THE NATIONAL IDENTITY OF A DIASPORA:  
A Comparative Study of the Korean Identity  
in China, Japan and Uzbekistan

Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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ABSTRACT

This research concerns the collective identity of Korean diasporas who have settled in China, Japan, and post-Soviet central Asia, with special attention to Uzbekistan. The main research considers how the Korean diasporas define their collective identities in their respective host states, and the political implications of the constitution of such identities.

The means by which a collective identity is secured vary, depending on a diaspora's relations and interactions with its homeland and host state, and vision of its own community. Despite sharing many features common to not being assimilated by host societies, the three Korean diasporas have maintained their distinctive identities in each case under this study. A diaspora's identity is thus to be understood as having a particular nature, which I see as a third type of national identity.

I argue that the features of diasporas are generated by the following three factors: the homeland, the hostland, and the diaspora organisations. A diaspora identity is reflected in the intrinsic quandaries it experiences within this triangular structure. These quandaries are created by fundamental tensions; such as the dilemma between seeking a fuller degree of inclusion and maintaining autonomy, the psychological conflicts between the awareness of the need for collective resistance against assimilation and the aspiration for overcoming sub-national collectivity, and the difficulties that arise from the process of accepting a different national identity while not detached from their ancestral motherland.

The Korean diasporas are nearing the point of creating self-determined communities with stable dual-national identities. The formation of such an identity has prerequisites; such as the knowledge and understanding of the two national cultures involved, clear and sufficient communication, the preservation of the diaspora's own history, and the sustaining of various forms of collective existence, all of which will legitimise a diaspora's aspiration for recognition.
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1 Introduction

Research question and focus

This study explores how diasporas define their national identity in exile; in other words, what collective national identity means to diasporas and how these definitions and meanings should be explained. This research concerns Korean diasporas in China, Japan and post-Soviet Uzbekistan as cases. These cases show how the identity of Korean diasporas has been evolved over generations, rather than disappearing or assimilating to other nations.

Including diaspora studies in general and studies of Korean diasporas in particular, existing research affords anthropological explanations of identity, sociological descriptions of the forms of diaspora communities, historical approaches to the formation of ethnic nationalism among diasporas, or theoretical studies of identity politics and multiculturalism. This research, in contrast, is a political analysis of the collective identity of Korean diasporas from a macro perspective. In the field of political science, studies on ethnic relations to date tend to focus on conflict-prone groups. This explains one of the reasons why the related issues on the national identity of Koreans are relatively under-researched. Existing work on Korean diasporas is rarely full-length academic research, and none has yet employed comparative qualitative methodology with theoretical explanations of diasporas.

Previous studies on the identity of Korean diasporas tend to frame diaspora groups within one of the, supposedly, official nationalities involved; either in the official nationality of the host state or in that of the motherland. As a result, they offer insufficient account of the nature of diaspora identity. Korean diasporas represent an under-researched field, more so in Anglophone academia. Not only in the Korean cases but in general, diasporas have been a constant phenomenon. Many diasporas have shaped their own sphere in host societies where they have been politically scape-goated, economically exploited, and legally overlooked. In a globalising world, efforts to shift the existing agenda from the exclusive nation-building process to a multi-nation building project may provide opportunities to normalise diaspora identity, rather than putting it into the rigid and exclusive existing framework of political membership. In this regard, I propose that diaspora identity needs to be more accurately characterised and categorised in political and legal terms. This can be achieved, above all, through better understanding of the nature of diaspora identity itself.

How do Koreans define their collective identity in exile and how should those definitions be explained in a political context? This question implies a correlation between diasporas and national identity. The question, in fact, infers tension between cultural and official political identity. Thus, in relation to the primary question, the following questions also need to be answered: To what extent do Koreans perceive themselves as Koreans? Why does the
question of national identity matter to them, and to what extent is this the case? How acceptable is the preservation of dual nationality to the modern multinational states where Koreans have settled?

The question of dual or plural nationality could connote further tensions for diasporas than for other ethnic groups or other kinds of cultural minorities, as the term ‘diaspora’ implies a more or less involuntary migration, as well as, not always but very commonly, the historical inevitability of attachment to another nation-state. According to conservative assimilationist scholars, the national identity of diasporas should be regarded as somehow abnormal or immoral and, consequently, regarded as something that should be adjusted and fixed. This view is related to the conventional way of considering the conditions, meanings and ethics of national identity. Scholars of this group tend to believe national identity is and should be completely separate from cultural identity. Disagreements are therefore provoked by questions as whether a diaspora’s collective identity is merely cultural and how one should distinguish the collective identity of a national group or a part of a national group from other kinds of cultural identities?

Defenders of multiculturalism have suggested both normatively and practically legitimate grounds for recognising cultural or sub-national minorities from the social to the political levels by demonstrating the positive roles of immigrants. Meanwhile, anthropologists and sociologists engaged in this field are more concerned with how, why and under what conditions national identity is evolved. The modernist approach within these particularistic views on nation and national identity is commonly categorised as a de-mythifying way of viewing cultural and sub-national sentiment. Applying this view to the national identity of Korean diasporas may lead to the conclusion that their national and political identity has become differentiated from cultural identity because they have undergone different nation-building processes during the focal historical period. The factor of citizenship in relation to national identity is the key issue in such analyses. It considers sub-national identity separately from political membership. A question, however, remains unresolved. Are cultural and political identities always so obviously separable? How can one understand a group of people claiming their own separate identity regardless of outsiders’ understanding of their cultural sense of belonging and their political citizenship? This study highlights the relatively disregarded aspect of diasporas’ collective national identity; that is to say, it considers diasporas’ endeavours to form their own kind of national identity. In addition, it also proposes an alternative view on creating or controlling a collective identity that has been perceived as either politically imposed or naturally given, and thus difficult to overcome when necessary.

The phenomenon of diasporas is increasing in this era of globalisation. A clearer conceptualisation of diasporas and its application to the real political and legal situation may aid acceptance of the inevitable emergence of a different type of national identity; one that has evolved as diasporised groups have become more distinctive. This, in turn, will foster an
inclusive political attitude to national identity by, ideally, perceiving national allegiance as an individual choice. The accommodation of diasporas is one of the barometers of the modern multinational state’s tolerance towards differences. The various concepts of citizenship in each host state help counter overemphasis of the distinctiveness of sub-national groups as being the most important aspect of their collective identity. Rationalist views, however, overemphasise constitutional membership as the normative and crucial variable and fail to explain why different minority national groups do not react in the same way to a common host society’s public policy and notion of citizenship.

Not all the sub-national or ethnic groups within Chinese territory, for example, have formed the same relations as the Koreans have built with the Han Chinese. For instance, some indigenous ethnic minorities such as the Manchurians and the Subei have almost either disappeared or been assimilated, and Tibetan and Muslim populations are regarded as ever troublesome minorities, at times threatening the harmony of multinational China. In post-Soviet central Asia, the Korean community failed to form an autonomous prefecture under Stalinist rule, whereas many other diasporas, such as the Jewish community, succeeded under the same regime and the same policy. As Martin (2001) mentions, it remains an interesting historical question as to why, from the beginning, the already concentrated Korean population was dispersed to barren land away from cultivated agricultural areas, whereas the dispersed Jews experienced the contrary; although in early twentieth century Russia both diasporas were equally categorised as untrustworthy disloyal peoples.1 Meanwhile, South-east Asian diasporas in Japan or the indigenous Ainu population have been living in isolation, inhabiting remote areas in Japan, whereas Koreans appear to have been incorporated into Japanese society to a greater degree. The key factors determining such differing situations are, broadly, the historical context of a diaspora’s resettlement, external influence framed by the diplomatic relations between host state and homeland, and a diaspora’s response to the host society and the influence of its motherland.

In the postcolonial and post-Cold War era, potentially political group identities were regarded as an ever-present menace to the existing international order. The burdens of ancient multiracial states, dealing with and taming minority groups and immigrants, seem still to be carried by the modern multinational states. The xenophobic reactions to foreign immigrants in the postwar world have not been mitigated. Political actions have been encouraged by a popular perception of threat, opportunistic politicians and the media. Both in theory and practice, through comparative analyses of the three cases, I argue that providing more room for minority national groups to form their own kind of collective identity does not necessarily threaten the host societies’ political stability, economic development or cultural harmony. I also argue that the relationship between diaspora and host-nation should be mutual. Diasporas’ demand for recognition involves prerequisites.
The cases in this study suggest that recognition of the collective identity of a minority group may encourage the group to develop a positive sense of obligation as a citizen towards the host country, without necessarily giving up their sense of belonging to the sub-national community. By recognition, I mean, the recognition of the group’s historical claims or justification for their *raison d'être* in the host state. Diaspora history, set by shared collective memories, determines the fundamental distinctiveness of a diaspora from other groups within the host state. Historical facts and events may be in the past, but shared collective memory and interpretation of such collective memories are vividly present, as a reality determining the relationships among different national groups. Sufficient negotiation over interpretations of diaspora history in the public sphere helps enhance the relations between diaspora and host-nation. Research into the self-definition of Korean diaspora identity demonstrates the degree of their sound incorporation into mainstream society. Sound incorporation can mean dealing with dual nationality adroitly, and gradually accepting such particular nationality positively as a further choice. The continuous process of Korean diasporas’ self-identification is the process of building diaspora identity, reflecting their search for safe grounds of recognition while, at the same time, managing the various levels of diaspora tensions.

Employing Panagakos's (1999) perspective, broadly, I consider that Korean diasporas have three different paths or choices regarding incorporation: first, complete assimilation into the host society without minimal institutionalised collectivity; second, remaining as perpetual foreigners, maintaining close political and cultural attachment to the ancestral motherland, and preferring to be categorised as overseas Koreans, undistinguishable from other types of immigrant societies; third, a self-determined community, reasoning their connection with the Korean motherland. Korean diasporas demonstrate features of transition from the second stage to the third in differing degrees. Unlike the commonly accepted perception of diasporas, in spite of the absence of collective action and a nationalist movement, Korean diasporas have manifested resistance against assimilation and the desire for recognition through various levels of discourse. In turn, such discourse on national identity has built a bounded diaspora identity.

**Methods and methodological issues**

In order to make such an intangible issue as national identity more researchable, one can understand it as interpretations of a collective self as one of the members of a nation. Identity should be understood in the context of continuity rather than as a static feature. The formation of diaspora identity is focused on a diaspora’s effort to identify itself with or against other national groups within the structure in which it has been evolved. The history of building its collective identity creates a diaspora’s own sphere within its host society. A diaspora’s own sphere can result in various levels of collective communities, which is not always obviously explainable...
within the dichotomy of public and private. A common, and the most crucial, basis for a
diaspora identity is the fact that a diaspora group bares their shared collective memory of
becoming a diaspora and thus remains distinctive. In other words, the diaspora's memory of
common history is composed of the particular process of incorporation into a host society, as
well as a shared memory prior to becoming a diaspora. Accordingly, the process of forming the
diaspora identity involves both the process of differentiation and the identification. Such process
can be best analysed by looking into diaspora Koreans' self expression and interpretation of
collective selves as diasporas, and by viewing it in relation to the three factors framing the
diaspora identity: identity vis-à-vis the host country, the motherland and the minority
organisations and/or institutions.

Selecting cases

While sharing the general features of diasporic identity, the Korean diaspora also shows
distinctive patterns from the existing models of diasporas in terms of origins, roles, goals and
forms of collectivities. The selection of cases is made valid for the reason that, first of all, the
first generation of Koreans who flew to these three countries were not voluntary immigrants in
real terms. The Koreans who settled in these countries therefore do not possess distinctive
collective or personal dispositions; for example, in terms of political attitudes or social and
cultural values, which may mean they fit well into the corresponding host state.

Second, the Korean nation was not divided before and during their migration period.
This means that they are neither South Koreans nor North Koreans, although their collective
identity is still associated with the Korean territory. Third, what matters most in discussing a
diaspora identity is a traumatic historical memory. Colonisation heavily influenced Korean
diasporas particularly in these cases of migration, as they occurred collectively and involuntarily
before 1945. Their shared memories of historical events such as Japanese colonisation of the
homeland and the former Manchu and Stalin's re-location project have structured Korean
diasporas' national identity.

Finally, the three cases demonstrate the impact of South Korea's de-territorialised
transnationalist agenda on moulding a distinct collective identity of a nation abroad. For
political and economic reasons, both South and North Korean governments have paid particular
attention to those areas. Among the post-Soviet central Asian cases, I focus particularly on
Uzbekistan. The Korean population in Uzbekistan outnumbers that in the rest of the
Commonwealth Independent States (CIS). Since 1991, Korean diaspora communities have been
reshaped, as with the collapse of the former Soviet Union. The Korean population was
incorporated into different political regimes. I should leave the task of detailed comparison of
Korean diaspora identity among CIS host countries to some future researchers, when the
reshaped identity becomes more differentiated according to the new host state. Nonetheless, I do include some comparative analyses whenever there are significant differences among CIS, and when the differences are relevant to post-Soviet Korean identity.

The period researched

Identity is fluid and subject to change. Potential characteristics of diasporas become salient at certain historical events. Considering the three examples simultaneously, one can divide them into two broad periods. The first period falls between 1953, the division of the Korean motherland, and 1988 until which time communication between diasporas and the capitalist world including South Korea was restricted in China and the Soviet Union, and around which period international pressure was imposed on Japan’s minority issues. In spite of some changes in the Korean diaspora communities, their national identity was fairly stable without external impacts between 1953 and 1988. The second period, between 1989 and 2003, can be described as a disruption of stability, the end of imagination of the ancestral motherland, and the formation of a diasporic identity. The changes in the second period imply that the diasporas came heavily under the influence of capitalisation, urbanisation and globalisation in the case of the two post communist states, while in Japan the issues of Korean minority came under the spotlight. Since the late 1980s, in accordance with rapid changes in the host countries, Korean diasporas have faced a new phase of identity formation. Chapters 4, 5 and 6 demonstrate the vicissitudes in the formation of this diasporic identity.

Interaction between homeland and diaspora is focused on the period between the late 1980s and 1990s, during which diaspora identity was more openly expressed, and thus exposed. Some of the primary materials used in my analyses are diaspora people’s recently published contemporary writings but such writings reflect diasporas’ history and their way of perceiving their collective pasts. The foundation of diasporas’ collective identity is their own interpretations of collective shared memories. Expression of minority’s collective identity is founded on a historical process of incorporation into the host society. Analyses of such processes tell us of diasporas’ self-justification of their collective existence along with their determination to seek for legitimate political membership of the host state. Diasporas’ attempts to make their life stories public and authentic is central to making themselves understood; who they are and how they hope to be identified by others.

The period between the late 1980s and the present shows a growing awareness of national identity among Korean diasporas. Primordial anthropologists would interpret this as the revival of ethnicity which has potentially existed since time immemorial. I stress the external changes, the end of the Cold War and globalisation as the main forces influencing diasporas’ awareness of who they are in collective terms. This is because such growing awareness has
much more to do with how outsiders define them. That had not been the case during the rigid Cold War era, following which they faced sudden exposure to outsiders. In this context, the period of diaspora history since 1953 demonstrates how the diasporas' initial confusion of where to belong has been gradually disappearing, and is interpreted in a positive manner during the period of shaping a stable diasporic identity.

It is also relevant to discuss the re-emerging nationalist sentiments led by a group of South Korean scholars, defending ethnic nationalism over the issues of overseas Koreans. Questions relating to the Korean diasporas have often been raised by scholars of Korean studies: Why are Koreans in the three regions not courageous enough to act more collectively in order to claim recognition and to gain practical interests? How should they be guided to preserve their Korean national roots and identity for the sake of consolidating Korean nationalism? It is assumed that Koreans abroad should act more collectively with a clearer national agenda, otherwise they will be gradually excluded from special benefits while conflict-prone ethnic or sub-national groups effectively succeed in securing group-oriented political rights. Considering only the diasporas' historical and cultural heritages as a part of the Korean nation, observations on diaspora identity will lead to the erroneous conclusion that diasporas' national roots, even in different soils, have survived and been resurrected almost intact, as opposed to the effect of political changes. As I will extend in the main chapters, diasporas' identity formation vis-à-vis their motherland does not adequately explain diasporas' resistance to the unilateral political and cultural influence of their ancestral motherland.

Reasons for comparisons

One of the primary reasons for undertaking comparative studies is to discover and expound the differences and similarities among selected cases. It is beyond question that there are considerable dissimilarities between the three examples. This is because the three communities are incorporated into different political regimes. At the same time, there are also similarities, owing to the fact that they all share some common historical memories and cultural features, as they were once parts of the same nation. Accordingly, the explanations of why their identity is similar or dissimilar, are less significant in this research; what, instead, is of greater interest to me is the examination of the implications of differences and similarities in the political domain. A political scientist is more likely to be interested in the comparative issues of different diaspora groups whose collective identities are either already or potentially political, and consequently often regarded as conflicting with officially promulgated loyalty to a dominant nation and a host state. The issues include patterns of co-existence of plural nationalities within a state, degrees and consequences of political mobilisation of diaspora identity, interplay between the host
state’s autonomy and a diaspora’s response, and a homeland’s political influence on a diaspora community.

To put the logic of comparison in a simpler way, one may imagine three brothers who happened to be brought up in different families during their childhood, who grew up as totally different kinds of human being, but all of whom managed to survive in their own fields as adopted children through having made the most of given resources: one as an educated intellectual, a successful Jōsōnjok; one, as an honourable farmer, a Koreiski; the other, as a politically-oriented, ambitious mobster, a typical Zainichi. Chapter 5 goes into this comparison in detail, by showing the host state’s accordance of different degrees and aspects of autonomy to the Korean diasporas. The metaphor above does not insinuate a biological explanation of nationhood by assuming that a nation is the natural extension of kinship based on genetically identical families. It is almost infeasible to prove whether the origin of a nation is purely primordial, perennial or modern. Modernism has predominantly occupied debates on nationalism. One of the important reasons behind this may well be the fact that the modern aspect of a nation is relatively perceivable and provable. As Gorski (2000) appropriately delineates, ‘[m]odernists generally answer the what question in essentialist terms, focusing on some features of nationalism which are regarded as essential, and then use these definitions to distinguish real nationalism from pseudo nationalism.’ As he concludes, ‘it [nationalism] has a genealogy, a ruptured and fragmented history whose only unity lies in the national category itself’ (1461-2).

In this research, however, it is possible to leave the polemic debate aside considering that my comparison only started with their childhood, when identity has already been influenced by the social and political environment. In each of them, there was an intrinsic desire to do something and become someone, but they had to compromise with external pressures and constraints. Stronger motivations could have been generated, but the external pressure would have been harsher than if they had been protected by their own parents. The desire to become someone is intrinsic, motivated by inner compulsion, but differently expressed because not only is identity self-defining, it is also inescapably contextual.

Major differences are compared and analysed within the structure of the main commonalities depending on the case in accordance with the politically significant period, regional particularities and circumstantial determinants. Despite the commonalities, what I cannot logically argue is that the commonalities are causally linked with any particular national features shared by Koreans or the diasporas’ own features in general, apart from an indirect deduction through comparing my observations with studies of other cases; such as other diaspora groups in the same host countries and Korean immigrant societies in other countries. In this regard, I avoid making hasty generalisations. I remain concerned with explanations of background and analysis of the commonalities within the scope of my research. In order to
clarify how Korean diasporas define themselves in exile, I elaborate further on how diaspora identity varies, under what conditions these variations occur and what the political implications of such variations are within the structure of commonalities which I consider as controlled variables, although these commonalities have fluctuated in all three cases over time.

I have relied on qualitative content analysis of those materials which, I judge, best reflect diaspora identity. These mainly include minority literature written by diaspora Koreans in the Korean language or in the language of a host nation but translated in Korean, which has generally created a clear boundary of identity in a multinational setting. As additional primary sources, my observations are based on in-depth interviews with public-minded diasporas including local officials, academics, lawyers, writers, businessmen, researchers, graduate students, artists, social activists, and religious practitioners. Various written forms of communication are also used. They include newspapers, yearbooks and pamphlets published in each researched region. In-depth, face-to-face interviews using semi-structured questionnaires were conducted primarily with local people who, in my view, hold relatively strong ideas, knowledge and information in relation to the collective identity of diaspora. Having conducted between fifteen to fifty formal and informal interviews in each country, I analyse, from the complicated multilayers of personal and collective identities, the extractions of the aspects expressing identity in relation to nations. Not all of the interviews were directly related to my research question, but I allocated generous time to all interviewees, on average approximately one hour each, but on some occasions up to four hours. Although no contentious matters regarding legally banned nationality issues and inter-ethnic conflicts were discussed during my fieldwork, some interviewees wished to remain anonymous, or, in some cases, wished that some parts of their information and view not to be included. In any case, the expression and interpretation of personal or social views on nations cannot be exclusively personal as such expression and interpretation can never be totally isolated from the collectivity to which a person belongs. It is based on personal experience but inevitably occurs in a historical and political context. I also referred to other forms of communication materials, for instance, unpublished writings, novels and personal letters. As Butler (2001) points out, 'much of diaspora experience is unwritten: it is inscribed in the creative arts, material culture, and oral traditions' (212). My close observations on diasporas' ways of life and their overall views towards their own communities and the outside world throughout my fieldwork allowed me to produce a useful analysis on their complicated identity beyond mere explanations of what is written and actually spoken.

Apparently, diasporas' collective identity is diluted as generations pass, losing the mother tongue, and forgetting national pasts. Nonetheless, the strength and degree of national identity is more dependent on community-level management rather than aggregation of individuals. Researching national identity as a collective identity attached to the notion of nation
does not address the sum of an individual’s personal identity. Discussion of how many people preserve how much Korean national identity does not help to articulate a collective identity itself. Although the majority of ordinary people has never seriously thought about such concepts as nation and collective identity, and does not necessarily understand what these terms mean, it is not safe to conclude that national identity does not exist among Korean diasporas and living as a Korean minority means nothing to them. Have the majority of people ever agreed with the present national and ethnic boundaries anyway? National identity can be imposed by external situations, consciously and subconsciously. The focus of this study is the impact of such external environments on the particular group of people who are seemingly unaware of national identity. The diaspora community is continuously replenished over generations, and collective national identity is reformulated and reproduced as a diaspora identity rather than simply a regional identity.

Who are the Korean diasporas?

The Korean diaspora as a whole is a group of people whose ancestral land is the Korean peninsula, which group is more or less aware of a sense of common origins and historical memories and, to a certain degree, distinctive culture. The particular ethnonyms of each Korean diaspora in the regions, however, reflect their own individual history. Korean diasporas were named as Josônjok, Koreîtsy and Zainichi when they were resettled away from the Korean homeland. Depending on the vicissitudes in their official nationality while being incorporated into a particular nation-building process, such ethnonyms were followed with public perceptions of poverty-stricken and powerless peoples. The ethnonyms are used pejorative sense depending on outsiders’ perceptions of the people.

On ethnonyms: who are the Josônjok, Koreîtsy and Zainichi?

The English word, Korean includes Koreans abroad but it is the official term for external usage. In South and North Korea, the Josônjok, Koreîtsy and Zainichi are called as dong-po in the Korean language, literally meaning the same nation living abroad, or j’aeoegyopo, meaning Koreans abroad. The different ethnonyms for Korean diasporas are however accidental. Josôn refers to unified Korea from 1392 till 1910. Goryô refers to the name of the ancient Korean kingdoms between AD 918 and 1356. Although the origins of diasporas are similar in all three cases, the former Soviet Koreans were named in a different way to distinguish them from Koreans in China.

Ethnonyms can be originated from physical and cultural differences, but social perceptions and political misrecognition are later incorporated into their meaning. Zainichi is a
simplification of Zainichi Josenjin, a literal translation of Koreans living in Japan at the beginning. However, the word Josenjin has taken on the negative image of a colonial subject under the Japanese occupation in Korea. Koreans in Japan have recently use Zainichi to refer to themselves. The ethnonym, Josōnjok, used for Koreans in China, began to have an image of a less modernised people, especially upon their renewed communication with South Korea. The former Soviet Korean is also called Goryōin, which is the Korean translation used among Koreans in Korea. In this research, however, I mostly use the ethnonyms, Josōnjok, Koreitsu and Zainichi. In South and North Korea, the Josōnjok were barely regarded as gyo-po or dong-po. Under a legal arrangement in 1998, Korean diasporas who moved to the three countries before 1953 are not regarded as members of the Korean nation. Such an arrangement allowed clarification of South Korea’s official position towards diaspora Koreans - especially those in diplomatically troublesome regions. Ever since its increased interaction with diaspora communities, South Korea has witnessed various social and political problems. These include diasporas’ sudden labour flows to South Korea, and subsequent questions of the legal status of the Korean returnees, while provoking public discussions regarding issues such as the historical and political responsibilities of a homeland for once orphaned people. In dealing with such issues as diaspora nationality, the national myth of racial homogeniety in Korea has been one of the sources of confusion.

The social debates over such issues are related to the interpretation of Korea’s pre-modern history: can one regard Josōn as a continuity of the Korean nation? If there is continuity between pre-modern Korean identity and modern Korean national identity, an identity shared by all Koreans including diaspora Koreans in other words, the collective identity crystallised in the Josōn dynasty could be understood as the shared legacy of Korean national identity. I use the term national identity rather than ethnic identity on the ground that pre-modern Korea, Josōn, can be referred to as a crucial foundation for national identity although there are some difficulties in defining it as a modern nation. In addition to the historical and cultural base of Korean national identity, anti-colonial nationalism as a political movement and ideology obviously consolidated Koreans’ national identity at the time that diaspora was becoming a phenomenon among part of the Korean population. Meanwhile, although I rarely use it, the term ‘ethnic identity’ in my study is employed as a situational and relational concept rather than as an exclusively spatial term. Thus, when such terms as ethnic group or ethnic community appear, they are used as opposed to a dominant ethnic group. Meanwhile, I use the terms ‘national identity of diaspora’ or simply ‘diaspora identity’ instead of ethnic identity when explaining diasporas’ collective identity distinguishable from the national identity of host nations. The ground for this distinction is that a national identity can exist separately from a designated national territory where diasporas settle. This is not because the concept of ethnic identity is unuseful, but because my primary concern lays more in the political identity of Korean
diasporas. In addition, what they have formed throughout history can be sufficiently categorised as a national identity rather than a cultural, regional or religious identity. This is not always the case for all other ethnic groups; that is, not all diaspora groups are a part of a nation from the beginning although they are not nation-less once incorporated into a new nation. My view on this point will become clearer as my argument is developed in the following chapters.

Certainly, there are national boundaries that can be explained in concrete terms in relation to those who are not obviously included within those boundaries. Within the boundaries, people share the same cultural codes and national heritage of Koreans, although these boundaries could become blurred and inclusive. Despite the fact that expression of collective identity among the Josŏnjok, Koreitsy and Zainichi has been a recent development, their collective movements reflect the will to demarcate a distinctive identity. It tends to be quite clear that while an identity can be blurred, having an identity is an essential condition for a human being. The identity that earlier generations had is fading away, but new types of identity are continuously shaped and reformulated by younger generations. Even people who do not have confused source of multiple national identities cannot clearly explain their national identity. Questions as to what it is to be Chinese or English are difficult to answer. For diasporas, such a question can be even more difficult. What I have examined in this regard is policy towards Korean minorities, visibly imposed on a particular group of people identified and defined as Koreans by both insiders and outsiders. I researched minority organisations and institutions developed and preserved by Koreans. One can argue that the official boundaries between Korean diasporas and host societies are fading away as an increasing number of diasporas naturalises, or mingles by inter-racial marriage and so on. Nevertheless, the name Korean remains, and will remain for the foreseeable future. Korean organisations and institutions are transformed but continue to exist, perhaps with different agendas, and are still identified as Korean organisations. The Korean peninsula will always exist as their ancestral homeland, although the identity attached to the Korean motherland will not remain the same, as members are changed by new generations and new immigrants from the Korean motherland join the old diasporas and contribute to the evolution of a new kind of collective identity.

**Organisation of the thesis**

Chapter by chapter, I show the evolution of the diaspora identity, beginning with a minority national identity vis-à-vis the host nation in Chapter 4, a diaspora identity in relation to their organisations and institutions in Chapter 5, and finally, in Chapter 6, a clearer national identity as a diaspora vis-à-vis the homeland. Each of the main chapters shows the search for distinctive identity, compromise for sound incorporation, and formation of a stable diasporic identity as the commonality of all three cases. This is followed by the theoretical framework and
conceptualisation of key terms in Chapter 2 and the historical background prior to the period researched in Chapter 3. The analysis of the dynamics of diaspora identity in Chapter 4 is of the continuous interactions between the diasporas’ desire for inclusion and the host state’s exclusivity of political membership. The Korean diasporas in each case have developed different patterns of national co-existence and incorporation, namely, segregation, isolation and dispersal in Japan, China and post-Soviet central Asia, respectively. This chapter discusses how the different policies of host states have affected such relations. The way Korean diasporas define their collective identity is reflected in how they select and interpret shared memories within the structure of the various concepts of citizenship of the host country. This chapter ultimately presents the tension experienced by a diaspora between political membership and a distinctive identity, in other words, the tension between full inclusion and recognition.

In Chapter 5, I take the origins and roles of minority organisations or institutions as litmus to reflect the historical accumulation of diaspora identity. This chapter demonstrates how Korean diasporas have secured a collective identity since their early settlement. The minority organisations and institutions are the by-products of interactions among host states, diasporas’ communities and homelands. I focus on the origins and the activities of the major minority organisations and institutions, namely, Yŏnbyŏn [Yanbian] Josŏnjok University in China, Mindan (Association of Korean Residents in Japan) and Jochŏngryŏn/Choryŏn (General Assembly of Korean Residents) in Japan, and the Korean kolkhozes, together with the recently developed Korean organisations. This chapter is a historical comparison focusing on the outcome of diasporas’ political, economic and cultural adaptation. Those selective minority organisations and institutions are neither necessarily officially recognised by the host government nor unanimously supported by diasporic communities as a whole. Yet, unarguably, they have been regarded as voluntarily built symbolic and practical centres of diasporic Koreans, such organisations having functioned as the means of shaping and reshaping a diasporic identity.

Successful inter-ethnic management is decided by the host country. Factors include citizenship regulations and specific policies as, in most cases, bargaining power lies in the hands of the dominant national group. For a diaspora, however, its power is also constrained by the diaspora’s and the host country’s relationship with the diaspora’s homeland. In this regard, Chapter 6 analyses the diasporic identity in a broader setting vis-à-vis its ancestral motherland, or the sending country. This chapter, in this context, highlights the evolution of the self-defined, stable identity. It shows the process as an awareness of the need to accept the differences of other nations and, simultaneously, the awareness of the necessity of generating their own identity. As mentioned earlier, the Korean diasporas in all three cases are currently moving towards more self-sufficient communities - for the sake of their own community’s well-being rather than for the sake of preserving the Korean national identity in an abstract sense or being
separate from the host state. Renewed communications with the ancestral motherland and other
Korean diasporas elsewhere have provided an opportunity for them to clarify who they are and
what it means to be a Josŏnjok, Koreītski and Zainichi. Finally, in Chapter 7, I recap the
findings in comparative terms along with concluding remarks and suggestions for further
research in this field.
2 The Politics of Diaspora Identity

On the theoretical level, the primary question underpinning this research relates to the implications of the collective identity of Korean diasporas on modern multinational states. This question suggests two levels of inherent tension: tension between two national identities, and tension between culture and politics. The first tension is that between a diasporic identity and an official national identity, fundamentally caused by the fact that a state is an involuntary association. In the present international setting of nation-states, we do not live in a world where everyone can freely choose a preferred nationality or plural nationalities voluntarily. The second tension relates to the first and is the fact that culture is undeniably one of the most powerful means by which to claim the legitimacy of a political boundary. Consequently, both minority national groups and dominant national groups often use their historical and cultural heritage as a source of legitimacy for a political unity.

The tension between diasporic identity and official nationality is unavoidable in a multinational state. Hence, important questions may be raised regarding how to reduce the tension on a practical level. In the case of diasporas, the question connotes different kinds of tensions than those experience by other ethnic or national groups, or other kinds of cultural minorities. This is because, to a certain degree, the term ‘diaspora’ implies involuntary, or at times forced, migration and strong political and cultural adherence to another nation-state.

National culture and citizenship are practically inseparable and have not been entirely separated. I do not normatively suggest that conflation of the two concepts is desirable. I argue that looking into relationships among various national or ethnic groups requires understanding of the agenda behind a modern multinational state which commonly uses dominant culture as a tool for justifying solidarity and the psychological bond of a nation, and where cultures of minority national groups who lack bargaining power are regarded as private or inferior to an official national culture. The historical context of a relationship between national or ethnic groups is necessary in order to avoid overgeneralised classifications of various kinds of ethnic or national groups. In this sense, positive discrimination may be required in a multinational society until perception of a minority group does not imply anything other than difference.

Conceptualising key terms

Diaspora

In my research, I use the term ‘diaspora’ rather than ‘ethnic Koreans’ to refer to Koreans, for the reason that the ethnic Korean does not clearly distinguish between Koreans living abroad with non-Korean official nationals and Koreans with official Korean nationality. Regardless of their
official nationalities, ethnic Koreans can refer to all Koreans in the world, including Koreans in Korea with official Korean nationality. And yet, these ethnic Koreans can possess Korean national identity along with identities attached to other nations. The term 'ethnic' often implies geopolitical confinement, referring to a certain group of people who have different cultural and historical backgrounds within politically designated boundaries, in which only a dominant ethnic group claims sovereignty over the territory. Just as Han Chinese in Chinese territory are still ethnically Han Chinese while being official Chinese nationals, Koreans in Korea with Korean nationality are still ethnic Koreans. This subsequently requires a term defining those who are ethnically or nationally Korean but dispersed and resettled away from the Korean homeland, in other words, Korean diaspora.

Diaspora as a social form is like an amoeba, which does not have organs but is still categorised as a living thing; as with the diaspora, its identity is also very fluid and unfixed. It is often said that diasporic people are alienated from both societies by virtue of building their own identity; they can be included in both societies simultaneously. As Armstrong (1976) states, 'much of the literature on contemporary diasporas appears to consider them to be anomalies or at least very transitory. ... A deeper historical perspective suggests... that other types of diasporas; like multiethnic polities themselves, are the norm rather than the exception' (393). Despite the varying degrees among different types of diasporas, in general, the history of a diaspora is a history of remembering, forgetting, and imagining an identity attached to the ancestral motherland and, at the same time, making a history of searching for full membership in another state from the moment of having become a diaspora.

The term diaspora originates from the Greek word dispersion (dia + speirein). As an ancient prototypical model, according to the Webster Dictionary, Diaspora refers to 'the settling of scattered colonies of Jews outside Palestine after the Babylonian exile', but it also means 'the Jews living outside Palestine or modern Israel' (1976, 3rd edn., vol.1). Today, the word has been coined as a generalised concept describing similar cases to that of the exiled Jews. It implies the phenomenon itself, the breaking up and scattering of people, the scattered people who settled far from their ancestral homelands, or the place where the scattered people settle. Having combined the three elements 'diaspora' refers to a group of people with cultural distinction involved in a particular phenomenon, dispersal, which resulted in spatial changes by long-term and short-term resettlement.

In academic writings, the term has been used to refer to a group of people who are scattered and settled away from their ancestral homelands and regarded as a form of ethnic group in today's world. '[A]s diasporan population proliferated, communities that scholars had once labelled as immigrant, nomadic, or exilic also began to be called diasporas' (Butler: 2001, 190). However, the concept of diaspora needs to be distinguished from other forms of ethnic group and immigrants. Due to the short history of diaspora studies as an academic field, so far
attempts at conceptualising diasporas have been somewhat sporadic. Some, for example, Armstrong, Sheffer, and Cohen, indirectly conceptualise diasporas by categorising them in accordance with their origins and patterns of incorporation. Others such as King (1998), G. Smith (1999), and Butler (2001) suggest conceptualisation of diasporas by providing the common features of the diasporas that have been researched. Scholars of major nationalism, on the other hand, only briefly suggest the definitions of diasporas in relation to other similar groups of people but, in their definitions, diasporas are regarded rather as a transitory phenomenon or an ethnic group lacking crucial conditions and ethics for qualification as a proper ethnic group.

Armstrong (1976) defines diasporas as various types of ‘ethnic collectivities which lack a territorial base within a given polity, i.e., it is a relatively small minority throughout all portions of the polity’ (393). He suggests two models: ‘proletarian diaspora’ and ‘mobilized diaspora’. The former is a ‘disadvantaged products of modernized polities’ (ibid.), especially referring to guest-workers during early stages of their existence. Most other diasporas are mobilised ethnic groups which do not have particular advantages in status but ‘enjoy many material and cultural advantages compared to other groups’ (ibid.). Mobilised diasporas have some characteristic of a quasi-society in a larger polity with a few social features. Mobilised diasporas have boundary-maintenance mechanisms that enable diasporas to persist.

Nevertheless, Armstrong’s distinction is mainly based on historical pre-modern diasporas, thus, it is not always applicable when attempting to explain the changes in and dynamics of diasporas within the structure of various host states. Besides, his definition of diasporas is too loose to understand diasporas as opposed to other types of ethnic collectivities. All diasporas exhibit some kind of ethnic collectivity but not all ethnic collectivities are diasporas, although a nation or a state can be built by a diasporic group; for example, English diasporas and the subsequent establishment of new states in America, New Zealand and Australia, and Jews in Israel. In this sense, nations could be diasporas in terms of their origins but obviously not all nations are diasporas.

In the pre-modern era the term ‘diaspora’ is strictly confined to people who, exiled or expelled for political reasons, consequently have a strong attachment to and connections with the ancestral motherland in their aspiration to return to their homeland when the time comes. In this sense, territorial attachment is emphasised and the reasons behind such diasporas are limited to either the political or the religious. The implications of pre-modern diasporas to outsiders are traumatic, negative and opportunistic. Such diasporas naturally maintained a strong collective identity and were highly mobilised. In the modern era, however, the term is loosely defined as both voluntarily and involuntarily dispersed people, not only for political or sacred but also economic and cultural reasons. Such diasporas, however, are less territorially bound and not necessarily mobilised.
There is an increasing number of diasporas who consider their exposure to plural national cultures and societies as advantages, even among marginalised proletarian diasporas. Whereas some scholars, such as Soysal (1994), regard denizens as disadvantaged and marginalised people, especially in reference to guest-worker immigrants who possess a modicum of civil and social rights, Cohen (1999) sees them in a positive light. In the global era, 'diaspora' becomes a more inclusive term to refer merely to dispersed people, including privileged global 'denizens' who are 'citizens of other countries... not necessarily seeking permanent settlement and normally professionals, managers and entrepreneurs from other countries' (198). Still, however, all three types of diaspora co-exist. Within the boundary of a state, pre-modern, modern and global diasporas exist simultaneously. As Sheffer (1984) explains, '[s]ome of the existing diasporas are ancient, for example, Jews, Indians and overseas Chinese, certain diasporas have been created in the more recent past, for example, Poles and Irish in the United States, and some diasporas are only now emerging' (12-13).

By outlining the features of diaspora one can make the concept clearer. Tololyan makes a useful point regarding the attributes of diasporas. He explains that, in terms of origin, coercion has to be involved from the beginning. Secondly, a diaspora shows persistence in not being assimilated and reluctance to assimilate. Thirdly, a diaspora shows a tendency to innovate a new identity, especially with semiotic, political and illusionary links with its homeland. Fourthly, a diaspora lacks power, being relatively weak in relation to the majority. Therefore diasporic anxiety is expressed that identifies the homeland with cultural anxiety. Tololyan's tighter way of conceptualising diasporas, however, suggests a working definition for certain cases - in his case Armenian or Jewish diasporas - as his conceptualisation is deduced from certain prototypes of diasporas.

King, Smith and Butler delineate the concepts of a diaspora by illuminating the specific qualities of diasporas as opposed to other ethnic or national groups. For King (1998), 'the migratory memory, strong inter-generational solidarity buttressed by communal institutions, permanent residence' outside the homeland, and 'a sense of divided loyalty between the state of residence and the homeland are the qualities differentiating [diasporas] from other ethnic communities' (7-8). Meanwhile, Butler suggests the common features of diasporas as multiple destinations after dispersal, some kind of relationship to an actual or imagined homeland, self-awareness of the group's identity, (that is to say, consciously being part of an ethnonational group), and the feature of being multi-generational with a collective history. These general qualifications of being a diaspora are commonly deduced from features of researched diasporas confined in a certain host country. Consequently, it is likely that the attributes of under-researched diaspora cases will be overlooked. In this sense, an agreed scholarly concept of diasporas is somewhat discursive and significant research is required so as to avoid the present problems of conceptualising diaspora.
If considering the factors such as the degree of attachment to their ancestral homelands, the final goal of diaspora communities and the degree of internal solidarity, the concept of a diaspora may be considerably loosened. Taking into account the recent changes regarding diaspora issues, including such aspects as perceptions, size and roles of diasporas and so on, the definition itself needs transforming. As generations pass and the present territorial national boundaries are more or less stabilised, people who historically belong to the same diaspora may share only some of the features of the existing concept of diasporas. However, this does not necessarily mean that the diaspora is a transitory phenomenon and that diaspora people are destined to be assimilated or to disappear. Ancient and pre-modern diasporas were the more or less victimised people created by the abrupt international arrangement of the present national territories. ‘As the history of the formation of nation-states shows, new national boundaries give rise to new national minorities’ (Solinger: 1999, 127).

There is an increasing amount of such international spillover and the withdrawal of the choice returning to ancestral homelands, including political refugees, asylum-seekers, economic diasporas and stateless people. Immigrant groups are a kind of diaspora, but not all diasporas are immigrants. Whereas legal immigration involves a change of official membership to another state, diasporas are not always clear in this matter. Diasporas occur between two or more states involving plural ethnic or national groups. Dispersal can occur as an individual or as a group, thus an individual can become a member of a diaspora community. Spatial changes occur by resettlement, which could be either short term or long term.

Involuntary migration is often considered one of the key differences between diasporas and immigrants. If considering diasporas to be an exclusively involuntary phenomenon by applying the dichotomised categories such as voluntary migration and involuntary migration to the real world, a more specific approach is required. Kukathas (1997), among many other scholars, has raised the question regarding the fact that children from voluntary immigrants have not voluntarily chosen to be born in the country to which their parents voluntarily moved. Even in the case of voluntary immigrants, if the conditions in their original homeland pushed them to choose to leave their own countries, should it be regarded as voluntary immigration? It is different from a physically forced migration but this situation still has involuntary connotations. Involuntary migrations include not only forced expulsion or exile, but also the withdrawal of the choice to return by their hostland or the international system. Some choose to leave their own countries to seek better opportunities than their own country can provide. Some individuals have firm beliefs that s/he was born in the wrong place. Some accept it and others do not. In this sense, in most cases, official nationality is an involuntary choice. But, a problem stems from the fact that in the present international system such an involuntarily acquired nationality is often used as a source of discrimination accompanied by unfavourable perception and unequal treatment without legitimate grounds. For some, however, nationality is a less involuntary
identity. Thus, a more helpful categorisation of an ethnic or national minority group seems to be its particular historical context, features and goals of minority groups in relation to other nations involved rather than whether its migration is voluntary or involuntary.

In modern multinational states, diaspora communities, mainly filled with old settlers, are mixed with other types of immigrant groups and new immigrants from the homeland. The issues of diasporas are inevitably political and international in the sense that a diaspora exists between international borders and different sovereign states. Accordingly, the crucial debate regarding immigrants juxtaposes open-border with restrictionist closed-border arguments; whereas for the case of diaspora, the focal point of discussion is inclusion versus exclusion. Many different levels of debate are engaged and there is a number of different cases of diasporas that do not neatly fit into any single typology.

One needs to consider the different aspects of diasporas: the origins of diasporas, the forms of diasporas, the roles of diasporas, and the ultimate goals of diasporas. Due to the complexities and inter-connections among the many variables, a more concrete way of defining diasporas is problematic unless each diaspora is scrutinised. The focal disagreement among scholars on the concept of diasporas is also rested on the range of the term. Thus, their first question would be among the numerous kinds of ethnic groups: which groups are qualified to be called diasporas? The common attributes of diasporas are classified on the basis of the cases falling in a certain range. Each scholar has drawn his/her own borderline between diasporas and the rest. Consequently, scholars interested in comparisons of great ranges of diaspora cases naturally prefer a looser definition of diasporas, and vice versa. Bearing in mind the difficulties and disagreements regarding the concept of a diaspora, I would suggest, for my case, a working definition of a diaspora as follows:

A diaspora is a group of people from a distinctive nation or ethnic group, being settled or resettled away from their ancestral homeland in another territory where the dominant national group has a different culture and history and, this group, to a certain degree, being aware of a collective memory preserved due to a shared history of collective relocation for inevitable political reasons. Consequently, they become categorised as a minority ethnicity or sub-national group with implications of more non-voluntary migration than other migrants in general. They naturally have the features and dispositions of a distinguishable group due to their separate historical and cultural origins. Accordingly, I suggest that the important conditions to qualify as a diaspora are a shared migratory memory resulting from collective relocation, duality in political loyalty and cultural attachment, collective existence, and linkage with an ancestral motherland.

On the following grounds, I define relocated Koreans under this study as a diaspora rather than an ethnic group, migrants, refugees, or overseas Koreans. Firstly, commonly for the three, collective settlement or resettlement occurred, despite the various causes. In consequence,
cultural and political clashes between two different nations occurred. Not all ethnic groups fall into this category. Secondly, political and historical inevitability is involved in their resettlement, implying that the causes of migration were rested on political forces further to individual choices, unlike migrants. The term ‘overseas Koreans’ does not necessarily signify collective resettlement for its origin. Thirdly, even after several generations, collective memory of relocation shapes and reshapes their community within the triad frames of homeland, hostland and organisations. Having described a particular section of the Korean population under this research as diaspora, I do not mean to exclude other ways of naming them. By my judgement, the term most clearly signifies a particular kind of collectivity which generates another type of collective identity on which this research is focused. Although the decisive condition for being a diaspora, collective relocation, ceased generations ago, diaspora identity has been continuously generated and regenerated by various diasporas’ public activities, including recording their historical memories, providing Korean education for children, participating in nationalist movements, being involved in minority organisations and institutions, having knowledge of public affairs in the societies of both homeland and hostland, and so forth.

The analytical framework in the third section of this chapter emerges from the conditions of a diaspora given so far. Suggested conditions are extracted from my working definition of a diaspora. The conditions provide the major variables to be analysed; namely, origins of a diaspora, the exclusivity of citizenship notion, collectivity of a diaspora and ancestral motherland. These key variables comprise the structure of the rest of the chapters. Diasporas' features are analysed in each chapter and ultimately show the nature of diaspora identity as a third type of national identity. I finally argue that such a third type of national identity somehow needs to be accepted for what it is. As for the theoretical grounds for this, the views of assimilationists, multiculturalists, and post structuralists are presented in the later part of this chapter.

Studying diaspora has only been a marginalised field, to the extent that diasporic people have been regarded as marginalised outsiders with the few exceptions of privileged groups. Diasporas have existed historically as a phenomenon that has been economically exploited and politically mistreated owing to their host societies’ suspicion of their conspiracy with their homelands. It is the more recent force of globalisation that has evoked academic interest in the field of diasporas and international migration.

National identity

Although my intention is not to discuss identity itself, it is necessary to make the concept clear to a certain extent. Psychologists tend to emphasise the inside mechanism of identity as a categorisation of human selves, whereas sociologists and political scientists pay more attention
to the objective conditions and visible qualifications by which various identities are categorised. Sigel (2001) succinctly summarises the common views on identity among social scientists; mainly social psychologists. First, all consider it socially constructed and, therefore, not immutable. Second, it implies a social relation; in other words, it encompasses notions of self and of the groups in which the self is embedded or with which it feels identified. Third, by such group identification, one defines oneself, differentiates oneself from, or at least compares oneself to, 'groups believed to be different from one's own. A person's sense of self thus included the I, the we, and the not-we' (112). Fourth, individuals tend to have multiple group identities, but their priority depends on the salience of a certain group to which they attach it. Lastly, 'social identities and their manifestations reflect the social structure and culture of which they are a part'.

An identity refers both to the self and to the social group; in fact, it provides the link between the two. Whereas personal identity is discovering and knowing oneself in relation to others, awareness of collective identity would mean perceiving oneself as a member of a larger group and, at the same time, having consciousness of one's own group within the context of, or in opposition to larger groups. This identification and differentiation process is inevitably accompanied by understandings of the group to which one supposedly belongs. In this sense, 'identity... bridges the gap between the "inside and the outside" - between the personal and the public worlds' (Hall: 1992, 276). When discussing the political aspect of collective identity, we may regard states and the international community as our public world. In the case of diasporas, in particular, states as the public world include both: the state of host nation and the state of homeland. The collective identity, however, is not to do with knowing or contacting members of the same group. Marxist-oriented post-modernism believers have emphasised the illusive features of a national identity following Anderson's (1983, 1991) assumption. Yet, discussion has gone further from the debates over falsity or actuality of a nation, as the falsity-actuality debate provides little help in understanding problematic relationships among different ethnic or national groups in real politics. Whether an outcome of pure imagination or not, national identity has eventually become real.

When one is aware of identity attached to, for instance, family, community or society, one tends to behave in the way that one is expected to, within the boundaries where one belongs. There may be a different type of member who behaves coherently in the opposite way to norms of the group according to which they are expected to think and behave. Yet, it is hard to maintain that such people are unaware of their collective identity and live completely in personhood. Being aware of an identity attached to an external world is inseparable from how one understands the world. Unless one considers what family, community or society means to her/him, one can hardly be aware or consciously unaware of collective identities. Identity is both intrinsic and extrinsic. It is subjective only in the context of objectivity.
As Sigel further suggests, identity is continuously being shaped and constructed at the same time. For instance, discovering how people understand the objective conditions of a nation to which they belong is the way to explain how they perceive themselves as a part of such a nation, regardless of whether or not they are satisfied with their identity. It can be argued that even people who do not have a strong sense of belonging towards their nation, or who wish to deny such communitarian feeling or obligation attached towards larger groups, still have a shared national identity, by virtue of outsiders' perception and categorisation. Thus, national identity can also be discovered and explained by outsiders, even if those of that national identity are unaware of what a nation is, or if it means nothing in particular to them in their everyday lives. National identity coexists with other kinds of identities. National identity is not essential, nor is it the primary kind of collective identity. There are numerous kinds of collective identities that simultaneously exist in complex layers.

In the studies of nation and nationalism, conventionally, liberal sociologists tend to explain identity within a theoretical framework of pre-mordialist versus modernist, and recently, post-modernist. Meanwhile, Marxist sociologists view the issue of nationalism as class versus nation. They commonly criticise anti-Marxist nationalism theories as 'bourgeois rationalization on the irrationality of nationalism' (Berberoglu: 1996, 218), arguing that national identity is an irrational, invented, forged, imagined or constructed ideology, set by an imaginary allegiance to the nation, independent of any direct links to class and social processes.

National identity can be defined as a collective consciousness of belonging to a nation. A nation, as one of the socio-political categories for dividing population, is a group of people that shares certain distinguishable features from other groups. Smith (1991) enumerates its features as '1) an historic territory, or homeland, (2) common myths and historical memories, (3) a common, mass public culture, (4) common legal rights and duties for all members, and (5) a common economy with territorial mobility for members' (14). Disagreements among scholars stem from the origins of a nation, components of the features of a nation, internal and external conditions of being a nation, and relationship with interlinked concepts such as ethnie and state. There has already been sufficient academic research on this aspect of nationalism studies based on rich case studies.

Whether the Korea of around the time when its diaspora was emerging in the nineteenth century can be called a nation may draw an academic attention. Whether judged to be nation or ethnie, one clear fact is that the particular group of people that were confined in the territory of the Korean peninsula had existed for over several thousand years. Undeniably, they shared most of the basic elements of a nation, including shared myths, territory, culture and religion, fundamentally suggesting its continuity to the present Korean nation. And, a sense of belonging possibly called as a kind of collective identity allowed them to distinguish themselves from outsiders. Josōnjok, Zainichi and Koreitsu are evidently a part of this particular group of people
called Korean. The emergence of Korean diasporas between 1860 and 1945 can be viewed as a transitory historical phase. During this period, Korean people as a group became gradually more modernised, unified and politicised through creating and developing common public culture, harmonising economic and legal system by force of modern and bureaucratic institutions and development of social infrastructure. These developments enforced the objective and subjective boundary determining Korea vis-à-vis outside world. During the colonised era, negative collective self-image began to be incorporated into the concept of nation. This happened through official publications and public discourses provided by colonial power. At the same time, modern institutions were set up, including social infrastructures, business corporations, a banking system, markets, schools, printing media, armies, courts, constitutions, police, government, and so on. A unified common economy and legal system were set up in the colonised national territory, Josôn, later renamed as D’aehan j’aeguk. In addition, in the period of emergence of Korean diasporas, anti-colonial nationalism certainly stimulated collective awareness of being one of the members of a distinctive political entity.

As the period of migration is not identical among these diasporas, their identities related to the Korean motherland and the Korean people are also varied. One clear point is that these diasporic Koreans have been incorporated into the period of nation building in each host state. Thus, it is safe to call their collective sense of belonging to a nation(s) as a national identity. It is self-evident that such national identity of Korean diasporas is composed of or related to not only the Korean nation, but also the nation of the host state. In this sense, they can also be named as a part of a nation, thus, a national group, becoming a sub or minority national group within another state. Not all ethnic groups are sub-national groups but Koreans under this study, for the historical grounds that I have explained so far, form an ethnic group at the same time as a national group. Also, not all diasporas are part of both an ethnic group and a nation. However, Korean diasporas can be considered as a part of the Korean nation. Nonetheless, due to continuity and the de-territoriality of identity, one cannot presume that the exact moment of diaspora migration was the exact borderline of possessing Korean identity and then having another national identity; that is, the one of a host state. Therefore, the national identity of a diaspora is explicable only when analysing it within the context of the plural nations involved. However, I restrict my use of the particular components of each relevant nation as variables to those generating each diaspora’s own collective identity, although such national identity is always formed in relation to the Korean nation and the nation of host state.

In the particular case of diasporas, the nation to which their collective identity is attached refers both to the nation they left behind and the new nation of the hostland. The diasporic collective identity can also be formed without necessarily being engaged in nation-building process of the homeland. Such process inevitably continues within the triad structure. The constitution of a diasporic identity cannot be entirely isolated from the homeland due to
their historical and cultural involvement. For some diaspora cases, this is merely imagined. Not only visible direct influences but also the imagination of Korea and related historical memories evoke a particular kind of collective identity. In this sense, a diaspora community is aware of the public issues in Korea. In some cases, they indirectly but continuously participate in political affairs in their homeland. Therefore, by the term national identity of diasporas, I mean that a diaspora’s identity belongs to both of the nations, old and new. It is crucial not to confuse the two different concepts: the national identity of the Korean diasporas called Josŏnjok, Zainichi and Koreitsy and the Korean identity of Josŏnjok, Zainichi and Koreitsy. In this sense, one may think that a diaspora’s own nation is not a precondition of generating a diaspora’s national identity. The history of a diaspora is formed through the process of forgetting and remembering collective memories while separated from the host society and thinking of the ancestral homeland, but at the same time keeping their own collective life stories. In this sense, a diaspora identity is continuously shaped and reshaped vis-à-vis the factors that structure the particular groups of people to be defined as diasporas. These factors include the ancestral homeland, the hostland and minority organisations or institutions. Identity includes the meaning of nation to self; perception of nation; significance of nation to self, relationship between self and nation, awareness of the relationship between self and nation, and sense of belonging to the nation. Identity can and should be in-and-out of the national culture rather than always entrapped or nested in the culture within which diasporas are involved.

One cannot see a diaspora's national identity unless it is expressed. Although expression of identity is not the same as an emergence of a collective identity, the expression of identity and formation of identity interplay. For the Korean diasporas’ case, I take sharing collective memories and keeping a distinguishable history of their own as the key markers of diasporic identity. Accumulated historical writings and interpretations of historical incidents reflect the process of moulding a diaspora’s collective identity. Such records and interpretations create a conflictual sphere with related nations; that is, the Korean nation and nations of host states. By interpretation, I intend inclusion of cognition, understanding and expression of oneself vis-à-vis something. I used the term ‘vis-à-vis’, as an interpretation of oneself is not necessarily either for or against, and neither strongly within (as a member) nor beyond the boundary of a collectivity. Of collectivity, I include subjective psychological bonds and objective components marking a certain kind of boundary between insiders and outsiders. In this particular case, collectivity means the forms of a diaspora’s existence, and the interpretation of being a diaspora is how Koreans in exile perceive the meaning of being a member of a diaspora vis-à-vis the previously mentioned factors forming and influencing diasporas.

The process of understanding and writing a diaspora’s shared history is the process of a diaspora’s self-justification and search for legitimate grounds of political membership in its host state. In this process, various visible and invisible cultures are used as the means of cognition
and recognition. Claims on historical lands, vernacular language, customs, values and religious faith are only a few examples. Diasporic identity is based on accumulated, collective memories of misrecognition or non-recognition. The next section develops why recognition is necessary for a diaspora, and how a diaspora can be recognised if it aspires to develop its collective identity by appropriate recognition.

Whether such an identity-based categorisation of human beings is useful in understanding the real world differs from whether such categorisation is normative. Universalistic observers tend to suggest the notion of citizenship as the right category of grouping people in politics, as it implies a culture-free legal individual as the basis of the whole political entity. Liberal republicans would suggest a more nationalised concept of citizenship as the most useful categorisation in understanding modern political societies, whereas Marxists view class as the fundamental cleavage defining human beings. Culturalists tend to hold that human beings are fundamentally divided by racial, ethnic and cultural differences. Feminists would view society and politics as seriously divided by gender. All these different ways of categorising people are equally necessary and thus significant, as long as they provide a sound framework by which to understand the problems of present societies. The categorisations are all political, as they provide different angles on problems hidden in every aspect of a world that can, and should, be politically adjusted.

Recognition of identity in the political context

Recognition of a minority national group’s collective identity

Apart from the Zainichi case, the issues of recognition for Korean diasporas might be regarded as premature. This is seemingly because Korean diasporas themselves have not yet openly questioned the issue of recognition in China and Uzbekistan. Recognition of minorities provides positive motivation for becoming an active citizen of a host state rather than necessarily encouraging antagonism or nurturing a separate identity, depending on the specific relationship. The question of political recognition of sub-national groups is directly related to the issue of citizenship. There seems to be no covering principle judging whether rational or national citizenship is normatively right or wrong. But in practice, overemphasis on the cultural basis of citizenship seems to cause more tensions in multinational states, where an increasing number of minority groups with different cultural backgrounds are mixed together.

The grouping of the theories below is only to provide a convenient framework for my research focus; that is, the political implications of diasporic identity. The grouping is based on the fundamental disagreement among scholars engaged in the field of identity politics. The following theoretical explanations are not, of course, originated from the practice of relationship
between dominant and minority national groups in Japan, China or the former Soviet Union. I take only those parts that provide general but fundamental issues and questions of power relations between a state and a group divided by differences in culture and history.

**Assimilationists versus multiculturalists**

Assimilationists highlight the negative nature of culture itself, negative effects on political process or negative effects of minority cultures on dominant culture. Despite holding various views on how to assimilate sub-national minorities, most conservative nationalism theorists and republican nationalists are included in this group. They advocate the assimilation of minority cultures and identities into mainstream society for the sake of political justice. Although they generally have fundamentally different philosophical stances on the particular issue of minority, Barry (2001) and Miller (1995) basically share the same normative ideas about cultural minorities in multinational states but on totally different grounds. Barry does so on egalitarian grounds while Miller’s is a result of scepticism about universalist beliefs in the neutrality of public affairs. Habermas’ (1992) concept of constitutional patriotism has also been criticised as assimilationist. Having focused on my research interests, restrictions of the tension between official nationality and a minority’s collective identity are given in Barry’s additive assimilation, Miller’s explanation on the relationship between national identity and communal identity, and Habermas’ constitutional patriotism.

Barry gives an answer to the question of why minority identity as a group should not be problematised and unnecessary to be collectively recognised in the political arena. Miller has explained why assimilation is the best answer for minority ethnic and national groups in modern states. Habermas, meanwhile, explains why migration and minority issues become more and more crucial, and how modern democracy should react to such minority issues. Such issues are directly relevant to understanding why multinational democratic states, regardless of the rough geopolitical division of East and West, including China and Japan, have developed a public fear against collectivity of different sub-national groups within their territories.

Miller views the cultural core of the citizenship notion both as a vision and a perspective, consequently there is little room for including other identities with difference in his liberal national world. He views nationality and citizenship as complementing each other, being deeply sceptical about a universalist understanding of nationhood. According to him, the national boundary should be congruent with the state boundary by assimilation and adaptation through rational deliberation. A group of people that possesses a justifiable national culture should have an independent state. For him, the pre-conditions of national identity are shared belief and mutual commitment, common history, its active character, connections with territory and distinct public culture, which provides ethical reasons for present national boundaries.
Undoubtedly, for him, a state is the best and most ethical arrangement of such national boundaries. The more homogenous public/national culture is, the more efficiently the state can function. 'Social justice will always be easier to achieve in states with strong national identities and without internal communal divisions' (1995, 96). Miller poses the causal relationship between common national identity embodied in a shared public culture and successful redistributive schemes of social justice by explaining both strength and character (quality) of national identity, and the existence of national identity along with communal divisions within multinational-looking states.

Following Miller, one can hardly prove the qualities of public culture and national identity of a nation without a sovereign state as all qualified nations with national cultures are likely to claim self-determination and are likely to be contained in the institutional form of a state. '[H]istorically, national identities have very often developed out of prior ethnic identities, and where a cohesive ethnic group finds that its legitimate claims are ignored by the state, a natural response is for the group to begin to think of itself as an alternative nationality' (ibid., 112-13) which will claim self-determination. Diasporas are the counter-examples of Millerian ideas. Diasporas are one of the sub-national groups that can plausibly possess plural national identities that are not necessarily territorially confined. Can one follow Miller and argue that Jews in Israel have a cohesive national culture whereas Jews elsewhere do not have a national identity as Jews? Taiwanese, Scottish, Corsicans and Tibetans, among many others, have their own national culture without having an externally recognised state. De-territorialised national identity could also be feasible and normative, and there exist qualified and cohesive national cultures without independent states. The common falsity among assimilationist views on this matter is the fact that their understandings of national or ethnic minority identity underestimate its political aspect and overlook their differences from other kinds of identities. Miller's term 'private cultural phenomenon' is itself a contradiction in terms. Culture inevitably possesses public characteristics. One does not understand a culture as personal dispositions and individual preferences. Also, the crucial difference of sub-national groups' collective identities from other kinds of cultural identities lay in their self-sufficiency as potentially independent political groups.

Barry, in the meantime, separates cultures from political rationality more radically by endorsing the idea of defending nationality as irrational and non-universal. For him, the concept of citizenship should be strictly based on legalistic and institutional understandings of membership to a modern state. He basically denies special attachments to the intrinsic significance of national boundaries, and criticises nationalists' irrational and particularistic sentiments in giving special weight to national allegiances. Barry argues that a politics of multiculturalism undermines a politics of redistribution. He is explicitly against the concept of equal citizenship embodied in equal rights needing to be replaced by a set of culturally
differentiated rights. For this argument, he gives examples of extreme racialised nationalisms in western history, such as Nazism and fascism, as the practice of particularism and politicisation of group identities.

Barry's main purpose is to show the theoretical loopholes of multiculturalist claims. The fundamental disparity between the two polemic debates multiculturalists versus rationalist/universalists is on how to reach a world where justice and equality are implemented without any risk of discrimination on the public level against sex, race, age, property, nationality and so on. The debate naturally involves the next stage of discussion as to whether it is fair to discuss the issues of cultural differences as the political means of negotiating public goods. In other words, the nature of the debate is the disagreement between problematising and neglecting the prevalent social and political injustice, either deliberately or accidentally, framed by more or less cultural lines. Barry basically means culture is not the kind of rights as intrinsic human nature that should be collectively protected in the political sphere as he perceives culture as a mere mannerism.

Speaking of the irrationality of culture, however, normally refers to the formality of or ways of practicing cultures. One needs to consider the logic behind such irrationality and its interconnection with power. The desire to keep cultural distinctiveness among diasporas, for example, is not only associated with feelings, sentiments or nostalgia attached to a group but also rational calculation. Human beings consciously or unconsciously tend to follow the customs and values of an existing culture, and to associate with people who share the same cultural norms, rather than changing or breaking commonly accepted cultural codes and rules. When one as a member of a group is aware of the rule of a particular group's culture, including customs and values, it becomes much easier to predict and calculate the benefits and outcomes of a relationship with others. This tendency is rested not only on comfortable feelings towards insiders but also on rational calculations of reciprocity and mutual cares and benefits. Among de-territorialised diasporas or migrant groups, in most cases, such cultural norms substitute for moral codes. Some ceremonies or rituals survive symbolically and often irrationality is involved. The purpose of such irrationality, however, is often to preserve the core of the rationale of culture. Some within the cultural circle follow the formality without understanding or questioning the core of the culture, and few tend to apply their own cultural codes beyond their own cultural circle for various reasons, including cultural pride, rational calculations caused by uncertainty of continuity in relationship and fear of a free-rider without ensuring reciprocity, not only with heterophobia. These seemingly unreasonable symbolic formalities of culture are necessary from a cultural minority's point of view because such cultural boundaries are not protected by the rationality of constitutional law. This is obviously applicable to any relations between diasporic communities and dominant national groups elsewhere.
Taking a risk in order to defend particular beliefs is harmless for a liberal society and does not impinge upon the principles of liberal democracy. Similar kinds of debates have occurred in most multinational societies, regardless of a liberal or non-liberal stance. The problems evoked by Japanese extreme nationalists targeting North Korean-affiliated Zainichi students wearing traditional costumes as school uniforms are one of those numerous examples. The point seems to be more a question of tolerance than the debate over whether principles of democracy are put in danger by minority cultures. Barry’s argument is focused on why, for the sake of equal distribution and ultimate political justice, culture is not worth taking seriously in the political arena. However, different levels of cultures seem to be mixed up and indiscriminately left aside as personal, private and irrational dispositions, lacking clarification of the different kinds and levels of cultures. On assimilation, in the same manner, Barry juxtaposes the ideal of assimilation with the ideal of diversity and finally suggests additive assimilation. However, the concept of additive assimilation, which Barry equates with plural identities, is itself paradoxical. Assimilation implies becoming one. Additive may suggest the process of assimilation but this is no alternative to forced or involuntary assimilation and it is only a milder way of expressing assimilation.

Identification within a group already involves assimilation. Even from the egalitarian point of view, there seems to be no logical ground for understanding that assimilation within a smaller group is acceptable whereas larger scale assimilation should be resisted for the sake of maintaining the mechanism of assimilation within a smaller group. In theory, such an argument seems to be convincing but what most multiculturalism theorists are concerned about is the fact that smaller and less powerful groups have been systematically oppressed or discriminated against only because someone is a member of that particular group. Barry argues that they are oppressed because of the very reason that they are in the form of such a distinguishable group rather than individuals. Barry downplays the gravity of deep-seated collective identities that have been politically and historically oppressed only because of the particular collectivities and the practical difficulties of rooting out all kinds of cultural identity. Such problems, according to his ideas on collective identity and political justice, fundamentally result from his clear-cut division of public and private arenas, which are not in reality always so neatly distinguishable, especially where culture and identity are concerned.

One may argue that his theory is developed set by western liberal democratic states, thus of little relevance to other cases, likewise multiculturalism theories with which I shall deal shortly. Yet, more accurately, his theory is developed based on the relationship between a state defending liberal traditions and a group from non-liberal traditions. In this sense, liberal cannot be understood simply as an absolute culture-free official political ideology. It can hardly be a separate issue from the cultures and traditions of a state. Although political regimes and ideologies can hardly be seen as universal, human relationships are universal. The nature of
problems, exhibiting misrecognised or under-represented collective identity, needs to be taken into account regardless of the geographical origins of theoretical debates. Diasporas' response to their host societies may be varied; a host society's manner of excluding minorities differ between countries; historical contexts and the traditions for deciding on membership are also different. All the countries under my research have officially presented themselves as either multinational or homogeneous democratic states. China and the former Soviet central Asia proclaimed socialism, but their policies towards ethnic minorities were nothing of the kind. Japan is more or less a liberal democracy in common with western countries, although the Japanese way of perceiving outsiders is not identical with other liberal democracies. In this sense, there seems to be little logic in exceptioning certain regions from useful theoretical concerns. When discussing the patterns of incorporating minority identities, I take the traditions, historical perceptions and cultures of each host state more seriously. This is not because I endorse Asian particularism but because my view is that political ideology cannot be separately developed from cultural and historical contexts. Even within liberal democracies, there exists a great variety, as there is in totalitarian regimes. In addition, theories modelled on western multinational societies are more organised owing to early exposure to racial problems among diverse national groups with more visible racial differences. Racial problems in Europe, for instance, have a longer history than, say, in northeast Asia, where differences among national groups were cultural and historical rather than racial, at least until the Japanese version of the theorisation of racial hierarchy spread throughout the region. Naturally, in western cases, one can learn more about racial, ethnic and national relations. But even in the major western European countries, patterns of ethnic and racial relationships are determined by particular historical and cultural contexts rather than by principles of liberal democracy. In this respect, Brubaker (1992)\textsuperscript{18} or Soysal (1994)\textsuperscript{19} have significance for the reason that they shed light upon how the supposedly same consensus on the universal principle of citizenship, in practice, functions differently in major European countries.

For Habermas, on the other hand, cultural diversity in the political arena is viewed as a perspective, but rational political allegiance is a vision. Habermas does not openly suggest the inevitability of the assimilation of minority cultures. He emphasises the process of accommodating cultural differences in a modern democratic state. Habermas does not deny the deeply embedded cultural ingredients within the notion of citizenship as a perspective, but as a normative vision he suggests the detachment of cultural differences from political citizenship. In this sense, he neither dismisses nor overemphasises nationhood or national identity as the basis of a modern state. Consequently, he opens a space in which to discuss the issue of various cultures and identities in political terms and the relationship between ethnic nationalist convictions and political citizenship.
The controversial issue on universal citizenship versus national citizenship has been sharply divided into two groups of scholars, including political theorists on multiculturalism and its critics, and sociologists who are interested in the relationship between nationalism and citizenship. Habermas is one of the former. The main question is whether constitutional patriotism against national citizenship is normative. He outlines a proposal for a less ethno-nationally defined citizenship in his defence of constitutional patriotism as a basis of political belonging. In this sense, his concept of citizenship is pivotal to understanding the core argument on the relationship between citizenship and national identity, which is the main theme of chapter 4 of this study. ‘The nation of citizens does not derive its identity from some common ethnic and cultural properties, but rather from the praxis of citizens who actively exercise their civil rights’ (Habermas: 1992, 3). For Habermas, constitutional patriotism should be based on political culture, which ‘must serve as the common denominator’ and ‘simultaneously sharpens an awareness of the multiplicity and integrity of the different forms of life which coexist in a multicultural society’ (ibid., 7).

In Habermas’ view, immigration from Third World and poverty-stricken regions may intensify the social diversity of multinational states. It is argued that although immigration may give rise to social tensions, such tensions can also enhance political mobilisation, and might encourage the endogenous type of new social movements, provided that those tensions are processed in a productive way. However, he strictly views minority identities separately from constitutionally bound identity. The identity of a political community, which may not be touched by immigration, depends primarily upon constitutional principles rooted in a political culture and not upon an ethical-cultural form of life as a whole. That is why one can expect that the new citizens will readily engage in the political culture of their new location, without necessarily giving up their cultural life. As much as his theory on the public sphere, Habermas’ view on communicative pluralism regarding minority identities shows his elitist ideal of deliberation. His conditions of rational bourgeois public culture only exist under well-established democratic institutions. However, the issues raised in his 1992 article directly address one of the most fundamental dilemmas that any multinational states face today.

I consider that national culture and citizenship are, in practice, difficult to separate. Nor is the conflation of the two concepts desirable. Instead, in my view, the cultural aspect of citizenship should be taken into account and become a separate issue, so that individuals are treated as individuals without any risk of being judged by their cultural or historical background unless they wish to be. The three diaspora cases under this research clearly demonstrate the different ways and degrees of a host state’s exclusion of non-Japanese, non-Han Chinese and non-Russians/non-Uzbeks through explicit and implicit nationalised political programmes embedded in the notion of citizenship. Even if there is no conflict or collective action, diasporas in those cases search for their own identity and recognition, which is part of intrinsic human

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nature. Apprehension of and resistance to assimilation are the fundamental motivation of maintaining their own kind of collective identity; the only difference is the way in which that identity is defended.

Following the major conservative assimilationist scholars, the national identity of diasporas or immigrants should be understood as abnormal, immoral at times, and consequently something to be adjusted, fixed, or at least fully melted away into mainstream society, although not by coercion but by rational democratic deliberation and communication. Contrary to the assimilationist view, contemporary theories categorised as multiculturalism highlight the role of minorities in host multinational states in terms of economy, and cultural richness. They try systematically to reveal experiences of discrimination and victimised pasts; criticise mistreatment.

In spite of the great variety, multiculturalism theorists problematise minority-dominant national relations as a perspective in the practical world, not necessarily suggesting further concrete visions of what multiculturalised nationality could be. For advocates of multiculturalism, the answer to the tension between official nationality and minority identities is the implementation of multiculturalism, where cultural diversity is respected and minority identities are recognised in public. The scholars in this group sympathise with cultural minorities on various grounds. They do so for the sake of protecting the intrinsic value of culture, the cultural diversity of human beings as individuals and societies, for the sake of political and social justice, for the sake of the intrinsic need for the recognition of identity, and for the sake of group rights to access to various resources. Multiculturalists, viewing the present society from a multicultural perspective, problematise the prevalent issues caused by benign neglect.

Kymlicka (1995 and 2000) argues that the politics of identity, in other terms, the politics of difference, do not hamper the principles of democracy as they are interpreted as an inclusive democracy through achieving multiculturalism. He disagrees with the idea that cultural issues should be strictly divorced from politics. In his view, making decisions regarding minority rights, such as the language of schooling, writing of history and choice of public holidays, is inevitably political, and not as simple to deal with as strictly individual matters. I also consider that more and more issues related to cultural choice become inevitably political. Cases of cultural choice involving political decision are infinite. A modicum of such examples include decisions on religious symbols at public schools, budget allocation for minority organisations and institutions, decisions on contents of school textbooks, introducing a quota system for cultural minorities in government institutes, regulations on promotion for minority nationals in the police or army, decisions on conditions for acquisition of citizenship and so on. Such policies towards minority groups are all unavoidably under political control. In this regard, the questions which Kymlicka raises are fundamentally relevant to the understanding of
prevalent issues in multinational states. These issues have remained, as ever, unresolved in Japan since the Korean diaspora community was formed, and to a lesser degree in the other two cases, but likely to be increasingly applicable.

In this sense, seeking group-differentiated rights is not a communitarian approach. Denial of such differences is even more against liberal principles and culturally-biased, imposing double standards towards the dominant ethnic group and disadvantaged groups. If members of certain groups are marginalised by virtue of their very differences, neglecting such differences would not be truly liberal. National membership seems to be based solely on accepting political principles of democracy but, in reality, civic or constitutional nationalism imposes a dominant culture. It is illogical to maintain that external protection causes internal pressures for the sake of solidarity and consequently violates individual rights, but immigrant groups have the choice of whether to preserve their identity. Kymlicka considers the causal relationship between internal restrictions and external protections. When implementing group-differentiated rights, there could be internal restrictions within minority groups, but Kymlicka perceives that this does not result from a recent policy of protection in any case. None of the categories of group-differentiated rights, including polyethnic rights, representation rights or self-governing rights is a threat to democracy. The final goal of national minorities is full inclusion as a citizen. For these people, freedom involves making choices about social practices and values. In their view, assimilation is not desirable because cultural ties are too strong to be given up and this is not something that we should regret.

Parekh (2000), meanwhile, sees multiculturalism as a perspective on human life, neither as a political doctrine nor as a philosophical theory. His apprehension of a multicultural and multinational world becoming culturally homogenised and politically unjust is based on his fundamental understanding of culture, human beings and society. As a response to critics maintaining that defence of cultural boundaries will result in the oppression of individuals within a cultural group, he stresses the internal plurality of culture, along with the richness and complexities of cultures. A multicultural perspective sees a society both as a community of citizens and as a community of communities. Concerning the relationship between citizenship and culture, because his concept of citizenship is nationalised and culturally-based, Parekh focuses on how to settle the problems of coexistence between unity and diversity in a multinational state. Being conscious of the universalist notion of culture-free citizenship, he naturally puts an emphasis on the sense of belonging to one's political community, which is a crucial factor in defining the quality of citizenship. He argues that the feelings of being a full citizen and yet also being an outsider are difficult to analyse, 'but it can be deep and real and seriously damage the quality of their citizenship and their commitment to the political community'. Culture is integrally tied up with political power 'because culture is itself institutionalised power and deeply imbricated with other systems of power' (342-3).
He remains on the level of suggesting a different perspective, conceiving a society rather than a concrete way of explaining the alternative identity formed as the result of successful resistance to force of assimilation and in a successful multicultural society. By encouraging all levels of cultures and identities and bringing them into the political sphere to be incorporated into a political procedure, in Parekh's view, it is not discussed how all those diversities should be multiculturalised. If a sense of belonging and a feeling of commitment to making a political entity just is so decisive and desirable, and at the same time culture and diversity are of such intrinsic value to all human beings, and also all those cultures should be incorporated into political arena with plural cultural identities and a love of diversity, a multiculturalised society in reality seems to be next to impossible to realise. As he has criticised the ethnicising procedure of modern states and the implication of political symbols, images, national identity and social values on people in order to integrate a society, it is contradictory when Parekh, maintains we cannot integrate them so long as we remain we; we must be loosened up to create a new common space in which they can be accommodated and become part of a newly reconstituted we,²⁵ stressing the significance of national identity in fostering political unity and holding the shared national identity as a crucial role in a multicultural society considering its greater demand of cultivating a sense of belonging among its diverse communities.

Unless one coherently criticises thick culturally, ethnically or racially based collective identity on both sides (i.e. dominant national group or minority national group), it seems more difficult to solve the vexed relationship between official nationality and minority collective identities. He urges multinational societies to be ready to understand other cultures, in order to know the people better so that they can implement the most appropriate policies to accomodate different nationals, ultimately to embrace their differences and legitimately incorporate them into the dominant societies. Nevertheless, understanding and adopting other cultures, cultural features and group dispositions based on biological differences is a separate issue from understanding the nature of culture as a principle, the special emotional attachment to and inalienability from a culture of human beings. What he expects and what he thinks we should expect from dominant national groups of multinational states is an understanding of both. In that case, Miller or other liberal secessionists are the only answer to his paradox. When bringing all ethnic, racial and cultural ingredients from all collectivised minorities into the political arena, if we all accept not only different cultures as contents but also their exclusivity, as he explained, only insiders understand the rules are painful to discard, it seems infeasible to expect there to be any room to consider adjusting or giving influence to different people from different cultures. Being ready to understand other cultures and being ready to adapt to other cultures are two different matters.
When applying a multiculturalist view on minority identity for the analysis of diasporic identity, one can understand the view that considers minority identities, including diasporic identity, as merely a negative identity in relation to a dominant national identity. By taking a minority identity as a passive agency, such view theoretically supports a certain viewpoint that perceives the host state or dominant national group as the fundamental and only cause of a minority’s exclusion and misrecognition. Consequently, such viewpoint justifies a critical but negative and passive national identity of a minority group. For that reason, I emphasise interactions between a dominant national group and diasporic communities rather than pressure for unilateral assimilation from the government of the host state.

Recognising third-ness

I do not intend to consider scholars such as Hall (1990, 1992b) and Soysal (1994) as a theoretical development in that field, but they do deal with alternative collective identities more directly from a different point of view. In consequence, with their views, diasporic identity can at least be normalised, and thus be regarded as something to which it is worthwhile to pay attention. This is because their theories explicitly recognise the feature of a third identity and hybridity, instead of framing conventionally regarded aliens in either of the other two categories. In this sense, I consider that multiculturalism is understood as a perspective, and further these scholars propose a vision of post-nationality. The theorists I categorise next are those influenced by postmodernism, trying to apply it to migrants’ identity. I mention Soysal and Hall for the reason that their views are applicable to diasporic identity. They both deal directly with the identities of diasporas and migrants. They view the issues of national identity in the international setting in relation to changes in the world order and, consequently, the conventional concept of territorially confined nationality is questioned.

Soysal, paying more attention to practical policies of host states towards immigrant communities, argues that the rights of the person transcend those of the citizen, which itself is an obsolete postwar arrangement defining membership in a territorially confined nation-state. She argues that the significance of nationals as a group adhering to the meaning of citizenship is/should be replaced by a more individual de-territorialised notion of citizenship based on universal human rights because of the incompatibility of the two notions of national sovereignty and universal human rights in a globalised world order. Consequently, she points out the inevitable inadequacy of the conventional concept of nationally based membership principle in protecting individual human rights of nation-less and state-less persons rather than as groups. Rather than a theoretical justification of full citizenship for immigrants, she gives a more concrete picture of how western democracies systematically exclude immigrants, especially guest-workers and refugees from less developed areas. Although her analytical framework is
only partially applicable to Korean diasporas, her concept of post-national identity as another type of national identity, as opposed to the national model of citizenship, explains how to understand the phenomenon of diasporas in the changing postwar world. Both as a practice and a vision, she perceives that there has been ‘a profound transformation in the institution of citizenship, both in its institutional logic and in the way it is legitimated’ (1994, 139). She explains that modern national citizenship was a postwar phenomenon introduced by passports, identity cards and visas, and which had not existed before the First World War. At the same time, the construction of the dichotomy between national citizens and aliens began. Naturally, according to the conventional model of citizenship, membership and territory were congruent. Although the boundaries of membership are fluid, the boundaries of the nation-state are not. ‘Indeed, the nation-states, still acting upon the national model - since their existence is predicated on this model - constantly try to keep out foreigners by issuing new aliens laws and adopting restrictive immigration policies’. Soysal makes it clear that nation-states remain ‘the central structure regulating access to social distribution’, as ‘[t]he world is still largely organized on the basis of spatially configured political units; and topographic matrixes still inform the models and praxis of national and international actors’ (ibid., 141-3).

The post-national model of citizenship, on the other hand, implies de-territoriality and multiplicity. In this sense, she believes, national identity reflecting the new trend can be called transnational. In her view of the post-national model, the basis for the legitimacy of citizenship has shifted from nationhood to universal personhood, as it is no longer located within the nation-state system and states’ obligations to foreign populations go beyond the national boundary. Thus, the individual transcends the citizen. Soysal discusses refugees in the same context. However, stateless people should be viewed differently from guest-workers when discussing a state’s obligations towards foreigners. In her view, the reconfiguration of citizenship occurred, first by a transformation in the organisation of the international state system resulting in increased interdependence and connectedness beyond conventional national sovereignty and jurisdiction; second, by the emergence of universalistic rules regarding the rights of the individual formalised and legitimised by international codes and laws embedded in complicated international charters, conventions and treaties, which she views as substantiated examples of ‘the impacts of transnational instruments in the rationalization of the status of international migration’ (ibid., 151). Consequently, her assumption endorses free, open borders as a more appropriated model for the globalised world and this has already happened. It is argued that nation-states mainly those industrialised welfare states preferred by international immigrants and refugees, ignore and either do not adjust or only reluctantly accept reality due to the dialectical dualities of the global system; the coexistence of national sovereignty and universal human rights.
Soysal expounds the reality, but she does not sufficiently discuss why modern welfare states should or should not resist those conventionally considered to be outsiders, apart from her empirical proofs of the seemingly irreversible changes in the trends of international migration, let alone the enthusiastic debates as to whether the world is as globalised and whether it is so dramatically different from the era of national citizenship as to be worthy of the term 'post'. An important issue regarding diasporic identity is how and to what extent diaspora should be included in the host societies, rather than open-closed border debates. An obvious tendency in the field of identifying minority national groups is that diasporic identity is discussed within the same category as other types of immigrants. Soysal’s belief is that universal human rights can be protected in individuals rather than collectivities. Any more sophisticated examinations of collective rights and individual rights are missing. There are numerous counter examples discrediting the individualistic approach towards protecting cultural minorities. In practice, highly complicated modern multinational relations necessitate much more specified consideration. Suggestions of the individualistic view towards the notion of citizenship will not always be the ultimate solution for some minority groups who pursue recognition in collective terms. Bearing in mind such difficulties, Chapter 5 of this work concerns diasporas' psychological conflicts, caused by the dilemma between maintaining nationhood and a deeper degree of incorporation into mainstream society as individuals.

Meanwhile, Hall (1990) takes the concept of diasporas rather broadly. ‘[D]iaspora does not refer us to those scattered tribes whose identity can only be secured in relation to some scared homeland to which they must at all costs return, …’ (235). The later passage contains his post modern position on national identity. ‘The diaspora experience … is defined not by essence or purity, but by the recognition of a necessary heterogeneity and diversity; by a conception of ‘identity’ which lives with and through, not despite, difference; by hybridity’ (ibid.) (emphasis in original). His main emphasis on the process of the representation of cultural identity can be discovered throughout his article. For him, identity is ‘something’ - not a mere trick of the imagination. It has its histories - and histories have their real, material and symbolic effects. The past continues to speak to us’ (ibid.) (emphasis in original). But for him, its discontinuity is emphasised as much as its continuity, suggesting a crucial difference from ethnicists and historians of sociology. Cultural identity no longer addresses diasporas ‘as a simple, factual ‘past, since our [diaspora’s] relation to it … always constructed through memory, fantasy, narrative and myth’ (ibid.).

Identity, for Hall, is highly fluid, but not a subject to be ignored as being falsified and constructed; cultural identity is always from somewhere, continuously changing: ‘There can be few political statements which so eloquently testify to the complexities entailed in the process of trying to represent a diverse people with a diverse history through a single, hegemonic “identity”’ (ibid.). He contends that, ‘We all write and speak from a particular place and time,
from a history and a culture which is specific. What we say is always "in context", positioned (222). Hall's emphasis is on the continuous necessity of representing identities; identification, which is the crucial process of naming, renaming, recovering and constructing history in a specific context. Bhabha's explanation on hybrid identity further suggests how to perceive diasporic identity in the same vein as Hall's hybridity:

The notion of hybridity comes from the two prior descriptions ... of the genealogy of difference and the idea of translation, because if ... the act of cultural translation (both as representation and as reproduction) denies the essentialism of a prior given original or originary culture, then ... all forms of culture are continually in a process of hybridity. ... [T]he importance of hybridity is not to be able to trace two original moments from which the third emerges, rather hybridity to me is the 'third space' which enables other positions to emerge. This third space displaces the histories that constitute it, and sets up new structures of authority, new political initiatives, which are inadequately understood through received wisdom.26

Bhabha's concept of hybridity, describing the construction of cultural authority within conditions of political antagonism,27 is to be read in a similar sense. Diasporic identity is formed through a continuous negotiating process with time, geopolitical locations, and power by coping with an exclusive nation-building process throughout the history of their having become diasporas. Hall emphasises the discursive accumulation of identity. For example, British history is written by those who want to create a singular national identity; it denies the experiences and histories of some, such as black people who are not part of that singular identity. In the same way, the Korean diasporas' efforts to keep their own history has contributed to the creation of diasporic identity. Such efforts are made always in the context of continuous power relations between diasporas and host nations: the Japanese, the Han-Chinese, the Russian and the Uzbeks who aim to create a single national identity.

Identity is an endless negotiation between subjective and objective identification. Perception becomes representation when one tells stories in a narrative way that identifies and locates oneself in a historical perspective at a certain dramatic point and historic moment. But one needs to speak from it to become a part of it, which means stitching together such moments with oneself rather than disconnecting them into parts. Human beings are products of such narration. There may be some intervening moments as a moment of watershed in narratives, which have important effects on identity.28 The expression of collective identity in Korean diasporas can also be understood in this way. Such expressions are normally made through selecting and organising previously discursive individual stories and memories into the form of a collective history. Identity is expressed rather than constructed. Diasporic identity is a novel and flexible identity built in a new global space. Today's diaspora is justified and consolidated
by dint of globalisation and transnationalism. Some are disappearing, but this can be hardly applied to Jewish diasporas, for example, which are constantly reproducing identity.29

In Hall’s view, the issues of multiculturalism are not novel in the global era, but there are different kinds of multiculturalisms. Specificity, in terms of different stages and forms, rather than identical force as particular kinds of fragmentation (that is, different elements and moments of social change within seemingly identical forces, say, modernity or globalisation) should be considered. Difference should be recognised in terms of needs and outcomes. Additional costs would be incurred. Levelling difference completely is not feasible, and equality and difference are fundamentally paradoxical and inevitably contradictory; therefore, one cannot strictly have both. Among various ethnic groups, we notice notions of rivalry of victimhood and subsequent rising hierarchy within minority groups. Then, privatisation of culture occurs, but there no longer exists a space for private life. Today, seemingly, it is the end of politics but at the same time every aspect of life is politicised. Perhaps a certain kind of politics has ended, but different issues become political. New forms of racism with multiculturalism, for example, are more often associated with other kinds of culture rather than only with physical distinctions.30

Following Hall’s view, I also consider history building through the continuous representation of collective identity as a necessary task for minority national groups. Building a national identity is making a distinctive history together with the host nation, but diasporas participate in the process with their own collective memories. Accordingly, such process of the formation of a diaspora’s identity is fulfilled through continuous negotiation with the dominant national group over conflicting interpretations of historical events.

One might be puzzled, then, why recognition is necessary for seemingly dormant groups such as Korean diasporas. Not only because I consider that the crucial condition for co-existence of plural national identities within one state is the recognition of minority history, but also because, after close examination, I found that what diasporic Korean people are searching for or are (un)satisfied with is how their historical existence is perceived in the host society. Their desire for recognition, sometimes hidden, sometimes explicit, is defining them through an outsider’s identification of them and ultimately repositioning them in the mainstream societies as a stable category, diasporas. In this context, I maintain that diasporic identity is to be considered as a third type of national identity, as opposed to one of the conventional types of national identity. This third-ness of Korean diasporas’ collective identity, as Bhabha suggests, can be something totally different from any of the existing national identities involved, although formation of a diasporic identity is begun with Korean identity and the official nationality of the host nation. The problems are caused by a tendency to frame a particular group of people with a seemingly unstable collective identity as citizens or non-citizens through exclusive nation-building in practice. Multinational states have always existed, but nation-building rather than multination-building has been the legitimate state agenda in modern political history.
Collective memory and national identity

How, then, should diasporic people experience positive discrimination and be politically recognised? As implied earlier, successful negotiation over interpretations of shared historical events is the central condition for the peaceful co-existence of plural nationalities involved. A minority group's collective identity grows side by side with the official history and culture of a national group in power. In my view, it is not impossible to share the dominant national culture, public or private, with another nation, especially for a diasporic group that has participated in a host state's nation-building process for a sufficient length of time. This is on the ground that a certain degree of acculturation and assimilation of a minority national group to a host nation is more or less natural and necessary. On the other hand, diasporas' historical memory of collective oppression is something inalienable. This is simply because negative history will never be welcomed by a host nation.

Fortunately, however, diasporas' collective memory comprises the second phase, which is participation in the nation-building agenda of a host nation. Here, one needs to consider the fact that not all diasporas are cooperative towards a host state's national projects. I say this is fortunate due to the fact that positive historical memories are ready to be shared, no matter what distinctiveness the minority national group has as opposed to the host nation. Both phases of diasporas' collective memory, oppression and participation, form diasporic identity. Diasporas' interpretations of such historical relationship with the host nation are self-justification of their existence. Recognition of diasporas' self-justification includes negotiations over history. How a host nation interprets and how much it accepts such diasporas' history determine the patterns of coexistence between the host nation and a minority nationality. Negotiations can take concrete forms through official history books, public speeches and actual policies, and so on. My view will become clearer in the main chapters when discussing Korean diasporas' selection of historical events and interpretations of them. As Renan's well known phrase rightly illuminates, 'nation-building requires getting one's history wrong ... The society has to be capable of forgetting those parts of its history that will interfere with the development of a sense of pride in it'. Inclusion of conventionally outcast minority groups' stories into official history is a painstaking process. Getting the written history right during the exclusive nation-building period is almost a process of rebuilding a nation as an inclusive multi-nation. However, it is important to discuss who has the power to get the history officially wrong or right.

Diasporas' national identity is built while interpreting, understanding or identifying one as a person to a member of a group, who actively possesses or is passively webbed in a particular history and culture. Diasporic identity emerges when they become aware of the relationship between nations and self, interpreting one in the context of their plural nationalities,
by positioning self in the several national contexts. A diasporic person identifies the self as a person in the way s/he understands the nations around him/her, at times figuring out or questioning the meaning of one's existence within multiple nations to which they voluntarily and involuntarily belong. All these activities of identification and differentiation of a diaspora's identity formation evolve both by the state's passive indoctrination and by their active involvement in national projects.

An analytical framework for understanding Korean diasporas

The following analytical framework suggests a way to comprehend the particularities and generalities of Korean diasporas. I formulated this framework mostly based on the researched cases, but also by comparison with other diasporic cases within my knowledge that are not dealt with in this research. It is not my ambition to provide an all-covering grand model explaining all diasporas. Thus, although the four factors are all very crucial to an understanding of Korean diasporas' national identity, this may not be the case for other examples. For instance, one may have little to talk about relations between motherland and diaspora in cases such as the Basque diasporas. One should begin with ethnic oppression and religious faith in order to discuss Jewish diasporas. One needs to begin with the system of slavery to discuss formation of the identity of the Black population in the United States. As I mentioned earlier, the primary conditions of being defined as a diaspora provide the four main factors of the analytical framework. A diaspora identity is generated from the structure conditioned by these factors. The primary conditions of a diaspora are extracted from my working definition of a diaspora, and such definition is selectively modified from existing research directly addressing diasporas discussed in the first part of this chapter. A chapter has been dedicated to each of these factors. I then repeat this framework in the concluding part, while adding concrete explanations of findings from empirical research. It may explain other diasporas with some limitations and modifications; otherwise, one should judge that Korean diasporas are unique.

Origins of a diaspora

The origins of becoming a diaspora decide the first stage of the relationship between a diaspora and the dominant nation. It is the beginning of transforming discursive collective memories into a national identity vis-à-vis host nation. At this stage, the fundamental causes of abhorrence or amiability between a diaspora and the host nation occur. Colonial and political diasporic identity tends to develop a relatively firmer linkage with the ancestral homeland, and tends to demand further recognition from receiving countries. In addition, when the host state is politically liberal, a minority national group is likely to demand further rights of citizenship from the host state. Within the category of colonial diasporas, the case of forced resettlement tends to develop stronger emotive, national sentiment, and show a stronger collective will to survive at the
community level. This is because deportation ends in an inappropriate social and natural environment for the oppressed group. The origins for being incorporated into a host society, however, are not sufficient to explain later developments of a diaspora's national identity due to the fact that identity is not static, and the host state plays a greater role in moulding a collective identity from the time of diaspora's resettlement and incorporation.

**Exclusivity of citizenship notion**
The host country's policy towards diasporas or immigrants based on different notions of citizenship, both intentionally and unintentionally, have somehow abnormalised diasporic identity through exclusive nation-building. An analysis of diaspora identity concerns changing memberships between two states: legally, politically and, at times, culturally. The specific policies of each host state, based on the different notions of citizenship, shape the present national identity of diasporas. The key issue is how far minority national identity should and can be accommodated by the official citizenship, the legal scheme of a whole range of rights and duties. Under the traditions of national citizenship and a liberal democratic regime, in Japan, as a notable example, ethnic or national minority groups tend to be culturally excluded from or ignored by the mainstream society as a deeper degree of cultural incorporation is required for full inclusion. When diasporas are economically exploited involuntarily under a totalitarian communist regime, owing to communist vision emphasising the agenda of inclusive multinational state-building, diasporas tend to highlight their contributions to the state. When a host state adopts policies of positive discrimination, a minority national group with a negative image of their history shows less tension against a host societies and a stronger desire for inclusion. And yet, without any explicit collectivity as a distinguishable group, a diaspora cannot be in the position from which it could demand official recognition. The awareness of the necessity of preserving collectivity develops hand-in-hand with substantial activities of differentiation of their identity vis-à-vis the host state.

**Collectivity of a diaspora**
Identity expressed in relation to minority organisations demonstrates the collectivity of diasporas in a tangible way, by looking into why and how certain types of minority organisations have emerged in a specific situation. The institutionalisation of diasporic identity is the means of making a diaspora space. Major minority organisations and institutions reflect the interactions between diasporas and a host society. The collectivity of diasporas becomes more active and visible when at least the following four conditions are met simultaneously: collective memory of historical oppression; the interconnection of interests and collective identity in the region where the territorial line is congruent with an ethnic or a sub-national line; an exclusive national bond within the group, especially through common religious beliefs with emphasis on collective rituals; circumstantial conditions stimulate collective actions. A diaspora without those conditions is still a diaspora, and can develop a collective identity with some
visible collectivity. Such diasporas secure collective features as psychological and cultural relief, but are highly unlikely to develop a collective action by means of a fully fledged collective identity alone.

Ancestral motherland

The factor of the ancestral motherland also affects the formation of a diasporic identity. Commonly, the more diasporas communicate with their ancestral motherland, the following features are deduced. First, there is a tendency to identify diasporas themselves as distinguishable groups of people vis-à-vis not only host state, but also the ancestral motherland. Some diasporas believe that they have more cultural and political options, thus positively accept and interpret their multiplicity, whereas some develop an antagonistic collective identity against one of the nationalities involved. The second feature is the development of a diasporic network, both within a host state and with diasporas elsewhere. In this process, for some, a stronger in-group identity is developed while, for others, a stronger desire to remain in personhood is also developed. The third tendency is to compare their own situations with diasporas from the same historical root but incorporated into other host states. Awareness of being a diaspora is nurtured while learning about those in a similar situation. In this process, diasporas develop sympathy for and a sense of competition with other diasporas. Lastly, diasporas tend to make political, economic and cultural demands of the ancestral motherland by emphasising their contributions to the state of the homeland and the maintenance of national features of the homeland, by identifying themselves with the nation of the homeland. Diasporas' demands increase when their homeland is politically opened and economically wealthier. In the opposite case, the denial of the historical root is more likely. Zainichi have demanded political rights from the South Korean government whereas the Josônjok demand is for economic support, and, the Koreitsu demand substantial cultural linkage with societies of the Korean motherland. If a diaspora has a divided ancestral motherland, analysis of their national identity becomes more complicated. Additional variables need to be considered, such as the relationship between the divided nations and diplomatic relations between the host state and motherland. Commonly, however, in such cases, the division among diasporas is inevitable to the extent that the diasporic group is transformed into a more self-sufficient community that is more or less distanced from homeland.

As for the consequences of the interplay among these four basic factors, Josônjok developed rather a stable, nested identity compatible with the official Han-Chinese nationality. The features of Josônjok identity are best represented in their intellectual activities in the forms of literature, educational institutes, research centres, publishing companies, journals and magazines as a means of cultivating spiritual heritages. They have built their community in isolation, geographically and culturally, which can also be explained as a positive element in developing a culturally and territorially confined sub-national community. Over the last fifteen years, various levels of tensions have been exposed upon their extensive communications with
the South Korean motherland. Having undergone a period of confusion, the factor of the South Korean motherland has added to their process of re-forming a diasporic identity; that is, expressing Josônjok identity vis-à-vis the Korean nation, which includes simultaneous identification and differentiation.

Meanwhile, I analyse that the evolution of Zainichi identity as a history of crystallising their distinctive collective identity rather than one of passive assimilation and subsequent disappearance. Unlike Japan's official rhetoric of smooth assimilation, the Zainichi identity vis-à-vis the Japanese nation has remained segregated, legally and socially. This hampered the creation of a sphere in which the Zainichi antagonism against Japan could be negotiated and their collective pathology cured. Actual interactions with, or mere imagination of their motherland have been their psychological exit and an important source of national salvation. Yet, the historically rooted triad structure, motherland-organisation-hostland, has been gradually loosened.

In the meantime, the Koreitsy population has been highly dispersed and recently mobile, spread all over the former Soviet Union Republics in central Asia not only in Russia, but also in Russian Far East. They have nurtured well tamed and adaptive multiple nationalities from the Soviet Union to the post Soviet central Asian states. Their collective identity has been expressed through the unique experience of deportation and success in collective farms, although this remains merely symbolic at present. Ethnic revivals have been the agenda of the Koreitsy community, with support from the South Korean motherland. Similarly with the Josônjok community, some intellectuals are sceptical or cautious about South Korean influence on the region. Such reflections among intellectuals and community leaders will, in the end, lead Koreitsy to form a distinctive diasporic identity.

Speaking of diasporas' paths, on the other hand, in general diasporas may be explained broadly within the following three categories: highly politicised diasporic groups with exclusive solidarity; inclusive diasporas with a third type of identity; and loosely bound diasporas with weak in-group identity.

The first type of diaspora would utilise cultural features and religious allegiances for political bargaining. In such cases, the means and ends became intermingled. They may be highly politicised and ready to develop their collective will towards aggressive actions. With the variable of a collective identity alone, however, one would not be able to analyse the developments of collective action. When it is exposed, one needs to consider other causes and the conditions of each group under particular circumstances.

The Korean diasporic cases, however, do not resemble any of the volatile diasporic groups. It is also true that the national identity of a diaspora without an explicit collective action is difficult to analyse. I argue that the way of expressing collective identity itself varies. It explains the various patterns of co-existence of multiplicity. In this regard, one can consider the
second type of diaspora, one that has built its own sphere of collective identity. All the Korean
diasporas fall into this type of group. Such a type of diaspora does not use cultural features as a
political means, although there is a considerable degree of cultural maintenance. The identity of
such groups is stable. Diasporas from such a category demonstrate fewer tendencies for political
mobilisation for the sake of collective aims. Intermittent democratic collective movements
among Zainichi should be understood in a different context, for their demand is a fuller degree
of inclusion in Japanese society, rather than to be separate or to achieve a special arrangement of
any kind of an independent political unit. In my view, the other two cases will develop in a
similar way to the Zainichi when their host states, China and the former Soviet Republics,
become less rigid in terms of type of regime and the degree of social openness.

Finally, the last type comprises diasporas who are destined to disappear and melt away
into another national group. For this type of group, collective identity would be weak and the
level of maintenance of distinctive cultural features is relatively low.

Conclusion

While problematising diasporas' collective identity, diasporas have become a new category of
human collectivity. Diasporas have necessarily been highlighted, both in academia and real life.
I do not particularly intend to moralise on diasporas, but intend to highlight the fact that
minority groups such as diasporas have somehow been demoralised and considered to be an
abnormal, disloyal and opportunistic people in the modern history of nation-building. Whether
diasporas' national identity is constructed or not, and whether diasporic people should be treated
as a group or individuals, it has been true that Korean diasporas as groups with a distinctive
culture and history have been mis-treated or marginalised. Also, diasporic identity is
insufficiently expressed, and consequently under-represented. Such mis-recognition and under-
representation have been enforced by the dichotomy between citizen and non-citizen, which is
framed and imposed during the early nation-building period as the implicit political agenda. In
such a way, building a positive collective identity with confidence has been systematically
discouraged. Consequently, diasporas have been alienated and their identity has had to be
concealed. By expressing a diaspora's existence, both by insiders and outsiders, as a group and
as individuals, a new sphere has been restored or created in which Korean diasporas can
comfortably represent and articulate their identity. In this way, diasporas, as an academic field
and as the human category, become meaningful. Otherwise, diasporas would have been left,
being perceived as an ever-dishonoured or inferior group of people in history. I regard this trend
as a development.
3 Becoming Diasporas

Origins of the Korean diasporas

As historical events and memories are the essential parts of discussions on the diaspora's national identity throughout the main chapters, here I only provide a broader historical account of how and why Korean diasporas came into existence. Until recently, little has been written on the origins of Korean diasporas. As Cummings (1997) noted, the origins of Korean migration beyond the present northern territorial boundary go back to an earlier period of history.

The northern border between Korea and China formed by the Yalu and Tumen rivers has been recognized by the world for centuries, much longer than comparable borders in Europe, and so one might think these rivers always constituted Korea's northern limits. In fact, Koreans ranged far beyond these rivers, well into northeastern China and Siberia, and neither Koreans nor the ancient tribes that occupied the plains of Manchuria considered these riparian borders to be sacrosanct.

Considering its special relationship with Korea, the region, Manchuria, has crucial significance in the history of Korean migration. Bate (1948) is correct to note that two inherent factors are involved in northeastern affairs in general: 'the latent and actual wealth of Manchuria' and 'Russia’s absolute necessity for warm water ports on the North Pacific seaboard to serve her vast and comparatively undeveloped hinterland'. In terms of racial components, it is known that Manchuria comprised several groups including Buyŏ, Suchens, Shanjungs, Tunghus, Wuhuans, Fuyus, Mais, Wuchis, Wei, Shihweis, Mujungs, Mohos, Khitans, Nurchens and so on. Manchuria was a major target for China, Japan and Russia. This was due to the territorial interests of Manchurian rulers, primary resources of interest to the Japanese empire, and the importance of the transcontinental railway to the Russians. Geographically and historically, the issues of Manchuria and Koreans are also inseparable when considering the prosperous periods of ancient Korean history, which flourished in the Manchu region. Korean history between the 1860s and 1953 in relation to the major neighboring countries - China, Japan and Russia - is crucial to understanding the origins of Korean diasporas. 'The process of diasporization is the logical starting point for diasporan studies. Variations in the experience of the initial dispersal' (Butler: 2001, 197) are categorical in order to make distinctions between various types of diaspora. I suggest that, based on their origins, Korean diasporas should be defined as a mixture of economic and colonial diasporas and voluntary, involuntary and forced migration.
The political history of Korea between the 1860s and the beginning of the twentieth century included the continuation of external threats by foreign powers and Korea's struggle to secure national sovereignty. 'Korea was the "Sick Man" of the Far East', as Lensen (1966) states. As '[a] tributary state of the Chinese empire', Korea 'had been 'opened' to the world by Japanese warships in 1876. China gradually reasserted her suzerain authority and a triangular struggle developed between China, Japan and Russia' (2). Until 1953, colonisation, decolonisation, the Korean War and the subsequent division of the nation were the major watersheds of Korean history.

Unlike the relatively stable era during the early Josōn Kingdom, on the eve of colonisation, overheated political struggles among political factions reached their peak while the long traditional stance of the policy of extreme seclusion towards foreign countries was kept. These struggles reached the worst during the Daewongun regime. The Yi dynasty recorded a relatively well developed bureaucratic system and enjoyed cultural prosperity before the dynastic rules began to decline and it had to face well-equipped modernised foreign powers. Overlooking the imminent necessity of modernising military power and lacking knowledge of the outside world and diplomatic skills, in addition to corruption within the dynasty, eventually gradually ruined the country. This finally put the country in the middle of the international turmoil, depriving of its sovereignty until the end of the Second World War. The history of diaspora marked between 1860 and 1953 reflects the continuous political chaos of the country ever since. Depending on the relevant period, collective migration of Koreans can be explained in different ways.

The origins of a relatively large Korean migration towards Manchuria began as early as the 1860s under the late Yi dynasty. Nevertheless, the migration was not an entirely sudden event. For example, at the end of the seventeenth century, King Sukjong, having been inspired by advice from officials such as Nam Goo-man and Lee Yi-myung, initiated exploitation of the frontier area so that civilians living nearby could move freely and settle down in the region. He regarded this as a safeguard in order to secure the territory against Qing China's occasional threats. King Youngjo carried forward the plan by investigating the area near B'aekdu Mountain, developing the Hamgyongdo region and establishing government institutions in charge of encouraging migration and protecting Korean settlers. During this period, the allegedly erroneous interpretation of the demarcation stone, b'aek-du-san-jöng-gye-bi, between Qing and Josōn was pointed out by Song In-myung. Among ordinary people living in the area, it had already become an unofficial custom both for the Chinese and Koreans to move back and forth across the territorial border in order to gather lucrative herbs, especially ginseng. Clear regulations were not set for controlling such activities, which sometimes involved serious diplomatic questions on social crimes committed in the region. There are no accurate historical records regarding exactly how many Koreans crossed the border between Korea and Qing China.

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and in which year. Until the b'aek-du-san-jŏng-kye-bi was built in 1712 to demarcate
the frontier line between Qing and Josŏn, the concept of national frontiers between China and
Korea remained unsettled. However, because the deciding of the territorial border did not follow
any clear principles, the two countries had continuous disagreement and had undertaken several
investigations regarding the nature of the stone and the frontier region itself, especially the north
Gando area, which later became the main object of political bargaining between Japan and
Russia.

It is said that there were earlier migrations than those the 1860s, even as early as the
1660s. Historians believe, however, that a collective form of migration began in the 1860s. As I
deal with nations after the 1860s by this time unarguably there were distinctive political
boundaries, more than just cultural groups, although the degree of modernisation of such groups,
the Josŏn, the Japanese, and the Chinese under the Qing dynasty, was not perhaps sufficient to
meet the conditions of the modern definitions of a nation. It seems to be clear that there existed
certain degrees of understanding of one's neighbour's racial origins, and cultural and political
differences among the three distinctive peoples, territories and countries. It is safe to suggest
that the story of political elaboration of distinctive collective identities with clear markers
between insiders and outsiders among the three neighbouring countries should go back to a
much earlier period than modernists would propose.

Anthropologists and historians of the three countries have shown hysterical reactions to
each others' claims on the origins of races, as such claims inevitably involve perceptions of
people in the neighbouring countries. Korean historians make efforts to incorporate the history
of Buyŏ as an extension of Goguryŏ into Korean history by highlighting the identical racial
origins and cultural heritages from ancient Korea developed in the southern part of the present
Korea. Meanwhile, Chinese historians tend to view Buyŏ as an independent political entity that
existed between China and Korea, rather than one of the ancient kingdoms that belonged to the
history of the three kingdoms. Korean historians mostly claim that the Buyŏ tribe inhabiting
Manchuria was composed of people originally from Goguryŏ. Chinese official history mentions
that Buyŏ were from inner China or that they are originally either Manchus or Mongolians. This
became an important historical debate for the reason that the issue is related to the establishment
of the Goguryŏ kingdom, the origins of Goguryŏ-in [man] and history of Balh'ae. Conservative
Korean historians' expansive psychological map has clashed with reality. Recently, the local
government of Jilin [Gilim] banned the exploration of historical heritages in North Gando
where, supposedly, Goguryŏ remains are buried. The official reason is to rebuild the destroyed
historical remains, but a group of Korean experts' rampant territorial claims followed by
frequent investigations on the Goguryŏ heritages were known to have displeased China.

China had viewed Korea as one of the subordinate countries in the same category as
Vietnam (Annam), Indochina, Andaman Islands, Taiwan and Malaya. The relations between
ancient China and its neighboring countries are deeply rooted in the Chinese view of the outside world often described as Sino-centrism. As a perspective and ideology, Sino-centrism has been reflected in China’s attitudes and views towards minority ethnic and national groups and embedded in policies towards them during the modern era. Throughout the Chinese modern state building period until recently, allowing a great deal of autonomy to minority nationals and isolation of those minorities from mainstream society can be understood in the historical and cultural context of Sino-centrism. China has been regarded as the regional centre of civilisation since the period of West Chu (BC 1120 - 770) for over 3000 years. For the Chinese, the peoples of the surrounding world were regarded as barbarians and enemies at the same time. They were named differently. Those from the eastern area of the river including Korea, Manchu and Japan were called Dong-I, meaning barbarians of the East. Until the Opium War broke out, weak and small countries were constant targets of China. Most of the present Chinese territory adjacent to the border was taken over by China by force during this period. In its heyday, the relationship between China and its neighboring countries was set by the semi-colonised tributary system.

The tributary custom was started from the fourth century and was firmly established and institutionalised in the seventh century, being continued until the late Qing dynasty. It is quite natural for all the semi-colonised countries to be deeply influenced by China in many ways, especially in terms of culture and ideology. The East Asian world order, or the treaty system, lasted for over a millennium. The system ‘was somewhere between the European-style international relations and the outright colonial arrangements’ (Iriye: 1974, 9). Josôn was a ‘dependency of China, but in matters relating to internal administration or foreign relationships Josôn had always enjoyed autonomy’ (Hsu: 1926, 109). The obscure definition of Chinese suzerainty over Josôn provided a convenient way for Japan to alter the interpretation of Korean sovereignty from time to time. In diplomatic negotiations over the issue of Korea, Japan could easily exploit the confusing Sino-Josôn relationship, excluding Josôn and China tactically. Prior to official annexation, Japan made it clear that Josôn was an independent country. As Hsu explains, ‘Chao hsien (Josôn), being an autonomous state, shall enjoy the rights of equality with Japan’, which Japan clarified in 1875. ‘This was, of course, nothing more than a declaration of historical facts’, Hsu observes, ‘for Korea had been an autonomous state ever since she came into existence. … and had always enjoyed the rights of equality with Japan, not excluding the days of the Hideyoshi invasion’ (ibid., 109). By ensuring the status of Korea as an independent country, Chinese influence on Korea began to be mitigated and, at the same time, foreign powers could deal with Korea more directly while excluding China.

Naturally, ethnic interaction in the region started much earlier than the recorded migratory history of people in today’s Korea, Japan and China. Lee (1997) refines the earlier stage of migration and ethnic mixture of this region.
Large-scale immigration of Koreans took place in several waves eastward through southern Mongolia, into Manchuria, and then to the Korean peninsula in the period of 5000 to 4000 B.C. until they reached the eastern sea. Even the sea did not stop them: when their civilization advanced and acquired riches to build large enough ships, they started to immigrate into the Japanese islands, conquering and assimilating the indigenous Ainus and Kumasos there from the second century B.C. to the fourth century A.D. Large waves of immigrants continued to move into the Japanese islands from the Korean Peninsula until the eighth century A.D., even after the Yamato state was established in Japan (7-8).

As much as Korea, Japan has kept the myth of racial homogeneity. Yet, Japan's population was much more heterogeneous than outsiders have been informed even after Japan evolved into a centralised state. The tribes in the southwest and northeast, the Kumasos and the Ainu, maintained their distinct characteristics. Even the Yamato who populated part of the central island were far from being homogeneous. When the debate developed from the issue of race to cultural heritages during ancient times, each country's efforts to discover the evidence of cultural superiority from time immemorial is an ever unfinished national project. It seems to be quite the case that history, race and cultural heritages have been politically misused or overused for the purpose of visualising the obscurity of a national boundary and enhancing political legitimacy relying on it. Anyhow, due to the geographical proximity, cultural interaction among the three nations was vigorous. During the fifth and sixth centuries, for example, Japan's domestic politics were closely tied to Korea, 'where Japan was involved in the conflict among the kingdoms of B'aekje, Shilla, and Goguryŏ. Each of the three kingdoms attempted to form alliance with a second and to eliminate the third' (Mitchell: 1967, 2). Japan attempted to make the most of this situation for its own advantage through military forces.

Under the described geopolitical conditions, a large scale Korean migration started toward firstly China and spread into Japan and Russia in the later period. Broadly, the period of Korean migration beyond the present border between North Korea and China can be divided into the following four periods: firstly, between 1860 and 1910, late Qing dynasty of China; secondly, from the beginning of colonisation until 1931 when the Manchurian crisis broke out; thirdly, after the Manchurian crisis and the rest of the colonial period until 1945; and finally, the decolonisation period between 1945 and 1953 including the periods of American occupation, the Korean War and the division of the nation. These periods are, however, merely for the sake of efficient explanation of the historical background of diasporas. The migration process and the formation of immigrant communities were continuous throughout these times.

Diasporas in the early years of migration during the Yi Dynasty, 1860 - 1909

This period represents the beginning of the Korean diasporas when destitution necessitated such migration. When the harsh famine began in the northern Hamgyŏngdo region adjacent to the
Duman River, a number of Korean households crossed the border between Qing China and Joseon, in spite of the risk of severe punishment by either government. As the borderline between Russia and Qing was unsettled during this period, Koreans who had settled in Chinese territory could easily cross up towards Russia when the political and economic situation of Qing China worsened, and exploitation from landlords and local officials became harsher from time to time. In this way, the early population of Koreitsy was generated during approximately the same period. Koreans living in Manchuria had moved to Siberia, and Vladivostok was founded as the largest Russian port and a naval base in East Asia in 1860 in accordance with the Peking Treaty. From this time, Russian territory reached the other side of the Duman River and Russia emerged as a new neighbour of Korea.

Historians discovered that the Koreans moved to Yonh'aeju in the early nineteenth century, as early as 1811, immediately after the Hong Kyung-rae uprising. They consisted of poverty stricken peasants and political rebels among the yangban, the upper class which was against the Joseon regime. Officially, however, it was the early 1860s when people of Goryeo first moved to Russia. The current territorial boundary between China and Russia was set in 1860 and was based on the Aihun Treaty in 1858. In 1869, immediately after economic disaster in Joseon, an increasing number of Koreans moved towards northern China and the Russian Far East. By 1870, there were approximately 8,400 Koreans settled in these regions. Since the Russo-Korean Treaty on Trade of 1888, Korean farmers became more actively involved in cultivating farms in the region. In the absence of established policies towards the Koreans in this area, their fate was very much in the Russian governors' hands.

Koreans who had initially settled in the Manchu region, mostly southern Manchuria, had to face unbearable exploitation from landlords, and heavy and unfair taxation under the Qing regime. Korea, since the Goryeo regime, had suffered from insecurity regarding the border areas adjacent to Qing. Depending on the fluctuating relationship between Joseon and Qing, however, the problem of migration was overlooked at times, and it was even encouraged by both Qing and Joseon. In the 1870s, for example, the then Korean provincial governor of Hamgyeongdo, Eur Yun-jung, decreed not to punish people crossing back illegally over the Duman River for economic activities after thorough investigation of the situation of Koreans there.

In the Yonh'aeju and Manchu areas, around this time, there were over 1,000 uprisings mobilised by Koreans but these were mostly unreported and promptly quelled by both Japanese and Chinese troops. This period, when Japan began to expand its army in the South Manchu, shows that the issue of a steadily increasing Korean population in the region became sensitive and burdensome for both China and Japan. After the Japanese victory in the Sino-Japanese war between 1894 and 1895, Japanese troops gradually penetrated into southern Manchuria.
Three years later in 1898, Russia successfully leased the Liaonyong peninsula from China. The two treaties offered Russia and Japan the chance to enhance their dominance over Manchuria and provided a legitimate excuse to control the Korean population. By this time, Japan had just begun to monopolise influence in Korea by murdering Queen Min who was virtually in power. While China, being threatened by Japanese aggression, signed a secret treaty with Russia, Japan signed two treaties with England in 1902 and 1905. The significance of the first treaty was the recognition of British interests in China and Japanese interests in Korea. The second meant to secure British recognition of Japan's further actions for influence in Korea. Russia, in the meantime, became more involved in Korean domestic affairs. Comments by Ernest Satow, the then British Minister Plenipotentiary in Japan, written in a memo in August 1895 insinuate the situation in a conversation with Ito Hirobumi, the then Japanese prime minister. Regarding the question of independence of Korea, it read as follows:

[I]t seemed to me advisable to join other Powers besides Russia and Great Britain. Explained the relations between Great Britain, Spain and Italy regarding status quo in Mediterranean, and suggested that Italy would be very willing to join, also perhaps Austria. He observed that it would be best to invite all the Great Powers, but it was not yet opportune. That 'independence' of Corea [Korea] would leave the question open, and he hinted that Russia would then be able to deal directly with Corea, and obtain her aims more easily and securely. We agreed that 'neutralization' was rather the term to employ than independence ... at any rate, Japan had gained two things by the [Sino-Japanese] war, namely, the annexation of Formosa; and secondly, that Corea was now independent of Chinese tutelage. (Lensen: 1966, 44)

Largely supported by a Treaty of Friendship with England in 1904, Japan nullified the diplomatic relationship with Russia and attacked Russian warships in the Yellow Sea which initiated the Russo-Japanese War between 1904 and 1905. Japan’s initiative to induce British overtures as a co-stabiliser of Asia and the Pacific guaranteed British support of Japanese claims to a special position in Korea, and 'to enhance national prestige and provide concrete evidence of Japan's status as an Asian-Pacific power' (Iriye: 1974, 15). Meanwhile, in Korea, as Latourette (1957) notes, '[t]he ruling house and most of the leading officials were hopelessly inept and corrupt'. He adds '[t]he British government believed that Korea must fall under the control of Japan' (512).

Japan gained Lianyong peninsula and Mukden with British help in blocking the passage of the Russian fleet at the Suez Canal. The war was ended with the Treaty of Portsmouth in September 1905 with the mediation of the then American president Theodore Roosevelt. Through the treaty, Japan gained rights of protection of Korea, the lease of Port Arthur and Darien with adjacent territories, and the lease of Jangchun and the south Manchurian railroad in addition to the southern part of the islands of Sakhalin and all the islands adjacent territories. By
this time, Japan had successfully eliminated Russian and Chinese influence in Korea. Korean independence movements had spread everywhere, not only in mainland Korea but among Koreans in China, Russia and the United States and had continued ever since. A Japanese plan for official annexation of Korea was successfully completed in 1910 and used as a base for Japan’s firm occupation of Manchuria afterwards.

Migration to Manchuria and Japan during the first colonial period, 1910 - 1931

This period witnesses an increasing volume of Korean migration to both China and Japan. The reasons for migration varied accordingly. Not only farmers with a mainly economic reason crossed the border, but also a number of political activists moved around the whole of Manchuria in order to avoid suppression and surveillance from the colonial government in mainland Korea. After 1911, nationalist activists moved towards the north as far as the Urals. By the year 1914, there were 63,000 Koreans living in Yŏngh'aeju. The Josŏn Socialist League, backed by the Russian Red Army, was established in 1917. Lee (1978) gives detailed explanations on the background of Bolshevik support of the Korean independence force in the region. ‘Since the Koreans possessed some organized strength in both political and military terms [Lee means in the region] ... Bolsheviks turned to the Koreans ... The Bolsheviks promised to provide material support for the cause of Korean independence once they put the situation in Siberia under their control’ (4). The Bolsheviks’ support of Korean communist parties ceased in late 1922 when the Bolsheviks consolidated their power in eastern Siberia and Japan withdrew their troops from Siberia in October 1922.

Russian military forces, meanwhile, had been strengthened at Vladivostok and eastern Siberia during this time, although Russia wished to delay the confrontation with Japan in the Far East while completing the Five-Year-Plan and the industrial, mineral and railway developments under construction in central Siberia without costly warfare. ‘Orthodox Russian communists... regard the Japanese aggression as an effective basis for propaganda for communism in Asia and are inclined [...] to hold off and permit the development of this exhibition of Japanese imperialism’ (Doenecke: 1981, 154). According to Doenecke’s explanation, this was ‘to drive the Chinese and other Asiatic masses in the direction of Moscow’ (ibid.).

During this period, a forced migration arranged by the colonial government added to the statistics. The farmers who lost their lands or those who were on the fringe of losing their lands were ready to be attracted by government propaganda describing Manchuria and Japan as paradises. Mitchell (1967) quotes the situation of Korea by the time agricultural society was about to be reshuffled:
After Japanese annexation, farm tenancy rose rapidly and a large landless class developed in Korea. Before 1910 all land was owned by the sovereign, but farmers had recognized cultivation rights if they paid tax and fulfilled other obligations. The Japanese government, in an effort to modernize the Korean economy and to fix land-ownership, carried out an extensive land survey between 1910 and 1918. Farmers were instructed to register their lands within a specified period, but many of the illiterate farmers did not understand the procedure and lost titles to their land. The Yangban (local gentry) enriched themselves during this period of confusion by filing claims to public lands and even to the lands of independent farmers. The increase in the use of money and a new tax structure caused other farmers to fall into debt.11

One of the chief architects of the Imperial Defence Plan, Tanaka Giichi, stressed the feasibility of large-scale agricultural settlement in the territory as Japan's long-term goals. Tanaka pointed out that 'recent survey reports had shown much of the arable land in southern Manchuria already occupied' (Matsusaka: 2001, 180), but he also stressed 'that the relatively low population density left room for doubling ... the current population' (ibid.). Devastated Korean farmers had little choice when the government promised a better life with the purpose of filling up the lack of labour in a rapidly industrialising Japan. At the same time, as the colonial oppression in Korea worsened, Korean nationalists in the region became more active by organising numerous uprisings and confrontations. The structure of the Korean economy became increasingly dependent on Japan's industrialisation process and the colonial economic relationship became firmly established. 'Most of the produce, however, was exported at a devalued price to Japan' (Bate: 1948, 23). As Latourette (1957) also rightly notes, while Korea cultivated large quantities of rice, few farmers who produced it could afford it.12

The tight confrontations between Japan and China in the region were exposed in the Manchurian crisis, which began in the autumn of 1931. Doenecke's (1981) account helps us to understand the power vacuum of Manchuria on the eve of the crisis and Japan's gains from it:

During the 1920s, Manchuria was legally a part of China proper. In reality, however, it was ruled by a local warlord and possessed considerable independence. As a result of agreements imposed upon Russia in 1905, and upon China in 1915, Japan had received far-reaching concessions there. Included was the right to station troops along 690 miles of the South Manchurian Railroad ... Yet local Chinese troops could operate legally in the rest of Manchuria (3).

In October 1920, during the Gando crisis, Korean nationalistic activism, as the extension of the Sam-il independence movement in 1919 in Korea and Japan, was rooted out for a while. In order to quell armed Korean independence activists, the Japanese army marched towards Gando. In the wake of the crisis, to the outside world Japan successfully imprinted the idea that Gando securely belonged to the Japanese territory and was out of Chinese control, although legal confirmation was completed after the Manchu crisis in 1931. Japan began to face internal
problems as well; its economy during the 1920s was unstable, suffering from inflation and chronic depression with financial crises in 1920, 1927 and 1929. In addition, Japan had to deal with the spread of communist movements as the consequence of rapid industrialisation, and the country's more open attitudes in accommodating Western ideas and trends. Since 1910, 'Tokyo had become the intellectual center of eastern Asia to which Chinese and Korean students were drawn to study the modern Western philosophy and the industrial techniques of Western civilization'.

Communist ideology and social movements organised by leftwing Japanese associations could easily attract Korean students and workers in Japan owing to the communist call for the abolition of private property which was mostly owned by Japanese. As Lee (1978) rightly contends, however, 'the largest proportion of those who had either been affiliated with the (communist) movement or become a part of it before 1945 did so because they saw in the movement a way of restoring Korea's independence' (16). After the failure of the Sam-il Movement, in the meantime, Korean students in Japan became increasingly radical, a typical stage of developing anti-colonial nationalism elsewhere in the Third World.

The Wanpaoshan [Manbosan] incident was one of the major cases which resulted from the harsh confrontations among different national groups, and complicated the political situation in Manchuria prior to the Manchu crisis. By 1931, 'China had been casting a wary eye on some 800,000 Korean residents in Manchuria' (Doenecke: 1981, 9). After Japan's annexation of Korea, China considers that Japan attempted to take a protective interest in Koreans who were formerly regarded as Chinese subjects. Japan was ready to make territorial claims on any parts of the region wherever Koreans were heavily populated. 'For some time, the Japanese had demanded the right to establish a subconsulate at Wanpaoshan on the Chinese side of the Yalu [Amrok] River, a district like Chientao, heavily settled by ethnic Koreans' (Matsusaka: 2001, 326). Japan took the initially minor dispute between Korean residents and local Chinese at the Wanpaoshan as an opportunity to instigate anti-Chinese sentiments among Korean farmers. In July 1931, Korean tenants and Chinese farmers fought over irrigation concessions at Wanpaoshan, a small village near Jangchun, initiated by Korean farmers under contract with Chinese landowners. By the time the construction was nearly completed, Chinese farmers made a protest against the irrigation system on the grounds of protection of their own farmlands. '[A] group of Chinese attacked the Korean farmers. The Chinese farmers were backed by Chinese police and the Koreans by Japanese consular police'. The incident 'highlighted long-standing issues relating to Japan's right to lease land and engage in commercial activity in Manchuria' (Wilson: 2002, 18). The Chinese government ordered Korean farmers to cease the construction and evacuate the region. The Koreans protested. At the beginning, the incident was the conflict between Korean farmers and Chinese residents. Later, however, with Japanese involvement, it developed into a political confrontation between China and Japan.
Unlike the earlier period, as the territorial occupation of South Manchu was by and large completed through the Manchu crisis, the colonial government turned the strategy of locating Koreans who legally became Japanese. By 1931, Japanese from Japan formed only 0.7 per cent of the population but were equipped with arms and colonial institutions whereas Korean population was estimated as over 800,000 or 2.7 per cent, and Manchus 15 per cent. The hometowns from which the Koreans in Manchuria originated became more various; previously, they were mostly from the northern Hamgyŏngdo but later mixed with many from other areas of southern Korea. As much as the region was perturbed by continuous military and political turmoil with Chinese, Japanese and Russian involvement, the ethnic relationship in Manchuria became complicated and unruly.

Colonial diaspora between 1931 - 1945

By 1931, Japan had invested 1.2 billion yen in Manchuria, controlled 690 miles of railroad and leased 1,400 square miles of arable land. Japan became 'increasingly dependent on Manchurian lumber, coal, iron, and steel; her populace was increasingly fed by Manchurian grain' (Doenecke: 1981, 7). Bate also explains that compared with no production of steel, synthetic oil and aluminium in 1932, by 1944, the amount of production of those goods reached 1,200,000, 384,000 and 12,000 tons respectively. However, in terms of population, 'only a few thousand Japanese have gone to Manchuria or even to Korea. ... A modern nation which depends on colonies to support its population does not necessarily send settlers' (ibid., 59). Such nations dispatch 'engineers, teachers, administrators, planters, prospectors and others to develop its resources in order that the resulting trade may benefit its people at home' (ibid.). As exploitation from Korean farmers and miners in Manchuria became severe during this period, the Koreans' hatred of Japan was an ever-growing phenomenon and in turn oppression from the colonial government also became harsher.

The Korean population was seen as a danger to all three parties; Russia, Japan and China. In response to external pressures, Korean nationalist activism began to take an indirect route instead of reckless uprisings. Schools, churches and socialist armies on the Soviet side were among those. For example, in 1932, there were 380 Korean educational institutions and a number of periodicals and newspapers written in the Korean language. The main purposes of such social movements establishing media in the Korean language were to instigate a nationalist spirit of ordinary people and to provide nationalist education to the younger generation of Koreans in consideration of the situation of mainland Korea when education in the Korean language was strictly banned throughout the colonial period. Such efforts to keep their own language and history through education played a great role in instigating national sentiments.
among early diasporas and memories of such activities have been proudly displayed in their writings and discourse since that time.

The situation of Manchuria after the Manchu crisis drove Stalin to decide the relocation of the Korean population for the preparation of the Russo-Japanese war. Russia was looking to the development of Siberia and central Asia for the economic and political reasons. Recent research has discovered that around this time, approximately 2,000 Korean socialist leaders in the Korean community began to disappear one by one. In September 1937, when Stalin's secret order finally reached the region, travelling outside Korean residential areas was strictly prohibited. The project of forced relocation was fulfilled between September and November in 1937. The total number of deported Koreans was 36,000 to 37,000 households, or 175,000 to 180,000 individuals. As Gelb (1995) holds, '[t]here may have been sporadic resistance, for observers recorded the arrest of 2,500 Koreans' (390). Taking one month, Korean people had arrived in a semi-desert called Ushutove, Kazakhstan and started to cultivate the barren area. As both Kazakhs and Uzbeks are nomads, Koreans spread agricultural skills to the local people. It took three years to settle down after great labour to utilise the wastelands. Soon after, the Korean community managed to establish thirty collective farms. From 1938, however, all Korean schools were shut down and use of the Korean language was strictly banned until the end of the Korean War.

The most convincing account on the background of deportation is Stalin's fear of Japanese expansion to the region and subsequent pro-Japanese Koreans' participation in the Japanese army. There is evidence that quite a large number of Koreans in the region were on the side of Japan, especially among earlier settlers who had experienced severe discrimination by Qing local officials and landlords and later Kuomintang's (KMT) hostility towards Korean settlers. There were some Koreans who naïvely believed that the power shift from China to Japan in Manchuria would bring them a less oppressive life. At the end of 1932, the Korean population reached about 650,000 in Manchuria and 200,000 in Siberia. The Korean population was a great concern for the Japanese government. Japan had set an arrangement by completing a treaty with the Soviet Union in 1925, 'in which the Russians agreed not to permit any Koreans in their territory to engage in anti-Japanese activities' (Lee: 1978, 59). Lee adds further explanations on Stalin's project of uprooting Koreans in the Maritime Provinces. It is stated that it was necessary for the Japanese not to be concerned about the possibility of using Koreans against Japan. Two contradicting explanations, Stalin's amicable decision eliminating Japan's fear of anti-Japanese Koreans and Stalin's fear of Japan's use of Koreans, in fact, lead to the conclusion that both Japan and the Soviet Union predicted Koreans living in the troublesome area would be against them under any foreseeable confrontations.

Nonetheless, anti-Japanese feeling was also prevalent among later migrants who had experienced severe oppression by the colonial government in Korea before moving to
Manchuria. From this period already, the Korean population in Manchuria was not homogeneous in terms of political orientation, regional identity and social class. Some Koreans were cooperative with the colonial government, some were on the side of the KMT which had been in power since 1927, and some became enthusiastic nationalistic activists. Under the Korean Provisional Government in Shanghai, the gwangbokgun (Korean Liberation Army) was formed. Even the groups of nationalists within, however, political orientations were diverged. Nationalist activists in this region were moving around other regions rather than situating in a certain place. They mostly travelled around Shanghai where the Korean provisional government was based, as well as Japan, Korea and Russia. Before the Stalin’s deportation project, however, most nationalist activists were purged as mentioned earlier.

On the contrary, the case of Koreans in Japan during this period is categorised as a colonial diaspora. With the help of earlier settlers, migrating to Japan became easier for the late comers. Some were mobilised to make up for the labour shortage during wartime economic boom producing military hardware to Japan. Some were drafted to be sent to labour camps for mines, factories and military construction. Others were sent to the Japanese army especially during the second Sino-Japanese war between 1937 and 1945. Consequently, the number of Koreans in Manchuria and Japan steadily increased.

Similarly with the Korean community in Manchuria, during this period, the background of Korean migrants in Japan became more diversified. Among activists, political ideology was also involved as an important variable. Some Koreans had already become used to the colonial government giving up the hope of independence.

The decolonisation of Korea and the diaspora, 1945 - 1953

During the first stage of modernisation, Korea was under foreign rule, which made Korean anticcolonial nationalism burgeon outside Korea. As explained in the previous sections, due to harsh oppression, nationalistic activists mostly built their bases in Shanghai, Siberia and Japan. After emancipation, those nationalist activists armed with various foreign ideas, modern political ideologies and secured networks with foreign powers overwhelmed domestic activists within Korea. Korean anticolonial nationalism combined with several different political ideologies held by nationalists inspired by foreign countries and even different regions. When the primary purpose of anticolonial nationalism gradually waned at the end of the Second World War, debates over political ideologies and power struggles took priority in discussions concerning a new vision of how to rebuild the country. As a small and weak state immediately after independence, superpowers’ deep involvement in internal affairs was fatally influential as elsewhere in other Third World countries. The decolonisation period of Korea, accordingly, was as equally chaotic as the colonial period. During this period, the fate of Korea was shifted to the
Western allies while Japan was eliminated. At the same time, the Soviet Union sent a large army into Korea and Manchuria in August 1945 a week before the Japanese emperor announced Japan's surrender to the allied powers. The Soviet army was already deep into Korea. A hasty decision was made to draw a demarcation line dividing Korea into two.

By the time a democratic system and communist ideology backed by superpowers were introduced, Korea was still in a great confusion and turmoil after thirty five years of colonial rule. Political disunity among so-called nationalist leaders within the nation naturally provided foreign powers with legitimate pretexts for protecting and dominating the nation once again. The national economy during this period showed a typically unbalanced colonial structure. The future of Korea was in the two powers' hands, as Iriye (1974) rightly describes.

Elsewhere in Asia, the two powers [the United States and the Soviet Union] behaved essentially in accordance with the same principle. Korea was a good example. While some sort of trusteeship sponsored by the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain and China had been accepted at the Yalta Conference, it was the first two powers that in fact exercised control (126).

A trusteeship of independent Korea under the United Nations and western allies was considered with the excuse of internal disunity at the Cairo Conference in 1943 and at the Potsdam and Moscow Conferences in 1945. The American-backed Rhee Seung Man could take up the power vacancy as the counterpart of Soviet-backed General Kim II Sung.

One may question why some Koreans remained as diasporas in the host countries even after Korean independence, in spite of the severe suppression. Reasons were varied. Broadly, Korean diasporas during this period can be divided into three groups. The earlier Korean immigrants in Manchu, who had moved before Japanese rule, settled down and carried on stable lives in the region. Although a number of people moved back to Korea after independence, most Koreans among this group remained in the region as they had already secured social and economic bases to a certain degree. Secondly, apart from those who voluntarily remained or those deprived of any other choices, another group of people were those who desperately wished and actually attempted to return to Korea but failed or had to give up for practical reasons. Or, they were discouraged by host governments' unreasonable conditions applied to the attempted returnees, mainly relating to the issues of colonial subjects' property rights. The policies towards those who wished to return to their homeland varied depending on the political situation and the host countries' relationship with Korea.

The third group is the political activists. As mentioned, unless they were purged either by the Russian or Japanese governments, major nationalist activists who moved to the region during the colonial period returned to Korea and participated in political factions which were divided into several groups according to their political beliefs, regional background and interests.
The major faction-like parties were led by advocates of American-backed democracy, Soviet-style socialism, or the middle of the road parties. The third group did not appeal to the superpowers. Nationalist activists moved from Japan had to make a choice. A number of communists moved up to northern Korea regardless of their original hometowns in order to avoid harsh suppression from the new Korean government and the United States’ military regime. Otherwise, they participated in partisan movements, moving around and inhabiting the mountains of southern Korea. Others from Japan went back to Manchuria, where Korean towns had already begun to take a stable shape as a territorially confined national group. Those were a relatively well educated group of people, most of whom went to Japan to study during the colonial period but had had to discontinue due to financial difficulties or participation in independence movements. Most were supported by the Japanese socialist party and ideologically attracted to Marxism. Also, left-wing nationalists, who were based in Manchuria, either joined the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) after Korean independence or move back to North Korea.

The Korean War broke out in 1950 and lasted for three years. It was hardly predicted that the 38 demarcation between South and North suggested by the United States as a temporary line would turn into a permanent division. Among Koreans abroad during wartime, Josônjok was mobilised by the CCP in support of the Kim Il Sung regime. The Soviet trained Korean Manchu army was not mobilised as much as Josônjok due to geographical remoteness and lack of unity. The strong nationalist spirit among Korean diasporas has been slowly weakened since Korea became independent. The present boundaries of nation-states were set. The rest of the history of Korean diasporas since then has been a story of surviving in foreign lands as minority national groups.

Conclusion

By dividing the history into four periods, I explained how Korean diasporas emerged in China, Japan and post-Soviet central Asia. Firstly, their migration started with Korean farmers in search of fertile lands when the modern concept of territorial division was not firmly established. In the later period, Koreans were voluntarily and involuntarily mobilised to move to Manchuria and Japan, and forcefully deported to central Asia during the colonial period. During the decolonisation period, however, the decision whether to return to their homeland or to remain in a foreign land was not so simple, for practical and at times political reasons. Their Korean motherland was still in great chaos and the Korean diaspora community in each country had been already set up after three to five decades of migratory history. Some returned, only to re-experience political turbulence, civil war and the division of the nation. In Soviet central Asia and China, communist ideology and farming opportunities were the two major sources that
accommodated Korean identity. They provided social and psychological comfort to the diasporised Koreans as a once stateless national group.

Having examined the origins of diasporas so far, it may be reasonable to conclude that the background of the Korean diasporas was equally heterogeneous and randomly mixed in the three regions in terms of their origins, including hometowns, economic background and political orientation. I would dismiss the assumption that, from the very beginning, different kinds of Korean population had moved to each region. This is unlikely to have happened because little choice of where to go was given to these early Korean migrants.
4 Diasporas and Citizenship

This chapter explains one of the intrinsic dilemmas for diasporas; that is, full membership whilst retaining difference. It aims to demonstrate how the particular policies of each receiving country affect the formation of diaspora identity. The policies reflect the official rhetoric, and process of the political project of nation building in each host state, which, in turn, determine the degree of inclusion and exclusion of minority national groups.1 Political decisions on including or excluding certain groups of people are reflected in the citizenship device. Depending on the host state, the concept of citizenship connotes various aspects and levels of peoplehood.

Citizenship and nationality policies

Policy towards minority national groups is set by different notions of citizenship; in other words, diversified ways of choosing political membership. An analysis of diaspora identity concerns changing memberships between two states. Under the traditions of cultural citizenship and a democratic system, minority national groups are often culturally excluded from mainstream society due to the reality that a deeper degree of cultural incorporation, albeit implicit, is required for fuller inclusion. The concept of citizenship and its implementation vary in each case, which causes difficulties in comparing which host society offers more autonomy to its minority national groups. The difficulties also lie in the different political systems of host states as well as different political traditions and cultures. In the cases of non-liberal societies such as China and post Soviet central Asia, it would be absurd for a minority group to claim special political and economic benefits and autonomy when even the individuals of the dominant national group do not enjoy the same degree of autonomy from their own state.

In the case of China, to what degree the cultural and national division will be exposed above the surface of socio-economic division by class-line is also one of the decisive factors. In the same context, it appears that Japan has comparatively more serious troubles regarding minority issues. Yet, one needs to consider that Japan is more liberal, and consequently issues regarding relations between Japanese and non-Japanese are more exposed to the outside world, and the fact that Koreans in Japan are aware of national identity to a greater degree than other cases. In spite of the difficulties of scientific comparisons, citizenship, as the thematic notion, is still relevant here on the ground that the various relationships between different national or ethnic groups are structured by a particular mode of categorising members and non-members of a state. Such a trend is backed by various factors such as political ideology, social systems, legal arrangements and cultural perspectives towards outsiders. Thus, comparing the various notions of citizenship provides a blueprint of each hostland's particular views towards minority national groups.
Theoretical preliminary: citizenship and national policy

The notion of citizenship in relation to identity can broadly be characterised as either thin/universal or thick/nationalised citizenship, although there are a number of variants and disagreements among theorists engaged in this issue. The important question of the debate is whether citizenship proclaims the surface layers of political life or represents the deepest layers of cultural identity. The former tends to imply a clear distinction of civic identity from national dispositions, in other words, a separation of the citizenship debate from culture and identity. Meanwhile, the latter denotes multi-layered national citizenship emphasising the collective sentiments and cultural features behind the notion of citizenship. The thin concept of citizenship tends to mean a strictly civic rational notion of citizenship that is culturally neutral. The major implications of the thick concept of citizenship are often employed by immigrant symphatisers with emphasis on its negative consequences on protecting disadvantaged ethnic or national minorities from the dominant national groups by creating problems in issues relating to cultures and identities in the political sphere. Detailed theoretical debates on this question was dealt in Chapter 2, highlighting the two opposite academic camps, assimilationists and multiculturalists.

Conditional inclusion: host states’ policies toward Koreans

Table 4.1 gives a succinct overview of each host state’s official attitude towards minority national groups in comparative terms. As the outcomes of interactions between (un)intentional official policies and Korean nationality, I describe the patterns of co-existence between Korean diasporas and the Chinese, the Japanese and the Uzbeks as isolation, segregation and dispersal, respectively, although there are difficulties in representing the historically accumulated relations in a single word.

The terms describing the patterns of co-existence show the different types of Korean diaspora generated by interactions between diaspora and host state rather than the unilateral or intentional policies of the host country. The relational forms, however, have been changing especially since the late 1980s. Outside influences such as neo-nationalism and globalisation reshuffled diaspora groups and restructured their collective identity. The official policy in Japan has been assimilation, but, so far, the result of implementation of such an official policy has remained segregation. In China, there have been rapid changes in the previously isolated Korean diasporas. The consequences of the drain of the Josônjok population have been seriously discussed in Yanbian as one of the signs of assimilation to Han Chinese. Korean diaspora in post-Soviet central Asia used to be a case of dispersal as individuals or in the official institutions, kolkhozes. Since the independence of the CIS, the Koreitsy community has been moving towards institutionalising Korean identity in order to secure collective features.
### Table 4.1 Comparisons of the degrees and dimension of autonomy given by host states

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>China</th>
<th>Japan</th>
<th>Former Soviet Union (Uzbekistan)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political aspect</strong></td>
<td>Officially affirmative action is applied for protection of representative rights of recognised minority groups</td>
<td>Customarily restricted</td>
<td>Regionally limited but active participation in state projects is encouraged Exclusion process has begun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Economic aspect</strong></td>
<td>Special budget is allocated to minority region</td>
<td>Exclusion of minority nationals from major economic activities and rights which require public protection and state support</td>
<td>Economically incorporated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No intentional discriminations towards minority regions in terms of state project of economic development</td>
<td></td>
<td>Active participation in the state project of economic development No right-based citizenship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Social aspect</strong></td>
<td>Minority education is encouraged</td>
<td>Discrimination and oppression in many fields Civic associations and new social movements have provided strong support for minority rights</td>
<td>No particular attention to minority issues yet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cultural aspect</strong></td>
<td>Great deal of autonomy with official support especially language usage and maintenance of minority customs and folklores</td>
<td>Discrimination and pressure Complete assimilation is prerequisite in public inclusion</td>
<td>Inconsistent and contradicting policies of autonomy and assimilation Cultural revival of Uzbek-ness has begun as national agenda</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Cultural autonomy and isolation

Having engaged China in the citizenship debates as one of the modern multinational states,\(^3\) China can be understood as a state that imposes the thin concept of citizenship as opposed to national citizenship. By dint of China’s looser concept of citizenship, territorial nationalism can be proclaimed, simultaneously embracing different cultural groups within its territory with a great deal of cultural autonomy. Both China and the former Soviet Union are, by and large, categorised as socialist regimes but within socialism there are considerable varieties. Accordingly, policy varies depending on the historical and cultural context of a host state. The former Soviet Union, for example, does not fit into the same socialist notion as China with regard to issues of nationalism and minority nationality. Similarly, the newly independent central Asian republics do not promulgate identical patterns of policies. Certain gaps exists between socialism as a theory and its practice in real politics. Political ideology alone cannot explain the different official policies towards minorities in China and the former Soviet Union.

In China, citizenship is understood as a state-given benefit and the expression ‘citizen’ could mean a politicised individual under the condition of active participation in state building projects. Since the Open Door Policy, however, the concept of citizenship is frequently employed as a result of economic relations with the outside world and the subsequent rise of
newly commercialised individuals in certain areas, but they are still under state control. In contrast to Japan, where the existence of minority nationality itself is often officially denied, Chinese rhetoric has been far more inclusive. An official report, for example, reads as follows:

Unity and cooperation among the various ethnic groups have helped to safeguard China as a united multi-ethnic state. In particular in modern times, when China became a semi-colonial and semi-feudal society and the Chinese nation suffered from imperialist invasion, oppression and humiliation and was reduced to the status of an oppressed nation, in order to safeguard the unity of the state and the dignity of the Chinese nation, all the ethnic groups united and fought unyieldingly together against foreign invaders and ethnic separatists.

The official policy towards minority ethnic and national groups on the state level can be described as autonomy backed by the universal or thin notion of political citizenship, and yet, for a variety of reasons, implementations of such a policy often turn out to be different from the primary intention of policy makers. ‘[P]olicies are inspired from within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), forwarded to the State Council [that is, the government], and passed down through the various concerned bureaus through central government, provincial, city or prefectural, county, and ultimately ‘grassroots’ levels’ (White: 1990, 13). This explains why interactions between the Josônjok community and official government policy have resulted in the isolated pattern.

The grounds for the description of Josônjok identity and community as an isolated pattern are that most non-Han Chinese regions overlap with rural areas in the territorial border of China. They have drawn less government attention for the new state project of developing economically backward regions especially at the beginning of the rapid economic modernisation period. In addition, local governments of the minority national autonomous regions become more and more nominal by playing less significant roles in response to different minority national groups’ particular demands.

Since Deng’s era, changes in non-Han Chinese regions have been enormous. As a result of rapid changes in many areas, Josônjok have faced new risks; Firstly, as the strong implementation of official nationalism has been weakened compared with that of Mao’s era, the justification for the class struggle has waned, leading to a search for a new way of categorising people. Secondly, in accordance with societal changes, individual capabilities are encouraged, particularly, in order to achieve a financial success. ‘The new moral order in China is one in which people are encouraged to be economically productive and self-reliant’ (Keane: 2001, 14). State-imposed equality is less emphasised, which means a mechanism of capitalism and competition among individuals has been gradually adopted. The government is less effective and less involved in individual economic and social lives, including education and occupations. In those regions where various minority national or ethnic groups are loosely interconnected.
with one another under the principles of citizenship, national antagonism can easily be involved in many public affairs.

Government funding has gradually decreased following the new economic policies. Some Josōnjok swiftly adjusted themselves to the new social changes by engaging positively in economic sector. An increasing number of Han Chinese have flocked to a previously Josōnjok region. It is allegedly said that the Josōnjok’s wandering disposition and rampant capitalist orientation have accelerated the changes. With regard to socio-economic changes in this region, scholars such as Luova (1999) explain how the Josōnjok’s cultural background has been taken advantage of. Josōnjok ‘have initiated their own ethnically-based local strategies for economic development. Ethnic economic networks, which cross national borders, are the best example of these strategies’ (18). He analyses that this is due to China’s economic reforms which have emphasised the coastal regions rather than remote border areas where minority national groups populated.5

The invariable principles of China’s official policy are the encouragement of autonomy and positive discrimination. Such principles are embodied by China’s application of a looser notion of citizenship. Cultural assimilation has not been an official precondition to be categorised as a Chinese citizen as long as sub-national groups remain politically loyal to the communist China.

Segregation and assimilation

In contrast to the case of Josōnjok, Korean diasporas in Japan has been regarded as the remaining enemies and aliens ever since the end of the Second World War. It is evident that one of the reasons stems from the particular historical relationship between Korea and Japan. Japan had built a strong nation well before it colonised Korea following the Meiji era. Japanese identity was reconsolidated while incurring wars with neighbouring countries. By the time Korean minorities were incorporated into the Japanese nation, Japan had already established a strong national identity. The questions of how to re-unify the Japanese nation or how to make the territorial borders safer were not included in the list of immediate postwar Japanese state building agendas equivalent to the experiences of Soviet making and China’s national agenda of communist family making.

Applying the notion of citizenship in a liberal sense to Japan may be equally awkward. This is so in the sense that in Japan citizenship hardly connotes rights of people whereas a sense of belonging and obligations were over-emphasised, at least until the late 1980s. The concept of citizenship in Japan is inseparable from the Japanese traditions and cultures rested upon the agenda of national homogeneity. Consequently, the ‘ultimate Japanese policy toward the non-Japanese was non-assimilation to preserve the Japanese racial purity and superiority’ (Che:
There are grey areas that do not fit into either universal citizenship or national citizenship. However, for a minority national group, desire for full inclusion into the host society, culture-free citizenship and cultural autonomy could mean political marginalisation and segregation from mainstream society. The excessive pressure of giving up nationality often causes problems for a minority national group when collective will and identity exist within the group.

The concept of nation substitutes citizen in Japan as Siddle (2001) rightly observes. The fundamental differences lie in the different relationship between the state and civil society which does not exist in its European sense. Nonetheless, what diaspora people require is a fuller degree of membership to a country not only through obtaining the legal nationality, but also through active participation in all aspects of public life, which is understood to be claims for rights to citizenship in real terms. Disparity between host society and diaspora group in terms of political dispositions is also one of the reasons why applying the notion of citizenship is premature when discussing issues such as minority national groups. Korean diasporas have been heavily influenced by the American Overseas Korean organisations, Korean Christian associations and also by South Korea. The political socialisation of Korean diasporas has been fulfilled by Koreans in western countries, notably Canada and the United States while the citizenship notion in the three host states remains obscure at this point. This also explains why there is insufficient room to discuss openly questions such as who has the political rights to those countries and why national minorities should have such rights. Nevertheless, minorities in less developed non liberal multinational states are equally entitled to claim for full membership and official recognition.

**Table 4.2 Official categorisation for minority groups in Japan**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Terms</th>
<th>Categorisation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Burakumin</td>
<td>Aboriginal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Okinawajin</td>
<td>Conquered</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ainu</td>
<td>Natives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chosenjin [Zainichi]</td>
<td>Foreign residents</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Japan is perhaps an extreme case of imposing a racialised and cultural concept of citizenship. Taking a sophisticated form of racism, on the surface it is an assimilation policy, but in reality segregation is in practice. The policy has been based on the particular social ideology and public sentiment instigated by the political agendas, the implementation of the idea of racial superiority. One of the well-known public speeches by the then Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro in 1986, declared Japan’s superiority grounded in its character as a homogenous nation-state reflects Japan’s official national agenda on the issue of ethnic and national
relationship. This political climate continued at least up until the memorable year of 1997 when 'Japan’s first national legislation to promote non-mainstream ethnic culture and to encourage multiculturalism within society came into force' (Siddle: 2001, 405), which was embodied by the Ainu Cultural Promotion Act, Law No. 52 in July 1997.6

Article 14 of the Constitution indicates principles against racial discrimination in political, economic or social relations. However, the official efforts of maintaining the continuity of Japan’s wartime ideology continue as is frequently demonstrated by the right-wing high officials’ public speeches. The feature of Japanese racism is its close interaction with Japanese culture and its well-developed discourse of moral theorisation of racism. ‘[A]s being related “by blood” to one another … [k]inship, race and religion were fused together to produce an intensely felt collective sense of ‘oneness’ (Yoshino, in Dikotter: 1997, 201). By racialising nation, there is little room to make a distinction between race and nation, since it is argued that only pure blood-tied Japanese can fully understand and practice the superior Japanese culture.

Naturally, a dilemma stems from this. To be recognised as a Japanese citizen, assimilation is encouraged diaspora groups are expected to live, speak and behave like the Japanese, but at the same time there is a strong belief that other peoples can never become fully Japanese. Through proper education in Japan, it is thought that it is crucial to have strong national qualifications in every aspect of life. Consequently, the naturalised Korean-origin-Japanese, who is believed not to become real Japanese anyhow, are despised to the same extent as Koreans who remain as permanent foreign residents. Due to the simultaneous pressure of assimilation and exclusion, disguised assimilation and institutional on-and-off identity have been the means of survival for Zainichi where a hyphenated nationality is not accepted. As Fukuoka (2000) states ‘Japanese society will not tolerate ambiguous identity. … The ambiguous person will be forced to abandon those characteristics and become as much like 'pure' Japanese as possible’ (3).

Throughout modern history, the Japanese way of nation building has been consistently a process of racialising the nation. The rest, out of Yamato blood minzoku, have been inevitably excluded from most aspects of political and social life, which is evidenced by various discriminative legal devices.

Dispersal and collectivity

The multiethnic and multinational composition of the Soviet state was rooted in territorial expansion, military conquests and colonisations. In 1926, there existed, officially, 178 recognised national groups. By 1979, the number had dropped to 101, but 128 different national groups were officially recognised in 1989. The statistics shifted both by fluctuating demographics and the government’s way of categorising its people.7 The Soviet nationality
policies can be featured as korenizatsiia, territorialisation, and indirect rule through local elites within federal arrangement. The Soviet’s policy reflected a contradicting duality. Whereas official policies in Japan and China have been relatively coherent, that of the former Soviet Union showed inconsistency in its principles according to the changes in regimes and, finally, caused by the disintegration of the Soviet Union.

The overall contradictions of Soviet policy largely lay in the gap between ideas and implementation, which resulted in the paradox of ‘nation-building and nation-destroying’, which aimed at, in Hirsch’s (2000) view, forming ‘a socialist union of denationalized peoples’ (225). This may explain, during the 1920s and 1930s, how ethnicisation and ethnic cleansing occurred at the same time. It is also related to the Soviet’s way of grouping and grading different national and ethnic minorities to decide how to deal with them differently. Martin (2001) explores Soviet’s East-West dichotomy and shows how this dichotomy was actually implemented in korenizatsiia, especially after 1923. As many as 97 culturally backward nationalities were singled out. Official features of backwardness were used based on literacy, written script, cadres and religious culture.

The way the former Soviet Union and post-Soviet central Asia moulded Koreitsy identity is fourfold: implementation of kolkhoz-based economic reforms; Stalin’s project of deportation; liberating re-emigration to ancestral motherlands in the late 1960s during Brezhnev’s regime; the independence of post-Soviet central Asia. These four factors have directly and indirectly influenced Koreitsy identity formation in relation to the Soviet and Uzbek nations. The reasons for the absence of explicit and specific policies toward Korean minorities are twofolds. Koreans comprised a tiny part of the minority population in the former Soviet Union in terms of the size of the population and the degree of collectivity, whereas in Japan and China, Koreans comprise one of the major sections of the non-Japanese population. Another reason for such a lesser degree of direct political interaction between the Koreitsy community and the central government is the geopolitical situation of the Koreitsy community. Dissimilar to the other two cases, where the relationship with the motherland could develop into diplomatic concerns, the Koreitsy community was established in isolation from the two Korean motherlands. Although a Korean diaspora community existed in Sakhalin, its population was no longer powerful enough to represent a significant group. Apparently, in a multinational state, diasporas, or any types of ethnic or national groups who have their motherlands nearby, are under more wary surveillance by the host state. Accordingly, in terms of the relationship between the Koreitsy and the former Soviet Union, apart from Stalin’s programme of deportation, there were no particular official policies restricting to Korean diasporas as such. Yet, the rest of Soviet policy relating to minority national groups, including titular and non-titular nationalities in general, had an indirect influence on the Koreitsy identity.
As for the political dimension, in terms of imposing citizenship, like China, the Soviet Union also imposed a thin concept of citizenship, as nationality was the substitute notion of citizen for them. Sovietisation in ideological terms rather than assimilation or Russification was attempted. The elements of Russian nationalism were incorporated into Soviet patriotism. The Soviet system, in a word, was de-russification, preferential advancement of underdeveloped peoples, and economic and administrative decentralisation. As in the Chinese case, local nationalisms were condemned as bourgeois nationalism as opposed to proletarian internationalism during the period of state building. During the period of revolution in each country, however, national and ethnic minorities were successfully mobilised to be cooperative in building a modern state in struggle against absolutism in the USSR under Stalin.

In the era of the Soviet Union, severe suppression and discrimination were accompanied with recognising and territorialising different national and ethnic groups which had been roughly categorised by their language and religion. Contradictions in Soviet policies were based on the collision between the two inherently contradicting ideas: recognition of nationalities as groups and russification as individuals. Lenin’s slogan, national in form and socialist in content, during the Stalin era, is implemented in the form of territorialisation and Sovietisation at the same time. In line with the dichotomy of national form and socialist content, cultural policy endeavoured to develop national cultures and languages as the basic vehicles of socialisation. In this regard, the features of Stalin’s policy can be summarised as granting equal citizenship, permission of linguistic autonomy with development of educational systems among the non-Russians, nurturing new national elites, setting up a constitutional structure of Soviet federalism, and modernisation. For Stalin, the term ‘nation’ was used to define people with common economic conditions, language, territory and a similar frame of mind. Meanwhile, national minorities meant the rest who were not from a titular nation.

Since the 1930s and throughout the Soviet regime, the internal passport system had been imposed. Since non-Russian national or ethnic origin is supposed to be noted in all identification documents, minority national groups, including the generations who were born in Russia, had practical restrictions in daily lives such as migration, employment, promotion and university entrance. Since 1954, by which time Soviet minorities had regained rights to free movement, the Korean population began to be dispersed all around Russia. According to statistics, the Korean diaspora population in the former Soviet Union was about 460,000. Among them, around 190,000 were in Uzbekistan, 105,000 in Kazakhstan, 10,000 in the Ukraine, and so on. Dispersal of Korețsy also describes family division, which was specifically included in Stalin’s order. However, if the government policy toward minority national groups alone is the main reason for such dispersal, it does not explain other groups which could preserve a higher degree of collectivity.
Overall, I describe the outcome of interplay between Soviet policy and the Koreïtsy as dispersal, considering the Soviet policy of diminishing the size of population as far as possible, relocating only a part of the Korean population, and intentionally separating family members in Sakhalin and Vladivostok before deportation. As the status of Koreïtsy was as a non titular national minority and was incorporated into other national minority regions, Koreïtsy community and identity can be understood as a re-marginalised national group within the marginalised Uzbek and Kazakh nations.

Stalin’s deportation project of Koreïtsy to the Kazakh region was planned much earlier than 1937, the year of the actual deportation. The first attempt was made in 1923 but the plan was soon dropped. The Soviet Union at that time had an apprehension of radical Korean nationalists who might cause embarrassing troubles such as anti-Japanese agitation by forming a Korean armed unit and by smuggling weapons. The Soviet authority feared that in such a way Koreans in the area would aggravate the unstable relationship with Japan. Hara supports this approach to the issue; ‘the majority of the urban Korean population consisted of newcomers and refugees who had actually experienced Japanese suppression and whose anti Japanese feeling was strong’ (Hara, in Suh: 1988, 3).

Later, however, the reasons for Stalin’s relocation project were caused by different grounds. Firstly, Japan had always been a fundamental menace to Russia. On Japan’s invasion, as referred to in Chapter 3, the Russian government assumed that Koreans could possibly participate in spying activities against Russia. Immediately after the Russo-Japanese negotiation over the matter of Manchurian railway in 1931, the Soviet Union began to be suspicious of a Korean conspiracy with the Japanese. Secondly, the establishment of an autonomous Jewish prefecture in 1934 also provided Russia with grounds to fear potential Korean demands. The fear combined with Stalin’s xenophobic reaction to the yellow race in the politically sensitive region. There was a high possibility that Koreans would demand a separate administrative arrangement in order to build the Far Eastern Korean People’s Republic, which was actually proposed by Korean nationalists in August 1929. The Korean population in Far East Russia were one of the many other minority national groups targeted by Stalin for ethnic cleansing. Stalin’s racial harassment of the Koreans was also caused by the same kind of apprehension and suspicion that the Soviets had towards other nations and diaspora groups in non-Russian border regions. Such groups included Germans, Poles and Finns. The Soviet Union feared their greater loyalty to their home countries and possible influence from a capitalist society. They were labelled enemy nations and targeted for arrest and execution. Although the Korean peninsula was under Japanese occupation at that time, for Stalin, racial distinction between Koreans and Japanese was a serious worry in case Japanese influence became greater in the region. Thirdly, it was necessary to develop barren central Asia. For the purpose of advancing the dilution of Islamic culture in Kazakh, nomads should not be neglected as an explanation as to why Koreans
were sent to that particularly barren area. Before relocation, Koreans were promised lands and farms, and an agricultural life under better conditions once resettled in central Asia. It has also something to do with supplementing the population shortage after a considerable number of Kazakhs migrated to Chinese Muslim regions bordered by central Asia during the collectivisation period between 1929 and 1933.

Apart from these strategic and political reasons, deterioration of the national hatred between Koreans and Russians in the region was also taken into consideration. According to the data presented by Martin, for example, by 1926 the Korean population had reached approximately 145,500, which is around 22.4 per cent of the population in the Vladivostok okrug. There were class and status differences between Koreans and Russians. Most Korean households were landless and non-Soviet citizens. Koreans cultivated exclusively rented land; that is, 7.8 per cent of Russians.\(^\text{10}\) When ‘Soviet policy called for the transfer of land to those who cultivated it’ (ibid.), the Russians refused to rent lands and demanded Koreans’ resettlement. Years later, local Russians’ view of Koreans was seriously reviewed. ‘They saw Koreans as potentially disloyal and economically detrimental illegal aliens, who should be resettled away from the sensitive border regions’ (ibid., 318). In the Soviet Far East, the hostile atmosphere between Russians and Koreans worsened until 1937, which in the end served as one of the impulses for Stalin’s decision to remove Koreans from the trouble spot.

So far, I have explained specific policies towards diasporic Koreans that were one of the decisive factors shaping the present national identity of Korean diasporas. Such policies are based on principles of citizenship of host state. Fundamental principles of various citizenship notions denote the mode of limiting full membership of Korean diasporas to Han Chinese, Japanese, and russified Soviet nations by implicit legal arrangements and physical coercion, as well as cultural and psychological oppression. The focal issue here is the question of full membership to the nation of host state. This condition is one of the features of diaspora identity in general; that is, conflicting hope for full inclusion and distinctiveness.

**The search for full inclusion with recognition**

In this part, I analyse diasporas’ self-expressions of collective existence. They reflect the process of forming a diaspora identity. The process includes identification with their own group and differentiation from the host nation. They demonstrate the evolution of a particular collective identity while being conditioned within another nation, that is, via-à-vis the host nation.
Koreans in China

Collective memory of participation in state building projects

It is remembered that Josŏnjointively participated in the Sino-Japanese War, the Communist Revolution and the Korean War against the United States. Josŏnjointly were effectively mobilised under communist ideology, which blurred the line between the Han Chinese and the rest, and guaranteed agricultural lands. Josŏnjointly’s enthusiastic cooperation has been appreciated by the Communist Party and Chinese government until today. Consequently, the Josŏnjointly have been recognised as one of the most loyal minority national groups in China. In return for their active cooperation, Josŏnjointly secured a relatively higher degree of autonomy in many aspects.

Josŏnjointly interpretations of their collective memory, including participation in an anti-colonial war against Japan, contribution to the communist revolution and an anti-imperial war to guarantee the Korean peninsula not being colonised by America, decorate history books written by the Josŏnjointly themselves. Recording a history of their own reflects the self-justification of being Chinese citizens; at the same time, their awareness of not yet being full members of the Chinese nation. It illustrates a spontaneous selection of historical memories leading to the building of a distinctive identity differentiating them from the dominant nation. Josŏnjointly’s case demonstrates that keeping a sub-national group’s own collective history is not necessarily antagonistic to the host society, although difference is very much highlighted.

Collective memory of nationalist movements against Japan is also a significant source of Josŏnjointly identity. The Josŏnjointly believed that Manchuria would not be successfully retaken by China without the Josŏnjointly’s patriotic cooperation. Josŏnjointly historians hardly fail to highlight Josŏnjointly participants during the anti-colonial war against Japan in Manchu in the 1930s.11 Self-evaluation of contributions to state building is the crucial element for a diaspora group who wish to represent their collective identity. It is recorded that, in total, 64 social and political organisations were involved in the nationalist movements against Japan in the region. They record that there were about 2,000 members of the Communist Party by 1931, over 90 per cent of whom were Josŏnjointly. While the Kuomintang (KMT)’s policy was ethnicised nationalist agenda, Hanification, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) led by Mao took a different strategy regarding non-Han Chinese. Maoism, based on pragmatism rather than principle, successfully mobilised the local populace in struggling externally with foreign imperialism and, internally with the political rivalry against the KMT. Mao’s strategy was reinforced during his political experiment of the Long March through which the CCP could successfully communicate with minority groups, even in the remote Chinese border.

Each non-Han Chinese group during the Communist Revolution had a different motivation for cooperation with the CCP. During the Communist Revolution, for national and
ethnic minorities of China, liberalism was regarded as a tool for suppression and discrimination. In the case of the Josónjok, such a view is closely linked with both identity and practical reasons. They were at ease cooperating in the series of Chinese state-building projects for the reason that they shared strong anti-colonialism with the Chinese against Japan and the CCP’s land reform in favour of non-Han Chinese minorities. Otherwise, they would have been expelled, if the KMT was in power, back to their insecure motherland.

The anecdote below provided by Lee Hae Soon, an interviewee, shows the Josónjok’s interpretation of their contribution to anti-colonial nationalist movements against Japan in Manchu.

In a Hanjok [Han Chinese] junior high school in Yanji city, Yanbian, the student monitor of the class, aged fifteen, protested against a Hanjok history teacher at the school. In a history class one day, when the teacher explained about Chinese nationalist movements against Japan during the 1920s and 1930s in Yanbian, the Hanjok teacher mentioned that at that time the Josónjok were mostly spies for the Japanese government and Josónjok fought against one another, forming numerous political factions, while Hanjok participated in nationalist movements under the centralised Communist Party. Immediately after the Hanjok teacher’s explanation of the history, all the students in the class began to ask each other who was Josónjok students, finally picking on the student representative, who is one of the few Josónjok students in the class. He had been terribly disappointed and ashamed before he tried to look into the true historical records on his own. His parents helped him to collect historical materials to protest against the teacher and the class. In the next history class, he raised his hand and presented the statistics and data he had collected, showing how many Josónjok participated in the nationalist movements against Japan and how much they had suffered and how they were killed by the Japanese, pointing out that the Hanjok were also divided into two different political factions, the KMT and the CCP who were already fighting and killing each other. Also, he reported this occurrence (it is very common for the Chinese in this region to report anything regarded as important to the Communist Party) to the Communist Party Committee, saying that the content of the history lesson and the Hanjok teacher’s attitude obviously went against the central government’s nationality policy which strictly bans both Great Hanism and local nationalisms. Within a few days, the Hanjok principal of the school walked into the class with a local cadre from the Party and corrected the content of the previous history lesson to the class. Later on, the Hanjok teacher was reported to the Party as disqualified, which affected the teacher’s evaluation.

The passage above can be regarded as a common anecdote that could happen in any multinational society. It shows, however, China’s efficient and prompt way of rooting out any tensions between Han Chinese and the rest as it demonstrates the local government’s immediate intervention in ethnic relations. It shows, at the same time, the disparity between private history lessons and the official interpretation of historical facts, which is common in a diaspora community. A mass education system unavoidably imposes nationalistic views on history whereas first or second generation diasporas, who have been outside such a mass education
system, provide their children with different perspectives and interpretations of the major historical events. The larger the gap, the more likely it is that the younger generation have confused experiences over the issues of nationality. Although the Josŏnjok collective memory of warfare against Japanese colonisation is not distinctively their own historical memory and separate from that of the Han Chinese, their interpretation of their participation in the war is not identical. Whereas the Josŏnjok still perceive their role in the war as guest fighters contributing to the foreign lands, Han Chinese regard it as the victory of the Chinese nation in cooperation with national and ethnic minorities. Neither of the two interpretations reflects an assumption that Josŏnjok and Han Chinese are included in a single nation. Their experience of historical events occurred over the same period, but Han Chinese and Josŏnjok do not share their own nationalised interpretations of such events. For Josŏnjok, the particular historical memory of warfare gives grounds for their justifiable existence in the Chinese territory. Because of a nationalistic interpretation of history in relation to Korean history, the younger generation Josŏnjok who have been taught in the present mass education system have a feeling of collective shame over the history of their ancestral motherland. 'We have learned only negative facts about Korea. Because of a Sino-centric historical view, we have learned that Korea had always been a Chinese colony until the Japanese occupation. Until recently I felt antagonistic towards South Korea. But after communication with South Korea, I've been learning about Korean history and I found a lot more things to re-learn'.

Collective memory of oppression is also a key factor in building a distinctive collective identity. For Josŏnjok, the Cultural Revolution is interpreted as a period of oppression. Nonetheless, for them, unlike other historical memories, the Cultural Revolution is not remembered as a significant period evoking nationality issues. This is because, firstly, although in some regions tensions between Han Chinese and non-Han Chinese eventually developed, such tensions were blurred by political and ideological lines and reduced to a class struggle. Secondly, although some remember the horrible suppressions of Josŏnjok leaders condemned as local nationalists and feudal class enemies, the oppressed are also aware of the fact that such events occurred in other minority regions and even among Han Chinese. Thirdly, Deng's regime successfully encouraged the people to remember the Cultural Revolution as a political error made by a few irrational political leaders. Throughout Deng's regime, sufficient time was given for ordinary Chinese to believe that the political clique was the people's common enemy. At the same time, symbolic compensations were given to the oppressed. After Deng's succession to Mao, local newspapers were full of criticisms of the clique, the Gang of Four, and news reports on government compensation for the victims through building memorial towers or offering special honours.

As explained, the way of remembering historical events varies depending on groups even if they are under the same regime. Although the self-celebration of distinctive history
differs case for case, the fundamental motivation of such self-celebration is, commonly among the Korean diaspora cases, not to be separated from the dominant society but to secure justifications for their existence in the host societies.

**Agriculture, land and identity**

At the beginning of their migration, most Korean populations settled in China were farmers who were searching for arable lands. Thanks to China’s policy of regional autonomy, collective identity among the Josŏnjok has been more territorialised or regionalised than in the other two cases. The Josŏnjok community is rather regionally self-completed with their historical lands. The consequence of urbanisation in previously Josŏnjok dominant areas has caused the Josŏnjok people to have apprehensions of losing their collective identity along with their territorial base. Josŏnjok expression of fear over the disappearance of a substantial base of national culture displays diasporas’ resistance to assimilation. But at the same time, among Josŏnjok it is also reasoned that the Josŏnjok’s attachment to lands and a territorial base has in fact driven their society to become more stagnant and isolated.

Josŏnjok identity relating to rice and agriculture is reflected on their expression of the attachment of the older generation Josŏnjok to lands and loyalty to Chairman Mao, and the memory of Chu Duk Hae. Not only with the Koreitsy identity attached to farming history, in relation to Japan, similarly, historical research has shown that in the late 1910s in Korea during the Japanese occupation, the nationalist uprisings increased immediately after Japanese exploitation of the rice crop. In his historical work, Ku (1995) points out the issues by using the then US consul-general in (mainland) Josŏn, Burghales' report. For a short period of eight months between November 1918 and June 1919, Korea had to export over nine million bushels of the rice crop to Japan. As a result, Koreans faced serious rice shortages and the cost of rice rocketed. As a substitute crops such as oats were to be imported from Manchu. Burghales, Ku cites, maintained that one of the grounds for the aggravated Korean’s hatred against Japanese during the Sam-il nationalist movement was the fact that Japanese let Koreans eat oats, which Koreans hate.

As Miller's (1995) ethical justification of cultural nationality implies, the needy is accurately understood in concrete terms only when one can define what is needy for a certain group of people in a culturally distinctive context. Cultural choice is often ignored as a non-political issue by considering it as a problem of life style but, for the Koreans, rice was a question of life or death. The discussion of cultural choice for a particular group is inevitably a political subject. Ordinary Josŏnjok remember at least one thing that Chu Duk Hae did, particularly for Josŏnjok. It is highly praised among Josŏnjok that, in the middle of the Communist Revolution in the late 1940s, Chu Duk Hae was thoughtful and swift enough to

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negotiate with Communist Party leaders to grant special permission to provide rice instead of wheat to the Josŏnjok. Cultural preferences and national dispositions in the political sphere are not something to be trivialised. ‘People necessarily and properly consider public issues in terms influenced by their situated experience and perception of social relations’ (Young, in Shafir: 1998, 270).

To an agrarian nation, lands mean more than practical interests. Josŏnjok’s particular attachment to historical lands was evident in every political upheaval throughout history. During the Qing dynasty, the Josŏnjok bore humiliation and discrimination under Manchurian rule in the region only to keep the lands that had been discarded as sterile territory. Later, the Josŏnjok were forced to move to the region when it was discovered that they were skilful at agriculture. In the early 1930s, the Josŏnjok population was only three per cent but over 90 per cent of the agricultural yield came from Josŏnjok lands.15 In this period, the Josŏnjok’s attachment to lands encouraged them to develop a form of community more easily than nomadic groups in ancient China. The position is far clearer to see when comparing this with the inner Mongolians or Manchurians. Under Japanese occupation, the Josŏnjok fought for the land. As I briefly explained in the previous section, the Josŏnjok were highly cooperative with the Chinese Communist Party in 1949 when fighting against the KMT mainly because the CCP allowed Josŏnjok to own the historical lands. This is often expressed in interviews with old people who remember those times. With regard to Josŏnjok views on their record of being cooperative with the CCP, the first and second generations still show strong loyalty to chairman Mao. They recall their destitute past, and that they had no other choice. The older generations are aware that they are living as outsiders, but they still have the memory that it was communist China and Mao Zedong that saved them: ‘Japan took our territory. We wouldn’t have been allowed to preserve our lands without comrade Mao and the Party’.16

It is not exaggerating to say that the region had been left infertile before the Josŏnjok arrived and started to cultivate the discarded lands into agricultural areas. As the region became increasingly cultivated, Manchurians moved in and claimed land ownership. Since the region had always been a power vacuum, there were no fixed regulations on land property and migration before the Japanese occupation. With regard to the questions related to their official nationality as Chinese citizens, older generations answer, ‘It is difficult to betray China. We should carry on the historically accumulated trust between China and the Josŏnjok. This is because China allowed us to keep our national features so well along with our lands’.17

From today’s discourse on the territory, however, a generation gap is also exhibited. Whereas older people, mostly first and second generation Josŏnjok, deeply regret that the Josŏnjok are losing lands which they regard as one of the most substantial aspects composing the national group, the younger generation, third and fourth generation Josŏnjok, tend to believe that as long as the Josŏnjok are obsessed with lands, they cannot expect any further development
in the long term. In fact, since 1997 public concerns about the historical lands have emerged. For example, Heilyongjiang shinbao [newspaper] deals with the crisis of the loss of the Josŏnjok lands.

Recently, in D’ae-jŏn-ja-chon where 75 per cent population was Josŏnjok, for instance, over 30 per cent of Josŏnjok farm households, 40 households out of 201, have already left the lands. Their lands have been taken by other people, mostly Hanjok. This is mainly because since last year (1996), 280 Josŏnjok left their hometown for South Korea, United States, or other Asian countries. As a result, the used-to-be Josŏnjok towns are naturally losing their Josŏnjok features. Josŏnjok local government officials in such towns take actions to allow one year reservation period in order to let Josŏnjok farmers can return and delay Hanjok’s taken-up. Nevertheless, it is unclear whether Josŏnjok who left hometowns would have intention to return home (Heilyongjiang shinbao, 2 April, 1997).

A similar tone of public concerns regarding the loss of historical lands has appeared frequently in both Yŏnbyŏn ilbo [newspaper] and Heilyongjiang shinbao since 1997. The concerns are closely related to other indicators of nationality, such as population decrease and dispersal, and the preservation of national attributes including languages, customs and values. It is true that Josŏnjok identity was built around agricultural activity and land ownership. Although such stories of building a community have become mere historical memories, such shared memories of activities of maintaining a distinctive group also remain as a crucial ingredient to retain a group identity. Nevertheless, one of the reasons why Josŏnjok regions and counties have become increasingly less geographically defined is naturally related to political and economic changes in China and adjustments in implementing government policies towards non-Han Chinese.

From nationalised identity to regionalised identity

For the reasons of urbanisation and increasing internal migrations in China, the national or ethnic divisions have become less clear than before, which sometimes causes confusion and misunderstanding among minority ethnic or national groups, especially those who have strong historical attachment to their territorial bases. As a related issue with the first category, agriculture, lands and identity explained in the previous section, the Josŏnjok fear of losing a distinctiveness reflects diasporas’ fundamental desire, the search for a guarantee of inclusion yet recognition of their difference as a group.

The principles of China’s nationality policy are One China Policy (分離不許) and the national and regional autonomy (當家作主:民族區域自治). Article 4 of the Constitution given below, indicates the overall principles of the policy, emphasising autonomy and unity at the same time. In other words, as Mackerras (1994) noted ‘the state permits and even encourages...
the consciousness of individual minorities, provided that it does not threaten national unity or the 'unity among the nationalities (minju tuanjie)' (1994, 32), which is well presented in Article 4.

Article 4, Constitution of the People’s Republic of China

All nationalities in the People’s Republic of China are equal. The state protects the lawful rights and interests of the minority nationalities and upholds and develops a relationship of equality, unity and mutual assistance among all of China’s nationalities. Discrimination against and oppression of any nationality are prohibited; any act which undermines the unity of the nationalities or instigates division is prohibited. The state assists areas inhabited by minority nationalities accelerating their economic and cultural development according to the characteristics and needs of the various minority nationalities. Regional autonomy is practiced in areas where people of minority nationalities live in concentrated communities; in these areas organs of self-government are established to exercise the power of autonomy. All national autonomous areas are integral parts of the People’s Republic of China. All nationalities have the freedom to use and develop their own spoken and written languages and to preserve or reform their own folkways and customs.

The principles of the relationship between the central government and local governments is indicated in Articles 115 and 116 of section VI which explains the degree of centralisation. The legal framework regarding self-government in China stipulated in section VI of the Constitution was adopted as a part of Constitutional Law in 1984. The specific legal ordinance for Josongjok Autonomous Prefecture, among thirty other autonomous prefectures, was implemented in 1952. As Chinese society is still under totalitarian state control, tensions and conflicts can be efficiently dealt with by applying constitutional laws even to legal cases on civil and private levels.

Although China’s official criteria of ethnic or national groups are not always clear, there are fifty-six officially recognised distinctive ethnic or national groups including the Han Chinese. In terms of population ratio, non-Han Chinese minorities make up only about 8 per cent of the total population. Minority national issues in China have been taken seriously. The reasons are that firstly, geo-politically, the minorities live in the politically sensitive territorial border zones. The Josongjok themselves refer to such a group as a guagye-minjok meaning ethnic or national group on the territorial borderline. Secondly, the areas occupy over 64 per cent of the national territory, with abundant under-exploited natural resources. Finally, the population growth rate of non-Han Chinese is much higher than among Han Chinese. The Josongjok, however, are the exception; their population growth rate is lower than Han Chinese. Since the One China Policy is not directly related to the Josongjok case and China’s policy is flexible depending on each situation, I put my attention more on the latter policy, national and regional autonomy and its impacts on Josongjok national identity.
Article 115 and 116, Section VI, Constitution of the People’s Republic of China

Article 115 The organs of self-government of autonomous regions, prefectures and counties exercise the functions and powers of local organs of state as specified in Section V of Chapter Three of the Constitution. At the same time, they exercise the power of autonomy within the limits of their authority as prescribed by the Constitution, the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Regional National Autonomy and other laws and implement the laws and policies of the state in the light of the existing local situation.

Article 116 The people’s congresses of the national autonomous areas have the power to enact regulations on the exercise of autonomy and other separate regulations in the light of the political, economic and cultural characteristics of the nationality or nationalities in the areas concerned. The regulations on the exercise of autonomy and other separate regulations of autonomous regions shall be submitted to the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress for approval before they go into effect. Those of autonomous prefectures and counties shall be submitted to the standing committees of the people’s congresses of provinces of autonomous regions for approval before they go into effect, and they shall be reported to the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress for the record.

The policy of national and regional autonomy was introduced in 1947 when Inner Mongolia was designated as the first autonomous prefecture. Its direct concern was the future possibility of the Republic of Mongolia (Outer Mongolia) making a territorial claim during internal political turmoil. With a similar background against North Korea, the Josǒnjok community was allowed to set up its own autonomous governance. Unlike prevalent misunderstandings about the principle of autonomy, from the beginning the concept of national autonomy was combined with regional autonomy. Among the five largest administrative levels of autonomous prefectures, Tibet is the only area where the number of Tibetans is outnumbered by other minority national groups that form as 95 per cent of the total population, although the official statistics have been fluctuating. Otherwise, the dominance of any one national group is not encouraged by central government. Article 113 of the Constitutional Law, Section VI implies such policy.

Article 113, Section VI, Constitution of the People’s Republic of China

In the people’s congress of an autonomous region, prefecture or county, in addition to the deputies of the nationality exercising regional autonomy in the administrative area, the other nationalities inhabiting the area are also entitled to appropriate representation. Among the chairman and vice chairmen of the standing committee of the people’s congress of an autonomous region, prefecture or county there shall be one or more citizens of the nationality or nationalities exercising regional autonomy in the area concerned.

Since Deng’s Open Door Policy and rapid social and economic changes, it is true that the emphasis of government policy has moved from national autonomy towards regional autonomy. On some occasions, tensions are revealed, caused by the unintended but unavoidable consequences of confusions and misunderstandings over the discrepancy between national
autonomy and regional autonomy. There exist some examples demonstrating this discrepancy between sub-national and regional lines; the protest against misjudgements of sports matches and the Josŏn'gok students' discontent about Han Chinese students' influence in the student union of Yŏnbyŏn University are such examples. The anecdote below which combines information from interviewees Lee and Choi, shows potential tensions developing based on the regional line and government response to them. On the interview question of whether respondents has experienced any feeling of discrimination as a minority national, the interviewees enthusiastically told me the events of the Yŏnbyŏn Odong Team (the Josŏn'gok soccer team).

Social enthusiasm towards sports has risen since the early 1990s, although the team has existed since 1960. In 1998 when the Yŏnbyŏn Odong Team had tournaments with Liaonyang and Harbin Teams, on at least three occasions the Hanjok referee made obvious partial judgements giving disadvantage to the Yŏnbyŏn Odong Team. After the matches, the Josŏn'gok people staged continuous demonstrations in front of the local government building in Yanji city. The interviewee recollected the atmosphere, saying, 'I felt strong nationalist sentiments. Hundreds of Josŏn'gok were together until two o'clock in the morning to protest against the serial misjudgements'. The interviewee continued, 'Josŏn'gok believe that Hanjok are not happy with the fact that a small minority group like Josŏn'gok has an exclusive and independent sports team keeping good records because it is unusual for any ethnic groups to have their own teams which are competent in nation-wide big matches, broader regional levels than autonomous Chu [region]'. In fact, the team was supported by a South Korean sports association in terms of finance and techniques. Several South Korean and North Korean players actually participated in the matches as invited players of Yŏnbyŏn Odong Team. In the end, the Yŏnbyŏn local government had to dispatch a representative to central government to appeal against this happening. Soon after, official apologies were offered from the Chinese Central Soccer Association. The referee was punished. The interviewee adds his comments on this: ‘The Chinese government has provided extremely effective solutions to any trivial cases which might develop into deeper tensions. China is extremely sensitive to the nationality issues. Thanks to such an immediate solution at government level, now Josŏn'gok people seem to believe that maybe they themselves were too sensitive, exaggerating the referee's individual partiality as discrimination.

For some time later, the South Korean association's technical and financial support for the Odong Team was banned and more Han Chinese players were recruited. As in all other work units, in educational institutes and social organisations, one minority group's exclusivity is not as tolerable as before. For the Josŏn'gok community, enthusiasm over exclusively Josŏn'gok sports teams would mean nothing further than cultural pride, since their final goal is only to keep a collective solidarity as Josŏn'gok in Han Chinese society. It is true that there have been trends
where regional identities replace national identities, and sometimes they are inseparably interconnected. When the two boundaries are incongruent, the crucial difference between the two is the fact that regional identity is a more territorialised and interest-based identity without necessarily retaining a strong psychological sense of belonging. Once one leaves, interests shared with people in the region are no longer relevant. One can still keep nostalgic feelings about landscape, food and people of the region but this is so in a much more detached manner. When regional and national boundaries are congruent, however, it becomes another matter.

According to official statistics from 1982 in the Josõnjok autonomous prefecture, 16 different national and ethnic groups, comprised of 57.4 per cent Han Chinese, 1.93 per cent Manchus, and 0.03 per cent Mongolians, live together with 40.32 per cent Josõnjok. The autonomous prefecture is composed of two major cities, Yõngil [Yanji] and Domun [Tuman], and six lower level administrative districts or counties. The autonomous prefectural government is located in Yanji which is mostly populated by Josõnjok who form approximately 57 per cent in Yanbian alone. A total of 61.5 per cent of Josõnjok live in Gilim [Jilin] province.

The migration policy for the purposes of encouraging various groups’ cohabitation and accelerating the development of minority regions has been compiled with, in accordance with the principle of national and regional autonomy. The migration policy began in 1949 and peaked during the Cultural Revolution. The reason for this is, in theory, that China saw the issues or troubles of nationality as transitory problems that would eventually disappear when the class struggle was completed. Although socialism is adopted in a Chinese manners, the basic logic of the socialist view of nationality issues in relation to the class struggle is relevant to this discussion. The struggle to overcome national problems in the communist movement is the most important task of Marxists and Leninists because the doctrine of proletarian internationalism is basically incompatible with nationalism. One of the most fundamental divisions of humankind is the vertical cleavage which divides people into ethno-national groups; meanwhile, for Marxists, such a division rests upon horizontal class distinctions that cut across national groupings.

Consequently, socio-economic classes rather than nations were perceived as the essential force of human history. Marxism outlines the nation as a historically evolved phenomenon which comes into existence only with the rise of capitalism. Prior to the capitalist stage, human groupings were in the form of tribes and clans, but the new economic relations, brought on by changes in the mode of production, created nations. Therefore, in Marxist theory, nationalism is a device of the bourgeois for identifying their class interests as the interests of society as a whole. Regardless of dissimilarities in culture and traditions, identification with a given nation rested simply upon ties to an economic unit. However, socialism was modified in the Chinese way during Mao’s era. ‘The extension of Marxism to Asia … brought with it new questions about universality of Marx’s, Engels’, and, indeed, Lenin’s observations concerning the character and endurance of the state. These concerns were intimately linked to issues
concerning national identity’ (Hoston: 1994, 40). Fundamentally, national tension was seen as a matter of class conflict and should be a part of class issues. The oppression of a majority of people within a nation and between/among nations is basically caused by a ruling bourgeois class which is both a class enemy and a national enemy at the same time. Thus, it was believed the national question would dissolve when the class struggle ends and socialism is accomplished.

It is true that ethnic and national minorities in China have received special attention and care in many fields due to the general character and territorial compactness of minorities including the Josŏnjok. However, unresolved issues related to Han and non-Han Chinese are much more complicated than are manifested in the Constitution. The Josŏnjok retain growing concerns over issues such as the gradual loss of political autonomy, lack of government subsidies and fear of the force of assimilation. More and more Josŏnjok perceive themselves to be politically excluded and isolated. It is widely believed that China is concerned about the possible instigation of strong national ties between the Josŏnjok and the two Koreas. Invigorating economic networks between Jilin province and South Korea may well lead to political influence, disloyalty to China and, even further, a territorial claim on the region which, in mainland Koreans’ psychological map, is seen as a lost land. China, meanwhile, makes historical claims on ancient colonies which include not only the region where non-Han Chinese live but also their homelands. Outer Mongolia is one of the clear examples.

In this section, I have analysed the evolution of the Josŏnjok identity. Firstly, I discussed the Josŏnjok interpretation of historical events. Secondly, I explained their shared collective memories of building a diaspora community through communal economic activities. Thirdly, I have shown a diaspora’s attachment and sense of belonging to their regional base, where Josŏnjok are regarded as a majority among other national or ethnic groups.

Koreans in Japan

Zainichi history consists of tensions, struggles and contradictions. Zainichi experience demonstrates that their collective desire is to maintain collectivity and to secure external recognition. The numerous potential issues and actual problems between the Zainichi and Japanese society have been aggravated. Their fundamental cause is the question of mis-recognition, which consequently affects all aspects of Zainichi public and private life. Zainichi identity vis-à-vis the Japanese nation is best reflected on the issues of discrimination and naturalisation. I take that Kim Hee Ro and Hitachi cases as symbolic incidents. The features of Zainichi identity are formed while facing discriminative occurrences or participating in community affairs. These occurrences and collective matters reinforce the aspect of their
differentiated national identity seeing that such particular issues are shared neither with Japanese nation nor elsewhere with the Korean nation.

Discriminations and naturalisation

Not all Zainichi consider changing their legal nationality to Japanese is a desirable way to respond to racial discriminations in Japanese society. Due to the particular relationship between the Zainichi and the Japanese, one cannot make a hasty conclusion that naturalised Korean-origin Japanese have more or less overcome internal struggles and external pressures. In the same vein, increasing figures of a naturalised Korean population do not safely tell us that naturalised Korean-origin Japanese cease to possess any other collective identity but Japanese national identity. As I explained in the previous section, this is fundamentally caused by Japan’s highly nationalised notion of citizenship. Zainichi identity has been crystallised while experiencing all kinds of discriminations and discussing such issues as naturalisation; that is, a superficial choice of national allegiance. A puzzling question may be why even now most Zainichi would rather remain as Korean nationals despite the fact that naturalisation into Japanese citizenship has been encouraged by the Japanese government and the procedure has been simplified and entails many other practical benefits. As for any minority national group in Japan, becoming a member of Japanese society is not only a matter of the socio-cultural, political and legal activities of citizens in liberal states. Being a tax payer, being included in the same pension scheme, speaking the Japanese language or even being born in Japan are insufficient reasons to be regarded as a Japanese citizen. ‘Instead of any visible, identifying markings on the Koreans, such as tattoos or patches on clothing’, Che (2000) explains, they are marked ‘by their birth certificates bearing the original Korean addresses as their permanent domicile’ (7-8). The limitations for Koreans in Japan include discrimination in most aspects of life including housing, education, health care, receiving loans, all levels of legal cases, occupational choices, pensions, marriage, travels, political participation and so on.

Cases implying racial discrimination against the Zainichi are numerous. The stories and issues that I introduce here are common reflections of major aspects of discrimination. However, they represent only a modicum of thousands of pending social and legal issues. Mun’s story shows Korean frustration when they are treated as total aliens in Japanese society. On the question of discrimination, Mun, aged 38, illustrates her tiring experience with a well-known language institute in Japan concerning receiving loans. It is a custom for NOVA, an English language institute in Japan, to arrange the offer of loans to students in order to cover their tuition fees. Mun confesses the offence she felt when she was firstly rejected because of her official nationality and later, after complaining, required to complete absurdly complicated documents
including a requirement to providing a Japanese guarantor, which is customarily required only for students under the age of eighteen.

I could have provided what they required but I was so frustrated and offended that I decided to fight. I had been a qualified high school teacher for over ten years. They did not consider a Joson school as a proper educational institute. Consequently, my work experience was not taken into account. I could not accept the fact that I am categorised as a distrustful alien. I was born in Japan. Both the loan company and the language institute shuffled off their responsibilities. At the end of the long annoying disputes with the institute, thanks to a helpful Japanese lawyer, Mr Yamaguchi, the institute received an official order of rectification from the Osaka Bureau of Judicial Affairs. Apart from such experience, we Zainichi are already excluded from all kinds of social welfare. Zainichi who are not naturalised and keep using Korean names, without medical insurance, had to pay usually ten times more medical expense. I remember when I was young, we had great difficulties whenever my father was ill and had to go to hospital.

Mun’s experience might be viewed as personal and particular but it is not an isolated example of discriminations against the Zainichi. Her frustration would not have happened if Mun had never attempted to get out of her segregated Zainichi circle. She had decided to develop her foreign language skill hoping to lead a better life, by studying abroad or by getting better paid work just as ordinary young Japanese do in Japan. Relying on legal accounts does not disentangle the hidden issue. Perhaps neither the loan company nor the institute had the intention of discriminating against a Zainichi individual. Legal devices functioning against Zainichi conveniently support popular concerns about providing the same benefits to Zainichi as to real Japanese citizens. Mostly due to lack of information, ordinary Japanese commonly question: why foreigners like Zainichi should be treated like true Japanese citizens. They have their own independent country in case they want to return, and if they want to be treated like Japanese citizens, why don’t they naturalise? Public apprehensions are rooted in misinformation concerning the Zainichi issue. In the above illustration, for example, Mun might have naturalised much earlier had the acquisition of Japanese nationality meant no more than a legal procedure. For historical and political reasons, issues regarding diasporas are far more complicated than has been understood.

Zainichi reactions to discrimination are varied, mostly depending on the generation involved. The observation that different generations react to the Japanese society in different patterns does not safely confirm the common assumption that strong collective identity is gradually weakened among younger generation Zainichi. Only the manners of resistance to the force of assimilation have changed. This is due to the different reasons for their indignation; that is, why and with what they are discontent. The first generation Zainichi mostly preserve humiliating historical experience vis-à-vis the Japanese. Their experience is on a directly familial or personal level. Or, at least, they remember the colonial experience as a national
shame and consider the Japanese nation as ever enemies. The nature of indignation of the second and third generation Zainichi, on the other hand, is more practical. The fundamental discontent of the younger generation is caused by the fact that they were born in Japan without choice and perfectly Japanese in many ways but hardly accepted as being the same people. This causes problems common in Zainichi families. During childhood, Zainichi children and teenagers usually show their anger towards their parents, regretting their Korean origin. Zainichi more or less share such collective shame, although reactions to it are varied. Korean national identity among the older generation Zainichi is the one nurtured during the time of the Korea’s anticolonial resistance. Meanwhile, the national identity of younger generations is the outcome of the following three causes; actual discrimination, lessons from their parents who pass down their oppressive historical memories, and the modern education of a democracy allowing them to be aware of basic human rights and the reciprocity of citizenship.

Most of the Zainichi population are engaged in small business but problems with Japanese banks are classic examples of discrimination. A Zainichi businessman explains the difficulties of interacting with Japanese banks as Zainichi. ‘With an excuse of security problems in cases of sending money to North Korea, Japanese banks strictly ban offering loans to Zainichi businessmen’. Although there are a number of Zainichi who have managed to succeed in self-employed business and other private sectors, a considerable number of Zainichi have been left unemployed. Opportunities for Zainichi are filtered through racial stratification. It is not surprising to see literature with Zainichi themes is full of gangster affairs, pachinko parlours, money-lending, violence, frustration, segregation, and identity crisis.

Zainichi are not the only non-Japanese minority group to have suffered from discrimination in Japan. The Burakumin and the Ainu, whose lifestyles are exhibited in natural history museums as being well-tamed indigenous and aboriginal, have been examples of the Japanese wartime ideological framework. They were used to show that, despite the persistent efforts of the Japanese to civilise and include them in Japanese society, they have remained uncivilised due to their congenital inferiority. A large group of wartime biologists and anthropologists were involved in proving the genetic superiority of Japanese blood, which is intrinsically inherited only from Japanese ancestors.27 ‘Everything else was relegated to the background, with the indigenous populations of Hokkaido, Taiwan and Korea classified as stagnant, degenerate and incapable of appreciating the resources they possessed’ (Weiner, in Dikotter: ibid., 110). Sophistication of Japanese racism influenced by European theorists such as Arthur de Gobineau and inspired by social Darwinism, was made throughout the wartime period and reached its peak during the 1930s, crystallised as pan-Asianism. The conceptualisation of Japanese racism ‘was predicated on a conflict between the white and yellow races, while, on the other, assumed distinct and immutable differences in intellectual and cultural capacities between the Yamato minzoku and those of China and Korea’ (Weiner: 1992, 443). An official guidebook
explaining the negative characters of Koreans titled Josenjin, meaning the Koreans, was published in 1921 by the Japanese colonial government in order to promulgate the idea that Koreans were by nature an inferior race and consequently subject to assimilation by the Japanese. Due to the subtle way of discriminating by the unique social pressure of homogeneity and by legal restrictions, Zainichi naturally built a distinctive collective identity from the Japanese nation.

The legal framework of Japan is structured as it was during the American occupation and it has been relatively consistent. The Japanese postwar policy towards Zainichi was institutionalised during this period. The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) saw the remaining Koreans in Japan as illegal and disturbing elements in the context of the prevailing left-wing tendencies both in Japan and Korea. During this period, the immigration control system, the continuation of jus sanguinis and strict naturalisation criteria, and the uniform loss of Japanese legal nationality by ex-colonial subjects were introduced. It caused serious trouble for the Zainichi. Being categorised as sometimes the decolonised or, at times, wartime enemies as the Japanese, SCAP’s policy towards the Zainichi were highly ambiguous. Overall policy was oppressive due to the risk of the communisation of Korea. The status of the Zainichi was aggravated by the Korean War and the division of motherland afterwards.

According to the 1952 Immigration Control Act enacted by the Civil Affairs Bureau in the Ministry of Justice, it was announced that minorities in Japan were not Japanese citizens and paternal blood descent as the basis of nationality was emphasised. The Immigration Control Ordinance of 1951 and Foreigner Registration Act of 1952 were implemented. The latter indicates the requirement that foreigners carry an alien registration certificate at all times, and the establishment of a fingerprint system. People aged over fourteen who had stayed in Japan for at least one year were required to have fingerprints taken at the time of registration and to apply for a new certificate every five years. Ryang’s description expresses the humiliating legalised discrimination and implies its impact on identity formation.

The process included fingerprinting and was an altogether humiliating experience ... especially because of the high-handed, authoritarian, and careless attitude of Japanese officials. Students thus had a concrete reminder of an oppressive institution that treated Koreans as potential criminals, part of the larger discrimination against them (1997, 181).

Until recently, early in the 1990s, upon naturalisation, foreign names were required to be Japanised including family names. This might not be a particularly humiliating custom for other minority national groups including diasporas as, in western countries, many foreigners voluntarily change their names into anglicised forms. Zainichi view the regulation as highly
offensive. Especially for the older generations of the Zainichi, it reminds them of the colonial period when many Koreans were harassed for resistance to the forced Japanisation. The majority of Zainichi take the process and requirements of naturalisation to be humiliating and unjust. This matter is reflected on in my interview with a well known Zainichi artist.

The problem is not laid on naturalisation itself. The process should be democratic and should be left as individual choice. In Japan, having Japanese nationality directly means to obey the Emperor. Zainichi do not want to accept it. Imposing such precondition itself is discrimination. Thus, unless there were structural change in Japanese society, Zainichi problems caused by Japanese fundamental social ideology would not be solved. The ideology behind naturalisation in Japan requires becoming completely Japanese more than acquiring another legal nationality. Only official nationality not our cultural and historical roots should be required to be changed. Spiritual change should not be forced. Why should such a society be kept where Zainichi face many difficulties in openly using their own names and implicitly being urged to have two names?31

Many people who would have naturalised refused to do so, while many of those who did met with ostracisation. The naturalisation procedures have become somewhat less constraining in recent years. Perhaps partly because of this, as Douglas and Roberts (2000) consider, more people are now seeking naturalisation (6). One of the recent changes in the nationality law to which Zainichi organisations, especially Choryōns’, has been against is the revision of the law in 1985 allowing children from different national backgrounds to follow not only the paternal family name and nationality but also that of the maternal side. ‘The revised law has helped many multinational individuals to live in Japan as Japanese citizens...However, Koreans [Zainichi] object to this procedure and attack it as a form of forced assimilation’ (Murphy-Shigematsu, in Douglas and Roberts: 2000, 205-6).

Along with the system of alien registration, the re-entry permit system was enacted especially with reference to the Zainichi. Under this system, the Ministry of Justice could effectively prevent Zainichi from leaving and/or re-entering Japan. This system functioned most harshly against the Zainichi population. Concerns over methods of abuse, such a restriction of alien registration, have been raised. The Japanese tradition of a national phobia of multinational cohabitation and collective hysteria against the Zainichi is also reflected, as Soh explained, in the reality that no separate official institute or independent division exists to handle with welfare issues of immigrants in such a developed democratic country.

The Japanese government ignores the issues of the Zainichi. There’s no appropriate division dealing with the pending issues regarding special kind of immigrants like the Zainichi. Problems and issues regarding the Zainichi are matters of the public security division in the Ministry of Justice. To the authority of Japan, immigrants are not viewed as people who should be protected but regarded as an object of oppression and control.33
The interviewee is aware of the fact that the main reason for this Japanese attitude is the concern of the North Korean connection with Zainichi society. But he believes this reason to be an official excuse. In fact, a dilemma for Japan relating to Zainichi issue is that the more exclusive Japanese society is, the closer the relationship between Choryon and North Korea becomes. In 1965 permanent residence had been granted to pro-South Korean Japan-born Zainichi, in other words, to the Zainichi who officially registered as having South Korean nationality. Previously, they were categorised as illegal immigrants with no nationality for the reason that the South Korean government did not recognise them as South Koreans for security reasons. Officially, Zainichi with North Korean official nationality were categorised as North Korean immigrants because the North Korean government issued North Korean passports to them. By the time permanent residence was given to Zainichi with South Korean nationality, the Zainichi with North Korean nationality also had to choose exclusively either a North Korean passport or re-entry permit scheme as a permanent residentship, issued by the Japanese Ministry of Justice. Zainichi who chose South Korean nationality were not allowed to have Japanese nationality by virtue of the South Korean nationality law. They preferred having Japanese permanent residence with a re-entry permit, even though a re-entry permit requires a pre-stamped visa. This is due to the fact that, in some countries, having a North Korean passport causes even more trouble than having no nationality. Only since 1980 have the Zainichi without South Korean passports been allowed to travel outside Japan using a travel document. Another anecdote from Mun below shows the impact of restriction on Zainichi daily life.

When I was about to leave Japan, attempting to travel to Italy in 1997, the immigrant control officer kept asking me annoyingly tedious questions. It was around the time when all my family members were ceasing to renew special residentship caused by the excuse of the government’s sudden special nationwide investigation of Korean smugglers during Jeju 4.3 hangj’aeng. Instead, we were given a one-year visa just like any other foreigners but without a passport. Due to the insufficient residue until the expiry date in my 'special' visa, the Italian embassy refused to issue a visa. I had to explain my special status to the Japanese officials. Of course, the immigrant officer prevented me having a special document to leave Japan temporarily. In such a case, we have to choose either giving up traveling outside of Japan or never coming back to Japan. He was not aware of the issues and problems of people like us. We could have North Korean passports but possessing a North Korean passport gives even more trouble as the officials do not understand the fact that a North Korean passport for us is only symbolic. Normally, Zainichi traveling with North Korean passports would be put under a two or three hour-long investigation. Even after long explanation about my special status, to the end I couldn’t make the officer understand who we are. I had to give up and I said to him, ‘Okay, I’m from the universe. You would never be able to understand who on earth we are’.

In this anecdote again, the official did not particularly mean to be discriminative against
Zainichi. He was fulfilling his duty applying the appropriate law. If Mun had a more passive character, she wouldn't have attempted to face such problems considering the fact that all Zainichi are aware of their unstable legal status, which may cause troubles in their efforts to travel out of Japan. Actual discriminations are not always visible to all Zainichi individuals. Some might not face any discriminatory experiences throughout their entire life. Regardless of their lifestyle and actual experience, non-action for fear of possible discrimination is also based on their self-awareness of being Zainichi. Experience of direct and indirect discrimination evokes collective awareness of being a member of a certain group. Zainichi consciousness vis-à-vis the Japanese nation has naturally developed their distinctive collective identity. Since 1990, as the Figure 4.4 demonstrates, compared to the previous years an increasing number of Zainichi has chosen Japanese legal nationality. This is mainly due to four factors: globalisation indirectly encouraging more people travel outside of Japan, the death of the North Korean leader Kim II Sung, the Japanese government's timely adjustment of the regulations of naturalisation, and the changed milieu of political detentes between South Korea and Japan, and between North Korea and South Korea since the Kim Dae Jung regime.

Figure 4.4 the number of nationalised Koreans, 1955-1998

![The number of naturalised Koreans, 1955-1998 graph](image)

Nevertheless, legal and administrative changes in official nationalities do not solve the fundamental problems in relations between Japanese and non-Japanese as the problems are not only caused by the Zainichi's legal status of being permanent aliens. Unlike Josōnjok or Koreitsu, the Zainichi community has not yet resolved the issue of self-justification for their legitimate collective existence, followed by symbolic and practical negotiations over the relational history of the two parties: diaspora and host nation; in the Zainichis' case, the inevitability of their settlement in Japan and recognition of their contributions to the host society. As an example, Zainichi contributions to the Japanese nation and state have never been officially acknowledged. Among numerous issues between Zainichi individuals and Japanese state, the major one is the question of government compensation for soldiers wounded in the
Second World War while fighting for Japan, and victims of the Hiroshima nuclear bomb. They have been systematically excluded from government protection. Immediately after the Second World War, Japanese imperial historians successfully convinced the Japanese public that the Japanese nation itself was in fact the greatest victim. Until today within Japan’s nationalism discourse, there has been no room to talk about what happened to non-Japanese during these national disasters. I regard recognition of diasporas’ participation in host nation’s affairs as the first and most crucial condition of a stable coexistence of plural national groups within a state. My discussion on this matter was given in Chapter 2, and applies equally to the other two cases. Delayed negotiation over history has provided more space to build an antagonistic collective identity against the Japanese nation. This is normally the case, no matter which official nationality is chosen for the sake of convenience. Undoubtedly, there are many Zainichi who admire Japanese culture and wish to behave like the Japanese, but having a sense of belonging to such a national culture is a different matter.

Symbolic cases as watersheds in Zainichi history

Urgent problems have gradually attenuated owing to vigorous civil activities and current international pressure. Among those thousands of legal cases, either solved recently or remaining unsolved, cases including Hitachi versus Arai Shoshi and the Kim Hee Roh case are more widely publicised, and are consequently regarded as watersheds in Zainichi movements. The cases are a few of the many issues that have been trivialised by Japanese authorities. The issues between the Zainichi and the Japanese authorities are obviously public and political matters in addition to the problems of individual Zainichi. Not all individual Zainichi have problems vis-à-vis the Japanese state, but if the Zainichi were not involved, the Japanese institutions concerned would not respond in the same way as they do towards people involved in legal cases. Arai Shoshi and Kim Hee Roh are obviously considered as members of the Zainichi as a group in the first place rather than being considered as individual culture-free Japanese citizens of the state. Detailed theoretical discussion was presented in Chapter 2 focusing on the explanations of why minority identity is significant in the political domain and why recognition of collective identity is necessary in order to solve problems of negative discrimination against minority national groups. The Hitachi case and the Kim Hee Roh case symbolically exposed historically rooted complicated national tensions, although such cases hardly appeal to the Japanese public.

There exist stereotypes of outsiders in every society. Such national stereotypes are not necessarily always related to political issues. However, as recent research appropriately discusses, ‘[r]acial and ethnic stereotypes are relevant to opinion formation about public policy, because they influence information processing and decision making’ (Burns et al.: 2000, 204).
The cases I have presented have illustrated how the public and private interact to perpetuate a national minority's second class citizenship and how this is inevitably a political matter. How an irrational judgement of a political leader influences policy making can be found in Premier Yoshida Shigeru's perception of Koreans. Yoshida was known as someone who hated two things: communists and the Koreans. In his letter to MacArthur asking for the repatriation of all Koreans in Japan to Korea, Yoshida stated that 'Koreans were harmful to Japan because many of them were engaged in criminal or communist activities, and because they were not contributing to the economic recovery of Japan'.

It is undeniable that such a tone of discourse has dominated Japanese society. Immigrants or colonial diasporas in Japan can hardly be accepted as necessary contributors to the prosperity of Japan. I would emphasise that officialising the historical inevitability of Zainichi incorporation into Japanese society and recognising their contribution to state affairs including economic development, are the key issues in ameliorating the relationship between Zainichi and the Japanese.

The Hitachi case is a watershed in the sense that it put the issues of discrimination into the public arena: Arai Pak passed the Hitachi recruitment exam with an outstanding result but was informed afterwards that he had in fact failed because of his Korean origin. In the wake of this case, Zainichi problems were highlighted both among the Zainichi community and Japanese society. One of the crucial prerequisites for recruitment to standard business companies or the public sector in Japan is family reputation. Korean descendents have been categorised as outcasts. The Hitachi case was a typical event. As Japan itself is one of the most exclusive societies, discrimination against different origins tends to be worsened when the racial line is overlapped with the class line. In the case of the Zainichi, social inequality has become even greater for this reason.

Although Pak himself gave up taking further legal action, social movements against discrimination were vociferously organised. Christian associations took the initiatives of the anti-Hitachi movement in association with Korean-American Christian social organisations operated by Korean communities in the US. After a three-year long legal fight, in 1972 he finally won the case, and yet tensions between the Zainichi community and the Japanese authorities reached their peak in 1980 over the issue of alien registration. Lee Chung Il, the head of the Korean Christian Centre in Osaka, explains the changing features of the Zainichi movement as depending on their periods. The first period is from 1945 before the Korean War. Zainichi movements during this period can be identified as preparation for settlement with adjusted legal status. The second period is between 1950 and 1953, during which time the Zainichi were deeply engaged in the political affairs of their motherland. During the third period, after the division of Korea until the early 1970s, the internal division of the Zainichi community had been consolidated like a miniature of the Korean motherland. Taking the several major incidents as watersheds since the early 1970s, the direction of Zainichi collective actions
has changed into more civil and grass root movements rather than political and ideological disputes, although the internal political division existed throughout.

As for a turning point, ever since the Hitachi case, Zainichi movements have become more explicit and organised. The case stimulated Zainichi’s national sentiments, and organised actions were instigated whenever necessary. Thanks to the continued struggle and temporary amelioration of diplomatic relations between two Koreas and Japan, the fingerprinting system was legally abolished in August 1999. Since the academic year of 2001, Josōn University graduates have been allowed to apply to Japanese national universities after passing an additional qualification exam for entering colleges. Some positions, such as lower level civil servants in local governments in a few regions such as Osaka and Kanakawa counties, have been slowly opened to Zainichi since 1998 after long legal fights. Voting rights for the Zainichi in local elections has been an important concern for a decade. With South Korean support, Japan has seriously reviewed the position but the Japanese government faces strong opposition both from Choryŏn related Zainichi and Japanese extreme nationalist groups. Japanese conservative nationalists have expressed deep concerns relating to the negative consequences of offering political citizenship rights to the Zainichi in terms of national interest, including security matters and national sentiments. As a compromise, the Japanese government has implemented relaxed regulations for naturalisation in order to encourage more Zainichi to take naturalisation as a precondition of political participation. As shown below in the interview text, North Korean affiliated Zainichi have been opposed to the endowment of voting rights and official easing of the naturalisation process. For them, such changes in Japanese policies are interpreted as another kind of forced assimilation. Zainichi discussions on topics such as naturalisation and voting rights reflect one of diasporas’ common features, the inevitable dilemma between a deeper degree of inclusion to the host nation and segregation from the mainstream society for the sake of their own collectivity.

I disagree with the naïve way of thinking regarding voting rights. Some believe suffrage rights will improve and solve Zainichi problems. There will be nothing changed. We’ll gain only symbolic change but the Zainichi population is not large enough to influence the Japan’s political process. Rather, more division will develop within the Zainichi community depending on political orientation supporting different political parties. The minimum rights that Zainichi enjoy at present came out of our continuous struggle. Rights are never given by Japanese government. Systematic struggle rather than legal and formal routes is the best way to secure our rights.

Such a view above is common among the Zainichi who have been exposed to a communist oriented Josōn national education in Japan. They fundamentally share sceptical views on the overall democratic political process. Among them, collective fights rather than individual incorporation are still strongly believed to be the way to respond to discriminations.
Along with the Hitachi incident, the case of Kim Hee Roh revealed the deep-seated ethnic hatred and issues of discrimination. During the legal procedure, institutionalised discriminations against the Zainichi were revealed, resulting in public resentment. It is well known that a considerable number of Zainichi are involved in yakuza, the criminal syndicate of Japan. Among the Zainichi, it is a typical story that a rebellious Zainichi youngster frustrated by his social environment and hopeless situation decides to join the predatory yakuza to have spiritual and financial stability. This explains why yakuza recruitment is normally from minority ethnic or national groups. Most groups and members of yakuza are affiliated with area-wide syndicates that cover several prefectures. ‘Seven of these syndicates together comprise 36.3 percent of the total number of groups, … The seven syndicates operate in 39 prefectures’ (Stark: 1981, 35) and, major cities such as Tokyo, Kyoto, and Osaka where Koreans are highly concentrated.

Figure 4.5 Korean population by region

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tokyo metro</td>
<td>294,083</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Tokyo, Ibaraki, Tochigi, Gifu, Saitama, Chiba, Kanagawa)</td>
<td>169,436</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Osaka metro</td>
<td>83,243</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Osaka, Kyoto, Nara, Hyogo, Wakayama)</td>
<td>23,910</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chubu metro</td>
<td>8,345</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Nagoya, Gifu, Shizuoka, Mie, Shiga)</td>
<td>14,912</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other prefectures</td>
<td>63,230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>657,159</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As, for example, Kang Tae-song’s short novel, *Kizuato* (meaning the Scar), which realistically reflects the reality of Zainichi society, Kim (also known as Kwon) Hee Roh was one of those stereotypical Zainichi. Kim, a former yakuza member, was a second generation Zainichi who had served 31 years of a life sentence for the murder of two Japanese yakuza members in February 1968. As a symbolic gesture of reconciliation with South Korea during the Kim Dae Jung regime in September 1999, Kim Hee Roh was freed on the condition that he leaves Japan for good. South Korean media sensationaly pictured him as a national hero having fought with Japanese society against discrimination and finally returning home country after long years of exile. The maximum sentence had been passed on Kim Hee Roh. Focal points were ignored.
They include circumstances and the situation behind the murder case, such as an allegedly offensive discrimination within yakuza, direct motivation of the criminal act and the background of the victim. Apart from that, customarily reprisal murder cases among yakuza had hardly been convicted under the protection of higher level yakuza members and related politicians, especially during the 1960s. It is regarded that, as Stark (1981) observed, no particular political benefits can be gained by prosecuting and fighting gangs in Japan. Nationwide yakuza networks with connection to politicians and government officials were a well known secret in Japan. Upon the excessive and uncustomary exposure of Kim Hee Roh's case to the public, openly offensive and biased public opinions and public speeches were made by officials. While nobody had been convicted of being in contempt of court, Kim Hee Roh was given the harshest sentence. The institutionalised discriminations against the Zainichi involved in the whole process of investigation and conviction were never discussed.

Figure 4.6 Percentage of the Korean population among foreign residents

The unique mechanism of Japanese society has allowed this underground society to mushroom. As Kaplan and Dubro rightly describe, the history of yakuza shows the dark side of Japan; the silent oppressed minority groups, such as the Burakumin and the Zainichi. By the time the Zainichi began to take up the lower level positions in the yakuza during the colonial period, Japan underwent rapid industrialisation, which requires cheap labour from so-called sangokujin; Chinese, Korean and Taiwanese who had been brought into Japan to replace the many workers drafted into the army. In the early 1940s, a prototype of modern yakuza leader, Akira Ando, was named guardian of Korean labourers and protector of Korean juveniles by the Tokyo Metropolitan Police. Apart from the higher salaries they earn, for minorities like
Koreans, it is far more tempting to join the organisation. They realised that the legitimised rules in a normal world are never on a minority’s side. The crucial requirement of *yakuza* membership, loyalty and a family like relationship in return for emotional protection and material security could well be a fascinating concept for marginalised people. The nature and function of the *yakuza* have long served as attraction for alienated groups. Over 90 per cent of the lower positioned *yakuza* were composed of the Burakumin before Koreans started to take up such positions from 1945 onwards.

Concerning the Kim Hee Roh case, the following four facts are notable. Firstly, the crime was triggered by insulting statements about his Korean origin although it was begun by other personal and organisational reasons. Accordingly, national or ethnic division within the *yakuza* became an issue. Secondly, the process of investigation of this case demonstrated institutionalised racial inequality. Throughout the legal procedure, he was treated as a foreign national who disturbed the Japanese social order while the Japanese victims, higher ranked *yakuza* members with more extensive criminal records, received public sympathy. Thirdly, unlike the Kim Hee Roh case, customarily previous criminal cases within the *yakuza* had never been unleashed until exposure to media and public, and consequently the case ended up with an unusually harsh sentence, whereas other *yakuza* criminals are normally released soon after. Fourthly, the final gesture, sending him home, exhibited that the government had controlled this case for the purpose of political bargaining rather than just as a criminal case, and ultimately made the decision to send the criminal back to his homeland on condition that he never re-enters Japan. In other words, expulsion is applied. Criminals should also have citizenship somewhere. Even in the case of a minor legal violation, Zainichi are subject to be expulsion from Japanese territory or disqualified as a citizen subject to periodic renewals.

As the cases demonstrate, fundamental problems between the Japanese and the Zainichi have not been resolved. Cases revealing Zainichi issues have long been mistreated by the authorities and trivialised by an insufficiently informed public. The Zainichi has not yet been provided with a psychological and social sphere in which to negotiate their national identity with the Japanese nation and where the Zainichi can justify and legitimise their collective existence.

**Koreans in post-Soviet central Asia**

Due to the particular history of the relationship between Korea and the Soviet Union, in explaining *Koreîtsy* identity built vis-à-vis host nation, broadly speaking the following three aspects are noteworthy: firstly, collective memories of deportation; secondly, incorporation into Uzbekistan; and finally participation in the various Soviet state building projects. The *Koreîtsy*
desire for legitimate inclusion in host states is reflected in their discussions and interpretations of related historical events.

Voluntarism: state wars and collectivisation

Koreitsy desire for inclusion in the host nation was expressed in their memory of participation in major socialist state building projects: collectivisation and warfare. For them, apart from economic achievements, participation in socialist revolutions and the war against Nazi Germany have been the important historical events that Koreitsy themselves hope to highlight. Around the time of their deportation, relocated Koreans had both Korean nationality and Japanese nationality regardless of their previously acquired Soviet nationality before resettlement. Japan had the diplomatic right to control the Korean population in central Asia in the absence of a specific treaty between the Soviet Union and Japan over the issue of nationality.

The Korean population in the Russian Far East before deportation was divided. The first All Goryoin Conference in May 1917 in the Russian Far East region ended up in fragmentation and disagreements due to the polemic issue of whether Koreans should support the Soviet regime or the Korean provisional government in Shanghai. Wealthier Koreans supported the Korean provisional government, whereas peasants and the poorer were on the Soviet side in keeping a close relationship with the league of nationwide proletariats. In October 1917, most Koreans supported the October Revolution, which they viewed as the preliminary condition for the independence of the Korean motherland. The direct reason why Koreans in Soviet territory at that time were so active in supporting the Soviet government is for the similar reason with Josonjok. The issue of farmland was the most crucial incentive for Koreitsy peasants. For Koreans who had been working as no better than slaves under the harsh exploitation of landlords, obtaining land was the most crucial issue.41 It was later in the 1930s when the Koreitsy had begun to be excluded from renting land and other industrial activities, and they were finally deported to barren land in central Asia by 1937. Koreitsy history of incorporation into central Asia is the history of building and managing kolkazes, which is the main theme of Chapter 5.

By the time they were resettled, the Koreitsy had barely restored their stable lives, while after deportation their conditional Russian citizenship was nullified. Migration to outside Kazakh regions was restricted. The Koreitsy were left as a people with no nationality. Needless to say, they were excluded from various duties and rights including military conscription and proper institutional educations in cities. For a diasporised population, exclusion from military conscription results in exclusion from immediate benefits for survival. In the meantime, the deprivation of an opportunity for education was a blow to the future of the next generation. 'The right to education is a genuine social right of citizenship, because the aim of education during
childhood is to shape the future adult'. It is crucial issue considering Koreans' particular enthusiasm for education. According to Em (1991), the average educational level for Koreîtsy is higher than that for other minority national groups. According to the data released in 1989, among Koreîtsy in Uzbekistan, about 22.4 per cent completed high school compared with about 10 per cent of Uzbeks. The author believes that Koreans' enthusiasm for education created the basis for an intellectual society in the former Soviet Union. According to data in 1989, 42.7 per cent of Uzbek Koreans, 36,900 out of 86,400, are reported as white collar workers. In this regard, for the younger generation of Soviet Koreans, restriction of movement out of central Asia was perceived as the most fatal discrimination, especially for those who were eager to pursue a better educational opportunity in larger and more modernised cities.

Older generation Koreîtsy take exclusion from military conscription during the Second World War as the most regrettable historical memory after deportation. 'Koreans were fully motivated with strong patriotism and ready to participate in the fight against fascism' (Um, in Schulze: 1996, 42). As the Koreîtsy were stigmatised as distrustful minority national group, only a few managed to fight. Most Koreîtsy were eager to contribute patriotic victory funds and other donations, which had been often used as Koreîtsy justification for their further inclusion as Soviet citizens. Koreîtsy who had been involved in the Communist Youth League in Vladivostok in 1922 were extirpated, being accused as anti-revolutionary local nationalists before and after relocation. Koreîtsy collective sentiment of exclusion from military conscription has been remembered as traumatic, as it is seen from most of Koreîtsy writings.

Stalin defined Koreîtsy as a distrustful group. But Koreîtsy sincerely wished to participate in the war to make substantial contributions to Soviet state building. Exclusion from participating in a patriotic war was regarded as such an indignity for us. Nevertheless, no Koreîtsy have complained ... Some Koreîtsy even disguised their names to Kazakh or Kirgiz in order to go into the army. [The regulations were less strict in regions where Koreîtsy were not highly populated.] When the Soviet country was in a difficult situation, Koreîtsy worked hard for the country in spite of all kinds of insulting experiences ... Koreîtsy thought that because they were not allowed to move freely to other regions and banned from political activities, success in agriculture was thought as the only legitimate way to act to the best of their ability and receive social recognition (Han and Han: 1999, 83-91).

Koreîtsy enthusiasm for participating in state projects was also caused by their apprehension of the possibility of further ethnic harassment. They had to ensure their status for survival. Due to the geographical isolation, Koreîtsy identity was formed more directly related to the people in the post-Soviet republics, including Uzbeks, Kazakhs and Kirgis, rather than the Russian nation. In Soviet central Asia, Uzbeks' identification against Russians was mainly based on their distinctive culture as nomads and Muslims whereas Koreîtsy identity, as opposed to Uzbeks, was related to their sedentary and non-Islamic culture. 'Although many Uzbeks
eventually became sedentary, the politically active class had an interest in preserving a separate identity' (Manz: 1994, 8). In the middle of such Islamic cultural environment, Koreîtsy were known to be highly adaptive. Kimura cites Iu. V. Ionova’s (1963) observation in the region on relocated Koreans in central Asia in 1937. ‘If the transportation was completed by December 1937, many Koreans must have perished. But once they moved to central Asia ... Koreans found themselves well adapted to their new circumstances’ (Kimura, in Suh: 1988, 91). He continues, explaining Koreîtsy’ rapid success in irrigation and agriculture under extremely poor conditions. Koreîtsy kolkhozes were successful ‘in bringing wasteland under cultivation in a short time, and in growing rice and other crops such as beans, barley and maize, as well as silkworm breeding’ (ibid., 92).

The fundamental spirit of collectivisation did not in fact affect negatively on Koreîtsy identity. The main purposes of collectivisation were, firstly, to create nationally homogeneous kolkhozes, not to make the volatile multinational composition worse by stimulating collective hatred towards different national groups. The second purpose was the disintegration of clan and tribal loyalty. Indigenous people in central Asia were equally oppressed by the time Koreîtsy were resettled. ‘[T]raditional Kazakh culture defined a man through the animals he owned, making private ownership of livestock almost the definition of what it was to be a Kazakh ... Kazakhs strongly resisted nationalization and ... sacrificed their lives and the lives of animals to try to prevent its introduction’ (Olcott: 1996, 248). Similarly, among Uzbeks in late 1938, ‘by establishing forced cotton monoculture, mass terrors and actions against collectivization were triggered to increase anti-Soviet sentiments’ (Simon: 1991, 161). By contrast, Koreîtsy in Vladivostok were already known as the most vigorously cooperative in Stalin’s policy of collectivisation, much more than Russians before deportation in 1920s. As Wada (1988) states, antagonism grew between the Russians, who were against Stalin’s forced collectivisation, and the Koreans, who are enthusiastic in implementing the policy. Great power chauvinism became an issue. Russian peasants resorted to violence against Korean kolkhoz members although the local authorities gave privileged treatment to the Russian farmers at the expense of the Koreans when the first collective farms were founded in Vladivostok.44

It is undeniable that the relocation project was traumatic and the process of resettlement was indescribably inhumane. Nevertheless, for Koreîtsy in the Soviet Far East as a sedentary and religiously heterogeneous national group, already holding anti-Japanese sentiments and socialist orientation, forced sedentarisation and collectivisation, and imposing Orthodox Christianity were not fatal policies so much as means of destroying collective identity. Towards the Koreîtsy, the Tzarist government had imposed acceptance of Russian Orthodox Christianity as a prerequisite for naturalisation. Acquisition of citizenship was essential to have rights to rice cultivation. The attempt to assimilate or exclude the Koreîtsy in this way was unsuccessful because their acceptance of Christian Orthodoxy was superficial. The common description in
existing literature of Korei'tsy is a relatively quick adaptation and maintenance of their own culture at the same time. '[T]he continuing flow of Koreans and the clustering of new arrivals brought about the formation of Korean villages. ... This growth served to reinforce Korean culture and values within the Korean community’ (Chey, in Suh: ibid., 64). Korei'tsy adaptability was useful to provide economic labourers and as a landmark securing an unclear territorial boundary, but sometimes they became a national target in times of crises.

The Korei'tsy, who had completely lost their political rights, thought that hard work was the way to restore lost dignity, which can be understood as their way of maximising the given autonomy. It is recorded that by the end of 1938, there were 48 Korean kolkhozes established in Uzbekistan and 57 in Kazakhstan. The Korei'tsy are proud to quote the records of their economic achievements. They emphasise the fact that between 1940 and 1945, for example, Korei'tsy kolkhozes like Palarnaya Zbezdka could increase the area of agricultural lands for rice farming and cotton fields ten times. Han's (1999) book also highlights how enthusiastic Korei'tsy were in their contribution to the building of the socialist Soviet nation by voluntarily funding for the defence of the Soviet nation (72 and 89). Similarly to the other two cases, the Korei'tsy have aimed for legitimate inclusion in their host society with justifiable explanations on their collective existence. As for a non-titular small minority national group, the Korei'tsy had perhaps no alternative to being cooperative with every national project of their host state, but their pattern of response to the host state’s policy was not quite identical with all the other non-titular minority national groups under the same regime.

From Soviet Korei'tsy to Uzbek Korei'tsy

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989, newly independent Soviet republics in central Asia have implemented their own nationalistic policies. Such policies impose another official nationality through language policy, education and religion. In central Asia under the Soviet regime, especially, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, assimilation was implemented broadly in two ways related to religion and land ownership: sedentarisation of nomads and religious assimilation. The basic framework of Soviet policy in relation to central Asia goes back to the era of imperial Russia. As Olcott (1996) explains, from their experience of the 1830s and 1840, Russians saw that 'nomads were difficult to rule', therefore, 'the short-term risks of encouraging the development of agriculture among the Kazakhs would be worth the long-term gains that pacification of the steppe would provide’ (84). According to Gleason's (1997) description, Uzbeks took the most arable lands in the central Asian region. Uzbeks ‘captured the most agriculturally productive watersheds and the associated irrigated agricultural areas of the Chirchik River ... the Zerafshan River ... and the Surkhan-Doria’ (337). This may also explain one of the reasons for the economic success of Korei'tsy farmers in Uzbekistan.
As for the minority national group in the newly independent states, Koreïtsy problems have been twofold: destabilised national identity due to the sudden political changes and a loss of an agricultural foundation caused by the introduction of market economy to the CIS in general. These two major problems are closely interconnected in the sense that rapid totalitarian reforms in Uzbekistan have influenced overall changes in society not unique in terms of economic system but in terms of national culture and political environment. In spite of the multinational composition, the Uzbek government has followed the classic way of promulgating strong nationhood as a major political slogan inevitably linked with Islamism. The phenomenon is rightly expressed in Abduvakhitov's phrase as 'an ongoing awareness of nationalism in the transitional development of independent Uzbekistan' (Abduvakhitov, in Bourdeaux: 1995, 302).

In spite of the independence of the Uzbek Republic, the Koreïtsy prefer to learn the Korean language to Uzbek, or remain comfortable with the use of the Russian language. Koreïtsy identify themselves neither with Russians nor Uzbeks in terms of nationality, although they are at times inclined to express their pride of more or less sharing a Russian cultural heritage, speaking the language and understanding the rich history and literature. As the revival of ethnic nationalism remains a potential political agenda in Uzbekistan, the Koreïtsy have faced a new crossroads choosing their collective fate once again. As G. Smith (1999) rightly describes, Uzbeks are in the process of a 'post-colonial search for national redefinition and symbol-building' through three factors, 'citizenship, Islam and form of governance'. Opting for citizenship develops along with 'elevating particular epochs or past heroes' as the process of building nationhood. As he holds, Uzbek 'symbol builders look back to the supposed halcyon age of the fourteenth-century ruler Tamerlane'. My interview with a South Korean social worker with about seven years' experience in Tashkent explains the situation:

At the moment, the Russian language is allowed to be used together with the Uzbek language, yet government policy is to impose exclusive usage of the Uzbek language by 2006. Already crucial public positions have been taken over by Uzbek speakers, who are mostly Uzbeks, and recently more and more official documents are written in the Uzbek language, which causes serious difficulties and inconvenience for non-Uzbek national groups. Yet, Koreïtsy do not seem to be aware of the serious situation and that their status is at stake. They are not sufficiently motivated or prepared to get into the newly establishing Uzbek society. They have somehow looked down on Uzbeks and have the tendency to identify themselves with Russians especially in terms of cultural heritage. Except a few Koreïtsy who were prepared, most Koreïtsy in public sectors along with other nationalities have been replaced by Uzbeks.

Under the totalitarian political culture at present, Uzbek Koreïtsy hardly express their personal experiences of racial discrimination on a public level. Like Russians in Tashkent, Koreïtsy engaged in the public sector have been slowly replaced by Uzbeks. This is especially the case for government officials, professors and journalists. Yoon (2000) also notes emerging
concerns about the current situation of the Koreïtsy. ‘[M]any Korean teachers, government employees, and other white-collar workers in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are in danger of losing their jobs’ because of the new language policy. They are ‘now under severe pressure to decide new courses of adaptation’ (45). Such necessary adaptation, however, is not particularly a Koreïtsy burden but also the problem of other non-Uzbek national and ethnic groups including Russians. This change is not an isolated example from the rest of the former Soviet central Asian republics. In Uzbekistan, such tendency of national exclusion is based on the Uzbek language and ancestral roots rather than the Islam religion at present. However, as the passage below insinuates, the possibility of religious exclusion in the future is not unpredictable.

By the constitutional law, the strict division between religion and politics is secured and, among Uzbeks and Kazakhs, Islam is penetrated only in the form of customs, traditions and value system like Confucius customs in Asian countries, and yet the possibility of consolidation of Islam as a religion should not be overlooked. Uzbeks are situated under influence of Islam fundamentalists in the neighbouring central Asian countries and the change of power shift within the government is also the crucial variable although present regime is occupied by the moderates.46

King (1998) rightly holds that ‘newly independent states have been engaged in the tortuous process of defining their own sense of nationhood and staking out unique proprietary claims to territories that are home to a manifestly heterogeneous population’ (King, in King and Melvin, 5). As the result of such newly instigated Kazakh and Uzbek Islamic nationalism and economic and educational achievements, as in the Josønjok case, a considerable number of Koreïtsy in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have migrated to other larger cities within the former Soviet territory. While there used be numerous collective farms where Koreïtsy took high positions, for example by 1993 in Kazakhstan, there is only one collective farm left where Koreïtsy hold important positions.

In addition to their sudden Uzbek citizenship, their renewed communication with the South Korean motherland provides another source of confusion. Since the early 1990s, the North Korean embassy has retreated. Instead, the South Korean embassy has taken a primary position in the Uzbek Koreïtsy community. Along with the North Korean embassy, all other North Korean affiliated Koreïtsy organisations have downsized or disappeared. Some Uzbek Koreïtsy show great concern over the future of Koreïtsy communities in central Asia. As mentioned, their contributions to agricultural development in the central Asian region were the major components of the Koreïtsy identity during the Soviet era. Uzbek Koreïtsy’s emerging insecurity is caused by their awareness of the fact that they, from now on, need other collective stories to ensure legitimacy of their existence vis-à-vis the Uzbek nation. It will be the time for them to rewrite Koreïtsy history, highlighting their economic cooperation with the Uzbek nation
and their oppressive experience during Stalin's era rather than enthusiastic participation in various Soviet state's projects.

The Koreïtsy have just reached the stage where a diaspora continuously produces the stories of their own community with a will to preserve their shared pasts. This is stimulated by series of political changes, the destruction of the Soviet Union, the emergence of Uzbek nationalism, sudden influence from South Korea and globalisation. As Steven Lee (2002) mentions in explaining the emptiness of Koreïtsy identity, which he considers as a consequence of Soviet policy, reflected in Soviet Korean literature. He rightly contours the invisibility of post-Soviet Koreïtsy. 'All that the Koreans gained during the Soviet Union was a hollow ethnic category; on all of their documents, they were registered as Koreans, but beyond this distribution, as well as a few stereotypes about them, they were highly assimilated, with Moscow regarding them as a model minority of sorts' (3). In contrary to his observation, however, I view that the Koreïtsy have just begun to express their collective identity in a more organised manner.

Collective memories of deportation

It is not entirely safe to judge that the Koreïtsy identity has disappeared or is in the middle of assimilation. It is also true that the population has been highly dispersed and the degree of ethnic maintenance, including language skills and other Korean tradition, is very low. Compared with Zainichi or Josonjok, the older generations of Koreïtsy have left so little of visible collectivity of their own. Nevertheless, their collective memories are just beginning to be expressed in various public forms. Among educated second generation Koreïtsy, the issues related to national identity have emerged as important subjects for public discussion, and consequently the meaning of being a Koreïtsy has been frequently questioned. The text below is one of such examples:

At dawn when I'm alone, I sometimes try to bring myself to the long past. The very strange history at that time made us live an entirely new life and afterwards the group of people has been called Goryōsaram [Koreïtsy]. Most of us have long forgotten how and why our ancestors settled in this foreign soil. But in the deepness of our minds, the compelling question has always remained unanswered ... 'Who are we on earth?' 'Where are we from?' (Han and Han: 1999, 13).

A Koreïski author, Em, the dean of the University of Tashkent, has written, in his autobiographical article, his memory of the situation around the time of deportation:

In 1937, our fate changed all of a sudden, having managed to settle down in the Far East after having undergone various obstacles. I was six but I remember clearly what happened. Sometime in July, two Soviet officials dropped by our house and informed us that we were supposed to move to some other region in a
months time without any explanation when and why. … One month later, a truck reached our house to pick up our family. … My great grand father, Em Shin-en who was born in Yöngwol, Kangwon-do, was 82 years old at that time and desperately wished to remain where we used to live in the Far East region hoping to return home and be buried in his hometown. He passed away three months later and was buried somewhere in Kazakhstan. … Most people didn't even arrive in central Asia safely and died in the middle of the relocation. My mother, Nam Sun-hee, at the age of 27, burnt to death in the overcrowded train by falling down into the heater due to severe shaking of the train. My two sisters died within a year of our arrival in central Asia. Only I survived after all (Em: 1991, 40-1).

As the author adds, this kind of story is very common among Koreitsy families although the detailed situation of that day and sentiments are varied. Gelb's description cited from Kim also helps further understanding of the situation:

The Koreans were … crammed into overcrowded, underheated, broken down, filthy freight cars that transported them across the entire continent of Asia. At least one train derailed (near Khabarovsk), killing over a hundred. Those being transported did not even learn their destination until well under way. The victims spent approximately one month in freight cars (not including the difficult journey from railhead to settlement) supplied with only one stove for every forty settlers. … Some died before reaching their new homes, and obscure way-stations of the Trans-Siberian remained the only markers of their graves. We have no statistics, but epidemics alone certainly carried off thousands during or shortly after the trip.

Regarding the detailed political background and process of the Koreitsy relocation project, it was not until 1997 when the Russian government revoked state secrets that official documents listing 60,000 out of 170,000 Koreitsy deported was obtained by some Koreitsy historians. The document contains basic personal backgrounds of the deportees. In the year 2000, the list of 1,000 out of supposedly 2,500 to 3,000 executed Koreiski was obtained by Goryõin organisations, the Sam-il Culture Institute and Goryõin Association. I discovered that personal, familial, collective, or national, no matter what level they may be, regrets and wrath have grown among older generation Koreitsy, in particular, first and second generation. Some older generations of Koreitsy even refuse any kind of interviews for fear of being reminded of such a horrible experience. Some have kept writing on their experiences no matter whether such work can be published or not. Certainly, in the future, their writings will represent diaspora's collective history marking a diapora's boundary as opposed to the Russian and the Uzbek nations as well as the Korean nation.

It has been over 60 years since the Koreitsy were moved to central Asia. Consequently, the first relocated generation has mostly died, and the age of the small number of the first generation survivors, about 5,000 to 6,000, is mostly over 70. Deportation occurred several decades ago, but the expression of collective memory of relocation and oppression developed
rather recently. Writing on collective memories and historical events has been the part of national revival among Korei'tsy. On the brink of the disappearance of Korei'tsy collective pasts, more and more Korei'tsy with various backgrounds have now begun to produce written forms of communication which gradually ensure their distinctive identity.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have explained Korean diasporas' collective identity formed in relation to their host nations. I focused on the notion of exclusivity of citizenship in each host state and its consequences with regard to the formation of a diaspora's identity. This focus was previewed in the second factor of my analytical framework in Chapter 2. The historical events and nature of the events making collective identity salient are varied depending on the case. Yet, the process of moulding a diaspora's collective identity in the three cases commonly demonstrates that the evolution of diaspora's national identity is hardly identical with that of their host nation. This may be explained as the first stage of forming a third type of national identity. So far, my explanations have been limited into the structure of the diaspora-host nation framework. One of the features of a diaspora's national identity under the structure can be analysed as the desire for inclusion whilst retaining distinctiveness. Their identity is collectively salient whenever it is necessary to ensure both the citizenship of the host state and recognition of their own historical and cultural distinctiveness. Maintaining their identity within a group is insufficient to form a stable diaspora identity when their identity is misrecognised by outsiders, especially by the host nation. In this regard, issues of diaspora groups and their identity may not be solely the problem of a diaspora. They are inevitably political. Minority national groups have their intrinsic desire resisting the force of assimilation. Only the aspects and degrees of such desire are dissimilar. Josônjok perceive themselves as a successful group on two grounds: because they have successfully preserved their own identity so far and at the same time, their historical contributions are well recognised by the host government. It is also noticeable that they have begun to perceive themselves as a minority group at stake due to the force of the host state's assimilation. In contrast, the Zainichi's strong collective identity has been more clearly expressive. This is because negotiation over their historical existence vis-à-vis the Japanese nation has not yet concluded. Vis-à-vis the host nation, the Zainichi have cultural and political pressure on their non-existence. Such pressure has nurtured constant Zainichi awareness of being different from and antagonistic to the Japanese nation. Korei'tsy also have kept their collective identity. The imperative components of Korei'tsy identity are their shared historical memory and the pride of successful survival as a group. As demonstrated, the collective will of a diaspora community is not enough for it to be accepted as a political member of their host nation with a stable collective identity. By stable collective identity I mean a positive sense of
belonging to their host nation as a distinctive group accompanied by a voluntary awareness of obligations as citizens to their host state. Nevertheless, such an identity will be developed only when rights to citizens are given by their host states.
5 Boundary for Diaspora Identity

Collectivities of diasporas

Maintaining the boundaries of a collective identity

This chapter explains how the diaspora’s national identity evolves in relation to minority organisations. Functions of diaspora organisations and their relations with host nations have driven diasporas to form a diaspora identity. Diasporas’ way of maintaining identity is reflected in their efforts to maintain their kinds of collective features. The main focus of this chapter is the causal relationship between minority organisations and the formation of a diaspora identity, but such relationship has been continuously shaped in the context of host state’s influence. By analysing the interactions between organisations and diaspora groups, I explain the common dilemma faced by diasporas. The dilemma is fundamentally caused by the incompatibility of exclusive organisations with full inclusion. Well established exclusive minority institutions and organisations may result in a diaspora community’s isolation and segregation. And yet, the opposite may accelerate assimilation and dispersal.

As a generation passes and people become mobile, diaspora identity is more and more understood as one of the numerous identities that one can control and choose under circumstances rather than something that is passively forged and statistically structured. Questions and comparisons of different diasporas come from such various kinds and degrees of collectivities. It is questionable why some diasporas have formed a more legitimately political form of community, such as a republic or autonomous prefecture, whereas others have not. For this reason, I argue that, with the host state policy towards the diaspora community alone, one cannot sufficiently explain the way in which a diaspora’s national identity is moulded. Features of a diaspora’s national identity are reflected on the selected minority organisations and institutions. Simultaneously, such organisations and institutions play a vital role in shaping and reshaping diaspora identity.

Soysal (1994), for example, analyses the types of minority organisations as depending mainly on the host state factor. ‘[T]he organizing principles and incorporation styles of the host polity are crucial variables in accounting for the emerging organizational patterns of migrants’ (85-6). I agree with her view that host states shape the migrants’ organisations ‘by providing (or not) certain resources for and models of organizing’ (86). A host state’s involvement in institutionalising a minority’s identity varies according to a host society’s resources. ‘Some host policies afford explicit channels for the participation and organization of migrant populations’ (ibid.). Her analysis, however, implies that the pattern of institutionalising immigrants’ collective identity is somehow passively defined by the attitudes and policies of host societies.
Her view implies that migrant’s organisations in response to host society’s policy ‘define their goals, strategies, functions, and level of operation in relation to the existing policies and resources of the host state’. Thus, ‘the expression and organization of migrant collective identity are framed by the institutionalized forms of the state’s incorporation regime’ (ibid.). There are different kinds of immigrants. The relationship between a dominant national group and a minority national group is mutual. Soysal’s comparative analysis of minority organisations, in this respect, underestimates particularities of certain minority national groups. By focusing equally on the latter aspect, one understands the diverse patterns of institutionalising collective identity among various national minority groups under the same host state. I add further observations on the consequences of interplay between host states and minority national communities. It sheds light upon a minority national group’s particular way of incorporation as a positive actor of community making.

Diasporas’ perception of who they (diaspora themselves) are is expressed in the origins, major roles, activities, and final goals of minority organisations and institutions. As interpretation of self as a member of a nation could mean not only those within the collectivity but also beyond the collectivity, the principle rule of voluntary membership of minority organisations also outlines a diaspora community. A community is dynamic, thus organisations of a community also change. Organisations are behavioural settings for human interaction and, at the same time, systems of institutionalised incentives governing individual behaviour and socio-cultural contexts in which individuals engage in symbolic interaction. Organisations and individual members continually interact.

**Collectivity of Korean diasporas**

Diasporas’ responses to the host state in general have been ‘conditioned by the available political opportunities, political resources and survival strategies’ (G. Smith: 1999, 96). Korean diasporas do not have a tendency to exploit their cultural dispositions as a political tool to maximise their collective interests. Instead, Korean diasporas have internalised national tensions in an adaptive way. Their internal struggle has long been concealed; Hicks (1997) defines Zainichi as ‘hidden apartheid’. To be accepted as a citizen in host societies, other national features are at times regarded as obstacles. More often than not, national identity as minority is viewed as something that should be overcome for the sake of unity and the security of the host state.

By boundaries for diaspora identity, I mean certain visible collective forms originated in host societies and primarily concerning the matters related to Korean diasporas and while are more or less exclusive. Minority institutions and organisations reflect the Korean diasporas’ efforts to maintain their own identity and compromise for material survival. It is questionable
why, under similar circumstances and financial situation, the Tibetans in China, for instance, would build temples, people in Xinjiang allow a greater budget for weapons and Josŏnjok nationalists put their energy into setting up a university. In the same way, why have the Burakumin been living in isolated areas whereas the Zainichi have made much more public fuss and built up large politically-oriented minority organisations? Why and how could Korean kolkhozes in post-Soviet central Asia manage to grow rice and make a good living whereas Uzbek or Kazakh locals had to grow cotton which is not as profitable as rice?

A collective identity is difficult to analyse when a group lacks active expression through collective actions such as nationalist movements. A collective identity crystallises a social identity, both individual and group identity, into the form of an action. Brewer’s (2001) distinction between social identities and collective identities is noteworthy in understanding national identity as one of the numerous collective identities. Collective identity is linked to social movements. Like group-based social identities, collective identity involves shared representations of the group that are based on common interests and experiences, but it also refers to an active process of shaping and forging an image of what the group stands for and how it wishes to be viewed by others. In this regard, ‘collective identities represent an achievement of collective efforts, above and beyond what category members have in common to begin with’. The concept of collective identity provides ‘a crucial link between social identity, at both individual and group levels, and collective action in the political arena’. Nevertheless, unless one clarifies what is meant by an active process of shaping and forging an image of a group, the distinction between social identity and collective identity is not convincing. There are numerous ways of being active in shaping an image of a group without developing social identity into a collective action. As a result, it does not seem feasible to distinguish social identity from a collective or political identity when the borderline between social identity and collective identity is drawn within the same group. National identity is a group-based social identity that can be transformed into collective action followed by some kind of movements but national identity can also remain a social identity which is, however, not static in itself.

It is not always clear, what we mean by being active. It would not be so safe to conclude that, because there have not been any serious politically-oriented conflicts or separatist movements that diaspora groups are passive in achieving collective ends or lack of collectivity in the end. For some diasporas, active interpretation of national cultures through non-conflict and the decision to remain seemingly passive cooperators are in fact a rationally chosen way of struggling for identity. Minority national organisations, namely Yŏnbyŏn University, Korean kolkhozes and the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan (Choryŏn) and the Association of Koreans in Japan (Mindan) are voluntarily drawn and accumulated collectivities securing a diaspora’s identity, which is neither necessarily a Korean identity nor a Chinese, Japanese or Uzbek identity. There is no organisation without a collection of individuals and yet
organizations are not merely collections of individuals’ as one can see ‘some collections of people constitute organizations and others do not’ (Argyris and Schon: ibid., 8). The various forms of diaspora organisations suggest the persistent pattern of diasporas’ search for a collective identity.

**Making diasporic space: collective responses in the political context**

In China, one can hardly expect minority political organisations such as Choryŏn and Mindan, although the Josŏnjok and the Koreitsy not only had greater political influence from their motherland but were also deeply involved in political affairs. In Japan, such a large scale officially recognised university exclusively for a minority national group, such as Yŏnbyŏn University, would have been most unlikely to be developed. In the same vein, the means of securing a collective identity among other national minorities in China were not quite the same as with the choice of the Josŏnjok. Similarly, other national minorities or indigenous people in Japan, such as Ainu, and South East Asian immigrants have not taken similar paths to preserve their identity as the Zainichi community has done.

In the case of Japan, politically-oriented minority organisations were allowed to be active because Japan is regarded as a politically liberal state. Nonetheless, flourishing minority organisations do not necessarily mean that mainstream political society is open to minority nationalities. Zainichi organisations in Japan have been seen as a convenient arrangement of political segregation. Since Japan is one of the countries that conflate culture and politics, as I have discussed in Chapter 4, such political segregation is obvious. Being officially liberal towards the political actions of minorities within a legal boundary in this sense does not automatically imply inclusion of minorities into the mainstream political field. Japanese policies towards minority ethnic or national groups have consistently promoted segregation except in the colonial period when Japan attempted the complete assimilation of other national minorities by force, in particular the Taiwanese and Koreans. The idea behind assimilation is rested on the ideology of ‘one nation-one state’.

The former Soviet Union unintentionally provided a breathing space to the Koreitsy through collectivisation. Throughout their history of immigration the Koreitsy had been perceived as an economic means. Although there were beneficial aspects for Koreitsy farmers, the Soviet policy toward them -dispersal, oppression and isolation- has left negative memories for the Koreitsy. Their relative economic success within the given space does not mean that Soviet policy offered economic autonomy to minority national groups. Rather, particular skills of minority national groups have been rationally used. In the end, the Koreitsy became known as a relatively well-off minority national group in central Asia.
In the case of China, it is true that a great deal of autonomy is given to minority national groups. I view the Chinese case as positive discrimination at the cultural and social levels, especially regarding China's differentiated policies regarding minority education, birth control, local languages and minority groups' customs and lifestyles. It is also true that due to the geographical character of China, such social and cultural autonomy as is allowed to minority national groups has been the crucial factor, hampering full inclusion of minorities in mainstream societies. As a consequence, many minority national communities have remained in isolation in the remote borders of Chinese territory with a few exceptions of certain minority groups who voluntarily assimilated into Han-Chinese, including the Manchus for example. Isolation is different from intentional exclusion. Active and positive discrimination has resulted in isolation. Assimilation policy could be a positive attempt at full inclusion and not necessarily discrimination against different nationalities. Rather, assimilation can be seen as (negative) indiscrimination to people who should be seen and treated differently in some aspects of their lives as I discussed in Chapter 2.

The following sections explain why the opted minority organisations or institutions in each case are the expression of a diaspora's national identity and in what way the particular organisations and institution reflect the commonality as the common denominator of the comparison of Korean diasporas. Table 5.1 below shows the certain affinity between Korean diasporas' nationality and the forms of collectivity reflected in minority organisations and institutions.

Table 5.1 Comparisons of the interactions between diaspora and host state

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<th>Comparisons of the interactions of diaspora-host state relations</th>
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<td><strong>Official policy</strong></td>
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<td>China</td>
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In the later period, after the 1980s, however, the above described tendency has gradually turned towards less emphasis on collectivity than before in the cases of the Josonjok and the Zainichi. Such change is the response to apprehension of being isolated and left aside in the remote region in the Josonjok case. In the Zainichi case, on the other hand, such change was motivated by reformist movements against negative functions and structural problems of existing organisations. On the contrary, the Koreitsy community has gradually moved towards the search for a more visible collectivity.
Maximising autonomy

Nationalist activists, Josōnjok autonomous government and Yŏnbyŏn University

It may be considered as an obvious outcome for the Josōnjok to have a large-scale national university considering that China allows cultural autonomy to minority national groups. Although there is flexibility in the Chinese policy towards different minority national groups, cultural autonomy is the main principle of China's policy towards minority national groups. The Yŏnbyŏn Josōnjok University has been the centre of reproducing Josōnjok identity. However, it has generated the fear of isolation from the mainstream society by helping the Josōnjok community to be highly self-sufficient. Yŏnbyŏn University has provided such a mechanism of preserving and reproducing the Josōnjok identity. As the Josōnjok society is rapidly changing, the university itself has been reshuffled in many ways including the proportion of Josōnjok students, values of national education and government funding.

In a way, Yŏnbyŏn University was an outcome of Josōnjok's compromise with Chinese government. The most crucial elements what comprise Josōnjok identity are their pride in educational achievements and the maintenance of their national culture, especially language. This is closely related to the policy of cultural autonomy given by the Chinese government as enumerated in Article 119 of the Constitution. Compared with the Josōnjok community in other cases or with other national minority groups in China, the amount of Josōnjok intellectuals' written work including academic writings and literature demonstrates the Josōnjoks' emphasis on educational and cultural development.

Article 119, Section 4 of the Constitution of the People's Republic of China

The organs of self-government of the national autonomous areas independently administer educational, scientific, cultural, public health and physical culture affairs in their respective areas, protect and sift through the cultural heritage of the nationalities and work for a vigorous development of their cultures.

One of the important sources for the Josōnjok loyalty towards China is based on appreciation of being allowed to keep their own customs and develop cultures in their own way. The Josōnjok believe it was only possible for them to preserve their language and customs because the present Josōnjok region was incorporated into China. A Josōnjok writer, Hyun Lyong Soon (1994), for example, mentions: 'The attempt to found a Josŏn college of education was cancelled in the Soviet Union and the Josŏn University in Tokyo is not an officially recognised educational institution. Only Josŏnjok in China could develop a national university with government support. This is the obvious result of the superiority of China's policy towards national minorities' (496). Similarly, a Josŏnjok professor from the department of language in
Yŏnbyŏn University paid great respect to the Chinese government. His comparison is with the period of Japanese occupation during which the Korean language was strictly banned and Korean schools were forcibly shut. As the most recent statistics, provided by the local government, in 1998, show the total number of registered students in Yŏnbyŏn University is 8,461, with as many as 1,503 teaching staff.

Josŏnjok enthusiasm for the university stems mainly from two historical reasons. Firstly, early Korean nationalist activists who have been respected by local people, such as Chu Duk Hae, Im Min Ho, Park Kyu Chan, Bae Keuk, Lim Yu Hoon, Park Yui Hoon, Kim Moon Bo and Jeong Hak, were the founders of the institution. Secondly, as I mentioned earlier, people remember the historical memory of the Cultural Revolution during which all local national minority schools had to be closed. Since the university has a symbolic implication of national survival for ordinary Josŏnjok people, the closure of the university directly meant suppression of the Josŏnjok. During this period, Im Min Ho was beaten to death and Chu Duk Hae could not recover from illness caused by severe torture. These are only a few of the numerous cases.

Although it was understood that such an experience was not only that of the Josŏnjok, they considered that the Josŏnjok were more severely oppressed, being regarded as one of the enemies of the revolutionaries not only due to the higher ratio of intellectuals but also due to the geopolitical situation. Chun Shin Chul (1999) recalls that due to the particular situation of the Josŏnjok, the Josŏnjok were more oppressed. During the Cultural Revolution, many Josŏnjok were sentenced to death, being erroneously accused as foreign spies especially during so called class arrangement; as many as 175 Josŏnjok cadres, local officials, and policemen were accused as foreign special spies. The number amounted to 70 per cent of the total Josŏnjok who were engaged in the public sector on various levels. During this period, minority national education, language, customs were severely oppressed. It was this period when Josŏnjok schools gradually became mixed with the Han Chinese.

Yŏnbyŏn University was founded in 1949 in Yanji city before the communist revolution. In Ryongjŏng city, meanwhile, the first college of agriculture, S'aeb'yŏk Nongmin University, was established in 1958. In the meeting for national affairs at the province level, Jilin, in 1949, Chu Duk Hae, one of the major founders, insisted on the implementation of a national autonomous governing system in Yanbian where the Josŏnjok population was concentrated. There were harsh disagreements among Josŏnjok leaders. Some, such as Im Min Ho, insisted on the establishing of a federal form of an independent republic of Josŏnjok and others such as Im Choon Ho persisted on the incorporation of Yanbian into Korea. Chu argued that it had been over 100 years since the Josŏnjok settled in China and while having cultivated the barren lands and fought against Japanese colonisation together with the Han Chinese, Josŏnjok had become a minority national group in China already. National autonomous governing under the Chinese party was the only way a Josŏnjok society could flourish. Other
suggestions, he thought, were not reasonable considering the political trends and reality of China at that time. Chu believed that achieving such an arrangement as a minority national's autonomous region was the best way to enjoy political equality and achieve economic development while securing some room for preserving national culture. He believed that the best model for a multinational society is gradually diminishing the differences between various national groups after providing sufficient time and opportunities to develop differences among nationalities rather than merely oppressing and assimilating minority ethnic or national groups.

Finally, Chu Duk Hae's idea was officially supported by China's government. As soon as his idea was agreed, Chu turned his efforts to founding a Josŏnjok university by urging nationalist-minded Josŏnjok leaders to participate in the educational project. Young, educated Josŏnjok who had left the region during Japanese colonisation for inner China or Japan for the purposes of further study or participating in the independence movement, came back to Yanbian to contribute to developing their hometown. They came to devote themselves to the building of the Josŏnjok University when, immediately after emancipation of Korea from Japan, they did not have a concrete idea of how to use their nationalistic spirit. Ultimately, Chu's compromise with the Chinese government was to secure further autonomy through agreement to the establishment of the Yanbian autonomous government. It is not too difficult to believe that China would not have supported the extremists' proposal of incorporating the region into North Korea. Local government concerns the welfare of region whereas Yŏnbyŏn University concerns the Josŏnjok collectivity and identity.

The history of the university reflects the changes in Josŏnjok society. During the earlier period, after its foundation in the 1950s until the mid-1960s, the university used to maintain nationalist spirit to a deeper degree than later as the period came immediately after the decolonisation of their motherland and the Chinese government supported and encouraged such an anticolonial nationalist spirit. From the mid-1960s until the late 1970s, however, the Yŏnbyŏn University was severely targeted as an anti revolutionary institute. Ever since, the university has become more and more symbolic, as much Korean nationality among the Josŏnjok becomes symbolic. Josŏnjok intellectuals express the belief that the Yanbian autonomous government is in name only. Official explanation is that this is because the autonomous government is a regional autonomous government rather than a national one. In relation to an interview question dealing with China's general policy toward minority national groups, Josŏnjok have expressed deep concerns of a warning sign sent by China to the Josŏnjok region. 'In subtle ways, China delays or hampers the further relationship between Josŏnjok society and South Korea. Besides, the number of Josŏnjok officials in Yanbian is obviously decreasing since late 1989'.

Also, 'government policy is to incorporate other cities where Han Chinese is the dominant population to Yanbian with justification of broadening and developing the Josŏnjok
region. For instance, Dongwha, where the Han Chinese population is over 80 per cent, was included in the Yanbian Josŏn'gok autonomous prefecture in early 1990. Such a policy accelerates the decrease of the Josŏn'gok population in this region. Autonomy is only nominal these days', according to an interview with a researcher. Nonetheless, the notable point is that the Josŏn'gok believe that such changes in Chinese policy are things that they can or should challenge, and that they are natural from China's point of view. This is because, as mentioned previously, Josŏn'gok are aware that they are not Chinese and that they are not living in their own state. In accordance with the changes in government policy, the Josŏn'gok positively adapt themselves to such changes. This Josŏn'gok attitude also supports my argument that their kind of collective identity is neither a Chinese national identity nor a Korean national identity. Evidently, the prototype of such an identity was a national identity as a Korean but their identity has always been heavily influenced by Chinese society. For this reason, it can be said that the Josŏn'gok have developed their own kind of national identity. Having opinions against host government policies or developing a sentiment of being excluded may not directly prove the presence of national identity. However, the Josŏn'gok case is rather particular in the sense that the regional boundary is nearly congruent with national one.

Most interviewees point out that Josŏn'gok officials in local government are voluntarily, and sometimes unnecessarily, obedient and excessively cooperative with the Party. 'We don’t enjoy even a limited degree of autonomy because of the local Josŏn'gok officials' voluntary obedience. A nationalist leader who can advocate Josŏn'gok’s interests does not exist in our society', as a Josŏn'gok professor adds. 'The head of the local government gives public speeches in the Chinese language whereas in other autonomous prefectures, their own local languages are used in public and official communication', as another interviewee shows her regret. 'The young generation does not perceive the local government as the centre of Josŏn'gok society any longer. It has remained merely as propaganda of the Chinese benevolent policy towards minority national groups'.

More and more, the educated younger generation Josŏn'gok prefer to have jobs in big cities rather than to stay in the Josŏn'gok region in spite of the government’s support of a minority educational institute which supposedly encourages minority national groups autonomy. Under the strict communist planned economic policy, minority national groups were encouraged to go to local educational institutions. Afterwards, they were appointed in work units of their own areas. The Josŏn'gok have rapidly taken the opportunity to work and study in big cities in China, South Korea, Japan and other foreign countries. One tenth of the total Josŏn'gok population had left the region for various reasons by the year 2000. The Josŏn'gok intellectuals' claim that the decreasing number of high level Josŏn'gok local officials in Yanbian (Table 5.2) shows this trend.
Table 5.2 The rate of Josŏnjok cadres in Yanbian

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Hanjok</th>
<th>Josŏnjok</th>
<th>Percentage of Josŏnjok</th>
<th>Percentage of Josŏnjok in Yanbian</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>1710</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>2530</td>
<td>3080</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>16370</td>
<td>25500</td>
<td>59.5%</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>26370</td>
<td>27646</td>
<td>51.6%</td>
<td>40.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>65192</td>
<td>58100</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>39.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from Kim, Jong Kuk 21s'aegiŭi Josŏnjok (Yanbian: minjokchulpansa, 1999) 66.

As can be seen from table 5.2, the rate of Josŏnjok local officials has dropped. As in the case of Yanbian, in 1952, the ratio is 12 per cent above the total population rate; in 1985, 10.5 per cent above; but in 1995, only 2.5 per cent above the total percentage of population. The number of Han Chinese officials has steadily increased from 550 in 1952 to 65,192 in 1992 (a rate of 12.7 per cent), whereas in the Josŏnjok case it is 9.2 per cent. This is also the case in local government positions in the Heilyongjiang province. The ratio of Josŏnjok officials is steadily decreasing.

During interview and in his book, Kim Jong Kuk (1999) rightly points out that the Josŏnjok intellectuals’ over-representation in cultural and educational sectors is the reason for the decreasing number of Josŏnjok officials in public sectors in Yanbian. This shows that the Josŏnjok are exceptionally tied to their traditional heritage. Dissimilar to other ethnic or national minority regions in China, even after the Cultural Revolution, Josŏnjok society maintains traditional Confucian value systems. Kim Jong Kuk views this negatively on the ground that such Josŏnjok traditional value is one of the major reasons for Josŏnjok society’s slower response to China’s economic and political changes. Kim’s analysis goes on as follows:

Josŏnjok used to have more autonomy than now. The ratio between four major fields, namely, power in the Party, politics, finance, and culture and education, in which Josŏnjok cadres participated, becomes more disproportionate. The number of Josŏnjok cadres in the field of culture and education has gradually increased and now they are outnumbered. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the eastern communist bloc in 1989, China has deprived local power from politics and Party, thus it is impossible for minorities to enhance power in politics. However, such a change is not exceptional to the Josŏnjok’s case. To survive the market economy mechanism, more intellectuals should be encouraged to participate in the economic field rather than in culture. Educated Josŏnjok still keep the traditional value system too strictly. Approximately seventy per cent of Josŏnjok cadres are involved in fields which are related to culture and education, such as professors, teachers and researchers. Economic power in this region is naturally moving toward Hanjok’s hands. Among other nationalities, Josŏnjok enthusiasm for culture and education is reflected in their vigorous publication activities. Today, there are twelve different Josŏnjok newspapers and twenty-one magazines and periodicals published in the Korean language, which is above the average compared with other ethnic or national minority societies.
In relation to his concerns on the weakening power of the Josŏnjok, Kim mentions that in order to achieve the goal of training national leaders in Josŏnjok society and to enhance our autonomy, we need to learn from other autonomous prefectures such as Xinjiang and Tibet. He positively views the way of rebellious groups' responses to China's policy. The only aspect in which minority national groups could employ their full autonomy in China is by participating in culture and education as this has been the safest way to survive. In the end, Korean is the language of culture and the arts, whereas Chinese is the language of science, politics and the state. The Josŏnjok exceptional enthusiasm for education also supports this argument.

When speaking of Josŏnjok confidence in their educational achievements, achievements here mean relative terms compared with the other fifty-five officially recognised nationalities in China. An academic article by a Josŏnjok scholar demonstrates that the ratio of college graduates among the Josŏnjok is three times higher than China's national average and that of high school graduates is 3.8 times higher. Also, the rate of illiteracy is the lowest among minority national or ethnic groups and far lower than the overall average of China. It is estimated that about 82 per cent of the total population of Josŏnjok are above elementary education compared with the China's national average of around 70 per cent and 71 per cent of Han Chinese. Among the population aged above 15 years old, the illiteracy rate of Josŏnjok is 7 per cent, which is far lower than the China's national average rate of 22 per cent, around 31 per cent of minorities and around 22 per cent of Han Chinese. Such educational performance among the Josŏnjok was the case not only in Yanbian in Jilin but also in other cities such as the Heilongjiang region where the ratio of multinational mixture is higher.

In this way, maintenance of the Josŏnjok identity has meant preserving their language and history through education. Yŏnbyŏn University was the essential centre for satisfying Josŏnjok enthusiasm for cultural maintenance. Intellectual activities have been organised around Yŏnbyŏn University. It was not only a mere reflection of Josŏnjok identity. Simultaneously, it nurtures the Josŏnjok identity in the sense that it has been a relatively independent sphere where the Josŏnjoks' own issues and collective visions are legitimately produced through public discussions and publication activities. This is also true in other Josŏnjok towns and counties in the three north-east provinces.

Recently, however, Josŏnjok intellectuals have been concerned that the community is becoming more and more isolated, and thus stagnating. Recent debates on the future of Yŏnbyŏn University reflect this. Jeong (1997) mentions the recent prevalent scepticism about the advantages of preserving an exclusive national minority university in such a period of globalisation. However, he puts emphasis on the historical development of Yŏnbyŏn University. Around the time of its foundation in April 1949, the Yŏnbyŏn University was funded by the collection of a handful of rice from every Josŏnjok farmer even in the midst of the political chaos in China (28 and 287). The foundation and development of Yŏnbyŏn University was a
great achievement not only for the sake of Josŏnjok identity but also the overall development of Josŏnjok society (286). Conservative thinkers, including Jeong himself, generally maintain that it is essential to keep the Josŏnjok historical lands because the territory and population are the substantial markers of a distinctive group. In contrast, rather progressive young intellectuals tend to believe that with their special attachment to the territory, the Josŏnjok only worsen their isolation, and the ‘Josŏnjok community will provide a mere tourist attraction like aboriginal areas in New Zealand’.15

Yŏnbyŏn University has produced as many as 20,000 professionals in all fields who now occupy leading positions in Josŏnjok society and other parts of China. As Jeong emphasises on the meaning of protecting Yŏnbyŏn University, preserving a national university abroad is not an easy task. Recent changes in China have threatened the possibility of maintaining such a sizable minority’s educational system. Due to the development of market economy and population policy, in certain Josŏnjok areas, minority national educational institutions have faced serious crises. The direct causes are the rapid disappearance of Josŏnjok towns and counties due to the recent migration tendency. Although some social organisations are eager to preserve Josŏnjok education, without sufficient funding from outside, it seems infeasible to preserve Josŏnjok’s exclusive education. Also, such changes have subsequently lower the quality of education due to the shortage of textbooks along with other school devices and Josŏnjok students’ extra burden to learn subjects in both languages, Korean and Chinese, and another foreign language.

Under such circumstances, it is only natural that the performance of Josŏnjok students on state level entrance exams decreased. This situation continues to university level. In Yŏnbyŏn University, Chinese books and language have gradually taken the place of Korean. This is due to the increasing number of Han Chinese students and academic staff. Obviously, without exclusive Josŏnjok education, it is not feasible for Koreans abroad to preserve national features for future generations. As Rho Hak Hae points out, in spite of the Josŏnjoks’ strong belief in the necessity of their own national education through Yŏnbyŏn University, due to its geographical disadvantage there is always the risk of isolation. The mechanism of Josŏnjok society is built around the university in a self-sufficient way by encouraging Josŏnjok education and guaranteeing life-time jobs afterwards. Consequently, Josŏnjok identity has been highly confined to the narrow circle of life which has kept them from mingling with mainstream society. Due to a government designation under the strict communist planned economy until 1990, most Yŏnbyŏn University graduates were appointed to local work units such as the local newspaper, broadcasting companies, the public sector and national educational institutions. Since 1992, however, Josŏnjok university graduates have preferred to leave the region for the better salaries and opportunities in cities. Josŏnjok public concerns and debates over the issue of
maintaining their exclusive educational system have mirrored the gradual transformation of the community itself.

Language maintenance and recording history

The language policy has been viewed the most benevolent among China’s preferential cultural policies. Minority ethnic or national groups in China speak over 80 languages,\(^{16}\) of which 30 have written forms.\(^{17}\) There exist a hierarchy within minority languages framed by the government. According to Dreyer’s (1998) study, there are five different ranks: the national standard, Mandarin Chinese; regional standard languages (that is, regional varieties of Mandarin Chinese, Yi, Mongolian, Tibetan and Uygur); primary minority languages with historical and/or modern prestige which include Qazaq, Korean, Manchu, Zhuang, Naxi, and non-standard Chinese dialects; secondary minority languages remaining low-prestige, usually unwritten languages, such as Evenki, Salar, Va; unrecognised languages meaning unclassified mixed languages which include Wutun, Aynu and Wakhi.\(^{18}\)

The language policy reflects China’s way of considering minority ethnic and national groups. Yahuda (2000) sees that China’s policy has been consistently assimilationist throughout its history since Sun Yat-sen’s political agenda. Yahuda goes back to ancient China to argue that Chinese attitudes towards minorities is rested on Han Chinese chauvinism and racial nationalism applying a clear distinction between outsiders as uncivilised barbarians, and insiders, who understand and share the great Confucian civilisation. Yahuda somehow overlooks the period of modern Chinese nation-building during Mao and Deng. Communist China since 1949 is the essential historical period during which the present relationship between Han Chinese and non-Han Chinese was framed.\(^{19}\) Among China’s anthropologists, amalgamation (ronghe) as the next stage of accommodation rather than assimilation (tonghua) is viewed as an ideal final goal of relations among different ethnic and national groups. Those terms, however, are not always so explicit to distinguish. Assimilation involves one side’s incorporation into the other’s sphere and, at the same time, it requires the destruction of differences in favour of similarity. By contrast, amalgamation, in this context, involves more natural communications for a fairly long period of time and aims to form a third type of identity, which is neither of the previous forms by influencing one another. Accommodation implies a partial maintenance, allowing cultural autonomy including language, customs and religion in China’s case, and a transitory character prior to amalgamation. During the stage of accommodation, various cultural features co-exist with the dominant one but no forced assimilation is attempted unless it develops into political independence which is violating the other framework, the One China Policy. As much as ethnic pluralism in liberal states is political rhetoric, amalgamation is socialist rhetoric. It is difficult to deny that most states somehow share the view in efficiency of being congruency between
political and cultural boundaries, and share the fear of secession. It seems to be less feasible for China's minority ethnic or national groups to resist dissolving their identity into Han Chinese, not only because of high degree of centralised political power and the size of the population, but also because of cultural heritage and historical influence.

In the case of the Josŏnjok, the amalgamation rhetoric resulted in isolation from the rest of the world. I argue that none of the terms describing ethnic relations are unilateral and not all the minority national or ethnic groups in China are left in isolation. The Josŏnjok have been forming a distinctive identity but it is not necessarily what the goal of amalgamation is searching for on the ground that no other groups share the Josŏnjok identity. For that reason, the Josŏnjok would never identify themselves with Han Chinese, although they do not have any problem with identifying themselves as Chinese citizens (公民). Most Josŏnjok people who I met prefer to make it clear, saying that 'I'm Josŏnjok in China. I'm not Chinese (中国人) but I'm a Chinese citizen (中国公民)'. Josŏnjok are clear in distinguishing civic identity from their own collective identity as in the Koreitsy case. This makes a good contrast with the Zainichi. Zainichi have the pressure of fitting themselves into either Japanese or Korean both in cultural and political terms. Minority nationality (族籍) is inscribed in everyone's identification card and passport in China.

For the Josŏnjok, language stands as one of the most important components of collectivity. This is more so than in the other two cases. 'The tension between maintaining at least symbolic attachment to its own language, and the practical employment of other languages, leads diaspora members to acquire unusually strong linguistic skills' (Armstrong: 1976, 396). Language is widely acknowledged as a barometer by which one can judge the strength of their own collective identity. However, the inability of commanding the Korean language among diasporas does not safely lead to a conclusion that either they are losing their own identity or they are culturally assimilated. There are a number of fifth or sixth generations Josŏnjok who speak the Korean language fluently but confidently say they are Chinese. In the same way, some others are reluctant to identify themselves as Chinese without speaking the Korean language.

It is also true, however, that diasporas' concern regarding the general decline of emphasis on the Korean language reflects diaspora Koreans' identity as being between national maintenance and adopting 'high culture', in Gellner's (1983) concept, is reflected in their public debates over language usage. More and more Josŏnjok children are sent to Han Chinese schools. 'Speaking two languages perfectly is not always feasible for ordinary people. Jonsŏnjok who went to Jonsŏnjok schools are not able to speak Chinese as fluently as those who were educated in Han Chinese schools. They naturally face difficulties when competing with Han Chinese outside this region'. Such resistance to and fear of cultural assimilation force are not necessarily caused by a state policy but by other external such as globalisation, industrialisation and urbanisation, which is pertinently expressed in Bilik's (1998) observation 'facing a double challenge of westernization and Sinicization' (61), which exists not only in the case of the
Josŏnjok. Deep concerns of minority national groups in China caused by the dilemma between
the maintenance of their own cultural identity and adopting high culture have developed in other
minority regions as well.21

It is estimated that around 60 to 70 per cent of Josŏnjok can communicate in the Korean
language. Regardless of generation, this rate does not decrease overall because of increased
interactions with the South Korean motherland. By nationality law, minority national groups
have the right to use their own languages in public life including school, media, publications,
official meetings, and courts; however, only the above mentioned five minority languages are
included as official languages which have the right to have official government publications
translated into them. Public debates on preserving Josŏn-mal, spoken Korean, and Josŏn-gul,
written Korean, among Josŏnjok intellectuals illustrate how much the Korean language means to
them. Since the end of the Cultural Revolution in 1978, usage of minority languages in national
education has been re-stressed. Since then, however, the public discourse on language and
education has gradually reflected the Josŏnjoks' threatening posture of losing their collective
features concerning language, literature and exclusive education.

A letter from a reader of Heilyongjiang newspaper reflects such concerns:

It is extremely disappointing to come across the truth that six Josŏnjok out of
twenty-six in a work unit in Yanji city cannot read or even speak Korean. Since
China and the Josŏnjok region are opened to outside world, the importance of the
Korean language ability in the Josŏnjok region has been emphasised more. Even
some Han Chinese in the Josŏnjok region are interested in learning the Korean
language ... We cannot expect a promising future from a national group which
fails to preserve its own language ... When people from the outside value our
strong will to keep our own language, I feel really proud.22

Recent debates among intellectuals on ways of writing the Korean language also reflect
that the society has developed insecurity in language maintenance. ‘To adopt a South Korean
way of writing our language, and mixing it with Chinese letters, may jeopardise our identity.
South Koreans would never struggle with keeping their own language because they have their
independent state. The Josŏnjok case is different. Once we begin to adopt mixed usage of
Chinese characters with the Korean language, it will be even more difficult to keep our
language’.23 The language skill of diasporas echoes Armstrong’s observation of the transferable
skills of diaspora people. ‘[T]he diasporas’ communication skills have been especially prized by
dominant elites who rarely possess either the multilingual ability or the more subtle
understanding of diverse communication patterns required to deal effectively with a multiethnic
population’ (1976, 397). Having a language is neither particular to this case nor essential for a
national identity. A notable fact, however, is that forming or preserving a collective identity
shows an awareness of being a distinguishable group as opposed to other nations. In the
Josŏnjok case, such other nations refer to the Han Chinese and the Korean nation. The search
for a national identity vis-à-vis the Han Chinese national identity has been constant to the present time among Koreans including today’s Josŏnjon. Education and oppressive history have consolidated the Josŏnjon national identity around the Hangul. Interviewee Pak’s remark also shows a linguistic identity: ‘As long as we have our own motherland nearby Jonsŏnjon community, we will not be assimilated with Han Chinese so helplessly like Manchurians. A Manchurian classmate with whom I studied when I was an exchange student in Shanghai could not even read Manchurian characters ... And, I believe that assimilation happens only when the minority nation is spiritually inferior to the dominant nation’.

Major Jonsŏnjon literature written in their own language dealing with national identity well reflects their will to maintain language as an important collective feature. Popular literature is more than just part of the arts in a society where direct expressions of intellectuals’ social discontents are not welcomed. As censorship developed at the same time during such an oppressive period of history, writers’ ways of participating in reality through their literature adds subtlety. ‘[F]iction - especially those works that enjoy mass popularity over time - taps into a deeper, sometimes truer understanding about a subject than that allowed by the constraints of social science’ (Ling, in Lensu and Fritz: 2000, 132). Apart from the well-known fictional works containing the historical background of Koreans in the Manjuguk era, such as Sŏlya and Bukgando, there are numerous fictions and poems dealing with collective experience and sentiments.

Jeong (1997) recalls a tragic event during the period of the Cultural Revolution. The name of the Jonsŏnjon university, Yŏnbyŏn University, was itself under severe criticism by the Red Army because the revolutionaries believed it was named after the particular region, and thus naturally reflected national separatism. Teaching in the Korean language was banned and Han Chinese staff joined the university. More and more Han Chinese students were encouraged to enter the university and, consequently, Jonsŏnjon staff who were not as fluent in Chinese as the Han Chinese had to leave. In the middle of the Revolution, Jonsŏnjon professors were accused of promoting so-called prevailing revisionist academic ideas by the Committee of the Revolution. A professor Choi Yun Gap, in his Korean language class, merely explained the origins of the vernacular language created by King Se-jong with scholars’ support. After that, certain students accused him of the fore-mentioned crime on the grounds that history can be created only by the people, ryanmin. The committee’s argument was that as with Chinese, language is an outcome which is formed by ordinary people following the process of historical development. If the Korean language is created as a typical symbol of a feudal ruler like King Se-jong, using such a language reflects a trite form of traditionalism and it is destined to be abolished. In fact, these kinds of happenings were occurring in every minority region in China at that time. It is clear, however, that such cultural oppression of a minority national group such as the Jonsŏnjon, who had maintained strong attachments to their language for historical reasons, might well be more
traumatic. Preserving a minority’s language and the rapid adaptation of the official language reflects the tensions and dilemmas of Josŏnjok aspiring to cultural maintenance and full integration simultaneously. Switching linguistic skills depending on circumstances is a crucial part of forming a diaspora identity.

It is one of the common dilemmas among all types of minority ethnic or national groups including diasporas that higher degrees of cultural and historical maintenance often cause isolation or segregation, hampering positive interactions with the host society. I described Yŏnbyŏn Josŏnjok University as a symbolic centre of the Josŏnjoks’ collective identity on the ground that it has been the largest institute representing Josŏnjok collectivity. As identity is not static, the university itself has been transformed, taking different forms. Such transformations in turn reflect the changes of values, views, and visions of the Josŏnjok. Josŏnjok collective identity has been relatively well maintained partly because they have had a collective will to do. Also, this is because Chinese policy encouraged minority national groups to institutionalise their collective features, and yet such institutionalisation of collectivity, at the same time, demonstrates the Josŏnjok’s particular manner of responding to host state.

Political dynamics of Zainichi identity

Fukuoka’s (2000) research on the Zainichi identity is noteworthy in the sense that it is an attempt to overcome the erroneous common belief that the Zainichi population has been perceived as highly assimilated into Japanese society without any serious conflicts. In this respect, Fukuoka’s paradigm of grouping the Zainichi is useful to understand various levels of Zainichi identity. According to the various degrees of their national allegiance, he suggests four different types of identity: pluralist type pursuing mutual cooperation, nationalist type living life as a foreign national, individualist type pursuing success in society using one’s ability, and assimilationist type becoming a Japanese citizen. Nevertheless, the individualist type would induce academic interests more from a psychologist rather than a political scientist. In this regard, I focus more on the groups who express their national identity outwardly. As my research is not to quantify how many people within the community regard themselves as Korean or Japanese, I focus more on the contents and background of a collective identity represented by people who are somehow aware of a national identity. Whether the rest who do not have the advantages of expressing themselves would share such an identity is (should be) an individual choice in the case of diaspora identity.

I share Fukuoka’s view regarding the issue of assimilation. Fukuoka correctly states that the Zainichi’s internalised psychological conflicts have long been concealed and misinterpreted. He disagrees with general perceptions in Japan of the younger generation Zainichi who are considered as being highly assimilated into Japanese society on various levels. Although his
efforts of scientific approach to the highly discursive issues exhibit some methodological
difficulties, his interview texts and analyses help to discover relatively overlooked aspects of
Zainichi identity. In a sense, the researched identity under Fukuoka’s work is represented among
the most under-expressed generation. Their expression of identity was conveyed in the Japanese
language and they were interviewed by a Japanese researcher. Consequently, the findings from
numerous interviews have led Fukuoka to ask the final question: how to incorporate the ever-
struggling Zainichi identity into Japanese society. The underlying assumption of Fukuoka’s
work is that in spite of Zainichi aspiration to become Japanese and to be regarded as completely
Japanese, their aspiration is ignored or unaccepted by Japanese society. His broad question
emerges from his disagreements on the common view among Japanese that the younger Zainichi
are already highly assimilated, thus, problems are by and large solved. And, the older Zainichi
cannot be accepted into Japanese society due to their inseparable political loyalty either to South
Korea or to North Korea. His methods limit generalisation of Zainichi identity as a collective
identity. On the one hand, diaspora identity as an accumulation of diverse individuals is well
expressed, and, on the other, diaspora identity as a kind of collective identity is disregarded
while overlooking the multiple layers and dimensions of identity; that is, Zainichi identity as a
part of the Korean nation and simultaneously as an individual Japanese citizen. For that reason,
in this chapter, I focus more on the Zainichi as a group and the Zainichi identity as a collective
identity.

As mentioned earlier, changes in the Zainichi community can be explained by dividing
into four pre-eminent periods: firstly, the period under the American military regime between
1945 and 1952; secondly, the transitional period between 1953 and 1963; thirdly, the rigid Cold
War era from 1964 until 1989; and finally, the 1990s to the present. During the first period
immediately after the Second World War, the Korean community was in great turmoil and
suffering from their new dilemma of not knowing where to place themselves in a changing
world. Some were in great confusion over the choices of either returning to the motherland or
remaining in Japan. Meanwhile, others who were a more politically-minded group of people
fought each other, setting up their own organisations in order to take an advantageous position
promptly and implement their own political and ideological orientations in the newly established
community. Such turmoil clearly reflects the domestic political changes in postwar Japan and
the situation in the motherland as well as American influence in Japan. During the second
period, the Korean community was able to achieve rather a stable settlement on the one hand.
On the other hand, discrimination and segregation against ethnic and national minorities in
Japan took legal and social shape by legal arrangement of the San Francisco Treaty.  

The Cold War era, in the meantime, was the peak of harsh confrontation between the
two Korean minority organisations. Zainichi identity has been built around the two major
organisations ever since. Identity becomes blurred but organisations remain a symbolic
boundary of identity, while reflecting changes and continuity in a diaspora community. Since the late 1980s, thanks to vigorous communication with their motherlands and Kim Il Sung’s sudden death in 1994, Korean diasporas in the Western world and more interaction with the international community have driven the Zainichi to form their own identity. Such periodisation, however, does not precisely reflect the changes in their national identity, which is relatively stable and resistant. The Zainichi choice was to maximise their given space by being involved in their motherland’s politics. The Zainichi identity formed around the structure framed by the three variables: division of the motherland, Japan’s segregation policy and minority organisations.

Choryŏn, North Korea and Zainichi identity

According to statistics in March 1953, on Zainichi, 61 per cent were from Gyŏngsang, 12 per cent were from Jejudo and 11 per cent were from Jŏllanamdo, which means 98 percent of Zainichi are from the southern part of Korea, which now is included in South Korea. However, in the same year, in terms of nationality, the Josŏn nationality comprises 76.4 per cent whereas people who recorded their official nationality as South Korean comprise 23.6 per cent. This shows that claimed nationality was, in this case, more to do with political affiliation rather than geographical origin and hometowns.28

A seemingly obvious but notable comparison between the Zainichi and Josŏnjok is made by Jeong. Josŏnjok society has not been divided by political ideology due to their awareness of being Chinese citizens. In China, there are no such organisations as pro-South Korean or pro-North Korean. Although it does not mean that Josŏnjok do not have political views on reunification of Korea, they are aware of the fact that the reunification issue should be regarded as Koreans’ own problem in the first place and, secondly, they believe that they are not supposed to be deeply involved. This view is a helpful contrast compared with a speech by Han Duk Soo, the head of Choryŏn, who died in 2001. By the time Choryŏn made the decision to be separated from the Japanese Communist Party in 1955, he announced that ‘as the main purpose of the Japanese communist party is to seize political power within Japan, we Koreans do not have to intervene in Japanese domestic politics. The critical interests of Koreans abroad should be laid upon motherland and our political aims are the reunification of motherland and the protection of Korean minority’s basic human rights’ (K. K. Lee: 1983, 52). ‘The emergence of Choryŏn in 1955 ... was a strategical reaction to the atrocious economic and political conditions that Koreans in Japan who were sympathetic to North Korea faced’.29 Having considered the fact that not all minority national groups in Japan have formed structured politically oriented minority organisations, the particular motivation within each minority community is to be taken into account.
By the time the Choryŏn was re-established in June 1955 in Tokyo, it was composed of 49 regional offices, 419 branch offices, 2,700 sub-committees and 246 units. Under the organisation, there are 15 related sub-organisations and 18 business organisations. Choryŏn was trying to break the relationship with Japanese Communist Party, and made a strong connection with North Korea instead. In fact, the seed of Choryŏn was first set up in October 1945. It was led by Koreans involved in the Japanese Communist League, such as Kim Cheon Hae who had been jailed for 17 years before Korean independence. This was because, during colonisation, the two parties were inter-connected and highly cooperative since their aims for the independence of Korea and a communist revolution in Japan were closely interlinked.

Immediately after the Second World War, there were temporarily, about 300 Korean organisations advocating nationalism in Japan. By the time Choryŏn had begun to absorb the small groups and take the shape of a major representative organisation with communist orientation, certain other nationalist advocates inside Choryŏn who were against communism seceded from the organisation and established others such as Gŏnchŏng or Mindan, advocating liberal democracy. Both Choryŏn and Mindan were fiercely nationalistic and anti-Japanese. The main purpose of Choryŏn was to overthrow the South Korean government through a communist revolution, taking advantage of the geopolitical environment in Japan and strengthening North Korean strategies toward South Korea. Among the 680,000 Koreans in Japan, there are as many as 250,000 Choryŏn members and the number of people working in related organisations amounts to 6,000. The severe struggle between Mindan and Choryŏn is the direct reflection of the divided situation of the motherland and the struggle for their political identity within Japanese society.

Until its disintegration in 1949, Choryŏn used to be the organisation which was the first mobilised for any Japanese leftist demonstrations or public events. Their way of protest was aggressive and distinctive. Such a manner was highly appreciated by Japanese communist organisations. In 1953, by the time the Korean War was over, the organisation was divided into two groups. One supported the Japanese communist party and the other supported North Korea. After the internal tensions were settled in 1954, in the following year on 26 May 1955, a pro-North Korean group was in power led by Han Duk Soo. Major events involving Choryŏn included the Mun Se Kwang incident in 1974, and the Kim Dae Jung kidnapping incident in the late 1970s. When Choryŏn members became sceptical about the North Korean regime, especially after official visits to North Korea arranged by the North Korean government, Kim Il Sung imposed harsher ideological influences on Choryŏn members to reinforce their loyalty to North Korea and include more of the Zainichi population. In 1980, Kim Il Sung reshuffled the local offices of Choryŏn as the implementation of a new approach called the patriotic revolution project, aeguk-saŏp-hyŏkshin.
Since the early 1990s, sceptical views on the existing system of Zainichi organisation have gradually developed caused by various factors. The death of the North Korean leader, Kim Il Sung, somehow diminished the image of a sublime motherland because of the disappearance of a symbolic spiritual centre among Choryŏn affiliated Zainichi. By dint of the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the subsequent international milieu of détente, the legitimacy of Choryŏn decreased. Their collective hope, reunification of the motherland under communism, has disappeared. It is true that the older generation Choryŏn oriented Zainichi still have a fear and reluctance of criticising Choryŏn and the North Korean regime. Yet, Zainichi society began to doubt the functions of the existing organisations and began to seek other ways to resist injustice and recognition. The interviews below with two former members of Choryŏn, Hur, a former professor of the North Korean-run Korean university in Japan, Josŏn University, and Yang, the former head of a Josŏn junior high school, as well as Park, the vice-president of a Zainichi company in Japan show the psychological tensions among insiders of the organisation. The tensions are caused by the problems of the oppressive mechanism of Choryŏn as an untouchable political organisation.

**Park**: Since 8.15, the date of independence from Japan in 1945, I have devoted myself to Korean national education for 20 years. Although my family had suffered, I had strong enthusiasm of providing national education to the second and third generation of Zainichi.

During his interview Park explains the totalitarian mechanism inside Choryŏn and the fundamental motivation for him to remain a member of Choryŏn. One of my interviews reveals that nationalistic Zainichi involved in Choryŏn-run schools tend to view that the initial goal of educational institutions run by North Korea in Japan are not to instigate students with political ideology. Mun explains, 'I’ve been very proud of devoting myself to Choryŏn schools. Not only Josŏn schools but all other educational institutions elsewhere advocate political ideologies to a certain degree anyhow. Choryŏn schools obviously advocate communism but teaching communism is not the main goal of the Josŏn schools. Instead, providing national education is the fundamental task of Josŏn schools in Japan. Nonetheless, the Japanese government often wrongly promulgates Josŏn schools as mere political agencies of North Korean regime. This is to instigate Japanese right-wings and illegalise Josŏn schools. Such instigation allows Japanese right wing activists to target Josŏn schools whenever North Korea makes political troubles'.

**Hur**: I was a college student when the Choryŏn was first organised and an education fund was provided by the North Korean government. I was very impressed with North Korean help. Thanks to such financial support, a poor student like me could pursue a college degree. I strongly believed North Korea was definitely developing and would achieve re-unification. I had a feeling of security that I had my own country to return to afterwards. Although such
positive images of North Korea and Choryŏn have faded away since 1967, my belief in national education for the younger generation of Korean-Japanese made me remain in the organisation.

Park: People involved in producing textbooks for Korean schools in Japan do not have autonomy from the North Korean authority. We are supposed to print exactly the same draft of what the North Korean government sends. Even the head of Choryŏn, Han Duk Soo, does not have the right to revise the contents (ibid., 229).

Mr Hur's comment is worthy of attention. Although he had had uneasy feelings towards North Korea throughout his organisational experience, and also the Choryŏn, he confesses, 'I have been living with a strong sense of responsibility for our children's generation to let them survive with national spirit'. 'I have also undoubtedly believed that however North Korea and Choryŏn have showed irrational attitudes, they are founded by our own nation. Only criticising and escaping from the organisation are not the right solution' (ibid., 232).

On the question of how they felt after they left their posts within Choryŏn, Yang, for example, answers that, 'for a while, I didn't have any motivation left and couldn't stop asking to myself what I have done so far in my life. I was in severe scepticism over politics and deep distrust of human beings'. Hur also explains his ideas after he had to give up his position in Choryŏn. 'Since I escaped from Choryŏn, isn't there any other way but to choose naturalisation? But I soon come to think that I cannot accept myself naturalised into Japanese ... Nevertheless, I couldn't find any other way ... as Yang mentioned earlier, I had to worry about how to survive after being unemployed, and besides, ... [f]riends were made within Choryŏn, I lost all my friends'. As leaving Choryŏn means being unemployed, it is not easy to criticise or leave the organisation. Choryŏn never tolerates criticism. Staying within the circle and network of Choryŏn is linked with financial security. It is notable that Zainichi with a Choryŏn educational background develop harsher internal tensions. In the case of remaining as insiders of the organisation, they jeopardise their opportunities of being included in Japanese society but then they have to go through the psychological fear of being disloyal to the organisation and North Korea. This is more so the case for the Zainichi who went to Josŏn educational institutes up to college level and have been deeply involved in Choryŏn related jobs. Such a dilemma between inclusion and isolation is a general feature of diasporas as I have discussed earlier. Such tension deepens when both the diaspora community and the host nation have an exclusive culture.

As the passage below illustrates, however, within the organisation, a reformist voice has begun to be carefully heard. Park makes a comment on Zainichi attitudes, 'We, Zainichi, should be able to make claim and urge what things should be done .... It was partly our own responsibility that Choryŏn has gone to such a wrong direction' (ibid., 233-235). The changed Zainichi view towards the Choryŏn-Zainichi relationship relates also to the overall recent changes in Zainichi society. The passage below also reflects changed Zainichi attitudes.
Yang: At present, the Choryŏn is almost empty and only devote all their efforts to giving their loyalty to North Korea. Nevertheless, the more they swear loyalty, the faster Choryŏn is declining. Accordingly, Zainichi need not be afraid of Choryŏn and they need to be courageous enough to speak up the truth. Choryŏn is not an organisation of Kim II Sung or Kim Jung II. Instead, it’s ours, Zainichi’s. We need to return to the original principle (ibid., 236).

Since it was founded in 1955, Choryŏn now has a number of associations. Eighteen affiliated organisations spread over 48 Japanese prefectures affiliated to the headquarters in Tokyo. It also runs Josŏn University, numerous schools of all levels. Students of Korean schools are trained to be bilingual. Josŏn University is the major educational centre reproducing the North Korean national identity. Although the Zainichi community in Japan has managed to establish several educational institutions equivalent to the Yŏnbyŏn University, they belong to the minority organisations and have not been fully recognised until recently. For the above provided reasons, I view Zainichi organisations rather than Josŏn University as the integral embodiment of Zainichi identity. However, the role of Josŏn University has been more or less the same as Yŏnbyŏn University in China. It has played a role in providing educated and skilled Zainichi to Zainichi-run companies, schools and organisations. It has contributed to maintaining the mechanism of the production of identity within Zainichi society. Also, it has remained the only university that advocates socialist ideology in Japan. For this reason, there are Japanese left wing scholars who support Josŏn University. Economically, Choryŏn has a close connection with North Korea by operating many joint management firms and engaging in trade with North Korea. Unofficially, Choryŏn claims 20,000 full-time employees throughout the main and attached organisations and affiliations.

During the Cold War era, ideological division between two Korea was consolidated. This means that communications between motherland and diaspora were restricted to either side of Korea. Consequently, the gap between the image and the reality of the motherland widened. To diaspora Koreans, in part the homeland had always been a place of mystery and nostalgia. In Japan, North Korea actively involved itself in Choryŏn affairs for strategic reasons. The more the motherland is involved in the Zainichi community, the more the Zainichi from identifying themselves either with the Japanese or Koreans. Due to communication and participation in homeland’s public affairs, to Zainichi, the division of Korean nation has been actual rather than imaginary compared to the two other cases. This is also partly because of Japan’s exclusivity, urging them to choose between two nationalities; South or North. Once their ideologically divided nationality was polarised, it could be consolidated by the two main minority organisations. Both have enjoyed a considerable degree of political autonomy under the strict condition of keeping a distance from Japanese politics.
The relationship between North Korea and Choryŏn was much closer than the one between South Korea and Mindan until the mid-1970s. Not only does North Korea influence Choryŏn’s political activities, but also Choryŏn members participate in North Korean politics although such participation is nominal. Choryŏn members can be elected as representatives and about seven members have been participating in the General Assembly Meeting as representatives. Nevertheless, for North Korean affiliated Zainichi Koreans, an identity detached from North Korea has been gradually formed through several major incidents including the Rangoon bomb attack and the explosion of Korean Air Line, and finally the death of Kim Il Sung. Choryŏn affiliated Zainichi began questioning their loyalty to the North Korean regime although, until now, some Choryŏn members regard those incidents as South Korean manipulation. However, as Jin has mentioned, though there has been some chaos within the organisation following the death of Kim Il Sung, Choryŏn affiliated Zainichi Koreans still keep loyalty to North Korea based on their appreciation of financial and psychological support in the past. This is also related to an interview discussing Mun’s complicated attitude towards North Korea. She acquired a South Korean passport in 1999 although she has been teaching in a Choryŏn school for long time and her father held a high position in Choryŏn. Her decision to get South Korean nationality was for a practical reason. For Choryŏn experienced Zainichi Koreans, naturalisation to Japanese is a more unbearable choice than applying for South Korean nationality. Mun preserves her strong loyalty towards North Korea based on the complexity of her Choryŏn-related personal background, nationalist sentiment and ideological orientation.

Nevertheless, younger generation Zainichi show a different view regarding the question of nationality. The interview below with Han Ahn Soon, a third generation Zainichi in her mid-twenties, is one example of this.

I remember one day several years ago my father convened a family meeting. He asked my brother and I whether we would willingly accept his decision to change the nationality of our family members’ from North Korean into South Korean. Both of us immediately said okay. My father seemed very disappointed, as for him it was a serious matter and he had thought about it for long time before discussing it with us.

The factor of generation explains such an illustration of indifference to the nationality question, which, for the older generation, has been considered as one of the most significant faiths. Along with generation, ideological orientation among the Zainichi divides its population when analysing the degree of national attachment. National solidarity attached to a totalitarian political ideology has functioned far more effectively among members of Choryŏn.

The South Korean government, on the other hand, displayed a lukewarm attitude towards Koreans abroad compared with North Korean enthusiasm. It was 1975 when the South Korean government provided financial support to Mindan in the wake of the Mun Sae Kwang
incident in August 1974 and the North Korean project of organising a Choryŏn members' tour to North Korea. The Mun Sae Kwang incident is one of the examples of Choryŏn’s deep involvement in political confrontations between North and South Korea. Mun Sae Kwang, as a second generation Zainichi, who was an activist in Choryŏn, undertook special training and committed the assassination of the then first lady of South Korea who was mistakenly targeted while the actual target was the then President, Park Jung Hee.

North Korean efforts to secure the communist zone in diaspora communities have been steadier than those of South Korean. Since the 1970s, North Korea also extended its project of securing ideological influence over Koreans abroad to Korean communities in both the North and South Americas, and Europe by contacting South Koreans who have leftist political ideologies or who have their hometowns in North Korea. When a disturbing atmosphere in Choryŏn was noticed, North Korea made an effort to reconsolidate her relationship with Choryŏn through the project mentioned earlier, aeguk-saop-hyŏksin. It means reconsolidation of patriotism including projects such as fortifying Choryŏn activities, re-emphasising Kim Il Sung’s theory of Self-Reliance, promulgation of North Korean reunification policy and establishing a special committee for overthrowing the South Korean regime. Depending on North Korean interests in influencing in the Zainichi society, the amount of financial support in the name of the educational fund has fluctuated. Figure 5.3 shows the trends.

**Figure 5.3 North Korean fund for Zainichi community**

![](image)

'Once every year North Korea sent subsidies to Zainichi community but several years ago, it has been stopped. Among Zainichi businessmen, there have been discussions over investment for the plan of exploitation of the Najin-Sŏnbong area in order to encourage
economic development of North Korea but there found too many legal and political difficulties.\textsuperscript{33} Although there have been various internal and external obstacles against legalised transparent economic cooperation between the Choryŏn-led Zainichi population and the North Korean government, relations between North Korea and the Zainichi community have been much more mutual than outsiders may consider. Whenever North Korea faced economic or diplomatic difficulties, the Zainichi, mobilised by Choryŏn or individually, have provided certain sums of patriotic fund.

Ryang’s (1997) research is one of the most refined academic works, showing how Choryŏn Koreans have formed and maintained their North Korean identity, being segregated from the Japanese society. She is mainly concerned with the interactions among language, ideology and identity in proving the formation and maintenance of national identity. Her main argument is that identification by nationality is socially constructed processes of a real life. In order to prove this, she observes Choryŏn members’ self-identification to find out how individuals use their socially generated linguistic capacity and linguistically constructed social resources. Throughout her outstanding self-intervening anthropological research, she shows how much as a second generation Choryŏn in Japan, she herself has struggled with collective identity.

However, the case is too extreme to demonstrate the argument that national identity is constructed and nothing but indoctrination. Only the passive, negative, indoctrinated part of minority organisations are emphasised, while overlooking the fact that once such allegiance is provided, it is another expression of their motivation for survival. In her work, political ideology and the cultural aspect of national identity are somehow entangled. Political ideology can be deeply entrenched in national identity. Yet, this is not because identity is merely a passive construction, but rather, that it is the nature of communist ideology and propaganda especially in the case of North Korea. In addition, Ryang’s structuralist view sees the usage of language and educational institutions as a tool for the ideological reproduction of social identity. Although her socio-anthropological concerns also touch upon the politics of identity due to the particular feature of this case, Choryŏn’s connection with the host society, Japan, as a safety valve is downplayed. Ryang deals mostly with the internal mechanism of the organisation and how individual identity has been oppressed for the organisation’s sake. Having followed her logic, one can only reach the conclusion that Zainichi identity has been greatly misused and abused for the sake of communist ideology and the irrational North Korean regime. Due to her overemphasis on organisation and micro-observation of relations between North Korea and organisation, the exclusivity of Japanese society is somehow disregarded.

In a similar vein, identity-building through education should be viewed differently from indoctrination. This in turn may explain why she continuously seeks for her real identity by considering her constructed North Korean-in-Japan identity as a fake. Ryang assumes that there
must be a real identity, something that should not be the result of political construction. Perhaps
her North Korean identity is totally constructed and that is why she believes her national identity
is forged. Ryang does not consider her Japanese identity as her real identity, either. In her view,
the entire history of Zainichi identity formation has been a result of the intervention of North
Korean political propaganda. Accordingly, Zainichi has been merely a political victim of such
political propaganda and there have been no other choices for Zainichi but to remain isolated
from Japanese society. Thus, the present way of building Zainichi identity resulted from the
interaction between the passive Zainichi population and a hopeless Korean motherland.
Accurately speaking, the present pattern of ethnic coexistence and negative national identity of
Zainichi so far are the outcome of continuous interactions between the Zainichi as an actor and
the Japanese society with North Korean intervention. A collective identity is not always
passively constructed.

Mindan and Zainichi community

Compared with Choryön, Mindan is much less organised. This is mainly because the people
involved in Mindan are more individualistic and liberal-oriented. In addition, there is a lack of
charismatic leadership equivalent to that of Han Duk Soo, although Mindan gained a more
advantageous position than Choryön after the summit meeting between Korea and Japan in
1963. For Mindan, the urgent task has been improving the status of Zainichi rather than being
involved in the politics of the motherland. After undergoing temporary disintegration of other
minor organisations, Mindan was left as the major right-wing Zainichi organisation on 3
October, 1946. Mindan, as a self-governing organisation, has politically supported South Korea
and the head office is located in Tokyo. In 1985, it had 49 local offices, 388 branch offices, 601
related groups and 4,600 activist groups. Their ultimate goal by the time of establishment was
enhancing Zainichi rights and welfare in Japan.34

The Korea-Japan summit meeting in October 1964 was the turning point when Zainichi
community began to care more about their own interests than the Korean nation. The pending
issues between the two countries ever since decolonisation had been repeatedly discussed
without any concrete agreements until the sixth meeting in 1964 during the Park Jung Hee
regime. The issues included diplomatic relations in general, issues over the fishing rights in the
maritime area were in dispute, issues regarding the request for property rights during the
colonial period and the problems of Zainichi's legal status. From the South Korean
government's point of view, the Zainichi problem was relatively unimportant. Between the two
representatives, Kim Jong Pil, the then prime minister, and Tae Pyong, the Japanese counterpart,
the Zainichi request for their private properties lost during the decolonisation period as the most
urgent issue was settled by reaching an agreement. Japan provided USD300 million of capital
and service, paying by spreading over ten years. The seventh meeting followed in December 1964, the final draft was officially agreed in February 1965 after a 20 year-long fight.

Regarding this event, both Choryŏn and Mindan responded fiercely for different reasons. Choryŏn criticised the South Korean government on the ground that the normalisation of the diplomatic relationship between Japan and South Korea excluding North Korea would result in the consolidation of the division of the nation and consequently delay their unification project. Mindan also voiced deep concerns for the reason that the normalisation of the diplomatic relationship was made without setting a clear legal status for the Zainichi. Mindan- led demonstrations during the series of summit meetings were initially to raise a voice on the issue of Zainichi legal status. By the time the last summit meeting was ended, Zainichi status was left ever obscure by being transformed to temporary residents from the previous categorisation of special foreigners.

Kim Sang Hyun (1988), for example, points out the major problems of Mindan. Unnecessary bureaucratisation of the organisation is one. It worsened at the time financial support from the South Korean government started in 1978. Mindan has been criticised for its authoritarian and illiberal way of dealing with Zainichi issues. It also includes the problems of corruption amongst the leaders of the organisation. Secondly, Mindan has gradually lost contact with the younger generation Zainichi due to its lack of human resources and a clear vision for the community. The main purpose of Mindan’s existence was from the beginning less clear and less exclusive than Choryŏn’s. This also causes the dilemma of being a diaspora organisation in general, by having to face the inevitable choice between aggressive fights against discriminations with clear and exclusive vision, and mild responses with less exclusive interests and vision.

The Mindan platforms below imply Mindan’s less exclusive views towards the Zainichi vis-à-vis other nations involved.

With understanding the fact that we are regional members of Japanese society at the same time citizens of the Republic of Korea, we aim to become respectable and trustful Koreans in Japanese society. Remembering our ancestors have contributed to cultural development of Japanese society, we make efforts to promote cooperation between Japanese and Koreans (Mindan platform No. 3). Although we reside in Japan, we bear in mind that our generation and the next generations can acquire necessary education as international people and at the same time maintain Korean identity (Mindan platform No. 4).

The content of these platforms conveys that Mindan sees the ultimate aim of the Zainichi as inclusion into Japanese society while instigating awareness of their ancestors’ contribution to Japanese society as legitimacy of their existence. When it says Korean in the
original text, it is written han-gug-in which means South Korean citizens. However, it does not suggest that Mindan sees South Korea as their ultimate place to settle.

Within the organisation, there are also negative views of South Korean involvement in Mindan. For example, Bae Sun Hee, the former director of the Women’s Committee of Mindan, commented that the people taking important positions in Mindan have wasted the South Korean people’s tax by doing nothing. The project of Korean national education gets worse. We still lack human resources. Another commentator, Kwon Hyuk Doo, the former director of Mindan, hukuoka office, mentions that Mindan was fulfilling its original aim better before receiving South Korean funds. People involved in Mindan had now become mere salaried men of the South Korean government. It became very difficult to proceed with projects of our own needs. In fact, during the 1970s the amount of South Korean financial support to Mindan was ten times larger than to any other Korean communities abroad including the one in the United States. In return for this financial support, South Korea acquired the rights to review overall operation and management not only in connection with the organisation’s future projects. Due to its focus on political orientation ever since, Mindan has been criticised by ordinary Zainichi as neglecting major issues such as improving their overall life conditions in Japan.

Since Kim Dae Jung government, Mindan becomes more powerful than before. I believe that it’s the right time for Mindan to deal with the Japanese government more actively to correct prevalent discriminative customs and laws. ... Among older generation Zainichi, there have been tendency to think that they are supposed to put up with discriminations because Japan is not our own country and at least Japan let us to survive here. But younger generations are different. Zainichi should raise their voice to protect their rights, and demand historical correctness. To do so, national minority organisations like Mindan should be the official route to communicate with the Japanese government ... It is also necessary to achieve our goals in cooperation with Choryón.

As I have shown, until recently the Zainichi community and identity have fluctuated considerably according to the politics of the Korean motherland. This is the crucial difference between the Zainichi from Koreitsy and Josônjok. A minority organisation is the barometer through which one can judge the collective will to maintain collective identity and potential power to mobilise the population when necessary. On the one hand, Zainichi organisations are well established, influencing most of the Zainichi population. On the other hand, such a firm influence of the two organisations on the Zainichi population has intensified a diaspora’s dilemma of maintaining an overt collective features with exclusive organisations whilst attaining fuller degree of inclusion to the host nation. The Zainichi case is one of the extreme examples due to historical relations between the homeland and the hostland, and Japan’s exclusivity in dealing with non-Japanese minority nationality issues.
Rise of social activism and new Zainichi organisations

The Zainichi have built their community in segregation from Japanese politics and society rather than being assimilated thus disappearing. The general contradiction between host countries and minority national groups elsewhere is the simultaneous process of inclusion and exclusion: in other words, assimilation and segregation. In Japan, the contradiction is relatively clearer. As I mentioned earlier briefly, Japanese policy towards the Zainichi is not to be regarded as assimilation. The Japanese government continuously restricted conditions by which Zainichi could willingly identify themselves with the Japanese.38

We have to be critical of some common statements made by Japanese researchers, which overlook the complexity of the problem by saying that the Zainichi youths are relatively smoothly accommodating themselves into Japanese society. This is in fact true when compared with the first generation who had been struggling with feelings of bitterness toward Japan and of nostalgia for their Korean homeland; and the second generation who had been desperately attempting to establish their economic bases and fighting against discrimination and harsh poverty. However, the accommodation to Japanese society of the Zainichi youths is far from being free of psychological conflicts.39

Fukuoka's assumption is also verified by an interview with the head of KCC (Korean Christian Centre), Osaka, which offers a Zainichi viewpoint.

The way of understanding the Zainichi situation is fundamentally different between the first and second generation. The first generation has the firm idea that they are foreigners living in a foreign country. Accordingly, they somehow accepted unfair treatment and internalised conflicts. Instead, the older generation has been obsessed with wealth and their children's education. Meanwhile, the second generation are aware of democratic procedures, and human rights issues due to their educational background which differs in a great deal from that of their parent generation. The younger generation view the Zainichi movement in the same context with grass root movements in Japan since 1970s.

The Zainichi psychological conflict is also shown in a quantitative research conducted by Hanb'aeak Research Foundation in 1997. By comparing, it explains the present problems of Korean minorities in each host state. According to this research, the Zainichi problem is more deep-seated psychological than practical. Economic difficulties are expressed as the most urgent issue showing, 46.1 per cent of responses among Josonjok, communication problems due to the language barrier for Koreitsy particularly, in Tashkent and Almaty, showing 58.5 per cent of the responses. In Japan, meanwhile, social discriminations against Zainichi were expressed as the most serious problem, showing 35.9 per cent of Zainichi respondents.40

Among the younger generation of Zainichi, there have been vigorous movements towards setting up new kinds of organisations. They explicitly focus more on Zainichi welfare,
especially aiming at giving confidence to the young Zainichi whose ultimate goal is to settle down peacefully in Japan. Such organisations include Mukuge no Kai, Tokkabi Kodomo Kai, and Seikyu Sha. They reflect the new trend of identity formation among the younger generation Zainichi, fighting various discriminations rather than being involved in conventional Korean minority organisations. Zainichi become an active actor forming their own kind of collective identity through actual participation in various community projects. Being aware of national identity for the Zainichi may not necessarily mean to be aware of Korean historical roots and attachment to the Korean nation instigated by a nostalgic motivation, but for them it is more likely to mean to continuous search for their own kind of national identity by keeping on questioning who we are, vis-à-vis the Japanese and the Koreans. One can also view the movements as an expression of searching for their own independent sphere to represent their real selves free from exclusive ethnocentric nationalism discourses of South Korea, North Korea and the Japanese nation. Such process of awareness, however, cannot be developed without a diaspora's certain efforts of distancing themselves from the motherland's influence while not being antagonistic to any of the nations related to them. I continue my argument on this point in the following chapter. Their movements, regardless of the modes of resistance, are motivated by a continuous trial of a search for a stable national identity and recognition as they are. Such efforts are future-oriented minority movements rather than backward looking revivalism. The interview text below represents the tendency.

Since the 1970s other Zainichi organisations neither Choryŏn nor Mindan have been established. This was because some began to be sceptical about the roles of Choryŏn and Mindan, and the vigorous civil movements in South Korea in defence of civil rights and democracy which have stimulated young Zainichi. Around the late 1970s, young Zainichi organised a joint response with Mintongryŏn [a South Korean organisation of civil movements for democracy and national reunification] towards the Japanese government. This organisation came into existence in 1984. The original purpose of the establishment of the organisation was to defend young Zainichi students who were studying in Japanese schools. We focused on providing national education for them in order to guide the development of Zainichi identity in a positive way as they did not have opportunities to learn about national history and cultures and as a result naturally develop shameful feelings about their national background under the Japanese educational system. At the same time, our organisation has played the role of mediator for the schools and Zainichi parents when there was an occurrence of a racially offensive situation. Within the Japanese school system, our organisation has also tried to implement a special class for Zainichi, teaching Korean history and language apart from the compulsory normal curriculum. At the moment, there are only a few Japanese schools which allow this project but we have kept lobbying with local governments and Japanese schools.\textsuperscript{41}

When generalising such a change in national identity among young Zainichi, the above interview with Kim Kwan Min, may be considered as a special case as he has several years'
experience of living in South Korea. His experience provided him with a sufficient period for reflection on his psychological conflicts regarding the issues of national identity through direct communication with Koreans in the motherland. Nonetheless, the recent Zainichi movements are initiated by Zainichi who stabilised their internal conflicts over dual national identities just as in the case of Kim Kwan Min. Such movements are interpreted as a sign of desire for inclusion in the host society with improved conditions. Meantime, their collective will does not denote either that the Zainichi have nurtured a separate collective identity from the Japanese nation, or maintained an exclusive collective identity firmly attached to the Korean nation.

**Active collectivisation**

*Korean kolkhozes*

In the former USSR, in terms of size, Koreans are the twenty-eighth largest minority national and ethnic groups among over 100 others comprising the former Soviet Union. Koreitsy is one of those whose population is decreasing and its density is dispersing. There are approximately 443,000 Koreitsy living in the territory of the former USSR according to statistics from the early 1990s. The main elements constituting Koreitsy national identity are their pride in successful performances in farming and their traumatic historical collective memory of forced relocation. Koreitsy are known as one of those dispersed non-titular minority national groups spread over the vast territory.

Having been victimised, regardless of ideological disposition, Koreitsy were settled in separate collective farms. Due to its national division, the collective farm system was not a de-ethnicised state economic institute. Within collective farms, Soviets could build their own organisations and institutes such as cultural centres, stadiums, hospitals, schools, clubs, libraries, drugstores and houses. Those organisations and institutes naturally grew out of particular national and ethnic features. Koreitsy’s language schools and publishing houses were set up and their own newspapers were printed. Koreitsy local musical troupes were relocated to Koreitsy kolkhozes in central Asia. They played traditional Korean operas and plays such as Ch’unhyang’ŏn and Shimch’’ŏng’ŏn. The troupe played multiple roles, such as passing letters from kolkhoz to kolkhoz and finding separated family members, not only being involved in performing arts. There is not much written record about their stories. Koreitsy have just begun to write or rewrite their history set by their shared collective memories.

Han’s (1999) pride in being a Koreitski in the former Soviet Union demonstrated how Korean intellectuals in the Soviet Union perceived themselves. ‘Although we have undergone various tragic incidents ever since we were relocated, and although we couldn’t achieve the Koreitsy Republic, I was proud of my nationality, Koreitsy in the Soviet Union, when thinking...’
how we have managed our successful lives. Thanks to our exceptional diligence, today we enjoy a relatively wealthy life compared with other minority national groups around us’ (Han and Han: 1999, 321). Having scrutinised various forms of Koreitsy written work, most of their writing is filled with proud comments on successful farming experience. They could develop a secure feeling within the boundary of kolkhozes.

At present, there are twelve to fifteen Koreitsy kolkhozes. Regardless of the percentage of Koreitsy population within a kolkhoz, in case the founders and managers are Koreitsy, it is known as a Koreitsy kolkhoz. Even when a kolkhoz begins with one hundred per cent from the Koreitsy population, later, unsuccessful farms are merged with Koreitsy farms, which decreases the percentage of the Koreitsy within a previously exclusive Koreitsy kolkhoz.\(^4\)\(^2\) For example, Kim Byung Wha kolkhoz is composed of approximately 25 per cent of Koreitsy. At present, the total size of the land is 3,127 hectares with about 1,920 households and a population of 7,820. The national composition of the kolkhoz (table 5.4) is as follows according to a data provided by Kim Brut.

**Table 5.4 Ethnic composition of the KBW kolkhoz**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Uzbek</th>
<th>Kazak</th>
<th>Karakal</th>
<th>Uighur</th>
<th>Russian</th>
<th>Tatar</th>
<th>Turk</th>
<th>Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>2,627</td>
<td>2,013</td>
<td>1,543</td>
<td>847</td>
<td>283</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A kolkhoz like Kim Byung Wha, however, is still regarded as a Koreitsy kolkhoz although it has become less exclusive to be named as such. For this reason, Koreitsy kolkhozes are left as a kind of symbolic centre rather than as principal economic bases. As for the return of the Koreitsy donations to the war against Germany during the Second World War, a street and a high school in Tashkent state are named after Kim Byung Wha, who died in 1974. At the edge of economic reshuffling, the process of maintaining Koreitsy kolkhozes as historical heritage has been supported by the South Korean government. Since the late 1980s, the main Koreitsy kolkhozes have been turned into museums and are decorated with historical documents. The president of KBW kolkhoz explains that ‘during the period of 1937 to 1945, we grew only rice, but from 1945 cotton farming was accompanied. Kim Byung Wha took over the position of president in the kolkhoz in 1940 until 1974. His management of the farm was outstanding. Unlike other kolkhozes, he installed an independent electric power plant within this kolkhoz. Various additional systems were successfully run including a hospital, schools covering all levels, ateliers, libraries and theatres. He was also actively involved in politics as a representative of the Republic of Uzbek for 30 years’.\(^4\)\(^3\) Thanks to his political activities and
successful management of the farm, Kim Byung Wha kolkhoz had once served as the official route of government propaganda during Khurushchev.

Gelb’s (1995) description below also supports the early success of Koreitsy farms in central Asia after deportation.

The temporary irrigation systems of 1937 and 1938 were subsequently rebuilt, construction completed, marshland drained, the area under cultivation expanded, and the harvest per hectare raised. The doubling or tripling of the capital stock of the typical Korean kolkhoz by 1941 quadrupled or quintupled its income. ...Their rapid transformation into dynamic enterprises whose management was well integrated into the regional ruling structure permitted Korean kolkhozes - many now converted into sovkhozes - to abundantly over-fulfil their plan quotas during the war and emerge as models of efficiency and prosperity in the 1950s.44

The history of successful kolkhoz life became the primary source of pride of being a Koreitsy. People suffered from an inhumane situation during this deportation period. Fortunately, however, the grassland to which the Koreans were relocated was relatively fertile and appropriate for rice-growing. By 1934 shortly before the relocation project, collectivisation of Koreitsy farms was partially completed. Until that year, the Soviet government had given large funds to encourage settlement of rice-growing farms in the region. The Soviet government actively supported Koreitsy farms in building irrigation systems. Koreitsy were already well known to be dextrous at building irrigation systems.

In 1928, of the 470 kolkhozes in the Far Eastern Region, 110 were in the Korean villages in Vladivostok okrug. Koreans resented Russian peasants and Korean kulaks who exploited them as land lenders. Whether naturalized or not, Koreans could now take part in the movement towards collectivization. For Koreans, this movement promised a shortcut to land and citizenship ... [T]he degree of collectivization grew to 90 per cent by the beginning of 1930, compared with 75 per cent in the Poyset region (Wada, in Suh: ibid., 39-41).

As collectivisation was completed, the cultural climate of Koreitsy farms was changed and full of hope. The rate of illiteracy dropped and cultural institutions such as public libraries, reading clubs, newspaper companies and Korean schools were well operated. Their temporary stability, however, was interrupted by another relocation project. In the early 1940s, additional population adjustment had begun. Koreitsy and Russians in the Uzbek region were moved to the Kazakh Republic. This project was to balance the ratio of population, avoiding Kazakhs being in the majority in the Kazakh region. It was common that, under the excuse of exchanging cadres and officials or encouraging harmonisation of different national groups, the ratio of composition of minority national groups was effectively controlled. Between 1968 and 1971, approximately 60,000 people from different minority ethnic and national groups had moved to the Kazakh Republic and 80,000 Kazakhs were sent out of the republic. Since deportation, the Koreitsy
were accustomed to the new environment, restoring a peaceful life once again for a short period up until the Second World War broke out. Moreover, 'The period of the post-Stalin regime about 25 or 30 years was the heyday for Soviet Koreans. Korean kolkhozes flourished, which was possible only within socialist regime ... The development of Korean kolkhozes could provide the farmers from other national minority groups with a strong hope' (Em: 1991, 43).

'Even after official pressure forced many to shift to cotton, Korean kolkhozes remained paradigms of good economy' (Gelb: 1995, 408).

I have explained the Koreı’tsy’s active participation in collectivisation as the major Soviet state building project. The positive identity as Koreı’tsy was built around stories about their various successful kolkhoz lives. The accumulated stories compose the history of the Koreı’tsy, which best reflects their collective identity. I describe this as a national identity of a diaspora. This identity is not antagonistic against any of the nations involved but it particularly construes the collective identity of Koreı’tsy. The next section explores further this Koreı’tsy way of managing kolkhozes.

Gobonjil

Although the system of collective farms appears to be identical, there are significant inequalities in the distribution of earnings within a kolkhoz, 'The spread between real earnings of the top management and the earnings of the field workers would appear quite large' (Khan and Ghai: 1979, 105). This explains how the Koreı’tsy could be seen as wealthier than other minority national groups in central Asia under the Soviet regime, 'The development of cost accounting since the mid-1950s; greater freedom by the kolkhozes with respect to the volume and pattern of investment financed either from internal sources or from borrowing; and greater self-sufficiency in managerial, professional and technical skills' (ibid., 53). As the other author also mentions, the reason why Koreı’tsy farms made more profits than others was not only owing to their agricultural skills but also because of their method of managing collective farms. In spite of the strict control of the central government and official and unofficial pressures and restrictions, most Koreı’tsy kolkhozes acquired lands by making conditional lease contracts with other kolkhozes. Koreı’tsy farmers could make greater achievements by altering the given systems and enjoyed more freedom within the system as well as with their customs of hard work and strong motivations. The Koreı’tsy introduced the concept of lease and rent to the kolkhoz system. These were not legally acceptable at first. In principle, the conditions for lease and rent were just like the ones under the feudal system and the risks and costs for items such as fertilizers, seeds, usage of equipments, harvesting, and carrying agricultural goods and so on, were all their own responsibility.
The Koreitsy way of running the kolkhoz system was feasible since there were some variations within the system. As Khan and Ghai explain, the varied features of each kolkhoz explain the possibility of differentiated adaptation of the system.

As a voluntary, co-operative association of producers in a planned, socialist economy, the kolkhoz presents some distinctive features. It differs from state enterprises which are the more usual form of organization in a socialist economy not only in the ownership pattern of means of producing but, perhaps more importantly, in the greater autonomy it enjoys in principle both in production and management. ... in principle, the kolkhoz provides greater scope for participation and democratic decision-making than may be possible in a state enterprise which comes directly under a ministry and is, therefore, more liable to political and bureaucratic control (ibid., 46).

In Han’s essay, it is described as gobongjil of which the linguistic root is not yet entirely clear. In the 1940s, Koreitsy farmers were looking for a new way of making profits. Around the end of the 1940s, renting lands was first introduced. The kinds of workers who rented lands from collective farms were called gobongja. In accordance with the contracts, a part of a gobongja’s harvest went to the kolkhoz and the rest was the gobongja’s share. Although gobongja have been working freely these days, until the 1980s this kind of economic activity used to be illegal. They always had to take the risk of being accused by others who were discontent with the Koreitsy making a great deal of profits. However, there were two reasons for their survival. Firstly, most kolkhozes prefer to hire gobongja since their yields were much higher even in barren and seemingly infertile lands. The average harvest per kolkhoz was 20 to 40 tons per hectare, whereas gobongja involvement usually guaranteed between 90 and 120 tons. Without hiring gobongja, kolkhozes could not possibly reach the production plan ordered by government.

Such activity was illegal, consequently, gobongja had to provide bribes to officials and other people unavoidably involved such as drivers and technicians. In the end, gobongja was a good source of income for those people involved. Since the principles of gobongja are self-supporting accounts in terms of profits and autonomy, the earnings were entirely dependent on their efforts and abilities, which, in fact, provided huge incentives to develop more efficient and lucrative ways of farming. From the mid-1980s government officials in central Asia started to acknowledge the Koreitsy way of farming and their renting systems. This Koreitsy way of farming has been carried out for twenty years now. The Koreitsy way of manipulating the system has resulted in disparities of income and productivity among kolkhozes. In terms of income among various categories of employees of a kolkhoz, differences are noticeable, thus it is difficult to arrive at generalisations about the differences.

Regarding the meaning of gobonjil, Kim Brut explains that ‘the literary meaning of gobon is a portion of funds and an investment of each for a business partnership but its practical
usage here in Koreitsy society is different. Gobonjil refers to a kind of freelance farming in other farms of their own region or farms in other regions out of their own farms. Koreitsy lease a small part of a large scale farm for rice or vegetables, and generally produce three to four times more tonnes of agricultural goods than local farmers normally produce. They paid a certain amount of products as the price for leasing part of the land. Uzbek Koreitsy normally travel to Russia and Ukraine. The reasons are as follows. Firstly, the size of the lands in Uzbekistan is relatively smaller than other regions. Secondly, Uzbek people are relatively dextrous with farming next to Koreitsy in comparison with the other minority national groups in the former Soviet republics. Thirdly, most Uzbek farms are involved in cotton farming which takes a longer period to gain harvest and accordingly it is difficult to make fortune in a short period. Fourthly, in certain regions such as Russia, the price of agricultural products are much higher than in central Asia. After harvest, Koreitsy sell immediately what they produce in the region and bring some back to central Asia'.

The Koreitsy’s technical difference also helped the kolkhozes to be relatively more productive. It is proved that, as soon as the Koreitsy in the Far East were deported to central Asia, the demand for Japonika showed a sudden drop. Consequently, lands for rice-growing fields also decreased from 20,000 hectare in 1930 to 3,600 hectare in 1939, and to 510 hectare in 1948. The main reason why the productive capacity of Russian state farms was not high enough was not only because of the institutional and structural problems of collective farming that discourage creativity and motivation for labour. Also, this was due to the Russian way of farming, direct sowing onto dry paddy fields, which is not appropriate for the soil and monsoon climate. The Korean or Chinese way of transplanting rice-plants on fresh watered fields was not familiar to Russian farmers. Koreitsy’s relative success in farming after all was based on their appropriate agricultural skills and their adaptability to the system. Koreisky kolkhozes have existed in name only since the 1990s and they no longer function as a major economic means. In spite of this, the Koreitsy’s shared memories have been preserved by telling their stories to outsiders or to younger generation Koreitsy, and more recently, by writing them in various communication genres.

Conclusion

Briefly returning to my initial question, put in a simpler form, it would be: Korean diasporas, who are they? I do not take ‘they’ here as the accumulation of individuals’ senses of belonging attached to nations. I took it as a collective outcome. Thus, I investigated national minority organisations and institutions as representations of diaspora identity. They reflect each diaspora’s collective will, the history of a diaspora community, and apprehensions and visions of their collective future. Then again, such a collective identity of Korean diaspora can never be
built in isolation from host nations. Some diaspora individuals have never been practically involved in any of those organisations. Even in such a case, however, their collective identity can hardly be expressed completely detached from Korean diaspora organisations and institutions. Regardless of a diaspora’s actual participation in those organisations, diaspora identity has continuously been formed and reformed while developing their own image and opinions of the organisations, and discussing the issues related to them.

By looking into the major diaspora organisations, the patterns of ethnic relations: isolation, segregation and dispersal, become clearer. Those organisations are the result of interplay between a host state’s policy and a diaspora’s way of responding to it. It explains why and how certain kinds of minority organisations emerge in a specific situation. Sound minority organisations and institutions are the prerequisites for a diaspora group to move forwards to more a self-confined diaspora community. The identical pattern of a Korean diaspora’s way of responding to host state and resisting assimilation can be described as a quiet struggle through maximising given autonomy. The vexing conflicts between nationhood and personhood are not only particularly applicable to diaspora groups. However, tensions are more likely to grow out of the internal conflicts among diaspora groups as they often face situations of having to make a choice between national bond and individual well-being. For diasporas, such tension makes it more difficult to co-exist comfortably. The tension is created by the dilemma of having to choose between expressing a will to fortify visible collectivity and a risk-averse decision to remain totally individual by concealing another national allegiance, which I regard as a diaspora’s particularity. On the other hand, such a tension can be viewed positively given that a diaspora’s collective boundary within their host nation is not an involuntary membership unlike the one in relation to a state.

It is also true that in the later period since the 1980s, the tendency has gradually turned towards emphasising less collectivity than before. This was the case for the Jōsōnjok as the response to apprehension of further isolation, left aside in the remote region, and for the Zainichi, as the opposition to deep rooted negative functions and the structural problems of organisations. The Koreitsu community has gradually progressed towards a movement that seeks more visible forms of collective existence. The penultimate chapter further develops the formation of a diaspora’s own kind of collective identity. A diaspora’s distinctive identity will be more clearly explicated through analysing a diaspora’s process of identifying and differentiating itself with/from the Korean nation.
6 Identification vis-à-vis the Motherland

In this chapter, I present the formation of diaspora identity reflected in the relationship between diaspora and homeland. Prior to forming a stable dual nationality, diasporas are exposed to certain historical periods of confusion during which their particularities are shaped. A sudden or renewed communication with the homeland is one of the crucial causes of a diaspora’s initial confusion.1 Despite the dissimilarity among the cases in terms of pattern and duration, initially there is a degree of fluctuation in the sense of national identity until a stable diaspora identity is formed through the acceptance and reinterpretation of the diaspora’s inevitable duality and difference vis-à-vis the Korean nation. And yet, certain preconditions explained in the previous two chapters play categorical roles in due course. In other words, a de-ethnicised citizenship that can accommodate a diaspora’s historical existence (Chapter 4) and a diaspora’s efforts to maintain collectivity (Chapter 5) precondition the process of building a self-reliant mature diaspora community. Through analysing a diaspora’s interpretation and reinterpretation of their collective identity as a self-defining process, the third type of national identity is delineated, the theoretical ground of which was discussed in Chapter 2.

The process of differentiation as a part of identity building has continued throughout the history of incorporation. As a result, a diaspora’s identity evolves as a collective identity distinguishable from the existing national identity. This third type of national identity can be conceptualised as opposed to a constantly stable national identity grown out of a situation in which one belongs to a dominant national group with their own externally recognised independent state. Thus, s/he is also undoubtedly entitled to be a first-class citizen. The third type of national identity is also understood by comparing it against a person from a minority national group who views his/her dual nationality as highly negative or abnormal. On the contrary, the third type of national identity can be nurtured when the plurality of a national identity is positively accepted and interpreted as an advantage, ultimately leading to a concept that national identity can be regarded as an individual choice when so wished. Diasporas’ inherent tensions generate a particular kind of collective identity. Such tensions include, as I have partly explained in previous chapters, firstly, the dilemma between the maintenance of distinctiveness and a fuller degree of incorporation; secondly, conflicting necessity between certain degree of visible collectivity and concealing their own cultural or historical background vis-à-vis the host nation; finally, the task of selective acceptance of the motherland’s influence. The rest of this chapter concerns this final feature of a diaspora identity.
The third sphere of national identity within a triangular structure

Extended claims of sovereignty and the control of diasporas

Mostly diaspora communities are seen as political means rather than humanitarian ends by the government of a homeland, depending on changing political agendas. Sheffer (1984) illuminates the common lukewarm attitudes of home countries toward their diaspora communities. ‘While diasporas maintain ties with their homelands, the attitudes of the homelands vis-à-vis their diasporas may be vague’ (11). It is common that diasporas are not always supported by their homelands. For example, ‘India did not intervene on behalf of its diaspora when it was persecuted and expelled from Uganda … The corollary of this situation is that diasporas do not always support the current government in their homelands’ (ibid.). The relationship between Korean diasporas and their homeland is not the exception.

Seemingly, it is out of the question why diasporas develop a differentiated national identity from that of their homelands. Quite obviously, it is because they have undertaken different paths to modernisation and nation-building process. Nevertheless, it is also meaningful to explain to what extent a diaspora’s own sphere of collective identity has evolved differently from that of the Korean nation, together with accounts on its implications. Insufficient understanding of those issues cause confusion when dealing with problems and issues regarding overseas Koreans and emerging re-migrants to South Korea. The questions of to what extent re-migrants to South Korea should be perceived as Koreans and how much the state of the homeland should be involved in the legal and social affairs of diaspora communities abroad have arisen as related issues.

Political background of transnationalism

Korean nationalism is built on a mixture of inferiority springing from colonial memory, insecurity from the geopolitical condition and confidence generated by the experience of economic success. Both South and North Koreas are typical examples of states that promulgate exclusive ethnocised nationalism with strong emphasis on self-celebrating cultural dispositions, traditions, particular value systems and blood tie. Korean nationalism has been consolidated through the continuous revival of cultural and traditional heritages rather than through the efforts of discontinuing the historical and premodern features of nation to which Hutchinson’s (2000) explanation of ‘ethnic revival’ (654) is applicable. During the most rapid industrialisation period of the 1960s and 1970s, state nationalism was effectively consolidated by re-emphasising traditional values and customs. The then president Park Jung Hee took Japan as a model for Korean modernisation by effectively strengthening traditional values and ethnic customs as the
bases of official political ideology. Similarly to Japanese society, South Korea has developed a nationalism discourse with emphasis on blood ties, familism, strong loyalty to the state and racial homogeneity. Since the late 1980s, Korean ethnic nationalism has re-emerged and spread to overseas Koreans. Cultural exclusivism has been accompanied by the agenda of transnationalism. The trend may be understood in a similar context to Huntington’s (1996) or Eagleton’s (2000) term ‘culture war’. In spite of some misinterpretations and exaggerations of the word *nihonjinron*, Japan is not the exception to promoting transnational soft power, being obsessed with *nihonjinron* in the mid-1980s. South Korean rhetoric of promoting pan Koreanism called, *hanminjok-gongdongche*, literally meaning the community of the Korean nation, is explicable in the same context.

The idea of *hanminjok-gongdongche* was initiated by the Roh Tae Woo regime in the late 1980s. The primary concern of the state project was to build a theoretical principle by which the unification agenda regains legitimacy. Racial and ethnic commonalities are re-emphasised. It was believed that political reunification would smoothly follow when the cultural and economic gap between the two parties is reduced. Such an agenda required support from Korean immigrant communities elsewhere, particularly Josōnjok, Zainichi, and Koreitsy communities. Naturally, academic projects related to this agenda have been encouraged. One of the examples is the wide range of studies on Josōnjok, Zainichi, and Koreitsy communities among South Korean scholars since the late 1980s, sponsored by various government institutions. Among historians in particular the reinterpretation of Balh’ae history has been encouraged by government and public alike. Table 6.1 reflects such an increasing interest in the region.

Table 6.1 Research trend on history of Manchu

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>South Korea</th>
<th>North Korea</th>
<th>Japan</th>
<th>China</th>
<th>Russia</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Before 1949</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>171</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950-1959</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>42</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960-1969</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>92</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970-1979</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>134</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980-1989</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>432</td>
<td>655</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990-1994</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>512</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>247</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>687</td>
<td>1,526</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The agenda behind today’s culture war is the achieving or enlarging of political dominance. Previously marginalised groups have been reintegrated into the political discourse. Domestic political leaders begin to claim sovereignty over people who have the same historical background in order to ensure the state legitimacy of governance. The transnational agenda includes emphasising obscure loyalty to the Korean national culture, and stimulating nostalgia and historical memories. This, at times, unintentionally instigates a diaspora’s antagonism to
their host nation and evokes a host state’s distrust of the diaspora. Economic benefits are also involved. During the financial crisis in the late 1990s in South Korea, statistics have shown that incoming funds from overseas Koreans were unexpectedly high. Diasporas’ political contributions to the homeland have been the vital issue while both South and North Koreas have taken diaspora communities as the diplomatic base and the means of ideological dominance.

With the background of changes in political environment surrounding diaspora communities, the incoherent motherland policies towards overseas Koreans and unarticulated concepts of diasporas have provided confusing routes in establishing a sound relationship between diaspora and homeland. However, the relationship varies depending on each diaspora’s specific mode of imagining its homeland and participating in homeland affairs. The key variables, common to all three cases, are the impacts of the division of a nation, rigid confrontation throughout the Cold War during 1960s and the projection of South Korean nationalism since the late 1980s. The Josŏnjok tend to regard their connection with South Korea as an economic opportunity although being closer, politically and ideologically, to North Korea, whereas the Zainichi have ever been engaged in the politics of the divided Korea. Meanwhile, the Koreitsy’s long period of envisaging their homeland has just ended. They recently required substantial interactions, in particular, a cultural aspect especially with the South.

Meanwhile, the cultivation of ties between the homeland and a diaspora ‘may also be aimed at ensuring that the diaspora remains diasporic, rather than becoming returnees’ (King: 1998, 11). Established diaspora communities are useful only when they remain as Korean diasporas abroad. It is also seen that in the absence of a clear legal categorisation of a diaspora’s official nationality, systems are abused by a highly mobile diaspora population. A number of social and economic crimes committed by Korean American re-emigrés to South Korea since the late 1990s should be considered in this context. Unlike the prevalent perception, which comfortably assumes a diaspora’s nostalgic attachment to its motherland, significant disparities and tensions between the two parties are also observed. The recent symbolic cases introduced in the following sections demonstrate the fundamental problems between motherland and diaspora communities. Such problems and tensions provide diasporas with the opportunities to rethink their national identity and to re-interpret who they are in the extended context of motherland-host state and the larger international setting. It shows the process of a diaspora’s realisation of the disparity between a fictional image of the motherland and their practical common interest. On the motherland’s part, planned communication with knowledge and vision of diaspora communities can only mitigate and positively guide the potential antagonism of diasporas and their over-expectations of motherland.

Not only the changes in the two Koreas’ policy toward diasporas, but the division of the Korean motherland itself is one of the major factors influencing the national identity of the diaspora. Although the historical fact of the division of the nation occurred in 1953, the
formation of identity regarding such a divided nation has been influential throughout history. This is through active involvement in the unification project, to a deeper degree in the case of Japan, in both sides or through imagination without actual communication in the two other cases.

National identity as a choice

Among diasporas, whether one actually belongs to the diaspora community or not is very much dependent on individual choice because a diaspora is not a fixed form of political or legal boundary or association. Although it has a kind of historical and cultural demarcation, as Tamir (1993) and Gutmann (2003) imply, providing the social environment to make such a choice is a political issue. Within the diaspora, there may be some who would want to live in personhood beyond such a categorisation as national or ethnic. One may want to live an entirely private existence. Social psychologists, Malesevic and Malesevic (2001) argue that both primordialism and modernism neglect the fact that individuals have different contextual perceptions of national identity. Accordingly, they suggest the consideration of different types of individuals in terms of orientation towards national identity. Their categorisation suggests there are different levels or stages of perceiving collective identity in terms of nation or ethnie; ‘Ritual ethnic identity’ referring to a high level of retention of the practice of ethnic traditions accompanied by a low level of subjective components such as feelings of group obligation, ‘ideological ethnic identity’ implying a high intensity of feelings of group obligation accompanied by a low level of practice of traditions, ‘identity of resistance/revolt’ remarking negative images of one’s own ethnic group, accompanied by a high degree of awareness of one’s ethnic ancestry, and finally, ‘identity of ethnic rediscovery’ referring to positive images of one’s ancestral group accompanied by a practice of highly selected traditions. Consequently, within a diaspora group, there are a number of differing degrees, strengths, and reasons for interpreting a diaspora’s national identity.

Although I focus on diaspora identity in the extended setting: Korean motherlands, other diaspora communities and the globalised international community, the particular aspect of diaspora identity explained here is inseparable from diaspora features developed within the structural relationship between host nation and diaspora and between organisations and diaspora individuals. This is because the evolution of diaspora identity has never been separated from host countries’ dominance and influence. In my intention, the national identity of a diaspora is not limited to meaning that Korean diasporas have formed their own separate national identity. Self-evidently, the diasporas under this study do not have their own separate nation, but they are not nationless. On the contrary, they belong to plural nations, thus, plural national identities have evolved. Such plurality in a diaspora’s national identity has been regarded as a confusing and unstable collective identity, which, thus, leads to it being regarded as an untrustful
community. But, once its duality or plurality is accepted as a stable and normal 'hybrid' in Bhabha's term, one can understand a diaspora's national identity as another type of national identity, a hybrid, as explained, not as confusing mixture but as a different domain, notwithstanding its inevitable linkage with the plural nations involved. As diasporas can position themselves in different settings, their interpretation of collective selves gradually develops into an awareness of clear difference and complexity. By expanding and deepening their interpretation of collective selves, diasporas continuously build their own sphere of identity to differing degrees and over differing time spans in each case. This can be explained as being the response to the paradigm shift: from the exclusive loyalty to a single nation in a rigid international framework with the hidden agenda of nation-state towards flexible understandings of multiple nationalities. Host state, motherland and international political environment, diasporas have imposed the idea on diasporas that they should position themselves in the frame of a citizen or a non-citizen. Through increased communication with the outside public world, diasporas perceive the extended structure in which they are situated. In due course, diasporas form a different kind of national identity of their own. For this, one may speak of an identity of the third kind. This implies an alternative to the conventional paradigm which perceives national identity as something rigidly belonging to an internationally legitimated political entity with a firm territorial base and exclusive attachment to a singular national culture. The third kind of national identity connotes more an optional and controllable national identity. Diasporas who have this third identity are able to think both in and out of the nation to which they are supposed conventionally to belong. They are exposed to multiple national cultures, and know how to shift their identities under changing circumstances when necessary. Diasporas may stabilise their plural national identities through positive interpretation of their third-ness. Throughout the modern history of the nationalised state building process, this third-ness of diaspora identity has been somehow demoralised.

**Forming a diaspora identity**

The major historical issues related to the formation of a diaspora's identity broadly include the three elements: the colonial history of Korea, the Korean War and the subsequent division of the nation, and South Korean economic success and its benefits for the diaspora communities. The colonial history of Korea and the unsettled issues between Korea and Japan are the major component of Zainichi history. Meanwhile, the Josōnjok used proudly to cite their experience of participating in the Korean War, fighting against American imperialism by joining the North Korean side. In accordance with increasing communication with South Korea, Josōnjok intellectuals emphasise less and less their antagonistic historical memory against the South. Among the Koreitsy, the meaning of the Korean nation to their identity is related to South
Korean economic support and the Christian influence of the western Korean emigrant communities.

Josŏnjok identity

The Meaning of the Korean motherland to the Josŏnjok

Common to the three cases, is the division of the Korean nation, one of the key variables of identity formation. Although it is abstract, aspiration for reunification as a common national agenda has linked diaspora Koreans and the Korean motherland. As a part of a divided nation, for the Korean diasporas, the issue of the image of their homeland is related to their views on reunification. All the interviewees in China regard the issue of reunification as an imperative question regardless of their ideological affiliation. For them, there is no need to explain, and the hope for reunification is instinctive. For diaspora Koreans in the three cases, an emotive sense of belonging to their Korean homeland means a nostalgic feeling toward the unified Korea. Korean diasporas are often puzzled and made uncomfortable by outsiders' curiosity on whether they see themselves as North Koreans or South Koreans. In their psychological map, such a division is hardly acceptable. The imagined homeland of the diaspora is psychologically expanded incoherently with the real political territory of the present homeland.

On the question of the impacts of the division of the nation and the issues of reunification in this region, 'we have been ashamed of the fact that our nation is still in division and we experienced the civil war. Sometimes Hanjok friends bring out the issue of the divided nation in a despising way. Josŏnjok used to be well-qualified to compete with Hanjok but these days we feel that Hanjok's development is far faster than Josŏnjoks in many fields. We Josŏnjok have felt serious threats. To have a stronger nation nearby, a unified Korea, would be, no doubt, very encouraging for us'. Among intellectuals, the Josŏnjok agree that they should not be involved in either side of the two Koreas, in order to be able to play the useful role of mediators. Regarding their cooperation with the CCP's involvement in the Korean War, an interviewee makes the excuse that '[t]he whole region was in chaos and people were extremely insecure. We were put into a truck with a bunch of loosely armed civilians. No one knew exactly where we were going and what was happening'. Historical research should be carried out in greater detail on this issue. 'We had just heard that our Korean homeland is again in danger because of American imperialist aggression'. Among historians, research on this issue is underway. Whatever the correct historical fact is, the notable point is that some Josŏnjok have selected this particular collective experience as an element that may prove a confrontational national identity against Korean nation. Their version of the interpretation will soon be developed now that the Josŏnjok are aware of the fact that their community may benefit South Korea less by
highlighting their conflicting collective identity against the Korean nation. This may be viewed as the process of negotiation over antagonistic collective identities.

It is worth quoting interview with J. Han:

Reunification should be inevitably achieved although neighbouring countries including China may well prefer the status-quo. Reunification is what our whole nation aspires to and it will be achieved anyway. It's just a matter of time. Josôn had been a unified independent nation for over several thousand years as the South Korean president Kim Dae Jung pointed out. It is nonsense to say that a fifty-year division would hamper us from being together again. Political ideology is a superficial difference. We all share the same contents of nation despite the superficial styles which have modified into three different modes. For example, we all enjoy Ch’unhyangjon, Korean traditional novels, and we sing Arirang, the national folk song. We may present them in different ways but still they share exactly the same contents.

The interviewee was in charge of mediating meetings between South and North Korean officials prior to the Summit Meeting between Kim Dae Jung and Kim Jong Il in May 2000. If employing Armstrong’s typology in this case, it is true that ‘mobilized diasporas have often been more directly involved in foreign policy’ (Armstrong: 1976, 400). The interview text above concerning reunification is a common view among the Josônjok people. 'Regarding the unification issue, Josônjok should not be divided into two like in the Zainichi community in Japan. What we can do now is to help the two regimes build a sound foundation for reunification. When the conditions are met, we should let our next generation decide whether they still want to or not'.

Josônjok intellectuals have been involved in reunification matters as mediators, playing roles between China and the two Koreas including interpretation, consultancy and research spurred on by the South Korean Northward policy. The government project during the Rho Tae Woo regime was continued by the Kim Young Sam regime. The current debates on the historical territory, Manchu, between South Korean and Chinese social scientists and historians well reflect the agenda. In the same vein, a group of South Korean historians and politicians have claimed Korea’s territorial sovereignty over the Balh’ae region on historical grounds by equating it with the Korean nation. Major historians in South Korea, who have been involved in this subject and provoked territorial claims, include Kim Dek Hwang, Yang Tae Jin, Yuk Nak Hyun, Bae Hu Seong and Cho Kwang. Scholars of international law with the same standing as those historians include, for example, Choi Jang Geun and Noh Young Don.

On 24 August, 1992, there was a joint declaration between South Korea and China in relation to the enlargement of economic relations between the two countries. For South Korea, the purpose of the normalisation of diplomatic relations with China was both for the sake of trade and the North Korean issue. South Korea had hoped China would play a more positive
role in improving South and North Korean relations for reunification in consideration of the Chinese influence over North Korea. For China, South Korea was the fifth largest trading partner at the time that direct trade relations were started in 1987. In 1990, the Korean Trade Mission to China was established, recording USD3,800 million trading volume. The volume had increased to USD5,800 million in 1991 and the interchange of personnel between the two countries has reached one hundred thousand. The development in economic relations between the two countries was pictured in such way when the then South Korean president and his Chinese counterpart had a summit meeting at the APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation) conference on 12 November, 1991. Meanwhile, Josŏnjok identity vis-à-vis North Korea has developed in a rather different way. Apart from the short period of the Cultural Revolution, the Josŏnjok and North Koreans enjoyed relatively free movements with an application of simple formality. Resulting from the severe suppression during the Cultural Revolution, statistics show a decreasing number of the Josŏnjok population between 1964 and 1982. Some changed their national origins and some successfully fled back to the North Korean border with North Korea’s support, which was strictly banned at that time.

For older generations, strong opinions for reunification are based more on the mixture of emotive, nostalgic aspiration and ideological reasons. Meanwhile, for younger generations in their 40s and younger, the issue is more related to their own identity and aspirations to obtain Korean national status for various practical and emotional reasons. Younger generations become reluctant to express their political affiliations for either South or North Korea. Psychological attachment to the homeland is not always the same as political affiliation. ‘The homeland relationship may differ from one segment of the diaspora to another’ (Butler: 2001, 204). As with the other two cases, some Josŏnjok whose hometowns and relatives are in the South, were politically affiliated and cooperative with the North Korean regime and vice versa.

Diasporas’ varied attitudes towards the motherland can be explained by the factor of mass education which is interlinked with the generation factor. In other words, the factors refer diasporas’ exposure to the host nation’s institutionalised mass education in addition to the duration of exposure to the host society’s national culture. It is true that, unlike third and fourth generations, first and second generation Korean diasporas rarely had the chance to be incorporated into a modern mass educational system. Older generations, however, have a more vivid memory and the experience of anticolonial struggles which evidently nurtured their nationalism of sort. On the contrary, the younger generation’s national identity bears a mixed kind of nationalism through undergoing two different or sometimes conflicting educations. Their education comprises private and familial lessons on the one hand, and public state imposed education on the other. Among diasporas, social problems reflecting generation gaps are often exposed through the issues of conflicting interpretations over a diaspora’s history and national identity. It is common that older generation diasporas possess stronger sentiments or
opinions regarding their homeland. However, Josônjok society has undergone rapid changes since the late 1980s. During this period, public discourse has exhibited the Josônjok's reinterpretation of their national identity in relation to the Korean nation. Table 6.2 below summarises how Josônjok interviewees view the consequences of renewed communication between South Korea and the Josônjok community.

Table 6.2
Summary of interviews with Josônjok intellectuals on the issue of South Korean influence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Positive impacts</th>
<th>Negative impacts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Professor of history</strong></td>
<td>Increase of communications in the field of culture and education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Writer</strong></td>
<td>Stimulation of ethnic identity and national consciousness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Researcher of a state run institute</strong></td>
<td>Higher possibility of reunification and economic development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Media specialist</strong></td>
<td>Cultural development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Retired journalist</strong></td>
<td>Economic development and family reunion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Buisinessman</strong></td>
<td>Awareness of ethnic and national identity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Head of a social science research institute</strong></td>
<td>Higher possibility of reunification and economic development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Local government official</strong></td>
<td>Increased possibility of forming a strong national community and economic development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>University researcher</strong></td>
<td>Awareness of globalisation and opportunity of economic development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Professor of social science</strong></td>
<td>Economic development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ideological barrier</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Such process that is, differentiating diasporas' collective identity from the Korean nation has been fused with the overall transformation of Chinese society. The new social value imposed by the Chinese government since the Open Door Policy has urged people to adjust themselves to the market-oriented world. ‘To survive in a competitive market society, people need to adjust their negative and pre-modern ideas to the rapid economic changes by encouraging individual wills and creativity. To do so, the urgent task for people in our prefecture is emancipation from ideology'.8 The social trends of emphasising economic
development are reflected in every work unit. The newspaper article below shows the political atmosphere of reform taking the Yŏnbyŏn broadcasting company as an example. 'In the past, the Yŏnbyŏn broadcasting company lacks competition mechanism. The employers in this work unit have been paid for doing nothing. It is time to root out equalism. Instead, entrepreneurship should be introduced. In the company, there are about 23 employees whose positions are already in jeopardy'.

Previously regarded as Josŏnjok towns and cities only nominally remain as Josŏnjok regions due to internal migration and reshuffling of ethnic composition backed by industrialisation and urbanisation. National or ethnic differences had not been highlighted in the past; whether it was Josŏnjok or Han Chinese did not matter when all people were treated equally in terms of salary and social position. Now people in the region have to compete with one another because the positions are not given by the government. By introducing a sudden competition mechanism into Josŏnjok society, the Josŏnjok have faced problems of competition with Hanjok. It is also the case that Josŏnjok companies and South Korean companies in Jilin prefer to employ Josŏnjok. This is mainly because of practical convenience and advantages; language is the most important reason. Naturally, the opposite applies to the Han Chinese-run employers.

In the same way, when Han Chinese take over the position of the head of work units, for instance, Josŏnjok believe that they will be disadvantaged not only because of a natural fondness of their own group of people but also because of a lack of capabilities when they compete with Han Chinese from inner China. Meanwhile, the Josŏnjok accept such changes as natural and politically fair. For them, the state is not an object from which they can require extended rights, but they perceive that the Josŏnjok have been beneficiaries of the Chinese government. When social positions and occupations are no longer allocated by a government plan, companies prefer choosing employees with the same cultural background in a multinational social environment when other conditions of candidates are equal and unless affirmative actions are implemented. Overall, the Josŏnjok had been positive about the continuous development of the region and proud of being members of a flourishing minority national group within China, until they realised that the Josŏnjok community is in crisis in many aspects. It is also true that some Josŏnjok believe that central government has cut the special budget for minority regions to curb the development of the Josŏnjok region offering the excuse of institutionalising a competition system on a social level.

Also, class stratification in Josŏnjok society occurred within the economic relationship between South Korea and the Josŏnjok. Among the Josŏnjok, there have been many successful entrepreneurs and businessmen with South Korean connections. They were admired by others who did not succeed in making timely adjustment to the changed mechanism. Consequently, among Josŏnjok businessmen, those who have connections with South Korea more positively adjust themselves to the system of market capitalism and emphasise cultural ties with South
Korea. Many of them hope to obtain South Korean nationality. Such group of Josŏnjok now enjoy a far higher standard of living in the region.

The rapid economic development in Yanbian has been impressive since the late 1980s. The changes in industrial structure prove this. Between 1980 and 1997, the primary and secondary industries showed sharp drops from 23.6 to 16.8 per cent, in case of the primary industry, and from 51.2 to 41.6 per cent, in the case of secondary industry. In contrast, in the sector of the tertiary industry, the ratio had markedly gone up by 16.4 per cent, from 25.2 percent in 1980 to 41.6 per cent in 1997. Yanji city is ranked first in terms of savings per capita (nationwide indicator), expenditure level (province level), usage rate of communication means including postal services, cars and telephones. Before the Open Door policy, such prosperity accompanying population migration was unthinkable, especially for the immobile populations in remote rural areas, owing to the strict administrative regulations in China. Statistics show that in the case of four Josŏnjok counties in the Heilyonjiang area, in 1996 the rate of television and telephone supply per household was 100 per cent and 45 per cent respectively, which is above the average in China. As a consequence, the industrial structure has been rapidly shifted.

As a result of urbanisation, population flow has become an important issue. The Josŏnjok population is not only decreasing but also dispersing. The direct causes of population dispersal are that, firstly, labour migration to other cities has occurred continuously within China or to foreign countries, notably South Korea, Japan and North America. Secondly, the increased number of marriages between Josŏnjok women and South Korean men has caused the dispersal of Josŏnjok families. Subsequently, capital flow from Josŏnjok labourers working abroad has made an enormous contribution to the GDP increase in the Josŏnjok region. In Heilongjiang Province in 1996, the currency flow from abroad through Josŏnjok workers in foreign countries was approximately USD12 million in total. Considering the fact that the average Josŏnjok college graduate white-collar worker earns USD60 per month, such an amount of capital is sufficient to restructure the previously backward community.

As the result of the dispersal phenomenon, the number of Josŏnjok peasants is dramatically decreasing. This spurred Han Chinese peasant penetration into the agricultural lands of the region. Han Chinese have taken up the Josŏnjok lands. Also, occupations requiring relatively lower level skills, such as taxi drivers, street vendors and cleaners are being taken up by Han Chinese. This is because, as Josŏnjok themselves interpret it the Josŏnjok have a tendency to engage in jobs that bring them immediate rewards whereas the Han Chinese prefer steady long-term occupations. 'For Josŏnjok, life is supposed to be enjoyed ... Maybe it is because they are fundamentally insecure and do not know what would happen to them in the near future'. Josŏnjok earn money from South Korea and we, Hanjok, earn Josŏnjok’s money because normally Josŏnjok are extravagant, which means in the end Josŏnjok’s money is coming into our pocket anyway'.
In accordance with the development of a capitalistic mechanism, choosing an occupation and making wealth become more to do with an individual’s own efforts and abilities. The previously Josŏnjok regions have faced the stage of the gradual retreat of government support in many aspects of social and economic life. People are struggling with the dramatic social and economic changes involved in adjusting themselves to the capitalistic spirit. The degree of loyalty to the communist party used to be the key barometer of a successful and promising life among the Josŏnjok. Since Deng’s reform policy especially in the late 1980s, successful businessmen who made a huge fortune are highly acclaimed by the party, which causes a fundamental impact on the value system of ordinary people. Political loyalty to the state and the Party with a firm belief in communism is no longer regarded as the indicator of success.

To the Josŏnjok since 1980s during the period of rapid changes, communication with South Korea had brought timely opportunities and South Korea was found easier to deal with. Various factors boosted the Josŏnjok’s Korean dream. The South Korean government took an active role to involve Josŏnjok people in the project of enhancing communication with China and North Korea and other areas such as trade, cultural exchange and academic research followed the political project. There were both positive and negative consequences, and discussion of the conflicts between emotive cultural ties and practical interests have been developed in both societies: South Korea and the Josŏnjok community. In the meantime, diasporas have come to realise who they are vis-à-vis the ancestral motherland and how to cope with their dual national allegiances depending on changing circumstances.

While hostility against the South Korean people and government is growing, some have been enthusiastic to trace back their family roots in South Korea. Especially among those in the Liaonyong Province, people who have the family name Pak have made an effort to incorporate their family lineage into their clan lines in South Korea. Unlike the Josŏnjok in Jilin Province, they have been more acculturated with other ethnic or national groups, and those previously reported as either Han Chinese or Manchu have reported themselves as Josŏnjok upon frequent contacts with the Korean motherland. Some Josŏnjok had concealed their national origin for the reason that it used to be more convenient and safer, especially for those who came from the southern part of Korea, during the Cultural Revolution. Recently, however, having a connection with South Korean relatives became an important qualification for travelling or working in South Korea.

Among the Josŏnjok, the awareness of the practical necessity of preserving some part of the Korean identity is accompanied by the restoration of national heritages. The Josŏnjok people from Ryongjŏng are proud of the fact that one of the national resistant poets, Yun Dong Joo, who suffered from Japanese oppression and died in jail as one of the victims of biological experiments at the age of twenty-eight, was born and went to junior high school in Ryongjŏng,
Yanbian. For various historical and political reasons, it was not until the 1990s when Yun Dong Joo and his work became well-known to ordinary Josônjok people, whereas Koreans share the memory of him as one of the most nationalistic figures. In the preface of the Yun Dong Joo memorial collection, Jeong Pan Ryong commented, as he (Yun Dong Joo) determined in his poem, Sô-shi, he lived a life that was ‘Shameless before God’. Although he had to live in the dark and oppressive era during which our nation was forced to forget our own names let alone our language, he kept writing numerous poems and essays in our own language. He never compromised until death ... We hereby decide to publish his work in Yanbian in order to let Josônjok people be aware of his sufferings and contributions to our nation [here, by nation, he means the Korean nation inclusively], not only to Josônjok but also to Chinese people.\(^\text{14}\)

The collection also includes a Chinese translation, and financial support was provided by South Korea. The Josônjok’s national pride surrounding Yun Dong Joo suddenly emerged in the early 1990s. In the late 1980s, the building of Kwang-myong Junior High School\(^\text{15}\) to which Yun Dong Joo went between 1936 and 1938 was opened to the public as a tourist attraction especially for South Korean visitors. Now people in Ryongjong compete with the Josônjok in Yanbian over the issues of who more vigorously participated in nationalist movements against Japan, and who have maintained Korean traditions and heritage more authentically. This is an example of what I explained as competition among diasporas for recognition from ancestral motherlands upon renewed communication included in the analytical framework in Chapter 2. One could also see it as a revival of national traditions rather than an ‘invention of traditions’ in Hobsbawm’s term (1983) which have long been forgotten and left as unsophisticated. People would hardly celebrate arbitrarily invented traditions. Only the manner of celebrating cultural heritages can be modernised by inventive means.

Developing the areas as historic vestiges naturally involved frequent communication and active cooperation between South Korean and Josônjok experts. These experts include historians, researchers, educators, social activists, politicians and financial supporters from various civil associations. This was stimulating not only for Josônjok historians but also for ordinary people in the town. Now some Josônjok, at least those in the city of Ryongjong, are aware of the meaning of this nationalist poet to them. They begin to be aware that the reason why preserving some national cultures and history is valuable to them is that not only it is profitable, it is also valued by outsiders.

The turning point: the peskama-ho case and afterwards

The criminal case of the fishing ferry Peskama was a turning point that alerted Josônjok society to reconsider the meaning of homeland and the Korean nation to them. Whereas the Peskama-ho incident was neglected by the South Korean media, for the Josônjok it was a
humiliating and irrevocable impulse damaging their collective pride. The case might be seen as one of the unavoidable negative outcomes of increased communication. The situation and development of criminal motive, however, should be considered as a symbolic case demonstrating the Josōnjoks’ growing antagonism toward South Korea, frustrated expectation and psychological conflicts. By continuously dealing with the related issues in highly sensational ways, Josōnjok newspapers have also strongly instigated Josōnjok disappointment and antagonism against South Korea.

Large numbers of illegal Josōnjok workers have entered South Korea and taken jobs in low-waged manual sectors of the economy. The incident happened in June, 1996, by the time the Josōnjok’s Korean dream had reached its peak. Six Josōnjok crews who were hired by the South Korean captain of the Peskama-ho, fishing ferry, were all involved in the murder case; seven South Korean crew members, along with other crews from other nationalities were murdered in August 1996. The six Josōnjok were charged and convicted of murder, violence and neglecting dead bodies. There was no sympathy with the Josōnjok murderers and the case had not been highlighted until the brutality of the South Korean crews and the captain toward the Josōnjok crews was revealed in great detail during the investigation period. It was discovered that the Josōnjok had to stand cruel discriminations, not only in terms of wage levels but also various forms of humiliations. The Josōnjok were shocked and infuriated by the case as the South Korean crews’ brutalities were reported. The trial for the case was delayed until recently with a South Korean civil associations’ support. The associations represented by social activists including lawyers, students, and ordinary citizens keep appealing to the congressmen and president in South Korea.

A book entitled, South Korea Doesn’t Exist, written by a Josōnjok writer called Kim Jae Gook and published in 1998 in Yanbian brought significant reflections to the society. The book warns of the Josōnjok who believe in the Korean dream. The social trends reflected in the publication and people’s reactions convey the Josōnjok awareness of their own situation separate from the South Korean nation. In the same context, Ahn Hwa Chun, during interview, points out that ‘some have serious misunderstandings about Josōnjok society from the very beginning. The Josōnjok assume that their society shares all cultural features with mainland Korean society in spite of different political regimes forming different states. In reality, however, Josōnjok culture itself has been changed a great deal. Culture is not permanently static regardless of any social and political changes’. He warns of the exaggeration of cultural attachment and emotive attachment to the motherland. Even the Josōn-mal (the Korean language) the Josōnjok use is modified to a considerable extent although it is still communicable with Koreans from the two Koreas’. Conservative Josōnjok nationalists, including Ahn Hwa Chun himself, tend to emphasise the Josōnjoks’ identity as being different from both the Chinese and the Korean nations. The distinction between culture and identity can be recalled.
What the Josŏnjok are struggling for is not preserving the authenticity of national culture itself but to form their diaspora's own stable identity as being Josŏnjok in China. As I argued in the second section of Chapter 2 and throughout the main chapters, the decisive constituent demarcating the distinctiveness of a diaspora identity is the history of their own. This is applicable not only to the diaspora identity vis-à-vis the hostland but also to its identity vis-à-vis its homeland, as diasporas have their separate collective historical memories from their nation of homeland. Culture is modifiable and shareable, thus acculturation occurs. A separate history filled with collective memories is not such a case, therefore only interpretations are refashioned. This is more so when the memories are oppressive and negative. For a simple example, the Korean nation in Korea would never be able to share the Josŏnjoks' oppressive memory of the Cultural Revolution.

The common view among scholars and specialists of the region is that the Josŏnjok became antagonistic towards South Koreans mainly because the South Koreans had mistreated the Josŏnjok between 1989 and the early 1990s, and more fundamentally because of the long period of interrupted communication. The formation of the Josŏnjok identity is in a phase of highlighting differences with the Korean motherland after undergoing a short period of positive identification with Korean diasporas elsewhere. In a sense, however, Josŏnjok antagonism towards South Korea has been nurtured by the host country during a particular period during which the Josŏnjok were mobilised to participate in the Korean War, and during rigid communist regimes. Antagonism towards North Korea, on the other hand, was projected harshly during the Cultural Revolution. Until now the Josŏnjok shared the painful memory of the government's strict ban on moving back to North Korea during that time. It shows that forming images of the homeland, in the Josŏnjok case, was also dependent on government propaganda and political ideology not only with the diaspora's own interpretation of major historical events.

Considering the fact that the interpretation of history can vary from group to group, the Josŏnjok history has only been incorporated into Chinese history for the past fifty years or so; some intellectuals are concerned about the lack of opportunity for the Josŏnjok to learn their own history. When Josŏnjok children learn historical views that contradict what they know from different sources, it is natural for them to feel excluded from mainstream society and to wonder where they belong. Also, as a compulsory subject, Political Ideology contains negative images of capitalist countries, including South Korea. Official policy and the content of national education in China make a good comparison with Korean national education in Japan, although in Japan Zainichi educational institutes are not officially recognised. Autonomy in national education is not extended to the content of education. National minorities are only allowed to learn the same content of Chinese history as all other national groups, including Han Chinese, but are allowed to learn it in their own language. In China, encouraging minority national education does not mean that minority national people are provided with an opportunity to learn
their own history. In this respect, the state policy of minority national groups’ autonomy is strictly confined to the cultural domain.

Until 2001 following the Peskama-ho case, Josŏn'gok antagonism towards the South Korean motherland had continued to grow. In February and March 2000, social crimes committed by the Josŏn'gok targeting South Korean visitors and students in China became a serious issue. The first motive of such crimes was financial but hatred was also involved. The main reason for this is that the Josŏn'gok has been exposed to a capitalist world without sufficient socialisation having been adopted. Secondly, South Koreans who had first contact with Josŏn'gok failed to give a positive image of the homeland to the Josŏn'gok. Also, the sudden influx of Josŏn'gok labour in South Korea has raised serious social issues which also contributed to worsen the relationship between Josŏn'gok and South Korea. Figure 6.3 shows the percentage and field of the smaller-sized South Korean companies’ exploitation and illegal treatment of Josŏn'gok labourers. Nevertheless, thanks to the Josŏn'goks’ ability to speak Korean, compared to other guest worker groups, the Josŏn'gok wage is higher. Tables 6.3 indicates this.

**Figure 6.3 Mistreatment of Josŏn'gok labourers in South Korea**

![Example of mistreatment of Chosenjok labour in South Korea](image)

**Table 6.4 Wage difference among different immigrants in South Korea**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Josŏn'gok</th>
<th>Filipinos</th>
<th>Bangladeshians</th>
<th>Nepalis</th>
<th>Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Monthly income</td>
<td>830,000</td>
<td>480,000</td>
<td>530,000</td>
<td>560,000</td>
<td>450,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monthly consumption</td>
<td>240,000</td>
<td>150,000</td>
<td>170,000</td>
<td>170,000</td>
<td>130,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Dong-a Ilbo, 30 November, 1996

Thirdly, among Josŏn'gok, it is believed that the South Korean government has discriminated against them. The Josŏn'gok have accused the South Korean government of treating them differently from other Korean emigrants elsewhere; more exactly, Koreans in
richer countries. Diaspora crimes abusing their dual nationalities, changeable cultural codes, and multiple spatial bases became transnational problems involving diplomatic issues between China and Korea. Appropriate laws and regulations on the transnational level have not yet been implemented following up on the changed situation. It is necessary to form a clearer legal and social categorisation of diasporas than that of re-immigrants, foreign residents, or Korean citizens.

Jeong (1997) also maintains that the Josŏnjok are simply Josŏnjok ‘neither Chinese nor Koreans’. He emphasises that ‘we are not and never can be Koreans and we are mere Josŏn nationality within China, we do not exist without China but at the same time neither do we exist without our own identity as Josŏnjok’. On the question as to what they believe is the most urgent social problem that the Josŏnjok people have to solve, it is discovered that the decreasing level of the Josŏnjok population makes them feel gravely insecure. A decrease in population due to its dispersion is one of the visible thrusts. Discourse on the population decrease and dispersion are closely related to their views on the future of the community. In analysing a diaspora’s discourse, conservative ideas could imply pro-Chinese communist or self determinism, which are not so clearly distinguishable at this stage. Conservative Josŏnjok intellectuals prefer ‘government guarantees of jobs, housing, and economic equality’ (Parris: 1999, 44). The division of intellectual discourse on Josŏnjok identity and community does not include ideological difference. On this matter, the Josŏnjok are beyond political ideology although there is still obvious division of political ideology within the community in other aspects. Whether they are pro-Chinese communist or the pro-South Korean capitalistic minded, Josŏnjok nationalists are inclined to believe that they are neither Chinese nor Korean but Josŏnjok in China. In the Josŏnjok case, such self-categorisation is relatively unproblematic.

The common view shared by intellectuals is their warnings to ordinary Josŏnjok people to prepare for South Korean investment in the Josŏnjok areas. Simultaneously, they warn people never to forget the reality of living within the Chinese territory. At the same time, it is equally emphasised they should preserve their own culture lest they should lose their national roots. The Josŏnjok have not demanded a fuller degree of political citizenship from China because they are aware that they are not living in their own country. ‘Anyway we are living in other’s place’. By ‘others’ place’ the interviewee means not the Josŏnjok’s own country. ‘Then, we have to admit that what China has done to Josŏnjok was absolutely beneficial. We are not supposed to rebel against China thinking back the past. China is not our own country anyway’. On the question as to what would be the difficulties in mingling with Han Chinese who are supposed to have exclusive and strong national pride, an interviewee answers as follows:

Sometimes it is unbearable to mix together, for instance, in a university dormitory, when Hanjok and Josŏnjok students start to share a room at the
beginning of the term, only a few, say, one out of ten turned out to be still sharing the room at the end of the term. In the case of mixed marriage, the situation is similar. The rate of inter-marriage between Han Chinese and Josŏnjok, which used to be approximately 11 per cent, has risen almost twice these days because more and more Josŏnjok young generation do not care about their spouse’s nationality, though the rate is still far below the average comparing to other minority national groups in China.\textsuperscript{18}

It is significant, however, that all the interviewees comment that such difficulties on the individual level are minor. The Josŏnjok think that as long as they are not living in their own state and the Chinese government has made efforts to keep discouraging Han Chinese great Hanism, most Josŏnjok believe that they should bear what they take to be Han Chinese arrogance.

The discourse about national identity among Josŏnjok intellectuals also changed after the period of fluctuation in national identity between 1989 and 1995. Josŏnjok people refer to Chinese territory excluding the area of frontiers as inner China whereas they call Korean territory as Josŏn mainland. Josŏnjok intellectuals see their Josŏnjok identity and the community to be in serious danger of disappearing. An influential Josŏnjok writer holds that ‘Josŏnjok writers in this period should strongly hold nationalistic spirit as Josŏnjok. Writers should have a clear picture about the future of Josŏnjok in the crisis of national identity’. He continues, ‘now it is the time to overcome political ideology and we Josŏnjok should search for our own identity which is rather fundamental identity based on individuality. The life of our parents’ generation was, in a word, tragic. Now we have to overcome the past’.\textsuperscript{19}

As I have emphasised, forming their national identity means interpreting and reinterpreting their collective existence in relation to the nations involved. As much as their identity as a minority national becomes clearer, national identity linked with the Chinese nation and state could also be either fortified or weakened. As the interviewee Pak expresses, ‘China is the only power which can keep check and balance role against American imperial influences on East Asia’.\textsuperscript{20} This may be interpreted as a political sense of belonging to China as a Chinese citizen. Josŏnjok intellectuals have also developed Asian nationalism. During interviews about the western world, especially the United States, some interviewees show that they are proud of having official Chinese nationality. This also suggests that national identities can co-exist with larger category of political identities. Imposing Asian nationalism would not discourage having national identity. But the framework of ‘China equal East Asia, and Asia against the United States’ may lead them to perceive that only western power was imperial whereas Chinese imperialism was ever benevolent to national minority groups like the Josŏnjok.

So far in this part, I have analysed Josŏnjok images and understandings of the Korean homeland and Josŏnjok discussions on the consequences of the relationship between diaspora and homeland. Diasporas’ expressions of who they are and who they want to be in collective
terms vis-à-vis the Korean nation are salient upon some preeminent historical watersheds. Through these visible watersheds, their collective identity is represented. Diaspora stories are written in an organised manner and passed down to the next generations. Through keeping a collective history, identity becomes concrete. Such an identity is featured as being particularly Josŏnjok at the same time as being diasporic.

Zainichi identity

In total, the Korean minority occupies 46.6 per cent of foreign migrants in Japan. If including naturalised Korean origin Japanese, the percentage of the Zainichi population is higher than official statistics show. Expression of diasporas’ collective identity becomes particular; their expression occurs at a significant time, in relation to regional particularities and circumstantial motives. The way of representing their collective identity among the Zainichi is more diverse and sophisticated than in the other two cases. With sophistication of expression, more complexities are added to the identity itself. 'Pressed peoples that may once have conceived of their situation in the context of ‘majority-minority’ power relations are now embracing diasporan discourse as an alternative' (Butler: 2001, 190). The Zainichi experienced a longer period of being vigilant for such power relations and consequently, their national identity as Korean descendants has been shaped in an aggressive fashion against Japanese and a negative manner of accepting dual nationality as a minority compared with the Josŏnjok and the Koreitsy. However, in relation to the Korean motherland, due to relatively sufficient communication, knowledge and understanding, the process of differentiating diaspora identity from Korean national identity has reached a more stable stage. The Zainichi accept the inevitable degree of alienation from the Korean society of the motherland whereas Josŏnjok society still remains at the stage of developing negative and antagonistic relationships towards the Korean motherland.

Collective memories: Zainichi in the colonial setting

The division of the motherland has a crucial meaning to the Zainichi. The Zainichi community has been firmly constrained within the triad structure of motherland, organisations and diasporas. Younger generation diasporas have developed diasporic skills of controlling duality. As in the other two cases, the Zainichi also have their self-justifications by which they felt impelled to remain in Japan rather than returning to a decolonised homeland. The Zainichi emphasise Japan’s strict regulations which eventually, they believe, deprived them of their chance to return to their homeland. Selecting historical components is a diaspora’s own will. However, in the process of keeping diaspora history, the Zainichi have developed antagonism towards the Japanese nation. This contrasts to the Josŏnjok who focus more on their cooperation
and contributions to Chinese state building.

Hong In Sook's (1991) passage below insinuates Zainichi's regret regarding the issue of returning to their homeland.

It may sound natural to return to their homeland right after the Korean emancipation. However, Zainichi Korean's return to the homeland process was not a simple question as it appears. However Koreans were an independent nation, they were still under suspicion and supervision, and unlike traveling land routes, returning to Korea required ships from Japan. Zainichi Koreans gathered the harbors, shimonoseki, shenzaki, and hakata, everyday. Most of them had to stay nearby the harbors as no actions were taken by the Japanese government and they could not afford to prepare ships on their own (462).

Not all Zainichi wished to return to Korea. The important point here, however, is the question why they continuously highlight this particular aspect of history. As I have discussed in Chapter 6, a stable diaspora identity should be based on recognised self-justification of their historical existence in the host state. Zainichi's discourse demonstrates that, between the Zainichi community and the Japanese nation, this precondition has not yet been negotiated. It explains Zainichi's non-existence in the Japanese society. Along with their collective memory of returning to their homeland, most Zainichi take the Kando earthquake and the Han-shin educational incident as the most memorable watersheds for the mobilising of Zainichi solidarity. In the selection of historical events, the crucial difference between Zainichi and the other two is that the Zainichi selection of collective memory includes the extensive historical period of Japanese colonial occupation of Korea. Accordingly, Zainichi selections are naturally antagonistic towards the host nation and, consequently, the tensions imply national confrontation. In this sense, it has been difficult for them to build their own identity, being distanced from the Korean nation. In this regard, Zainichi identity has been more confined to the historical relationship between the two Koreas and Japan.

I take the passage, the selection of historical events, to mean what the Zainichi have chosen as their diaspora history to remember for themselves and to pass down to the next generations. These selections reflect their identity as Zainichi and the motivation and their desire for recognition by telling outsiders and themselves how they have lived. Zainichi collective reactions implied in such selections are viewed as spontaneous. In the end, the Zainichis' own history makes their collective identity, which is distinctive from the Korean national identity and also from the Japanese national identity. The Zainichi often express their suffocating sentiment of non-existence. Most interviewees have pointed out that ordinary Japanese people in general are uninformed or misinformed of the problems of the Zainichi. Han Ahn Soon mentions such an issue:
When I entered Japanese college after graduation from Jo-go [Josōn high school] and began more interaction with Japanese, I was quite bewildered by the fact that Japanese in general know so little about Zainichi or history of Korea-Japan relationship. It was a surprising experience for me to discover that most Japanese have been such misinformed of Zainichi issues such as the Kando earthquake and so on. I come to realise that I myself must have more knowledge of Zainichi issues and Korean history in general.21

The Kando earthquake was the most destructive earthquake in Japan. In Tokyo on the 1 September 1923, about 100,000 people were killed and 100,000 were injured. The entire city was destroyed by this disaster. Zainichi were targeted immediately after the catastrophe. As many as 20,000 out of a total 30,000 Zainichi were indiscriminately killed in the region. By exploiting public sentiments against Zainichi students and left-wing workers in the region, false rumours and reports were spread throughout the region:

Soon after the earthquake, rumours began to circulate that the Koreans were planning to attack the Japanese and were setting fires, looting, and poisoning wells. In the midst of the confusion that followed the earthquake, many Japanese believed these rumours. The Tokyo police made matters worse by authorizing a radio broadcast warning that the Koreans, aided by Japanese anarchists, 'were burning houses, killing people, and stealing money and property'. Japanese army reservists and civilian volunteers were organized as a vigilante corps to roam the streets in search of Koreans (Mitchell: 1967, 39).

Without investigation, the accused Koreans were killed by outraged mobs and armed policemen. Although the truth has been revealed by Japanese historians, the record of the event has been remembered by ordinary Japanese. The public image of the Zainichi in Japan as fearful and harmful has hardly changed until now. Major Japanese media and conservative politicians occasionally instigate and regenerate negative public perception of the Zainichi by calling attention to the North Korean issues. They often make connections between North Korean issues and the Zainichi, being ready to accuse the Zainichi of being a potential danger to national security. The very fact that such an incident as the Kando earthquake is continuously remembered as a memorable historical issue contrasts to the cases of the Josōnjok and the Koreitsy, who prefer highlighting historical events after incorporation. For the Josōnjok and Koreitsy, the Qing dynasty and the Soviet Union under Stalin are not regarded as the same host states into which they are presently incorporated. Korean diasporas in these regions consider that negative historical memories that occurred between diasporas and host nations belong to the Qing or Soviet regime, which no longer exist. Meanwhile, postwar Japan always remains the same wartime colonial Japan to the Zainichi.

The Zainichi, especially those who have been exposed only to Japanese national education, normally develop negative self-identification of their Korean origin for a while. The quotation below from Jin Saeng So’s article on his self-identification is rather typical.
Without adequate knowledge about my family backgrounds, I started to feel ashamed of being Korean. Every time I heard related words ... just sounded like ‘kankoku/chousen’ [South Korea/North Korea in the Japanese language], I was so scared that somebody would find out my ethnicity and pick on me. I kept denying my heritage and tried to disengage in being involved in anything related to Korea and its culture. It is also common that Zainichi Koreans have been conditioned by Japanese society to believe in the inferiority of their Korean ethnicity ... The biggest challenge for Zainichi Koreans is the process of finding their self-identity with the understanding of the cruel reality that the society they live in sees them as inferior.22

By quoting an illustration from Hideki Harajiri’s book, Jin Saeng So explains the consequences when their Korean origin is revealed among their peers. It is also added, however, through some unexpected occasions of self discovery, many Zainichi start to use their real Korean names in their thirties and forties and feel great relief. The phrase in Jin Saeng So’s passage, ‘without adequate knowledge about family background, I felt ashamed of being Korean’ reflects the younger generation of Zainichis’ new mode of perceiving their collective selves and responding to discriminations. This trend also relates to the development of South Korea and its enhanced international recognition compared with the 1960s and 70s.

Interviews with Goh Chan Yoo and Kim Gwang Min also reflect the trend. They have led the new social movements, which I explained in Chapter 5. They explain the purpose of such movements as providing younger generation Zainichi with the knowledge of their national background. They add explanations that this is not in order to return to the Korean motherland but to live in Japan with confidence. ‘I lacked knowledge of Korean motherland and Korean nation23 and I was too ignorant of Zainichi overall problems. ... that was the reason why I had to feel that I was a helpless alien from both societies. But in the end, I come to realise that identity should be defined by myself first of all’.24 Similarly, Goh Chan Yoo, a Zainichi writer, also expresses the crucial moment that he comfortably felt himself as Zainichi. ‘I went to Japanese schools up until high school. I had been always ashamed of my Korean origin. In 1965, for the first time, I happened to learn about Zainichi history and the history of the Korean nation. I participated in demonstrations against the summit meeting between Korea and Japan in 1965 around that time. I began to think that it is not the Zainichi who should feel ashamed; what is wrong is the Japanese way of teaching history. I decided to go to Joson University afterwards ... I’m happy that I finally found to what I have to devote myself for the rest of my life’.25

Such a new trend of nationalist movements among Zainichi population is not necessarily exclusively led or participated in by younger generation Zainichi. Regardless of generations, the new types of movements are spirited by a well educated group of Zainichi who have been somewhat indifferent to and discontent with the previous manner of Zainichi response to discrimination. People involved in these groups are more concerned with practical issues for
Zainichi well-being. They prefer to face Japanese society and the government directly rather than the Korean motherland.

As I have mentioned, the Zainichi have had more social pressure to frame themselves clearly as being either Korean or Japanese. The following passage demonstrates such pressure:

[T]he population of Zainichi Koreans in Japan is often invisible to the majority of the Japanese, and, ironically, to a large portion of the younger generation of Zainichi Koreans themselves. Many Korean youths who grew up in Japanese society often have difficulties accepting their Korean identity because the Japanese culture they grew up with enforced the concepts of a homogenous Japanese society as well as discriminatory attitudes towards Koreans that they themselves have accepted as correct. This identity confusion leads to many different paths of identifying themselves and expressing their existence in Japanese society.26

However, when the Zainichi encounter South Koreans, the Zainichi are again bothered by feeling pressured to frame themselves within on one side or the other in the same way as with Japanese society. Mun Young Sook explained her unpleasant experience. 'I was disappointed when I happened to talk to a group of South Korean college students. When they noticed my poor ability in Korean language with a strong Japanese accent, they annoyingly asked me why I don’t go for naturalisation'. As a teacher in a Josōn school who has been brought up in a strong nationalist environment and has longed to be outwardly Korean, she was extremely disappointed by the exclusive attitude of those South Koreans whom she met.

Only the ways of resisting assimilation differ depending on generations and diaspora cases. A hasty conclusion of voluntary assimilation among the Zainichi would seem to be unsafe. Korean observers have somehow misinterpreted Zainichi resistance to severe discriminations as expression of their Korean national identity. In the same way, Fukuoka misjudges the Zainichis' antagonistic or differentiated expression against/towards Korean motherlands as an aspiration for Japanese identity. The layers of different identities are far more complex in the case of diasporas. Since the early 1990s, owing to balanced communication with both South and North Korea, Zainichi public discussion on their identity and community has reached a mature phase. They have voluntarily begun to implement national educational programmes. The programmes are to provide unbiased knowledge of their national background. Such movements have led the Zainichi to be successfully incorporated into mainstream society with confidence. People involved in these projects believe that the Zainichi collective shame has been nurtured by Japan's national mass education and the Zainichi’s own ignorance of their history and culture. Accordingly, educational reform movements have recently been the greatest concern not only within Minidan associated organisations but also among Choryōn schools.

I began this section by showing the causal relations between colonial history and the Zainichi identity. It explains why the Zainichi community is particularly bound with the
homeland to a deeper degree than in other diaspora cases. However, new types of social movements have emerged that are led by an educated group of Zainichi activists. These activists are more concerned with building a more self-reliant Zainichi community less influenced from either of the two Koreas. The next section explores further on how Zainichi identity is linked with their enthusiasm for national education.

**Political ideology, national education and the motherland**

An emphasis on the next generation's education was almost a path of salvation for older generation Zainichi. Koreans' efforts to set up schools wherever they go became a nationalised ritual. For diaspora people, the entire process of setting up schools in foreign lands represented a struggle for their future. Such a process involved discussing education, raising funds, negotiating the issues of minority education with host governments and deciding on curricula. Educational issues stemmed from concerns over their collective future and hope that all Zainichi would share. The special attention to the next generation's education among diasporas can be explained in the following two contexts: the desire to move up the social ladder based on their firm beliefs in class mobility, and the fundamental insecurity of being outsiders in host states.

Historically, among Zainichi, Korean education took the crucial role of providing ideological means for anticolonial struggle and later as the means of promulgating North Korean political agendas. Accordingly, the issue of education in Zainichi society had never been discussed separately from the framework of diaspora and motherland. In Japan, by October 1947, the National League of Koreans in Japan, before the division into the two separate organisations, had built 541 elementary schools, 7 junior high schools, 22 adolescent schools, and 8 high schools. The League developed its own curriculum which emphasised Korean history and geography. Later, however, the SCAP intervened in the establishment of Korean schools because they were seen as a potential source of social conflicts. The number of schools is included in the list of closure. Tensions between Koreans and the SCAP along with the Japanese government were intensified and mass protests took place in the face of the risk of closing down already established schools. The events are called the Han-shin/Osaka and Kobe education incidents. Japan in cooperation with the US military regime decided to abolish 442 educational institutes which were categorised as below the standard of the newly implemented educational law. The Kobe and Osaka [Hanshin] incidents were the two major protests by several hundreds of Zainichi parents only to be sentenced, injured and killed. In 1948, a negotiation was settled and a few Korean schools were left but categorised as special/kakushu (or other category) private institutes by Article 1 of the School Education Law.

As Korean schools are not officially recognised, graduates of Korean high schools, for example, are not eligible to sit entrance exams for Japanese state universities. The content and
The formality of minority education shows a contrast. In China, the autonomy given to minority education during compulsory education periods means that the official language used in minority ethnic or national schools are the minority’s own languages but the curriculum and contents of textbooks should be uniform. In consequence, unless parents are aware of historical issues, students have little chance to become aware of the history of Korea or the Josёнjok. The only difference between Josёнjok minority schools and Han Chinese schools in the region is whether the standard textbook is taught in the Korean language or Chinese language. Japan has rejected categorising Josён schools as proper educational institutes on the grounds that Josён schools do not abide by the Japanese educational laws, which require conditions that the Zainichi believe go against the basic norm of minority national education. ‘If abiding by the codes, we are supposed to teach only certain contents which the Japanese government approves … then, what is the point to maintain Josён schools under the title of Josён national education in real terms’.

Numerous problems with Choryён education have also been pointed out. Firstly, language is the most difficult barrier for students of Choryён-run schools. Fluent Japanese is regarded as a foreign language and from second year elementary school students are supposed to speak only Korean. Adaptability to Japanese society becomes a serious problem as students grow up. Secondly, apart from language, the contents of the textbooks are not relevant to daily life in Japan since they are similar to the ones used in North Korea. Thirdly, there are difficulties in pursuing higher degrees in Japanese universities after graduating from Choryён primary and secondary schools. Consequently, in 1960, the enrolment in Choryён schools numbered 50,000 but this had dropped to 20,000 in 1982. However, the problems with Choryён education have been gradually solved by steady reforms with an ideological shift to a milder line since the mid-1990s.

Through continuous movements by the Zainichi themselves and widespread support from Japanese civil activists since 1994, a number of local governments have now recognised the minority national education and provide a modest amount of subsidies to Zainichi schools, although the Japanese government’s national level subsidies have not been offered. Approximately 40 per cent of Japanese universities on the prefectural, municipal and private levels have accepted Zainichi high school graduates to sit for the entrance exams. However, in order to enter national universities, until now Zainichi high school graduates have been required to take an extra exam to prove qualifications. It is true that the minority national school have been segregated from Japanese society. Students who attend the Choryён-run schools used to be heavily indoctrinated by the North Korean government. As the internal mechanism of the Choryён was the same as that in North Korea, Choryён-run national schools did not provide an alternative to Japanese dominance and discrimination.

An increasing proportion of the Zainichi, the same as in China and elsewhere in multinational countries, more and more prefer not to send their children to exclusive minority
national schools. This is due to their gradual awareness of functional necessity and steady
decrease in options. In the end, minority schools are becoming run down, caused mainly by lack
of funding in most cases unless they are under the special protective government scheme. 'It is
ture that Josōn schools have been somehow political means but Zainichi education needs reform
... In the past, we urged Josōn school graduates to go to Josōn University exclusively. Josōn
high schools these days provide active support for students who want to enter Japanese higher
education after graduation. Accordingly, textbooks have been adjusted in more balanced way
and we even provide them special preparation courses'.

The Zainichi have come to believe that minority national education gives more options
for the future and cultural choices. Han Ahn Soon went to Josōn schools for her secondary
education and went on to Japanese college. She expresses, 'I felt I was in the new world ... but I
also think that my Josōn education provided me with a unique world after all. It was advantage
to have a chance to expose to different cultures at the same time. ... When I become well-known
and received requests for interviews, by Japanese media people, I am always asked whether I
can speak Japanese. While speaking in Japanese, I'm always asked how I can speak such good
Japanese ... Well ... I was born in Japan and I am like one of them ... it is complicated and even
annoying to explain all the details of the existence of we, Zainichi, and why we are remain as
Korean nationality.'

As purity of blood has been overemphasised as being one of the important national
agendas, Japan hardly accepts a hyphenated identity. In other words, a hyphenated identity is not
viewed as normality. It is viewed, instead, as an unstable identity that should be adjusted at
some point. Such exclusion is deduced from the Japanese public fear that full inclusion of
diaspora groups like the Zainichi will cause a danger to the unity and security of Japan. The
assumption behind the fear is that two national identities are mutually exclusive. As some can
have two occupational identities at the same time and use different identities under different
circumstances, dual nationalities should not necessarily be seen as either unethical or infeasible.
There is not a convincing argument why several and different levels of public spheres or public
cultures should not exist simultaneously under the same administrative arrangement of state. On
the other side of the coin, the very existence of a separate independent public culture does not
give theoretical justification to claiming political sovereignty contrary to Millerian thoughts.

As I have discussed so far, the problems of Zainichi education are interwoven with
political issues involving colonial history, Japan’s policy, and North Korean influence. Hence,
the factors: the historical relationship between Japan and Korea, and Korea’s control over
diaspora communities have always been the underpinning issues when discussing educational
reform within the Zainichi community. However, as a positive interpretation of their situation
and duality has emerged among the Zainichi, they have begun to consider the issue of education
more as concerning a community’s own future free from political or diplomatic issues. I view
this change as one of the reflections of the development of third type of national identity. This shows a trial of overcoming their restrained circumstances. Under such circumstances, Zainichi identity was passively constructed within the rigid trial framework of motherland-hostland-organizations. The Zainichi have now begun to see themselves as positive actors although their collective identity will always be represented from such structure.

Building an independent identity

It is not so safe to conclude that the Zainichi are assimilated and have lost their collective identity as they speak perfect Japanese, behave like Japanese, hide their Korean origins and occasionally show hostility towards the Korean nation. The former principal of the Osaka hangook-hak-gyo (South Korean school), Lee Young Hoon’s (1992) passage reflects Zainichi identity vis-à-vis the Korean nation.

Even if their children are deaf and mute, to parents, they are still their children. How could (the motherland) give up her children only because they cannot hear and cannot speak the language! Even with other means of communication, as a family, we should share the collective identity and national attachment with emotion and inspiration. The problems of Zainichi education should be viewed in this way, too ... the rigid idea that the degree of fluency in the Korean language is the only standard of evaluating the achievement of national education should be corrected (255).

The passage above shows the Zainichi search for a collective identity. The Zainichi have been more confused with a national identity to a greater extent. A Zainichi painter symbolically expresses, ‘I often ask to myself; who, on earth, am I who knows s’aekkihoe?’ I had thought that eating s’aekkihoe was common culture among all Koreans’. Among Zainichi the fluctuation of identity was explicit with the sudden death of Kim Il Sung in July 1994. The Japanese government pushed harsh inspections banning Choryŏn’s financial support to North Korea in the wake of Sato Katzumi’s, the head of Modern Korea Research Centre in Japan, announcement that Choryŏn’s 6,000 million yen fund has been used for North Korean nuclear weaponry. Choryŏn has organised a wider range of fund-raising for North Korea in return for a North Korean educational fund for the Zainichi. It started with 50 million yen in 1972 and 500 million yen in 1982. Since the early 1980s, the fund from Choryŏn to North Korea outweighed North Korean support for Choryŏn. Since 1994, the relationship between Choryŏn and North Korea became more slack and internal conflicts within the organisations have been frequent. Such disturbance is proved by the number who changed their official nationality. Statistics shows that the number of people who changed their nationality from Josŏn to South Korean, Japanese or something else after Kim’s
death is almost the same as the number as on the collapse of the Soviet Union. During 1994, as many as 6,200 Zainichi changed their official nationality. The number was recorded as the next highest to 6,600 Zainichi who changed their nationalities in 1990 on the occasion of the collapse of the Soviet Union,\(^3\)\(^5\) as I have briefly mentioned in Chapter 4. It is unclear, however, whether such fluctuation in nationality reflects the decline of Choryŏn or temporary changes. The people who gave up Choryŏn membership do not necessarily join Mindan or change their nationality to South Korean instead. Even when a Choryŏn member changes nationality to South Korean, in many cases it is only for the sake of convenience. Mun is one such cases that shows a change of nationality to South Korean is practical, but she still keeps strong loyalty to North Korea although she was born in Japan and her parents are originally from southern Korea where her relatives still reside.

The Zainichi identity has begun to be more stabilised. A stable diaspora identity is more likely to be achieved when diasporas are incorporated into mainstream society to a deeper degree. And yet, diasporas face many levels of barriers, both in collective and individual terms. Diaspora groups are not homogeneous within. Internal and external class division is one of those barriers. Diaspora people can take a relatively advantaged position when they are involved in occupations requiring transferable skills and dual nationality including trading with countries of origin, translation/interpretation, tourism, diplomatic affairs, and so forth. Also, they are more settled than immigrant groups. However, new division of labour occurs within diasporas. A more complicated issue arises when, in the host states, the class line is more or less congruent with the ethnic or national line. Japanese society is one of those examples. Among diaspora, a handful of upper class privileged denizens are advantaged to a deeper degree by being integrated into both societies whereas lower class denizens are further marginalised from both societies. For the reason that the Zainichi are incorporated into the relatively more developed capitalised host society, division among diaspora society within is more complicated.

A higher degree of diaspora incorporation into the host society is normally regarded as a consequence of losing a collective identity. I do not consider, on the contrary, that only collective actions or visible collectivities such as minority organisations are the expressions of collective identity. Of course, minority organisations should function well but their membership regulations should be voluntary to their own national members and inclusive to other nationalities within their host state. I regard this as a multinational and multicultural choice of a diaspora. Developing an independent identity via-à-vis the motherland is also a precondition. In such a way, diasporas may be more dispersed, yet being dispersed with more a stable collective identity. This stage can be described as a self-reliant diaspora community. To the host society, such a community will be regarded as a well established diaspora community rather than an ever threatening potential separatist group. The Zainichi will settle their intrinsic dilemmas in this way. Again, I conceive that this is also a diaspora's active choice. Only the manner of resistance
to assimilation is different. For that reason, it is not always safe to regard that naturalisation, concealing names, and discontent with organisational activities should lead to the conclusion that the national identity of diaspora is fading away as a generation passes and because the Zainichi lack a collective will to maintain their collective identity. Zainichi expressions of being different from the Korean nation are often erroneously interpreted as antagonism towards the Korean motherland, loss of national identity as Korean, or desire for being Japanese. Self-expression of being different is more likely to be understood as the process of securing their own kind of national identity. Recent changes tell us that the Korean nation of the mainland is seen as the object from which they differentiate themselves rather than as a model with which diasporas would identify themselves. Prewar Korean diasporas’ efforts to create a diaspora network with Korean immigrants to wealthier western countries can also be interpreted in this context.

Koreitsy identity

Revival of collectivities

Unlike Zainichi or Josônjok, Koreitsy are in a relatively advantageous situation in which the South Korean motherland can positively engage in shaping the community and identity. Korean kolkhozes are disappearing and people are dispersing but new types of collective features have emerged. Korean political organisations and nationalist movements were equally as active in the Soviet Union as in the other two countries until the independence of Korea. None of the political organisations survived. This was mainly because of the eradication of political factions before deportation. ‘[R]ecent work has documented the destruction of approximately three thousand Korean party and government officials, army officers, writers and teachers - nearly the entire administrative and cultural elite’.36 A considerable number of Koreitsy activists returned to North Korea after 1950. However, due to their alienation from North Korean society most of them actually returned to central Asia and Sakhalin. This was mainly because of Kim Il Sung’s proclamation of self-reliance in December 1955, confirming an anti-Soviet and pro-Chinese stance. It is analysed that Kim’s exclusive policy was a profound ideological justification to domesticate communism into a Korean-style. Most Koreitsy who occupied important positions of party and government in North Korea were expelled to the Soviet Union or purged by 1956, when the DPRK’s relations with the Soviet Union was aggravated.

Since the vigorous communications with South Korea in the wake of the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games, Koreitsy interests in the establishment of various cultural institutions and organisations became fashionable. In May 1989, the Moscow Goryōin association was organised and others, such as the Goryōin associations and the Goryō Culture Centre in
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, followed. In May 1990, the All Goryōin Association in Moscow was also set up in order to represent all Koreitsy under the unified organisation. After the independence of central Asian states, however, communications between organisations were not smooth enough to integrate the Korean people spread over the vast territory. Today, those organisations operate independently, depending on the region. Founding Korean organisations has been a noticeable trend in the post-Soviet central Asian states also, especially, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. While collective features centred around Koreitsy kolkhozes faded away with the disintegration of the former Soviet Union, the South Korean nationalist agenda has penetrated into the region in the form of Korean schools, churches, welfare institutes, entrepreneurs and so forth. These institutions have instigated awareness of cultural heritages. Koreitsy, who could promptly make some connection with South Korean people, actually had advantages in job searches, study in South Korea or short trips to South Korea. All the South Korean-Koreitsy institutes have played relatively positive roles in developing the community.

The Goryō Cultural Association is one the most representative Koreitsy organisations. It is composed of forty branch offices spread over each city and collective farms in Uzbekistan. At present its major functions are fourfold: fund-raising, enhancing Koreitsy welfare, enlarging membership and supporting cultural events. ‘In order to secure funds, we’ve purchased a few fishing kolkhozes in 2002 and run them in the form of a joint stock company. We also run a fifteen hectare size cemetery exclusively for Koreitsy upon the request of elderly Korean population. The organisation is also in charge of taking care of orphaned Koreitsy children whose family members have been dispersed to other regions of central Asia. From time to time, we support various cultural activities including exhibitions, shows on tour, traditional Korean ceremonies and so on’. At present, in Uzbekistan there are six Koreitsy organisations. Four of them are supported by the South Korean government and operate in cooperation whereas the other two are pro-North Korean organisations. However, only one minority organisation per nationality is approved by Uzbek Law. If including small unofficial Koreitsy organisations, the number rises above twenty.

Such a trend of maintaining cultural heritage is followed by discussions on the future of the community. Em’s (1991) passage is noteworthy.

As the Koreitsy community in post Soviet society is not a major minority national group, ... there are quite a few important issues to solve regarding the present status of Koreitsy in the new era of multinational regime. ... There is large number of minority ethnic and national groups which achieved exclusive autonomous regions or prefectures. Even minority groups such as Kalmuk, Kabargin, Balkar, Avhaz, which are consisted smaller number of population than Koreitsy have proposed an autonomous prefectures. ... The population of Koreitsy is nearly a half million but we haven’t acquired self-governing rights. ... Without achieving political, legal and territorial self-governing arrangement,
Koreïtsy only face a difficult life and it will not be possible to protect national interests, and political and socio-economic security (52).

However, expression of their collective identity is rather a recent phenomenon. ‘At the absence of indigenous religion, it was relatively easy for Koreïtsy to form loyalty towards communist ideology. Koreïtsy were extremely cooperative and active in communist movement and projects’. When explaining the relatively weak maintenance of Koreïtsy in comparison with the Zainichi or Josônjok, the following variables are to be considered. Firstly, the size of population is small in comparison with other minority national groups in the former Soviet Union and Uzbekistan. Secondly, geographical distance from the Korean motherland hampered their engagement in communal affairs with the two Koreas. Thirdly, they have lived in multinational environments where plural national identities are not unusual. Fourthly, communist propaganda of equality among nationalities had masked and delayed national tensions. Fifthly, discussing issues of national based economic inequality is immature due to the overall economic underdevelopment in this region. The next point is that among minority groups, Koreïtsy have secured relatively higher economic status, which helped them to build a positive idea on who they are in relation to the Korean, Soviet, and Uzbek nations. The seventh point is, as I mentioned earlier, that the purge of nationalist activists during the Soviet era quelled any potential activism. This is evidenced by official documents obtained from the former Soviet KGB, Committee for State Security, in 2000 and other subsequent historical documents. The eighth point is that self-recorded written history is very rare from the older generation. Written records on their own history not only reflect, but shape and guide a collective identity. Finally, the Soviet state has disappeared. The Koreïtsy no longer have any responsible central government of whom to demand compensations or to whom correction of historical misrecognition can be addressed.

So far, in this section, I explained Uzbek Koreïtsy’s emerging efforts to create cultural centres and organisations. Such efforts have been realised through communications with the South Korean government and people. The influence of the motherland has stimulated their awareness of the necessity of preserving Korean national heritage, and offered a practical opportunity for some and an emotive national connection for some others. Such an emerging phenomenon is seen as a revival of collectivity and identity whereas, during the Soviet era, institutionalisation of collective identity was strictly limited to the state-supported forms, notably, the kolkhoz. The South Korean role has been viewed as rather positive. This is because its transnational project was better planned before implementation dissimilar to the Josônjok case. Also, the Uzbekistan government has been supportive of South Korean influence, not only on the Koreïtsy community but on the overall Uzbek society for political and economic reasons.
In the following sections, I analyse further the Koreït'sy identity formation vis-à-vis the Korean nation.

**Renewed communication, national revival and diaspora identity**

Han (1999) mentions an ancient Korean popular novel, *Hong-gildong-jôn*, in relation to his memory of his father and his motherland. 'My father didn't know the Russian language at all. He only spoke Korean. He often read to us Hur Gyun's *Hong-gildong-jôn* written in the fourteenth century and we have kept the story in our notebooks'. The author recalls what his father told him, 'this book is about a good man called Hong Gil-dong, a Korean version of a Robin Hood sort of character, who continuously fought for justice throughout his life in the late Josôn era and people respected and admired him a lot. But he judged that in Josôn, ultimate happiness and justice cannot be found, and decided to leave Josôn for yuldoguk to establish a new country on an island where he could guarantee the people a happy and comfortable life. Father said to me, 'A long time ago, I had also left my hometown with my brothers to search for a place like yuldoguk' (79).

Along with collective memory of deportation, agricultural contribution and participation in the socialist revolution during Soviet era, the Koreït'sy identity has developed with an imagining of the homeland. As in the similar case of Josônjok, the Koreït'sy kept a closer relationship with North Korea not only their hometowns and blood ties left in the North, but also a political relationship between North Korea and the former Soviet Union explains this. Since the 1950s, after the existence of North Korea, Soviet Koreans had freedom to move to North Korea. Most cases of Soviet returnees to North Korea, however, were due to North Korea's unpredictable policies and harsh discrimination against Soviet-based communist activists.41 There were only a handful of Soviet Koreans who survived the process of a power struggle within the North Korean regime. There are many undiscovered cases regarding Soviet returnees to North Korea. Some were exiled and some have been missing and uncontactable for several decades. Kim Mikhail Sergeyvicci's story of his missing aunt shows the relationship between the Koreït'sy community and North Korea, although there was also a short period during which North Korea played the role of a warm home town for the Koreït'sy.

One of my aunts was a returnee to North Korea in the early 1950s. She took a high position in the North Korean regime at the beginning. Our family were allowed to get in touch with her on a yearly basis until 1956. Sometime in 1956, however, she was excluded from the regime due to her Soviet background. Our family could manage to bring her children [interviewee’s cousins] back to Uzbek republic through the North Korean embassy here. My aunt has been missing since 1962. We know she was not allowed to go to any other countries at all.
He adds, 'unification seems to be practically difficult but if only it happens I would be very proud towards Uzbeks … but I just want to be called as Koreitsy [He means in an inclusive way of the Russian translation of Korean people.] Aren’t we all Koreans no matter South or North?’ Having worked for South Korean business entrepreneurs in Tashkent, he has developed his own view on how to react to South Koreans. During the Brezhnev regime, the period of détente in the 1970s, re-emigration into ancestral motherlands was allowed basically ‘in order to improve relations with Germany and the United States’. During this period, in the 1970s and 1980s over 100,000 Germans emigrated to the federal Republics of Germany. Similarly, in the 1960s, over 700,000 Jews emigrated mainly to Israel and the United States. Koreitsy attempts at re-emigration to North Korea also occurred during this period.

According to North Korean law revised in 1963, once diaspora Koreans or Koreans on North Korean territory acquire North Korean nationality, they are not allowed to give up their nationality. However, there was a certain period during which Soviet North Koreans could choose Soviet nationality by giving up North Korean nationality, when such a treaty between North Korea and the Soviet Union was agreed in 1957. As a result, in 1977 for example, among Koreitsy, there were 25 per cent Soviets while about 65 per cent remained with North Korean nationality. However, most of their choices of official nationality before deportation were dependent on convenience for survival and not to be excluded from benefits, rather than ideological allegiances. Until recently, North Korea did not allow North Korean nationals to alter their official nationality to other nationalities except labourers in specific fields of labour under contract. In the case of such labourers in the former Soviet Union, in accordance with Kim Il Sung’s political order in 1955, giving up North Korean nationality was allowed for a short period until 1957. Apart from that, there are no specific legal codes addressing the rest of the Koreitsy who officially kept two nationalities, Soviet and North Korean, during the Soviet regime. During the Soviet period, South Korea regarded the Koreitsy rather as a North Korean nationality.

During the Soviet era, the younger generation Koreitsy who were educated under the Soviet regime, had developed a negative image of their Korean background. They were taught that Korean traditions and customs are unscientific feudalistic remnants that should be discarded. On the other hand, having some ingredients of Russian civilisation in their national identity becomes the source of being proud and different from Koreans from the mainland. As Koreitsy intellectuals rightly express, 'It is regrettable that there have been no scientific studies or high level public discussions on the issues regarding fundamental problems and process of cultural movement for national revival led by Koreitsy organisations … Revival of what and for what?' (Han and Han: 1999, 376). Meanwhile, the authors’ suggestion implies his diaspora identity, which emphasises differences both from a national collective identity attached to their ancestral motherland, and from a collective identity as the Uzbek nation or Russian nation.
It is necessary to adopt and understand modern North Korean and South Korean cultures but the process of acquisition of new cultures without deep understandings will make little difference from accepting mere foreign cultural invasions (ibid., 376-7).

The quotation above also tells us one of the diaspora’s features, selective identification with the nation of the motherland. Such selection, however, requires some conditions and time in accordance with accumulated interaction between motherland and diaspora. The Koreït’sy community is, rather, in the primary stage of building a self-contained diaspora community. It is also reflected in the small amount of recorded history and cultural maintenance in comparison with the Zainichi or Josõnjok community. As the reflection of Koreïski intellectuals’ common apprehension about negative influence from South Korea in the region, the author suggests discriminative acquisition in learning new cultures rather than taking all as national cultures. A diaspora’s fear of unwilling assimilation into the ancestral nation and culture tends to grow when the diaspora community is lacking security in terms of their own collectivities, such as voluntarily built minority national organisations, a written history of the diaspora’s pasts and diaspora literature and so on. As much as diasporas resist assimilation by the host nation, they exhibit the anxiety of being culturally absorbed in the culture of the ancestral motherland.

[The] process of adopting Korean cultures would be no better than adopting another foreign culture rather than restoration of national identity ... Koreïtsy’s attempt to imitate South Korean ways may generate the idea of a complex that Koreïtsy is inferior to South Koreans. ... We, Koreïtsy, should perceive ourselves as merely different kinds of people who are neither superior nor inferior just possessing a new collective existence inside (ibid., 377).

It is notable that the movement of national revival instigated by South Korea and the overall atmosphere of newly independent central Asian states, has led the Koreïtsy to rethink and reinterpret their own identity vis-à-vis a new public world by situating themselves in a broader context and extended historical period. As in the cases of the Zainichi and Josõnjok, the Koreïtsy also interpret their plural nationalities in a positive way as more cultural choices are given. The Josõnjok and Koreïtsy possess clearer collective identities as a minority national groups in a multinational state. In other words, they have a clearer understanding of their collective identity as opposed to that of the host state meanwhile, as opposed to the motherland, the Zainichi have developed relatively clearer identification as Korean diaspora group. However, as mentioned above, the Koreïtsy have kept a lesser record of their own history. It is only recently that Koreïtsy historians and social scientists have cautiously begun expressing their pasts and national identity in writing and public discussions, which will, in the end, serve as a cornerstone in building the diaspora’s own kind of community.
Repositioning the Koreitsy vis-à-vis the South Korean motherland

Further to my discussion of the Koreitsy collective identity, this section discusses how the Koreitsy interpret their duality in a positive way. Some observers understand the process as assimilation or disappearance. I view the process, instead, as a silent struggle for recognition as being a distinctive group. In general, however, my fieldwork region, Tashkent, has faced other urgent political and economic problems that require discussion. Considering the fact that Uzbekistan is under a rigid totalitarian regime, issues related to nationality and sub-nationalisms are one of those subjects not openly discussed in public: strict laws are applied not only to minority national groups but also to the dominant Uzbek nation. The Koreitsy have developed a relatively cooperative relationship with the South Korean motherland, with the Uzbek and Kazakh governments’ active support. This can be understood in the context of King’s (1998) observation of the political roles of diasporas in the former Soviet Union. The relatively weak newly independent states from the former Soviet Union ‘have in many cases learned the value of diasporas, using their cultural and linguistic ties with co-ethnic communities abroad as instruments of both domestic politics and foreign policy’ (King, in King and Melvin: 1998, 2).

In the Koreitsy case, however, economic incentives to induce foreign investment have spurred closer diplomatic relations between South Korea and Koreitsy communities.

Intermittently, negative problems in connection with South Korean influence are also noted. Ahn and Lee (1993) have reported that a government official criticised some South Korean newspapers that groundlessly reported that Uzbek nationalists have threatened Koreitsy to leave Uzbek territory within a year. The official strongly requested the Korean journalists concerned to investigate regional affairs thoroughly and correct such reports. The official also expressed unease that the All CIS Goryoin Association has conducted a survey regarding the issue of the establishment of a Koreitsy Autonomous Prefecture. There have been continuous discussions over the issue of urging dispersed Koreitsy to move back to Yŏnh’aeju from where the first generation Koreitsy were deported. The goal of the project is to build a Koreitsy Autonomous Prefecture, regarded as the most regrettable memory shared by some groups of Koreitsy leaders. This project has been persistently suggested by groups of South Korean scholars, experts and religious activists. This issue is rooted in exclusive Korean ethnic nationalism. It has caused apprehension among the ordinary Koreitsy whose aim is to continue to manage their peaceful life in Uzbekistan with other national groups including Uzbeks.

It is also criticised as being a suggestion that ignores the Koreitsy’s own wishes. Interviewee, Kim Vita mentioned the issue. ‘For a short period between 1993 and 1994 immediately after the independence of the Uzbek Republic, Koreitsy were in confusion. Uzbek exclusivism seemed to grow and some were threatened to return their homeland. Most Germans
and Ukraines returned to their home countries. Quite a number of Koreitsy went to the Russian Far East but a few years later they returned to Uzbek and Kazakh regions again. I realised Uzbekistan is my homeland. I’m neither South Korean, nor North Korean nor Russian. I found I have nowhere to go. I just wish the economic development and political stability of the Uzbek republic … But I also learned that we Koreitsy are well treated when our own nation, Korea, is powerful. I believe a nation without a history and collective has no future’. 

A group of Korean scholars and experts’ ethnocised perspective on diaspora identity has led the Koreitsy issue to the following observation and apprehension. Firstly, it is concluded that the Koreitsy identity has been assimilated and is thus disappearing judging from common statistics and anthropological barometers of the degree of cultural maintenance. The reasoning is based on judgements of the level of maintenance of a minority community often including the ability to command the Korean language, the interracial marriage rate, size of population, birth rate, degree of cultural maintenance including frequency of eating Korean food, Korean style interior design, wearing Korean traditional costumes, following Korean style ceremonies, knowledge of Korean national festivals, myths, folklores, and historical national figures and so on. Secondly, the ethnocised approach to diaspora identity frames the Koreitsy once again in the conventional dichotomy; that is, framing them in a single fixed category of national identity: either pure Korean or else Uzbek. Consequently, it has been considered that the Koreitsy history has been a process of assimilation as they are losing their national identity, thus requiring guidance from South Korea. Following their motherland’s point of view, the Koreitsy identity is undoubtedly disappearing. In the same way, the Uzbek government regard Koreitsy identity as a transitory identity which should be adjusted at some point to the Uzbek national culture. Nevertheless, one can view the Koreitsy identity from a different angle, even while considering the same categories of cultural maintenance. If recognising a diaspora’s own sphere of culture, the Koreitsy modifications of plural cultural and historical heritages naturally include similarities and dissimilarities with/from Korean or Uzbek national cultures, some of which are completely different from both, and so are the Koreitsys’ own.

Legally, the Koreitsy are also excluded from South Korea's official categorisation of overseas Koreans.

A special law on overseas Koreans which was initially proposed in October, 1998 could have opened the door to Koreans in central Asia and other parts of the CIS. The law would grant the same legal rights and privileges to overseas Koreans as Korean citizens in terms of exit and entry, stay, and political and economic activities. … The revised law, which became effective in December 1999, excluded Koreans in China and the CIS by defining overseas Koreans as Korean nationals and their descendants who departed Korea after 1948… Because the majority of Koreans in China and the CIS left their motherland in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, they were not eligible for the benefits of
the law, which are available to Koreans in the United States and Japan who left the home country after 1948 (Yoon: 2000, 43).

Ever since the special law was drafted, harsh disagreements have been voiced by the diasporas and South Korean social activists and specialists. Negotiations over this special law are still underway. At the same time, however, investment from South Korean companies steadily increased and cultural exchange and humanitarian supports have followed. Divided opinions are seen among Koreitsu intellectuals themselves over general issues concerning visions of their community. Such divisive discussions are to be viewed as a natural and sound process for leading the community to be founded on a stable diaspora identity. Em (1991), for example, views this increased communication positive. 'I positively view Koreitsu's recent effort to preserve national traditions and customs, and vigorous contacts between North and South Korea. Most Koreitsu's hope is to see our ancestors' homeland' (51).

It is also true that among the Koreitsu themselves, there have been expressions of concern over losing the Korean language as Em shows in the following passage, although he also confesses he himself cannot speak or write the Korean language at all. It is reported that 55.8 per cent of Koreitsu use the Korean language in their daily conversations:

One can hardly expect a bright future for the Korean minority in the former Soviet Union at this stage because of many problems we have faced. Among those problems, the most sensitive issue is on the Korean language which is something to do with the issues of restoring national culture, traditions and customs, inter-linking dispersed Koreitsu by exchanging information, and fostering a close relationship with our ancestors' homeland. Furthermore, it is the issue of our own existence as a national group within the former Soviet Union (ibid., 48).

By contrast, Han (1999) discuss how the Koreitsu should react to South Korean cultural influence. This also demonstrates the diaspora's common feature, selective identification with the nation of the homeland.

Restoring national identity could be understood as restoration of national traditions, customs, lifestyles and so on. However, as for Koreitsu living a totally different world, traditional (unsophisticated) national culture sounds no more than an exotic culture. Unless Koreitsu fundamentally changes our psychological orientation, full adoption of Korean culture is not possible. ... It is not necessary, either (377).

The text represents one of the preconditions of a stable diaspora community, sufficient information on the culture and history of the plural nations concerned. A certain degree of understanding of national culture and history is a prerequisite for diasporas to be able to control their multiple national identities as an individual choice. Upon the renewed communication with
South Korean homeland, diasporas’ demands, economic support and recognition, from South Korea is also growing. A Koretsky historian and lawyer, Kim Vladimir, points out that ‘both South and North Koreas have deliberately omitted the history of Koreitsy’s participation in the independent movement during Japanese colonisation. Koreitsy were the most active participants in the independent movement but have never been fairly recognised in Korean history .... Consequently, we are excluded from the South Korean government compensation scheme. The history of Koreitsy’s independent movement should be completely rewritten. Koreitsy suffered the most’.

In his unpublished manuscript, he explains Koreitsy patriotism which, he insists, has not been properly evaluated and recognised by either North or South Korean history.

Immediately after the colonisation of Korea, Korean patriots realised that only with Russian support, Korean independence could be achieved. Such faith among those activists, organised as a foreign supportive army, became the motivation of their positive participations in wars against White Russians in the Far East.

On the question why the Koreitsy have to approach the South Korean government rather than the Uzbek government with demand special attention for issues including development of Koreitsy organisations or historical recognition of Koreitsy, another interviewee, Boris Kim, for instance, answers, ‘Uzbekistan is still a small and weak country with only ten year of independent history. Economically, South Korea is in a far better situation’. Ahn and Lee (1993) see that the Koreitsy communities in post-Soviet central Asia are still under heavy influence from North Korea, although there has been an atmosphere of reconsideration from South Korea. However, the North Korean embassy has retreated from normalised diplomatic relations with South Korea, and pro-North Korean Koreitsy organisations have been inactive. As the Uzbek government is keen to induce South Korean investment, diplomatic relations between Uzbek Republic and South Korea have been the crucial factor for relatively positive cooperation between the Koreitsy community and South Korea.

Some research, notably including that of Yoon (2000), analyses one of the reasons why the Koreitsy show a high degree of rapid linguistic assimilation. It is considered that the Korean desire to achieve ‘upward social mobility via urbanization and investment in human capital has been the crucial motive’ (53). Yoon’s observation, for example, is evidenced by central Asian based Koreitsy migration to the Russian cities. Nevertheless, in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, an increasing number of Koreitsy are keen to learn the Korean language. Kim Brut expresses his views on linguistic assimilation: ‘One can say that the population of Koreitsy is decreasing, on the other hand, more and more Koreitsy population speak Korean these days. During Soviet times, it was not easy to find qualified interpreters on the occasions of official visits of North Korea, whereas, now there’s no longer such a problem’.
The Koreitsy community has recently set up a basis to induce the chain immigration of South Koreans. Recent South Koreans settlers, since the late 1980s, have joined in reshaping the Koreitsy community. Interviewee, Nam Victor, evaluates the achievement of his Department of Korean Studies in Tashkent College of Education: ‘Younger generation Koreitsy are more and more interested in learning the Korean language’. On the question of the dispersing population, ‘Leaving the Koreitsy community is an individual choice ... but among those who share the same vision need to cooperate. My plan is to build a Koreitsy national university like the one in the Yanbian Josonjok prefecture ... I will continue making efforts for my plan ... there are many things to be done for Koreitsy community but myself alone it is not possible to achieve’.

In a similar way to the Zainichi and Josonjok, Koreitsy discussion on language maintenance well reflects their concern about a collective future.

In this section, I have analysed the Koreitsy response to South Korean influence. I explained their response as being part of the process of building diaspora identity through undergoing some period of selective identification with the Korean nation. Such process features a particular diaspora identity.

Religion and diaspora networking

There have been growing concerns on the penetration of Korean churches into the culturally islamic zones, including Uzbekistan. This could generate an odd situation with the Uzbek people. So it is especially under these circumstances that newly independent Muslim dominant countries are eager to establish a genuine national identity promoted by Islamic beliefs. Diaspora networking has been developed within the CIS and with Korean diasporas elsewhere. Korean Christian missionaries from North America and South Korea have initiated networking supported by South Korean semi-governmental institutes such as the Hanminjok network [Overseas Korean Network] attached to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Korean diasporas do not share any homogenous religious rituals and worships. In the absence of substantial territorial or institutional boundaries, for many ethnic or national groups, religious allegiance undoubtedly plays a crucial role in consolidating solidarity and identity. When the division between religion and nation is unclear, it is much easier to mobilise people, when it is necessary, by adopting a similar collective allegiance. Religion has been rather a secondary concern for diaspora Koreans, whose loyalty can be flexible. This has, in fact, reduced potential tensions considerably. It is only recently that overseas Korean Christian associations have become extremely active all over the world, operating a broad network. Kim Daniel has explained how he believes that a religion is required at the sudden loss of strong political identity in the CIS countries.
Central Asian Koreîtsy’s identity has become unstable since the collapse of the Soviet regime and subsequent consolidation of local nationalisms, say, Uzbek and Kazakh nationalisms and Islamic fundamentalism. Under the Soviet regime, in central Asia, there were no dominant majority national groups. Now the situation has changed. Koreîtsy will be driven to a more and more difficult situation with the absence of any alternative stable collective identity. The Uzbek government does not intentionally implement discriminating public policies towards other minority national groups. Koreîtsy are one of the officially recognised minority national groups, which means they are not regarded as Uzbeks. In this sense, Koreîtsy have relatively more religious freedom than Uzbeks who are expected to be Muslims. Uzbek nationalism is developing in an exclusive way. Koreîtsy are reluctant to be accommodated to Uzbek national culture. They rather admire Russian culture and are inclined to identify themselves with Russians. At the same time, their expectation towards the Korean motherland is very low. Accordingly, central Asian Koreîtsy are in a very unstable and difficult situation. This is the reason why they need their own religion.49

Until the independence of the Uzbek Republic, Russian colonial policy in central Asia had allowed the cultural aspects of Islam to remain influential. However, ‘the official structures of Islam were either destroyed or captured by the Soviet regime ... In its cultural aspects, Islam continued to serve as a guide and source of solace for the moral person’ (Gleason: 1997, 42-3). The cultural aspects of Islam have been explicitly reconsolidated since its independence from the former Soviet Union, although officially Islam still remained for life-styles and customs. Along with other newly independent central Asian states, Uzbekistan became the case where minority cultures and religion were officialised with the embodiment of legitimacy as an independent state. Accordingly, relationships between Uzbeks, who became the dominant group, and the other national or ethnic groups within the same category are under transformation. Along with the retreat of Russian influence and financial benefits, the Uzbek cultural revival explains why an increasing number of the Koreîtsy are involved in Korean-led Christian institutions.

As with the Josõnjok, the Koreîtsy make connections with Korean diasporas in wealthier areas for practical reasons, such as better opportunities for education and employment. South Korean nationalism and human rights issues are much in use and incorporated into the legitimacy of missionary activities in the central Asian region. Koreîtsy involved in Christian organisations are encouraged to participate in various cultural and humanitarian projects. A collective identity as a member of the Korean nation regardless of where they live is instigated prior to developing religious faith. Consequently, Christian-influenced Koreîtsy tend to have a stronger collective identity and be aware of the necessity of networking with Korean diasporas in other regions and countries. In Almaty, Kazakhstan alone, there are more than thirteen South Korean founded churches that also run a number of Korean language schools, business corporations, and charity and social welfare institutions. If churches set up by Korean diasporas
from North America are included, the number is ever increasing. Uzbekistan becomes more and more religiously exclusive. It is not too difficult, considering the ratio of Muslims taking up 70 per cent of the total population. Christian activities are strictly banned in Uzbekistan. Although relations between the Koreitsy and Muslims in the CIS have so far been cooperative, recently, due to the engagement of South Korean civil associations, churches and scholars, a few sensitive issues regarding religious activities have been exposed. In spite of an uneasy atmosphere which may evoke a disadvantaged situation, it is almost enigmatic to observe how enthusiastic the Koreitsy can be for Christian oriented affairs and activities. This is also the case among the Josŏnjok and, to a lesser degree, among the Zainichi. The smooth penetration of Christianity into the Josŏnjok and and Koreitsy ways of life can be explained as a reaction to a particular pressure or the absence of a social ideology. Such pressure includes the disappearance of Maoism as a political mentor, the decline of rigid communism, the rise of Uzbek Islam nationalism, and the rise of western discourses such as multiculturalism and human rights under the influence of North American Korean diaspora Christian associations combined with civil activism. Christianity is also a sort of cultural relief through which Korean diasporas can experience western cultures and values. In addition, diaspora Korean Christian activities often demonstrate a strong affinity with nationalism and evoke collective sentiments and actions. This is due to the historical reason that, in Korean society, Christian influence once served as a strong belief system fortifying anticolonial nationalism against Japanese social ideologies during the colonial period. Now the fusion of Christian belief and political agenda has been shifted from Korean independence to reunification.

Comparative analysis

As my analyses have so far demonstrated, the homeland factor makes a crucial impact on the formation of diaspora features and identity. The basic framework of the following comparative analysis was included in Chapter 2. The more diasporas communicate with their homeland, the more likely the following diaspora features will occur.

Firstly, diasporas show a tendency to identify themselves as a distinguishable group of people, vis-à-vis both the nation of the host state and the nation of the homeland. Korean diasporas express their identity as Josŏnjok, Zainichi and Koreitsy. In a positive case, diasporas take their dual national identity and multicultural backgrounds to be an advantage and an opportunity, and positively interpret them in collective terms. However, at some stages in communication, some diasporas nurture antagonism towards homeland society, which can be understood as being the necessary process of selective differentiation. A negative collective identity existed among the Zainichi, with a strong feeling of alienation from both the Japanese and Korean nations. Gradually, however, since the mid-1990s, the Zainichi have made an effort
to build a positive collective identity, seeking a national identity of their own, notably by reinterpretations of their own collective memories and active participation in Zainichi collective affairs. After undergoing certain phases of accepting and understanding their unavoidable alienation from both societies and the necessity of overcoming problems of plural national identities, each Korean diaspora under this study has reached a stage of reorganising and reinterpretng their discursive collective memories in order to situate their collective existence again within the triad structure and further in the international setting.

The second feature is the development of a diaspora network both within a host state and with diasporas elsewhere. Christian missionaries from Korean diasporas in America and Canada have initiated networking Korean diasporas in every country of the world. The South Korean government also created institutional support for diaspora networking with a political and cultural agenda, rather than religious. In this process, for some, a stronger in-group identity is developed while, for others, a stronger preference for remaining in personhood also develops. A networking project is, however, not regarded as major feature of Korean diasporas on the ground that Christianity alone cannot be a basis for mobilising a religiously heterogeneous population. In addition, China and central Asia have not yet been comfortable bases from which religious Koreans can spread their beliefs.

Lastly, diasporas tend to make political economic and cultural demands of their motherland by emphasising their contributions to the motherland and the maintenance of the homeland’s cultural heritages by identifying them with the nation of the motherland. Diasporas’ demands increase when their motherland is politically opened and economically more developed. In the opposite case, denial of cultural and historical roots is also common. For example, among the Zainichi, demand for political rights from South Korea has been growing. A group of Zainichi have demanded voting rights for major elections in South Korea to such an extent that Choryŏn-affiliated Zainichi have representative rights in the North Korean state’s annual General Assembly Meeting. Economic support from South Korea is required by the Joseonjok. The Koreitsy demand a higher level of cultural interaction with South Korea. As Korean diasporas have a divided homeland nation, analysis of a diaspora’s national identity becomes more complicated. Additional variables are to be considered, such as political and cultural relationships between the two divided homelands and diplomatic relations between host states and the two Koreas. In such a case, a certain degree of political division among diaspora communities is inevitable. When trial period is over and certain conditions are met, diasporas will establish a more self-reliant community with their own kind of national identity while being aware of their own separate interests and collective future.
Conclusion

The main purpose of this chapter was to demonstrate how diasporas define themselves vis-à-vis outsiders, mainly, the ancestral motherland. As one of the commonalities of all three cases, I explained the process of forming their own kind of collective identity. This process can be understood as a search for difference while resisting pressure to assimilate. In this sense, diasporas’ common feature, resistance to pressure to assimilate, is applicable not only to their relationship with the host nation but also to the nation of the homeland.

Compared with the other two cases, the Zainichi have struggled the most for identity and recognition due to harsher pressure from their host society and heavier influence from the motherland. Accordingly, their ways of resistance have diversified, and expression of a collective identity develops in a sophisticated manner. On the other hand, a further degree of demand for recognition based on their collective identity is only a possibility among the Josŏnjok and Koreitsy. The reasons are, firstly, in both cases, a multinational environment has been naturally accepted. Secondly, thanks to the socialist agenda, discrimination against cultural differences is officially discouraged. Thirdly, there is no particular historically rooted antagonism in the relationship between the host state and Korea as much as with Japan. Fourthly, Korean minorities are not particularly disadvantaged. Problems of minority national groups have not yet emerged as urgent issues. Overall economic problems or political crises are not particular in the cases of the Josŏnjok and Koreitsy. Problems are equally applicable to other minority national groups including the dominant national groups, the Uzbek and the Han Chinese. Lastly, Josŏnjok and Koreitsy are not major minorities in China and the CIS in terms of population and they have been accepted rather as an adaptive minority national group.

In order to achieve a successful transnational agenda, some prerequisites are necessary for both parties, the motherland and the diaspora community. These include a clearer vision of the diaspora community rather than emphasis on historical and cultural proximities between the homeland and the diaspora. Both parties need to accept the inevitable changes in cultural features and interpretations of history. Meanwhile, diaspora communities need clear knowledge of their own history and distinctiveness vis-à-vis the nations of the host country and motherland. The next practical step is an appropriate legal categorisation for further regulations before opening the door for re-emigres. The lack of mutual understanding of the inevitable cultural and historical changes has generated the diasporas’ impression that the motherland’s influence is another pressure to assimilate, or exploitation or colonialism. Lack of legal categorisation of a diaspora has caused social and diplomatic confusion in the motherland. Multiplicity and the third-ness of a diaspora’s national identity will be accepted in the real world only when diasporas nurture their sense of loyalty and obligation to the larger society accompanied by
understanding the multiple cultures, regardless of their national or ethnic origins wherever they are territorially situated.
7 Summary and Conclusion

Until now, I have characterised the Korean diaspora identity, analysed its conflicts with official nationality in each case, and discussed the theoretical implications of diasporas' search for a distinctive identity. My hypothetical concern was that Korean diasporas have resisted the gradual dissolution of their collective identity into mainstream society. Only the manners of resistance vary. I have demonstrated, so far, that regardless of various policies and different conditions for political membership in each host state, Korean diasporas in all three cases do search for their own kind of collective identity. This is partly because, under the present nation-state system, the yielding of a potentially political collective identity of a certain group, to a degree, preconditions safe inclusion in a dominant national group. The main theme of Chapter 4 was the foreseeable dilemma of diasporas in the course of shaping a collective identity conditioned by the implementation of the notion of citizenship. Citizenship as an institutional device connotes particular conditions for shifting political membership.

However, relying on this variable, citizenship, may be a fallacy resulting in a single factor explanation. This is because the citizenship factor disregards the dissimilarities of various sorts of collective identities which are generated in particular historical contexts under the given structure from which diasporas generate identity. In this concern, in Chapter 5, I examined minority national organisations as embodiments of diaspora choices and an accumulation of a collective identity. It could also be understood as a particular manner of response to pressure to assimilate either voluntarily, or by being compelled by the host state as well as the Korean motherland. I developed the diaspora's tensions in Chapter 6 in relation to the ancestral motherland, which marks the most critical particularity of diasporic identity in general. I highlighted major incidents that reflect the problems of diasporas' mythical and nostalgic vision of the motherland. Discussions and interpretations of collective matters concerning diasporas' visions reflect that, albeit in differing degrees, Korean diasporas have been in the process of transforming their communities into more self sustained communities with a clearer and more stable collective identity. This will be supported by rich records of collective history and a destiny of their own in various forms of public communication. Therefore, when the title of this project says, Korean identity in Japan, China and in Uzbekistan, this is not identical with the Korean identity on the ground that their Korean identity has already been transformed into a diaspora identity. The title says national identity of diaspora because, although their identity is transformed, diasporas still have a national identity. Such an identity is obviously different from the national identity of the host nation or of the homeland. Korean diasporas' collective identity is regarded as Korean identity within the boundary of the host state, but when analysing their collective identity vis-à-vis the host nation or the motherland, their collective identity is found to
be particular. This is the moment when they form the third identity, which originates from the national identities involved but is also very different from them.

Summary of the study

Collective forms of massive Korean migration began in the 1910s in the cases of Japan and China, and in 1937 in the case of Uzbekistan, although migration on a smaller scale started much earlier. At the end of the Second World War in 1945, many of the migrants settled down in the countries under study, and developed their communities. Officially, the Zainichi people have been categorised as a special type of foreigner, the Koreitsy have fallen into the category of one of the non-titular minority national groups under the former Soviet Union, and the Josonjok have been recognised as an honourable group decorating multinational communist China. The origins of the early Korean settlers in those countries can be traced to a colonial diaspora under Japanese rule. In categorising this particular group of people, I employed the concept of diaspora instead of an immigrant or an ethnic group. I should admit that not all diaspora-like groups can be defined as diasporas as such if the term is taken exclusively to include only a few prototypes of ancient diasporas, such as the Greeks, the Jews, and the Armenians. In spite of the etymological debate, I employed the concept of a diaspora in a somewhat looser way.

Consideration of the varieties and vicissitudes of the diaspora phenomena is necessary to provide better understanding of the more recent diasporas including that of Koreans in the three cases. They possess distinguishable origins, features and collective goals from Korean communities elsewhere. A diaspora group is a sort of ethnic or national group; more accurately, a part of an ethnic group or a part of a nation. The term diaspora must sufficiently imply one of the crucial features of the particular Korean groups under my research, which is collective geopolitical relocation followed by the formation of identity based on the shared historical memories of collective resettlement while not being mutually incompatible with the other related terms.

It goes without saying that there are notable disparities among the three cases as each has been incorporated into different states. I defined the different patterns of co-existence of the Korean diasporas vis-à-vis their host nations as dispersal, segregation and isolation. These were relatively noticeable until the mid-1990s, by the time of the decline of the Soviet system and the gradual political and economic transformation of China. From mid-1990s onwards there have been some changes in such patterns; commonly in those three cases based on different state projects, more positive assimilation has been encouraged, although the degrees and modes are diverse. The policies of host states towards their minority national groups play their part in shaping diaspora identities in particular ways. Such policies are based on the host country’s traditional views of outsiders, historical relations with diaspora’s motherlands, the various
adaptations of the notion of citizenship, and regime types. In response to the policies, Korean diasporas have maintained their collective identities which show the inevitable quandary of diaspora identity, full inclusion with distinctiveness.

As a more concrete form of diaspora collectivity, I chose to study Korean diaspora organisations and institutions. The Yŏnbyŏn University, which was set up in 1949 in the Korean Autonomous Prefecture in China, has functioned as a cultural and historical centre, reproducing a collective identity as a minority national group within the Chinese territory. In Japan, the Choryŏn and Mindan have played a great role in shaping the Zainichi community in its present form. The internal problems of the two organisations, however, have deepened the division of the Zainichi population. Since the late 1980s, under the pressure of the conciliating political mood between the two Koreas and the death of Kim Il Sung, the two organisations have undergone some structural changes. In addition, the younger Zainichi generation has built different forms of organisations, mainly concerning the issues related to how to enhance Zainichi status through collective actions in order to eradicate deep-seated discrimination against the Zainichi in Japan. In post-Soviet central Asia, the Koreitsy identity was preserved by means of building and managing kolkhozes in their own way. Korean schools, theatres and publishers were built around the kolkhoz system. Although the system itself originated in the Soviet state and was under state surveillance, the internal mechanism of each kolkhoz in the region did not function in the same manner, as kolkhoz were mostly built along national lines. The origin of each Korean minority organisation represents the diaspora's manner of response to the host society. The different nature of the organisation in each state also reflects the aspect and degree of autonomy given to diaspora Koreans.

For a diaspora, their motherland also plays a key role in moulding its distinctive identity. Sufficient communication between diaspora communities and their motherland results in the process of building a clearer collective identity. Due to the particular condition of being a diaspora, that is, collective geo-political relocation, discontinuity of communication and a certain degree of imagination are inevitable components of a diaspora's identity. At the beginning of renewed communication, the South Korean government's political initiative was ill-presented and misinterpreted by the Josŏnjok and Koreitsy. Meanwhile, the Zainichi have been heavily influenced by the politics of the two Koreas. Various changes in the political environment in the two Koreas have directly reflected on the Zainichi society and, consequently, reflected in their identity as well. In accordance with the quantity and the quality of communications with their motherland, the process by which diasporas differentiate themselves from the Korean nation varies. This differentiation process helps to form a stable collective identity, which in turn leads to a mature diaspora community.
Summary of the comparative analyses

In this section, I summarise the commonality and dissimilarity of the three cases. There are notable common features among Korean diaspora identity. They are based on their commonality as Korean, as well as generality as a diaspora. To the contrary of previous observations, Korean diasporas have developed their own kind of distinguishable identity, which I call a diasporic identity, as another type of national identity. Korean diasporas show their will to resist pressures to assimilate and their fear of vanishing as a distinctive people. At the same time they have the common burden of accepting other national cultures, including dominant national history, official language, values and so on. Their efforts to be included with due recognition are demonstrated by the highlights of their historical contributions to the state building process of their host country. Their collective history has been accumulated and initiated by diaspora writers, teachers, professors, activists, artists and so on. Korean diasporas have created their identity through recording or passing their stories down through generations. A history of a diaspora group is a history of making a new sphere of collective identity. How much such stories can be officially recognised as a part of public and official history is the key determinant in measuring the degree of inclusion of a minority national group’s collective identity.

Diasporas, in line with other types of immigrants, are aware of the occasional necessity for the alienation of identities in return for political security and economic benefits. As diaspora children grew up under the situation in which private culture and public national culture are strictly separated in terms of language, value systems, customs, and religion, they were well trained to switch their cultural norms and forms depending on the situation. This has been relatively easier for a non-religious diaspora group such as the Korean diasporas. Korean diasporas’ particular enthusiasm for education, a determination to achieve upward mobility, secular vision of religions and the particularly insecure situation of the motherland have facilitated the formation of a diasporic identity.

Differences among diasporas are also notable. Firstly, differences are caused by the varying degrees of inclusion in the host countries. China has recognised the Josōnjok roles in securing the territorial boundary during the Sino-Japanese War, and officially recognised their contributions to building a Chinese multination after the communist revolution. In addition, their efforts to cultivate the barren lands in the Manchu area have been well appreciated. Although on a private level, there are some potential tensions among different minority ethnic or national groups, the Chinese government has played a positive role in intervening and rooting out potential conflicts. Josōnjok have developed a clearer collective identity by distinguishing their cultural affiliation from political citizenship. In the case of Japan, the history of diaspora has been segregation and antagonism. Zainichi have been constantly viewed as foreigners who are temporarily staying in Japan and represent potential danger for the Japanese nation in terms of
homogeneity and security. Issues over the historical relationship between Korea and Japan have heavily affected relations between the Zainichi and Japan. In the case of the Koreîtsy, agricultural and educational achievements during the Soviet regime have been officially praised. Koreans were flexible in changing their official nationalities without necessarily changing their political loyalty or way of living. Even after undergoing their inhumane deportation during the Stalin era, the Koreîtsy in central Asia were eager to cooperate with various state projects, militarily and economically. This is partly because politically oriented and nationalistic minded community leaders had been purged before and after the deportation. Also it is because the size and density of the Koreîtsy population in the former Soviet central Asia hampered any attempts at collective action.

Secondly, differences are generated by the development of minority national institutions. Yŏnbyŏn University has been the cultural centre of Josŏnjok society. Nationalist activists devoted themselves to the project of building an educational institution by the time the Yanbian autonomous prefecture was established. Whereas the latter has been developed as a political centre under the control of central government, Yŏnbyŏn University has been relatively free from the influence of political power. Josŏnjok enthusiasm to record their own interpretations of historical events and preserving shared memories has been supported by this large national university. In Japan, the confrontation between the two major minority organisations, Mindan and Choryŏn, reflects the political situation of the Korean motherland. The official policy of segregation has spurred such confrontation, and, in turn, the division of the Zainichi community has held them back from being actively included in Japanese society. In the former Soviet Union, the only way of securing a collective identity and minority group national culture was through the official institution, kolkhozes. For the Koreîtsy, who had agricultural skills, the collectivisation project through collective farms based on national lines unintentionally helped to secure their own psychological and cultural boundaries. Although the system of kolkhozes is neither unique to the Koreîtsy case nor voluntary in any other ethnic or national minorities, the Koreîtsy are proud of what they have achieved through the Koreîtsy kolkhozes using their agricultural skills. They also tend to emphasise official recognition of such achievements. They certainly take such achievements as collective or national rather than individual. Although there are only a few collective farms left since the collapse of the former Soviet Union, the Koreîtsy became aware of writing their own history, which definitely consolidates their own identity as Koreîtsy.

Finally, differences are also caused by communication between diaspora and motherland. The Josŏnjok have kept cultural features with government support under China's affirmative action. The Josŏnjok ability with the Korean language is greater than that of the Zainichi and Koreîtsy. The Josŏnjok's maintenance of national culture, including their ability with language played a positive role in accelerating vigorous communication with the Korean
motherland. Due to the economic disparity between the Josōnjok community and South Korea, a relationship with South Korea became vital to Josōnjok society. As the Josōnjok community is more or less territorially confined, thanks to an arrangement of an autonomous government, the Josōnjok identity is inseparable from their strong regional attachment. In the case of Japan, the Korean motherland and the diasporas are much more closely interlinked. Both for North and South Korea, the Zainichi community have some strategic interests, for which reason financial transactions and cultural communications have been much more vigorous than in the other two cases. It is only recently that the Zainichi began to see that building a more self determined community with their own identity within Japan is an urgent project, rather than relying on their motherland. In the case of the former Soviet Union, except the Koreïtsy left behind in Sikhalin, the geographical reasons, the rest had been detached from their ancestral motherland. It is also because South Korea's diplomatic relations with the former Soviet Union were not as active as those with China and Japan. In addition, depending on the changes in the relations between North Korea and the former Soviet Union, the Koreïtsy in central Asia had undergone various unstable political upsets at times. Recently, the Koreïtsy have opened communications with the motherlands, especially with South Korea, by dint of enhanced diplomatic and economic relations between South Korea and the CIS, especially Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan.

Theoretical implications

Diasporas may not strongly define their collective identity by adhering to either of the nations to which they are conventionally believed to belong. For diasporas, national collective identity is something which is relatively controllable due to their particular experience of exposure to multinational environments. However, such characteristics do not necessarily mean that national or collective identity is something less significant to diasporas. Diasporas have kept their own collective stories in relation to their history of being incorporated into a different political boundary during the period of nation state building in the postwar period. Diasporas often try to make their collective memories official, but such attempts should not be separated from the official nation, but be fully included with some justification for their existence. For both sides, the dominant national group and the minority national groups, overemphasising cultural and historical bases of national solidarity in the political process could deepen potential conflicts among different national groups. In theory, it is perhaps right to suggest that political decisions, as a public sphere, should be separate from culture. And yet, practical problems and issues resulting from cultural and historical biases in a society, which can be adjusted only by political means, have often been encouraged and manipulated by the state’s agenda through ideological devices including mass education, social and religious institutions, and so on. Preserving or
creating a collective identity may well be a minority group’s task but recognition for their identity through negotiation is considered a critical political task.

My comparative case study also demonstrates that particularities of a group should be considered in making policies relating to minorities. Different kinds of groups need to be positively discriminated rather than categorised under the same principles used when dealing with immigrants, other kinds of cultural groups or refugees and stateless people. Apart from different histories of being a minority group, the features of Korean diasporas themselves played an important role in creating relatively flexible but still collective identities as diasporas. It is obvious to say that there are historical and cultural traditions in each host society which make their policies towards minorities inevitably various. At the same time, it is necessary to admit that there are diverse traditions and cultural heritages among different minority national groups for whom, in turn, policies should be varied.

As generations pass, the three cases in common are more or less going towards assimilation in varying degrees. Research on Korean diaspora at present would be particularly meaningful as several generations have intermingled from the first generation and consequently the character of their collective identity reflects such diversity and provides some guidance for seeing future trends. Although older generations with stronger Korean identity disappeared, the particular forms of collectivity still remain to be filled up by new generations and new comers from other regions. As long as the present world order of a nation-state system is preserved, having a stable (but not exclusive) national identity with a certain degree of collectivity will remain considered essential for securing various aspects of practical benefits and psychological comfort. In this sense, efforts to correct misperceptions of a particular group of people should be encouraged in the political sphere until such discussion and debates themselves are considered outdated.

Conclusion

I conclude by answering the main questions I posed. On the first question, ‘How do Korean diasporas define their collective identity in exile?’, it is discovered that a certain degree of collective national identity is meaningful for them in order for survival on foreign soils, and they have developed their own identity as a diaspora. The process is reflected on their interpretation of history, which shows their continuous negotiation and compromise over their own life stories, which became a shared collective memory within the triad structure confining diasporas. This leads to the answer to the second question: ‘What are the implications of such a process?’ Such a process proves that the more the host society tolerates cultural differences and recognises diasporas’ own shared collective stories as part of the heritage of a unified citizenry, it is more cooperative to compromise and negotiate over their history, and they are even eager to become
active citizens. Therefore, diasporas’ dual or multiple nationalities are not to be perceived as suspicious as they are well trained to accommodate several cultures at the same time, and have a relatively clear idea of the difference between various levels of collective identities. Patriotism does not necessarily function effectively when it is based on cultural attachment or loyalty to a single nation. Diaspora cases apparently show that attachment to distinctive shared historical memories and citizenship can be two separate issues, despite the common fear of modern multinational states which are keen on promulgating the superiority of their own exclusive historical heritages and the purity of a national spirit. The creation of a third type or third sphere of national identity, diasporic identity, is an increasing phenomenon in the global era. How to achieve appropriate recognition and include this type of identity is more crucial than how to prevent such a phenomenon and how to fix such a fluid and seemingly immoral identity into one of the national identities to which they are expected to belong. Finally, in the case of diasporas, in particular, recognition of their history of being incorporated into the host society, and their cooperation in building a multinational society are the key determinants to reduce potential tensions and conflicts. Historical facts and events are in the past but diasporas’ shared collective memory continuously affects building the present and future multinational relationships. Negotiation over the interpretation of such historical memories remains an important political issue in every multinational state.

One has taken for granted to posing diaspora people such questions ‘Are you Chinese/Japanese/Uzbek/Russian or Korean?’, or ‘If there were a war between the Korean motherland and your host country, on which side would you fight?’. Or, ‘When there are sports matches, which side do you normally support?’ Having researched the nature of diaspora identity, more appropriate questions to pose to diaspora people would be: ‘What roles can diasporas play in order to prevent possible wars or in order to mediate worsened diplomatic relations between the homeland and host country?’ Or, ‘How can diasporas use their dual nationality and cultural duality in a positive way?’ When cultural norms more or less substitute other kinds of moral codes in the modern, unavoidably multicultural world, such norms should be applied in an inclusive and deterritorialised manner. The duality of diasporas should be recognised as what it is, rather than trying to frame it into either of the societies. Different national identities do not necessarily jeopardise host societies in terms of political security, economic development or cultural development. The history of the relationship between host states and diasporas has been one of abnoramalisation and stigmatisation of diasporas’ duality by the nation-building process. Now, such an exclusive historical construction based on a dichotomy of citizen and alien is under deconstruction, giving room for special citizens not only as a historical or conceptual category, but also as a legal category, which not only will correct negatively formed identity that has been based on oppressive collective pasts, but also prevent diasporas’ abuse of their multiple political and cultural membership. Host countries are normally
reluctant to specify such rules for them, either because they are viewed as an abnormal type of people who are destined to be assimilated in the long run, or benignly neglected for fear of encouraging a separate collective identity. At the same time, however, the future of the Korean diaspora community is also dependent on how they themselves develop and reshape their own community with a stable and inclusive identity.

Limit of the project and suggestions for the future studies

As the area of diaspora studies has been spotlighted as an academic discipline only recently, the previous studies lack theoretical and conceptual debates. Consequently, although there are abundant case studies, comparisons of Korean cases with other diaspora cases in theoretical terms were beyond the theme of this project. In the future, however, it will be necessary to conduct comparative research of Korean diasporas with other diaspora cases. For the discussion of the relations between motherland and diaspora, the North Korean part is less concrete due to the lack of precise information on North Korean policy regarding diasporas. I also discovered that there are a number of important historical cases that have been under-researched, especially during the prewar history of diasporas. Political theorisation on diasporas will become more convincing when it is based on thorough historical evidences. In this sense, my research is only the beginning of political studies on Korean diasporas. In addition, although most of the written work by diasporas themselves is translated into the Korean language, researchers with more language skills in all the three host states will be able to provide further analyses. As switching between two languages often accompanies switching cultures and identities, interviews in plural languages will allow observations of diasporas from another angle.
Note

Introduction

1 Including this issue, for a historical analysis of the deportation of the Korean population during the time Stalin was in power, see T. Martin, The Affirmative Action Empire (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001) 316-9.

2 The best examples of this are the Jewish communities settled out of Israel. For a detailed explanation, see A. Panagakos, ‘Citizens of the Trans-Nation: political mobilization, multiculturalism, and nationalism in the Greek diaspora’, Diaspora (New York: Oxford University Press 8/3, 1999) 277.

3 See, for example, E. Ringmar, Identity, Interest and Action: A Cultural Explanation of Sweden’s intervention in the Thirty Years War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) in particular, the Introduction.

4 In the Russian language, Koreitsy is a collective noun meaning Korean people as a group whereas Koreïski refers an individual Korean. At times, I use Korean translations of each ethnonym when necessary; for example, a direct quotation from an interview.

5 As I consider that continuity is central to the understanding of a national identity in the historical context of each nation, I agree with ethnicists, notably A. Smith’s explanation of origins of national identity putting an emphasis on premodern distinctive cultural and historical bases forming the national identity of a political group. See, for example, A. Smith, National Identity (London: Penguin Books, 1991) ch. 2.

6 At times, I use the terms sending and receiving, when it is necessary to avoid the common confusion of the word, motherland, which could also mean the country where diasporic people were born in the case of the third generation to whom the term motherland does not literally mean the country from which their parents originally came.

Chapter 2

1 Whereas national identity connotes self-definitions, nationality can be understood as the features of a nation; that is, depending on scholars, it is substituted for national character or national culture. Thus, official nationality here means the national culture of the dominant national group, in other words, the public culture of the host nation.

2 The German case may be the extreme but it helps in understanding other similar cases. Germany, since the 1990s, ‘reveals ongoing tensions between political ideals and perceptions shaped by a volkisch concept of nationhood developed in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and a civic-territorial concept of the nation-state associated, in Germany, with the postwar Bonn regime, with its emphasis on constitutionalism and human rights. This tension is represented at the level of intellectual debate by the terms Kulturnation (nationhood expressed through ethnic and cultural identity) and Verfassungsnation (national identity based on the principles of legal constitutionalism)’ (P. Hogwood, ‘Citizenship Controversies in Germany’ German Politics, London: Frank Cass, 9/3, 2000) 136.

3 For the term, homeland, I employ King and Melvin’s definition as ‘a piece of territory having a (...) symbolic connection with the identity of a given ethnic group’ (See C. King and N. Melvin (eds.) Nations Abroad: diaspora politics and international relations in the former Soviet Union, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998, 2).

4 The notion of ‘denizen’ is first coined by Hammer in 1990 and is used often by scholars engaged in the field of international migration. ‘The “denizen” is a long-term, legally settled, migrant whose legal status is characterized as a halfway ... between citizen and alien. In many respects, including legal, civil, social, economic and often cultural rights, denizens are “members” of a state. They pay taxes, have households, bring up children, and are often involved in the cultural life of the community in which they live’ (See J. Shaw, ‘Citizenship of the Union: towards post national membership’, http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/97/97, 1997, 13).

The basic purpose of his conceptualisation of diasporas, however, is to explain the trans-border ethnic groups which suddenly came to existence due to the collapse of the former Soviet Union, and to frame them into the categorisation of diasporas and therefore distinguishable from immigrants, refugees, and so on.


For the detailed discussions of the range of diasporas and the problem of semantic stretching, see, for example, W. Safran, ‘Comparing Diasporas: a review essay on Robin Cohen’s Global Diasporas’, Diaspora, 8/3, 1999, and D. Schnapper, ‘From the Nation-State To the Transnational World’, Diaspora, 8/3, 1999.

An ethnic group can mean a group of people who share distinctive collective features and are a distinguishable group internally and externally. Racial differences are one of those features, along with culture, history and religion, although they should not to be discussed on the same level. Some ethnic features are absolutely exclusive to particular ethnic groups, while others are not. The terms ethnic and national are not mutually exclusive. The Korean diasporas studied here are seen as a part of the Korean nation. They are a part of an ethnic group in relation to host nations, while being a minority national group as a part of a nation. When discussing Korean diasporas in relation to their host nations, to avoid confusion I use the expression a ‘minority national group’ or ‘sub-national group’ to refer Korean diasporas under this study. In the Korean language, depending on scholars, the word, ‘nation’, is translated either minjok or gukmin, but neither term exactly implies the meanings of a nation that is political and cultural at the same time. Minjok is too exclusively cultural and gukmin is too distanced from culture to substitute the English word ‘nation’.

For this reason, I use the term ‘minority’ to refer to diaspora groups in relation to hostlands. Sub-national group can also be used as a substitute for minority national group.

Individuals can be categorised as diaspora. Nevertheless, individual migration can form part of an existing diaspora while all the individual immigrants are not diasporas.

As a good example, Berberoglu’s classification shows another way of categorising scholars engaged in this field. He considers that nationalism and national movements are a product of class relations and class struggles at both national and international levels. He divides nationalism theorists into two groups: the liberal bourgeois camp versus Marxist rationalists, rather than employing the conventional framework, primordialist versus modernist (See B. Berberoglu, ‘Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict and Class Struggle’, Critical Sociology, NJ: Humanities Press, 228).

In the same way, national and ethnic are not identical, the terms ‘multi-national’ and ‘multi-ethnic’ are not literally the same. However, most modern states exhibit multi-ethnic and multinational composition at the same time. This is because completely nationalising all different ethnic groups under one single dominant group has not yet been practically achieved. Japan, China and Uzbekistan are obviously states with multi-ethnic and multinational compositions.

Unlike private culture such as personal dispositions and individual preferences, public culture means a set of understandings about the nature of a political community, its principle and institutions, its social norms and so on (See D. Miller, Nationality, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999, 159). For criticisms and comments on Miller’s philosophical grounds on nationality, among many others, see, for example, A. Follesdal, ‘Future Soul of Europe: nationalism or just patriotism? A critique of David Miller’s defence of nationality’ Journal of Peace Research, London: Sage Publications, 37/4, 2000.

For Brubaker’s comparative analyses on historical contexts in which national applications of citizenship differ, see his *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany* (Cambridge; London: Harvard University Press, 1992) chapter 4.


Habermas defines nationalism as a form of collective consciousness which both presupposes a reflexive appropriation of cultural traditions that has been filtered through historiography and which spreads only via the channels of modern mass communication. See J. Habermas, ‘Citizenship and National Identity: some reflections on the future of Europe’, *Praxis International* (Oxford: Blackwell, 12/1, 1992) 3.


By culture, Kymlicka means nation or people as an intergenerational community, more or less institutionally complete, occupying a given territory or homeland, and sharing a distinct language and history.

Scholars defending this view include Y. Tamir (1993), I. Young (2000) and A. Gutmann (2003).


For more detail, see Parekh, ibid., 204.


Although my concern is on diaspora groups in a multinational state, I occasionally put the terms ‘immigrants’ and/or ‘ethnic groups’ together with diasporas when the contexts are explanations of a host state’s policy towards minority groups. This happens when certain policy is relevantly addressing diasporas but not exclusively to diasporas.

Korean diasporas can build and create Korean communities when a degree of collectivity is present. More detailed discussion on such collectivity is included in Chapter 5. The term ‘community’ can be understood as a kind of social and political collective entity connecting insiders with collective interests and identity. ‘Diaspora’ refers to a group of people whereas ‘diaspora community’ is a visible collective entity built by diasporic people. For a more specific discussion of conditions and attributes of an ethnic community relating to ethnic categories, see A. Smith *National Identity* (London: Penguin Books, 1991) 20-1.
Manchu is recognised as being divided in two, North Manchu and South Manchu, but the division is made for Japanese and Russian convenience in accordance with the treaties of 1898 and 1915. Roughly, Harbin was the division between Russian and Japanese interests. Commonly, North Manchu includes the Jilin and Heilongjiang regions, whereas the rest is referred to as South Manchu. See, for example, H. K. Lee, ibid., 5.

See O. Bae, Josŏnhugi kukkyŏnggu sa'akgyeuanui byŏnhwa (Seoul: iljisa, 1998) 71-3.

The translation of the original content of the demarcating stone in English is as follows: The Great Manchurian officer Mujideng, the governor of Niaola, under the emperor's instruction, to patrol the border, comes to this place to superintend. To the west is Yalu (river); to the east is Tomun (river). Hence on the watershed the boundary stone is erected as a mark. The fifteenth of May, the fifty-first year of Emperor Kangxi (translated by Yu-kang Liang).

Korea, during the Qing period in China, kept a hostile stance towards China, considering Qing an uncivilised foreign power that had illegitimately seized sovereignty by overthrowing Ming, to whom Goryŏ and Josŏn kept a strong cultural loyalty. Korea had been apprehensive of the northern border between the two countries ever since. Korea’s cultural loyalty towards China accepting the Sino-centric world order gradually weakened with the disappearance of the Ming dynasty, culture and ideology developed during Josŏn which in fact reflected the efforts of a refining indigenous culture.

Gando includes Yanji, Hwa-ryong, Wang-ch'ŏng and Hun-chun in southeast Jilin. The Gando treaty (4 September, 1909) was made by Japan and China to cease the territorial disputes between Josŏn and Qing. Japan agreed the Tomun River as territorial demarcation in return for Chinese approval of Japanese dominance over Koreans in the region.

See, for example, Y. C. Han et al., Sinhanchunggu anyesid’ aeui hangukui mir’ae (Seoul: jayupyŏngnonsa, 1993) 40-1.


Disputes between ancient China and Korea over the territory of southern Manchuria began in the Ming era in China and the Goryŏ era in Korea. After several diplomatic adjustments between the two parties during Ming China, the relationship between Ming and Goryŏ was relatively peaceful, although historical records show the Goryŏ apprehension of losing the territory. Ming China gradually expanded into southern Manchuria after the Tang Empire’s forty year capture of the region. Ming shared the border with Goryŏ across the Amnok River. Ming demanded the return of territory north of Pyong-yang on the grounds that it was once occupied by Mongols. During Josŏn, Ming kept an amicable relationship with Korea. Ming respected the sovereignty of Josŏn and did not interfere with domestic politics. For nearly three hundred years between 1368 and 1644, Ming and Josŏn had peacefully shared the territorial border until later Qin (renamed Qing afterwards) frequently crossed the Amnok River and invaded Josŏn.


See H. K. Lee, ibid., 89. Lee, however, points out the inaccuracy of the figures. The reasons are the following: some households were missed out from the official statistics in the case of Koreans who were reluctant to register with the colonial institution; some Koreans had already naturalised to Chinese; Koreans in other parts of Manchuria were not included; the official population census by the Chinese government had not been made.

In fact, Korean migration from other parts of the Korean territory began earlier than this period, if not in a collective form. The Josŏn regime encouraged immigration of southern Koreans (province of old Shila) to the north into Hamgyong Province near the Manchurian border whenever Josŏn was threatened by Qing.

For more detailed explanations, see Bate, ibid., 14.
There were numerous legal problems that occurred in dealing with the Korean population. Koreans naturalised to Chinese kept two official nationalities in accordance with the Gando treaty between China and Japan. Chinese officials saw naturalised Koreans as Chinese, whereas Japanese officials treat them as Japanese on the grounds of the treaty which agreed Japanese control over the Korean population. For detailed discussion, see, for example, H. K. Lee, 1931, 160 and 240-1. Korean naturalisation into Chinese, however, was strongly discouraged by local Japanese government, which insisted on a legal procedure to have government recognition of the change of nationality prior to naturalisation into Chinese.

Chapter 4

I take the term ‘minority national group’ or ‘sub-national group’, to mean a non-dominant nation of host states under this study, who are a part of a dominant nation somewhere, such as Korean diasporas, Mongolians in China, or Russians and Germans in Uzbekistan, and who are officially recognised by their government as a titular nationality group like many other groups under Soviet regime, including Uzbeks, Kazakhs, Tajiks, and so on. But the prefixes, 'minority' and 'sub' only have relational significance. Tibetans, for example, are a majority national group in Tibet but they are, at the same time, a minority national group when speaking of Tibetans in relation to Han Chinese.

2

I employed the terms from Turner. Turner’s concept of thin or thick citizenship is based on the two different natures of community. The traditional (thick) gemeinschaft was an organic community based on hot communication in which members were bound together by propinquity, common cultural inheritance and shared memories. The electronic (thin) community and cool communication can be an association of strangers, who never physically connect with each other, share only a computer language, and visit each other’s sites merely out of idle curiosity (See B. S. Turner ‘General Theory of Cultural Citizenship’, Culture and Citizenship, N. Stevenson (ed.) London: Sage Publications, 2001, 29). Brubaker’s work (1992) is also relevant here. His comparative historical accounts on the development of the exclusive mechanism of the notion of citizenship insightfully demonstrate how the institute of citizenship has inseparably linked with modern state’s exclusive nationalising mission throughout the period of state building, while differentiating the French case from the German experience. Further, he analyses that in spite of its inclusive univeral implications, citizenship was conditioned by state interests with fluctuating interpretations of nationhood (See Brubaker: 1992, chapters 1 and 4).

The differences of the notions of citizenship are rooted not only in different traditions and historical relations but also in various types of political regimes. For example, M. Keane’s explanations are useful. His argument on the different notion of Chinese citizenship from western ideas is mainly based on the latter. He argues ‘[i]n contrast with the Western democratic tradition that emphasizes sovereignty, participation in politics, and civil rights, citizenship in China is seen as a benefit granted by the State to persons born in the People’s Republic’ (M. Keane, ‘Redefining Chinese Citizenship’, Economy and Society, London: Routledge, 30/1, 2001, 2).

4


5


6


7

Note that it signifies indigenisation/ethnicisation; the social engineering of making indigenous nation.

For a detailed historical account on this point, see T. Martin, ibid., 177-81.

Cited in Martin, ibid., 317, from GARF (Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii) 1235/140/141 (1925).

For example, the number of participants killed during the Sino-Japanese war shown below is one of the data appearing in an unpublished booklet in the region. However the source of data is unclear, thus reliability is low, it gives an idea of the way Josônjk claim their historical contributions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>City</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Han Chinese</th>
<th>Josônjk</th>
<th>Other nationalities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yǒnggil (yanji)</td>
<td>517</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>512</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domun (tuman)</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>185</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ryongjong (longjin)</td>
<td>817</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>814</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hwaryong (helung)</td>
<td>287</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>283</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ando (antu)</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>1 (Manchurian)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wangchung (wangqing)</td>
<td>566</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>531</td>
<td>1 (Manchurian)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hunchun (hunchun)</td>
<td>358</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>353</td>
<td>1 (Manchurian)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donwha (tunwha)</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1 (Manchurian)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Interview. Zhao.

One bushel equals 36 litter.


Interview. Han.

The constitution was adopted at the Fifth National Session of the Fifth National People’s Congress and promulgated for implementation by the Proclamation of the National People’s Congress on 4 December, 1982, as amended at the First Session of the Seventh National People’s Congress on 12 April 1988, and again at the First Session of the Seventh National People’s Congress on 29 March, 1993 (www.chinalaw.cc/lib/general).

By 1954 the Chinese government had identified thirty-eight ethnic groups in total. Another fifteen ethnic groups had been identified by 1964. In addition to the Lhoba ethnic group identified in 1965 and the Jino in 1979, altogether fifty-five ethnic groups have been officially recognised. (See Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, ‘White Paper on National Minorities Policy and Its Practice in China’, China Report (New Delhi; Thousand Oaks: London: Sage Publications, 36/1, 2000) 130.

The Chinese term minjuo, is either an ethnec or a nation in English translation, depending on sinologists. Thus, the terms ‘ethnic group’ and ‘nationality’ used in the direct quotation are both the translation of the same Chinese word minjuo, which includes Han Chinese. However, as I explained, the English word, ‘nation’, in my view, should be understood as have something inbetween minjuo (minjok) and guomin (gukmin) in the Chinese and the Korean languages.

Yanbian Autonomous Prefecture is one level below. In China, there are five autonomous regions, which include Mongol, Hui, Tibetan, Ughur, and Zhuang, and twenty-nine autonomous prefectures and sixty-nine autonomous counties. Two of them are designated as Josônjk autonomous administrative areas, which include Yanbian Autonomous Prefecture. In 1995 the Josônjk population was 2,183,000, being 39.18 per cent of the total population, and in Jangbaek Autonomous County, 14,700 (17.60 per cent). Article 112 of the Constitution, Section 4,
on the ‘Organs of Self-government of National Autonomous Areas’ indicates the basic administrative arrangement. The organs of self-government of national autonomous areas are the people’s congresses and the people’s governments of autonomous regions, autonomous prefectures and autonomous counties (www.chinalaw.cc/lib/general).

22 Unpublished document provided by interviewee, Kim Jong Guk.

23 See, for example, M. S. Kang, chungongu sosuminjokjôngch’ae (Seoul: Yungsŏng Publisher, 1988) 300-9.


25 Articles 114 and 122 of the Constitution indicate the regulations on chairman and cadres of the local governments. ‘The state provides financial, material and technical assistance to the minority nationalities to accelerate their economic and cultural development’ (Article 122).


30 For detailed explanations of legal regulations regarding alien registration in general, see, for example, H. Komai, Foreign Migrants in Contemporary Japan (Melbourne: Trans Pacific Press, 2001) 313; in particular, for the Zainichi case with a very informative legal approach on discrimination, see Insup Jeong, j’aëii gyopoû bôbjokjiui (Seoul: Seoul National University Press, 1996).

31 Interview. Lee, K. J.

32 The main reasons why Choryŏn was against the reform of alien registration are that, firstly, it has an implication of oppressive security law. Secondly, it has been misused and abused. Between 1947 and 1983, for 36 years, the violators numbered as many as 520,000, 80 per cent of the total population of Zainichi. Thirdly, Zainichi should be treated differently from other immigrants.

33 Interview. Soh.

34 Interview. Mun.


36 Daehanmoeil daily newspaper, 30 August, 1999.

37 Interview. Goh, W. H.


40 Ando controlled Korean labour – a valuable commodity in labour-short wartime Japan.

41 See, for example, M. Han and S. Han. koryŏsaram urinun nuguîngu?, T. H. Kim (trans.) (Seoul: kodamsa, 1999) 27. This book is one of the rare pieces of literature written by the Koreîsy directly concerning their collective memory, history and identity. I take quite a large part of this book as one of the primary sources for analysing Koreîsy identity.

H. Wada quoted from Syn Khva’s (1960) Ocherki po istorii sovetskikh koreitsev (163), which was the only history book on Soviet Koreans written by a Soviet Korean. He explains that ‘in 1928, of the 470 kolkhozes in the whole Far Eastern Region, 110 were in the Korean villages in Vladivostok okrug’ (Suh ed., Koreans in the Soviet Union, Honolulu, Hawaii: The Center for Korean Studies, University of Hawaii, 1988).


Interview. Kwon, social worker.


Chapter 5

1 See Y. Soysal: ibid., 85-6.
3 Their identity became ‘ethnic’ within the host society. In this regard, Peter Aspinall’s argument is worth consideration. His argument in the article is that the usage of the terminology ‘ethnic’ should be reconsidered by distinguishing ‘minority ethnic’ from ‘pan ethnic’. See P. Aspinall, ‘Collective Terminology to Describe the Minority Ethnic Population’, Sociology (London; Thousand Oaks; New Delhi: Sage Publications, 36/4, 2002).
5 Yŏnbŏn is Yanbian in the Korean language. I write it in the Korean way as ‘Yŏnbŏn University’ is a proper noun.
7 See P. Jeong, gohyangtta osipnyŏn (heilyongjiang: minjokchulpansa, 1997) 351.
8 See S. Chun, Josŏnjok sahoeūi byŏnhwaaoa jŏnmang (Liaonyong, China: Liaonyong minjokchulpansa, 1999) 43.
9 J. K. Han, Chu Duk Hae, 512; C. R. Kang, Chu Duk Hae, 160. For similar explanations on the three different views of Josŏnjok activists during that period, see also, C. S. Lee, bukhanjungkuk guangue: 1945-2000, 2000, 52.
10 See, for example, C. R. Kang et al.: 1992, 161-3.
13 See, for example, P. R. Jeong: ibid., 67.
14 P. R. Jeong: ibid., 216-7. According to 1990 statistics, although the number of students studying at Hanjok schools has increased, it is still only 15 per cent. The total number of Josŏnjok students is about 355,000 studying at Josŏnjok schools including 1,363 Josŏnjok primary schools and 288 Josŏnjok junior high schools. In the case of Yanbian, the percentage of Josŏnjok elementary school students studying at Hanjok schools is only 9.2 per cent compared with 30 per cent in Lionyong and 22 per cent in the Heilongjiang region. This shows that 85 per cent of Josŏnjok elementary school students are still in Josŏnjok schools (ibid., 284).
15 Interview. Lee, H. S.
16 This number shows that not all ethnic groups with their own vernacular languages are officially recognised.
17 See M. Zhou, ‘Language Policy and Illiteracy in Ethnic Minority Communities in China’, Journal of Multilingual and Multicultural Development (Clevedon: Multilingual Matters, 21/2,
Zhou examines minority languages in China by using three categorisations: those with writing systems of historically broad usage; those with writing systems of historically limited usage; those without functional systems (129).


Interview. Hwang.


Heilyongjiang Shinbao. 6 May, 1997.


Interview. Pak, K. S.

For more detailed historical episodes, see Jeong: ibid., 252-269.

See Y. Fukuoka, Lives of Young Koreans in Japan, T. Gill (trans.) (Melbourne: Trans Pacific Press, 2000) 3-5 and 12-8. However, the problems of such categorisation are twofold; firstly, it is not safe to conclude that 'being nationalists' exclusively means a group of people who have a strong interest in their own history, and weak attachment to the Japanese community, as he categorises. A choice to become individualistic detached from their own diaspora community could also be a different expression of nationalistic identity. Secondly, 'trying to become a Japanese' could also be seen as a struggle for their own identity, in other words, a diaspora identity, rather than giving up their identity.

It was the major watershed for Koreans in Japan as they could turn their interests and energy to politics in their motherlands instead, until they experienced a traumatic disappointment from both the North Korea and South Korean governments after the Korea-Japan Summit meeting in 1963.

Although the reliability of existing statistics are low, see for example, H. K. Jin, 'bukhangu jochongryungan jongch'igyongjae guankye', Unification and Economy, (Seoul; Yongin: Hyundai Research Institute, 120, Aug., 1996) 53.


Research Institute of Koreans Abroad, 'Choryon; what is the urgent problem?', Data for Policies Towards Koreans Abroad (Seoul: Research Institute of Koreans Abroad, 22, 1984) 228.

Although it was officially accepted as a legal educational institute on 17 April, 1968, there have been various restrictions applied by Japan’s government. Contrary to what Choryon affiliated Koreans believes that Japan did not approve an already established proper university. From the beginning, Joson university was a small attached institute rather than falling into any official categorisation of being a school. For this reason, Joson University has been categorised as gakjong daehak.

See, for example, M. S. Kang, 'Chochonryonui namhan jonymak', Data for Policies towards Koreans Abroad (Seoul: Research Institute of Koreans Abroad, 25, 1987) 105.

Interview. Goh, W. H.


S. H. Kim provides an illuminating evaluation of Mindan in general, see ibid., 97.

For a more detailed discussion, see S. H. Kim: ibid., 132-3.

Interview. Jeong B. C.

Chapter 6

1 Each diaspora has particular historical reasons for being disconnected from their ancestral motherlands. Accordingly, having difficulties communicating with the ancestral motherlands is almost inevitable.

2 Detailed explanations on the correlation between official political ideology and cultural heritages focusing on Korean familism were dealt with in another thesis, ‘A Study of the Family Structure as the Ideological Source during Park Jung Hee Regime’ (MA thesis, Ewha Womans University, 1993).


4 See S. Malesevic and V. Malesevic, ‘Ethnic Identity Perceptions: an analysis of two surveys’, Europa Ethnica (Wien: Braumuller, 58/1-2, 2001) 33, quoted from Isajiw (1990, 37-8). As I explained, the Korean diasporas under this study are a part of a nation while being an ethnic group. Thus, the two terms, an ethnic group and a national group, are sometimes used interchangeably, not because their concepts are identical but because my research concern, diasporas’ national identity is inevitably linked with ethnicity.

5 Interview. Pak, K. S.

6 I consider that he presumes the matter of unification of the two Koreas is very much dependent on the relationship between China and two Koreas, and neighbouring countries would not be so positive about having a country with increased power nearby.

7 Interview. Ahn, H. C.

8 A speech by Nam Sang Bok, chief of Yanbian Korean autonomous prefecture, 15 January, 1999, at the Conference of People’s Representatives, Yanbian, China.


10 Yanbian Yearbook, 30.

11 Yanbian Yearbook, 18.

12 Interview. Kim, H. S.


14 See the preface of Yun Dong Ju ginyŏmjip, M. S. Choi and D. H. Kim (ed.) (Yanji, China; Yanbian University Press, 1996).

15 The school is now incorporated into Ryongjŏng Junior High School.

Interview, Kang, H.

For detailed survey data and information on the present situation and historical development of Korean schools in Japan, see ‘History and Current State of Ethnic Education By Korean People in Japan’ compiled and published by the Committee for Protection of Human Rights for Korean Residents in Japan [http://www.korea-np.co.ip/pk/002nd issue/97073006.htm](http://www.korea-np.co.jp/pk/002nd_issue/97073006.htm).

Interview, Kang, H.

Interview, Han, A. S.

*Saekkho* is a particular dish known as a Korean traditional one among Zainchi Koreans.


See H. Jin: ibid., 61.


Interview. Shin, Bladimir.

Interview. Kwon, social worker.

Although North Korea accepted some Soviet Korean returnees during Krushchev’s regime for a short period, most Soviet Koreans were excluded in the course of the power struggle within the party.


For further explanations, see Gitelman: ibid., 131.


Interview. Kim, J. H. Vita.


Interview. Kim, Brut.

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*This list does not include interviewees who wished to remain anonymous.