The Romantic Zeitgeist in Post-Cold War International Relations and the Disintegration of Yugoslavia

by

S. M. Milovac-Carolina

PhD

Department of International Relations

London School of Economics and Political Science

University of London

2006
Declaration

I declare that the work presented in this thesis is my own.

S. M. Milovac-Carolina
THESES
198543
Abstract

The post-Cold War 1990s were pervaded by a popular sense of pessimism and decline. The thesis argues that such sentiments were part of a general mood in international relations towards Romanticism. It examines how this Romantic sensibility affected interpretations of conflict in Yugoslavia, outlines Romantic predictions about post-Cold War conflict, and compares the Romantic view with a structural perspective of Yugoslavia’s demise. The thesis uses a variety of methods, including a philosophical exploration of Romanticism in the nineteenth century and the 1990s, a literary analysis of key texts on conflict, an empirical investigation of armed conflict data, and a theoretical treatment of structural factors in conflict.

The thesis historicises nineteenth-century Romanticism as a reaction to the uncertainties created by three transformations: political revolution in France, Industrial Revolution in Britain, and cultural revolution in Germany. It then examines Romanticism through five themes—anti-rationalism, pessimism, nostalgia, relativism, and nature. It compares the 1990s and its ‘revolutions’—fragmentation and globalisation—developing the concept of Postmodern Romanticism within these themes and applies them to trends in 1990s international relations.

Further, the thesis examines Romantic interpretations of conflict in the works of Robert Kaplan, Samuel Huntington, and Martin van Creveld, specifically scrutinising their interpretations of conflict in Yugoslavia. It then empirically investigates various Romantic predictions about conflict, providing empirical evidence that these predictions are inaccurate.

Building on the empirical analyses that find state creation rather than identity differences an important factor in conflict, the thesis develops an alternative theoretical framework for assessing state stability based on four structural risk factors: colonial legacy, political institutions, economic structure, and demographic shifts, introducing agency through the concepts of exit, voice, and loyalty. The thesis uses this framework to compare Romantic and structural views of conflict in Yugoslavia. Finally, it provides some reflections on 1990s Romanticism and conflict.
Table of contents

Declaration .......................................................................................................................2
Abstract ............................................................................................................................3
Table of contents ..............................................................................................................4
Table of figures ................................................................................................................6
Introduction. Of Flesh and Blood ..................................................................................7
(i) Why Romanticism? .................................................................................................7
(ii) Why Yugoslavia? .....................................................................................................13
(iii) Chapter Overview ................................................................................................14
(iv) Methodology ..........................................................................................................18
Chapter 1. Nineteenth-Century Romanticism and Zeitgeist: Defining an Age ..........21
1.1 Romanticisms and the Zeitgeist—Definitions ....................................................25
1.2 Historicising Nineteenth-Century Romanticism—Political, economic, and cultural background .................................................................29
1.3 Deep Sleep of Reason—Anti-rationalism and spiritual reawakening..........33
1.4 O Tempora! O Mores!—Pessimism and ennui ..............................................37
1.5 Protagoras' Children—Relativism, nationalism, and will .........................40
1.6 Search for a Golden Age—Nostalgia and medievalism .............................44
1.7 Dreaming of Arcadia—Nature and the exotic ............................................47
1.8 Walking by Faith, Not Sight—Conclusion .......................................................50
Chapter 2. Age without a Name: The Romantic Zeitgeist in post-Cold War International Relations .......................................................................................................................53
2.1 Historicising Postmodern Romanticism—Global disruptions in the 1990s .................................................................57
2.2 Armour of God—Anti-rationalism and emotionalism ..................................64
2.3 Valediction in the Air?—Pessimism and ennui .............................................73
2.4 Cement of Blood—Relativism, nationalism, and identity ...........................81
2.5 Painting Over the Ugly Parts—Nostalgia and neo-imperialism .................88
2.6 Hearts of Darkness—Essential human nature and the exotic 'Other' ......92
2.7 No Shelter, No Relief?—Conclusion .................................................................97
Chapter 3. Prophets of the Apocalypse: Romantic Approaches to Conflict in Kaplan, Huntington, and van Creveld .................................................................101
3.1 Making Meaning—Metaphors and analogies .................................................104
3.2 Postmodern Jeremiah—Kaplan and the 'coming anarchy' .......................108
3.3 Every One Against His Brother—Huntington's culture clash ..................123
3.4 Return to Darkness and the Sword—Decline of the state and rise of insecurity in Van Creveld's neo-medievalism .................................130
3.5 Omnium Finis Imminet?—Conclusion .............................................................136
Chapter 4. Increased Conflict in the Early 1990s: A Harbinger of the Coming Anarchy? ......................................................................................................................140
4.1 Looking Backward—Background to the chapter ..........................................141
4.2 Methodology—Definitions of conflict and overview ..................................143
4.3 Conflict Levels—The Cold War, 1945-1988 ...............................................149
4.4 Conflict Levels—The post-Cold War transition, 1989-1992 ......................151
4.5 Conflict Levels—The later post-Cold War, 1993-1999 ..............................153
4.6 Conflict Levels—The turn of the millennium, 2000-2004 ..........................156
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>The Effects of State Collapse on Conflict Levels—The disintegration of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>The Effects of African Conflicts on Conflict Levels in the 1990s</td>
<td>159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>Conflict Termination—An under-explored post-Cold War trend</td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.10</td>
<td>Conflict and State Creation during the Cold War—Wars of decolonisation</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.12</td>
<td>The Coming Anarchy Myth—Conclusion</td>
<td>179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 5. Rationalism Redux: Assessing State Stability from a Structural Perspective</td>
<td></td>
<td>185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>Structures, Stability, and Conflict—Examining four risk factors</td>
<td>187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>The Legacy of the Past—Colonial/imperial history and institutions</td>
<td>188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>The Structure of the Present—Political factors</td>
<td>193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>The Structure of the Present—Economic factors</td>
<td>195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>The Shadow of the Future—Demographic change</td>
<td>198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>Method of Analysis—Exploring agency through exit, voice, and loyalty</td>
<td>202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>The Role of Exit and Voice in Stemming Institutional Deterioration</td>
<td>204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>The Logic of Loyalty in Institutions</td>
<td>207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>Towards an Alternative Framework—Conclusion</td>
<td>209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>Where the Wild Things Are—Irrationality, relativism, nature</td>
<td>214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>Deep, Dark Winter of Death—Pessimism and nostalgia</td>
<td>219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>The Centre Will Not Hold—Structural factors and disintegration</td>
<td>224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>Traitors All?—An analysis of exit, voice, and loyalty in Yugoslavia</td>
<td>241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>Romantic Illusions—Conclusion</td>
<td>246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 7. Considering Phlebas—Romanticism and Declinism in International Relations</td>
<td></td>
<td>249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>Bones of Contention—Tragedy and conflict</td>
<td>252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>Selling Götterdämmerung—Conclusion</td>
<td>257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix</td>
<td></td>
<td>261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(i)</td>
<td>Methodology for Database Cleaning</td>
<td>261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(ii)</td>
<td>Base Rate Calculation</td>
<td>264</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(iii)</td>
<td>List of States, Declarations of Independence and UN Admission Dates</td>
<td>266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bibliography</td>
<td></td>
<td>271</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table of figures

Table 2.1: Summary of Common Perceptions of the Post-Cold War Order ............ 63
Table 2.2: Growth of Cultural Topics in the Social Sciences, 1980-2005 .......... 84
Graph 4.1: New Conflicts: Annual average base rates, 1945-1992 ................. 142
Graph 4.2: Base Rates of Conflict by Region (Singer & Small), 1945-1988 .... 150
Graph 4.3: Base Rates of Conflict by Region (Kosimo), 1945-1988 .......... 151
Graph 4.4: Expected versus Observed New Conflicts (Singer & Small), 1989-1992 ................................................................. 152
Graph 4.5: Expected versus Observed New Conflicts (Kosimo), 1989-1992 ........ 153
Graph 4.6: Expected versus Observed New Conflicts by Region, 1993-1999 ................................................................. 154
Graph 4.7: Expected versus Observed New Conflicts by Region, 2000-2004 ................................................................. 156
Graph 4.8: Contribution of FSU/FY to Overall Conflict Levels, 1945-1999 .... 157
Graph 4.9: Contribution of FSU/FY to Excess New Conflicts, 1989-1992 .... 158
Graph 4.11: Percentage Contribution of Africa to Conflict Levels, 1945-1999 ................................................................. 161
Graph 4.12: Declining Conflict in Asia, 1945-1992 ............................................ 162
Graph 4.13: Overall Conflict Termination Over Time, 1945-1992 ................. 163
Graph 4.14: Rates of Conflict Termination, 1945-1992 ......................................... 163
Graph 4.15: Comparison of Conflict Termination Rates by Region, 1945-1999 ................................................................. 164
Graph 4.16: Duration of Conflicts by Start and Termination Date ..................... 165
Table 4.1: Definitions of State Creation ......................................................... 167
Graph 4.17: Conflicts Over Independence in New States, 1945-1999 .............. 167
Graph 4.18: Comparing Definitions of State Creation, 1945-1988 ................. 168
Graph 4.19: Comparing Definitions of State Creation, 1989-1999 ................. 170
Graph 4.20: Top Three Conflict Issues Over Time, 1945-1999 ...................... 172
Graph 4.23: Mean Duration of Conflict by Issue and by Start and End Dates .... 177
Graph 4.24: Average Minimum Number of Casualties by Conflict Issue .......... 178
Table 6.1: Structural Factors and Impact on Loyalty to the Central State .......... 245
Introduction. Of Flesh and Blood

'He is merely flesh and blood. / Flesh-and-blood is weak and frail, / Susceptible to nervous shock'

—T.S. Eliot

Twenty years ago, if we were to have asked Western policymakers, academics, or even informed members of the public about the reasons for state failure and intrastate conflict, the conventional wisdom would have encompassed a roster of coldly rationalist and bloodlessly structural answers, such as insufficient economic development or a lack of democracy. However, after the end of the Cold War international relations became about flesh and blood again. The rationalist Cold War metaphor of states as billiard balls in international relations made famous by Kenneth Waltz and other Realists was challenged, overtaken by events. While the 1990s seemed to begin promisingly with the fall of communism, the violent collapses of Yugoslavia and parts of the Soviet Union showed a global audience 'what history meant in flesh and blood', one which was 'weak and frail, susceptible to nervous shock'. The disintegration of both states, but particularly Yugoslavia, also put paid to lifeless Cold War abstractions, like billiard balls, and replaced them with the bloody standards of clashing ethnies instead. Rather than speaking of progress through rationalism, the 1990s shouted of pessimism and decline in an irrational age. Although some observers in the 1990s analogised the period to the Middle Ages, it may be appropriate to analogise the first decade of the post-Cold War to another period: the age of Romanticism.

(i) Why Romanticism?

Just as significant systemic dislocations at the end of the Cold War—fragmentation and globalisation—bred fear and uncertainty in the 1990s, disruptive transformations in the nineteenth century rocked the foundations of European societies during the age, creating a deep sense of malaise. The French Revolution and the Napoleonic wars

3 In 1937, Rebecca West famously said that she went to Yugoslavia 'to see what history meant in flesh and blood'.
4 See, for example, Alain Minc, Le nouveau Moyen Âge (Paris: Editions Gallimard, 1993).
that followed changed the political map of Europe; the Industrial Revolution in Britain introduced enormous economic and social disruptions; and the cultural revolution in Germany created far-reaching philosophical and political insights. The Romantic ‘movement’, or Romanticism, developed partly as a reaction to these troubling uncertainties and the perceived failure of Enlightenment rationalism to provide answers in a time of profound turbulence. What defines Romanticism is not a set of ideological precepts; instead it can be likened to a ‘mood’, ‘atmosphere’, or ‘sensibility’ that suggests certain themes, five of which we explore in this thesis: 1) anti-rationalism, emotionalism, and spirituality; 2) pessimism and ennui; 3) nostalgia; 4) relativism and the role of identity; and 5) a focus on nature.

Romanticism’s legacies have a long arm. Despite having its roots in the nineteenth century, Isaiah Berlin noted that ‘[R]omanticism […] is the largest recent movement to transform the lives and the thought of the Western world.’

‘Rather than offering a set of logical principles, nineteenth-century Romanticism developed several key themes or strands of thought which are loosely tied together, and can perhaps be best understood as affective tendencies or sensibilities. These themes affected understandings of politics and international relations in the 1990s. In fact, it would be difficult to comprehend contemporary society outside the framework of these themes, which include a cyclical sense of history; nostalgia; ‘holistic’ or organic views of society; the symbiosis of man and nature; the primordial pull of identity and cultural determinism; or the essential duality of life. Furthermore, we are all heirs to Romanticism’s sense of historicism—the understanding that time has specific meanings relative to a certain age forms the basis of modern political thinking. In fact, it is difficult to conceive of contemporary scholarship in the social sciences that is not rooted in an historic conception of society.

However, perhaps Romanticism’s most enduring legacy is its tragic sense of destiny and the fatalistic inevitability of decline. Declinism, often expressed through the medical metaphor of health/disease or the biological metaphor of youth/old age, has been a recurrent theme for the past 200 years, profoundly affecting perceptions of and approaches to politics and international relations. Such perceptions of angst and decline were significantly present in international relations in the 1990s. As Charles William Maynes put it in 1995, ‘In the last couple of years, as optimism has given

---

way to pessimism, hope has given way to resignation. The future seems increasingly sombre while the past acquires an artificial glow.\(^6\)

Although we aim to restrict our discussion to the 1990s, some would question whether this declinist aspect of the Romantic mood remains, particularly in the US, where neoconservative triumphalism is seen to reign. Have 9/11 and the US invasion of Iraq reversed America’s sense of pessimism and decline? Is the \textit{Zeitgeist} of Romanticism an artefact of the past? We respond to this question with three arguments. First, that triumphalism may naturally co-exist with declinism and Romanticism in American politics. These moods are not mutually exclusive, and one can actually cause the other. Second, even if the waves of American triumphalism, specifically with respect to 9/11 and Iraq, are valid arguments against a declinist mood in America, the era of ‘good feelings’ about the war against terror is either dead or dying while the sense of domestic decline still pervades US public opinion. Finally, some key Romantic themes, such as anti-rationalism, are not restricted to American neoconservatives; they have appeal on the left as well.

First, the declinist aspect of American Romanticism can actually be seen as a causal factor in the resurgence of American triumphalism. America is a pluralistic society where social and cultural groups are often re-aligning around differing political goals. One of the key developments in twentieth-century American politics is the awakening of the so-called ‘silent majority’ who view the advances of modern, ‘permissive’ liberal society—such as gender or race equality—as a giant leap backwards for mankind.\(^7\) Commonly dismissed simply as ‘religious fundamentalists’, this social group has increasingly fostered political change by playing on a generalised sense of social and moral decline.\(^8\) This same group, however, also breeds a strongly nationalist and populist style of politics. While simultaneously bemoaning the ‘decline of American society’, this same political force continually trumpets the


\(^7\) The term ‘silent majority’ was infamously used by Richard Nixon in his successful campaign for the US presidency, often seen as the beginning of a national backlash against the liberal and social democratic policies begun in the 1930s by President Roosevelt, and continued through the 1960s by Presidents Kennedy and Johnson.

\(^8\) See, for example, the early work of the self-styled ‘Moral Majority’ political pressure group, which is widely acknowledged to have had an influence on the administration of President Ronald Reagan. For a discussion of current activism by Christian religious groups, see John Green, Mark Rozell, and William Clyde Wilcox, eds. \textit{The Christian Right in American Politics: Marching to the Millennium} (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2003). For a cross-confessional comparison of political activism in the US, see William Martin, ‘With God on Their Side’, \textit{Georgetown Journal of International Affairs} (Vol. 1, No. 1, Winter/Spring 2000).
natural supremacy of the ‘American system’ of government, free markets, and liberty.9 The two observations are logically antagonistic to one another, and yet they perfectly reflect the mood of the growing Romantic majority. In fact, for some Christian evangelicals, 9/11 was a sign of God’s displeasure at the secularisation of society and a clarion call for religious revival in America.10 The sense of societal decline and threat from abroad after 9/11 promoted a circling-the-wagons effect around ‘tradition’—family and country—and fed Christian nationalism.11 Thus American triumphalism may be, if anything, the natural and predictable outgrowth or end-product of American Romanticism.12 Indeed, a form of American expansionism and triumphalism in the nineteenth century, known as ‘manifest destiny’, was tied to Romanticism and Romantic views of America’s national mission as a force for good—liberty and democracy—on the continent.13

Second, if 9/11 did bring about an American resurgence, its moment may be over. While in 2003 we could have argued that Americans were optimistic and determined in their attempt to rid the world of al-Qaida and terrorism more broadly speaking, little popular enthusiasm remains in 2005 for the Pentagon’s fledgling praetorians in Iraq. Opposition has formed not only on the left, but more importantly in the administration’s own conservative ranks. Although the Bush administration has confidently asserted America’s ability to project power internationally, its rhetoric rings increasingly hollow as a much deeper anxiety hangs over the direction that the country is taking, both with respect to Iraq and domestically.

9 See Linda Kintz, Between Jesus and the Market: The Emotions that Matter in Right-Wing America (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1997), especially Chapter 7. Evangelical universities make this link between Christianity and the market plain in their mission statements. Cf; Liberty University, ‘Purpose/Mission’, which highlights the importance of democracy and free markets to Christians. Available at http://www.liberty.edu/index.cfm?PID=6899
11 As an example of this, some evangelical churches changed their services to include a pledge of allegiance to the Christian flag and the American flag in their services.
12 A similar argument can be made with respect to the rise of the Populist political movement in early twentieth century American politics.
13 ‘Manifest destiny’ refers to a term used in the nineteenth century by American politicians and philosophers to express a sense of pre-ordained mission that justified American expansion across the continent. As a great nation, America had a clear fate or destiny to colonise the continent. It can perhaps be compared to the French idea of a mission civilisatrice, or an imperial ‘white man’s burden’. It was particularly used to justify expansion into Spanish-held territories. Manifest destiny is a vast subject in US history. For an example of the literature, see Sam W. Haynes and Christopher Morris, eds., Manifest Destiny and Empire: American Antebellum Expansionism (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press for University of Texas, 1997).
Key Republicans are anxious that US policy in Iraq has gone awry and is undermining US credibility and leadership in the world. For example, Republican Senator Chuck Hagel (Nebraska), who serves on the Senate’s Foreign Relations and Select Intelligence Committees, has argued that ‘US leadership is determined as much by [America’s] commitment to principle as by [its] exercise of power’, a direct counter to the administration’s relentless happy-talk on Iraq. More difficult is that the American public has yet to be persuaded of the benefits of the war. Public opinion polls highlight the growing sense of unease that Americans feel over Iraq. By June 2005, the majority of Americans (52 per cent) had stated that the war in Iraq would not make America safer.

More recent polls confirm a deepening sense of apprehension over Iraq. According to a December 2005 CNN/USA Today/Gallup poll, 61 per cent of adults disapproved of the Bush administration’s handling of Iraq. Other polls reflected this pessimism: between 53-60 per cent of Americans disapproved of the administration’s handling of Iraq; steep drop from March 2003, when 74 per cent of Americans thought the decision to go to war with Iraq was the right one. Overall, as one scholar noted, ‘the Iraq War has become so unpopular that it ranks just above gay marriage’. These numbers should not be surprising. The American public is notoriously fickle about its judgements, especially ones that concern ‘foreign entanglements’. Political failure is no less an orphan in the US than anywhere else. When policies are seen to fail—as Iraq has—public abandonment does not trail too far behind. Therefore, despite official crowing about the advent of democracy in Iraq, the mood of the American public has been stubbornly more pessimistic. The sense of

---

14 Chuck Hagel, ‘A Republican Foreign Policy’, Foreign Affairs (July/August 2004).
17 See Polling Report. These polls are ABC News/Washington Post (15-18 December 2005), 53% disapproval; Associated Press/Ipsos (5-7 December 2005), 58% disapproval; NBC News/Wall Street Journal (9-12 December 2005), 60% disapproval.
20 President George Washington used this phrase in his farewell speech, urging his successors to beware the perils and temptations of adventures abroad. See ‘Washington’s Farewell Address’ [1796]. Available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/washing.htm
failure in Iraq is reflected in the way Americans view the Bush presidency overall, with a majority perceiving it as a failure.\textsuperscript{21}

This is further reflected in the sense of decline that most Americans have expressed about their own society. Polls in December 2005 show that 61-64 per cent of Americans think that America is ‘on the wrong track’.\textsuperscript{22} Zogby International polls have shown that Bush is rated as ‘poor’ on a host of bread-and-butter domestic issues which conservatives should win hands down: jobs and the economy, taxes, and petrol prices.\textsuperscript{23} Continuing negative assessments about Bush’s helmsmanship could pressure Republicans to distance themselves from the White House’s policies in the 2006 elections.\textsuperscript{24} As John Kenneth White notes, ‘The remainder of the Bush presidency will be more about limits, since his status has suffered a fatal blow’.\textsuperscript{25}

Finally, Romantic themes and modes of thought are not restricted to conservatives nor to the US; themes such as anti-rationalism, including the role of religion in society, have appeal on the left as well. For example, some on the American left have argued that religious values should be expressed by progressive politicians as a method to connect with the public.\textsuperscript{26} In Britain, Prime Minister Tony Blair has consistently expressed the value he places on his faith, and more recently Gordon Brown has begun to do the same, endorsing a new book on the role of faith in politics.\textsuperscript{27}

Therefore, Romanticism’s ‘moment’ may not yet be over. The twin genies of uncertainty and fear that the end of the Cold War let escape have yet to be put back into the bottle. Despite the American asymmetry of power, no perceptibly stable framework for international relations exists; even American scenario planners note that the ‘architecture issue’—the structure of international relations—remains

\textsuperscript{22} See Polling Report, Gallup poll (19-22 December 2005), 62% ‘dissatisfied’ at direction of country; Cook Political Report/RT Strategies (8-11 December 2005), 61% ‘wrong track’; and Associated Press/Ipsos (5-7 December 2005), 64% ‘wrong track’. Available at http://www.pollingreport.com/right.htm
\textsuperscript{23} White, ‘A Presidency on Life Support’.
\textsuperscript{25} White, ‘A Presidency on Life Support’.
\textsuperscript{26} See, for example, Amy Sullivan, ‘Getting Religion’, \textit{Blueprint Magazine}, Democratic Leadership Council (7 May 2004).
\textsuperscript{27} Gaby Hinsliff, ‘Meet Pastor Jim, the Chancellor’s religious guru’, \textit{The Observer} (5 February 2006), p. 3.
important since it is still in flux.\textsuperscript{28} It is likely to remain so for some time as whatever public consensus that the US neoconservatives had manufactured about the proper use of American power erodes with each dip in the opinion polls. Hence we may soon find ourselves back at a similar impasse as in the 1990s, at a point of uncertainty and instability, valediction and decline.

(ii) Why Yugoslavia?

In the thesis we explore how Romantic themes had an impact on Western thinking about international relations in the 1990s, including interpretations of post-Cold War conflicts, particularly Yugoslavia. Although other states could have been chosen as a case study—for example, the Soviet Union—we have chosen Yugoslavia because, while a significant rise in the overall number of conflicts from 1989-1992 generated feelings of apprehension in the West, a considerable sense of pessimism in international relations began with the break-up and resulting conflicts in former Yugoslavia. As Yahya Sadowski remarked, 'the war in Bosnia in particular worked to reshape the national mood in America (and elsewhere) into one of pessimism'.\textsuperscript{29}

At the time of its collapse, Yugoslavia was the key issue in international relations; as Nicholas Burns noted of the United States, '[t]he Balkans were our top foreign policy priority [then]—just as Iraq and the Global War on Terrorism are today'.\textsuperscript{30} In a quantitative sense, it was perhaps the most widely reported and discussed conflict of the early 1990s. As one of the first major post-Cold War conflicts, Europe's 'backyard war' did not merely become an international media story or academic case study,\textsuperscript{31} it became much more: a dominant metaphor, a key analogy, a popular framework within which current conflicts were judged and future conflicts were to be analysed, and a spark for a general discussion about the 'nature of our age and its future'.\textsuperscript{32} It also became almost apocryphal, helping to generate new

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{30} R. Nicholas Burns, 'Ten Years After Dayton: Winning the Peace in The Balkans', speech at the Woodrow Wilson Center, Washington, DC (19 May 2005). Burns is US Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs.
  \item \textsuperscript{31} This phrase is taken from Mark Almond's \textit{Europe's Backyard War: The War in the Balkans} (London: Mandarin, 1994).
  \item \textsuperscript{32} Anatol Lieven remarked that the war in Yugoslavia sparked a more general debate on nationalism that 'spread far and fast beyond academic circles to become a central theme of the wider debate on the
pessimistic predictions about the risks and uncertainties facing the post-Cold War order more generally. The Yugoslav conflicts gave direction, impetus, and meaning to some of the Romantic interpretations and frameworks that have been developed to explain subsequent conflicts.

Finally, since the conflicts in Yugoslavia have ended, the case is considered 'history', albeit very recent history. Unlike the war in Iraq, or the ongoing issues over the 'war on terrorism', the Yugoslav conflicts can be viewed in retrospect.

(iii) Chapter Overview

This thesis argues that within the span of the 1990s several Cold War Establishment 'isms' took a knock in politics and international relations: rationalism and Realism seemed passé, overtaken by the popular mood of the post-Cold War era, one filled with anti-rationalism (irrationalism or emotionalism), pessimism, relativism, a sense of nostalgia, and a greater emphasis on nature, not only of the natural environment, but also a critical re-examination of human nature and identity. We argue that such sentiments were part of a larger 1990s theme in politics and international relations towards various aspects of Romanticism. We examine this topic to see how this Romantic sensibility affected common interpretations of the break-up of Yugoslavia, and compare this Romantic view with a rationalist structural perspective of Yugoslavia's demise. In order to explore these themes, the thesis is divided into the following chapters.

Chapter 1 examines nineteenth-century Romanticism, or perhaps more accurately Romanticisms, including the Romantic idea of Zeitgeist—that time has a material meaning—to investigate some of the main themes, moods, and key ideas of the period. Further, we consider the historical context of the Romantic period (broadly defined from about 1780-1900), to argue that Romantic concepts themselves were products not only of a philosophical reaction against the Enlightenment, but also an historical reaction against the uncertainties of the age, which include the three great European transformations of the period: the French Revolution, the Industrial Revolution, and the German cultural revolution. We explore the period through five
key Romantic themes—anti-rationalism, pessimism, nostalgia, relativism, and a focus on nature.

Chapter 2 historicises the 1990s and its ‘revolutions’ which had seemingly accelerated the pace of social change globally and ushered in an era of greater public uncertainty worldwide. While some scholars and pundits may see the 1990s Zeitgeist of Romanticism (which we call Postmodern Romanticism), as a philosophical reaction against the rationalism of the Cold War era, we argue that its basis may be found in three potentially dislocating social and historical transformations whose roots lie in the Cold War, but which flowered in the 1990s: democratisation in former communist states leading to the destruction of the bipolar world, economic globalisation, and growing cultural homogenisation. These transformations—often collectively called fragmentation and globalisation—left uncertainty in their wake, one that was followed by a deep sense of pessimism, foreboding, and civilisational decline among disenchanted publics, policymakers, and academics, especially in the West. These uncertainties added new impetus to those who challenged the Cold War predominance of rationalist paradigms and provided ready audiences with greater receptivity to Romantic themes and messages. We then develop the concept of Postmodern Romanticism within the five key themes outlined in Chapter 1—anti-rationalism, pessimism, nostalgia, relativism, and a focus on nature—and apply them to diverse trends (both popular and scholarly) in 1990s politics and international relations.

Chapter 3 scrutinises the works of three writers who have influenced the Romantic themes and tone of post-Cold War international relations, particularly with regards to interpretations of post-Cold War conflict: Robert Kaplan, Samuel Huntington, and Martin van Creveld. Their works are prominent among those who foretold (and continue to foretell) of an apocalyptic era of chaos and conflict in international relations. We have chosen these three for a variety of reasons: they are recognised experts in their fields; they reach different influential audiences; they answer different and complimentary questions about past conflicts and potential conflicts; and their work has been important in moulding interpretations about the conflict in former Yugoslavia.

---

The chapter also discusses the creation of metaphors and analogies in policymaking, including the importance of heuristic devices (and biases) in the selection of cognitive analytical frameworks. One reason these authors have gained influence in international relations is through their use of vivid analogies and metaphors, some of which have achieved interpretive ascendancy in international relations during the post-Cold War period. After this discussion, we specifically examine how some of their Romantic interpretations of conflict in the 1990s, especially the war in Yugoslavia, inform their writings in light of the five categories that define the Zeitgeist of Postmodern Romanticism. We also examine how various heuristic biases operate in these works. These Romantic interpretations generate a series of predictions about conflict—for example, that identity conflicts are more intractable or deadly, or that the conflicts seen in the 1990s will continue to increase, creating the conditions for a 'coming anarchy'—that we examine in the following chapter.

Chapter 4 investigates Romantic claims and predictions about the trajectory of armed conflict. We examine the empirical evidence on armed conflicts, comparing the post-Cold War era with that of the Cold War. We find that Romantic pronouncements of a 'coming anarchy' or 'clash of civilisations' may have been due to the disproportionate effects that the collapse of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union had on conflict levels. Indeed, using three databases, two which define conflict from a quantitative perspective (Singer & Small and SIPRI) and a third which uses a qualitative definition (Kosimo), we find that the disintegration of these two states into conflict accounted for approximately 70-80 per cent of excess conflicts (those above expected Cold War levels). Had these two states not collapsed, there would have been no spike in 1990s conflict levels. Hence Romantics' pessimism about a 'coming anarchy' is based partly on the widely-reported conflicts in these two states.

The empirical data show that while the immediate aftermath of the post-Cold War era (1989-1992) did see a significant rise in new conflicts, from 1993-1999 the number of new conflicts declined and conflict levels returned to at or below Cold War

---

34 The Singer and Small data are from J. David Singer and Melvin Small, *Correlates Of War Project: International and Civil War Data, 1816-1992* [Computer file] (Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research, 1993). The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) database on Major Armed Conflicts is compiled by researchers for the Uppsala Conflict Data Project (UCDP) in Uppsala University, Sweden, and is published annually in the *Journal of Peace Research*. See http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/UCDP/ The Kosimo data was developed by the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research. See http://www.hiik.de
Introduction

rates of conflict. Additionally, post-2000 levels of conflict have fallen further. The
rate of new conflicts is about half of the expected rate during the Cold War and the
total number of ongoing conflicts in 2004 was at a level not seen since the 1970s.

These empirical results confirm the work of some other scholars in the field.
Indeed, we find that a variety of conflict trends belie the Romantic ‘coming anarchy’,
‘civilisational clash’, and ‘neo-medieval’ interpretations of conflict. First, conflict
termination was a significant, if under-reported, trend in post-Cold War international
relations. Therefore, contrary to the 1990s being a period of greater anarchy, for some
places, like Mozambique, it meant the end of longstanding conflicts. Second, the
Kosimo data show that state creation rather than culture or identity clash per se has
been a driving issue in conflict since the end of World War II, particularly during the
period of intense decolonisation in the 1960s, as well as during the post-Cold War
era. Third, the Kosimo data show that identity conflicts are neither more deadly nor
more intractable than other kinds: during the Cold War, some of the longest and
deadliest conflicts were proxy wars, with an important component of ideological
struggle.

Since our empirical analyses in Chapter 4 highlight the significant role that
state creation and national power contention played in Cold War conflicts, Chapter 5
develops a framework of analysis for assessing state stability based partly on a
streamlined version of the results of the State Failure Task Force at the University of
Maryland. Our framework examines state stability through four structural risk factors:
colonial legacy, political institutions, economic structure, and demographic shifts.
While structural factors may be necessary to create the underlying conditions for
conflict, they may not be sufficient. Therefore, we introduce the concept of agency in
a narrow and limited way, through Albert Hirschman’s concepts of exit, voice, and
loyalty. Hirschman’s concepts mimic the interplay between politics and economics
within organisations, including states. Under conditions of institutional deterioration,
and faced with dissatisfaction over declining performance, Hirschman argues that
individuals or groups have two main options in any institution, including a state: exit
(leaving) and voice (open dissent), which are mediated through a concept of loyalty,

35 These are terms used to describe the theories of Kaplan, Huntington, and van Creveld, respectively.
36 Albert O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and
which Hirschman sees as rational and interest-based. This alternative framework provides a structural perspective within which to examine state instability, breakdown, and conflict that acts as a contrast to the Romantic vision of state break up as one fundamentally based on differences in primordial identity, culture, or civilisation. We develop this structural perspective in order to compare and contrast this view with the competing Romantic interpretation of Yugoslavia’s disintegration into conflict.

Building on the five thematic elements of post-Cold War Romanticism developed in Chapters 1 and 2, and following the structural framework of analysis created in Chapter 5, Chapter 6 compares and contrasts the Romantic and structural views of conflict with respect to the disintegration of Yugoslavia. First, the chapter examines the Yugoslav conflict through the eyes of the Postmodern Romantic Zeitgeist, exploring elements of anti-rationalism, pessimism, relativism, nostalgia, and the focus on nature extant in some common public, policymaking, and academic interpretations of the Yugoslav conflict. The chapter then considers how the Yugoslav conflict could be interpreted through the four structural criteria and the exit-voice-loyalty framework we develop in Chapter 5. In particular, it analyses the differing choices between exit and voice made by the various groups based on their perceived loyalty to the state.

Lastly, rather than summarising the arguments, Chapter 7 provides some final reflections on the Zeitgeist of Postmodern Romanticism and conflict, focusing on the sense of pessimism and decline that pervaded international relations in the 1990s.

(iv) Methodology

Finally, the careful reader of the previous section will note that we do not outline a specific methodology or school of thought that is to be carried through the thesis. This is because, quite simply, there is no single methodological approach used. Rather, we use a variety of methodological tools to look at various issues.

We set forward not to argue the superiority of one school or another, or one methodological approach. Unfortunately, in some ways, methodology imputes ideology, so those who examine a particular issue using particular tools are labelled as belonging to a particular ideological school. For example, those using the rational

37 Hirschman, p. 79.
choice approach may be considered neo-liberals, while those who consider the
importance of language in politics may be considered poststructuralists or
Postmodernists. We broach the issue of methodological approach less as philosophers
than as tradesmen, asking rather pragmatically about which tool seems most fit to do
a certain job, rather than using the tool to advance a particular standpoint.

In this vein, we develop various pieces of our argument differently. Chapter 1,
which sets out our understanding of Romanticism and \textit{Zeitgeist}, provides a
philosophical underpinning to these topics. We offer both a literary analysis of the
five Romantic themes—anti-rationalism, pessimism, relativism, nostalgia, and a
focus on nature—as well as a theoretical analysis of how these themes reflected a
reaction to the uncertainties of the social transformations of the nineteenth century.
Similarly, we do this in Chapter 2 to the 1990s, examining more generally how the
concept of Romanticism can be applied to another age of transformation:
international relations during the post-Cold War period. We examine how the broad
themes present in nineteenth-century Romanticism were more specifically re-defined
in the 1990s. In both chapters, the evidence we marshal is anecdotal; a series of
thematic strands which are woven to create an impressionistic whole.

Chapter 3 builds on the philosophical discussions of Romanticism in the two
previous chapters, but focuses specifically on how Romantic ideas were reflected in
analyses of 1990s conflict. It mixes a textual analysis with the social science approach
of cognitive psychology. The chapter examines the work of three influential observers
who wrote on conflict in the 1990s—Kaplan, Huntington, and van Creveld—and
provides a close textual analysis of some of their key writings, particularly with an
eye to Yugoslavia. Additionally, it dissects, from the perspective of cognitive
psychology, why their works are persuasive.

Chapter 4 examines the Romantic predictions that Kaplan, Huntington, and
van Creveld outline about the future of conflict generally, which they significantly
based on their analyses of the conflict in Yugoslavia. The most objective method to
examine their claims is through numerical analysis. Chapter 4 uses an empirical
approach to investigate their various hypotheses: data is generated using three armed
conflict databases, and then analysed numerically. Based on this analysis, the data
indicate that key claims about the increasing growth of conflict generally, and
especially ethnic conflict, in the 1990s were inaccurate, especially since they seemed
to be based more specifically on the unexpected conflicts in Yugoslavia, which contributed disproportionately to the perception of a post-Cold War conflict spike.

Chapter 5 builds on the analyses in Chapter 4, which show that state creation has been an important factor in conflict since the 1950s. This chapter develops an alternative framework for examining conflict through an empirical analysis of structural factors and conflict, and combining this approach with Hirschman’s interest-based theoretical framework: exit, voice, and loyalty.

Finally, putting the various pieces types of analyses together, Chapter 6 provides a case study on Yugoslavia, comparing Romantic and structural views of conflict. It uses both a literary analysis to discuss Romantic perspectives, and an empirically-based structural factors approach.
Chapter 1. Nineteenth-Century Romanticism and Zeitgeist: Defining an Age

'Abandon All Hope, Ye Who Enter Here'

—Dante Alighieri

While nearly 700 years ago Dante imagined that these words were carved above the gates of Hell, they capture the deeply pessimistic tenor of recent political times, in the domestic sphere, as well as in the realm of international relations, particularly after the end of the Cold War. Ironically, the post-Cold War era began auspiciously. By the end of 1989, the Western world had much to be hopeful about: economically, globalisation would lead to increasing living standards world-wide; socially, various activist movements seemed to be successful in reducing inequalities between groups; and politically, the collapse of communist regimes proclaimed a new age of democracy and freedom throughout the world.

However, if the fall of communism ushered in a hopeful nouvelle vague, its ripples were shallow and ephemeral. While the end of the Cold War initially sounded a triumphalist note on the part of Western leaders and intellectuals—most well-known perhaps was Francis Fukuyama's The End of History and the Last Man—no sooner had the Berlin Wall collapsed than discordant noises were heard; as William Pfaff intoned, 'The second millennium closes with the secular optimism of modern times confounded and history set upon an unmapped course'. Fukuyama's resounding optimism could not be squared with bloody conflicts in Africa and the former communist bloc, the spectre at Liberalism's short-lived feast. Unlike Fukuyama, who argued that the end of communism heralded the remaking of a new, liberal international order, alternative voices spoke of disorder, chaos, violence, and dislocation in a confusing, rapidly globalising world, where loyalties were loosened,

---

1 Dante Alighieri, Inferno, Canto III (1321).
2 The terms 'post-Cold War' and 'the 1990s' will be used interchangeably throughout the text since the period we are discussing refers to 1989-2001, roughly corresponding to the 1990s. More specifically, we are speaking of the period between the fall of the Berlin Wall in October 1989 and the terrorist attack on the World Trade Centre on 11 September 2001.
Chapter 1

primordial identities awakened, and the ‘nation-state’ was in terminal decline.\(^5\) Rousseau’s maxim that ‘everything degenerates in the hands of man’ became the implicit slogan of the 1990s.\(^6\)

Indeed, what distinguished much of the post-Cold War’s international vision during the 1990s, if there can be said to be one, was its almost unremitting gloominess, akin to Nietzsche’s ‘spirit of heaviness’, which one could call a ‘Zeitgeist of pessimism’.\(^7\) This spirit of collective pessimism and decline has a venerable intellectual pedigree. As historian Arthur Herman remarks, the intellectual tradition of Western ‘declinism’ ‘formed the dark underside of modern European thought in the nineteenth century and [...] became arguably the single most dominant and influential theme in culture and politics in the twentieth century’.\(^8\) This contemporary sense of decline is neither culturally Western nor historically unique. The ancient Egyptians, Greeks, and Romans, as well as medieval peoples all lamented the decay in their societies and cultures from a previous Golden Age.\(^9\) Can Cicero’s famous cry ‘\textit{O temporal O mores!}’ be understood as anything other than an appeal to the past glory of Rome during a period of decline?

Further, declinism is often bereft of a specific ideological content. As Herman explains, declinism’s characteristic feature is pessimism, which is neither a left-wing nor a right-wing ideology but a rather an attitude, a sensibility, or feeling, noting, ‘Of course, facts alone cannot make or unmake a theory of history. Pessimism and optimism are attitudes the scholar brings to his analysis of events, not conclusions that arise from analysis’.\(^10\) Indeed, it could be argued that the philosophical and cultural pessimism that underpins declinism is itself an ideology. Alternatively, such pessimism could be considered a psychological or biological disposition, as Oliver Bennett argues.\(^11\)

\(^6\) Jean-Jacques Rousseau, \textit{Emile} (1755). The complete quote is ‘everything is good when it leaves the hands of the Creator, everything degenerates in the hands of man’.
\(^7\) Christopher Coker discusses some of the post-Cold War malaise in the West in Chapter 1 of his book, \textit{Twilight of the West} (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998).
\(^10\) Herman, p. 3.
Critics and commentators on all sides of the political spectrum are prone to declinism. To use a medical analogy, the main difference between declinists is not necessarily their diagnosis of the patient's illness, but rather their recommendations for the best course of treatment. Using an example from US domestic politics, conservative Charles Murray (*Losing Ground*, 1984) has emphasised cultural decay—for example, a growing underclass and an increase in family breakdown—in his critique of American society and makes conservative prescriptions for change. Likewise, liberal American social critics, like Christopher Lasch (*Culture of Narcissism*, 1979), take similarly pessimistic views of American society from the opposite end of the political spectrum and offer progressive policy as an antidote. Declinism is no stranger to the field of international relations. For example, scholars with views as politically different as Mary Kaldor (*The Disintegrating West*, 1978) and Paul Kennedy (*The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*, 1987) have used the attitude of pessimism inherent in declinism as the underlying sensibility behind their arguments.

What is notable about the tide of declinism in many of its forms during the 1990s is that it seems to have a number of similarities with the Romantic period of the nineteenth century, so much so that the post-Cold War *Zeitgeist*, or spirit of the age, could be re-labelled 'Postmodern Romanticism'. While some observers and commentators on international relations have analogised the post-Cold War era to the Middle Ages and labelled the post-Cold War world as one of 'neo-medievalism', we will attempt to analogue the 1990s to another, more recent period: the nineteenth century. The nineteenth century, especially during the early part of the century, was also a period of extraordinary political, economic, and cultural change and uncertainty. The French Revolution and the Napoleonic wars that followed indelibly redrew the political map of Europe; the Industrial Revolution in Britain introduced enormous economic and social disruptions and dislocations; and cultural revolution in Germany generated significant new philosophical insights which were to have far-reaching impact even in the twentieth century.

---


13 Note that the term *postmodern* here is meant to indicate a time period—a time after the modern or modernity—while *Postmodernism* or *Postmodernist* indicates a viewpoint, ideology, or methodology.
Just as significant dislocations at the end of the Cold War bred fear and uncertainty in the 1990s, disruptive transformations in the nineteenth century rocked the sure foundations of European societies during the age, creating a deep sense of malaise and uncertainty. The Romantic 'movement', or Romanticism, developed partly as a reaction to these disturbing uncertainties. What defines Romanticism is not a set of ideological precepts, since it 'cannot be identified with any particular political or social doctrine', but it can be likened to a 'mood', 'atmosphere', or 'sensibility'. Rather than offering a set of ideological precepts, nineteenth-century Romanticism cultivated several key themes which also seemed to flourish in popular and academic post-Cold War interpretations of international relations in the 1990s: anti-rationalism and the rejection of reason as the primary means of ascertaining truth; pessimism and a sense of 'end times' despair; nostalgic reappraisals of the past; relativism and the role of national identity and culture in society; as well as a focus on nature, including views of society as an organic whole, man and nature as a unity, and the duality of all existence. The predominance of these themes had an impact on Western thinking about international relations in the 1990s, including interpretations of post-Cold War conflicts, particularly Yugoslavia.

To examine some of the similarities between nineteenth-century Romanticism and post-Cold War thinking about international relations, we will first look at the concept of Zeitgeist. Second, if the post-Cold War Zeitgeist is distinctly 'Romantic', we need to ask, what was nineteenth-century Romanticism, who were the Romantics, and what were the key features of the 'movement'? Finally, how is the Romantic Zeitgeist of the 1990s related to our understanding and interpretation of politics, particularly international relations? In order to provide a tentative answer to these questions, this chapter and the next will review the concept of Romanticism and how it has affected thinking about international relations since the end of the Cold War, more specifically from 1989-2001. First, we will define nineteenth-century Romanticism and the concept of Zeitgeist (itself an idea rooted in the Romantic age). Second, we will provide an overview of the historic conditions of the Romantic age and the responses of some writers and thinkers of that era to those conditions. Finally, we will discuss five salient Romantic themes—anti-rationalism, pessimism,

---

14 Frederick B. Artz, Reaction and Revolution, 1814-1832 (New York, NY: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1934), p. 55. Artz notes that Romantics came in various political stripes; while some were conservatives or reactionaries, others espoused liberal ideas. Ibid., pp. 55-56.
15 We primarily consider the period 1989-2001 in our analysis.
relativism, nostalgia, and a focus on nature—and how they defined and were expressed throughout the nineteenth century. We will use the analysis developed in this chapter in the following chapter to examine the role of Romanticism in popular and academic approaches to international relations in the 1990s.

1.1 Romanticisms and the Zeitgeist—Definitions

'I must first protest against the notion that [R]omanticism can be enclosed within a concept; for [R]omantic precisely means that it oversteps all bounds.'

— Søren Kierkegaard

The first difficulty in discussing ‘Romanticism’, the ‘Romantics,’ or the ‘Romantic era’ is defining these terms, or even delineating the time period during which the ‘movement’ occurred. Is there a single ‘Romanticism’ or do we need to speak of ‘Romanticisms’ in the plural? Even critics writing during the period had difficulty in providing a definitive taxonomy of Romantic ideas. French literary and social critic Madame Germaine de Staël seems to have coined the term ‘Romanticism’ in 1813 in her celebrated essay *De l’Allemagne* (*From Germany*), using it to differentiate a style of Romantic poetry that had a ‘naturalness’ that she favourably contrasted with the ‘artificiality’ of Classicism.

However, the term has come to embrace much more than a certain type of poetry or literary style to include an entire ‘view’ on life. George Mosse notes, ‘The Romanticism which became all pervasive in modern European culture was a “mood” which escaped any rigid scheme of classification.’ By 1930, Ernest Bernbaum had noted that there already were ‘[h]undreds of definitions of Romanticism’ and that the ‘attempt to reduce [Romanticism] to one formula was begun more than a hundred years ago, and has occupied an incredible amount of time and ingenuity.' According to A.O. Lovejoy, it is difficult to define Romanticism because it runs the gamut of writers and thinkers, both on the left and the right. Isaiah Berlin calls any definition

---

18 Mosse, p. 13.
a 'trap'.

Chapter 1

His circumspection is due to the fact that whenever one scholar tries to
generalise on the subject of Romanticism, another one immediately finds a
countervailing tendency. As Berlin argues, 'the literature on [R]omanticism is larger
than [R]omanticism itself, and the literature defining what it is that the literature on
[R]omanticism is concerned with is quite large in its turn. There is a kind of inverted
pyramid.' Additionally, it can be difficult to decide whether the terms 'Romantic' or
'Romanticism' have true analytical purchase or whether their use is mainly rhetorical,
used to dismiss or exalt certain types of works.

Dating the period of Romanticism precisely is equally open to debate. While
some scholars date Romanticism's beginnings to the early nineteenth century, others
believe it began either earlier or later. Some scholars argue that the age of
Romanticism began with the works of Jean-Jacques Rousseau and his writings
glorifying 'natural' man unsullied by the corrupting influence of civilisation,23 while
others point to Immanuel Kant or Francis Bacon as forebears, although both are
sometimes associated with the Enlightenment.24 Indeed, the number counted among
the 'Romantics' is vast; some have even included Plato or Homer as the 'fathers' of
the movement for various 'Romantic' characteristics in their writings.25

Despite the lack of precise dating, many scholars trace Romanticism's
beginnings to the era of the French Revolution, or just before, and its end to around
1830—with July Revolution that ended the restoration of the Bourbon monarchy in
France.26 Others end the Romantic period at about 1850, with the quashing of various
uprisings and revolutions around Europe (1848) and before the publication of
Darwin's *Origin of the Species* (1859), which some argue was the first work to
seriously challenge some of the moral underpinnings of the movement.27 However,
the Romantic 'mood' continued among various artists, writers, and philosophers well
past 1850—for example with French Romantic painting, the English Pre-Raphaelites,

---

22 Ibid.
23 For a discussion on Rousseau's contribution to Romanticism, see Hugh I'Anson Fausset, 'Rousseau
and Romanticism', in eds. Enscce and Gleckner, pp. 72-87.
26 For example, Thorlby dates the period from about 1770-1830, which reflects beginning
Romanticism with the works of Rousseau, and ending the period with the restoration of the Bourbon
the Russian Pan-Slavists—into the early twentieth century, and beyond. For the purposes of this discussion, we will look at the most expansive timeframe that scholars can use to discuss Romanticism, from approximately 1780 to the end of the nineteenth century.

As for the characteristics, ‘moods’, ‘sensibilities’, or ideas that define the Romantic period, ‘[t]hese differing versions of the age of Romanticism are matched by a corresponding diversity in the descriptions offered by those of our time who have given special care and observation of it.” Yet considering that ‘[R]omanticism [...] is the largest recent movement to transform the lives and the thought of the Western world’, some generalisation is appropriate, even if the resulting analysis can only be said to be tentative. Although Lovejoy and Berlin underscore the perils that lie in wait for any scholar trying to define something as slippery and with as many countervailing tendencies as an ‘age’ or ‘era’, commentators on the time period do look to particular events, trends, and sensibilities that they believe define the Romantic era or capture the spirit of the age—the Zeitgeist.

Interestingly, Romantics were the first to express the idea that ‘time has a material meaning and is imbued with context’, which we have come to know as Zeitgeist. Originally known as Geist der Zeit or Geist der Zeiten, the phrase meant the totality of the spirit of many generations through time. Later, the term Zeitgeist came to mean ‘the characteristic spirit of a [sic] historical era taken in its totality and bearing the mark of a preponderant feature which dominated its intellectual, political, and social trends’, as well as the way in which a particular period conceives of itself. In other words, the term moved away from describing a universal or cumulative understanding throughout historical time, and instead to the relative, particularistic understanding of a specific period of time.

The concept of Zeitgeist could be said to have been expressed most fully in G.W.F. Hegel’s philosophy, in which Geist (spirit) is both the motivating force and justification for a particular philosophy. Hegel famously saw what he called the

---

28 Arguably some Romantic ideas, such as nationalism, were more important and had an even larger impact on the twentieth century. However, we will limit our discussion here to the nineteenth century.  
30 Berlin, p. 1.  
32 Rotenstreich, p. 536.  
33 Ibid.  

— 27 —
‘World Spirit’—the face of history yet to come, personified by Napoleon Bonaparte on the battlefield at Jena.\textsuperscript{34} Hegel’s fatalistic observation—that there is an untrammeled fate written within and through history—implies that an historical era is imbued with a particular social, cultural, or political ‘spirit’, ‘atmosphere’, or ‘climate’ that is both embedded in time and which embeds actors within their time.

This spirit swirls around actors and events like a swift, invisible current, sharply defining the time period, which makes it impossible or even foolish to try and fight the prevailing tendency. In this sense, \textit{Zeitgeist} can be both a guiding principle as well as a limiting one, since those who swim successfully with the tide are landed safely while those who fight against it are likely to drown.\textsuperscript{35} Further, it implies that judging the best swimmer is a relative task, since the tide will change with changes in the course of history. As A.K. Thorlby argues,

\begin{quote}
the [Romantic] period saw the emergence of a new sense that all things may be immersed in the absolute flow of history: in which case, neither the excellence of art, nor the truth of philosophy should be understood as standing above the stream in the changeless light of a purely rational order, while the stream itself loses its merely factual character.\textsuperscript{36}
\end{quote}

Indeed, the notion of \textit{Zeitgeist} and its emphasis on the history of ideas through time—with an historic, and hence relativistic, understanding—may be said to be the key concept of the age of Romanticism. Historicism and \textit{Zeitgeist} form a particularly ‘nineteenth-century understanding of history’,\textsuperscript{37} as nothing can be understood as timeless, but rather as a product of the particular spiritual age in which it exists, or as Heidigger suggests, that it is a certain interpretation of truth. As A. Cobban argues, an ‘[h]istoric conception of society [is] perhaps even the nucleus of [R]omanticism’.\textsuperscript{38}

Or as Ernest Renan put it, ‘\textit{L’histoire est la vraie philosophie du XIXème siècle}’.\textsuperscript{39}

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{Rotenstreich, p. 537.}
\footnote{Coker, ‘How wars end’, p. 624.}
\footnote{A. Cobban, ‘The Revolt Against the Eighteenth Century’, in \textit{The Romantic Movement}, ed. Thorlby, p. 130.}
\footnote{‘History is the true philosophy of the 19th century’, quoted in \textit{ibid.}, p. 129. Author’s translation.}
\end{footnotes}
1.2 Historicising Nineteenth-Century Romanticism—Political, economic, and cultural background

'It is nowadays becoming gradually understood that one of the basic elements of reality is precise locality.'

—Victor Hugo

What is the Zeitgeist that defines Romanticism—the specific history and dominant trends that differentiate the era? Many scholars note that Romanticism was a reaction to the Enlightenment. However, this reaction was not merely the philosophical rejection of the rationalism and ideals of the Enlightenment, although this did play a part. Romanticism was also an historical reaction, born of the crises and turbulence that plagued Europe in the nineteenth century, which due to the Napoleonic wars ‘for the first time made history a mass experience [...] on a European scale.' Other scholars also note the importance of the ‘disruption’ of war in generating a sense of Romantic restlessness and insecurity:

Romanticism [is] the sum total of the ways in which man’s self-awareness was affected by the Revolutionary-Napoleonic disruption, and in which he tried to take his bearings in a world that had lost its ‘fixities’ and ‘definities’. Man was at once a révolté and a creature craving some objective order; a being strained to express and assert itself and a soul yearning for self-surrender.

Indeed, as Alex Comfort argues, if Classical periods are those in which men have a great sense of economic and psychological security, then Romantic ones are those in which men have lost their moorings on an uncertain sea, noting ‘[t]he [C]lassic sees man as master, the [R]omantic sees him as victim of his environment. That seems to me to be the real difference.’ The Romantic age was certainly one of those eras, tempest tossed by three great transformations: political revolution in France,

---

40 Victor Hugo, Preface to Cromwell (1827).
41 Some scholars argue that the ideas of Romanticism and the ‘revolutions’ that defined the historical period need to be considered separately, although we will consider both here. For a discussion of this point, see Morse Peckham, ‘Toward a Theory of Romanticism’, in Romanticism: Points of View, eds. Enscoe and Gleckner, p. 213.
industrial revolution in England, and cultural revolution in Germany. \(^4^5\) We will now briefly outline these three upheavals facing European societies of the period.

Politically, the Romantic period was a ‘drama of revolution and reaction’. \(^4^6\) The French Revolution in 1789 shattered illusions about a stable political order based on monarchy and strengthened the desire for democracy across Europe, although the Reign of Terror and the Directoire that followed shook the political landscape with their brutality and incited widespread reaction. Furthermore, the rise of Napoleon, the expansion of the French empire, and the Napoleonic wars that followed the Revolution spread the ideals of revolutionary republicanism throughout Europe and engendered extreme resistance among the conquered nations. \(^4^7\) These wars played an important role in fanning the flames of European nationalism and in the consolidation of subjugated territories into unified national states, particularly Italy and Germany. \(^4^8\)

Economically, the Romantic period was defined by rapid growth and industrialisation made possible by technological change. \(^4^9\) The Industrial Revolution in Britain not only made it the wealthiest state, it also permanently changed the nature of British society, ushering in a wealthy new middle class as well as economic dislocation, urbanisation, and a changing social value structure. The unprecedented wealth that economic growth brought created a new bourgeoisie that not only enjoyed a much-improved standard of living, but also sought the franchise to ensure its newly found wealth, widening social access to political power and furthering democracy. Additionally, the Industrial Revolution transformed social relations. Before the Industrial Revolution, most families lived in small villages and worked together on farms. Industrialisation changed the face of society through economic dislocation—many small farmers and artisans lost their livelihoods through increasing mechanisation—and urbanisation, as workers sought factory work and found themselves in crowded and unsanitary social conditions. Further, the pursuit of profit and growing demand for more consumer goods changed the value structure of society

\(^4^7\) For a discussion of how the Napoleonic wars affected the areas and peoples conquered by the French, see Michael Broers, Europe Under Napoleon 1799-1815 (London: Edward Arnold, 1996).

Culturally, the Romantic period was characterised by a movement away from the Neoclassical values of order and rationality that had defined the Enlightenment, beginning with the \textit{Sturm und Drang} (storm and stress) literary movement—typified by Schiller and Goethe—which coincided with the beginning of the Romantic age.\footnote{Mosse, p. 15.} German philosophical thought was ascendant in the early nineteenth century and thousands of Europeans were influenced by German writers, whether in the original German or in translation.\footnote{Some foreign critics were particularly influential in disseminating the philosophy of German writers. For example, Madame de Stael's \textit{De l'Allemagne} 'did more than perhaps any other book to spread the new gospel [Romanticism] throughout Europe'. Artz, p. 61.} The cultural revolution in Germany emphasised feeling and sensibility and glorified the traditions and the oneness of the \textit{Volk} (people), exemplified in Herder's doctrine of cultures as organic growths.\footnote{Thorlby, 'Introduction', p. 4.} This emphasis on national culture was a turn towards relativism; one scholar notes, '\textit{völkish ideology was a direct denial of all universalism}'.\footnote{Talmon, p. 127.} As F. Stricht argues, much of Romanticism's cultural element was defined by the German cultural \textit{Geist}, a combination of \textit{Weltschmerz} (world-weariness), Faustian rebellion, and idealism. This \textit{Geist} looked for release from the mundane and into the spiritual, visionary, or magical realm. For some writers the goal was to break down the barrier between themselves and others and to be absorbed into the 'oneness' of the \textit{Volk}.\footnote{Some scholars argue that the widely-held academic concept that French nationalism—through citizenship—has solely political origins, and thus is based purely on reason, is false. As one scholar notes, 'any interpretation that reduces nationalism to a political strategy and to a series of claims about political sovereignty is fundamentally mistaken'. David A. Bell, \textit{The Cult of the Nation in France: Inventing Nationalism, 1680-1800} (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), p. 18.} This concept of national oneness was significantly different from other European concepts of 'oneness'. For example, the French spirit of being bound together was based on reason—being a \textit{citoyen} (citizen) erased the differences between people within the state.\footnote{F. Stricht, 'Europe and the Period of German Classicism and Romanticism', in \textit{The Romantic Movement}, ed. Thorlby, p. 53.} However, the German idea of being bound together is based on spirit, so it focuses on common beliefs, hence church, language, culture, and nation are
important.\footnote{Stricht, pp. 52-53.} As a result, legacies of the Romantic period include the concepts of nationalism and cultural determinism.\footnote{Thorlby, 'Introduction', p. 13.}

To a significant extent, these tectonic changes within the span of just two generations radically undermined what remained of the certainties of eighteenth-century European society and created the foundations of the modern states and societies we now recognise as our own. These transformations also wrought a deep pessimism within societies produced by a ‘moral malaise which was undoubtedly influenced by the historical situation and by the loosening of the social framework’\footnote{P. Van Tieghem, ‘The Romantic Soul’, in The Romantic Movement, ed. Thorlby, p. 23.} and strengthened three tendencies in the new Romantic state of mind: ‘dissatisfaction with the contemporary world, restless anxiety in the face of life, and sadness without cause.’\footnote{Ibid., p. 22.} As one commentator notes,

\begin{quote}
[the [R]omantic mood thus capitalized on the dissatisfactions engendered by rationalism’s disavowal of the emotions, particularly man’s need for a security which discounted external reality by escaping into a contemplation of the inner man. No doubt the change of Europe from a rural to an industrial and urban civilization enhanced the attractiveness of this habit of mind. It gave men a feeling of importance, of stability in terms of their own souls amid rapid and incomprehensible changes.\footnote{Mosse, p. 14.}
\end{quote}

Although the cultural aspects of Romanticism are important to understanding the movement, Romantics made significant contributions to political theory, offering some of the first critiques of modern society, seeing it as an ‘organic’ being existing within a natural organism (the environment). Indeed, some scholars tend to see Romanticism as both the aesthetic reaction against Classicism and the political reaction against the French Revolution, although some early Romantics were fervent champions of the initial ideals of the Revolution.\footnote{Frederick C. Beiser, Enlightenment, Revolution, and Romanticism: The Genesis of Modern German Political Thought, 1790-1800 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992), pp. 222-224.} The cultural projects of the early Romantics can even be seen as a route to change society; as Frederick Beiser argues, ‘Placed in its historical context, […] the [R]omantics’ aestheticism was simply their strategy for social and political reform.’\footnote{Ibid., p. 229.} As a result, many Romantic cultural and
political works reflect affinities toward particular types of subject matter and moods. Thorlby has classified some of these as:64

- a reaction against abstract reason and faith in ‘feeling’;
- a sense of Weltschmerz and ennui (boredom);
- ‘truth to one’s time and country’ (relativism);
- a nostalgia for the Middle Ages;
- a fascination with power and will;
- a focus on nature and ‘natural’ man;
- a ‘celebration of the Doppelgänger’, and finally;
- a tragic tone and pessimism.

We will examine some of these tendencies which define key aspects of the Zeitgeist of Romanticism below, grouped together under the following broader categories: irrationality, pessimism, relativism, nostalgia, and focus on nature. As we will see, many of these ideas are interrelated and any categorisation is therefore somewhat arbitrary. For example, the Romantic movement’s preoccupation with history and movement through time, as well as its tragic outlook on the future that coloured the interpretation of events, often resulted in nostalgia for a golden past, resignation to an uncertain present, and fear of the future—all interrelated subjects.

1.3 Deep Sleep of Reason—Anti-rationalism and spiritual reawakening

’Reason is perhaps the most limited of all our faculties.’

—Ludovico Di Breme65

One of the key features of the Romantic era was the spread of anti-rationalist modes of thought, many of which were promoted by the growth of religious belief during the period, especially highly emotional forms of Christianity.66 As Lord Acton argues, Romanticism was a function of the historical and political situation of the early nineteenth century, which included a resistance to and a reaction against the revolutionary rationalism and secularism of the eighteenth century.67

64 Thorlby, ‘Part Two: Select Documents’, in The Romantic Movement, ed. Thorlby, pp. 145-161. We will also examine one Romantic tendency that Thorlby did not identify individually—increased spirituality.

65 Ludovico Di Breme, Il Conciliatore (1818).

66 Note that Christianity was not the only source of anti-rationalist belief. The Romantic age saw a greater emphasis on mysticism and spirituality overall, including a renewed interest in the occult and the supernatural. See Georges Poulet, ‘Romanticism’, in The Romantic Movement, ed. Thorlby, p. 40.

asserts, Romanticism sought to make 'distant times [...] acceptable and intelligible to a society' that knew nothing but a rationalist outlook in order 'to establish a counterweight to claims of reason'.

Other scholars also maintain that Romanticism had a strongly anti-rationalist, religious (Christian), and emotionalist sensibility. Nicholas Riasanovsky contends that Romanticism's true emergence began less as a materialistic reaction to the turbulent events of the early nineteenth century than as a pantheistic, religious vision within Christianity among German and English poets and writers who sought to transcend the 'finite', the eternal striving for perfection. Others also highlight Romanticism's anti-rationalist and emotionalist roots, noting that that 'Romanticism began as a moral revolt against physics'. This anti-rationalism morally rejected the objectification of nature; one of its key facets was a reaction against the 'abstract reason' of the Enlightenment that preceded it, and the exaltation of the emotional, irrational, and sentimental side of man's nature. Romantics argued instead that reality was merely superficial, an outward expression of something deeper that only the emotions could truly fathom. Thus 'the Romantic craved not to find the same universal truth, but to experience reality in a way wholly his own. This was to be done not by reasoning, but through feeling, sentiment, imagination, instinct, passion, dream and recollection'.

For Romantics, one manner in which man could restore the balance between reason and emotion was through rootedness in spiritual faith. The Romantic age saw a great upsurge in deeply emotional, eclectic, and personal—as opposed to rigidly formal, ritualistic, and impersonal—forms of religiosity, and the period from the Enlightenment to the Romantic age could be called 'from an age of unbelief to the Ages of Faith'. The revived anti-rationalist spiritual fervour that emerged as one reaction against the hard rationalism of the Enlightenment was an important stimulus to Romantic writers, artists, and thinkers who were inspired by a growing interest in emotional forms of Christian religious worship. Pietism in Germany, Methodism and

---

68 Kochan, p. 89.
72 Talmon, p. 139.
73 Cobban, p. 131.
evangelism in England, conversions to Catholicism—and the concomitant growth in political ultramontanism—throughout Europe, and even the proliferation of new religious sects in the United States all fuelled the Romantic mood.74

In Germany, Pietism sought to rid religion of its arid intellectualism and emphasised the emotional nature of spirituality, 'kindl[ing] the flame of Christian mysticism'.75 As Artz argues, Pietism preached 'an ardently emotional faith' that had a profound influence on German philosophy and political thought.76 Its concern with an individual's personal morality and salvation, the divine truth of the 'piety of the heart', and its views on religion as mainly a sentimental and emotional experience provided a solid rejection of the Enlightenment's secularism and 'the dry-rot of rationalism'.77 In England, Methodism and evangelism represented 'a revolt against the deism, skepticism, and democratic thought of the eighteenth century', and emphasised the emotional aspects of 'coming to Christ', collective religious revivals, and hymn singing, or raising voices to God in prayer.78 On the Continent, the resurgence of Catholicism was fuelled by a similar reaction against rationalism and the anti-clericalism of the French Revolution. For example, one of the most influential books of the period, Chateaubriand's Genie du christianisme (The Genius of Christianity) published in 1802, was an ardent defence of Catholic Christianity and its emphasis on the redemption of sin, as well as its appeal to tradition, social harmony, order, and hierarchy.79

In the United States the Second Great Awakening was contemporaneous with the European Romantic movement—from about 1790 to the mid-1800s. The Awakening fuelled an emotional Christian spiritual observance, mainly rooted in evangelical Protestantism, and spawned a variety of new Christian religious sects. The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons), the Jehovah's Witnesses, and the Seventh-Day Adventists were all born of the religious seers of the Romantic age in America. The American revival also inspired the establishment of radical

---

74 Mosse, p. 38.
75 Artz, p. 50.
76 Ibid.
78 Artz, pp. 50 and 54-55.
79 Mosse, p. 34, and Artz, pp. 56-57.
Christian utopias, such as Shaker communities. The mood for utopian redemption and reform based on a revival of Christian ideals reached deep into the fabric of American society. As Ralph Waldo Emerson wrote to Thomas Carlyle in 1840, '[w]e are all a little wild here [in America] with numberless projects of social reform. Not a reading man but has a draft of a new community in his waistcoat pocket.'

This Christian reawakening in Europe and the United States was imbued with the urgency of impending doom, as religious visionaries predicted the end of the world, spurring a growth in millennialist and apocalyptic thinking during the Romantic age. For example, in America, William Miller (founder of the Seventh-Day Adventists) predicted the end of the world in 1844 while the Mormons sought to prepare the way for the millennium by creating a perfect society on earth. As such, Christian religious revival was seen as part of the coming 'end times', a way to either convert non-believers or remake the world in anticipation Christ’s coming in order 'to purify [...] society and to make it ready for the coming Kingdom.' These apocalyptic sentiments were disseminated among the writers, artists, and philosophers of the period. J. K. Huysmans’ Against the Grain (1884) incorporated catastrophic visions of the destruction of the world, predicting that it would end either in biblical cataclysms, or that civilisation would drown in its own filth; Elémir Bourges’ The Twilight of the Gods (1884) shared this prophetically tragic tone.

The revival in religion also had a significant impact on European and American civil societies throughout the nineteenth century. In Germany, Pietists produced hundreds of books and pamphlets that overwhelmed the reading public through their sheer quantity, significantly informing the views of the general reading audience as well as influencing the key thinkers of the age, such as Lessing, Herder, and Novalis. In England and the United States, as readership increased among

-----

83 Placher.
85 Artz, p. 51.
Victorian populations, the average reader was exposed to a steady diet of materials discussing personal morality—books, pamphlets, and newspapers of the age were all laced with morality tales. Additionally, the growth of associations based on an ideal of Christian ‘good works’, such as temperance leagues, societies against vice, and organisations such as the Salvation Army put the teachings of Christian faith into action within society.  

1.4 O Tempora! O Mores!—Pessimism and ennui

'Manj, having relegated to hell all pain and torments, had nothing left for heaven but ennui.'

—Arthur Schopenhauer

The Romantic age is often defined by a sense of Weltschmerz (world-weariness) and ennui (boredom) which critics attribute to the social upheavals of the time:

the [R]omantic movement was in its very essence the expression of an acute sense of cultural failure. The [R]omantic was a man convinced that the old world of courts, salons, dynastic wars, rational religion, and enlightenment stood in ruins [...] He felt himself called to create a new order...  

A tragic tone and pessimism accompanies this Romantic ennui and sense of loss, leading one critic to claim that Romanticism was

a movement which [...] produc[ed] the greatest literature of despair the world has ever seen. No movement has perhaps been so prolific of melancholy as emotional [R]omanticism. To follow it from Rousseau down to the present day is to run through the whole gamut of gloom.  

As E. Cassirer puts it, Romanticism is a ‘Weltanschauung [worldview] that searched out the dark places rather than the light and found its own peculiar satisfaction in so doing’, while Irving Babbitt notes that Romantic poets were in ‘a veritable competition with one another as to who shall be accounted as the most forlorn.’  

Indeed, one scholar’s labels for describing the various periods within Romanticism are replete with foreboding: sensibility (beginning with Rousseau, 1761),

86 Placher.
87 Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Idea (1818).
88 Wagar, p. 151.
Chapter 1

_Weltschmerz_ (Schiller, 1795), _mal de siècle_ (Hugo, 1830), pessimism (Schopenhauer and Stendhal, 1865), and neurasthenia (the culmination of the _fin de siècle_ movement, 1900).91

The Romantic age’s literary _dramatis personae_ reads like a roster of pathetic souls, heroic misfits, and misunderstood geniuses living a tragedy, bound by the ‘loss of a world explainable by myth’, who need protection from life’s philistines.92 Tennyson’s nobility in suffering (“Thou majestic in thy sadness’); Wordsworth’s bucolic melancholy; de Maistre’s rejection of the modern world; Baudelaire’s ‘disdain for the world’; Mallarmé’s ‘romantic despair’; Carlyle’s and Coleridge’s pessimism; Poe’s and Melville’s ‘vivid expressions of [R]omantic anxiety’; and Hardy’s _fin de siècle_ angst were all representative of the period.93 Heroines of the age were no less tragic. Romantic literature is replete with Camilles—Dumas-fils’ fragile heroine; Catherines—Bronte’s wild, tragic creation; and Carmens—Bizet’s exotic, doomed _femme fatale_.94

In this Romantic anguish from the heart, sadness equals wisdom, with the lyricism closely allied with nostalgia and the pursuit of the strange and the exotic.95 However, the Romantic’s pessimism itself is not ‘natural’ but an artifice of the storyteller, since tragedy is the product of two elements. One element is the fact, myth, or story. The second is the handling, treatment, or art of the piece. In that sense, tragedy is not a work of nature but a work of art, or an interpretation of nature.96 The interpreter _par excellence_ of Romanticism’s theology of despair was the Marquis de Sade:

> the archetypal prophet of naturalistic despair was […] the Marquis de Sade […] Sade’s anti-heroes, for all their success as libertines and criminals, repeatedly confessed their hatred of the natural order […] Their rule of life—to enjoy oneself at no matter whose expense—was a transparent counsel of despair, in a world bereft of all purpose or goodness.97

This interpretation became more pessimistic as the century wore on. The taste for ‘the wild, the macabre, and the horrific’ among early Romantics developed into ‘a programmatic aestheticism that scorned the world or rejoiced, masochistically, in its

91 Babbitt, p. 307, quoting the labels created by E. Seillière in _Mal romantique_.
92 Mosse, p. 20.
93 Babbitt, p. 132 (on Tennyson and Wordsworth); Wagar, pp. 152-158 and 171 (on de Maistre _et seq._).
94 Mosse, p. 25.
95 Babbitt, pp. 308-311.
96 Prosser Hall Frye, _Romance & Tragedy_ (Boston, MA: Marshall Jones Company, 1922), pp. 143-144.
97 Ibid., p. 168.
decay' in the latter nineteenth century. Toward the turn of the century, scientific pessimists, like H.G. Wells, ‘painted lurid prophetic pictures’ of decadent society’s last men caught in dystopian worlds, while others like Anatole France, in *The Garden of Epicurus* (1894), offered pessimistic parables with end-of-world visions.

Outside the literary realm, there were many ‘politically minded exponents of cultural despair’, such as Julius Langbehn in Germany, Charles Maurras in France, and the Russian Pan-Slavists. However, perhaps the most long-lasting effect of Romanticism’s pessimistic tendencies was on the study of history and philosophy, affecting their interpretation even today. Romanticism in philosophy and history contributed to the atmosphere of pessimism, especially in Central Europe: Schopenhauer, Kierkegaard, Burckhardt, Nietzsche, and Spengler (sometimes described as a late Romantic despite the fact that his works were in the twentieth century) were philosophical pessimists.

Furthermore, in the study of history, the relativistic spirit of historical scholarship combined with organic or lifecycle views of human institutions which were developed during the Romantic era can be said to be a variety of disenchantment and despair. Historians of earlier periods, such as Polybius, Seneca, and Florus, hadanalysed history in terms of the human lifecycle—birth, youth, maturity, and death. Indeed, the idea that states rise and decline as part of an organic lifecycle is found in Pericles’ defence of his policy against the Spartans, when he notes that ‘all things are born to decay’, even Athenian power.

As David Lowenthal argues, in Europe the organic or biological analogy was reintroduced and popularised by Johann Joachim Winckelmann, whose perspectives about art and culture were influential in the eighteenth century. Winckelmann’s ideas gained widespread currency with art critics and writers in the nineteenth century; indeed, Herder applied the analogy to whole cultures. Others such as Hegel and Schelling denounced those civilisations that had unproductively prolonged their appearance on the world stage. The organic view of vaunted youth and senescent old

---

98 Wagar, p. 155.
99 Ibid., pp. 169-170.
100 Ibid., p. 153. Wagar notes that some of these were saved from complete despair by their chiliastic or nationalistic hopes for the future.
101 Ibid., p. 174.
age which Giambattista Vico applied to nations and political institutions in 1744, and which was a preoccupation of eighteenth-century writers, also became a dominant analogy during the Romantic age.\textsuperscript{104}

Building on these analogies, Romanticism’s cyclical theories of history where institutions, states, cultures, races, or civilisations are said to rise and decline over time are representative of historical pessimism, particularly when married to medical analogies of health and disease. The rise or development phase is seen as the perfection of youth and analogised to vigour and robust health, while declining stages are seen as a part of the decay of old age, sickness, and impending death.\textsuperscript{105} In particular, these metaphors play on the almost universal human distaste for age, and its associations with decay, weakness, senility, impotence, and corruption.\textsuperscript{106}

Oswald Spengler’s work in this regard could be seen as the apotheosis of late Romantic pessimism, as could the work of Brook Adams in the twentieth century, both of whom exploited the analogy between the decadence and decay they saw in their own societies and the fall of ancient Rome.\textsuperscript{107} ‘Race failure’ theories were another popular species of pessimism during the late Romantic period. They posited that the ‘nobler’ races—such as the Aryans—would be overrun by the rapidly multiplying hoards of barbarians comprised of assorted ‘inferior’ races.\textsuperscript{108}

1.5 Protagoras’ Children—Relativism, nationalism, and will

\textit{The idea of happiness changes as circumstances and regions change [\ldots] Every nation has its centre of happiness within itself.}'

\textsuperscript{109} Johann Gottfried von Herder

In contrast to the Enlightenment’s turning outward to search for universal ideas, the Romantics turned inward to seek the truth within their own thoughts and spirits. The Romantics exhibited a ‘heightened self-consciousness’ that, as one critic sardonically quips, ‘[I]oved not so much truth, whose hard master is the actual world, as the

\textsuperscript{104} Lowenthal, pp. 140-142. Isaiah Berlin notes that while Vico was rarely read during his age, his works were revived a century later during the Romantic period. Berlin claims that Vico’s most original contributions were his insistence on the uniqueness of culture, cultural relativism, and historicism which were part of the Counter-Enlightenment. See Berlin, ‘The Counter-Enlightenment’, pp. 102-103.

\textsuperscript{105} Wagar, pp. 154 and 158.

\textsuperscript{106} Lowenthal, pp. 127-135.

\textsuperscript{107} Wagar, pp. 164-166. Note that both of these scholars produced works in the twentieth century.

\textsuperscript{108} Mosse, pp. 79-80.

\textsuperscript{109} J.G. Herder, \textit{Auch eine Philosophie der Geschichte zur Bildung der Menschheit} [trans.: \textit{Yet Another Philosophy on the History of the Education of Mankind}] (1774).
process of their own thinking, which they believed to be the key to the universe.\textsuperscript{110} In comparison to the grand, universalising vision of such Enlightenment masterworks as Diderot and D’Alembert’s \textit{L’Encyclopédie}, the Romantic period’s representative forms of expression were more intimate and parochial—diaries, confessional poems, and individual accounts of the writer’s process of personal inspiration. This stress on individual expression in Romanticism found a stronger outlet in France and Britain, which were unified states, than in states that sought national independence, such as Germany and Italy, where emphasis was laid more on the development of national unity.\textsuperscript{111}

If truth was relative to the individual, it was also relative to time and place; Romanticism asserted that there was a ‘truth to one’s time and country’ that could only be known through history.\textsuperscript{112} Romanticism’s ‘scientific kernel’ was historicism, summed up as ‘sympathy’—sympathy for the man, his age, his society—which meant an understanding of the relativistic context of history, or an emotional ‘internal vision’ of a period. The key failure of Romanticism was its lack of an ‘external vision’, a universal morality or standard.\textsuperscript{113} Herder’s historicism and Burke’s traditionalism—his belief that a nation is a community bound by long historical tradition—contributed to the relativistic idea that political values are to be judged in their relation with the historical community.\textsuperscript{114} If the Enlightenment was a challenger to history—by wiping the slate clean and beginning again from the universal principles of reason—Romanticism was its champion, arguing that neither man nor society, as a product of history, is infinitely malleable.

Relativism and historicism applied to societies appeared as nationalism. However, nationalism was not uniquely a development of the Romantic era, a part of the process of modernisation or modernity as many scholars, such as Ernest Gellner, Eric Hobsbawm, or Benedict Anderson argue.\textsuperscript{115} George Mosse and Adrian Hastings point to the medieval roots of nationalism. Mosse notes that nationalism existed in

\textsuperscript{110} Thorlby, ‘Introduction’, p. 9.
\textsuperscript{111} Mosse, p. 41.
\textsuperscript{112} Thorlby, ‘Part II: Select Documents’, p. 154.
\textsuperscript{113} Kochan, pp. 90-92.
\textsuperscript{114} Cobban, pp. 129-130.
most medieval states, usually associated directly with the person of the king, a common language, and mercantilism. Additionally, the Reformation and ensuing wars of religion fostered a type of nationalism before the Romantic era. This leads to the conclusion that, for example, England was 'English' before it was 'modern'.\textsuperscript{116} Hastings contends that religion, as a key aspect of identity, had decisive and irreversible effects on the shaping of national identities among many European nations during medieval times, particularly through the development of a vernacular liturgy, or through biblical and religious literature or teaching in the vernacular.\textsuperscript{117}

Due to the differing circumstances in which various peoples achieved national consciousness, it is possible only to talk about 'nationalisms' in the plural. Indeed, the Romantic era saw a significant transformation in the idea of nationalism—from cultural to political nationalism. In early Romanticism, nationalism took a cultural form predicated upon the idea of harmony among nations, with disputes centring on the specific contributions that each nation could make toward the broader European civilisation.\textsuperscript{118} If in Schlegel's terms, only those with 'great national memories' survive as a people, then with no such memories the Germans and Slavs turned to the \textit{Volk} for their inspirations of greatness and unity.\textsuperscript{119} This was the cultural nationalism of folk ballads and fairytales.

However, in the latter nineteenth century Darwinism and its law of the survival of the fittest ultimately was synthesised with nationalism, particularly after the 1871 Franco-Prussian war, which was perceived as a struggle between rival nations and cultures. After that point, 'Social Darwinism [became] the natural theology of nationalism' and nationalism achieved a hard political core which sought self-determination and territorial sovereignty as key goals.\textsuperscript{120} This political core had particular resonance among nations under foreign occupation and subjugation, who had known no glorious past but only disunity and backwardness.\textsuperscript{121} In an age which embraced emotion and rejected reason, part of political nationalism's appeal was its spiritual vision of the people living in a national state, a utopia of unity and

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\item\textsuperscript{116} Mosse, p. 53.
\item\textsuperscript{117} Adrian Hastings, \textit{The Construction of Nationhood: Ethnicity, Religion and Nationalism} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
\item\textsuperscript{119} Mosse, p. 42.
\item\textsuperscript{120} Binkley, p. 30.
\item\textsuperscript{121} Mosse, p. 46.
\end{thebibliography}
belonging. These moving visions, often imbued with mystical, occult, or Christian meanings, played a similar role to chiliiasm and millenarianism, acting as a secular dogma in rousing the ‘faithful’ to action. Indeed, nationalist visions could readily be infused with religious meanings; Romantics such as Herder, who was a scholar of biblical poetry, were often much taken by biblical stories. As one scholar notes, ‘[t]aking the Bible seriously nurtured the Romantic fascination with cultural particularity’ since knowledge of the Bible shaped their moral understandings and sentiments of ‘a single nation [Israel] in its struggle for survival’.

The fusion of nationalism—often casting the nation in mystical or even biblical terms—with the metaphor of evolutionary biology has cast a long shadow into the twentieth century. Tzvetan Todorov comments that twentieth-century totalitarianisms are based on the union of Darwinism and politics, where Clausewitzian war (war as a continuation of politics by other means) is seen ‘as the truth of life’ and society is seen as engaged in various forms of permanent struggle: national clashes, racial conflicts, class wars, or even the ‘battle’ of the sexes. Not only were Hitler and Lenin influenced by the synthesis of political and Darwinian thinking, but earlier Marx and Engels were as well.

Such fusions of Darwinism and politics could have quasi-spiritual, apocalyptic, or millenialist undercurrents. As Norman Cohn observed in 1957, What Marx passed on to present-day communism was not the fruit of his long years of study in the fields of economics and sociology but a quasi-apocalyptic fantasy which, as a young man, unquestioningly and almost unconsciously, he had assimilated from a crowd of obscure writers and journalists [...] Capitalism as Babylon, now about to go under in a sea of blood and fire so that the way shall be cleared for the egalitarian millennium.

Finally, Romantics shared a fascination with power—the power of nature, of nations, and of the individual, particularly the lone, brooding heroic genius who was ‘firm in [his] passions’ and created new worlds from the sheer force of his will.

---

122 Mosse, pp. 71 and 74.
126 Mosse, p. 27.
Napoleon, Hegel's spectre haunting Europe, aroused this fervour for men of power and will who were to be judged not by a universal standard, but under their own terms and in their own time. As Chateaubriand says,

Napoleon's greatness does not lie in his words [...] or any love of liberty [...] he is great because he created a working and powerful government [...] and great above all because he owed everything to himself, and without any authority but that of his genius made thirty-six million subjects obey him in an age where no illusions surrounded a throne.127

This hero worship and admiration for the powerful was not limited to France. In Britain, Thomas Carlyle moved Romantics from reverence for the awesome power of nature to an appreciation of the awesome power of man—his industry and capacity to exercise his individual will. Carlyle's Past and Present (1843) portrays the hero not as a man with nostalgia for the medieval past, but as one who creates his own future, who reforms society through his will. This conquering hero stands for industrial and later imperial progress, championing the national cause.128 In Germany, late Romantics like Nietzsche echoed Protagoras' aphorism that 'man is the measure of all things' by extolling the power of individual will and distinguishing between master and slave moralities: 'the noble type of man feels himself to be the determiner of values [...] he knows himself to be that which in general first accords to honour things, he creates values.'129

1.6 Search for a Golden Age—Nostalgia and medievalism

'[The Middle Ages] were beautiful, brilliant times, when Europe was a Christian country, and a single Christian faith dwelt in this humanized region of the world; one great communal interest united the most distant provinces of this vast realm of the spirit.'

—Novalis130

For Georges Poulet, nostalgia rests at the heart of the Romantic soul: 'the central belief [...] of nearly all the Romanticists [was...] the belief in the continued existence

128 Mosse, pp. 27-30.
130 Novalis (pseudonym for Georg Friedrich Philipp von Hardenburg), Die Christenheit oder Europa [trans.: Christianity or Europe] (1799).
of the past, in the wonderful possibilities of its revival. Nothing is lost. Yet what is nostalgia? One everyday definition describes it as a fond remembrance of the past. However, nostalgia was originally classified as a mild form of mental illness, first coined by a Swiss doctor to characterise the symptoms some Swiss mercenaries exhibited. Another doctor later defined it as '[a] species of melancholy, or a mild type of insanity, caused by disappointment and a continuous longing for home'.

Contemporary psychologists have noted that nostalgia gives a sense of permanence and stability during rapid change and 'indicates individuals' desire to regain some control over their lives in an uncertain time', often performing 'as a means of temporal escape'. However, nostalgia is more than a personal reminiscence. It is also a collective means of reconstructing the past to fulfil a variety of social purposes which involves selective remembering and selective forgetting to filter and construct a narrative of the past. The key to nostalgia is longing, mostly to recapture a previous idealised and idolised mood or spirit—nostalgia is expressed for what is loved or hoped for, a species of wishful thinking or wish fulfillment, often for something that never really was. However, nostalgia may not only be a longing for the past; while conservative Romantics may yearn for the past, progressive Romantics may long for an age yet to come. Indeed, some writers suggest that this sense of nostalgia as an 'infinite longing' is in fact 'the essence of Romanticism'.

During the unstable Romantic period, nostalgia manifested itself in many ways, one of the most important being a revival of interest in the Middle Ages, which was inherently tied to the central importance that spirituality and mysticism played during the age. While some Liberal commentators during the nineteenth century—such as John Stuart Mill—saw the medieval period as 'barbaric', and unfavourably contrasted it with their own 'modern' era, others lauded the Middle Ages as a time not only of mystery, romance, and adventure, but also as a Golden Age of higher spirituality and morality, as well as a time of great social stability. Writers,

---

133 R.C. Aden quoted in ibid., p. 296.
134 Ibid.
135 Ibid.
137 Coker, 'How wars end', p. 623.
138 Cobban, 129-133.
painters, and philosophers of the Romantic age mined the history of the Middle Ages for its heroes and images to inform and inspire their own societies towards perceived medieval ideals.

In literature and poetry, Romantics emphasised the 'use of imagery, symbolism, and myth', some retelling chivalrous historical morality tales from the Middle Ages, and recounting folk stories. In some cases, such as with Germany's Brothers Grimm, the revival of fairy tales was also a form of nationalism, a way to build a unified, 'authentic' national consciousness through the Volk. Medieval historical novels, such as Ivanhoe by Sir Walter Scott—who was probably the most widely-read novelist in Europe during the early nineteenth century—also flourished during the period, and early Romantic writers and poets extolled medieval chivalry and Christian themes.

Romantic, idealised heroes from the Middle Ages such as Robin Hood and his merry men and chivalrous knights from the Crusades pervaded Romantic culture: the Exhibition of Paris in 1819 was filled with people dressed as latter-day Merovingians and roving troubadours. Additionally, interest in the Middle Ages as a time of mystery and inspiration is evidenced in the growth of the so-called 'Gothic' novels, exemplified by the emotionally-charged works of the Brontë sisters.

In the visual arts, admiration for the medieval past came not only in terms of images on canvas but also in the physical representation of the past in bricks and mortar. Pre-Raphaelite painters like John Everett Millais and Dante Rossetti focused on the beauty of Christianity, using medieval imagery to underscore the mystical, transcendent qualities of deep spiritual faith. A Gothic revival in architecture, not only in churches but also in public buildings such as the British Houses of Parliament, was a testament to the strength of the medieval revival in visual culture.

Yet the period's fascination with medievalism went beyond culture. While scholars note that the roots of the medieval revival began as a reformist movement with nineteenth-century Liberals and early Romantics, the movement became reactionary in the later Romantic period. As Frederick Beiser notes

---

140 Artz, p. 61.
142 Mosse, pp. 21-22.
143 Ibid., p. 33.
144 Cobban, pp. 130-131.
[w]hat separates early from later [R]omanticism is [...] this distinction between the community and the paternal state. The more the [R]omantics feared the social disintegration created by the [French] Revolution and advancing capitalism, the more they looked back with longing on the corporate order of the Middle Ages. The more they lost faith in the power of the people to develop a community through their own spontaneous efforts, the more they trusted the powers of the state. Eventually, it seemed as if only the paternal state could ensure the bonds of community against all the disintegrating and corrupting forces of modern life. The [R]omantics’ increasing identification of the community with the old corporate order brought their position closer to the conservatives.145

The Romantics’ historical re-discovery of the Middle Ages, which was conducted in terms of an ‘idealised Medievalism’ that replaced the ‘idealised Classicism’ of the Enlightenment, also rehabilitated perceived medieval corporatist ideas on social relationships.146 Far from seeing the Middle Ages as a period of ‘fluid identities’, conservative Romantics appreciated the Middle Ages for its ‘fixities’, its social and political stability. They looked to the medieval era nostalgically as one of paternalistic social relationships with order imposed through a hierarchical and corporate state.147 In this image of medievalism, identities and loyalties were fixed and deeply spiritually rooted in Christianity. Lord, merchant, peasant, and priest all had their assigned roles in society which they performed dutifully.

1.7 Dreaming of Arcadia—Nature and the exotic

‘The pleasure we take in nature is not aesthetic but moral [...] the things of nature] are what we once were, and what we must become again.’

—Friedrich von Schiller148

The idea of ‘nature’ in the nineteenth century had two fundamental meanings—one historical and one philosophical—which were ‘confusingly intertwined’.149 The historical meaning was nature as it was or now is, known as natura naturata. This definition saw nature as something in its ‘original’ state, the state during which it is free from any artificial blemish after leaving the Creator’s hands. The philosophical

---

145 Beiser, p. 223.
146 Cobb, p. 130.
147 Mosse, p. 22.
meaning was *nature as it could become*, known as *natura naturans*. This view perceived nature as something in its final state of development, or in its most perfect state attainable. Both are intertwined and yet have opposite implications. Is nature a fixed state, a dynamic process, or both? Furthermore, is ‘nature’ to be understood by reason or emotion? While more conservative Romantics regarded the idea of *natura naturata* as the true meaning of ‘nature’, and Romantic progressives preferred notions of *natura naturans*, both agreed that feeling and emotion, rather than abstract reason, was the best method to understand ‘nature’.¹⁵⁰

In their understanding of nature, early Romantics shared an emotional beauty aesthetic which was also an ethic: beautiful places were virtuous places. Arcadia was not only a place of physical perfection, but a spiritual utopia as well. For Romantics, sylvan woods, storm-blown shores, and craggy hills were not merely beautiful in themselves; they also held deep symbolic and moral meaning, often filled with longing for an unattainable perfection and sense of loss for the past. As W.K. Wimsatt notes, ‘the common feat of the [R]omantic nature poets was to read meanings into the landscape’, where nature articulated the highest form of perfection and human emotion, and where man could attain transcendence.¹⁵¹ Painters such as Turner and Constable also expressed this sentiment visually, with their windswept landscapes filled with longing and foreboding.

In an increasingly urban, industrialising society, Romantics also idealised children, childhood, and the ‘natural man’—often represented by the peasant—as these were seen as innocents, exhibiting the purer virtues, unspoiled and untouched by the corrupting hand of civilisation or living in a bucolic, nostalgic vision of the perfection of simpler times.¹⁵² Indeed, so far had the idea of the ‘natural man’ gone that it became somewhat of a fad. Louis XVI had a rural village recreated so he and his wife could play the roles of a ‘natural’ married couple.¹⁵³ The perfection of this original state of nature and state of man was also linked to the Christian and the divine. For example, Chateaubriand integrated nature and man into a Romantically Christian ideal.¹⁵⁴

¹⁵⁰ Willey, pp. 196-200.
¹⁵⁴ Ibid., p. 21.
Romanticism’s fascination with nature turned toward the darker side of the human psyche—the ‘unnatural’, cruel parts of human nature and the evil Doppelgänger in Gothic horror novels and romans charognes. Writers such as the Marquis de Sade regaled and horrified readers with tales of pleasure and perversion, Robert Louis Stevenson’s Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde (1886) played on the ambiguity between vice and virtue existing in the same man, and other writers spoke of the duality of human nature, of noble criminals and fatal women.155

The idealisation of nature also created a penchant for the exotic, especially the Orient, as Romantics deemed far away, primitive peoples from ‘lesser’ civilisations to be closer to the natural state of man, pure and unspoiled. This growing interest coincided with the ‘unparalleled’ European colonial expansion from 1815-1914, when European direct colonial rule swelled from 35 per cent to 85 per cent of the earth’s surface.156 Napoleon’s invasion of Egypt greatly fuelled this fashion, as the expeditionary forces included some of the great minds of the time. Napoleon counted among his expedition’s savants some of the most well-known astronomers, engineers, painters, linguists, poets, musicians, and experts on the Orient who produced a collection of work called Description de l’Égypte, one of the most influential bodies of work on the region.157

These experts also brought back artefacts, such as the Rosetta stone, creating the beginnings of a ‘renaissance’ in the West’s understanding of the Orient, which more broadly included a new scientific and artistic awareness of the region—Champollion’s decoding of the hieroglyphs being one of the most famous accomplishments of the age.158 The growth of specialist societies founded to study the Orient—such as Britain’s Royal Asiatic Society and the American Oriental Society—reflected this growing interest in the exotic, as did the increase in the number of published books and journals, and the number of new professorships created in Oriental subjects.159 This burgeoning curiosity spawned new translations of texts in Arabic as well as other non-Western languages, such as Sanskrit.160 More broadly,

155 Thorlby, ‘Psychological Symbols’, p. 43.
158 For a discussion of Champollion’s work, see Adkins.
159 Said, p. 43.
160 Ibid., p. 41. For a discussion of the importance of Napoleon’s expedition on future scholarship on the region, see ibid., pp. 76-92.
escalating interest in the Orient also influenced such artists as Delacroix and Vernet of the French Romantic School, who filled Western audiences with images of exotic landscapes and languorous, mysterious women.161

Finally, Romanticism's fascination with nature and the exotic influenced a number of racial theories explaining the historical rise and fall of civilisations. Some late Romantics, such as Joseph Arthur de Gobineau, made the correlation between man and nature and used 'natural' racial stereotypes to explain these cyclical patterns. These theories described the 'natural' pattern of the rise and the decline of certain races and delineated a hierarchy of races where some—like the Aryans—had the 'natural' right to rule over lesser races.162

1.8 Walking by Faith, Not Sight—Conclusion

'For we walk by faith, not by sight.'

—2 Corinthians, 5:7

If during the Enlightenment period Classical man learned to trust his own senses and hard reason in his walk through life, Romantic man would trust his walk to a sentimental faith, not sight. Whereas Classicism, which '[stands] on the ground of the present' is—in the words of Wilhelm Schlegel—the 'poetry of possession', the possession of stability and a known truth, Romanticism, which '[sways] between recollection and atonement', is 'the poetry of longing'—a longing for security, for meaning in an age beset by rapid change.164 As we have argued, nineteenth-century Romanticism was partly a philosophical reaction against the Enlightenment and partly an historical response to the uncertainties of the age, particularly to the three transformations that shook the European consciousness: the political revolution in France, the Industrial Revolution in Britain, and the cultural revolution in Germany. These developments wrought a change in outlook among European publics, writers, thinkers, and artists during the nineteenth century, from one of the optimism, universalism, rationality, and sense of progress during the Enlightenment, to one

162 Mosse, pp. 76-80.
164 Wilhelm Schlegel (brother of Friedrich) called Classical art the 'poetry of possession'. The rest of the comments in quotes are Talmon's. See Talmon, p. 149.
emphasising a variety of related themes during the nineteenth century, in particular anti-rationalism, pessimism, relativism, nostalgia, and a focus on nature and the exotic.

When looking at nineteenth-century Romanticism—or more accurately, Romanticisms—it is difficult to set out any all-encompassing definition or tendency; even less still a coherent ideology. Perhaps this is because, in a significant sense, Romanticism is about rejection, about loss, and about protest—protest against the Enlightenment’s overweening rationality and objectification of the human soul, of unsettling and uneven material progress in the face of vast human suffering, and of the smallness of man when faced with the infinitude of God and nature. This protest and rejection took many forms and directions. Unlike Realism or Liberalism, which rest on a set of foundational precepts and logically drawn arguments bound by human reason, Romanticism’s goal is to transcend mere human logic to get at a higher truth, the truth of the divine. This anti-rationalism, bound up with a turn to emotionalism and spirituality as the true seats of knowledge and understanding, pervaded the era along with a deflated sense of the possibilities for the future.

This atmosphere of decline suffused a significant body of the literature and philosophical work of the age. Romantic pessimism stems from the desperate knowledge that human logic will not triumph, but this failure is also a form of exhilaration; that there can be a release and liberation from the bounds of logic. Yet what can start as a noble effort to redefine the boundaries of liberty can degenerate into libertinism; an ironic sense of horror into the idolatry of violence and barbarism. As the ideals of the early Romantics—whose flight from the strictures of logic led them to seek the immanence of the divine—morphed into the hardened pessimism of the late Romantics—who rejected the possibility of the divine—the Romantic sensibility of Wordsworth’s bucolic transcendence became Nietzsche’s godless abyss. Fascination with the duality of all life—the inhuman, the diseased, the malformed, criminals, prostitutes and others at the extremes and margins—as well as with the exoticism of ‘Others’ deemed at once both innocent and barbaric created a picture of contradiction and incoherence in the Romantic ‘movement’.

By its very nature, this type of rejectionism often lacks unity or coherence since it is a negative turning away from something, rather than an affirmative movement toward something: a refutation of logic, of optimism, or of hope. Therefore, Romanticism may be more an attitude, mood, persuasion, sensibility, or
receptivity to certain themes than a particular logic or set of logics as commonly understood. As a *Geist*, a feeling, an atmosphere, it can be everywhere and nowhere at once, subtly informing attitudes and opinions, the selection of topics and what counts as evidence. In this sense Romanticism is less an ideology—or so at least it likes to see itself as less an ideology—than other ‘isms’ we can think of, in part because its goal is to break free of ideology or the strictures of convention without itself necessarily creating new rules or foundations, a logical impossibility. What is something that has no foundation—is neither itself nor its opposite?

In essence, Romanticism may be said to have been everything and its contradiction at once, thesis and antithesis bound within an uncomfortable synthesis. Romantics were seeking it all at once, to feel the heights of passion, the agonies of despair, the thrill of the divine, and the taste of blood—negative or positive, all was equally sensation. Perhaps it is this sense of extreme sensation, the need to feel intensely rather than to think intensely, that describes the core of its anti-rationalism and relativism. Yet once the sensation is gone, what then? What may be left are escapes to even greater extremes of sensation, or a lingering nostalgia about loss for the ‘innocence’ of the past. From that perspective, Romanticism may be more about the thrill of the journey than the actual destination. Of course the problem is that in the end we always arrive somewhere.

Romanticism’s legacies have a long arm. It is almost impossible to think of our own era outside the framework of Romanticism’s key themes: its cyclical sense of history, its nostalgia, its views of society as an organic whole, of nature and man as a unity, of identity and cultural determinism, or of the essential duality of life. Furthermore, Romanticism bequeathed us a sense of historicism, an understanding that time it is imbued with specific meanings relative to a certain age, which forms the foundation of modern political thinking. Indeed, the very fabric of contemporary scholarship in the social sciences is rooted in Romanticism’s historic conception of society. However, perhaps Romanticism’s most enduring legacy is its tragic sense of destiny and the inevitability of decay and decline. Declinism, often expressed through the medical metaphor of health/disease or the biological metaphor of youth/old age, has been a recurrent theme for the past 200 years, profoundly affecting perceptions of and approaches to politics and international relations. In the next chapter, we explore how these Romantic themes have been expressed in international relations during the 1990s.
Chapter 2. Age without a Name: The Romantic Zeitgeist in 
post-Cold War International Relations

'The piers are pummeled by the waves; / In a lonely field the rain 
Lashes an abandoned train; / Outlaws fill the mountain caves.'

—W.H. Auden

While the Cold War 'created a sense of stability among most of the world 
population', the troubling conflicts that followed the fall of communism created 
widespread apprehension and a sense of pessimism. With the promise of an 'end to 
history' dead, would the West end up as a slowly decaying, pitiable figure like a 
barbarian-sacked Rome sapped of power, while the rest of the world degenerated into 
chaos? That was a key question in the 1990s, a period during which we were so 
anxious of our seemingly awful, uncertain era that we were living in an age without a 
name whose only solid reference was to its past: the post-Cold War.

By 2000, the editors of one academic journal noted that '[i]n the past decade, 
the phrase the end of the Cold War has recurred with numbing frequency [...]
Perhaps it is time to coin a new phrase for the dawn of a new millennium: the age of 
angst.' Outside the ivory tower, those policymakers tasked with predicting the future 
of international relations, such as intelligence scenario developers and military 
planners, came to cautious, sceptical, and even pessimistic conclusions, ones replete 
with increasing polarisation between the haves and have-nots, economic rivalry and 
regional conflicts, rapid climate change and competition due to resource depletion.
Those predicting the long-term business environment for global corporations also 
offered some grim possibilities for the future, including growing economic rivalries 
and conflict.

---

2 Ted Robert Gurr and Barbara Harff, Ethnic Conflict in World Politics (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 
4 For an example of this in the US intelligence community see, National Intelligence Council, Mapping 
5 In this vein, see some of the scenarios offered by long-term planners for oil producer Shell, a pioneer 
in scenario planning. Shell International Limited, Shell Global Scenarios to 2025. The Future Business 
Chapter 2

The lack of clarity that accompanied the melancholic loss of what was believed to be a predictable system of international relations led to a revival of the Romantic mood in the 1990s, with its concomitant emphasis on anti-rationalism, pessimism, nostalgia, relativism, and nature. Yet aspects of this mood may persist post 9/11. One scholar noted that, in the United States, the calls for waging a 'just war' on terrorism as well as the mounting discussions of the roles that honour, integrity, morality, and collective guilt play in international conduct are a species of Romanticism:

[T]hose sympathetic to war in our time are heirs to the Romantic tradition. We are the children of William Wordsworth’s and Johann Gottlieb Fichte’s ardour in resisting Napoleon. We think and feel in the moral currents still surging from John Brown’s attack on Harpers Ferry and from Abraham Lincoln’s conceiving the United States as a single ‘nation under God’ that must ‘long endure’. We have come to think of our nation as an actor in the drama of good and evil [...].

Other commentators pointed out the way in which anti-globalisation scholars, environmentalists, and Postmodernist thinkers expound theories akin to Romanticism, which place an emphasis on nature (whether the natural environment or the various aspects of ‘normalcy’ in human nature), on the importance of the ‘irrational’ (emotion, sentiment, or religion), on relativism (culture, identity, or ethnicity), or which reject industrialisation and commoditisation.

However, we will argue that the spirit of 1990s post-Cold War Romanticism in international relations may be broader than any single Romantic strand, such as Postmodernism. One way to describe the work of influential thinkers in 1990s international relations, particularly American international relations which informed...
the foreign policy of the world's most powerful state, is as part of a *Zeitgeist*, an atmosphere, mood, or sensibility which gripped the academic, media, and policymaking communities. If, as we have discussed in Chapter 1, manifestations of culture and politics in society can sometimes follow a common spirit or *Zeitgeist*, then what is the *Zeitgeist* that defines 1990s Romanticism—the specific history and dominant trends that differentiate the first decade of the post-Cold War era, particularly in international relations? We will argue that the popular and academic *Zeitgeist* in 1990s international relations had several striking resemblances to the nineteenth-century Romantic period, but with various changes that fit within the particular history of the post-Cold War era. Clearly, there were a variety of countervailing tendencies in international relations at that time; however, Romanticism may be a particularly strong contender to describe the 1990s *Zeitgeist*.

A brief glance at some of the topical preoccupations of pundits and academics on issues in international relations during that period includes a roster of Romantically-themed subjects:

- considerations of ethics and morality in international relations including psychoanalytic, emotional, or irrational approaches to understanding such issues as warfare and human rights;
- constructivist and relativistic international relations approaches with an emphasis on ethnic identity, culture, or gender;
- generalised sense of pessimism or 'emptiness' within materialism, or of societal failure and decline;
- sense of loss, melancholy, or nostalgia for the past, whether for the stability of the Cold War or for the imperial age; and
- environmentalist discourses and others concerning nature as well as a re-examination of human nature, such as the proper role of man and society.

Our inquiry into the post-Cold War 1990s *Zeitgeist* will be impressionistic, discussing a wide variety of popular and scholarly strains of Romanticism and their impact on international relations during that period. However, the anecdotal evidence may be used as a starting point for further research.

While 1990s Romanticism—which we will call Postmodern Romanticism to distinguish it from its nineteenth-century cousin—may have been part of the

---

philosophical reaction against the dominance of Cold War Realism or Liberalism, we will argue that the considerable re-emergence of Romantic modes of thought and analysis in international relations during the 1990s was also an historic reaction that gained momentum with the crises and uncertainties that followed the fall of communism and the destruction of the bipolar world, just as Romanticism was an historic reaction to the political, economic, and cultural changes that followed the Enlightenment. In essence, Romantic moods and modes of thought survived the period of the nineteenth century, but were often drowned out by rationalist perspectives and sensibilities during the Cold War. After years of labouring away in comparative Cold War obscurity, the vital shifts that accompanied the end of the Cold War put Realist (and other rationalist) perspectives and ‘moods’ under greater scrutiny and provided Romantics with their historical and philosophical ‘moment’, particularly during the 1990s.

First, we briefly outline some common perceptions and impressions about the post-Cold War in the 1990s. Second, we historicise the 1990s to discuss how the perceptions of the period were founded on contemporary ‘revolutions’ which accelerated the pace of social change. These changes had a significant hand in undermining the seeming political, economic, and cultural verities of the Cold War, leading to greater feelings of insecurity among policymakers and publics. These uncertainties also added impetus to those who challenged the Cold War predominance of rationalist paradigms and lent greater receptivity to the Romantic message. In international relations this translated into a challenge against the predominant Realist (and to some extent Liberal Internationalist) frameworks.

Third, we examine the Romantic strain of thought in the 1990s. We apply the same categories of analysis used in the previous chapter—irrationality, pessimism, relativism, nostalgia, and focus on nature—to examine how they helped to describe

---

10 In international relations, the death of the bipolar confrontation has led to the concomitant decline of the dominant Realist paradigm and a search for other explanatory frameworks, some of the most prominent of which could be described as Romantic. Romantic ideas have never truly ‘gone away’, although they were perhaps less pervasive before the end of the Cold War in various academic disciplines. Therefore, whilst the reaction against Realism is not new; it has become more prevalent in some disciplines.

11 One author has argued that Realism’s ‘real strengths […] do not lie in its concepts and precepts, in its clear and accurate understanding of the reality of international affairs. Rather, they lie in its attitudes and sensibilities’. See James Kurth, ‘Inside the Cave: The Banality of I.R. Studies’, *The National Interest* (No. 53, Fall 1998).

12 The end of the Cold War has also caused difficulties for traditional liberal internationalists. For a discussion, see Stanley Hoffmann, ‘The Crisis of Liberal Internationalism’, *Foreign Policy* (Spring 1995).
the 1990s Zeitgeist and affected understandings of international relations. Finally, we offer some tentative observations about how the ‘atmosphere’ or ‘sensibility’ of Postmodern Romanticism affected perceptions of international relations in the 1990s.

2.1 Historicising Postmodern Romanticism—Global disruptions in the 1990s

If the Romantic mood of the nineteenth century was a response to the uncertainties generated by three upheavals in European society—political revolution in France, industrial revolution in Britain, and cultural revolution in Germany—what fuelled the pessimistic mood of 1990s Postmodern Romanticism? Greater receptivity to Romantic modes of thought in the 1990s seems to have been a response to three dislocating global transformations which may have taken root during the Cold War, but which only fully came to fruition in the post-Cold War 1990s. Together, these transformations are often referred to collectively as the processes of fragmentation and globalisation which can be viewed as mirror images of each other. In abbreviated form these transformations are: 1) political revolution through the fall of communism and the destruction of bipolarity in the international system; 2) economic revolution through intensified globalisation, including a significant retreat of the state from social provision and control of national economies, and; 3) cultural revolution, partly through technological changes such as satellite-based media with global audiences and the internet, as well as the internationalisation and possible homogenisation of culture.

These transformations created disruptions in the 1990s which, similar to those during the nineteenth century, generated a public sense of uncertainty, restlessness, and anxiety in the face of change, calling into question the Cold War’s rubric of progress through rationalism. There is a significant body of literature discussing the end of the Cold War and these transformations that need not be repeated here.\(^\text{13}\)

Chapter 2

origins, development, direction, and meaning of fragmentation and globalisation, as well as their relationship to each other are contested, as is their continuity or discontinuity with the past.\textsuperscript{14} Rather than reiterating these arguments, we will examine four concerns that have underpinned the pessimistic conclusions that the 'New World Order' was and remains highly disorderly: 1) the differences in the underlying political and ideological framework of the international system post-1989; 2) the unclear dividing lines between the 'good guys' and the 'bad guys'; 3) the perceived new threats facing Western governments and publics; and, 4) the new 'rules of the game' emerging from these realities.

First, the underlying political framework of the early post-Cold War era then seemed and continues to seem unstable, in contrast to the apparent stable bipolarity that developed during the Cold War. Politically, the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the disintegration of communism in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe defined the early post-Cold War era. While initially trumpeted by Liberals as the wave of the future, communism's failure left significant political, economic, and social problems in its wake.\textsuperscript{15} In particular, the violent fragmentation of multinational states in the region, especially the disintegration of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia through seemingly ethno-nationalist conflict (not to mention burgeoning African conflicts), provided a sobering lesson in the perils of democratisation and transition towards market capitalism after the Cold War.

At the same time, the early post-Cold War world could boast no ascendant ideology or overarching framework, like Realism (or at times, Liberalism) in international relations, which filled the vacuum left by the collapse of communism. As a result, many scholars questioned—and continue to question—Realism's applicability as an explanatory model not only in the post-Cold War period, but also its record during the Cold War.\textsuperscript{16} Fukuyama's famous notion that democracy was left

\textsuperscript{14} For a wide-ranging discussion of this literature, see Ian Clark, \textit{Globalization and Fragmentation: International Relations in the Twentieth Century} (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), especially pp. 172-196.


the unchallenged global conqueror after the fall of the USSR proved to be Liberalism’s fifteen minutes of fame. Indeed, the only certainty about the new order seemed uncertainty itself. Christopher Coker summed up Western disillusionment with the post-Cold War world thus: ‘What we Westerners see is anarchy, a “new world disorder”, in which wars are seemingly endless, an age in which war has become a condition of life.’ If what Westerners expected at the end to the Cold War was greater peace of mind, it proved elusive.

Second, what were once thought to be the clear dividing lines between the two opposing sides during the Cold War had blurred by the early 1990s. One main division was that the Cold War had sectioned Europe into neat parcels of East and West, both engaged in a seemingly endless if relatively bloodless struggle for position and mastery—a chess game for the highest stakes. The rest of the world was also similarly separated between client states of either side, with the non-aligned movement on the sidelines. By contrast, the 1990s New World Order defied these tidy partitions. Eastern Europeans clamoured for acceptance into Western institutions, both the US and USSR either scaled down support to or abandoned client states, and seemingly stable parts of the former Soviet empire—Tajikistan, Georgia, Moldova—and Yugoslavia succumbed to apparent anarchy, ethno-nationalist conflict, or economic despair. Furthermore, the old areas of bipolar Cold War conflict and cooperation lacked clear demarcation lines in the post-Cold War era.

Third, the perceived threats that the West faced during the Cold War seemed certain and straightforward, focused on a single adversary: Soviet expansionism and the possibility of nuclear attack. The methods the West developed to thwart these threats were equally certain: variations on the themes of containment, mutually assured destruction, or developing a modus vivendi through détente. By contrast, the early post-Cold War era offered no certain directed threat or unitary adversary. While some commentators have offered up the war on terrorism as the new post-Cold War

---

19 However, commentators forget that the term ‘Cold War’ itself comes from a privileged perspective, since what was a ‘cold’ war of strategy and position to Americans, Europeans, and the Soviets, was a ‘hot’ war for millions in the developing world. Proxy wars raged in the Third World during the Cold War, killing 37 million people—about seven million soldiers and a further 30 million civilians, or nearly two-thirds as many as had died in World War II. See Coker, p. 619.
20 For a discussion on strategies the US used to meet the Soviet threat, see for example, John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy (Oxford and New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1982).
enemy, it is an enemy that has lacked direct control of state structures, a unified leadership, and a clear, single-minded goal. Additionally, while we may have thought that the Islamist terrorist enemy has been ideologically unified, religion is often a blunt political instrument and it may be more analytically useful to speak of Islamic fundamentalisms in the plural, rather than of a single ideology.

Further, new security issues came to the fore as surges in what appeared to be identity-based conflicts, a breakdown of traditional state authority, floods of refugees, growing environmental degradation and resource depletion, and potential proliferation of weapons of mass destruction posed highly diffuse challenges without an identifiable adversary that require multiple methods to contain them. Some of these challenges have appeared to be so complicated that they have often been considered ‘complex emergencies’ rather than straightforward conflicts. The term ‘complex emergency’ bespeaks the supposedly depoliticised and multifaceted nature of the challenge: it is both ‘complex’—hence a difficult issue without ready political solutions—and an ‘emergency’, thus fundamentally humanitarian in nature. As one scholar notes, ‘[t]he widespread use of the term in describing conflicts may be due to the way it diverts attention from any possible political connotations, blaming instead the ‘complexity’ of the causal picture, and excuses the absence of solutions’.

Fourth, the rules of the game—from the Cold War to the 1990s—appeared to have changed. The Cold War seemed to be an era in which the state was in control, and during which Realism was ascendant in international diplomacy. In the 1990s, the state appeared to have lost control to multiple other actors that were performing tasks that states have traditionally seen as their own purview—like defence—or to more idealistic or utopian ideologies that seek to supplant the state itself, such as Islamic fundamentalism, or political Islam. Indeed, throughout the 1990s the Cold

---

22 For a discussion on the multiple ideologies in Muslim societies, see Akeel Bilgrami, ‘The Clash within Civilization’, Daedalus (Vol. 132, No. 3, 2003).
23 For a discussion of redefining the idea of national security in the post-Cold War era, see Emma Rothchild, ‘What is Security?’, Daedalus (Vol. 124, No. 3, 1995), or Ronald Steel, ‘A New Realism’, World Policy Journal (Vol. 14, No. 2, 1997). Steel notes the emotional aspects of security, commenting, ‘[s]ecurity is, after all, not a condition, but a feeling and a process. It is also an abstraction. We may feel secure and not be so, or be secure and not feel so. We are all vulnerable in ways we cannot imagine and cannot fully protect ourselves against. That is our human condition.’
25 A wide number of books and articles have appeared discussing the privatisation of traditional defence structures and military capabilities. On the growing use of privatized armies and mercenaries,
Chapter 2

War's secularism was steadily replaced in many parts of the world with a rise in religious fundamentalism that seriously questions many of the tenets of the state as we have known it. In the economic realm, past state controls on the economy—such as relatively closed trading regimes, strict controls on currency convertibility and financial flows, and foreign direct investment rules—also gave way to increasingly unfettered globalisation and the dislocations and uncertainties that it can create.

Finally, to the great chagrin of Atlanticists, the multilateral approach of America's 'wise men'—that the US should broadly define its self-interest and work through alliances and multilateral institutions to bring it about—was replaced with greater emphasis on unilateralism and 'coalitions of the willing' which have shunned multilateral interference. While to a significant extent the multilateral institutional structures of the West, such as NATO, have been preserved, they have altered sometimes uncomfortably to adapt to these post-Cold War changes.

This move towards unilateralism has come with a rising asymmetry of power, or the inequalities in capabilities, between the US and other states in favour of an expansion of US power measured across various indicators such as economic growth or defence expenditure. Examining the top eight 'big spenders' on defence in the 1990s, the US not only ranked first, but outspent the next seven combined. This military asymmetry has continued and has become particularly marked after the September 11 terrorist attacks on the United States. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), worldwide military spending in 2004 was $975 billion, only six per cent less than the peak level of Cold War spending in 1987. With an expenditure of over $455 billion in 2004, the US accounted for 47 per cent of total global spending on defence and outspent the next top 14 states.


28 Ikenberry, After Victory, p. 233.

combined. Not only has American defence spending risen, the United States has also increasingly succumbed to the siren song of unilateralism, and the Bush administration has adopted a policy some have dubbed 'pre-emptive war', which seeks to eliminate potential power rivals.

This trend toward asymmetry leads some American observers to conclude optimistically that unipolarity will continue to provide a stable international system for the foreseeable future. Yet while American policymakers often regard growing asymmetry in the international system as a positive factor both for the United States and the world, others perceive the advance of American hegemony differently. As one British diplomat comments, 'One reads about the world's desire for American leadership only in the United States. Everywhere else one reads about American arrogance and unilateralism.' These combined factors led to a growing rift between the United States and the rest of the international community during the post-Cold War period which intensified after 2001, with public opinion in most states, particularly those with large Muslim populations, increasingly antipathetic to US goals and hostile to US global leadership. According to the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, the percentage of Europeans and Muslims expressing favourable perceptions of America plummeted after the war in Iraq. Thus the stability of American unipolarity is questionable—the global unipolar moment may

---


34 For a positive statement of how US power is a force for good in the international system, see for example, The Project for the New American Century, Rebuilding America's Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources for a New Century (September 2000). See http://newamericancentury.org/ RebuildingAmericasDefenses.pdf


be short-lived if the American 'locomotive of progress' steams ahead with dissent building up in the 'caboose'.

Overall, the post-Cold War world has been marked with unsettling changes and uncertainty not only in individual states but also in the structure of the international system itself. At the state level, weaker states face the perils of uneven democratisation, ethno-nationalist conflict, state fragmentation, and the dislocations of globalisation. At the structural level, all states face the uncertainties of a contested nascent international system in which bipolarity has ended but the longevity of its unipolar replacement is in doubt. Indeed, some US government scenario planners note that part of the future of uncertainty is what they call 'the architecture issue'; that is, the future structure of international relations is yet to be determined.

These perceptions can be summarised and contrasted as follows:

Table 2.1: Summary of Common Perceptions of the Post-Cold War Order

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political and ideological framework</td>
<td>Stable: bipolar confrontation between democracy/capitalism vs. communism</td>
<td>Unstable: no single overarching framework</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dividing lines</td>
<td>Clear: divided Europe, and proxy wars in Third World</td>
<td>Unclear: areas of cooperation and conflict not demarcated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived threats</td>
<td>Certainly: Soviet expansionism and nuclear war</td>
<td>Uncertain: identity-based conflicts, environmental degradation, migration surges, WMD, terrorism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rules</td>
<td>The state in control: realism, secularism, fixed trading regimes, US-led multilateralism</td>
<td>The state in retreat: idealism/utopianism, religious fundamentalism, globalisation, increasing unilaterialism</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These transformations of the post-Cold War age have signalled a shift in tone, atmosphere, or feeling among publics, policymakers, and academics from one of optimism about the possibility of progress and a sense of control over the future.

37 McGeorge Bundy once called America ‘the locomotive at the head of mankind, and the rest of the world the caboose’. Quoted in Waltz, ‘Globalization and American Power’, p. 46.

38 Comment during a discussion at Chatham House in 2005.
towards a deflated sense of the possibilities for the future and a sense of powerlessness over events, and hence greater receptivity toward Romantic messages, modes of thinking, and analyses.

If the Cold War’s mantra of progress through rationalism has rung hollow, then what has come in its place? We will argue that various strands of Romanticism have filled the vacuum since the 1990s, most broodingly declinist in outlook. While they share no particular ideology and may be propounded by conservatives and progressives alike, they do share similarities in sensibilité in the French sense—a sensitiveness, receptivity, or sympathy—to certain ideas and a penchant for similar themes. Perhaps most importantly, they often share a sense of philosophical pessimism and declinism. We will analyse these themes through the same five categories used to discuss nineteenth-century Romanticism—irrationality, pessimism, relativism, nostalgia, and focus on nature—and with the same caveats: first, that these ideas are impressionistic, and second, that they are interrelated and any categorisation is therefore somewhat arbitrary.

2.2 Armour of God—Anti-rationalism and emotionalism

‘Put on the whole armour of God, that ye may be able to stand against the wiles of the devil. For we wrestle not against flesh and blood, but against principalities, against powers, against the rulers of the darkness of this world, against spiritual wickedness in high places.’

—Ephesians, 6:11-12

If rationalism’s cold-eyed calculus dominated the Cold War era, then the Romantic logic of the heart—emotion, irrationality, and spirituality—arguably captured the mood of the 1990s. As with nineteenth-century Romanticism, multiple strands of anti-rational thought came to the forefront during the 1990s, some of which continue to have resonance. Perhaps the most important populist refutation of rationalism has been the role of religion in politics, particularly in the apocalyptic or fatalistic interpretations of various faiths. Among scholars, dissent from rationalism included a mounting rejection of logical positivism—including a turn against science and the application of scientific methods—in favour of relativistic standpoints emphasising cultural or particularistic interpretations of agents and events.

---

From a populist standpoint, during the 1990s more of the world’s faithful put on the armour of God. The growing role of religion, especially emotionally-driven ‘fundamentalist’ and apocalyptic interpretations of religion, in politics was one Romantic sign of the times that continues. In fact, one important trend for this century may be the rise in new religious movements around the world, particularly new Christian movements, which bode to become a significant social and political force this century.\(^{40}\) However, the most obvious case in point has been the growth of political Islam, in politics around the world, not only as a factor in the domestic politics of predominantly Muslim countries, but also in international relations. While political Islam emerged as an important political actor before the end of the Cold War, the growth of the al-Qaeda network and the increasing number of assaults on Western targets, particularly the September 11 attacks on the United States, concentrated popular and scholarly attention on Islamism. Indeed, a vast literature dissecting the origins, goals, and methods of political Islam, and its emphasis on martyrdom and \textit{jihad} as emblems of faith, exists that need not be repeated here.\(^{41}\) While aspects of fundamentalist Islam could be said to have an apocalyptic vision at their core that motivates political action,\(^{42}\) what is perhaps less discussed is the political role of other fundamentalisms—in Hinduism, Judaism, or Christianity—particularly in international relations.

As Karen Armstrong argues, all fundamentalisms share certain similarities; fundamentalists of all stripes are often those who have been disappointed in life and are looking for a spiritual refuge and hope for the future in a world that seems confusing and uncertain. In essence, fundamentalists are seeking a ‘new redemptive order’ where only their virtue can reverse what they see as social decline in order to usher in a new Golden Age.\(^{43}\) Despite their utopian sensibilities, fundamentalist ideologies can have a violent or apocalyptic undercurrent, seething with rage about

---


\(^{41}\) See, for example, Reuven Firestone, \textit{Jihad: The Origin of Holy War in Islam} (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).


circumstances in which followers feel trapped. Such violent or millennialist thinking 'has historically appealed especially to those who see their era as a time of crisis'. Specifically, '[m]illennialism is indicative of a desire for social and political reformation' that is 'inherently political because it arises from the perception of political evil—the abuse of power—which it seeks to remedy'. Such thinking rests on a pessimistic sense that the world is in decline, a nostalgic sense of past society's moral probity, and a spiritual sense that both God's chastisement and His redemption are imminent.

The 1990s saw a resurgence in anti-rationalist thought in the US which continues today post 9/11. The US has been experiencing what Robert Fogel calls the 'Fourth Great Awakening': a revival of conservative Christianity and a reassertion of political activism around several core cultural issues, such as abortion. The United States has periodically gone through various cycles of religious revivalism, including those during the Romantic age. These revivals often were outbursts of activism against what believers saw as the corruption of modern society and its slide into an irreversible decline; they focused not only on personal redemption and self-purification, but also on creating a state of grace and social perfection on earth.

Considering the predominant international role of the United States, the rise of political Christianity in international affairs is noteworthy. While evangelicals were politically active and effective in the US domestic sphere during Reagan era, their attention to international affairs grew during the 1990s. As one critic observes,

---

47 Ibid.
49 Fogel contends that the Great Awakenings went through various lifecycle phases, including religious revival, political ascendency, and political challengers (decline) so they span significant time periods, with various Awakenings overlapping. First Great Awakening's revival period was from 1730-1760, political ascendency was from 1760-1790, with decline coming from 1790-1810. The Second Great Awakening saw revival from 1800-1840, an activist phase from 1840-1870, and decline from 1870-1920, etc. In a sense, Fogel argues that the US is in some ways in a permanent state of religious revival, activism, or decline. See Fogel, pp. 17-43.
50 President Bush's (43) election victories have been ascribed to the effective mobilization of evangelical voters. On evangelicals and the Reagan administration, see for example, Matthew Dallek, The Right Moment: Ronald Reagan's First Victory and the Decisive Turning Point in American Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). On the religious right and the role of values-based politics, known colloquially as 'God, guns, and gays' in various US states, see for example, John
Chapter 2

‘America’s evangelicals have become the newest internationalists’ which ‘reflect[s] a broad new trend that is beginning to reshape American foreign policy’. Part of their influence lies in their numbers. In 1976, only 34 per cent of Americans described themselves as evangelical Christians; by the end of the 1990s the figure rose to 45 per cent, according to the Institute for the Study of American Evangelicals at Wheaton College, Illinois. 

Most of these believers are pre-millennial dispensationalists; as one scholar notes, ‘[a]cceptance of pre[-]millennial thought is now a majority position in the thought of Southern Baptist ministers’. Pre-millennialists are biblical literalists who take a keen interest in international events as signs of biblical prophecy about the coming end of the world. The apocalyptic arguments of these believers are not new: there is a history of prophetic discourses throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, beginning with the Millerite sect during the Romantic age in the US. The influence of these beliefs in the US has waxed and waned. As Wheaton College’s Institute for the Study of American Evangelicals notes, ‘The doctrine [of dispensationalism] has experienced fluctuations in its popularity over the years, often coinciding with times of national and international crisis,’ with numbers rising in turbulent periods in the United States.

Many of these politically-minded evangelicals have shared a Romantic vision which sees the world as a battle for transcendence, a moral and religious crusade against the infidels abroad and the heretics at home. Much of their fatalism has come from observing the American scene, with social problems pessimistically interpreted in Victorian terms as character failings. Thus, dispensationalists tend to see a country prophetically caught in deep moral decline. To support this pessimistic view of America, evangelicals offer a variety of ‘scary numbers’ that convey a sense of moral panic about the state of American society, including out-of-control divorce rates,

53 William A. Pitts, ‘Southern Baptists and Millennialism, 1900-2000: Conceptual Patterns and Historical Expressions’, Baptist History and Heritage (Spring 1999). The Southern Baptist Convention is the single largest and most influential Protestant sect in the US.
rising abortions, and the growing societal acceptance of homosexuality.\textsuperscript{56} However, evangelicals also expand this pessimistic vision to include world events as fulfilment of an apocalyptic prophecy found in the book of Revelation. Such signs include: increasing tensions in the Middle East; the removal of Saddam Hussein as a way to rebuild Babylon; developing power struggles in the EU, that will eventually spawn the Antichrist; the growing apostasy of the Christian church; and faltering democracy in Russia.\textsuperscript{57} For evangelicals, a worsening international situation and devastating war, particularly in the Middle East, is not only inevitable, it is indispensable to bring about biblical prophecy.\textsuperscript{58}

However, even among non-evangelicals, the rubric of spiritual, moral, and social malaise in America was particularly acute in the 1990s and continues this decade. As one scholar notes, '[p]restigious academics, popular magazines, and plenty of politicians all converged on moral decay' as an important theme in the 1990s, especially after the 1994 elections installed new conservative majorities to the US Congress and most US state legislatures. This return to Victorian moral messages 'rewrote American public policy in one area after another'.\textsuperscript{59} These messages, often with a doomsday undercurrent, have continued to be promoted in the 2000s.

Part of the American post-Cold War \textit{Zeitgeist} has been defined by the popularity of various media expounding these apocalyptic visions, with an explosion of books published in this genre in the US.\textsuperscript{60} Particularly influential has been the dispensationalist \textit{Left Behind} series which has included 12 books, each of which has been a bestseller. The series collectively sold over 60 million copies and boasts to be

\textsuperscript{56} For example, Focus on the Family, a prominent Christian organisation, produces and disseminates a significant amount of information on these themes. See http://www.focusonthefamily.org. However, some of the data underpinning these 'signs' are open to competing interpretations. For a discussion on 'scary numbers' and how they are used in social debates, see Joel Best, \textit{More Damned Lies and Statistics: How Numbers Confuse Public Issues} (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2004), pp. 63-90.

\textsuperscript{57} These are some of the signs as outlined by the works of Tim LaHaye. His newsletter, 'Pre-Trib Perspectives' offers a monthly commentary on prophetic signs of the 'end times'.

\textsuperscript{58} One influential voice in propounding this view since the 1980s has been Hal Lindsey. For a discussion of his rhetoric, and its application to US politics and international affairs, see O'Leary, \textit{Arguing the Apocalypse}.


\textsuperscript{60} For a detailed discussion of the wide variety of pre-millennialist fiction that has appeared in the US in the 1990s, see Thomas Doyle, 'Competing Fictions: The Uses of Christian Apocalyptic Imagery in Popular Fiction Works', \textit{Journal of Millennial Studies} (Vol. 1, No. 1, 2001). There has also been growth in anti-apocalyptic religious fiction as well, see Thomas Doyle, 'Anti-Apocalyptic Fictions', \textit{Journal of Millennial Studies} (Vol. 1, No. 1, 2001).
Chapter 2

the ‘fastest selling adult fiction ever.’ The books form part of a media empire extolling the fatalistic ‘end times’ message. This message is also promoted through movies, videos, CDs, audio books, discussion guides, a children’s series, graphic novels (comic books), calendars, cards, a prophecy club with regular e-mails, text messages, and a weekly newsletter—‘Interpreting the Signs’—which outlines how current global political events follow biblical prophecies.

Regardless of their specific beliefs in dispensationalism and the coming apocalypse, American Christian leaders such as Gary Bauer also have underscored that evangelical Christians perceive the international scene pessimistically and fatalistically as a ‘clash of civilisations’. In this vision the Islamic world is directly opposed to God and will be defeated by the armies allied with God, namely Christian and American armies. This alignment between an evangelical Christian God and country at the highest reaches of the American military establishment is not new; evangelicals have comprised a significant proportion of military personnel for decades. However, recently personnel, such as recruits at elite military institutions, have come under intensified pressure to convert to evangelical Christianity.

Beyond the evangelicals’ millennialist message, a variety of religiously-themed, anti-rationalist, and emotionalist works overall had great popular appeal in the 1990s. Indeed, the US-based Media Research Center found that religious depictions on American television increased by fivefold from 1993 to 1997. This trend seems to continue into this century. In terms of religiously-themed books, for example, the widely-decried The Da Vinci Code—which Christians denounce as blasphemous for questioning the divinity of Christ—spent 54 weeks on the US bestseller’s list. The mainstream secularist Penguin Putnam publishing house

---

61 See http://www.leftbehind.com for the series’ promotional material.
63 On the growth of evangelicals in the US military, see, for example, Anne C. Loveland, American Evangelicals and the U.S. Military 1942-1993 (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1997).
created its own religious fiction series based on the popular *Left Behind* model.\(^67\) Finally, *The Passion of the Christ* became the eighth bestselling movie in history; it made over $355 million in the United States in a few weeks and broke records worldwide.\(^68\)

While the growth of anti-rationalism was obvious in popular culture in the 1990s, among scholars the post-Cold War rebellion against rationalism was more subtle, but nevertheless marked. The scholarly rejection of rationalism included a greater examination of irrational and relativistic or subjective factors, such as identity—religion, culture, or ethnicity—as the locus for group loyalty and as prime motivating factors for human action. The anti-rational strain of argumentation that gained ground in the 1990s has an intellectual pedigree that pre-dates the fall of the Berlin Wall. However, the turn against rationalism in international relations gathered momentum in a variety of forms: feminism, environmentalism, and Postmodernism or poststructuralism (among others), all which offered an anti-rational (some also an anti-foundational) intellectual critique of international relations.\(^69\)

Of these, Postmodernism offers perhaps the most trenchant anti-rational, anti-foundational critique which rejects science and logical positivism, and instead pronounces the centrality of language and power in the modern world. As such, Postmodernism’s spiritual father may be Friedrich Nietzsche, whose late Romantic works proclaim the death of God. Postmodernism may be godless, but it is arguably founded on a greater sense of the irrational than is present even in religious faiths, which all claim that there is an underlying reality, truth, and logic in their worldviews. Postmodernists deny that there is an objective reality that is measurable and understandable through a scientific or logical method by scholars who merely interpret and analyse data, or any ‘empirical methodology, Cartesian subjectivity or

\(^{68}\) Associated Press, ‘Passion Back at Top of US Box Office’ (13 April 2004).
perfection of language'.

For Postmodernists, the subject of the knower cannot be disconnected from the object of his knowledge; apart from individual experience the world is unknowable. Since scholars approach their subjects within particular standpoints, they engage in an interpretive interaction with the data and the text to reproduce, simulate, mediate, or generate social power structures. Thus knowledge is relative, the construct of specific human experience which exists in a particular context.

Knowledge is also plural rather than unitary, and contingent rather than absolute, the product of subjectivity. Therefore, Postmodernists are sceptical about the claims of scholars to ‘truth’ since we cannot ‘verify an existence or truth independent of its representation’. They reject philosophical realism’s emphasis on parsimony, conceptual rigor, and clarity, sometimes dismissing them as ‘a particularistic sign system posing as a universal discourse’. Postmodernism also scorns meta-narratives—worldviews which reflect a variety of inter-connected assumptions—and the possibility of logical coherence within such narratives. Finally, since knowledge of human experience is conveyed through the form of imperfect language, deconstructing language and exposing its relationship to power is paramount.

Many Postmodernist international relations works ‘celebrate’ subjectivity or performativity—the simulation, impersonation, or articulation of ‘realness’ or authenticity which is actually artificially constructed, or a performance of what ‘is’—concepts which can be applied to individuals, groups, and states. Such frameworks are based on an anti-rational, or perhaps post-rational, conception of the self and sometimes borrow ideas from gender theory or from broadly psychoanalytic approaches in philosophy and the social sciences. For example, academics such as Cynthia Weber have examined how the concept of sovereignty is performative and gendered, an artificial simulation of various acts that scholars and policymakers

---


72 This discussion and quotes from Der Derian, ‘Post-Theory’, pp. 58 and 59.
recognise as ‘sovereignty’, while others have explored the construction of humans rights discourses and subjectivity from Kristeva’s psychoanalytic perspective. Still others have examined aesthetic approaches to politics and international relations, including the importance of art, images, and narratives to constructions and representations of ‘the political’.

After the end of the Cold War, increased academic attention to sentiment also extended to considerations of past historical events where sites of ‘memory’ and ‘remembering’, rather than documents or other forms of evidence, become the focus of knowledge. The result is that Freudian or psychoanalytic understandings inform historical debate, with the relativistic view that one set of memories or one way of remembering is as valid as another. Without an objective or universalist concept of reality, sifting out the ‘truth’ about past events—the historian’s traditional role—is not possible; instead it is a process where history is what is remembered, felt, or believed, a contemplation of scattered and perhaps irreconcilable individual reflections. In this sense, Postmodernist ‘truth’ is spiritual, a revealed corpus of sacred knowledge that cannot be externally validated apart from the individual. Before the Enlightenment and during the period of nineteenth-century Romanticism, this sacred knowledge often came in the form of biblical revelation. For today’s Romantics, it resides in the holy temple of the ‘group’ or ‘self’, whose individual or particularistic ‘truths’ cannot be externally challenged as they reside within the identity of the individual or group.

---

76 For a critique of Postmodernism’s effect on the field of history, see Richard J. Evans, *In Defence of History* (London: Granta, 1997).
2.3 Valediction in the Air?—Pessimism and ennui

'We have no more beginnings [...] [T]he contracts with time which so largely determine our consciousness point to late afternoon [...] We are, or feel ourselves to be, latecomers. The dishes are being cleared [...] Valediction is in the air.'

—George Steiner

With a dejected sense of loss, the 1990s felt 'lateborn', valedictory. Just as pessimism and declinism were defining features of nineteenth-century Romanticism, they have characterised Postmodern Romanticism. While a tragic sense of history is at least as old as Thucydides, melancholic laments about the 'death of progress' have echoed in the popular culture and the scholarly community. Two widespread strands of pessimism in the mass culture have been the growth of fatalistic conspiracy theories as an explanation for international political events and the apocalyptic focus on impending global biological and ecological disasters popularised through the media.

In academe, various aspects of pessimism about the future of international relations have permeated the ivory tower: 'coming anarchy' theory, 'clash of civilisations' theory, and neo-medievalism.

Conspiracy theories have been part of American and European political culture since at least the eighteenth century. Fears of the Illuminati swept the United States after the time of the French Revolution, Masonic and Catholic plots were feared in the aftermath of the US Civil War, Jewish bankers were reviled by the Populist movement at the turn of the century, and anti-communist paranoia was rife in the 1950s and 1960s. These waves of paranoia in the West are hardly culturally unique; the predominant belief in conspiracy theories among societies in the Middle East is also well documented. Considering this historical legacy of paranoia during various periods of uncertainty, it is useful to ask how a 'culture of conspiracy' could be seen as part of a new form of Romanticism. While belief in conspiracy theories could be said to be a marginal phenomenon, especially among serious scholars, it

nevertheless increased as a mass explanatory model for politics generally and for international events more specifically, particularly after 9/11. In the wake of the attacks, international polls found that globally a large number of people believe in conspiracy theories to explain world events.\(^1\) The proof of conspiracy's mass popularity shows in its balance sheet. Consumer thirst for this paranoid mode of thinking makes the 'industry' worth billions—conspiracy books, films, tabloid programmes, television shows, computer games, and the internet tout to an eager international audience.\(^2\)

Conspiracy theorists have much in common with anti-rationalists, as the theories are based on an emotional faith imbued with pessimism: '[a] conspiracy theory [...] offers solace, an explanation that confirms an existing worldview. As thought, it’s pre-rational, arising not from fact but from belief. It’s about faith.'\(^3\) Conspiracy fears rest on a search for certainty and determinism; those who feel powerless can find themselves in control, replacing the general ambiguity that most people face with a complete sense of clarity and purpose.\(^4\) Psychologist Patrick Leman has documented the trend in the United States, noting 'people [in America] are becoming more likely to believe in conspiracy theories'; he surmises that this trend is also mirrored in Europe. Leman attributes the phenomenon to anomie, 'the fact that people are experiencing increasing dissociation from society [... and] feeling increasingly powerless and divorced from the institutions that have power.'\(^5\) Powerlessness begets paranoia and fatalism. Robert Alan Goldberg echoes this sentiment, associating the increase in conspiracy theories with the growing fatalistic sense among fundamentalist Christians that the 'end times' are upon us.\(^6\)

The apocalyptic visions of catastrophes and plagues leading to worldwide chaos are two popular post-Cold War themes which continue to attract an eager mass audience. According to scholars Peter Gray and Kendrick Oliver, 'The modern era is often cast as an age of catastrophe, of global conflicts, genocides and “ethnic cleansings”, disasters of industrial and agrarian change and of technological hubris,

---

\(^1\) Hari, 'Who Really Downed the Twin Towers?'
\(^2\) Sam Vaknin, 'The Economics of Conspiracy Theories', United Press International (10 April 2002).
\(^3\) Rich Cohen, 'Welcome to the Conspiracy', Vanity Fair (May 2004), p. 80.
\(^4\) Surowiecki.
\(^5\) 'It's all a conspiracy, isn't it?', Western Mail (14 March 2003).
and—increasingly—environmental cataclysms.\textsuperscript{87} Public fascination with diseases, plagues, and epidemics is not new but the number of articles, books, films, and news reports discussing these subjects reached new heights in the post-Cold War era. The accumulated effect is one of resigned pessimism or fatalism, as these disasters are acts of God—unpredictable and unstoppable by something as puny and insignificant as human action.

The fascination with the ability of disease to corrupt the body matches a millennial mood: doomsday scenarios often begin with plague and pestilence, both a form of ‘apocalyptic purification […] that is a] technique of separating the damned from the saved’ which become ‘a metaphor for genocide’.\textsuperscript{88} The theme of disease as a transformer of human life and civilisation is not new; historian William McNeill famously outlined the role of disease exchanges in shaping history—the impact of smallpox on the Amerindian population during the Spanish conquest, or the role of the Mongol invasions in spreading the Black Death in Europe.\textsuperscript{89} However, in the post-Cold War era, Pestilence—as one of the biblical Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse—has particular prophetic resonance for the chiliastically inclined. And pestilence there has been: AIDS, SARS, ebola, anthrax, smallpox, MRSA, the growth of dengue fever and malaria in the Third World, and the latest plague—avian flu.

Considering disturbing trends in animal plagues, such as foot-and-mouth disease, the alarm grows further. All of these have received widespread media coverage in the post-Cold War period. The amount of literature targeted to a mass audience on the developing AIDS pandemic alone is vast. This is not to say that a serious concern about AIDS, and other possible biological threats, is unwarranted. However, such popularised forms of scientific knowledge about developing biological threats often lack subtlety, so the underlying message sent to the public is a gloomy one: science (and human rationality) may be no match for vengeful, irrational nature.

Attention to planetary calamities was also at new highs in the 1990s and the trend continues. Cataclysmic natural disasters, man-made environmental catastrophes like global warming, planetary-level extinctions by asteroid hits with end-of-the-world visions, or politically-created nuclear disasters have been in vogue. In particular, many Christian biblical literalists see these events—such as the 2004

\textsuperscript{87} Peter Gray and Kendrick Oliver, ‘The Memory of Catastrophe’, \textit{History Today} (February 2001).


tsunami in the Indian Ocean—as prophetic. For secularists, books such as David Keys’ *Catastrophe: An Investigation into the Origins of Modern Civilization* (1999)—which chronicles the role of plagues, climate changes, and volcanic eruptions on civilisation—dissect the frightening impact that natural disasters have had on societies. Others in a similar vein include: Brian Fagan’s *Floods, Famines and Emperors: El Nino and the Fate of Civilizations* (1999); Mike Davis’, *Late Victorian Holocausits: El Nino, Famine, and the Making of the Third World* (2001); or Richard B. Alley’s *The Two-Mile Time Machine: Ice Cores, Abrupt Climate Change, and Our Future* (2000), to name a few. While these works may be based on scientific evidence, the barrage of bad news fits in with a sense of pessimism and decline. The gloomy implication is that the past may be prologue, and sooner than we think.

Additionally, after years of languishing as B-movie also-rans, major-release disaster films made a comeback in the 1990s. According to ‘Disaster Online’, an internet almanac of disaster films, the number of disaster films produced in the US peaked in the 1990s with almost as many films screened in the 1990s as in the two previous decades combined. Unlike 1970s disaster films, which focused on single, containable calamities, such as a skyscraper on fire (*The Towering Inferno*) or a tidal wave striking a luxury liner (*The Poseidon Adventure*), 1990s disaster films often follow themes of planetary-level catastrophe, like asteroid strikes and other ‘extinction-level’ events, such as the devastating effects of rapid and sudden global warming. The apex of the disaster phenomenon was in 1998, when 21 disaster movies were released. Hollywood produced more disaster films in that year than during the 1960s. Post-9/11, 53 such films have been released. Trends in such films may follow popular feelings of pessimism and insecurity.

In academia, post-Cold War pessimism in international relations is a many-headed hydra. To explain the range of conflicts brewing worldwide—pictures of which were beamed live daily into Western homes via satellite thanks to the global communications revolution—many scholars reached into their Realist analytical toolboxes and came out empty. Ideologically-laden Cold War rationalist paradigms no longer seemed adequate to explain the course of international events in a brave

---

90 There were 83 American disaster films produced in the 1990s, while 88 were produced from 1970-1989. Available at http://www.disasteronline.com/Articles/swarm.html.
91 Eighteen films were released from 1960-1969.
new world filled with such seething, perplexing identity conflicts. Instead, pessimistic theories about an anarchical future filled the void where Realism seemed to fail. Dubbed ‘chaos theory’ by Yahya Sadowski, these theories gained ground on the basis of a depressing reality—the outbreak of brutal new conflicts in Africa and in the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia.\(^{93}\) The war in Bosnia had a particularly important role in undermining Western, and especially American, confidence about the post-Cold War future. While conflicts in the former Soviet Union, Rwanda, and Somalia dimmed the US public mood, ‘the war in Bosnia in particular worked to reshape the national mood in America (and elsewhere) into one of pessimism’.\(^{94}\) These theories are particularly important since they have been widely disseminated by American scholars and pundits since the end of the Cold War.\(^{95}\) In particular the metaphors and historical analogies that these theories have created have been especially influential in framing policymakers’ visions and responses to Cold War challenges.\(^{96}\)

Chaos theories share a declinist thesis about cultural and political decay, coupled with a pessimistic outlook for the future. They are a related set of pessimistic, Romantic theories (although Sadowski does not describe them as such) which see widespread anomie and globalisation as main factors in spreading future anarchy, fragmentation, and conflict across the globe.\(^{97}\) Sadowski underscores that chaos theorists trounce Fukuyama’s optimistic ‘end of history’ argument with three confounding points: 1) democratisation can be a trap, leading to libertinism (rather than merely liberalism) and conflict as new groups make demands on a weak state; 2) cultural anomie can set in as Americanisation, global homogenisation, or other forms of ‘McWorld’ vulgarise indigenous cultures and set up a wave of resistance, and; 3) globalisation and the economics of political chaos, such as mass migration and urbanisation, promote greater resource competition and ‘instrumental solidarities’ between ethnic groups that lead to violence.\(^{98}\)

---

\(^{94}\) Ibid.
\(^{95}\) Sadowski, p. 5.
\(^{97}\) Sadowski.
\(^{98}\) Ibid., pp. 31-44.
Chapter 2

The first of these theories is ‘the coming anarchy’, named after the title of a book by Robert Kaplan which secured his position as a postmodern Jeremiah. Kaplan’s work places emphasis on the fragmentation side of the globalisation-fragmentation debate; he is most concerned with the ‘externalities’ of globalisation, namely the strife and conflict that accompany economic dislocation. As a travel writer-cum-political theorist, or as one wag put it ‘part Arnold Toynbee and part Robert Pelton’, Kaplan has traversed the world’s post-Cold War conflict hotspots—Sierra Leone, Liberia, Bosnia, and Central Asia—not looking to create mere reportage, but to elaborate upon his core thesis: that the problems of weak states in the developing world are a mere precursor to the larger global anarchy to come.100

Kaplan’s work is generally fatalistic in tone, and can be described as ‘tragic realism’; that is, politics is essentially about tragedy.101 For Kaplan, conflict is inevitable, a part and parcel of the centrifugal forces pulling states and regions apart under the onslaught of globalisation. Kaplan crafts his thesis largely through visual impressions of a particular place and conversations with locals in true travelogue style, leaving no stone unturned in his pursuit to capture the Third World’s misery, all of it coming soon to a state near you. However, his fixation with visual aesthetics slides into a Romantic, quasi-Victorian philosophical elision between aesthetics and ethics, where wealthy, physically attractive Westerners in tidy homes become paragons of modern political virtue, while the world’s scraggly poor share a barbaric spirit. As one critic chides, ‘Put bluntly, Kaplan doesn’t like poor people’.102 In coming to his pessimistic conclusions Kaplan quotes extensively from a rich, historic panoply of conservative thinkers —Malthus, Huntington, van Creveld, Hobbes, and Kissinger, just to name a few—whose views on the perfectibility of human nature, the existence of justice, or merely the possibility of progress ranges from the simply glum to the downright desperate.103

99 Pelton is the adventure journalist who writes for Fielding Guides’ World’s Most Dangerous Places. Parag Khanna, ‘Tragic realism: Robert D. Kaplan’s book may be out of print in Britain, but he is emerging as one of the most influential commentators on the new world order’, New Statesman (25 February 2002).
101 Khanna.
103 Kaplan, Coming Anarchy, see pp. 9 (Malthus), 26-30 (Huntington), van Creveld (44-50), Gibbon (111-117), and Kissinger (127-155).
For its supposed stabilising effects, Kaplan also waxes nostalgic over the benefits of empire as it keeps down the noisome nationalism of small ethnicities, quoting Rebecca West's famous remark: 'I hate the corpses of empires, they stink like nothing else.' More recently, Kaplan has written approvingly of empire in his attempt at creating a grand strategic vision for his philosophical pessimism in *Warrior Politics*. In this guidebook for would-be American praetorians, Kaplan emphasises the nostrum that those who forget history are bound to repeat its tragic mistakes, or at least remain in a perpetual state of delusion about the possibilities (generally grim) for the future. With another trip through philosophical pessimists down the ages—again Hobbes, Machiavelli, Malthus—Kaplan provides readers with a grand tour of laments and cautions about the dangers that lie in wait in international relations.

'Clash of civilisations' is another pessimistic international relations theory that sees so-called irrational and relativistic factors, such as cultural differences, as the primary motivator for future conflicts—the principal fault lines of fragmentation—which will come about through globalisation (or perhaps more accurately, through democratisation and Americanisation). Importantly, the theory argues that modernisation and economic development, including economic globalisation, along Western lines has not led to the acceptance of Western universal values; rather, these processes have created various patterns of rejection and revisionism that threaten both the stability of non-Western states and set the stage for future clashes between civilisations.

Originally developed by American scholar Samuel Huntington, clash of civilisations theory has sparked considerable controversy among scholars of international relations across the globe. Huntington's work has had a significant impact outside the United States and English-speaking world, particularly with Japanese, Malaysian, Chinese, Russian, and Arab scholars, especially those who see Western influences as normatively bad and who desire to promote their own

---

104 Sadowski, p. 8.
107 Huntington's work has been translated into many languages and has generated responses across the globe. For a review of Chinese scholars' responses to Huntington, see, Christopher Hughes, 'Globalisation and Nationalism: Squaring the Circle in Chinese International Relations Theory', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* (Vol. 26, No. 2, 1997), pp. 103-124.
particularistic ethnic or national values. Overall, the thrust of Huntington’s work is very pessimistic. His idea of the rise and decline of civilisation is mainly seen through the eyes of philosophical pessimists such as Arnold Toynbee, Oswald Spengler, and Fernand Braudel.

Another strand of chaos theory is neo-medievalism. Struggling to understand the brave new world of post-Cold War phenomena without clear theoretical frameworks to fall back on, some experts mined history for explanations. Were the growing fragmentation, ethno-religious conflict, and warlordism in the world signals that we were on the cusp of a new Middle Ages? Did we need to look back in order to see the future? Some scholars wove these modern threads into an old historical analogy and thus was born a popular strain of post-Cold War analysis—neo-medievalism. Neo-medievalism stresses that the post-Cold War era represents a break with the immediate Cold War past on several different levels, such as locus of political control, security, loyalty, and state authority. Neo-medievalists focus on the effects that globalisation and fragmentation have on states, with special emphasis on the fragmentation process, arguing that ‘the process most characteristic of our age is political splintering, decentralization, even disintegration’. Neo-medievalists see globalisation as the motor for change, and developing technologies, particularly in communications, as a key method for fragmentation or “decentering” or dispersal of authority to multiple and overlapping sites.

Neo-medievalists analogue the new situation to the Middle Ages, and emphasise the revival of religion, loose identities, and fluid boundaries as the future for the post-Cold War world. While some authors clearly state that they are not making a direct comparison between the Middle Ages and our own era, and that the term is being used essentially as a trope, the method of comparison between the

---

108 Sadowski, p. 72.
109 Huntington, pp. 40-45.
110 John Mearsheimer was the first to use the phrase ‘Back to the Future’—in parody of a popular 1980s movie—in his article of the same title, which argued that the future was much more bleak than the liberals suspected, and that the West would look back nostalgically at the bipolarity of the Cold War as a stable period. See John Mearsheimer, ‘Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War’, International Security (Vol. 15, No. 1, 1990).
111 For example, see Alain Minc, Le nouveau Moyen Âge (Paris: Éditions Gallimard, 1993).
112 Martin Van Creveld, ‘The New Middle Ages’, Foreign Policy (Summer 2000).
Middle Ages is often seriously flawed. However, the unconscious imagery that the comparison between our era and the Middle Ages creates is nonetheless unmistakeable—a return to the horrors of a medieval past we thought we had left behind hundreds of years ago, only to be thrown into the abyss once again. The sense of tragedy and pessimism underlying this stream of thinking is palpable.

2.4 Cement of Blood—Relativism, nationalism, and identity

'Arcadias, utopias, our dear old bag of a / democracy are alike founded: For without a cement of blood (it must be human, it must be innocent) / no secular wall will safely stand.'

—W.H. Auden

With universalist rationality having proved a cold and disappointing mistress, unable to predict the slide into conflict that succeeded the end of the Cold War, the Romantic ‘cement of blood’—nation, religion, culture, identity—increasingly became the relativistic lens through which the Western public and academics analysed international events in the 1990s. Where once rational economics reigned supreme, irrational culture and ethnicity (or nationalism) were considered once more key variables motivating domestic and international political events. One key spark igniting the endless debates on identity and nationalism was the war in former Yugoslavia. As Anatol Lieven remarks, ‘Activated by the [Yugoslav] war, this debate on nationalism has spread far and fast beyond academic circles to become a central theme of the wider debate on the nature of our age and its future.’

Anti-immigration and national unity parties—such as France’s National Front, Pim Fortuyan’s party in the Netherlands, or the British National Party—made inroads in the West. Domestic newspapers and magazines in the West resounded with articles ardently arguing issues of identity with titles such as the Observer’s ‘The English identity crisis; who do you think we are?’ This decade, books such as Roger Scruton’s England: An Elegy (2001) or Samuel Huntington’s Who Are We? The Challenges to America’s National Identity (2004) covered this type of ground, albeit

117 Amelia Hill, ‘The English identity crisis; who do you think we are?’, Observer (13 June 2004). Available at http://observer.guardian.co.uk/focus/story/0,,1237597,00.html

81
very differently. Indeed, ‘who are we?’ has encapsulated the plaintive refrain of an uncertain age. We will briefly consider two trends giving greater prominence to relativism, nationalism, and identity in the post-Cold War era, one popular and the other scholarly: populist nativism coupled with isolationism, and academic attention to considerations of culture and ethnicity, including nationalism.

A sense of isolationist nativism that puts a particular nation or polity first grew at the end of the Cold War, partly as a response to globalisation. In many countries, the concept of a core identity, core values, and the essential ‘nature’ of a particular society have been hotly contested. Immigration debates, particularly in Western countries, centre on this issue, especially due to the upturn in migration after the end of the Cold War. For example, the percentage of the foreign born population in the United States doubled in 20 years, from just over 6 per cent of the population in 1980 to about 14 per cent in 2000.118 In the US, this form of ‘backward-looking [R]omanticism’119 has had a champion in Patrick Buchanan, one of the most stalwart advocates of promoting a fixed American national and cultural identity rooted in Judeo-Christian values.120 Buchanan’s alarmist visions of Third World immigration—as a form of demographic ‘swamping’ of the West—have found eager publics among those in the working class who are afraid of immigrants stealing their jobs and cultural pessimists who see a steady decline in the expression of specifically American values.

In addition to his views on cultural separatism—Buchanan’s theory seems to be that cultures should be separate but equal, shunning a vision of go-go American universalism—Buchanan proselytises against globalisation and the hollowing out of the American economy, which he believes undermines US sovereignty and imperils the standard of living of average working people.121 Interestingly, Buchanan’s list of global ‘baddies’ fits in with the usual suspects pummelled by evangelical Christians and conspiracy theorists: the United Nations, global bankers, global media, and

have become a core part of the social sciences across subject areas. For example, in Britain more new university courses on these subjects are being offered in departments, more new degrees—particularly at the postgraduate level—are being developed to incorporate these subjects into other fields of study, more textbooks are being written, and more new academic posts have been created in these subjects. At the British undergraduate level, cultural studies are being incorporated into the ‘design, delivery, and contents of courses’ across the humanities and social sciences.124

Additionally, the 1990s saw at least a doubling, and in some subjects a larger increase, in the number of articles published on culture, ethnicity, identity, or nationalism as compared to the previous decade. These topics continue to be prominent post-2000. The chart below, based on results from the Social Sciences

\[\text{References}\]


international financial institutions like the World Bank and IMF. Unfortunately, the list does contain a certain whiff of anti-Semitism as the terms ‘global media’ or ‘global bankers’ are sometimes shorthand for ‘Jews’. Yet Buchanan is hardly alone in this view which has proven international purchase. ‘Enlightened nationalism’, as Buchanan terms it, coupled with certain isolationist tendencies has global takers. If the vision were a stock, it would be a ‘buy’. From Malaysia’s Mahathir Mohamad and his promotion of a unique vision of ‘Asian values’ to moral panics about immigrants in such small and homogeneous societies as Slovenia, the cocooning safety of cultural particularism has its own peculiar seductions.122

Relativism’s seduction of intellectuals is hardly news. Indeed, Karl Popper once commented that relativism is an ‘understandable [result] of disappointment with dogmatism and authoritarianism’.123 Throughout the Cold War, scholars examined a variety of topics through a relativistic lens, mainly in the fields of anthropology, area studies, women’s studies, or cultural studies, where issues such as race, gender, and ethnicity have been debated. However, since the end of the old War, cultural studies have become a core part of the social sciences across subject areas. For example, in Britain more new university courses on these subjects are being offered in departments, more new degrees—particularly at the postgraduate level—are being developed to incorporate these subjects into other fields of study, more textbooks are being written, and more new academic posts have been created in these subjects. At the British undergraduate level, cultural studies are being incorporated into the ‘design, delivery, and contents of courses’ across the humanities and social sciences.124

Additionally, the 1990s saw at least a doubling, and in some subjects a larger increase, in the number of articles published on culture, ethnicity, identity, or nationalism as compared to the previous decade. These topics continue to be prominent post-2000. The chart below, based on results from the Social Sciences

---

Chapter 2

Citation Index database, show the rise of these issues in journal articles across the social sciences from 1989-2005 compared to 1980-1988.125

Table 2.2 Growth of Cultural Topics in the Social Sciences, 1980-2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Keywords searched</th>
<th>Articles found 1980-1988</th>
<th>Articles found 1989-1999</th>
<th>Articles found 2000-2005</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cultural identity</td>
<td>29 [3.2]</td>
<td>1,115 [101.4]</td>
<td>1,529 [254.8]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic or ethnicity</td>
<td>3,292 [365.8]</td>
<td>12,610 [1,146.4]</td>
<td>13,146 [2,191]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalism</td>
<td>752 [85.6]</td>
<td>2,385 [216.8]</td>
<td>1,671 [278.5]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion and politics</td>
<td>280 [31.1]</td>
<td>633 [57.5]</td>
<td>380 [63.3]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Ethnic conflict'</td>
<td>82 [9.1]</td>
<td>320 [29.1]</td>
<td>233 [38.3]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* number in brackets [] indicates average number of articles published per year

The effects of relativistic thought on interpretations of international relations have been varied. Perhaps one of the most important effects was the introduction of particular themes in international relations, such as: the return of culture as the main explanatory model with a focus on identity and identity politics; the role of ethics and aesthetics; and the place of nature and the environment.126 Indeed, in international relations the study of cultural and identity issues was marginalised during the Cold War. However, the 1990s saw cultural, ethnic, and nationalism studies soar to new heights to the point where reconsiderations of ethno-nationalism and related subjects became a major focus of study for many politics and international relations faculties.127

Whereas Cold War international relations scholars may have turned to the rationalist, materialist, and universalist demands of economics to underpin their theories, during the 1990s international relations scholars increasingly turned to borrowings from such fields as anthropology or psychoanalysis, with their anti-

125 Results from word searches in the SSCI performed in November 2005.
126 See, for example Millennium: Journal of International Studies, which has been in the forefront of publishing articles which discuss Postmodernist and Romantic themes in international relations. Over the past decade, the journal has published special issues on such themes as culture in IR (1994); ethics in IR (1998); territoriality and identity in IR (1999); religion in IR (2000); and the role of aesthetics—images and narratives—in IR (2001).
127 The field of cultural studies has show significant growth overall. The humanities and media databases show extraordinary growth in cultural topics. See Marjorie Ferguson and Peter Golding, eds., Cultural Studies in Question (London: Sage, 1997).
Chapter 2

rationalist, quasi-spiritual, and relativistic understandings. This increase in relativistic and anti-rationalist approaches in international relations was reflected in the types of articles published in scholarly journals, in the courses and degrees offered to students, as well as the number of new academic posts opening for scholars working within these perspectives. Significantly, the trend to consider these issues seems to have begun with the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, whose break-up was particularly disturbing and served as the touchstone for brooding commentaries about the corrosive effects of nationalism, the dangers of exclusive identities, and the perils of multiethnicity. Pessimistic scholarly analyses of ethnicity and nationalism became so common that, as Tom Nairn notes, nationalism became the ‘theory of the Ethnic Abyss’. 130

These cultural theories achieved particular attention at end of the Cold War, just as the search for new frameworks and analogies to explain the ‘new world disorder’ began.131 Just as Vietnam became a metaphor for the 1960s, in many Western media and intellectual circles the violent break-up of Yugoslavia became the metaphor of the 1990s—a Postmodernist, relativistic vision of hell, complete with competing primordial identities engaging in meaningless orgies of nationalist violence.132 At least that was (and in some cases continues to be) one common, if covertly racist, interpretation of the conflict.133 Despite the actual historical particularities of the Yugoslav case, which would suggest that it was more unique than perfectly generalisable, any complex multinational state in potential crisis could

128 See for example, Yosef Lapid and Friedrich V. Kratochwil, The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1996).
129 For a discussion of the importance of the Bosnian war in these analyses, see Sadowski.
131 This phrase is a distorted and ironic version of President George Bush’s proclaimed ‘New World Order’.
have been dubbed a future ‘new Yugoslavia’ (or a ‘clef’ country, to use Huntington’s parlance), with all of its implications of violent disintegration and chaos to come. For example, was Pakistan the ‘next Yugoslavia’? Or, perhaps Indonesia? Even stable liberal democracies were not exempt from the comparison, as some suggested that multiculturalism in Great Britain could create the conditions necessary for a future Yugoslavia.

In the 1990s, conflict in multinational societies, particularly in Yugoslavia but also in the former USSR, put the domestic rubric of Western liberal multiculturalism under pressure, from both the ideological left and right in their domestic culture wars. In the US, the violence in these multiethnic states served to underscore the fears that American critics had about a ‘growing “cult of ethnicity” in American education and civic culture’ that threatens to ‘[undermine] national cohesiveness by exacerbating ethnic strains’. In the United States, some conservatives argued that Yugoslavia showed the impossibility of true multiculturalism existing in one state, and used the case as a sobering illustration of what could happen in Western societies if the dominant Judeo-Christian culture were not openly reasserted. One commentator argued that as almost complete assimilation—if not annihilation—of other cultures was the true basis of American democracy, with the implication that it should be expected and, perhaps, tolerated in other states as well.

For some on the left, particularly in the United States, the war in Bosnia—the vestige of Yugoslavia’s shattered multiculturalism—had a different meaning. The Los Angeles riots after the Rodney King verdict prompted anxieties about racial meltdown in the United States. Policymakers in the Clinton administration used the Bosnian conflict as a metaphor about the legacy of domestic racial division in the

---

134 The metaphor of Yugoslavia—with its subtext of anarchy and ethnic violence—has been used by politicians, academics, and journalists in a range of situations. Robert Kaplan used the metaphor to describe the potential for fragmentation in Pakistan. See Robert Kaplan, ‘The Lawless Frontier’, *The Atlantic Monthly* (Volume 286, No. 3, September 2000), pp. 66-80.

135 A well-respected journalists’ roundtable posited that Indonesia was the ‘next Yugoslavia’. See Reporting the World’s seminar on ‘Indonesia—The Next Yugoslavia?’ Available at http://www.reportingtheworld.org/clients/rwhome.nsf/h/3pdx.

136 For example, the former British Tory Party Chairman Lord Tebbit claimed that devolution would lead to the creation of a Yugoslavia-like situation in Britain. See Lord Tebbit, ‘Britain’s Desperate Need for a Sense of Identity’, *Conservative Way Forward* (2001).

137 Yossi Shain, ‘Multicultural Foreign Policy’, *Foreign Policy* (Fall 1995).


United States. In other words, Bosnia became the proxy battleground of the angst-ridden intellectual ‘culture wars’.\textsuperscript{140} Unfortunately, pundits of all political persuasions with an ideological axe to grind could find some aspect of its bleeding corpse a useful rhetorical foil.

In the US, post-9/11 the issue of immigration and cultural assimilation has focussed on the integration of Muslims in Western societies. Commentators and scholars have put particular emphasis on uneven assimilation and persistence of a Muslim identity, despite their modernisation and even secularisation within Western societies.\textsuperscript{141} This trend is also repeated in Europe. In the Netherlands, murders by Muslims of critics of Islam have provoked a backlash against immigration and intensified government efforts to assimilate immigrants into Dutch society.\textsuperscript{142} In France, widespread rioting by disaffected Muslim youths in several cities in November 2005 questioned French attempts at integrating their Muslim population and underscored popular unease with the growth of Muslim immigration.\textsuperscript{143} In Britain, the 7/7 attacks on the public transport system in London highlighted public disquiet at growing social divisiveness and have prompted calls for a new understanding of ‘Britishness’, including a shared commitment to British civil institutions.\textsuperscript{144}

\textsuperscript{140} See, for example, the comments by Michael Omi on the intersection of concern in the US about race and immigration, images of Bosnia as an example of warring ethnicities, and American nationalism tinged with racism. See the University of Minnesota Institute on Race and Poverty’s forum report on ‘Race and Poverty: Our Private Obsession, Our Public Sin’ (13 October 1995). Available at http://www1.umn.edu/irp/publications/race.htm

\textsuperscript{141} See, for example, Mustafa Malkik, ‘Muslims Pluralize the West, Resist Assimilation’, \textit{Middle East Policy Journal} (Vol. 11, No. 1, 2004).

\textsuperscript{142} \textit{Economist}, ‘Another political murder’ (11 November 2004).

\textsuperscript{143} The conservative journal \textit{Le Point} is typical of some of this unease. It has published a series of articles on the topics of Muslim immigration, integration, and French social unease. See their series of articles ‘Banlieues-Ce que l’on n’ose pas dire’ at http://www.lepoint.fr/dossiers_france/doc_banlieues.html

\textsuperscript{144} Michael White, ‘Call for a new definition of Britishness’, \textit{Guardian} (20 December 2005). The article discusses the Fabian Society’s ‘Charter for a New Britain’.
2.5 Painting Over the Ugly Parts—Nostalgia and neo-imperialism

"Advice is a form of nostalgia, a way of fishing the past from the disposal, wiping it off, painting over the ugly parts and recycling it for more than it’s worth."

—Mary Schmich

Nostalgia for the past, including painting over the ugly parts, was in full swing during the early post-Cold War. In 1990, John Mearsheimer predicted that we would soon miss the Cold War: ‘We may […] wake up one day lamenting the loss of the order that the Cold War gave to the anarchy of international relations’. If multipolarity results in anarchy and conflict, he concluded, then ‘the stability of the past forty-five years is not likely to be seen again in the coming decades’.

Mearsheimer was right about the sense of loss. A variety of post-Cold War trends can be seen in the light of nostalgia. For example, the anti-globalisation movement can be seen as a form of nostalgia for the past, when workers had secure jobs with good employee benefits and less domestic and global labour competition. Various forms of nativism and cultural particularism hark back to a nostalgic, innocent Golden Age untainted by multiculturalism or the invasion of a foreign set of values.

Additionally, a nostalgic wave of reappraisal of the Cold War and the search for a new role for the West in the world was in vogue in the 1990s, and some aspects of this trend continue. Populist nostalgia for the certainties of the Cold War is one version of this trend, while in the academy and among policymaking circles, the revisionism extends further to a growing reappraisal of colonialism, in Kipling’s words, taking up ‘the white man’s burden’ in ‘savage wars of peace’.

In popular culture, nostalgia for the clarity and seeming simplicity of the bipolar world and economic ‘good times’ under socialism bloomed in the 1990s and continues in some respects. In the states of the former Eastern bloc, it has taken the form of residual nostalgia for communism and the relative social and economic stability of the Cold War. While some of the nostalgia is clearly tongue-in-check, such as communist-themed pubs in Ukraine or Good Bye, Lenin!, a film satirising communist nostalgia in Eastern Germany, a majority of Eastern Europeans express

---

146 John Mearsheimer, ‘Why We Will Soon Miss The Cold War’, The Atlantic Monthly (August 1990); pps. 35 and 50, respectively. This article is the popular version of Mearsheimer’s ‘Back to the Future’ published in International Security.
147 Rudyard Kipling, ‘The White Man’s Burden’ (1899).
nostalgia for the days of a strong authoritarian state and the socialist economy. Much of this nostalgia is bound up with a sense of uncertainty about the future. Despite their accession into the EU in 2004, nostalgia for the past may remain in some former communist states due to pessimism about the new democratic system and dissatisfaction about the economy. In the Czech Republic, one political analyst says that ‘There are still a lot of people who long for the communist days, when everything was clear, black was black and white was white’, while one novelist notes that ‘many old people are nostalgic for their youth. They miss the security of communist times’. According to polls by the New Europe Barometer, approval ratings for a return to communist rule in Eastern Europe ranged between about 6-16 per cent of population in 1993 (depending on country) rising to 16-30 per cent in 2001, expressing a trend of political support for communist parties. Significant majorities across Eastern Europe also indicated a desire for a strong state, even one based on non-democratic principles. While these views were most common amongst the old, there were increasing levels of nostalgia amongst the young. Additionally, majorities of post-communist citizens saw the former socialist economy in a positive light, suggesting that nostalgia is based on dissatisfaction with the economic system and the inability of the transition economies to deliver prosperity rapidly or evenly. This may reflect a low level of public trust in political institutions in these states that continues. As the economic benefits of EU membership may take some time to become clear, nostalgia may persist.

151 Data in this paragraph from Joakim Ekman, ‘Communist Nostalgia in Central and Eastern Europe: A Matter of Principles or Performance?’, paper presented at the Nordic Political Science Association’s Annual Meeting, Aalborg, Denmark (15–17 August 2002). Note that these figures were lower in the Baltic states.
In the West, Cold War nostalgia is also present, with Western publics similarly hungering for stronger political leadership, a sense of purpose and direction, and a better economy. In the US, former President Ronald Reagan’s funeral was accompanied by a mass outpouring of nostalgia for his optimistic ‘it’s-dawn-in-America’ leadership style and the economic ‘miracle’ that Reaganomics was credited with producing (whether rightly or wrongly).\(^{154}\) As Professor Peter Bondanella notes, ‘Fascination with the Cold War persists because it was a time when we hunkered down for the long haul [...] It was in many ways our finest hour [...] There was no immediate gratification. We had real direction.’\(^{155}\)

Beyond the Reagan and Cold War nostalgia, nostalgia persists for the heroism and sacrificial responsibility of World War II, or ‘The Good War’. In the US, nostalgia for World War II began after the fiftieth anniversary of D-Day in 1994 and continued throughout the 1990s.\(^{156}\) It has been underpinned by a wide variety of popular books, films, and television programmes taking a Romantic view of the war.\(^{157}\) The implicit undercurrent of these works is one of declinism and a sense of nostalgic loss at the fact that there will be no equal to the generation that fought and won the war—‘The Greatest Generation’. Since Vietnam did not serve as the younger generation’s honourable, sacrificial service to country, the implication is that the current generation is decadent and lacks a sense of duty and commitment to country. This conclusion also extends to the Cold War society that the ‘Greatest Generation’ built after the war, which is now a crumbling and decaying husk of its former self. There is a sense that with the passing of this generation, twilight will descend on one of the greatest periods in Western (or at least American) history.

For academics and policymakers, post-Cold War nostalgia also extends to a reconsideration of the age of empire with a wide variety of titles discussing the challenges and perils awaiting a budding American \textit{imperium}.\(^{158}\) Others openly

\(^{157}\) These include, for example, the film \textit{Saving Private Ryan}; books by Stephen Ambrose such as \textit{Band of Brothers}, \textit{D-Day June 6, 1944}, \textit{Citizen Soldiers}, or \textit{Pegasus Bridge}, and Tom Brokaw, \textit{The Greatest Generation} (New York, NY: Random House, 1998); or the television programme \textit{Band of Brothers}.
champion the white man’s burden. Imperialism and neo-imperialism are again being discussed as benign forces for peace and prosperity among academics and policymakers. In a era replete with perceived ‘failure’—the growth of ‘failed’ states, ‘rogue’ states, international criminal gangs, drug barons, global sex trafficking and human exploitation, global terrorist groups, and other lethal non-state actors—empire presents the image of an orderly return to good governance in areas where the norms of democracy have not taken root.

A variety of scholarly works in the 1990s examined empires, both old and new. Post-9/11, discussions of empire still have purchase. Among these, Dominic Lieven’s *Empire: The Russian Empire and Its Rivals* (2001) provides an historical examination into empire, presenting an extensive view of the rise and decline of the Russian empire. However, much of the discussion on empire and imperialism is geared towards an examination of America’s role as the lone superpower and US unipolarity. Andrew Bacevich’s *American Empire: The Realities and Consequences of US Diplomacy* (2002) argues that domestic considerations, specifically the interests of US corporations, are setting the US agenda in foreign policy and driving the US towards empire. Rashid Khalidi’s *Resurrecting Empire: Western Footprints and America’s Perilous Path in the Middle East* (2004) examines the legacy of empire in the Middle East and how this applies to America’s attempts to control and rebuild Iraq. In *Incoherent Empire* (2003), Michael Mann criticises the US focus on military power as a form of domination that creates significant resistance abroad.

While these authors are critical of empire, others suggest that the main flaw is in the US not pursuing empire in a coherent and sustained fashion. In an idea reminiscent of Paul Kennedy’s *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers* (1987), Niall Ferguson explores the rise and decline of the British empire to glean history lessons for America in *Empire: The Rise and Demise of the British World Order and Its Lessons for Global Power* (2003). Ferguson follows up with a paean to America’s

---

159 See, for example, Thomas Sowell, *Conquests and Cultures: An International History* (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1998). Sowell, who seems to argue from an ethnocentric standpoint and creates a hierarchy of cultures with the usual suspects (Europeans) on the top, offers a murderous view of Africans.

160 John Lloyd, ‘The return of imperialism; Empire is no longer a dirty word: It is now a respectable debating point among thinkers and politicians. John Lloyd on a global U-turn’, *New Statesman* (Vol. 131, No. 4583, 15 April 2002).

liberal empire which is in the unique position of enforcing a benign order on the world in *Colossus: The Price of America’s Empire* (2004). Ferguson’s argument has the scent of nostalgia; he might as well be quoting Joseph Conrad:

> The conquest of the earth, which mostly means the taking it away from those who have a different complexion or slightly flatter noses than ourselves, is not a pretty thing when you look into it too much. What redeems it is the idea only.\(^\text{162}\)

However, the key question for Ferguson is whether Americans lack the political will to see through their mission, arguing that America’s ‘best and brightest’ do not have the same commitment to administer an empire that the British did. However, this aspect of Ferguson’s thesis collapses when it hits the hard pavement of American reality. The British administration was largely staffed by those who were clever but blocked by class or connection from rising in society or getting rich. First-born sons of the aristocracy did not sail for distant shores. In Britain’s class-bound and hierarchical system, the empire provided a safety valve for all those talented sons who threatened to become disaffected if their ambitions were checked in the motherland. This sense of limited opportunity is not present in America’s ‘best’, as they see a bright future for themselves; they need not seek their fortunes on the empire’s peripheries.

### 2.6 Hearts of Darkness—Essential human nature and the exotic ‘Other’

> “Don’t you hear them?” The dusk was repeating them in a persistent whisper all around us, in a whisper that seemed to swell menacingly like the first whisper of a rising wind. “The horror! The horror!”

—Joseph Conrad\(^\text{163}\)

While there are a variety of post-Cold War trends that focus attention on the Romantic concept of nature, particularly environmentalist discourses, we will examine one that more squarely approaches issues of conflict and violence: the current resurgence of late nineteenth-century Romanticism’s fascination with the ‘unnatural’, horrific side of human nature, the heart of darkness that lies within


individuals and nations. The popular allure of contemporary forms of horror and Gothic is complemented by an academic preoccupation with the essential barbarity of human nature and the vision of an exotic, tragic ‘Other’ wracked by violence and despair.

Popular culture has seen the resurgence of Gothic in all its gory glory, like the Grand Guignol and romans charognes of the late nineteenth century. Slasher films, television programs featuring vampires, and gritty crime shows all exhibit a contemporary taste for the exotically dark, hidden underside of a society which is seen as only superficially ‘normal’. Additionally, modern panics over the prevalence of serial killers or paedophiles, as well as bizarre or quasi-religious beliefs in the occult, all conform to a darkly pessimistic view of the world and a foreboding sense of the duality of human nature, of the hidden evil lurking menacingly close to the surface in everyday life. This fascination with the lurid and bizarre parallels the late Romantic despair of Nietzsche, with the popular mythos fatally repeating that we live in the worst of all possible times, perhaps even the ‘end times’.

Among academics and intellectuals, fascination with the duality of human nature and an exotic ‘Other’ has centred on analyses of conflict in the post-Cold War period. Significantly drawing on the experiences of the outbreak of war across West Africa, as well as the violent dissolution of Yugoslavia, and rapidly disintegrating pockets of the former Soviet Union in the early 1990s, many scholars rejected what they saw as liberalism’s Pollyanna-ish international vision of the benign effects of growing democratisation and globalisation. Both the pictures and the tone of the reporting in the Western media on these wars underscored scholarly pessimism. Mainstream reports of these conflicts in the West often centred on ‘heart of darkness’ stories that focussed on the atavistic ‘nature’ of the conflict or the ‘savagery’ of the people, as well as broad-brush journalistic impressions led by sensationalistic television pictures. Sometimes journalists fell back on racist explanations for violence in regions they knew little about, and for which they had been ‘parachuted in’ for the story. Nevertheless, such reporting became a staple in the media news diet.

164 Mark Edmundson, Nightmare on Main Street: Angels, Sadomasochism and the Culture of Gothic (Boston, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997).
166 These comments on media coverage were made by Mark Huband, editor of the world economy pages for the Financial Times, at a Reporting the World conference, ‘Is Coverage of Africa Racist?’.
Chapter 2

The conflicts in former Yugoslavia and Africa also prompted scholarly consideration about the essential ‘nature’ of warfare. The consensus has become that warfare is essentially an emotional act, imbued with religious or cult meanings, replete with heroism and the notions of honour, as Michael Ignatieff has argued.\(^{168}\) Those who study the biological bases of behaviour have added to this perception of violence and war as irrational and passionate endeavours, hidden deep inside human nature as primitive yet inescapable ‘urges’. Barbara Ehrenreich, a social critic with a background in science, has argued that war is a passionate act rather than a rational calculation of interest and that there is an inner human need to ‘sacralize’ war.\(^{169}\) For Ehrenreich, while war is socially constructed, it also has biological, ‘primal’ roots, arguing that this is more apparent in recent ‘tribal’ conflicts in Bosnia and Rwanda, rather than in the more antiseptic and aesthetic American conflicts.\(^{170}\) However, Ehrenreich’s view may be more an artefact of the American media’s unwillingness to show the casualties of war on the other side than the truly ‘clean’ or ‘surgical’ nature of the actual conduct of American warfare.

While Yugoslavia could serve as a facile metaphor and exotic ‘Other’ for many of the post-Cold War’s internal ills and sense of domestic decline in the West—including the problems of racial polarisation, multiculturalism, poverty, and social exclusion—other conflicts also became apocryphal. African wars in the early 1990s became political shorthand for the loss of all rationality, not only for the loss of rationality in war, but for the loss of all rationality throughout the entire non-Western world. While previous African conflicts were analysed within the Cold War framework of wars of liberation or conflicts over state governance—in other words,
as rationally-based conflicts grounded in the political and economic realities of people's lives—in the post-Cold War these wars were to become the bywords for anarchy and the unending 'nature' of ethnic conflict and the essential, 'natural' barbarism of Africans.  

The conflicts in West Africa—particularly in Sierra Leone and Liberia—became bywords for the cruelty of war and for the 'strangeness' of Africans, who in one account have 'a paper-thin veneer of civilization'. Other conflicts in Eritrea, Somalia, and Rwanda served a similar rhetorical purpose. Africans were deemed incapable of waging war out of rational calculation or any form of higher interest—the main explanations for the conflicts that swept through Africa during the 1990s consisted of appeals to the 'atavistic' nature of these conflicts, and by implication, the people involved in the violence. While some experts with in-depth knowledge particular conflicts underscored their rational basis—for example, Philip Gourevitch's investigation in Rwanda, that detailed the highly calculated and structured nature of the Hutu genocide against the Tutsis—the mythology has remained with the 'unending conflict' model, followed by its quasi-rationalist stepsister, the 'criminal activity' model.

Various aspects of African conflicts served to underscore Western prejudice that they were somehow more barbaric. For example, since African wars have generally been waged on a low-tech basis—that is by guns and machetes rather than by Cruise missiles and Stealth technology—they have been seen as 'primitive' and 'bloody' compared with the supposedly antiseptic and civilised nature of Western wars. Additionally, some commentators have categorised acts such as the cutting off

---

171 Compare this type of treatment focusing on irrational factors in Africa with, for example, the rationalist discussion of political conflict in the Congo in the 1960s. See Rene Lemarchand, Political Awakening in the Congo: The Politics of Fragmentation (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1964).
174 Philip Gourevitch, We Wish to Inform You that Tomorrow We Will Be Killed with Our Families: Stories from Rwanda (New York, NY: Farrar Straus Giroux, 1999).
175 The World Bank's Paul Collier has focused on the economics of civil war, publishing a variety of articles on the 'criminal activity model'. See, for example, Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, 'Greed and Grievance in Civil War', World Bank Working Papers (21 October 2001). Available at http://econ.worldbank.org/view.php?type=5&id=12205 See also Mats Berdal and D. M. Malone, eds., Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000). While the criminal activity model presupposes a rational economic basis for conflict, it does essentialise the participants or instigators of war as greedy criminals and their societies as especially prone to criminality and opportunism.
of limbs as proof of the 'barbarism' and 'irrationality' of African wars, despite evidence that such tactics are rationally calculated to terrorise the population and lower morale against resistance, both rationally effective methods in war-fighting.\footnote{\textit{Paul Richards}, \textit{Fighting for the Rain Forest: War, Youth, & Resources in Sierra Leone} (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 1996).} Furthermore, the rituals that some African militias employed before fighting, such as wearing wigs or women’s clothing, walking backwards, casting magical spells, or using drugs or alcohol, also fed this image of irrationality.\footnote{See \textit{Associated Press}, 'Tribal Hunters Bank on Mysticism in Fighting Sierra Leone Rebels' (28 November 1998).} However, this ignores the fact that such rituals prepare the troops for battle and lower their psychological resistance to killing enemy combatants, a key aspect of success in war. Since only about two per cent of any population is capable of killing without hesitation on the battlefield, professional armies in wealthy states expend a great deal of time and money training troops to overcome their instinctive hesitation to kill.\footnote{\textit{John Mueller}, 'The Banality of “Ethnic Conflict”: Yugoslavia and Rwanda’, paper presented at the American Political Science Association annual meeting, Washington, DC (31 August-3 September 2000), p. 25. Mueller cites work by \textit{Dave Grossman}, \textit{On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society} (1995).} For example, it has been estimated that it costs over $44,000 to train and basically equip a US marine.\footnote{\textit{Diane Olick}, ‘An army of one carries a high price’, CNBC (21 October 2002).} With a lack of resources, militias in developing countries turn to lower-tech methods of achieving the same results: magic, drugs, and alcohol. In other words, far from being irrational, these conflicts are governed by a situational rationality that forces poor participants to ‘make do’ with the low-cost resources at hand.

Finally, unlike the case of Yugoslavia, which some experts cited as a convenient vehicle to critique or to make comparisons with their own developed, multicultural societies, African conflicts were less flatteringly—and in more overtly racist tones—deemed the shape of things to come for many developing post-colonial societies.\footnote{Some authors contend that racist American coverage on Africa has a long pedigree. For example, Milton Allimadi claims that the \textit{New York Times} archives show that its journalists and editors were using racist language to describe Africans, and that editors were even concocting fabricated but plausible ‘scenarios’ that fit racists stereotypes to insert into stories, at least as far back as the 1960s. See Milton Allimadi, \textit{The Hearts of Darkness: How White Writers Created the Racist Image of Africa} (New York, NY: Black Star Books, 2003).} Overall, the main theme that came out of these conflicts was one of unmitigated tragedy; that the conflicts, and the people involved in them, were caught up in tragic circumstances beyond understanding or control—theirs or ours. However,
what we see in a tragic context may be otherwise for the combatants or others involved in those conflicts. Christopher Coker notes, ‘As Aristotle reminds us, tragedy works on the spectator. It is we—the spectators—who find life tragic. This is not necessarily true for those involved in the events we see on our television screens at night’.181

2.7 No Shelter, No Relief?—Conclusion

‘What are the roots that clutch, what branches grow / Out of this stony rubbish? [...] A heap of broken images, where the sun beats, / And the dead tree gives no shelter, the cricket no relief, / And the dry stone no sound of water.’

—T.S. Eliot182

If no clear definition of nineteenth-century Romanticism exists, the post-Cold War’s Postmodern Romanticism also suffered from a similar definitional weakness. No coherent set of precepts much less a specified ideology defined the ‘movement’, if it can be called one; rather, it is ‘a heap of broken images’. As with nineteenth-century Romanticism, it had been a sensibility, mood, series of metaphors, or receptivity to certain themes and ideas defining the 1990s. Perhaps this is because Postmodern Romanticism was also defined by rejection and protest: it was partly a philosophical protest against the rationalism and economistic thinking of the Cold War, and partly an historical response against the transformations that spurred global change. However, since protest and rejectionism rarely offer a clear way forward, no singular or dominant model of international relations has presented itself.

In this chapter, we tried to historicise the decade of the 1990s and its ‘revolutions’—often collectively called fragmentation and globalisation—which have seemingly accelerated the pace of social change, arguing that these changes undermined the certainties of the Cold War period, leading to greater feelings of insecurity among policymakers and publics. These uncertainties added new impetus to those who challenged the Cold War predominance of rationalist paradigms and greater receptivity to the Romantic message. We also explored the Romantic strain of thought during the post-Cold War era using five categories—irrationality, pessimism, relativism, nostalgia, and focus on nature—to describe the Zeitgeist and how it

affected popular and academic contemporary understandings of politics and international relations.

How did this shift towards more Romantic perceptions affect international relations? One of the most important shifts was, and continues to be, attitudinal: an atmosphere of decline and a sense of pessimism have pervaded international relations. While Realist approaches often have an underlying sense of pessimism, even tragedy, about them, post-Cold War pessimism has been deeper. From the paranoia of conspiracy theorists to increased awareness of potential natural catastrophes, the post-Cold War continues to be defined by deep public pessimism. As George Steiner put it, this is a lateborn era, one in which a persistent sense of valediction is indeed in the air.

Yet since the shape of what will definitively follow the Cold War is still too amorphous to describe, despite burgeoning US unipolarity, bleak images such as T.S. Eliot’s ‘Waste Land’ serve as a standing metaphor for the desolate future that is seen for international relations. This sense of decline is no respecter of ideology. Both left- and right-wing commentators have expressed declinist views of international relations. In some part, these visions are a form of nostalgia and a longing for the Cold War past. Indeed, it could be argued that a growing post-Cold War ‘red-brown alliance’ is based on a shared nostalgic sense of Romanticism. Such fusion of conservative religion and left-wing militancy may not be restricted to Christians; in Britain, Islamists and the extreme left have found common cause on a variety of issues.

The expansion of anti-rationalist thought and spirituality have been key post-Cold War trends, paralleling nineteenth-century Romanticism’s search for transcendence and existential meaning. The growth of fundamentalist religions of all stripes, with a concomitant rise in the political activism of religious fundamentalists, and the post-Cold War upsurge in all forms of spirituality have been popular aspects of this trend toward irrationalism. A growing rejection of logical positivism and a turn towards irrational, emotional, or sentimental factors as key explanatory variables in politics are academic reflections of this trend. Attention has increasingly turned

---


184 Amir Taheri, ‘We don’t do God, we do Palestine and Iraq’, The Sunday Times (12 February 2006), p. 12.
away from materialism or rationality and towards a key aspect of Romanticism—irrationality, emotionalism, and spirituality.

Another Romantic theme, relativism or the return of identity—ethnicity, religion, culture, or language—as a key variable and motivator for human action also gained prominence in theories of international relations in the 1990s, and issues of culture and identity continue to be important topics this decade. If during any age the key question is ‘who are we?’, during the Cold War era the answer was often a rationalist one—*Homo economicus*, defined by his utility-optimizing behaviour. With the waning of rationalism and its economically-based thinking, the developing post-Cold War answer seems to be *Homo sociologicus*—defined by his cultural, religious, or ethnic identity and values. From a variety of forms of populist nativism around the world to the growing ‘cottage industry’ in identity and similar cultural issues in the academy, the Romantic, sentimental ‘cement of blood’ created by shared ethnicity, religion, or culture is at the centre of popular and academic thinking about the future of politics and international relations.

Nostalgia is another Romantic theme, or perhaps more accurately ‘mood’, that has defined the post-Cold War period, partly because in an era of ‘endings’—of communism, of bipolarity, of materialism, of history—and the uncertainty of ‘beginnings’ there is a melancholic search for meaning and a necessary reappraisal of the past, part of which entails ‘painting over the ugly parts’ of history. The uncertainty of the post-Cold War transition has spurred popular revisions of the Cold War. Among citizens of former communist states, it has brought some nostalgia for socialism and strong (even authoritarian) government. In the US, it has generated nostalgia for strong political leadership à la Reagan. This nostalgia also has included a popular re-examination of the World War II era as a ‘Golden Age’ and eulogies to the rapidly passing members of the ‘Greatest Generation’ who fought the war. The political turbulence of the post-Cold War period also has been followed by a revival of interest in empire and imperialism as a possible solution to international conflict and political instability.

Finally, the Romantic focus on nature, particularly the sinister duality of human nature, was prevalent during the 1990s. The ‘heart of darkness’ leitmotif runs deep in the post-Cold War psyche and in understandings of international relations. The popular revival of interest in the dark side of human nature whether on television, films, or in bestselling books recalled the nineteenth century *fin-de-siècle* fascination.
with Gothic, which explored the hidden undercurrent of violence and degradation that exists within Western society. This theme extended to popular and academic understandings of international relations. For example, depictions of African conflicts often focussed on the irrationality and barbarity of war, providing images of an exotic, orientalised ‘Other’ which was so prevalent in nineteenth-century Romanticism. However, unlike the sometimes languorous and mysterious descriptions of the Orient that nineteenth-century Romantics presented, the post-Cold War’s Romanticism focussed on the ‘mindless’ brutality and violence present in often poor, generally non-Western states.
Chapter 3. Prophets of the Apocalypse: Romantic Approaches to Conflict in Kaplan, Huntington, and van Creveld

‘And the kings of the earth, and the great men, and the rich men, and the chief captains, and the mighty men, and every bondman, and every free man, hid themselves in the dens and in the rocks of the mountains; / And said to the mountains and rocks, Fall on us, and hide us from the face of him that sitteth on the throne, and from the wrath of the Lamb: / For the great day of his wrath is come; and who shall be able to stand?’

—Revelation, 6:15-17

Romantic visions of politics and international relations flourished during the 1990s. One area in which they gained a foothold is in approaches to conflict studies where, after the collapse of the bipolar world, some scholars, policymakers, and pundits detected prophetic signs and portents—metaphorically speaking—of an apocalyptic ‘great day of wrath’ to come. In particular, many observers saw a violent future for international relations along Yeatsian lines, with ‘mere anarchy loosed upon the world’ resulting in a rising ‘blood-dimmed tide’ of primordial ethnic conflict. While there are many authors whose works can exemplify the Romantic Zeitgeist in post-Cold War international relations, we will mainly look at three authors who write on security and conflict and whose works reach deep into the academic and policymaking heart of the American imperium in international relations—Robert D. Kaplan, Samuel P. Huntington, and Martin van Creveld. Their works are prominent among those who foretold (and continue to foretell) of an apocalyptic era of chaos and conflict in international relations. We have chosen these three for a variety of reasons: they are recognised experts in their fields; they reach different influential audiences; they answer different and complimentary questions about past conflicts and potential conflicts; and their work has been important in moulding interpretations about the conflict in former Yugoslavia.

---

2 The phrases are from W.B. Yeats, ‘The Second Coming’, 3-6 (1921): ‘Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold; Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world. / The blood-dimmed tide is loosed, and everywhere / The ceremony of innocence is drowned’.
First, they are widely recognised as expert observers in their respective fields among scholars, policymakers, and journalists. Each has been widely cited, particularly in English, which indicates that scholars read and recognise their work. For example, according to the Social Science Citation Index of academic journals, Huntington’s *The Clash of Civilizations*, which is widely available in translation and has spawned a minor cottage industry either in support or refutation, was cited over 1,000 times in major journals. Kaplan’s *The Coming Anarchy* was cited 307 times, while *Balkan Ghosts* was cited 97 times. Martin van Creveld’s *Transformation of War* has been cited at least 142 times and his other works cited 455 times. These totals do not include the numerous citations to their works in the popular press, or discussions about them in other media. Considering that most scholarly works are never cited, these are fairly impressive totals. Additionally, neither Kaplan, Huntington, nor van Creveld is a ‘soft target’ or a strawman—they do not represent the most extreme, inarticulate, or least thoughtful strain of the Romantic Zeitgeist in studies of conflict in international relations. Rather, they are highly articulate, have well-thought out views, and are intellectually respected among many of their peers.

Second, while their work is in many ways complimentary—they may often be read together, and in fact these authors cite each other in their works—they reach different, but influential audiences. Kaplan is a journalist, polemicist, and populariser of the ‘new world disorder’ thesis. His work touches the ‘chattering classes’ and public intellectuals as well as policymakers, including those in the US military. Huntington mainly reaches an academic audience, although his work is also widely known in policymaking circles, and his *Clash of Civilizations* was a bestseller in the US and worldwide in translation. While van Creveld has a strong reputation among academics as a military historian, his key influence is over the Western military and defence policy establishment, particularly in the United States. Van Creveld has

3 These totals are as of November 2005. The precise totals for are 1005 citations in 796 articles for Huntington’s *Clash of Civilizations*, including the original article that appeared in *Foreign Affairs* and the book. For Kaplan, 307 citations were made to the *Coming Anarchy* in 263 articles, 210 of which cited the original article published in *The Atlantic Monthly* and the rest which cited the book. For *Balkan Ghosts*, the 97 citations were in 79 separate articles. Van Creveld’s *Transformation of War* was cited 142 times in 120 articles; since the work was published under the title *On Future War* in Britain, this total includes citations to both titles. The rest of van Creveld’s works were cited 455 times in 266 articles. Note that these numbers may vary and are not comprehensive due to the limitations of the database and authors’ inconsistencies in reporting citations. The data is not standardised, so searching must be done through a variety of alternatives (for example, by searching for Vancreveld, Van Creveld, Creveld, M. van, etc.) These results were based on a combined search for all terms.

4 According to Amazon.com, the world’s largest online bookseller, readers who purchased books by Kaplan often purchased books by Huntington and van Creveld as well.
lectured widely in high-level military circles and his views can be prominently found in journals targeted to a US military audience, such as the US Army War College’s *Parameters*.

Third, each author answers a slightly different question with respect to past and future conflicts. If we analyse conflict in terms of the six journalistic questions—who, what, when, where, why, and how—each writer answers separate but complimentary aspects of those questions. While each seeks to answer all six, they lean more heavily towards answering certain questions. For example, Kaplan’s work focuses the ‘what’ and ‘why’ of conflict—on what the future of conflict will be about, and why. While Huntington also considers why conflicts arise, he primarily answers the questions of ‘who’ and ‘where’—which groups will do the fighting (civilisations), and where those conflicts are likely to occur (along fault line states). On the other hand, while van Creveld provides answers to all these questions, as a military historian his forte is on the ‘hows’ of conflict—the methods by which those wars will be fought and the setting of conflict. His neo-medieval vision for the context of future wars has also been a particularly compelling metaphor for policymakers and military planners.

Fourth, and perhaps most importantly, their metaphors of anarchy and chaos, their predictions of civilisational clash, and their analogies to the Middle Ages as the shape of post-Cold War international relations provided (and may continue to provide) academics, policymakers, and pundits with a pervasive and influential framework within which to understand global politics and conflict. While it is difficult to say with any certainty whether these views became the dominant interpretation of conflict in the 1990s, some of their ‘clash’ and ‘chaos’ metaphors were particularly influential in interpretations of the conflict in former Yugoslavia.

In order to discuss how these authors exemplify the post-Cold War Zeitgeist, we will first briefly discuss the creation of metaphors and analogies in policymaking and their importance in the construction of persuasive analytical frameworks. One reason these authors gained influence in international relations is through their use of vivid analogies and metaphors, some of which achieved if not interpretive dominance, then interpretive ascendancy, in international relations during the post-Cold War, especially in the US. After this discussion, we examine each of these authors in light of the various aspects that define the mood of Postmodern
Romanticism—such as anti-rationalism, pessimism, relativism, nostalgia, and a focus on nature—that we developed as the framework for our discussion in the two previous chapters. Since Kaplan’s popular themes of anarchy and chaos resonate with perhaps the widest general public and provide the Romantic ‘mood music’ that plays in the background of ‘chaos theories’, we will examine his work in greater detail than the other two. Finally, we also examine how these authors construct the Yugoslav conflict as a broader metaphor for their views on the future of conflict, and the various heuristic techniques and biases in their work.

3.1 Making Meaning—Metaphors and analogies

'T[Very frequently the “word images” that have been created by “ideas” have, like switchmen, determined the tracks along which action has been pushed by the dynamic of interest.]

—Max Weber

With the reappraisal of Realism that came with the collapse of the bipolar system, scholars and policymakers in international relations began searching for new frameworks to understand the post-Cold War era, to provide policy guidance, and to develop predictive models for the future. Significantly, since international relations scholars and policymakers often draw on history and the concept of ‘learning from history’ when faced with new situations, this process entailed the search for new historical analogies and metaphors as the basis for developing new approaches to understand the post-Cold War period.

As Yuen Foong Khong notes, learning from history is the idea that policymakers and scholars examine the past for historical similarities with the present that can provide useful, predictive guidance about a problem or offer a series of actions; Stanley Hoffmann underscores that this method of historical analogical reasoning is part of the American ‘national style’ in foreign policymaking. The logic policymakers use to connect any two historical periods is generally through an analogy, with the reasoning as follows: situation A (in the past) looks like situation B (usually in the present) in that they both share characteristic X. Since situation A also has characteristic Y, by implication situation B has it as well. Other characteristics

---

that A has, like Z, can be imputed to B as well. The structure of theses analogies has several functions: it allows policymakers to go beyond the given information; allows top-down ('theory'-led) processing of information, rather than bottom-up (data-led) which is faster and more efficient; and it creates a durable, or persistent, framework of understanding for the future.\footnote{This paragraph is based on Khong, pp. 6-7, and 14.}

Yet how do we (and policymakers more specifically) choose among the vast array of cognitive schemas, scripts, metaphors, and historical analogies available to us at any time in order to make decisions, and how do we judge the probability of various outcomes? Cognitive psychologists have shown that various heuristic devices (or rules of thumb) are used in the formation of judgement and decisionmaking. These heuristic devices determine the choice of analogies and cognitive frameworks as well as estimations of probability. These rules include the availability of information (how easily we remember and recall it), its recency, its perceived representativeness, and ‘surface commonalities’—that is, the effects that mere appearances have on observers.

The availability heuristic is about how easily recalled or remembered information or a particular event is. The more easily we can recall information, the more ‘real’, ‘plausible’, or ‘truthful’ the information seems to us, the more ‘available’ it is said to be. As social psychologist Scott Plous notes,\footnote{Scott Plous, \textit{The Psychology of Judgment and Decision Making} (New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1993), p. 121.}

\begin{quote}
[s]ome events are more available than others \textit{not} because they tend to occur frequently or with high probability, but because they are inherently easier to think about, because they have taken place recently [recency heuristic], because they are highly emotional, and so forth.\footnote{Vividness is defined by social psychologists as ‘how concrete or imaginable something is’. That is, how ‘real’ or ‘life-like’ the author or speaker can make something seem. See Plous, p. 125-126.}
\end{quote}

Thus our ability to imagine an event or an outcome makes that event more psychologically ‘available’ to us, which highly increases our probability (or risk) estimates of that event actually happening whether or not it is statistically more probable. One factor that increases our memory and recall of an event or information is vividness.\footnote{Vividness is defined by social psychologists as ‘how concrete or imaginable something is’. That is, how ‘real’ or ‘life-like’ the author or speaker can make something seem. See Plous, p. 125-126.} As psychologists have shown, one key to persuading an audience is the use of vivid language, and the use of such language—especially if it appeals to the senses—is even more convincing to the target audience than logic because vivid
information is easier to recall, particularly over the long term. In fact, psychologists Richard Nisbett and Eugene Borgida have found that audiences are affected and persuaded strongly by vividness, much more so than by pallid—dry or abstract—information, such as statistics.

In particular, first-hand accounts, individual testimonies, and anecdotes including personal experiences are consistently more persuasive to audiences than more objective information, like comprehensive statistical summaries. Indeed, in a legal setting, personal accounts like eyewitness identification and testimonies are often the least accurate yet the most persuasive types of evidence. Audiences are more likely to use such personalised information disproportionately in the formation of their judgements because it is vivid and easy to recall. Thus vividness affects the availability of information. The recency heuristic is also related to availability, affecting memory and recall. The more recent an event is, the more easily it is recalled, which increases its availability and hence our judgements about an event’s probability.

The representativeness heuristic judges the likeliness of a particular outcome or event by asking the question, ‘to what extent does X represent Y?’ Psychologists Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman have found that people perceive more detailed and specific scenarios to be more representative, or plausible, than general, less detailed ones, even though more general ones are statistically more probable. Therefore, increasing the amount of detail in describing any event or scenario increases its perceived representativeness. Thus, we perceive any event described in-depth and detail as more probable not because it is statistically more probable (actually, it is usually less probable), but because it conforms to the way we imagine events taking place in a highly specific manner. Questions of representativeness often involve errors of omission when considering probability. For example, decisionmakers often ignore ‘base rate’ information, that is, information on the relative frequency an event or outcome occurs, and neglect to factor in the idea of

---

10 Pious, p. 126.
11 For example, in a reader’s survey Pious asks subjects to judge the probability of the following two scenarios: ‘Scenario 1: An all-out nuclear war between the United States and Russia. Scenario 2: A situation in which neither country intends to attack the other side with nuclear weapons, but an all-out nuclear war between the United States and Russia is triggered by the actions of a third country such as Iraq, Libya, Israel, or Pakistan’. Subjects judge Scenario 2 to be most likely because it is how we imagine events unfolding, even though its likelihood is less probable. Pious, pp. 110-112.
regression to the mean (that is, that extremes in events, outcomes, or performance do not necessarily follow each other; instead a more general regression to the ‘average’ outcome will likely follow).\textsuperscript{12} In terms of international relations, for example, this principle suggests that periods of extreme global violence (which could be considered statistical outliers) are not representative; they do not necessarily herald the beginning of a greater ‘age of chaos’. Instead, such periods are more likely to be followed by a return to ‘average’ levels of violence worldwide.

Finally, the heuristic of \textit{surface commonalities} or mere appearance suggests that we choose those frameworks which have perceived (and often superficial) similarities with each other. Out of any group of possible variables, which ones do we concentrate on to compare similarities? Those variables that are chosen for specific attention by policymakers often share one important characteristic: salience—that is, a dominant, obvious, or even extreme trait that commands attention. We choose to lavish attention on salient factors because we perceive them to be more causal than other factors, often wrongly. Therefore, policymakers’ perceptions of causality will be influenced by where their attention is turned, which is a function of salience and the appearance of surface similarities.\textsuperscript{13}

Additionally, policymakers can make various other errors of causality (known as attribution errors), the most common of which is known as the \textit{fundamental attribution error}. This error is the tendency of observers mistakenly to attribute various behaviours to dispositional factors, that is, to traits specific to a person or group (agents), rather than to impersonal or general situational factors (structures or systems). While most participants attribute their actions to the situation in which they find themselves—and perhaps even see themselves as reacting to the situation or to larger events—outside observers often attribute others’ actions as resulting from the traits of individual personalities or the group. When observers are negatively disposed towards certain individuals or groups, attributing actions to immutable traits becomes the basis for prejudice, especially since observers generally see others as less variable and multifaceted than themselves.\textsuperscript{14}

Therefore, we may be more prone to attribute rational situational influences as the causes of our own actions, but perceive others as behaving less rationally based

\textsuperscript{12} Plous, pp. 109-120.
\textsuperscript{13} Ibid., pp. 178-180.
\textsuperscript{14} Ibid., pp. 180-187.
on their presumed dispositional (character) traits. This attribution error may explain why Western policymakers may be more inclined to define Western actions in terms of rational adjustments to an existing situation, structure, or system while attributing the cause of others’ behaviour to cultural, religious, or other dispositional traits. Indeed, in international relations, the dispositional versus situational question of causality may lie at the heart of the discipline’s agent/structure debate.\(^{15}\)

These various heuristic devices and their limitations and biases often lead to the selection and application of incorrect, often superficial, analogies and metaphors by policymakers in international relations.\(^{16}\) Most importantly perhaps, once these analogies and metaphors are developed and repeated many times, they become durable and persevere, gaining what scholars of political communication call ‘interpretive dominance’ even in the face of contradicting evidence. Thus, consistent exposure to and repetition of various metaphors and analogies can lead to the creation of a default framework of policy analysis that anchors subsequent information.\(^{17}\)

In the next sections, we will examine Romantic aspects in the work of Kaplan, Huntington, and van Creveld, including the Romantically-themed analogies and metaphors they develop, and we will investigate how this has impacted their views of the conflict in former Yugoslavia. We also will comment on the types of heuristic devices and biases that their works present.

3.2 Postmodern Jeremiah—Kaplan and the ‘coming anarchy’

‘And I will send the sword, the famine, and the pestilence, among them, till they be consumed from off the land that I gave unto them and their fathers.’

—Jeremiah, 24:10\(^{18}\)

War, famine, and disease are some of the common threads that bind American journalist Robert D. Kaplan’s disparate work together. While ostensibly a travel


\(^{16}\) Khong, pp. 29-46.


\(^{18}\) Old Testament, King James Version.
writer, Kaplan’s work has grander pretensions than this humble title suggests. Indeed, Kaplan has been one of the most influential populisers of the Zeitgeist of Postmodern Romanticism and its inherent pessimism whose travelogues filled with dire predictions on the state of the world have graced the pages of The Atlantic Monthly, an intellectually well-regarded and influential magazine published in the United States. Kaplan has used the magazine as a springboard for his views, some of which have also been reprinted in books. He is occasionally featured in columns and commentaries in such mainstream, Establishment newspapers in the United States as The New York Times, The Washington Post, and The Wall Street Journal. He is also a Senior Fellow at the New America Foundation. Kaplan is influential in military circles—he lectures frequently to the US military and was a consultant to the US Army’s Special Forces Regiment. His articles and books are widely cited, and he is invited to high profile meetings and events as a top speaker on international relations and the future of conflict.

Although Kaplan has been prominently criticised for writing ‘alarmist jumbles’ and for using African conflicts as ‘passive foils for the psychoses of others’, his work nevertheless had a significant impact on US policy during the Clinton administration, particularly with regard to US policy on Bosnia. President Clinton noted Kaplan’s influence on his views of the Yugoslav conflict several times, including in front of then Secretary of Defence Les Aspin and then Joint Chiefs of Staff chairman Colin Powell.19 As Sabrina Ramet noted, Kaplan’s Balkan Ghosts had a ‘baneful influence, infecting the rhetoric of British Prime Minister John Major and, by their own admission, influencing the thinking of US President Bill Clinton and EU mediator David Lord Owen’.20 This section will discuss some of this work and its influence over the past decade, beginning with an analysis of Kaplan’s methodology. Afterwards, we will examine how Kaplan uses this methodology to expound on the

---

Romantic themes we have identified, and how the heuristic devices and biases presented in his works make his views influential.

The first work of Kaplan’s we will discuss is a series of travelogues published in 1998 in the *Atlantic Monthly*: ‘Travels Into America’s Future’.\(^{21}\) In this series, later published as a book, *Empire Wilderness: Travels Into America’s Future*, Kaplan explores the US Southwest and Mexico, as well as the US Pacific Northwest and Canada as microcosms of what the future holds in store for the Americas. Considering that we will be focusing on aspects of Kaplan’s writing that deal with the former Yugoslavia, it might seem unusual to discuss these writings at all, as the regions that Kaplan discusses in this text—all in North America—are not in conflict. However, we will start with these articles because they give us the sharpest insight into Kaplan’s analytical technique and methodological approach. Why? These two articles, which were conceived as a single work, provide us within a unified text with the strongest contrast between different places that Kaplan visits—the Third and First Worlds. As we will see, throughout the travelogue on North America, there is a distinct difference in the way in which Kaplan reports his travels through Mexico from those in the US or Canada. These differences—which highlight his analysis and methodology—may not be so readily apparent in a text which focuses simply on one region, such as the Balkans. Additionally, these regions in North America, as well as their societies and histories, are also familiar to many in the West, and therefore Kaplan’s analysis may be more readily scrutinised. Finally, we will use the same method of analysis in comparing Kaplan’s work that focuses on the former Yugoslavia. Further, we will argue that Kaplan’s methods, and the conclusions that result from his analysis, stem not only from logical errors, but also partly from heuristic biases and attribution errors.

We will first look at the main techniques that Kaplan uses to derive his analyses: use of vivid language; focus on aesthetics to draw essentialist sociological conclusions; haphazard collection of anecdotal facts; and lack of attention to possible alternative explanations. While we examine these issues, we will discuss how his work fits the major themes of Romanticism we outlined in the last two chapters: anti-

---

rationalism, pessimism, relativism, nostalgia, and the use of nature as an aesthetic and ethic. For example, Kaplan’s work draws heavily on the assumption that people’s actions are based on irrational motivations, often those deeply rooted in a dysfunctional culture. Kaplan also primarily presents anecdotal evidence (some of it nostalgic) that is interpreted pessimistically, formed in a highly personal and impressionistic manner (for example, by simply strolling through an area rather than using more systematic techniques), which he then uses to draw broad, empirical social generalisations that are not tenable. Unfortunately, he often does not consider possible alternative explanations when forming conclusions. Finally, Kaplan bases a significant amount of his judgement of people, their motivations, their character, and their level of ‘civilisation’ on a key Romantic trope: the use of aesthetic judgements to draw historical, sociological, or ethical conclusions. In particular, Kaplan uses vivid language to describe the physical landscape and the people he encounters which is an especially potent persuasive technique.

(a) Reading Meanings into the Landscape—Kaplan’s Methods and Approach

The concept of nature and the importance of aesthetics is an important Romantic theme. Kaplan largely relays the aesthetics of his surroundings through the technique of vivid language. What is significant about Kaplan’s writing is its vividness, which captures and captivates his audience, increasing its availability and perception of plausibility. Kaplan has an affinity for creative description that strikes the reader as almost akin to watching a film or television—the images, crafted through strong verbs and liberal use of adjectives, unfold clearly in the reader’s mind’s eye and become real. Kaplan’s forte is capturing the space around him—its sights, sounds, smells and other sensual aspects of the places he visits. This is both its strength and its weakness.

There is a danger in the use of vivid language in that it can be used to supercede logic, by basing its appeal on mere ‘appearance’ alone, which leads to severely flawed judgements. It is this part of the logical flaw that makes Kaplan draw essentialist conclusions from his anecdotes. Yet the use of vivid language is a staple of travel writing, so what differentiates Kaplan’s work from others in the genre? What makes Kaplan’s work different is that it goes beyond mere travelogue; Kaplan draws
heavily on his physical surroundings—that he persuasively describes through vivid language—in order to make more attenuated social, historical, political, and moral judgements. These descriptions are not neutral, but rather are imbued with either pessimistic or optimistic connotations which imply social or ethical judgements. Thus, his writing is not merely about a place, but also about the ‘essence’ of its people, their history, their society, their level of ‘civilisation’, and their morality. He uses these ‘essences’ to causally attribute actions to people, relying on a dispositional rather than situational interpretation of causality. He then uses these conclusions about causality to draw broad foreign policy prescriptions which have resonance with American policymakers and political commentators.

We see the use of this technique often in Kaplan’s work. For example, the travelogue through Mexico and the American Southwest begins as Kaplan travels by bus to the north of Mexico bordering on Texas, with a pessimistic depiction of the landscape and people. He begins with a bleak description of desperate people scratching a meagre living on a desolate wasteland.\(^\text{22}\) Kaplan is immediately struck by the ugliness of northern Mexico. For Kaplan, there are no dirt roads with mere potholes, instead he declares them to be ‘cratered’; clouds are not ‘grey’ they are ‘iron’-coloured, conveying a sense of heaviness and despair; the landscape may lack a ‘poisoned ugliness’, but it is nevertheless ‘environmentally ravaged’ and scarred by ‘bleak underdevelopment and deforestation’. Indeed, Kaplan takes his forlorn description so far to declare that even the town’s green spaces are ‘overgrown and scruffy’, while the washing lines ‘sag’.\(^\text{23}\)

After situating the reader mentally in this depressing physical space, Kaplan then moves on to recount ‘the’ history of the place—a sad tale of brutal Spanish conquest, of Cortez and the conquistadors (‘crude zealots’)—and of the ‘macabre’ savagery of the Indians, with their ‘human sacrifices’, which he juxtaposes with a comment about the difference between the ‘Enlightenment Europeans’ who came to build the US and the barbaric nature of Spanish rule in Mexico.\(^\text{24}\)

This combination of a depressing physical description of the landscape and a pessimistic socio-historical commentary forms the pattern that Kaplan follows


\(^{23}\) Ibid.

\(^{24}\) Ibid.
throughout, with the current material living conditions of the locals serving as a reflection of their historical or social patterns. Throughout the text, Kaplan’s work exhibits signs of several classical historians’ fallacies—selection bias (very highly selective use of history); telescopic history (making a very long and multifaceted story very short and simple); tunnel history (the past leads inevitably to the contemporary situation); and presumptions of historical continuity (or inertia) in the case of Third World peoples, coupled with occasional presumptions of historical change (or dynamism) in the case of those in the First World.²⁵

However, the first fallacy we readily notice is Kaplan’s insistence on the literal truth of physical beauty—that beauty is more than skin deep: aesthetically pleasing surroundings imply a contented, democratic, free, efficient, hardworking, or moral populace. Ugly also goes straight to the bone—sagging washing lines imply laziness, inefficiency, despotism, or criminality. Like the Romantic poets, Kaplan reads meaning into the landscape. Hence Kaplan’s version of historical logic is summed up by Keats—‘beauty is truth, truth beauty,—that is all / Ye know on earth and all ye need to know’.²⁶ The aesthetic fallacy leads Kaplan to tell either beautiful truths or ugly ones. The beautiful ones are usually told about the Americans and Canadians. The ugly ones are told about the Mexicans.

In one passage, the physical scars on the Mexican landscape betray deeper historical ones, lurking deep in the heart of a people. For example, Kaplan combines a sombre description of Ixtlán del Río, with a telling historical point:

I opened the window curtains and saw dusty streets, broken sidewalks, and windows protected by metal bars; a man in worn and filthy clothes slowly cutting sugarcane; women with plastic buckets waiting in line for water; peeling posters advertising a bullfight; and men partly uniformed and carrying AK-47 assault rifles. On one corner was a white-tiled shrine holding busts of three early-twentieth-century revolutionaries: Francisco Madero, Venustiano Carranza, and Emiliano Zapata. I knew that they had fought one another and that each had been assassinated.²⁷

The deprived physical environment—‘dusty’, ‘broken’, ‘filthy’, ‘peeling’—is merely the outward manifestation of an even uglier social history, littered with assassinated revolutionaries, the symbols of a failed past.

²⁵ For a discussion on these fallacies, see David Hackett Fischer, Historians' Fallacies: Toward a Logic of Historical Thought (New York, NY: Harper, 1970).
²⁷ ‘Mexico and the Southwest’, p. 48.
Further on, Kaplan uses the same technique to describe Tepic and its residents—by turns punctuated with ‘boxy buildings marred by graffiti’, a ‘treeless wilderness of broken signs […] and hard right angles’, filled with ‘architectural bleakness’—which he pairs with the spiritual and moral emptiness of the social environment:

[Later, in the hotel restaurant, half a dozen young men in jeans, T-shirts, and Nikes entered. Two of them carried Magnum revolvers, which they carefully placed on the chair cushions and then sat on. They ate a three-course meal without the slightest show of discomfort.]

Yet Tepic, and by way of corollary the rest of Mexico, is not merely physically ravaged or socially deprived. It is also lost—its people are either in ‘denial’ of their brutal past or are ‘ambivalent’ about it, both of which have dire implications for its future. How do we know? Kaplan asks two hapless receptionists at a local hotel and tourist office workers about the Spanish explorer Coronado, and draws a universal blank. The implication seems to be that a people so out of touch with its own history cannot understand its future.

This method of drawing conclusions is typical of Kaplan’s work. Kaplan does not merely commit the fallacy of the lonely fact once; he does it consistently, drawing generalisations from a single anecdote. The evidence he gathers is haphazard—asking a question of two or three people who happen to be in the vicinity—and the resulting effort is just a ‘lonely fact’ from which broad generalisations are not sustainable. Kaplan does not seek out any empirical evidence, solid case studies, or expert opinion about Mexicans’ knowledge of their own history—of what they know, their attitudes about the past, and what it means (if anything) for the future.

The first full introduction we get to the US is in Tucson, which sharply contrasts with first impressions of Mexico. The American city is all ‘luminous metallic signs’, ‘landscaped roadsides’, and ‘upscale mini-malls’, in a ‘warm and

---

28 Ibid.
29 Ibid.
30 ‘Mexico and the Southwest’, p. 48
31 Interestingly, Kaplan considers the historical amnesia of many Americans to be a positive factor in economic development as it frees Americans from their past, making the US more dynamic and open to experimentation and innovation.
32 The fallacy of the lonely fact is when a scholar uses a singular ‘lonely’ fact in order to extrapolate a much larger conclusion, which is only supportable with many more facts. See Hackett Fischer, p. 109-110.
scenic desert location’ peopled with ‘prosperous retirees with independent incomes’. Kaplan continually suffuses his text with this optimistic, even nostalgic, image of pristine cleanliness, angularity, standardisation, and seeming tidiness, less as mere description and more as a general commentary on the inherent moral virtues and wholesomeness of American society, whose ‘silent streets’ and ‘their display of noncoercive order and industriousness, cast the United States in a different light not only from Mexico but from many of the other countries I had seen in my travels’.

Kaplan’s America nostalgically retains an almost-1950s quality about it, with order and efficiency the defining themes.

At the same time, ‘the chaos of Mexican construction’ —the shoddy material landscape of Mexico—is visible proof that ‘centuries of oriental despotism’ have kept Mexico down despite the influence of ‘a great democratic civilization to the north’. Even worse, Mexico may never be able to replicate the economic dynamism of its northern neighbour, since ‘[t]he unpalatable truth about Mexico is its intractability—the intractability of an ancient “hydraulic” civilization [. . .] in which the need to build great water and earth works [. . .] led to a vast, bureaucratic tyranny’. The past is surely prologue, at least for Mexicans.

Kaplan’s reliance on aesthetics to draw social conclusions causes his analyses to misfire seriously. For example, in his travels through the US Southwest and Mexico, Kaplan is surprised to learn of criminality in a ‘well-maintained’ Tucson, Arizona, suburb:

When Strong told me about the drive-by shootings and the crack houses, I was truly surprised: I saw well-maintained tract houses with metal or asphalt roofs and white-painted brick; some even had gardens of bougainvillea and oleander, despite the arid desert soil. The only hints of working-class poverty were old pickups and the occasional sagging clothesline.

While here Kaplan admits surprise at his mistaken analysis, one where American material success is a sign of proper behaviour and lack of criminality, it does not cause him to question how it may reflect on the rest of his social judgements; indeed,  

33 Ibid., p. 55.
34 Ibid., p. 54.
35 Ibid., p. 53.
36 Ibid., p. 52.
37 Ibid., p. 52. The comment on ‘hydraulic civilisation’ is a reference to Karl A. Wittfogel’s Oriental Despotism (1957). Wittfogel hypothesised that oriental civilisations became despot(ic) because of a need to control water resources, which made them essentially different from the West.
38 ‘Travels into America’s Future: Mexico and the Southwest’, p. 57.
he continues a similar travelogue-cum-sociological commentary in his follow up work on Southern California and the Pacific Northwest.³⁹

For example, equally mistakenly in this travels to California and the Pacific Northwest, Kaplan observes while strolling in a Latino community in Los Angeles that bridal shops are ‘suggestive of strong family patterns’ (unlike the black community), offering a pat cultural reason for the phenomenon rather than seeking a rational alternative explanation—a demographic bulge of youth of marriageable age among Latinos.⁴⁰ Or, Kaplan notes that the influx of new Chinese immigrants to the region are particularly wealthy, and again commits the fundamental attribution error by concluding that they are therefore more diligent, hardworking, successful—and thus better immigrants. However, he again fails to consider an alternative explanation—the significant flight of Chinese capital from Hong Kong to Canada and the US in the late 1990s following the handover of British sovereignty to China. Those best able to expatriate their profits did so as rapidly as possible.⁴¹ This pattern repeats itself throughout his works; Kaplan consistently offers dispositional factors rather than situational ones as causal explanations. In essence, Kaplan does not consider possible alternatives and instead draws value-laden sociological judgements based on anecdotes, often obtained in a haphazard way. These judgements reflect social prejudices about certain groups, implying a clear hierarchy, from poor to rich, with blacks on the bottom, Latinos next, and wealthy Asian immigrants on top.

In some sections of the text on his travels through North America, Kaplan slips into an essentialist analysis, betraying a disdain for Mexican ‘values’ and admiration for America ‘values’. For example, in one discussion of Latinos in the United States, Kaplan seems to imply that the only hope for Mexicans is if they become Americans even if this is merely the superficial adoption of American (or European) good habits and manners, particularly economic efficiency. If lucky, they may even be able to become ‘thoroughly modern’:

The people I saw on the street [in Arizona] were in most instances speaking Spanish, but they might as well have been speaking English. Whether it was the quality of their clothes, the purposeful stride that indicated they were going somewhere rather than just hanging out, the absence of hand

⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 40.
⁴¹ Ibid., pp. 40-42.
movements when they talked, or the impersonal and mechanical friendliness of their voices when I asked directions, they seemed to me thoroughly modern compared with the Spanish-speakers over in Sonora [Mexico]. The sterility, dullness, and predictability I observed on the American side of the border—very building part in its place—were signs of economic efficiency.42

Here Kaplan commits the fallacy of special pleading—that is, using a double standard of inference and interpretation.43 Kaplan seems to see the Mexican adoption of European values (or at least the mere appearance of European mores and manners, such as fashionable European clothing, 'purposeful' striding, and lack of gesticulation) as a path to transcendence—to obliterate a dysfunctional past, and replace it with a functional present and future, unlike the other incapable peoples of the South. Interestingly, Kaplan views this obliteration, a form of purposeful historical amnesia, as a positive force in the US, while at the same time condemning it in Mexicans. As outlined earlier, at the same time he questions how Mexicans—seemingly ambivalent, ignorant, or in denial about their violent history—can progress without knowing their past. Thus, Kaplan ascribes two different meanings and draws two distinct conclusions (and makes opposite judgements) about the same phenomenon. The only difference is whether he is speaking about Mexico or the United States.

Throughout, Kaplan draws broad conclusions and offers a strong opinion based on weak method; thus, at several points Kaplan's work is, at best, a combination of extremely detailed (mainly pessimistic or nostalgic) descriptions and a series of personal anecdotes. However, it is precisely this weak method which resonates with his audience and which makes his work memorable. By eschewing sound, yet pallid, information such as statistics or academic studies and relying on anecdotes and personal testimonies, Kaplan boosts the credibility and plausibility of his conclusions because the information he presents becomes readily available in the mind of his reader. Additionally, Kaplan's detailed word pictures and eye for the minutiae of life also increase the perceived representativeness of his information, while his reliance on the most prominent and obvious features enhance its plausibility. We will meet these and other biases in his work on the Balkans.

---

42 'Mexico and the Southwest', pp. 53-54.
43 Hackett Fischer, p. 110-113.
(b) Ethnic Cauldron?—Kaplan’s *Balkan Ghosts*

As we have seen from this overview of Kaplan’s writings on the Americas, Kaplan reflects various moods of the post-Cold War Romantic Zeitgeist, in particular its pessimism, emphasis on the irrational aspects of human nature, nostalgia for an often-idealised past, and the use of nature as an ethic and aesthetic. We will now examine how these techniques have been applied to his views on the former Yugoslavia.

With his dystopian vision of conflicts in former Yugoslavia, Robert Kaplan sprang to intellectual prominence as one of the new prophets of the post-Cold War world with his widely-read and influential *Balkan Ghosts*.\(^{44}\) Indeed, one scholar notes the particular influence of this work on US policymaking circles: ‘Balkan Ghosts was the only readable, up-to-date account of political life among the Serbs and Croats available when many Americans (including those who slept in the White House) were scrambling to understand the Bosnian tragedy’.\(^ {45}\) A US Naval War College publication notes in a short blurb to one of Kaplan’s articles that *Balkan Ghosts* ‘directly influenced US foreign policy in that region’.\(^ {46}\) Throughout the work, Kaplan uses similar techniques to the ones in used to describe the Americas: vivid descriptions in a travelogue style; use of aesthetic assessments to stand in as historical, cultural, and ethical judgements; use of historical analogies to discuss present-day problems; and finally a focus on the irrational, emotional, and relativistic aspects of the human condition, especially the obduracy of culture and religion as inescapable categories that determine historical destiny.

Kaplan opens his vision of the Balkans with a quote from Rebecca West: she had come to Yugoslavia ‘to see what history meant in flesh and blood’, both a lyrical and gruesome notion.\(^ {47}\) He then moves into his travelogue style of describing a nostalgic sense of place, and linking it with his pessimistic view of both history and its implications for the future. Thus Kaplan analogises the past as an object, being ‘underfoot’ in Croatia, like a soggy carpet of leaves, or as a hole in the Zagreb fog. The place itself is depressing, a ‘shadow-show’ (in the words of Rebecca West), a

---


\(^{47}\) Kaplan, *Balkan Ghosts*, p. 4.
tragedy where people 'become phantoms', a place of 'primitive ferocity' with a history of 'forty-five years of systemized poverty' under communism. Yet Croatia's deeper past, the past of Austria-Hungary, is still there in the 'luxurious decadence' and 'delicious gloom' of Zagreb, a mini 'fin-de-siècle Vienna'. All the signs of the degenerate Austrian Secession period and its subtext of louche disregard for the norms of propriety are there. In Zagreb's Esplanade hotel:

The lobby and dining hall resembled a cluttered art gallery whose pictures recalled the universe of Sigmund Freud, Gustav Klimt, and Oscar Kokoschka: modernist iconography that indicates social disintegration and the triumph of violence and sexual instinct over the rule of law.

In contrast with his descriptions of Croatia, which begin in the corrupt cosmopolitanism of an urban centre, Kaplan begins his treatise on Serbia in the pure, ascetic confines of the Gracanica monastery, with its Byzantine masterpiece of the suffering of John the Baptist, a figure 'distorted by hunger' who was 'too preoccupied with ideas to notice his physical suffering', which is a 'particularly oriental strength' that serves Kaplan's starting point for understanding the Serbs. These separate visions, one of degenerate urbanites the other of rural monks, set up Kaplan's dichotomy of Yugoslavia, a place where the debauched West, with its emphasis on commerce and pragmatism, meets the spiritual East, and its emphasis on magic and beauty. Indeed, Kaplan plays out a Huntingtonian theory of East and West churches—one of Western ideas and deeds versus Eastern splendour and mysticism which engenders inherently conflicting approaches to life.

The inevitable clash of civilisations between East and West—or where 'Asia meets Europe', as Kaplan again quotes Rebecca West—'the ultimate historical and cultural conflict' is the broader theme of Kaplan's book which he primarily explores through the prism of religion and how it creates primordial identity attachments that ultimately lead to tragedy. Indeed, most of Kaplan's section on Yugoslavia is a pessimistic tale of competing religions with repeated emphasis on images of Christianity and on the differences between Orthodoxy and Catholicism. While some attention is paid to the notion of Yugoslavism and such figures as Yugoslavist Bishop

---

48 Ibid., p. 5.  
49 Ibid., p. 6.  
50 Ibid., pp. 29-30.  
51 Ibid., p. 7.
Jure Strossmayer, the focus remains squarely on religion as a locus of identity in Yugoslavia. In Croatia, Kaplan mainly examines the Catholic Church and particularly the debate over Cardinal Alojze Stepinac—his fanaticism, bigotry, and ‘Cromwellian air’—and his relationship with the fascist Ustashe puppet state during World War II. While certainly Stepinac is part of the story of the Catholic Church, Kaplan’s text makes it seem as if it were the only story, as he returns to this theme time and again: Stepinac’s guilty ghost clearly stalks not only the region, but Kaplan as well.52

Kaplan repeats this sense of the tragic and nostalgic in Serbia, noting ‘[a]s I had tried to intuit the sensibility of Croatia’s national problem through its cathedral, I tried to do the same with respect to Serbia through its monasteries.’53 Kaplan begins his religious history of Serbian orthodoxy not during World War II, as with the Croats, but 800 years ago, chartering the history of the Serbian church and state from the time of Stefan Nemanja to his son Sveta Sava (Saint Sava), and later to his descendent King Milutin, of whom Kaplan paints a scandalous picture of lust for women and voracious ‘sexual proclivities and imperialist ambitions’ which included Milutin consummating his marriage to the six-year old daughter of Byzantine emperor Andronicus as part of a deal to keep him out of Constantinople.54 Whether discussing Serbia or Croatia, Kaplan’s emphasis remains squarely on the emotional aspects of human action, with a pessimistic undertone of instinctive violence and barely-concealed primitive desire.

While Kaplan makes an uncharacteristic foray into an economic interpretation of the reasons for Yugoslavia’s demise, noting that ‘positions [between Yugoslavia’s republics] hardened under the weight of increased poverty, an annual inflation rate of several thousand percent, and the fragmentation of the Yugoslav federation’,55 he maintains that the real battle between Yugoslavia’s national groups is one over the historical meaning, real or imagined, of a thousand different forms of suffering which forged their national identities, whether from the almost mythical past, like the history of Kosovo Polje, or of more recent nostalgic vintage, like the horrors of World War II. Through these references to a tragic past, Kaplan consistently implies that Yugoslavia’s core problem may be ‘too much history’, or at least too many collective memories of suffering and grief, implying that a form of historical amnesia might be

52 Ibid., pp. 9-16.
53 Ibid., p. 30.
54 Ibid., p. 31.
55 Ibid., p. 13.
a potent cure for the region’s ills. Yet this is a form of special pleading: it is precisely this historical forgetting that Kaplan deplores in his other travels through Mexico, where he signals that a nation so out of touch with its past cannot have a future.

Kaplan’s characterisations of people are also instrumental to this task. For example, the first Croat Kaplan meets in Zagreb is Slavenka Drakulic, the well-known writer, dressed ‘with a panache that complemented’ her opulent surroundings in the Esplanade hotel: ‘designer black glasses’ and ‘a bright red headband that perfectly matched her red blouse and lipstick’. Drakulic provides Kaplan with an expertly articulated argument about Yugoslavia’s downfall, drawing parallels to the Soviet Union.56 By contrast, the first Serb Kaplan meets in Kosovo (which he uses as his set piece to discuss the Serbian mentality) Kaplan describes as a ‘peasant’—Mother Tatiana, a nun with a ‘strong, lusty appearance’ and eyes ‘strangely unfocused, as though blotted out by superstition’.57 Mother Tatiana is no sophisticate and does not wax historic or provide complex political analyses; she is prone to simplistic, nationalistic outbursts against Albanians.58 Thus, Kaplan again pessimistically underscores the differences between East and West through a bifurcated cultural prism—educated, pragmatic West versus uneducated, superstitious East—based on a few personal conversations and other anecdotal evidence. However, whether educated urbanites or unsophisticated peasants, both inevitably seethe with historical and cultural resentments: the Croats over the ever-present ghosts of Austria-Hungary, the Serbs over the fact that the wealth and prosperity of Western Europe was ‘constructed over [their] bones’, and both over World War II.59

Kaplan also tries to provide an irrational, emotionally-based explanation for the ‘tribal’ nature of Yugoslavia and its ‘tendency’ towards mass fanaticism: ‘[the] psychologically closed, tribal nature tribal nature of the Serbs, Croats, and others makes them […] suited to crowd symbols’.60 The clear image is that these people are pre-modern, reacting to deep, irrational passions and emotive primitive symbols rather than reason, ‘full of suspicions and hatreds’.61 Kaplan highlights this idea by

56 Ibid., p. 6.
57 Ibid., p. 34.
58 Ibid., pp. 33-34.
59 Ibid., pp.23-36 and 33.
60 Ibid., p. 16.
61 This is one of Kaplan’s comments on Bosnia. He also adds that Bosnia is replete with villages ‘full of savage hatreds, leavened by poverty and alcoholism’, Ibid., pp. 22-23.
paraphrasing West’s comment on the fall of the Ottoman empire, that ‘there is a lot of emotion loose about the Balkans which has lost its legitimate employment’.

Kaplan’s use of sources also reveals his pessimistic vision of history as an inescapable tragedy that will be repeated over and over again by successive generations. For example, Kaplan makes extensive use of old sources to confirm and colour his own views. He uses West’s 1937 pessimistic travelogue extensively throughout to guide him and to pepper his own views of Yugoslavia, which he considers as relevant today as when they were written. He also uses the accounts of pessimistic observers John Reed (1915) and Nevill Forbes (also from 1915) to provide an analysis of the contemporary situation in Yugoslavia, as if nothing, especially the mentality of the people, had changed in 75 years. This is despite the fact that in those 75 years the regions which later became Yugoslavia went from being one of the poorest and most poorly educated in Europe to Western levels of literacy and technical education, with the highest standard of living in communist Eastern Europe. Thus, Kaplan’s work is stuck in a time warp of interpretation. By relying so heavily on such pessimistic sources, Kaplan is almost compelled to see a grim future in a gloomy past, using selection bias, a reliance on tunnel history (all tunnels lead to today), and the telescopic fallacy (making a very long history very short through selective facts) which limit his vision. Had Kaplan chosen to follow the work of another commentator who travelled to the region during West’s time, such as journalist Elizabeth Wiskemann, he might have had a different view on Yugoslavia.

While Kaplan extrapolates more of a theory with less material than many writers, his thesis—that the religious basis of identity and historical animosities created the conditions of a Balkan tinderbox and generated the war in Yugoslavia—is highly persuasive for policymakers because it fits several key criteria for successful heuristic devices: easy availability; recency; high perception of representativeness; and use of surface commonalities, especially salience, to draw conclusions. First, Kaplan’s information is easily available (memorable) to policymakers because his writing is so vivid and emotional, as well as based on compelling first-hand

---

62 Ibid., pp. 25 and 35 (Forbes); pp. 8, 34, 35, 38, and 52 (Reed); and pp. 1, 4, 10, 26, 35, 52, 58, and 72 (West).

63 For a discussion on the logical fallacies of tunnel history and telescopic history, see Hackett-Fischer, pp. 142 (tunnel history) and 147 (telescopic fallacy).

64 Elizabeth Wiskemann, Undeclared War (London: Constable, 1939).
experiences and conversations rather than on pallid academic statistics. His information is also recent (the war in the former Yugoslavia was ongoing at the time of his writing), boosting its ease of recall. Second, Kaplan’s information has a high perception of representativeness because it contains rich details, which are important in helping his audience imagine his scenarios unfold, thus making policymakers’ judgements of their probability, and the concomitant acceptance of Kaplan’s ideas, more likely. Finally, Kaplan’s use of surface commonalities, particularly the salience of ethnic differences—that is, since differing religious and cultural groups were in conflict, thus it was a conflict about religion and culture—boosts his believability since a factor’s prominence or obviousness is a key factor in its perceived importance and thus in the persuasiveness of Kaplan’s arguments.

For all these heuristic biases, perhaps Kaplan’s most significant weakness in *Balkan Ghosts* is promoting the ‘fundamental attribution error’—that of asserting that possibly situational actions of participants are actually dispositional, a function of the actors’ immutable group traits. This gives Kaplan’s writing the sense that the culture of the ‘Other’ is hermetic, unified, and unchanging rather than as complicated or multifaceted as that of the West and varying over time. Instead, this error promotes the understanding of identity as a fixed and given end rather than a means to an end and leads to silences about the possibilities for instrumentalising culture and religion to serve political purposes, or how the rhetoric of culture or religion can be used to achieve specific political goals.

3.3 Every One Against His Brother—Huntington’s culture clash

‘[A]nd they shall fight every one against his brother, and every one against his neighbour; city against city, and kingdom against kingdom.’

—Isaiah, 19:2

Does the future hold increasing conflict, pitting neighbour against neighbour across lines of culture and identity? Samuel Huntington’s controversial work, *The Clash Of Civilizations*, forcefully puts forward the thesis that conflicting cultural values along civilisational lines defined the post-Cold War conflicts of the 1990s and will be the

---

65 Old Testament, King James Version.
shape of wars to come. While a variety of commentators have objected to Huntington’s claims, his paradigm of increasing civilisational conflict remains pervasive and influential. Indeed, Huntington’s work—which exhibits several traits common to Romanticism including pessimism, a sense of nostalgia, and a focus on irrational and relativistic factors—has reached a large audience outside the United States and the English-speaking world, particularly gaining a hearing with some Asian and Muslim scholars.

First, ‘clash of civilisations’ is an intrinsically pessimistic theory. Importantly, the theory contradicts the rationalist view that modernisation and economic development, including economic globalisation, along Western lines will lead to greater Westernisation or the acceptance of Western universal values. Rather, ‘clash’ theory argues that these processes have created various patterns of rejection and reform that threaten both the stability of non-Western states and may set the stage for future clashes between different civilisations. Part of its pessimism is its declinism and cyclical sense of history. Huntington’s ‘clash of civilisations’ theory contains within it an unspoken understanding of the rise and decline of civilisation that is largely channelled through the intellectual prism of scholars with cyclical views of history, such as Arnold Toynbee, Oswald Spengler, Fernand Braudel, and Carroll Quigley—philosophical pessimists to a man.

The inherent declinism in these works tacitly pervades Huntington’s own thesis and informs the direction of his analysis. For example, without the implicit Romantic notion of cyclical history in ‘clash of civilisations’ theory, Huntington’s future of identity-based rivalries and conflicts would not necessarily be viewed as ‘inevitable’, nor would the rise or decline of any particular civilisation be seen in this light. Indeed, so strong is the embedded understanding of a cyclical history within ‘clash’ theory that Huntington’s thesis has attracted supporters among Romantics in the non-Western world. These observers see outside (generally Western, often American) influences as normatively bad and share a declinist and melancholic,

---

68 Sadowski, p. 72.
69 Huntington, Clash of Civilizations.
70 Huntington, Clash of Civilizations, pp. 40-45 and 302-304.
cyclical historical view of their own ‘decaying’ cultures. They therefore seek to create a separate carve-out for their own particularistic ethnic or national values, such as ‘Asian values’ or ‘Islamic values’, which they believe have socially regenerative or spiritually redemptive qualities.

Second, Huntington’s emphasis on civilisations contains within it an unseen kernel of nostalgia. Fundamentally, descriptions of anything as broad as a ‘civilisational character’ simplify the multiple historical strands, narratives, or themes that occur through time by reifying some and minimising others. Often those themes we choose to represent the ‘character’ of a civilisation while salient (in the sense of most obvious) are not necessarily the most important or enduring. They can be, however, the most nostalgic. Such character descriptions may be tales of how we wish to see ourselves and our past, rather than complete descriptions of the lived past. For example, Huntington’s description of Western civilisation focuses on a few key themes, in particular the rise of the West economically (through capitalism), militarily (through technological superiority), and politically (through democratisation). Thus, the great river of ‘Westernness’ has one fountainhead, only flows in one teleological direction, and has no tributaries. This creates the impression of a hermetic notion of ‘Westernness’ as defined by these characteristics, which then become ideals by which all cultures are judged, rather than merely a potentially changing set of values or practices common to a specific group at a certain time. It also enshrines the rise and apogee of capitalism, innovation, and democracy in Western society as being firmly in the past, thus engendering a certain sense of decline and a nostalgia for those past ‘lost’ values.71

Third, and perhaps most importantly, Huntington’s theory stresses the importance of anti-rationalism and relativism in international relations. ‘Clash’ theory sees so-called irrational and relativistic factors, such as culture and ethnicity, as the primary motivator for future conflicts—the principal fault lines of fragmentation—which will come about through increasing globalisation (or perhaps more accurately, through democratisation and Americanisation). ‘Clash’ theory takes as its basic unit not the state, which has traditionally been the focus of international relations, but more broadly the concept of ‘civilisations’. While the idea of ‘civilisation’ is always a

---

71 Huntington’s nostalgia about past ‘lost’ values is perhaps best outlined in a later book discussing the decline of traditionally Anglo-Protestant American values and the challenge of Latino culture. See Samuel P. Huntington, Who Are We?: The Challenges to America’s National Identity (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 2004).
slippery notion, Huntington presents a well-thought-out concept of civilisation, despite many criticisms about the foundational problems about parsing identities while living in a so-called world of multiple or fluid identities that many of his critics see as his main flaw.\(^\text{72}\) Huntington sees nine basic civilisations, mainly defined by religion, each with a ‘core’ or dominant state or set of states that support and discipline others within its civilisation and take the lead in inter-civilisational conflict and cooperation. For Huntington, these nine civilisations and possible dominant states are: Western (United States and Western Europe); Latin American (Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, and Venezuela); African (Côte d’Ivoire, Nigeria, and South Africa); Islamic (Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Malaysia); Sinic (China); Hindu (India); Orthodox (Russia); Buddhist (Thailand, possibly); and Japanese (Japan).\(^\text{73}\)

Two brief general points about the focus on culture and irrational factors in ‘clash’ theory can be made. First, Huntington’s list of ‘civilisations’ and core states seems fairly reflective of international power politics as it already stands, where most of the largest, wealthiest, and most powerful states are now also leaders (or ‘core states’) within their civilisations, as well as powerful state actors in their own right. Indeed, Huntington tries to graft the concept of culture to the more traditional one of power (‘culture [...] follows power’), even quoting Shakespeare’s Brutus in *Julius Caesar* to elucidate his point.\(^\text{74}\) Therefore, there is a question as to how much an improvement over the traditional concept of power politics the notion of civilisational politics has if power, traditionally-defined by Realist as capabilities, and leadership within a civilisation automatically go hand-in-hand. Second, Huntington’s use of

\(^\text{72}\) However, critics themselves generally do not see the possibility of a hierarchy of identities within their conception of multiple identities. Identities are assumed to be equal. For one critic’s view of this issue, see Stephen Chan, ‘Too Neat and Under-thought a World Order’, *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* (Vol. 26, No. 1, 1997), pp. 137-140.

\(^\text{73}\) Huntington, *Clash of Civilizations*, pp. 45-48. Note that Huntington’s separates Western and Classical (Ancient Greek and Roman) civilisations. His views are parallel to Carroll Quigley’s who discusses the differences between the two in *The Evolution of Civilizations: An Introduction to Historical Analysis* (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Press, 1979), pp. 269-414. Historian David Gress also separates Classical and Western civilisations, arguing that the Western ‘grand narrative’—which recounts a continued, unbroken line of intellectual history from the ancient Greeks to Western civilisation today—is flawed, and that Western culture has been mediated through both Roman thought and Christianity, particularly Germanic Christianity. See David Gress, *From Plato to NATO: The Idea of the West and Its Opponents* (New York, NY: Free Press, 1998).

\(^\text{74}\) Huntington, *Clash of Civilizations*, pp. 310-311. The quote Huntington uses is: ‘Our legions are brim-full, our cause is ripe. / The enemy increaseth every day; / We at the height, are ready to decline. / There is a tide in the affairs of men, / Which taken at the flood, leads on to fortune. / Omitted, all the voyage of their life / Is bound in shallows and in miseries. / On such a full sea are we now afloat, / And we must take the current when it serves, / Or lose our ventures.’ Interestingly, the quote also suggests a *raison d’être* for preventative war.
religion as shorthand for ‘civilisation’ and perhaps less grandly, ‘culture’, and its relationship to development is not new—Max Weber uses religion as an explanation for the rise of capitalism in Protestant countries. However, Huntington’s particular view of some religions is very heavily influenced by what can be described as Romantic Orientalist works which essentialise other cultures. For example, Huntington relies on Bernard Lewis, who has been criticised for his anti-Arab and Romantically-tinged emotionalist views, to inform his perspective of Islam.

From a methodological perspective, the metaphor of Yugoslavia and what it means more broadly for ‘clash’ theory looms large in Huntington’s analysis. Huntington fleshes out his thesis with a variety of examples for different types of conflicts including what he terms ‘fault line wars’, or wars in which two civilisations meet and clash. The most extended of the examples that Huntington offers dissects the war in former Yugoslavia, which he calls ‘the most complex, confused, and complete set of fault line wars of the early 1990s’, and indeed his entire chapter on ‘The Dynamics Of Fault Line Wars’ draws heavily from the Yugoslav case. Thus Huntington derives a significant amount of mileage for his general thesis on this example. Indeed, when interviewed, Huntington has specifically mentioned the Yugoslav case as an example of what can happen when dangerous inter-civilisational rivalries break into conflict.

Importantly, Huntington uses the Yugoslav case to argue one of the key premises for his clash thesis: that civilisational conflicts provoke ‘kin country’ rallying across borders; that is, that civilisational brethren rally to each others’ causes based on their (irrational) cultural or religious affinities rather than on a serious, rational calculation of economic or political interest. This premise is important because it suggests both the pattern of alliances in conflict and also implies how conflict can either be spread as more cultural ‘kin’ become involved or contained as cultural core states move to police conflict. However, Huntington’s assertion of the primacy of culture may be one long fundamental attribution error, as it places disposition (cultural characteristics) above situation as the seat of causality.


Huntington, Clash of Civilizations, p. 281 and pp. 266-298, respectively.

See a transcript of his interview with journalist David Gergen for the American television programme The News Hour with Jim Lehrer in PBS, ‘Many World Orders’, Online NewsHour, (9 January 1997), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/gergen/january97/order_1-10.html
Huntington tries to prove his concept of ‘kin country’ rallying with the conflict in former Yugoslavia by claiming that the Serbs, Croats, and Bosnian Muslims all received support from ‘civilisational’ kin (the Russians, Germans, and Iranians, respectively). Unfortunately, his analysis misfires largely through a lack of seeking alternative explanations. While he recognises that one major player—the United States—did step outside its ‘civilisational’ (Western) interests to support the Bosnian Muslims, Huntington’s explanation for this falls flat: that the US did so mainly for a dispositional reason, which is according to Huntington a ‘widespread sympathy’ for the Bosnians as well as American ‘idealism, moralism, [...] naivete, and ignorance’ about the region.79

Thus, Huntington downgrades the importance of situational possibilities and causes for US actions. Could there not have been various situational factors or interests at stake, for example the US recognition of its broader role in maintaining post-Cold War order as the world’s lone superpower? Some of Huntington’s despised ‘isms’ could have been at issue, but within the larger context of situational interest, broadly defined. Additionally, Huntington is silent on why those with the same cultural dispositions acted so differently in the case of Yugoslavia’s disintegration. While Huntington notes German support for Slovenian and Croatian independence, he omits mentioning opposition to it from Great Britain and France, both of which failed to rally to the Croatian (Western Christian) side of a supposedly ‘civilisational’ war, as his thesis would predict. Clearly, other types of interests or considerations must have been in play, yet Huntington fails to elucidate any of them.

If cultural ‘kin’ do rally to support each other, then the reason is assumed to be that the action is ‘civilisational’ (rather than interest-based) and that cultural survival is at stake. Yet if cultural ‘kin’ do not rally then other, non-civilisational issues are presumed to be involved. This pattern repeats itself through the work. For example, in the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, Huntington fails to explain why the Islamic Republic of Iran (a core Islamic state) failed to support its Muslim brethren, the Azeris, and instead sided with the Orthodox Armenians, while Russia (the core Orthodox state) backed the Azeris. Clearly, civilisational compatibility took a backseat to some rational consideration of interest. This begs the question: when does

action on the basis of interest trump identity? Or, can identity itself merely be a cloak for interest?

While these and other flaws exist in *Clash of Civilizations*, Huntington’s work is persuasive because it relies on a few key heuristic devices that convince his audience of the purchase of ‘clash’ theory. Although Huntington writes well, he generally eschews the more colourful, vivid language that Kaplan employs to such heady effect in his travelogues—cum-commentaries and provides more logically compelling evidence such as statistical information. Instead of vividness, Huntington relies on the heuristics of availability, representativeness, and surface commonalities (such as salience) to persuade his reader. For example, Huntington’s examples are drawn from (at the time) current events, thus making the events compelling to his audience and easy to remember, which has the effect of increasing their availability in the mind of the reader.

Additionally, Huntington offers a considerable amount of detail in his key examples (particularly in his longer cases, such as Yugoslavia) which heightens their plausibility and hence our perception of their representativeness, or the probabilistic assessment of their likelihood of happening in a particular manner. Most importantly, Huntington’s use of surface commonalities pervades his work. In particular, Huntington uses the salience of culture or religion in a few key examples, particularly Yugoslavia, to argue that cultural factors are indeed the most important ones in leading to conflict. However, it is a fallacy to argue that the obvious trait that commands the most immediate attention, in this case cultural difference, is the actual reason for the underlying conflict. Indeed, without offering and eliminating other possibilities for conflict this assertion cannot be made.

Finally, Huntington’s work exhibits some aspects of the fundamental attribution error in action. Through its emphasis on the most salient characteristics of culture and identity Huntington’s thesis relies largely on dispositional characteristics of ‘civilisations’ rather than on situational factors to explain actions. By discounting situational effects, Huntington’s limits his exploration of motives past the most obvious or seemingly dominant traits of post-Cold War conflicts and does not adequately test alternative explanations, creating a major lacuna in his work.
3.4 Return to Darkness and the Sword—Decline of the state and rise of insecurity in Van Creveld’s neo-medievalism

‘He believeth not that he shall return out of darkness, and he is waited for of the sword.’

—Job, 15:22

Another influential commentator who heralded the 1990s as an era on the cusp of an increasingly anarchic future is Israeli military historian Martin van Creveld. Van Creveld perhaps most clearly exemplifies those works which postulate the decline of the modern, centralised state, a state that has for 200 years effectively imposed order on its territory through the Weberian monopoly of violence while summoning great loyalty to its cause by a grateful (or at least placid) citizenry. Rather than today’s Westphalian world of state-imposed, territorially-bounded order, van Creveld and others envision a future encompassing a looser constellation of weaker, quasi-medieval powers that lack the centralising will to impose order and extinguish conflict, thus generating greater global insecurity, if not downright chaos. In this sense, for van Creveld and other neo-medievalists, the decline of the state and the security umbrella it provides for its population means that we are approaching a period of darkness where the collapse of authority will doom many for the sword. Van Creveld outlines these pessimistic visions in two of his main works, The Transformation of War and The Rise and Decline of the State.81 Van Creveld sets out his views on the decreasing capabilities of states in Rise and Decline, while Transformation of War focuses on the move towards a more anarchical future, a scenario which had particular resonance in the early 1990s.

For van Creveld, the decline of traditional strategy- (or policy-) driven war made by states for political ends augurs the end of modern war as we know it and instead portends of a more ominous anarchical future. In Transformation of War, van Creveld argues that modern, Clausewitzian war (‘trinitarian’ war) is comprised of the trinity of government (state), army, and people.82 This ‘trinity’ is breaking down as

80 Old Testament, King James Version.
81 Martin van Creveld, The Transformation of War (New York, NY: Free Press, 1991), and Martin van Creveld, The Rise and Decline of the State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). Note that Transformation of War was published by Brassey’s in Britain under the title On Future War.
82 While Clausewitz himself uses the term ‘remarkable trinity’ in reference to war, some scholars claim that van Creveld and others misunderstand Clausewitz’s use of the term when they apply it to mean a modern ‘trinity’ of state, army, and people. Instead, they argue, Clausewitz used the term to describe
Chapter 3

states disintegrate; armies outsource, relying on mercenaries or privatised security forces; and the people become less loyal to the state. State decline and breakdown has led to a greater number of low-intensity conflicts that will further erode the ‘trinitarian’ structure of war as the people see that the state is impotent in the face of this type of challenge. The future of warmaking is likely to be less by states than by tribes, robber barons, guerrillas, or religious zealots supporting themselves through criminal activity. Therefore, future wars are more likely to resemble medieval patterns, where ‘to speak of war in modern Clausewitzian terms as something made by the state for political ends is to misrepresent reality’. Therefore, trinitarian war is inherently political, but non-trinitarian war is essentially apolitical, being more an extension of personal rivalries and loyalty-based charismatic leadership. Indeed, the concept of ‘interest’ (rational calculation) as a cause of war in the future might well be dead; van Creveld notes that the concept itself is a sixteenth-century neologism and, therefore, by implication not applicable to pre-modern forms of warfare.86

For van Creveld, the root cause of the coming transformation of war—from modern, political Clausewitzian war, to a more barbaric and loose quasi-medieval, apolitical form of war—and impending insecurity is the decline of the modern state. Van Creveld’s thesis is based on four trends which he sees as hastening this decline and the slide into neo-medieval anarchy and conflict. These factors are: the state’s declining ability to fight other states; the waning of the welfare state and its paternalistic treatment of citizens; the effects of democratisation and ease of access to various technologies and mass communications, as well as globalisation; and the state’s declining ability to maintain public order.87

In *Rise and Decline* van Creveld provides us with a broad, sweeping overview of the development of the modern Western (or at least westernised) state, which he contends reached its apotheosis from 1789 (the French Revolution) to about 1945, at the irrational (emotion), non-rational (chance), and rational (calculation) forces at play in war. Thus the concepts of ‘non-trinitarian’ or ‘non-Clausewitzian’ war are a contradiction in terms since these forces would be in play in pre-modern as well as modern war. See Edward J. Villacres and Christopher Bassford, ‘Reclaiming the Clausewitzian Trinity’, *Parameters: US Army War College Quarterly* (Vol. 25, Autumn 1995).

84 Ibid., p. 52.
85 Ibid., pp. 52, 197, and 212.
86 Ibid., p. 212. However, this last point is a bit like arguing that gravity never actually existed until Newton ‘discovered’ it and gave it a name.
87 Van Creveld initially outlines these points in a 1996 article, Martin van Creveld, ‘The Fate of the State’, *Parameters: US Army War College Quarterly* (Spring 1996), pp. 4-18. He also makes these arguments throughout *The Rise and Decline of the State* (1999).
the end of WWII, although he does also discuss the burgeoning growth of the welfare state from 1945-1975. Van Creveld argues that this Golden Age represented ‘the transformation of the state into a god on earth’, a period during which successful states were capable of ‘squeezing the last ounce of marrow out of their citizens’ bones’. Before the development of a strong centralised state, van Creveld argues, insecurity in its various guises was endemic throughout the world, not only during the period of city states or tribal rule but also during the period of medieval governments. Indeed, it was not until the medieval state had faced down the external challenges of the Catholic Church, the Holy Roman empire, the nobility, and the entrenched interests of urban communities, morphing into the more modern monarchical state from 1300 to 1648 (the date of the signing of the Treaty of Westphalia), that greater order and security were possible for most of its subjects.

Since 1975, van Creveld contends, the modern state has gone from being considered by its citizens as both necessary and idealised to being burdensome. This is seen in the state’s declining share of gross national product at its command; the dwindling scope of its responsibilities, especially in terms of providing mass welfare; the increasing capabilities of non-state actors, such as NGOs and corporations; and the state’s growing impotence at providing security and enforcing its sovereignty over its territory. With this diminishing power has come diminishing respect for the state itself; van Creveld cites a growing lack of trust in governments, a lack of willingness among citizens to fight for the state, growing integration in such entities as the EU, and even the waging of unpopular wars (such as the US war in Vietnam or the USSR’s war in Afghanistan) as factors that lead to the erosion and loss of popular loyalty to the state. Interestingly, while noting the state’s decline in welfare provision, van Creveld does not suggest that it may have natural limits. He does not discuss the problems of privatisation, namely the lack of public accountability of private or privatised entities and public distrust of for-profit government outsourcing, no matter how efficient it may be. Such public disquiet over the democratic deficit this poses suggests a natural limit on public, taxpayer, citizen, and voter tolerance for such schemes.

---

89 Ibid., pp. 261 and 262, respectively.
90 Ibid., pp. 410-414.
were) within a Romantically cyclical view of history, as well as a projection of our modern insecurities and feelings of pessimism coupled to a déjà-vu medievalism.

Van Creveld’s work contains a subtle sense of nostalgia about the modern state and modern warfare that we mainly discern through his stark dichotomy between the modern state and war, and the pre-modern or non-modern ‘state’ and pre-modern war. Van Creveld does this by creating a significant distance between modern war and pre-modern or medieval war. Whereas the modern state is impersonal and professional, its goals political and rational, the pre-modern forms of political organisation were personal and parochial, their goals apolitical and irrational. Whereas modern war is surgical, clinical, and antiseptic, non-modern war is messy, barbaric, and intimately—if not passionately—human, unlike the bloodlessness of modern, technology-driven warfare. Indeed the entire concept of ‘trinitarian’ (Clausewitzian and hence ‘modern’) war in van Creveld’s hands almost sounds like a form of religion; a holy trinity of state, army, and people performing in sacred unity, whereas ‘non-trinitarian’ war is an unholy act, bereft of the divine blessings of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost of warfare.

Van Creveld couples this pessimistic sense of the future of the modern state (and the certain demise of ‘clean’ modern warfare) to a cyclical understanding of history and implicit analogies of youth (virility) and old age (impotence). While the future looks bleak and anarchical, the virile, young modern state over the past 200 years created a Golden Age in terms of order; its increasing impotence now in the face of challengers foretells of anarchy. In this way, van Creveld argues that the modern state is now reaching its nadir; in its crippled old age it cannot fight back against the centrifugal forces pulling it apart to impose order. Yet how likely is it that perhaps the most successful and democratic form of political organisation, with an historically unparalleled extractive ability, will go gently into that good night? As one commentator notes, such analyses about the death of the state ‘[miss] the slyness of states, the unsentimental and cold-blooded nature of so much of what they do as they pick their way through chaos’.91 Indeed, far from being news, reports of the death of the state have been greatly exaggerated. As one observer has noted, the role of the state in the future is always predicted to be less than it was in the past; even Adam

Smith and Karl Marx have made this claim. In various fits of wishful thinking, Liberal declinists have been writing its obituary since at least the middle of the last century. Therefore, the trajectory of state decline, if there even is one, is unlikely to be clear, linear, or particularly rapid.

With regard to Yugoslavia, since van Creveld mainly takes a generalist and long historical view, his works make only a passing mention to Yugoslavia, often within the broader context of World War I, World War II, or other post-Cold War ethnic conflicts, for example, Somalia, Sri Lanka, or Rwanda. Thus, van Creveld does not explicitly use an extended discussion of the disintegration of Yugoslavia as a framework for his thesis or to develop a metaphor for post-Cold War conflict.

However, in the preface of *Rise and Decline*, van Creveld argues that his final chapter on the decline of the post-1975 state outlines 'forces which, even now, are undermining states all over the world, and which, will in all probability, cause them to collapse (as in Yugoslavia)'. Thus, while the specific causes of Yugoslavia’s demise are not carefully delineated, the break up of Yugoslavia still remains a cautionary tale, the key—if unspoken—example of post-Cold War state failure and rapid decline into a neo-medieval future.

Van Creveld persuades his reader not through the technique of vivid language like Kaplan, or through use of the salience of culture like Huntington. Rather, van Creveld’s key heuristic is representativeness, specifically in arguing that the medieval past is being reborn in modern times by creating an artfully crafted mosaic out of various fragments of history. In this way, van Creveld projects our modern insecurities about the crumbling of the Cold War order onto an assembled version of medievalism. Yet is history merely a repetition of assembled facts or an interpretation of events? If the latter, then history is what we make of it, and van Creveld has turned the medieval state into a metaphor for post-Cold War disorder and the collapse of the certainties of the bipolar world. Interestingly, van Creveld’s medieval state is

---

92 Observation made by commentator at Chatham House discussion in 2005.
94 Van Creveld mentions Yugoslavia on four pages (pp. 48, 61, 194, and 220) in *Transformation of War*, and Bosnia on one page (p. 44). In *Rise and Decline*, he discusses Yugoslavia on seven pages (pp. 36, 255, 353, 375, 395-396, and 414) and Bosnia on three pages (pp. 353, 385, and 414).
95 Van Creveld, *Rise and Decline*, p. viii.
Chapter 3

remarkably different from its earlier Victorian version, which was prized for its moral clarity, paternalistic order, and strict hierarchies.

If we read van Creveld’s descriptions of the state in decline—moving towards a more medieval type of security regime—less as a theoretical framework for understanding the future of the state or of the anarchical future of international relations and more as a product of our particular time and place, we see that the collective ‘storyline’ does not speak of a ‘straight’ medievalism with all of its complexities. Rather, the tone of neo-medievalism is a postmodern twist on nineteenth-century Romanticism. Just as the early Victorian Romantics turned to the nostalgia of a specific version of the Middle Ages during their own turbulent times in order to reject what they saw as the horrors of the industrial age, the postmodern turn to medievalism fits the needs of our post-Cold War age.

The Romantics dressed up their desire for a ‘purer’ society that existed before the Industrial Revolution and their nostalgia for an age of stability with a fashion for Gothic horror, neo-gothic architecture, and revivals of interest in Arthurian legend, chivalry and good manners, as well as romance novels akin to Rolland’s medieval masterpiece, La Romance de la Rose. This Romanticised view of the Middle Ages represented the period as an age of romance and adventure, as well as one of orderliness, patrimony, and security. In a pessimistic and uncertain age, the Romantics mined medieval history and selected those aspects which best suited their needed version of the Middle Ages, one which offered a nostalgic salve and the promise of a social utopia.

However, the Romanticised post-Cold War version of medievalism—neo-medievalism—radically departs from the typically nostalgic and sentimental Victorian version of the Middle Ages and instead offers a dystopic reading of the medieval period. For van Creveld and other Postmodern Romantics, the Middle Ages are no longer associated with a sentimental nostalgia and a mythical longing for a medieval Golden Age. The orderly hierarchical society and the chivalrous manners of its errant knights are gone. Instead, neo-medievalism has selected those dismal aspects of the medieval past which it pessimistically projects onto the present and future. For neo-medievalists, the Middle Ages have become a shorthand for the fear, foreboding, and pessimism that have plagued the post-Cold War ‘order’—pessimism about the barbarism of war, the insecurity of globalisation, and the uncertainties of democratisation that have come in the wake of the collapse of the bipolar world.
With its emphasis on loose identities, fluid boundaries, and fragmentation of authority, neo-medievalism may be less an assessment of the objective realities of the 1990s than a reflection of the underlying pessimism and sense of decline stalking the post-Cold War era, mirroring the myriad insecurities and uncertainties facing publics and policymakers during an age of seemingly rapid transformation. Just as the utopian Romantic vision of the Middle Ages says more about the nostalgic Victorian longing for stability in turbulent times than it does about the medieval period, the dystopian Postmodern Romantic vision of the Middle Ages (neo-medievalism) says more about the post-Cold War era’s collective sense of insecurity in the 1990s than what the medieval past actually was. In both cases, an emotion-laden selection bias seeks to condense the specific Romanticised ‘truths’ from the past that we believe are most closely reflected in our era.

3.5 Omnium Finis Imminet?—Conclusion

‘But the end of all things is at hand: be ye therefore sober, and watch unto prayer.’

—1 Peter, 4:7

With their vivid visions of the future of conflict—partly drawn through the metaphor of Yugoslavia—Kaplan, Huntington, and van Creveld foretell the ‘end of all things’ the West took for granted under the Cold War’s bipolar system of international relations: order and stability, peace and predictability. All three authors develop their arguments and base their predictions by drawing on a rich and varied set of Romantic themes, including irrationalism, pessimism, relativism, and nostalgia, persuading their readers through the use of various heuristic devices and the operation of heuristic biases. They also rely to various extents on the violence generated by the disintegration of former Yugoslavia as a broader metaphor for the future of conflict.

All three authors place a strong emphasis on the growing importance of irrational, emotional, and relativistic factors in early post-Cold War conflict and in the future of conflict. Kaplan argues the importance of religion in shaping national character and culture in an unnuanced and essentialist manner. His views telescope hundreds of years of national histories into clean and predictable trajectories for the

---

future based on various religious differences. In contrast, Huntington avoids this simplistic formula, but still outlines the centrality of religion in shaping political culture through a more sophisticated argument about the development of civilisations. While Van Creveld does not directly tackle these arguments, he heralds the end of rational calculation in warfare, since for him the developing non-trinitarian conflicts seen worldwide will be more about personal or parochial disagreements and be fought based on irrational loyalties to tribes or local fiefs rather than to large utility-maximising, rationalist agglomerations, such as states.

Pessimism and nostalgia are also recurring themes with all three authors. Kaplan's work is replete with pessimistic judgements, mainly told through his depressing physical descriptions of various poor places. Additionally, his trope of reading meanings into the landscape lends his work the air of an inescapable tragedy, where actors are passively, or at least helplessly, caught in circumstances beyond their control. In Kaplan's world, these circumstances were foretold through the iron logic of history, as some sort of biblical destiny. For Huntington, pessimism is most fully expressed through his implicit understanding of cyclical history, of the rise and decline of civilisations, while Van Creveld waxes pessimistic through his selection of aspects of medieval history. A Romantic concern with nostalgia also flavours these works. Kaplan manifests nostalgia through his telescoping of history, where the past is always melancholically present. Huntington's focus on civilisations is a form of nostalgia, as civilisations inevitably become unchanging essences caught in a timewarp of interpretation. Van Creveld's nostalgia comes through with regard to trinitarian (modern) war and the modern state, which he reifies into especially rational, orderly, and antiseptic beings when contrasted to the bloody messiness of 'pre-modern' states and warfare.

These declinist views of the future of international relations are persuasive because of the various heuristic devices and biases that Kaplan, Huntington, and van Creveld employ throughout their works. For Kaplan, the most persuasive technique at his disposal is his journalistic gift for vivid language, which has a striking immediacy that places the reader in the centre of an easily imagined space. Kaplan uses this technique to elide between aesthetic and ethical judgements of whole cultures. Huntington's work plays on various causal biases, including salience and the fundamental attribution error. By assuming that wars between cultures (or civilisations) are fundamentally about them, Huntington elevates salience to
causation. This has the potential to turn culture almost to a post hoc ergo propter hoc fallacy. Huntington also uses the observer’s natural psychological willingness to attribute the causes for the actions of others to their irrational dispositions, while attributing his own actions to a situational rationality. Thus the fundamental attribution error of seeing character (or culture or identity) as the key variable determining the actions of others, while seeing rationality as the seat of our own motivations, may operate powerfully in Huntington’s work. Van Creveld’s work relies on the heuristic of representativeness: on how closely the period of the Middle Ages parallels our own. However, van Creveld’s work is an historical mosaic of selected, often-pessimistic aspects of the medieval period. As we have seen with the Victorians, the Middle Ages could equally be seen as representative not of conflict and disorder, but of political stability, religiously-inspired order, and a corporatist form of paternalism in society, depending on the selection bias of the observer.

Each of the three authors also develops his thesis with regard to the disintegration of Yugoslavia, and how it serves as a Romantic metaphor for the future of conflicts. Kaplan offers an extended commentary on the disintegration of Yugoslavia through the perspective of inevitably clashing, primordial ethnicities indelibly marked by religious differences. Huntington uses the conflicts in Yugoslavia as the prime example of his theory on the clash of civilisations, particularly the concept of ‘kin country rallying’, and the future of civilisational alliances and clashes in ‘cleft states’. By contrast, Van Creveld eschews an extended dissection of the Yugoslav wars but notes that his neo-medieval vision of the future of conflict had already essentially come true in the example of Yugoslavia. Thus Yugoslavia stands as a foretaste of the great day of wrath to come in the post-Cold War world.

If we view these three authors’ interpretations of conflict from a broader perspective, we can see that the Romantic (and often pessimistic) analyses of ‘exotic’ conflicts are often judgements about the unpleasant or at least different dispositional (cultural and hence irrational) factors of those involved in conflicts rather than analyses of their situations. At the same time, in Western conflicts, such as the war in Iraq, we recognise the situational (interest-based and hence rational) factors that drive conflict and are less likely to attribute our motivations in conflict to cultural characteristics. Therefore, we in the West are more likely to see our own conflicts from a more rational and dispassionate perspective, as the result of underlying
necessity and reason, and hence to see them as less tragic. Conflict viewed from the perspective of those involved in conflict is not necessarily futile, barbaric, or even tragic, but may be a deliberate act, or even a sacrifice for a group goal.

Thus warnings of a coming anarchy, civilisational clash, or the possibility of a neo-medieval future are not simply descriptive of the post-Cold War world, a series of objective assessments about international relations, nor are they just predictive of the world to come. These pessimistic pronouncements are also prescriptive, operating as prophetic admonitions about the prospect that violence and chaos in the developing world will act as a contagion—infected a complacent, apathetic West—and sounding a call to arms against this complacency. In this sense, they fundamentally resonate with the aura of declinism that pervades the Romantic Zeitgeist of post-Cold War international relations. In the next chapter we will examine the accuracy of these Romantic pronouncements of chaos, anarchy, and ethnic conflict through an empirical investigation that compares trends in armed conflict during the Cold War era with those of the 1990s.
Chapter 4. Increased Conflict in the Early 1990s: A Harbinger of the Coming Anarchy?  

'It is Thomas Malthus, the philosopher of demographic doomsday, who is now the prophet of West Africa's future. And West Africa's future, eventually, will also be that of most of the rest of the world.'

—Robert D. Kaplan

In the early 1990s, Postmodern Romantics like Robert Kaplan, Samuel Huntington, and Martin van Creveld predicted a coming era of conflict that would differ significantly to what had gone before. Their visions painted a disturbing picture of growing anarchy, civilisational clash, and state fragmentation that would not just engulf the Third World, but would also increasingly threaten the West. These visions of fragmentation and disorder generated specific predictions about conflict, especially that post-Cold War conflicts would be both quantitatively more numerous and qualitatively different from Cold War conflicts. Their hypotheses may be summed up as follows:

1) the dislocations of globalisation create social frictions and state fragmentation leading to disorder and generating a greater number of conflicts;

2) these social frictions are over identity-based (ethnic, cultural, or civilisational) differences;

3) identity-based conflicts are more intense, leading to more death and destruction;

4) identity-based conflicts are intractable, creating longer conflicts that are more difficult to end;

5) African conflicts are a 'contagion'; they are an example of what lies in wait for the developed world.

Considering the prevalence of their message in the 1990s, it is valid to ask whether these Romantic predictions of anarchy and chaos came to pass or whether they were manifestations of the sense of pessimism and decline that defined the Romantic

---

1 This chapter is based in large part on the author's work as a Summer Associate at The RAND Corporation in Santa Monica, California in 2000.

Zeitgeist in post-Cold War international relations. The most objective way to investigate that question and the validity of the Romantic 'coming anarchy', 'culture clash', or 'neo-medievalism' hypotheses about conflict is through an examination of the empirical evidence on armed conflicts, comparing the 1990s with the period of the Cold War, and investigating whether the post-Cold War era actually experienced greater, and growing, conflict along the lines that Romantic theories would have predicted. Based on the empirical evidence, we will argue that Romantics incorrectly predicted a decade of increasing conflict in the 1990s. Furthermore, these predictions remain invalid this decade.

4.1 Looking Backward—Background to the chapter

If we were to look at the historical conflict data narrowly from the vantage point of 1992, then our answer to Romantics purporting that the world was on the cusp of a 'coming anarchy' and endemic conflict might be 'maybe we are'. If we were to restrict our discussion to conflicts from 1945-1992, then the unmistakeable trend in conflict at that point would seem to be ever upwards, particularly after 1989, when conflict trends careened skywards after the end of the Cold War, sharply and ominously so. In that period, the number of total ongoing conflicts in the world during a particular year rose from less than ten in the wake of World War II in 1945 to nearly 60 ongoing conflicts by 1992.3 Perhaps more importantly, there was a sharp spike in new conflicts from 1989 forward, from an average of about two new conflicts per year in the Cold War 1980s—the decade immediately preceding the end of the Cold War—which almost doubled to an average of 3.5-3.75 new conflicts per annum in 1989-1992, based on results obtained from the Singer & Small and SIPRI quantitative datasets, and the Kosimo qualitative dataset, respectively.4 The following graph highlights these results.

---

3 Based on the results from the Singer & Small and SIPRI, as well as Kosimo datasets.
4 For a discussion of the methodology used in this chapter, see the Appendix.
From the perspective of the early 1990s, then, anarchy and ever-growing ethnic conflict seemed a potential future scenario as conflict spiked in the first few years of transition from the Cold War. Behind these cold numbers, the human toll of post-Cold War conflict was harrowing. As two scholars noted, ‘at the beginning of 1993, about 63 percent of the world’s 42 million refugees were fleeing from ethnopolitical conflicts and repression’.\(^5\) All of these observations lent themselves to the pessimistic conclusion that the world was indeed on the cusp of increasing disorder, if not outright anarchy. In particular, commentators noted the rise and rise of ‘ethno-nationalist’ conflict in the 1990s as a key harbinger of increasing anarchy worldwide. From the vantage point of the early 1990s, the Romantics seemed to have been right.

However, what does the empirical evidence say about this trend? Did the number of conflicts increase throughout the 1990s and beyond? Did any particular conflicts contribute disproportionately to the common perception that the world was on the brink of increasing anarchy? As the Romantics predicted, were ‘culture clashes’ the primary forms of conflict? Could we therefore expect an anarchical future of ethnic conflict or of fissiparous states? Were identity-based conflicts more intense or intractable? Did African conflicts act as a ‘contagion’, ‘infecting’ other parts of the world?

In order to examine the viability of the Romantics' predictions, in this chapter we will examine some of the empirical data on armed conflict to ascertain:

1) conflict levels during the Cold War period from 1945-1988, overall and by region as a basis for further comparison with the post-Cold War period;
2) conflict levels in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, from 1989-1992, and conflict from 1993-1999, overall and by region, in order to ascertain whether conflict increased in the 1990s;
3) conflict levels after 2000, in order to explore whether conflict levels increased this decade;
4) how the break up of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia affected post-Cold War conflict levels, in order to investigate whether the disintegration of these two multinational states disproportionately affected conflict levels;
5) how African conflicts affected post-Cold War conflict levels, in order to see if African conflicts provided a 'contagion' effect;
6) the rate of conflict termination during the Cold War and the 1990s, in order to see whether conflicts in the 1990s had become more intractable;
7) the relationship between conflict and state creation from 1945 to 1999, in order to investigate whether identity-based conflict had become more prevalent in the 1990s, or whether state creation could explain an increase in 1990s conflicts;
8) the main reasons for conflict from 1945-1999, including the effects of conflict issues on conflict duration and casualties, in order to examine whether identity-based conflicts had become more numerous, more intense, or more intractable than other conflicts in the 1990s.

4.2 Methodology—Definitions of conflict and overview

In order to answer these questions, we need to define what we mean by 'conflict' for the purposes of our study. Various empirical datasets use several alternative definitions for conflict, whether measured in qualitative or quantitative terms. For this study, we are interested in the most serious cases of conflict, those that would

---

6 For a discussion of the methodology we use to create greater comparability between the databases, see the Appendix.
conventionally be called a war. That would mean that lower levels of violence, such as various state police actions, riots, or coups would necessarily be excluded. It would also exclude low-level terrorism. In quantitative terms, one of the most common definitions for a conflict rising to the level of a war is that at least 1,000 deaths have occurred over the course of the conflict.\(^7\) In qualitative terms, there are many possible thresholds for war, however, the definition we will use is any conflict which brings about the sustained use of regular government troops.\(^8\) Both types of definitions have their strengths and weaknesses.

The quantitative definition allows easy comparability in terms of magnitude or scale of the conflict. We can ascertain that conflicts that reach the threshold of 1,000 deaths are of sufficient magnitude to deserve serious scholarly attention. Such conflicts are unlikely to include local skirmishes or minor outbreaks of violence, and instead are likely to occur only as a result of deliberate actions and intent, as well as some form of group organisation. Additionally, quantitative definitions are scalable—conflicts with more deaths are readily identified as being more serious, more intense, or more longstanding, therefore indicating the willingness of the parties to pursue violence at a high level of intensity to achieve a particular outcome.

To track quantitatively-defined conflict levels,\(^9\) we will examine two widely used conflict databases that use this definition of conflict: the Singer & Small database and the SIPRI database.\(^10\) Both databases categorise conflict in terms of the

---

\(^7\) This definition was first used by Quincy Wright. The 1,000 deaths threshold has also been used subsequently by many other scholars. This is the threshold definition used by the Singer & Small and SIPRI databases. Other definitions include 1,000 deaths per year, or at least 1,000 deaths in any one year of a conflict.

\(^8\) This definition is the highest threshold definition for war used by the researchers at Heidelberg University in developing the Kosimo database, which uses qualitative criteria for defining levels of conflict.

\(^9\) 'Conflict levels' are defined as the amount of 'conflict' present—whether quantitatively or qualitatively defined—at a certain time.

\(^10\) The Singer and Small data are from J. David Singer and Melvin Small, *Correlates Of War Project: International and Civil War Data, 1816-1992* [Computer file] (Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research, 1993). The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) database on Major Armed Conflicts is compiled by researchers for the Uppsala Conflict Data Project (UCDP) in Uppsala University, Sweden, and is published annually in the *Journal of Peace Research*. See [http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/UCDP/](http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/UCDP/) While it is sometimes referred to as the UCDP dataset, we will call it the SIPRI data here as it is the data that appears in SIPRI's annual yearbook on armed conflicts. In our analysis, we use the data as updated in 2000 throughout, except for post-2000 data, in which case we use Version 3 of the data which is noted. The data have gone through various updates. For a discussion of changes to the database, see 'Armed Conflict Dataset Version History and Known Errata'. Available at [http://www.prio.no/cwp/armedconflict/current/version_history.pdf](http://www.prio.no/cwp/armedconflict/current/version_history.pdf) Although a revised version of the Correlates of War dataset now has data through 1997, we use the SIPRI data for the post-1992 period. Note that the new version of the SIPRI dataset (Version 3.0) includes coding for a conflict's Correlates of War number.
number of battle deaths. The Singer & Small Correlates of War database from the University of Michigan, which is used for data from 1945-1992, defines ‘war’ as 1,000 deaths incurred over the course of the conflict.\footnote{11} The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) database on armed conflict, which we use for the quantitative data from 1993, codes for three levels of intensity: minor armed conflict, intermediate armed conflict, and war. For our purposes, we only consider the two higher SIPRI levels, intermediate armed conflict and war. SIPRI defines the threshold for intermediate armed conflict as ‘at least 25 battle-related deaths per year and an accumulated total of at least 1,000 deaths, but fewer than 1,000 per year’, while the threshold for war is ‘at least 1,000 battle-related deaths per year’. For our purposes, this means defining ‘war’ at the level of at least 1,000 deaths over the course of the conflict since these levels are comparable to the Singer & Small definition.\footnote{12} Both the Singer & Small and the SIPRI datasets require that one party to the conflict be a state.

On the other hand, while quantitative definitions have the benefit of being readily comparable, qualitative definitions of conflict can convey the implied intent or the seriousness with which a state’s government perceives a particular conflict, even if few or no deaths are involved. For example, a state’s use of regular government troops to put down a relatively small rebellion in a minority region that results in few deaths may indicate that the state views any type of rebellion as a serious existential issue and therefore would be worthy of scholarly attention. To track qualitatively-defined conflict levels, we will use the relatively new Kosimo database developed at Heidelberg University in Germany, which broadly defines conflict qualitatively as

the clashing of overlapping interests (positional differences) around national values and issues (independence, self-determination, borders and territory, access to or distribution of domestic or international power); the conflict has to be of some duration and magnitude of at least two parties (states, groups of states, organizations or organized groups) that are determined to pursue their interests and win their case. At least one party is the organized state.\footnote{13} Kosimo qualitatively defines ‘war’ as a ‘systematic, collective use of force by regular [government] troops’.\footnote{14} Therefore a state has to be one party in the conflict as well.

\footnote{11 See the Correlates of War Project Database User Manual.}
\footnote{12 See the SIPRI Data Codebook, section on ‘Intensity Level’.}
\footnote{13 The Kosimo data was developed by the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research. See http://www.hiik.de For the definition of ‘conflict’, see the Kosimo Manual, section on ‘Operational Definition’. Available at http://www.hiik.de/en/manual.htm}
\footnote{14 See the Kosimo Manual, section on ‘Variable 14, intensity of conflicts’, which it codes from 1-4 for intensity. Kosimo collects data on all conflicts, violent and non-violent and uses other definitions for
Chapter 4

The comparative use of both definitions to examine conflict levels over a long period has several advantages. First, it allows us to check whether scholars’ analyses of conflict levels mostly depend on which definition of conflict they use. Do perceptions of conflict—in this case, wars—and pessimistic conclusions about a ‘coming anarchy’ depend merely on scholarly choice of definitions? This would be true if conflict levels between the datasets differed significantly over time, particularly if they went in different directions, with one definition showing increasing conflict levels while another indicated decreasing levels over time.

Second, using both types of definitions significantly improves the robustness of any conclusions we can draw. If conflict levels across both types of definitions show trends of relatively similar magnitude and direction, then the conclusions we can draw from them are not dependent on a particular, narrow definition of conflict, possible diverging interpretations of data, differences in data collection, or any idiosyncrasies specific to any one particular dataset. Instead, confirming results across datasets would suggest that despite differences in definition and data collection, the results robustly reflect actual conflict trends.

(a) Methodology—Level of analysis

The level of analysis we will use in this study will be states. All three databases use this level of analysis, so it is the most pragmatic level of analysis to continue to use for this study. Additionally, the state has been the traditional subject of study in international relations and most available data are gathered on this basis. Apart from these practical considerations, using the state as the level of analysis also has another advantage: it allows us to examine trends in types of conflict. For example, are new conflicts arising within sovereign borders (intragovernmental) or between them (intergovernmental)? Are new conflicts between neighbours sharing a border? Are they over the creation of new states or over governance and control?

lower-level conflicts. These types of conflicts are: latent conflict (completely non-violent); crisis (mostly non-violent); and severe crisis (irregular use of force). The only level we will consider in this chapter is for conflicts coded as level 4, 'war'.
(b) Methodology—Unit of analysis and ‘counting’ conflicts

There are various ways to count conflicts, such as the number of total conflicts in any one year, whether new or ongoing. The unit of analysis we will use is the number of ‘new conflicts’ per year. A new conflict is defined as a war between two or more parties that has arisen in a particular year that is not part of an already ongoing conflict. A conflict can be categorised as a ‘new conflict’ in several ways. For example, a new conflict may be between two parties that have never engaged in conflict before. Or it may be a new issue area of conflict between two parties that have experienced conflict in the past. Alternatively, it may be a new party that arises in an already ongoing conflict, changing the conflict dynamic.

This has an impact on how conflicts are counted. For example, a conflict is only counted once: in the year it begins. While conflicts can last several years, they are only counted in the initial year of conflict. For example, a war beginning in 1982 and ending in 1985 would only be coded as new for 1982. Considering that there are various ways to count conflicts, why do we use ‘new conflicts’ as the unit of analysis? One reason is that counting the total number of ongoing conflicts during any one year gives a different picture of conflict than examining new conflicts. If we were to use the method of counting ongoing conflicts, or total conflict, we would get an aggregation effect. The picture we would see is one of steadily increasing conflict over time merely through the accretion of old conflicts. By this we mean that since many conflicts do not end in the year that they begin, but rather that there is an overhang of several years. For example, if in 1980 there were 10 ongoing conflicts and 4 new conflicts, while in 1981 there was only 1 new conflict, the data would show that there were 14 total conflicts in 1980 (10 ongoing plus 4 new conflicts) but 15 conflicts in 1981 (11 ongoing plus one new conflict). Therefore, even though many more new conflicts were started in 1980 than 1981, 1981 would appear to be a year of higher conflict. Unless many ongoing conflicts terminate and no or very few new conflicts start, these results easily compound over time, and the picture that we would build is one of increasing conflict.

The advantage of using ‘new conflicts’ as a unit of analysis is that it avoids the accretion of conflicts over time and allows us to examine whether the end of the Cold War actually heralded an age of greater conflict. We can specifically compare the number of new conflicts and rate that new conflicts have been developing in the
post-Cold War era with the number of new conflicts and the rate that existed during the Cold War. With these definitions and parameters in mind, we examined aggregate conflict data that have been developed from three databases—the Singer & Small database, the SIPRI database, and the Kosimo database.

(c) Methodology—Calculating base rates of conflict

In order to ascertain whether conflict went up inexorably during the 1990s as Romantics predicted, we need some way to measure the relative frequency of conflict before and after the Cold War to create a basis for comparison. By examining conflict levels during the Cold War period, we can determine the expected level of conflict; that is, the level of conflict we could have expected had the Cold War not ended. This level of Cold War conflict will serve as our primary means of comparison with the 1990s. We will also examine the regional distribution of conflict over time to see if there are any changes from the Cold War period.

To compare conflict levels between the Cold War era and the 1990s, we calculate base rates for conflict by region for each decade of the Cold War. The Cold War base rate is calculated by counting the number of new conflicts that were started during a particular time period (usually a decade) and dividing by the number of years covered. The base rate per decade tells us what the expected conflict levels are for any given region during the Cold War period. We then compare these expected rates of Cold War conflict with the actual observed rates of conflict after the Cold War. Do expected and observed rates differ considerably in the 1990s? In other words, had the expected rates of conflict during the Cold War changed after the end of the Cold War, and if so, did these trends continue, as Romantics argued? If conflict continued to rise after the end of the Cold War, then Romantic visions of a ‘coming anarchy’ may have been correct.

However, if conflict levels from 1989-1999 continued at the same rate or lower than during the Cold War, it suggests that the ‘coming anarchy’ hypothesis was incorrect. We will also look at levels of conflict termination to see if the end of the Cold War changed the rate at which ongoing conflicts ended. Again, a high rate of conflict termination when compared to Cold War levels also suggests that there was

\[15\text{ A calculation for the base rate is included in the Appendix.}\]
no ‘coming anarchy’ as Romantics predicted. Indeed, it may signal the opposite: that the 1990s was a time of conflicts ending.

Differences between the expected and observed conflict rates by region over time also allows us to determine if conflict in certain regions—particularly in the former Soviet Union and former Yugoslavia (FSU/FY)—contributed disproportionately to overall conflict levels in the 1990s. For example, if much of the new conflict we saw in the early 1990s was concentrated in a particular region or a few states, such as FSU/FY, then this would also question the Romantic ‘coming anarchy’ thesis as these conflicts were not generalised; rather they may be epiphenomena.

Finally, if conflict levels changed, then how did they differ and in which regions over time? For example, did conflict levels increase in all regions after the Cold War, or did they decrease or remain on par with Cold War levels in some regions? Widely distributed increasing levels of conflict, particularly after 1989, would indicate that the Romantics’ predictions were correct, while falling conflict levels would suggest that they were incorrect. Indeed, an inconsistent rise in conflict levels across regions raises doubts about Romantic hypotheses about conflict.

4.3 Conflict Levels—The Cold War, 1945-1988

To determine expected levels of conflict for the Cold War for comparison with the present, we examined conflict rates for the following categories of regions: Africa, Asia, the Middle East, the Americas, Oceania, Europe, and the FSU/FY. We chose the categories mostly on a geographic basis, but also partly to be able to distinguish clearly conflict levels in FSU/FY and their overall contribution to conflict rates. Because of this, the regional category ‘Europe’ is defined as all European states from the Atlantic to the Urals except for those in the FSU or FY. When we complete our calculations, the time series for quantitatively-defined conflict is as follows:

---

16 The countries defined in each category are listed the Appendix.
17 Of course, we could have validly defined other regions, such as all of Europe, including the FSU in that category, or Eastern Europe and Western Europe if we did not wish to examine the FSU/FY as a separate region in greater detail.
18 Note that the time periods used in the graph are decades, except at the beginning and end of the series which are shorter. Strictly speaking, graphs should always use equal units for comparison purposes, in this case years. However, since the study covers the period of the Cold War, usually defined as non-World War II related conflicts from 1945-1988, the beginning and ending ‘decades’
What is immediately noticeable from the graph is that base rates for Cold War conflict hit their peak in Asia immediately after World War II, with the second highest overall peak also in Asia in the 1970s, although Africa runs a close second in the number of new conflicts for that decade. In Africa, base rates of conflict were relatively low after World War II, and climbed during the 1950s and 1960s, reaching their peak in the 1970s and dropping off sharply in the 1980s. Base rate conflict trends for the Americas indicate that conflict was at its highest in the immediate aftermath of World War II, with rates dropping in the 1950s, and then levelling off throughout the rest of the Cold War. The Middle East also showed relatively steady base rates of conflict throughout the period. By contrast, Cold War conflict base rates were zero for FSU/FY and for Oceania. Similarly, if we develop a graph for qualitatively-defined conflict using the Kosimo dataset, the time series is:

---

under consideration are shorter than 10 years. This is not an attempt to confuse the reader, rather simply a matter of trying to capture the historical time period as conventionally defined.
The Kosimo dataset confirms that the peak of Cold War conflict was reached in Asia in the late 1940s, immediately after World War II. For Kosimo, the second highest peak occurs in Africa in the 1970s, with the number of Asian conflicts close behind. Thus the second peaks differ between the datasets, with the positions of Asia and Africa reversed. However, since the difference between Africa and Asia is fairly small, the results are fairly comparable to the quantitative data.

### 4.4 Conflict Levels—The post-Cold War transition, 1989-1992

When we compare the Cold War period with its immediate aftermath—the three years from 1989-1992—a different pattern of conflict arises. In the graph below, we use the Cold War annual base rates of conflict calculated for each region to determine the number of conflicts we would have expected if Cold War conflict rates had continued during the period 1989-1992; this is the number of expected conflicts. The observed conflicts are the actual number of new conflicts that started from 1989-1992.
What is immediately noticeable is the sharp spike in the number of actual conflicts observed occurring during the period of 1989-1992. Instead of the ten new conflicts that would have been expected if Cold War conflict trends had continued, 1989-1992 saw 17 new conflicts, or a rise of 70 per cent above expected levels. However, the trend is not uniform across all regions. Conflict levels in Asia and the Americas show a trend downwards—the end of the Cold War signalled fewer conflicts in those regions in its immediate aftermath—and Oceania remained at its Cold War historic zero level of conflict. Surprisingly, Europe showed an increase in conflict; however, that conflict was a single, brief conflict—the Romanian revolution—which was more of an outlier than part of a larger trend across non-FSU/FY Eastern Europe. The Middle East also saw a rise in conflict at the end of the Cold War due to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the First Gulf War against Iraq. However, the main reason for the significant rise in conflict from 1989-1992 was due to the doubling of the number of new conflicts in Africa and to the development of new conflicts in FSU/FY, a region which had experienced a zero level of conflict during the Cold War; had Cold War conflict trends continued, this area would have expected a zero level of conflict. Examining the data from the qualitative Kosimo dataset shows similar results—a sharp upwards trend in conflict levels with a similar conflict distribution.
While the qualitative data would have predicted that about eight new conflicts would have been expected worldwide during 1989-1992, 15 conflicts actually started, almost double the rate of new conflicts erupting during the Cold War. However, confirming the Singer & Small data, the qualitative data indicate that conflict levels were not uniformly high in all regions. The number of actual conflicts in Asia and the Americas dropped significantly lower than their expected levels, while conflict was up in the Middle East (again the invasion of Kuwait and the First Gulf War), and one conflict began in Europe—again, the Romanian revolution—which caused an unusual, if brief, trend upwards in Europe. However, the Kosimo data also confirm the quantitative data and indicate that conflict rates increased markedly in Africa, and perhaps most surprisingly in the FSU/FY—which had a zero base rate of conflict during the Cold War and therefore had no expected conflicts.

4.5 Conflict Levels—The later post-Cold War, 1993-1999

Did conflict levels continued to follow the pattern of increasing conflict set at the end of the Cold War or did the pattern change? If we consider 1993-1999 we see that the number of new conflicts by region actually dropped to Cold War levels. That is, after a period of significantly increased conflict during the immediate end of the Cold War, overall conflict levels regressed to the mean and were approximately at or below their expected Cold War levels. Neither the quantitative nor qualitative data suggest that

---

19 The SIPRI data show a smaller drop in Asia.
conflict was on an increasing spiral upwards after 1993, thus refuting the Romantics’ predictions. Examining the numbers of expected and observed new conflicts, and comparing the quantitative and the qualitative data side-by-side, we obtain the following chart:

**Graph 4.6: Expected versus Observed New Conflicts by Region, 1993-1999**

Overall, the quantitative data indicate that the number of observed conflicts worldwide during 1993-1999 was below Cold War levels, while the qualitative data denote that conflict levels were just slightly higher than those during the Cold War. In both cases, the data suggest that conflict levels peaked in the early 1990s and fell at or below their historical Cold War levels afterwards.

From a regional perspective, all regions except Africa and the FSU/FY showed significant declines in observed levels of conflict when compared with historical Cold War levels. This occurred even in regions of perceived high conflict, such the Middle East. The Americas also showed improvement, with conflict rates dropping about 50 per cent over Cold War levels after 1988. Perhaps the most significant reduction in conflict rates occurred in Asia, which held the dubious title of ‘leader’ in the Cold War conflict stakes, with the highest regional conflict levels during the Cold War. Levels of conflict in Asia plummeted in the range of 50 per cent (qualitative data) to 80 per cent (quantitative data) after the end of the Cold War.
For Africa, conflict levels continued to be higher. While the data show a wide range, they indicate the same general trend—conflict was up significantly after the end of the Cold War—35 per cent higher (according to the quantitative data) to 106 per cent higher (qualitative data) than their Cold War rates. Comparatively speaking, both types of data show that conflict rates in Africa rose during the whole of the post-Cold War period (1989-1999) were higher, and showed no signs of improvement post-1992, the peak year of world conflict overall. When compared to the Cold War period, the number of observed conflicts over the number of expected conflicts in Africa more than doubled from 1989-1992, with a similar trend seen from 1993-1999.

Put into an historical perspective, during the Cold War, Asia was the region with the highest overall conflict levels, with average Cold War base rates of conflict of 0.66 conflicts per year, which was about 14 per cent above Africa’s average base rate of 0.57 conflicts per year (Kosimo qualitative data). The Singer & Small quantitative data show an even larger difference between the two regions during the Cold War, with Asian base rates at 0.9 conflicts per year—or almost 50 per cent higher—than African rates of 0.61. Conflict levels for Africa from 1989-1999 surpassed the high historic expected levels reached during the peak period of Cold War conflict in Asia.

An unexpectedly high post-Cold War conflict rate was also true for the FSU/FY, where conflict rates were higher in the post-1989 period than during the Cold War. However, from a comparative historical perspective, observed conflict rates in the FSU/FY from 1993-1999 were still relatively low when compared to the Cold War expected rates for other regions. For example, observed rates in the FSU/FY were lower during 1993-1999 than the historical, expected Cold War conflict rates for Asia, Africa, the Americas, or the Middle East. Indeed, the observed rates for the FSU/FY for 1993-1999 were lower than all other regions except Europe and Oceania, which experienced similarly low levels (virtually zero) of conflict during the Cold War.

Overall, 11 out of the 15 new violent conflicts that arose during 1989-1992 were in the FSU/FY or Africa. Considering that Africa and the FSU/FY seem to be the outliers in the regional trend towards lower levels of conflict during the 1990s, we will examine their contribution to the ‘conflict spike’ that occurred in 1989-1992 in more depth in section 4.7.
4.6 Conflict Levels—The turn of the millennium, 2000-2004

If Romantics' predictions were incorrect between 1993-1999, did they hold true after 2000? According to the most recent SIPRI data (the Kosimo database stops at 1999), despite the threat of terrorism and the US invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan, the number of new armed conflicts fell further after 2000. In fact, the early part of this decade experienced about half of the expected level of new conflicts when compared to the Cold War. This pattern was repeated in every region except the Middle East, where the 9/11 attacks on the US and the US war in Afghanistan and invasion of Iraq doubled over expected conflict levels. Interestingly, Africa saw a significant decrease in new conflicts, reversing its post-Cold War trend. The graph below illustrates these points.

**Graph 4.7: Expected versus Observed New Conflicts by Region, 2000-2004**

Without the 9/11 attack on the United States, and US retaliation against the al-Qaida network in Afghanistan and war against Iraq, the Middle East would also reflect the more general trend downwards that other regions experienced. This decrease in new conflicts also reflects a trend towards an overall decline in the
number of total ongoing conflicts; the number of ongoing conflicts in 2004 was lower than during the 1980s, and approximately approached a level similar to the 1970s.20

4.7 The Effects of State Collapse on Conflict Levels—The disintegration of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia

If we specifically examine the conflict ‘spike’ that occurred in 1989-1992, both the quantitative and the qualitative data suggest that conflicts over the creation of new states in the former Soviet Union and former Yugoslavia had a significant impact on conflict levels. The Kosimo data show that 15 new conflicts broke out worldwide during that period, the most intense single period of conflict during the post-Cold War era, surpassing the highest levels of conflict found during the Cold War. Of these 15 new conflicts, six were the wars following the break-up of the former Soviet Union and the disintegration of former Yugoslavia. In percentage terms, the collapse of the FSU and FY contributed 40 per cent to conflict levels during the period 1989-1992. With the end of the wars in FY, that rate dropped significantly in the subsequent period, 1993-1999. Comparing historical eras then, the FSU/FY region contributed zero to all new violent conflicts during the Cold War, 40 per cent from 1989-1992, and about 10 per cent from 1993-1999. The next graph shows the relative total contribution to conflict levels for the FSU/FY region over time.

Graph 4.8: Contribution of FSU/FY to Overall Conflict Levels, 1945-1999

The Singer & Small and SIPRI data confirm these findings: 17 conflicts occurred from 1989-1992, five of which were the result of the disintegration of the FSU and FY. In percentage terms, these conflicts contributed about 30 per cent to overall conflict levels. The quantitative data also suggest that conflict fell significantly from 1993-1999 to nine new conflicts, two of which, or about 20 per cent overall, were due to FSU/FY conflicts. If we compare the quantitative data historically, the FSU/FY region contributed zero to new violent conflicts during the Cold War, about 30 per cent from 1989-1992, and about 20 per cent from 1993-1999.

Further, if we look at the data available for the number of expected conflicts for 1989-1992, we find that conflicts in the FSU/FY region comprised a high percentage of those 'excess' or unexpected conflicts during the period. According to the Kosimo data, 82 per cent of new conflicts above those expected during the period are attributable to the disintegration of those communist states. That is, over 80 per cent of the growth in new conflicts during the period can be attributed to the conflicts in FSU/FY. If Cold War rates of conflict had continued during 1989-1992, then there would have been about eight new conflicts expected worldwide, with none expected in the FSU/FY region. Instead, there were 15 new conflicts, seven more than expected, and six of which are attributable to wars in the FSU/FY. If we take the FSU/FY conflicts out of the equation for 1989-1992, we obtain a level of conflict that is almost the same as that found during the Cold War. While eight conflicts would have been expected worldwide if Cold War base rates persisted into the post-Cold War era, nine non-FSU/FY conflicts were observed during the period, a rise of just over 10 per cent above Cold War levels. Instead, the actual number of new conflicts almost doubled in the after the Cold War. The graph below illustrates the point.

**Graph 4.9: Contribution of FSU/FY to Excess New Conflicts, 1989-1992**
The Singer & Small and SIPRI datasets confirm these results, indicating that while about ten new conflicts could have been expected during the period, 17 were observed, a 70 per cent increase over expected rates. Of those seven conflicts above the expected number, five were in the FSU/FY. Therefore, the disintegration of the FSU and FY contributed over 71 per cent of new conflicts above expected rates from 1989-1992. In other words, the violent collapse of the FSU and FY accounted for most of the rise in worldwide conflict levels above their expected Cold War rates, in the region of 70 per cent (quantitative data) to 80 per cent (qualitative data). The conflict ‘spike’ observed during 1989-1992 would not have appeared without the break-up of these two multinational states. With the resolution of the wars in former Yugoslavia, conflict levels again tumbled to near-Cold War levels in 1993-1999.

4.8 The Effects of African Conflicts on Conflict Levels in the 1990s

What is interesting about conflict during 1989-1992 is how it departed from Cold War norms. While the disintegration of the FSU and FY contributed disproportionately to rising conflict levels worldwide above their expected Cold War norms, other regions actually experienced lower than expected levels of conflict. Significantly, Africa bucked that downward trend, with conflict more than doubling over its expected regional Cold War base rate. These results confirm those obtained by Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler at the World Bank, who have found that Africa had a lower incidence of intrastate conflict from 1965-1980, but then saw conflict increase through the 1980s and grow significantly from 1990.21 This phenomenon may have led some Romantic observers to predict that African conflicts were the wave of the future, providing a ‘contagion’ effect that would sweep the world.

---

In terms of raw numbers, the qualitative data indicate that from 1989-1992 African conflicts doubled from their expected Cold War rates: while about two conflicts could have been expected, four were observed. This trend continued from 1993-1999, where Kosimo indicates that about 3.5 conflicts (actually between three and four conflicts) could have been expected, while seven were observed. The graph above illustrates this point, showing the raw numbers (right-hand side of graph) and the steep increase as a percentage (left-hand side of graph). The quantitative data confirm this initial steep rise in African conflicts, with the Singer & Small data indicating that about two new African conflicts could have been expected during 1989-1992 while five were observed. However, the data from 1993-1999 are more equivocal; while about four new conflicts could have been expected from 1993-1999, SIPRI observed five.

If we examine the data on African conflicts as a contribution to overall international conflict levels, we see that the immediate end of the Cold War did not signal a disproportionate rise in African conflicts, as the percentage contribution of new African conflicts to overall conflicts remained steady. While the raw number of African conflicts increased, since the 1989-1992 period saw a total rise in international conflict, Africa’s proportion of conflicts remained the same. African conflicts comprised about 27 per cent of all new conflicts started both during the Cold War and from 1989-1992. However, the 1993-1999 period marked a significant shift from the Cold War norm, with the proportion of African conflicts rising to about 54
per cent of all new conflicts as conflict levels in other regions fell. These results confirm separately tabulated SIPRI findings; for example, SIPRI’s 1999 Yearbook noted that Africa was the one region where armed conflict was on the rise.\textsuperscript{22}

**Graph 4.11: Percentage Contribution of Africa to Conflict Levels, 1945-1999**

The distribution of the most afflicted conflict regions changed from the patterns established during the Cold War. While conflict levels in other regions fell to below Cold War levels or remained steady, from 1993-1999 the percentage of new African conflicts as a proportion of all new conflicts worldwide rose by 100 per cent, from about 27 per cent of all new conflicts to about 54 per cent of all new conflicts worldwide. However, as discussed in the previous section, the number of new conflicts in Africa dropped significantly after 2000. Thus counter to Romantic predictions, African conflicts did not spiral ever upwards; they did not provide a ‘contagion’ effect, nor did they presage the shape of things to come in the developed world.

\textsuperscript{22} See ‘Highlights from the SIPRI Yearbook 1999’. Available at http://editors.sipri.se/pubs/yb99/pr99.html
4.9 Conflict Termination—An under-explored post-Cold War trend

While the presence of conflicts in the FSU/FY and Africa made headlines in the 1990s, one important point to highlight is that the absence of conflict in some regions was and continues to be an under-explored topic. For example, both the qualitative and the quantitative data show a decline in the number of new conflicts in Asia since the 1970s, with a significant drop over Cold War levels after the end of the Cold War. The graph below exhibits this unsung success story.  

Graph 4.12: Declining Conflict in Asia, 1945-1992

Not only did fewer new conflicts arise in Asia after the end of the Cold War, more old conflicts terminated globally. Worldwide, the total number of ongoing conflicts that ended after the fall of the Berlin Wall was higher than the number of conflicts that terminated in the 1980s. Depending on how we define conflict, the total raw number of total ongoing conflicts ending during the four years of the immediate post-Cold War transition (1989-1992) was slightly lower than (using quantitative data) or

---

23 Again, the time units used in the graph are not in even increments in order to highlight changes during the immediate post-Cold War era.

24 The data is somewhat divergent from 1945 to the 1960s, where the direction each graph is going is different. For example, Kosimo shows an increase in conflict from the 1950s, while the Singer & Small data indicate a drop in conflict during the same period. However, both datasets agree on the direction and magnitude of conflict post-1970.
slightly greater than (using qualitative data) during the previous nine years. The following graph illustrates this point.

**Graph 4.13: Overall Conflict Termination Over Time, 1945-1992**

When we express these raw numbers as an average annual rate, the rate of conflict termination during 1989-1992 was actually twice that of the 1980s, the immediately preceding decade during the Cold War. In fact, old conflicts terminated at a more rapid rate from 1989-1992 than during any single period of the Cold War.

**Graph 4.14: Rates of Conflict Termination, 1945-1992**

According to the Singer & Small quantitative data, the rate of conflict termination from 1989-1992 was 25 per cent higher than during the 1970s, the peak conflict termination period during the Cold War, and about 97 per cent above the rate during
the 1980s. Similarly, for the Kosimo qualitative data, the 1989-1992 period exhibited a 12 per cent higher rate of conflict termination compared to the 1970s, and a 166 per cent greater rate than in the 1980s.

**Graph 4.15: Comparison of Conflict Termination Rates by Region, 1945-1999**

When we look at the trend towards conflict termination from 1993-1999, we see a similar pattern emerging, with the number of old, ongoing conflicts terminating at a rate of about 4.5 per year (Kosimo data). This compares favourably with the Cold War period, when on average about 1.5 ongoing conflicts would end each year, as well as with the immediate post-Cold War period (1988-1992), when about 3.3 ongoing conflicts ended per year (Kosimo data).

Additionally, the regional pattern for conflict termination shows that rates of conflict termination after the Cold War not only increased in Asia, but also in other regions such as the Americas, the Middle East, and even in Africa. Therefore, while there may have been more new post-Cold War conflicts in Africa, some of these new conflicts ended during the period and older Cold War conflicts also terminated. If we look at the types of conflicts that ended during the 1990s, we find that many of those terminating were ongoing, old Cold War conflicts of long duration.

Of the 45 conflicts that ended between the years 1989-1999, 17 were conflicts started during the Cold War. These conflicts had an average (mean) duration of 14.4 years and a median duration of 13 years. This is in sharp contrast to wars that started and finished during the Cold War (1945-1988), whose average duration was about three times shorter—4.4 years, with a median of 3 years. This means that about one-

---

25 Note the large variance in these figures.
third of post-Cold War conflicts that ended were particularly longstanding Cold War conflicts. Of these longstanding conflicts, seven were less than 10 years in duration, seven were 10-20 years in duration, and three were over 20 years in duration. The rest of the conflicts ending during 1989-1999 started during the post-Cold War period. These were actually shorter in duration than average Cold War conflicts, with a mean duration of 3.3 years and a median duration of 2 years (Kosimo data). The graph below illustrates these points.

Graph 4.16: Duration of Conflicts by Start and Termination Date

Overall conflict termination trends during the 1990s were positive, contradicting Romantic predictions of ever-increasing conflict. The post-Cold War period from 1989-1999 was also a time of increased conflict termination, with the rate that conflicts ended being higher than any period during the Cold War. These trends were seen across all regions, even those of higher conflict, such as Africa and FSU/FY. Additionally, many older Cold War conflicts of long duration were ended during the 1990s, while new conflicts commencing in the post-Cold War era were generally shorter in duration than those begun during the Cold War.

4.10 Conflict and State Creation during the Cold War—Wars of decolonisation

As we have demonstrated, contrary to Romantic hypotheses about post-Cold War conflict, the wars that followed the disintegration of the FSU and FY and the creation of new states in this region contributed disproportionately to the rise in conflict levels
during the early 1990s; the post-Cold War spike was not generalised to other regions. Indeed, between 70-80 per cent of all new conflicts above expected Cold War levels (excess conflicts) were due to the collapse of these states. Had these states not fragmented, Romantics would have seen no ‘coming anarchy’—conflict levels after the end of the Cold War would have remained roughly on par with expected Cold War norms. However, are there any parallels between the 1990s and the Cold War process of decolonisation? Counter to Romantics’ hypotheses that the 1990s represented a disruption in traditional Cold War patterns of conflict, did the creation of new states also contribute significantly to conflict levels during the Cold War era?

(a) State Creation—Definitions

To examine this question, we need to define state creation as a specific moment in time that a new state is created. But when is that moment? Since state creation may be more a continuum or a period of time rather than a single, specific date, there are several qualitative definitions open to scholars, such as the creation of leaderships whose stated goal is independence, or the installation of new governments. However, to examine the issue within the parameters of the available data, two definitions we will investigate further are 1) the date when independence or autonomy is declared and 2) the date of UN admission of the new state.26 Both have strengths and weaknesses, as listed below:

---

26 Note that the source we use for the dates of UN admission is the United Nations ‘List of Member States’, available at http://www.un.org/Overview/unmember.html. The source for dates on declarations of independence is the CIA World Factbook. The Factbook notes that ‘[f]or most countries, this [independence] entry gives the date that sovereignty was achieved and from which nation, empire, or trusteeship. For the other countries, the date given may not represent “independence” in the strict sense, but rather some significant nationhood event such as the traditional founding date or the date of unification, federation, confederation, establishment, fundamental change in the form of government, or state succession’. See http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/docs/notesanddefs.html#2088
Table 4.1: Definitions of State Creation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Independence declared</th>
<th>UN admission</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Definition</strong></td>
<td>Date a party to conflict declares that independent or autonomous state is the goal of conflict</td>
<td>Date of admission to UN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Strengths</strong></td>
<td>Considers all cases of conflict over independence or autonomy regardless of outcome; looks at motives or intent of parties to conflict</td>
<td>Precise, knowable date and single definitive source of information about dates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Weaknesses</strong></td>
<td>Date open to interpretation, particularly if there are multiple parties to a conflict, and various sources needed for information</td>
<td>Not all wars of independence end in statehood, so restricts number of cases</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The first point to note about state creation is that the majority of new states created under decolonisation during the Cold War did not have to fight for independence, which has remained true for the new states created in the post-Cold War era.\(^{27}\) During the Cold War, about 30 per cent of all new states had conflicts over state creation. The figure is slightly lower for the 1990s, with about 24 per cent of new states created involved in state creation conflicts. The following chart illustrates this point.

Graph 4.17: Conflicts Over Independence in New States, 1945-1999

---

\(^{27}\) Note that states in the Americas are not included in this analysis since the period of decolonisation and the creation of new states in the region date to before 1945.
(b) Timing State Creation Conflicts

In order to determine whether conflict is in some way connected to the development of new states, we need to understand the timing of conflict. We assume that conflicts that occur near the time a state is created are most likely related to state creation since proximity in time can impute motive. On the other hand, conflicts occurring significantly earlier or later than the ‘moment’ of state creation may not be about state creation. Of the new conflicts that developed in newly independent states, we can examine the timing of conflict. We can do this by looking at the onset of conflict over certain time intervals. For example, if conflict occurs about one year before or after a declaration of independence or autonomy, we can be fairly confident that the conflict is actually over the issue of state creation. Similarly, we would be less likely to attribute a conflict to state creation if it broke out a decade before or after such a declaration.\(^ {28}\) The graph below shows the results of this analysis, plotting the percentage of new conflicts started over the years before or after state creation using both definitions.\(^ {29}\)

Graph 4.18: Comparing Definitions of State Creation, 1945-1988

\(^ {28}\) There could of course be cases where a decades-long conflict finally does result in a declaration of independence by one party, and therefore we would be undercounting the number of conflicts over state creation, but we are assuming that such conflicts are less likely than ones where a party declares its intentions much sooner to the onset of conflict.

\(^ {29}\) Note that the time intervals are not evenly divided. The \(-1/+1\) interval is 3 years long, the \(-5/-2\) and \(+2/+5\) intervals are 4 years long, and the \(-10/-6\) and \(+6/+10\) intervals are 5 years long. The reason for this difference in the size of each interval is to examine the occurrence of conflict in the short-, medium-, and long-terms after state creation. With each further interval, conflict is less likely to be about state creation.
If we compare the two definitions of state creation—a declaration of independence and UN admission—side-by-side with the starting dates of new conflicts, we see that we get different results for each definition. If we define state creation from the moment a declaration of independence is made, then the onset of conflict often came within one year of state creation with the plurality of the data supporting this view. This holds for both the qualitative and the quantitative data, with the percentage of new conflicts starting within one year of a declaration of independence being 44 per cent and 36 per cent, respectively. The second largest number of conflicts arises in the 6-10 years after a declaration of independence, with 25 per cent (qualitative data) or 16 per cent (quantitative data) of conflicts likely to occur at that time. This suggests that many new conflicts occur at the point of state creation, and then much later, possibly over another issue, such as national power, or the control of the new state government.

If we use the date of UN admission as our definition of state creation, these positions are reversed. We see that conflict in new states was more likely to occur 6-10 years after UN admission. Again, both the qualitative and the quantitative data show the same trend, with the percentage of conflicts starting during this time being 37 per cent (qualitative data) or 27 per cent (quantitative data), respectively. The second largest number of conflicts arises in the one year before or after UN admission, with 25 per cent (qualitative data) or 22 per cent (quantitative data) of conflicts likely to occur at that time.

Clearly, the choice of definition of state creation in this context has an important impact on the results of the timing of conflict. Why would the positions be reversed? One possible reason for the difference is the time lag involved between a declaration of independence and UN admission. Clearly, many states had conflicts in which one party declared independence, a conflict ensued resulting in independence, and then the state was admitted to the UN much later. This suggests conflict timed to the earlier move toward independence.

If we compare the Cold War period to the post-Cold War era, we see that the onset of conflict during both periods generally came within one year of state creation. The qualitative data suggest that all of the post-Cold War conflicts that involved new

---

30 Note that the Kosimo qualitative data are more clear on this point, since the +6/+10 interval is clearly the second highest for that dataset. The SIPRI quantitative data are more ambiguous—all intervals other than the -1/+1 are at about 16 per cent.
states started within one year of a declaration of independence or UN admission, so the choice of definition of state creation made no difference to the results. However, the quantitative data differ slightly depending on which definition is used. While they do indicate that about 80-82 per cent of these conflicts began within the $-1/+1$ interval of state creation for both definitions, they make a departure in direction for the rest of the data. If state creation is defined as a declaration of independence, the data show that about 18 per cent of conflicts will commence in the 2-5 years after such a declaration, while the UN admission definition suggests that about 20 per cent of conflicts would be initiated 2-5 years before the declaration. Despite this discrepancy, the preponderance of the data in both datasets strongly indicates that post-Cold War conflict in new states began a year before or after state creation, suggesting that state creation was a primary reason for conflict.

**Graph 4.19: Comparing Definitions of State Creation, 1989-1999**

While the data are equivocal in favouring one definition over another in the 1990s, since the results barely differ in either case, the results for the Cold War period suggest that the best definition for state creation is a declaration of independence or autonomy, since the immediate onset of conflict is most closely matched to the period one year before or after such a declaration. Within that interval, we can be fairly sure that such conflicts are more likely to be about state creation, rather than about other issues. The disparity in the results for the Cold War period between the two
definitions suggests that there was a time lag between most declarations of independence and UN admission from 1945-1988, which could account for the different results. It also suggests that there are two types of conflicts to consider in new states. First, conflicts that are about state creation—triggered in the year immediately preceding or following a declaration of independence (or autonomy), many of which were about decolonisation. Second, conflicts occurring in the wake of state creation are more likely to be about governance—the control of the state—or national power conflicts after the creation of a new state.


While much has been written about the post-Cold War upsurge in identity-based conflicts, national power struggles were at the heart of most 1990s conflicts, just as they were during the Cold War. Additionally, while identity-based conflicts often provoked images of unrestrained violence, conflicts over national power were more deadly. As one commentator notes, '[f]or the period after 1987, power-contention conflicts produced more than ten times the fatalities and refugees of indigenous-rights conflicts and more than 50 [per cent] more deaths and refugees than ethnonational conflicts'.

---

31 Perhaps it also indicates that new states created in the post-Cold War era have experienced less of a time lag between their declarations of independence and UN admission.

32 Kosimo included ethnic conflicts only as part of its basket of issues called 'ethnic, religious, or regional autonomy'. These conflicts over autonomy have been aggregated with conflicts over independence or decolonisation since the core issue of creating a separate political entity is the same, with claims for autonomy often seen as a part of claims for later independence. See the Appendix for more information on methodology.

When examining the variety of reasons for conflict in the Kosimo database (which only includes data to 1999), the top three conflict issues from 1945-1999 were: 1) national power conflicts, which are intrastate conflicts over who controls the state, 2) bids for independence or autonomy, which are often classified as intrastate conflicts but can just as easily be seen as interstate conflicts between a state and a state-in-waiting, and 3) ideological or system conflicts, which are mostly superpower proxy wars.\(^{34}\)

Of particular interest is the change over time of the predominance of the three issues. From the late 1940s, and peaking through the 1960s, most conflicts were over issues of independence and autonomy, coinciding with the era of decolonisation that followed the end of World War II. By the 1970s, conflicts over state creation slipped into third place, and instead we saw a rapid rise in conflicts over national power—the internal governance of the state, as various groups within newly created states vied for political control. However, conflicts over state creation were once again rising by the 1980s, although national power conflicts remained the most numerous. By contrast, ideological conflicts remained fairly level throughout the Cold War in comparison with the other two issues. Overall, the graph describes the peak historical periods of decolonisation conflicts—from the 1940s through the 1960s—and traces

---

\(^{34}\) These results are based only on the Kosimo dataset, which is the only dataset to include this information. Note that Kosimo codes the data for multiple conflict issues that are not mutually exclusive, so a particular conflict could be coded for both national power and ideology, for example. Therefore, any single conflict may be included in more than one issue area on the chart. For our purposes, we have included all conflicts that are at least partly over the particular issue, rather than only those that were exclusively over a particular issue. For more information on issue coding, see the Appendix.
the change to intrastate conflicts over state control from the 1970s onwards as newly
decolonised states consolidated.

When comparing the 1990s with these results, we see that conflicts over
national power remained the most numerous, steadily since the 1970s. However,
another surge of state creation conflicts followed in the wake of the collapse of
FSU/FY during 1989-1992, although such conflicts declined post-1993. Finally,
ideology or system conflicts dwindled sharply at the end of the Cold War, as would
be expected with the collapse of communism and the end of the ideological
confrontation between the United States and Soviet Union.

(a) Comparing Conflict Issues—Asia and Africa

If we take a regional approach to state creation in the two most conflictual parts of the
Cold War world—Asia and Africa, which had the highest base rates of conflict from
1945-1988—we see that state creation played a differing role in generating conflict in
each region. In Asia, state creation played a major role in conflict, accounting for
about 50 per cent of all new conflicts. Rates of new conflict due to state creation were
high from 1940-1950, and while they trailed off in the 1960s and 1970s, state creation
still remained an issue in about one-third of conflicts during those periods. The graph
below shows these points:

Graph 4.21: State Creation in Asia: New States, New Conflicts, and the Issue of
Independence or Autonomy as a Reason for Conflict, 1945-1998
However, Cold War conflicts in Africa did not follow this pattern. While state creation was an important conflict issue for Africa in the 1960s, during other decades most conflicts remained about other issues.


As the previous graph indicates, about one-third of all African conflicts during the Cold War were about state creation—fighting for independence or autonomy. However, more African Cold War conflicts were about national power, the control and governance of the state, which occurred after state creation. Overall, compared to Asia, Africa had a less conflictual independence or decolonisation process; however, the period of state consolidation was more conflictual. Indeed, in Africa most conflicts have been about control of the state after independence. According to Kosimo, of the 37 wars it lists in Africa for the period 1945-1999, 30 had a national power contention component, while 12 included issues of independence or autonomy, and only one conflict was part of an ideological or system conflict.

However, post-independence domestic power contention conflicts became more acute after the end of the Cold War. Why did this happen in Africa, and not in other developing countries? In other words, why did Africa not act as a ‘contagion’? A variety of scholarly explanations have been offered which include political, historical, and economic reasons for the upsurge in African conflicts. Jeffrey Herbst and William Reno contend that the state is particularly weak in Africa, which suggests that it is more internally fractured and politically unable to head off conflict.
than other regions. Crawford Young offers an historical explanation: that the European colonial state in Africa—in the form of the crushing, oppressive Bula Matari—had a particularly brutal effect on subsequent political and economic development when compared to colonial regimes in other regions.

Others, like Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler at the World Bank, maintain that African states have weak economic performance and are more reliant on primary commodities which are lootable assets prone to generating conflict. Their argument rests on Africa's particularly dismal economic performance since the Cold War when compared to other developing regions. Another possibility is that these relatively poor states were more vulnerable to superpower priorities at the end of the Cold War. Once the Cold War ended the United States and FSU, as superpower patrons, restructured their strategic priorities and therefore were either less willing (in the case of the US) or able (in the case of the FSU) to fund or assist their African clients, creating a greater risk of conflict.

Additionally, some scholars have contended that post-Cold War African conflicts were not part of a trend towards global anarchy, but a part of a new period of African renaissance, creating a new balance of power in Africa. As one scholar noted,

The Age of Empire [had] truly ended in the 1990s. The political order imposed by the colonial powers and maintained until recently by U.S.-Soviet rivalry and French interventionism can no longer be taken for granted. States [in Africa] will survive only if they can establish domestic control and defend themselves against outside infringement.

Finally, despite Africa's reputation for conflict, considering the number of ethnic groups in Africa, scholars have calculated that only 0.05 per cent of all potential

---


38 Marina S. Ottaway, 'Think Again: Africa', *Foreign Policy* (Spring 1999), p. 15.
ethnic conflicts between the time of state independence and 1979 actually erupted into violence.\textsuperscript{39}

(b) Conflict Issues—Effects on Conflict Duration and Casualties

As Romantics predicted, are identity-based conflicts more intense and intractable? That is, do they generate more casualties and last longer than other conflicts? If we look at the duration of conflicts according to conflict issue and further divide these by three conflict periods—those starting and finishing during the Cold War (1945-1988); those starting during the Cold War (19845-1988) and finishing during the post-Cold War period (1989-1999); and those starting and finishing during the post-Cold War period (1989-1999)—we find that on average across time periods the longest lasting conflicts generally were those over independence or autonomy. For those Cold War conflicts started and finished during 1945-1988, ideological conflicts lasted about as long as independence conflicts, with national power conflicts in third place. These last two positions are reversed for conflicts started after 1989. In comparison with Cold War conflicts, post-Cold War conflicts over national power were about as long, while conflicts over independence or autonomy were shorter, and ideological conflicts were shortest of all, most likely due to the collapse of the bipolar confrontation between the United States and Soviet Union.

If we examine those 83 conflicts in Kosimo that started and finished from 1945-1988 (Cold War) separately, we find that independence and ideological conflicts had the longest duration, about six years, while national power contention conflicts were appreciably shorter, about three years in length. For the 28 conflicts started and finished from 1989-1999 (post-Cold War), these conflicts were shorter than those started during the Cold War. Post-Cold War conflicts over independence or autonomy were on average about 1.5 years shorter and conflicts over ideology have been 4 years shorter, while national power conflicts have lasted about as long as their Cold War counterparts (each just over 3 years).

More interestingly perhaps, the 17 conflicts that started during 1945-1988 (Cold War) but that finished during 1989-1999 (post-Cold War) had a significantly different pattern of conflict duration. Not only were all their conflicts longer across all

three issues, but their independence and ideological conflicts were particularly long-lasting (about 17 and 15 years on average, respectively). Additionally, when compared to other Cold War conflicts, their duration across issue areas was 2.5-3 times as long. The chart below illustrates these points.

**Graph 4.23: Mean Duration of Conflict by Issue and by Start and End Dates**

The fact that 1990s conflicts generally had a shorter duration than Cold War conflicts works to question Romantic predictions, since the length of post-Cold War conflicts make them seem no more ‘intractable’ than those during the Cold War. Considering that some Cold War ideological conflicts ground on for more than 15 years, it is hard to argue the ‘never-ending’ nature of 1990s conflict.

Finally, if we look at the deadliness of conflict according to conflict issue, we see that of the top three issues—national power, independence or autonomy, and ideological or system conflict—the most deadly conflicts from 1945-1999 included an element of ideological or system conflict. According to the Kosimo database’s minimum casualty estimates for conflicts, ideological conflicts claimed, on average,
194,000 casualties over the course of the conflict. National power conflicts ran a close second, with about 184,000 casualties per conflict. Far behind were conflicts over independence or autonomy. These were, on average, about half as deadly as ideological or national power conflicts, resulting in an average minimum casualty figure of about 90,000 casualties per conflict. These results also seem to undermine Romantic predictions, since Romantics presume that the highest intensity (high casualty) conflicts are not over such ‘rational’ issues as ideology but over ‘irrational’ issues such as culture, primordial identity, or ethnicity which could include conflicts over ethnic autonomy or the creation of new ethnically-based states.

**Graph 4.24: Average Minimum Number of Casualties by Conflict Issue**

![Bar Graph](image)

**Note:** These figures are for average minimum number of casualties. Since casualty figures can vary widely, Kosimo states both minimum and maximum ranges for figures. We have used only the most conservative estimate here, of average minimum casualties.

40 Note that the Kosimo database does not include casualty estimates for all conflicts, but only those for which it has some reliable estimates. For example, of the 31 ideological conflicts, Kosimo contained 25 estimates. For the 41 independence/autonomy-coded conflicts, it had casualty estimates for 38 conflicts. Of the 60 conflicts coded for national power, the database included casualty estimates for 39 conflicts. Therefore, these figures are based on only those conflicts which included casualty estimates.
4.12 The Coming Anarchy Myth—Conclusion

'When the truth cannot be clearly made out, what is false is increased through fear.'

—Quintus Curtius Rufus

At the beginning of the post-Cold War era, the conflict spike created by the violence in former Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union, and parts of Africa caused many observers to fear for the future, particularly since the trend in conflict in the early 1990s seemed ever upward. Romantics like Kaplan, Huntington, and van Creveld predicted a future of anarchical identity-based conflict which would be both more intense and more intractable, with African conflicts serving as a ‘contagion’, an example of what awaited the developed world. However, as our empirical data show, global conflict levels after 1993 fell to levels at or below those experienced during the Cold War. Indeed, post-2000 conflict levels are about half of expected Cold War levels. As we have argued, Romantic ‘chaos theories’—whether in their ‘coming anarchy’, intractable ‘culture clash’ or descent into neo-medieval violence forms—are more a myth based on a sense of pessimism at the loss of the certainties and perceived security of the bipolar world order than observations that have withstood empirical scrutiny, much less accurate predictions of the shape of the post-Cold War world. In effect, pessimistic Romantic assessments of the future of conflict promulgated during the post-Cold War era, although false, have been increased by the fear sown by the fog of uncertainty over the future ‘architecture’ and structure of international relations.

Our empirical results confirm the work of some other scholars in the field. For example, Roy Licklider’s work shows that while intrastate conflicts were the primary type of conflict in the 1990s, they had been so since the end of World War II. In that sense, the movement toward intrastate conflict (rather than interstate conflict) was not a new phenomenon generated by the end of the Cold War or the collapse of the bipolar system but rather a continuation of a much older trend.

---

42 Quintus Curtius Rufus, De Rebus Gestis Alexandri Magni [History of Alexander the Great] Book IV, section 10, sentence 12. The original reads 'quippe ubi explorari vera non possunt, falsa per metum augmentur.' See http://www.thelatinlibrary.com/curtius4.html

Our results indicate that conflict levels dropped significantly by the mid-1990s, and other conflict researchers report that this trend continues unabated in the post-9/11 world. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute’s 2004 Yearbook indicates that the number of major armed conflicts has fallen precipitously since 1991: from 33 wars in 1991 to 19 in 2003, a decrease of over 40 per cent.\footnote{44} Another NGO, Project Ploughshares, sponsored by the Canadian Council of Churches—using a separate methodology—estimates that the total number of armed conflicts fell from 44 in 1995 to 36 in 2003, a drop of over 18 per cent.\footnote{45} Casualty figures for the post-1991 period also decreased. Post-Cold War conflict casualties were down to about 20,000 estimated deaths in 2003, after having averaged 40,000-100,000 per year in the 1990s.\footnote{46} However, the ‘conflictual’ 1990s were still more peaceful than some years during the Cold War: the peak period for conflict deaths was in 1951. Indeed, one report notes that ‘the general magnitude of global warfare has decreased by over fifty percent since peaking in the mid-1980s, falling by the end of 2002 to its lowest level since the early 1960s’.\footnote{47}

Additionally, our results and analyses confirm work by Ted Robert Gurr, Yahya Sadowski, and Giacomo Chiozza who have argued that the Romantic contention that the world was sliding into a period of unending identity or ethnic conflicts is a myth.\footnote{48} Gurr indicates that the brutality of some high-profile conflicts and ‘the messiness of the international responses to them [...] obscures the larger shift from confrontation to accommodation’. Therefore, ‘[e]thnic warfare’s heyday may belong to the last century’.\footnote{49} Equally, Sadowski’s review of various empirical data on war shows that 1990s conflicts exhibited no more ‘culture clash’ elements than wars begun during the Cold War.\footnote{50} Additionally, Chiozza has empirically shown that civilisational differences between states do not generate a higher propensity for

\footnote{46} Charles J. Hanley, ‘War deaths said to be declining’, Associated Press (27 September 2004).
\footnote{49} Gurr, ‘Ethnic Warfare on the Wane’, p. 52.
\footnote{50} Sadowski, especially Chapter 9, ‘Post Cold War Patterns of Conflict’, pp. 121-144.
conflict. Moreover, the concept of a purely ‘ethnic’ conflict may be questionable, as many of these conflicts are tied up with bids for statehood or other forms of self-determination; according to David Quinn and Ted Robert Gurr, ‘[s]eventy territorially concentrated ethnic groups have waged armed conflicts for autonomy or independence at some time since the 1950s, not counting the peoples of former European colonies’.

However, the number of these conflicts is on the wane: ‘[e]thnonational wars for independence, which were the main threat to civil peace and regional security in the first post-Cold War decade, have declined to their lowest level since 1960’.

When examining the evidence from our database comparisons, our results show that levels of new conflicts did indeed rise sharply—by about 70 per cent—above expected Cold War rates in the immediate end of the Cold War, from 1989-1992, to new and unprecedented levels. However, much of that conflict spike was attributable to the break-up of two multinational states: the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. That is, the conflict spike did not represent a generalised upswing in conflict, but rather reflected the specific disintegration of two states: there was no ‘contagion’ of conflict. If we examine the number of excess conflicts in the 1990s—those above expected Cold War rates—we see that about 70-80 per cent of these excess conflicts from 1989-1992 were due to the disintegration of and conflict in these two states. These occasional spikes of intrastate violence are not surprising as they happened during the Cold War period. As two researchers note:

‘despite its higher prominence, the phenomenon of communitarian conflict is not new. Occasionally, major world events, such as decolonization, the collapse of empires, and, more recently, the collapse of communism, have caused spikes in the incidence of communitarian conflict.’

Further, when we examine conflict levels from 1993-1999, overall and by region, we see that the number of new conflicts was generally at or below expected Cold War levels. This regression towards the mean conflict rate found during the Cold War suggests that the collapse into conflict of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union was

---

53 Ibid., p. 1.
unusual—perhaps even an epiphenomenon—rather than part of a larger worldwide trend towards anarchy, conflict, or the violent fragmentation of states. These trends continued into this decade: the post-2000 period has seen a halving of the number of new conflicts overall. Only one region—the Middle East—has seen an upswing in new conflicts due to events after 9/11.

There was one regional exception to the post-1992 trend towards lower conflict: Africa. Considering that Africa was not the region of highest conflict during the Cold War—that dubious distinction goes to Asia—this suggests a change in the distribution of conflict from Cold War patterns. Additionally, while African conflicts did not make up a disproportionate percentage of new conflicts from 1989-1992 as compared with Africa’s experience during the Cold War due to the overall rise in conflicts worldwide, that pattern changed after 1993. From 1993-1999, as conflict levels dropped in other regions, conflicts in Africa grew and comprised over 50 per cent of all new conflicts worldwide, double Africa’s Cold War contribution to conflict levels. However, post-2000 African conflict rates have dropped, following the pattern established in other regions. Therefore, African conflicts did not act as a ‘contagion’, heralding a preliminary movement towards global anarchy, chaos, or state disintegration.

Another point at variance with the broad acceptance of the Romantic ‘chaos theories’ was the rate of conflict termination. If the 1990s were a period of growing anarchy, we would have expected fewer conflicts to terminate, or at least would have expected longer conflict duration, during that time. The rate of conflict termination during the 1990s was at or above Cold War levels; thus while new conflicts started, many old conflicts terminated after the end of the Cold War. Therefore, contrary to the 1990s being a period of greater anarchy, for some places the end of the Cold War meant the end of longstanding conflicts. However, since these incidents of conflict termination have, arguably, received far less attention from both popular media and scholars, they may appear to be less salient and therefore less obviously important to policymakers and academics alike.

A further issue is at odds with the Romantics’ thesis: the nature of post-Cold War conflict itself. ‘Chaos theories’ posited that identity-based conflicts would increasingly lead to unending, intractable conflicts. However, we find that state creation—the development of a new political organisation—rather than solely identity or culture per se was an important issue in 1990s conflicts. When we
investigate the relationship between conflict and state creation and other conflict issues from 1945 to 1999, we see that a significant number of conflicts during the Cold War were over state creation (independence or autonomy). In the two most conflict-prone regions during the Cold War, Asia and Africa, state creation comprised a significant proportion of all conflicts: about 50 per cent in Asia, and about 33 per cent in Africa. These regions reached conflict peaks in the 1940s and the 1960s, the height of the decolonisation period for each region. By comparison, similar conflict spikes were seen in the post-Cold War mainly due to the wars over the creation of new states after the collapse of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. If state creation is an important issue in a conflict, then it suggests that conflict is not necessarily intractable, and that conflict levels are likely to drop after the state creation process.

Finally, while Romantic hypotheses point to irrationally-based identity conflicts as being particularly deadly and intractable, the empirical evidence suggests otherwise. When we explore the top three reasons for conflict from 1945-1999—national power contention, independence and autonomy, and ideological conflicts—we find that conflicts over state creation—including conflicts over ethnic autonomy or independence—were not the longest in duration nor did they produce the most casualties. During the Cold War, ideological conflicts were on average as long as conflicts over independence and autonomy, while both national power conflicts and ideological conflicts were more deadly than state creation conflicts, producing double the number of average minimum casualties. Therefore, the contention that there is a ‘coming anarchy’ of particularly troublesome ethnic, religious, or other identity conflicts may be more mythic than real. These results also mirror Licklider’s, who finds that identity conflicts do not result in either longer or more intense conflicts (in terms of casualties).55

Indeed, if Romantic predictions about a ‘coming anarchy’ of intense, intractable, identity-based conflicts prove anything at all it is the perils of projecting a series of specific events occurring over a relatively short period of time into a much longer time horizon. Rather than the early 1990s representing a spectacular break with the past in terms of conflict, as Romantics hypothesised, the number of conflicts regressed to the mean relatively soon after the end of the Cold War. In fact, post-2000

55 Licklider found that conflicts based on identity were no more intense and were as likely to end in negotiated settlement as non-identity conflicts. However, peace settlements in identity conflicts were more likely to break down. See Licklider, ‘The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars, 1945-1993’. 183
the number of observed conflicts has fallen by half of what we would have expected during the Cold War.

Yet the Romantic idea of a 'coming anarchy' during the 1990s persists. For example, in 2003 one group of researchers noted that the 1990s were 'a record decade for bloodshed' due to the 2.5 million conflict deaths during the period.56 This type of analysis ignores the baseline—the death toll of Cold War conflicts—which some scholars put at 37 million conflict deaths, or approximately 8 million dead per decade, more than three times the post-Cold War average.57 Unfortunately, this view of the past may lead to erroneously pessimistic assessments about the future of conflict as analysts project Romantic hypotheses into this decade. As we have discussed in previous chapters, such judgements may be less a reflection of the empirical realities of post-Cold War conflict than the hold that the Postmodern Romantic Zeitgeist—with its emphasis on anti-rationalism, pessimism, relativism, nostalgia, and focus on nature—may have on interpretations of post-Cold War international relations.

Chapter 5. Rationalism Redux: Assessing State Stability from a Structural Perspective

'And yet, in my conceit, in public affairs, there is no government so ill, provided it be ancient and has been constant, that is not better than change and alteration.'

—Michel de Montaigne

The conflicts of the 1990s proved Montaigne's aphorism—the states deemed worthy of changing and altering rarely had either proven age or constancy on their side. Some were what political scientists have come to call 'weak', 'failed', 'rogue', or collapsed states. While some observers highlight the intractable 'culture clash' elements of conflict as the most salient features of post-Cold War violence in these states, our empirical examination in Chapter 4 has shown that conflicts over national power contention and state creation have been a significant driving force for conflict in these states, as well as during the Cold War. In other words, struggles for control of an existing state—its power and resources—or the decision to carve out a new state from an existing state have been over the past 50 years, and will likely continue to be, major reasons for conflict. In the sense that conflict is likely to be over such rational political ends as the control of a state, there has been much continuity since the end of World War II. In this chapter, we will examine some of the risk factors that may be markers for potential future struggles over national power and state creation, leading to state instability and conflict.

As we have argued, identity conflict per se—where primordial identities clash—outside the context of structural conflict over power and resources is a hypothesis that is difficult to support with the empirical data we examined in the previous chapter. Rather than being primordial, we will take our departure on the basis that identity is often significantly instrumental and therefore the underlying structure of a particular state has a significant impact on the possibilities and limits of

---

2 In some cases, even the word 'state' is inaccurate, as places like Bosnia and Kosovo have become de facto international protectorates.
conflict. However, since certain types of state structures may be necessary but insufficient to create state instability and conflict, a limited analysis of the role that agency may play in conflict be helpful in this regard. Therefore, we will try to introduce the role of agency in a circumscribed way into our analysis by examining how agents may react in a narrow set of circumstances—when state structures are perceived to deteriorate—through the concepts of exit, voice, and loyalty.

While the agent/structure debate continues to rage in international relations with inconclusive results, a discussion of which is beyond the scope of this chapter, our framework will focus more on structures than on agents, with the concomitant weaknesses that this brings. In particular, we will investigate four structural factors that may impact conflict: a state’s past colonial legacy, the structure of its political institutions, its economic system, and its demographic structure. We will first briefly summarise and discuss the importance of some structural factors in generating the potential for conflict. In addition, we will outline a framework for analysing how change in these factors under the condition of the perceived deterioration of the state leads groups to pursue one of two key options—either voice or exit—depending on their loyalty to the state. In effect, an analysis of the exit/voice strategies that various groups pursue suggests that there are differing structures for various types of intrastate conflict. Groups less loyal to the state are more likely to pursue exit strategies (such as autonomy or secession), which can generate conflict over territorial issues, while groups loyal to the state are more likely to pursue voice strategies (such as institutional reform or reconstruction), which can prompt conflicts over governance. While this framework is neither definitive nor comprehensive, it can serve as the foundation for further research.

5.1 Structures, Stability, and Conflict—Examining four risk factors

We partly base the choice of our structural factors from some of the results obtained by the work of the State Failure Task Force (SFTF) in the United States.\(^5\) SFTF has been a working group of scholars led by a team at the University of Maryland and funded by the CIA’s Directorate of Intelligence who have been researching the underlying structural conditions present in state failure. SFTF has developed perhaps the world’s most comprehensive dataset which includes information on almost 1,300 political, economic, demographic, social and environmental variables for all states from 1955-1998. Using logistic regression analysis, neural networks analysis, and expert surveys the Task Force identified some of the key risk factors associated with state instability, failure, and conflict to a 70-80 per cent rate of accuracy.\(^6\)

Their general or global model indicates that several key factors influence state instability and conflict, including: quality of life; regime type; international influences (trade openness, membership in international and regional organisations, \(i.e.,\) the socialisation of the state into international structures); and demographic factors (ethnic composition of population or leadership). Additionally, SFTF also developed regional models for state failure, including an ‘ethnic war’ model and an ‘African war’ model. While the indicators that predict state failure globally also apply to these cases, a few extra factors are also important, especially ethnic discrimination (in both models) and colonial history (in the African model). In our streamlined examination of key structural factors, we will group these issues into four main categories: colonial history, political institutions, economic institutions, and demographic changes. In some sense these factors require an analysis of a state’s past (colonial history), its present (current economic and political institutions), and future trends (coming demographic shifts).

While these factors point us to what structures may be important in setting the stage for conflict, they do not in themselves make conflict inevitable. Often, what

\(^5\) The SFTF’s data and codebooks are available online at http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/stfail/index.htm Note that the latest version was published in 2000.


187
may create conflict is change in structures: structures are not static; they are dynamic and evolve over time. However, while structures may ‘prime the pump’ of conflict, they are not necessarily sufficient in themselves to cause conflict since various agents can react differently to the same structural conditions. Therefore, we introduce an aspect of agency in a circumscribed way into our analysis. In order to interpret how groups within a state react to structures, we use the exit-voice-loyalty framework that political economist Albert Hirschman developed in the 1970s. In particular, Hirschman explores the options that groups have and the choices that they pursue when an organisation, such as the state, is in the throes of deterioration or decline. Under conditions of decline, two main options present themselves to actors in order to forestall or reverse a deteriorating situation: exit (leaving an organisation) or voice (usually some form of dissent). The choices are mediated by loyalty, the strength of ties that a group has to the organisation and its perceived influence within it. As one scholar notes, ‘Hirschman’s grand theory carries an important message to the study of civil war as it suggests a typology of exit and voice conflicts.’7 The exit-voice-loyalty framework suggests that responses to institutional failure in states can result in a push to reform the system from within (voice) or for the search for separation or secession (exit) depending on the specific loyalty that groups have to the state. Thus, we examine Hirschman’s thesis for what it can say about power contention within states, particularly those facing difficult or deteriorating circumstances.

5.2 The Legacy of the Past—Colonial/imperial history and institutions

Considering that most of today’s internationally recognised states were created as part of the process of decolonisation, a key factor when considering their historical past is the colonial legacy that each has been left, especially since the history of colonisation in these states is relatively fresh—within the living memory of some of its citizens. The process of foreign conquest and local struggle against occupation, and often colonial reconquest by other foreign powers through various periods in history, has bequeathed many of these states a variety of social, economic, and political

---

challenges that find their roots during the period of colonial administration and the reaction of the local population to colonisation. These residual problems can be either deeply embedded as part of the ingrained patterns of colonial society or are the result of 'untidy departures' by the previous colonial administration. Whether historical or of more recent issue, in the words of one commentator they often 'remain dangerously stalemated'.

The State Failure Task Force tested the proposition that colonial legacies may have an impact on conflict, using African states as their test model. SFTF found that the risk of state failure was lower in post-colonial states that had been French colonies. This effect could be institutional, that is that the French institutional legacy has been more stabilising, or it could be an artefact of France’s greater involvement with her former colonies, which might have various stabilising effects. However, since the population data sample was small, only 15 states, the results could not be said to be statistically significant. Despite the inconclusive results due to the small sample, various qualitative researchers indicate that colonial legacies have an important bearing on institutional structures and therefore on the future stability and the potential for conflict of postcolonial states. There are both direct and indirect challenges associated with previous colonial rule that these new states face.

State boundaries. One of the most discussed direct problems has been the effect that the creation of colonial boundaries has had on subsequent state consolidation and unity, particularly with regard to Africa. Colonial powers competing for Africa had no regard for boundaries between ethnic or linguistic groups; their main concern was to control as much territory as possible, resulting in the famous scramble for Africa. The main check on the unbounded expansion of one colonial power was another colonial power, consequentially colonial boundaries were artificial—the outcome of negotiations between colonial powers as to the extent of their respective control over conquered territory rather than representative of ‘natural’ boundaries between subject colonial peoples, such as the extent of the traditional

---

10 SFTF Phase III report, pp. 22-23.
Chapter 5

territory of the various ethnic, tribal, or linguistic groups. When decolonisation came to Africa, new states were created along pre-existing colonial boundaries. While the new rulers and governments accepted these boundaries—indeed, insisting on their territorial integrity in the post-colonial era—many separate groups were ‘trapped’ in these very heterogeneous new states. Compared to other regions of the world, African states are the most heterogeneous; however, this can actually serve as a protective social factor against conflict.

Economic practices. Additionally, there have been other perhaps less discussed direct effects, stemming from colonial treatment of issues as varied as: land use and regulation; population transfers and colonial settlement policy; colonial labour policies, such as indentured labour or slavery; colonial economy and system of colonial distribution of resources; and the creation of colonial systems of preference. Another factor in the colonial legacy may be the sheer brutality of colonial rule, which seems to be a factor in subsequent political and economic development.

When we examine the issue of land use, the legal treatment of land and patterns of colonial settlement have had a lasting impact on some states. For example, patterns of colonial land ownership patterns and land distribution still remain important issues in such states as South Africa and Zimbabwe. Other colonial practices also have lasting legacies. Colonial labour practices, including the use of indentured labour and slave labour, particularly in such areas as West Africa, have had lasting social consequences, especially when tied to systems of colonial labour preferences, where certain local populations were encouraged to exploit members of other local groups, such as in the Congo where some tribes participated in the enslavement of other tribes in the colonial system.

1 Tharoor notes that these problems can lead the new states to develop a sense of unity through created national myths that are ‘unconvincing’ and artificial. Tharoor, ‘The Messy Afterlife of Colonialism’.
4 Gurr and Harff discuss some of these points in, Ethnic Conflict in World Politics, pp. 16-17.
5 Crawford Young makes this argument about the African colonial state in particular. See Crawford Young, The African Colonial State in Comparative Perspective (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994).
Colonial migration and settlement policies. Colonial policies of *divide et impera* encouraged the systematic use of one group against another to keep both in check. This was done through a variety of means, including transfers of whole populations to another area (for example in Russia) or colonial labour policies that transferred skilled or semi-skilled workers from one part of the empire to another to work in particular economic sectors. For example, the British empire used Asians from the subcontinent as labour in Fiji and migrated Muslims and Hindus from the subcontinent to work in parts of Africa, including Kenya, Uganda, and South Africa. Unfortunately, many of these immigrants have not assimilated or even integrated into the indigenous social structure, creating a potential issue of conflict.\(^{17}\)

*Systems of preferences.* The colonial system of distribution of resources and preferences also had an impact on the subsequent development of post-colonial states. In general, colonial states used an unequal distribution of resources and the creation of group preferences between subjugated groups as a means of control. These systems of preferences can endure, creating long-term difficulties in new states as resource competition occurs between groups. As Charles Tilly indicates, such competition happens across states and national groups, creating durable inequalities which act to the advantage of some groups.\(^{18}\) In a resource-poor or 'statist' environment where the economic 'pie' is either stagnant or not expanding as quickly as needed to provide job opportunities to a growing population, such competition will increase, especially among the educated for scarce government positions, so any competitive 'edge', such as perceived group loyalty, is coveted.

These practices of preference and competition undermined local economies and used non-indigenous groups in a strategic manner against indigenous peoples, leading to permanent occupational, social, and class stratification along lines of group identity, pitting various colonial peoples against each other.\(^{19}\) These systems of preferences also have led to long-term resentments and grievances between groups long after the demise of the colonial state. As Thanoor notes about post-colonial Sri Lanka (former British Ceylon), ‘Sinhalese resentment of privileges enjoyed by the

\(^{17}\) Gurr and Harff.  
\(^{19}\) Gurr and Harff, p.15-16.
Tamils in the British colonial era in Sri Lanka prompted the discriminatory policies after independence that in turn [has] fueled the current Tamil revolt. 20

Such socially divisive colonial policies which assisted the colonisers in asserting and maintaining control over vast territories and diverse peoples have generated a significant number of historical grievances that can form the basis of social discontent and conflict in post-colonial states. As Gurr and Harff note, the use of such economic stratification causes a present-day conflict faultline, commenting that colonial 'polic[i]es of using immigrants and minorities to staff colonial bureaucracies often gave them privileged status in the host country and also provoked discriminatory measures against their descendants in the postindependence period. 21

Motivated sociology. In addition to direct colonial policies that have led to social division in these states, colonialism also had indirect results, such as an intellectual legacy of what Thanoor calls 'careless anthropology' and 'motivated sociology'. 22 For example, the Belgian creation of the classification between the Hutu and the Tutsi peoples, initially based on differences in wealth between the two groups is an example of anthropology created whole cloth to serve a colonial purpose, while the British creation of 'martial races', such as the Gurkas, represents a form of sociology motivated by colonial needs to police the empire. 23

Multiple colonisation. Some states have a history of multiple forms of colonisation. These states' legacies include a different history of colonisation and varying experiences among subjugated groups. These mixed colonial histories can themselves create problems and cleavages in post-colonial states. For example, conflict in some states, such as the secessionist movement in part of Somalia, could be attributed to colonial legacy of partition, in this case between the Italians and the British. 24 Finally, the extent of the colonial state's brutality during colonisation needs consideration. Some historians argue that the history of colonisation in Africa has been comparatively brutal, especially in the former Belgian colonies, such as the Congo. 25

20 Tharoor.
21 Gurr and Harff, p. 17.
22 Ibid.
24 Tharoor.
25 Young.
5.3 The Structure of the Present—Political factors

'Partial democracies—particularly in lower-income countries where the quality of life remains poor—are associated with elevated risks of failure.'

—State Failure Task Force

The State Failure Task Force examined 18 different political variables for conflict potential. Of these, it found that 11 were significant. These include: separatist activity; discrimination or separatist activity; parliamentary responsibility; regime type; regime duration; leader's years in office; Freedom House political rights index; Freedom House civil rights index; Amnesty International political terror scale; neighboring countries in major armed conflict; and membership in regional organizations. However, not all factors were equally important. SFTF found that regime type is the single most important predictor of conflict: '[o]f the variables examined in our analyses, regime type has the most powerful association with the risk of state failure'. That is, that the structure of the political institutions within a state has the most significant bearing on that state's internal stability and risk of conflict.

SFTF examined three types of regime: full democracies, partial democracies, and autocracies. Interestingly, democracies were not found to be the most stable; state failure for full democracies was approximately ten per cent higher than for autocracies; however, the results were roughly equivalent for both regime types. SFTF's most significant finding was that the risk of state failure was seven times as high for partial democracies which have a mix of democratic and autocratic institutions as for other regime types. In particular, the highest risk of failure was found in states that had a powerful executive and 'a relatively fractious or ineffective legislature'. Partial democracies seem particularly unstable since these regimes combine some democratic institutions or practices, such as elections and a multiparty system, with those that counter democracy, such as restrictive voting rules or a non-

---

26 SFTF Phase II report, p. 67.
28 SFTF defines these regime types as follows: 'Democratic regimes have competitive political participation, elected chief executives, and significant checks on executive power. Partial democracies have a mix of democratic and autocratic institutions, with democratic features outweighing autocratic ones', p. 12.
independent judiciary. However, such political regimes often last fewer than five years.

SFTF adds that there are four lessons from the high rate of state failure in partially democratic regimes. First, the transition from non-democratic governance to a stable democracy is filled with pitfalls and missteps. Few democratic states make the transition without reversals and the process is a gradual one. Second, there are no gains in political stability to be made by simply installing democratic or partially democratic regimes. Third, elections do not ensure that a stable democracy is being formed; indeed, parliamentary and presidential elections can be strongly associated with instability. Finally, the potential to backslide to autocracy exists within partial democracies, so democratic institutions and practices cannot be taken for granted.31

The SFTF’s conclusions on the relationship between the risk of conflict and regime type is supported by the vast empirical literature on ‘democratic peace’ theory, which holds that democracies are less likely to go to war than non-democracies (since they do not go to war with other democratic states), democracies are less likely to engage in serious disputes just short of war than other states, and even if they do go to war democracies are also more likely to win the wars that they do fight than non-democracies (a fact which can dissuade challengers).32 However, some scholars dispute the timeless concept of the ‘democratic peace’, either as an historical artefact of the Cold War or as a result of flawed research design.33

---

31 Ibid., p. 15.
33 Despite the significant empirical support for democratic peace theory, some researchers have argued that it is incorrect. For an argument that the democratic peace is mainly an artefact of the Cold War, see Joanne Gowa, Ballots and Bullets: The Elusive Democratic Peace (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999). For an argument that democratic peace theory is based on flawed research design, see E. A. Henderson, Democracy and War: The End of an Illusion (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002).
5.4 The Structure of the Present—Economic factors

"Material living standards have an undeniable effect on the risks of state failure."

—State Failure Task Force

Scholars have pointed to a variety of structural economic factors that can lead to groups contending over control of a state or pushing to create a new state. These include: durable categorical inequalities within a state; state spending and redistribution policies; remittances and diasporas; and international trade openness.

Durable categorical inequalities. Charles Tilly argues that categorical inequalities—those based on gender, ethnicity, language, or other identity markers—can operate as an organisational network in the market that provides various opportunities and benefits for its members. Such benefits can include direct access to economic resources, control of the decisionmaking sphere of the economy, access to raw materials, control of financial institutions, control of state contracts, or access to top jobs. It can also include indirect access to resource-generating educational opportunities or the acquisition of vocational skills. According to Tilly, such categorical inequalities are often durable across long periods of time since they accrue significant economic advantages to members. Tilly further comments that this type of inequality results from the institution of a general, powerful, problem-solving organizational form in a location that commands substantial rewards and/or punishments; it is pernicious to the extent that it causes harm to the excluded and produces a net underuse of potentially life-enhancing talent.

For example, in the labour market Tilly notes nine aspects of categorical inequalities. They create differences in job qualifications, employer discrimination, differences in job preferences, bounding, ranking, linking, a categorical designation of jobs, segregation of networks, and differential distribution of categories among firms and nonfirm worksites. These categorical inequalities work in four instances: elite exploitation of labour-demanding resources, non-elite hoarding of opportunities, [Embed Footnotes]

34 SFTF Phase II report, p. 67.
diffusion of organizational models, and elaboration of valued social relations around existing divisions.  

Categorical inequality works in two key ways for elites. First, it extracts the benefits of efforts by subordinate populations and it distributes 'solidarity-generating benefits' to elite members, a group which Mancur Olson once called 'distributional coalitions', or 'organizations for collective action within societies [...] overwhelmingly oriented to struggles over the distribution of income and wealth rather than to the production of additional output'. Second, when members of a categorically-bounded network get access to a valuable resource, members regularly hoard their access and struggle to maintain control. Immigrant networks that channel members to work in certain industries or trades are an example of this phenomenon.

In the case of states, the rewards for creating categorical inequalities through statehood are high. As Tilly notes, elites in states derive a host of benefits from political autonomy and sovereignty, generating the potential for conflict: 'the frequency of genocide and politicide have increased dramatically in the world as a whole since World War II, precisely as the possibilities and advantages of a putative nation’s controlling its own state and excluding others from its benefits have risen'.

*State spending and redistribution.* Some scholars note that government spending can be a factor in conflict, as it reflects resource allocation between various groups or regions within a state. In a study of spending on US public goods, scholars observe that the share of spending on public goods is inversely related to ethnic fragmentation in a particular region, suggesting that an heterogeneity of preferences generates lower government spending in certain regions. Others note that redistribution policies in states can lead to conflicts. For example, some economists argue that when income distributions vary across regions in a state and the efficiency gains for the state from unification are small, there is an incentive to secede from the existing state, while if all factors of production are perfectly mobile within a state then all incentives for secession disappear. Other scholars argue that statist policies

---

36 Ibid.
38 Tilly, Lecture 4.

\textit{Remittances and diasporas.} Some scholars note that it is important to consider the role of remittances as a hidden export for many states. Remittances not only subsidise the state, they also provide a separate source of income for various groups in a society who then do not necessarily have to rely on the productive capacity of the state to provide them with employment, a pension, or other means of financial support. The scale of remittances worldwide is substantial, especially considering the total size of GDP in many small and low income states. Remittances averaged an estimated at $70-$75 billion per year in the early 1990s, which is a ‘large proportion of world financial flows, second in value only to oil among aggregate international trade and financial transactions’.\footnote{Nicholas Van Hear, ‘Refugee Diasporas, Remittances, Development, and Conflict’, Migration Policy Institute (1 June 2003), p. 59.} By 2000, migrants’ remittances totaled $100 billion, which represents a large proportion of world financial flows and is substantially more than global official development assistance. Indeed, diaspora resources may be the hidden finance engine of the developing world, considering that 60 percent of global remittances are thought to have gone to developing countries in 2000.\footnote{Van Hear.} For example, in Albania, remittances were worth $330 million by 1993, more that two times the country's official export earnings. Remittances rose to $400 million by 1995. In that case, Albania's number one export was its people.\footnote{Gurr and Harff, p. 217.}

However, there are problems in estimating global flows of remittances, especially since artificial exchange rates in developing countries and difficulty in estimating foreign workers abroad can underestimate remittances. For example, in Ghana, while the Ghanese government, IMF, and World Bank estimated that remittances in the early 1980s totaled about $1 million per year, more accurate figures for that time were 300-500 times that amount, or about $300-$500 million annually.\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, pp. 167-168.}

\textit{International trade openness.} Various scholars have argue that economic freedom is a key indicator of stability in states, and that lack of it is a marker for conflict. In its report, the State Failure Task Force notes that its empirical results...
indicate that '[i]nvolvement in international trade, as measured by trade openness, is associated with a lower risk of state failure in virtually all states and all contexts.'

Others find similar relationships between economic freedom and conflict. Using the conflicts listed in the Kosimo database and data scores from the Economic Freedom of the World Index (EFWI), John Tures demonstrates that economic freedom, even when controlled for level of economic development, has an impact on conflict reduction. More economically free states have fewer conflicts, while those that are partly free or unfree engage in more conflicts. Tures' findings echo the democratic peace argument—that politically free states have fewer conflicts.

5.5 The Shadow of the Future—Demographic change

'The stork is the bird of war.'

—Winston Churchill

Another potential risk factor for conflict is demographic change. When considering the long-term future of a group's influence, position, status, access to state power and resources, or even mere survival within the state, predicted demographic changes can factor significantly in calculations. The SFTF found that demographic variables had some associations with risks of state failure. For example, population size and population density had an impact on conflict risk, as did a youth bulge, labour force as a percentage of population, and urbanization. For example, in the case on Rwanda, some commentators have suggested that overpopulation and resulting resource competition may have been important factors in the 1994 genocide. In the SFTF global model, ethnic fractionalisation was a significant demographic marker for increased conflict risk, while in the African model, ethno-linguistic fractionalisation and discrimination were significant markers.

---

46 SFTF Phase II report, p. 66.
48 Unverifiable and popularly attributed quote.
49 Jared Diamond, Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed (New York, NY: Viking, 2005). In a similar vein, see the views of fertility expert John Guillebaud, "'The Stork is the Bird of War': Reflections on the Rwandan Genocide", Bohdi News (No. 26, June 2004), p. 4. For an alternative view on Rwanda, arguing that overpopulation was not an issue, see Richard H. Robbins, Global Problems and the Culture of Capitalism (Boston, MA: Allyn and Bacon, 1999).
50 SFTF Phase III report, pp. 18 (population size and density); 17 (global model); 24 (ethno-linguistic fractionalisation); and 22 (discrimination).
Other scholars are beginning to examine the impact that demographic change has on the politics of conflict, especially since demographics can be the root of contentious politics. As Milica Bookman notes, population size has taken on a new political meaning as nations and groups within multinational states struggle for power, causing potential instability within states.\(^5\) She writes:

[c]urrently the size of a total population is less relevant than the absolute and relative size of a particular ethnic, religious, racial or linguistic group. Indeed, an inter-ethnic war of numbers is taking place in numerous locations. The goal of this war of numbers is to increase the economic and political power of an ethnic group relative to other groups, and the method by which this is achieved entails the increase in size of one population relative to others. Most ethnic groups in multinational states across the globe are engaged in this activity in varying degrees, thus clearly manipulating population numbers in their struggle for power. They have similar goals and differ only in the form and intensity of the struggle.\(^5\)

Yet such power struggles, while seemingly between ethnic or national groups, have little to do with Romantic notions of identity \textit{per se} and much to do with garnering benefits for members of successful groups. The struggle for increasing demographic power within a state can reap substantial political rewards. Greater population size can award groups with greater political representation in legislative bodies, increased political legitimacy, and is likely to guarantee equal protection or even preferential treatment in the state administration and courts. As Bookman comments, the available economic rewards to greater population size are also worth the struggle. These include: access to scarce resources, input into economic policymaking, and allocation of economic favours and patronage.\(^5\)

Considering the high stakes for the groups involved, the idea that population and demographic shifts should be considered a security variable is gaining credence among scholars and policymakers.\(^5\) There are various reasons why demographic shifts are now being considered important. For example, demographic trends can change the nature of conflict, introduce new instruments of conflict, alter sources of military power, modify a state's internal security dynamic, cause refugee flows, or

\(^{52}\) Ibid.
\(^{53}\) Ibid.
even cause a state to lose legitimacy.\textsuperscript{55} Periods of demographic transition are thus conflict-prone, as one study notes: ‘countries in the late phases of demographic transition were less likely to experience outbreaks of civil conflicts than those still in the transition’s early or middle phases’.\textsuperscript{56}

However, demographic shifts do not inevitably either lead to or prevent conflict; rather they mix with other factors to create a potential source of conflict or stability, as demographic changes work in tandem with other variables to either ameliorate or exacerbate existing security problems. Indeed, demographic factors are part of a complex series of causal variables behind violent conflicts. Other factors that affect state failure include economic development (based on such indicators as GNP or infant mortality), regime type and government leadership, a state’s past colonial experience, its terrain, or its openness to trade.\textsuperscript{57} In particular, demographic shifts that change the relative power of groups within a state are conflict-prone.\textsuperscript{58} This may be because population shifts can create sociological pressure for change in ranked societies, especially when ethnicity or nationality is tied to class in some way; that is, if national origin or other categorical inequality has a strong effect on economic opportunities.\textsuperscript{59} As Jack Goldstone observes, there are four types of population change that are more likely to contribute to the onset of violence within a state. These include: rapidly expanding agrarian populations, urbanisation, youth bulges, and migration across borders. We will discuss each of these factors below.

\textit{Agrarian expansion.} One demographic risk factor is an expanding agrarian population. Indeed, demographic changes that put pressure on scarce resources can create the opportunity for conflict. For example, states with a low availability of arable land for farming and a low availability of renewable fresh water per capita were 1.5 times more likely to experience civil conflict.\textsuperscript{60} Issues such as water scarcity can aggravate group tensions, as in the Middle East; however, land shortages may be

\textsuperscript{55} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{58} Cincotta et al., pp. 12-13.
\textsuperscript{59} Donald L. Horowitz discusses the ranked and unranked structure of societies and economic sources of ethnic conflict in \textit{Ethnic Groups in Conflict} (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1985), pp. 21-36 (ranked and unranked societies and conflict) and pp. 105-140 (economic interests, ethnicity, and conflict).
\textsuperscript{60} Cincotta et al., p. 13.
more conflict-prone than water scarcity. Another potential conflict risk is faced by states with high concentrations of landholding or landless peasants. States that have a growing agrarian population that needs more arable land face difficulties if most land is owned by large landowners or developers, especially if peasants are then forced to cultivate more marginal land, creating a potential conflict with landholders and political elites, as with the Zapatista rebellion in the Chiapas region of Mexico. In particular, rural income insecurity can exacerbate political tensions between groups if agricultural expansion has been used as a social safety valve.

Youth bulge. A demographic youth bulge within a state, especially one comprising over 40 per cent of the population, can signal possible brewing conflict if there is a 'persistent mismatch between population and employment prospects'. This problem may be especially acute in cases where there are a significant number of youths who are overeducated for the jobs available and who have a limited ability to access government or other elite positions within the state. Under conditions of economic stagnation and shrinking job opportunities—which results in underemployment, low wages, and social discontent—a youth bulge (especially one of frustrated young men) can lead to violence. For example, in the former Soviet Union a large expansion of technical and higher education coupled with a restriction on entry to desirable employment due to party requirements lead to widespread youth dissatisfaction in the face of a stagnant economy. This was one mobilising factor working against the continuation of the regime. While some studies have shown that youth bulges can increase the severity of conflicts, not all experts agree on the effects of youth bulges on conflict. For example, Urdal argues that youth bulges are not associated with civil wars, but instead are problematic in transitional regimes.

Urbanisation. Rapid urbanisation is another demographic shift that signals potential conflict, especially if the growth of urbanisation is more than four per cent per year, which doubles the potential of conflict. However, the rate of urbanisation alone is not necessarily the critical factor. The real issue is how rapidly formerly agrarian or peasant populations can be absorbed and employed within an urban

---

61 Ibid., p. 55-60.
62 Goldstone, p. 10.
63 Cincotta et al., p. 58-59.
64 Goldstone, p. 10.
65 Cincotta et al., p. 44-45.
66 Goldstone, p. 15.
67 Cincotta et al., p. 13.
centre. If an industrialising economy is able to employ a large rural population looking for jobs, then conflict can be avoided. If not, then urbanisation can lead to conflict: the risk of political crisis nearly doubles in countries with above-average levels of urbanization but below-average levels of per capita income.\(^6\)\(^8\) Urbanisation increases resource pressures on states and societies: ‘flood[ing] job markets, exacerbat[ing] inter-ethnic competition, challeng[ing] the adequacy of existing services and infrastructure, and deplet[ing] city budgets’.\(^6\)\(^9\) Another reason why urbanisation can lead to conflict is the concentration of interested groups, such as workers, students, professionals, and the middle class, who can organise and mobilise opposition effectively. Finally, urban areas are likely to be more multicultural or multiethnic, thus the competition for political and economic resources in urban centres is more intense than in rural areas.

**Migration across borders.** Migration across borders can create the potential for conflict. As Goldstone comments:

> when one distinct ethnic group migrates into an area that is considered a homeland by another ethnic group and challenges the dominance of the latter, then conflicts are likely to arise. If these conflicts escalate into contests for political control of the region, then ethnic war and even genocide often results.\(^7\)\(^0\)

Other types of migration, such as internal colonialism, can create difficulties. For example, Han Chinese settlement throughout various parts of non-Han majority areas of China, the expansion of Europeans into Native American Indian territory, the Bantu migration, and forced migration in the former USSR with the large scale immigration of Russians to non-Russian areas, all have lead to conflict.\(^7\)\(^1\)

### 5.6 Method of Analysis—Exploring agency through exit, voice, and loyalty

While the factors we discussed—colonial legacy, political regime type, economic structure, and demographic change—can prime the pump of conflict, it is not the state structures themselves but the reaction of groups or individuals to these structures, or

---

\(^6\)Goldstone.

\(^6\)Cincotta *et al.*, 50-51.

\(^7\)Goldstone, p. 15.

\(^7\)Ibid., pp. 13-14.
changes in these structures, that can foster the conditions for conflict, particularly if
the state is facing unfavourable or deteriorating conditions. What happens to
institutions—such as states, firms or other organisations—when their performance
deteriorates or they are otherwise unable to satisfy the needs and goals of their
constituents or customers? In his classic work *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to
Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States*, political economist Albert Hirschman
argues that there are fundamentally two responses open to constituents or customers
that act to limit and reverse an organisation’s deterioration: exit and voice.72 A variety
of political scientists have applied Hirschman’s framework to examine such diverse
topics as migration policy in Cuba, the collapse of the East German regime, and
institutional decline in the Russian military.73 We will endeavour to apply this
framework to aspects of the disintegration of Yugoslavia in the next chapter.

Simply put, *exit* is the option to leave an institution (to switch suppliers, to
move out of an area, or even to secede from a state), while *voice* is the option to
exercise a vocal dissent. These two options are mediated by *loyalty*, the willingness of
interested constituents to remain with the deteriorating institution and to continue to
work to improve it and ultimately to save it. Loyalty is what cements individuals and
groups to an institution and prevents defection while remedies are sought to stem its
decline. Institutions that allow constituents to use both options are likely to be more
stable and enduring, while those that have the ability to repress both voice and exit,
such as totalitarian states, ‘will largely deprive themselves of both recuperation
mechanisms’, and are ultimately likely to face unrecoverable deterioration or
collapse.74

The varying degrees with which constituents or customers choose one option
over the other or implement some combined strategy are the focus of Hirschman’s
thesis. Rather than stressing any particular option, we will examine Hirschman’s
concepts of exit, voice, and loyalty and how they interplay to develop a framework

---

72 Albert O. Hirschman, *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970). Note that psychologists often cite a third choice: neglect (or apathy). Neglect is the option of staying within the organisation, but ignoring the deterioration and saying nothing. Thus it is a choice of non-action; neither exit nor voice is activated.


74 Hirschman, p. 4
within which we will analyse the four structural risk factors that we outlined previously in this chapter. We will use this framework of analysis in the next chapter to develop a rationalist structural perspective on the disintegration of Yugoslavia which we compare to the predominant Romantic perspective discussed in previous chapters.

5.7 The Role of Exit and Voice in Stemming Institutional Deterioration

Hirschman's concepts of exit, voice, and loyalty mimic the interplay between politics and economics within organisations, including states. Hirschman also notes that these options reflect scholarly biases within the social sciences. While economists have a bias for exit and against voice, political scientists favour voice (usually within the context of democratic dissent) over exit as the critical option in an institution. For economists, exit is a market force, whereas voice is a non-market force; exit is an economic option while voice is a political option and therefore economists stress the economic option of exit. Thus for economists examining declining organisations, exit is the key method to effectuate change and customers are either loyal (choosing not to exit) or traitorous (choosing to exit). An economist's article of faith is that the more elastic demand is—that is, the faster and easier the exit option can be used—the better the market and economic system under consideration. The exit option, or what Americans term 'voting with your feet', is so important in the workings of a market economy and US democracy that Hirschman dubs it the 'ultimate nature of the American experience'.

Alternatively, for political scientists, voice is the key option. Indeed, political scientists can see the opposite phenomenon (voice) as an article of faith—that the best functioning organisations require maximum voice with little or no options for exit. Often known as 'interest articulation', voice includes various types of actions to express dissatisfaction and affect change, such as petitions, protests, or appeals to authority. Therefore, political scientists either ignore or overlook the exit option open to constituents and instead focus on other political options, such as public

---

acquiescence to authority or constituent apathy and indifference towards particular institutions. As Hirschman stresses, social institutions are, in the parlance of business economists, ‘satisficers’, not ‘optimisers’. That is, organisations like states and firms do not provide the conditions for a social optimum; rather they seek mainly to provide ‘satisfactory’ results for a very broad group. However, this lack of optimisation can lead to complacency and a decline in an organisation’s performance, creating dissatisfaction among some groups. When faced with deterioration, some groups choose to exit, while others choose to express dissent (voice).

Exit is often the clearest option to express dissatisfaction. Voice is an alternative to exit; it is not a subordinate choice, but rather some groups can prefer voice as a substitute for exit under certain conditions, for example, in cases where exit is difficult or impossible, such as with families, churches, or states. Such social and political institutions mimic monopolies in economics, where exit options are limited. Under such circumstances, voice acts as a residual of exit, offering individuals and groups a way of reacting if the exit option is either unavailable or very costly. However, most institutions are not pure ‘monopolies’, either in the economic or the social sense; instead most institutions are mixed, so there is an interaction between the options of voice and exit.

Hirschman posits that the level of voice within an institution feeds on inelastic demand from its constituents; that is, it is based on the lack of opportunity for constituents to exit the institution. Thus, the role of voice should increase as opportunities for exit decline; with a lack of choice or an ability to exit, the opportunity and desire for constituents or customers to voice their dissent or dissatisfaction should increase. For example, in less developed states, where there are fewer consumer choices and therefore exit is constrained, there are louder complaints or even protests about the quality of goods, choices, or prices, because there is no exit

---

78 Ibid., p. 31.
79 Ibid., pp. 10-11.
80 A third choice which Hirschman does not outline is neglect. Additionally, others have pointed to non-exit, non-voice options that ultimately undermine an institution while keeping exit at bay, such as corruption. Corruption is a method of diverting an organisation’s resources for the use of certain groups, often because voice is ineffective and exit is not really an option. Corruption is seen as a form of ‘compensation’ for lack of voice and an inability to exit. See for example, Marten Zisk, ‘Institutional Decline in the Russian Military: Exit, Voice and Corruption’.
81 Hirschman, pp. 33-36.
from the system. In essence, basic economic issues become more quickly politicised where a consumer's lack of silent exit is impossible.82

While economistic or market thinking is oriented towards the exit option—such as selling shares or dumping investments as a signal of dissatisfaction—political thinking is oriented towards staving off the exit option, by making an organisation more responsive and accountable to its members through the use of voice. Indeed, most organisations take steps to make their services more responsive to members and fend off dissatisfaction and possible defection. For example, some use decentralisation as a mechanism to improve voice and retain their members' loyalty; in a more decentralised organisation individual members can have more input and influence than under a centralised organisation.

Voice can be particularly important in protecting an organisation against deterioration in the quality of the products or services it provides, and it is especially important in fending off decline in various quality of life services, such as essential services provided by the state like schooling, transport, or healthcare. In particular, most consumers and constituents use voice when a high-quality product deteriorates. However, since constituents and consumers judge quality subjectively, any deterioration in the quality of an organisation affects those who rely upon it differently. Often the most sensitive customers or constituents who find quality deterioration hardest to deal with are the first to exit, leaving behind those who are least active, least knowledgeable, or least reliable to stay loyal to the organisation. Unfortunately, those left behind are generally the least capable of generating meaningful change within an organisation.83

However, not all organisations seek to restrict members' exit; some actively encourage exit as a means of discouraging or limiting dissent. Effectively, they trade off exit for voice.84 For example, politically many Latin Americans states have encouraged political opponents to become exiles, such as in Columbia where

82 Ibid, pp. 34-35.
83 Ibid, pp. 47-53.
84 In some quarters this is thought of as the 'safety valve' theory of history, where the dissatisfied are allowed to leave as a means of releasing the pressure for change within an institution. In 1893 Frederick Jackson Turner was perhaps the first historian to posit the benefits to American social (or institutional) stability of allowing the disgruntled and dispossessed to leave for greener pastures. A variety of other historians have elaborated on Turner's point. See Frederick Jackson Turner, The Frontier in American History (collection of republished essays, 1920). Available online at http://xroads.virginia.edu/~HYPER/TURNER/ See also David Montgomery, 'The Significance of the Frontier in American Historiography', web article http://members.aol.com/profdavidmont/turner.htm
dissidents, opponents, and other 'troublemakers' were rewarded with monetary incentives for exile, thus creating an 'ever-beckoning opportunity for exit' in the region which served to limit the effects of dissent and restricted both the possibilities for large-scale conflict and institutional reform.85

5.8 The Logic of Loyalty in Institutions

Loyalty is often thought of as an emotional or irrational attachment: 'Loyalty is the virtue, state, or quality of being faithful to one's commitments, duties, relations, associations, or values. It is fidelity to [...] anyone or anything to which one's heart can become attached or devoted'.86 However, for Hirschman loyalty is profoundly rational: loyalist behaviour 'retains an enormous dose of reasoned calculation'.87 In fact, Hirschman argues that loyalty in some governmental situations is actually opportunism rationalised as public-spirit mindedness.88

Loyalty has the function of preventing deterioration in an organisation from being cumulative and putting the organisation on the path to improvement, allowing it to recuperate. The idea of loyalty has two rational components of calculation. Members are likely to voice their grievances in an attempt to improve the organisation rather than head for the exit if: 1) they are willing to trade off the certainty of exit with the uncertainty that things will improve in the deteriorated organisation, and 2) they have a high estimate of their ability to influence the organisation.89 Loyalty has various benefits for members. A loyal member can expect to have his dissent taken seriously and acted upon in the organisation. Indeed, the threat of exit is part of his bargaining power and increases the overall effectiveness of his dissent. Without the threat or possibility of exit, an organisation can neglect, ignore, or otherwise marginalise dissent to its own detriment.

Those members of an organisation lacking a concept of loyalty to it often have low expectations of their influence over it. In the absence of loyalty, exit can sometimes be considered costless (economically for the consumer, or politically for

85 Hirschman, pp. 60-61.
87 Hirschman, p. 79.
88 Ibid., p. 116.
89 Ibid., p. 77.
the constituent); lack of loyalty can limit the perceived costs of exit.\textsuperscript{90} Additionally, non-loyal members can sometimes pursue other options to exit, such as neglect (apathy), in which case they do not exit, but also do not dissent, staying silent about an organisation’s difficulties. Others can choose to boycott the organisation, which is effectively a form of temporary exit from the institution, and is suitable mainly for those who may feel that while their dissent is ineffective, they also cannot or will not exit, but can temporarily do without the benefits that the organisation provides.\textsuperscript{91}

In order to encourage loyalty, institutions may either encourage voice or they can erect specific barriers to exit, which can be highly functional, depending on the situation. Since the exit option is generally easier to use than the voice option—members often prefer the ‘neatness of exit over the messiness and heartbreak of voice’, as leaving is often preferable to an ongoing, tedious dissent that ultimately requires compromise—high barriers or penalties to exit can be appropriate when the effective use of dissent requires inventiveness and exit is not effective and resolves little.\textsuperscript{92} In organisations where there is a high penalty for exit, members can repress their awareness of the organisation’s deterioration, which from the organisation’s standpoint has the beneficial effect of suppressing the idea of exit and encouraging at least temporary loyalty, but it also potentially represses dissent to the organisation’s detriment.

Thus, rather than creating a situation where exit does not occur, institutions where the cost of exit is punitively high face the potential for a secret or secretive exit, where members do exit but simply omit their open dissent and threats to exit. This lack of willingness to voice dissent out of fear of punishment means that the organisation delays or forgoes the potentially beneficial action of voice until it may be too late to act to stem institutional deterioration.\textsuperscript{93} In addition to suppressing exit to encourage loyalty, some institutions try to repress dissent. For example, both totalitarian and one-party systems allow neither voice nor exit. This makes them less viable in the long-run since they are unable to recuperate from deterioration because the two main methods of rescuing them from institutional decline, exit and voice, are

\[90\] Ibid., p. 82.
\[91\] Ibid., p. 82-86.
\[92\] Ibid., p. 107.
\[93\] Ibid., pp. 93-98.
only activated ‘when deterioration has reached so advanced a stage that recovery is no longer either possible or desirable’.  

This can be particularly deleterious in the case of states and the provision of public goods, since members find that it is impossible to have complete exit from an organisation, for example from governmental services such as a state school system. While individuals may be free to choose non-state schools, the state’s overall skills base and economy is still dependent on the performance and public goods that the state school system provides. Only a true exit, that is an exit from the community or the state, can allow members to avoid the deterioration in quality in public goods.

5.9 Towards an Alternative Framework—Conclusion

In this chapter we have tried to outline four structural factors that some political scientists consider important markers for conflict risk. Effectively, these take into account the past, present, and perceived future of a state: the legacy of the past (colonial history), present structures or conditions (political and economic factors), and the shadow of the future (demographic change). We gleaned these risk factors mainly from the results of the State Failure Task Force, but also from the work of various social scientists. Each of these factors may have some role to play in creating potential structures for conflict.

A state’s colonial history can bequeath several difficult legacies to new states through the creation of new state boundaries, exploitative colonial economic practices, colonial migration and settlement policies, or a discriminatory system of preferences. Additionally, colonisers may also introduce ‘motivated sociology’ as a method of social control. Finally, a history of multiple colonisations can exacerbate these problems. A state’s current political structure can also present a conflict risk, especially for transitional states. While democracies and autocracies may be fairly stable, partly democratic regimes are more significantly at risk of conflict. Additionally, a state’s economic structures can prime the pump for conflict in various ways. Some of these include the existence of durable categorical inequalities between groups, state spending and redistribution policies, the effects that remittances and diasporas have, as well as a state’s lack of openness to international trade (or a lack of

94 Ibid., p. 121.
95 Ibid., pp. 98-101.
economic freedom more broadly). Finally, the shadow of upcoming demographic changes and a demographic transition can sometimes create potential conflict risks. Factors such as agrarian expansion, rapid urbanisation, a youth bulge, migration across borders, or significant population shifts can be markers for conflict.

In addition to these four structural factors, which can generate the potential for conflict, we have briefly outlined a method to analyse how agents may react to a change in these structures in order to create conflict: Hirschman's exit-voice-loyalty framework. Hirschman’s framework is especially applicable under specific conditions—when an institution or organisation is deteriorating and at risk of decline or collapse. He argues that members have various strategies for dealing with institutional deterioration, either exit or voice, which are mediated by the member’s loyalty to the organisation. Loyalty itself is significantly based on a rational calculation, not only on the likelihood that the organisation is likely to improve, but also the member’s understanding of his influence within the organisation.

In the next chapter, we examine how the four structural factors we discussed, when considered within the exit-voice-loyalty framework of analysis, can provide an alternative structural perspective on the disintegration of Yugoslavia. We compare this perspective to the Romantic perspective which emphasises the role of irrationality, pessimism, nostalgia, relativism, and nature in the collapse of the Yugoslav state.

"The twentieth century began and ended with conflict in the Balkans. A decade ago, international peacekeepers were held hostage in Bosnia, and the international community was held hostage by a lack of consensus for action. The Balkans were our top foreign policy priority—just as Iraq and the Global War on Terrorism are today."  

—R. Nicholas Burns

Although the war in Iraq leads current headlines, a decade ago the news was filled with stories of the conflict in Yugoslavia. In 1991 Yugoslavia, the improbable survivor, succumbed to the most violent conflict on European soil since World War II. Born in the aftermath of World War I and formed from the borderlands of two failed empires, Yugoslavia had survived a royalist dictatorship; a Nazi invasion and a devastating civil war between Ustashe, Chetniks, and partisans during World War II; the formation of a socialist federation under the charismatic leadership of Josip Broz Tito; Tito’s break with Stalin; and the ‘Croatian Spring’, a rebellion against the central state in 1971. Improbably, by the 1980s the regions that made up Yugoslavia had gone from some of the most underdeveloped in Europe in the 1940s, to being perhaps the most economically advanced and politically liberal in Eastern Europe, with Western levels of education and technical expertise. Additionally, Yugoslavia found itself in the international limelight as a founding member of the non-aligned movement, balancing between East and West.

Yet despite economic progress during the earlier years of the socialist state, by the time of Tito’s death in 1980 Yugoslavia was facing a severe economic crisis. The deteriorating economic situation during the 1980s—including more than 30 per cent inflation, the highest foreign indebtedness of any European state per capita, growing

---

3 For a discussion of Tito’s break with Stalin and his efforts to play off both Moscow and Washington, see Lorraine M. Lees, Keeping Tito Afloat: The United States, Yugoslavia, and the Cold War (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University, 1997).
unemployment, insolvency, and strikes—was coupled with a leadership crisis and political stalemate between the republics. Just over a decade after Tito’s death, the state he forged disintegrated into conflict.

As a conflict, the disintegration of Yugoslavia embodied many of the issues we have identified with the Romantic mood that dominated the post-Cold War: anti-rationalism, pessimism, relativism, nostalgia, and a focus on the dark side of human nature. While previously conflicts would have been understood in political terms, such as a bid for power or control over resources, Yugoslavia’s break up became most immediately understood in cultural terms, as a war between cultures. As such, Yugoslavia became a key case study of the post-Cold War.

In this chapter we explore how the Romantic mood of the post-Cold War era coloured interpretations of the conflict in former Yugoslavia. Then we examine the Romantic themes of irrationalism, pessimism, relativism, nostalgia, and the focus on nature. We group these themes in two sections. First, we discuss the role that irrationality, relativism (through a focus on culture), and nature (particularly the essential ‘nature’ of ‘Balkan man’) played in fomenting stereotyped images and metaphors of the region, which then were used as a popular substitute for analysis in the Yugoslav conflicts. This type of analysis reflects the use of the fundamental attribution error; that is, the use of dispositional traits to explain potentially situational factors. Second, we consider the role that pessimism and nostalgia play in either the coverage or analysis of the Yugoslav conflicts mainly in the West.

Finally, we compare the metaphors and analogies that the Romantic Zeitgeist generates about the Yugoslav conflict with the alternative structural framework we developed in the previous chapter. Within this section we will not include in-depth discussions of the history of Yugoslavia or its constituent republics or provinces,

---


Chapter 6

an extensive chronology of events that resulted in its disintegration into conflict; there are already many books and articles which amply discuss these subjects. We will also not examine the conduct of the war in Yugoslavia; again, this is a vast territory that has been well covered by others. Additionally, we will not investigate the influence of international diplomacy in its demise. Instead, what we aim to offer is a more narrow exploration into how several structural factors can come into play within a decision either to voice dissent but remain within Yugoslavia or to exit from it under conditions of the perceived deterioration of the state. We discuss aspects of Yugoslavia’s imperial history, its political and economic structures, and demography for the conflict markers we identified in Chapter 5. We then briefly evaluate these factors for how they can be interpreted within an exit-voice-loyalty framework. We conclude by arguing that a structural perspective significantly questions the validity of the popular Romantic interpretation of Yugoslavia’s demise.

---

9 Some would perhaps consider this a straight cost-benefit analysis; however, we do not use this terminology. For a discussion of cost-benefit analyses in the decision to secede, see Viva Ona Bartkus, The Dynamic of Secession (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
6.1 Where the Wild Things Are—Irrationality, relativism, nature

'[The Balkans are] one of those ill-fated portions of the earth which, though placed in immediate contact with civilization, have remained perpetually barbarian'.

—Thomas Arnold

Considering that Arnold, an Englishman who was headmaster at the famous Rugby School, made this comment in the mid-nineteenth century, it is obvious that the ‘Balkan’ region, however defined, has long held negative associations in the mind’s eye of the West. Such associations have often played along the intertwined Romantic themes of anti-rationalism, relativism, and nature; specifically, that the region’s ills are fundamentally due to the culture and essential human nature of *Homo balcanicus*, who is closer to ‘natural’ man in his primitive and irrational state.

Indeed, scholars such as Božidar Jezemik and Maria Todorova have outlined some of these common Western perceptions and stereotypes of the area which have been present since at least the seventeenth century. These common perceptions of irrationality and primitiveness have included images of the Balkans as a part of ‘Wild Europe’, an area that is both geographically proximate and thus near, yet culturally exotic and thus far away, perhaps more a part of Asia than of Europe, or the point where the West ends and the East begins.11 As Todorova comments, ‘the Balkans have served as a repository of negative characteristics against which a positive and self-congratulatory image of the “European” and the “West” have been constructed’.12

Of course negative Western civilisational judgements have not only been passed on the Balkans; for centuries Eastern Europeans in general were said not to suffer from a surfeit of civilisation. As Larry Wolff argues, for Western Europeans Eastern Europe was located not at the antipode of civilization, not down in the depths of barbarism, but rather on the developmental scale that measured the distance between [the] civilization [of Europe] and [the] barbarism [of Asia....] Eastern Europe was essentially in between, and by the nineteenth

---

11 Jezemik, p. 29.
century these polar oppositions [between Asian and European] acquired the force of fixed formulas.\textsuperscript{13}

Hence the Balkans are marginal and peripheral, not quite as exotic as the ‘real’ East but close enough to be near the true ‘nature’ of primitive man before civilisation intruded on or reigned in his ‘nature’.

In addition to primitiveness, another common image invoked to describe the Balkans has been that of barbaric, irrational violence, which always seems to be bubbling beneath the surface. For centuries, various commentators and travellers to the area have reinforced this violent image through the use of such terms as ‘ruthless’, ‘cannibalistic’, or ‘barbarous’ in association with the Balkans.\textsuperscript{14} In the past century, the Balkan Wars, waged from 1912-1913 and which finished off the Ottoman ‘sick man of Europe’, reinforced this image of a region harbouring deeply irrational, violent impulses and perpetually at the edge of civilisation. For example, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace’s ‘Report on the International Commission to Inquire into the Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars’ (1914) highlighted the savage ‘passions’ ruling the Balkans, noting the ‘death, blood and crime crying everywhere for vengeance’ and ‘the Te Deums rising from churches whose very possession was disputed by rival fanaticisms’.\textsuperscript{15}

These cultural stereotypes gained new life at the end of the Cold War with the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia. Although the term ‘Balkans’, which specifically applies to a mountain range in Bulgaria, has generally been applied to all states on what has become known as the Balkan Peninsula in the 1990s it became primarily associated with one state: Yugoslavia, which with its disintegration in 1991 became the inheritor of traditional Western images and views about Balkan primitiveness, barbarism, and irrationality. While Todorova warns of the dangers of applying a regional signifier such as ‘Balkan’ on just Yugoslavia—and thus artificially extending the conflict into a regional problem—many experts do indeed use the term ‘Balkan’ as shorthand for ‘Yugoslavia’. Thus, we see books such as *Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War*, *Balkan Babel*, or *Habits of the Balkan*

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{14} Jezernik, pp. 40-41.
\end{itemize}
Heart, all of which pertain to the disintegration of and resulting conflicts in the former Yugoslavia.

While perhaps unintentional, the use of such simple shorthand allows a certain type of analogical reasoning and suggestive metaphors to be introduced into any analysis about the disintegration of Yugoslavia, for by operation of analogy, if Yugoslavia→Balkan, and if Balkan→primitive, irrational, barbaric, then simple logic yields the formula Yugoslavia→primitive, irrational, barbaric. The analogy allows the analyst to apply a series of ‘fixed formulas’ and creates an instantly recognisable framework within which to understand the conflicts as simply the continuation of the historical past. Furthermore, it suggests a type of judgement. These formulas are used even by astute and expert observers in international relations. For example, US statesman George Kennan, in a preface to the re-publication of the Carnegie Endowment’s 1914 report on the Balkan Wars, refers to the ‘distracted Balkan region’ with its ‘excited peoples’. Peace negotiator Lord David Owen notes that there is ‘a tradition in the Balkans of a readiness to solve disputes by taking up arms’.

Tom Gallagher observes that in EU states representations of the Balkans, and more specifically the conflicts in former Yugoslavia, have been based on prejudice about the region. Specifically, Western Europeans view the Balkans through the politics of ethnicity and the economics of dependence, in other words, as the poor cousins of Western Europeans. Like Robert Kaplan, they have an aversion to poor people and this aesthetic is converted into an ethic: wealth signals a variety of blessings, such as democracy and respect for human rights, while poverty suggests an authoritarian bent and a lack of respect for basic liberties. This elision between ethic and aesthetic for rich and poor regions is not limited to the Balkans. Negative cultural stereotypes are associated with other poor regions of Europe as well, for example, with southern Italy. However, the term ‘Balkans’ has garnered perhaps the most pejorative regional connotation of all. As Gallagher comments, ‘“Balkanisation” is now one of the most negative paradigms in international relations’.

---

20 Gallagher, p. 2.
In the United States, the media and policymaking communities often have formed their representations of Yugoslavia based on stereotypical images of the violent nature of the people of the Balkans generally, and of Yugoslavs specifically. Coverage of the Yugoslav wars has often included graphic, yet context-less, images of violence and atrocities, which cement the region’s reputation for irrational, meaningless violence. As John Allcock argues, ‘More than anything else, atrocity stories have served to buttress the image of the fundamental alterity of the South Slavs.’

One common interpretation of the wars in Yugoslavia is that they have been largely about the ‘clash of civilisations’: an intractable and historical religious war between Muslims and Christians. In his in-depth study of the US media’s perspectives on the war in Yugoslavia, James Sadkovich maintains that the media’s stereotypical representations include portrayals of Yugoslavs as vicious and atavistic tribes culturally prone to hatred, tragically caught within a centuries-old conflict that is unreasonable and intractable; that is, a ‘history of hatred’ underlies their conflicts. Sadkovich notes that these views have been widespread throughout the policymaking community, since the media do not present original perspectives; rather they generally ‘recast reality in ways congruent with the attitudes of those who control the political and economic levers of the country’ and ‘cooperat[e] with those in power’. In general, stereotypes of Yugoslavia have not been unusual or marginal views of the country or its people, but a mainstream or Establishment view of reality that fits closely with those of respected and educated middle class professionals. In a significant way, this view of reality stresses ‘the apartness of the Balkans from the European civilization’.

The ‘history of hatred’ concept as a cause for contemporary war in Yugoslavia has particular Romantic resonance, as it follows the time-honoured biblical concepts of original sin, of the transmission of sin by birth, and of blood atonement, echoed in St. Paul’s epistle to the Hebrews: ‘And almost all things are by the law purged with blood; and without shedding of blood is no remission.’ It implies that all parties

---

21 Allcock, p. 395.
23 Sadkovich, pp. 1 and 3.
24 Ivo Banac’s comment on Western attitudes towards the war in Yugoslavia, as quoted in Todorova, p. 185.
have an historical ‘original sin’ that is transmitted from one generation to the next, from one historical grievance to the next, and that the atonement of those sins is only by blood, a form of purification by violence or war. This concept underlies the Romantic notion of collective guilt that resides within the nation.\textsuperscript{26} It is also particularly pernicious, since the transmission of sin, guilt, and atonement continues without a rational end. Hence such conflicts could never really be said to end in any meaningful way.

While the popular media and policymaking communities may perhaps be forgiven their stereotypes of the region and the causes of conflict in it since they generally reflect the lowest-common-denominator form of conventional wisdom on any given subject, some experts even fall into the trap of repeating these tired prejudices. For example, Duško Doder takes up the popular theme that the conflicts in Yugoslavia represent a ‘history of hatred’.\textsuperscript{27} Sociologist Stjepan Meštrović offers anthropological and sociological ideal types as an explanation for the conflicts in Yugoslavia, discussing ‘Marian’ versus ‘Dinaric’ aspects of various Yugoslav national groups.\textsuperscript{28} This representation has much to do with the perceived dichotomy between town and country (urbanites versus agrarians) that has been a staple of sociology in the region, where urbanites represent civilisation, while agrarian or mountain-folk represent barbarianism or primitive culture.\textsuperscript{29}

These dispositionally-based arguments and emotionally-charged images of war follow a time-worn Romantic perspective that argues that violence is highly irrational, as it is more about honour and emotion than for calculated effect, à la Ignatieff’s \textit{Warrior’s Honor}.\textsuperscript{30} While for some individual soldiers that may be true, large-scale violence usually has at its heart an important dose of calculation, the

\textsuperscript{26} George P. Fletcher, \textit{Romantics at War: Glory and Guilt in the Age of Terrorism} (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002), pp. 139-147.
\textsuperscript{27} Duško Doder, ‘Yugoslavia: New War, Old Hatreds’, \textit{Foreign Policy} (Vol. 91, Summer 1993).
supposed irrational excesses of so-called ‘ethnic war’ notwithstanding. The futility of ending irrational wars based on immutable traits led on to the inevitable Romantic response: relativism. Since the observer can do nothing—since the sin of violence is within them—no outside factor can change the course of events. Thus relativism between all parties in the conflict became the stock media story, standing in for ‘objectivity’ and ‘balance’. The relativistic pox-on-all-their-houses response to the war also served as a ready-made excuse for non-intervention.

These representations share Kaplan’s and Huntington’s visions of civilisational clash, which focus on primordial identity, collective history, and deposits of memory as key sites for conflict. They also have much in common with the Western Orientalist tradition, and the images and stereotypes that Westerners generated and propagated about the Orient, especially the Middle East. Indeed, there is a form of ‘nested orientalism’ (where various cultures or more or less ‘oriental’ and hence more or less irrational and barbaric) in the Western understanding of the Balkans which is reflected in its interpretations of the conflicts in Yugoslavia.

6.2 Deep, Dark Winter of Death—Pessimism and nostalgia

'The stars have set. And of all seasons the lands south of my new country know but a single one—the deep, dark winter of death.'

—Aleš Debeljak

In speaking of Yugoslavia, Debeljak pointedly chooses a title which echoes Nietzsche’s The Twilight of the Idols: Or How One Philosophises with a Hammer (1889), a refutation of rationalism or any form of foundationalism which is a species of Romantic despair. While Debeljak’s reference could be seen as an affirmation of the Apollonian urge to order, the tone of his book bespeaks a darker interpretation: that of Nietzsche’s exaltation of the Dionysian impulse, of joy in destruction, disorder, and irrationality, and of the mastery of the irrational through the sheer force

---

32 On relativism in the media over the war in Bosnia, see Sadkovich.
33 For examples of this among Western statesmen and the media, see Almond; and Brendan Simms, Unfinest Hour: Britain and the Destruction of Bosnia (London: Allen Lane, 2001).
of will. As we have discussed, it is within this context that many commentators see Yugoslavia: destruction and disorder, irrationality, the force of will of dictators, a place forever in the grip of the deep, dark winter of death. This assessment lends itself to a Romantic atmosphere of both pessimism and nostalgia: pessimism both about the destruction of Yugoslavia and any hope of a future for the peoples of ex-Yugoslavia and a sense of nostalgia either for the deep past or for the former state itself.

A quick examination of the library bookshelves on the topic of Yugoslavia fills the observer with pessimism. Even many academic titles about the disintegration of Yugoslavia are replete with a sense of foreboding. For example, Yugoslavia is alternatively a ‘drama’, a ‘tragedy’, a ‘slaughterhouse’, or where ‘the nations rage’. Cover photos depict images of war with exhausted soldiers or crying children; torn flags symbolising the tearing apart of a state; burnt out bridges; or destroyed buildings. Others offer biblical allusions, such as a reproduction of a picture of the cringing, pitiable figure of Job by Ivan Meštrović, ironically so because Meštrović is perhaps best known for his sculptures of strong, resilient peasants. These are just the first impressions we receive when we cursorily glance at the titles and covers of books discussing Yugoslavia.

More substantively, many writings about the conflicts in former Yugoslavia underscore a sense of pessimism not only about its demise, but suggest that the prospects for the future of its successor states are bleak. Obviously, conflicts often generate a sense of pessimism or resignation. However, pessimism about the potential for rebuilding the area was a recurring theme. In the immediate aftermath of the war, some expressed pessimism about the prospects for democracy, basic liberties like free speech, or the development of a free market economy. For some commentators, the underlying pessimism directed the mood in a nostalgic direction. Nostalgia about Yugoslavia has at least two distinct forms, one from the right and one from the left, each of which can be considered a sort of teleology. Right-wing nostalgia reminisces

---

36 See Crnobrnja (drama), Woodward (tragedy), Rieff (slaughterhouse), and Christopher Catherwood, Why the Nations Rage: Killing in the Name of God (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002).
37 Crnobrnja (exhausted soldiers), Lampe (tom flags), Woodward (broken bridge), and Magaš (destroyed building).
38 Allcock.
about the deep past, with a misty focus on national culture and identity. Left-wing nostalgia eulogises the glories of the socialist state and its passing.

On the right, there is little nostalgia about the death of communist Yugoslavia per se; instead there exists a certain wistfulness about the role of culture, religion, and identity in the lives of men, which mark the past indelibly and shape the future. It examines religion and cultural identity as the key source of the incompatibility between the peoples of Yugoslavia. This form of nostalgia is a backward-looking one centring on the bonds of deep community. Its wistfulness extends to looking backward to history to explain both the present and the future. The past is firmly prologue. Conservative nostalgia plumbs the deep past, offering discourses on the importance of religion as a marker for identity, or on a sense of the ‘corruption’ of the people from their true national natures.

Interestingly, there are two competing Romantic notions of identity among South Slavs: first, the notion of national identity; second, the notion of a pan-South Slav identity. Conservatives fundamentally question the notion of a state for all South Slavs, arguing the impossibility of Yugoslavia itself. As such, they refute the grander pretensions of various forms of Romantic collective unity between the South Slavs such as Yugoslavism, the Illyrian movement, and other shallower forms of pan-Slavic unity, emphasising instead more traditional, parochial, and deep nationalist forms of community. Conservative works may reject the notion that there were ‘seasons’ of Yugoslavism and pan-South Slav notions of unity that waxed and waned among the nationalities, emphasising instead the desire for independent existence. Some also extol the benefits of empire, holding up Austria-Hungary as a model of good governance. However, this gloss on Habsburg rule is an anachronism, as at the time South Slav subjects of the empire were eager for an alternative form of rule through in majority South Slavic polity; they did not necessarily demand their own national states.

---

43 Huntington’s comments on Yugoslavia in *Clash of Civilizations* can be read in this vein.
44 See Banac.
Chapter 6

For the left, the mood of nostalgia is wrapped up more in a melancholic longing for the failed state of Yugoslavia itself, often expressed in the future sense of a ‘what-could-have-been’-style utopia had not various forces intervened to make it disintegrate, or personal reminiscences of the ‘good’ state.\(^{45}\) This nostalgia encompasses several arguments, including that Yugoslavia was uniquely torn by the opportunism of ethnic entrepreneurs who preyed on the weakness of the state; that dismemberment followed cack-handed attempts at external intervention; and that imperialistic overtures by crude American zealots were the primary cause of state failure.\(^{46}\) Some leftist works blame the West’s sins of omission for Yugoslavia’s failure, such as the lack of Western financial backing for the state, for example, by the IMF’s lack of willingness to prop up Yugoslavia’s faltering economy after 1983, when the international community became seriously concerned about debt levels in less developed countries.\(^{47}\)

Left-wing nostalgia mainly proffers an argument for the preservation of Yugoslavia as it was, albeit with some reforms.\(^{48}\) Unfortunately, some of these positions refuse to examine the harsh realities not only of the economic failure of Yugoslavia’s system of worker self-management, but also of the social and political breakdown of the state, relying instead either on nostalgic visions of the past or on external factors (such as the refusal to continue to prop up Yugoslavia economically) as the main causes of state failure.\(^{49}\) While infusions of Western cash might have ameliorated some of the excesses of state failure, it is probable that such actions would have postponed the state’s disintegration rather than avoided it altogether. Additionally, some proponents of socialist Yugoslavia can have a general unwillingness to deal with the lack of democracy and human rights in the state, and


\(^{47}\) See, for example, Criton Zaokos, ‘IMF’s shock therapy is true culprit in former Yugoslavia’, Insight on the News (14 June 1993).

\(^{48}\) Although this nostalgia can be seen most readily in hard-left works, some academic works, such as Alcock’s and Lampe’s, have a tinge of nostalgia about the potential for the socialist state to reform.

\(^{49}\) See, for example, Sean Gervasi, ‘Why is NATO in Yugoslavia?’ paper presented to the Conference on the Enlargement of NATO in Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean, Prague, Czech Republic (13-14 January 1996).
the unpopularity of Yugoslavia as it was among its population, indeed the unpopularity of the state with its largest national group, the Serbs.\footnote{Some commentators argue that the case of Yugoslavia involved the secession of the central republic, Serbia, first. For arguments along this line, see Silber and Little; see also, Daniele Conversi, 'Central Secession: Towards a New Analytical Concept? The Case of Former Yugoslavia', Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies (Vol. 26, No. 2, 2000).}

To some extent, Yugoslavia as it was (or 'really existing socialism', as some call it) may have been more popular as an abstract construct than as a real state. Some of Tito's supporters in the West were captured by the promise of multinationalism, multiculturalism, and by the concept of the socialist 'third way' of worker self-management which appeals to the Romantic left with its ideals of independent and autonomous workers collectives that put a human face on the oppressive collectivism of the Soviet command and control model of the economy. However, such popular Western notions of Titoism, or Yugoslavism, sat uncomfortably with the everyday realities of people's lives, such as the repression of political dissent and lack of democracy and human rights.\footnote{For a highly critical view of Yugoslavia, see Nora Beloff, Tito's Flawed Legacy: Yugoslavia and the West since 1939 (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985).}

Both forms of nostalgia can be seen as teleological since they impose a goal on the path of history; one which is seen as 'reactive' while the other is seen as 'progressive', but both of which are deemed inevitable. One sees the future as the storehouse of past experiences, the other as a blank slate upon which the past has no place. In one, the creation of Yugoslavia is impossible, in the other its demise is impossible. Both telescope their selective histories from different periods, one from a deep 'primordial' past when identity was formed mainly by religion, and the other after 1946 as the creation of brotherhood and unity, a non-Soviet alternative to socialism. Both use history as a weapon to make their points, one emphasising periods of conflict, the other periods of cooperation. One argues the primacy of religious or cultural difference, the other the primacy of linguistic sameness. One is nostalgic about the deep identity forged by religion and culture, the other is nostalgic about the fleeting identity forged by Yugoslav communist ideology and socialism. One is about disciplining and punishing the main stalwarts of a unified Yugoslavia, represented by the Serbs (through the creation of newly independent states), the other is about disciplining and punishing what Engels terms the 'non-historic peoples', represented by the Croats (through a unified Yugoslavia).
6.3 The Centre Will Not Hold—Structural factors and disintegration

In contrast to this Romantic interpretation of the conflicts in former Yugoslavia, we will examine the four structural factors we defined in Chapter 5—colonial history, political factors, economic factors, and demographic change—through an exit-voice-loyalty framework. This analysis is not meant to be comprehensive or definitive. Rather, it is meant to suggest how a variety of rational factors could point to a situation of potential conflict. We then compare this view with the Romantic perspective, which focuses on dispositional factors, we discussed earlier.

(a) Conflicting Inheritance—Yugoslavia and imperial history

'Unless an empire is destroyed through revolution, much of its social structure is reproduced in the post-imperial context'

—Karen Barkey

As we outlined in chapter 5, a state’s colonial or imperial legacy can have an important impact on the structure of its institutions long throughout the postcolonial/postimperial period. Thus significant historical continuities can exist that are not necessarily based on culture, but rather on varying patterns of institutional or economic development. For Yugoslavia, there were two postimperial states—a kingdom and a socialist federation—whose structures were complicated by the fact that they were successors to more than one imperial legacy: the Ottoman and Habsburg empires. As Karen Barkey notes,

The collapse of an empire leaves several legacies for the political entities that develop in its aftermath. Among these are social and economic structures, state institutions of a certain nature and strength, a particular set of elites, demographics, and an overall political cultural legacy. Unless an empire is destroyed through revolution, much of its social structure is reproduced in the post-imperial context.[...] the Ottoman and Habsburg, provide excellent examples of this continuity.

53 Allcock, p. 5.
As Barkey argues, empires leave institutions of administration and control that survive in successor states as well as continuity among imperial elites. Additionally, empires leave behind demographic and ethnic legacies that can lead to population exchanges, forced migrations, or land transfers to create strong ethnic majorities across defined territories in new states. Importantly, the strength of institutions in these newly created states often depends on the position that the territory of the new state played within the empire: core and periphery states have different imperial legacies. While core states are more likely to make a successful transition to independence with the creation of civic institutions, a legacy of domination creates problems for institutions in peripheral states, where institutions are often weaker, shallower, and non-indigenous. Thus, in new states where civic institutions are weak or shallow, centralising elites have a better chance at controlling the apparatus of the state, especially if they are supported by a strong ideology to bolster and mobilise national support for the state.

Legacies of the Ottoman empire. Although the Ottoman empire went through various periods of reform and modernisation during its three-hundred year history, economically, socially, and militarily the Ottoman empire at heart remained a medieval state with a despotic system of government and discriminatory religious and economic practices until its disintegration. Rule was exercised by grand viziers and a system of corruption and bribery permeated the administration, while the Islamic clergy and powerful Janissary military class held a corrupting influence and power. The pashas and governors who administered the provinces and vassal states purchased their posts and recovered their investments by extorting the local population and heavily taxing their subjects. Further, while the state preached a general toleration of non-Muslims, it practiced discriminatory fiscal and tax policies towards its non-Muslim subjects. Thus the long-term institutional practices of the Ottoman empire left a variety of economic, political, and social legacies that influenced the areas of Yugoslavia which had been under an extended period of Ottoman rule: the republics of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, and Macedonia as well as the province of Kosovo.

---

55 Ibid., pp. 101-103.
56 Ibid., p. 104-106.
57 Ibid., p. 104.
58 Note that these territories all had different periods of Ottoman rule. For example, Serbia came under Ottoman rule in 1459, became a tributary vassal state in 1817, gained full autonomy in 1856, and won
Throughout the Balkans, the Ottoman empire established a fairly uniform agrarian social structure that was without a strong landed aristocracy and which was based on an independent peasantry living on the family farm; the Ottomans saw their primary social function as support of the peasantry.\textsuperscript{59} Thus the empire left behind ‘a production system rooted in agriculture by the peasant for the peasant’ that focused on family and community self-sufficiency in agriculture which hindered the development of full-fledged market economies in Ottoman lands.\textsuperscript{60}

As Caglar Keyder notes, legally all Ottoman lands belonged to the sultan. The Ottoman system frowned upon the accumulation of wealth in private hands since its chief concern was to guarantee the continuation of its revenue stream which was collected through a land tax. Thus ambitious landlords would always remain uneasy in a climate where their acquisitions could be easily reversed by a change in policy or a change in leadership, a fact which limited capitalist accumulation. However, within the empire’s European territories, commercialisation and monetisation created opportunities for various groups to create alternative poles of power: new merchant groups, urban dwellers, and an educated middle class accumulated economic power which was later used to bring to life national movements that would challenge Ottoman authority.\textsuperscript{61}

Although the Ottoman empire made various attempts at centralisation and reform, by the nineteenth century the central state had difficulties completely imposing its economic system especially in the empire’s European territories, creating uneven development, where landlords who managed to develop a degree of autonomy from the state were able to reinforce their independence through access to trading networks in Central Europe. The wealth these non-Muslim Balkan provinces were able to generate created a newly educated middle classes while their proximity to Western and Central Europe spurred their political development and nationalist aspirations. Furthermore, the Ottoman central state’s slow and tentative pace of independence in 1878. Bosnia and Herzegovina came under Ottoman rule in 1463, were lost to the Austrian crown in 1878, and then annexed to Austria-Hungary in 1908.


\textsuperscript{60} Barkey, p. 101.

reforms and its internal resistance to change meant that brewing opposition to the empire would be drawn along the nationalist push for independence.⁶²

One key political legacy of the Ottoman empire was a comparatively strong centralised and bureaucratic state. As Barkey comments, the Ottoman state left behind a complex legacy:

On the one hand, the long tradition of a strong central state devoid of representative institutions has hindered the development of democracy in many post-Ottoman nations. On the other hand, the Ottoman empire left behind a complicated political cultural legacy, as seen in the complex relationship between Islam and the state. The Ottoman empire was an Islamic empire, yet it allowed for a certain separation between state and religion.⁶³

The empire tried to recentralise the ‘the heartland of the empire, namely Anatolia and the Balkans’ during the first half of the nineteenth century which began a process of bureaucratic modernisation that would bring the governance of the Ottoman state closer to the state model of Europe. However, the modernization efforts of the Ottoman state elicited different responses among the various groups under Ottoman rule.⁶⁴

Legacies of the Habsburg empire. Like the Ottoman empire, the Habsburg empire was significantly economically underdeveloped compared to the rest of Western Europe, and differential levels of internal economic diversity and development plagued the empire.⁶⁵ Indeed, the fact that various parts of the empire were economically out of phase with each other exacerbated internal tensions.⁶⁶

However, unlike the Ottoman empire, the structural legacy of the Habsburg empire was different and more varied. Economically, the Hapsburg empire had a weak and dependent peasantry alongside a powerful aristocracy with tight economic and political control over the peasantry. Farmers were a weak social class, dominated by the nobility or a growing merchant and industrial class. However, while their social structures differed from the Ottoman empire, the successor states of the Habsburg

⁶² Keyder, pp. 33-34.
⁶³ Barkey, p. 102.
⁶⁴ Keyer, p. 32.
⁶⁵ Allcock, pp. 28 and 53. Allcock discusses some aspects of Ottoman and Habsburg history throughout his first chapter. John Lampe also notes that the ‘fragmented borderlands’ that became Yugoslavia suffered from uneven development. Lampe, pp. 20-33.
empire did share the similar economic legacy of a large peasantry and economically underdeveloped towns, which stymied economic growth in the post-imperial period. Although the Habsburg lands were generally more prosperous than those of the Ottomans, like the Ottoman empire, the Habsburg empire suffered from uneven economic development. Rapid and uneven economic growth strengthened the hand of social and nationalist movements against the centralising and the centripetal forces in the empire by weakening the bond between Vienna and the Habsburg periphery.

However, it is perhaps in its political legacy that the Habsburg empire differs most from the Ottoman empire. Unlike the Ottoman entity, the Habsburg empire never developed a strong, centralised bureaucratic state comparable in strength and reach. Instead, the Habsburg state competed for power with feudal institutions, such as the church or nobility. By 1867, when the dual monarchy came into being, a form of decentralisation was institutionalised in the Habsburg regions.

Solomon Wank argues that the Compromise of 1867 which the Emperor Francis Joseph signed with the Hungarian oligarchy in order to secure Magyar loyalty to the empire was in essence a rearguard action to stem nationalism and an attempt at reform to appease it, noting ‘The compromise gave the empire a deceptive stability for fifty years, but at the price of alienating most of the Slavs, with the exception of the Poles’. Effectively, the Compromise ensured that the Habsburg state would retain a German imperial dynasty with a germanising imperial presence. However, by 1867 the Compromise had weakened this ideal. Rather than ruling for all nationalities, the Compromise implied that the Habsburgs ruled in the name of the Germans and Hungarians rather than in the entire empire.

The dual monarchy was viewed with suspicion and distrust by its Slavic subjects. Although the Compromise sought to stem Magyar nationalism, and to bind the core Magyar nation more firmly to the central state, the empire lost the loyalty of its peripheral Slavic regions. For example, in Croatia anti-dynastic sentiment was rife, along with the sentiment that the empire was anti-Slav, and that the emperor was

---

70 Wank, p. 50.
71 Ibid., p. 51.
German with a German understanding. Ultimately the policy was self-defeating as Slavic lands clamoured ever more loudly for national autonomy and equality of treatment.\(^{72}\) Thus the empire was deeply unstable beneath the surface after 1867. Its surface stability was not due to any sort of loyalty that its subjects to the empire, but rather the willingness of the empire to brutal suppress revolt through military means. However, despite the state’s willingness to use force against its subjects, the Slavic nationalities such as the Croats, Czechs, Poles, and Slovenes consistently sought to press their interests and gain recognition on the international stage, seeking independent representation at the international level, for example at the Second International, at international sports events, and in professional, scientific, and academic organisations.\(^{73}\) Thus these nationalities rejected the empire’s centralising tendencies and instead called for looser ties with the centre, including federalisation and national autonomy. With all of these countervailing tendencies, the Habsburg empire was, in the words of R.J.W. Evans, ‘a complex and subtly balanced organism, not a “state” but a mildly centripetal agglutination of bewilderingly heterogeneous elements’.\(^{74}\) As a result, compared to the Ottoman empire, there was a much weaker statist tradition in the successor regions to the Habsburg empire.

**Boundaries.** These colonial legacies bequeathed a variety of challenges to both Yugoslav successor states which they never successfully overcame. First, as multicultural and multinational empires, both the Ottoman and the Habsburg systems of government created imperial boundaries which did not necessarily reflect population boundaries.\(^{75}\) Rather these were boundaries created by various wars and their subsequent treaty settlements, reflecting imperial priorities and historical compromises rather than national or ethnic boundaries. These boundaries later served to define, to a large extent, the borders of their postimperial states and which are not completely uncontested even after the disintegration of Yugoslavia.\(^{76}\)

**Migration and settlement policies.** Second, colonial migration and settlement policies generated intercommunal difficulties that remained with the postimperial

---

\(^{72}\) Ibid., pp. 51-52.

\(^{73}\) Ibid., pp. 46-47.

\(^{74}\) Evans quoted in ibid., p. 50.

\(^{75}\) Although it is fair to say that state boundaries and population boundaries are rarely completely complementary.

\(^{76}\) For example, complaints about border issues remain, particularly with regards to the Serbs. For an example of their arguments, particularly with reference to the Badinter Arbitration Commission, see Peter Radan, ‘Yugoslavia’s Internal Borders as International Borders: A Question of Appropriateness’, *East European Quarterly* (June 1999).
state. These policies include such tactics as settlement of non-native populations for
the purposes of securing the state. For example, the migration and settlement of the
Serbs in the Habsburg military frontier (the Militärgrenze, or krajina) that is now part
of Croatia was part of a strategy to secure the empire against foreign or Ottoman
invasion. The area had a special status under the empire, including separate social
structures. For example, the krajina had no feudal obligations and families living in
the region preserved the zadruga, the extended family headed by a patriarch who was
under service obligations to the crown. However, the empire also used method of
ensuring Croatian quiescence as these units could be used to quell any potential
Croatian rebellions.

The empire used this ‘divide and conquer’ strategy with other nationalities as
well. For example, Croatian units were sent to quash the Hungarian uprising against
the empire in 1848. Thus the colonial policy of migration and settlement, as well as
the strategic use of one nationality to police another to prevent rebellion against the
imperial centre created long-term tensions between groups. For example, Istvan Deak
notes that the Habsburg empire experienced significant alliance shifting among
national groups for political advantage and to check and balance power, while
Nachum Gross argues that the empire played off not only nationalities, but classes
and economic interests to stay in power.

Systems of preferences. Third, imperial systems of preferences created the
basis for historical cleavages between local populations. For example, the Ottoman
empire offered inducements for assimilation and conversion to Islam. Indeed, huge
numbers of peasants in Bosnia converted to Islam, an event that did not occur in any
other Ottoman country. Thus, unlike the colonial practice active migration and
large-scale settlement of another population on conquered territory, the Ottomans
effectively tried to convert the sitting population. Most peasants converted for
economic reasons—to escape feudal duties and tax burdens as well as to gain greater

---

77 Lampe, pp. 30-31.
78 Istvan Deak, Beyond Nationalism: A Social and Political History of the Habsburg Officer Corps,
79 Zeman, p. 26. Zeman notes that 200,000 Russian troops were used as well against the Hungarian
rebellion in 1848.
Deak, Beyond Nationalism, p. 50.
81 Avdo Sučeska, Bošnjaci u Osmanskoj Državi [trans.: Bosnians in the Ottoman State] (Sarajevo:
freedom within the empire. In addition to financial advantages, conversion had social advantages, including prestige and opportunities to join the Ottoman ‘nomenklatura’.

Multiple colonisations. Finally, a history of multiple colonisation complicated Yugoslav unity by developing competing sets of expectations in the postimperial republics of Yugoslavia. This was especially true with regards to expectations about the proper structure of the postimperial state and its relationship to subsidiary units. Ottoman rule was more highly centralised and created expectations about the role of a strong central state, while Habsburg rule was predicated on greater local self-government and autonomy, eschewing a strong central state. These differing interpretations of the role of the state created opposing political affinities toward centralisation that could not be reconciled. The centralising tendencies of both royalist Yugoslavia and socialist Yugoslavia faced significant challenges from the republics that were part of the Habsburg lands, who had experienced a higher degree of political autonomy under Habsburg rule.

As Stevan Pawlovitch argues, the Yugoslav state and Yugoslavism always had different meanings for its two largest groups, the Serbs and the Croats based on their differing imperial experiences:

In Serbia, which had emancipated itself from Ottoman rule, Yugoslavism was seen as a way of uniting all the dispersed Serbs into one unit built around Serbia. This could come about only after the empires had been destroyed, and on the understanding that all South Slavs would come together in the same independent state. A different conception was to be found in Habsburg-ruled Croatia, where it was realized that Croats had to combine with other South Slavs in the empire in order to gain more weight. That would be a union within a reorganized Habsburg monarchy.

---

82 Ibid, pp. 11-12.
85 Barkey.
For example, other than the two core states of the Habsburg empire, Croatia’s position within Austria-Hungary was that of the most privileged nationality. After the 1869 Nagodba, or compromise agreement between Hungary and Croatia, Croatia gained increasing administrative authority and autonomy. During the unification of Yugoslavia after 1918, Croats clung to various aspects of the autonomy that they had gained under the Austro-Hungarian empire and protested against the new state’s centralising tendencies over a variety of issues, including currency conversion, the assessment of land taxes, the re-imposition of corporal punishment on peasants (which was banned under Austria-Hungary in 1867), and draft-animal registration, which provoked a serious revolt against the new central bureaucracy. Thus the Yugoslav republics’ understandings and expectations of the proper role of the state—especially the state’s level of centralisation and control—were highly coloured by their imperial experiences and became highly contested.

(b) Incomplete Transition—Yugoslavia and political factors

As we discussed in Chapter 5, perhaps the single most important political marker for potential conflict is regime type. In particular, partial democracies and democratising states have the highest potential for conflict of all regime types since their political systems contain conflicting democratic and autocratic tendencies which are fundamentally unstable and subject to political reversals, coups, and revolutions. Yugoslavia was one such state, by 1990 containing republics and provinces with differential levels of democratisation within a federal system that was partially democratising: effectively the system was one of partial democracies existing within a partial democracy. This system had some hallmarks of democracy, such as movement towards free elections in some of the republics, while maintaining autocratic features, such as a non-independent judiciary or a muzzled press.

After the death of Tito in 1980, the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) still held a monopoly on political power throughout the federal system and the

---

88 Ibid.
89 Banac, pp. 214-225 and 248-249.
90 For example, by 1990, Slovenia and Croatia had held free elections. However, the judiciary and press remained non-independent.
republics. The party monopolised the selection and appointment of all cadres, including those in the federal power structure, the agricultural communes, and in industry. However, there was widespread latent opposition to the party’s monopoly on power that the party formally silenced.\(^9\) However, partly due to deteriorating economic circumstances from the middle of the 1980s, Yugoslavia experienced a trend towards political pluralisation which influenced the political process and eroded the power of the communist party. In addition to overt political movements, civil institutions such as scientific and artistic associations clamoured for greater political space.\(^9\) Many of these organisations vociferously lobbied for the end of the communist hold on power; a variety of strikes, protests, demonstrations were held throughout Yugoslavia in the late 1980s to that effect.\(^9\)

These protests underscored the party’s waning authority and influence throughout Yugoslavia.

However, pluralisation was not uniform across republics. In 1989, both the Slovene and Croatian communist parties came to accept pluralisation as part of the political scene and began several fundamental institutional changes to the operation of the political system in these republics. These changes included the legitimisation of opposition parties and the movement towards democratic elections. Although the communist party in these republics struggled to preserve the *status quo* and their privileged status within the political system, by the spring of 1990 both Slovenia and Croatia had held free multi-party elections which swept the communists from power.

The communist parties in these republics lost their mass electoral bases, and many former communist party members joined new parties, highlighting the weak ideological attraction of the party. As Vladimir Goati notes, ‘For many in the [communist] party apparatus, their party function served largely as a convenient way to live well without working or investing any personal capital.’\(^9\) However, the newly-election opposition party leaderships did not necessarily share true ‘democratic’ tendencies, and purged those who opposed them, as the communists had


\(^{94}\) *Ibid.*, pp. 7-12. The quote is on p. 12.
Chapter 6

done previously. Thus while these republics did have free multi-party elections, their democratisation was incomplete and they maintained authoritarian tendencies with respect to other branches of government, the economy, and the press.

At the same time, other republics resisted democratisation. Serbia, with some support from the other republics, strongly opposed the multi-party elections in Slovenia and Croatia, and resisted a change to a multi-party system in Serbia itself. In December 1990 the Serbian communist party relented and also held multi-party elections. However, unlike in the other two republics, Serbian opposition parties had little access to the media and called for a boycott of the election. They dropped their boycott and lost soundly; the communists (renamed the Socialist Party of Serbia) won 77 per cent of assembly seats. Macedonia, Montenegro, and Bosnia-Herzegovina also held multi-party elections in November and December 1990. In Macedonia and Montenegro, the communist parties did well. In Montenegro, they won a 66 per cent majority in the assembly; in Macedonia, they formed a coalition with the Macedonian nationalists. Only in Bosnia-Herzegovina was the party effectively eliminated.

Thus the other republics of Yugoslavia were also partial democracies. While they held multi-party elections, these were not necessarily free or fair. The communists held a firm grip on political power in both Serbia and Montenegro, and were still significant political players in Macedonia. All republican institutions still had varying authoritarian tendencies, without an independent judiciary or a free press.

At the same time that the republics were partial democracies, the federal system itself could be seen as a form of partial democracy. After Tito’s death, the system was headed by an eight-man presidency, with each republic and province (Vojvodina and Kosovo) given a voice within it. (The communist party presidency had a ninth member, a representative of the JNA). Each republican or provincial representative remained responsible to his republican or provincial assembly. The representatives were all formally equal and the presidency rotated among them. The rotating presidium was created in order to foster consensual government—no single republic could dominate the federal system. In effect, it was a means of assuring some

---

95 Ibid., pp. 18-19.
democratic voice for the smaller republics albeit within the context of one-party
control of the system. However, the consensual nature of the system failed in 1991.97

This system of partial republican democracies within a partial federal
democracy suggested the potential for significant instability and conflict within the
state.

(c) Dolce Far Niente—Yugoslavia and economic factors

'[T]here was no country like Yugoslavia, in which one could live so
well while working so little.'

—Žarko Puhovski98

Economist Marko Veselica once said, 'The problem of the relationship between the
nations and republics in Yugoslavia is primarily a question of their economic
relationship'.99 As we discussed in Chapter 5, there are several economic markers that
suggest the potential for conflict. These include: 1) conflicting state spending and
redistribution priorities, 2) the hidden financial subsidies that remittances represent to
the state, and 3) differential integration into the world economy between the
Yugoslav republics.

State spending and redistribution. The question of economic development and
internal resource allocation plagued Yugoslavia from its inception as a kingdom and
continued under socialist Yugoslavia. Royal Yugoslavia saw discord over differential
tax policies between republics; socialist Yugoslavia saw protests among the more
developed republics against what they saw as 'excessive' transfers of capital
investment to the underdeveloped republics.100

Since socialist Yugoslavia was from its inception conceptualised as a
multinational state, the republics adopted strategies that may have been more
appropriate to sovereign states than to a federal state system; the Yugoslav system
was filled with redundancies and inefficiencies because each republic wanted to
pursue its own form of economic development.101 During the takeoff stage of

97 Magaš.
98 Puhovski, p. 128.
99 Veselica, p. 5.
100 On this issue in royalist Yugoslavia, see Banac. On this issue in the 1960s and 1970s, see Veselica,
p. 5, and Rusinow. For the 1980s to 1991, see Ramet, Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia,
1961-1991, especially Chapters 8 and 10; and Ramet, Balkan Babel.
101 Christopher Cvijic, Remaking the Balkans, Chatham House Papers (London: Royal Institute of
International Affairs, 1995). See also, Pedro Ramet, Yugoslavia in the 1980s (Boulder, CO: Westview
industrialisation in the 1960s Yugoslavia grew substantially. However, this rapid growth was replaced by stagnation and lost opportunities, as the federal state was burdened with centralised distribution and the financing of the underdeveloped republics. For example, by 1980 about 2.5 per cent of Yugoslav national income was redistributed to underdeveloped regions, encouraging ‘chronic dependency’ in inefficient industries. This system of redistribution was prone to what Veselica terms an ‘ingrained parasitism’ that generates conflicts over the division of income between the republics and the federal state, as well as over each republic’s fair share of development income. Thus instead of investing in those areas that had the greatest potential for economic growth, political priorities determined economic ones, further undermining economic growth, ingraining economic dependencies, and stoking inter-republican resentment.

One significant problem was that the republics received funds from the federal sector without supervision or accountability for the results. Thus they could choose their development priorities without regard for their return on investment. These transfers of economic assistance generated huge imbalances and perverse economic incentives, especially since some republics received more in aid than their entire GDP. For example, Montenegro received approximately four times the amount in federal development transfers than it produced in its own economy. By the late 1980s, economic redistribution to the poorer and more underdeveloped republics had become a mainstay of Slovenian, and to a somewhat lesser extent Croatian, opposition to the centralised state, and calls for a confederalist alternative.

Remittances as a hidden export. Another factor that is a potential marker for conflict is expatriate remittances. Remittances are now second only to foreign direct investment as a source of external funding for states. Remittances reflect a hidden export asset to the state as well as a form of indirect financing, especially in states

102 For a discussion of Yugoslav economic growth in that period, see Rusinow, especially Chapters 4 and 5.
103 Veselica, p. 25.
104 Ibid.
105 Ramet notes, per Steven Burg, that in the early 1980s there were fundamentally three Yugoslav Central Committee leadership ‘tendency groupings’ that were significantly based on economic affinities: confederalists (Slovenes, Croats, and those from Vojvodina); ideological conservatives (military and those from the underdeveloped regions); and liberal reformers (mainly economists and those from the Belgrade party organization). See Ramet, Yugoslavia in the 1980s, p. 156.
with fixed official exchange rates. They also provide greater financial independence from the state to those groups (and republics) receiving remittance payments. Indeed, despite its relatively small population Yugoslavia became one of the major labour-exporting countries in the world. Due to the slow development of Croatia's economy in the 1970s, the republic was not able to provide adequate employment for its workforce, and a high rate of emigration from the republic followed.

With high emigration came a high rate of remittances. From 1977-1989 average remittances for Yugoslavia were worth $US 1.7 billion per year, hitting a peak worth of about $US 2.4 billion in 1981, based on a migrant population of over 550,000 abroad, or an average of $US 3,090 worth of remittances per worker. This represents more than the average wage of Yugoslav workers at the time. Even in the 1990s, Croatia was one of the world's top 15 recipients of per capita remittances. By the 1980s, Yugoslavia saw significant Kosovar Albanian emigration to the West and remittance payments back to Kosovo.

These remittance payments created a hidden financing engine both for the territories concerned (Croatia and Kosovo) as well as for the federal state, as fixed foreign exchange rates were set fairly low by the state central bank. This amounted to enormous transfer of undocumented income to the state that acted as a hidden export. Additionally, the remittance income that Croatia and Kosovo received allowed both to be less dependent on the overall Yugoslav economy.

Differential trade openness. Trade openness and integration into the world economy are indicators of stability in states, while lack of trade and lack of economic freedom suggest instability. The republics of Yugoslavia had a differential rate of integration into the global economy and thus each region had separate dependencies on the federal state. For example, high income agricultural areas like Vojvodina had significant trade dependencies on national (Yugoslav) markets and a low dependency on extra-regional markets, whereas high income industrialised areas like Slovenia had significant exports, a higher integration with the world economy, and a lower

---

109 Veselica, p. 27.
dependence on regional or national markets. These differences in dependence on global trade created differing priorities and tensions between the regions.

Additionally, trade and integration in the global economy—especially imports—also caused problems for the federal state. Individual republics were allowed to run deficits in order to import capital goods at artificially subsidised foreign exchange rates which encouraged the waste of resources and added to inter-republican tensions since these policies did not provide incentives for those who generated wealth and instead encouraged the importation of goods on items that could be sold profitably internally. The importation of foreign licenses and patents at artificially low prices killed off internal innovation and created a large balance of payments problem. By 1980, Yugoslavia’s trade deficit stood at about $US 6.5 billion, and by 1988 it had accumulated a further $US 20 billion in debt—the highest per capita foreign debt in Europe—requiring repayments at high interest with hard currency earnings. As Goati argues, these difficult economic pressures created a zero-sum game for the republics.

All of these difficulties suggested that by the 1980s, Yugoslavia was in deep economic crisis. Indeed, Yugoslavia stopped publishing details of the country’s current account due to its poor economic performance.

(d) Fearing the Future—Yugoslavia and demographic change

As we outlined in Chapter 5, demographic factors may play a role in conflict. Such factors as agrarian expansion, urbanisation, youth bulges, or migration across borders may be markers for future conflict as demography shifts the relative balance of numerical power between groups. Additionally, long-term trends such as natality rates can have an effect on perceptions of the viability of group power as groups see their potential role within the state changing as a result of demographic shifts. In terms of conflict markers, by the 1980s Yugoslavia saw several demographic shifts: 1) rapid urbanisation, 2) youth bulges among the Muslim (especially Kosovar Albanian) population and high natality rates among Kosovars, and 3) significant

---

112 Goati, p. 19.
migration across borders out of Yugoslavia and to Western Europe or North America, especially by Croats and Albanians in search of economic opportunities abroad.

*Urbanisation.* A variety of scholars have commented on the rural-urban divide in Yugoslavia and its divisive effects. First, Yugoslavia experienced rapid urbanisation from 1948-1981. In the span of a generation, Yugoslavia went from a largely rural population to a largely urban one, thanks to rapid industrialisation and economic development during that period. In the aftermath of World War II, Yugoslavia's agrarian population stood at 73 per cent. By 1981, that figure stood at 27 per cent; indeed, the urban population increased by 80 per cent between 1953 and 1971. Thus approximately two-thirds of previously agrarian households had moved to the cities in just over 20 years. This form of rapid modernisation created significant social dislocation, and dislocated and marginalised groups new to urban areas developed ethnic group solidarities and in-group preferences which Xavier Bougarel argues were used either 'to take over parts of the state apparatus (e.g., Krajina's Serbs in the Croatian police), to facilitate their migration abroad (Herzegovinian Croats in North America and Sandjak's Muslims in Germany), or to control different activities linked with organized crime'.

*Youth bulge and differential natality rates.* Second, by the 1980s, while most Yugoslav nationalities were experiencing a 'baby bust' and falling natality rates, the Muslim populations of Yugoslavia, particularly in Kosovo, experienced a youth bulge and rising birth rates, which Milica Bookman calls a 'passive pronatalist policy' that has existed for decades among the Albanians of Kosovo and FYROM, resulting in the highest population growth rates in Europe. In comparison with other Yugoslavs, by 1990 Kosovar Albanians were increasing at a rate of 2.5 percent per year. In comparison, the numbers of Croats were increasing at a rate of 0.4 percent. The birthrate among Kosovars was 30.4 (per 1,000 population) compared to 15.3 (per 1,000 population) in the rest of Yugoslavia. By 1990, the Serbian birth rate dropped to 11.4 percent, while that of the Croats stood at 12.5 percent, Muslims at 18.4 percent, and Kosovar Albanians at 28.8 percent. Thus, by 1990 the Muslim

---

113 See, for example, Allcock, especially Chapter 12; Christopher Bennett, *Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse: Causes, Course and Consequences* (New York, NY: New York University Press, 1995); and Mueller, 'The Banality of Ethnic Conflict'. Mueller underscores the rural-urban divide in the generation of conflict in Yugoslavia.


115 Bougarel.
populations of Yugoslavia had at least a 50 per cent higher natality rate than the two largest constituent national groups of Yugoslavia.\footnote{Bookman, ‘Demographic Engineering’.}

\textit{Emigration.} Third, from the 1970s onward, Yugoslavia saw significant emigration from Croats to the West, many to work abroad as guest workers. By 1980, one economist estimated that more than 50 per cent of all Yugoslav economic migrants were Croats from Croatia, and most migrants from Bosnia-Herzegovina were also Croats.\footnote{Veselica, p. 6.} This migration hid a significant unemployment and underemployment problem in Yugoslavia. It was estimated that if the approximately 500,000 Croats who lived in Western Europe would have returned to seek employment in Yugoslavia, about 40 per cent of Croatia’s population would have been unemployed.\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, p. 26.} By the 1980s, Kosovar Albanians became the most numerous group to emigrate abroad and seek economic opportunities.

These shifting demographics created social tensions in Yugoslavia. As Milica Bookman argues, there is a positive link between economic power and relative population size within states across a variety of parameters including ethnic heterogeneity as well as type of political organisation and governance. Therefore, groups may compete to boost their numbers, as these then can be turned into demands for tangible benefits from the state. The various economic rewards to greater population size are impressive. They include: 1) access to scarce resources and access to the state; 2) input into policymaking and the ability to make demands that benefit the group; and 3) greater allocation of economic favours and patronage, including access to job opportunities, favourable workplace siting, access to educational opportunities and training slots.\footnote{Bookman, ‘Demographic Engineering’.

Bookman notes that groups may insist on three types of demands from the state as their numbers increase, which can reflect group size and implicate group loyalty to the state. These are: 1) cultural rights, such as insisting on native language schooling or rights to religious observance; 2) greater integration into the state decision-making process, such as demands for equal rights with the majority or the largest group; and 3) the right to autonomy, self-determination, or secession from the

\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}}, p. 26.}
state. These demands create pressures on powerful groups, who may then fear for their continuing future in the state and may seek to reinforce their hold on state power.

6.4 Traitors All?—An analysis of exit, voice, and loyalty in Yugoslavia

'A nation can survive its fools, and even the ambitious. But it cannot survive treason from within.'

—Cicero

Based on our examination of structural factors, we see that several conflict markers were present in Yugoslavia. These include a history of different multiple colonisation which bequeathed different institutional legacies to the republics; partial democratisation with residual authoritarian tendencies in all of the republics; republican tensions over state spending and distribution policies, hidden financing from expatriate remittances, and differential regional integration into the global economy; as well as a shifting demographic pattern. If we examine Yugoslavia from the perspective of Hirschman’s exit-voice-loyalty framework, we see that many of these structural factors suggest that each republic would have a different pattern of loyalty to the federal state, which suggests that there would be no uniform republican choice between exit and voice if the state deteriorated. We will examine each of these structural categories to see how they might bias the choice between exit and voice for the three largest and wealthiest republics: Croatia, Serbia, and Slovenia.

Differing institutional legacy of colonialism. The legacy of colonialism in Yugoslavia varied depending on whether the territory in question was part of the Habsburg or Ottoman lands. One key difference between the two empires was the strength of the central state and the autonomy of the territories under imperial rule. Lands under Ottoman rule experienced significantly more state central control than Habsburg areas; the Habsburg empire was centrally weaker and devolved significantly more authority to its subsidiary units.

Both Croatia and Slovenia experienced greater autonomy under colonial rule, thus their pattern of loyalty to a central state was weak, instead loyalty resided

---

120 Ibid.
121 Speech in the Roman Senate.
Chapter 6

primarily with the local authority. After Serbian independence from the Ottoman empire, the Serbs followed Ottoman institutional patterns in that they created a strong central state. Thus the Serbian locus of loyalty lay with central authority. After the creation of Yugoslavia, the three main republics had differing institutional expectations about the role of a central state, and had a differing pattern of loyalty to it based on their colonial experiences. These patterns of loyalty to a central state remained in the second Yugoslavia, suggesting that the republics would have differing responses to the deterioration of the central state: while the Serbs were likely to support the central state (at least at first) and choose voice (dissent), Croatia and Slovenia were more likely to choose the exit option.

Partial democratisation. Each republic and province experienced a different level of democratisation during the late 1980s suggesting a differing level of loyalty to the central state. The move towards pluralism throughout Yugoslavia in the 1980s suggests that the entire system was under considerable pressure and that the first line of defence to stem deterioration would be the voice option: great political pluralism. However pluralism was experienced differently in the republics. The Croatian and Slovenian communist parties collapsed to be replaced with ruling opposition parties who were less loyal to the central state. This suggests that these two republics were seeking a path of at least partial exit from the federal system. On the other hand, the success of communist rule in Serbia after elections suggested a continuing loyalty to a central state and the pursuit of the voice option (at least initially).

These patterns fit with ones seen in the 1970s. After the Croatian Spring of 1971 which saw huge protests, strikes, and demonstrations in Croatia in favour of greater decentralisation of the federal state, 32,000 people were arrested, dismissed from their jobs, interrogated, or persecuted. Additionally, the federal state used other forms of punishment to quash political dissent. In 1980, the central state still held political trials; tortured political prisoners; denied dissidents employment, the right to travel, or the right to leave; and subjected them to continued police harassment. These tactics had a chilling effect on those opposed to the system of federal rule, denying the state the benefits of dissent in stemming institutional deterioration. Indeed, Croatia was known as 'the silent republic' from the 1970s onwards. It also rewarded those elements within the republic most loyal to the central

122 On the Croatian Spring, see Rusinow, especially Chapter 7; on the numbers arrested, etc., see Veselica, p. 12.
state. In Croatia, it de-legitimated the voice option for the majority altogether, reinforcing its latent tendencies towards favouring exit.

Additionally, Tito’s Karadjorjevo coup against the liberals in the Serbian communist party in 1971—as a parallel purge of Serbs that occurred after the purge of Croats following the Croatian Spring—eliminated all progressive forces with the LCY ruling structure, denied internal dissent, and reinforced those sectors of the party most loyal to the central state. Instead of open dissent, the Yugoslav system legitimated exile (exit) for dissenters, as in Latin America. Those who were disgruntled with the political system or could not find employment within Yugoslavia did not necessarily dissent; they voted with their feet and left for the West. While in the short term this provided the state with a safety valve for the discontented and gave the state the economic benefit of remittances, in the long term it eroded the loyalty of many groups to the central state, as well as those republics receiving the most benefit from remittances who had an independent source of income. Those groups and republics that did not depend as heavily on the overall health of the Yugoslav economy—like Croatia—could rely on their own resources rather than seek to reform the state. This diminished the appeal of the voice option and instead reinforced the likelihood that these sectors of society would prefer the exit option.

Economic factors. Different priorities for federal spending, the role of remittances, and differences between the republics in their integration in the global economy meant that they had different patterns of loyalty to the central state. These varying loyalties suggested that they were more likely to choose one option over the other. For example, those republics that were contributing the most to the federal budget were likely to be less loyal to the central state as they were not reliant on continuing access to federal development funds for their economies. Thus Slovenia and Croatia had a lower loyalty to the state than republics like Montenegro which received significant development aid.

The role of remittances also had differential effects on the loyalty that the republics would have to the state. For example, high rates of emigration to the West and remittances from expatriate Croatians to Croatia (and later expatriate Kosovar Albanians to Kosovo) lowered the loyalty of these sectors of Yugoslav society as they

---

123 Ibid.
had financial resources that were independent from the continuing economic success and development of the Yugoslav state.

Finally, varying levels of integration into the global economy changed the level of loyalty to the central state. Those regions that had a high level of integration and had successful export sectors, such as Slovenia, had a degree of financial independence from the state and thus less loyalty to a central state. These factors indicate that the exit option was more viable in those republics or provinces with a lesser reliance on the central state for financing.

Demographic shifts. Lastly, changing demographic patterns suggested that the existing patterns of loyalty to the central state could shift in the future as different groups increase and demand access to the state and its resources. Different republics (or groups within republics) would be expected to have a varying level of loyalty to the central state in the future as their influence increased or decreased with their numbers, and hence potential power status within the state. Urbanisation, differing natality rates, and emigration had an impact on loyalty to the state.

Invariably, urbanisation leads to the social dislocation of people accustomed to an agrarian life who find themselves living in an urban setting. This dislocation often leads them to seek solidarities among those similar to themselves, relying on kin or extended family networks rather than on formal state institutions, and thus place less loyalty in the central state. The high Muslim natality rate in Yugoslavia led to changing calculations about loyalty to a central state especially among the Serbs. High birth rates among Kosovars led them to demand greater access to the state. However, this threatened the long-term viability of the Serbs in Kosovo. This factor had a negative effect on Serbian loyalty to the central state in the long run, as they withdrew their loyalty to the state as they saw their position erode within it.

Finally, the effects of migration suggested differing patterns of loyalty to the state among those groups who had a high rate of migration to the West. Yugoslavia’s liberal emigration policy acted as a safety valve for dissidents and the unemployed, who were allowed to leave to seek employment elsewhere, mainly in the West. However, the price of this policy was a long-term loss of loyalty among those groups, as well as among their dependents who received remittances in Yugoslavia. Their economic independence from the state allowed them to look less to the state as the guarantor of their economic future and more to own resources, which made the exit option more viable. Some of these main points are summarised in the table below:
As we can see from this brief analysis, structural factors were likely to have a negative impact on both Slovenian and Croatian loyalties to a central state while several factors favoured continued Serbian loyalty to a federal system. This suggests that both Croatia and Slovenia would likely have chosen the exit option over voice, while Serbia would have favoured voice, at least in the beginning, in a bid to reform or restructure the central state. Our brief examination of the role of exit, voice, and loyalty on these structural factors shows the incompatibilities between the republics of Yugoslavia, the impact these differences seemed to have on their respective loyalties to the central state, and thus the likelihood that one option would be seen as preferable over another. Therefore, merely a brief consideration of these factors points to significant potential for situationally-based conflict regardless of specifically ‘cultural’ or ‘ethnic’ dispositions. In effect, each of these three republics was deeply

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 6.1: Structural Factors and Impact on Loyalty to the Central State</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Colonial institutional expectations</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Results of partial democratisation</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>State spending policies</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Effect of remittances</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Integration into world economy</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Urbanisation</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Natality rates</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Emigration</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Key: (+) indicates factor increases loyalty to the central state
(-) indicates factor decreases loyalty to the central state
dissatisfied with the central state and the federation as it existed in irreconcilable ways.\textsuperscript{124}

### 6.5 Romantic Illusions—Conclusion

'Against today's journalistic commonplace about the Balkans as the madhouse of thriving nationalism one must point out again and again that the moves of every political agent in ex-Yugoslavia, reprehensible though they may be, are totally rational within the goals they want to attain. The only exception, the only truly irrational factor in it, is the West babbling about archaic ethnic passions.'

—Slavoj Žižek\textsuperscript{125}

'Analysis of the Balkan wars of this decade has for too long been characterized by simplistic generalizations and sweeping judgments about the character and mentality of entire peoples, generalizations that would hardly be accepted anywhere else in the world.'

—Sergio Vieira de Mello\textsuperscript{126}

If we compare and contrast Romantic and structural interpretations of the conflict in Yugoslavia, we see that Romantic \textit{Zeitgeist} significantly privileges dispositional factors that are presumed to exist in the various Yugoslav nationalities. Many of these character traits are simply repetitions of negative stereotypes about the 'nature' of the Balkans that Westerners have shared for centuries. These stereotypes include Romantic images of a 'Wild Europe' filled with barbaric and atavistic tribes who behave based on irrational and often violent impulses. Other aspects of the Romantic mood in operation in interpretations of the Yugoslav conflict include a sense of pessimism about the region; a nostalgia either for the deep past or for the Yugoslav state; and expressions of relativism—both cultural (as a motivating factor for conflict) and moral (as a response to the perceived immutable barbarity of the 'tribes').

Near the beginning of the war in Yugoslavia, Žižek reminded his Western audience that the war was rationally based; the real irrationality was the Western penchant for dispositional thinking about Yugoslavia. Žižek's argument lost the day. Six years later, Vieira de Mello chided the West's over its continuing 'simplistic generalisations and sweeping judgements about character' that verged on racism.

\textsuperscript{124} Cvic.
Despite such cautions, these perspectives persist. Such interpretations rely on various Romantics strains of thinking about the world, including a belief that irrational forces fundamentally drive decisionmaking, that decisions are mainly based on one’s relativistic cultural attributes, and that such attributes themselves are based on a particular definable ‘nature’ or ‘essence’ that flows in the blood of a people. Inevitably these views are both pessimistic and nostalgic; pessimistic in the sense that they despair of ever ‘fixing’ the ‘atavistic tribes’ since their problems are in the blood, and nostalgic for some ideal time before the ‘irrationality’ of their parochial disputes.

The assertion of the primacy of irrational motivations in the Yugoslav wars often leads observers to confuse brutality with irrationality. In that sense conflict becomes almost a biological act, and those closest to the primitive state of man are most likely to engage in it. As Barbara Ehrenreich has argued, war has primal roots which seem closer to the surface in some societies, like Bosnia; these are interestingly absent in Western wars. In a similar vein, the Yugoslav wars become about the ‘sacred’, about honour, about keeping face, as Michael Ignatieff has maintained. It is a short trip from these relativistic positions to arguing, as John Keegan has, that such ‘irrational’ wars, primitive wars, based on ethnic hatred are essentially apolitical. Or, as van Creveld would perhaps argue, they are non-trinitarian (non-Clausewitzian); in van Creveld’s view they are fought by people, rather than armies.

Significantly, Romantic views are often ascribed to other societies rather than our own—we recognise our own conflicts as interest-based, political, and rational. One of the problems underpinning these understandings may be the conventional moral reasoning that is applied to others in such situations. For example, if rationality is the ‘good’, and violence is the ‘bad’, then it must also be ‘irrational’ (which is also the ‘bad’). The utility of violence is lost in the rush to judge it; violence and irrationality become conflated. Significantly, such reasoning may lie in a dispositional understanding of conflict and may rely heavily upon the heuristic of surface commonalities (or mere appearance) and salience. Salience—or the prominence of one obvious characteristic—is the basis of the outsider’s judgement. Looking from the outside in with little prior understanding, salience leads the viewer to attribute

---

128 Ignatieff, The Warrior’s Honor.
causality to the most dominant characteristic, often erroneously. In the case of Yugoslavia, differences in culture and ethnicity were prominent, and it was a short leap of logic to see these salient characteristics as the most causal. However, the salience of ethnic differences not only led observers to incorrect conclusions about the reasons for conflict—as various structural factors underscore—it also primed them towards prejudice and stereotyping.

However, if we compare dispositional judgements with a structural perspective which privileges situational factors (and disregards the salience of dispositional traits), we see that conflict markers—that is, certain variables present that may make a polity more prone to conflict—highlight rational incompatibilities between groups that serve as a basis for grievance, regardless of cultural dispositions or other issues of identity coming inexorably into play. If we then examine some of these factors within the structure of Hirschman’s exit-voice-loyalty framework, we see that these structures can either enhance or erode groups’ loyalties to the state, and thus make either voice or exit the preferable option under conditions of state decline. Thus a structural perspective—which examines issues from the perspective of participants—provides a corrective to the Romantic view.
Chapter 7. Considering Phlebas—Romanticism and Declinism in International Relations

'O you who turn the wheel and look to windward, / Consider Phlebas, who was once handsome and tall as you.'

—T.S. Eliot

In the aftermath of World War I, Eliot penned his famous poem, 'The Waste Land'. In it, he depicts a modern nightmare: Western society as an arid, sterile Waste Land, a shell of its former self. Eliot’s world contains images that are by turns apocalyptic and fatalistically resigned, clearly pessimistic and declinist in nature. The underlying message is one of despair accompanied by wistfulness, a touch of nostalgia: the present world is a ruin, the best chance for redemption lies in the past. The work is a lament for the dying West, one which speaks to the uncertainties and pessimism of the 1990s and its Zeitgeist of Romanticism.

Yet with the US invasion of Iraq and America’s sometimes jingoistic, triumphalist rhetoric has the sense of decline been reversed? Is the Zeitgeist of Romanticism behind us? Although the Bush administration has certainly asserted its confidence in America’s ability to project power abroad in order to effectuate change, that optimism may be a veneer that hides much deeper social disquiet over the direction that the country is taking, both with respect to Iraq and more broadly at home. On the left, Iraq has been discussed as a ‘quagmire’. However, there is growing concern, even among Republicans, that US policy in Iraq is undermining US credibility and prestige in the world; there is growing friction in the Republican party ranks over Iraq. At a more grassroots level, groups like Republicans for Humility, with the motto ‘country before party’, have challenged the administration’s policies in Iraq.

While party discord is one troubling issue for Bush, perhaps more problematic is that the American public has yet to be convinced of the long-term benefits of

2 See, for example, Phyllis Bennis and Erik Leaver, ‘The Iraq Quagmire: The Mounting Costs of War and the Case for Bringing Home the Troops’, Institute for Policy Studies and Foreign Policy In Focus (31 August 2005). Available at http://www.ips-dc.org/iraq/quagmire/IraqQuagmire.pdf
3 Jill Lawrence, ‘Politicians across spectrum state their case on Iraq: Rumsfeld says the US must stay the course as lawmakers pitch own withdrawal plans’, USA Today (21 November 2005), p. 4A.
4 See their website at http://www.republicansforhumility.com/
toppling Saddam Hussein. Public opinion polls underscore the growing sense of apprehension that Americans feel over America’s big adventure in Iraq. Americans have been coming to the view that the war with Iraq was a blunder, with 49-52 per cent saying that the war ‘was not worth fighting’ and 49-52 per cent saying that sending troops to Iraq was ‘a mistake’. More importantly, many Americans have concluded that there is no clear way forward: between 56-59 per cent did not believe that the administration had a plan for the future. Although Americans were more upbeat about the US making significant progress in restoring civil order and establishing democratic government in Iraq, they were divided about Iraq’s future stability, with only 50 per cent believing that Iraq will have a democratic government that will not be overthrown (47 per cent disagreed). As for America’s playing a positive role in the region, only 47 per cent believed that US actions would promote democracy in other Arab states (50 per cent disagreed).

With a price tag of over $230 billion and counting, America’s ongoing stalemate in Iraq is unlikely to draw greater public support in future. Therefore, while the Bush administration has been extolling the virtues of its policies, the mood of the American public has been decidedly less triumphalist and more ambivalent. This is further reflected in the sense of decline that most Americans have expressed about their own society. The most popular rating of the Bush administration on a wide range of issues—health care, social security, the environment—is ‘poor’, including such crucial domestic leadership issues as disaster recovery from Hurricane Katrina.

---

5 See Polling Report, NBC News/Wall Street Journal (9-12 December 2005), 49% ‘not worth it’; ABC News/Washington Post (15-18 December 2005), 52% ‘not worth fighting’; Associated Press/Ipsos (13-15 December 2005), 49% ‘made a mistake in going to war in Iraq’; and CNN/USA Today/Gallup (16-18 December 2005), 52% ‘United States made a mistake in sending troops to Iraq’. In each case, the negative response was the most popular answer.

6 See Polling Report, CNN/USA Today/Gallup Poll (16-18 December 2005), 56% ‘no plan to achieve victory’; and ABC News/Washington Post (15-18 December 2005), 59% ‘no clear plan’.

7 See Polling Report, ABC News/Washington Post Poll (15-18 December 2005), 60% ‘making significant progress toward restoring civil order; and 65% ‘making significant progress in establishing a democratic government’.

8 See Polling Report, CNN/USA Today/Gallup Poll (16-18 December 2005).


Therefore, Romanticism’s ‘moment’, although stronger in the 1990s, may not yet be spent. The sense of US domestic decline is still present. Globally, uncertainties brought on by the end of the Cold War have not yet been replaced with a perceptibly stable framework; American unipolarity—especially in its go-go neoconservative form—may be unstable since there is little US domestic consensus about the proper use of American power. The ongoing and costly American stalemate in Iraq is likely to restrain further imperial ambitions, not that a fickle American public has had any particular taste for empire, at least not for long. Therefore, the ‘architecture issue’ remains paramount and may be so for some time.

This declinist, pessimistic sensibility is a key mood, perhaps even ‘the’ key mood, of the Zeitgeist of Romanticism that came in the 1990s. An atmosphere of pessimism and decline can fuel religious fervour and emotionalism in the face of impending doom; drive nostalgic reappraisals of a mythical golden past; spur the replie-sur-soi mentality of cultural particularisms; and provoke disquieting questions about our ‘essential natures’. While the Romantic declinist mood has been present in Western culture since at least the nineteenth century, in the 1990s it bestrode the academic and policymaking communities like a colossus. As historian Arthur Herman points out, ‘while intellectuals have been [mistakenly] predicting the imminent collapse of Western civilisation for more than one hundred and fifty years, [declinism’s] influence has grown faster during that period than at any time in history’. Therefore, in this chapter, rather than recapping our arguments in previous chapters, we will offer some final reflections on Postmodern Romanticism and international relations, focusing especially on the pervasive mood of decline and tragedy that stalked the 1990s. In essence, we will finish this work where we initially began it in Chapter 1: with a short discursion on decline and declinism.

First, using part of Eliot’s ‘The Waste Land’ as a starting point, we will discuss how the pessimistic theme of decline, including the sense of tragedy within declinism—which is so pervasive in Romanticism—colours perceptions of international relations, particularly those about post-Cold War conflicts, including the conflicts in former Yugoslavia. Second, we will offer some observations on the place and role of such declinist frameworks in international relations.

7.1 Bones of Contention—Tragedy and conflict

'A current under the sea / Picked his bones in whispers'

—T.S. Eliot

In the fourth stave of 'The Waste Land'—'Death by Water'—Eliot tells the tale of Phlebas, a Phoenician sailor who has found his death by water, by drowning. The image seems to have been taken from Jessie Weston's myth of the Fisher King, the king of the Waste Land, whose infirmity is a curse upon his land. In order to lift the curse and restore fertility to the land, a Romantic sacrifice must be made. Thus, old age, impotence, and sterility haunt the once-great kingdom. Only a worthy, youthful, and virile sacrifice can lift the curse or provide the blood atonement necessary to erase the King's original sin. This is found in the body of Phlebas, the Phoenician sailor. Yet Phlebas dies; the currents 'picked his bones in whispers'. He does not save the King; the land is not restored. His sacrifice is in vain.

Through the tale of the Fisher King, Eliot analogises the state of Western civilisation with that of the Fisher King's Waste Land, a sterile land beset by a curse and the impotence of its leadership. He also plays on a biological and organic view of civilisation, where civilisation is part of a lifecycle: youth versus old age, fertility versus aridness and sterility, virility versus impotence. As with Phlebas, physical decay and death await the West; even a worthy sacrifice may not save our civilisation. Death and tragedy—Nietzsche's 'art of metaphysical comfort'—serve as the ultimate truth of life.

Yet is Phlebas purely a tragic figure? Our answer depends on whether we view him from a dispositional or a situational context. The conclusion that his act was tragic, and that Phlebas is therefore a tragic, pitiable, and fearful figure, can be most clearly seen in retrospect and only by the spectator. Fundamentally, the judgement that Phlebas is a tragic figure can be drawn mainly if we consider his act as deriving from his person (which we can argue is a Christian or modern view of tragedy), rather than from his situation (which is considered a Classical view of tragedy). In some

---

14 Some scholars argue that a Classical view of tragedy arises mainly from the protagonist's situation, in which he is caught up in an external evil, while the Christian (and often modern) view of tragedy involves the protagonist caught up in an evil of his own making, arising from his internal flaws. See Edward G. Ballard, 'Sense of the Tragic', in Dictionary of the History of Ideas: Studies of Selected Pivotal Ideas, ed. Philip P Wiener (New York, NY: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1974) Vol. 4, pp. 411-
sense the tale of Phlebas is about how we attribute causes. For the modern spectator, a figure becomes tragic when we attribute causality to him primarily based on his character (dispositional factors) rather than to the environment or his circumstances (situational factors). Considering Phlebas is about recognising that error.

If we consider Phlebas’ predicament from the perspective of how we view conflict in international relations, we can see that Romantic (and often pessimistic) analyses of ‘exotic’ conflicts are often judgements about the unpleasant or at least different dispositional (cultural) factors of those involved in conflicts rather than analyses of their situations. At the same time, in our own Western conflicts, such as the war in Iraq, we recognise the situational factors that drive conflict and are less likely to attribute our motivations in conflict to cultural characteristics. Yet in the same way that Phlebas is not inherently tragic, conflict is not inherently tragic. Conflict viewed from the perspective of those involved is not necessarily futile, barbaric, or even tragic, but may be a deliberate act, or even a sacrifice for a group goal.

By emphasising the tragedy of conflict, which works on the spectator, rather than on the potential meaning of conflict for the actors, who often perceive that their actions are rational responses to their situation, we emphasise our standpoint as observers over theirs as participants. Additionally, the tragic perspective used as an observational standpoint instantly turns those engaged in conflict into either barbaric or pitiable figures, depending on whether they are aggressors (barbaric) or victims (pitiable). Acts that may seem tragic, meaningless, or barbaric to the spectator may be perfectly rational and meaningful to the actors themselves. These judgements—from tragedy, then to pity—may also leave the spectator with a sense of disgust: disgust at the actors and their situation, as long-term pity becomes inured to the seemingly unending and unresolved nature of the conflict and the repetitive images of suffering. Sometimes we refer to this sensibility politely as ‘compassion fatigue’, a sense of apathy or habitual indifference, but at its heart it betrays a harder core: disgust.15

When we consider the creation of metaphors and analogies used to analyse the conflict in former Yugoslavia and to make it more understandable to Western publics,


15 On the various stages of emotion that Western audiences and the media go through in reporting conflict, including the war in Yugoslavia, see Susan D. Moeller, Compassion Fatigue: How the Media Sell Disease, Famine, War and Death (New York, NY: Routledge, 19991), pp. 257-280 (Yugoslavia).
we see the operation of a sense of tragedy from the perspective of the spectator. Therefore, we take the conflict for what it means for us, and not what it means for the actors, who become barbaric or pitiable, fearful, and potentially disgusting. The standpoint of tragedy, and the fear it generates, also serves to distance ‘us’ the spectators from ‘them’ the actors, insulating us from their perceived tragedy, preventing its spread from them to us, and preventing us from becoming pitiable ourselves. The contagion of their tragic misfortune is quarantined.

For the spectator/helmsmen, Phlebas thus remains a tragic cautionary tale of decline: we too can be brought low. Perhaps what is most interesting in this type of declinist reasoning is the unspoken reliance on the almost biblical concepts of contagion, pollution, and purification. Underlying all these concepts is a sense of fear. Again if we consider interpretations of conflict in international relations, pessimistic and declinist works rely on the idea of the fear of the spread of barbarism and the contagion of anarchy (invariably in the developing world) that have the potential to pollute or infect us, operating as a cautionary tale for the West.

For example, if we go back to the three authors we discussed in Chapter 3 as exemplars of the Romantic Zeitgeist in interpretations of conflict—Kaplan, Huntington, and van Creveld—we can argue that Kaplan’s perspective on Yugoslavia and other conflicts is a form of voyeuristic ogling at barbarism for the sake of introducing a morality tale for Westerners. In its telling, Kaplan betrays a sense of disgust—disgust at violence and the people caught up in it—based on a fear of contagion, a fear that we, too, in the West are not immune from these primitive forces and that we will be in turn corrupted and overwhelmed by them. Huntington’s clash of civilisations also has an undercurrent of fear of contamination, one in which a key role for core states is to dampen the contagion of extra-civilisational violence. For van Creveld, the spread of low-intensity conflict will corrupt and effectively end the modern, trinitarian state, reverting us to medieval times where ‘the lines between public and private, government and people, military and civilian, [...] become [...] blurred’.

Romantic views seem to imply the operation of underlying theories of correspondences—a series of hidden but meaningful causal relationships—in these works. Theories of correspondences predate scientific thinking and are perhaps one of

---

Chapter 7

the first primitive modes of analysis. They are based on a form of sympathetic magic, which presumes both a ‘law of similarity’ and a ‘law of contamination’.

The law of similarity is a metaphysical belief that holds that like affects like, so similarities in surface appearance (or ‘mere appearance’) imply that there exist deeper similarities in substance. Thus, for example, in developing countries the surface appearance of disorderliness or physical poverty implies something deep and substantive, like barbarism or moral poverty. The law of similarity is akin to the Romantic trope of reading meanings into the landscape, where beauty and ugliness are manifestations of the power and majesty, or contrarily, the evil and brutality, of nature or humanity. Thus the aesthetic becomes ethic.

The law of contagion or contamination is a belief that holds that one can pass on—by infection, pollution, or contamination—traits to another by simple contact or proximity, and once infected, always infected.\(^1\) Thus, for example, those engaged in or caught up in conflict are not behaving rationally—instead they are ‘infected’ or ‘polluted’ by irrational behaviours or motivations with violence. Their actions have the potential to ‘contaminate’ the world with anarchy and chaos. Most importantly perhaps, they are unredeemable: their contamination and pollution is permanent; once ‘infected’ with violence, always infected. This reasoning underlies the biblical notion of the transmission of sins by birth as well as some Romantic concepts of collective guilt. In these conceptions sin (or responsibility) is transmutable; the punishment for it is collective; the atonement for it is only by blood.

These laws generate a sense not just of pity but also of disgust towards those contaminated by the pollutant (in this case, violent conflict). As William Miller argues, disgust ‘plays a motivating and confirming role in moral judgment [....] It ranks people and things in a kind of cosmic ordering’ and it ‘can convey a strong sense of aversion to something perceived as dangerous because of its powers to contaminate, infect, or pollute by proximity [or] contact’.\(^2\) The moral judgement such metaphors of unending chaos and anarchy convey is one of miasmic despair, of horror and disbelief at the depravity and barbarism of those engaged or caught up in conflict. The ‘cosmic ordering’ function of disgust then relegates them to the

---


hierarchical status of sub-human; their fallen, diseased state a manifest sign of their unworthiness as human beings. They cease being men and become ‘wild things’, uncivilised brutes close to the rawness of primitive survival against ‘nature, red in tooth and claw’. 19

These pre-scientific laws also replicate heuristic biases found in cognitive psychology. The law of similarity replicates the heuristic of surface commonalities, where judgements are unreliably based on ‘mere appearance’ alone. The law of contagion can produce the fundamental attribution error, since it assumes that certain immutable, inheritable traits are the root cause of problems. This view minimises the effect of circumstances on agents, denies them the possibility of rational action, and underestimates their potential for multifaceted and variable responses to situations.

Rather than being based on a rational logic, these theories of hidden correspondences are highly emotional, playing on some of the most basic psychological instincts, including fear. They mix easily with Romanticism which is both anti-rationalist and emotionalist. Romanticism is also tied to a spiritually Christian worldview (at least in the West), particularly the Christian view of tragedy as a moral failing or a sin within the individual or group rather than one which is based on the situation. Extending this Romantic (Christian) view of tragedy to conflict, we see that those engaged in conflict are responsible (sinful) because of their own failings (sins) and not worthy of assistance because they are ‘contaminated’ by violence. This tragic view creates a sense of helplessness on the part of the observer. If tragedy results from the sin of the participant, then the observer can do nothing. If conflict is not a matter of rational calculation and is based on dispositional factors, rather than the situation, then no solution can be found in politics; only the participants’ repentance provides the way out of the sin of violence. Hence rather than reliance on political action, we see a Romantic attachment to the idea of ‘reconciliation’—a psychological and emotional response—as atonement for past conflicts.

Within international relations, the atmosphere of decline that enveloped the Romantic Zeitgeist prompted a focus on the dispositional aspects of conflict—the irrational, relativistic, nature of man—to the detriment of understanding situational factors, generating a sense of tragedy, pity, and fear. While sometimes dressed up in

19 The phrase is from Alfred Lord Tennyson’s poem ‘In Memoriam’ (1850).
the jargon of ‘privileging agency’ (which has admittedly often been marginalised) over ‘mechanistic’ structuralist explanations, agency perspectives can themselves end up being little more than a series of Romantic discussions about ‘national characters’ and ‘mentalities’, with cultural interpretations that rely on biased historiography sliding carelessly into stereotyping. This can create precisely the sort of ‘mechanistic’ categories and analyses that are faulted in structuralist thinking—that humans are cogs in the wheel, only the rational ‘structural’ wheel has been replaced with the irrational ‘cultural’ or ‘identity’ wheel. Rather than offering deep insights, they become mere echoes of the pervading Zeitgeist of Romanticism.

These Romantic views persisted throughout the 1990s despite empirical evidence to the contrary. Indeed, as we discussed in Chapter 4, by the mid-1990s conflict rates had already begun dropping, and by 2000 were below Cold War levels. Further, the ‘contagion’ potential of ethnic conflict that Romantics had heralded had not come to pass. Although some scholars, like Ted Robert Gurr and John Mueller, did argue against simplified views of coming cultural or ethnic conflict, Romantic views captured the not only the popular imagination, but remained salient in policymaking and academic discussions. The question is: ‘why?’ Why were Romantic themes revisited despite the fact that they were empirically incorrect? We will offer a tentative answer in the next section.

7.2 Selling Götterdämmerung—Conclusion

‘Sell them their dreams. Sell them what they longed for and hoped for and almost despaired of having.’

—Radio announcement at American retail convention

If the art of selling consumer goods is about selling dreams, then perhaps the art of selling policy pronouncements is about selling nightmares, especially in international relations. Although dreams can be sold during an optimistic age, in the anxious 1990s nightmares cornered the market. While proclamations of the ‘end of history’ through the triumph of free market democracy languished in the international relations deep

---

discount bin, tales of a future Götterdämmerung were flying off the shelves. Simply put, when it came to international relations, worst case scenarios sold in the 1990s.

Some of this was clearly due to the requirement on the part of those involved in policymaking to consider prudence and the precautionary principle when it came to the highest matters of state. Therefore, Kaplan’s idea of ‘anxious foresight’ does not seem out of place when considering matters of war and peace.\(^1\) However, the Zeitgeist of Postmodern Romanticism went further in its pessimism than mere prudence or anxious foresight would suggest. Its deep pessimism and sense of tragedy generated an alarmist mythos about conflict that said more about the sense of uncertainty about the era than about the empirical realities of conflict. Indeed, Post-Cold War Romanticism in the West was perhaps based more on a sense of domestic decline that was then more broadly reflected in international relations.

As we have discussed, declinism is neither a right-wing nor a left-wing ideology; rather it is a mood, sensibility, or attitude toward events, perhaps even a psychological or biological orientation. It is the sensibility that we live in the worst of all possible worlds, in decline, at the end of civilisation, or even more prophetically during the ‘end times’. In some ways, declinists are disappointed idealists with a great sense of weariness and ennui who see their own age as inherently corrupt and tragic, have lost confidence in the future, and may search for redemption in another era as a means of temporal escape. Despite their diminished sense of the possibilities for the future, they can seek a new, pure redemptive order through the pursuit of virtue;\(^2\) for them, only virtue can reverse the present tragic tide of misfortune and social or civilisational decline to create a new Golden Age.\(^3\) However, the most hardened Romantics, who deny the possibility of revival or redemption and see their age as the continuing unfolding of a tragedy, may give in to a theology of despair and anxiously anticipate or even rejoice in a future Götterdämmerung. The taste for what is considered Gothic, wild, macabre, and libertine, or the celebration of what is on the extreme margins—criminals, prostitutes, or exotic ‘Others’—follow from this mood of jaded cynicism that trails in the rejection of hope and the possibility of progress.

Views that propagated this sense of doom—that the West is indeed in terminal decline—share a more general Romantic sensibility that emphasises other related

\(^2\) Herman, p. 8.
\(^3\) Ibid., p. 16.
themes such as anti-rationalism or emotionalism, relativism, nostalgia, and a focus on nature. The specifics of these themes changed from nineteenth century Romanticism to Postmodern Romanticism, but they have common threads. Historically, both seem to be based on a sense of traumatic upheaval, uncertainty, and rootlessness after major social, economic, or political transitions. For nineteenth-century Romantics, this was political revolution in France coupled with the vast displacement of people and conflict during the Napoleonic wars, the Industrial Revolution and the rise of capitalism in Britain, and the cultural revolution in Germany. For Postmodern Romantics, it was the collapse of the certainties of the bipolar system, including democratisation in formerly socialist states, economic globalisation, and the development of the homogenisation of culture, generally along American lines, that gives people a sense of displacement, insecurity, and loss of control. These uncertainties created the moment and conditions under which audiences became receptive to Romantic declinism.

What audiences are receptive to invariably 'sells', whether it is books or films for a popular audience, policy prescriptions for politicians, or course offerings for students. Based on some of the evidence that we have discussed, themes that reflected the Romantic Zeitgeist sold. Some of the areas that have been growth topics in international relations include considerations of ethics and morality in international relations, especially emotional or irrational approaches to understanding such issues as conflict and human rights; relativistic approaches with an emphasis on ethnic identity, culture, or gender; environmentalist perspectives that focus on nature; and perspectives that re-examine human nature and society.

Despite their empirical inaccuracy, Romantic themes caught the imagination of conflict studies and those who wrote about conflict. Persuasive Romantic analogies about brewing conflicts worldwide—and especially Yugoslavia—that emphasised the irrational, emotional, or relativistic (cultural) factors that drive conflict were influential especially in the US where the works of authors such as Kaplan, Huntington, and van Creveld were widely disseminated. These interpretations of conflict then created more fodder for pessimists, who recycled tragic images as the essential 'truth of life', creating a feedback loop that saw civilisational decline.

While cultural declinism sold, its fundamental appeal was to the weary, resigned, fearful, or cynical. As such, it was a pessimism of weakness. Nietzsche once called optimism an 'effeminate doctrine' and asked, 'Is pessimism necessarily a sign
of decline, decay, degeneration, weary and weak instincts' or 'is there a pessimism of strength?'
Examed from the viewpoint of the 1990s, the answer to the second question would be a resounding 'no'.

---

Appendix

(i) **Methodology for Database Cleaning**

In order to create greater comparability between the datasets, especially about the timing of conflicts, we cleaned the data to: 1) focus on new conflicts (rather than ongoing or all conflicts); 2) standardise location of conflict, both by state and region; 3) standardise conflict dates and timing of conflicts; and 4) standardise coding of conflict issues. In order to achieve these goals, we performed the following tasks on the datasets.

**Removed all old conflicts, even in new states.** A new state can be involved in an ongoing conflict. We removed all old conflicts from consideration, even if this resulted in the creation of a new state. This eliminated Eritrea from consideration in both datasets since it was involved in an old, ongoing conflict with Ethiopia extending to at least the 1960s.

**Standardised the location of each conflict.** The databases treated the location of conflicts slightly differently in the cases of the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. For example, the Kosimo dataset located the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in the USSR, and then in Armenia and Azerbaijan. SIPRI located it in the Soviet Union and then in Azerbaijan. Since it is an autonomous province within Azerbaijan, we located it just in Azerbaijan for consistency. The result was that conflict in Armenia dropped out for Kosimo since it was no longer co-located. For Yugoslavia, Kosimo located the conflict in each republic. SIPRI located the conflicts first in Yugoslavia, then in each of the newly recognised states. We located the conflicts in the territory in which they occurred, regardless of the territory’s legal status. (In other words, we located the conflicts on the territory of the Yugoslav or Soviet republics before they were internationally recognised as sovereign states). This had the effect of moving the SIPRI start date for conflict in Croatia from 1992 to 1991. SIPRI lists the conflict in Croatia beginning with 1992, since this is the date of legal recognition of the Croatian state. However, it also lists the 1991 start date of the conflict in Croatia in the section on Yugoslavia, because Croatia was not yet recognised as a state in 1991. We moved
the location of the conflict to Croatia and used the start date listed under Yugoslavia, which was 1991.

**Created greater comparability in the dating schemes.** Kosimo tends to date the start of a conflict at an earlier date than SIPRI. This may be because Kosimo’s standard definition for violent conflicts depends on whether or not a government uses regular troops, whereas SIPRI’s is based on casualties. It may be that the use of regular troops happens earlier in one year (which Kosimo codes as the start date), and then casualties mount to the point where SIPRI includes the conflict in the next. Or that Kosimo codes the intensity of the conflict for its most intense point (i.e. war), but codes the start date from its lowest point, which could have a similar effect. Note that we use the older SIPRI database codings, which code the intensity of each year of conflict separately from 0-3. With zero there is no violent conflict (<25 deaths per year); however, there is a conflict of values (an incompatibility) that is stated by one of the parties. SIPRI 1 (>25 deaths but not yet 1,000 for the conflict), 2 (>25 but not yet 1,000 per year) and 3 (1,000 per year) have higher thresholds. Therefore, using the date that a conflict reaches the SIPRI 2+3 threshold as the starting date might have the effect of pushing its date forward. To try to take this into account, we included only conflicts that reached an intensity level of 2 or 3 at any point during the conflict, but we coded those conflicts from the first date in which violence was used (SIPRI 1). Thus the least violent conflicts were still excluded (conflicts only reaching SIPRI 1 intensity were excluded), but the starting point of a violent conflict was moved to the date the violence was first coded, rather than the date the violence was coded at a high intensity. This had the effect of moving the SIPRI start date of conflict in Georgia from 1992 to 1991, and the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh (Azerbaijan) to 1990.

**Accounted for other possible lags in coding the start date.** Since even when dating schemes are made more comparable, scholars may still reasonably disagree on the starting dates of conflicts because of different criteria, it is possible that starting dates may be off for a short interval (+/-1 year). Therefore, we used a moving average take this into account.

**Standardised regions for each conflict in database.** Since regions may vary across databases, and since the part of the purpose of Chapter 4 was to examine the
Appendix

correlation of FSU and FY conflicts to conflict levels in the 1990s, we standardised the region of conflicts. The categories we used and the states in each region are defined as follows, which is based on the regional divisions used in the Kosimo database:

- **Europe**: all states in Western or Eastern Europe, except former FSU or FY states, plus Turkey and Cyprus
- **FSU/FY**: all states formerly part of the USSR or Yugoslavia
- **Oceania**: Australia, New Zealand, and all South Pacific islands (including the French DOM/TOM possessions and other types of dominions or territories of European states in the Pacific)
- **Americas**: all states in North, South or Central America and the Caribbean
- **Middle East**: all states in North Africa, Sudan, Israel, Jordan, all states on the Arabian peninsula, Iran, and Afghanistan
- **Africa**: all states in sub-Saharan Africa
- **Asia**: India, Pakistan, China, all states in Southeast Asia, the Indonesian archipelago, Japan, and the Philippines

These changes created greater comparability between the datasets, which were particularly important when the timing of conflict was considered. The results of the database cleaning are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Databases and issue</th>
<th>Before cleaning</th>
<th>After cleaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kosimo-Singer&amp;Small Independence, 1945-88</td>
<td>.54</td>
<td>.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosimo-Singer&amp;Small UN admission, 1946-88</td>
<td>.66</td>
<td>.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosimo-SIPRI Independence, 1989-98</td>
<td>.67</td>
<td>.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosimo-SIPRI UN admission, 1989-98</td>
<td>.66</td>
<td>.94</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Coding for Conflict Issues. The Kosimo database codes for multiple conflict issues. Each conflict may have multiple codings for issues. For example, a conflict can be both a national power struggle as well as an ideological conflict. The determination of conflict issues was based on information in the Kosimo database. In order to examine the effects of state creation on conflict, we created the category 'state creation' from a basket of issues that are related to the creation of new states. This basket included two categories: the Kosimo coding for a conflict over national independence or decolonisation and the Kosimo coding for ethnic, regional, or religious autonomy. Additionally, we coded four cases that Kosimo did not include separately where we reasonably thought the coding could apply:

1) Africa—secession of the Shaba (Zaire); Belgium’s intervention in Zaire 1960
2) Asia—Indian partition (and the creation of Pakistan)
3) Europe—Cyprus conflict
4) FSU/FY—Croatia and Bosnia conflicts (coded only for 1989-1992 period); the Chechnya conflict was coded for the 1993-98 period, when the conflict grew in intensity (the SIPRI coding for the conflict is 1994)

A conflict was coded as being about state creation if any of the above Kosimo codes were included. Since we did not exclude conflicts with multiple codings for conflict issues, a conflict did not have to be exclusively about state creation in order to be included in the basket.

(ii) Base Rate Calculation

The base rate is a measure of relative frequency, which is simply an annualised rate over time that allows comparison. The base rate of conflict is calculated by counting the number of new conflicts that were started during a particular time period (usually a decade for our purposes) and dividing by the number of years. The base rate is calculated as follows:

\[
\text{Base Rate} = \frac{\text{Raw number of new conflicts}}{\text{Number of years}}
\]
Appendix

To illustrate this, we will consider Asia, the region with the highest rates of conflict during the Cold War. From 1945-1949, Asia experienced 7 new non-World War II related conflicts. Since the time period considered, 1945-49, is 5 years long, we divide 7 by 5 to get 1.4. That means that the relative frequency of conflict in Asia during that decade was 1.4 new conflicts each year. Obviously, since conflicts occur only in whole numbers, this means that during each year of that period, on average, either one or two new conflicts would start. A similar calculation can be made for other decades.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of new conflicts</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of years</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Base rate</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.22222</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.14286</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As we can see, the relative frequency or base rate of conflict in Asia dropped significantly in the 1950s, to 0.4 new conflicts, or about one new conflict every 2.5 years. In the 1980s, it fell to 0.22 new conflicts per year, or about one new conflict approximately every 4.5 years.
### List of States, Declarations of Independence and UN Admission Dates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Independence declared</th>
<th>Independence from:</th>
<th>UN admission date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>1919</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>1946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>1912</td>
<td>Ottoman empire</td>
<td>1955</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>1962</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>1962</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andorra</td>
<td>1278</td>
<td></td>
<td>1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>1976</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antigua and Barbuda</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>1981</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>1816</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>1945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>1901</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>1945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>1156</td>
<td>Bavaria</td>
<td>1955</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahamas</td>
<td>1973</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>1973</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahrain</td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>1971</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>1974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barbados</td>
<td>1966</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>1966</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>1945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>1830</td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>1945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belize</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>1981</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>1960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bhutan</td>
<td>1949</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>1971</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>1825</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>1945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>1966</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>1966</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>1822</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>1945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brunei</td>
<td>1984</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>1984</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>1908</td>
<td>Ottoman empire</td>
<td>1955</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>1960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>1962</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>1962</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>1953</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>1955</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>1960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>1867</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>1945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cape Verde</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>1975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAR</td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>1960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>1960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>1810</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>1945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td>1945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Columbia</td>
<td>1810</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>1945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comoros</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>1975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo (Brazzaville)</td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>1960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo (Zaire)</td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>1960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>1821</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>1945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State</td>
<td>Independence declared:</td>
<td>Independence from:</td>
<td>UN admission date</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cote d'Ivoire</td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>1960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>1902</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>1945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>1960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
<td>1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>1900</td>
<td></td>
<td>1945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>1977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominica</td>
<td>1978</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>1978</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>1844</td>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>1945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>1822</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>1945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>1922</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>1945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>1821</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>1945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equatorial Guinea</td>
<td>1968</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>1968</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>1991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td>1945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiji</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>1970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>1917</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>1955</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>486</td>
<td></td>
<td>1945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>1960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gambia</td>
<td>1965</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>1965</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>1871</td>
<td></td>
<td>1973</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>1957</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>1957</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>1829</td>
<td>Ottoman empire</td>
<td>1945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grenada</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>1974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>1821</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>1945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>1958</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>1958</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>1973</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>1974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guyana</td>
<td>1966</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>1966</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>1804</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>1945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>1821</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>1945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td></td>
<td>1945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>1944</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>1946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>1947</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>1945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>1945</td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>1950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>1945</td>
<td></td>
<td>1945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>1932</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>1945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>1921</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>1955</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>1948</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>1949</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>1861</td>
<td></td>
<td>1955</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>1962</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>1962</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td>1956</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>1946</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>1955</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>1963</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>1963</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiribati</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>1961</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>1963</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State</td>
<td>Independence declared:</td>
<td>Independence from:</td>
<td>UN admission date</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laos</td>
<td>1949</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>1955</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>1991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>1943</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>1945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>1966</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>1966</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>1847</td>
<td></td>
<td>1945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>1951</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>1955</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liechtenstein</td>
<td>1719</td>
<td></td>
<td>1990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>1991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>1839</td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>1945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FYR Macedonia</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>1960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>1964</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>1964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>1957</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>1957</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maldives</td>
<td>1965</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>1965</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>1960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malta</td>
<td>1964</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>1964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>1961</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritius</td>
<td>1968</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>1968</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>1810</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>1945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Micronesia</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>1991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monaco</td>
<td>1419</td>
<td></td>
<td>1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mongolia</td>
<td>1921</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>1961</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>1956</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>1956</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>1975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>1948</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>1948</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>1990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nauru</td>
<td>1968</td>
<td>UK, Austral., NZ</td>
<td>1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>1768</td>
<td></td>
<td>1955</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>1579</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>1945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>1907</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>1945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>1821</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>1945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>1960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>1960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N. Korea</td>
<td>1945</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>1991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>1905</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>1945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>1650</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>1971</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>1947</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>1947</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palau</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>1903</td>
<td>Columbia</td>
<td>1945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Papua New Guinea</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>Australia*</td>
<td>1975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>1811</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>1945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>1821</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>1945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>1946</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>1945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>1918</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>1945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>1140</td>
<td></td>
<td>1955</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qatar</td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>1971</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State</td>
<td>Independence declared:</td>
<td>Independence from:</td>
<td>UN admission date</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>1881</td>
<td>Ottoman empire</td>
<td>1955</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>1945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>1962</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>1962</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Kitts/Nevis</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>1979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Vincent Grenadines</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>1980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samoa</td>
<td>1962</td>
<td>New Zealand *</td>
<td>1976</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Marino</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>1979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sao Tome Principe</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>1975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>1932</td>
<td></td>
<td>1945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>1960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia/Mont.</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>1976</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seychelles</td>
<td>1976</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>1976</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>1961</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>1961</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>1965</td>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>1965</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
<td>1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solomon Is.</td>
<td>1978</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>1978</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>UK, Italy</td>
<td>1960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. Africa</td>
<td>1910</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>1945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. Korea</td>
<td>1945</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>1991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>1492</td>
<td>Moors</td>
<td>1955</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>1948</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>1955</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>1956</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>1956</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suriname</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>1975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swaziland</td>
<td>1968</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>1968</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>1523</td>
<td></td>
<td>1946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>1946</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>1945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>1238</td>
<td></td>
<td>1946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>1960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tonga</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trinidad/Tobago</td>
<td>1962</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>1962</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunesia</td>
<td>1956</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>1956</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>1923</td>
<td>Ottoman empire</td>
<td>1945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmenistan</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>1962</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>1962</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>1945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>1971</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td></td>
<td>1945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>1,961</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>1961</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>1776</td>
<td>England</td>
<td>1945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>1825</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>1945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vanuatu</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>France, UK</td>
<td>1981</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>1811</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>1945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>1945</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>1977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N. Yemen (merged)</td>
<td>1918</td>
<td>Ottoman empire</td>
<td>1947</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State</td>
<td>Independence declared:</td>
<td>Independence from:</td>
<td>UN admission date</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. Yemen (merged)</td>
<td>1967</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>1967</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>1918</td>
<td>Austria-Hungary, Ottoman empire</td>
<td>1945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>1964</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>1964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>1980</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Bibliography


Bennis, Phyllis and Erik Leaver. ‘The Iraq Quagmire: The Mounting Costs of War and the Case for Bringing Home the Troops’, Institute for Policy Studies and Foreign Policy In Focus (31 August 2005).


Bookman, Milica Z. 'Demographic Engineering and the Struggle for Power', Journal of International Affairs (Vol. 56, No 1, 2002).


Bibliography


Cohen, Rich. 'Welcome to the Conspiracy', Vanity Fair (May 2004).


Colomer, Josep M. 'Exit, Voice, and Hostility in Cuba', International Migration Review (Summer 2000).


Bibliography


Cviic, Christopher. Remaking the Balkans, Chatham House Papers (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1995).


Djokic, Dejan. ‘A farewell to Yugoslavia’, Open Democracy (10 April 2002). Available at http://www.opendemocracy.net/content/articles/PDF/325.pdf

Doder, Duško. ‘Yugoslavia: New War, Old Hatreds’, Foreign Policy (Vol. 91, Summer 1993).


Bibliography

_Economist_, ‘Another political murder’ (11 November 2004).


European Commisssion, _Eurobarometer 63: First Results_ (July 2005).


Bibliography


278


Gray, Peter and Kendrick Oliver, 'The Memory of Catastrophe,' *History Today* (February 2001).


Greenberg, David. 'D-Day OD: Why World War II nostalgia has gone too far,' Slate.msn.com (June 4, 2004). Available at http://slate.msn.com/id/2101752/


Haddock, Vicki. 'Running as the UnBush', *San Francisco Chronicle* (18 December 2005).

Hagel, Chuck. 'A Republican Foreign Policy', *Foreign Affairs* (July/August 2004).


Hanley, Charles J. 'War deaths said to be declining', Associated Press (27 September 2004).


Haynes, Sam W. and Christopher Morris, eds. *Manifest Destiny and Empire: American Antebellum Expansionism* (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press for University of Texas, 1997).


Bibliography


Hill, Amelia. ‘The English identity crisis; who do you think we are?’, *The Observer* (13 June 2004).

Hinsliff, Gaby. ‘Meet Pastor Jim, the Chancellor’s religious guru’, *The Observer* (5 February 2006).


Hoffmann, Stanley. ‘The Crisis of Liberal Internationalism’, *Foreign Policy* (Spring 1995).


Bibliography


Bibliography


Khanna, Parag. 'Tragic realism: Robert D. Kaplan’s book may be out of print in Britain, but he is emerging as one of the most influential commentators on the new world order', *New Statesman* (25 February 2002).


Lapid, Yosef and Friedrich V. Kratochwil. The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1996).

Lawrence, Jill. ‘Politicians across spectrum state their case on Iraq: Rumsfeld says the US must stay the course as lawmakers pitch own withdrawal plans’, USA Today (21 November 2005), p. 4A.


Lees, Lorraine M. Keeping Tito Afloat: The United States, Yugoslavia, and the Cold War (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University, 1997).


Lieven, Anatol. ‘Qu’est-Ce Qu’une Nation? Scholarly Debate and the Realities of Eastern Europe’, The National Interest (Fall 1997).

Lieven, Anatol. ‘The empire strikes back: imperialism isn’t pretty. Add a sense of righteous victimhood and it’s downright dangerous,’ The Nation (7 July 2003).
Bibliography


Lloyd, John. ‘The return of imperialism; Empire is no longer a dirty word: It is now a respectable debating point among thinkers and politicians. John Lloyd on a global U-turn’, New Statesman (Vol. 131, No. 4583, 15 April 2002).

Lobe, Jim. ‘Republicans Cut and Run from Iraq and Bush’, Inter Press Service News Agency (15 November 2005).


Malik, Mustafa. ‘Muslims Pluralize the West, Resist Assimilation’, Middle East Policy Journal (Vol. 11, No. 1, 2004).

Mandaville, Peter and Andrew Williams, eds. Meaning and International Relations (London: Taylor & Francis, 2003).


Meštrović, Stjepan with Slaven Letica and Miroslav Goreta Habits of the Balkan Heart: Social Character and the Fall of Communism. (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1993).


Montgomery, David. ‘The Significance of the Frontier in American Historiography’, web article http://members.aol.com/profdavidmont/turner.htm


Olick, Diane. ‘An army of one carries a high price’, CNBC (21 October 2002).
Bibliography


Ottaway, Marina S. ‘Think Again: Africa’, Foreign Policy (Spring 1999).


Pardo, Carlos. 'Le cinéma indépendent marginalisé' Le Monde diplomatique (May 2003), p. 27.


Pitts, William A. ‘Southern Baptists and Millennialism, 1900-2000: Conceptual Patterns and Historical Expressions’, Baptist History and Heritage (Spring 1999).

Bibliography


Reporting the World. ‘Indonesia—The Next Yugoslavia?’ Available at http://www.reportingtheworld.org/clients/rtwhome.nsfrh/3pbx


Bibliography


Schmich, Mary. ‘Advice, like youth, just wasted on the young’, Chicago Tribune (1 June 1997).

Schmidt, Alvin J. The Menace of Multiculturalism: Trojan Horse in America (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1997).


Bibliography


Shain, Yossi. ‘Multicultural Foreign Policy’, *Foreign Policy* (Fall 1995).

Shearer, David. ‘Outsourcing War,’ *Foreign Policy* (Fall 1998).


Taheri, Amir. ‘We don’t do God, we do Palestine and Iraq’, *The Sunday Times* (12 February 2006), p. 12.


Tilly, Charles. ‘Durable Inequality’, edited notes from the Irene Flecknoe Ross Lectures at the University of California, (October-November 1995).


Van Creveld, Martin. ‘The Fate of the State’, *Parameters: US Army War College Quarterly* (Spring 1996), pp. 4-18.

Van Creveld, Martin. ‘The New Middle Ages’, *Foreign Policy* (Summer 2000).


Bibliography


Western Mail, ‘It’s all a conspiracy, isn’t it?’ (March 14, 2003).


White, Michael. 'Call for a new definition of Britishness', *Guardian* (20 December 2005).


Windschuttle, Keith. 'The Cultural War on Western Civilization', *New Criterion* (Vol. 20, No. 5, 2002).


