Rearticulating the Meaning of Community in International Theory: Territoriality, Identity and the Political

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Territoriality, Identity and the Political

The thesis examines the concept of community in international relations theory. It is my contention that articulating the concept of community as the sovereign state in international relations ultimately places limits on political space, hampering the extent to which the discipline is able to understand and explain the varieties of global politics and political actors that increasingly affect international relations. The thesis argues that in order to redefine political space, it is necessary rearticulate the meaning of community in international theory.

To examine the feasibility of rearticulation, the thesis focuses on international theory. The first chapter sets out the problem of political space in international relations, arguing that it tends to be rather narrowly and problematically demarcated by the sovereign state. With the meaning of community in international relations therefore in need of rearticulation, the second chapter turns to social theory for a concept of community that is not framed by the sovereign state, and argues that the concept of community may be understood by way of three components: territoriality, identity and the political.

The subsequent three chapters examine exemplars from international theory for each of these three components. These three chapters consider the extent to which it is viable to seek rearticulation, what this might involve and the extent to which it is already underway in international relations. The thesis determines that rearticulation is possible, given that the existing work on territoriality, identity and the political suggests that the necessary conceptual tools are already employed in the discipline and are applicable for rearticulating the meaning of community. Moreover, with the addition of work from social theory, the thesis concludes that rearticulation is not only feasible but also essential. The conclusion sets out what is required to continue the process of rearticulating the meaning of community in international theory.
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Introduction

A haze of Paradigm Lost still surrounds the word "community" in popular parlance, the social sciences, philosophy and history... the term almost inevitably evokes a mixture of description, sentiment, and moral principle.¹

The concept of community is central to political discourse and practice. From the ancient polis to the modern sovereign state, concepts of community provide organising principles and a framework for political life and political action for individuals and for groups. At first glance, the concept seems relatively straightforward; it tends to conjure up images of better times in the past, often based on what is thought to be absent from the present. Typically, it is a concept that most people believe they understand: we know community when we see it; in addition, the concept of community tends to be understood as positive, perhaps because it exists more in the realm of nostalgia than elsewhere. As a result, the concept of community is frequently invoked to great political effect, but in practice it is notoriously difficult either to define or create. Most people have some (utopian) idea of what community must consist, but such images are sufficiently hazy as to make the concept applicable in virtually any social, political or ideological context. Thus what community means is highly contested, and what is involved in realising community varies widely. Upon closer examination, therefore, the concept of community is not at all straightforward.

Looking to the social sciences, where it seems reasonable to expect at least some measure of clarity, the concept in fact gets murkier. It is understood to refer to an abstract concept or to a concrete conception or, indeed, both, and it also refers both to discourse and to practice. Thus there is a strange combination of both interest and apathy when it comes to the concept of community: it seems to be an important subject of tremendous controversy but at the same time debate about it

¹ Charles Tilly, "International Communities, Secure or Otherwise" in Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, eds. Security Communities (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 397-398. Or, to put it more directly, "... people who use the word 'community' don't have a thought in their heads, apart from some vague notion that people should be nicer to one another." Zoe Williams, "Words That Should Be Banned: Community" in The Guardian (29 June 2002), p. 7.
remains relatively scarce, and clarity in usage is uncommon. In many ways, this lack of clarity is not surprising because it seems that the more one examines the concept, the less possible it becomes to say or do anything with it. Indeed, most social theorists who set out to clarify the concept of community eventually acknowledge that it is insufficient even to qualify as an essentially contested concept because there is so little agreement about its core meaning. And yet the concept of community remains central to political discourse and to political practice, and it is often employed as if its meaning is untroubled by ambiguity, and is both universally understood and applicable.

This ambiguity certainly extends to international relations, where the concept of community is understood to exist in principle and in practice as the sovereign state. Moreover, this understanding of community has prevailed both in political studies and in international relations for decades, if not centuries, and to a certain extent is a defining feature of both disciplines. Community is thought to exist inside states, it is thought to consist in the sovereign state itself, and it is understood, in an international context, to be so vague as to be more useful for rhetorical purposes than for analytical thought or questions. Thus although the utility of this concept does not go unrecognised in international relations, its conceptual murkiness does. By articulating the concept of community as the sovereign state in the discipline, it is rendered complete: the concept of community becomes indistinguishable from the sovereign state in international relations. The problem is that the sovereign state is merely one articulation of the concept of community.

This important but neglected distinction is a problem for international relations because the discipline is at present unable to fully account for some varieties of international politics, due to the narrow understanding of political space that results from the discipline’s focus on the sovereign state. And the uncritical acceptance of this understanding of political space is problematic for the discipline in terms of both theory and practice. Problematising the prevailing notion of political space in international relations may thus contribute to a better understanding of both international theory and international politics, and it is the
contention of this thesis that the meaning of community in international theory must be rearticulated in order to avoid the problem of political space.

The thesis argues that there is much to be gained from problematising political space in international relations. Providing a critique of how political space is understood in the discipline opens up the possibility of examining international relations outside the terms of both the principle and the practices of the sovereign state. And by working outside of state boundaries, a critical examination of the concept of community allows for sounder critique both in terms of what constitutes, and what is constituted by this concept: the components of territoriality, identity and the political. Moreover, such an approach also allows for the possibility of moving beyond critique, to rearticulate the meaning of community and to change how political space is understood in international relations. Thus by arguing that the concept of community requires rearticulation in international theory, and examining work on the core components of this concept that is already underway in the discipline, the thesis demonstrates that a rearticulation of the meaning of community in international relations theory is both necessary and feasible.

Moreover, to engage in conceptual analysis and contest the dominant articulation of community in international relations is to do more than critique. As William Connolly suggests, conceptual contests are themselves fundamentally political:

Since we often cannot expect knockdown arguments to settle these matters, we must come to terms somehow with the political dimension of such contests. It is possible, and I believe likely, that the politics of these contests would become more enlightened if the contestants realized that in many contexts no single use can be advanced that must be accepted by all reasonable persons. The realization that opposing uses might not be exclusively self-serving but have defensible reasons in their support could introduce into these contests a measure of tolerance and a receptivity to reconsideration of received views. Politics would not be expunged, but its character would be enhanced. These conclusions are themselves disputable. They flow from the assumption that rationality, fragile as it is, is helped, not hindered, by heightened awareness of the nature and import of our
In other words, the conceptual analysis employed in this thesis is intended to illuminate the political dimensions of contests over articulating the concept of community as the sovereign state, over how political space is understood in international relations, and over our understanding of international politics and international theory. In short, the argument that it is vital to rearticulate the prevailing articulation of community in international theory is an argument about the meaning and character of political space in international relations.

In order to move toward rearticulation, this thesis focuses on the theoretical implications of the prevalent understanding of political space in international relations. Thus while not engaging in empirical work, the thesis is informed by an awareness of concrete political and social problems, and therefore adopts a critical theory, rather than a problem-solving approach. The logic of employing a theoretical approach to this problem is that the discipline may only be able to piece together the practical puzzles of world politics if international theory is able first, to account for them and second, to provide terms of reference within which to understand and explain them. Moreover, given the scope of the thesis and of the problem of political space in international relations, it is not possible to here provide a rearticulated account of the concept. Instead, the goal of the thesis is to argue that such work is necessary, to question whether it is feasible, and to set out the core components of rearticulation.

Thus it is the central argument of this thesis that it is vital to problematise the prevailing understanding of political space in international relations by challenging the largely uncritical articulation of the sovereign state as the concept of community in the discipline. Such an argument means that the thesis is concerned with providing the terms of reference within which international theory might better approach the problems of international theory and international politics. Connolly suggests that such work must begin with

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conceptual questions because

[...] those who simply use established concepts to get to the facts of political life, those who act unreflectively within the confines of established concepts, actually have the perceptions and modes of conduct available to them limited in subtle and undetected ways. Such conceptual blinkers impede the work of any student of politics, but they are particularly corrosive of efforts to explore radical perspectives on politics. For to adopt without revision the concepts prevailing in a polity is to accept terms of discourse loaded in favour of established practices.3

The thesis does not accept the terms of discourse of international relations, including its understanding of political space and its articulation of the concept of community as the sovereign state. Instead, the intent is to problematise political space in the discipline and bring to international relations a means to better understand international politics and international theory, by first, unpacking unexamined 'perceptions' and 'modes of conduct' in the discipline, and second, by setting out what is required to rearticulate the meaning of community, with a view to addressing the problem of political space in international relations.

The point is not that international theorists unquestioningly accept the terms of discourse set out by the international relations discipline. Nor is it the case that the sovereign state has been insufficiently problematised. Rather, the argument here is that the sovereign state has been unreflectively articulated as the concept of community in international relations to such an extent that it is not clear how to challenge these terms of discourse, nor if such an approach is even feasible. Indeed, in international relations it is difficult to separate the discipline's terms of discourse from questions of the state, because the sovereign state is itself a defining feature of those terms of discourse and of the discipline. Thus by starting with the problem of political space, the thesis is able to focus on rearticulating the meaning of community in international theory as a means to address this problem. Contesting the sovereign state alone is insufficient, because it sharply narrows the terms of any critical approach by remaining within the terms of

3 Ibid., pp. 1-2.
discourse of international relations.

In sum, this thesis takes on concerns that the boundaries of the sovereign state and thus of political space are too comfortable; that they are so old and familiar that the limits they impose are rarely challenged directly, because they are not recognized as limits. International relations must recognize its modernist complacency, and acknowledge that the international relations articulation of the concept of community – the sovereign state – is not final or fixed any more than it is natural or inevitable. Mainstream approaches in the discipline provide a narrow account of political space due in part to the hegemony of realism in the discipline in which problem-solving theory is prioritised over critical theory. Coupled with the more substantive debate and discussion about the concept of community in social theory, this approach provides terms of reference for analysis in the form of three components of the concept of community, because most debates focus on variations of arguments about the nature and importance of the relationships of individuals or/and groups in various configurations of political space. Thus the core components of the concept of community are identified as territoriality, identity and the political, and bringing these terms of reference back into international relations from social theory makes it possible to examine the extent to which they are presently understood in the discipline, so that it is then possible to determine what is required in order to rearticulate the meaning of community in international theory.

Rearticulating the meaning of community in international relations theory will begin to redress at least some of the effects of the narrow understanding of political space prevalent in international relations. It is required because of the theoretical shortcomings in the discipline, and therefore it may also create the conditions in which the practical shortcomings of its current articulation might be more effectively addressed. Moreover, by critiquing political space and seeking to rearticulate the meaning of community in international theory, it becomes possible to determine the extent to which this problem is already being addressed in the discipline, and what work remains to be done to rearticulate the meaning of community in the discipline. Such a programme of work needs to be established
as at least within the abilities of the international relations discipline before setting out what is involved in rearticulation. Eventually undertaking that work is necessary, but unfortunately setting out a substantive account of a rearticulated concept of community is beyond the scope of this thesis. Instead, it is through critique, an engagement with key theorists in international relations, and by bringing together their work with that of social theory on the concept of community, that the thesis seeks to make the case for such a project, to establish that this work is already underway to some extent in international relations, and to set out how it might proceed.

In short, the meaning of the concept of community must be rearticulated in international theory both to better understand its discrete components – territoriality, identity and the political – and because its rearticulation will help the discipline better understand political space and thus international politics and international theory as well. What will determine the extent of the impact of rearticulating the meaning of community in international relations is how that concept is itself understood. At present the meaning of the concept of community in international relations is unclear. If it is articulated in the discipline at all, it is as the sovereign state. But by unsettling this articulation of the concept of community, it will be possible to unpack this concept. If, after unpacking it, it is evident that its rearticulation is feasible, and perhaps already underway in international relations, then what remains is to set out how to continue the process of rearticulating the meaning of community in international theory, which may also offer an improved understanding of political space in international relations. This thesis is about opening up those possibilities.

The Structure of the Thesis

Following this introduction, the thesis is divided into six chapters, consisting of two parts, in addition to a conclusion. The first part of the thesis addresses the problem of political space and the concept of community. It includes two chapters that focus on how both are understood, in international relations and in social theory, respectively. By engaging in critique and making the case in part
one for considering the potential of rearticulating the meaning of community in international theory, the second part of the thesis focuses on three core components of community. The three chapters of the second part each focus on theorists in international relations who address one component of the concept of community from a critical theory, rather than a problem-solving perspective. After examining the extent to which work on the core components of the concept of community is already underway in the discipline throughout part two, the final chapter compares the three critical international theory approaches and introduces the work of one theorist from outside international relations to 'interrupt' the concept of community in the discipline. The conclusion outlines what it means to understand the concept of community as process, and it sets out what is involved in the process of rearticulating the meaning of community in international relations theory.

Chapter one addresses the problem of political space in international relations, arguing that the prevalent understanding of it is too narrowly demarcated by the (dominance of the) sovereign state in the discipline. In analysing the nature of this problem, the chapter examines the prevalent articulation of the sovereign state as the concept of community in international relations, and argues that the resultant understanding of political space is a problem for both international politics and international theory. Through a survey of international relations literature, chapter one traces how this problem developed, and concludes that rearticulating the meaning of community in international theory will positively affect how political space is understood in international relations, particularly through a critical theory approach. Thus chapter one suggests that what is required is an assessment of the extent to which such work is already underway in international relations. But given the limited understanding of the concept of community in the discipline, the chapter concludes that it is first necessary to look outside of international relations for the terms of reference for such an analysis.

In seeking an understanding of the concept of community that is not articulated as the state, therefore, chapter two explores how the concept is understood in social
theory. The chapter provides an overview and analysis of the key debates about the concept of community, finding that social theory is no more successful than international relations at defining the concept of community. However, with a more nuanced approach to the concept, the chapter argues that social theory does provide terms of reference for articulating and, crucially, rearticulating it. Thus chapter two proposes that the three core components of the concept of community are territoriality, identity and the political. The chapter concludes with an examination of each component with reference to both social theory and international theory.

Since chapter two notes that each component is already addressed in international theory to varying degrees, the second part of the thesis examines the three components in turn, with reference to particular theorists in international relations who adopt critical theory, rather than problem-solving approaches. The first of these three chapters examines the critical theory approach of Andrew Linklater to the concept of community and the component of territoriality. With his focus on problems of boundaries and on the universal-particular dichotomy, Linklater's work makes an important contribution to the potential rearticulation of the meaning of community in international theory. By problematising boundaries in the discipline, and in particular the boundaries of the sovereign state that reinforce the universal-particular dichotomy, Linklater not only introduces to the discipline the idea of transforming the concept of community, but he also critiques political space and illustrates the need to rearticulate the meaning of community in international relations.

Rather than examine the work of one particular theorist, chapter four instead considers feminist international theory with particular reference to two theorists who work on the concept of community and the component of identity. Arguing that feminist theory is critical theory, the chapter provides an overview of feminist literature generally, and in international relations specifically, and examines the work of two feminist theorists who particularly address the concept of community: Iris Marion Young and Shane Phelan. Based on this feminist work on the concept, the chapter argues that feminist international theory has a great
deal to offer the potential rearticulation of the meaning of community in international relations theory, since it highlights problems of self/other, and the importance of the component of identity and its constitutive relationship with the concept of community.

Chapter five examines the poststructuralist work of R.B.J. Walker on the concept of community, and the problem of political space and the sovereign state in international relations, with reference to the component of the political in the discipline. Walker's work makes an important contribution to the potential rearticulation of the meaning of community because his focus on the political addresses the other two components of territoriality and identity as well. Following Walker's analysis, the chapter argues that contesting the notion of the political produced by and reinforced within the boundaries of the sovereign state and the principle of state sovereignty is inherently self-referential and problematic, and he argues that the political needs to be re-located.

The final chapter of the thesis argues that in different ways, all three critical theory approaches to the core components of the concept of community contribute to the potential rearticulation of the meaning of community in international relations theory. As a consequence, the thesis argues that the project of rearticulation is both essential and attainable, because the discipline demonstrably possesses the analytical tools for carrying out this work. By taking some initial steps toward rearticulation in this thesis, it is clear that none of the three critical theory approaches themselves undertake this work and that much remains to be done in international relations in order to rearticulate the meaning of community. Thus the chapter turns to the work of Jean-Luc Nancy on (interrupting) the concept of community, and concludes that his approach, in combination with critical work already underway in international relations, together provides the terms of reference for taking the next step in the rearticulation of the meaning of community.

The conclusion examines the idea of understanding the concept of community as process, and indicate what is expected to come out of the process of rearticulating
the meaning of community in international relations theory. By beginning the work of rearticulation, this thesis underscores the importance of a critical theory approach, and the need to refocus the analytical tools of international relations away from questions principally determined by and referring to the sovereign state. In sum, the thesis suggests that the rearticulation of the meaning of community is both necessary and feasible in international relations theory, and in addition to initiating the process of rearticulation, it argues that this process must continue, and sets out in general terms how to proceed.
Chapter One
The Problem of Political Space in International Relations

Inevitably the political communities imagined by theorists are reifications of political space that obscure the actual and potential communities that people develop in the course of their political activities. Thus, we have theories of political community that are just theories of the state disguised.¹

The relatively short history of the international relations discipline belies the number and intensity of internal debates that rage about its nature and purpose. From the first disciplinary dispute between realists and idealists in the early part of the last century, through the inter-paradigm debate, to more recent questions about critical theory, postmodernism and constructivism, international relations is characterised by theoretical uncertainty.² Even core concepts such as the state and the international system are disputed in international relations. This chapter examines the problem of political space in international relations, arguing that the discipline needs to redefine how political space is understood.

For many international relations theorists, the idea that political space might require redefinition would appear odd. It is not a commonly recognized problem, or a widely acknowledged gap in the discipline. After all, as R.B.J. Walker notes, "... the principle of state sovereignty offers both a spatial and a temporal resolution to questions about what political community can be...",³


² As Scott Burchill suggests: "In International Relations, there is rarely a consensus about when theoretical progress is made and the central questions of the discipline are never finally settled: they will always be open to new interpretations and further refinement." Scott Burchill, Introduction in Scott Burchill et. al., Theories of International Relations (Houndmills: Macmillan, 1996), p. 11.

thereby setting out the boundaries of political space. But this chapter questions the merits of the resolution offered via state sovereignty, and asks whether the boundaries of political space are contiguous with those of the sovereign state. Its contention is that redefining political space via the concept of community is vital for improving our understanding of international relations, both in terms of international politics and international theory.

The problem is that the sovereign state in international relations no longer provides satisfactory answers to questions "...about human identity, about who we are and how we might live together whoever we are."\(^4\) It is the contention of the chapter (and indeed the thesis) that international relations would therefore benefit from redefining how political space is understood in the discipline. This chapter sets out the problem of political space as articulated via the sovereign state, with the thesis exploring a possible solution to this problem in the form of a rearticulated concept of community.

What is interesting about referring to the problem of political space is that at first glance it seems as if the predominant expression of political space in international relations - the sovereign state - has resolved the question of 'who we are' and 'how we live together'. But the starting point for this thesis is that the sovereign state is merely one possible answer to this question, because the sovereign state is merely one way of demarcating political space. The concept of community is another possible answer, and this thesis argues that it may provide better ways to answer these questions than the sovereign state.

The question of 'what political community can be', as Walker puts it, is central to this thesis. The sovereign state is one possibility, but despite its long history, its prevalence in international relations and its apparent success, it is not the only answer. As Mark Hoffman argues

Within the existing discourses of international and political theory the question of political community is solved through recourse to the sovereign state. Both argue that the realisation of political community is possible only within the spatial and temporal boundaries of the modern sovereign state. But as the intellectual and practical boundaries of the state are increasingly contested, so too is the limitation of community to the confines of the state's authoritative domain.\(^5\)

In fact, the success and longevity of the sovereign state as the main expression of political space in international relations is remarkable compared to social theory generally. In political studies, philosophy, and sociology, for example, the meaning of political space is understood as highly complex. Its potential permutations are vigorously debated and well explored.\(^6\) But in international relations, the sovereign state provides the boundaries of political space, and there has been relatively little interest in exploring alternatives to this approach.

The work that does seek an alternative to the sovereign state's demarcation of political space in international relations tends to focus on those problems that fall outside of it. For example, local or municipal politics, global politics, social movements and questions concerning refugees and migration all pose significant problems for the political space of the sovereign state. And in addition to these "new" forms of politics that explicitly challenge the political space demarcated by the sovereign state, even the classical politics of diplomacy, war and trade are increasingly spilling out of the space.


\(^6\) Chapter Two provides an overview and analysis of debates about the concept of community in social theory. It is important to note that the point here is not that social theory either defines the concept of community or provides a model of political space. Rather, the point is that a self-consciousness exists in social theory that seems absent from international relations when it comes to that concept, with the result that the intrinsic difficulties of thinking about political space and the concept of community are recognised and acknowledged in social theory but not, typically, in international relations.
traditionally allotted to them. International terrorism, the rise of wealthy and powerful non-national corporations and global environmental problems all frequently defy and sometimes even threaten the traditional boundaries of political space as set out via the sovereign state.

This range of problems challenges the sovereign state's definition and control of territoriality in terms of the boundaries of both time and space; it challenges the sovereign state's determination of personal and group identities and its claim on their loyalties; and it challenges the sovereign state's management and understanding of the political, particularly in terms of the tensions of the universal-particular dichotomy. It is this tension between duties to humanity and obligations to the state that the political space of the sovereign state was initially meant to resolve. But this dichotomy is at the centre of many of the problems that now challenge the sovereign state. Thus it seems, at least in part, that because the sovereign state has failed to deal with the universal-particular dichotomy adequately, its definition of political space is increasingly problematic and frequently challenged.

By tracing some of the questions, problems and concerns that are no longer contained and satisfied within the political space of the sovereign state, this chapter argues that the universal-particular dichotomy must be central to any redefinition of political space. It concludes that the best way forward is via the concept of community which, if rearticulated, will redefine political space and allow for better, more useful ways of framing the problems facing international relations, including the universal-particular dichotomy. Thus it is the goal of this chapter to critique political space and highlight the necessity for redefining it, which may be achieved through a rearticulation of the meaning of community in international theory. The thesis as a whole seeks to set out a framework for this rearticulation, exploring the extent to which such work is already underway in various critical theory approaches to international relations. Therefore, although it is beyond the scope of the thesis to provide a substantive account of a rearticulated concept of community, it does set out a general framework as to how this rearticulation ought to proceed. But first, this chapter begins by exploring the problem political space in international
relations.

The first section of this chapter examines how political space came to be understood through the sovereign state in international relations. It analyses the tension that exists in the discipline between realism and normative theory, because this tension of realism versus idealism, of problem-solving versus critical theory is an important factor in the redefinition of political space in international relations. Finally, following a look at the universal-particular dichotomy and its apparent resolution in the sovereign state, the section concludes that the dominance of the realist, problem-solving paradigm is key to the prevailing expression of political space in international relations as demarcated through the sovereign state.

The second section of the chapter examines some of the problems resulting from the prevailing understanding of political space in international relations in more detail. By considering both international relations theory and international politics, this section sets out the consequences of failing to manage the problem of the universal-particular dichotomy, and in particular the consequences for the discipline of focusing on realist and problem-solving approaches rather than normative and critical theory approaches. The section argues that both international theory and international politics pose serious challenges that the prevailing expression of political space in international relations is ill-equipped to manage.

The final section of the chapter examines the potential of critical theory approaches to alter how political space is understood in international relations by way of the concept of community. It examines what conceptual tools are required in order to rearticulate the meaning of the concept of community in the discipline and redefine political space. Arguing that the rearticulation of the meaning of community in international relations theory might be best undertaken from a critical, as opposed to problem-solving approach, the section concludes that it is possible to redefine political space through the concept of community instead of state sovereignty. The chapter argues that international relations does possess the analytical tools necessary to
rearticulate the meaning of community: normative and critical theory approaches offer the best way forward. Specifically, the work of Andrew Linklater, feminist theorists and R.B.J. Walker are identified as offering a basis for the potential rearticulation of the meaning of community in international theory.

1. The Problem of Political Space in International Relations

The academic discipline of international relations is less than one hundred years old, and for most of its history has been dominated by the state-centric realist paradigm which places state sovereignty at the centre of both international politics and international theory. It is this realist paradigm which has demarcated political space in international relations. However, early international relations was characterised by idealism, with its institution-based, internationalistic, peace-through-law approach (that appeared absurdly utopian to many). Thus with the decline of the League of Nations, the Second World War, and growing skepticism about such a utopian approach to international politics, idealism was relegated by the realist paradigm to the margins of international relations by the 1950s.

Hedley Bull suggests that post-war realists served the necessary function of

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7 For E.H. Carr, idealism was a response to the First World War, and is an approach conciliatory in nature, legalistic in action, moralistic in thought, and ultimately naive and overly optimistic in reality. E.H. Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations*. (2nd ed., 1946). Idealism refers here to the earliest paradigm of international relations, which was challenged and marginalised by realism. Subsequent variants of this approach will be collectively referred to as "normative theory". As Kimberly Hutchings suggests, "[normative theory] is a very broad term which refers to any theorization of reality which is in some sense evaluative...". Hutchings, *International Political Theory: Rethinking Ethics in a Global Era* (London: Sage, 1999), p. 1 (emphasis original). Thus here, "idealism" is an early variant of normative theory. See also Chris Brown, *International Relations Theory: New Normative Approaches* (New York and London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992), especially p. 3. On the history and development of idealism in international relations see Hutchings, *International Political Theory*; and see also, for example, G. Goodwin and K. Taylor, *The Politics of Utopia: A Study in Theory and Practice* (London: St. Martin's Press, 1982).
deflating the optimistic and moralistic disposition of idealism.\textsuperscript{8} Thus in the realist school which supplanted that of the idealists, questions of universalism, peace, morality, and obligations to humanity gave way to the three central premises of realism: that the state is central in international politics, which is primarily about power relations, within an international anarchical society or system.\textsuperscript{9} In short, particularism and duties to one's fellow citizens were prioritized over universalism and obligations to humanity.

To put it another way, the political space of international relations was demarcated by the sovereign state. Realism apparently resolved the universal-particular dichotomy by centralizing the sovereign state and power relations, thereby largely dismissing universalist considerations in favour of particularist concerns. As Magnusson summarises:

\begin{quote}
... the space within the state is the domain in which we can hope to achieve the ideals articulated in the grand tradition of Western political thought. Outside, nothing is secure; inside are liberty, equality, and fraternity, democracy, order and progress, conservatism and radicalism, liberalism and socialism, even
\end{quote}


\textsuperscript{9} Neo-realism, or structural realism, does not dispute these tenets, but is a more systemic, deterministic account of state-centric power politics, seeking to be less reductionist than realism. Both have a negative view of human nature, both distinguish sharply between the domestic and the international, and both omit moral/ethical considerations. On the two see, for example, Scott Burchill "Realism and Neo-realism" in Burchill et. al., op. cit.; and for a comparison of realism, neorealism and idealism see Hutchings, \textit{International Political Theory}, ibid., especially pp. 1-27; and see generally, for example, Barry Buzan "The Timeless Wisdom of Realism?" in Steve Smith, Ken Booth and Marysia Zalewski, eds. \textit{International Theory: Positivism and Beyond} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); J.G. Ruggie "Territoriality and Beyond: Problematising Modernity in International Relations" in \textit{International Organisation} 47(1); Alan James, "The realism of Realism: The State and the Study of International Relations" in \textit{Review of International Studies} (Vol. 15, No. 3, 1989); Robert O. Keohane, ed., \textit{Neorealism and its Critics} (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986); Kenneth Waltz, \textit{Man The State and War} (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959); Waltz, \textit{Theory of International Politics} (Reading, MA.: Addison-Wesley, 1979); Richard Devetak, "Incomplete Theories: Theories and Practices of Statecraft" in John Macmillan and Andrew Linklater, eds., \textit{Boundaries in Question: New Directions in International Relations} (London and New York: Pinter Publishers, 1995).
reform and revolution. The state keeps the barbarians out – or, more accurately, keeps them locked up in states of their own.10

This understanding of political space has provided international relations with a long-lasting – if ultimately unsatisfactory – answer to Walker’s question of what political community can be. There have been attempts to develop alternatives to realism in the discipline, to challenge its state-centricity, but disputes such as the inter-paradigm debate of the 1980s had little effect on the dominance of the realist paradigm and the centrality of the sovereign state in the discipline.11 Even (non-realist) international society approaches prioritise the sovereign state over alternative expressions of political space.12

Still, questioning the role of the sovereign state is something of a tradition in international relations13; it was part of what motivated Martin Wight over forty years ago to ask "why is there no international theory?"14 When Wight noted


14 Martin Wight, "Why is There No International Theory?" in Herbert Butterfield and Wight, eds. Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International Politics
the deficiency in 1960, he argued that

"by "international theory" is meant a tradition of speculation about relations between states, a tradition imagined as the twin of speculation about the state to which the name "political theory" is appropriated. And international theory in this sense does not, at first sight, exist."\(^{15}\)

His recognition of "... a kind of recalcitrance of international politics to being theorised about..." led him to compare political and international theory.\(^{16}\) For Wight, "... political theory is the tradition of speculation about the state..."\(^{17}\) which is possible because the state provides reliable indicators in the form of "[p]olitical theory and law [which] are maps of experience or systems of action within the realm of normal relationships and calculable results. They are the theory of the good life."\(^{18}\)

But international theory, Wight suggests, only theorises survival: "[w]hat for political theory is the extreme case (as revolution, or civil war) is for international theory the regular case... involv[ing] the ultimate experience of

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\(^{16}\) Wight, ibid., p.33. For another perspective from a different approach to this point, see Charles Beitz, *Political Theory and International Relations* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979) especially pp. 154-156. See also, for example, Howard Williams *International Relations in Political Theory* (Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1992), and Williams *International Relations and the Limits of Political Theory* (Houndmills: Macmillan, 1996).

\(^{17}\) Wight, ibid., p. 18.

\(^{18}\) Wight, ibid., p.33.
life and death, national existence and national extinction. Wight's argument suggests that the narrow political space demarcated by the sovereign state arose in part because of the anarchical nature of international politics, with particularism prioritized over universalism in the name of survival.

Somewhat more recently, Chris Brown suggests that "... the most central question of any normative international relations theory [is] the moral value to be credited to particularistic political collectivities as against humanity as a whole or the claims of individual human beings." He argues that

... Wight sets up political theory in such a way that international theory is inevitably a marginalised twin discourse, doomed to insignificance. But international relations theory is not something separate from, running in tandem with, political theory; it is political theory, seen from a particular angle or through a particular filter.

In international relations that filter is the sovereign state. And because realism dominated the discipline almost from its inception, the dominant notion of political space in international relations is expressed through and by the sovereign state. While idealism and normative theory might understand political space differently, as Wight and Brown imply, there has been no opportunity to find out, because normative theorists have not succeeded in promoting viable alternatives to the prevailing realist hegemony.

Therefore, the demarcation of political space by the sovereign state in international relations is inextricably linked to the historical development of

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the academic discipline, and in particular to the dominance of realism in it. Realism focuses on the sovereign state and looks no further, even though normative theory understands political space differently: as a locus for debate regarding ethics, values and other normative and idealist concerns. Of course, both of these paradigms are more complex than this brief summary suggests, as they involve much more than simply disparate approaches to political space. But because realism has dominated the discipline, in international relations the sovereign state is political space.

However, there is ongoing opposition to this status quo, and post-structuralist and critical theory debates in the discipline have produced more explicit interest in developing alternative expressions of political space in international relations. As Magnusson argues, such approaches disrupt "... the critical spaces from which modern intellectuals have done their work... by insisting

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22 Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett suggest that "... realist thought assumes a political community, but presumes that it is exhausted by the state's territorial borders...". Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, eds. Security Communities (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 14.

23 Indeed, Kimberly Hutchings suggests that debates between realism and idealism, for example, establish the parameters for all normative theorising in international relations: "... schools of thought about normative issues in international politics were underlain by conceptual oppositions... between reason and nature, ideality and reality, universal and particular, and they dominated fundamental presumptions about the nature of morality and politics." Hutchings, International Political Theory, op. cit., p. 91. She summarises these two positions as "system of states" versus "universal community of humankind", and suggests that they are also played out in the communitarian-cosmopolitan debate. (Ibid., p. 73). Moreover, it must be noted that most, if not all, aspects of contemporary questions about the concept of community are much older than the discipline of international relations. See, for example, F. Parkinson, The Philosophy of International Relations: A Study in the History of Thought (Beverly Hills, CA.: Sage Publications, 1977); H.P. Kainz, Philosophical Perspectives on Peace: An Anthology of Classical and Modern Sources (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1987); H.L. Williams, International Relations in Political Theory (Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1991). The history of debates on the concept of community in social theory is addressed in the next chapter, but for one example of a general discussion of conceptions of community ranging from Aristotle to Hegel (encompassing Cicero, St. Augustine, Aquinas, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Locke, Grotius, Pufendorf, Rousseau and Burke, etc.), see Carl J. Friedrich, "The Concept of Community in the History of Political and Legal Philosophy", in Friedrich, ed., Community: Nomos II, Yearbook of the American Society of Political and Legal Philosophy (New York: The Liberal Arts Press, 1959), pp. 3-24.
that all knowledge is necessarily local and particular..."\(^{24}\). Three such disruptive approaches may be found in the work of Andrew Linklater, feminist theorists and R.B.J. Walker, all of whom take an explicit interest not only in how the discipline understands political space, but also in the role of the concept of community in the universal-particular dichotomy in that understanding.\(^{25}\)

Before turning to look at what these critical theory and poststructuralist approaches have to offer, though, the remainder of this section examines the universal-particular dichotomy in more detail. The tension of universal obligations versus particular duties is a key feature in how political space is understood, because it centres around the dualism of one's role as both individual and citizen. Andrew Linklater suggests that

... a very significant part of the history of modern international thought has centred upon what may be termed the problem of the relationship of men and citizens. We may characterize this problem in different ways: as the issue of the proper relationship between the obligations which men may be said to acquire \textit{qua} men and the obligations to which they are subject as citizens of particular associations; or, as the question of reconciling the actual or potential universality of human nature with the diversity and division of political community.\(^ {26}\)

For Linklater, international relations theory involves measuring particularistic duties to one's community by virtue of membership in that community against universalistic obligations to humanity by virtue of one's own humanity. Identifying political space through the sovereign state thus allows the discipline to prioritize the particular at the expense of the universal. And with the problematique of anarchy and the need to focus on survival central to it, the sovereign state may therefore claim to resolve the universal-particular

\(^{24}\) Magnusson, \textit{The Search for Political Space}, op. cit., p.6.

\(^{25}\) Linklater's work is addressed in detail in chapter three; that of feminist theorists in chapter four; and Walker's approach is considered in chapter five.

\(^{26}\) Andrew Linklater, \textit{Men and Citizens in the Theory of International Relations} (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1990) p.IX.
dichotomy even when this means that it has simply ignored the part of it that is inconvenient.\textsuperscript{27}

International relations has, in other words, focused on particular duties at the expense of universal obligations. In fact, it is not unreasonable to characterize the early international relations contest between realism and idealism as focusing around the universal-particular dichotomy, with the realist 'public interest' set against the idealist 'common good'.\textsuperscript{28} With realism victorious, international relations became a discipline more concerned with particular state interests than universal problems faced by humanity. By centralizing the sovereign state and defining individuals as citizens, the discipline was able to avoid troublesome moral and ethical questions about universal obligations, because they fall outside the parameters of the boundaries of political space as demarcated by the sovereign state. In fact, the rise of the modern sovereign state is about this tension: managing the problem of universal obligations versus particular duties is the point of how political space is demarcated by the sovereign state.

The fact that this dichotomy persists, however, is crucial, because it goes some way to explaining why the sovereign state is increasingly poor at framing a range of political problems. It is possible that the persistence of universal-particular tensions in international relations may be inevitable, and not susceptible to resolution regardless of how political space is framed. But if the sovereign state is affected by political actors and issues that appear to fall outside of its boundaries, it can no longer ignore the universal-particular

\textsuperscript{27} For R.B.J. Walker, "... the principle of state sovereignty expresses an historically specific articulation of the relationship between universality and particularity in space and time." Walker, \textit{Inside/Outside}, op. cit., p. 176.

dichotomy.

Linklater notes that

... Kant claimed that the entire range of human powers could not be expressed in a single individual or particular community, but only in the species as a whole in the course of its long historical development... A universal association was not then an end in itself (perpetual peace for Kant was only the highest political goal), nor did it simply bring the international state of nature to a close; it was an essential part of the conditions required by human beings when they turned, late in their history, to the task of perfecting themselves.  

The point, as Kant and Linklater suggest, is that neither the particular nor the universal - however articulated - is sufficient alone. What is required is to redefine political space so that international relations is able to better serve both, by being able to (at a minimum) field their questions. At present, the international relations understanding of political space is not doing so. That is why rearticulating how political space is understood in the discipline is important.

The next section sets out the need for such a redefinition of political space in more detail. Focusing on the (realist) tendency in international relations to circumscribe political space, the next section considers the implications for both international politics and international theory. In particular, it examines the tensions that exist between problem-solving (realist) and critical theory (normative) approaches to international relations, since it is already clear that poststructuralist critical theory approaches have a great deal to offer as an alternative to the problematic status quo. First, however, section two shifts away from examining the history and development of state sovereignty and political space in international relations to instead consider the effects this has

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had on both international politics and international theory.

2. The Problem of Political Space in International Politics and International Theory

The paradigmatic dominance of realism in international relations, with its trademark state-centricity, helps to explain how the prevalent expression of political space developed in the discipline. Less clear are the consequences of this development in terms of the extent to which international relations is able to understand varieties of international politics, and the extent to which the discipline is able to develop or adapt international theory to account for them.

This is, of course, a mutually constitutive dilemma: theories and the concepts which inform them inevitably affect the ability of the discipline to explain and understand international politics, whilst the changing nature of international politics also challenges established theories and concepts. The point of this section is not, however, to establish a calculus of cause and effect, nor is it to revisit the vanquishing of normative, idealist approaches by realism in international relations. Instead, this section seeks to outline some of the consequences faced by an international relations discipline that understands political space through the sovereign state, both in terms of international politics and international theory.

The argument here is that the theoretical hegemony of realism has had serious consequences for the way that political space is expressed in international relations. The section notes that this problem is related to the dominance of a problem-solving, rather than a critical theory approach in international relations. Arguing that a shift away from problem-solving theory toward critical theory approaches will mean that international relations no longer unquestioningly reduces political space to the sovereign state, the section concludes that redefining political space will better serve both international

30 And in any case, as R.B.J. Walker puts it, "[n]either the realist appeal to an eternity of states nor the idealist appeal to a universal community tell us very much about politics...". Walker, Inside/Outside, op. cit., p. 46.
politics and international theory. As R.B.J. Walker puts it, "[t]he disjunction between the seriousness of international politics and the triviality of international relations theory is quite startling."\textsuperscript{31} Redefining political space in international theory will begin to redress this disjuncture.

\textit{International Politics}

What is at stake in redefining political space in international relations theory is the way the discipline understands questions of identity and subjectivity, its understanding of territoriality and problems of inclusion and exclusion, and the way that international relations manages questions of how to live together, that is, of how to negotiate the political and ensure the common good. International relations is able to provide limited insight into these problems and issues at present because it seeks to do so through the narrow angle of the sovereign state.

As R.B.J. Walker and Saul Mendlovitz argue, "...we have become so used to thinking about political life as if state sovereignty is the only guide to what is possible that it even informs our understanding of what alternatives there might be."\textsuperscript{32} Therefore, identifying and articulating more effective ways of thinking about international politics requires a better starting point than the sovereign state. Ken Booth argues that

[under conditions of globalisation, mass consumerism, environmental decay, identity politics, burgeoning science and technology and so on, 'the state' - in the textbook conception of a territorial political unit with sovereign decision-making power and the primary locus of loyalty - might be seen as the problem of

\textsuperscript{31} R.B.J. Walker, "Genealogy, Geopolitics and Political Community: Richard K. Ashley and the Critical Social Theory of International Politics" in \textit{Alternatives} (Vol 13, No. 1, 1988), p. 84.

world-politics, not the solution.33

To put this another way, the discipline is unable to provide a complete account of international politics due to its problematic understanding of political space.

Sub-state and global politics, social movements, and refugees all raise significant questions for international politics that the discipline does not fully address. A substantial part of the reason for this shortcoming is the international relations (realist) focus on the sovereign state, and a resultant inability to understand forms of politics and political actors that deviate from the boundaries of the state or from the identity of citizenship; Magnusson notes that it is important to

... consider the mounting evidence regarding the insufficiency of states as political communities. This is not just a matter of states being too large for politics... there is also the matter of states being too small to enclose the most pressing political problems... In the circumstances, the claim that the state provides the inevitably necessary framework for dealing with the modern world seems quite unwarranted, and even a bit bizarre.34

The problem for the state-centric discipline of international relations is that environmental activists, participants in the women's movement, and the interests of indigenous peoples, for example, do not fit into the political space of the discipline as demarcated through the sovereign state, and yet they profoundly affect international politics. The politics of social movements, for example, do not tend to be addressed in international relations35 because the

33 Ken Booth, "75 Years On: Rewriting the Subject's Past - Reinventing its Future", in Smith, Booth and Zalewski, eds., op. cit., p. 336.

34 Magnusson, Search for Political Space, op. cit., p. 52. Emphasis original.

35 The point here is about addressing the politics of social movements, and not that social movements go entirely unaddressed in international relations: for example see Robert O'Brien, et. al., Global Governance and Social Movements (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Barry Gills, Globalisation and the Politics of Resistance (London: Palgrave, 2000); and Pierre Hamel, et. al., Globalisation and Social Movements (New York: Palgrave, 2001). For an older survey see the Millennium: Journal of International Studies Special Issue on Social Movements and
women's and indigenous people's movements, for example, prioritise non-state identities. Since the identity of 'citizen' fails to meet their particular needs and interests, which, like those of the (global) environmental movement, are not neatly contained within territorial state boundaries, they explicitly challenge this state-centric identity.\textsuperscript{36}

Similarly, the political crises, emergencies and dilemmas created by refugees, displaced persons and migrants are explicitly non-state, or perhaps even anti-state, and thus tend (by their very nature) to escape the usual international relations boundaries of the political. As Roxanne Lynn Doty notes,

\begin{quote}
post-World War II immigration and reactions to it highlight the blurring of national boundaries and the increasingly problematic nature of presuming a unified “inside” in contrast to an “outside” characterised by disorder, conflict, and a multitude of identities... the very differentiation between inside and outside, the thing that the discipline of International Relations is most dependent upon, is called into question.\textsuperscript{37}
\end{quote}

Thus the problems arising out of such movements (whether political, social or migratory) are perplexing for international relations in policy terms, because of the narrow way the discipline understands political space. Similarly, these issues and dynamic political movements often resist explanation by the dominant realist approaches to international theory which tend to better understand more static and unidimensional politics, particularly those that fall into state-based categories.

\begin{itemize}
\item World Politics (Vol. 23, No. 3, 1994). On civil society movements and community see Darrow Schecter, Sovereign States or Political Communities? Civil Society and Contemporary Politics (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000).
\end{itemize}

\textsuperscript{36} Or as Warren Magnusson would have it: “[t]hese movements involve people in active citizenship and thus lay claim to a political space that may or may not conform to the spaces allowed by the existing government.” Magnusson, The Search for Political Space, op. cit., p.10. See also R.B.J. Walker, “Social Movements/World Politics” in Millennium: Journal of International Studies (Vol. 23, No. 3, 1994).

As a result, understanding what motivates an individual or a group to flee their home, family or state because of political or religious conviction, for example, seems beyond the comprehension of mainstream international relations, and is certainly beyond the interests of many in the discipline. Equally, what drives such groups to engage in protest, violent conflict, or even terrorism is not within the realm of traditional international relations. And as for individuals and groups singled out for persecution based on their identity, whether religious, sexual, or political, international relations tends to be equally unhelpful.

Unhelpful does not mean silent, of course, but the point is that these examples are prevalent types of politics and political actors that affect international relations in diverse and important ways, and they ought to be fully addressed in the international relations discipline. That they are not at present is a problem because international relations is unable to understand or explain, either theoretically or in policy terms, politics and political actors that fall outside the narrow demarcation of political space as determined by realism and the sovereign state.

Perhaps the problem is that these are questions more of a universal than a particular bent, and are seldom asked in a discipline that focuses more on the sovereign state and duties to fellow citizens than on issues of morality, ethics, and obligations to humanity. Magnusson points out that,

> [as Aristotle and Plato recognized, politics in its highest sense is not just about who should hold what office, but also about what sort of offices there should be, and, most generally, what sort of arrangements we should have for our life together as human beings. The state is but one aspect of our arrangements...](38)  

Questions about some of these issues and some of our arrangements are, of

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38 Magnusson, *The Search for Political Space*, op. cit., p. 9.
course, being asked in international relations. However, it is important to note that despite increasing interest in these issues, movements and dynamics, such work tends to be scattered rather than systematic, and more marginal than mainstream. For example, Lothar Brock notes that

...the nexus of *territorialities, identities and movement* (TIM) has become a major object of research in International Relations... Even so, what TIM research often comes up with is confined to a specific community of researchers and it is fairly difficult to make it visible across the borderlines separating various IR communities.

In addition to the problem of countering the realist hegemony of international relations theory that marginalises such approaches, another complicating factor is that the ways in which the discipline deals with such issues tends to focus largely on their consequences.

As a result, crucial questions concerning causality, for example, are often by-passed by international relations discussions of effects on the international system or on particular states, in the (often legalistic) context of, for example, human rights and intervention. As Ian Forbes and Mark Hoffman suggest,

> [t]he inadequacy of traditional approaches and accounts of intervention calls for new thinking in respect of the state, sovereignty, the nature of international society and the political discourses employed by theorists of politics and international relations.  

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39 In addition to social movements literature, op. cit., see, for example, the *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* Special Issue: *Territorialities, Identities, and Movement in International Relations* (Vol. 28, No. 3, 1999) for a number of studies on such issues as (im)migration, nationalism, and diaspora politics.


Thus when states or/and international organisations that consist of states fail to intervene, international relations offers relatively little; the aftermath and outcome of some political practices and some political processes by some political actors is analysed, rather than the actors, practices or processes themselves. Of course there are exceptions, but accounting for change, for challenges to the state and its authority, or for identity-based politics, for example, tends to fall outside the scope of an international relations discipline that understands political space primarily in terms of the territorially bounded sovereign state.

An alternative will be unavailable as long as the main referents in international relations are the sovereign state and the problematique of anarchy. Faced with such shortcomings, and the dominance of realism, international relations theory has produced futuristic images and dreams about a transformed international politics. Most begin with critiques of the sovereign state as the main actor and central organising principle of international relations, but they might be more helpful were they supported by some redefinition of political space, i.e. one that is not the sovereign state.

Of course, this is a complex issue; David Harvey’s comments about modernity also capture the problem with analysing state sovereignty or political space in international relations:

> It is never easy, of course, to construct a critical assessment of a condition that is overwhelmingly present. The terms of debate, description, and representation are often so circumscribed that there seems to be no escape from evaluations that are anything other than self-referential.  

However, the benefit of redefining political space in international relations...

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42 For one example see the work of Andrew Linklater generally, replete with "visions" of an improved future. Linklater’s work is discussed in detail in Chapter Three.

theory is that the discipline may begin to offer an improved understanding of international politics, by allowing for nontraditional varieties of politics and political actors.

The problem at present is that there appears to be no alternative to the prevalent notion of political space in international relations. What is needed is a redefinition of it that would provide a basis for better critiques of the sovereign state, including the development of alternatives. International relations would better be able to account for some of the varieties of international politics that the discipline now neglects, and such a redefinition would also potentially strengthen international theory by, for example, providing the context for more comprehensive critiques of the principle (and not only the practice) of state sovereignty in international relations.

The remainder of this section explores the problem of political space in international theory in more detail, arguing that it is imperative to redefine its meaning which is narrow, at best, not only because of the dominance of realism in international relations, but also because realism is primarily a problem-solving approach.

*International Theory*

Robert Cox (in)famously pointed out that "[t]heory is always for someone and for some purpose." Thus while the sovereign state is the filter in international relations through which political space is understood, in large part because of the realist dominance of international relations, it also serves the purposes of a discipline that prioritises value-free, positivist analysis.

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45 For a discussion concerning the relationship of realism and positivism, see, for example, Michael Nicholson, "The Continued Significance of Positivism?" in Smith, Booth and Zalewski, eds., op. cit., pp. 128-145. See also Steve Smith, "Positivism and Beyond" op. cit., pp. 11-44.
In other words, the hegemony of the realist paradigm is not the only reason that political space in international relations is so narrowly demarcated as to be of limited utility and applicability. Also contributing is what Cox identifies as problem-solving theory, which

... takes the world as it finds it, with the prevailing social and power relationships and the institutions into which they are organised, as the given framework for action [with] the general aim... to make these relationships and institutions work smoothly by dealing effectively with particular sources of trouble.46

Problem-solving theory characterises much of what goes on in international relations, and Cox notes that it certainly dominated the discipline during the Cold War era.47

But Cox also recognizes the existence of an alternative approach - critical theory - which while influential, is less prevalent than problem-solving theory in international relations. Critical theory, according to Cox,

... stands apart from the prevailing order of the world and asks how that order came about. Critical theory, unlike problem-solving theory, does not take institutions and social and power relations for granted, but calls them into question by concerning itself with their origins and how and whether they might be in the process of changing.48

To put it another way, "[t]he central concern of critical international theory is with the articulation and rearticulation of political space, of political society, of political community, of identity."49 Thus a normative, critical theory

46 Cox, op. cit., pp. 128-129.
47 Cox, ibid., p. 130.
48 Cox, ibid., p. 129.
49 Mark Hoffman, "Agency, Identity and Intervention" in Ian Forbes and Mark Hoffman, op. cit., p. 206. For further discussion of the meaning(s) of critical theory (and Critical Theory) in international relations, see, of only a few examples, Mark
approach stands in opposition to the predominant problem-solving, positivist approach in international relations, in which 'political space, political society, political community and identity' are contained by and within the sovereign state. However, the problem is that realism dominates international relations to such an extent that alternative approaches such as critical theory are marginalised in the discipline. As a result, in international relations the sovereign state remains the filter through which the discipline understands political space.

Despite the relative marginalisation of critical theory approaches, Richard Devetak notes that the dominant positivist views prevailing in the discipline have not gone unchallenged in international relations:

Critical international theory reacts against the conventional tendency to associate community with the state or nation. It challenges the practice of limiting community to "the confines of the state's authoritative domain". By refusing to take the sovereign state as an idealised form of community it challenges the state's role as sole constructor of identity, and invites rethinking the nature and limits of moral and political community under changing global conditions.\textsuperscript{50}

Critical theory critiques of realism thus challenge core assumptions in international relations about the prevalent understanding of political space. As Andrew Linklater and John Macmillan note: "[t]he critical turn in International Relations has raised important questions about the state..."\textsuperscript{51} and "[s]uch questions invite a normatively engaged re-examination of traditional

\textsuperscript{50} Richard Devetak, "Critical Theory" in Burchill et. al., op. cit., p. 168.

conceptions of sovereignty, community and citizenship." They (optimistically) conclude that

> [t]he discipline is undergoing rapid transition from an essentially problem-solving approach to strategic interaction between existing bounded communities to a normatively engaged analysis of the history of bounded communities and the possibility of improved forms of political community.\(^{53}\)

This transition from problem-solving to critical theory, however, focuses mainly on critique and is still more a promise than a reality in international relations. But however incomplete it may be, critique is nevertheless vital, as realism and the sovereign state so dominate international relations that it is difficult to imagine how to redefine political space in the discipline.

Another theorist who is sharply critical of the sovereign state and its demarcation of political space is Warren Magnusson. He suggests that questions such as those posed by critical theory approaches are at least as important, if not more so, than those which tend to inform the dominant problem-solving theories of international relations. Magnusson suggests that

> [t]he key assumption is that political community requires enclosure - that politics proper is impossible without a protected space where ideals can be realized and interests ideally adjudicated. [...] Serious thought about the relation between what is contained in and what is excluded from the political enclosures is extremely rare, and is usually distorted by the assumption that political community - and the values associated with it - depend on enclosure. That there might be forms of political community that resist enclosure or are stifled by it is barely considered. How these forms might sustain or extend common political ideals is not a serious subject.\(^{54}\)

Thus Magnusson is concerned with the reification of the state as community,

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\(^{52}\) Ibid., p. 14.

\(^{53}\) Ibid., p. 15.

and with the limitations imposed on how political space is understood as a consequence. He argues that the reification of the state stems from a failure to problematise the concept of community, which in turn limits the scope of the political, and of what may be theorised at all.

In problematising prevailing assumptions in international relations concerning what constitutes political space, therefore, Magnusson suggests that

[b]y freeing ourselves from standard conceptions of political community, we can begin to examine politics as people actually experience and practice it. [...] In part, this is a matter of [people] confronting, challenging, or participating in practices of domination, some (but not all) of which are organized by the state. But it is also a matter of their creative social interaction: inventions, not just resistances.55

The point is that in order to fulfill the promise of critical international theory it is vital to challenge the demarcation of political space by the sovereign state. But it is also essential to move beyond critique and resistance, to substantively and 'inventively' theorise and redefine political space in international relations theory. One such method for doing so is to examine the concept of community in more detail.

A number of the international relations theorists who are critical of the way that political space is understood in the discipline have singled out this concept. And as one of the key features of employing a critical theory approach is that it demands more than critique, then perhaps exploring the concept of community offers a way forward, and a possible solution to the problem of political space in international relations. As Magnusson argues, resistance is necessary but insufficient; it must be accompanied by something more. As a result, while problematising the sovereign state is a necessary and significant step in revitalising the discipline's (limited) understanding of global politics, it does not go far enough in redefining political space in international relations theory. Further analysis of the state is of course

55 Magnusson, ibid., p. 55.
beneficial, but what must eventually be developed is a rearticulated meaning of community that does not narrowly demarcate political space. In other words, what is required is a concept of community that — unlike the state — does not seek to resolve the universal-particular dichotomy, but acknowledges it as constitutive of political community and as a core feature of political space in international relations. The possibilities of rearticulating the meaning of community are explored in the next section.

3. The Concept of Community

The problem with using the concept of community in international relations as a way to redefine political space is that it is currently articulated as the sovereign state in the discipline. This narrowly circumscribes what may be understood to constitute politics and political actors, it limits expressions of identity, and it reduces the concept of community to a territorially-based enclosure. What is needed is to articulate a concept of community that frames global politics so that the discipline might think about issues such as refugees or social movements in a more comprehensive, useful way. At present, such politics and political actors have no place in the political space demarcated by the sovereign state. But a rearticulation of the meaning of community, based in critical international theory, would allow for a redefinition of political space in international relations, one that is not framed by the sovereign state.56

The current understanding of political space in international relations is

56 The point here is that the state is one articulation of the concept of community, but that they do not necessarily mean the same thing. John Ladd, for example, argues that "[a]lthough a formal organization, such as a state, may be coextensive with a community... it is not identical with it; a state may be founded on a political community or a political community may evolve as a result of the fact that a state has been formally organized, but the formal organization aspect of the community must not be confused with the community itself." John Ladd, "The Concept of Community: A Logical Analysis", in Carl J. Friedrich, ed., Community: Nomos II, Yearbook of the American Society of Political and Legal Philosophy (New York: The Liberal Arts Press, 1959), p. 271. On the state as community in social theory, see, for example, Elizabeth Frazer, The Problems of Communitarian Politics: Unity and Conflict (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 207-209 and 241-245; the concept of community as understood in social theory is discussed in detail in Chapter Two.
prevalent mainly as a result of the dominance of the realist paradigm, and the problem-solving approach of a discipline that dismisses critical and normative concerns. Because this has produced a limited and ultimately thin notion of global politics, international relations theory must rearticulate the meaning of community and reclaim political space. As Andrew Linklater and John Macmillan point out, "... the conditions under which the state emerged as the primary form of political community appear to be in retreat."57 Moreover, David Held suggests that "[i]t is clearer than ever that the political fortunes of communities and peoples can no longer be understood in exclusively national or territorial terms."58

But Warren Magnusson sounds a cautionary note with a reminder of the longevity and influence of the sovereign state in international relations:

The state system that has developed in the modern era involves a massive political effort, marked by both force and propaganda, to fix politics in a particular form, to centre politics upon the sovereign institutions of the state.59

Changing how the sovereign state is understood in international relations, therefore, is insufficient. What is required instead is to rearticulate the discipline’s answer to Walker’s question ‘about human identity, about who we are and how we might live together’. Or as Mark Hoffman puts it, international relations must question ‘...the limitation of community to the confines of the state’s authoritative domain’.

Rearticulating the meaning of community in international theory will help to

57 Linklater and Macmillan, ibid, pp. 12-13. In the same volume Richard Devetak goes further: "...that there is statecraft, but that no complete state exists", and "... no state is complete and all states are struggling against failure." Devetak, "Incomplete Theories: theories and practices of statecraft" in Linklater and Macmillan, eds., op. cit., p. 20.


59 Warren Magnusson, The Search for Political Space, op. cit., p.15.
redefine political space in the discipline. At present the sovereign state produces a narrowly circumscribed understanding of global politics and is an inept attempt to resolve the universal-particular dichotomy. Moreover, the result of focusing on the state is not only a lack of clarity in terms of international politics, but also an over-emphasis on problem-solving theory in the discipline. What is required instead is a critical theoretical approach to rearticulating the meaning of community in the discipline that would provide a framework within which to reclaim and redefine political space.

Such a framework does not, unfortunately, come ready-made in international relations because of the dominance of the realist paradigm in the discipline, and its habitual recourse to problem-solving approaches. For example, three bodies of work in international relations - on security communities, the communitarian-cosmopolitan debate and cosmopolitan democracy - at first glance seem appropriate for providing such a framework. The reality, however, is that none is able to do so because they all remain entrenched in the problem-solving logic of a discipline dominated by the realist paradigm. Indeed, these approaches do not seem to question the prevailing order, as Cox might put it, in terms of either international politics or international theory.

Work on security communities originated in the 1950s, when Karl Deutsch observed that some groups of states possess a "sense of community".60 As Charles Tilly puts it, "[u]sers of the term [community] with respect to international relations are usually hoping to create or restore solidarity among nations... [and the] quest not merely to identify but also to promote security communities, manifests just such a hope."61 The general perception of this

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61 Charles Tilly, "International Communities, Secure or Otherwise" in Adler and
work was "...hopelessly romantic and vividly discordant against the backdrop of the Cold War and the prospect of nuclear war."  

The communitarian-cosmopolitan debate, characterised in social theory as a debate between conservatives and liberals, appears to focus on the problem of political space in international relations. However, this debate "...is remarkable for the absence of any extended analysis of the concept 'community'," and like work on security communities, it begins and ends with the sovereign state. By operating within the realist, problem-solving paradigm, neither provides a framework for redefining political space, as


Frazer, op. cit., p. 61. On this point, see also Cochran, *Normative Theory in International Relations*, op. cit.
neither is able to escape the boundaries demarcated by the sovereign state.

A final body of work that initially seems to have something to contribute to the rearticulation of the meaning of community in international theory is cosmopolitan democracy.66 This is "...a political project which aims to engender greater public accountability in the leading processes and structural alterations of the contemporary world."67 However, one of its proponents, David Held, acknowledges that "[d]emocratic theory's exploration of emerging regional and global problems is still in its infancy."68 Moreover, this approach works within the political space demarcated by the sovereign state. Thus like the communitarian-cosmopolitan debate and work on security communities, cosmopolitan democracy also fails to provide the analytical tools required to rearticulate the meaning of community in international theory.

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66 For a discussion suggesting that cosmopolitan democracy is only one of three distinct but overlapping approaches to 'political cosmopolitanism' (the others are liberal internationalism and radical democratic pluralism), see Hutchings, *International Political Theory*, op. cit., pp. 153-181. However, as Hutchings notes, "[t]reating these models as completely separate and distinctive inevitably leads to an element of caricature... Many theorists debating democratic political cosmopolitanism draw on a range of models." Hutchings, ibid., p. 180, n. 4.


68 Held, ibid., p. 12.
In short, escaping the framework provided by the sovereign state for political space in international relations seems impossible given the dominance of the realist, problem-solving paradigm in the discipline. But despite these three examples of approaches in international relations that are unable to escape the confines of the realist problem-solving, boundaries of political space as demarcated by the sovereign state, there is available in international relations a range of critical theory approaches that explicitly confront the problem of political space and seek a (non-state-based) concept of community as the basis for change. In other words, international relations appears to possess the basic tools required for rearticulating the meaning of community in international theory.

Of particular interest is the work of Andrew Linklater, a number of feminist theorists and R.B.J. Walker. Each will be considered in more detail in subsequent chapters. For the present, what is important to note is that this brief look at work in international relations on security communities, the communitarian-cosmopolitan debate and cosmopolitan democracy is further indication that there is a problem with political space in international relations and a need to rearticulate the meaning of community in the discipline in order to redefine it. It also affirms the need to adopt a critical theory approach in order to escape the realist, problem-solving paradigm. Finally, the failure of these approaches to transcend the boundaries of the sovereign state indicates that the universal-particular dichotomy is also an issue that must be included in any attempt to rearticulate the meaning of community in international theory.

That the sovereign state no longer satisfactorily manage this dichotomy – if it ever did – is an indication that its demarcation of political space requires

69 Andrew Linklater's work in chapter three; that of feminist theorists in chapter four; and the work of R.B.J. Walker in chapter five.

70 In addition to the earlier section in this chapter on the universal-particular dichotomy, it is also considered in some detail in chapter three, in the context of
redefinition. The tension of man and citizen, as Linklater puts it, or of universal (humanitarian) obligations versus particular (statist) duties, is central to how political space is understood, and at the centre of a number of problems, both in international politics and international theory. Unless it is incorporated into a rearticulation of the meaning of community, redefining political space will be fruitless. In short, it is no longer sufficient to focus on particularism at the expense of universalism; moral and ethical questions, problems of loyalty and identity, and the changing nature of global politics all challenge the status quo, and international relations must be able to respond.

In sum, this section has argued that the analytical tools required to rearticulate the meaning of community in international theory are available. The next step is to use critical theory approaches that are already present in international relations to undertake this work. However, what is still lacking is an understanding of the concept of community itself. It is not enough to understand the problem of political space. Nor is it enough to point out that the pervasive presence of the sovereign state is a constitutive feature of this problem. What will help with rearticulating the meaning of community in international theory is some notion of what the end result might be, particularly as distinct from the sovereign state. What is required, therefore, is to better understand the meaning of the concept of community.

**Conclusion**

This chapter argues that the prevailing understanding of political space in international relations is a problem. Despite the history of debate about the role and nature of the sovereign state in the discipline, political space in international relations remains narrowly demarcated. Normative concerns that might help to produce an alternative understanding of political space have remained largely undeveloped. Instead, normative and critical theory approaches are marginalised in a discipline dominated by the problem-solving, state-centric paradigm of realism. Therefore, it is the contention of this chapter

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Andrew Linklater's work.
that the meaning of community requires rearticulation in international relations theory in order to redefine political space.

Specifically, the chapter argues that undertaking the work of rearticulating the meaning of community requires a critical theory approach to address the problem of how political space is understood by redeploying its analytical tools. This chapter has shown that the means by which the meaning of community may be rearticulated are already present within international relations theory; the discipline possesses a range of critical theory approaches, some of which already address the problem of political space and the concept of community explicitly.

Rearticulating the meaning of community in international relations theory will yield a number of benefits. It will enable the discipline to confront the problem of defining political space through the sovereign state, and rearticulating the meaning of community will also enrich debate generally in the discipline. Critiques of the state, for example, would be less self-referential, and a more nuanced and comprehensive understanding of global politics would result. Moreover, rearticulating the meaning of community in international relations theory would also permit reassessing our understanding of citizenship and identity, and of territoriality as representing the fixed and unchanging boundaries of the political.

The next step needed in order to rearticulate the meaning of community in international relations theory is an analysis of critical approaches that address the concept of community in the discipline. Three critical theory approaches that directly consider the problem of political space and the concept of community in international relations are of particular importance: first is the critical international theory work of Andrew Linklater; second is feminist critical international theory; and the third is R.B.J. Walker's post-structuralist work in international relations theory. All three provide different, but explicitly critical approaches to the problem of political space and the concept of community in international relations, and they must be assessed to determine the extent to which they already do the work of rearticulating the
meaning of community in international relations theory.

Prior to undertaking this three-part analysis, however, it is useful to first explore thinking about the concept of community in social theory, as this will indicate of what the constituent elements of a rearticulated concept of community consist. Despite the fact that the means for rearticulating the meaning of community are present in international relations theory, the fact remains that the concept is ill-defined in the discipline. As a result, a framework for understanding it must be sought elsewhere. Since a more nuanced account of the concept of community is available in the work of other social science disciplines, the next chapter examines non-international relations approaches to the concept of community.

The goal of the next chapter is to analyse what is understood to constitute the concept of community in social theory, and to deploy this as a starting point for the rearticulation of the meaning of the concept in international theory. By outlining the core component of the concept of community, the next chapter will make it possible to examine how the concept is used and articulated in forms of contemporary critical international theory, in order to determine the extent to which rearticulating the meaning of community is already underway in international relations theory.
Chapter Two
The Concept of Community in Social Theory

... all community is a question of degree.\(^1\)

As argued in the previous chapter, there is a growing need in international relations to redefine political space. But framed as it is by the sovereign state, political space cannot be redefined without first rearticulating the meaning of community in international theory. This chapter will look outside of international relations to provide an account of the concept of community that is not demarcated by the hegemony of realist problem-solving approaches in the discipline that centralize the sovereign state. This chapter therefore looks to social theory for an alternative understanding of the concept of community, to establish a frame of reference with which to return to international relations theory, and examine the extent to which rearticulating the meaning of community in the international relations discipline is already underway.

It must be noted, however, that this chapter does not suggest that social theory offers a straightforward path to rearticulating the meaning of the concept in international relations theory. As Raymond Plant notes,

... the concept of community seems to be the one most neglected by social and political philosophers. Other concepts such as rights, power, authority, freedom, democracy, and justice have all been subjects of penetrating and sustained analyses. In contrast, the concept of community is strangely neglected.\(^2\)

Such conceptual neglect is, however, relative. In political studies and sociology, for example, the concept of community has at least been the subject of explicit analysis and debate, in contrast to international relations. And at least Plant suggests that the neglect of the concept of community is a serious problem that "...greatly hinders any understanding of social and political life and, more


importantly, is an abrogation of responsibility." Thus unlike international relations, there is in social theory a recognition that despite the complexity involved in analysing the concept of community, it is nevertheless an important, if seemingly open-ended, task.

As a result, while social theory may not offer a fully developed definition of the concept of community, it does offer more than international relations. The central concern of the chapter is thus to set out how the concept of community is understood in social theory generally. Seeking an alternative perspective is vital, for rearticulating the meaning of community in international theory. The goal of this chapter is, therefore, to set out the core components of the concept of community through an examination of the concept in social theory, in order that, with an established frame of reference, it will be possible to assess the extent to which critical theorists in international relations have managed to provide a rearticulation of the concept that offers the discipline a way to redefine political space so that it is able to address the full range of problems, issues and questions that currently seem to be outside the political space of a realist dominated discourse.

The chapter opens with an overview of the principal approaches to the concept of community in a variety of social theories, to outline the basic configuration of traditional debates surrounding the concept. Moreover, this section also explores the apparently inevitable resistance to definition of the concept of community, a problem which is not unique to international relations, but is a problem in social theory generally. The second section considers three models of community in social theory, and argues that although defining the concept of community is inherently problematic, it is nevertheless possible to outline its main components. The third section of the chapter thus proposes that the three central components of the concept of community are territoriality, identity and the political. In the course of examining each component in turn, the section addresses social theory perspectives, and also reintroduces international relations theory into the analysis,

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3 Plant, "Community: Concept, Conception, and Ideology", ibid., p. 79.
arguing that the discipline already addresses all three components to varying degrees. The final section therefore concludes that these three components of the concept of community provide a framework from which it is possible to return to international relations and determine the extent to which the three components identified here are already understood in the discipline.

1. Social Theory Debates about the Concept of Community

A somewhat improbable number of distinct interpretations of the concept of community exist in social theory. Raymond Plant, for example, cites a 1955 study in which the author catalogues ninety-four definitions of community, only to conclude that the one consistent element throughout is that "... all the definitions deal with people. Beyond this common basis there is no agreement." Indeed, even The Blackwell Encyclopaedia of Political Thought admits defeat when it attempts to define the concept:

...‘community’ has a high level of use but a low level of meaning... on the one hand it appears to identify particular forms of social interaction, though what these are has been a matter of dispute; on the other hand its use is usually meant to imply something positive and valuable about the social relationships thus defined, though across the political spectrum there is disagreement as to where its value resides.

And Elizabeth Frazer, similarly, suggests that

"Community" is a concept with open frontiers and vague contours, which seems to extend across a very heterogeneous class of things, which conveys a wealth of meaning - it appeals to people's emotions, it is shot through with value judgements, it conjures up associations and images from a wide, wide range of

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discourses and contexts. It excludes a good deal, and what is excluded comes back to haunt those who deploy the concept. It encompasses more than one contradiction.6

Despite its ambiguity, however, or perhaps because of it, the concept has been pivotal in social and political thought; Carl Friedrich suggests that there are three historical "great debates" about community:

First, there is the debate as to whether community in the first instance simply exists, or whether it is willed. Secondly, there is the debate over whether the community, other values apart, is primarily a community of law or of love. Thirdly, there is the debate over whether community is organic or purposive. These three questions are, of course, not unrelated to each other, but they constitute, it seems, the main motifs of past political thought.7

However, the best known, and indeed archetypal expression of the idea of community is Ferdinand Tonnies' typology of Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft, or community and association.8

Robert Nisbet notes that Tonnies' work is often characterised as nostalgic. Originating in a study of the development of European society, Tonnies notes the shift away from community towards association, with these changes "... reflect[ing] a growing individualization of human relationships, with impersonality, competition, and egoism becoming gradually more dominant."9 Thus the ideal-types of Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft may be seen as representing a move from rural to urban sensibilities, from traditional to modern values. Indeed, Nisbet suggests that Tonnies' typology in fact theorises

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modernity:

The rise of capitalism and the modern nation-state are both made aspects, by Tonnies, of the more fundamental social change that he identifies for us in the terms of Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft... Whereas, for example, in Marx the loss of community is dealt with as the consequence of capitalism, in Tonnies capitalism is treated as the consequence of the loss of community - of the passage of Gemeinschaft into Gesellschaft.\(^\text{10}\)

Tonnies' argument that the shift away from community towards association is bound up with the larger social and political forces of modernity is significant, and not only because it highlights the importance of the concept generally. In addition, his argument seems to account for the nostalgic appeal and emotive resonance that invariably accompanies the concept of community. As a result, the influence of Tonnies' work cannot be overstated, not least because virtually all discussions of the concept of community make reference to it.

Indeed, Tonnies' studies of the concept of community greatly influenced the disciplines of sociology and social anthropology including, for example, the work of Max Weber and Emile Durkheim. In addition, political studies and philosophy are also influenced by Tonnies, even with their long history of competing ideas of community, ranging from Plato and Aristotle to Hobbes, Rousseau and Burke.\(^\text{11}\) Thus while Tonnies' typology has been remarkably influential on debates surrounding the concept of community, it is not the only approach to the concept.

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\(^{10}\) Nisbet, ibid., p. 78.

For example, while acknowledging the importance of Tonnies' characterisation of the concept, Joseph Gusfield argues that community and association are not the only ways to understand it. Instead, Gusfield suggests two alternative usages of the concept: first, there is the 'territorial' usage of community, in which physical location determines the nature of community; and second, there is the 'relational' usage which "... points to the quality or character of human relationships, without reference to location."\(^{12}\) Noting that these two usages are not exclusive, Gusfield concludes: "[t]hat the concept of Community has had so constant a usage is testimony both to its power and to the ubiquitousness of its ideal."\(^{13}\)

Indeed, William Corlett similarly distinguishes between two usages of community as either reciprocity or commonality. He explains that

> [s]ome political theorists use community in its geographical sense, but only on the way to summoning images of commonality, perhaps human commonality. They speak of sharing qualities - ethnicity, respect for the law, love of God, duty to country - in common... One common mistake is to equate reciprocity with the geographical usage of *community*.\(^{14}\)

This understanding of community as reciprocity mainly concerns the shared, and often mundane but necessary experiences of daily life, in which, for example, "[p]eople with nothing in common can register their pets in city hall [or] drive on state highways... Political theories will come and go... but the roads where I live will always need to be plowed."\(^{15}\) Thus Corlett's notion of community rests on a distinction between community 'with oneness or unity' and community 'with gifts or service', based on an "...underlying distinction between unity and diversity."\(^{16}\)

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\(^{12}\) Gusfield, ibid., p. xvi.

\(^{13}\) Gusfield, ibid., p. 104.


\(^{15}\) Corlett, ibid., p. 18.

\(^{16}\) Corlett, ibid., p. 18.
Interestingly, both of these studies make a similar distinction between two types of community, in spite of their very different analyses of the concept. Moreover, neither distinction is directly related to Tonnies' influential dichotomy of community and association. For Gusfield and Corlett, in fact, the origins and purpose of community seem less important than questions of territory or space, which is for both a distinguishing feature of community set against the notion of particular types of relations between people. In other words, Gusfield and Corlett move away from a community/association equation, to one which pits territory/geography against relational/reciprocal bonds.

In yet another typology of the concept of community, Robert Nisbet notes that "[preoccupation with community in Western civilization has taken many forms... but there are... four such forms that have been in the past and are now preeminent: political, religious, ecological, and revolutionary." Locating the first three in classical philosophy, and the latter in modern terms, Nisbet provides an historical and philosophical account of the concept, arguing that these four forms represent it both in chronological order and also in (descending) order of influence and importance. In short, political community is centred on "...making this form of community, first set forth so compellingly in Plato's Republic... supreme in society." Religious community is largely a Christian phenomenon, represented mainly by Augustine, and involving "...the search for community, worldly as well as transcendental...". Ecological community is concerned with "...the idea of community based upon nature and nature's independence of parts, environmental and spiritual." And finally, revolutionary community begins with the English Revolution of the seventeenth century, develops during the French Revolution, and culminates in the work of Marx, Engels and Lenin.

Despite the strengths of Nisbet's wide-ranging historical and philosophical approach, it does not capture the richness and depth of Tonnies' work, or the

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18 Ibid., pp. vii-viii.
crucial debates, both practical and theoretical, as well as doctrinal or political contests, as represented by Gusfield and Corlett. In short, Nisbet sets out a sound historical typology of community, but does not focus on disputes about the meaning of the concept of community itself. Thus his approach illustrates the importance of the distinction between analysing conceptions or types of community, and analysis of the concept itself. To put it another way, "[c]ommunities may be nouns in the English language, but that does not make them things."19

Indeed, Raymond Plant suggests that the distinction between the concept of community and conceptions of community is crucial for analysis. He notes that

[i]t is possible, on one hand, to establish a definition for the concept of community in which different conceptions are contestable as well as being politically committed interpretations... On the other hand, this approach, while it may help in terms of clarity about the structure of a concept, is going to be useless so far as social-science explanations are concerned. These core, descriptive definitions [concepts] are too formal to be used as tools in substantive analyses of social structures and processes, but once the terms in the formal definition are interpreted or given a "cash value" [as conceptions] then we are back with normative and ideological assumptions once again.20

Thus it is through interpretation, through an explicitly political act, that it is possible to move from the abstract - the concept of community - to the concrete - a conception of community.21 Indeed, as Elizabeth Frazer notes, "[w]hichever

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21 It is important to note that rather than seek to develop a concrete account - a conception - of community, the chapter (and, indeed, the thesis) instead focuses on the concept of community. Thus, following Frazer, the intent is "... that this analysis will not be read as a definition of the concept, nor as an attempt to specify a set of necessary and sufficient criteria for use of the term. It is not meant as a legislation for the concept." Frazer, ibid., p. 76.
way you look at it, a 'concept' is a highly abstract thing"\(^{22}\), and there is debate as to whether concepts "... are thought to govern correct language use, or to be abstractions from language, or both [or, perhaps, neither]."\(^{23}\)

Thus it seems that no single study of 'community' is able to address all of its potential meanings [concepts] or all of its potential applications [conceptions]. Raymond Plant, for example, points out that the concept of community has been used

... as a legitimizing device in social policy and welfare contexts in which, it seems, the emotional power of the appeal to community is used to set policy preferences in a favourable evaluative light with the minimum of empirical content. There are therefore both empirical and ideological disputes about the nature of community and... these disputes are interlinked.\(^{24}\)

Recognising the complexity of analysing the concept of community, therefore, Plant seeks to characterise it so as to introduce some order to the disputes which appear inevitably to attend it. Echoing Tonnies, he begins with the 'positive evaluative' meaning of the concept of community which "...is used not only to describe or to refer to a range of features in social life but also to put those features into a favourable perspective. Community is a valued and valuable achievement or social state."\(^{25}\) This positive consensus about the concept of

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\(^{22}\) Frazer, ibid., p. 49. Indeed, even the notion of 'defining' a 'concept' or a 'theory' is complicated because these three terms are themselves debatable. See Frazer, op. cit., pp. 47-61.

\(^{23}\) Frazer, ibid., p. 52. Frazer outlines four approaches to this problem. The first is to understand concepts as "...bounded entities with a clear and determinate relationship with their referents." Second is the (Wittgensteinian) view "... that concepts should be thought of as having boundaries that are only drawn by specific language users for specific purposes, and are not stable or determinate." A third approach links concepts with theories, in which they are mutually constitutive: one's view of the world determines one's concepts, and one's concepts influence one's world-view. Finally, the fourth approach suggests that concepts "... are unstable and perhaps unsustainable." Thus she concludes that "...whichever of these four ways of conceptualizing concepts we favour, the process of analysing concepts must begin with interpretation. For nobody has ever argued that the object of analysis -- a concept -- is obvious." Frazer, ibid., p. 94.

\(^{24}\) Plant, "Community", in \textit{The Blackwell Encyclopaedia}, op. cit., p. 88.

\(^{25}\) Plant, "Community: Concept, Conception, and Ideology", op. cit., p. 81.
community almost implies that its meaning is unambiguous, but Plant argues that this apparent clarity is deceptive, for there is a significant difference between the evaluative and the descriptive meanings of community.

Indeed, while the evaluative meaning of the concept of community is largely positive, its descriptive meaning is characterised by multiple and often contradictory interpretations (echoing the concept/conception distinction). Therefore, Plant concludes that "[w]hile there is formal consensus that to talk about community is to talk in a commendatory way, there is no such consensus about what precisely is being commended in terms of empirically detectable features of social life."26 As a result, he considers the possibility that community is an essentially contested concept, but notes that

If the concept of community is radically contestable... and if it can only be given a fixed definition against a particular ideological or normative background, then any theory developed within the social sciences that makes use of such a concept is going to embody ideological/normative assumptions.27

As a consequence, Plant argues that it may be wrong to characterise the concept of community as an essentially contested concept, because "[t]he relativism implied by the essential contestability thesis can be overdone."28 Therefore, he concludes that while a range of views representing different conceptions of community which stem from various political positions may exist, a consensus on the concept may not. For Plant, in other words, a conception of community is inevitably normative and inherently political, and therefore it is virtually impossible to define the concept of community.

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26 Plant, "Community: Concept, Conception, and Ideology", ibid., p. 82. Of course, in international theory there is not even a consensus that 'community' is necessarily a laudatory term.


28 Plant, "Community: Concept, Conception, and Ideology", ibid., p. 89.
Like Plant, Anthony Cohen also argues that focusing on questions of essential contestedness or definition may be unproductive for understanding the concept of community. Indeed, Cohen suggests that the study of the concept was "... consigned for some time into an abyss of theoretical sterility by obsessive attempts to formulate precise analytic definitions...".²⁹ He thus approaches the concept of community as a cognitive construct instead:

In seeking to understand the phenomenon of community we have to regard its constituent social relations as repositories of meaning for its members, not as a set of mechanical linkages... Community exists in the minds of its members, and should not be confused with geographic or sociographic assertions of "fact". By extension, the distinctiveness of communities, and, thus, the reality of their boundaries, similarly lies in the mind, in the meanings which people attach to them, not in their structural forms.³⁰

Thus Cohen concludes

... that whether or not its structural boundaries remain intact, the reality of community lies in its members' perception of the vitality of its culture. People construct community symbolically, making it a resource and repository of meaning, and a referent of their identity.³¹

This notion of the symbolically constructed community is important, for it acknowledges that the concept of community both provides an identity for its members and at the same time cannot have a separate existence from them. In other words, the concept of community fosters identity at the same time as the notion of identity enables the concept of community. One without the other is virtually meaningless in terms of the meaning of community, and Cohen

²⁹ Cohen, op. cit., p. 38.
³⁰ Cohen, ibid., p. 98.
³¹ Cohen, ibid., p. 118. For a similar definition which emphasises the notion of self-consciousness, see Robert Booth Fowler Enduring Liberalism: American Political Thought Since the 1960s (Lawrence, KA: University Press of Kansas, 1999), p. 150.
suggests, therefore, that territory/geography is less important a component of the concept of community than the identity component of relational/reciprocal ties.

Echoing this approach, Zygmunt Bauman suggests that the concept of community stems from identity, and may produce "... a 'community' of the like-minded and the like-behaving; a community of sameness...". Moreover:

[i]t must be as easy to take apart as it has been to put together. It must be and stay flexible, never being more than "until further notice" and "as long as the satisfaction lasts". Its creation and dismantling must be determined by the choices made by those who compose it - by their decisions to bestow or withdraw their allegiance. In no case should the allegiance, once declared, become irrevocable: the bond made by choices should not inconvenience, let alone preclude, further and different choices. The bond sought should not be binding on those who found it.

Bauman classifies this conception of community, following Kant, as aesthetic community, and he notes that

the need for aesthetic community, notably the variety of aesthetic community which services the construction/dismantling of identity, tends for those reasons to be as much self-perpetuating as it is self-defeating. That need is never to be gratified, and neither will it ever stop prompting the search for satisfaction.

However, Bauman also notes that in opposition to the aesthetic community is what he calls the "ethical community". This type of community stems from origins similar to that of the aesthetic community (in which individuals "... seek a kind of community which could, collectively, make good what they, individually, lack and miss." but differs from the aesthetic community because

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33 Ibid., pp. 64-65.

34 Ibid., p. 66.

35 Ibid., p. 72.
It would need to be woven from long-term commitment, from inalienable rights and unshakeable obligations... And these commitments which make the community ethical would be of the "fraternal sharing" kind, reaffirming the right of every member to communal insurance against the errors and misadventures which are the risks inseparable from individual life.36

This distinction, in other words, is about identity, about the value or quality of relationships in a community. Indeed, David Harvey suggests that conceptions of

... community (as a social entity created in space through time) can disguise radical differences in meaning because the processes of community production themselves diverge remarkably according to group capacities and interests. Yet the treatment of communities as if they are comparable... has material implications to which the social practices of people who live in them have to respond.37

In social theory, therefore, 'community' appears to have a dual existence: both as concept and as conception.

The former involves debates about 'community' centred around some variation of the question of whether territory/geography (territoriality) is more or less influential for the concept of community than relational/reciprocal ties (identity). As Plant and others suggest, the only means of addressing this question is by resorting to the political. Thus the latter iteration of 'community' centres around a concept in which explicitly political considerations determine whether territoriality or identity are understood to constitute the defining feature of some conception of community. In other words, the importance of the different roles played by territoriality and identity must be evaluated through consideration of the political.

This distinction is central to analysing the concept of community. It goes some way toward explaining the ambiguity and ubiquity of the concept, its frequent

36 Ibid., p. 72.

invocation in startlingly different contexts, and its apparent resistance to definition. Indeed, the concept seems susceptible to neither rigorous analysis nor precise definition. At the same time, however, community is nevertheless a "... warmly persuasive word..." for virtually all individuals, public or private. It seems, in other words, that the social sciences in general have had little success with defining the concept of community. However, at least social theory analysis is asking the question.

Thus in acknowledging the complexity and ambiguity of the concept of community, social theory makes an important contribution to its rearticulation in international relations. And Raymond Plant outlines a means by which to classify the various and competing approaches to the concept of community, based on debates about territoriality and identity, while not glossing over the problem of the political in the move from concept to conception. The next section thus considers Plant's typology, both as a comprehensive overview of approaches to the concept of community, and as an analysis that acknowledges the difficulties (if not the impossibility) of seeking its definition.

2. Three Models of Community

Despite the seemingly inevitable slipperiness of analysing the concept of community, Raymond Plant suggests that the disparate approaches to it may be represented by three basic models. His typology does not exhaust work on the

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38 Apparently, this position is tediously predictable: "A number of papers on the subject of community, for instance, take something like the following form. They ask whether it is possible to come up with or arrive at a 'definition' of 'community'; they survey the extant literature both theoretical and empirical, descriptive and normative; they list fifty-six ways 'community' is defined in this literature; they argue that these various definitions don't 'boil down' or 'add up' to a definitive solution. They conclude either with a 'core concept' or working definition which, as Raymond Plant says tends to be so formal and abstract as to be empirically vacuous; or they conclude that the concept community is hopelessly vague or non-existent." Frazer, op. cit., p. 54. Incidentally, like this section, in Frazer's analysis of the concept of community, she too adopts this 'traditional' approach to the concept; see especially pp. 61-76.

concept of community, but the three models represent the principal approaches to it, philosophically and politically. Moreover, they account for (the political) disputes over the components of territoriality versus identity, and also echo Carl Friedrich's understanding of the three great debates about the concept of community.

The first model Plant considers tends to identify community with locale. In this model, locality is not considered a sufficient condition for community, so debate centres around the qualities or nature of the relationships involved in order to arrive at a definition. As Plant explains, the most frequently cited method of differentiating between qualities which may or may not characterise community is the classic distinction made by Tonnies between Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft, or community and association.40

In Plant's first model, the distinction lies with the origins of the community:

[w]hereas associations of various sorts can be self-consciously built, instituted or contracted into, a true community is organic, based upon blood, kinship, shared habitat and locality, and a set of common attitudes, experiences, feelings and dispositions. Community is something which one is born into and grows within...[it] is emphatically not a matter of individuals coming together to advance their specific interests.41

While this first model of 'natural' community derives from Tonnies' 1887 work on Community and Association, the second model considered by Plant is based upon R.M. MaclIver's 1917 Community. MaclIver focuses on qualities dismissed by Tonnies: the question of a "communality of interests".42 He argues that community can, in fact, be created by will, but emphasizes that it must be based upon the notion of common good, or at least on a coincidence of public interests. In MaclIver's conception of a 'public' community, elements of both community (Gemeinschaft) and association (Gesellschaft) are present:

40 See Tonnies, Community and Association, op. cit.


42 Plant, "Community", ibid., p. 89; and see MaclIver, op. cit.
Community of interest, as MacIver sees it, is not the aggregate of individual private interests, but is rather dependent on the existence of a group, which in his view can be as large as a nation. Unlike Tonnies, MacIver accepts the idea that community can be created by will, but it has to be a will of a particular sort, namely for a common good, or a set of interests which a group has in common.\textsuperscript{43}

Finally, the third model of community Plant explores "... is much more restricted in scope and, in opposition to Tonnies, allows for partial communities based upon the coming together of individuals with specific private interests".\textsuperscript{44} It differs from MacIver's model in that it takes into account not only public interests, but also interests that are private. A community within this model is not, therefore, dependent upon locale, and as such a professional or occupational group might possess a sense of this 'private' community. This partial community model thus emphasizes association (\textit{Gesellschaft}) more than community (\textit{Gemeinschaft}).

As Plant points out, none of these models - natural community, public community or private community - suggest that physical location (territoriality) is alone sufficient for the existence of community. In the first two it is significant, but all three models emphasize that community is constituted by a certain quality of the relationships within it (identity). The dispute over defining community thus tends to be mainly one of value, a political dispute, regardless of which model is considered. It is a debate about the nature of relationships and how to measure their quality. Thus for Plant the concept of community may be quantifiable, but a conception of community requires a qualitative judgement:

It has been argued that disputes about the empirical qualities which communitarian relationships must possess could be bypassed by requiring, as a minimum definition, that they must embody a sense of solidarity and give individuals a sense of significance. Nevertheless, it is not at all clear that this is much of an advance...[because] while solidarity and significance may

\textsuperscript{43} Plant, "Community", ibid., p. 89.

\textsuperscript{44} Plant, "Community", ibid., p. 89.
define the concept of community these features when interpreted will yield different conceptions of community.\textsuperscript{45}

Therefore, without normative or political interpretations, the

... necessary and sufficient conditions for the use of community are entirely formal and abstract; there are no definite requirements expressed or implied for... a community so defined. Before the concept of community can be used in social and political analysis these necessary and sufficient conditions have to be interpreted and provided with some "cash value".\textsuperscript{46}

Thus Plant argues that "[t]he rigor and precision of the concept of community... is bought at the cost of empirical vacuity; the terms of the definition themselves have to be further specified and once this occurs we are back in the thick of ideological assumptions."\textsuperscript{47} It is this inherent elasticity in meaning, due to the inevitably political nature of moving from concept to conception, that explains why the notion of community is so widely deployed across the political spectrum, and why such debate about its definition persists.

Indeed, Plant suggests that his typology of community (with its distinction between concept and conception) thus applies to a range of political positions. For instance, a conservative approach to the concept of community seems closest to that of Tonnies' natural community, with its emphasis on organic relationships. Second, Plant argues that socialists tend to endorse MacIver's Rousseauian conception of public community with its shared interests, in which community may be within reach only through socialism and the abolition of class relationships. Finally, Plant suggests that liberals might favour the third model, the partial or private community approach, which centralizes individualism and private interests, and thus association, allowing for communities to flourish within it, rather than (necessarily) serving as a community itself.\textsuperscript{48}

\textsuperscript{45} Plant, "Community", ibid., pp. 89-90. Emphasis original.

\textsuperscript{46} Plant, "Community: Concept, Conception, and Ideology", op. cit., p. 87.

\textsuperscript{47} Ibid., p. 88.

\textsuperscript{48} Ibid., p. 90.
Therefore, the crucial dispute over what constitutes the concept of community in Plant's typology concerns the value or quality of relationships within a particular conception of community. But the unavoidable difficulty is that its political nature does not allow for 'community' to be defined. In short, Plant suggests that the central problem is that the concept of community lacks an incontestable core or, in Gallie's words, an original exemplar, and that "[t]his feature of community would make it perhaps more radically contestable than any other central social and political concept."49

Thus the relative clarity of Plant's typology of community seems only to underscore the confusion that ensues when analysing the concept itself. Indeed, it seems that the one feature which unites all approaches to the concept of community (both inside and outside international relations) is a lack of clarity about its meaning. Moreover, as it seems that pursuing a definition of the concept of community is a fundamentally political act, and must rest on qualitative judgements or, more likely, a series of value-laden assumptions, the meaning of the concept of community seems destined to end in either vagueness or relativism.50

At the same time, this 'warmly persuasive word'51 belies any real definitional problem, for it is employed often and to great effect in social and political contests, in part because of its strong emotive appeal.52 Thus the weaknesses of

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49 Ibid., p. 85.

50 This is not necessarily problematic, and indeed may be a strength of the concept. Again, it is important to note that this chapter neither seeks nor provides a stipulative definition of community.

51 Williams, op. cit., p.6; cited in Plant, "Community: Concept, Conception, and Ideology" ibid., p. 82. On the "feel" of community see also Bauman, op. cit., especially pp. 1-6.

52 The usage of the concept, for example, in the Thatcherite policy of "Care in the Community" is one (certainly ironic, and possibly also cynical) example of such an application. Plant also cites "'[c]ommunity action', 'community development', 'community work', 'community organization', 'community politics', 'community medicine', 'community power', 'community school'..." as examples of only a few common and influential usages. Plant, "Community: Concept, Conception, and Ideology", op. cit.,
the concept of community are at once its strengths. The nostalgia it tends to
evoke reflects the personal and political upheaval wrought by modernity and by
changing societal and political values. And the ambiguity of the concept of
community is the basis of both its longevity and its continuing relevance, for it
may refer equally to very disparate human groupings, organisations, and even
individual as well as collective desires. Indeed, it is both in spite of, and because
of its resistance to definition that the concept of community has such ongoing
applicability and relevance.

Therefore, the inherent flexibility of the concept of community and its near-
universal applicability provide ballast against the vagueness and relativism of
conceptions of community. Moreover, its fundamentally political nature also
suggests that setting out basic requirements for what constitutes community will,
despite potential complications, nevertheless provide an approach with which to
address the possibility of rearticulating the meaning of community in
international relations theory. The next section, therefore, draws on Plant's
typology to propose that the three core components of the concept of community
are territoriality, identity and the political. The section begins by setting out how
and why these components in particular are important, and then considers each in
turn in terms of both social theory and international relations theory.

3. Three Components of the Concept of Community

With so little consensus about even the possibility of defining the concept of
community, this section instead sets out the core components of the concept.
Indeed, throughout the very different approaches to it, there are a number of
consistent themes, or at least shared points of departure. Thus, for example,
locality, longevity, the self, group identification, the common good, and overall
purpose are usually addressed in most approaches to the concept of community,
such as in Plant's typology. As a result, while extracting the elements of the
concept of community from within these varied approaches may still necessitate
some element of interpretation, such a perspective nevertheless provides reference points and criteria with which to address the concept in international relations theory.\textsuperscript{53}

There are only two features of the concept of community which are obviously universal, or at least very rarely challenged. First, there is the recognition that "... all the definitions deal with people."\textsuperscript{54} That this is blindingly obvious does not make it inaccurate: the concept of community does, indeed, invariably 'deal with people'. The second shared feature of varying approaches to the concept of community is what Plant calls the positive evaluative meaning of the concept. Indeed, the commendatory tone employed in conjunction with this concept is remarkably consistent, as Raymond Williams notes:

\begin{quote}
Community can be the warmly persuasive word to describe an existing set of relationships, or the warmly persuasive word to describe an alternative set of relationships. What is most important, perhaps, is that unlike all other terms of social organization (state, nation, society, etc.) it seems never to be used unfavourably, and never to be given any opposing or distinguishing terms.\textsuperscript{55}
\end{quote}

The import of the universality of the positive evaluative meaning of community is debatable; it makes the concept seem accessible and important, and like the claim that the concept of community deals with people, it is a fact,\textsuperscript{56} but it contributes little to efforts to define the concept. Beyond these two apparently universal

\textsuperscript{53} This may also go some way to explaining why international relations has been able, for so long, to avoid defining – or even attempting to define – the concept of community in any way except as the state.

\textsuperscript{54} Plant, \textit{Community and Ideology}, op. cit., pp. 37-38. For the original study see Hillery, op. cit.

\textsuperscript{55} Williams, op. cit., p.6; cited in Plant, "Community: Concept, Conception, and Ideology" op. cit., p. 82.

\textsuperscript{56} Frazer notes that "... it does not follow from the fact that a concept has positive connotations that every instance of the phenomenon is good. I agree that it does not in logic. But... meaning can defy logic, so that a case of 'bad community' while not illogical seems odd. Given the current use of the concept it would have to be glossed or explained." Frazer, op. cit., p. 82, n. 129.
features of the concept there is little agreement, with virtually every proposed
definition meeting a litany of criticism.

Thus setting out the core components of the concept of community must be
undertaken with an acute awareness of the problems of defining the concept.
Indeed, John Ladd argues that defining the concept of community is
inappropriate, given that most attempts "...will inevitably be either so narrow as
to exclude many types of community or so vague and general that any
aggregation of individuals whatsoever could be called a 'community'."\textsuperscript{57} Thus in
analysing the concept of community Elizabeth Frazer, for example, does not
develop a definition but instead

\[\ldots\text{lays out the range of elements of the concept, in such a way as to enable analysts to say something about the kinds of connotations and echoes the term generates in use, the ways that elements that the concept excludes nevertheless are salient, and the points at which theories about how the world works are relevant.}\textsuperscript{58}\]

This section thus adopts Frazer's approach, seeking to outline and examine the
'range of elements' of the concept of community rather than develop a definition
of it.

Some of this work has already begun; preceding sections illustrate that virtually
all disputes about the concept of community involve variations on the themes of
place or territoriality, of individual and group identity, and of the political
disputes that attend each, and which also inform any move from the (abstract)

\textsuperscript{57} John Ladd, "The Concept of Community: A Logical Analysis", in Friedrich, ibid., p.
269. As an alternative, Ladd suggests a genealogical approach: "[w]e can hope for
greater success if, instead of asking what kind of thing a community is, we ask how the
concept is used in political and legal arguments, and how it functions logically... If we
follow this procedure, I believe we will acquire a theoretical framework which will make
clear the main points of agreement and the sources of disagreement among the various
views concerning the nature of community..." Ibid., pp. 269-270. Such a genealogical
approach is more about a conception of community than the concept of community,
however, and is therefore of limited utility when it comes to rearticulating the meaning
of community in international theory.

\textsuperscript{58} Frazer, op. cit., p. 76.
concept of community to its (concrete) conception. Thus while the early
formulation of debates about the concept of community focused on the dichotomy
of community/association, more recent debates have shifted to questions of the
political, concerning how to determine the importance of territory/geography
versus relational/reciprocal bonds; as a consequence, territoriality and identity are
clearly central to debates about the concept of community. Given the political
necessity of favouring one approach over the other, it is the argument of this
chapter that a third core component of community is the political, because not
only are territorial versus identity debates themselves politically informed, but
adjudicating between the two explicitly involves questions of the political.59

Therefore, this section sets out an approach to the concept of community which
includes the components of territoriality and identity, while still reflecting the
political nature of the complexities of the concept and its conception(s). Thus the
argument here is that territoriality, identity and the political are three core
components of the concept of community. They are not necessarily the only
components of the concept of community, but they are crucial to understanding it
and, as such, are the central and, ironically, the defining components of it, which
nevertheless do not constitute a definition of the concept. In other words, this
argument does not make or rely on claims concerning whether one or more of the
components is either necessary or sufficient to constitute community. Again,
following Frazer, the intent is "... that this analysis will not be read as a definition
of the concept, nor as an attempt to specify a set of necessary and sufficient
criteria for use of the term. It is not meant as a legislation for the concept."60
Instead, the argument here is that these components, rather than being 'necessary
and sufficient' criteria of community, are instead mutually constitutive and thus
conditional and contingent, but still core, components of the concept of community.

59 Moreover, Plant's typology (loosely) follows this pattern: natural community focuses
on questions of territoriality; public community on concerns with identity; and private
community on issues of the political.

60 Frazer, ibid., p. 76.
Such an approach may be seen as vague and relativistic, but this is almost an inevitable charge given the vagueness and relativity of the concept of community itself. In any case, the conditionality of this approach is more a strength than a weakness, given the ambiguity and the ubiquity of the concept of community. After all, as Frazer suggests, "... that [a concept] is vague and open does not imply that we can't have a quite precise account of its vagueness and openness."61

And finally, since these three components of territorality, identity and the political are key to both social theory and international relations theory, this approach will contribute to rearticulating the meaning of community in international relations theory. The remainder of this section will thus examine each component in turn, with reference both to social theory and to international relations theory.

Territoriality

In international relations, political studies, and the social sciences generally, territorality tends to be synonymous with the state. This correlation is largely a product of modernity, a consequence of the development of the modern states system based on the principle of state sovereignty, but it also reflects the implicit understanding that land or locale is fundamental to politics and, of course, to the state and the concept of community. This is not a uniquely modern development; for Plato and Aristotle land was part of the defining criteria of the polis, and it was also a crucial feature for Hobbes, Locke, Mill, and indeed for most other political and social theorists.62

61 Frazer, op. cit., p. 60.

62 See, for example, Friedrich V. Kratochwil, "The Politics of Place and Origin: An Inquiry into the Changing Boundaries of Representation, Citizenship, and Legitimacy", in J. Michi Ebata and Beverly Neufeld, eds. Confronting the Political in International Relations (Houndmills: Millennium and Macmillan Press, 2000), pp. 185-211, especially pp. 193-199; and Huntington Cairns, "The Community as the Legal Order", in Friedrich, ed., op. cit., pp. 25-37, especially pp. 26-27. For a review of territorality in international relations, see Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Special Issue: Territorialities, Identities, and Movement in International Relations (Vol. 28, No. 3, 1999).
Thus Warren Magnusson notes that "[p]olitical community has long been conceived as an enclosure..." and "[s]ince the sixteenth century, prehistoric, ancient, and medieval reifications of political space have gradually been rejected in favour of the modern state." Moreover, echoing the emotive appeal of the concept of community, William Connolly emphasises the importance of territoriality when he notes "... a homesickness that construes correspondence between the scope of common troubles and a territorial place of action to form the essence of democratic politics. It is nostalgia for a politics of place." In other words, as with the sovereign state, the concept of community is inexorably linked to territoriality.

Talcott Parsons, in fact, offers "... a tentative working definition of community as that aspect of the structure of social systems which is referable to the territorial location of persons... and their activities." Indeed, he classifies community structure into four categories based on territory: the first two categories are

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66 In fact, in international relations the linkage of territoriality and the concept of community may be understood as codified and indeed solidified in the modern sovereign state. This point is elaborated further in this section, and in chapter five, in terms of the work of R.B.J. Walker. It is also evident in literature on nationalism in international relations; see, for only a few examples, Anthony Smith, Theories of Nationalism, 2nd ed. (London: Duckworth, 1983); Ernst Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983); Elie Kedourie, Nationalism, 4th ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993); and Brian Porter, "Nationalism" in James Mayall (ed.) The Community of States: A Study in International Political Theory (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1982). The question of whether this modern development is also codified and solidified in the concept of community is addressed in chapter six.

residence and work/occupational structures; the third territorial element of community structure is jurisdictional, which refers to political and social organization\textsuperscript{68}; and the fourth category is communication, which refers to virtually all types of human interaction, "... to the processes which go on between persons-in-places."\textsuperscript{69}

In response to this approach, Thomas Cowan notes his disappointment that Parsons chooses "... to study the community as a space-anchored sociological construct."\textsuperscript{70} Cowan explains: "... I took it for granted that no one could deny that when the notion of community is presented the idea of space or place naturally arises..." but that "[c]ommunity for me, in a word, had been much more appropriately an idea than a locus."\textsuperscript{71} John Ladd agrees, and notes that "I shall not regard either a territorial condition or a size limitation as essential to [the concept of community]."\textsuperscript{72} In other words, although territoriality is a core component of community, it does not capture the concept completely, as noted earlier in Plant's typology. However, territoriality may also mean more than simply locale, for it may also reflect a notion of time, or temporality.

For example, R.B.J. Walker suggests that the principle of state sovereignty

... embodies an historically specific account of ethical possibility in the form of an answer to questions about the nature and location of political community. Specifically, the principle of state sovereignty offers both a spatial and a temporal resolution to questions about what political community can be, given the priority of citizenship and particularity over all universalist claims to a common human identity.\textsuperscript{73}

\textsuperscript{68} Parsons, ibid., p. 160.

\textsuperscript{69} Parsons, ibid., p. 167.

\textsuperscript{70} Thomas A. Cowan, "The Principal Structures of Community Reviewed", in Friedrich, ed., op. cit., p. 180.

\textsuperscript{71} Cowan, ibid., p. 180. Cowan also notes that time plays an important role in this analysis too "... since Parsons' systems are all teleological". Ibid., p.185.

\textsuperscript{72} Ladd, op. cit., in Friedrich, ed., op. cit., p. 272.

\textsuperscript{73} R.B.J. Walker, \textit{Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory}
Thus temporality is an important aspect of the component of territoriality, and the idea of a politics of time and a politics of space is particularly important in the international relations approach to the concept of community. Indeed, for Walker, "... the principle of state sovereignty expresses an historically specific articulation of the relationship between universality and particularity in space and time." Moreover, temporality is also important for the concept of community in terms of the positive evaluative nature of the concept: the nostalgic appeal and emotive resonance that usually accompanies the concept of community is informed, at least in part, by a sense of timelessness associated with community. Moreover, its explanatory value in terms of the transition to modernity is also bound up with a notion of time that seems greater than any one individual.

Therefore, Walker argues that:

To engage with questions about modernity is to work with accounts of history and time. It is to be concerned with the possibility of establishing and sustaining political community in time, with struggles to bring about better forms of political community over time. The problems of international relations, by contrast, are usually framed in terms of differentiations of political space. They emerge from the geo-political separation of territorial communities in space, a separation that may be taken to imply both the non-existence of a common community that may be improved over time and, consequently, the marginality of questions that presume the possibility of temporal progress within particular communities.


Walker, ibid., p. 176.

Walker, ibid., p. 61. On the relationship of political space and time, see also Magnusson, The Search for Political Space, op. cit., especially pp. 5-7 and pp. 291-295; and Harvey, op. cit.
Thus a notion of time as well as space in the component of territoriality is important for understanding the concept of community. The point is that the concept may be limited by what Walker calls spatiotemporal boundaries: "... modernity has been characterised as either a privileging of space over time or as a culture of historical and temporal self-consciousness."76 As a result, Walker sees the sovereign state as a (flawed) spatial and temporal resolution of political and philosophical problems that is "... predicated on the early-modern fiction that temporality can be fixed and tamed within the spatial coordinates of territorial jurisdictions."77 As a result, part of the problem with political space in international relations is also time; territoriality as a component of the concept of community must be understood as being about both spatial and temporal boundaries. In short, then, rearticulating the meaning of community requires some notion of space and time. Territoriality is a core component of the concept of community, not least because it plays an important (political) role in determining the identities of those within it.

Indeed, in discussing the importance of territoriality, Friedrich Kratochwil argues that

... it is not surprising that the land often defines the group or indicates the origin from where the group came or is invoked in order to evoke a sense of permanence and identity. And it is out of this dynamic between defining the group and locating it in certain places that the drama of politics emerges. After all, the term politics derives from polis, which means to build a wall. These walls include and exclude members as well as delineate the space that is home, by setting it apart from the wilderness, the no-man's land, or from the land of others.78

76 Walker, ibid., p. 9. Interestingly, Warren Magnusson points out that “Geographers have long held that the uncritical understanding of space in social theory has led to profound distortions. They complain that time has been privileged in relation to space, and hence that history has been invoked over geography in developing the most influential social theories.” Magnusson, ibid., p. 5.


Thus while territoriality is a core component of the concept of community, it also influences notions of identity (and, indeed, of the political). As Kratochwil suggests, the mutual dependence of territoriality and identity is a central feature of the concept of community, and the next section examines the second core component of the concept: identity.

Identity

In the social sciences, including international relations, identity and the idea of 'identity politics' has become increasingly important, particularly throughout the twentieth century. From a series of metaphysical questions about human nature, society and their purpose, identity is often reduced to a logic, or what Warren Magnusson following Theodor Adorno calls a metaphysics, of unity "... which assumes that what is most fundamental about any thing is its ultimate identity or essence." The result of this logic of identity tends to be the establishment of a hierarchy of identity and difference. Criticised as sexist, racist and classist, this approach to identity is problematic on many levels, not least because it is fixed and immutable, denying the potential for change, growth or the possibility of a multiplicity of identities at either the individual or the group level.

Another, more (late) modern, approach to identity is to consider it in the context of the concept of community, and particularly in terms of the sovereign state, distinguishing the public citizen from the private individual. With its foundation in the sovereign state, in this equation citizenship is generally portrayed as the

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79 For an overview of the study of identity formation and notions of self/other relations in social theory from the perspective of the international relations discipline, see Iver B. Neumann, "Self and Other in International Relations" in European Journal of International Relations (Vol.2, No. 2, 1996), pp. 139-174.

ultimate identity.\textsuperscript{81} Indeed, as Walker points out, this issue is central to international relations:

It is the simple question about human identity, about who we are and how we might live together whoever we are. This is the question that has been answered by claims about the modern subject. We are, supposedly, self-representing, self-developing, self-identical subjects. Or, in the form that is crucial to the theory of international relations, we are supposedly free and responsible citizens of sovereign states. Modern politics, and the modern theory of international relations, is grounded in the claim that this is a sufficient, and perhaps even necessary and inevitable answer to this question...\textsuperscript{82}

In fact, the development of the modern states system was partly a solution to the problem of competing and conflictual identities, with the result that, "[i]n the modern era, political identities have been constituted between the two poles of the sovereign state and the sovereign individual."\textsuperscript{83} The inevitable tension between these two identities (expressed as outlined in the preceding chapter as the universal-particular dichotomy, or the tension between man and citizen) was seen as resolved in the sovereign state.

Walker notes "... that there is really very little in the modern theory of international relations that cannot be extrapolated fairly straightforwardly from the way in which the claim to state sovereignty works to resolve all contradictions of unity and diversity in space and time upon a particular territory and a specific subjectivity."\textsuperscript{84} However, this dichotomy was (temporarily) settled rather than (permanently) resolved; Walker suggests that

\textsuperscript{81} Adrian Oldfield actually suggests "... that if one creates citizens, one also, and at the same time, creates community." Oldfield "Citizenship and Community: Civic Republicanism and the Modern World" in Gershon Shafir, ed. \textit{The Citizenship Debates: A Reader} (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1998), p. 88.

\textsuperscript{82} Walker, "International Relations Theory and the Fate of the Political", in Ebata and Neufeld, eds., op. cit., p. 231.

\textsuperscript{83} Magnusson, \textit{The Search for Political Space}, op. cit., p. 105.

\textsuperscript{84} Walker, "International Relations Theory and the Fate of the Political", in Ebata and Neufeld, eds., op. cit., p. 223.
... the early modern insistence that claims about citizenship have priority over all claims about humanity, and indeed that one can only achieve one's humanity by paradoxically submitting to the necessities of citizenship, is more than simply ragged around the edges.\textsuperscript{85}

Indeed, writing in 1959, Dante Germino argued that "... the necessity for resurrecting community without at the same time burying the individual in some new collectivist idolatry is rapidly becoming, after survival itself, the political problem of our time."\textsuperscript{86} Germino's concern is

... the fact that the experience of alienation and isolation is a common rather than a marginal phenomenon in recent Western society. The decline of a sense of community may be said to exist as a social reality rather than simply as a projection of the imagination of a few neurotic "outsiders". And when a problem arises from the level of the rare and the exceptional to that of the common and universal, it becomes quintessentially a \textit{political} problem...\textsuperscript{87}

In other words, like Walker, Germino no longer sees the sovereign state as providing either a 'sense of community' or a sufficiently robust identity. The sovereign state, for both, fails the individual.

Taking up this line of argument concerning the individual need for a sense of community, Zygmunt Bauman also captures the apparent contradiction of locating individual identity within the group. For Bauman,

"Identity" means standing out: being different, and through that difference unique - and so the search for identity cannot but divide and separate. And yet the vulnerability of individual identities and the precariousness of solitary identity-building prompt the identity-builders to seek pegs on which they can

\textsuperscript{85} Walker, ibid., p. 232.

\textsuperscript{86} Dante Germino, "The Crisis in Community: Challenge, to Political Theory", in Friedrich, ed., op. cit., pp. 81-82. Emphasis original.

\textsuperscript{87} Germino, ibid., p. 81. Emphasis original.
together hang their individually experienced fears and anxieties, and having done that, perform the exorcism rites in the company of other similarly afraid and anxious individuals. Whether such "peg communities" provide what it is hoped they offer - collective insurance against individually confronted uncertainties - is a moot question...\(^8^8\)

Consequently, Bauman proposes that individual insecurity is a driving force of communal life, but at the same time, he also notes the vital role played by the group (often the community) in (re)structuring that identity.

Thus the issue of the nature of the relationship between the individual and the group is crucial for understanding identity as a component of the concept of community. This question is often characterised by debate as to which comes first: whether the concept of community provides identity, or whether the collective is first formed by the (shared) identity of its members. However, this approach is less than helpful, not least because the reciprocal, mutually dependent relationship of individual and group makes it virtually impossible to answer. Nevertheless, the issue remains important, not so much in terms of origins, but because both the tension and the mutual support that exists between individual and collective identity is fundamental to understanding this component of the concept of community.

Indeed, the two are mutually constitutive and dependent upon each other, because one without the other is less resonant, less meaningful than the two together. As Frazer puts it, "... in 'community' individuals orient not only to each other as members of the group, but to the whole itself, and they conceive this whole as having a significance that transcends present purposes."\(^8^9\) Bauman suggests that this is the case because

\(^8^8\) Bauman, op. cit., p. 16. The assertion that this is a moot question is debatable, because it seems central to a specific conception of community in question, and indeed to the very concept of community it represents in general. But for Bauman, it seems that the extent to which a 'community' is able to provide 'collective insurance against individually confronted uncertainties' is less important than the fact that this is an alternative at all.

\(^8^9\) Frazer, op. cit., p. 207.
[t]he construction of identity is a neverending and forever incomplete process, and must remain such to deliver on its promise (or, more precisely, to keep the promise of delivery credible)... identity must stay flexible and always amenable to further experimentation and change; it must be a truly "until further notice" kind of identity.\textsuperscript{90}

Warren Magnusson also notes the importance of a flexible approach to identity, suggesting that much of the security derived by the individual from group membership depends upon territoriality:

Sealed territorial identities are particularly dangerous. It actually is quite difficult to seal nonterritorial identities, because they must submit with others in a common territory: thanks to the interactions of everyday life - which cannot easily be policed - the identities we would seal usually begin to open up, and the communities we would create prove fragile. The seductiveness of a tightly bounded territory is that it promises the possibility of sealing an identity that grows out of an everyday life shared in common. Everything within that territory is, or can be, a part of the identity to be sustained. A territorial identity can, in principle, be comprehensive.\textsuperscript{91}

Thus the concept of community requires a flexible notion of identity, one, for example, that allows for difference within it, regardless of territorial boundaries.\textsuperscript{92}

Because community both constitutes and is constituted by the individuals within it, it is imperative that neither the identities of these members nor that of the community be fixed. After all, it is the relationships of its members which determine its nature. At the same time, however, the limits imposed upon the expression of individual identities within communities is affected, in turn, by the nature of the community in which they are based, and this includes their territorial (spatial and temporal) boundaries.

\textsuperscript{90} Bauman, op. cit., p. 64. Emphasis original. On the notion of flexible identity in international relations (or the "multidimensional character of identity formation") see Neumann, "Self and Other in International Relations", op. cit., pp. 139-174, especially pp. 165-168.

\textsuperscript{91} Magnusson, \textit{The Search for Political Space}, op. cit., p. 113. Emphasis original.

\textsuperscript{92} On this point see Bauman, op. cit., especially pp. 64-65 and 112-113.
Therefore, the quality of the relationships that constitute a community must be measured not only in terms of the public relationships between its members, but also in terms of the ability of individuals to reconcile their own numerous, and occasionally conflicting, identities. The concept of community must be sufficiently flexible about the core component of identity that its members' (various) individual identities are compatible both amongst a number of individuals and also for an individual to reconcile and express them.

Crucially, this need for individuals to reconcile numerous and conflicting identities within a specific conception of community is inherently political. After all, determining the value of the relationships within a conception of community is necessary for understanding the concept of community, even though this political move is also one of the central problems of the concept of community. Thus the next section examines the third component of the concept of community: the political.

The Political

In social theory, politics and the political are central, but essentially contested concepts. As a core component of the concept of community, the political is important because it is distinct from politics. Indeed, in addressing the relationship of the political and the concept of community, Jean-Luc Nancy sees the distinction as crucial. Christopher Fynsk explains Nancy's understanding of the difference: "... 'the political' (le politique: the site where what it means to be in common is open to definition) and 'politics' (la politique: the play of forces and interests engaged in a conflict over the representation and governance of social existence)." Politics, in other words, is essentially governance, while the political is about competing notions of the good life.

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Explaining that he is coming from the left in his argument about community, Nancy argues that "left" means, *at the very least*, that the political, as such, is receptive to what is at stake in community. (On the other hand, "right" means, at least, that the political is merely in charge of order and administration.) [Thus] the political is the place where community as such is brought into play. It is not, in any case, just the locus of power relations.\footnote{Nancy, ibid. pp. xxxvi-xxxvii. Emphasis original.}

For Nancy, then, politics produces a *conception* of community, or what he calls "... the realization of an *essence* of community." The result of such essentialising, he suggests, is that "... one loses sight of community as such, and of the political as the place of its exposition." Thus he argues that a focus on politics produces "...the thinking of community as essence [which] is in effect the closure of the political."\footnote{Nancy, ibid., p. xxxviii. Emphasis original.} As a consequence, the distinction between 'politics' and 'the political' is central to the meaning of community, and for international relations, it suggests that the political is what distinguishes community from the (politics of the) state.\footnote{On international relations and politics/the political, see Ebata and Neufeld, eds., *op. cit.*, especially Ebata and Neufeld, "Politics in International Relations", pp. 1-16. On "the idea of a political community" in general see Frazer, *op. cit.*, 203-245. On the concept of politics in particular see Frazer, *ibid.*, pp. 221-236.}

In fact, given its narrow understanding of political space, international relations provides relatively limited opportunities for debates about what constitutes the political. As R.B.J. Walker suggests, "[i]nternational relations theory is a theory about crisis, about the *limits* of the normal...".\footnote{Walker, "International Relations Theory and the Fate of the Political", in Ebata and Neufeld, eds., *op. cit.*, p.219. Emphasis mine.} As a result, the discipline expends little effort in considering the political and possibilities of the good life; following Martin Wight's lead, there is an assumption in international relations...
that politics inside states is distinct from political interaction outside state boundaries, because what is absent outside is a notion of the universal, the common good. By focusing on the particular instead, international relations has placed limits on the political.

Indeed, Mark Neufeld suggests that even when attempts are made in international relations to counteract this view, little progress is made. Drawing on the work of Charles Taylor, Neufeld suggests that the problem stems from

...conceiving of morality purely as a guide to action, concerned exclusively with what it is "right" to do, rather than with what it is "good" to be. As such, the central task of moral theory is identified as defining the "content of obligation" rather than the nature of the good life.99

Thus in the interests of expediency, the dominant realist problem-solving approach, and its privileging of the 'problem' of survival, international relations tends to prioritise politics and questions of what is right, and ignore the political, and questions about what is good.

This tendency is not unique to international relations, and in terms of the concept of community it is, in fact, fairly common. For instance, 'the political' seems to be the focus in what Carl Friedrich describes as "Aristotle's cautious definition of the community (koinonia) as 'aiming at some good' [which] is later elaborated somewhat to suggest that it is a group of men having some values (customs, beliefs, interests) in common."100 But Friedrich himself focuses on 'politics',


suggesting that the concept of community is "... central to much political thought... it is the thing within which political events occur... it is the thing upon which all the political goings-on depend."\textsuperscript{101} And similarly, John Ladd suggests that, "...like natural law, the community acts as a background for the political and legal order."\textsuperscript{102}

In focusing on politics rather than the political, Ladd, for example, objects to "... the Aristotelian definition of a community as an aggregation of individuals 'aiming at some good', that is, a common good', on the grounds that the common good is an ambiguous notion.\textsuperscript{103} Instead, Ladd argues that the function of community is "... to bind men together for certain purposes",\textsuperscript{104} in which community is about politics and is "... a practical concept... whose primary function is to guide action, direct and redirect attitudes, and to state commitments of one sort or another..."\textsuperscript{105} The distinction is clear: for Ladd and Friedrich, a conception of community necessitates the narrowly practical functions of 'politics' – governance – while for Aristotle the concept of community is about 'the political', and the importance of enacting the common good.

In other words, the distinction between politics and the political is of the same order as the distinction between conception and concept: politics is a conception, a concrete day-to-day manifestation of an abstract concept, that of the political, the common good. This is important because the political is not only one of three core components of the concept of community; it is also a pivotal component because it not only informs the understanding of community as concept or conception, but it also directs how the components of territoriality and identity

\textsuperscript{101} Friedrich, ibid., p. 23. Emphasis original.

\textsuperscript{102} Ladd, "The Concept of Community: A Logical Analysis", in Friedrich, ed., ibid., p. 290. Emphasis mine.

\textsuperscript{103} Ladd, ibid., p. 276. Molly Cochran suggests that the communitarian-cosmopolitan debate is, in fact, essentially a debate about the good life. See Cochran, "Postmodernism", op. cit., pp. 242-244.

\textsuperscript{104} Ladd, ibid., p. 277.

\textsuperscript{105} Ladd, ibid., p. 270.
are understood as well. Indeed, in the (Aristotelian) idea of the political, of situating the common good in the concept of community, there is, at least in part, a focus on identity, which is seen to counteract what Dante Germino calls 'the experience of alienation and isolation'. For Germino, this experience involves questions of identity which are problems in the realm of the political.

Moreover, Germino sees their potential solution in the concept of community, suggesting that "[o]ur efforts should be directed towards expanding, rather than contracting, the radius of community...". This is not a new idea, for as Friedrich Kratochwil notes,

\[
\text{[m]aking membership and the dichotomy between friend and foe the fundamental categories for "the political", is not only characteristic of Carl Schmitt; it has a long tradition dating back to Aristotle and Plato who focused on participation, ancestry, and the land as defining criteria of the political.}\]

Thus as Kratochwil notes, it is not only the component of identity that is influenced by the political, but also the component of territoriality. Indeed, Peter Mandaville suggests that

\[
\text{[t]he political, as I understand it, names the field of social interaction in which visions of the Good society are articulated, contested, and negotiated. It is my contention that the territorial ontology of International Relations - most clearly manifest in its reification of the nation-state as political community - offers a severely limited account of the political.}\]

And Warren Magnusson argues that it is necessary to think about both politics

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and the political in a new way, given the "...disjuncture between the political spaces that are being claimed democratically and the ones that are offered to people as sites for public participation."\textsuperscript{110} He notes that

\begin{quote}
[as Aristotle and Plato recognized, politics in its highest sense [i.e., the political] is not just about who should hold what office, but also about what sort of offices there should be, and, most generally, what sort of arrangements we should have for our life together as human beings. The state is but one aspect of our arrangements...\textsuperscript{111}
\end{quote}

In international relations the concept of community tends to be limited to the territoriality of the state, to the identity of citizenship, while the political -- the universal -- is overlooked in favour of (particularist) politics. William Connolly aptly sums up problems with territoriality, identity and the political when he notes his concern with

\begin{quote}
... the nostalgic idealism of territorial democracy [because it] fosters the nostalgic realism of international relations and vice-versa... [t]he nostalgia is for a time when a coherent politics of 'place' could be imagined as a real possibility for the future.\textsuperscript{112}
\end{quote}

This problem of developing a coherent understanding of political space in international relations must be confronted. This chapter argues that territoriality, identity and the political provide a sufficiently robust framework from which to address how the concept of community is understood in international relations theory, which is the next step in rearticulating the meaning of community in the

\textsuperscript{110} Magnusson, \textit{The Search for Political Space}, op. cit., p. 9. Magnusson's solution to this problem involves opening up space for a politics that already exists at the local level. Thus while not proposing to replace the state, he challenges the view that the local is simply a miniature version of the state, and proposes reversing such thinking, to see the city as a model for the state.

\textsuperscript{111} Magnusson, ibid., p. 9.

discipline. This chapter has set out a framework of that concept based on the nuanced approaches to it in social theory. The next step is to return to international relations with this framework, and examine the components of the concept of community with reference to the analytical tools available in the discipline for its rearticulation.

Conclusion

The goal of this chapter has been to analyse what is understood to constitute the concept of community in social theory. By outlining the core components of the concept of community, it is possible to examine how the concept is used and articulated in forms of contemporary critical international theory in the international relations discipline. The preceding chapter argued that such a critical theory approach was required, and the thesis will draw on three different approaches, as each on its own does not provide an adequate understanding of the concept of community to serve as the basis for redefining political space. In short, in the absence of one single critical international theory to consider, the thesis will look at three such approaches in turn.

By looking to social theory for a frame of reference to examine the potential for rearticulating the meaning of community in international relations theory, this chapter determines that there are intrinsic and apparently unavoidable difficulties in defining the concept of community. As a result, the chapter focuses on its core components, rather than seeking its definition. Thus, the chapter concludes that there are three core components of the concept of community: territoriality (including time and space); identity (both flexible and multiple); and the political (universal notions of the common good). It is the contention of this chapter that these components will serve as terms of reference from which to examine the extent to which rearticulating the meaning of community in international relations theory is already underway.

By assessing how each component is presently approached in the discipline, it will be possible to outline the work that still remains to be done to rearticulate the
meaning of community in international relations theory, and eventually redefine political space. This is important because at present international relations is ill-equipped in terms of both international politics and international theory. By identifying the concept of community with the spatial and temporal limits of the sovereign state, by tying identity to citizenship, and by reducing the political to the particular, international relations is left with a narrow and problematic understanding of political space. Rearticulating the meaning of community in international theory will allow for a more robust approach to all three components, and overall for a less restrictive approach to political space in international relations.

Therefore, the following three chapters examine each component in turn through the lens of a particular theory or theorist in international relations whose work is concerned with the concept of community and the problem of political space. Moreover, each of the three chapters focuses on a critical international theory approach, since chapter one concluded that critical theory holds the most promise for rearticulating the meaning of community in international relations theory. In contrast to the realist paradigm in international relations that prioritises problem-solving approaches, the subsequent three chapters focus instead on one of the core components of the concept of community and has the potential to bypass the limited international relations understanding of political space.

The next chapter begins with the component of territoriality, and the subsequent two chapters address the components of identity and the political, respectively. Chapter three focuses on the work of Andrew Linklater as an exemplar of a critical theory approach to the concept of community which focuses on territoriality. Chapter four focuses not on a particular theorist, but on feminist international theory as a critical theory approach that focuses on the component of identity. And finally, chapter five considers the critical work of R.B.J. Walker on the political. By examining these three discrete approaches to the core components of the concept of community, the result will be an analysis that will provide an indication of the extent to which rearticulating the meaning of community is already underway in the discipline, and thus of what remains to be
done as well.

The next chapter thus begins this three-part analysis of critical theory approaches by turning to a principal exponent of critical theory in international relations, Andrew Linklater, to consider the component of territoriality and the concept of community.
Chapter Three
Territoriality and the Concept of Community:
Andrew Linklater in International Theory

*Imagining new forms of political community has emerged as a major enterprise in the contemporary theory of the state and international relations.*¹

As a core component of the concept of community, territoriality refers to boundaries, to a notion of demarcated space and time. In international relations, territoriality is largely about the boundaries of sovereign states. These boundaries are often defined in terms of inclusion and exclusion, with the state providing an identity both for individual citizens and for the totality of those inside the state. The boundaries in question are understood to be stable and fixed, with identity defined as citizenship and the political defined as the expression of that identity, writ large. In other words, territoriality in international relations serves the purpose of providing a resolution in space and time of the universal-particular dichotomy. It is within this particular territorial structure that the political comes into play as the means by which the particular — individual identity — is transmuted into the universal — the sovereign state, by way of a totalizing move from the former to the latter.

But as argued in Chapter 1, the political space demarcated by the sovereign state is problematic. It neither resolves the universal-particular dichotomy nor addresses the inability of international relations to theorise such problems as social movements, for example. In short, the problem of the universal-particular dichotomy in international relations is inadequately addressed by the sovereign state. This problem has long been recognized by international relations theorists of a normative, critical theory bent and they contest the territorially defined understanding of international politics as set out by realism. Prominent among them is Andrew Linklater.²

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² Other theorists in international relations who deal with similar issues and themes include R.B.J. Walker, whose work is considered in detail in chapter five; David Held,
From his earliest study of *Men and Citizens in the Theory of International Relations*, to his 1998 analysis of *The Transformation of Political Community*, Linklater explores the problem of the universal-particular dichotomy in international relations. He does so from an explicitly normative position, with an interest in analysing the moral and philosophical underpinnings of the discipline. The central thrust of his work is a challenge to the territorially demarcated boundaries of international relations: specifically, he seeks to extend the boundaries of political community beyond what he views as the restrictive confines of the sovereign state. Linklater employs the concept of community as an alternative to the territorial state, and his goal of transforming it includes both a critique and also a blueprint of what he believes the concept of community ought to embody instead.

For Linklater, the way the sovereign state has dealt with the universal-particular dichotomy is problematic. The resolution of this dichotomy, as expressed in the state, has been represented as *the* resolution rather than *a* particular historical resolution (and one which may no longer be satisfactory). For Linklater, the tension "...between a sense of obligation to the state and a belief in obligations to humanity..." is at the centre of international relations, embodied in the state and imprisoned by its boundaries. For Linklater aspires to resolve this tension, with the concept of community for him an ideal that produces inclusion rather than exclusion, universalism rather than particularism, and a commitment to reduce material inequalities rather than institutionalise them. He argues that such goals

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are not attainable within the sovereign territorial state: "[i]t is possible to imagine citizens of a polity which is wider than the state but which is not itself a state... [but a] widened and deepened political community..."\textsuperscript{4}.

Linklater seeks to transform the way the concept of community is understood in international relations: the fact that the state once resolved the universal-particular dichotomy satisfactorily is insufficient since it no longer does so. Like most critical theorists, he does not stop with critique, and he argues that the state’s failure to resolve the universal-particular dichotomy requires a new approach. Using his work an exemplar of a critical theory approach in international relations that explicitly examines the concept of community in terms of the universal-particular dichotomy, this chapter seeks to determine the manner and extent to which Linklater’s work contributes to the potential rearticulation of the meaning of community in international relations theory.

The chapter begins with an examination of Linklater’s work, providing a general outline of his approach and an overview of his work. The central argument here is that Linklater's project is characterised by the territoriality of the sovereign state and the boundaries it sets in international relations. His goal is the transcendence of territoriality and narrow the demarcation of political space, focused on the need to overcome the universal-particular dichotomy. The first section ends with an analysis of Linklater's understanding of the concept of community and of the sovereign state.

The second section considers Linklater’s characterisation of the universal-particular dichotomy. His account of it is largely based on his concern with territoriality, with the boundaries of international politics and the international relations discipline. Linklater’s goal is to problematise the universal-particular dichotomy and he particularly criticizes its exclusionary nature. Linklater calls for a rejection of the particularism embodied in the sovereign state, with its mediated relations, and for a move toward a universalism

that he believes is the next stage in the evolution of the international system: the post-Westphalian state. However, the section argues that although the universal-particular dichotomy is a significant problem in international relations, Linklater overstates the need to eliminate it. Part of the problem with his approach is that it is not clear what will result from resolving the universal-particular dichotomy. Moreover, Linklater does not address the possibility that the universal-particular dichotomy may not require resolution, or even be resolvable.

Before addressing this questions specifically, in section four, the third section of the chapter considers Linklater's proposed solution to the problem of the universal-particular dichotomy – the “triple transformation of political community” – in more detail. The argument here is that Linklater's solution is as problematic as his statement of the problem. First, it is challenging to work out exactly what his solution requires, in part because he takes a teleological, evolutionary stance which seems to minimize (if not eliminate) the need to act, and this reduces the transformation of community to a matter of time. Second, his proposed solution is also vague, and in any case, seems neither feasible nor attainable, not least because he says so little about it. He tends to refine his questions at the expense of explaining his answers, which may be because he implies that his solution is virtually inevitable.

Picking up on this concern, the fourth section of this chapter addresses the question of whether resolving the universal-particular dichotomy is even desirable, let alone possible. The argument here is that Linklater's approach has two basic flaws that stem from his teleological conviction that some concept of community, stemming from the state, will flourish and replace the state if the universal-particular dichotomy is resolved. The first is his argument that the universal-particular dichotomy is resolvable, and the second is that it ought to be resolved; the chapter argues that the universal-particular dichotomy is in fact integral to the concept of community.

The final section of the chapter concludes that Linklater makes a vital contribution to the potential rearticulation of the meaning of community in
international relations. First, he identifies the problem of the universal-particular dichotomy and its troubled resolution in the sovereign state. Second, he articulates the serious consequences of the failure in international relations to resolve this problem, and he offers a potential alternative in his ‘triple transformation of political community’. In doing so, Linklater seeks to transcend the boundaries set by the sovereign state in and by international relations. Therefore, despite problems with how he depicts the problem and with the solution he proposes, Linklater sets out the terms of the problem, and while not in the way he intends, he does also illustrate a way forward.

By focusing on the universal-particular dichotomy, Linklater’s work problematises the boundaries of international relations, and in particular the boundaries characterized by the universal-particular dichotomy. Linklater helps to illustrate their importance as these boundaries may in fact be constitutive of community. As a result, Linklater’s contribution to rearticulating the meaning of community in international relations is that he clarifies problems inherent in the sovereign state’s demarcation of political space and at the same time confirms, if inadvertently, that the universal-particular dichotomy is in fact mutually constitutive of the concept of community.

1. Contesting Boundaries: Linklater in International Relations

Territoriality is central in Linklater’s work. Whether they separate individuals, groups, or states, or whether they promote universalism or particularism, Linklater’s work is steeped in boundaries: political, state-based, moral, territorial, community-based, or sociological, boundaries are to be reconciled, opened, debated, overcome, widened, balanced, surpassed, mediated, or extended.\(^5\) For Linklater, territoriality as boundary-making is pivotal to his goal of transforming community, and he explores how boundaries are set up in the first place, why they persist, whether they may change and how they might be altered. Above all

else, Linklater problematises boundaries, and his work focuses on the goal of unbounded community: non-state, non-territorial, and non-restrictive community.

Linklater's central concern is to ensure that a form of community that would supersede the sovereign state is permitted to flourish. He critiques particularism, and "...the observation that a tension between the obligations of citizenship and the obligations of humanity has been a recurrent feature of both the theory and practice of the modern states-system."6 Throughout his work, Linklater seeks to resolve the universal-particular dichotomy in the name of normative universalism. In seeking such a reconciliation, he not only introduces the problem of the universal-particular dichotomy to international relations, but he also brings to the fore the concept of community as an alternative to the sovereign state. In doing so, his work touches upon a number of related issues in international relations, including identity, toleration and difference, the role of the state and the meaning of citizenship, and normative questions concerning obligations, freedom, morality, ethics and politics.

Linklater's work is important for international relations because he challenges the status quo, questioning the assumptions that inform international relations, its understanding of the state and political space. And because he seeks to offer a more viable alternative through his efforts to reconcile the universal-particular dichotomy, Linklater seeks to move beyond the narrow focus on the territorially-defined sovereign state in international relations by inquiring "...into the nature and possibility of new forms of political community."7 Indeed, Linklater criticises international relations for its inability to see beyond the state to other forms of social, moral and political organisation that better manage the universal-particular dichotomy. His central objective, therefore, is "... to reaffirm the cosmopolitan critique of the sovereign states-system and to defend the widening of the moral boundaries of political communities."8


8 Ibid., p. 2.
His initial study, *Men and Citizens in the Theory of International Relations*, is a philosophical defence of ethical universalism, with specific reference to the universal-particular dichotomy. In exploring the tension that exists between humanity and citizenship, Linklater seeks to measure moral progress in international relations in terms of ethical universality, beginning with Martin Wight's question "why is there no international theory?" Linklater suggests that Wight, in fact, asked the wrong question:

> It is the tension between different concepts of obligation, and neither the need to confront the undeniably important and recurrent problems of survival nor the practical need to respond to interdependence and integration which provides the international political theorist with some purchase on the world of international relations and which determines his immediate task, that of effecting a convincing philosophical reconciliation of the components of an apparently bifurcated moral and political experience.

For Linklater, reconciling this dichotomy by altering or removing the boundaries that define it is essential. He sees the relationship of humanity and the state as characterised by the tension between different concepts of obligation, originating in a fundamental dichotomy of the universal versus the particular, of man versus citizen, and of ethics versus politics. *Men and Citizens* therefore sets out to defend "...universalistic forms of political organisation that would transcend the ethical limitations of sovereign nation-states..."; in other words, Linklater is contesting the boundaries of international relations with a view to amending how the discipline demarcates political space.

The basic task Linklater proposes is ambitious:

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10 Ibid., pp. 15-16. On Wight, Linklater also notes that "[o]ne of the consequences of distinguishing political theory as the theory of the good life from international theory as the theory of survival has been the dearth of analysis of the origins, development and actual or conceivable transformation of the bounded territorial state." Linklater, *Transformation*, op. cit., p. 35.

Any political theory which ignores the problems created by our double existence as men and citizens is no longer adequate to the conditions of modern political life... A political theory acquainted with the problem of men and citizens should proceed to construct a vision of an integrated social and political life within a theory of the international system. On the other hand, a theory of international relations which overlooks the fact that modern citizens possess concepts of humanity fails by offering only a mechanistic interpretation of the states-system.12

In short, Linklater suggests that although the universal-particular dichotomy is a problem for international relations, he also argues that it provides the opportunity of "... extending the boundaries of moral and political community."13 Specifically, he calls for "... a movement beyond the world of state-centred theory and practice."14

With his philosophical defence of ethical universalism in *Men and Citizens*, Linklater laid the normative groundwork for his subsequent studies. Having begun with setting out the problems of the universal-particular dichotomy, he turns to consider the effect this notion of territoriality has had on international relations in terms of the problem of inclusion/exclusion, in *Beyond Realism and Marxism: Critical Theory and International Relations*. Of course, these are related problems — while tracing the different forms and evolution of the universal-particular dichotomy in *Men and Citizens*, Linklater is concerned to delineate the content of (moral) obligation, because it is not "... exhausted by the demands of citizenship alone."15 And this is why a critical theory approach is so crucial: Linklater wants to turn to an exploration of "the key question of how the defence of universality and the claim for difference might be woven into a single theoretical perspective",16 because in *Men and Citizens* he "... defended the need

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14 Ibid., p. 199.
15 Ibid., p. 207.
16 Ibid., p. 216.
for including insiders and outsiders alike as moral equals in political communities which supersede the nation-state.\footnote{Ibid., p. 218.}

In \textit{Beyond Realism and Marxism: Critical Theory and International Relations}, Linklater picks up on the themes of the universal-particular dichotomy and especially on the problem of inclusion/exclusion. He explores the relationship of realism and Marxism in an effort to address more empirical issues concerning the history of the expansion and contraction of political communities.\footnote{Andrew Linklater, \textit{Beyond Realism and Marxism: Critical Theory and International Relations} (Houndmills: Macmillan, 1990), p. vii. This volume is subsequently referred to as \textit{Beyond}. For a more recent commentary on the strengths and weaknesses of Marxism in international relations theory, see Andrew Linklater, "Marxism" in Scott Burchill, et al., \textit{Theories of International Relations} (Houndmills: Macmillan, 1996), pp. 119-144.} Thus, in \textit{Beyond Realism and Marxism}, Linklater turns his attention to expanding his normative starting point, and developing a critical theory of international relations.\footnote{For Linklater’s views on critical theory in international relations generally, see Andrew Linklater, "The Achievements of Critical Theory" in Steve Smith, Ken Booth and Marysia Zalewski, eds. \textit{International Theory: Positivism and Beyond} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 279-298.} His overall purpose in his second book is to present:

... a philosophical defence of the notion of universal emancipation and a practical inquiry into the measures which may be capable of advancing this ideal in the modern system of states. These are the main concerns of a critical international theory which endeavours to incorporate and yet to supersede the main achievements of realism and Marxism.\footnote{Linklater, \textit{Beyond}, op. cit., p. 7.}

In making the case for a post-Marxist critical theory of international relations in \textit{Beyond}, Linklater pursues "...a sociology of international relations [concerning] the part that war, production, the quest for international order and moral development have played in shaping the moral and political boundaries of community."\footnote{Linklater, \textit{Transformation}, op. cit., pp. 10-11.} Thus Linklater's interest in developing a critical theory of
international relations emerges in this examination of the established boundaries of the state, its notion of territoriality, and moreover, develops into a central focus of his work.

Linklater argues that there are three important questions with the statist approach to inclusion/exclusion that are characterised in its response to the universal-particular dichotomy.

The recurrent philosophical questions [are] whether or not there is any rationale for the state's inclusion of citizens and exclusion of noncitizens from the moral community. The main sociological questions [concern] whether or not the dominant principles of inclusion and exclusion in the international states system are changing. Questions of practice [raise] the issue of whether foreign policy ought to be concerned with these principles or with preventing them from changing.22

In calling for further study of these three issues of territoriality and inside/outside or inclusion/exclusion, Linklater seeks both to address the problem of the universal-particular dichotomy, and also to develop a critical theory of international relations. He argues that all three elements are crucial because international relations lacks a perspective (i.e. a critical theory) that can address these issues of boundaries, and questions about inclusion and exclusion.23

For Linklater, in other words, "... the main dimensions of a critical theory of international relations [come] under three headings: the normative problem of the state, the sociological problem of community and the praxeological question of reform."24 He frames his larger emancipatory project within these three approaches; his goal is the extension of universality and difference via a new

22 Andrew Linklater, "The Problem of Community in International Relations" in Alternatives (Vol. 15, No. 2, Spring 1990), p. 135. See also Linklater, "The Question of the Next Stage in International Relations Theory: A Critical-Theoretical Point of View", in Millennium: Journal of International Studies (Vol. 21, No. 1, 1992), pp. 77-98.

23 Linklater, "The Question of the Next Stage", ibid., p. 79.

24 Ibid., p. 79.
understanding of community.\textsuperscript{25} Indeed, he argues that "... the fate of political community depends on the outcome of the struggle between diverse acts of cultural enclosure and efforts to open social arrangements simultaneously to subnational and transnational claims."\textsuperscript{26} He thus calls for "... a fundamental re-examination of the purposes of political communities..."\textsuperscript{27}, and offers his own

... normative vision of the state in Europe in which subnational and transnational citizenship are strengthened and in which mediating between the different loyalties and identities present within modern societies is one central purpose of the post-Westphalian state.\textsuperscript{28}

This argument concerning the post-Westphalian state is taken up in detail in Linklater's \textit{The Transformation of Political Community: Ethical Foundations of the Post-Westphalian Order}.

In \textit{Transformation}, Linklater extends his critical theory work on the universal-particular dichotomy, and in restating his defence of universalism "in the light of the contemporary politics of difference"\textsuperscript{29}, he also extends his examination of the exclusionary nature of the territorial, bounded state. In particular, Linklater focuses on citizenship as a means of combating exclusion, both within and outside the state. Working from the premise that "[t]he tyranny of the concept of the sovereign nation-state has impoverished the Western political imagination, and left it ill-prepared for the current challenge of rethinking the foundations of modern community"\textsuperscript{30}, he argues that "... it is necessary to reflect upon new forms of political community which sever the links between sovereignty, territoriality,

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{26} Ibid., p. 178.
\textsuperscript{27} Ibid., p. 195.
\textsuperscript{29} Linklater, \textit{Transformation}, op. cit., p. 10.
\textsuperscript{30} Ibid., pp. 34-35.
\end{flushright}
citizenship and nationalism." In short, Linklater is seeking to redefine political space in international relations. He is interested in all three core components of the concept of community: territoriality, identity and the political, though as we will find, he focuses his interest around questions of territoriality, and of boundaries.

It is Linklater's goal in Transformation to rethink the very foundations of modern political community, that is, the sovereign state. To this end, he explains his understanding of the resolution of the universal-particular dichotomy:

Visions of the triple transformation of political community to secure greater respect for cultural differences, stronger commitments to the reduction of material inequalities and significant advances in universality resists pressures to contract the boundaries of community while encouraging societal tendencies which promise to reduce these basic moral deficits.

Before considering Linklater's triple transformation in more detail, it is important to first clarify his understanding of the concept of community and of the state. In fact, one of the interesting features of Linklater's work is the distinction he makes between the two concepts.

**Community and the State**

Through his generally positive references to community and his criticism of the state, Linklater is drawing a distinction between the two; in short, he sees the state as a particular historical manifestation of community. For example, he notes that "[s]tudies of the origins, development and transformation of bounded communities remain in their infancy by comparison with sociologies of the state..." As a particular historical articulation of the concept of community, however, Linklater notes that neither is well-defined: "... the nature of modern

31 Ibid., p. 34.
32 Ibid., p. 3.
33 Linklater, Transformation, op. cit., p. 118.
political community, including that of the great powers, has been the subject of deep uncertainty and debate since the emergence of the Westphalian states-system.\footnote{Ibid., p. 23.} And he notes in the footnote to this sentence that "[t]he possibility of new forms of political community... have long been immanent within the dominant moral vocabulary of most modern states\footnote{Ibid., p. 222, n. 16.}, suggesting that the state is merely one articulation of community.

In fact, he suggests that post-Westphalian states "... take the more radical step of breaking with the supposition that the sovereign nation-state is the only legitimate form of political community\footnote{Ibid., p. 177.}, but that despite debates about it, "... the sovereign state remained secure as the dominant form of political community."\footnote{Ibid, p. 35.} Thus Linklater is arguing that the state is an historical reality, and that its apparent ‘givenness’ must be taken seriously. However, he also suggests that, as an historical social formation, the state is open to transformation and change. It is not a fixed and immutable reality. The reason for this is that "... state structures have been able to mobilise sufficient power to prevent the reconstitution of political community."\footnote{Ibid, p. 27.} The problem is that because the sovereign state resists change, this one historically contingent expression of community appears to be all that is available. Indeed, Linklater argues that "... as a result of industrialisation, the modern state began to nationalise political community..."\footnote{Ibid, p. 28. Emphasis mine.} and so he emphasises that he is not offering "... the unlikely proposition that conventional state structures will or should disappear..."\footnote{Ibid., p. 44.}. Rather, the proposition he is offering is that the traditional or historical sovereign state may nevertheless be subject to change, despite appearances to the contrary.
In *Men and Citizens*, for example, Linklater suggests that some theorists of international relations "...criticised and condemned the sovereign state and the states-system as fetters upon the further development of a properly human community." He notes that

> [t]he modern state has been successful because it has been able to create community out of the diverse groups brought within the same boundaries by change or force. A great array of [state] mechanisms have been used to create political community...

Linklater thus suggests that "[t]hree monopoly powers define the modern state" and "... point towards the different factors which shape the boundaries of community." These three factors include the state's claim to monopolise both the right to control the tools of violence and the right of taxation, in addition to the state's right to determine political allegiance, and thus identity.

Indeed, Linklater argues that "... the modern state made it possible for citizens to feel that they belonged to a cohesive community..." and that "... the sovereign state remained secure as the dominant form of political community." Thus the state is one articulation of community; for Linklater, at a particular moment in time and in space, community is not only defined as the state, but also by the state. In particular, he acknowledges

> ... three types of community: [one] in which men have rights in

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41 Linklater, *Men and Citizens*, op. cit., p. 27.

42 Linklater, "Community", op. cit., p. 177-78. See also Linklater, "The Problem of Community", op. cit., p. 136.


44 Ibid., pp. 183-84. See also Linklater, "Citizenship and Sovereignty", op. cit., pp. 82-85.


their community as tribal members (and no rights outside it) ... one in which they have rights in their states by virtue of their citizenship, [and one] in which they have rights in a universal political association by virtue of their humanity.47

He argues that "... the question of how states and other social actors could create new political communities and identities has never been adequately addressed"48, and therefore calls for "... a sociology of community, to ascertain whether political community is likely to expand or contract, [or] remain bound up with the sovereign state..."49, because "... the time is indeed ripe for enunciating new principles of political life which break with the tyranny of the concept of the state."50

For Linklater this work is urgent, since "[p]atterns of global change at the end of the century are eroding traditional political structures [i.e. the state] but new models of community are not emerging in their place."51 Thus he suggests that

... the problem of organizing human beings still requires states, but states which are less guarded about old sovereign rights... In this context, the political theory of the modern state might focus on its future role in balancing membership of different communities - sub-national, national and transnational.52

In sum, Linklater seeks the transformation of the sovereign state, with different levels or types of community accommodated by it, or perhaps within it, or perhaps in addition to the state. His project is based on "[v]isions of the triple transformation of political community"53 because he argues that


48 Linklater, "The Question of the Next Stage", op. cit., p. 96.

49 Ibid., p. 94.

50 Linklater, "Community", op. cit., p. 178.

51 Ibid., p. 193.


53 Linklater, *Transformation*, op. cit., p. 3.
... forms of political community which promote universal norms which recognise cultural claims and demands for the reduction of material inequalities have a unique role to play in bringing about the transformation of international relations.\(^{54}\)

For Linklater, in other words, the transformation of the sovereign state into a new form of political community will also bring about the transformation of international relations. He believes that problems of inclusion/exclusion may be obliterated by resolving the universal-particular dichotomy within a transformed post-Westphalian state. Before examining his solution — the proposed transformation of the state — in more detail, the next section considers Linklater's characterisation of the problem: the universal-particular dichotomy.

2. Linklater's Problem: The Universal-Particular Dichotomy

The problem of the universal-particular dichotomy according to Linklater, is that it produces a "bifurcated moral and political experience."\(^{55}\) The sovereign state is the territory of this problem, and provides the boundaries of it, since at present it is the dominant articulation of political community in international relations. But the state also intensifies the problem since it fails to reconcile the particular with the universal\(^{56}\) and produces problems of inclusion and exclusion. Linklater argues that the state's "...modern unity of sovereignty, territoriality, citizenship and nationality has ensured that the basic moral tension between obligations to other citizens and obligations to the rest of humanity has persisted."\(^{57}\)

As a result, there are three main ways to conceive of the concept of community for Linklater: as the state, as the society of states, or as a community of

\(^{54}\) Ibid., p. 220.


\(^{56}\) Linklater, *Transformation*, op. cit., p. 201. See also p. 55.

\(^{57}\) Ibid., p. 190.
humankind. He notes that the state has long been the prevalent articulation of community, and continues as such today. But the problem with the predominance of the sovereign state, Linklater argues, is that it fails to resolve the universal-particular dichotomy, "[f]or particularism, the state and the states-system are to be seen as a 'climax'; for universalism, they are simply the 'dominant' forms of modern political life." This dichotomy, or conflict between man and citizen may be seen

...as an expression of the capacity to apprehend the universality of human nature, and as an awareness of the fact that this universality is frustrated by the division of men between particularistic groups. In modern conditions, the conflict between man and citizen reveals dissatisfaction of a specific kind, namely with those impediments upon human freedom and rationality which stem from the sovereign state itself and the constitutive principles of the international system.

Linklater suggests that because people have moral claims upon each other by virtue of their shared humanity, there is a fundamental flaw in the unquestioning faith placed in the state and the states system by the international relations discipline, and indeed by citizens of states. For him, moral claims are not established merely by virtue of shared citizenship: "... determining the structure of a rational form of political life would have to extend as far as consideration of the proper organisation of the species as a whole rather than conclude with an analysis of the structure of its constituent parts." Linklater sees limitations in focusing on the state because it is by definition exclusionary; the boundaries of the sovereign state prevent consideration of the species because territoriality determines inclusion and exclusion, and by definition, the sovereign state does not include 'the species'.

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60 Ibid., p. 138.
61 Ibid., p.16.
Setting aside the inevitable complications involved in organising 'the species as a whole', Linklater argues that the universal-particular dichotomy, the fundamental conflict of obligations owed by man versus citizen, is nevertheless a surmountable problem. He wants to "... avoid the conclusion that the human race is condemned forever to remain partitioned between bounded political communities." Therefore, Linklater seeks a concept of community which promotes universality and difference, and alleviates material inequalities. For him, "... modern political communities have been too universalistic (too neglectful of the range of differences between citizens) and too particularistic (too inclined to purchase their own national autonomy by limiting or sacrificing the autonomy of aliens)." The boundaries of the sovereign state, in short, seem to Linklater to be little more than barriers to organising the species as a whole and resolving the problem of the universal-particular dichotomy.

Consequently, it is because of the universal-particular dichotomy that Linklater "...considers communities as systems of inclusion and exclusion." He argues that communities define themselves in exclusive terms, by what distinguishes them from others, and therefore in negative terms, by what they are not. For Linklater, this occurs in two ways: when the "others" are members of another community altogether and therefore alien, and when the "others" are marginalised members of the same community. Consequently, shifting moral boundaries may be measured according to a state's orientation towards minority groups within, and equally, towards aliens without.

As a result, Linklater argues that understanding the concept of community based on fluctuating degrees of exclusion is an integral part of the problem of the universal-particular dichotomy. He encourages "fundamentally extending the boundaries of moral and political community", with a two-fold goal of

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63 Ibid., p. 27.

64 Ibid., p. 2.

combating "...the forms of exclusion which constrain subordinate groups within the community..." and of "...widening the boundaries of the community so that the rights of outsiders are properly recognised."66 In short, the problem is that the state neither exhausts people's political and moral obligations, nor is it (sufficiently) inclusive:

There are two dimensions to the problem of modern political community. First, although modern states have insisted that obligations to fellow-citizens take precedence over obligations to the rest of humanity, the precise moral significance of the boundary between citizens and aliens has been the subject of continuing ethical debate... Second, although state-formation and nation-building have reduced cultural differences within many states, the struggle for cultural rights has been a key feature of national and international politics.67

Thus for Linklater it is the "...commitment to sovereignty, territoriality, nationality and citizenship which differentiates the modern form of political community [the state] from all previous forms of human organisation."68 Moreover, it is specifically the boundaries set by the state which are problematic, because Linklater sees the state as contributing to and even worsening the problem of the universal-particular dichotomy. He calls for "[t]he expansion of moral community [which] involves the surrender of the sovereignty of those associations which mediate between the individual and the species."69

According to Linklater, the role of the state as mediator is flawed: "...obligations between human beings have not been enacted by the individual members of different political communities directly, but indirectly, through the mediation of their states."70 Thus while the universal-particular dichotomy is meant to be managed by the state, the role of state as mediator actually exacerbates the

67 Ibid., p. 17.
68 Ibid., p.167.
70 Ibid., p. 199.
tensions of man versus citizen. What is required, therefore, is a form of community that differs from the sovereign state. The removal of the state as mediator is presumably what Linklater seeks when referring to the problem of the absence of "a properly human community." He concludes that

... to realise their freedom or humanity, citizens must progress beyond the conception of the state as a repository of absolute rights of ownership of their territorial resources, beyond the view that the state's representatives have economic obligations to insiders which are not similarly due to outsiders, and beyond the notion that international economic cooperation will be perpetuated only insofar as it promotes the state's particularistic goals. By imputing rights to one another within a world political system which exercises control over the totality of their resources, members of the human species complete the move from particularism to universalism.

Therefore, Linklater claims that "[t]he state remains the principal site on which the conflict between efforts to monopolise the control of significant resources and opportunities and struggles to create less exclusionary political communities is worked out." In particular, he sees the reconceptualisation of citizenship as central to escaping particularism. Thus Linklater's proposed solution to the problem of the universal-particular dichotomy – the triple transformation of political community – includes transforming the state and citizenship in order to redefine how political space is understood.

Central to this transformation is the problem of the universal-particular dichotomy. Linklater argues that:

We may characterize this problem in different ways: as the issue of the proper relationship between the obligations which men may be said to acquire qua men and the obligations to which they are subject as citizens of particular associations; or, as the question of reconciling the actual or potential universality of human nature

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71 Ibid., p.27. Emphasis mine.

72 Ibid., p. 201.

with the diversity and division of political community.\textsuperscript{74}

The central point for Linklater is that individuals often face a dilemma in fulfilling particular duties of citizenship that conflict with their universal obligations to humanity. In this context, the universal-particular dichotomy is clearly a problem on the level of the individual. Linklater acknowledges that "[s]ince political obligations are superimposed upon primordial ones, the \textit{individual} has to determine their precise relationship and respective claims upon him."\textsuperscript{75} At the same time, he also locates the universal-particular dichotomy in relation to the state:

...our experience of living in and among sovereign states cannot avoid a sense of moral division and political estrangement. As an exclusive moral community, the sovereign state emphasised its liberty to promote its interests without recognising any fundamental obligations for the welfare of outsiders...\textsuperscript{76}

Thus, in addition to operating at the level of the individual, Linklater is suggesting that the \textit{state} experiences the universal-particular dichotomy, as well.

Additionally, Linklater suggests that the \textit{international system} is another locus of the universal-particular dichotomy, although he understands that the \textit{individual} initiates corrective changes: "...awareness of the historical development of moral life made it possible... for modern \textit{men} to systematically transform their international relations so creating a world in which they were associated with other men as their equals."\textsuperscript{77} Arguing that the universal-particular dichotomy affects the individual \textit{and} the sovereign state \textit{and} the international system, it would seem that Linklater is suggesting that there is a causal relationship at work. He acknowledges that the state and the states-system are "...at least partially constituted by our ideas about them, by our suppositions about the most desirable

\textsuperscript{74} Ibid., p. ix.


\textsuperscript{76} Ibid., p. 25.

\textsuperscript{77} Ibid., p. 25.
system of social relations", and he concludes that "... men faced a world which was their own historical product..." in which "... the sovereign state and the states-system [are] fetters upon the further development of a properly human community."78 Thus he concludes that

When characterized adequately, the conflict between citizenship and humanity reveals dissatisfaction with the impediments to human freedom which issue both from the character of the sovereign state and the constitutive principles of the international states-system.79

In identifying the universal-particular dichotomy as a problem, then, Linklater is challenging the boundaries of political space in international relations. The difficulty with this formulation is that the solution to the problem would eliminate the universal-particular dichotomy, and thus one of the constituent elements of the sovereign state and the international system.

But the fact is that the universal-particular dichotomy is not a new, modern problem tied exclusively to the sovereign state. Linklater acknowledges that "[t]he tension between particularism and universalism is a recurrent theme in the history of Western moral and political thought."80 Thus his characterisation of the universal-particular dichotomy as a problem in its contemporary manifestation may be unjust; Linklater claims that the sovereign state ought to resolve the universal-particular dichotomy and promote universal norms, recognize cultural claims and reduce material inequalities. But these problems are not the result of the universal-particular dichotomy. They are problems inherent to the sovereign state and its notion of territoriality: specifically, these are problems of the demarcation of political space in international relations. The universal-particular dichotomy is in this context less a problem to be resolved and more of a dilemma to be accommodated. But because Linklater is focused on territoriality and boundaries, he sees the universal-particular dichotomy as a problem that, if

78 Ibid., pp. 26-27.
79 Ibid., p. 34.
80 Ibid., p. 140.
solved, will transform the sovereign state. What he does not appear to consider is whether it is even possible to resolve the this dichotomy, or whether the problem lies more with the sovereign state – with the prevalent demarcation of political space in international relations.

Linklater depicts the problem of universal and particular, inclusion and exclusion, almost exclusively in terms of territoriality. The problem is that he fails to see that promoting universal norms, recognizing cultural claims and reducing material inequalities is not about resolving the universal-particular dichotomy. It is about redefining political space in international relations by rearticulating the meaning of community. Part of the difficulty may be that Linklater’s characterisation of the problem is at times exaggerated. He fails even to acknowledge that citizenship may not be expected "...to enable the individual to participate in the control of his total political environment" any more than the state is expected to "...exhaust our moral and political obligations." These are grand expectations, and the fact that the state neglects to fulfil every human need and want is not evidence that the universal-particular dichotomy is a debilitating problem for the individual, or the state, or the international system.

The point is that while the universal-particular dichotomy is central to

81 For example, Linklater tends to use overtly negative and dramatic language: he wants to "... avoid the conclusion that the human race is condemned forever to remain partitioned between bounded political communities." Linklater, Transformation, op. cit., p.113. Emphasis mine.

82 Linklater, Men and Citizens, op. cit., p. 36. Linklater does not explain what constitutes a "total political environment".


84 In fact, Linklater's perspective begs the question of whether individuals in fact entertain such lofty expectations; most would never expect any state to 'exhaust' their 'moral and political obligations', and it is likely that few would even want a state to try to do so. As Jean Bethke Elshtain notes, for example, people in situations of "...repression and horror... are not in need of a new cosmopolitanism. They are in need of concrete action of a generous not contemptuous sort on their behalf." Jean Bethke Elshtain, "Really Existing Communities" in Review of International Studies (Vol. 25, No. 1, 1999), p. 144. The relinquishment of personal responsibility in the notion that the state may be expected to exhaust an individual’s moral or political obligations is discussed in Chapter 4.
international relations and the formation and contemporary character of the sovereign state, it does not necessarily define the sovereign state, any more than it defines individuals or the international system. That it is a crucial feature of all three is not in dispute. But for Linklater to place the universal-particular dichotomy at the centre of his transformation of community is too simple. The problem is not the universal-particular dichotomy; the problem is the prevalent understanding of political space in international relations as determined by the sovereign state. It is the narrow demarcation of political space via the sovereign state that results in a failure to manage the universal-particular dichotomy. Nevertheless, the next section explores Linklater’s proposed solution to the universal-particular dichotomy.

3. Linklater's Solution: The Transformation of Political Community

For Andrew Linklater, the universal-particular dichotomy is a problem of such magnitude that it requires 'the transformation of political community'. And, because the problem is embodied in the state, this equates to a transformation of the state. Linklater ultimately seeks a community which, unlike the sovereign state, is free of tensions between universal and particular obligations; his transformed community is intended to embrace universality and difference. He hopes to enact this transformed community via his solution to the problem of the universal-particular dichotomy: "the triple transformation of political community."\(^{85}\)

Linklater's goal of transforming the state into a new form of political community is based on his contention "... that the division between men and citizens contains intimations of a higher form of political life",\(^{86}\) which consists of a moral and political reality in which the state no longer mediates the relationship of the individual and humanity. He argues in *Men and Citizens*, that

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\(^{85}\) Linklater, *Transformation*, op. cit., p. 3. The triple transformation of community "...promotes universal norms which recognise cultural claims, and demands for the reduction of material inequalities." Ibid., p. 220.

[It] is important to replace the sovereign state... with a global legal and political system which affords protection to all human subjects as moral equals. The expansion of moral community involves the surrender of the sovereignty of those associations which mediate between the individual and the species.\textsuperscript{87}

Having introduced the idea of replacing the state to solve the problem of the universal-particular dichotomy in \textit{Men and Citizens}, Linklater outlines the details of this solution in \textit{The Transformation of Political Community}.

By this time, Linklater is no longer replacing the state, but will be transforming it instead. Thus he limits the possibilities for a global (universal) resolution of the universal-particular dichotomy, arguing that this "...is tenable where member states possess [certain] moral resources..."\textsuperscript{88} In other words, Linklater has moved from arguing that all states may be transformed, to suggesting that certain types of states are better positioned than others to resolve the universal-particular dichotomy.

Specifically, three 'moral resources' serve as criteria of eligibility for the new post-Westphalian era. First there is constitutionalism, which "...stands for the rule of law as opposed to despotic and arbitrary government."\textsuperscript{89} The second moral resource is the possibility of "...extending democratic accountability beyond national frontiers..."\textsuperscript{90} And the third involves what Linklater calls "...the evolution of more sophisticated understandings of the social and economic preconditions of dialogic communities."\textsuperscript{91} This third point refers to a general

\textsuperscript{87} Ibid., p. 199.

\textsuperscript{88} Linklater, \textit{Transformation}, op. cit., p. 169.

\textsuperscript{89} Ibid., p. 169.

\textsuperscript{90} Ibid., p. 171.

\textsuperscript{91} Ibid., p. 169. Linklater puts this slightly differently elsewhere: "...the three developmental tendencies which are evident in the politics of modern states [are] the universalisation of legal and political rights, moral outrage against economic inequalities and the greater concern for the survival of cultural differences...". Linklater, "Cosmopolitan Citizenship", op. cit., p. 36. Both iterations echo Linklater's idea of the "triple transformation", which includes greater respect for cultural differences, stronger
principle of universal inclusion in international dialogue to encourage closer political and moral cooperation.\textsuperscript{92}

Linklater argues that the solution to the problem of the universal-particular dichotomy is available via "... post-Westphalian communities [which] would promote a transnational citizenry with multiple political allegiances and without the need for submission to a central sovereign power."\textsuperscript{93} However, this solution is available only to certain states: "[t]he prospects for designing forms of political community which are more sensitive to the claims of universality and difference are immanent within existing forms of life which have serious commitments to citizenship."\textsuperscript{94} In other words, Linklater is acknowledging that it is impractical – if not impossible – to simply resolve the universal-particular dichotomy and replace the state entirely. His revised approach is to identify certain states that may be amenable to transformation via the resolution of the universal-particular dichotomy.

In presenting this now narrower solution to the problem of the universal-particular dichotomy, Linklater makes a five-part argument in which he "... seeks to integrate the normative and sociological dimensions of critical theory with praxeological concerns."\textsuperscript{95} He begins with citizenship, and three stages of its evolution, in which social actors challenge the moral and political assumptions that provide the foundation of each stage. The result is a broad form of citizenship that critically acknowledges its part in excluding marginal groups.

Second, Linklater notes the close connection between citizenship and the sovereign state, but argues that this relationship is at risk of becoming combative commitments to the reduction of material inequalities and significant advances in universality.

\textsuperscript{92} Linklater, \textit{Transformation}, op. cit., pp. 169 and 175.

\textsuperscript{93} Ibid., p. 181.

\textsuperscript{94} Ibid., p. 11.

\textsuperscript{95} Ibid., p. 11.
rather than contingent. He cites three particular problems: first, that citizens can no longer rely on the state to provide them with control over their lives; second, that a range of international actors do not require the consent of any citizenry to act; and third, Linklater argues that national populations no longer have the right to withhold consent for international political cooperation on the grounds of national interest. Having problematised citizenship, Linklater suggests that "[o]ne of the tasks of the post-Westphalian state is to harmonise the diversity of ethical spheres including sub-national or sub-state, national and wider regional and global affiliations." Consequently, he believes that citizenship ought to be separated from the state.

Fourth, Linklater argues for extending the achievements of national citizenship because

[the possibility of higher forms of citizenship which embed [civil, political, social and cultural] rights in the structure of European international society is already immanent within modern state structures and international law, as is the potential for lower forms of citizenship which increase the power of local communities and minority nations.]

Fifth, and finally, Linklater examines "... states which are in the process of dissolving the union between sovereignty, territoriality, nationality and citizenship." He claims that in Western Europe, though not necessarily elsewhere, these changes provide evidence of a shift toward the post-Westphalian era.

In fact, Linklater suggests that these changes may signal the beginning of a further move toward cosmopolitan citizenship. But he notes that cosmopolitan

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96 Ibid., pp. 197-98.
97 Ibid., p. 203.
98 Ibid., p. 183.
99 Ibid., p. 204.
100 Ibid., p. 212.
citizenship is not all the post-Westphalian era offers, for just as the post-Westphalian state would produce a different type of community, so too might international politics as a whole be recast:

A post-Westphalian political order which is not closed in on itself can widen the boundaries of dialogue by recognising that a variety of non-state actors, including non-governmental associations, social movements and national minorities, can enjoy membership of an international society which is not just a society of states but a society of peoples and individuals.\(^\text{107}\)

Thus Linklater is not proposing changes to the state solely to resolve the problem of the universal-particular dichotomy. He is proposing to alter the very nature of citizenship, and the state, and the international system, in order to resolve the problem of the universal-particular dichotomy. Linklater's solution therefore appears to amount to nothing less than a programme for changing international relations.

One difficulty with Linklater's solution to the universal-particular dichotomy is how little he actually says about it. Throughout his work, including his first two books, Linklater remains largely silent about his solution which initially involves replacing, and later transforming, the sovereign state to expand the boundaries of moral and political community. Moreover, when he does explain how he envisions such a solution, he tends toward vagueness. For example, "Men and Citizens made the case for a sociological analysis of moral development in international relations; but the specifics of that enterprise fell outside the scope of its principle area of inquiry."\(^\text{102}\) Additionally, he notes that this solution leaves two important questions unanswered: "...how difference and universality can be accommodated within the structure of the modern state... [and] how a world order which overcomes the tension between citizenship and humanity can be constructed over time."\(^\text{103}\) Though these questions inform his work, in Men and

\(^{101}\) Ibid., p. 209.

\(^{102}\) Linklater, Men and Citizens, op. cit., p. 212.

\(^{103}\) Ibid., pp. 218-219.
Citizens Linklater answers neither.

Instead, he focuses more on posing questions than providing answers. Concluding "The Problem of Community in International Relations" Linklater notes that "[t]his paper has identified a range of philosophical, sociological and practical questions about the problem of community in the modern states system."\(^{104}\) In "Community", however, when Linklater argues for "[o]pen communities... which respect the rights of minorities and demonstrate internationalism"\(^ {105}\), he does analyse the forces that undermine community, and he admits that the solution may not be universal, but limited to like-minded states in Europe.\(^ {106}\) But even this development amounts to little more than a restatement of the problem from a new angle. Indeed, Linklater concludes that further study is required, and he calls for yet another "...fundamental re-examination of the purposes of political community and the uses to which the state should put its monopoly powers."\(^ {107}\)

Nevertheless, there are occasional hints at a possible solution to the problem of transforming community (the state) in order to resolve the universal-particular dichotomy. In "Citizenship and Sovereignty in the Post-Westphalian State", Linklater

... makes the case for a normative vision of the state in Europe in which subnational and transnational citizenship are strengthened and in which mediating between the different loyalties and identities presented within modern societies is one central purpose of the post-Westphalian state.\(^ {108}\)

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\(^{104}\) Linklater, "The Problem of Community", op. cit., p. 151. Emphasis mine. Similarly, Linklater also asks questions he fails to answer in "The Question of the Next Stage", op. cit., pp. 77-98.

\(^{105}\) Linklater, "Community", op. cit., p. 185.

\(^{106}\) Ibid., p. 190. On this European focus, see also Linklater, "Cosmopolitan Citizenship", op. cit., especially pp. 33-37.

\(^{107}\) Ibid., p. 195.

\(^{108}\) Linklater, "Citizenship and Sovereignty", op. cit., p. 78. See also p. 77.
Linklater is thus already narrowing his approach to include only certain states with certain characteristics. Thus the implication is that while the Westphalian state is flawed because of the way it mediates the relations of man and citizen, the proposed post-Westphalian state will better mediate those relations. In "Citizenship and Sovereignty in the Post-Westphalian State", Linklater thus considers "... the possibility of remaking political communities to achieve levels of universality and diversity which modern states have typically discouraged." He reviews Hedley Bull's work on a post-Westphalian Europe, and considers its practicality in light of his own goals. He concludes by restating what ought to be done:

... one of the central tasks facing normative theory is to envisage new political structures which... problematize the bounded community, question the modes of exclusion inherent in the social bond and defend global efforts to overcome unjustified exclusion... The normative task is to give these developments concrete expression in new forms of political community...  

Thus although Linklater repeatedly calls for the solution to the problem of the universal-particular dichotomy, he neglects to offer one himself until The Transformation of Political Community. Moreover, the solution he offers is itself problematic, and more another (albeit refined) statement of the problem, rather than a feasible solution to it.

The issue of whether or not Linklater's proposed solution is feasible may explain his recurring equivocation about it. After all, while the solution he recommends in Transformation is more specific than in his earlier work, it is also more narrow in scope. For instance, Linklater tends to refer to European examples throughout most of his work, but he moves away from the early idea of transforming the state

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109 A more detailed discussion of how and why mediated relations are problematic follows in chapter four.

110 Ibid., p. 98.

111 Ibid., p. 99.
in general, toward a focus on the European state in particular. Thus when he finally presents his solution, Linklater has established a set of criteria that states must meet in order to participate in post-Westphalian arrangements, including the "moral resources" outlined earlier. These criteria tend to limit eligible states to those in the West, if not only those in Western Europe:

States which are wedded to modern conceptions of citizenship are obliged by these convictions to... collaborate with states which have similar conceptions of human rights... and they have the far-reaching obligation when dealing with like-minded states... to join them in designing post-Westphalian arrangements.

Of course, it is logical that similar states will be more likely to share a similar future, but by placing these limits on potential post-Westphalian states, Linklater acknowledges the practical limitations of his proposed (global) solution to the problem of the universal-particular dichotomy. Moreover, these required moral resources (constitutionalism, democratic ideals and recognition of social and economic rights) are just the beginning of what is required of post-Westphalian states.

To explain his solution in full, Linklater turns to Hedley Bull and his analysis of a "neo-medievalist international order":

Multi-layered structures of authority would not supersede the state entirely, but the state's role in world politics could be diminished to such an extent that there could be considerable doubt in theory and in practice as to whether sovereignty lay with the national governments or with the other levels of authority... The state's monopoly right to determine the order of priority of political allegiances - national before sub-state and transnational - would also be relinquished within a neo-medievalist international order... [and s]imilar doubts would inevitably be raised about its

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112 See, for instance, Linklater, "Citizenship and Sovereignty", op. cit., especially p. 78, although the entire piece really focuses on the European state. See also Linklater, Transformation, op. cit., p.183 and also p. 166, on the potential of the European state in contrast to non-Western states.

113 Linklater, Transformation, op. cit., p. 181. On the potential of Western European states, see also p. 204.
monopoly of control over the instruments of violence.¹¹⁴

Linklater thus argues that relinquishing traditional state powers (i.e. sovereignty and citizenship) allows for the development of a new form of political community which balances universality and diversity, thereby resolving the universal-particular dichotomy.

Moreover, he claims that these practices are already in place in Europe, to differing degrees. For example, the Maastricht Treaty recognises different levels of (non-state based) politics; the Council of Europe and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe recognise the importance of national minority rights; "[e]lements of transnational citizenship have been introduced in the European Union..."; and the European Court of Human Rights allows for legal action beyond national courts.¹¹⁵ For Linklater, these (European) developments are significant and indicative of greater potential for the transformation of political community. He sees these practices as evidence that the solution to the problem of the universal-particular dichotomy is immanent within the sovereign state, and is largely a matter of political and moral evolution.

Linklater does acknowledge that there is more work to be done, particularly to make transnational or cosmopolitan citizenship a reality. But he fails to acknowledge that the practices that he claims are so important are in fact partial and hesitant and not universal, even within Europe. Recent debates and disagreements in Europe about the future of the EU and its constitution illustrate this point at a very basic level. In fact, Linklater does not seem to consider the possibility that enduring particularism remains at least as important a factor in Western Europe as these more universalising practices. Moreover, beyond citing developments in the European Union, Linklater remains vague as to the practical necessities of realising his solution. They do not seem to apply outside Western Europe, and certainly not in the developing world.¹¹⁶

¹¹⁴ Ibid., p. 195.

¹¹⁵ Ibid., p. 198.

¹¹⁶ On European exclusivity, see Linklater, op. cit., "Cosmopolitan Citizenship",
Thus Linklater's solution to the problem of the universal-particular dichotomy is not the universally feasible, almost natural and evolutionary process he implies. By limiting the type of state that might participate, and by reducing the scope of the solution to Western Europe, Linklater endeavours to make his resolution of the universal-particular dichotomy more practical. But readjusting his project produces a solution that is neither universal nor resolves the tension that exists between man and citizen. Thus despite his challenges to the boundaries of the sovereign state, and to inclusion and exclusion, Linklater's solution is more firmly in the realm of possibility than practicality. Its implementation is at best potential, and even then it seems partial and tentative.

Moreover, it is unclear whether the individual, the state or the society of states is to enact Linklater's solution to the universal-particular dichotomy. Given that he is vague about where the problem lies in the first place, it is not surprising that he is equally ambiguous about the solution. As R.B.J. Walker puts it: "[t]o respond to Andrew Linklater's The Transformation of Political Community is to walk a very fine line between admiration and perplexity." And as his solution to the universal-particular dichotomy depends on creating a post-Westphalian society of states, it seems even less feasible, given the criteria he sets out for transformation.

The claim that the peaceful transformation of international society can be achieved by the general practice of extending the boundaries of moral and political associations is tenable where member states possess these moral resources...

But where this transformation takes place is unclear. With his focus on the

e specially pp. 33-37. Moreover, it is not clear how post-Westphalian states and Westphalian states would interact when it comes to questions of inclusion and exclusion, material inequalities and cultural differences. Even if these issues are resolved within and between post-Westphalian states, there is still the reality of dealing with non-like-minded Westphalian states, lower on Linklater's evolutionary scale, to be addressed.


118 Linklater, Transformation, op. cit., p. 169. Emphasis mine. See also p. 175.
potential in citizenship for transforming political community, it might be that Linklater sees the individual—in addition to the state and to international society—playing an important role in resolving the universal-particular dichotomy. This is certainly implied by Linklater’s talk of the state no longer mediating between the individual and the species as a whole, for example, and yet his discussion of citizenship is not particularly clear either. The result of this conceptual vagueness is confusing, at best, and does not bode well for possible implementation.119

Linklater suggests that citizens can no longer rely on the state to provide them with control over their lives, in part because many of their citizenship rights are increasingly compromised by the state and its (independent) behaviour. He thus proposes to separate citizenship from the state, by extending it both beneath and beyond the state.120 This is problematic for several reasons. First, it is not at all apparent what rights, if any, a non-stated-based citizen would possess, where they would originate, and how they would be applied, exercised, and defended (if necessary); second, a notion of local (sub-state) citizenship would almost by definition be second-class, particular and not universal; and third, it is almost inconceivable to think that an international (extra-state) notion of universal

119 For a variety of critical perspectives on his work in general (including his usage of concepts) and Linklater’s response, see the Forum on Transformation in Review of International Studies (Vol. 25, No. 1, 1999), pp. 139-175. For a brief summary and critique of Linklater’s work (up to Transformation) from the perspective of Kantian critique, see Kimberly Hutchings, Kant, Critique and Politics (London: Routledge, 1996), pp. 154-158; and on Kant and Linklater see also Linklater, “Cosmopolitan Citizenship” in Citizenship Studies (Vol.2, No.1, 1998), pp. 23-41. See also Hutchings, International Political Theory: Rethinking Ethics in a Global Era (London: Sage, 1999), pp. 135-138; Molly Cochran, op. cit., pp. 78-117.

120 For a discussion of the separation of citizenship from states, see Linklater, “Cosmopolitan Citizenship”, op. cit., especially pp. 25-33. For a critique of universal citizenship, see Iris Marion Young, "Polity and Group Difference: A Critique of the Ideal of Universal Citizenship" in Gershon Shafir, ed. The Citizenship Debates: A Reader (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1998), pp. 263-290. See also Cochran, op. cit., pp. 115-116. Furthermore, note feminist critiques of notions of identity and citizenship: Young's concern with the denial of difference and problems of subjectivity and identity (as sameness) in community problematise Linklater's assumption that citizenship is equal to, or sufficient for identity. Feminist theory challenges the notion of immutable identity and problematises the role gender plays in citizenship as an identity. These feminist critiques, including Young's, are discussed in the next chapter.
citizenship could be realised as long as particular states exist.\textsuperscript{121}

Thus Linklater's solution is troublesome on a number of levels. His evidence of a shift towards post-Westphalian politics in Europe is attributed both to individual states and to the society of states,\textsuperscript{122} and in a discussion of cosmopolitan citizenship, Linklater refers variously to "the transformation of international society", to "post-Westphalian states", "post-Westphalian structures", "the post-Westphalian association", a "post-Westphalian configuration of states", and a "post-Westphalian order".\textsuperscript{123} Moreover, he confuses the matter further by suggesting that "[t]he post-Westphalian era will begin when societies act as cosmopolitan citizens..."\textsuperscript{124}. But setting aside these concerns with pragmatism, one further problem remains: Linklater does not clarify whether it is desirable – let alone possible – for the state (or any other articulation of the concept of community) to resolve the universal-particular dichotomy. And perhaps such a resolution is simply impossible, in addition to being undesirable. The next section turns to the question of whether the universal-particular dichotomy is resolvable at all.

\textsuperscript{121} Linklater's answer to this critique is that certain developments already exemplify the potential for separating citizenship and state: "... concrete rights and duties can be embedded in complex transnational arrangements such as the European Union." Linklater, "Cosmopolitan Citizenship", op. cit., p. 29. However, not only is this far from being a universal example, but it also fails to address the criticism of Linklater's Euro-centric approach to transforming community in general, which he acknowledges may be a problem because, for example, "[t]here is also the fear that the enterprise of transforming the nature of political community in Europe may be exclusionary and that the region turns in on itself. The danger is that international [more accurately, regional] integration will preserve one of the key moral deficits of the sovereign state." Linklater, "Cosmopolitan Citizenship", op. cit., p. 33. There is also a telling feminist critique of such notions of citizenship, which argues that these apparently non-hierarchical identities "... are gendered concepts into which assumptions of inequality between men and women and elites and less privileged are built." J. Ann Tickner, "Identity in International Relations Theory: Feminist Perspectives" in Yosef Lapid and Friedrich Kratochwil, eds. The Return of Culture and Identity in International Relations Theory (London: Lynne Rienner, 1996), p. 159. Further discussion of the question of identity follows in the next chapter.

\textsuperscript{122} Linklater, Transformation, op. cit., p. 204.

\textsuperscript{123} Ibid., pp. 206-207.

\textsuperscript{124} Ibid., p. 211.
4. Resolving the Universal-Particular Dichotomy

Perhaps the most serious difficulty with Linklater's project is his presumption that the universal-particular dichotomy is resolvable and that it ought to be resolved. He suggests that the tension between men and citizens is an obstacle to be overcome, because while the modern state provides unprecedented levels of freedom, opportunities for political participation, and for individual self-determination, "... states separately can only imperfectly realise the human capacity for collective self-determination. The possession of citizenship alone is not sufficient to enable the individual to participate in the control of his total political environment."¹²⁵ As a consequence, Linklater argues that the conflict between man and citizen is intolerable and must be resolved.

But the tension between universalism and particularism is neither new nor a product of the modern sovereign state. It is an old problem, even an ancient problem dating back to (at least) the Stoics, which is now firmly ensconced within the boundaries of the modern state. With the statist settlement of the universal-particular dichotomy increasingly unsatisfactory, Linklater's depiction of the tension between man and citizen as problematic and in need of transformation is accurate. But this tension is a fact of political life, and has been for centuries.¹²⁶ The difficulty with Linklater's characterisation is not, therefore, that he views it as a problem, but that he views it as a problem that can be resolved.

Moreover, Linklater argues that the debilitating universal-particular dichotomy may be resolved via the transformation of the sovereign state. The problem is that the sovereign state provides the only terms available with which to characterise


the problem of the universal-particular dichotomy.\textsuperscript{127} What Linklater fails to see is that there is a difference between depicting the problem as located \textit{in} the sovereign state and depicting the problem \textit{as} the sovereign state. For Linklater, the problem is the universal-particular dichotomy and the failure of the state to resolve it; his solution is to transform the state so that it does resolve the universal-particular dichotomy. But given that the problem of the universal-particular dichotomy is ancient, perhaps the focus should be less on seeking to resolve it, and more on rearticulating a concept of community that provides a better way of managing it than does the sovereign state. Linklater sees the task of a transformed community as eliminating the universal-particular dichotomy, but the very basis of the sovereign state is this dichotomy. As a result, what is needed is not a transformation of the state to \textit{eliminate} the universal-particular dichotomy, but a rearticulation of the meaning of community in order to \textit{manage} the universal-particular dichotomy. In other words, the problem with Linklater's approach is that he seeks to do away with a constitutive feature of international politics. The argument here is to retain the universal-particular dichotomy, but seek to find better ways to cope with it, particularly through rearticulating the meaning of community.

It is important to note that the state does not and cannot provide a \textit{resolution} of the universal-particular dichotomy. Rather, the best it can do is provide a \textit{settlement} of it. The former is long-term if not permanent and this is what Linklater is aiming at. The latter reflects the contingent and temporary nature required of any treatment of the universal-particular dichotomy, and seeks not to resolve it, but to frame it as effectively as possible. In short, the universal-particular dichotomy is a problem contained within the state, but it is also contained by the state. The problem with Linklater's statist approach, as R.B.J. Walker puts it, is that the choice between conflicting obligations "... is the one that is \textit{produced} by the account of a politics of modern sovereign states in a

\textsuperscript{127} As Linklater himself recognises: the "... modern unity of sovereignty, territoriality, citizenship and nationality has ensured that the basic moral tension between obligations to other citizens and obligations to the rest of humanity has persisted." Linklater, \textit{Transformation}, op. cit., p. 190.
states-system." Suggesting that the solution to the problem is innate within the state is troublesome because it reveals an overwhelmingly teleological approach that overlooks, or perhaps ignores, the contradiction of locating both problem and solution within the state, especially since the universal-particular dichotomy is constitutive of both.

In short, it is impossible to separate the problem of the universal-particular dichotomy from its historical or contemporary settlement in the state, as Linklater attempts. R.B.J. Walker argues that this is because

... state sovereignty and subjectivity express a series of relationships. But having been constructed through all those long and complex practices that went into making the modern self and the modern state, state sovereignty then poses all those dualistic problems [i.e. the universal-particular dichotomy] with which we are so familiar and which Linklater articulates so well. But it is quite futile to stay working to resolve dualisms of universality and difference on the terms they have been given to us by state sovereignty and the modern subject as specific relations between universality and difference.

In other words, the universal-particular dichotomy and the state are mutually constitutive: each defines the other and both are institutionalised in the process of state-formation and subsequently in maintaining the sovereign state. Linklater’s belief that the state will thus eventually evolve to resolve this dichotomy reflects a problematic teleology: as Kimberly Hutchings puts it:

Linklater claims that his critical theory involves a utopianism which is constrained by the comprehension of actual historical processes. Yet we are given to understand that a proper comprehension of historical processes involves reading history as if it were progress.

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129 Ibid., p. 154.

130 Hutchings, op. cit., p. 158. On this point see also Cochran, op. cit., especially pp. 111-117.
Therefore, Linklater's understanding of the universal-particular dichotomy is problematic and he fails to understand that resolving the universal-particular dichotomy does not allow for any concept of community, post-Westphalian or otherwise. The problem may lie with Linklater's focus on boundaries of the territorial state. For instance, he notes that

The recurrent philosophical questions in modern international relations theory have been concerned with the grounds for conferring primacy upon any one of three competing visions of community - the nation-state, the society of states, or a community of humankind.\textsuperscript{131}

He argues that the practical problems arising from these philosophical issues are also three-fold; whether "... the purpose of foreign policy [is] to advance the interests of the exclusive nation-state, to strengthen a more inclusive society of states, or to promote a logic of moral inclusion by establishing a community of humankind."\textsuperscript{132} Linklater suggests that the key to resolving these dilemmas lies with the sociological question of the state and its "... capacity to attract human loyalty and structure political identity...", while "[t]he key question of whether industrialization would erode the power and authority of the state and generate consensual forms of world politics continues to set the terms of the debate."\textsuperscript{133}

The irony of this (teleological) approach is that it relies on the state evolving into a new form of community. Whether states seek to advance their interests, strengthen the society of states, or promote the moral inclusion of humankind, the force behind and aim of each is the state. For Linklater, therefore, it seems that the problem of the universal-particular dichotomy is a consideration mainly because of the erosion of the 'power and authority of the state'. Furthermore, the desire to 'promote a logic of moral inclusion by establishing a community of humankind based on the state' seems simply illogical. Considering Linklater's criticism of the inadequacies of the Westphalian state as mediator between man

\textsuperscript{131} Linklater, "The Problem of Community", op. cit., p. 136.

\textsuperscript{132} Ibid., p.137.

\textsuperscript{133} Ibid., p. 137.
and citizen, and the implication that relations between individuals and humanity are somehow less authentic because they are mediated by the state, it is rather implausible that he centres his solution to the problem of the universal-particular dichotomy in the state, however evolved it may be.(come). Indeed, this fixation on the state is part of the reason this solution fails.

As R.B.J. Walker argues,

> [t]he core issue cannot be posed as a simple choice between citizenship and humanity, between the necessities and tragedies of statist power politics and the potentials of some more ethical, more rational, more communicatively competent humanity. That choice is the one that is produced by the account of a politics of modern sovereign states in a states-system. Moreover, the way in which this choice is produced depends not on a radical dualism [i.e. universalism and particularism] but precisely on a specific relationship between the claims of universality and those of diversity.¹³⁵

Seeking to resolve the universal-particular dichotomy is, in fact, problematic because, as Walker argues, it is the relationship of universalism and particularism that is crucial, not the choice between one or the other. As a result, any reconciliation of the universal-particular dichotomy must, by its very nature, be temporary and contingent.

Linklater fails to see that the universal-particular dichotomy is not a problem to be solved, because it is in fact being settled over and over, day after day, by many

¹³⁴ Feminist critiques of the concept of community are crucial here: Iris Marion Young challenges the very idea that social relations in community are somehow more authentic than those which take place within states. She also questions the assumption that the good life exists within states in the first place, let alone that it can simply be transferred to some sort of community invoked by imagination, which ignores problems of both time and space. A detailed analysis of these critiques, including Young's work, is developed in the next chapter.

¹³⁵ Walker, op. cit., p. 153. Emphasis original. One interesting aspect of Walker's critique is that his work reflects many of the same concerns with community as Linklater, though from a different perspective; chapter five provides an overview and assessment of Walker's approach, and chapter six provides a comparative perspective of the two.
different agents (individual, state, international). The means by which it is settled the component of community that is the political. It is a way of framing individual lives within one articulation of community - the state - that recognises their various identities and their differing politics, including their competing needs and wants, their struggles with morality and ethics, and their competing desires for the common good.

Linklater's emphasis on territoriality, on extending and widening boundaries may thus be understood as part of his effort to challenge and transform the state. It seems that this transformation depends upon re-drawing the boundaries of the state, with a view to eventually eliminating them. But challenging and contesting its boundaries is one thing; removing them altogether poses serious problems since these boundaries shape the universal-particular dichotomy itself, and are shaped by it in turn.

Linklater's solution is thus problematic because the state and the universal-particular dichotomy are both defined by the very boundaries that Linklater seeks to enlarge. The universal-particular dichotomy cannot be resolved by this approach. However, Linklater's position is that Hegel believed that the decline of the polis was necessary so that a higher form of political community could emerge - the modern state some two millennia later. At the end of the century it is unclear whether the close cooperation which was provided by the modern state is finally coming to an end and an unavoidable period of estrangement between different cultures awaits, or whether new communities which extend universality and difference can be designed. Herein lies the problem of community at the end of the century.

136 Noting that the universal-particular dichotomy is not in need of reconciliation, Jean Bethke Elshtain, for example, points out that "[t]here are millions of people in the world, unnoticed by Linklater, who have already widened 'the boundaries of political community'..." Elshtain, "Really Existing Communities" op. cit., p. 144.

137 Linklater, "Community", op. cit., p. 196. He also notes "...that a process of universalizing norms is intrinsic to the history of the European states system." Linklater, "The Problem of Community", op. cit., p. 145.
And herein too lies the problem for Linklater: with his teleological vision of new communities of universality emerging from the modern state, he is unable to account for the constitutive nature of the universal-particular dichotomy in the modern territorial state. Thus it seems he is wrong to identify the dichotomy as a problem to be resolved; the tension that exists between one's duties as a citizen and one's obligations to humanity is a dilemma that will persist forever. It needs to be accommodated and managed, not resolved or eliminated.

However, Linklater does not seem to have questioned whether the universal-particular dichotomy ought to be resolved. He fails to consider that it may be a useful problem, and that it may be unavoidable. Perhaps the universal-particular dichotomy is the (community- or state-based) means by which we understand our sometimes contradictory identities. And perhaps the tensions it produces are managed via the political. In short, the universal-particular dichotomy is not meant to be eliminated through the concept of community; rather, a rearticulated meaning of community may help provide a more effective demarcation of political space in terms of both international theory and international politics, to better accommodate this inevitable dichotomy.

Linklater's fundamentally teleological approach is inherently based in traditional international relations and demarcated by the boundaries of the sovereign state, and he also seeks its solution within the same limited terms. Recognizing some of the problems of this perspective, Linklater does seek to transcend this international relations perspective and escape its boundaries, but he is unable to do so because his solution ultimately comes full circle, back to the state.

Therefore, Linklater's "... inquiry into the nature and possibility of new forms of political community"\textsuperscript{138} both starts and ends with the state. His understanding of the concept of community is ultimately fixed within the boundaries of the international relations understanding of the territorial state, which is itself an expression of the universal-particular dichotomy. As a result, it seems that more

work on the territorial component of community in international relations is necessary. Linklater's approach confirms that there is much to be gained, but that it is not enough to problematise boundaries; rearticulating the meaning of community in international relations theory involves understanding the political in terms of how those territorial boundaries constitute and are constituted by both community and identity.

Conclusion

For Andrew Linklater, the universal-particular dichotomy is the central problem of international relations. It is about territoriality, and is a matter of conflicting obligations between individuals as citizens and human beings that is produced by the boundaries of the territorial state. Thus Linklater seeks to widen and enlarge these boundaries by transforming community, and as a consequence, his work focuses on territoriality as a component of the concept of community. Linklater succeeds in emphasising the need to address this core component to rearticulate the meaning of community in international theory, but he is unable to resolve the problem as he understands it because he cannot escape or alter the troublesome boundaries of political space as demarcated by the sovereign state.

Nevertheless, despite difficulties with a number of areas of his work, that Linklater makes an important contribution to the rearticulation of the meaning of community in international theory. First, he recognizes that the way international relations understands political space is at best incomplete and at worst has serious implications for understanding international politics and international theory. As a consequence, he identifies the need for the discipline to rethink the concept of community. Second, by adopting an explicitly normative and critical theory approach, Linklater was not only able to see past the territoriality of the sovereign state, but he was also able to see a way forward and propose an alternative to it. Third, Linklater's approach focuses on a core component of the concept of community – territoriality – and not at the expense of the other important components – identity and the political. And, fourth, Linklater cogently links all three components into his plans for the transformation of political community. As
a consequence, the work of Andrew Linklater is a clear indication that international relations possesses the analytical tools to rearticulate the meaning of community.

However, despite the importance of his work and the value of this contribution, the reason that this chapter has focused on critique is because of the serious disjuncture that exists between his depiction of the problem and his solution. In other words, Linklater asks many of the questions that international relations has long avoided confronting about the concept of community. In doing so, his work highlights the importance and influence of rearticulating this core concept in the discipline. What it fails to do, however, is answer those questions satisfactorily, and provide for international relations a rearticulated understanding of community. His proposed transformation is insufficient because it does not and cannot escape the territorial boundaries demarcated by the sovereign state.

Therefore, Linklater's work is necessary for rearticulating the meaning of community in international relations theory, but it is insufficient on its own to achieve this rearticulation. It does not fulfil its initial promise of either reconciling the tension of universalism and particularism, or of moving beyond the state in international relations. The fact that Linklater problematises and draws critical attention to these issues is a significant part of his contribution and his critical theory approach is vital in its challenge to the state-centric problem-solving approach of realism. But by locating both problem and solution in territoriality, within the boundaries of the sovereign state, Linklater is unable to escape them.

The essentially teleological approach he adopts is part of the problem. Linklater's characterisation of the universal-particular dichotomy and his proposed resolution of it are central to this problem. He does not recognise the mutually dependent, and indeed constitutive relationship of community and the universal-particular dichotomy. Indeed, he situates both problem and solution within the state by suggesting that it may evolve into a new form of community which is not based on tensions between universalism and particularism, because it has wider and
deeper boundaries. But the problem with this formulation is that the universal-particular dichotomy constitutes these boundaries, and at the same time, the boundaries of the territorial state reinforce the tension of universal and particular.

Thus, it is the conclusion of this chapter that seeking to resolve the universal-particular dichotomy is itself problematic. The tensions between universal and particular, between inside and outside, and man and citizen, help to define the concept of community, and may in fact be required for it to exist and to flourish. By seeking to resolve the universal-particular dichotomy, Linklater envisions a transformed community evolving from the (flawed) state, as some sort of morally inclusive, universalised entity. But such an entity would be fundamentally apolitical, because of the absence of the universal-particular dichotomy.

The problem in Linklater's work therefore, lies in identifying the sovereign state as the only available articulation of community in international relations and reducing its flaws to a failure to resolve the universal-particular dichotomy. This approach to the concept of community is ultimately limited by the territoriality of the sovereign state. Thus Linklater's critical theory approach to this question highlights the importance of the component of territoriality for rearticulating the meaning of community in international theory, though perhaps not in the sense that Linklater anticipated, which is the widening and deepening of international relations boundaries and the resolution of the universal-particular dichotomy. Instead, his work points to the fundamental interconnectedness of these problematic boundaries and the universal-particular dichotomy. Thus, while Linklater proposes to transform community by prompting (what he sees as inevitable, teleological) changes in the sovereign state and thus also in political space, his work actually highlights the importance of rearticulating the meaning of community based on the constitutive element of the universal-particular dichotomy.

In short, it is the conclusion of this chapter that the concept of community is inseparable from the universal-particular dichotomy. Linklater's efforts to problematise and to resolve it indicate that, in fact, the boundaries of the
universal-particular dichotomy, as configured in the territoriality of the sovereign state, are constitutive of the concept of community. But because Linklater's work is based so firmly within the assumptions and prejudices of international relations, the state-based nature of his approach to the concept of community does not allow him to escape the narrow confines of the discipline or recognise the value and necessity of the universal-particular dichotomy. In other words, his project indicates that more work is needed for understanding the mutually constitutive relationship of territoriality and universal/particular tensions in rearticulating the meaning of community.

In sum, Linklater's work highlights the importance of recognising that the sovereign state does not embody the concept of community any more than citizenship constitutes the ultimate identity. It is to this question of identity that the next chapter turns, to examine another critical theory approach - feminism - in international relations. Like this chapter, the goal of chapter four is to determine the extent to which work in international relations presently contributes to a potential rearticulation of the meaning of community, in terms of one of its three core components. Feminist international theory provides not only a critique of the component of identity, but it also critiques the other components of the concept of community, territoriality and the political. Thus in challenging the ontological and epistemological soundness of dualisms such as community/state, identity/citizenship and the universal-particular dichotomy, feminism, like Linklater's work, may have a great deal to contribute to the potential rearticulation of the meaning of community in international relations.
Identity and the Concept of Community: Feminist International Theory

The aura around the word "community" leads us to certain expectations that rest on and reinforce the call of identity, of sameness, and it is this that needs disconnection.¹

As this quote indicates, identity is a core component of the concept of community, referring to the mutually constitutive relationship of individual and collective identities. In international relations, however, both individual and collective identities tend to be defined by the collective alone. As a result, the main understanding of identity in the discipline is state-based, in which the individual is defined by virtue of membership in a sovereign state, whether by birth or by choice. Thus as the state is understood to constitute community in international relations, so citizenship is understood to constitute identity in the discipline; "... only states have the authority under international law to grant or deny the status of citizen. Thus, citizenship is strongly linked to the idea of political community which in turn is seen as synonymous with the territorial exclusivity of the sovereign nation-state."²


Moreover, this state-based approach to identity is reinforced because the realist paradigm dominates international relations, and the primary subject of the discipline is the sovereign state: it is both the focus of mainstream international relations theory and its main actor. As a result, individual identity is linked with the identity of the collective - the state - and although citizenship is only one identity among many, it is conferred by states with little or no reference to the other (non-state) identities of its citizens.

A number of approaches in international relations challenge the prevailing notion of identity as citizenship in international relations, because sovereign subjectivity as an identity conferred by states does not complete an individual's identity any more than the state itself completes the concept of community. However, questions of identity in international relations are a relatively recent addition; issues of identity and subjectivity, and of formations of self and other were imported from social theory generally in the 1980s, to become increasingly prevalent in the 1990s. The inclusion of such questions in international relations theory tends to reflect an interest in issues such as conflict and security, culture and civilisation, or nationalism and ethnicity.\(^3\) There is also some interest in more philosophical and ontological questions of sovereign subjectivity and citizenship, for example in poststructural and constructivist theory\(^4\), but for the most part, this literature remains within the boundaries of the state and of international relations.\(^5\) This is a serious shortcoming, especially since Friedrich Kratochwil,


\(^4\) See, for example, Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); the work of R.B.J. Walker generally (discussed in chapter five); and David Campbell, *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity* (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1992).

\(^5\) For a review of identity in the international relations discipline, see Iver B. Neumann, "Self and Other in International Relations" in *European Journal of International Relations* (Vol.2, No. 2, 1996), pp. 139-174. On the absence of studies of identity in
for example, claims that identity and authenticity are the twin problems of modernity.\(^6\)

But one area of the discipline which does offer an explicit and sustained effort to address questions of identity is feminist theory. Feminist theory addresses identity from a critical theory perspective, and it addresses the universal-particular dichotomy, self-other relations, and other modern dualist constructions of political space that emanate from the sovereign state and realist problem-solving approaches in international relations. Feminism argues that an identity constituted solely by the state is incomplete, and is concerned with ontological questions of identity and difference, epistemological questions of subjectivity, and praxeological questions of resistance.\(^7\) The critical orientation of feminist theory also offers an approach to identity in international relations which is connected to the potential rearticulation of the meaning of community in the discipline. Indeed, feminist theories are also interested in critiques of the territorial state, and in prevailing notions of what constitutes the political. In short, feminist theory is employed here as an exemplar of approaches to identity in international relations because it is a critical theory approach that critiques both identity and the concept of community, and also offers a rearticulation of both.

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\(^7\) For an argument about the unique contributions feminist theory makes to studies of identity in international relations, and the importance of examining identity for the discipline generally, see Marysia Zalewski and Cynthia Enloe, "Questions about Identity in International Relations" in Ken Booth and Steve Smith, eds., *International Relations Theory Today* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), especially pp. 294-297; and Roger Tooze "Prologue: States, Nationalisms and Identities - Thinking in IR Theory", in Krause and Renwick eds., *Identities In International Relations* op. cit., pp. xvi-xx. On citizens in fact contesting the boundaries of political territory and political identity, see Peter G. Mandaville, "Territory and Translocality: Discrepant Idioms of Political Identity" in *Millennium* Special Issue: *Territorialities*, op. cit., pp. 653-673.
At the same time, this approach still functions mainly at the edges of the discipline, and even after years of work in international relations, is still often required to justify itself in international relations. But the intent of the chapter is not to develop a feminist theory of community, or of identity. Instead the argument here is that feminist theory makes a crucial contribution to rearticulating the meaning of community in international relations in terms of the component of identity. In particular, feminism provides an alternative approach to; international relations tends to regard identity as fixed and singular, but feminist theory argues that identity is in fact fluid and multiple. Thus it is the contention of this chapter that feminist theory makes an important contribution to the rearticulation of the meaning of community by proposing an alternative understanding of identity within its critique of the concept of community in international relations.

The first section of the chapter provides a critical overview of feminist theory in general, to explore how and on what grounds feminist theory engages with the discipline. The argument here is that feminist theory is well situated to provide an analysis of identity in international relations, since it provides both a normative and a critical theory perspective on identity, as well as analysis of the concept of community. The second section of the chapter considers feminist approaches to the component of identity in more detail. The argument here is that feminist work problematises identity comprehensively, and in the process, also problematises the other two components of the concept of community: territoriality and the political.

Turning from general approaches to feminism and identity, the third section of the chapter examines two feminist approaches to the concept of community itself. Focusing on the work of Iris Marion Young and Shane Phelan, this section argues that these feminist theorists provide both a strong critique of the concept of community, and a useful contribution to its rearticulation in terms of the component of identity. Finally, the chapter concludes that feminist theory makes an important contribution to understanding the component of identity in international relations. Thus it is the contention of this chapter that feminist
theory in international relations makes an important contribution to the potential rearticulation of the meaning of community in the discipline.

1. Feminist Theory and International Relations

Feminism has been a part of international relations theory for many years, and like many approaches in the discipline, it originated elsewhere. It is thus useful to address feminist approaches in general in this section before turning to feminist international theory in particular, especially as this is not the work of a single theorist, but a body of work. There are two aspects of feminist theory in general that are important to outline before turning to focus on international relations; the first is that feminist theory is critical theory, and the second is that questions of identity are integral to feminism in general. Thus, rather than focus on other international relations approaches to identity, this section focuses on feminist international theory because it prioritises identity as part of its critical theory approach to the problem of political space and the concept of community.

The difficulty with addressing feminist theory in general terms, however, is that there are about as many types of feminism as there are women. Thus in the Blackwell Encyclopaedia of Political Thought, feminism is defined as "[a] generic term for a complex phenomenon... defined in part by contests generated over its meaning"; as a consequence of its diversity, and its origins as a social movement, summarising feminism is problematic. Jacqui True, for example, suggests that there are:

...conservative feminisms, liberal feminisms, Marxist feminisms and socialist feminisms... radical feminisms, eco-feminisms, cultural feminisms... lesbian feminisms, women of colour/Third

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8 For a survey of feminist and gender studies in international relations, see Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Special Anniversary Issue Gendering 'the International', (Vol. 27, No. 4, 1998); see especially Fred Halliday "Gender and IR: Progress, Backlash, and Prospect", pp. 833-846, and Zalewski "Where is Woman in International Relations? 'To Return as a Woman and be Heard'", pp. 847-867.

World feminisms, and a complex group of postmodern critical feminist theories which draw variously on poststructuralist, French continental theory, psychoanalysis, postpositivist epistemologies and non-Western, multicultural feminisms.\textsuperscript{10}

When it comes to defining feminism, then, it is difficult to reflect all of these varied approaches and their differences at once. One widely deployed typology is Sandra Harding's, who outlines three feminist theories of knowledge: feminist empiricism, feminist standpoint theory and feminist postmodernism.\textsuperscript{11}

Feminist empiricism claims that there is a male bias in empirical work which directs the types of problems chosen for investigation. The argument of this approach is that the scientific method may achieve objective truth only if this male bias is removed, or a (balancing) female 'bias' is added. Feminist standpoint theory, on the other hand, rejects the notion of objective truth as attainable, instead relying on obtaining truth from within a certain perspective, such as from the standpoint of feminism. Feminist postmodernism, finally, rejects the notion of objective truth entirely, seeing knowledge and reality instead as socially constructed and in need of sceptical deconstruction.\textsuperscript{12}

In terms of the international relations discipline, and less specifically epistemological concerns, Marysia Zalewski includes an additional three feminisms in her historical/political typology: liberal feminism, Marxist/socialist

\textsuperscript{10} Jacqui True, "Feminism" in Scott Burchill and Andrew Linklater, et. al., \textit{Theories of International Relations} (Houndmills: Macmillan Press, 1996), p.212. For a contentious critique of feminist perspectives in international relations, see Adam Jones, "Does 'Gender' Make the World Go Round? Feminist Critiques of International Relations" in \textit{Review of International Studies} (Vol.22, No.4, October 1996), and for a critical (feminist) commentary on Jones's work, see Zalewski "Where is Woman", op. cit., especially pp. 850-856.


\textsuperscript{12} Marysia Zalewski, "Feminist Theory and International Relations" in \textit{From Cold War to Collapse: Theory and World Politics in the 1980s}, eds. M. Bowker and R. Brown (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991) p.120.
feminism, and radical feminism.\textsuperscript{13} Liberal feminism is the classic equal rights feminism of individual freedom and autonomy, also known as "... the 'add women and stir' variety of feminist thought."\textsuperscript{14} In contrast, marxist and socialist feminism identify patterns of gendered oppression directly linked to repressive and exploitative economic and social systems. Finally, radical feminism triumphs the notion of the personal as political, interpreting all aspects of life - public or private - as permeated by male domination and in need of redescription and fundamental change.\textsuperscript{15}

Thus at first glance it appears that the various types of feminisms and their debates involve little more than wide-ranging disputes over highly contested terrain. However, while there is no question that there are important and complex distinctions between feminist schools of thought, it is still possible to identify shared characteristics throughout feminist theories. Feminist theory is, first and foremost, \textit{critical} theory. Critical in this context has a double meaning, referring both to the general notion of challenging received wisdom concerning women and gender, but also referring to the Frankfurt School and poststructuralist variants of post-Marxist critical theory. This view of feminism, as seeking to problematise the existing social order, is perhaps the most useful characterisation of feminist theory as a whole, in terms of understanding the shared characteristics of feminisms, as well as the debates among them.

In \textit{Critical Theory in Political Practice}, Stephen Leonard suggests that while feminist theory is deeply suspicious of universalising or grand theory, critical feminist theory "... can accommodate the plurality of life experiences and the particular forms of domination and struggle reflecting this plurality". Specifically,

\begin{quote}
... what feminists have shown is that critique cannot be grounded
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{13} Ibid., p. 120

\textsuperscript{14} Ibid., p.116.

\textsuperscript{15} Ibid., pp.118-119.
in an ahistorical, transcendental or abstract understanding of knowledge and self that is separated from a particular, historically contingent context. Nor can it simply assume that the contingency of knowledge and identity reduces critique to nothing more than a radical skepticism. ...[Thus, r]ather than asking how an emancipatory political practice can be theoretically defined and defended... feminists ask instead what theory must look like if it is to speak to practical concerns. The issue for feminists is, in short, less one of realizing theory in practice than it is of realizing the practical demands theory must meet.¹⁶

Thus, because of its origins as a social movement in which theory must meet the needs of political and social goals, feminism is a critical theory which not only deconstructs, but also reconstructs.

In Leonard's assessment of the feminist deconstruction of scientism, liberalism and marxism, it is apparent that one of the first steps in feminist deconstruction is to focus on questions of identity and subjectivity. Quoting Catherine Mackinnon, Leonard points out that asking 'what does it mean' prompts the feminist reply 'to whom', and he thus suggests that

... in terms of these questions, many feminists have come to realize that much of modern discourse means "objectivity" from the standpoint of a "disinterested" observer who in reality is being neither objective nor disinterested, but rather distinctively male.¹⁷

The element of deconstruction in feminist theory is crucial, and questions of identity are central to it. As a result, there are multiple meanings at work in the seemingly straightforward observation, for example, that the subject of feminism is women: subjectivity (and thus objectivity) is contested, and feminists debate as to whether women as opposed to gendered subjects ought to be their addressee. Indeed, a further step posits a difference between women and 'women'.¹⁸


¹⁷ Ibid., p.217.

Christine Sylvester's reason for using the scare quotes is to reduce the apparent ontological clarity of 'women', for she wants to problematise the subject of feminism - the socially constructed, oppositional identities of masculine and feminine, men and women.

Such dualisms represent for feminist theories what Sylvester calls "... the pattern of certainty and oppressive bifurcation that marks modern knowledge."\(^{19}\) Bifurcation "...implies a modernist/positivist separation of fact/value, known/knower, epistemology/ontology, which conjures up a strait-jacketed view of the world and how we think about it."\(^{20}\) Thus central to most feminist theories is the argument that identity is not either/or, fixed and stable, but fluid and multiple and even contradictory. Moreover, perceptions of identity directly and indirectly affect the acquisition and development of knowledge: in this context, feminists explicitly seek ways to challenge epistemological assumptions, and to break down dualisms, arguing that they are social constructs.

In international relations, this dichotomous approach is challenged by feminists, who express

... a deep dissatisfaction with existing orthodox approaches to the understanding of the international, a dissatisfaction with both theoretical and practical dimensions. On the one hand, traditional approaches are seen as perpetuating actual discrimination against women in both economic and political spheres, and on the other hand those same approaches are seen as incapable of yielding a proper understanding of the international sphere itself.\(^{21}\)

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\(^{19}\) Ibid., p.53.


One of the main concerns in feminist approaches to international relations has been to problematise the discipline's dominant (realist) paradigm, including "... the assumption of the state as a given; notions of power and 'international security'; and the model of a rational human individual standing apart from the realm of lived experience, manipulating it to maximize his own self-interest."22 One such example of a feminist critique of the realist paradigm is J. Ann Tickner's analysis of Hans Morgenthau's work.23

Tickner critiques Morgenthau's six principles of political realism, countering with her own feminist reformulation of them. In particular, she challenges his notions of power and of the political; where Morgenthau, and by extension the mainstream discipline, seek a theory of international relations that prioritises rationality and universality in abstract terms, Tickner contends that a feminist perspective would instead emphasise contingency and the need to link subject and object in theories of international relations. Tickner's approach is that of feminist standpoint theory, and for her,

... [t]he theoretical significance of gender is that it provides an experientially grounded perspective which complements that of traditional approaches to the understanding of the international realm. The suggestion is that, when the two perspectives, masculinist and feminist, are given equal importance, then a universal ground for knowledge will have been attained.24

One problem with this analysis, however, is that it (re)produces further dichotomies, for example that of masculine/feminine, and is open to criticism on

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epistemological grounds.

Feminist critiques of realist approaches often face the problem of overcoming the (social science) logic of binary oppositions. In fact, the problem as Kimberly Hutchings sees it is that "[a] feminist approach to international relations can never repeat the infinite ambition of realism, which claims to have captured the eternal truth of inter-state relations from an objective standpoint." Indeed, feminist approaches object to the notion of objectivity, arguing that knowledge is only available from an individual standpoint. Hutchings notes that

\[\text{[t]his implies paying attention to who and what we are not, as well as who and what we are, and means that our knowledge claims will be inevitably tentative. There is no need to apologize for this tentativeness, since it is all that knowledge can ever be. In the context of international relations in which all subjective identities are implicated in global political, social and economic relations, there is no absolute closure between the identity in difference of subjects seeking to understand the international sphere from what may be experienced as radically different, or even opposing standpoints.}^{26}\]

Thus while the dichotomy raised by Tickner's analysis of the realist paradigm may be viewed as positive because at least it introduces a feminist perspective to mainstream international relations, it ultimately raises epistemological concerns.

As Hutchings argues, an alternative to the standpoint approach is one which is less experiential and more structurally based. Sarah Brown undertakes such work, which does not seek to ask the traditional questions of international relations from the (socially constructed) perspectives of men and women, but instead focuses on what a gender analysis may reveal about "...structured relations of inequality."^{27} The problem, however, is that "[i]f Tickner's approach to feminist

\[^{25}\text{Hutchings, "The Personal", op. cit., p. 160.}\]

\[^{26}\text{Ibid., p. 160.}\]

theory raises problems about the epistemological privilege to be accorded to gendered identities, then Brown's also raises similar problems about the status of her own critical discourse", because Brown also relies on dualisms, in this case, those of "appearance/reality" and "subjugation/emancipation".  

While feminism offers a subversion of the ontological, epistemological and methodological bases of international relations, it seems unable to escape the problem of the bifurcation of knowledge as identified by Sylvester. Seyla Benhabib and Drucilla Cornell aptly summarise the problem facing feminist theorists in international relations, when they ask:

...where do we go beyond the politics of gender? To a radical transcendence of the logic of binary oppositions altogether or to a utopian realization of forms of otherness, immanent in present psychosexual arrangements, but currently frozen within the confines of rigid genderized thinking?  

The problem for feminist theory, in other words, does not end with its critique, which opens up further problems of, for example, the 'politics of gender, the logic of binary oppositions, and rigid gender-based thinking'. Thus given that feminist critical theory is about developing an alternative vision of the social order, the problem for feminists involves moving beyond critique to apply the subversive nature of feminism to problems in international relations.

While deconstruction is an essential part of feminist theorising, the difficulty with it is, as Kathy Ferguson puts it, "how can we simultaneously put women at the center and decenter everything including women?" In other words, deconstruction begs the question of how to centralise the issues of concern to feminists - including identity and the social and political roles of women - and at

28 Hutchings, ibid., p. 183.


the same time decentre social constructions such as gender. The problem, as Hutchings suggests, is that feminists seem to risk falling into the trap of debating between "... false knowledge and no knowledge at all", in which

[t]he logic of the feminist standpoint itself seems to push us into a plurality of viewpoints, yet the abandonment of the idea of a standpoint leaves us without anchor in a sea of contending narratives, with no possibility of distinguishing between those that are meaningful and those that are not.31

In short, it is not immediately clear what might serve to ground, or even locate a feminist critical theory of international relations. Thus reconstruction is as important, if not more so, as deconstruction for feminist theory, but it is a difficult step to take, particularly when in international relations, for example, feminists are still required to justify their presence in the discipline, let alone reconstruct it.32

Hutchings summarises the dilemma:

All feminist theorizations of international politics have two critical dimensions: they involve the critique of the way that global relations enforce and are enforced by the systematic subordination of different women in different ways; they also involve the critique of alternative ways of theorizing world politics. Involved in both dimensions is the reconceptualization of the international realm in richer and more complex terms and an ethical commitment to exposing and enhancing the position of women throughout the world. However, both dimensions also involve the question of how this critical theoretical work is


For Hutchings, this question of how critical theoretical work is possible is based on "...the choice between universalist dogma and particularist skepticism...", because feminism, like all critical theory, risks two alternatives: "[o]n the one hand, there is a tendency for critique to lapse back into the terms that it is its purpose to transcend. On the other hand, this logic implies the refusal of critique either to fail or succeed in its aims." Feminist theory certainly faces this dilemma in international relations, but it still offers the possibility of moving beyond critique.

In particular, feminist theory has a great deal to offer in terms of the rearticulation of the meaning of community in international relations theory. Feminism challenges mainstream international relations on questions of territoriality and the state, on its fixed and inflexible notion of identity, and its (consequent) understanding of the political. In short, feminists in international relations have gone some way toward deconstructing this concept already, or at least its components, and thus it seems that the meaning of community is ripe for rearticulation in international relations theory from a feminist perspective. However, as Zalewski warns, a feminist re-working of any aspect of international relations theory may have dangerous implications if it does not set its own terms, and relies instead on those already set by the discipline. At the same time as she warns against simply developing a feminist version of international relations theory though, Zalewski also emphasises the importance of the subversive nature of feminism, noting that "...when the notion of subversion is stripped of its derisory connotations, applied to it by defenders of the status quo, subversive strategies provide a foundation from which to emancipate and liberate."

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33 Hutchings, Kant, op. cit., p. 184.

34 Ibid., p. 185.

35 Zalewski, "Feminist Theory" op. cit., p.139.

36 Ibid., p. 142.
Thus rearticulation for feminist theory in international relations relies on its critical theory roots, and on its critique of the discipline and the unique perspective feminism brings to theorising the international. This perspective may be powerfully applied to rearticulating the meaning of community in terms of the component of identity, because feminist theory addresses all three components of the concept. Indeed, feminist critiques of identity in particular help to highlight how inadequately the concept of community is now understood in international relations. Thus the next section considers the feminist approach to identity in international relations theory, and the implications of this critique for the other two components of the concept of community, territoriality and the political.

2. Feminist International Theory and Identity

While relatively few feminists address the concept of community directly, feminist international theory nevertheless provides a significant critique of the three individual components of the concept of community. In particular, feminist theory focuses on authenticity and the problem of mediated relations, and it addresses, as Linklater does, the problem of the universal-particular dichotomy, and of course, the problem of political space, in which the sovereign state represents the individual. For feminist theory, these are problems because of a concern with the totalizing impulse of the sovereign state and the consequent loss of identity. In addition, feminists also address problems of self/other relations. Virtually no other body of work in international relations tackles this range of issues – certainly not the realist problem-solving paradigm – and thus what drives the project of feminist theory (insofar as one can be said to exist for this it itself totalizing and hence problematic), in sum, is the problem of identity. Simply put, the understanding of political space in international relations fails to meet the needs of feminist theory in terms of identity.

Before considering in the next section two feminist approaches that focus on the concept of community, it is useful first to address the general feminist approach to identity. Because identity drives the project of feminist theory, it tends to inform most feminist work in international relations, and touches on the
components of territoriality and the political as well. Allison Weir argues that

[o]ne of the most important tasks facing contemporary feminist theories is the task of reformulating and reconstructing our concepts of the self. We need new models of identity, of individuation, of agency and autonomy which will take account of the important critiques of these concepts generated by feminist theorists... A normative ideal of self-identity comes out of a conviction that we need to uphold a commitment to women's struggles for identity and autonomy which will not clash with our conviction that individuals must be understood as embedded, embodied, localized, constituted, and fragmented, as well as subject to forces beyond our control.37

In terms of international relations, such a feminist approach to identity begins with questions concerning the identity of the territorial state. J. Ann Tickner argues, in fact,

... that the identity of the modern state, legitimised through ambiguously gendered ideologies of nationalism, has been constructed by drawing exclusionary boundaries to contain security threats from devalued and dangerous "others" on both the inside and the outside. While the state has been historically inscribed with the characteristics of "sovereign man", others on the outside are frequently described in less favourable terms, similar to those used to describe women.38

This feminist approach to identity and the state in international relations thus captures questions of all three components of community: territoriality (inside and outside), identity (sovereign man/woman) and the political (ideology and identity formation based on territoriality). The focus is identity, of course, and Tickner thus argues that yet another bifurcating dualism - the public/private divide - characterises the historical development of notions of identity, because "...women's identities were constructed around a lack of autonomy and independence - in other words, a lack of the (favorable) characteristics

38 Tickner, "Identity", op. cit., p. 148.
attributable to men."\textsuperscript{39} Because of this lack of identity, women are perceived as having no history, and

... this lack of subjectivity causes women's subordination to appear natural... \textsuperscript{40} Importantly for feminist theories of identity, woman as "other" is a relational concept that depends on and is derived from the identity of the male as universal subject.

In short, feminists argue that such identities are socially constructed, as is knowledge.

The argument that identity and knowledge are socially constructed has serious implications for the realist paradigm in international relations. Feminist theory challenges its claims to objectivity and universality, because its epistemological basis is informed almost exclusively by an experience of masculine identity. The result has been to create state identities that are fundamentally male; women are excluded from engaging in the public life of the state, and they are thereby excluded from its identity. As Tickner puts it, "[w]e must conclude, therefore, that the collective we, embedded in the historical construction of the state-as-unitary actor model of international theory, represents men's rather than women's voices."\textsuperscript{41} And she also points out that these social constructions are inherently political, that it is for specific political purposes that the territorial state determines the identities of those within its boundaries.

Interestingly, the concept of community is often invoked by the state to reinforce territorially determined identities. Tickner notes that this sense of community is frequently depicted as female, or feminine, designed to appeal to nationalist sentiment and patriotism: "[i]mages of motherlands [community], fatherlands [the state], and homelands [territoriality] evoke a shared sense of purpose and community for states and their citizens alike."\textsuperscript{42} But such appeals are not always

\textsuperscript{39} Ibid., p. 149.

\textsuperscript{40} Ibid, pp. 149-150.

\textsuperscript{41} Ibid, p. 152. Emphasis original.

\textsuperscript{42} Ibid., p. 153.
sufficient, and Tickner notes that these identities are often reinforced with references to difference, to an "other" that exists outside the territorial and identity-based borders of the state. This self/other dichotomy rests on yet another dualism, that of order/anarchy, and because feminist international theory argues that such state-based dualisms are inherently gendered, they contest the notion of state-based identity that informs such dualisms, and which is informed by them.

In other words, feminist theory demonstrates that notions of identity in international relations theory are about more than merely the state's reduction of identity to citizenship based on the public/private divide and perceptions about the other in an equation of state/anarchy. They also result in notions of exclusionary territoriality and hierarchical political practices that are inherently problematic. Thus the feminist approach to identity is crucial for the concept of community in international relations theory, challenging as it does what is understood by territoriality, identity and the political. Moreover, Tickner argues that thinking about identity in new ways has far-reaching implications; applying Joan Tronto's model of care, Tickner suggests that "[t]hinking about human identity in this way starts from the assumption that human beings are interdependent rather than autonomous, an assumption that would challenge our traditional view of the world."43 Thus she concludes that:

Given their definition of gender as a hierarchical social construction, feminist theories can make an important contribution to formulating an identity-based approach to international politics that understands the exclusionary nature of national identities built on similar relationships of social inequality.44

Indeed, this notion of the mutually constitutive relationship of identity and the state is crucial, and feminists argue, as Allison Weir puts it, that

[t]he very concept of a self, of an I, of a me, is something which is


44 Tickner, "Identity", ibid., p. 161.
constructed only through intersubjective interactions, which take place always in contexts of shared meanings. Similarly, my identity as this specific individual is constructed through my participation in communities, institutions, and systems of meaning, which organize my interactions with, and through which I interpret my interactions with, the world, my self, and others. My identity is produced through a complex process through which I am identified, and identify myself, in terms of intersubjective contexts of meaning. 45

Thus like that of many feminists, Tickner's approach to international relations is not to eliminate the state but to emphasise the mutually constitutive nature of the relationship between individual identity and collective identity, whether the collective is the state or community or another entity entirely.

For feminists, then, identity comprises a mutually dependent relationship: individuals constitute community as much as community constitutes individuals. This approach to identity reflects the notion that the universal-particular dichotomy, which Andrew Linklater is keen to resolve, may in fact not constitute a problem that requires resolution; feminist theory suggests that it is settled in this mutually constitutive relationship of identity and community. Indeed, Weir argues that

[c]entral to self-identity, then, is the capacity to sustain and in some sense reconcile multiple and often conflicting identities and to understand, criticize and reconcile multiple and often conflicting interpretations of those identities, not to mention the capacity to live with and somehow reconcile all of the ambiguity and complexity of our lives that does not (and never will) readily lend itself to this identity-work. Ideally, these reconciliations are achieved not through the imposition of an identity which excludes or represses difference and nonidentity... but through a capacity to reflexively and practically accept, live with, and make sense of differences and complexity. 46

Weir does not suggest that enacting such an approach is easy. She notes that

"[t]he capacity, and the responsibility, to problematize and define one's own

45 Weir, op. cit., p. 264.
46 Ibid., p. 265. Emphasis original
meaning (one's own identity) is both the burden and the privilege of modern subjects.\textsuperscript{47} Moreover, she also notes that there is debate as to whether identity and difference are at all reconcilable, and the subsequent section considers this question by examining Iris Marion Young's critique of the denial of difference in community.

But before turning to that issue, it is necessary to underscore the feminist theory argument that identity is not unilateral, in which a state-based identity is bestowed upon individuals, for example. Rather, individuals determine their identities within the context of the collective, thereby affecting the identity of the collective in turn, which again – coming full circle – affects both the individual's self-imposed identity, and their externally-determined identities, in a continuing reciprocal process of identity formation for both the individual and the collective. Thus because neither identity nor the concept of community are completed by the state, and because both are in fact defined by the other, feminist theory argues that identity is not fixed and stable, but fluid and multiple. Identity, in other words, is not an end in itself but an ongoing process.

Therefore, by challenging the identity of the state and state-imposed identities, and arguing that the individual plays an active role in identity formation, feminists contest prevailing notions of identity, and also the meaning of community. The identity of the territorial state is challenged, as is the notion of individual identity based on it, and the political processes involved in creating these identities are thus contested as well. The next section moves from considering identity and its impact on the separate components of the concept of community, to address feminist theories that not only critique, but also attempt to rearticulate the concept of community.

3. Feminism and the Concept of Community

Two feminist theorists who explicitly address the concept of community in terms

\textsuperscript{47} Ibid., p. 264.
of questions of identity are Iris Marion Young and Shane Phelan. In her discussion of "The Ideal of Community and the Politics of Difference", Young critiques the concept of community, arguing that it is a false ideal. In short, she argues that it ought to be abandoned. Shane Phelan, in "All the Comforts of Home: The Genealogy of Community", follows Young's critique but instead proposes an alternative concept of community. Their work highlights the potential contribution of feminist theory for rearticulating the meaning of the concept in the discipline. The remainder of this section examines each approach in turn.

**Young: Deconstructing the Ideal of Community**

Iris Marion Young's work focuses on the three components of the concept of community, all of which are of interest to feminists: territoriality, identity (including subjectivity) and the political. She is sharply critical of the concept of community, because she understands it as an ideal which "...privileges unity over difference, immediacy over mediation, [and] sympathy over recognition of the limits of one's understanding of others from their point of view." Young begins her discussion of community with a central feminist concern: identity, and in particular, abstract individualism. This philosophy "...considers individual human beings as social atoms, abstracted from their social contexts, and disregards the role of social relationships and human community in constituting the very identity and nature of individual human beings."  

Young supports critiques of this liberal individualist social ontology. However, while recognising their importance, she objects to the routine and (for her) largely unquestioned substitution of community in its place. She is particularly critical in this regard because of the lack of content in these substituted communities; the

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ideals invoked, Young argues, fail to "... ask what [community] presupposes or implies, or what it means concretely to institute a society that embodies community."50 Moreover, she rejects the dualistic notion of community versus individualism as either/or, but in contrast to Andrew Linklater's argument that resolving the universal-particular dichotomy is central to the problem of community, Young argues that this dualism "... is integral to political theory and is not an alternative to it."51

Objecting to what she calls the "metaphysics of presence", or a Derridean 'logic of identity', Young is critical of such bifurcating dualisms because "[t]he desire to bring things into unity generates a logic of hierarchical opposition. Any move to define an identity, a closed totality, always depends on excluding some elements, separating the pure from the impure."52 Moreover, she also critiques the logic of identity because it characterises "... the subject as a unity and an origin, the self-same starting point of thought and meaning, whose signification is never out of its grasp."53 Instead, following Julia Kristeva, Young argues that "[t]he subject is never a unity, but always in process..."54. She thus argues that the concept of community is problematic, because it is part of a dichotomy opposite individualism, and as a result "... the ideal of community exhibits a totalizing impulse and denies difference..."55.

Specifically, the ideal of community for Young

... expresses a desire for the fusion of subjects with one another which in practice operates to exclude those with whom the group does not identify. The ideal of community denies and represses

50 Young, "Ideal", op. cit., p. 302.

51 Ibid., p. 306.

52 Ibid., p. 303.

53 Ibid., p. 303.

54 Ibid., p. 304.

55 Ibid., p. 305.
social difference, the fact that the polity cannot be thought of as a unity in which all participants share a common experience and common values. In its privileging of face-to-face relations, moreover, the ideal of community denies difference in the form of the temporal and spatial distancing that characterizes social processes. 

Therefore, beyond concerns with the ambiguous values invoked via the ideal of community in opposition to abstract individualism, Young has specific objections which stem from three central concerns raised by feminist theory.

Since feminism tends to begin deconstruction with questions of identity, Young first considers the issue of subjectivity and identity, arguing that the ideal of community is totalising, and produces a denial of difference between subjects, replacing difference with social wholeness and identification in community. Second, Young addresses questions of territoriality, arguing that the routine denial of difference in the ideal of community is reinforced by the utopian dream of "decentralized face-to-face" communities, which are impractical at best. Finally, Young addresses questions of the political, arguing that the ideal of community poses "... an opposition between authentic and inauthentic social relations" which "...provides no understanding of the move from here to there that would be rooted in an understanding of the contradictions and possibilities of existing society." 

Sabina Lovibond's comments on what she calls the "...Kantian vision... of a universal rational community" parallel Young's concerns with the ideal of community in terms of its denial of difference. Explaining the essence of the feminist concern with the notion of universal identity that is central to the ideal of


57 For an overview of social anthropology/sociological approaches to the question of intimate social relations see, for example, A.P. Cohen, The Symbolic Construction of Community (London: Routledge, 1985), especially pp. 28-36.

58 Young, "Ideal", op. cit., p. 302.

59 Sabina Lovibond, "The End of Morality?" in Lennon and Whitford eds., op. cit., p.68.
community (for feminists and for others), Lovibond notes that:

[1]he furthest point to which one might be carried by this movement of recoil from universalism would be the point of inability to accept *anything* public as capturing the content of one's thoughts or feelings. How (one might ask) could I allow my unique subjectivity to be made to submit to some *abstraction*, some *general idea*, which would mediate between me and other subjects by furnishing us with a common thought - and so with a point of intellectual identity? Isn't this process of mediation, as Nietzsche maintained, necessarily one of *vulgarization* - a systematic infliction of violence on the inexpressible in order to make it fit the expressive forms available within some arbitrary language?60

This concern with authenticity, with unmediated relations is central to feminist questions of identity, and Young does recognise that this problem of the suppression of difference has been countered by some theorists:

[un]like reactionary appeals to community which consistently assert the subordination of individual aims and values to the collective, [there are] radical theorists [who] assert that community itself consists in the respect for and fulfilment of individual aims and capacities. The neat distinction between individualism and community thus generates a dialectic in which each is a condition for the other.61

However, she argues that this dialectical relationship between individual and society still reflects a totalising desire, and ultimately produces a denial of difference, because of a failure to address the problem of identity and subjectivity:

[a]ll these formulations seek to understand community as a unification of particular persons through the sharing of subjectivities: Persons will cease to be opaque, other, not understood, and instead become fused, mutually sympathetic, understanding one another as they understand themselves. Such an ideal of shared subjectivity ...denies difference in the sense of the basic asymmetry of subjects [since] ...persons necessarily

60 Ibid., p. 69. Emphasis original.

61 Young, "Ideal", op. cit., p. 307.
transcend each other because subjectivity is negativity. The regard of the other upon me is always objectifying. Other persons never see the world from my perspective, and I am always faced with an experience of myself I do not have in witnessing the other’s objective grasp of my body, actions, and words.\(^{62}\)

Thus the feminist critique of identity and subjectivity is crucial here for, as Zalewski notes, who women are is not the only question that arises in feminist theory, because where and how and what women are must also be considered.\(^{63}\)

In other words, just as not all feminists agree on what constitutes feminist theory, because no one theory can possibly represent the views, interests, politics, identities, and concerns of all women, neither would all members of a community be able to accept one unified and singular vision of that community, or, indeed, of themselves. In fact, Young and Lovibond argue that this tendency towards universalising identity diminishes the individual.

Furthermore, the failure to address the significance of the feminist critique of subjectivity and identity leads to the related epistemological problem of knowledge acquisition, and "...presupposes that a subject can know himself or herself and express that knowledge accurately and unambiguously to others."\(^{64}\)

Feminist theory rejects such a notion of both knowledge and subjectivity; Young points out that "[n]ot only does this ideal of shared subjectivity express an impossibility, but it has undesirable political implications... because it denies difference in the concrete sense of making it difficult for people to respect those with whom they do not identify."\(^{65}\) In other words, the ideal of shared subjectivity is problematic not only in terms of individual identity, but it also sets up a problematic equation of otherness, of us versus them. As a consequence, Young concludes that "[t]he desire for community relies on the same desire for social wholeness and identification that underlies racism and ethnic chauvinism

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\(^{62}\) Ibid., p. 309.

\(^{63}\) Zalewski, "Women/Women", op. cit., p. 408.

\(^{64}\) Young, "Ideal", op. cit., p. 310.

\(^{65}\) Ibid., p. 311.
on the one hand and political sectarianism on the other.\textsuperscript{66}

Young's critique of shared subjectivity is crucial for international relations and its tendency to see state-defined identities as an ultimate or sole identity. Stephen Leonard argues that "... critical feminist theory is... opposed to 'totalizing' identity claims", and he argues that

\[\text{for feminists, the self is indeed socially constructed, but at the same time it may be socially constitutive... The self is not something given prior to social relations, nor is it something that need be exhaustively determined by those relations; it is not static, but always (potentially) a condition of \textit{becoming} rather than \textit{being}.}\textsuperscript{68}

This understanding of identity is thus in part an objection to dualisms such as nature/nurture, but it also addresses Young's concerns with denial of difference and shared subjectivities. The point is that for feminists, identity is not fixed and immutable, but fluid and variable. Thus referencing Catherine Mackinnon, Leonard argues that questions of identity and the self ought to be approached with some caution, because "... asserting one's self-definition at the expense of the autonomy of others... is precisely that form of 'power to create the world from one's point of view [that] is power in its male form'.\textsuperscript{69}

As a consequence, the feminist position on identity demands the recognition and respect of otherness, of the validity of identities that differ from one's own. The problem with the concept of community for Young is that it tends to disrespect difference, and risks promoting 'totalising identity claims'.

Following from her critique of the ideal of community in terms of problems with identity and difference, Young applies these concerns to more explicitly political

\textsuperscript{66} Ibid., p. 302.

\textsuperscript{67} Leonard, op. cit., p. 246.

\textsuperscript{68} Ibid., p. 234. Emphasis original.

questions. She problematises community as an ideal which "...implies a model of the good society as consisting of decentralized small units, which is both unrealistic and politically undesirable". Her discussion in this context focuses on two related problems which stem from the idea that community must consist of face-to-face relationships, in which social relations are intimate and immediate. Young argues that the world in which we live simply does not lend itself to such an ideal of social relations. This ideal of community is unrealistic because

[s]uch a model of the good society as composed of decentralized, economically self-sufficient, face-to-face communities functioning as autonomous political entities is both wildly utopian and undesirable. To bring it into being would require dismantling the urban character of modern society, a gargantuan physical overhaul of living space, work places, places of trade and commerce... If we take seriously the way many people live their lives today, it appears that people enjoy cities, that is, places where strangers are thrown together.

Thus in addition to questioning the practicalities of the ideal of small and decentralised community, Young also contests the notion that intimate and immediate social relations are somehow more authentic than those mediated by the realities of time and space.

In highlighting the political undesirability of such intimate relationships, she argues that "[t]heories of community are inclined to privilege face-to-face relations... because they wrongly identify mediation and alienation." Young rejects this dualism of authentic and inauthentic social relations, noting that while

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70 Young, "Ideal", op. cit., p. 313.

71 Ibid., p. 316. Young's argument about city life considers themes also found in the work of Warren Magnusson, who advocates using the local as a model for the international. See Warren Magnusson, The Search for Political Space: Globalization, Social Movements, and the Urban Political Experience (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996). See also Young's more extensive work on this question in Justice and the Politics of Difference op. cit., especially pp. 236-256. This idea is also discussed further in chapter six.

72 Young, "Ideal", ibid., p. 314.
"... mediation is a necessary condition for alienation [this] does not entail the
reverse implication: that only by eliminating structures of mediation do we
eliminate alienation."[73] Indeed, the issue of mediation echoes Young's earlier
concerns with shared subjectivity, and the impossibility "... that a subject can
know himself or herself and express that knowledge accurately and
unambiguously to others."[74] The point is that Young sees "... both face-to-face
and non-face-to-face relations [as] mediated relations, and in both there is as
much the possibility of separation and violence as there is communication and
consensus."[75]

This critique of the idea that social relations in community are somehow more
authentic because they are intimate and immediate, rather than mediated, is
important in terms of international relations and the rearticulation of the meaning
of community. Andrew Linklater's work, for example, rests in part on the
assumption that it is possible to do away with mediated relations, and in
particular with the role of the state as mediator between the individual and
humanity as a whole. His argument that "[t]he expansion of moral community
involves the surrender of the sovereignty of those associations which mediate
between the individual and the species"[76], implies that unmediated relations will
do away with differences between inside and outside, self and other, and thus
produce universal equality. But Young's point is that unmediated social relations
do not and cannot exist, and that moreover, notions of self-identity are
themselves mediated.

Young's feminist critique of the ideal of community is powerful and compelling.
She problematises notions of identity (and subjectivity), territoriality and the
political. First, she addresses the problem of identity and subjectivity in terms of

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[73] Ibid., p. 315.
[74] Ibid., p. 310.
[75] Ibid., p. 314.
the likelihood of denial of difference in community. Feminist theory offers an alternative understanding of identity, which is based not on a denial of difference, but on promoting it. Second, Young problematises the notion of authentic versus inauthentic social relations, based on shared subjectivity and territoriality and the idea that intimate social relations occur only in decentralised small units. Third, Young concludes that because of these problem with identity and subjectivity, an idealised and unrealistic notion of the political in community develops.

This critique of the concept of community seems to suggest that its potential rearticulation in international relations theory is not desirable from the perspective of feminist theory, particularly in terms of potential problems with the component of identity. However, another feminist theorist, Shane Phelan, seeks to retain the concept despite sharing the same concerns as Young. The remainder of this section considers Phelan's work on the concept of community within a feminist critical theory framework.

Phelan: Rearticulating the Meaning of Community

In "All the Comforts of Home: The Genealogy of Community", Shane Phelan reiterates Young's critique, but rather than rejecting the ideal of community, Phelan offers an alternative. In seeking to retain the concept, she begins by exploring two approaches to it: voluntarist and ascriptive. These are the ideals of community that Young critiques and that Phelan characterises as 'identitarian'. An ascriptive community is one in which "... we understand ourselves not simply as 'like another' in certain discrete ways but as sharing a common identity, a common membership within a concrete community."77 Voluntarist community, on the other hand, is not based on natural or organic relationships, but on members of community who share common goals, values, and behavioural norms.78 Phelan points out, however, that this dualistic notion of identitarian communities is not as straightforward as it appears:

77 Phelan, op. cit, pp. 236-237.

78 Ibid., p. 238.
What is involved here is a process of rearticulation that reascribes us, as it were, not necessarily by challenging notions of primordial or "true" identity, but by relocating our identities. We may thus refer to "created communities", not in stark contrast to "natural" (ascriptive) ones, but along a continuum of relations between space and time on the one hand and consciousness on the other.

Thus again, identity for feminist theory is key to the concept of community, and Phelan concludes that "[n]either ascriptive nor voluntarist conceptions of community... do the work that feminist theory and politics require." Based on a critique which echoes many of Young's concerns, Phelan notes that with identitarian communities there is a problem because "[i]f questioning stops here, we find a reified 'community' that constitutes individuals, without itself requiring constitution. Community does not preexist its members..." In fact, as Phelan puts it, "[t]he essentializing of community and the essentializing of identity and the subject are complementary." Specifically, Phelan (like Young) problematises the notion of community as a substitute for the state, on the grounds that it does not necessarily embody more authentic social relationships than those in states. Moreover, she is critical of this ideal of intimate social relations because identitarian community denies difference by failing to problematise identity, thereby resulting in what Jean-Luc Nancy refers to as "the closure of the political". Phelan therefore proposes an alternative understanding of community that addresses these concerns, and which stems from the notion that the concept of community need not deny difference or the political. Her approach to theorising community addresses the elements that both she and

79 Ibid., p. 237.
80 Ibid., p. 238.
81 Ibid., p. 239.
82 Ibid., p. 241.
Young note are crucial: problems of identity (and subjectivity), questions of the political, and the issue of territoriality.

Unlike Young, Phelan does not see community as necessarily resulting in a denial of the political, but instead she views it as a potential locus for the political:

Community has been firmly entrenched within the logic of the same that mandates self-identity and unity among members. In such definitions, community becomes an essence, a thing to be studied and acted upon and used. In [Jean-Luc] Nancy's terms, such essentializing amounts to "the closure of the political"... shutting us off from the insecurity and instability of actually being-in-common and wrapping us in common being, in sameness. Politics, the art of being-in-common, is eliminated when we fix identities and locations in this way. This helps us to see that our "common understandings" of community trap us into antipolitical postures even as we try to valorize "differences." 84

Thus Phelan posits a theory of community which moves beyond identitarian notions that understand community as sameness and consequently deny difference. Her central concern is with questions of subjectivity, identity and difference, so that questions of the political are not lost in a quest for authentic or intimate social relations.

Moreover, Phelan is also concerned with the question of territoriality, recognising the problem of social relations which are of necessity mediated by time and space. She addresses these concerns in her argument that

[c]ommunities are not formed of or by individuals with pre-existing "characteristics"... [r]ather, the characteristics are created over time as part of building a community... [thus w]e are still constituted by community, but that does not give to community a prior, separate existence, for community is simultaneously constituted by us. 85

84 Phelan, ibid., p. 239. Citation in quote from Nancy, Inoperative Community, ibid., p. xxxviii. Nancy's work is discussed further in chapter six.

85 Phelan, ibid., p. 239.
In other words, Phelan is echoing Young's argument, and the argument of feminist theory in general, against totalising identity claims. The idea of being-in-common rather than sharing a common being is crucial here, and Leonard's comment on this issue bears repeating: "[t]he self is not something given prior to social relations, nor is it something that need be exhaustively determined by those relations; it is not static, but always (potentially) a condition of becoming rather than being."\(^\text{66}\)

Thus following Jean-Luc Nancy's work on the concept of community, Phelan proposes an understanding of community as 'being-in-common' as opposed to (its opposite) 'being common' or being the same. In this concept of community, subjectivity and identity are not reduced to sameness, and nor is there any denial of difference. Moreover, this approach addresses the problem of what may constitute the political, because differences are recognised as real and valid and not dissolved in or mediated by community. In fact, they rely on the political to remain unmediated.

In addition, this concept of community challenges prevailing approaches to identity and subjectivity. Phelan argues that

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\text{[t]he modern subject, the unified, self-reflective, and autonomous originator of its actions and emotions, is a concept that makes being-in-common impossible to conceive. Even as we are drawn to community, the allure of the subject limits our ability to think beyond [identitarian] models of association or ascription. A full thinking of community requires that we move past the subject as origin or fixed point...}^7
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Moreover, Phelan argues that "[a]s an ideal of harmony and wholeness, community can never satisfy its own demands... We can best realize community in our lives not by willing it directly but by continuing to call it into

\(^{66}\) Leonard, op. cit., p. 234. Emphasis original.

\(^{77}\) Phelan, op. cit., p. 242.
existence..."88 Therefore, Phelan argues that an alternative notion of identity and thus of the political may flourish through a concept of community as 'being-in-common' for two main reasons.

First, the notion of identity as both pre-existing and fluid is accepted: the self is not assigned a stability and autonomy that is consequently suppressed by membership in community. Second, community itself is also (untypically) seen as neither unified nor fixed. In fact, answering Young's concern about shared subjectivity and thus the production of supposedly more authentic and intimate social relations, community is understood to be unstable and thus insufficient at providing its members with a singular and fixed identity. Phelan argues that "[c]ommunity in fact works to destabilize identity, as our being with others brings us face to face with multiplicity and differences. Thus community is not a place of refuge, of sameness, but is its opposite."89 Moreover, this concept of community is not one of mediated relations, because it is no more fixed and unchanging than the identities of its individual members. In allowing for difference, then, the concept of community as being-in-common allows for a notion of the political that prioritises the opportunity to explore competing political questions, rather than to suppress difference, reify sameness and thus close the political.

The central point here is that understanding community and individuals to be mutually constitutive does not lock either into a fixed identity, does not require intimate and direct social relations as the only authentic type, and thus allows for the political. Indeed, Phelan suggests that "[r]ather than being a source of support, Nancy's 'being-in-common' is the locus of anxiety and vertigo that the Western philosophical tradition has fled from."90 As Nancy argues:

... thinking of community as essence - is in effect the closure of

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88 Ibid., p. 242.
89 Ibid., p. 241.
90 Ibid., p. 240.
the political. Such a thinking constitutes closure because it assigns to community a common being whereas community is a matter of something quite different, namely of existence inasmuch as it is in common, but without letting itself be absorbed into a common substance. Being in common has nothing to do with communion, with fusion into a body, into a unique and ultimate identity that would no longer be exposed. Being in common means, to the contrary, no longer having, in any form, in any empirical or ideal place, such a substantial identity, and sharing this (narcissistic) "lack of identity".\(^{91}\)

In terms of international relations, this critique of the ideal of community is essential to rearticulating the meaning of community. For while Andrew Linklater, for example, proposes the transposition of community (as the state) to the international realm, Phelan argues that this idealistic notion of the inherent goodness of communities is problematic. She notes that "[f]or Nancy, community is the ground of all possibility, but an unstable, shifting ground. Attempts to fix it are flights from community toward identity, flights from being-in-common to being common."\(^{92}\) Thus in acknowledging and even celebrating difference and the mediated nature of social relations, this feminist critical theory approach allows for locating community without grounding it, without essentialising and thus totalising it.

Indeed, the point of community for Phelan is not safety, comfort, consensus and therefore the absence or closure of the political. Rather, the rearticulated meaning of community represents the opposite: a recognition of the fact that identity and differences and insecurities and, thus, the political exist. Phelan's work underscores the crucial contribution that feminist theory makes to rearticulating the meaning of community in international theory.

However, Phelan is cautious and notes that this approach to the concept of community, based on Nancy's work, "... is insufficiently politically oriented to serve as more than a philosophical reminder against identitarian hubris."\(^{93}\) For

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\(^{91}\) Nancy, *Inoperative Community*, op. cit, p. xxxviii. Emphasis original.

\(^{92}\) Phelan, op. cit., p. 241.

\(^{93}\) Ibid., p. 244.
Phelan, more work on identity is needed because "[a] view that serves only to remind us of the provisionality of our identities is a step in the right direction away from identitarian politics, but in itself, it is only a step."94 Thus Phelan calls for more genealogical work on the concept of community, because she wants to problematise agency in terms of how and perhaps most importantly, by whom this alternative, rearticulated meaning of community might be enacted.

In particular, Phelan is concerned with two problems of rearticulating the meaning of community. First, she notes that "[n]o matter how many modifiers we attach to 'community', we will not eliminate difference(s)."95 And second, she is concerned that a logic of identity, of sameness, is still operating even within being-in-common, because there is a ".... belief that our actions and ideas are simply the product of social location, so that if we 'specify' the location tightly enough we will be the same."96 According to Phelan, these are both fundamentally political problems, which cannot be resolved or even settled theoretically, but only by political means, through confrontation and contestation.

Therefore, being-in-common is not sufficient, though it is a necessary beginning of rearticulating the meaning of community in international theory. Phelan concludes that "[r]ather than basing community on what we have in common, we can only come to community by negotiating about what we will have in common, what we will share, and how we will share it."97 To paraphrase Leonard, the point is not to realise theory in practice, but to realise the practical demands theory must meet. Phelan's point is that the rearticulated meaning of community as being-in-common does not, in practice, do this work. In short, there is a political component of the concept of community that Phelan emphasises; a rearticulated meaning of community addresses

94 Ibid., p. 245.

95 Ibid., p. 247. Emphasis mine.

96 Ibid., p. 247. Emphasis original.

97 Ibid., p. 248.
... not what needs to be done to really have community or how to live without it or with the recognition of its instability, but how we have and do construct the communities we live in, what discourses we are living within, their costs and hidden implications. [This] provides the link between identity politics and broadbased movements for change by bringing identities out of their isolation and into a world of multiple locations and discourses.98

Phelan's insistence on linking identity to the political is a vital contribution of feminist theory to rearticulating the meaning of community in international relations theory. The next chapter examines the component of the political in more detail, in terms of the concept of community, to determine the extent to which this work is already underway in international relations.

Conclusion

Feminist theory, in all its diversity, is a critical theory approach that contributes to rearticulating the meaning of community in international relations. It offers a critique of the component of identity, both in social theory and in international relations, and also problematises notions of territoriality and the political. Feminist theory also provides a comprehensive critique of the concept of community and highlights potential pitfalls and dangers in theorising the concept. But more importantly, it offers a way forward, a means of retaining the concept of community despite its problems, and it provides a means to negotiate and perhaps overcome them. In particular, feminist theory makes three central contributions to the potential rearticulation of the meaning of community in international relations.

First, feminism challenges apparently unbiased notions of identity and subjectivity in international relations, arguing that citizenship is merely one identity among many. Feminist theory questions the apparent ontological soundness of social constructions such as masculine or feminine, women and 'women', identity/citizenship, order/anarchy, universal-particular and

98 Ibid., p. 249.
state/community. Such dualisms are rejected through the feminist engagement with questions of knowledge, and of identity and difference, particularly in terms of the feminist assertion that identity is neither fixed nor singular, but is a (political) process.

Second, the feminist critique problematises the sovereign territorial state, not only in terms of the boundaries of the state which, for example, tend to exclude women, but also in terms of the boundaries of international relations, which do not look beyond the state. Feminist theory argues that permitting the territorial state to define political space in international relations is problematic because it produces narrow notions of identity and subjectivity, and thus of the political. In short, feminism problematises territoriality as providing the boundaries of both identity and the political in international relations, within a problematic understanding of political space.

Third, feminist theory challenges prevailing notions of what constitutes the political in international relations. Critiquing the state-based focus on what is right, feminists instead open up political debates about what constitutes the common good, because not only are notions of politics and power male-dominated in international relations, but the state and citizenship are seen as fixed and immutable, thus denying difference, and circumscribing the political. Thus feminism problematises the political and politicises identity and territoriality.

Therefore, by introducing to international relations a critical theory approach to questions of identity, authenticity, mediated relations, the totalizing impulse of community, self/other relations and the denial of difference, feminist theory encourages the rearticulation of the meaning of community in international relations. Feminist approaches to the concept promote sensitivity to both identity and difference, recognise the impact of territoriality (including space and time) on individuals and on social relations, and explicitly prioritise the political. In short, feminist theory does much of the groundwork of rearticulating the meaning of community in international relations theory, at least in terms of the component of identity. But as Phelan notes, the political dimension of rearticulating the
meaning of community is in need of more work.

Thus if international relations is to be able to redefine political space, the meaning of community must be rearticulated and the compelling challenges that feminist theory poses for the discipline can no longer be ignored. In arguing that identity is a process, and part of a mutually constitutive relationship of individual and collective, feminist theory characterises both the concept of community and identity formation as ongoing political, rather than teleological processes. In doing so they provide an important corrective to Linklater's teleology and the insistence in feminism that identity is thus not fixed and stable, but fluid and multiple, is crucial for rearticulating the meaning of community in international relations.

Taken together, this work has a great deal to offer: feminism highlights the importance of the component of identity in terms of its effects on the other components of territoriality and the political. Perhaps most importantly, however, feminist theory indicates that more work on this issue is imperative, especially in terms of the core component of the political. The next step in dealing with the question of the political is to consider the extent to which work already underway in international relations contributes to rearticulating the meaning of community. The next chapter examines the component of the political in terms of the work of R.B.J. Walker in international relations.
Chapter Five
The Political and the Concept of Community: R.B.J. Walker in International Theory

Modern accounts of the political are still framed spatially; here and there, inside and outside, First World and Third World... Without that framing, it is difficult to make sense of politics at all.¹

The political is a core component of the concept of community, and refers to the common good. It is distinct from politics, which is the means by which the political is (or ought to be) enacted. In international relations, politics tends to refer to questions of order, resting on the order/anarchy characterisation of inside versus outside, and the political thus tends to be reduced to what is right for (or in) the sovereign state. As a result, to consider the political as a component of the concept of community is not the same as considering forms of politics, political actors, political institutions or political practices. They are related, but it is their distinctiveness that makes the political, rather than politics, vital to rearticulating the meaning of community in international theory. As Walker argues, "... in speaking about challenges to our understanding of political community, we run into the limits of our own ability to speak about politics at all...".²

The distinction between politics and the political is important because it raises the question of what constitutes political space. The question of whether the political is bounded by the sovereign state, or whether it is the political that establishes the boundaries of the sovereign state is central. A third possibility is that the political and the sovereign state are mutually constitutive. What is important about these questions is that they all revolve around the meaning of political space, and in international relations, such questions are generally framed by the boundaries of the sovereign state. This is a function of the dominance of realist problem-solving


approaches in the discipline, and it is a function of political space being defined as and by the sovereign state in international relations. However, not all theorists in the discipline accept this framing of the political, or of political space. One such theorist is R.B.J. Walker, and this chapter examines his work in international relations theory.

In contesting prevailing notions of the political and the influence of the sovereign state in international relations, Walker seeks to explain their origins and development. He is interested in why state sovereignty is such a problematic articulation of political space. For Walker, in other words, the political and the sovereign state are mutually dependent. This means that political space is not in itself problematic, but that a particular articulation of it, based as it is on the sovereign state, is the problem. Thus for Walker, rearticulating how political space is understood in international relations is vital. As such, this chapter examines his work in order to determine the extent to which it contributes to rearticulating the meaning of community in international relations theory.

Moreover, in the same way that the preceding two chapters argued that the narrow disciplinary views of international relations on territoriality and identity are problematic, this chapter also argues that the circumscribed understanding of the political in international relations is a problem. But in addition, the chapter contends that the narrow international relations notions of territoriality and identity also contribute to a restricted understanding of the political, and thus political space as well. And how the political is understood has an effect on how territoriality and identity are understood, too. In short, notions of the political in international relations might be less constricted were there an understanding of political space that went beyond the territorial state, and an understanding of identity that went beyond citizenship. And conversely, a wider notion of the political in international relations might help to produce new notions of identity and territoriality, and thus of political space too.

Walker examines all three of these interconnected issues in his critique of international relations theory. He is concerned with the disciplinary
understanding of political space and its attendant problems. As a result, this chapter seeks to determine the extent to which Walker's work makes a contribution to the potential rearticulation of the meaning of community in international relations theory in terms of the component of the political. The argument here is that questions of the political, of identifying and maintaining the common good, would be answered differently in the absence of the sovereign state, and that this prevalent articulation of political space might be different depending on one's notion of the political. And with questions of territoriality and identity fundamentally interconnected with the political, all three are considered in this chapter. But the political is the pivotal component of the three, playing a central role in understanding the other two.

The chapter begins with an overview of Walker's work in international relations. He is critical of the ways in which the discipline traditionally understands the political, and he argues that it is bounded and ultimately limited by the notions of state sovereignty and sovereign subjectivity. He considers the state, territoriality, identity and the political in his critique of international relations, and as a consequence his approach is an examination of the concept of community in international relations that integrates all three of its components. Walker, like Linklater and feminist theorists, identifies problems with the current understanding of political space in international relations theory, and he consequently calls for a rearticulation of the meaning of community.

The first section of the chapter concludes with an examination of Walker's notion of the political in particular, arguing that his focus on this component distinguishes Walker's approach to the concept of community from other similar approaches. In particular, the argument here is that despite centring on critique, and not venturing past it, Walker's focus on the political in terms of his critique of

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3 The approach taken by Andrew Linklater, for example, as discussed in chapter three. Walker notes that “[t]here is much that I agree with in Linklater’s analysis” though of course, he also adds that “[t]here is also, of course, much with which I disagree quite strongly...” R.B.J. Walker, "The Hierarchalization of Political Community", in Review of International Studies (Vol. 25, No. 1, 1999), p. 151. These two approaches are compared in some detail in Chapter 6.
the sovereign state is crucial. Specifically, the section argues that while Walker does not provide an alternative notion of political space, he does set out a framework for rearticulating the meaning of community in international relations theory. Thus his refusal or inability to venture beyond critique, while problematic, is a product of Walker's insistence that it is impossible to attempt reconstruction within the problematic boundaries of international relations theory, as they are demarcated by the sovereign state.

The second section of the chapter argues that Walker thus make an important contribution to rearticulating the meaning of community in international relations theory, both in terms of his critique, and in terms of providing a framework within which to conduct its potential rearticulation. Walker is especially concerned with the relationship of unity and diversity as expressed (or not) in the sovereign state and sovereign subjectivity; this section considers what it means to argue, as Walker does, for “... finding a place for universality in particularity...” by focusing on the importance of the “... relation between unity and diversity...”.

It argues, in other words, that understanding the political as a process is essential to rearticulating the meaning of community in international relations theory.

The chapter concludes by arguing that what Walker's work offers is a framework for moving from the critique of political space – the sovereign state – in international relations, to the eventual rearticulation of the meaning of community in the discipline. By establishing through critique that the boundaries of the concept of community do not have to be coextensive with the boundaries of the sovereign state, Walker brings the three components of territoriality, identity and the political into his work, and illustrates how it might be possible to begin to rearticulate the meaning of community in international relations theory.

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4 Ibid., pp. 151-152. Emphasis original.
1. R.B.J. Walker and International Relations Theory

R.B.J. Walker writes extensively, though often implicitly, on the concept of community in international relations. In the context of a sustained critique of the principle of state sovereignty, his central concerns focus on (the limits of) the political and how space, time and change are understood in the discipline, because "... the crucial modern political articulation of all spatiotemporal relations, is the principle of state sovereignty."5 Walker's approach is unabashedly critical of international relations theory and its traditional assumptions and approaches, which he views as modernist, static and as ultimately limiting the possibilities of both politics and the political.

For Walker, both the principle and the practice of state sovereignty represent a solution to a set of problems that developed during the rise of the modern state and of capitalism in Europe:

The principle of state sovereignty is less an abstract legal claim than an exceptionally dense political practice [that] ... articulates a specifically modern account of political space, and does so through the resolution of three fundamental contradictions. It resolves, in brief, the relation between unity and diversity, between the internal and the external and between space and time.6

In another iteration of this approach, Walker identifies the three sets of problems as "... universality/particularity, self/other and space/time...".7 In terms of self and other, Walker suggests, first, that notions of identity formation and subjectivity are limited due to the tendency in international relations to locate and therefore define identity within the terms of the sovereign state. Walker sees this as problematic in general, and echoing feminist critical theory, he particularly criticises resolving the problem of identity within the terms of the universal-


6 Ibid., p. 154.

7 Walker, "IR and the Concept of the Political", in Booth and Smith, eds., op. cit., p. 321.
particular dichotomy, and consequently seeing it as settled in the form of state-based citizenship.

Second, in terms of the problem of space and time, Walker suggests that there is a tension "...between philosophies/ideologies of Enlightenment and Despair..." which goes largely unrecognised in the discipline, but which still underpins all of international relations theory. He suggests that the issue of temporality or historical change is apparently settled by the principle of state sovereignty, particularly through an equation that correlates the concept of community to temporality and history and change, while in contrast the sovereign state is linked to spatiality and structure and continuity.

Third, Walker problematises the notion that questions of universal-particular relations are settled, either in practice or in principle, by state sovereignty. He suggests that critical approaches to international relations (such as postpositivism) that explicitly challenge assumptions about identity and space/time are not new to the discipline, but that they are in fact implicit in international relations, though often unacknowledged. Moreover, reflecting Linklater’s arguments, Walker argues that these critical approaches have been marginalised by the principles and practices of state sovereignty which appear to have settled the universal-particular dichotomy.9

What all three issues share is the larger problem of relying on the sovereign state to resolve them, or at least to eliminate the need for any further discussion about them. Walker thus questions "... the degree to which the modernist resolution of space-time relations expressed by the principle of state sovereignty offers a plausible account of contemporary political practices...".10 Walker suggests that the two groups of problems concerning identity and history are ignored rather

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than resolved in international relations, and that the third, concerning universal-particular relations, while at least arising out of a critique of these other (false) resolutions, are equally problematic because they too rest on the same set of assumptions concerning state sovereignty.

Thus this statist "resolution" of these fundamental problems is unsatisfactory for Walker, coming as it does from an historically specific context, in which a particular culture and philosophy are reflected. In short, the principle of state sovereignty as a set of political practices may settle these contradictions, but it does so at best temporarily and without resolution. Walker argues that the further we move away from the origins of this principle and its practices, the less satisfactory are its resolutions:

It is the capacity of state sovereignty to mediate between the claims of universality and those of particularity that is in question, not some shift from a world of particularities to one of unities. Again, bluntly, the early-modern trade-off between men and citizens, between understanding that one can become human only by becoming a citizen of a particular state, or in later terms, of a particular nation, is no longer as persuasive as it has been...11

Walker, in fact, has little faith in "...the continuing capacity of states to resolve the contradiction between citizenship and humanity through claims to absolute authority."12 And in particular, he is concerned that democracy is often heralded as a way to redress this contradiction when, for Walker, we are only able to speak of democracy because of the (false) resolution provided by the principle of state sovereignty, "...through which our identity as both citizen and human is simultaneously affirmed and denied."13

11 Walker, "International Relations and the Fate of the Political" in Ebata and Neufeld, eds., op. cit., p. 234.


The problem, in other words, is that international relations has been unable to surpass, or at least evade, both the territorial and the conceptual boundaries of the sovereign state: "[t]he conventional history of state sovereignty, while confirmed by practice and offering a persuasive resolution of the most basic political and philosophical questions about the nature and location of political community, must also be understood as a reification."\(^{14}\) Indeed, Walker also suggests that the "spatial limits of the state become the limits of theoretical reconstruction"\(^{15}\), and that the discipline actually celebrates these boundaries, in part by including debates about their inherent limitations in mainstream international relations.

As Walker notes, however, this leaves little room for a critique that either seeks or provides alternative perspectives beyond the state and the principle of state sovereignty:

> The conditions under which we are now able - or unable - to conceive of what it might mean to speak of world politics, and thus of the spatiotemporal rearticulation of political community, are largely defined in terms of assumptions enshrined in the principle of state sovereignty.\(^{16}\)

Walker challenges the reification of the principle of state sovereignty on which international relations is based. He argues that the problematic effects of this reification are to dichotomise extremes, in which the state as political community is measured against international anarchy; identity is reduced to an equation of self and other in citizenship; ethics is reduced to a debate about universalism and particularism; and in which "spatial differentiations" reduce the political to "...accounts of a society of states that try to mediate between geopolitical anarchy and temporal political community".\(^{17}\) Indeed, for Walker a circumscribed notion

\(^{14}\) Walker, "Sovereignty", op. cit., p. 171.


\(^{16}\) Ibid., p.21.

\(^{17}\) Ibid., p. 74.
of the political results from such dichotomising, and in turn reproduces a problematic and narrow notion of political space.

Rather than engage in what he perceives as an essentially fruitless teleological argument about the possibilities inherent in the sovereign state, and the variety of possible future iterations of it, Walker instead proposes to focus on "... other forms of political identity and community, other histories, other futures." He argues that the historical and political circumstances in which the sovereign state was developed in an effort to resolve dichotomies of self/other, universal/particular, and community/anarchy no longer exist. Walker points to contemporary notions of space and time, for example, which differ radically from those of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, as evidence of the need "...to open up the site delineated by temporal claims about modernity on the one hand and spatial claims about political community on the other." Such a task involves addressing the central question of international relations, which for Walker is "...about human identity, about who we are and how we might live together whoever we are." The international relations answer, of course, is that we are citizens who live together in sovereign states: ",supposedly, self-representing, self-developing, self-identical subjects. Or in the form that is crucial to the theory of international relations, we are supposedly free and responsible citizens of sovereign states." But as Walker points out,

... the early modern insistence that claims about citizenship have priority over all claims about humanity, and indeed that one can only achieve one's humanity by paradoxically submitting to the necessities of citizenship, is more than simply ragged around the edges. It is this insistence that is expressed by the principle, institutions and practices of state sovereignty.

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19 Ibid., p. 79.
20 Walker, "Fate" in Ebata and Neufeld, eds., op. cit., p. 231.
21 Ibid., p. 231.
22 Ibid., pp. 231-232.
The limits of the political are, for Walker, coexistent with the boundaries of the sovereign state, both conceptually and practically. And this applies to the limits of self/other and space/time too. Consequently, he suggests that it is almost irrelevant to ask about an alternative concept of community, or about power or authority in international relations, because these questions are all answered by the principle and practices of state sovereignty, leaving little or no room for further debate and contestation. He notes that "... once one crosses the official boundaries of the established conceptions of politics, the boundaries of the modern state, it becomes very difficult to speak about any kind of politics at all."\(^{23}\)

Therefore, Walker argues that the principle of state sovereignty provides the only "... credible resolution of the fundamental questions about the possibility of political life..."\(^{24}\), and

... that there is really very little in the modern theory of international relations that cannot be extrapolated fairly straightforwardly from the way in which the claim to state sovereignty works to resolve all contradictions of unity and diversity in space and time upon a particular territory and a specific subjectivity.\(^{25}\)

As a result, in order to challenge this apparent resolution, Walker – echoing Andrew Linklater – calls for "... the analysis of the state as an historically variable form of political community."\(^{26}\) He argues that "... questions about the presence or absence of state sovereignty must dissolve into questions about what political community can be now... " and this "... will appear as a return to questions about political practice to which the resolutions of modernity have


\(^{25}\) Walker, "Fate" in Ebata and Neufeld, eds. op. cit., p. 223.

\(^{26}\) Walker, "Sovereignty", op. cit., p. 179.
ceased to provide plausible answers."²⁷

One of the strengths of his project is that Walker recognises the inherent contradiction of contesting territoriality, identity and the political within the terms of the international relations discipline, especially since the concerns he seeks to problematise are apparently successfully resolved by it within those very terms. As he puts it:

As both principle and practice, as an expression of a specifically modern articulation of political identity in space and time, state sovereignty is something we can neither simply affirm, nor renounce, nor gaze upon in silent admiration... But if not state sovereignty... what then?²⁸

Walker asked this question about alternatives to the principle of state sovereignty in 1993, and subsequently continues to examine this problem. However, he has yet to provide an answer to his own question. Before turning to the question of Walker's solution the remainder of this section considers the component of the political in Walker's work in more detail.

Walker and the Political

Walker's analysis of international relations theory mainly consists of critique. He seeks to unsettle and contest the principle of state sovereignty, and the territorial notions of identity and the political that it produces and that in turn also inform state sovereignty. But in spite of his critique and his questions about alternatives to the principle of state sovereignty, Walker has yet to provide an answer to his own question(s). Part of the reason for this apparent reticence is that Walker recognises the inherent contradictions of attempting to address problems arising from the principle of state sovereignty within the terms established by this principle. As he puts it:

²⁷ Ibid., pp. 182-183.

... challenges to the principle of state sovereignty are conventionally advanced... on the ground of universalising claims about peace, justice, reason and humanity in general. This ground is precisely the condition under which claims about state sovereignty were advanced in the first place. It cannot offer the possibility of effective critique.29

Thus while Walker seems determined to escape the confines of the sovereign state, he does not do so, because the sovereign state is so present and all-encompassing.

Therefore, Walker does not offer a way to bypass or circumvent the boundaries set by state sovereignty. In terms of the concept of community Walker's work is important as far as it goes; in his critique of the political in the context of international relations, state sovereignty and sovereign subjectivity, Walker problematises important features of all three components of the concept of community - territoriality, identity and the political. And he explicitly argues for the need to rearticulate the concept. But he fails to provide a clear alternative understanding of any of these components or to undertake such a project himself. Walker recognizes this gap in his work and he claims that offering alternatives is inherently problematic. For Walker, any such alternative must of necessity be expressed within the very terms he critiques in the first place - those of the principle of state sovereignty as understood in international relations theory.

Therefore, Walker makes only very limited efforts to venture beyond critique. The only attempt he makes to venture beyond critique is in his work on social movements. But even this work, though helpful, is a meagre offering, because on the one hand he suggests that

...there is no ground for political community outside the state or between the state and individual. The state has a monopoly over political solidarity and identity, just as it has a monopoly over the legitimate use of force...30


And on the other hand, he argues that social movements... refuse the idea that we must choose between identity and difference, the One and the Many, the state and communities... This refusal is practical, and not just theoretical. It involves a recognition of the political spaces within the state... as being among the spaces for political action. What it denies is that these are the *privileged* spaces for political action.31

Thus Walker posits two types of politics based on his analysis of social movements: a politics of connections and a politics of movements.32 Both, he says, are crucial, but "[e]xactly what a politics of connection would look like is not clear."33 And a politics of movement, as far as he explicates it, seems not to represent a genuine alternative, but focuses on the types of politics that social movements already undertake: mounting critical, resistance-based challenges to apparently static state structures of political life. Thus even in proposing these "new" types of politics, Walker is still engaged in critique. His "politics of movement", in particular, seems to continue to focus on the deconstruction of the state, sovereignty, territoriality, identity and politics and the political, rather than engaging in efforts to rearticulate them.

As far as it goes, then, Walker’s work captures a central problem in international relations theory, and does so within an approach that integrates the political problems of identity and territoriality within a critique of the sovereign state. He is clear that it is necessary to rethink state sovereignty, in principle and in practice. But he contends that such a route is impossible, or at least impractical. And yet setting up the international relations notion of the political as the problem, even while not offering a resolution of it, contributes to some extent to the potential rearticulation of the meaning of community in international relations theory.

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31 Ibid., p. 65. Emphasis original.


33 Ibid., p. 699.
Walker acknowledges that "... the state is not the central problem; it is itself a solution to a problem, that of founding a political community and establishing some kind of legitimate authority over time and within a particular space."\(^{34}\) Walker points out that the first step toward rearticulating the meaning of community in international relations requires a similar solution, but the problem is how to ground the concept of community without essentialising it. And that is what the component of the political is for and why it is pivotal. By problematising the component of the political, Walker is seeking to use it in a new way, as Linklater does the component of territoriality and feminist theorists use the component of identity, to ground but not essentialise the meaning of community in international relations theory.

For Walker, the political is a compromise between extremes, it is about their settlement, and "[i]t is the plausibility of this settlement, this reconciliation of the apparently irreconcilable that is in question. For a middle ground between extremes is, and has long been, a tenuous place to be...\(^{35}\). Thus the political for Walker is inherently limited by the sovereign state, and its dichotomies, like space/time, universal/particular and self/other. He suggests that international theory is therefore a theory in crisis, and he argues that the implications of having reached these limits is not a problem confined to international relations:

\[\text{[i]f state sovereignty is somehow in trouble as the great constitutive principle of modern political thought and practice, then any crisis in international relations theory can only be one expression of a more profound crisis in modern conceptions of political life in general.}\(^{36}\)

Thus Walker argues that it is the inability of the discipline to see beyond its state-based boundaries that is causing a crisis, because international relations theory seems unable to understand the political outside these familiar boundaries. The

\(^{34}\) Ibid., p. 696.  
\(^{35}\) Walker, "Fate" in Neufeld and Ebata, eds., op. cit., p. 214.  
\(^{36}\) Ibid., p. 223.
problem, as he puts it, is that "[t]he international system is constituted as a state of crisis, and there is no alternative to living in this state of crisis."\textsuperscript{37} In other words, the political in international relations is about the continuing (in)ability of state sovereignty to successfully mediate between space and time, self and other and universality and particularity. Walker does not offer a solution to this problem, but he does provide an approach for beginning to address it. The next section examines the framework Walker provides.

2. Rearticulating Political Space

Although he does not go beyond critique, Walker's analysis of the sovereign state and his depiction of the component of the political provides an indication of what is required to move toward a rearticulation of the meaning of community in international relations theory. Crucially, a \textit{spatial} notion of the political, a territorial focus that is concerned with the establishment and maintenance of boundaries between inside and outside, must be avoided. This notion of basing the political on geopolitical fragmentation means that "[t]heories of international relations can thus be read as a primary expression of the limits of modern politics. They, especially, frame these limits spatially. Politics, real politics, they suggest, can occur only as long as we are prepared - or able - to live in boxes."\textsuperscript{38}

In contrast, Walker argues that

\textquote{[t]o try to conceive forms of politics other than those framed as a spatial distinction of here and there, self and other, is to recognize that even the imagination of an alternative politics is constrained by accounts of escape that keep us firmly where and what we are.}\textsuperscript{39}

Thus Walker reframes arguments about territoriality to refers not only to

\textsuperscript{37} Ibid., p. 228.

\textsuperscript{38} Walker, "IR and the Concept of the Political", in Booth and Smith, eds., op. cit., p. 307.

\textsuperscript{39} Ibid., p. 307.
geopolitics, but also to temporality. The result is that neither geography nor history is privileged. Indeed, the omission of temporality or a sense of history is another serious pitfall to be avoided. Walker notes that

> [t]here are undoubtedly good reasons both in our experiences and in our selective memories to be impressed by the resilience of the spatial politics of both *polis* and state, but it requires a fair degree of historical myopia to give much credit to the claim that these experiences and memories tell us what and where the political *must* be, or even what and where it now is.40

It is vital to avoid an ahistorical understanding of the political, since a concept of community that is bound by modernity will simply duplicate bounded notions of the political already present in the sovereign state. Such essentialising is to be avoided, especially in terms of the component of territoriality.

In short, international relations must be able to account for change. Walker suggests that "... as discourses of limits in space, theories of international relations can also be read as discourses of limits in time."41 For Walker, the spatial or territorial boundaries of the political produce temporal limits, and both affect identity, and "... aspirations for other ways of being human."42 Thus Walker suggests that

> [c]hallenges to these [spatial and temporal] limits... constitute the crucial condition under which we might be able to renegotiate our understanding of the political under contemporary conditions, not least because they render quite untenable so many familiar accounts of who this 'we' is/are.43

In other words, answers to the questions of who we are and how we live together must not be determined solely in terms of territoriality. The political is needed as

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40 Ibid., p. 308. Emphasis original.
41 Ibid., p. 309.
42 Ibid., p. 310.
43 Ibid., p. 309.
a process for negotiating these answers — but not for providing one answer, for all places and all time and for all people. Rather, the political is to serve as the process through which these questions are asked and answered repeatedly. Thus international relations is bounded in the particular space and time of the sovereign state. It is these boundaries, these limits, according to Walker, that the discipline must re-draw in order to move away from the sovereign state and toward a rearticulation of the meaning of community in international relations theory. And the means to do so is via the component of the political.

This approach to the concept of community is crucial because challenges to the temporal and spatial boundaries of the sovereign state are inherently political. As Walker puts it,

[m]odern accounts of the political are still framed spatially: here and there, inside and outside, First World and Third World. It is within that framing that modern conceptions of temporality, of progressive history and development, have found their political purchase. Without that framing, it is difficult to make sense of politics at all. Modern accounts of the political have assumed that the puzzles of temporality can, and indeed must be solved in territorial space.44

Walker's critique challenges both the apparent universality and the apparent timelessness of political space and the concept of community as embodied in the sovereign state, and the international relations theory that is based on and perpetuates this notion of the political, as "... both an institution and a practice."45

Walker suggests that

... considerable nonsense has been uttered in many recent debates about the future of international relations precisely because they continue to be framed on the assumption that specifically modern claims about a sovereign subjectivity can be sustained as the final ground on which debates about knowledge and power can be

44 Ibid., p. 314.
Since the problems of political space are no longer satisfactorily resolved via these modernist answers, rearticulating the meaning of community in international relations must address the inherently modern character of the political in international relations. Indeed, modernist approaches to international politics are increasingly being challenged, and Walker argues that this illustrates...

...just how fragile modern accounts of the location and character of the political have become. They are certainly much too fragile to permit much confidence in the capacity of modern theories of international relations to tell us where or what the political can now be.  

In looking for a post-modern alternative to these problematic accounts of the political, Walker cites the increasing interest in 'identity politics' in international relations as one example of the recognition of problems with modernist notions of the political in the discipline.

Consequently, he suggests that in addition to the territoriality problem of limiting the political to the space and time of the sovereign state, the resultant characterisation of a politics of extremes is also problematic. For Walker, what is required is a shift away from the essentialising that defines the political as an either/or contest between universal/particular or self/other. So just as he sees the state and state sovereignty as a modernist response to problems of territoriality, so too does Walker see the settlement of self/other in the reduction of identity to (state-based) citizenship as a modernist settlement. As a consequence, the political is reduced to refereeing these modernist dichotomies via the sovereign state.

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46 Walker, "Fate" in Ebata and Neufeld, eds., op. cit., p. 220.

47 Walker, "IR and the Concept of the Political" in Booth and Smith, eds., ibid., p. 324.

48 Ibid., p. 324.

49 As Walker puts it, the modernist principle of state sovereignty is "...first and foremost, a spatial resolution of the relation between universality and particularity." Ibid., p. 78.
Consequently, Walker sees international relations theory as a theory in crisis, because it has "...reached the limits of what it is able to say about the character, location and management of crisis in modern political life." He argues that the implications of having reached these limits is an "...expression of a more profound crisis in modern conceptions of political life in general." Walker suggests that responses to this problem in international relations tend to focus on debates about identity, like those of feminist theorists, for example, or to engage in imaginative exercises concerning a future with no boundaries of inclusion/exclusion or one of global governance as, for example, Linklater does.

In other words, critical theorists in international relations are attempting indirectly to contest what presently constitutes the political in international relations. But Walker argues that this is a problem and that instead of dealing with the question of the political directly, critical theorists look elsewhere for answers, focusing on territoriality or identity rather than on the political *per se*. Walker argues that the inability of the discipline to see beyond state-based boundaries means that such work will be ineffective because international relations theory remains limited by its focus on the sovereign state. As Walker puts it, "[t]he international system is constituted as a state of crisis, and there is no alternative to living in this state of crisis." The consequences of working within this state of crisis are also serious, because even in contesting the international relations status quo, the tendency is to reproduce it. Thus Walker calls for a focus on the political and sees a rearticulation of political space as the only way to move beyond this essentialising impasse.

And because the sovereign state is neither a monological category nor an expression of extremes of either time or space, unity or diversity, there may be a

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50 Walker, "Fate" in Ebata and Nefueld, op. cit., p. 218.
51 Ibid., p. 223.
52 Ibid., pp. 231-232.
53 Ibid., p. 228.
way forward. For Walker, the sovereign state relies on its ability to successfully mediate *between* universality and particularity. This is what he means by the political. It is a process, a system for arbitration and negotiation. The fact that the sovereign state does not always successfully reconcile the universal-particular dichotomy is crucial. It allows international relations to redefine itself and political space, and not expect a solution to the universal-particular dichotomy, but to allow the individual the flexibility to do so. As Walker puts it, we must

... become more modest and recognise the difficulties we will all encounter in trying to make sense of who we are and what is going on in the world given that we have only the most fragile and fleeting idea of what it might now mean to speak of the relation between universalities and particularities on terms other than those required by the discourses of sovereign subjectivity.\(^\text{54}\)

Rearticulating the meaning of community in international relations theory, in other words, means working without the safety net of state sovereignty. It means relying on uncertainty as the one consistent feature of the political and thus of the concept of community, and seeking a means for managing, rather than resolving dichotomies such as the universal-particular dichotomy or self/other.

As an open-ended solution, this grounds without essentialising the rearticulated meaning of community. Walker argues, for example, that

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\text{[t]}o \text{ celebrate difference is, within the conventional categories, to invite the charge of relativism. But the more important project is to challenge the discursive practices in which difference is always defined as relativistic by the presumed guarantees of unity. It is to stress the possibility of new forms of political community and political practice that are open to the variety of people's experiences and histories, not closed off by either the claims of state or the claims of hegemonic universalism.}\(^\text{55}\)
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Therefore, by relying on difference and on the political as a process for

\(^{54}\text{Ibid., p. 235.}\)

negotiating it, Walker’s work illustrates the potential for rearticulating the meaning of the concept of community in international relations theory. Put simply, it requires relinquishing traditional international relations categories of territoriality – space and time – of identity defined by difference – state-based citizenship – and an understanding of politics – rather than the political – that is tied to the sovereign state and its modernist, essentialising dichotomies.

Unfortunately, this is as far as his argument goes, since it is not Walker’s explicit intention to develop a theory of community or to rearticulate its meaning in international relations theory. But his work does at least share Linklater’s concerns with territoriality and those of feminist theorists on identity, uniting them in an argument about the paucity of international relations theory as it depicts the political. The result is a notion of political space that is characterised by problems, of territoriality, identity and the political. In short, Walker problematises the fact that the sovereign state fails to provide a satisfactory answer to the questions of who we are and how we live together. In doing so he confirms that a rearticulation of the meaning of community in the discipline must account for all three core components – territoriality, identity and the political – in order to escape the modernist and essentialist settlement offered by the sovereign state.

Above all else, Walker’s work demonstrates that it is problematic to look to the sovereign state to continue to serve as the central iteration of the concept of community in international relations:

... against those who would insist that fundamental questions can still be resolved within modernist assumptions about the relationship of unity and diversity in space and time, I want to suggest that it is precisely these assumptions that make it so difficult to envisage any kind of meaningful political identity in a world of profound temporal accelerations and spatial dislocations.56

However, Walker also suggests that reframing identity less in terms of unity and

more in terms of diversity is inadequate without a complementary shift in territorial notions of community and a recognition of the implications for the political of such a change:

... while there is undoubtedly some difficulty in claims about the continuity of questions over time, it does seem to me that questions about political identity, and thus about the legitimation of various forms of inclusion and exclusion, are no longer adequately answered in the territorial terms we have inherited from early-modern Europe and reproduced so readily in the name of state and nation. This has always been a contested answer, although the terms of contestation may have now become more complex and insistent.  

And the more complex terms of contestation also need a notion of the political that is more than policies and institutions, but that provides a process for answering the questions of who we are and how we might live together. In sum, Walker's work challenges the prevailing notion of political space in international relations and he demonstrates that for rearticulating the meaning of community in international relations theory, it is necessary to understand territoriality and identity and the political.

At present, these three components tend to be examined separately, as discrete elements of international relations. Moreover,

... challenges to the principle of state sovereignty are conventionally advanced... on the ground of universalising claims about peace, justice, reason and humanity in general. This ground is precisely the condition under which claims about state sovereignty were advanced in the first place. It cannot offer the possibility of effective critique.  

According to Walker, we must therefore

... recognise the difficulties we will all encounter in trying to make sense of who we are [identity] and what is going on in the

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57 Ibid., pp. 21-22. Emphasis mine.

world [the political] given that we have only the most fragile and fleeting idea of what it might now mean to speak of the relations between universalities and particularities on terms other than those required by the discourses of sovereign subjectivity [territoriality].

The point is not that the political precedes notions of territoriality, identity or even the sovereign state. Rather, these components of the concept of community are each dependent on the others, and it is through the political that they come to constitute some expression of political space. That this does not result in the sovereign state, but a rearticulated meaning of community in international relations theory, depends on the process – the political.

By integrating all three components, Walker illustrates that territoriality, identity and the political are mutually constitutive elements, and in the sovereign state they come together to form a particular notion of political space. As a result, it is necessary to consider all three both discretely and together to rearticulate the meaning of community in international theory. The question now is whether Walker’s work on the pivotal component of the political provide a basis within international relations from which to undertake such a rearticulation.

Whether intentional or inadvertent, Walker’s critical analysis of the sovereign state and sovereign subjectivity in international relations sets out an integrated approach to rearticulating the meaning of community in international theory by problematising the political. His understanding of the political does not preclude ideas of identity or territoriality, and in fact he explicitly addresses both. In particular, Walker’s work on the political demonstrates that for rearticulating the meaning of community in international relations theory, it is necessary to understand all three components.

Walker’s work illustrates the impossibility of understanding the concept of community in any way other than as the sovereign state as long as the political is bounded by the principle and the practices of state sovereignty. The argument

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59 Walker, "Fate", in Ebata and Neufeld, eds., op. cit., p. 235.
here is not that the political is deterministic, that it precedes notions of territoriality, identity or even the state. Rather the point, as Walker argues, is that these components of the concept of community are each dependent on the others, and it is through a particular notion of the political that they come to constitute some articulation of community. However, in the case of the current prevalent articulation, Walker suggests that international relations theory

... involves the very clever trick of claiming that the principle of state sovereignty is the most important fact of life, to which students of political reality must direct their undivided attention, and then treating that same principle as merely a fact of life, an unproblematic given requiring no further examination.60

Thus rearticulating the meaning of community in international theory first requires problematizing the principles and practices of the sovereign state.

The preceding two chapters established that such work is ongoing, in terms of problems of territoriality and the universal-particular dichotomy outlined by Andrew Linklater, and in terms of problems of identity and self/other outlined by feminist theorists. For Walker, this is an essential start, and his work adds to these critiques with an indictment of the international relations understanding of the political that both frames and is framed by these other critiques. Walker’s project, crucially, includes all three components, incorporating territoriality (time and space), identity and subjectivity, and the political. As he suggests, “[i]f state sovereignty is under challenge, then no only do we have to think long and hard about the possibility of new ways of thinking about universality and difference but also about space and time and self and other.”61

The critique of international relations theory provided by R.B.J. Walker unsettles the foundations of the discipline of international relations. He suggests that moving forward requires


... an engagement with the ways in which modern sovereignties and subjectivities are now proliferating, fragmenting, becoming highly mobile and embedded in networks of relations, and are being reshaped in spatiotemporal practices that make very little sense in terms of the histories and cartographies through which we have come to naturalize the state as the only thing that can reconcile universality and particularity, space and time, self and other.62

By focusing on the political, Walker challenges underlying assumptions of international relations theory, and in particular the role of state sovereignty as the defining principle of international relations. He argues that because the political is both located in, and characterised by this principle, the sovereign state defines political space in the discipline. But he also points out that this is becoming increasingly problematic.

Without claiming that it ever provided a context for ensuring the common good, resolved the universal-particular dichotomy, settled questions of self/other in terms of identity or the territorial problems of space/time through sovereign subjectivity, Walker argues that the state certainly does not now address those problems of the political successfully. However, the difficulty in rethinking and changing this prevailing notion of community in international relations so that it might begin to address such problems more satisfactorily, is that this project is both located in, and characterised by the sovereign state.

For Walker, the question of political space is the key question for understanding the political in international relations: it determines how problems of identity and difference, of inside and outside, of inclusion and exclusion are resolved; it determines how the territorial problems of boundaries and of the universal-particular dichotomy are worked out; and it determines whether competing notions of the common good are expressed, and how they are moderated and put into practice. For Walker, any question of the concept of community is a question

62 Ibid., p. 156.
of the location and character of the political, and any question of the political is a question of the boundaries and settlements implicit in the concept of community - the two are inseparable.

Walker provides an understanding of why international relations critiques that attempt to rethink the concept of community are unsuccessful. He points out that seeking alternatives to the sovereign state and its notion of the political is bound to fail because of the tendency to address the outward manifestations of the principle of state sovereignty, rather than either the principle itself or the notion of the political on which it is based. Thus instead of asking, for example, about the nature and location of the political that informs the territorial state, there is instead a tendency in international relations theory to focus on the sovereign state itself (whether as problem or as solution). As a result, such a critique might focus on questions of territorially and problems of inclusion and exclusion. But Walker's argument is that these critiques miss the point; while challenging the state in these terms appears to be central to critiquing the political in international relations, it is in fact only a critique of the outcomes of state sovereignty, of a particular articulation of political space, and not the underlying notion of the political that give rise to the sovereign state.

There is a tendency in international relations theory to treat the symptoms rather than the disease, because it is difficult to critique international relations except within the terms of the principle of state sovereignty. And because these terms are further reinforced by the state-centricity of realism, Walker argues that engaging in critique to escape them is unavoidably self-referential. But critique is possible in those political spaces where the modern state no longer resolves problems of the political adequately, such as in terms of identity questions, for example. International relations must therefore reconsider what is meant by the prevailing articulation of community in the discipline - the state - because unless and until the foundations of international relations - such as the principle

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63 As Walker argues, "...in speaking about challenges to our understanding of political community, we run into the limits of our own ability to speak about politics at all...". Walker, "Sovereignty" op. cit., p. 168.
of state sovereignty and notions of the political – are challenged, the state will remain the sole expression of the concept of community in the discipline.

The component of the political is central to the rearticulation of the meaning of community in international relations theory. Walker's particular understanding of the political suggests that there are increasing opportunities to rethink the concept of community in international relations. By examining the three components of territoriality, identity and the political, he provides an integrated approach to rearticulating the meaning of the concept of community in international relations theory. In other words, the whole (the concept of community) must be regarded as greater than the sum of its parts (the components of territoriality, identity and the political). They are all bound together in a mutually constitutive relationship, or perhaps a series of mutually constitutive relationships. It is not enough to re-invent the sovereign state, or even to replace it. As Walker puts it:

... challenges to the principle of state sovereignty are conventionally advanced... on the ground of universalising claims about peace, justice, reason and humanity in general. This ground is precisely the condition under which claims about state sovereignty were advanced in the first place. It cannot offer the possibility of effective critique.64

International relations must therefore relocate the political by rearticulating the concept of community, to formulate a new understanding of political space.

Thus aside from problematising the prevailing concept of community in international relations with reference to problems of territoriality, identity and the political, Walker's work also offers a holistic, integrated approach within which to address all of these issues. That he does not himself undertake this programme of work is not reason to conclude that it is impossible. However, it does suggest that what is required is to reconsider the current status of the concept of community and its components in the discipline in terms of Walker's integrated approach.

Conclusion

R.B.J. Walker’s work on international relations theory does not provide a blueprint for rearticulating the meaning of community in the discipline. Not only is this not his goal, but he would argue that even to suggest doing so is problematic; since the sovereign state and political space are mutually constitutive, it is impossible to critique either because “... we are working with a set of problems produced by the claims of state sovereignty.”65 But what Walker does point out is that this set of problems does not have to be reduced to a series of essentialising dichotomies that must be resolved. Space and time, self and other, and unity and diversity are, for Walker, necessary and constitutive components of political space. Likewise, political space necessitates incorporating all of these dimensions. Setting them up as problems to be solved is a large part of the reason that the sovereign state is no longer able to satisfactorily provide answers to so many elemental questions.

What is required instead is an effort to reconstruct political space that is not essentialising and that acknowledges the need for an ongoing process of managing these dichotomous relationships without seeking to silence them. If as Walker suggests, the political is understood as a process and not an end, then political space will necessarily be different. At present, the sovereign state is the space in which the the contradictory relations between unity and diversity, between the internal and the external and between space and time are resolved. But if political space is no longer conceived as an enclosure, and territoriality, identity and the political are no longer reduced to problems to be solved, then thinking about political space may become an exercise in rearticulating the meaning of community in international theory.

The point is that a new notion of political space will still have to face the dichotomies of universality/particularity, self/other and space/time, but it may do

so by using them rather than ignoring or silencing them. Rearticulating the meaning of community does not, therefore, require a choice between man and citizen, or universal and particular. It involves recognizing that both are integral parts of political space. Similarly, inside and outside must be acknowledged as fluid rather than fixed, with neither location nor longevity conferring a greater value on either. To put this another way, the relationship of time and space, self and other, and unity and diversity in the sovereign state is very different than in the concept of community. The former fixes a solution to all three and is itself an end, while the latter is ongoing and manages all three as an open-ended process.

By distinguishing between politics and the political in Walker's work, he is able to show us that state sovereignty comprises a set of political practices that provides a poor solution to the fundamental questions of who are we and how we ought to live together. Moreover, he is also able to point to an alternative, and argues that if we look beyond politics to see what informs these practices, we must also look beyond the sovereign state and rearticulate the meaning of community in international theory. This will not only begin to address the limits placed on the political by the sovereign state, but it will also refocus the limits of political space that result from focusing on politics rather than the political. In short, by rearticulating the meaning of community in international relations theory, it is no longer necessary to separate the contradictions of self and other, universal and particular into specific territorialities and identities. The political, in other words, is the process by which these contradictions are continually and repeatedly worked out.

Thus simply because the sovereign state critiqued by Walker is a (relatively) successful articulation of political space that now prevails, there is no reason to think that alternatives are unavailable. And while cautioning against the seemingly inevitable pitfalls of the sovereign state, Walker's work offers a framework for moving from critique of the current conception of community in international relations to its eventual rearticulation via the possibility that the boundaries of the concept of community do not have to be coextensive with the boundaries of the state.
This framework is based on the assertion that the sovereign state and the political are mutually constitutive; to critique the former is to make a set of claims about the latter, and to question what constitutes the political is to question the boundaries of the sovereign state. The problem Walker highlights is that critique of either on any other terms but those set by state sovereignty is virtually impossible. Hence the pivotal nature of the component of the political. It determines how the problems of identity and difference, of inside and outside, of inclusion and exclusion are approached; it determines how the territorial problems of boundaries and of the universal-particular dichotomy are worked out; and it determines what, if anything, is understood as the common good.

Therefore, Walker unsettles the notion of the political that appears, naturally and inevitably, to flow from the sovereign state. He argues that seeking alternatives to the sovereign state and its notion of the political is bound to fail because critical approaches tend to address the outward manifestations of the principle of state sovereignty, rather than either the principle itself or the political. He establishes that it is difficult to critique international relations except within the terms of the principle of state sovereignty. And because these terms are further reinforced by the state-centricity of realism, Walker argues that engaging in critique to escape them is unavoidably self-referential.

Thus his particular understanding of the political as a mediator of space and time, self and other and unity and diversity is vital. His work suggests that international relations theorists must reconsider what is understood to constitute political space in the discipline. Walker's work offers a holistic, integrated approach within which to do so, but that he does not himself undertake this work suggests that Walker's approach alone may not be sufficient for this task. Therefore, what is required is to reconsider the concept of community and its components in the discipline in terms of Walker's framework.

The work of Andrew Linklater on territoriality and (the boundaries of) the universal-particular dichotomy, the work of feminist theorists on
identity/difference and self/other, and Walker's work on the political which incorporates all of these concerns, must be evaluated together. This chapter and the two that preceded it indicate that the analytical tools for undertaking the rearticulation of the meaning of community are present in international relations theory, and that what remains, crucially, is to bring these disparate approaches together. As Walker's work illustrates, territoriality, identity and the political are not discrete, but fundamentally interconnected components of the concept of community. It is the task of the next chapter to take account of the work already done on these individual components, to determine what is required on the part of international relations theory to integrate them into an approach that will foster rearticulation.

The next, concluding chapter thus takes on Walker's concerns that the boundaries of state sovereignty and thus of the political are too comfortable; that they are so old and familiar that the limits they impose are rarely challenged directly, because they have ceased to be understood as limits. Like that of Linklater and the feminists, Walker's project alerts international relations to its modernist complacency: all three critical theory approaches demonstrate that the prevailing concept of political space in international relations - the sovereign state - is not final any more than it is a natural articulation of the concept of community. By comparing their contributions, the next chapter concludes that all three, combined with the work of Jean-Luc Nancy on the concept of community, indicate the way toward rearticulating the meaning of community in international relations theory.
Chapter Six
Interrupting the Concept of Community in
International Theory

Perhaps we should not seek a word or a concept for it, but rather recognize in the thought of community a theoretical excess (or more precisely, an excess in relation to the theoretical) that would oblige us to adopt another discourse of praxis and community.¹

This thesis argues that the prevailing understanding of the concept of community in international relations is the sovereign state. Given that this produces an understanding of political space that is inadequate on a number of grounds, the thesis seeks to rearticulate the meaning of community in international theory, in order to better answer the questions of who we are and how we ought to live together. In order to do so, the thesis looks outside of international relations to understand of what the concept of community consists, and proposes that territoriality, identity and the political are its core components. Considering each component in terms of international relations theory, the thesis argues that the analytical tools for rearticulating the meaning of community in international theory are present in the discipline, specifically in the work of Andrew Linklater, feminist theorists, and R.B.J. Walker. This chapter therefore turns to the question of what is required to move beyond identifying the basic elements for rearticulation, to develop a framework for undertaking that task. What is at stake is no less than creating the conditions of possibility for developing better and more useful ways of answering the fundamental questions of who we are and how we ought to live together, by way of a rearticulated meaning of community in international theory.

The preceding chapters suggest that such a project is feasible, that it is necessary, and that it is, to an extent, already underway in international relations. However, there is still more to be done since Linklater, feminist theorists and Walker are not explicitly seeking to rearticulate the meaning of community, nor do any of them provide an explicit method for doing so. In short, this thesis has argued that

the work done by all three is necessary but insufficient to rearticulate the meaning of community in international theory. This chapter, therefore, sets out what is required in addition to rearticulate the meaning of community in international theory. It revisits the three components of territoriality, identity and the political that constitute the concept of community, not as discrete parts, but as mutually constitutive of the concept of community, and it explores the work of another theorist – Jean-Luc Nancy – from outside international relations on the concept, seeking to bring them together.

The first section begins with a comparative analysis of the work of Linklater, feminist theorists and Walker. In establishing the extent to which work on the concept of community is already underway in international relations, the argument here is that an integrated approach to the concept of community is required for its rearticulation, and that such an approach necessarily pivots on the component of the political. The problem that remains, however, is that these presently disparate international relations approaches are insufficient on their own. They are critical theory approaches that explicitly seek to redefine political space in international relations by rejecting the problem-solving state-centricity of realism, and they do centralize normative concerns, but they are insufficiently interconnected for rearticulating the meaning of community in international theory. They have different goals and ultimately understand the concept differently. Thus the section concludes that it is imperative to once again look outside of international relations for a way forward.

The second section thus addresses what is required to move ahead, arguing that the concept of community must no longer be conceived as an end in itself. Focusing on the component of the political, this section looks to the work of the French philosopher Jean-Luc Nancy on the concept of community. Nancy addresses many of the concerns raised by the three critical theory approaches to the components of the concept of community, and offers a highly abstract but helpful approach to rearticulating the meaning of community in international theory. The conclusion of this chapter argues that, taken together, Nancy's work on the concept of community and the critical theory work already ongoing in the
discipline provides a framework for the rearticulation of the meaning of community in international relations theory.

1. The Concept of Community in International Relations

The preceding three chapters indicate that work on rearticulating the meaning of community in international relations theory is underway. The analytical tools for undertaking this work are present in international relations theory. What remains, crucially, is to bring these disparate approaches together. Territoriality, identity and the political are not discrete parts, but are fundamentally interconnected components of the concept of community. In international relations at present, they are not dealt with as such. It is the task of this section to compare the three international relations approaches to each component, assess the extent to which these interconnections are evident and what work remains to ensure that the concept of community as a whole may be rearticulated in the discipline.

The three approaches in international relations to the concept of community that offer the best way forward are all based in critical theory, and include the work of Andrew Linklater, feminist theorists and R.B.J. Walker. Linklater has much to offer, though he takes on so much that his contribution ultimately seems spread rather thin. Indeed, he sets out to address philosophical, sociological and praxeological questions, and he does so within a normative, cosmopolitan argument that prioritises the component of territoriality via questions of boundaries and inclusion/exclusion, in terms of the universal-particular dichotomy, and all with a view to transforming community. Attempting to address these complex issues is itself a huge task, and trying to bind them together in a neat package of some sort of transformed community ultimately proves too much for Linklater to achieve, even theoretically. In short, his

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2 This is a common theme throughout the “Forum on The Transformation of Political Community”, in Review of International Studies (Vol. 25, No. 1, 1999), pp. 139-175. As R.B.J. Walker put it, capturing the difficulty of Linklater's approach in general, and specifically his ambiguity in Transformation: “One of the challenges of reading the book, in fact, is that it covers so much ground, and so many theoretical controversies, that I am left more with an impression of how the central argument is supposed to work than with any clear sense of either its logical or empirical force. Many of its key
ambitious efforts to transform community do not succeed, not least because he locates both problem and solution in the sovereign territorial state.

Linklater's work nevertheless contributes to the potential rearticulation of the meaning of community because of his focus on the universal-particular dichotomy. Ironically, this contribution is not based on resolving this dichotomy, despite Linklater's best efforts. Rather, his work on the component of territoriality highlights the importance of the universal-particular dichotomy as a mutually constitutive element of the concept of community. In sum, Linklater's normative critical theory approach to the problem of political space and the concept of community in international relations contributes to the potential rearticulation of the meaning of community by establishing that such a rearticulation must be about finding a way to manage such dichotomies without essentialising them.

Feminist international theory, with its focus on the component of identity, also contributes to the rearticulation of the meaning of community in international theory, especially in terms of problems of self/other. In this context, feminist theorists critique the component of identity by drawing attention to the problems of denial of difference and shared subjectivity. By recognising that the concept of community is potentially problematic, feminist international theorists are, unlike Linklater, sceptical of relying on it as a solution to problems of identity and difference. Their work thus contributes to the task of rearticulating the meaning of the concept of community in international relations theory because of their focus on the importance of identity, and also because their work sounds a cautionary note about the potential dangers of the denial of difference in idealizing the concept. In sum, feminist theorists, like Linklater, also point to the importance of a rearticulated meaning of community in international theory embracing dichotomies like self/other, rather than seeking to silence them, or ignoring them altogether.

Walker focuses on the political, and by engaging almost exclusively in critique, is
able to avoid the inevitable criticism that attends any attempt to solve the problems he identifies. However, his work does contest the limitations of the sovereign state, and perhaps more importantly, also questions the (apparent) inevitability of it as the dominant articulation of the concept of community in international relations. As a consequence, Walker's work addresses all three components of the concept of community while recognising the problem of the ubiquitous nature of state sovereignty that permeates any attempt to move beyond critique given the limitations on political space set by international relations. Despite the gap that results from Walker's focus on critique, his work on the political illustrates the need to move beyond characterising the rearticulated meaning of community primarily with reference to its discrete components. In other words, while rearticulation requires more work on the components than that already done in international relations, Walker's contribution is that this work must in future be integrated. Focusing on the political is vital because it necessitates consideration of the other two components as well.

Therefore, the argument arising from work on the concept of community in social theory, and particularly from the critical approaches in international relations to it and its components, is that the meaning of the concept of community is to a significant extent determined by how these individual components are approached and understood. And conversely, the meaning and importance of the discrete components is equally influenced by how the concept of community is characterised. To put this another way, the concept of community and the components of territoriality, identity and the political are mutually constitutive. This is the reason that each of the three critical approaches on its own is insufficient for rearticulating the meaning of community. And this is why Linklater, feminist theorists, and Walker do not succeed on their own – each is focusing too much on one component of the concept of community, at the expense of consideration of the others and of the concept as a whole. And this is why the component of the political is pivotal. It best captures all three components escapes the political space of the sovereign state: it is through a recognition of the distinction between politics and the political that rearticulating the meaning of community depends.
This distinction, as Walker's work makes clear, is part of what separates the sovereign state from the concept of community. The former is an end in itself, with politics providing closure, while the latter is a process based on an understanding of the political that does not fix time and space, self and other, and unity and diversity once and for all. The concept of community, as understood through the three critical theory approaches of Linklater, feminist theorists and Walker, is about questioning those dichotomies and accepting and even embracing them through the political. The sovereign state is about how politics operates to silence or ignore those dichotomies. Both produce a very different understanding of political space, and how we define and enact political space is about questioning what we understand by territoriality, identity and the political; it is about questioning what we understand by the concept of community. It is not – or ought not to be – about silencing or ignoring those questions, as the sovereign state so often does, given its understanding of political space, and reproducing it in turn.

For Linklater, political space is a problem because of territoriality. He is concerned with the distinction made between inside and outside, and with inclusion and exclusion, as determined by how the universal-particular dichotomy is fixed within the boundaries of the sovereign state. For feminist international theory, political space is a problem because of identity. Feminist theorists are concerned with the problem of sameness or denial of difference in social relations, as determined by how citizenship is an exclusive identity of self/other as defined by the sovereign state. For Walker, political space is a problem because the political is reduced to politics determined by the sovereign state, fixing time and space, self and other, and unity and diversity within it. Therefore, there is common recognition that there is a problem with political space in international relations theory, but each of these critical theorists approaches and understands it in a different way, and consequently offers up a different angle as to why and how to rearticulate the meaning of community in international theory.
Of course, it is not the case that Linklater, feminist theorists and Walker address only one component of the concept of community each: all three approaches address all three components to varying degrees, because the components are fundamentally interconnected. Indeed, for Linklater, territoriality, identity and the political are all aspects of the problem of transforming community whose solution he situates in the evolution of the sovereign state. Put simply, Linklater argues that changing the boundaries/territoriality of the state will also result in problems of identity and the political being settled. However, Linklater is unable to escape the boundaries of the sovereign state despite problematising them explicitly, mainly because he situates his solution in the sovereign state, which he presumes to be evolving naturally in a cosmopolitan direction, and also because he seeks a resolution to the universal-particular dichotomy, rather than accepting that temporary and transitory settlements of it may be all that is possible. In other words, while Linklater's approach does address all three components, it is limited because of his focus on territoriality.

For feminist theorists, territoriality, identity and the political are all aspects of a problem whose solution lies in addressing the issue of denial of difference. Again, to put it simply, feminist international theorists argue that changing state-based notions of identity will have a beneficial effect on problems of territoriality and the political. Feminist international theorists, therefore, are somewhat more successful than Linklater because their solution is at least based on changing the way that identity is demarcated by territoriality, rather than merely seeking to change the boundaries of the territory in question. Nevertheless, by focusing primarily on the component of identity, the feminist theory approach is ultimately dependent on a different notion of the political developing in order to implement such a change. In other words, while all three components are addressed by feminist theory, its focus on identity places limits on its contribution to the rearticulation of the meaning of community in international theory.

And finally, for Walker, territoriality, identity and the political are both constituted by and constitutive of the sovereign state. As a result, he does not situate a potential solution in territoriality as Linklater proposes, or in identity as
the feminists suggest, because he does not see these components as separable from the prevailing concept of community in international relations: the sovereign state. Instead, Walker sees a solution as resting on changing how international relations conceives of the political. For Walker, to put it simply, changing how the political is understood in international relations will, in turn, produce altered notions of territoriality and identity, and ultimately result in an opportunity to redefine political space through a rearticulation of the meaning of community. Thus Walker is better able to indicate how to move beyond the sovereign state than the others because he problematises the political: his approach allows for escaping the boundaries of the sovereign state because, unlike Linklater, who also seeks to escape them, Walker challenges the notion of the political that produces and is produced by them. And because Walker's approach recognizes that the dichotomy of self/other is bound up with the territoriality and identity of the sovereign state, his approach, unlike feminist theorists, who also recognize this problem, challenges the notion of the political that produces and is produced by them. Thus by focusing on the political, Walker includes critiques of territoriality and identity as well.

The problem with Walker's approach, though, is that he does not venture beyond critique. This places (self-imposed) limitations on his contribution to the potential rearticulation of the meaning of community in international theory. Interestingly, the work of Linklater and Walker is similar in that they both identify corresponding problems in international relations theory. And yet their work diverges, for two main reasons. First, although they both problematise the sovereign state, they do not conceptualise the concept of community in the same way. Linklater adopts a hierarchical approach to transforming community, arguing that the problem lies with the boundaries of inside and outside expressed in the sovereign state and with the problem of resolving the universal-particular dichotomy. Walker, conversely, argues that the problem is the sovereign state itself and that the boundaries of inside/outside are merely symptomatic of this larger problem. Second, by focusing on different components of the concept of community, Linklater and Walker see a political solution differently. For Linklater, the solution is to be found in some new iteration of the concept of
community that naturally arises out of the sovereign state, while Walker suggests that any solution that is state-based will inevitably fail.

The crucial point is that each of the three approaches illustrate the fundamental interconnectedness of the three components of the concept of community. Linklater, feminist theorists and Walker all touch on territoriality, identity and the political regardless of their primary focus. But equally important is the fact that, whichever component they do focus on determines the extent to which their potential contribution to rearticulating the meaning of community in international theory is likely to be successful. In sum, focusing on the political, as Walker does, is the most helpful and productive approach to the problem of political space, because it inevitably includes the other components as well in its rearticulation of the meaning of community in international theory. The same cannot be said for focusing on either territoriality or identity.

In sum, the critiques and solutions offered by Linklater, feminist theorists and Walker are all necessary for rearticulating the meaning of community in international theory. None on its own, however, is sufficient. What they share, crucially, is a concern with the problem of political space in international relations, a critical theory outlook and approach, and a recognition of the need to rethink and rearticulate the meaning of community in international theory. What distinguishes them is their focus on different components of the concept of community, and the different ways forward implied as a consequence. The result is that, first, it is evident that the analytical tools for rearticulating the meaning of community in international theory are present in the discipline, and second, that what is necessary for rearticulation is an approach that incorporates all three components. The next section thus looks outside international relations once again for an approach to the concept of community that will bring all three international relations approaches together to rearticulate its meaning.

2. The Inoperative Community

There is not much work in international relations that explicitly calls for a
rearticulation of the meaning of community, including the work of theorists included here – Linklater, feminist theorists and Walker. But given that the understanding of political space in international relations is increasingly inadequate, it is correspondingly clear that the sovereign state is no longer what it was, or at least no longer what it was once meant to be. Thus new standards for political space in international relations must derive from outside the discipline, in part from social theory and the requirements set out for the concept of community in political studies and sociology, for example. In this context, David Harvey's comments about modernity apply equally well to the concept of community:

It is never easy, of course, to construct a critical assessment of a condition that is overwhelmingly present. The terms of debate, description, and representation are often so circumscribed that there seems to be no escape from evaluations that are anything other than self-referential.3

In other words, the need to rearticulate the meaning of community in international theory is clear, but the dominance of realist, problem-solving approaches in the discipline means that it is not a straightforward task of simply adding to or redirecting international relations theory.

The question of the rearticulation of the meaning of community in international relations theory might be summed up with "... the simple question about human identity, about who we are and how we might live together whoever we are."4 This apparently simple question goes to the very centre of questions about the meaning of the concept of community. First, it asks directly about the nature and

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constitution of political space; second, it begs the question of who "we" are, both individually and collectively; and finally, it brings both questions (of territoriality and identity) together in terms of the political by asking what it means to live politically.

Rearticulating the meaning of community in international relations must address these three questions and seeks to provide better answers. At a minimum, a better context than the state must be developed for addressing these questions. A rearticulated meaning of community, therefore, must not be conceived primarily or exclusively in terms of territoriality; it must not require a single common identity; and it must not be understood as a (political) end in itself. To put this another way, rearticulating meaning of community in international relations theory must allow for political space to be de-territorialised, for identity to be disengaged from citizenship, and for the political to be a process and not an end. In fact, a rearticulated meaning of community in international relations theory must itself be understood as a process.

In order to rearticulate the meaning of community, therefore, the work of Jean-Luc Nancy, and what he calls the inoperative community will be of use. Nancy's approach challenges the territorial limitations of inside and outside exemplified in the sovereign state, as well as notions of identity that deny difference, and thus he also challenges what these problems produce: what Nancy calls 'the closure of the political'. In short, Nancy's approach to the concept of community, in conjunction with the insights of the three international relations critical theory approaches, together provide the conditions of possibility for rearticulating the meaning of community in international relations theory.

Jean-Luc Nancy and The Inoperative Community

Jean-Luc Nancy's work on the concept of community begins by noting its absence: "[t]he gravest and most painful testimony of the modern world, the one that possibly involves all other testimonies to which this epoch must answer... is the testimony of the dissolution, the dislocation, or the conflagration of
community."⁵ Indeed, suggesting that communism is an ideal of community that "... stands as an emblem of the desire to discover or rediscover a place of community...", Nancy argues that in practice it ended in betrayal, in totalitarianism.⁶ This problem of 'immanentism' (a term that Nancy prefers to 'totalitarianism') is a problem of the communist/communitarian ideal, particularly in practice, because it demands political fusion, denying individuality in its demand for (political) absolutes.⁷

In explaining his understanding of the contemporary "breakdown in community", Nancy suggests that

... history has been thought on the basis of a lost community - one to be regained or reconstituted. The lost, or broken, community can be exemplified in all kinds of ways, by all kinds of paradigms: the natural family, the Athenian city, the Roman Republics, the first Christian community, corporations, communes, or brotherhoods - always it is a matter of a lost age in which community was woven of tight, harmonious, and infrangible bonds and in which above all it played back to itself, through its institutions, its rituals, and its symbols, the representation, indeed the living offering, of its own immanent


⁶ Nancy, Inoperative, ibid., p. 2.

⁷ And this is not a merely theoretical problem; as Nancy rather starkly puts it "... political or collective enterprises dominated by a will to absolute immanence have as their truth the truth of death. Immanence, communal fusion, contains no other logic than that of the suicide of the community that is governed by it. Thus the logic of Nazi Germany was not only that of the extermination of the other, of the subhuman deemed exterior to the communion of blood and soil, but also, effectively, the logic of sacrifice aimed at all those in the 'Aryan' community who did not satisfy the criteria of pure immanence..." Nancy, ibid., p. 12. Emphasis original.
unity, intimacy and autonomy. Distinct from society... and opposed to empires... community is not only intimate communication between its members, but also its organic communion with its own essence... it is made up principally of the sharing, diffusion, or impregnation of an identity by a plurality wherein each member identifies himself only through the supplementary mediation of his identification with the living body of the community.  

Nancy argues that this history of the concept of community, which informs the modern ideal of the concept, is largely mythical.

The sense of 'lost community' is mythical according to Nancy because it is an ideal reflecting "...the modern, humanist Christian consciousness of the loss of community..." and thus he argues that "Community has not taken place..." because

[society] was not built on the ruins of a community. It emerged from the disappearance or the conservation of something - tribes or empires - perhaps just as unrelated to what we call "community" as to what we call "society." So that community, far from being what society has crushed or lost, is what happens to us - question, waiting, event, imperative - in the wake of society. Nothing, therefore, has been lost...

As a result, Nancy suggests that the concept of community is not some sort of Platonic ideal to be rediscovered or sentimentally longed for, and in fact the idealised community is to be rejected outright. For Nancy, the immanence inherent in the ideal of community is problematic because "... immanence, if it were to come about, would instantly suppress community...". Thus the concept of community should not aim to produce fusion, or some sense of communion,

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8 Ibid., p. 9.
9 Ibid., p. 11.
10 Ibid., pp. 11-12. Emphasis original.
11 Ibid., p. 12. Nancy suggests that immanence as an ideal of community is in fact deadly, producing a logic that demands nothing less than the extermination of the other, of those who are distinct and not fused together, whether they be inside or outside such a community.
sameness, or unity, because of "... the paradox of a thinking magnetically attracted toward community and yet governed by the theme of the sovereignty of a subject... for us all, a thinking of the subject thwarts a thinking of community." But in rejecting the ideal of community, Nancy is not promoting an ideal of individualism instead. In fact, he argues that "... the individual is merely the residue of the experience of the dissolution of community... [i]t is another, and symmetrical, figure of immanence: the absolutely detached for-itself, taken as origin and as certainty." 

Nancy instead proposes a notion of sharing (partage) as central to the concept of community, suggesting that rather than promoting fusion, or a common being, community instead is about 'being-in-common'. He notes that "[b]eing-in-common does not mean a higher form of substance or subject taking charge of the limits of separate individualities." Instead, Nancy proposes the idea of the sharing of individuality, emphasising communication rather than communion. As a result, his concept of community is not a project, because it cannot be created performatively. Instead Nancy develops the idea of "the inoperative community", arguing that:

[i]t is not a matter of making, producing, or instituting a community... it is a matter of incompleting its sharing. Sharing is always incomplete, or it is beyond completion and incompletion. For a complete sharing implies the disappearance of what is shared. Community is given to us with being and as being, well in advance of all our projects, desires, and undertakings... Community is, in a sense, resistance itself: namely, resistance to immanence.

In other words, community is inherently and unavoidably political for Nancy, where

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12 Ibid., p. 23. Emphasis original.
13 Ibid., p. 3.
14 Ibid., p. 27.
15 Ibid., p. 35.
"[p]olitical" would mean a community ordering itself to the unworking of its communication, or destined to this unworking: a community consciously undergoing the experience of its sharing. To attain such a signification of the "political" does not depend, or in any case not simply, on what is called a "political will". It implies being already engaged in the community, that is to say, undergoing, in whatever manner, the experience of community as communication...\(^\text{16}\)

Communication, in Nancy's terms, involves interrupting myths of community which are, of necessity, immanentist or totalitarian, and which are also the opposite of communion, which he argues is (the impossibility of) "... the unique voice of the many...".\(^\text{17}\)

In seeking to preempt fusion, or communion, and avoid immanentism, community resists myth and is, rather, inoperative: both interrupted and incomplete. For Nancy, "[i]nterruption occurs at the edge, or rather it constitutes the edge where beings touch each other, expose themselves to each other and separate from one another, thus communicating and propagating their community."\(^\text{18}\) The interruption of the concept of community and of community myths is crucial, because interruption allows for being-in-common rather than communion or fusion, and moreover, it allows for resistance to the ideals and myths of community:

... we understand only that there is no common understanding of community, that sharing does not constitute an understanding (or a concept, or an intuition, or a schema), that it does not constitute a knowledge, and that it gives no one, including community itself, mastery over being-in-common.\(^\text{19}\)

Additionally, Nancy also suggests that the inoperative community does not

\(^\text{16}\) Ibid., pp. 40-41.
\(^\text{17}\) Ibid., p. 51.
\(^\text{18}\) Ibid., p. 61.
\(^\text{19}\) Ibid., p. 69.
produce a common space, a common identity, or, therefore, a common notion of the political.

Instead, community is about "... the inscription of a meaning whose transcendence or presence is indefinitely and constitutively deferred." Community

...defines at least a limit at which all politics stop and begin. The communication that takes place on this limit, and that, in truth, constitutes it, demands that way of destining ourselves in common that we call a politics, that way of opening community to itself, rather than to a destiny or to a future... [thus] community, in its infinite resistance to everything that would bring it to completion... signifies an irrepressible political exigency... it refers... to that which resists any definition or program, be these political, aesthetic, or philosophical.

The point for Nancy is that within "... the thinking of community as essence - is in effect the closure of the political... because it assigns to community a common being..." whereas the inoperative community is instead about sharing, about being-in-common, rather than being common or being the same. As he puts it, "[h]ow can we be receptive to the meaning of our multiple, dispersed, mortally fragmented existences, which nonetheless only make sense by existing in common?" Thus the concept of community for Nancy is not teleological, any more than it is ever complete, or a matter of choice or of design.

According to Nancy, all that individuals have in common is their differences, and thus community exists as a recognition and an embodiment of difference: "... what community reveals to me, in presenting to me my birth and my death, is my existence outside myself." But the inoperative community that interrupts

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20 Ibid., p. 80. Emphasis mine.

21 Ibid., p. 81.

22 Ibid., p. xxxviii. Emphasis original.

23 Ibid., p. xl. Emphasis original.

24 Ibid., p. 26
immanentism is not apathetic or indifferent to the individual because

...the passion of and for community propagates itself, unworked, appealing, demanding to pass beyond every limit and every fulfilment enclosed in the form of an individual. It is thus not an absence, but a movement, it is unworking in its singular "activity", it is the propagation, even the contagion, or again the communication of community itself that propagates itself or communicates its contagion *by its very interruption.*

Thus community for Nancy means being-*in*-common or sharing; what is vital is the experience of unity *in* diversity, because what unites *is* difference, and anything else risks immanentism or totalitarianism. In short then, the concept of community for Nancy means difference, and the political must not be dominated either by a totalising universalism or a reductionist, atomistic individualism: indeed, Nancy's notion of the inoperative community is meant to ensure that neither develops.

In offering a concept of community that resists traditional ideals, Nancy's work is important. It incorporates concerns with boundaries and territoriality, with identity and subjectivity, and the political. But the problem with his approach, at least in terms of the potential rearticulation of the meaning of community in international relations theory, is that it is highly abstract.

Commenting on Nancy's inoperative community, Christopher Fynsk notes that:

... anyone seeking an immediate political application of this thought of community risks frustration... [because] it is exceedingly difficult to define, for example, how one might move from his definition of a nonorganic, differential articulation of social existence... to any currently existing politics. For once again, there is a point at which this move becomes properly unthinkable in the terms of any traditional conception of the relation between theory and practice: one cannot work to institute or realize this thought of community.

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25 Ibid., p. 60. Emphasis original.

Indeed, Nancy himself notes that "[p]erhaps we should not seek a word or a concept for it, but rather recognize in the thought of community a theoretical excess (or more precisely, an excess in relation to the theoretical) that would oblige us to adopt another discourse of praxis and community."\textsuperscript{27} However, despite the practical difficulties and theoretical excesses of Nancy's work, Fynsk suggests that "... the experience of the political, as Nancy defines it, demands political response - both because it provides a sharp sense of the abstraction of the reigning political ideologies and because it entails the experience of something like an imperative."\textsuperscript{28}

Recognising both the importance of Nancy's work and the impediments to its realisation, Simon Critchley suggests that there may be a way to move the inoperative community from abstract theory to concrete practice. In summarising Nancy's work, Critchley suggests that "Nancy is attempting to think the community, the in-common of human beings, not as a substance or subject, but rather as the practice of a partage, a non-totalisable existential disposition of sharing and division."\textsuperscript{29} As a result, Critchley argues that

... the question of politics, as I see it, becomes a question of how the community can remain a place for commonality, whilst at the same time being an open community, an interrupted community that is respectful of difference and which resists the societal closure implicit within totalitarianism and immanentism. In Nancy's critique of immanentism and his rethinking of politics and community one finds the basis for a reinvention of politics upon an ethical recognition of injustice.\textsuperscript{30}

Thus for Critchley, Nancy's ontology of community may be put into practice by


\textsuperscript{28} Fynsk, in Nancy, \textit{Inoperative}, ibid., p. xi. Emphasis original.

\textsuperscript{29} Simon Critchley, "Re-tracing the Political: Politics and Community in the Work of Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy" in David Campbell and Michael Dillon (eds.) \textit{The Political Subject of Violence} (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993), p. 89.

\textsuperscript{30} Critchley, "Retracing" ibid., p. 91.
way of ethics, and particularly in terms of linking ethics and the political.

This focus on ethics is important, because the idea of community as inoperative might seem to imply an inherent apathy or indifference. But as Fred Dallmayr notes,

The notion of an "inoperative community" is meant to serve as a bulwark both against a totalizing globalism (dominated by hegemonic powers) and against the surrender of politics to the relentless self-interest of atomistic agents (be they states, corporations, or private individuals).31

And Nancy himself argues not only that the concept of community and the political are mutually dependent, but also that the importance of the questions they pose cannot be overstated:

One thing at least is clear: if we do not face up to such questions, the political will soon desert us completely, if it has not already done so. It will abandon us to political and technological economies... Being-in-common will nonetheless never cease to resist, but its resistance will belong decidedly to another world entirely. Our world, as far as politics is concerned, will be a desert, and we will wither away without a tomb - which is to say, without community, deprived of our finite existence.32

Thus in his work on the concept of community, Nancy focuses on the political, both beginning and ending with how to avoid its closure. As a result, he develops a concept of community based on the political that is distinct from the sovereign state.

For Nancy, community allows individuals to come together in the only way he sees possible, not by virtue of their commonality, but because of their differences, which is all that unites individuals because it is all that they have in common.


Difference is the feature that both distinguishes us and which we all share. Thus the concept of community is the means by which to open the political, and Nancy argues that territoriality alone is an inadequate approach to community, to the openness demanded of a political life based on being-in-common. In short, Nancy offers a concept of community in sharp contrast to the dominant expression of it in international relations.

Therefore, given the critical work already underway on the question "... about who we are and how we might live together whoever we are." Nancy's work on the concept of community, in combination with the three critical theory approaches in international relations, is indicative of a way forward – one that is distinct from the state and which provides the conditions of possibility for the rearticulation of the meaning of community in international relations theory. The final section of the chapter sets out what is involved in rearticulation, based on the argument that the concept of community must be understood as a process.

Conclusion

By critiquing the concept of community in international relations, developing terms of reference for it via social theory, and analysing ongoing work on the concept in the discipline, this thesis takes the initial steps towards the rearticulation of the meaning of the concept of community in international relations. The thesis has established that there is a need to rearticulate the meaning of the concept of community in international relations theory, and that the analytical tools to do this work are present in the discipline. What remains is to undertake it, and move beyond the initial steps outline here. This conclusion sets out the necessary elements of a rearticulated meaning of community in international relations theory. The basis of rearticulating the meaning of community as a process is, therefore, critical theory work on the three components of the concept of community – territoriality, identity and the political – using the approach of Jean-Luc Nancy and his notion of the inoperative

33 Walker, "International Relations Theory and the Fate of the Political", op. cit., p. 231.
community. This approach is vital because separating the concept from its components in any way other than for heuristic purposes does not reflect the contingent and conditional nature of the concept, its components, or their mutually dependent relationships. Thus like putting together a jigsaw puzzle, each piece is crucial separately, but discrete only until connected to the next, when it begins to form a coherent, and thus a meaningful whole.

In *Life: A User's Manual*, Georges Perec captures this idea in his discussion of jigsaw puzzles:

... the perceived object... is not a sum of elements to be distinguished from each other and analysed discretely, but a pattern, that is to say a form, a structure: the element's existence does not precede the existence of the whole, it comes neither before nor after it, for the parts do not determine the pattern, but the pattern determines the parts: knowledge of the pattern and of its laws, of the set and structure, could not possibly be derived from discrete knowledge of the elements that compose it... The pieces are readable, take on a sense, only when assembled; in isolation, a puzzle piece means nothing - just an impossible question, an opaque challenge. But as soon as you have succeeded... in fitting it into one of its neighbours, the piece disappears, ceases to exist as a piece. The intense difficulty preceding this link-up - which the English word *puzzle* indicates so well - not only loses its *raison d'être*, it seems never to have had any reason, so obvious does the solution appear. The two pieces so miraculously conjoined are henceforth one, which in its turn will be a source of error, hesitation, dismay, and expectation.34

When it comes to rearticulating the meaning of community in international relations theory, the problem is that, unlike a jigsaw puzzle, the concept of community is open-ended, it is an ongoing process in which the separate pieces change and move, as does the whole, without ever becoming fixed or totalising.

But the metaphorical puzzle captures much of what is involved in rearticulating the meaning of community in international relations theory. It describes the

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relationship between the discrete components, the concept itself and their mutually constitutive nature. Moreover, it also illustrates that focusing on one component, for example, or on the concept of community as a whole without reference to its components, is problematic and will yield problematic results. Thus in international relations, political space is demarcated by the sovereign state and the components of territoriality, identity and the political are unsatisfactorily managed via these narrow boundaries. And when these components are addressed separately, as in the work of Andrew Linklater, feminist theorists and R.B.J. Walker, they are unable to rearticulate the meaning of community, or even redefine political space. Rearticulating the meaning of community depends on acknowledging that these components constitute and are constituted by the concept of community.

Thus it is possible to address troublesome issues in international relations such as social movements or migration by examining one piece of the problem, and focusing on territoriality rather than identity, for example. Indeed, components like territoriality, identity and the political are often treated as discrete elements in international relations, and analysed as distinct from and even unrelated to each other, which is why these types of politics and political actors are so poorly understood in the discipline. However, the point of rearticulating the meaning of community (and making it possible to redefine political space) is that it turns the challenge of understanding social movements or migration into more than a series of discrete questions about identity or territoriality or the political. A rearticulated concept of community requires that, in order to provide answers about migration or social movements, it is necessary to consider territoriality and identity and the political and that it is also necessary to see the discrete components as part of a larger process, as part of the concept of community.

Rearticulating the meaning of community means understanding the concept as an ongoing process rather than an end in itself. The concept of community in international relations theory is thus conditional. Both the concept of community itself and its rearticulation are processes and do not have a specifiable end. Moreover, work on the separate pieces of the puzzle of community - the three
components of territoriality, identity and the political - is dependent on how the concept of community is understood. Therefore, what is required for the rearticulation of the meaning of community is the integration of these discrete components into a larger understanding of the concept of community as a process, and in particular, as a process that is inherently contingent and which thus revolves around how the political is understood.

Therefore, rearticulating the meaning of community in international relations theory is not a straightforward task of, for example, critiquing the sovereign state or further developing discrete notions of identity or territoriality or the political in international relations. Rather, as Linda Singer suggests, "[t]he writing of community, especially when mobilized by a strategy of critical revision, is a task of retrieving and unravelling loose ends." Indeed, by pulling at the various "loose ends" of the concept of community in terms of examining its discrete components, this thesis has unravelled a number of assumptions in international relations about the state, and about notions of territoriality, identity and the political that inform the state and are informed by it.

Gathering together the loose ends of the concept of community in international relations theory is the task of the next, concluding chapter. It does not seek to define and settle the concept, because this would involve the closure of the political. Instead, the presence of these loose ends serves to reaffirm that international relations possesses the analytical tools to do the work of rearticulating the meaning of community, and that this process is contingent upon the discrete components of territoriality, identity and the political, just as these components are contingent upon how the concept of community is understood. Rearticulating the meaning of community as a process, therefore, is itself a process. Indeed, in light of Nancy's argument that the concept cannot be willed into existence, it is important to emphasise that the point is not to seek to create or establish a community in an international context, but rather to rearticulate the

meaning of community in international theory so that it is distinct from the sovereign state, and allows for the redefinition of political space in international relations.

To put this another way, the intent of rearticulating the meaning of community in international relations is to answer Walker's question of who we are and how we ought to live together. Rearticulating the meaning of community must address first, the problem of political space; second, who "we" are, individually and collectively; and third, how to bring both questions — about territoriality and identity — together, by examining what it means to live politically. The conclusion takes up these questions and explores in more detail the process of rearticulating the meaning of community in international relations theory and understanding the concept of community as a process.
Conclusion

Toward Rearticulation: the Concept of Community as Process

The elasticity of community is its appeal, an appeal that operates not as presence but as discourse, exchange, and difference...¹

This thesis has begun the process of rearticulating the meaning of community in international theory by arguing that territoriality, identity and the political provide a sufficiently robust framework from which to proceed, in combination with Nancy's work on the inoperative community. It has not offered a substantive account of a rearticulated concept of community, because that is beyond the scope of the thesis. Instead, the focus has been on critique, and on establishing that this rearticulation is first, necessary and second, feasible; what remains is outlining of what a rearticulated meaning of community consists. This conclusion begins from the initial steps already taken towards rearticulation in this thesis, and sets out what it means to understand the concept of community as process, and to undertake the process of rearticulation.

The contemporary problem of political space in international relations may be traced back to issues that existed long before the discipline was created. Accounting for varieties of politics, political actors, policies and forms of community is not, in other words, an exclusively modern task. But the contemporary problem of political space is not characterized by these questions alone. Its roots are also to be found in the international relations discipline, and in particular in the way international relations answered — and continues to answer — these questions. Thus the problem of political space is also traceable to realist, problem-solving theories grounded in the sovereign state. The result is that the modern discipline of international relations exacerbated the already-existing problem of political space, so that while the sovereign state was once presented as a solution, it has instead come to intensify the original problem it sought to address. In other words, the problem

lies not only with problematic answers in international relations, but also with the questions themselves, and the ways in which they are formulated.

A number of theorists of international relations have recognized this problem of political space, ancient and modern, and have sought better questions and answers than the sovereign state either allows for or provides. This thesis has focused on three such critical international theory approaches — Andrew Linklater, feminist theories, and R.B.J. Walker — which suggest that international relations might better seek to address the problem of political space by rearticulating the meaning of community in international theory. Rearticulation may not solve — certainly not once and for all — the very old question of political space — the question of who we are and how we ought to live together — that the sovereign state was meant to answer. But this thesis argues that the process of rearticulation is necessary in order to redress the problem of political space in international theory.

The crucial point is that this problem did not develop recently, nor did it suddenly spring into existence, fully formed. Similarly, its solution will also not be easily or quickly attained. Rather, it is the contention of this thesis that what is required is a long-term outlook, because rearticulating the meaning of community in international theory is, like the concept of community itself, a process. In other words, rearticulation is a means, not an end. Just as political space is not (and could never be) fixed and unchanging, neither is the concept of community. This is why the concept has multiple articulations, and why it lacks enough of a centre to necessarily be deemed an essentially contested concept. It has an elasticity that makes it difficult, if not impossible, to ground or become totalising and deterministic, because the concept of community, in contrast to the sovereign state, is constituted by and constitutive of the dualisms that international relations seeks to do away with, such as space and time, self and other, and unity and diversity.

Rearticulating the meaning of community in international theory is about recognizing that the sovereign state is only one possible articulation of this concept among many, and that while it solves some problems, it exacerbates
others. Rearticulation, therefore, may not solve the problem of political space, but neither will it deny that such a problem exists, and in fact it celebrates the differences and dualisms that are at the centre of the problem of political space. A rearticulated concept of community moves away from the atomistic particularism of the sovereign state, and by opening up to the possibilities of global politics rather than international relations, provides the conditions of possibility for universalism instead. This does not mean a doing away with territoriality or boundaries, for the dichotomies that pose such problems for the sovereign state in international relations are in fact constitutive of a rearticulated concept of community. Universalism in this sense is also not about sameness and denial of difference, but instead bases its very existence and purpose on the inevitability of difference. And universalism does not mean the end of politics, but rather a focus on the political and its negotiation of dualisms and of differences in order to establish the common good.

Thus, mindful of the problem of political space, the rearticulated meaning of community must not be about eliminating the tension of man and citizen, or resolving the issue of self/other. Instead, it must focus on understanding that the universal-particular dichotomy is a defining feature of the concept of community, just as problems of identity and subjectivity are constitutive of our individual and collective natures. And it must be about recognizing that the political is the means, the process, by which we manage conflict and contestation and negotiate these defining (not divisive) dualisms. Where the sovereign state uses territoriality, identity and the political as ends that close off debate and conflict about who we are and how we live together, the rearticulated meaning of community allows for these components to be reclaimed as means, not closed off but opened up. And where the sovereign state may be totalising and deterministic, the rearticulated meaning of community is inoperative, focused on – even existing because of – difference. Thus, both the concept of community and its rearticulation in international theory must be understood as a process. In this way, political space in international relations will no longer be narrowly demarcated, fixed and immutable. Instead, it will be adaptable and elastic, able to incorporate the varieties of international politics that will inevitably persist, as long as
disparate answers to the question of who we are and how to live together persist.

*The Concept of Community as Process*

Recognising that the concept of community in international relations is both constituted by and constitutive of the three components of territoriality, identity and the political is a step required to rearticulate the meaning of community in international theory. A second requisite step is related, and requires recognising that the three dichotomies of space and time, self and other, and unity and diversity are also mutually constitutive of the concept of community in international relations. These two steps are related, of course; as the thesis argues, the three components of territoriality, identity and the political are complementary of these dualisms; concerns with territoriality echo problems of space and time, identity concerns are often characterized by the dichotomy of self and other, and the political is very much about negotiating dilemmas of unity and diversity.

A third step necessary for rearticulating the meaning of community in international theory is adopting a critical theory approach to the problem of political space in international relations, as a counter to the prevailing realist problem-solving approach so dependent on the dominant articulation of community in international relations that is the sovereign state. A fourth requirement for rearticulating the meaning of community in international relations theory is to acknowledge that the denial of difference, and the concomitant urge for conformity and sameness, must be either resisted if possible, or interrupted if unavoidable. In sum, rearticulating the meaning of community in international theory requires that the concept of community be understood not as an end in itself, nor even as a means to some undefined (and perhaps indefinable) end, but as a *process*.

Understanding territoriality, identity and the political as necessary, though insufficient, elements in the rearticulation of the meaning of community in international theory is essential. This requires moving away from an
essentialising or totalising approach such as that of the sovereign state which fixes the concept of community in time and space, basing it on an opposition of self and other, and maintaining it in terms of specific claims of unity and diversity. Rearticulating the meaning of community involves embracing, rather than eliminating such dichotomies. Political space would, as a result, no longer be limited to the territoriality of the sovereign state, to the identity of the sovereign subject, and to a politics that silences difference in the name of (political) expediency. The concept of community would instead allow for an understanding of political space as a process, not an end. A rearticulated meaning of community will allow for a definition of who we are that is both individual and collective, and it will allow for a focus on how to live together because we have differences, not in spite of them.

Territoriality in this rearticulation centralizes the universal-particular dichotomy, and rather than silencing or ignoring the differences it highlights, instead seeks to achieve unity in diversity. Identity in a rearticulated meaning of community challenges the potential for totalitarianism in this concept by also celebrating difference, and by recognising the constructed nature of identity, the inevitability of mediated relations and the contingency of subjectivity. The political in this rearticulation, finally freed from the constraints of the crises and politics of the sovereign state and the anarchy problematique, opens up the possibility of being-in-common, of sharing the inevitable fact of division, both individually and collectively. As a pivotal component of the concept of community, the political is the means by which the perpetual fight against essentialising and totalising politics takes place, so that by focusing on the political, the normative centre of the concept of community as process revolves around constantly seeking, even if not always locating, the common good.

Rearticulating the meaning of community in international theory will allow for a redefinition of the problematic understanding of political space that now dominates international relations. The nature and constitution of political space is, at present, demarcated by the sovereign state, producing a closure of the political. A rearticulated meaning of community, distinct from the
sovereign state, will produce a shift away from thinking in bounded, limited terms of either/or, and allow for the universal-particular dichotomy to constitute and be constituted by the concept of community. Rearticulation does not involve the elimination of boundaries; instead, it explicitly addresses and includes the problem of the boundaries of the universal-particular dichotomy, and thus opens up the political. Rather than managing the constraints of limiting the concept of community to a particular time and place, rearticulation allows for it to be a process, to be elastic and characterized by change and difference rather than bound by artificially imposed linear and spatial demarcations.

Rather than introduce hierarchies of individuals, sovereign states and international politics, a rearticulated meaning of community allows for the possibility of the political to flourish in all of these contexts at once. Such a shift would allow international relations to consider the varieties of political life that it cannot at present account for, such as social movements and migration. It would also allow for a consideration of local or other sub-state politics. Moving beyond inflexible and narrow distinctions such as inside/outside, and instead focusing on contingency and change to provide contexts for the measurement and evaluation of the political is vital. After all, potentially conflicting obligations are a perennial problem of global politics, certainly not a state-centric development, and a rearticulated meaning of community both constitutes and is constituted by this tension. As such, questions of membership, of inclusion and exclusion are formative and important features of identity that ought not be hidden or ignored.

Accepting the inevitability of the tensions of the universal-particular dichotomy is therefore an unavoidable part of working out who we are, both individually and collectively. And like the concept of community itself, identity is also a process. By recognising that identity is variable and that it may be multiple and even contradictory, the rearticulated meaning of community does not eliminate difference, because identity is not reducible to either man or citizen any more than the political may be limited to a choice between different obligations imposed by virtue of that fixed and state-based
identity. This is an important factor in terms of Nancy's concerns with immanentism, with the potential of totalitarianism in some articulations of community, and with those of feminist theorists who call attention to the exercise of power involved in the denial of difference.

In a rearticulated meaning of community, this threat of immanentism, of fusion, is addressed by centralizing alterity in a flexible notion of identity that emphasises unity in diversity. This does not eliminate problems of inclusion and exclusion, but recognises that they are integral to the concept of community. The meaning of inclusion and exclusion in an understanding of the concept of community as process is part of the point of participating in the community, or opting out of it, and neither status is imposed nor is it fixed. Rearticulation thus involves moving away from both territorially defined notions of political space and from the either/or equation that reduces identity to a choice between competing obligations, such as in the universal-particular dichotomy. In other words, identity too is a process, rather than an end; it is not fixed and stable, but flexible and contingent.

Rearticulating the meaning of community in international theory does not limit the political to the boundaries of the state. Opening up the political allows for consideration and negotiation of the common good and is therefore about making connections rather than imposing limitations or, as Nancy would put it, it is about communication and not communion. By focusing on relational or reciprocal bonds rather than territoriality or geography, the rearticulated meaning of community opens up political space and allows for consideration of more than merely the politics of governance and institutions, because the political is about human agency, about connections, communication and social relations. These concerns must inform the rearticulation of community in international relations theory, in order to resist the closure of the political that occurs in the sovereign state, for example.

In sum, the rearticulated meaning of community in international theory must be understood not as an end in itself, but as a process, and more particularly as a process that is predicated on the political. In turn, the notion of the political,
of the common good that may develop, is contingent on a rearticulated meaning of community. To paraphrase Nancy, the political is the place of community's exposition, and it is also the place of identity's exposition; territoriality, identity and the political are not separable from each other or from the notion of community as being-in-common: they are mutually constitutive. As a result, the rearticulated meaning of community is not fixed territorially, but is rather conditional and contingent because it is a process that is both incomplete and inoperative, and thus explicitly predicated on opening up the political. Critical theoretical approaches are the most promising means for rearticulating the meaning of community in international theory because rearticulation is also a process, and requires an approach that is itself contingent and incomplete and non-essentialising.

The Process of Rearticulation

The process of rearticulating the meaning of community in international theory is conditional; as Nancy argues, it is impossible to enact, perform, or design community. As a consequence, a critical theoretical approach is the best available means in international relations through which to undertake the process of rearticulating the meaning of community. Not only does this approach address the problem of political space in terms of the limitations of realist, problem-solving theory, but it is also the approach adopted by those theorists in international relations who recognise the problem of political space and seek to address it. In addition, this approach provides the explicitly normative outlook necessary for rearticulation, as it is not paralyzed by, but in fact promotes, ambiguity and uncertainty.

Thus what is left in theoretical terms for rearticulating the meaning of community in international theory is to move beyond the initial work of this thesis in setting out the framework of a critical theory methodology, Nancy's ontology and the epistemology of Andrew Linklater, feminist theorists and R.B.J. Walker. An important feature of the process of rearticulation concerns the distinction of concept and conception that is so pivotal to the social theory understanding of the concept of community. Because in international relations
the sovereign state is understood as both abstract concept and concrete conception, it is vital to avoid this way of depicting political space or the concept of community in the process of its rearticulation in international theory. The distinction, in other words, between concept and conception, must be retained in rearticulating the meaning of community. Because this distinction is lost in international relations in terms of the sovereign state, there is a related loss of nuance and fluidity in the discipline, which is part of the problem of political space.

The result in international relations of understanding the sovereign state both as conception – an entity capable of action and reaction – and as concept – as a model or an ideal – is dire, because it leaves no room for difference or for change. There are myriad varieties of politics that do not fit into the ideal embodied in the sovereign state, but because it is both archetype and prototype, there is no alternative. Thus for the process of rearticulating the meaning of community in international theory, it is vital to recognize that there is a level of useful abstraction in a concept that is lost in a concrete conception, whether the issue at hand is articulating the sovereign state or the concept of community. The distinction permits the idea of the concept of community as process to be more nuanced and fluid, and less deterministic and fixed than would be the case if there were no conceptions of community that differed from it. In short, the concept of community is an elastic process that is inherently supple, but conceptions of community are rigidly fixed, in time and space, according to self and other and in terms of unity and diversity.

Therefore, rearticulating the meaning of community is crucial for international relations, not least because it allows for a redefinition of political space. But in addition, rearticulation also means that there is no need to develop a theory of community. Instead, theories of community may flourish and compete, and the political will be the means – the process – through which we negotiate these theories and concepts. The rearticulation of the meaning of community in international theory that retains the distinction between concept and conception will thus avoid the closure of the political that results via the sovereign state, which is both concept and conception, with no room for
difference. An ideal of community, in other words, that may inform the rearticulated meaning of community, is not required to be enacted in its potentially realized form. With the sovereign state, the pressure to enact the ideal is unavoidable, and ultimately detrimental.

The point is that because the concept of community is supple and invariably changing – because it is a process – settling on a definition or a theory of it will not be a successful way to rearticulate the meaning of community in international theory. Developing a theory of community would produce the kind of essentialising and totalising that amounts to a closure of the political, and produces the either/or ideas of time and space, self and other, unity and diversity that characterise the sovereign state in international relations. Thus a rearticulated meaning of community in international theory does the theoretical work of providing a process for negotiating these defining dichotomies, rather than seeking to resolve and thus silence them. But the potential of concrete or practical work that might be accomplished by a rearticulated meaning of community in international theory is still vast, for while rearticulation is theoretical and conditional, it also stems from and is concerned with the concrete problems of international politics.

Rearticulating the meaning of community will not solve or eliminate these problems, but it is a process that will provide a different lens through which to understand them, because it will necessitate a redefinition of political space for the discipline. To paraphrase William Connolly, political space will not be expunged through the rearticulation of the meaning of community in international theory, but its character may be enhanced. And this is certainly the case given that the process of rearticulation is open-ended, a means rather than an end. It is clear that international relations possesses the analytical tools necessary to rearticulate the meaning of community, in terms of ontology, epistemology and methodology. If rearticulated, the concept could be deployed in the discipline to redefine political space, and change how both international theory and international politics are understood, and to change perceptions of what may constitute the political in international relations.
The process of rearticulation will thus involve a move from the sovereign state and its boundaries to a concept of community as a mediating process. By becoming facilitative, rather than prescriptive, a rearticulated meaning of community will be a process that fosters more and better answers to the question of who we are and how we ought to live together. Issues such as defining "otherness" will be better managed through rearticulation, because the process involved in rearticulating the meaning of community will force the discipline to move beyond defining community as exclusive, even while recognizing that this is a problem, to instead embrace the universal-particular dichotomy as an essential part of an inoperative community. In other words, the universal-particular dichotomy may be productive rather than obstructive in a rearticulated meaning of community, in which notions of duty and obligation produce liberation and action, rather than tension and confusion. The effects of such a change for understanding complex political emergencies, for example, may be profound, so that the actions and motivations of displaced persons and refugees, for instance, need no longer be puzzling, but will be understood as reflective of a definition of political space in which the sovereign state does not meet the needs of all of its citizens, with the reality being one to which those citizens are responding in the only way open to them, which is by rejecting that particular embodiment of community, be it the sovereign state or some other entity.

Similarly, the actions and motivations of the social movements of indigenous peoples, environmentalists, women or globalization protesters will also be easier to explain and understand via an international relations understanding of political space that is not demarcated by the sovereign state. Like the choices made by refugees and displaced persons, the politics of social movements will appear to be an almost inevitable and in fact welcome part of international relations. Opposition to state-based institutions will no longer be relegated to the domain of political studies, but acknowledged in international relations as expressing vibrant and legitimate concerns that ought to be heard not only in the interests of justice or ethics, but because they are part of the political space of international relations. In short, those people, movements and protests that now require justification for the attention of international relations, would
instead, within a rearticulated meaning of community, be a natural and vital consideration for understanding global politics. Without the demarcation of territoriality that is such a foundational aspect of contemporary international relations, and absent the notion that any genuine identity must be state-based, social movements, for example, will not only be taken account of, but will also become influential voices in the (new) political space of international relations.

Rearticulation will also mean that individual or group choices that result in violence or terrorism become less opaque because they fall more within the purview of global politics. Rearticulation will open up political space in the discipline below the sovereign state to local and municipal politics, and beyond the sovereign state to the politics of diasporas and disaffected groups who have no political voice. One result will be that international relations will at the very least better understand violent conflict and terrorism, and at best, it might finally provide a means to provide disaffected and disenfranchised individuals and groups a voice that might allow them the luxury of understanding violence as a desperate last resort rather than the best option open to them. And in less extreme terms, those individuals and groups clamouring for recognition and representation might also benefit in the same way, including minority groups such as the Basques in Europe, or the Quebecois of Canada.

Thus the rearticulation of the meaning of community in international theory will widen not only how political space is understood in the discipline, but in social theory generally. Moreover, what is distinctive about the international in this redefined political space is the possibility of accommodating presently unforeseen forms of international or global politics and actors. Because the concept of community is a process, its rearticulation presents a significantly reduced likelihood of the problem of political space recurring in international relations. And because rearticulation is itself an ongoing process, by opening up international theory, the rearticulation of the meaning of community also opens up international politics, and this will affect international theory in its turn. Thus the consequences of the rearticulation of the meaning of community
in international theory mean that it may be possible to stop thinking about international relations, and instead turn to global concerns. Rearticulating the meaning of community in international theory will not solve the problems of global pollution, poverty or hunger, but it may help international relations ask better questions about these and other problems.

And even if the answers remain elusive, the process of rearticulation, of escaping the limitations of the sovereign state and its understanding of political space, and seeing the concept of community as more than idealized myth or metaphor, will have profound implications on a number of levels. It is already evident that state-based notions of territoriality, identity and the political do not resolve, and may exacerbate, the dichotomies of time/space, self/other, and unity/diversity. Moreover, it is also evident that such dualisms, however troubling or inconvenient or even deadly they may be, will always be with us. Negotiating these dichotomies on a continuing basis, and not as if they are temporary aberrations or problems to be solved, will help to propel international relations beyond the constraints of the sovereign state and its limited understanding of political space.
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