discourses of the institutional players which participate at the ideology production, and examine how these discourses are ‘locked’ at the national level and what is the system that governs their formation and co-existence. As Foucault (1972: 32) suggested for the study of discourse ‘[w]hat one must characterise and individualise is the co-existence of these dispersed and heterogeneous statements; the system that governs their division, the degree to which they depend upon one another, the way in which they interlock or exclude one another, the transformation that they undergo, and the play of their location, arrangement and replacement’ (ibid.: 34).

Hence the research strategy proposed here is based on the one hand on the identification of the key-institutional actors and the study of the evolution of their discourses, and on the other hand on the study of the evolution of the terms of coexistence and interaction of these institutional discourses at a national level (see also Introducing the Thesis). In this regard comparative institutionalism is introduced to the study of hegemonic discourses, as a way of disaggregating and studying the public.

In such a research project language and its study is of great importance; and in this regard the proposed project has a lot in common with the linguistic approaches to discourse analysis in IR (e.g. Larsen, 1997; see also the contributions in Wodak and Meyer, 2001). Yet, the focal point of the project proposed here is not language, but the mechanisms of ideology and life production at the national level; the focus is on the ideological/power institutional basis of public discourses.

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24 In this manner, this thesis is closer to the theory of hegemony articulated by Ernesto Laclau. But still this project focuses more on continuity, the system that governs social antagonisms, and life production, rather than on social antagonisms themselves, Gramscian hegemony, and universality as an empty space beyond subjects. See for instance Laclau, 1985, 2000, 2001.
Recapitulation

In this chapter an effort has been made to demonstrate the limits of the ‘ideational turn’ in IR/IPE, through a problematisation of the assumption that ‘ideas do not flow freely’. In particular it was argued that although the ideas literature has manage to produce a sophisticated body of studies which deals with how ideas and discourses are disseminated across boundaries, it does not have the analytical capacity/instruments to account for the communication of a certain type of discourses, defined by the thesis as hegemonic. It was then argued that in order to understand what the hegemonic discourses are and what they do, one must escape from the metaphor of ‘ideas floating’, and adopt a more social constructivist approach based on the discursive formation of social life and reality.

Along these lines, hegemonic discourses have been conceptualised as social technologies that concern the production and reproduction of social life, and it was argued that the appropriate level of analysis for studying these discourses is that of the reproduction of everyday life. The concept of the ‘public’ was then introduced as a key organisational layer of everyday life, and the relations of mutual presupposition between the ‘public’ and the ‘hegemonic’ were elaborated. Finally, it was emphasised that everyday life is about life, and not about forces externally given or created; i.e. everyday life is about the ‘subject’. It is here, in the ultimate inside, where one should look for the rise and fall of the ‘hegemonic’. It is here where the power for emancipation, subjugation or resistance lies. Through this analysis the thesis aspired to suggest a theoretical framework for thinking about and studying hegemonic discourse communication.

Up to this point, we have discussed the concept of hegemonic discourses mostly in a ‘generic’ sense. The next section turns to globalisation. The main questions here are: Why did this project focus on globalisation? How is globalisation conceptualised in the IR/IPE literature? What does it mean to think of globalisation as a discourse, and what is a Foucaultian reading of globalisation? What is the stance taken by this thesis towards globalisation?
Why Globalisation? The Need to Understand & the Need for an All-Encompassing Discourse

Globalisation has been selected as an object of analysis by this thesis on the basis of its impact on the academic, social and policy realms, at both a national and an international level, since the mid 1980s. It is indeed striking, as has been observed, that the concept of globalisation 'came out of nowhere' and dominated during the 1990s most of the international and national contexts and discourses. As Giddens (1999: 7) has put it, 'the global spread of the term is evidence of the very developments to which it refers...Yet even in the late 1980s the term was hardly used, either in the academic literature or in everyday language. It has come from nowhere to be almost everywhere'; and along the same lines Beck (2001) has argued that 'the most important victory of globalisation may be the globalisation of the globalisation discourse'.

Indeed saying that globalisation, for good or ill, is the state we are in would not be an exaggeration or a rhetorical scheme. Important political and economic decisions have been taken and justified in the name of globalisation, and a huge transnational social movement has been developed and activated against economic globalisation and the policies associated with it. The academic literature has not been immune to this trend. On the contrary, globalisation has become the single most popular concept and theme of the last decade. One can indeed observe that globalisation, with agency or not; as a process, a structure or a project; new or old; even through the negation of its existence has become a 'world for itself' (Robertson, 1992), which is all-present in our everyday lives. How did the state we are in come into being? How has it been communicated and materialised in different national institutional contexts? What are

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25 The works that have been produced and are still produced about globalisation, are too numerous to be mentioned in any comprehensive way here (or indeed elsewhere). The Global Transformation Reader edited by D. Held and A. McGrew (2000), including forty-three articles, manages to encapsulate the various debates surrounding globalisation. Often-quoted edited volumes include that of: J. Mittelman (1996); E. Kofman and G. Youngs (1996); R. Germain (1999). Moreover, often quoted texts include: J. Scholte (2000); U. Beck (1999); D. Held, A. McGrew, D. Goldblatt, J. Perraton (1999). Finally, often-quoted critics include: R. Falk (1999); P. Hirst and G. Thompson (1999); J. Mittelman (2000); J. Rosenberg (2000); G. Mander and E. Goldsmith (2001). It is also interesting to note the engagement in the debate of mainstream authors such as R. Keohane and J. Nye (2000a, 2000b) and K. Waltz (1999).
the forces that are governing and conditioning its rules of formation and transformation? Where did globalisation come from and where is it going? The aim of these questions is to signify that the main reason for choosing globalisation as our object of analysis is a normative one. There is a need to unfold and understand the state we are in, and through this analysis there is a need to understand how this state is (re)produced and changes.

Beyond this normative criterion, globalisation discourse has the merit of being a general/all-encompassing discourse, as opposed to a knowledge-based, or otherwise specialised, one. The discourses of Keynesianism or disarmament for instance, although concerning society as a whole, were initially introduced/communicated through specialised social groups. In the first case through the community of economists (Hall, 1989a), and in the second through the liberal internationalist community (Risse-Kappen, 1994: 196-200). Hence, in the communication of these discourses there has been a critical channel, which shaped the communication process. Therefore, the analysis of the two aforementioned discourses would need to be focused on specific groups. This condition does not exist in the case of globalisation discourse, where there is no authoritative source of definition. In this regard, globalisation constitutes a critical case study for the project undertaken by the thesis. It offers a most important case to study the nature and function of hegemonic discourses and the interplay between the 'hegemonic' and the 'public' discourses.

Globalisation in the Literature I

The problem of capturing, and therefore studying globalisation, is that it simultaneously refers to and forms objects and processes 'that are in fact highly dispersed' (Foucault, 1972: 44). It 'gives birth simultaneously or successively to mutually exclusive objects' and processes 'without having to modify itself' (ibid.). This seems to be a common point in the globalisation literature. Giddens (1999) argues that globalisation is not an 'out there' phenomenon but an 'in here' one, which restructures the ways in which we live. It constitutes 'a complex set of processes which operate in a contradictory or oppositional fashion'. Held, McGrew, Goldblatt and Perraton (1999) propose that globalisation should be thought of as 'a process (or
set of processes) which embodies a transformation in the spatial organisation of social relations – assessed in terms of their extensity, intensity, velocity and impact’. They underline, however, that globalisation should not be conceived in opposition to more spatially delimited processes (such as localisation and regionalisation), but as standing in a complex and dynamic relationship with them. Cerny in a similar ‘dispersed’ logic (2000, see also 1995) argues that globalisation ‘is a multilayered, asymmetric admixture of international, transnational, domestic and local processes the interaction of which increasingly generate multiple equilibria’. In his ‘critical introduction’ to globalisation, Scholte (2000) argues that globalisation is simultaneously an effect and a cause; an ‘outcome’, which turned to be a causal force. He further suggests supraterritoriality/deterritorialisation as the defining feature of globalisation, underlining that the global and territorial spaces co-exist and interrelate in complex fashions. Finally, Robertson (1992: 102), in an often quoted phrase, suggests that globalisation is a ‘form of institutionalisation of the two-fold process involving the universalisation of particularism and the particularisation of universalism’, and Rosow (1994) in a similar manner argues that in a dialectical ongoing process ‘selves’ and ‘identities’ become more globally diffused and at the same time more homogeneous (see also Beck, 2000; Appandurai, 1995; Rosenau, 1995).

It is this dispersed logic, and the different and – more often than not – antithetical nature of the various manifestation of globalisation that led us to conceptualise globalisation as a hegemonic discourse. Such manifestations stretch from the interconnectedness of financial markets, to the organisation of the anti-globalisation movement; and from the global media, as hegemonic channels of homogenisation, to the internet as a self-liberating and anarchic place.

*Globalisation in the Literature II: Globalisation as Discourse*

There is now a relatively developed body of literature dealing with globalisation as a discourse. Gill (1995: 405) argues that globalisation ‘in its present mythic and ideological representations’ serves to ‘reify a global economic system dominated by large institutional investors and transnational firms’. He argues, furthermore, that the
discourse of globalisation leads to the 'global incorporation of the market' at the micro-level of the individual (ibid.: 410). McNamara (1997, 2001: 3), argues that international economic integration is proceeding in tandem with the spread of the global cultural norms of neoliberalism. These norms influence actors’ decisions, which in turn reformulate the world through their effects. Along the same lines Hay and Rosamond (2000: 9) use the concept of globalisation discourse to refer to the way in which globalisation has come to provide a cognitive filter, frame, conceptual lens or paradigm through which social, political and economic developments might be ordered, narrated and rendered intelligible. Moreover they suggest that policy makers acting on the basis of assumptions consistent with the hyperglobalisation thesis may well serve to bring about outcomes consistent with that thesis, irrespective of its veracity (ibid.: 5; see also Rosamond, 1999; Hay and Watson, 1999; Hay and Marsh, 2000).

Rosamond (1999: 10-15) elaborating on the literature on globalisation as a discourse, distinguishes two ways of approaching the discursive dimensions of globalisation. The first is globalisation as a discursive device to render the world manageable (for instance Hay and Rosamond, 2000). Such an approach treats globalisation as a (new) cognitive map which enables actors to make sense of the world in which they live (see also Mittelman, 2004). The second approach treats globalisation as a discourse of power associated with particular interests. This approach treats globalisation as a hegemonic project aiming at the establishment of a particular world order (for instance Gill, 1995; Hay and Watson, 1999). To do justice to the above works we need to underline here that the boundaries between these two approaches are more than blurred in most of the analyses of the above authors. This thesis stresses the interconnection of these two approaches by following a power/knowledge analysis. Through such a prism globalisation as a discourse of power and globalisation as a 'cognitive map' reflect the interaction between power and knowledge, which takes place at all the levels of human action, cognition and organisation. This interaction as mentioned above acquires its own dynamic and cannot be reduced to particular conditions and interests. That is, globalisation as a discourse of power is in fact the project of making globalisation the dominant cognitive map of thinking about, and understanding the contemporary world. Nevertheless, through its communication this project detaches itself from the particular interests that gave birth to it in the first
place. It generates a series of processes and signs, which acquire their own dynamic, leading to the redefinition of interests, argumentations, narratives and identities, even though there is no single conceptualisation or understanding of globalisation. The next section elaborates further on this Foucaultian approach to globalisation.

Globalisation Discourse: a Foucaultian Reading

The globalisation discourse in a Foucaultian approach signifies a set of practices and meanings that systematically and reflexively form the objects and processes of which they speak (see Foucault, 1992: 49)\textsuperscript{26}. Hence, globalisation discourse is not defined in terms of a privileged object, for instance neoliberal norms (ibid.: 32-37). The aim is not to reduce the phenomenon of globalisation to a single aspect of it. On the contrary the aim is to study the dispersed logic and antithetical aspects of globalisation; to study the globalisation discourse as such. This means that the unity of the globalisation discourse is not, and should not be expected to be found in a single ‘object’. Such an approach would be appropriate, if for example one studied the neoliberal economic discourse. The unity of the discourse of globalisation – in a Foucaultian approach – is the common space in which the various objects and processes of globalisation discourse ‘emerge and are continuously transformed’ (ibid.: 32). Therefore, in order to study the globalisation discourse one must focus on the condition of co-existence of these dispersed and heterogeneous objects and processes; one must focus on ‘the system that governs their division, the degree to which they depend upon one another, the way in which they interlock or exclude one another, the transformation that they undergo, and the play of their location, arrangement and replacement’ (ibid.: 34); one must focus then on what Foucault defines as the rules of formation of the discourse (ibid.: 38).

Such an approach constitutes part of the project of studying the discursive and subjective aspects of globalisation. Indeed, a number of scholars seem to agree on the

\textsuperscript{26} This paragraph applies Foucault’s approach to discourse, as developed in The Archaeology of Knowledge, to the study of globalisation discourse. In The Archaeology of Knowledge Foucault focused on the discursive formation of medicine, economics and grammar in the course of the 19\textsuperscript{th} century.
conclusion that ‘globalisation is what we make of it’ (see for instance McNamara, 1997; Scholte, 2000: 7). A Foucaultian approach extends this project by focusing on the how we make of it; how we make what globalisation is.

Globalisation in the Thesis

This thesis, based on the analysis of this Chapter, conceptualises globalisation as a hegemonic discourse, i.e. as a historical-specific social technology concerning the production and reproduction of everyday life. Thus here globalisation consists of the practices and meanings that have dominated in world politics and economics at least since the mid-1980s. Such practices include: capital account liberalisations, internationalisation of production, integration of financial markets, deregulation, flexibility policies in labour markets, tax-incentives to corporations, internet communication etc.; whereas meanings include: globalisation itself as a mental map and a way of conceptualising the international, as well as the concepts of borderless world, information society, knowledge economy, risk society, Americanisation, imperialism, individualisation, cultural annihilation and so forth.

The proposed approach allows us to study globalisation in its complexity and multiplicity, without demanding its reduction to a single process or object. It allows us to avoid developing a research project designed to fit in a narrow, a priori and externally enforced definition of globalisation. Approaching globalisation as a hegemonic discourse allows us to account for the diverse understandings that the various social actors hold about it. It lets the actors speak for themselves, and set on their own the limits and the rules of globalisation’s definition; thus allowing us to study globalisation in dynamic and reflexive terms (see for instance Rupert, 2000: 42). Approaching globalisation as a hegemonic discourse enables us to scrutinize the aforementioned common space of globalisation discourse, and illustrate its rules of formation at the national level. To return to Foucault’s terminology it enables us to study the ‘conditions of existence (but also of coexistence, maintenance, modification and disappearance)’, of the various understandings, statements, practices and policies that constitute globalisation (Foucault, 1972: 38).
This chapter has discussed the theoretical framework of the thesis, and, within this framework, introduced globalisation as our object of analysis. Chapter 2 turns to the choice of the two test-cases in which the communication of globalisation discourse will be studied, i.e. Greece and Ireland. The purpose is to offer a concise analysis on the nature of the two national contexts and the rationale of their choice. Chapters 3 and 4 then move on to the examination of the communication of globalisation discourse in these two countries.
CHAPTER 2
WHY GREECE AND IRELAND\(^1\)? THE CASE-STUDIES AND THE RATIONALE OF THEIR CHOICE

Introduction: Focused Comparisons and the Thesis

Let us begin this section by elaborating on how the proposed comparison serves the purpose of the thesis. The thesis aims to examine how countries, which belong to different politico-economic systems, vary in the way in which they communicate global hegemonic discourses. In order to do so the method of ‘focused’, and in particular, ‘paired’ comparison has been chosen. This method as its name implies is based on an intensive comparison of two (‘paired’), or three (‘triangular’), cases/countries, and the emphasis of the analysis is at least as much on the comparison per se, as on each of the different cases (Hague and Harrop, 2001: 73). As Hague and Harrop (ibid.) observe focused comparisons ‘work particularly well when a few countries are compared over time, examining how they vary in their response’ to common problems and incentives.

Beyond the appropriateness of ‘focused comparison’ for this thesis, the method has also an important function in the production of knowledge in general and in comparative studies in particular. It helps us continually to test and reconsider established assumptions, generalisations and categorisations, which exist in social and comparative studies. Paired and triangular comparisons, by being focused and intensive, attempt to offer explanations with reference to social interactions (i.e. ‘from within’), rather than with reference to pre-existing constructed models and categorisations (i.e. ‘from without’). Hence, although their starting point may be

\(^1\) Ireland includes both ‘Northern Ireland’, which is part of the UK, and the ‘Republic of Ireland’, which became independent from the UK in 1922. The use of the name ‘Ireland’ in this thesis is made for convenience and refers only to the Republic of Ireland.
based on existing assumptions and models, the dynamic of focused comparisons allow them to test and if needed to problematise these assumptions and models.

Of What Are Greece and Ireland Cases?

Keeping the chosen method in mind let us proceed to the justification of the choice of Greece and Ireland as case studies. The first issue to be addressed is the question of what Greece and Ireland are cases of. This is a rather static question, as its main point of reference is the established politico-economic models found in European comparative politics literature, i.e. the Anglo-Saxon, the Continental, the Scandinavian, and the Mediterranean. In this regard Greece is classified in the Southern European or Mediterranean model\(^2\) of polity and political economy – a model which is usually treated as a sub-category of the Continental Model\(^3\) – and Ireland is classified in the Anglo-Saxon model of polity and political economy (even if it is not the most representative case of it\(^4\)). Yet it should be noted here that these two models (i.e. the Anglo-Saxon and the Southern European) signify different things to the different disciplines of political science, and thus it is hard to draw clear and definite division lines concerning the countries included in each model. The United Kingdom and Ireland, however, represent the Anglo-Saxon tradition at the European level, whereas Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain constitute the core of Southern European model.

Two influential research projects, that have adopted a similar approach towards Greece and Ireland are as follows: First, Rhodes and Mény (1998), who classify European states in three categories/groups according to the nature of their institutional arrangements and welfare states\(^5\): the ‘Scandinavian’ (Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Norway), the ‘Germanic-continental’ (Germany, France, BENELUX, Austria, Switzerland) and the ‘Anglo-Saxon’ (UK, Ireland). Moreover they refer to

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\(^2\) This model is also referred to as ‘Latin’. See for instance Ferrera, 1998, and Therborn, 1995.

\(^3\) Referred to also as ‘Germanic’ model. See for instance Rhodes and Mény, 1998.

\(^4\) Indeed, the use of the term Anglo-Saxon for Ireland sounds rather bizarre, considering its history, culture and relationship with the UK. This issue is addressed below in this Chapter.

\(^5\) See also Esping-Andersen’s book *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism* (1990), on which Rhodes and Mény’s approach is based.
Southern Europe (Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece) as a separate variant of the ‘continental’ group (see also Ferrera, 1998). Second, Hall and Soskice (2001a) who based on a well-developed literature in comparative political economy, have argued that the industrially advanced OECD countries can be classified into three categories: (a) Organised market economies (e.g. Germany, Japan), where there is an extensive institutional support for the coordination of politico-economic agents, (b) liberal market economies (e.g. USA, UK, Ireland), where there is less institutional support available for non-market forms of coordination, and (c) a more ambiguous category often associated with Mediterranean capitalism (e.g. Italy, France, Greece).

The following paragraphs aim to present briefly the characteristics with which the Anglo-Saxon and Southern European models are associated. It is important to stress from the outset that these models do not serve explanatory purposes in this thesis, and their accuracy in describing Greek and Irish societies is not taken for granted. They are rather used as points of departure. The ‘pair comparison’ undertaken here will test their accuracy and their limits both in descriptive and analytical terms. Therefore it is important to keep in mind that the contrast of the two models that follows aims at constructing an ideal-type axis of analysis, which can be questioned and problematised by the particular case studies employed by the thesis. Finally, it should be emphasised that the various characteristics of each model are not independent from each other, but interact in complex and changing cause-and-effect relationships.

In the comparative studies literature the most frequently employed strategy is the juxtaposition of countries belonging to the Continental and the Anglo-Saxon model. By contrast countries from the Southern European model are less often used in comparisons with Anglo-Saxon or ‘orthodox’ Continental cases. Arguably, this is so mainly for two reasons: (a) the different developmental trajectory of the southern model, which makes it hard to compare countries belonging in this model with countries from the other two models, and (b) the ‘ambiguous’ (see for instance, Hall and Soskice, 2001a), or the ‘hard to classify’ character of the countries in this model. Yet the different developmental trajectory of the South European countries is an asset for research projects which seek ‘to show the robustness of a relationship by demonstrating its validity in a range of contrasting settings’ (the ‘most different research design’ according to Przeworski and Teune, 1970), or which seek to explore how does domestic context matter, in the way in which different states react to common incentives. Moreover, it can be argued that the hard to classify character of Southern European countries is rather an advantage, which increases the richness of comparative studies and verify the diversity and pluralism of European tradition in general. Hence the hard-to-classify character of the Southern model is a problem/threat only for established categorisations and dichotomies, which cannot account for these ‘ambiguous’ cases, and thus need to reduce difference to particularism.
The Anglo-Saxon model is usually associated with early democratisation. Thus, Britain and USA are the classical examples of the 'first wave' of democratisation, whereas Greece, Portugal and Spain are examples of the 'third wave' (Huntington, 1991). In such a classification Ireland would be placed in-between the first (1828-1926) and the second (1943-1962) wave of democratisation.

The Anglo-Saxon model is also associated with pluralism in the organisation of societal interests and state-society relations; whereas the Continental model is associated with 'neo-corporatism' (or 'societal' and 'liberal' corporatism), and the Southern European model with 'state corporatism' (or statism). Let us confine ourselves to the following characteristics of each category. On the one hand pluralist systems are typically associated with an individualistic social culture, and a clear separation between state and society (Cawson, 1978). Furthermore, the role of the state in these systems is confined to the arbitration of competition among the various societal groups and interests (ibid.). On the other hand, neo-corporatist systems are typically associated with a consociational social culture. State and society in these systems are in an 'institutionalised' and 'collaborationist' relationship (Schmitter, 1979), and thus the state, rather than being an arbiter, is a partner which, along with employers and employees, shapes the trajectory of socio-economic development (Lehmbrunch, 1979). Lastly, state corporatism signifies the 'from above' compulsory intervention of the state, which aims at the restriction and/or the control of the voice of societal interests, and not the creation of a 'genuine collaboration' between these interests and the state, as in the case of neo-corporatism (Schmitter, 1979). State

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7 For a classical comparison between pluralism and corporatism see Schmitter, 1979. In particular according to Schmitter 'pluralism can be defined as a system of interest representation in which the constituent units are organised into an unspecified number of multiple, voluntary, competitive, non-hierarchically ordered and self-determined (as to type or scope of interest) categories which are not specially licensed, recognised, subsidised, created or otherwise controlled in leadership selection or interest articulation by the state and which do not exercise a monopoly of representational activity within their respective categories' (ibid: 15); corporatism is defined as 'a system of interest representation in which the constituent units are organised into a limited number of singular, compulsory, non-competitive, hierarchically ordered and functionally differentiated categories, recognised or licensed (if not created) by the state and granted a deliberate representational monopoly within their respective categories in exchange for observing certain controls on the selection of leaders and articulation of demands and supports' (ibid: 13). Finally, Schmitter (based on Manoilesco, 1936) distinguishes societal corporatism from state-corporatism on the basis that in the latter organised interests 'were created by and kept as auxiliary and dependent organs of the state which founded its legitimacy and effective functioning on other bases' (ibid.: 20).
corporatism is usually associated with conditions of late-development and late-
industrialisation, such as in Southern Europe, the Balkans and Latin America⁸.

Hence the nature and the function of the state and its relationship with society, are
very different in the Anglo-Saxon and the Southern European models. In the former
the state is – or is assumed to be – a ‘Weberian’ type state; it is small and functional,
with a well-developed independent bureaucracy, where formal and transparent rules
and practices are dominating, and where meritocracy prevails over patronage and
clientelistic relationships. It is a state which is clearly separated from society, and
able to resist particularistic organised interests. Finally, it is a state which exists and
functions in interaction with a well developed civil society. In a stereotypical sense
the Southern European state is considered to be the exact opposite. The state can
hardly be described as ‘Weberian’, and it is usually (very) big and dysfunctional. In
particular, in most of the states in this model there is a tradition of a patrimonial
structure of state organisation, close to what Max Weber (1978) called ‘sultanism’.
The bureaucracy is characterised by ‘extended politicisation of the top administrative
ranks, enduring patronage patterns in recruitment for the public sector, uneven
distribution of human resources, and formalism and legalism’ (Sotiropoulos, 2004;
see also Dashwood, 1983). As a result, informal practices usually prevail over formal
rules and procedures (for the Greek case see Spanou, 1996), and clientelistic practices
and patronage infuse society into the state, and undermine ‘both the technical
capacity…and legitimacy of public administration’ (ibid.: 474; Ferrera, 1998: 87). As
Ferrera (ibid.) argues, the ‘Southern’ state ‘is largely infiltrated and easily
manipulated by organised interests (and in particular political parties)’, and it is
exactly this ‘low degree of ‘stateness’ of the Latin Systems…that isolates this family
of nations from the others in Europe’ (see also Ferrera, 1996). Therefore, society and
state were traditionally fused in the Southern model, and civil society – in its Anglo-
Saxon and Continental expression – has remained underdeveloped.

Taking into consideration this brief contrast between the Anglo-Saxon and the
Southern European models it would not be an exaggeration to argue that the two

⁸ For a comparison of the developmental trajectories of the Balkans and Latin America see Mouzelis,
1986. In addition, for a Marxist analysis of the ‘dependent development’ and ‘externally centred’
industrialisation in Portugal, Greece and Spain, see, Poulantzas, 1976.
models occupy the two extremes of a hypothetical axis concerning the role and nature of state in the political system and its relationship with society. These differences in historical experience and institutional arrangements have been the first incentive for choosing countries from these two models, despite the fact that Ireland is certainly not a classical case of the Anglo-Saxon model (see below). The following section focuses on why this specific pair of countries, i.e. Greece and Ireland, has been chosen.

**Why Greece and Ireland?**

*Limitations posed by the nature of the thesis*

There are two main constraints imposed by the very nature of the concern with the communication of the hegemonic discourse of globalisation. First, the project aims at exploring the interplay between hegemonic discourses and domestic social spheres. Yet, within the ‘international’ not all the domestic social spheres have the same place and influence. Following this rationale one could assume that the communication process of a hegemonic discourse would be more easily analysed in the case of small domestic spheres that had not played a crucial role in the generation of this discourse, rather than in the case of larger countries, where the moment in which the hegemonic discourse acquires an independent dynamic would be more difficult to be captured and studied. It was this rationale that led us to the choice of small countries.

Second, the choice of two small states within the same ‘regional block’ reduces the independent variables which are involved in the communication of a hegemonic discourse. Regional integration processes, such as the EU, NAFTA and ASEAN, constitute an important factor in the way in which countries are exposed to, and affected by global trends and incentives. They thus constitute an important intervening variable for any project on national responses to global processes. The choice of Greece and Ireland, that is of two member states of the EU, reduces the variables involved in the communication process by keeping the regional dimension ‘constant’. If the two countries were members of different regional blocks then one more independent/intervening variable would be added to the research project, and it
would be difficult to assess whether the observed differences in the communication of globalisation discourse were due to different institutional contexts or to different regional influences. The fact that the regional dimension is kept constant does not, however, mean that its effect is identical on all the member states. Moreover, the dynamic and multi-dimensional changes in the political opportunity structures within the EU member states, as well as the interplay among the local, national and regional levels and authority structures are crucial for the communication of, and reactions to, global trends and discourses. In this regard, EU regionalism constitutes a unique case, which poses high challenges for any research project focusing on the domestic/societal level, of its member states. Finally the study of the EU factor in the communication of globalisation discourse creates challenging puzzles, for the EU is both a part of, and a response to globalisation. It will indeed be interesting to see how these interwoven and intersecting realities are realised and experienced at the societal level of our case studies.

On the other hand, the choice of two EU member states places certain limitations on the theoretical implications of the findings of this project. The domestic structures of Greece and Ireland, despite their differences, both belong to a western, democratic model of polity. Different models of socio-political organisation or non-democratic regimes are not examined. Therefore the research project limits itself to the examination of discourse communication in western democratic polities. Obviously, further research needs to be done in the communication of discourses in different regimes, but such a purpose remains beyond the aspirations of this project.

_Greece and Ireland as ‘Extreme Stories’ in the EU_

The third reason for choosing Greece and Ireland is not so much related to the specific needs of the proposed research project, as to their inherent interest within the context of the European Union. Thus one could argue that on the one hand Ireland represents the most ‘successful story’ in the European Union. A country of the ‘Regional Development Fund’, with significant economic and social problems up to the mid/late 1980s, became the ‘European tiger’, succeeding in having a steadily
impressive rate of growth after 1987. The following Table demonstrates this growth
in comparison to Greece, the Euro area, and the OECD average in the 1990s.

Table 1. Growth in Real GDP in Ireland and Greece: a Comparative Perspective
(Percentage change from previous year)

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Greece</th>
<th>Ireland</th>
<th>Euro area</th>
<th>Total OECD</th>
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<tr>
<td>1990</td>
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Source: OECD

Indeed, from the ‘poorest of the rich’ in 1988 (Economist’s Survey, 1988), Ireland
became the ‘Celtic tiger’ (inter alia Gardiner, 1994: 9-21; Sweeney, 1998; O’Hearn,
1998, 2000; and for a critique Allen, 2000) and ‘Europe’s shining light’ (Economist’s
Survey, 1997) in the 1990s. Furthermore the dynamic of Irish development was not
limited in the EU-borders. It is suggestive that in the ‘Globalisation Index’ used by
the US journal Foreign Policy (published by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), Ireland was found to be the most globalised country in the world
throughout the period 2000-2002 (Foreign Policy, 2002, 2003, 2004; see also, Table
6 below). The A.T. Kearney/Foreign Policy ‘Globalisation Index’ (GI) was used for the first time in 2001. The GI does not include all the countries of the world. However, the 62 countries ranked, account approximately for 95% of the world’s GDP and 84% of the world’s population (see, Foreign Policy, 2004: 58). In terms of research methodology the Index uses 14 variables grouped in four baskets, in order to measure the degree of openness/globalisation. These are as follows: (a) Economic Integration: trade, FDI, portfolio capital flows, investment income; (b) Personal Income: international travel and tourism, international telephone traffic, remittances and personal transfers; (c) Technological Connectivity: Internet users, internet hosts, secure servers; (d) Political Engagement: memberships in international organizations, personnel and financial contributions to UN Security Council missions,
The striking integration of Ireland in the structures of international economy in the 1990s, is also evident from the following economic indicators (Tables 2 - 4).

Table 2. Foreign Balance Contributions to Changes in Real GDP:
Greece and Ireland in a Comparative Perspective
(As a per cent of real GDP in the previous period, seasonally adjusted at annual rates)

Table 2 shows how payments from abroad (including the price of exports, and the inflows of capital and gold) contributed to Ireland’s GDP in comparison to Greece, and the EU and OECD average.

Source: OECD.

international treaties ratified, governmental transfers (ibid.). Notwithstanding its potential flaws, the variety of variables used in the Index makes it a good general indicator of state openness and global engagement. For criticisms that have been made of the A.T. Kearney/Foreign Policy ‘Globalisation Index’, see Kudrle, 2004 and Lockwood, 2004.

Another ‘Globalisation Index’ with a growing impact in the literature of globalisation is this of the ‘Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation (CSGR)’ of the University of Warwick (see its webpage ‘The CSGR Globalisation Index’ at: http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/csgr/index). For this Index, Ireland was the most globalised country in economic terms (economic ranking), and the second most globalised country in economic, social and political terms (overall marking), throughout the period 1998-2001 (see Lockwood and Redoano, 2005).
Table 3. Foreign Direct Investment Intensity:
Greece and Ireland in a Comparative Perspective
(Average value of inward and outward FDI flows divided by GDP, multiplied by 100)

According to Eurostat this index measures the intensity of investment integration within the international economy.

Source: Eurostat

Table 4. Trade Integration of Services: Greece and Ireland in a Comparative Perspective
(Average value of imports and exports of services divided by GDP, multiplied by 100)

According to Eurostat when this index increases over time it means a country is becoming more integrated within the international economy.

Source: Eurostat
On the other hand it can be said that Greece in general represents the least ‘successful story’ in the European Union. A country of the ‘Regional Development Fund’ as well, and a country which entered the EU in a rather better economic condition than Portugal and Spain, its Southern European counterparts, it was the only EU member state which, although it did not opt-out, did not manage to fulfil the criteria and participate in the first wave of countries that entered into the third and final stage of the Economic and Monetary Union (i.e. Euro-zone) on January 1, 1999. Moreover, according to the Eurostat, at least up to 2001 it remained the country with the poorest living standards in the EU. The following Table is suggestive of Greece’s performance in the EU in comparison with Portugal, Spain and Ireland.

**Table 5. Per Capita GDP of Selected European Countries as % of the EU average**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Greece</th>
<th>Portugal</th>
<th>Spain</th>
<th>Ireland</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td>1986</td>
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<tr>
<td>1990</td>
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<tr>
<td>1995</td>
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</tbody>
</table>


It is also suggestive that in terms of the above-mentioned *Foreign Policy* ‘Globalisation Index’, Greece was at the bottom of the EU countries ranked, throughout the period 1999-2002 (Table 6).

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13 Greece managed to join the euro-zone two years later, on January 1, 2001.
Table 6: The *Foreign Policy* ‘Globalisation Index’ – Selected EU Member States

Ranking rate: Absolute numbers, from 1 (the most globalised country of the Index) to 62 (the least globalised country of the Index).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Ireland</th>
<th>Spain</th>
<th>Finland</th>
<th>Austria</th>
<th>Greece</th>
<th>EU-GI average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2000</td>
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<td>2001</td>
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<tr>
<td>2002</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The table is based on data from various *Foreign Policy – Globalisation Indexes* (see *Foreign Policy*, 2002, 2003, 2004).

NOTE: EU-GI average includes Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the UK.

It would also be interesting to use the ‘Globalisation Index’ in order to compare three indicators of economic globalisation in Greece and Ireland, in the year 2001 (Table 7).
Table 7: Measuring Economic Globalisation in Greece and Ireland in 2001

The numbers indicate the position of the countries in the various categories of the ‘Globalisation Index’. The rankings are from 1 to 62, whereas 1 indicates the most globalised country and 62 the least globalised.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Trade</th>
<th>Foreign Direct Investments</th>
<th>Portfolio Capital Flows</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The Table is based on the *Foreign Policy* Globalisation Index (see *Foreign Policy*, 2003).

From the above Table we see that from the 62 countries that were ranked in the *Foreign Policy* Globalisation Index, for the year 2001, Ireland was in the third best position in terms of trade and FDIs, and in the first position in terms of portfolio investments, whereas Greece along with Italy were significantly low in the ranking, especially with regard to trade and FDIs.

This poor economic performance combined with an ‘idiosyncratic’ foreign policy during the 1980s generated a negative image of Greece in the European press. As a result, during the late 1980s and early 1990s, Greece was widely considered to be ‘an awkward partner or indeed a black sheep in the European Union’ (Tsoukalis, 1999).

To sum up, considering the above, one can indeed refer to Greece and Ireland as two ‘extreme stories’ within the EU, i.e. ‘Europe’s shining light’ on the one hand, and the ‘last to join the euro’ on the other. Yet, this is not the only way to approach the developmental trajectories of the two countries. In the following sections another approach is offered, which constitutes the fourth reason for choosing Greece and Ireland as our case studies.
The argument put forward here is as follows. One of the characteristics of Greece and Ireland — at least up to the mid/end 1980s — has been the strongly 'traditional' character of their societies (for Ireland see, Coacley, 1999b; for Greece see Diamandouros, 1994; Tsoukalas, 1993a). The term ‘traditional’ is used here as opposite to the term ‘reflexive’. Put crudely a traditional society is one that does not deeply question and/or re-examine its beliefs and practices. Identities, national interests and the boundaries of the community are clearly defined, and the way to pursue or protect them is beyond discussion and reflection. It can be argued that since the late 1980s both Greece and Ireland have entered a stage in their history characterised by intensive self-reflection and the re-examination of traditionally well-rooted social beliefs and practices. Put sociologically and abstractly, they have entered into a period in which the eternal struggle and balance between social structures and agency has become weighted in favour of agency. Such a reading of the modern social change in Greece and Ireland is compatible with Anthony Giddens’s conceptualisation of reflexive modernisation14. It is also a reading which focuses not only on the level of individuals but also on that of society as a whole. It refers to a re-examination and re-evaluation of beliefs and practices at the level of collective intentionality. It refers to a re-examination of the boundaries and nature of the political community and to a reshuffle of the societal forces that struggle to structure the content of collective intentionality15. I would argue that two broad developments played a crucial role in this process of self-reflection in Greece and Ireland.

First, is the accession to the European Community. The ‘project EC/EU’ has had a crucial role in enhancing the aforementioned dynamics in the two societies. Indeed

14 Giddens (1990: 38, 1991, 1995) argues that in late-modern societies ‘social practices are constantly examined in the light of incoming information about those very practices, thus constitutively altering their character’.

15 For the concept of ‘collective intentionality’ see Searle, 1995: 24-26. In particular Searle argues: ‘The crucial element in collective intentionality is a sense of doing (wanting, believing, etc.) something together, and the individual intentionality that each person has is derived from the collective intentionality that they share. Thus, to go back to the earlier example of the football game, I do indeed have a singular intention to block the defensive end, but I have that intention only as part of our collective intention to execute a pass play’ (ibid.: 24-25).
change in modern Greek and Irish polities – along with all the other EU member states – can hardly be studied and understood if the impact of European integration and Europeanisation, as an explanatory factor for change in these polities, is neglected\textsuperscript{16}. Along these lines it can be argued that in the case of Ireland, the European Community constituted and incarnated an alternative to the dependency on the UK (see also Coakley, 1999b: 47; Garvin, 2000, O’ Donnell, 2000: 162-166); and Ireland seized the opportunity and found itself in a position to confront its own (new European) future. In the case of Greece, the European community incarnated a much needed deus ex machina for the ‘reformist social forces’ (Diamandouros, 1994), and a much needed injection of confidence which led Greece to face its well-rooted national insecurities (mainly on the side of Greek-Turkish relations)\textsuperscript{17}. The Greek-Turkish rapprochement since the late 1990s should rather be interpreted through such a framework.

The second factor behind the reflexive turn of the two societies refers to a significant – both in real and symbolic terms – disruption between, on the one hand the socio-economic past, and the perceptions that accompanied it, and on the other the socio-economic present and the experiences and images it generates. In the case of Ireland, the ‘country of the famine’\textsuperscript{18} and the ‘poorest of the rich’\textsuperscript{19}, experienced an economic miracle. Professor Walsh (2000) chose the title ‘From Rags to Riches’ to describe this development. In any case it is hardly disputable that this economic boom has

\textsuperscript{16} For this point, see the contributions in Goetz and Hix, 2001. In their introduction the editors note: ‘In the main theories of integration, domestic politics is a central explanatory factor of the integration process...Much less effort has gone into thinking about the reverse effect: European integration as an explanatory factor in domestic political continuity or change’ (Goetz and Hix, 2001a: 1).

\textsuperscript{17} In this context Professor Tsoukalis makes a comparison between the Finnish and Greek experiences of EU membership. ‘For Finland, membership of the EU has opened a window to the rest of the world while also providing some kind of a security umbrella for the country in an awkward neighbourhood....there is no doubt that EU membership is perceived by many Greeks as a means of strengthening their national security’ (Tsoukalis, 2001: 125). For a discussion of the effect of Europeanisation on Greece see Ioakimidis, 1996, 2001; Featherstone, 1998, 1998a; Lavdas, 1997; Kazakos, 1999; Mitsos and Mossialos, 2000: parts III and IV, and Pagoulatos, 2001, 2003. More general studies on the Greece-EU relationship include: Kazakos and Ioakimidis, 1994; Dimitrakopoulos and Passas, 2003.

\textsuperscript{18} The 19th century famine in Ireland has been one of the most formative experiences in the development of the modern Irish identity. The failure of the potato crop for successive years, in a population almost dependent for its diet on the potato, led to a major famine which lasted from 1845 to 1851. According to estimations, in a total population of six to eight millions, one million people died of starvation and one and a half million emigrated abroad, mainly to Britain and the USA. Irish considered Britain as partly responsible for the famine (Collins and Cradden, 2001: 2-3; Finnegan and McCarron, 2000: 31-41).

\textsuperscript{19} For the historically poor Irish economic performance see also, Barry, 1999, 2003.
been changing the way in which Irish people think of themselves. Moreover the 'miracle' in conjunction with other characteristics of Ireland, such as the EU membership and the use of English language, turned the country into an attractive location for foreign direct investments (FDI). This FDI trend was epitomised by the announcement of the agreement reached between the Irish government and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), that the European Headquarters of the MIT Media Lab research centre would be located in Dublin (see MITnews, Dec. 3, 1999). Lastly and maybe more importantly for the aforementioned reflexive change of Irish self-conceptualisation, was the shift of Irish society from a traditional emigration profile to that of immigration in the 1990s. Thus Ireland for the first time in its modern history experienced the growth of sizeable immigrant communities (see, Mac Einri, 2001). One cannot downgrade the impact of this changing economic and social geography of Ireland on the self-perception of its population. Furthermore, it would not be an exaggeration to argue that such a development put Irish society in a position to mirror and redefine itself, through the 'new foreigners'.

On the other hand, one can observe a similar disruption between the socio-economic past and present in the Greek case. Greece did not experience an economic miracle as Ireland has done. Nevertheless, the economic policies that took place during the

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20 See O’ Connor, 2001. Of course FDIs are both a cause and an effect of the economic boom. For this relationship see Walsh, 2000: 118-120. For the argument that the economic boom was merely due to a huge flow of US investments see Allen, 2000: 21-29.

21 The following table is indeed indicative of the change in migration that took place in Ireland, in the 1990s:

**Migration in Ireland**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Emigrants</th>
<th>Immigrants</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>1990</td>
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<tr>
<td>2002</td>
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Source: Central Statistics Office, 2002

22 For the reflexive re-articulation of Irish identity see also Tonra, 2000. Tonra links changes in Irish foreign policy to changing conceptions of Irish identity.
1990s have managed to correct many of the chronic structural imbalances of the Greek economy, and to bring both high growth rates and stability; developments that generated positive reports in foreign media and international economic institutions. This U-turn in macroeconomic figures and policies was epitomised by the entrance of Greece into the euro-zone in January 2001. These developments enhanced the confidence of Greek society, and problematised many traditional negative self-images. Moreover the new economic and political geography of the Balkan region and the significant role of Greece within it, constituted an important factor in the reflexive redefinition of Greek self-understanding. In particular Greece emerged as (i) a point of entrance to Balkan markets for foreign FDI, (ii) a significant FDI home-country itself, and (iii) a stabilisation force in the region. Finally and again most interestingly, Greek society has also shifted during the 1990s from a traditionally emigration society, to one of immigration, experiencing for the first time in its post-war history sizeable immigrant and economic refugee communities (Clogg, 2003). This phenomenon, as has been argued for the Irish case, led Greek society to look into the mirror and to reflect on its past and future (see also, Diamandouros, 2001).

The above discussion demonstrates that the drive towards the reinvention and redefinition of the boundaries of community and the content of national identity, that has been taking place in Greek and Irish societies during the last decades, was not and could not be independent from changes in the ‘material context’ (brought mainly by the EU support). Indeed, these two sets of factors (i.e. the ‘material context’ and the ‘psychological realm’) need to be addressed and studied together in order to understand the dynamics of the reflexive societal change in the two countries.

The next section aims to contextualise further the parallel politico-economic trajectories of Greece and Ireland. It focuses on key developments that exemplify why the early 1990s should be considered a turning point for the two countries.

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25 In the same context Diamandouros (2001: 72) notes: ‘Greek society has until very recently thought of itself as a country of emigrants. It is a society and a country whose literature, whose poetry, whose folklore resonates with the notion of nostalgia, of emigration, of the desire to return. Objectively speaking, all of these things are, in fact, things of the past’. 

83
The U-Turn of the early 1990s

There are at least two reasons why the early 1990s should be considered as a U-turn in the history of Greece and Ireland. One already mentioned refers to a positive disruption in their socio-economic development. The second has to do with a change in the nature of their political systems.

Until the 1990s both countries had experienced a long period of unfortunate economic experimentation and mismanagement. In the case of Ireland one can observe 'the continuation of protectionism into the late 1950s' and an 'irresponsible fiscal experimentation in the late 1970s' (Walsh, 2000: 121); policies that resulted in a deep economic crisis in 1980s. It is also worth mentioning that according to surveys, during the period 1979-1983 the Greeks and the Irish were prominent among the peoples of the EU in their support for 'classic economic policies of the left' (Coackley, 1999b: 60).

The turning point for Ireland may be put in the second half of 1980s, when the tripartite approach to national socio-economic development was revived – in a much wider basis and agenda – through the National Economic and Social Council (NESC). As Gary Murphy notes the NESC's Strategy for Development agreed in 1986 formed the basis upon which the new Programme for National Recovery was negotiated by the social partners in 1987 (see Murphy, 1999: 274-277). From this point onwards an impressively successful model of consociational socio-economic governance has been functioning in Ireland.

In Greece on the other hand, protectionism with irresponsibly expansionist fiscal policies, was followed up to the end of 1980s, with a small stabilisation parenthesis in 1985-87. (see, Katseli, 1990; Kazakos 1992; Alogoskoufis, 1995). The last years of the 1980s were indeed very formative for the modern Greek politico-economic system. From an economic point of view, a series of events brought the country to the brink of economic disaster. The government of PASOK (elected in 1984)

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26 Some analysts put the turning point in 1994. See Murphy, 1999.
abandoned its 1985-87 economic stabilisation programme and, in a pre-electoral climate, adopted an expansionary economic policy. The two coalition governments that followed (see below), not only failed to reverse the rapid deterioration of macroeconomic indicators but also contributed to the increase of government deficits. When the centre-right party New Democracy came into power in April 1990 the Greek economy was undergoing its most severe economic crisis since 1974, the date of birth of the fourth Greek Republic. Nevertheless the governmental change of the 1990 can be considered a turning point in the modern Greek politico-economic history. It signified, a shift from statist to deregulation/liberalisation oriented policies and discourses (i.e. privatisation, competition, integration into the European and global market); thus signifying a shift in the dominant economic paradigm (Kazakos, 1992a)\textsuperscript{27}. It was a moment of transition in which an expansionist and purely clientelistic state, started to be transformed into a stabilisation (Pagoulatos, 2001) and a modernisation state.

The beginning of the 1990s can also be considered a turning point for the nature and function of the Greek and Irish political systems. In the case of Greece the turn from the 1980s to the 1990s was marked by the formation of two – if short-lived – unprecedented coalition governments. After eight years in government, the socialist party PASOK was replaced in power in 1989 by a previously unthinkable coalition government, consisting of the centre-right New Democracy (ND) party and Synaspismos, a coalition of the Communist and other left parties. After five months in office (June-October, 1989), this coalition government was replaced by another, consisting of all three major Greek parties (ND, PASOK and Synaspismos). This all-party government was headed by a widely respected Professor of Economics, Xenophon Zolotas, and also lasted only five months. It was finally replaced by a weak ND government in April 1990\textsuperscript{28}. These successive coalition governments marked a historical departure from well-established political cleavages in the Greek

\textsuperscript{27} Kazakos (1992a) argues that elements of the new paradigm were already in place after the second half of the 1980s. On the same issue Ioakimidis (1996: 41) notes: 'Only in the years 1992-93, under the ND government, did privatisation (apokratikopiisti) policy appear to be pursued as a clear political preference'.

\textsuperscript{28} For these coalition governments see Pridham and Verney, 1991. The new ND government was based on a coalition of ND with an independently elected MP.
political scene\textsuperscript{29}; thus constituting the epitome of Greece's democratic consolidation (Pridham and Verney, 1991). Moreover, these coalitions played a significant role in the decline of the traditionally intensive polarisation of Greek politics (Pridham and Verney, 1991; Pappas, 2001)\textsuperscript{30}; a development that led to an enhancement of the base and role of civil society in the Greek political life.

During the same period, Ireland experienced an equivalent transition in its political system. The turn from the 1980s to the 1990s signified the end of a long standing, polarised pattern in Irish politics (that lasted from 1948 to 1989): the 'Fianna Fail versus the rest' system (Mair, 1999). During this period Fianna Fail was the only party which was in a position to form, and did form, single-party majority governments; whereas Fine Gael and the Labour Party often had to choose between forming a coalition in order to come to power, or stay in opposition. This system came to an end in 1989, when Fianna Fail, in order to form a government, entered a coalition with the Progressive Democrats\textsuperscript{31}. The years that followed 1989 were indeed formative for Irish political life. In the elections of 1992 a traditionally unthinkable coalition government was formed from Fianna Fail and the Labour Party. In 1994, however, the Labour Party left the government and returned to its 'historical ally', Fine Gael. Thus a new government was formed by Fine Gael and the Labour Party, without general elections being held. Taking into consideration the above, 1989 was indeed a landmark in Irish politics. It gave birth to a 'new politics of coalition-making', initiating a new, compromising style of party politics (Mair, 1999: 148).

\textsuperscript{29} The period after the collapse of the colonels' regime in Greece and up to the PASOK's rise to power, that is 1974-1981, is characterised by an intensive and remarkably successful democratisation and modernisation process. Nevertheless this process had also its 'darker side', the main characteristics of which were the 'anticommunist' and socially exclusive state strategies, which had created deep cleavages in the Greek political scene (Diamandouros, 1997). It was to these ideological cleavages and hatreds that the coalition governments of 1989/90 put at rest.

\textsuperscript{30} Pappas (2001) argues that the reason for the decline of the polarisation in Greek politics is to be found in the 'new party system' which emerged after the 1981 elections.

\textsuperscript{31} Progressive Democrats 'had initially resulted from a division within Fianna Fail over its policies in relation to Northern Ireland, but quickly won support from elements in both major parties [Fianna Fail and Fine Gael] on the basis of its essentially conservative economic policies and liberal stance on 'moral' issues' (Mair, 1999: 141).
As the elections of 1997 and 2002 demonstrated\textsuperscript{32}, the era of single-party governments (and voting behaviour) in Ireland may be over\textsuperscript{33}.

Here, one should also mention the different electoral systems of the two countries. The electoral system used in Ireland is proportional representation by means of the single transferable vote (PR-STV) (see Sinnott, 1999), whereas the Greek electoral system is one of reinforced proportional representation. It can be argued that the main difference between the two systems is that the PR-STV in Ireland facilitates proportional representation in the Dail, and therefore creates a greater potential for coalition governments, whereas the Greek electoral system encourages and enhances the formation of single-party majority governments. However, a comprehensive examination of the political consequences of the two systems (in terms of political stability, party discipline, proliferation of parties' formation, elections of independent candidates etc.) is beyond our purposes here; and in any case generalisations on the effects of the two systems are very difficult to make without consideration of the different socio-political histories, contexts and cultures\textsuperscript{34}.

To sum up, the above analysis suggests a 'parallel lives' conceptualisation of the modern Greek and Irish politico-economic systems, and constitutes a further reason why this particular pair of countries makes an interesting comparison.

The next section focuses on the last factor that determined the selection of case studies; the fact that Greece and Ireland have similar political systems but significantly different political economies. The term political system is narrowly used here to refer to the 'triangle' of presidency-government-parliament. The term political economy, on the other hand, is also narrowly used to refer to the level of formal or informal institutionalisation of the interactions between the government, the employers and the employees, including other organised interests that belong to civil society. Both the nature of the political system and the political economy are crucial

\textsuperscript{32} Both elections led to a coalition government between Fianna Fail and Progressive Democrats. Furthermore, one of the characteristics of the 2002 elections was the considerable increase of the power of small parties (Green Party and Sinn Fein).

\textsuperscript{33} Marsh and O'Malley (1999: 425) referring to the 1997 elections note: 'In fact, Fianna Fail lost one seat to the Labour party. It did not manage to convince the electorate that there would be advantage in making government less dependent on independents for parliamentary majority'.

\textsuperscript{34} With regard to the PR-STV see the analysis of Sinnott, 1999.
for the purposes of this thesis, because they add important information about the power basis of the national public discourses, i.e. about the institutional structures which determine the formation of Greek and Irish public discourses. Finally, a number of similarities between the Greek and Irish (civil) societies are also examined.

**Political System, Political Economy, Society**

By way of introduction it is worth noticing that both the Greek and Irish republics are based on and function according to their written constitutions. ‘The Constitution of Greece’ (‘To Σύνταγμα της Ελλάδας’) was enacted in 1975 and was last revised in 2001, whereas the ‘Constitution of Ireland’ (‘Bunreacht na hÉireann’) was enacted in 1937 and its last amendment took place in 1999. The form of government in both Greece and Ireland is that of a *parliamentary republic*[^35], and the Constitutions of both countries recognise *popular sovereignty* as the basis and the source of all powers[^36]. In the following paragraphs we attempt a brief outline of the balance of power among the institutions of presidency, government and parliament in the two countries.

**Political System: The Triangle of President – Government and Prime Minister – Parliament**

Democratic regimes are usually classified according to the constitutionally prescribed balance of power between the presidency, the government/prime minister and the Parliament. In this regard both the Greek and Irish political systems are highly centralised, and are characterised by a *critical concentration of power* in the hands of the prime-minister[^37]. The Presidency in both systems performs a rather symbolic

[^35]: Article 1.1 in the Greek constitution. The Irish constitution lacks an explicit statement about the ‘form of government’.
[^36]: For the Greek case: Article 1 para. 2 & 3; for the Irish: Article 6. The two constitutions differ considerably in the way in which they can be revised. In the Irish case, in order any provision of the constitution to be amended, a referendum has to be held (Articles 46 and 47.1). In the Greek case on the other hand, a special two-stage amendment procedure is prescribed (Article 110), in which amendments can be made by a special parliamentary majority (of three-fifths).
[^37]: For the Irish case see Elgie, 1999; Connolly and O’Halpin, 1999; Ward, 1994; O’Leary, 1991. For the Greek case see Alivizatos, 1993. Moreover, King (1994) classifies Greece and Ireland in the six western European states with the most ‘influential’ heads of government.
function, and the Parliament is too government-dependent to act as counter-balancer. Let us consider these issues in some depth.

The Greek ‘President of the Republic’ and the ‘President of Ireland’ (‘Uachtaran na hEireann’) are constitutionally the supreme figures in their polities, but their role and powers are more symbolic than real. In the Greek case the President of the Republic is elected with a special majority by the parliament (Article 32), and is constitutionally responsible for the ‘function of the institutions of the Republic’ (Article 30.1). The powers of the Greek President were curtailed by the constitutional amendment of 1986, when all the actual powers of the President were transferred to the parliamentary majority, and in real terms to the prime minister (Alivizatos, 1993: 68). Yet, it should be mentioned that depending on the person in office, the influence of the institution to the public discourse vary. The case of the President of Ireland is similar. The latter, even though s/he is elected by a direct vote (Article 12.2.1) and according to the constitution takes precedence over all other persons in Ireland (Article 12.1), has no decisive power in the Irish political system (Elgie, 1999). As in the Greek case, the person in office may make a difference in the influence that the institution of presidency exercises on the public discourse, but again this function is/can be confined and/or controlled by the government (see Article 13.7). Hence the Presidency in both Greece and Ireland lacks the constitutional means to act as a counterbalance to the powers of prime minister. The same applies to the Greek and Irish Parliaments, on which the following paragraph focuses.

Ireland’s parliament (‘Oireachtas’) is bicameral. It consists of a directly elected House of Representatives, called the Dail, and an indirectly elected Senate, called the Seanad (Article 15.2). The Greek parliament on the contrary is a unicameral one and is called the Vouli. This difference in the two systems, however, should rather be treated as a difference in form and not in substance, in so far as both parliaments are characterised by their inability to exercise any independent or significant control on

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38 See Articles 30-50 of the Greek constitution.
39 See Articles 12-14 of the Irish constitution.
40 See Articles 15-27 of the Irish constitution.
41 See Articles 51-80 of the Greek constitution.
42 Considering the limited role and power of Seanad in Irish politics, the focus of our analysis is on Dail (see, Gallagher, 1999).
their governments. There are two main reasons for this. First, is the fact that both the Dail and Vouli are *party-dominated* (Gallagher, 1999: 178-179; Alivizatos, 1993: 70). This, along with the high degree of party discipline that is found in both Greek and Irish political systems\(^{43}\), reduces significantly any possibilities for an independent role by the parliaments. Second, is the fact that government and parliament cannot in real terms be considered as separate bodies, in a ‘check and balance’ relationship. As Gallagher (1999: 178) notes for the Irish case, ‘it is more realistic to see parliament as wielding power *through* the government that it has elected than to see it as seeking to *check* a government that has come into being independently of it’. This also describes the Greek case. Moreover, in the latter the existence of majoritarian single-party governments reduces even further the possibilities of an independent role by the Vouli\(^{44}\). Therefore even if the parliaments under examination are not only forums of party confrontation (i.e. talking parliaments) (Alivizatos, 1993), or even if they are not limited to legitimising legislation rather than making it (Gallagher, 1999), they certainly lack the power effectively to counter-balance the role and powers of their governments. As a result, the power in the political systems of both countries is concentrated in the government and in particular in the person of the prime minister.

It can be argued that the all-powerful role of the prime minister\(^{45}\) constitutes the single most important common characteristic of the Greek and Irish political systems\(^{46}\). In both cases the prime minister is solely responsible for the formation and composition of the government and the cabinet, and for the policymaking process. S/he is the one who set the agenda for the government and thus for the parliament too, and who supervises and evaluates the policy implementation, and the performance of the various ministries\(^{47}\). It can be argued that the only real constraints on the powers of the prime minister in both systems come from internal party politics\(^{48}\) (see, ibid.: 238-245). Nevertheless, the latter do not cancel out the high and constitutionally

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\(^{43}\) For the Greek case see Alivizatos, 1993: 70. For the Irish case see, Gallagher, 1999: 179; Sinnott, 1999: 116-117.

\(^{44}\) It should however be mentioned here that the decline in the ability of parliaments to control executive is a common characteristic of most EC/EU states since 1950s (see Raunio and Hix, 2001).

\(^{45}\) In Ireland the prime minister is called Taoiseach (Article, 28.5).

\(^{46}\) It must also be noted here that the prime ministers in both systems are both head of governments and head of their parties.

\(^{47}\) It is also in her/his responsibilities to appoint the Attorney General who, in the Irish case, has also a seat at the cabinet (Elgie, 1999: 238).

\(^{48}\) In the Irish case one could also register the increasing importance of ‘coalition politics’.
prescribed centralisation of Greek and Irish political systems. These characteristics have justified the term ‘prime ministerial government’ for the Irish political system (Elgie, 1999), which surely also describes the Greek case. Finally, it can be noted that this centralisation of power in the person of the prime minister produces highly personalised electoral campaigns\textsuperscript{49}.

Up to this point the similarity of the political systems in Greece and Ireland have been outlined. The next section juxtaposes this similarity, with the difference in the political economies of the two countries. If the study of the formal political institutions gives us an idea about the nature of the state (narrowly defined), the study of political economy gives us an idea about the nature of state-society relationships.

**Political Economy**

The contemporary Irish political economy and the related structure of interest representation are characterised by a high degree of institutionalization. The latter is expressed through: (i) the institution of social partnership, i.e. the institutionalised cooperation among the government, the employers and the employees, and (ii) the role and function of the National Economic and Social Council (NESC), i.e. the tripartite consultative body, which set the strategic goals and delineates the parameters for the negotiations among the social partners. Since the revival of the social partnership in 1987 ‘five three-year pacts have been agreed\textsuperscript{50}, each building on the success of the previous and attempting more ambitious targets for economic growth; investment in education and health care; social inclusion and action to promote enterprise and employment...’, as one reads on the Irish Congress of Trade Unions’ official website\textsuperscript{51}. Thus, the social partnership has evolved as the most distinctive

\textsuperscript{49} For the Irish case see Elgie, 1999.

\textsuperscript{50} These pacts are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Programme</th>
<th>Period</th>
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<tr>
<td>Programme for National Recovery (PNR)</td>
<td>1987-1990</td>
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<tr>
<td>Programme for Economic and Social Progress (PESP)</td>
<td>1990-1993</td>
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<td>Programme for Competitiveness and Work (PCW)</td>
<td>1994-1996</td>
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<td>Partnership 2000</td>
<td>1997-2000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Programme for Prosperity and Fairness (PPF)</td>
<td>2000-2003</td>
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\textsuperscript{51} http://www.ictu.ie/ (28/05/2002).
characteristic of Irish political economy during the last approximately fifteen years, and many analysts contend that it is the successful functioning of this partnership that has led to and sustains the Irish economic miracle\(^5\) (see O'Donnell and O'Reardon, 2000). In this context the social partnership and NESC can be seen as the central institutions of politico-economic governance, in which state and society meet, discuss, co-programme and co-decide. The range of civil society organisations that participate in the meetings of social partnership is indeed impressive and best demonstrates the highly consociational nature of the Irish political economy. For instance in the Partnership 2000 (the agreement reached by social partners in 1997) these organisations included: The Irish National Organisation of the Unemployed, the Conference of Religious in Ireland, the National Women's Council, The National Youth Council of Ireland, the Society of St. Vincent de Paul, Protestant Aid and the Community Platform (see, Murphy, 1999: 276-277). In the next agreement of the partnership, the Programme for Prosperity and Fairness, the number of these organisations reached approximately 35 (Hardiman, 2000: 302). It is also important to underline that many of these organisations of the voluntary and community sector not only participate in the negotiations of the social partnership but also (since 1998) in the meetings of the NESC (ibid.: 303). In this regard Ireland is a striking exception from the Anglo-Saxon model in which such centralised and consensual mechanisms are unthinkable (see also below).

On the other hand, the Greek political economy is characterised by a considerably low degree of institutionalisation and centralisation. The fusion of state and society, a defining characteristic of the Mediterranean model, is also explicit in the Greek case. For instance, the Greek employee unions are not fully independent from the state, and until recently at least, could hardly be considered as organisations belonging to civil society. Yet, this dependency did not lead, as one might expect, to the control of organised interests by the state. It rather led to a fragmented bargaining system characterised by the antagonistic action of political factions, which had as a result the generation of 'particularistic demands', based on a strong 'guild mentality'

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\(^5\) This view is also held by Peter Cassells (personal interview, 27-06-2002). Peter Cassells is Chairman of Forfás (National Policy and Advisory Board for Enterprise, Trade, Science, Technology & Innovation), Executive Chairperson of the National Centre for Partnership and Performance, and former General Secretary of ICTU (1987-1999). He was personally involved in all the negotiations for partnership agreements, since 1987.
(Mavrogordatos, 1993: 61-63; see also Lavdas, 1997\textsuperscript{53}). As analysed below, this has also been a dominant characteristic of the Irish political economy; at least up to the end of the 1980s, when the revival of the institution of social partnership acquired an unprecedented dynamism. In the Greek case various attempts have been made since 1990 to develop an independent and viable social partnership on the basis of the neo-corporatist model (see, Ioannou, 1999; Kioukias, 1997). Most importantly, in 1994 an ‘Economic and Social Council’ was created by law (2232/1994) in order to provide the institutional framework for the development of a social partnership. Nevertheless the PASOK government that created the Council in 1994 decided to follow the ad hoc model of a ‘National Social Dialogue’ in 1997 (Ioannou, 1999). Furthermore, a provision in the constitutional amendment of 2001, describing the Council as an instrument of social dialogue, aimed to enhance its institutional role. Yet its impact has not been – at least yet – significant. Therefore in contrast to the well-institutionalised social partnership in Ireland, the Greek political economy is characterised by under-institutionalisation and increased – even if diminishing – party domination in the representation of organised interests.

This contrast between the Greek and Irish political economies increases the interest of their comparison in terms of discourse communication. Although both countries have highly centralised political systems (that are characterised by the concentration of power in the person of prime minister), they differ considerably in the organisation of their political economies. Ireland has a highly institutionalised and consensual social partnership, in which ‘actors’ energies are focused on agreeing amongst themselves and on then persuading their own constituencies that the agreement is acceptable’, as Schmidt (2001; see also 2000) would characterise it. On the contrary, the Greek political economy is highly fragmented, with the result that global trends and discourses are not mediated by any thick consociational interest structure.

\textsuperscript{53} Mavrogordatos (1988, 1993) and Lavdas (1997) adopt different approaches in the definition of the Greek interest intermediation system. Mavrogordatos argues that the Greek system is a characteristic case of ‘state corporatism’. Lavdas, adopting a more qualified approach, argues that although state corporatist elements have historically been present at various sectoral levels of the economy, the institutional character of the Greek interest intermediation system as a whole, is closer to what could be termed ‘disjointed corporatism’.
From Political Economy to Civil Society and Society

The preceding discussion of political economies of Ireland and Greece may be an interesting point of entry to a discussion about the limits of a ‘models approach’ (i.e. Anglo-Saxon vs. South-European) to capturing the societal reality of the two countries.

Let us start by contextualising the consociational base of the Irish political economy. The emergence of this base, which is unknown to the Anglo-Saxon model, is relatively new. For instance, before the late 1980s, although ICTU may have been able to veto industrial relations reforms, its ability to propose and bring about policy changes was limited (Hardiman, 1988: 207). It can be argued that the consociational base of Irish political economy was born out of the severe economic crisis that Ireland was facing at the time. Indeed, according to Peter Cassells, a key person in the transformation process54, the institution of social partnership as it functions today, and the economic miracle, would never have emerged if economic disaster had not been so close.55

Yet, the divergence of Irish political economy from the ideal type of the Anglo-Saxon model is not a phenomenon of the 1980s. Ireland had never had, contrary to the Anglo-Saxon model, a non-party dominated public policy-making process, and an independent civil service (Hardiman, 1988: 205-206). Moreover, Irish political life has traditionally been characterised by ‘pervasive localism’ and clientelistic relations and, as Hardiman says, rather than mediating, governments were trying to accommodate all these diverse societal interests (Hardiman, 1988: 198-203). Hence, it can be argued that the Irish political economy up (at least) to the beginning of the 1990s was characterised by fragmentation, and was dominated by particularistic

54 As mentioned above, Peter Cassells was involved as Secretary General of ICTU in the negotiations of all the national agreements for the period 1987-1999.
55 Personal interview with Peter Cassells, 27-06-2002. In this regard O'Clery's (1986: 215-6, quoted in Hardiman, 2000: footnote 4) writes: ‘Gay Byrne, in an interview in 1986 with Hot Press magazine, as Ireland’s most popular broadcaster, said ‘[Ireland] is banjaxed and washed out...a man...stood up in the audience at the Late Late Show three or four years ago and said that if we had any manners we’d hand the entire island back to the Queen of England at 9 o’clock the following morning and apologise for its condition...As every week passes, I think that guy has something'.

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interests – characteristics usually associated with the Southern European model. Moreover, it can also be argued that Ireland shares many historical characteristics of the ‘externally-centred industrialisation’ experienced by Portugal, Spain, and Greece (Jacobsen, 1994: 23).

In conclusion it can be said that Ireland’s divergence from the Anglo-Saxon model is remarkable both before and after the 1990s U-turn. Nevertheless, at least in terms of political economy, Ireland still belongs to the Anglo-Saxon model. It does have a flexible labour market, and an Anglo-Saxon corporate governance culture, which to a great extent are enforced by the high degree of foreign direct investments coming from the USA (see also the comparative indicators in Appendix B). But these Anglo-Saxon elements coexist with a (newly born) consociational politico-economic structure, and a (very old) community – rather than individualist – oriented social culture. All these elements produce an interesting hybrid model. Furthermore, they add important and interesting information for the comparison with Greece attempted here.

Hence, it is interesting to note that clientelistic relations, a community rather than an individualistic oriented society, and an ‘underdog culture’ are all elements to be found traditionally in both the Greek and Irish societies. An extended analysis of these elements is beyond the purposes of this chapter. Let us, however, briefly underline some points with reference to the socio-political culture. First, the community-oriented culture – as opposed to the ‘individualist orientation’ that characterises the Anglo-Saxon model – can be said to be still dominant in both Greek and Irish societies (or at least at the self-perceptions of their people). This defining characteristic has posed a number of challenges for the way in which we understand and analyse the clientelistic networks in the two countries, as well as concepts such as

56 For a study of socio-political change in modern Ireland through a Dependency theoretical prism, see Jacobsen, 1994.
57 It is interesting that, when studying the ‘collaborative production’ in Ireland, many scholars distinguish between ‘unionised’ and ‘non-unionised workplaces’ (see for instance, Roche and Geary 2000). For the issue of flexibility in the Irish labour market see Gunnigle and Brosnan, 2001. Moreover, for the effect and practices of US firms in the Irish workplace see: Gunnigle, Morley and Heraty, 1997; Geary, 1999; Gunnigle and McGuire, 2001. Gunnigle and McGuire (ibid: 59) have two very interesting extracts from interviews conducted with two Vice Presidents of US Multinationals: ‘Any country that requires union recognition is immediately stricken off our list of possible locations’, and ‘We don’t deal with unions. We don’t have a union in the US. It does not fit with our culture’.
civil society or the public/private sphere. Tovey (2001: 81) in a strong critique of the methods that are used to study different societies, writes: 'For example, Giddens' Sociology appears to be extensively and uncritically read in Ireland as an account of Irish Society. This is a text that does not refer anywhere to community as either a social or a sociological problematic'. With regard to this community culture it can also be argued that it creates an invisible social net which is based on rather personal relationships and traditional social bonds. The important function and role that the institution of the family still plays in these two societies is not unrelated to this community culture. Moreover, with regard to the issue of public/private division, one must not forget the separate developmental trajectories of the 'semi-peripheral' countries of the EU. Hence in the UK and France for instance, the rise of a 'private sphere', which supplied the 'vital space' for the development of a 'private/civil society', has been the result of long standing social struggles. These struggles delineated a space in which private (economic) interests came together and developed a separate social sphere of (economic) transactions, in opposition to the State. Hence, 'private/civil society' and 'State' emerged in these societies as two separate and – to a high degree – oppositional spheres (Tsoukalas, 1993). On the contrary, in many cases in (semi-) peripheral societies, the emergence of these spheres was not the product of a particular historical development coming out of social struggles, but the result of 'models and institutions transferring' from the 'European core' (ibid.); a fact which created new hybrid models and trajectories. This 'transplantation process', dominant in colonial and late-development conditions, has to be kept in mind when we think of categories such as public/private in Greece and Ireland. This is one more fact that brings Ireland closer to the South-European model.

58 For the case of Greece see Tsoukalas, 1993; for the case of Ireland see Tovey, 2001.
59 This point relates also to the discussion of how autonomous the state is from particular dominant societal interests and forces. In this context Tsoukalas (1993: 334), studying the case of Greece, makes an important point: '...before even the issue of the 'degree' of State autonomy to be raised, one should investigate to what extent the development of social and economic forces, and the building of State machinery are processes 'external' to each other'. For the issue of 'state autonomy' see the contributions in Evans, Rueschemeyer and Skocpol, 1985, and for a marxist critique on this issue see the review article of Cammack, 1989.
60 See also the interesting discussion on the emergence and stabilisation of Irish democracy in Kissane, 1995. Kissane argues that in order to understand the emergence of modern Irish polity, traditional post-colonial explanatory frameworks should be combined with modernisation approaches.
A second point with regard to the socio-political culture of the two countries is the existence of a traditionally strong ‘underdog culture’, which is still (in a lesser degree though) informing and influencing their political culture. Elements of such a culture can be said to include feelings and attitudes of introvertedness, exceptionalism and cultural insecurity. Furthermore, the historical experiences of both societies have given to this underdog culture a distinctive moral gravity and significance. The saying that: ‘O my son/We may be a small country/We may be a poor one/But we have our pride’ or ‘/But we can hold our head high’, captures one of the traditionally commonest notions to be found in the Irish and Greek societies. This notion has many times been accompanied by a tendency to introversion. If cultural heritage and national identity were to be protected, foreign influences and the ‘opening’ of the society had to be prevented or minimised. Yet, as noted above, these feelings of insecurity and introvertedness have been challenged in both countries since the 1990s. For economic growth, along with the confidence generated by the EC/EU membership problematised these traditionally negative/defensive self-images.

Moreover, in both the Irish and Greek cases, the balance of ‘knowledge transfer’ ceased to be unidirectional in the 1990s. Ireland started to export the experience of its own successful model of growth and social partnership, as well as its experiences with EU membership; and Greece did the same with its own experiences of EU membership and public sector reform, especially towards its northern neighbours in the Balkans. These developments increased the pressures on traditional negative self-images and syndromes of inferiority. Reflecting on these trends in the case of Ireland,

61 For an analysis of this culture in the Greek case see Diamandouros, 1994.
62 As many Irish grandparents keep saying.
63 The most common Greek version.
64 A caveat should be inserted here. I do not mean to make a value judgment about the aforementioned underdog culture, nor does the thesis subscribe to (simplistic) analyses which equate ‘tradition’ with ‘backwardness’. Indeed, part of the discourse of the ‘modernising camps’ in both countries has often been based on a simplistic ‘binary logic’ in which ‘[t]radition, suitably packaged, homogenised and essentialised, becomes a mere caricature’ which is reconstructed and scapegoated as the ‘enemy of progress’ (see, Doak 1998: 26). What this thesis does argue is that the changed material and psychological landscape, as analysed above, led to the problematisation of historically well-rooted notions of dependency and insecurity (of which the historical origins and reasons are undisputable); and furthermore that this changed landscape led to a reflexive and self-confident attitude about the capacity of the two countries to decide for and formulate their own future, and therefore take responsibility for it.
it can be argued that a big chapter of its history has been closing. A chapter which
could be titled by the well-known reply of Samuel Beckett.
~Vous êtes Anglais?
~Non, au contraire.

In this context Professor O'Donnell, the Director of NESC, closing an edited volume
on the *Irish Experience*, writes: ‘[Ireland] is free to walk and run in the century that
lies ahead...It leaves the century free of the two masters that dominated and
constrained it – London and Rome. It is now free to reinvent itself’ (O’ Donnell,
2000: 212). Of course, as is also argued below, this does not mean that the impact of
the British legacy on Ireland’s socio-political life is – or indeed can be – over. A
good example for this is the centrality of the issue of neutrality in the negative
referendum on ‘Nice Treaty’ in 200165.

Let us close this chapter with a short reference to the role of the church in the two
countries66. By way of introduction one should note that both societies are
characterised by a high degree of homogenisation with regard to the religion of their
population. In the Republic of Ireland the overwhelming majority of the population is
Roman Catholic (91.6%), whereas in Greece the majority of the people is attached to
the Greek Orthodox Church (98%)67. It is also important to note that religion in both
countries is considered by the majority of the population to be an integral part of
national identity; and within this majority a (large) part would consider that
‘Greekness’ and ‘Irishness’ as forms of national identity cannot exist without
Orthodoxy and Catholicism respectively. Yet the attitudes of the population towards
religion either as an esoteric belief or as a part of the national identity should not be
equated with the role of the institution of the church in the society. This becomes
clearer when one studies the attitudes of the population not towards the religion but

65 Irish neutrality has traditionally been more about not being allied to Britain than about unilateralism
per se. In the case of the Nice referendum, it is interesting how the concept of neutrality has moved
beyond an ‘instrumental definition’, and has acquired a central position in the Irish public discourse ‘as
a synonym for national identity and core political value’ (Gillespie, 2002). For the issue of Irish
neutrality see also FitzGerald, 1998.

66 Two recent accounts of the State-Church relations are: Kissane, 2003 (for the Irish case) and
Konidaris, 2003 (for the Greek case).

67 In particular, according to the 1991 census, the religious composition in the Republic is:
Roman Catholic: 91.6%; Church of Ireland (Anglican): 2.5%; Presbyterians: 0.4%; other, or no
information or specific religious beliefs: 5.6%. The respective composition in Greece is: Greek
Orthodox: 98%, Muslim 1.3%, other 0.7%.
towards the church, or when the focus of the analysis is on the relationship of state and church.

With regard to the role of church in the two countries at least two points should be mentioned. First, the church is considered to have played historically an important role in the preservation of the national identity and in the fight for national independence. Second, personalities do make a difference in the way in which the church intervenes in political life. This was made clear with the election of Archbishop Christodoulos in Greece, and Cardinal Desmond Connell in Ireland, who both adopted an 'interventionist' stance in public affairs. But the nature and role of the church in the two countries are also considerably different. These differences are not only limited to historico-institutional aspects, such as the fact that the Greek Church is a 'national church', whereas the Irish Church is a 'global' (and hierarchically structured) one, but also extend to more functional social-specific aspects. Thus it can be argued that traditionally the Greek Church depended on and was 'used' by the Greek state for its own purposes, rather than vice versa, which was the case in Ireland. Furthermore, it can be argued that church influence on the public discourse is more centralised in Greece than in Ireland. In the latter one finds a number of powerful interest groups, which although they advance the church's positions, do not have any formal affiliation to it. Such interest groups include the Pro-Life Amendment Campaign (PLAC), the Society for the Protection of the Unborn Child (SPUC), the Family Solidarity and the Anti-Divorce Campaign (Inglis, 2000: 54-55). In Greece on the other hand, the church's intervention in public discourse remains relatively centralised, and is mainly expressed through the church hierarchy itself.

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68 In the case of Ireland, the term 'church' is used for convenience to refer to the Catholic Church. The 'Church of Ireland' is the official name for the Anglican Church.

69 Even though the official Orthodox Church took a conservative stance towards the Greek fight of independence in the 19th century.

70 For the Greek case see, Stavrakakis, 2002.

71 The 'national church' is a common characteristic of the Christian Orthodox religion. Thus, national Orthodox churches were founded by Bulgarians (1872), Serbians (1879), Romanians (1885), Finish and Estonians (1923), Polish (1924), Albanians (1937) and Czechs and Slovaks (1998).

72 Here it is interesting to note that in Ireland, mass-attendance has dropped from 87% in 1984 (Breslin & Weafer Survey), to 64% in 1995 (IMS Survey) and 57% in 1999 (IMS Survey) (source: The Irish Council of Churches). For the case of Ireland, Inglis (2000, 1998) argues that in the latter half of the 20th century, the media began to take over from the Church in providing a new 'habitus', (in terms of a 'collective orthodoxy') in the Irish society. Thus the media have instituted a new form of civil society, which is not dominated any more by the Church. On the other hand in the case of Greece an
Conclusion

This chapter has elaborated on the reasons why Greece and Ireland were chosen as case studies. These reasons include: First, the fact that the two countries are usually classified as different models of polities and political economies (the Anglo-Saxon and the South-European model respectively). Second, the fact that they are both members of the European Union, and therefore the regional/regionallisation factor remains constant. Third, the fact that they are both small countries; a fact that makes it easier to capture and analyse the communication process of the globalisation discourse. Fourth, the fact that the two countries represent two extreme stories within the EU, while at the same time they have been undergoing a similar modernisation process since 1990s. Fifth, the fact that their political systems and culture are similar, whereas their political economies differ (in the level of institutionalisation and centralization). This mix of similarities and differences will allow us to examine in-depth how the nature of political economy affects the communication of hegemonic discourses. Lastly, it should be pointed out that although there are many works in the literature of comparative institutionalism dealing with the large EU states, especially Germany, France and the UK, the case is not true of the research on small states. Therefore the choice of Greece and Ireland aims at contributing to the rather developing small EU states literature.

One further question, central in every comparison, should be raised here. Were Greece and Ireland the only or the best cases to be chosen for addressing the question about the communication of globalisation discourse? What were the alternatives and how they would affect the result of the research? It is true that the 1990s has been a decade of profound societal changes in many EU countries (including Austria, Italy, interesting philosophical debate emerged in the mid-1990s on the relationship (and compatibility) of the Orthodox culture with modernity and post-modernity (see Giannaras, 1994, and Mouzelis, 1995). Yet based on various 'Eurobarometer' surveys throughout the period 1990-2001, it can be argued that Greeks and Irish remain among the most religious people in the European Union. For instance, in 1994, in the question: 'Whether you do or you don't follow religious practices, would you say that you are: Religious/Not Religious/Agnostic/Atheist/Don't know...', 93% of the Greeks who participated in the survey - the highest percentage in comparison to the other eleven EU member states - replied 'religious', whereas Irish came fourth with 82% (Portuguese were second with 89%, and Italians were third with 82%). The EU12 average for this answer was 59% (Eurobarometer 42, 1995).
Finland, Portugal, Spain). Yet, the fact that Greece and Ireland are at the opposite ends of the EU spectrum, combined with a models-of-political-economy consideration, gave us a ready-made and exciting research puzzle to investigate the nature of hegemonic discourse communication. The attractiveness of this puzzle was then increased by one more factor. Both Greece and Ireland can be considered 'deviant cases' in the group of political economies to which they belong (i.e. the Mediterranean vs. AngloSaxon groups). The problem with comparing deviant cases is that the research conclusions may not be easily comparable with already existing hypotheses and academic assumptions. Studies of 'deviant cases', however, have the potential to push the limits and widen the horizons of comparative research, and increase the possibility for unexpected research findings (see also Lijphart, 1971: 65).

All these factors led us to the cases of Greece and Ireland. To return to the above question about the 'uniqueness of the pair', it can be argued that alternatives did exist, but the 'extreme cases' factor added an interesting and distinctive aspect to the proposed project.

Finally, the thesis starts from an observation, i.e. the 'globalisation of the globalisation discourse', and seeks to test the role of different national institutional arrangements in this process. In a first research wave the importance of institutional arrangements in political science and international political economy was established. This research project falls within a second wave of research which focuses more on 'how institutions matter' rather than on whether they matter. The findings of this second wave of research remain to be crystallised, through, as always, an incremental process of academic dialogue based on theses and counter-theses, observations and counter-observations. This thesis aims to contribute to this incremental, knowledge advancing process; a process which takes both 'understanding' and 'explaining' to progress.

73 There is one important difference between Greece and Ireland which should be mentioned: the fact that in Ireland the spoken language is English. This factor is indeed important, considering the 'global status' of English language, but arguably this does not affect the substance of the research project proposed here. For the issue under examination in this thesis is the actual communication process in each country. The factor of the English language does not influence the domestic institutional arrangements in Ireland, which are the critical variable of this project. Language can indeed influence the timing of communication but not the means. Thus, language would be a critical factor in the case that foreign direct investments would be under investigation, but it is not at the case of the communication of hegemonic discourses, as conceptualised in this project.
Having developed the theoretical framework of the thesis (Chapter 1), and presented its case studies (Chapter 2), Part II turns to the examination of the communication of the globalisation discourse in Greece and Ireland.
Part Two
The Communication of Globalisation Discourse in Greece and Ireland: Politics and Biopolitics

Introduction

Part II examines the communication of the globalisation discourse in Greece and Ireland. The focus is on the discourses of the domestic institutional actors. How is globalisation implicated in their discourses? What are the main objects/themes of their discourses irrespectively of globalisation discourse? How do the various institutional discourses on globalisation ‘speak’ to and ‘lie’ on each other, and how they are locked in, and evolve, at a national level? In so doing, the aim is to study the power conditions which underlie the way in which the *hegemonic* is communicated at a national level. Moreover (and more importantly) we also aim to examine how the hegemonic is internalised and biopolitically transforms public discourses and their agents.

Following the above research strategy the aim is to bring the two aspects of a hegemonic discourse under a single analytical framework. At a first order level it is exemplified that the practices that are generated by the globalisation discourse produce clear ‘winners’ and ‘losers’. Indeed, these practices both benefit and damage, empower and weaken social actors in the same social settings. Therefore the analysis of the ‘politics’ of globalisation discourse, in terms of its impact on the organised, vested and mediated interests and interest-structures, is put forward with a double purpose: first to examine how the hegemonic discourse influences the existing institutional configuration at the national level (i.e. which actors are empowered and which are weakened or marginalized); second to examine how the existing institutional configuration influences the way in which the ‘politics’ of the hegemonic discourse is mediated and negotiated at the national level, and what is the role of the different mediation structures.
On a second order level, however, the proposed research aims to illustrate that while the politics of a hegemonic discourse is negotiated, this discourse has a deeper biopolitical effect on the subjects of the public discourses and through them on the public discourses themselves. Thus, while social actors are negotiating how the new conditions (e.g. ‘globalisation’) should be faced, in fact they materialise these new conditions, and thus also experience their consequences.

We start our investigation with the case of Greece, and we turn to Ireland in Chapter 4. We then summarise and compare our findings in Chapter 5.
CHAPTER 3
THE GLOBALISATION DISCOURSE IN GREECE: 1995 – 2001

Introduction

The study of the communication of globalisation discourse in Greece aims to examine the effect that this discourse had in the reproduction of the Greek public discourse. Some broader contextualisation might be helpful here. In Chapter 2 we argued that 1990 could be considered a turning point for Greek politics. In the same framework of analysis it can also be argued that 1996 signified both the consolidation of this turning point and a new significant shift in the Greek public discourse. In particular in 1996 Andreas Papandreou, the historical leader of PASOK, who had come back in power with the elections of 1993, died. This event symbolically brought to an end the period of charismatic leaders in Greek politics. The other side of this development was that Costas Simitis, against all odds, replaced Papandreou as the leader of the PASOK government, and within a few months was also elected president of PASOK. Simitis was part of the ‘modernisation wing’ of PASOK. This wing was always a small minority within the party and was defined in opposition to Papandreou’s populist content and style of governance. In addition, its members were occasionally accused as ‘traitors’, and it had only little influence, if any, in the bureaucratic party machine. It is indicative that Simitis had resigned from the position of minister of National Economy in 1987, during a Papandreou government, almost explicitly accusing Papandreou of violating the agreed governmental programme of economic stabilisation. It should also be mentioned here that this political stance of Simitis and PASOK’s modernisers, made them, if not popular, sympathetic to many voters of both New Democracy (on the right-to-the-centre) and Synaspismos (on the left).

These developments constituted the epitome of the shift that had taken place in 1989-1990. The Greek political system had seemed to leave behind the increased polarisation and the ‘Koskotas scandal’, and an old political project, that of
‘modernisation’, seemed to form a new and dynamic historical block, creating a new public discourse which challenged the traditional party division lines. Based on these trends we can argue that 1996 signified the emergence of a new public discourse. The purpose here is to study how this changing public discourse in Greece interacted with the emerging, in the same period, globalisation discourse; how the hegemonic discourse was implicated in the public discourse formation, and how, conversely, the emerging public discourse was created and expressed in the terms of the globalisation discourse.

Institutional Actors and the Discourse of Globalisation

The list of institutional actors on which the research focuses is as follows:

- **The Main Political Parties and their Leaders**
  - Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) & Constantinos Simitis.
  - New Democracy (ND) & Kostas Karamanlis.
  - Communist Party of Greece (KKE) & Aleka Papariga.
  - Coalition of Left and Progress (Synaspismos) & Nicos Constandopoulos.

- **The Main Social Partners**
  - The Greek General Confederation of Labour (GSEE).
  - The Federation of Greek Industries (SEV).
  - The Economic and Social Council of Greece (OKE).

- **The Greek Church**

- **A Press Sample** (the Sunday Edition of the newspaper To VIMA), which also captures aspects of the book-production and the discourses of politicians, think-tanks and anti-globalisation groups.

The general criterion for the construction of the above list of actors was that of ‘inclusion’. Therefore the purpose was to include as many actors as possible, and at least all these actors with an important institutional role in the (re)production of public discourse. A detailed justification of the various actors selected is offered in the sections that follow. It is also important to point out here that there may be slight differences in the period of examination of each institutional actor. Thus although the
The overall span of our research is from 1995 to 2001, in the case of political parties for instance, we take as a point of departure the electoral year 1996. Whenever such variations in the examination period do apply, a detailed reasoning is offered.

The analysis of the actors’ discourses takes place as follows: First, where necessary, the identity of the actors/institutions is presented. Second, the rationale of the analysed documents is discussed. Finally, the nature of engagement with the globalisation discourse is analysed. All translations of the official documents in this Chapter are mine, unless otherwise stated.

The Main Political Parties and their Leaders (PASOK, ND, KKE, Synaspismos)

The criterion for the selection of the political parties to be studied was a double one: first, their ‘representativeness’, as expressed by votes in the national elections; and second their continuity in the political scene. In this regard the following parties have been studied: (a) The ‘Πανελλήνιο Σοσιαλιστικό Κόμμα/Panhellenic Socialist Movement’ (PASOK), which during the 1990s won the 1993, 1996 and 2000 elections. PASOK is a centre/lef-to-centre party, (b) The ‘Νέα Δημοκρατία/New Democracy’ (ND), which during the same period won the 1991 elections. ND is a right-to-centre party, (c) The ‘Κομμουνιστικό Κόμμα Ελλάδας/Communist Party of Greece’ (KKE), which is the third biggest party in Greek politics, and is steadily represented in parliament since its foundation in 1974. KKE is a traditional communist party. (d) The ‘Συνασπισμός της Αριστεράς και της Προοδείας/Coalition of Left and Progress’ (Synaspismos), which was the fourth biggest Greek party in the 1990s. Synaspismos is a ‘progressive’ left party. It was founded in 1989, and with the exception of the 1993 elections, it was the only small party which had a constant presence in the Greek parliament during the period 1990-2001.

In order to study the discourse of the above parties, their electoral manifestos and the speeches and interviews of their leaders were scrutinised for the period 1996-2000. Moreover, in the case of the two biggest parties (i.e. PASOK and ND) the activities of their think-tanks were examined. We first turn to the party electoral manifestos.

The study of electoral manifestos is important for at least two reasons. First, the manifestos are a primary material of research, in the sense that they are published by the parties themselves, and usually express the outcome of an in-party conversation. Therefore they are an authoritative source for tracing and studying the positions of the parties in the past. Moreover, their publication constitutes a ‘media event’ and their content is used by the media for criticism or praise, independently of whether the manifestos themselves are read or not by the majority of the electoral population. In essence they are important because they incarnate the way in which parties choose to communicate with the electorate. This latter point brings us to the second reason of why the study of manifestos is important (at least for this project). Electoral manifestos are not academic texts, or texts aiming to a particular target group. Their target group is the electoral body as a whole (at least for the big parties) and that is why they are free of jargon or complex analyses which would not be accessible to the majority of people. In this regard electoral manifestos offer important insights and inroads for studying public discourses. They are texts that have been made in order to resonate to a great part of the population; or put differently, they include positions and arguments that (the parties hope) can resonate with the wider public. Therefore they constitute important means for studying the public discourse of a particular period.  

It has to be mentioned here that not all the Greek parties had an electoral manifesto, in terms of a single publication which summarises the proposed party policies in each and every policy area, during the period of examination. In particular, the idea of an electoral manifesto was fully embraced by the parties, with the exception of KKE, only in the 2000 elections. The lack of electoral manifestos was covered with the use of the various leaflets that the parties used in those election periods.

The methodology used for the study of the manifestos is as follows. First, references to the concept of globalisation were traced, and their content and context was studied.

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1 For a short history of the study of electoral manifestos through content analysis see: Budge and Bara, 2001. For a review of manifesto-based research see Budge and Bara, 2001a.
Next it was examined how the different references within each manifesto related to each other. The purpose here was to find and analyse underlining notions and tendencies within each single manifesto. Finally, for each party separately, the manifesto of 1996 was compared with that of 2000 in order to trace changes and continuities of notions and tendencies. Concepts such as internationalization, neoliberalism and imperialism, were also examined and linked with the globalisation discourse where considered necessary, i.e. when they were the focal points of reference in the documents under examination. The next sections proceed with the analysis of the manifestos. We order the parties according to the power they had in the parliament.

_Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK)_

PASOK published electoral manifestos for both the 1996 and 2000 elections. The manifesto of 1996 was entitled _Strong and Modern Greece: The Programme of PASOK for the Road to the 21st Century_, it was 143 pages long, and it reflected the tensions which existed in PASOK at that period. It made five explicit references to (the term) globalisation in four different sections; the general-introductory statement, the section on foreign policy and defence, the section on export strategy and that on education.

In general it can be argued that although the 1996 manifesto adopted a critical-to-negative stance towards globalisation, in the sectoral sections, in many instances it referred to and replicated many aspects of the discourse of economic globalisation as a new international economic _reality_. The following paragraphs follow up these references.

The conceptualisation of globalisation in the introductory section of the manifesto is of particular importance, because it is the section in which the ideological platform of

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2 The reference for this manifesto throughout the thesis will be, PASOK, 1996. The title in Greek is: 'Ισχυρή και Σύγχρονη Ελλάδα: Το Πρόγραμμα του ΠΑΣΟΚ για την Πορεία προς τον 21ο Αιώνα'.

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the party was set out. The section was entitled ‘Before The New Era: Programme for the Way to the 21st Century’ (pp. 5-8)³ and its first paragraph read as follows:

In the dawn of the 21st century radical changes transform the world as we knew it until today. A new world takes over, which knows no boundaries for people, money, work, civilisations and values (p. 6).

This is the way in which PASOK conceptualised the historical environment within which its ideological platform was formed. The third paragraph of the same introductory section is on economic globalisation.

_The globalisation of the economy_ and the domination of free market competition are accompanied by the domination of a narrow economic logic which has profit as its absolute criterion....’ (p. 6, emphasis in the original).

And further on one reads:

_Social injustice and exploitation accompany the modern societies of the third industrial revolution...At the same time new...hopes emerge for a better life, more free, more socially just_. ‘What will dominate? The positive prospect or a new barbarism? This will be decided by the struggles and the efforts of us all’ (p. 6, emphasis in the original).

The next reference to globalisation in the manifesto was in the section on ‘foreign policy - defence’. In particular the term ‘globalisation of the economy’ was used twice in the definition of the new ‘international system’ and the conceptualization of the ‘new international economic environment’ (p. 10). Furthermore, the same concept (i.e. globalisation of the economy) was used in section 4, on ‘education’, for the definition of the ‘new social environment’ (p. 74). Finally in section 3 of the manifesto on ‘export strategy’, where the first heading was ‘A Dynamic Response to the Forces of Globalisation’ (p. 67), globalisation was again conceptualised as the ‘new international economic scene’.

³ Μπροστά στη Νέα Εποχή: Πρόγραμμα για την Πορεία προς τον 21ο Αιώνα’.
Beyond these explicit references to globalisation, one also finds scattered references throughout the manifesto to the need for adjustment to the new international environment, and other issues related to the globalisation debate, such as flexibility. Three instances follow:

We live in a period of unrelenting competition among countries, in which the main stake is who will succeed in adjusting more, faster and more effectively in the new models of production and competition that have emerged. It’s not enough to keep going. We must go faster than the others (p. 35)...

*Our target is,* a more **flexible** and **effective** state.

*Our target is,* a state which will function with less cost but with **social criteria**...

*Our target is a Strategic State’* (pp. 40-41, emphasis in the original)...

Third target of our [employment] policy is the *enhancement of the mobility of employees and firms.* In a period in which extensive changes take place in a global scale...employees and firms must move with flexibility among different sites of production, working methods and geographical locations of employment (p. 44, emphasis in the original).

Hence, overall it can be argued that PASOK’s 1996 manifesto was characterised by an internal tension. At the level of its ideological platform, references to the danger of a ‘new barbarism’⁴, as well as to ‘economism’, ‘social injustice’ and ‘exploitation’ were dominant. Therefore a rather negative stance to globalisation was adopted. Yet, at the various sectoral, policy specific sections of the manifesto (e.g. on the economy and education), globalisation and economic globalisation were recognised as a given historical condition, as a/the new international structure. Consequently, the urgent need for adjustment to the new conditions was repeatedly underlined. Thus while the manifesto criticised the conservative party’s policies of ‘less state and privatisations’ (p. 37), it itself propagated the need for a more flexible state, and flexibility in the industrial relations. In conclusion it can be argued that when the *new reality* and its

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⁴ The term ‘barbarism’ made an explicit reference to the political philosophy of Cornelious Castoriadis. Castoriadis formed the ‘Socialism or Barbarism’ group in 1948, and he was also the founding editor of the *Socialism or Barbarism* journal.
requirements were under discussion in the various sectoral sections of the manifesto, the ideological stance of the party was neutralised or just ignored.

The manifesto for the 2000 elections was entitled *The Governmental Programme of PASOK: Our Proposals, Our Commitments* (165 pages long), and the use of the concept of globalisation for the definition of the international state of affairs was widespread. In particular the term globalisation appeared eleven times in the document, and the references were spread among most of the sectoral/policy sections.

As in the 1996 manifesto, that of 2000 gave primacy to globalisation by including it in its introductory statement. In particular globalisation was mentioned as one of the ‘critical developments’ that Greece had to face before and after the elections\(^5\) (p. 8). Thus in the opening statement of the manifesto globalisation was conceptualised as a phenomenon which created ‘new relations, new problems, new political questions and challenges which need to be met’ (p. 8; see also p. 9). This introductory section had also a subsection, entitled ‘the security of our society in conditions of globalisation’ (p. 10), where interestingly globalisation was referred to as the driving force of development.

> We consider that market liberalisation, globalisation, the restructuring of the production and technological change constitute the driving forces for development. At the same time they create dangers and instability in social relations (p. 10).

A similar approach was adopted in the section ‘a new model of development: towards a modern and competitive economy’. This started with the subtitle ‘new reality, new policies’ (p. 16) and argued that ‘[t]echnology and globalisation change the nature of international competition’ (p. 16).

The effort of the manifesto to combine a traditional left narrative with the need for adjustment was perhaps best exemplified in the following extract:

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\(^5\) Along with (a) the choice of the values on which the future development of Greece would be based and (b) the accession to the Eurozone.
The empowerment of the institutions of welfare state and their adjustment to the new facts of the post-industrialist society and the globalisation of the economy constitute the great challenges of the coming decade (p. 90, emphasis added).

It is interesting to note that the references to globalisation as a ‘new reality’, a new set of conditions which required particular actions at the domestic level, were usually found in the introduction of the various sections where either the general ideological platform of the party was laid out, or the ‘new challenges’ of the contemporary international state of affairs were discussed. Furthermore, the manifesto was full of references to a ‘new economy’ (for instance pp. 16, 58, 59), a ‘new age’ (pp. 1, 58, 59, 130, 131) or as already mentioned to a ‘new reality’ (p. 16).

Beyond the electoral manifestos it is important here to analyse the activities of PASOK’s think-tank, ‘Institute for Strategic and Development Studies, Andreas Papandreou’ (ISTAME) which was founded in 1995. ISTAME has had a well-developed nation-wide framework of members and people engaging in research groups, and since its foundation it has organised numerous activities both in Athens and in smaller cities all around Greece. These activities had a variety of topics and the respective talks were delivered not only by academics but also by local politicians and local public figures. With regard to globalisation ISTAME organised two high profile events in Athens as early as in 1997. The first was organised in co-operation with two other civil society organisations and was entitled ‘International Market Economy and Contemporary Left’ (May 12, 1997), and the second was an international conference on ‘The Left in the Europe of the 21st Century: Globalisation, Nation-State, Social Solidarity, Technology and Culture’. The latter was opened by Simitis himself and included speeches on globalisation by Leo Panich, Nicos Mouzelis and Robert Cabanes. These two events show that the globalisation

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6 Overall 13 references to globalisation were made in the manifesto (including two references to the ‘globalised society of knowledge’ in page 76). Beyond the above mentioned extracts, see also p. 120 (section on constitutional reform), pp. 130-131 (section on public administration), and p. 156 (section on the European and international position of Greece).

7 ISTAME (2001: 2) is legally a ‘civic non-profit making corporation’, and ‘has been officially recognised as a Non-Governmental Organisation by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’. See the official web page of the institute at: http://www.istame-apapandreou.gr.

8 The ‘Όμολος Προβληματισμού για τον Εκωσηχρονισμό της Κοινωνίας’ (Reflection Group for Societal Modernisation), and ‘Πολιτεία’ (Politeia).
discourse was becoming increasingly central in the Greek public discourse, at least at
the level of political and academic elites. It is even more important that in 1999
ISTAME attempted to popularise and widely communicate the globalisation
problematique by organising a number of local conferences on globalisation in
various cities around Greece. Thus, two conferences were organised in January, one
in Athens, on ‘the globalisation of news’, and one in Agrinio, on ‘globalisation and
the welfare state’. Two conferences were also organised in March, one on ‘woman
and globalisation’ in Arta, and one on ‘youth and globalisation’ in Herakleion.
Furthermore, a conference on the effects of globalisation on the periphery was
organised in Patra, in May. ISTAME kept up the globalisation conferences
momentum in 2000. Thus, a conference on globalisation and agriculture took place in
Nemea, on February 21, and one more on globalisation, knowledge and the future of
labour in Korinthos, on November 11.

This prominence of globalisation in both PASOK’s manifestos and ISTAME’s
activities should be related to the emergent European debate among social democratic
parties and leaders on the issue of ‘the future of Social Democracy’, the ‘third way’
and ‘progressive governance’. ISTAME for instance participated in the following
relevant events: an international conference in Stockholm on ‘where is power? A
closeup on democracy and influence in the age of globalisation’, organised by the
‘Olaf Palme Institute’ (July 1998); an international conference in Berlin on ‘shaping
globalisation’, organised by ‘Friedrich Ebert Stiftung’; and the annual NGOs’
conference of United Nations in New York on ‘challenges of a globalised world’
(September 1999). To sum up we can say that there was an explicit effort by
ISTAME to bring the issue of globalisation and its effect on society, to the forefront
of political debate all over Greece (that is beyond Athens and Thessalonika).

**New Democracy (ND)**

The New Democracy Party did not publish a single electoral manifesto for the 1996
elections. It issued, however, a detailed programme on economic policy (60 pages
long). Along with the sectoral sections on banking, trade, securities, and maritime
affairs, this covered broader issues, such as the role of the state, the social and
political cohesion, and the definition of the new international environment. It is this economic manifesto, entitled *The Governmental Programme of New Democracy for the Economy*\(^9\) that was used here as a substitute for a general electoral manifesto\(^{10}\).

This economic manifesto made no explicit reference to the term globalisation\(^{11}\). It seems however that instead of this term, the concepts of 'internationalisation' and 'internationalisation of the world economy' were used to signify the same phenomena and developments. In particular, there were four references to the concept of internationalisation. The first one was in the section on 'the role of the state' (pp. 9-11) and, as in the case of PASOK's 1996 manifesto, was urgent about the new conditions that 'we are in'. It was as follows:

> The internationalisation of the world economy and in particular the European integration, the technological advancement and the change of the developmental strategy of some countries have unleashed forces that demand more freedom in transactions. Greece cannot be an exception in the new international environment. *These developments necessitate the revision of the role of the state and of the institutional framework that defines the function of our economic system* (p. 9, emphasis in the original).

The need for adjustment to the new economic reality of the internationalisation of the world economy was repeated at least twice more in the manifesto. In the section on the 'New Economic Conditions' (pp. 18-20) one reads:

> Our adjustment to the new international environment demands many changes...The internationalisation of the world economy is the most important change. It is now a chimera to believe that any country, and certainly Greece can isolate itself from the international conjuncture (p. 19)...The internationalisation of economic activities creates the need and imposes the modernisation and the adjustment of the Greek credit system in the international tendencies and developments (p. 35).

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\(^9\) The reference for this manifesto throughout the thesis will be, ND, 1995. The title in Greek is: 'Το Κυβερνητικό Πρόγραμμα της Νέας Δημοκρατίας για την Οικονομία', and was published in February 1995.

\(^{10}\) This was also the suggestion of the 'Electoral Manifestos Section' of the ND party.

\(^{11}\) This, as such, is an interesting finding. Potential explanations are offered later in this Chapter.
Therefore in the ND’s 1995 economic manifesto, the concept of internationalisation of the world economy was put forward as the new international structure, due to which a wide range of policy and structural changes needed to be made in the Greek politico-economic system. Furthermore, this internationalisation of the world economy was not judged (criticised or applauded) by the manifesto, but was presented as the new international economic order.

For the 2000 elections, ND adopted the idea of a single manifesto, and published in March 2000, *The Governmental Programme of New Democracy*[^12], a 98 pages long document. The manifesto made few explicit references to globalisation as such[^13], but the arguments/assumptions about a ‘new era’ and a ‘new reality’ that were found in PASOK (2000), were clearly put forward here too. The first reference was made in the introduction of the section on the future of Greek economy:

> It is a common belief that the whole world is at the end of one era and the beginning of an other. We are already in the first stage of the post-industrial era. The stage of the era of globality, of technology and of knowledge (p. 32, emphasis in the original).

And further below:

> For the country to meet the challenges of the 21st century, we must mobilise all the social agents and factors, public and private, of the Greek society, in an attempt to reach a social transformation tuned with the today’s global reality and capable of meeting the needs of the new era (p. 84).

The manifesto also turned to globalisation in the section on culture. The reference, however, did not negatively relate the two concepts. It argued that the ‘challenges of globalisation necessitate today more than ever before, to face Culture as the basic bond of our national existence’ (p. 96). In a similar manner the manifesto referred

[^12]: The reference for this manifesto throughout the thesis will be, ND, 2000. The title in Greek is: 'Το Κυβερνητικό Πρόγραμμα της Νέας Δημοκρατίας'.
[^13]: Overall three references, including one on ‘globality’ (p. 32) and one on ‘globalised economy’ (p. 53).
positively to the phenomenon of the ‘globalised economy’, as one of ‘the new big challenges’ for the development of Greece (p. 53).

To sum up, it seems that ND’s manifestos did not develop a discourse on globalisation per se. Instead, they put forward the notion of an emerging new global reality that presented a developmental challenge, to which Greece should adjust in order to prosper. Reasons for this no use of the term globalisation are discussed when the discourse of party’s leader Karamanlis is examined. We conclude this section on New Democracy’s discourse with a brief reference to the activities of its think-tank.

New Democracy created its own think-tank, the ‘Constantine Karamanlis Institute for Democracy’ (CKID), in 1998\(^{14}\). Globalisation, however, did not feature high in the activities and interests of CKID, at least until 2001, when it organised a conference on ‘Globalisation and Orthodoxy’, and published its proceedings (CKID, 2001). It is indeed interesting that CKID chose this subject as a point of entrance in the debate on globalisation. But it is also true that this issue had emerged at the time (with the help of Archbishop Christodoulos) as one of the most central issues in the public discourse. Beyond this intervention, CKID did not seem to change in any way the engagement of ND with the globalisation discourse, as this was manifested through the party’s electoral manifestos.

**Communist Party of Greece (KKE)**

For the 1996 elections, KKE published a 10 page long document entitled *Electoral Manifesto of the Communist Party of Greece: People Counterattack with a Strong KKE*\(^{15}\). This document made no reference to globalisation, but this was because the processes and conditions that in the manifestos of PASOK and ND were associated

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\(^{14}\) The institute is a ‘nonprofit organization...for the purpose of examining and analyzing social, political and economic issues’. See, http://www.idkaramanlis.gr/html/_en-version/profile/index-en.html (30/10/02). Compared to ISTAME, CKID is in organisational terms more centralised, i.e. it does not have local branches around Greece.

\(^{15}\) The reference for this manifesto throughout the thesis will be, KKE, 1996. The title in Greek is: ‘Εκλογική Διακήρυξη του Κομμουνιστικού Κόμματος Ελλάδας: Αντεπιθέσει Λαέ με Ισχυρό ΚΚΕ’. The extracts from the manifesto are not accompanied by page numbers because the document was not paginated.
with globalisation and internationalisation, in the case of KKE, were conceptualised as imperialism.

Thus the KKE manifesto conceptualised the new world order as a 'new imperialist order' that posed an immediate threat to Greece. It furthermore accused PASOK and Simitis, for serving the plutocracy. For instance with regard to the elections it argued that, 'the powerful circles of plutocracy and the imperialist centres', had called early elections in order 'to promote a new storm of anti-worker and anti-farmer measures, according to the demands of the industrialists, the imperialist organisations and the European Union'. Finally the KKE called for the creation of a 'front against the imperialist new order', and for confrontation and clash with 'the monopolies and the choices of imperialist organisations'.

Hence the discourse of KKE remained grounded in a conceptualisation of the international politico-economic order as an imperialist terrain that served particular economic interests. Along these lines the increased levels of internationalisation or globalisation signified, for KKE, the advancement of the old plutocratic and imperialist order.

In the 2000 elections instead of an electoral manifesto, KKE published twelve leaflets, with a sectoral (e.g. for farmers and self-employed) or thematic (e.g. on education and on the pension system) orientation. Some of these leaflets did make reference to globalisation, the main thesis being that globalisation was used by PASOK and ND as a means for justifying policy reforms that served the interests of multinational corporations and 'plutocracy' in Greece. For instance, the leaflets for education and for self-employed workers claimed:

Both PASOK and ND focus on the no-alternative of EMU and 'globalisation', struggling over which of the two will win the trust of the plutocracy (leaflet on education). Their policy serves the big monopolies and the multinationals....(leaflet on self-employed workers).

16 The title of this leaflet is 'Strengthening the Fight for Education and Life'. The reference for this leaflet throughout the thesis will be, KKE, 2000.
Finally, the leaflet for farmers added:

The way forward for the KKE...is the struggle for the development of an agriculture, against the quotas and common responsibility fines that aim at shrinking the Greek farming, making it supplementary to the EU, and adjusting it in the so called globalised market, from which are excluded more than 1.5 billion people who starve or are undernourished.

Thus, KKE remained constant in both electoral campaigns in its conceptualisation of the 'new world order' as an imperialist and plutocratic order. It furthermore accused the two big parties of using globalisation (and the EU) as an excuse to advance the changes demanded by plutocracy and its forces (mainly the MNEs).

**Coalition of the Left and Progress (Synaspismos)**

Considering the width of the gap between KKE on the one side, and PASOK and ND on the other, it is indeed interesting to see how Synaspismos was positioned towards the changing international environment, of the time. Synaspismos’ 13 page *Electoral Manifesto 1996*[^17], did not engage, at least directly, with the concept of globalisation. It propagated the need for a 'modernisation with a human face', and argued that ‘[t]he proposals of Synaspismos constitute and promote a modernisation which is not neutral, which is not a boring technocratic process’. In this regard it can be argued that Synaspismos was reading the need for modernisation of the Greek politico-economic system, not as something that was externally required, but as something that was a domestic, societal need. Thus the manifesto attempted to relate the ‘modernisation proposals’ of PASOK and ND to bureaucratisation, and argued for a ‘progressive’ and ‘people-driven’ modernisation. Yet, since the manifesto was mainly domestically-focused with no explicit reference to the ‘new international conditions’, no conclusions can be drawn on its stance toward globalisation.

[^17]: The reference for this manifesto throughout the thesis will be, Synaspismos, 1996. The title in Greek is: ‘Εκλογική Διακήρυξη 1996: Εμείς Μπορούμε να σας Κοιτάμε στα Μάτια’.
The manifesto for the 2000 elections was much more internationally oriented. It was entitled *Decide Left - Vote Synaspismos: Elections 2000* and it was 56 pages long. It paid particular attention to the ‘post-EMU’ era in Greece, it attacked the ‘neoliberal orthodoxy’ and ‘warn[ed] the Greek people that PASOK and ND prepare[d]...a new round of deregulations and blood-sacking of the weaker social classes, in the name of the adjustment of the Greek economy in the post-euro reality’.

The manifesto referred also to the ‘problems and demands that emerged from the new reality, defined by the revolution in science and technologies, and the globalisation of markets...the model of uncontrolled markets, and of the domination of market over society, cannot be the future of the country in the new century’ (emphasis in the original). Furthermore, the section on ‘sustainable development’ placed globalisation among the factors that damaged the quality of human life.

Overall, it can be argued that the focal point of criticism in the manifesto was neoliberalism and the process of the domination of economy over society that was associated with the phenomenon of globalisation.

**Synopsis**

From the above reading of party manifestos for the period 1995-2000 some elementary conclusions can be drawn. The party in power, PASOK, changed its stance significantly towards globalisation. From warnings against the danger of a ‘new barbarism’ in 1996, it moved to a relatively positive treatment of the concept of globalisation, as a ‘new reality’ that demanded domestic changes, and which was the driving force for international development. On the other hand ND had a more neutral approach from the outset. For this party, the internationalisation and globalisation processes signified a ‘new global reality’; the ordering principle of a new era to which the country had to adjust. On the left of the equation, the positions seem to converge during the period under investigation. The communist party (KKE)

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18 The reference for this manifesto throughout the thesis will be, Synaspismos, 2000. The title in Greek is: 'Αποφάσεις Αριστερά - Ψήφισε Συνασπισμό: Εκλογές 2000'. The document is not paginated.
started in 1996 by defining the 'new world order' as another plutocratic and imperialistic order, whereas Synaspismos argued for a modernisation with a human face, as an internal, societal necessity. Yet by 2000, both parties accused the government of PASOK of using globalisation as an excuse, in order to promote particular neo-liberal policies that were against the interests of the weakest social classes.

From this, it can be said that globalisation emerged gradually as a new zone of contestation in Greek politics. It defined a new political axis with globalisation as an opportunity for development and a 'new reality' on the one side, and as a 'new means for imperialist expansion' on the other. Hence, either through its acceptance as a new structural environment, or through its negation, as an excuse for neoliberal policies, the globalisation debate in Greece during 1995-2000 was all about the definition of what 'reality' and 'adjustment' were, and what they implied in policy terms.

The next section moves the examination on to the discourses of political leaders. Such an examination enriches our investigation of Greek public discourse in both qualitative and quantitative terms. It allows us to monitor the political actors' attempts to deliberately explain the phenomenon of globalisation to a variety of social groups and on different occasions, expanding from ad hoc electoral speeches to local farmers, to more institutionalised events such as the annual assembly of Greek employers.


Introduction

The methodology that was followed for the collection and the study of the research material is as follows. All the four parties have well-developed on-line archives, containing the public pronouncements of their leaders since approximately the
beginning of 1997\textsuperscript{19}. These pronouncements include, (i) speeches delivered in the parliament and in events organised by a wide variety of social organisations and associations, (ii) short statements made in a variety of occasions (e.g. new year messages, comments on the air strikes on Kosovo, comments on industrial actions, etc.), and (iii) interviews in the press or on TV. In this regard, the on-line party archives constitute a great source for the study of party leaders’ discourses. The rationale was that even if this material did not include all the public interventions of the political leaders during 1997-2000, it included a critical mass, able to give us an accurate picture of the discourses of political leaders. With regard to methodology, a ‘key-word-in-context’ and a ‘word-count’ methodology were combined\textsuperscript{20}. The ‘key word’ given was ‘globalisation’ (παγκόσμιοποίηση).

\textit{Costas Simitis, Prime Minister and President of PASOK throughout the period}

\textit{1996 – 2000}

Costas Simitis’s intervention in the public discourse is very important given that the prime minister is a powerful figure in the formation and evolution of Greek public discourse. In order to study this intervention 347 speeches, interviews and other various statements, searched for references to globalisation during the period 1997-2000. From these 347 documents, 68 were found to include an explicit reference to globalisation; that is approximately 20\% of the total. The exact evolution of these references is presented in Table 1 below.

\textsuperscript{19} The KKE’s archive contains documents published after 1998.
\textsuperscript{20} See, Denzin and Lincoln, 2000: 775-777.
Table 1: References to Globalisation in Speeches, Statements and Interviews by C. Simitis

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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
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<td>8:2</td>
<td>3:0</td>
<td>17:1</td>
<td>16:0</td>
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<td>3:0</td>
<td>5:0</td>
<td>11:0</td>
<td>4:1</td>
<td>12:1</td>
<td>89:06</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: The first number in the Table’s cells indicates the absolute number of examined documents, and the second number indicates the absolute number of documents in which a reference to globalisation was made. The last column indicates the per annum percentage of documents referring to globalisation.

We thus observe that 2 out of 10 public interventions (i.e. speeches, statements, interviews) of Simitis in 1997 included a reference to globalisation, and this figure rose to 3 out of 10 in 1998. Interestingly the references were reduced to 1 out of 15 interventions in 1999, to pick up again to 2 out of 10 in 2000. Therefore, the first general observation to be made is that globalisation constituted a constant theme, an integral part, of prime-minister’s discourse. Furthermore considering the dynamics of references during the years 1997 and 1998, it can be argued that globalisation was also implicated in the ‘modernisation project’ discourse of PASOK, and through it, it became an integral feature of the Greek public discourse. Nevertheless, the significantly low number of references to globalisation in 1999 remains hard to explain. It might be the case that by 1999 globalisation had started to be perceived and experienced in Greece as a process with concrete benefits and costs for the different groups of the population. Such an explanation would also be consistent with the negative connotations that globalisation had acquired at an international level by 1999. These factors, combined with the fact that 1999 was a pre-electoral year, may have led Simitis to put temporarily to the side his effort to defend globalisation within the public discourse.
Yet it is important to underline here that the above numbers and percentages should be treated as indicators of tendencies and not as absolute figures. Many of the examined speeches and statements were delivered on occasions when a reference to globalisation would be rather ‘out of context’ (e.g. a short public statement on the crisis in Kosovo, or a short statement on the re-election of C. Stefanopoulos to the Presidency). In this regard, the fact that the percentage of public interventions that made a reference to globalisation remained on average 20% is indeed striking.

In Table 2 we classify the sixty-eight references to globalisation made by Simitis, in different categories, according to their context.

**Table 2: The Context of C. Simitis’s References to Globalisation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Globalisation of the market/economy/production/competition (usually along with references to technology &amp; technological advancement)</th>
<th>The Challenge of Globalisation (in general)</th>
<th>The EU as a response to globalisation</th>
<th>Political globalisation (including 'globalised system' and 'globalised relations' mainly in an IR context)</th>
<th>Globalisation and culture</th>
<th>Definition of globalisation</th>
<th>Various (incl. Crime and Olympic Games)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTE:** The numbers in the Table's cells signify the number of thematic annual references and not absolute numbers of documents examined. For instance, if a document made a reference both to the EU and to culture, then both categories would be credited. For the annual totals of documents see Table 1.
Table 2 indicates a shift in the discourse of the prime-minister from an emphasis on economic globalisation, to a broader depiction of globalisation as a new era and as a challenge that had to be faced and taken advantage of, i.e. a shift from a passive to a pro-active approach to the phenomenon of globalisation (see also below). There was also a constant amount of references to the European Union as a response to globalisation. Furthermore, as time passed by, globalisation was used with reference to an expanding list of issues such as international governance, culture and crime. This points to a deeper implication of the concept of globalisation in the Greek public discourse. What follows are some direct extracts from Simitis’s speeches on globalisation. Through these extracts we aim to elucidate further the substance of his discourse on globalisation, and the content and dynamics of the categories mentioned in Table 2.

During 1997 C. Simitis initiated a series of high profile events aimed at discussing the position of the ‘socialist movement’ within the contemporary world. These series were part of the broader European debates on the future of ‘social democracy’, the ‘third way’ and international ‘progressive governance’ and the speakers included Massimo D’Alema, Jacques Delors and Lionel Jospin. In the first event, with D’Alema present, Simitis in his speech argued:

> The first and more powerful dynamic is that of the globalisation of the economy. Its characteristics include: The ever greater liberalisation of the movement of capitals, goods, services and economic actors. The ever-increasing demand for the stabilisation, synchronization and convergence of the economies. It is a new reality with ever diminishing economic borders21.

During 1998 this ‘new reality’ approach to globalisation was augmented to accommodate the dimension of ‘challenge’. Thus, Simitis tried to present globalisation in Greek public discourse as a challenge, (which remained, however, an inevitable reality). At the same time, an integral part of his discourse on globalisation was also the need for Greece to be an EU member state in this new era.

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21 The speech took place in March 14, 1997.
Today we have passed from the bipolar age to the age of globalisation\(^{22}\).

The globalisation is not only a challenge for the country but also a field that we are well-positioned to take advantage of\(^{23}\).

European integration is the means to respond to the great challenges that characterise our era. The first development is the globalisation of the economy...More and more it's becoming obvious that this trend is not reversible, that there are no ways to cancel it\(^{24}\).

In a similar manner in 1999 Simitis was noting:

The globalisation of the economy and the development of technology create opportunities and capacities to those able to adjust and those who have the will and the creativity to take advantage of them...Technology and globalisation integrate the national economies and change the nature of global competition. They give to smaller countries like Greece the ability to participate further and more dynamically in the international markets\(^{25}\).

The above extract is indeed indicative of Simitis’ strenuous effort to present globalisation as an opportunity within the Greek public discourse. It also signifies the shift of his discourse from a rather passive to a proactive stance towards globalisation. The message that Simitis wanted to communicate was that the opportunities ‘were there’; it was up to Greece to take advantage of them and prosper – adjustment was a crucial step to this end.

A decisive factor for the development of Simitis’ discourse on globalisation was his confrontation on exactly this issue with Archbishop Christodoulos. As we demonstrate below, by 1999 the Greek Church had developed through the Archbishop an explicitly hostile discourse towards globalisation. Simitis was asked on several

\(^{22}\) Speech in the parliament, June 23, 1998.


\(^{24}\) Speech in an international seminar, November 14, 1998.

occasions to comment on these negative positions of the Archbishop. In a high profile TV interview in 'Mega Channel', he said:

You mentioned the issue of globalisation; I believe that one should face globalisation as a reality, and should not fight it. What one should fight for is to adjust the country to globalisation...²⁶

In a similar context responding to a question about the danger of global cultural homogenisation he replied:

[the response to the negative consequences of globalisation] comes from our intellectual production...we must develop dynamics that confront this annihilating logic²⁷.

To sum up, Simitis was engaged in a tireless effort to present and defend globalisation in Greek public discourse as a 'new reality', and as a 'challenge' for the development and prosperity of Greece. Thus he tried to stress the potentials for taking control and advantage of globalisation. The decisive factors in the formation of his stance towards globalisation were: (i) his effort to counterbalance the negative and defensive discourse on globalisation of Archbishop Christodoulos (see below), and (ii) his participation in the European debates on the future of social democracy and on progressive governance. It seems, however, that Simitis had a genuine personal belief in globalisation as an opportunity for the development of Greece.

Kostas Karamanlis, President of New Democracy (ND), 1997 – present

After its defeat in the 1993 elections, the New Democracy party underwent an identity crisis, trying to delineate its political and ideological space. In this process, prominent neo-liberal as well as extreme-right members of the party were marginalized or expelled. Kostas Karamanlis, who took over the presidency of ND

²⁶ Interview with Stavro Theodoraki, in Mega Channel, April 2, 2000.
from Miltiadis Evert in March 22, 1997, attempted to promote the concept of ‘middle space’ (μεσαίος χώρος) as both the political space of belonging and an ideological orientation for the party.

Table 3 examines the frequency of the use of the concept of globalisation by K. Karamanlis.

**Table 3: References to Globalisation in Speeches, Statements and Interviews by K. Karamanlis**

<table>
<thead>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2:0</td>
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<td>6:0</td>
<td>2:0</td>
<td>0:0</td>
<td>0:0</td>
<td>3:0</td>
<td>6:1</td>
<td>15:1</td>
<td>8:1</td>
<td>44:3</td>
<td>6.8</td>
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<tr>
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<td>6:0</td>
<td>9:0</td>
<td>4:0</td>
<td>10:0</td>
<td>17:0</td>
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<td>1:0</td>
<td>12:0</td>
<td>12:0</td>
<td>10:0</td>
<td>9:1</td>
<td>105:1</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>10:0</td>
<td>38:0</td>
<td>32:1</td>
<td>9:0</td>
<td>27:0</td>
<td>20:2</td>
<td>4:0</td>
<td>0:0</td>
<td>7:0</td>
<td>14:1</td>
<td>32:0</td>
<td>34:1</td>
<td>227:5</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is clear that Karamanlis avoided the use of the term globalisation. From the 556 documents that were searched only 42 made a reference to globalisation (or globality), which corresponds to approximately 8% of the documents. It is revealing that even the increase in the use of the term in 2000 does not strictly refer to the term globalisation but to the term globality (παγκόσμιωτητα), which Karamanlis used most of the time, after 1999, instead of the term globalisation. Table 4 offers a more concrete picture of the context and content of Karamanlis’ (limited) discourse on globalisation.
Table 4: The Context of K. Karamanlis’s References to Globalisation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Globalisation of the market/economy/production/competition (usually along with references to technology and technological advancements)</th>
<th>The Challenge of globalisation - The era of globalisation</th>
<th>The EU as a response to globalisation - EU and Globalisation</th>
<th>Political globalisation (including ‘globalised system’ and ‘globalised relations’ mainly in an IR context)</th>
<th>Globalisation and culture</th>
<th>The definition of the concept of globalisation</th>
<th>The Era of globality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>9&lt;sup&gt;28&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>17</td>
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</table>

For most of the period up to 2000 Karamanlis used the concept of globalisation in a narrow manner to refer to the international economic environment. The more, however, the concept of globalisation was charged ideologically – both domestically and internationally – the more Karamanlis adopted a more critical stance towards it or avoided references to it. This should also explain the lack of references to globalisation in the electoral manifestos of New Democracy. In this framework the conceptualisation of the European Union as a response to globalisation became an integral part of Karamanlis discourse<sup>29</sup>. From the last months of 1999, however, the leader of the Opposition started to make use of the more neutral concept of globality (παγκοσμιότητα). Karamanlis used globality along with technology and knowledge

<sup>28</sup> Two of which refer to ‘globality’ rather than globalisation.

<sup>29</sup> See for instance his reference to the importance of the project of European Integration in the age of globalisation in his message on the occasion of the 28<sup>th</sup> of October (a national day for Greece), 1999.
to define the nature of our age. The context of his references to globality was repetitive and served an introductory purpose in his speeches. The following extract is characteristic of these references, and was also found in the 2000 electoral manifesto:

It is a common belief that the world is in the end of an era and the beginning of an other. We are already in the first stage of the post-industrial era. The first stage of the era of globality, technology and knowledge. The developments in all the sectors of human activity have acquired an unprecedented speed\textsuperscript{30}. The concept of globality gave to Karamanlis an ideological-free alternative to globalisation. Its use can itself be considered as a critique of the concept of globalisation as a challenge for development that was advanced by Simitis. In this way, Karamanlis tried to send the message that globalisation was a rather negative development, as opposed to globality which signified the arrival of the post-industrial era. Thus he was implicitly taking the Archbishop’s side in the ‘war’ between the latter and the government, on the concept and consequences of globalisation; a stance which no matter how genuine it was, was an easy way to increase his party’s popularity.

\textit{Aleka Papariga, Leader of the Communist Party of Greece, 1991 - present\textsuperscript{31}}

Aleka Papariga adopted from the very beginning a highly critical approach both to the phenomenon of globalisation as such and to the way in which globalisation was used by the government. The focal point of Papariga’s discourse on globalisation was that globalisation constituted a development which was inexorably related to the evolution

\textsuperscript{30} Speech at the Annual Assembly of the Federation of Greek Industries, January 20, 2000.
\textsuperscript{31} It has to be noted here that the available on-line party archive cannot be used as a source for the majority of the speeches and interviews of the party leader. Although it has a number of Paparigas’s speeches it mainly includes decisions and reports of the Central Committee of the party as well as speeches and interviews by other party members. For the purposes of our research we did not only examine the available on-line Papariga’s speeches and interviews, but also the available decisions and press reports of the party’s Central Committee (for the period 1998-2000). Therefore the examination of Papariga’s discourse remains thinner compared to the analysis offered for the other party leaders.
and expansion of the capitalist system, and in this regard it was the modern face of imperialism. In this discourse the European Union was considered to be part of the ‘imperialist problem’ (rather than a response to it), and both PASOK and ND, were accused of using the excuse of globalisation to serve the interests of the plutocracy in Greece.

The one-way of ‘globalisation’ and the ‘new order of things’ that the government tries to impose, is fake.

The workers can choose between two paths. Either they will be subjugated in the inhuman globalisation of EMU...or they will follow the path of class struggle, adopting as their vision the overturning of the domination and power of the monopolies...

Following this logic the KKE adopted an explicitly supportive stance towards the anti-globalisation movement (including its radical expressions). For instance, after the protests in Gotebor, in 2001, the Central Committee of KKE criticised Simitis for supporting with his statements ‘state violence’ that had led to ‘hundreds of prosecutions and...one clinically dead protester’. Moreover, according to the Central Committee, these developments demanded ‘an equally strong response to be given to the imperialist barbarism’. The announcement concluded that ‘[t]he struggle against NATO and EU is of vital importance’.

Thus it can be argued that Papariga and KKE remained faithful to their traditional negative approach to the European Union, as a ‘neoliberal project’ that serves the interests of the global and local plutocracies. Along the same lines KKE approached globalisation as a new form of imperialism that had to be resisted through class struggle.

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33 Announcement of the Press Office of the Central Committee of the KKE regarding the entrance of Greece in EMU, June 20, 2000.
34 Declaration of the Central Committee of the KKE on May 1, 2000. See also the speech of Papariga in the meeting of the ‘European United Left’ in Rizospastis, April 12, 1998.
Nicos Constantopoulos, President of Synaspismos 1993 – 2004

Nicos Constandopoulos articulated a clear, coherent and critical discourse on globalisation. Some quantitative and qualitative aspects of his discourse are as follows.

Table 5: References to Globalisation in Speeches, Statements and Interviews by N. Constandopoulos

<table>
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<tbody>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>2:1</td>
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<td>6:1</td>
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<td>2:0</td>
<td>22:3</td>
<td>14</td>
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<td>1:0</td>
<td>3:1</td>
<td>1:0</td>
<td>2:1</td>
<td>2:1</td>
<td>1:0</td>
<td>1:0</td>
<td>2:1</td>
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<td>2:0</td>
<td>3:1</td>
<td>28:5</td>
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<td>2000</td>
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<td>4:0</td>
<td>4:0</td>
<td>3:0</td>
<td>0:0</td>
<td>2:1</td>
<td>0:0</td>
<td>1:0</td>
<td>3:0</td>
<td>1:1</td>
<td>3:1</td>
<td>29:3</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6: The Context of N. Constandopoulos’s References to Globalisation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Globalisation of the market/economy/production/competition (usually along with references to technology and technological advancements)</th>
<th>Globalisation (the phenomenon of)</th>
<th>Political Globalisation (with relation to a hegemonic power)</th>
<th>Globalisation of networks of news and technology</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1998 3 (Globalisation of the market/economy/production/competition)</td>
<td>2 (Globalisation)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999 2 (Globalisation of the market/economy/production/competition)</td>
<td>3 (Globalisation)</td>
<td>1 (Political Globalisation)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000  - (Globalisation of the market/economy/production/competition)</td>
<td>3 (Globalisation)</td>
<td>3 (Political Globalisation)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals 5 (Globalisation of the market/economy/production/competition)</td>
<td>8 (Globalisation)</td>
<td>4 (Political Globalisation)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

37 Speeches and Interviews were available at Synaspismos on-line archive only after 1998 (excluding two speeches delivered in 1997). Thus the investigation was limited to the period 1998-2000.
From the 81 speeches that were examined only 11 made an explicit reference to globalisation, a number (14% of the documents) that fails to capture both the dynamic and the coherence of Constandopoulos’s discourse on globalisation. The focal point of the latter was that globalisation is a hegemonic ideology aiming at the subjugation of politics and society by the market. Constantopoulos’s discourse was also decisive in the institutionalisation in the Greek public discourse of the critique of globalisation as an excuse used by the government to promote particular (neoliberal) policies and laws. The following extracts are indicative of his discourse:

The sacrifice of society and politics on the altar of the market must be prevented. The deification of globalisation is idolatry\textsuperscript{38}. The government constantly uses the gospel of globalisation of market and the commandments of uncontrolled free competition, calling on the citizens to accept...their subjugation in the economic, social, cultural and regional inequalities that are generated and getting deeper by the governmental policy itself\textsuperscript{39}.

In the same manner, in his last speech before the 2000 elections he called for resistance at the European level in order ‘not to surrender democracy and society to the uncontrolled globalisation’\textsuperscript{40}. Yet Constantopoulos carefully differentiated himself and his criticism from the stance taken by the Archbishop Christodoulos. Therefore he strongly criticised references to ‘forces of darkness, that aim to take the soul of our faith and destroy our national identity’\textsuperscript{41}.

In conclusion it can be argued that Costandopoulos developed a critique of globalisation and its effects on human societies and the environment, similar to the one that was adopted by the majority of the European left at the time.

\textsuperscript{38} Speech in the Fest of Synaspismos in Athens, in September 13, 1998.
\textsuperscript{39} Speech in the Parliament, on April 28, 1998.
\textsuperscript{40} June 7, 1999.
\textsuperscript{41} An explicit reference to the Archbishop’s approach to globalisation. Speech at the 3rd Annual Conference of Synaspismos, in July 2, 2000.
Party Discourses: A First Reflection on the Findings

Up to this point we have focused on the main political parties and their leaders. This analysis is important because as has been argued, the political parties in Greece constitute all-powerful social institutions which penetrate and dominate most aspects of the Greek polity and society. In this regard, by studying the discourse of political parties and their leaders, we have examined one of the most fundamental nexuses of ideology production in Greece.

The question to be raised here is what the above data tell us about the communication of the globalisation discourse in Greece. It can be argued that the examination of party discourses revealed a gradual but critical restructuring of the Greek public discourse in the terms of the hegemonic/globalisation. Thus the discourse of globalisation seems to emerge as a new zone of contestation, a means through which social interests and conflicts were reordered and expressed anew. Moreover globalisation did not emerge, and was not communicated, as a thematic, issue-specific discourse. It was about the economy and the opportunities for future development, as it was about culture and the danger of homogenisation; it was about the environment and social inequalities, as it was about the role of the state and capitalism. It can thus be argued that the emergence of globalisation discourse in Greece was about the conceptualisation and definition of the conditions and environment the country was in. Put differently, globalisation was all about everyday life, its constraints, its opportunities, its conditions of production and reproduction. At this point the boundaries between inside and outside become highly problematic. Globalisation, being about the reproduction of people's everyday life, was also about the conceptualisation of the dynamics and the substance of the 'out there'; it was about the understanding, ultimately at the level of the subjects, of what the current world state of affairs was and what was becoming.

This process of everyday life reconceptualisation and restructuring is about politics, because it carries with it the politics of the hegemonic discourse, in terms of power relationships and 'winners' and 'losers'. But it is not only about politics, at least when the latter are narrowly defined. It is also about biopolitics, i.e. about the (re-)
production of *subjects*, their self-understanding and their social space of existence. Much of the material used for tracing this latter biopolitical process constituted part of the ordinary, the obvious, the commonsensical, the everyday. It is through the incremental changes at this obvious, everyday level that a hegemonic discourse operates.

Yet the Greek public discourse cannot be boiled down to the discourses of the political parties and their leaders. Broader social institutions that underlie or/and interact with the world of political parties, such as the church, the organised interests, the media and the intelligentsia have to be taken into consideration. The following section turns to the analysis of the Church.

The Archbishop of Athens and All of Greece, Christodoulos, and the Greek Church

The purpose of this section is to study the Greek Church’s discourse on globalisation. It should also be noted that the Church can exert significant influence in the formation of the Greek public discourse, and has the power to mobilise people when it feels that its interests are at stake\(^{42}\). In order to study the Greek Church the speeches and public interventions of Archbishop Christodoulos were examined. Such a narrowing down of the research cannot be fully representative of the various and diverse positions that existed within the Greek Church in the second half of the 1990s. Yet, the Archbishop is the leader of the Church and, in terms of public influence, is the single most important personality in it.

The thesis examined the 62 speeches, letters and interviews of the Archbishop that were available in the on-line archive of the Church of Greece. Of these documents 54 were in Greek and 8 in English. From the 54 documents in Greek (covering the period 1995-2001) 12 made a reference to globalisation (i.e. 22%), and most of these references were rather extensive. Furthermore most of these documents were

\(^{42}\) This became clear during the confrontation between the Church and the government of PASOK on whether religious affiliation should be mentioned on identity cards.
gathered together in a thematic subdirectory of the archive under the name ‘globalisation’ (the main directory was ‘Europe’). On the other hand, in the English section of the web-site, the percentage of the speeches that made a reference to globalisation was as high as 40% (3 out of the 8 speeches). Nevertheless, these figures cannot capture the influence that Archbishop Christodoulos exerted on Greek public discourse, regarding the concept and conceptualisation of globalisation, no matter whether this was channelled through his after Mass talks every Sunday, through books and other publications, or through interviews in Greek mass media.

In the Archbishop’s discourse, globalisation represented a great and multilevel threat to the European societies in general. It would not be an exaggeration to say that the Archbishop personified and declared a war on globalisation. Sometimes, the object of this war was concrete, for instance the protection of the European socio-political model. Yet, most of the time more abstract and transcendental categories were employed to describe the ‘enemy’, such as the ‘forces of evil’.

In 1998, talking about the future of the European Union, the Archbishop noted: ‘A real development is only that which promotes social cohesion, in other words, solidarity’; and in this context he was calling for resistance against the ‘thailandisation of Europe’ for ‘development is the opposite trend, namely the elevation of the Thai and other poor populations to the standards of the Europeans’. In the same context a year later he argued:

In the first place, I am asking myself whether the term globalisation is correct. Is it, indeed, about globalisation?... Instead, we have the exportation of a model, which belongs to only one country and the imposition of that model on other countries. Hence, whoever does not wish to play with words and the reality these words signify would speak of world Americanisation rather than globalisation – even if he does not a priori oppose to Americanisation.

David Rothkopf, the managing director of Kissinger Associates, participated in a debate... which had been organized by ‘Foreign Policy’, a magazine of indisputable authority, published by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. There David Rothkopf emphatically declared that

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43 Opening Greeting at the ‘Athens Meeting 1998: Peace and Development’ (original text in English).
globalisation is nothing more but 'the dominion of the American model' which as a phenomenon is not something new, but the old and notorious model of colonialisation. He straightforwardly pointed out, that 'it is in the general interest of the United States' that 'exclusionary aspects of religion, language, and political/ideological beliefs' to be abolished... That's exactly why the director of Kissinger Associates evaded the use of the term 'globalisation' and chose instead the term 'cultural imperialism'...

Under these conditions, whoever resists the dissolution of national identities, and languages, he does not simply resist American imperialism but the suzerainty of international crime.

It's typical that the most powerful argument on behalf of globalisation is that it's about an inescapable situation; however, there are many catastrophes which are inescapable, but this does not mean we are obliged to applaud them; on the contrary, we are obliged to find out ways, which can secure the survival of Man and civilization.

Another argument is that globalisation would facilitate the economic development, and the domination of free market... However, the European civilization has been the product of a parallel action of two elements: of free economy and social solidarity. And we all Europeans paid very dearly whenever we hazarded to abolish that parallel action...44.

Most of these points were being replicated in the everyday speeches and interviews of the Archbishop. For instance in one of his speeches after a Sunday Mass he stressed:

Today the Church tries to protect the people from their entrapment in the new forms of the demonic. Today the implementation of globalisation is dramatic, and appears with the mask of global economic development...globalisation is the means and not the end; it is the means which leads to the imposition of syncretism. Syncretism is promoted by the same forces which promote globalisation ...A second step in the promotion of syncretism is the cold planned effort for the destruction of Christianity45.

44 All three references from the Opening Greeting at the 'Athens Meeting 1999' (original text in English).
Furthermore, during his confrontation with the PASOK government on the issue of identity cards, he urged: 'The Church knows well that its compromise with the secularisation...[and] globalisation... is a criminal mistake'.

Hence, Archbishop Christodoulos conceptualised globalisation as a manipulated process, which was driven by particular interests that aimed at the 'annihilation' of the cultural diversity around the world in general, and the 'Christian discolouring of Europe' and thus of Greece in particular. The main reference points of this discourse were Americanisation, American cultural imperialism, the danger of cultural homogenisation, social estrangement and individualism/egocentrism.

Concluding, it can be argued that the Archbishop was very effective in articulating a discourse of globalisation as a real and immediate threat to the Greek national identity and way of life, in a period when the confidence of the Greek people about their position in Europe and the World was increasing. This anti-globalisation stance of the Archbishop created a wide popular trend against globalisation. His critics have argued that the demonisation of globalisation by the Archbishop, was one way of securing and justifying the active role of the Church in the Greek socio-political system.

The success of Archbishop Christodoulos in constructing globalisation as an immediate threat in the public discourse adds an important piece to the ideology production puzzle of the Greek polity. Moreover, it supports the thesis about the effect of the hegemonic discourse in the (re)production of the national, social spheres. Yet in order to get a more complete understanding of the dynamics at work in Greek public discourse, other important institutional actors should also be brought in the picture. The following two sections focus on the employers and workers.

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46 October 11, 2000.
Federation of Greek Industries (SEV)

The Federation of Greek Industries was founded in 1907 and is the main national association that 'represents and speaks for industry, and for the economy's private sector in general, vis-à-vis state authorities and other societal institutions'\(^48\). SEV's 'members are individual enterprises or employer organisations, both sectoral and regional'. 'More than 85% of its members are manufacturing enterprises and the corresponding sectoral or regional employer organisations'\(^49\).

Considering the widespread penetration of political parties in the structure of interests representation in Greece, it can be argued that the Federation of Greek Industries is the most enduring and 'party-independent' group of organised interests that has ever existed in the Greek industrial relations system.

Studying the role of SEV in the communication of globalisation discourse, one has to keep in mind the impact of the intervening European level, and in particular the relationship and interaction of SEV with the Union of Industrial and Employer's Confederations of Europe (UNICE), i.e. the respective European association. The impact of UNICE on SEV becomes clear from the UNICE's documents and positions that SEV used in Greece for the promotion of its ideas and policies. We return to this issue when the conclusions of the comparison between Greece and Ireland are drawn.

In order to capture SEV's discourse, the following documents were scrutinised: (a) the annual activity reports ('Απολογισμός', henceforth 'annual report' or 'Report') of the Federation for the period 1995-2001, and (b) the speeches of the Chairman of SEV, during the meetings of the annual General Assembly of the Federation for the period 1998-2001. A personal interview with Iason Stratos, the Chairman of SEV for the period 1992-2000, was also conducted on April 30, 2002. On the one hand, the annual reports allowed us to trace and monitor all the activities of SEV during the


period into question. On the other hand, the annual General Assembly is a ‘media event’ and can be considered as the activity of SEV with the single most important influence in the Greek public discourse.

Annual Reports

The general conclusion from the study of the annual reports is that SEV and its leadership did not develop, or attempt to develop, a discourse on globalisation as such. Yet particular ‘dominant objects’ of the economic globalisation discourse, mostly ‘flexibility’ and ‘privatisation’, were at the heart of SEV’s discourse. Iason Stratos, the Chairman of SEV had a clear idea on whether globalisation was something new for SEV: ‘Globalisation and the need for adjustment to market forces was not something new for SEV; it was what SEV was fighting for since the late 1980s’\(^{50}\). It is also interesting that all the Reports made reference to the conscious effort of SEV to promote its positions in media and the broader public, and ensure that these positions would be commented on in the ‘appropriate way’ (i.e. positively)\(^{51}\).

In order to understand the dynamics at work in SEV’s discourse, we should bring the European level back into the picture. In this regard the ‘Essen strategy’ (i.e. the ‘five action points’ agreed in the European Council in Essen in December 1994) constituted an important point of reference, as it became a focal point in SEV’s discourse\(^{52}\). In particular, the second ‘action point’ of the Essen Strategy referred to flexibility, suggesting an ‘increase in the employment intensity of economic growth through a flexible organisation of work and working time, moderate wage settlements and new areas of employment’\(^{53}\). In this context, one more important development at a European level was the publication of the ‘Concluding Report’ of the ‘Molitor

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\(^{50}\) Personal interview, 30/04/02.

\(^{51}\) The same reference existed in all the Reviews. See SEV, 1996: 75-76, SEV, 1998: 25, 114, SEV, 2000: 36. The latter noted that the creation of the ‘right [public] image for the Industry…and particular its contribution to the creation of wealth and social prosperity, was…of central concern to…SEV’ (p. 36).

\(^{52}\) This was clear in the annual report of 1996 (that covers the period May 1995 to April 1996).

\(^{53}\) See SEV, 1996: 42-43. The quotation is from: http://www.eu-employment-observatory.net/ersep/imi53_uk/00030001.asp (11/11/2002) and was party reproduced in SEV, 1996: 42-43. These trend is also exemplified at the agreement signed by the social partners at the EU level on the issue of part-time jobs, facilitating the use of flexible modes of employment (see SEV, 1998: 15, 89).
group', on the simplification and deregulation of European and national legal frameworks; a report which also triggered an UNICE report, published in October 1995. It is also worth mentioning here that with the treaty of Amsterdam, competition became a basic target for the European Union (see respective reference in SEV, 1998: 122).

These European level developments are instrumental in demonstrating that the need for deregulation, flexibility and adjustment to the ‘new conditions’ were not only defining features of SEV’s discourse but were also in the spotlight in the European Union in general and UNICE in particular (of which SEV was a member). Thus, throughout 1995-2001 SEV promoted positions reached at UNICE’s level, stressing both the need for the transformation of the labour market in more flexible terms, and the important role of the social partnership, in this regard.

Thus the discourse of SEV (at least initially) was built on the trio of flexibility, privatisations and the danger of a ‘regression to statism’.

Clearly the scheduled privatisations are being delayed, whilst the closing of some enterprises, has in some circles revived the logic of statism. There is a danger these developments could be used as an excuse for undermining the privatisation policy. If the trust of the investors in Greece and abroad is to be restored, then this danger should be faced with determination (SEV, 1996: 64; repeated also in SEV, 1998: 101).

The same stance toward the role of the state and the need for privatisations and flexibility was also taken in all the subsequent Reports. For instance the 2001 Report stressed:

54 A group of independent experts on legislative and administrative simplification and deregulation, which had been founded by the European Commission.
56 SEV’s approach to flexibility was a broader one and referred to the restructuring of the whole socio-economic system. With regard to education see SEV, 2001: 48-50.
57 In November 1996, SEV and GSEE created the ‘National Observatory for Industrial Relations’. For the SEV’s stance towards the role of social partners, see SEV, 2001: 46.
58 On this issue see also SEV, 1996: 104-105.
Today, the transformation of the State is the absolute priority; it needs to be radically modernised, and adjusted to the new conditions (SEV, 2001: 29) ... SEV has ... expressed its opinion on the general need for the modernisation of the regulatory framework of the country either [through] simplification...or deregulation...or...self-regulation...[T]he above modernisation is imposed by the processes of globalisation, the new technologies and the development of the new economy, which demands less barriers in world competition (ibid.: 33-34)...[t]hese positions are now meeting a wider acceptance in large parts of Greek society and are faced with greater realism by the workers (ibid.: 47; see also the foreword in SEV, 1998).

In this context, it is also interesting that SEV translated the EU ‘race to the bottom’ debate59 as a proof of the need for immediate and ‘brave’ economic reforms. In this regard SEV criticised PASOK’s ‘tax reform’ (promoted with the law 2753/99) as a very limited one which had completely ignored SEV’s suggestions (see SEV, 2000: 33-35).

To account fully for the above dynamics, we also need to consider the impact of the EU pressures on its member states for the institutionalisation of tripartite consultation mechanisms. These pressures were generated by the intensification of the social dialogue between employers’ associations (UNICE and CEEP60) and workers’ unions (European Trade Union Confederation-ETUC) at the EU level61, especially since 1997, when the role of the social partners in European integration was institutionalised by the Treaty of Amsterdam. Thus the member states were forced to create (if they did not already have in place) policy mechanisms that institutionalised the participation of social partners in various aspects of their public policy making. In the Greek case and regarding the employers, this pressure was translated into the enhancement of the institutional role of SEV, through the participation of its representatives in an ever-longer list of public committees and working groups (SEV,

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59 To face this ‘negative’ race ECOFIN adopted a code of conduct in December 1, 1997 (SEV, 1998: 98).
60 The European Centre of Enterprises with Public Participation and of Enterprises of General Economic Interest (CEEP) is recognised as a Social Partner by the European Commission. See http://www.ceep.org.
1998: 22, 92). The following instance is characteristic of these institutional pressures and changes. In the European Council in Luxembourg (November 1997), the member states agreed to submit each year a ‘national action plan’ for employment. Yet the first plan which was submitted by the Greek government in 1998 had not been prepared in consultation with the social partners, a fact which triggered criticism from the European Commission towards the Greek Ministry of Labour. As a result, the Ministry of Labour was forced to change its policy process in order to accommodate consultation with the social partners, in the preparation of the next plans (SEV, 2000: 22).

Within this context PASOK initiated a ‘Social Dialogue’ (i.e. round table discussions/negotiations between the government and the social partners), in May 1997, and an agreement was reached by the social partners in November of the same year (ibid.: 16). SEV saw the promotion of the ad hoc framework of Social Dialogue by the government not in opposition but as complementary to the Economic and Social Council that the government itself had created in 1995 (SEV, 2001: 16-17). Yet it severely criticised the government for organising a ‘fake’ Social Dialogue in 2000, that resulted ‘in the creation of rigidities in the organisation of labour as well as in the rise of labour cost’ (SEV, 2001: 60-61).

*The Chairman*

The study of the speeches of the Chairman of SEV at the Annual General Assembly of the federation since 1998 does not add much more to the above picture. The need for the acceleration of privatisation, and in general for the redefinition of the role of state in the economy, along with the need for greater flexibility in the labour market and for deregulation remained the focal points of reference. In terms of vocabulary, Iason Stratos seemed to have avoided the use of the term globalisation, preferring the concept of ‘globalised markets’ (see Stratos, 1999), which also appeared in the annual

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62 The agreement was titled ‘Development, Competitiveness, Employment’.
Leuteris Antonacopoulos replaced Stratos in the leadership of SEV in May 2000. In his speech to the annual assembly Antonacopoulos (2000) referred to the ‘challenge of globalisation’ that the modern enterprises confront, but in substance his approach was similar to Stratos and the focus of his speech remained on the need for ‘structural changes, which...have been delayed’ (ibid.). Thus, SEV’s chairmen not only did not join the public debate on globalisation but rather avoided the use of the term altogether.

This attitude may have a simple explanation. On the one hand the ‘economic side’ of globalisation discourse did not offer something new in the discourse of SEV. The arguments in favour of privatisation, deregulation and competitiveness had always been central to SEV’s interventions in the public discourse. On the other hand, after 1995, globalisation was increasingly charged with a heavy ideological content, and arguably the SEV leadership wanted to avoid associating its policy prescriptions with a concept towards which a large number of Greek people were negatively predisposed.

Synopsis

It can be argued that the Federation of Greek Industries was very active in promoting the ‘politics of globalisation’ (in terms of the needed structural adjustments) and generating a discourse that was based on the ‘dominant objects’ of economic globalisation, such as ‘anti-statism’, ‘privatisations’, ‘deregulation’ and ‘flexibility’. Overall, SEV’s strategy and discourse was characterised by a ‘new reality’ approach to globalisation, even if the term globalisation itself was generally avoided.

The next section turns to the other half of the story of industrial relations in Greece, the discourse of the Greek General Confederation of Labour.

Moreover, on the question of how he conceptualised the phenomenon of globalisation, Mr Stratos started his answer by saying: ‘We live in a globalised market, a globalised society’. Personal interview, 30/04/02.
Greek General Confederation of Labour (GSEE)

The Greek General Confederation of Labour (GSEE) is the main national association which represents workers and employees in the private sector. Traditionally, GSEE was dominated by political parties, and thus the potential for the articulation of an independent stance and discourse was extremely limited, to the point of zero. It is revealing that 87.9% of the trade unions' leaders belong to a political party. Since the beginning of the 1990s, however, GSEE has been acquiring a more independent stance. Two factors seem to have played a significant role in this change. First, was the integration of GSEE in the structures of social partnership at a European level. These structures, as has been argued, demanded and necessitated an institutionally independent stance from GSEE in public policy making, helping it at the same time to develop such a role (see also the respective SEV section). The crucial factors in this process were the intensification of the interaction of GSEE with other workers' unions around Europe, as well as the fact that the Chairmen of SEV and GSEE had on many occasions to represent together the 'Greek side' at the European level. A product of these processes was the creation by GSEE of the 'Institute of Labour' (INE), in December 1990; a think-tank aiming to 'scientifically' support the Greek 'trade union movement'. The Institute of Labour is chaired by the Chairman of GSEE, and has contributed immensely to the articulation and promotion of an independent and effective role and discourse by GSEE. In particular it invested GSEE and its intervention in public discourse with an epistemic capacity that significantly enhanced its public credibility. Thus INE broke the tradition that wanted 'scientific' research and arguments to come only from the government's or SEV's sides (leaving GSEE to manifesto-like interventions). Moreover the creation of an independent unit of analysis and a pool of experts reduced GSEE's dependence on political parties and their experts.

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65 Iason Stratos, personal interview, 30/04/02.
66 ADEDI, the union for the public sector employees, also participates in INE.
67 Quotations are from the official webpage of the Institute of Labour. See at, http://www.inegsee.gr/INE-profile.htm (14/11/02).
In order to study the role of the General Confederation in the communication of the
globalisation discourse in Greece, we examined the monthly publication of the
one to trace and monitor all the (main) activities of INE and GSEE, including the
activities of their Chairman, who is also the editor of *Enimerosi*. This material was
complemented by a personal interview with Professor Savvas Robolis, the ‘Scientific
Director’ of INE, held in Athens, in April 29, 2002.

*Enimerosi: Tracing GSEE’s Discourse on Globalisation*

During the first years of the period under investigation, i.e. 1995-96, the concept of
globalisation did not seem to figure significantly in the argumentation and public
interventions of GSEE. Instead, the focal point of its discourse were the concept of
‘neoliberalism’, as well as the ‘dominant subjects’ of the economic globalisation
discourse, mainly ‘flexibility’ and ‘deregulation’ (which were also in the front line of
SEV’s public interventions).

In 1995, at the top of GSEE’s agenda was the issue of a 35-hour working week.
GSEE succeeded in bringing the issue onto the public agenda, forcing both the
government and the employers’ associations to take a position on the subject. A
demand for a 35-hour week was also adopted by the 8th Congress of ETUC, in 1995.
In terms of public discourse it can be argued that the issue of a 35-hour working week
was developed against the pressures for flexibility in the labour market, exercised by
the Federation of Greek Industries and the government. Thus, in 1995 the pressure
for ‘structural adjustments’ translated in Greece into the flexibility of labour market
vs. reduction of working hours debate.

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68 The first 32 issues of *Enimerosi* (March 1995 – January 1998) are available only in hard copies. I
am grateful to Mr Dimitris Katsoridas (economic analyst and responsible for the archive in INE) for
his crucial help in acquiring a copy of them.
This confrontation was carried forward in 1996, and in general remained central throughout the period 1995-2000. Thus, the first issue of Enimerosi in 1996\textsuperscript{71} was almost exclusively devoted to the issue of 35-hour week. GSEE criticised the government for not consulting the social partners in its decisions on the subject, and for not following the ‘wider European trends’, as these were exemplified, according to GSEE, in the case of France\textsuperscript{72}. In March of the same year, GSEE publicised its positions on the matter, rejecting ‘the unrestrained ‘flexibility’ that deregulates the social life of employees and increases their insecurity and exploitation’\textsuperscript{73}. Yet it remained within the ‘game’, asking ‘for ... the establishment of minimum requirements for the implementation of part time and other flexible practices’, rather than rejecting flexibility policies altogether\textsuperscript{74}. This modest strategy bore fruits. In a survey on the issue of the 35-hour week, contacted by DIMEL, on a significant sample of Greek companies, the results were as follows: 40% replied that the unions’ demand was right, 25% that it was premature, 29% that it would create problems in the function of companies and 6% did not answer.

During the same period the concepts of internationalisation and globalisation were also mobilised. Internationalisation along with ‘new technologies’ were conceptualised as the new defining parameters of the industrial relations and social security systems\textsuperscript{75}, whilst references to the ‘globalisation of markets and economies’\textsuperscript{76} started to appear. Neoliberalism, however, remained the main point of reference. In this context, Professor Pierre Bourdieu was invited and gave a lecture to GSEE on October 16, 1996. He argued for the need to create an ‘anti-trend, against the trend of neoliberalism’, and criticised the ‘fatalisme neoliberale’, i.e. the tendency to approach neoliberalism as a historically inevitable process\textsuperscript{77}. Christos Polizogopoulos, the Chairman of GSEE, made similar comments in his welcoming

\textsuperscript{71} Enimerosi, no 10, January 1996.
\textsuperscript{72} Enimerosi, no 10, January 1996, p. 15.
\textsuperscript{73} Enimerosi, no 12, March 1996, p. 6.
\textsuperscript{74} In particular GSEE’s demands included: (a) the specification of a maximum percentage of part-time workers per company, (b) the specification of a minimum time of employment per day, (c) payment of the part-time workers on the basis of their working hours (with an increased ratio) (ibid.). Moreover, in 1996 INE published two studies on flexibility and its affects. See Enimerosi, no 22, February 1996.
\textsuperscript{75} See for instance the intervention of S. Laimos, the Vice-General Secretary of GSEE and Secretary of Social Policy, in Enimerosi, no. 17, September 1996, pp. 15-16.
\textsuperscript{76} See for instance ibid., p. 16.
\textsuperscript{77} Enimerosi, no 18, October 1996.
remarks, referring to ‘neoliberal policies that diminish the welfare state and workers’ rights’. It was not until 1997 that the concept of ‘globalisation’ came into the spotlight at GSEE, along with the distinction between different models of capitalism. With regard to the latter, GSEE, in its written response to the government’s proposal for a ‘Social Dialogue’, argued:

The demand for adjustment to the new laws of global competition leads to the transfer of practices and experiences related with attitudes that dominate at the ‘Atlantic side’. These practices demolish the European social model...and deregulate the system of labour relations...developments which do not fit in the traditions and vested rights of the European people.

On the other hand, globalisation was being introduced and conceptualised as a form of market domination. Thus, the new conditions for labour relations and social protection were set by ‘the market forces that...controlled the globalisation of the economy’. The way in which Enimerosi reacted to an IMF report published in 1997 is also indicative of the position that globalisation had acquired in GSEE’s discourse. The report (World Economic Outlook, May 1997) had as its main subject the effects of globalisation, and one of its conclusions was that globalisation in the form of competition by low-wage countries ‘does not seem to constitute the main factor for the negative developments in employment and income distribution which are observed in many advanced economies’ (ibid.). Enimerosi’s editorial comment, was that ‘what of course the IMF report does not mention is how many rushed and wrong decisions have been taken in the EU during the last five years due to exactly this erroneous dominant belief with regard to globalisation’.

In 1997 the discourse of globalisation was becoming central also in the international labour movement. Most importantly, at the 85th Conference of the International Labour Office  

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78 Ibid. GSEE tried to maintain its relationship with P. Bourdieu, and a common research project was included in its annual activity plan of 1997. See Enimerosi, no 22, February 1997, p. 2.
79 Enimerosi, no 24, April 1997, p. 5.
81 Enimerosi, no 29, October 1997, p. 17.
Labour Organisation the newly elected President Mrs. Olga Keltosová brought the issue of globalisation to the heart of her presidential speech and thus to the heart of the international labour movement. Keltosová argued that 'globalization and the realization of ILO goals are interconnected...Globalisation should be accompanied by respective progress in the social field...every state, company, multinational enterprise and individual should receive its share from the benefits of globalisation'.

After 1997 globalisation remained central to GSEE's discourse. Moreover, it was treated more and more as an excuse used by SEV and government to promote their (neoliberal) policies. During this period, Dimitris Katsoridas, an economic analyst in INE, published widely on globalisation in *Enimerosi*. One of his first articles was 'The Globalisation of the Economy: Myth or Reality?', where he argued:

> The phenomenon of 'globalisation' has emerged as a pivotal economic and political issue. Yet the concept of 'globalisation' is often used with ideological purposes, to bend workers' resistance in the attempted capitalist restructuring, by supporting the 'inevitable' and the 'omnipotence' of the market-without-frontiers'.

Furthermore using statistical data he went on to argue:

> the debate which goes on with regard to the 'globalisation' of the economy is without any basis, because even today most companies are based on nation-states.\(^{82}\)

This conceptualisation of globalisation as an excuse, as a means for policy justification dominated INE's discourse. For instance, an article published in 2000 and signed by three of the main economic analysts of INE, N. Grammatikos, D. Katsoridas, G. Kollias, argued:

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In most cases the term ‘globalisation’ is used as an inaccessible – enforced from the outside – force, to which states have no choice but to adjust. Moreover, it is used as an excuse for the introduction of changes in labour market\(^8\).

At the same time other aspects of the international anti-globalisation discourse were also acquiring a prominent position in the public interventions of GSEE. For instance, in the 9\(^{th}\) Convention of ETUC, in Finland, in June 26, 1999, GSEE submitted a proposal ‘for the implementation of the TOBIN-Tax’\(^5\).

Finally, the General Council of GSEE, in its decision taken on December 10, 1999 (after the events in Seattle) argued for ‘flexibility within socially accepted limits’ and stated that: ‘The General Council supports the need for *international solidarity* among workers, in order to put a limit to the omnipotence and arrogance of the globalised economic power’\(^6\) (emphasis in the original).

**Synopsis**

To sum up, it can be argued that globalisation acquired a prominent position in the discourse of GSEE, after 1997. This development supports the argument about the gradual restructuring of Greek public discourse in the terms of the hegemonic discourse of globalisation. Instrumental in this process was the participation and further integration of GSEE in the European and international labour movements. One more point should be stressed here. GSEE, maybe for the first time in its history, was not the social partner which followed a policy of slogans, but the partner which accused the government and SEV of doing so, trying at the same time to value the discourse of globalisation concrete by using ‘scientific’ arguments and data (see also below).

\(^8\) *Enimerosi*, no 61-62, July/August 2000.
\(^5\) *Enimerosi*, no 54, December 1999.
\(^6\) *Enimerosi*, no 54, December 1999.
Some more general observations can be derived from the study of the issues of *Enimerosi*. These observations reveal the dynamics that were at work in Greece, in the second half of the 1990s.

First, is the normalisation of the relationship between the trade unions and the employers, and the intensification of the process for the construction of a ‘social partnership’. It is indicative of traditional industrial relations in Greece that a joint research publication between INE and the Federation of Industries of North Greece (published in 1995) was characterised by C. Protopapas, the chairman of GSEE in 1995, as an innovation for Greece.\(^87\)

Second, we see clearly the first instances of a more proactive and epistemic stage of the labour movement in Greece. For instance, GSEE managed to put onto the public agenda the issue of the 35-hour working week.\(^88\) In order to support this demand, a number of ‘scientific’ articles were published by the research team of INE from 1995 onwards.\(^89\) The publication for the first time of an ‘Annual Review of the Greek Economy’ by GSEE, in 1999 (along with the traditionally published annual reviews of the Bank of Greece and SEV) is to be placed in this context. Such a scientific approach was gradually adopted in many issues that were raised in public agenda and were of interest to GSEE. At the same time, as in the case of SEV, the EU integration process necessitated and enhanced an independent voice from GSEE, and representatives of GSEE were increasingly invited to sit in committees and working groups at various ministries.\(^90\) This rapid trend towards an ‘epistemisation’ of GSEE (i.e. a more ‘scientifically-centred’ public intervention) triggered some internal reactions and accusations over the ‘bureaucratisation’ of the Greek labour movement. In this context, when GSEE said a conditional ‘yes’ to the ‘Social Dialogue’ proposed by the government in 1997, it also made it explicit that this Dialogue ‘does not

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\(^87\) *Enimerosi*, no 1, March 1995, p. 6.
\(^89\) For instance, see *Enimerosi*, nos 2, 3, 7 (the special sections by H. Ioakimoglou and D. Katsoridas), 10, 16.
\(^90\) See *Enimerosi*, no 34, 1998.
replace the action of trade unions. Furthermore, the decisions of the Annual Convention of INE/GSEE in 1997 included the following caveat: 'The transformation of INE in either a public relations mechanism or a tool for the bureaucratisation of the syndicalist movement... must be avoided'.

Third, we can observe an impressive level of interaction and transnational knowledge transfer among the trade unions of the EU countries. In this regard numerous common projects through the FORCE-NEPTURE, the Association for European Training of Workers on the Impact of New Technology (AFETT), and the LEONARDO DA VINCI programme (on vocational training) were mentioned in Enimerosi’s pages. Furthermore, the interaction and knowledge transfer between Greece and the rest of the Balkan countries increased rapidly after 1995 (the PHARE programme was essential in this regard). For instance in 1996 INE/GSEE: worked with its counter-part FRATIA in Romania for the development of the Romanian Institute of Labour, co-organised a seminar in Bulgaria on electronic communications and labour unions, and co-organised a training programme on ‘collective bargaining and social pacts’ in Albania. It is worth mentioning that such an interaction was not only centralised, but was also taking place through the various peripheral or sectoral channels and institutes of which INE is constituted. For instance, the sectoral institute of INE which specialises in banking and securities (INE/OTOE) was very active in developing various joined projects with Albania, Bulgaria, Romania, FYR Macedonia, Serbia and Cyprus through the LEONARDO and PHARE programmes and the AFETT.

Our analysis of the social partners’ discourse will be concluded with a short reference to the Economic and Social Council of Greece (OKE).

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93 The PHARE programme has aimed to assist the applicant countries of Central and Eastern Europe in their preparations for joining the European Union. Originally created in 1989, it covered the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria and Romania. Until 2000, when the CARDS programme was created, the countries of the Western Balkans (Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina and the FYR Macedonia) were also beneficiaries of the PHARE. See the official webpage of the Programme at: http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/pas/phare.
94 See Enimerosi, no 11, February 1996, p. 11.
The Economic and Social Council (OKE)

The Economic and Social Council was founded in 1997 as a tripartite, consultative organ. It includes representatives from the government, the employers, the employees, and other civil society organisations. OKE is also a member of the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC), which is the forum 'where the various socio-economic organisations in the Member States of the European Union are represented'. This European level should be stressed because, as already shown, it played a crucial role both in terms of institutional reconfiguration and in terms of agents’ discourse formation at the level of the member states.

Yet it needs to be pointed out here that OKE’s influence in the Greek public discourse has been minimal, if not negligible. The decision to include it in our analysis was based mainly on two reasons: (i) for comparative purposes, as its Irish counterpart had an important role in the Irish public discourse, and thus it had to be studied, and (ii) because the study of OKE adds some interesting information on the interaction of social partners in Greece, on the issue of globalisation.

In July 2000 the EESC discussed in a plenary session a working paper on the issue of globalisation of trade in the framework of WTO. As a follow up of this session and in order to participate and contribute to the discussion on Globalisation in Greece OKE published an ‘Opinion’, on 17 October, 2000, entitled, ‘The Globalisation of Trade in the Framework of WTO’. This document, albeit close to the end of the period under investigation, is important because it was the only single document which was explicitly on globalisation, and was prepared by all the social partners (i.e. government, workers, employers). The second section of this document was entitled ‘the positions of OKE’ and started as follows:

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Greece is a country which has been integrated in the phenomenon of globalisation, thus facing both the prospects and the consequences that are generated by it. Yet the dialogue on this issue in our country has not acquired the publicity that it should, whereas whenever the issue is raised, it is raised in such an ideological and philosophical manner that the substance of the matter is put at risk. OKE considers that globalisation is a development that creates serious threats, but also important potentials for the economic and social conditions of the countries which participate in it (OKE, 2000).

The above paragraph signifies the tensions which existed at the time in the Greek public discourse with regard to globalisation. First, is the view of the critics, mainly labour unions and left parties, that globalisation carried with it many threats. Second, is the view of the government and the employers that no matter what globalisation was or did, Greece was part of it, and in any case globalisation created many opportunities. It is also interesting that the text acknowledged and criticised the fact that the debate on globalisation in Greece was so ideologically-laden that it tended to miss the point. In this regard the equilibrium reached in OKE can be said to be closer to the PASOK government’s and employers’ approach. Maybe this is why a caveat was put in the introduction of the document, stating that the ‘Opinion’ referred to the respective document which was to be discussed by EESC ‘and it does not constitute a general statement on the phenomenon of globalisation’ (OKE, 2000).

Up to this point, we have examined the discourses of political parties and social partners in Greece. Yet any study of public discourse formation and transformation would be incomplete if the media were not included in the analysis. The media are an institutional actor who has the power to give voice or to impose silence, to create events or to sentence events into oblivion. In this regard the media are both an institutional actor, with their own – diverse and conflicting – agenda, and a mirror of a society. Indeed, media coverage in a dialectical process both reflects and creates the public agenda. Thus, media coverage allows us at least to study what was considered to be ‘news’ and what was at the forefront of public consideration and public agenda at a certain period of time.
Media Coverage

Introduction

In this research project the study of media coverage serves mostly an instrumental/quantitative purpose. In this regard, this project does not employ discourse analysis, as the latter is known in media studies, in order to study in depth specific texts. The aim is to study in a consistent manner a representative source of media coverage in Greece, throughout the period 1996-2001, in order to examine: (a) the volume and the evolution of the use of the term ‘globalisation’, (b) the context of its use, and (c) the composition of the people using this term. Through the above information we also aim to capture the discourses and activities of groups that have not been studied above, such as think-tanks, academics and anti-globalisation protesters.

In the case of Greece, it was decided that such a representative and functional source of coverage is the Sunday edition of daily newspapers. It is representative because the Sunday editions of the Greek newspapers summarise all the important weekly events and include several special sections on topical issues, published books and journals, cultural events etc. It is also functional because it would be practically impossible, due to time limits, to search all the daily editions of a newspaper, or indeed of any other source, for a period of six years; whereas the use of the Sunday editions offer a credible alternative. It is also important to note that in Greece the circulation of the Sunday editions of newspapers are much higher than the daily ones. Moreover, when it comes to Sunday editions party-preference as a criterion for choosing newspaper is, even if only in some respects, relaxed. Therefore many readers will buy the newspaper of their political preference along with one of the newspapers that have been (at least for the period 1995-2001) in the first ranks of circulation among the Sunday editions i.e. To Vima, Kathimerini and Eleftherotypia. In this regard it can be argued that the latter three editions have a considerable effect on the formation and reproduction of the Greek public discourse. The thesis chose as a ‘sample source’ the newspaper To Vima (henceforth ‘VIMA’), because its Sunday edition had the highest circulation for most of the period under investigation.

97 The ranking of the daily editions is different.
98 VIMA was first in circulation throughout the period 1995-1999. Eleftherotypia surpassed VIMA in 2000-2001, but their distance remained within approximately 1% (source: Athens Daily Newspaper Publishers Association).
The methodology followed in the study of VIMA is as follows. VIMA has a free access, on-line archive for all its Sunday editions, since 14 July 1996. This on-line availability of the newspaper made possible the collection of all the VIMA articles/texts that made a reference to globalisation during the period July 1996 – December 2001. This work was based on a ‘key-word’ and a ‘key-word-in-context’ research methodology, the ‘key-word’ being ‘globalisation’ (‘παγκόσμιοποίηση’). Thus, for the references which were found, a paragraph before and a paragraph after the reference were copied and kept for further reading and analysis. In the cases of articles that had as their main subject globalisation itself, the whole references/articles were kept. The results of this research appear in Table 7 and in Chart 2.

Here, we must also mention that the references to globalisation found in VIMA can be classified into three broad categories: (a) references in texts in which globalisation itself was a ‘news item’ (e.g. the anti-globalisation protests, or a conference or a book on globalisation); (b) references in texts in which the term globalisation was used in the commentary of everyday social, political and economic news; (c) references found in statements, remarks, announcements, press releases etc. of specific institutional actors (e.g. political parties, workers, the church).

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99 The circulation per year of the two best selling Sunday papers was as follows:

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Source: Athens Daily Newspaper Publishers Association

100 See Denzin and Lincoln, 2000: 775-777.
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<td>29: 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>30: 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUB-TOTALS</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL for 2001:</td>
<td>210</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TOTAL SUM for the period 1996-2001: 841**

NOTE: In the cells of the Table, the first number indicates the date of the Edition and the second the number of articles found (see also page 159).

**CHART 2: References to the term Globalisation per year, in the Sunday Edition of the Newspaper VIMA (1997-2001)**

(% of the total sum of references for the period 1997-2001)
The Discourse of Globalisation in the Newspaper VIMA, 1996-2001

Table 7 indicates the evolution of the use of the term ‘globalisation’ in the Sunday edition of the newspaper ‘VIMA’ during the period 1996-2001. Under each month-heading a series of a pair of numbers appears; for instance, the first reference in July 1996 is ‘14:0’. The first of these numbers indicates the date of the publication of each edition. For instance in July 1996, three editions were available and examined, that were published respectively on the 14th, the 21st and the 28th of July. The second number of the pair indicates the absolute number of articles which made a reference to the term ‘globalisation’ in each edition. For instance, in the publication of 28 July 1996, the term globalisation was mentioned in four articles (the reference being 28:4).

Based on the above data some important observations can be made. First, contrary to our expectations a significant number of references to globalisation are traced, since 1997, i.e. well before the anti-globalisation protests in Seattle. In a more specific manner, the comparison of the second semesters (July-December) of 1996 and 1997 demonstrates a threefold increase in the use of the term globalisation (from 16 in 1996 to 45 references in 1997). Then again the number of references on an annual basis is doubled in 1998 (from 80 in 1997 to 156 in 1998) and remains at the same level up to the end of 1999 (149 references). Finally, the Seattle events in December 1999, led to an approximately 50% increase in the references to globalisation in 2000 (230 references) in comparison with 1999, and approximately the same levels were maintained in 2001 (210 references). Figure 1 offers a schematic depiction of the evolution of the volume of references to globalisation in the Sunday Edition of ‘VIMA’.

Figure 1: Articles with a Reference to Globalisation in VIMA (Sunday Edition)
It is important to note here that the absolute number of references made to globalization does not speak for itself. But the comparison of the references per year does demonstrate the dynamics under play during the respective period. In this regard, it can be noted that the emergence of globalization discourse took place gradually, in a process that was initiated at least in 1997. Moreover, considering the year 2000 as the ‘peak-point’ of the globalization discourse it can also be noted that globalization was implicated in the discourse generated by ‘VIMA’ at least after 1998; and this implication, and its wider effect in the Greek public discourse, is independent – even if not irrelevant – from the source of the references (i.e. who where the authors of the respective articles). For, if the references to globalization in 2000 (i.e. the peak-year) are 230, then 156 and 149 references in 1998 and 1999 respectively, can be considered significant numbers even if we do not have data available to compare these numbers with other issues discussed during the same period in VIMA. On this basis, the (approximately) 50% increase that took place after the Seattle events does not really seem to suggest an ‘out of the blue’ change in the references to globalization, even though the content of these references and the composition of the authors remain open.

Thus, in order to grasp better the dynamics that the above data signify, one should study the composition of the authors who were using the term globalization, and the evolution of this composition, as well as the distribution of the references among the various sections of the newspaper and how this distribution changed during 1996-2001. The following paragraphs focus on these questions. I start with the distribution of references in the various sections of VIMA, and then move on to the composition of the authors.

Chart 3 offers aggregate data for the distribution of references in the various sections of VIMA for the period 1996-2001, whilst Table 8 monitors the evolution of this distribution within the respective period.
CHART 3: Thematical Distribution of References to Globalisation in the Sunday Edition of the Newspaper VIMA (1996-2001)
### TABLE 8: Evolution of the References to Globalisation in VIMA (Sunday edition), According to the Newspaper's Section of Appearance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A (main/political)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B (academic)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D (economic)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E (Europe/monetary)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S (books)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V (miscellaneous)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTE**

Section A: *TO VIMA* (the main/political section of the newspaper)

Section B: *Nees Epoxes* (mostly academic contributions on topical issues, and adverts for seminars, conferences, books, journals, talks, concerts etc.)

Section D: *Anaptyxi* (the economic section)

Section E: *To Vima tis Europis* (special section on Europe; ‘E’ was also used for Sections on Drachma and Euro.)

Section S: *Vivlia* (special section on books, that includes book adverts and news on journals and magazines)

Section V includes the following sections:

Section C: *To Alio Vima* (the cultural section: news, reports, interviews etc.)

Section T: *Taxidia* (special section on travels and vacations)

Section U: *Akinita* (special section on Property)

Section Y & I: various special publications (etc. on stock market, on personalities etc.)

Section Z: *TV* (up to the 16/11/1997), Art and Artists (23/11/1997-30/12/2001)

The dynamics of the above data are diagrammatically depicted in Figure 2.
Based on the above data we can infer the following. First, the references to the main, political section of the newspaper (i.e. section A) remained dominant throughout the period under investigation, even though the evolution of these references was not linear. After a 'peak-point' in 1998 these references started to decline; a trend that was drastically reversed after the anti-globalisation protests in Seattle in the end of 1999. The same event seems to have had an opposite effect for the references in the economic section (section D). In this section the references increased gradually but steadily up to 2000, when a significant decrease of their number took place. This decrease could possibly be explained by the fact that the concept of globalisation, as we saw in the discourses of the political parties, the workers and the church, had acquired an ideologically charged, negative connotation in the Greek public discourse and therefore its use was avoided in relation to economic policies and related economic issues. The most linear pattern is found in the 'academic' section (i.e. section B), in which the references steadily increased throughout the period 1996-2001, surpassing the references of the economic section in 2000, and approaching the references of the political section in 2001. A similar dynamic appears also in the book section (i.e. section S), despite the decrease in 2001. With regard to the references in the rest sections of the newspaper it can be observed that after a tremendous increase in 2000, they returned to their pre-Seattle levels in 2001.
It is also interesting that even before the protests in Seattle in December 1999, references to globalisation in the main/political section of VIMA outnumbered those in the economic section. Moreover up to 1998 (inclusive) the references in the political section outnumbered also these in the academic (section: B) and book (section: S) sections, if the latter two are counted together (Table 9).

Table 9. Globalisation Discourse in VIMA: ‘Political’ vs. ‘Academic’ pages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A (main/political section)</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B (academic section) + S (books)</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If, however, in the above diagram to the references of the political section one adds the references of the economic section in order to juxtapose the references made in the ‘politico-economic pages’ (sections: A+D) with those made in the, broadly speaking, ‘academic pages’ (sections: B+S) then the references to the ‘non-academic pages’ remain higher throughout the period 1996-2000 (Table 10).

Table 10. Globalisation Discourse in VIMA: ‘Politico-Economic’ vs. ‘Academic’ Pages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A (main/political section) + D (economic section)</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B (academic section) + S (books)</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Based on the above data it can be argued that the academic discourse on globalisation, generated through the pages of VIMA, did not outnumber or precede the globalisation discourse that was generated through the everyday politico-economic pages and commentary of the same newspaper; rather the opposite is the case. Thus, the implications and the effects of globalisation discourse in Greek public discourse seem to be much deeper and wider than those of an elite based discourse, limited to academic circles. The above findings can be further sharpened if combined with information about the identity of the people who wrote the respective articles. In this regard, Chart 4 presents the overall picture for the period 1996-2001, and Table 11 monitors the evolution of the authors’ identity within this period.

**CHART 4: References to Globalisation in the Sunday Edition of the Newspaper VIMA, according to the Authors’ Identity (1996-2001)**
Table 11: Evolution of the References to Globalisation in VIMA (Sunday Edition) According to the Authors’ Identity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Journalists</th>
<th>Academics(^1)</th>
<th>Politicians</th>
<th>Miscellaneous(^2)</th>
<th>Civil Servants(^3)</th>
<th>Unsigned</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>08:08</td>
<td>01:01</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>13:33</td>
<td>19:24</td>
<td>05:05</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>39:61</td>
<td>32:49</td>
<td>07:11</td>
<td>01:01</td>
<td>02:02</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>43:62</td>
<td>32:43</td>
<td>08:08</td>
<td>01:02</td>
<td>01:01</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>51:86</td>
<td>44:79</td>
<td>06:07</td>
<td>12:16</td>
<td>01:01</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^1\) Including all articles in the books' section.
\(^2\) Including managers, consultants, artists. The reference in 1998 is an interview with the Archbishop Christodoulos.
\(^3\) This category refers to the highest ranks of the public services and institutions such as the Chairman of the Bank of Greece and the Vice-Chairman of the public employment organisation OAED.

In Table 11 the first number of each pair refers to the number of the authors, whereas the second number of the pair refers to the number of the written articles. For instance in the column ‘Journalists’ in the year 1999, 62 articles were written by 43 journalists. In this manner we take into consideration both the volume of the references and the diversification of their source.

If one focuses on the number of authors independently from the volume of the written articles then the following picture is derived:
The above picture does not change significantly even if the focus is placed on the number of articles per category of authors.

Based on the above data it can be observed that during 1998-2000 the number of journalists who used the concept of globalisation in their articles outnumbered that of academics who did so. If the number of articles rather than the number of authors is taken into account, then the journalistic references were more than the academic ones.
throughout the period 1997-2000\textsuperscript{101}. This finding enhances the conclusion we reached in the analysis of references according to the newspaper’s section of appearance. Thus the intensity of the implication of the globalisation discourse in the politico-economic pages remained higher than in any other section of VIMA up to 2000. Furthermore to the extent that VIMA reflected Greek public discourse, it can be argued that globalisation had a significant position in this public discourse after 1998. An other indicator of this ‘quotidianisation’ of the globalisation discourse at the national level is the high number of the unsigned references, as well as the increase of the engagement with the concept of globalisation of the categories of ‘miscellaneous’, ‘politicians’ and ‘civil servants’. The latter seem to constitute an additional finding in favour of the argument about the gradual biopolitical transformation of the Greek public discourse, in terms of the then newly emerging hegemonic discourse of globalisation. It is also important to point out that the ‘journalistic engagement’ with globalisation discourse in the newspaper VIMA was led by journalists who were widely read and had a significant influence in the public discourse. Therefore the list of the journalists who had the highest per year references\textsuperscript{102} includes: D. Mitropoulos (in the years 1997, 1998), R. Someritis (1997, 1998, 2001), N. Nikolaou (1997, 1999, 2001), J. Pretenderis (2000, 2001), all leading figures of the newspaper.

This analysis of the ‘press sample’ will be completed with a short reference to the issue of book production. The aim here is double: first, to capture one more channel of discourse communication and dissemination, and second to double-check the role of academics/intelligentsia in the communication of globalisation discourse.

There is no single and secure way to trace all the books published on a specific subject during a certain period in Greece. The data used below have been collected after having consulted the following resources: The ‘National Book Centre of Greece’, the main on-line catalogue of the ‘Panteion University’, the on-line catalogue of ‘Protoporeia’ bookstore, and the ordering catalogue of ‘Politeia’ bookstore\textsuperscript{103}. The ‘National Book Centre’ holds a list with all the books that the

\textsuperscript{101} It is important to keep in mind that the above analysis is independent from the sections in which these articles were published. Thus many academics have permanent columns and/or occasionally write in the main political section of the newspaper, and not in the academic one.

\textsuperscript{102} That is more than three articles per year.

\textsuperscript{103} ‘Protoporeia’ and ‘Politeia’ are two of the biggest bookstores in Greece.
publishers have sent to the Centre but this list is by no means an exhaustive one. The research was limited in books that had the term ‘globalisation’ in their title or subtitle. The time-span of the research was 1990-2001. Chart 5 and Table 12 summarise the findings:

CHART 5: Books having the Term ‘Globalisation’ in their Title or Subtitle published in Greece during 1990-2001

NOTE: The ‘subject categories’ were taken either by the ‘National Book Centre’ or by the respective bookstores.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<tr>
<td>Number of Books Published</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>32</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
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<tbody>
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<td>Political Science</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Translations</td>
<td>Alan Mink, <em>Happy Globalisation</em></td>
<td>Barber Benjamin, <em>Jihad vs MacWorld</em></td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>Religion</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<td>-</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Critical</td>
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<td>1</td>
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</tr>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not applicable</td>
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<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Translations</td>
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<tr>
<th>Subject Area</th>
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<th>2001</th>
<th>No date given – but before 2001</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>Political Science</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Sciences</td>
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<tr>
<td>Economics</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Other</td>
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<td>2</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Classified</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stance towards Globalisation</td>
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<td>3</td>
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<td>Positive</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Critical</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>Unidentifiable</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not applicable</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Translations</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTES**

1 As 'subject area' was used the one given either by the 'National Book Centre' or by the respective bookstores.

2 The 'stance towards globalisation' was judged by the provided book abstracts. 'Unidentifiable' was used when no abstract was available or when the stance was not absolutely clear by the provided abstract. 'Not applicable' was used for edited volumes, with no clear or single 'stance'.
It is clear from Table 12 that significant numbers of books started to be published only after 1998. This can easily be explained considering the slow nature of the book publication process, and the fact that it always takes more time for books to catch up with current developments and events. Moreover, it is also not surprising that the books that adopted an explicitly critical or negative approach to globalisation outnumbered the ones that adopted an explicitly positive approach (seventeen vs. four). At least for the period in question this seems also to be the case at the international level. Yet the data of Table 12 should be treated with caution, for books central to the globalisation debate, such as *The Third Way* published by Anthony Giddens in 1998 (and translated in Greece the same year), were not included in the Table as long as they did not have the term globalisation in their title or subtitle. Let this short reference to the book-production close here. The next section offers a summary of the findings of the analysed ‘media sample’.

**Synopsis**

After 1997 globalisation was implicated in the discourse generated by the newspaper VIMA and it was to be found more than anywhere else in the construction/production of news in the political columns of this newspaper. To the extent that VIMA reflected the Greek public discourse, the same can be said to be true about the latter and globalisation discourse. In this regard, it can also be argued that the boom of globalisation discourse observed in VIMA, and consequently in Greek public discourse, in 2000 was rather a part of a longer and gradual process.

The purpose of this section was to use a representative ‘press sample’ in order to uncover the dynamics that were at work in the Greek public discourse during the period in question. By definition such an analysis and its conclusion can only be an indication of the broader dynamics at work in the Greek public discourse. We trust however that we managed to offer a concrete and representative sample of how, when and to what extent the concept of globalisation became a significant point of reference in the production of Greek public discourse.
Conclusion

This chapter has investigated the discourses of key institutional actors in Greece, in order to trace changes or continuities in the production of Greek public discourse during the period 1995-2001. Through this investigation we saw that globalisation gradually emerged as a new point of reference, through which the institutional actors rearticulated their interests and goals, renegotiated their identities, and redefined their strategies. Thus globalisation was defended as an opportunity for economic development (e.g. PASOK), accused as a new means of imperialist or neoliberal expansion (e.g. KKE, Synaspismos, GSEE), associated with the forces of evil (e.g. the Church), taken for granted as a new reality (e.g. SEV), or just avoided as a concept (e.g. ND, SEV). This analysis brought also to the forefront changes in the power of the different actors, as these were manifested in the evolution of their interaction; for instance, we saw how workers, after a period of resistance, accepted to discuss proposals for flexibility policies in the labour market – a traditional employer position. This is also an example of how the (new) politics of globalisation, in terms of ‘winners’ and ‘losers’, was materialised at the national level. The sample of press coverage that was examined supported the above analysis. Globalisation after 1998 occupied a significant position in the discourse of the Sunday newspaper that had the highest circulation during the period in question. This cannot but mirror the increased importance of the concept of globalisation in the discourses of key institutional actors. It also, however, manifests the increase of the importance of globalisation both as an independent news item, and as a way of reading events and changes in the domestic and international realms. In this manner, VIMA not only mirrored the restructuring of Greek public discourse in terms of the globalisation discourse, but it was also an actor in this restructuring process.

A detailed synopsis and conclusion for this chapter are offered in a comparative perspective with the Irish case in Chapter 5. Yet based on the above, it is clear that

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104 Within this context, Giorgos Kirtsos, editor at that time of the Greek right-wing newspaper, *Eleftheros Typos*, suggested that, ‘this new politics of globalisation was also experienced in Greece through – among other things – the centralisation of Greek mass media and the new order of American hegemony in the Balkans’. G. Kirtsos, personal interview, 27/04/2002. For *Eleftheros Typos*’ circulation rates see Chart 1.
globalisation discourse did not ‘arrive’ in Greece with the Seattle protests. Rather the opposite was the case. The events in Seattle signified (in Greek public discourse) not the beginning but a ‘peak’ of a longer hegemonic restructuring process (to which these events were a reaction). The increased references to globalisation throughout the period 1998-99 in VIMA should be conceptualised in this context. Such an understanding does not aim to undermine the crucial impact of the ‘Seattle events’ on public discourses around the world, and the new dynamics they created. It rather aims to place these events in the broader social dynamics, material and conceptual, of which they constituted an integral part. These include the new production, technological and communication *techniques* and *practices*, (including the internationalisation of production through multinational corporations; the globalisation of financial markets, the increasing power of short-term capital and the financial crises of the 1990s; the spread of new communication and information technologies – most importantly the internet) which started to bio-politically restructure world politics, economics and everyday life, at least since the late 1970s. Arguably, the hegemonic discourse of globalisation came out of the dynamics that were unleashed from these new developments, and Greek public discourse was produced and reproduced in interaction with these. This conclusion, however, needs to be double-checked. For this, Chapter 4 turns to the communication of the hegemonic discourse of globalisation in the case of Ireland.
CHAPTER 4

Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to study the communication of globalisation discourse in Ireland. In order to do so and to secure a comparative study with the Greek case, we replicated the structure and methodology followed in Chapter 3. Hence, we scrutinised the discourses of the key institutional actors, in order to examine the following questions. How was the globalisation discourse implicated in the discourses and identities of these actors? How was the communication of globalisation discourse affected by the existing national institutional configuration, and what impact did it have on this configuration? Finally, what did these changes mean for the Irish public discourse?

Before starting the analysis of the institutional actors’ discourses some contextualisation is necessary. As we argued in Chapter 2 the decade of the 1990s signified a turning point for the Irish political system. The well-established ‘Fianna Fail versus the rest’ political pattern – which had dominated the Irish political life for approximately fifty years (1948-1989) – ceased to define Irish politics and gave way to a ‘new politics of coalition-making’ (Mair, 1999). Moreover, the turn from the 1980s to the 1990s witnessed the significant enhancement of the socio-economic role of the institution of ‘social partnership’. Within these conditions a new public discourse started to emerge, with new points of references and signifiers (e.g. Celtic tiger, Europe’s shining light). As in the case of Greece, the purpose is to examine the nature of the relationship between this emerging public discourse and the hegemonic discourse of globalisation.
Institutional Actors and the Discourse of Globalisation

In the case of Ireland the thesis focuses on the following institutional actors. As in the case of Greece the main criterion for the construction of the list was that of ‘inclusion’, in an attempt to study all the actors with a significant role in the formation of the Irish public discourse.

- The Main Political Parties
  - Fianna Fail (FF)
  - Fine Gael (FG)
  - Labour Party (LP)
  - Progressive Democrats (PD)
- The Main Social Partners
  - Irish Congress of Trade Unions (ICTU).
  - Irish Business and Employers Confederation (IBEC).
  - National Economic and Social Council (NESC).
- The Catholic Church
- A Press Sample (the newspaper The Irish Times), which also captures part of the discourses of various actors (e.g. academics, anti-globalisation groups, artists, entrepreneurs, civil servants etc.) not included above.

The analysis of those actors’ discourses was conducted as follows. First, where necessary, the identity of the examined institution is presented, and the rationale of the analysed documents is discussed. Then the means and nature of the engagement with the globalisation discourse is elaborated.

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1 In the case of Greece, the study of the discourse of political parties was complemented by the study of the discourse of party leaders. The latter was based on the well-organised on-line archives of the Greek parties. Unfortunately in the case of Ireland it has proven impossible to collect in a consistent manner the speeches and interviews of all the party leaders. Thus such a separate section on the leaders discourses was omitted, and replaced with further analysis on the party discourses.

2 Again, in the Greek case there was a small separate section on ‘book production’. This was omitted in the case of Ireland because (due to the English language), the book industry market for Irish academics is internationalised; i.e. Irish academics prefer to publish in well-established international publishers.
The Main Political Parties (FF, FG, LP, PD)

Two criteria were used for the selection of the political parties. First, their 'representativeness', as expressed by votes in the national elections, and second their 'continuity' in the political scene and/or participation in government. The inclusion of the 'participation in government' criterion was deemed necessary in the case of Ireland, due to the existence of coalition governments since the early 1990s.

Based on the above criteria we have studied the following parties: (a) Fianna Fail: The Republican Party (FF), which got the majority of votes in all the elections since 1989 (i.e. in 1992, 1997, 2002), and formed coalition governments with the Labour Party in 1992 (lasted until 1994), and with Progressive Democrats in 1989, 1997 and 2002. (b) The Fine Gael (FG), which came second in all the elections in the 1990s, and was in power, in a coalition government with the Labour Party during 1994-1997. (c) The Labour Party (LP), which is the third biggest party, and was in power as a partner of FF during 1992-1994 and as a partner of FG during 1994-1997. (d) The Progressive Democrats (PD), which is the youngest party (founded in 1985). It came fourth in the elections of 1989, 1992, 1997 and 2002, but participated in coalition governments with FF in 1989, 1997 and 2002.

The most decisive factor for the formation of the Irish party system has been the 'Anglo-Irish Treaty' of 1921, that led to the division of Sinn Fein. Thus Fianna Fail emerged (in 1926), from the anti-Treaty tradition, while Fine Gael (which was founded in 1933) has its origins in the 'Cumann na nGaedheal', the party that supported the Treaty. The first, the anti-Treaty stance was mainly based on landless farmers, farm workers, small business and industrial workers. In contrast, the Treaty was mainly supported by large business owners, merchants and big farmers. Both Fianna Fail and Fine Gael evolved to catch-all parties, fact that makes their classification in a traditional left-to-right axis very difficult. Yet, both parties are generally considered to be conservative. It is indicative that in the European Parliament Fine Gael belongs, along with New Democracy and British Conservatives, to the 'European People's Party and European Democrats' group, that includes 'Christian Democrats, Conservative and other mainstream centre and centre-right
political forces\textsuperscript{3}. On the other hand Fianna Fail belongs to the ‘Union for Europe of the Nations’ group, a Euro-sceptic and rather nationalistic group. Regarding the smaller parties, it can be said that the Labour Party is a rather progressive left party. In terms of its European belonging, it is a member, along with PASOK and the British Labour Party, of the ‘Party of European Socialists’ group of the European Parliament (and is not for instance in the left group of ‘European United Left/Nordic Green Left’ where the Greek Communist Party belongs). Finally, the party of Progressive Democrats has its origins in Fianna Fail. In fact it was created by Fianna Fail members, as a reaction to the party’s populist character and conservative stance, under the leadership of Charles Haughey, during the 1980s. The Progressive Democrats are a right-wing party with a strong liberal character (both economically and politically)\textsuperscript{4}.

As discussed above, the broader focus of the thesis is on the second half of the 1990s. Yet within this broader period the thesis looks for ‘moments’ that signify changes, discursive shifts within the societies under consideration. In this regard, in Greece it was the coming to power of the ‘modernisation block’, in 1996, that was taken as a point of departure. In the Irish case a parallel moment is the 1997 elections. The latter signified the end of a long period of short-lived coalition governments (1992-1997). Furthermore, it signified the consolidation of the post-‘FF versus the rest’ political scene, and the crystallisation of a new political dynamic, based on the FF-PD programmatic bargaining and governmental co-operation. The choice of 1997 as a point of departure, forced us to include in our research the year 2002, which is marginally outside the focus of the thesis, but is the year when the next election campaign took place.

\textsuperscript{3} See the official website of the group at: www.epp-ed.org.
\textsuperscript{4} For a short overview of the history of Irish parties, see Collins and Cradden, 2001: 16-31. For a well-documented research on Irish parties and elections, see Sinnott, 1995.
Electoral Manifestos: 1997 and 2002

Electoral manifestos were published and used by the Irish parties in both the 1997 and 2002 elections. An analysis of their content with respect to the discourse of globalisation is as follows.

Fianna Fail (FF)

The 1997 manifesto of Fianna Fail was entitled People Before Politics (144 pages long), and was characterised by a populist tone. Thus, after a short introduction by the leader of the party Bertie Ahern, and a chapter on 'sustainable growth' (pp. 5-11), the three (out of five) main chapters of the manifesto bear the following titles: 'Winning the country back for the people' (pp. 11-50), 'Revitalising the fabric of our nation' (pp. 51-80), and 'Preserving and extending our heritance' (pp. 112-139). The other two chapters of the manifesto focused on the economy (pp. 81-111) and on 'strengthening Ireland’s place in the world' (pp. 130-139). Yet, even though the above titles seem very conducive to the various aspects of the globalisation debate, the term globalisation was totally absent from the manifesto, while the adjective 'global' was only used three times, two with regard to the economy (i.e. 'global marketplace', p. 82; 'global economy', p. 111) and once with regard to international affairs in general (i.e. 'global issues', p. 135). But let us consider carefully if, where and how the globalisation discourse did appear in the manifesto.

It can be argued that the bottom line of the electoral strategy of Fianna Fail in 1997 was the following:

[The Irish] now have the opportunity to build on the current wave of success, laying solid foundations for a prosperous Ireland in the 21st century...Or we

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5 For the methodology followed in the study of the manifestos, see the introduction of the respective section in the case of Greece, in Chapter 3.
6 The reference for this manifesto throughout the thesis will be, Fianna Fail, 1997.
can watch helplessly while lawlessness takes over our country\(^7\), and the gap grows wider between the haves and the have-nots (‘Introduction’ by B. Ahern, p. 2).

In the same manner, the *Winning the Country Back for the People* chapter declared:

Fianna Fail believe that disadvantage in our society can no longer be tolerated. Irish people want prosperity, but not at the expense of those who are genuinely in need or disadvantage. Neither do Irish people want a society that is at war with itself, because of growing gaps between the ‘haves’ and ‘have nots’ (p. 21).

Therefore, Fianna Fail, although in opposition during 1994-1997, did not dispute – and it could not meaningfully do so – the fact that economic growth, success and prosperity were there in 1997. Its focal point was how this prosperity should be managed and what strategies should be followed, from that point onwards, in order ‘to build on the current wave of success’ (p. 2). This point needs to be stressed. What was at stake, in the way that Fianna Fail set the format of electoral struggle, was not how prosperity should be created, was not about the basic choices of economic policy, but rather how the existing success could work better for all the social strata in Ireland. Thus, the wealth-creating mechanisms (for instance tax cuts) of the Irish political economy, being the undeniable reason for the economic success, remained *outside* from party competition, at least as the latter was set in the manifesto of Fianna Fail. Furthermore even when these mechanisms entered in the electoral game, it was only to create a race for their expansion to an ever-wider range of areas, rather than to be problematised. Tax cuts are perhaps the most prominent example here. The second chapter of the manifesto, under the heading ‘Economy & Taxation’, substantiated Fianna Fail’s ‘prudent’ profile in sound economic management, on its past ‘ability to reduce the tax burden’ (p. 7), and developed the strategy through which Fianna Fail would reduced further the ‘tax burden’ (p. 7-10). It is indicative that ‘tax cuts’ was the fifth most popular concept in the manifesto.

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\(^7\) It is worth mentioning here that the manifesto gave primacy to the issue of crime. ‘Crime threatens us on our streets, in our homes, and in our business...it poses a major threat to the fabric of our society’ (p. 12-13). Accordingly FF was arguing for a ‘zero tolerance’ approach to crime (p. 13-14).
This ‘apoliticisation’ of Irish economic policy can principally be attributed to the following reasons: (a) the positive effects that this policy had in terms of economic growth and living standards; an effect which was directly experienced by Irish people on an everyday basis, and (b) the social partnership, the new ‘anchor-institution’ of the Irish politico-economic system. Indeed the concept of partnership/social partners was the second single most popular term of the 1997 manifesto. Fianna Fail stressed that the ‘ground-breaking social partnership’ was its initiative in 1987 (p. 7), and included the participation of social partners in almost all the proposed new institutional bodies. The following extracts are only indicative:

We will set up a National Competitiveness Council...which will include representatives of the Social Partners (p. 88).

[W]e will...enter into full discussions with the Social Partners before any final decisions are taken on rationalisation [of state policies towards business] (p. 90).

FF will set up a new partnership between the Department of Agriculture, Teagasc, farm organisations... (p. 101).

[In the state sector FF will work] in the spirit of social partnership and consensus (p. 109, see also p. 111).

[FF will] Involve the whole community in environment policy through a new National Environment Partnership Forum (p. 113).

These extracts illustrate how the concept of social partnership had been evolving as the new core of Irish politics – the means through which politics were to be delivered. The content of the politics to be delivered seemed rather to be taken for granted, due to a ‘new state of affairs’. Thus, although the concept of globalisation was absent, the most popular concept of the manifesto was that of the ‘information age’, while the concept of ‘Ireland’s attraction’ (to foreign investments), and the concept of the ‘world marketplace’ were the third and fourth most popular concepts respectively.
In particular a whole section was devoted to the ‘information age’ which was conceptualised as a ‘massive opportunity’ (p. 82) but which nonetheless carried with it threats.

[The] Information Age offers Ireland a massive opportunity...The reason is that the new age offers us...a way around the disadvantages we have always suffered because of our remote position...In the Information Age, where we are will no longer matter. Ireland will be as well-placed as any country in a truly global market-place... However...the dividend from the Information Age will not come automatically. On the contrary: if we do not prepare properly, we will be left behind...(p. 82)...The key fact about the Information Age is that it is connected. Without the means to communicate instantly and cost-effectively, our human resources are powerless (p. 85).

In general, references to the ‘information age’ were scattered throughout the manifesto, and Ireland had to ‘catapult [itself] to the front rank’ of it (p. 2), ‘position itself aggressively in the forefront of’ it (p. 6), lead itself into it (p. 86), ‘reposition’ or ‘upgrade’ itself for it (p. 89, 92), ‘accelerate access by schools to’ it (p. 84), etc. Furthermore these references to the information age were backed up by references to a ‘new world’ (p. 32), ‘new era’ (p. 69) and ‘new age’ (p. 69). Within this context Fianna Fail criticised the FG-LP coalition for lacking a ‘strong pro-enterprise attitude’ and for following a tax policy that put in danger ‘Ireland’s attraction as a location of inward investments’ (p. 6).

Finally, the section on the public sector declared: ‘[Fianna Fail will take] a practical rather than an ideological approach to State companies...rejecting ideology in favour of practicality’ (p. 109). Thus FF ‘will not engage in a wholesale dismantling or disposal of State companies. We will not sell off State assets cheap to make quick profits for investors...’ (emphasis in the original, p. 110), acknowledging at the same time that: ‘It is a time of change in the State Sector, change that is being driven by technology, by EU deregulation and competition’ (p. 110).
In sum it can be argued that economic globalisation was ever-present in the manifesto, not to be contested or discussed but to be promoted, whereas the cultural aspects of globalisation discourse were completely absent.

The 2002 manifesto, entitled *A Lot Done - More to Do* (94 pages long), does not change much from the above picture. Of course the context was not the same. In 2002 Fianna Fail was not trying to defeat a government, but to stay in power. In this regard the issue of the growing gap between the ‘haves’ and the ‘have nots’, central in the 1997 manifesto, gave place to confident statements such as:

[W]e consolidated an economy that is still the envy of the world (p. 6).

[The] era of mass unemployment and emigration has been brought to an end (pp. 3, 4).

Under Fianna Fail Ireland has been the world’s most dynamic economy (pp. 4, 25).

[We want to] ensure that Ireland continues to be a world leader in Knowledge-based industries (p. 33).

It is indeed striking that, although we were in an electoral competition that took place in 2002, once again the manifesto of the biggest party did not make a single reference to the term globalisation, while the usage of the adjective global remained limited. In particular the term global was used twice, one of which was to refer to ‘global poverty’ (p. 21). The second use was more interesting. It was in the section on employment, and was as follows: ‘We will encourage the Irish operations of multinationals to engage in high value added activities that are likely to be retained during periods of global rationalisation…’ (emphasis added, p. 29). Indeed the term ‘rationalisation’ is used here instead of terms such as crisis, downturn, recession etc. The appearance and use of the term globalised, is also interesting. The term was not used in order to describe the global economy, communication networks etc. It was

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8 The reference for the 2002 manifesto throughout the thesis will be, Fianna Fail, 2002.
borrowed by the A.T. Kearney/Foreign Policy Globalisation Index, to describe Ireland itself:

In 2002 Ireland ranked first in the world as the world's top globalised economy (A.T. Kearney Consultants Survey)...As one of the most successfully globalised countries in the world, we will continue as labour market conditions require... (pp. 29-30, emphasis added).

Thus, in this context policies related to labour market flexibility and mobile capital investments were considered to be a proactive policy target and positive achievement:

In order to progress as a society, we will be seeking a maximum proportion of skilled, well-paid and flexible forms of employment, both full and part-time, for the benefit of everyone seeking paid employment (p. 29).

We are committed to maintaining a favourable business environment, so that we can continue to attract mobile capital investments and technology (p. 26).

The above approach towards the concepts 'globalised', 'flexibility' and 'mobile capital' is instrumental in understanding where Fianna Fail's discourse lay with regard to the globalisation discourse. Fianna Fail emphatically argued for, and tried to achieve what the anti-globalisation movement had as its focal points of criticism (principally flexibility and mobile capital investments). At the same time the (economic) policies suggested by Fianna Fail, far from being conceptualised as 'globalisation' were considered as manifestations of a new approach to economic development: the 'Irish economic model'.

Our policy is to further develop the Irish economic model, combining the most positive and distinctive features of our own experience, with the dynamism, investment and light regulation characteristic of the US economy and the social solidarity and inclusive participation characteristic of the European economy (p. 26).
In the above context the concepts of ‘partnership’ and ‘social partners’ were the most popular (e.g. pp. 6, 11-12, 31-32, 45, 60, 72, 76, 90), while the issues of tax reduction, and the criticism of ‘ideological approaches’ to the economic policy remained central.

Two things need to be kept in mind before we turn to Fine Gael. First, the absolute absence of references to the term globalisation in both the 1997 and 2002 manifestos; and second, the fact that policies thoroughly associated with the phenomenon of economic globalisation, such as those related to flexibility, tax cuts and mobile capital, were conceptualised as non-ideological and were thus pursued not in the name of globalisation or external pressures, but in that of the guaranteed success of the Irish economic model.

Fine Gael (FG)

Fine Gael did not publish a single electoral manifesto for the 1997 elections. Instead, it published four documents under the title *Securing your Future*, each of which was focusing on a different issue (on economy/prosperity, education and healthcare, environment and crime). When the term manifesto is used without further specification (e.g. economic, environmental) in the analysis below, then we refer to all the four documents. It is worth keeping in mind that in 1997 Fine Gael, and its leader John Bruton, were trying to stay in power by taking advantage of the fact that Ireland was in the midst of an unprecedented economic boom.

The economic manifesto, entitled *Securing and Sharing our Prosperity*, was the longest (18 pages long) and first to be published of the above four documents. It paid particular attention to the *sharing* of the prosperity that had been created. As was mentioned in its introduction, the broader FG electoral programme aimed to ‘secure our nation’s prosperity and share it fairly for the benefits of all our citizens’ (p. 2). In this regard Fine Gael was trying to counterbalance the Irish people’s worries and FF’s

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9 The reference for this document throughout the thesis will be, Fine Gael, 1997a.
10 The reference for this document throughout the thesis will be, Fine Gael, 1997b.
11 The reference for this document throughout the thesis will be, Fine Gael, 1997c.
12 The reference for this document throughout the thesis will be, Fine Gael, 1997d.
accusations about the growing gap between the ‘haves’ and ‘have nots’. And this was the stance taken in a document whose most popular concept was that of social partnership and social partners (see for instance the references in the pages 3, 8, 10, 13, 14, 17, see also FG, 1997c: 2, 1997d: 6, 7).

The economic manifesto was also the only document that made a reference to the term globalisation. In particular, in its first section, a ‘new World Trade Organisation agreement, further trade liberalisation and globalisation of the economy’ were included in the challenges that the new ‘millennium government’ would have to face (p. 3). Yet beyond this reference to the challenge of the globalisation of the economy, the Fine Gael’s manifesto (i.e. all the four documents) did not engage in a discussion on globalisation, while, as in the case of Fianna Fail (1997, 2002), a lot of policies associated with economic globalisation were supported, as an integral part of the Irish economic success, and Fine Gael promised to promote them further. Thus policies associated with economic globalisation were taken for granted between the two big parties in the electoral debate, and the issue was who would push these policies further.

In this context Fine Gael’s aim was ‘to see Ireland attain a permanent place in the top 10 league of international competitiveness’ (FG, 1997a: 5), and the means to achieve this aim were flexibility, mobile investments and ‘corporatisation’. It is indicative that ‘tax reductions’ was, after social partnership, the most popular concept of the manifesto (see for instance page pp. 2-3, 9, 10, 15, 17). The following extracts are elucidating:

Building on Fine Gael-inspired initiatives to promote more flexible systems of wage and salary compensation (p. 4, see also p. 5).

[W]e continue to remain highly attractive to internationally mobile investments, which has been one of the foundation stones for the huge advances we’ve made in employment (p. 4).

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13 The manifesto makes also one reference to the term ‘globally’. In particular it mentions that a workforce must be developed with ‘globally tradable skills’ (p. 4).
This decisive measure [i.e. the reduction of enterprise taxes] underscores our attractiveness as a location for mobile international capital (p. 16; in the section: ‘reducing the burden of enterprise taxes’).

Fine Gael supports the continuation of the ‘corporatisation’ drive among all the Commercial State-Sponsored Bodies (CSSBs)…‘Corporatisation’ requires all the CSSBs to act ‘as if’ they were corporates in the private sector, by requiring them…to generate dividends…and commercial returns…(p. 14).

Thus we see how key – negatively charged – concepts of the economic globalisation discourse were used in the 1997 electoral campaign. Fine Gael did not support flexibility as a necessary evil but on the contrary tried to persuade the electorate that flexibility policies were FG-inspired. The same applied to the case of mobile capital, which was not approached as the ‘curse’ of globalisation, but as the ‘magic touch’ of Irish economic success14. The choice of the term ‘corporatisation’ is also telling, if only on a semantic level, about the dynamics found in the Irish public discourse. Removed from the Irish context the term could only sound like an anti-globalisation slogan.

Some interesting insights with regard to the cultural/social aspects of the globalisation discourse are to be found in the manifesto Education and Healthcare – The Future (FG, 1997b). In its introductory paragraph one reads: ‘For Fine Gael, family and community encapsulate a way of life which we value highly. Growing urbanisation and technological change place stress on the family’ (p. 2); and further below was declared (as an FG’s millennium pledge):

The Government must support the family. The family is the institution which best provides care, nurture and love for children, for elderly and for the incapacitated…Changes in society such as the growth of individualism and secularisation, urbanisation, technological change, changing work practices and changed gender roles are placing families under pressure…(p. 5).

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14 A similar approach to mobile capital was also adopted by FF, 2002.
The above reference could be conceived as a cultural critique of globalisation. In this regard it is indeed interesting that the FG 1997b identified as a problem, what the FG 1997a promoted as a policy for wealth-generation, i.e. changing work practices.

Under the new leadership of Michael Noonan in the 2002 elections, Fine Gael chose to push this kind of identity-critique further. There are two key documents in this regard: the general 2002 electoral manifesto, under the indicative title *Towards a Better Quality of Life*\(^{15}\) (38 pages long), and a separate economic manifesto, entitled ‘Just Economics’\(^{16}\) (24 pages long).

The most striking observation derived from the study of the above documents is (again) the complete absence of any reference to globalisation. The sole relevant reference was found in the section on competitiveness of the economic manifesto, where it was mentioned that threats to Irish competitiveness would ‘become more pronounced in an increasingly globalised marketplace’ (FG, 2002b: 19). Nevertheless, Fine Gael brought the issue of the quality of life, and the fading values of Irish society to the forefront of its manifesto. Indeed, the issue of ‘community spirit vs. selfishness’, the importance of family and traditional values, along with a critique of the nature of ‘Celtic Tiger’ created by FF and PD, were all central to the 2002 manifesto. Noonan, developing his vision of Ireland in the introduction of the manifesto (FG, 2002a), noted:

> [Fine Gael vision is an] Ireland built on a sense of community – not one that has room only for individual selfishness (p. 2).

So the choice is stark: it is a choice between a philosophy that says money is all that counts, and one that puts money in the wider context of quality of life (p. 3)\(^{17}\).

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\(^{15}\) The reference for this manifesto throughout the thesis will be, Fine Gael, 2002a.

\(^{16}\) The reference for this manifesto throughout the thesis will be, Fine Gael, 2002b.

\(^{17}\) A similar reference is made in the economic manifesto: ‘...our people are *living to work rather than working to live*’ (FG, 2002b: 9, emphasis in the original).
One of the greatest strengths in the Irish tradition has always been...family life. Under Fianna Fail and the PDs, the Celtic Tiger has put this tradition under serious stress (p. 10)

and in a similar manner on FF and PD economic policies:

It has been a policy of survival of the fittest. This policy...runs the boilers at full speed and never minds who gets caught in the backwash’ (p. 22).

Along with such references, which were scattered throughout the manifesto, there were also more issue-specific references such as to the negative effects of ‘individualisation’ on single income families (p. 23), or the need for a ‘sustainable neighbourhood’ project (p. 29). Furthermore, Fine Gael’s 2002 manifesto stressed the widening ‘gap between the have and have nots’ (pp. 2, 22) (a critique which had also been used by FF in 1997).

Beyond the above criticism Fine Gael tried also to develop an outside-in critique. In this regard, in relation to the EU, it argued that ‘Irish policy positions have become narrow and selfish’ and that ‘[u]nder Fianna Fail and the PDs, Ireland became ‘the bad boy’ of Europe’ (p. 34). Finally, the manifesto declared that under an FG government ‘Ireland’s new reputation as a selfish, greedy country...[would] decisively [be] put to rest – forever’ (p. 35).

The 2002 Economic Manifesto Just Economics does not add much to the above picture. Both Jim Mitchell (Deputy Leader and Front Bench Spokesperson on Finance) and Michael Noonan in their introductions stressed that Fine Gael was ‘proud of the part it has played in bridging about this economic miracle’ (p. 2). Mitchell in particular declared that ‘the end for which we are working is A JUST SOCIETY...However, to achieve this Ireland must always be at the cutting edge of competitiveness and flexibility’ (p. 2; capital in the original); a position that exemplifies the extent to which concepts such as flexibility were embedded in the Irish public discourse and politico-economic system. The economic manifesto declared also that the ‘era of unprecedented growth known as the Celtic Tiger came to
an end in 2001’ (p. 9), and analysed how the ‘Irish Economic Model’ could be developed as ‘a third way between Boston and Berlin’ (pp.12-14).

The above examples make it clear that the electoral strategy of Fine Gael wavered between two opposites: on the one hand, a critique of the FF’s and PD’s version of Celtic Tiger and its negative socio-cultural effects; on the other hand, an attempt to cash in on the role it had played in bringing about the economic miracle of (the same) Celtic Tiger, and to make clear that it would continue the relevant economic policies. Hence whereas one can find in the Fine Gael’s critique of the ‘Celtic Tiger model’ elements of the cultural aspect of globalisation discourse, the economic aspect of the latter seems to remain beyond any contestation in the policies and ideology promoted by both FG and FF (i.e. the two biggest Irish parties) throughout the period 1997-2002.

The following sections turn to the ‘partners in power’ of the Fine Gael and the Fianna Fail, i.e. the Labour Party and the Progressive Democrats.

**Labour Party (LP)**

The Labour Party published electoral manifestos for both the 1997 and 2002 elections. During 1997 its purpose was to stay in government, while in 2002 its aim was to come back as a partner in power. The 1997 manifesto was entitled *Making the Vital Difference*¹⁸ (79 pages long), and despite the fact that the term globalisation was used only once, one can find in it a discussion about globalisation and its nature. Let us however begin the analysis of the manifesto by pointing out how the Labour Party identified itself and the policies needed, in 1997:

> Building hope and confidence for the future...requires a mix – a mix of values, of vision, and of practical policies (p. 1)...On the one hand, a rapidly changing economy demands economic flexibility. On the other, people have

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¹⁸ The reference for this manifesto throughout the thesis will be, Labour Party, 1997.
a right to a reasonable level of income security...Achieving both will be the key measure of...success (p. 49).

Labour is the party of work and the party of enterprise. Without enterprise in the public or private sector, there is no wealth and no basis for social progress. Labour is committed to a strong market economy based on competition (p. 11).

Our object is...[t]he prioritisation of enterprise and innovation as a key elements in the creation of wealth (p. 6).

It would be hard to guess that the above extracts were found in the electoral manifesto of a Labour Party (at least in the continental Europe). Indeed the 'commitment' to a 'strong market economy', and the self-identification of the Labour Party as the 'party of enterprise' elucidates conceptually where the 'parliamentary left' of the Irish political scene was drawing the line of ideological and policy confrontation; the line of what could be considered to be 'practical policy', and what should be considered as 'ideological policy'. This is an important point because it indicates the area of economics and politics that was not contested by the Irish political parties. It signifies, in other words, what was conceptualised and treated as non-ideological by the Irish party ideology production mechanisms. Along the same lines, the new anchor of Irish politico-economic life, i.e. the social partners/partnership, was also dominant in the Labour Party's discourse, being the most frequently used term/concept within the manifesto [see for instance pp. 5-6, 8-10, Chapter 3: 16-25, 35, 68].

In contrast however to the two big parties, the LP's 1997 manifesto did engage with the globalisation debate which was evolving both at academic and political circles at a European level after the mid-1990s. The following extracts illustrate the Labour Party's attempt to make sense of and define the 'new' international environment:

As we approach the 21st century, the world is in the early stages of a revolution as profound and all-pervasive as the industrial revolution of the last century...it is within our abilities to ensure that this time, the information revolution does not leave us behind. The new age promises the ability to
liberate people...However there are also real dangers...with consequent marginalisation for some (p. 49).

[The suggested economic goals] must be achieved against a background of free trade, of rapid technological change and communication advances...The global dimension is intruding ever more strongly into national and local economies. The 'Information Society' is upon us. These are the realities. They are challenges to be met with enthusiasm...(p. 4, see also p. 11, where EMU and globalisation are defined as the context of economic policies).

Therefore a 'new reality' approach to globalisation was clear in the Labour Party's rhetoric. Furthermore, this new reality, i.e. the coming information revolution, and the 'global dimension' were defined as challenges that were to be met with enthusiasm. Within this context the effort of the Labour Party to put forward a left rhetoric in the Irish public discourse was characterised by serious inherent contradictions. The following extracts are indicative:

Labour is opposed to individualism as a social philosophy. Thatcherites and their Irish clones follow an alien creed19 (p. 4). [Yet, in] the Information Age citizens will find it necessary to think even more for themselves (p. 50).

In accepting the market system with private enterprise and private property we recognise that we also have to seek to humanise it where necessary, but without undermining its capacity to perform (p. 4).

Thus the opposition to individualism gelled with the diagnosis of the Labour Party on the nature of the 'information age'. Furthermore, in the need to 'humanise' aspects of the market system, one condition was set: such attempts should not undermine its functionality. This statement is one more important indication of the 'ideological consensus' found among the Irish parties, on what was acceptable/unacceptable in the realm of public policy. Finally the 1997 manifesto included some discussion on the cultural aspects of globalisation and the Irish Gaelic identity and language; yet its

19 Along these lines the Labour Party promoted the idea of a 'Social Guarantee' for disadvantaged and disabled people. See LP, 1997: 16-20.
approach to the future of Gaelic tradition 'in a multifaceted culture' was more positive and confident than negative or defensive (pp. 46-47).

The 2002 manifesto entitled *Our Values, Our Pledges* (36 pages long)^20^, signified a shift in the Labour Party's discourse, towards the endorsement of a classical left critique of globalisation. Thus the manifesto articulated a discourse on globalisation through repetitive references to 'global capitalism' (p. 1), 'global capital' (p. 2, 32), 'global economic justice' (p. 10), 'global economic development' (p. 16), 'globalising economy' (p. 32), 'global militarisation' (p. 33), 'global community' (p. 34), and the need for 'the introduction of the Tobin tax' (p. 35). Thus although the manifesto made only one reference to the term globalisation, the term 'global' was its most popular term, while the mobilisation of the concept of social partnership was very low in comparison to the 1997 manifesto. Moreover, in the self-identification of the party, the emphasis shifted from 'enterprise' to the identity of the party as a 'part of the European Social Democratic and Socialist Parties' (p. 32, see also p. 2). In this manner the Labour Party was adopting a 'social democratic vision of society' (p. 13, see also p. 32).

In general, in 2002 the Labour Party attempted to bring the question of 'values' to the heart of its electoral campaign. The introduction of the manifesto declared:

>This election is about values...This Government has been guided by a combination of crude Thatcherite ideology...and the populist complacency of the larger Government Party...Labour believe that the State has a vital role to play in Irish Society...As globalisation has driven a new way of economic change and opportunity, it has brought with it uncertainty, and in some cases gross injustice...Unchecked by democratic control, global capitalism has the potential to do severe damage to the social and economic rights of the individual (p. 1).

In this context it was claimed that a 'deadening cynicism has taken hold in Irish politics' (p. 2), that was the result of the 'simplistic economic individualism' (p. 2) and the 'simplistic right-wing' agenda (indicatively pp. 2, 7) followed by the

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^20^ The reference for this manifesto throughout the thesis will be, Labour Party, 2002.
governmental coalition. What about the principle of flexibility, the cornerstone of Irish economic success? The Labour Party did not go so far as to dispute its necessity. Thus, ‘[redundancy payments legislation’ had to be upgraded so as employers may ‘deliver the flexibility required to remain competitive in the new economy’ (p. 9, emphasis added). Considering the Labour Party’s approach to flexibility, as something required by the new economy, it can be argued that the Labour Party did not really dispute the heart of governmental economic policies, but rather the ‘compensation mechanisms’ that accompanied these policies. Again, this is very telling about the ideological consensus found in the Irish public discourse about what was not considered to be ideological or disputable in the realm of Irish economic policy; and this ideological consensus was not affected by the assertions of the Labour Party that it ‘believe[d] in the European Social Model’ (p. 32). The framing of the following passage is suggestive in this regard.

> With increasing economic uncertainty, and new forms of work as well as an anti-union ethos prevailing in a number of enterprises both domestic and multinational, there is as great a need as ever for the protection and enhancement of the statutory rights of workers (pp. 8-9).

Again, although a critical stance was adopted towards for instance the ‘anti-union ethos’, the suggestion was closer to a compensation-logic, than addressing the roots of the problem (no matter what these might be considered to be).

The next section moves on to the other end of the Irish political spectrum, to study the discourse of the Progressive Democrats.

*Progressive Democrats (PD)*

It would not be an exaggeration to say that the Progressive Democrats, although the youngest party, had the greatest impact on the Irish politics in the 1990s. As described in Chapter 2 it was through the Progressive Democrats that the traditional format of Irish politics, the ‘FF vs. the rest’ system, was brought to an end. It is also worth-mentioning that the Progressive Democrats was the only right-wing party with
a clear ideological stance in Irish politics and economics, i.e. an open neo-liberal agenda.

The Progressive Democrats’ electoral strategy for the 1997 elections was not in substance very different from that adopted by Fianna Fail in the same campaign. The core of this strategy was clearly delineated by Mary Harney, the leader of the party, in the introduction of the party’s manifesto *Real Answers, Not Idle Promises* (49 pages long)\(^\text{21}\):

> We are in the midst of an unprecedented economic boom. But it has not impacted on the lives of thousands of our people. The more we grow, it seems, the greater of isolation of those on the fringes (p. 1).

Therefore the issue of a ‘two-tier’, ‘divided’, society (p. 1) was pushed to the forefront of the electoral strategy. The reasons however for this ‘unequal’ development were not clearly elaborated in the manifesto. Instead the emphasis was put on how a ‘strong economic growth’ (p. 4) and a good ‘business environment’ could be maintained and promoted further. The core strategies suggested to this end were: ‘Rewarding Work’ (section 1), ‘Promoting Enterprise’ (section 2), ‘Controlling Public Spending’ (section 3), and enhancing the competitiveness of the Public Sector, through privatisations and other competition policies (sections 5, 6). Although, broadly speaking, these policies defined an economic globalisation agenda, any references to globalisation, or indeed to an ‘information society’, a ‘new age’ etc. were absent from the manifesto. The only relevant reference was found in the section on public spending, that referred to the ‘reality of rationalisation and restructuring’ (p. 4).

In general, ‘tax reform’ and ‘tax reductions’ were the flagship prescriptions of the Progressive Democrats (indicatively pp. 2, 4, 29, 41, 44), along with ‘non ideological privatisations’ (p. 7) and ‘less regulation’:

\(^{21}\) The reference for this manifesto throughout the thesis will be, Progressive Democrats, 1997.
It is clear that employers are responding to more and more labour-market regulations by turning full-time posts into casual ones. If we want less casualisation, then we must have less regulation... We want to see an opt-out clause so that workers themselves are free to decide how many hours a week they want to work (p. 3).

The Progressive Democrats were also attacking the unemployment benefits system which they defined as the ‘dole system’ (see section 8, p. 13); ‘The genuine unemployed want more jobs, not more dole’ (p. 16). Along these lines the Progressive Democrats were radical enough to dispute the primacy of the consociational base of the Irish politico-economic system:

Consensus is no bad thing in some regard – but if it props up the status quo, it cannot be productive (p. 1).

Nevertheless the concept of social partnership was often mobilised and retained a significant position in the manifesto.

The 2002 manifesto pushed the ideological platform of the Progressive Democrats further, adopting the indicative title, *Manifesto 2002: Value for Your Vote* (92 pages long). In a consistent ideological manner the core concept of the manifesto was that of ‘enterprise’, with abundant references made to an ‘enterprise economy’ (for instance pp. 14, 44, 46), an ‘enterprise approach’ (for instance with regard to education and curriculum development pp. 70-71, see also p. 44), and an ‘enterprise society’ (for instance p. 70). In particular a whole chapter of the manifesto was devoted to, ‘A Pro-Enterprise and Pro-Consumer Society’ (pp. 44-47). Its introduction claimed:

Enterprise is at the heart of a vibrant, developing society. An enterprising approach is about taking initiative to make change for the better happen. Enterprise creates wealth, delivers jobs and improves people’s lives... no more so than at local community level where initiative and enterprise bind strong communities together (p. 44).
The Progressive Democrats kept high in their 2002 agenda the need for an ‘inclusive society’ (pp. 14-19) and in the chapter on agriculture acknowledged that ‘some have gained more than others’ and thus that the existing ‘pattern of growth has been uneven’ (p. 55).

It is again striking that the term globalisation is only used twice, in the sections on ‘Europe’ (p. 84) and ‘International Affairs’ (p. 86), in a rather neutral manner. For instance in the chapter on ‘Irish International Affairs’ it was noted that the ‘world is becoming increasingly globalised, politically as much as economically’ (p. 86), and that Ireland needed to work ‘to build an institutional and policy framework that promotes human rights and economic opportunity in globalisation’ (p. 87).

To sum up, it is important to stress that the Progressive Democrats’ calls for a pro-enterprise society and for liberalisation, deregulation and tax cuts were not justified in the name of external pressures, but rather were promoted as a mode of both being and remaining prosperous. In this regard globalisation was not constructed or approached as something external. But nor was a new reality approach elaborated; even though many references were made to the need for modernisation in various sectors, such as in education and the economy (see PD, 2002: 6, 22, 48, 61, 79). Rather, enterprise and deregulation policies were put forward as preconditions for the development of a wealthy and inclusive society. In this regard the most suggestive reference was that relating enterprise to the reproduction of the local communities, by arguing that ‘enterprises bind strong communities together’ (p. 44). To conclude, it would not be an exaggeration to say that enterprise was suggested by Progressive Democrats as the new ‘core’ through which (traditional) social life should be organised and reproduced. This point gains additional importance if one considers that the other end of the Irish political spectrum, i.e. the Labour Party, also put enterprise at the top of its agenda (at least in 1997).
Synopsis

The study of Irish party discourses has revealed an interesting paradox. The concept of globalisation is virtually absent from all the parties' manifestos (with the exception of LP, 2002), in the most globalised country of the world, in two electoral campaigns that took place at the high period of globalisation discourse, and specifically in 1997 and 2002. Thus considering that political parties define one of the most fundamental ideology production nexuses of Irish polity, it can be assumed that the concept/term of globalisation had not become a central point of reference in the production and reproduction of Irish public discourse and life.

But let us return to the basic research question: What do the discourses of the Irish parties tell us about the emergence and communication of the hegemonic discourse of globalisation in Ireland? An easy answer is that the globalisation discourse, contrary to what happened in Greece, had not become a new zone of contestation through which Irish politics were reordered and redefined. Yet the above findings suggest more than this. It is not only that globalisation did not become a focal point of reference, it is that the concept of globalisation was completely absent in the majority of the texts through which parties (re)defined their identity, explicated their programmatic statements, communicated with their public and asked for its vote.

Thus, based on the above analysis, it can be argued that our research revealed also a non-ideological, i.e. not contestable, space in Irish politics and economics. This space consisted of policies and concepts which have been widely associated with extreme aspects of economic globalisation. Thus economic policies, which had been widely contested in many European states, which constituted the main target of the anti-globalisation movement, and which were promoted by most European governments as a necessary evil due to globalisation and external pressures, in Ireland constituted the given, the uncontested, what was to be taken for granted, what needed to be protected and promoted. They thus constituted a *policy and cognitive space*

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22 In their investigation of the discourse of globalisation in Ireland Hay and Smith (2005) seem to arrive at a similar conclusion: '...globalisation [rather than to be presented] as a set of external challenges (still) to be accommodated, it is introduced more as a means of reflecting positively on the distance already travelled by the Irish economy in its rise to "tigerdom".' (ibid.: 136).
against which Irish parties competed only in the name of safeguarding or expanding it.

This is a challenging phenomenon to conceptualise. It can be said that Irish political and economic life reproduced itself through this non-ideological space, which, however, was nothing else than the core of the hegemonic discourse of globalisation. The thesis comes back to this argument in Chapter 5. What needs to be stressed here is that as long as the consensus on the non-ideological space was maintained by the parties, the hegemonic discourse seemed to be equated – if this is meaningful – with the Irish model of development (see also Hay and Smith, 2005: 136). Thus it was becoming an integral part of Irish identity production, and was read as the reason for Irish success.

It is now necessary to examine whether the above conclusion about the non-ideological space applies beyond the party discourses. In this way we will get a more accurate picture of the dynamics under way in the production and reproduction of Irish public discourse. This is the purpose of the following sections.

**Irish Business and Employers Confederation (IBEC)**

The Irish Business and Employers Confederation is the national and international 'voice of Irish business and employers' and has approximately '7000 member businesses and organisations from all sectors and of all sizes' of the Irish economy\(^\text{23}\). Being an integral part of the institution of social partnership, IBEC has had a decisive and independent role in the formation and change of Irish political economy. It is worth mentioning here that the increase of its influence that followed the revival of the social partnership in the late 1980s, was accompanied by a decline in its membership, mainly due to the 'arrival of increasing numbers of multinationals and

\(^{23}\) As a national association IBEC came into being in 1993, as a result of the merger between the Confederation of Irish Industry (founded in 1934) and the Federation of Irish Employers (founded in 1942). See IBEC's official website, at: [http://www.ibec.ie](http://www.ibec.ie) (02/07/2003).
other companies refusing to bargain with trade unions... [and]...join...employers' association\textsuperscript{24}.  

A crucial factor in IBEC's discourse has been UNICE and the general developments that had been taking place at the European level. Yet as we have referred to these developments in the case of Greece, here we proceed directly to the examination of IBEC's discourse for the period 1996-2001. In order to do so we consulted the following sources: (a) The 'Annual Reviews' of the Confederation for the period 1996-2002. The Reviews cover all the activities of the Confederation, including its publications. (b) The newspapers \textit{The Irish Times} and \textit{Irish Independent} for the period 1996-2001. This research was conducted through the electronic data-base 'Lexis-Nexis Executive' and its aim was to counterbalance the lack of an on-line archive with the speeches and interviews of IBEC's executives (i.e. the Chairpersons and the Directors General).

\textit{Annual Reviews}

The main conclusion from the study of IBEC's Annual Reviews for the period 1996-2001, is the same as that reached from the study of SEV's Reviews: IBEC did not develop a discourse on globalisation, as such. It is indeed suggestive that the term globalisation was only mentioned once, in the annual review of 2001-2002, to describe the 'growing globalisation of business' (IBEC, 2002: 15). As in the Greek case the lack of references to globalisation should not be interpreted as an absence of globalisation discourse, as particular 'objects' and 'themes' of the economic globalisation discourse were reiterated and brought to the heart of IBEC's discourse and communication efforts. The list of these objects and themes is predictable: tax cuts, with particular emphasis on the reduction of corporate taxes, competitiveness, flexibility, liberalisations and privatisations, social partnership and enterprise culture. Below I briefly explore the way in which these objects were 'mobilised'.

\textsuperscript{24} See the official webpage of the 'European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions', a 'tripartite European Union body, at: http://www.eurofound.eu.int/emiire/IRELAND/EMPLOYERSASSOCIATION-IR.html (02/07/2003).
One could start by distinguishing between the tone and the stance of the Annual Reviews before and after the year 2000. The former were characterised by a strong optimism based on the assumption that the economy and the social partnership were moving on the right track for Ireland’s international competitiveness. In the 1997 Review (covering the year 1996), the section on the economy was entitled *1996: Strong Growth and a New Agreement* (IBEC, 1997: 4). The respective title in the 1998 Review was *1997: A Year of High Growth and Low Inflation* (IBEC, 1998: 2); whereas the notion that the ‘economic performance of Ireland...has been...the envy of...[its]...fellow European members’ (IBEC, 2000: 3) was widespread in all the Reviews for the period 1996-1999 (for instance see IBEC, 1997: 6). This strongly positive and optimistic rhetoric was qualified to an extent in the analysis of the economic year 2000, which still remained a year in which *Growth Exceeds Forecasts* (IBEC, 2001: 4). The optimistic stance changed with regard to 2001. The 2002 Review mentioned that, as ‘we predicted in last year’s Annual Review the Irish economy slowed down dramatically in 2001’ (IBEC, 2002: 4; emphasis added).

Regarding this latter phase of IBEC’s discourse it can be said that even though the slowdown of the Irish economy was undisputable, the growth rates of the Irish economy remained among the highest within the OECD, and hardly justified the use of dramatic tones by IBEC. Thus the repetitive use of the term dramatic in IBEC’s 2002 Review must have been serving a different purpose. Let us develop this point further.

In the 1997 Review IBEC defined as ‘reasons for Ireland’s very positive economic performance’, the successful ‘overall macroeconomic management’, the ‘continued consensus approach’ and the success ‘in attracting high quality’ FDIs (IBEC, 1997: 4). At the same time Anthony Barry, the president of IBEC, was congratulating the government for following an employment policy

*which largely reflected the policy objectives for which...IBEC...had campaigned over the years* (ibid. 3, emphasis added; see also p. 7),

and which was characterised by flexibility (ibid.). Building on this approach, in the 1998 Review Barry was arguing: ‘we now have to look forward to even more radical changes...to meet the greater changes of an expanded marketplace’; and in his call
for the reduction of 'corporation tax and...capital gains tax' he referred to the 'principle that wealth must be generated before it can be redistributed, and business is the wealth creator in the economy' (IBEC, 1998: 1, emphasis in the original). The 1997 and 1998 Reviews were also stressing the difference between the 'industrial unrest in the public sector' versus the 'stable' and 'relatively peaceful' industrial relations of the private sector (see for instance IBEC, 1997: 6, 1998: 4, 1999: 4-5).

At the same period a burning issue in the agenda of Irish industrial relations was the issue of the recognition of trade unions. In this regard, in the 'High Level Group on Trade Union Recognition', established under the terms of the social pact Partnership 2000, IBEC argued strongly for important principles which the Confederation had articulated over the past number of years: that the voluntary system of industrial relations must be underpinned and reinforced; and that no action be taken to impose mandatory trade union recognition on employers (IBEC, 1999: 4).

In defending its flexibility agenda IBEC did not hesitate to qualify its general pro-European stance. For instance it 'repeatedly expressed grave concerns' with regard to the 1999 EU 'Working Time Directive' (IBEC, 2000: 9,11). Furthermore, with regard to the Irish proposal for tax cuts it noted: 'The EU Commission, however, had a different view and its very public disagreement with the government on the issue did nothing to improve the image of the EU among Irish citizens' (IBEC, 2001: 5). In the same context IBEC stressed, as a way of self-advertisement, that it intensively and successfully lobbied the government, to force it to 'to accept...[IBEC] policy recommendations with regard to Public/Private Partnerships' (see IBEC, 1999: 9; 2000: 3, 10).

What can be inferred from the above extracts is that IBEC contended that the economic miracle was based on the fact that the government and the other social partners (mainly ICTU), had conceded, subscribed to and followed the 'policy objectives...which...IBEC had campaigned over the years' (IBEC, 1997: 3). Considering the economic policies that dominated in the Republic after the end of the 1980s, IBEC's claim seems to be a valid one, i.e. it is rather clear that it was IBEC
that set the parameters within which the social partnership strategy was moving and changing. It must, however, be pointed out that even though these parameters triggered industrial action, mainly in the public sector (see for instance IBEC, 1998: 4; 1999: 4-5), they generated such an unprecedented wealth that any trade union opposition to them became unsubstantiated if not irrelevant. This format of politico-economic development seems to be challenged in 2000. William Burgess, the president of IBEC, opened the Review for this year as following:

It is something of a paradox that, in a time of unprecedented prosperity and economic activity, the factors which contributed to our success are in danger of collapse. Government over-spending; industrial unrest....inflation ...infrastructure...[In this regard] IBEC lobbied intensively during the year to ensure that a business-friendly climate was nurtured (IBEC, 2001: 1, 10).

Above all it seemed that the parameters set by IBEC were no longer to be taken for granted even if they bore the partnership’s imprint. To face this situation IBEC tried to maximise the pressure on its partners through warnings such as the following:

the failure of trade unions to deliver their commitments under PPF [the 2000 social pact Programme for Prosperity and Fairness] was a major source of unease, calling into question the very validity of such agreements in the future (IBEC, 2001: 15).

In addition in its message in the 2002 Review W. Burgess noted:

The Confederation has been seriously concerned for some time that business is the only social partner which remembers that the prosperity of the nation depends on our ability to sell our goods and services at the right price in the global market (IBEC, 2002: 1).

And the Review went on to underline:
Throughout the year, major difficulties were experienced with PPF because of the failure by trade unions to comply with basic commitments under the agreement...Companies experienced real problems in ensuring cooperation with on-going change, with trade unions exploiting change initiatives by demanding payment in return (IBEC 2002: 2).

It was within the above context that the 2002 Review (on the year 2001) talked about a 'dramatic slowdown', 'weakening confidence' and 'eroded' competitiveness with regard to the Irish economy (ibid.: 4, 5).

To conclude, the lack of any discussion on globalisation in the Annual Reviews was compensated for by an omnipresent economic globalisation agenda, in the name of which IBEC did not hesitate to confront and criticise the European Commission, or even to dispute the validity of the social pacts, so central to the Irish economic miracle. Thus, it could be argued that the non-ideological space that was traced in the manifestos of the political parties, found its definition and generating-dynamics in the discourse of IBEC. To double check this conclusion, the thesis examined also the discourses of the various Presidents and Directors-General of IBEC, as captured by the two biggest in circulation Irish broadsheets; *Irish Independent* and *The Irish Times*.

**IBEC Representatives**

The examination of the discourses of IBEC representatives was based on the following methodology. The data-base 'Lexis-Nexis Executive' was used as an online archive for the newspapers *The Irish Times (TIT)* and *Irish Independent (II)* published during 1996-2000. Having specified the two newspapers as our source, specific key-words were given to find articles referring to the IBEC executives under examination. These executives and the key-terms used, as well as the respective findings are presented in Table 1:
TABLE 1: IBEC Chief Executives and the Use of the Concept of Globalisation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>'Search Terms' used</th>
<th>Articles found in <em>TIT</em> &amp; <em>Irish Independent</em> during 1996-2000</th>
<th>Articles attributing the use of the term 'globalisation' to the IBEC Executive under consideration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tony Barry (1996-1998)</td>
<td>President</td>
<td>Barry and IBEC</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard Burrows (1998-2000)</td>
<td>President</td>
<td>Burrows and IBEC</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Dunne (1992-2000)</td>
<td>Director General</td>
<td>Dunne and IBEC</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is important to keep in mind that the above numbers do not indicate how many times the term globalisation was used by IBEC’s top executives, but how many times a substantial part of the printed press brought together the name of an executive and the term globalisation. The result is indeed suggestive: none. This supports, if not confirms, the above analysis of IBEC’s discourse on globalisation. The representatives of Irish businesses did not engage in or develop a discourse on globalisation as such. At the same time, the issues of competitiveness, tax reductions and flexibility retained their predominance in the above articles, as they did in the Annual Reviews. For instance, referring to a speech by John Dunne\(^{25}\), *The Irish Times* noted:

> While accepting a need remained for achieving greater social cohesion, [John Dunne] told...this could not deflect the social partners from ‘the primacy of competitiveness’\(^{26}\).


\(^{26}\) Extract from a speech to the conference ‘Framework for a New Partnership’ in Dublin. The conference aimed to the negotiation of the basis for a new social pact among the social partners. ‘Director of IBEC says 10% pay rises ‘out of the question’’, *The Irish Times*, October 24, 1996, p. 10.
It is also interesting to note how the institution of social partnership was used differently in different periods, with regard to the issue of flexibility in pay rises. Thus in 1996 during the negotiation of a new wage agreement John Dunne was opposing any local bargaining clause: 'I’d have to be very blunt...The greatest attraction to employers of national agreement on the pay side is certainty. The more you introduce so called flexibility, the more you reduce certainty'\(^{27}\). Yet in 2000, when pay rises were at stake, Turlough O’ Sullivan, the successor of John Dunne, was arguing: ‘Any extra money made available must be on the basis that employers have the right to bargain at local level, as the provisions of the PPF [the social pact ‘Programme for Prosperity and Fairness’] allow, to seek greater flexibilities, productivity and so on\(^{28}\). This is a small example, but indicates the development of a clearly instrumental approach towards the social partnership by IBEC.

The lack of an IBEC discourse on globalisation as such, was also confirmed by a keyword-in-context research in *The Irish Times* and *Irish Independent* through Lexis-Nexis. The object of this research was to find articles that included both the terms ‘globalisation’ and ‘IBEC’. Indeed, none of the 21 articles found for the period 1994-2001 offered any indication of an engagement of IBEC in the debate about globalisation\(^{29}\).

Finally, the above newspaper research demonstrated that IBEC’s economic globalisation discourse and agenda were not the most radical of their kind in the Irish politico-economic scene. In fact the biggest in circulation (but not in ‘status’) Irish newspaper, i.e. *Irish Independent*, was throughout the second half of the 1990s criticising IBEC (and the social partnership as a whole) as a ‘dinosaur’, ‘the voice of the big banks and the semi-states’, ‘the old economy\(^{30}\), as opposed to ‘the tigers’, i.e. the multinational companies, and the ‘new economy’. Thus one of the two most important newspapers in the Irish public discourse, and that owned by the so called

\(^{27}\) Padraig Yeates, ‘Fear of Failure to aid case for a new PCW’, *The Irish Times*, September 26, 1996, p. 14. (P. Yeates was the industry and employment correspondent).

\(^{28}\) Padraig Yeates, ‘Fear of Failure to aid case for a new PCW’, *The Irish Times*, September 26, 1996, p. 14

\(^{29}\) The organisation of a conference on the impact of globalisation on the food and drink industry seems rather to be an exception. See ‘Dilger in call for big companies’, *Irish Independent*, November 21, 1998.
‘baron’ of the Irish media, Tony O’Reilly, was strongly pushing and arguing throughout the 1990s for the extension of the non-ideological space of Irish politico-economic scene, accusing the official body of business representatives of being a ‘dinosaur’, suffering from a ‘semi-state mindset’, and not serving the needs and interests of the Irish economy. The criticism went so far as ironically to suggest that IBEC ‘should apply for membership of ICTU’. In this regard it should be stressed that a major part of the mainstream press criticised IBEC’s economic discourse and agenda, not for demanding too much, too fast of economic globalisation but for not demanding enough.

Irish Congress of Trade Unions (ICTU)

The Irish Congress of Trade Unions was formed in 1959 and ‘is the single umbrella organisation for trade unions in Ireland’. As we saw in Chapter 2 the role of ICTU in Irish economy and society, changed fundamentally in the end of the 1980s. A key factor for this change was the agreement **Programme for National Recovery**, reached by the social partners in 1987. This agreement met its aims and led to a new one for the period 1990-1993, titled **Programme for Economic and Social Progress**. As Peter Cassells, the General Secretary of ICTU for the period 1987-1999, commented, this second agreement ‘worked better than expected thus creating a new and unprecedented dynamic in Irish politico-economic life; a dynamic which found at its core the institution of social partnership’.

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31 Tony O’Reilly is the Chairman and major shareholder of the firm ‘Independent Newspapers’, which ‘is the dominant actor in the Irish newspaper industry’. The degree of the concentration of the latter is exemplified ‘in that around 80 per cent of Irish newspapers sold in Ireland in 2001 were sold by companies which are fully or partially owned by Independent Newspapers’. See the Irish country report of the ‘European Journalism Centre’ available at: [http://www.ejc.nl/jr/emland/ireland.html (07/07/2003)](http://www.ejc.nl/jr/emland/ireland.html).
32 ‘Troops in: Bust AIB’s top Brass’, op. cit.
33 ‘Top of the agenda the PPF is as dead as a dodo’, *The Sunday Independent*, December 3, 2000.
34 95% of Irish trade union members are in unions affiliated to the Congress. The Congress, is a 32-county body (including both the Republic and Northern Ireland). See the official website of ICTU at: [http://www.ictu.ie](http://www.ictu.ie). See also the information in the European Foundation’s web-page at: [http://www.eurofound.eu.int/emire/IRELAND/IRISHCONGRESSOFTRADEUNIONS-IR.html](http://www.eurofound.eu.int/emire/IRELAND/IRISHCONGRESSOFTRADEUNIONS-IR.html).
We have analysed above how IBEC seemed to set the parameters of the aforementioned dynamic, and how it did not speak about globalisation. We have also tried to outline the emergence of a non-ideological space in Irish politico-economic life; a space which would be defined by most globalisation critics and anti-globalisation protesters as globalisation par excellence. Within this context it is important to study the discourse of ICTU, and try to understand and illustrate how the workers were making sense of the world and were re-reading their identity, role, aims and strategy. The importance of the EU level in these developments should always be kept in the background of our analysis (see the relevant section in the Greek case).

In order to study the discourse of ICTU on globalisation we examined two official documents for the period 1995-2001: (a) The biennial ‘Report of the Executive Council’ (REC). The Reports of the Executive Council are approximately a hundred pages long each and cover in a comprehensive manner all the annual activities of ICTU. They are thus the main source for examining the ICTU discourse. (b) The ‘Reports of Proceedings’ (RP) of the Biennial Delegate Conferences of ICTU; which are approximately a hundred and fifty pages each. The ‘Delegate Conferences’ were established in 1993 and bring together a big number of delegates from most, if not all, the Irish trade unions, along with other invited speakers. In these conferences approximately a hundred motions carried from the various delegates, are discussed and brought to a vote thus setting the ‘strategic orientation’ for the ICTU Executive Council. Finally this material was complemented with a personal interview with Peter Cassells, the General Secretary of ICTU for the period 1987-1999.

Unlike the IBEC, ICTU did develop a discourse on globalisation as such, and traces of this discourse were to be found as early as in 1995. For instance Peter Cassells used the term globalisation in his introduction for both the 1997 and 1999 Reports of the Executive Council. In particular, in the 1997 Report36 (for the years 1995-1997) he noted: ‘We also worked closely with the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions in highlighting the implications of globalisation for workers in the developing world’ (p. 5), an issue which was then explored further in the section on the
international activities of ICTU (see p. 61; overall the term globalisation appeared twice in the Report). In the 1999 Report the term and concept of globalisation was mobilised more frequently. Thus a reference to globalisation was made in nine different pages of the Report (including a reference in the contents). In his introduction, referring to the developments in the Irish politico-economic scene, Cassells observed that 'all these changes are occurring in a world seeking to cope with the impact of globalisation' (p. 4). Furthermore, the section on the Irish economic situation concluded that the 'sustained pattern of growth reflects the resilience of the Irish economy to increasing globalisation' (p. 12); and the section on the social partnership argued that there 'is still the challenge of securing the European social model in the face of globalisation which seeks to build a competitive edge on low wages and low standards' (p. 16). Lastly, in the section on international activities a sub-section was devoted to globalisation under the title, Responding to Globalisation. Here, one reads:

Globalisation can be described as the increased integration of national economies into the world economy which significantly reduces the scope for independent national economic policy-making and increases the interdependence between nations and regions of the global economy. Ireland as a small open economy is one of the most global economies...Around 45% of the workshop in manufacturing industry are employed in foreign owned companies. In the face of the challenges presented by globalisation Congress has consistently advocated the need to adopt a 'high road' strategy to economic development (p. 92).

According to Cassells such a 'high road' strategy should be based on investments in technology and on social partnership, in contrast to a 'low road' strategy that would be based on 'deregulation, unfettered competition, low wages' (ibid.).

Thus after 1998 the issue of globalisation seemed to acquire a more central position to the discourse and agenda of ICTU. This is also exemplified by the fact that in the

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36 The reference for this Report throughout the thesis is: ICTU (1997), Unions in Action: Making Partnership Work. Dublin: ICTU.
Biennial Delegate Conference, in 1999, the third motion carried (out of 77) was exclusively devoted on globalisation. The motion was put forward by Inez McCormack who was representing UNISON; it was entitled *Globalisation: Social Ground Rules*, and its first paragraph reads as follows:

Conference recognises that in order to tackle the effects of globalisation it is essential to lay social ground rules to enable all to claim their fair share of wealth...and to ensure that social progress goes hand in hand with economic progress. Conference therefore commits itself to vigorously campaign for such a global ethic...(ICTU, 1999a: 11).

The ICTU attempts to conceptualise, contextualise and operationalise the concept of globalisation continued in the Activity Report for 1999-2001[38] (where references to globalisation were made in six pages). It is important to note that in this Report an analysis of globalisation appeared at the section on the Irish economy entitled, *Modernising the Economy* (IBEC, 2001a: 53-64). This included a special section on globalisation entitled *Globalisation: the Need for International Standards* (ibid.: pp. 61-62). The approach to globalisation adopted was as follows:

Globalisation refers to major shifts towards the elimination of controls on markets both through the reduction of barriers to international trade and investment and the deregulation and privatisation of national industries that has occurred during the past twenty years...Congress and the international labour movement are not against globalisation: indeed we would agree that globalisation can be a big part of the answer to the problems of the world's poor. But it is also a big part of the problem...Unfortunately this move towards free trade has not been balanced by the development of a social dimension...(ibid.: 61).

[38] I do not mean to personify ICTU. But the views expressed in the pages of these Reports can be taken as a 'common denominator' of the unions represented in ICTU, or even as views which were consciously pushed forward in order to become a common denominator for the various trade unions. The 2001 Report was published in two parts. The reference for the first part is: ICTU (2001a), *Working for a Fair Society – a Sound Economy (Part I): Priorities and Strategy*. Dublin: ICTU; and for the second: ICTU (2001b), *Working for a Fair Society – a Sound Economy (Part II): Organisation and Finance*. Dublin: ICTU.
Within this context it was argued that ICTU would keep working towards a more equitable sharing of ‘the profits of globalisation’ between companies and workers (p. 62). The same was also argued in a motion carried in the Delegate Conference, in Bundoran, in 2001. The motion was entitled Economic Strategy: Nearer to Brussels than Boston, and declared ‘that globalisation should be underpinned by social ground rules and a commitment to the redistribution of wealth’ (ICTU, 2001: 9-10). The main objective of the motion was to express ICTU’s commitment to the ‘European model of development’ (ibid.).

Why was the discourse of ICTU untypical of the politico-economic consensus found among political parties and the IBEC? In order to understand the way in which ICTU approached the non-ideological space of Irish politics and economics and related it to globalisation, one needs to take into consideration three contextual factors, and their deep implications for the formation and evolution of the ICTU discourse.

The first of these factors had to do with the impact, in terms of wealth generation, of the ‘Irish miracle’ itself. This miracle had been based on economic globalisation policies, such as corporate tax reductions, non-mandatory recognition of trade unions and flexibility in the labour market in general. These were policies that brought to Ireland significant investments from big pharmaceutical and IT companies, and generated for more than a decade the highest growth rates within the OECD countries. They also reversed a historic trend to emigration, generating full employment. They thus elevated Irish society from deprivation and misery to economic success, delivering for the first time in Irish history the promise of a wealthy and prosperous society. This could not but lead to the emergence of a set of politics and policies that were beyond contestation – what we have defined here as the non-ideological space of Irish politico-economic system. Within this context, at least for the first years of the second half of the 1990s, the discourse of ICTU on (economic) globalisation could not be negative or aggressive, as happened with many trade unions in many countries around the world. Yet ICTU was not insulated either from these foreign unions or from the debates within the left and the international labour movement. Arguably that is why in the beginning globalisation was conceptualised and presented as a phenomenon with implications for developing countries, disassociated from everyday life in Ireland. In short, it can be said that the problematisation by ICTU of
the parameters of Irish economic development, was not a logical option at the time, because these parameters and the respective policies were delivering unprecedented wealth in the Irish society, including the trade union members.

The second factor that conditioned the worker’s discourse was the issue of social partnership. The view that IBEC set the broader parameters of policy agenda is not indeed sufficient to draw an accurate picture of the Irish politico-economic scene of the second half of the 1990s. It seems to be the case that a genuine social partnership was being developing between IBEC and ICTU (or, in any case, ICTU and the majority of the trade unions were thinking so). Thus, in the years up to 1997-1998, not only did ICTU not develop a ‘mainstream’ European trade union discourse on globalisation, but to a big extent it endorsed many aspects of the European employers associations’ discourse. Basic instances include: (i) The priority that was given to the concept of competitiveness, which was brought to the fore of the ICTU discourse (also through the ‘Partnership 2000’), in the name of the improvement of living standards (see for instance ICTU, 1997: 10). (ii) The adoption of the concept of flexibility which was often mobilised in a rather neutral way. For instance, the 1995 Delegate Conference ‘calls on the Executive Council to campaign to ensure that...flexible working practices are jointly agreed by employers and trade unions’ (carried motion 33, see: ICTU, 1995: 70, see also ibid. p. 69; ICTU, 1997: 7, 25; 1999: 51, 57). (iii) The soft stance that was adopted towards ‘the necessity for restructuring’, the need to increase the ‘atypical and part-time employment’, and the ‘reform of the public sector’; which were conceptualised as rather natural and inevitable effects of the ‘changing economic and commercial environment’ (see for instance ICTU, 1997: 28-30). (iv) The emphasis that was paid on the ‘necessity for modernisation’. For instance, a motion on Economic Progress Through Partnership in the 1997 Conference acknowledged that ‘much more needs to be done to modernise our economy and our workplaces for the challenges of the new millennium’ (ICTU, 1997a: 41, see also relevant references in ICTU, 1999: 2, 12, 44, 60, 67). The need for modernisation was also stressed in the first motion carried out in both the 1999 and 2001 Conferences (see respectively ICTU, 1999a: 9; 2001a: 10). (iv) The adoption of the concept of, and necessity for, efficiency (see for instance ICTU, 1999: 4, 12, 45).
The adoption, however, of employers’ views and their lexicon did not stop the Congress from bringing to the heart of its discourse the issue of the unfair and unequal distribution of the benefits from the economic miracle\textsuperscript{39}. But for ICTU a genuine partnership was the best place for addressing and solving this problem. Thus, within the above context, the strategic objective of ICTU was to avoid reducing the bargaining with IBEC to a plain ‘pay negotiation’ issue, as this would destroy the genuine character of their partnership. This strategy seemed to work well up to the end of the 1990s. Furthermore developments such as the ‘Profit Sharing’ and ‘Employee Share Ownership Plans’ were reassuring the workers’ representatives for the genuine character of the partnership\textsuperscript{40}. In this regard the ICTU’s approach to the economic globalisation discourse remained rather neutral, even if increasingly alarming.

The last factor that influenced and arguably moved the Congress’s discourse on globalisation closer to its European counterparts, had to do with what can be described as the identity crisis of the social partnership and of the labour movement. Three interwoven developments were instrumental here. First, was the growing dissatisfaction on the part of labour with social partnership’s failing promise of a more fair and equal society. Thus although all the strata of Irish society had moved upwards in terms of economic benefits, both the discourse and the reality of the gap between the ‘haves’ and the ‘have nots’ acquired a central place in the Irish polity after the end of the 1999. Second, this dissatisfaction was fed by the fact that some of the parameters of the social partnership which were pushed by the unions throughout the 1990s proved to be much less flexible than what a concept of a genuine partnership would imply. For instance the issue of the mandatory recognition of trade unions, central to the discourse and expectations of the Congress, had reached a stalemate in 1999. Thirdly, and maybe more importantly, a feeling started to be generated among labour unions that although ‘Partnership has...helped to produce a great number of jobs,...it has been less effective in ensuing that those jobs are rewarding, less stressful, more secure and compatible with rich family life’; thus the

\textsuperscript{39} See for instance the introduction of Peter Cassells in the 1997 and 1999 Reports (see, ICTU, 1997: 5 and 1999: 4, respectively), the motion 63 carried in the 1997 Conference, and the motion 1 carried in the 1999 one (in ICTU, 1997a: 107 and 1999a: 9 respectively).
'Work-Life balance' had been changed for the worse\textsuperscript{41}. As a result the ICTU in 1999 seemed to abandon the prioritisation of competitiveness as a condition for a better future. This was a period when the need for a 'social dimension' was placed at the core of Congress's discourse; when the effects of globalisation were not to be discussed only with regard to the developing countries; and when the 'European model of development' was promoted by ICTU as a response to globalisation. As Cassells argued:

if this country's vision does not reach beyond the goal of economic growth and competitiveness, we could slide into a shallow, selfish, highly divided society where poverty, exploitation and discrimination become permanent features (ICTU, 2001a: 45).

The above three factors delineate also three broad phases in ICTU's discourse on globalisation. These should not be understood as insulated from each other. For instance in the last phase, when ICTU mobilised the concept of globalisation to conceptualise developments taking place both in Ireland and internationally, a chapter in the 2001 Report was devoted to the need for \textit{Modernising the Economy} (ICTU, 2001a: 53-62). Yet in this latter phase (i.e. 1999-2001) the discourse of globalisation as was articulated by the European Left, also acquired a central dimension in the strategies, vocabulary and identity-reproduction of the Irish labour unions.

\textbf{National Economic and Social Council (NESC)}

The National Economic and Social Council of Ireland was founded in 1973 with as its main task 'to advise the Government on the development of the national economy and the achievement of social justice'\textsuperscript{42}. For the purposes of this section two things need to be underlined. First, that the Council had played a crucial role in the revival of the social partnership in Ireland, since the late 1980s; and second the fact that the personality of Professor Rory O'Donnell, as Director of NESC, did make a great

\textsuperscript{41} The quotations are from the introduction of Peter Cassells in the 2001 Report (see ICTU, 2001a: 3).

\textsuperscript{42} See NESC's official website at: http://www.nesc.ie.
difference in the role and influence of the Council in Irish politico-economic scene. Indeed Rory O’Donnell is considered to be one of the main architects of the modern social partnership (i.e. post mid-1980s).

NESC had been a place where the social partners (including representatives from the government, employers, workers, farmers and the community and voluntary sector) met and exchanged ideas about a wide range of economic and social issues. The Council’s Secretariat (led by the Director) had a crucial role in this process, for it is up to the Secretariat to synthesise and guide the various and often opposing opinions expressed. The published Reports and Recommendations that constituted the end products of these processes, aimed to delineate, or define, the common ground among the various participants and to offer (strategic) guidance for governmental policies.

After IBEC and ICTU, NESC remains the last piece of the puzzle of social partners’ discourse on globalisation. In order to study NESC’s discourse we examined: (a) The Press Releases of the Council for the period 1993-2001. Through the Press Releases one can monitor all the activities of NESC. They also included comprehensive summaries of all the publications of the Council. (b) The full text of the Reports of the Council for the period 1999-2001. Some of these Reports focus on general topics, such as the future opportunities and challenges for the Irish economy, while others had a more thematic focus, such as the issues of poverty or profit sharing.

The picture that emerges from the study of the press releases is rather a clear one. Up to 1997/1998 three issues constituted the core of NESC’s discourse: the necessity and priority of competitiveness, the level of unemployment (which for the first time since 1990 decreased into a single figure in 1998), and the importance of social partnership as the ‘most effective mechanism for developing Irish competitiveness and social cohesion in the...global context’. After 1998 the issues of social cohesion and inclusiveness seemed to replace the issue of unemployment in the core of NESC

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43 They were available on line at: http://www.nesc.ie/Press.htm.
discourse45. Globalisation came to the fore of the Council’s discourse with the Report *Opportunities, Challenges and Capacities for Choice* that was published, in December 1999 (NESC, 1999). There NESC developed its vision for Ireland for the first decade of the 21st Century and elaborated on the economic and social strategy that had to be followed in order Ireland to reach this vision. The Report had plenty of scattered references to globalisation, but notably also included an explicit section on Globalisation (NESC, 1999: 92-109). NESC saw globalisation as one of the three fundamental integration processes that posed a challenge in the development of Irish economy (along with the European and the Republic-Northern Ireland economic integrations). The section started with the acknowledgement that globalisation ‘is a term that has become part of everyday life in the 1990s’ (p. 92) and that it ‘is a term that connotes momentum, suggesting an almost unstoppable force over which people (national governments, firms, individuals) have no control’ (ibid.); an assumption that was disputed later in the Report. Three factors were defined as the ‘main driving forces of globalisation: technology, trade liberalisation and increased capital/financial flows’ (p. 95); and through their analysis, and the study of the respective literature, it was concluded that ‘it is increased use of technology and not increased trade that has reduced the demand for low-skilled workers in developed countries’ (p. 110).

Based on the above extracts and on a detailed reading of the Report, it can be argued that NESC attempted to free the concept of globalisation from its negative connotations, and to present globalisation as a given context that necessitated particular policies. In this regard NESC discourse was based on a new reality approach to globalisation. Finally it can be argued that the NESC discourse on globalisation was determined by the attempt of its leadership to define and protect the consensus among the social partners on what were, and what was demanded by, the prevailing economic conditions. Hence, the engagement of NESC’s Secretariat with the globalisation debate served also, intentionally or unintentionally, a strategic purpose; that is, pre-emptively to neutralise a potential politicisation of the non-ideological space of the Irish politico-economic life, that could take place through the mobilisation of the anti-globalisation discourse, by any of the social partners.

45 See the press releases for both the ‘Overview’ and the full text of the report *Opportunities, Challenges and Capacities for Choice*, published in November and December 1999, respectively.
The Archbishop of Dublin and Primate of Ireland, Cardinal Desmond Connell, and the Church in Ireland

The Church is an important actor in Irish society and therefore its impact cannot be excluded from the study of the Irish public discourse. It is also worth pointing out that the active stance adopted by Cardinal Connell in public affairs, did make a difference, while in some respects reviving the role of the Church in Irish public discourse. Of course within the Church in Ireland one can find different voices and views. Yet the focus of this section on Cardinal Connell is entirely legitimate as the latter is not only the head of the Catholic Church in the Republic, but also the person with the most active and influential, even controversial, stance in the Irish public discourse.

Our analysis of the Cardinal Connell’s discourse on globalisation was very much based on the press coverage of Cardinal’s speeches, interviews and public interventions in general. In particular the newspaper The Irish Times was selected as the most credible ‘source of references’ in the Irish press. The research was conducted through the electronic data-base Lexis-Nexis Executive, while the key-word used was ‘Desmond Connell’. For the period 1996-2001, 474 articles were found. We then used this material as an electronic pool of articles from which we kept all the articles that included one of the following key-words: global, globalisation, identity, flexibility and Celtic Tiger. In addition, articles that included the key-words ‘modern’ or ‘Europe’ were also kept, when the context of the use of these terms was judged relevant to our investigation. This selection process left us with forty articles, the great majority of which had direct quotations from Cardinal Connell, and approximately one fourth of which were interviews and articles or speeches of his. This material was then supplemented with his speeches and statement, for the period 1999-2001, which were available in the on-line archive of Dublin Diocese.

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46 Cardinal Desmond Connell was appointed as Archbishop of Dublin in 1988, and elevated to the Sacred College of Cardinals in 2001.


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It is striking, once again, that in none of the above articles, speeches or statements did Cardinal Connell use the term globalisation or its derivatives. Yet if one considers the fact that the concept of globalisation represented no stakes and served no significant function within the Irish public discourse, then at least some room for an explanation is made. The Cardinal’s discourse could not but exist in a dialectical relationship with the discourses of the other national institutional actors, and as long as the latter did not engage with the concept of globalisation, Cardinal did not do so either. Nevertheless, Cardinal Connell attacked, with the same ferocity and publicity that Archbishop Christodoulou fought globalisation in Greece, the most important expression and achievement of the Irish non-ideological space: the Celtic Tiger.48 Furthermore, his critique, having as focal points the issues of secularism49, individualism, identity and tradition, had many things in common with Archbishop Christodoulou’s critique of globalisation. Thus in 1998 the Cardinal argued that the ‘technological world...reduces...[the children] to the indignity of products and derives its meaning from power rather than from gift. This becomes all more acute when they find that the brave new world of prosperity leaves them without hope of participation’.50

In the same year, speaking in Accord (the Catholic Marriage Counselling Service) he characterised the dominant economic system as ‘unchecked capitalism’, and called for ‘a radical re-examination of the whole economic system under which we are living’. He also added that ‘we are so full of the Celtic tiger that anything else seems unthinkable’.51 A year later, in 1999, he stressed:

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48 In this regard, an editorial of The Irish Times, on April 2, 1999, argued that Dr Connell ‘has been among the most insightful critics of the Celtic Tiger’ (p. 17).
49 For this criticism see for instance his article ‘Church Cannot Accept the People Can Do no Wrong’, The Irish Times, October 14, 1997, p. 16, where he connected the Holocaust and the Nazi or communist regimes on the one hand, with the ideology of a secular modernity on the other. This article triggered a lot of criticism. See for instance, Fintan O’Toole, ‘Time to Move away from Moral Monopoly’, The Irish Times, October 17, 1997, p. 12.
Co-existing with the prosperity and gain of the Celtic Tiger is the sad spectacle of poverty and exclusion... The forthcoming budget represents an ideal opportunity for the Government to build further on its commitment to tackling poverty... It must also take note of what is being referred to as the 'New Poor' in our contemporary society: those who, while gainfully employed, struggle to survive economically.52

Thus the Cardinal articulated a discourse that had as its focal points most of the dominant objects of the anti-globalisation critique, e.g. 'unchecked capitalism', 'poverty', 'exclusion', 'consumerism'53, 'depersonalisation'54. The concept of globalisation, however, was not mobilised as a means of bringing together and conceptualising these diverse developments. Nor did the Cardinal engage with the all-dominant contemporary debate on globalisation. It seems that rather than using globalisation to attack the Celtic Tiger, he generated a critique of Celtic Tiger 'from within'. In this regard Cardinal Connell's discourse can be considered as the only domestic discourse that aimed from the outset to problematise the non-ideological space of Irish politics and economics.

Media Coverage

Introduction

The aim of this section, as in the Greek case, is to study in a consistent manner a representative source of media coverage throughout the period 1996-2001, in order to examine: (a) the volume and the evolution of the usage of the term globalisation, and (b) the composition of the people using this term. Through this study we also aim to capture the discourses and activities of groups that have not been studied above, such as think-tanks, academics, civil servants, artists and anti-globalisation protesters.

53 Ibid.
54 Desmond Connell, 'Science and Technology bring benefits but Risk of Depersonalisation', op. cit.
In the case of Irish press, the choice of the source to be studied was between the two (out of four) morning newspapers big in circulation, i.e. *The Irish Times* and *Irish Independent*. From these two, the thesis focused on *The Irish Times*, even though *The Irish Independent* had been higher in circulation (see Chart 1 below), for the former, according to all the people interviewed in Ireland (see Appendix A), is more credible both as an ‘archive’ of social actors’ discourses, and as an indicator of the political debates that dominate in Irish polity.\(^{55}\)

**CHART 1: Share of Total Sales of Irish Newspapers 1996-2002**

![Pie chart showing share of total sales of Irish newspapers 1996-2002](chart1.png)

Source: ABC

Finally, the research was conducted as follows. The *Lexis-Nexis Executive* data-base has had an on-line archive of *The Irish Times* since the early 1990s. Using the data-base we made a key-word search in *The Irish Times* for the period 1996-2001, using as a key-word the term globalisation. The search machine retrieved 1045 articles, whose classification according to the time of their publication is recorded in Table 2 and Chart 2.\(^{56}\)

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\(^{55}\) The circulation per year of the two morning papers was as follows (numbers are in '000):

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<th></th>
<th>1996</th>
<th>1999</th>
<th>2001</th>
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<td><strong>Irish Independent</strong> (Daily ed.)</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>169</td>
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</table>

Source: National Newspapers of Ireland

\(^{56}\) The manual processing of these 1045 articles proved that a sizeable number of them were mis-downloaded. After the one-by-one processing only 816 of the 1045 actually had a reference to the term globalisation. The latter include: 30 references to the term 'globalise(d)', 13 references to the term 'globalising', and 2 references to 'globalism'.

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### TABLE 2: The Emergence of the Discourse of Globalisation in *The Irish Times*: 1996-2001

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Year</th>
<th>January</th>
<th>February</th>
<th>March</th>
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<td>15</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>279</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TOTAL SUM for the period 1996-2001**: 816

### CHART 2: References to the term Globalisation per year, in *The Irish Times* (1996-2001)

(\% of the total sum of references for the period 1996-2001)
The evolution of the number of articles found is depicted in Figure 1.

**Figure 1: Articles with a Reference to Globalisation in The Irish Times**

The Discourse of Globalisation in The Irish Times, 1996-2001

The first thing that needs to be stressed here is that the above numbers refer to the numbers of published articles in the daily edition of *The Irish Times* (TIT is not published on Sundays). Thus, whereas in the Greek case, the research was based on the Sunday edition of VIMA, in the Irish case the research was based on the daily *Irish Times*. Beyond its methodological importance, this difference makes a strong statement about the quantitative nature of the findings. Thus the number of articles found in VIMA exceed, sometimes by far, for most of the period under consideration (except 2001) the articles found in *The Irish Times*, despite the fact that in quantitative terms the absolute number of *The Irish Times* papers studied was six-fold (being a daily edition) those of VIMA (being the Sunday edition). The following Figure is suggestive.

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57 I do not mean to downsize or disregard the potential methodological problems created by the comparison of a ‘Sunday’ with a ‘Daily’ edition. Yet our aim was to find a representative press sample within the two different national contexts; and the Sunday VIMA and the daily *The Irish Times* serve this purpose. Of course when the two sources are compared, their difference is taken into consideration.
Figure 2: A Comparison of References to Globalisation between the daily *Irish Times* and the Sunday Edition of the VIMA

Note: The year 1996 was omitted due to incomplete data in the case of VIMA.

Thus, considering the absolute number of the articles found in *The Irish Times*, it can be argued that the first and most important observation from the study of *The Irish Times* is the very low number of articles making reference to the term globalisation, at least in comparison with VIMA. This represents an interesting paradox. Before conducting the research the main hypothesis was that the concept of globalisation would be marginal in the Greek press up to the end of 1999 (i.e. the Seattle protests), and popular in the Irish press which literally speaking, if nothing else, ‘speaks’ the language of globalisation (i.e. English). The second obvious observation that can be made on the basis of Figure 1 is that the evolution of references in *The Irish Times* was a linear/upward one, throughout the period 1996-2001 (whereas in the Greek case, the year 2000 represented a peak point). Furthermore, the ‘Seattle effect’ does not seem to have had a significant impact on the evolution of references. The 57% increase in references from 1999 to 2000, is lower than that seen from 1996 to 1997 (67%), and close to the change seen from 1997 to 1998 (44%) or from 2000 to 2001 (50%). Beyond these general observations however, so as to elucidate *The Irish Times* globalisation discourse, we need to break down the numbers according to the sections of publication and authors’ identity. In this way we aim to find out the different aspects of the globalisation discourse (economic, political, cultural, etc.) and their relative gravity within *The Irish Times*; and even if such a target can hardly be

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accurately met in a quantitatively-oriented research as the one followed in this section, the basic dynamics under way can be demonstrated.

The following sections and Tables aim to classify thematically the articles found in *The Irish Times*, according to the newspaper’s section in which they were published. It must first be noted that the relevant articles were found under 31 different section-headings. Therefore, the first task was thematically to group these sections in more general ones, without completely losing the internal diversity of the new categories. Table 3 presents this thematic organization.

**TABLE 3: Organisation of *The Irish Times* Sections in ‘Generic’ Categories**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Main Political Section (MPS) includes:</th>
<th>Main Economic Section (MES) includes:</th>
<th>World News (WN) includes:</th>
<th>Education, Art, Life and Sport (EALS) includes:</th>
<th>Miscellaneous Include:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Home News (HN)</td>
<td>Business &amp; Finance (B&amp;F)</td>
<td>World News (WN)</td>
<td>Art</td>
<td>Sound &amp; Vision (S&amp;V)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Editorial</td>
<td>Budget 2001</td>
<td>World Review (WR)</td>
<td>Media Scope (MS)</td>
<td>Computimes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Front Page (FP)</td>
<td></td>
<td>European Parliament News (EPN)</td>
<td>Education &amp; Living (E&amp;L)</td>
<td>Commercial Property (CP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>News Features (NF)</td>
<td></td>
<td>The Amsterdam Treaty (TAT)</td>
<td>Style</td>
<td>Obituaries (Obit.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opinion</td>
<td></td>
<td>Developing World (DW)</td>
<td>Culture</td>
<td>Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elections '97</td>
<td></td>
<td>France</td>
<td>Sport</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Features</td>
<td></td>
<td>Attack on America (AA)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Scotland &amp; Ireland (S&amp;I)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Having organized the 31 sections of *The Irish Times* into 5 generic categories, and before studying the dynamics between them, let us examine what happens within each generic category. These intra-category dynamics are presented in the Tables 4-8 (the numbers in the vertical axis indicate absolute number of articles).
Table 4: The Globalisation Discourse in the Main Political Section of *The Irish Times*

![Graph showing the Globalisation Discourse in the Main Political Section of *The Irish Times*]

Table 5: Main Economic Section

![Graph showing the Main Economic Section]

Table 6: World News

![Graph showing World News]

Table 7: Education-Art-Life-Sport (EALS)

![Graph showing Education-Art-Life-Sport (EALS)]

Table 8: Miscellaneous

![Graph showing Miscellaneous]
Finally, Table 9 puts all the above data into a single framework to allow a comparison between the different generic categories.

**Table 9: Evolution of the References to Globalisation in The Irish Times**

**According to the Section of Publication**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MPS</td>
<td>MES</td>
<td>WN</td>
<td>Letters to the Editor</td>
<td>Business this Week</td>
<td>Weekend</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: ‘Business this Week’ is Thursday’s supplement on Business. ‘Weekend’ is a supplement on TV, theatre, cinema, books etc.

Trying to draw some tentative conclusions from the above data we can observe: First, that the ‘political pages’ lead the Irish Times discourse on globalisation, with the ‘world news’ being second and the ‘economic pages’ third. This is important to underline, especially as the great bulk of the references found in the political pages were in the pages under the heading ‘home news’ (see Tables 3 and 4). Thus we can, if tentatively, infer that beyond the globalisation discourse of the ‘world news’ pages, there was also a strong ‘home news’ discourse on globalisation. In addition the latter seemed to be significantly stronger compared to the ‘world news’ discourse, in the

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58 Particular attention should be paid here to the comparison with VIMA. VIMA has a daily economic supplement, which can be separated from the main body of the paper. Therefore when, in the case of VIMA, a reference is made to ‘economic pages’ it implies the aforementioned economic supplement. The Irish Times has a separate economic supplement only every Thursday, called ‘Business this Week’, which is studied here as a separate section. The daily edition, however, does have particular pages under the heading ‘Business and Finance’. It is these pages of the main body of the paper that are called here ‘economic pages’.
year 2001. Furthermore if one adds the political (MPS) to the economic (MES) pages, and counter-poses them to the ‘world news’ – to tentatively explore the inside/outside aspects of the globalisation discourse in *The Irish Times* – then it can be argued that the home/inside discourse on globalisation was significantly stronger than the world news one. It should be kept in mind however, that this comparison refers to the section of publication, rather than to the content of the news themselves (see, Table 10).

**Table 10: The ‘Domestic vs. International’ Aspect of the Globalisation Discourse in *The Irish Times* ⁵⁹**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>MPS+MES</th>
<th>WN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A second observation that can be made on the basis of Table 9 is that 1999 seems to constitute a turning point, at least for the dominant, in terms of references, sections – something which was not clear in the aggregate data of Figure 1. Thus after a short decline in the number of articles published in political (MPS), economic (MES) and World News pages in 1999 as compared to 1998, there was an intensification of the references in 2000; a trend that was significantly enhanced in 2001. Moreover the intensification of the use of the concept of globalisation after 2000, at least in the political pages, seems to be on a much higher scale in *The Irish Times* than that found in VIMA. It is indicative that in VIMA the references in Section A (which is the main political section of the newspaper) increased only by 4% between 2000 and 2001, whereas the respective increase in the Main Political Section of *The Irish Times* was 130%. Therefore, even if the events in Seattle were responsible for the reversal of...

⁵⁹ A short note may be added here. In the domestic side of the equation one could consider adding the ‘Letters to the Editor’ section. Yet, although the majority of these articles were about Ireland – and many of them especially on Irish culture – some of them discussed broader issues of globalisation, world trade, international economy etc. That was the reason for excluding this section from the domestic side.
of the trend in 1999, they do not seem capable of accounting for the increase in references between 2000 and 2001. Hence, another dynamic must have been driving the 2001 increase. In order to explore this issue, and study further the figures of Table 9, one needs to get a more complete picture of the globalisation discourse in *The Irish Times*, by considering not only the sections where articles were published, but also the identities of the authors of these articles. Table 11 offers a detailed classification of the evolution of references according to their source, and Chart 3 offers a graphical representation of the universe of references according to authors’ identity.

**TABLE 11. Evolution of References to Globalisation in *The Irish Times* according to Authors’ Identity**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Academics</td>
<td>1*</td>
<td>3*</td>
<td>6*</td>
<td>10***</td>
<td>12***</td>
<td>11*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Academics</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politicians</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6*</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prime Minister</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governmental Documents</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Politicians</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5****</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8****</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Servants (Upper Echelons)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2*</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Church</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entrepreneurs/Business3</td>
<td>1*</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5*</td>
<td>7**</td>
<td>8****</td>
<td>5*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers Unions Reps</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employers Reps.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Employers’ Reps</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGOs</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artists</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Books4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Organisations5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Readers</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>The Irish Times</em> Journalists</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unsigned Articles</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Including references made by Mary Robinson.
2 Including references made by Peter Sutherland (former EU Commissioner and Attorney General).
3 Including both Chief Executives and Business Researchers/Specialists.
4 This section includes only book reviews written by journalists. Book reviews written by academics were included in the ‘academics’ category.
5 Including, ILO, UN, WTO.

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Some of the references, although they explicitly attributed to certain politicians, businesspersons etc., were not articles written by them, but articles that were focusing on these persons’ actions or speeches. To indicate the number of this category of references, an asterisk (*) is used. For instance, 8****, in ‘Foreign Politicians’, signifies that 8 articles were found of which 4 were signed by foreign politicians and 4 were focusing on foreign politicians’ statements on globalisation.
CHART 3: References to Globalisation in *The Irish Times* according to Authors’ Identity (1996-2001)

- Journalists 59%
- Readers 5%
- Entrepreneurs/Business 4%
- NGOs 1%
- Others 3%
- Books 3%
- Workers Unions 1%
- Foreign Politicians 3%
- Civil Servants 1%
- Prime Minister & Politicians 5%
- Academics 5%
- Unsigned Articles 10%
- Readers 5%
- Journalists 59%

NOTE: The category ‘others’ includes: governmental documents, international organisations, foreign academics, the Church, employers’ representatives and artists. ‘NGOs’ includes both Irish-based and overseas organisations. For a detailed picture of these categories, see Table 5.

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Based on the above data we can observe the following: First, the above mentioned boom of references in 2001 was led primarily by journalists, and strongly supported by the ‘readers’ (i.e. letter to the editor) and ‘unsigned articles’ categories. The significant increase of the references by ‘readers’ in 2001 (Table 11), indicates that globalisation had started to become a focal point in the Irish public discourse. This trend seems also to be confirmed by the significant increase (in absolute terms) of the ‘unsigned articles’ in 2001. As has already been argued this category can be treated as an indicator of the degree of ‘quotidianisation’ of a hegemonic discourse, i.e. as an indicator of the transformation of globalisation from an event ‘out there’, to an integral part of the everyday and everyday news. This conclusion is enhanced also by the steadily increasing percentage of references by politicians and academics. Thus, contrary to our findings from the party discourses, politicians seem to have had an active role in the communication of globalisation discourse. Interestingly this role seems to have been from the outset as important as that of academics. Yet it must be kept in mind that the active stance of politicians and academics that comes out from Chart 3, is based on a very low absolute number of articles/references for the period 1996-2001. Second, ‘business’ (mainly entrepreneurs and market specialists) seems also to have been very active in the communication of the globalisation discourse. Workers unions, on the other hand, seem to have developed a discourse on globalisation only in 2001, whereas the employers remained silent throughout the period 1996-2001. Nevertheless the aforementioned caveat on the low absolute number of references should also be placed here. Finally, the increase of references related to the book reviews section in 2000 and 2001 supports the claim for an intensification of the communication of globalisation discourse after 1999.

It is also interesting to break down the category with the highest number of references, i.e the ‘Irish Times Journalists’, trying thus to figure out how and by whom globalisation discourse was generated within the Irish Times community. Chart 4 illustrates the relative engagement with the globalisation discourse of the various editorial/correspondence teams.
The breaking down of the ‘Irish Times Journalists’ category into its constituent elements adds some more pieces to the discourse of the Irish newspaper on globalisation. Most importantly, the ‘other journalists’ category\(^6\) clearly dominates in terms of written articles. Thus the globalisation discourse of The Irish Times, no matter how small, it seemed to be rather dispersed, i.e. not produced only by a few editors or correspondents. Second, it is interesting, although predictable, to observe the dominance of the European editors and correspondents within the signed articles. Thus, if we count them all together (i.e. Europe, Paris, Rome and half of the

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\(^6\) This category includes signed articles by authors, who used the concept of globalisation very few times, and were not part of the established editorial/correspondence teams mentioned in the Note of Chart 4.
references of ‘Europe and Washington’ correspondents), they amount approximately to 23% of the signed articles. A closer qualitative analysis of the articles of these editors/correspondents would be helpful here.

The *Irish Times* followed throughout the period 1996-2001 a consistent policy of covering the way in which globalisation was conceptualised in Ireland’s major European partners. The increased number of relevant references by European Correspondents such, as Ms Lara Marlowe (Paris Correspondent) and Patrick Smyth (European Correspondent), should be explained as a result of this policy. This coverage was very important for the Irish public discourse at least for the following reason. It consciously or unconsciously related Ireland to the globalisation discourses of its major European partners. Some examples should elucidate this point:

Covering the French general election in 1997, Lara Marlowe (Paris Correspondent) argued:

> Without naming the evil monster that embodies French fears of the outside world, Mr Chirac briefly tried to do a public relations job for mondialisation (globalisation)...If globalisation is an almost mystical force, buffering France from afar, le liberalisme is the creed of those who collaborate with it;

and in a similar manner:

> France’s fitful mood seems rooted in misgivings over globalisation and economic liberalism. A subliminal fear of losing their identity and secure existence.

Such an approach to the French reading of globalisation implies that the respective conceptualisation in Ireland was — or should be — rather different and certainly a non-demonising one. Furthermore, considering that during that period globalisation was absent from the Irish public discourse, such an approach could be explained through

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the confrontation of Ireland with most of its European partners on the issue of corporate taxation. As it was noted in an article by Partick Smyth (European Correspondent):

Socialist EU finance ministers are unlikely to be sympathetic to Charlie McCreevy’s [Minister for Finance] ideological case for maintaining our low corporate tax regime and may instead see it as more special pleading by Ireland...In truth, however the argument [against low corporate tax] is somewhat old-fashioned. It may have been a different matter 20 years ago, but we now live in the age of globalisation and extraordinary capital mobility.

This debate was then evolved/diffused in 1998-1999 in the discourse on ‘progressive governance’ and the respective dynamic that had been created by the meetings of centre-left leaders, including Bill Clinton, Tony Blair, Gerhard Schroder and Massimo D’Alema. Within this discourse, globalisation was formulated (as we also saw in the Greek case) as a great challenge to be met, and these developments were monitored by the correspondents of The Irish Times. It was within this framework that Paul Gillespie wrote the article The Answer to Globalisation is Europeanisation, maybe the only intervention on globalisation that was debated both within and beyond the pages of The Irish Times. This discourse on the relationship between Europeanisation and globalisation came to dominate in the pro-European circles of Irish political life, and as we saw it also dominated in the discourses of the Labour Party and ICTU. This Europeanisation/globalisation discourse came also to the forefront of the debate on the referendum on EU Amsterdam Treaty. Patrick Smyth in this regard wrote:

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66 The Irish Times, December 30, 1997, p. 50.
Fears whether rational or irrational, about loss of sovereignty or the erosion of neutrality will vie with those who desire to see the newly self-confident Ireland at the centre of Europe. It will be a contest between those who see the winds of globalisation as a challenge to be met by battening down the hatches and those who want to build a bigger boat and hoist more canvas\textsuperscript{67}.

These debates on globalisation co-existed in \textit{The Irish Times} with a more cautious or even sceptical approach to globalisation that was formulated by the Pope John Paul II\textsuperscript{68}, and the UN, both traditionally very influential in the Irish public discourse\textsuperscript{69}. The latter, however, did not seem to have had any broader impact on the Irish public discourse.

\textit{Synopsis}

To sum up, it can be argued that there are two main findings from the study of \textit{The Irish Times}' globalisation discourse. The first is that, in comparison to VIMA, this discourse seems to have been of very low ‘intensity’ until 2000, i.e. during most of the period under consideration here. Thus, to the extent that the Irish public discourse was reflected in the everyday pages of \textit{The Irish Times}, it can be argued that up to the late 1999 – mid 2000 period, the globalisation discourse was comparatively (to Greece) absent, from Ireland, i.e. the country that internationally was at the heart of globalisation debate. The second finding is closely related to the first one. From the second half of 2000 there was a boom in the use of the concept of globalisation. This boom cannot be unconnected to the ‘Seattle effect’ and the anti-globalisation protests that followed it. Yet the dynamics it had acquired in 2001, and the evolution of the references in terms both of section of publication and authors, suggest that there must have been a deeper, domestic reason for this development. It might be the case that it was only in 2001 that the rigidity of the social partnership’s parameters came to be felt and challenged; or in broader terms it might be the case that after a period of

\textsuperscript{67} \textit{The Irish Times}, May 7, 1998, p. 11.

\textsuperscript{68} See for instance, P. Agnew, ‘Pope’s Choices Map out Path to his Successor’ \textit{The Irish Times}, February 22, 2001, p. 16.

\textsuperscript{69} See for instance, P. Gillespie, ‘UN plan calls on Member-States to Agree Targets’, \textit{The Irish Times}, April 4, 2000, p. 10.
unprecedented growth and prosperity, it was only in 2000-2001 that notions of 'winners' and 'losers' started to be felt in the population, and thus globalisation discourse, as the latter dominated in Europe, started to make sense and be mobilised by the population. It could also be the case that it was in this period that the Irish public discourse started to embrace the way Ireland was conceptualised by its EU partners. We return to this point in the next chapter. Here it is important to point out that the study of *The Irish Times* demonstrated that after 2000 the globalisation discourse started to be implicated and have a more central role in the reproduction of Irish public discourse. This finding supports also the findings from the study of the evolution of the discourses of the other institutional actors.

**Conclusion**

The analysis in this chapter revealed an interesting paradox. The concept of globalisation was relatively absent from Irish public discourse during the period 1996-2001. Furthermore, this absence of the concept of globalisation was complemented by the existence of an economic globalisation agenda that was both taken for granted, and was celebrated as the reason for the Irish economic miracle by all the political forces, including the employers and – for a long period of time – the workers. Within this context the debate about the potential negative effects of economic globalisation that was developing in most European countries did not seem to resonate in Irish public discourse. This is also evident in the very low number of references to globalisation found in the press sample that was examined. What we did see to emerge during 1996-2001 was a Celtic Tiger discourse. The latter had a twofold character. On the one hand, it celebrated the economic success of Ireland. In this manner the economic policies that were linked to this success had been invested with a non-negotiable, non-disputable quality. On the other hand, however, it brought to the forefront of the Irish public discourse a critique of the cultural consequences generated by these economic policies (e.g. deregulation, flexibility, tax cuts). This cultural critique was led by the Church and was later adopted by Fine Gael. Furthermore, after 1998, a clear shift in the discourse and position of the workers took place, joined later on also by the Labour Party. Through this shift globalisation
became an object of critique, as it was already the case in many other European left parties and workers’ unions.

In the next chapter we recapitulate and compare the findings from the Greek and Irish cases, and conclude what these cases tell us, and do not tell us, about hegemonic discourses and their communication.
CHAPTER 5
THE GREEK AND IRISH CASES
JUXTAPOSED

This chapter has a dual purpose. It begins by offering a comparison of the communication of globalisation discourse in Greece and Ireland. Thus it summarises, juxtaposes and compares the findings of Part II. From there, it elaborates on what conclusions we can draw from this comparison with regard to the communication of the hegemonic discourse of globalisation in Greece and Ireland.

Introduction: Juxtaposing the Communication of Globalisation Discourse in Greece and Ireland

The thesis's findings will be summarised and juxtaposed in four sections. The first will focus on political parties and their leaders, arguably one of the most, if not the most, important part of the ideology production nexuses of the two countries. The second will juxtapose the interaction among the social partners, focusing on the discourses of the national associations of workers and employers as well as the respective National Economic and Social Councils. A third section compares the discourses of the Catholic Church in Ireland and the Greek Orthodox Church. Finally, the study of the media sample in the two countries is considered.
It is worth recalling here that the study did not enforce or mobilise any specific definition of globalisation as part of its research design. It let the social actors speak for themselves, and took as ‘globalisation’ whatever was defined or referred to explicitly as such by them. Accordingly, the absence of references to globalisation was used as an important finding in its own right. Yet this key-term-driven reading of the primary material was qualified and backed up by a second independent-to-the-term-globalisation reading of the material (see below). This second reading had a double purpose. First, it allowed us to capture instances where terms and concepts alternative to globalisation were (consciously) used and promoted by the respective social actors (e.g. neoliberalism or imperialism). Second, it allowed us to identify core themes within the research material independently of any pre-specified referent or anchor-term. The thesis returns to these issues and their importance after the juxtaposition of the two cases.

The political parties

It would be helpful to begin our analysis with a recapitulation of the political parties’ positions towards globalisation.

Greek Parties

PASOK
PASOK is the party with the most significant change of position towards globalisation during the period 1994-2002. From a fundamentally negative approach to globalisation in 1994, it gradually moved to a proactively positive argumentation, portraying globalisation as a ‘significant opportunity’ for Greece’s development. This shift was based on the conscious effort of Simitis’ government to reverse a socially dominant, negative understanding of globalisation.

New Democracy
New Democracy maintained a neutral, ‘new reality’ approach to globalisation, throughout the period under examination.
The Communist Party
The Communist Party adopted a fundamentally negative stance, conceptualising globalisation as a new ‘form of imperialism’.

Synaspismos
Synaspismos followed the opposite trajectory from that of PASOK. From a rather positive to neutral position in the mid 1990s, it gradually adopted a highly negative position towards globalisation, accusing the government of using globalisation as an excuse in order to implement its (neoliberal) policies.

Thus in the Greek political scene, there had been four dominant discourses on globalisation. Globalisation as a significant opportunity (positive); globalisation as a ‘new reality’ (neutral); globalisation as a ‘justification instrument’ for the implementation of neoliberal policies (negative); globalisation as a new form of imperialism (negative).

Irish Parties

Fianna Fail
The biggest party of the coalition government remained attached to a ‘new reality’ approach to globalisation, which, however, presented a ‘unique opportunity’ for Ireland’s development and prosperity.

Progressive Democrats
The Progressive Democrats were the most passionate advocates of globalisation and its unique benefits for Ireland, within the Irish political party terrain.

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1 As was demonstrated in Chapter 4, three out of the four Irish parties (FF, PD, FG) do not develop a discourse on globalisation as such. Thus the analysis of the globalisation discourses of Irish parties is based on a broader consideration of their stance towards policies, practices and issues associated with the various aspects of globalisation debate (e.g. economic, cultural, etc.).
Fine Gael

For most of the period under investigation Fine Gael’s attitude towards globalisation was similar to that of Fianna Fail. Yet since 1999 FG developed a critique of the phenomenon of the Celtic Tiger that can be broadly conceived of as a critique of globalisation’s negative impact on culture and tradition. Thus, FG started to move away from an understanding of globalisation as a ‘unique opportunity’.

Labour Party

Labour Party’s attitude followed a similar trajectory with that of Fine Gael. Yet LP’s distancing from a new positive reality approach to globalisation took place a little earlier than that of FG and it was more explicit.

Thus in the Irish political scene there appears to have been only one discourse on globalisation, at least for most of the period under investigation: globalisation as a new positive reality that represented a unique opportunity for Irish prosperity. It was only at the end of the 1990s that this discourse was challenged by a ‘traditional’ European Left critique of globalisation developed by the Labour Party, and a respective cultural critique developed by Fine Gael.

Reflecting on the Findings

One must not consider the party discourses in static terms or in isolation from each other. It is important to examine how each party discourse functioned within its broader national political party context, and how the latter differently communicated and thus materialised the globalisation discourse. The core findings of the thesis in this regard are as follows. In Greece the concept of globalisation (παγκόσμιοποίηση) was ever-present in the discourses of the political parties and their leaders. In particular, the research suggested that globalisation emerged as a new zone of confrontation in Greek politics, as a new political axis. This axis had globalisation as a ‘new reality’ on one side, and as an ‘instrument of justification’ for policies serving particular interests, on the other. In any case, globalisation either as a ‘positive thing’ and an opportunity for Greece, or as a ‘great threat’ and a form of imperialism, by the end of the 20th century came to dominate the vocabulary and the conceptual arena of
the Greek politico-economic life (at least as the latter was reflected in the political party discourses).

It was indeed unexpected that the case of Ireland (one of the most globalised economies in the world at the time) proved to be almost the exact opposite to the case of Greece. The research suggested that, not only did globalisation not become a focal point of reference in party discourses and party competition, but it actually remained marginal, almost non-existent, within the party discourses, for most of the period 1995-2002. Indeed, one finds no reference to the term globalisation in the manifestos of Fianna Fail (the biggest party in the coalition government). It is also significant that with the exception of the Labour Party in the 2002 elections (when it adopted a globalisation rhetoric close to what was at the time a dominant European Left rhetoric) there was absolutely no debate on globalisation in the party manifestos during the last two elections (i.e. 1997, 2002).

Yet, two important findings must be added to this picture of the Irish politico-economic scene. First, although the term globalisation was absent from party electoral debates and discourses, many dominant objects of the economic globalisation discourse, such as deregulation and liberalisation were widely used in their discourses, and generally in the nexus of ideology defined by the Irish political parties. But, these dominant objects were not identified – as in most other European cases and certainly in the case of Greece – as a 'necessary evil' to be pursued due to 'external pressures' or globalisation. They were there either to be celebrated as the 'magic touch' that led to the Irish miracle, or to be taken for granted. Thus these dominant objects did not define a zone of contestation in Irish politico-economic scene, but rather a zone of non-contestation; a zone beyond ideology and party antagonisms (unless it was to claim the respective policies' parenthood). The second point refers to the discourse of the 'Celtic Tiger'. It could be argued that this discourse substituted in the 2002 electoral strategy of Fine Gael (the second biggest party) a discourse on globalisation. The material, however, suggests that this critique of the Celtic Tiger (developed by the opposition parties) was mainly cultural, leaving untouched the non-ideological space of Irish political economy. To be precise the Celtic Tiger critique did have an economic aspect but this was about the
redistribution of wealth rather than the redefinition or reconsideration of the core policies generated by the aforementioned non-ideological space.

To sum up, it can be argued that there was a significant difference in the communication of the hegemonic/globalisation - in terms of understandings, policies, strategies, rhetoric - within the political parties' realms in Greece and Ireland. In both cases it has functioned as a new ordering principle. Yet, in the case of Greece this seems to be expressed as a zone of contestation, whereas in the case of Ireland it seems to be expressed as an invisible, underlying line of agreement.

Having explored the national ideology production nexus defined by the political parties, the following sections turn to the juxtaposition of the social partners' discourses in the two countries. While studying the latter, it is important to keep the developments at the EU level as a backdrop. As has already been underlined, since the mid-1990s the social dialogue between the European employers' associations (UNICE, CEEP) and workers' unions (ETUC) had been enhanced, while with the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997 this dialogue was institutionalised. These developments increased the interactions both between and within the workers and the employers at a European level.

Employers

The examination of the discourses of the Federation of Greek Industries (SEV) and the Irish Business and Employers Confederation (IBEC) revealed a similar pattern in the way these actors engaged with the hegemonic discourse of globalisation. On the one hand, neither of these organisations mobilised the concept of globalisation or developed a discourse on globalisation as such. On the other hand, both organisations actively promoted a de facto economic globalisation agenda. Thus although the concept of globalisation was not mobilised by SEV and IBEC, one finds the dominant objects of economic globalisation (e.g. flexibility, liberalisation and privatisation) at the core of their public intervention and policy suggestions.
It is also worth emphasising the closeness of the reading of the situation\(^2\) by the chairpersons of SEV and IBEC. In Greece, Iason Stratos argued that globalisation and the need for adjustment to market forces was not something new for SEV; it was what SEV had been fighting for since the late 1980s. In a similar manner, Anthony Barry in Ireland congratulated the government in 1997 for following policies that largely reflected the policy objectives for which IBEC had been arguing for years.

Undoubtedly, the developments at the EU level cannot be underestimated when the commonalities between IBEC and SEV are considered. Thus after the mid-1990s the need for adjustment to the ‘new conditions’ and the need for deregulation and flexibility had been at the top of the policy agenda of both the EU in general and UNICE in particular; and both IBEC and SEV were committed to and actively participated in the dissemination of the debates, statements, publications and benchmarking exercises produced by UNICE.

On the other hand, even though the discourses of IBEC and SEV had many things in common and were characterised by the same pattern, there were some interesting differences in the context of these discourses. First, in the case of Greece and mainly after 1997, the concept of globalisation was becoming more and more ideologically charged, acquiring a negative connotation. Thus the avoidance of the use of the term by SEV can also be attributed to its effort to avoid associating its policy prescriptions with an increasingly negatively charged concept. This was not the case in Ireland. On the contrary, considering the language factor (i.e. English) one would expect a wide dissemination of the concept of globalisation, as happened for instance in the United Kingdom. In addition, Ireland’s proximity to the latter and to the USA (through the Irish Diaspora and business) would also be reasons for one to expect an early dissemination of the concept of globalisation in the Irish domestic public discourse. Contrary, however, to these expectations, the concept of globalisation is more visible in the discourse of SEV rather than of IBEC.

\(^2\) The ‘situation’ being the changes that had been taking place at the national and international levels since the early/mid 1990s.
The second difference concerns the place of IBEC's and SEV's discourses within their broader domestic public discourses. In the case of Greece, SEV and its policy prescriptions were leading the pro-economic globalisation agenda. In the case of Ireland the situation was different. IBEC was not the most active advocate of economic globalisation policies. On the contrary, it faced strong criticism and pressure for not being more active in this regard. As mentioned in Chapter 4, the highest in circulation Irish newspaper, the Irish Independent, was criticising IBEC throughout the 1990s as being part of the 'old economy', a 'dinosaur', the voice of Irish big banks and semi-state companies. Thus, in contrast to SEV in Greece, IBEC seemed to be far from leading the pro-economic globalisation agenda in Irish public discourse.

Workers

Contrary to the case of employers, the workers unions in Greece and Ireland engaged, if in slightly different time-frames, with the concept of globalisation. Indeed globalisation discourse came gradually to re-order and dominate the discourses of GSEE and ICTU. In the case of GSEE this process was intensified in 1997, whereas in the case of ICTU this happened a year later.

If 1997 and 1998 signify shifts for the workers' discourses in Greece and Ireland, the first important question to be raised is what was there before these shifts. What was it that globalisation changed or continued in the discourses of GSEE and ICTU? This question brings into sharp relief the issue of continuities and changes wrought in the wake of the discursive transformation operated by the workers.

In the case of GSEE the central concept during the period 1995-1998 was 'neoliberalism'. The latter seemed to have offered to GSEE both a conceptual framework for decoding and understanding the politico-economic environment of the time (i.e. 1995-97), and a point of reference for defining its interests, policies and broadly speaking identity. Globalisation acquired a significant position in GSEE's vocabulary during 1996, but it was only in 1997 that it became the new defining conceptual framework through which GSEE (re)produced itself and read its environment. At the same time (since mid/late 1997) globalisation came to be
increasingly conceptualised as a ‘justification instrument’ used by the government and the employers to promote policies against the vested interests and living conditions of the workers.

In the case of ICTU globalisation did not seem to have replaced any other dominant concept or point of reference. What did seem to happen was that ICTU itself changed in the late 1990s the way it used the concept of globalisation. Thus, globalisation was present in ICTU’s discourse since 1995, i.e. much earlier than in the case of GSEE. Yet as has been shown in Chapter 4, this early understanding and mobilisation of the concept was associated rather with developing countries and broader issues of international development. 1998 seems to signify a shift in this regard. From being a developmental issue, globalisation began to be associated more and more with Ireland and its model of development. This shift was completed towards the end of the 1990s, when globalisation became indeed a central point of reference of the ICTU’s discourse. Figure 1 aims at capturing some of the aforementioned dynamics.

Figure 1: Workers’ Engagement with the Globalisation Discourse in Greece & Ireland
Contrasting the above two ‘discursive trajectories’, it could be argued that although globalisation came to dominate GSEE’s discourse first, it represented in fact a more significant shift in the case of ICTU’s discourse. In the former case, the discourse on globalisation was built on – rather than against – the former central point of reference of workers’ discourse, i.e. neoliberalism. Moreover, if this development is placed in the broader politico-economic context of the late 1990s (as this was expressed in the party discourses), then it can be said that GSEE’s shift was an integral part of the Greek public discourse emerging at the time, which had globalisation as its new point of reference. On the other hand, in the case of ICTU, it seems that the employment of the concept of globalisation in the late 1990s signified a transformation of an ‘out there’ developmental issue to an ‘in here’, first order, domestic issue. Through this employment ICTU, in essence, was contesting the ‘untouchable’ of the Irish social partnership, and was questioning, if not the results, then the direction of the Celtic Tiger’s development.

Lastly it is worth mentioning one central point of reference around which the workers’ discourses in both countries were converging in the late 1990s: the existence of different models of capitalism, and the importance of the ‘social dimension’ of the European model. This emphasis on the European model was gradually developed as an integral characteristic of the globalisation discourse of both GSEE and ICTU. Finally, the European and international levels should be kept as a significant backdrop. Of particular importance in this regard was the 85th conference of the ILO, in 1997, when globalisation came to the forefront of the debates within the international labour movement (see Chapter 3).
impact in the Greek public discourse. The opposite can be said to be the case for the NESC in Ireland. The latter had been strongly associated with the Irish economic miracle, and indeed it was considered to be the institution which had set the strategic parameters of Irish development, since the late 1980s. Its voice was clearly heard within the Irish public discourse, and its Director, Professor Rory O’Donnell was a significant public figure. Nevertheless, it is useful to think of the documents produced by OKE and NESC not only as representing a lower common denominator of the social partners’ positions, but also as attempts by the Councils’ directors to create (potential) strategic frameworks for action in various policy fields.

In Greece, OKE published an ‘Opinion’ on globalisation (OKE, 2000), where it recognised that the globalisation debate in Greece had come to be too ideologically driven, and thus counter-productive. Based on this understanding it tried to redirect the debate in a more pragmatic direction, where not only the threats but also the opportunities stemming from globalisation, would be at the forefront of the public debate. A similar public intervention occurred in Ireland. In the latter case, it seems that in 1998 when ICTU started to question globalisation, NESC tried to channel the public discourse to a more neutral understanding of the phenomenon, as a positive challenge and a given context for the Irish economic development.

Hence, it can be argued that in both countries the purpose of the Councils’ intervention was to define and promote a rather technocratic or ‘new reality’ approach to globalisation. The goal and the context of these interventions, however, were different. In the case of Greece, OKE was attempting to redirect a heavily ideologically charged debate, whereas in the case of Ireland NESC was attempting to prevent the domestic debate from becoming ideologically charged. Furthermore, in the case of Greece, OKE’s intervention can be seen as part of the broader polarisation of the public discourse produced by the globalisation discourse. In the case of Ireland, NESC’s intervention can be seen as an attempt to protect the non-ideological space of Irish politico-economic life, from the challenges presented by a diffusion of (an ‘ideologically’ charged) globalisation discourse.
The Church

The Church is a very important actor in both countries both due to the undisputed influence it has and to the nature of its membership, which transcends the dividing lines of political parties and organised interests. Moreover, as we have shown, both Archbishop Christodoulos in Greece and Cardinal Connell in Ireland adopted a very interventionist stance in the socio-political life of their countries.

In the case of Greece, Archbishop Christodoulos launched a ferocious attack against globalisation. He portrayed it as a major and immediate threat for the European societies in general and Greece in particular, and as a development that was associated with the ‘forces of evil’. Globalisation came thus to dominate church’s discourse in Greece. The Irish case seems to be the opposite. Although a great number of Cardinal Connell’s speeches and remarks in the press were examined, no reference to globalisation was found. What was found, however, was a ferocious attack on the very concept and nature of the Celtic Tiger. Nonetheless, a striking similarity appears when observing the focal points of the critique of globalisation in the case of Greek Church, with this critique of the Celtic Tiger idea. In the case of Christodoulos, these were national identity, tradition, Americanisation, cultural homogenisation, secularism, social estrangement and individualism. In the case of Connell they were national identity, tradition, secularism, consumerism, depersonalisation, as well as unchecked capitalism, poverty and exclusion. Thus, in both cases we have two rather secular and highly politicised church discourses, which although their targets were different (i.e. globalisation and the Celtic Tiger respectively), addressed approximately the same issues, pointed to the same problems, and sensed similarly the nature and consequences of the changes underway.

There is, however, one important difference in the nature of the two discourses. The discourse of the Greek Church was based on an outside-in logic. External forces and

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1 One difference between the two discourses was the references of Archbishop Christodoulos to Americanisation and American cultural imperialism, references that were missing from Cardinal’s critique of the Celtic Tiger.
interests had penetrated and attempted culturally to annihilate European societies, and thus Greece. Thus no matter how it was promoted or expressed at the national level, the source of the threat for the Greek Church was both external and externally driven. In contrast the Church discourse in Ireland, albeit stressing the same ‘symptoms’ as its Greek counterpart, was an inside-out discourse, a fact which was also reflected in its name. Its principal object was the Celtic Tiger, the most impressive ‘product’ of the domestic, Irish non-ideological space, and not external forces driven by globalisation or otherwise. It is interesting that this remained the case despite the concern of Pope John Paul II with globalisation⁴, and the global structure of the Catholic Church, which could act as a transmission belt of the globalisation discourse. Thus to address the same problems the Church in Ireland focused on the concept of the Celtic Tiger, whereas the Church in Greece turned to globalisation. It can be argued that these two stances represented two different approaches to locating and understanding the hegemonic. For the Greek Church the core of the hegemonic was to be found ‘out-there’, in forces external to Greece. For the Church in Ireland, the (same) hegemonic was something that was produced within Ireland, ‘in-here’ rather than ‘out there’. This difference may be suggestive of the different nature of the interplay between the hegemonic discourse of globalisation and the two countries, a point developed in the Conclusion of this Chapter.

⁴ A clear substantiation of this point is beyond the purposes of this thesis. Yet two examples, one older and one more recent, may be helpful. Thus, Pope John Paul II, when addressing the Vatican Foundation ‘Centesimus Annus – Pro Pontifice’, in 1998, said: ‘to prevent the globalization of the economy from producing the harmful results of an uncontrolled expansion of private or group interests, it is necessary that the progressive globalization of the economy be increasingly met with a ‘global’ culture of solidarity attentive to the needs of the weakest’ (available on line at: http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/speeches/1998/documents/hf_jp-ii_spe_09051998_fondazione-cent-annus_en.html) (May 5, 2003). Similarly, in a May Day speech in Rome, in 2000, he was warning: ‘New realities which are forcefully affecting the productive process, such as globalisation of finance, of the economy, of commerce and of work, should never be allowed to violate the dignity and centrality of the human person or the democracy of peoples’, and he went on to say: ‘Globalisation is a phenomenon present today in all aspects of life, but a phenomenon which needs to be wisely harnessed. It is necessary to globalise solidarity too’. (BBC News, May 1, 2000, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/ 732379.stm) (September 17, 2003). In the same way, the Pope brought the issue of globalisation to the heart of his welcoming remarks, during the visit of the US president George Bush in Rome, in 2002 (see the White House transcript of the remarks available on line at: http://www.usembassy.it/file2001_07/alia/ a1072220.htm) (March 24, 2003).
The Press

Up to now we have juxtaposed the ways in which important institutional actors in Greece and Ireland engaged with the discourse of globalisation. We have focused on these actors based on the assumption that they had a strategic role in the production and reproduction of the public discourses of their countries. Yet a study of domestic/public discourses without a consideration of the media would be rather incomplete. It is in this regard that a media sample was studied along with the above actors. Through such an analysis the purpose was to get a sample of the role of media both as an autonomous agent and as a mirror of society, i.e. both as a major agent in terms of reality-construction/ideology-production, and as a mirror which reflected and represented the prevailing social concerns and relations of power. The focus of the thesis has been on the press and in particular on the Sunday edition of VIMA in Greece, and the daily edition of *The Irish Times* in Ireland.

The quantitative comparison of the aforementioned media sources, with regard to the concept of globalisation, came to enhance the picture that had already been formed through the analysis of the other institutional actors. Compared to the references to globalisation found in VIMA, the references found in *The Irish Times* were minimal. Specifically, the absolute number of references found in the daily Irish paper (6 papers per week) was lower than those found in the Sunday edition of the Greek paper (i.e. 1 paper per week) each and every year, throughout the period 1997-2000. Considering that *The Irish Times* is in English (so, a new term did not have to be created, and/or the term globalisation did not have to be translated, or otherwise appropriated for domestic use) then indeed the extremely low number of references found in *The Irish Times* (in comparison to VIMA) was contrary to all expectations. This situation seemed to change after the mid-2000, and in 2001 the references to globalisation in *The Irish Times* exceeded those found in VIMA (always in the Sunday edition). Yet further research is required to establish whether this was a temporal or sustainable trend.
It also needs to be stressed here that globalisation gradually dominated the press coverage in Greece – at least to the extent that VIMA is representative of this coverage – both as an object and as a prism of analysis; both as news and as a way of reading the news. Furthermore, this domination reflected the dominant position of globalisation in the discourses of the key institutional actors. The opposite conclusions can be drawn in the case of Ireland. Globalisation was not there (i.e. in the public discourse as this was reflected in the press) either as a news item, or as a means of reasoning. Moreover globalisation was not implicated in the discourses of institutional actors, as these discourses were reflected and reconstructed in the press. Thus, it can be said that the hegemonic/globalisation that seemed to speak stronger and stronger to and within the Greek public discourse after 1997, by contrast seemed to be virtually absent, or at least invisible, in the Irish public discourse, up to the year 2000.

Synopsis & Conclusions

We have studied the communication of globalisation discourse in Greece and Ireland during the period 1995-2001 (including 2002 in the case of Ireland). Based on the above juxtaposition and the primary material presented in Chapters 3 and 4 we can summarise the findings of the thesis as follows. The discourse of globalisation, as manifested in the mobilisation of the concept of globalisation itself, dominated the Greek public discourse. It became an integral part of the vocabulary of the key-institutional actors, including the press’s everyday commentary. It became a new means/filter through which actors’ identities, interests, targets and strategies were understood, negotiated, expressed and reproduced. Either as an ‘external structure’/‘context’, or as an ‘opportunity’, ‘justification instrument’ or ‘threat’, it came to define the terms of what was politically, economically, socially and culturally at stake. The above picture includes an exception: the Federation of Greek Industries. Yet overall the study of Greek public discourse seems to verify and exemplify the model of hegemonic discourse communication presented in Chapter 1. For the Greek public discourse was restructured and redefined in the terms of the hegemonic discourse of globalisation. Put differently the ‘hegemonic’ (i.e. globalisation) came to provide the new conditions for the reproduction of the ‘public’ (i.e. the Greek
polity); or, to be more precise, the hegemonic was these new conditions, this new social technology of the public’s reproduction. Is this model also confirmed by the Irish case?

The main finding from the study of the Irish case is that the object, or referent, globalisation left the Irish public discourse relatively untouched, especially up to the year 2000. Globalisation was not invoked in the vocabularies of the key institutional actors, did not appear to emerge as a new zone of contestation in the politico-economic life, and, based on the press sample, was not – at least in any significant way – implicated in the commentary of everyday news. Nor was it there as a significant news item. The only exception to this picture was the ICTU and later the Labour Party, but this exception cannot meaningfully be compared with the transformation observed in the Greek case, or with the transformation described at the proposed hegemonic discourse communication model. If one adds to this picture, the language factor (English), the fact that the Irish model of the economy (Anglo-Saxon) was conducive to economic globalisation, the status of the Irish economy (the most globalised in the world), the changes underway in the Irish society (reflexive modernisation), and the fact that the late 1990s were the high-days of globalisation discourse internationally, then the absence of a discourse on globalisation within the Irish public discourse is indeed surprising.

Yet as we have shown in Chapter 3, during the same period the Irish public discourse and politico-economic life were dominated by meanings and practices that were constitutive of the concept of economic globalisation. Thus although the concept of globalisation was absent from Irish public discourse, the main components of economic globalisation were dominating actors’ discourses and actions, and were defining the conditions for the reproduction of Irish public discourse. This set of meanings and practices, however, did not bring about a new zone of contestation in the Irish society as in the Greek case. Rather the opposite was the case. These meanings and practices emerged as if they were beyond the spheres of politics and ideology. They delineated not a zone of contestation, but a zone of fundamental consensus; the underlying givens of Irish politics and economics, upon which the whole political life seemed to be based. These givens did not seem to be directly contested at any time during the period under examination, but they did seem to
produce a cultural critique. The discourse of the Celtic Tiger did seem to emerge as a new way of conceptualising and negotiating what was at stake in modern Irish society and culture.

Thus in the second half of the 1990s, the Irish public discourse seemed to be reproduced under a new ordering principle, based on the meanings and objects of the economic globalisation discourse. As in the case of Greece, this principle acted as a new means through which actors' identities, interests, targets and strategies were understood, negotiated and reproduced. In addition, although in the Irish case these meanings and practices did not come to be unified under the rubric of globalisation, they were constituent elements of the hegemonic discourse of globalisation, and they did set the parameters of what was at stake in Irish politics, economics, society and culture.

Based on the above synopsis of the Greek and Irish cases we can draw the following conclusions.

First, that the reproduction of the Greek and Irish public discourses during the period under investigation was dominated to a significant extent by the same meanings, practices and points of reference. This does not mean that one finds the same practices (e.g. the flexibilisation of labour market) to have been implemented at the same extent in the two countries. It means that – either as taken-for-granted assumptions or as highly politicised and contested policy concepts and strategies – these meanings and practices functioned as focal points that defined the terms of reproduction of their public discourses, and the stakes, identities, strategies and power relationships of the actors involved. The ever-increasing power of the employers to set the domestic agenda and define the rules of the game in both countries must be read as part of this broader rearrangement of the domestic discourses in the term of the new hegemonic. In this regard globalisation discourse, as a delineation either of the socially given, or of the socially contested, seems to have supplied the common ordering principle (based on a specific stock of objects, meanings, practices and policies) on the basis of which both the Greek and the Irish public discourses were being restructured. Finally, this ordering principle was generating within both the
Greek and Irish public discourses a certain 'globalised' understanding of the international.

Yet how do we deal with the lack of linguistic expression in the same terms in Ireland and Greece? The term globalisation is important within this framework. Its spread cannot but be associated with the new mental map that was produced by the hegemonic discourse it referred to. The study of the hegemonic discourse, however, is something more than a study of a name. Names do matter in the study of hegemonic discourses, and indeed names and naming must themselves be conceptualised and studied as social practices. But a hegemonic discourse cannot be reduced to any of its elements (see Chapter 2), even if this is the very name of the discourse itself. Thus the term globalisation constitutes only a part of the broader set of 'practices and meanings' that the hegemonic discourse of globalisation consists of.

The second conclusion to be drawn is already apparent from the preceding analysis. Although the stock of meanings and practices that was present in the two countries was, with few exceptions (e.g. the term globalisation) the same, the way in which this stock was present in the two cases was fundamentally different. In Greece the hegemonic/globalisation was communicated, and thus materialised, as a multi-level struggle over a new political. Most social, political, economic and cultural stakes had to be thought through, redefined and fought for anew within the Greek society. In Ireland the hegemonic/globalisation was communicated, and thus materialised, as a set of practices and meanings that stood outside the political. From the very beginning it emerged and was experienced as a social technology that was succeeding in elevating Irish society above the traditional misery and poorness of the past. Thus the hegemonic/globalisation offered the basis on which new sociocultural and politico-economic stakes could be negotiated, but in itself the hegemonic remained beyond contestation or deliberation. Thus the hegemonic/globalisation materialised fundamentally differently in the cases of Greece and Ireland. In the first it was manifested as a new political, whereas in the second as a new apolitical. For convenience, the thesis henceforth refers to these two different manifestations as facets of the hegemonic.
The last conclusion is a more tentative one and refers to the dynamics of the communication/materialisation of the globalisation discourse in the two countries. Thus, for most of the period under investigation the different facets of the hegemonic seemed to grow stronger and stronger; whilst everything regarding globalisation was becoming political in Greece, it was becoming apolitical in Ireland. The more economic globalisation practices were generated in Ireland, the more economic globalisation was politicised in Greece. During the latter part of the period under investigation, however, these opposing dynamics seemed to change, and divergence seemed to have given place to convergence between the political and the apolitical facets of the hegemonic. Thus, in Ireland since 2000 there has been gradually developed a trend towards the politicisation of the ‘apolitical’\(^5\). This dynamic had at least two sources: (a) There was a domestic dynamic towards politicisation that was led by the failure – real or perceived – of the ‘apolitical’ and its underlying institutional apparatus (mainly the social partnership) to fulfil certain promises (e.g. reduction of social disparities, recognition of unionism). (b) There was also a dynamic that was generated by the communication within Ireland of Ireland’s image abroad, and in particular within the European Union. This interaction led domestically to discussions on the purpose and desirability of the Celtic Tiger’s policies and practices. On the other hand, a similar but reverse trend can be traced in the case of Greece. Thus, some highly politicised issues, such as part-time employment, through their quotidianisation seemed to be treated as less and less political within the Greek public discourse. This quotidianisation should not necessarily be understood as a passive process. Thus for instance in the case of the labour movement in Greece, the struggle against the ‘neoliberal prescription’ of labour market flexibility during the early-to-mid 1990s, was transformed as time passed by into a new bargain on what the (‘inevitable’) promotion of flexibility should be exchanged with.

\(^5\) The adjective ‘gradual’ is very important here, as even after the 2000 the Fine Gael’s critique of Celtic Tiger did not focus on, or dispute, the policies that had produced this Tiger, but rather on the cultural consequences of these policies; thus leaving relatively intact the non-ideological space. A special reference needs to be made here to the discourse of the Church before 2000. Thus, the Catholic Church developed from the outset (i.e. at least since the mid-1990s) a strong critique of the cultural consequences of the policies produced by the non-ideological space; a critique that came by time to include a critique of the followed economic policies themselves. Thus elements of contestation of the ‘apolitical space’ within the Irish public discourse can be found even before 2000, in the discourse of the Church.
Hence, the convergence of the two communication/materialisation processes became possible only after the two hegemonic facets had reached a certain degree of reification, within the respective public discourses. It was this reification that started to make visible the givens of the Irish politico-economic system and their respective limits and limitations. In an opposite way, it was also through their use, denial or resistance at every possible instance within the Greek public discourse that aspects of the globalisation discourse were reified as a new reality in the Greek context and redefined agents’ conceptualisations and strategies. Finally, as we saw in the study of social partners’ discourses, the EU had a significant role in this convergence process, acting as a powerful generator of economic globalisation objects, policies and practices.

To conclude, a common set of practices and meanings, i.e. a common social technology, dominated in the reproduction of both the Greek and Irish public discourses in the second half of the 1990s. Yet, the way in which this social technology was communicated/materialised in the two countries was fundamentally different. In the case of Greece this new social technology emerged as a new field of struggle, a new zone of contestation, a new ‘political’ (the meanings and the practices of which were present and were contested at all the levels of the social, political, economic and cultural life). In the case of Ireland this same new technology emerged as a new ‘apolitical’, which was all-present at the Irish everyday life, but it was present as a social technology that was beyond ideology and contestation; it was socially taken as given, as granted. Finally, it seems that after a period of divergence, the distance between the two different ways of communication started to reduce. In Ireland aspects of the imperceptible, the apolitical started to enter into the sphere of the socially visible, the socially disputable, the sphere of the political, whereas in Greece, highly contested aspects of the globalisation discourse started to acquire an apolitical, taken for granted character.

This Chapter juxtaposed the communication of the hegemonic discourse of globalisation in Greece and Ireland, and offered conclusions on the nature of the interplay between this hegemonic discourse and the two countries. Chapter 6 elaborates on how these conclusions inform our understanding of hegemonic discourses and their communication.
CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSIONS

This last Chapter focuses on the reasons for the different communication/materialisation process of the hegemonic discourse of globalisation in Greece and Ireland. The issue at stake here is how the differences in the communication of the hegemonic discourse are to be explained. The Chapter concludes with an analysis of what we can learn and what we do not learn about the interaction between the 'hegemonic' and the 'public' from the comparison of the Greek and Irish cases, and how these lessons shed new light on our understanding and analysis of hegemonic discourses.

Models of Political Economy, Domestic Institutional Arrangements and Hegemonic Discourses

The nature of the political economy of the two countries is a key factor in the explanation of the observed different aspects of the hegemonic. As was argued in Chapter 2, although the hegemonic itself cannot be reduced to any particularity, to any specific interests and conditions, the origins of a hegemonic discourse can be traced in particular interests and material/power conditions. Based on this framework, one could argue that there must be a certain degree of 'genealogical compatibility' between the conditions in which a hegemonic discourse originates, and the conditions that a hegemonic discourse in turn generates. Thus in our case, one could assume that the practices and meanings that were generated by the hegemonic discourse of globalisation (e.g. liberalisation, flexibility, deregulation, privatisation, tax-cuts) would be more or less taken for granted, or smoothly absorbed in political economies that were based on institutional arrangements that were conducive with the globalisation discourse (the Anglo-Saxon model in the case of Ireland), whereas they
would generate controversy, tension and clashes in political economies that were based on different, non-compatible arrangements (the continental/Mediterranean model in the case of Greece). For example, the reduction of state control over the economy and the deregulation of national economic frameworks have been defining characteristics of the hegemonic discourse of globalisation. Nevertheless, whereas the contemporary Irish political economy, as an Anglo-Saxon type, was characterised by low state control over the economy and a highly deregulated economic framework, the Greek political economy had the opposite characteristics, i.e. high state control of the economy and a strict regulatory framework (see Appendix B). Consequently, one could claim that whereas the hegemonic was 'Irish-friendly', it was, in contrast, dismantling of the practices that dominated in the Greek political economy.

The above argumentation and its rationale draw mainly from the findings and the conclusions that have been put forward from the 'goodness of fit' literature, mainly in European Studies. The main assumption of this literature is that, the degree and intensity of the adaptational pressures at the national level depend on the degree of the 'fit' or 'misfit' (i.e. the compatibility) of the national institutions and practices with those promoted by the European Union (among others see, Knill and Lehmkuhl, 1999; Borzel and Risse, 2000; Caporaso et al, 2001).

Yet when considering the role of political economy in the study of hegemonic discourse communication one must be cautious to avoid a circular logic that turns a goodness of fit approach into a self-proof explanation. First and most significantly we have already argued that although a hegemonic discourse originates in particular interests and conditions, it acquires an independent dynamic that not only cannot be reduced to, but also transforms the very conditions and interests that gave birth to it in the first place. Thus the outcome of the hegemonic re-arrangement at the domestic level is far from being pre-determined. It is this independent and un-determined effect of the hegemonic discourse that breaks down the circular, self-proved explanation of the goodness of fit approach. Thus, the analysis of globalisation as a hegemonic discourse suggests an independent and significant reordering effect even on political economies that are 'genealogically compatible' with it. Consequently, although the nature of the political economy does affect the communication/materialisation process, it hardly determines it. Otherwise we end up
with a closed, circular system that both analytically and conceptually is premised on the absence and the impossibility of social change.

Furthermore, even when the level of osmosis between a political economy and a hegemonic discourse is high, one would expect that social groups that are on the losing-side of the changes underway would protest and try to block the respective governmental policies. To put this differently, the fact that the contemporary Irish political economy belongs to the Anglo-Saxon model, does not mean that the changes in the domestic environment and the domestic distribution of power, produced by the hegemonic discourse would escape, if not public protest, at least public deliberation\(^1\). In this regard one must not conflate the (non-) power of an actor with its willingness to dispute or deliberate on existing and changing practices. For instance, the fact that the ICTU and its leaders and members were socialised within an Anglo-Saxon politico-economic environment, does not mean that when ICTU’s suggestions and preferences were marginalised in the policy process, ICTU would not protest, or would not, however unsuccessfully, try to block governmental policies that are disadvantageous for its members. The same goes for the ICTU’s preferences. For instance the fact that the Irish labour market was flexible compared to most of its European counterparts, does not mean that the labour force in this country had a fixed preference in favour of flexibility practices, and that it would steadily support policies that enhanced the flexibility of the labour market.

Finally, an uncritical emphasis on the role of the models of political economy runs the risk of reducing these models to ahistorical constructs, beyond change and social agency. For instance, in Britain in the 1980s, Thatcher was functioning within a traditional Anglo-Saxon political economy but, at the same time, was changing the nature of this political economy by, among other, reversing the long-established tradition of Keynesianism, putting an end to the powers of the trade unions, and minimising the welfare state provisions. Along the same lines, the rise of the social partnership in Ireland in 1987, although it took place within specific politico-

\(^1\) A parallel would be relevant here with the development of a discourse on globalisation in the United Kingdom, the par-excellence Anglo-Saxon political economy in Europe. Yet a full elaboration of this example and its evidential basis is beyond the scope of this thesis. For the development of the globalisation discourse in the United Kingdom see Hay and Smith, 2005.
economic arrangements, in fact transformed the Irish political economy, producing a new hybrid model. Thus, the models of political economy should always be examined in dynamic terms and not as end-products. This points to a weakness of the existing project that limits its focus only on the second half of the 1990s.

Based on this analysis it can be argued that the fact that Ireland was an Anglo-Saxon economy cannot fully account for the way in which the globalisation discourse was communicated/materialised. Thus although the importance of the nature of the political economy in the hegemonic discourse communication process is undisputable, a clear correlation between the nature of the political economy and the nature of the communication/materialisation of a hegemonic discourse cannot be established, or at least cannot be extracted from the case studies considered by this project.

To get a picture that can better account for the different facets of the hegemonic, one must qualify the role of the models of political economy with a study of the case and time specific (domestic) conditions that affect the capacity and willingness of the various actors to dispute or deliberate on the practices and policies generated by the hegemonic.

In this regard, the existence of a highly-institutionalised, well-functioning and ever-inclusive social partnership, at the heart of the politico-economic developments in Ireland cannot but be considered instrumental in the explanation of the communication of globalisation discourse in this country. Thus although Ireland is classified as an Anglo-Saxon political economy in the comparative political economy literature, it is very different from the ideal type of the Anglo-Saxon model, as its political economy has been characterised throughout the period under investigation by a strong and expanding consociational institutional base (a defining characteristic of the continental model of economy). It seems that this distinctive characteristic of the Irish political economy played a crucial role in the way in which the hegemonic discourse of globalisation was communicated at the national level. Thus, the effects that were generated by the production of new winners and losers, inherent in any hegemonic discourse communication process, were mediated, negotiated and resolved, at the level of this consociational mechanism, ever-dominant in the Irish politico-economic life. Finally, the fact that many heads or representatives of public
institutions in Ireland, had grown up together or had personal/family relationships, due to the small size of the Irish society, must have facilitated the above dynamics².

Consequently, it could be argued that it was on the one hand the genealogical compatibility between the globalisation discourse and the Irish political economy, and on the other hand the strong consociational base of the Irish political economy that led to the apolitical facet of the hegemonic, observed in the Irish case. Respectively, it could also be argued that the effects from the incompatibility between the hegemonic discourse of globalisation and the Greek political economy, were exacerbated by the overly fragmented and particularistic structure of interest representation that characterise the Greek politico-economic life, and this is why one observes so strong a political facet of the hegemonic in the Greek case.

The above combination of a general models-of-political-economy perspective with a case-specific, domestic-institutional-arrangements analysis appears to improve significantly our understanding of the nature of hegemonic discourse communication. It takes into consideration, not only factors concerning the degree of genealogical compatibility between hegemonic discourses and national political economies, but also factors concerning the way in which different societies negotiate social change domestically, i.e. whether there are strong or weak social mediation structures of interest-representation, and whether these structures promote consensus building, or rather enhance the reproduction of social divisions and antagonisms. This analysis leads to the following 2x2 matrix in the study of hegemonic discourse communication.

² Personal interview with Peter Cassells, 27-06-2002.
Table 1: Studying Hegemonic Discourse Communication: a Hypothesis on the Determinants of the Facets of the Hegemonic – The Case of Globalisation in the 1990s

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Consociational political economy with a strong and well functioning social partnership</th>
<th>Political Economy compatible with the practices and meanings, generated by the hegemonic discourse</th>
<th>Political Economy not compatible with the practices and meanings, generated by the hegemonic discourse</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Strong apolitical facet': smooth, passive, imperceptive communication/materialisation process (e.g. Ireland)</td>
<td>(e.g. Austria, Sweden)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Non-consociational, fragmented political economy, with a weak or marginalised social partnership</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>D</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(e.g. United Kingdom)</td>
<td>'Strong political facet': high politicisation and polarisation, increased controversy and contestation in the communication/materialisation process (e.g. Greece)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1 puts forward a number of hypotheses and research puzzles that are beyond the purposes of this thesis. For instance, one needs to conduct further research to double check the conclusions presented at boxes ‘A’ and ‘D’. In addition, one needs to extend the research to cases that fall under the categories ‘B’ (e.g. Austria and Sweden) and ‘C’ (e.g. United Kingdom), in order to fill in the missing pieces of the jigsaw.

At any rate this matrix – and its capacity to capture the hegemonic discourse communication process – remains tentative, even with respect to the categories ‘A’ and ‘D’. It is indeed true that the structure of interest representation comes to complement the models of political economy analysis, thus significantly advancing our understanding of the determinants of the hegemonic discourse communication process. Yet while the structure of interest representation tells us important things
about how a public discourse is reproduced, it tells us little about actors’ preferences and understandings. To put this more clearly, although the study of these mediation structures tells us much about where and with whom the actors speak, it tells us little about what they say. Thus it seems that the problem mentioned with regard to the models of political economy, applies also to the structures of interest representation. The fact that a political economy is based on consociational institutional arrangements does not mean that the social actors that are negatively affected by the hegemonic discourse will not react; it just means that their reactions will be brought into and negotiated within the framework of these institutional arrangements. This argument is also conducive with the recent findings of Vivien Schmidt (2000, 2001, 2002) on the communication of ideas. Broadly interpreted, these findings are as follows. In political economies that are characterised by non-consociational institutional arrangements, the process of ideas-communication focuses on the attempt of key policy groups to persuade directly the public about the necessity and appropriateness of these ideas and the respective policies. On the other hand in consociational political economies the focus is on the attempt of policy groups to agree among themselves.

Vivien Schmidt’s hypothesis seems to be confirmed by the Greek case. All the key social actors seem to struggle to persuade the public about what is necessary, appropriate and desired. It is not, however, confirmed in the case of Ireland. Thus, although a broad, public debate on economic globalisation policies did not take place in Ireland, in accordance with the hypothesis, one finds no relevant debate in the interacting discourses of the relevant actors and forums (mainly the social partnership), as the hypothesis would have it. Thus, in Ireland, it is not that the social partners were negotiating economic globalisation policies among themselves, but rather that the promotion of these policies, let alone the policies themselves, were taken as a given; that is, they were beyond discussion and public or intra policy group deliberation.

3 To address this issue Schmidt would refer to background assumptions of an uncontested ‘master discourse’ that, arguably, had dominated Irish public discourse in the 1980s (see Schmidt, 2002: Chapter 5). Such a historisation of the observed phenomenon is very important, yet still not capable of explaining why such debates did take place in the UK (for the latter case see for instance Hay and Smith, 2005).
Accordingly, the Irish case suggests that the model of political economy and the mediation structure of interest representation cannot on their own account for all facets of the hegemonic; it cannot offer a conclusive explanation of the hegemonic discourse communication process. It seems that in order to grasp the apolitical facet observed in the Irish case, one needs to dig deeper into the reasons that affected social actors’ understandings, and their capacity and willingness to dispute or deliberate on the meanings and practices of the globalisation discourse. Following such a deep, case-specific, analytically bottom-up route it becomes apparent that the social technology (i.e. the hegemonic) that in the Greek case came at a certain historical period to be communicated and materialised by the ‘public’ as a new zone of contestation concerning the redistribution of wealth and power, in the Irish case was communicated and materialised by all strata of Irish society as a historically unique economic miracle, a social technology of prosperity and wealth-generation. Following this reasoning, it can also be argued that it was this economic miracle experience, that defined what was conceivable and what was non-conceivable, what was part of politics and what was beyond politics, what in general could be spoken of and how, within the Irish public discourse of the time. Additionally it can be argued that this prosperity was so deeply and widely felt in Ireland, that it marginalised or made (temporarily) irrelevant any social clash as to who gets what; i.e. the great majority of the population was experiencing so absolute a gain in the conditions of their everyday life, that until the end of the 1990s, relative-gains considerations remained beyond considerable public deliberation.

A significant question arises at this point: could the study of the model of political economy and/or the structure of interest representation account for the economic miracle and its impact on the Irish case? Our answer is negative; that is, the factor of an economic miracle has distinctive qualities that go beyond the more general factors discussed above. Thus, considering the nature of the hegemonic discourse, such a miracle could only (or most probably) have taken place within an Anglo-Saxon economy; and the existence of a (continental) well-functioning social partnership in Ireland played a crucial role in this miracle. But although these conditions appear necessary for the economic miracle, they cannot by any means be conclusively considered also sufficient for its emergence.
Furthermore, one cannot easily generalise the findings of the Irish case, as the factor of economic progress and prosperity should not be expected to have exactly the same effects on just any public discourse or national context. In this regard, in the case of Ireland some further historical contextualisation adds important details on the nature of the communication of the hegemonic. Thus it seems that in the Irish case, this economic miracle disrupted the continuity of a generations-long collective memory and social self-portraying that was driven by the potato-famine of the 19th century. Hence, it was the positive social shock produced by the above disruption that 'placed' the practices, mechanisms and policies of the economic miracle beyond the sphere of the socially contested and negotiable, beyond the sphere of the political.

To conclude, the nature of political economy and the nature of institutional arrangements that define how a society domestically negotiates social change seem indeed to be central to the hegemonic discourse communication process. Yet, the findings of this thesis suggest that no conclusive correlation can be established between specific types of national contexts and specific modes of hegemonic discourse communication. In this regard, more research on more cases could shed new light. The findings of the thesis, however, suggest that a complete reading and understanding of the different facets of the hegemonic cannot but finally rest upon certain, case-specific qualitative characteristics and historically specific factors. Consequently, it can be argued that understanding and studying the hegemonic entails moving beyond the general categories of models of political economy and institutional arrangements to more case and time specific factors that affect the dynamics between the 'hegemonic' and the 'publics'. To this end, one cannot underestimate historical contingency, without underestimating the social realities under examination.

This section has attempted to explore and elucidate the nature of the hegemonic discourse communication process. In so doing it evaluated the role of the various factors engaged in this process, and pointed out how our findings contribute to various approaches and bodies of literature within international and comparative politics, and political economy. In this regard, in the evolving interdisciplinary debate among the various strands of institutional analysis, this thesis takes the part of the approaches that underline the crucial role of the translation process of
international ideas, discourses, policies or paradigms, at the national level\textsuperscript{4}. Yet, the thesis attempted to take a step further. It focused on a certain type of discourses that concern the production of (social) life itself, and argued that in the case of these discourses this 'translation process' is a constitutive part of the writing of the 'original text'. That is why the thesis employed a vocabulary based on the concepts of the hegemonic and of communication/materialisation, rather than one based on the concept of translation.

Having completed in the last two Chapters the juxtaposition of our case-studies and the analysis of what we can and cannot learn about the hegemonic discourse communication process, it is important to return to our definition of the hegemonic discourse. Thus, the main task at this final section is to outline the fundamentals and evaluate the potentials of a Hegemonic Discourse Approach (HDA).

\textbf{Thoughts Towards a Hegemonic Discourse Approach}

Hegemonic discourses have been defined in this thesis as historically specific, overarching social technologies concerning the (re)production of social life. In the approach proposed here, the stuff of hegemonic discourses is both material and non-material\textsuperscript{5}. For instance a hegemonic discourse can be equally manifested in the way a building is built or in the way in which a commercial transaction is conducted. Furthermore, and equally important, the meanings and practices of which a hegemonic discourse consists are not created in a laboratory. They are the product of, and reflect, specific material conditions, technological developments and power relationships, although they are not reducible to, or detachable from any of these factors.

\textsuperscript{4} A significant contribution to this debate is the edited volume \textit{The Rise of Neoliberalism and Institutional Analysis}, published in 2001. There, John Campbell and Ove Pedersen (2001) gather and discuss contributions from all the strands of institutional analysis, namely rational choice, plus historical, organisational and discursive institutionalism. For the issue of national translations see the sophisticated chapter by Peter Kjaer and Ove Pedersen (2001) 'Translating Liberalization: Neoliberalism in the Danish Negotiated Economy'.

\textsuperscript{5} Along these lines Ernesto Laclau argues: 'by discourse we should not understand simply speech and writing, i.e. there is nothing specifically linguistic about it'. He also goes as far as to argue that '[t]he notion of discourse could...be replaced by that of practice' (see, Ernesto Laclau and Roy Bhaskar, 1998: 9).
Throughout the thesis our aim has been to suggest a way of conceptualising and analysing Hegemonic Discourses, i.e. the changing conditions of social-life reproduction. The basic premises of the proposed Hegemonic Discourse Approach (HDA) are as follows:

A Hegemonic Discourse Approach aims at explicating how the universe of world politics and economics (what can be defined as the international) is (re)produced and changes. It is important to stress here that HDA is not understood as a theory in its own right. Rather, it is put forward as a mode of social inquiry that offers a method of ‘isolating’ — in a Foucaultian, archaeological sense — the international, in order to study its conditions of production, reproduction and change. Thus, we propose HDA as an analytical framework for studying the biopolitics of the international, which is ultimately the power politics of social life; the study of how social life, having entered ‘into the order of knowledge and power’ of the international (see Foucault, 1978: 141-142), becomes the main stake of politics.

Within this framework, the basic assumption of HDA is that each and every ‘international’ is characterised by a certain hegemonic, i.e. a specific set of meanings and practices that dominate in the process through which the international is reproduced and thus changed. We suggest that this hegemonic can be thought of and studied as a social technology — a mode of organising and producing societies, invented by human beings themselves. Thus it is suggested that in order to study and understand the international we need to study and understand the hegemonic; how it is structured, how it functions, where it is to be found and studied.

HDA suggests that the strategic field of the hegemonic is everyday life; in fact it is premised that the hegemonic is about the definition of a certain everydayness, i.e. of a certain way of everyday life reproduction. This definition of everydayness cannot be based on physical violence or direct imposition. It should be conceptualised as a
process of ‘making up citizens’ (Rose and Miller, 1992); a process that invests in life-in-freedom rather than in life-in-subjugation⁶.

To capture this hegemonic the approach proposed here suggests that we need to turn to the domestic, and compare and contrast the reproduction of different societies during the same historical period. It further suggests that we need to focus on the social institutions that play a dominant role in the production of ideology at a national level (for instance political parties, religion institutions, organised interests, the press, the army; these institutions differ from case to case, from country to country).

At this point the question becomes, what can HDA offer to social research and practice? We would argue that a Hegemonic Discourse Approach favours a much needed bottom-up, agent-centric approach to world politics and economics. Thus, it is not that Greece and Ireland were forced to implement an external, already well-defined set of practices and meanings called globalisation. Instead, globalisation is what these countries have been pro-actively producing through their actions. The aim of such an approach is not to deny historically specific constrains and limitations. The aim is to avoid a bland, deterministic understanding of what is ‘out there’, and what this ‘out there’ does. In the policy process one very often comes across the argument that ‘this or that must be done due to external powers/pressures’. It is exactly these ‘powers/pressures’ and their relationship to the suggested course of action, that are under problematisation in a Hegemonic Discourse Approach. Thus, in policy terms HDA aims at questioning a narrow deterministic approach to policy-making; it denies a policy-making that is deprived of politics. Furthermore, a Hegemonic Discourse Approach aims at opening, rather than closing, the question of what is possible in a specific historical period and what a state can do within a certain historical context.

The Hegemonic Discourse Approach offers also a useful analytical tool to study the dynamics of social change. In this regard, it can be argued that this project managed

⁶ Along these lines Rose and Miller (1992) argue in relation to biopower: ‘[It] is not so much a matter of imposing constraints upon citizens as of ‘making up’ citizens capable of bearing a kind of regulated freedom. Personal autonomy is not the antithesis of political power, but a key term in its exercise, the more so because most individuals are not merely the subjects of power but play a part in its operations’ (Rose and Miller 1992: 174).
to capture and study globalisation in action. By focusing on the reproduction of public discourses – analytically independent from the globalisation discourse – it managed to capture what globalisation is and when it emerged; and how it influenced the reproduction of these public discourses. In this way we get an anatomy of the hegemonic and its function, thus also getting a detailed picture of how human societies become what they are. In this way, HDA can offer a powerful tool for demystifying the ‘unchangeable’ or the ‘universal’ of what are in fact historically-specific social structures or practices.

More broadly, by conceptualising the hegemonic as a human technology, HDA aspires at opening an avenue of reflecting on the human condition as a condition of our own making, rather than as a condition externally given or otherwise externally determined. It thus aims at bringing the subject and its importance to the forefront of the theorising and practicing of world politics and economics. Milan Kundera opens his Book of Laughter and Forgetting by saying that ‘the struggle of man against power is the struggle of memory against forgetting’. This thesis has tried to argue that power, the hegemonic, rather than being something external to human life, is a defining characteristic of the human condition. In this regard we very much share Foucault’s tireless effort to ‘understand how we have been trapped in our own history’ (Foucault, 1982: 210). Nevertheless, forgetting may remain a significant factor in the equation of social change. More often than not, people, human societies tend to take their everydayness as given and externally imposed, and mainly try to enjoy their life in their ‘free time’. We, many times, prefer to forget, or to externalise, the repetitiveness, the banality of our everydayness. If, however, the latter is merely a human technology, a human product, then it may be crucial to cease considering it as externally given, as the ‘system’, ‘real life’ etc. There may be more space for agency, change and imagination in human history. To this end, one must not underestimate the emancipatory potential of reflecting.
EPILOGUE

The thesis: from fragments to an ontological point

The thesis aspired to open a new intellectual field, to raise an ontological point. Domestic structures and institutions, ideology production, discourse and (everyday) life were brought together in an attempt to reflect on the conditions of the production, reproduction and change of social life. Names (e.g. globalisation, Celtic tiger, deregulation), texts (e.g. political manifestos, annual reviews, newspapers), policies and practices (e.g. liberalisation, privatisation, deregulation, the institutionalisation of social partnerships, tax cuts, flexibility policies in labour markets), national actors and institutions (e.g. political and religious leaders, political parties, workers’ unions, the church, the press), publics (Greece and Ireland), international actors and institutions (e.g. EU, UNICE, ETUC, ILO) and discourses (e.g. globalisation, the Celtic tiger, the European social model, liberalisation, as well as the Greek and Irish public discourses) were brought together to compose a complex social universe, defined by multiple, and multiply interacting, discursive fields. Furthermore it was assumed that this social universe cannot but be based on a social/human technology; a technology developed, reproduced and changed by people. It is this social technology that the thesis conceptualises as the hegemonic, and essentially it is this conceptualisation and the interrelated suggested way of studying the hegemonic that are at stake in the thesis.

Existential preoccupations: ‘The fault, dear Brutus, is not in our stars, But in ourselves that we are underlings’ (William Shakespeare, Julius Caesar)

Why? What has been the motivation for this enterprise? To whom are the thesis and its themes speaking? There is an existential preoccupation to be found at the foundations of this project; a preoccupation that both guided and supported this thesis throughout its undertaking. What is ‘the system’ (that is blamed for everything), and how is it reproduced or/and changes? What is the stuff from which the ‘real world’
(that follows the years in school) is made? If most people would prefer an other way of living, an other everydayness, where and how do they submit themselves to and reproduce the system, the real world they accuse? What part of the social reality and the production of social life is of our own making and what is not? These were the preoccupations that led this thesis to engage in a strenuous effort to encroach upon, and learn to read, the socio-historical spiral of social reproduction (if only an infinitesimal moment of it), trying to understand the conditions of this (re)production and thus the conditions of social change.

Finding while walking: 'When setting out upon your way to Ithaca, Wish always that your journey be long, Full of adventure, Full of lore. Of the Laestrygones and of the Cyclopes, of an irate Poseidon never be afraid ... Ithaca ... the marvelous journey.' (Constantine Cavafy, Ithaca)

The above project was not evolved linearly. It was rather an intellectual journey with many surprises and unexpected reorientations. A gap in the ideas literature in IR/IPE led us to hegemonic discourses. A lack of a serious engagement of the comparative institutionalism literature with the domestic aspects of the communication of ideas and discourses led to the question of how ideology is produced at the national level, and to the concept of public discourses. The synthesis of the above problems led to the development of a hegemonic-discourse-communication-model that is based on the interplay between public and hegemonic discourses. This analysis led to a finer elaboration of the relationship between the publics and the hegemonic; an elaboration through which the hegemonic came to be conceptualised as the social technology of the publics’ (re)production. This conceptual move proved very productive as it assertively pieced together the various fragments and elements of the research project (i.e. names, texts, policies, practices, actors and institutions and their discourses), creating a framework through which they could be studied and understood in their dynamic interplay. This development made the hegemonic the core stake of the thesis. The comparative nature of the research allowed us to dig further into the qualities and properties of the hegemonic, thus exemplifying the multiple ways of its communication/materialisation. An exploration of the reasons for these different facets of the hegemonic was the final step to be taken. This exploration demonstrated
that although the role of domestic institutions and the nature of political economy are very important in the hegemonic communication/materialisation process, a complete understanding of this process requires also the accommodation of other case-specific factors, as well as, and maybe more importantly, historical contingency.

*Silence is not always a statement; or issues arising...*

The venture of conceptualising the hegemonic has led us to the importance of bringing the subject and everyday life back in the analysis of world politics and economics. This attempt brought us many times face to face with many long-standing issues/problems in social and political theory. Unfortunately the limits of this thesis in terms of time, space and focus did not allow us to engage in-depth with these issues. Yet, here we should at least mention three of them.

(a) *Hegemon, Hegemony and the In-Between: Q: Tea or Coffee? A: Yes, please*

The thesis has outlined a political and a biopolitical approach to politics, and argued that in order to capture the conditions of existence and change of the international/social, both these traditions need to be taken into consideration. We need to examine power both as bombs and economic coercion (power without) and as a technology of the self (i.e. power within).

In discussing the hegemonic however, (also loosely referred to here as hegemony or empire), it became clear that this, i.e. the hegemonic, transcends/exceeds any entity that can be captured under the noun ‘hegemon’. Thus the two, i.e. the hegemony and the hegemon, must not be conflated, and the relationship between the two must not assumed to be in principle harmonious. Tensions between on the one hand the hegemon’s policies and practices and on the other hand the terms and forms of hegemony may lead to changes in the dominant practices and meanings (i.e. the hegemony) of which the hegemon has been an expression in the first place.
It was on this basis that 'everyday life' in general and the 'subject' in particular were proposed as the appropriate terrains for capturing and studying the hegemonic and its change. Along these lines it has been argued that hegemony is 'here', in the 'inside' and thus the main question is who is and produces what part of the hegemonic, when and how?

Does such an approach obfuscate the power relations that dominate in the international/social? By diffusing hegemony at the level of the subject, don't we lose sight of the role and function of the hegemon? Are we losing our way in the search to understand how power is exercised in world politics and economics? Don't we end up with a Gramscian hegemony without a hegemon?

No, or rather yes. Yes, we need not to lose sight of the hegemon and its role in the international, as manifested in the traditional approaches to politics. Thus yes, not talking about the hegemon does obfuscate dominant power relations. But this is only half of the story of life-in-the-international, and to present this half, as the whole story is equally misleading with neglecting the role of the hegemon.

In particular, it seems to us that for a long period of time this focus on the hegemon and the 'power without' has consciously or unconsciously acted as an alibi, that helped to obfuscate both the conditions of existence and the conditions of change of the system. Indeed, to accuse a hegemon has always been an easy and convenient answer and attitude in world politics and economics. The contention here is that it is time to move beyond the idea of the hegemon in order to understand change and continuity in the international/social. Within this framework, bringing the subject back in does not manifest a fear of politics, but rather the generalisation-universalisation of politics. Such an understanding does not allow hegemony/empire comfortably to lie 'out there' with a hegemon; it does not allow an externalisation of the system, and thus an externalisation of the responsibility for the system. The system lies with us, and is reproduced and changes through us, through the social subjects.

For sure such an analysis does not give us a centre, a clear target, an alibi (for instance, MNEs, the USA, financial capital, the economic etc.). But it is exactly this
point that it aims to address; the hegemonic has no centre; the hegemonic is not reducible to the hegemon or any other of its properties. Even more controversially, there is no life beyond the hegemonic (as there is no hegemonic beyond life). The hegemonic just is; as life just is. Life is the (only) subject of the hegemonic; its condition of existence; its condition of change. These thoughts bring us to the second issue (not) encountered by the thesis, the sovereignty of the sovereign subject.

(b) Subject, Subjectivity and the Hegemonic: 'Lukacs is trying to preserve...a Marxism which incorporates subjectivity into history without making it an epiphenomenon' (Maurice Merleau-Ponty, 1973: 41)

The literature that deals with the issue of subjectivity is massive, and a critical engagement with it has been far beyond the scope and the purpose of this thesis¹. Yet the conceptualisation of the subject and its place and role in the social universe has been central to our inquiry, and even if not immediately apparent, in essence, it defined the identity of this project.

We have argued that the constitution of the subject, what is usually referred to as socialisation, is by definition a hegemonic process. We have also argued that hegemony is (re)produced at the subject level. What we would like to make clear here is that these claims do not refute or reject an understanding of the subject as sovereign. For the put-together-subject is capable of reflecting on and changing the nature of the process that put it together in the first place, namely its 'making' apparatus. That is what makes the subject sovereign; its tragic – in an ancient Greek understudying of the term – freedom to reflect and act (or not) on the conditions of its existence. In this framework, the issue at stake is this making-apparatus ² and its place and conditions of existence in relation to the subject. To explain the stance

¹ The primary literature on the subject extends from the antiquity to present. One could think of names such as Aristotle, Spinoza, Leibniz, Hegel, Heidegger, Lukacs, Foucault. For a recent and thoughtful review of the 'persistence of the subject' in French philosophy, see Williams, 2001. For a similar study, from an author critical towards the post-structuralist tradition, see The Era of the Individual, Renaut, 1997.

² Different theoretical traditions are referring to this apparatus as, the 'hegemonic', 'history', 'hegemony', that which 'exceeds' etc.
adopted by the thesis, it is important to return to the first stages of this research project.

At these initial stages the thesis greatly benefited from the writings of Ernesto Laclau, Chantal Mouffe and Judith Butler (Butler et al, 2000, Laclau and Mouffe, 1985). These writings suggest that globalisation should be conceived as an empty signifier\(^3\), i.e. as a particularity that in a certain historical period assumed the representation of an universality, thus occupying the ‘ahistorical’, ‘empty’ and ‘ineradicable’ space of the social; the space which each historical hegemony comes to occupy, to fill in. (Butler, 2000: 31 on Laclau). Thus globalisation as an empty signifier was too substantial, rather than negligible, as the use of the metaphor ‘empty’ would have it. The thesis tried to push this analysis further. It argued that one needs to bring this ahistorical, empty and ineradicable space of the social, from ‘up’ and ‘out there’, to ‘down’ and ‘in’ the subject. In this way our understanding of social change and continuity changes radically. The structuralism many times found in studies of discourse is transformed to an open social milieu that is multiple, dynamic and chaotic. In this context, every minor/unobservable and every major/expressive, action/inaction, talk/silence, movement/inertia, statement and repetition by the subject(s) has a role in a bigger picture. The more one wants to approach hegemony/history, the more one needs to search for those expressions, practices, understandings, habits that have exceeded/escaped the sphere of the conscious/disputable\(^4\). Hence, the aforementioned ‘making apparatus’ – or, if one prefers, history, hegemony, the system etc. – emerges, wanes and changes every day through us, through the subject. The sovereignty of the subject lies exactly in its ability to reflect on its life and change...change its life, that is, change its ‘making

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\(^3\) For the concept of ‘empty signifier’ see, Laclau, 1996.

\(^4\) A separate diatribe would be needed to talk about the ‘escape’/‘exceeding’ of the ‘everyday’ and its expressions. Here it may suffice to cite the inspiration of the thesis. Maurice Blanchot (1993/1969), in his short essay ‘Everyday Speech’, returns again and again to the phrase/conclusion, ‘The everyday escapes’. In his poetic manner he notes: ‘Hence the everyday must be thought as the suspect (and the oblique) that always escapes the clear decision of the law, even when the law seeks by way of suspicion to track down every indeterminate manner of being...The two sides always meet: the everyday with its tedious, painful, and sordid side (the amorphous, the stagnant); and the inexhaustible, irreducible, constantly unfinished everyday that always escapes forms or structures...Whatever its other aspects, the everyday has this essential trait: it allows no hold. It escapes. It belongs to insignificance; the insignificant being what is without truth, without reality, and without secret, but also perhaps the site of all possible signification...by another trait, the everyday is what we never see for a first time but can only see again’ (Blanchot 1993/1969: 239-240).
apparatus’, the conditions of its existence. It was this understanding of hegemony and the subject that informed how this thesis approached and conceptualised both its empirical material, and the nature and role of the examined social actors, institutions and discourses. In addition it was the above thoughts that made us to turn to everyday life as the strategic theatre of hegemony.

(c) Sovereign Subjects, Sovereign Power and Resistance

This conceptualisation of the relationship between the hegemonic and the subject has also a profound effect on how one understands the concepts of sovereign power and resistance. Thus, following this path, resistance is not conceptualised as an action that is formulated and organised against an external sovereign power, because such a power is to be found at the subject level in the first place. That is, the hegemonic is a condition of existence for the subject, and being so it cannot constitute an object of resistance by the subject. Within this framework, resistance should be conceptualised as a reflection on, and change of, this condition of existence, through the reproduction of life at the everyday. Thus resistance is not outside of the hegemonic; it does not act upon the hegemonic from a point exterior to it, but rather signifies specific moments/facts that have a transformative effect on the condition of its (re)production. Thus at an ontological level resistance is what leads, or aims at leading, to a certain transformation of our conditions of existence; and hence to a certain transcendence of the (always historically-specific) subject⁵.

How is this translated into strategy at the level of everyday life? The thesis has hardly something new to add in this regard. It would suggest looking back at the theories of social change in everyday life. It would point at the direction of the enactment of transformative moments in the everyday⁶. Different terms have been

⁵ Of course if the hegemon, rather than the hegemonic, is the point of departure of the analysis, one clearly conceptualises ‘resistance’ as an action external to the sovereign power, to the hegemon. The approach suggested here aims at enriching rather than ignoring such an exterior understanding of resistance, by placing it within a wider and more complex set of social relations, where ‘the system’ is not reducible to the hegemon, and is not external to the social actors. It is through this framework that this thesis subscribes to the statement that a ‘break with the everyday by means of festival – violent or peaceful – cannot endure’ (Lefebvre, 1987: 11).
used to describe such moments. For instance the Situationists were advocating the need to construct situations in the everyday that would transform people’s understanding of the normal, the ordinary, the feasible, the desired (Guy Debord, 1957). Such enactments would disrupt everyday practices and understandings that through repetition have escaped the sphere of the conscious, the sphere of the question ‘why’. The nature and effects of such transformative events have become the subject of what is broadly defined as the ‘theories of the event’ (see Verstraeten, 1990). Alain Badiou’s work is central here. According to Badiou (1999: 105: quoted in Noys, 2003: 2) an event is ‘what-is-not-being-qua-being’. ‘The event punctures knowledge and leaves behind a trace’ (Noys, 2003: 2, on Badiou, 1999); it compels us to ‘a new way of being’ (Badiou 2001: 41 quoted in Noys, 2003: 4); it set off new social ethics (Badiou, 2001).

Here one could legitimately raise the question of where such events are coming from? For sure there cannot be a conclusive answer to this question. We would like, however, to think of this question as similar to its exact opposite, i.e. where these events are leading to? For both are based on a single field of problematique: the question of what is possible (in a given historical context)? To follow up the analysis of this thesis, the historically possible cannot be thought independently from the hegemonic, independently from its historical context. In this regard the historically possible is defined by the currently existing stock of knowledge and technology. Yet it is not determined by the latter. The past has shown that the human imaginary has the potential to transcend its historical context and to create new possibilities, opening new conceptual avenues. Furthermore, it was often this capacity to imagine that historically pushed the limit of the historical stock of the possible, directing human energy to the creation of new technology, whether this was money, employed labour, airplanes or cities. It is within this framework that this thesis would argue that ‘events’ are coming from the sphere of the historical possible/potential and ending up redefining this very sphere.\footnote{Here we borrow the concept of \textit{enactment} from Jacques Ranciere’s work on the definition of politics. See Ranciere, 1988, 2003.}

\footnote{The problematique of what is possible is central to Lefebvre’s philosophy. See for instance Lefebvre, 1991/1958: 228-252. Moreover this discussion on ‘the possible’ as an integral part of social reality is central to the currently ascending (philosophical) school of Critical Realism. For a well-elaborated application in the field of international relations see, Patomaki and Wight, 2000.}
Finally

Along these lines this thesis joins its forces and voice with the recently re-emerging interest in everyday life in social science research. Michael Gardiner (2000) in his book *Critiques of Everyday Life* proposes that there exists a counter-tradition within everyday life theorising. ‘This counter-tradition has sought not merely to describe lived experience, but to transform it by elevating our understanding of the everyday to the status of a critical knowledge’. This thesis aspires to rejoin this counter-tradition. I think it is important to rearticulate our understanding of everyday life and its centrality in world politics and economics. It is important to re-read the social science picture that portrays everyday life as a space of ‘radical passivity’. For, if the analysis proposed here has any value, then everyday life is not a place of radical passivity, but a space of passive radicality⁸; the strategic field of life’s production and change. Thus more work needs to be done in order to reclaim everyday life from the sphere of banality, irrelevance and indifference and reconnect it to human life and reason (no matter what the latter is perceived to be).

As a Way of Closing: Reflections on the Methodology

The above thoughts indicate issues and avenues for further research which have emanated from the thesis. Along with these issues, the facets-of-the-hegemonic hypothesis also needs to be tested further. More public discourses need to be studied, and more regions of the world need to be included (e.g. Japan, China, Egypt, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Russia, India, Algeria, Congo, South Africa, Brazil), if more acute conclusions and qualified understandings of the hegemonic, and its interplay with the public, are to be reached. Such a regional and cultural opening of the methodology and the conclusions of the thesis could, for instance, produce findings that would transcend the political/apolitical facets of the hegemonic found in Greece and Ireland, within the European context.

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⁸ For an interesting elaboration on the concept of ‘passivity’, albeit not an easily accessible one, see Thomas Carl Wall, 1999.
Furthermore, such an extension of the research could also produce new insights on the interplay between international and comparative politics. In this regard one of the lessons drawn by the thesis is that the employment of the concept of the public seems too productive to be abandoned for a methodology which either would reduce the international to the public/domestic (in a crude comparative politics/economics manner), or would ignore the role of the latter in the production of the international (in a crude global politics/economics manner).

The relationship between theory and methodology is also important here. In particular, the decision of the thesis to invest in a theoretical framework that functioned as an acting research strategy, rather than as a passive ready-made theory, proved very useful, as it led from the outset to a clear and productive integration of the empirical material with the theoretical problematique of the thesis.

Finally, through the adopted methodology the thesis attempted to transcend the dichotomy between understanding and explaining in social sciences. It placed the emphasis on understanding the conditions of change in the international, in order to explain these conditions, in order to offer a standpoint, a way of influencing the direction of this change. We found no evidence to deny our belief that a way of explaining is a way of changing things on the basis of a certain understanding.
Appendices

Appendix A: List of Interviews

Interviews in Greece

Professor Nikiforos Diamandouros, National Ombudsman of Greece (April 22, 2002).

Mr Pandelis Kapsis, Editor-in-Chief of the newspaper TA NEA (April 29, 2002).

Mr Giorgos Kirtsos, Editor-in-Chief and Publisher of the newspaper Eleftheros Typos (April 27, 2002).

Professor Elias Nikolakopoulos, expert in Greek politics, and public opinion in Greece, University of Athens (April 25, 2002).

Mr Dimitris Politis, Deputy General Secretary of the Greek General Confederation of Labour (GSEE), and Vice President of the Economic and Social Council of Greece (OKE) (May 2, 2002).

Professor Savvas Robolis, Scientific Director of the Institute of Labour (INE) of the Greek General Confederation of Labour (GSEE) (April 29, 2002).

Mr Iason Stratos, former President of the Federation of Greek Industries (SEV) (April 30, 2002).

Interviews in Ireland

Mr Peter Cassells, Chairman of the National Centre for Partnership and Performance (NCPP) and former Secretary-General of the Irish Congress of Trade Unions (ICTU) (June 27, 2002).

Mr Garret FitzGerald, former Prime Minister of Ireland (June 24, 2002).

Mr Paul Gillespie, Foreign Editor of the newspaper The Irish Times (June 26, 2002).

Dr Niamh Hardiman, expert in Irish politics and Irish political economy, University College Dublin (June 14, 2002).

Professor Brigid Laffan, Director of the Dublin European Institute in the University College Dublin, and Advisor to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Irish Parliament (June 11, 2002).
Appendix B: The Models of Political Economy through Selected Political Economy Indicators

Note: The data and rankings of the following tables are used only indicative by the thesis. The purpose is just to offer a diagrammatical depiction of the classification of Greece and Ireland to the South-European and Anglo-Saxon models respectively. Therefore, UK and Ireland are always to the one end of the scale of indicators as opposed to Greece, Italy and Portugal for instance, which are to the other end.

Table I. Indicators of the Strictness of Employment Protection Legislation (EPL)¹: Selected European Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Selected EU countries</th>
<th>Overall Ranking²</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom (UK)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland (IE)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland (FI)</td>
<td>9.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Norway (NO)</td>
<td>11</td>
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<td>Sweden (SE)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy (IT)</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal (PT)</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: OECD, 1994: 71

¹Employment protection refers both to regulations concerning hiring (e.g. rules favouring disadvantaged groups, conditions for using temporary or fixed-term contracts, training requirements) and firing (e.g. redundancy procedures, mandated priornotification periods and severance payments, special requirements for collective dismissals and short-time work schemes); see OECD, 2004: 50.

²Counted against dismissals

Table II. Overall Strictness of Employment Protection Legislation in the EU¹: Shifts Between the Late 1980s & 1990s

Source: OECD, 2004: 61; ¹Average of indicators for regular and temporary contracts.
Table III. Situation of Full- and Part-Time Employment: Selected European Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Selected EU countries</th>
<th>Full-Time Jobs</th>
<th>Part-Time Jobs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom (UK)</td>
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<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland (IE)</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy (IT)</td>
<td>94</td>
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<td>Portugal (PT)</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece (GR)</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: OECD (1994: 71)

Table IV. Ranking of Selected EU Countries According to their ‘State Control Domain’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Domain</th>
<th>Sub-Domain</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>State Control</th>
<th>Public Ownership</th>
<th>Involvement in Business Operation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>United Kingdom (UK)</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>0.03</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Finland (FI)</td>
<td>1.51</td>
<td>3.28</td>
<td>1.90</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Norway (NO)</td>
<td>2.11</td>
<td>3.72</td>
<td>2.51</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sweden (SE)</td>
<td>2.68</td>
<td>2.25</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Greece (GR)</td>
<td>2.83</td>
<td>3.39</td>
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<td>2.36</td>
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<td>4.44</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Portugal (PT)</td>
<td>3.92</td>
<td>2.69</td>
<td>3.02</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Nicoletti et al. (1999: 23)

Table V. Overall Regulatory Approaches in Selected OECD Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Domain</th>
<th>Sub-Domain</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>State Control</th>
<th>Public Ownership</th>
<th>Involvement in Business Operation</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>Ireland (IE)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Portugal (PT)</td>
<td>3.92</td>
<td>2.69</td>
<td>3.02</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Nicoletti et al. (1999: 34)

1 The methodology for constructing the detailed indicators followed several steps. First, the raw information obtained from the questionnaire or other sources was transformed. The qualitative information was coded by assigning a numerical value to each of its possible modalities (e.g. ranging from a negative to an affirmative answer) while the quantitative information (such as data on ownership shares or notice periods for individual dismissals) was subdivided into classes. Second, the resulting coded information was normalised by ranking it on a common 0-6 scale, reflecting the increasing restrictiveness of the regulatory provisions. Third, in some cases, several of the normalized rankings corresponding to the various regulatory provisions were aggregated into a single measure.
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