

**THE IMPACT OF POLITICAL LEADERSHIP ON
BUREAUCRATIC INSTITUTIONS IN FRANCE:
THE CASE OF DATAR**

JUNE BURNHAM

LSE

**Submitted for examination
for the PhD degree of the University of London**

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ABSTRACT

The thesis questions the common assertion that only exceptional political leaders can implement their aims, such are the institutional constraints on their action. This assertion is examined in relation to DATAR, the regional development agency of France, where the self-confident and compartmentalised bureaucracy would be expected to provide leaders with a difficult challenge.

The analytical framework is derived from Blondel's *Political Leadership*, one of the few texts to assume that a full spectrum of leadership potential exists. The thesis starts by showing that political leaders could shape bureaucratic organisations to their own needs. Ministers interested in regional policy adapted its structures from a weak ministerial division to a model inter-ministerial agency, DATAR, whose reputational power was substantially affected by the political leadership's support for the policy. Political leaders were able to recruit DATAR's top staff on the basis of the criteria they chose; and to make DATAR's size, budget and work activities respond to their own policy aims. Through DATAR they could create, modify and direct interministerial committees and budgets to fit their particular objectives.

The thesis then assesses the leadership's impact on policy instruments in two contrasted domains to judge how much leaders are helped or hindered by bureaucratic and other institutions, including DATAR. Whether on roads policy or on regionalisation, the political leadership mostly achieved incremental change, either because that was what it sought, or because its ambitions were curtailed by internal conflict and local politicians as much as by bureaucratic opposition. Sometimes leaders failed to make headway, and occasionally they asserted their political will in a dramatic fashion. Overall, the variety and strength of outcomes demonstrate that political leaders have a capacity to make an impact on bureaucratic organisations and to re-orient bureaucratic activities towards their particular political goals that is far greater than even Blondel anticipated.

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AdT	<i>Aménagement du territoire</i>
CGP	<i>Commissariat général au Plan</i>
CIADT	<i>Comité interministériel d'aménagement et de développement du territoire</i>
CIAT	<i>Comité interministériel d'aménagement du territoire</i>
CID	<i>Conférence interdépartementale</i>
CNADT	<i>Conseil national d'aménagement et de développement du territoire</i>
CNAT	<i>Conseil national d'aménagement du territoire</i>
CNER	<i>Conseil national des économies régionales</i>
CODER	<i>Commission de développement économique régional</i>
CR	<i>Conseil régional</i>
CRIDEL	<i>Centre de rencontres et d'initiatives pour le développement local</i>
DAFU	<i>Direction de l'aménagement foncier et de l'urbanisme</i>
DAT	<i>Direction de l'aménagement du territoire</i>
DATAR	<i>Délégation à l'aménagement du territoire et à l'action régionale</i>
DGEN	<i>Délégation général à l'équipement national</i>
ENA	<i>Ecole nationale d'administration</i>
EPR	<i>Etablissement public régional</i>
FAD	<i>Fonds d'aide à la décentralisation</i>
FDES	<i>Fonds de développement économique et social</i>
FGER	<i>Fonds de gestion de l'espace rural</i>
FIAM	<i>Fonds interministériel pour l'auto-développement en montagne</i>
FIAT	<i>Fonds d'intervention pour l'aménagement du territoire</i>
FIDAR	<i>Fonds interministériel de développement et d'aménagement rural</i>
FNADT	<i>Fonds national d'aménagement et de développement du territoire</i>
FNAT	<i>Fonds national d'aménagement du territoire</i>
FNDE	<i>Fonds national de développement des entreprises</i>
FRILE	<i>Fonds régionalisé d'aide aux initiatives locales</i>
FRR	<i>Fonds de rénovation rurale</i>
GIRZOM	<i>Groupe interministériel pour la restructuration des zones minières</i>
IEP	<i>Institut d'études politiques (Paris)</i>
IGAME	<i>Inspecteur- général de l'administration en mission extraordinaire</i>
IGEN	<i>Inspecteur- général de l'économie nationale</i>
LOADT	<i>Loi d'orientation pour l'aménagement et le développement du territoire</i>
OREAM	<i>Organisation d'études d'aménagement des aires métropolitaines</i>
PAR	<i>Programme d'action régional</i>
PAT	<i>Prime à l'aménagement du territoire</i>
SEM	<i>Société d'économie mixte</i>
SGAR	<i>Secrétaire- général aux affaires régionales</i>

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CHAPTER 1

POLITICAL LEADERS AND BUREAUCRATIC INSTITUTIONS

INTRODUCTION

Neustadt's work on American presidents showed over forty years ago that their 'influence on governmental action' varied with the incumbent.¹ Though the legal 'powers' of an American president are derived from constitutional provisions that are similar for all, each president 'confronts a personal problem: how to make those powers work for him'.² Because Neustadt's interest was 'in what a President can do to make his own will felt within his own Administration',³ he observed the ways that different presidents treated a given set of institutions, and found that they varied. It was perhaps not surprising that outcomes would vary when Franklin D. Roosevelt, Harry S. Truman and Dwight Eisenhower used powers that relied on personal attributes, such as 'the power to persuade'. Yet Neustadt demonstrated that there were also differences between outcomes even when presidents acted through the more impersonal 'power to command' the bureaucracies. Nevertheless, *Presidential Power* stresses the common institutional constraints all presidents faced: 'Presidential weakness was the underlying theme of *Presidential Power*'.⁴

In 1960 it was innovative and important, in theory and in practice, to draw attention to the gap between the formal and the real institutional resources available to a political leader. Though Truman had observed that "'powers" are no guarantee of power. Presidential *power* is the power to persuade', Eisenhower found in 'shocked surprise' that orders would not carry themselves out.⁵ For a president, 'the same conditions that promote his leadership in form preclude a guarantee of leadership in fact': officials had departmental duties and their own constituencies and they might see their duty as following him or they might not.⁶ Neustadt's work balanced the arguments for the unexpected 'presidential weakness' with practical observations of the variations between presidents. Formal powers were only one aspect of the power to persuade and they depended on how far the incumbent was 'able and willing to use them'.⁷ Studying Roosevelt, Truman and Eisenhower, Neustadt had found that personal influence on government action was 'a chancy thing',

¹ Neustadt, R. (1960) *Presidential Power: the Politics of Leadership* (New York: Wiley). 'Influence on governmental action' was Neustadt's definition of power (1960), p.1.

² *ibid.* p.vii.

³ *ibid.* p.i.

⁴ Neustadt, R. (1976) *Presidential Power: the Politics of Leadership*, 2nd edition (New York: Wiley), p.i;

Neustadt, R. (1990) *Presidential Power and the Modern President* (New York: Free Press), p.ix.

⁵ Neustadt (1960), pp.8-9, p.163.

⁶ *ibid.* p.7.

⁷ Neustadt (1976), p.4.

while Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon were regarded by most Americans as having 'altogether too much influence on far too many acts of government'.⁸ Neustadt's view in 1976 was that 'the power of a President today derives from roughly the same sources as a generation ago, is comparably limited, similarly frustrated, more changeable than ever, yet as central to our system as before, a far cry from congressional government'.⁹

AN UNDER-EVALUATED POLITICAL LEADERSHIP

Political scientists studying the workings of government have in recent decades tended to pay more attention to the constraints of institutions on political actors than to the effect of political behaviour on institutions as defined in Hall's study of economic policy:

'Institutions' mean 'the formal rules, compliance procedures, and standard operating practices that structure the relationship between individuals in various units of the polity and economy'.¹⁰

British public administration has traditionally been conducted within a more formal institutional framework that gave little consideration to behavioural factors, especially those relating to individual leaders. In the years following Neustadt's original research the 'Great Men' genre fell from favour. In the era of student rebellions, feminism, and neo-Marxist histories of the working class, studies of leaders seemed out of place.¹¹ Blondel argues that national political leadership, because it is a manifestation of power, is often treated as 'a Leviathan, a frightening beast, which it is perhaps more urgent to tame than to dissect'.¹² Leadership, notably as a psychological phenomenon inducing 'followership', is said to be linked to times when there was a culture of deference and respect; it is even 'pre-democratic'.¹³ As Foley remarks:

The role of political leadership has often been dismissed as something of an aberration in British political life. Except for the most extreme conditions of wartime, leadership has been seen as unnecessary, unseemly, and largely non-existent'.¹⁴

This view was also taken in 'Europe and Latin America', where liberal thinkers tended to fear leadership, and political elites saw leadership as essentially bad, given the excesses of past rulers.¹⁵ In Britain there has been the same reluctance to talk of leadership, partly because of its associations with Fascism and the cult of personality,¹⁶ but especially because the normative institution of Cabinet government meant the concept of prime-ministerial

⁸ *ibid.* p.i.

⁹ *ibid.* p.2.

¹⁰ Hall, P. A. (1986) Governing the Economy: The Politics of State Intervention in Britain and France (Oxford: OUP), p.19.

¹¹ When this thesis was presented to a 'Work in Progress' research seminar of the Social Policy Academic Group, Middlesex University, 21 May 2003, the first question, from Lesley Jordan, was: 'Have we really gone back to the great men theory again?'. We agreed that the impact of individual leaders could have the status of a 'residual'.

¹² Blondel, J. (1987) Political Leadership: Towards a General Analysis (Sage), p.3.

¹³ Heywood, A. (2000) Key Concepts in Politics (Macmillan, p.136)

¹⁴ Foley, M. (1993) The Rise of the British Presidency (Manchester, MUP), p.151.

¹⁵ Blondel, J. (1995) Comparative Government 2nd edn (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf), p.301.

¹⁶ Gaffney, J. (1991) The Language of Political Leadership in Contemporary Britain (Macmillan), p.11.

leadership was rejected. Many authorities on the British premiership have been unwilling to entertain the notion of personal leadership, or accept that the leadership actions and their impact might vary significantly depending on the person in the post. The individual contributions of the leading post-holders are seen to matter only in the most exceptional circumstances, which are then defined as such.¹⁷ Within this framework the actions of the British prime minister are conceived as being strongly determined by institutional constraints. Foley calls in evidence Rose's 1980 study:

'Personal style influences how a Prime Minister carries out the demands of office, but it does not determine what is done. The first priority of a Prime Minister is to do what is expected of him or her. How a Prime Minister meets these role expectations reflects not only his or her basic personality, whatever that may be, but even more what the incumbent has learned in a quarter century of socialisation in Westminster and Whitehall'.¹⁸

As Rose says, it is not enough to look at 'personality stories'; an attempt should be made to measure and assess the 'impersonal record'. His own research showed that:

'even a prime minister as radical in rhetoric and as long in office as Margaret Thatcher left in place two-thirds of Acts of Parliament inherited from predecessors, and more than seven-eighths of spending commitments'.¹⁹

The 'new institutionalism' expounded by March and Olsen in 1984 gave a stronger theoretical base to this view of the relation between leaders and institutions.²⁰ They contended that institutions should form a greater part of the explanation of political phenomena than behavioural approaches accorded them. 'The state is not only affected by society but also affects it'.²¹ Institutions shape perceptions, and therefore behaviour, by embodying norms of what should be done, and by providing rules to structure and guide behaviour. By arguing that institutions and their relationships strongly shape and constrain political actions, institutionalists infer that institutions are not easily susceptible to modification by leaders and other political actors. Their analysis readily explains the persistence and incrementalism seen in bureaucratic institutions and policy-making. However, in trying to persuade behaviouralists (especially in the United States) to bring institutions back in, March and Olsen also renovated a traditional institutionalism (especially in Europe) that already placed more stress on institutions than on leaders. Journalists can write articles on the influence of leading politicians over events, and political biographers of leaders must aim their searchlight on the individual's contribution to events. However, academic analyses of the relationship between leaders and institutions, in seeking generalisations and typologies, more often smooth out or relativise the distinctive but smaller

¹⁷ Foley (1993), pp.1-2, p.19, pp.150-1.

¹⁸ Rose, R. (1980) 'British Government : The Job at the Top', in R.Rose and E.Suleiman (eds) Presidents and Prime Ministers (Washington: AEI), pp. 1-49, p.44, quoted by Foley (1993), p.151.

¹⁹ Rose, R. (2000) 'When and Why does a Prime Minister Change?', in Rhodes, R. Transforming British Government: 2. Changing Roles and Relationships (Basingstoke: Palgrave), 47-62, p.60.

²⁰ March, J.G. and Olsen, J.P. (1984) 'The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life', American Political Science Review, 78, 734-49, p.735.

²¹ March and Olsen (1984), p.738.

contributions of individuals.²² When Rose analysed in a comparative context the role of prime ministers in Western Europe, he summed up his conclusions thus:

'Differences between national political institutions create more variation in the office of prime minister than do differences of personalities and circumstances within a country'.²³

Elgie's *Political Leadership in Liberal Democracies* too stressed the common constraints and opportunities that applied to the leaders of each nation and that in the end seem more significant than the variations between individual leaders.²⁴ Some individuals, having won the status of national leader (such as many German chancellors), secured 'a certain autonomy' from their parties, and found themselves in 'a dominant and advantageous position'; and others (for example, Konrad Adenauer and Helmut Kohl), were able to profit from 'exceptional circumstances' to overcome the normal institutional conventions that dispersed power; while yet others, as a result of their personal ambitions or styles (including Roosevelt, Adenauer, Charles de Gaulle and Margaret Thatcher), could 'act as catalysts of change'. However, taking into account the features of the national institutional and social environments that are likely to affect a leader's freedom to act, Elgie concludes that 'what these leaders can and cannot do is primarily determined by the institutional structures of their countries'.²⁵

Cole however, while too taking a balanced approach, thought the role of the leader should play a larger part in the explanation of events, even if institutional constraints meant that political leaderships in liberal democratic states have limited margins for manoeuvre.²⁶ He argued that:

'political science has traditionally reasoned in terms of the scientific study of political systems, where there is little place for assessment of the individual leader, but it will be contended ... that the analysis of politics is incomplete without a correct identification and assessment of the contribution of individual political leaders'.²⁷

Cole used the elements of Blondel's analytical strategy (described below) as a systematising 'checklist' to sum up his comprehensive analysis of Mitterrand's political leadership. Putting together the effect of personal characteristics with institutional factors and changing environmental constraints and opportunities, he found that:

'the institution of the presidency is more important than the personality of the incumbent in understanding the French political system, although each individual President has left his own unmistakable mark on the institution'.²⁸

²² P. Dunleavy and G. W. Jones with J. Burnham, P. Fysh and R. Elgie (1993), 'Leaders, Politics and Institutional Change: The Decline of Prime Ministerial Accountability to the House of Commons, 1868 - 1990', *British Journal of Political Science*, 23, pp. 267-98.

²³ Rose, R. (1991) 'Prime Ministers in Parliamentary Democracies', *West European Politics*, 14/2, 9-24, p. 9. Many thanks to Richard Rose for sending me a copy.

²⁴ Elgie, R. (1995) *Political Leadership in Liberal Democracies* (Macmillan), 'Preface', pp. xi-xii, and see comments on de Gaulle and Mitterrand in France, and 'the greatest chief executives' in the USA.

²⁵ *ibid.* p. 88, p. 105, p. 208, p. 210.

²⁶ Cole, A. (1994) *François Mitterrand: A Study in Political Leadership* (Routledge), p. 194.

²⁷ *ibid.* p. 164.

²⁸ *ibid.* p. 175.

But he goes on:

'The study of political leadership, in France and elsewhere, must be appreciated in terms of the interaction between leadership resources (personal and positional) on the one hand, and the constraints imposed and opportunities offered by particular socio-economic and political systems and sets of historical circumstances on the other. The examination of political leaders within their environment is clearly preferable either to the denial of leadership by reference to environmental determinism, or the Great Man approach, which isolates leaders from their political context'.²⁹

Edinger also sets out this two-way appreciation of the relationship between the leader and the context, in his introduction to Sheffer's volume on innovative leadership in international politics.³⁰

'From one point of view, political developments may only in the last analysis be attributable to the leadership of a particular individual. It is at most a so-called residual variable—the last, if not the least important remaining factor that could conceivably account for events that cannot be entirely explained by other variables in an analytic framework for a sequence of causal factors.

A contrasting point of view makes individual leadership a primary postdictive or predictive causal factor, the former in retrospective historical studies and the latter in prescriptive political forecasting. One way or another, this sort of analysis starts with the premise that one person's leadership has a great deal to do with the course of past or future political developments'.³¹

Edinger and his co-authors were mostly sceptical about the capacity for autonomous leadership. Even if leaders might sometimes 'at least be the proximate cause', it was 'extremely rare' to find them introduce new patterns of relationships, since it required the leader not only to have power to introduce such change but the legitimacy to maintain it.³² Sheffer's conclusion was no more sanguine about the chance of most leaders making an impact:

'Quintessentially, only leaders who are handsomely endowed with immense inspiration and stamina and who can overcome powerful forces of inertia will be able to effect innovation in the international sphere and be remembered in the annals of politics'.³³

The balance between, on the one hand, the levelling effect on a leader's efforts of the enduring institutional environment and, on the other, the extent to which the leader can make this environment adapt to his or her own requirements, is more usually summed up in favour of the institutions. It is nevertheless a matter of academic judgement that is to a large extent guided by the theoretical assumptions and methodological approach. As Loughlin explains, 'scientific theories' accentuate by drawing our attention to the interesting aspects of the system they purport to explain.³⁴ Institutional analysis was an advantageous theoretical perspective for interpreting informal institutions such as intergovernmental relations. 'In

²⁹ *ibid.* p. 175.

³⁰ Sheffer, G. (ed.) (1993) Innovative Leadership in International Politics (Albany: State University of New York Press).

³¹ Edinger, L. J. 'A Preface to Studies in Political Leadership', in Sheffer (ed.) (1993), 3-20, p. 15.

³² Edinger (1993), p. 15.

³³ Sheffer, G. (1993) 'A Final Overview', in Sheffer (ed.) (1993), 245-7.

³⁴ Loughlin, M. (1996) 'Understanding Central-Local Relations', Public Policy and Administration 11/2, 48-65, p. 52.

seeking to identify the significance of these institutions, we cannot ignore the issue of what the institutions mean to those whose institutions they are...'.³⁵ In contrast, because Neustadt rejected the idea of investigating relationships between the president and the institutions from the institutionalist perspective (the president's role as chief legislator, chief administrator, chief of party...), and looked at them from the president's viewpoint ('from inside looking out'),³⁶ he revealed the differences between presidents in their impact on other stakeholders, even while demonstrating their relative powerlessness in comparison with the popular image of a president.

Within the institutionalist approach it is common to assert that political leaders in executive posts - presidents, prime ministers and ministers - have little chance of putting their own imprint on the bureaucratic institutions nominally under their direction, such are the constraints to change. While the possibility that exceptional leaders can in exceptional circumstances impose their will is widely accepted, most analysts see little scope for conventional political leaders in 'normal times' to make more than a marginal impact. In times of 'normal politics', political leaders are confined to roles that are strongly conditioned by institutional structures, referential frameworks or other rules of the game. Thus political leaders tend to be given an asymmetrical dichotomous character: a 'few charismatic leaders' on the one hand and 'a mass of grey and indistinct office-holders' on the other.³⁷ There is little academic interest in differentiating between one leader's impact on bureaucratic institutions and that of another, because the individual contribution of leaders to the outcomes is assumed to be insignificant in contrast with the much larger forces applied by the institutions. Leadership action becomes one of the 'residuals', left over when most of the observed variation is accounted for by more statistically-significant or theoretically-interesting factors. The real difficulty is therefore not so much about the large part played by some leaders but about the smaller impact of the great majority of leaders'.³⁸

The main question addressed by the thesis is the validity of these assertions. Do the vast majority of political leaders have so little influence over bureaucratic institutions that they are unable to impose their own recognisably-distinct orientation on them? Are they so weak compared with the bureaucratic organisations that develop and implement policy programmes that the impact of one leader on these programmes can scarcely be differentiated from that of another? Blondel is among the few social scientists to insist that the full range of leadership impact exists between charismatic leadership at one end and 'managers' at the other; and to propose a framework in which this impact can be assessed against the background of their environment. It is to that methodology we now turn.

³⁵ *ibid.* p.55.

³⁶ Neustadt (1960), p.vii.

³⁷ Blondel (1995), p.303.

³⁸ *ibid.* p.300.

ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF POLITICAL LEADERS

A far-reaching programme for assessing and comparing the impact of different political leaders was set out by Blondel in *Political Leadership: Towards a General Analysis*. The object was to 'indicate the ways in which enquiries into the impact of leaders - and therefore of government - can be conducted...'.³⁹ Blondel's strategy for measuring the capacity of political leaders to implement their individual policy aims, given the particular resources and the particular constraints they face, is mainly a hypothetico-deductive one, though each step in his argument is backed up with illustrative examples. The research would enable political leaders to be categorised on the basis of their potential impact on the polity in terms of the scope of the goals they determine and the extent of the constraints they face. Blondel provides a general framework for a comparative appraisal of leaders but does not embark upon a systematic empirical study of any particular leader or leaders. Indeed the comprehensive research programme he outlines, for a world-wide comparison of political leaders, is beyond the reach of any individual researcher. However, the conceptual scheme he develops can be used as a systematic guide to a more-focused study.

Blondel's research strategy

Blondel defines 'national political leadership' as the 'power exercised by one or a few individuals to direct the actions of the members of the nation'.⁴⁰ He reasons that if leaders are able to affect their environment, it is a result of their power, which will in part be personal in origin and in part derive from the instruments made available to them by the institutional structures. The personal characteristics include elements of personality, such as energy and intellect, and sociological attributes, such as social status and experience. Institutional instruments, such as the bureaucracy, parties and parliaments, link the leaders to government and nation. The personal and institutional sources of power are analytically distinct, and Blondel analyses them in separate strands, while acknowledging that it is difficult to separate the person from the position, and the instruments may be both a source and consequence of power.⁴¹

Blondel would prefer on logical grounds to judge the impact of leaders on society by the responses of citizens to the exercise of leadership; and he discusses how leaders may be evaluated according to the bond that ties them to the population. In this strand of his analytical framework, derived from Weber, the impact of the leader depends mainly on the personal sources of power and societal conditions. Leaders would be categorised along two dimensions: the extent to which leadership is personalised (the presence or absence of charisma or something between) and the type of relationship between the leader and society (from the loyalty of traditional communities to the legalistic contracts of associational

³⁹ Blondel (1987), p.viii.

⁴⁰ *ibid.* p.3.

⁴¹ *ibid.* p.5.

societies).⁴² A study of the social impact of leaders, while important to Blondel's world-wide and historical study, is less relevant to modern liberal-democracies (their leaders would be placed in a cluster at one end of the typology). In any case, Blondel develops more fully the other strand of his analytical framework, which assesses leaders by the political goals they seek to achieve using power deriving mainly from the positional aspects of leadership.

In Blondel's earlier work on *World Leaders* the theoretical and methodological difficulties of measuring leadership had led him to deal 'with chief executives rather than with political leaders in the broadest sense'. He operationalised leadership there by adopting a 'positional standpoint', noting that someone is likely to be a leader if it is believed by others that he or she has the right to be a leader.⁴³ Analysing in *Political Leadership* the personal component of leadership impact, he finds that socio-demographic, biographic and psychological studies have provided plausible accounts of individual leaders but not yet produced general criteria for assessing 'the precise extent to which personal characteristics affect the achievements of leaders'.⁴⁴ As in the earlier work, Blondel therefore puts more emphasis in *Political Leadership* on the positional than the behavioural aspect of leadership, partly because it is more productive methodologically, but also because it can be justified logically: the position provides the institutional instruments that sustain leaders' actions while at the same structuring the environment of their political behaviour. The scope of leaders' activities depends on their personal ambitions but is conditioned by their institutional and non-institutional environment. On the one hand the definition of which matters are in a leader's province, or are 'felt' to be so, will be determined by the institutional environment: that is, by constitutional and legal arrangements, and customs and conventions inherited from previous leaders, or acknowledged *de facto* by the bureaucracy and citizens as being part of the leader's role. On the other hand, the non-institutional environment (the economic problems or social demands they face, internal or external crises and other contingent events), may constrain or give greater opportunities, and here the leaders' own perspective and capacity to respond will come into play.

Thus, while a classification of leadership should essentially be based on the categorization of these leaders' actions, a second and necessary step has to be the examination of the ways in which the environment modifies the dynamics of the actions of leaders and indeed sets the boundaries between what is possible and what is precluded'.⁴⁵

The two principal conceptual components of Blondel's proposed assessment are therefore the leaders' actions and the countervailing influence of the institutional and non-institutional environment. First, how is the impact of leaders' activities to be assessed? Blondel dismisses the possibility of operationalising the concept through leaders' concrete actions (lengthy to list, hard to rank, and often implemented by others) or their 'intentions'

⁴² *ibid.* pp.51-7.

⁴³ Blondel, J. (1980) *World Leaders* (Sage), p.9, p.12, p.14.

⁴⁴ Blondel (1987), p.128.

⁴⁵ *ibid.* p.30.

(often vague, merely excuses or rationalisations). Although it would 'unquestionably be valuable, for the preparation of a detailed analysis of the orientations of a particular leader or a set of political leaders, to examine the goals that are pursued in each field and sub-field',⁴⁶ Blondel suggests that, for a first pass at least, it would be more practicable to develop a broad-brush typology of leaders. He chooses to classify them by their goals, the 'set of intentions which leaders effectively attempt to put into practice'.⁴⁷ The 'general orientation towards action' of political leaders would be categorised along two dimensions: 'the *extent* to which they are concerned with maintenance or change (small or large changes to a policy) ... and the *scope* ... of intervention' (from changing policy to changing the system).⁴⁸ Thus Blondel's scheme does not evaluate the concrete results from the leaders' actions, but classifies leaders by their 'potential leadership impact'.⁴⁹

The second component of assessment is the policy-making environment, which takes institutional and non-institutional forms. The fundamental institution for a leader is his or her position or title as office-holder, from which a number of other institutional resources flow.

'Because they hold a position of national leadership, for instance, rulers will usually be able to appoint members of the government; they will also be able to "instruct" the bureaucracy to act in a certain way; finally, they will often have power within the dominant party and thereby will be able to try to mobilize the population towards their policies'.⁵⁰

The effect of holding the leadership position will vary between countries and over time: a prime minister or president may or may not be able to appoint at will the minister in charge of bureaucrats implementing a favoured policy; and the bureaucracy may be more or less efficient.

The measurement of the potential effect of these institutional arrangements in helping or hindering leaders has obviously to remain rather crude... it is not possible to state exactly how much a ruler gains by being able to appoint and dismiss ministers at will or by having a strong bureaucracy'.⁵¹

Blondel debates whether leaders are more helped or hindered by constitutions and other products of 'institutional engineering', such as bureaucratic organisations. He concludes they are more likely to constrain leaders' power than add to it, since the formal structures are often set up specifically to limit the discretionary power of leaders.⁵² The impact made by the leadership depends especially strongly on the public bureaucracies, and Blondel devotes several pages to the subject:⁵³

'If governments are the arms of leaders in their effort to make an impact on society, bureaucracies are the tools, the instruments *par excellence*, which leaders have to use and on which they have to

⁴⁶ *ibid.* p.82.

⁴⁷ *ibid.* pp.81-2.

⁴⁸ *ibid.* p.94.

⁴⁹ *ibid.* p.97.

⁵⁰ *ibid.* p.148.

⁵¹ *ibid.* p.149.

⁵² *ibid.* p.151.

⁵³ *ibid.* pp.167-73.

rely ... This help... has to be considered realistically, that is to say, on the understanding that there is necessarily some gap between politicians and administrators, that administrators cannot be expected merely to implement, and that variations in energy and drive on the part of administrators will have to exist.⁵⁴

Yet the system leaders encounter as they take office is often poorly designed:

'The "lines" linking leaders to the bureaucracy and the populations are full of faults and "short-circuits". Thus, from the point of view of leaders, the "system" is often inefficient, badly-structured and badly-organized. This is not only because of deliberate opposition, but often, perhaps mostly - because the system is simply unresponsive or only partly responsive'.⁵⁵

Blondel suggests that four characteristics of a public bureaucracy condition the impact of leaders:

- the design of the administrative organisation;
- the links between the bureaucracy and the leader;
- the competence of officials; and
- the links between the bureaucracy and the population.⁵⁶

Having considered the relationships between political leaders and bureaucracies in various types of polity, Blondel concludes that leaders will want to increase the effectiveness of the bureaucracy, but he is not optimistic about their chances.

'Leaders of all countries are thus faced with structural problems with respect to bureaucracies...Of course, leaders - and in particular leaders who wish to achieve goals that are appreciably more "activist" than those of their predecessors - often wish to do more; to an extent at least, they can try and bend the "muscles" of the bureaucracy; but their expectations will remain largely unfulfilled'.⁵⁷

New leaders, he argues, can attempt to improve the operation of the bureaucracy by using their personal powers (their prestige, their following in the nation and in the bureaucracy itself), and contingent environmental circumstances (such as a post-appointment 'state of grace'), to obtain greater loyalty, zeal or responsiveness to their goals.

'The more effective transformations are those that are concerned with, besides changes in the recruitment and training of the personnel, a systematic examination of the ways in which the linkage with the government, the organization of the service and the linkage with the population can be improved'.⁵⁸

Blondel warns that reforms intended to improve one of the four important characteristics of a bureaucracy, listed above, may worsen one of the other characteristics (recruitment methods that favour loyalty may lead to a decline in competence, for example), so that leaders will need to consider the trade-offs; improvements are in any case likely to be slow, difficult and expensive. 'Bureaucracies are an important element in the process by which leaders can see their goals realized; but the constraints and hurdles are numerous and cannot be overcome easily, let alone rapidly'.⁵⁹

⁵⁴ *ibid.* p.167-8.

⁵⁵ *ibid.* p.150.

⁵⁶ *ibid.* p.168.

⁵⁷ *ibid.* p.170.

⁵⁸ *ibid.* p.172.

⁵⁹ *ibid.* p.172.

Blondel rejects some common assumptions: the hurdles are not erected by bureaucracies deliberately resisting the implementation of leadership goals - bureaucrats are not in any case sufficiently homogeneous to promote a single oppositional interest; and ineffectiveness is not inherent to bureaucracy but more likely to be the consequence of unsatisfactory conditions. Blondel emphasises the crucial role of the bureaucracy in implementation and the difficulty for leaders of ensuring that it is played as they would like it to be played.

'Leaders have to accept that the bureaucratic tools at their disposal cannot enable them to achieve more than a certain amount over a specified period of time. The impact of leadership depends on the structure of the bureaucracy. Leaders are not powerless to move the machinery and the structures, but the extent of their power is, and to their detriment, often overestimated'.⁶⁰

Blondel is similarly pessimistic about the constraints on leaders posed by other parts of the institutional environment, including local government, political parties and interest groups. Their 'permanent' procedures and linkages structure relations between the leader and the population. Parties can help national leaders by reducing particularist loyalties, but may also oblige them to pay attention to regional and local leaders. Leaders might set up new 'personalised' parties to provide backing for their own aims, or try to modify the existing territorial organisational structure, but new institutions need time and the sharing of power with subordinates before they can reach into the community. They are of limited use to current leaders, who therefore need to rely on the bureaucracy nominally under their command. Blondel frequently reminds researchers both of the wide range of impacts that leaders can make on institutions (from maintenance to system change), and that institutions can facilitate as well as limit leadership action; but on the whole he seems to agree with the arguments of those who assert that institutions are the main determinants of a leader's actions, and that their role is a constraining and limiting one.

In contrast, when discussing non-institutional environmental structures, Blondel sees more opportunities for leaders than constraints. The wider environment (a country's economic base or social structure, or a short-term economic or political crisis), provides a more or less exogenous framework to leaders' actions that is not always restricting. Crises, or 'the honeymoon period' or 'state of grace' sometimes given to new political leaders can offer opportunities as well as constraints.⁶¹ Blondel analyses the interaction between political leaders and the non-institutional environment as a complex two-way behavioural process. In one direction, 'some leaders are better able than others to make use of the opportunities the environment gives them', perhaps using them to counteract other pressures (for example, the success of a foreign policy initiative can bring domestic rewards). In the other direction a particular societal environment may give support to a would-be progressive reformer; or may 'call out' for a 'saviour' or a 'comforter'.⁶²

⁶⁰ *ibid.* p.173.

⁶¹ *ibid.* pp.29-30.

⁶² *ibid.* pp.99-113.

Blondel's summary of his conceptual assessment of the impact of political leaders brings together this reciprocal influence of leaders and their environmental context with the normative goals of his enquiry:

'Whether because they are forced to choose or because they are able to choose, leaders seem *prima facie* to be able to make an impact on the complex network of the environment. Clearly, there is an interplay between the will of the leaders, their aims and ambitions, and the reality around them. It is by gradually analysing the conditions of this interplay that we shall be better able to assess the precise impact of leadership under various types of circumstances and discover the ways leaders can serve nations in the manner most profitable to their populations'.⁶³

The thesis strategy

The thesis uses Blondel's analytic framework as a departure point for a more focused exercise that tests the same hypothesis; that is, the impact that political leaders make on the institutional environment is too varied in strength and content, and too closely related to their own diverse goals, to be summed up as a dichotomous contrast between exceptional leaders and those so strongly constrained by institutional forces that their intervention has only the status of a residual. Figure 1.1 indicates the similarities and divergences between the thesis strategy and Blondel's conceptual scheme (the numbers in brackets below refer to the numbered items in that Figure). For the Blondel scheme it summarises his train of argument and the sequence of steps his empirical analysis would take. For the thesis strategy it outlines the equivalent elements in the same order, to show the parallels with the Blondel analysis - in the thesis itself, as discussed below, these elements are brought together in different combinations to explore the leadership's relationship with bureaucratic institutions. Overall, the thesis strategy seeks to adapt the universalist aims of the Blondel strategy to a more practicable exercise.

The thesis replaces the comparison of political leaders across different political systems with a longitudinal comparison of the impact of different leaders in one country (1). Though polities evolve over time (and indeed choosing a country for the case study that changes its political system in a distinctive manner adds empirical and theoretical interest), the task of comparing the impact of different leaderships against the environmental context is nevertheless facilitated.

Furthermore, the thesis concentrates on the institutional facet of the 'political leadership', examining the input of political leaders in their roles as 'political post-holders': presidents, prime ministers and ministers (2). There are two points here: the content of 'leadership', and nomenclature. The thesis leaves to one side consideration of what Blondel refers to as the 'bond between leader and society'. Blondel assesses the leadership's impact on institutions separately from his assessment of the leadership's bond with society (2a); they are 'stand-alone' exercises. Some writers do not consider post-holders who do not exhibit the psychological trait of 'leadership' to be 'leaders' and would reject the use of that word for mere 'post-holders': Rose distinguishes between prime ministers who are leaders

⁶³ *ibid.* pp.113-14.

and others who are jugglers, bargainers or symbols.⁶⁴ But 'leadership' is the most useful generic term, particularly when the subject is, as here, a collection of top post-holders (a president with his or her prime minister and ministers), whose activities are discussed in interaction with each other. 'The political leadership' expresses well enough the group of leading politicians examined here. The further problem of distinguishing 'political' leaders is also eased by focusing on holders of key ministerial posts: the distinction between political and non-political governmental figures is not as clear in all countries as in the British traditional dichotomy of permanent, neutral, selected bureaucrats and temporary, political, elected ministers. The personal characteristics of leaders are examined to some extent, first because the relationship of a leader's level of interest in a specific policy domain to the outcome is part of the inquiry, and second, in the analysis of leaders' reactions to environmental opportunities. However, an examination of whether particular character traits help leaders make an impact on bureaucratic institutions is beyond the scope of this thesis.

By confining the empirical field of research to a single policy domain, the thesis can evaluate actual leadership actions (3). Blondel wanted in principle to include the whole of a leader's actions (3b), but had to settle for assessing the extent and scope of the leader's firm intentions. The thesis strategy is to choose a domain that implicates a number of bureaucratic and other institutions, and within that domain, to consider the leadership's actions with respect to creating, changing or maintaining bureaucratic organisations and bureaucratic instruments. The interplay between leadership resources and the institutional and non-institutional environment can be examined more easily with respect to one domain. While focusing on one policy limits the generalisations that can be made from the research findings, the Sheffer volume on leadership in international politics proved that such a restriction need not preclude a worthwhile research output. As a result of narrowing down the research in this way, the thesis can produce comparative evaluations based on detailed empirical research, assessing the actual outcome of the leader's actions in qualitative and quantitative terms, whereas Blondel had to use a broader-brush approach to inform a typology of 'potential leadership impact' (4).

The remaining elements of the thesis strategy are modelled on the Blondel methodology but reduce it to topics most relevant to the leader-bureaucracy relationship. Few elements covered by Blondel's analysis are entirely omitted as a result of this choice. The bureaucracy is always implicated, whether as one of the leadership's positional resources, or as part of the environment structuring the leadership's action. Moreover, a focus on the relationship between leadership and bureaucrats does not neglect other institutions, whether formal or conventional, material or procedural, since all these are involved in leader-bureaucracy transactions. The leadership's use of positional resources (5) is addressed when considering the constitutional-legal powers and powers of appointment

⁶⁴ Rose (1991), p.19.

(which enable top leaders to modify bureaucratic organisations and appoint competent and loyal officials), or examining the party system configuration and conventions on 'who does what' (which between them help decide 'the pecking order' within the leadership on decisions), or the duration of a leader in post (which affects control of implementation). The analysis of the influence of the institutional environment (6) must deal chiefly with the interplay between leaders and bureaucratic institutions but it will also be important to understand how it is often mediated by parliament and local government. Finally, the influence of the non-institutional environment (7) is treated under the same headings found in Blondel: the general state of the economy, the economic and political crises and the 'state of grace' or 'honeymoon period' that may provide opportunities as well as constraints for leaders, depending on the leader's responses to these events.

Despite the close parallels between the two schemes in Figure 1.1, the thesis is deliberately focused on political leaders' impact on bureaucratic institutions; it does not claim to assess the entirety of the relationship between the political leadership and the institutional environment. The research goal (8) is a comparative assessment of the capacity of political leaders to make an impact on bureaucratic institutions, in relation to their aims in one particular country and one policy arena and in the context of the wider institutional and non-institutional environment.

Choice of case-study

France is a particularly relevant polity in which to examine the interaction between the political leadership and bureaucratic institutions because both parties in that relationship are theoretically interesting. The characteristics of the French civil service are such that political leaders face a particularly difficult challenge. It is an hierarchically and rationally-organised, technically-competent institution led by a elite group recruited on formally meritocratic and competitive grounds. It is self-regarding and highly-autonomous, having been constructed before the development of popular democracy and trained to believe it incarnates the public interest as well if not better than do elected politicians. It is highly-regarded and defended by the population as a whole and by other institutions such as local government and the Senate. It exhibits strongly the characteristics Weber both recommended as the ideal rational model and feared would take control in the absence of strong leadership.

'Long before she had democratic institutions, France possessed an exceptionally capable, self-confident, powerful and centralised bureaucracy'.⁶⁵

The chief weakness of this strong bureaucracy - that is, the fragmentation caused by the vertical 'silos' of ministries and the multiplicity of *corps* - only adds to the problems faced by the political executive. In the 1960s Crozier emphasised the French administration's 'bureaucratic rigidity', that reduced its effectiveness and made reforms hard for leaders to

⁶⁵ Williams, P. (1972) Crisis and Compromise, 3rd edn (Longman), p.336.

achieve.⁶⁶ Those at the top had power in name only, because of divisions between hierarchical and vertical strata, deepened by poor interpersonal communication.⁶⁷ It is hard to orient French bureaucratic institutions towards common goals, despite a number of horizontal linking mechanisms, including the top interministerial *corps* and specialised interministerial organisations. Top officials 'were paralysed when it came to reforms that might change some equilibrium'.⁶⁸ Crozier related the culture of French administrative institutions to that of their social environment. 'Such a model of human relationships and such a style of action could only have developed because they corresponded to deep cultural traits in French society'. Only heroic leadership or social crises could change the bureaucracy. But that 'tended to make the reformer an authoritarian, charismatic person, acting intuitively rather than rationally', and produced a counter-reaction.⁶⁹ 'To obtain a limited reform in France, one is always obliged to attack the whole "system"'.⁷⁰

There is no single assessment about the character of French administration: Wright's 'on the one hand... but on the other' chapter sums up admirably 'The foundations and myth of administrative power' in France.⁷¹ France's apparently strong and autonomous bureaucracy is divided by *corps* and conflicts, as expressed in Thoenig and Dupuy's book *L'administration en miettes*,⁷² and personally by senior officials.⁷³ It was likely to provide more of an obstacle than a valuable resource for leaders, and for that very reason a critical test case of the thesis that leaders can make an impact on bureaucratic institutions.

On the other side of the political leader- bureaucrat relationship, the political executive's constitutional and positional resources have changed a number of times since 1940. After four years of authoritarian rule under Vichy, followed by the two-year Liberation government, Fourth Republic political leaders were given few constitutional powers over parliament, and were further handicapped by a fragmented and conflictual party system which brought unstable government. The Fifth Republic Constitution of 1958 considerably strengthened the French political executive over the legislature and thereby over the bureaucracy (parliament is often the bureaucracy's strongest defender); and political executives remain in post for longer periods. Thus a demonstration that Fifth Republic leaders were able to inflect bureaucratic institutions to their own goals might not provide convincing evidence that leaders in other constitutional positions could do likewise. Yet the

⁶⁶ Crozier, M. (1964) *The Bureaucratic Phenomenon* (Chicago: University of Chicago).

⁶⁷ Crozier, M. (1966) 'Crise et renouveau dans l'administration française', *Sociologie du Travail*, 8/3, 225-48, pp.225-32. All translations from French texts are by the thesis author.

⁶⁸ Crozier (1964), p.240.

⁶⁹ *ibid.* p.232, p.236.

⁷⁰ Crozier, M. (1964a) *The Bureaucratic Phenomenon* (Tavistock), p.287.

⁷¹ Wright, V. (1989) *The Government and Politics of France*, 3rd edn (Unwin Hyman), pp.99-131.

⁷² Dupuy, F. and Thoenig, J.-C. (1987) *L'administration en miettes*, 2nd edn (L'Harmattan).

⁷³ J.-C.Boual, head, 'Mission Europe', Ministry of Infrastructure, and K.Varin, *chef de cabinet* to P. Mayet, head of the *Ponts et Chaussées*, told the author that the purpose of their association, *Réseaux Services Publics*, was to overcome the *cloisonnement* (partitions) of French administration. Limousin's Hôtel de Région, Limoges, 16 Feb.1998.

Fifth Republic provides a particularly appropriate context because it offers both a period of continuity of political regime for the core empirical study, and useful comparisons and contrasts with the three previous regimes, including the crisis moments that enable the leadership's use of that potential opportunity or constraint to be tested. Setting the inquiry within the longer post-war period, with its varied institutional and non-institutional environments, could produce a fruitful response to the questions posed; and indeed a more detailed examination of the Fifth Republic shows that the 'strength' of the French political executive was often rather relative, especially where there were conflicts on aims or strategy within the 'dual-headed' executive.

To illustrate the complexity of the interplay between political leaders and the bureaucracy, the administrative organisation chosen as exemplar is that of the *Délégation à l'aménagement du territoire et à l'action régionale* (DATAR), a government agency which coordinates the policy of *aménagement du territoire*. *Aménagement du territoire* is generally agreed to be untranslatable into English. The most succinct definition in English seems to be the following:

'It can best be described as a flexible and generic notion referring to that state activity which aims to promote the balanced territorial development of France as a whole without neglecting the specific needs and character of individual regions and their constituent parts'.⁷⁴

Sometimes the terms regional policy or regional development or regional planning seem appropriate, but most academics recognise the difficulty in translation and adopt the French term (Appendix A explains the problem).

DATAR offers an exemplary case study of the impact of political leaders on the bureaucracy in France for a number of interlocking reasons. It is a bureaucracy in direct contact with political leaders: its staff are appointed by them, financed by them and instructed by them. It is the prime instrument for orienting the rest of the public service towards the leaders' goals on *aménagement du territoire*, but is at the same time itself a bureaucratic organisation that new leaders with an interest in the policy will want to reshape and put under their own control. A small interministerial agency, created in 1963, it is legally part of the Prime Minister's Office, though day-to-day responsibility is often delegated to another minister (an evolving structure that enables a number of issues to be explored). The interactions between ministers and DATAR's top officials are not complicated by intervening actors in the real world, and therefore relatively easy to evaluate for research purposes. It is a 'doubly-bureaucratic' subject of analysis, because of its status as a bureaucracy and its task of coordinating other bureaucratic institutions. It is the political leadership's tool for coordinating the initiation and implementation of policy programmes that help stimulate and redistribute regional development, a wide-ranging policy domain that encompasses a large number of ministries, their field offices and local councils, enabling the

⁷⁴ Biarez, S. (1982) 'Aménagement du territoire in France: State intervention or regulation?', *West European Politics*, 5, July, 271-86, p.270fn.

leaders' relationships with these institutions to be explored. DATAR is an administrative organisation that leaders must be able to shape to their own demands, and be shown to do so if the argument of this thesis is to be sustained. Its functional role also allows more distant relationships between leader and bureaucratic institutions to be assessed, since its role is to persuade other officials at central and field levels, local councils and others to adopt centrally-decided measures as envisaged by the government of the day.

Just as it is theoretically useful to extend the boundaries of the case-study to more than one constitutional arrangement, it is also useful to extend them from DATAR to 'non-DATAR' in two ways: first to the period 'pre-DATAR', as various political leaderships tried in different constitutional contexts to promote the same policy through more conventional ministerial units; second, to 'anti-DATAR' or 'non-DATAR', when political leaders do not make use of DATAR in circumstances in which other political leaders have done so. DATAR's reputation has varied widely over the years, for which some blame the variations in its closeness to leaders, others its movements within the machinery of government or changes in the non-institutional environment; it is to that extent a good research object in methodological terms. Finally, there are well-established variations in the attitudes of French political leaders to *aménagement du territoire* and in its output. In sum, it provides a good test of Blondel's view that bureaucratic institutions are crucial to leaders as a tool to help conceive, decide and deliver a policy goal but, for the same reason, constitute a serious handicap if they are not sufficiently subject to leadership control and action.

The research design

The research design of the case study is outlined in Figure 1.2, which shows how and where the different elements of the thesis strategy are tackled. All chapters makes a longitudinal comparative analysis of the impact of political post-holders on bureaucratic organisations and instruments, centred on and around DATAR and (in some chapters) its forerunners.

Chapter 2 analyses the organisational reform process that starts with the initiation of the policy of *aménagement du territoire* in the 1940s and ends in the creation of DATAR, as leaders with an interest in *aménagement du territoire* make successive amendments to the ministerial divisions responsible for the policy before setting up DATAR as a radically-different form of agency. This study tests the capacity of both bureaucratic and political leaders with 'activist' ambitions to make structural changes to the machinery of central government to improve its effectiveness, as Blondel had suggested they might. The research method in this chapter is a historical narrative of the various reforms that contrasts the actions of different leaders, and identifies the distinctive roles of political leaders (of whom some are not typically 'political') and bureaucrats.⁷⁵

Chapters 3, 4 and 5 tackle questions Blondel posed about the characteristics of a

⁷⁵ Blondel (1987), p.170.

Figure 1.2 Summary of case-study design

CHAPTER 2	RESHAPING ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURES: THE CREATION OF DATAR 'Leaders of all countries are ... faced with structural problems with respect to bureaucracies ... their expectations [for reform] will remain largely unfulfilled. Blondel (1987), p.170.
Analytical goals	- The capacity of political leaders to reform bureaucratic structures to improve coordination, against the 'constraints' and 'hurdles' posed by the bureaucratic institutions.
Empirical base	The reform process leading to the creation of DATAR.
Research method	A comparative and historical narrative of successive reforms from 1941 to 1963, contrasting the roles of bureaucrats and technocratic or political leaders.
CHAPTER 3	LINKING DATAR TO THE LEADERSHIP: POSITIONAL OR PERSONAL? 'Links between the bureaucracy and the leader must be close and effective'. <i>ibid.</i> p.168.
Analytical goals	- The nature of the effective links between the leadership and the bureaucracy: positional (direct attachment to leader's office) or personal (leadership commitment)?
Empirical base	Changes in DATAR's location; leaders' interest in the policy; and DATAR's reputation
Research method	Qualitative and quantitative comparison of relationships between DATAR's position in the government machinery against the leadership's level of interest and economic growth.
CHAPTER 4	RESPONSIVENESS, COMPETENCE AND LOYALTY: CONTROLLING DATAR 'The system is often unresponsive'. 'A manifest requirement is to increase competence... and foster loyalty...'. There would be trade-offs and it would take time. <i>ibid.</i> p.150 p.168.
Analytical goals	- Capacity of new political leaders to ensure a bureaucracy responds to their goals. - Identification of trade-offs and poor responses to leadership goals.
Empirical base	DATAR's staffing, recruitment, budgetary controls, working methods and activities.
Research method	Qualitative analysis of political leaders' capacity and use of powers of appointment. Comparison of recruitment, size and internal structure with leaders' demands.
CHAPTER 5	STEERING POLICY THROUGH DATAR: COMMITTEES AND FINANCE 'Bureaucracies must be closely linked to the population'. <i>ibid.</i> p.168.
Analytical goals	- Capacity of political leaders to use and adapt administrative tools and its funding powers to steer implementing institutions towards its own particular interests.
Empirical base	Interministerial committees, funds and financial instruments in this domain.
Research method	Qualitative examination of leaders' use of DATAR's main committee, and the effectiveness of DATAR's financial tools. Matching of committees and funds to leadership interest.
CHAPTER 6	CASE STUDY 1: ROADS PLANNING AND FUNDING Blondel's framework for assessing how different leaders use positional resources and non-institutional environment to meet obstacles from the institutions. <i>ibid.</i> p.25
Analytical goals	- Capacity of political leadership to influence policy in this bureaucratic arena. - Assessment of DATAR (compared with DAT) as a leadership tool in this policy area.
Empirical base	Inputs from leaders, DATAR, 3 bureaucratic groups to 36 instruments and their outcome.
Research method	Quantitative and qualitative analysis within the Blondel framework to compare impact of leaders and bureaucratic groups on policy outcome. Identification of different leadership approaches to dealing with bureaucratic institutions, with /without DATAR's help.
CHAPTER 7	CASE STUDY 2: REGIONALISATION Blondel's framework for assessing how different leaders use positional resources and non-institutional environment to meet obstacles from the institutions. <i>ibid.</i> p.25
Analytical goals	- Capacity of political leadership to modify institutional structures at regional level - Assessment of DATAR (compared with DAT) as a leadership tool in this policy area.
Empirical base	Inputs from leaders, DATAR, prefects, local politicians to 34 steps in regional reform.
Research method	Quantitative and qualitative analysis within the Blondel framework to compare impact of leaders and bureaucratic groups on policy outcome. Identification of different leadership approaches to dealing with bureaucrats and local government, with/without DATAR's help

bureaucracy that political leaders might need to change to ensure the bureaucracy implemented leadership goals loyally and competently. Blondel argued that it is important for links between the political leadership and the bureaucracy to 'be close and effective... if bureaucracies are to provide a significant help to leaders in achieving their goals'.⁷⁶ Chapter 3 surveys the changes since DATAR's creation in its organisational links to the political leadership; its personal links to leaders, as indicated by presidents' and prime ministers' reported commitment to DATAR and/or the policy of *aménagement du territoire*; and DATAR's reputation. The goal is to test alternative understandings of the nature of the links between the political leadership and DATAR, and of how close they need to be to ensure DATAR is an effective instrument of leadership aims. The analysis compares the advantages and disadvantages of organisational locations to estimate their real importance; it charts DATAR's varying reputation first against the varying locations and then against the variations in the leadership's personal commitment. It also examines briefly a common alternative thesis that the economy is the prime explanation of DATAR's changing reputation, not location or leadership.

Blondel noted too that 'a manifest requirement' was for political leaders to improve their bureaucratic tools by increasing the competence of officials and the 'fostering of loyalty ... by a variety of means - but not at the expense of initiative taking'.⁷⁷ Through a qualitative analysis of the leaders' use of powers to make top appointments and to determine staffing budgets and numbers, Chapter 4 seeks to show the political leadership's use of positional and personal resources to make DATAR responsive to its needs by adapting its organisation and activities, and to examine the trade-off between loyalty and competence.

According to Blondel, the bureaucracy had to provide effective links to the population if the leader's aims were to be implemented effectively, such as through a system of field offices.⁷⁸ DATAR is not a conventional ministry and its main role, as conceived in 1963, was not to provide services directly to the population but to coordinate and steer the programmes of ministries towards the political leadership's goals for *aménagement du territoire*. DATAR's relevant 'population' consists mainly of other bureaucratic institutions, and the main instruments it has been given by political leaders are the traditional bureaucratic coordinating instruments: committees and budgets. Chapter 5 therefore scrutinises the way the leadership has been able to use the major administrative and financial tools, with the aid of DATAR, to implement its policies for *aménagement du territoire*. It examines the creation, modification and abolition by leaders of committees and other interministerial administrative bodies in the *aménagement du territoire* domain. Through an analysis of their 'input' controls on budgets and special funds, and the evolution of funding mechanisms in particular sectors, it assesses the capacity of new leaders to adapt these bureaucratic

⁷⁶ *ibid.* p.168.

⁷⁷ *ibid.* p.172-3.

⁷⁸ *ibid.* p.168.

instruments to their own needs.

However, assessing the political leadership's ability to adapt the organisation and management of the civil service to its needs is only part of Blondel's programme for evaluating leadership impact, even with regard to bureaucracies. The relationship with the bureaucracy fits into an analysis of the impact of leaders on the polity as a whole, 'helped or hindered' by their bureaucratic and other institutional resources.⁷⁹ After all, whether 'political leaders appear to "make a difference" to the type of policies which are followed'... 'is in many ways the central question of political activity'.⁸⁰ However, as noted earlier, Blondel did not propose to measure a leader's impact on the polity in concrete terms but to assess his or her 'potential leadership impact' by the ambition of their goals, defined in terms of their 'extent' and their 'scope'. The methodology of this thesis can and should modify Blondel's approach while preserving his underlying rationale. While Blondel is working 'towards a general analysis' of comparative political leadership, this thesis is specifically concerned to establish in empirical terms that political leaders can make an impact on and through the bureaucratic institutions, and to reach a better understanding of the institutional and non-institutional conditions that enable them to do so.

Therefore Chapters 6 and 7 undertake case-studies of two 'sub-fields' that have different levels of 'scope' and different dominant policy actors: one is a mainstream public policy (roads network planning), in which technical bureaucracies with a reputation for driving the policy agenda are likely to pose a powerful constraint on leaders as well as a necessary source of advice; and the other a process of institutional change (regionalisation) in which successive leaders make changes first to the bureaucratic territorial organisation and then introduce more ambitious change to political structures, while at all times local and national political actors are important players. Both case-studies include leadership initiatives that extend from incremental change to innovation. An assessment is made of the political leadership's impact that includes the main elements in Blondel's framework: the leadership's personal aims; positional resources such as constitutional-legal rules and conventions; the institutional environment, including parliament, local government and the party system as well as bureaucracies; and the non-institutional environment, such as crises. In effect, the assessment considers those parts of Cole's appraisal of Mitterrand noted earlier under his headings of 'positional resources' and 'internal constraints and opportunities'.⁸¹

Chapter 6 concerns the planning and funding of the major road network. It shows how three bureaucratic organisations are key actors in determining this highly technical policy. Political leaders try to inflect the officials' preferences towards their own aims, mostly by using DATAR (or its predecessor, the *Direction à l'aménagement du territoire*, DAT). The goal is to assess how much impact the leadership is able to make in this

⁷⁹ Blondel (1987), p.149.

⁸⁰ Blondel (1980), p.15.

⁸¹ Cole (1994), p.170.

bureaucratic arena, and to see what difference the creation of DATAR as a leadership tool made to the success and operating procedures of the political leadership. The aims and input of the political leaders, DATAR and the bureaucratic groups with respect to three dozen roads-and-regional planning projects are compared in a quantitative analysis with their outcomes, and the results used to guide a qualitative analysis within the Blondel framework of resources, constraints and opportunities. The different ways that leaders use the resources and opportunities are summarised in a flow chart.

Finally, Chapter 7 considers regionalisation, a process in which DATAR played a leading part in the 1960s. The analytical aim is to demonstrate the capacity of the national political leadership to modify territorial bureaucratic structures against a background of opposition from prefects and other field officials as well as local political leaders. Since some political leaders kept DATAR away from some aspects of the political transfer of power to regions in the 1980s there is also the chance to 'compare and contrast' these occasions. As in Chapter 6, the relative significance of the input from political leaders and different institutional groups is analysed first quantitatively and then qualitatively within the Blondel framework.

The validity of the thesis as a whole is enhanced by using a mix of quantitative and qualitative methods that are explained in each chapter, but all using a variety of indicators and varied data (summarised in Appendix B). Different aspects of the same phenomenon are thus examined from multiple perspectives, each with their different strengths. A consistent picture builds up to provide a persuasive case in the concluding chapter. Though the thesis methodology may lose something by being less generalisable than Blondel's methodology, it gains by not having to adopt the simplifying assumptions Blondel has to make to cover such a broad spectrum of people, issues and political systems, and especially by being able to establish empirically the conclusions about leadership impact that Blondel has to leave at the level of 'leadership goals'.

CHAPTER 2

RESHAPING ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURES: THE CREATION OF DATAR

INTRODUCTION

The examination of the impact of the political leadership in the domain of *aménagement du territoire* starts with the conception of the policy and the administrative arrangements to deliver it. The bureaucracy is the final element Blondel explores in his study of political leadership.¹ Blondel considers that political leaders are likely to have to improve its organisational structure if they are to achieve the outcomes they desire; but he is sceptical about their chances of doing so.

Leaders have to accept that the bureaucratic tools at their disposal cannot enable them to achieve more than a certain amount over a specified period of time; they can improve these tools somewhat, but also over time. The impact of leadership depends on the structure of the bureaucracy. Leaders are not powerless to move the machinery and the structures, but the extent of their power is, and to their own detriment, often overestimated'.²

Blondel's analysis suggests that the setting-up of a bureaucracy responsible for an innovative or ambitious policy - and *aménagement du territoire* was both - would meet special difficulty.

'Leaders of all countries are .. faced with structural problems with respect to bureaucracies...Of course, leaders - and in particular leaders who wish to achieve goals that are appreciably more "activist" than those of their predecessors - often wish to do more; to an extent at least, they can try and bend the "muscles" of the bureaucracy; but their expectations will remain largely unfulfilled'.³

This chapter examines the efforts to find an effective organisational structure for *aménagement du territoire*, from the establishment of an administrative unit with that name in the 1940s to the creation of DATAR in 1963. The principal actors in this historical institution-building process, their posts and their professional status are listed in Figure 2.1.

THE SERVICE DE L'AMENAGEMENT DU TERRITOIRE

The Vichy State invented the policy of *aménagement du territoire* and created its first administrative structure, the *service de l'aménagement du territoire*.⁴ While a near equivalent ('town and country planning') had started in Britain before the war, 'the term *aménagement*

¹ Blondel (1987), pp.167-73: 'The character of the bureaucracy and the impact of leadership'.

² *ibid.* pp.172-3.

³ *ibid.* p.170.

⁴ Alvergne, C. and Musso, P. (2003) Les Grands Textes de l'aménagement du territoire et de la décentralisation (DATAR/la Documentation française), p.104, is the first official mention of the Vichy origins of the policy.

Figure 2.1. Principal actors in changes to the organisation of *aménagement du territoire*

VICHY STATE						
		<u>Deputy Head of State</u>		<u>Head of the DGEN</u>		<u>Officials</u>
1	1941	Darlan	ex-official ex-minister	Lehideux	ex-manager	
	1942			Giraud	official	
	1944			Surleau	official	
LIBERATION						
		<u>Head of Government</u>		<u>Minister of Reconstruction</u>		
2	1944	De Gaulle	ex-official ex-minister	Dautry	ex-official ex-minister	Gravier
3	1946			Billoux	politician	
FOURTH REPUBLIC						
		<u>Prime Minister</u>		<u>Minister of Reconstruction</u>		
4	1948	Queuille	politician	Claudius-Petit	politician	Gravier
	1950	Bidault	politician	Cl-Petit		Bloch-Lainé
	1950	Pleven	politician	Cl-Petit		
	1951	Queuille	politician	Cl-Petit		Bloch-Lainé P.Dreyfus
				<u>Minister of Economy</u>		
5	1954	Mendés-F	politician	E. Faure	politician	Bloch-Lainé
	1955	E. Faure	politician	Pflimlin	politician	
				<u>Minister of Construction</u>		
6	1958	De Gaulle	ex-official ex-minister	Sudreau	ex-official	
FIFTH REPUBLIC: PRESIDENT DE GAULLE						
		<u>Prime Minister</u>		<u>Minister of Construction</u>		
	1959	Debré	ex-official politician	Sudreau	ex-official	Monod
				<u>Ministre-délégué of AdT</u>		
7	1962	Pompidou	unelected politician	Schumann	politician	Monod
		<u>PM and Minister for AdT</u>		<u>délégué</u>		
8	1963	Pompidou	unelected politician	Guichard	unelected politician	Monod

Notes:

Some actors had also been on the border of politics and administration in *cabinets*: Lehideux, Giraud, Surleau in Dautry's 1939-40 *cabinet*; Pompidou in de Gaulle's 1944-46 and 1958 *cabinets*, Sudreau in Faure's 1955 *cabinet*, Monod in Debré's then Schumann's *cabinets*; and Guichard in Pompidou's *cabinet*.

For a full list of governments please see Appendix C.

du territoire did not exist in France in 1939: it was born in 1944 under Vichy'.⁵

Initiation by Vichy, 1941-44

The full powers given to Marshal Pétain by the constitutional law of 10 July 1940 enabled his government to start reorganising an administration his supporters said had been corrupted by parliamentary influence.⁶ Some ministries were split into single-purpose units, and new types of administrative bodies (*délégations*, *commissariats*, *secrétariats...*), were created. This movement accelerated after Pétain made Admiral Darlan his deputy in February 1941. Darlan brought into government a younger generation: '*polytechniciens*, *inspecteurs des finances*, company directors: that is, the "technocrats" with a new vision of society and the socio-economic future of France'.⁷ Many had been trained at the *Ecole polytechnique* or the *Ecole libre des sciences politiques*, which gave access to the best public service posts, and/or belonged to the State finance inspectorate, even if some were now directors of industrial firms or banks. They were the more right-wing members of the clubs of the 1930s (such as *X-Crise*, *Nouveaux Cahiers*, *Urbanisme*) that promoted a Keynesian economics, the orderly planning of infrastructure investment or urban development, and a technical rationality in decision-making.⁸ They had rejected both the Popular Front and liberal economics. Some of these technocrats were enthused with the overall Vichy project of the National Revolution; for others the first priority was the modernisation of a State administration they thought out-of-date.⁹

Among Darlan's new organisations was the *Délégation Général à l'Équipement National* (DGEN), set up in February 1941, which reported directly to Pétain. Its function was to draw up investment and retooling plans for the post-war economy, and specifically a ten-year national infrastructure plan, of which versions were published in 1942 and 1944.¹⁰ Two administrative bodies were attached to the DGEN: the *Commissariat à la reconstruction immobilière*, created in October 1940 from a section of the former Ministry of Public Works, and which was responsible for planning and reconstruction in war-damaged communes; and the *service d'aménagement et d'urbanisme de la région parisienne*, which combined urban planners from the Seine prefecture and from the Ministry of Interior's suburban offices. The first *délégué général* of the DGEN was François Lehideux, former second-in-command at Renault. He was more clearly a politician than later *délégués*

⁵ Gravier, J-F. (1970) *La Question régionale* (Flammarion), p.57. Gravier worked for Vichy, was at the Ministry of Reconstruction in 1944 and introduced 'town and country planning' to the French public.

⁶ Baruch, M. (1997) *Servir l'Etat français: l'administration en France de 1940 à 1944* (Fayard), p.171.

⁷ Dreyfus, F.-G. (1990) *Histoire de Vichy* (Perrin), pp.395-7.

⁸ Dreyfus (1990), pp.21-2, 34, 223; Paxton, R. (1972) *Vichy France: Old Guard and New Order: 1940-1944* (New York: Knopf), p.356; Massardier, G. (1996) *Expertise et aménagement du territoire: l'Etat savant* (L'Harmattan), pp.15-32.

⁹ Baruch (1997), p.222.

¹⁰ Shennan A. (1989) *Rethinking France: Plans for Renewal 1940-1946* (Oxford: Clarendon), p.21.

généraux, even if 'the administration of an authoritarian State is a political administration'.¹¹ Lehideux was simultaneously Minister for Industrial Production from July 1941, unlike his successors, Henri Giraud, previously head of Public Works at the Paris town hall, and Frédéric Surleau, a senior official in the *Ponts et Chaussées* technical corps, who were both responsible to ministers. But all three had experience on the boundaries of politics and administration in the *cabinet* of Raoul Dautry, 'technocratic' minister of munitions in the last government of the Third Republic;¹² and they had common ideas on reform: Lehideux was 'genuinely interested in rationalising the outmoded French industrial system', and produced the ten-year State investment plan;¹³ while Surleau wrote that 'France had an overriding need for a new, keen administration that deliberately breaks with the errors of past ways'.¹⁴

The *service de l'aménagement du territoire* was created within the DGEN's urban planning division. Giraud had the idea of combining Dautry's pre-war policy of moving factories away from Paris with the need to tackle Paris's transport congestion and housing shortage.¹⁵ A report for Giraud by the engineer Gabriel Dessus recommended encouraging the relocation of industrial firms from Paris to smaller towns to 'balance' their agricultural activities;¹⁶ and it seems likely that the *service de l'aménagement du territoire* was set up to develop it. But one critic asserted that its role was to ensure that urban workers were not concentrated together, to reduce the likelihood of another Popular Front; and it may, like the rural elements in the DGEN's ten-year plan, have been in part a response to the provincial ideology of the Pétain entourage.¹⁷

The changes to administrative structures at Vichy were made in pursuit of efficient coordination. The DGEN was cited by Darlan's secretariat in May 1941 as one of four institutions that had fulfilled the government's goal of 'concentrating in the hands of one person responsibility for problems of a specific nature that in themselves belonged to several ministries'.¹⁸ Yet DGEN's experience illustrated the 'hurdles' Blondel predicted would be placed in front of new administrative structures. Lehideux soon found that colleagues from 'classic' ministries refused to regard it as 'a real ministry' (and he was also Minister of Industrial Production unlike his successors Giraud and Surleau).¹⁹ Two of the most classic State administrations' demonstrated their hostility: the prefects through the Interior Ministry complained about the independence of the *délégués*; and the Ministry of Finance criticised the cost of the new agencies. The Finance Minister, Yves Bouthillier, warned that the

¹¹ Baruch (1997), p.380, citing a 1941 text by Maurice Duverger.

¹² Baudouï (1992) *Raoul Dautry 1880-1951: Le technocrate de la République* (Balland).

¹³ Paxton (1972), p.219.

¹⁴ Baruch (1997) p.173, quoting Surleau's note of 18 July 1940.

¹⁵ Randet, P. (1955) 'L'Aménagement du territoire', reprinted in Randet, P. (1994) *L'Aménagement du territoire: genèse et étapes d'un grand dessein* (La Documentation française), 139-45, pp.140-1; Pierre Randet worked in the Vichy urban planning division.

¹⁶ Mazet, P. (2000) *Aménagement du territoire* (Colin), p.7.

¹⁷ Mioche, P. (1987) *Le Plan Monnet: Génèse et élaboration 1941-1947* (Sorbonne), p.23.

¹⁸ Baruch (1997), Annex 16, reproduces the note, AN F60 592.

country could not afford the new priorities, however urgent, and the DGEN was later put under his control.²⁰

Restructuring by the Provisional Government, 1944-46

The *service de l'aménagement du territoire* was available to be recreated in the Fourth Republic because de Gaulle decided the existence of the Vichy State had to be denied,²¹ and the bureaucracy survived 'almost intact'.²² De Gaulle's 'government of national unanimity' in September 1944 had 'no formal or legal title' of authority;²³ its structure had been negotiated between de Gaulle's representatives and the *Conseil national de la Résistance*. De Gaulle had little room for manoeuvre in allocating ministers and portfolios because the appropriate weight had to be given to the main Resistance groups and political parties, old and new generations, 'technicians' and parliamentarians.²⁴

The DGEN officials were transferred to a Ministry of Public Works and Transport, apart from Surleau and the officials working on the ten-year investment plan, who were assigned to the Minister of National Economy, Pierre Mendès-France. In November 1944 the Minister of Public Works and Transport asked to be relieved of the reconstruction portfolio. De Gaulle invited Dautry to take it on. Dautry's 'apolitical' stance did not upset the political balance and he was famous for his reconstruction work after the First World War.²⁵ He was honorary president of the journal *Urbanisme*, and had kept in touch with the DGEN planners until 1943.²⁶ Dautry persuaded de Gaulle to add urban planning to his portfolio, arguing France should be modernised, not restored.²⁷ The Commissariat engineers and the urban planners were transferred to Dautry's Ministry of Reconstruction and Urban Planning.

Dautry set up two directorates in the new ministry: a construction directorate, in which the Commissariat officials were divided between reconstruction and war damage compensation; and a directorate of urban planning and housing, which included a *service de l'aménagement du territoire*. In practice however, though the minister kept its title 'to open up a wider perspective from the start', the *service de l'aménagement du territoire* 'drew up

¹⁹ Dreyfus p.534.

²⁰ Baruch (1997), pp.202-3.

²¹ Guichard, O. (1999) *Vingt ans en 40* (Fayard), pp.12-13. Bloch-Lainé, F. and Gruson, C. (1996) *Hauts Fonctionnaires sous l'Occupation* (Odile Jacob), p.119, p.135.

²² Paxton (1972), p.333. 98% of active officials in the Cour des Comptes in 1942 were also there in 1946; 97% of officials in the Inspection des Finances in 1948 served in 1942. Ibid, p.335.

²³ Williams (1972) *Crisis and Compromise*, p.20.

²⁴ Rioux, J.P. (2002) *La France de la Quatrième République*, I, 1st edn 1980 (Seuil).

²⁵ 'Hardly a familiar name to British readers, he is an almost heroic figure in his own country'. Pacey, P. (2002) *Les Chemins de fer de la Baie de Somme* (Usk: Oakwood), p.67. During the 1914-18 war he built supply lines in record time, then headed post-war rail reconstruction; he unified French railways. He did not approve the armistice and took no part in Vichy but his 'managerial efficiency' inspired many who did.

²⁶ Avril, M. (1993) *Raoul Dautry: La passion de servir* (France-Empire), p.230; Baudouï (1992), pp.264-88; Massardier (1996), p.104fn, citing Archives Nationales documents.

²⁷ Avril, M. (1993), p.246.

urban redevelopment plans... for war-damaged communes'.²⁸ Though the central arrangements were conventional, Dautry also appointed a tier of regional commissioners chosen from former colleagues in other organisations, and a *mission de décentralisation industrielle*, to which he recruited Jean-François Gravier as *chargé de mission*. Dautry asked Gravier to 'set out the tenets of *aménagement du territoire* in a way that would be intelligible and useful to everybody'.²⁹ Dautry was 'assuredly the father of industrial decentralisation, which was the first visible form of *aménagement du territoire*, but one circumscribed by economic problems... that pushed the spatial dimension into the background'.³⁰

De Gaulle and Dautry were thus able to adapt the ministerial structure towards their own aims, yet only after experiencing constraints. Dautry too had been limited in his aspirations by the *Conseil national de la Résistance*; in June 1944 they had refused him a role in urban planning, giving him other duties.³¹ Once de Gaulle was in post in Paris there were fewer restrictions: indeed the DGEN planners in the Ministry of National Economy were moved yet again after ministers in the *Conseil économique* decided that the Ministry of Reconstruction should draw up a national reconstruction plan to fit the Ministry of National Economy's investment plan.³² But this scheme was rescinded - a technical detail, but one that was at the origin of long-term conflict between the regional development planners and the investment planners. There had been disputes between ministers (Mendès-France, Plevén, Bidault and Dautry among others) about how the Plan should be organised,³³ and the outcome was eventually decided by de Gaulle on political grounds. Investment planning was assigned to a *Commissariat Général au Plan* (Plan Commissariat), which was placed under the authority of the prime minister 'to counterbalance the appointment of a Communist Party member [Billoux] as Minister of National Economy'.³⁴

Removing the regional tier, 1946

In 1946 Billoux succeeded Dautry as Minister of Reconstruction. He was the first person with a ministerial responsibility for *aménagement du territoire* to fulfil Page's definition of 'political leadership', by using his position, 'gained as a result of a career in politics, a career in the struggle for power through competition involving election within a system of representative government, to assert the choices of the politician';³⁵ though, like Claudius-Petit who would be the next to restructure the *service de l'aménagement du territoire*, his

²⁸ Randet (1994), pp.16-18.

²⁹ Avril, M. (1993), p.246.

³⁰ Charles, H. and Cristini, R. (1992) 'Le général de Gaulle et la gestion du sol français', in Institut Charles de Gaulle, *De Gaulle en son siècle. III. Moderniser la France* (La Documentation française/ Plon), 465-82, pp.468-9.

³¹ Baudoui (1992), p.276.

³² Mioche (1987), p.62; *Ordonnance* of 21 April 1945.

³³ Mioche (1987), pp.45-7.

³⁴ *ibid.* p.89. He cites evidence from both de Gaulle's *chef de cabinet* and Billoux.

³⁵ Page, E.C. (1992) *Political Authority and Bureaucratic Power: A Comparative Analysis*, 2nd edn (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf), p.148.

career developed through Resistance activity not through conventional politics.

Billoux confirmed a minister's freedom to restructure by removing Dautry's regional tier, dismissing all the regional commissioners and all but one of the regional construction inspectors appointed under Vichy. There was a general animus against regions, especially but not exclusively among the Left. 'Regionalism and regionalisation were equated with collaboration and Fascism'.³⁶ Billoux kept the *service de l'aménagement du territoire* and was interested in its work.³⁷ But, as a Communist, he was 'short-circuited' by prime ministers, and his policies increasingly limited by the Finance Ministry.³⁸ In the first years of the Fourth Republic,

'the influence of the *service de l'aménagement du territoire*, which had no financial instruments, was rather weak; as evidence, the first Monnet Plan, drawn up 1946-47, showed no interest in this domain'.³⁹

A Reconstruction official, Pierre Randet, admitted that 'the Ministry of Reconstruction and the Plan Commissariat did not at first feel the need to coordinate their efforts... The Plan had objectives for basic industries... that were not easily adapted to *géographie volontaire* [changing the map of France]....and the Ministry of Reconstruction was driven by the need to re-house people...'.⁴⁰ While Reconstruction ministers from 1946 to 1948 were 'completely indifferent to any policy of *aménagement du territoire*';⁴¹ they did not alter its structures, either to improve them or remove them; their housing portfolio took greater priority in their short terms in office.⁴²

THE DIRECTION DE L'AMENAGEMENT DU TERRITOIRE

The concept of *aménagement du territoire* was brought to public attention in 1947 with the publication of Gravier's *Paris et le désert français*.⁴³ Gravier reproduced his report to Dautry as a book, prefaced by Dautry, in order 'to attack the Plan'.⁴⁴ The author feared that the Plan Commissariat's investment programme would reinforce existing regional imbalances. His book became a key reference for regional developers and geographers in many countries.⁴⁵ The centre-party leader, Eugène Claudius-Petit, promoted Gravier's book and ideas in the National Assembly at the time of publication and then within the government when he

³⁶ Mény, Y. (1987a) 'France: the Construction and Reconstruction of the Centre, 1945-86', *West European Politics*, 10/4, 52-69, p.53.

³⁷ Randet (1994), p.17; Avril, M. (1993), p.246.

³⁸ Yvert, B. (ed) (1990) *Dictionnaire des ministres (1789-1989)* (Perrin), pp.668-9.

³⁹ Gravier (1970), p.57. Gravier was posted from the Prime Minister's secretariat to the Plan Commissariat's 'regional' section in 1947 but there was little regional content in the Plan until the 1960s.

⁴⁰ Randet (1994), pp.18-19.

⁴¹ Gravier (1970), p.57.

⁴² Randet (1994), p.24.

⁴³ Gravier, J.-F. (1947) *Paris et le désert français* (Le Portulan). They were followed by Gravier, J.-F. (1958) *Paris et le désert français*, 2nd edn [1947] (Flammarion) and Gravier, J.-F. (1972) *Paris et le désert français en 1972* (Flammarion) among many other texts on the subject by the same author.

⁴⁴ Alvergne and Musso (2003), p.110.

⁴⁵ For example, Hall, P. (1975) *Urban and Regional Planning* 1st edition (Harmondsworth: Pelican).

became Minister for Reconstruction and Urban Planning in 1948. Claudius-Petit's explanation of *aménagement du territoire* in his Ministry's 'green paper' remains the standard definition:

Aménagement du territoire is the search for a more balanced distribution of the population within the territory of France in relation to the distribution of natural resources and economic activity. Its constant concern is to provide people with better living and working conditions, and improved facilities for leisure and cultural activities. It is therefore being carried out not just from economic motives, but much more for the people's well-being and fulfilment.⁴⁶

Restructuring within the Ministry of Reconstruction, 1948-52

Claudius-Petit renamed the ministry's urban planning directorate the *Direction de l'aménagement du territoire* (DAT); and divided its former *service de l'aménagement du territoire* between a *service de l'aménagement national*, under Randet, and a section that continued to draw up urban plans. The minister set officials to produce rival programmes for a national plan that would fulfil the aims of *aménagement du territoire*. Randet's version, *Pour un plan national d'aménagement du territoire*, outlining objectives and actions, was approved at a Cabinet meeting of the Bidault government.⁴⁷ A Central Commission to advise on drawing up this Plan was set up by decree in 1950. Composed of nine top public sector officials or managers (including François Bloch-Lainé of the State investment bank, the *Caisse des Dépôts*; Gabriel Dessus, by then a director at *Electricité de France*; and Alfred Sauvy, director of statistics), it met in Claudius-Petit's office to hear expert witnesses.⁴⁸

Claudius-Petit, a leader of a centrist Resistance party, was in post for a much longer period than most Fourth Republic ministers - 1948-53 - and was supported until 1952 by three political leaders from his part of the political spectrum who 'took turns' at the premiership during this time (Queuille, Bidault, Queuille, Pleven, Queuille, Pleven). They introduced a law in 1950 creating a fund, the *Fonds national d'aménagement du territoire* (FNAT), that the DAT could offer industrialists as an incentive to relocate, and another law in 1951 that enabled public corporations or mixed-economy companies (SEMs) to be set up for regional development projects. But the regulatory texts implementing this law were not issued,⁴⁹ and the Central Commission stopped meeting in June 1952, before a national plan for *aménagement du territoire* was agreed.⁵⁰ Prime Minister Pinay (in office March to December 1952) was against planning.⁵¹ Claudius-Petit deliberately lowered his own ambitions rather than endanger the Plan Commissariat's investment Plan, itself rather fragile

⁴⁶ Ministère de la Reconstruction et de l'Urbanisme (1950) Pour un plan national d'aménagement du territoire (MRU), p.3. Quoted in Lajugie, J. (1964) 'Aménagement du territoire et développement économique régional en France (1945-1964)', Revue d'économie politique, 74/1, 278-336, p.282.

⁴⁷ Ministère de la Reconstruction et de l'Urbanisme (1950).

⁴⁸ Randet (1994), p.60; Bloch-Lainé, F. (1977) Profession: fonctionnaire (Seuil) p.141.

⁴⁹ Pisani, E. (1956a) 'Administration de gestion, administration de mission', Revue française de science politique, 6/2, 315-30, p.322.

⁵⁰ Randet (1994), pp.65-7.

from 1950 to 1952.⁵²

[Claudius-Petit] soon noticed that through this notion [of *aménagement du territoire*] he risked calling planning as a whole into question. He therefore directed his actions mainly towards urban policy.⁵³

The DAT continued to pursue the goals set by this minister but there was opposition from other parts of the bureaucracy and other ministers: Randet, the official in charge of the *service de l'aménagement du territoire*, acknowledged in 1955 that the 'classic conflict of powers' between the Plan Commissariat and the DAT had led them into 'rivalry'.⁵⁴

Furthermore Randet 'was heckled' (*apostrophé*) in a corridor of the Matignon [the Prime Minister's office] by a Minister of Industry, who accused Randet of trespassing on his patch (*pré carré*).⁵⁵ While there were differences between bureaucracies that constituted hurdles to a coordinated policy, the primary constraints were imposed by other political leaders.

An economic re-orientation, 1953-56

By the time Mendès-France became prime minister in 1954, the DAT had made itself 'especially responsible' for encouraging Breton regional development.⁵⁶ However, 'the DAT encouraged initiatives from others because it was unable to provide them itself'.⁵⁷ The priority for Claudius-Petit's immediate successors was their housing portfolio. Courant (1953) is remembered for his housing action plan, and Lemaire (1953-54) for his levy on wages to fund house-building.⁵⁸ Not only was housing the political issue of the time, but the prime minister, Laniel, disliked urban planners and had 'urban planning' removed from the ministry's title.⁵⁹

However, outside the Ministry of Reconstruction, officials and other ministers made organisational arrangements for regional economic development. The *Caisse des Dépôts* under Bloch-Lainé started supporting development projects outside the ministerial investment programmes; and at the Ministry of Industry, the official Pierre Dreyfus, 'working closely with Bloch-Lainé', created an industrial expansion and decentralisation division attached to the minister's *cabinet*.⁶⁰ The DAT was still formally responsible for *aménagement du territoire* but it had no formal powers or ministerial support to coordinate

⁵¹ Cohen, S.S. (1977) *Modern Capitalist Planning: the French model* 2nd edn (Berkeley: University of California), p.56.

⁵² Cohen (1977), pp.88-9.

⁵³ Bloch-Lainé, F. (1962) 'Pour une réforme de l'administration économique', *Revue économique*, 6, 861-85, p.869.

⁵⁴ Randet (1955), p.140.

⁵⁵ *Administration* (1994) 'La DATAR a trente ans', special edition, 11/164: contribution by P.Randet, p.22. The Matignon is the prime minister's official residence.

⁵⁶ *Le Monde*, 7-8 Feb.1954, selected for the '50-years ago' article, *Le Monde*, 7 Feb 2004.

⁵⁷ Pouyet, B. (1968) *La D.A.T.A.R.* (Cujas), p.23.

⁵⁸ Yvert (ed) (1990), p.778, p.810.

⁵⁹ He instructed Courant, 'Tell the urban planners to go to hell'. Randet (1994), p.27.

⁶⁰ Rouso, H. (1986) 'Le Ministère de l'Industrie', in H.Rouso (1986) (ed.) *De Monnet à Massé* (CNRS), 27-40, p.32

these efforts.

When Mendès-France became prime minister in June 1954 he gave new impetus to regional development under the heading of 'decentralised expansion', but not through the Ministry of Reconstruction. The major role was given to the Minister of Finance and Economy, Edgar Faure, to whom the Plan Commissariat was also transferred by decree (In effect Mendès-France created the structure he had wanted in 1944.). Both Mendès-France and Faure

'emphasised their determination to modernise economic structures, were interested in economic productivity, and conscious of the need for *aménagement du territoire*'.⁶¹

'Having launched economic growth, it was now a matter of accelerating it by dealing with the weakest links through *aménagement du territoire*, industrial restructuring and agricultural modernisation'.⁶²

Mendès-France was foreign minister for most of his premiership and was fully occupied with that role: the practical steps were therefore taken by Faure in liaison with the prime minister's *cabinet*. Further instruments were decided by Mendès-France in February 1955 with Robert Buron as Finance Minister. Then Prime Minister Faure with Pierre Pflimlin at Finance completed a set of 120 decrees in the economic domain that included 'the first attempt to put a coherent apparatus for *aménagement du territoire* in place'.⁶³ These decrees were able to be taken because parliamentarians had given Mendès-France and then Faure special powers to make decrees in the economic, social and fiscal domain with the laws of 10 August 1954 and 2 April 1955.

Apart from moving the Plan Commissariat, these ministers did not restructure administrative bodies at national level but at regional level: they started reforms that would require ministries with field officials to adopt common regional boundaries, in order to coordinate the planning and implementation of 'regional action programmes'. At central level, new interministerial institutions were added and new functions assigned, especially to the 'economic' bureaucracies. The Plan Commissariat was asked to draw up the regional action programmes, and to head an interministerial committee (the *groupe de synthèse*) which would propose suitable regional boundaries. The *Inspecteurs généraux de l'économie nationale* (IGENs, a former *corps* within the Ministry of National Economy) were asked to oversee the implementation of the programmes. The powers of the Finance Ministry in this domain increased further with the creation of a substantial development fund, the *Fonds de développement économique et social* (FDES), whose committee was chaired by Bloch-Lainé. The Ministry of Finance became strong [in the field of *aménagement du territoire*] because it controlled the tools for decentralised expansion: the legal measures put in place

⁶¹ Bernstein, S. (1985) 'Un Mendésisme sans Mendès-France? Les gouvernements Edgar Faure et Guy Mollet', in Bédarida, F. and Rioux, J.P. (eds) *Pierre Mendès-France et le Mendésisme* (Institut d'Histoire du Temps Présent / Fayard), 221-27, p.222.

⁶² Rioux, J.P. (2001) *La France de la Quatrième République*, II, 1st edn 1983 (Seuil), pp.63-4.

⁶³ *Revue française de science politique* (1956), 'Aménagement du territoire: problèmes politiques et administratifs', special edition, 6/2, 1956, editorial, p.261.

between 1954 and 1957 gave it the dominant role'.⁶⁴ The DAT was assigned relevant but minor roles: it ran an interministerial 'decentralisation committee' that drew up a list of State industrial firms that could be moved out of Paris (chaired by Surleau, the former director of DGEN); it was vice-chair of the Plan Commissariat's *groupe de synthèse* deciding regional administrative boundaries, and technical adviser to the FDES's industrial decentralisation sub-committee. It kept its own development fund, the *Fonds national d'aménagement du territoire*, much smaller than the FDES.

There were unlikely to be objections from finance officials to this increase in their powers and indeed this 'experiment ... received the full agreement of the Rue de Rivoli [Ministry of Finance]'; moreover, 'the big names of the civil service... Gabriel Ardant, Claude Gruson, François Bloch-Lainé, Paul Delouvrier, Louis Armand, Alfred Sauvy, gave their unswerving support' to Mendès-France.⁶⁵ But the reforms met substantial resistance from other bureaucracies (discussed further in Chapter 7). The decree setting out the boundaries for the regional action programmes was not published for 18 months, such were the administrative disputes - and national politicians with local mandates added last-minute changes favouring their own cities.⁶⁶ Even then only two ministries designated a regional-level official. The IGEN officials were 'unable to overcome psychological and administrative resistance' from ministries to implement the programmes.⁶⁷ Prefects took no notice of the IGENs.⁶⁸

In the last two years of the Fourth Republic, 1956-58, senior officials and reforming politicians interested in administration and *aménagement du territoire* started to put forward recommendations for change, notably in a special edition of the *Revue française de science politique*, with contributions from serving and former officials, including Michel Debré, *conseiller d'Etat* and regional commissioner during the Liberation; Jean-François Gravier, *chargé de mission* at the Plan Commissariat; and Edgard Pisani, senator and former prefect. They observed that 'the extensions' made by Mendès-France and Faure to the policy of *aménagement du territoire* 'posed delicate problems of administrative coordination' which the Ministry of Reconstruction was incapable of resolving.⁶⁹ Gravier wanted to reorganise the administration on the basis of the needs of *aménagement du territoire*, while Debré identified political and constitutional problems as the cause of the administrative problems. Pisani concluded that 'a real *aménagement du territoire* policy would require reforms not only to the administration but to the State, to taxation and to habits'. However, he 'brought

⁶⁴ Pouyet (1968), p.38.

⁶⁵ Rioux (2001), p.63, p.51.

⁶⁶ Decree of 26 Nov.1956. Monier, R. (1965) *Région et économie régionale* (Berger-Levrault), p.35; Clout, H. (1972) *The Geography of Post-war France* (Oxford: Pergamon), pp.31-5.

⁶⁷ Pouyet (1968), p.39.

⁶⁸ Monier (1965), p.67. Monier was an IGEN official.

⁶⁹ *Revue française de science politique* (1956), editorial, p.261.

his small stone to the edifice' with a proposition for reform at development project level.⁷⁰ Pisani's seminal article, '*Administration de gestion, administration de mission*',⁷¹ contrasted traditional ministerial bureaucracies (*administrations de gestion*): formalist, reactive, permanent, hierarchically-organised and suited to managing activities that did not change much, with what he termed *administrations de mission*, set up to conceive and carry out a 'mission': lightweight, realist, forward-looking, project-focused, informal in working methods and interministerial in recruitment and function. There was a clear parallel in the contrast between the DAT and the Plan Commissariat, though ministers did not draw the consequences immediately. The government of Guy Mollet and Paul Ramadier, Socialist Premier and Finance Minister, 1956-57, was the last in the Fourth Republic able to envisage changes. They asked Bloch-Lainé to prepare a reform of the economic administration, including the Plan Commissariat, but then 'dropped it'; Bloch-Lainé concluded that 'the Socialist position was more verbal than operational'.⁷²

The DAT continued to promote its own objectives without being able to achieve them. Its top official (not its minister) had asked Pflimlin in 1955 if the Plan Commissariat's regional action programmes could be framed within regional development plans drawn up by the Ministry of Reconstruction, but Pflimlin refused, preferring actions that would produce jobs quickly.⁷³ The Reconstruction ministers, Duchet and Chochoy, were focused on their housing responsibilities: Duchet in 1955 organised a massive low-cost housing programme; and Chuchoy was a housing specialist specifically appointed by Mollet to prepare a housing bill.⁷⁴ Despite this ministerial disinterest the DAT, 'puffed up with its pioneering role in this domain', inserted a clause in the housing bill, to make regional development plans a legal requirement.⁷⁵ Questions were immediately raised: would the DAT and the Plan Commissariat use the same procedures and consult the same organisations? Or would conflicting plans emerge, given that there were no formal arrangements for coordination and little prospect of the DAT and the Plan Commissariat working together voluntarily?

The government's official adviser on administrative efficiency, the *Comité central d'enquêtes sur le coût et le rendement des services publics*, issued immediately an interim report that was 'a long indictment of the inability of the Ministry of Reconstruction to ensure the coordination of regional development activities'.⁷⁶ It recommended the Prime Minister set up and chair an interministerial committee on *aménagement du territoire*.

⁷⁰ "E.P." [Pisani] '*Avant-propos*', in *Revue française de Science Politique* (1956), pp.262-66.

⁷¹ Pisani (1956a).

⁷² Bloch-Lainé, F. and Bouvier, J. (1986) *La France restaurée, 1945-1954* (Fayard), p.100.

⁷³ Randet (1994), p.81. The Construction plans were maps showing the urban or rural centres where investment could be concentrated usefully instead of dividing it between communes.

⁷⁴ Yvert (ed) (1990), p.786, p.773.

⁷⁵ Lajugie (1964), p.307; Pouyet (1968), p.36. Act 57-908 of 7 Aug. 1957, Art.27.

⁷⁶ Pouyet (1968), p.36. The *Comité* was set up at the Liberation as a standing body of top civil servants and parliamentarians to advise the government on administrative reform. Machin (1977), p.63.

The implementation of *aménagement du territoire* cannot belong to a single ministry; all ministries are equally involved. A body placed at the highest level, responsible for following up each year the implementation of the policy as a whole, seems indispensable'.⁷⁷

Adding interministerial provisions under de Gaulle and Debré, 1958-62

The leaders of the new constitutional regime modified the organisation of *aménagement du territoire* by adding new institutions. As last Prime Minister of the Fourth Republic, de Gaulle appointed Pierre Sudreau as Minister for Construction. Sudreau was an official: a top prefect, he was deputy director of the Faure *cabinet* of 1955 that prepared the regional reforms, and then headed the *Commissariat pour l'urbanisme de la région parisienne*, responsible for developing Parisian infrastructure. Sudreau was both interested in the domain of *aménagement du territoire* and 'had seen on the ground how ineffective the administration could be at achieving the public good'.⁷⁸ He persuaded de Gaulle that his ministry should retain Dautry's responsibility for *aménagement du territoire* but with enhanced interministerial provisions to improve coordination. Sudreau was one of the few ministers or administrators (with Delouvrier, Pisani, Bloch-Lainé and Massé) whom de Gaulle held in high esteem and whose proposals for reform he was willing to consider if they promised to improve coherence and coordination.⁷⁹ Though a strong supporter of the General he resigned when de Gaulle proposed that the President should be directly elected.

The DAT decentralisation committee, listing State enterprises that could move out of Paris, was now to select ministerial candidates too, but it would be located at the Plan Commissariat. New interministerial committees, chaired by the DAT, would decide planning permits for industrial or scientific buildings to be built in Paris, and give grants to firms locating in disadvantaged regions. The DAT's regional development plans and the Plan Commissariat's regional action programmes were to be combined into a single set by a regional plans committee, which the Commissariat would chair, with the DAT as vice-chair. Finally, an advisory body on planning for *aménagement du territoire*, the *Conseil supérieur de la Construction*, was created, chaired by the well-known regional developer, Philippe Lamour (see Figure 2.2 for a diagram of the organisational structure at this time). Bloch-Lainé must have been referring to Sudreau and his ambitions when he warned:

'[Claudius-Petit's] successors experienced, as he did, the temptation to overextend the boundaries. However discreet their staff, they could not avoid some conflict with the Plan Commissariat when the latter, somewhat belatedly, started to take an interest in regionalising its programmes'.⁸⁰


The 'high-level ministerial body' recommended by the *Comité central* in 1957 was introduced in 1959 when Sudreau met similar problems with finance and industry ministers to those the DAT met with officials. At Sudreau's request, Prime Minister Debré started to

⁷⁷ Report of *Comité centrale d'enquêtes*,....., Sept. 1957, quoted in Pouyet (1968), p.47.

⁷⁸ Debré, M. (1988) *Trois républiques pour une France: Mémoires III* (Albin Michel), p.91.

⁷⁹ Chevallier, J. (1992). 'De Gaulle, l'administration, la réforme administrative', in Institut Charles de Gaulle, *De Gaulle en son siècle. III* (La Documentation française/ Plon), 541-66, p.563.

Figure 2.2 Organisational structure of French regional planning at national level 1959-61



Note: Solid arrows represent stronger influence. Dashed and dotted arrows represent weaker influence.
 Only the links related to the DAT and regional policy are shown here (e.g. the CGP's other links do not appear).
Sources: Information on the bodies and links comes from texts by leading participants cited in Chapter 2.

hold an informal monthly meeting, soon formalised by decree as the *Comité interministeriel permanent pour les problèmes d'action regional et d'aménagement du territoire* (CIAT, see Chapter 5). Sudreau prepared reports for the committee; Debré's *cabinet* adviser for administrative affairs and *aménagement du territoire*, Jérôme Monod, organised the meetings.⁸¹ Debré and Monod were simultaneously preparing more comprehensive administrative reforms at regional level (discussed further in Chapter 7). However Debré took more immediate steps to support Sudreau by appointing *Commissaires à l'aménagement du territoire* to peripheral regions, to work with the DAT and local officials under Sudreau's direction.

However, the DAT remained unable to unify the implementation of *aménagement du territoire*. The *Commissaires à l'aménagement du territoire* 'clashed with the field officials, especially the Prefects'.⁸² The agriculture ministry, under Pisani, and the Plan Commissariat introduced their own redevelopment projects. The Plan Commissariat did not want regionalised planning.

'Its tables of figures ... were already so complicated to draw up that an additional dimension was resented as at best a new constraint and at worst an unwarranted interference. Adding regional needs, even smoothed out by us... made it too obvious that some trends were erroneous, or did not fit Plan assumptions... It risked exposing the inconsistencies, even contradictions, that were more easily masked in total national figures. ... What remained, therefore, was to go through the motions [*faire "comme si"*]. The Plan ... could not and did not want to integrate the regional dimension'.⁸³

By 1962 the survival of the Ministry of Construction itself was under review: its former responsibility for Paris plans had been transferred to a new Paris District authority and 'post war reconstruction was now complete'.⁸⁴ The ministry then published a *Plan d'aménagement du territoire* that Sudreau had requested from the *Conseil supérieur de la Construction*.⁸⁵ It was issued just before the Plan Commissariat's Fourth Plan was presented to parliament. The ministry's Plan embarrassed the government politically by encouraging parliamentarians debating the Fourth Plan to ask for multi-annual regional plans too, first conceded by Finance Minister Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, then countermanded by President de Gaulle.⁸⁶ The embarrassment became the stimulus for a more fundamental structural reform by the incoming prime minister, Pompidou.

The Plan Commissariat and the DAT tried simultaneously to set out the principles of French regional planning. Regret was expressed during the parliamentary debate on the Fourth Plan that there was no harmonisation between the two plans, whether on their timescale, geographic framework or proposals. This situation could not have continued without endangering the effectiveness of regional policy'.⁸⁷

⁸⁰ Bloch-Lainé (1962), p.869.

⁸¹ Debré (1988), p.22, pp.166-7, p.177.

⁸² Pouyet (1968), p.37.

⁸³ Roche, J.-M. (1986) 'Missionnaire au Plan: La dimension régionale', in Rouso (ed.), 65-70, pp.69-70.

⁸⁴ Bloch-Lainé (1962), p.869.

⁸⁵ P. Sudreau, 'Preface' in Randet (1994), p.5; Conseil Supérieur du Ministère de la Construction (1962) *Plan d'aménagement du territoire* (February).

⁸⁶ Rodwin, L. (1970) *Nations and Cities* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin), pp.338-9.

⁸⁷ Lajugie (1964), p.309.

AN EPHEMERAL MINISTRY FOR AMÉNAGEMENT DU TERRITOIRE

Unlike Debré, Pompidou was not a parliamentarian. He had served in de Gaulle's *cabinet* in 1944-46 and was his *directeur de cabinet* in 1958, helping him to set up the new governmental structures. He was director-general of Rothschild's bank, but had also served briefly in the *Conseil d'Etat* and on the Constitutional Council.

'He thought that France was not up-to-date, that it must industrialise, build up its infrastructure, and launch an ambitious policy of *aménagement du territoire*'. In fact, a proper executive body for *aménagement du territoire* was still to be created, and it was this gap to which Georges Pompidou applied himself urgently'.⁸⁸

On the day he became Prime Minister, Pompidou brought under his direct authority both the Plan Commissariat and *aménagement du territoire* by creating a new post of *ministre délégué auprès du premier ministre, chargé du Plan et de l'aménagement du territoire*. The title signalled that the minister had the delegated authority of the prime minister and was part of his *cabinet*. The post was offered to Maurice Schumann, a centre-party leader. The Plan Commissioner, Pierre Massé, was not consulted and learned of his transfer from the Ministry of Finance to Matignon from Schumann.⁸⁹ Schumann appointed as *directeur de cabinet* the Plan Commissariat's top finance official, who chose as his deputy the specialist in administration and *aménagement du territoire* in Debré's *cabinet*, Monod.⁹⁰ Schumann 'made no secret of his desire to construct *un grand ministère de superposition et de coordination*',⁹¹ which would have included a *délégation à l'aménagement du territoire* for interministerial coordination, supported by technical divisions. Critical comments quickly appeared in the press.⁹²

By the time Schumann resigned a month later for foreign policy reasons,⁹³ his ministry had still not been set up: no ministry would transfer staff or areas of competence.⁹⁴ As a member of Schumann's *cabinet* told Catherine Grémion:

The decree appointing M. Schumann was not even issued, he resigned before that, because we had not managed to settle it properly. Why? Because the opposition from other ministries was formidable. In consequence, a minister of State existed but he had no decree setting out his responsibilities, he had no staff..... And secondly, there had been no provisions made to give him powers, especially financial.⁹⁵

On Schumann's resignation Pompidou officially received the responsibilities for the Plan and *aménagement du territoire* that he had temporarily united under Schumann: the Plan

⁸⁸ Roussel, E. (1994) *Georges Pompidou 1911-1974*, 2nd edn (Lattès), p.150, p.153.

⁸⁹ Massé, P. (1986) 'Le métier de Commissaire au Plan: en feuilletant l'introduction au quatrième Plan', in H.Rousso (ed.), 197-208, p.199, p.210.

⁹⁰ G. Brac de la Perrière, witness account in H.Rousso (ed.) (1986), pp.210-11.

⁹¹ Lanversin, J. de (1970) *L'aménagement du territoire et la régionalisation*, 2nd edn (LITEC), p.62.

⁹² Pouyet (1968), p.45, quoting R. Barillon, *Le Monde*, 18 April 1962, among others.

⁹³ With other centrist ministers because of de Gaulle's anti-EC 'Volapük' speech of 15 May 1962.

⁹⁴ Pouyet (1968), p.45.

⁹⁵ Grémion, C. (1979), p.143.

Commissariat had already been moved from the Ministry of Finance and National Economy to the prime minister by decree.

THE *DELEGATION À L'AMÉNAGEMENT DU TERRITOIRE ET À L'ACTION REGIONALE*

The top official, Bloch-Lainé, analysing the structure of the 'economic administrations', said that *aménagement du territoire* needed an executive 'horizontal administration' like the Plan Commissariat, that would work closely with the Plan Commissariat, but preferably not be the Plan Commissariat.⁹⁶ For academics the Schumann ministry had been a valuable practical experiment; it seemed to demonstrate the importance of two 'fundamental principles':

'[the principle that] a *délégation à l'aménagement du territoire* placed at the heart of State administrative and financial action should be responsible for coordinating the implementation of this policy.. and the principle that the responsibility for *aménagement du territoire* must be located at the highest level in the government hierarchy'.⁹⁷

Pompidou's closest aide, Olivier Guichard, put it more pragmatically.⁹⁸

'[Pompidou] relaunched the idea of *aménagement du territoire* by asking a minister, Maurice Schumann, to invent the role. It was not the best method. It was much better for the role to be held by someone located outside the classic governmental structures but directly attached to the Prime Minister, sufficiently discreet not to raise alarm, sufficiently well-supported to secure decisions, and with real power, that is to say, money. After a month, the departure of the MRP ministers... gave him the chance to arrive at this formula .'⁹⁹

Like Pompidou, Guichard was political but not an elected politician, and had the status of an official without having been a bureaucrat. His father had been Darlan's *directeur du cabinet* at Vichy, though de Gaulle had the 'good manners never to mention him',¹⁰⁰ and Guichard himself was de Gaulle's *chef de cabinet* from 1947 to 1960, working at times with Pompidou. He was made a prefect by special decree (see Chapter 4), and ran the Organisation for Saharan Development until France left Algeria. From 1962 to 1967 he occupied the office next to Pompidou's in Matignon, a *chargé de mission* but independent of the *cabinet*. Guichard said the idea of DATAR came mainly from Pompidou, but they often talked it over.¹⁰¹ Monod and many others say Guichard was the 'inventor' of DATAR.¹⁰² Because of the problems met by Schumann the structural arrangements and legal texts were prepared in detail for several months before DATAR was announced. Guichard, Monod and Xavier Ortolí (Pompidou's *directeur du cabinet*) 'surveyed the principal decision-making nodes in the administrative and financial apparatus and organised the necessary regulatory

⁹⁶ Bloch-Lainé (1962), pp.884-5.

⁹⁷ Grémion, C. (1979) *Profession: décideurs: Pouvoirs des hauts fonctionnaires et réforme de l'Etat* (Gauthier-Villars), p.143; quotation from Pouyet (1968), p.46.

⁹⁸ Guichard, O. (1975) *Un chemin tranquille* (Flammarion), p.89.

⁹⁹ *ibid.* p.90.

¹⁰⁰ Guichard (1999), p.161.

¹⁰¹ Guichard (1975), p.89.

¹⁰² *Administration* (1994), contribution by J. Monod, 28-34, p.29.

provisions'.¹⁰³ The *délégué* was made a member of any committee or secretariat that dealt with issues important for *aménagement du territoire*. 'Right from the beginning, he had all the legal powers required and seats in all the arenas where these problems were discussed'.¹⁰⁴ The *délégué* was also given financial powers that Schumann had lacked. One of the first acts of Schumann's *cabinet* had been to ask for a special aid fund to be set up. In preparing the creation of DATAR, Pompidou asked the Minister of Finance, Giscard, for a fund for *aménagement du territoire* to be added to the prime minister's budget, so that he 'could dispose of a sum to be used at the discretion of the Matignon without the sometimes stifling supervision of the Ministry of Finance'.¹⁰⁵ The *Fonds d'intervention pour l'aménagement du territoire* (FIAT), was created by decree at the same time as DATAR. It was agreed that the *délégué* would participate in the settling of each ministry's budget, and report on the outcome at the end of each financial year (The reality of these powers is examined in Chapter 5). The organisational diagram in Figure 2.3 illustrates this notion of giving the prime minister, through this one centrally-placed agency, a comprehensive oversight of all pertinent committees, agencies and funding bodies.

There were arguments on the detailed text of the decrees, 'the technical administrations having reservations on everything'.¹⁰⁶ The phrase 'regional action' at the end of DATAR's title was a particular sticking point:

There was pressure to create a *délégation à l'aménagement du territoire*, full stop. An economic problem had to be resolved, a certain number of technical problems were to be resolved, and that was it'.... 'Every time the text came back from those countless meetings '*l'action régionale*' had to be added again'.¹⁰⁷

Guichard, in his last public speech, revealed that Pompidou and de Gaulle were among those reluctant to admit the regional dimension.

'As for me, I was particularly engaged, with some tenacity, in persuading the President of the Republic and the Prime Minister that the last two letters of DATAR should be adopted, that is, the 'A' and the 'R'. In effect, since it was thought that the regions were going to be the preferred framework for regional planning, and that the *Délégation* would be in charge of the coordination and promotion, it was essential that it was concerned in regional action. Therefore I positively insisted, in the end successfully, that the *Délégation "à l'aménagement du territoire"* should also be called "*à l'action régionale*". Even though the President of the Republic had thought about these issues less than had his Prime Minister, he accepted that DATAR would adopt the whole of its acronym'.¹⁰⁸

In relation to DATAR the decree says only that 'it will be created, under the authority of the prime minister', and that 'it will be directed by a *délégué* appointed by decree'.¹⁰⁹ Other Articles give the *délégué* powers to attend, chair or prepare the meetings of named

¹⁰³ Grémion, P. (1976) *Le Pouvoir périphérique* (Seuil), p.124.

¹⁰⁴ Pompidou *cabinet* member, interviewed by C. Grémion (1979), p.144.

¹⁰⁵ Roussel (1994), p.153.

¹⁰⁶ Perrilliat, J. (1992) 'La révolution de la Ve République dans la représentation', in Hamon, L. (ed) *La Région de De Gaulle à nos jours* (Maison des sciences de l'homme), 1-13, p.9.

¹⁰⁷ *ibid.*

¹⁰⁸ *Intervention d'Olivier Guichard lors du 40e anniversaire de la Datar le 13 février 2003*, www.datar.gouv.fr.

policy or funding committees, to use a few named divisions of sectoral ministries, and responsibilities for 'harmonising' or 'monitoring' the allocation of grants or ministerial budgets to meet the 'objectives of *aménagement du territoire*'. The report to the President that accompanied the decree explained that the new institution was stimulated by the 'need for a new stage in improving structures responsible for regional expansion and *aménagement du territoire*'. There needed to be 'a more complete coherence': first in planning, to 'put an end to the dual structure', in which 'the Plan Commissariat drew up four-year economic and social plans and the *Conseil Supérieur de la Construction* much longer-term plans for *aménagement du territoire*'; and second, in implementing planning objectives, 'where they concerned regional action and *aménagement du territoire*'; while ministries were 'fundamentally responsible for execution, there was a need for more efficient coordination... and monitoring.. and promotion'.¹¹⁰ Further decrees reconstituted the DAT as the *direction de l'aménagement foncier et de l'urbanisme* (DAFU) reducing its functions to urban planning; the *délégué* was made a member of the FNAT fund committee (renamed FNAFU) though it remained under DAFU control.¹¹¹

From the decree it appeared that the *délégué* had little direct executive power: he or she would mostly rely on interministerial committees, a few specified ministerial divisions and budgetary oversight to coordinate the implementation by ministries of the Plan Commissariat's schemes. It reassured ministers that there would be no further attempt at a ministry of *aménagement du territoire*.¹¹² But DATAR had been designed to be a more effective organisation. The *délégué* was left free to staff and organise DATAR within the prime minister's wishes and budget, and set up immediately at Guichard's former Office for Saharan Development, retaining a number of former colleagues there,¹¹³ and recruiting by word of mouth from among those who had heard 'something promising was going on'.¹¹⁴

The methods used were those that Georges Pompidou was hoping for. They included "the *administration de mission*", very light, very mobile, using flexible procedures. It was an administration that was not at all bureaucratic, very close to the ground, very close to the local authorities, and it benefited, more than any of the usual organisational schemes ever could, from a real interministerial power'.¹¹⁵

In addition to the more usual characteristics of an *administration de mission*, DATAR was made more powerful by Guichard combining his role as *délégué* with that of the *chargé de mission* at Matignon closest to Pompidou.

¹⁰⁹ Decree 63-112, Art 1, 14 Feb. 1963, *Journal Officiel (J.O.)*, 15 Feb. 1963, p.1532: decree reproduced in Teneur and di Qual (1972), pp.14-17.

¹¹⁰ Lanversin (1970), pp. 70-2, reproducing *Le Rapport au Président de la République*, J.O. 15 Feb. 1963.

¹¹¹ Decree 63-122, 14 Feb. 1963, modifying Decree 58-1305, 23 Dec. 1958, relating to the Ministry of Construction's field of competence.

¹¹² Pouyet (1968), pp.57-8.

¹¹³ *Administration* (1994), contribution by P. Camous, 36-9. Camous was the 'regional' *chargé de mission*.

¹¹⁴ Roche (1986), p.70, Essig, F. (1979) *DATAR, des régions et des hommes* (Stanké), p.19.

¹¹⁵ Ortolí, F.-X. (1990) 'La politique économique et sociale', in *Georges Pompidou: Hier et Aujourd'hui: Témoignages* (Neuilly: Breet), 121-40, pp.130-1.

The double post gave us sufficient weight to carry out activities that inevitably involved having to counteract all the bureaucratic inertia (*pesanteurs*) of the time.¹¹⁶

The power was guaranteed by the choice of a man, Olivier Guichard, who was very close to Pompidou, and by the permanent, pressing intervention of the Prime Minister.¹¹⁷

Guichard claimed afterwards that, as *délégué*, 'he had been placed in an exceptional position: simultaneously outside the administrative circuit and yet able to intervene everywhere, on almost all development problems', and that he had enjoyed more real power at DATAR than in his next post as Minister of Industry.¹¹⁸

CONCLUSIONS

The ability of the French political and administrative system to adopt a new policy and eight different bureaucratic structures to deliver it in a twenty-year period seems to refute Blondel's worst assumptions about the time political leaders would need for restructuring a bureaucracy. The body responsible for the policy of *aménagement du territoire* expanded by stages from the *service de l'aménagement du territoire* initiated by Vichy's DGEN, retained at Liberation, to a full directorate, the DAT. However, the DAT proved unable from its vertical 'silo' to coordinate other institutions in this broad-ranging policy domain. Although it retained its official role, political leaders gave powers in related fields to other bureaucracies; these too failed to work together. The new political leaders of the Fifth Republic first consolidated then improved existing structures by adding 'horizontal' interministerial committees, but conflict continued. A more thorough attempt at reform, retaining vertical divisions but under a horizontal coordinating structure in a ministry for *aménagement du territoire*, failed almost immediately for unrelated reasons, but not before it had shown it was unlikely to overcome the objections of other ministers or ministries. Learning from this failure, as well as from the analyses of reform-minded officials and politicians, the prime minister's aides prepared a radically different form of bureaucratic institution. A new agency, 'lighter but stronger', was introduced - DATAR - whose formally-prescribed powers were few in number but critical for effective coordination and intervention on the prime minister's behalf.

How easily was the political leadership able to 'bend the "muscles" of the bureaucracy', as Blondel put it? What 'constraints and hurdles' did it meet from officials?¹¹⁹ The relationship between political leaders and bureaucrats in these organisational changes was often complex. Not only did the contributions of political leaders and officials intertwine, but the distinction between 'politicians' and 'bureaucrats' was frequently unclear. As Figure 2.1 illustrates, only during the Fourth Republic did the key actors conform to 'ideal types'. The first administrative unit for *aménagement du territoire* was set up by technical officials at the top of the Vichy DGEN, itself created by Darlan, a military

¹¹⁶ *Administration* (1994), contribution by G. Worms, 35-6. Worms was at DATAR at the start.

¹¹⁷ Ortoli (1990), p.131.

¹¹⁸ Guichard (1975), p.87.

officer and former Third Republic 'technical' minister. However, the creators of the *service* were more like ministers than official heads of ministerial divisions, in terms of the position they held, the DGEN having been conceived as a unit directly responsible to the head of state, and run first by a business leader with political aspirations. The DGEN, like the other new agencies created by Vichy, was resented by officials in traditional ministries, and the DGEN's autonomy, which the reformers hoped would add efficiency, was eventually curtailed by the finance minister. De Gaulle, as head of the Liberation government, was able to move DGEN's staff between ministries repeatedly without obstacle from officials, and the Minister for Reconstruction, Dautry, decided not only to recreate the *service de l'aménagement du territoire* but to introduce additional units to advance that policy. Both ministers had career backgrounds more like those of the Vichy leaders of 1941 than of the party politicians who were now their colleagues. Still, Dautry's successor, Billoux, a political leader typical of the Fourth Republic, demonstrated a similar ability to alter bureaucratic structures by removing Dautry's new posts while retaining the *service de l'aménagement du territoire*. Although the continued existence of this *service* under four ministers uninterested in *aménagement du territoire* could have indicated inertia, these short-lived ministers had more urgent priorities than internal ministry restructuring.

Then in the early 1950s the Reconstruction Minister, Claudius-Petit, with prime-ministerial support, was able to restructure the ministry, creating the DAT, and adding other bureaucratic institutions. A change in political leadership halted these activities at ministerial level but Claudius-Petit had engaged the interest of the DAT and reform-minded top officials. Despite two subsequent governments taking a different economic direction these officials continued to pursue an agenda they saw as in the public interest. Yet, without political support DAT was unable to overcome opposition from other bureaucracies, while the top officials did not have the appropriate tools. In 1954 and 1955 more interventionist political leaders - Prime Ministers Mendès-France and Faure, and Finance Ministers Faure and Buron - provided economic instruments and interministerial institutions that could have addressed the problem effectively. However, the reforms required some restructuring of the field administrations of ministries, and their stronger coordination at regional level. Other ministries and ministers were thus brought into the domain, and their opposition delayed implementation. Although official advisory bodies and individual (official and political) campaigners for administrative reform called for administrative reorganisation to resolve these deficiencies, political leaders in the late 1950s were not prepared and eventually not in a position to contemplate reform.

De Gaulle's government of 1958-59 resembled that of 1944-46 as far as the organisation of *aménagement du territoire* was concerned. The Construction Minister was a top official with practical experience and interest in the sector; like his predecessor in 1944 he was a strong supporter of de Gaulle but uncomfortable in party politics. Like Dautry too,

¹¹⁹ Blondel (1987), p.172.

Sudreau kept the existing structures with additions to improve horizontal coordination, and with Prime Minister Debré's aid appointed regional commissioners to help this task. However he was opposed by other ministers and their officials, and policies he initiated clashed with those of the Plan Commissariat, despite Debré initiating the interministerial committee on *aménagement du territoire* that should have resolved those issues. Officials openly questioned the utility of the Ministry of Construction's continued existence. Another political - though unelected - Prime Minister (Pompidou) tried out more innovative arrangements; first an 'interministerial' ministry to which bureaucratic groups and probably their ministers mounted an effective opposition; and then an *administration de mission*, DATAR, whose strong positional advantages were carefully prepared in advance by official and political aides to the prime minister.

While a summary of eight specific attempts by the political leadership to alter bureaucratic structures is necessarily rather crude (they were not equally ambitious and they took place in different contexts), it is worth comparing the successes and failures. Leaders seem to have achieved most of what they wanted and with lasting effect on more than half those occasions (in the creation and re-creation of the *service de l'aménagement du territoire*, the suppression of the regional Reconstruction tier, the creation of the DAT and DATAR). Only the introduction of a ministry for *aménagement du territoire* ended in outright failure. In other cases, the changes in structures that minister and prime minister demanded were made (the Mendès-France regional boundaries, the Sudreau interministerial devices), but they did not lead to the speedy restructuring or enhanced cooperation their initiators anticipated. Yet opposition that was sufficiently constraining to limit the choices made by political leaders, or even reverse the changes made, came from other political leaders more than from bureaucratic groups. When top officials developed ideas for organisational reform, they were able to be implemented only when ministers took them up with enthusiasm. Politicians had more power to change or to resist change to organisational structures than had bureaucratic organisations.

There is some evidence of a tendency for the most radical and lasting changes to be introduced by leaders with strong political convictions (whether or not they had been elected or were leaders of a party), and those decisions made by 'technical' ministers to be those least likely to be accepted by their more political colleagues. Nevertheless, the *position* of ministers conferred the *de facto* as well as *de jure* authority to make organisational changes. Decisions were not queried or opposed by bureaucrats according to the personal status of minister: whether politician or former official; elected or unelected. Blondel's operationalisation of the concept of political leadership by the holding of an executive position in government, with the argument that it is position that both confers and acknowledges political authority, seems to be justified in practice, at least where it concerns the relationship between leaders and bureaucratic institutions.

CHAPTER 3

LINKING DATAR TO THE LEADERSHIP: POSITIONAL OR PERSONAL?

INTRODUCTION

Blondel insists that 'the links between the bureaucracy and the leader must be close and effective' because he fears that these links are often imperfect.¹

The "lines" linking leaders to the bureaucracy... are full of faults and "short-circuits". Thus, from the point of view of leaders, the "system" is often inefficient, badly-structured and badly-organized. This is not only because of deliberate opposition, but often, perhaps mostly - because the system is simply unresponsive or only partly responsive'.²

Bureaucratic institutions may hinder political leaders more than they help them, he argues, because they are not 'reliable'. Leaders may be able 'to press a button' to the bureaucracy, but they cannot expect decisions to be implemented just because they have pressed the button; 'all they can hope for is that some of these decisions will be partly implemented in the fairly near future'.³ Yet it is possible for leaders to improve the conditions under which the bureaucracy operates. In his view,

'the more effective transformations are those that are concerned with, besides changes in the recruitment and training of the personnel, a systematic examination of the ways the linkage with the government... can be improved'.⁴

The political leaders who created DATAR in 1963 were of the same view, as the last chapter showed. They were concerned to bring the coordination of *aménagement du territoire* under the political leadership's control by placing it directly in the hands of the prime minister. Given the prime minister's other commitments, the day-to-day responsibility was delegated to DATAR and its *délégué*. The reformers also gave DATAR better connections to the implementing bureaucracies than the DAT had enjoyed. Using Blondel's imagery, the political leadership's button to *aménagement du territoire* connected directly to DATAR which in turn assured links to the bureaucracy; but for all except the most strategic decisions DATAR pressed the button on the leadership's behalf.

The close link between DATAR and the prime minister in law has remained intact for 40 years: DATAR is part of the prime minister's office, and the prime minister continues to perform the strategic functions such as appointing the *délégué* and chairing interministerial committees. However, as Figure 3.1 illustrates, DATAR has usually been attached to other

¹ Blondel (1987), p.168.

² *ibid.* p.150.

³ *ibid.* p.150

⁴ *ibid.* p.172.

Figure 3.1 Location of ministerial responsibility for *aménagement du territoire*

	PM	Ministerial responsibility	Minister
PRESIDENT DE GAULLE			
1963-67	Pompidou	Prime Minister	—
1967-68	"	<i>Ministre-délégué</i> to Prime Minister, responsible for Plan and AdT	Marcellin
1968-69	Couve	"	Guichard
PRESIDENT POMPIDOU			
1969-72	Chaban	"	Bettencourt
1972-74	Messmer	Minister of AdT, Infrastructure, Housing, Tourism (and later Transport)	Guichard
PRESIDENT GISCARD D'ESTAING			
1974-76	Chirac	Minister of Interior	Poniatowski
1976-77	Barre	Minister of Plan and AdT	Lecanuet
1977	"	Minister of Infrastructure and AdT	Fourcade
1977-78	"	"	Icart
1978-81	"	Prime Minister	—
PRESIDENT MITTERRAND			
1981-83	Mauroy	Minister of Plan and AdT	Rocard
1983-84	"	Prime Minister - Junior Minister could 'call on' DATAR	[Le Garrec]
1984-86	Fabius	Minister of Plan and AdT	Defferre
1986-88	Chirac	Minister of Infrastructure, Housing, AdT and Transport	Méhaignerie
1988-91	Rocard	Minister for Industry and AdT - Junior Minister for AdT	Fauroux and Chérèque
1991-92	Cresson	Minister for Urban Affairs and AdT	Delebarre
1992	Bérégovoy	Junior Minister to Prime Minister	Laignel
1992-93	"	Minister of Industry and Trade - Junior minister for AdT	Strauss-Kahn and Laignel
1993-95	Balladur	Minister of Interior and AdT - Junior Minister for AdT	Pasqua and Hoeffel
PRESIDENT CHIRAC			
1995-95	Juppé	Minister of AdT, Infrastructure and Transport	Pons
1995-97	"	Minister for Urban Affairs and AdT	Gaudin
1997-01	Jospin	Minister for Environment and AdT	Voynet
2001-02	"	"	Cochet
2002-04	Raffarin	Minister for Public Service and AdT	Delevoye
2004-05	"	Minister for Infrastructure, Transport, AdT, Tourism and the Sea - Junior minister for AdT	de Robien and Briand then St Sernin

ministers, the prime minister delegating his or her oversight to the minister. The prevailing opinion among political and academic experts on *aménagement du territoire* is that this arrangement harms DATAR's capacity to coordinate bureaucracies:

'While each solution may have a good explanation, in reality it favours one aspect of *aménagement du territoire* and weakens others.' In particular it makes coordination more difficult'.⁵

Yet there has been no empirical evaluation of this claim and, though there are good arguments to justify attaching DATAR to the prime minister, there are plausible arguments for (and against), attaching it to other ministers.

This chapter therefore examines more fully the nature of the link between the political leadership and DATAR, and its relationship to DATAR's capacity to act. It asks, first, what are the arguments for and against the various ministerial locations? Second, how important is proximity to the prime minister to DATAR's effectiveness as a coordinator? Existing evaluations of DATAR's work are limited to official figures of simple outputs that take no account of context. Hypothesis-testing studies by academics are also restricted by the lack of data. An indirect measure of DATAR's effectiveness had to be developed by assessing its reputational power, with the assumption that the more powerful DATAR is perceived to be the more likely it is to persuade bureaucracies to adopt its programmes. Its reputational power at different periods was then matched to the different ministerial locations. Then, what countervailing factors were proposed by those who noticed that DATAR's sharp decline in reputation occurred in the mid-1970s and not when it was first detached from the prime minister in 1967? The most frequent explanation is the oil crisis of the early 1970s; and the validity of this alternative thesis is explored below.

Further, if 'location' is not of supreme importance and economic crisis is not an adequate explanation, is the 'close link' between leadership and DATAR really less significant than Blondel asserted? One finding of the last chapter was that leaders keen to act in this policy domain were those most likely to change its structures. Is DATAR's effectiveness related less to its formal closeness to the political leadership than its ideological closeness to leadership concerns? Blondel argued that political leaders could also affect their environment through actions with a personal origin.⁶ The crucial characteristic of the link between leadership and bureaucracy may not be positional but personal. While the leadership's position gives it the authority to press the button represented by DATAR, the leadership's interest in *aménagement du territoire* may also need to be invoked. That hypothesis is tested below, comparing the interest in *aménagement du territoire* expressed by (or imputed to) different political leaders with variations in DATAR's reputational power.

DATAR'S LOCATION IN THE MINISTERIAL STRUCTURES

The view that DATAR's direct attachment to the prime minister is the essence of its power is

⁵ Montricher, N. de (1995) *L'Aménagement du territoire* (La Découverte), p.38.

⁶ Blondel (1987), p.5.

widespread, stretching from political scientists⁷, law academics⁸ and public administration specialists,⁹ to the national consultative body, the *Conseil économique et social*,¹⁰ a commission of enquiry¹¹ and three former *délégués*.¹² It was held on both sides of the political spectrum, as shown by the reaction of the Socialist Party leader François Mitterrand in 1963 to the new Gaullist arrangement:

'Attaching DATAR to the prime minister's office seems to me to be a very good decision. When *aménagement du territoire* was treated like a ball that could be tossed from one ministry to another... neither industrial decentralisation nor any other aspect of *aménagement du territoire* could be tackled in a comprehensive way'.¹³

Before he became President, Mitterrand endorsed the principle by copying it, making Robert Fabre responsible for *aménagement du territoire* and directly under his 'presidency' in the first 'shadow government' he set up in 1966.¹⁴ There is general agreement that the greater impact DATAR made in the first decade of its life was related to its governmental location. 'The 1960s and 1970s were the golden age of *aménagement du territoire* when a direct line joined DATAR to the Matignon'.¹⁵

'Returning to the 1967 situation and attaching *aménagement du territoire* directly to the prime minister, without a minister or junior minister in between, would enable DATAR to be given its maximum authority and effectiveness'.¹⁶

The reformers in 1963 argued that DATAR would be more authoritative than the DAT precisely because of its link to the prime minister. DATAR's role as an 'intermediary', ensuring that

'the sectoral ministries modified their actions... in order to make them converge on the government's overall objectives,...required it to have the permanent possibility of appeal to the arbitration and the authority of the prime minister'.¹⁷

DATAR, 'like other *administrations de mission*, has suffered from more or less judicious

⁷ Biarez (1982), p.271.

⁸ Lanversin (1970), p.73; Madiot, Y. (1979) *L'Aménagement du territoire* (Masson), p.50; Madiot, Y. (1996) *Aménagement du territoire*, 3rd edn (Colin), p.21.

⁹ Bodiguel, J.-L. and Quermonne, J.-L. (1983) *La haute fonction publique sous la Ve République* (PUF), p.181; Rigaud, J. and Delcros, X. (1984) *Les institutions administratives françaises: Les structures* (Daloz), p.195.

¹⁰ Conseil économique et social (1994) Report by G. Parrotin, 'Les orientations de la politique de l'aménagement du territoire à l'horizon 2015', *Avis* 4249.

¹¹ Guichard Commission [Commission de réflexion sur l'aménagement du territoire] (1986) *Propositions pour l'aménagement du territoire: Rapport au Ministre de l'équipement, du logement, de l'aménagement du territoire et des transports*, p.59.

¹² Essig (1979), p.286; Monod, J. and de Castelbajac, P. (1980) *L'Aménagement du territoire*, 4th edn (PUF), p.33; O. Guichard, interviewed by B. Jérôme, *Le Monde*, 13 Feb. 2003.

¹³ *A.N.Débats*, 26 Nov. 1963, reprinted in DATAR (1964) *Un Grand débat parlementaire: l'aménagement du territoire* (La Documentation française), p.70.

¹⁴ Pouyet (1968), p.70; Stevens, A. (1992) *The Government and Politics of France* (Macmillan), pp.216-7.

¹⁵ *Le Monde*, 23-24 March 1986.

¹⁶ Madiot (1996), p.21.

¹⁷ Rapport au Président de la République, *J.O.*, 15 Feb. 1963, reprinted in Alvergne and Musso (2003), p.124.

attachments to other parts of the administration'.¹⁸ The array of locations listed in Figure 3.1 can be grouped under five 'functional' headings:

- *attached directly to the prime minister*, with a variant in which a junior minister in the prime minister's office 'can call on' DATAR's services;
- *attached to a minister for planning*, alongside the Plan Commissariat, another *administration de mission* in a related domain. This option was first tried under a *ministre-délégué*, then a full minister;
- *attached to the interior ministry*, sometimes through a junior minister;
- *attached to a technical ministry*: first and most often the ministry of infrastructure, but also the ministry for the environment or the ministry of industry, the latter through a junior minister;
- *attached to a minister responsible for other 'cross-cutting' areas*, such as urban affairs or 'State reform and public service' (the Plan and the environment could fit here too).

The arguments about the effects of different locations

The conventional view on options other than a direct link to the prime minister is that 'none of these groupings is illogical', but that the disadvantages outweigh the advantages.¹⁹

Direct attachment to the prime minister

The closest link possible between prime minister and DATAR is regarded by most analysts as the best arrangement. 'This solution is unquestionably the simplest. It also confers the greatest prestige on *aménagement du territoire* and the greatest authority on DATAR'.²⁰ As well as the initial period 1963-67, DATAR was also directly attached to the prime minister in Raymond Barre's third government, 1978-81, when he brought DATAR under his own authority and made much of DATAR's 'exemplary character' as an active '*mission*'.²¹ During Mitterrand's presidency, Pierre Mauroy brought DATAR within his own orbit in his second government, 1983-84, though arranging for his junior minister responsible for State-region Plan contracts (see Chapter 5), to be able 'to call on' DATAR's services with regard to the Plan. Pierre Bérégovoy briefly assigned *aménagement du territoire* to his junior minister, in 1992, before transferring the minister and DATAR to the minister of industry.

For two early DATAR members, Jérôme Monod and Philippe de Castelbajac, its close link to the prime minister was its most desirable attribute for making maximum impact; it was one of the three vital characteristics of *aménagement du territoire* in France:

¹ - the authority of the prime minister as the direct source of power in the area of *aménagement du territoire*;

¹⁸ Bodiguel and Quermonne (1983), p.181.

¹⁹ Madiot (1979), p.49.

²⁰ Madiot (1979), p.50.

²¹ M. Cuperly, *La Croix*, 24 April 1980; *Le Monde* 3 May 1979.

- the regular holding of Cabinet committees devoted to it (*comités interministériels d'aménagement du territoire*);
- the existence of a financial budget that is not already committed (FIAT).²²

All three characteristics link DATAR closely to the prime minister since the *comité interministériel d'aménagement du territoire* (CIAT, now called CIADT) is chaired by the prime minister, even when DATAR is attached to another minister, and the fund FIAT (now called FNADT), is financed from the prime minister's budget. *De facto* as well as *de jure* the prime minister and DATAR are closely linked wherever the latter is located.

Despite the arguments put forward in 1963, Pompidou in 1967 appointed Raymond Marcellin *ministre-délégué*, responsible to himself for the Plan Commissariat and DATAR. Guichard had left DATAR to become Minister of Industry and some academics argued that DATAR staff, as mere officials (and even Guichard, for all his role as *chargé de mission* to Pompidou, was only an official), had not been able to persuade other officials to adapt their programmes and that a minister was therefore required.

'It was observed that DATAR by itself was incapable of ensuring coordination. The *délégué* could not manage to prevail over officials in the relevant ministries such as industry, construction, etc.'²³

Ministers as well as officials had made difficulties, the Minister for Industry, Jean Charbonnel, 1966-67, demanding that he should be responsible for regional development grants DATAR was allocating.²⁴ The decision on location also probably owed something to political expediency because Pompidou was unexpectedly dependent on Giscard's Independent Republican Party for his parliamentary majority after the second round of the 1967 parliamentary elections (the polls and the first round had indicated a large majority for the Gaullists). 'Giscard was the arbitrator of the situation' and Pompidou suddenly had to find additional posts for Giscard's colleagues, such as Marcellin.²⁵

The principle of direct attachment continues to be promoted strongly. In a 'grand parliamentary debate on *aménagement du territoire*' in 1990 many *députés* told the minister for 'aménagement du territoire and industrial conversion', Jacques Chérèque (a junior minister responsible to the industry minister), that DATAR should be returned to the prime minister's office.

- 'Your ministry is not located where it should be within the governmental structure. You should not be attached to the industry minister but directly to the prime minister' (Francis Geng, Orne) ...
- 'Policy on *aménagement du territoire* must be all-encompassing, all ministers must contribute. That is why it would surely be preferable to re-attach it to the prime minister' (Auguste Bonrepaux, Ariège)...

²² Monod, J. and de Castelbajac, P. (1971) *L'Aménagement du territoire*. 1st edn (PUF), pp.38-9; and similarly in subsequent editions until 1997 (9th edn), p.31. The 10th edn (2001), no longer refers to the link to the prime minister. 'The two characteristics are...'. p.31.

²³ Teneur, J. and di Qual, L. (1972) *Economie régionale et aménagement du territoire* [Documents and Commentaries] (PUF), p. 14.

²⁴ Madiot (1979), p.50.

²⁵ Chevallier, J.J., Carcassone, G., Duhamel, O. (2002) *La Ve République: 1958-2002* (Colin), pp.134-40.

- 'We deplore the lack of coordination on decisions... I am one of those asking for the minister of *aménagement du territoire* to be made directly responsible to the prime minister and to become a real conductor of the orchestra' (René Drouin, Moselle)...

- 'Everyone agrees about the poor organisation of *aménagement du territoire* at State level as a result of it not being attached to the prime minister' (Olivier Guichard, Loire-Atlantique).²⁶

Guichard 'insisted' for forty years that DATAR 'must be attached directly to the prime minister to be able to exercise an authority over all the other ministers'.²⁷

Attachment with the Plan Commissariat to a minister for planning

Joint responsibility with the Plan to a minister for planning ought to help DATAR be effective since DATAR's official remit had been to ensure that ministries carried out the objectives developed by the Commissariat. This option, introduced by Prime Minister Pompidou in 1967, continued undisturbed until 1972, when President Pompidou put *aménagement du territoire* in the hands of the Infrastructure Minister, Guichard. Then in 1976 President Giscard made Jean Lecanuet, leader of the centre party, minister for Plan and *Aménagement du territoire*, one of three top posts given to the leaders of his coalition partners.²⁸ For ministers of Plan and *aménagement du territoire* in the Left governments after 1981, it was not a powerful position (The Socialist Party took some time to reconcile regional planning with decentralisation). When President Mitterrand appointed 'Michel Rocard, the rival, Minister for the Plan and *aménagement du territoire*: it was a way of marginalising him'.²⁹ Rocard told interviewers: 'It was my time in purgatory, I paid on the nail' (*payé comptant*).³⁰ 'Michel Rocard was confined to the ministry of the Plan'.³¹ In 1984 Gaston Defferre, 'though tired, wanted to remain in government. He had to be content with the Plan and *aménagement du territoire*'.³²

Grouping the two planning bodies, DATAR and the Plan, is often seen as 'the least bad solution' for those who think DATAR should really be linked directly to the prime minister.³³ Yet a Plan Commissariat official who had experienced this arrangement during the 1967-72 period, found that it did not work well in practice. The relations between DATAR and the Plan Commissariat were: 'characterised by a mixture of cooperation and competition, a relationship facilitated when the two bodies were united under the control of the minister responsible for planning and spatial development, [but] 'the allocation of

²⁶ A.N. Débats, 29 May 1990, reprinted in DATAR (1990) Une nouvelle étape pour l'aménagement du territoire (La Documentation française), p.14, pp.31-3.

²⁷ Statement to B. Jérôme, Le Monde, 13 Feb. 2003.

²⁸ Chevallier et al (2002), p.249.

²⁹ Brachet, P. (1995) Du Commandement au Management (Publisud) (1995), p.81fn.

³⁰ Favier, P. and Martin-Roland, M. (1990) La Décennie Mitterrand: 1. Les Ruptures (Seuil) p.70.

³¹ Le Monde, 'Un quart de siècle d'affrontements'. 6 April 1993.

³² Favier, P. and Martin-Roland, M. (1991) La Décennie Mitterrand: 2. Les Epreuves (Seuil) p.166.

³³ Madiot, Y. (1993) L'Aménagement du territoire, 2nd edn (Masson), p.37.

responsibilities ...was not really operational'.³⁴ An official inquiry on planning later warned against trying to combine the two bodies, since they were carrying out tasks 'difficult to reconcile: forward planning and the operational execution of *aménagement du territoire*'.³⁵ However, a more important constraint was their historically-poor working relations:

'Joint working by DATAR and the Plan Commissariat... is indispensable; but certain aspects of our administrative sociology sometimes make this collaboration difficult. Collaboration is however essential and requires the capacity for dialogue between the two institutions to be strengthened'.³⁶

In the early years their conflict was 'latent' rather than 'flagrant', because their top officials (Guichard at DATAR, Massé at the Plan) kept it so, by 'reducing *aménagement du territoire* to mere regional planning'... and 'restricting DATAR's coordinating activities',³⁷ while the the Plan Commissariat concentrated 'on problems everyone agreed about (medium-term growth) and refused to let itself be dragged into political fights over short-term decisions ... or ideological disputes about the longer-term future'.³⁸ However DATAR, especially under its second *délégué*, Monod, wanted to plan 20-year developments and look at scenarios 30 years ahead. The Plan Commissariat's style was to depoliticise decision-making, relying on consensus-building.³⁹ DATAR's style was 'imperial', 'sure of itself', 'domineering' and 'authoritarian'.⁴⁰ The overlap between the Plan Commissariat's role of conception and DATAR's role of execution was made 'more complex by personal conflict... There was, it seems, some fear at the Plan Commissariat of a certain expansionist tendency at DATAR'.⁴¹ The rivalry between the Plan Commissariat and DATAR became too entrenched for them to work effectively together.⁴²

Attachment to the minister of interior

A link to the minister of the interior has also has been recommended as a 'second-best' option to that of a direct link to the prime minister. If the prime minister 'did not think it advisable to return DATAR to its original position, would it not be better to attach it to the

³⁴ Ullmo, Y. (1975) 'France' in J.Hayward and M.Watson (eds), Planning, Politics and Public Policy (Cambridge: CUP), 22-51, p.35.

³⁵ De Gaulle, J. (1994) L'avenir du Plan et la place de la planification dans la société française: Rapport au Premier ministre (La Documentation française), p.72.

³⁶ *ibid.*

³⁷ Pouyet (1968), p.96, p.97.

³⁸ Crozier, M. (1965) 'Analyse sociologique de la planification française', Revue française de sociologie, 6/2, 147-63, p.154.

³⁹ Hayward, J. (1975) 'Introduction: Change and choice: the agenda of planning', in J.Hayward and M.Watson (eds), Planning, Politics and Public Policy (Cambridge: CUP) 1-21, p.9.

⁴⁰ Madiot (1979), pp. 51-4.

⁴¹ *ibid.* p.55, p.55fn.

⁴² At a local government conference (Entretiens Territoriaux de Strasbourg, Dec. 2001), when the DATAR and CGP officials responsible for public services policy danced together, it was the event of the evening, the 'only time the two organisations had ever cooperated'. The DATAR member was atypical for DATAR (a lecturer who became a mature student and sous-prefet), and she said he was atypical for CGP, service in the centrist Stolérú cabinet in the Rocard government making his subsequent career difficult. They offered a photo for the thesis, thus confirming their unusualness.

Minister of Interior?', asked the Conseil d'Etat.⁴³ *Le Monde's* long-term specialist on *aménagement du territoire* argued that, since political decentralisation had increased the role of local authorities, DATAR would be strengthened by an alliance with this minister, responsible for local government.⁴⁴ However, when Giscard put his closest colleague, Michel Poniatowski, Minister of the Interior, in charge of DATAR in 1974, it 'weakened DATAR's image because the minister of interior is in charge of elections'.⁴⁵ The award of the first *contrats de pays* (schemes for improving rural areas) showed that "favours" were given to *députés* or mayors from the political majority'.⁴⁶ François Essig, who was deputy to the *délégué* in 1974 and *délégué* 1975-78, advised against this particular link since 'Michel Poniatowski had been more interested in public security problems [mass strikes and Corsican terrorists] and party politics than in DATAR'.⁴⁷ Nevertheless, when Charles Pasqua was Minister of Interior and *aménagement du territoire* in 1993, he made effective use of the prefects as well as DATAR to raise the profile of *aménagement du territoire* (and his own profile too),⁴⁸ by organising local consultation on the 1995 *Loi d'orientation pour l'aménagement et le développement du territoire* (the 'Pasqua Act' or LOADT).

Attachment to a technical ministry

Despite Guichard's frequent exhortations for a return to the original arrangements, he categorised his own early experience as Minister of *Aménagement du territoire*, Infrastructure, Housing and Tourism, 1972-74, as 'a notable effort of administrative coordination'.⁴⁹ Although this ministry would seem to be an agglomeration of rather disparate sectors, it should be remembered that the main programmes of *aménagement du territoire* at this time concerned developing metropolitan centres and infrastructure-intensive tourist schemes and the combination was appropriate. The minister told *Le Monde*:

I am not achieving absolute administrative and political rationality from the accumulation of powers provided by the new ministry. But I think it is at least progress.⁵⁰

A similar combination was tried by other prime ministers: Barre in 1977-78, Chirac in the *cohabitation* government of 1986-88, Juppé in his brief first administration and Raffarin in 2002-04. In two Socialist governments, those of Rocard and Bérégovoy, DATAR was assigned to a junior minister for *aménagement du territoire* who worked under a minister for industry, reflecting the policy concerns of those governments. Rocard in 1988 had planned to fuse DATAR and the Plan Commissariat but instead decided to put *aménagement du territoire* under his close colleague, Roger Fauroux, at Industry, and appointed Chérèque,

⁴³ Conseil d'Etat (1986) *Structures gouvernementales et organisation administrative* (La Documentation française), p.24.

⁴⁴ F.Grosrichard, *Le Monde*, 20 Jan. 1990; 17 March 1991.

⁴⁵ Audouin, J. (1977) *La France culbutée* (Moreau), p.201.

⁴⁶ Madiot (1979), p.50.

⁴⁷ Essig (1979), p.34.

⁴⁸ M. Valo, *Le Monde*, 3 Nov.1995.

⁴⁹ Madiot (1979), p.50.

who had 'made a good job' of industrial restructuring in Lorraine, the junior minister.⁵¹ In the run-up to the elections of 1995 and 1997, the Socialist leader Lionel Jospin agreed with the Green Party to put DATAR under a Green minister with the environment and transport: in the event transport was allocated to a Communist Party minister.⁵²

Attaching DATAR to a sectoral ministry 'presents the major disadvantage of putting *aménagement du territoire* at the service of a sectoral concern'.⁵³ As a parliamentarian said of Chérèque, 'the minister is slightly too much the minister for industrial restructuring and not enough the minister for *aménagement du territoire*'.⁵⁴ Notwithstanding, a sectoral minister who wants to make an impact on *aménagement du territoire* is better able than DATAR to implement policies in that sector. Under Jean-Pierre Fourcade, 1977, and Pierre Méhaignerie, 1986-88, there was good implementation of transport projects that linked peripheral or isolated regions. Even the more complex ministerial structures of this type did not hinder the prime minister from having close links with DATAR. DATAR in 1988-91 was 'under the authority' of the minister for *aménagement du territoire* and industrial restructuring, who was himself junior to the minister of industry. But DATAR still worked directly for Prime Minister Rocard in areas not related to industrial restructuring, such as negotiating the State-Region Plan Contracts, preparing an interministerial committee on Corsica, and taking on the coordination for France of European Community structural funds, which until then each ministry had organised separately.⁵⁵

Joint responsibility to a minister with other interministerial agencies

The link of *aménagement du territoire* to urban affairs was seen as a political response to 'inner-city' crisis when Delebarre was made minister 'à la ville et à l'*aménagement du territoire*' in the left-wing government of 1991-92, and Gaudin similarly in the right-wing government, 1995-97. Because Delebarre had expertise in regional development, but mainly because he 'wondered what to do to make his mark' (urban programmes having already been announced), he encouraged Prime Minister Cresson to reinvigorate the policy of 'decentralising' public bodies, and thus promoted *aménagement du territoire*.⁵⁶ Gaudin was also interested in *aménagement du territoire* but in his case adding urban policy to the portfolio adversely 'affected the implementation of the Pasqua Act' on *aménagement du territoire*.⁵⁷ Finally, President Chirac appointed Jean-Paul Delevoye as minister for public service and *aménagement du territoire*, only because Delevoye asked Chirac to add the latter role 'so that he was not a minister who just says no' [because of threatened civil service

⁵⁰ *Le Monde*, 10 Oct. 1972.

⁵¹ Drevet, J.-F. (1991) *La France et l'Europe des régions* (Syros), p.216. The author was then at DATAR.

⁵² J.P. Besset, *Le Monde*, 6 June 1997; Manesse, J. (1998) *L'Aménagement du territoire* (LGDJ), p.45.

⁵³ Manesse (1998), p.45.

⁵⁴ Georges Chavannes (Charente), reported in *Le Monde*, 11 Nov. 1989.

⁵⁵ Interview with the *député* Jean-Pierre Duport by F. Grosrichard, *Le Monde*, 25 Jan 1990.

⁵⁶ Bezès, P. (1994) *L'Action publique volontariste* (L'Harmattan), pp.76-77; Favier, P. and Martin-Roland, M. (1999) *La Décennie Mitterrand: 4. Les Déchirements* (Seuil), p.102.

cutbacks], as his wife explained to reporters.⁵⁸ The rationality of appointments does not always have much to do with arguments about the advantages and disadvantages of certain locations.

The consequences of a changing location

There seem to be two separate problems about locating DATAR other than directly under the prime minister: the first is that the particular ministerial position may emphasise one part of DATAR's role to the detriment of its other activities - but that may reflect accurately the leader's emphasis, too, and it does not hinder DATAR working directly for the prime minister on other issues as seen in Rocard's premiership. The second is that 'nomadic behaviour' may in itself be deleterious to DATAR's reputation. DATAR's place in the ministerial structure has changed every two years on average but some researchers argue that little changed when DATAR was relocated since it was still in law part of the prime minister's office.

This capacity for arbitration does not seem to have been prejudiced by the successive attachments of DATAR to different ministries, since the *Délégation* has remained in the prime minister's service'.⁵⁹

But the former *délegués* Guichard and Essig thought differently. Essig said:

'Even though we were placed under the authority of influential members of the government, these frequent changes made people forget DATAR was still part of the prime minister's office'.⁶⁰

The Guichard Commission thought the instability led to a loss in effectiveness.⁶¹ DATAR had also lost the former 'interministerial' status conferred by the direct link to the prime minister, free of ministerial connotation.

'No clever presentational device - whether *ministre-délégué* or committee nominally chaired by the prime minister - prevents other ministries thinking this "ministry" is just one of them'.⁶²

The *Conseil d'Etat*'s analysis of the ways in which prime ministers could delegate authority for 'coordinating roles' found that political authority transferred fully only if:

'it was not just in principle but also in fact that they were acting in the prime minister's name. It can be observed in practice that as soon as the prime minister devolves certain functions to authorities which do not fulfil these conditions, the most express legal formulae have no effect'.⁶³

That is, delegation could still be effective, but only providing prime ministers took care that the relevant policy actors knew that the agency had his or her full backing. The *délégué* Essig had witnessed this relationship as deputy *délégué* in 1972, when DATAR was first attached to a technical minister:

⁵⁷ Manesse (1998), p.45.

⁵⁸ J.B. de Monvalon, *Le Monde*, 24 July 2003.

⁵⁹ Biarez (1982), p.271.

⁶⁰ Essig (1979), p.33.

⁶¹ Guichard Commission (1986), p.58.

⁶² *ibid.*

⁶³ *Conseil d'Etat* (1986), p.19.

'This change could have had damaging consequences...Our fears rapidly dissipated: first the minister received the same powers delegated from the prime minister; second, our minister was none other than Guichard.. he held a privileged place in the government'.⁶⁴

However, Guichard himself no longer thought any ministerial position for DATAR was an effective option:

'*Aménagement du territoire* can manage without a minister but not without a prime minister'.⁶⁵

An empirical assessment of the effects of location

Despite these strong recommendations, doubt must remain, partly because so many political leaders have not followed them, and partly because there has been no empirical evaluation of the relationship between DATAR's location and its impact. Such an exercise is not easy since there are no appraisals of DATAR's work or data on which they might be based. Official performance data consist of time-series of basic statistics (number of firms moving into France, number of grant-aided projects, number of jobs involved) that are not set in context (for example, against economic trends or inward investment in other countries).⁶⁶ DATAR's official 'history' and its intermittent reports do not evaluate (rather than merely record) the outputs of its wide range of activities.⁶⁷ The Guichard Commission of 1986 acknowledged this problem:

'The "1960s policy", created and supported by a strong political will, achieved its objectives despite a few failures, though without it being possible to distinguish precisely what should be attributed to the policy itself and what to the spontaneous evolution that would have affected the territory in any case'.⁶⁸

The decisions of Prime Minister Balladur in 1995 and Prime Minister Juppé in 1997 to create *observatoires de l'aménagement du territoire* to monitor policy implementation were not put into effect.⁶⁹ The Cour des Comptes has recently examined particular aspects of DATAR's work (its support of public-private associations, and its management of its budget and personnel), but it is interested chiefly in whether the correct administrative and financial procedures have been followed.⁷⁰ Most texts on *aménagement du territoire*, whether official or by academics, are commentaries on DATAR's broad range of policies. A few academic studies analyse *aménagement du territoire* but they limit their assessment to a particular sector or problem: for example, Massardier's research is a sociological study of a

⁶⁴ Essig (1979), p.32.

⁶⁵ Guichard Commission (1986), p.59.

⁶⁶ Lettre de la DATAR, 175, 2002.

⁶⁷ Laborie, J.-P.; Langumier, J.-F., and de Roo, P. (1985) La Politique française d'aménagement du territoire de 1950 à 1985 (La Documentation française); DATAR (2002) Rapport d'Activité 2001 (Premier ministre, Ministre de la réforme de l'Etat et d'aménagement du territoire).

⁶⁸ Guichard Commission (1986), p.10.

⁶⁹ In application of the 1995 LOADT, Art.9, a decree creating an Observatoire des territoires was eventually published on 14 Sept. 2004: it refers only to 'collecting and publishing data useful to DATAR'.

⁷⁰ Cour des Comptes (2001) Le Rapport Public 2000 (Journaux Officiels).

technocratic elite.⁷¹ The most comprehensive research, by Biarez, evaluates *aménagement du territoire* 1963-80 within a larger study of local-central relations.⁷² It makes the most of the statistics available when it compares regional wealth with DATAR's allocation by grants by region to test the hypothesis that DATAR's goal is to subsidise private investment and reduce social unrest. Biarez confirms

'[DATAR's] lack of interest in any approach that would enable the results of its policies to be known. DATAR uses few indicators to determine the success or failure of an activity. ... Observation is not continuous, and the validity of criteria and the usefulness of those chosen are not discussed'.⁷³

However, DATAR is not alone in this regard in France, where 'despite the introduction of several autonomous structures attached to the Plan Commissariat, and recently to parliament, evaluation remains marginal'.⁷⁴

A special metric was therefore developed to represent DATAR's effectiveness in its official role: to ensure that 'ministries modified their actions... to make them converge on the government's overall objectives...'.⁷⁵ The variable to be measured has affinities with the terms 'power, influence, control and domination', which, as Dahl says, enjoy little consensus among scholars as to their meaning or how they may be measured. 'Concepts like these have proved to be notoriously difficult both to interpret and to employ rigorously in empirical work'.⁷⁶ The 'reputational survey' methodology that Dahl developed to meet the empirical problem has remained a useful tool for assessing who has or had power over others to influence their decisions.⁷⁷ The theoretical justification for using 'reputational power' rests on the assumption that those reputed by others to have power are more likely to be able to persuade them to accept their views. In their 'rehabilitation' of reputational power, Dowding, Dunleavy, King and Margetts note that 'reputations....are a key power resource for actors' in interactions with other players and in bargaining over decisions.⁷⁸ That is, one measure for DATAR's effectiveness at persuading policy actors to modify their policy programmes is the level of 'power', 'influence', 'strength' or similar characteristic that witnesses judge DATAR to have at that time.

The survey described below uses a similar strategy to the reputational power analysis

⁷¹ Massardier (1996) and see Andrault, M. (1990) 'Aménagement du territoire et stratégie industrielle', *mémoire*, IEP de Paris; and Bezes (1994).

⁷² Biarez, S. (1983a) *Dix-sept années d'aménagement du territoire en France (1963-80): du rééquilibrage au compromis social* (Grenoble: CERAT).

⁷³ Biarez, S. (1989) *Le Pouvoir local* (Economica), p.213. Andrault (1990), pp.250-7, concurs.

⁷⁴ Chagnollaud, D. (2000) *Science politique* 3rd edn (Daloz), p.270. Hayward, J. and Wright, V. (2002) *Governing from the Centre: Core executive coordination in France* (Oxford: OUP), p.58 give some of the political and bureaucratic reasons for this resistance to evaluation.

⁷⁵ 'Rapport au Président de la République', 15 Feb. 1963, reprinted in Alvergne and Musso (2003), p.124.

⁷⁶ Dahl, R. (1989) *Democracy and its Critics* (New Haven: Yale), p.272 and fn.

⁷⁷ For example it is used by A.Fischer, S.Nicolet, P.Sciarini, in 'How Europe hits home: evidence from the Swiss case', *Journal of European Public Policy*, 11/3, June 2004, 353-78.

⁷⁸ Dowding, K., Dunleavy, P., King D., and Margetts, H. (1995) 'Rational Choice and Community Power Structures', *Political Studies*, 43/2, 265-77, p.272.

conducted by Dowding *et al.* These researchers used computerised techniques to search a large database of newspaper articles; they measured the influence of actors in terms of the number of times they were cited, using the 'fact of being reported' as a quantifiable measure of the actor's power resource.⁷⁹ In the case of DATAR, the data came from two sources: academic texts and press cuttings. The latter comprised the folder compiled by the *Institut d'Etudes Politiques* (Paris) of articles that refer to DATAR and a few other public actors responsible for *aménagement du territoire*.⁸⁰ This evidence base and search method enabled DATAR's reputation to be given a rating according to the opinions expressed rather than the number of citations. First, for each year or time period, three items were listed that referred to DATAR's power and status in the government. Where possible the three included both an academic and a press opinion. For some years fewer than three comments were found; where there were more than three, the items were selected for the clarity of their meaning and to reflect any spread of views. DATAR's 'reputational power' was then given a rating according to the three comments.

Figure 3.2 Reputational power comparators

Reputation indicator	Comparator evidence	Source
Very strong 8	'DATAR's preferences could be imposed by Guichard' 'The golden age of <i>aménagement du territoire</i> '	Grémion, C. (1992), p.498 <i>Le Monde</i> , 23-24/3/86
Capable 4	'Rocard gives DATAR the role of selecting zones' 'DATAR is seen as capable of conquering new fields'	Bezes (1994), p.118 Madiot (1993), p.39
Credible 3	'Now DATAR is more closely linked to decentralisation and planning it has a new future' 'Plan-Contract negotiations give DATAR new credibility'	Rigaud & Delcros (1984), p.202. <i>La Croix</i> , 28/6/84
Weak 2	'DATAR becomes a nurse [to sick firms] 1975-76' 'Barre visits DATAR, tells it to reconquer the territory'	Audouin (1977), p.31 <i>La Croix</i> , 24/4/80
Very weak 1	'DATAR downgraded when Poniowski is appointed and then Monod resigns' 'Minister Méhaignerie manages to preserve DATAR'	Audouin (1977), p.31 <i>Le Monde</i> , 7/4/87
Powerless 0	'DATAR in disarray 1981-82' 'Belin-Gisserot reports recommends DATAR should go'	Madiot (1996), p.6. <i>Les Echos</i> , 8/7/86

Figure 3.2 lists the comments used as comparators for estimating DATAR's 'reputation indicator', from the 'very strong' reputation in the 'golden age', when the *délégué* Guichard could 'impose DATAR's preferences' (but only if the prime minister and president agreed), and its 'powerlessness' in 1981 or 1986 when DATAR was 'in disarray' or likely to be abolished. These indicators were expressed numerically ('8 out of 10' for 'very strong', 0 out of 10 for 'powerless'). Though the numbers are subjective they enable statistical assessments to be made (in practice the statistical findings were not sensitive to coding changes).

⁷⁹ The ESRC 'Metropolitan Governance' project used a search of *FT Profile* to help decide the 'reputational power' of London politicians. The theoretical justification is in Dowding *et al.* (1995), pp.272-4.

⁸⁰ Dossier de presse 506/01 - 'organismes chargés de la politique de l'aménagement du territoire, 1974-...'.

Figure 3.3 summarises the opinions expressed about DATAR that were used to estimate its 'reputational power indicator' for each year or period. The results are plotted on a chart in Figure 3.4. Within the limits of the methodology it gives a first assessment of one aspect of the link between the political leadership and DATAR. The first decade, which is universally seen as DATAR's 'strong' period,⁸¹ included times when it was attached to the minister for the plan or for infrastructure. Periods of relative weakness in the late 1970s include years attached to the prime minister. This evidence undermines the proposition about the prime importance of a direct tie between the prime minister and DATAR for both to be fully effective. More generally, attachments to the prime minister; his or her junior minister; the minister for the plan; and the minister for infrastructure, were all associated at different times with both a stronger and a weaker DATAR. Each location can be associated with better or worse outcomes, which must therefore depend on other or additional factors.

THE EFFECTS OF ECONOMIC CONTINGENCIES

The most frequent explanation given for DATAR's dramatic loss of reputation for power in the mid- 1970s is the oil crisis of the period. '*Aménagement du territoire* was born in the years of strong economic expansion, the 1960s, and was then confronted from 1973 with the crisis and a series of mutations that were poorly understood'.⁸² It was never the only explanation: Audouin at the time attributed the 'degradation' of DATAR's reputation to the appointment of Poniowski as minister, who made DATAR seem even more of a party-political vehicle than it had been under the Gaullists.⁸³ Elie Cohen's description of the 'Monod doctrine' that the government adopted (to 'rescue' vulnerable firms with regional development funding while they were still viable), also portrays DATAR as an active institution at this time, but one diverted from its principal goals.⁸⁴

Figure 3.5 tests the 'economic explanation' by correlating economic growth (the percentage change in 'real GDP' per annum) with DATAR's reputational power as estimated earlier. There is a close statistical connection in the first part of the 30-year period between the strong performance of DATAR and the economy until 1974, then their joint crisis, followed by recovery. In the second half of the period, the two seem to be unrelated. Although this simple methodology cannot settle the question definitively, the finding does help back up the argument of Serge Wachter, an academic researcher who had worked at DATAR, that:

⁸¹ 'I knew DATAR when it was strong', was the immediate response of the first academics with whom I discussed this thesis (Chantal Lombard, Roehampton Institute; Simon Lee, Polytechnic of Central London). They meant the late 1960s and early 1970s.

⁸² O. Milhomme, *Quotidien de Paris*, 24 April 1990. See also items for 1973-75 in Figure 3.3.

⁸³ Audouin (1977), p.29.

⁸⁴ Cohen, E. (1989) *L'Etat brancardier. Politiques du déclin industriel (1974-1984)* (Calmann-Lévy), p.270.

Figure 3.3 DATAR's reputational power: 1963-92

Reputational power indicator *		Evidence	Source
1963-65	8	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 'The 1960s and 1970s were the golden age of <i>aménagement du territoire</i> (AdT), when a direct line joined DATAR to Matignon'... • 'DATAR's preferences could be imposed by Guichard; in certain cases, at Matignon, even at the Elysée'. • 'DATAR was most effective when it had 30 staff, says Guichard'. 	<p>Le Monde 23-24/3/86</p> <p>C.Grémion (1992) p.498</p> <p>Drevet (1991) p.188</p>
1966-68	8	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 'DATAR, run by Guichard..., benefiting from PM's authority.. played big role in interministerial decisions, especially on budget'. • 'DATAR is strong because of PM's support and interest ... Can use threat of his arbitration to constrain ministries'. • '1963 to 1973/74 the 2nd phase of AdT with creation of DATAR. Powerful Gaullism, technocratic ... AdT proclaimed a success'. 	<p>Quermonne (1967) p.21</p> <p>Pouyet (1968) p.73.</p> <p>Clout (1987) p.186</p>
1969-71	8	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 'The <i>délégué</i> was [a] quasi-minister in the late 1960s'. • 'Political influence and importance because of Guichard, a noted Gaullist politician; Monod, close to Guichard, a potential minister'. • 'Monod's role, knowledge of French society, gave such weight that he sometimes overshadowed sectoral ministers, cabinets, directors'. 	<p>Libération 2/8/89</p> <p>Prud'homme (1974) p.40</p> <p>Coulbois and Jung (1994) p.15</p>
1972	8	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • '1972 the apogée of DATAR and Monod, when Pompidou ill'. • 'New ministry of AdT is not perfection but political and technical progress at least'. • 'A good effort at administrative coordination'. 	<p>Audouin (1977) p.29</p> <p>Guichard in Le Monde 10/10/72</p> <p>Madiot (1979) p.50</p>
1973	8	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 'DATAR's flamboyant period goes up to 1973'. • 'The golden age of AdT lasted 10 years; until the mid-1970s. Harmed by slowing-down of economic growth and technical change'. • 'The interministerial committee of <i>aménagement du territoire</i> of Dec. 1973 agrees to decentralise public bodies. They do not go'. 	<p>Le Monde 2/1/80</p> <p>Libération 10/10/86</p> <p>Le Monde 18/11/91</p>
1974	1	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 'After 1973 DATAR became less enthusiastic, more respectful of directions from the PM's office during unemployment crisis'. • 'DATAR came up against economic crisis; AdT a luxury'. • 'DATAR degraded when Poniatoski appointed: Monod resigns'. 	<p>Le Monde 2/1/80</p> <p>Quotidien 4/4/90</p> <p>Audouin (1977) p.29</p>
1975	1	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 'Decline seems to start 1975: economic crisis; Giscard's policies'. • 'Pillars supporting DATAR's action successively foundering since economic crisis of 1970s'. 	<p>Madiot (1996) p.5</p> <p>Le Monde, 29-30/3/87</p>
1976	1	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 'DATAR becomes a nurse 1975-76'. • 'It was unreasonable to attach DATAR to ministry of interior, which is a political ministry'. The attachment raised problems. 	<p>Audouin (1977) p.31</p> <p>Guichard 1976 in Madiot (1979) p.49</p>
1977	2	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • '8 ministries 1967-78 - 'great uncertainty on AdT's place and role'. • 'DATAR prepared 15th anniversary at a time, when after a little eclipse, it carried out some significant acts, rising in public opinion'. 	<p>Madiot 1979) p.50</p> <p>Essig (1978) p.277</p>
1978	3	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Giscard supports DATAR, 'asks for national conference'. He says he wants to give AdT its 'second wind'. • 'DATAR missions means has more important role than texts say'. 	<p>Speech at Vichy conference 6/12/78.</p> <p>Madiot (1979) p.56</p>
1979	2	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 'Has lost role of regulating and organising space; tries to create jobs anywhere on anything; has become a vast rural nurse'. • 'Ain department denounces role of DATAR in diverting jobs away'. 	<p>Josselin (PS) in Le Monde 3/2/79</p> <p>Le Monde 3/5/79</p>
1980	2	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 'Barre visits DATAR; says it is "an exemplary organisation"; small, innovative, active, tells it "to reconquer the territory".' 	<p>La Croix 24/4/80</p>
1981	0	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Rocard takes 6 months to appoint Délégué. 'DATAR breaks down' and 'has an identity crisis'. • 'Attali must breathe life back into DATAR'. • 'DATAR in disarray 1981-82'. 	<p>Le Monde 18/9/81</p> <p>Le Monde 16/10/81</p> <p>Madiot (1996) p.6</p>


contd

Figure 3.3 DATAR's reputational power *contd*


1982	1	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 'DATAR still coordinator; but stress now is on regions' action'. • 'DATAR staff go on strike, do not want to go to regions'. • 'Rocard gives DATAR coordinating role for Plan-Contracts. Keeps délégué: chance of 2nd wind after stagnation of recent years'.. 	Clout (1987) p.188 Le Monde 4/6/82 Bodiguel & Quermonne (1983) p.181
1983	3	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 'Plan-contract negotiations give DATAR new credibility with ministries and regional politicians'. • 'Now DATAR is more closely linked to decentralisation and planning it has a good future'. • 'Plan-contracts the big moment within period of decline in DATAR's interministerial role'. 	La Croix, 28/6/84 Rigaud and Delcros (1984) p.202 Guichard Commission (1986) p.57
1984	1	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 'Délégué [not PM] gives taciturn press conference after CIAT' • 'DATAR "by-passed by government", appoints a separate délégué for Lorraine industrial restructuring'...'What use is DATAR?' • 'MP says "not bad" that DATAR budget to go up 14% in 1985'. 	Le Monde 19/4/84 La Croix 28/6/84 Le Monde 25/10/84
1985	0	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DATAR's 'control on Paris offices removed. Dirigiste AdT fails'. • 'AdT no longer exists'. (Guichard in Le Monde). • 'No defender of regional policy in government, not even Defferre'. 	Libération 15/12/84 Le Monde 2/12/85 Tribune 4/9/86
1986	0	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 'DATAR drifting, image tarnished'. 'Many in government majority ask whether to keep it, but Méhaignerie believes in it'. • 'Belin-Gisserot report recommends DATAR should go'. • 'Public opinion fairly indifferent to DATAR in Sallois tenure'. 	Le Monde 20/5/86 Les Echos 8/7/86 Le Monde 7/5/87
1987	1	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • '[Minister for administrative reform] thinks DATAR could be used to warn government of undue imbalance between regions'. • 'Minister Méhaignerie manages to preserve DATAR'. • 'DATAR the target of left and right.. Needs a new credibility'. 	Le Monde 13/1/87 Le Monde 7/4/87 Le Monde 7/5/87
1988	1	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 'DATAR still does not hold the same cardinal place in government's interest... But no longer thinking of abolishing it'. • 'Coup de grâce: Budget so low senators abolished it in derision'. • 'DATAR "confused" for several years.. stuck in the mud'. 	Le Monde 9/1/88 Le Monde 16/12/88 Le Monde 7/4/89
1989	0	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 'Délégué less than ministry director-general. DATAR sleeping for years; doesn't have position in government structure it should have'. • 'Government takes months to appoint délégué minister wants'. • 'AdT a bit stuttering over recent years'. (Minister Fauroux). 	Libération 2/8/89 Le Monde 6/10/89 Le Monde 11/11/89
1990	2	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 'Assembly doubles DATAR's budget. Rocard: "A new phase is beginning: AdT must mobilise the whole government".' • '"Hasn't DATAR lost influence for several years?" Délégué: "Only in appearances - does not know how to make itself known'. • 'A third age for AdT - based on long-term vision'. 	Le Monde 31/1/90 Le Monde 25/1/90 Quotidien 24/4/90
1991	4	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 'After census results Rocard in November 1990 gives DATAR the role of selecting zones for ministry relocation plans'. • 'DATAR...rose in status during the early 1990s'. • 'Since relaunch of AdT policies DATAR is seen as capable of conquering new fields'. 	Bezes (1994) p.118 Stevens (1992) p.101 Madiot (1993) p.39
1992	0	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 'Government assigns coordination of relocation to a new "mission" attached to minister for public service, not DATAR'. • 'DATAR staff strike against move to Paris suburbs'. 	Le Monde 27/5/92 Le Monde 13/12/92

*Note: The 'reputational power indicator' (out of 10) is estimated from published opinions as cited, and with reference to the comparator quotations in Figure 3.2.

Sources: Press cuttings from the Paris IEP's 'dossier de presse' no. 506/01: 'Bodies responsible for *aménagement du territoire*', and academic sources (full references are listed in bibliography). Some quotations are abbreviated to save space but they are faithful to the sense of the original.



Source of data: Figures 3.1, 3.3.



Source of data: Figure 3.3, INSEE, *Comptes Nationaux* (various years).

Notes. The GDP figures are for that year's percentage growth. There seems to be no published 'real GDP' series for the whole period examined.

The correlation coefficients for the relationship between DATAR's reputational power and GDP annual change over the three time-periods are given below.

	GDP series	r^2	N	Significance level of r
1963-81	1970 prices	0.625	19	highly significant (1 in 1000 chance)
1971-89	1980 prices	0.328	19	significant (1 in 100 chance)
1978-92	1995 prices	0.009	14	not significant

'the decline of [DATAR's] institutional power is, in many respects, independent of changes in the economic environment. Certainly, the context of crisis restricted the redistributive power of *aménagement du territoire*. But the appropriate responses were worked out and applied'.⁸⁵

High levels of growth in the 1960s enabled political leaders and DATAR to conceive 'redistributive' policies for *aménagement du territoire* based on developing several 'metropolitan counter-magnets' to Paris. But there were policy alternatives that did not require strong growth, such as the contracts to improve small towns, that DATAR invented in 1975. Low levels of growth in the late 1980s did not stop ministers such as Chérèque and Delebarre, who had been professional regional developers, promoting the policy energetically with programmes for industrial restructuring or administrative relocation to provincial cities. Indeed Chérèque argued that economic crisis increased the need for long-term *aménagement du territoire* programmes.⁸⁶ Thus, there is no necessary connection between particular economic conditions and DATAR's reputation or impact. As Blondel suggests, the political leaders' own perspective and capacity to respond comes into play when they are confronted with events in the non-institutional environment.⁸⁷ However, the coincidence of the oil crisis and the change of President in 1974 makes the two factors hard to disentangle without other evidence. Economic conditions and DATAR's links to the leadership were seen as twin conditions for its success.

The end of the period of economic growth brought a halt to industrial decentralisation, principal beneficiary of the policy of *aménagement du territoire* invented by Olivier Guichard with the support of Georges Pompidou and imposed thanks to the political authority of General de Gaulle.⁸⁸

LEADERSHIP INTEREST: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

In the last section, as in the last chapter, there were signs that the active interest of members of the political leadership could have an impact on DATAR, as they had on the DAT. The concluding part of this chapter is guided by a statistical test of the relationship between political leaders' interest in *aménagement du territoire* and DATAR's reputational power. It seeks to show whether DATAR's power depends on the leadership's own commitment to the policy, and hence, conversely, whether different leaders have a different impact on bureaucracies (both DATAR and those DATAR tries to coordinate), depending on their own aims.

The evaluation of leaders' interest in *aménagement du territoire* was based mainly on opinions, but also on actions almost certain to have been taken on their own initiative (for example, President's Giscard's creation of a new Planning Council chaired by himself). The relationship being examined is therefore that between a leader's reported intentions on

⁸⁵ Wachter, S. (1989) 'Ajustements et recentrage d'une politique publique', *Sociologie du Travail*, 31/1, 51-74, p.56.

⁸⁶ Marcou, G., Kistenmacher, H. and Clev, H.-G. (1994) *L'Aménagement du territoire en France et en Allemagne* (La Documentation française), p.79.

⁸⁷ Blondel (1987), pp.7-8.

⁸⁸ T. Bréhier, *Le Monde*, 13 July 1993.

aménagement du territoire and DATAR's reputation for being able to coordinate that policy. For each president and prime minister over the thirty-year period (1963-92) statements were collected that indicated the leader's attitude to *aménagement du territoire*. Ten statements were selected for presidents, but only up to five for prime ministers, partly because of the number of actors involved, partly because many were not in place long enough or had enough interest in the policy for relevant statements to be made. In selecting the statements priority was given to the leader's own writings, speeches and actions, and then to authors who had worked with the leaders or interviewed them. Based on these statements, an 'interest indicator' was estimated for each leader. Figure 3.6 lists the statements used as comparators, from the 'strong' interest expressed by Pompidou to the 'no interest' shown by Chirac after his Gaullist party adopted a liberal economic policy in response to the Left gaining power in 1981.⁸⁹

Figure 3.6 Leadership interest comparators

Interest indicator	Comparator evidence	Source
Strong	Speech, 12/7/61: 'Activity is concentrated in certain regions, while held back in others.. 'we must ... <i>aménagement le territoire</i> , that is, remodel the structure and face of France'.	De Gaulle (1970) III, p. 329
4	'Pompidou was passionate about <i>aménagement du territoire</i> , especially as in his view, a coherent industrial policy ought to be decentralised'.	Roussel (1994), p.151
Fairly strong	PM Barre, April 1980: 'In early 1978 I decided that, in the circumstances we found ourselves, a second wind had to be given to <i>aménagement du territoire</i> '.	Andrault (1990), p.222.
3	PM Cresson: 'I saw <i>aménagement du territoire</i> needed a new wind. DATAR had got very good results for 15 years but then no longer had a well-defined role'.	Bezes (1994), p.72
Average	Giscard speech 16/12/77: 'Farming is our oil...the whole of France needs a living, well-equipped countryside with modern living standards'.	Andrault (1990), p.144
2	[Chirac in 1974] 'knew DATAR and regional development well because of his passion for the Corrèze and Limousin; he was a precious arbiter for DATAR'.	Essig (1979), p.89
Weak	PM Mauroy in committee creates PAT grants 6/5/82 and decides 29/9/82 to devolve allocation to regions.	Rémond (1999), p.97
1	President Mitterrand 21/6/82 asks Minister of Transport and DATAR to organise public works to create jobs	Attali (1993) p.388
None	Fabius 1985 abolished DATAR's <i>agrément</i> procedure for licensing office building in Paris new towns	Bezes (1994) p.25
0	'The new prime minister [Chirac] being in favour of its death, the fate of DATAR appeared sealed'.	Drevet (1991), p.215

Figures 3.7 and 3.8 collate the statements for each president and prime minister surveyed, and assign a quantified indicator, according to the balance of the comments. A summary of the findings is shown in Figure 3.9. These indicators were then plotted against

⁸⁹ Derville, J. (1990) 'Le discours des partis gaullistes', *Regards sur l'Actualité*, 165, 17-29, p.23.

Figure 3.7 The commitment of presidents to *aménagement du territoire*: 1963-92

President and Interest indicator*	Evidence	Source
De Gaulle 1963-68 4	• Speech, 14/6/60: 'It is a matter of transforming our old France into a new country... and make it marry its century: our decision is made.'	De Gaulle (1970) III, p. 225
	• Speech, 8/5/61: 'The objectives to be decided by the Plan for the whole country and each of its regions... need to take on for all French people a character of strong obligation.. '	De Gaulle (1970) III, p.314
	• TV speech, 12/7/61: 'Activity is concentrated in certain regions, while held back in others.. 'In brief, we have to, as one says, <i>aménager le territoire</i> , that is, remodel the structure and face of France.'	De Gaulle (1970) III, p.329
	• Press conference, 14/1/63: '[It means] a transformation of the human condition...by social investment... in the whole nation...by the <i>aménagement</i> of its economy and administration on its own territory'..	De Gaulle (1970) IV, p.64
	• TV speech, 31/12/63: 'The IVth Plan will be executed and the Vth established. Where it is a matter of... the <i>aménagement</i> of the whole territory and each of its regions... we will continue to advance'.	De Gaulle (1970) IV, p.154
	• 'His interest in AdT appeared clearly only after the first projects took shape. Then AdT became a great mission'. (Guichard 21/6/89)	Charles and Cristini (1992) p.470
	• Speech at Lille, 23/4/66: 'Our economic power depends on developing all our regions. In each.. it must be according to its character and capacities, in such a way the whole nation is coherent and balanced. By marrying multiple diversities unity is achieved. As always it is the State which is in charge of unity in France.'	De Gaulle (1970) V, p.30
	• Speech at Lyon, 24/3/68: 'The multi-century effort of centralisation ...is no longer needed - on the contrary it is regional activities that are likely to be the sources of tomorrow's economic power'.	De Gaulle (1970) V, p.271
	• Speech at Quimper, 2/2/69: 'Our Plan must <i>aménager</i> ..State action over the whole territory..so that each region..has the will and receives the means to take its own particular share in the overall national effort.'	De Gaulle (1970) V, p.378
	• 'There are three vital necessities for the nation: infrastructure and development of the territory; creation of regions and.. participation'	De Gaulle (1971) p.294
Pompidou 1969-73 4	• 'De Gaulle and Pompidou were passionate about this problem because it was political in the highest sense'..	Guichard (1975) p.90
	• 'With de Gaulle I have no memory of the Elysee looking.. at our dossiers. When Pompidou became President it was different. DATAR was a little his favourite child'.	Essig (1979) p.97
	• Oct. 1970 opens Lille-Marseille motorway: 'I want to emphasise it is ...a factor in promoting economic activity and thus the goal of AdT'.	Esambert (1994) p.109
	• Held <i>conseils restreints</i> on AdT 11/12/69, 25/11/71, 6/12/73 and many others on regional reform, Paris and infrastructure.	Archives Nationales (1996) 2/53-63...
	• March 1971. Esambert writes in L'Expansion, at request of Pompidou: the President 'is aiming for significant growth in a liberal framework with territorial balance'.	Esambert (1994) p.28
	• 'Pompidou was passionate about AdT especially as in his view a coherent industrial policy ought to be decentralised'.	Roussel (1994) p.151
	• Spring 1971: 'When we told him that rural renovation policy was affected by ministries holding back their budgets, he said: "I see very well that a Rural Renovation Fund should be created", and it was'.	Michardère in 'Georges Pompidou' (1990) p.260
	• Speech: Saint-Flour, June 1971: 'France must not become a dusting of conurbations dispersed in desert, even if green and well-maintained'.	Esambert (1994) p.141
	• Committed to AdT as PM. Then more concerned with industrial imperative. But nominated Guichard as Super-minister of AdT in 1972.	Flockton et al. (1989) p.107
	• Holds <i>Conseil restreint</i> 6/12/73 that agrees to put limit on new office space in Paris to help service sector decentralisation.	Audouin (1977) p.162

contd.

Figure 3.7 contd

Giscard 1974-80	• On 25/9/74 set up <i>Conseil central de planification</i> (CCP) that he chaired, which decided to hold a complete review of AdT policy.	Lajugie et al (1979) pp.417-8
	• Held 3 <i>Conseil central de planification</i> meetings on AdT by 1979, which issued new goals for AdT and instructions for projects.	Essig (1979) p.81
	• At CCP 25/11/75: 'In period of crisis, AdT must be an economic policy for country's global development'. He decides the 5 priorities.	Alvergne et al. (2003) p.198
	• Giscard not at first as sympathetic as Pompidou to AdT but soon grasped the interest and then paid great attention.	Essig (1979) p.97
	2 • Giscard says he is against planning and corporatist concertation, wants community of responsible individuals and participation.	Giscard (1977) p.42
	• Giscard says 'Centuries of centralisation led to the overdevelopment of Paris, underdevelopment of certain provinces.. need a powerful movement of decentralisation'.	Giscard (1977) p.82
	• Vassy speech 16/12/77. Farming is our oil: all France needs a living, well-equipped countryside with modern living standards'.	Andraut (1990) p.144
	• Speech at Vichy national conference of AdT, 6/12/78. Wants different type of AdT, emphasising quality of life in rural areas.	Derville (1990) p.21
	• Mazamet speech 17/11/79 Ten year plan for Grand South West 'is also necessary for France which must be able to count on the capacities of all its regions and capacities for work of all its citizens'.	Andraut (1990) p.144
	• As president of Auvergne rejected idea of planning for regional contract plans 1982. But promoted its tourism projects.	Madiot (1993) p.75.
Mitterrand 1981-92	• In 'Ici et Maintenant' (1980): 'France needed a strong centralised power to make itself.. now needs decentralised powers not to unmake itself'. criticises 'domination from Paris by colonial administration'.	Quoted by Favier & Martin-Roland (1990) p.144
	• AdT not among '110 propositions' of 1981 manifesto (nor in 'themes' of 1981 book). Reform of Plan is no.19, decentralisation: 54	Mitterrand (1981) pp.313-24
	• 'Michel Rocard, the rival, was the first Minister for the Plan and aménagement du territoire: it was a way of marginalising him'.	Brachet (1995) p.81fn
	• <i>Délégué</i> the 16th on list of 22, in order of priority, of posts to be appointed within 6 months of election (not including prefects, banks).	Attali (1993) p.38
	1 • March 1982 decentralisation laws (giving development powers to communes in competition with each other) destroys spatial coherence.	Montricher (1995) p.5.
	• Press conference 9 June 1982: 'territorial balancing' 6th aim mentioned; creates development grants, to be decided by regions	Le Monde 11/9/91
	• 21/6/82 President asks Minister of Transport and DATAR to organise public works programme to create jobs.	Attali (1993) p.388
	• 1/3/89 Conseil des Ministres on decentralisation of Paris ministries, 'When it comes to anti-Parisian outbidding, no-one to beat Mitterrand.'	Attali (1993a) p.181
	• Speech at Chinon 12/9/91: proposes local development by communes (then denied by minister for local government).	Le Monde, 22-23/9/91
	• Deconcentration of administrative bodies in 1991-92 inspired by Cresson and Mitterrand's dislike of Parisian elites.	Attali (1993a) p.761

* The 'interest indicator' (out of 5) is estimated from the speeches, actions and comments summarised above, and with reference to the comparator quotations in Figure 3.5.

Sources: Full references are given in the bibliography. Some quotations are abbreviated to save space but they are faithful to the sense of the original.

Figure 3.8 The commitment of prime ministers to *aménagement du territoire*: 1963-92

Prime Minister and Interest indicator*	Evidence	Source
Pompidou 1963-67 4	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 'Became interested in AdT because sensitive to need for France not to remain sick man of Europe. AdT needed urgent development'.. • 'In 1962 he made AdT a national priority... Gave it much care, supported by forecasting studies, directive and incentive measures. • 'Overall, believed France not up- to-date, must industrialise, build infrastructure, launched an ambitious policy of AdT'. • Speech to National Assembly 26/11/63 [Putting AdT into operation is] '<i>la grande affaire de la nation toute entière</i>'. • 'DATAR strong because of PM's support and interest in the topic'. • 'Showed constant interest in problems of AdT'. 	<p>Guichard (1975) p.91</p> <p>Esambert (1994) p.37, p.140</p> <p>Roussel (1994) p.150</p> <p>Lanversin (1970) p.32</p> <p>Pouyet (1968) p.73, p.126</p>
Couve de Murville 1968 0	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • At Sciences Po in 1939 Couve was very liberal, marked Delouvrier down for writing in favour of a type of planned economy. • Couve 'had never shown any interest in the regions'. • 'Ill-at-ease outside Paris'. • In 1985 Le Figaro article demands 'Rueff'-type rigour and free-market policies. 	<p>Delouvrier in Chenu (1994) p.49</p> <p>Guichard (1980) p.435</p> <p>Essig (1979) p.134</p> <p>Reprinted in Slama (ed.) (1986) p.346</p>
Chaban-Delmas 1969-71 4	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • From 1953 'plays the regional expansion card'; encourages Bordeaux regional expansion committee'; salutes creation of DATAR in 1963 • 'He saw in AdT a social project halfway between technique and politics'. • 'On the first Conseil national d'aménagement du territoire [1963-]'. 'I emphasised importance of AdT: concern to locate new industries in new regions, develop metropolises, reduce weight of Paris region' • Vth Plan needed Chaban-Delmas's personal commitment to Plan and DATAR... to keep AdT, against preference of top officials for market. 	<p>Lagroye (1973) pp.75-121</p> <p>Audouin (1977) p.184</p> <p>Essig (1979) p.71</p> <p>Chaban-Delmas (1997) p.442</p> <p>Lajugie et al (1979) p.393</p>
Messmer 1972-73 0	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No interest expressed. 'Particularly respectful of Presidential authority: the President's views a sure guide to his decisions'. • 'Colourless, uninspiring, unimaginative'. 	<p>Essig (1979) p.87</p> <p>Hayward (1993) p.28</p>
Chirac 1974-75 2	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 'Knew DATAR and regional development well because of passion for Corrèze and Limousin; a precious arbiter for DATAR: Monod his aide'. • Instruction of 1/7/74 to SNCF: 'aim to fight devitalisation of market towns and country areas, no new closures of local passenger lines'. • 20/4/75, Fourcade told 'Figaro' that Chirac was 'more interventionist and dirigiste than I am - has been affected by constituency sociology'. • Letter to President 27/7/76 said government needed to give '<i>une impulsion vigoureuse et coordonnée</i>' to political and economic action'. • In 1980 Chirac was still saying he regretted France had moved so far away from treating the Plan as an 'ardent obligation'. 	<p>Essig (1979) p.89.</p> <p>Essig (1979) p.137</p> <p>Servent (1989) p.165</p> <p>Servent (1989) p.183.</p> <p>Derville (1990) pp.21-3</p>
Barre 1976-80 3	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In 1962 was on Normandy regional development committee; drafted Normandy regional plan. • Had been on the Conseil national d'aménagement du territoire. • Speech 23/4/80: 'In early 1978 I decided that in the circumstances we found ourselves a second wind had to be given to AdT'. • April 1980: Official visit to DATAR; says it is 'an exemplary organisation'; small, innovative, instructs it 'to reconquer the territory'. • 1987 presidential campaign speech: "will give preference to a strategy of economic and social development over a mainly financial strategy'. 	<p>Lanversin (1970) p.157.</p> <p>Essig (1979) p.71</p> <p>Andrault (1990) p.222</p> <p>La Croix 24/4/80</p> <p>Le Monde 6-7/9/87</p>

contd

Figure 3.8 contd.

Mauroy 1981-83	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Very active at running own regional and city development in Lille and Nord-Pas-de-Calais in tandem with regional prefect. • Speech 15/4/81: 'When people talk about Mitterrand's term in 20 years, will mention decentralisation, abolition of prefects, local government reform, direct election of regional assemblies'. 	Quoted in Lacour (1983) p.63.
1	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1982 laws devolve AdT to regions. Decides in committee to create PAT grants 6/5/82 and decree 22/9/82 to devolve them to regions. • Chaired AdT committee 6/5/82 but left press conference to Rocard. Chaired it 13/4/84 but left press conference to Attali, four days later. • Tells ministries to prepare relocation plans for DATAR committee. 	Rémond (1999) p.97. Le Monde 19/4/84 Bezes (1994) p.25
Fabius 1984-85	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1985 decided to abolish agrément (approval) for speculative office building in Paris new towns (DATAR's main instrument). • Opposed to regional tier and 'regional grands ducs', which led him to prefer departmental wards for regional elections. 	Bezes (1994) p.25. Rémond (1999) p.37.
0		
Chirac 1986-87	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 'DATAR was not his thing... He's never had a pronounced taste for a vision of France as a whole'. Guichard interview. • 'The new prime minister being in favour of its death, the fate of DATAR seemed sealed'. [Drevet was at DATAR in 1986]. • Lets Balladur reduce DATAR's budget substantially for 1987. • Wanted DATAR's procedures examined, efficiency improved, and to let prefects and sub-prefects deliver the new AdT aims on the ground. • Launches roads for backward France and TGV for winning France in 1987 with privatisation income, although Balladur at Finance against. 	Le Monde 13/2/03 Drevet (1991) p.215 Le Monde 19/9/86 Le Monde 10/4/87 Le Monde 15/4/87 Le Monde 12/2/88
0		
Rocard 1988-90	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Decided to put AdT under Industry with Chérèque who had done good job in Lorraine; and gave Chérèque a new development fund.. • Reintroduced agrément for speculative office building. 'Prime minister putting new wind in sails for a rebalancing of Paris region'. • Rocard: 'A new phase for DATAR is beginning'. Allows minister to run a debate in National Assembly 29/5/90 to relaunch AdT. • 1990 census results show massive growth of Paris: Rocard's AdT committee 1990 defines new aim to move 15,000 jobs out of Paris. • As PM spoke in support of DATAR but was 'très [Ile-de]-francilien'. 	Drevet (1991) p.216 Le Monde 9/8/88 Libération 2/8/89 Le Monde 31/1/90 Bezes (1994) p.27 Le Monde 22/9/91
3		
Cresson 1991	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Interventionist. As Industry Minister reorganised its regional division and appointed expert so could respond better to DATAR. • Had already decided to steal the Right's AdT theme when a Paris commuter train crash made her agree to support relocation scheme. • 'I saw AdT policy needed new wind. DATAR had got very good results for 15 years at start, but no longer had well-assigned role. Did not see how could be brought up to date. Problems had changed'. • Audacious deconcentration of central administrative bodies. Inspired by a dislike of Parisian elites which she shared with President. • If one wanted to give it [relocation] a push, it required the State showed the example, otherwise it was just words. 	Le Monde 3/8/85 Cresson to Favier et al (1999) pp.100-3. Cresson to Bezes (1994) p.72 Attali (1993a) p.760. Cresson to Bezes (1994) p.80.
3		
Bérégevoy 1992	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 'From 1985 Bérégevoy talked like the liberals he had attacked'. • In a context bound to be disastrous, he decided to keep to a rigorous economic and monetary policy. 	Bauchard (1994) p.40 Chevallier et al. (2002) p.398.
0		

* The 'interest indicator' (out of 5) is estimated from the speeches, actions and comments summarised above, and with reference to the comparator quotations in Figure 3.5.

Sources: Full references are given in the bibliography. Some quotations are abbreviated to save space but they are faithful to the sense of the original.

those for DATAR's reputational power, as shown in Figures 3.10 and 3.11. Although the assessments are subjective and individual indicators are vulnerable to error, the exercise is systematic and transparent.

Figure 3.9 Political leaders' level of interest in *aménagement du territoire* 1963-92

Level of interest	Strong	Fairly strong	Average	Weak	None
Presidents	De Gaulle Pompidou		Giscard	Mitterrand	
Prime ministers	Pompidou Chaban-Delmas	Barre Rocard Cresson	Chirac 1974-76	Mauroy	Couve de Murville Messmer Fabius Chirac 1986-88 Bérégovoy


In statistical terms, the data in Figure 3.10 show a close link between the president's reported interest and DATAR's reputed power. The correlation is 'highly significant', such that there is a 1 in 1000 chance of finding such a close link if there were no real correlation; and changes in the president's interest 'explain' statistically a high proportion of the changes in DATAR's reputation. In visual terms, Figure 3.10 shows that the stepped reduction in presidential interest throughout the 30 year period is accompanied by a general decline in DATAR's reputational power. In policy and political terms, DATAR looks stronger under the early Gaullists (committed to a national modernisation policy to which all regions must contribute),⁹⁰ weaker under Giscard (against planning and budgetary expenditure but willing to agree a limited number of focused *aménagement du territoire* measures),⁹¹ and almost disappears under Mitterrand (DATAR was the very symbol of 'the obsessive domination from Paris of a colonial administration'.⁹²). DATAR's strength within the administration is therefore not independent of the presidency; it seems to follow its demands closely. That is, different presidents seem to make a different impact on DATAR in a way that is well-related to their own level of commitment to *aménagement du territoire*.

Despite the stronger legal link between the prime minister and DATAR (the president's single formal power over DATAR is his counter-signature to the *délégué's* appointment), Figure 3.11 shows only a weak correlation statistically between the prime minister's reported interest in *aménagement du territoire* and DATAR's reputational power. Not only do variations in the prime minister's interest 'explain' statistically only a small


⁹⁰ De Gaulle's speeches on 14 April and 8 May 1961, 14 Jan. 1963, 27 April 1969, in De Gaulle, C. (1970) *Discours et Messages* (Plon); Pompidou's speech of October 1970 in Esambert, B. (1994) *Pompidou: Capitaine d'industries* (Odile Jacob), p. 109.

⁹¹ Giscard d'Estaing, V. (1977) *Towards a New Democracy*, tsl. V. Cronin (French edn 1976) (Collins), p.42; Madiot (1979), p.73.

⁹² Favier and Martin-Roland (1990), p.144.



Source of data: Figures 3.3, 3.7.



Source of data: Figures 3.3, 3.8.

Note: A third graph (not shown) relating DATAR's reputational power to the 'joint commitment' of the two leaders (the sum of the interest indicators of the president and prime minister) produced a correlation coefficient less than that for the president alone.

Relation to DATAR's power	r^2	Significance level of r (N = 30)
President's interest	0.889	highly significant (1 in 1000 chance)
PM's interest	0.176	probably significant (1 in 20 chance)
President's+ PM's interest	0.604	highly significant (1 in 1000 chance)

proportion of the variation in DATAR's reputational power, but also the finding is only 'probably significant'; that is, there is a 1 in 20 chance that this level of correlation would be found even if there were no real connection. The weak relationship between the prime minister's aims for *aménagement du territoire* and his or her impact on DATAR's efforts is likely to be related to the strong relationship found for the presidency: the president's wishes tending to dominate the outcome. On the one hand DATAR's reputation could remain high under Couve and Messmer, who were opposed to or not interested in planning but disposed to follow the wishes of President de Gaulle (for Couve de Murville)⁹³ or President Pompidou (for Messmer)⁹⁴. Premiers keen to promote *aménagement du territoire* initiatives could go ahead if the president were also keen or at least in accord with them, as Pompidou did in creating DATAR during de Gaulle's presidency, and Cresson did during Mitterrand's when deciding to move administrative bodies out of Paris (see Chapter 5). On the other hand, President Giscard seems to have been able to constrain Prime Minister Barre, who had been interested in regional economic development for twenty years and chose to bring DATAR directly under his authority because, he said:

'I had in effect, at the beginning of 1978, acquired the conviction that in the circumstances in which we found ourselves, a second wind had to be given to *aménagement du territoire*'.⁹⁵

Although Giscard had in the first years of Barre's premiership respected Barre's economic competence, made him Minister of the Economy and let him 'exploit that territory', from 1978 he was more suspicious of Barre's independence.⁹⁶

It would seem that prime ministers are not as free as presidents to make an impact on DATAR and its activities in accordance with their own preferences, if the two leaders have different views on policy. The 'joint' commitment of the top leadership (as measured by adding together the interest indicators of president and prime minister), correlates well with DATAR's standing but less well than does the president's commitment alone. This finding tends to confirm that the president has a greater impact on DATAR's activities than has the prime minister, and that the interest of a prime minister cannot substitute for the absence of presidential interests. It is yet another piece of evidence that the legal tie to the prime minister is unimportant compared with the goals that political leaders, especially the president, have for the policy.

CONCLUSIONS

Blondel's condition for ensuring an effective transmission of policy between executive decision and implementation was that 'the links between the bureaucracy and the leader must

⁹³ Hayward, J. (1993) 'The President and the Constitution', in J. Hayward (ed.) De Gaulle to Mitterrand: Presidential Power in France (Hurst), 36-75, p.59. Couve de Murville was 'evasively and unswervingly reliable'.

⁹⁴ The *délégué* Essig wrote: 'the President's views were a sure guide to his decisions' (1979), p.87.

⁹⁵ Quoted in Andrault (1990), p.222; Barre's speech at DATAR, two years after the reorganisation, La Croix, 24 April 1980.

be close and effective'.⁹⁷ Two contrasting interpretations of the nature of those essential links have been examined. The prevalent assumption since 1963 has been that DATAR's prestige and authority is dependent on its formal link to the leadership. It is usually argued that DATAR's direct attachment to the prime minister is crucial to persuading ministries to adopt the leader's goals. The implication is that the impact of the political leadership depends on the formal institutions above all else, and that the leadership's 'positional' resources, which derive from the institutional environment, are more important than their 'personal' characteristics, such as their commitment to a particular 'cause' or their responsiveness to the non-institutional environment.

An assessment of the arguments and examples cited in favour of one location or another showed however that there was no 'single best solution'. In any case, prime ministers dealt directly with DATAR on issues that interested them even when they had attached it to other ministries; and they continued to chair the interministerial committees. The 'positional' resources could therefore still be used wherever DATAR was located in the ministerial structures. A quantitative evaluation of the variations in DATAR's 'reputational power' showed it bore no consistent relationship to its place in the ministerial structure. DATAR could be attached to a technical minister and look relatively strong in its dealings with the rest of the bureaucracy, especially when the minister was technically or politically outstanding. It could be attached to the prime minister and look relatively weak.

The alternative thesis - that variations in the commitment of political leaders to *aménagement du territoire* could have an impact on DATAR's capacity to act effectively - was then tested empirically and systematically. A very strong link was found between the president's interest in *aménagement du territoire* (as reported and self-reported), and DATAR's reputed capacity to act effectively. A much weaker link was observed between the prime minister's interest and DATAR's reputational power, despite the traditional emphasis on the formal legal link. Though the inevitable subjectivity of the survey methodology must limit claims to validity, these results are supported by the concrete examples given and are consistent with well-understood patterns of power between the two members of the executive in the Fifth Republic.⁹⁸ On the whole, the 'close and effective links' that Blondel thought necessary between leader and bureaucracy refer in the French case to the president, not the prime minister. In terms of the capacity of political leaders to make an impact on the efforts of bureaucratic institutions and policy implementation, presidents are in a much stronger position than prime ministers. Just as significantly, the relevant links seem to be those of personal commitment to a policy more than legal-positional ties of formal responsibility.

⁹⁶ Servent, P. (1989) *Oedipe à Matignon ou le complexe du Premier ministre* (Balland), p.51.

⁹⁷ Blondel (1987), p.168.

⁹⁸ See Wright (1989), pp. 86-98, and Wright, V. (1993) 'The President and the Prime Minister: Subordination, conflict, symbiosis, or reciprocal parasitism?' in Hayward (ed.) *De Gaulle to Mitterrand: Presidential Power in France* (London: Hurst), 101-19.

The analysis also supported Blondel's claim that political leaders can respond differently to similar changes in the non-institutional environment, with the statistical test of the relationship between economic growth and DATAR's reputational power. The apparently close link between a healthy economy and DATAR's powerful reputation until 1973, that led some observers to use the oil crisis as the explanation of DATAR's later weakness, is called into question by the weak relationship between economic growth and DATAR's reputation after 1974. Rather there was evidence that some leaders saw economic problems as a constraint, while for others they were an incentive for countervailing action.

These conclusions seem to show that DATAR constitutes, in Blondel's terms, a 'reliable button', in that its level of 'power' to influence bureaucratic action corresponds to the level of activity that the political leadership (especially the president) envisages in this domain. In other words, the political leadership seems to make an overall impact on the bureaucratic DATAR's activities and the eventual output from the wider bureaucratic system in proportion to its desire to make an impact. If the political leadership has no special interest in *aménagement du territoire*, it does not press the button, or at least does so without much insistence. It remains to be shown how this link between a political leadership's commitment to *aménagement du territoire* and DATAR's reputational power might be made concrete by leaders. If the formal position of DATAR within the ministerial structure is not of prime importance, the resources given to political leaders by virtue of their formal position are vital to steering DATAR's action. The following chapters therefore set out to demonstrate that political leaders can shape DATAR to match their own aspirations for it, and ensure that it persuades bureaucratic organisations to 'adjust their actions' to the particular objectives set by each leadership.

CHAPTER 4

RESPONSIVENESS, COMPETENCE AND LOYALTY: CONTROLLING DATAR

INTRODUCTION

The last chapter showed that DATAR's effectiveness was linked to the interest taken by political leaders in its affairs and, conversely, that leaders had an impact on DATAR that was linked to their interest in its work. This chapter and the next strengthen the validity of that conclusion by showing how that 'probable' relationship at the statistical level of principle is effected at the level of political-administrative practice.

Blondel thought 'the system' linking political leaders to the bureaucracy was 'often - perhaps mostly.. simply unresponsive or only partly responsive' to their needs.¹ He thought four main factors made a difference to how well bureaucrats implemented leadership aims, of which three apply to DATAR itself (the fourth, links from DATAR out to other organisations, will be considered in the following chapter):

- 'competence';
- 'administrative organisation - not too light or too heavy...';
- 'the links between the bureaucracy and the leader must be close and effective; civil servants must ... be expected to be reliable.. the fostering of loyalty of civil servants by a variety of means - but not at the expense of initiative taking - is a manifest requirement if bureaucracies are to provide a significant help to leaders in achieving their goals'.²

New leaders have 'two types of instruments' with which to improve these factors, according to Blondel: they can use personal mechanisms, such as their prestige and following within the bureaucracy to obtain greater loyalty and zeal; and they can use institutional mechanisms to restructure the bureaucracy, such as by attending to the 'recruitment and training of the personnel' and 'the organisation of the service'; but there would be 'inevitable trade-offs' between the various elements.³

As constituted in 1963, DATAR was the outcome of 'personal' and 'institutional' mechanisms that political leaders had employed to combine reliable orientation towards their interests with operational effectiveness. It was headed by a *délégué*, Olivier Guichard, personally close and loyal to the Gaullist leadership, technically competent in the domain and able to attract an enthusiastic team of colleagues; and DATAR was subject to formal leadership control on senior appointments and staffing budgets, yet flexible since, within those constraints, the *délégué* was free to determine recruitment, work programmes and

¹ Blondel (1987), p.150.

² *ibid.* p.168.

³ *ibid.* pp.171-2.

working practices. The decree of 14 February 1963 had left DATAR's structure undefined, but the first *délégué* described DATAR as an *administration de mission*, and DATAR continued to define itself in the same terms: 'DATAR is an *administration de mission* of interministerial character'.⁴ DATAR was expected by its founders to have the features of this organisational type, as described by Pisani: lightweight, project-focused, informal in working methods and interministerial in recruitment and function.⁵ While this bureaucratic model was capable of a speedy refocusing on a new leader's aims, by the same token it had relative freedom to evolve in some self-determined direction, pursuing its own projects.

How have different political leaderships been able to ensure DATAR evolved in the ways each intended? How have they balanced the 'inevitable trade-offs' between loyalty and competence? Have DATAR's activities adapted to the particular aims of each leadership? In short, have political leaders been able to ensure that DATAR's staffing and actions responded to their needs? These issues are explored through an analysis of the leaders' capacity to choose as *délégué* someone loyal to them and their aims, and competent in carrying them forward through an agency responsiveness to leadership demands. It will assess the political leadership's powers to appoint the *délégué*, and evaluate the people appointed. The second part of the chapter scrutinises the ability of political leaders to make the impact they desire on DATAR as a bureaucracy. Three aspects of DATAR sum up its character as an *administration de mission*.⁶

- its 'light weight': how well can leaders determine DATAR's staffing levels and the sources of its recruitment?
- its interdisciplinarity: how easily can leaders attract the top generalist officials reputed to be the most effective in persuading ministries to adopt the leaders' programmes?
- team working: a 'team spirit' was deemed essential in 1963 for an inter-ministerial approach to policy: has this characteristic been maintained, and are teams restructured to deal with the priorities of new political leaders?

CHOOSING THE DELEGUE

The political leadership's strong powers to appoint a *délégué* of its choice can be judged from the official rules for such appointments, as applied to DATAR, and then from evidence about the dozen *délégués* that served from 1963 to 2004 (Figure 4.1 lists them, together with variables explored later in this section).

The political leadership's powers to appoint

With the decree of 14 February 1963, political leaders gave themselves the positional

⁴ Guichard, O. (1965) *Aménager la France* (Gonthier), p.6; www.datar.gouv.fr/, topic 'La DATAR'/'Lexique', 26 Nov. 2003.

⁵ Pisani (1956a), pp.323-6.

Figure 4.1. DATAR *délégués* 1963-2004

<i>Délégué</i> -Date and - age at appointment	Prime minister -Date of appointment	Training and <i>corps</i>	<i>Cabinet</i> and development experience	Immediate and 'top' subsequent posts	Personal affiliations
Olivier GUICHARD 14/2/63 (43)	Pompidou 14/4/62	SciPo Prefect	-cabinets 5 years -Saharan Office	-Industry Minister; -a Gaullist party 'baron'	-chef de cabinet to De Gaulle -chief adviser to Pompidou
Jérôme MONOD 24/10/68 (37)	Couve 10/7/68	ENA Cour des Comptes	-cabinets 4 yrs -DATAR 5 yrs	-dir.cab to PM Chirac -President of Suez-Lyonnaise	-friend and aide to Chirac; -conflict with AdT Minister Poniatowski
François ESSIG 12/9/75 (41)	Chirac 25/5/74	ENA Conseil d'Etat	-no cabinets -DATAR 12 yrs	-DG shipping; -DG Paris Chamber of Commerce	-knew Chirac at SciPo -brother a PS member and later a PS minister
André CHADEAU 27/4/78 (51)	Barre 25/8/76	SciPo Prefect	-cabinets 4 yrs -regional development	-Mauroy cabinet; -President SNCF	-dir.cab. to Chaban -worked closely with Mauroy when Nord Regional Prefect
Bernard ATTALI 14/10/81 (38)	Mauroy 21/5/81	ENA Cour des Comptes	-cabinet of Plan Commissioner -DATAR 6 yrs	-President GAN; -President Air France	-twin of J. Attali, Mitterrand's adviser
Jacques SALLOIS 6/9/84 (43)	Fabius 17/7/84	ENA Cour des Comptes	-cabinet 3 yrs	-Caisse des Dépôts; -DG Musées de France	-dir.cab. to Lang -member of ex-PSU; 'imposed on Defferre', Le Monde, 7/5/87
Jean-F. CARREZ 6/5/87 (47)	Chirac 20/3/86	ENA Cour des Comptes	-cabinets 7 yrs	-DG of Nat Geog Institute 1989; -DG ONF 1994	-Minister's 'right arm' since 1978 in cabinet and region. La Croix 6/5/87
Jean-Pierre DUPORT 4/10/89 (47)	Rocard 9/5/88	ENA Admin. civil	-cabinet of Plan Commissioner -Paris planning	-Prefect Seine-St Denis; -Regional Prefect Ile-de-France	-'osmosis with minister who defended his appointment' Le Monde, 6/10/89
Pierre-Henri PAILLET 2/9/93 (39)	Balladur 29/3/93	X, ENPC Ponts et Chaussées	-cabinet 2 yrs -Paris planning	-dir.cab Borotra -director of a building firm	-Radical noticed by Pasqua'; took bribe for Pasqua; Le Monde, 15/1/95, 18-19/5/03
Raymond-M AUBERT 15/11/95 (48)	Juppé 7/11/95	ENA 80 Admin. civil	-cabinet 2 yrs -rural affairs junior minister	-inspecteur-général de l'équipement; -Pres.A.N. Chèques de Vacances	-false job for Chirac at Paris town hall 89-95; -icy relations with minister, Le Monde 5/6/96; 31/3/03
Jean-Louis GUIGOU 23/7/97 (57)	Jospin 2/6/97	ENSA Professeur des univ.	-cabinet 1 yr -DATAR 12 yrs	-inspecteur-général de l'éducation nationale	-spouse of Mitterrand chief adviser -minister wanted him replaced Monde 8/7/01
Nicolas JACQUET 24/7/02 (50)	Raffarin 6/5/02	ENST ENA Prefect	-cabinet 0.2 yr -regional development	-DG of Paris Chamber of Commerce	-chef to Raffarin -'proche de Raffarin' Monde 8/5/03

Sources: Data from *Who's Who in France*, *Lettre de la DATAR*, IEP press cuttings.

resources to choose the *délégué*. The head of DATAR became one of about 500 'discretionary' appointments they could make in a Council of Ministers. Although the president is responsible under the 1958 Constitution, Article 13, for making such appointments, the decree must be countersigned by the prime minister, and the sectoral minister and junior minister to whom DATAR is attached, if any; all four signed the decree appointing Pierre Mirabaud as *délégué* in 2004.⁷ The political leadership has a wide choice of recruits: the person selected does not need to be a civil servant.⁸ Ministers are free to dismiss the *délégué* at any time and have a number of means to ease a departure or reward loyal service. The 'discretionary' rules can be used to appoint a civil servant to a 'director' post in a ministry; for instance the *délégué* François Essig in 1978 was made head of the maritime transport directorate. An appointment can be made to a public body: Prime Minister Mauroy in 1981 arranged for André Chadeau, with whom he had worked closely at regional level, to be made President of the SNCF rail enterprise. The president can make 'outsider appointments' by the *tour extérieur* to top administrative *corps*: the *délégué* Jean-Pierre Duport was made a prefect when he left DATAR in 1993 (the new minister of *aménagement du territoire* was also the Interior minister in charge of prefects). The *tour extérieur* procedure was extended to 'inspector-general' appointments in 1984: such appointments were offered to two departing *délégués*, Raymond-Max Aubert in 1995 and his successor, Jean-Louis Guigou, in 2002.

Individual ministers can appoint staff to their *cabinets* by simple *arrêté* (without needing presidential approval), and this provision has been used to facilitate appointments. First, a *cabinet* post can be used for a departing *délégué* until a new post is organised: Prime Minister Chirac in 1975 made his friend Jérôme Monod his *directeur de cabinet* when Monod left DATAR after conflict with his minister,⁹ and Chadeau was in Mauroy's *cabinet* for a few months until appointed SNCF president. Second, a minister's candidate for *délégué* can work from the *cabinet* until the departure of the incumbent. Before Jean-François Carrez was appointed *délégué* in May 1987, he 'performed that role from his minister's *cabinet* from March 1986',¹⁰ as did Pierre-Henri Paillet for six months in 1993. Political leaders can expand these powers quite subtly; for example, President Pompidou reduced the term of these 'discretionary' appointments so that more frequent nominations could be made 'without drama',¹¹ just as the Left later extended the range of *tour extérieur* appointments.

The need for leaders to use such procedures is in one sense witness to the constraints

⁶ Pouyet (1968), pp.60-7.

⁷ Decree of nomination of 20 Nov.2004, *J.O.* 21 Nov.2004.

⁸ Bodiguel, J.-L. (1994) *Les fonctions publiques dans l'Europe des douze* (LGDJ), p.72.

⁹ Massot, J. (1979) 'Le Chef du Gouvernement en France', *Notes et études documentaires* 4537-8 (La Documentation française), p.216 fn.

¹⁰ F.Grosrichard, *Le Monde*, 7 May 1987; also *La Croix*, 6 May 1987.

¹¹ Massot, J. (1987) *L'Arbitre et le capitaine* (Flammarion), p.292.

imposed by a tenured civil service where careers are strongly protected by statute. The political leadership of 1959 adapted the existing discretionary procedure to add flexibility and incentives in a bureaucracy whose top posts were 'monopolised by certain corps', not for purposes of politicisation.¹² But the use of these procedures by the Left in 1981, and by the Right in 1986, gave rise to accusations of 'witch-hunts' that demonstrated the 'trade-off', to use Blondel's term, between ensuring loyalty in particular posts and alienating other public servants. 'Politicisation gave new resources to those who already possessed social capital and could accept the risks, while the officials who had only their professional competence and savoir-faire, and went methodically and patiently up the grades, found themselves short-circuited'.¹³ Legislation was introduced in 1986 to restrict *tour extérieur* appointments.¹⁴ Lochak illustrated the 'structural politicisation' that had occurred:

Bernard Attali, nominated in 1981, gave way in 1984 to Jacques Sallois, ex-PSU [Parti Socialiste Unifié] and *directeur de cabinet* to Jack Lang [a minister close to Mitterrand]; in May 1987 Sallois was replaced by Pierre Méhaignerie's *directeur de cabinet* [Carrez], who would be replaced in his turn in October 1989. But .. these changes were made without haste, the government trying in general to offer fair compensation to the departing official'.¹⁵

Nevertheless, Sallois and Carrez were undermined as *délégués* by the mere expectation of their dismissal. Sallois 'knew his days were numbered from March 1986', when the Right won, and for nine months he had to 'work in double harness' with his successor, Carrez.¹⁶ Then 'the departure [of Carrez] was programmed for a long time'; he 'more or less disappeared from the scene six months before'.¹⁷ In 1997 Aubert simply 'put his post at the disposal of the minister', and 'in compensation would be appointed *inspecteur-général de l'équipement*'.¹⁸

As Anne Stevens says, putting the issue of discretionary posts into perspective:

'many of these posts are not particularly prominent or sensitive, and ministers will usually fill them with competent people from within the career service, with little attention to their political orientation'.¹⁹

In the case of the *délégué*, four or five early appointments took this 'non-politicised' form. While Guichard's appointment was transparently political, his three bureaucratic successors demonstrated their allegiance 'to the government of the day', and the political preferences of two of them remain ambiguous. Bernard Attali had already held a senior post at DATAR for six years, and the press commented only on the family link to Mitterrand's economic

¹² Bodiguel (1994), p.72.

¹³ Bodiguel, J.L. and Rouban, L. (1991) *Le fonctionnaire détrôné* (FNSP), p.52.

¹⁴ Law of 23 December 1986. Baecque (1992), p.75.

¹⁵ Lochak, D. (1992) 'Les hauts fonctionnaires et l'alternance: quelle politisation', in P.Muller (ed.) *L'Administration française: est-elle en crise?* (L'Harmattan), 35-58, p.51.

¹⁶ F.Grosrichard, *Le Monde*, 7 May 1987; also *La Croix*, 6 May 1987.

¹⁷ F.Vey, *Libération*, 2 Aug.1989; F.Grosrichard, *Le Monde*, 19 and 29 Sept.1989.

¹⁸ F.Grosrichard, *Le Monde*, 10-11 Aug.1997.

¹⁹ Stevens (1992), p.129.

adviser, Jacques Attali.²⁰ Essig was warned by the first deputy *délégué*, Charles Frappart, that the *délégué* was 'a political post' (and later regretted not heeding the warning).²¹ Yet only when Left and Right alternated in power from 1981 did it become clearer that political leaders had strong powers to select the *délégué*, and on political grounds if they so chose.

The constraints within a multiple political leadership

For all the powers of the 'political leadership' as a whole to select a *délégué*, the need for agreement between two or more politicians (usually president, prime minister and minister), meant that the appointment process did not always go smoothly. Except during periods of *cohabitation* the chief players were the president and prime minister. Pompidou when prime minister told Mitterrand that: 'because the signatures of prime minister and president have equal value, the decision can be made only after the two highest governmental authorities agree'.²² Guichard's explanation of 'why he was nominated' shows why they agreed in his case:

Neither of them told me precisely and it's too late to ask them. But I think it's not too difficult to understand. The General was fond of me and I was very close to Pompidou, and they were passionate about this issue'....²³

De Gaulle's only concern was about Guichard retaining his simultaneous position as chief adviser in Pompidou's *cabinet*.²⁴ In Giscard's presidency, Essig's appointment was 'arranged' between the departing *délégué* Monod, Prime Minister Chirac and the Minister of Interior and *aménagement du territoire*, Michel Poniatowski, who was Giscard's chief political adviser.²⁵ In 1978 Prime Minister Barre, having decided to take direct control of DATAR, persuaded Essig this was 'an opportune moment to move on', and chose Chadeau to replace him.²⁶ Mitterrand at first ruled that 'to appear on the agenda of a Council [Wednesday], a nomination must be proposed to the prime minister the previous Friday, and to the president on Monday'.²⁷ Prime Minister Mauroy then talked over with Mitterrand or Jacques Attali each week the proposals for forthcoming appointments.²⁸ In September 1981 Mitterrand decided that, for a list of posts 'over which the State had some means of control', a group of aides from the Elysée and the Matignon would decide which names to put to Mitterrand.²⁹ If a name could not be agreed before the Council of Ministers, including

²⁰ F.Grosrichard, *Le Monde*, 16 Oct.1981; M.Cuperly, *La Croix*, 23 Dec.1981; *La Croix*, 28 June 1984.

²¹ Essig (1979), p.19, p.14.

²² Massot (1987), p.293, quoting a debate at the National Assembly, 24 Apr. 1964.

²³ Guichard (1975), p.90. Interviewed by G.Suffert.

²⁴ Charles and Cristini (1992), p.470, citing an interview with Guichard, 21 June 1989.

²⁵ Audouin (1977), p.30, says arranged with Poniatowski, who would have persuaded Giscard. Essig (1979), p.33, implies arranged with Chirac. All three would need to sign the decree.

²⁶ Essig (1979), p.15.

²⁷ Attali, J. (1993) *Verbatim I: 1981-1983* (Fayard), p.70; entry for 30 June 1981. The justice minister had asked for two nominations to be made the following day.

²⁸ *ibid.* p.107; entries for 11 and 17 August 1981.

²⁹ *ibid.* p.134; entry for 14 Sept 1981.

during the 1986 *cohabitation*, the name was withdrawn from the agenda.³⁰ In 1986 Mitterrand required Chirac to provide the people dismissed with a 'suitable' post at the same pay level, even if not politically important.³¹

The Mitterrand system did not produce a *délégué* until October 1981, five months after Chadeau left. *Le Monde's* regional specialist 'did not find M.Rocard's explanations really convincing', especially as the minister for the Plan and *aménagement du territoire* had quickly appointed a Plan Commissioner.³² It seems likely that Rocard, who was at political odds with the rest of the government, had been unable to agree on the name. The decree appointing Bernard Attali was eventually signed at the same Council of Ministers at which Rocard presented an Interim Plan in which he did not believe, because he 'had had enough' of being kept out of decision-making.³³ The President had not in any case seen this post as a priority. In the list of posts 'to be filled by the end of [1981], in order of relative urgency and importance', the *délégué* was 16th of 23, not counting prefects, banks and the media.³⁴

The next minister for *aménagement du territoire* had no say at all in the choice of *délégué*; Sallois was:

'imposed on Gaston Defferre, a few weeks after the latter was made Minister of the Plan and *aménagement du territoire*. He had the gift of irritating the Mayor of Marseille, who progressively marginalised him'.³⁵

But in the *cohabitation* government that followed, the President had no standing, Prime Minister Chirac had no interest in the topic and was reliant for his majority on the Minister for *Aménagement du territoire*, Méhaignerie, for whom the nominee, Carrez, had worked for many years. In Mitterrand's second presidency, Duport was named *délégué* only 'after months of shilly-shallying'. The minister had to 'defend his candidate tooth and claw', while the Elysée 'took pleasure' in sustaining 'numerous, hesitant manoeuvres' over the choice of Carrez's successor. Prime Minister Rocard had asked for an end to 'witch hunts',³⁶ and also needed parliamentary support from Méhaignerie, who himself had not practised 'witch-hunts'. Carrez left 'when he could be appointed to an reasonable post'.³⁷

The *délégués* Aubert and Guigou were appointed against the wishes of their ministers and never formed good working relationships with them. In 1995 President Chirac 'personally asked Juppé to find an important post for Raymond-Max Aubert, forcing the hand a bit of both the head of government and the new minister for *aménagement du*

³⁰ Massot (1987), p.293.

³¹ Mény (1992a), *La Corruption de la République* (Fayard), p.110.

³² F.Grosrichard, *Le Monde*, 18 Sept.1981.

³³ Favier and Martin-Roland (1990), p.119, citing an interview with Rocard 18 Oct.1989. In his entry for 14 Oct.1981 Attali mentions the Plan but not the appointment of his brother. Attali (1993), p.172.

³⁴ Attali (1993), p.38; entry for 2 June 1981.

³⁵ F.Grosrichard, *Le Monde*, 7 May 1987.

³⁶ Circular, 25 May 1988 quoted in Lochak (1992), p.42.

³⁷ F.Grosrichard, *Le Monde*, 29 Sept and 6 Oct.1989. Lochak (1992), p.48.

territoire... who probably had other candidates in mind'.³⁸ Relations between the minister Gaudin and the *délégué* were 'glacial'.³⁹ In Jospin's government of 1997-2002, the appointment of Jean-Louis Guigou was unwelcome to the minister, Dominique Voynet. Her *cabinet* had numerous clashes with the *délégué*.⁴⁰ The minister 'frequently asked Jospin to replace him. In 2001 she went and he stayed'.⁴¹

Figure 4.1, listing the dates of appointment of *délégués* and the prime ministers who signed their decrees of appointment, illustrates graphically (if sometimes misleadingly), how a change of government led to a change of *délégué* and increasingly speedily after the new premier was appointed. The correlation is misleading to the extent that *délégués* were not replaced in four premierships: first, those of Chaban-Delmas and Messmer in the Pompidou presidency - but Pompidou had already appointed Monod as deputy *délégué* in his own premiership - and then those of Cresson and Bérégovoy in the Mitterrand presidency. Significantly, Cresson's past failure to make such appointments was seen as the major cause of her weakness in 1991. She lacked

'supporters, networks and intermediaries in the top administration and the media from her own party.....[because], unlike those Socialists who hoped to become president, she never applied herself to getting her friends appointed to powerful posts in the top civil service, the top *corps* and public sector'.⁴²

However, Cresson's government was an exception to the increasingly personalised basis of appointments. For DATAR, only Chadeau was subject to what Lochak calls 'revenge politicisation', in which officials nominated by a previous government are evicted precipitously, even if the post has no strategic value. Only Guichard's appointment was 'missionary politicisation', in which the political leadership puts in place a politically-engaged person they trust to conduct a new policy. Mostly DATAR's politicisation is of the type she calls 'clientelist':

'which is characterised by the fact that replacements are dictated less by suspicion of the incumbent than by the ... desire to satisfy the ambitions of one's friends, or, in some cases, to reward services rendered.... In most cases, appointing one's friends is not just to reward them, but also to be able to work with people one knows and can rely on'.⁴³

That is, most *délégués* were appointed to supply the reliability that Blondel saw as one essential characteristic of a bureaucracy, or to reward services rendered. But there were 'inevitable trade-offs' in the consequent disquiet within the bureaucracy as a whole, and a loss in DATAR's authority when there was rivalry between leaders on who could name their friend. There was probably also a loss of competence from restricting the recruitment pool; and it is to that issue we now turn.

³⁸ F.Grosrichard, *Le Monde*, 16 Nov. 1995.

³⁹ *Le Monde*, 5 June 1996.

⁴⁰ Personal experience of two conferences organised by the association Europa with and for DATAR that were taken over by the minister's *cabinet*; disputes over the roads and rail content of Plan Contracts.

⁴¹ B.Jérôme, *Le Monde*, 8-9 July 2001.

⁴² Favier and Martin-Roland (1999), pp.17-18.

Professional competence and personal loyalty

'Competence' is the first of the four characteristics of the civil service that affect the impact of political leaders, according to Blondel.⁴⁴ Within the limitations of this thesis the assessment of each *délégué's* competence for the post had mostly to be based on paper qualifications, even though, as Aline Coutrot says: 'they omit the role of personality, Olivier Guichard having to be put like any other prefect into the box marked "prefects"'.⁴⁵

Since the *délégué* directs a team that provides interministerial coordination and prepares interministerial decisions, the characteristics required are similar to those of a *directeur de cabinet*. *Directeurs* are virtually always career civil servants, in mid-career at about 35 to 45 years of age.⁴⁶ They are likely to have been trained at the *Ecole nationale d'administration*, ENA.⁴⁷ About half the *directeurs* belong to the top *grands corps* recruited from those with greatest success at ENA (*Inspection des Finances*, *Conseil d'Etat* or *Cour des Comptes*); a few to the top technical *grands corps*, recruiting from the highest-placed graduates of the *Ecole polytechnique* (*Corps des Mines* and *Ponts et Chaussées*), and the rest to the corps of prefects, diplomats or *administrateurs civils*.⁴⁸ Although ENA-trained staff made up a lower proportion of *cabinet* members in the 1990s than in the 1970s, they still filled most of the posts of *directeurs*,⁴⁹ because *grands corps* members 'have a vast network of relationships across society' and 'an irreplaceable general competence'.⁵⁰ While *cabinets* should include some who are there primarily because of their links with the minister, the criterion for choosing a *directeur* must be administrative expertise.⁵¹ Hayward and Wright reported the 'disastrous consequences' for Prime Minister Balladur of choosing as *directeur* a young, inexperienced official: 'It is an example of the "court politics" danger of choosing someone with whom one is comfortable rather than who is competent'.⁵² The main requirements are 'political skill and administrative authority, although in some ministries.. specialist skills are also necessary'.⁵³ From the 1980s about 40 per cent of *directeurs de cabinet* made explicit their political commitment;⁵⁴ in the *cabinets*, 'politicisation has gained ground at the expense of technocracy'.⁵⁵

Have political leaders been able to attract to their service a *délégué* with similar attributes? Figure 4.1 summarises the evidence on twelve *délégués*: their age at appointment,

⁴³ Lochak (1992), p.55.

⁴⁴ Blondel (1987), p.168.

⁴⁵ Coutrot, A. (1982) 'Les membres des cabinets...' in de Baecque, F. and Quermonne, J.L. (eds), *Administration et Politique sous la Cinquième République* (FNSP), 61-7, p.67.

⁴⁶ Hayward and Wright (2002), p.46.

⁴⁷ Schrameck, O. (1995) *Les Cabinets ministériels* (Daloz), p.34.

⁴⁸ Thuillier, G. (1982) *Les Cabinets ministériels* (PUF), p.33.

⁴⁹ Rouban, L. (1998) *La Fin des technocrates?* (Sciences Po), p.27.

⁵⁰ Suleiman, E. (1979) *Les élites en France: Grands corps et grandes écoles* (Seuil), p.107.

⁵¹ Schrameck (1995), p.34.

⁵² Hayward and Wright (2002), p.48.

⁵³ *ibid.* p.46.

⁵⁴ *ibid.* p.43.

the training institutions attended and *corps*, the years of experience in a *cabinet* and in DATAR's technical domain. The post offered on leaving DATAR and a later 'top job' are listed as a guide to the reward structure and the calibre of the person appointed, and finally, a note on personal links between *délégué* and political leaders, even if '*proche de*' or '*ami de*' does not always identify satisfactorily the basis of the closeness or the friendship.⁵⁶

All *délégués* so far have been civil servants, which brings advantages for interministerial coordination, though Guichard had been a prefect for only four years and was appointed by the *tour extérieur*.⁵⁷ Aubert had only a few years as a junior ministry official before becoming 'a political person' in the words of his entry to *Who's Who in France*. He had been a junior minister for a few months immediately before the posting, and while at DATAR remained the mayor of Tulle (chief town of Chirac's Corrèze). Until 1993 the majority of *délégués* had taken the generalist high-achievers' route through the *Institut d'études politiques* (IEP) and ENA, although those born earliest, Guichard and Chadeau, went only to the predecessor *Ecole des sciences politiques*. Paillet, appointed in 1993, was the only *délégué* to be trained at the *Ecole polytechnique*. Among those who followed him, two went to ENA relatively late (at 29 for Aubert and 26 for Jacquet rather than the 22 or 23 of earlier *délégués*) as internal civil service candidates. Guigou did not go to ENA. That is, from 1993 the people selected have not had the classic IEP- ENA background that gives the greatest authority to a French civil servant and the best access to coordinating networks.

This finding is necessarily reinforced by a consideration of *corps* status, since that depends on educational prowess. Starting with Monod, five of the first six *délégués* came from one of the three top *grands corps*, and the sixth, Chadeau, was at the highest level of the prefectural *corps*. When Carrez was appointed in 1987 *Le Monde* emphasised the 'continuity' of postings, 'the post of *délégué* having always fallen to a 'magistrate of the Cour des Comptes since 1981... not to mention the most illustrious of the Cour des Comptes *délégués*, Monod'.⁵⁸ However, Carrez was the last of the *délégués* from the top three *corps*. Whereas Duport, *administrateur civil hors classe*, was presented by *Le Monde* in 1989 as part of 'the Jacobin technostructure and administrative intelligentsia', Aubert in 1995 was 'an ephemeral junior minister in the Juppé government, RPR mayor of Tulle, close to Jacques Chirac, and had lost his seat in Corrèze', and Guigou in 1997 'the spouse of the justice minister and a professor of agricultural economics'.⁵⁹

This decline in the level of conventional qualifications was accompanied by a similar

⁵⁵ Luc Rouban, quoted in Hayward and Wright (2002), p.43.

⁵⁶ Lochak (1992), p.37.

⁵⁷ Guichard (1975), p.79.

⁵⁸ F.Grosrichard, *Le Monde*, 7 May 1987.

⁵⁹ *Le Monde*, 6 Oct.1989; J.Menanteau, *Le Monde*, 24 July 1997; F.Grosrichard, *Le Monde*, 10-11 Aug.1997. Regional economic development is Guigou's specialism. His books are excellent and attract media attention to DATAR's work. He has persuaded ministers of all parties to adopt his paradigm of how France should develop. In formal discussion he is supercilious, but uses 'tu' to everyone. Yet the most

if uneven decline in relevant experience. Although it was possible to work in a *cabinet* without having or adopting appropriate sympathies,⁶⁰ it is unsurprising that the first two *délégués* appointed by Left governments had been *directeurs de cabinet* to the Plan Commissioner but not to ministers. Their predecessor Essig had never served in a *cabinet*. Even so, the *délégués* appointed after 1993 had substantially less experience of *cabinet* work than those appointed earlier. Paillet's two years in a *cabinet* was as only *chef du cabinet*, as was Jacquet's three months. Aubert's *cabinet* service was in the ministry for overseas *départements*, which is not at the centre of affairs. In contrast, among the first seven *délégués*, Guichard and Monod had been members of the prime minister's and/or the president's *cabinets*; Chadeau was *directeur de cabinet* to Prime Minister Chaban-Delmas, and Sallois and Carrez had been *directeurs de cabinets*.

Although competence in a bureaucracy's technical area of business is not seen as essential (generalist skills being prized), in practice nearly all *délégués* had relevant experience. Some had already worked for DATAR (Monod, Essig, Attali, Guigou), or in the Paris region planning offices (Duport, Paillet), or developing the Sahara (Guichard) or Paris new towns (Chadeau) or in a regional prefect's office as secretary-general for regional affairs, SGAR (Jacquet). But again there is evidence of a decline in the level of expertise. By 1967 Monod had prepared regional decrees, worked with Schumann in the ministry for *aménagement du territoire*, and helped Guichard design and then run DATAR: by 1995 Aubert had been a rural affairs minister for five months. By 1976 Chadeau had been 'an enthusiastic sub-prefect' developing Paris new towns and 'an activist regional prefect' in the Nord Pas-de-Calais region:⁶¹ by 2002 Jacquet had been the SGAR in the Nord Pas-de-Calais and the Paris region. By 1981 Attali as No.3 at DATAR had organised the prime minister's *comité interministériel d'aménagement du territoire* (CIAT, later CIADT), for six years: by 1997 Guigou had worked as No.3 at DATAR for 12 years as a technical expert, developing scenarios and plans. Only Sallois had no relevant expertise, but though DATAR dropped to its lowest point of authority while he was in charge (the minister was persuaded to give up its most important instrument, see Chapter 3), the probability is that both his appointment and the loss of authority derived from a common cause, the lack of enthusiasm for *aménagement du territoire* of the political leadership.

A last indicator of the relative competence of the different *délégués* is their subsequent career. Guichard, Monod, Attali and Duport seem to have reached the highest points in their diverse spheres: Guichard in politics, Monod in business, Attali in public

frequent comment I heard from academics and regional developers was that 'he only got the job because of his wife'.

⁶⁰ Paul Delouvrier said 'top officials discovered under de Gaulle and Pompidou that the president was likely to stay, and therefore to get somewhere they had to give a little allegiance'; in Chenu, R. (1994) *Paul Delouvrier ou la passion d'agir. Entretiens* (Seuil) (1994), p.129. A top transport official told me an interesting posting was cancelled in May 2002 because he 'could not, unlike some others, adopt appropriate political sympathies'. Hôtel de Région, Limoges, 24 Oct.2002.

⁶¹ Chenu (1994), p.263; Hayward, J. (1986) *The State and Market Economy* (Brighton: Wheatsheaf), p.119.

corporations, and Duport in the prefectural *corps*; with Chadeau, Sallois and Carrez appointed to discretionary posts that others covet. Those appointed after 1989 seem unlikely to reach equivalent positions.

The final column in Figure 4.1 summarises the unavoidably incomplete evidence of affiliations between *délégué* and political leaders. Guichard had been de Gaulle's aide-de-camp for 13 years and then Pompidou's closest aide as his *chargé de mission*, a post above the *cabinet* hierarchy.⁶² Monod had a close comradeship with Chirac at IEP, ENA and the Cour des Comptes, but pursued a non-political career and was already *délégué* when Chirac became prime minister. Though Chirac made Monod his *directeur de cabinet* when Monod was in conflict with his minister, and the following year recruited Monod as secretary-general of his new Gaullist party, Monod's technocratic style soon brought about his departure, and he is better described as Chirac's *éminence grise*.⁶³ Essig too knew Chirac from IEP and ENA but they were not close. Essig's brother was a career rail official and PS member who was later appointed SNCF president and junior minister by Left governments, but there is no evidence on Essig's own political leanings. Chadeau had been *directeur de cabinet* to right-wing ministers of different strands, but also worked closely with the Socialist Mauroy before 1981, developing the Nord-Pas-de-Calais region.

The politicised system of appointments that appeared therefore to start and finish with Guichard did not at first seem to restart with Bernard Attali in 1981. It was assumed that his appointment was due to his brother's influence in the Elysée and that DATAR's work would benefit from the family, not political, link.⁶⁴ However, the brothers had different careers and personalities and, moreover, relations were poor between Jacques Attali and Bérégovoy, then head of the Elysée Secretariat, which liaises between the political leaders.⁶⁵ Nonetheless, DATAR's dealings with ministries improved during Attali's tenure;⁶⁶ and the perception of close links was probably beneficial to DATAR. Of the seven *délégués* who followed Attali at least six had a personal or political connection to the leadership. Carrez and Paillet had already worked for the ministers who proposed their appointment, though in both cases differing from their ministers in their party politics ('Barriste': 'Centriste'; Radical: Gaullist). Three *délégués* who had personal and party connections to president or prime minister (Sallois, Aubert and Guigou) had poor working relationships with the ministers for *aménagement du territoire* who had played no part in their selection. For two *délégués*, the personalised links were taken to illegal extremes: Paillet admitted and was charged with collecting £500,000 from Alstom in 1994 on behalf

⁶² Stevens (1992), p.114.

⁶³ Collovald, A. (1999) *Jacques Chirac et le Gaullisme* (Belin), p.226, pp.103-4, based on interviews with Monod and Robert Poujade, 17 May 1985.

⁶⁴ Hayward, J. (1983) *Governing France: The One and Indivisible Republic*, 2nd edn (Weidenfeld & Nicolson), pp.200-1.

⁶⁵ Stevens (1992), p.74; Favier and Martin-Roland (1990), p.434.

⁶⁶ *La Croix*, 28 June 1984.

of Pasqua, in return for awarding a permit to build in Paris.⁶⁷ Aubert was charged with benefiting from a 'false job' in Chirac's Paris town hall, 1989-95.⁶⁸

In 1988 *Le Monde* judged the *délégué* to be 'one of the highest civil service posts'.⁶⁹ Subsequent nominations suggest that it is no longer one of those posts (*Le Monde* now only reports the decree appointing a *délégué*; there is no editorial comment). Whatever the criterion examined, there was a trend to a reduction in the qualities usually thought to give officials the best networks and reputation for effectiveness. For political leaders not particularly interested in *aménagement du territoire* (President Mitterrand, President Chirac) it could be appropriate to use the post to reward loyalty, but Prime Minister Balladur and his minister Pasqua were strongly committed to the policy,⁷⁰ and yet appointed less well-qualified candidates. Nevertheless, even if an unusual appointment such as Aubert's was unlikely to add credibility to DATAR's endeavours, it is witness to the capacity of a French president to impose the candidate of his or her choice. Political leaders seem to be choosing the person they want but, in Hayward and Wright's phrase: 'in danger of choosing someone with whom one is comfortable rather than who is competent'.⁷¹

STEERING DATAR'S RECRUITMENT AND ACTIVITIES

Through their power over the *délégué's* appointment, political leaders can exert influence over DATAR's activities. That control is reinforced by budgetary powers on recruitment but other facets of DATAR's operations are not so susceptible to formal command. The second part of this chapter therefore examines the leadership's capacity for steering DATAR's pattern of recruitment, and DATAR's responsiveness to changes in the leaders' policy priorities.

A light-weight and flexible administration

Some political scientists assert that bureaucracies tend to 'oversupply' public services and grow,⁷² and some of DATAR's opponents agreed: 'The young lightweight structure has become a fat old lady succumbing to Parkinson's Law...'.⁷³ Yet French political leaders have considerable power to control the number of staff DATAR employs, and French civil service rules provide substantial flexibility in recruitment to meet new areas of political interest.⁷⁴

⁶⁷ *Le Monde*, 18-19 May and 25 June 2003.

⁶⁸ F.Lhomme, *Le Monde*, 31 March 2003.

⁶⁹ A.Faujas, *Le Monde*, 29 Sept. 1988.

⁷⁰ The ideas for 'Gaullist' *aménagement du territoire* in Pasqua, C and Séguin, P. (1993) *Demain la France. II. La Reconquête du Territoire* (Albin Michel), were promoted vigorously by Balladur and Pasqua 1993-95.

⁷¹ Hayward and Wright (2002), p.48.

⁷² Niskanen, W. (1971) *Bureaucracy and Representative Government* (Chicago: Aldine-Atherton).

⁷³ M.Giraud, *Le Monde*, 29-30 March 1987. Michel Giraud was president of the Ile-de-France region.

⁷⁴ Burnham, J. (2000) 'Human Resources Flexibilities in France', in D.Farnham and S.Horton (eds) *Human Resources Flexibilities in the Public Services* (Macmillan), pp.98-114.

DATAR's in-house staff

The number of staff a ministry can pay is set out in the Finance Act agreed by parliament. Because DATAR is part of the prime minister's office, the prime minister, in negotiation with the *aménagement du territoire* minister, the *délégué* and, especially, the Finance Ministry, determines DATAR's 'budgetary posts'. Figure 4.2 gives examples from Jospin's last full calendar year and Raffarin's first full calendar year. The budget figures specify the number of tenured officials and non-tenured contracted staff working at DATAR in 'budgetary posts', and the number of posts in these two categories to be abolished or created during the coming year. A comparison of the figures for Jospin and Raffarin shows that Raffarin was able to adapt staffing to his government's requirements, especially but not only through the use of contracts; there was a high turnover of posts in 2002-03, following the change of government, contrasting with the stability of 2000-01. (The overseas staff in Jospin's budget are in DATAR's 'Invest in France' agencies, whose status has long been criticised by other ministries: in 2001 they were transferred to a separate French Agency for International Investment).

Figure 4.3 gives more detail on the categories of staff in 2001 to show the flexibility there is within the budgetary posts. Only a third of the budgetary posts were filled by tenured officials based permanently at DATAR, difficult to dismiss or transfer. A smaller group of tenured officials in budgetary posts had been contracted to DATAR (*détaché*) from their ministry or *corps*. Half the budgetary posts consisted of staff recruited on short-term or 'indefinite' contracts, of which the latter could be terminated at any time. It is easier for leaders to vary the numbers of these last groups (in 1999 fewer tenured officials were *détachés* than in 2001 but many more were on 'indefinite' budgetary contracts). However, a third of DATAR's 'in-house' staff were seconded officials, 'put at DATAR's disposal' (*mis à disposition*), seconded by their *corps* or ministry; their salaries paid by their 'home' institution. These officials fill over half the senior posts (60 per cent in 2001; 'a majority' 1963-80⁷⁵). To attract these valuable officials the political leadership must demonstrate that the posting to DATAR will be of value in terms of individual or *corps* goals.⁷⁶ That is, the recruitment of these staff is determined by the leadership's signals about its intentions for *aménagement du territoire*.

This evidence on the 'input' controls of the political leadership can be backed up by 'output' figures. Figure 4.4 shows the number of staff at DATAR in relation to changes of prime minister and *délégué*. The information derives mainly from surveys by Souchon-Zahn and Massardier of DATAR's records on policy staff 1963-88 (*chargés de mission* and above); and official figures on budgetary posts 1982-2004 (which include support staff but

⁷⁵ Bodiguel and Quermonne (1983), p.187.

⁷⁶ *ibid.* p.188; Suleiman, E. (1979), p.182.

Figure 4.2. Budgetary posts for DATAR approved in the budgets for 2001 and 2003

Prime Minister Jospin's last full year's budget: 2001

Budgetary posts 2000-01	Posts at 31/12/00	Posts abolished	Posts created	Total posts to be provided 2001
Tenured officials	58	0	3	61
Non-tenured staff	55	0	0	55
Sub-total	113	0	3	116
Overseas staff	28	0	0	28
Total	141	0	3	144

Source: *Loi de Finances initiale, Services de PM, V.Aménagement du territoire* for 2001.

Note: Overseas staff moved in November 2001 to the French Agency for International Investment (AFII).

Prime Minister Raffarin's first full year's budget: 2003

Budgetary posts 2002-03	Posts at 31/12/02	Posts abolished	Posts created	Total posts to be provided 2003
Tenured officials	68	4	6	70
Non-tenured staff	55	34	32	53
Total	123	38	38	123

Source: *Loi de Finances initiale, Services de PM, V.Aménagement du territoire* for 2003.

Figure 4.3. Categories of DATAR personnel, 2001

	Budgetary posts				Total budgetary posts	Tenured officials seconded to DATAR	TOTAL in December 2001
	Tenured officials		Non-tenured contract staff				
	Permanent at DATAR	Contracted to DATAR	Indefinite	Fixed term			
DATAR	43	14	20	24	101	42	143
Commissariats	3	0	4	5	12	12	24
Other offices	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
TOTAL	46	14	24	29	113	56	169

Source: DATAR, *Rapport d'activité 2001*.

Note: The 113 total budgetary posts do not tally with the 116 posts allocated in the budget outlined in Figure 4.2 because DATAR did not recruit the full complement of 116 in 2001.

Figure 4.4. The number of DATAR staff 1963-2004

	Prime Minister	Délégué	Total staff	Chargés de mission	Turnover of <i>chargés</i> and above			
					Join	Leave	Net change	Average change
1963	Pompidou	Guichard	35	15	34	3	31	21 join and 8 leave p.a.
1964			44	19	24	9	15	
1965			54	21	14	10	4	
1966			56	21	15	8	7	
1967		[Monod]	65	27	22	11	11	
1968	Couve	Monod	c.100	c.40	13	12	1	15 join and 13 leave p.a.
1969	Chaban				11	16	-5	
1970					14	17	-3	
1971					17	9	12	
1972	Messmer				17	13	4	
1973					8	13	-5	
1974	Chirac				17	13	4	
1975		Essig			14	13	1	
1976	Barre				22	10	12	
1977				45	14	11	3	
1978		Chadeau	c.100	39	19	8	11	32 join and 22 leave p.a.
1979					16	14	2	
1980			Budgetary posts	c.50	15	16	-1	
1981	Mauroy	Attali		c.50	13	15	-2	
1982			183	49	35	13	22	
1983			177		30	22	8	
1984	Fabius	Sallois	150+	40	24	23	1	
1985			c.150		38	29	9	
1986	Chirac				16	28	-12	
1987		Carrez			16	19	-3	14 join and 23 leave p.a.
1988	Rocard				9	23	-14	
1989		Duport						
1990			130					
1991	Cresson		118					
1992	Bérégevoy		126					
1993	Balladur	Paillet	139					
1994			120					
1995	Juppé	Aubert	118					
1996			116					
1997	Jospin	Guigou	115					
1998			113					
1999			113					
2000			113	62				
2001			116	63				
2002	Raffarin	Jacquet	123					
2003			123					
2004			121					

Notes: Monod acted as *délégué* in 1967 (Marcellin was *ministre-délégué*) and appointed *délégué* in 1968.
 Sources: DATAR staff and *chargés de mission*: 1963-67 Pouyet (1968), p.60; 1968, 1978 Essig (1979), p.25, p.57; 1977 Madiot (1979), p.57; 1980 *La Croix*, 24/4/80; 1981, *Monde*, 16/10/81; 1982 Madiot (1993), p.40; 1983 Rigaud et al (1984), p.196; 1984 Laborie et al (1985), p.25; 1985 Madiot (1986), p.187.
 1990-2001 DATAR, *Rapport d'activité* 2000 and 2001; 2002-04 *Loi de finances initiale* 2003 and 2004.

Staff turnover: Recalculated from Massardier (1996), pp.148-85.

not the seconded *chargés* whose salaries are paid by other public bodies).⁷⁷

Massardier's figures for turnover in policy staff (in the last column of Figure 4.4) show the general correlation between changes in leadership and DATAR's staffing levels. There is a sharp increase of DATAR's numbers 1963-67 in de Gaulle's presidency and Pompidou's premiership (but not Couve's); slow growth in the Pompidou and Giscard presidencies; rapid expansion with the arrival of the Left government; and finally a sharp decrease during the Chirac premiership. Then, within this broad picture, there are years of high net change in the number of policy staff that usually match changes in political leadership or leadership commitment. Following DATAR's initial construction, the biggest net changes occur in 1967 (when Guichard is replaced by the *ministre-délégué* Marcellin), in 1976 (when Barre took over from Chirac), in 1978 (when Barre took direct charge of *aménagement du territoire* and appointed a new *délégué*), in 1982 (after the change of political control and of *délégué*), in 1986 (when Chirac became prime minister) and in 1988 (a presidential election, change of prime minister and a long-delayed appointment of a new *délégué*). The strong net increases in 1967, 1976 and 1978 are linked to occasions when prime ministers and ministers showed interest in the topic; and the strong decreases in 1986 and 1988 when prime ministers and presidents signalled their disinterest. In contrast, the expansion in 1971, when the 'technocratic' Monod started the forecasting studies, seems to be an exercise of bureaucratic autonomy.

Changes in budgetary posts are less easy to interpret because they do not include all seconded staff, and are highly susceptible to short-term budgetary strategies, such as the cutbacks of 1991 and the pre-election increases of 1992. Nevertheless it is clear that these figures too show an initial strong recruitment in 1982, in parallel with the process seen at Matignon and the Elysée, where leaders gave experience to groups new to power, put sympathisers in posts close to decision-makers, and rewarded campaigners with 'jobs for the boys'.⁷⁸ This expansion was followed by declining numbers under the Fabius and Chirac governments, who both reduced DATAR's influence (removing regulatory powers). But it likely there was some recovery in numbers in 1990 after Duport's appointment as *délégué*, and the minister Chérèque revived the forecasting studies. The smaller surge in 1993 was initiated by the minister responsible for *aménagement du territoire*, Pasqua. 'Pasqua wanted "shock troops" put in place [to] re-conquer the territory' and Paillet recruited more staff.⁷⁹ When Balladur later prioritised budgetary savings, requiring DATAR

⁷⁷ Marie-Françoise Souchon-Zahn's unpublished survey of 105 *chargés de mission* 1963-80 is summarised in Bodiguel and Quermonne (1983), pp.186-8. Massardier (1996) analysed DATAR's records of 518 staff at *chargé* level and above, appointed 1963-88. Data was incomplete for 31 of the 518, and there were definitional problems, because some officials are appointed for part-time or short-term assignments. Massardier (1996), p.154fn.

⁷⁸ Prof. N. Wahl, LSE guest seminar, 22 Nov.1983. Mauroy had 100 aides; most of his predecessors had 50. Wright (1989), pp.81-2.

⁷⁹ I. de Gaulmya, *Les Echos*, 29-30 Oct 1993.

to reduce its staff by 20 per cent,⁸⁰ DATAR complied. Finally, there was an increase in budgetary posts after the change of government in 2002, with the new numbers maintained by Raffarin in his first full budgetary year.

Souchon-Zahn's work on the 1963-80 period seemed to demonstrate that turnover 'tended to increase' when the *délégué* changed.⁸¹ However the more detailed later figures show this conclusion does not hold in 1975, 1984 or 1987. Rather, step changes are associated with changes in political leadership or commitment, and the change of *délégué* that is often associated with a high turnover is another consequence of the same cause, the change of political leadership. The political leadership not only has the legal powers to control DATAR's size but on the whole seems to have done so, the increase under Monod in 1971 being an exception.

DATAR's external collaborators

DATAR's human resources extend beyond the 'in-house staff' in two ways. First, under the terms of the 14 February 1963 decree the *délégué* can call on the services of experts. 'Personalities', such as Philippe Lamour, Paul Delouvrier, Pierre Racine, Roger Grégoire and Marcel Long, were brought in to chair development missions and committees and write special reports. Massardier found that the use of such prestigious collaborators had declined, an evolution that he attributed to a decline in the prestige of DATAR itself.⁸² Second, DATAR contributes staff to 'parallel' institutions that organise redevelopment projects at local level, cutting across functional and territorial boundaries. Some critics see these institutions as strengthening the political leadership's control. For example, DATAR's rural development commissioners implement centrally-decided regional strategies and transmit to central decision-makers the views of important 'private groups that bring together the various social interests of the regions'.⁸³ But others, such as the Cour des Comptes and the Guichard Commission, have criticised DATAR for 'paying for people not at its disposal'. The Guichard Commission listed 'seven structures under DATAR's more or less direct control':

'rural development commissioners, development project coordinators, industrial commissioners, tourist development missions, economic action missions, conversion poles, and general secretariats for regional affairs (SGARs...), as well as 21 offices abroad....'⁸⁴

These agencies are more complicated for DATAR and therefore the prime minister, to supervise than are 'in-house' staff.⁸⁵ However, all seven structures were appointed, created and funded by will of the political leadership: the commissioners and heads of missions are appointed in a Council of Ministers; DATAR's grants to associations are approved in a

⁸⁰ *Le Moniteur*, 1 July 1994.

⁸¹ Bodiguel and Quermonne (1983), p. 186.

⁸² Massardier (1996), p. 155.

⁸³ Biarez (1982), pp. 272-3, p. 277; Biarez (1989), pp. 185-6 reaffirms the same point.

⁸⁴ Guichard Commission (1986), p. 56 and p. 56fn.

CIADT, chaired by the prime minister; 'conversion poles' are approved in the Council of Ministers or a CIADT, and the SGARs are 'economic divisions' of regional prefectures, mostly run by sub-prefects. As DATAR's minister reminded the Cour des Comptes, 'the allocation of the main headings of DATAR's budget is decided by the prime minister or the minister responsible for *aménagement du territoire*'.⁸⁶ (The leadership's control of this funding is explored further in the following chapter).

In summary, wherever DATAR staff are employed, the political leadership can adapt the number and location of posts through the formal controls of budgetary law and ministerial decision-making; but its recruitment of higher-level officials and experts seemed to depend more on the signals it sends out about its level of interest in the policy. The leadership has instruments such as the *Cour des Comptes* that can draw its attention to imperfect practices that need to be corrected, as witnessed by DATAR's recruitment of a human resources specialist in 2001, responding to *Cour* warnings that DATAR was no longer a small team around a *délégué*.

An inter-disciplinary organisation

Just as the *délégué* seems likely to be most effective if he or she has similar characteristics to those of a *directeur de cabinet*, DATAR is like a *cabinet* in needing the right balance of mobile *grands corps* members from ENA or Polytechnique if it is to succeed in using their networks to facilitate coordination.⁸⁷

In 1966 just over half DATAR's *chargés de mission* had attended ENA or Polytechnique. A third were from the top five administrative *corps* and another third from top technical *corps*. Every relevant bureaucratic institution was 'covered' by a *chargé* competent in its domain: an *ingénieur en chef du génie rural* dealt with the agriculture ministry; sub-prefects were responsible for regional programmes, two *ingénieurs des ponts et chaussées* worked with the infrastructure ministry.⁸⁸ Guichard had been able to build this organisation from a network of previous collaborators in the Office for Saharan Development,⁸⁹ and from those in the *Conseil d'Etat* and elsewhere who had heard that 'something promising was going on'.⁹⁰ Though the early recruitment was personalised, it was 'close to the administrative ideal-type' for an *administration de mission*.⁹¹ But even this 'promising' new organisation, known to have strong backing from president and prime minister, had been unable to attract a member of the *Inspection des finances*. Monod had wanted 'someone to pursue financial matters for DATAR, but the Finance Ministry refused to allow an *inspecteur des finances* to work for a *conseiller référendaire* from the *Cour des*

⁸⁵ Cour des Comptes (1998) *Le Rapport Public 1997* (1998), S.1. 'Associations subventionnées par la DATAR'; *Le Rapport Public 2001* (2002) returned to the subject.

⁸⁶ Cour des Comptes (2002), Yves Cochet, para. 6745.

⁸⁷ Hayward and Wright (2002), p.45.

⁸⁸ Pouyet (1968), pp.62-4.

⁸⁹ At least 8 of the 27 *chargés de mission* recruited 1963-67. Massardier (1996), p.130.

⁹⁰ Roche (1986), p.70, Essig (1979), p.19.

Comptes' [Monod].⁹² How well therefore were subsequent political leaders able to ensure that staff at DATAR had the qualities to match their needs?

Figure 4.5 compares figures compiled by Massardier on the educational background of *chargés de mission* who were recruited in (approximately) the Gaullist presidency, the Pompidou and Giscard presidencies, and the first Mitterrand presidency.⁹³ The proportion of *chargés* who had been at ENA was much the same among those recruited in the 1970s as among those who arrived earlier, but in the 1980s it declined markedly. However, the absolute number of ENA graduates recruited per year, having risen slightly in the 1970s as DATAR continued to expand gently, was the same in Mitterrand's first term as under the Gaullists. The presence of recruits trained at *Polytechnique* increased both proportionately and in absolute numbers in the 1970s, partly no doubt because of Monod's forecasting studies but also because the political leadership gave *aménagement du territoire* a strong technical bias during this period (see Chapter 6 on roads planning). In Mitterrand's first term the proportion of *Polytechnique* recruits declined substantially but the number of *polytechniciens* recruited per year remained as high as in the 1970s. Staff levels at DATAR expanded hugely in the early 1980s with the arrival of the Left government (see Figure 4.4); and a larger proportion of them than before had been educated in other ways (university, ministerial *écoles*). That is, in the first Mitterrand presidency just as many ENA-trained officials were attracted to DATAR as had been attracted to the early DATAR, and even more *Polytechnique*-trained officials were willing to serve. This type of recruitment, retaining the same capacity in terms of ENA and *Polytechnique* networks, yet offering additional posts to people with different training, matched the new political regime's desire to open recruitment to its own people without cutting back on traditional, proven arrangements.⁹⁴

A similar overall picture is seen in the recruitment of staff from the top *grands corps*. Figure 4.6 gives figures derived from Massardier for director-level posts (*délégué* and deputy *délégué*); the *chargés de mission* in Paris; and the *chargés* in *missions* and commissariats. Although numbers are rather small, recruitment from the top *grands corps* for director-level posts seems similar across the three periods; the *délégué* (until 1987) and the deputy *délégué* (until 1982) continued to be appointed to DATAR from the *grands corps*. The overall number of *chargés* from these *corps* also remains steady though recruitment from the administrative *grands corps* to missions outside Paris ceases, to be replaced by the technical *corps*. In total, the same number of top *grands corps* officials are recruited to DATAR in the 1980s as in the 1960s, though not at the level of the early 1970s, when Essig had to 'keep numbers down by pleading the smallness of the building to stem demand'.⁹⁵

⁹¹ Pouyet (1968), p.62.

⁹² Essig (1979), p.21.

⁹³ The data rely on Massardier (1996), pp.159-63, which uses these time-periods. But he emphasises the percentage changes, whereas for the purpose of this thesis, the absolute number is more important.

⁹⁴ Pfister, T. (1988) *La République des fonctionnaires* (Albin Michel), p.92.

⁹⁵ Essig (1979), p.57.

Figure 4.5. Training of *chargés de mission* at DATAR

Training establishment of <i>chargés de mission</i> in Paris office	1963-70	1971-81	1982-88
ENA	14 (29%)	25 (32%)	15 (21%)
<i>Ecole polytechnique</i>	8 (17%)	21 (27%)	13 (18%)
Other <i>grandes écoles</i>	3 (6%)	5 (6%)	4 (6%)
Other public service <i>écoles</i>	4 (8%)	8 (10%)	11 (15%)
IEP (only)	13 (27%)	10 (13%)	10 (14%)
University	13 (27%)	10 (13%)	10 (14%)
Others	5 (10%)	8 (10%)	15 (21%)
TOTAL (N= 100%)	48	70	72

Notes: Following Massardier, the middle period, 1971-81, is longer than the others.

IEP includes former *Ecole Libre des Sciences Politiques*.

Source: Recalculated from figures and tables in Massardier (1996), pp.159-63.

Figure 4.6. *Grands corps* membership of senior DATAR personnel

Corps membership of personnel	1963-70	1971-81	1982-88
<i>Administrative grands corps</i>			
Director-level	3	4	4
<i>Chargés</i> in Paris	5	7	4
<i>Chargés</i> outside Paris	4	1	0
Total administrative <i>grands corps</i>	12	12	8
<i>Technical grands corps</i>			
Director-level	1	5	2
<i>Chargés</i> in Paris	6	12	8
<i>Chargés</i> outside Paris	3	4	5
Total technical <i>grands corps</i>	10	21	11
Total <i>grands corps</i> members	22	43	23

Notes: Following Massardier, the middle period 1971-81 is longer than the other two.

The administrative *grands corps* are *Inspection des Finances*, *Conseil d'Etat*, *Cour des Comptes*.

The technical *grands corps* are *Mines* and *Ponts et Chaussées*.

Source: Calculated from figures and tables in Massardier (1996), p.152, pp.170-71.

The point about the stability of *grands corps* recruitment in the early 1980s needs to be emphasised because it contrasts with the decline in *grands corps* recruitment to DATAR in the second Mitterrand presidency.

Evidence on how far political leaders were still able to recruit *grands corps* members to DATAR at the end of the 1980s was sought from an examination of senior posts held at DATAR between 1986 and 1999. Figure 4.7 includes all posts that were held at some point 1986-99 by an official whose *corps* membership is given in *Bottin administratif*. It indicates whether their predecessors and successors were of the same *corps* or no *corps*, or the post was vacant or abolished. It shows that recruitment of *corps* members declined overall. There is a stronger recruitment from the *administrateur civil corps* rather than the higher *corps*, but even this *corps* is rare at DATAR after 1997. Chirac's DATAR in 1986 recruited two *grands corps* members and retained those already present. Rocard's government in 1988 similarly recruited two new *grands corps* members. But 1988 was the last year⁹⁶ that there were officials from the *Cour des Comptes* (a *corps* that had always had one or two members at DATAR); it is also the last year that senior members of three top technical *corps* were present at the same time (*Mines, Ponts, Télécoms*). By the same token, it is clear that bureaucratic *corps* did not control the appointment process. Of the 58 postings listed after 1986, only 8 consisted of a *corps* member (or member of no *corps*) replacing a member of the same *corps* (or none). Other traditional bureaucratic norms were transgressed when a second 'No.2' was appointed by the Left government in 1990, demoted to 'No.3' by the Right government in 1995 and created *délégué* by the next Left government in 1997. Flexibility remains; eleven new posts (not just a name-change) were created in this period; and posts were not continued when a role ceased to be a priority.

Yet the explosion of appointments under the Balladur government 1993-95 reveals the most significant point. Political leaders promoting a more dynamic *aménagement du territoire* were able to attract *corps* members who, in this case at least, were less politically-identified. A deputy *délégué* arrived from the interior ministry, where he had planned the decentralisation laws under the Socialist Defferre, and the reorganisation of local authority functions under the Socialist Joxe, to oversee the drawing up of the Gaullist Pasqua's bill on *aménagement du territoire* (LOADT).⁹⁷ There were also small increases in recruitment from the technical *grands corps* in 2001 and 2002 as a new presidency approached.⁹⁸ The willingness of senior officials to be seconded to DATAR varied with the political leadership.

The responsiveness of teams to leadership priorities

Guichard's period as *délégué-général* of the Organisation for the Development of the Sahara had impressed on him the merits of a team-based system without internal divisions, that

⁹⁶ In 2004 a *Cour des Comptes* official (by the *tour extérieur*) was appointed to DATAR as the 'No.3'.

⁹⁷ *Le Monde*, 16 Feb. 1994; *La Tribune Desfossés*, 17 Feb. 1994; F. Grosrichard, *Le Monde*, 3 Feb. 1995.

⁹⁸ DATAR (2001) *Rapport d'Activité 2000* (DATAR); DATAR (2002).

Figure 4.7. *Corps* appointments at DATAR 1986-99

About mid-year:	1986	1988	1989	1992	1993	1995	1996	1997	1999
Prime minister	Chirac	Rocard	Bérégovoy	Balladur	Juppé	Jospin			
<i>Délégué</i>	Cour des Comptes.....>	Administrateur civil hors classe	Ponts	Admin. civil	Professor				
<i>Deputy délégué/directeur</i>	Professor	C. Comptes	Professor	Prefect	Admin. civil hors classe.....>	Prefect			
<i>Directeur</i>		INSEE	Professor.....>	[Vacant]	No corps				
<i>Conseiller technique</i>	Sub-Prefect	Sub-Prefect	Sub-Prefect	Administrateur civil	Sub-Prefect	Admin. civil	No corps		
<i>Conseiller au délégué</i>			Prefect.....>	Admin. civil	Prefect				
<i>Conseiller au délégué</i>				Armaments.....>	No corps				
<i>Relocation of firms</i>	No corps	Telecomms	Mines	Ponts	No corps	No corps	Armaments		
<i>Infrastructure, plans</i>	Ponts		Ponts	Local government corps.....>	[Vacant]	No corps			
<i>Rural development</i>	Rural engineer	Agronomist	[Vacant]	No corps	Rural engineer.....>	[Vacant]	No corps		
<i>Location factors</i>	Mines		[Vacant]	Contracted					
<i>Finance, Gen.Sec.</i>	C. Comptes	Administrateur civil	Administrateur civil	Sub-Prefect	Admin. civil	INSEE			
<i>Europe, international</i>	Agronomist	Administrateur civil hors classe.....>	Administrateur civil	Admin. civil	No corps				
<i>Studies, forecasting</i>	[Vacant]	No corps.... ..>		INSEE	Lecturer	No corps			
<i>Act on AdT</i>				TPG [finance]					
<i>State action/services</i>				Administrateur civil.....>	Admin. civil	Lecturer			
<i>Institutions/regions</i>				Prefect		Public Works			
<i>Economic action</i>				Administrateur civil		No corps			
<i>Universities, research</i>				Lecturer					

Note: Posts with slightly different titles but similar roles are combined together.

The posts shown are all those in DATAR's Paris office that at some point between 1985 and 1999 were held by an official from a senior *corps*.

Sources: *Bottin administratif* (various years), supplemented by *Lettres de la DATAR*.

transcended sectoral boundaries.⁹⁹ The founding myths still translate into DATAR's working practices. Because of the high proportion of secondments there can be no career structure, the diversity of backgrounds blurs status, and there is an informal relationship within teams.¹⁰⁰ But if the teams that Pouyet thought were 'original' in French administration still exist, how well do they reflect the leaderships' priorities?

Figure 4.8 sets out the evolution of the team structure. Some changes would probably have taken place under any political leadership in response to changes in the environment (the addition of the service sector in the 1970s, a 'European' team in the run-up to the Single Market 1992). But there is considerable evidence of response to leadership demands, which shows in the substantial changes in structure when there is an alternation of political leadership (1978 to 1982, 1992 to 1993, 2002 to 2003). At a finer level, changes to individual teams match the political leadership's orientation on *aménagement du territoire*. For example, by 1978 had been added a 'rural team, focusing on country areas and small towns', to meet the goals Giscard defined in November 1975. The Paris Basin team was set up in 1990 in response to Prime Minister Rocard's alarm at census results for the region. Its report was published in 1992; a Paris region scheme agreed by ministers in 1993 and a Paris Basin plan signed by regional presidents in 1994.¹⁰¹ In 1993 *Les Echos* reported that 'DATAR is adapting its structures to its new tasks',¹⁰² as the *délégué* reorganised the teams around Pasqua's priorities. In 1997 DATAR did not just adopt the vocabulary of 'sustainable development' when Voynet became Minister for Environment and *Aménagement du territoire*, but organised the production of sustainable development plans for several public services - which a new minister was able to set aside in 2004.

Yet if DATAR's teams are linked to leaders' priorities, not all the leaders' priorities are covered by the teams. Journalists questioned why Bernard Attali's DATAR did not have an industrial team to come up with ideas for industrial restructuring,¹⁰³ though it was among the top presidential concerns. In 2003 DATAR set up four teams that corresponded closely to most of the policy goals proclaimed by the premier in December 2002 ('promote wealth creation'; 'make metropolitan areas and regions attractive internationally'; 'enable all territories to participate in regional development'; 'give them the means of self-development'). But the policies most dear to Jean-Pierre Raffarin (decentralisation and the trans-national associations he called '*petites Europes*'), 'would be given to [un-named] members of staff to follow up'.¹⁰⁴ Professional notions of *aménagement du territoire* also

⁹⁹ Charles and Cristini (1992), p.470 citing interview with Guichard, 21 June 1989. Essig (1979), p.24.

¹⁰⁰ Working with the 'public services' team 2001-03 it was not clear in discussion or behaviour, in or outside meetings, whether the university lecturer turned sub-prefect, a Banque de France official or a Post Office official was the team leader.

¹⁰¹ Lacaze, J.-P. (1994) *Paris: Urbanisme d'Etat et destin d'une ville* (Flammarion), p.344; *Lettre de la DATAR*, 153, Oct 1994.

¹⁰² I.de Gaulmya, *Les Echos*, 29-30 Oct. 1993.

¹⁰³ *La Croix*, 28 June 1984.

¹⁰⁴ B.Jérôme, *Le Monde*, 13 Feb. 2003; DATAR website, section 'L'organisation', 28 Feb. 2004.

Figure 4.8. The evolution of DATAR's teams

1967	Industrial decentralisation, foreign investment and aid to firms			Public works			Regional action			Studies							
1978	Industrial team (firms)			Urban team (towns, offices, service sector)			Rural team (country areas and small towns)			Studies and forecasting							
1982	Relocation of economic activities			Urban policy and infrastructure			Sensitive zones		Regional development		Forecasting		Finance				
1985	Relocation of activities		International sector		Urban policy and infrastructure		Sensitive zones		New technologies		Regional development		Studies and forecasting		Finance		
1992	Economic re-location, foreign investment		Location factors	European affairs	Towns and infrastructure	Paris basin	Local development	Rural development	Region Plan-Contracts, international cooperation			Studies and forecasting		Administrative, financial, inter-ministerial affairs			
1993	Economic activity, jobs, social cohesion, foreign investment			Europe and international cooperation		Spatial and territorial organisation complementary urban decongestion and rural depopulation					Emergency action		Regional and inter-regional action and forecasting		General secretariat and fund management		
1996	Economic action (industrial zones in difficulty, grants, foreign investment)				European affairs		Spatial organisation		Action of State and public bodies		Regional action and rural development		Studies and forecasting		General secretariat		
1998	Economic development		European affairs		Organisation of space	Action of State and public bodies			Rural development action			Studies and forecasting and international cooperation			General secretariat		
2001	Economic activity, foreign investment		European action, cross-border cooperation		Organisation of territories	Local development, jobs, local productive systems, public services, State reform, admin. relocation			Environment, rural action, sustainable development		Interministerial and territorial action		Regional and inter-regional action		Studies and forecasting		General secretariat
2002	Economy, jobs, foreign investment		Europe and international cooperation		Sustainable urban development	Public services, State reform, Paris delocalisation		Local development, local productive systems		Territorial strategic planning		Region plan contracts, large projects		Studies and forecasting - 8 groups		General secretariat	
2003	Economic development and attractiveness		Europe and international		State territorial policies and sustainable development				Rural and local development			Regional action and metropolitan areas			General secretariat		

Sources: 1967: Pouyet (1968), p.66; 1978: Essig (1979), p.61; 1982: *Le Monde*, 25 Dec.1981; 1985: Laborie et al (1985), p.25; 1992: Madiot (1993), p.39; 1993: *Lettre de la DATAR*, 146, Nov 1993; 1996: Madiot (1996), p.23. 1998 *Bottin administratif* (1998); 2001-03, DATAR website, topic "L'organisation", various dates.

intrude: in 2001 the creation of the 'local productive systems' team and the expansion of the *délégué*'s forecasting programme were surely facilitated by the departure of Voynet. On whole, however, DATAR seemed to adapt to the demands of a new leadership even when these changed frequently.

CONCLUSIONS

This chapter set out to show how the political leadership was able to adapt and steer DATAR as a bureaucratic organisation that responded to its requirements. The analysis focused on the two structural elements that combine to give leaders the assurance of reliability, competence and a flexible responsiveness: the post of *délégué*, in which political leaders would need to marry loyalty with competent management of DATAR's activities; and the constitution of DATAR as an *administration de mission* whose varied and high-quality recruitment and informal working methods ought to enable it to ensure interministerial coordination while adapting quickly to new political demands.

The examination showed that the French political leadership has considerable power to appoint a loyal *délégué* from a wide recruitment pool. Despite the strong career protection rights of the French civil service there are many ways a new leadership can replace a *délégué* without undermining the loyalty of the bureaucracy as a whole or the willingness of able candidates to be recruited; this system seemed to operate satisfactorily for twenty years. The greatest constraint on the political leadership seems to have come from internal conflict within its multiple components (president, prime minister and minister(s) for *aménagement du territoire*), mediated by the party system. The most efficient nomination processes took place when there were fewer active participants (a valid argument for attaching DATAR directly to the prime minister). There was dysfunctional conflict between the *délégué* and ministers for *aménagement du territoire* whose views had not been respected. 'Structured politicisation' after 1981 soon led to a loss in DATAR's effectiveness during every period of transition between a new government and a new *délégué*. In choosing a *délégué*, political leaders make a 'trade-off', in Blondel's phrase, between competence and loyalty. The several indicators examined all pointed in the same direction: political leaders gave increasingly greater weight to personal links than to professional criteria. It fitted Lochak's category of 'clientelist politicisation', at best appointing people who could be relied upon, at worst satisfying the ambitions of friends or rewarding services rendered.

This conclusion was reinforced by the examination of the political leaders' powers over DATAR as a whole. Political leaders have direct and effective control of the number of staff paid from the prime minister's resources and whether they will be permanent additions to the bureaucracy or can be dismissed at will. However, almost by virtue of the type of policy domain, DATAR staff in the field are more difficult to control in formal ways; nevertheless, each field office was consciously created by the political leadership, and it is within their power to abolish them or curtail irregular practices. The recruitment of an important minority of senior staff is largely at the choice of seconding institutions and the

officials themselves, based on the value to them of work at DATAR; it is therefore related to the signals the leadership sends out about the future of the policy. This correlation could be seen in quantitative terms, with staff numbers and turnover rising and falling with the arrival of new political leaders with a greater or less commitment to *aménagement du territoire*.

The point was underlined by analyses of the recruitment to DATAR of the officials most able to network and persuade effectively: those trained at ENA or *Ecole polytechnique*, and especially members of the higher *corps*. Up to the start of Mitterrand's second term of office, the numbers of ENA and *grands corps* staff at DATAR did not change greatly in absolute terms, while the numbers from *Polytechnique* and the technical *grands corps* varied mainly in response to policy changes decided by political leaders. Officials were keen to work at DATAR and there was a rapid expansion after 1981 when the new leadership opened up recruitment to staff with different qualifications. But by the late 1980s there was a decline in the numbers of staff recruited from the higher *corps*. Nevertheless, the greater presence of these officials during the mid-1990s when Balladur and Pasqua revived the policy, showed that recruitment could be stimulated quickly in response to interest shown by the political leadership. Finally an examination of DATAR's evolving team structure showed that the agency adapted quickly to new demands by the political leadership, even if some effort went into rather technical work, and some themes of interest to ministers failed to be addressed.

Overall, it was demonstrated that the political leadership could use personal and institutional mechanisms in the manner asserted by Blondel to re-orient DATAR to its own needs. It was limited by the capacity of the *grands corps* to resist appointment, but so far this constraint has materialised only when the leadership itself was not interested in the policy. The major constraints on an effective response to policy demands were the conflicts within the leadership itself and the consequences of politicisation. First politicisation gained ground at the expense of technocracy; then from the mid-1990s political loyalty, friendships and reward took over from competence and authority as the major criteria in appointments. In a paradoxical way the personalisation of appointments is witness to the power of the leadership to make an impact on a bureaucratic agency, but the consequence of this short-term action is a decline in the long-term credibility of the institution. Yet the brief return of the *grands corps* in the mid-1990s when political leaders were enthusiastic about this policy domain, showed that political interest and will make an impact on DATAR itself and its capacity to influence the bureaucratic environment on behalf of the political leadership.

CHAPTER 5

STEERING POLICY THROUGH DATAR: THE USE BY POLITICAL LEADERS OF ADMINISTRATIVE AND FINANCIAL TOOLS

INTRODUCTION

Blondel argued that there were four features of a public bureaucracy that governed its implementation of the leader's goals, and which an active political leadership would try to improve. The impact of the leadership on three of those features - competence, organisation, reliability - was examined in the last chapter. The fourth feature was the linkage between the bureaucracy and the population. For the leader's aims to be carried out in society, not only should there be close links between the leadership and the bureaucracy but also the bureaucracy should 'be closely linked to the population'.¹ The political leaders who created DATAR did not intend it to link them directly to the population in the manner of field offices, but DATAR had a 'target population' of public actors, whose actions it would steer on the leadership's behalf.

Those in Prime Minister Pompidou's office who designed DATAR

'had surveyed the principal decision-making nodes in the administrative and financial apparatus and organised the necessary regulatory provisions'.²

The chief administrative instrument was the prime minister's committee, the *comité interministériel d'aménagement et du territoire* (CIAT, from 1995 CIADT),³ and the *délégué* was given a place on other committees relevant to regional development. The main financial instruments were a fund, the *Fonds d'intervention pour l'aménagement du territoire* (FIAT),⁴ and new procedures to give DATAR oversight of ministries' capital budgets. If 'bureaucracies... are the tools, the instruments *par excellence*, which leaders use and on which they rely',⁵ DATAR, together with its committees and financial powers, was the innovative bureaucratic tool that would coordinate the activities of ministries and deliver a more effective policy of *aménagement du territoire*.

This chapter evaluates the use made by political leaders of these administrative and financial tools and the constraints to their action. First, with respect to the administrative tools: what evidence is there that different political leaders have been able to ensure that these committees meet their particular needs? Have political leaders been able to create and abolish

¹ Blondel (1987), pp.168-9.

² Grémion, P. (1976), p.124.

³ Comité interministériel d'aménagement et de développement du territoire.

⁴ Subsumed in 1995 into a new Fonds national d'aménagement et de développement du territoire (FNADT).

⁵ Blondel (1987), p.167.

other committees in this policy domain, and modify their purpose or membership to suit their own programmes, or do committees take on an institutionalised existence?⁶ Second, with respect to the financial tools, how easy has it been for the political leadership to control the size and use of funding allocated to *aménagement du territoire* programmes? Have new leaders been able to create, abolish and modify development funds in relation to their own priorities? How well has DATAR been able to impose the leadership's priorities for regional development on ministries' spending? Overall, has each political leadership been able to create, use and adapt to its own goals the administrative and financial resources it derives from its legal and constitutional position, and through which DATAR drives the political agenda for *aménagement du territoire*?

THE ADMINISTRATIVE TOOLS

This section assesses political leadership's use of that conventional administrative device, the interministerial committee. It examines the organisation of the principal committee in this domain, CIAT/CIADT, to judge whether it was an efficient tool, and show whether different political leaders have been able to use it as they intend. It matches the frequency of CIAT meetings to the levels of leaders' interest in *aménagement du territoire* for further evidence that it is leaders' will that drives CIAT. The last part of this section shows how other interministerial committees whose interests concern *aménagement du territoire* respond to the varying concerns of leaders.

Operating the committees CIAT and CIADT

CIAT was not only the crucial committee for *aménagement du territoire* but was 'without contest the most important of the committees created by decree' [in any domain].⁷ The importance of CIAT for Massot stemmed from the size of FIAT, the direct legal force of its decisions over administrative bodies (it does not prepare decisions: it enacts them),⁸ and its methodology, which was so effective that it was adopted as a model by interministerial committees run by the government secretary-general.⁹

Prime Minister Debré introduced CIAT in 1959 as an informal meeting to discuss conflicts between the Ministers of Construction, Finance and Industry, and found it sufficiently useful to establish it formally the following year.¹⁰ He chaired the meetings, which were organised by Jérôme Monod, his *cabinet* staff member for administrative reform and *aménagement du territoire*, and it discussed reports presented by the Minister of Construction. Under Georges Pompidou's organisational arrangements (designed by Olivier

⁶ Of 32 'permanent' interministerial committees serviced by the prime minister's office in 1985 only 11 met that year, 4 had met for the last time in 1984, 2 in 1983...and 7 had never met or were considered to be no longer functioning. Conseil d'Etat (1986), p.42.

⁷ Massot (1979), p.151.

⁸ Conseil d'Etat, 4 June 1993. The ENA association had challenged CIAT's power to move ENA to Strasbourg.

⁹ Massot (1979), p.152.

¹⁰ Decree of 19 Nov. 1960. Debré (1988) p.177, lists 10 CIATs he held 1959 to 1962.

Guichard, Monod and Pompidou's *directeur de cabinet*), DATAR became responsible for preparing and organising CIAT meetings and for seeing that the decisions it took were followed through by ministries.¹¹ The decisions were presented as a list of actions (*résumé de décisions*) that were directions to ministers from the prime minister; in practice they ratified agreements DATAR had already organised between the participants, or 'formalised' decisions already taken by the prime minister.¹² Figure 5.1 gives examples of decisions taken in CIAT meetings, 1963 to 2003.

In 1963 CIAT had a core membership of the prime minister, ministers of interior, finance, industry and agriculture, and the *délégué*; other ministers were invited for particular topics. Figure 5.1, listing a few decisions made at different CIATs, shows their wide scope. They fall into three categories: first, administrative decisions about government programmes, such as the decision in 1966 to create interministerial organisations for planning metropolitan areas (OREAMs); second, financial decisions, whether about a sum to be assigned to a sectoral policy, or a subsidy regime; and finally, 'the prime minister settles any dispute that has arisen between DATAR and ministers'.¹³

In the 1960s and early 1970s CIATs were an administratively -efficient tool. Their decisions could have far-reaching consequences for a town or region, but they were dry and technocratic. They produced a *résumé de décisions* of two pages.¹⁴

The first two *délégués*, Olivier Guichard and Jérôme Monod, developed a working method that was particularly effective. DATAR prepared CIAT's agenda and dossiers carefully, giving the relevant ministries the right amount of information and taking the prime minister into their confidence. The prime minister met the *délégué* a few days before CIAT and was thus fully aware of the dossiers and any political or technical problem. He made his decision in practice at that point. The *délégué* gave the prime minister an element of choice without going outside the draft agreement [with ministries]. He selected some dossiers on which DATAR was ready to accept strategic withdrawals to save the face or the position of the minister concerned. Thus during the committee sessions the prime minister really had the feel of 'hands-on' government and taking clear decisions. The often sterile game of interministerial conflict was in most cases replaced by agreements that enabled action to take place with the power of a government decision behind them.¹⁵

Political control of CIATs

With such attention paid to the efficient organisation by DATAR it might seem that the control of CIAT was in the hands of bureaucrats. When Pompidou's chief political aide, Guichard, was *délégué*, it was clearly political will that prevailed. But the vignettes offered by the *délégué* François Essig of other prime ministers in CIAT seem to show they too put their own political stamp on decisions. Pompidou's successor, Maurice Couve de Murville, 'was really exacting', and sent back for further study several dossiers that DATAR thought well-prepared.¹⁶ Jacques Chaban-Delmas, Prime Minister 1969-72, was more interested in

¹¹ Decree of 14 Feb. 1963, Art 3.

¹² Massot (1979), p.152.

¹³ Madiot (1979), p.48.

¹⁴ Essig (1979), p.91.

¹⁵ Rigaud and Delcros (1984), p.197.

¹⁶ Essig (1979), p.86.

Figure 5.1 Meetings and decisions of CIAT and CIADT

Date	Decisions or Frequency of meetings	Sources
31/7/63	Agreed new aerospace activity would be sited in SW France	Labasse (1966) p.588
23/12/63	Agreed to relocate pensions administration out of Paris	Monod (1974) p.27
1964	Agreed to fund aerospace centre at Toulouse	Lanversin (1970) p.381
2/6/64	Named 8 regional metropolitan cities; Languedoc mission budget	Madiot (1979) p.132
7/64	Relocation of Ecole Polytechnique to Palaiseau	Audouin (1977) p.169
	'meets every two to three months'	Guichard (1965) p.132
24/2/66	Agreed to create OREAMs (Metropolitan area planning bodies)	Rémond (1977) p.7
4/3/66	Created the interministerial land property group (GIF)	PLF 1967, I, p.51
22/7/66	Set up an interministerial group on Paris region basin	PLF 1971, I, p.85
12/10/66	Created mission for developing Corsica	Madiot (1986) p.234
{27/11/66	Agreed regional parks; grants regime (double session with 28/11)	PLF 1968, I, p.90
{28/11/66	Adopted CGP report on Plan regionalisation	PLF 1968, I, p.128
6/2/67	Approved Fos development plan and report on Aerotrain	Audouin (1977) p.77
22/5/67	Awarded FIAT to Navibus; relocated State body to Toulon	PLF 1968, I, p.131
6/6/67	Agreed trial of Aerotrain	PLF 1969, I, p.32
27/7/67	Approved New Town of Le Vaudreuil	Rémond (1977), p.96
12/67	Relocated 3 Hautes Ecoles to Rennes	PLF 1969, I, p.28
2/68	OREAM draft plan for Lyon; agreed Imprimeries to go to Douai	PLF 1969, I, p.39
4/4/68	Agreed Breton Road plan, and 3 rural renovation zones	PLF 1969, I, p.32
13/5/68	Approved OREAM draft plan for Nord	PLF 1969, I, p.39
18/6/68	Created industrial conversion zones	PLF 1969, II, p.193
1/10/68	Created industrial zones of Fos and Lorraine	PLF 1970, I, p.124
17/12/68	Corsica; Pays Basque; Alsace; OREAM Marseille and Lorraine	PLF 1970, I, p.124
1/4/69	Plans for Côte Aquitaine and 'metropolitan countermagnets'	PLF 1970, I, p.124
25/5/69	Savoie; Lyon-Mediterranean canal; road schemes	PLF 1970, I, p.124
6/10/69	Rural renovation; roads in Auvergne mining area; Corsica	PLF 1971, II, p.157
9/12/69	RN10 to Bordeaux; relocation of officials to Toulouse	PLF 1971, II, p.157
24/2/70	Nord; Lorraine; water supply; local airports	PLF 1971, II, p.157
{15/5/70	Road schemes; regional observatories; natural parks (with 26/5)	PLF 1971, II, p.157
{26/5/70	OREAM Rhone-Alpes, OREAM Picardie-Sud	PLF 1971, I, p.89
30/7/70	Examined OREAM Lorraine draft plan	PLF 1971, II, p.156
9/70	Approved draft Loire OREAM plan	Rémond (1977) p.60
17/12/70	Côte Aquitaine Plan; funds for experimental projects	PLF 1972, II, p.143
13/5/71	Long-term coastline studies	PLF 1973, I, p.6
29/7/71	OREAM Centre; regional observatories, Imprimeries to Douai	PLF 1973, I, p.166
7/10/71	1972 regionalised budget; scheme for network of major roads	PLF 1973, I, p.166
21/12/71	Fos, OREAMs to go to Regional Prefect; OREAM Alsace	PLF 1973, I, p.167
20/4/72	Took decision of principle on Valbonne-Sophia-Antipolis	PLF 1973, I, p.167
3/8/72	OREAMs Normandie, Aquitaine; villes moyennes	Rémond (1977) p.99
26/10/72	Invited Minister of Finance to develop Lyon as financial centre	Monod (1974) p.29
22/12/72	Examined OREAM Aquitaine	Rémond (1977) p.127
12/7/73	Paris; agreed contrats de villes moyennes for some towns	Audouin (1977) p.203
5/11/73	Agreed more villes moyennes contracts	Audouin (1977) p.203
20/12/73	Mountain commissioners; central ministries to plan relocation	Rémond (1977), p.80
14/3/74	Villes moyennes; decisions on Valbonne-Sophia-Antipolis	Laborie (1985) 103
10/7/74	Created Mission for development of Plateau of Valbonne	Madiot (1986) p.241
{25/7/74	OREAM Nord {'double session' with 30/7}	Rémond (1977) p.52
{30/7/74	Villes moyennes, Valbonne	Laborie (1985) p.103
12/12/74	Funding for Massif Central within mountain policy	Audouin (1977) p.65
11/4/75	Announced Contrats de pays; 3 of 4 National technical institutes	Rémond (1977) p.52
26/6/75	OREAM Seine-Normandie	Rémond (1977) p.100
10/7/75	Marseille OREAM; Fos 'grands chantiers'; villes moyennes	Rémond (1977) p.42
12/9/75	Decided development charters for Massif central, Corsica	Madiot (1979) p.120
12/75	Massif Central grants	Audouin (1977) p.65

Figure 5.1 Meetings of CIAT/CIADT *contd*

Date	Decisions or Frequency of meetings	Sources
23/2/76	OREAM schemes for border regions; villes moyennes	Rémond (1977) p.149
25/6/76	Access channel to Le Crotoy; GIRZOM; 22 mF for Massif Central	Rémond (1977) p.52
26/11/76	Regions can group communes for contrats de pays	Montricher (1995) p.52
1/3/77	Prefect can modify OREAM area; Regionalised contrats de pays	Rémond (1977) p.27
10/7/77	Agreed motorway network scheme	Quinet et al (1980) p.72
22/11/77	Rural one-stop shops; mountain programmes Jura and Alpes du Sud	Madiot (1979) p.174
13/2/78	Regional Prefects can ask Breton commissioner for grants	Madiot (1979) p.212
18/7/78	Relocation aid for service sector; contrats de pays; industrial zones	DATAR Documentation
22/2/79	Massif Central; rural funds; mining zones; aid to relocation	DATAR Documentation
no meeting in 1980		
19/11/81	Reform of regional aids; tertiary decentralisation (SNCF to Lille)	DATAR Documentation
6/5/82	Paris agrément; State-region programmes; transport	DATAR Documentation
20/12/82	Census results; sensitive zones; regional action; relocation aids	DATAR Documentation
18/4/83	New AdT goals; road network; Grand Sud-Ouest, FIAT	DATAR Documentation
27/7/83	Regions' proposals for Plan Contracts; tourism; mountains; culture	DATAR Documentation
22/12/83	Plan Contracts; Auvergne technological pole	DATAR Documentation
13/4/84	Road plan; waterways; Plan Contracts; mining zones	DATAR Documentation
5/3/85	Conversion poles; Plan Contracts; EC funds, enlargement; FIAT	DATAR Documentation
no meeting in 1986		
13/4/87	Roads policy and funding; Regional Plan Contracts	DATAR Documentation
10/2/88	Contract priorities for Regional Prefect; priority road projects	Chain (1997) p.150
31/8/88	Set additional objectives for Regional Contracts	Chain (1997) p.150
17/11/88	Pre-draft Regional contracts; TGV via Amiens; motorways	Quotidien 18/11/88
10/2/89	Authorised signature of Regional Plan Contracts	Chain (1997) p.150
19/5/89	Signed Ile de France and Dom-Tom Contracts	Chain (1997) p.151
late 89	[CIAT on Corsica prepared by DATAR]	Le Monde 15/1/90
17/6/90	Roads budget (conflict between transport and finance ministers)	Dunn (1995) p.281
5/10/90	Grant regime for private-sector relocation; administrative relocation	Madiot (1996) p.164
5/11/90	Urban charters; mining zones; Sophia; relocation; CNAT	Lettre DATAR 142
14/5/91	Approved national TGV plan [published 2/4/92]	Carrère (1992), p.71
3/10/91	Administrative relocation; regional universities; Plan-Contracts	Le Monde 25/10/91
7/11/91	20 bodies to be relocated from Paris, including DATAR and Plan.	Le Monde 12/11/91
28/11/91	Rural CIAT; regional universities; public services in mountains	DATAR, Lettre 142
29/1/92	More relocation of 14000 jobs; aids to civil service mobility	Madiot (1996) p.138
23/7/92	Procedures for preparing Regional Contracts	DATAR, Lettre 142
10/2/93	Coast, ports, research, rural development, TGV-Est; Contracts	DATAR, Lettre 142
12/7/93	At Mende: Relaunch of AdT; LOADT; relocation; Contracts	DATAR, Lettre 144
30/6/94	A 'CIAT rural' on 'points publics' (one -stop -shops)	Madiot (1996) p.189
20/9/94	At Troyes: Paris basin; jobs; redeployment of public services	DATAR, Lettre 153
CIADT - no meeting in 1995 or 1996		
10/4/97	CIADT at Auch: adopts draft schéma national; pays; FNDE; defence	DATAR, Lettre 159
15/12/97	Agree to renew LOADT, service schémas, Region Plan Contracts	DATAR, Lettre 161
15/12/98	Contracts: rules for prefects; modernise public services; job creation	DATAR, Lettre 164
23/7/99	At Arles: 1st budgets for Plan Contracts; aid to individual sites	DATAR, Lettre 167
28/2/00	At Nantes: Coastline; storm damage and oil slicks	Senate (2003), p.11
18/5/00	Service schémas; rail schemes; relocation out of Paris	DATAR, Lettre 169
9/7/01	At Limoges - cable-internet; schémas; Pyrénées rail tunnel study	DATAR, Lettre 172
13/12/02	Metropoles; high-speed internet; individual regional measures	DATAR, Lettre 179
26/5/03	Defence and other restructuring; minister of agriculture's plans	DATAR, Lettre 178
3/9/03	Rural policies: small towns, mobile telephones, airline fund	DATAR, Lettre 178
18/12/03	Plan Contract reform; metropoles; transport; internet; 50 projects	DATAR, Lettre 179

Notes: The sources refer to the date, and one or more decisions at that CIAT; other decisions derive from other sources in the table. PLF: *Projet de Loi de Finances*. Full references are in the bibliography.

the 'big picture', and left preparation to his *cabinet*, which settled 'practically everything' before CIAT met. He allowed ministers scarcely any time for discussion but he left implementation to them, rarely intervening in details.¹⁷ With Pierre Messmer, 1972-74, there was much more debate around the table, and prime-ministerial advisers were subjected to the same critical questioning as ministers; then the decision was made with 'particular respect to presidential authority: for him the President of the Republic's goals were a sure guide to decisions'.¹⁸ Jacques Chirac in 1974 demonstrated an 'aggressive political will'. As an experienced minister who already knew the dossiers he was able to assert himself as *patron*. He worked closely with his strong *cabinet* but did not always take their advice.¹⁹ Raymond Barre from 1976 behaved like Pompidou in CIAT; he was intellectually interested in the dossiers, explained them to the committee 'in his professorial way', but once he had made the decision, 'every one understood they had no choice but to execute it'. Barre was always suspicious of 'courtiers'; he thought about issues and made up his own mind.²⁰

By 1978 the CIAT agenda was longer, the briefs thicker and the *résumé de décisions* sometimes 70 pages.²¹ The 'core membership' of CIAT had expanded to ten ministers.²² The policies had changed too: for example, instead of the few *grand projets* of the 1960s there were many contracts with small towns. DATAR was negotiating more at local level, and that led to even more decisions for CIAT (even where a minister's signature would have sufficed), because field officials pressed for a 'decision in CIAT', since it had a 'quite different effect among local people: it was a sign of the attention the whole government was giving their area'.²³ Although CIAT was thus improving the 'links with the population' in Blondel's terms, it was less efficient. The load was therefore reduced by devolving some decisions to regional administrators and preparatory meetings of *cabinet* advisers, reserving only major or disputed decisions for CIAT. Yet 'decisions were then taken without direct political authority'.²⁴ Schrameck argues that pre-meetings of *cabinet* members could often lead to a ministerial committee becoming a formality, with ministers sending their *directeur de cabinet* in their place, and the prime minister sending another minister to chair the committee.²⁵ Barre stopped holding CIATs after February 1979, even though he still demonstrated his support for an energetic *aménagement du territoire*, telling DATAR staff to 'go out and re-conquer the territory'.²⁶

In the Mitterrand presidencies there were more signs that CIAT was no longer

¹⁷ *ibid.* p.86.

¹⁸ *ibid.* p.87.

¹⁹ *ibid.* p.87.

²⁰ *ibid.* p.88.

²¹ *ibid.* p.91.

²² Decree of 17 June 1975, in Madiot, Y. (1986) *Aménagement du territoire: recueil de textes commentés* (LITEC), pp.104-5.

²³ Essig (1979), p.89.

²⁴ *ibid.* p.91.

²⁵ Schrameck (1995), p.63.

²⁶ *La Croix*, 24 April 1980.

politically significant. Decrees appointing the minister for *aménagement du territoire* gave them the authority to chair CIATs, and 'this practice became frequent'.²⁷ Nevertheless Pierre Mauroy chaired at least six of the seven held during his premiership, 1981-84. Michel Rocard, as the minister, 1981-83, held press conferences after CIATs, but when Mauroy took responsibility for *aménagement du territoire* in 1983 he left the press to the *délégué*.²⁸ Under Laurent Fabius there was one CIAT in two years, and regional development decisions were made in Councils of Ministers: for example, in 1984 the Minister, Gaston Defferre, agreed to relax the conditions under which firms obtained DATAR's permission (*agrément*) to build in Paris;²⁹ and in 1985 he presented a report on industrial restructuring to a Council that increased its funding.³⁰ Chirac did not hold a CIAT in 1986, while in 1987, like Mauroy and Fabius before him, he held CIATs mainly to discuss State-Region Plan Contracts (discussed below in the section on funding), which the Planning Reform Act of 1982 required to be approved in CIAT. One confirmation that political leaders control CIAT decision-making can be seen in the agreement by a Chirac-chaired CIAT to keep the new *Instituts Universitaires de Technologie* approved in a CIAT held under Fabius but to site them in different towns.³¹ As under Fabius, other decisions that would formerly have been made in CIAT were made by decree in the Council of Ministers.³²

In the second Mitterrand presidency Rocard as Prime Minister returned to the practice of three CIATs a year. At the CIAT of November 1990, Rocard asked ministers to provide by July 1991 a plan for relocating 5 per cent of their staff outside Paris, and suspended all authorisation for expansion within Paris until the plans were approved.³³ Ministers did not produce the plans, just as they had not produced them following similar CIAT decisions in 1973 and 1981.

Cresson's relocation CIATs

Michel Delebarre, minister for *aménagement du territoire* in Edith Cresson's government, 1991-92, was committed to regional development but also wanted to use the publicity of a CIAT to make his political mark.³⁴ Cresson was reluctant to hold a CIAT because ministers had not produced the relocation plans. Cresson and Delebarre agreed to '*faire un coup*' by announcing ministries' relocation plans for them.³⁵ Their *cabinets* quietly prepared a list of candidates for each ministry. At her first CIAT in October 1991 a few moves were

²⁷ Madiot (1993), p.36. The comment seems to refer to Cresson's last CIAT and both Bérégovoy's.

²⁸ F.Grosrichard, *Le Monde*, 19 April 1984.

²⁹ *Le Monde*, 15 Dec. 1984.

³⁰ *Le Monde*, 29 Nov. 1985.

³¹ DATAR (1990), p.126.

³² E.g. Decree of 25 July 1987 re-centralising the award of the *prime d'aménagement du territoire* that a decree agreed in CIAT, 6 May 1982, had decentralised to regions. *Le Monde* 28 July 1987.

³³ Bezes (1994), p.62.

³⁴ Favier and Martin-Roland (1999), p.103. Delebarre was a regional geographer, chief development adviser to Mauroy in Lille and mayor-developer of Dunkerque.

announced, to increase pressure for more.³⁶ The full lists were not published, to give each ministry the chance to substitute its own candidate before the next CIAT. The November CIAT named 20 public bodies that would form the first stage of 30,000 posts to leave Paris by the year 2000.³⁷ They included some 'symbolically important' institutions, such as ENA, the Plan and DATAR itself.³⁸ Ministers at the CIAT did not oppose the prime minister. 'No provincial minister could be against. All provincial ministers had asked for something for themselves'.³⁹ The political self-interest of ministers overcame

'administrative inertia, conflict with the *grands corps* and civil service trade unions, family and financial constraints on officials, and the old Jacobin power reflex - in a word, conservatism - which had prevented this policy of redeploying public bodies from really taking off'.⁴⁰

DATAR did not officially organise Cresson's 'relocation CIATs'. The DATAR *chargé* who ran the 'decentralisation committee' (the interministerial body responsible for planning relocation, see below), helped Cresson and Delebarre's *cabinets*, but without approval from DATAR. He 'saw the chance to relocate administrative bodies [which had long agreed to move but] that had proved difficult to dislodge with normal procedures and without the visible protection of political actors'.⁴¹ Unsigned lists of administrative bodies were sent to Matignon from DATAR; and the minister's *cabinet* received faxed pages of the government directory, *Bottin administratif*, with entries marked with crosses. The DATAR *chargé* stopped participating during the few days before the November CIAT when final 'political' choices of locations were made.⁴² Nevertheless, 'people were annoyed with DATAR'.⁴³ The *délégué* said:

'We regretted the change to past practice....We did the prior technical work, on the administrative bodies that DATAR identified as able to move. But the definitive decisions were made by Edith Cresson and Michel Delebarre and their *directeurs de cabinet*'.⁴⁴

Unlike the DATAR of the 1960s DATAR did not want to seem an authoritarian institution or risk conflict with ministries. Cresson's CIATs showed the limitations of the bureaucratic agency, DATAR, for making an impact on policies that affected the personal lives of other bureaucrats. Delebarre's *directeur de cabinet* said DATAR did what it could but it needed the 'acceleration from the political level [which] came from the *cabinets* and the

³⁵ Bezes (1994), p.96, p.81, p.67. This section owes much to primary research on the relocation of one particular administrative body by Philippe Bezes

³⁶ The mayor of Clermont-Ferrand hoped 'to obtain satisfaction' at the CIATs of November and December. J.P.Rouger, *Le Monde*, 25 Oct.1991. The leaders of Roubaix, Lorraine, Bretagne, Limousin, disappointed in November, hoped for something in December. F.Grosrichard, *Le Monde*, 17-18 Nov.1991.

³⁷ In the light of past failures, the achievement of the target by 2004 was a success.

³⁸ F.Grosrichard, *Le Monde*, 8 Nov.1991. ENA half-moved. DATAR and the Plan did not move.

³⁹ A Matignon adviser to Bezes (1994), p.127.

⁴⁰ F.Grosrichard, *Le Monde*, 17-18 Nov.1991.

⁴¹ Bezes (1994), pp.89-90.

⁴² Bezes (1994), p.90, p.92, p.119.

⁴³ DATAR *chargé de mission*, interviewed by Bezes (1994), p.129.

⁴⁴ Bezes (1994), pp.128-9.

political will.⁴⁵ Once the prime minister had ruled in CIAT, minister's *cabinets* and even 'Budget officials totally hostile to the policy' felt unable to dissent with the decision, one saying: 'An administration in the end is there to execute a government's decisions'.⁴⁶

Subsequent changes to the Cresson programme showed the political ownership of CIAT decisions. A CIAT in Bérégovoy's government approved transfers but added various measures to help families move.⁴⁷ Edouard Balladur's government 'kept the goals in terms of the principle and the numbers' but looked at each case afresh 'on its geographic, political and legal merits', with the aid of the prefects. Its CIATs of July 1993 and September 1994 'altered the programme significantly' while increasing the number of officials transferred.⁴⁸ The CIAT (by then CIADT) held by Alain Juppé in 1997 confirmed the programme and added new candidates, but decided to use private sector firms to help spouses find work.⁴⁹ Lionel Jospin's CIADT of December 1997 agreed to 'maintain promised figures on posts' but make negotiations more transparent and add measures to help spouses integrate. The first CIADT of the Raffarin government in December 2002 confirmed the numbers but changed the locations to 'a more strategic focus on the regional metropolitan areas' favoured by a renewed Gaullist *aménagement du territoire*.⁵⁰ Thus each political leadership used CIATs in its own way to adjust a policy on which there was broad agreement.

The creation of CIADT

The Balladur government of 1993-95 conducted a thorough reform of the institutions and procedures of *aménagement du territoire*, that culminated in the 'Pasqua Act' of 4 February 1995, the *Loi d'orientation pour l'aménagement et le développement du territoire* (LOADT). Article 33 requires the 'establishment of a committee chaired by the prime minister to be responsible for managing FNADT', a fund created by the Act (see below). CIADT was created by a decree that also abolished CIAT.⁵¹ The 'core membership' was widened to 14 ministers, and the Government Secretary-General was made responsible for drawing up the *résumé de décisions* and sending out instructions to ministers, as it does for other interministerial committees. CIADT did not meet for two years, but was only one of many articles of LOADT that were implemented late or not at all.⁵² Jean-Claude Gaudin, the minister of *aménagement du territoire*, had prepared a rural support plan, but Juppé did not want to agree to it formally because of its funding implications.⁵³ The first CIADT took

⁴⁵ *ibid.* p.90.

⁴⁶ *ibid.* p.130, p.139.

⁴⁷ F.Grosrichard, *Le Monde*, 27 May 1992.

⁴⁸ André Rossinot, minister for the public service, in *Courrier Picard*, 15 and 16 April 1993; *Lettre de la DATAR*, 144, August 1993, www.citep.gouv.fr/transferts.htm.

⁴⁹ *La Lettre de la DATAR*, 159, May 1997.

⁵⁰ www.citep.gouv.fr/transferts.htm.

⁵¹ Decree of 21 April 1995.

⁵² M.Valo, *Le Monde*, 3 Feb. 1995, F.Valletoux, *Les Echos*, 21-22 June 1996.

⁵³ Juppé wanted 'cheap, geographically-focused, spectacular measures', said Gaudin, quoted by F.Grosrichard, *Le Monde*, 28-9 July 1996.

place just before the 1997 parliamentary elections, when Juppé announced Gaudin's plan and six other spending programmes for implementation 'in the summer' [i.e. after the elections].⁵⁴ The first CIADT of the new Left government in December 1997 agreed to overturn the Right's LOADT but disagreed openly about its replacement. The session was 'characterised by a fight for supremacy between the Minister for *Aménagement du territoire* and her Interior and Public Service colleagues'.⁵⁵ Jospin then held so few CIADTs that DATAR was unable to organise the spending of FNADT within each financial year. The *Cour des Comptes* confirmed that political leaders determined when CIADTs met:

'DATAR does not control the timetable for CIADT, whose meetings are held so late that they lead to the first grants hardly ever being allocated until the second semester, and thus part of each year's budget is regularly deferred to the following budgetary year'.⁵⁶

CIAT had been an efficiently-organised operation in the 1960s and early 1970s, that prime ministers used in their own way. It had changed by the late 1970s to a tool that was less efficient in administrative terms though it still delivered the political goals of the leadership, and with closer ties at local level. In the 1980s and again in the late 1990s prime ministers called CIATs more rarely, and sometimes asked a minister to chair them. Yet prime ministers and ministers for *aménagement du territoire* could still use them to great effect at times to promote their own political goals. Overall, it seems that throughout the decades, political leaders made use of CIATs as they thought fit, but without the full and open cooperation of DATAR where moving bureaucrats (including itself) out of Paris was concerned.

A tool of presidents and prime ministers

Yves Madiot asserted in 1993 that 'the frequency of [CIAT] meetings is variable and depends on the place of *aménagement du territoire* in governmental policy'.⁵⁷ There is no record of CIATs before 1978.⁵⁸ However it was possible to establish the dates of 90 per cent of meetings, leaving only a small element of uncertainty about 1963-65 (see Figure 5.1 and notes to Figure 5.2). Figure 5.2 charts the relationship between the numbers of CIATs held each year for thirty years with the 'interest indicator' for each president as assessed in Chapter 3. Figure 5.3 repeats the exercise for the prime ministers. Figure 5.2 shows that there is a very close link between the president's interest in the policy and the number of times that CIAT meets; there is only a 1 in 1000 chance of finding this level of correlation if the president's interest were irrelevant. The correlation is so strong that several errors in


⁵⁴ *La Lettre de la DATAR*, 159, May 1997.

⁵⁵ Manesse (1998), p.138. Voynet wanted regional plans; Chévènement wanted a national plan, *Le Monde* 20 Jan. 1999. 'Pasqua, Chévènement, même combat', said Pierre Sadran, ASMCF conference, Cardiff 2-4 Sept. 1999.


⁵⁶ *Cour des Comptes* (2002), 'Les difficultés de gestion de la Délégation à l'aménagement du territoire et à l'action régionale' (DATAR), paras 6650-833, S.IIIC.

⁵⁷ Madiot (1993), p.36.

⁵⁸ DATAR's Documentation Centre relies on CIAT press releases which did not start until 1978. Many thanks to the Documentation Centre for supplying copies, 8 Sept. 1992.



Source of data: Figures 3.5, 5.1.



Source of data: Figures 3.8, 5.1.

Notes: Dates for early CIATs are not available. Following the evidence by the *délégué* Guichard (1965), p.132, on the frequency, and the *délégué* Essig (1979), p.89, on the total number 1963-78, a missing eight meetings were assigned to 1963-65.

For the prime minister, the number of CIATs given is the number per year of their premiership rather than the actual number in any calendar year (e.g. Chaban, prime minister 20/6/69-4/7/72, held 13 CIATs, i.e. 4.22 CIATs per year, assigned to 1969, 1970 and 1971)

A third graph (not shown) relating the number of CIATs to the 'joint interest' of the two leaders (the sum of the interest indicators of the president and prime minister), shows the correlation is less than that for the president alone.

Relation to number of CIATs	r^2	Significance level of r (N = 30)
President's interest	0.468	highly significant (1 in 1000 chance)
PM's interest	0.232	significant (1 in 100 chance)
President's+ PM's interest	0.460	highly significant (1 in 1000 chance)

assigning quantitative values would not call this link into question. In contrast the statistical relationship between the prime minister's interest and the holding of CIATs, while still significant, is much weaker, despite CIAT being a tool that is legally in the hands of the prime minister (see Figure 5.3). It seems CIATs are much more likely to be held when the president is interested in *aménagement du territoire*, and that the interest of the prime minister has a smaller effect.

First, prime ministers without a strong interest in the policy nevertheless have reasons to hold CIATs/ CIADTs, such as to decide Plan-Contracts or to spend FIAT/ FNADT by the year end or before an election. Second, the president's level of interest dominates that of the premier (except during *cohabitation*). The periods when the frequency of CIATs diverges most from the prime minister's level of interest are the premierships of Couve de Murville (1968) and Messmer (1972-73) and the second half of Barre's premiership (1978-80). Couve de Murville and Messmer held more CIATs than would have been expected (but still less than their immediate predecessors), because both de Gaulle and Pompidou promoted regional development strongly at these times, and Couve was 'a passive and impassive tool of the presidential will'⁵⁹ while, for Messmer, 'the President of the Republic's goals were a sure guide to his decisions'.⁶⁰ In contrast Barre was more interested than Giscard in the policy. He created a number of instruments for *aménagement du territoire* but by decree in Councils of Ministers (where the President is present), perhaps because Giscard was more suspicious of Barre's economic strategy after 1978,⁶¹ but probably because CIAT was now less efficient.

During Mitterrand's presidency, the frequency of CIATs was closer to the wishes of his prime ministers, as Figure 5.3 indicates, but Mauroy and Fabius responded to the President's policy preferences too when they focused in Councils of Ministers on industrial strategies; and Rocard and Cresson had his support when they promoted in CIAT the relocation of Parisian officials.⁶² Prime ministers were free to use CIAT/ CIADT as they themselves decided only during *cohabitation*. Thus Essig's observation in 1979 that de Gaulle's 'successors presidentialised *aménagement du territoire*' because Pompidou and Giscard decided the major aims in *Conseils restreints* (Pompidou) and the Central Planning Council (Giscard),⁶³ applies just as much to Mitterrand, even though he had little interest in the policy as a whole. But whether the president or the prime minister decides a CIAT should be called, it is the political leadership, not DATAR, which decides if it will be useful. CIAT and CIADT are no different from other interministerial committees described by Schrameck:

⁵⁹ Hayward (1983), p.108.

⁶⁰ Essig (1979), p.87.

⁶¹ Servent (1989), p.51.

⁶² Favier and Martin-Roland (1999) p.100, p.103, quoting interviews with Cresson, 18 Nov. 1993, and H. Vedrine, 27 Feb. 1993. See also Attali (1993a) p.761; and Bezes (1994), p.88, citing several witnesses.

⁶³ Essig (1979), p.81.

'Some of the prime minister's interministerial committees are held at regular intervals and have a quasi-institutional form. They often reflect the government's policy priorities and can therefore become rarer or not meet at all when those change'.⁶⁴

Other committees, commissions and groups

The *délégué* is ex officio chair, secretary or member of many committees and councils. Ministers also appoint the *délégué* to public bodies sponsored by their ministry, such as the SNCF and the Post Office. More unusually, ministers with an interest in DATAR's work have helped it set up organisations outside the ministerial framework. For example, Debré's 'total support as Foreign Minister' enabled Monod to create Invest in France Agencies abroad in 1969, 'in the face of hostility from the Quai d'Orsay';⁶⁵ Guichard as Minister in 1974 helped DATAR set up the *Association Bureaux-Province* to find office space outside Paris for ministries; and Rocard as Prime Minister in 1989 set up the *Centre de rencontres et d'initiatives pour le développement local* (CRIDEL), steered by a committee chaired by DATAR. By 2000 DATAR was part-funding 64 such bodies, of which the largest were *Entreprises, territoires et développement*, the Invest in France Network and eight regional development associations.⁶⁶ The range of non-traditional 'links to the population' that ministers were able to create through DATAR, against the norms of the incumbent bureaucracy, are testimony to the political leadership's powers.

More conventionally, DATAR has or had a major role in 39 interministerial committees and councils, listed in Figure 5.4 (funding committees are dealt with separately below). The evolution of two very different examples - the decentralisation committee and the consultative body for *aménagement du territoire* - illustrates the considerable leeway political leaders have to create, modify and abolish interministerial committees and councils.

When DATAR was set up, Prime Minister Pompidou appointed it to the two *comités de décentralisation* (one for public bodies, one for industrial firms) that encouraged relocation out of Paris and/or awarded the *agrément* to move into or build premises in Paris. The first was set up in 1955 and run by the DAT. The second was added by de Gaulle in 1958 and run by DAT but from the Plan Commissariat. In 1963 Pompidou made DATAR secretary of both committees, and in 1967 he combined them into one, which he moved to DATAR. The *agrément* was DATAR's most powerful bargaining tool (for example, awarding the *agrément* for a small extension in Paris if the applicant built a second larger establishment in Toulouse...), but was always under challenge from Parisian Gaullists, Communists and business.⁶⁷ While the Right governments resisted this pressure, the Left weakened the *agrément* constraints in 1982 and 1984, and in 1986 gave the Paris Region

⁶⁴ Schrameck (1995), p.63.

⁶⁵ Essig (1979), p.245; Monod, J. and de Castelbajac, P. (2001) *L'Aménagement du territoire*, 10th edn (PUF) (2001), pp.57-8.

⁶⁶ Cour des Comptes (2002). S.II.A. These 11 received 85% of DATAR's grants to associations. I am grateful to Louis Guillaume, assistant director of DATAR's London agency in November 1989, for factual information.

Figure 5.4. Interministerial committees and councils in the *aménagement du territoire* domain

Committee or council	Purpose	DATAR's role	Other information	Creation	Changes
PM Pompidou					
Comité de décentralisation (pre-DATAR)	To plan decentralisation of State bodies, and award <i>agrément</i>	Délégué on committee; advises on <i>agrément</i> (Paris permit)	Secretariat at CGP from 1963; Goes to DATAR in 1967	D.30/6/55 and 14/2/63	1967 reformed*
Comité interministériel des parcs nationaux (pre-DATAR)	To organise bodies to run national parks	PM committee; DATAR to organise management bodies	National Parks Act 22/7/60; Not meeting in 1980s	D.31/10/61	1985 to Nat.Council
Comité des investissements étrangers (pre-DATAR)	Authorises foreign investments in France	DATAR a member and 'associated with its work'	Ministries of economy, finance, industry, agriculture	n.d.	2001 to AFII*
Comité national pour les problèmes de l'eau	Ministry of Interior, then DATAR to organise 'water boards'	Staff attached to Délégué 1965 Secretariat in DATAR	Supervision transferred with boards to Min. Environment	D.6/7/61	1971 wound up
CNAT Commission national de l'AdT replaced Cons. Construction	Consultative body on national plan for AdT. Reconvened 1970.	Attached to CGP; Délégué the Vice-President	President Lamour, Officials, business, professions, TUs	PM arrêté 14/2/63	1975 to CNAT-CV*
GCPU Groupe Central de Planification Urbaine	Defines policy on conurbations, approves OREAM plans	Attached to DATAR and secretariat at DATAR	Top finance official, plus 2 ministries, CGP, DATAR.	CIAT 2/6/64	1977 wound up
GIF Groupe Interministériel Foncier	Decides which urban development zones can have public funds	Chaired by Délégué on industrial zones; Minister Infra. on urban	Responsible to Min. for Plan and AdT PM decision 11/3/66	CIAT 24/2/66	June 1984 abolished
Groupe interministériel d'aménagement du bassin parisien	Promotes overall policy for Paris basin to disperse growth	DATAR a member	1967-71 produced development plans for zones outside Paris	CIAT 22/7/66	n.d.
Commission interministérielle des parcs naturels régionaux	Parks to help development, tourism, protect environment	Policy initiated by DATAR; Attached to Délégué	Starts work 1970; moves to Environment 1975	D.1/3/67	1975 to regions
Comité central de rénovation rurale	Advises Rural Renovation Commissioners	Committee and rural commissioners at DATAR	Took over from Min. of Ag. Superseded by CIDAR 1979	D.24/10/67	1979 to CIDAR*
Groupe central de conversion	Advises Industrial Conversion Commissioners	Committee, commissioners at DATAR; attached to Min AdT	Officials from 2 ministries, CGP, DATAR	D.24/10/67	n.d.
Comité de décentralisation	Committee for public and private sector offices locating in Paris	DATAR a member. It reports to Min AdT and CIAT	Délégué advises on dossier; Min Infrastructure decides	D.24/10/67 & I.13/2/69	1986 reformed*
PM Chaban-Delmas					
GCVN Groupe central de villes nouvelles	Manages credits of FNAFU etc and CDC funding	Managed by Sec.Gen. of VN at DATAR then at Infrastructure	Attached to Infrastructure in 1972 then DATAR from 1981	PM arrêté 29/12/70	1984 reformed*
Groupe interministériel pour l'aménagement du plateau de Valbonne	Mission Valbonne to develop it created in CIAT of 10/7/74	Attached to DATAR. 1 staff member full time	Coordinates ministries in liaison with dept. prefects	CIAT 20/4/72	extant in 2003

Fig 5.4. Interministerial committees and councils, *contd*

PM Messmer					
GIVM Groupe interministériel des villes moyennes (VM)	To draw up special AdT grants of Min Infrastructure for VM	Set up by Délégué. Chaired by Délégué	Officials from DAFU, DATAR, relevant ministries	1973	1982
PM Chirac					
CIASI comité intermin. d'amén. des structures industrielles	Gives FDES grants to firms in trouble, or about to be	Chaired first by Délégué, then Industry. Secretary at Trésor	DATAR, Economy, Industry, Employment officials	PM arrêté 28/11/74	1982 to CIRI*
Commission de l'aménagement du territoire et du cadre du vie	Report on draft aims of 7th Plan, voted by Parliament 27/6/75	Attached to CGP; deputy-Délégué the vice-chair	Chaired by official: 33 officials, banks, firms, TUs	1975	1975
Conseil d'administration du Conservatoire de l'espace littoral	Improvement, protection and land management of coastline	Attached to DATAR until 1986, DATAR still on the board	Min AdT, Politicians, officials; later at Environment:	D.11/12/75 Act 1986	extant in 2003
Conseil interministériel pour le promotion de l'emploi	Resolves administrative problems for firms taking on staff	DATAR chairs		PM arrêté 3/3/76	n.d.
PM Barre					
Groupe interministériel des services publics en milieu rural	To propose measures for reducing closure of rural public services.	DATAR's idea to set up; proposed departmental cttees	D.16/10/79 set up committees of services, chaired by prefects	Cabinet 8/2/78	1979 to local councils
Comité de l'aménagement du territoire (of Plan)	To consult and prepare AdT aspects of VIIIth Plan (1981-85)	A CGP commission; DATAR official is rapporteur	Collected regions' views. Produced 1980 report	n.d.	1981 abolished
CIDAR Comité interministériel de développement et d'amén. rural	Policy on rural diversification - funds to Plan contracts 1984	DATAR is secretary; chairs preparatory official committee	PM /MinAg; Econ, Budget, Industry, Tourism, CGP	D.3/7/79 D.17/9/84	June 1994 last met
CODIS Comité ministériel ..des actions de développement industriel	To determine future economic sectors for priority action	Délégué a member	Did not meet after 1980; then incorporated in Fund FIM	Arrêté 16/10/79	1983 to FIM
Groupe interministériel permanent pour l'aménagement des banlieues	Help ministries to take inner suburbs into account in policies	Délégué a member; Secretary at Urban Development Fund	Min Env't; Officials from 6 ministries, Délégué, CGP	Arrêté 22/4/80	7/12/84 abolished
PM Mauroy					
CIRI comité interministériel de restructuration industrielle	Gives FDES grants to industrial firms in difficulty to help adapt	Délégué is a member; Secretariat at Trésor	Chair: Min Finance, CGP DATAR, Industry, Work,	Arrêté 6/7/82	extant in 2003
CIALA Comité interministériel des aides à la localisation des activités	Awards PAT grants for relocation of non-tertiary sector activity	Chaired by Délégué; Secretariat at DATAR	Staff from Tresor, Industry, Budget, Trade, Work, CGP	PM arrêté 10/7/82	extant in 2003
GCVN Groupe central de villes nouvelles	Prepares CIAT decisions on each New Town, proposes measures	Managed by SecGen of VN at DATAR 1984-93	Many ministries. To Ministry of Infrastructure 1993	Arrêté 16/5/84	1999 abolished
CIV Comité interministériel pour les villes & comité de gestion	Coordinates policy for urban solidarity, Urban Social Fund	Délégué on cttee of Ministers; Min Urb. & DATAR organise	PM/Min Urban: 15 Ministers, DATAR; Sec Gen is secretary	D.16/6/84 D.19/9/84	1988 reformed*

Fig 5.4. Interministerial committees and councils, *contd*

PM Fabius					
Conseil national de la montagne	Advises on spending of FIDAR and FIAM in mountain zones	Secretariat at DATAR	Initiated by Rocard 1983: PM chairs; élus and associations	Decree 20/9/85	extant in 2003
Comité de décentralisation	Public and private applications to locate in Paris or move out.	DATAR a member; advises on dossier with Region Prefect	Min AdT and Min Urbanism; officials: Industry, Il-de-France	Arrêté 28/2/86	2001 to CITEP*
PM Rocard					
CIV Comité interministériel des villes	Coordinates policy for urban solidarity; urban contracts	Délégué on cttee of Ministers; run by Delegation à la Ville	PM/Min Urb: 15 Ministers, DATAR; DIV	D.20/10/88	extant in 2003
GIDEL Groupe interministériel sur le développement local	CRIDEL created by DATAR as network on local development	Délégué chairs GIDEL and organises CRIDEL	GIDEL: 23 officials; CRIDEL 48 officials, LAs, firms, banks	Decided by PM 1989	1996 joins ETD*
CNAT Commission national d'aménagement du territoire	To advise, report on sectoral and EU policies linked to AdT	Supposed to meet twice a year but scarcely met at all	PM/ Min. AdT; 50 members: officials, politicians, TUs...	CIAT 11/90 D.23/9/91	1995 to CNADT*
PM Balladur					
Observatoire interministériel des restructurations d'activités	To monitor and prepare firms' restructuring and relocation	DATAR to organise	Under PM's authority	CIAT 20/9/94	n.d.
Groupe d'orientation stratégique	To increase attractiveness of France to foreign investors	DATAR organises and provides secretariat; set up 1996	Brings administrations together under PM's authority	CIAT 20/9/94	2001 to AFII*
PM Juppé					
CNADT Comm. nat. de l'amén. et du développement du territoire	Advise on implementation of AdT by State, local authorities and EU	DATAR runs secretariat and publishes CNADT opinions	PM: 52 members, politicians; TUs; associations, no officials	Act 4/2/95 D. 29/9/95	1999 to CNADT*
Observatoire de l'aménagement du territoire (public interest body)	To evaluate AdT policies, with 'comité de finances locales'	DATAR to organise and fund (in LOADT, Art 9).	National and local politicians, State officials, associations	CIADT 10/4/97	n.d.
PM Jospin					
CNADT Comm. nat. de l'amén. et du développement du territoire	Advise on implementation of AdT by State, local authorities and EU	DATAR runs secretariat and publishes CNADT opinions	PM/AdT; 70 members, élus, civil society; no officials	Act 25/6/99 D19/9/00	extant in 2003
CITEP Comité pour l'implantation territoriale des emplois publics	Prepare and execute relocation policy for public bodies	DATAR is a member of the interministerial committee	Ministers for Public Service and for AdT. PM appts chair	CIADT 7/01 D.14/1/02	extant in 2003

Notes: *An asterisk means the committee is replaced by a later committee listed or by the following bodies:

ETD - Entreprises, Territoires et Développement - an association created and funded by DATAR from 1989.

AFII - Agence française pour les investissements internationaux - a public body combining DATAR staff abroad with Ministry of Economy staff.

Sources: Conseil d'Etat (1986); Essig (1979); Houée (1989); Laborie, Langumier and de Roo (1985); Lanversin (1970); Madiot (1979,1986,1993,1996); Manesse (1998); Maus (1992); Perrin, Pouyet and Raffi (1968); Teneur et di Qual (1962); DATAR, *Lettre de la DATAR* and *Rapport d'Activité* (various years). www.citep.gouv.fr, www.etd.asso.fr, www.archives.premier-ministre.gouv.fr.

Prefect equal weight with DATAR in the committee.⁶⁸ Rocard in 1990 restored the *agrément* because of the resulting office-building and population boom. From 2000 the *agrément* for private companies was determined by the Paris Region prefect. In 2001 the Jospin government merged the decentralisation committee (no longer dealing with private firms), with the *Mission pour l'implantation territoriale des emplois publics* that was set up by Delebarre in 1992 to implement the relocation projects of 1991; it became the *Comité pour l'implantation territoriale des emplois publics*, and helps public sector bodies plan their relocation from Paris. Within its own sector, the changes in this bureaucratic committee reflected well the views of different political leaders on *aménagement du territoire*.

The *Conseil national d'aménagement du territoire* (CNAT) is unusual among the committees listed in Figure 5.4 because it always included 'civil society' as well as officials. CNAT was created in 1963 to replace the Ministry of Construction's advisory body that had clashed with the Plan Commissariat (see Chapter 2). It was set up at the Commissariat with the same chair as before, and the *délégué* as vice-chair, to advise on the regional aspects of the national plan. It was reconvened briefly under Giscard, wrote a report on the Seventh Plan and stopped meeting: Giscard was 'a convinced anti-planner'.⁶⁹ Rocard in 1990 approved its re-establishment, and Cresson issued its decree of application in 1991. Members had scarcely been appointed when the Balladur government decided in 1993 to replace it with the *Conseil national d'aménagement et du développement du territoire* (CNADT) in the Act LOADT, not passed until 1995. Its decree of application was issued by Juppé and members appointed, but the Act and therefore CNADT was rescinded by the Jospin government. A new CNADT, with a different membership, finally started work in 2001 under the Limousin regional president, the Socialist Robert Savy, but the governmental change in 2002 was inevitably followed by his replacement with the only right-wing regional president, Adrien Zeller. Whereas changes to the *comité de décentralisation* responded to policy changes and local pressures, changes to CNAT/CNADT were driven by what Lochak called 'revenge politicisation' (see Chapter 4).

Of the 39 committees listed in Figure 3.5 less than a quarter remained in their original format by 2003, one indication of the political leadership's capacity to adjust committees to their own needs. Only seven of the committees were so constrained in their activities that they just stopped meeting or show no signs of having met. But it is notable that these included the two 'observatories' that might have gone some way to evaluating DATAR's - and ministers'- actions.⁷⁰ Nevertheless, political leaders showed they were not limited by an institutionalised continuity when they expressly wound up another seven

⁶⁷ Madiot (1996), p.691.

⁶⁸ F.Fressoz, *Libération*, 15 Dec.1984; P.Pujas, *Tribune de l'Economie*, 4 Sept.1986.

⁶⁹ Green,D. (1980) 'The Budget and the Plan' in P.Cerny and M. Schain (eds) *French Politics and Public Policy* (Methuen), 101-24, p.103.

⁷⁰ As noted in Chapter 3, the *Observatoire des territoires* set up by decree on 14 Sept. 2004 will 'collect and publish data useful to DATAR'.

committees, reconstructed 13 under another format, or transferred four to bodies outside central government.

THE FINANCIAL TOOLS: FUNDS AND BUDGETS

The political leaders who created DATAR expected its financial powers to be the vital weapon in *aménagement du territoire*. 'In the end, the *délégué*'s effectiveness will depend on the financial means at his disposal and on the role he plays within the funding bodies involved in regional expansion'.⁷¹ The financial means consisted chiefly of the prime minister's budget for *aménagement du territoire*. Its main element was the fund FIAT/FNADT but DATAR played a role in other funds created to encourage the type of development that leaders sought. Yet DATAR's main role was expected to be its orientation of ministries' spending patterns. Each of these instruments and activities is scrutinised in turn to see how well they fulfilled the leadership's expectations of making an impact on *aménagement du territoire* through DATAR.

The prime minister's budget for *aménagement du territoire*

Because DATAR is part of the prime minister's office, DATAR's annual budget is the '*aménagement du territoire*' chapter of the prime minister's budget. The minister responsible for *aménagement du territoire* negotiates this budget, 'and proposes it to the prime minister'.⁷² Figure 5.5 sets out the budgetary headings within which the *délégué* must work. The budget for staff and other administrative costs sets one limit on DATAR's activity. Its programme budget consists of the fund FNADT, the capital grant PAT (*prime d'aménagement du territoire*) that is awarded to firms to set up in assisted areas, and its support to the 'Invest in France' agencies. In both the current and capital grant sections, FNADT is divided between the amount that DATAR has agreed to contribute to State-Region Plan Contracts, and a rather larger amount that is allocated in CIADT. As Figure 5.5 shows, the government can change DATAR's income substantially both in total (dropping by 25% in the two years between the 2.2bnF under Balladur in 1995 and 1.7bnF under Juppé in 1997), and between its elements (the Juppé budget preserved DATAR's administrative budget and drastically reduced its programme budget; while Raffarin's budget imposed a reduction in staffing while increasing capital grants). The government can also amend each figure during the year. While most likely when there is a change in political leadership or economic conditions,⁷³ an *arrêté* removed 100mF in May 2001 from the 380mF allocated to FNADT's contribution to Plan Contracts on the grounds that the Contracts were not being implemented quickly enough.⁷⁴

⁷¹ Rapport au Président de la République, 15 Feb. 1963, cited in Pouyet (1968), p. 73.

⁷² Sénat, Commission des Finances, (2003) [Besse Report], 17, Le Fonds national d'aménagement et de développement du territoire (FNADT) (Sénat), p. 29.

⁷³ Baslé, M. (2000) Le Budget de l'Etat 5th edn (La Découverte), p. 15

⁷⁴ Arrêté of 31 May 2001, cited in Sénat (2003) p. 33.

Figure 5.5. The prime minister's budget for *aménagement du territoire*

(million francs)				
Year budget voted	1995	1997	2000	2003
Prime Minister at the time of budget vote	Balladur	Juppé	Jospin	Raffarin
DATAR staff costs	59	57	58	41
Equipment, research	38	34	43	48
Agencies abroad	[funded from another budget]		18	-
Total administration	97	91	119	89
- FNADT				131
State-regions contracts				
- FNADT				207
non-contractualised				
FNADT current grants	412	294	459	338
AFII agencies	-	-	-	50
Total current grants	412	295	459	388
- FNADT				453
State-regions contract				
- FNADT				531
non-contractualised				
FNADT capital grants	1425	1155	943	984
PAT grants to firms	343	155	420	295
Total capital grants	1768	1310	1363	1279
TOTAL budget	2277	1696	1942	1755

Sources: *Loi de Finances initiale (LFI) 'Services du Premier ministre. V.Aménagement du territoire'*. crédits de paiements. (various years).

Notes:

FNADT: *Fonds national d'aménagement et de développement du territoire*

AFII *Agence française pour les investissements internationaux* (DATAR staff abroad).

PAT *Prime d'aménagement du territoire*.

It is tempting to argue that, given these controls, the political leaders' budgetary allocation must reflect their policy intentions:

'Since the beginning of the 1980s it has seen significant variations which are explained by the relative interest or disinterest in *aménagement du territoire*: 1981, 1983 and 1986 are 'black years' for the policy in this respect'.⁷⁵

'The increase in 1991 is significant and reflects the political will to relaunch *aménagement du territoire*'.⁷⁶

However the budgetary figures are to some extent a mirage. The *député* Jean-Pierre Kucheida (PS, Pas-de-Calais), a specialist on the *aménagement du territoire* budget, called it '*mystificateur et trompe l'oeil*'.⁷⁷ The reasons are best explained with reference to Figure 5.6 on the evolution in DATAR's funding. The budget is presented to parliament as two sets of figures. The *crédits de paiements* (budget voted) are the sums parliament votes to DATAR to cover that year's spending. The *autorisations de programme* (budget authorisations) specify the maximum sum that DATAR can that year undertake to spend (that year or in the future) on multi-annual grants or projects.⁷⁸ The difficulty of tracking DATAR's actual spending in any year from which year's *crédits* is such that only rarely do parliamentarians or the Cour des Comptes establish the details.⁷⁹

In 2003 Senator Besse of the Senate Finance Committee

'deplored the fact that 'budgetary authorisation' in the case of FNADT does not mean very much. Not only is the division of its budget mainly decided by the prime minister, but also a sizeable proportion is traditionally postponed into subsequent years'.⁸⁰

The data in the 'Besse report' show that the annual variations in the *crédits* voted for FNADT 1997 to 2002 made no difference to DATAR's actual annual spending. Its 'dormant budget authorisations', built up from delays in expenditure, enabled it to spend consistently about 1500mF each year (and have up to 2000mF available to spend). Between 1995 and 2000 DATAR spent each year only two-thirds of the budget voted to it.⁸¹ When Jospin's government increased the FNADT budget in 2000 and 2001, DATAR 'seemed not to know how to spend it'; and although the government reduced its budget mid-year in 2001 by 250mF and in 2002 by 300mF, DATAR still spent up to the level originally specified in the Finance Act.⁸²

However, political leaders determine this behaviour to a large extent. The National Assembly's rapporteur for trade and industry in the 1994 budgetary debate asked for CIAT

⁷⁵ Mazet (2000), p.84.

⁷⁶ Madiot (1993), p.52.

⁷⁷ A.Chausebourg, *Le Monde*, 24-25 Oct 1993.

⁷⁸ Baslé (2000) p.99.

⁷⁹ Rapport Kucheida, A.N. 1353, (1990) cited in Madiot (1996), p.113; Cour des Comptes (2002); Sénat (2003).

⁸⁰ Sénat (2003), p.28.

⁸¹ Cour des Comptes (2002), S.II.

⁸² Sénat (2003), p.31.

Figure 5.6 DATAR's budget, FIAT and FNADT (million francs)

	Budget authorisations current prices (1)	Budget authorisations in 1980 prices (2)	FIAT authorisations (5)
1963			110
1964			150
1965			175
1966			175
1967			200
1968		100mF added to FIAT for commissioners mid-year	219
1969			218
1970		32mF added as fonds d'action conjoncturelle mid-year	218
1971			270
1972			270
1973			279
1974			281
1975			287
1976			282
1977			269
1978			259
1979			276
1980	1863	1863	273
1981	1658	1462	246
1982	2200	1740	576
1983	1681	1211	348
1984	2235	1499	856
1985	2338	1480	907
1986	1914	1212	
1987	1959	1172	
1988	1850	1079	
1989	1883	1061	
1990	1855	1010	
1991		1104	
1992		1150	
1993		1381	
1994			864
	(3)	Budget voted (4)	FNADT voted (6)
1995	3146	2277	1837
1996	2565	2268	1842
1997	1944	1696	1450
1998	1999	1806	1397
1999	2008	1803	1377
2000	2122	1942	1404
2001	2409	1752	1161
2002	1765	1870	1327
2003	1771	1755	1325

(1) *Autorisations de programme* (AP) as amended by supplementary or cancelled *crédits*. Madiot (1993), p.52, citing Rapport Kucheida, AN, 1353 (1990), p.13.

(2) As for (1) but in 1980 francs. Madiot (1996), p.38.

(3) and (4) AP and *crédits de paiements* (CP): LFI, 'Services du PM, V.aménagement du territoire', and DATAR, *Rapport Annuel*, various years.

(5) AP: 1963-72: *Projet de loi de finances initiale* (LFI), 1971,1972;

1970-79: Biarez (1989), pp.215-6; 1976-85: Madiot (1986),p.199; 1994: Madiot (1996),p.43.

(6) CP: in LFI, 1995-97: Manesse (1998), p.113; 1997-2003: Sénat (2003) 17, p.15.

to be placed directly under DATAR as the only way to speed up spending.⁸³ That would however reduce the leadership's ability to control decisions, to announce funds and not spend them, or to make political capital out of awards. Political leaders held up spending by not calling CIADTs in some years (1995, 1996), and late in the year in others (1998, 1999, 2001, 2002). The first meeting of CIADT to decide spending from the 2001 round was so late that 'grants were not paid until 12 December 2001 (current) and 8 January 2002 (capital); that is, the 2001 *crédits* could not in fact be spent in 2001'.⁸⁴ The Raffarin government in 2002 'took account of the structural deferral of *crédits* related to delayed implementation of operations subsidised by FNADT',⁸⁵ and cut DATAR's budget for 2003 severely. There is not even a reliable connection between the budget as presented to parliament and the leadership's commitment to spend it, as the *délégué* confirmed in 2003 when he explained that DATAR's (smaller) budget:

'matches engagements clearly identified for 2003, not a 'flag-waving' budget (*budget d'affichage*) whose sole concern is to make it appear there are more *crédits* than in the previous year'.⁸⁶

Although there is little value therefore in assessing the link between the political leadership's aim for *aménagement du territoire* and the level of budgetary funding, other studies of the budgetary process suggest it is determined by political leaders, even if their *directeurs de cabinet* and financial advisers, using information supplied by Ministry of Finance officials, conduct the negotiations. The specific outcomes on *aménagement du territoire* are consistent with the general strategies reported by Robert Elgie, Jack Hayward and Vincent Wright.⁸⁷ President Mitterrand's announcement, following his Budget Minister's advice, that the budget deficit would not exceed 3 per cent imposed (along with macro-economic indicators), the sharp decrease in ministerial budgets for 1983 that *aménagement du territoire* shared. The 1985 budget was similarly 'budgeting by Presidential *fait accompli* fiat'.⁸⁸ Chirac's *cohabitation* budget of 1987 was also one of cuts for *aménagement du territoire* after Finance Minister Balladur negotiated with the minister, Méhaignerie.⁸⁹ In 1990, Industry and *Aménagement du territoire* was among a group of ministries that Prime Minister Rocard, 'in coordination with the Finance Ministry and the presidency', decided would be inflation-proofed or suffer decreased expenditure (Figure 5.6 shows *aménagement du territoire* suffered decreased expenditure).⁹⁰ Finally, in 1997, President Chirac's announcement that he was committed to a 3 per cent maximum budget

⁸³ A. Chassebourg, *Le Monde*, 24-25 Oct 1993.

⁸⁴ Sénat (2003), p.35. Personal experience confirms the observation. DATAR offered a research contract in May 2001 but had to delay signing until December 2001. The research was thus not delivered in 2002 but in 2003, when DATAR's budget was cut back and we were 'lucky to be paid'.

⁸⁵ *Project de Loi des Finances 2003: Aménagement du territoire*.

⁸⁶ *Lettre de la DATAR*, 176, 2003.

⁸⁷ Elgie, R. (1993) *The Role of the Prime Minister in France, 1981-91* (Macmillan); Hayward and Wright (2002), pp.169-80.

⁸⁸ Hayward and Wright (2002), p.171.

⁸⁹ *ibid.* p.174.

deficit had the same impact on ministers' budgets as had Mitterrand's announcement in 1983. The negotiations were conducted by Prime Minister Juppé,⁹¹ and the budget proposed for *aménagement du territoire* was reduced drastically.

In general, parliamentarians do not constrain the political leaders seriously on the budget.

'Provided it is willing to set aside about 0.05 per cent of the budget to make a number of minor but politically popular concessions to its own parliamentary supporters, the government can secure the legitimisation of its budget by parliament'.⁹²

The budget legislation for 1989 posed the greatest challenge in recent years. Rocard did not have majority support in the National Assembly and tried to work with it rather than use the executive's powerful voting procedures. In the Assembly the government had to withdraw the vote on 'industry, tourism, trade and *aménagement du territoire*', because *députés* objected strenuously to the amount for *aménagement du territoire*, despite the Minister offering an additional 215mF for three funds, and accepting a Centrist amendment for another 50mF. *Députés* were persuaded to vote for the budget as a whole with another increase of 75mF. However Senators remained opposed to the *aménagement du territoire* budget, even after much negotiation by *cabinets*, and it approved the budget as a whole only by abolishing completely the *aménagement du territoire* chapter 'in derision'.⁹³ For the 1990 budget, the government had to resubmit to the Assembly in January 1990 a budget for *aménagement du territoire* that was twice that originally proposed.⁹⁴ Nevertheless, in both 1989 and 1990, following mid-year amendments, the budget had still declined in real terms from the previous years (see Figure 5.6, centre column). Thus, even in the difficult conditions of a minority government, political leaders were able to determine DATAR's income, and delay expenditure, but not always control the year in which it was spent.

FIAT, FNADT and other funds for regional development

The relationship between the leadership's interest in *aménagement du territoire* and its capacity to influence its funding is more easily seen in the changes to funds than in the overall volume of funding. FIAT was for thirty years the chief financial instrument. Early DATAR staff emphasised that FIAT was its 'war chest' (*trésor de guerre*). It could persuade a ministry to make a different decision; for example, it supported in 1964 the establishment of an *Ecole nationale supérieure d'aéronautique* in Toulouse that helped the city become the centre of a modern industry.⁹⁵

'DATAR owes a large part of the results it has achieved to the fact that it prepares [CIATs] and

⁹⁰ *ibid.* p.175.

⁹¹ *ibid.* pp. 176-8.

⁹² Hayward (1983), p.194.

⁹³ *Le Monde*, 11 Nov., 20-21 Nov., 13 Dec, 16 Dec. 1988.

⁹⁴ *Le Monde*, 31 Jan. 1990.

⁹⁵ Perrin,F., Pouyet,B., Raffi,G. (1968) 'L'aménagement du territoire en France', *Notes et études documentaires*, 3461 (La Documentation française), p.57.

notably to the fact that it submits to this committee proposals for the use of funds from FIAT'.⁹⁶

It was a 'stock of funds not already earmarked' that DATAR used to persuade ministries to start a project: 'If you undertake to build this port, we will pay part of the first tranche'.⁹⁷ But FIAT increasingly substituted for ministries' programmes, such that by 1981 about 80 per cent of its annual *crédits* were already committed before the start of the budgetary year.⁹⁸

The stability of the FIAT budget 1970-81 (see Figure 5.6), and thus its decline through inflation, shows the 'withering on the vine' typical of a budget ministers find difficult to tell recipients they have abolished. However, it does not demonstrate a lack of power among leaders over the budget they assign to *aménagement du territoire*, since they have created other funds to target their favoured aims. Figure 5.7 lists two dozen funds created since Claudius-Petit introduced FNAT in 1950 (see Chapter 2), and summarises their purpose, level of funding, and the role of DATAR and other actors in their creation and control. Examples of the evolution in two sectors, rural and urban renovation, illustrate the roles played by political leaders and the problems of ministerial coordination that they used DATAR to resolve.

In 1967, with Pompidou as Prime Minister and Michel Debré as Minister of Finance, several changes were made to give DATAR stronger powers. They included Pompidou's appointment of commissioners to 'renovate' certain rural zones 'under his authority'.⁹⁹ A *Fonds d'action rurale* (FAR) was created which the Ministry of Agriculture would distribute, advised by the commissioners. However, in 1971 President Pompidou was advised by his *cabinet* that 'certain technical ministries were holding back funds for rural renovation'. He invited the commissioners to dinner to hear the problems and told them a *Fonds de rénovation rurale* (FRR) would be created.¹⁰⁰ It was funded partly from the prime minister's budget and partly from that of the Ministry of Agriculture, but DATAR organised its expenditure, with decisions made in CIAT. When Prime Minister Barre took responsibility for *aménagement du territoire* in 1978 he grouped various rural funds, including FAR and FRR, into a new *Fonds interministériel de développement et d'aménagement rural* (FIDAR) for 'fragile rural zones'. It was funded from the prime minister's budget for *aménagement du territoire*, allocated by an interministerial committee, CIDAR, chaired by the prime minister or minister of agriculture, and managed by DATAR and regional prefects. In 1986 Prime Minister Chirac transferred budgetary responsibility for this fund to the Ministry of Agriculture but only after 'after a trial of strength' between

⁹⁶ Baecque, F.de and Holleaux, A. (1982) 'Les problèmes posés par la diversité de l'organisation des administrations centrales', *Études et documents du Conseil d'Etat*, 14, p.101.

⁹⁷ Monod and de Castelbajac (1980), p.33.

⁹⁸ Cour des Comptes (1982), cited Madiot (1986), p.198.

⁹⁹ Decree of 24 October 1967, Article 1, Michardère (one of the commissioners) in *Georges Pompidou. Hier et Aujourd'hui: Témoignages* (1990) (Neuilly: Breet), p.260.

¹⁰⁰ Michardère, *ibid.* p.260

Figure 5.7 Specialised funds significant for *aménagement du territoire*

Funding Body	Purpose	Role of DATAR and others	Budgetary source and/or control	Creation	Changes
PM Pompidou (some existing pre-DATAR)					
FDES Fonds de développement économique et social 180mF 2002	Loans to firms, local authorities for restructuring, relocation	Délégué on main board; vice-chair of two sub-committees	Special Treasury account run by Min. of Finance. Role in decline	D.30/6/55 D.14/2/63	extant as IES 2003
FAD Fonds d'aide à la décentralisation 38mF 1976; 25mF 1983, 0mF1988	Grants to firms to locate outside Paris (paid from FIAT 1977-80)	Run by DAT, then DATAR; grants decided in CIAT	50% PM's budget, 50% from redeance for locating in Paris	Act 2/8/60 Act 7/7/71	1991 new FAD*
FNAFU (ex-FNAT) Fonds national pour l'aménagement foncier et urbain	Funds to buy land for industrial renovation, eg.EuroMediterranée	Equipement runs, Délégué, Finance, Interior on board	Special Treasury account run by Ministry of Equipement	D.14/2/63	wound up 1999
SCDC Société Centrale d'aide au Développement des Collectivités	Facilitates capital development projects by local authorities	DATAR a shareholder; (replaced SCET, run by CGP)	Shareholders: Caisse des Dépôts, mutual banks, DATAR ministries	1967	extant in 2003
FAR Fonds d'action rurale	For rural development initiatives	DATAR's rural commissaires give advice on how spent	Ministry of Agriculture	Act 30/12/67	1979 to FIDAR*
PM Chaban-Delmas					
FRR Fonds de rénovation rurale 50mF 1978, 61mF 1979	Funds various projects by DATAR's rural Commissioners	Managed by DATAR grants decided in CIAT	PM's budget and budget of Minister of Agriculture	CIAT 1972	1979 to FIDAR
PM Messmer					
FDA Fonds de décentralisation administrative 57mF 1976, 23mF 1986	Grants to encourage Paris administrations to move	'At the disposal of DATAR'	Minister of Finance's 'common charges' to 1979, then Min AdT	CIAT 1973	wound up 1987
PM Chirac					
GIRZOM Gpe intermin. ... restructuration des zones minières 170mF 1992	Committee plans infrastructure improvement in 3 mining areas	Ponts et Chaussées, DATAR, prefects. Decided in CIAT	PM & 5 ministries 1972-5; PM; AdT 1983; Industry 1989	CIAT1972 and 1975	1995 to FNADT
PM Barre					
FSAI Fonds spécial d'adaptation industrielle 3bnF total	For steel, shipbuilding or textile zones	DATAR chaired management committee	n.d.	8/9/78	wound up 1981
FIDAR Fonds intermin. de développement et d'amén. rural 420mF 1992	Groups funds for rural areas - later added to Plan Contracts	PM or Min of Ag chairs; DATAR, Prefects organise	PM/AdT budget to 1986 then Min. Agriculture and Prefects	D.3/7/79	1995 to FNADT
PM Mauroy					
FIM Fonds industriel de modernisation 5bn in 1984	Research to finance research and innovation in conversion poles	Délégué on FIM board (and on on ANVAR board)	Chaired by Minister of Industry. Dossier prepared by ANVAR	PM arrêté 28/7/83	wound up 1986
FSGT Conseil d'administration du Fonds spécial de grands travaux	Funds for rail, roads, energy conservation	Chair Ponts-et-Chaussées DATAR represents Min AdT	Under Min Econ and Finance in Act 3/8/82 - but Transport ran it	D.13/8/82	wound up 1987

Figure 5.7 Specialised funds, *contd*

FIBM Fonds d'industrialisation du bassin minier 100mF 1990, 40mF 1995	Aids reconversion of mining zones	DATAR not involved	Managed by Ministry of Industry (created by Fabius)	1984	extant in 2001
PM Fabius					
FIAM Fonds intermin pour l'auto-dévt en montagne 40mF 1985, 35mF 1992	Funds projects on a variety of themes in mountainous areas	PM's Conseil de la Montagne advises; DATAR manages	Budget of Min AdT except Chirac 1986-88 gives to Min Ag	Act 10/1/85	1995 to FNADT
PM Rocard					
FRILE Fonds régionalisé d'aide aux initiatives locales260mF 1994	Subsidises local job creation ideas by groups of communes	DATAR manages at centre, and Prefects at field level	Budgets of PM/ Min. AdT, Employment, Agriculture	PM circlr 28/10/88	1995 to FNADT
PM Cresson					
FAD Fonds d'aide à la décentralisation 100mF 1992, 127mF 1994	Grants to firms and their staff locating outside Paris	Managed by DATAR - CIALA - Entreprises et Territoire	PM's budget, 50% comes from redevance for locating in Paris	Re-funded 1992	1995 to FNADT
PM Balladur					
FDPMI Fonds de développement des petites et moyennes industries	Gives aid to modernise in DATAR's 'PAT' areas	DATAR involved as part of Plan Contract negotiation	Budget of Ministry of Industry; in Plan-Contracts	CIAT 12/7/93	extant in 2001
FGER Fonds de gestion de l'espace rural 500mF 1995, 140mF 1998	Grants to communes for farmers' conservation projects	Managed at department level; DATAR has no official role	Minister of Agriculture's budget, managed by Min Ag and prefects	Act 4/2/95 D.5/4/95	wound up 1999
FPTA Fonds de péréquation des transports aériens 21mF 2001	Support regional air services 'in the interest of AdT'	Air Minister chairs: MPs, local élus, Délégué, officials	Special Treasury account, Air budget financed by airport tax	Act 4/2/95 D..9/5/95	1999 to FIATA*
FITTVN Fonds d'invnt des transports terrestres .. voies nav. 4340 mF 2000	Fund roads, TGV, canals, to serve "hard-to-reach places"	Transport Minister chairs: officials, including Délégué	Special Treasury account, budget Equipement from tolls and HEP	Act 4/2/95 D13/10/95	wound up 2001
FNDE (1) Fonds nat. de dévt des entreprises [1bnF expected 1997-99]	Guarantee loans, risk capital to small firms in priority zones	"Successive Ministers for AdT wanted it but not operational"	Special Treasury account from privatisations: Trésor opposed	Act 4/2/95	not funded
PM Jospin					
FNDE (2) Fonds nat. de dévt des entreprises 200mF 1998	Guarantee loans, risk capital to small firms in priority zones	Secretariat at DATAR; Commissariats to operate	BDPME (Bank for small & medium firms), CDC, DATAR	CIADT 15/12/97	extant in 2002
FIATA Fonds d'intervention .. aero-ports.. transport aérien 463mF 2003	Inter-regional airlines and airports for AdT and safety	Implementing measures decided at CIADT, eg. 3/9/03	Special Treasury account managed by Ministry of Transport	Finance Act 1999	extant in 2003
FGMN Fonds de gestion des milieux naturels 100mF 2003	To fund rehabilitation of natural habitats and quality of life	Discontinued by Raffarin's ecology minister	Budget of PM/ Ministry of Environment and AdT	Act 25/6/99	wound up 2003

Sources: DATAR, *Rapport d'Activité* and *La Lettre de la DATAR*, various dates; Ministry of Finances, '*Les Bleues*' (various dates); Madiot (1979, 1986, 1993, 1996), Manesse (1988); Mazet (2000); Teneur and di Qual (1972).

Balladur [Minister of Finance] and Méhaignerie' [*Aménagement du territoire*].¹⁰¹ Agriculture was one of only two budgets that Chirac dealt with personally that year, 'out of personal interest and because they were politically sensitive'.¹⁰² Méhaignerie too was interested (an *ingénieur en chef du génie rural*, and son and brother of a farmer), but he was also being asked to accept serious cuts in other parts of his portfolio.

As under Pompidou it was difficult to persuade the Agriculture Ministry to fund rural development. In 1988 Prime Minister Rocard introduced the *Fonds régionalisé d'aide aux initiatives locales* (FRILE) to encourage small communes to group together to promote economic development. Half its funding was to come from *Aménagement du territoire*, 40 per cent from Employment and the rest from Agriculture, but the Ministry of Agriculture did not pass its contribution to regional prefects, and there were calls to put FRILE into one ministerial budget, preferably that of *aménagement du territoire*, and allow DATAR to coordinate its expenditure.¹⁰³ The large-scale reform of *aménagement du territoire* in 1995 incorporated FIDAR and FRILE into the larger FNADT fund organised by DATAR.

Yet earlier political leaders had already met the problem of coordinating funds from multiple sources. Pompidou's first Prime Minister, Chaban-Delmas, agreed after a visit to the Nord to provide a single budget for modernising miners' houses. The programme was being funded from FIAT and five ministerial budgets and 'if one did not give its contribution the whole project seized up'.¹⁰⁴ He set up the *Groupe interministériel pour la restructuration des zones minières* (GIRZOM) at DATAR but left office before creating the fund. From 1972 to 1975 CIAT agreed an annual budget with contributions from each ministry, but 'they always competed with other ministry demands'. Chirac in April 1975 'renewed the promise'; and created a special chapter in the prime minister's general budget. It was shared out between ministries in CIAT until 1979, but there were long delays between CIAT authorising the expenditure and the field offices receiving the funding.¹⁰⁵ There was no CIAT meeting in 1980, and in 1981 GIRZOM renewed its pleas for a single budget. In 1983 Pierre Mauroy, Prime Minister and minister for *Aménagement du territoire*, mayor of Lille, agreed to a *Fonds du groupe interministériel pour la restructuration des zones minières*. The sums were allocated to DATAR, which redistributed them through the State-Region Plan Contracts. This fund too became part of FNADT in 1995.

By 1994, with the creation of other funds, FIAT represented less than half the funding for *aménagement du territoire* allocated from the prime minister's budget. FIAT was worth 864mF; FIDAR, FRILE and the GIRZOM fund, together with the *Fonds d'aide à la décentralisation* (FAD) which helps firms and their staff leave Paris, and the 'mountain fund', the *Fonds interministériel pour l'auto-développement en montagne* (FIAM), came to

¹⁰¹ F. Grosrichard, *Le Monde*, 19 Dec. 1986.

¹⁰² Hayward and Wright (2002), p. 174.

¹⁰³ Madiot (1993), p. 53, p. 60.

¹⁰⁴ GIRZOM (1981) *Rapport d'activité 1972-80* (DATAR), p. 14.

¹⁰⁵ *ibid.* p. 73.

over 1000mF. There were other active funds too (see Figure 5.7). Although each had enabled political leaders to promote their own particular concerns at some stage, their division into separate small envelopes reduced DATAR's capacity to respond to changing political priorities and added complexity that baffled those the funding was designed to help.

As part of the fundamental reform of *aménagement du territoire*, the 'Pasqua Act', LOADT, created a new fund FNADT which combined FIAT with five other funds managed or part-managed by DATAR. However, parliamentarians still wanted to know how much was spent on their particular concerns and constituencies. Pasqua was able to incorporate into FNADT the mountain fund FIAM and the rural fund FIDAR only by agreeing to consult mountain representatives on FNADT expenditure.¹⁰⁶ DATAR was unable to dissolve FIAM into FNADT until 2002 because it was obliged to published a separate tally of 'notional FIAM' spending. Moreover, Pasqua was pressurised during the passage of the bill to introduce new funds, such as the *Fonds de gestion de l'espace rural* (FGER), for 'rural management'; though his successors were able to nullify it in practice by funding it poorly and making the qualifying conditions highly restrictive.¹⁰⁷

Political leaders have treated FNADT like FIAT by funding it less and less well, and instead continue to create in a variety of statutory ways (law, decree, *arrêté*, circular, CIAT) the targeted funds that attract media attention, sometimes using new resources (such as airport taxes and motorway tolls, see Figure 5.7). Of the 24 listed in Figure 5.7 ministers reformed nine and abolished eight. Another six, mostly recent, remain in substantially the same form: only one, in 1996, was successfully opposed by the Ministry of Finance, and was eventually set up in a different form by a different government (the *Fonds national de développement des entreprises*, FNDE). It seems that leaders have a good capacity for funding policies to which they are committed, can reduce the budgets of those of their predecessors, and abolish those they see no need to retain.

Control of ministerial budgets

The justification for putting weak levels of funding in DATAR's hands in 1963 was that the political leadership ambitiously decided that public capital spending (schools, hospitals, roads...) would be directed towards regional development. It had arranged for the *délégué* to monitor ministries' draft budgets by region and report to CIAT 'on whether the proposed investment programmes fitted with the aims of *aménagement du territoire*'.¹⁰⁸ DATAR and the nascent regional prefects would monitor implementation at regional level. A prime minister who wanted to coordinate public investment at regional level to help development had in DATAR, CIAT and the regional prefects a system which could in principle achieve it. This objective was never implemented effectively on the national scale. However, after decentralisation in 1982 the State-Region Plan Contracts agreed in CIAT/CIADT went some

¹⁰⁶ Manesse (1998), p.112.

¹⁰⁷ *ibid.* p.115.

¹⁰⁸ Decree 14 February 1963, Art.1.

way to producing a similar effect with similar agents.

In the mid-1960s DATAR liaised between ministries and the Plan Commissariat while budgets were being prepared, and then in June 'it was associated with the Ministry of Finance's drawing up of the final draft budget.¹⁰⁹ DATAR had an informal right, 'secured by Guichard', to attend the budget minister's meetings with sectoral ministers: it was 'the first time civil servants from outside the Rue de Rivoli' [Ministry of Finance] had attended such talks.¹¹⁰ The *délégué* would give advice during the arbitration conducted by the prime minister,¹¹¹ who would settle 'any conflict between the geographic considerations of DATAR and the sectoral concerns of the ministries',¹¹² before DATAR drew up the report to CIAT. By 1968 officials were more likely to 'think geographically', and less likely to consider only their own sector or 'where they had got to on a dossier'.¹¹³ The Ministry of Construction had divided its housing budget between the eight regional cities and had allocated 90 per cent of its total budget by region; the Ministry of Education divided 62 per cent of its budget in 1966 compared with 54 per cent in 1965. But the Ministry of Public Works had managed to regionalise only 'new spending' on urban infrastructure; continuing programmes had not been regionalised.¹¹⁴

However, DATAR was by 1969 no longer in close contact with ministries as they drew up their budgets. DATAR still attended the budget meetings in the Ministry of Finance,¹¹⁵ but ministries regionalised their budgets without DATAR.¹¹⁶ In 1980 Monod and de Castelbajac acknowledged that 'administrative practice had not entirely lived up to the ambitions of the decree-makers'.¹¹⁷ First, bureaucratic divisions did not want DATAR's interventions; for example, they did not let DATAR know of amendments they made during the year.¹¹⁸ But, second, the 1960s was a period of intense reform to French regional administrative structures which local-national politicians as well as officials were resisting (see Chapter 7). Though de Gaulle wanted further regional reform, Pompidou saw the political challenge and drew back.¹¹⁹ Third, 'rational' budgeting had intensely political implications. Essig, in charge of this dossier at the time, explained that where politicians wanted equal provision, as in education, DATAR would look to see 'whether the

¹⁰⁹ Lanversin (1970), p.200.

¹¹⁰ Essig (1979), pp.26-9; and Pouyet (1968), p.87.

¹¹¹ Lanversin (1970), p.200.

¹¹² Monod and de Castelbajac (1971), p.38, (1980), p.32.

¹¹³ Pouyet (1968), p.88; Essig (1979), p.26.

¹¹⁴ Pouyet (1968), p.89.

¹¹⁵ Essig (1979), p.27.

¹¹⁶ Lanversin (1970), p.200.

¹¹⁷ Monod and de Castelbajac (1980), p.32.

¹¹⁸ Lanversin (1970), p.200,

¹¹⁹ Machin, H. (1977) *The Prefect in French Public Administration* (Croom Helm), pp.59-60, Grémion, C. (1992a) 'Le cheminement des idées de région et de décentralisation sous la Ve république', in L. Hamon (ed) (1992) *La Région de De Gaulle à nos jours* (Maison des sciences de l'homme), 17-41, pp.29-33. Grémion, C. (1987) 'Decentralization in France', in G. Ross, S. Hoffmann and S. Malzacher (eds) *The Mitterrand Experiment* (Polity), 237-47, p. 240.

administration was catching up in lagging areas or accentuating the advantages of those already favoured'.¹²⁰ Yet the Plan Commissariat's regional team in 1962 had found that 'to remedy the accumulation of under-investment in some regions, no new schools should be built in Paris, Aix, Montpellier or Toulouse. Nearly all expenditure should be concentrated in the industrial zones of Northern and Eastern France',¹²¹ an idea that would not have been popular among the Paris elite and right-wing politicians. Fourth, in the late 1960s, Giscard as Finance Minister rejected the idea of 'Rationalisation of Budgetary Decisions' because it would jeopardise the Ministry's position as arbiter between ministries' budgets.¹²² In all, DATAR's close supervision of ministries' budgets would have met political as well as bureaucratic constraints.

Only 30 per cent of central government's civil capital expenditure was ever allocated by region, ministries arguing that most spending was 'national' not 'regional'.¹²³ 'Confronted with strong administrative forces, DATAR ... had difficulty making ordinary capital expenditure match the priorities it had decided with the regions'.¹²⁴ Nevertheless, DATAR found it 'could fairly easily make ministries take into account the major projects that the government decided'.¹²⁵ Reforms that Prime Minister Pompidou introduced in 1966-68 with Debré as Finance Minister, such as the setting up of the OREAMs to develop regional cities, the *Group interministériel foncier* that decided which urban projects would be eligible for public funding, the Languedoc-Roussillon and Fos projects that were provided with block budgets,¹²⁶ and the rural and mining area commissioners in particular zones, were all ways to direct and monitor expenditure in ways that political leaders intended.

However, these innovative projects gave DATAR an centralist, authoritarian image, and the new political leaders in the early 1980s did not see a useful role for DATAR in the decentralised system. Regionalised budgets disappeared in 1984. The Chirac government in 1986 rejected DATAR's oversight of budgetary preparation:

'DATAR no longer attends the budgetary conferences and no longer has the right to oversee the deconcentrated budgets of ministries. After the regionalised budget disappeared, DATAR remained associated with the budgetary process by helping to draw up ministers' *lettres plafonds* but was kept outside this procedure during the preparation of the 1987 Finance Bill'.¹²⁷

Yet the State-Region Plan Contracts that allocate ministry spending in the regions through negotiation with regional councils provide the political leadership with an efficient tool. 'Contractual planning appears as a means of mobilizing the regions behind state policies

¹²⁰ Essig (1979), p.26.

¹²¹ Roche (1986), p.68.

¹²² Ashford, D.E. (1982) Policy and Politics in France: Living with uncertainty (Philadelphia: Temple).

¹²³ Madiot (1979), p.67.

¹²⁴ Monod and de Castelbajac (1980), pp.32-3; and see Biarez (1989), p.183.

¹²⁵ Monod and de Castelbajac (1980) *ibid.*

¹²⁶ Racine, P. (1980) Mission impossible? L'aménagement touristique du littoral du Languedoc-Roussillon (Montpellier: Midi Libre), p.57.

¹²⁷ Guichard Commission (1986), p.57.

rather than as a mechanism to provide state support for autonomous regional policies'.¹²⁸ DATAR in 1973 had 'initially conceived... the institutional technique of contractualization',¹²⁹ with its 'contracts with small towns'. By 1975 it had suggested that 'reciprocal contracts' could be effective instruments in a decentralised state.¹³⁰ DATAR influenced the Goux Commission that designed post-1981 Plan procedures, with Monod a Commission member and DATAR officials on six working groups, three as rapporteur.¹³¹ The Minister for the Plan and *Aménagement du territoire*, Michel Rocard, and the *délégué*, Bernard Attali, are given the credit for having invented and put the Plan Contracts in place.¹³² Rocard gave DATAR the coordinating role on Plan Contracts.

The political leadership, especially the prime minister, plays a leading role by defining negotiating procedures, national priorities and draft and final Contracts in CIATs for each round of five-year Contracts.¹³³ For the first round (1984-88), Mauroy appointed Jean Le Garrec, a personal friend, as junior minister for the Plan, to oversee negotiations and check that agreements matched the government's industrial priorities.¹³⁴ DATAR and the prefects advised regional councils on procedures, with DATAR explaining the proposals made by central ministries. Even after the negotiations were complete, prime ministers could adjust individual decisions: thus, for instance, Fabius moved to Grenoble a Synchrotron Mauroy had agreed would be built in Strasbourg.¹³⁵ In the *cohabitation* of 1986-88, Chirac agreed there would be a second generation of Contracts (1989-93) and he set out revised procedures in CIAT in 1987. Regional prefects were to be the main negotiators, with DATAR confined to the central level; it was to organise CIATs and arrange interministerial meetings for prefects; and put draft proposals to ministries (in which it used FIAT/FNADT to push State aims for regional development). Once the Contract came into effect DATAR was to monitor expenditure.¹³⁶ Chirac identified and set out four priority sectors for the Contracts; but when Rocard became Prime Minister in 1988 he was able to add another two

¹²⁸ Balme, R. and Bonnet, L. (1995) 'From Regional to Sectoral Policies', in J. Loughlin and S. Mazey (eds) *The End of the French Unitary State?* (Cass), 51-71, p. 70.

¹²⁹ Balme and Bonnet (1995), p. 53.

¹³⁰ Charlet, C. (1976) 'Les équipements collectifs et la décentralisation', in Debbasch, C. (ed.) *La Décentralisation pour la rénovation de l'Etat* (PUF), 207-18, pp. 211-16. Christian Charlet was then *chargé de mission* at DATAR.

¹³¹ Goux Commission [Commission de réforme de la planification] (1982) *Rapport au Ministre d'Etat: ministre du Plan et de l'aménagement du territoire* (La Documentation française).

¹³² F. Grosrichard, *Le Monde*, 29 Sept. 1988.

¹³³ Act of 29 July 1982 on Planning; decree of 21 Jan. 1983.

¹³⁴ Favier and Martin-Roland (1991), pp. 60-68, p. 119; Madiot (1996), p. 66.

¹³⁵ Favier and Martin-Roland (1990) p. 554. Strasbourg appealed to the Conseil d'Etat, who decided a State-Region contract was a real contract and that the decision would need to be contested elsewhere. CE, Ass. 8 Jan. 1988, Pontier, J.-M. (1998) *Les Contrats de plan entre l'Etat et les régions* (PUF), pp. 21-2.

¹³⁶ Chain, P. (1997) 'Les Contrats de Plan Etat - Région', in Voisard, J. and Lavallard, F. (eds) *Dynamique de l'investissement public*, 1 (Paris: GERI/ La Documentation française), 139-60, pp. 147-8, p. 151. Chain was *chargé de mission* at DATAR at this time.

that reflected the Left's priorities.¹³⁷

The preparation of the third generation of Contracts (1994-99), took place under the three short-lived premierships of Cresson, Bérégovoy and Balladur. They all held CIATs to specify or re-specify objectives and give negotiating instructions. Balladur and Pasqua made the 'third generation of Plan contracts a more energetic instrument of *aménagement du territoire*' by varying the State's contribution according to regions' GDP and unemployment.¹³⁸ They defined in CIAT a 'hard core' of specific projects to try to focus expenditure. But this 'unilateral' decision upset some regions, who had to be given additional grants before they would sign contracts.¹³⁹ The Juppé government was then 'unilaterally' able to decide to spread the five-year State funding over six years, arguing it would bring the timetable in line with the six-year European Union funding programme that started in 2000.

State-Region Plan Contracts have therefore enabled the political leadership to claw back some of the financial power ostensibly decentralised to territorial authorities. Central government provided only 44 per cent of the 1989-93 Contracts (when annexes and VAT paid by regions were taken into account).¹⁴⁰ Further, the promise of 'matching funding' and FNADT from DATAR encourages regions to 'adapt to' the government's main objectives; these prevailed in 75 per cent of the funding of the 1994-99 Contracts, according to the *délégué* at the time.¹⁴¹ Thus, if Contracts, which currently combine 15 to 20 per cent of the State civil (capital and current) budget and 25 to 30 per cent of the regions' (capital and current) budget,¹⁴² are 75 per cent targeted on the political leadership's aims, they achieve a control over the regional destination of expenditure as good as the 30 per cent of the State civil capital budget (current spending was never covered), that DATAR was able to 'regionalise' in practice. In summary, although the political leadership no longer tries to use DATAR to organise the territorial distribution of ministerial budgets 'at source', the Plan Contracts, determined in CIATs, using the regional prefects and DATAR as negotiators (and, in effect, regional politicians as monitors), have become an effective alternative.

CONCLUSIONS

This chapter has continued the inquiry into the political leadership's ability to make an impact on the actions of bureaucracies, in this case focusing on the way leaders can use administrative and financial tools to adjust policy delivery through DATAR. It was established that CIAT/CIADT, nominally and normally chaired by the prime minister, was

¹³⁷ DATAR (1990), p.146.

¹³⁸ Madiot (1996), p.67; Mazet (2000), p.79; *Lettre de la DATAR*, 151, 1994. The 'corrective effect' was in the event reduced by subsidiary annexes to individual Contracts. www.datar.gouv.fr, 'Dossiers CPER'.

¹³⁹ Balme and Bonnet (1995), p.69.

¹⁴⁰ Plan Commissariat figures, cited by Madiot (1996), p.66.

¹⁴¹ R-M. Aubert, quoted in Billet, J. (1997) 'Nature et mise en œuvre des procédures de contrat de plan Etat-régions' [CES report] *Problèmes économiques*, 2529, 4-8, p.7.

¹⁴² www.datar.gouv.fr. 'Les grands chiffres des contrats 2000-2006'. 16 Dec. 2003.

for at least a decade (the Gaullist and Pompidou presidencies), an efficient and effective tool for a leadership that wanted to take a small number of 'heroic' decisions at central level. In the early 1970s CIATs became less efficient in technical terms, even if it translated into effect a growing linkage between the political leaders and the local population that Blondel thought essential. CIAT was dealing with more and smaller-scale policies, involving more ministers, that were the choice of a different political leadership. When CIAT failed to meet in 1980, it at least demonstrated that CIATs met when political leaders determined they should. Yet CIAT remained an effective forum for highly political interministerial decision-making and especially for decisions most likely to be resisted by bureaucrats, as the CIATs of Cresson and Delebarre showed. Whether CIATs were held or not depended on three factors: the political leadership's interest in *aménagement du territoire*; its desire to take decisions that had legally to be taken in CIAT; and its wish to spend - or to not spend - FIAT or FNADT. Although there was a statistically-significant link between the prime minister's commitment to the policy and its holding of CIATs, the president's interest was a stronger influence, even though CIAT/CIADT is an instrument legally in the prime minister's hands. Prime ministers with no interest in the topic, but working to a president who was interested, held CIATs that implemented his policies, while presidents who were not interested in the policy as a whole but in specific elements took the relevant decisions in Councils of Ministers at which they could be present.

While most political and media attention focuses on CIAT/CIADT, partly because of its membership, partly because of the significance of its funding decisions, scrutiny of other interministerial and inter-organisational bodies showed the facility that presidents, prime ministers and ministers have to create administrative institutions that help promote their aims. Examples were given of a number of 'agencies', 'associations' and 'commissioners' that ministers had introduced outside the traditional ministerial framework to fill gaps in implementation left by French public bureaucracies and administrative law. But more conventional committees and councils were also shown to respond to the changing demands of the political leadership, two-thirds having been modified substantially, transferred to bodies outside central government or simply abolished. A few show no signs of having been established and to that extent leaders may have encountered resistance, while others, including those with a membership from civil society, were frequently reconstituted because of the central leadership's desire for political control.

It was demonstrated that political leaders have strong and effective power to specify the resources that will be devoted to *aménagement du territoire*. First, like the staffing budget examined in the previous chapter, the financial budget that the prime minister and the minister for *aménagement du territoire* negotiate for DATAR is not only finely detailed but can be amended during the year. Budgets were determined by prime ministers and budget ministers working within constraints set by the president (apart from during *cohabitation*). But if DATAR's annual income was strongly constrained by the political leadership, with a

subsidiary political intervention by parliament, control over its expenditure was more complex and erratic. Yet the chief cause was leaders' own failure to make spending decisions, leading DATAR to build up a backlog of unspent funds.

The fairly consistent decline in FIAT since 1963 and the similar if more variable decline in FNADT are explained by the creation by leaders of new funds focused on their own objectives, and breaking free of older funds that had become tied to past programmes. Examples of the funds for rural development and the rehabilitation of miners' housing showed not only the recurrent coordination difficulties when budgets came from multiple sources, but also the capacity of some leaders to devise solutions when their interest was engaged. In quantitative terms, the impact of political leaders on funds was similar to their impact on committees; of the two dozen examined, they were able to abolish a third and modify substantially another third. A quarter, mostly recent, continued unchanged until 2003 at least. Only one was so opposed that it failed to materialise, and it was eventually set up in a different format by another government. The early efforts of political leaders to use DATAR to re-orient ministries' annual budgets were soon abandoned for more focused forms of expenditure planning that could take better account of political criteria. If the State-Region Plan Contracts developed in the 1980s give national political leaders only a partial control of public spending in each region, they are equivalent in outcome to the best the more ambitious reforms achieved in practice, and they are better-coordinated across ministries and more closely-linked to the population.

In Blondel's analysis of the relationship between the bureaucracy and the political leadership he was fairly pessimistic about a political leadership's decisions being followed by good implementation, because

'from the point of view of leaders, the "system" is often inefficient, badly structured and badly organized. This is ...often, perhaps mostly - because the system is simply unresponsive or only partly responsive. This lack of responsiveness, in turn, is due largely to the fact that we do not know how to make the system effective. There are thus manifest limits to the degree in which leaders are able to rely on institutions, arrangements and organizations around them to have the desired impact'.¹⁴³

However, this chapter has shown that the well-understood traditional formulae of interministerial committees and targeted funding can be used very effectively by political leaders, supplemented by a wide variety of area -based or programme-specific solutions, such as commissioners, planning agencies, block budgets and contracts with local and regional authorities. Although DATAR, the central State's organiser of these projects, was not originally seen as a useful partner in the Left's decentralised system, political leaders have been able to adapt DATAR and the traditional and newer tools it deployed for their predecessors so that it continues to steer public policy on their behalf.

¹⁴³ Blondel (1987), p.150.

CHAPTER 6

CASE STUDY 1: ROADS PLANNING AND FUNDING

INTRODUCTION

The two-fold concern of the thesis is with the empirical difficulties that political leaders experience in coordinating bureaucratic institutions and the theoretical argument that political leaders find it difficult to make their mark on policy, such are the institutional constraints. Previous chapters have dealt with that concern in relation to the leadership's capacity to alter the organisational design and operation of the bureaucracy itself. It was demonstrated that presidents, prime ministers and ministers for *aménagement du territoire* were, to varying extents, able to use administrative-legal and financial tools to adapt DATAR's staffing, funding, working arrangements, decision-making committees and implementing agencies towards a better fit with their own aims for DATAR and its promotion of their policy goals.

However, as explained in Chapter 1, the assessment of the political leadership's ability to affect the workings of the bureaucracy needs to be carried through to the eventual outcome, and in particular to the role of the bureaucracy in 'helping or hindering' the leadership's efforts. As Blondel observed,

'whether political leaders appear to "make a difference" to the type of policies which are followed...is in many ways the central question of political activity'.¹

Blondel adopted a conceptual analysis of a leader's 'potential impact', because of the difficulties of evaluating leaders' actual actions (too many to count, variable in importance, implemented by ministers and bureaucrats, and intertwined with the rest of the environment). 'Lists of separate actions of leaders do not provide the answer, because they are too concrete and too embedded in their context'.² However, by selecting a narrow sub-policy such as the planning of the network of major roads, an empirical exercise becomes more practicable. In methodological terms, roads planning and funding is a policy area that political leaders asked DATAR to coordinate with their goals for *aménagement du territoire*; and it is also an area in which the significant decisions are made at the top and on identifiable occasions; thus it is feasible to explore the contributions of significant players to each decision, within the wider context.

In more theoretical terms, despite the banality of roads policy (in contrast to the regionalisation issue considered in the next chapter), this technical domain poses a strong challenge to the political leadership. Indeed banality and technicality can signify a policy domain that professional bureaucracies have defined as theirs, and in which political

¹ Blondel (1980), p.15.

² Blondel (1987), p.81.

intervention, such as the introduction of regional development criteria, is likely to be resisted.

'Decisions high on the national political agenda are those discussed in public, in the media, and by the nation's top political leaders....Issues low on the political agenda are treated in relative obscurity, often by career government officials according to standard operating procedures, with little political oversight or interference, and in close consultation with affected interests'.³

Baumgartner argues that elite actors gain by persuading other interested parties that an issue is 'technical'; for example, Hall showed that in France 'economic policy was successfully portrayed [by the elite civil servants] as a technical question best left to the experts'.⁴ Studies of policy-making in France that demonstrated a technocratic dominance were those in which there was little partisan and public debate, such as economic planning, nuclear power or weapons procurement. Political leaders could still make an impact if their attention were drawn to an issue, for example, by opposition in parliament or a public demonstration that made it 'political'.⁵ Roads planning was therefore likely to be a 'theoretically-interesting' policy domain in which there were varying levels of conflict between a technical bureaucracy 'in charge' of the policy, and a changing political leadership.

The chief bureaucratic players

Given the specialised nature of the domain, the bureaucratic actors chiefly responsible for the policy and their interactions with the political leadership and DATAR are introduced below before embarking on a more synthetic analysis.

The Ponts et Chaussées

Thoenig and others have shown that the technical *corps* of the *Ponts et Chaussées* held a quasi-monopoly over road planning and funding at central level in the Roads Directorate of the Ministry of Infrastructure (ex-Public Works), and in the *départements*. Their position on an issue such as a national road network or road tolling could be changed by political leaders only with difficulty and after repeated attempts. The *corps* found numerous objections on technical grounds, and its opposition was strengthened if the career goals of the *corps* were affected. The example of the motorway network illustrates the general pattern. The *corps* opposed the Talled Motorways Bill presented in 1952 and 1954 by Transport Ministers Antoine Pinay and Jacques Chaban-Delmas, arguing that motorways were expensive, would not be used, would pose surfacing problems and favoured rich men's transport; and that tolls were undemocratic (it also feared that such major investments would be decided by national political leaders, taking away the decisional and fee-earning power for the *corps* at local level).⁶ Though short lengths of untolled motorway were built, 'tolls remained a 'taboo

³ Baumgartner, F. (1996) 'The many styles of policymaking in France', in J. Keeler and M. Schain (eds) *Chirac's Challenge: Liberalization, Europeanization and Malaise in France* (Macmillan), 85-10, p.86.

⁴ Baumgartner (1996), p.87, p.89; Hall (1986).

⁵ As Baumgartner found for French education policy (1996), p.90, p.87.

⁶ Thoenig, J.-C. (1973) *L'Ere des technocrates: Le cas des Ponts-et-Chaussées* (Editions d'Organisations), pp.60-1.

of the Roads Directorate'.⁷ Only when Prime Minister Pompidou in 1963 set up the *Caisse nationale des autoroutes*, to offer loans and advise the private sector on building tolled motorways to link regional cities, was there a change in *corps* strategy; it and the Roads Directorate of the Ministry of Infrastructure moved to take control, the Roads Director chairing the *Caisse nationale des autoroutes* and the committee of the *Caisse des Dépôts* that funded it.⁸ In 1969 with both President Pompidou, advised by his *cabinet* and DATAR, and Prime Minister Chaban-Delmas wanting a 'faster motorway programme... to encourage activity... within the framework of *aménagement du territoire*,⁹ the political leadership agreed to build motorways through private-sector contracts. The Infrastructure Minister, Chalandon, 'removed the obstacle of the Roads Directorate' by offering the *corps* a fee to inspect motorways.¹⁰ *Ponts et Chaussées* engineers soon held the top posts in the private constructor, Cofiroute, and its parent company.

The *Ponts et Chaussées* has had administrative responsibility for roads for three centuries. The *grand corps*, educated at *Ecole Polytechnique* and further selected for the *Ecole Nationale des Ponts et Chaussées*, staffs senior posts in the Infrastructure Ministry as well as serving in *cabinets* and other public bodies such as DATAR. The work in local offices is organised by the next highest '*Ponts*' *corps*, the *Travaux Publics* (Public Works). During most of the period covered by this thesis these officials designed, managed or inspected roads infrastructure. They were close to local politicians, for whom they carried out road improvements for a fee distributed within the *corps*. They opposed projects proposed by DATAR to the political leadership, such as the Breton expressway, because they did not respond to the professional criterion: meeting current traffic demand.¹¹ From the 1960s the *Ponts* were challenged for their traditional 'career opportunities' in public and private industry by the administrative *grands corps*, and younger members guided the *corps* to take over the urban development being promoted by the DAT in the Ministry of Construction. They supported the combining in 1966 of Construction and Public Works into the Super-Ministry of Infrastructure, which President de Gaulle instigated in order to have a single 'overseer' of all large national infrastructure projects.¹² They helped the political leadership deliver coordinated development in regional cities, while 'nibbling away' at the

⁷ Randet (1994), p.87. Randet was head of the DAT, DATAR's predecessor, at the time.

⁸ Thoenig (1973), p.61.

⁹ Esambert (1994), p.109; Essig (1979), p.100; Chaban -Delmas, J. (1997) *Mémoires pour demain* (Flammarion), p.442; Archives Nationales [Pompidou] (1996) 5 AG2/182-5, *Conseil restreint* 27 Nov.1969.

¹⁰ Randet (1994), p.87; Mény, Y. (1974) *Centralisation et décentralisation dans le débat politique français: 1945-1969* (Pichon) (1974), p.269.

¹¹ Essig (1979), p.31, p.85; Jardin, A. and Fleury, P. (1973) *La révolution de l'autoroute* (Fayard), p.xxiv; Thoenig, J.-C. (1987) *L'Ere des technocrates: Le cas des Ponts-et-Chaussées*, 2nd edn (L'Harmattan), pp.303-5.

¹² Chevallier (1992), p.563; Pisani, E. (1974) *Le Général indivis* (Albin Michel), p.142; Suleiman, E. (1974) *Politics, Power and Bureaucracy in France: The Administrative Elite* (Princeton: Princeton University Press), p.174fn, p.177.

efforts of DATAR and the Plan Commissariat to coordinate this activity at national level.¹³ Well-integrated into local society,¹⁴ the *Ponts* could call up support from the local political milieu,¹⁵ or from road lobbies.¹⁶ The Roads Directorate was the only central division to disobey Prime Minister's Cresson's instruction to ministries to leave negotiations on the 1994-99 State-Region Plan Contracts to DATAR, the prefects and the regions (see Chapter 5).¹⁷ The Roads Director went to war against anything that threatened his sector's autonomy'.¹⁸ According to Olivier Guichard, *délégué* 1963-67, and minister of *Aménagement du territoire* and Infrastructure, 1972-74:

The *ingénieurs des Ponts* do admirably what they know how to do, tarmac. But... it didn't occur to them to ask themselves why they were doing it.... But when it has been decided that a bridge should be built here and not there... who can oppose it when technical people made the decision?...¹⁹

The Plan Commissariat

A special feature of French transport funding has been its incorporation within medium-term national and regional investment planning, for which the *Plan Commissariat* was primarily responsible. Created by General de Gaulle immediately before he left office in 1946, the Commissariat was an interministerial *administration de mission* like DATAR, but a more persistent attempt than with DATAR was made to keep the Commissariat politically-autonomous of government so that it could negotiate a national investment plan that would be widely accepted.

The first three 'Modernisation and Infrastructure Plans' (1947-61) gave no place to roads.²⁰ The Plan Commissariat 'found it difficult to break into the closed world of transport',²¹ and were impressed with the arguments of Louis Armand of the SNCF and Pierre Massé of *Electricité de France* that priority should be given to rail electrification.²² The Fourth Plan (1962-65), was 'the high-water mark of French planning',²³ and the first to make provision for roads and regions. Yet 'the project to regionalise funding in the Plan failed' (as noted in Chapters 4 and 5, dividing planned investment by region would expose technical problems with the 'sums' at national level, and the existing disparities between the North-East and Paris would raise political questions).²⁴ President de Gaulle had ambitions

¹³ Thoenig (1973), pp.71-3, p.101, p.129.

¹⁴ *Courrier Picard*, 31 Aug.2003, reported on the farewell speech by mayors of the canton of Albert for 'their [sic] TP official'. 'Despite your sensitive position between the State and the *élus*, you (*tu*) always made sure our paperwork was carried out correctly. We really appreciated your work, and are sad to see you go'.

¹⁵ Thoenig (1973), p.119, p.97.

¹⁶ The General Secretary of the Conseil National des Transports observed, 31 May 2002, that 'the road transport companies are always the noisiest lobby in the CNT'.

¹⁷ Cour des Comptes (1998), p.140, p.161.

¹⁸ Thoenig (1973), p.76.

¹⁹ Guichard (1975), p.97.

²⁰ Jardin and Fleury (1973), xxiv.

²¹ Thoenig, J.-C. and Despicht, N. (1975) 'Transport policy', in J.Hayward and M.Watson (eds) *Planning, Politics and Public Policy* (Cambridge: CUP), 390-423, p.395.

²² Cohen S.S. (1977), pp.99-100, p.110.

²³ Green (1980), p.121.

²⁴ Roche (1986), p.23, pp. 65-70.

for the capital and supported Paul Delouvrier, *délégué-général* of the Paris region, who persuaded the Commissariat to increase the funding for Paris.²⁵ The Plan Commissioner, Massé, assured the National Assembly there would be no differences in objectives between regions, and that the 'Fourth Plan was not aiming to stop the growth of Paris'.²⁶

Almost simultaneously with the Fourth Plan, the DAT published a rival *Plan national d'aménagement du territoire* in which tolled motorways linked regional cities.²⁷ Prime Minister Pompidou replaced the DAT with DATAR and attached the Plan Commissariat directly to his office. The Fifth Plan (1966-70), had a more 'scientific' version of the DAT scheme, the Plan Commissariat having accepted DATAR's proposal with its 'technical criteria' and 'precise numbers'.²⁸ The Plan Commissioner now argued that 'the motorway network should structure the regional cities and link them to the European Community'.²⁹ DATAR and the Plan Commissariat were 'on better terms' during the drawing-up of the Sixth Plan (1971-74, extended to 1975);³⁰ and DATAR also worked with *Ponts* urban planners using the 'rationalised decision-making' techniques developed by *Ponts* economists. Together they decided that new roads in Paris would lead to more jobs and more congestion.³¹ Despite this analysis, the Sixth Plan prioritised radial roads into / out of Paris;³² and Paris received a third of the Sixth Plan provision for motorways.³³ President Pompidou had decided in a *Conseil restreint* of October 1970 that the priorities for Paris were radial roads; 'Pompidou distrusted the planning apparatus and economic advice'.³⁴ His successor, Giscard, was 'a convinced anti-planner',³⁵ and set up his Central Planning Council 'to control the Plan Commissariat'.³⁶ He did not favour motorways for Paris and revised downwards the provision for Paris roads in 1974-75.³⁷ The Seventh Plan (1976-80), consisted of a few dozen specific actions. While one Priority Action Programme (PAP5) targeted links to the West and the Massif Central that Giscard and DATAR wanted, the 'roads to open up disadvantaged regions' were those that suffered most from budgetary problems'.³⁸

²⁵ Delouvrier in Chenu (1994), pp.271-3; Massé (1986), p.206.

²⁶ Massé speech of 29 May 1962, reproduced in Bauchet, P. (1964) *Economic Planning: The French Experience* (Heinemann), pp.381-95.

²⁷ Conseil Supérieur de la Construction (1962), I, p.8.

²⁸ Randet (1994), pp.82-5; Delouvrier in Chenu (1994), p.273.

²⁹ Massé (1964), reprinted in Massé, P. (1968) 'L'Aménagement du territoire: projection géographique de la société de l'avenir', in J.Boudeville (ed.) *L'Univers rural et la planification* (PUF), 63-88), pp.79-85.

³⁰ Essig (1979), p.70.

³¹ Lojkine, J. (1972) *La Politique urbaine dans la région parisienne* (Mouton), pp.121-2.

³² Lojkine (1972), p.123.

³³ Jardin and Fleury (1973), p.102, p.229.

³⁴ Ozenda, M. and Strauss-Kahn, D. (1985) 'French planning: decline or renewal?', in H.Machin and V.Wright (eds) *Economic Policy and Policy-making under the Mitterrand Presidency* (Pinter), 101-13, quoting Gruson, p.105.

³⁵ Green (1980), p.103.

³⁶ Bodiguel and Quermonne (1983), p.178.

³⁷ Marchand, B. (1993) *Paris: Histoire d'une ville: XIXe-XXe siècle* (Seuil), p.328.

³⁸ Quinet, E. and Touzery, L. (1986) *Le Plan français: mythe ou nécessité* (Economica) p.60, p.81.

The Eighth Plan (1981-85) gave up any pretence of quantified investment planning, and in any case was replaced by the Left in 1981 with an Interim Plan and Interim State-Region Contracts, which were negotiated between regions and ministries independently of the Plan Commissariat and DATAR. Roads investment was the largest element in these regional contracts, as it was in all rounds of State-Region Plan Contracts. In the Ninth Plan (1984-89) the impressive-sounding Mini- Multisectoral Dynamic -Transport econometric model enabled the effect of transport infrastructure on other sectors to be taken into account,³⁹ and favoured the TGV. 'The Plan Commissariat had worked out that 'on any conceivable basis, motorways were more economic than the TGV but the TGV won'.⁴⁰ In the Tenth Plan (1989-92), the 'first objective' for *aménagement du territoire* was to improve links to the European core from Paris and 'European-scale' regional cities, and again favoured the TGV.⁴¹ Despite the apparent technical advances, the Tenth Plan, 'like its recent predecessors... [was] 'primarily an extended elaboration on the priorities already announced by the government'.⁴²

The Plan Commissariat, like DATAR, was nearly abolished by Chirac in 1986 but 'caution triumphed'.⁴³ However, 'the existence after 1982 of a new category of territorial authority, the region, changed the givens of planning'.⁴⁴ Whereas the authority of National Plans continued to decline, and with it the Plan Commissariat, regions continued to press for State-Region Plan Contracts, for which DATAR is chief negotiator at central level. The Plan Commissariat and National Plans were superseded in practice by DATAR and State-Region Plan Contracts. Although political leaders often propose reforms to make the Plan Commissariat more effective at planning and evaluating public expenditure,

'its role has become like that of planning: blurred and uncertain.... The Commissariat remains in existence for reasons that have more to do with symbols than with practical State action'.⁴⁵

The Finance Ministry

The power of the financial bureaucracy is well-known,⁴⁶ but a particular conflict of interests between the Ministry of Finance and the Plan Commissariat on transport needs to be noted. Until the 1980s much infrastructure spending was 'provisionally planned'⁴⁷ in the Plan

³⁹ 'Planifier Aujourd'hui' (1989) *Cahiers Français*, 242, p.85.

⁴⁰ Peter Holmes, to LSE Government Department seminar, 1 Dec.1983.

⁴¹ Plan Commissariat (1989) *France, Europe, Xth Plan 1989-92* [English language version] (La Documentation française), p.80, p.69.

⁴² Hall, P.A. (1990) 'The State and the Market' in P.A. Hall, J.Hayward, H.Machin (eds) *Developments in French Politics* (Macmillan), 171-87, p.183.

⁴³ Machin, H. (1989) 'Economic planning: policy-making or policy preparation?' in P.Godt (ed.) *Policy-Making in France: from de Gaulle to Mitterrand* (Pinter), 127-41, p.136.

⁴⁴ Pontier (1998) p.11.

⁴⁵ Madiot (1996), p.27.

⁴⁶ The relations between French bureaucratic groups and financial and economic policy for much of the period covered is summarised in Stevens, A. (1980) 'The higher civil service and economic policy-making', in P.Cerny and M. Schain (eds) *French Politics and Public Policy* (Methuen), 79-100, and Green (1980).

⁴⁷ Green's term, (1980), p.103.

Commissariat. But, while the macro-economists of the Plan Commissariat tended to favour growth led by investment (in rail), the budget officials tried to curtail spending to restrain the subsequent inflation.⁴⁸ Political leaders who wanted to spend on roads were therefore likely to meet resistance from both the Finance Ministry and the Plan.⁴⁹ Finance Ministry officials were in ministerial *cabinets*, on committees drawing up road programmes, in the motorway funding agency, and on the working group on the 'rationalisation of transport decisions'. It argued about budgets for the road plans political leaders had decided, and then amended them according to budgetary and economic contingencies, such as in 1990-92 when the road improvement budget depended on the state of the currency and unemployment.⁵⁰

'In France the Finance Ministry has always intervened positively to the point of practically dispossessing the spending ministries of many of their powers...'⁵¹

Such claims need to be evaluated more systematically alongside the efforts of political leaders.

THE COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

The aim of this comparative analysis is to show that political leaders have a considerable capacity to define and implement policy instruments in a 'technocratic' arena, and to specify more closely the conditions in which leaders intervene effectively. A four-stage framework for comparing the impact made by political leaders on policy instruments within the context of the institutional and non-institutional environment was developed in Chapter 1 (see Figure 1.1) from Blondel's conceptual scheme:⁵²

- first, the ways in which political leaders use the positional resources offered by the Constitution and its conventions, and the configuration of the party system;
- second, the influence of bureaucratic organisations that might help or constrain leaders in this domain;
- third, the leadership's use of financial and contingent opportunities, such as crises or honeymoon periods; and other less tangible factors, such as 'prevailing ideas';
- fourth, the opportunities and constraints during implementation, especially the leadership's ability to oversee execution and continued funding.

Data collection and analysis

Evidence on each of these items was sought for the 36 instruments for road investment with a potential impact on *aménagement du territoire* that were launched after that policy was initiated in 1944 (See Figure 6.1). Some are 'one-off' events, such as legislation to allow motorways to be built. Yet even the road network, with its appearance of steady evolution,

⁴⁸ Green (1980), p.104.

⁴⁹ Cohen S.S. (1977), pp.99-100.

⁵⁰ *Le Monde*, 11 Dec.1991; Bauchard, P. (1994) *Deux ministres trop tranquilles* (Belfond), p.52; Merlin (1994), p.46.

⁵¹ Hayward (1975), p.8.

⁵² Blondel (1987), pp.4-8.

Figure 6.1 Roads planning instruments relevant for *aménagement du territoire*

	Prime Minister	Instrument	Date
FOURTH REPUBLIC			
President Auriol 1946-53			
T1	Pleven to Pinay	FSIR Road Fund and 1st Road Plan	1951-52
President Coty 1954-58			
T2	Mendès to Faure	Act on tolled motorways	1954-55
T3	Mendès to Faure	IIInd National Plan - DAT initiative	1954-55
T4	De Gaulle	Roads in IIIrd National Plan	1958-61
FIFTH REPUBLIC			
President de Gaulle 1959-69			
T5	Debré	1st National Roads Programme	1959-60
T6		Roads in IVth National Plan	1962-65
T7		DAT's 2nd Plan of <i>Aménagement du territoire</i>	1962
T8	Pompidou	Caisse nationale des autoroutes	1962
T9		Roads in Languedoc-Roussillon (& Fos) mission	1966
T10		Creation of Super-ministry of Infrastructure	1966
T11		Vth Plan inter-metropole road network	1966-70
T12		OREAM bodies to develop regional metropolises	1966
T13		Breton expressway scheme (Plan breton)	1968-69
President Pompidou 1969-74			
T14	Chaban-Delmas	Act on tolled motorways by concessions	1969
T15		2nd National Road Network 1971	1969-71
T16		VIth Plan: competition and solidarity	1971-74
T17		Paris-Strasbourg motorway	1972
President Giscard d'Estaing 1974-81			
T18	Chirac	Conseil central de planification	1974-76
T19		Revised VIIth Plan: reduce territorial imbalance	1976-80
T20	Barre	National motorway programme 1978-83	1977
T21		Rationalisation of Transport Decisions Group	1978-80
President Mitterrand 1981-95			
T22	Mauroy	Interim State-Regions Plan Contracts	1981-82
T23		Transport Act 1982 (LOTI)	1982
T24		FSGT Fund for transport and energy projects	1982
T25		1st State-Region Plan Contracts 1984-88	1983-84
T26		Motorway and national road plan	1983-84
T27		Massif Central and Breton expressways	1984
T28	Chirac	National Road Plan - increase competitiveness	1987
T29	Rocard	2nd State-Region Plan Contracts 1989-93	1987-88
T30	Cresson	National Road and Motorway Plan	1992
T31	Balladur	3rd State-Region Plan Contracts 1994-99	1993-94
T32		Acceleration of motorway programme	1993
T33		Paris Basin Charter and Contract	1994
T34		National Plan of AdT and road plan	1995
President Chirac 1995-			
T35	Jospin	4th State-Region Contracts 2000-06	1998-00
T36		Sustainable transport service plans	1999-01

is a product of discrete actions by political leaders, when they re-define the map of strategic roads in a Council of Ministers or DATAR's interministerial committee CIAT/CIADT, chaired by the prime minister. In accordance with a methodological strategy suggested by Miles and Huberman for this type of qualitative research, the evidence was organised into a database for each instrument, operationalising Blondel's four analytical themes:⁵³

- first, the constitution, date, president and prime minister (indicators for the political leadership's constitutional powers and the party systems);
- and the actions or views attributed to the president, prime minister, minister for *aménagement du territoire* and the roads minister, in relation to the road instrument;
- second, the actions or views attributed to DATAR, the *Ponts et Chaussées*, the Plan Commissariat;
- third, funding (sources or outcomes or problems), and the technical paradigm ruling in the domain of the instrument examined;
- fourth, other significant issues especially those concerning implementation, such as the views or actions of the Ministry of Finance or parliamentarians; and economic or political crises;
- in addition, evidence on the output of the instrument, both in terms of fulfilling the stated intentions for roads and in terms of the impact on *aménagement du territoire*.

A sample of this database is shown in Figure 6.2, and Figure 6.3 lists the sources used.⁵⁴ The information from each database was condensed into Figure 6.4 to enable data to be compared more easily, and to show the additional information that supports the quantitative analysis but which there is not space to discuss. In addition, each instrument was evaluated succinctly in terms of the issues raised at the start of the chapter:

- how well did the output match leaders' announced intentions for the instrument?
- how well did the road tool fulfil the leaders' aims for *aménagement du territoire*?

To facilitate and guide the qualitative interpretation a 'quantivised' analysis was first made of the information in Figure 6.4, as suggested by Ragin.⁵⁵ In Figure 6.5 a 'tick' (✓) was assigned when the action (or expressed preference, or funding, or technical paradigm) favoured the introduction of the instrument, 0 when there was no known input or action, and a 'cross' (X) when the action or other factor was unfavourable. The 'star rating' in the final columns relates first to the match between the leaders' expressed aims for the instrument and its outcome, and, second, to the practical impact of the instrument on *aménagement du territoire*.

⁵³ Miles, M. and Huberman, A. (1994) *Qualitative Data Analysis* 2nd edn (Thousand Oaks: Sage), pp.173-94.

⁵⁴ A 37-page print-out and/or computer file of the full database with conventional bibliographical referencing could be provided.

⁵⁵ See Ragin, C. (1987) *The Comparative Method* (Berkeley: University of California), chapter 8.

Figure 6.2 Example of roads planning database

T11	Vth Plan Road network to link regional cities	1966-70
Fifth Republic	PRESIDENT: De Gaulle PM: Pompidou	Source * = primary
Instrument and context	Major objective of Vth Plan: transport investment to enable a locality to be developed, intensify regional action and AdT. Roads to develop the 'regional capitals' agreed in CIAT 1964.	Thoenig & Despicht, 1975: 396
Role of DATAR	Formal role to ensure coherence of Plan investments with AdT objectives, coordinate annual infrastructure spending. Vice-chair of CNAT, regional Plan and funding committees. In 1968 2 staff at DATAR liaised with Ministry of Equipment. CGP accepted DATAR's proposal of a more elaborate version of DAT's 1961 scheme, supported by CNAT study on transport and location 'technical criteria'. 'Monod [had learned] to present precise numbers' and 'quantify his needs'	*decree 63-112 -14/2/63 Pouyet 1968: 66; *Randet, 1994: 82-5; *Delouvrier 1994: 273
Role of President	Wanted grandeur of France served through grandeur of Paris: favoured quality of technical performance: motorways, peripheriques, new towns. Asked "What will you need to achieve all that?" "Very strongly supported the périphérique".	Hoddé 1992: 531, 535
Role of PM and AdT minister	Put Plan and AdT under himself as PM in 1962 to limit CGP. Gave Guichard FIAT, free of Ministry of Finance, to finance sections of motorway etc. Approved roads to develop metropoles d'équilibre in CIAT 1964. - End 1964 Delouvrier showed Pompidou Paris motorway plan. PM didn't want to spend money on them but accepted he had to.	*Guichard in Roussel 1994: 152; *Delouvrier in Chenu, 1994: 272
Role of Roads Minister	Report to de Gaulle 27/4/66. Harms AdT to give Paris public transport infrastructure subsidies. Some large projects underway not based on cost-benefit research. Dismissed by PM (for other reasons), then Ortoli, Galley, Chalandon.	*Pisani 1974: 150-1
Ponts role and view	Ponts 'saw red' when regions created by decree March 1964, and had to respond to prefect Roads Director against anything harming the autonomy of his sector. But regional prefect relied on Ponts to decide road investments. Motorway projects decided centrally, but on advice of central and regional roads officials.	Dupuy et al 1973:77 Thoenig 1973:76 Hansen 1968: 240
CGP role and view	Massé [original text in 1964]) was pro- metropoles and said must define motorway network to match, structure the Mets & link to EU. Massé said CGP agreed to tolls (a) because only solution Minister of Finance [Pinay] likely to accept and (b) regions in Plan survey wanted motorways before phones.	*Massé 1968:79-85 *Massé in Rouso1986 202, 217
Funding	DATAR's FIAT by 1970 had given one-third aid to roads. January 1966 Debré, Minister of Finance made 'solemn visit' to DATAR – said would help industrial conversion, reduce burden of unproductive areas	Allen et al, 1970:188 *Essig1979: 28,42,45
Other issues	DATAR's annex to budget now to show credits allocated to each programme region.	Perrin et al: 1968: 53
Output from instrument	Vth Plan concentrated investments on 'nationally-important motorways' – around 6 of 8 metropoles, plus Nice, but not in the 2 least prosperous (Toulouse, Nantes). CGP pressurised to add more 'Mets' e.g. Nice. Delouvrier persuaded Plan to increase roads funding for Paris (in Chenu 1994: 273)	Thoenig & Despicht, 1975: 396 Prud'homme 1974:40

Figure 6.3 Roads planning database sources

Most information cited in the roads planning database came from the texts listed below; the full bibliographical details are at the end of the thesis.

Other information came from:

- Published and unpublished information from DATAR, such as *Lettre de la DATAR*, DATAR's press cuttings, DATAR's records of CIAT agendas.
- Legislation, Finance Bills, Debates in the National Assembly.
- *Le Monde*, *Les Echos*, *Le Courrier Picard*, and IEP Paris *dossiers de presse*.
- Own records of seminars and meetings at LSE, DATAR, Conseil National des Transports.

Books, articles and reports cited in roads planning database:

DATAR	Perrin et al (1968)	Merlin et al (1990)	Hayward (1982)
DOCUMENTS	'Planifier', Cahiers	Monod (1974)	Holmes et al (1988)
Bonnafous et al	Français (1989)	Monod et al (1971)	Jardin et al (1973)
(1993)	Touzery (1982)	Monod et al. (1980)	Julienne (1996)
DATAR (1973a)		Morand & Racine	Keating et al (1986)
DATAR (1977)	OTHER	(1987)	Labasse (1966)
DATAR (1986)	PRIMARY	Pasqua et al (1993)	Lacour (1983)
DATAR (1990)	TEXTS	Pisani (1974)	Lagroye (1973)
Guigou (1993)	Attali (1993)	Quinet et al (1986)	Lajugie (1964)
Laborie et al (1985)	Aubert in Billet	Racine (1980)	Lajugie et al (1979)
Marcou et al (1994)	(1997)	Roche (1986)	Lanversin (1970)
Randet (1994)	Bloch-Lainé (1962)	Savy (1996)	Lojkine (1972)
Rémond (1977)	Carrère (1997)	Sudreau in Randet	Machin (1989)
	Chaban-Delmas	(1994)	Machin et al (1985)
OTHER	(1997)	Ullmo (1975)	Madiot (1979)
OFFICIAL	Delouvrier in Chenu	Vaujour (1970)	Madiot (1986)
DOCUMENTS	(1994)		Madiot (1993)
Archives Nationales	Givaudan in Costa	SECONDARY	Marchand (1993)
(1996)	(1988)	TEXTS	Meissel (1995)
Biays et al (1992)	Debré (1988)	Allen et al (1970)	Mény (1974)
Chain (1997)	De Gaulle (1971)	Andrault (1990)	Mény (1987)
Charles et al (1992)	Drevet 1991	Ashford (1982)	Noin (1998)
Chevallier (1992)	Esambert (1994)	Audouin (1977)	Pontier (1998)
Cons. supérieur	Essig (1979)	Bauchard (1994)	Pouyet (1968)
Construction	Faucheux (1959)	Benko (1987)	Prud'homme (1974)
(1962)	Faure (1982)	Bougeard (1994)	Quermonne (1967)
C.Comptes (1992)	Fournier (1993)	Cohen, S (1977)	Rodwin (1970)
C.Comptes (1992)	Frappart (1965)	Dupuy et al (1987)	Roussel (1994)
C.Comptes (1999)	Giscard d'Estaing	Dupuy (1988)	Rousso (1986)
C.Comptes (1999a)	(1977)	Estrin et al (1983)	Rousso (1987)
C.Comptes (2001)	Gravier (1972)	Favier et al (1990)	Suleiman (1974)
Coulbois et al	Gruson in Ozenda et	Favier et al (1991)	Suleiman (1980)
(1994)	al (1985)	Favier et al (1999)	Thoenig (1973)
[Goux] (1982)	Guaino (1998)	Gervaise et al	Thoenig (1987)
[Guichard] (1986)	Guichard (1975)	(1997)	Thoenig et al (1975)
Grémion, C (1992)	Lacaze (1994)	Green (1980)	Toulemonde et al
Hoddé (1992)	Langumier (1986)	Grémion, P (1976)	(1994)
Merlin (1982)	Massé (1964)	Grémion, P et al	Williams (1972)
Merlin (1994)	Massé (1986)	(1975)	Yvert (2002)
[Quinet et al] (1980)	Massé in Rousso	Hansen (1968)	
Quinet (1982)	(1987)	Hayward (1966)	

Figure 6.4 Roads planning data meta-matrix

INSTRUMENTS		Leaders' Input				Bureaucratic Input		Policy process			Output	
	DAT or DATAR	President	PM	Minister for AdT	Minister for Roads	Ponts role and view	CGP role and view	Technical paradigm	Funding	Other Issues	Match to leaders' aim	Impact on AdT
T1	1951-52 - FSIR Road Fund & 1st Road Plan										0	0
	'Relations with CGP not organised, harmed implementation'	No interest, and no powers in this field	Pro-AdT PM agreed FSIR, ex transport minister PM agreed plan	V. keen on AdT but chose not to take actions in conflict with CGP	Agreed FSIR as Min, then signed decree as PM	TP did not want to lose local power; Ponts preferred rail	Preferred rail spending; could not enter Corps world.	Ponts plan based on Paris-focused traffic and growth forecasts	Special funds organised but gradually absorbed into general budget	Strong roads lobby entering parliament	Leaders introduced tool but no output	Little or no output, on roads or AdT aspect
T2	1954-55 - Act on tolled motorways										0	0
	No formal role on roads	Pro-DAT when at Construction, but no powers	2 PMs had special voting powers -but still had to give in to MPs	Keen Tsp-and-AdT minister promoted Bill, especially for local development; next Roads minister asked Ponts for Plan		Said undemocratic; also about loss of local control by Corps	Against - might have diverted funds away from CGP priorities	Motorways a Ponts taboo	Would use private funds, but that posed 'public service' problems	MPs reduced Act to exceptional circumstances; not local use	Bill so reduced that no longer what leaders wanted	Bill so reduced that no use for local development at the time
T3	1954-55 - IInd CGP Plan - DAT Initiative										*	0
	Late DAT initiative in 1955 to persuade Minister of Plan	Pro-DAT when at Construction, but no powers	Promoted industrial relocation and transport coordination	Minister not involved in persuading Minister of Finance.	2 active roads ministers, one keen on AdT	Said 'roads are rich men's transport'; conflict with AdT officials	'A period of aménagement-infrastructure classic conflict of powers'	CGP thought regional plans could divert Plan spending from its IInd plan aims	Roads had largest reduction of funding from	Faure de-emphasised Plan	Leaders able to choose a different option	'Plan road funds not divided in line with industrial relocation'
T4	1958-61 - Roads in IInd CGP Plan										0	0
	Vice-chair CGP regional cttee (CGP chaired); on Finance funds cttee	As PM, created the CGP cttee; restarts Plan, as President left it to PM	Supported AdT Min, asked CGP to regionalise Plan in 1961	Active Min, keen on AdT, a former close aide of Pres, friend of PM	Keen on roads and local development, asked PM for funds	Ran CGP cttee; in field 'wanted to strengthen existing network'	Coordinated regional plans. Found it difficult to enter transport world	Need to respond to traffic growth, catch up Germany, Italy	Gaullist expansion policy but Finance cutbacks	National planners worried congestion hinders growth	Leaders did not achieve institutional change in CGP	'Maps did not find place'. Roads not in CGP Plans till IVth
T5	1959-60 - Ist National Roads programme										*	0
	DAT on Roads Commission with Finance and CGP to oversee Ponts	Approved roads but especially in Paris	Agreed plans, but lifted toll restriction to fund telecomms	Must have agreed Commission and appointed DAT. Pro AdT	Wanted more funds & free roads. Finance Ministry said build with tolls	'Tolls a taboo of the roads division'; delayed motorways	CGP on Roads Commission. Massé gave tolls as compromise	'Needs of AdT not taken into account because of the roads backlog'	Funds controlled by Roads division; Finance refused funds	Political desire not to stop Paris expansion and roads two-way	Mixed output reflected different goals of political leaders	'New network .. based on existing traffic, not voluntary geography'
T6	1962-65 - Roads in IVth CGP Plan										*	0
	Vice-Pres of regional Plans committee	First wanted roads for economic modernisation, then Paris	Supported CGP Regional division with Finance and CdC staff.	An active promoter, trusted by Debré and de Gaulle	Strong support to Delouvrier's infrastructure spending in Paris	Ponts tried to meet traffic demands; TP prioritised their local roads	CGP ran regional process, met problems, no road options'	CGP said could not allow regional differences; nor slow Paris	First time Finance Ministry adapted policy to help CGP	Delouvrier had worked out quantified Paris needs in IVth and Vth Plans	Mixed output. PM wanted change: Pres and Roads Min pro- Paris	More roads investment but not allocated on AdT grounds

Note: Star rating on match of output with leaders' announced aims for the instrument, or impact on Aménagement du Territoire: 0 to ** in order of increasing impact.

Figure 6.4 Roads planning data meta-matrix

INSTRUMENTS		Leaders' input				Bureaucratic input		Policy process			Output	
	DAT or DATAR	President	PM	Minister for AdT	Minister for Roads	Ponts role and view	CGP role and view	Technical paradigm	Funding	Other issues	Match to leaders'aim	Impact on AdT
T7	1962 - DAT's 2nd Plan of AdT										0	*
	Wrote Plan, met CGP, criticised 'short-termism' of Roads division	No known intervention	Debré did not know about it? Pompidou's reaction was to invent DATAR	Had it drawn up under friend Lamour, asked for its publication	Not officially involved. But same minister who did not want toll roads	Started economic division to draw 'roads' part of CGP Plan	CGP reluctant to add regions; would show up its statistics problems	Ponts 'wanted to strengthen existing network- a new argument'	DAT met CGP weekly to discuss urban investment	Bloch-Lainé wanted rail and road in one ministry to help AdT	DAT out of top leader's control though Minister for AdT in favour	No direct impact but called effective attention to problem
T8	1962 - Caisse nationale des autoroutes										*	*
	No input. DAT in disgrace after published 2nd Plan of AdT	None known. But in favour in Paris	Used CNA format to avoid confrontation with Ponts on tolls	Trying without success to construct a Ministry of AdT and Plan	As Paris District President supported Paris roads	When lost monopoly, took over motorways and chaired CNA	Massé proposed tolls to Debré - as roads without funding needs	Ponts prioritising response to traffic demand	Funding by CDC (Bloch-Lainé) and CNA chaired by Ponts	Paris had high proportion of State budget at this time eg. for peripherique	PM able to set up new tool, but use partly diverted from his aims	CNA funds first used for Paris-Lille, to help Lille car plant
T9	1966 - Roads in Languedoc mission										**	**
	Head of mission used contacts to bypass Ponts and Finance	Approved efficient structure, finance, and the project	Debré appointed friend as mission head, then Pompidou as PM and Minister of AdT signed decree	A Minister who promoted Paris investment. He was bypassed.	Ponts built roads where mission decided from mission funds	A rival project to CGP's local project; CGP kept outside this one	A 'mission' or special purpose vehicle then in vogue	Block budget, not sectorally - divided an administrative innovation.	Only period 1962-74 Debré not Giscard the Minister of Finance	Scheme fully in tune with leadership's wishes	"A complete network of roads built-would do same again" (Monod)	
T10	1966 - Creation of Superministry of Infrastructure										*	*
	No input	His initiative to create - a real 'overseer' of large national infrastructure	Hostile to creation of Super-ministries. Separated public transport off when Pisani left	Wanted long term planning of transport, land, finance	Ponts wanted to take on new roles; Roads engineers against merger	Not known	President thought proximity increases efficiency	DATAR lost some urban funding power to Infrastructure ministry	Local politicians did not like loss of posts, local advice	Mixed output. Pres wanted change: PM did not and made temporary	Remove urban planning from DATAR but a good outcome	
T11	1966-70 - Vth Plan road network to link regional cities										**	*
	Formal role to see Plan met AdT goals: checked budget plans	Kept CGP in being. 'But very strongly supported the peripherique'	Approved scheme. Took over Plan and AdT to check CGP / Finance. Gave DATAR FIAT, 'free of Finance Ministry', to fund motorway sections	Three successive ministers approved inter-urban roads	Coordination by Regional Prefect - who relied on Ponts advice	Supported metropolises, but also Paris infrastructure	Regional capitals' now scientific 'metropolises d'équilibre'	FIAT gave 1/3 aid to roads; Finance Minister supported AdT	Delouvrier persuaded CGP and Roads Minister to fund Paris	Leadership achieved what wanted including mixed aims on Paris	Action in some AdT metropolises but also Nice, Paris	
T12	1966 - OREAM bodies to develop regional metropolises										**	**
	Organised CIATs to agree plans, financed them, central coordinator	No known intervention	Agreed OREAMs in CIAT. Reluctant to spend on Paris roads. Arbitrated State- region and Ministry-DATAR disputes in CIAT. Set up central GCPU	Pisani's link of Roads and Construction helped OREAM	Ponts and ex-DAT organised OREAMs to reduce DATAR, CGP power	CGP eclipsed by DATAR in OREAMs because had funds, realistic	DATAR 'a norm-setter' on economic growth and modernisation	DATAR worked with Finance and ministries to see where money spent	Mayors of metropolises freed of departments	Leadership achieved what wanted including mixed aims on Paris	Limited funding but enabled short lengths around most metropolises	

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Figure 6.4 Roads planning data meta-matrix

INSTRUMENTS		Leaders' Input				Bureaucratic Input		Policy process			Output	
	DAT or DATAR	President	PM	Minister for AdT	Minister for Roads	Ponts role and view	CGP role and view	Technical paradigm	Funding	Other issues	Match to leaders' aim	Impact on AdT
T13	1968-69 - Breton expressway scheme (Plan breton)										**	**
	Guichard persuaded PM in 1968 riots to give political launch	Announced again in speech in Brittany 1969	Agreed 1965 - no outcome. A 'measure for Brittany' in June 1968	Breton, said transport important for AdT; worked with PM	Four ministers 1965-69, some pro-AdT, some pro-Paris.	Roads division said 'it was folly'	Marcellin and Guichard Ministers Plan & AdT 1967-69 pushed it.	Cost-benefit of motorway poor; and Brittany 'had right to modern rail'	Some funding from DATAR's FIAT, plus FSIR decided by Roads minister	Built under pressure from Bretons, Chirac-Giscard, Mauroy	Scheme fully in tune with leadership's wishes after hesitation	AdT policy agreed and implemented after hesitation
T14	1969 - Act on tolled motorways by concessions										**	**
	Worked with President's adviser, to get road links to metropolises	Wanted car-driven, industrial economy; helped DATAR	Had introduced 1954 motorway bill to help regional development	Bettencourt, helpful to DATAR but not driving force here	For property development, 'lifted obstacle of Roads Division'	Ponts were paid to inspect motorways, later ran road companies	Massé had proposed tolls to Debré - as roads without funding needs	Pres: No more counting cars'; Ponts: 'Got M-ways we wanted'	Minister had to promise MPs roads would help western regions	Accelerated 2 roads to west and Metropoles - but other roads more	Political leadership achieved their congruent purposes	Matched AdTs goals though still favoured growth regions
T15	1969-71 - 2nd national road plan										**	**
	'In close liaison with Ponts' on which provincial roads to fund	Wanted roads 'to help AdT and industry'. Took decision in Conseil	Wanted transport to help AdT. Decided to list funded roads.	Formally his and PM's priorities were now in command	Upset DDE traditional ways. Cut Paris motorways	Drew up as asked, but later critical: 'no figures to justify'	No role but fitted Plan spirit. 'A signal to private investors'	RCB promoted by a Ponts group working with CGP and DATAR	50% of FIAT went to roads DATAR wanted, but not enough funding	Giscard at Finance opposed completion date for Plan	Political leadership achieved their congruent purposes	'Translated better than predecessor a desire for AdT'.
T16	1971-74 - Vth Plan: competition and social solidarity										*	*
	On better terms with CGP. Vth Ponts on CGP working party	Distrusted Planning. Wanted roads, including Paris radials	Pro-Plan, Re-concentrated funds Minister of Plan & AdT deconcentrated	Guichard, then Bettencourt persuaded MPs to accept Plan	'Central fiefdoms' took back decisions from regional prefects	Ran CGP transport cttee. RCB officials against Paris radials.	CGP and regional unit in opposition. Pressed to add more cities	Roads cost-benefit appraisal now to include AdT	Priority investments in Vth Plan served Paris most & Nice	DATAR 'always had problems making its concerns prevail'	Mixed output reflected different goals of political leaders	Regional plans had little AdT impact; politicians added towns
T17	1972 - Paris-Strasbourg motorway										**	**
	Used Presidential visit to accelerate an AdT decision	Announced on visit: 'Motorways appreciated by local élus'	No intervention known. Unlikely (Paris-to-Bordeaux his priority)	Important that Guichard Min of Roads and AdT during implementation	'This political route went through towns of 2 transport ministers'	'A political decision.. an operation typical of AdT'	No known role. Additional to planned investment	Decision political 'but also based on transport and AdT studies'	President examined progress', found new funds	Road thought useful at time of EC growth to anchor region into France	"President's will prevailed. Motorway built two years sooner"	DATAR got a one-off policy decision it really wanted
T18	1974-76 - Conseil central de planification										**	**
	Advised on AdT. Ran CIAT which decided 22 mF for Massif Central	Set up and chaired it. Decided 'rural' AdT policy in it	Held CIAT to agree funds for Massif C; announced Brittany roads	Changed AdT from urban network to rural support	Had promised Breton roads; Ministers stop defending Ponts/rail	Still trying to meet traffic demand	Plan on CCP. But Giscard anti-Plan, used CCP to control CGP	Gave attention post-73 to 'life-quality' - 'vivre au pays'	More funds to rural areas, small towns, and 'pays'	Giscard led 1975 budget arbitration not PM and DATAR	A tool for making President's will prevail and did	Effective AdT output even though DATAR officially not much involved

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Figure 6.4 Roads planning data meta-matrix

INSTRUMENTS		Leaders' Input				Bureaucratic Input		Policy process			Output	
	DAT or DATAR	President	PM	Minister for AdT	Minister for Roads	Ponts role and view	CGP role and view	Technical paradigm	Funding	Other Issues	Match to leaders' aim	Impact on AdT
T19	1976-80 - Revised Vllth plan: reduce territorial imbalance										**	*
	Not 'chef de file' for transport PAP5. CNAT played no role	His goals for AdT: 'spread economic activities over territory'	Chirac -no known input. Barre wanted a Plan for Nation, not State	Fourcade, technician, 'restored DATAR's 'active, daring image'- let DATAR decide roads. Fourcade and liberal lcart were stronger against Ponts		Said PAP5 (access to disadvantaged regions) unimportant	Main plan not regionalised. Giscard - Barre marginalised CGP	Ponts wanted roads to meet traffic demand not isolated regions.	PAP5 spending in Massif Central but not Brittany in 1976-80.	Road spending down by 50% though Massif Central funded	Political leadership's will prevailed	Some output useful to AdT though DATAR not much involved
T20	1977 - National motorway programme										*	*
	Negotiated a CIAT with Ponts to decide road programme	Giscard anti-car and metropolises; but left more to Barre in CIAT	'Behind liberal rhetoric, a powerful practice of dirigisme'.	Fourcade a technician keen to rebalance Paris and weaker regions; Full support to DATAR on roads, versus PM and in ministerial arbitrages on roads		Ponts at DATAR unable to return: 'had fought ministry road policy'	No known input	'[DATAR] tried to integrate regional devt into Roads' calculations.'	Depends on Finance, CNA, CdC. Road spend halved from 1978	Some leading Ponts wanted to conquer wider world of AdT	Political leadership's will prevailed but then limited by finance	Road plans now decided in CIAT. Funding limited AdT output
T21	1978-80 - Rationalisation of Transport Decisions Group										**	**
	3 DATAR officials with 5 Finance/Plan and 19 Transport	No role. Did not like RCB when Finance Minister	Set up as PM & Economy minister, published as PM and AdT	lcart a liberal Minister of Infrastructure- AdT. Group on to introduce fair competition, accepted recommendations and published report		Roads director: 'No economic impact from roads, limited redistribution'	CGP had small representation in Group	'Obliged to consider AdT impact though no evidence of any impact'	Roads Appraisal amended 1980 to include AdT - not done 1974	Issue raised by Guillaumat Commission on fair road-rail competition	Political leadership achieved their congruent purposes	AdT now officially (sceptically), considered in road schemes
T22	1981-82 - Interim State-Region Plan Contracts										*	0
	No part in organising contracts. Lost budget role	Put Rocard in a cupboard (the Plan). Wants Plan & AdT attached to PM	Chaired CIATs on regional contracts; put friend in charge	No ministry contacts. Gave DATAR the coordinating role but late	Each region negotiated independently with the ministry	Ponts officials had most input on negotiating roads content	No role in Interim tsp contracts. At its weakest	'TP want decisions on legal technical bases, want results'	DATAR lost role of budgetary oversight	Motorways a paradigm for local leaders.	Deliberately poor coordination within political leadership	No AdT input to 1981-2 investment decisions
T23	1982 - Transport Act (LOTI)										**	**
	On National Transport Council and advisory role on projects	Gives opinion on all bills from March 1982; wants urban transport	Chaired CIAT 5/82 with AdT contribution to transport as 1st item	Act gives minister a formal approval role for road schemes	AdT one of his 4 objectives in promoting the Bill	Ponts economist wrote the Bill, including AdT criteria.	No known position or locus for intervention	Ponts praise DATAR 1971 map 'balanced access to all regions	AdT to be apart of the costs-benefits appraisal	Imposes wide consultation, CNT, regions, not just Parisian elite	Political leadership achieved their congruent purposes	AdT ministers must now agree to all large transport decisions
T24	1982 - FSGT - Fund for transport and energy projects										**	**
	Delegue a Board member of FSGT, and disburses the funds	Asked for projects: Transport and DATAR to execute	Wanted for electoral reasons but keen on urban redevelopment	Le Garrec, PM's friend, set it up. Implemented well by Defferre	Asked by President to carry out some aspects including TGV	Unlikely to object to new funds provided for road and rail schemes	No known position or locus for intervention	Seen as a job creation scheme, but roads were needed	About 1.3bn F a year: of which 400mF to main roads, 50m to estate roads	Delors opposed 2nd tranche: Sum reduced after arrival of Chirac	Political leadership achieved their congruent purposes	Funded TGV Atlantique & roads thought good for AdT at the time.

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Figure 6.4 Roads planning data meta-matrix

INSTRUMENTS		Leaders' Input				Bureaucratic Input		Policy process			Output	
	DAT or DATAR	President	PM	Minister for AdT	Minister for Roads	Ponts role and view	CGP role and view	Technical paradigm	Funding	Other Issues	Match to leaders' aim	Impact on AdT
T25	1983-84 - 1st State-Region Plan Contracts 1984-88										**	*
	Pivot of negotiations, checked ministry budgets	No known role but keen to help Lorraine (partly for votes).	No known role in most contracts, but keen to help Lorraine. Chaired CIATs, wanted decentralisation, appointed friend as junior minister	No known input	Thought DATAR 'took care to match regional with national strategy	Guillaume saw only limited role for intervention in market economy	Ponts derided 'regions' demand for roads, airports and canals'	DATAR used FIAT to push aims, but Lorraine got largest sums	Poorer regions now funding State roads others had free	Unbalanced funding reflected goals of political leadership	Helped AdT aims in some regions more than others	
T26	1983-84 - Motorway and national road plan										*	*
	Drew up jointly with Ponts. All schemes now decided in CIATs.	Asked for projects: Transport and DATAR to execute	PM is Minister in for AdT with Le Garrec, CFDT, friend, his junior minister. Discussed road plan in CIATs, approved it just before he resigns in 1984	Said financial rigour meant he could not make his dossiers move	Drew map with DATAR. Issued as 'administrative guidance' in 1986.	No known position or locus for intervention	Ponts say DATAR 1971 map 'balanced access to all regions. . . '	Cutbacks in budget from 1984 when Beregevoy at Finance	Decree agreed it but map not published till 1986 (No funding?)	Tool that leaders wanted but not published/ well-funded	Focuses on inter-urban roads; but not 'unprofitable' roads	
T27	1984 - Massif Central and Breton expressways										**	**
	Developed old plan, organised CIAT which agreed it	No known input: but likely to have agreed	Mauroy agreed at CIAT to fund Massif Central expressway. Implemented by Defferre as Minister for AdT	PCF minister then replaced by Quilès (friend of Mitterrand)	No known input	No known input	Paradigm is TGV but still roads to Massif Central, Brittany	Wholly State financed though national transport budget reduced	2.2mF in Brittany, MC, Midi-Pyrenees in two years 1984-85	Scheme fully in tune with leadership's wishes	More spent on roads for AdT even though other budgets cut back	
T28	1987 - National road plan - Increase competitiveness										**	**
	Published 1984 map in 1985. Organised CIAT to approve plan.	Cohabitation - No known input and seems very unlikely.	Funded from privatisation, tolls. Prioritised roads to help France in EC	Minister of Infrastructure and AdT. Ordered Guichard Report which recommended road programme. Minister promoted motorways, TGV etc.	Road division adopted evaluation including AdT benefits	Very weak. Chirac nearly abolished, but 'caution triumphed'	AdT policy differentiating less between regions; more about growth	MinFin Balladur only agreed reluctantly if regions co-funded	Limousin, Midi-P said 'right to a motorway' - not road subject to annual budgets	Tool that PM wanted, over-ruled Finance minister	What DATAR wanted for AdT	
T29	1987-88 - 2nd State-Region Plan Contracts 1988-93										**	*
	Organised 4 CIATs. Liaised with prefects, with CGP on evaluation	No known input. Sarcastic about Rocard's planning	Chirac made roads 1st priority: Rocard added regional development	Regional industrial development his main interest	Delebarre wants roads but Finance against	Some Roads Ponts want; others query link to development	CGP fading, CIAT main decision site', CGP set up evaluation	'X'th Plan logic' of "One Europe" governed road contracts	Contracts fund 80% State roads. Main roads budget cut.	Prefects play stronger role than DATAR at Regional level	New political leaders able to inflect tool towards their own priorities	Helped AdT aims mainly in Massif C and Brittany
T30	1992 - National road and motorway plan										**	**
	Published reports of dT problems from fast transit TGVs	Wanted all citizens at '30 minutes from fast road'.	Cresson's initiative for jobs and AdT, signed on last day as PM	Delebarre (ex-roads minister), keen to make his mark	Quilès, X-Shell, wanted long-term transport policy-making	Ponts agree fast-transit systems produce 2-tier localities	Issued report showing impact of roads on AdT modest, except urban areas	Comptes report: transport access development link unclear	Béré not keen to fund, - but some roads are job - support programme	Road budgets restored to appease strikers etc Nov 1991	Scheme in tune with leadership's wishes	Plan in line with old AdT aims, just as paradigm changing

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Figure 6.4 Roads planning data meta-matrix

INSTRUMENTS		Leaders' Input				Bureaucratic Input		Policy process			Output	
	DAT or DATAR	President	PM	Minister for AdT	Minister for Roads	Ponts role and view	CGP role and view	Technical paradigm	Funding	Other Issues	Match to leaders' aim	Impact on AdT
T31	1993-94 - 3rd State-region Plan Contracts 1994-99										**	**
	Central coordinator. Checked budgets spent	Cohabitation - No known input and seems very unlikely	2 Socialist PMs held CIATs. Balladur CIAT fixed totals for prefects.	Pasqua the driving force, but followed up previous minister	The ministry that delegated the least budget to regions	Roads the only division to disobey PM's circular to leave talks to DATAR	CGP had to work with DATAR on evaluating expenditure	The State-imposed aims included development & AdT	Provided 80% road funds. Poorer regions were given more	Finance ministry does not give DATAR adequate statistics	Contracts 75% in tune with leadership's wishes	Variable State funding to regional roads on an AdT basis
T32	1993 - Acceleration of motorway programme										**	*
	No known input - even turning away from road emphasis apart from EU links	Cohabitation - No known input and seems very unlikely	Decided to complete network in 10 years not 15	Pasqua keen to complete scheme; improve access	Pons gave go-ahead to an (ex?) AdT road scheme under Juppé	Builds tolled motorways instead of links that help AdT more	No input; still not evaluating roads according to AdT criteria	Many groups suggest diminishing returns for AdT of new roads	Use of CNA and 'private' motorway companies hid true cost	'A response to powerful road and public works lobby'	Scheme in tune with leadership's wishes	AdT policy DATAR once wanted. Now asking whether best value
T33	1994 - Paris Basin Charter and Contract										**	**
	Asked 1965 colleague for Report, used chance given to implement it	Cohabitation - No known input and seems very unlikely	Balladur signed at 2 CIATs in 1994. Juppé continued at CIADT 1997	Pursued by PS then Pasqua, RPR Paris leader and Interior minister	No interest shown. Not at ceremony to sign the contract	Délégué and Report author had both been Ponts planners in Paris region	No input. [Prefects more important]	An engineers' network to decongest Paris, link regions to EU	DATAR used reserve Plan Contract funds for Paris Basin contract	Coordination easier: led by political allies, and Ponts-AdT officials	Scheme in tune with leadership's wishes	Effective introduction of long-wanted and planned scheme
T34	1995 - National Plan of AdT and Road Plan										0	0
	Coordinated debate on Act, technical input and wrote the material	Cohabitation - No known input and seems very unlikely	Balladur supported it, then he and Juppé slowed it down.	Pasqua promoted 45 min. access but then Pons delayed	Delayed Plan - said only 'best value' projects, including social grounds	Approved Boiteux Report to incorporate non-market values	Commissioned Boiteux Report on rational transport decisions	Scepticism on structuring role of transport but 'handicapped without it'	LOADT would introduce funds from tolls to pay for AdT roads	MPs added 'pork barrel' provisions government reluctant to fund	Programme some Right wanted, but Greens rejected	A planned 'systematic' AdT network never put into force
T35	1998-2000 - 4th State-Region Plan Contracts 2000-06										*	*
	Central negotiator but conflict with AdT minister's cabinet	No known input but not likely	No interest. Adjudicated at rare CIAT meetings	Minister wanted negotiations run by regions; rail more than roads	Wanted to keep up spending on road, as well as rail.	Roads division said 'mayors want tarmac'. Other Ponts differed	CGP secretariat for advisory CNADT and evaluation	Too much emphasis on roads - impact on AdT unproven	Roads still as large an element in Regional Contracts	Right-wing Presidents of regions object to paying for State services	National political leaders unenthusiastic and divided.	Policy DATAR wanted for some regions; now moving to other policies
T36	1999-2001 - Sustainable transport service plans										0	0
	Little role compared with ministry and the regions	No known input but not likely	In CIAT chose service schemes and rail not National Plan	Wanted green decentralised plans and no road growth	Wanted to keep up spending on road, as well as rail.	Some drew up plans and approved; Roads still want roads	Commissioned 2nd Boiteux Report on transport decisions	Too much emphasis on roads - impact on AdT unproven	Government mainly relying on regions to pay for roads	Local élus delay, Incoming minister scraps	National political leaders unenthusiastic and divided. Plans scrapped	Responds to traffic demand in 1999, does not modify demand

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Figure 6.5 Roads planning instruments in date order

Roads planning instrument				Leaders' input				Bureaucratic input		Policy process			Output	
			Role of DAT/ DATAR	President	Prime Minister	AdT Minister	Roads Minister	Ponts role and view	Plan role and view	Technical paradigm	Funds	Other issues	match to leaders' aim	impact on AdT
FOURTH REPUBLIC														
T1	1951	FSIR Road Fund & Road Plan	0	0	√	0	√	X	X	X	0	√	0	0
T2	1954	Act on Talled Motorways	0	0	√	√	√	X	X	X	√?	X	0	0
T3	1954	IIInd CGP Plan - DAT initiative	√	0	√	0	√	X	X	X	X	0	*	0
PRESIDENT DE GAULLE														
T4	1958	Roads in IIIrd CGP Plan	√	0	√	√	√	X	X	X	0	X	0	0
T5	1959	Ist National Roads programme	√	0	√?	√	√	X	√	X	X	X	*	0
T6	1962	Roads in IVth CGP Plan	√	X?	√	√	X	X	√	X	√	X	*	0
T7	1962	DAT's 2nd Plan of AdT	√	0	0	√	0	0	X	X	0	√	0	*
T8	1962	Caisse nationale des autoroutes	0	0	√	0	0	X	√	X	X	X	*	*
T9	1966	Roads in Languedoc mission	√	√	√	√	0	0	0	√	√	√	**	**
T10	1966	Creation of a Superministry	0	√	X	X	√	√	0?	√	0	X	*	*
T11	1966	Vth Plan road network	√	0	√	√	√	√	√	√	√	√	**	*
T12	1966	OREAM development bodies	√	0	√	√	√	√	0	√	√	X	**	**
T13	1968	Breton expressway scheme	√	√	√	√	√	X	√	X	√	√	**	**
PRESIDENT POMPIDOU														
T14	1969	Act on Motorways by concession	√	√	√	0	√	√	√	√	√	0	**	**
T15	1969	National roads plan	√	√	√	√	√	0	0	0	√	X	**	**
T16	1971	VIth Plan: competition, solidarity	√	X	0	√	0	√	X	√	X	X	*	*
T17	1972	Paris-Strasbourg motorway	√	√	0	√	√	X	0	√	√	√	**	**

Notes: √ = input favouring the instrument, X = opposition to it; 0 = no input, ? = less certain or varying.

Star rating on match of output with leaders' announced aims for the instrument, or impact on AdT: 0 to ** in order of increasing impact.

Figure 6.5 Roads planning instruments in date order

Roads planning instrument			Role of DAT/DATAR	Leaders' input				Bureaucratic input		Policy process			Output	
				President	Prime Minister	AdT Minister	Roads Minister	Ponts role and view	Plan role and view	Technical paradigm	Funds	Other issues	match to leaders' aim	impact on AdT
PRESIDENT GISCARD D'ESTAING														
T18	1974	Conseil central de planification	√	√	0	√	√	X	X	√	√	√	**	**
T19	1976	Revised VIIth Plan	0	√	0	√	√	X	0	X	√	√	**	*
T20	1977	National motorway programme	√	0	√	√	√	X	0	√	0	√	*	*
T21	1978	Rational Transport Decisions	√	0	√	√	√	√	√	√	√	√	**	**
PRESIDENT MITTERRAND														
T22	1981	Interim State-Region Contracts	0	0	√	√	√	√	0	√	√	√	*	0
T23	1982	Transport Act (LOTI)	0	√	√	√	√	√	0	√	√	√	**	**
T24	1982	FSGT Transport projects	√	√	√	√	√	√	0	√	√	X	**	**
T25	1983	1st State-Region Plan Contracts	√	0	√	√	0	√	0	X	√	X	**	*
T26	1983	Motorway and main road plan	√	√	√	√	√	√	0	√	X	X	*	*
T27	1984	Massif Central, Breton roads	√	0?	√	√	0	0	0	√	√	√	**	**
T28	1987	National roads plan	√	0	√	√	√	√	0	√	√	X	**	**
T29	1987	2nd State-Region Plan Contracts	√	0	√	√	√	√	0	√	√	X	**	*
T30	1992	National road and motorway plan	√	√	√	√	X	X	X	X	√	√	**	**
T31	1993	3rd State-Region Plan Contracts	√	0	√	√	0	X?	√	√	√	X	**	**
T32	1993	Acceleration of road programme	0	0	√	√	√	√	0	X	√	√	**	*
T33	1994	Paris Basin Charter & Contract	√	0	√	√	0	√	0	√	√	√	**	**
T34	1995	National AdT Plan and road plan	√	0	X	√	X	√	√	√	0?	X	0	0
PRESIDENT CHIRAC														
T35	1998	4th State-Region Plan Contracts	√	0	0	X?	√	√	√	X	√	X	*	*
T36	1999	Sustainable transport plans	0	0	0	√	0	√?	?	X	0	X	0	0

Notes: √ = input favouring the instrument, X = opposition to it; 0 = no input, ? = less certain or varying.

Star rating on match of output with leaders' announced aims for the instrument, or impact on AdT: 0 to ** in order of increasing impact.

Drawing conclusions from the comparative table

Figure 6.5 shows that the leaders' roads instruments resulted in strong outcomes in just over half the policy tools (20 of 36 with **), such as the 1969 Act to build motorways through public-private partnerships. About a quarter made some impact (10 of 36 with *), such as the roads provision in the Fourth Plan; while only a sixth seemed to have no direct impact (6 of 36 with 0), including the *Plan national d'aménagement du territoire* of 1962. In four of the ten cases where some impact was made (*), the outcome simply part-fulfilled leaders' aims; for example, political leaders agreed the National Motorway Programme of 1977 but in later years insufficient funding was given to complete it on time. But in the other six cases the rather mixed outcome reflected leaders' mixed views; for example, Prime Ministers Debré and Pompidou wanted the Fourth Plan to provide for nationwide development, but the Roads Minister was also President of the Paris Region District and mayor of a Paris new town; he supported the Paris Region *délégué-général*, who persuaded President de Gaulle to give priority to Paris.⁵⁶ Thus, altogether, the political leadership saw outcomes that matched well its common and/or mixed aims in about two-thirds of cases (26 of 36, comprising 20 with the best outcomes, and six whose mixed outcome reflected mixed intentions).

Critics could argue that, even if outcomes matched the leaders' aims, leaders were not the primary causal agents. Yet there is evidence to the contrary in Figure 6.5. In the group of 20 instruments whose outputs matched leadership intentions very well (those with **), all were favoured by the President or Prime Minister, mostly both. In the group of six with poor outcomes (0) only half were favoured by either the President or the Prime Minister, and one was opposed. In the group of 10 instruments that partly met the leaders' aims, the level of leadership support fell in-between these extremes. If the outcome of the instruments were mainly related to factors other than leadership action, a more random relationship would be expected. Furthermore, in at least seven cases there is primary 'triangulated' evidence that the instrument was personally adopted by ministers (T4, T5, T9, T10, T12, T14, T30). As one example: the Plan Commissioner Massé and Prime Minister Debré both say that the Roads Minister, Buron, wanted a larger State budget in 1960; Buron asked Finance Minister Pinay and Massé to dine, and they agreed on inter-urban tolls as the only mutually-acceptable source of funds; and Massé proposed the tolls to Debré.⁵⁷ Sources on six further tools insist on the personal nature of the president or prime minister's initiative, even if it chimed with officials' views (T11, T15, T17, T18, T19, T24). The *Fonds spécial des grands travaux* of 1982 is an example: President Mitterrand wrote to Prime Minister Mauroy asking for various measures, including a transport fund to be run by DATAR and the Transport Minister. Attali said that the President had been working on the letter for a week, to ensure that budgetary rigour did not halt all reform.⁵⁸

⁵⁶ Delouvrier, in Chenu (1994), p. 271.

⁵⁷ Massé (1986), p.203; Debré (1988), p.64.

⁵⁸ Attali (1993), pp.387-8. Entry for 21 June 1982.

Moreover, the link between the inputs of bureaucratic actors and outcomes is much weaker than the link between leadership support and outcomes. About a third of the instruments that matched the leaders' goals very well did so despite active opposition by the *Ponts* and/or the Plan Commissariat. For instance, the Breton expressway scheme that was opposed by the *Ponts* was nevertheless agreed in CIAT in 1968, the Roads Minister Galley saying that his officials (*services*) thought 'it was folly' but he guaranteed it would be done.⁵⁹ Five successful tools offended the 'technical paradigm' of the technocrats (T13, T19, T25, T32, T30), including the regional councils' demand for roads in State-Region Plan Contracts.⁶⁰ Four tools had strong outcomes despite opposition by the Finance Ministry (T15, T24, T28, T29), including Mitterrand's *Fonds spécial des grands travaux* and whose second tranche of funding the Finance Minister Jacques Delors had also opposed.⁶¹ Nonetheless bureaucratic groups played a significant role in determining outcomes. If leaders' aims were fulfilled in a third of projects despite bureaucratic opposition, two-thirds of those with partial or poor outcomes had been opposed by one or more bureaucratic actors; and all instruments with very weak outcomes were not funded adequately.

However, less than half the instruments were really helpful for *aménagement du territoire*, and a quarter seemed to be unhelpful. Although some roads policy decisions had not been directed at *aménagement du territoire* goals all could have been; and this relative lack of success reveals the relative difficulty or unwillingness for leaders to ensure that the roads instruments they approved were coordinated with their official policy on *aménagement du territoire* (there was often a conflict within the leadership over whether helping poorer regions should be at the expense of Paris). Nevertheless, Figure 6.5 seems to show that DATAR made a difference to outcomes for *aménagement du territoire*. No instruments before 1962 had any identifiable impact on *aménagement du territoire*, even though some had that specific intention. The first really successful instrument was DATAR's 'Languedoc-Roussillon' project to which ministers gave a block budget to develop its roads as the *mission* decided (as seen in the previous chapter).⁶² The later instruments in which DATAR played no role nearly always had poor outcomes for *aménagement du territoire* (T10, T19, T22, T32, T36).

Thus the influence of bureaucratic actors is not negligible but the columns of Figure 6.5 show the greater importance of the support of two or three political leaders. Given the wealth of evidence on their personal intervention in decisions, it would be perverse to claim

⁵⁹ Frappart, C. (1965) 'Aménagement du territoire et choix économiques', reprinted from *Moniteur des Travaux Publics et du Bâtiment*, 2 May (la Documentation française), pp. 6-14 (Frappart was deputy *délégué* at the time); Essig (1979), p.31, p.85; Gravier (1972), p.221.

⁶⁰ Quinet and Touzery (1986), p.68.

⁶¹ Favier and Martin (1990), p.438; and Attali (1993), p.721, entry for 1 July 1983.

⁶² Racine (1980), p.57.

that political leaders were not mainly responsible for the substantial impact of instruments decided in their name.

EXERCISING POLITICAL LEADERSHIP

A qualitative analysis within Blondel's conceptual scheme for comparing political leaders, guided by the general assertions from the quantitative analysis, helps to identify the conditions under which the leadership exercises its preferences in the roads planning and funding process, and in particular the role of the bureaucracy, including DATAR.

The positional resources of political leaders

Constitutional arrangements made a difference to the formal capacity of leaders to enact instruments but they made little practical difference. Fourth Republic parliamentarians, pressured by roads officials, rejected the Tolloed Motorways Bill in 1952, and in 1954 amended it, restricting tolls to 'exceptional circumstances'.⁶³ Prime Minister Debré was able to use the stronger decree powers of the Fifth Republic to lift the restriction, but the *Ponts* still delayed tolled motorways.⁶⁴ His successor, Pompidou, created the *Caisse nationale des autoroutes* as a way to implement them without open confrontation.⁶⁵ But that 'provoked' new quarrels',⁶⁶ and it is difficult to find other examples of leaders in the Fifth Republic introducing roads instruments using different legal powers from their Fourth Republic predecessors. Road programmes were approved by decree in both Republics; and funds such as Mitterrand's *Fonds spécial des grands travaux* were created by a parliamentary Act as had been the *Fonds spécial d'investissement routier* in 1951.⁶⁷ Though the Fifth Republic's executive had stronger support from new rules on parliamentary votes, in practice a favourable *configuration of the party system* was the principal advantage for the political leadership in parliament. Even so, ministers must have felt the Fifth Republic's legal-constitutional resources were insufficient, because Roads Minister Chalandon, when preparing the 1969 Motorway Concessions Act, gave the *Ponts et Chaussées* the kind of 'compensation' that Mény saw as a sad example of '*La Corruption de la République*'.

'When Albin Chalandon wanted to remove the resistance of his Ministry of Infrastructure and the *Ingénieurs des Ponts et Chaussées* to the privatisation of motorway construction and maintenance, he used a procedure of unimpeachable legality: he required the companies awarded the concession to pay 0.5 per cent to the State engineers for their supervision and monitoring work'.⁶⁸

The new Constitution and the party system configuration made more difference where it concerned relationships within the executive, and which leader's views on roads policy was likely to prevail. In turn the political balances of power affected whether DATAR or another

⁶³ Thoenig (1973), p.60; Jardin and Fleury (1975), xxii; Dunn, J. (1995) 'The French Highway Lobby, *Comparative Politics*, 27/3, 275-95, pp.281-2.

⁶⁴ Decree of 4 July 1960.

⁶⁵ Thoenig (1973), pp.61-90.

⁶⁶ Jardin and Fleury (1973), p.83.

⁶⁷ Law of 30 Dec.1951 and decree 22 Dec 1952; *Loi* 82-669 of 3 Aug 1982.

⁶⁸ Mény (1992a), pp.221-2.

bureaucratic actor was more likely to make an effective input to the decision. Presidents made no documented input to roads policy in the Fourth Republic, or in periods of cohabitation in the Fifth. In the Fifth Republic, the prime minister is 'in general charge of the work of government' (Article 21), which has 'the administration at its disposal' (Article 20). Not only DATAR, but all instruments decided in CIAT/CIADT or supported by the prime minister's budget or FIAT/FNADT (roads plans, regional city development plans, most road projects in the provinces, State-Region Plan Contracts), are the prime minister's tools, that can be used to secure adhesion of technical ministries. However, in roads planning as in other areas, presidents made their own interpretation of the constitutional conventions on 'who does what', depending on their interest in a topic and their inclination to trust the prime minister.⁶⁹

De Gaulle wanted the 'massive development of transport networks for economic modernisation'.⁷⁰ But he especially 'favoured the *periphérique* and the motorways for the quality of their technical performance that served France through the *grandeur* of Paris', and had asked Delouvrier 'What will you need to complete all that?'.⁷¹ Pompidou as his Prime Minister and Minister for *Aménagement du territoire* had taken direct responsibility for the Plan Commissariat, DATAR and the Paris Region in order to coordinate major infrastructure spending, and had decided in CIAT to use Fifth Plan funding to develop roads linking regional cities. But Delouvrier showed Pompidou the new Paris plan that de Gaulle had approved, and 'although the Prime Minister did not want to spend money on them he accepted he had to'.⁷² Pompidou as President decided the motorway programme and the detail of motorway contracts in *conseils restreints*, using technical information sought by his *cabinet* from the Ministry of Infrastructure.⁷³ His first Prime Minister, Chaban-Delmas, too wanted this policy to help *aménagement du territoire* (he had introduced the 1954 Motorways Act for that purpose).⁷⁴ Though the President ordered the Roads Minister Chalandon to bring private capital into the motorway companies, Chalandon, who had ambitions to use motorways to help property development, was more than willing to agree.⁷⁵ A Council of Ministers chaired by the President also agreed in 1971 which roads would form the National Road Network (non-motorway roads to link regional cities). President Giscard used his own small Central Planning Council (prime minister, two ministers and the Plan Commissioner), to supervise the Plan Commissariat,⁷⁶ and called in

⁶⁹ This analysis fits that for other domains, see Massot (1979), (1987); Massot, J. (1988) 'La pratique présidentielle sous la Ve République', *Regards sur l'Actualité*, 139, 27-37; Elgie (1993); Hayward (1993).

⁷⁰ De Gaulle, C. (1971) *Mémoires d'espoir. II. L'Effort* (Plon), p. 133.

⁷¹ Hoddé, R. and Toussaint, J.-Y., 'Dessin de ville ou dessin de capitale?', in Institut Charles de Gaulle (1992), 520-39, p.531, p.535.

⁷² Roussel (1994), pp. 152-3; Delouvrier in Chenu (1994), p.272.

⁷³ *Conseils restreints* of 29 Nov. 1969, 11 Dec. 1969, 25 Nov. 1971. Archives Nationales (1996), 5AG2/63, 183 and 197; Esambert (1994), pp. 108-9.

⁷⁴ Chaban-Delmas (1997), p.442.

⁷⁵ Dunn (1995), p.284. Randet (1994), p.87.

⁷⁶ Bodiguel and Quermonne (1983), p.178.

technical advisers such as DATAR's *délégué* Essig, when he chose. 'It was the place *par excellence* at which decisions were taken'.⁷⁷ It issued his priorities for the Seventh Plan (1976-80), including 'roads to open up disadvantaged regions'.

The technical ministers had fewer political or institutional powers than had presidents and prime ministers and it was conceivable that roads ministers would be strongly pressured to carry out sectoral goals. Certainly, some prime ministers and presidents thought that would be the case. In the CIAT that decided the Breton expressway, Prime Minister Pompidou is reported as saying:

'Gentlemen, we are going to conduct high politics today; one of our provinces is in despair... we must do something dramatic (*font un coup*) ... I am sure you are going to repeat what your officials (*services*) say.. too expensive, not economically sound, etc. but I will decide anyway and you will do it'.⁷⁸

Essig thought that if the prime minister had not adopted that tone the *Plan breton* would have been 'sanitised by the over-frequent administrative trench warfare'.⁷⁹ Mitterrand too worried that the inexperienced Left ministers would let officials take control. He ruled that ministers were not to read out notes in Councils of Ministers; and in 1982 he complained that in large *Conseils restreints* everyone except Defferre repeated the opinions of their *cabinet*.⁸⁰ The more successful early instruments were those that by-passed the roads minister, such as the block budget for the Languedoc *mission*.⁸¹ In 1991 Cresson's television announcement of a massive road project that 'could generate 80,000 to 100,000 jobs', was received with surprise by the minister.⁸²

Yet, within the parameters set by the President and the Prime Minister, roads ministers with particular concerns could make their own contribution to policy. For example, in 1978 Jean-Pierre Fourcade, a 'technical' minister (a former finance official), responsible for both infrastructure and *aménagement du territoire*, re-energised *aménagement du territoire*, and a four year national motorway programme was agreed in CIAT, which was from then on the site for such decisions. Five road instruments with very successful outcomes for *aménagement du territoire* were introduced and/or implemented by Ministers of Infrastructure and *Aménagement du territoire* committed to regional development (Guichard, Fourcade, Méhaignerie). In contrast, but equally showing the impact that could be made by a minister, their market-orientated successor, Bernard Pons, slowed down the drafting of the national road plan required by the 1995 Act on *aménagement du territoire*. He instructed the Roads Directorate to retain only the few

⁷⁷ Hayward, J. (1982) 'Mobilising Private Interests in the Service of Public Ambitions: The Salient Element in the Dual French Policy Style?', in J. Richardson (ed.) *Policy Styles in Western Europe* (George Allen & Unwin), 111-40, p.123.

⁷⁸ Essig (1979), p.85. 8 May 1968.

⁷⁹ Essig (1979), p.85.

⁸⁰ Attali (1993), p.34, entry of 27 May 1981; p.246, entry of 9 Feb 1982.

⁸¹ The minister was Jacquet, President of the Paris District Council, a strong supporter of Paris roads. Delouvrier in Chenu (1994), p.271.

⁸² Cresson on 'Cinq', 8 Dec.1991 quoted *Le Monde*, 10 Dec.1991; A.Faujas, *Le Monde*, 11 Dec.1991.

schemes with the best cost-benefit ratio, and kept his more interventionist junior minister, Gaudin, away from transport projects and their funding.⁸³

Thus, although sectoral ministers are more constrained in their actions by constitutional conventions and the party system than is the prime minister, whose input and impact is in turn constrained by the president, each member of the political leadership has some capacity to amend policy to his or her particular goals.

The influence of bureaucratic organisations

DATAR was more effective than the DAT had been at promoting political leaders' intentions when they perceived the interest of adding *aménagement du territoire* concerns to roads policy. The DAT urban planners in the Ministry of Reconstruction had no official role or practical competence in relation to national roads. At the urging of their Minister, Claudius-Petit, they had developed the idea of regional cities as counterweights to Paris that was to be very influential, and then that of roads to link them together.⁸⁴ 'Their relations with the Plan Commissariat [in charge of infrastructure spending] were not organised',⁸⁵ and in 1955 they failed to persuade the Minister of Finance and the Plan to include their proposed regional transport networks in the [few] Second Plan regional programmes.⁸⁶ In his 1958 government, General de Gaulle, probably prompted by the Minister of Construction, Sudreau, put the DAT on the Plan Commissariat's regional plans committee where its transport maps again made no impact.⁸⁷ In 1959 Debré included the DAT with Ministry of Finance and Plan Commissariat officials on a Roads Commission to supervise the drawing up of a programme by the Public Works engineers. The engineers were asked to include projects with the best costs-benefits ratio but also motorways in Brittany and the Massif Central.⁸⁸ The engineers' scheme 'corresponded faithfully to the distribution of existing traffic': Brittany and the Massif Central were not on the list.⁸⁹ In 1962, with the Plan Commissariat's Fourth Plan as well as the *Ponts* giving priority to meeting traffic demand in the Paris region, DAT published its *Plan national d'aménagement du territoire* that included motorways connecting eight regional cities,⁹⁰ but with no legal or practical means to bring them about.

In contrast, DATAR had some input into three-quarters of the instruments introduced after it was created (22 of 28), and of these virtually all had good outcomes in terms of fulfilling leaders' aims for roads (17 successful and 4 partly so), though not quite as good in terms of *aménagement du territoire* (14 successful and 7 partly so). More significantly, the interventions were generally in support of the leadership; but in five cases one or two leaders

⁸³ *Tribune de l'Economie*, 2 May 1996; F. Grosrichard, *Le Monde*, 5 Dec. 1996.

⁸⁴ Ministère de la Reconstruction et de l'Urbanisme (1950a) *L'Aménagement du Territoire: 1er rapport*, p.21.

⁸⁵ Lanversin (1970), p.61. As seen in earlier chapters they were conflictual.

⁸⁶ Randet (1994), p.81.

⁸⁷ Randet (1994), p.81.

⁸⁸ Jardin and Fleury (1973), p.xxiv.

⁸⁹ Monod and de Castelbajac (1971), p.100.

did not favour the instrument, and these cases were those where the instrument was least successful: for example, the national road plan of 1995 was developed by DATAR for Balladur's government, but was not supported by Balladur's successor. But these exceptions demonstrate, if that were needed, that political leaders were not constrained by DATAR's advice. For de Gaulle and Debré, Paris was simply more important than *aménagement du territoire*.

In the 1960s and 1970s DATAR's intervention often took on a rather hierarchical form, helping political leaders overcome bureaucracies. Pompidou's announcement on a visit to Metz that the Paris-Strasbourg motorway would go through Metz and two years early, 'thanks to new funds and loans decided by the government', was one of several instances when DATAR 'took the opportunity of an official visit to snatch a definitive ruling' in favour of a route it wanted; and although 'generally' the announcement was prepared with ministries, Essig 'admitted':

'that, in certain cases, the dynamism of DATAR, aided by the President's or Prime Minister's advisers' concern for the success of their boss's visit, could lead to these stages being skipped'.⁹¹

The block budget for the Languedoc *mission* was organised at the top by its president, Pierre Racine, *conseiller d'Etat* and close colleague of Debré for 20 years, while Debré was Finance Minister. This budgetary sum, not previously allocated by sector, was an administrative innovation. Racine 'was given exorbitant decision-making and financial powers';⁹² he would simply ring up ministers about what he needed.⁹³ When DATAR was attached to a Minister of Infrastructure, 'the arbitration of the minister was often required'; and if that failed, 'the minister very often let us defend our own position in meetings with the Prime Minister'.⁹⁴

However, from the Chaban-Delmas premiership onward, DATAR could work 'in close liaison' with Infrastructure engineers, for instance in selecting the roads that would compose the National Road Network Scheme of 1971.⁹⁵ But the Road Director later dismissed this scheme as 'no more than a list of routes of national interest with no costs-benefits figures',⁹⁶ and one engineer was unable to return to his ministry after serving at DATAR, 'because he had fought the Ponts' roads policy'.⁹⁷ DATAR was also on better terms with the Plan Commissariat during the Chaban premiership when the agencies were

⁹⁰ Conseil Supérieur de la Construction (1962), I, p.8

⁹¹ Essig (1979), pp.100-1.

⁹² Mény (1974), p.243.

⁹³ Essig (1979), p.65.

⁹⁴ Essig (1979), p.75.

⁹⁵ Jardin and Fleury (1973), p.115, p.117. DATAR (1972) 'Les grandes liaisons routières, histoire d'un schéma', *Travaux et Recherches de Prospective*, 31 (La Documentation française).

⁹⁶ [Quinet, E.] (1980). Ministère de l'économie et des finances. Ministère des Transports. La coordination des infrastructures de transport: étude interministérielle de rationalisation des choix budgétaires (La Documentation française), pp.27-8.

⁹⁷ Essig (1979), p.60.

attached to the same minister.⁹⁸ DATAR and the Roads Directorate negotiated the National Motorway Programme of 1978-83 jointly, despite their different priorities; one trying to integrate into the calculations the presumed effects on development, the other evaluating in terms of current or potential traffic.⁹⁹ DATAR and the Plan Commissariat served on the working party of transport officials, chaired by the Roads Director, that discussed the rationalisation of transport budgetary decisions, at the request of Prime Minister and Minister for the Economy, Barre. DATAR had no role in the Interim State-Region Contracts of 1981 that contained large sums for roads (apart from organising the CIAT that agreed them), but its practice in negotiating local development contracts made it an obvious central coordinator for subsequent rounds of Plan-Contracts (see previous chapter).

Road tools that had successful outcomes were only half as likely to have been opposed by the *Ponts* as those that failed fully or partly to meet leaders' aims. The same finding applied to the impact on *aménagement du territoire*. But the ambiguous outcomes of some instruments demonstrated that the *Ponts'* common professional norms did not preclude internal divergence. While the 'young Turks' treated as career opportunities the new Super-Ministry of Infrastructure that 'took over' the DAT, or DATAR's agencies developing regional cities, or tolled motorways,¹⁰⁰ the Roads Directorate and the field officials saw them as a diversion from their traditional monopoly.¹⁰¹ At the same time as Guichard was expressing his exasperation with Infrastructure officials keen to tarmac, *Ponts* economists were lobbying for a costs-benefits approach that included *aménagement du territoire* criteria.¹⁰² Guichard did not worry about 'being excommunicated by the administration [for his criticism]... In all the *grands corps* there are people who think the same'.¹⁰³ The *Ponts* hampered national political leaders most in the 1950s and 1960s when they were reluctant to abandon their local discretion. In a second phase, some sections realised that joining in could be an advantage. In a third phase most agreed that road-building could be combined effectively with *aménagement du territoire*. Then *Ponts* economists showed that fast roads did not help economic development.¹⁰⁴ But they were ignored by national and local leaders. In short, though the *Ponts*, as a specialised bureaucracy, is a dominant force within its own sector, it could be persuaded, overcome or even set aside by political leaders as easily as were the 'sustainable transport service plans' they had drafted with great difficulty to help the Minister for *Aménagement du territoire* and the Environment,¹⁰⁵ when a different leadership took office.

⁹⁸ Essig (1979), p.31, p.70.

⁹⁹ Essig (1979), p.75.

¹⁰⁰ Georges Pébureau, the young leader of the 'Ponts' association in 1964, became director of DAFU (ex-DAT) in 1966, and was director-general of CGE, building the new motorways, by 1972.

¹⁰¹ Thoenig (1973), pp.67-8.

¹⁰² Ashford (1982), p.75; Jardin and Fleury (1973), p.64.

¹⁰³ Guichard (1975), p.98.

¹⁰⁴ Merlin, P. (1994) 'Les transports en France', *Les Etudes de la Documentation française*.

¹⁰⁵ Official from DAEI-SES, Infrastructure Ministry, at CNT, 12 Oct 2001.

Many early instruments that failed to match leaders' aims well or address *aménagement du territoire* were those the Plan Commissariat had opposed. Its statistical weaknesses made it reluctant to give the Plan a regional dimension.¹⁰⁶ Its worry that road congestion would slow expansion encouraged it to increase investment for Paris.¹⁰⁷ From 1966 most instruments that succeeded did so with little or no intervention from the Plan Commissariat. For Pompidou and Giscard, unlike for General de Gaulle, planning was not 'an ardent obligation'. 'Mitterrand's decision to stigmatise Rocard by appointing him Minister for the Plan' signalled the future for national planning in his presidency.¹⁰⁸ Some thought the influence of the Plan might be transmitted from within the bureaucracies by left-wing Plan officials who were in decision-making positions after 1981, but others thought they would take on the practical short-term goals of their new roles:

'planning will continue to have severe problems of politico-administrative effectiveness as well as of sustained economic impact'.¹⁰⁹

Financial, technical and contingent constraints and opportunities

Nearly all roads instruments depended on financial resources, and the most common reason for poor or delayed outcomes was inadequate funding. Typical of Fourth Republic problems was the absorption into the general budget of the *fonds spécial* of 1951 that came from fuel duties.¹¹⁰ In the Fifth Republic the weakest source of funding was ministerial budgets, which can be revised at any time. During the second Mitterrand presidency, the national roads budget was cut in June 1990 after a conflict in CIAT between Delebarre (Roads), and Bérégevoy (Finance),¹¹¹ because of the Gulf War, the rising cost-of-living index and a weak capital market, then partly restored in November 1991 to appease demonstrating road hauliers and construction companies,¹¹² and further supported by a jobs programme in March 1992. It is for this reason that regional councils demand motorways (funded through concessions and tolls) rather than dual carriageways (vulnerable to annual ministerial budgets).¹¹³

Political leaders sought to persuade the finance minister to 'find' additional budgetary funds, or to introduce new sources of funds for programmes they were intent on implementing. Pompidou as Prime Minister in 1963 asked Finance Minister Giscard for the fund FIAT (see Chapter 5) to be included in the prime-ministerial budget, so that DATAR could subsidise motorway sections independently of the Finance Ministry.¹¹⁴ From 1984

¹⁰⁶ Ullmo (1975), p.37.

¹⁰⁷ Jardin and Fleury (1973), p.xxvi.

¹⁰⁸ P.Fabra, *Le Monde*, 11 Dec. 1981.

¹⁰⁹ Ozenda and Strauss-Kahn (1985), p.112, followed by comment of Jack Hayward, p.116.

¹¹⁰ Dunn, (1995) p.280; Thoenig (1973), pp.60-2; Jardin and Fleury (1973), p.xxi,p.xxii.

¹¹¹ Dunn (1995), p.281.

¹¹² *Le Monde*, 11 Dec.1991.

¹¹³ Discussion with Claude Husson, AdT adviser to the President of Limousin, at DATAR, 1 June 1999. Communes also receive a percentage of road tolls, increasing the attraction of motorways to them.

¹¹⁴ Guichard interviewed in Roussel (1994), p.152.

FIAT was used to orient roads expenditure in State-Region Contracts.¹¹⁵ When DATAR arranged for Pompidou in 1972 to announce an early completion of the Paris-Strasbourg motorway, the advance funding was raised by borrowing against future toll income; and two decades later Prime Minister Balladur (in 1972 Secretary-General of the Presidency) used a similar financial procedure for his 'accelerated motorway programme'. The *Fonds spécial des grands travaux* of 1982-85 came from supplementary fuel tax; and DATAR's *délégué* was made a board member of the fund and responsible for disbursing it. Some of this funding went to improving roads in 'industrial restructuring zones', but most to the *TGV Atlantique* which Mitterrand (and DATAR at that time) wanted.¹¹⁶ In 1986, despite protests from Balladur as Finance Minister, Prime Minister Chirac used privatisation proceeds and Paris tolls to build motorways for '*la France en retard*', and the TGV for '*la France qui gagne*'.¹¹⁷

However, by the time Balladur announced his 'accelerated motorway programme' of 1993, the technical paradigm had changed: experts had become sceptical about the development value of fast roads.¹¹⁸ Yet national leaders continued to fund them, for instance in State-Region Plan Contracts, because of the pressure on them from local interests. Regional presidents announced 'officially' that they would not sign the 1989-93 contracts if the government did not make offers at the high end of the range on roads.¹¹⁹ In the fourth round of State-Region Contracts, despite the efforts of the Green Minister for *Aménagement du territoire* and Environment, Voynet, roads were still as large a proportion of the Contracts as in previous rounds.¹²⁰ Overall, however, political initiatives that matched the dominant technical paradigm were more likely to be adopted. Three-quarters of the instruments that fitted the contemporary professional view led to successful outcomes for leaders, and a quarter succeeded in part.

Crises and honeymoon periods had a weak and inconsistent effect on roads policy. Though Prime Ministers de Gaulle and Debré in the 1958-59 inter-Republic transition were able to put the DAT onto interministerial committees on roads investment its impact there, if any, was limited. The political crisis of May 1968 certainly helped Prime Minister Pompidou, Minister for *Aménagement du territoire* Marcellin and DATAR overcome opposition to the Breton road plan, but President de Gaulle had to re-announce the project a year later, and its implementation relied on later leaders. Responses to economic crises also depended on the leader, but were always small-scale or short-term. While Mitterrand, and

¹¹⁵ DATAR put one-third of FIAT 1963-70 towards road projects. In the first round of Plan-Contracts, 1984-88, 10% of the State's share came from FIAT.

¹¹⁶ DATAR (1986) *Rapport d'Activité 1984-85* (Ministère du Plan et d'aménagement du territoire), p.21.

¹¹⁷ Chirac interviewed in *Le Monde*, 12 Feb.1988.

¹¹⁸ Bonnafous, A.; Plassard, F.; Vulin, B. (1993) *Circuler demain* (Tour d'Aigues: L'Aube/DATAR); Carrère, G. (1992) *Transports Destination 2002* (Ministère de l'Équipement et des Transports); Cour des Comptes (1992) *La Politique routière et autoroutière* (Journaux Officiels).

¹¹⁹ F.Grosrichard, *Le Monde*, 18 Nov.1988.

¹²⁰ Article by D.Voynet, *Le Monde*, 8 Sept. 2000; Cour des Comptes (1999a), II.iii.

later Cresson, were stimulated by economic problems to add new projects, Rocard and Bérégevoy cut road budgets. In the roads policy domain contingent events are less significant than the reaction to them of individual political leaders.

Implementation and persistence

The implementation of transport instruments can be difficult, because although the French President enjoys a relatively long term it is still short in terms of road-building or *aménagement du territoire*. A quarter of the road instruments promised good outcomes for roads-and- *aménagement du territoire* but were not implemented effectively, even if some leaders made up for earlier weaknesses. For example, the Fourth Republic's Tolled Motorways Bill of 1952 at first failed to pass, was reintroduced in 1954, but neutered by parliamentarians; and only with Chalandon's Act of 1969 was the full value of the Bill restored. But combining road policy for *aménagement du territoire* was relatively consistent in the Gaullist period because Pompidou was committed to it as Prime Minister, and as President appointed ministers of like mind, and therefore implementation was usually good. Much seemed to depend upon the interest and persistence of individual leaders: the *délégué* Essig was surprised to find that even Fourcade, a Minister of Infrastructure and *Aménagement du territoire* with 'an extraordinary knowledge of his dossiers', monitored only those Seventh Plan programmes which he had personally negotiated out of those for which he was nominally responsible.¹²¹ The most frequent difficulty was with ensuring continuity of funding; investments with the least economic return (inevitably in the peripheral or isolated regions) were those most likely to be delayed: for example, the last Mauroy government of 1984 was still making a special effort to fund the Massif Central and Brittany expressways that Pompidou had started to implement in 1968. More recent instruments have met problems directly stemming from changes in political leadership (Balladur to Juppé, Juppé to Jospin and Jospin to Raffarin), showing the ease with which new leaders can replace or annul the roads instruments that their predecessors have just enacted.

CONCLUSIONS

The aim of the chapter was to show that political leaders can 'make a difference' to road planning and funding; and to examine the opportunities and constraints they meet in the policy process, especially with regard to bureaucratic institutions and DATAR in particular. A preliminary analysis of the functions of the specialised bureaucratic organisations in road planning and investment, and some of their interactions with political leaders over particular instruments, indicated that the *Ponts et Chaussées* (especially the Road Directorate), the Plan Commissariat and the Ministry of Finance were typical of bureaucracies that

¹²¹ Essig (1979), p.35, p.120.

'are an important element in the process by which leaders can see their goals realized; but the constraints and hurdles are numerous and cannot be overcome easily, let alone rapidly'.¹²²

The statistical exercise showed that just over half the instruments enacted matched very well leaders' published intentions for the instrument, though slightly fewer had good outcomes for *aménagement du territoire*. While far from the constitutional ideal, this outcome contradicts more pessimistic assumptions of what leaders can achieve in practice within the constraints of bureaucratic systems. Furthermore, another group of instruments had mixed outcomes because political leaders themselves were not united in their aspirations. The outcome depended much more on the input of the president and/or the prime minister than whether bureaucratic groups opposed or supported the aims. Moreover, the relationship was not purely statistical; there was some good primary evidence that political leaders were personally engaged in initiating, developing or negotiating instruments.

A qualitative assessment of the political leadership's actions was then made within a framework, derived from Blondel, that focused around four aspects of the leaders' institutional and non-institutional environment: their positional resources, the actions of bureaucratic institutions; the leaders' financial resources, the 'fit' of their instrument to the prevailing technical paradigm, and other 'contingent' circumstances; and the opportunities and the constraints of implementation.

Although it was clear that political leaders were more likely in the Fifth than the Fourth Republic to bring their policy action to a successful conclusion, the difference did not seem to relate to any difference in the executive's formal powers to enact roads instruments. Indeed Debré's early use of the stronger decree-making power, to facilitate motorway building, did not stimulate the Road Directorate to build motorways; Pompidou's introduction of a potential 'rival' motorway-builder was much more effective. However, the change in the party system (or its better discipline) after 1958, helped a motorway law that did not pass in the Fourth Republic to pass in the Fifth. The change in Constitution and its conventions made more difference in determining who took decisions. Apart from periods of cohabitation, the goals of a president who chose to intervene took precedence over those of the prime minister; for example, President de Gaulle's relatively rare expressions of preference in this domain, on roads spending in Paris, had to be accepted by Prime Minister Pompidou even though he had prepared other priorities with DATAR. Presidents Pompidou and Giscard (in Chirac's premiership) 'presidentialised' this domain by specifying road instruments in small Councils they controlled, and by calling in technical advice when they chose. However, from Barre's premiership onwards, road networks were decided in CIATs chaired by the prime minister.

Both the quantitative and qualitative analysis demonstrated that instruments to which the interministerial DATAR made some input nearly always succeeded in achieving its

¹²² Blondel (1987), p.172.

leaders' aims (unlike those involving the DAT), though DATAR was given no role in a quarter of policy initiatives that could potentially have helped *aménagement du territoire*. In the first (Gaullist) decade, roads projects proposed by DATAR that fulfilled the leadership's goals for *aménagement du territoire* were often achieved by political leaders 'simply' overruling or bypassing *Ponts* or Finance officials who might have objected to the instrument (the Breton scheme, the Strasbourg motorway, the Languedoc and Fos block budgets, for example). Relations with the Plan Commissariat were poor, mainly because planning in a regional framework posed technical, economic and political problems for the Commissariat. In a second period (the Giscard and Mitterrand presidencies), there was more collaboration between DATAR and some *Ponts* engineers on preparing roads schemes (though there was more scepticism at the top of the Roads Directorate), and between DATAR, *Ponts* economists and the Plan Commissariat on developing evaluation techniques that took account of *aménagement du territoire*. By the 1990s DATAR, *Ponts* economists and others had shifted to a new technical paradigm that assumed that *aménagement du territoire* was a valid criterion when preparing roads projects (and comparing them with rail alternatives), but that more tolled motorways were not the best way to help regional development. When Cresson and Balladur continued to promote such roads they demonstrated that political leaders can ignore both the paradigm and their official bureaucratic advisers.

Finally, the analysis looked at the non-organisational constraints and opportunities in the policy environment. Leaders were more likely to see their initiative implemented quickly if it had 'ear-marked' funds, not from a ministerial budget vulnerable to general cutbacks or different priorities under new leaders. DATAR's fund FIAT was conceived by Pompidou to counter this problem, but other solutions included the block funds to DATAR's *missions*, and Mitterrand's *Fonds spécial des grands travaux*, run by DATAR. Mitterrand's reminder to his ministers that they had agreed on this fund was evidence of the problems of implementation even after a decision was made. For this reason crises in the economic and political environment rarely contributed to successful instruments. Though the May 1968 events encouraged ministers to overcome their officials' doubts and agree to DATAR's Breton expressway, its completion required the assent of many other leaders in other environmental conditions. Economic crises encouraged some leaders to extend roads programmes to create jobs and reduce political tension, but others preferred to cut back road budgets, prioritising other goals, which demonstrated yet again that leaders always retained the capacity to take a different approach to similar stimuli.

The flowchart shown in Figure 6.6 synthesises the findings in this chapter.¹²³ It traces the main connections in the network of influence on roads planning and funding at successive stages in the policy process. If DATAR, together with its interministerial

¹²³ The idea of the flowchart derives from Miles and Huberman (1994), pp.222-8. They use it to model a network of variables with causal connections between them, drawn from multiple case analyses of projects to change teaching practice.

location, its negotiating and decision-taking prime-ministerial committee, CIAT, and its bargaining fund from the prime minister's budget, FIAT, are replaced on the chart by the DAT, responsible to the minister for *aménagement du territoire* alone, the central weakness in the pre-1963 arrangements becomes clear. In the early years of *aménagement du territoire* the DAT lacked DATAR's administrative and financial resources; and political leaders interested in the policy were not able to give sustained support in the face of oppositional parliaments; thus the DAT's efforts to negotiate policy instruments had little impact. Bureaucratic groups, sometimes with the support of dual-mandate politicians, had a much greater influence on the outcome. A similar pattern could be seen in some later instruments that political leaders did not try to coordinate, such as the Interim State-Region Contracts. Outcomes in these cases too were dominated by sectoral bureaucratic organisations because of the absence of a coordinated input from the political leadership.

Yet, where DATAR could negotiate a tool on the political leadership's behalf to the mutual satisfaction of bureaucratic and local actors, the political leadership did not have to intervene assertively to make its aims succeed. Some decisions negotiated in this way were approved in CIAT or a Council of Ministers for legal reasons or to gain political publicity, but in effect the prime minister ratified an agreement DATAR had prepared for the leadership, perhaps working closely with the minister for *aménagement du territoire*. Examples were the road plans and programmes in the 1970s and 1980s which instrumentalised the technical paradigm of the day. The negotiation of State-Region Plan Contracts from 1984 followed a similar pattern, though DATAR increasingly shared the negotiating task with Prefects. The 'quietness' of this conventional policy-making process did not mean that political leaders do not 'make a difference'. The outcome reflected their individual goals, but their intervention was low-key because negotiated on their behalf by DATAR.

Political leaders could however adopt a more active, 'voluntarist' approach, asking DATAR to prepare reforms that would shift roads policy towards regional policy objectives quickly. Decisions were taken in a peremptory fashion, perhaps without consulting the technical bureaucracies or even their ministers. Instruments might avoid using ministry officials in implementation, or incite them to conform; for example, using local expectations raised by a Presidential announcement during a visit 'to the provinces', or the threat of rival service-providers. This pattern was prevalent in the 1960s and early 1970s, when Gaullist leaders keen to promote *aménagement du territoire* were trying innovative ways rather than repeating actions that had not worked well in the past. This way of proceeding was to some extent copied by the 'Gaullist' partnership of Balladur and Pasqua in the 1990s. The main problem was ensuring that 'top-down' decisions were carried through to implementation. But where the issue in the past was one of bureaucratic groups un-persuaded of an instrument's value, now it is one of project reversal by an incoming government.

Finally, political leaders can play a very personal role in initiating instruments that bring together roads and regional planning, using DATAR only marginally or not at all. Thus President de Gaulle, inspired by Pisani, introduced the Super-Ministry of Infrastructure; Giscard set up his Central Planning Council and used it to develop and announce his aims for *aménagement du territoire*; and Mitterrand proposed a public works programme for DATAR and the transport minister to implement, and insisted it was done. Presidential actions seem to have a higher chance of success than those of prime ministers, partly because of their longevity in office. If the president and prime minister have conflicting objectives, as President de Gaulle and Prime Minister Pompidou did on Paris, then the outcome can be mixed and reflect the balance of political power within the divided leadership. The thesis deliberately does not treat the psychological aspects of leadership, because it is more concerned to show that even 'grey and indistinct office-holders'¹²⁴ have more power to change the institutions than is often thought. But the evidence and the analysis make clear that some political leaders were more likely than others to spot and seize opportunities in pursuit of their aims. They showed that there were many ways to overcome the constraints posed by bureaucracies and other institutions.

¹²⁴ Blondel (1995), p.303.

CHAPTER 7

CASE STUDY 2: REGIONALISATION

INTRODUCTION

This case-study, like that in the previous chapter, examines leaders' efforts to implement their aims within their environment, and especially with regard to bureaucratic institutions, including DATAR. A case-study on regionalisation was chosen because it contrasted with the first. Roads planning is 'of specialised scope' in Blondel's term, whereas Blondel would categorise innovation in regional administrative and political structures as an ambitious aim of 'moderate scope'.¹ Roads planning was a component of DATAR's operations: the regional structure was the institutional context to all the operations of the *Délégation à l'aménagement du territoire et à l'action régionale*. Regionalisation was for 25 years 'above all a reform of the State, which was organised at regional level'.² It sought to change institutions, meaning not only the formal organisational structures, but also the customary relationships between the political and bureaucratic actors who operated them.

A second contrast to the roads planning case was the apparently radical nature of the 'step changes' in the regionalisation process, such as in 1964 when a 'Prefect of the Region' (*préfet de région*) was made responsible for regional economic development, coordinating the work of ministry field offices, and consulting with the new regional body, the *Commission de développement économique régional* (CODER). It was the first time 'the Region' existed administratively as a noun.³ Decentralisation of political power in 1982 to the regional councils that had succeeded the CODERs seemed even more radical. However, while political and administrative historians of regionalisation agree that 1964 and 1982 are high points, their texts show dozens of incremental moves, adding to (or subtracting from) the institutional presence of regions before 1964, between 1964 and 1982, and indeed after 1982.⁴ The analysis in this chapter therefore does not compare a small number of outstanding events but a larger number of mostly less dramatic reforms undertaken by a multiplicity of leaders; these reforms are listed in Figure 7.1.

¹ Blondel (1987), pp.92-3.

² Giuily, E. (1992) 'Historique de la réforme Defferre', in Hamon (1992), 115-25, p.116. Eric Giuily was one of Defferre's two aides responsible for preparing and piloting the Act of 1982 through parliament.

³ Monier (1965), p.79.

⁴ Inter alia: Aubert, J. (1977) 'L'administration du territoire', in B. Tricot et al. (eds.) *De Gaulle et le service de l'Etat* (Plon), 281-322; Bodineau, P. and Verpeaux, M. (1997) *Histoire de la décentralisation* 2nd edn (PUF); Bourjol, M. (1969) *Les Institutions régionales de 1789 à nos jours* (Berger-Levrault); Dayries, J and Dayries, M. (1982) *La Régionalisation* 2nd edn (PUF); Grémion, C. (1979, 1992a); Huguenin, J. and Martinat, P. (1998) *Les Régions entre l'Etat et l'Europe* (Le Monde); Monier (1965); Rémond, B. (1999) *La Région* 3rd edn (Montchrestien); Schmidt, V. (1990) *Democratizing France* (Cambridge: CUP).

Figure 7.1 Political leaders and regionalisation instruments 1944-1986

	PM	Tool	Date
VICHY STATE			
R1	Darlan	Vichy regional administration	1941-44
LIBERATION GOVERNMENT			
R2	De Gaulle	Regional commissioner	1944-46
R3	Gouin	Abolition of regional administration	1946
FOURTH REPUBLIC			
President Auriol 1946-53			
R4	Schuman	Creation of regional IGAMES	1947-48
R5	Marie to Queuille	Regional reform under IGAMES	1948-51
R6	Queuille to Faure	Economic regionalisation reforms	1948-52
R7	Pinay to Laniel	Rejection of regional administration	1952-53
President Coty 1954-58			
R8	Mendès	Official expansion committees	1954-55
R9	Faure	Regional action programmes	1955
R10	Faure	Economic programme regions	1955
R11	Faure	Preparation of regional action programmes	1955-56
R12	Mollet	Relaunch of regional administrative reforms	1956-57
R13	Mollet	DAT regional plans	1957-58
R14	De Gaulle	Relaunch of regional administrative reforms	1958-59
FIFTH REPUBLIC			
President de Gaulle 1959-69			
R15	Debré	Interdepartmental conference	1959-60
R16		Regional administrative boundaries	1960-61
R17		Regional coordinating prefect	1961
R18		Official regional expansion committees	1961
R19	Pompidou	Regional administrative reform	1962-63
R20		Reform of regional committees	1963
R21		Introduction of CODERs	1964
R22		Prefect of the Region	1964
R23		Implementation of 1964 reforms	1964-66
R24		De Gaulle's socio-economic regions	1966-68
R25	Couve	Regional referendum	1968-69
President Pompidou 1969-74			
R26	Chaban-Delmas	Regional deconcentration	1970
R27	Delmas	Act on EPR regional bodies	1972
President Giscard d'Estaing 1974-8			
R28	Chirac	Promise then halt to regionalisation	1974-75
R29	Barre	Blois programme	1978
R30		Bonnet Bill, Barre decrees	1980
President Mitterrand 1981-95			
R31	Mauroy	Defferre Act 1982	1982
R32		Planning Reform Act	1982-83
R33		Implementation of Defferre's reform	1982-86
R34	Fabius	Election of regional councils	1986

A third contrast with the roads case study is the uneven role played by DATAR. While the DAT in the Ministry of Reconstruction was associated from 1944 to 1962 with the majority of the steps in regionalisation, its efforts were mostly unsuccessful. But the very failure of the Ministry to coordinate regional planning effectively across field services drew the government's advisory body on administrative reform, the *Comité centrale d'enquête sur le coût et le rendement des services publics*, to recommend strongly that the government should reform the administration within the regional planning framework.⁵ DATAR and its *délégué*, Olivier Guichard, were 'driving forces' behind the creation and design of the CODER, on behalf of General de Gaulle, as well as participating in the initial preparations for the regional administrative reform.⁶ DATAR and its minister, Michel Rocard, were not invited to help prepare the 'Decentralisation Act' of 2 March 1982.

The final contrast is in the identity of the groups that were important throughout the regionalisation process. While many public bureaucracies were involved in the reforms, the *corps* of prefects was always the most important institution for political leaders to consider, for its role as the territorial representative of the government and for its links to local political leaders. In the words of Article 72 of the 1958 Constitution:

'In the *départements*...the Government delegate is responsible for the interests of the nation, supervises the administration and ensures the observance of the law.'⁷

The other important group was not a formal bureaucracy but the locally- elected politicians, the *élus*, and especially those who were the leading players in a *département* (department), often by virtue of their national party and/or parliamentary role. The attitudes and actions with respect to regionalisation of these two groups (and the DAT/ DATAR), need therefore to be outlined.

Institutional actors: the prefects, *élus*, the DAT and DATAR

After the 1789 Revolution the provinces and their *intendants* were replaced by departments and Commissioners to create national unity and equality. Napoleon replaced the Commissioners in 1800 with a system of prefects to organise local and State affairs. A few radical leaders tried to introduce administrative regions to implement new State roles, especially economic development, but were always opposed by the prefects.⁸ Whether in the 1850s or the 1940s the prefects objected to regional bodies 'because they put a screen between them and the government in Paris'.⁹ They were 'attached to the department

⁵ Report of July 1958: Monier (1965), pp.38-9; and see Machin (1977), p.50, p.63.

⁶ In Catherine Grémion's reputational survey, 21% cited Guichard as an important actor in the reform, 11% a DATAR *chargé de mission*. The minister of administration reform's *directeur de cabinet* received 17% and no-one else more than 6%. Grémion, C. (1979), p.321; Grémion, C. (1979), p.321.

⁷ Pickles, D. (1972) *The Government and Politics of France*, I (Methuen), Appendix II.

⁸ Le Clère, B. and Wright, V. (1973) *Les Prefets du Second Empire* (FNSP), p.107; Chapman, B. (1955) *The Prefects and Provincial France* (Allen & Unwin), pp.14-17, p.32.

⁹ Bodineau and Verpeaux. p.83; Leclère and Wright, 1973, p.107.

structure and to the traditional equality of prefects'.¹⁰ By 1940 the only regional bodies were the 17 'Clémentel' chambers of commerce, deriving from emergency committees set up by Clémentel, Minister of Commerce, in 1917. According to DATAR's *délégué*, over two hundred regional theorists had since 1800 proposed grouping departments together but 'not even the most famous of them could impose their plan'.¹¹

The first Regional Prefects were introduced in 1941 under the full powers of Marshal Pétain. Pétain had started to reconstitute the historic provinces, and his head of government and Minister of Interior, Admiral Darlan, pre-empted him by introducing 18 administrative regions, headed by Regional Prefects, with assistant *intendants* for civil order and economic development.¹² DGEN, the infrastructure directorate which housed the new DAT division, appointed officials to this new tier, but the *intendants* were too burdened with wartime problems to consider economic development.¹³ The prefects thought Vichy regionalisation 'seriously threatened the *corps*... The Regional Prefect ...aroused the hostility of ordinary prefects'...He 'was a brash political upstart'.¹⁴ General de Gaulle replaced the Regional Prefects with Regional Commissioners (none were prefects) to ensure order at Liberation, but the restored department councils were hostile to the Commissioners: 'they did not like their lack of accountability to an elected assembly'.¹⁵ Their representatives in parliament voted down the Commissioners' budget; and the posts were abolished after de Gaulle went in 1946. The prefect remained as executive head of a department, even though the Fourth Republic Constitution, Articles 87 and 89, said that role would transfer to department *présidents* (chairs). There were many political and pragmatic reasons why 'neither the politicians, the chairmen, nor the Government want the reform but none considers it tactful to say so in public'.¹⁶

However, during the 1947-48 national strikes the Interior Minister, Jules Moch, persuaded parliament to let him appoint eight 'inspectors-general of the administration on special mission' (*Inspecteurs-généraux de l'administration en mission extraordinaire*, IGAMEs), to restore order;¹⁷ and his immediate successors made the IGAMEs the prefect of a chief town in his zone but with no authority over the prefects of the other departments. In 1952-53, Interior Ministry circulars and decrees confirmed that IGAMEs would not lead groups of departments nor coordinate a regional conference of field officials.¹⁸ The

¹⁰ Grémion, C. (1979), p.135.

¹¹ Guichard (1965), p.197.

¹² Paxton (1972), p.199.

¹³ Damette, F. and Scheibling, J. (1998) *La France: permanence et mutations* (Hachette), p.214.

¹⁴ Chapman (1955), p.57.

¹⁵ Bodineau and Verpeaux (1997), p.83.

¹⁶ Chapman (1955), p.175; e.g. communists might run departments; an onerous local role would hamper business or national work; a strong local political figure would challenge parliamentarians for their jobs.

¹⁷ *ibid.* p.61.

¹⁸ Mény (1974), p.354; Lemasurier, J. (1954) 'Les Inspecteurs généraux de l'administration en Mission extraordinaire', *Revue administrative*, 7/40, 377-82, p.380.

prefectoral *corps* 'condemned the regions and regionalism to defend the departments',¹⁹ it being assumed that if regions were introduced, departments would be abolished.

Then in 1954, Prime Minister Mendès-France launched an economic regionalisation that implied an administrative regionalisation, and which those looking back see as initiating the 1982 political regions.²⁰ Prefects were asked to select regional committees to be consulted on the Plan Commissariat's regional action programmes, PARs (lists of capital projects). In a policy some called 'incorporating the periphery', the political leadership wanted to ensure only one committee spoke for each region, while keeping the goodwill and energies of new local actors.²¹ A group led by the Plan Commissariat and the DAT was asked to delineate the regional boundaries. Torn between arguments for 9 'European-size' regions (preferred for *aménagement du territoire*) or 47 'large departments' (the preference of Jacobins who thought 'regions would pose political problems for Paris')²², the group proposed 19 regions, based on the Clémentel divisions. However, 'to pacify some cities and bureaucracies', a total of 22 'programme regions' was announced in 1956 (two Normandies to satisfy Caen and Rouen; Socialist Arras and Lille in Nord-Pas-de-Calais divided from Communist Amiens in Picardie; a separation of Besançon and Dijon).²³ Ministries were asked to modify the areas covered by their field offices to fit PAR regional boundaries, but few obeyed. Prefects would not work with the IGAMEs responsible for drawing up the PARs.²⁴ The *élus* complained that the IGAMEs were selecting the voluntary regional expansion committees and not the departments' own committees, and numerous department committees were then 'approved'.²⁵ DAT started to draw up regional development plans (*plans d'aménagements régionaux*), to concentrate PAR 'actions' on its development target areas but was unable to persuade the Plan Commissariat or ministries to use them.²⁶

In September 1957 an interim report of the *Comité centrale d'enquête* ...was heavily critical of the 'Ministry of Reconstruction's incapacity to coordinate *aménagement du territoire*'.²⁷ In July 1958 its main report said that *aménagement du territoire* needed and was the opportunity for reforming administrative action at regional level: the Prefect in the central city of a region should have the IGAME's coordinating powers, and all ministries should adopt the PAR-region boundaries.²⁸ In the last days of the Fourth Republic Prime Minister de Gaulle issued decrees that would require ministries to harmonise their regional field

¹⁹ Mény (1974), p.347, p.352.

²⁰ For example, Michel Rocard (2001) *Entretien avec Judith Weintraub* (Flammarion), p.84.

²¹ The term is Jack Hayward's in Hayward (1986), Chapter 7. Groups had set up with diverse and overlapping boundaries, all claiming to represent their area. Monier (1965), p.57.

²² Debre, M. (1956) 'Problèmes économiques et organisation administrative', *Revue française de Science Politique*, 6/2, pp. 301-314, p.308.

²³ Clout (1972), pp.31-5.

²⁴ Monier (1965), p.30, p.62.

²⁵ Mény (1974), pp.319-20.

²⁶ Pouyet (1968), p.36.

²⁷ *ibid.* p.36.

²⁸ Report of July 1958: Monier (1965), pp.38-9.

boundaries; and a prefect in each region to coordinate an 'Interdepartmental Conference' (CID) of field officials.

In 1958 'the majority of prefects were strongly opposed to any kind of regional reform'.²⁹ The Senate, elected by local *élus* and representing rural interests more than the urban business interests and academics in the expansion committees, set up a group in 1959 to veto the reforms.³⁰ Prime Minister Debré in 1960 made the CIDs responsible for executing the regional plans,³¹ but the prefects boycotted the CIDs.³² Debré asked the Interior Minister to designate individually the prefect in the largest town of each region as 'coordinating prefect',³³ but these prefects then found themselves unable to coordinate the technical field services who still reported directly to their Paris office.³⁴ Once the Algerian crisis was over, President de Gaulle turned his attention to administrative reform. In 1962 he appointed a Minister for Administrative Reform, who studied rival proposals from the Interior Ministry, DATAR and the Plan Commissariat. Guichard at DATAR tried hard but failed to implement de Gaulle's wish for a strong role for economic and social regional committees. DATAR then proposed the CODERs, which combined members of the expansion committees with local *élus* in one consultative body. Prime Minister Pompidou approved the CODER plan, but President de Gaulle accepted the suggestions of the Interior Ministry to make CODERs smaller and weaker vis-à-vis the prefects.³⁵ De Gaulle agreed in a Council of Ministers the decree instituting the 'Prefect of the Region', though he knew that:

'it was not without some apprehension that [the prefects] envisaged the changes to be introduced in the long-established balance of local appointments and practices, as well as in the ranks of their own hierarchy'.³⁶

The implementation of the 1964 reforms did not bring the renewal of elites and the 'rational' regional spending that DATAR wanted, but re-established at regional level the traditional local networks of solidarity - and rivalry - and traditional patterns of 'sharing out' public expenditure.³⁷ Pierre Grémion judged that the 'winner of the [1964] administrative reforms was the Minister of Interior', because it controlled the implementation; yet the prefects too were constrained by historic ties, and nominated to the CODERs more of 'their'

²⁹ Machin (1977), p.53.

³⁰ Roig, C. (1964) 'L'administration traditionnelle devant les changements sociaux', in IEP Grenoble, Administration traditionnelle et planification régionale (Colin), 11-84, pp.15-16.

³¹ A decree of 31 Dec. 1958 unified the Plan Commissariat and the DAT plans under the control of a Plan committee, with the DAT as vice-chair.

³² Grémion, C. (1979), p.135.

³³ *ibid.* p.137, citing a cabinet member.

³⁴ Roig (1964), p.32; Bauchet (1964), p.57.

³⁵ Grémion, C. (1992a), pp.36-7.

³⁶ De Gaulle (1971), II, p.369.

³⁷ Grémion, P. and Worms, J.-P. (1968) 'La concertation régionale, innovation ou tradition', Aménagement du territoire et développement régional [1965-66], 1 (Grenoble: IEP), 35-60, p.51.

élus than business people and academics.³⁸ De Gaulle pursued the idea of socio-economic representation of regions, asking Guichard (Minister for *Aménagement du territoire* and regionalisation) and Jean-Marcel Jeanneney (Minister for Regional and Senate Reform) for referendum proposals. The latter's were chosen by de Gaulle but rejected in 1969 by Senators and the electorate. In 1972 President Pompidou introduced instead the two-tier *établissements publics régionaux* (EPR), made up of a regional council mainly of *élus* (some chosen by the prefect), and an economic and social committee. They were restricted to an advisory role on economic development, the President being caught between the conservatism of many parliamentarians and the aspirations raised in the CODERs and revealed in electoral campaigns by Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber.³⁹ In the Giscard presidency, DATAR was asked to draft a list of new regional powers, which was adopted by the Blois 'Common Programme of the Right', and dropped after the 1978 parliamentary elections.

Yet reform-minded regional prefects were already observing that they had to take account of the wishes of important regional politicians.⁴⁰ Some opposition leaders (Le Pensec, Mitterrand, Mauroy, Defferre) proposed bills to strengthen the EPRs or elect them directly, and though the Barre government rejected the bills it extended regions' legal powers, and allowed some regions to extend their practical power. Within a year of President Mitterrand's election, and under Prime Minister Mauroy, Defferre's Act of 2 March 1982 had transferred power to the regional councils on existing boundaries. DATAR's minister, Rocard, was *persona non grata* in Mitterrand circles during the preparation of the Act, and had little to do with it.⁴¹ *Députés* and senators, as local *élus*, wanted to retain prefectural supervision as their guarantee against risk and local pressure, but Defferre was adamant about the transfer of power,⁴² and

'though the reform was not perhaps adopted cheerfully within the Interior Ministry, it was accepted without argument, and the prefectural *corps* in particular... 'played the reform game' without argument once parliament had decided it, as is normal in a Republic'.⁴³

The elections to regional councils that would turn them into political entities were continually postponed because of the Left's poor showing in local elections,⁴⁴ during which time the chair of the department became the 'new strong man', supplanting the prefect's executive role - while appointing former prefects as chief financial aides.⁴⁵ Mitterrand and

³⁸ Grémion, P. (1976), p.129; Grémion and Worms (1968), p.54.

³⁹ Machin (1977), p.61; Essig (1979), p.113; Philipponneau, M. (1981) *La Grande affaire: Décentralisation et régionalisation* (Calmann-Lévy), p.69.

⁴⁰ Philip, O. (1976) 'Déconcentration et Décentralisation', in C.Debbasch (ed.) *La Décentralisation pour la rénovation de l'Etat* (PUF), 15-30, pp.25-7.

⁴¹ Favier and Martin-Roland (1990), p.119; Grémion, C. (1987), p.245.

⁴² Favier and Martin-Roland (1990), p.146; Grémion, C. (1987), p.244.

⁴³ Giully (1992), p.124. Eric Giully was one of Defferre's two chief assistants on the reform.

⁴⁴ Douence, J.-C. (1995) 'The Evolution of the 1982 Regional Reforms: An Overview', in J.Loughlin and S.Mazey (eds) *The End of the French Unitary State?* (Cass), 10-24, pp.12-13.

⁴⁵ Favier and Martin-Roland (1990), p.148

Prime Minister Fabius agreed to hold the 1986 parliamentary elections using proportional representation within departmental constituencies to 'reduce the defeat',⁴⁶ and to hold the regional elections at the same time with the same electoral system, leading regional councillors to pay more attention in the following years to their departmental clientele than to the needs and the political identity of the region as a whole.⁴⁷

THE COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

A similar four-stage analytical framework to that used in Chapter 6, based on Blondel's conceptual scheme, can be applied to regionalisation:

- the positional resources and constraints of the Constitution and its conventions, and the configuration of the party system;
- the actions of the bureaucratic organisations and other policy actors affected by changes to regional institutions;
- the leadership's use of institutional and contingent opportunities to help decide the instrument; and
- the constraints exerted during implementation by such factors as the duration of the leadership's mandate.

Data collection and analysis

Figure 7.1 listed the 34 projects of the political leadership identified as contributing to the regionalisation process from Vichy to the election of regional councils in 1986.⁴⁸ (Some very short-lived governments with the same personnel, 1948-51 and 1952-53, made successive increments - or attempted to - with the same aims, and these are grouped together). For each project, the evidence was compiled into a database around Blondel's main analytical themes:

- the constitution, date, president and prime minister (indicators for the political leadership's constitutional powers, party systems and duration of mandate);
- the actions or views attributed to the president, prime minister, and ministers for *aménagement du territoire*, the interior, the economy and administrative reform;
- the actions or views attributed to DATAR, the prefects, other officials, the *élus*, and other regional groups;
- the environmental context, especially economic or political crises;
- and in addition, the outcome in terms of the institutional development of regions.

A sample of this database is shown in Figure 7.2. Figure 7.3 lists the sources used.

⁴⁶ Chevallier (2002), p.323.

⁴⁷ *ibid.* p.325.

⁴⁸ Aubert (1977); Bodineau and Verpeaux (1997); Bourjol (1969); Dayries and Dayries (1982); Grémion, C. (1979, 1992a); Huguenin and Martinat (1998); Monier (1965); Rémond (1999); Schmidt, V. (1990).

Figure 7.2 Example of regionalisation database

R25	Regional referendum of 27 April 1969	1968-69
Fifth Republic	PRESIDENT: De Gaulle: 8/1/59-28/4/69 PM: Couve de Murville; Interior: Marcellin; Reform and Regions: Jeanneney; AdT and regionalisation: Guichard	Source *=primary
Instrument - context	De Gaulle wanted referendum on socio-economic representation, in regions and Senate; referendum proposals prepared by Jeanneney and Guichard; Jeanneney's option chosen, and fails.	
DATAR	Drew up suggestions for minister Guichard.	*Essig 1979:110
Minister of AdT	Prepared brief questions; had wanted two separate referendums; but later thought President right to have one. Held a large survey of regions. Was with de Gaulle at Quimper 2/2/69 when President promoted regions. Guichard ('but not certain colleagues') wanted élus and group representation on equal terms (except on budget), 'to inspire innovation and mobilise all regional actors in economic market'.	*Guichard 1975:103 *Aubry 1988:134, 130-2
President	After parl. elections 7/68, asked Tricot to brief him (Tricot) In 7/68 wrote to PM: "Jeanneney is to prepare referendum"; chose J's project because detailed, would not need an Act (J.1992:93). "De Gaulle absolutely insisted: regions to have full power over decisions, but regional prefect to prepare dossiers and execute decisions as guarantee against partisanship and fiefdoms" (J in H).	*Tricot 1977:111; *Jeanneney 1992:73,93; Huguenin 1998:18
PM	Told Nat.Ass. that only a State-selected prefect, not elected regional assembly could be effective, ensure general interest (H). Advised President not to hold the referendum (Tricot 1990:143). PM not very keen, delayed holding it (Jeanneney 1992:83).	Hayward; 1983:51; Tricot 1990: 143
Minister of Interior	Couve and Marcellin wanted to resist public disorder, and therefore gave a key role to Prefects.	Machin 1977: 59
Minister of Reform	In Nat.Ass. 11/12/68 referred to Clemenceau's regional project to remove old structures. Transform society by decentralisation and participation by socio-professional groups, not elected executive.	Rémond 1999:13-14;
Prefects	'Prefectoral corps apprehensive.. on changes to be introduced in the long-established balance of local appointments and practices, as well as in the ranks of their own hierarchy.'	*De Gaulle M.Hope,II, 1971:369
Elus	Local notables opposed to regional reform and also anti-region (G) 80% of notables wanted prefect to exercise regional powers (H); PS notables said would reduce role of departments, groups would take over from élus (*Philipponneau 1981:35,48).	Gourevitch 1980:122 Hayward 1983: 51
Regional actors	Regionalists said proposals inadequate, undemocratic: these were reasons for voting 'No'.	*Philippon. 1981:35
Critical resources	Referendum delayed while Guichard organised his regional survey, which gave Senators extra time to campaign against it.	*Jeanneney 1992:83
Other issues	Regionalisation proposed on 27/4/69 was really wanted by voters, but did not understand why it was also harming Senate.	CGrémon 1992:39.
Outcomes for regions	Guichard thought CODERs the "indispensable counterweight to implementation by State regional administration" - as a transitional phase - but could not persuade regional people of the idea; 1969 was the end of CODERs and regions.	*Camous 1973:223

Figure 7.3 Regionalisation database sources

The texts used in compiling the database are listed below (full bibliographical details at end of thesis).

Other information came from:

- Official reports by DATAR or other French sources.
- DATAR's unpublished records of CIATs.
- Legislation, exposé de motifs, and Debates in National Assembly.
- *Le Monde*, *Les Echos* and IEP Paris *dossiers de presse*.

Books, articles and reports used in compiling the regionalisation database:

DATAR

DOCUMENTS

DATAR (1964)
 DATAR (1971)
 DATAR (1986)
 Kotas (1997)
 Laborie et al (1985)
 Randet (1994)

OTHER OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS

CSC (1962)
 Charles et al (1992)
 Chevallier (1992)
 Foulon (1975)
 Grémion, C (1992)

OTHER PRIMARY TEXTS

Antoine (1960)
 Attali (1993)
 Aubert (1977)
 Aubry (1988)
 Auriol (1970)
 Auriol (1971)
 Baecque (1964)
 Bloch-Lainé (1962)
 Bloch-Lainé (1977)
 Bloch-Lainé (1986)
 Bloch-Lainé and Gruson (1996)
 Camous (1973)
 Carrère (1977)
 Chaban-Delmas (1997)
 Charlet (1976)
 Dautry in Avril (1993)
 Debré (1956)
 Debré (1988)
 Debré (1996)
 De Gaulle (1971)
 Essig (1979)
 Giscard d'Estaing (1977)
 Giuly (1992)
 Gravier (1956)
 Gravier (1964)
 Gravier (1972)
 Guichard (1965)

Guichard (1975)
 Guigou (1986)
 Hamon (1992)
 Jeanneney (1992)
 Lemasurier (1954)
 Massé (1986)
 Monier (1965)
 Monod et al (1971)
 Monod et al. (1997)
 Philip (1976)
 Phlipponneau, (1981)
 Pisani (1956)
 Pisani (1998)
 Rocard (2001)
 Roche (1986)
 Tricot (1977)
 Tricot (1990)
 Trorial (1976)

SECONDARY TEXTS

Alexandre (1972)
 Allen et al (1970)
 Andrault (1990)
 Ashford (1982)
 Balme (1995)
 Bauchard (1963)
 Bauchet (1964)
 Bédarida (1985)
 Bernstein (1985)
 Biarez (1983)
 Bodineau et al (1997)
 Chapman (1955)
 Chevallier (2002)
 Clout (1972)
 Damette (1969)
 Damette (1998)
 Dayries (1982)
 Debbasch (1976)
 Delcamp (1993)
 Deloye (1997)
 Douence (1995)
 Dreyfus (1990)
 Durrieu (1969)
 Estrin et al (1983)
 Favier et al (1990)
 Flockton et al (1989)
 Grémion, C (1979)

Grémion, C (1987)
 Grémion, C. (1992a)
 Grémion, P (1976)
 Gremion, P. and Worms
 (1968)
 Gourevitch (1980)
 Guesnier (1986)
 Hansen (1968)
 Hayward (1983)
 Hayward (1986)
 Hourticq (1963)
 Hourticq (1973)
 Huguenin al (1998)
 Kuisel (1985)
 Labasse (1966)
 Lacour (1983)
 Lajugie (1964)
 Lanversin (1970)
 Limouzin (1988)
 Machin (1977)
 Madiot (1979)
 Madiot (1993)
 Manesse (1998)
 Marx (1997)
 Massardier (1996)
 Mény (1974)
 Mény (1976)
 Mény (1987)
 Paxton (1972)
 Pickles (1958)
 Pogorel (1986)
 Pouyet (1968)
 Pouyet et al (1964)
 Quermonne (1963)
 Quermonne (1964)
 Quermonne (1967)
 Rémond (1999)
 Rigaud et al (1984)
 Roig (1964)
 Rouso (1986)
 Sfez (1979)
 Shennan (1989)
 Watson (1983)
 Williams (1972)
 Worms (1966)
 Yvert (1990)

The information in each database was then summarised as Figure 7.4, to compare data more easily, and to indicate the evidence that backs up the analysis that follows, but which there is not space to discuss in the chapter.⁴⁹ To guide the qualitative analysis a 'quantivised' version of the information in Figure 7.4 was drawn up in Figure 7.5, similar to the methodology of the previous chapter. In Figure 7.5 each cell is coded as a 'tick' (✓), 0 or a 'cross' (X), depending whether the action or view of the actor favoured stronger regions (✓), there was no input from the actor (0), or opposition to regionalisation (X). Where there was a clear division within a group of officials or *élus* to a proposed measure (such as between rural and big-city mayors), or the actor changed his mind (President Giscard in the face of differing electoral pressures), the 'division' symbol (÷) was assigned. Events that might have provided a stimulus for political leaders were categorised as 'system' changes (such as the first 'alternation' of power of the Fifth Republic in 1981), 'major' crises (decolonisation in 1954-55), or the merely 'electoral' threat. Finally, for each instrument, the outcome in terms of regional change in the short-term was summed up in a phrase in Figure 7.4 and a 'star rating' assigned. Projects were rated 0 to *** depending on the 'amount of change', bearing in mind Blondel's distinction between managing (administering day-to-day problems), adjusting (modifying aspects of policy) and innovating (new policies within the policy domain),⁵⁰ or X if it reversed the regionalisation process.

Drawing conclusions from the comparative table

Of the 34 leadership initiatives 1946-86 shown in Figure 7.5, only two were explicitly intended to halt or reverse administrative regionalisation: the abolition of the Commissioners in 1946, and the assurances in 1952-53 that the prefects would not lose powers to the IGAMEs. Of the remaining initiatives, all were intended to strengthen the regional level and three-quarters (24 of 32) succeeded, although less than a quarter (7 of 32) consisted of innovatory or radical change. This spread of outcomes is related to the political leadership's level of support for regionalisation; that is, the leadership made an impact on regionalisation in proportion to its collective aims. First, nearly all instruments that achieved most change (6 of the 7** or ***), such as the appointment of Regional Prefects in 1964, were supported by a majority of the leaders. Of those that did not succeed in increasing power at regional level (such as the regional referendum of 1969), less than half were supported by a majority of leaders (3 of 8 with '0'). Those that made modest changes, such as the creation in 1960 of the Interdepartmental Conference of field officials, fell midway between: two-thirds had been supported by the majority (11 of 17*). But there were idiosyncratic exceptions, in particular the regional council elections of 1986 undoubtedly strengthened the region by legitimising it, even though the *départementalist* President, Prime Minister and Interior Minister chose an electoral system that strengthens departments within the region.

⁴⁹ A 35-page print-out and/or computer file of the whole database can be made available.

⁵⁰ Blondel (1987), p.95.

Figure 7.4 Regionalisation data meta-matrix

Regional projects		Leaders' Input				Bureaucratic input		Other actors		Critical resources	Outcome
	DATAR/ Minister AdT	President	PM	Minister of Interior	Minister of Economy	Prefects	Other officials	Elus	Regional actors		
R1	Vichy regional administration									System	*
1941-1944	Appoints staff to regions; provincial economic elites to advise administration	Wants provinces, governors, councils in Constitution	Creates Regional Prefects, for order and economy	Asked ministries to align boundaries on provinces	Wants non-bureaucratic region to help implement State policies	Regional Prefects are political upstarts - a threat to Corps	Many ministries, eg Beaux-Arts adapt to new framework	Councils would displace 3rd Rep 'pals' of MPs/ Senators	Expansion committees start; Brittany given official status	Wartime regime imposed structure for order, food	Vichy survived most in admin, economic modernisation, planning
R2	Regional Commissioners									System	*
1944-1946	Appoints regional staff; Gravier reports on industrial relocation, AdT	Wanted Regional Commissioners to restore order, did not have 90 prefects; wants order and an efficient territorial scale		Wants prefects to restore order; state		Prefects are 25% from corps. Commissioners not prefects but top resisters	Most ministries reconcentrate powers 1944; Prefects just go-between	Department élus hostile to Commissioner; not accountable locally	Suspicion of regional cttees. Breton regionalists suppressed	Liberation tactic to keep down PCF and keep out US-led admin	Vichy broke ice for regional reorganisation for order in automobile age
R3	Abolition of regional administration									0	X
1946	PCF minister sacks regional staff. DAT focuses on urban planning			Made budgetary provision for Comms but parl refused it; posts abolished 5/46		50% prefects from old corps. Against CR - screen prefects from ministers	Many retain regional structures but with variety of boundaries	Praised dept; reduced Commissioner budget in 12/45, then to zero in 3/46	Moselle sets up modernisation committee	De Gaulle paralysed by parties in 1945 when peace restored	Region smelt of sulphur; Debré - dangerous for national unity
R4	Creation of regional IGAME									Major	*
1947	Gravier's book: deconcentrate for economic balance and civil virtues	Auriol advised ministers: strengthen department prefect	Interior Minister against deconcentration to prefect; in strikes persuades parl to fund 8 IGAMES to coordinate prefects - then agrees would be city prefect	Gets INSEE in IGAME regions agreed by Parl		Condemned regions to save dept. IGAMES were 'regions in disguise'	Closon, head of Census, wants region like CODER of 1964	MPs will fund IGAMES provided no admin reform nor attack on prefects	Region too large to be controlled by elus' traditional processes	Severe strikes used by Moch to persuade parliament	Crisis used to restore regional officials but limited by prefects, MPs
R5	Regional reform under IGAME									0	*
1948-1951	Pro-AdT Minister. Planners want and adopt IGAME regions	Queuille makes dep-IGAME prefects, Bidault give IGAMES bigger regional role, Queuille (PM & Interior Minister) gives ministries power to delegate to IGAMES	Asks IGAMES to consult prefects in regional meeting	IGEN officials adopt IGAME regions; Bloch-Lainé wants links to groups		Consecrates ... administrative regionalism of sad [Vichy] memory	40 pluri-dept field services by 1950; helps resistance to change		Gravier book stimulates 'regional Poujadism' in social groups	Department inadequate but protected by Constitution	Government starts regional administrative reform under IGAME
R6	Economic regionalisation reforms									0	*
1948-1952	Gravier encourages regional economic groups; organise informal associations; set up regional missions	Minister to aid regional economic groups; organise informal associations; set up regional missions	Queuille PM and MinFin, then Pleven encourages AdT Minister. Then Queuille PM and Min Interior, makes law on SEM regional development companies	Economic officials work with Min AdT; 1951 Act on SEMs for regional devt		Given no control over SEM development missions	Calsse, Ministry of Industry help regional development in SEMs	Politicians are important in committees but not their initiative	Initiative from local groups; form CNER, pressurise government		Committees sensitise public and ministers on relocation, AdT, regions

NOTE changes of column headings relating to ministers from page 4 onwards.

Star rating: 0 to *** in order of level of institutional change towards regions; X = move away.

Figure 7.4 Regionalisation data meta-matrix

Regional projects		Leaders' Input				Bureaucratic Input		Other actors		Critical resources	Outcome
	DATAR/ Minister AdT	President	PM	Minister of Interior	Minister of Economy	Prefects	Other officials	Elus	Regional actors		
R7	Rejection of regional administration									0	X
1952-1953	Some links with Brittany but otherwise no role. PM anti-planning	Pinay (PM and Min Fin) concentrates on budget; circular of Minister Interior (Brune) tells prefects that IGAME would not head group of departments		Gives power to prefects, not IGAME, to coordinate devt funds	Most prefects complain about IGAMEs 'not extra-ordinary'; but prefect Pisani starts department committee to mobilise local economic development	CGP sends Gravier to CELIB, says match local to CGP goals		Vichy settlement - Vichy MPs amnestied 3/53	Breton committee completes Plan, pushes regional plans with CGP/ DAT		Regional administration was rejected
R8	Official expansion committees									Major	*
1954-1955	'AdT -industrial conversion posed admin coordination problems'	PM wants economic progress by modern State. Moved Plan to Min Econ. Set up group of economic advisers. Decrees to approve one representative goodwill of local actors, set up regional devt SEMs,			Strong role on economic AdT; Decree on regl SEMs; IGEN given a role	Prefects and IGEN to select cttees, attend meetings with field heads	Hierarchical officials do not like reform, know all the tricks (Chaban)	Tolerated MF while he took responsibility for colonies	"Bretons as influential in decrees as Gravier "	"Regional action of MF, Faure, Mollet, result of crisis, but pragmatic"	Offers regional committees role to avoid excesses, keep goodwill
R9	Regional Action Programmes (PARs)									Major	**
1955	Wants 10 Parises; but lacks resources and powers on AdT	Says must develop under-used regions, and Plan. "Did practical reform; enabled State devt aid to be given to regional devt not just industrial conversion"		Decrees on PARs & funds - do not state for what territory, who draws up; creates SDR banks; National Council of State, admin, committees, 'first try at coherent apparatus' boundaries	Pisani says AdT needs reform of	Min Fin starts PAR; IGAME and IGEN argue; CGP left to do it.		Think about 'querelles de clocher' on funds, not the future	Expansion cttees chaired by 'cumuls': Pfilmin, Faure, Chaban, Pleven	Faure voted special econ, social powers: used to make the decrees	Mendes F, Faure strongly promote economic regionalism
R10	Economic programme regions									Major	**
1955	CGP -DAT group define 19 [Clementel] regions. 'No time for study'.	Radicals implement economic regionalism like Clementel			Creates SDR banks in large regions, do not help weakest regions.	IGAME: IGEN conflict on plans, prefects reluctant, job goes to CGP	Top CS groups wanted 7- 12 regions, like Perroux growth metropole	19 regions changed to 22 to pacify rival towns and administration		Faure voted special econ, social powers: used to make the decrees	Regions delineated; Agriculture, Public Works, designate regional official
R11	Preparation of regional progs (PARs)									0	0
1955	'Unsuited to AdT'. No role in CGP PARs. DAT starts own plans	Arrêté:Regional expansion committees to be consulted on SDRs		Econ minlster asks IGAMES to help organise LA consultation	IGENs asked to consult cttees. Pfilmin rejects DAT's plans	Say difficult to consult cttees because role defined re a department.	CGP control from Paris; new ministerial collaboration slow	CGP make little contact with elus for fear of regional demands	PARs, SDRs depended on elus or group taking initiative, and resources		Appeals for coordination between CGP and DAT never succeeded
R12	Relaunch of regional administrative reforms									0	0
1956-1957	Close relations with national CNER organised by Pfilmin	Fixed borders for 22 PAR regions around depts. Did not want regions		PAR and IGAME zones aligned. IGAMES made top prefects	Prefects, IGEN to encourage regional cttees; SDR can lend to firms	Prefects ignore IGAME. Corps warns prefects of risks from regions.	Regional boundaries decreed, but 30 field services did not comply	Department presidents complain that regional expansion committees approved. Leads to approval of many committees created by departments.	Regional reform outside revolutionary period, and pragmatic		"IGAME resisted by prefects, officials, PARs left to CGP".

NOTE changes of column headings relating to ministers from page 4 onwards.

Star rating: 0 to *** in order of level of institutional change towards regions; X = move away.

Figure 7.4 Regionalisation data meta-matrix

Regional projects		Leaders' Input				Bureaucratic input		Other actors		Critical resources	Outcome
	DATAR/ Minister AdT	President	PM	Minister of Interior	Minister of Economy	Prefects	Other officials	Elus	Regional actors		
R13	DAT regional plans									0	*
1957-1958	CCECRSP report says DAT unable to coordinate multi-admin action on AdT. DAT asks for regional development plans in 8/57 housing law			EEC Treaty assumes 'European-size regions'	Prefects, IGENs, service chiefs learn habit of meeting to draw up joint need resolute position on PAR; but department and central admins keep power on (Racine, 5/57) execution				Breton MOB demands financial autonomy and elected council	'Economic or functional regionalism not administrative regionalism'	CCECRSP report: AdT is a rationale to reform field services
R14	Relaunch of regional administrative reforms									System	*
1958-1959	CGP and DAT plans fused; Min, PM appoint 3 Regional commissioners	Region to aid F influence as well as own devtlopment; asked Bouloche and Mollet (& B-Lainé) to propose efficient administrative regrouping	Interior Minister appoints Reform Group which produces -after changes-	Reform Group which produces -after changes-	Reform Group which produces -after changes-	Some IGAME/ Prefects want regions; strong Prefect role in AdT. Most not	CCERSP '58: AdT needs coord. Prefect; all Ministers to use 22 regions	Petits notables subordinated to State AdT/ "made allies in restructuring"	Regional ctees consulted on plans. CGP drew up plans, monitored	De Gaulle voted full powers 6/58 to solve Algeria	PAR plans agreed by Plan, DAT, FDES, 19 Ministries, CNAT, in committee
R15	Interdepartmental Conference - CID									Major	*
1959-1960	No input	As PM, made decree to create CID; but said "Vive la Creuse"	Wants State-run larger depts, run by officials, but not to rival prefects	Chatenet: aim to improve depts not have regions; then replaced with Frey	MinFin's cut-backs and Gaullist expansion are in conflict	Prefects resisted CID; will accept it only if chair and site rotated	CS obstacles led PM to shelve department reform	Senate (of rural grands notables) set up group to veto reforms	Urban, industry forces gain access to govt through regional ctees	Algerian crisis led PM to restrict reform to 'inter-dept' coordination	Inter-department coordination under prefect starts
R16	Regional administrative boundaries									Major	*
1960-1961	DAT on Mairey boundary Commission.	"Tempted by provinces" when Debré writing 1958 Constitution	Wanted economic regions, not MP /metropole-led federalism	Mairey boundary commission wanted large depts or Euro-regions. Minister said one too old and other too young. So 22 regions remained		Upset by CID, attached to depts and to equality of prefects	Debré's staff (Monod...) acted from own ideas more than Debré's will	Depts assured that trad offices not harmed by "convenient units for AdT"	PM needed decree for May conference of regional committees	PM signs letters despite Algeria barricades "Business must go on".	Harmonisation on 21 'regl action areas' but no capitals. Admin given 6 months
R17	Regional coordinating prefect									0	*
1961	Plan for 8 Euro-regions. Minister did not appoint regional chiefs	Says Regional Prefect to be head of economic and social region	Insists Interior Minister nominates Chairs of CID where prefects resist	One prefect to have regional economic role: dept prefects to keep powers	IGEN lose role to Prefects once Prefects decide have to accept reform	Some prefects favourable to regions, but others boycott CIDs	Only Ponts, Construction, Agriculture name regional heads.	After 1959 changes made by orders /circulars, not parliament		Debré and Vth could accept IV's regions because not ideological	"CID collegiality a good first move, since other admin reform opposed"
R18	Official regional expansion committees									Electoral	*
1961	Economic devt needs plans developed with community, till autonomous	PM told CNER that ctees in CID areas would be recognised, so CNER would press admin for CID; wanted committees to be more legitimate, representative of TUs			Bloch-Lainé wanted regional groups for democratic planning	Prefects, IGEN asked to get regional ctees set up quickly	CGP said committee to give views on regional, but not State Plan	Rivalries meant many/ no ctees in some regions	CELIB refused decree rules. Kept both expansion ctee and élus' ctee	Bretons started direct action; their MPs pressed admin.	Revival of decree to approve regional committees and consult

NOTE changes of column headings relating to ministers from page 4 onwards.

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Figure 7.4 Regionalisation data meta-matrix

Regional projects		Leaders' Input				Bureaucratic Input		Other actors		Critical resources	Outcome	
		DATAR	President	PM, Min. Plan and AdT	Minister of Interior	Min. Admin Reform	Prefects	Other officials	Elus			Regional actors
R19	Regional administrative project										0	*
1962-1963	Pushes for large met-regions. Main planning link with regions	Appts Min Ad Reform: prefect to be regl chef; groups to be represented	Regionalises budget; takes on DATAR and CGP; staff monitor reform	Appts directeur de cabinet favourable to regional reform	Saw project as improving coherence of admin and economic policy	A few coordinating prefects wanted CID/CAR strengthened	CGP found regional plans difficult: used only West, East, Paris	Political class more hostile to de Gaulle after 1962 referendum	Regional unity rare; department a solid admin reality		DATAR and Minister start to prepare coordinated regional action	
R20	Reform of regional committees										0	0
1963	Wants controlled consultative regional institutions	Wants better socio-econ representation at regional level	Appts friend Guichard to DATAR, main reformer of region bodies	Wants representative cttee, not new body - or elus would object	Wants cttees with planning role, more representative, not new body	Some coordinating prefects wanted representative committees	CGP asserts that cttees a way to create new Gaullist local elites	Cttees were 'philately societies' , or political opposition	CNER favoured DATAR plans, then saw would lead to political control		President's and DATAR's Committee option for regions fails to be accepted	
R21	Introduction of CODERs										0	**
1964	Designed CODER; put under prefect; let expansion cttees die unfunded	Agreed CODER but amended: keep cttees; CODER to be much smaller	PM agreed Guichard plan: not rival plan of Min Int, Admin Reform, CGP	Against regional institution; would bring political problems	Liked DATAR proposal; added CODER powers, cttees to remain	Wanted weak regional body of local elus; to inform not consult	CGP said CODER will endanger Plan; will disappoint region	Grand élus on cttees feared link to CODER would lead to cttee capture	Guichard spent a year visiting chef-lieux 'idea of CODERs born then'		First official regional body - with exclusive consultation rights	
R22	Prefect of the Region										0	**
1964	Not much interest in prefectoral reform	Agreed provisions in Conseil: Prefect to be regional patron	Agrees regional prefect to stay as department prefect	Favoured regional reform; but regl prefect to stay as dept prefect.	Wanted fundamental reform: strong powers to regional prefect	Told by PM to tell elus, groups that AdT to be through regional action	LA divn of Min Int & CGPsorted out planning articles without conflict	Were told: "not a new admin tier", "keeps character of local councils"	Regionalising Plan a serious challenge to Prefect and his notables		"Region" used as noun for first time (not as adjective)	
R23	Implementation of 1964 reforms										0	0
1964-1966	Did not get political aim, but experience let it insert itself in provinces	Determined to deconcentrate, not decentralise.Told Prefects to confine by 1968, because committees to 'studies', and CODER to controlled consultation execution			"Winner of reform" Created interministerial mission to monitor execution	Circumscribed by existing relations: put dept élus on CODERs	Set up regional offices; but dept office refused to 'delegate' to it	Committee regionalist spirit replaced by "esprit de clocher"	Treason of notables: Left fought for dept when Gaullist helped regions		Trad department networks re-established at region level	

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Figure 7.4 Regionalisation data meta-matrix

Regional projects		Leaders' Input				Bureaucratic Input		Other actors		Critical resources	Outcome
	DATAR	President	PM, Min. Plan and AdT	Minister of Interior	Min. Admin Reform	Prefects	Other officials	Elus	Regional actors	Major	0
R24	De Gaulle's socio-economic regions										
1966-1968	Minister wants budget, AdT decentralised. Consults regions widely	Wants socio-econ regional assembly and referendum - abandoned	De Gaulle's project will fail. Agreement to elections instead		[Jeanneney against; a rushed text - would fail]	Only 2 of 22 regional prefects want a separate dept prefect	Rocard, Jean Moulin, DATAR, Pisani vaunting regionalism	"Admin cannot ignore Chirac and Chademagor in Limousin".	Functional regionalism brought more regional demands	'Conseil des ministres held in middle of Paris insurrection'	De Gaulle withdraws it on Pompidou's advice
	Min AdT		PM	Interior							
R25	Regional referendum									0	0
1968-1969	Minister to propose referendum Q; DATAR makes suggestions	Wants referendum on elus-socio-econ assemblies; and prefect to execute.	"Not against" but not for. Wants prefect to execute, non-elected council	Fear of public disorder, so gave key role to Prefects	'Clemenceau' regional project to remove outdated admin divisions	Want to keep old balance of appts, methods; and own ranks.		PS wants to keep want role of dept. Grands notables want prefect to run	Regionalists said reform inadequate; undemocratic; should vote no	Referendum delayed; gave Senators time to campaign	Guichard thought CODER should balance admin but could not impose idea
	DATAR			AdT							
R26	Regional deconcentration									Electoral	0
1970	Back to admin deconcentration; assumes will have economic regions	Learns lesson. Overrules PM. Functional de-concentration - Union of Depts	Wants regionalisation: gave admin and finance powers to Regl Prefects.	Rural Commissioners use regional funds as DATAR not dept decides	Junior minister: region must not become a State - break up France	Not able to control field officials	Paris admin resist DATAR's transfer of responsibility to R. Prefects.	Senate able to persuade the local elus that should not have regions	16 regions want to try Chaban's regionalisation experiment	Servan-Schreiber relaunched regional idea in byelections	No de-centralisation, more powers to Regional Prefect
R27	Act on EPR regional bodies (CR + CESR)									Electoral	**
1972	No role in Act. Implements it. 11 regional missions.	Draws up with his advisers: wants trad elus to take shock of modernisation	PM and regional demands push Act on reluctant President; Frey; traditional elus	No role. Some city planning OREAMs enlarged to regions	Cautious reformer Frey asked to write a narrow law.	New ex-ENA Regl Prefects appointed, interested in regl econ devt	INSEE helps DATAR set up regional economic observatories	Reform had to please both centrist Senate notables and Gaullists	CODER did not satisfy, but maintained aspirations.	JJSS's candidacy forces reform, but has to go through Parl	Regions now economic quangos: centre-left promise political regions
	DATAR			Interior & AdT							
R28	Promise then halt to regionalisation									Electoral	0
1974-1975	Wants regions to steer decent-ralisation; proposes Plan Contracts	3/75 says wants regions. 11/75 says region not to replace other tiers	3/75 says will decentralise; 3/76 says CR will not be real authorities	Regional Prefect given prefects' powers on dept funds	JJ.SS appointed but PM soon asked Pres to sack him	Philip: Must work with local elus even if not on CR. Elected CR should decide but not execute (or will not be given power)	PS introduce regional Bills; Faure, Gaullists want bigger role for regions	Elus on Council represent Depts. Many CR hostile to CESR.	Corsican riots; regionalists lose in 1973 elections	Councils the representative of departments, more than regions.	

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Figure 7.4 Regionalisation data meta-matrix

Regional project		Leaders' Input				Bureaucratic Input		Other actors			
	DATAR	President	PM	Plan and AdT	Minister of Interior	Prefects	Other officials	Elus	Regional actors	Critical resources	Outcome
R29	Blois programme									Electoral	*
1978	Proposes new regional powers; issues regional Scenario	Talks of decentralisation - then 1972 Act to be tried for 10 years first	Negotiates Blois Program: wants region's economic and social role to grow	Lecanuet asks DATAR: reflect on regional inferences of Guichard report		Some regional prefects annual Regl Council acts. Others let them overstep law	Bloch-Lainé still wants metropolises policy. Paris too large	Pressurise to increase CR funds. Senate bill on region's own economic plan	Hostility between depts or main towns in some regions	Economic crisis: more powers to region. Servan-Schreiber pressure	EPR economic development role grows, some develop political identity.
R30	Bonnet Bill, Barre decrees		PM and AdT							0	*
1980	"DATAR and Regl Comms short-circuit Prefects, EPR but good work"	"Use 1972 Act fully". Gives Regl Council new powers to fund econ devt	Blois proposals dropped after 1978 part elections. 1980 starts intermin review of Act; 1981 decrees extend CR powers but keep EPR status	Bonnet Bill on local freedom - but not region. Senate agree then silence		Some prefects the regional coordinator of economic action	Vigouroux Report on EPRs - to do both more and less than 1972 law	Senate Bill for regions. PS introduce Bill in Nat Assembly	Giraud (Ile-de-France): decentralise to regions, to responsabilise		Dynamic and economic need pulling EPRs further than 1972 law intended
R31	Defferre Act of 2/3/82		PM	Plan and AdT						System	***
1982	No input	Wanted elected regions, decentralisation; pro-department and prefects	Wants decentralisation to regions, though a big-city actor	Rocard pro-region; wanted to participate but had little to do with it.	For big cities vs Prefects; wants responsible, free, elected regions	Defferre would abolish but Constitution, President, elus protect them	Gaullists: elected CR threat to national unity; Mitterrandistes for departments; Rocardians regions; Mauroy wants large regions: Nord and Picardy in 1981 against	No regional contributions from grassroots in 1981		Priority to rapid institutional reform and transfer of power to elus	Transfer of power; political regions created
R32	Planning Reform Act									0	**
1982-1983	Had Contracts idea. Coordinated; but pressed from top and below.	Pushed Rocard to more reformist texts than wanted, in Conseil	Agreed in CIATs. Asked friend to oversee negotiation.	Gave DATAR coordination role. Weak. No Plan contacts in Ministries	Had history of arguments with a Parisian DATAR	Negotiate with regions, and propose State priorities	Ministries go direct to regions. Promote own sectoral plans	Some notables able to modify Contract after CIAT by direct access	Mostly unused to planning. Want powers but often overwhelmed	Technical debate by cabinets, administration, a few grand notables	State-Region Plan Contracts a concrete role that defined regions
R33	Implementation of Defferre's reform									Electoral	0
1982-1986	Missions go to regions; new regional commissioners created.	Told Defferre to let ministers keep more powers; Prefect useful against elus	Devolved regional aids to regions.	Delors, Fabius, Rocard, Lang want to keep grip on their budgets'	Says will give as many new powers to Prefects as give to regions	"Directs" field admin. Regain power because electorally useful to Government	First against decentralisation; then senior officials use for career	While wait for CR elections, Pres of dept becomes "new strong man".	Until election, Council represented by MPs and local councillors	Right won Depts 1982: 'would be naive to give the powers to others'	Ministers fight loss of power: 'classic French politico-admin reform'
R34	Election of Regional Councils									Electoral	*
1986	No role	Promotes PR by depts to save depts and give best national effect for PS	Opposed to regions. Wants PR by dept to stop regional 'dukes'	(Defferre) No input known	Presents Bill: "Department deeply rooted in ancient history"			Most PS want departmental election; a few PR by dept; Right opposes PR	Big cities became de jure as well as de facto powerful	Government doing badly in polls, want to minimise losses	Electoral system reinforces department strategies of councillors

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Figure 7.5 Regionalisation analysis charts in date order

Regional instruments or projects			DAT/ DATAR	Political leaders					Bureaucrats		Other actors		'Crisis'	Outcome	
				Pres- ident	PM	Interior	Economy	AdT	Reform	Prefects	Other officials	Elus			Regional actors
VICHY STATE															
R1	1941	Vichy regional administration	√	√	√	√	√	√		X	√	0	√	System	*
PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT															
R2	1944	Regional commissioner	√		√	X	0	√		0	X	X	X	System	*
R3	1946	Commissioners abolished	0		0	√	0	X		X	X	X	√	0	X
FOURTH REPUBLIC															
R4	1947	Creation of IGAME	√	X?	0	√	√	0		X	√	√	0	Major	*
R5	1948	Reform under IGAME	√	0	√	√	√	√		X	X	0	√	0	*
R6	1948	Economic regionalisation	√	0	√	0	√	√		0	√	+	√	0	*
R7	1953	Rejection of regional admin	0	X?	0	X	0	0		+	+	X	√	0	X
R8	1954	Official expansion committees	0	0	√	0	√	√		0	X	X	√	Major	*
R9	1955	Regional action programmes (PARs)	√	0	√	0	√	0		+	√	X	√	Major	**
R10	1955	Programme regional boundaries	√	0	√	0	√	√		X	√	X	0	Major	**
R11	1955	Preparation of PARs	0	0	√	√	√	0		X	X	0	√	0	0
R12	1956	Relaunch of PARs	√	0	X	√	√	0		X	X	X	0	0	0
R13	1957	DAT regional development plans	√	0	0	0	0	+		0	0	0	√	0	*
R14	1958	Relaunch of administrative reforms	√	0	√	√	0	√		+	√	√	√	System	*
PRESIDENT DE GAULLE															
R15	1960	Interdepartmental conference	0	√	√	+	0	√		X	X	X	√	Major	*
R16	1960	Regional boundaries	√	√	√	√	0	√		0	√	+	√	Major	*

Codes: 0 = no view/input; √ = view/input favouring regionalisation; X = opposition to regionalisation; + = mixed views.
Star rating: 0 to *** in order of level of change in region's favour. X = move away.

Figure 7.5 Regionalisation analysis charts in date order

Regional instruments or projects			DAT/ DATAR	Political leaders					Bureaucrats		Other actors		'Crisis'	Outcome	
				Pres- ident	PM	Interior	Economy	AdT	Reform	Prefects	Other officials	Elus			Regional actors
R17	1961	Coordinating prefect	0	√	√	÷	0	√		÷	÷	0	√	0	*
R18	1961	Official regional committees	√	0	√	0	0	√		÷	√	X	√	Electoral	*
R19	1962	Regional administrative project	√	√	√	√	√	√	√	÷	X	X	X	0	*
R20	1963	Reform of regional committees	√	√	0	X	0	0	√	÷	X	X	÷	0	0
R21	1964	Introduction of CODERs	√	√	√	X	0	√	√	X	X	÷	÷	0	**
R22	1964	Prefect of the Region	0	√	0	√	0	0	√	÷	√	X	0	0	**
R23	1964	Execution of 1964 decrees	√	0	÷	√	0	÷	√	÷	X	X	√	0	0
R24	1968	De Gaulle's socio-econ regions	√	√	X	0	0	√	0	X	√	√	√	Major	0
R25	1969	Regional referendum	√	√	0	X	0	√	√	X	0	X	X	0	0
PRESIDENT POMPIDOU															
R26	1970	Regional deconcentration	√	√	√	0	0	√	X?	÷	X	X	√	Electoral	*
R27	1972	1972 Act on EPRs	0	√	√	0	0	√	√	√	√	√	√	Electoral	**
PRESIDENT GISCARD D'ESTAING															
R28	1974	Regional promise and halt	√	÷	÷	√	0	√	√	÷	0	√	÷	Electoral	0
R29	1978	Blois programme of the Right	√	÷	√	0	√	√		÷	√	√	÷	Electoral	*
R30	1980	Bonnet bill, Barre decrees	0	÷	÷	0	0	÷		√	√	√	√	0	*
PRESIDENT MITTERRAND															
R31	1982	Defferre Act 1982	0	√	√	√	0	√		X	0	÷	0	System	***
R32	1982	Planning Reform Act	√	√	√	√	X	√		√	X	÷	÷	0	**
R33	1982	Implementation of Defferre Act	√	X	√	÷	X	X		√	÷	X	÷	Electoral	0
R34	1986	Election of regional councils	0	X	X	X	0	0		0	0	X	√	Electoral	*

Codes: 0 = no view/input; √ = view/input favouring regionalisation; X = opposition to regionalisation; ÷ = mixed views.
Star rating: 0 to *** in order of level of change in region's favour. X = move away.

Second, the link between leadership aims and output is not just statistical but supported by evidence of their active involvement in many decisions. For example, 'it was a personal idea of [Prime Minister] Michel Debré in April 1960', to use an announcement to the national council of regional committees (CNER) to 'bounce' the prefects into activating the Interdepartmental Conferences.⁵¹ In the 1964 reforms President de Gaulle asked two *cabinet* members to monitor progress on two specific outcomes he wanted.⁵² In 1969 President de Gaulle sent the newly-created Prime Minister Couve and Minister Jeanneney 'a letter fixing a programme of reforms, in which he assigned the creation of regions and the reform of the Senate to [Jeanneney]'.⁵³ Minister of Interior Defferre himself decided and insisted that his decentralisation bill should be presented very soon after the 1981 election, even if it could not be finely-prepared.⁵⁴ These were not decisions taken in the name of the leader by other actors.

Opposition to reforms by four groups of actors in this policy-making community (prefects, other officials, *élus*, other regional actors), certainly had an impact on outcomes. Over half those producing no significant change had been opposed by two or more groups (5 of 8), in contrast to only a third of those that succeeded (8 of 24). Nonetheless, though the prefectural *corps* had opposed half the regionalisation reforms that failed (4 of 8), its opposition to nearly half those that made largest changes (3 of 7) did not stop the political leadership achieving them. The *élus* successfully opposed or reduced in scope a dozen reforms, especially the empowerment of the regional expansion committees.⁵⁵ Nevertheless, most successful reforms were introduced despite local political objections, perhaps with some concessions such as by increasing the number of regions. Successful attempts to strengthen regions were more likely to be associated with events such as elections or system change. But the tendency is slight, and there is a noteworthy contrast between the Defferre Act, expressly introduced in 1981 to gain any advantage from the 'honeymoon period', and the almost equally significant 1964 reforms, prepared after the crises of 1958-62 were settled.

Figure 7.6 contrasts the instruments in which DAT and DATAR intervened. Each was involved in about two-thirds of projects before or after 1963. However the reforms engaging DATAR were more likely to end in failure, partly because they were more ambitious, 'system-changing' attempts by President de Gaulle to introduce a different type of non-party, socio-professional representation. Though these issues need further exploration in the qualitative analysis below, the statistical exercise indicates that political leaders in a large majority of cases implemented the changes they proposed to territorial

⁵¹ Grémion, C. (1979), p.135 and p.135n, quoting Debré's *cabinet* aide.

⁵² Aubert (1977), p.287; Grémion, C. (1979), p.147.

⁵³ Jeanneney, J.M. (1992) 'Histoire du projet de loi référendaire', in L.Hamon (ed) *La Région de De Gaulle à nos jours* (Maison des sciences de l'homme), 71-91, p.73. The letter was published in *Le Figaro*.

⁵⁴ Giuily (1992), p.118.

⁵⁵ Grémion, C. (1979), p.166.

Figure 7.6 The intervention of DAT and DATAR

Regional projects		Political leaders							Bureaucrats		Other actors			
		DAT	Pres-ident	PM	Interior	Econ-omy	AdT	Reform	Prefects	Others	Elus	Regional actors	Crisis	Outcome
R12	1956	√	0	X	√	√	0		X	X	X	0	0	0
R1	1941	√	√	√	√	√	√		X	√	0	√	System	*
R2	1944	√		√	X	0	√		0	X	X	X	System	*
R4	1947	√	X?	0	√	√	0		X	√	√	0	Major	*
R5	1948	√	0	√	√	√	√		X	X	0	√	0	*
R6	1948	√	0	√	0	√	√		0	√	+	√	0	*
R13	1957	√	0	0	0	0	+		0	0	0	√	0	*
R14	1958	√	0	√	√	0	√		+	√	√	√	System	*
R16	1960	√	√	√	√	0	√		0	√	+	√	Major	*
R18	1961	√	0	√	0	0	√		+	√	X	√	Electoral	*
R19	1962	√	√	√	√	√	√	√	+	X	X	X	0	*
R9	1955	√	0	√	0	√	0		+	√	X	√	Major	**
R10	1955	√	0	√	0	√	√		X	√	X	0	Major	**
R3	1946	0		0	√	0	X		X	X	X	√	0	X
R7	1953	0	X?	0	X	0	0		+	+	X	√	0	X
R11	1955	0	0	√	√	√	0		X	X	0	√	0	0
R8	1954	0	0	√	0	√	√		0	X	X	√	Major	*
R15	1960	0	√	√	+	0	√		X	X	X	√	Major	*
R17	1961	0	√	√	+	0	√		+	+	0	√	0	*
		DATAR												
R20	1963	√	√	0	X	0	0	√	+	X	X	+	0	0
R23	1964	√	0	+	√	0	+	√	+	X	X	√	0	0
R24	1968	√	√	X	0	0	√	0	X	√	√	√	Major	0
R25	1969	√	√	0	X	0	√	√	X	0	X	X	0	0
R28	1974	√	+	+	√	0	√	√	+	0	√	+	Electoral	0
R26	1970	√	√	√	0	0	√	X?	+	X	X	√	Electoral	*
R29	1978	√	+	√	0	√	√		+	√	√	+	Electoral	*
R21	1964	√	√	√	X	0	√	√	X	X	+	+	0	**
R32	1982	√	√	√	√	X	1		√	X	+	+	0	**
R33	1982	0	X	√	X	0	0		0	0	X	√	Electoral	0
R30	1980	0	+	+	0	0	...		√	√	√	√	0	*
R34	1986	0	X	X	X	0	0		0	0	X	√	Electoral	*
R22	1964	0	√	0	√	0	0	√	+	√	X	0	0	**
R27	1972	0	√	√	0	0	√	√	√	√	√	√	Electoral	**
R31	1982	0	√	√	√	0	√		X	0	+	0	System	***

Notes: √ = input favouring regionalisation (of whatever type); X = opposition to regionalisation

0 = no view/ input; + = group has mixed views; ? = less certain interpretation

Star rating: 0 to *** of level of change in regions' favour; X = move away

institutions, even if most changes were incremental or reduced in scale by opposition (which could come from within the leadership). They met considerable opposition from those holding power at territorial level, whether bureaucrats or local politicians, but it could be overcome.

EXERCISING POLITICAL LEADERSHIP

Qualitative analysis within Blondel's scheme can specify better the conditions in which leaders took and implemented the decisions in the regionalisation process; while the findings from the quantitative survey ensure that the examples cited typify a more general pattern.

The positional resources of political leaders

Overall, the Constitutional changes of 1958 did not much help leaders in this domain. Projects occurred about once a year on average in both Republics, and about three-quarters achieved some success in each case; even the incidence of really major reforms was similar. However the most significant regional reforms of the Fourth Republic (those of Mendès-France and Faure in 1954-55), were made under special powers granted by parliament; whereas the equivalent *Ordonnance*-making power in the 1958 Constitution did not help Debré when he used it in 1959 to set up a Paris regional body, because it was not obeyed by the councils and ministries it concerned; Debré had to seek parliamentary authority with the Act of August 1961.⁵⁶ Defferre would have used the *Ordonnance* procedure for his initial decentralisation bill to save time, but rejected the idea as politically-unsustainable once the Left gained a large parliamentary majority.⁵⁷ His desire to abolish the prefect was constrained by Article 72, but in any case Mitterrand argued that the State needed this official on its side in face of the local *élus*.⁵⁸ The different Constitutional contexts therefore made little practical difference to the outcome of these projects.

The configuration of the party system weakened leaders of the Fourth Republic. The frequent changes of prime minister could bring policy reversals, as when Pinay's conservative coalition took over from centrists in 1952 and rejected their moves towards a regionalised administration; it announced that the IGAMEs would not head groups of departments, nor run regional conferences of field officials; and it gave more powers to department prefects.⁵⁹ The President, Vincent Auriol, intervened on this occasion (as on the same theme in 1947-48), 'as a guarantor of State authority'. He told the Finance Minister, Edgar Faure, that the prefectural *corps* had prepared a bill in 1948 to deconcentrate functions to the prefects.⁶⁰ Regionalisation nevertheless tended to progress because there was much

⁵⁶ Debré (1988), p.168.

⁵⁷ Giuily (1992), p.119.

⁵⁸ Favier (1990), p.146.

⁵⁹ Circular of 21 May 1952, Mény (1974), p.354; Decree 26 Sept 1953; Lemasurier (1954), p.380.

⁶⁰ Auriol, V. (1971) *Journal du Septennat 1947-1954, vol.7, 1953-54*, ed. J.Ozouf (Colin), p.332; letter of 16 Aug. 1953; and Auriol, V. (1970) *Journal du Septennat 1947-1954, vol.1, 1947* ed. P.Nora (Colin), p.544, 14 Nov. 1947.

continuity of personnel between coalitions,⁶¹ and especially of centrist politicians (Radicals, UDSR, MRP) favourable to administrative regionalisation and/or *aménagement du territoire*.⁶² When Moch, Queuille, Faure and Claudius-Petit returned to government they took up again their own or each other's projects. For instance Queuille as Minister of Interior in 1950 made the IGAME the prefect of the chief town of an 'IGAME-region', and then as Prime Minister-and-Minister of Interior in 1951 gave ministers authority to delegate some powers to the IGAMEs, while his fellow-ministers of Reconstruction (Claudius-Petit) and the economy (Petsche and Faure) adopted the IGAME boundaries for the DAT planners and the IGENs (economic inspectors-general).⁶³ Nonetheless, poor cohesion between leaders in these governments restricted reform.

The Fifth Republic's Constitution and party system configuration together greatly influenced which leader's views prevailed on regionalisation reforms, the decisions being ultimately in the President's hands, except during periods of cohabitation, as was evident in the previous chapter and as numerous texts have shown for other domains.⁶⁴ The projects with the strongest outcomes for regions were all actively supported by presidents, though this support did not guarantee success, as de Gaulle's projects on socio-economic representation showed.

Prime Minister Debré implemented the 1958-59 decrees that Prime Minister de Gaulle had issued, inaugurating administrative reform within existing departments and PAR-region boundaries, even though Debré had argued for a decade for a territorial restructuring into 40 to 50 super-departments for economic and administrative purposes;⁶⁵ and this despite Debré being premier at a time when the President was fully engaged in foreign and colonial policy. Although de Gaulle took Prime Minister Pompidou's advice not to hold a referendum on representation on 27 May 1968, but to call a parliamentary election instead,⁶⁶ he then exercised his right to appoint a different prime minister, who was immediately asked to prepare a referendum on the same subject. President Pompidou himself openly over-ruled his Prime Minister Chaban-Delmas, who had said in September 1970 that he had 'not abandoned regionalisation'.⁶⁷ Chaban was contradicted by Pompidou in October 1970 who said the 'region must be ..a union of departments';⁶⁸ and that he himself would decide the outcome of regional reform,⁶⁹ and did so with his advisers (creating the EPRs).⁷⁰ Similarly,

⁶¹ Williams (1972), p.430, puts the total number of *ministres* in the Fourth Republic at about 50.

⁶² Radicals: Marie, Queuille, Mendès-France, Faure, Chaban; UDSR: Pleven, Claudius-Petit; MRP: Bidault, Pflimlin, Buron; responsible between them for a dozen regionalisation instruments 1948-55.

⁶³ Decrees 19 May 1950 and 24 May 1951.

⁶⁴ Massot (1979, 1987, 1988), Elgie (1993, 1995), Hayward (1993).

⁶⁵ Debré (1988), p.176; Debré (1956) p.311.

⁶⁶ Alexandre, P. (1972) *The Duel: De Gaulle and Pompidou* (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin), p.171; Jeanneney (1992), p.73.

⁶⁷ Chaban-Delmas (1997), p.435, p.441; Ashford (1982), p.37p.

⁶⁸ In a speech at Lyon, 30 Oct. 1970. Essig (1979), pp.111-12.

⁶⁹ Machin (1977), p.60.

though Prime Minister Barre negotiated the 'Blois common programme' in January 1978 that proposed increasing the powers of the EPRs, Giscard proclaimed in December 1978 (at the Vichy conference 'celebrating' DATAR's 15 years), that 'the issue is not to increase their powers but for them to exercise them fully'.⁷¹ Despite Mitterrand leaving the Defferre Act 1982 very much to his colleague at the Ministry of Interior, his wishes as well as those of the Prime Minister determined the principles of the Act.

'Defferre essentially preferring the commune... Pierre Mauroy and his chief aide... being primarily regionalists, while the President... loved to reaffirm his attachment to the department council and the cantons'... [Defferre's aides] 'received very firm instructions to decentralise equally to all three local administrative tiers'.⁷²

Prime Minister Fabius opposed the regional tier because it could create 'regional *grands ducs*', but in choosing in 1985 an electoral system for regions in which councillors represented departments, this 'bizarre choice...satisfied the presidential concern to ensure the survival of departments'.⁷³

In the Fourth Republic Economic and Finance Ministers led many of the successful moves in the regionalisation process, which had developed more rapidly after the Minister of *Aménagement du territoire*, Claudius-Petit, promoted expansion committees and regional economic development from 1950.⁷⁴ In the Fifth Republic they were minor players even if the prime concern of the administrative reforms was efficient coordination of State investment. Raymond Barre, as Prime Minister and Economic Minister in 1977 issued a decree extending the economic powers of the EPRs. In 1982, Delors as Finance Minister was only the most prominent of ministers who resisted transferring spending to regions. 'Delors, Fabius, Rocard and Lang are still opposed to decentralisation. They intend to keep their grip on the whole of their budget'.⁷⁵ The President told Defferre 'to be realistic' and to 'adjust the balance between ministers and territorial authorities'.⁷⁶ While Mitterrand generally left Defferre to organise the decentralisation bills as the Minister wanted, he set limits on Defferre's aims where they clashed with those of ministers on budgets or his own on prefects and departments.

Initiatives in the Fourth Republic and even in the Fifth Republic were more likely to succeed if they did not involve the Minister of Interior - such as the 1972 Act on EPRs written under President Pompidou's guidance by the Minister of Administrative Reform,

⁷⁰ Archives nationales [Pompidou] (1996) Dossiers of secretary-general and conseillers: 5AG2/2/ 61, 66, 71, 82, 253, 258: conseils and comités restreints: 10 June 1970, 7 Apr. 1971, 22 Sept. 1971, 12 July 1972 on the regional reform; draft bill on regions, variants of the draft bill and amendments.

⁷¹ Rémond (1999), p.26; Phlipponneau (1981), p.17.

⁷² Giuily (1992), pp.119-20.

⁷³ Chevallier (2002), p.324, and also Attali, J. (1993a) Verbatim I: 1981-86 (Fayard), p.755, p.789, p.794: entries for 15 Jan, 26 March and 3 April 1985.

⁷⁴ Randet (1994), p.60; Bloch-Lainé (1977), p.141.

⁷⁵ Attali (1993), p.99: entry for 27 July 1981; and see Grémion, C. (1987), p.242, p.245.

⁷⁶ Grémion, C. (1987), p.246.

Frey.⁷⁷ As Interior Minister in 1961 Frey had to be 'reminded' firmly by Prime Minister Debré to implement the Interdepartmental Conferences, and told what tactics to use.⁷⁸ At the same time, those instruments strongly promoted by the minister were a little more likely to succeed. The Defferre Act of 1982 was pursued with vigour by the Interior Minister (his two aides on the bill were constantly in parliament),⁷⁹ while working within limits set by the other political leaders.

During the two-year preparation of the 1964 decrees Prime Minister Pompidou was also Minister for *Aménagement du territoire*, with DATAR, led by Guichard, playing a large part in the package. In 1969 Guichard as Minister for *Aménagement du territoire* drew up a proposal for the regional referendum but it was rejected for its brevity (De Gaulle wanted a detailed referendum text that would not need parliamentary debate).⁸⁰ Barre as Prime Minister and Minister for *Aménagement du territoire* added increments to the funding powers of the EPRs. In 1982 Rocard and the *délégué*, Bernard Attali, worked together on a reform of planning that gave regional councils a strong role in determining State capital expenditure in their area.⁸¹

The evidence from this chapter confirmed that in the Fifth Republic (apart from cohabitation), presidents set the overall goals and then intervene to the extent they determine, so that prime ministers and ministers have to work within those constraints.

The influence of bureaucratic organisations

The key question for Blondel in considering bureaucratic organisations was whether these vital instruments 'helped' or 'hindered'.⁸² It would be posed more acutely for the DAT, a conventional ministerial bureaucracy, than for DATAR, which could be adapted to a political leadership's needs, as previous chapters have shown. DAT participated in many regionalisation projects, but its contribution to them was weak. It 'very early encouraged regional initiatives by expansion committees - because it was unable to carry them out effectively itself'.⁸³ Though DAT was vice-chair of the group selecting regional boundaries in 1955-56, the 19 or 22 regions agreed did not help its planning of development within the larger IGAME -region. The regional programmes promoted an administrative structure that was not based on any serious criterion and has paralysed the establishment of a healthy urban structure.⁸⁴ DAT's very incapacity to coordinate regional planning stimulated the Gaullist reform of regional administrative structures.

⁷⁷ Machin (1977), p.60.

⁷⁸ Grémion, C. (1979), p.137, quoting Monod.

⁷⁹ L.Favoreu, 'Contribution' in Gilbert, G. and Delcamp, A. (eds) (1993), *La décentralisation dix ans après* (LGDJ), 16-22, p.21.

⁸⁰ Jeanneney (1992), p.75, p.93.

⁸¹ F.Grosrichard, *Le Monde*, 29 Sept. 1988.

⁸² Blondel (1987), p.149.

⁸³ Pouyet (1968). p.23

⁸⁴ Labasse, J. (1966) *L'Organisation de l'espace* (Hermann), p.568.

DATAR played the lead role in preparing the representation elements of the 1964 reforms and it gave de Gaulle substantial help with his referendum proposals.⁸⁵ However, the 1964 reforms did not enfranchise the 'modernising' elites as both DATAR and the political leadership expected,⁸⁶ leading DATAR, with the Prime Minister's authority, to appoint Regional Commissioners outside the Regional Prefect's direct control (see Chapter 4).⁸⁷ The decentralising views DATAR promoted from 1968 did not fit the 'Jacobin centralising concepts' that underpinned the Act of 1972 on EPRs, and DATAR played no part in its drafting;⁸⁸ though 'it was very active in putting the new arrangements in place'.⁸⁹ Rocard and therefore DATAR had no role in the Defferre Act of 1982, and the Act took no account of *aménagement du territoire*. But DATAR had developed a technique of negotiating contracts with local authorities, and transferred this procedure to the new decentralised national planning and State-Region Plan Contracts that Rocard introduced in the Planning Reform Act of 1982.⁹⁰ Though DATAR participated in about the same proportion of initiatives as had the DAT, it played a more central role when it intervened. However, leaders could leave it out of their reforms, including some of those that produced the greatest change, when the *aménagement du territoire* that DATAR represented clashed with their own aims.

The *prefectoral corps* was more often against regionalisation initiatives than for them, and even though these initiatives were eventually put into effect, the *corps*'s protests and delaying tactics were a constraint on political leaders. The *corps* had to accept the creation of the IGAMEs approved by parliament in 1948 in a time of crisis, but its 'fear that the IGAMEs were regional prefects in disguise',⁹¹ led the IGAMEs to remain in Paris until 1950, paying their areas 'flying visits' (*IGAMEs-volants*).⁹² Though an *arrêté* of 13 July 1956 made the IGAMEs responsible for drawing up the regional action programmes, those IGAMEs who called meetings met strong resistance from 'the prefects and the field services' and 'the text of 13 July 1956 was not in fact implemented'.⁹³ When the *Comité central d'enquête*... recommended that administrative coordination at regional level be strengthened, the *prefectoral corps* asked the government :

'to create no new intermediate level of authority...(whether regional prefectures or regional services) between [the Prefect] and the Government; [and] not to superimpose...any new regional units...; and to beware of the 'regional mystique'.⁹⁴

⁸⁵ Aubry, F.X. (1988) *Essai sur la Décentralisation* (Journal des Communes), p.131, Camous, P. (1973) 'DATAR: dixième anniversaire', *Revue administrative*, 152, 222-3, p.233; Essig (1979), p.110, Grémion (1979), *passim*; Grémion, C. (1992), p.38; Jeanneney (1992), pp.82-83.

⁸⁶ Grémion, C. (1979), p.148, pp.167-9.

⁸⁷ Grémion, P. (1976), p.37.

⁸⁸ Lacour, C. (1983) *Aménagement du territoire et développement régional*, 2nd edn (Daloz), p.57.

⁸⁹ Essig (1979), p.114.

⁹⁰ Charlet (1976), p.216; Balme and Bonnet (1995), p.53.

⁹¹ 12 Dec. 1947, 14 Jan. 1948. Mény (1974), p.352.

⁹² Lemasurier (1954), p.378.

⁹³ Monier (1965), p.30, p.62.

⁹⁴ Text of July 1958 quoted in Machin (1977), pp.52-3.

De Gaulle's decrees of 1958 required common ministerial regional boundaries and an Interdepartmental Conference coordinated by a prefect. The implementing texts were prepared by members of Debré's *cabinet* but they 'did not dare' designate a regional coordinator;⁹⁵ and the prefects did not choose one. Debré had to 'issue a sharp reminder to the Interior Minister, Frey, that the government had agreed this reform'.⁹⁶ Prefects had approved and organised the 22 regional economic committees by January 1962.⁹⁷ However they were worried again by the CODERs proposed by DATAR in 1964. They wanted a weak regional conference of local *élus*,⁹⁸ and as already seen, in their appointments to the CODERs local *élus* predominated. The 1972 reform creating the EPRs gave new economic tasks to Regional Prefects. At the same time a large number of retirements and promotions brought in younger Prefects, more interested in 'regional solutions to economic development'.⁹⁹ There had long been a few in the *corps*, like the former prefect Pisani, arguing for changes to budgets, taxation and administrative habits not just boundaries.¹⁰⁰ By 1958 some IGAMEs and prefects, including Camous who went to DATAR in 1963, wanted radical regional reform and a strong role for prefects in regional development.¹⁰¹ Philip recognised in 1968, as Regional Prefect of Limousin, that he could not ignore regional priorities negotiated between the Socialist Chadenagor and the Gaullist Chirac even if they were not 'what the administration wanted'. By 1976 he foresaw elected regional councils making decisions, even if power to execute them was likely to remain in the hands of prefects.¹⁰² The Interior Minister Defferre kept the prefectural *corps* away from the preparation of his decentralisation bill in 1981-82.¹⁰³ However, after the Left lost heavily in the departmental elections of 1982, the government 'needed the prefects for preparing the municipal elections'. Prefects were 'compensated' for decentralisation with further deconcentration from Paris ministries.¹⁰⁴

The prefects were not the only bureaucratic group to resist regionalisation, especially the control of State spending at regional level that the reforms would facilitate. Many other ministries had deliberately obstructed political leaders' efforts to create regional coordinating structures.¹⁰⁵ They had kept the functionally-useful regional divisions of Vichy but varied the boundaries, 'enabling them to resist change'.¹⁰⁶ Thirty field services did not adopt the

⁹⁵ Lanversin (1970), p.55.

⁹⁶ Grémion, P. (1976), p.122.

⁹⁷ Monier (1965), pp.72-4.

⁹⁸ Grémion, C. (1979), p.180, p.185.

⁹⁹ Machin (1977), p.101.

¹⁰⁰ Pisani, E. [E.P.] (1956) 'Avant-propos' *Revue française de science politique*, 6/2, 262-6 (1956), p.262.

¹⁰¹ Machin (1977), p.53.

¹⁰² Philip (1976), 25-7.

¹⁰³ Nakano, K. (2000) 'The role of ideology and elite networks in the decentralisation reforms in 1980s France' *West European Politics*, 23/3, 97-114, pp.108-11.

¹⁰⁴ Attali (1993), p.388, 22 March 1982.

¹⁰⁵ Phlipponneau (1981), p.28.

¹⁰⁶ Monod and Castelbajac (1971), pp.47-8.

regional boundaries decreed in 1956 until after Debré renewed the decree in 1960. Only three ministries (Public Works, Agriculture, Construction), had appointed regional officials to the Interdepartmental Conferences by 1963.¹⁰⁷ Departmental field offices refused to 'delegate' to the regional officials,¹⁰⁸ while central ministries handicapped DATAR's planning by resisting the deconcentration to regional prefects that Chaban decreed in 1970.¹⁰⁹ However, if the actions of the technical officials were important, no other bureaucratic group was as able as the prefects to constrain the political leadership on regionalisation, because none was as crucial to monitoring implementation or so close to local politicians.

The constraints posed by other policy actors

Pierre Grémion and Jean-Pierre Worms showed the networks of complicity between the prefects and 'their' *élus*, in which each actor supported the other in the promotion of their joint goals.¹¹⁰ Like the prefects, therefore, in both Republics *élus* were more often against regionalisation moves than for them. The first post-war department councillors, especially with the experience of Vichy, did not like having a State official at a territorial level that was not controlled by elected people,¹¹¹ and their representatives in the National Assembly refused to vote a budget for de Gaulle's Regional Commissioners in 1946. Though they agreed to Moch's IGAMES in 1948 he had to assure parliament that the IGAME's powers would not grow.¹¹² They 'reluctantly tolerated' Mendès-France and his regional economic modernisation in 1954 while he took on the Indochina problem.¹¹³ The regional map prepared by the Plan Commissariat and DAT in 1955 for the action programmes could not 'transgress' department borders, and political compromises had to be made, before it became official in 1956.¹¹⁴

In the Fifth Republic the Senate, over-representative of rural cantons that did not mirror the expansion committees, set up a group to veto Debré's regional reform.¹¹⁵ It forced the government to 'take oratorical precautions', assuring departments that ministerial field divisions would not be touched.¹¹⁶ The 1960 texts on the Interdepartmental Conferences 'did not dare' name regional 'capitals' because of local rivalries (for every department with a regional capital there would be three or four without).¹¹⁷ Many

¹⁰⁷ Monier (1965), p.66.

¹⁰⁸ Grémion and Worms (1968), p.53.

¹⁰⁹ Essig (1979), p.112.

¹¹⁰ Worms, J.P. (1966) 'Le Préfet et ses notables', *Sociologie du Travail*, 8/3, 249-75; Grémion, P. (1966), 'Résistance au changement de l'administration territoriale', *Sociologie du Travail*, 8/3, 276-95.

¹¹¹ Lemasurier (1954), p.378.

¹¹² *ibid.* p.378.

¹¹³ Williams (1972), p.440; Guichard (1975), p.20, p.64.

¹¹⁴ Monier (1965), p.35.

¹¹⁵ Roig (1964), pp.15-16.

¹¹⁶ Monier (1965), p.44.

¹¹⁷ Lanversin (1970), p.55.

parliamentarians were scornful of the regional committees ('unelected stamp clubs').¹¹⁸ In contrast, '*grands élus*' (such as Pleven, Pflimlin and Chaban), who were interested in regional development, chaired the committees and wanted a larger role for regional economic actors, rejected DATAR's plans for a stronger role for the new actors in the CODERs, fearing participation would lead to capture.¹¹⁹ But 80 per cent of *notables* at this time wanted the prefect to exercise the regional powers.¹²⁰ The 1972 Act creating the EPRs had to go through parliament, where

'the Senate, the bastion and guardian of traditional local *notables* was especially critical, and successfully diluted the content of the bill by a number of amendments.'¹²¹

During the passage of the 1982 Act the National Assembly had the largest number ever of *députés* holding local mandates;¹²² and 'the debates in the Senate were particularly long and difficult'.¹²³ Even when announcing to the Senate the electoral procedures for the regions, the new Minister of Interior, Joxe, was still reassuring senators that 'the department, deeply rooted in ancient cultural and economic history, cannot be ignored'.¹²⁴

Institutional and contingent constraints and opportunities

No specific *institutional forum* emerged that political leaders could use systematically to decide or ratify decisions on territorial structures, analogous to DATAR's CIAT on roads policy. In the Fourth Republic political leaders might discuss projects in Councils of Ministers, but they adapted regional institutions as individual ministers. In the Fifth Republic, the president's *conseils restreints* with the prime minister and a small number of ministers, followed by a Council of Ministers to adopt decrees, as organised for the three decrees of 14 February 1964, seem to be typical arrangements.¹²⁵ Despite these collegiate formalities, presidents exercised their prerogative to decide the outcome, sometimes in advance. Although the 1972 Act on EPRs was considered by at least one *comité restreint* (chaired by the prime minister) and three *conseils restreints* (chaired by the president),¹²⁶ the most significant decision had already been announced by President Pompidou in his Lyon speech on 'the union of departments'.

Blondel suggested that *honeymoon periods and crises* might create special opportunities for leaders to assert their will. In 1981 'some Socialists, from Mitterrand down' thought it was so.¹²⁷ Significant steps towards regions were taken following regime change in 1940, 1944 and 1958. Other considerable reforms were contemporaneous with

¹¹⁸ Grémion, C. (1979), p.166.

¹¹⁹ *ibid.* p.166, p.190.

¹²⁰ Hayward (1983), p.51.

¹²¹ Machin (1977), p.61.

¹²² Mény (1987), p.248.

¹²³ Giuily (1992), p.120.

¹²⁴ Douence (1995), p.16.

¹²⁵ Burin des Rozières, E. (1990) 'Communication', in Institut Charles de Gaulle, De Gaulle et ses Premiers ministres (Plon), 81-89, p.84.

¹²⁶ Archives Nationales (1996) 22 Sept. 1971; 10 June 1970, 7 April 1971 and 12 July 1972.

the major events in 1947-48 (strikes and riots), 1954-55 (Indochina) and 1960-61 (Algeria). Yet if Moch in 1948, and Mendès and Faure in 1954-55 used parliamentary support deriving from a crisis to launch reform, Debré signed the January 1960 texts despite the crisis, accepting that domestic business must continue,¹²⁸ and de Gaulle turned his attention to administrative reform and the substantial 1964 project only 'after Algeria was settled'.¹²⁹ The belief in crises and 'honeymoon periods' as environmental opportunities may be as important as the environmental conditions themselves in producing a rush to action. De Gaulle's hasty referendum text of May 1968, imposed on a Council of Ministers 'in the middle of the Paris insurrection', would have been an embarrassment had it been published.¹³⁰ The same concept conditioned the content of Defferre's Bill on the 'Rights and Liberties of Communes, Departments and Regions'.

'Defferre's approach was based on two deep convictions: first the need to work quickly to benefit from what was then called 'the state of grace', and impose a radical reform before conservative forces, in the broadest sense, took over again. Gaston Defferre was very influenced by Pierre Mendès-France's theory about "the hundred days" and the need to undertake any fundamental reform during the short period after the elections'.....

The second conviction was that any metaphysical or philosophical discussion about the territorial organisation of France must be avoided...¹³¹

Defferre's convictions ensured a speedy transfer of political power by giving all tiers and authorities equal autonomy, leaving to a later date the consideration of responsibilities and limitations on autonomy, leading Guichard among others to oppose the Bill.¹³² They barred a reconsideration of regional boundaries, because it was 'useless to increase the difficulties by drawing new regions or departments'. Although Defferre and Mauroy spoke in 1981 about changing the size of regions, Mauroy had soon found that political opinion in his Nord-Pas-de-Calais and neighbouring Picardie was against it.¹³³

In the Fifth Republic a third of instruments seemed to have been affected by short-term electoral concerns. Giscard as Presidential candidate and as President put forward decentralisation proposals when needing electoral support of centrist parties promoting regionalism, and dropped them when the need evaporated. Defferre's reforms were affected first by the Socialists' willingness to give more power to department prefects to ensure their support before local elections, and then by the choice of a department-based electoral system for regions to minimise losses in simultaneous national elections. In this domain at least, forthcoming elections constituted environmental constraints whereas post-election euphoria,

¹²⁷ Mény (1987), p.248.

¹²⁸ Signing the ministerial instructions Monod presented on the night of the Algerian barricades, he said: 'You're right, we must continue to ensure that things go on'. Quoted in Grémion, C. (1979), p.133.

¹²⁹ Aubert (1977), p.287.

¹³⁰ Jeanneney (1992), p.73.

¹³¹ Giuly (1992), pp.118-19.

¹³² For example, there was not, as in Britain and in Germany, the need for the lower tiers to work within planning guidelines set by upper tiers; it also led to rich communes being able to outbid any incentives provided to developers in poorer regions.

¹³³ G.Defferre, *Le Monde*, 10 June 1981.

and economic and political crises, provided opportunities that could take a number of directions depending on the response of the leadership to the opportunities presented.

Implementation and persistence

The significance of the 'duration' of a political leadership is evident in the short-lived regional structures of the Vichy State and the Liberation government compared with the capacity of political leaders of the Fifth Republic to consolidate and develop the direction of their reforms. The Gaullists exemplified most clearly the intensive use that French political leaders could make of their extensive powers to overcome substantial opposition. Yet, the persistence shown by some political leaders of the Fourth Republic also demonstrates the capacity of political leaders to make an impact against the opposition of bureaucratic institutions, and in a difficult political context.

Even in the Fifth Republic individual political leaders could make a difference by the paths they took. Prime Minister Debré did not accept the tardiness of the prefects and the Interior Minister (a former head of the prefectural *corps*) in setting up the Interdepartmental Conference but exercised hierarchical authority over the Interior Minister and used local interests to put pressure on officials. Pompidou's archives show that he ensured that the regional institutions he wanted in 1972 were implemented down to the individual candidates for the regional prefecture's economic *missions*.¹³⁴ In contrast, Giscard had seven years to implement his promise to make his term 'that of a France of the regions',¹³⁵ but abandoned both his proposals to do so. President Mitterrand reined Defferre back on their joint aspirations, when they met objections, while nevertheless retaining the essence of their goals. Thus the ability of political leaders to make an impact on regionalisation goals in conformity with their aspirations seems to depend in the end more on the leader than on the conditions that constrain them.

CONCLUSIONS

The aim of this chapter was to show that political leaders can make an impact on the regional institutions that condition the policy of *aménagement du territoire* and DATAR's work. The initial account of the regionalisation process showed that the 'attachment' to the department of the prefectural *corps* and local-national politicians would make the construction of a regional tier difficult. The prefects valued the formal parity of their posts and relationships, and their direct links to Paris. The local *élus*, well-represented in parliament, were quick to reject any regional institution and to defend the prefects, in part for the same reasons of parity, in part because they relied on the prefect to absolve them from responsibility, as shown in the debates on the Defferre Bill, 1981-82. Nevertheless, initiatives on regional

¹³⁴ Archives Nationales (1996) 5AG2/2/ 325 Comité restreint, 4 July 1973; Conseil restreint of 12 July 1973 on implementation of regional reform: brief, draft decrees, decisions; 2/326 Missions économiques régionales: composition and activities: individual fiches on candidates as chef de mission 1969- 73.

institutions were undertaken in most premierships after the second world war. Three-quarters of them made some impact, nearly all in the direction of strengthening the institutions; and a quarter made quite radical changes. The link between political leadership and regionalisation project was not just formal; there was much evidence of leaders keeping themselves informed, taking the final decisions and putting forward their own solutions to a problem. The objections of bureaucratic groups and other political actors made a difference, weakening and delaying projects but some considerable reforms were made despite their opposition.

The differences between the Fourth and Fifth Republic Constitutions made little difference to the number of leadership initiatives or their outcomes. Fourth Republic leaders made use of special powers voted by the National Assembly, while Fifth Republic leaders did not find the new 'Ordonnance' procedure effective, and the Constitution prevented Defferre from abolishing the prefect in 1981 even if the President would have agreed. The Constitution, together with the configuration of the party system, made more difference to which political leader prevailed. Overall, it seems that political leaders in the Fourth Republic were able to take incremental actions that laid the groundwork for the more spectacular changes of the Fifth Republic. However, these actions were the work of sectoral ministers operating within their ministerial remit (or prime ministers who took a ministerial portfolio), and were poorly-coordinated across the government as a whole. In the Fifth Republic, presidential wishes on regional reform mostly constrained the choices of prime ministers. In turn prime ministers might take on a sectoral role or leave actions to a minister, but they could put pressure on a minister to implement agreed actions. Regionalisation projects were better coordinated in the Fifth Republic, with the corollary that individual political leaders were less free to pursue their own aims.

The ministerial division DAT was energised by a long-serving minister into encouraging regional committees, but its organisational weaknesses brought the issue of coordinated administration at regional level onto the political agenda. DATAR played a central and effective role in some substantial regionalisation projects, but others failed, and political leaders did not always call on its services. However, the chief bureaucratic actors were the prefects. They were often against regionalisation projects, and although their opposition did not negate the political leadership's efforts it delayed implementation or reduced the import of the change. By 1958 there were already a few prefects who wanted regional reform, and when in the 1970s political leaders promoted a new generation of regional prefects at the same time as creating the EPR regional councils, there were more prefects who saw the regional economic role as interesting. But even these 'regionalist' regional prefects found it hard to imagine elected councils that executed their own decisions.

¹³⁵ *La Vie française*, 13 March 1975, quoted in Déloye, Y. (1997) 'L'aménagement du territoire en débats', in Gaxie, D. (ed.) *Luttes d'institutions* (Harmattan), 23-48, p.39.


Local *élus* were important in constraining the political leadership's regionalisation initiatives, since those with a national role were policy actors with a veto and also policy recipients, both dependent upon the prefects and putting pressure on them. In the Fourth Republic they rejected the Vichy Regional Prefect and the Liberation Regional Commissioners, limited the role given to the IGAMEs, forced a redrawing of the map of regions, delayed the concept of a regional town and opposed the participation of 'unelected' regional committees. In the Fifth Republic, *élus* ensured the new CODERs were dominated by themselves and, through the Senate, ensured that regions did not diminish departments. From the 1970s *élus* from larger urban areas, often with significant national roles, changed their position on regions. But many protected the status quo, wanting neither to give up powers to regions nor to take responsibility for their own acts. Despite this opposition, a series of political leaders gradually constituted regions, and Defferre removed the prefects' supervisory guarantee. But Mitterrand and Fabius chose to delay the first elections to regional councils, giving time for the incumbent *élus* to consolidate their power at department and city level.

Successful regionalisation projects often took place at times of national crisis or national euphoria. However the motivation was partly pragmatic, making use of special powers given by parliament at these times, or deriving from a scepticism about colleagues' resistance to conservative forces. Moreover, an equally large number of regionalisation instruments were enacted either despite crisis or expressly because there was no crisis. But electoral considerations were important, whether the political leadership needed tactical alliances with parties, support from the prefects, or to reduce electoral losses at national level.

Implementation was a particular problem for Liberation and Fourth Republic leaders. Early reforms were occasionally put into reverse under the next government. Bureaucratic groups could delay putting texts into effect until the next dissolution; yet some political leaders pursued the same goals through different coalitions and thus the regionalisation process gradually moved forward. But even with the powers of the Fifth Republic, Debré and his *cabinet* had to persist and insist that the Interior Minister and the prefects implemented decrees agreed by the political leadership as a whole. President Pompidou and his advisers monitored carefully the putting in place of his projects. The outcome of the Defferre reforms was substantially altered by the implementing texts, particularly under a new Prime Minister and Interior Minister that did not share the same goals.

The flowchart in Figure 7.7 portrays the networks of influence on regionalisation instruments during the Fifth Republic; a Fourth Republic version would differ little. In contrast to roads policy, there are no new institutions such as CIAT or special funds that might give later leaders an advantage earlier leaders did not have. While the DAT was permanently involved in the process but weak and with no special powers, DATAR provided stronger support to leaders when they chose to involve it, but it was not an

Figure 7.7 Flow chart tracing the interplay between political leaders and the regionalisation environment



Notes: Solid arrows represent stronger influence than dashed arrows, but influence varies with each instrument. The diagram includes only the main links relevant to the regionalisation process

essential part of any reform instrument; and it has also taken different paths to 'alternative regions' with the consent of the political leadership. The constituted regions have evolved in their composition and functions (programme-regions, CODER, EPR, regional councils) but their territorial boundaries were no easier for political leaders to change in 1981 from the pattern set in 1917 than they were in 1955. But within the overall context of positional resources provided by the constitution and party system configuration, and the constraints from bureaucracies and local political actors, political leaders found considerable opportunity to pursue their aims effectively in their own manner.

Figure 7.7 is a composite picture of the diverse ways in which leaders operated the system. The decrees issued by Mendès-France and Faure in 1954-55 or by Prime Minister de Gaulle in 1958 were 'heroic decisions', as defined by Jack Hayward in 1974 in relation to economic planning. Such decision-making

'would be heroic in the dual sense that it would be both an ambitious political exercise in rational decision-making and an ambitious assertion of political will by government leaders'.¹³⁶

The decrees issued by Mendès-France and Faure were developed by a small circle of people (the ministers Mendès, Faure and Buron and their *cabinets*), and comprised an unusually coherent set of measures, developed by linking the regional committees, the regional action programmes and harmonised regional boundaries, as well as a large number of practical measures for helping regional economic development. That was not to say they were implemented, especially where the technical bureaucracies were concerned; and General de Gaulle had to re-state the same demand on boundaries while adding the Interdepartmental Conference that prefects had opposed for a century. Debré's preparation of the implementing decrees was similarly 'heroic', in being conducted as 'a technocratic reform, not political or dogmatic',¹³⁷ with the help of his *cabinet* aides [it was before the creation of DATAR], and executed despite the reluctance of officials and the Interior Minister, who was reminded of the government decision in an authoritative fashion.

'Men as different as Pierre Mendès-France and Michel Debré feared that without a modernised state and a real political will in Paris, economic progress would be hampered and social reform blocked'.¹³⁸

Yet political leaders could also introduce political change of wide scope through a process of 'negotiating with' rather than 'imposing on' other policy actors.¹³⁹ The 1964 innovations were more ambitious in their scope and effect than the 1959-61 reforms. But the decision-making was widely shared among political leaders and bureaucratic agencies, and

¹³⁶ Hayward, J. (1982) 'Mobilising Private Interests in the Service of Public Ambitions: The Salient Element in the Dual French Policy Style?', in J. Richardson (ed.) *Policy Styles in Western Europe* (George Allen & Unwin), 111-40, p.112, commenting on his earlier work.

¹³⁷ Antoine, S. (1960) 'Les Régions de programme et la géographie administrative française', *Revue administrative*, 76, 357-62, p.358. Serge Antoine, part-author of Debré's 1960 decrees, assuring readers of the 'non-revolutionary' character of these regions 'carried over' from the Fourth Republic.

¹³⁸ Williams (1972), p.435.

¹³⁹ This distinction is made in Hayward (1982), p.113.

substantial consultation was undertaken by DATAR on the part to be played by regional actors, with the outcome 'a compromise'.¹⁴⁰ The 1982 Defferre Act combined significant institutional change with intensive negotiation, notwithstanding the minister's determined exercise of political will on aspects that he considered non-negotiable, such as the transfer of executive power.

In contrast, other initiatives more clearly matched Mény's categorisation of the decentralisation laws as 'part of a progressive, incremental process in the politico-administrative system...'.¹⁴¹ They were low-key, but were often very effective even if the amount of change was relatively limited. Most Fourth Republic proposals were of this nature: narrow in scope (within the remit of a single minister), making small steps, with reforming premiers having to take on a ministerial role to act in the sector, rather than expect to be able to lead an interministerial project. In the Fifth Republic there were also instruments of this nature: measures that implemented and then added to the 1964 reforms; the setting-up with the help of DATAR of the EPRs; the Barre decrees prepared by DATAR that gave additional economic powers to EPRs; and the State-Region Plan Contracts, initiated and negotiated by DATAR, fit into this un-heroic but progressive model.

Finally, some initiatives were neither heroic nor 'progressive' in Mény's sense, but weak, negative or vacillating, such as the 1952 circular that confirmed 'there could be no question of transforming the IGAME into the administrative head of a group of departments';¹⁴² the short-lived 'Blois' proposals on regional decentralisation that DATAR was asked to develop to shore up electoral alliances with regionalists; or the choice of a 'bizarre' electoral system that would departmentalise the region that political leaders from the same government had so recently created.

These four different modes of operating the policy-making institutions could be corralled into a rather approximate double dichotomy based not on Blondel's two dimensions of the 'scope' and the 'amount' of leadership ambitions, but on the nature of the ambitions and the nature of the policy process: heroically-ambitious change versus limited modifications; leadership-imposed initiative versus a negotiated compromise settlement. But like all dichotomies these would misrepresent the diversity and complexity of approaches taken by political leaders, and the range of their capacities to adapt to the institutional and non-institutional constraints and opportunities.

¹⁴⁰ Grémion, P. (1976), p.37.

¹⁴¹ Mény (1987), p.250, citing Hayward (1982).

¹⁴² Quoted by Mény (1974), p.354.

CHAPTER 8

CONCLUSION

INTRODUCTION

The objective of this thesis was to demonstrate that political leaders have considerable control over bureaucratic institutions, with a substantial ability to modify organisational structures and re-orient bureaucratic activities towards their own political goals. The predominant interpretation of the relationship between leaders and institutions in the political science literature is that political leaders have little autonomy relative to the constraints exerted by formal and informal institutions.¹ Journalists and political biographers often credit individual leaders with a strong influence on political events but administrative and political scientists working explicitly or implicitly within an institutionalist framework are more reluctant to accept that possibility. Even authorities on individual presidents and prime ministers, despite providing evidence that the contributions of these leaders to outcomes matter, assert at some point that institutional constraints are even stronger.² For most authors leadership initiative is reduced to more or less the status of a 'residual', the gap that is left in the analysis of a phenomenon when all that can be explained by the institutional and non-institutional environment has been.

Exceptions to the general rule are widely- accepted: exceptional leaders, or leaders profiting from exceptional situations, can change institutions.³ However, rather than being seen as a pointer to a widespread potential for power that all leaders might exercise to varying extents, exploiting as well as submitting to institutional contexts, such instances are often used to support a dichotomous classification of political executives as, on the one hand, 'charismatic' or 'strong' leaders who make a profound impact on the polity, and the rest, mere 'managers' or 'jugglers', not even deserving the term 'leader'. Presidents and prime ministers are divided into those exceptional leaders who override institutions and those who are subordinate to them.

Not all writers on political leaders adopt a pure dichotomous typology. Blondel is among the few who argue that a full spectrum of intermediate cases exists, whether of leaders' intentions or of their actual impact in the short or long term.

¹ See Chapter 1.

² Neustadt (1990), p.ix., Cole (1994), p.175; Elgie (1995), p.210.

³ Thelen, K. and Steinmo, S. (1992) 'Historical institutionalism in comparative politics', in S.Steinmo, K.Thelen and F.Longstreth (eds) Structuring Politics: Historical institutionalism in comparative analysis (Cambridge: CUP), 1-32, pp.15-16; Edinger (1993), p.67.

'Between those who maintain, reconstruct or otherwise concern themselves with the "whole" system and those who devote their activities to one or a very limited number of policies, there is a large number - indeed, an infinity of - positions which leaders may, and indeed, do take'.⁴

Blondel also makes a more even-handed assessment of the balance between the behaviour of leaders on the one hand and the responses of the institutional and societal environment on the other. He argues that leaders differ in the extent of their ambitions, and that the eventual outcome of these ambitions will depend on the level of resources the leaders have by virtue of their position, on the extent to which the institutions constrain or assist them, and on the contingent opportunities they are offered. Leaders may maintain the policy orientation set by their predecessors because 'the system is strong' or because their preferred policy orientation really is 'do nothing'.⁵ Others may achieve the reputation of being a great leader in part because the social or environmental climate was propitious for radical change. The exact contribution of a leader to the outcome is often hard to distinguish from that of the environment, though the 'immense influence' of some outstanding leaders is more easily recognised as such.

The real difficulty is therefore not so much about the large part played by some leaders, but about the smaller impact of the great majority of leaders.⁶

As one of the rare academics to be interested in comparing the actions of 'a mass of grey and indistinct office-holders',⁷ Blondel proposed a general methodology for appraising the comparative impact of different leaders within their institutional and non-institutional context, summarised in Chapter 1. The thesis focused on and expanded one element of that methodology - the relationship between the political leadership and bureaucratic institutions - and then examined that relationship within one policy domain, *aménagement du territoire*, and especially with reference to the central bureaucratic actor within that domain, DATAR. Blondel considered the bureaucratic institutions to be very significant constraints to political leaders.

To an extent, at least, they can try to bend the "muscles" of the bureaucracy; but their expectations will remain largely unfulfilled'.⁸

Yet the help of bureaucratic groups is also crucial to leaders' success:

'bureaucracies are the tools, the instruments, *par excellence*, which leaders have to use and on which they have to rely'.⁹

It is therefore probable, says Blondel, that 'activist' leaders will try

'to improve (somewhat) the general conditions under which bureaucracies can be expected to help their rule to be more effective'.¹⁰

⁴ Blondel (1987), p.94.

⁵ *ibid.* p.97.

⁶ Blondel (1995), p.300.

⁷ *ibid.* p.303.

⁸ Blondel (1987), p.170.

⁹ *ibid.* p.167.

¹⁰ *ibid.* p.171.

Bureaucracies are only one part of Blondel's 'general analysis of political leadership',¹¹ and he does not establish criteria for a 'model' bureaucracy, should one exist. However, he suggests that 'four factors' in the civil service affect the impact of political leaders, which they are likely to take into account as they seek to improve the effectiveness of the bureaucracy, namely:

- the design of the administrative organisation: it should not be too light nor too heavy; coordination must be good and horizontal links may be as important as vertical hierarchy;
- the links between the bureaucracy and the leader: they 'must be close and effective ... The fostering of the loyalty of civil servants by a variety of means - but not at the expense of initiative taking - is a manifest requirement';
- the competence of officials;
- the links between the bureaucracy and the population: bureaucracies must be closely linked to the population, for example through offices in the provinces.¹²

The thesis tested the capacity of political leaders to control and adapt these features of the bureaucratic organisation, DATAR. The first 'empirical' chapter (Chapter 2) examined the efforts to design an effective organisational structure for implementing *aménagement du territoire* from the time the policy emerged in the 1940s until DATAR's creation in 1963. While noting the attention leaders paid to the 'weight' and 'coordination' of the structures they were amending, it was more important to judge whether Blondel was correct that:

'leaders are not powerless to move the machinery and the structures, but the extent of their power is, and to their own detriment, often overestimated'.¹³

Then Chapter 3 investigated the links between DATAR and the leadership. Blondel thought that when leaders 'press a button' to the bureaucracy 'all they can hope for is that some of [their] decisions will be partly implemented in the fairly near future'.¹⁴ Chapter 3 therefore tried to determine the character of the links that would make DATAR an effective button to press. Chapter 4 inquired into how a changing political leadership could ensure DATAR's personal loyalty and overall responsiveness to leadership goals, without at the same time reducing the level of competence and capacity for independent initiative of officials selected from a small pool. How damaging to a leader's effectiveness were the 'inevitable trade-offs' that Blondel saw between these various desiderata? Blondel's fourth factor applies only indirectly to DATAR, which was not designed to link directly to the population as a whole. Its 'population' is the set of public actors whose programmes it coordinates and steers on the leadership's behalf, mainly through administrative and financial procedures. Chapter 5 surveyed the committees and funds that DATAR organises, or in which it participates, to evaluate the leadership's ability to use and reshape these traditional instruments to match the

¹¹ *ibid.* in pp. 149-50, 167-73, and *passim*.

¹² *ibid.* p. 168.

¹³ *ibid.* p. 173.

current political goals for *aménagement du territoire*. Blondel thought that:

'because the system is simply unresponsive or only partly responsive... there are manifest limits to the degree in which leaders are able to rely on institutions, arrangements and organizations around them to have the desired impact'.¹⁵

Chapter 5 reviewed those limits, as did the case-studies reported in Chapters 6 and 7. In *World Leaders* Blondel had reminded readers that

'whether political leaders appear to "make a difference" to the type of policies which are followed ...is in many ways the central question of political activity'.¹⁶

The comparative examination of this question that he had proposed to undertake was replaced in *Political Leadership* by an assessment of 'potential leadership impact' based on leadership goals. However, by confining the study to two sub-policy areas, it proved possible to make an empirical assessment of the ability of leaders to 'make a difference'. As in Blondel's scheme, the goal was to compare political leaders' actions in the context of their institutional and non-institutional environment. Though the terrains of these case-studies ('roads planning' and 'regionalisation'), were occupied by bureaucratic groups reputed to be powerful, the policies were strongly contrasted in other ways: one was a conventional public policy, the other that of institutional change; in the former DATAR was a constant participant on behalf of the leadership; in the latter it could be lead actor or have no part. These chapters completed the study of the interplay between the political leaders and the bureaucratic and other institutions that Blondel thought would circumscribe leadership action, to demonstrate that leaders could make significant and widely-varying levels of impact on the institutions, and to explore the conditions in which they did so.

THE IMPACT OF POLITICAL LEADERS ON A BUREAUCRACY

The evidence presented in the first part of this thesis showed Blondel was too pessimistic when he asserted that those activist leaders who expected to be able to adapt a bureaucratic organisation to match their needs would find their expectations remained 'largely unfulfilled'.¹⁷

Reshaping organisational structures

Chapter 2 examined the changes made to the central administrative structures responsible for the policy of *aménagement du territoire*, as a succession of governments created, enhanced, reduced, revived, ignored, reinstated and eventually replaced the ministerial division DAT with DATAR. Its findings could be summed up as follows: using the strong executive powers of Vichy, then of the Liberation government, technocratic ministers with a planning ideology were able to introduce an innovative policy and its bureaucratic office without difficulty; then political leaders in the Fourth Republic were able to modify the

¹⁴ *ibid.* p.150.

¹⁵ *ibid.* p.150.

¹⁶ Blondel (1980), p.15.

¹⁷ Blondel (1987), p.168, p.170.

bureaucratic structure within the ministries they ran, weakening or strengthening it to match their particular aims; but they had less success ensuring coordination with other bureaucratic groups. During a period in which ministers were uninterested in this topic top officials pursued their own solutions, while other bureaucrats inside and outside the DAT tried to preserve their own roles. The first prime minister of the Fifth Republic used conventional coordinating committees without success to overcome sectoral conflicts between ministers and ministries. Once the new political conditions of the Fifth Republic had settled, a prime minister with a strong commitment to the policy initially tried to introduce a new type of ministry, and when that failed created a small but powerful coordinating agency, DATAR, transferring responsibilities away from the old ministerial division.

As Blondel had suggested would happen, leaders active in *aménagement du territoire* undertook reforms to its administrative organisation, and were concerned by the mid-1950s with improving horizontal links across the 'silo' bureaucracies. Having failed in 1962, for unconnected reasons, to construct a vertically-organised ministry with a horizontal tier, the political leadership's solution in 1963 was a lighter organisation that was given a strong presence in interministerial coordinating mechanisms. Blondel had expected political leaders to be able to reform bureaucratic structures, but slowly.

'Leaders have to accept that the bureaucratic tools at their disposal cannot enable them to achieve more than a certain amount over a specified period of time; they can improve these tools somewhat, but also over time. The impact of leadership depends on the structure of the bureaucracy. Leaders are not powerless to move the machinery and the structures, but the extent of their power is, and to their own detriment, often overestimated'.¹⁸

Yet the frequency with which changes took place to the structure for conceiving and implementing *aménagement du territoire* was strong support for the argument that political leaders can make an impact on bureaucratic institutions. Seven changes of configuration of the central machinery in twenty years (see Figure 2.1) are testimony to the speed with which bureaucratic structures could be altered to fit the goals of the leadership, even if the effort to create a ministry for *aménagement du territoire* in 1962 was useful only in serving as a lesson for the creation of DATAR. However, the restructuring process cannot be assigned wholly and clearly to political leaders, at least in a conventional understanding of that term.¹⁹ Career officials were always in the background, promoting their ideas for administrative reform - though some ministers, but not others, chose to pick them up. In addition, the early arrangements were conceived by prime ministers and ministers who were not typical 'party-politicians'; they were either former officials and officers who had been 'technical' ministers in 1939 (Darlan, Dautry, de Gaulle), or officials or public-private managers who had been in the *cabinet* of one of those ministers (Lehideux, Giraud, Surleau). The same pattern was repeated in 1958 with Prime Minister de Gaulle and the Minister of Construction Sudreau (a

¹⁸ *ibid.* p. 173.

former prefect), and the final changes were carried out under a prime minister who had political goals but was no more elected than these others had been (Pompidou).

Some judgment of the impact of political leaders on bureaucratic structures can be made nonetheless. First, the 'ministerial' leadership mostly had the outcome it intended. There was success on five of the eight occasions (creating the *service* in the DGEN and again in the Ministry of Reconstruction, and the DAT and DATAR; and dismissing the regional Reconstruction officials); in another case (the interministerial instruments instigated by Sudreau), new structures were implemented though coordination was not much improved. The reform to regional boundaries in the mid-1950s could be judged to have failed or to have 'improved over time' (eight years). Only Schumann's reform of 1962 was abandoned (when he resigned for other reasons). That is, 'ministerial' leaders usually made an impact on bureaucratic structures and mostly with the results they intended.

Second, political leaders were more likely than 'technical' ministers or officials to achieve a successful reform. Even the most authoritative of top officials in the Fourth and Fifth Republics could not introduce reforms inside the ministerial machinery; and their reforms in the public-private sector were dependent on powers agreed by political leaders. Moreover there was a tendency for the radical and lasting changes to be introduced by politicians, whether or not they had at that point been elected (Claudius-Petit, Mendès-France, Faure, Pompidou); and the changes they introduced were more likely to be respected by political successors or colleagues than those introduced by technicians (Dautry's regional tier, Sudreau's coordinating efforts).

Third, the career status of the minister (politician or former official; elected or unelected), was immaterial to whether bureaucrats implemented the changes demanded. It was the post or position that counted. Blondel's argument (see Chapter 1) that the defining characteristic of a political leader, as far as his or her relationship with the institutions are concerned, is the executive position in government, seemed to be justified by the evidence in Chapter 2. However, while Blondel was no doubt correct that leaders might well 'overestimate' their power to 'move the machinery and the structures',²⁰ in the case of *aménagement du territoire* at least, it seems their power should not be underestimated.

The relative importance of positional links and political commitment

The evidence presented in Chapter 3 supports Blondel's hypothesis that the 'links between the bureaucracy and the leaders must be close and effective' if the leadership is to have a strong impact on policy implementation.²¹ However, the essential relationship was not the legal link of DATAR to the position of prime minister, as is frequently asserted, but the 'effective' and 'affective' relationships between the political leadership and the bureaucratic

¹⁹ Implying achieving power through a political career and competitive elections: Page E.C. (1992) Political Authority and Bureaucratic Power: A Comparative Analysis, 2nd edn (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf), p. 148.

²⁰ *ibid.* p. 173.

organisation it expected to deliver its goals. The impact of the political leadership on bureaucratic action in this field was more a function of the level of interest taken by the president and prime minister in DATAR's action than the governmental location of DATAR. A close empirical relationship was demonstrated between the political leadership's reported commitment to *aménagement du territoire* and DATAR's reputation for being a strong actor in this policy domain. This finding was evidence that individual leaders made an impact on a policy in accordance with their level of support for the policy (the effect was proportional to their input). It also showed that the important link between a bureaucratic agency and a leadership that wants to make a strong impact on that bureaucracy's work is the political commitment of the leadership to the agency's work, not a formal link on organisational diagrams to the office of leader.

Numerous political, academic and bureaucratic authorities had stressed the importance for implementation of DATAR's close links to the prime minister, interpreting this link in legal-institutional terms.²² They thought DATAR would have more power to translate the political leadership's goals into action if attached directly to the prime minister rather than delegated to another minister or a junior minister. This reasoning emphasised the prime minister's positional status, putting it before other considerations such as the prime minister's positional resources (which are maintained and continue to be used by the prime minister even when DATAR is delegated),²³ or personal attributes, such as a leader's political commitment to the policy. Yet, according to the Conseil d'Etat's report to the prime minister on 'governmental structures', the prime minister's *political* authority transferred to a delegated authority (such as DATAR or its minister), only if 'it was not just in principle but also in fact that they were acting in the prime minister's name'.²⁴

Arguments of administrative principle, illustrated with practical examples, showed that other locations had advantages that could balance the disadvantages. A close link to the minister of infrastructure and tourism in 1972, for example, enabled the minister to promote and supervise the implementation of DATAR's tourist development projects. A quantitative assessment of DATAR's evolving 'reputational power', even if it was unavoidably rather subjective,²⁵ seemed to show there was no 'single best site'. DATAR could be attached to a technical ministry and look relatively strong (or weak) and be attached to the prime minister and look relatively weak (or strong). In contrast, there was a very close ('highly significant') statistical link between the president's reported and self-avowed political commitment to *aménagement du territoire* and DATAR's reputational power, and a weaker ('probably significant') link between the prime minister's interest and DATAR's reputational

²¹ *ibid.* p.168.

²² See Chapter 3.

²³ The prime minister still chairs CIAT, co-appoints the *délégué*, decides DATAR's budget, etc.

²⁴ Conseil d'Etat (1986), p.19.

power. Schematically, DATAR's power declined since 1963 in step with the decreasing enthusiasm of the president (see Figure 3.10), the prime minister's level of interest making relatively little difference to DATAR's effectiveness compared with that of the president (see Figure 3.11). DATAR looked strong during the premierships of Couve de Murville and Messmer because their presidents signalled a strong interest in regional development (and the premiers followed their lead in enacting the practical decisions). Prime ministers might still be able to implement their distinctive goals even within the same presidency, as for example Cresson distinguished herself from Bérégovoy when she inaugurated a very energetic policy of moving civil servants from Paris to the provinces. Yet premiers were nevertheless constrained by their president's wishes - Cresson acted in a sub-sector that happened to engage the enthusiasm of President Mitterrand, and she made sure she had his support for this decision. In terms of the impact that could be made on bureaucratic institutions by these two members of the political leadership, prime ministers were weaker than presidents, as many studies of the French leadership have shown.²⁶

A re-attachment of DATAR to the prime minister was not irrelevant if leaders used it as a signal that the political leadership was keen to promote the policy (as reporters inferred when Prime Minister Barre took direct responsibility for DATAR and made a well-publicised visit to its premises), but it was not sufficient to make DATAR effective. It was the political commitment to the policy that mattered.

Responsiveness, loyalty and competence

Although a direct link to the position of prime minister was not the most vital factor in ensuring DATAR's effectiveness, the positional resources given to the prime minister by virtue of DATAR's legal link gave the political leadership strong powers to orient DATAR - and these powers were retained whether or not DATAR was delegated to another minister. Blondel thought that 'the system' linking political leaders to the bureaucracy was 'often-perhaps mostly - simply unresponsive or only partly responsive' to leaders' needs.²⁷ Bureaucrats had to be not only competent but also 'reliable', meaning loyal to the leadership of the day, and ready to work to their particular aims:

The fostering of the loyalty of civil servants... is a manifest requirement if bureaucracies are to provide a significant help to leaders in achieving their goals'.²⁸

He argued that new leaders could improve this state of affairs by using 'personal mechanisms', such as their prestige and following, to encourage loyalty and reliability in the bureaucracy, and 'institutional mechanisms', such as organisational design and 'recruitment

²⁵ DATAR does not evaluate its work, though in 2005 it set up regional observatories to collect data. There are a few academic assessments of its work in particular sectors that are themselves handicapped by lack of data. See Chapter 4.

²⁶ For instance, Elgie (1993), Hayward (1983), Hayward and Wright (2002), Massot (1979), Massot (1987), Massot (1988), Stevens (1992), Wright (1989), Wright (1993).

²⁷ Blondel (1987), p.150.

²⁸ *ibid.* p.168.

and training', to improve competence; but there would be 'inevitable trade-offs' between the various elements.²⁹

Chapter 4 demonstrated that French political leaders had considerable positional resources with which to alter DATAR's staffing, size, structure and activities so that it responded to their particular demands. Such is the extent of their formal powers of appointment that some recent leaders were able to prioritise political sympathies and relationships in the case of the *délégué*, reducing the traditional prestige of this post, and thereby harming the capacity of their successors to appoint the most highly-regarded officials. The Constitution and civil service statutes between them gave the president, prime minister and the minister for *aménagement du territoire* joint formal powers to appoint a *délégué* from any part of the public, private or political world, and to ease out the previous incumbent. The greatest constraint came from conflict within the leadership, with the president and then prime minister having most influence over the name and the timing, to the extent that some ministers for *aménagement du territoire* had difficult relationships with 'their' *délégués* (Minister Defferre with Sallois, 1984-86; Minister Gaudin with Aubert, 1995-97; Minister Voynet with Guigou, 1997-2001). The qualifications of the dozen *délégués* appointed since 1963 (considered along a number of criteria) exhibited a common trend of decline as personal and political loyalty superseded professional qualifications and experience (see Figure 4.1). Politicisation of the appointment process started to make it dysfunctional from the 1980s, at first because the expectation of a *délégué's* dismissal at each change of government made the official and DATAR 'lame ducks', and then because the credibility of the incumbents was undermined by its 'clientelist' character.³⁰ The possibility for future political leaders to make an impact on policy implementation through DATAR was reduced.

The analysis of the leaders' capacity for controlling DATAR's internal composition was organised around the three characteristics of an *administration de mission* that prevailed at its creation, and which in principle assured a blend of responsiveness and competent coordination of interministerial policies: a 'lightweight' staff whose numbers can be adapted quickly to different demands, a core of interdisciplinary *grands corps* officials; and interministerial teams working on the leadership's priority areas. The prime minister can use budgetary procedures to control in fine detail the number of DATAR personnel, and a high proportion, especially among 'policy' staff can be appointed or transferred elsewhere at short notice. Staff numbers tabulated in Chapter 4 were shown to respond mainly to leadership demands, whether Pasqua in 1993 asked for rapid expansion, or Balladur in 1994 asked for a 20 per cent contraction. Expansion was occasionally the result of extensive research programmes which, though approved by ministers, were enthusiasms of the *délégués* Monod and Guigou, and probably did not reflect leadership priorities. Political

²⁹ *ibid.* pp.171-2.

³⁰ Lochak (1992), p.55, 'rewarding services rendered'.

leaders were able to control and adapt DATAR's overall size to their requirements. On the other hand, recruitment of senior staff from the *grands corps* and ministries depends on the career attraction of a post at DATAR. If the political leadership wants DATAR to be effective it therefore has to convince these officials that 'something promising is going on', as was the case in 1963.³¹ From the mid-1980s political leaders were unable to recruit *grands corps* staff to DATAR in the same numbers. Yet the sudden increase in appointments of well-qualified officials during the revival of the policy in 1993-95 showed that a leadership that wanted to make a strong impact in this policy domain was able to recruit such staff.

Finally, a survey of the policy programmes tackled by DATAR teams since 1963 proved not only that the agency retained the interdisciplinary team-working, but that its teams were reshaped to match leaders' priorities, this responsiveness being especially clear at times of strong ideological change (1979-82, 1992-93, 2002-03). However DATAR in the early 1980s did not follow up the new leadership's political concern for industrial restructuring, and in the 1990s added some highly technical programmes to a range that otherwise faithfully translated leadership priorities. In sum, DATAR as a body seems to be a flexible tool that responds well generally to leadership changes. However, appointments increasingly reflected the lack of presidential commitment and the prioritisation of personal loyalty, which in combination was likely to constrain the capacity of future leaders to recruit the competent officials they need.

Steering policy with administrative and financial tools

The "lines" linking leaders to the bureaucracy and the populations' were often unresponsive, according to Blondel, because

'we do not know how to make the system effective. There are thus manifest limits to the degree in which leaders are able to rely on institutions, arrangements and organizations around them to have the desired impact'.³²

For a political leadership seeking to make an impact on policies through DATAR the 'institutions, arrangements and organisations' were the committees and financial mechanisms in which DATAR had a locus. The creators of DATAR arranged in 1963 for the *délégué* to organise the prime minister's committee for *aménagement du territoire* (CIAT, later CIADT), and be secretary or member of interministerial policy and funding committees that should be steered towards *aménagement du territoire*. Furthermore, the prime minister's budget would service a new fund for *aménagement du territoire* (FIAT, replaced later by FNADT), put at DATAR's disposal to inspire suitable ministerial projects. Especially, DATAR would help decide and monitor ministries' capital spending in each region. These carefully-considered improvements to 'the system' were scrutinised in Chapter 5 for their effectiveness and their continuing utility to later political leaders.

³¹ Roche (1986), p.70, and see Essig (1979), p.19.

³² *ibid.* p.150.

The CIAT was until the mid-1970s an exemplar for other government committees for the way it enabled the core leadership to make an impact on policy efficiently and effectively; for instance, prime-ministerial authority was used to ratify substantial and conflictual regional development projects (see Figure 5.1). While keeping the capacity to make equally-significant interministerial decisions (as the CIATs conducted by Prime Minister Cresson and Minister for *Aménagement du territoire* Delebarre illustrated), CIAT became less administratively-efficient (treating more, smaller, uncontentious decisions). Qualitative and quantitative evidence in Chapter 5 demonstrated that political leaders held CIAT meetings for one of three reasons: they were interested in *aménagement du territoire*; they wanted to announce a programme that had legally to be agreed in a CIAT (such as major transport projects); or they wanted to spend FIAT, which is legally-allocated in CIAT. Although the CIAT is a legal resource of the prime minister, and the frequency of CIAT meetings was significantly-related statistically to the prime minister's interest in *aménagement du territoire*, the president's views were even more influential. Prime Ministers Couve and Messmer, either antipathetic to or uninterested in *aménagement du territoire*, followed the lead of their more enthusiastic presidents. Presidents that had specific intentions for policy instruments (if not legally-decided in CIAT), had them agreed in meetings at which they could be present (Pompidou in *conseils restreints*, Giscard in his Central Planning Council and Mitterrand in the Council of Ministers). These three leaders 'presidentialised *aménagement du territoire*', in the *délégué* Essig's words. Numerous other interministerial councils and committees were set up in sectors or areas linked to *aménagement du territoire*, with DATAR as secretary. A review of three dozen institutions showed the considerable practical powers of political leaders to create, modify, and abolish consultative councils and coordinating committees, adapting them both to their particular policy needs and, in the case of the consultative councils, to their party-political orientations.

A similar review of two dozen special funds confirmed that leaders had substantial freedom to create funds to match their own policy priorities. They occasionally abolished older funds not relevant to their interests but mostly they just reduced their budgets. They did not maintain the budgets 'in real terms' of FIAT, which had increasingly become a provider of on-going support to established programmes. Leaders found it easier to announce new funds for new projects than to conduct a drastic reform of existing funds that policy recipients expected to flow in their direction (for example, the fusion of several small funds, including the 'mountain fund' FIAM, into a larger FNADT, as experts recommended, brought objections from parliamentarians from upland areas). To that extent, political leaders were constrained by local pressures and budgetary inertia; they had to be innovative if they wanted to make an impact in their own priority areas. The prime minister's budget for *aménagement du territoire*, and for its largest element, FIAT/ FNADT, were determined primarily by the prime minister and the minister for the budget, working within a 'headline' figure set (except during cohabitation) by the president. Chapter 5

showed that political leaders were able to alter budgets almost at will during the year; that those who did not prioritise *aménagement du territoire* could restrict spending by holding CIADTs late in the year or not at all. While DATAR could 'store up' unspent budgets and spend fairly consistently from one year to the next, DATAR's expenditure in the end had to be approved by the political leadership in CIADT.

The least effective of the arrangements made in 1963 was the ambitious decision that DATAR should coordinate that part of ministries' capital budgets which was allocated by region. The proportion was only ever at most 30 per cent of ministry capital expenditure. Instead DATAR, with the support of political leaders (especially Pompidou as Prime Minister and Debré as Finance Minister) found other ways to programme inter-ministerial expenditure for regional development projects. Following the Left's decentralisation of power in 1982-84 the procedure to check ministries' budgets was formally abandoned. However, the State-Region Plan Contracts, invented by DATAR, and negotiated by DATAR and the prefects, seemed to achieve a control over regionalised public spending as good as that DATAR achieved in the 1970s using the centralised procedures. Despite Blondel's strictures, therefore, it appears that the standard interministerial administrative and financial procedures have been used effectively by DATAR on behalf of the political leadership to steer public bodies towards leadership goals.

THE IMPACT OF POLITICAL LEADERS ON THE POLICY ENVIRONMENT

Having established that leaders can make a substantial impact on bureaucratic institutions, whether with respect to DATAR or through DATAR in accordance with their own policy orientations, Chapters 6 and 7 extended the comparative inquiry to the impact of political leaders on the wider bureaucratic environment, as Blondel suggested in *World Leaders*, by

'examining whether, on a comparative basis, political leaders appear to "make a difference" to the type of policies followed'.³³

In *Political Leadership* Blondel makes an 'a priori' assessment of 'potential leadership impact' based on the 'scope' and 'extent' of their firm ambitions (see Chapter 1 of the thesis). He discusses the elements of the institutional and non-institutional environment that will need to be taken into account in establishing the actual achievements of the leaders, but does not model this evaluation. The thesis therefore adopted a procedure similar to Alistair Cole's appraisal of Mitterrand's leadership, 'by contrasting the resources and opportunities available to executive leaders', under a number of headings derived from Blondel.³⁴ That is, the actions of political leaders were considered in the light of the institutional and non-institutional context, particularly the resources and constraints deriving from constitutional-legal provisions and the configuration of the party system; the 'help or hindrance' of

³³ Blondel (1980), p.15.

³⁴ Cole (1994), p.170.

bureaucratic organisations - especially DATAR - and other groups; and the constraints and opportunities offered by such factors as crises or honeymoon periods.

Roads planning and funding

The ministerial DAT and then DATAR participated constantly in road planning decision-making, on behalf of the leadership; other principal bureaucratic actors were the *grands corps* of the *Ponts et Chaussées* (*Ponts*), which had been 'in charge' of roads planning for two centuries and staffed the senior technical posts, including the Roads Directorate of the Ministry of Infrastructure; the Plan Commissariat, and the Finance Ministry.

A quantitative analysis revealed that half the roads instruments matched well the leadership's announced intentions in terms of roads policy. The proportion increased to two-thirds if instruments were included whose mixed outcomes accurately translated differences within the leadership (for instance much of the funding destined for roads linking regional capitals, which prime minister Pompidou wanted, went to roads that de Gaulle wanted for Paris). There was a much stronger statistical link between leadership support for instruments and their outcomes than there was between bureaucratic support (or opposition) and outcomes; and there was substantial primary evidence that political leaders were personally engaged in initiating, developing or negotiating instruments (see Chapter 6). Political leaders found several ways to overcome or side-step some long-held 'taboos' of the Roads Directorate (road tolls and motorways) and the Finance Ministry (block budgets).

The general findings from the quantitative analysis guided the qualitative analysis, structured around Blondel's 'resources and opportunities'. The change of Constitution in 1958 did not by itself make a difference. Although it helped Prime Minister Debré to remove a legislative restriction on tolled motorways, it did not persuade the Roads Directorate to build them. Changes in the party system enabled Infrastructure Minister Chalandon in Chaban-Delmas's government to introduce in 1969 the tolled motorways that Chaban-Delmas as Minister for Roads and *Aménagement du territoire* in the Fourth Republic could not persuade an oppositional parliament to accept, but 'compensation' still had to be offered to the *Ponts*. However, the Constitution, together with party hierarchy, determined which members of the political leadership were more likely to see their policy goals prevail. Fourth Republic presidents did not intervene in this domain, whereas in the Fifth, President de Gaulle's concern for Paris took precedence over Prime Minister Pompidou's concern for the provinces and the roads vehicle industry. Throughout the Fifth Republic, presidents determined what role they and the prime minister would play. President Pompidou discussed the details of motorway contracts in *conseils restreints*, on the basis of briefs prepared by his own aides with technical advice from the Roads Directorate; President Giscard decided a special programme for Brittany and the Massif Central in 1976, but was content to let Prime Minister Barre make CIATs the forum for approving the national road network; while President Mitterrand asked Prime Minister Mauroy to tell DATAR and the Minister of Transport to organise a funded transport programme. In a policy domain in

which projects take some years to complete, crises in the political or economic environment were unlikely to help leaders make a lasting impact, even if Prime Minister Pompidou used 'the events of May 1968' to ask the Roads Minister to 'strike a blow for one of our provinces', and agree to the Breton expressway. President de Gaulle, Prime Minister Chirac and President Giscard d'Estaing all had to re-approve sections of this road network in the following decade in different political environments. Yet the variety of responses to economic crisis confirmed that much depended on the individual leader: some cutting back the roads budget, others increasing it.

Whether and how 'leaders made a difference', or whether the outcome was dominated by bureaucratic groups, varied from road instrument to road instrument, and depended both on leaders and on the role DAT or DATAR played on their behalf. The different processes could be grouped into four schematic models that fall approximately into time-periods that are also in part those of different leaderships:

- *instruments whose outcomes are dominated by the incumbent bureaucratic institutions*, especially when the DAT (in the Fifth as well as the Fourth Republic) did not have the administrative and financial tools given later to DATAR, nor sustained support from a cohesive political leadership. These conditions also re-emerged at the start of the Mitterrand presidency when DATAR's coordinating role was (temporarily) rejected and Interim State-Region Contracts were negotiated separately by each region with each ministry.
- *substantial projects actively promoted by political leaders*, using DATAR to prepare an instrument that challenged or ignored the opposition of bureaucratic groups. Examples were the Breton expressway, the Presidential announcement of the Strasbourg motorway and the 'block budgets' for DATAR's regional development projects.
- *low-key but effective intervention by political leaders*, initiating, announcing or ratifying agreements that DATAR had organised in a consensus-seeking manner. During the 1970s DATAR collaborated with *Ponts* engineers in designing a 'national road network for *aménagement du territoire*'; and served on a working group with *Ponts* economists, the Plan Commissariat and Finance officials that agreed that *aménagement du territoire* would be a criterion in evaluating road projects. Political leaders were still present in these decisions, whether approving the network in a CIAT or 'ordering' the working party and authorising its final report.
- *personalised interventions by presidents*, using DATAR just to implement them or not at all. President de Gaulle, in a joint initiative with administrative reformer and minister, Edgard Pisani, brought together road infrastructure and the planning of DATAR's regional cities by combining the Ministries of Construction and Public Works into a new Ministry of Infrastructure. Mitterrand's transport funding programme (and his reminder to the Finance Ministry), and Cresson and Balladur's unexpected announcements of 'massive' or 'accelerated' road programmes, would be included here.

Nevertheless these general models undervalue the variety of approaches adopted, and the flowchart in Figure 6.6 is a better representation of the diversity of paths that could be taken by political leaders through the institutional constraints and opportunities in the roads planning and funding area.

Regionalisation

Chapter 7 showed that DAT was an early, consistent but weak player in the long regionalisation process whereas DATAR, by decision of the political leadership, could be the lead actor, disregarded, or something in-between. The permanently-powerful institutional actors in this domain were the prefects and their partners in the *départements* (departments), and the *élus* - politicians with a dual local-national mandate. The prefects and the *élus* until the 1970s opposed any instrument that might initiate or enhance a regional institution. Despite their objections, three-quarters of the three dozen official proposals that were made by political leaders from 1941 to 1986 made some impact, and a quarter implemented substantial reforms. There was considerable evidence of personal involvement by individual leaders in the projects; whether Prime Minister Debré in 1960 coming up with a solution to prefectural resistance, or President de Gaulle asking particular *cabinet* members to monitor specific aspects of the 1964 reforms, or Defferre's decision to push ahead quickly with the 1981 decentralisation bill.

The change of Constitution in 1958 made no difference to the frequency with which political leaders introduced regionalisation instruments, the level of their ambitions or their impact. Fourth Republic leaders even seem to have made more effective use of 'special powers' than Fifth Republic leaders did of the equivalent *Ordonnance* procedure. The hold of rural politicians over the Senate and the prevalence of dual-mandate politicians in both parliamentary chambers were also constant Constitution-derived constraints on reform. President Auriol in the Fourth Republic gave advice to ministers on deconcentrating power to department prefects, while President de Gaulle in the Fifth, having issued regional reform decrees as premier, left this domestic issue to Debré. But these events were something of exceptions and constitutional conventions, coupled with the party system, usually meant that presidents imposed their views on regionalisation projects over those of their prime ministers. Whereas Fourth Republic ministers for *aménagement du territoire* were freer to introduce their own regional initiatives (as Dautry, Billoux, Queuille and Claudius-Petit did), but could not diffuse them to other ministries, in the Fifth Republic projects were better-coordinated but by presidential authority.

The prefects posed the greatest bureaucratic constraint to regionalisation. They encapsulated Blondel's argument that political leaders need the bureaucracy in order to achieve their goals, and yet may find it erects hurdles.³⁵ Prefects were the generalist coordinators of State field services, and the traditional conciliators between local councils,

³⁵ Blondel (1987), p.172.

and between local and national political goals. Chapter 7 showed that the prefectural *corps* was the most frequent source of opposition to a regional tier, because it would destroy the traditional parity between prefects and impede direct access to Paris. Yet a younger generation of prefects saw the interest of posts promoting economic development, such that there was a measurable (if small) change between 1958 and 1972 in prefectural attitudes to regional institutions, if not to decentralisation.³⁶ The Interior Minister Defferre took care not to let the prefects design his Act of 1982, but still had to 'compensate' them for decentralisation with additional deconcentrated powers. The *élus* were equally important because they constituted a potential veto point in both parliamentary chambers. They amended and delayed the leadership's reforms, allowing them to proceed but reducing their content. In the Fourth Republic, national leaders found that the *élus* reshaped the proposed instruments more to their own liking; for instance, they altered the number and boundaries of regions and prevented the naming of regional towns. In the Fifth Republic *élus* ensured that prefects nominated them to the first regional bodies designed by DATAR in 1964, not the newer economic elites which DATAR and the Gaullist political leadership wanted to make responsible for regional investment decisions. Each major reform to regional institutions was only partly successful from the point of view of leaders promoting *aménagement du territoire* because it tended to reconstitute old departmental practices within the regional framework. Some of the regionalisation projects in which leaders made the most impact took place at times of crisis or during a post-election 'state of grace', but other equally ambitious projects, such as the 1964 reforms, were embarked upon by General de Gaulle because Algeria had been settled. The use of contingent events, like the successful implementation of projects through persistence or insistence, depended greatly on the leader's individual response to problems and opportunities.

These variations on how 'leaders made a difference' and on the role DAT or DATAR played on their behalf, seemed to fit into one of four models - that do not parallel exactly those identified for roads planning:

- *initiatives whose (negative) outcomes were dominated by bureaucracies, local actors or electoral considerations*, that is, by the institutional and non-institutional environment. They included the slowness of ministries to harmonise their boundaries, the reluctance of prefects to meet in an interdepartmental conference, the regional referendums and the electoral law of 1985.
- *modest incremental instruments* that represented what was possible given the opposition to more significant change, in which the DAT often played a role in the Fourth Republic (delineating regional planning boundaries, drawing up regional programmes), and DATAR in the Fifth Republic (implementing the 1972 regional councils, and negotiating proposals to increase their economic powers);

³⁶ Machin (1977), p.53, p.101.

- *ambitious instruments introduced despite group opposition*, enacted by political leaders with some concessions negotiated with the groups; the exemplars being the 1964 reforms and the Defferre Acts of 1982-84, which combined significant institutional change and a determination not to concede the most important points. Among this small group of reforms DATAR might be the chief actor or, like other bureaucratic groups, deliberately kept out of the reform process;

- *heroic decisions*, in the dual sense of being 'both an ambitious political exercise in rational decision-making and an ambitious assertion of political will by government leaders'.³⁷

These instruments (such as the Mendès-France and Faure package of 1954-55 and the Debré decrees of 1960-61) were decided by a very small number of ministers and prepared by them with their *cabinet* advisers. (The creation of DATAR itself, as a contribution to the construction of regions, might have been included under this category).

These four models are nevertheless a generalisation that should not obscure the diversity of pathways that can be seen in the flowchart in Figure 7.7.

CONCLUSIONS

Blondel suggested that for political leaders to implement their goals they would need an effective administrative organisation that was not too light nor too heavy, and well-coordinated, with horizontal links being as important as the vertical hierarchy. Political leaders were able to construct DATAR as a model bureaucracy of this kind, and make it their resource for re-orienting the State bureaucracy towards their goals for *aménagement du territoire*. Though technocrats in the 1940s introduced the precursor of this policy with a small *service* of officials in a conventional ministry, it took political leaders in the 1950s to push *aménagement du territoire* onto the government's policy agenda and give it its first effective instruments. Yet though Fourth Republic leaders could advance a cause that particularly interested them, poor coordination between ministers and ministries hindered this multi-sectoral policy. It required the stability of a post-Algeria Fifth Republic and a government majority, but also a committed prime minister and president, before the appropriate agency, DATAR, could be created.

The 'links between the bureaucracy and the leaders must be close and effective', Blondel argued, if the leadership were to have a strong impact on policy. As far as DATAR and *aménagement du territoire* are concerned, many experts had argued that the ideal organisational arrangement was that instituted at its creation: directly attached to a prime minister who was keen for the policy to succeed, and run by a *délégué* who had the personal support of both president and prime minister. For the political leadership to make an impact, it was the demonstration of political commitment that was important, not the direct formal

³⁷ Hayward (1982), p.112.

attachment to the prime minister. That is, the policy impact of the political leadership was strongly related to its active policy input.

Blondel thought that the 'system' linking political leaders to the bureaucracy was 'often .. simply unresponsive... to leaders' needs'. In DATAR's case, leaders were able to use their budgetary powers to increase or decrease its staffing levels to match their own ambitions, and were nearly always able to adapt its policy work to their own priorities, even if officials occasionally added their own technical initiatives. However, the most effective way for the leadership to make DATAR a competent and flexible organisation, responsive to leadership needs, without itself needing to intervene in detail, was to appoint a *délégué* and senior staff who were well-regarded among the ministerial *cabinets* and the bureaucracy as a whole. The French bureaucracy provides a large pool of such officials in the *grands corps*, who are able to assure horizontal links across ministries and influence the technical bureaucracies; and constitutional provisions give French leaders considerable powers to appoint them. In part, the gradual decline in the traditional profile of DATAR's top officials accurately reflected the decline in the leadership's concern to make *aménagement du territoire* a high-profile policy, as confirmed by the stronger recruitment of *grands corps* members during the policy revival of the early 1990s. In part, decline in the reputation of DATAR's top officials was a consequence of changes in the wider political environment that applied to DATAR too. Personalisation and politicisation of appointments after 1981 exacerbated the disputes between president, prime minister and minister over who would have most say on choice of *délégué*. The subsequent prioritisation of political and 'reward' criteria perhaps increased 'loyalty' (though there had been no evidence of disloyalty) but reduced the pool of willing and competent candidates available to future leaders.

The exercise of political leadership through to policy implementation demands a bureaucracy that can ensure an effective link between the leaders and the population - Blondel's fourth proposition. For *aménagement du territoire*, political leaders have specialised tools to steer and implement their programmes in interministerial committees and funds run by DATAR. The CIAT/ CIADT remains a tool that each leadership can modulate according to its own priorities. Political leaders adjusted the frequency of its meetings to their own level of interest; they varied its purpose between a solemn meeting between a few ministers to decide the long-term future of a whole region, a dramatic occasion in which the prime minister put pressure on ministers to agree decisions that officials would then find difficult to dispute, or an occasion for pre-election publicity. Leaders rarely confronted established interests by abolishing committees, especially funding committees; most preferred to leave them to 'wither on the vine', and create new ones (but the 'established interests' were likely to be local politicians as much as bureaucrats). Political leaderships had adequate powers to give DATAR the financial resources for programmes to which they were committed, to finance less well existing funds that did not match their aims, to reduce funding in particular years, or to transfer control to different agents.


The thesis took up the challenge announced by Blondel in *World Leaders* (but not fully implemented in *Political Leadership*), to examine the comparative impact of different political leaders on two policy areas, both shown by previous researchers to be dominated by distinctive bureaucratic groups. Though roads planning and regionalisation cannot represent all the policy domains that *aménagement du territoire* covers, their intrinsic differences and organisational contrasts mean weight must be given to features found to be common to both. The flowchart in Figure 8.1 brings together the findings from the two policy studies to show the potential resources at leaders' disposal and the constraints they are likely to meet as they seek to implement their aims. They illustrate some of the many paths that individual leaders can take as they manoeuvre their way through the institutional and non-institutional environment. The outcomes, in relation to the input of political leaders and bureaucratic institutions, can be generalised as four schematic models:

- *initiatives dominated by the institutional and non-institutional environment*, in which there was no significant output from the instrument because of the constraints exerted by bureaucratic institutions and/or local political actors, often in concert; or because of a context in which national political leaders were divided or had 'do nothing' aims; or because of electoral constraints on the leaders. DATAR (or the DAT) was not asked to contribute on these issues or its advice was rejected. In both policy domains examined, these failed initiatives, from the leadership's point of view, represented a quarter to a third of instruments. The poor outcomes were as much the result of opposition by local political-administrative networks as by bureaucratic organisations themselves;

- *incremental achievements by political leaders against strong constraints* from bureaucratic groups or more powerful political leaders. These were instruments in which DATAR was often used as a leadership resource to negotiate with State bureaucrats and other groups at national or local level, to move the technical paradigm along, or to modify ministries' or Regions' projects using FIAT and other funds, before politicians settled last details in CIAT. Where DATAR was not directly involved, or even where it was, political leaders had an adequate set of conventional institutions in which to take decisions and issue formal instructions: Council of Ministers, Giscard's Planning Council, *conseils restreints*. This model applied to nearly half the instruments across both policy sectors, but more often in the regionalisation process in which local actors were directly affected, than on road instruments, whose incremental outcomes were more frequently the result of internal compromise within the political leadership. Though it cannot be described as the 'normal' method of interaction - because processes varied greatly - it was the most usual method;

- *ambitious achievements* by highly-committed political leaders who used resources from outside the traditional policy community to prepare or implement the instruments, challenging the incumbent power-holders. But they were willing to give concessions on the non-essential to oppositional groups of bureaucrats or local political actors, providing their core goals were retained. The outsiders could be advisers from a different *corps* or no *corps*,

Figure 8.1 Interplay of political leaders and the institutional and non-institutional environment in *aménagement du territoire*



Notes: Solid arrows represent stronger influence than dashed arrows, but influence varies, e.g. with 'cohabitation'. The diagram includes only the main links relevant to the regional policy agenda

DATAR or the private sector. A few of these instruments were enacted by leaders using 'special powers' or in 'honeymoon' conditions, but it was difficult to demonstrate that the 'honeymoon' was essential to the output. This form of interaction represented nearly a quarter of the instruments in the two policy domains;

- *assertions of personal political will* by a president or prime minister over other political leaders and/or bureaucratic groups, with little or no discussion with them. Although the idea might come from a close adviser or be elaborated with close advisers, essentially they were projects that others, including DATAR, were expected to accept and implement as they stood. They constituted only about a tenth of the processes examined and were not necessarily 'ambitious' projects; those that were, happened perhaps once in a presidency.

A more or less absolute exercise of political will and judgment by a leader, defying the institutional constraints, was thus a very rare event. The empirical assessment of the interplay between leaders and bureaucrats confirmed the continuous spectrum of 'potential leadership impact' that Blondel was sure existed. As Blondel says:

'Whether because they are forced to choose or because they are able to choose, leaders seem *prima facie* to be able to make an impact on the complex network of the environment. Clearly, there is an interplay between the will of the leaders, their aims and ambitions, and the reality around them. It is by gradually analysing the conditions of this interplay that we shall be better able to assess the precise impact of leadership under various types of circumstances and discover the ways leaders can serve nations in the manner most profitable to their populations'.³⁸

While disassociating itself from Blondel's final normative sentiments, this thesis examined the same assumption that political leaders have considerable control over bureaucratic institutions, with a substantial ability to modify organisational structures and re-orient bureaucratic activities to match their own political ambitions. It was Blondel's ambition to demonstrate the validity of that assumption through an examination of the interplay between leaders and institutions in a comparative framework. This study has gone some way towards achieving that through a longitudinal study of the impact of political leaders on the work of one bureaucratic institution in France.

³⁸ Blondel (1987), pp.113-14.

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APPENDIX A

AMENAGEMENT DU TERRITOIRE

'There is no adequate translation of this term'.¹ *Aménagement du territoire* is described by Prud'homme as being even 'in French both vague and beautiful'.² French texts explain it to their readers at length.³ *Aménager* is to arrange in an orderly manner, for a certain purpose (*disposer avec ordre... pour tel ou tel usage*), in order to make the objects arranged more comfortable, more convenient and easier to use.⁴ The term can be used at any scale: interior design, landscape design, town planning, a transport network.

Aménagement du territoire - the first aim in the title of the *Délégation à l'aménagement du territoire et à l'action régionale* (DATAR) - arranges on a national scale, and as such can only be a policy of national government, though the post-1981 left-wing governments especially have tried to combine it with decentralised economic and land-use planning. However, the dispute in 1997 between the Jacobin Interior Minister, Chévenement, and the Green minister for the Environment and *Aménagement du territoire*, Voynet, over whether there could be *aménagement du territoire* without one single national plan, demonstrates the continuing vitality of the philosophical argument. *L'action régionale* - the second aim in DATAR's title - focuses on the development of each region. Having passed almost into disuse after being used to promote the investment programmes drawn up for each new administrative region in the 1960s, the emphasis on this aspect comes and goes (see names of DATAR's teams in Figure 4.8). This term too gave rise to conflict on grounds pertinent to the main theme of the thesis. Every time the legal text creating DATAR came back from the 'countless' meetings in which it was debated, the term *action régionale* had disappeared: the law specialists and the technical ministries wanted a '*délégation à l'aménagement du territoire*, full stop'. Members of the *Conseil d'Etat* resisted a term 'unusual in French law', and the State technical corps rejected the suggestion of 'a region' that might not fit their technical needs and would make it easier for the prefect to coordinate them. 'Guichard put the term back each time, feeling he was interpreting exactly what the General thought and Pompidou thought'.⁵

The translation offered by Biarez or her editors puts these two aspects together well.

¹ Biarez (1982), p.270fn.

² Prud'homme, R. (1974) 'Regional economic policy in France, 1962-1972', in N.Hansen (ed.) *Public Policy and Regional Economic Development* (Cambridge, Mass: Ballinger), 33-63, p.35.

³ Lanversin (1970), pp.15-18.

⁴ *Petit Larousse: Grand Larousse*.

⁵ Perrilliat, J. 'La révolution de la Ve République dans la représentation', in Hamon (ed) (1992), 1-13, pp.9-10. Perrilliat was in Pompidou's *cabinet* at the time; he went to DATAR with Guichard. At DATAR's 40th birthday event (13 Feb. 2003), Guichard admitted he had to work hard to persuade the General.

'It can best be described as a flexible and generic notion referring to that state activity which aims to promote the balanced territorial development of France as a whole without neglecting the specific needs and character of individual regions and their constituent parts'.⁶

Regional planning academics and government documents commonly quote the definition of *aménagement du territoire* given by Eugène Claudius-Petit, Minister of Reconstruction, in a 'communication' to a Council of Ministers in 1950:

'Aménagement du territoire est la recherche, dans la cadre géographique de la France, d'une meilleure répartition des hommes en fonction des ressources naturelles et des activités économiques ... cette recherche est faite dans la constante préoccupation de donner aux hommes de meilleures conditions d'habitat et de travail, de plus grandes facilités de loisir et de culture. Elle n'est donc pas faite à des fins strictement économiques, mais bien davantage pour le bien-être et l'épanouissement de la population'.

'Aménagement du territoire is the search for a more balanced distribution of the population within the territory of France in relation to the distribution of natural resources and economic activity. Its constant concern is to provide people with better living and working conditions, and improved facilities for leisure and cultural activities. It is therefore being carried out not just from economic motives, but much more for the people's well-being and fulfilment'.⁷

Though policy analysts and political scientists tend to focus on the economic aspects when trying to measure the effectiveness of *aménagement du territoire*, successive governments and *délégués* have continued to emphasise the social goals mentioned by Claudius-Petit too. The latter are assumed to have been mentioned to counterbalance the economic goals and impact of the Modernisation and Infrastructure Plans of the *Commissariat général du Plan* (Plan Commissariat), which not only ignored social issues but reinforced existing spatial inequalities.

Though the main goal of *aménagement du territoire* is an improved balance between regions, and especially between the Paris region and the rest of France, there are many other policy goals with which *aménagement du territoire* is linked and which have been emphasised to different extents at different times. 'Regional policy' can be a suitable translation when considering the total sum of policy measures promoted by various ministries which it is DATAR's responsibility to coordinate, and which apply to one or many regions, whether constituted as formal institutions or specific to each ministry's sectoral concerns. However, another strong element within *aménagement du territoire* is a 'regional planning' that is both top-down in concept and applies to all regions. Whether 'regional policy', 'regional planning' or the more recent 'territorial cohesion' (another concept somewhat alien to English thought), is uppermost at any one time depends on who is in charge of the policy domain.

Urban planning and urban policy are components of *aménagement du territoire* that could perhaps be separated from regional planning and regional policy at the national scale.

⁶ Biare (1982), p.270fn.

⁷ Ministère de la Reconstruction et de l'Urbanisme (1950) Pour un plan national d'aménagement du territoire. (MRU), p.3. Quoted in Lajugie (1964) 'Aménagement du territoire et développement économique régional en France (1945-1964)', Revue d'Economie politique, 74/1, 278-336, p.282.

Yet planning an urban area can affect the region of which it is a part and, in the end, the whole country, and it is indeed the deliberate goal of the policy to develop regional cities (*métropoles d'équilibre*) as counterweights to Paris. Peter Hall's standard textbook on 'Urban and regional planning' deals with the semantic and conceptual problem by referring, in the French case, to 'national/regional' and 'regional/local' planning.⁸ They are not convenient terms and reinforce the impression that there is no single translation. For local politicians outside the main cities, industrial decentralisation, rural development policies and road construction are often identified with *aménagement du territoire*. But industrial restructuring, water supply and water pollution control, transport planning, ports development, administrative and financial services decentralisation, coastal protection, control of development in Paris and agricultural modernisation policies and many others are connected in theory and in reality by DATAR's activities.

When DATAR acts as a regional development agency for poorer, undeveloped rural areas or for regions of outdated industry, *aménagement du territoire* can be translated appropriately as regional development. Yet DATAR is an agency for the whole of the country: its purpose as much to reduce congestion in areas of economic growth or to save areas of coastline under threat of property development as to stimulate development: it is not a *Cassa per il Mezzogiorno* (working just for the Italian South), nor 'an agency for developing clapped-out regions' as one anglocentric LSE colleague described it. While it might be trivial to say, as did one source quoted by Hayward, that 'regional policy was what DATAR did',⁹ the subsidiary objectives of regional policy, though not the fundamental concern for regional balance, have had to adapt to match the paradigms of professional theories of development, evolving social and economic conditions, reallocation of central-local government powers and alternations of parties in government. The multiplicity of goals and ideas that are encompassed with the term *aménagement du territoire* is the main reason that there is no one English translation that is adequate. The thesis therefore adopted the same solution as the first volume of *West European Politics* to publish an article on the subject, and refers to the policy as *aménagement du territoire*.¹⁰

⁸ Hall, P. (1975) *Urban and Regional Planning* (Harmondsworth: Pelican), p.204.

⁹ Hayward (1986), p.121.

¹⁰ Biarez, S. (1982) "Aménagement du territoire" in France: State intervention or regulation?, *West European Politics*, 5, July, 271-86.

APPENDIX B

MULTIPLE SOURCES OF DATA

Pettigrew's case-study on 'the politics of organizational decision-making' provided a useful point of departure for the data-collecting and analytical strategies of this thesis. According to Pettigrew, case studies should, where practicable, employ multiple methods, multiple data sources and multiple observers, in order to improve validity through 'triangulation', and expose the researcher to a wide range of insights and evidence.¹ From a different epistemological perspective, Denzin and Lincoln observe that 'triangulation is not a tool or a strategy of validity, but an alternative to validation'; the multiple methods inherent to qualitative research are used to gain a deeper understanding of a phenomenon whose objective reality can never be captured.² Even researchers working within a non-positivist epistemology think triangulation of methods and sources of evidence assists validation by reducing the likelihood of misinterpretation, as Stake puts it.³

The methods chosen have to fit the theoretical requirements of the study. This research project shared with Pettigrew the focus on power and cognate concepts that are hard to define in ways capable of being operationalised and measured. 'Concepts like these [power, influence, control...]... have proved notoriously difficult both to interpret and to employ rigorously in empirical work'.⁴ Moreover, this thesis is often dealing with notions Dahl regards as 'particularly troublesome':⁵ potential power as opposed to manifest power; having power as opposed to exercising power; and the power of anticipated reactions, for example, of civil servants and political leaders who frame their advice or their policy demands in terms of what they think will be accepted by the other party.⁶

Dahl distinguished between rigour and relevance. Experimental rigour can produce interesting results but not well-rounded explanations of complex political systems, whereas attempts to understand concrete phenomena can provide a guide to the real world but often at the expense of rigorous logic and verifiability. Dahl's pragmatic solution was 'to compensate for the unsatisfactory character of all existing operational measures [by being] eclectic' and to use a wide assortment of data.⁷

By basing analysis on DATAR's 'reputational power' and 'leadership commitment' or 'interest', the research project shifts to some extent the burden of defining and measuring

¹ Pettigrew, A. (1973) The Politics of Organizational Decision-Making (Tavistock), p.52

² Denzin, N. and Lincoln, Y. (1998) 'Introduction' in N. Denzin and Y. Lincoln Strategies of Qualitative Inquiry (Sage), 1-34, p.4.

³ Stake, R. (1998), 'Case studies' in Denzin and Lincoln (1998), 86-109, p.96.

⁴ Dahl, R. (1989) Democracy and its Critics (New Haven: Yale), p.272.

⁵ *ibid.*

⁶ Page (1992), p.143.

⁷ Dahl (1961), pp. 330-1; Pettigrew (1973) p.64.

a variable concept to the subjective opinions of multiple observers. Yet the multiple methods adopted in the different chapters (quantitative, qualitative, historical-legal and comparative) also allow that variability to be expressed and its different aspects to be treated. In turn these multiple methods led to the adoption of multiple analytical strategies to produce findings of relevance to the thesis. These included the 'quantivised' coding of text-based evidence, socio-biographical surveys, tabular arrays, graphical pattern-matching and statistical correlation, heuristic graphical plots, comparisons of measures over time, and Boolean 'truth tables'.⁸

Pettigrew, studying decision-making processes within a private company, chose as his multiple data sources participant observation, interviews and content analysis of the firm's contemporary records. His emphasis on gathering evidence 'by immersion' in the subject, in an inductive and post-positive manner, derived from the limited theoretical understanding of the processes he was studying, and the possibility of being able to observe them 'in real time'. Elgie's thesis similarly examined events over a very recent time-period, which made interviews with participants and witnesses a strong data- collecting strategy.⁹

In contrast, the overall strategy of this thesis was to analyse events over a long period of time, in order that the interplay between political leaders and bureaucratic institutions could be compared across different environments (different constitutions, different configurations of the party system, times of crisis and times of peace...). Furthermore the material was to be analysed against a familiar theoretical assumption about leadership and within a firm framework outlined by Blondel (see Chapter 2). Specific empirical data from 'historical' records were therefore required: participant observation and interviews on current and recent activities would be inadequate. These two 'interactive' data-collecting strategies were still employed, but to a limited extent only.

Participant observation served chiefly as a cross-check on evidence from other sources. The participation comprised writing reports for DATAR-led projects (including negotiations and discussions at DATAR); giving lectures at conferences run by DATAR or in a team with DATAR officials; and operating as UK member of a French government observatory in European transport policy run by a former DATAR official, attended by senior members of the 'Ponts' corps, which was particularly helpful in the roads policy case study. DATAR staff and other 'witnesses' were informed that I was undertaking a PhD thesis on 'DATAR's coordination', but not that it concerned political leadership. Participation in these events was also used to obtain informal opinions on DATAR's activities, working procedures and reputation with people from external bodies who were working, or had worked with DATAR in a variety of contexts. This information was generally used as background or in footnotes to illustrate general points.

⁸ Ragin (1987); Miles and Huberman (1994); Yin, R. (1993) *Applications of Case Study Research* (Sage); Yin, R. (1994) *Case Study Research: Design and Methods*, 2nd edn (Sage).

The main evidence came from primary and secondary documents. Case-study researchers on the French bureaucracy can find far more 'first-hand' evidence and opinion offered by officials in memoirs, other books and articles in the press than could be envisaged from any British organisation, public or private. Few DATAR *délégués* have not put their views into print, or described DATAR's activities, whether in or out of office. One benefit in conducting longitudinal research on 'contemporary history' is that sufficient time has passed for officials to be willing to participate in 'witness seminars'. While these texts have to be treated with caution they are as credible as a researcher's interview with a top official or politician who has long ago decided 'the line to take'. In many cases 'cross-validation' is possible between several primary sources. Two texts by academic researchers on DATAR who became staff members or participant observers of the organisation (Wachter, Massardier) were virtually primary sources, and a source of expert observations. Massardier's collection of socio-biographical data on DATAR staff and recruitment statistics for his thesis were immensely useful for a different analysis in this one (see Chapter 5). Bezes's thesis on the decision to relocate one particular administrative body provided not only a 'cameo' case study for this thesis (in Chapter 6) but interview material that illuminated other issues too.¹⁰

DATAR publishes a bulletin on its activities, goals and staff (*Lettre de la DATAR*), reports by its staff and outside experts, and conference proceedings. A number of official enquiries have included reviews of DATAR, and leading politicians have published their own critiques. Print sources are richer in France than in Britain in a number of other ways, such as the interviews undertaken and commentaries by *Le Monde's* specialist journalists, and the '*dossiers de presse*' at the Paris Institut d'Etudes Politiques. Some unpublished internal DATAR records were provided on request and other DATAR documents obtained as a result of 'participant-observer' activity. But most of the empirical material was available and derived from published sources. Thus equivalents of all the 'multiple sources of data' that Rhodes lists for studies of the UK core executive were used in this thesis:

- parliamentary debates
- white papers, green papers, official statistics
- media reports
- memoirs, autobiographies and diaries
- biographies
- discussions with past and present officials [but ministers from printed sources only]
- seminars [as participant-observer and not under Chatham House rules]
- Cabinet papers (*Archives nationales*)
- other secondary sources, written by participants, journalists or academics.¹¹

⁹ Elgie, R. (1992) 'The influence of the French Prime Minister in the Policy-Making Process, 1981-1991', PhD thesis, LSE, F6923.

¹⁰ Massardier (1996); Wachter, S. (1985) 'L'aménagement du territoire et son institutionnalisation: des réseaux centraux et locaux', *Revue d'Economie et Urbaine*, 3; Wachter, S. (1989) 'Ajustements et recentrage d'une politique publique', *Sociologie du Travail*, 31/1. Bezes (1994).

¹¹ Rhodes, R. (1995) 'From Prime Ministerial Power to Core Executive', in R. Rhodes and P. Dunleavy, *Prime Minister, Cabinet and Core Executive* (Basingstoke: Macmillan), p.32.

APPENDIX C

POLITICAL LEADERS 1944 TO 2004

PRIME MINISTER	PM's party	INTERIOR	ECONOMY & FINANCE	CONSTRUCTION	PUBLIC WORKS	AMENAGEMENT DU TERRITOIRE	DELEGUE
PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT							
De Gaulle	10/9/44	Tixier	Mendes then Pleven	Dautry	R.Mayer	From 1944 to 1962 the Minister of Reconstruction or Construction was responsible for aménagement du territoire	
De Gaulle	21/11/45	Tixier	Pleven	Dautry	Moch		
Gouin	26/1/46 Soc	Le Troquer	Philip Schuman &	Billoux	Moch		
Bidault	24/6/46 MRP	Depreux	Pflmlin Philip &	Billoux	Moch		
Blum	16/12/46 Soc	Depreux	Guyon	Schmitt	Moch		
FOURTH REPUBLIC							
PRESIDENT AURIOL (Soc) 1946-Dec 53							
Ramadier	22/1/47 Soc	Depreux	Schuman & Philip	Tillon	Moch	Moch was Minister Economy, Plan, Works	
Ramadier	22/10/47 Soc	Depreux	Moch	Letourneau	Moch		
Schuman	24/11/47 MRP	Moch	R.Mayer	Coty	Pineau		
Marie	26/7/48 Rad	Moch	Reynaud	Coty	Pineau		
Schuman	5/9/48 MRP	Moch	Pineau	Coty	Queuille		
Queuille	11/9/48 Rad	Moch	Queuille, then Petsch	C-Petit	Pineau		
		Moch then	Petsche & Buron	<div>BUDGET</div>	Pineau, then		
Bidault	28/10/49 MRP	Queuille	Buron	C-Petit	Chastellain		
Queuille	2/7/50 Rad	Queuille(PM)	Petsche	E.Faure	Bourgès-M		
Pleven	12/7/50 UDSR	Queuille	Petsche	E.Faure	Pinay		
Queuille	10/3/51 Rad	Queuille(PM)	Petsche	E.Faure	Pinay		
Pleven	11/8/51 UDSR	Brune	R.Mayer	Courant	Pinay		
E.Faure	20/1/52 Rad	Brune	Buron (Econ)	Courant	Pinay		
			Pinay & s/sGaillard	Moreau	C-Petit	Morice	
Pinay	8/3/52 RI	Brune	Bourges-M	Moreau	Courant	Morice	
R.Mayer	8/1/53 Rad	Brune					
		Martinaud-					
Laniel	28/6/53 RI	Déplat	E.Faure	Lemaire	Chastellain		

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PRIME MINISTER	PM's party	INTERIOR	ECONOMY & FINANCE	CONSTRUCTION	PUBLIC WORKS	AMENAGEMENT DU TERRITOIRE	DELEGUE
PRESIDENT COTY (Cons) Jan 1954-May 1958							
Laniel	28/6/53 RI	Déplat	E. Faure Buron	20/1/54	Lemaire Chastellain		
Mendes-F	19/6/54 Rad	Mitterrand	E. Faure Buron	14/8/54 3/9/54	Lemaire C-Petit Chaban-Delmas		Faure was Minister of Economy and Plan
E. Faure	23/2/55 Rad	Bourges-M, 2/12/55 Faure	Pflimlin Lecoste, Ramadier	Duchet s/sChochoy- > s/sFelice s/sChochoy- > s/sThome	Corniglion-M s/s Pinton		No senior minister for Construction or Transport
Mollet	1/2/56 Soc	Gilbert-Jules					
Bourges-M	13/6/57 Rad	Gilbert-Jules	Gaillard		E. Bonnafous		
Gaillard	6/11/57 Rad	Bourges-M M. Faure,	Pflimlin (with Plan)	Garet	E. Bonnafous		
Pflimlin	14/5/58 MRP	17/5 Moch	E. Faure (with Plan)	Garet	E. Bonnafous		
De Gaulle	1/6/58	Pelletier	Pinay	Sudreau	Buron		
FIFTH REPUBLIC							
PRESIDENT DE GAULLE 8 Jan 1959-26 April 1969							
Debré	8/1/59 UNR	Berthouin	Pinay	Sudreau	Buron		
Debré	28/5/59	Chatenet	Baumgartner	13/1/60	Works & TSP	ADMIN REFORM	MIN-DELEGUE
Debré	6/5/61	Frey	Giscard	8/1/62			
Pompidou	14/4/62 UNR	Frey	Giscard	Maziol	Buron	L. Joxe	Schumann
Pompidou					16/5/62		
PM & AdT	28/11/62 UNR	Frey	Giscard	Maziol	Jacquet		14/2/63 Guichard
				SUPER-EQUIPEMENT			
Pompidou				Pisani with Junior Tsp			
PM & AdT	8/1/66 UNR	Frey	Debré	Bettencourt			
				INFRASTRUCTURE	TRANSPORT	Min-Del PLAN- AdT	
Pompidou	1/4/67 UNR	Fouchet	Debré	Ortoli	Chamant	Marcellin	[6/4/1967]
Pompidou	31/5/68 UDR	Marcellin	Couve	Galley	Chamant	Guichard	Monod
Couve	10/7/68 UDR	Marcellin	Ortoli	Chalandon	Chamant	Guichard	24/10/68

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POLITICAL LEADERS 1944 TO 2004

PRIME MINISTER	PM's party	INTERIOR	ECONOMY & FINANCE	CONSTRUCTION	PUBLIC WORKS	AMENAGEMENT DU TERRITOIRE	DELEGUE
PRESIDENT POMPIDOU (UDR) 20 Jun 1969-2 April 1974							
Chaban-D	20/6/69 UDR	Marcellin	Giscard s/sChirac	INFRASTRUCTURE Chalandon	TRANSPORT Mondon then Chamant	ADMIN REFORM Frey from 7/1/71 with s/s Malaud Peyrefitte	Min-Del PLAN- AdT Bettencourt
Messmer	5/7/72 UDR	Marcellin	Giscard	AdT & INFRA...	Guichard & Galley		
Messmer	2/4/73 UDR	Marcellin	Giscard		s/s Bonnet Guéna		
Messmer	27/2/74 UDR	Chirac	Giscard	AdT, SUPER-INFRASTRUCTURE 1/3/74 Guichard, s/s Bonnet		Peyrefitte	
PRESIDENT GISCARD (UDF) 21 May 1974-21 May 1981							
Chirac	27/5/74 UDR	INTER & AdT Poniatowski	Fourcade	INFRA Galley	TRANSPORT Cavaillé	PLAN & AdT	12/9/75
Barre	25/8/76	INTERIOR Poniatowski	Barre	Fourcade	Cavaillé	3/7/76 Lecanuet	Essig
PM & Economy	29/3/77	Bonnet	Barre	AdT, SUPER-INFRASTRUCTURE Fourcade	s/s Tsp Cavaillé		
PM & Economy				26/9/77 lcart	s/s Dijoud ADT		
Barre	3/4/78	Bonnet	Monory	ENVIRONMENT D'Omano	TRANSPORT Le Theule		27/4/78
PM & AdT					Hoeffel	2/10/80	Chadeau
PRESIDENT MITTERRAND (PS) 21 May 1981-7 May 1988							
Mauroy	21/5/81 PS	Defferre	Delors	TOWNS Quilliot	TRANSPORT Fiterman	PLAN & AdT s/s PLAN	27/10/81
Mauroy	22/3/83 PS	Defferre	Delors	Quilliot	Fiterman	Le Garrec	Attali
PM, Plan & AdT	4/10/83 PS	Defferre	Delors	Quilès	Fiterman		goes 28/6/84
PM, Plan & AdT				INFRA	s/s Tsp	PLAN & AdT	
Fabius	18/7/84 PS	Joxe	Bérégevoy	Quilès	Auroux	Defferre	6/9/84
Fabius	20/9/85 PS	Joxe	Bérégevoy	Auroux	11/85Josselin		Sallois
Chirac	20/3/86 RPR	Pasqua	Balladur	AdT, SUPER-INFRASTRUCTURE Méhaignerie	s/s Douffiagues		6/5/87 Carrez

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POLITICAL LEADERS 1944 TO 2004

PRIME MINISTER	PM's party	INTERIOR	ECONOMY & FINANCE	CONSTRUCTION	PUBLIC WORKS	AMENAGEMENT DU TERRITOIRE	DELEGUE
PRESIDENT MITTERRAND (PS) 8 May 1988- 7 May 1995							
				INFRA	TRANSPORT	PLAN	INDUSTRY & AdT
Rocard	9/5/88 PS	Joxe	Bérégovoy	M.Faure	Mermaz	Stoléru	Fauroux
Rocard	23/6/88 PS	Joxe	Bérégovoy	M.Faure	Delebarre		s/s AdT
				22/2/89 Delebarre	s/s Sarre		Chérèque
							4/10/89 Duport
				INFRASTRUCTURE	TOWN & AdT		
Cresson	15/5/91 PS	Marchand	Bérégovoy	Quilès	s/a Sarre	Delebarre	INDUSTRY & AdT
Bérégovoy	2/4/92 PS			Bianco	s/s Sarre		Strauss-Kahn
							s/s AdT Laignel
		INTERIOR & AdT					
Balladur	29/3/93 RPR	Pasqua					
		s/s AdT Hoeffel		Pons	s/s Bosson		2/9/93 Paillet
PRESIDENT CHIRAC (RPR) 8 May 1995- 7 May 2002							
		INTERIOR		AdT, SUPER-INFRASTRUCTURE			
Juppé	17/5/95 RPR	J.L.Debré	Madelin	Pons	s/s Idrac		
						TOWN & AdT	
Juppé	7/11/95 RPR			SUPER-INFRASTRUCTURE			15/11/95 Aubert
				Pons		Gaudin	
						AdT & ENVIRONMENT	23/7/97 Guigou
Jospin	2/6/97 PS	Chevenement		Gayssot		Voynet	
	1/9/00 PS	Vaillant	Fabius	Gayssot		Voynet	
					2001 Cochet		
						PUBLIC SERVICE & AdT	24/7/02 Jacquet
Raffarin	7/5/02 UMP	Sarkozy		De Robien		Delevoeye	

Main sources: Yvert, B. (ed) (1980) Dictionnaire des ministres 1789-1989 (Perrin); Le Monde.