

**ON NATIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY:  
A MARXIST EXAMINATION**

**Ofer CASSIF**

**The London School of Economics and Political Science**

**PhD**

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## **ABSTRACT**

‘Historical development toward a universal community of civilization,’ said Rosa Luxemburg, ‘will, like all social development, take place in the midst of a contradiction...’ Indeed, on its face it seems that the simultaneous consolidation and spreading (within a progressing global order) of nationalist particularism, on the one hand, and of the support for democracy, on the other, do constitute such a contradiction. But is this really the case? Are nationalism and democracy mutually exclusive, or are they reconcilable after all?

In this project, to paraphrase Rousseau's words at the beginning of *The Social Contract*, it is my purpose to enquire whether it is possible to reconcile nationalism with democracy, taking nationalism as it is and democracy as it may be. The dissertation shows that both democracy (as we commonly understand it today) and nationalism are strongly embedded in modern conditions (primarily capitalism) and their inherent contradictions, namely, the development of the autonomous self, on the one hand, and the loss of community and prevalence of identity crisis, on the other. Liberal theories of democracy, the thesis suggests, celebrate the development of the autonomous self but largely neglect or ignore the problem of identity crisis, hence contribute precisely to moral and political tendencies they normally reject. Nationalism and its academic sympathisers, though, may supply a solution to identity crisis but too easily or carelessly sacrifice individual liberty and equality on the altar of renewed *Gemeinschaft*-like communities. What is urgently needed, I argue, is a form of democracy that could transcend the contradictions latent in modern capitalism and deliver a solution to identity crisis and alienation without subverting the values of individual equality and liberty. Such a democracy, it is concluded, must be a socialist one in which the means of identity production are collectively owned.



## **TABLE OF CONTENTS**

### **VOLUME 1:**

<b>1</b>	<b>Introduction</b>	<b>6</b>
1.1	Global Capitalism, Nationalism, and Democracy	6
1.2	The Thesis	13
<b>2</b>	<b>Identity and Premodern Communities</b>	<b>22</b>
2.1	Primordialism and Modernism	22
2.2	Path-Dependence and Primordernism	28
2.3	Old Loyalties as <i>Gemeinschaften</i>	37
2.4	<i>Gemeinschaft</i> and Individual Identity	46
2.5	Notes on Hegemony and Alienation	72
<b>3</b>	<b>The Consequences of Modernity</b>	<b>80</b>
3.1	Modern Conditions and the Decline of Old <i>Gemeinschaften</i>	80
3.2	Sources of Identity Crisis	91
3.3	Two Reactions to Modern Conditions: Democracy and Nationalism	101
<b>4</b>	<b>Nationalism and Ethnicity</b>	<b>115</b>
4.1	Some Academic Observations on Ethnicity and Nationality	115
4.2	The Nationalist Conception of the Nation	121
4.3	Awakening the 'Sleeping Beauty'	136
4.4	Civic Nationalism?	144
<b>5</b>	<b>National Self-Determination</b>	<b>149</b>
5.1	National Self-Determination: General Remarks	149
5.2	Nationalism and the Meaning of National Self-Determination	158
5.3	Nationalism and the Right to National Self-Determination	160

5.4	National Self-Determination as an Ethnic Safeguard	171
<b>6</b>	<b>Homeland and Foreigners</b>	<b>190</b>
6.1	Nation and Homeland	190
6.2	Realpolitik in the Nationalist Policy	198
6.3	The Misodemos	207
 <b><u>VOLUME 2:</u></b>		
<b>7</b>	<b>Some Puzzles About Democracy</b>	<b>217</b>
7.1	Terminological Chaos (or, the Importance of Being Coherent)	217
7.2	Popular Sovereignty or Decision-Making?	222
7.3	Between Deliberation and Decision-Making	228
7.4	A Question of Equality	236
7.5	Consequences of Unequal Power	245
7.6	Some Moral Observations	256
 <b>8</b>	 <b>The Democratic Conditions and the Nation</b>	 <b>266</b>
8.1	Choice Situation and Contractarianism	266
8.2	The Scanlonian/Barryian Construct: the Motivation of Fairness	276
8.3	The Scanlonian/Barryian Construct: Equality and Information	288
8.4	What Is <i>Not</i> the Democratic Conception of the Nation?	304
8.5	What <i>Is</i> the Democratic Conception of the Nation?	310
 <b>9</b>	 <b>National Self-Determination Revisited</b>	 <b>320</b>
9.1	Some Preliminary Thoughts	320
9.2	National Self-Determination: General Remarks	324
9.3	Democracy and the Meaning of National Self-Determination	329
9.4	Undemocratic Nations and Self-Determination	342

<b>10</b>	<b>Whose Right? Which Territory?</b>	<b>351</b>
10.1	The Right to National Self-Determination	351
10.2	Territorial Demarcation: Historical Possession?	359
10.3	Territorial Demarcation: Majoritarian Decision?	366
10.4	Territorial Demarcation: A Question of Interests	372
<b>11</b>	<b>Socialist Democracy: Liberal Democracy Sublated?</b>	<b>383</b>
	<b>Bibliography</b>	<b>391</b>

1**INTRODUCTION****1.1 GLOBAL CAPITALISM, NATIONALISM, AND DEMOCRACY**

Modernity, suggested Marx, is better understood as the kind of civilisation formed by the domination of the capitalist mode of production. The dominance of capitalism (or, rather, *industrial* capitalism), Marx observed, involves three interrelated trends of expansion, each of which constantly accelerates due to the rapid development of the productive forces inherent in capitalism: the consolidation of ever bigger industries at the expense of small manufacturers and the self-producing peasant household, urbanisation, and globalisation. As he put it in the *Communist Manifesto*, there is no need to abolish ‘the property of the petty artisan and of the small peasant...the development of industry has to a great extent already destroyed it; and is still destroying it daily.’<sup>1</sup> As far as urbanisation is concerned, ‘The bourgeoisie has subjected the country to the rule of the town. It has created enormous cities, has greatly increased the urban population as compared with the rural, and has thus rescued a considerable part of the population from the idiocy of rural life.’<sup>2</sup> And in regard to globalisation, Marx observed that

The need of a constantly expanding market for its products chases the bourgeoisie over the

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<sup>1</sup>K. Marx & F. Engels, *The Communist Manifesto*, in *Karl Marx – Selected Writings*, ed. D. McLellan (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977; infra: MSW), p. 232.

<sup>2</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 225.

whole surface of the globe. It must nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, establish connections everywhere.

The bourgeoisie has through its exploitation of the world-market given a cosmopolitan character to production and consumption in every country....In place of the old local and national seclusion and self-sufficiency, we have intercourse in every direction, universal interdependence of nations. And as in material, so also in intellectual production. The intellectual creations of individual nations become common property. National one-sidedness and narrow-mindedness become more and more impossible, and from the numerous national and local literatures, there arises a world literature.

The bourgeoisie, by the rapid improvement of all instruments of production, by the immensely facilitated means of communication, draws all, even the most barbarian, nations into civilization.<sup>3</sup>

Global capitalism, Marx added, not only reduces national differences, but also diminishes conflicts and hostility between peoples. In his own words, 'National differences and antagonisms between peoples are daily more and more vanishing, owing to the development of the bourgeoisie, to freedom of commerce, to the world-market, to uniformity in the mode of production and in the conditions of life corresponding thereto.'<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>3</sup>Ibid., pp. 224-225.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., p. 235.

But was Marx right in his depiction? To a great extent he was: despite the uneven scope and pace it takes in different regions and societies, the movement towards ever bigger businesses is a paramount tendency nowadays; gigantic corporations and firms (industrial and others, e.g., communication companies and networks) often merge and cartelise and firmly winnow out small enterprises, retail chains and shopping centres succeed small shops and stalls, and where the movement of people from rural to urban areas (on a world scale a prevalent tendency in itself) is still limited, a growing number of the villagers there nonetheless become city-based labourers.<sup>5</sup> Globalisation, in its turn (and therein the economic ‘universal interdependence of nations’), is a bare fact that nobody could seriously deny: whether one likes this fact or not is, of course, another question. To be sure, the state still retains some power and to some extent still decides (despite the globalisation of capital – the internationalisation of both industry and finance – and the dictates of the IMF, WTO, World Bank and others of that kind) how to distribute its domestic resources and wealth.<sup>6</sup> Further,

...the role of the state has grown substantially since the early 1970s; state policies have become increasingly decisive on the international front, not more futile. Governments have become more and more involved in active management of monetary policy and interest rates in order to condition exchange-rate fluctuations and short-term capital flows. They

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<sup>5</sup>See for example the details regarding movement of labour power from the countryside to the city in East Asia in the World Bank Group, *Annual Report 1997: East Asia and Pacific* (Washington DC: World Bank Group, 1997), table 4.

<sup>6</sup>See A. Giddens, *The Third Way* (Tel Aviv: Yedioth Aharonot, 2000), pp. 51-56. (In Hebrew).

have become actually and potentially decisive in bargaining over production and investment agreements...[E]veryone including transnational corporations has become increasingly dependent upon co-ordinated state intervention for restructuring and resolution of the underlying dynamics of crisis.<sup>7</sup>

But, as B. Barry remarks, the distributive ability of the state in our global era is indeed more limited than before: 'There is unquestionably some validity in the claim that the ability of the nation-state to transform market outcomes in line with an egalitarian political agenda is more circumscribed than it was in the era of exchange controls and import quotas.'<sup>8</sup> And although the state can, and in fact does, restructure and resolve the underlying *dynamics* of economic crises, it cannot, by itself, avoid or prevent them altogether and produce smooth economic growth. Indeed, a butterfly that flaps its wings in the stock exchange in Singapore may easily bring a hurricane to the US, flood to Brazil and sirocco to Italy. Thus, as J. Gray put it, everyone is 'threatened by a return of the boom-bust cycle...[because] when capitalism is truly global, as it is today, no economy can be insulated from turmoil elsewhere in the world.'<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>7</sup>D. M. Gordon, 'The global Economy: New Edifice or Crumbling Foundations?', in *New Left Review* 168 (1988), pp. 63-64. As Giddens adds, 'the nation state does not vanish with the globalisation, and the general scope of state rule does not shrink, but expands.' Giddens, *The Third Way*, p. 55.

<sup>8</sup>B. Barry, *Culture and Equality* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002), p. 8.

<sup>9</sup>J. Gray, 'Gordon's Little Lamb', in the *Guardian*, July 31, 1998.

The question we are yet to answer, then, is, Does globalisation also reduce national and cultural differences and antagonisms, as Marx asserted? Again, as far as national and cultural *differences* are concerned, I believe that Marx was quite correct, or at least not grossly wrong. Globalisation, argues D. Held, does not involve the movement of goods and capital alone, but also 'the flow of communication, the interchange of cultures and the passage of people.' And the spread of globalisation, he adds, takes place through different 'dimensions of activity – technological, organizational, administrative and legal, among others...' <sup>10</sup> As J. Waldron elaborates, these different 'structures of action and interaction, dependence and interdependence, effortlessly transcend national and ethnic boundaries and allow men and women the opportunity to pursue common and important projects under conditions of goodwill, cooperation, and exchange throughout the world.' <sup>11</sup> Obviously, such associations and their activities influence and transform the structures, relations and ideas within nations and cultures, and at the same time are to a great extent the outcome of these structures, relations and ideas. In short, exchange of practices and ideas between nations and cultures do prevail in our world and blur some of the differences between them, although diversity does exist and is definitely here to stay. Practically, then, cultures and nations, to paraphrase E. Gellner's words, are not islands. <sup>12</sup>

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<sup>10</sup>D. Held, 'Democracy: From City-States to a Cosmopolitan Order?', in *Prospects for Democracy*, ed. D. Held (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994), p. 39.

<sup>11</sup>J. Waldron, 'Minority Cultures and the Cosmopolitan Alternative', in *The Rights of Minority Cultures*, ed. W. Kymlicka (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 102.

<sup>12</sup>E. Gellner, 'Anything Goes', in *Zionism: A Contemporary Controversy*, eds. P. Ginossar & A. Bareli



Many (perhaps most) of these inter- and transnational associations and organisations (e.g., Amnesty International, UNICEF, the international socialist movement, Doctors Without Borders, some ecological movements) are formed and characterised by their commitment to advance human interests, relieve suffering and satisfy needs globally. Taking into account the highly heterogeneous national composition of these movements and associations, it seems to be a bare fact that in all societies – across cultures, nations, states and different communities<sup>13</sup> – there are people who are devoted to the promotion and protection of universal human rights, individual equality, just distribution of resources and universalist democratic politics.<sup>14</sup> It is therefore not only that cultures and nations are not islands, but in a way (to take up Gellner's metaphor) they constitute one land, so to speak, in which democratic practices and ideas are widely performed and accepted, though rarely institutionalised, constitutionalised or implemented politically in a satisfactory way, if ever.<sup>15</sup>

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(Sde-Boker: the Ben-Gurion Research Center, 1996), p. 119. (In Hebrew).

<sup>13</sup>Note that nations are presented here as separate structures and by no means identified *as* cultures, states, or even communities.

<sup>14</sup>Democracy, I take it, is inherently universalist. But what exactly this universalism entails (both morally and politically) is rather controversial. For the moment, then, I will confine this universalism to a very basic common intuition, according to which democracy requires 'that the rights to engage fully in political life must be extended, with very few if any exceptions, to the entire population of adults permanently residing in a country.' R. A. Dahl, *On Democracy* (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1998), p. 90. Later on I will elaborate on this general idea and show what full engagement in political life exactly means, what kind of institutional arrangements the right to so participate entails, and how democracy should decide who is entitled to permanently reside in a country in the first place. It will thus also become clear what fundamentals are involved in the universalism of democracy.

<sup>15</sup>For a relevant discussion, see S. Buck-Morss, *Thinking Past Terror* (Tel Aviv: Resling, 2004). (In Hebrew).

The main difficulty, then, is Marx's assertion regarding the disappearance of national conflicts and antagonisms. As we all know, the 20<sup>th</sup> century has experienced the most violent, not to say genocidal, nationalist particularism, seclusion and exclusion, bigotry and hostility ever (hopefully more than coming centuries as well).<sup>16</sup> Serbia's atrocities in Kosovo, Russia's terror in Chechnya, China's brutality towards the Uighur population, the slaughter in Rwanda, Burma's oppression of the Muslim Rohingya in Arakan state, Indonesia's horrors in East Timor and Aceh, and Israel's ferocities in the 1967 occupied Palestinian territories, all unfortunately make C. J. Hayes's famous words from 1931 very topical:

We do know that as an accompaniment of this [industrial; O.C.] revolution there has been a rapid growth of a kind of economic internationalism—a huge expansion of trade in goods, persons, and ideas across national political frontiers. But it is, or should be, apparent also that there have been during the same hundred and forty years and down at least to the present moment a parallel diffusion and intensification of nationalism, so that the more trade has expanded between nations, the more within each nation various sorts of nationalism have been intensified and recently have given rise to the most intolerant sort, integral nationalism. It seems paradoxical that political nationalism should grow stronger and more virulent as economic internationalism increases. Yet the former is as much a fact in contemporary society as is the latter...Industrial revolution...[o]f itself...is neither nationalist nor internationalist. It is essentially mechanical and material. It has merely

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<sup>16</sup>Cf. J. Habermas, *The Postnational Constellation* (Tel Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuchad, 2001), p. 21. (In Hebrew).

provided improved means and greater opportunities for the dissemination of any ideas which influential individuals entertain....[W]hile the newer industrial machinery has been utilized for international ends, it has also been utilized, even more, for nationalist purposes. The obvious international fruits of the Industrial Revolution must not blind our eyes to its intensely nationalist contributions and implications.<sup>17</sup>

‘Historical development toward a universal community of civilization,’ said R. Luxemburg, ‘will, like all social development, take place in the midst of a contradiction...’<sup>18</sup> Indeed, on the face of it it would seem that the simultaneous consolidation and spread (within a progressing global order) of nationalist particularism, on the one hand, and of the support for democracy, on the other, do constitute such a contradiction. But is this really the case? Are nationalism and democracy mutually exclusive, or are they reconcilable after all?

## 1.2 THE THESIS

In this project, if I may paraphrase Rousseau's words at the beginning of *The Social Contract*, it is my purpose to enquire whether it is possible to reconcile nationalism with democracy, taking nationalism as it is and democracy as it may be.<sup>19</sup> In analysing

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<sup>17</sup>C. J. H. Hayes, *The Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism* (New York: Russell & Russell, 1968), pp. 236-237.

<sup>18</sup>R. Luxemburg, ‘The National Question and Autonomy’, in *The National Question* (New York & London: Monthly Review Press, 1976), p. 129.

<sup>19</sup>See J. J. Rousseau, *The Social Contract*, in *Political Writings* (Wisconsin: the University of Wisconsin Press, 1986), p. 3.

nationalism 'as it is', I will be referring to *actual* nationalist movements and thinkers – what Barry calls 'real-world nationalists'<sup>20</sup> – and to the ideas, goals and activities that they commonly share and pursue. In contrast, in talking of democracy 'as it may be', I (naturally) do not intend to examine existing societies and regimes. Instead, I would like to develop a *normative theory* of democracy that could tackle the urgent (and indeed dynamic) issues that we all now face better than the current (pathological) institutions and other (problematic) theories, and by reference to which actual societies should be assessed and amended.<sup>21</sup>

Now two related questions may be raised here. First, am I not being too abstract here in taking democracy as it may be? Am I not, that is, building castles in the air that bear no relation to reality? The answer is decidedly in the negative: in analysing democracy as it may be my intention is by no means to ignore current theories and conceptions of democracy, but to reveal their logical implications out of which my own theory will emerge. In other words, my own theory will not ignore the current democratic wisdom but will examine the real possibilities and potentialities that are inherent in it and try to suggest their actualisation and radicalisation. The other question, then, might be, What about nationalism? Am I not,

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<sup>20</sup>See B. Barry, 'Statism and Nationalism: A Cosmopolitan Critique', in *NOMOS XLI: Global Justice*, eds. I. Shapiro & L. Brilmayer (New York: New York University Press, 1999).

<sup>21</sup>For the general difference between empirical and normative theories of democracy, see R. A. Dahl, *Democracy, Liberty, and Equality* (Oslo: Norwegian University Press, 1986), p. 229. For a detailed discussion, see Dahl, *On Democracy*, parts II & III.

in examining it as it is, ignoring its own possibilities and potentialities? It will be shown during this study that the present characteristics of nationalism, as plainly expressed by those who are commonly regarded as nationalists (i.e., real-world nationalists), and the nationalist ideal are in fact one and the same. In that sense, the possibilities and potentialities of nationalism are already materialised in its current ideas and practices, as opposed to democracy in which, as said, there is still a gap to be filled between its present features and its paragon. Putting it another way, whereas the innate characteristics of democracy can still be expanded into a new and higher form of democracy, the intrinsic qualities of nationalism cannot be transformed into any superior nationalist model without losing the very meaning of the term or the common intuition about it.<sup>22</sup>

As Held correctly argues, under prevailing conditions, especially the circumstances of globalisation,

...the meaning and place of democratic politics, and of the contending models of democracy, have to be rethought in relation to a series of overlapping local, regional and global processes and structures...Democracy has to come to terms with all...these developments and their implications for national and international power centres. If it fails to do so, it is likely to become ever less effective in determining the shape and limits of political activity. The international form and structure of politics and civil society have,

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<sup>22</sup> A very similar point is made by N. Bobbio: 'The natural state of democratic system,' he writes, 'is one of a constant change. Democracy is dynamic, as opposed to despotism that is static, resembles itself and always substantive.' N. Bobbio, *The Future of Democracy* (Jerusalem: Magnes, 2003), p. xi. (In Hebrew). I shall show that nationalism is equally static, resembles itself and always substantive.

accordingly, to be built into the foundations of democratic thought and practice.<sup>23</sup>

I believe that radical changes in our understanding of democracy and the implementation of a new form of democratic politics are also required in order to confront the grave(yard) problem of nationalism. I will thus not examine the relations between nationalism and those actual political systems commonly called democratic. The question, rather, will be, How democracy – given its internal structure and qualities – *should* treat nationalism, given its own internal structure and qualities? Should democracy adjust itself to nationalism, accommodate it in one way or another, or perhaps reject it altogether?

As Hayes rightly suggested, modernity (globalisation in particular) could, in principle, spread any ideas. But would it not be correct to say that modernity also *created* new ideas, not only spread, as it were, ideas from a premodern available repertoire? And would it not be also correct to add that both nationalism and democracy are such ideas (and, incidentally, practices) that modernity in fact created? The modernity of democracy, I believe, is unquestionable. Indeed, the term ‘democracy’ was coined in ancient Greece to designate ‘rule by the people’ or, in Dahl’s words, ‘popular government.’ But as Dahl himself shows, neither the existence of the term nor of past popular governments (e.g., in classical Rome and in some Italian city-states during 11<sup>th</sup>-13<sup>th</sup> centuries) suggests that current democratic ideas and practices are theoretically or practically identical to them. Clearly enough, given

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<sup>23</sup>Held, ‘Democracy: From City-states’, p. 39.

its universalism (even if in the minimalist sense we currently employ), democracy, as we understand it today, is quite new: it represents ‘not only a new type of political system but a new kind of popular government, a type of “democracy” that had never existed’ until the 20<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>24</sup> What seems to me to be wholly new in modern democracy is not necessarily the representative form it takes but rather, as already noted, its universalism – the idea that ‘rule of the people’ means rule by *all* the people, i.e., that the sovereign people consists of ‘the entire population of adults permanently residing in a country.’ Modern democracy, then, is supposedly totally inclusive and therefore qualitatively different from old forms of democracy: it involves a thoroughly new kind of social relations and institutions. This new type of democracy, it will be argued, is a by-product of the rise of ethical individualism (the moral priority of the individual over the community), itself an outgrowth of modernity.

But what about nationalism? Is this a modern phenomenon as well? Chapters 2 and 3 concentrate on that question. Chapter 2 critically reviews the primordialist-modernist debate and offers an alternative theory to both. It then continues with a detailed analysis of premodern communities and the individual identity in them, as a background to Chapter 3's study of the rise of nationalism and democracy. Chapter 3, then, explores both the causes and the consequences of the decline of premodern communities. It will be suggested that the modern conditions were responsible for this decline, and that it was (and still is) their internal contradictions that gave rise to as distinct doctrines as nationalism (described as

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<sup>24</sup>See Dahl, *On Democracy*, ch. 2 & passim. The citation is from p. 90.

ethically collectivist) and democracy (portrayed as ethically individualist).

Chapter 4 takes up the issues of the nationalist conception of the nation and national identity formation, and looks into their relations to ethnicity. It will be argued that the affinity that scholars normally find between nationalism and ethnicity is radically different not only from the ways that nationalists themselves see it but also from the common intuition people in general have about nationalism.

Chapters 5 and 6 conclude the discussion on nationalism by focussing on the question of national self-determination: the nationalist understanding of this concept, its view on the *right* to national self-determination and the political *role* of self-determination are dealt with in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 concentrates on the significance that nationalists ascribe to the notion of homeland and their attitude to foreigners as well as to conational political and ideological rivals. On the whole, Chapters 4-6 try to show that nationalism is inherently oppressive, not only towards foreigners but also towards conationals.

A theory of democracy is elaborated in Chapters 7-11. Chapter 7 addresses some key issues concerning democracy such as popular sovereignty, decision-making procedures, public deliberation, majority rule, power and equality. A special weight is given here to the problems inherent in unfair choice situations which democracy, it will be argued, ought to surmount. Chapter 8 examines the social and political conditions that are required in order



to deliver fair choice situations for all, i.e., for democracy to prevail. It then moves on to ponder over a few conceptions of the nation that have been commonly employed by democratic theorists, and concludes in outlining a democratic conception of the nation that may be consistent with the democratic requirements that were depicted before. The subject of national self-determination is addressed in Chapters 9 and 10: while Chapter 9 concentrates on the democratic understanding of the idea of self determination in general, Chapter 10 focusses on the democratic bearing on the *right* to national self determination, national territory and foreigners.

Chapter 11 outlines an argument in favour of socialist democracy:<sup>25</sup> it maintains that such form of democracy involves what we shall call ‘the collective ownership of the means of identity production’ which practically enables (among other things) a free and equal public discourse throughout the process of national identity formation (which, in principle, is never deemed to have finished). The idea is that, socialist democracy is not merely the *full* form of democracy (understood as liberal democracy being sublated), but also the only sustainable bulwark against nationalism.

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<sup>25</sup>In contrast to different theories of democratic socialism and social democracy, socialist democracy implies that socialism is a precondition for democracy and not the other way around. It will be indicated, however, that socialist democracy does not bear any affinity with communitarianism nor does it adhere to any substantive conception of the good.

'The old is dying and the new cannot be born,'<sup>26</sup> said Gramsci. We are living in an era in which old conceptions of democracy are dying and new ones are yet to be born institutionally, that is, to materialise and be entrenched into the basic structure of actual societies and regimes. A normative theory of democracy, like the one I wish to offer here, then, is not only an observation or reflection upon reality. It also purports to be a call and prescription for action. It is indeed up to us as human beings to determine what will be born out of the current conditions, where we are bound for and how things are to be pursued: globalisation could indeed spread any ideas, but it is still up to us to decide which ideas will eventually win the political agenda. As E. Caird, a British idealist, noted (already in 1897),

The horizon of politics has widened, so that the ebb and flow of reforming or conservative influences in every nation become part of one great movement. And we can see that these causes will go on operating in still more decisive ways in the future, till it shall become impossible to avoid a kind of co-operation and even union of all nations, of which we now see only the beginnings...[T]he problem of the modern world *is to turn these necessities into freedom*. It is, in other words, to make them the means of improving our lives, instead of allowing them to crush us.<sup>27</sup>

In the face of modern conditions (especially globalisation), I would argue, old forms of

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<sup>26</sup>A. Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks* (New York: International Publishers, 1992), p. 276.

<sup>27</sup>E. Caird, 'The Present State of the Controversy Between Individualism and Socialism', in *The British Idealists*, ed. D. Boucher (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 192 (*italic original*).

democracy deserve euthanasia, but the yet to be born should already be nourished and protected from nationalist obstetricians, as it were: ultimately, as Luxemburg famously put it, we do have to choose between socialism and barbarism.

2**IDENTITY AND PREMODERN COMMUNITIES****2.1 PRIMORDIALISM AND MODERNISM**

More than once, when journalists had asked him about his origins, the Russian nationalist Vladimir Zhirinovskii used to answer: my mother is Russian and my father is a lawyer (the common rumour is that Zhirinovskii's father is Jewish). This answer implies few things: first, you may be a Russian citizen or inhabitant, but this alone does not make you a member of the Russian nation. Second, to be a citizen or inhabitant in the state of Russia without being a member of the Russian nation, at least as a politician, is illegitimate. These concepts of habitation or residence, citizenship, nationality, state, legitimacy, and the connections between them are essential for the exploration of the relations between nationalism and democracy, and will be discussed in length later in this study. But taken within his broader expressed system of beliefs and political views, Zhirinovskii's answer also involves two additional aspects, which altogether constitute his apparent conception of the nation upon which his political agenda is built.

First, if Jews who live in Russia are not, as it were, real or authentic Russians, it is not because they did not choose to be Russians or to identify themselves and be considered as such. Rather, they simply *cannot* be Russians because they were born into another nationality, i.e., the Jewish one, and cannot alter their belonging by an aspiration or act of

will. In short, national membership is regarded here as a given status, not a volitional or chosen one. Nationality as a given status, however, also supposes (at least in Zhirinovskii's case) that the nation is a fixed group that has existed for centuries, if not from time immemorial, and to which one belongs in virtue of one's ancestors. Thus, 'persons who are Jewish by descent...but they have no connection whatsoever of their choosing – religiously, culturally, philanthropically or emotionally – with the Jewish people...are [still] Jewish only because a label has been attached to them (by the non-Jewish world) which they have not actively sought to remove or, having tried, have failed.'<sup>1</sup>

It is the second proposition which I would like to refer to now: is the nation 'as old as history,' as W. Bagehot claimed,<sup>2</sup> or at least the "natural", relatively uninterrupted continuation and development of old cultural units and communities and the manifestation of their, as it were, maturity? Or is the nation after all a pure modern phenomenon, the

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<sup>1</sup>M. Davis, *I Am A Jew* (London & Oxford: Nowbrays, 1978), p. 61. It must be emphasised, though, that such a label is not attached solely, let alone universally, by the 'non-Jewish world'. Many persons who were born into Jewish families but do not have any affinity with Jewishness are still considered as Jews primarily by self-identified Jews or Jewish institutions, not by non-Jews. Paradoxically, it is in the state of Israel where such a label is especially prominent and *legally* attached to individuals: a Jew, according to the Israeli law, is basically a person whose mother is a Jew (and, accordingly, whose own mother is a Jew), not a person who simply identifies himself as a Jew. Consequently, a born-Jew who does not identify himself as such is still considered by the state as being Jewish, and therefore cannot, e.g., marry or be buried in Israel but in a Jewish orthodox ceremony. Equally, persons who identify themselves as Jews but their mother is not a Jew and were not converted into the Jewish *religion* by a recognised authority, are legally labeled as non-Jews. Not in vain a respected Israeli sociologist argued that some laws in Israel 'define the boundaries of Judaism...more or less in accordance with the broader definition of the Nuremberg laws.' B. Kimmerling, 'Neither Democratic nor Jewish', in *News from Within* 13/2 (Jerusalem & Bethlehem: AIC – Alternative Information Centre, 1997), p. 29.

<sup>2</sup>W. Bagehot, *Physics and Politics* (Kitchener: Batoche Books, 2001), p. 49.

substitution of premodern loyalties and communities that modernity undermined rather than their continuation? It is around this question that scholars of nationalism are divided into two main camps, primordialism and modernism. Primordialists, it is normally assumed, claim that nations are the crystallisation and developed form of premodern definite groups, which A. D. Smith, J. Armstrong and W. Connor refer to as ethnic groups or *ethnies*.<sup>3</sup> Premodern ethnic groups, then, are thus seen as ‘embryonic’ (Smith), ‘incipient’ (Armstrong) or ‘potential’ (Connor) nations, which preceded nationalism both as modern ideology and movement. Modernists, as the term itself suggests, are taken to argue that nations are strictly the creation of nationalism; and since nationalism is itself a modern phenomenon, the nations it creates cannot be but modern: a departure, even a break, from premodern communities. As E. Gellner put it, nationalism ‘invents nations where they do not exist,’<sup>4</sup> and it ‘is not the awakening and assertion of these mythical, supposedly natural and given units [i.e., premodern cultures and *ethnies*; O.C]. It is, on the contrary, the crystallization of new units [i.e., nations; O.C], suitable for the conditions now prevailing...’<sup>5</sup>

But is the dispute between primordialists and modernists so substantial as it may appear and

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<sup>3</sup>A. D. Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations* (Oxford & Cambridge: Blackwell, 1995); J. Armstrong, *Nations before Nationalism* (Chapel Hill: the University of North Carolina Press, 1982); W. Connor, *Ethnonationalism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), esp. pp. 40–41, 103 & ch. 8.

<sup>4</sup>E. Gellner, *Thought and Change* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1965), p. 168.

<sup>5</sup>E. Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983), p. 49.

is normally claimed to be? Is there any dispute at all? Consider for example the following citations and paraphrases, for now deliberately without references:

1. Nations are 'a product of European thought in the last 150 years...[Yet] nationalism derives the greater part of its strength [to create nations] from the existence of ancient communal and religious ties...'
  
2. 'It is nationalism which engenders nations, and not the other way around. Admittedly, nationalism uses the pre-existing, historically inherited proliferation of cultures or cultural wealth...[Nations as new units are thus] using as their raw material the cultural, historical and other inheritances from the pre-nationalist world.'
  
3. '...why, having lost real communities, people should wish to imagine this particular type of replacement [i.e., the nation]. One reason may be that, in many parts of the world, states and national movements could mobilize certain variants of feelings of collective belonging which already existed and which could operate, as it were, potentially on the macro-political scale which could fit in with modern states and nations. I shall call these bonds 'proto-national'.'
  
4. '...traditions are invented and social realities constructed...[P]olitical and economic elites who make use of ethnic group attributes are constrained by the

beliefs and values which exist within the group and which limit the kinds of appeals which can be made...[T]he ethnic community or nation created in this way does not necessarily constitute an entirely new entity but one that has been transformed...A nation, therefore, may be seen as a particular type of ethnic community or, rather, as an ethnic community politicized...'

5. The nation is an imagined community that was created 'towards the end of the eighteenth century.' But this modern phenomenon of nationalism still 'has to be understood by aligning it...with the large cultural systems that preceded it, out of which – as well as against which – it came into being.'

6. 'Usually, there has been some ethnic basis for the construction of modern nations...Nationalism, both as ideology and movement, is a wholly modern phenomenon, even if, as we shall see, the 'modern nation' in practice incorporates several features of pre-modern *ethnie* and owes much to the general model of ethnicity which has survived in many areas until the dawn of the 'modern era...[Ethnicity] sets limits to elite attempts to manipulate and mobilize populations in their strategies of national construction.'

7. '...the key to the significance of phenomena of ethnic identification is persistence rather than genesis of particular patterns...[W]idespread intense ethnic identification,



although expressed in other forms, is recurrent...One result has been that modern nationalist thought...has sought permanent “essences” of national character instead of recognizing the fundamental but shifting significance of boundaries for human identity...[There was a] slow emergence of nations in the premodern period. The primary characteristic of ethnic boundaries is attitudinal. In their origins and in their most fundamental effects, ethnic boundary mechanisms exist in the minds of their subjects...Acting through nostalgia, an earlier life pattern conditions the attitudes of subsequent generations...Nostalgia was not just a folk memory...Like most identity themes, it was systematically manipulated by elites.’

8. ‘An ethnic group may be readily discerned by an anthropologist or other outside observer, but until the members are themselves aware of the group’s uniqueness, it is merely an ethnic group and not a nation... [T]hose who have successfully mobilized nations have understood that at the core of ethnopsychology is the sense of shared blood, and they have not hesitated to appeal to it...[Accordingly, a nation] is a group of people who feel that they are ancestrally related.’

It seems to me that these arguments constitute different nuances of a similar view regarding nationalism and the emergence of nations rather than a substantial dispute. Could one easily identify, if ever, which of these arguments were made by primordialists and which by modernists? I do not think so. The fact remains, though, that the first five points were made

by modernists<sup>6</sup> and points 6-8 were put forward by primordialists.<sup>7</sup> In that sense, D. D. Laitin is totally right in indicating the blindness of these schools, although their blindness is not, as Laitin implies, to the partial truth that each school represents but rather to the similarities between them and the beliefs they actually share.<sup>8</sup>

How should we assess these similarities and, even if quite minor, disagreements that still do exist between modernists and primordialists? I believe that the theory of path-dependence, which is normally used to assess economic and institutional change, will be quite useful here.

## 2.2 PATH-DEPENDENCE AND PRIMORDERNISM

The very idea of path-dependence is not monolithic and is interpreted in various ways. Here, however, I would like to refer only to two of these interpretations, the first contrasts path-dependence with path-shaping approach, whereas the second places path-shaping within the theory of path-dependence. The first interpretation thus argues that,

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<sup>6</sup>See, respectively, E. Kedourie, *Nationalism* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), pp. 68 & 71; Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, pp. 55 & 49; E. J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism Since 1780* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 46; P. R. Brass, *Ethnicity and Nationalism* (New Delhi, Newbury Park & London: Sage Publications, 1991), pp. 14, 16, 17 & 20; B. Anderson, *Imagined Communities* (London & New York: Verso, 1991), pp. 7 & 12.

<sup>7</sup>See, respectively, Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*, pp. 17 & 18; Armstrong, *Nations before Nationalism*, pp. 4, 7, 16 & 17; Connor, *Ethnonationalism*, pp. 103, 197 & 202.

<sup>8</sup>D. D. Laitin, *Identity in Formation* (Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press, 1998), p. 20. Incidentally, Laitin himself is rather blind to these similarities and ultimately refers to a debate that basically does not exist.

Path-dependency suggests that the institutional legacies of the past limit the range of current possibilities and/or options in institutional innovation...At some earlier time, when different routes were possible, a specific developmental path was instituted; and it then tends to be re-established...This position does not exclude various developmental leaps, lags, or reversals. But these are seen as pre-given possibilities in what could be regarded as a game of institutional 'snakes and ladders'...Conversely, the path-shaping approach implies that social forces can intervene in current conjunctures and actively re-articulate them so that new trajectories become possible...[T]he path-shaping approach implies that, within specific, historically given, and potentially malleable limits, social forces can redesign the 'board' on which they are moving and reformulate the rules of the game.<sup>9</sup>

Both path-dependence and path-shaping approaches, then, agree that (i) the past matters and sets limits on present possibilities, and (ii) within the limits of the past there is still enough room for social forces to intervene, change and innovate by exploiting the different possibilities the past bequeathed. But while path-dependence asserts that these changes and innovations are limited by a fixed structural path, necessarily take place within it and cannot exceed or transform it, path-shaping argues that changes and innovations within a path can eventually exceed and transform the path itself.<sup>10</sup> The differences between path-dependence

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<sup>9</sup>J. Hausner, B. Jessop & K. Nielsen, 'Institutional Change in Post-Socialism', in *Strategic Choice and Path-Dependency in Post-Socialism*, ed. Hausner et al. (Brookfield: Edward Elgar, 1995), pp. 6-7.

<sup>10</sup>One may recall here Hegel's and Marx's 'dialectical law' of the transformation of quantity into quality – the process by which *gradual* changes within a system results in a *sudden* change of the system itself. As Hegel illustrated, a man who successively plucks single hairs from his head undergoes in the beginning only a quantitative change, but eventually he becomes bald, a qualitative change in his condition.

and path-shaping, then, are basically quantitative rather than qualitative. In other words, what divides them is neither a disagreement about the importance of the past and its influence on the present, nor a quarrel regarding the possibility of changing and reconstructing past experiences. The disagreement is rather a question of degree: how much does the past influence the present and the future? What is the scope that the past, as it were, immunises against changes, or the boundaries the past sets within which changes take place and beyond which changes are impossible?

If the differences between path-dependence and path-shaping are basically quantitative, I believe that it would be legitimate (if not required) to place them together in a common theoretical framework. Such incorporation is made by H. Hakansson and A. Lundgren who distinguish between a strong version of path-dependence (paths as structures) and a weak one (paths as processes).<sup>11</sup> In the first case,

...paths carry history through the fact that the pre-existing structure controls or governs future action...The dynamics of a system are not only governed by where it is, but also by where it is coming from. In path dependent dynamics, history is transmitted through a series of positive feedbacks, through which the system gains momentum: pushing it forward in a

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For a detailed exposition of the dialectic and the Marxist tradition, see J. Rees, *The Algebra of Revolution* (London & New York: Routledge, 1998).

<sup>11</sup>H. Hakansson & A. Lundgren, 'Paths in Time and Space – Path Dependence in Industrial Networks', in *Evolutionary Economics and Path Dependence*, ed. L. Magnusson & J. Ottosson (Cheltenham & Brookfield: Edward Elgar, 1997), pp. 119-137.

direction set by the past.<sup>12</sup>

In this case, then, present and future are strictly *controlled* (not only influenced) by a path set by the past, which in itself cannot be transformed as an established structure. Thus, 'Viewing paths as structures inevitably leaves us with history as a restriction.'<sup>13</sup> Paths as processes, argue Hakansson and Lundgren, 'points at totally different ways in which history matters.' Here, the present is not derived from the past nor is the future from the present:

...we are not slaves of the past, but we are its children. Progress is propelled by circumstances embodied in history...Here it is a possibility, something that can be exploited. The question is how much an individual actor can and will take advantage of it...This means that it [i.e., the structure of the path; O.C] has been translated or framed into a picture which is partly determined by how the individual organisation reads its past and present...The past, or rather the path through the past, defines the range of possible actions, while the decision of what action to take is always determined by the perception of the present state of affairs. One important aspect must be our ability to exploit the past...But since we ourselves are the carriers of history we have a choice...<sup>14</sup>

Here, then, the past does not control but *influences* the present and the future: it opens

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<sup>12</sup>Ibid., p. 128.

<sup>13</sup>Ibid., p. 132.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid., pp. 132-133.

numerous possibilities that can be exploited and out of which people can *choose* how to pursue. While the strong version is thus closer to determinism – as it asserts that present and future actions are *determined* by the past and are thus, to a great extent, predictable – the weak version is closer to voluntarism – as it claims that actions are influenced by the past and take place under given conditions, but these conditions still allow us to choose between different courses of action and shape the future, including by creating new paths: ‘All roads do not lead to Rome but as way leads onto way, the particular path ‘chosen’ will make all the difference.’<sup>15</sup>

What could be said here about primordialism and modernism? First, both, as we have seen, agree that (i) the nation is a construction of modern nationalism, and (ii) modern nationalism uses premodern social bonds and attachments as the raw material out of which it creates the nation. Secondly, the differences between them are quantitative rather than qualitative. Like the strong version of path-dependence, primordialism talks of premodern fixed and definite existing groups (those it categorises as ethnic communities or *ethnies*) as the only structure out of which nations emerge.<sup>16</sup> The path, then, is a strong one: the nation cannot be but a new form within an old path, a continuation of an existing structure. As such, the nation is

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<sup>15</sup>Ibid., p. 123. As to the possibility of ‘breaking paths’ and ‘escaping history,’ as the authors call it, see p. 135.

<sup>16</sup>Note that primordialism does not assert that all ethnic groups eventually turn nations. However, it does suggest that all nations originate in ethnic groups, so once a nation *is* formed, it *must* be a continuation of preexisting *ethnie*.

understood as a positive feedback through which the ethnic unit gains momentum: 'pushing it forward in a direction set by the past.'

Modernists, on the other hand, bear close affinities with the weak version of path-dependence; they suggest that (i) the past sets different possibilities that can be exploited, of which nationalism is only one, and (ii) the old bonds or raw materials out of which nations *are* eventually created vary from one case to another, are often numerous in the same case, and, still more important, by no means constitute one fixed and definite category of the kind that primordialists ascribe to *ethnie*. In other words, here too there are different possibilities that can be exploited for the creation of a nation, when *ethnie* (as primordialists characterise it) is hardly one of them.<sup>17</sup> There is no path to nationhood, then, there are paths to nationhood, which under certain conditions may be joined together or internally divided by nationalist movements and turned into a new common path, namely, the nation.<sup>18</sup> The

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<sup>17</sup>Note that I emphasise *ethnie as primordialists understand it*. Some modernists agree that ethnic groups are at least *one* of the raw materials out of which nations are created, but their conception of 'ethnic groups' and exposition of the transformation of these groups into nations are very different from the primordialist one. For primordialists, ethnic groups *universally* incorporate the same basic and quintessentially distinctive markers, which remain intact once the group is transformed into a nation. This transformation is thus regarded as being a transformation of a persistent structure *qua* structure, universally applied (see, e.g., Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*, pp. 22-31, chs. 6-7 & *passim*). For modernists who accept the role of ethnicity in the formation of the nation, however, almost everything could serve as an ethnic marker. Accordingly, markers of and boundaries between ethnic groups are strongly contested, diverse, variable and normally cut across each other. There are no fixed and definite pre-national ethnic groups, then, only loose and fluid ones. Thus, the transformation of *some* of these groups into nations *necessarily* entails a break of structures rather than persistence, and the formation of new structures which, at the most, are presented *as if* they were persistent. In that sense, modernists argue that even when a nation *is* created out of a preexisting ethnic group its creation largely involves a simultaneous formation of a *new* ethnic group. See Brass, *Ethnicity and Nationalism*, ch. 1, esp. pp. 20-21 & *passim*.

<sup>18</sup>For the relevant issue of crossing of paths and creation of new ones, see Hakansson & Lundgren,

type, attributes and boundaries of groups that may become nations, then, are rather flexible and not as rigid as in the primordialist case.

Now if the differences between primordialism and modernism (just as with the two versions of path-dependence) are quantitative and marginal in comparison to their (qualitative) similarities, as I have tried to show, there is good reason to incorporate them into one theoretical framework, a framework we shall call primordernism. Consequently, the nation would appear as a primordernist body, one which is indeed created by modern nationalism, but which is nevertheless created out of old bonds that nationalism uses as the raw material for this creation.

If the nation is thus created, a few essential questions immediately arise. First, why is it modernity of all things that engenders nationalism (and, as we shall see, universalist democracy)? Second, as what is the nation constructed, i.e., what is the *content* (or the characteristics) that nationalist 'entrepreneurs' give to the nation (the nationalist conception of the nation) and in what sense, if ever, is this content different from the characteristics of old loyalties? And how, as part and parcel of this content, do nationalists present the *historical* relations between the nation and old loyalties (i.e., do they present the nation as a pure new entity, a continuation of old loyalties, or perhaps as one of these loyalties)? Third, how do nationalists produce and sell this content (the product and commodity of

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'Paths in Time and Space', pp. 134-135. Cf. pp. 129-130.



national identity), i.e., what is the *process* by which the nation is created? All these questions will be addressed in Chapters 3-4. Note, however, that my discussion is radically different from the way primordialists and modernists normally tackle the issue of the relations between old loyalties and the nation. First, my discussion is largely not historical (though, of course, not ahistorical) but rather conceptual:<sup>19</sup> it concentrates, as said, on the nationalist *own* conception of the nation and on how nationalists *themselves* relate the nation to old loyalties, and does not ask from which groups the nation is *actually* created. There are two reasons for posing the issue that way, one is philosophical and the other political.

As we have seen, both primordialists and modernists agree that it is nationalism that creates the nation and not the other way around, and that this creation involves the transformation of preexisting bonds and their interrelations. If this is the case, it is essentially important to examine how nationalists conduct this transformation: what they do and say in order to nationalise the relevant population, and how they *themselves* delimit this population in the first place. These delimitation and nationalisation, though, necessarily involve (among other things) the employment of a particular conception of the nation, which, in order to materialise, must appeal to the very same bonds out of which the nation is supposed to be constructed. The questions that a philosophical enquiry into nationalism should ask, then,

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<sup>19</sup>Although conceptual, this discussion is also implicitly theoretical: the analysis of the nationalist own conception of the nation will be used as the pillar of my theory of nationalism.

is not who exactly are the groups that nationalism uses and transforms in the construction of the nation (themselves variable), but rather (i) how nationalists themselves determine the relevant group, and (ii) how the said transformation takes place: how the concept of the nation is presented before the prospective conationals and related to their old identities and communities. Having said that, it is also crucial to explore (iii) under what circumstances nationalism tends to develop and gain massive support.

But the following line of enquiry is also important politically. Whether we regard nationalism as a positive, negative, or potentially both positive and negative phenomenon, we should deal with it politically: to *actively* sustain, oppose or amend it (that is, to actualise its positive potentialities and marginalise its negative ones). And dealing with it politically requires the understanding of its appeal – both the ideas, aspirations and activities it involves, on the one hand, and the circumstances that make them compelling, on the other.

My own discussion, then, also differs from primordialism and modernism as far as historical examination *is* concerned. The debate between primordialists and modernists is essentially about the constraints the past imposes on the formation of the nation, i.e., about the pregiven cultural scope within which nationalist ‘entrepreneurs’ can manoeuvre and from which they can draw the material for nation-building. The current study, however, does not deal with this question of constraints at all. Instead, where it examines the past (more

specifically, the nature of premodern communities and their decline) it does so in order to (i) understand the background and circumstances under which nationalism (both as ideology and movement) has risen, and (ii) expose the similarities and differences between these communities and the nation *as these appear in the nationalist image*.

It should be clear now, I believe, why primordernism fits the aims of this study perfectly and serves its purposes better than any primordialist or modernist approach or methodology could. In accepting the qualitative agreement between primordialism and modernism and avoiding their quantitative dispute, primordernism allows us to concentrate on the questions mentioned before without treading water in focussing on the question of constraints. Besides, I have never figured out why there should be only one story: would it not be right to say that in some cases the primordialist analysis holds and in others the modernist version is valid? In accommodating the seemingly contradictory cases and incorporating them within one framework, then, primordernism not only allows the two versions to coexist coherently, but also seems to fit reality better than each of them by itself can.

### 2.3 OLD LOYALTIES AS *GEMEINSCHAFTEN*

As said before, in examining old loyalties I wish to concentrate on the question of identity. Why identity of all things? Is this really the central aspect by reference to which we should analyse human associations and social evolution? Am I not implying here, almost in a

Weberian fashion, that status groups are the central agents of collective action?<sup>20</sup> Is identity the aspect that could help us to differentiate modern groups from premodern ones and, perhaps, to understand the rise of nationalism? These questions are significant and interesting and will be touched upon sporadically during this study. Right now I would like to beg the reader's patience and move directly to the analysis of old loyalties.

If identity in old loyalties is the issue, I find F. Tönnies's distinction between the concept of *Gemeinschaft* and that of *Gesellschaft* both analytically useful and historically valid.<sup>21</sup> Usually the terms *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft* are read in English as, respectively, community and association (or society). And although sometimes the English use of these terms is quite close to the German purport,<sup>22</sup> the English terms of community and society still often have different connotation from the meaning that Tönnies tried to cast into

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<sup>20</sup>As J. Elster explains, analysing groups as collective actors does not necessarily violate methodological individualism: such analyses may well assume that 'collective action should indeed be understood in terms of the propensities of individuals to engage in it.' My question, then, could be rephrased as, Am I not implying that individuals tend to engage in collective action with those who share the same status as they do as opposed to, say, those who belong to the same class? See J. Elster, *Making Sense of Marx* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 336, n. 1. Also, note that what we shall henceforth call 'identity groups' bear some affinities with Weber's own concept of 'status groups', i.e., groups 'based on a subjective feeling of the parties, whether affectual or traditional, that they belong together.' See M. Weber, *Economy and Society* vol. 1 (New York: Bedminster Press, 1968), p. 40. I would argue, though, that instead of talking about the *feelings* of the parties we should talk about their *actions* and the *circumstances* under which they take place.

<sup>21</sup>See also E. Gellner, *Reason and Culture* (Oxford & Cambridge: Blackwell, 1992), pp. 116-123.

<sup>22</sup>See for example Rawls's use of the terms in his 'Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical', in *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 14/3 (1985), p. 241. For a relevant discussion, see also Rawls's *Political Liberalism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), pp. 40-43.

shape.<sup>23</sup> For this reason I prefer to use the original German words rather than their English translation.

So what are the main characteristics of *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft*?

1. 'Gemeinschaft', says Tönnies, 'should be understood as a living organism' and familial body.<sup>24</sup> First, its members see themselves as being bound together by common ancestors (hence believe that their communal belonging is a natural decree) and thus identify themselves as inseparable parts of an organic whole.<sup>25</sup> By implication, they share a strong sense of belonging, devotion and commitment to their community: they share, as Tönnies

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<sup>23</sup>See C. P. Loomis, 'Notes on Tönnies' Fundamental Concepts', in F. Tönnies, *Community and Society (Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft)* (Michigan: Michigan State University Press, 1964), p. 284, n. 2.

<sup>24</sup>Tönnies, 'Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft', in *ibid.*, p. 35 & *passim*.

<sup>25</sup>*Ibid.*, *passim*, esp. pp. 33-34, 45, 48, 50, 53, 57, 210. This is not to say that members of the *Gemeinschaft* do not have a sense of selfhood as separate individuals. We know, for example, that some form of autobiographies already existed in 2<sup>nd</sup> century BC China as appeared, e.g., in Ch'ien Ssu-Ma's *Historical Records* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994). Similarly, archeological findings show that individual graves and funerary ceremonies marked the Early Bronze age from the Neolithic period, and Christianity has always emphasised the individual soul. But as far as the individual memberships and social positions and roles are concerned (the individual station and its duties), those are predetermined by preexisting social norms and are not open to individual will or choice. Ch'ien's account of himself was thus interwoven with his study of the history of his community, and in antiquity individuals were buried in accordance with their social prestige and status as these were predetermined by their group. Even conversions to another religion (Christianity and others) normally involved the transformation of entire collectives which followed their leaders' steps rather than the 'rebirth' of individuals who 'found God' or experienced a 'revelation'. The conversions of Germanic tribes (e.g., the Vandals, Burgundians, Ostrogoths) to Arian Christianity and then to Catholicism, of the Franks under and following Clovis, of Slavic tribes by Cyril and Methodius, of the Sinhalese to Buddhism under king Tissa – all of these, among others, represented the norm, whereas individual conversion, e.g., of Victorinus (who, according to St. Augustine, enraged his community fellows by his conversion) and of Augustine himself, epitomised the exceptional. On Victorinus, see St. Augustine, *Confessions*, book 8, ch. 2:4. We should also recall that the very term 'person' comes from the Latin 'persona', which in antiquity referred to the mask that was worn by actors (originally by Etruscan mimes, I think), and thus to their role. 'Persona' thus denoted one's *social* position.

put it, a 'unity of spirit—family spirit.'<sup>26</sup> But, second, these strong feelings and belief in common objective belonging are translated into actual behaviour through which the *Gemeinschaft* materialises and turns, as it were, into a real functioning family. For one thing, by recognising themselves as kith and kin (making exit inconceivable) and distinguishing themselves collectively from outsiders as the other side of the coin (making joining improbable), membership in the *Gemeinschaft* *actually* becomes an ascribed status, i.e., it is not open for individual choice; instead, it is determined by birth and by birth alone.<sup>27</sup> Moreover, like any family (as Tönnies conceives it), the *Gemeinschaft* is a hierarchical order ('the *Gemeinschaft* as the unity of unequal beings')<sup>28</sup> in which, like a father in the family, the whole is manifested in one member of the group, who also controls the collective and its wealth;<sup>29</sup>

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<sup>26</sup>Ibid., p. 208. See also pp. 43, 47 & passim.

<sup>27</sup>This aspect is not incompatible with the mutability of *Gemeinschaften*, i.e., that they can be concocted, dissolve into separate ones, or merge into larger ones. Indeed, Tönnies does not deny this possibility, nor does he disregard such historical transformations. The point is that membership in the *Gemeinschaft* remains objective even when its boundaries change, and is not open to *individual* will or choice. For an identical argument regarding the plasticity of ethnic identities and still the impossibility of the individual to choose or alter his ethnic belonging, see B. Barry, 'Self-Government Revisited', in *The Nature of Political Theory*, eds. D. Miller & L. Siedentop (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), p. 134. To be sure, there were some cases of individual change of membership, as was the case of individual metics who were granted Athenian citizenship. But as already implied, these were extremely exceptional: 'the ideology that distinguished metics from citizens seems to have been widely accepted among metics and citizens alike. The dominance of birth and blood over political membership was part of the common understanding of the age.' M. Walzer, *Spheres of Justice* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983), p. 55. And this common understanding, accompanied by what Z. Bauman calls 'heterophobia' (resentment of the different), went beyond Athens as well as beyond the 5<sup>th</sup> century BC. See Z. Bauman, *Modernity and the Holocaust* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991), pp. 62-66.

<sup>28</sup>Tönnies, 'Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft', pp. 46, 210, 255 & passim. The phrase is from p. 46.

<sup>29</sup>Ibid., pp. 39 & 183. See also pp. 59-62.

2. *Gemeinschaft* can never be wrong: 'the expression bad *Gemeinschaft* violates the meaning of the word.'<sup>30</sup> Because the individual social memberships and positions are predestined by the community whose norms are conceived not only as mandatory but as unquestionable, a criticism of the community or its norms by its own members amounts to a contradiction in terms.

In contrast, *Gesellschaft*

1. is 'a mechanical aggregate and artifact,'<sup>31</sup> it is an aggregation of individuals considered as equals, who have chosen to live together in an act of contract and whose status is acquired rather than ascribed. Here each individual is a manifestation of himself only, and everyone controls himself and his own property. Thus, the *Gesellschaft* reflects neither devotion and commitment nor a sentiment of belonging, but isolation and alienation;<sup>32</sup>

2. can be good or bad. Because it is an aggregation of individuals who have chosen to live together upon their separate autonomous will, each individual is detached from the whole and can judge it from the outside, as it were, as a free agent and bearer of individual rights *vis-à-vis* his society.<sup>33</sup>

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<sup>30</sup>Ibid., p. 34.

<sup>31</sup>Ibid., p. 35.

<sup>32</sup>Ibid., p. 65 & passim.

<sup>33</sup>Ibid., pp. 34, 71, 214-216 & passim.

As we know, Tönnies used these concepts to distinguish between what he saw as the two main epochs in human history and to characterise their different course. In the first (premodern) epoch people have conducted their lives mostly (if not solely) as members of *Gemeinschaften* and only marginally (if ever) as fellows of *Gesellschaften*.<sup>34</sup> First, throughout this era as a whole the overwhelming majority have lived *only* in *Gemeinschaften* and hardly even known any kind of *Gesellschaft*. But, second, even the *Gesellschaften* themselves (and the small portion of the population they comprised) were always confined and subordinate to a particular and closed *Gemeinschaft* and constituted only part of its internal structure (consider, e.g., mediaeval guilds and other associations that followed the 12<sup>th</sup> century urban revolution in Europe).<sup>35</sup> With modernity and the Enlightenment, which Tönnies identifies with the rise of capitalism and Hobbes's idea of the social contract,<sup>36</sup> the social world was inverted as *Gemeinschaften* and their social significance have declined while *Gesellschaften* have become the central form of human association.<sup>37</sup>

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<sup>34</sup>Ibid., p. 34.

<sup>35</sup>The exclusion of Jews from guilds (and other *Gesellschaften*) demonstrates this point: they were disallowed to join precisely because and where they were not considered as members of the *Gemeinschaft* to which these associations belonged.

<sup>36</sup>See also R. Tuck, *Hobbes* (Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 99.

<sup>37</sup>Tönnies, 'Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft', esp. p. 259. Tönnies does not ignore the existence of distinct stages and changes *within* each epoch; his theory is an evolutionary one and aims at the sociological interpretation of what he (rightly) conceives as a gradual rather than a quantum-leap-like development of human societies throughout the times. He thus does indeed agree that the form of *Gesellschaft* is not wholly modern, that some elements of it already existed in the period of *Gemeinschaft* (or at least in some of its phases) and certainly influenced the *Gemeinschaften* within which they arose: in that sense, to paraphrase



As Tönnies argues, the *Gemeinschaft* is a family. In saying that, though, he does not identify the *Gemeinschaft* solely with the family as the smallest unit of kinship or blood relations (the nuclear family). Indeed, this kind of family is *Gemeinschaft* as well, but not the only one. As Tönnies claims, those *Gemeinschaften* that predominated the premodern era went much beyond the nuclear family, although all of them were based on and resembled this family in the ways mentioned before, essentially in sharing its “organic” and “natural” character.<sup>38</sup> In that respect, then, each *Gemeinschaft*, apart from the nuclear family itself, is understood as a sort of extended family, be it a village, a clan, a tribe, a town or even a city-state.<sup>39</sup> Naturally, each and every *Gemeinschaft* that is wider than the nuclear family encompasses other, smaller, *Gemeinschaften* (each of which a “natural” entity in itself) up to an ultimate *Gemeinschaft*, which embraces the other *Gemeinschaften* as a whole and

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the famous Hegelian phrase, the seeds of the period of *Gesellschaft* already germinated in the womb of the old *Gemeinschaften* themselves. The distinction Tönnies makes between the two epochs, then, is about the relative balance between the two forms of grouping and their importance in individual and social life: the transition from the first epoch to the second, then, is not marked by the *emergence* of *Gesellschaften* as a new social form (though their modern *substance* might be different from the older one), but by the autonomy they gained and superiority they won over *Gemeinschaften* in commanding people’s loyalty, and thereon by the withering away of the latter. The sharp conceptual distinction Tönnies makes, however, accurately represents the differences between the two epochs. Applying the Hegelian/Marxian dialectic again, the gradual changes in the balance between opposite moments within a system (itself a manifestation of the dominant moment) eventually result in a rapid transformation *and* negation of the system itself. The changes in the balance and *mutual* influence between *Gemeinschaften* and *Gesellschaften* within the period of *Gemeinschaft*, Tönnies seems to suggest, still (by definition of ‘period of *Gemeinschaft*’) took place within the dominant structures of *Gemeinschaft* and were gradual indeed. But the change in that balance in favour of *Gesellschaften* embodied a rapid transition to a *qualitatively* distinct form of society and era, even if the changes that preceded and led to it were in themselves gradual and quantitative.

<sup>38</sup>As Tönnies adds, the *Gemeinschaften* were also based on the nuclear family in the economic sense, ‘as domestic economy and as community co-operating in work and consumption.’ See *ibid.*, p. 54. See also Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*, ch. 3, note esp. p. 49.

<sup>39</sup>See *ibid.*, pp. 53-64 & *passim*.

incorporates them into, as it were, one big family. As Tönnies put it, every *Gemeinschaft* (apart from the nuclear family itself) is then simply 'a community of houses [i.e., families; O.C], which is itself like a more comprehensive house [family; O.C].'<sup>40</sup> On the whole, then, the different parts of the ultimate *Gemeinschaft* (and more generally, the different parts within any *Gemeinschaft*), whether they constitute *Gemeinschaften* in themselves or *Gesellschaften*, are conceived as inseparable and integrated parts of the same "natural" and "organic" whole.<sup>41</sup>

As many a scholar noted, premodern communities were prominently characterised by lack of social differentiation, i.e., the absence of separation between different spheres such as economy, politics, religion, morality and so on.<sup>42</sup> As M. Walzer suggests, in that sense too

Society was conceived as an organic and integrated whole. It might be viewed under the aspect of religion, or politics, or economy, or family, but all these interpenetrated one another and constituted a single reality. Church and state, church-state and university, civil society and political community, dynasty and government, office and property, public life and private life, home and shop: each pair was, mysteriously or unmysteriously, two-in-one, inseparable.<sup>43</sup>

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<sup>40</sup>Ibid., p. 54.

<sup>41</sup>See *ibid.*, pp. 208-216 & *passim*.

<sup>42</sup>See for example Weber, *Economy and Society*; E. Durkheim, *The Division of Labor in Society* (New York: the Free Press, 1964); T. Parsons, *The Social System* (New York: the Free Press, 1951).

<sup>43</sup>M. Walzer, 'Liberalism and the Art of Separation', in *Political Theory* 12/3 (1984), p. 315. Note,

It should be added, though, that not only did social spheres permeate one another. They were also, in themselves, monolithic: each sphere or *formal* social category (e.g., religion) was ruled by one *substantial* social category (e.g., Catholicism). It was therefore the particular uncontested *content* of different spheres that interpenetrated one another and altogether constituted one whole. In this situation, centrifugal tendencies within communities (whether along religious, political, cultural, and other lines, or along different spheres) were extremely rare, whereas the centripetal forces within them remained rather solid.<sup>44</sup>

Tönnies's theory not only conforms perfectly to assumptions of different scholars (primordialists as modernists) as to the characteristics of tribes, clans and other ancient loyalties, but it also seems to fit history. In ancient Greece, for example, the family was taken as the basic unit of loyalty, while all the other loyalties – from villages through clans and city-states up to the Hellenic society at large – were based on the family ties and conceived as their expansions.<sup>45</sup> Similar patterns could be found in other European societies

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however, that in contrast to Walzer I am referring here to communities in general and not necessarily to states.

<sup>44</sup>This, of course, is not to say that there were no conflicts within communities (e.g., class conflicts or quarrels between sub-communities within a larger *Gemeinschaft*). But these were not centrifugal ones, i.e., they did not involve the question of separation, neither between spheres nor between communities.

<sup>45</sup>See A. Andrewes, *Greek Society* (Middlesex & New York: Penguin Books, 1986), ch. 5. See also Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*, pp. 48 & 99-100; and his *National Identity* (London: Penguin Books, 1991), p. 24.

up to the 17<sup>th</sup> century (and in some areas till much later),<sup>46</sup> as well as in non-European ones, e.g., Japan, Brazil, the Aztecs, and India – in which the five *varnas* (*Brahmans*, *Kshatriyas*, *Vaisyas*, *Shudras*, and *Pancamas*) were subdivided into thousands of castes and sub-castes (or *jatis*),<sup>47</sup> themselves further divided into villages and joint-families.<sup>48</sup>

## 2.4 GEMEINSCHAFT AND INDIVIDUAL IDENTITY

Tönnies's depiction of old loyalties as *Gemeinschaften* gives us a clear picture as to the social identities of individuals in premodern times. If the different parts of the ultimate *Gemeinschaft*, from which the individual social identities were constructed, were conceived as inseparable and altogether constituted one "organic" whole, then it seems only natural that the individual social identities within the ultimate *Gemeinschaft* were also related in such a way and altogether constituted the individual social identity in its totality and integrity. The multiple identities that coexisted within a person constituted after all one

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<sup>46</sup>See for example H. Brody, *Inishkillane - Change and Decline in the West of Ireland* (London: Allen Lane – the Penguin Press, 1973), esp. chs. 4-6, and E. Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976), esp. chs. 11 & 15. For the influence of *Gemeinschaft* divisions in Europe on patterns of settlement in the Middle-East during the crusades, see J. Prawer, *The Crusaders – A Colonial Society* (Jerusalem: Bialik Institute, 1985), *passim*. (In Hebrew).

<sup>47</sup>The term itself is derived from the Sanskrit *jata*, 'born', and indicates a form of existence determined by birth.

<sup>48</sup>See, respectively, K. Yoshino, *Cultural Nationalism in Contemporary Japan* (London & New York: Routledge, 1992), ch. 5; E. Bradford Burns, *Nationalism in Brazil* (New York, Washington & London: Fredrick A. Praeger, 1968), ch. 2; J. Soustelle, *The Daily Life of the Aztecs* (UK: Pelican Books, 1964), esp. chs. 2, 4-5; L. Dumont, *Homo Hierarchicus* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974), see esp. pp. 61-64. See also J. Nehru, *The Discovery of India* (New York: Anchor Books, 1960), pp. 49-53 & 147-150. See also E. L. Schusky (ed.), *Political Organization of Native North Americans* (Lanham: University Press of America, 1980).

whole, namely, the undivided or, to use G. Lukács's phrase, unreified person:<sup>49</sup> one's memberships in a family, village or town, clan or tribe, religion and sometimes even occupation, interpenetrated one another and constituted inseparable and integrated parts of one's total and definite social identity.<sup>50</sup> And it was the encompassing category (the ultimate *Gemeinschaft*) that supplied the social fixed and all-embracing label of the individual.<sup>51</sup>

Moreover, Tönnies's depiction also gives us a clear notion as to the relations between the *personal* identity of individuals in the premodern era and their *social* identity and the value that was attached to each of them by society. Personal identities, explains Laitin, 'are firmly entrenched in primordial or genetic discourse realm. A person who is *x* today will surely be *x* tomorrow. My name, my gender, the fact that I am the father of two children, and my

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<sup>49</sup>See G. Lukács, 'Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat', in *History and Class Consciousness* (London: Merlin Press, 1990), part I, esp. p. 99. For a comprehensive discussion on the divided or split self from philosophical, psychological and economic perspectives, see a series of essays in J. Elster (ed.), *The Multiple Self* (Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988).

<sup>50</sup>Indeed, in many premodern societies occupation *itself* was conceived as natural or given. There were two prevailing, not necessarily separate, norms that reflected such a status of occupation. One is an ethnic division of labour, according to which, like in the traditional Indian caste system, one's *accessibility* to *métiers* depends on one's ancestry. The second is hereditary *métiers*, according to which a *specific* occupation is handed down from parent to child. See E. Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, ch. 2, and his *Nationalism* (New York: New York University Press, 1997), ch. 4.

<sup>51</sup>The ultimate *Gemeinschaft* supplied the individual with an encompassing identity both in space and time. In other words, it is not only that it integrated the individual actual multiple identities into one whole; it also, as it were, inlaid him in a continuous historical collective, hence gave him a sense of eternal and stable identity.

credit history have a DNA-like continuity to them'.<sup>52</sup> Social identities, on the other hand, ...are labels that people assign to themselves (or that others assign to them) when they claim membership (or are assigned membership) in a social category that they (and others, whether members of that category or not) see as plausibly connected to their history and present set of behaviors. It is further implied that this assignment has powerful emotional appeal, both to its holder and to others in the society.<sup>53</sup>

If, as said, in old loyalties social memberships and roles were predetermined by society and ascribed to individuals rather than acquired by them, then it is clear that social identities were basically assigned to individuals in accordance with what *society* saw as plausibly connected to their history and present set of behaviours. From this, I believe, we can infer two things. First, in the era in question the individual was not conceived and treated as a free agent who may choose his memberships, roles and identities (i.e., as an autonomous human being), but was evaluated or valued according to his social positions that the community itself dictated. In that sense, the community held ethical primacy over its individual members. Secondly, despite the differences and separation (analytically and historically) between personal and social identities, it seems that in *Gemeinschaft* societies the individual *social* identities were also entrenched in a genetic discourse realm and had a DNA-like continuity to them. This is because, as already suggested, the individual various

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<sup>52</sup>Laitin, *Identity in Formation*, p. 14.

<sup>53</sup>Ibid., p. 16.

memberships and positions in the age of *Gemeinschaft* were given and determined by birth and were not open for individual choice or alteration. In other words, social identities were themselves unconvertible, just like personal identities. In that sense, to borrow Laitin's words, 'the two realms of discourse, personal and social, at times overlap',<sup>54</sup> and in the said age they did indeed recurrently overlap. And as Marx noted, in premodern tribes and estate societies 'a nobleman always remains a nobleman, a commoner always a commoner, a quality inseparable from his individuality irrespective of his other relations.'<sup>55</sup>

We saw, however, that some *Gesellschaften* did exist in the premodern era, which means that not *all* social identities were predetermined, ascribed and unconvertible. As Marx and Engels put it,

The difference between the individual as a person and what is accidental to him is not a conceptual difference but a historical fact. This distinction has a different significance at different times...It is not a distinction that we have to make for each age, but one which each age makes itself from among the different elements which it finds in existence.<sup>56</sup>

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<sup>54</sup>Ibid., p. 15.

<sup>55</sup>Marx, quoted in Elster, *Making Sense of Marx*, p. 334. One may argue that Marx's claim is too exaggerated, but in my view it is not blatantly wrong. The crucial point here is the real historical fact that, in premodern times (taken as a whole) social mobility was extremely limited, though not entirely impossible. In that sense, stripping a nobleman of his rank and ennobling a commoner (to use Marx's example) were perhaps viable, but far from frequent.

<sup>56</sup>Marx & Engels, *The German Ideology*, in MSW, p. 180.

The important point, however, is that despite the existence of some accidental social identities (i.e., identities that are not conceived as a natural part of the individual personality and which therefore can be chosen and altered by him), throughout the premodern era as a whole the individual was still tagged by other (“natural”) social identities that prescribed his roles and positions and from which he still could not withdraw at will. In prehistoric communities, Marx points out, individuals exhibited ‘herd consciousness’: ‘each individual has as little torn himself free from the umbilical cord of his tribe or community as a bee has from his hive.’ With the beginning of division of labour a ‘long and tormented historical development’ has begun, through which ‘can groups and individuals break down the material, geographical, and cognitive barriers restricting their potential for new and wider forms of self-determination.’<sup>57</sup>

Individuals, then, are *gradually* liberated from “natural” or ascribed belongings: in each age other social identities appear as being accidental rather than natural.<sup>58</sup> Throughout premodern times, however, it was still the existence of an ultimate *Gemeinschaft* that supplied the individual with a “natural” encompassing identity – a constitutive substantial essence, as it were, which permeated all aspects of one’s life and allowed him to manage

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<sup>57</sup>Marx, quoted and paraphrased in E. Benner, *Really Existing Nationalisms* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), p. 66.

<sup>58</sup>Indeed, the development of the individual and that of community cannot be separated: the evolution of the former necessitates the evolution of the latter and vice versa. The changes within an epoch and then its transition to a new one as sketched above, then, necessarily involve changes of human beings as well, the ways they see themselves and are related to each other.



his other commitments (accidental as natural) and to see that they fit in with one another. Such an “essence”, then, binds one’s multiple identities together and, to use Waldron’s words, keeps the whole house in order.<sup>59</sup> As Marx says, it was only in the 18<sup>th</sup> century that the individual as a person and his social identities were totally separated, that all social identities appeared as being accidental to him, and that the individual was completely detached from any sort of “organic” whole.<sup>60</sup> In short, the liberal (and, I will argue later, the democratic as well as the socialist) conception of the person, according to which the individual is not identified by (or ought to be treated in accordance with) any of his social stations and should therefore be regarded and treated as an autonomous (though social) subject, is essentially a by-product of the modern material conditions out of which the liberal, democratic and socialist views emerged.

As Laitin suggests, multiple identities ‘can coexist within a person only insofar as choice is not necessary,’ i.e., only when one’s identities are not contradictory or mutually exclusive.<sup>61</sup> If, as said, the multiple identities of the individual in the premodern era interpenetrated one another and inseparably formed the individual identity in its totality and integrity, then it seems that these identities as a whole (social as personal) were not contradictory or

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<sup>59</sup>Waldron, ‘Minority Cultures and the Cosmopolitan Alternative’, p. 111.

<sup>60</sup>Marx & Engels, *The German Ideology*, p. 180, and K. Marx, *Grundrisse*, in MSW, p. 346.

<sup>61</sup>Laitin, *Identity in Formation*, p. 23. It should be stressed that contradictory identities cannot coexist within a person if and only if the person is aware of this contradiction. Clearly, only when such awareness exists the person is compelled to choose.

mutually exclusive: generally, then, there was no need to choose between incompatible identities and thereby to wonder where one really belonged; there was, that is, an equilibrium between identities, and 'At any equilibrium, it appears to actors that the world is completely stable. In this situation, identities are not under question. There is (by the definition of equilibrium) no incentive for anyone to explore new identities. It is obvious to people who in fact they are.'<sup>62</sup>

On the face of it, then, it seems that our premodern predecessors have hardly suffered any identity crisis: a situation in which one's identity is divided into disparate and conflicting elements, which cannot be bound together into one coherent and integrated personality, and in which, by implication, one's identity and individuality are ambiguous and uncertain as one still cannot decide which of these elements fits one better, i.e., where one belongs.<sup>63</sup> But could this really be the case? Can we seriously claim that identity crises hardly occurred in the period of *Gemeinschaft*? Allow me to elaborate (to refine and defend) my point in further detail.

As said, people hardly suffered splits in their identity as the encompassing communities to

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<sup>62</sup>Ibid., p. 22.

<sup>63</sup>See *ibid.*, pp. 14, 17-19 & *passim*. Cf. E. H. Erikson's concepts of 'identity diffusion' and 'negative identity' and their relation to identity crisis (a term that Erikson himself coined) in his *Identity and the Life Cycle* (New York: International Universities Press, 1959). See also Erikson's 'The problem of ego identity', in *Journal of the American Psychoanalytical Association* 4 (1956), pp. 56-121.

which they belonged supplied them with an integrated encompassing identity, or a sort of substantial essence as it were that allowed them to integrate their multiple identities into one coherent whole. Within the ultimate *Gemeinschaft*, then, the individual obtains ‘for himself a certain degree of coherence or integrity. The coherence which makes his particular community a single cultural entity will confer a corresponding degree of integrity on the individual self that is constituted under its auspices.’<sup>64</sup> ‘But,’ Waldron argues, ‘this can be exaggerated. However we define and individuate cultures, can we simply assume that each culture is coherent in this sense? Aren’t some cultures, even some traditional ones, riven by contradictions?’<sup>65</sup>

Whether Waldron refers here to *logical* contradictions or simply to intra-community *quarrels* (he does not elaborate his remark further), his point is compelling: surely contradictions and quarrels existed in premodern communities too. Contradictions in a society, however, may well remain latent without being observed or affecting people’s beliefs and behaviour: ‘Where public discourse is itself inconsistent...people may not even notice the contradiction.’<sup>66</sup> It may well be the case, then, that some identities in old communities did contradict one another but were not conceived as being contradictory,

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<sup>64</sup>W. Kymlicka, paraphrased in Waldron, ‘Minority Cultures and the Cosmopolitan Alternative’, p. 110.

<sup>65</sup>Ibid., p. 118, n. 61.

<sup>66</sup>T. Kuran, *Private Truths, Public Lies* (Cambridge & London: Harvard University Press, 1995), p. 184.

hence were not translated into any tension *within* individuals.<sup>67</sup> The existence of such contradictions, then, does not undermine my suggestion that the members of premodern communities hardly suffered identity crises.

It is manifestly true that intra-community *quarrels* (even bloody ones) also occurred. But these were basically about the character or conduct of a community that was still conceived (by the contending parties themselves) as a familial body to which they “organically” (that is, inseparably) belonged. And indeed, in *The Peloponnesian War* Thucydides referred to the war between the Greek city-states as a war between brothers,<sup>68</sup> Horatius viewed the war between Octavianus and Sextus Pompeius within the Roman Republic in a similar way, and in the Jewish tradition the bloody dispute between the followers of the house of Hillel and the disciples of the house of Shammai was always considered, again, as a war between brothers. The mediaeval conflicts between church and state also fall under this description. Consider for example the Investiture Crisis as an exemplar of these conflicts. The dispute between Pope Gregory VII and King Henry IV and their respective followers involved a conflict between religious and political loyalties, but neither of the parties intended to

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<sup>67</sup>Perhaps Sophocles's *Antigone* demonstrates this point. Socially, religious and political identities in Thebes were conceived not only as compatible but rather as inseparable. There were nevertheless some logical tensions between the two, and these were exposed and brought into public attention once Antigone had to choose between them (Antigone herself, then, did face an identity crisis). See G. W. F. Hegel, *The Philosophy of History* (Buffalo: Prometheus Books, 1991), part II; and R. Norman, *Hegel's Phenomenology – a Philosophical Introduction* (London: Sussex University Press, 1976), pp. 74-77. Cf. G. W. F. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit* (Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press, 1977), pp. 212-217.

<sup>68</sup>Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War*, book III, chs. 82-83. Cf. Plato, *The Laws*, 744c & 757.

renounce either of these loyalties. Moreover, the quarrel was not even about the separation of state and church and basically occurred precisely because they were inseparable. Despite the church-state quarrel, then, one's identity as a Christian and one's identity as a state subject did not contradict each other: one needed not wonder where one really belonged and could certainly integrate one's religious and political identities into a coherent whole, i.e., one did not face an identity crisis. The existence of intra-*Gemeinschaft* conflicts, then, does not pose any problem to my discussion on identities and identity crisis either.

There is, however, a more serious challenge to my account of old loyalties and the individual identity in them. As we have seen, in his reference to the *Gemeinschaft* as an organic and familial body Tönnies never claimed that it was actually a biological unit. As he stressed, his 'study does not deal with genus and species, i.e., in regard to human beings it is not concerned with race, people, or tribe as biological units. Instead, we have in mind their sociological interpretation, which sees human *relationships and associations* as living organism or, in contrast, mechanical constructions.'<sup>69</sup> And, 'The social collective has the characteristics of *Gemeinschaft* in so far as the members *think* of such a grouping as a gift of nature or created by a supernatural will.'<sup>70</sup> Tönnies, then, also seems to agree that both *Gemeinschaften* and *Gesellschaften* (and thus human associations at large) are human-made entities, and that the only difference between them in that matter amounts to whether those

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<sup>69</sup>Tönnies, 'Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft', p. 37 (italic mine).

<sup>70</sup>Ibid., p. 255 (italic mine).

who form them are aware of this bare fact or not.

The last two citations, however, reveal one basic shortcoming in Tönnies's work, which seems to "infect" my own discussion too. In the first phrase Tönnies suggests that the *Gemeinschaft* (and other communities) is constituted by individual *actions* or *behaviour*; in the second, he argues that it is constituted by individual *beliefs*. There are two related problems here. First, beliefs or feelings are things that go on in people's minds or hearts and thus cannot be easily discerned;<sup>71</sup> we thus cannot offhandedly say that communities are formed by the beliefs of their members without falling prey to baseless speculations, futile metaphysical idealism, or psychological reductionism – 'the assumption that the structure of any society can be reduced to the wishes and motivations of its members.'<sup>72</sup> Many scholars of nationalism also erred in arguing that nations are constituted by beliefs. D. Miller, for example, asserts that 'nations are not things that exist in the world independently of the beliefs people have about them...people's own beliefs about their nationhood enter into the definition;' and 'national communities are constituted by belief: nations exist when their members recognize one another as compatriots.'<sup>73</sup> Yet again, we can only rarely know

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<sup>71</sup>See Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism Since 1780*, pp. 78-79.

<sup>72</sup>R. Vanneman & L. Weber Cannon, *The American Perception of Class* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987), p. 15.

<sup>73</sup>D. Miller, *On Nationality* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), pp. 17 & 22. Miller goes on and adds to this subjective conception of the nation another four features, three of which are objective: common history, common territory, and common culture (pp. 23-25). For a criticism of such features as characteristic of the nation and especially of the conjunction Miller makes between objective and subjective features, see D. George, 'National-Identity and National Self-Determination', in *National Rights*,

how people think or feel towards their communities, let alone nations.

Apparently, looking at how people *behave*, hence at their concrete interrelations, is what should count, then. On the surface, then, it seems that Tönnies's first suggestion is sound. But it seems that this suggestion of his is inseparable from the second one: as we have seen, Tönnies implies that people's behaviour necessarily follows (hence reflects) their beliefs, so by looking at the former we will also get a clear picture of the latter. Among scholars of nationalism, Connor makes a similar point: when analysing sociopolitical phenomena like the nation, he says, 'what ultimately matters is not *what is* but *what people believe is*,' because 'it is not *what is* but *what people perceive as is* which influences [their] attitudes and behavior.'<sup>74</sup> I find this line of thinking rather odd. As L. Festinger has shown in his study on cognitive dissonance,

There are circumstances in which persons will behave in a manner counter to their convictions or will publicly make statements which they do not really believe...[A] person changes his overt behavior or overt verbal expression of his opinions while *privately* he still holds to his original beliefs...[and does so under] a threat of punishment for noncompliance...[or in order to obtain] a special reward for complying.<sup>75</sup>

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*International Obligations*, eds. S. Caney, D. George & P. Jones (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996), pp. 15-19.

<sup>74</sup>Connor, *Ethnonationalism*, pp. 93 & 197 (italic original).

<sup>75</sup>L. Festinger, *A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962), pp. 84-85 (italic original).

Kuran takes this point even further and extensively shows that it may well be the case that the vast majority in a community do not believe in the prevailing norms of that community and perhaps do not even feel that they belong to it, yet under specific conditions behave as if they did, thus not only give the wrong impression as to their identifications, but in fact preserve the very same structure they privately reject.<sup>76</sup> In his explanation of the phenomenon of collective conservatism, as opposed to personal conservatism, Kuran adds that 'A community might display a collective attachment to the status quo even if *none* of its members has any affinity to the status quo as such.'<sup>77</sup>

Tönnies and the theorists mentioned before (among many others) look at individual behaviour, then deduce a system of beliefs from this behaviour and ascribe it to the actors, and then conclude that these beliefs must have been the cause of the course of action that was taken by the actors in question. These theorists, however, overlook the circumstances in which people act and therefore cannot really introduce any mechanism through which this seeming causality could be explained or even shown – they simply take it for granted. We

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<sup>76</sup>Kuran, *Private Truths, Public Lies*, esp. chs. 6 & 11. It has thus been suggested, for example, that most Druse in the Golan who publicly identify themselves as Syrians do so for fear of Syrian retribution if (or when) the Golan is returned to Syria, and that they privately do not see themselves as Syrians at all. Indeed, such a suggestion has been made by the Israeli right and used to justify the continuation of the occupation of the Golan, i.e., it is a politically motivated assertion that should raise many doubts about the integrity of those who make it. But whatever their motivation is, it is still possible that they are right. This, of course, does not sap the stance (which I personally share) that the Golan should be liberated from Israel; after all, even if the Druse there do not really see themselves as Syrians, they do not automatically identify themselves, let alone are treated by Israel itself, as Israelis either.

<sup>77</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 106 (*italic mine*).



could equally say that the behaviour of a raped woman who did not fight back her attacker necessarily shows that she believed in the legitimacy of the assault; indeed, such an assertion (apart from being mean) is as ridiculous as the said reasoning about behaviour being an obvious indication of beliefs, pure and simple. Note, however, that I am not saying that beliefs are irrelevant and do not influence (and sometimes indeed determine) people's behaviour at all. What I am saying, then, is that (i) behaviour and expressed views are driven by a complex of incentives of which (under certain circumstances) beliefs might play only a marginal role, or even no role at all; and accordingly, (ii) one's behaviour and expressed views may well be at odds with one's beliefs, so one's actions do not necessarily reflect one's convictions.

In his extensive study of crime and punishment in both premodern and modern societies, the sociologist E. Durkheim shows that social norms in premodern societies were very strict and rigid. Accordingly, any violation of a norm was conceived as an offense to society as a whole, as a collective, and led to serious sanctions.<sup>78</sup> Obviously, under such conditions the incentives of individuals to comply with social rules and norms and refrain from infracting them were rather strong. It looks more than reasonable, then, that people in the age of *Gemeinschaft* often behaved or acted in a way counter to their real convictions and identifications. So it may also be the case that people did often suffer identity crises but did

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<sup>78</sup>Durkheim, *The Division of Labor in Society*, ch. 2. Note that Durkheim's conception of premodern societies – societies which are based on mechanical solidarity, in Durkheim's terminology – resembles Tönnies's conception of *Gemeinschaft*.

not “translate” them into any visible course of action for fear of retribution.

On what basis, then, can I claim that identity crises hardly occurred in premodern communities? Do I not, just like the scholars I criticised before, *underestimate* the circumstances under which people act and *overestimate* their feelings or beliefs? I do not think so. Indeed, my argument about the rareness of identity crises did not refer to individuals’ actions but only to their identifications, but this argument of mine was based on the *circumstances* under which such identifications were formed, i.e., on the conditions of identity formation. As already suggested, ‘social identities are constructed from the available repertoire of social categories...’<sup>79</sup> If, as said, in the age of *Gemeinschaft* such categories interpenetrated one another, were conceived as inseparable and altogether constituted one “organic” whole (namely, the ultimate *Gemeinschaft*), then it is logically clear that the individual identities that were constructed from those categories also interpenetrated one another and constituted an integrated identity of the individual. Now since multiple identities can coexist within a person only when they are not *consciously* contradictory, and identity crisis is defined as ‘a situation in which one’s identity is divided into disparate and conflicting elements’, then it follows that identity crises could not occur. Only when a really existing contradiction between identities came to the fore, i.e., to public knowledge (as pictured in the case of Antigone, and an exception in itself in the era in

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<sup>79</sup>Laitin, *Identity in Formation*, p. 17. As said (and Laitin also notes), it is not only that identities are constructed from social categories; social categories are also in-themselves human-made constructions.

question) could identity crisis prevail. Thus, I have been quite cautious in arguing that identity crises *hardly* occurred and not that they did not emerge at all. Another question that should be answered, then, is, Why existing (i.e., objective) contradictions between identities only exceptionally or rarely came to the fore in the period of *Gemeinschaft* and normally remained dormant without being observed by people and affect their beliefs and behaviour? Since the following thinking is going to be readdressed and used in chapters to follow, I would like to dwell on it at length already now.

Following Mohammed Arkoun's study of public discourse in the Islamic world, Kuran makes a distinction between unthinkable and unthought beliefs and applies it to public discourses at large:

An unthinkable belief is a thought that one cannot admit having, or even characterize as worth entertaining, without raising doubts about one's civility, morality, loyalty, practicality, or sanity. An unthought belief is an idea that is not even entertained. Underlying Arkoun's interpretation of Islamic history is the notion that a belief treated as unthinkable eventually disappears from human consciousness, that it moves from the realm of the thought to that of the unthought.<sup>80</sup>

As Kuran shows extensively in his theory and in its application to the cases of the caste system, Eastern Europe's communism and affirmative action – under conditions of social

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<sup>80</sup>Kuran, *Private Truths, Public Lies*, p. 176.

pressure, socially unpopular beliefs and ideas (the unthinkable) gradually vanish from public *discourse*, thereon from public *knowledge*, and thereafter from *private* knowledge, i.e., from individuals' consciousness; those beliefs and ideas thus become unthought.<sup>81</sup> Kuran, similarly to Festinger, identifies three basic incentives in people's preference and belief formation as well as in their behaviour:<sup>82</sup>

- (1) Self-assertion or expressive utility: people need to express their own genuine inner beliefs and opinions, i.e., they 'derive utility from candor...'<sup>83</sup>
- (2) Social approval or reputational utility (outer peace): people need to be socially acceptable and enjoy public esteem.
- (3) Inner peace: individuals need, and seek, cognitive consistency (or consonance, in Festinger's words), i.e., consistency between one's various private beliefs and preferences and themselves and between one's private beliefs and preferences and one's outer behaviour, including the public *expression* of one's beliefs and opinions.

Now, very often (1) conflicts with (2), i.e., one's inner beliefs are socially unpopular (unthinkable), so any public expression of them will put one in a socially unpopular position which, in Kuran's words, will raise 'doubts about one's civility, morality, loyalty, practicality, or sanity'. In such a situation, and given the three incentives mentioned above,

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<sup>81</sup>Ibid., ch. 11 & passim.

<sup>82</sup>Ibid., passim.

<sup>83</sup>Ibid., p. 189.

one will face two alternative strategies: first, to hold on to (1) and thus lose (2) or, second, to give in to (2) and repress (1). An adoption of the second strategy, though, will also lead to lack of inner peace, i.e., it will lead to cognitive dissonance as one's *genuine* beliefs will be at odds with one's *expressive* beliefs. In this situation, then, the individual will either express his private beliefs and thus renounce the second strategy altogether and adopt the first one, or he will adjust his private inner *unthinkable* beliefs to the public *thinkable* ones – in Kuran's words, 'she will brainwash herself, thereby bringing her private preference in line with her public [expressed; O.C] preference.'<sup>84</sup> Obviously, the more the society in which the individual lives is intolerant to unthinkable beliefs and therein practices rigorous social pressure towards conformity, the more will the individual in it be motivated to adjust himself to social beliefs and norms and 'brainwash himself' in order to avoid inner inconsistency.<sup>85</sup>

When individuals hide their genuine beliefs and express what they *think* that others expect them to express (preference falsification, in Kuran's conceptualisation), they distort public discourse: they create the (wrong) impression as to what people are expected to express, i.e., what is within the bounds of the thinkable and, accordingly, what amounts to the unthinkable. Now, since public discourse carries information on public preferences, beliefs and thoughts, a distortion of public discourse leads to knowledge distortion: beliefs that are

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<sup>84</sup>Kuran paraphrasing Festinger, in *ibid.*, p. 182.

<sup>85</sup>See *ibid.*, p. 88 & *passim*.

not expressed in the public discourse eventually become unknown or unthought and thus distort 'private knowledge and private opinion.'<sup>86</sup> In this argument, however, 'Beliefs get abandoned in response to transformation of the corpus of public information, *not because individuals decide to change their own minds*.'<sup>87</sup> The question is, What could motivate individuals to *decide* to abandon their private inner beliefs and change their minds? The answer, I believe, lies in the third incentive mentioned above, i.e., the aspiration to avoid cognitive dissonance. According to Festinger's logic, when there is disharmony between one's private and public beliefs or preferences, one will adjust 'his beliefs deliberately in an effort to minimize the tensions they create.'<sup>88</sup> And under a threat of great hardship, 'she will try harder to adapt her private preference to her chosen public preference.'<sup>89</sup>

Kuran, then, introduces two mechanisms of belief transition from the realm of the unthinkable (thus, the thought) to that of the unthought: (i) lack of information or knowledge, i.e., unawareness of some ideas or beliefs, and (ii) deliberate *decision* on the part of individuals to submit to public beliefs at the expense of their private ones. These two mechanisms (themselves interconnected) have two consequences – one is *intragenerational*, the other *intergenerational* – each of which, as we shall see, relevant to our current

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<sup>86</sup>Ibid., p. 178.

<sup>87</sup>Ibid., p. 181 (*italic mine*).

<sup>88</sup>Ibid., *ibid.*

<sup>89</sup>Ibid., p. 182.

discussion. *Intragenerationally*, as said, individuals will abandon their private beliefs and give in to public ones in order to attain inner consistency (cognitive consonance); *intergenerationally*, the abandoned beliefs will simply disappear from individuals consciousness: ‘by withholding its reservations about the status quo, a community can keep its descendants unaware of ideas for reform. Once sustained because people were afraid to challenge it, the status quo might come to persist because its alternatives are no longer known.’<sup>90</sup>

As said, following Durkheim, the age of *Gemeinschaft* was characterised by strict social values and norms. Accordingly, there existed an immense social pressure towards conformity, whereas any act of nonconformity was strictly punished – either legally or socially.<sup>91</sup> Surely this drive towards conformity did not skip the issue of identities, so, as argued before, it may well be the case that people in old communities did repeatedly suffer identity crises but were too afraid to externalise them. In other words, some individuals might have become aware of an *objective* contradiction between their *socially* consistent identities but still believed that their companions or society at large would perceive such a contradiction, once revealed, as unthinkable; those individuals thus refrained from displaying it in public. Moreover, under the circumstances such individuals might have well

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<sup>90</sup>Ibid., p. 186.

<sup>91</sup>For a relevant discussion, see E. R. Dodds, *The Greeks and the Irrational* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968).

taken part in the common social pressure they privately rejected, apparently because there was also pressure towards pressure, i.e., to exert pressure on apostates.<sup>92</sup> Such individuals, then, not only suffered a contradiction between their different *inner* identities but also between their private and public ones – between the way they genuinely identified themselves and the way they presented themselves to others.

It should be clear now why really existing contradictions between identities only rarely came to public knowledge, but it should also be clear why an awareness to such contradictions *within* individuals (identity crisis) could not last. Following Kuran's mechanisms I will argue that (i) individuals who became aware of a contradiction, and forbore from revealing it in public, eventually repressed their personal contradiction and *privately* submitted to public truism in order to avoid cognitive dissonance or identity crisis (which is, I would argue, one type of cognitive dissonance); accordingly (ii) the contradiction itself remained out of public discourse and knowledge and thereon of *private* knowledge (both intragenerationally and intergenerationally); the contradiction thus became unthought. My previous argument, then, should be refined and say that, in the age of *Gemeinschaft* there was hardly any *continuous* identity crisis, neither within individuals nor across generations.

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<sup>92</sup>As Kuran shows, under enormous social pressure people who privately oppose the common social beliefs or preferences are normally terrified of being exposed, hence very often become the most zealous persecutors of those who *publicly* oppose the very same beliefs, or are suspected of challenging them. See Kuran, *Private Truths, Public Lies*, pp. 62-63 & passim.



To conclude my argument I would like to add yet another point. As said before, echoing Walzer, the multiple identities the individual had in the era in question interpenetrated one another and constituted a single reality, namely, an encompassing identity that permeated all aspects of one's life, bound one's sub-identities together and saw they fit with one another, and, as Waldron put it, kept the whole house in order. In the rare cases of identity crisis, then, it was that encompassing identity that assisted the individual in bringing back his inner order, that is, in adjusting his sub-identities to one another and overcoming his identity crisis. It should be noted, though, that the encompassing identity not only bound one's identities together but also consisted in those identities and largely depended on them.<sup>93</sup> Adjusting sub-identities to one another, then, could materialise only when the contradiction between them was relatively minor and not overflowed, i.e., only when most of them were mutually consistent (or, rather, *perceived* as being consistent) and only a smidgen was out of line; if sub-identities were wholly contradictory, the encompassing identity itself would lose its force and dissolve.

Now due to the simple structure of old *Gemeinschaften*, especially their little division of labour,<sup>94</sup> each and every member of them featured within himself quite limited social identities (both in number and scope). In such conditions (limited social identities and their interpenetration), it would be more reasonable to assume that an identity crisis (if occurred)

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<sup>93</sup>See pp. 45–46 above.

<sup>94</sup>On this matter see the following discussion.

typically involved a minor contradiction between identities and not an overflowed one. In saying that the encompassing identity sustained one's integrity, then, we are actually saying in other words that the individual could confront a recalcitrant sub-identity, as it were, by appealing to his other sub-identities, themselves attached by the encompassing identity and therefore consistent with one another. If, for example, one shared identities  $a_1$ ,  $a_2$ ,  $a_3$  and  $a_4$  under the auspices of one's encompassing identity  $A$ , and one discovered that  $a_1$  did not fit  $a_2$ ,  $a_3$  and  $a_4$  (themselves coupled by  $A$ ), one actually found out that  $a_1$  did not fit  $A$ . In the attempts to overcome the crisis, then, one would concurrently adjust  $a_1$  to  $A$  and to  $a_2$ ,  $a_3$  and  $a_4$ . Obviously, a minor contradiction is much easier to solve than an overflowed one,<sup>95</sup> so it may be added that in the age of *Gemeinschaft* people hardly suffered any continuous or *serious* identity crisis – serious being a crisis that cannot be overcome or solved by an appeal to one's other own identities.

Now allow me to sketch out, as briefly as possible, what were the conditions that led to the domination of the structure of *Gemeinschaft* throughout the premodern era, hence to the sense of natural and organic belonging that people in that era shared. Despite the differences and development in time,<sup>96</sup> the economic and social structure of premodern communities remained rather simple: they were mostly characterised by little division of labour and were

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<sup>95</sup>See Festinger, *A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance*, p. 17 & passim.

<sup>96</sup>As already noted, the age of *Gemeinschaft* in itself was not monolithic or static but passed through various stages and phases.

based on small, largely self-sufficient (autarkic), units of production and consumption.<sup>97</sup>

Under these material conditions of the premodern world, the undeveloped means of production, transportation and communication, there was hardly a need or an ability of constant or manifold interactions between such small communities, or at least between distant ones.<sup>98</sup> Consequently, premodern states were, as Connor puts it, 'poorly integrated,' and as such they neither interfered in the lives of these communities nor did they lead to varied or intensive contacts between them.<sup>99</sup>

Under such conditions, then, 'meaningful identity of a positive nature remains limited to local, region, clan, or tribe.'<sup>100</sup> With regard to any wider group identity, Connor adds,

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<sup>97</sup>See Tönnies, 'Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft', pp. 53-64 & passim. Cf. Marx & Engels, *The German Ideology*, pp. 161-163, and K. Marx, *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*, in MSW, p. 317.

<sup>98</sup>In a way this is a tautological statement: the very notion of distance is dependent upon the ability to interact, which appeals both to geography and means of transportation as well as to the means of communication. The inability of two communities to interact, then, already implies that they are distant. We may still say (not purely metaphorically) that if today we are living in a global village, in the epoch in question the village was the globe.

<sup>99</sup>Connor, *Ethnonationalism*, p. 36. An identical argument is put forward in Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*, pp. 154-155. See also G. H. Sabine, *A History of Political Theory* vol. 1 (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1955), pp. 331-332, and A. Hastings, *The Construction of Nationhood* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 29. Even in many cases of wars and conquests (e.g., in areas that were conquered by the Roman Republic and the Macedonians), new rules constituted no more than remote political roofs for preexisting *Gemeinschaften*, whose intra structures and interrelations remained more or less the same as before. In other cases, though, wars and conquests led to the physical destruction of *Gemeinschaften* by genocide and exile (often accompanied by their intentional disintegration and enslavement).

<sup>100</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 103.

‘peoples [were] not yet cognizant of belonging to a larger ethnic element.’<sup>101</sup> To the extent that interrelations between such small communities did exist (e.g., in trade, rituals or cases of warfare) and constituted wider *Gemeinschaften*, as Smith for instance indicates, they were basically conducted by relatively small elites (‘the educated upper strata’, in Smith’s words) who communicated the communal sense of belonging to the masses without, as Smith implies, interfering in the internal life of the sub-*Gemeinschaften* or posing any threat to their integrity.<sup>102</sup>

The inter-community isolation and intra-sufficiency also involved a communal sense and strong feelings of common identity and destiny which embodied the belief in a given, natural and organic belonging; they have led old communities, to use Anderson’s words, to conceive ‘of themselves as cosmically central...’<sup>103</sup> And as P. Bourdieu explains, ‘when there is a quasi-perfect correspondence between the objective order and the subjective principles of organization (as in ancient societies) the natural and social world appears as self-evident. This experience we shall call *doxa*, so as to distinguish it from an orthodox or heterodox belief implying awareness and recognition of the possibility of different or antagonistic

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<sup>101</sup>Ibid., p. 102.

<sup>102</sup>Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*, pp. 30-31. See also Tönnies, ‘*Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft*’, pp. 210-211.

<sup>103</sup>Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, p. 13.

beliefs.’<sup>104</sup> In Smith’s words,

Out of this economic pattern of local ties and local exchange, there developed characteristic ‘folk rhythms’ and Little Traditions...These include local myths and legends, patois and dialects, rites and customs which tend to persist for generations in the countryside, and which complement the work patterns and residence patterns of the peasantry. This round of weekly, seasonal and life cycles, with their associated feasts and customs and *rites de passage*, comprises the religious and folk cultures of peasants and tribesmen in many ancient and medieval societies everywhere...<sup>105</sup>

A belief in a given, natural and organic belonging (self-evident social order, in Bourdieu’s words) should be associated with an equilibrium between identities for sure, but it is not in itself born “automatically”, without further human intervention. Such a belief, then, is a product of identity formation, of the incorporation of various identities (themselves constructed) into one coherent encompassing identity, by those who Laitin identifies as cultural entrepreneurs. Thus, ‘Cultural and political elites of a group in equilibrium, by giving meaning to the equilibrium – that is, by providing it with the “beliefs’ principles and constraints” that Harré identified – make it into a focal point’, that is, ‘A point of coordination, in which there is a tacit understanding among all people in a community that

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<sup>104</sup>P. Bourdieu, *Outline of A Theory of Practice* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 164 (italic original). It is interesting to note the resemblance between Bourdieu’s concepts of *doxa*, orthodoxy and heterodoxy and, respectively, Kuran’s concepts of unthought, unthinkable and thinkable.

<sup>105</sup>Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*, p. 33.

this is an aspect of their identity...'<sup>106</sup>

The material conditions, then, may boost the equilibrium, but cultural entrepreneurs advance it and give it meaning – they ‘naturalize, or essentialize’ it, thus ‘make that equilibrium look like a law of nature’ so it ‘will be thought of as natural, or inevitable.’<sup>107</sup> In premodern communities that were characterised by little division of labour and little professionalisation, such ‘cultural entrepreneurs’ constituted a highly homogeneous stratum with little competition on identity formation.<sup>108</sup> Accordingly, the social spheres, categories and identities they produced were easily incorporated and seen as natural and inseparable, i.e., they constituted *Gemeinschaften*.

## 2.5 NOTES ON HEGEMONY AND ALIENATION

*Any* social category or identity, society or community is a *social* creation or scheme – it is not formed and materialise exclusively by one elite or another but by *all* the people who are associated with it and consists of the total interrelations of those people. The point is that, the formation of those schemes and their materialisation in the era in question (and, I will

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<sup>106</sup>Laitin, *Identity in Formation*, p. 22. Casting a meaning to preexisting “objective” equilibrium would be identified by Marxists as an ideology, i.e., the rationalisation of preexisting state of affairs, normally a tasteless and *irrational* one.

<sup>107</sup>Ibid., p. 23.

<sup>108</sup>Cf. A. Gramsci, ‘The Different Class of the Urban Intellectuals and of the Rural Intellectuals’ and ‘Traditional Intellectuals’, in *On Hegemony* (Tel Aviv: Resling, 2004), pp. 42-52. (In Hebrew).

argue later, still at present) were not made under conditions of liberty and equality but rather under hierarchical and oppressive ones. The influence of different people on the character of those schemes, then, was far from being equal. Thus, as Smith puts it, the economic subjection of the peasant masses also led to their passivity in and exclusion from active influence on their group identities.<sup>109</sup> And in Connor's words, 'the masses, until quite recently isolated in rural pockets and being semi or totally illiterate, were quite mute with regard to their sense of group identity(ies),'<sup>110</sup> i.e., they were not *actively* involved in the determination of their identities. But those masses were still involved in that formation *passively*, i.e., by accepting their lot as a law of nature: 'Acceptance and a spirit of resignation was often bred in these circumstances...'<sup>111</sup>

Following Kuran's arguments, I would like to make here two clarifications. First, in my view the passivity of the masses stemmed not *only* from economic subjection and illiteracy, but *also* from the intolerance and pressure towards conformity (driven and conducted by elites), a pressure characteristically typical of small traditional communities.<sup>112</sup> Secondly, such pressure was indeed driven and conducted, even *imposed*, by elites, but not totally

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<sup>109</sup>Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*, p. 155.

<sup>110</sup>Connor, *Ethnonationalism*, p. 223.

<sup>111</sup>Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*, p. 155.

<sup>112</sup>See Kuran, *Private Truths, Public Lies*, pp. 98-99. I would argue, though, that one's economic position, literacy or illiteracy and location on the 'pressure scale' (i.e., one's *power* in pressing towards conformity) are deeply connected.

*unilaterally*, i.e., without some *active* contribution by some of the masses themselves. So alongside the ‘muteness’ and passivity of *some* of the masses, *some* of them were at least partly *actively* involved in the formation and preservation of their group identity and of their station within it, hence in their own subjection in it.

As we have seen (following Kuran’s study), the active involvement of the masses found expression primarily in the sanctions imposed by the masses on nonconformists – those who deviated from the conventional credo of their community with the intention of reforming it and improving their kismet. Accordingly, as Kuran shows, under the pressure towards conformity the abovementioned involvement of the masses ultimately really benefited the elites and their economic, cultural and political agenda. In that sense, *and in that sense alone*, we may say that the elites were those who determined their group identity. In other words, the elites did not form, consolidate and preserve their group identity exclusively and unilaterally, but they indeed were more *powerful* in dictating that identity – that is, they enjoyed *hegemony* in those formation, consolidation and preservation, and in the lives of their community at large.<sup>113</sup>

As Kuran notes in his discussion on the caste system:

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<sup>113</sup>Following Gramsci, I understand hegemony as the power to manufacture consensus. See Gramsci, *On Hegemony*, passim. Cf. E. S. Herman & N. Chomsky, *Manufacturing Consent* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1988). According to Gramsci, as well as Herman and Chomsky, the power to manufacture consensus is primarily the ability to brainwash *others*, i.e., the ruling classes use their power to imbue beliefs and opinions into the minds of the ruled ones. In my view, though, the power to manufacture consensus (hegemony) is also the ability to make others brainwash *themselves* (see pp. 62-65 above).



My own explanation does not deny the brahmans' role in imposing and preserving inequality. It insists, however, that the subjugated castes contributed to the system's persistence through their willingness to uphold caste regulations and to sanction their nonconformist peers.

There is much truth to the view that the minds of Indians, including those of the lower castes, have been shackled by an ideology that exalts hereditary differences...Hinduism has reinforced India's social stability by weakening individual Indians' inner resistance to discrimination. Many brahmans have been among the beneficiaries of various Hindu tenets.<sup>114</sup>

At a later stage Kuran asks the inevitable question,<sup>115</sup> 'Does my explanation amount to "blaming the victim"?' and he answers:

If by this one means that victims contribute to their own victimization, the answer is an emphatic yes. The victims of oppressive, misguided, and counterproductive policies invite the perpetuation of their misery whenever they hide, shade, or distort their convictions. That they face very strong pressures to conform does not deny them free will. They are not passive objects caught in the toils of a machine made and preserved entirely by others...The

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<sup>114</sup>Kuran, *Private Truths, Public Lies*, p. 135.

<sup>115</sup>Note that this question of Kuran's does not refer to the caste system only but to the general phenomenon of collective conservatism – when 'a society perpetuates a structure that is widely disliked and resented...because reform-oriented individuals refrain from publicizing their views, thus reinforcing the social incentives for such preference falsification.' Ibid., p. 153. Note that according to Kuran those 'reform-oriented individuals' are normally victims of that 'disliked and resented' structure.

pressures that weigh on victims of a policy are sustained at least partly by their own choices.<sup>116</sup>

My only reservation is from Kuran's assertion that 'very strong social pressure' of the kind he specifies does not deny people free will. As T. M. Scanlon rightly observes, 'once the people are placed in disadvantageous circumstances, circumstances which themselves make it very unlikely that anyone would make the choices necessary to escape, offering these people the opportunity to exert themselves does little to improve their position.'<sup>117</sup> Similarly, I believe that the circumstances of immense social pressure that Kuran describes also 'make it very unlikely that anyone would make the choices necessary to escape', even if Kuran is kind enough to offer the people in these circumstances 'the opportunity to exert themselves'. In other words, such circumstances cannot be described as conditions of free choice, hence they do indeed deny people free will.

In fact, I think that in the second answer Kuran gives to his question – 'Does my explanation amount to "blaming the victim"?' – he actually contradicts his assertion on the free will of people who face 'very strong social pressure'. As he says, 'if "blaming the victim" is taken to mean that the victim is unequivocally wrong to engage in preference

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<sup>116</sup>Ibid., *ibid.*

<sup>117</sup>T. M. Scanlon, 'The Significance of Choice', in *The Tanner Lectures on Human Values VIII*, ed. S. M. McMurrin (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1988), p. 185.

falsification, the answer is no. It is not immoral to avoid social isolation, material deprivation, and physical injury...'<sup>118</sup> According to this contention, we cannot blame people for falsifying their preferences, and thus preserving their own oppression, when they do so in order to avoid dire sanctions. Obviously, the threat of such sanctions rules out any possibility of free choice or will. Moreover, in order to say that people did not act immorally, we should be able to show that they could not truly act but in the way they did, i.e., they did not really have any other choice or alternative, hence they did not make a free choice. On the other hand, in order to say that people acted immorally, we should be able to show that they could truly act otherwise and chose the wrong way. In saying that people who face grievous sanctions are not immoral in the actions they take in order to avoid those sanctions, Kuran actually implies that those people cannot truly do otherwise, i.e., they are indeed denied free choice and will.

As I said, *any* social category or identity, society or community is formed and materialise by *all* the people who are associated with it and consists of the total interrelations of those people. Given my arguments thus far, it seems that in the age of *Gemeinschaft* the victims of different social schemes were also *sociologically* responsible for the preservation of their communities, categories and identities, but they were not *morally* responsible for it (at least not to the same extent that the elites were) because they acted under social conditions that they did not choose or agree upon, although, as said, they surely did contribute to their

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<sup>118</sup>Kuran, *Private Truths, Public Lies*, p. 153.

existence. In that sense, the victim 'is as much a prisoner of an oppressive situation as he is a perpetrator, for he cannot correct it unilaterally.'<sup>119</sup> The victims are both prisoners and perpetrators because they are 'unaware of their collective power to institute reforms,'<sup>120</sup> they are unaware of this power of theirs because under the pressure they (individually) falsify their preferences, hence suppress any knowledge about the viability of reforms and, consequently, refrain from any individual endeavour to reform. Eventually, the oppressed individuals themselves conceive the social order that oppresses them as inevitable and self-evident, that is, as natural.<sup>121</sup>

The oppressive social order (categories, identities and communities), then, was to a great extent an unintended by-product of individual actions on the part of the oppressed individuals themselves, who failed to engage in collective action in order to reform and amend it. Far from being nice, cosy homes, old communities constituted an alienated form in the Marxist sense. As Elster explains, according to Marx alienation is 'the fact that the products of human activity may take on an independent and even hostile form *vis-à-vis* their creators.'<sup>122</sup> People are alienated 'from the aggregate result of their activities when (i) they do not realize that these aggregates are the result of their own activities and (ii) they are

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<sup>119</sup>Ibid., *ibid.*

<sup>120</sup>Ibid., p. 134.

<sup>121</sup>See *ibid.*, pp. 198-201.

<sup>122</sup>Elster, *Making Sense of Marx*, p. 92.

unable to control or to change the outcome.'<sup>123</sup> And as Marx himself put it, the social power ...appears to these individuals, since their co-operation is not voluntary but has come about naturally, not as their own united power, but as an alien force existing outside them, of the origin and goal of which they are ignorant, which they thus cannot control, which on the contrary passes through a peculiar series of phases and stages independent of the will and the action of man, nay even being the prime governor of these.<sup>124</sup>

The oppressed individual is thus also alienated from his own activity that creates the alienated social order: the individual is related to 'his own activity as something that is alien and does not belong to him; it is activity that is passivity, power that is weakness, procreation that is castration...an activity directed against himself, independent of him and not belonging to him.'<sup>125</sup>

In this chapter I have concentrated on the character of premodern communities and the individual identity in them. The next chapter concentrates on the modern conditions and the unique advantages as well as *disadvantages* they pose on the individual in general and on his identity in particular.

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<sup>123</sup>Ibid., p. 100.

<sup>124</sup>Marx, *The German Ideology*, p. 170.

<sup>125</sup>Marx, *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts*, in MSW, P. 81. Note that Marx is talking here about the worker's alienation from the act of production. I would argue, though, that Marx's theory of alienation in general and in regard to production in particular may coherently be extended to cover any social activity and construction, including the formation of communities, categories and identities.

### 3

## THE CONSEQUENCES OF MODERNITY

### 3.1 MODERN CONDITIONS AND THE DECLINE OF OLD *GEMEINSCHAFTEN*

Nationalism, says T. Nairn, derives a considerable part of its power from its ability to supply an identity: 'It [nationalism] supplies peoples and persons with an important commodity, 'identity'... Whenever we talk about nationalism, we normally find ourselves talking before too long about 'feelings', 'instincts', supposed desires and hankerings to 'belong', and so on. This psychology is obviously an important fact about nationalism.'<sup>1</sup> Now if, as said, in the premodern era this 'commodity' of identity was supplied and the people in that era hardly suffered any identity crisis, and nationalism is a *modern* doctrine whose power lies in its ability to supply an identity, then it seems that prior to its emergence an identity crisis (as a widespread, *social* phenomenon) did pervade, otherwise there was no need to have a 'new supply'. And if an identity crisis did pervade, it also seems that those old loyalties that supplied people with certain and stable identities could not deliver these goods anymore and declined as *Gemeinschaften*. But how did it take place? How did modernity dissolve preexisting *Gemeinschaften*? And how exactly did nationalism and universalist democracy emerge out of these decline and crisis? The answers, I believe, lie primarily in the rise of modern capitalism and the contradictions it brings along.

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<sup>1</sup>T. Nairn, *The Break-up of Britain* (London: Verso, 1981), p. 334.

In his *All That Is Solid Melts Into Air*, Marshall Berman writes:

There is a mode of vital experience – experience of space and time, of the self and others, of life's possibilities and perils – that is shared by men and women all over the world today. I will call this experience 'modernity'. To be modern is to find ourselves in an environment that promises us adventure, power, joy, growth, transformation of the ourselves and the world – and, at the same time, that threatens to destroy everything we have, everything we know, everything we are. Modern environments and experiences cut across all boundaries of geography and ethnicity, of class and nationality, of religion and ideology: in this sense, modernity can be said to unite all mankind. But it is a paradoxical unity, a unity of disunity: it pours us into a maelstrom of perpetual disintegration and renewal, of struggle and contradiction, of ambiguity and anguish. To be modern is to be part of a universe in which, as Marx said, 'all that is solid melts into air'.<sup>2</sup>

Modernity, then, should be understood as a unique combination of expansion in space and contraction in time, each of which and the two together, as was suggested in the Introduction, are strongly associated with capitalism: it is only under capitalism that the growing division of labour, specialisation and professionalisation, development of the productive forces, means of communication and transportation, growth-oriented economies and technological innovations – all take an unprecedented rapid and pervasive form. It should not be too difficult to imagine what kind of contradictions and tensions Berman finds

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<sup>2</sup>Quoted in A. Callinicos, *Against Postmodernism* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996), p. 31.

in these developments and what sort of ideas these contradictions could give rise to.

The primary contradictions are necessarily those that are inherent in capitalism itself, as a specific mode of production: its conduciveness to economic growth, on the one hand, and the chronic economic crises, recessions and uncertainties it entails, on the other; its simultaneous creation of enormous wealth and horrific poverty; the technological advantages it produces, potentially beneficial for all, together with its inability to prevent their misuse and marginalise the dangers they inherently bear and of which masses of people are actual and we are all potential victims; its enlargement of human needs and the means to satisfy them, alongside its failure to actually satisfy them. But these contradictions and tensions go beyond the capitalist mode of production itself and pervade into realms other than the economy. As Marx and Engels put it (in the paragraph on which Berman relies),

Constant revolutionizing of production, uninterrupted disturbance of *all* social conditions, everlasting uncertainty and agitation distinguish the bourgeois epoch from all earlier ones. All fixed, fast-frozen relations, with their train of ancient and venerable prejudices and opinions, are swept away, all new-formed ones become antiquated before they can ossify. All that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned, and man is *at last* compelled to face with sober senses, his real conditions of life, and his relations with his kind.<sup>3</sup>

The constant and, it should be stressed, uncontrolled and unplanned changes that capitalism

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<sup>3</sup>Marx & Engels, *The Communist Manifesto*, p. 224 (italic mine).



brings about,<sup>4</sup> upset the applecart and give rise to social uncertainties which involve (among others) the decline of well-known attachments and the solid sense of belonging and identity they supplied. At the same time, however, the individual is *at last* liberated from 'all fixed and fast-frozen relations,' 'venerable prejudices and opinions,' and any sort of "organic" whole, i.e., from *Gemeinschaften*:<sup>5</sup> he is 'compelled to face with sober senses, his real conditions of life, and his relations with his kind.' That is, the individual is compelled to evaluate his social situation and relations not, as it were, as an organ of this or that community, but 'from the outside', as an autonomous subject; he thus can break down the old material, geographical, and cognitive barriers and reach 'wider forms of self-determination.'<sup>6</sup> Indeed, as G. Kateb puts it (although in another context), when everything

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<sup>4</sup>In 'uncontrolled and unplanned' I primarily mean, just like Marx, that the changes that capitalism brings (and capitalism itself, as a specific mode of production) are not an intentional or deliberate product of cooperation between freely associated individuals, but the *unintentional* by-product of their separate uncoordinated actions. And as long as individuals do not (*voluntarily*) coordinate their actions and act collectively in order to control their common conditions, the consequences of their doings will always differ from their intentions and forevermore remain out of their control. See, e.g., Marx & Engels, *The German Ideology*, esp. pp. 178 & 181; Marx, *Preface to A Critique of Political Economy*, in MSW, p. 389; and Kuran, *Private Truths, Public Lies*, ch. 2 & *passim*.

<sup>5</sup>Recall Marx's claim that in contrast to premodern times, in which individuals belonged, as it were, to larger wholes, in modernity the individual as a person and his social memberships are totally separated.

<sup>6</sup>Cf. G. Simmel, *On Individuality and Social Forms* (Chicago & London: University of Chicago Press, 1971), ch. 15. As will be touched upon in ch. 11, Marx did indeed celebrate these developments under capitalism. He nevertheless still saw the limited nature of these developments under capitalism and believed that only socialism could deliver them fully. For one explicit statement in support of ethical individualism (the moral priority of the individual) and individual liberty and the positive role of capitalism in their development, see Marx, *Grundrisse*, p. 372. Cf. Benner, *Really Existing Nationalisms*, pp. 46, 58 & 67. For a comprehensive discussion on the development of individualism and the concept of the individual, see C. B. MacPherson, *The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962); C. Taylor, *Sources of the Self* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), esp. parts I-II; and L. Dumont, *Essays on Individualism* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996). See also Giddens, *The Third Way*, pp. 57-60.

is unsettled, the growth of individuality becomes inevitable.<sup>7</sup> The upshot is that, human identities and associations can no longer appear as “natural” and “given” but are conceived as artificially constructed, premeditated, and thus negotiable and changeable: they become, in other words, *Gesellschaften*.

If this is the contribution of capitalism in the temporal sense (contraction in time), the same should be said as to its contribution as far as the spatial dimension is concerned (expansion in space), of which Marx was also well aware. As E. Nimni explains in his analysis of Marx and Engels’s treatment of the national question, capitalism causes ‘the destruction of local peculiarities...[and intensifies the] interdependence among units of production...Capitalism breaks the isolation of feudal units, increasing the interaction of the various participants in the newly formed market.’<sup>8</sup> And as Elias observes,

...as the series of actions and the number of people on whom the individual and his actions constantly depend are increased, the habit of foresight over longer chains grows stronger. And as the behaviour and personality structure of the individual change, so does his manner of considering others. His image of them becomes richer in nuances, freer of spontaneous emotions: it is “psychologized”.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>7</sup>G. Kateb, ‘Democratic Individuality and the Claims of Politics’, in *Political Theory* 12/3 (1984), p. 339.

<sup>8</sup>E. Nimni, ‘Marx, Engels, and the National Question’, in Kymlicka, *The Rights of Minority Cultures*, p. 59.

<sup>9</sup>N. Elias, *The Civilizing Process* (Oxford & Cambridge: Blackwell, 1994), p. 477.

Similar to temporal contraction, then, spatial expansion also leads to the emancipation of individuals – their liberation from closed forms of *Gemeinschaften* and the dominant experience of *doxa*; the individual multiplicity and complexity of statuses, identities and dependencies allow nothing else as they involve his exposure to various and distinct, perhaps even infinite, identity projects from which he is compelled to choose, again, as an autonomous self-choosing subject.<sup>10</sup> Paraphrasing Virginia Woolf in her *A Room of One's Own*, it seems that modernity makes it more difficult than ever to put gates, locks, or bolts upon the freedom of the mind.

From what I have said so far, it is easy to see in what sense the modern conditions are conducive to the development of epistemological, ontological and methodological individualism.<sup>11</sup> Epistemologically, the individual comes to recognise himself (and human beings at large) as an autonomous self-choosing agent, i.e., as a (perhaps the only) creature that can come to have knowledge and act upon it; ontologically, social practices and structures come to be seen as constructed by individual human beings and not the other way

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<sup>10</sup>In evaluating and choosing his social relations and identities as an autonomous subject, I do not mean that the individual makes these evaluations and choices in a vacuum, out of any context. Rather, I mean that for the first time in history the individual is both able and bound to evaluate his social identities and affiliations as a whole, including those in which he makes his evaluations and choices. It is precisely this possibility that characterises the modern individual.

<sup>11</sup>According to Bobbio, one of the main incidents that led to the 'crystallisation of the individualistic conception of society and state and to the undermining of the organic conception' was the birth of the modern capitalistic political economy, which put the individual in the centre 'as *homo economicus* and not as *politikón zoon* like in traditional thought, according to which the individual is not counted for himself but only as a member of community.' Bobbio, *The Future of Democracy*, p. 6.

around – any social reality thus consists only of individuals who make choices and act and has no reality independent of their choices and actions; methodologically, social realities come to be explained in terms of individuals' actions and not in terms of social wholes or 'organisms'.

But out of this triple individualism and the modern conditions in general also emerge various *normative* ideas and theories that celebrate those developments, pushing them into the ethical and political realms. Such ideas and theories thus acclaim the centrality of the individual and prioritise his nature and value as an autonomous self-choosing being. Accordingly, these ideas and theories put the individual interests at the centre of ethical and political concern, arguing that the only criterion for evaluating social and political practices is by reference to their contribution to the interests of those individuals who are affected by them.<sup>12</sup> As will be elaborated in Chapters 7-11, democracy is indeed one theory of this kind, i.e., a theory that puts the individual and his interests at the centre and tries to devise a reasonable way of advancing them. Indeed, as Bobbio puts it,

Democracy was born out of an individualistic conception of society, and it is opposed to the organic perception that dominated the Ancient-Age and the Medieval-Age, perception according to which the whole is superior to the individual. Democracy sees in *any form of society*, particularly in the political society, an artificial product – an outcome of

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<sup>12</sup>Obviously, the concept of interests is widely controversial and I shall refer to it in later chapters. For the moment, however, I would like to put this issue aside. For a relevant discussion, see Barry, 'Self-Government Revisited', p. 124.

individuals' will.<sup>13</sup>

Note that according to Bobbio democracy sees *any* form of society as a product of individuals' will. In later chapters I shall argue that this claim is also true as far as the nation is concerned, and that the democratic conception of the nation is indeed subjective, i.e., it sees the nation as constructed by individuals and by individuals alone. But in the quoted phrase Bobbio seems to make an ontological observation and not a normative claim – democracy, he says, *sees* any form of social practice as an outcome of individuals' will, but he does not say how, following this observation, democracy *should* act and treat individuals. This flaw is revealed in Bobbio's failure to address three essential questions, which will be dealt with primarily in Chapters 8 and 11: (i) what are the origins of people's will to form a common social form? (ii) are those people who belong to a common social form *themselves* aware of its artificiality and of their role in creating it? and (iii) what conditions should be met in order to make the will of those people reasonably free? In overlooking these questions, Bobbio also fails to distinguish between private will and public will. In talking of will in general, without making this distinction, Bobbio ignores the possibility that the people who construct a social practice act or express specific wills or preferences and beliefs because of the social circumstances they face and not because they really (i.e., privately) endorse them. In other words, he overlooks the probability that

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<sup>13</sup>Bobbio, *The Future of Democracy*, p. 6 (italic mine). As Bobbio adds, the basic principle of democracy says that the source of power in a democratic system is the individuals '*uti singoli*' (*qua* individuals). Ibid., p. 128.

individuals' actions and expressed wills will be at odds with their true convictions and aspirations. Following Kuran's theory, then, I will maintain that it would be more accurate to say that the nation (and social practices at large) is constructed by individuals' *actions* or *public* will and not simply by will.

As already suggested, though, it is exactly the above-mentioned modern developments that entail the agitations Marx talks about, of which, I would argue, identity crisis constitutes a major part. In place of the well-known *Gemeinschaften*, the communal values and strong sense of belonging and identity they supplied (primarily the encompassing identity that was furnished by the ultimate *Gemeinschaft*), the modern conditions engender a chaotic self whose identity consists of a disintegrated eclectic hotchpotch: 'myself disintegrated, everyone disintegrated,' as W. Whitman puts it.<sup>14</sup> The self, the managerial entity of this *mélange*, thus itself appears ambiguous and unclear: 'it has none of the ethical unity that the autonomous Kantian individual is supposed to confer on his life; it is a life of kaleidoscopic tension and variety...[It is] pluralism internalized from the relations *between* individuals to the chaotic coexistence of projects, pursuits, ideas, images, and snatches of culture *within* an individual.'<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>14</sup>Quoted in G. Kateb, 'Walt Whitman and the Culture of Democracy', in *The Self and the Political Order*, ed. T. B. Strong (Oxford & Cambridge: Blackwell, 1992), p. 215.

<sup>15</sup>Waldron, 'Minority Cultures and the Cosmopolitan Alternative', p. 94 (paraphrasing Salman Rushdie; italic original). Cf. C. Taylor, *Hegel* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), ch. 1, note esp. p. 23.

In my view, however, Waldron is too reckless in conflating *cultural* variety and *social* pluralism with tensions and, as he does in other places, conflicts, dissonances, confusions and antagonisms *within* individuals.<sup>16</sup> Why should cultural variety and pluralism engender any tension, chaos or antagonism within the individual? Why should they lead to a schizophrenic and disintegrated self? Why cannot the individual choose from the various options he faces and incorporate within himself a *coherent* order or ‘coexistence of projects, pursuits, ideas, images, and snatches of culture’? Indeed, as Weber realises, modernity produces and exposes us to numerous irreconcilable values and identities and cannot answer Tolstoy’s question: what shall we do and how shall we live? In that sense, it is up to individuals to choose or invent their own values and identities out of the available contradictory materials (social categories).<sup>17</sup> Yet again, it is far from being self-evident that tensions and contradictions between social categories are *necessarily* translated into tensions and contradictions within the individual.

As we have seen, multiple identities can coexist within a person only insofar as choice is not necessary, i.e., only when these identities are not conflicting or contradictory. On the face

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<sup>16</sup>See *ibid.*, pp. 110-112. A similar conflation is made by Whitman, who argues that in the (modern) democratic age we all carry within ourselves a nearly unlimited, and thus conflicting, set of identity possibilities: ‘Our potentialities are not only numberless but – and for that reason – conflicting. We are inhabited by tumultuous atoms. We are composite, not even composed.’ Whitman thus concludes that there is no clear self – no single, transparent entity to know – but only a multiple, unfamiliar and contradictory one. Kateb, ‘Walt Whitman and the Culture of Democracy’, pp. 215 & 218-219.

<sup>17</sup>M. Weber, ‘Science as a Vocation’, in *From Max Weber*, ed. H. H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills (London: Routledge, 1970), pp. 143 & 152-153.

of it, then, it is not only that social pluralism and the existence of contradictory social categories are not necessarily translated into a chaotic, let alone contradictory, identities within the individual; rather, it seems that they necessarily are *not* translated into such a chaotic or contradictory self: each individual incorporates within himself multiple and changeable identities, that is true, but (in principle) they are so incorporated insofar as they can coherently coexist. As we have seen in Chapter 2, Laitin, Festinger and Kuran (among others) persuasively argue that in fact there is a human natural incentive to sustain the coherence and integrity of the self. Far from being a “natural” or desirable condition, ambiguous or contradictory identity, as Laitin puts it, ‘indeed represents a “problem”, or more commonly a “crisis”.’<sup>18</sup> Identity crisis, then, is primarily the frustration of the incentive for a coherent and integrated self, the failure of the individual to integrate his multiple identities into one coherent and certain or clear personality.<sup>19</sup>

An identity crisis, then, is not a result of pluralism and variety as such, nor is it a consequence of the loss of an ultimate *Gemeinschaft* – a single cultural entity that may confer a corresponding degree of integrity on the individual self that is constituted under its auspices, to use Waldron’s words. An identity crisis, that is to say, occurs not simply because the modern individual is exposed to numerous and irreconcilable categories and identities from which he has to choose in absence of any encompassing identity; rather, such

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<sup>18</sup>Laitin, *Identity in Formation*, p. 18.

<sup>19</sup>See pp. 52-53 above.



a crisis arises only when the individual is compelled to choose between categories and identities that he concurrently would like to embrace but cannot because these *particular* categories and identities are contradictory. In other words, it is not the necessity to make choices in general and in itself that represents the crisis but the specific circumstances under which the said pluralism and contradictions materialise, i.e., the specific social conditions under which individuals construct and choose their social identities (the *choice situation* the modern individual faces). In such a situation the individual will have to renounce one or more of the conflicting identities with which he actually identifies himself in order to endorse others and to sustain his inner coherence.<sup>20</sup> When the individual in such a situation is unable to make the necessary choice because he cannot decide which of these conflicting identities fits him better, i.e., where he really belongs, then he will face an identity crisis – most probably a *serious* and *continuous* one.<sup>21</sup>

### 3.2 SOURCES OF IDENTITY CRISIS

As noted above, the social conditions that capitalism brings along are *en masse* unregulated and unplanned: they are not created consciously or willfully and on which, in practice, people have no control. Under these conditions, and in the absence of any global

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<sup>20</sup>As Laitin explains, ‘when the actions or behaviors consistent with one identity conflict with those of another identity held by the same person, as they do when the two identities represent antagonistic groups on the political stage, people are compelled to give priority to one identity over the other.’ Laitin, *Identity in Formation*, p. 23.

<sup>21</sup>For the meaning of ‘serious’ and ‘continuous’ identity crisis, see sc. 2.4, esp. pp. 65-68.

cooperation or united attempt to transform and overpower them, the associations and identities people form are still abandoned to chaos and subject to unintentional consequences of uncoordinated actions. They are, so to speak, consciously human-made elements within a totality ruled by chance. Here too we can divide the impact into temporal and spatial dimensions. For one thing, the said conditions not only sweep away all ancient 'fixed, fast-frozen relations,' they also antique 'all new-formed ones before they can ossify.' New, consciously human-made identities (*Gesellschaften*), then, can deliver neither stability and certainty nor a sense of continuation. In that sense, the individual identity is unclear and fragmented in time.<sup>22</sup> As far as the temporal dimension is concerned, then, the chaotic self is better understood as a by-product of chaotic conditions and not simply of multiple and changeable identities or snatches of culture as such. On top of that dimension there is the spatial fragmentation of identities, which also involves the chaotic and contradictory conditions to which capitalism is conducive. Before moving on to this dimension, though, there is one point that should be clarified.

A contradiction between identities may be logical or social.<sup>23</sup> In logical contradiction, the different identities are *inherently* incompatible irrespective of how society treats them or understands their interrelations, e.g., one cannot be at the same time a homosexual and a bisexual. Such a contradiction, then, cannot be solved by political means and is of no

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<sup>22</sup>Cf. Benner, *Really Existing Nationalisms*, pp. 234-235.

<sup>23</sup>See Festinger, *A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance*, p. 14.

interest to us here. Social contradiction, on the other hand, refers to situations where identities are mutually exclusive *only* because society conceives them as being contradictory, i.e., it is an *artificial* or *constructed* contradiction. Thus, for example, any individual can logically be at one and the same time a Catholic priest *and* a homosexual, but if these two identities are socially structured and considered as incompatible, then an individual who would like to embrace the two but under the circumstances (the choice situation) is forced to choose between them will clearly face an identity crisis.<sup>24</sup> This kind of crisis, however, can be resolved by social action or political means – people may collectively transform the situation and bring those *socially* contradictory identities in line with one another – and it is therefore this type that deserves our attention in this study.

As far as the spatial dimension is concerned, I believe that the modern conditions contribute to such social contradictions in two basic (and connected) ways. First is the separation between social identities or categories and themselves, i.e., the differentiation of formerly interpenetrating social identities (itself a by-product of the growing division of labour) and the loss of any encompassing one.<sup>25</sup> Second is what Marx calls the separation between the individual as a person and what is accidental to him, i.e., the liberation of the individual from

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<sup>24</sup>See B. McMahon, 'Vatican to Toughen Rules on Homosexuals with Ban on Gay Men Joining Priesthood', *The Independent*, September 23, 2005.

<sup>25</sup>See Durkheim, *The Division of Labor in Society*, pp. 266-270. Cf. Parsons, *The Social System*, pp. 481 ff. As Durkheim adds, the process of differentiation and the varied culture it creates is an unintentional consequence of division of labour and competition: people receive it 'without having desired it' (p. 273).

any sort of ascribed or organic belonging. The idea I have in mind is in a way both a revision and an expansion of Lukács's idea of reification and its application to the question of identities. For Lukács, the capitalist division of labour and fragmentation of the production process into disparate elements 'invaded the psyche': they entail the division of the individual personality and its psychological compartmentalisation (reification).<sup>26</sup> In my view, however, the important point is that, in the context of production and labour some of the individual 'compartments' are regarded as part of his personality while others (his labour-power) are treated as external, even opposed, to it, and only used to sustain production as an external end: 'Therefore, we should not say that one man's hour is worth another man's hour, but rather that one man during an hour is worth just as much as another man during an hour.'<sup>27</sup> The individual is thus not regarded as a person but as a producer whose capacities and needs as a person are left behind the factory gates.<sup>28</sup> In other words, in production and labour the individual is unable to realise his humanity in full or to achieve full self-realisation.

Applying the idea of reification to the question of identities,<sup>29</sup> we might have said that the

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<sup>26</sup>Lukács, 'Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat', part I, esp. scs. 1-2.

<sup>27</sup>Ibid., pp. 88 & 99. The quotation is from p. 89.

<sup>28</sup>This attitude was well expressed by Henry Ford who complained: 'How come every time I want a pair of hands I get a human being?' A "scientific" method for the separation between the worker and his mental skills was (in)famously offered by F. W. Taylor in *Scientific Management* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1947).

<sup>29</sup>Note that applying Lukács's idea of reification to the question of identities does not imply that there

fragmentation of society into disparate identities leads to the reification of the person and its internal division. Had we confined ourselves to this, however, we would have inevitably admitted that it *is* social pluralism itself that creates the schizophrenic self. But, as said above, in my view the main problem in the production process is not the fragmentation of the process itself nor is it the compartmentalisation of the individual as such. Instead, the main difficulty is the interrelations between the individual as a person and his labour 'compartment', i.e., the opposition between the individual as a human being and the individual as a worker. As far as social categories and identities are concerned, then, it seems that the major trouble is the separation between the individual as a person and his social identities, as sketched above. Yet again, had we said that this was the issue, we would have implied that it is after all the necessity of the modern individual to choose his identities by himself that causes the crisis. The primary cause of the crisis, as already suggested, lies therefore not merely in the differentiation of formerly interpenetrating social categories but in their constructed *antagonistic* interrelations, i.e., in posing them as mutually exclusive.<sup>30</sup> Accordingly, nor is the crisis a consequence of the separation between the individual as a person and his social identities as such but of the *antagonism* that is created between the individual 'compartments' (his identities) themselves and therein between each and every one of them and the individual as a person.

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is necessarily any causal relation between the division of the self in the production process à la Lukács and the division of the self in the sphere of identities as I present it.

<sup>30</sup>See p. 91, n. 20 above.

But, still, why should differentiated categories and identities come to conflict or antagonism? After all, differentiation is not identical to conflict or contradiction, nor does it necessarily *lead* to such conflicts and contradictions. As Laitin suggests,

...issues of social identity become part of public discourse only when the categories themselves become fuzzy. Self-appointed boundary-keepers arise to redefine these categories so that rules of inclusion and exclusion, as well as the behavioral implications of belonging to this or that category, can be clarified.

One of the main reasons there is so much talk of identity in the press on our times is that the boundaries and behavioral implications of many of our social categories are being contested.<sup>31</sup>

Note that in the first paragraph it seems that Laitin means that the rise of those ‘self-appointed boundary-keepers’ may *solve* identity crises, themselves a by-product of the fuzziness of categories embedded in the destruction of clear-cut boundaries between them. In the second paragraph, though, Laitin seems to imply that due to their disagreement and contest on the boundaries of categories those boundary-keepers actually *create*, or at least escalate, that fuzziness. As we shall see, these two possibilities are complementary rather than mutually exclusive and *together* explain both the prevalence of identity crisis *and* the rise of nationalism as a solution to that crisis.

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<sup>31</sup>Laitin, *Identity in Formation*, p. 16.

As mentioned above, under the uncertain circumstances that modernity creates (temporal contraction and spatial expansion), social categories do indeed become fuzzy, so the once-stable boundaries and equilibrium between identities is undermined. The modern conditions (primarily the immense division of labour and professionalisation and the differentiation of social categories and spheres), however, also give rise to new, varied and competing elites and classes among which we could count those that Laitin identifies as cultural entrepreneurs or group boundary-keepers.<sup>32</sup> Consequently, 'All societies – perhaps *especially today* – have cultural entrepreneurs who offer *new* identity categories (racial, sexual, regional), hoping to find “buyers.” If their product sells, these entrepreneurs become leaders of newly formed ethnic, cultural, religious, or other forms of identity groups.'<sup>33</sup> In contrast to premodern times, then, in the modern age these cultural entrepreneurs and boundary-keepers constitute a highly heterogenous stratum with a continual competition on identity formation,<sup>34</sup> or, as Laitin shows, with competing claims about the desirable new equilibrium.<sup>35</sup>

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<sup>32</sup>Cf. Smith's concept of the intelligentsia ('the new priesthood', as he calls it) and his analysis of its rise and role in the modern age. Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*, pp. 157-161.

<sup>33</sup>Laitin, *Identity in Formation*, p. 11 (italic mine). Similar to Gramsci and Bourdieu, I would argue that these cultural entrepreneurs and boundary-keepers are primarily those intellectuals who rule the sum total of the superstructures (Gramsci) and those who control the cultural capital and symbolic production (Bourdieu). See Gramsci, 'The Formation of Intellectuals', in *On Hegemony*, pp. 35-41, esp. pp. 38-41, and P. Bourdieu, *Questions of Sociology* (Tel Aviv: Resling, 2005), pp. 68, 239 & passim. (In Hebrew).

<sup>34</sup>See p. 72 above.

<sup>35</sup>See Laitin, *Identity in Formation*, p. 23. Laitin refers here specifically to the competition between old elites and new emerging ones, but obviously the same contest exists between the new elites and themselves.

The fuzziness of categories may well cause an identity crisis. In other words, the crisis does not arise because the individual has to choose his identities by himself or because there are too many options to choose from (pluralism), but because the available options (and therefore the choice situation) are *themselves* unclear or chaotic. One might think, then, that it is merely the uncertainty of categories that leads people to look for some kind of identity that would supply stable and clear belonging and to embrace nationalism as that kind of identity. M. Ignatieff thus argues that it is the destruction of boundaries between identities that prods people to be 'insisting ever more assiduously on the margins of difference that remain,' and that nationalism is that type of identity that turns such margins into clear and primary belonging.<sup>36</sup>

Ignatieff is surely right in saying that in conditions of uncertainty and chaos (partly characterised by lack of clear identities)<sup>37</sup> people tend to look for some clear and stable identities, but in saying that people under such conditions are 'insisting ever more assiduously on the margins of difference that remain' he seems to take those margins of difference for granted, as if they were self-evident. Ignatieff thus ignores both the constructed nature of identities and the contest between different elites on the boundaries of categories, i.e., he overlooks the fact that the margins of difference are themselves contested and constructed by various cultural entrepreneurs or group boundary-keepers.

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<sup>36</sup>M. Ignatieff, quoted and paraphrased in *ibid.*, p. 17.

<sup>37</sup>See M. Ignatieff, *Blood and Belonging* (New York: the Noonday Press, 1998), p. 9.



In my view, then, we should carefully examine the role of those elites in the evolvement of identity crises as well as their place in their solution.

Given the vagueness of categories, the competing elites tend to point up, magnify and emphasise the differences between their respective categories rather than their similarities in order to make the boundaries between them (and therefore the categories themselves) clearer. In this way, they hope to mobilise followers and mould them into a cohesive group, to attain power and take control of those groups, and, perhaps, to promote the collectivities with whom they identify.<sup>38</sup> In so doing, though, those elites recurrently create social antagonisms between categories that may logically be in line with one another, hence force people to choose between them. In that sense, the contending elites only intensify identity crises whose originations might well lie in the obscurity of categories itself. Moreover, in mobilising prospective followers by deepening the differences and clarifying the boundaries between categories, the elites also emphasise (perhaps even invent) the peculiarities of their respective categories and, accordingly, bring into prominence and appeal only to those individual qualities that are taken to match the relevant category and advance it.

Like in production and the context of labour à la Lukács, in each and every category and identity group only some of the individual attributes are considered while others are

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<sup>38</sup>See Laitin, *Identity in Formation*, p. 22. Cf. Brass, *Ethnicity and Nationalism*, Introduction and ch. 1.

disregarded if not dismissed altogether: it is only those attributes that are taken to sustain the category or group in question that are endorsed, divorced from and advanced at the expense of the personality as a whole. In other words, in each and every category and identity group only some of the individual 'compartments' are regarded as part of his personality while others (the properties that seem to fit the group) are treated as external, even opposed, to it, and only used to sustain the group as an external end. The individual thus feels that his capacities and needs as a person are required to be left out of the group boundaries: the person and his social identities are thus not only separated, they are practically contradictory. In practice, then, the individual as a person is unable to integrate his identities into a coherent self: on the one hand, the social categories from which his identities are constructed are repeatedly posed against one another and are not attached by any encompassing one; on the other hand, since his identities are separated from and posed against his personality, he cannot unite them together within himself. On the whole, then, the upshot is an identity crisis: a schizophrenic self whose social identities appear as contradicting each other and altogether contradicting the individual as a person.<sup>39</sup>

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<sup>39</sup>On the influence of identity crisis (partly understood as a contradiction between various cultural elements and cultural discontinuity) on European Jews and on Francophone Quebecers, see respectively P. Mendes-Flohr, *Divided Passions* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1991), and M. A. Tremblay, 'Ethnic Profile, Historical Processes, and the Cultural Identity Crisis among Quebecers of French Descent', in *Ethnicity and Aboriginality*, ed. M. D. Levin (Toronto, Buffalo & London: University of Toronto Press, 1993), pp. 111-126, esp. pp. 122-125.

### 3.3 TWO REACTIONS TO MODERN CONDITIONS: DEMOCRACY AND NATIONALISM

‘The kind of society that, retrospectively, came to be called modern,’ says Bauman, ‘emerged out of the discovery that human order is vulnerable, contingent and devoid of reliable foundations. That discovery was shocking. The response to the shock was a dream and an effort to make order solid, obligatory and reliably founded.’<sup>40</sup> However, the development of individuality, on the one hand, and the prevalence of identity crisis (strongly connected to the vulnerability, contingency and lack of reliable foundations Bauman mentions) on the other, give rise to alternative dreams and attempts (that is, various political ideas, theories and practices) to attain solid, obligatory and reliably founded order. Some theories and practices endorse ethical individualism and, accordingly, aspire to found social order on individual interests, but either totally ignore the problem of identity crisis or badly tackle it. Other theories and practices may confront the crisis by seeking to found social order on a clear, stable and (ostensibly) coherent identity, but ultimately do so at the expense of individual interests and at the cost of ethical individualism.

There are, however, two things that should be clarified here. First, saying that some theories

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<sup>40</sup>Z. Bauman, *Intimations of Postmodernity* (London & New York: Routledge, 1992) p. xi. If in ‘retrospectively’ Bauman means that modernity is a thing of the past, I must disagree. As will become clearer throughout this study, the solution to the problems and contradictions of modernity are still to be found within modernity itself – in what Habermas and Callinicos call ‘the radicalisation of the Enlightenment’ – neither in a mythical past nor in a ‘postmodern’ figment. Note, however, that the radicalisation of the Enlightenment need not take the same form that Habermas or Callinicos offer. See Callinicos, *Against Postmodernism*, ch. 5, and J. Habermas, *Autonomy and Solidarity* (London: Verso, 1992), *passim*.

or practices may confront the crisis by seeking to found social order on a clear, stable and coherent identity does not necessarily mean that the *motivation* or *aim* of those theories and practices is to confront the crisis or to satisfy the *individual* need for a coherent identity. In other words, their endeavour to found social order on a clear and coherent identity need not stem from their view of *individual* interest or good and may well follow, e.g., their will to 'aestheticize politics and thus resolve a crisis of cultural decadence and decline,'<sup>41</sup> or to revitalise a lost authentic community 'in which certain absolutes such as blood, race, and soul were placed beyond rational justification,'<sup>42</sup> or to promote the good of some group (understood as a living organic whole) where 'power belongs to the whole. The individual serves this whole. The totality is sovereign,' and thus to 'reverse this [modern; O.C.] state of chaos and decadence...'<sup>43</sup>

In an age of widespread identity crises, such theories and practices might unwittingly satisfy individuals' interest or need for a coherent identity (thus being welcome by them) while (perhaps by) violating other individual interests. Second, then, it is indeed possible that theories and practices that deliver a coherent identity will still do so at the expense of individual interests and at the cost of ethical individualism. After all, as we have seen, old

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<sup>41</sup>J. Herf, *Reactionary Modernism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 71 (paraphrasing Ernst Jünger).

<sup>42</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 13.

<sup>43</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 51 & 57 (quoting and paraphrasing Oswald Spengler).

*Gemeinschaften* also delivered coherent identities but were thoroughly oppressive towards their own members.

Democracy, as already suggested and will be further elaborated in later chapters, unequivocally belongs to the ethical individualist tradition. In Chapter 11, however, I shall suggest that liberal individualist theories of democracy fail in addressing the significance of identities and therefore also fail in tackling the problem of identity crisis, i.e., the individual need for a clear and coherent identity.<sup>44</sup> I shall also point out that other (i.e., not liberal) democratic theories may offer a remedy to the problem of identity crisis but eventually slide into ethical collectivism, thus not only infringe on democracy but also (at least in some cases) undermine their own democratic pretensions and (sometimes) individualist premises and rhetoric. In that sense, I find Waldron's words very compelling: 'It is no secret that the old individualist paradigms are in crisis and that something must be done to repair or replace the tattered remnants of liberalism.' As sectarian and communal exclusiveness and violence persist, Waldron concludes, 'people have a right to expect something better from their political philosophers than a turn away from the real [i.e., diverse and mixed; O.C] world into the cultural exclusiveness of the identity politics of community.'<sup>45</sup>

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<sup>44</sup>It will also be indicated that in failing to appreciate the importance of identity and inner coherence, liberal democrats unintentionally pave the way for sectarianism, particularism and collectivism that they actually reject. For a relevant discussion, see Benner, *Really Existing Nationalisms*, pp. 241-255, and S. Žižek, *Looking Awry* (Tel Aviv: Resling, 2005), pp. 160-171. (In Hebrew). Cf. Callinicos, *Against Postmodernism*, pp. 37-38.

<sup>45</sup>Waldron, 'Minority Cultures and the Cosmopolitan Alternative', pp. 113-114.

In the concluding chapter I shall follow Waldron's recommendation suit and sketch out a repair for those 'tattered remnants of liberalism', a repair which is at one and the same time a replacement for those 'remnants'. The relevant concept here is the German notion *Aufhebung*, which often gets translated as 'sublation'. In German, *Aufhebung* means concurrently 'to cancel out', 'to preserve' and 'to transform'. According to Hegel (and Marx), in the historical evolvement (dialectically understood) old orders<sup>46</sup> are not wholly destroyed, but neither are they continued in their prior forms. Instead, they are *aufgehoben* or sublated, i.e., they are transformed into different (generally, according to Hegel and Marx, higher) forms of existence, thus they are both cancelled out and preserved. In other words, in the transformation of an order the fundamental or innate characteristics of that order are preserved while its older form (the prior *manifestation* of those innate characteristics) is cancelled out. My intention, then, will be to sublate liberal democracy: (i) to unreservedly cling to its ethical individualism, (ii) to expose its internal fallacies and weaknesses that undermine some of its own premises and values as well as its potential realisation, and (iii) to offer a transformed form of liberal democracy, i.e., one which will preserve its fundamental requirements and values but will cancel out its fallacies and weaknesses, hence make it both a higher and more realisable and stable form of democracy.<sup>47</sup>

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<sup>46</sup>By 'order' I mean to include social structures, systems and institutions as well as theories and ideas.

<sup>47</sup>Whereas in chs. 7-10 I will be offering and defending a rather "conventional" liberal theory of democracy, in ch. 11 I will be trying to show that the intrinsic qualities of liberal democracy itself logically necessitate its transformation into a socialist democracy. It will also be suggested that such a transformation

If liberal democracy is ethically individualist but cannot deliver a coherent identity, nationalism, as we shall see shortly, might supply a coherent identity but does so by sacrificing essential individual interests on the altar of a new *Gemeinschaft*-like identity group, i.e., the nation; nationalism, that is to say, turns its back on ethical individualism in favour of ethical collectivism.

Capitalism, as we have seen, develops a sense of autonomous individuality among people: the modern individual conceives of himself as a sovereign self-choosing being and not as an organ of larger wholes. Such an individuality, as suggested above, becomes meaningful and sustainable only if the individual feels that his inner coherence is preserved, i.e., if he does not face a continuous and serious identity crisis. As Benner shows, 'most people will remain dissatisfied with freedoms which unsettle, or prevent them from acquiring, satisfactory social and personal identities.'<sup>48</sup> Following my foregoing characterisation of identity crisis, I believe that a sense of inner coherence is achieved once the individual feels (even if falsely) that he is regarded and treated (recognised, in I. Berlin's words)<sup>49</sup> as a

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is required if liberal democratic values and virtues are to be realised. It might be said, then, that if liberalism and individualist paradigms at large ought to be 'socialised' (i.e., transformed into socialism) in order to pursue ethical individualism, socialism itself must be individualised for the very same purpose. Indeed, as Hillel Steiner has put it: 'the left badly needs to recover its cosmopolitan individualist roots.' See my 'In What Sense Must Socialism Not Be Communitarian?', p. 1 (an unpublished paper given at the annual meeting of the British Association for Legal and Social Philosophy, Edinburgh, April 1997; and at the Graduate Conference in Political Thought – Brave New World, Manchester, June 1997).

<sup>48</sup>Benner, *Really Existing Nationalisms*, p. 247.

<sup>49</sup>See I. Berlin, *Four Essays on Liberty* (Tel Aviv: Reshafim, 1971), pp. 204-211, esp. pp. 205-207. (In Hebrew).

person in his entirety in actual social contexts, i.e., only when the relevant social group gives him the hunch that he is a full member of (or fully belongs to) it as a complete person irrespective of his other social identities and affiliations. My usage of the term 'recognised', however, by no means implies that I accept the so-called 'politics of recognition' or Berlin's own view regarding people's 'longing for status'. In fact, in saying that the individual may *falsely* feel that he is regarded and treated as a person in his entirety or as a full member of a group irrespective of his other social identities and affiliations, I mean quite the opposite to Berlin's view.

According to Berlin, people may (and indeed normally do) prefer to be bullied, maltreated and persecuted by their peers (i.e., by members of their own group) for who they are and what they choose than being tolerated and well treated by aliens (i.e., those who do not belong to their group). This inclination, claims Berlin, stems from the individual longing for status or recognition, i.e., the desire to be 'recognized as a man and a rival – that is as an equal', which can be delivered *only* by one's (even if oppressive and terrorising) peers who understand and therefore recognise him as such, hence give him 'a sense of being somebody in the world.'<sup>50</sup> Now, I do not deny Berlin's statement that individuals often prefer to be

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<sup>50</sup>Both citations are from *ibid.*, p. 207. The belief that only one's peers can truly understand him is of course highly controversial. For a philosophical rejection of the Berlin-like idea of linguistic *Gemeinschaft*, see D. Davidson, 'On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme (1974)', in D. Davidson's *Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 183-198. For Wittgenstein's adherence to linguistic *Gemeinschaft*, see S. Kripke's 'community interpretation' in his 'Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language', in *Perspectives on the Philosophy of Wittgenstein*, ed. I. Block (Oxford: Blackwell, 1981), pp. 238-312. For an alternative interpretation, see G. Baker & P. M. S. Hacker, *Scepticism, Rules and Language* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1984). See also Gellner, *Reason and Culture*, pp. 116-123.



oppressed by those they consider as their peers (internal oppression) than being well-treated by foreigners (benevolent external rule).<sup>51</sup> Nor do I disclaim Berlin's allusion that people may *subjectively* feel that they are recognised as equals by their professed peers even if the latter bully and persecute them, but I cannot for the life of me see how being bullied, maltreated and persecuted can *objectively* be considered as being recognised as a human being ('as a man', in Berlin's words), let alone as an equal or '*entirely independent* human being.'<sup>52</sup>

Moreover, if a person is persecuted by his *peers* for *who he is and what he chooses* (as Berlin puts it), then he is actually persecuted for some of his identities by people who share some other identity/ies of his. In other words, such a downtrodden person is actually bullied for who he is and what he chooses by people who with him share part of who he is and what he chooses. Now if, as Berlin suggests, people are *ready* to be bullied by their peers for who they are and what they choose in order to be recognised as equals and entirely independent human beings (i.e., as human beings in their entirety), then they are actually ready to be maltreated for who they are and what they choose in order to be recognised as

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<sup>51</sup>Following J. S. Mill's discussion of benevolent despotism, however, I would argue that benevolent external rule is only a 'supposed good despot' which 'abstains from exercising his power' but is still 'holding it in reserve.' If such an external rule is, eventually, to be resisted by its alien subjects, then it will have to (i) exercise its reserved power and therefore become, as it were, a fully-fledged despot, or (ii) abstain from exercising its power and whither away, i.e., collapse altogether or give in to the rebellious aliens and allow them, e.g., to secede. Cf. J. S. Mill, *Representative Government*, in *Utilitarianism, Liberty, and Representative Government* (Great Britain: 1926), pp. 204-205.

<sup>52</sup>Berlin, *Four Essays on Liberty*, p. 207 (italic mine).

who they are and what they choose. Putting it that way, Berlin's argument seems to be logically self-defeated from the start. In contrast to Berlin, then, I would argue that if a person feels that he is regarded and treated (recognised) as a person in his entirety by people (or a group) who actually maltreat and abuse him, then that person *falsely* feels so.

As mentioned above, I do agree with Berlin that people may feel that they are recognised as full human-beings by groups and peers, as it were, that bully and persecute them. The question is, How come? Why should any sane individual feel that he is regarded and treated as a person in his entirety by those who maltreat and abuse him, hence (perhaps) *accept* such a treatment? And why should one's persecutors be conceived by him as peers in the first place? Furthermore, if people really long for inner coherence, how can any abusive group whose oppressive nature lies primarily in the suppression and exclusion of some of its own members' identities (i.e., in creating a social contradiction between identities) deliver such coherence?

A subjective feeling of full belonging as a complete person, hence of inner coherence, may be attained in two different ways:<sup>53</sup> (i) by democratising *all* social categories and identity groups so in each and every one of them the individual will be treated as a person in his entirety (i.e., as entirely independent or autonomous human being) and so as to bring those

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<sup>53</sup>Cf. F. Hölderlin, quoted in Taylor, *Hegel*, p. 35.

categories as a whole into line with one another;<sup>54</sup> or (ii) by supplying the individual with, as it were, a sort of objective (that is, ontologically independent of individual-subjective-volitions),<sup>55</sup> qualitatively superior and encompassing identity that will outweigh all other identities and where the individual personal identity and his social identity are supposedly congruent or merged into one another. If it sells, such an encompassing identity will allow the individual to bound his multiple identities together and (using Waldron's words again) will confer a sense of integrity and coherence (both in time and space) on the individual self that is constituted under its auspices.

The first strategy, then, aspires to base social categories and identities on the individual voluntary identifications, and understands full belonging as the possibility of the individual to fully, equally and freely participate in determining the identities and agendas of his groups. The second strategy insists that people fully belong to a group once they share some "objective" characteristics that define the group and set its boundaries (e.g., common culture, religion, mother – or, rather, parents tongue, mythical ancestors and the like), by virtue of which those people are, as it were, identical to one another; this strategy thus strives to base the encompassing identity (at the very least) on such "objective"

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<sup>54</sup>This, of course, is true only insofar as *social* contradictions are concerned; obviously, *logical* contradictions cannot be overcome that way.

<sup>55</sup>In objective identity I mean an identity that is widely conceived *as if* it were objective. As already suggested before, *all* human associations are in fact human-made entities, but people are not always aware of this reality. See pp. 55-56 and sc. 2.5 above.

characteristics which people allegedly share independently of their choice or will. The first strategy is characteristically democratic and will be dealt with in later chapters. The second strategy, as we shall see in a moment, is typical of nationalism.

From what I have said thus far, it seems quite clear that some of the contending elites (whose competition, as mentioned above, *amplifies* identity crises) may *solve* the crisis by offering people an encompassing and objective identity; those elites, then, ‘purposefully reify categories, giving people with complex pasts a single dominant label...’<sup>56</sup> This is exactly what nationalist entrepreneurs do, but here also lies a puzzle: ‘nationalism is a *fiction* of identity, because it contradicts the multiple reality of belonging. It insists on the primacy of one of these belongings over all the others. So how does this fiction of the primacy of national identity displace other identities? How does it begin to convince?’<sup>57</sup> Ignatieff answers these questions in another of his texts: ‘Faced with a situation of *political and economic chaos*,’ he writes, ‘people wanted to know whom to trust, and whom to call their own. Ethnic nationalism provided an answer that was intuitively obvious: *Only trust those of your own blood*.’<sup>58</sup> And he then continues:

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<sup>56</sup>Laitin, *Identity in Formation*, p. 18. Note that Laitin identifies those elites as intellectuals who themselves perfectly ‘know those categories are constructed.’ Ibid., *ibid*. Although I do agree that *some* elites are really aware of the constructed nature of their categories, I simultaneously feel that ascribing such awareness to the elites as a whole ultimately amounts to conspiracy theory, which I find highly unrealistic and simplistic. In my view, then, while *some* elites are truly aware of the constructed nature of their categories, other elites really believe in their objective status.

<sup>57</sup>Ignatieff, quoted in *ibid.*, p. 17 (*italic mine*).

<sup>58</sup>Ignatieff, *Blood and Belonging*, p. 9 (*italic mine*).

When nationalists claim that national belonging is the overridingly important form of all belonging, they mean that there is no other form of belonging – to your family, work, or friends – that is secure if you do not have a nation to protect you. This is what warrants sacrifice on the nation's behalf. Without a nation's protection, everything that an individual values can be rendered worthless...[T]he nationalist claim is that full belonging, the warm sensation that people understand not merely what you say but what you mean, can come only when you are among your own people in your native land<sup>59</sup>

In contrast to Ignatieff,<sup>60</sup> though, I do not think that the protection that national belonging is supposed to give is primarily from violence; as we already noted (following Berlin), people may well be intolerant, oppressive and violent towards their own conationals. In fact, Ignatieff himself stresses that 'nationalist regimes are *necessarily* impelled toward maintaining unity *by force* rather than by consent.'<sup>61</sup> In my view, then, national identity chiefly secures the individual inner coherence and sense of continuity, and *here* lies the power of nationalism which induces people to believe that

...distinctive cultures, languages, and 'ways of life' embodied in nations do in fact permeate all aspects of people's lives, shaping their other commitments and interests. The 'constitutive' character of national attributes fosters a singular depth of attachment which

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<sup>59</sup>Ibid., p. 10.

<sup>60</sup>See *ibid.*, pp. 9-10.

<sup>61</sup>Ibid., p. 8 (*italic mine*).

cannot be replicated in other social groupings...National identities...do provide a sense of continuity in a world where older bonds are brittle and other social roles transient...National identity gets its resilience [sic] and mobilizing power from its capacity to withstand these turbulent waters.<sup>62</sup>

There is, however, yet another difficulty that should be addressed. On the face of it, nationalism also seems to infringe on the individual autonomy as it claims ‘that an individual’s deepest attachments are inherited, not chosen. It is the national community that defines the individual, not individuals who define the national community.’<sup>63</sup> How, then, can nationalism convince and be sold to the *modern* individual who, as said above, conceives of himself as a sovereign self-choosing being and not as an organ of larger wholes? As already suggested, many people will be ready to give up their freedoms in order to attain a clear, stable and coherent identity: ‘it seems clear that people do not always make freedom their top priority even when their basic [i.e., physical and material] wants are largely satisfied.’ There is

...another set of values that may conflict with freedom, sometimes– but not always– through strong nationalism. The values I have in mind are usually clustered together under the term ‘identity’, although this term covers many desires that are at least partly distinct: desires to know who I am, on whom I can rely, and how others see me...Many baulk at the prospect

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<sup>62</sup>Benner, *Really Existing Nationalisms*, p. 224.

<sup>63</sup>Ignatieff, *Blood and Belonging*, pp. 7-8.

of having to define themselves anew in unpredictable circumstances, not knowing what competing identities will be asserted against theirs or how the revamped society will evaluate them. This fear, moreover, may be just as acute in established liberal democracies as in newly 'democratizing' countries, especially during periods of rapid social and economic change. [Thus, t]he old western democracies today are facing a veritable epidemic of personal and collective identity crises...<sup>64</sup>

Under these circumstances, then, people 'have scant control over their own destinies' and feel helpless, 'and helpless people will cheer nationalist promises of protection if no other credible protectors are available.' In these conditions, then, people's fears and anxieties are easily 'exploited by leaders anxious to preserve their power from democratic assaults.'<sup>65</sup> In my view, then, nationalism (pace Nairn) does not derive its power simply from its ability to supply an identity, but from (i) its ability to supply a sort of *encompassing* and *interminable* identity to confer a sense of integrity and coherence on individuals, and (ii) the unavailability of any other 'credible protectors' which, in my view, has to do with the failure in promoting the first strategy mentioned before, i.e., the lack of any tenable theoretical or practical endeavour to democratise *all* social spheres, categories and identity groups so as to abolish all social contradictions. In that respect, I find Bauman totally right in saying that in modern societies 'The marriage between freedom and insecurity was prearranged and consummated

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<sup>64</sup>Benner, *Really Existing Nationalisms*, p. 246.

<sup>65</sup>All citations are from *ibid.*, p. 235.

on the wedding night,' and that 'all subsequent attempts at separation proved vain, and the wedlock remained in force ever since.'<sup>66</sup> I surely hope that the foregoing first strategy, which this study wishes to promote, will succeed in divorcing the two and in wedding freedom and security after all.

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<sup>66</sup>Bauman, *Intimations of Postmodernity*, p. xii.



## 4

### NATIONALISM AND ETHNICITY

#### 4.1 SOME ACADEMIC OBSERVATIONS ON ETHNICITY AND NATIONALITY

As we have seen in the last chapter, Ignatieff argues that it is *ethnic* nationalism that offers people a solution to their identity crisis. But what exactly does ethnic nationalism mean? And must nationalism be ethnic or is there another type of nationalism? In this and the following Section I would like to clarify the concept of ethnicity and ethnic groups and to examine how both scholars of nationalism (current Section) and real-world nationalists (Section 4.2) see the relations between ethnicity and nationality, ethnic groups and nations. Section 4.3 will enquire into the role that nationalists ascribe to nationalist movements and figures (i.e., to themselves), and the final Section will analyse the common academic distinction between two different types of nationalism. It will argue that this distinction is invalid primarily because it is at odds not only with real-world nationalism (our locus of examination) but also with the dominant (or “popular”) intuition about the nationalist phenomenon.

It seems that the number of definitions that are given to ethnicity is larger than the number of existing ethnic groups themselves, whatever definition one chooses to employ. There is considerable dispute 'within the camp', as Smith puts it. There is, however, one thing that almost all scholars of nationalism (modernists and primordialists alike) do agree upon, i.e.,

that ethnic groups are characterised by a myth of common descent and kinship relations.<sup>1</sup> The differences between scholars, then, have to do with subjects such as the reasons for the formation, durability and dissolution of ethnic groups, the power of ethnic identity, the flexibility of ethnic identity (to what extent ethnic identities are open to change) and the political and social implications of ethnic identities. I have no intention to address these additional aspects here, though – this is a matter for a deep scrutiny which this study cannot afford.

What is important for my present purpose, then, is that the common academic conviction that ethnic groups are (mythical) kinship groups shows in what sense they should be regarded as *Gemeinschaften*.<sup>2</sup> First, their members identify themselves as parts of a natural and organic whole as they believe, or act *as if* they believed,<sup>3</sup> in their belonging to a common descent, i.e. to a shared extended family.<sup>4</sup> But, second, the group also appears as

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<sup>1</sup>See, e.g., C. Geertz, 'The Integrative Revolution', in *Old Societies and New States*, ed. C. Geertz (New York: the Free Press, 1965), p. 109; Brass, *Ethnicity and Nationalism*, p. 19; D. L. Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley, Los Angeles & London: University of California Press, 1985), ch. 2; Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*, pp. 24-25 & passim. See also Barry, 'Self-Government Revisited', p. 134, and Miller, *On Nationality*, p. 19. For a comprehensive presentation of various approaches to ethnicity, see J. Hutchinson & A. D. Smith (eds.), *Ethnicity* (Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press, 1996). See also I. Shapiro & W. Kymlicka (eds.), *NOMOS XXXIX: Ethnicity and Group Rights* (New York: New York University Press, 1997).

<sup>2</sup>Note that in German ethnic membership is translated as *Gemeinsamkeit*, which evidently resembles the concept of *Gemeinschaft*.

<sup>3</sup>H. Seton-Watson defines the nation in a similar way, arguing that a nation exists where a large amount of people see themselves as constituting a nation or behave *as if* they constituted a nation. See H. Seton-Watson, *Nations and States* (London: Methuen, 1977), p. 5.

<sup>4</sup>Recall Tönnies's contention that a group should be sociologically interpreted as *Gemeinschaft* when

if it were natural, organic and familial in the objective sense. To use Anderson's main argument about nations in his *Imagined Communities*, the ethnic group might be imagined or constructed, yet it is also 'realistic' as the individual's membership in the group is not open to conversion by will: 'it may be all in the mind,' says M. Canovan, again, in regard to nations rather than ethnic groups, 'but it is not all in *my* mind and I cannot alter the situation by an act of will.'<sup>5</sup> One example of many for such an understanding of ethnic groups as objective entities is reflected in the list of objectives of the ethnic movement *Association de la Jeunesse Togolaise* in Ouagadougou: being a Togolese, claims this movement, is a matter of origins and not of choice. Consequently, each member, whatever his aspirations and wills are, is compelled to pursue the honour of his ethnic group.<sup>6</sup> Here, then, we can also see the conjunction commonly made by ethnic boundary-keepers between *ethnicity* (the group objective characteristics, as it were) and *ethnicism* (the ideology which turns the alleged group characteristics into supreme values).<sup>7</sup>

As already noted in Chapter 2, many scholars of nationalism assert that ethnic groups are the specific *Gemeinschaften* from which nations emerge. In other words, ethnic groups are

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its members believe (or behave as if they believed) in their natural belonging to this group.

<sup>5</sup>M. Canovan, *Nationhood and Political Theory* (Cheltenham & Brookfield: Edward Elgar, 1996), p. 55 (*italic original*).

<sup>6</sup>See E. P. Skinner, 'Voluntary Associations and Ethnic Competition in Ouagadougou', in *Ethnicity in Modern Africa*, ed. B. M. du-Toit (Boulder: Westview Press, 1978), p. 205.

<sup>7</sup>G. Shimoni, *The Zionist Ideology* (Jerusalem: Magnes & Zionist Library Press, 2001), pp. 5, 44-47 & *passim*. (In Hebrew).

often understood by theorists and researchers as the raw material from which modern nationalism forms nations.<sup>8</sup> In that respect, then, the academic distinction between ethnic groups and nations boils down to two: a conceptual distinction and a historical distinction. Conceptually, the nation is described as a *transformed* ethnic group, which means that the nation (and nationality) and ethnic groups (and ethnicity) might be related but are far from being the same. Also, since the nation is an ethnic group being transformed, it is clear that ethnic groups are historically marked off from nations and precede them. But what does this transformation consist of?

Connor, for example, argues that ethnic groups are collectivities with some common unique characteristics that ‘may be readily’ discerned as such by outside observers, e.g., by anthropologists.<sup>9</sup> The transformation of these ethnic groups into nations, Connor continues, is strictly embedded in the transition of the self-identity of the co-ethnics – from identification with regions, clans or tribes (sub-*Gemeinschaften*) to an identification with their larger ethnic group (ultimate *Gemeinschaft*). Once the ethnic group is self-aware, it is a nation.<sup>10</sup> Conceptually, then, ‘While an ethnic group *may*, therefore, be other-defined,

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<sup>8</sup>See, e.g., Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*, esp. pp. 154-157; Connor, *Ethnonationalism*, p. 103; L. Greenfeld, *Nationalism* (Cambridge & London: Harvard University Press, 1995), p. 13; Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, pp. 49 & 55; and H. Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1945), pp. 13-14. Cf. Miller, *On Nationality*, p. 20.

<sup>9</sup>Connor, *Ethnonationalism*, p. 103.

<sup>10</sup>*Ibid.*, *ibid.* See also Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism*, p. 6ff.

the nation *must* be self-defined.’<sup>11</sup>

As opposed to Connor, Smith identifies the transformation of ethnic groups (*ethnie*, in his usage) into nations with politicisation: the nation, that is, is a *politicised* ethnic group, the politicisation of which also creates a sense of *political* identity and *civic* bonds among its members *in addition* to their preexisting ethnic ones. If in premodern eras ethnic survival was dependent primarily upon the community ‘distinctive priesthoods,’<sup>12</sup> Smith explains, the modern conditions<sup>13</sup> have weakened that stratum and the integrity of their respective *ethnies*. Accordingly, there emerged a need to find an alternative force to equip and reenforce individuals with a *renewed* identity, and thus to unite them and preserve the declining ethnic groups.<sup>14</sup> Nationalism provided this renewed identity by inviting the masses into history, i.e., by mobilising the masses and politicising them, hence moulding them into a renewed ethnic group, namely, a nation. In short, in order to survive in the modern age ethnic groups should adopt a civil bond and turn into active communities whose members are mobilised for a political goal, i.e., they should become nations:

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<sup>11</sup>Ibid., *ibid.* (italic original).

<sup>12</sup>Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*, ch. 5, see esp. pp. 119-125. The quoted phrase is from p. 119.

<sup>13</sup>Smith identifies those conditions with a ‘triple revolution’ which, all in all, created and embodied a new form of centralised state characterised by a unified and integrated economic system, administration and bureaucracy, and public mass education and culture systems. See *ibid.*, pp. 130-134, 138 & *passim*.

<sup>14</sup>Note that the emphasis here is not on the *individual* need for a renewed identity but rather on the aspiration to preserve the declining *groups*.

What is required is a sense of political purpose to mobilise members and create the new bond of citizenship...The mobilization of a religio-ethnic community some of whose members [i.e., the intelligentsia; O.C.] aim to transform it into a 'nation' is predominantly political: it aims to achieve a measure of secular power for the community in a world of nations, and to ensure its survival and prosperity by turning a passive 'object-community' into an active 'subject-nation'...[T]oday [the] members [of ethnic groups] have *all* armed themselves with a new vision of what survival and success entail in the modern world of nations, and are no longer content to suffer [the] effects of rule by members of other ethnic.<sup>15</sup>

Indeed, Smith argues, the identity of conationals is imagined through the application to ethnic sentiments and built around ethnic cores. Nevertheless, the “pure” ethnic identity is transformed into a new identity that also includes a sense of common citizenship, laws and legal codes, economic institutions, and even political culture.<sup>16</sup> So eventually, in the concluding chapter of his book, Smith can infer that both ethnic groups and nations aspire to preserve their collective identities and survive as distinct communities, and in that they both share the same ends. The main difference between them, then, refers to the *means* they use for achieving their identical ends, as well as to the scope and content of their communal

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<sup>15</sup>Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*, p. 168 (italic mine). See also p. 216 & passim.

<sup>16</sup>Ibid., p. 144 & passim.

identity.<sup>17</sup> Thus, conationals have a different self-identity from the one that co-ethnics have, given that the national identity, as mentioned above, includes political awareness as well. In that, concludes Smith, 'there is a remarkable continuity between nations and ethnic, nationalism and ethnicism; continuity, but not identity.'<sup>18</sup>

The theories of Connor and Smith are indeed interesting and illuminating, yet they do not really explain how nationalism *itself* conceives of the nation and sees the relations between ethnic groups and nations. In the following Section, then, I would like to concentrate on real-world nationalism itself and to introduce its own conception of ethnicity and nationality and thereby its perception of the individual identity *vis-à-vis* his nation.

#### 4.2 THE NATIONALIST CONCEPTION OF THE NATION

We saw that both Connor and Smith (among others) argue that the main difference between ethnic groups and nations involves, in one way or another, a change or a transformation of individuals' self-identity. But does nationalism accept that? What is the role of individuals' *self*-identity (or personal identification) in the nationalist conception of the nation? Would nationalism argue that a social category whose members do not feel themselves as parts of it and are not devoted to it cannot be a nation at all? Can a nation exist independently of individuals' will? For nationalism, I shall argue, the self-identity of individuals or their sense

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<sup>17</sup>Ibid., pp. 214-217. See also p. 154 & *passim*.

<sup>18</sup>Ibid., p. 216.

of solidarity and devotion have nothing to do with the definition or formation of the nation. Such an identification is conceived by nationalists as a very important component in the vitality and "healthy" life of the nation, yet it does not define or form the nation. Nations, that is to say, are understood as "objective"...social forces which act through and move individuals, who are in turn regarded as their vehicles and representatives. The behavior of individuals and their beliefs, in this framework, are determined by this "objective" reality...'<sup>19</sup> National identity, in its turn, is thus recognised as 'an involuntary fate which is imposed upon the individual like a beautiful or an ugly body.'<sup>20</sup> Such a nationalist stance was well expressed by J. G. Herder, who is commonly regarded as the harbinger of the nationalist credo.

Herder, S. H. Bergman tells us, was the first to use the term nationalism (*Nationalismus*) while applying it to *Volk*, which emphasises the organic nature of a people.<sup>21</sup> Thus,

...Herder's nation is a natural creation. He regarded nationalities not as the product of men, but as the work of a living organic force that animates the universe...National culture...is, as Herder puts it, 'inexpressible' and closed to foreign eyes...We can assimilate or adopt what is similar to our nature and remain cold, blind, and even contemptuous of and hostile

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<sup>19</sup>Greenfeld, *Nationalism*, p. 19.

<sup>20</sup>C. G. Jung, quoted in J. Singer, *Boundaries of the Soul* (London: Victor Gollancz Ltd., 1973), pp. 136-137.

<sup>21</sup>S. H. Bergman, *A History of Philosophy* (Jerusalem: Bialik Institute, 1978), pp. 94-95. (In Hebrew).



to anything which is alien and distant.<sup>22</sup>

The nation, then, is presented as a “natural” and “organic” entity to which people belong independently of their will, choice, or consciousness. If there is any room for will at all, it is the will of the nation as an “organic” collective rather than the will of the individuals who constitute the nation. As Smith puts it, ‘For nationalists, will and aspiration are predicated of the pre-existent nation. It is not your will and my aspirations that matters; it is the nation’s, however embryonic...[N]ations are distinct and natural entities, which thereby embody the collective will.’<sup>23</sup>

As far as I can see, Smith puts forward two different arguments here. First, for nationalism the nation has its own will as a body, as a sort of a self, and therefore it is not the individuals’ will that forms the nation. The second assertion, to which I shall return in Chapter 5, suggests that the supreme importance for nationalism is the nation’s will, so the wills of the individuals should be subordinated to the collective will of the nation. This, I will show, is exactly what the ethical collectivism of nationalism is all about.

Now if the nation is a “natural” and “organic” entity, then national *belonging* is an ascribed

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<sup>22</sup>M. Viroli, *For Love of Country* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), pp. 121-123.

<sup>23</sup>A. D. Smith, *Theories of Nationalism* (London & Southampton: the Camelot Press Ltd., 1971), p. 19.

status, one that is a matter of birth. The familial connotation is quite clear, and indeed Herder defines the nation as a sort of extended family: 'a nationality is as much a plant of nature as a family, only with more branches.'<sup>24</sup> But this bond between the family and the nation is far from being unique to Herder's ideas. L. W. Doob, for instance, argues that the understanding of the nation as a family is in fact the basic idea of nationalism at large; nationalism, he says, is

...almost always extolled through the use of some sort of familial metaphor. In fact almost anyone who has ever written on patriotism and nationalism contends that much of their strength can be traced to such symbolism, which in turn exists because of a close connection in fact between nation and family...Members of the nation are really considered to be a family, or they are viewed as though indeed this were the actual situation.<sup>25</sup>

For Herder, as for some other nationalists, the organic and familial nature of the nation is embodied in its unique culture, mainly in its language (when language here does not mean what individuals actually speak but their 'parents tongue').<sup>26</sup> But for many other nationalist thinkers and movements the national organism is revealed in the group's unique race,

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<sup>24</sup>Herder, quoted in Viroli, *For Love of Country*, p. 123.

<sup>25</sup>L. W. Doob, *Patriotism and Nationalism* (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1964), pp. 183-184. In sc. 4.4, though, I will distinguish between nationalism and patriotism and show in what sense any equation between them (like that of Doob's) is essentially flawed.

<sup>26</sup>See J. G. Herder, 'Essay on the Origin of Language', in *J. G. Herder on Social and Political Culture* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), pp. 117-179. Cf. F. M. Barnard, *Self-Direction and Political Legitimacy* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), p. 224.

history, or religion. Yet each of these aspects, when employed by a specific nationalism, is understood as an objective entity in itself and as such as an exclusive characteristic of the national family. As Barry puts it,

It is notorious that almost anything may serve to differentiate those who see themselves as belonging to one nationality from others. But why should phenotype, language, religion, or place of residence (among others) serve as markers of nationality in some cases and not others? The answer is that for almost all real-life nationalists, a differentiating feature serves as a marker of nationality when it is thought to coincide with a distinctive descent group.

This does not necessarily entail that the members of an ethnically defined nationality (as we may call it) actually believe in the myth of a common ancestor. But it does mean that the nation is thought of as a sort of extended family.<sup>27</sup>

Indeed, it seems that different nationalist thinkers and movements do conform to this picture of nationalism. This could be seen in the writings of Giuseppe Mazzini, the Italian nationalist, in the old cult of Nativism and the modern nationalism of figures such as Gilberto Freyre and movements like the '*Antropofagia*' in Brazil, Peron's Hispanic nationalism in Argentina, Lithuanian nationalism, different nationalist movements in Africa,<sup>28</sup> or Japanese nationalism (in which even the nation state was regarded as the 'family-

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<sup>27</sup>Barry, 'Statism and Nationalism: A Cosmopolitan Critique', p. 17.

<sup>28</sup>On Mazzini, see Canovan, *Nationhood and Political Theory*, pp. 6-9. Cf. Kedourie, *Nationalism*, p. 101. As to nationalism in Brazil, see Bradford Burns, *Nationalism in Brazil*, esp. chs. 1-2 & 4. In regard

state': *kazoku kokka*).<sup>29</sup> An identical perception of the nation is also characteristic of Zionism and, some say, even of Islamic fundamentalism. Thus, in his extensive study of Zionist ideology Shimoni shows that for Jewish nationalists

The Jewishness of a person is a natural thing, just as a child belongs to his natural parents.

Any attempt of a born-Jew to substitute his people for another nation amounts to self humiliation and self failure. Assimilation is nothing but a form of inner slavery and spiritual decadence. The nation is a growing and evolving organic entity, and not a contractual association that can be joined to or left by will or caprice.<sup>30</sup>

And as S. Zubaida argues, Islamist movements combine 'a populist nationalism with 'Islam', when Islam itself is used as 'the identifying emblem of the common people against the 'alien' social spheres in their own country which had excluded and subordinated them.'<sup>31</sup>

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to Peron's nationalism, see D. Rock, *Authoritarian Argentina* (Berkeley, Los Angeles & Oxford: University of California Press, 1993), pp. 139-145, 146 & passim (for a discussion about cultural nationalism in Argentina generally, see particularly ch. 2). Concerning Lithuanian nationalism, see W. Roszkowski, 'Polish-Lithuanian Relations: Past and Present', in *Ethnicity and Nationalism*, ed. P. Kruger (Marburg: Hitzeroth, 1993), pp. 47-59. For discussions about different nationalist movements in Africa, see C. Rosberg, 'National Identity in African States', in *The African Review* (1971), pp. 79-92; and W. Miles, 'Self-Identity, Ethnic Affinity and National Consciousness: an Example from Rural Hausaland', in *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 9/4 (1986), pp. 427-444.

<sup>29</sup>Yoshino, *Cultural Nationalism in Contemporary Japan*, pp. 90-91. Cf. B. Stronach, *Beyond the Rising Sun* (Westport & London: Praeger, 1995), ch. 2.

<sup>30</sup>Ahad Ha'am, paraphrased in Shimoni, *The Zionist Ideology*, p. 253.

<sup>31</sup>S. Zubaida, *Islam, the People and the State* (London: I. B. Tauris, 1989), p. 33. The argument that Islamic fundamentalism is connected to nationalism is strongly contested. D. Zaks, for example, argues that Islamic fundamentalism is in fact *anti* nationalist and serves as an *alternative* 'tool for group identification, in an age of fuzzy identities...' See D. Zaks, 'Fundamentalism: the New Totalitarianism', in *State, Government and Politics*, ed. B. Neuberger, I. Kaufman & K. Shimshi (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1999), pp. 153-158. (In Hebrew). The quotation is from p. 153.

To conclude this point, then, we can see that from the nationalist point of view there is a close connection between the nation and old *Gemeinschaften*. From what has been said so far, we can see that nationalism attributes to the nation the very same “objective” features that characterised old *Gemeinschaften*. In that respect, nationalism does not draw any *conceptual* distinction between old *Gemeinschaften* (including those *Gemeinschaften* that scholars term as ethnic groups) and nations: the same “organic” and “familial” nature applies to both alike. In that sense, there is indeed a similarity and a sense of continuation between old *Gemeinschaften* and the nation. But what about the *historical* distinction? Does nationalism diverge from academic researchers on that matter too?

As Smith himself admits, the attempt to study the emergence of nations is in itself strange, and I would add *estranged*, to the nationalist belief, for whom the nation is eternal: ‘the nationalist belief [is] that nations have existed from time immemorial, though often in prolonged slumber. To the nationalist...there was therefore no special problem about the origins and causes of nations, no need to explore the processes of their formation.’<sup>32</sup> And as Anderson indicates, ‘If nation-states are widely conceded to be ‘new’ and ‘historical’, the nations to which they give political expression always loom out of an immemorial past, and, still more important, glide into a limitless future. It is the magic of nationalism to turn chance into destiny.’<sup>33</sup>

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<sup>32</sup>Smith, *National Identity*, p. 43.

<sup>33</sup>Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, pp. 11-12.

Historically, then, nationalism does not distinguish between the nation and anything of the kind that scholars identify as ethnic groups that preceded it. This, of course, should not come as a surprise: if, as said, nationalists believe that the nation is not formed by human deeds, consciousness or will but by a sort of natural or living organic force (always veiled in mythical, not to say mystical, past and heroes),<sup>34</sup> then it is only logical that the nation could not be created due to any twist in individuals' self-identity or by any process of politicisation and mobilisation. Thus, for example, the French nationalist painter Jacques-Louis David, when he appealed to the French nation, did not see himself as if he were participating in the formation of this nation. Rather, he believed that the nation has existed for centuries,<sup>35</sup> felt obliged to it, and saw himself as taking part in its vitalisation by creating for it:

Each of us is accountable to the fatherland for the talents which he has received from nature; if the form is different, the end ought to be the same for all...It is thus that the traits of heroism, of civic virtues offered to the regard of the people will electrify its soul, and will cause to germinate in it, all the passions of glory, of devotion to the welfare of the fatherland...'David! take up your brushes...avenge Marat.'...I heard the voice of the people, I obeyed...[T]he livid and blood-stained features of Marat will recall to you his virtues, which must never cease to be your own...I vote for Marat, the honors of the Pantheon...<sup>36</sup>

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<sup>34</sup>See Smith, *National Identity*, pp. 19-20.

<sup>35</sup>J. L. David, cited in *Texts for Introduction to Modern Art*, ed. Z. Amishai-Maisels (Jerusalem, 1977), p. 63.

<sup>36</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 61-62.

Similarly, when composers such as Dvorak, Borodin, Liszt or Grieg were tracing back, and to some extent influenced by, what they believed to be the authentic melodies of their nations, neither of them was looking for these melodies in the 17<sup>th</sup> or 18<sup>th</sup> centuries. For them, these melodies were brought up within and by an ancient nation and were not originated by any previous ethnic group.<sup>37</sup> Likewise, neither Dostoevsky nor Ernst Moritz Arndt referred to any ethnic source that preceded the emergence of the Russian or the German nations. A similar point, though much more intricate for its metaphysical character, was put forward by Hegel, for whom the nation is an eternal spirit that exists whether individuals are aware of it or not.<sup>38</sup> The examples for this kind of nationalistic attitude to the concept of the nation are infinite, and it is not held by intellectuals and influential figures only. As B. Akzin has put it, for the people 'in the street' 'nation' means what 'ethnic group' means for scholars.<sup>39</sup> If we moderate Akzin's claim and stress instead '*most* people' and '*some* scholars', I think that Akzin's statement would be quite correct.

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<sup>37</sup>As one example for a nationalist composer Smith mentions, very justly, the Russian Mussourgsky. However, when Smith refers to Mussourgsky's operas 'Boris Godunov' and 'Khovanschina' he fails in noting the nationalist nature of Mussourgsky's *tune* because he concentrates only on the libretto. Besides the fact that the libretto of 'Boris Godunov' is actually based on Pushkin's (a nationalist in himself) historical drama, it is Mussourgsky's music to be nationalistic too: it combines, rather as a matter of principle, folk Russian scales with old melodies of the Orthodox church. In my remark, then, I refer only to music, e.g., Dvorak's 'Slavic Rhapsodies', Borodin's 'Prince Igor', Liszt's 'Hungarian Rhapsodies', and Grieg's 'Pictures from the life of the People'. Incidentally, in a CD of Nordic Romantic salon music it was mentioned that much of the popularity of this music 'is due to a nostalgic longing and the need of many for an idyll in times of unrest.'

<sup>38</sup>G. W. F. Hegel, *Lectures on the Philosophy of World History* (Cambridge, London, New York & Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1975), p. 52.

<sup>39</sup>B. Akzin, *State and Nation* (London: Hutchinson University Library, 1964), p. 30.

Nationalism, then, does not see the nation as a new entity that continues one or another ancient loyalty but rather as an entity that has always been there, as part and parcel of those ancient groups:

It is in it that we were born, it is our mother;

We are men because it reared us;

We are free because we move in it;

If we are angered, it soothes our pain with national songs.

Through it we talk today to our parents who lived thousands of  
years back;

Through it our descendants and posterity thousands of years later  
will know us.<sup>40</sup>

So far I have been showing that nationalism does not distinguish between the ethnic origins of the nation and the nation itself. Yet this does not mean that nationalism makes no conceptual distinction between ethnic groups and nations whatsoever. In other words, nationalism may see the nation as nothing but an ethnic group, but it does not necessarily claim that each and every ethnic group is a nation. In that sense, nationalism distinguishes between two types of non-national ethnic groups: (i) those groups that are neither nations nor ethnic 'fragments' of a wider nation,<sup>41</sup> and (ii) those groups that constitute ethnic

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<sup>40</sup> A Romanian poem, cited in Connor, *Ethnonationalism*, p. 205.

<sup>41</sup> The Roma is one example of such a group. As M. Kohn shows, nationalists who perceive nationhood



'fragments' of a wider ethnic nation.<sup>42</sup> Nationalism, then, believes that the nation (itself ethnically homogeneous) can comprise diverse ethnic groups which, obviously, are not nations. The differences between these groups, though, are within the bounds of the national common features and sometimes only reflect different quantities of the same quality, as it were. In that respect, as A. R. Zolberg claims, "Ethnicity" appears to be to "nationalism" what, in common parlance, "dialect" is to "language."<sup>43</sup>

As we have seen, nations and ethnic groups have at least one common denominator: both alike are understood as groups of common descent. But as we have also seen, the markers of ancestry are not the same in every case and different nationalisms employ different features to mark off their national families from others. Thus, Doob mentions three differentiating features of this kind: birthplace (or homeland), consanguinity, and culture.<sup>44</sup> Barry, as mentioned above, recognises that nationalists use much more differentiating markers, and adds to Doob's list features such as phenotype, language, religion and so forth.

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as a bond between blood and soil have not seen the Roma as a nation, nor as a part of another nation, for its nomadic way of life and lack of a 'homeland.' See M. Kohn, *The Race Gallery* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1995), p. 194. The Roma also consider themselves as a group with no land of their own: they 'have no home, and, perhaps uniquely among peoples, they have no dream of a homeland.' See I. Fonseca, *Bury Me Standing* (London: Vintage, 1996), p. 5. For a relevant discussion see R. Kawczynski, 'Nationality: Roma, Citizenship: Europe', in *Roma Rights*, ed. D. Petrova (the European Roma Rights Center, Spring 1997), pp. 3-4.

<sup>42</sup>The idea of 'ethnic fragments in a wider ethnies' is borne out in Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*, p. 156 & passim.

<sup>43</sup>A. R. Zolberg, 'Ethnic Regionalisms in Western Europe', in *The State in Europe*, ed. A. Cyr (Chicago: the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, 1977), p. 111, n. 1.

<sup>44</sup>Doob, *Patriotism and Nationalism*, pp. 183-187.

But if in specific cases some features are supposed to represent common national ancestry, while other features are disqualified for this aim, the disqualified features themselves can still be used to distinguish between different groups *within* the nation. If religion, for example, is understood by a particular nationalism as a marker of its nation, it does not necessarily mean that the nationalism in question rules out language, for instance, as a marker of ethnicity and descent altogether. Religion, then, can differentiate the nation from other nations, while language can still distinguish between descent groups within the nation. If we recall that ethnic groups and nations are *Gemeinschaften*, and each and every *Gemeinschaft* (apart from the nuclear family) consists of different *Gemeinschaften*, then ethnic groups can definitely be incorporated into one nation while keeping their own ethnic status without causing any problem to the ethnic uniformity of the nation itself. As Smith indicates, individuals may

...feel allegiances to *different ethnic communities at different levels of identification simultaneously*. An example of this in the ancient world would be the sentiment of ancient Greeks as members of a polis, or the 'sub-ethnie' (Dorians, Ionians, Aeolians, Boeotians, etc. – really ethnic identities in their own right) and of the Hellenic cultural ethnie. In the modern world the various clans, languages and ancestral 'sub-ethnies' of the Malays or Yoruba furnish examples of the concentric circles of ethnic identity and allegiance.<sup>45</sup>

As for the Malays, for instance, they indeed share 'a highly cohesive, overarching identity

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<sup>45</sup>Smith, *National Identity*, p. 24 (italic mine).

vis-a-vis the substantial number of Chinese immigrants,' Horowitz suggests, but at the same time they also seem to sustain their more particular ethnic loyalties, and therefore 'can still divide up by ancestral place of origins': Sumatra, the Celebes, Borneo, Java and Malaya.<sup>46</sup> In the Malays case, then, we can see an example of simultaneous membership in, and loyalty to, different ethnic groups. The question, though, is whether nationalism can accept it? Does nationalism necessarily repudiate the existence of distinct descent groups within the ancestral nation? Indeed, some nationalisms see their nations as entities that cannot be subdivided into different descent groups at all. Thus, for instance, when in France language became 'an objective characteristic of French ethnicity,'<sup>47</sup> it was imposed by French nationalists on different groups in France while rejecting any kind of ethnic subdivision within it.<sup>48</sup> Other nationalisms, however, while seeing their nations as ethnic wholes, simultaneously recognise ethnic subdivisions within their nations and acknowledge their multi-ethnic composition.

The *Front de Liberation Nationale* (FLN), for example, described the Algerian nation in ethnic terms (when Islam was regarded as the main descent marker of the nation), yet

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<sup>46</sup>See Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, pp. 66-68. Cf. Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, pp. 165-166.

<sup>47</sup>Greenfeld, *Nationalism*, p. 99.

<sup>48</sup>See Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*, p. 136, and Connor, *Ethnonationalism*, p. 220 & p. 226, n. 40. Note also that until not too long ago French citizens were compelled to give only Gallic names to their children. Some Corsicans, for instance, were punished (fined or even imprisoned) when they insisted on giving Corsican names to their kids.

recognised the ancestral differences between Arabs and Kabyles.<sup>49</sup> Likewise, Kurd nationalists regard the Kurds as one nation that is marked off from others by common 'race, language, lifestyle, and geography,<sup>50</sup> but agree that the Yazidis, for instance, belong to a distinct ancestry and that there are ethnic differences between the Kurds who originated in the plains and those whose ancestors are from the mountains.<sup>51</sup> In a similar way Scottish nationalists (e.g., Hugh MacDiarmid) refer to the differences between highlanders and lowlanders, and pan-African nationalists to distinct tribes and state-nations.<sup>52</sup> Another example would be the attitude of Serbian, Bulgarian, and Greek nationalisms to the Macedonians. Thus, Serbian nationalism, which considers its nation as a descent group, claims that the Macedonian people (as a distinct ancestry in itself) is a branch of the Serbian nation, and Greek and Bulgarian nationalisms profess the very same claim.<sup>53</sup> Serbian nationalists, one can recall, have a similar idea about the Motenegrins as well, and identify them as a descent group that constitutes a part of the Serbian nation.<sup>54</sup> Zionism too has

<sup>49</sup>See A. Horne, *A Savage War of Peace* (Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defence, 1989), pp. 35, 48-49, 78, 495 & passim. (In Hebrew).

<sup>50</sup>H. Hannum, *Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-Determination* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1996), p. 199.

<sup>51</sup>See *ibid.*, ch. 9 (esp. pp. 179, 182, 186, 199) & pp. 484-485.

<sup>52</sup>About the Scots see A. Marr, *The Battle for Scotland* (London: Penguin Books, 1992); cf. Connor, *Ethnonationalism*, p. 219. On pan-Africanism see O. J. E. Shiroya, *Dimensions of Nationalism* (Nairobi: the Jomo Kenyatta Foundation, 1992); cf. J. Breuilly, *Nationalism and the State* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993), pp. 7-9, 183-198 & 281-287.

<sup>53</sup>Connor, *Ethnonationalism*, p. 213.

<sup>54</sup>*Ibid.*, *ibid.*

always considered Jews as a specific stock, but never denied that there are, as it were, ancestral differences between *Ashkenazim* (Western Jews) and *Mizrahim* (oriental Jews), themselves further divided into, e.g., American, British or German Jews and Iraqi, Iranian or Moroccan Jews.<sup>55</sup>

If my argument is right, and nationalism can accept the idea of multi-ethnic nation without renouncing the view that the nation is an ethnic group in itself, how does nationalism distinguish the nation from other ethnic groups after all? There are three related parts in the answer to this question. Firstly, nationalism sees the nation as the largest kinship group, 'the fully extended family' beyond which there are no kinship relations.<sup>56</sup> Secondly, since the nation is the largest kinship group it is 'the supreme and most important, to which therefore, in the case of conflict of group-loyalties, [one]...owes supreme loyalty.'<sup>57</sup> As R. W. Emerson put it, the nation is a 'terminal community – the largest community that, when the chips are down, effectively commands men's loyalty, overriding the claims both of the lesser communities within it and those that cut across it or potentially enfold it within a still

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<sup>55</sup>For a relevant discussion, see S. Shalom Chetrit, *The Mizrahi Struggle in Israel* (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 2004), esp. chs. 1-2. (In Hebrew).

<sup>56</sup>Connor, *Ethnonationalism*, pp. 80, 202, 207, 212 & passim. The citation is from p. 202.

<sup>57</sup>See Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism*, pp. 11-12. The citation is from p. 11.

greater society.<sup>58</sup> Although (alas) this observation has normally been proved right,<sup>59</sup> nationalists would still change the 'effectively commands' to '*should* command'. Thirdly, as 'the fully extended family' the nation appears as an encompassing identity: it supplies the individual with a total and all-embracing identity while other ethnic groups supply it only partly. Thus, it is the nation that supposedly enfolds one's identities as a whole and fulfills 'a deep need in human beings – the need to belong to a society that provides them with a complete form of life.'<sup>60</sup> In my view, though, it is not the need to belong itself that the ethnic nation satisfies but rather the sense of coherence it may confer on its members.

#### 4.3 AWAKENING THE 'SLEEPING BEAUTY'

As I said before, while nationalists do not ascribe to the individual identification any role in the formation or existence of the nation, they do recognise that such an identification is essentially important in the vitality and "healthy" life of the nation. So how exactly does such an identification, as a vitalising or reviving force, get into the picture of the 'eternal nation'? In order to explain that I would like to refer to the elements that exist, according to Smith, in any national mythology. These elements, or rather a series of them, are:

1. a myth of origins in time; i.e. when the community was 'born';

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<sup>58</sup>R. W. Emerson, quoted in Geertz, 'The Integrative Revolution', p. 107.

<sup>59</sup>As Connor shows (based on empirical studies), when national identity comes to conflict with other loyalties 'nationalism customarily proves the more potent.' Connor, *Ethnonationalism*, p. 196.

<sup>60</sup>A. Margalit, 'The Moral Psychology of Nationalism', in *The Morality of Nationalism*, eds. R. McKim & J. McMahan (New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 83 (paraphrasing Herder).

2. a myth of origins in space; i.e. where the community was 'born';
3. a myth of ancestry; i.e. who bore us, and how we descend from him/her;
4. a myth of migration; i.e. whither we wandered;
5. a myth of liberation; i.e. how we were freed;
6. a myth of the golden age; i.e. how we became great and heroics;
- 7 a myth of decline; i.e. how we decayed and were conquered/exiled; and
8. a myth of rebirth; i.e. how we shall restored to our former glory.<sup>61</sup>

In contrast to Smith's own analysis, for nationalism, which treats these elements as actual events rather than myths, the subject in *all* these stages is the nation. Nationalists seem to believe that from its creation (elements one to three) up to the peak of the golden age the nation has flourished, despite a possible migration, because conationals have seen themselves as parts of their national whole. The nation began to face problems once its members stopped to identify themselves as such, and developed instead a sense of individuality, perhaps even the belief that nationality itself is mutable and open to one's choice. Let me elaborate this point a bit and relate it to the more general meaning of the concept of identity.

As everybody knows, the term 'identity' has two different meanings, which apply to various languages such as English, French, Spanish, German and Hebrew. As the OED clarifies:

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<sup>61</sup>Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*, p. 192.

Identity 1. The quality or condition of being the same in substance composition, nature, properties, or particular qualities under consideration: absolute or essential sameness; oneness.

Identity 2. The sameness of a person or thing at all times or in all circumstances; the condition or fact that a person or thing is itself and not something else: individuality, personality.

Appeals to the second meaning (*ipse identity*) appear in Leibniz's idea of the Monadology, in Locke's *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, and most prominently in Kant's concept of 'the transcendental unity of apperception'.<sup>62</sup> On the other hand, the first meaning of the concept of identity (*idem identity*) is commonly employed by nationalists. That is to say, nationalism stresses that the nation has its own unique and objective characteristics and that conationals are identical to each other in virtue of sharing these characteristics. Consequently, one's *ipse identity* cannot be separated from one's nationality: being 'itself and not something else' means after all to be identical to one's conationals in those traits that distinguish them from 'outsiders'.<sup>63</sup> Furthermore, since one's *ipse identity* refers to one's

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<sup>62</sup>Cf. the Buddhist teaching of *Anatman* (Sanskrit) or *Anatta* (Pali), which means 'lack of a self' or 'selflessness'. This teaching stresses that there is no self in the *ipse* sense, i.e., there is no sameness of personality at all times. For a relevant discussion, see S. Collins, *Selfless Persons* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982).

<sup>63</sup>See D. Miller, *Market, State, and Community* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), pp. 238-239. Cf. Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*, pp. 26-28.



sameness 'at all times or in all circumstances', and this identity cannot be separated from one's nationality, one's nationality is eternal.

The decline of the nation (the seventh motif in Smith's list), then, is associated by nationalists with the detachment of the individual from his national whole and unawareness to his *idem identity*. The factors that led to this detachment, as indicated before, were the changes that modernity brought about and not necessarily conquests or deportations, as Smith suggests.<sup>64</sup> The vitalisation and revival of the declining nations are thus related by nationalists to their own attempts to revive the conationals' self-identity, to redeem the nation from its decline, and to achieve a new national golden age. Thus, for example, Ben-Zion Dinur – a professor of History at the Hebrew university (1948-1973), the Israeli Minister of Education and Culture (1951-1955) and a committed Zionist – wrote already in 1926 that the task of Zionist historians is to 'stimulate among the [Jewish; O.C] people the feelings of identification with their nation' and 'to bequeath a 'historical sense'...which is a proven means to achieve the sublime goal of merging the personal "I" with the general "I" of the nation.'<sup>65</sup> In 1953, following Dinur and Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion's push,

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<sup>64</sup>It is true, of course, that modernisation was often introduced to different groups and changed them through occupation, e.g., in the colonialist cases of India, Algeria or Nicaragua. Nevertheless, there were other cases in which modernisation was not associated with conquest or deportation. On nationalism and colonialism, see P. Chatterjee, *Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998).

<sup>65</sup>B. Dinur, paraphrased and quoted in U. Ram, 'Zionist Historiography and the Invention of Modern Jewish Nationhood: the Case of Ben-Zion Dinur', in *Zionism: A Contemporary Controversy*, pp. 126-159. The quotations are from pp. 131-132.

the State Education Law was drafted. The law called for all Jewish education in Israel to be based on 'the values of Jewish culture and scientific achievement, love of the homeland and loyalty to the State of Israel and the *Jewish People...*' (Italic mine).

Nationalists, then, do agree that nationalism *as a movement* is modern as its task is to cope with a problem that emerged only in the modern era. Yet, as I have already explained, this does not entail that the nation itself is modern. So in contrast to most scholars of nationalism, nationalists believe that the nation precedes the nationalist movement and not vice versa. As such, nationalism as a movement is understood as a bridge between the nation's past and its future, as a 'living museum of the past', 'a futurism of the past', or as a movement that aims to 'renew the eternal essence'.<sup>66</sup> Nationalists, in this way, thus identify themselves as 'the authentic voice of the nation,'<sup>67</sup> i.e., those who authentically and truthfully represent the real will and good of the national whole.

One example of such self-understanding of nationalism could be seen in the formal publication of the Arab Information Center (as a manifesto of the Arab National Movement, or what is often called pan-Arabism):

The deciding factor therefore is the *Spirit of Arab community*, a spirit not necessarily

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<sup>66</sup>All these phrases are cited, respectively, in Rock, *Authoritarian Argentina*, pp. xv, 1 & 2.

<sup>67</sup>J. Breuilly, 'Nationalism and the State', in *Nationality, Patriotism and Nationalism*, ed. R. Michener (Minnesota: Paragon House, 1993), p. 21.

dependent upon a common religious experience...Arab Unity, as such, is an end in itself for it reflects the community of language, culture, experiences and aspiration which all Arabs share despite political boundaries...[The Arab National Movement] aspires to attain the same norm of life which the Arab people had shared in the past and which was only interrupted...when Arab lands were divided by European powers against the will of their peoples.<sup>68</sup>

According to this manifesto, the Arab nation – as a community of language, culture and other characteristics – has existed for centuries, and it is absolutely not the creation of the Arab nationalist movement. The role of the movement is to unite the nation and bring it back to its authentic nature, as this is revealed in the Arab norm of life before the intervention of foreigners. In the same way Zionism has never pretended to be the creator of the Jewish nation but its saviour,<sup>69</sup> and Mickiewicz's patriotic society did not claim to be the harbinger of the Polish nation but its liberator. Likewise, the Boxers society in China, Genchi Kato's Shinto nationalism in Japan, and different nationalisms all over the globe.

So as Smith acknowledges, nationalism sees itself as the power that has to reawake the

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<sup>68</sup>'Arab Information Center: Arab Nationalism and Arab Unity, 1959', in *The Dynamics of Nationalism*, ed. L. L. Snyder (New Jersey: D. Van Nostrand, 1964), p. 313 (italic original).

<sup>69</sup>As Shimoni shows, the origin of Jewish nationalism (Zionism) was *not* a defensive reaction to antisemitism but, quite the contrary, a response to the (mostly *de jure*) *emancipation* of European Jews. This emancipation encouraged many Jews to assimilate into their host societies and was therefore conceived by those proto nationalists (and thereafter by Zionists themselves) as a threat to Jewish identity and communities and as a manifestation of national decadence. See Shimoni, *The Zionist Ideology*, chs. 1-2, esp. pp. 8-13, 43-47 & 60-66.

nation from its prolonged slumber, to reawake but not to create.<sup>70</sup> In its attempts to return the nation to its 'eternal essence', nationalism tries to close the gap that was opened wide between, as it were, the organic and objective nature of the nation and the unawareness of conationals to their inborn membership: to imbue conationals with the understanding that their *ipse identity* emanates from and depends on their *idem identity*. In other words, nationalism strives to revitalise, realise and actualise the national *Gemeinschaft* in full as nationalism believes it was in the past. However, one should note that this kind of revivalism does not necessarily mean a regression. As Hutchinson puts it,

By revivalism, I mean more than a conviction that a once-existent nation must be recreated. Ethnic revivalists in my sense are those who perceive the nation as a creative force that evolves through periods of decay and regeneration in competitive interaction with a world of similar groups. For the revivalist, the past is to be used not in order to return to some antique order but rather to re-establish the nation at a new and higher level of development.<sup>71</sup>

Thus, nationalists in our days do not hesitate to use modern means to preserve and enforce their nation.<sup>72</sup> Chang Chih-tung, a Chinese nationalist, for instance, wrote at the end of the

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<sup>70</sup>Smith, *National Identity*, pp. 19-20.

<sup>71</sup>J. Hutchinson, *The Dynamics of Cultural Nationalism* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1987), pp. 9-10. For a further discussion see ch. 1 in Hutchinson's book, esp. pp. 30-42.

<sup>72</sup>As Herf shows in his study of Weimar and the Third Reich, German nationalist intellectuals were, as Herf names it, 'reactionary modernists' to the extent that, they endorsed modern technological means for a reactionary irrationalist goal, i.e., the revitalisation of the national *Gemeinschaft*. Such reactionary

19<sup>th</sup> century that in order to survive, i.e., to preserve its religion and culture, the Chinese nation should acquire and utilise Western knowledge.<sup>73</sup> One may recall Adolph Gottlieb's words about our relations with nature: 'certain people,' he says, 'always say we should go back to nature. I notice they never say we should go forward to nature.'<sup>74</sup> In a similar way most nationalists argue for the progress of the nation: the nation should go forward to its past.<sup>75</sup> This is not necessarily self-contradictory: the traditional and national past, or rather what nationalism sees as the authentic nature or essence of the nation, supplies the route and boundaries for the progress, when within these national bounds there is enough room for change and evolvement. As Shiroya, himself a pan-African nationalist, puts it: 'What remains or what changes very slowly in any given culture is its roots, its core, its "soul", while the other aspects go through varying degrees of change or adaptation.'<sup>76</sup> Accordingly, Shiroya calls on the 'African nation' to return to its authentic roots and revive its "soul", which he finds in the 6<sup>th</sup> millenium B.C., and to adjust them to the modern world through

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modernism, he emphasises, is not unique to Germany: 'As long as nationalism remains a potent force, something like reactionary modernism will continue to confront us.' See Herf, *Reactionary Modernism*, passim. The quotation is from p. x; for the nationalist conception of the nation as *Gemeinschaft* see esp. p. 51.

<sup>73</sup>C. Chih-tung, 'Essay on How to Save China, 1898', in Snyder, *The Dynamics of Nationalism*, pp. 318-320.

<sup>74</sup>A. Gottlieb, cited in *Texts for Introduction to Modern Art* vol. 2, ed. Z. Amishai-Maisels (Jerusalem, 1988), p. 350.

<sup>75</sup>Cf. J. Lele, 'The Two Faces of Nationalism: on the Revolutionary Potential of Tradition', in *National and Ethnic Movements*, ed. J. Dofny & A. Akiwowo (California & London: SAGE, 1980), pp. 201-216.

<sup>76</sup>Shiroya, *Dimensions of Nationalism*, p. 108.

the device of 'pan-African cultural nationalism.'<sup>77</sup>

#### 4.4 CIVIC NATIONALISM?

When Mahatma Gandhi was once asked what he thought about British civilisation his witty answer was: 'It would be a good idea.' If someone asked me what I thought of civic nationalism, I would give a very similar answer. Unfortunately, I do not only think that something like civic nationalism does not exist but also that the concept itself is defective and misleading. Nevertheless, many scholars distinguish at least between two kinds of nationalism and do count something like civic nationalism:

...there are two quite different types of nationalism – cultural and political – that must not be conflated, for they articulate different, even competing conceptions of the nation...[P]olitical nationalists...[have] a cosmopolitan rationalist conception of the nation that looks forward ultimately to a common humanity transcending cultural differences...[For] the cultural nationalist...the essence of a nation is its distinctive civilization...Nations are primordial expressions of this spirit; like families, they are natural solidarities...[and] *organic* beings...<sup>78</sup>

Hutchinson, of course, is not the only scholar who makes such a distinction. Similarly,

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<sup>77</sup>Ibid., p. 109. Note that Shiroya also refers to the African nation as a race, and argues that the academic intellectuals are the ones who have to educate it and bring it back to its roots. On the role of the intellectuals, see *ibid.*, chs. 5 & 6.

<sup>78</sup>Hutchinson, *The Dynamics of Cultural Nationalism*, pp. 12-13 (*italic original*).

Barry distinguishes between civic and ethnocultural nationalism, J. G. Kellas between social and ethnic nationalism, and Greenfeld, Canovan, and R. Brubaker differentiate between variant types of nationalism in a similar way.<sup>79</sup> In contrast to these scholars, I believe that the concept 'civic nationalism' is in itself essentially flawed for three reasons. First, from the historical perspective, as Smith indicates, nationalist movements have always incorporated a sense of ethnicity, though sometimes expressed it only indirectly, and have never applied purely to civic or territorial bonds.<sup>80</sup> Secondly, if our object of examination is real-world nationalists, then we have to ask who those figures and movements that are commonly regarded as nationalists are. Basically, it seems to be self-evident that people commonly ascribe the terms 'nationalism' or 'nationalists' to figures like the Serbian Radovan Karadzic or the Austrian Jörg Haider, or to movements like the Italian Neo-Fascist party or the French National Front.

Obviously, such figures are not identified as nationalists because of their conception of the nation but because of their specific ideologies, policies or deeds of (often violent)

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<sup>79</sup>See respectively: Barry, 'Statism and Nationalism: A Cosmopolitan Critique', sc. VI, note esp. p. 54; J. G. Kellas, *The Politics of Nationalism and Ethnicity* (London: MacMillan, 1991), ch. 4; Greenfeld, *Nationalism*, pp. 9-12 & passim; Canovan, *Nationhood and Political Theory*, esp. ch. 2; R. Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), esp. pp. 5-6 & 32-35.

<sup>80</sup>Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*, pp. 134-140 & passim. Cf. Waldron, 'Minority Cultures and the Cosmopolitan Alternative', p. 96. In saying that sometimes nationalist movements expressed their sense of ethnicity only indirectly I refer to Smith's remarks on 'Western territorial' nationalist movements. In principle, Smith suggests, these movements have described the nation in civic or political-territorial terms. In practice, though, these movements have identified the territorial nation as a specific ethnocultural group, and often recognised the political-territory as an ancestral marker of the nation.

particularism and exclusion.<sup>81</sup> It is therefore not surprising that people normally refer to nationalism in *negative* terms and consequently ascribe it to others and only rarely to themselves, even if in fact they do conform to their own interpretation of the term.<sup>82</sup> Thus, as Ignatieff puts it, for most people 'everyone else is a fanatic, everyone but us is a nationalist.'<sup>83</sup>

Nevertheless, all those figures and movements that are commonly regarded as nationalists also share the organic and familial conception of the nation. Thirdly, then, as far as real-world nationalists (especially elites) themselves are concerned, they have always described the nation in ethnic terms and used *this* description of theirs in mobilising the masses. In that respect, I find Connor's critique of other scholars of nationalism quite compelling:

In ignoring or denying the sense of kinship that infuses the nation, scholars have been blind

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<sup>81</sup>The particularist and exclusive nature of nationalism will be addressed in length in the next two chapters.

<sup>82</sup>Quite often, though, people do not impute nationalism even to *others* that deserve that title. Consider for example the policy of the Czech Republic towards its Romani population. The citizenship laws that were enacted by the Czech government (led by the alleged liberal Václav Havel) in 1994 denied citizenship to many Roma. Moreover, sterilisation of Romani women was still taking place as 'a loose *ad hoc* racial hygiene programme...[A] Velvet genocide' under Havel's rule. See Kohn, *The Race Gallery*, pp. 202-203. That policy towards the Roma is clearly nationalistic, but Havel and the Czech government have widely been described as liberal and democratic and by no means as nationalists. But this popular view of Havel and the Czech government, to mention only one example of many, does not show that people do not associate nationalism with particularism and exclusion but only exposes either ignorance, partiality or inconsistency in people's beliefs and attitudes.

<sup>83</sup>Ignatieff, *Blood and Belonging*, p. 16. Thus, for example, while Zionists refer to themselves as national (*leumi'im*, in Hebrew), many of them refer to the Palestinians as nationalists (*leumanim*) and to their legitimate aspiration to national self-determination as nationalist (*leumani*). In this, they hope to delegitimise the said aspiration of the Palestinians.



to that which has been thoroughly apparent to nationalist leaders. In sharpest contrast with most academic analysts of nationalism, those who have successfully mobilized nations have understood that at the core of ethnopsychology is the sense of shared blood, and they have not hesitated to appeal to it.<sup>84</sup>

In fact, the argument that nationalism is inherently ethnic and ethnicist was put forward by Connor right in the beginning of his book:

A likely first response to the title of this book, *Ethnonationalism*, is “What is it and how does it differ from just plain *nationalism*?” The answer is that there is no difference if nationalism is used in its pristine sense. Unfortunately, this is rarely the case...[S]lipshod use of the key terms, nation and nationalism, is more the rule than the exception, even in works purportedly dealing with nationalism. As used throughout this book, nation connotes a group of people who believe they are ancestrally related. Nationalism connotes identification with and loyalty to one’s nation as just defined. It does not refer to loyalty to one’s country. Admittedly then, ethnonationalism has an inner redundancy, and it is used solely to avoid any misunderstanding concerning our focus. Throughout this work, nationalism and ethnonationalism are treated as synonyms.<sup>85</sup>

Everything I have said thus far amounts to an *empirical* observation on nationalism, but one

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<sup>84</sup>Connor, *Ethnonationalism*, p. 197.

<sup>85</sup>Ibid., p. xi. Connor thus infers that nationalism *logically* means ‘Loyalty to the ethnic group...’ Ibid., pp. 40–41.

may legitimately make a *normative* point and argue that nationalism should (and therefore *may*) be transformed into something like civic or political nationalism as defined by Hutchinson et al. In order to remain coherent and credible, though, the concept of nationalism cannot be totally metamorphosed like in the case of Gregor Samsa, who in Kafka's *Metamorphosis* one day turned into a cockroach. In other words, a transformed nationalism must bear *some* relations to its prior form, i.e., it must be *sublated*. The question is, Is it possible? Can nationalism be sublated into 'civic' one?

Sublation, we saw, means that in any transformation of an order the fundamental or innate characteristics of that order are preserved while its older form (the prior *manifestation* of those innate characteristics) is cancelled out. Now if, as argued before, the intrinsic characteristics of nationalism are basically reflected in its organic conception of the nation, then any reasonable sublation of it would not and could not entail an overall cancellation of those ethnic (and ethnicist) properties. On the whole, then, I agree with Viroli that the language of nationalism is different and should be distinguished from the language of patriotism, which emphasises civic bonds and individual liberties rather than ethnic or organic ties.<sup>86</sup> Let us see now how the nationalist creed that was depicted in this chapter bears on the question of national self-determination.

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<sup>86</sup>Viroli, *For Love of Country*, note esp. p. 8. Incidentally, I think that it is not a coincidence that most (though not all) academic proponents of 'civic nationalism' are quite reluctant to actually use the concept of nationalism and normally prefer to use terms like nationhood, nationality or even nationness; similarly, they usually choose to employ the concept of national rather than nationalist. See, e.g., Miller, *On Nationality*.

## 5

### NATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION

#### 5.1 NATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION: GENERAL REMARKS

In his book *Nationalism*, Kedourie asserts that nationalism is 'largely a doctrine of national self-determination.'<sup>1</sup> If we look at different nationalist movements it seems that Kedourie is quite right in this point: the aspiration to achieve national self-determination, and to preserve it once it has been achieved, has always been the main motive in the formation of nationalist movements and behind their thinking and activities. The idea of national self-determination, though, was never accepted and defended by nationalists alone. In other words, although all nationalists support the idea of national self-determination, one need not be a nationalist to favour it. As we shall see, the contradiction between nationalism and democracy, in our case, is not around the question of accepting or rejecting the idea of national self-determination but about their incompatible understandings of this idea, which *both* uphold.<sup>2</sup> To show this incompatibility between nationalism and democracy, I would like to divide my discussion into four different questions. Although these questions are strongly interrelated, analytical purposes require that they be discussed separately. The questions I would like to deal with, then, are as follows:

1. what is the principle of national self-determination, i.e., what does national self-

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<sup>1</sup>Kedourie, *Nationalism*, p. 23.

<sup>2</sup>For the democratic views on national self-determination, see chs. 9-10.

determination mean?

2. why, if ever, is national self-determination morally justifiable, i.e., what are, if any, the moral aims that national self-determination is supposed to achieve or protect, and, consequently, is there a universal moral right to national self-determination or are there any moral limitations to this right?
3. how are the answers to 1 and 2 connected, i.e., how is national self-determination believed to satisfy the moral aims, if any?
4. where is national self-determination supposed to take place, i.e., what is the specific territory in which the nation should become self-determined?<sup>3</sup>

Most scholars and political figures agree about the general meaning of national self-determination, stressing that this notion refers to the set of political institutions that allow the nation to make collective decisions and to determine by itself how to conduct its own life, at least on those matters that are most significant for itself.<sup>4</sup> A self-determined nation, then, is understood as a nation that holds its own political institutions through which it can reach and enforce collective policies and determine its own life. The demand for national self-determination, in its turn, is described as a *political* claim – 'directed towards an institutional arrangement: it demands changes in legislation and economic policies, the setting up of new political institutions (government, political committees, etc.) and the re-

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<sup>3</sup>Questions 1-3 will be addressed in this chapter whereas question 4 will be dealt with in ch. 6.

<sup>4</sup>See Miller, *On Nationality*, p. 11 & ch. 4, esp. pp. 81 & 99-101.

definition of their borders, both geographically and functionally.<sup>5</sup>

National self-determination, though, does not necessarily mean an independent state and can be satisfied through other political arrangements. As R. Higgins argues, and demonstrates with a few examples, 'While independence has been the most frequently chosen path, other possibilities have always existed and have sometimes been chosen. General Assembly Resolution 1541 (XV) spoke long ago of self-determination being exercised 'through independence, free association, integration with an independent state, or emergence into any other political status freely determined by a people'. 'Self-determination', Higgins concludes, 'has never simply meant independence. *It has meant the free choice of peoples,*'<sup>6</sup> both to adopt any political status they see fit as a way of realising self-determination, and subsequently to determine and pursue their own political, economic, social and cultural life through the status they have chosen and on a continuing basis.<sup>7</sup>

At this point, one should already understand why national self-determination is not identical to secession.<sup>8</sup> On the one hand, secession does not necessarily refer to nations, and it 'may

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<sup>5</sup>A. De-Shalit, 'National Self-Determination: Political, not Cultural', in *Political Studies* 44/5 (1996), p. 910.

<sup>6</sup>All quotations in this paragraph are from R. Higgins, *Problems and Process* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), pp. 118-119 (*italic mine*).

<sup>7</sup>See *ibid.*, pp. 120 & 123.

<sup>8</sup>For a discussion that confuses the idea of national self-determination with the concept of secession, see A. Heraclides, *The Self-Determination of Minorities in International Politics* (London: Frank Cass,

include any group which wants to secede.<sup>9</sup> On the other hand, even when secession does refer to nations, it reflects only one form of national self-determination as it 'involves the withdrawal of a group and its territory from the authority of a state of which it is a part,'<sup>10</sup> whereas national self-determination can take, as we have seen, forms other than that.<sup>11</sup>

Another point that demands clarification refers to the relations between national self-determination and national control over a particular territory. As de-Shalit's quotation suggests, national self-determination refers to the re-definition of the borders of political institutions, 'both geographically and functionally.' The geographical aspect is indeed very important: normally, when a nation demands to be self-determined it also stakes a claim to a particular piece of land in which the nation aspires to form its own political institutions, i.e., to turn this piece of land into a *political*-territorial unit, be it a state, an autonomy within a larger state, or otherwise. Moreover, when a nation stakes such a territorial claim, it often sees the relevant territory as an integral part of its nationality (i.e., as a national marker), and thus believes that to be really self-determined requires the formation of political institutions in this *particular* land and not elsewhere. Consequently, when such a

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1991).

<sup>9</sup>De-Shalit, 'National Self-Determination: Political, not Cultural', pp. 907-908.

<sup>10</sup>D. L. Horowitz, 'Self-Determination: Politics, Philosophy, and Law', in Shapiro & Kymlicka, *NOMOS XXXIX: Ethnicity and Group Rights*, p. 423.

<sup>11</sup>For a relevant discussion, see *ibid.*, pp. 421-463, and M. Freeman, 'Democracy and Dynamite: the Peoples' Right to Self-determination', in *Political Studies* 44/4 (1996), pp. 746-761. See also M. Walzer, 'Notes on the New Tribalism', in *Political Restructuring in Europe*, ed. C. Brown (London & New York: Routledge, 1994), p. 199.

nation fails to form its own political institutions *in the relevant territory* the nation might consider its self-determination as only partly realised and try to achieve it in full, i.e., to take control over the *relevant* land, and over that land as a whole.<sup>12</sup>

Nevertheless, I believe it would be wrong to say that territorial claims are immanent to the idea of national self-determination, as the latter can also be realised in forms other than territorial control, e.g., 'through institutions (e.g., educational) which confer some self-government on the [national] segment.'<sup>13</sup> In some cases, where two nations or more were intermixed throughout a specific territory, and neither of them could control this area, the adopted solution was 'a form of power-sharing between the groups to guarantee each at least some measure of self-determination.'<sup>14</sup> Thus, for instance, in Brussels, in which the Flemings and the Walloons, as well as the German population, are living together, 'a system of 'personal' autonomy is operating, with separate schools for members of each community

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<sup>12</sup>To the question what *is* this relevant land and what are the criteria to determine it as such I shall return in the next chapter, when I deal with the question 'where is national self-determination supposed to take place?'

<sup>13</sup>Kellas, *The Politics of Nationalism and Ethnicity*, p. 137. For a relevant discussion, see H. van Amersfoort, 'Institutional Plurality: Problem or Solution for the Multi-ethnic State?', in *Notions of Nationalism*, ed. S. Periwal (Budapest, London & New York: Central European University Press, 1995), pp. 162-181. Freeman, for instance, argues that there are more than twenty forms of national self-determination, half are clearly non-territorial. See Freeman, 'Democracy and Dynamite: the Peoples' Right to Self-determination', p. 751. Although I believe that many of Freeman's examples do not represent national self-determination at all, his general argument that there are various forms of non-territorial self-determination (and *some* examples he mentions) seems to me to be quite correct.

<sup>14</sup>Miller, *On Nationality*, p. 118.

under a common Brussels authority which neither community entirely controls.<sup>15</sup> And in pre-war Bosnia each community – the Muslim, Croatian, and Serbian – had a proportional representation in the province government, although in the end, as we know, the "solution" that was implemented by Karadzic and Mladzic's gangs in their attempts to take control over Bosnia was another 'final solution' rather than any form of power-sharing.

So far I have given a very general account of the idea of national self-determination. However, as A. H. Richmond correctly realises, while 'The ideal of self-determination of peoples was entrenched in international law and the United Nations Charter...the concept of a 'people' is not defined, and the idea of 'self-determination' is open to various interpretations.'<sup>16</sup> As far as I can see, there are two important elements in the idea of national self-determination that veer whenever the conception of the nation does, and thus also alter the meaning of national self-determination at large. The first, which seems to be quite neglected by political theorists, deals with the *meaning* of national institutions and decisions (i.e., what renders them national). The second, to which many scholars have dedicated much attention, refers to the issue of the *right* to national self-determination and to the moral justification of this right.<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>15</sup>Kellas, *The Politics of Nationalism and Ethnicity*, p. 140.

<sup>16</sup>A. H. Richmond, *Global Apartheid* (Toronto, New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 225. Cf. A. Cassese, *Self-Determination of Peoples* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).

<sup>17</sup>See for example Horowitz, 'Self-Determination: Politics, Philosophy, and Law', pp. 437-438, and Y. Tamir, *Liberal Nationalism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), pp. 69-70.



As we have seen, a self-determined nation is understood to be a nation that holds its own political institutions through which it can reach and enforce collective decisions and determine by itself how to conduct its own life, at least on those matters that are most significant for itself. But what exactly renders any institutions and decisions to be really 'its own', i.e., national? Largely, the answers are dependent upon the conception of the nation one chooses to employ. A nation is believed to have its own political institutions, I will argue, when two conditions are met: first, the condition of membership (MC), and second, the condition of national markers (NMC). As to the MC, a nation is regarded as having its own political institutions when these institutions include only members of the nation in question.<sup>18</sup> This does not necessarily mean that each and every member of the nation is entitled to take an active part in these institutions, whether as a representative, a voter, or otherwise (note that I have said 'members of the nation' and not '*the* members of the nation'). It does mean, though, that those who are entitled to take part in these institutions should be members of the nation so the institutions may reasonably be regarded as national in the sense that they are conducted by conationals and not by foreigners.<sup>19</sup> Now this condition is indeed a necessity but not sufficient for saying that the institutions are really of the nation;<sup>20</sup> there is a need, I believe, to look at the things that political institutions *do* and not only at the figures who take part in them. Here, then, the NMC becomes very

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<sup>18</sup>Cf. Miller, *On Nationality*, pp. 88 & 150.

<sup>19</sup>Cf. Rousseau, *The Social Contract*, book 2, ch. I.

<sup>20</sup>For a relevant reference, see Kedourie, *Nationalism*, pp. 70-71 & 96.

important.

I have said before that a self-determined nation can, by definition, determine by itself how to conduct its own life, *at least on those matters that are most significant for itself*. Naturally, these most significant things are those factors that define the nation as such or, in other words, are considered as the markers of the national identity. In general, then, national institutions are those that embody the national markers and aspire to protect and advance them. When these institutions are sovereign, i.e., have the ability to reach and enforce collective decisions and are the final authority on all matters concerning the national markers, we would say that the nation is self-determined as it holds

...a political unit with authority of the relevant scope, but what that scope must be will depend on the particular identity of the group in question, and on the aims and goals that they [the group's members] are attempting to pursue. Thus, one nation may include religious affiliation as part of its self-definition, in which case it is very likely to want the political authority it exercises to extend to religious questions, whereas another nation may define itself in ways that make no reference to religion. It is therefore going to be difficult to set a priori limits to the proper scope of sovereignty from this perspective. Moreover, we cannot tell in advance which particular features of society's way of life will come to assume importance as markers of national identity.<sup>21</sup>

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<sup>21</sup>Miller, *On Nationality*, p. 100.

To illustrate the NMC, allow me to use Miller's own example.<sup>22</sup> Think of those who consider the Pound as a marker of English national identity and as a symbol of English national self-determination. For them, the acceptance of the Euro is a threat to English identity and self-determination: by accepting the European currency, many of them claim, the English political institutions will no longer embody the Pound as a national marker, hence lose a great deal of their Englishness and of their sovereignty on matters regarding the English national identity. Thus, William Rees-Mogg, in an article in *The Times*, stressed that the acceptance of the single currency, taxation and electoral system of the European 'new Holy Roman Empire', as he calls it, would reflect 'the destruction of England as a nation' – the loss of English national identity and sacrifice of English independence.<sup>23</sup>

I believe that the MC and NMC provide us with a good grasp of the principle of national self-determination. To put it succinctly, then, a nation is self-determined to the extent that the political institutions it holds embody its national markers, are sovereign on all matters concerning these markers, and are managed only by conationals who are committed to the protection and advancement of these markers. Consequently, only decisions that are accepted by institutions that answer the MC and NMC are regarded as the decisions of the nation, which reflect and allow it to determine its own collective life.

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<sup>22</sup>See *ibid.*, pp. 100-101.

<sup>23</sup>W. Rees-Mogg, 'Revenge of the Celtic Fringe', *The Times*, September 15, 1997.

Now the question is, as Miller justly says, What are the features that define the nation as such? Is a nation a race, a linguistic body, or maybe a body of individuals who share the same citizenship? Moreover, is a nation an objective entity or is it constituted by beliefs? And do individuals acquire their nationality by birth or choice? Are conationals characterised by common habitation, or maybe by a shared culture? Obviously, each of these conceptions of nationality has a different understanding of what national institutions and decisions are, what they should embody and what turns them national. Accordingly, the idea of national self-determination varies as each conception of the nation interprets this idea in accordance with its own understanding of national institutions and decisions.

## 5.2 NATIONALISM AND THE MEANING OF NATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION

Following their conception of the nation, and as far as the MC is concerned, nationalists would claim that a nation is self-determined to the extent that its institutions include only members of the organic nation. To put it briefly, nationalists perceive self-determination in *ethnic* terms and believe that in order to be self-determined the nation should keep its political institutions as much as possible away from any influence, let alone domination, of those who do not belong to the national stock. The nationalist principle of self-determination, then, reflects, to use Gellner's words,<sup>24</sup> an external autonomy (autonomy *vis-à-vis* exterior forces) for sure but also an internal ethnic homogeneity of the political

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<sup>24</sup>See Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, p. 1.

institutions that the nation holds.<sup>25</sup>

Turning now to the NMC, we have seen that this condition requires that in order to count as national the political institutions should embody and advance the national markers, or features, of the nation. Also, only when these institutions are sovereign on all matters concerning those markers the nation will genuinely be self-determined. Nationalist movements, as we saw, employ various features to mark off their respective nations: culture, language, religion, place of residence and so forth, are all used as differentiating markers. But as we also saw, for nationalists 'a differentiating feature serves as a marker of nationality when it is thought to coincide with a distinctive descent group.' In that sense, nationalists describe national markers in ethnic terms and thus believe that national institutions by definition embody and promote the *ancestral* markers of the nation and their corresponding values therein. For nationalists, then, a nation is self-determined only when it holds such institutions and when these institutions are sovereign and control all matters concerning the ethnic markers of the nation.<sup>26</sup>

I argued before that it is not enough that those who conduct the national institutions are conationals; to be precise, they must be *devoted* conationals, i.e., committed to the

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<sup>25</sup>Cf. C. Schmitt, *The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy* (Cambridge & London: the MIT Press, 1985), pp. 9-17.

<sup>26</sup>Cf. Barry, 'Statism and Nationalism: A Cosmopolitan Critique', pp. 20-21.

protection and advancement of the national features. If we coopt the MC onto the NMC, then, it is clear that from the nationalist point of view those conationals who are entitled to rule (and, more generally, to fully participate and influence) the national institutions are those who conform to the nationalist creed as presented above, i.e., those who fit the 'authentic voice of the nation.' According to the nationalist stance, then, institutions that are not ruled by nationalists in their own right do not deserve the title 'national' in the first place, and those who do in fact run them should be considered as misguided (at best) or disloyal (at worst).

### 5.3 NATIONALISM AND THE RIGHT TO NATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION

As mentioned before, there are two elements in the idea of national self-determination that change whenever the conception of the nation does. I would now like to turn to the second element: the issue of the *right* to national self-determination and its moral justification.

As J. Raz and A. Margalit put it, the issue of the right to national self-determination embraces the question 'Who has the right and under what conditions is it to be exercised?'<sup>27</sup> Assuming that the relevant group for national self-determination is the nation, the question can be rephrased as 'Who is the nation that has this right and under what conditions is it to be exercised?' Obviously, when the conception of the nation changes, so does the group that

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<sup>27</sup>J. Raz and A. Margalit, 'National Self-Determination', in *The Journal of Philosophy* LXXXVII/9 (1990), p. 441.

has the right, as well as the role of national self-determination, i.e., the aims that it is supposed to achieve or protect. In general, national self-determination is understood as a protective device: it aims at the protection either of specific communities, individual interests, human rights, world peace and order, or of some or all of them together.<sup>28</sup> But each of these elements is associated with a different conception of the nation, each of which gives different weight apiece and justifies and bases its preferences on different ontological beliefs and moral grounds.<sup>29</sup> So a dispute around the conception of the nation does not entail only a debate as to the group that deserves self-determination but also about the elements that self-determination ought to protect, that is, about the role of national self-determination. One objection to this argument of mine is put forward by Tamir, who asserts that differences in the conception of the nation do not entail an essential disagreement as to the elements that national self-determination ought to protect. But I think it will not take too long to show that Tamir's assertion is as realistic as, say, the story of creation in Genesis or the Original Sin.

Historically, Tamir argues, there were two interpretations to the right of national self-determination – cultural and democratic – each of which with its own distinctive conception

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<sup>28</sup>See Freeman, 'Democracy and Dynamite: the Peoples' Right to Self-determination', pp. 751 & 754-761. See also Raz and Margalit, 'National Self-Determination', pp. 439-461; Barry, 'Self-Government Revisited', pp. 124-154; Miller, *On Nationality*, pp. 83-90; Tamir, *Liberal Nationalism*, pp. 69-77. Cf. Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*, pp. 157 & 165-173.

<sup>29</sup>See *ibid.*, *ibid.*

of the nation. These different interpretations, Tamir insists (not accidentally without any supportive reference or evidence) based their justification of the right of nations to self-determination on one value: the protection of individual interests. Even the nationalist version, Tamir argues, always aimed at such a protection:

Historically, the interpretation of the right to national self-determination followed two distinct courses, each relying on a different definition of the term "nation," and deriving its justification from the protection of a different *individual interest*...According to the **cultural** version, "nation" is defined as a community sharing a set of *objective characteristics* grouped under the rubric of culture and national consciousness. Consequently, the right to national self-determination is understood as the right of a nation or, more precisely, *the members of the nation*, to preserve their distinct existence, and to manage communal life in accordance with their particular way of life...[This version] suitably reflects the national essence of the right to self-determination...<sup>30</sup>

Tamir's statement seems to be a sciolism or a figment rather than a historical observation or a serious analysis. As de-Shalit correctly argues, in his critique of Tamir's theory, 'A nationalism which is based on culture and cultural distinctions was, not very long ago, a concept characteristic of right-wing, or romantic theorists such as Herder...' <sup>31</sup> As everybody knows, hopefully Tamir too, romantic nationalists have never aspired to protect *individual*

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<sup>30</sup>Tamir, *Liberal Nationalism*, p. 69 (emphasis original; italic mine).

<sup>31</sup>De-Shalit, 'National Self-Determination: Political, not Cultural', p. 911.



interests. Instead, they have stressed the importance of national self-determination for the protection and vitality of the nation and its unique identity as a collective, more often than not *at the expense* of individual liberties, rights or equality:

...an original people needs freedom, that this is the security for its continuance *as an original people*, and that, as it goes on, it is able to stand an ever-increasing degree of freedom without the slightest danger. This is the first matter in respect of which love of fatherland must govern the State itself...*[I]t must be love of fatherland that governs the State by placing before it a higher object than the usual one of maintaining internal peace, property, personal freedom, and the life and well-being of all. For this higher object alone, and with no other intention, does the State assemble an armed force.*<sup>32</sup>

The concept of 'cultural nationalism', as Tamir uses it, goes beyond the romantic view and enfold all forms of nationalism that see the nation as an objective body; in short, in my usage it applies to nationalism at large. As already noted in the former chapter, following Smith, 'For nationalists, will and aspiration are predicated of the pre-existent nation. *It is not your will and my aspirations that matters; it is the nation's*, however embryonic...[N]ations are distinct and natural entities, which thereby embody *the collective will.*' This, of course, does not make Tamir's argument more plausible: nationalism in general aspires to vitalise, as it were, the authentic nation by reviving the self-identity of its

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<sup>32</sup>See J. G. Fichte, 'Addresses to the German Nation', in *The Nationalism Reader*, eds. O. Dahbour & M. R. Ishay (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1995), pp. 62-70. The quotation is from p. 66 (italic mine). See also Barry, 'Self-Government Revisited', pp. 150-151.

members – by imbuing them with the awareness to their *idem identity* and ethnic belonging. National self-determination, then, is understood by nationalists as a political device for national vitalisation and ethnic survival, neither for protecting individuals nor for embodying their interests or wills:

...the nostalgic perspective regards the survival of the ethnic as the dominant value. The community may be defined by language, religion, 'race', and nationality, or simply as an extended family that wants to be reunited...The means to this goal is separation from and the exclusion of the 'Others'...It is also a powerful emotive component of most nationalist movements seeking independence...[N]ationalism seeks to maintain the autonomy, unity, and identity of a nation. Fear of losing this identity, or the desire to restore it, drives the movements aimed at ethnic survival.<sup>33</sup>

For nationalists, to use Greenfeld's words, the nation 'is seen in unitary terms...[and has] the character of a collective individual possessed of a single will...'<sup>34</sup> Nationalists believe that this collective will must take priority over individual wills and aspirations and should determine conationals' preferences and not the other way around; individuals, in this view,

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<sup>33</sup>Richmond, *Global Apartheid*, pp. 224-225. Incidentally, the Israeli parliament (the *Knesset*), where Tamir also serves, has dedicated much more attention to the 'danger of assimilation' of Jews in 'the diaspora' than to the menace of antisemitism. In other words, as far as the *state* of Israel is concerned the persistence of Jewish *identity* and *nationhood* (ethnicism, in Shimoni's parlance) takes priority over the freedom and wellbeing of *individual* Jews. Tamir, by the way, not only seems to accept this priority but actually contributed to it while serving as the Israeli Minister for (note the title!) Immigrant Absorption.

<sup>34</sup>Greenfeld, *Nationalism*, p. 11.

are no more than 'biological instruments' of the nation.<sup>35</sup> National self-determination, as the way to realise the nation's will, is also described as the will of the nation which naturally aims at its own self-preservation. The moral justification of national self-determination, then, is based on the view that the nation, its identity and will are the supreme values: 'What the Nation willed was its own justification: there were no limits to the demands it might make on its members.'<sup>36</sup> Just like Edgar Allan Poe's house of Usher, which appears as a perfect mansion despite its crumbling individual stones, so nationalists aspire to reach a perfect collective even if individuals' conditions are poor. In that respect, then, it is not that nationalists aim at a solution for the individual identity crisis *per se*; rather, they aim at the preservation of the nation and the identity crisis simply makes it easier on them to mobilise the masses and assimilate them to their cause.

Now, after I examined the nationalist justification of the right to national self-determination, we are still left with the second part of Raz and Margalit's question, namely, Under what conditions is this right to be exercised? I shall argue that according to nationalists there are no moral limitations to this right and no special conditions are required. In order to make my point, allow me to follow Gellner and concentrate on what he calls an 'ethical universalistic spirit' of nationalism, which refers to nationalists who are 'preaching the

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<sup>35</sup>The notion 'cultural biological instruments' was minted in Barry, 'Self-Government Revisited', p. 152.

<sup>36</sup>M. Howard, *The Causes of Wars* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984), p. 26.

doctrine for all nations alike: let all nations have their own political roofs, and let all of them also refrain from including non-nationals under it.<sup>37</sup> This version is notably presented in the writings of Herder and Mazzini, who preached the right of all nations to be self-determined for the preservation of their natural features and ethnic identity.<sup>38</sup> But this moral view of theirs stemmed from a deeper ontological conviction, i.e., that nations are 'distinct moral universes'.<sup>39</sup> In other words, as far as *content* or *substance* are concerned – i.e., the *specific* culture or national markers that self determination is supposed to revive or protect – there are no common grounds between different nations which are culturally distinctive.

As Herder has put it, 'nations modify themselves, according to time, place, and their internal character; each bears in itself the standard of its perfection, totally independent of all comparison with that of others.'<sup>40</sup> And as Viroli adds, for Herder '[t]o comply with nature's plan we must...protect the purity and authenticity of our national culture, resisting both the arrogant inclination to conquer or dominate and the vain desire to imitate alien cultures.'<sup>41</sup>

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<sup>37</sup>Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, pp. 1-2. Note that Gellner describes the nation in ethnic terms because he believes that this is the way nationalists themselves see it.

<sup>38</sup>According to Horowitz, the post-World War I Wilsonian idea of national self-determination was commonly interpreted as this right of all nations to preserve their ethnic identity. Although in practice, he adds, this right was never completely realised. Horowitz, 'Self-Determination: Politics, Philosophy, and Law', p. 437.

<sup>39</sup>See Barry, 'Statism and Nationalism: A Cosmopolitan Critique', p. 49.

<sup>40</sup>J. G. Herder, 'Reflections on the Philosophy of the History of Mankind', in Dahbour & Ishay, *The Nationalism Reader*, p. 54.

<sup>41</sup>Viroli, *For Love of Country*, p. 123.

Herder's objection to imperialism, it should be noted, has nothing to do with condemnation of oppression of individuals and everything to do with denunciation of 'cultural contamination and impurity.'<sup>42</sup> Mazzini also believed that nations have no shared moral codes, and thus has called for the sovereignty of all nations: 'You', he called to his Italian conationals, 'will plant the banner of Liberty and of Association, so that it shines in the sight of all the nations,' and then he added '[y]ou will never deny the sister nations.'<sup>43</sup> Mazzini, of course, was talking of national liberty, not of individuals' freedom, and for him it was the former that God commanded, not the latter.<sup>44</sup> Now if each nation is a (perhaps *the*) self-authenticating source of valid moral and cultural claims, and self-determination is understood as a political device through which 'the survival of the ethnies as the dominant value' – its 'autonomy, unity, and identity' – is secured, then it is logically clear that each and every nation is morally entitled to self-determination, i.e., the right to national self-determination is unconditional and unlimited.

As Kedourie argues, Mazzini's legacy and, I would add, Herder's too, 'has found great vogue in recent decades in Asiatic and African countries.'<sup>45</sup> Indeed, this version of moral

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<sup>42</sup>Ibid., p. 120.

<sup>43</sup>G. Mazzini, 'The Duties of Man', in Dahbour & Ishay, *The Nationalism Reader*, p. 97.

<sup>44</sup>See ibid., pp. 92-97. See also Kedourie, *Nationalism*, pp. 101-103.

<sup>45</sup>Kedourie, *Nationalism*, p. 103.

relativism, which asserts the unbridgeable moral differences between nations,<sup>46</sup> has been used by many anticolonialists and alleged nationalist liberation movements, although it is also accepted by many occidentals.<sup>47</sup> Thus, for instance, a number of third world nationalists (e.g., the Chinese Sun Yat-Sen and the West Indian Frantz Fanon) reject the notion of universal human rights as Western 'cultural imperialism',<sup>48</sup> hence stress the incompatible moral divergences between nations and call for the right of each and every nation to be self-determined. This moral relativist stance was also well expressed by Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir, who stated at the annual meeting of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations in Kuala Lumpur (July 1997) that 'Human rights is not a monopoly of the West,' and, accordingly, that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights should be reviewed. In reviewing the *Universal Declaration* Mahathir obviously did not mean that it should be brought in line with universal *individual* human rights but with, as it were, universal *group* (i.e., national) rights, i.e., the universal right of all nations to self-determination.<sup>49</sup>

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<sup>46</sup>Cf. P. Feyerabend, *Science in a Free Society* (London: New Left Books, 1978), pp. 8-9, and Walzer, *Spheres of Justice*, pp. 312-313.

<sup>47</sup>Note that I am not arguing here against anticolonialism or national liberation whatsoever. I believe that there is good reason, even a moral *obligation*, to support national liberation. But national liberation must not be confused with nationalist movements that consider liberation merely as freedom from foreign control, no matter what the alternative is as far as it is national. To override a foreign oppressor only to substitute it for an internal tyranny is hardly morally justifiable and should not be supported blindly or automatically. Cf. G. Lukács, 'Towards a Methodology of the Problem of Organisation', in Lukács, *History and Class Consciousness*, p. 311.

<sup>48</sup>See K. Boyle, 'Stock-taking on Human Rights: The World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna 1993', in *Politics and Human Rights*, ed. D. Beetham (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), pp. 79-95.

<sup>49</sup>Cf. M. Walzer, *Thick and Thin* (Notre Dame & London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1994). In p. 16, for example, Walzer argues that 'some things that we [i.e., the occidentals; O.C] consider oppressive are not so regarded everywhere.'

My only reservation regarding Kedourie's insight is, his concentration on the influence of Mazzinian ideas on Asia and Africa. Kedourie, himself a conservative and sympathetic to (British?) colonialism, prefers to overlook the Mazzini- and Herder-like romantic nationalism that flourished in *Europe*. Such nationalism, explains G. M. Fredrickson, actually came about as a reaction *against* the universal values of the European Enlightenment:

If civilizationism was a universalist progressivism with its roots in the European Enlightenment, romantic racialism – as the term implies – was a product of the nineteenth-century reaction against the Enlightenment. It held that each “race” or “nation” had its own inherent peculiarities of mind and temperament and would develop according to its own special “genius” rather than follow some model based on the experience of peoples with different inherited or inbred characteristics.<sup>50</sup>

Following the said stance, to take one example, nationalists like Academician Sakharov and Gavril Popov could insist that 'a "people" or a "nation" is first of all an ethnic community, that from the beginning it has an inherited "historical" right to its "own" state, and that *each* ethnos must have its own state, which is to be determined by the ethnos itself.'<sup>51</sup>

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<sup>50</sup>G. M. Fredrickson, *Black Liberation* (New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 69.

<sup>51</sup>See A. V. Tishkov, 'Nationalities and Conflicting Ethnicity in Post-Communist Russia', in *Ethnic Conflict Management in the Former Soviet Union* (Cambridge: the Working Paper Series – Conflict Management Group, 1993), p. 13 (*italic mine*). Note that it is only Sakharov who clearly speaks of states while Popov talks about self-determination in the form of 'national-cultural autonomy.' The idea of an unlimited right of each nation, though, is the same in both cases.

Nationalists see the nation as 'a collective individual possessed of a single will' which is, as it were, the right will. Individuals who criticise or challenge their nation or its "authentic values", then, are considered by the national self-anointed representatives as mistaken or misguided. But such individuals may also be considered as apostates who violate the national will and undermine its aspirations and "authentic values" who must therefore be rehabilitated, even by force if necessary.<sup>52</sup> I shall return to the nationalist attitude to such "deviant" members when I deal with the issue of foreigners. There is, however, one point that emanates from the nationalist understanding of the national will and to which I would like to refer now. As Kedourie argues, nationalism is 'a method of teaching the right determination of the will.'<sup>53</sup> As we can see, Kedourie is quite right. Yet we should remember that for Kedourie the nationalist method *creates* the nation whereas nationalism itself sees this 'teaching' as a vitalisation of a declining *preexisting* nation. For nationalism, teaching the right determination of the will means to revive 'a shared awareness on the part of members of a nation of those shared, objective characteristics by virtue of which they constitute a nation,' i.e., 'a passive reflection of the independently existing nation, the mere mental record of a fact.'<sup>54</sup> The question we are facing now is, How is self-determination

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<sup>52</sup>See Kedourie, *Nationalism*, p. 102.

<sup>53</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 76.

<sup>54</sup>George, 'National-Identity and National Self-Determination', p. 17. For attempts to achieve such a revival see for example the cases of the Ibo and Yoruba groups in Nigeria, in P. P. Ekeh, 'Colonialism and the Two Publics in Africa: A Theoretical Statement', in *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 17/1 (1975), pp. 91-111, esp. pp. 104-105.



believed to deliver the revival of the nation and the protection of its identity?

#### 5.4 NATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION AS AN ETHNIC SAFEGUARD

How, then, is national self-determination believed to satisfy the nationalist aims? In my answer to this question I would like to employ three concepts: power, authority and legitimacy. As we shall see, nationalists believe that self-determination enables the nation to exercise its power, to enforce its will, and to practice and underpin its legitimate authority over its members so as to revive and protect the national identity.

National self-determination is taken by nationalists to be the political device by which the nation is able to practice its will, which is first and foremost its own self-preservation, i.e., its ethnic survival. As we have seen, nationalists believe that national survival can be accomplished by closing the gap between the organic and objective nature of the nation (or its 'authentic essence') and the unawareness of conationals to their inborn membership in such a group. This project, in its turn, demands three basic things: education, education, education.<sup>55</sup> Now for educating the members of the nation in the spirit of the national will, nationalists need first and foremost the power to enforce this (i.e., *their*) will on conationals at large. In other words, nationalists require 'the ability to influence or control the actions of others [conationals], to get them [conationals] to do what...[the nationalists] want them

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<sup>55</sup>See Tamir, *Liberal Nationalism*, pp. xvii-xx.

[conationals] to do, and what they [conationals] would otherwise not have done.<sup>56</sup>

Indeed, nationalist movements often have different resources that give them the power to mobilise and influence members of the nation *before* the achievement of national self-determination. Nevertheless, to a great extent this power of theirs is very limited in practice as they have no freedom, or at least not enough of it, to use their power sufficiently and effectively: they lack the freedom to exercise the “national will” without foreign interference and the sovereignty to enforce (when they see fit) their decisions *as a whole* on the *whole* relevant population, and at *all* times.<sup>57</sup> Thus, for example, the Zionist movement under the British Mandate in Palestine had its own institutions (national assembly and even political parties and elections), but these were not sovereign and could not enforce their decisions on the Jewish population in Palestine at large – complying with those decisions was a matter of choice, an ideological and voluntarist commitment that people undertook upon themselves if and when they saw fit. Furthermore, the very belonging to the Zionist camp and acceptance of its conception of Jewishness (national markers) and institutions in the first place (their legitimisation) was also a matter of choice, and indeed many Jews (e.g., ultra-orthodox and communists) did not endorse them and occasionally even acted against

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<sup>56</sup>D. Beetham, *The Legitimation of Power* (Hampshire & London: Macmillan, 1991), p. 43. For a short but comprehensive analysis of the concept of power, see R. Dahl, 'Power', in *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* 12 (London: Cromwell Collier & Macmillan, 1968), pp. 405-415.

<sup>57</sup>In that sense, of course, their power is itself rather flimsy. Accordingly, self-determination may be seen as a form of empowerment.

them.<sup>58</sup>

The establishment of the state of Israel, of course, equipped the Zionist movement with the ability to impose the national markers (as Zionists decide them) and to enforce its decisions through the mechanism of a sovereign state.<sup>59</sup> The same lack of freedom characterised the situation of the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip after the Oslo Accords, even before the total reoccupation of those territories by Israel: although the Palestinians had 'their own political institutions, every law the Palestinians want[ed] to pass has [had] to obtain the authorization of the Israeli authorities.'<sup>60</sup> Thus, the Palestinian National Authority

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<sup>58</sup>See D. Horowitz & M. Lissak, 'Authority Without Sovereignty: The Case of the Jewish Community in Palestine', *Government and Opposition* 8/1 (1973), pp. 48-71. See also their *Origins of the Israeli polity* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978). *Agudat Israel* (a Jewish ultra-orthodox group), for example, spoke against Zionism and the creation of a Jewish State quite from the very beginning of Zionism. Jakob Israel de Haan, probably the most articulate spokesman for *Agudat Israel*, was therefore assassinated by Zionists for this anti-Zionist stance of his in 1924.

<sup>59</sup>Note, however, that despite the general agreement among Zionists as to *some* national markers of Jewishness there are simultaneous *disagreements* about some other markers and about the relative importance of each of them. The ethnic nature of those markers, though, is common to all. See, e.g., the Israeli Law of Return (1950), sc. 4b, and Kimmerling, 'Neither Democratic nor Jewish'. See also O. Yiftachel, 'Ethnocracy: the Politics of Judaizing Israel/Palestine', in *Constellations* 6/3 (1999), pp. 364-390.

<sup>60</sup>De-Shalit, 'National Self-Determination: Political, not Cultural', p. 915. It is important to note, however, that many Palestinian nationalists would not accept de-Shalit's statement that the Palestinian nation (understood ethnically) holds its *own* political institutions. In their eyes, in its actual renunciation of the Palestinian 'historical' and 'natural' right to control Greater Palestine (which includes the whole territory that Israel now controls), the Palestinian Authority has abandoned a fundamental national marker, hence it is not national and cannot be regarded as a political institution of the nation. By the way, I am not necessarily denying here the right of return of the exiled Palestinians even to areas which are parts of the state of Israel, i.e., not only the West Bank and Gaza Strip. I would argue, though, that if such a right is to be justified, its justification should be based on principles of justice and not on ethnonational markers or, as it were, 'historical' possession or 'natural' rights to the land, unless these could somehow be reduced to principles of justice. In contrast to the view that many Palestinian nationalists hold, it is anyway clear that the right of return cannot justify an *exclusive* Palestinian control over the land.

(PNA) lacked (still does) the freedom to exercise its power, to legislate its *own* laws and to enforce them on its members. Clearly, even before the Oslo Accords and the establishment of the PNA the Palestinian national movement (PLO) also had some power in mobilising Palestinians and influencing their activities. Yet again, the PLO, just like the PNA, lacked sovereignty and could not enforce its creed upon the Palestinians at large. As such, similar to the Zionist movement before the establishment of Israel, the PLO was often challenged by alternative (often nationalist in themselves) movements, e.g., *Hamas*.

As the Israeli and Palestinian examples indicate, very often nationalists who appeal to the very same titular nation<sup>61</sup> are at odds with each other not only as to the ‘authentic national values’ that should be preserved but also as to the national markers that delimit that nation or, at least, about the relative importance of each marker.<sup>62</sup> Accordingly, in such cases nation-building and national self-determination may take different courses and will normally follow those boundary-keepers whose mobilising resources or power are greater than those of their competitors’.<sup>63</sup> At times, the contending elites might join together and cartelise into

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<sup>61</sup>In ‘appealing to the same titular nation’ I mean nationalists who use the same title (e.g., French nation or Hungarian nation) but in employing or emphasising different national markers actually include different populations under the same rubric. In G. Frege’s conceptualisation, nationalists may apply the same *sense* or mode of presentation to different *references* or ‘objects’. For a recent introduction to Frege’s conception of sense and reference, see R. L. Mendelsohn, *The Philosophy of Gottlob Frege* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), esp. ch. 3.

<sup>62</sup>For a relevant discussion on Slovak, Greek, Indian and especially Irish nationalisms, see Hutchinson, *The Dynamics of Cultural Nationalism*. On the Slovaks and Greeks, see pp. 23-30; on India, see pp. 42-46; and on the Irish see chs. 6-7.

<sup>63</sup>See, e.g., the competition between Zionism and the Jewish Labour Bund (‘league’ in Yiddish). For

one national movement which speaks in one language.<sup>64</sup> As Hutchinson shows, nationalists aim at national unity and wish to transcend internal divisions: 'by 'reviving' an ethnic historicist vision of the nation,' he says, nationalists seek 'to redirect traditionalists and modernists away from conflict and instead to unite them in the task of constructing an integrated distinctive and autonomous community, capable of competing in the modern world. This they do by introducing into the community a new nationalist ideology in which the accepted meanings of 'tradition' and 'modernity' are transformed.'<sup>65</sup>

National self-determination, understood as a 'separation (even isolation) from those who are different,'<sup>66</sup> gives the nationalist movements the freedom to use their power and to enforce the "national will". But for practising their power nationalist movements need more than freedom from external interference, that is, legitimacy: their power needs to be accepted by conationals so as to turn the nation's agents into legitimate political authorities.

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a relevant discussion, see Y. Peled, *Class and Ethnicity in the Pale* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989), and Z. Gitelman (ed.), *The Emergence of Modern Jewish Politics* (Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh University Press, 2003).

<sup>64</sup>See O. Zimmer's examination of Swiss nationalism in his *A Contested Nation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), esp. pp. 12-16 & chs. 3 & 6.

<sup>65</sup>Hutchinson, *The Dynamics of Cultural Nationalism*, p. 34. Cf. Kedourie's reference to Cypriot nationalism as a sort of hybridisation between Hellenism and orthodoxy in his *Nationalism*, p. 71. See also the *Palestinian National Charter* (1968), esp. articles 8 & 10-12. According to these articles, the supreme value is the preservation and cultivation of Palestinian and (pan) Arab national identity, for which Palestinian national unity and amalgamation of the different Palestinian groups are required. And as article 8 stresses, 'the contradictions among the Palestinian national forces are of minimal importance that must be suspended in the interest of the main conflict between Zionism and Colonialism on the one side and the Palestinian Arab people on the other.' *Palestinian National Charter* (1968), quoted in J. Nedava, *Israel-Arab Conflict* (Ramat Gan: Revivim, 1983), pp. 174-177. (In Hebrew).

<sup>66</sup>Richmond, *Global Apartheid*, p. 225.

At this stage, I wish to distinguish between the philosophical account of legitimate authority (which asks what makes the authority legitimate) and the Weberian sociological account of legitimate authority (which asks what makes people *believe* that the authority is legitimate), and to show what the nationalist answers to these two questions are.

Nationalists (similar to democrats) see the nation as the ultimate source of political authority and believe that any legitimate political power should be authorised by the nation. In that sense, nationalists see themselves as the only legitimate political authority of the nation because they claim to be the only ones who speak in its name and act on its behalf. But since nationalists present themselves as if they were speaking in the name of the nation as a collective self, the authorisation they speak about has nothing to do with the consent of individual conationals. Rather, as nationalists consider themselves to be the educators of conationals it is the consent of the latter that should follow the nationalist authority. In other words, it is not individual members of the nation to authorise the nationalist movement; they, instead, are obliged to accept it as an existing legitimate authority which obtains its legitimacy from the collective will of the nation, as it were. Accordingly, when nationalists profess to speak in the name of *a* specific people they do not necessarily involve the relevant people (in plural) in any public discourse or decision-making. As Greenfeld shows in her examination of Russian nationalism,

The "people", which the elite eventually made the central object of collective worship, was a mental construct, the conclusion of syllogism. The soul – the sign of Russianness – derived from blood and soil. The people in the sense of plebs, the toilers, animals

uncontaminated by civilization, had nothing but blood and soil. Therefore their soul – their nationality – was the purest.<sup>67</sup>

Here we can see how right Greenfeld is in claiming that such nationalism is, as she puts it, authoritarian:

Collectivist ideologies are inherently authoritarian, for, when the collectivity is seen in unitary terms, it tends to assume the character of a collective individual possessed of a single will, and someone is bound to be its interpreter. The reification of a community introduces (or preserves) fundamental inequality between those of its few members who are qualified to interpret the collective will and the many who have no such qualifications; the select few dictate to the masses who must obey.<sup>68</sup>

And as Miller adds, when referring to conservative nationalism,

...the nation is compared to the family, a human community which has built into it the unequal relation of authority between parent and child. The family requires of its junior members not merely loyalty but *piety*...It is therefore a legitimate task of the state to ensure that national myths are preserved and, to the extent to which this conflicts with liberal commitments such as those of freedom of thought and expression, liberalism must be

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<sup>67</sup>Greenfeld, *Nationalism*, p. 258. Thus, for example, Uvarov, the Education Minister of Tsar Nicholas I, publicly based his policy on the fundamental trinity of 'Autocracy, Orthodoxy, and Nationalism', but was very far from allocating any active role to the masses in this policy of his. For a similar view regarding the role of the peasants in German nationalism, see Herf, *Reactionary Modernism*, ch. 3, esp. pp. 55-59.

<sup>68</sup>Ibid., p. 11.

transcended.<sup>69</sup>

But nationalists, of course, still claim to represent the national will, and see themselves as the exclusive moral legitimate authority. At any rate, they can always claim that their critics are after all those individuals who lost their way and should be educated. As Ayatollah Khomeini declared, 'nobody else has the right to legislate and nobody may rule by that which has not been given power by God.'<sup>70</sup> And indeed Khomeini and his successors have represented, as it were, the divine power, just like other nationalists claim to be given a similar moral authority from the national collective, whether it is described as a race, a culture or otherwise. From the nationalist philosophical or moral point of view, then, it is not national self-determination that helps the nationalist movement to become a legitimate authority. Rather, because the nationalist movement is considered as the legitimate authority in the first place, national self-determination, as the movement sees it, is justified. Nationalist movements, though, still need to *convince* their conationals that they are really the authentic representatives of the nation and its only legitimate authority and should

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<sup>69</sup>Miller, *On Nationality*, pp. 124-125 (italic original). We find here, then, another similarity between the nation and the *Gemeinschaft*: nationalist movements appear as if they were the manifestation of the national whole, exactly like the father in the family (as Tönnies understands it) or the father-like master in other old *Gemeinschaften*. Indeed, the term 'father of the nation', in the name of whom nationalists normally pretend to speak, exists in all nationalist genealogies or myths, e.g., Sun Yat-Sen as the father (*Guófù*) in Taiwan, Timur in Uzbekistan, Genghis Khan in Mongolia, Miguel Hidalgo in Mexico, Lajos Kossuth in Hungary, and Carl Gustaf Emil Mannerheim in Finland. Incidentally, as V. Lal has pointed out, 'No woman remembered as the 'Mother of the Nation' would ever achieve parity with the 'Father of the Nation'...' V. Lal, 'The Mother in the 'Father of the Nation'', in *Manushi: A Journal of Women and Society* 91 (1995), pp. 27-30.

<sup>70</sup>Ayatollah Khomeini, 'Islamic Government', in Dahbour & Ishay, *The Nationalism Reader*, pp. 260-267. The quotation is from p. 266.



therefore get the support of the masses. The question, How do nationalists attempt to do that? refers to the Weberian sociological conception of legitimacy.

If nationalists see themselves as the 'authentic voice of the nation' and appeal to people who lost their attachment with their national whole, how can nationalists lead such people to identify with their nation again? How can they induce the masses to accept the nationalist movement, its ideas and power and to believe in its authority? Here too nationalists apply to education. The belief of conationals in the legitimate authority of the nationalist movement and its *right* to command is equated by nationalism with their acceptance of the national will. Thus, nationalist education aims at both the acceptance of the national will and of the nationalist movement, two missions which are in fact one and the same: I am the nation and the nation is me, the nationalist says. It is important at this stage to mention briefly what I mean by education.

Education does not simply mean schools and national-political control of curriculum. This is indeed an essential part of the general picture, as the next extract shows: 'all today's curricula and textbooks in the humanities are destined for fundamental revision if not outright rejection. And the drumming-in of atheism must be stopped immediately.'<sup>71</sup> But obviously it cannot be the whole picture: when nationalists take control over a nation, by means of self-determination, they do not try to imbue the youngsters with nationalist ideas

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<sup>71</sup>A. Solzhenitsyn, 'Rebuilding Russia', in *ibid.*, p. 175.

while leaving the elderly to pursue with their own non-national lives. When Fichte, for instance, asserts that 'The new education must consist essentially in this...that it completely destroys freedom of will in the soil which it undertakes to cultivate, and produces, on the contrary, strict necessity in the decisions of the will, the opposite being impossible,'<sup>72</sup> he definitely does not refer to schools alone.

For nationalists, then, education (or, rather, *socialisation*) means the nationalisation of the masses:<sup>73</sup> by means of sanctions, rewards, appeals to a national mythical past, and the guarantee of eternal life which is reflected, as it were, in the nation.<sup>74</sup> As suggested before, nationalists often tend to appeal to and speak in the name of the nation's ancestors and their mandatory legacy. This, as Kuran noted, is especially easy: 'Dead authorities are particularly convenient to invoke, for their teachings can be revised or reinterpreted without challenges from the authorities themselves.'<sup>75</sup>

The glorification of national wars and struggles are also used by nationalists to mobilise support and nationalise the masses. The *Futurist Manifesto* of 1909 and his proto-fascist

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<sup>72</sup>Fichte, cited in Kedourie, *Nationalism*, p. 78.

<sup>73</sup>For a relevant and illuminating discussion, see G. L. Mosse, *The Nationalization of the Masses* (Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press, 1996).

<sup>74</sup>See Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*, ch. 8.

<sup>75</sup>Kuran, *Private Truths, Public Lies*, p. 164.

leader, Filippo Tommaso Marinetti, have expressed the relations between war and nationalism (as well as the place of women in the national family) very clearly: 'we will glorify war – the world's only hygiene – militarism, patriotism, the destructive gesture of freedoms bringers, beautiful ideas worth dying for, and scorn for women.'<sup>76</sup> Many nationalists have worshipped the idea of national wars as an instrument for mobilising the conationals and melting them into one whole, as Fanon wrote:

The armed struggle mobilizes the people; that is to say, it throws them in one way and in one direction...The mobilization of the masses, when it arises out of the war of liberation, introduces into each man's consciousness the ideas of a common cause, of a national destiny, and of a collective history. In the same way, the second phase, that of the building-up of the nation, is helped on by the existence of this cement which has been mixed with blood and anger...the struggle, they say, goes on...the native's violence unifies the people.<sup>77</sup>

The same point is put forward in the autobiography of former Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir, and by figures such as Maurice Barres and Heinrich von Treitschke. As Howard shows, for nationalists 'Service to the Nation was ultimately seen in terms of military service; personal fulfilment lay in making 'the supreme sacrifice'.<sup>78</sup> The nationalist use of

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<sup>76</sup>*The Futurist Manifesto*, sc. 9, cited in Z. Sternhell, M. Sznajder & M. Asheri, *The Birth of Fascist Ideology* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), p. 29.

<sup>77</sup>F. Fanon, 'The Wretched of the Earth', in Dahbour & Ishay, *The Nationalism Reader*, pp. 282-283.

<sup>78</sup>Howard, *The Causes of Wars*, p. 27. Cf. Y. Shavit, 'Uri Zvi Greenberg: Conservative Revolutionarism and National Messianism', in *The Jerusalem Quarterly* 48 (1988), pp. 63-72.

national wars, though, is not expressed only, and definitely not always, in actual conscription or warfare but also (perhaps mostly) in the glorification of historical battles, as if conationals throughout the generations were serving in the same platoon. The appeal to historical battles, however, is often used for justifying present wars in the name of the national ancestors and past martyrs who are taken to represent the real will of the nation. Thus, the eternal life of the nation and its martyrs takes priority over present living individuals: 'loyalty, discipline, selfless denial, and sacrifice' are those virtues which place 'the good of the national *Gemeinschaft* over that of the individual.'<sup>79</sup> Z. Tomac's words in regard to the Croatians should resonate like Edvard Munch's *Scream*: 'We, the living,' he says, 'no longer bury the dead – the dead, more and more often, bury us alive.'<sup>80</sup>

In the Weberian sociological sense, the legitimation of nationalist movements begins before the achievement of self-determination and to a great extent the latter even depends on the former. In other words, nationalist movements need to get at least *some* degree of legitimacy from *some* conationals to have the ability to advance, let alone to achieve, self-determination. But once achieved, national self-determination underpins the ability of nationalists to gain support and legitimacy from the members of the nation because it gives them a powerful political mechanism, especially when self-determination takes the form of

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<sup>79</sup>Spengler, paraphrased in Herf, *Reactionary Modernism*, p. 51.

<sup>80</sup>Z. Tomac, *The Struggle for the Croatian State* (Zagreb: Profikon, 1993), p. 19. See also K. Marx, *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*, in MSW, pp. 300-301.

a sovereign state. Thus, since nationalism is 'Often unable to extend beyond the educated strata, it is forced to adopt state-oriented strategies by which to institutionalize its ideals in the social order. In this guise, although still an elite movement, revivalism is often of considerable political import.'<sup>81</sup>

Through national self-determination nationalists can monopolise education and regulate information,<sup>82</sup> hold the means for military conscription, and control means of rewards and sanctions. Thus, once a nationalist movement realises self-determination it can reduce foreign influence, indoctrinate conationals, practice its 'moral authority', and fortify its political legitimacy. In brief, the freedom nationalist movements get to exercise their power also gives them the means for underpinning their legitimacy and realising, as it were, the national will.

In the light of Weber's typology of legitimate authority, it seems to me that nationalism fits the traditional basis. One should note, though, that like Weber I am referring here to archetypes, and that the basis of legitimacy of nationalist movements may combine tradition with charisma or even rationality. Tradition, however, is the only basis of legitimacy that each and every nationalism involves to define 'the boundaries of possible belief and debate,

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<sup>81</sup>Hutchinson, *The Dynamics of Cultural Nationalism*, p. 17.

<sup>82</sup>See Richmond, *Global Apartheid*, p. 226.

and the terms in which any debate must be conducted,<sup>83</sup> i.e., the realms of the thinkable, the unthinkable and (eventually) the unthought. The appeal of nationalists to a mythical authentic and ancient nation – its original identity and markers, golden age and wars – in order to mobilise the masses is indeed an appeal to national tradition, even if mythical (as tradition often is), a tradition which sets the boundaries of the public discourse within the national institutions and in society at large. Obviously, the boundaries of discourse are different from one nation to another and evolve in time. But in any event, those boundaries are set in accordance with the national markers and tradition which remain ethnic in their nature.<sup>84</sup>

As the last paragraph implies, not all nationalist movements and figures ban any form of public discourse and debate, and many may even allow (*provided some conditions are met*) a sort of participation of “apostates” and even of *foreigners* in the public discourse and even in national institutions.<sup>85</sup> Where such participation is allowed, though, it is so only when the

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<sup>83</sup>Beetham, *The Legitimation of Power*, p. 76. Cf. E. Burke, *Reflections on the Revolution in France* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1968).

<sup>84</sup>Thus, for example, all Zionists agree that Israel should be a Jewish state which, by definition, promotes the Jewish national tradition or identity. But what Jewish tradition or identity mean or include is highly controversial among Zionists, some of whom argue that it is limited to the Jewish religion credo (itself a moot question) while others contend that it covers, e.g., ‘canonical’ texts of secular Jewish personalities. What makes those personalities Jewish, though, is highly agreed and based on ethnic definitions of Jewishness. See Shimoni, *The Zionist Ideology*, p. 252 & passim. For an examination of debates about French national identity and tradition, see K. M. Baker, *Inventing the French Revolution* (Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), chs. 2-4.

<sup>85</sup>Those conditions and the circumstances under which they may emerge will be specified later. I will also argue, however, that such participation, when allowed, does not entail *equal* voice in the public discourse and always boils down to a division of the citizenry into first-class and second-class citizens.

nation is already self-determined,<sup>86</sup> and that for two basic reasons. First, very often once the nation becomes self-determined it contains non-nationals in its midst. Not all nationalists, despite their common aspiration to revive the ethnic nation and achieve an exclusive national rule, will be ready to take measures such as genocide, expulsion or even total gagging of foreigners or national “apostates”. As Hastings rightly observed, ‘The extreme nationalist will indeed regard all other values as insignificant compared with the imagined requirements of the nation but many nationalists would see those requirements as limited *to some extent* by other requirements of morality, religion or even the rights of other communities.’<sup>87</sup>

Secondly, when nationalists are still involved in a struggle to national self-determination and lack sovereign institutions, they will naturally appeal exclusively to conationals in order to mobilise *them*. Moreover, in lacking sovereign institutions nationalists (and the nation at large) cannot rule non-nationals, hence do not have any *formal* political responsibility for them or commitment to involve them in deciding the national agenda. This, of course, is in addition (as noted before) to the reluctance of “apostates” and foreigners *themselves* to be

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<sup>86</sup>One may reasonably argue that this contention of mine is inconsistent with my former argument that, according to nationalists genuine self-determination requires ethnic homogeneity of the political institutions and a commitment of those who conduct them to protect and advance the national features, i.e., the nationalist creed. Indeed, such aspirations reflect the nationalist *ideal*, but, as we shall see later (see sc. 6.2), when facing *reality* nationalists are often compelled to moderate *some* of their ideal demands in order to save or materialise others.

<sup>87</sup>Hastings, *The Construction of Nationhood*, p. 32 (italic mine). The extent of those other requirements is also, of course, different from one case to another and from one era to another.

involved in the nationalist movement, an involvement they can avoid insofar as the movement is as yet not sovereign.

In many cases, then, even *some* nationalists do not impose a narrow substantial conception of the good on the public and enables a debate as to that good. They do, nonetheless, still seek the good of their nation as a collective whole, which entails the preservation and advancement of its identity and tradition. This means that (i) the boundaries of legitimate debate and controversy are limited to the broader conception of the national good (the preservation of its markers, identity and tradition), and accordingly (ii) those who have an equal voice in the public deliberation must themselves be devoted to that broader conception of the national good, i.e., they must accept the nationalist credo and undertake its promotion.

In such cases, then, the nationalist movement (and thereafter the nation-state) may be divided into different parties and organisations which debate and confront each other and even compete in elections. The elected representatives in these cases form, to use Weber's words, a legal authority with a legal-rational basis for its legitimacy. Yet again, the debate itself and those who have an equal voice in it are determined and limited by the national tradition (its ways of allocating membership and of marking the national features) as the nationalist movement at large interprets it.<sup>88</sup> In that sense, the unequal relation of authority,

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<sup>88</sup>Cf. N. M. Stolzenberg, 'A Tale of Two Villages (or, Legal Realism Comes to Town)', in Shapiro



that Miller ascribes to conservative nationalism, and the fundamental inequality between those who are qualified to interpret the collective will and the many who are not qualified, that Greenfeld recognises as authoritarian nationalism, are both still characteristic of nationalism even where its entrepreneurs allow the kind of public debate that I have just sketched.

Now note that I was very cautious here and preferred to suggest that nationalists *determine* the national tradition rather than *invent* it.<sup>89</sup> For ‘inventing’ implies the creation of something totally new, while ‘determining’ does not. If, as we saw, nationalists need to convince people to accept them as the authentic voice of the nation, then they cannot ignore the beliefs and values that prevail amongst those people.<sup>90</sup> Thus, in their appeal to what they see as the eternal nation nationalists do not simply create tradition in the way that Frankenstein formed the Creature, i.e., it does not invent something from nothing. Rather, nationalists construct and bias these values and beliefs for their own advantage: they emphasise and exaggerate some aspects, marginalise and push out others, and in between also succeed in inventing some ‘traditional hybrids.’<sup>91</sup> As Brass puts it,

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& Kymlicka, *NOMOS XXXIX: Ethnicity and Group Rights*, p. 322.

<sup>89</sup>On the invention of tradition, see E. Hobsbawm & T. Ranger (eds.), *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).

<sup>90</sup>For a relevant discussion, see Q. Skinner, ‘Some Problems in the Analysis of Political Thought and Action’, in *Political Theory* 2 (1974), pp. 277-303.

<sup>91</sup>See Kedourie, *Nationalism*, pp. 69-71.

...political and economic elites who make use of ethnic group attributes are constrained by the beliefs and values which exist within the group and which limit the kinds of appeals which can be made. At the same time, the process by which elites mobilize ethnic identities simplifies those beliefs and values, distorts them, and selects those which are politically useful rather than central to the belief systems of the people in question.<sup>92</sup>

‘[T]he choice of the leading symbol of differentiation’, adds Brass, ‘depends upon the interests of the elite group that takes up the ethnic cause.’<sup>93</sup> So in determining the national tradition, nationalists also decide what are the national markers and, accordingly, who are the members of the nation.

In an age of a widespread identity crisis, and unfortunately history affirms that, nationalism has succeeded to thrust its way forward and to acquire the faith of the masses through the ways I mentioned before and to become the most powerful basis for the legitimation of political authorities. As we shall see in the next chapter, an integral part of any national tradition refers to the concept of ‘homeland’, in which national self-determination is supposed to take place. As we shall see, the attempts to take control over the homeland are normally taken by nationalists as a necessary activity of any political movement that pretends to speak in the name of the nation, and as a precondition for the integrity and

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<sup>92</sup>Brass, *Ethnicity and Nationalism*, pp. 16-17.

<sup>93</sup>Ibid., p. 30.

legitimacy of such a movement.

**6****HOMELAND AND FOREIGNERS****6.1 NATION AND HOMELAND**

The nationalist education of the masses, as said earlier, applies to the national past and tradition. Basically, when nationalists apply to such a past and pretend to speak in the name of the authentic nation they refer to 'national ancestors', with whom present conationals are supposed to have a connection of blood, and to 'a national homeland', as a connection of that blood group to a specific land: 'The nationalism of real-world nationalists characteristically has two elements, often described as blood and soil. Less poetically, the first is the identification of a nation or people as a descent group; the second is the claim that there exists a certain national territory or homeland which the members of the descent group are entitled to control.'<sup>1</sup> Such a nationalist belief in the relations of blood and soil is expressed very clearly in the writings of Barres:

We shall derive profit by turning to the great moments of French history, by living in our thoughts with all our dead, with all the experiences of our native land...Nothing is more valuable in forming a people's soul than the voice of our ancestors. Our soil gives us a discipline, for we are only the continuation of the dead...We are the products of that collective being which speaks in us. Let the influence of our ancestors be enduring. Let the

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<sup>1</sup>Barry, 'Statism and Nationalism: A Cosmopolitan Critique', pp. 16-17.

sons be vigorous and honest. Let the nation be one.<sup>2</sup>

As I said before, Gellner argues that nationalism aspires for external autonomy and internal homogeneity. I applied Gellner's argument to the national institutions, but Gellner's original argument refers to political-*territorial* units. Thus, he says, 'Nationalism is primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and national unit should be congruent,' and 'nationalism is a theory of political legitimacy, which requires that ethnic boundaries should not cut across political ones, and, in particular, that ethnic boundaries within a given state – a contingency already formally excluded by the principle in its general formulation – should not separate the power-holders from the rest.' Gellner also stresses that

There is a variety of ways in which the nationalist principle can be violated. The political boundary of a given state can fail to include all the members of the appropriate nation; or it can include them all but also include some foreigners; or it can fail in both these ways at once, not incorporating all the nationals and yet also including some non-nationals. Or again, a nation may live, unmixed with foreigners, in a multiplicity of states, so that no single state can claim to be *the* national one.<sup>3</sup>

If we apply Gellner's argument to the nationalist idea of homeland, then it becomes clear that for nationalists the ideal situation (i.e., an ideally self-determined nation) is: a nation

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<sup>2</sup>M. Barres, 'The Undying Spirit of France, 1902, 1917', in Snyder, *The Dynamics of Nationalism*, pp. 125-126.

<sup>3</sup>All quotations in this paragraph are from Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, p. 1 (*italic original*).

that controls its homeland as a whole through its sovereign institutions and in which only conationals and the whole body of conationals live. Thus, instead of Gellner's idea of *twofold* congruence (between the national and the political units), we should say that the nationalist ideal is of a *triple* congruence between the national, the political and the territorial units. Following Gellner's citation, it is also obvious that for nationalists the ideal form of self-determination is that of a sovereign nation-state in the homeland, but it is still not the only form of self-determination that nationalism may accept. As Barry puts it,

A nation, understood as a collection of people unified by language and culture in this way, needs a state in order to create the institutional framework within which the common language and culture can be protected and the common values pursued through a variety of public policy measures. A weaker version allows that subunits (cantons, provinces, states) in a federal state may—on condition that they control linguistic and cultural issues—provide a satisfactory alternative to an independent state. Either way, the notion is that a political authority must have sufficient autonomy to embody, as it were, and to protect the distinctive language and culture of its people.<sup>4</sup>

Here we can see another identity between the nationalist conception of the nation and the *Gemeinschaft*: the nation has its own collective property, that is, a homeland, which must be controlled by the nation alone and in accordance with its collective will. Nationalists believe that the nation is not only entitled to control its ancestral homeland and to realise

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<sup>4</sup>Barry, 'Statism and Nationalism: A Cosmopolitan Critique', pp. 20-21. Note that Barry mentions language and culture only as examples of ethnic markers.

its self-determination there; it is rather a national decree to take control over the homeland because it is considered as an integral part of the legacy of the national ancestors, hence as a fundamental element of the national identity and tradition. Consequently, any realisation of national self-determination out of the relevant territory is not regarded as full or genuine self-determination and may even be seen as lack of self-determination altogether. Thus, for example, when B. Z. Herzl, the founder of Zionism, called for a sort of Jewish autonomy in Argentina, he saw it only as a temporary 'night-shelter' for the persecuted Jews and emphasised that only in the land of Israel ('the land of our ancestors that we will never forget') the Jewish people can genuinely become self-determined.<sup>5</sup> All similar ideas of Jewish *temporary* autonomous 'night-shelters' outside the land of Israel were successively rejected by the Zionist Congress and led to the abdication of few 'pro-shelter' Zionists from the Congress and the establishment of the (insignificant) Jewish Territorial Organisation (ITO) in 1905.<sup>6</sup>

Moreover, many nationalists claim that even if the nation does achieve a sort of self-determination in the homeland, but controls only part of the land, the nation is not completely self-determined and should therefore take control over the missing parts, by conquest if necessary. For such nationalists, if the political institutions do not endeavour to

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<sup>5</sup>See B. Z. Herzl, 'The Jews' State', in *Zionist Writings* (Tel Aviv: Mitzpe, 1950), p. 35. (In Hebrew). See also 'The Land of Israel' in the same book, pp. 210-213.

<sup>6</sup>Shimoni, *The Zionist Ideology*, p. 91.

control the homeland as a whole, let alone are ready to renounce parts of it, these institutions are not national enough to be legitimised. Now there are still two questions that need to be answered: first, what exactly are the boundaries of the homeland and how are they to be determined as such? Second, if the ancestral homeland of a nation is currently populated by foreigners, in which they might even constitute the majority, how would nationalists treat them?

Nationalists, we saw, aspire to redeem the nation from its decline and to bring it back to its golden age as it allegedly was before the identity crisis of its members, or before the interference of foreigners. The national golden age, however, is not associated only with the identification of nationals with their national whole but also with the integrity of the national homeland as its boundaries were during that golden age. Nationalism, then, stretches the boundaries of the national homeland in both time and space: it goes back to this stage in history, often a mythical one, which is entitled as the national golden age, and in which the relevant territory was under the control of the nation and when the territorial boundaries under its control were larger than at any other point in history. Nationalists thereon draw the boundaries of the homeland in accordance with these largest historical ones, and occasionally demand a return to the "authentic" area.

As L. Brilmayer puts it, 'in assessing national claims, nationalists tend to take as the baseline – the point against which claims should be justly measured – their own historical apogee,



the point of their own greatest power.<sup>7</sup> Thus, Hungarian nationalists tend to define their homeland in accordance with Hungary's borders before the Treaty of Trianon – which included, amongst others, Transylvania (Erdely, in Hungarian), and present Slovakia (Felvidek). The harbingers of modern Slovak nationalism claimed that their homeland is delimited by the borders of their Greater Moravian state from the 9<sup>th</sup> century, and as Brilmayer illustrates,

...the Serbs in the former Yugoslavia measure the status quo against the point in time when they possessed control over the greatest amount of territory; the Chinese start the clock running at the point in time when (according to their view of the facts) China exercised dominion over Tibet; and Palestinians prefer the status quo of the beginning of this [20<sup>th</sup>; O.C.] century rather than two millenia previous, when (according to their rival claimants) the land was a Jewish community.<sup>8</sup>

Nationalists, as previously mentioned, believe that the nation's "ownership" of its homeland is a function of ancestral connections between the two, or what I have referred to as relations of blood and soil. In principle, then, nationalists that stake a claim to a particular land would consider this land as belonging to their nation whether the current population there is mostly national or not. In other words, the numerical balance between conationals and non-nationals is in principle irrelevant for the nationalist attitude to the national

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<sup>7</sup>L. Brilmayer, 'The Moral Significance of Nationalism', in *Notre Dame Law Review* 71/1 (1995), p. 20.

<sup>8</sup>*Ibid.*, *ibid.* For a similar point regarding Polish nationalism, see Kedourie, *Nationalism*, pp. 115-116.

homeland and to the national right, or rather the obligation, to control it.<sup>9</sup> Thus, for example, in January 1991, six months before the outbreak of the war in Yugoslavia, Slobodan Milosevic declared in a meeting with ambassadors from EU states that if Yugoslavia breaks up, Serbia would strive to establish Greater Serbia, which will include parts of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. In accordance with this declaration, Serb nationalists took control over Srebrenica and stated that this is a part of Greater Serbia, although according to the census of 1990 75.2% of Srebrenica population were Bosnian-Muslims.<sup>10</sup>

Nationalists, we should recall, believe that individuals cannot change their nationality by an act of will and assimilate in another nation than the one they are born to. Whatever an individual foreigner may do, then, he cannot be regarded as a member of the nation that claims for the land because his behaviour will always be associated, as it were, with his inborn national characteristics. A well-known experiment that may illustrate that point comes to mind here.<sup>11</sup> In this experiment, a few students (the impersonators), considered as pathologically sane, were instructed to complain about voices they hear and to hospitalise

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<sup>9</sup>See Horowitz, 'Self-Determination: Politics, Philosophy, and Law', p. 438. For this reason I prefer to use the term 'foreigners' rather than 'minorities'.

<sup>10</sup>See J. W. Honig & N. Both, *Srebrenica* (London: Penguin Books, 1996). Srebrenica, of course, is only one example of Serbian nationalist attitude to Bosnia at large (not to mention Kosovo), in which the Serbs comprised before the war only about 30% of the overall population. Nowadays, ten years after the Muslim massacre by the Serbs, only 40% in Srebrenica are Muslims. See D. Rohde, 'Bosnian Muslims Retrace Steps of Those Killed in 1995', in *The New York Times*, July 11, 2005.

<sup>11</sup>See D. L. Rosenham, 'On Being Sane in Insane Places', in *Science* 179 (1973), pp. 167-185.

themselves in *different* mental asylums. Once hospitalised, the impersonators were told to behave as usual (i.e., normally) in less than no time and to tell the asylum staff that the voices totally disappeared. Although all the staffs were informed in advance about the upcoming experiment (without mentioning the specific dates, of course), no one exposed the impersonators and, instead, ascribed any behaviour and declaration of the impersonators to their, as it were, insanity.

As the gestalt psychological school (within the realm of which the said experiment took place) indicates, 'there are "central" personality traits...which are so powerful that they markedly color the meaning of other information in forming an impression of a given personality.'<sup>12</sup> If in the said experiment the alleged insanity of the impersonators was seen as such a personality trait, for nationalists it is the alleged inborn nationality that constitutes those traits.<sup>13</sup> As the screenwriter Hanif Kureishi wrote, 'The British complained incessantly that the Pakistanis wouldn't assimilate. This meant they wanted the Pakistanis to be exactly like them. But of course even then they would have rejected them...The British were doing the assimilating: they assimilated Pakistanis to their world view. They saw them as dirty, ignorant and less than human – worthy of abuse and violence.'<sup>14</sup> As Kureishi's words show,

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<sup>12</sup>Ibid., p. 173. See also S. E. Asch, *Social Psychology* (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1952).

<sup>13</sup>Cf. Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, pp. 64-73, esp. pp. 70-72.

<sup>14</sup>H. Kureishi, 'London and Karachi', in *Patriotism: the Making and Unmaking of British National Identity* vol. II, ed. R. Samuel (London & New York: Routledge, 1989), pp. 272-273.

very often the foreigners are not only seen as *essentially* different, but also as inferior and doomed to rejection.

With this belief on the background, and its ideal of the triple congruence, when a nationalist movement stakes a claim to a specific land which is populated by foreigners,<sup>15</sup> what could be its attitude towards them? This question takes us from the pure theoretical examination of nationalism or the nationalist *ideal* to the realm of political realism.

## 6.2 REALPOLITIK IN THE NATIONALIST POLICY

Much more often than not, the land to which nationalists stake a claim is also populated by non-nationals. Accordingly, the nationalist ideal of the triple congruence can very rarely be realised in full, at least not without serious combat, brutal coercion or even genocidal practices. If the triple congruence appears as unrealistic or too costly, then nationalists may well go for a double congruence. In principle, then, nationalists might (i) give up those parts of the homeland that comprise many non-nationals and thus increase the congruence between the national and the political units,<sup>16</sup> or (ii) take political control of the homeland

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<sup>15</sup>Note that in foreigners I mean non-nationals, i.e, those who are identified as foreigners by the nationalists who stake the claim to the land. Evidently, in many cases those who are considered as foreigners are actually the indigenous people of the land.

<sup>16</sup>Thus, for example, in justifying their support of Sharon's Disengagement Plan and, furthermore, a total withdrawal of Israel from the occupied territories, the so-called Zionist-leftists emphasise the need to relinquish those parts of the homeland staffed by Palestinians in order to attain Jewish majority in the state of Israel, hence to secure the *Jewish* state. In other words, they aspire to enlarge the congruence between the national and the political units by retreating from what they still see as parts of the *Jewish* homeland. Incidentally, the 'Zionist-left' also says that only such a retreat would secure Israel as a

as a whole and “reduce” the number of non-nationals within it.<sup>17</sup>

Theoretically there is also another option, i.e., (iii) giving up the idea of a political unit altogether so as to achieve a congruence between the national and the territorial units. There are a few reasons why such an option should be regarded as a nonsensical one, but it would suffice for our purpose here only to indicate that it cannot be regarded as a *nationalist* (or even a *national*) one. As indicated right in the beginning of the former chapter, nationalism is largely a doctrine of national self-determination. Evidently, the third option just mentioned is at odds with *any form* of self-determination, hence it cannot be characteristic of nationalism.

Basically, then, nationalists aspire to reduce the number of non-nationals in the national homeland and thereby also to prevent their involvement in, or influence on, the political institutions that the nation may form in “its” land. This “reduction” may be executed through genocide (as in the Nazi case), massive deportation (as Armenia did when it deported all Azerbaijanis from its area), or by encouraging conationals to migrate to their

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*democracy*. What it actually suggests is that, if the majority in Israel would not be Jewish, then the state would have to infringe on non-Jews’ rights in order to preserve the Jewishness of the state, which entails that the state will not be democratic. The question, then, is not of numbers *per se* but of sovereignty: not how many gentiles reside in the state but who should be the sovereign in that state. Accordingly, those gentile citizens (mostly Palestinians) that reside in Israel proper (i.e., where there is no military occupying rule) are still not regarded as equal citizens, even by those who are identified (grotesquely enough) as leftists.

<sup>17</sup>There is also a possibility of combining those two options: nationalists may forego some areas staffed by non-nationals while clinging to others in which there are also many non-nationals, of whom they may then try to be rid of, or, at least, to deny them equal treatment, as just exemplified by the case of Israel.

homeland so as to reduce the number of foreigners in comparison to that of conationals, as Serbia did in Kosovo alongside its genocidal policies there. Another possibility, as advocated by the Israeli party *Moledet* ('Homeland') – now a faction in the far-right National Union Party, is called 'voluntary transfer'.<sup>18</sup> The idea here is to persecute and harass the foreigners so as to make them flee the land, of their own free will as it were. As MK Binyamin Elon, *Moledet*'s Chairman, said to former MK Shulamit Aloni, 'You are opposed to transfer, so we will embitter their lives until they transfer themselves.'<sup>19</sup>

Very often, however, nationalists allow foreigners to live in the national homeland provided they remain under the domination of the relevant nation, which itself remains the sole agent of sovereignty; international pressure, lack of power, economic needs (e.g., the need for cheap labour), and even moral considerations may all prevent a policy of "reduction", although there are always and everywhere nationalist factions that insist on the expulsion

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<sup>18</sup>Cf. J. Casey's call for the voluntary repatriation of British Indians and West Indians, in his 'One Nation: the Politics of Race', in *Salisbury Review* 1/1 (1982), pp. 23-28.

<sup>19</sup>Quoted by Shulamit Aloni in her 'Israel's Wonderful Youth', *Haaretz*, July 10, 2005. Incidentally, in July 2005 the Israeli *Knesset* enacted (by support of overwhelming majority of MKs, including Prime Minister Sharon) a law for the commemoration of Rehavam Zeevi's legacy. Zeevi, the Israeli tourism minister who was assassinated in October 2001, was the founder and head of the *Moledet* party who more than once referred to the Palestinians as 'lice' and a 'cancer'. It is quite clear, then, what the legacy of such a person (now legally entrenched) entails. In fact, discrimination of the Palestinian *citizens* and negligence of their needs were always carried out by the Israeli governments, particularly in Jerusalem where such policies are employed 'in order to urge the Arabs to emigrate out of Jerusalem's jurisdiction.' M. Klein, *The Jerusalem Question in the Arab-Israeli Peace Negotiations – Arab Stands* (Jerusalem: the Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies, 1995), pp. 35-40 & 86. (In Hebrew). The citation is from p. 36. For an example of such a policy, see G. Myre, 'Israeli Barrier in Jerusalem Will Cut Off 55,000 Arabs', in *The New York Times*, July 11, 2005.

of the foreigners, often accusing them for, e.g., 'taking *our* jobs'.<sup>20</sup> The presence of foreigners, though, may be tolerated by nationalists if and only if the demographic and/or power relations between conationals and foreigners are clearly in favour of the former and there is no foreseeable risk of any significant influence (let alone domination) of the latter on the national institutions.

As G. Smith has shown, although in both post-Soviet Latvia and Estonia Russian descendants were 'categorized as social and political agents of sovietization' and seen as 'a sociocultural threat, as illegal migrants, and as politically disloyal,' it was easier on Estonian nationalists to reach a compromise on the (still restrictive and exclusionary) citizenship laws because they felt more secure against their Russian population than Latvian nationalists did. Thus, 'the greater willingness of Estonia's political factions to reach a compromise on the citizenship question, undoubtedly made easier than in Latvia by Estonians feeling more comfortable about the greater security of their ethno-demographic

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<sup>20</sup>For the very same reasons some nationalists may even support the "imports" of foreigners, although they generally oppose any kind of foreign immigration. The most common incentive in "importing" foreigners is, of course, economic: the interest in cheap labour. Few nationalists, though, may even agree to grant political asylum to foreigners, although that will normally follow political interests rather than moral considerations. As many noted, granting asylum to refugees from the east bloc during the cold war was conceived as a political triumph, and it was that victory which drove their acceptance. Furthermore, granting such an asylum was always determined in accordance with the seekers' ethnicity, especially the colour of their skin. For a deep scrutiny of the issue of restricted immigration and asylum giving in Britain, see S. Rushdie, 'The New Empire within Britain', in his *Imaginary Homelands* (Harmondsworth: Granta, 1991), pp. 129-138. For an ethical examination of immigration, see B. Barry & R. E. Goodin (eds.), *Free Movement* (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992).

ratio.’<sup>21</sup>

As just suggested, wherever foreigners are allowed to stay in the national homeland, they are expected to live under the domination of the relevant (and sovereign) nation and the rule of *its* state. That, of course, means that the foreigners will always be regarded and treated by the national institutions as second class citizens, or, even worse, subjects.<sup>22</sup> In cases where the political discourse (and system) is particularly exclusive and limited to a very narrow stratum of 'national interpreters and educators', and individual liberties are restricted in the first place, foreigners are normally further marginalised, delegitimised (even dehumanised) and discriminated against in additional ways: residential segregation and restrictions of movement, legal limitations on worship and language usage, poor or unavailable housing, education and healthcare, inaccessibility to jobs and material resources, and discriminatory treatment by the police and the courts – are all characteristic of the nationalist attitude towards the 'others'. Naturally, this discrimination on the institutional level (what Richmond calls 'macro racism') makes the foreigner more vulnerable to assaults on the part of individual conationals ('micro racism'): the 'others', as Kureishi puts it, are seen as 'worthy of abuse and violence'.

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<sup>21</sup>G. Smith, 'The Ethnic Democracy Thesis and the Citizenship Question in Estonia and Latvia', in *Nationalities Papers* 24/2 (1996), p. 204.

<sup>22</sup>In Israel, for example, even Palestinians and Lebanese people who collaborated with the Israeli occupying forces in the West Bank, Gaza Strip and Lebanon were often denied shelter in Israel. Those who were let in, though, were hardly accommodated and always denied citizenship altogether or maltreated, e.g., by being forced to live in (usually hostile) Palestinian communities within Israel.



In cases where the political discourse is less restricted (i.e., when it is limited by the national tradition, yet enables the existence of a plurality of voices within it which may even compete in elections), foreigners are usually excluded from this discourse,<sup>23</sup> e.g., by depriving them of the legal status of citizenship altogether (as Russia did with some minorities within its area), or by *practically* preventing them from voting, let alone being elected (as was the case with the black population in the southern states of the US).<sup>24</sup>

Another way of excluding the foreigners is to allow them to take part in the public discourse and even in national elections and institutions, but to prevent them of having an equal voice in them, or, as Y. Peled puts it: to deny them the status of republican citizenship, i.e., the right to take part in deciding the national common good (as Israel does in regard to its Palestinian citizens).<sup>25</sup> This can be done by, e.g., delegitimising (even outlawing) any challenge on the national character and “ownership” of the state, i.e., by limiting *some* liberties and rights (e.g., freedom of speech and association) of the foreigners. Thus, Basic Law: The Knesset (Amendment No. 9) of 1985 reads as follows:

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<sup>23</sup>For a relevant discussion, see P. Panayi, 'Methods of Minority Exclusion in the Liberal Nation State', a paper given at the conference *Nationalism and Racism in the Liberal Order* (Usti nad Labem, the Czech Republic, July, 1997).

<sup>24</sup>In practical prevention I mean to include different devices by which a specific population is excluded from any involvement in the collective decision-making, even if there is no *legal* obstacle. Thus, for example, black Americans in the southern states could legally vote after the Voting Rights Act of 1965, but many of them were (often physically) not allowed to register to vote or were compelled to pass literacy tests which were premeditated so as to fail them and thwart their legal right to vote.

<sup>25</sup>See Y. Peled, 'Ethnic Democracy and the Legal Construction of Citizenship: Arab Citizens and the Jewish State', in *American Political Science Review* 86/1 (1992), pp. 432-443.

**'Prevention of participation of candidates' list**

7A. A candidates' list shall not participate in elections to the Knesset if its objects or actions, expressly or by implication, include one of the following:

- (1) negation of the existence of the State of Israel as the state of the Jewish people;
- (2) negation of the democratic character of the State;
- (3) incitement to racism.<sup>26</sup>

However, when foreigners are allowed to participate in the political discourse and happen to succeed the domination of the nation, then it is most likely that nationalists will try to restore the national control and may even resort to violence, as happened for instance in Fiji in 1987, when 'an election was won by a party which predominantly represented the descendants of the Indians originally imported as indentured laborers who stayed on (and some who came independently). Then the government was promptly overthrown by the army, overwhelmingly staffed by native Fijians.<sup>27</sup> It is important to note, though, that the

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<sup>26</sup>I find it very hard to see how the first section can become compatible with sections (2) and (3). Moreover, as already noted in regard to the *Moledet* party, the *Knesset* is not exactly clear of racist lists. In all fairness, though, the Israeli High Court has continuously permitted the participation in elections to the *Knesset* of parties that explicitly negate 'the existence of the State of Israel as the state of the Jewish people.' The very existence of section (1), though, entails a formal restriction on gentile's rights in Israel. Taken as a whole, the Amendment reminds me of that restaurateur who insisted that no Jews and racists be let in to his business. It is rather clear why he himself should not enter.

<sup>27</sup>Barry, 'Statism and Nationalism: A Cosmopolitan Critique', p. 43. For a relevant discussion, see R. R. Premdas, 'Balance and Ethnic Conflict in Fiji', in *The Politics of Ethnic Conflict Regulation*, eds. J. McGarry & B. O'Leary (London & New York: Routledge, 1993), pp. 251-274.

institutional exclusion of foreigners is often accompanied with discrimination and prosecution which are typically associated with the more exclusive and restricting political regimes. Thus, the main critique of Amnesty International Report 1997 of the states that are commonly called 'liberal democracies' refers to their ill-treatment of foreigners and asylum seekers.<sup>28</sup>

It seems that the most common form of exclusion and marginalisation of foreigners is after all carried out by means of residential segregation and poor access to different services and resources. As Fredrickson noted, the bad socioeconomic lot of blacks in the *northern* states of the US that led to the bloody riot in Watts district in Los Angeles (1965) was not purely an unintended by-product of rampant capitalism, market failures or running rife economic competition:

...the end of legal segregation and racially discriminatory voting restrictions in the southern states did not address the main problems of poor, urban blacks, who suffered less from a denial of their civil rights than from unemployment, inadequate housing, and limited educational opportunities. Fully enfranchised, they often did not bother to vote because none of the parties or candidates addressed their problems. The residential segregation they suffered from was sustained by a bewildering complex of laws, regulations, and institutional practices that were ostensibly impartial or color-blind but had the effect of disadvantaging

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<sup>28</sup>See 'Refugees: Human rights have no borders', in *Amnesty International Report 1997* (London: Amnesty International Publications, 1997), esp. pp. 4-15. See also the sections on Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Switzerland and the UK in this report.

blacks more than whites.<sup>29</sup>

On the whole, all forms of exclusion and marginalisation that were depicted so far boil down to one policy commonly employed by nationalists, though in different extents: unequal treatment in accordance with the nationalist division of the state's residents (citizens or otherwise) into first- and second-class denizens. One may argue, though, that the very existence of public discourse and elections, in which foreigners are also eligible to participate, signifies that the political system or state in question is necessarily democratic, especially if the results in the elections are based on the principle of majority rule. But As J. McGarry and B. O'Leary argue, 'Democracy in its most primitive meaning is understood as 'majority rule'.' But, they add, "'majority rule' can become an instrument of hegemonic control,' which they identify as 'ethnic domination.'<sup>30</sup> In the upcoming chapters I shall argue that such ethnic domination (just like any other form of hegemonic control) does not simply point to a democracy of low quality, as S. Smootha argues,<sup>31</sup> but to something which is not democratic at all because it contradicts the most basic democratic requirements.

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<sup>29</sup>Fredrickson, *Black Liberation*, p. 291. As Malcolm X once asked, what use is there in having the right to sit at the same restaurant with the whiteman if the blackman has no money to actualise that right? Cf. Australian socioeconomic marginalisation of Aboriginals, in S. Castles, B. Cope, M. Kalantzis & M. Morrissey, 'Australia: Multi-Ethnic Community Without Nationalism?', in Hutchinson & Smith, *Ethnicity*, esp. p. 364.

<sup>30</sup>J. McGarry & B. O'Leary, 'Eliminating and Managing Ethnic Differences', in Hutchinson & Smith, *Ethnicity*, pp. 339-340.

<sup>31</sup>S. Smootha, 'The State of Israel's Regime: A Civil Democracy, a Non-Democracy, or an Ethnic Democracy?', in *Israeli Sociology* 2/2 (2000), see esp. pp. 567-568 (in Hebrew).

### 6.3 THE MISODEMOS

Another distinction that nationalists commonly make, which is also connected to the division of the population into first- and second-class citizens, is between devoted conationals, i.e., those who are committed to the national tradition and its limited discourse, and those who violate this discourse and try to transcend it (the 'misodemos', to use Polycrates's term in his accusation of Socrates). The latter, then, are also excluded from the public discourse or at least do not enjoy an equal voice in it, and are often accused as traitors who betray the national will or as 'patricides' who violate the ancestral bond and should therefore be amended by the nationalist movement or state.<sup>32</sup> Thus, for instance, individuals who were regarded as authentic Americans (basically, WASPs) in the 1950's but were suspected of leftist activity, had to confront the Un-American Activities Committee. As the name of the committee suggests, to be an authentic American, as it were, but to act in contrast to the American authentic way of life, entails a loss of one's real Americanism and therefore requires one's exclusion from the political discourse as well as the exercise of other retributive means, e.g., discrimination in the job market or even imprisonment.<sup>33</sup>

In many cases, then, national "apostates" (similar to foreigners) are persecuted and

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<sup>32</sup>See Connor, *Ethnonationalism*, p. 201.

<sup>33</sup>On the persecution of homosexuals as another unauthentic American group (commonly called the 'pervert peril') during the McCarthy era, see C. J. Cohen, 'Straight Gay Politics: The Limits of an Ethnic Model of Inclusion', in Shapiro & Kymlicka, *NOMOS XXXIX: Ethnicity and Group Rights*, pp. 585-586.

discriminated against in other ways than mere exclusion from the public discourse, and are often imprisoned, deported, executed or physically attacked (as normally happened, for instance, in Spain under Franco and in Chile under Pinochet's rule). Very often such “apostates” are not only accused of adopting alien ideas, cultures or ideologies but also of being associated (not always wrongly) with the foreigners themselves and their own (just or unjust, real or imaginary) aspirations and interests. Such accusations, particularly the second one which presents the “apostates” as a fifth column or collaborators with the enemy, is normally used to delegitimise those “apostates” and their ideas, and to justify their persecution. Thus, for example, during the witch hunts of the McCarthy era whites who fought against racism and for racial equality were often identified as communists who not only, by definition, subvert the American way of life but also cooperate with and fight for the ‘black foes’. So, although the (predominantly white) Committee on Racial Equality (CORE) ‘was staunchly non-Communist, its members were often accused of being “reds” by people who shared the common belief that only Communists believed in racial equality.’<sup>34</sup>

As we saw, nationalists tend to limit the foreigners and (at the very least) some of their rights and liberties, often by legal or regulatory restrictions on their freedom of association, speech or participation in decision-making procedures (where those are permitted in the

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<sup>34</sup>Fredrickson, *Black Liberation*, p. 236.

first place). Those restrictions, as said, are not reflected solely in the exclusion of foreigners as such but also in the imposition of the national tradition as the only criterion that sets the boundaries of any legitimate deliberation. Accordingly, laws and regulations that prevent *foreigners* from challenging the national tradition or the national character and “ownership” of the state, equally apply to *conationals* who oppose them. Consider for example Amendment No. 9 of Basic Law: The Knesset that I mentioned earlier. I stressed that section (1) of that amendment entails a formal restriction on gentiles’ (especially Palestinians’) rights in Israel. But this is also true of ethnic Jews who oppose the nationalist creed of Zionism and the corresponding state and policies. Obviously, those (unfortunately scarce) Jews are limited and discriminated against almost like those that Israel considers as foreigners.

Nationalists, to use Barry’s words, impose ‘a “collective goal” held by “political society” on those who repudiate that goal and therefore (despite being members of the ethnic nation) do not belong to a society defined by its adherence to it.’<sup>35</sup> This fact about nationalism is another illustration of its authoritarian character, as Greenfeld calls it. The interpreters of the national will, so called, define the national markers, set the boundaries of the national tradition and discourse, and determine what is the national collective goal. Consequently, they exclude the ones they see as foreigners and traitors, and thus advance their own

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<sup>35</sup>Barry, ‘Statism and Nationalism: A Cosmopolitan Critique’, p. 48.

interests which are presented as if they were the national collective interests:

...an ethnic nation is a (mythical) extended family... [and] an appeal to the “interests of the family” against claims by individual members of it may very well be a cover for the pursuit of the interests and objectives of the one who decides the agenda...[T]he “interests of the nation” normally goes along with the suggestion that it is at best irrelevant and at worst disloyal to divide the nation by making demands on behalf of one socioeconomic group against another.<sup>36</sup>

Marx, for whom the dominant group that decides the agenda is always the dominant class, has also understood that any attempt to enforce a sort of common interest or good actually reflects a very particularist interest or conception of the good: 'throughout history the 'general interest' is created by individuals who are defined as 'private persons'...[T]he so-called 'general' is constantly being produced by the other side, private interest...'<sup>37</sup>

In my view, the nationalist guiding principle that is reflected in Barry's and Marx's criticisms is one of divide and rule: those nationalists who 'impose a collective goal' and 'decide the agenda' not only exclude foreigners but also use them as a scapegoat – they

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<sup>36</sup>Ibid., p. 50.

<sup>37</sup>Marx, *The German Ideology*, in MSW, p. 183.



overstate<sup>38</sup> (at times even invent) an image of those non-nationals as an external enemy or risk, hence try to unite the nation under their own rule, to minimise the “apostates”, and to marginalise their remnants by, e.g., identifying them as sympathisers of that external risk. That way, nationalists may promote their own sectorial (economic, class or other) interests and objectives. As historical records show, this strategy much too often proved successful. In Australia, for example, racism and the exclusion of the Aborigines was used to draw ‘people together through effective links which transcend conflicting socio-economic interests;’<sup>39</sup> and as W. E. B. du Bois noted in his discussion of the division and lack of cooperation between white and black workers, ‘the white group of labourers, while they received a low wage, were compensated for by a sort of public and psychological wage,’ that is, a feeling of membership in the ruling nation.<sup>40</sup>

The said insight may also answer a question that might have been raised following my quotation of Barry, who indicates that conationals who repudiate a ‘collective goal’ that nationalists impose through ‘political society’ (i.e., the state) do not belong to that society despite being members of the ethnic nation. If that is true, and I think it is, then it seems that

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<sup>38</sup>In ‘overstate’ I refer to cases where there is a *real* conflict (even armed) between the nation or the nation-state and another group/s or nation state/s but in which the nationalist masters try to manipulate the situation and present it as if it were graver or even insoluble.

<sup>39</sup>Castles et al., ‘Australia: Multi-Ethnic Community Without Nationalism?’, pp. 363-364.

<sup>40</sup>Du Bois, quoted in A. Callinicos, *Race and Class* (London, Chicago & Sydney: Bookmarks, 1998), p. 36.

nationalism not only fails in solving identity crises but actually creates them because it may easily lead to social contradictions between the national demands and other affinities or expectations.

According to Callinicos, racism (and equally nationalism) offers ‘workers the comfort of believing themselves part of the dominant group,’ and gives them a particular identity which unites them with “their” capitalists – ‘we have here, then, a case of the kind of ‘imagined community’ discussed by Benedict Anderson...[I]n particular, ‘regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep horizontal comradeship’.<sup>41</sup> Callinicos, then, asserts that conational *workers* may accept their subjugation in order to feel part of the *dominant* nation and in order to achieve an identity that would ‘provide them an *imaginary* solution of *real contradictions*,’ a solution which is, in being imaginary, ‘a false one.’<sup>42</sup> Applying this explanation to Barry’s point, it would seem that workers *may* (though they also may not) repudiate a collective goal imposed on them by nationalist entrepreneurs or boundary-keepers, but in being identified as part of the *dominant* (ethnic) nation they will repress this repudiation of theirs (in Kuran’s words, they will brainwash themselves, thereby bringing their private preference in line with the dominant public preference) so as to cling to their belonging to that

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<sup>41</sup>Ibid., p. 38. See Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, p. 7.

<sup>42</sup>Ibid., *ibid* (italic mine).

dominant nation. That way, workers may overcome the real contradictions between their factual exclusion from 'deciding the agenda' (their 'actual inequality and exploitation', as Anderson puts it) and their (false) identification by nationalist entrepreneurs as full and equal members in the nation (their 'deep horizontal comradeship').

On the whole, I find this explanation quite compelling, but there are however two points I would like to revise. First, I think it would be wrong to focus only on workers. In my view, we should apply the said argument to subjugated strata and groups as a whole, e.g., women, homosexuals and even some sub-*ethnies* within the encompassing one, i.e., the nation. Second, Callinicos seems to conflate two distinct observations which need not come together. On the one hand, he argues that workers (or the subjugated groups in general, as I put it) may well follow the nationalist creed in order to be part of the *dominant* nation, i.e., in order to feel superior in comparison to another (national or racial, as it were) group/s. Similar to Rousseau, then, Callinicos asserts here that people 'let themselves be oppressed only insofar as they are carried away by blind ambition; and looking more below than above them. Domination becomes dearer to them than independence, and they consent to wear chains in order to give them to others in turn.'<sup>43</sup> On the other hand, however, Callinicos stresses that people 'consent to wear chains' in order to feel as full and equal

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<sup>43</sup>See J. J. Rousseau, *Discourse on the Origins of Inequality (Second Discourse)*, in *Discourse on the Origins of Inequality (Second Discourse), Polemics and Political Economy* (Hanover & London: Dartmouth College, 1992), p. 63.

members of a nation which is not necessarily dominant – in Berlin’s viewpoint, they prefer to be maltreated by conationals rather than being well-treated by aliens so as to achieve a sense of belonging.

Callinicos’s two arguments, of course, are logically unrelated and historically not necessarily connected. In my view, then, while the first argument may apply to *some* cases, the second one always applies, and to all cases where nationalist dictates of identity and agenda are widely accepted. As I argued earlier, though, such an acceptance is not a consequence of the ‘longing for status’ or recognition à-la Berlin but of the need for coherence, i.e., the incentive to avoid identity crises. Facing identity crises, nationalism will appear very attractive and appealing for most people, if no other credible alternative is available. But it is also crystal clear that in each and every nation there are some people (even if a minority) that do not accept the nationalist credo and, instead, strive to transcend or overthrow it. Those people, the “apostates”, then, will surely repudiate the ‘collective goal’ that nationalists impose and may well pay the price for.

Thus far, I have concentrated on nationalists’ attitude to those they themselves consider as foreigners. But there is also a possibility of people who see themselves as non-nationals and are yet considered as conationals by those nationalists who stake a claim to the land in which those people reside. Apparently, in such cases nationalists will employ a policy of assimilation (the ‘melting pot’ policy, as it was often called) rather than one of exclusion.

The basic perception here, however, remains the same as in the case of exclusion, i.e., that the *individual* cannot change his national membership simply by an act of *will*. As we saw, the nationalist understanding of the relations between individuals and their national whole fits what Tamir calls 'the strict discovery model' according to which one's national identity 'can only be discovered and cannot be a matter of choice.'<sup>44</sup> Accordingly, nationalists may enforce different groups in the national homeland to assimilate in the relevant nation, while insisting that those groups are actually not foreign but part of the nation in question and that they simply have to be guided by the nationalist movement to discover this fact. For the nationalist movement itself, of course, this guidance has nothing to do with assimilation because it only reflects the teaching of the 'right determination of the will' of groups that are already taken to be an integral part of the relevant nation. But for the groups that are required to accept the nationalist "teaching" (or at least for those who decide their own agenda), and may even hold their own nationalisms, this "teaching" reflects an attempt to enforce them to assimilate in a *foreign* group and to adopt *alien* goals and traditions.

Obviously, then, in many cases people who are expected to assimilate reject the national "teaching" and insist on clinging to their own traditions or goals. Facing opposition, those who take the assimilating cause may well apply a policy of exclusion to those who repudiate that cause, although they will exclude them as internal renegades who deny the 'right

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<sup>44</sup>Tamir, *Liberal Nationalism*, p. 20.

determination of the will' and not as foreigners. Moreover, since a policy of *enforced* assimilation by definition entails a marginalisation (if not a total erasure) of identities of those who are supposed to assimilate, such a policy is almost always accompanied by practices of exclusion. Paraphrasing Barry, nationalists impose a collective identity on those who repudiate that identity and therefore (*because* they are identified by nationalists as members of the ethnic nation) do not belong to a society defined by it. This mode of enforced assimilation and simultaneous exclusion was employed, for instance, by French nationalism towards Corsicans and Bretons, by Castilian Spanish nationalism towards Basques and Catalans, and to some extent by Kalman Tisza, the Hungarian Prime Minister between 1875 and 1890, who employed a policy of Magyarisation amongst the subject nationalities.<sup>45</sup>

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<sup>45</sup>For a profound examination of enforced assimilation into Zionism and accompanied marginalisation of *Mizrahi* identities and the corresponding exclusion of *Mizrahim* in Israel, see Shalom Chetrit, *The Mizrahi Struggle in Israel*, passim.