

**International Relations and the Shaping
of State-Societal Relations –
a Postcolonial Study**

**Ernest Hilaire
London School of Economics
and Political Science
PhD. International Relations**

UMI Number: U228692

All rights reserved

INFORMATION TO ALL USERS

The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.



UMI U228692

Published by ProQuest LLC 2014. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.

All rights reserved. This work is protected against
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.



ProQuest LLC
789 East Eisenhower Parkway
P.O. Box 1346
Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1346

THESES

F

8647



1 1 1 2 8 19

TABLE OF CONTENTS

| | |
|--|------------|
| Acknowledgement | 5 |
| Abstract | 6 |
| Chapter 1: Understanding the Emergence of Postcolonial States | 7 |
| 1.1: Some Preliminary Definitions | 12 |
| 1.2: West Indian States in the International System | 15 |
| 1.3: Formulating a Theoretical Approach | 21 |
| 1.4: Thesis Outline | 25 |
| Chapter 2: Locating State and Society in International Relations Theory | 29 |
| 2.1: The state of the State in IR Theory | 30 |
| 2.2: Revisiting IR Theory – bringing in the ‘domestic’ | 41 |
| 2.3: Reconceptualising the State | 54 |
| 2.4: Moving Forward – A Critical Historical Approach | 58 |
| 2.4.1: An Alternative Approach to IR Theory | 58 |
| 2.4.2: Fundamentals of a Critical Historical Approach | 61 |
| Chapter 3: Understanding Postcolonial State and Society – The Caribbean Experience | 67 |
| 3.1: The State – Conceptual Issues | 68 |
| 3.2: The Origin of the State: the Western European Experience | 72 |
| 3.3: The Origin of the State: the Caribbean Experience | 82 |
| 3.4: Colonialism and the shaping of state-societal relations | 92 |
| 3.5: State-societal Relations in the Postcolonial Caribbean – A Framework for Understanding in IR | 101 |
| Chapter 4: State and Society: From Imperial Domination to the establishment of the Colonial State | 104 |
| 4.1: The Plantation State-society Relationship | 105 |
| 4.1.1: British Colonial Expansion and the Emergence of the Plantation Economy | 105 |
| 4.1.2: The Emergence of the Colonial State | 112 |
| 4.1.3: The Constitution of Colonial Society | 118 |
| 4.2: Emancipation as a Transformative Event | 122 |
| 4.2.1: International Economic Changes and the Collapse of the Plantation Economy | 123 |
| 4.2.2: Social and Political Reform in Britain and Consequences for Colonial Slavery | 126 |
| 4.2.3: Domestic Influences – the Effect of Slave Resistance | 131 |

| | |
|--|-----|
| 4.3: Shaping of a Colonial State-society Relationship | 133 |
| 4.3.1: Imperial Policy and the Framework for State-societal Relations | 135 |
| 4.3.2: Free Labour and the Emergence of a New Colonial Economy | 140 |
| 4.3.3: The Creation of a Free Labour Society | 148 |
| 4.3.4: Governance in Colonial Society – Domestic and Imperial Government Interplay | 154 |
| 4.4: Conclusion | 161 |

Chapter 5: State and Society: From Crisis of Colonial Rule to Political Enfranchisement 169

| | |
|--|-----|
| 5.1: State-Societal Relations leading to Labour Unrest | 171 |
| 5.1.1: Imperial Domination and the Implications for Colonial Policy | 172 |
| 5.1.2: The Impact of Imperial Economic Policy on the Colonies | 178 |
| 5.1.3: Political Challenge and the Failure of Colonial Policy | 182 |
| 5.2: Labour Unrest as a Transformative Event | 191 |
| 5.2.1: International Politics and the Anti-colonial Struggle | 192 |
| 5.2.2: Labour Unrest and Political Action | 194 |
| 5.2.3: Imperial State Response – the Moyne Commission | 199 |
| 5.3: Reformed Colonialism and a New State-societal Relationship | 202 |
| 5.3.1: International Framework as the context for British Colonial Policy in the Caribbean | 203 |
| 5.3.2: A New Imperial Economic Policy and Persistent Underdevelopment in the Colonies | 206 |
| 5.3.3: Social Development under Reformed Colonialism | 211 |
| 5.3.4: The Labour Movement as Institutionalised Opposition | 216 |
| 5.3.5: Reform of the Colonial State | 220 |
| 5.4: Conclusion | 225 |

Chapter 6: State and Society: From Associated State to International Actor 234

| | |
|---|-----|
| 6.1: Imperial Policy and Decolonisation in Saint Lucia- Impact on State and Society | 235 |
| 6.1.1: International Relations and the Context for Imperial Policy | 235 |
| 6.1.2: Imperial Policy and the Decolonisation Process | 239 |
| 6.1.3: The Granting of Associated Statehood | 243 |
| 6.1.4: The Emergence of an Autonomous State | 248 |
| 6.1.5: External Concerns for Economic Viability | 255 |
| 6.2: Independence as a Transformative Event | 259 |
| 6.2.1: Changes in Imperial Policy and the End of Imperial Rule | 260 |
| 6.2.2: State-societal Conflict and the attainment of Independence | 263 |

| | |
|---|-----|
| 6.3: The Impact of Independence in Saint Lucia – A New State-societal Relationship | 270 |
| 6.3.1: Independence and the Shaping of an International Role | 272 |
| 6.3.2: National Development Policy and the Role of International Aid | 274 |
| 6.3.3: International Politics of National Economic Management | 279 |
| 6.3.4: Independent State and Implications for Society | 283 |
| 6.3.5: Transnationalisation of Society | 288 |
| 6.4: Conclusion | 291 |
| Chapter 7: State-society Relations: Providing Understanding within an IR Framework | 302 |
| 7.1: Utility of a New Framework | 303 |
| 7.2: The Origin of State-societal Relations – Colonialism and External Dominance | 306 |
| 7.3: The Development of State-societal Relations – Rise of Internal Influences | 311 |
| 7.4: State-societal Relations – Implications for Empirical Statehood | 320 |
| Bibliography | 324 |

Acknowledgement

This work could not have been completed without the love, support and encouragement of many people to whom success is owed. To my mother, Ann, who fathered me and provided the strength and faith which have carried me through life. Her eternal faith in me is always a source of inspiration. To Maya Jean and Anya Marie, my greatest joys, both born during the hard work of writing this thesis, and my wife Lisa for her constant support and tolerance of my wavering moods during it all. To Callixta, who encouraged me to pursue the thesis and whose unwavering friendship, through thick and thin, is endearing. To Dr. John Kent, who was the model supervisor, for his outstanding guidance, constant availability, and insightful comments even when it was obvious that I did not always agree. To all who shared advice and opinions to make the thesis a success, I accept responsibility for any failings.

Abstract

The thesis examined the role played by international and domestic influences in shaping the relationship between state and society in post-colonial societies. It argued that the nature of the state in the international system is the product of the historical processes of state and societal formation and must be studied as such. Therefore, it examined the evolution of state-societal relationship from colony to independent state in Saint Lucia. The examination is premised on the view that the state acts in two dimensions – the domestic and the international. The thesis therefore critiques traditional international relations theories which treat the state in its totality as an analytic abstraction, and argued that international relations theory can best explain the nature of the state when it brings into analysis the role of the domestic in shaping the state. Therefore, the nature of the state was examined as the interplay of the “domestic” and the “international”.

Three historical periods are examined to show how international and domestic influences shaped state-societal relations and generated conflicts which caused transformative events. These events in turn caused fundamental changes to the state-societal relationship. All three periods showed that the nature of state and society is rooted in the dominance of external forces over domestic forces. The early state originated in the colonial experience which lasted until independence in 1979. That state was not a product of society and did not enjoy an organic relationship with society. As the state evolved, the level of influence of the domestic was shown to increase. The independent state, though sovereign, was itself a product of external influences and remains influenced by external forces. However, the thesis showed that in the post-independence period these influences are forcing integration between state and society.

Introduction: Understanding the emergence of the Post-Colonial State and Society

The ex-colonial states have been internationally enfranchised and possess the same external rights and responsibilities as all other sovereign states: juridical statehood. At the same time, however, many have not yet been authorized and empowered domestically and consequently lack the institutional features of sovereign states as also defined by classical international law. They disclose limited empirical statehood: their populations do not enjoy many of the advantages traditionally associated with independent statehood. Their governments are often deficient in the political will, institutional authority, and organised power to protect human rights or provide socioeconomic welfare. The concrete benefits which have historically justified the undeniable burdens of sovereign statehood are often limited to fairly narrow elites and not yet extended to the citizenry at large whose lives may be scarcely improved by independence or even adversely affected by it. These states are primarily juridical. They are still far from complete, so to speak, and empirical statehood in large measure still remains to be built. I refer to them as 'quasi-states'.¹

This thesis is an examination of the historical evolution of the state and society in post-colonial states using Saint Lucia as the case-study. In particular, it focuses on the consequences of the interplay of external and internal forces on shaping state-societal relations. The thesis starts

¹ Robert Jackson, *Quasi-states: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World* (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1990), p.21. Jackson's concern was to demonstrate how international constitutional change through the universal acceptance of the principle of self-determination after 1945 made it possible for many states to be created and survive despite what he describes as their limited empirical statehood. This is in contrast to established sovereign states whose statehood was based on their abilities to provide the benefits of statehood to their citizens and can be said to possess 'positive sovereignty'. Quasi-states, on the other hand, because they lack the institutional features of sovereign states and their dependence on international law and development aid can be said to possess 'negative sovereignty' as the basis for their sovereign statehood.

with the above observation from Jackson which highlights a characteristic lack of 'empirical statehood'. However, the thesis will show that this feature is not an inherent feature of states but a consequence of the colonial experience, a result of the evolution of the state and society. There is no suggestion that Jackson is wrong in his assessment of post-colonial states but rather that the story of post-colonial states begins before the granting of juridical statehood. Having taken the condition of the post-colonial state and society for granted, Jackson proceeded to account for the emergence of the post-colonial state in the international system by treating sovereignty as a right possessed by the state to participate in the inter-state system. Having equated sovereignty with the state, the fact that states with limited empirical statehood are now part of the system suggests that the conception of that right – sovereignty – has changed. This is a logical conclusion simply because Jackson treats the state as a totality within international relations. Therefore despite Jackson recognising the internal features of quasi-states as the defining difference with classical states, the basis for the difference in sovereign status must lie at the level of the system. It is the change in the international constitutional framework which provides for the existence of post-colonial states. The state is the state is the state.

Viewed differently, the emergence of these states could have been seen as an acceptance of the failure of colonial rule and the consequent breakdown of empires and/or as a product of the internationalisation of the state as the most efficient mechanism for the expansion of the state system. However, to reach these conclusions would require that the 'black-box' of the state be opened and the historic role of colonial states be examined. Therefore, what if Jackson's totality approach is rejected and a new approach looks beyond the present conditions of quasi-states to understand the origin of the characteristic of limited empirical statehood of these states. That approach should not start by taking Jackson's 'limited empirical statehood' for granted but instead by asking

how 'limited empirical statehood' became a defining characteristic of the post-colonial states. Indeed it may well be that in the international configuration of power, the limitations of that empirical status could be historically construed as a consequence of the incorporation of ex-colonial states in the global economy as they were forced to adjust to an international order predicated on the emergence of these states as "autonomous" entities in that economy. It can also be argued that these limitations constitute part of the institutional and geo-political constraints that have circumscribed the options available to these newly independent states. Although this argument has not been explicitly argued in this manner, it has been suggested in the use of the concept of the post-colonial state and its structural limitations.

The new approach must pose an alternative set of questions to those posited by Jackson, on the basis that it is not enough to understand the justification for these states' emergence as sovereign states. We need to broaden the understanding to incorporate the emergence of the state in the international system, the influences which shaped the state and the implications for society of such a state structure. These questions are primarily: *how can the study of International Relations (IR) allow for a conception of the sovereign state beyond its totality? How did the post-colonial state evolve historically? What were the implications for the development of domestic society? Was the process of post-colonial state-building brought about by the combined will of society and government reflecting their common aspirations? How have international factors shaped the evolution of state and society?*

Accordingly, this thesis seeks to examine how the interplay of international and domestic factors shaped the evolution of state and society in Saint Lucia. To achieve that an alternative approach must reject the traditional totality approach to understanding the state in international relations and instead argue that the state in international relations can be understood by treating the state as both a domestic and

international actor. Theoretically, it involves crossing what has been described as the 'Great Divide'.² Therefore, the thesis starts with the argument that international relations can and must include both state and society as units of analysis and situate their historicity. Once that theoretical basis is established, a framework exists to explain that state and societal relations are a product of the interplay of the international system and domestic society. The thesis will show that the characteristic of 'quasi-states' - the absence of empirical statehood - can be seen as a description of a particular form of social relations which exists within states which were formed at a particular stage in the expansion of the inter-state system. Specifically, it was the expansion of the state as an instrument of political control beyond the European states-system which created these post-colonial states. This thesis examines how the state was formed and the implications for society in the case of Saint Lucia. It will highlight that the lack of empirical statehood was the result of the absence of any significant merging of interests between the state and society within political entities which were artificially created for the benefit of the European states-system and facilitated by its colonial expansion. Because the state was not created to serve the societies within which it was established but for the external purposes of the Imperial State, the state was incongruent and there was a disjuncture between state and society. That disjuncture continued as a distinctive feature of the post-colonial state as the state functioned primarily as an instrument of political control, for whichever group that has power, rather than as an instrument for national development representing national aspirations. Despite the instances of integration through a strengthened domestic society, the state does not function in consonance with society.

² Ian Clark, *Globalisation and International Relations Theory* (Oxford; Oxford University Press, 1999).

The change in the international framework which allowed for the post-colonial state to become a member of the inter-state system is seen as legitimising the globalisation of the post-colonial state as the most efficient instrument of political control after the failings of colonial rule as a form of control. The explanations provided will highlight that the nature of state-societal relations is the consequence of the dynamic interplay of the efforts of the inter-state system to reinforce the state in post-colonial societies because of its utility to the system, and the attempts by domestic society to strengthen itself vis-à-vis the state.

From the onset, it is necessary that some clarification be provided. I do not attempt to address all, or even most of, the international and domestic factors that may have shaped the state and society. The objective is to provide *sufficient* understanding of the major influences that can be seen as having a direct effect on shaping the state and society. This explains the approach of choosing the three most significant transformative periods in the evolution of the state and society from colonial to independent status. These periods contain events which represented a decisive break with the old order of the state and created the conditions for a new order. The thesis uses a historical approach that analyses the nature of the state and society leading to the transformative event, the nature of the event, and then assesses the impact of each event on the state and society. There are two important reasons for choosing such an approach. Firstly, the thesis highlights the most critical events that transformed the state and society and exposes the sources of the influences that brought about these events. Secondly, by contrasting the period leading to the event with the period after, it draws attention to changes which took place.

Therefore I attempt to examine how the international/domestic interplay, each with varying degrees of influence, gave rise to three significant events which transformed the nature of the state and shaped its relationship with society.

1.1 Some Preliminary Definitions

It would be helpful to clarify the meanings of some concepts that are fundamental to the explanation which the thesis attempts to provide. In arguing for a crossing of the 'Great Divide', a concern comes to the fore - what is '**international**' and '**domestic**'? Sorensen offers the sovereign border as the line of demarcation.³ In the case of this thesis, the borders of the territories are used as the line of demarcation. However, they cannot be considered as sovereign borders since the colonies were not independent self-governing territories. However, there were universally accepted borders for colonies and these should serve as the line of demarcation. In the case of the British West Indian colonies the task is easier as all except Guyana are islands which make the demarcation straightforward. Therefore, all actions, material conditions, institutions and policies which occurred within the colonies are seen as domestic influences. Conversely, all influences that occurred beyond the borders are seen as international influences. The determining factor is the location of the activity rather than the origin of the influence. This adds a new dimension to Cox's critical historical approach which identified three levels or spheres of activity which in unity represent the totality of social existence.⁴ According to Cox,

[c]onsidered separately, social forces, forms of state, and world orders can be represented in a preliminary approximation as particular configurations of material capabilities, ideas and institutions....[c]onsidered in relation to each other, and thus moving toward a fuller representation of historical process, each will be seen as containing, as well as bearing the impact of, the others.⁵

³ Georg Sorensen, *Changes in Statehood. The Transformation of International Relations* (New York; Palgrave, 2001), p.5.

⁴ Robert Cox, 'Social Forces, states, and world orders: beyond international relations theory' in *Approaches to World Order* (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1996).

⁵ *Ibid.* p.101.

Importantly, each level can contain as well as bear the impact of the others. Therefore, decolonization may have been initially achieved by the armed struggle of nationalists in some colonies against colonial exploitation at the level of social forces but also play out or impact at the level of the world order and become a universal norm. Eventually that norm may then influence the evolution of the state in other colonies that may never have had a nationalist struggle but were decolonized under that norm - the right to self-determination. Therefore, at one stage, decolonization forces may have been a domestic influence but in later stages, it became an international influence.

Sorensen raises another complication, “[s]hould developments in British colonies before Decolonization be considered part of the domestic affairs in Britain? How should the ‘domestic/international’ dynamic in those colonial areas be conceptualized?”⁶ Whilst, it suffices to accept the demarcation of borders as the acceptable definition of what is ‘international’ and ‘domestic’, it must be stressed that historical contingency and the role of international norms and rules are critical in shaping that demarcation.⁷ It will be useful to see the demarcation as the borders established for units of political organization that are accepted by international norms and practice as distinct and having separate identities. Therefore, it is possible to conceptualize the colonies as constituting the domestic but also the British Empire as ‘domestic’, with Great Britain as the center having responsibility for the welfare and development of all the colonies.

We also need to differentiate between ‘imperial state’ and ‘colonial state’. The **Imperial State** refers to the state apparatus within Great Britain while the **colonial state** refers to the state apparatus within the colony. Unlike the traditional IR conception of the state which presented

⁶ Sorensen, *Statehood*, p.12.

⁷ International norms are important as according to Sorensen it is the act of recognition that bestows a special status on states thus making them sovereign.

the state as a totality, a new approach in IR must allow for a differentiation between the state as the institutional mechanism which is responsible for ordering social relations within a territory and the government which is the "...executive personnel formally in positions of supreme control."⁸ It is important to note that it is possible for the imperial state to act according to different sources of influence. For example, the action of the Imperial State can be the expression of a societal sentiment, e.g. anti-slavery; the ideological position of the Government or the group which exercise greatest influence on the state, e.g. the trade union sympathies of the British Labour Party; or the bureaucratic position of Government Departments, e.g. the Colonial Office or the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. There is no attempt in the thesis to identify the institutional source of the policies and actions of the Imperial State.

It is possible to differentiate between **imperial policy** as the policy towards the colonies advocated by the His Majesty Government and implemented by the Imperial State and **colonial policy** as the policy administered by the colonial state, often the application of imperial policy. It becomes possible to identify the colonial state as having a separate existence and mode of operation although controlled by the Imperial State. It also helps to demonstrate the extent to which the government of the colonial state may interpret imperial policy and engage in trade-offs with various interests and local elites to fashion colony-specific variations to imperial policy.

The understanding of **society** rests upon a Gramscian notion of civil society as those institutions and processes that stand between the economic structure and the state with its legislation and coercion.⁹

⁸ Fred Halliday, *Rethinking International Relations* (London; The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1994), p. 82.

⁹ A. Gramsci, *Selections from the Prisons Notebooks*, edited and translated by Q. Hoare and G.N. South (London; Lawrence and Wishart, 1971).

Therefore, society outside the state organizes itself and represents itself, forming both a source of pressure on and, sometimes becoming an extension of the state. This view offers the opportunity to conceptualize the relationship of the state to the rest of society and it becomes possible to analyze society as a unit or to identify the institutions within society that are organized to stand against the state or, in certain cases, to be incorporated within the functioning of the state.

The notion of a relationship between state and society or **state-societal relations** can be described as the interrelation between political events and structures, economic relations and social processes and institutions. In other words, it involves the study of national politics but by studying state-societal relations, the persistent debate of state-centered versus society-centered approaches is avoided. Instead, state-societal relations recognize the contribution of both society and state institutions. As this thesis seeks to bring in international influences, it accordingly expands state-societal relations from being the consequence of domestic processes to becoming the common ground at the intersection of international and domestic forces.

1.2 West Indian States in the International System – Saint Lucia as a case-study

It is hoped that the use of Saint Lucia, in particular, and the West Indies, in general, will vividly illustrate the effect of the interplay of 'international/domestic' factors on shaping the nature of state-societal relations in post-colonial societies. When reference is made to the West Indies what is meant is the Commonwealth Caribbean – a cluster of island states reaching from Jamaica in the north to Guyana on the South American coastline, all sharing the experience of colonialism from different powers at various stages in their history but unified by the experience of having their political system shaped by British colonialism.

The West Indies more than any other region has had a history of colonialism.¹⁰ It can be argued that other regions had colonialism imposed on existing societies that transformed their existence but the West Indian society was a manufactured society. The indigenous population was virtually decimated within a short period of the arrival of the colonial powers and the societies which were created were entirely new, designed for colonial purposes by people alien to the region drawn from Europe, Asia and Africa.¹¹ This is significant because the West Indian colonies were not only plantation societies but were slave societies which produced a particular social structure which was required for their colonial status. The nature of the relationship between state and society was rooted in that historical occurrence.

Saint Lucia presents the ideal historical circumstances for analyzing the evolution of the state and the implications for society. The state in Saint Lucia, as in all other West Indian islands is a product of the political legacy of British colonialism. It was administered as a separate unit until 1838 but annexed to the Government of the Windward Islands which comprised Barbados, Grenada, Saint Vincent and Tobago. However, this collective existed for colonial administrative purposes, its membership varied constantly, and there were slight differences in the political structures of each colony. The initial political system, Crown Colony Government (CCG), provided a narrow suffrage to the white oligarchy that included the planter, merchant and professional classes united by the ownership of property. The majority of the population were slaves who did not possess the right to exist except as property. The white Legislative Council was nominated consisting of both

¹⁰ S. Mintz, *From Plantations to Peasantries in the Caribbean* (Princeton; Focus Caribbean, 1984).

¹¹ Eric Williams, *From Columbus to Castro* (London; Deutsch 1970). Williams points out that the population of Hispaniola decreased from about 300,000 in 1492 to about 14,000 in 1514. This was the result of wars, alien diseases and slavery. This trend occurred throughout the West Indies.

official and unofficial members. The official members were representatives of the Crown and possessed a majority while the unofficial members represented the local oligarchy. The local Executive Council comprised of official members plus a few unofficial advisers but was not responsible to the legislative body for its functioning. Political power was in the hands of the Governor who represented the Imperial State and implemented the policies of the British Government. The local legislature was virtually powerless and was more conservative than the Governor and more reactionary on every issue facing the island – slavery, emancipation, religious tolerance and economic development. Differences between the legislature and executive were always resolved in the structure of the old system as the location of power between the executive and legislature allowed the alien executive to override the opposition of the legislature.

The first major transformative event took place with the emancipation of slaves. In the period leading to emancipation another social feature emerged in the growth of a creole or indigenous white oligarchy. Those changes were significant as a local elite demanded legislative powers and an increased role in the executive, and, secondly, a vast majority of the population now being free demanded social, economic and political participation. In terms of the development of the state, reforms were not introduced until after the Wood Report of 1921 when the Legislative Council included an elective element though as a minority. However, the Executive Council still had the final say on all matters and, through the Governor, the Colonial Office actually had to give its approval. The system was a colonial administration whose function was to facilitate the rule of a subject people by an alien power. The legislative process was in effect a parody of representative government with a set of officials acting on orders whilst the unofficials, selected and nominated by the Governor, gave uncritical support for they

owed their positions to the Governor.¹² The absence of a constituent base robbed the Unofficials of the possibility of taking independent positions. The minority-elected representatives were never in a position to push an alternative programme and acted as an ever-present but powerless opposition.

From the above description, it can be said that the practice of colonial government was an exercise of alien control. It did not grow from the society in which it existed as the larger part of the population had no relation to the government. The government was further insulated by not having to be accountable to even the legislative process that existed. The interests promoted by the government were externally derived, albeit in the interest of the local white oligarchy on most occasions. The system survived because the majority which had just fought for their freedom were yet to attain the consciousness to advance their struggle further. In any event, they were aware of the military strength possessed by the colonial power while the white oligarchy was 'profoundly constitutionalist' and believed in the rule of law. Yet there was always underlying tension between government and the people because the colonial government was not designed and did not act in the interest of the masses.

The labour revolts of the late 1930's provided the background for the second transformative event – the attainment of universal adult suffrage and the political democratisation of the society.¹³ The event was inspired by labor unrest and social discontent from the Negro working class. The emerging Negro working class was largely centered in Castries, the capital of Saint Lucia which was a major coaling station that engaged manual labour at the docks. The revolts were part of a series of actions

¹² The members of the legislature were referred to as officials and unofficials.

¹³ Sir Arthur Lewis, *Labour in the West Indies. The Birth of a Workers Movement* (London; New Beacon Books, 1977) is invaluable in understanding the importance of the 1930's in the Caribbean.

that took place throughout the colonies and were more than a demand for higher wages. It was an explosion of social discontent against the way the Negro masses lived and were treated by colonial policy. The period until 1950 witnessed every effort by the British to withhold constitutional growth and to grant minuscule changes each time it appeared that the contradictions of colonial rule would not be contained.

Universal adult suffrage was granted in 1951 and the resulting elections gave victory to the Saint Lucia Labour Party which had a large black working class following and black leadership. The granting of adult suffrage was complemented not with the granting of full internal self-government but with staggered constitutional growth.¹⁴ An elected majority was allowed in the legislature and an increase, although still a minority, of elected members in the executive council which lessened the separation between the legislative and executive councils. It was the setting up of the office of Chief Minister which created the head of the cabinet and allowed for the genuine existence of a party system. The Governor would choose the person who commanded a majority in the legislature to be Chief Minister and would appoint ministers on his advice.

Under the Crown Colony system after 1951, the colonial government through the Governor was still responsible for deciding which ministries should exist. Financial matters remained in the hands of the Financial Secretary, a nominated member, and matters of external relations were not even for consideration. The civil service was not correspondingly democratised and remained essentially a British-manned service. In considering this period of gradual constitutional change, it is possible to posit the view that leaders were slowly being prepared for self-rule. However, in relation to the wider society, there is no evidence of the political education of the masses to prepare them for

¹⁴ Gordon K. Lewis, *The Growth of the West Indies* (London; Modern Reader Paperbacks, 1968), p.107-8.

their civic duties and participation in the political process. The participation of the society was restricted to voting at election time depending on which party provided the greatest appeal. Beyond voting there was no allegiance to the process except an acceptance of constitutionalism and rule of law.

Saint Lucia was eventually granted Associated Statehood with Britain in 1967 and this led to the third transformative event. This quasi-sovereign status bestowed total control over internal affairs to the local political authority with Britain maintaining responsibility for foreign relations and defence though in consultation with the island's government.¹⁵ The next transformative event took place in 1979 with the achievement of independence. Independence meant the transfer of control over all the affairs of Saint Lucia to the local political authority. It was the attainment of statehood with Saint Lucia, as a state, possessing equal sovereign rights in the international system. The functions of the state also changed to reflect this constitutional development. The attainment of independence was in reality a shift in political control from an alien capital to local control without the state becoming more transparent and accountable to the society in which it exists. The managers of the newly independent state were seduced by the trappings of independence advocating independence as needed for the transformation of the state.

Saint Lucia in many ways represents the typical West Indian island state. It shares all the characteristics – plantation economy; slave society; small size; small population; and in particular the legacy of British colonial rule. There are a few exceptional characteristics but these tend to prove the rule rather than the exception. Firstly, unlike Jamaica under Manley's democratic socialism, Guyana under Burnham's co-operative socialism, Grenada under Bishop's revolutionary socialism

¹⁵ Saint Lucia Year Book 1982, p.17.

and Trinidad under Williams' nationalism, Saint Lucia has not experienced any ideological deviation in the functioning of the state after independence. During the periods of experimentation by those regimes, these states assumed high profiles and played an increased role in international politics. This lends support to the view that when there is a high level of integration between state and society, through mobilization or political consciousness, there is a greater awareness to integrate state and society. Secondly, unlike the aberration of Trinidad and Guyana, the Saint Lucian society is very homogenous and largely of African descent. One would expect a greater level of integration between state and society since there is no ethnic consideration in deciding who assumes government and therefore no rational^e for exclusive policies. Thirdly, as imperial policy in general was not implemented simultaneously in the West Indies the smaller colonies suffered a delay in the implementation of progressive policies such as representative government reforms, recognition of trade unions and political parties, and the granting of independence. Such a delay may be the consequence of lower levels of agitation or greater reactionary tendencies in the smaller colonies, the desire for the Imperial State to judge the effects of a policy before applying it across the colonies or considerations of viability associated with small size.

The above broad profile of Saint Lucia as a case-study suggests that the historical evolution of the state and society in Saint Lucia provides sufficient reason to study the role that international and domestic forces played in shaping post-colonial state and societies.

1.3 Formulating a Theoretical Approach

The acceptance of post-colonial states as sovereign states in the international system was propelled by the changed international normative framework after 1945 which allowed for these states to exist

either through recognition of national liberation struggles or through pressuring imperial nations to grant independence. Traditional IR theory generally does not provide for understanding the nature of these states within the international system. For example, in his exposition, Jackson notes the essential difference in the nature of these states compared to classical states is their internal empirical characteristics, a requirement which was relegated after 1945 as a criterion for statehood.¹⁶ Undoubtedly, Jackson looks within the 'state' to establish categories of states in the international system. Such an approach opens new possibilities for IR theory as it peeps into the black box of the state. Yet it carries the fundamental weakness of traditional IR theory, for whilst it describes the weakness of the states by looking at their insides it explains away the actuality of post-colonial states by focusing on their totality. They emerged because of a change in the international normative framework; they exist because the international system accepts responsibility for them and provides the development assistance to ensure survival; and the states are quasi-states because they are weak and lack empirical statehood. Jackson attempts to study the historical change in the international system but the state is taken as a constant and given a permanent present. There is a presentation of the post-colonial state's possession of limited statehood as an inherent and defining feature.

One of the consequences of treating the state in its totality is to overlook its historical specificity and its evolving form and function. It becomes impossible to examine the internal dynamics of the state, the implications for the society, and it denies an understanding of how the international and the domestic are integrated in shaping the state and society. Therefore, this thesis requires an approach that is capable of

¹⁶ Jackson, *Quasi-states*.

dismantling the reification of the nation-state and can look for the deeper sources of social continuity and change.

In suggesting an alternative approach to understanding international phenomena, the objectives are clear. First, the aim is to ensure that domestic-based concepts can enhance theories in IR. These include political science and sociological concepts such as the state and society. Therefore, we move from the strict 'inside-out' approaches of neorealism and world-systems and the 'outside-in' approach of liberal political science. Second, the thesis aims to apply new understandings of these concepts to IR theory, thereby expanding the analysis of the traditional agenda of issues. Thereby we are able to study the impact of the internationalization of the state on domestic settings; the growth of a transnational civil society and its effect on domestic societies; the consequence of domestic and international power struggles on shaping the state; and the strengthening of domestic civil society and the consequences for domestic politics. Third, the thesis aims to understand how historical changes – international and domestic - influenced state formation and societal development. Fourth, the thesis aims to utilize an analytical framework that avoids determinism of one influence and instead provides an understanding of the competing influences which shaped state and society.

Therefore, the task is to study the historical evolution of state-societal relations from the colonial period to the present by analyzing simultaneously the domestic and international forces at play in shaping state-societal relations. The theoretical approach of the thesis will be shaped by four main themes.¹⁷ Firstly, recognition of the significance of 'material' factors in the shaping of social existence. In particular, the socio-economic context will be acknowledged for its contribution to the shaping of the inter-state system, individual states and consequently,

¹⁷ Influenced by the outline provided in Chapter 3 – Historical Materialism and International Relations in Halliday, *International Relations*.

state-societal relations. Secondly, the importance of history in the understanding of social and political phenomena. History provides the context for understanding how events came about, their form and essence and how the present is shaped by the past. Thirdly, the centrality of classes in understanding state-societal relations. This allows us to understand why certain groups struggle for the control of the state, how they use the state to pursue their own interests, and how the contest between state and society takes place. Fourthly, the role of contradictions and conflict in social relations. This forces an examination beyond the form of a phenomenon to its essence. Social phenomena can now be dissected and analyzed to highlight the contest of social forces and their resolution.

As the focus of the research is on the changing nature of the state and society, it is necessary to utilize methodological approaches that allow for comparative historical analysis. The thesis is not primarily concerned with testing theory but with examining an historical case and looking for patterns or occurrences that give meaning to the object of the research. Both state and society will be seen as concepts whose form and characteristics are ever changing due to an expanding international society. Thus, the location of explanatory factors for the nature of state-societal relations lies in the historical intersection of the expansion of the international system and the domestic socio-political configuration. The research process will be guided by five considerations¹⁸ : an awareness that action is never free but takes place within a framework for action; the framework for action changes over time and therefore any approach must seek to understand these changes; the framework is a historical structure - a combination of thought patterns, material conditions and human institutions - which while it does not determine action provides the constraints and space within which action takes place; the

¹⁸ Drawn from Cox's basic premises for a critical theory. Cox, *Social Forces*.

framework must not be analyzed for its equilibrium but in terms of its conflict and the possibility of transformation; and the framework existed at a number of spheres or levels of activity – social forces, state form and the international system. The last consideration is particularly important as it transcends two shortcomings of traditional approaches. Firstly, it avoids the arguments in political science for using the contrasting approaches of either state-centered or society-centered explanations of the relationship between state and society. Secondly, it provides a solution to the traditional IR shortcoming of the diminution of society as a useful concept in understanding the state in the international system.

1.4 Thesis Outline

This thesis focuses on three significant political achievements that transformed state-societal relations – the emancipation of slaves and consequent emergence of a free labor market; the attainment of adult suffrage and the consequent right for the majority to participate in the political process; and the attainment of independence and the consequent right to participate in the international system. In general, this thesis begins by arguing for a new understanding in IR which integrates domestic and international influences as necessary to account for the nature of post-colonial states and society. Using that understanding, it utilizes three historical periods which contained transformative events to highlight how these events occurred, the impact on the evolution of the state and the implications for society. Each of these historical chapters will start by examining existing state-society relations and how they were shaped by the interplay of domestic and international factors. A transformational event will then be examined highlighting the role of domestic and international factors. The chapters end with an examination of how the transformational event shaped a new state-society relationship.

In particular, Chapter 2 argues that a satisfactory understanding of post-colonial states and society can only be achieved by bringing in the international dimension to conceptualize domestic political and social development. Therefore, it is posited that the nature of states can best be understood by using an approach that presents a new understanding of the state as the interplay of the domestic and the international spheres. Domestic society becomes fundamental to IR and the state and society is seen as acting in two dimensions – the domestic and international – but in a seamless and integrated space. Chapter 2 also makes the case for an approach that allows for historical specificity in analyzing the emergence of the state and society and avoids taking the characteristics of the post-colonial state and society for granted.

Chapter 3 argues that each state is a product of a particular historical context that produced distinct configurations of state structure and consequent state-societal relationships. The modern European state and its relationship with society was the consequence of a long historical process that shows a higher level of integration. In other words, though state-societal relations are influenced by the international, developments within a domestic context are highly influential. On the other hand, it is argued that the colonial state was influenced more by external developments despite the significance of some internal factors. This legacy has circumscribed the nature of state-societal relations. The Chapter also outlines a framework for an analysis in post-colonial states of the evolution of state-societal relations and the relationship to the international system.

Chapter 4 demonstrates that the establishment of the colonies was the result of the expansion of European international society as both the quest for national supremacy and the demands of a new economic order for trade and raw materials motivated sovereigns to move beyond the borders of Europe. The cultivation of sugar for export transformed these colonies requiring a particular form of state and created a distinct

society. In effect the mode of production required a particular form of state-societal relationship to be successful. The emancipation of the slaves, a vital cog in the plantation system, would be the first transformative event that affected the evolution of the state and society. The Chapter examines some of the dominant domestic and international reasons for emancipation and outlines how the state and society was transformed as a result.

Chapter 5 focuses on the crises of colonial rule during the inter-war period and the culmination of social discontent in the labour unrest of the 1930's. This was the second transformative event which resulted in the establishment of the Moyne Commission to investigate and make recommendations for the restructuring of the colonial state and society. The recommendations of the Commission would lead to the legitimization of trade unions, political parties and universal adult suffrage and significant development financing. The colonies had less economic importance and nationalist tendencies were increasing domestic pressure on the imperial state giving way to new colonial arrangements. State and society developed a new relationship as the society was finally given political power with trade union leadership and a means to redress the ills of colonialism.

Chapter 6 examines the movement to independence which was inspired less by nationalist agitation and more by the imperial need to avoid international criticism for the lack of development in the smaller colonies. The change in the international framework facilitated the emergence of dozens of colonial states with the increasing intolerance of colonial rule. Yet in the case of the smaller colonies, issues of viability delayed any enjoyment of self-determination. Eventually the desire of the imperial state to unload its colonial burden and the persistent demands from emerging elites replacing colonial interests would lead to independence and the emergence of the colonial state as an international actor.

Chapter 7 highlights these key themes and arguments in understanding the pattern of interplay between international and domestic forces in shaping the relationship between the state and society in Saint Lucia.

2

Locating state and society in International Relations Theory

As highlighted in the previous chapter, understanding the nature of the state and society in post-colonial societies requires a focus on the interplay between the 'international' and 'domestic' in shaping the structures of the state and society. Accordingly, concepts located within International Relations (IR) theory, political science and sociology must be utilized for such a broad understanding. However, while sociology and political science have been preoccupied by the nature of their subject matter with the domestic, IR theory has not had an extended engagement with the 'domestic'.

Until recently, IR theory remained rooted in the acceptance of the primacy of its core actor – the state - and the academic ease it offered for analyzing the international. That ease was enhanced by the associative feature given to the state, namely sovereignty. For sovereignty to be meaningful, the state had to be 'black-boxed'. Equally, for the state to be analytically simple, sovereignty had to be uncontested. This is evident in James' definition of sovereignty as a legal, absolute and unitary condition.¹ The state is used as an analytic abstraction while sovereignty provides the ideological and value justification for its existence. This is reflected in the ease with which Jackson was able to account for the emergence of post-colonial states.

¹Alan James, *Sovereign Statehood: The Basis of International Society* (London; Allen & Unwin, 1986).

Such a conception of the state restricts the research programs of IR and in particular is insufficient for the task of understanding the post-colonial state and its society. In traditional IR, we are forced to accept the post-colonial state as a given entity – corrupt, little institutional capacity, no respect for human rights and persistent poverty. However, by dismantling the edifice that the traditional conception of the state presents we can study the historical genesis and evolution of states and what have been the implications for society. The characteristic lack of empirical statehood can be studied in its historical context. In studying the historical evolution of the state, we necessarily have to examine its relationships within a broader context of social reality that includes both the domestic and international. Only then can we fully appreciate how and why post-colonial states possess limited empirical statehood yet exist as sovereign states.

Therefore the aims of this Chapter are to: (a) examine the case against traditional conceptions of the state in IR; (b) examine the arguments and attempts to integrate society within IR theory; (c) consider a conceptualization of the state that allows for an understanding of its relationships with both society and the international system; and (d) formulate a general theoretical approach that would allow us to understand the state and its relationship to the domestic and international spheres of activity.

2.1 The state of the State in IR Theory

There are three aspects to traditional conceptions of the state in IR theory that require examination – the issue of the state being used as an analytic abstraction and autonomous actor in IR; the contrasting modes of knowledge that provide different conceptions of the state; and the definition of the state.

The traditional view of the state as autonomous actor was heavily challenged with the emergence of pluralist thinking in the 1970's which forced a focus on the primacy of the state in IR theory and led to what has been called the 'first state debate'.² Hobson argues that the 'first state debate' was,

concerned with the fundamental question as to whether 'states' predominate over 'social forces' and 'non-state actors'. Put differently, the debate revolves around the degree of autonomy that states have from non-state actors and social processes.³

In Hobson's view, the debate centered around two trends of thought. At one extreme, neorealists argued that the state is highly autonomous and has primacy in international politics. At the other extreme are the pluralists and liberalists who argued that state autonomy has declined and other actors and processes are becoming more significant.

From that perspective, it appears that the first state debate was a denial of neorealism and its articulation of the state as a 'black-box' and its primacy. The issue of whether the state predominates or has autonomy over other social processes or actors in the conduct of international politics appeared to be the focus of the state debate. Halliday also identifies that much of the theoretical debate has focused, "...around the analytic primacy of the state as the constitutive actor in international relations."⁴

Whilst it is true the debate involved a focus on the primacy of the state, it can also be argued more importantly, that the debate was essentially about the case for an alternative view of international politics and that other actors are necessarily important in such a conception.

² John Hobson, *The State and International Relations* (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 2000), p.1-2.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Fred Halliday, *Rethinking International Relations* (London; Macmillan, 1994), p. 74.

The case for an alternative view of international politics, through 'the first state debate', was not a denial of the historical accuracy of a state-centric world but rather that it was no longer adequate to comprehend contemporary reality. In fact, the emergence of the 'sovereign' state-centric model had mirrored the evolution of the nation-state as the distinctive political form of organization and was quite appropriate as an explanatory model. International relations became a system of relations between equal states rather than a system guided by universal law.⁵

The state-centric model was therefore appropriate, as the most important actors were states. This is not to suggest that other actors did not exist in cross border activities. The Catholic Church, trading companies and religious groups had a transnational character before the emergence of a modern inter-state system and continued to exist after the recognition of the nation-state as the sole sovereign entity in the international system. What was distinctive was that these groups seemed to have more or less acted within the authority of the state. According to Morse, "...for several centuries the autonomous nation-state became increasingly the major political institution under which people organized their social relations."⁶ Once the state appeared to decline as the popular instrument for the expression of the aspirations of people, other organizations emerged.

There was a changed from a system dominated in the immediate post-World War II period by military and security issues and the consequent primary focus on the 'state as actor' to a world of other concerns and emerging issues and the ascendancy of new actors across

⁵ Richard Mansbach, Yale H. Ferguson, Donald E. Lampert, *The Web of World Politics* (New Jersey; Prentice-Hall Inc., 1976). The acceptance of no law above the state introduced sovereignty as the defining characteristic of the system. The legitimating of the state apparatus by a distinctive national grouping saw the emergence of the nation-state as the dominant political form.

⁶ Edward L. Morse, *Modernisation and the Transformation of International Relations* (Canada; The Free Press, 1976), p. 3.

state boundaries. The sharp distinction between the 'international' and the 'domestic' spheres became very blurred when explaining either sphere. It was now a feature of world politics for domestic events such as revolutions and civil wars to spill over state boundaries and affect inter-state relations. Similarly, international issues served as either a constraint on and/or impetus to domestic politics. It is not argued that these features were new but that their occurrence and significance increased significantly.

It was the deficiency of realism and neorealism in IR theory to adequately account for such new global realities that led to a call for a re-examination of the use of the state as the 'constitutive actor' in understanding and explaining international politics. Realist accounts had included a number of factors influencing international politics but stopped short of using them as causative or explanatory factors. For example, Carr argued that international order was affected by changes at the level of the state. In each of his four periods of European history, changes in the nature of the state led to corresponding changes in the international system.⁷ However, international politics was about how the sovereign state constituted an international order and was explained by the nature of the units (states) which formed its constituents. In addition, Morgenthau recognized that in what determined national power, a number of human, technological and social factors were relevant.⁸ Yet, he was explicit in the view that international politics was about the contest for power among nations. Waltz was forthright in his view that using the state and its internal attributes was unnecessary for a theory of international politics. Explaining theory needed to avoid

⁷ E.H. Carr, *Nationalism and After* (London; Macmillan, 1945).

⁸ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* (New York; McGraw-Hill, 1993).

looking within the structure that determined the relational nature of the system.⁹

The intellectual responses to realism and neorealism challenged the state as a “black-box” and presented alternative approaches to the ‘billiard-ball’ view of the world with a ‘cobweb model’ that focused on foreign policy processes;¹⁰ pursuit of parochial politics and bureaucratic interests;¹¹ transnationalism;¹² and even acknowledging the emergence of a ‘world society’.¹³ A common feature of these alternative views is an approach that includes consideration of nonstate actors. According to Mansbach et al, the approach is not to,

...deny the paramount position that nation-states still occupy in international politics. Our claim is simply that the behavior of nonstate actors has not been studied systematically and has not been integrated into the dominant model.¹⁴

That dominant model had always established the state as the core unit and that international politics could be understood from studying interstate relations.¹⁵ Rosenau succinctly pointed out,

...inquiry has been organized exclusively around the foreign policies and interaction of states and, unfortunately, the paradigms, models, and concepts employed to probe these phenomena simply have not proven sufficient to the task of comprehending the changes that appear to be transnationalising world affairs.¹⁶

⁹ Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (New York; McGraw-Hill, 1986).

¹⁰ Richard C. Snyder, H.W. Bruck and Burton Sapin, *Foreign Policy Decision Making: An Approach to the Study of International Politics* (New York; Free Press, 1962).

¹¹ Graham Allison, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Boston, MA; Little, Brown, 1971).

¹² James N. Rosenau, *The Study of Global Interdependence: Essays on the Transnationalisation of World Affairs* (New York; Nichols, 1980).

¹³ John Burton, *The Study of World Society: A London Perspective*, International Studies Occasional Paper No.1 (U.S.A., 1974).

¹⁴ Mansbach, Ferguson and Lampert, *World Politics*, p. 2.

¹⁵ Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, *Transnational Relations and World Politics* (Cambridge, MA; Harvard University Press, 1972), p.7.

¹⁶ Rosenau, *Interdependence*, p. 4.

Mansbach et al identified seven components of the traditional state-centric model of international politics and observed that an actor in international politics is defined 'by the ascriptive quality of sovereignty' or 'by the descriptive characteristic of territoriality'.¹⁷ Instead, it is argued that an actor should be "...defined by the behavioral attribute of autonomy."¹⁸ In other words, an actor is able to freely exercise influence in world politics. Therefore, the contemporary world is seen as a multiplicity of autonomous actors that interact through independent decision-making and, in the process, shape the behavior of each other.

Mansbach et al in explaining the challenge to the state observed "...[w]hile national governments remain principal actors in the contemporary global system, the past decade has witnessed an explosive increase in popular participation in 'affairs of state'.¹⁹ Mansbach et al are quite correct in rejecting a state-centric approach as "...private citizens or groups have increasingly intruded in world politics without reference to governments or interstate organizations."²⁰ What was once presented as the exclusive domain of states has now been extended to previously unacknowledged actors and, correspondingly, IR theory has to accommodate their emergence in its paradigms. Therefore, Rosenau made the claim that there is now an enlarged space for the study of international politics and although nongovernmental entities may never be as powerful as governments or have as many issues to address, they help shape world events and cause governments to interact with them.²¹

Hobson, as indicated earlier, saw the first state debate as a contest of ideas on the primacy of the state or the level of autonomy of the state in determining international relations. He argued that in the end, both

¹⁷ Mansbach, Ferguson and Lampert, *World Politics*, p. 3.

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 4. This definition is an ideal type representation.

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 26.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Rosenau, *Interdependence*.

sides in the debate failed as the debate was not about the state and both ended up denying that the state can shape international politics free of international structures. In attempting to resolve the state debate, he proposed a 'second state debate' which locates IR theory within the agent-structure problematic. In comes the notion of the domestic and the international agential powers of the state.²²

However, the state debate and Hobson's final attempt to resolve it does not really address the fundamental issue – how best to account for social reality within international politics. The debate was concerned with accounting for the varying levels of primacy of the state in shaping international politics.²³ *The resolution should not be about whether the state is the primary constitutive actor and when, but who are the constitutive actors, how do they interact and the levels of interaction and, equally important, how do we explain their social existence.* It is about how to bring in more sources of action and influences that shape international politics and how international politics shape the state and other actors. Of course, to resolve the issue of whether the state has primacy helps but that distracts from a richer and broader conception of international politics. This shortcoming within IR - how to provide a broader account for phenomena within international politics - has been partly identified by Cox as a failure,

...to consider the state/society complex as the basic entity of international relations. As a consequence, the prospect that there

²² Hobson, *The State*, p. 5-7. Hobson defines domestic agential power as the ability of the state to make domestic or foreign policy as well as shape the domestic realm, free of domestic social-structural requirements or the interests of non-state actors. International agential power as the ability of the state to make foreign policy and shape the international realm free of international structural requirements or the interests of international non-state actors.

²³ Within sociology and comparative politics, there has been a similar debate on the level of autonomy of the state which resulted in Theda Skocpol, *Bringing the State Back In* (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1985).

exists a plurality of forms of state, expressing different configurations of state/society complexes, remains very largely unexplored...²⁴

The critical point in Cox's observation is that the state as a singular concept limits our investigation in international politics and bringing in the state/society complex offers tremendous scope for new explanations IR. Even without the acceptance of Cox's view that the state/society complex should be the basic entity of international relations, its examination can provide invaluable explanations of the nature of the state in the international system. For example, why some states are unable to mobilize internal resources to compete internationally, why some states have not been able to develop sufficient institutional authority to prevent societal disintegration, how those holding state power use international advantages to reinforce themselves in power, and how society is able to establish contacts beyond the state to strengthen itself. In examining the state/society complex, the society now becomes a constitutive actor in IR. This provides new agenda items for study in IR that can now be pursued if the state is dismantled as an analytic abstraction. IR theory will be able to examine the state in its multiple dimensions, how it relates to other actors including the society, and at what levels such interaction takes place. A new scope of enquiry in IR is critical for this thesis to offer a framework that will explain how and why post-colonial states came into being with limited empirical statehood instead of taking the post-colonial state and its attributes for granted.

Another dimension that remains fundamental to expanding the scope of enquiry of IR is to understand social existence and reality. Cox noted two different modes of knowledge: positivism and historicism.²⁵ Positivism refers to an attempt to conceive of knowledge with the rigidity

²⁴ Robert Cox, 'Social Forces, States and World Order' in *Neorealism and its critics*, ed., Robert Keohane (New York; Columbia University Press, 1986), p. 205.

²⁵ *Ibid.*

of natural science approaches that separate subject from object. This approach suggests that the events we study in IR are externally derived from the actions of the actors. In the case of the state, it can be studied as an abstract natural entity that is a product of the interaction of actors. Further, positivism claims that a scientific understanding of society requires neutral perceptions. There are natural units or parts that make up social reality based on repeated and regular occurrences and must be studied as such. Again, the state is seen as the present logical outcome of the action of actors and is not seen as historically contingent. Historicism refers to an attempt to conceive of knowledge as the product of people's perception of and responses to the material context in which they exist. Knowledge therefore has to be related to the "...changing mental processes of their makers."²⁶ In other words, knowledge must be based on the link between these mental processes and the material constraints and opportunities that exist for people to act.

These two approaches lead to two purposes of theorizing, namely problem-solving and critical theory.²⁷ The problem-solving approach takes the existing order of the international system as given and the existing social and power relationships as unquestioned. The particular configuration of order and relationships provides the limits and possibilities for explanation. Conversely, the critical approach starts by questioning the existing order and examines its genesis and evolution. Institutions and social relations are all examined for their origins and historical change. Critical approaches place great importance on historical specificity as they accept that social existence is a reflection of the material conditions that exist and sees the interpretation of and changes in social existence as continuing processes. Rather than taking

²⁶ Ibid., p. 242.

²⁷ Ibid.

a sphere of activity as a unit for analysis in itself, critical approaches seek to establish the wider social reality as an interrelated whole and locate the place of the activity within that whole. This dimension is also useful for the task of this thesis as critical theory provides an approach that can treat the state as part of the wider historical system that must be examined not in terms of its equilibrium but in terms of its changing processes. Within that system, the state is also a changing concept that must be studied alongside its social and political relations. Problem-solving approaches do not offer such possibilities for researching and understanding of IR as they seek to justify and rationalize the existing order.

The third aspect to the state in IR theory that is important for a resolution of the impasse, according to Halliday, "...goes to the heart of International Relations, to the concepts it bases itself upon, to the research programmes it stimulates, and to its relation with other disciplines within the social sciences. This is the question of the definition of 'state' which is used."²⁸ In a sense, IR theory has to resolve what is meant by the state when discussing new approaches to understanding and explaining international politics. We have noted how traditional IR theory conceptualized international politics as inter-state relations and the state as a totality. As such, traditional approaches were unable to examine the contending influences and processes which shaped the state nor how various forms of states – distinguished by history and structure - played different roles within the international system.

Clark presents this shortcoming as a consequence of the 'Great Divide' and points out that the division has allowed for a separate framework for theorizing in IR and the claim of IR being a separate

²⁸ Halliday, *International Relations*, p.76.

academic discipline.²⁹ The Great Divide allows for assumptions about two distinct and different spheres of action with separate tools of analysis. Clark identifies the various manifestations in which the separation of 'state as internal' and 'state as external' has taken place as,

a morality of states and morality of people; communitarianism and cosmopolitanism; communitarianism and liberalism; thick and thin; democracy of the polis and cosmopolitan democracy; foreign policy analysis and International Relations; and reductionism and systemic theory.³⁰

This clearly shows that even beyond the arguments of the primacy of the state and the state as black-box, there is a more fundamental problem of a theoretical separation between the 'state as external' and the 'state as internal'. It is a separation that holds no promise in an age of globalization. As pointed out by Clark "...one of the salient characteristics of globalization is precisely the manner in which it transcends or subsumes the separation between the internal and external political realms."³¹ This is reinforced by Sorensen's view that the "...future of the world order, the configuration of forces that set the context for world affairs, cannot be adequately understood if the international-domestic relationships are left out."³²

Thus, the new approaches in IR theory must look for an agenda beyond the totality of the state and must assert that explanation and understanding can incorporate issues, processes and units that are not about questioning the primacy of the state. Most importantly, it requires dismantling the Great Divide and allowing for a place for the 'domestic' in helping to understand international politics and how international

²⁹ Ian Clark, *Globalisation and International Relations Theory* (Oxford; Oxford University Press, 1999), p.17. The Great Divide refers to the academic separation between political science that studies the internal and international relations that studies the external.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p.18.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p.16.

³² Georg Sorensen, *Changes in Statehood. The Transformation of International Relations* (New York; Palgrave, 2001), p. 3.

politics helps in understanding the 'domestic'. IR theory must provide for an examination of the emergence of the state, what factors have influenced the nature of the state, and what have been the implications for societies and the international system.

2.2 Revisiting IR Theory – Bringing in the 'domestic'

From the above it is recognized that IR theory must incorporate state and society if it is to cross the Great Divide and to project a revelatory understanding of state-societal relations and their relationship with international politics. It is now obvious that IR theory must continue to break its theoretical chauvinism and look to other disciplines for satisfactory adducts that can assist in providing more meaningful explanations. Such a rethinking must allow for the examination of post-colonial states and their societies not as failed entities but as historical constructs and products of an expanding 'international system'.

It has been shown that it was traditional IR theory, through Realism, that treated the state as a monolithic entity which served as the constitutive unit of the interactions that defined international politics. Neorealism accentuated this approach and with World-System theory placed more emphasis on the international or systemic level.³³ Therefore, the internal attributes of states are constants rather than variables and the range of policy outcomes are due to changing external pressures rather than internal changes. On the other hand, there are pluralist approaches that locate the explanation of foreign policy and international relations at the level of the state. The state does not respond to but also constitutes the external.³⁴

³³ For a good account of World-systems theory, a variant of Marxism, see Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Politics of the World-Economy* (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1984).

³⁴ Robert D. Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games," in *Double-Edged Diplomacy*, eds. Peter B. Evans et al (Berkeley:CA; University of California, 1993).

It is clear though that both domestic and international explanations of international politics recognize that both domestic and international factors are involved. Therefore according to Putnam, it is no longer productive to argue whether domestic politics or international relations determines each other as the answer is each act causally on the other and it is more useful to ask “how” and “when”.³⁵ According to Sorensen, revisions are needed and it will have to be accepted that, “...the core values pursued by states, that is, security, freedom, order, justice, wealth, and welfare, each contain ‘international’ as well as ‘domestic’ aspects.....the international-domestic should be at the center of inquiry.”³⁶ Clark also offers a way forward by treating the state, “...as the common but contested ground that brings the international and the national together, rather than as the barrier which marks the line of separation between them.”³⁷

Therefore, there are two tasks involved in seeking to bring in the domestic to International Relations. The first task is to assess the attempts to conceive of international politics as a whole and present both domestic and international dimensions that interact and, secondly, to consider a definition of the state which dismantles totality with an inclusive role for the ‘domestic’ in its understanding of the international role of the state.³⁸

Arguments to link domestic and international relations in a move from a state-centric conception of international politics were a feature of

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Sorensen, *Statehood*, p. 1-2.

³⁷ Clark, *Globalisation*, p. 17.

³⁸ A number of writers have sought to catalogue attempts to bridge the ‘domestic-international’ divide. James A. Caporaso, *Across the Great Divide: Integrating Comparative and International Politics* (EUI Working Papers, RSC No. 97/58, Florence Italy, 1997) recognizes three possibilities: two-level game; second-image reversed; and domestication of international politics. Clark, *Globalisation*, identifies attempts in decision-making theory; historical materialism/world systems; international society and constructivism.

early pluralist writings.³⁹ Other writings developed that sought to examine how the international and the domestic are related particularly in the areas of economic policy, interdependence and transnationalism.⁴⁰

Keohane and Nye, using the foundations of the 'second image reversed' and interdependence, introduced the concept of internationalization to highlight the effect of the international economic exchanges on domestic politics.⁴¹ Their compilation of essays argued that domestic politics can no longer be understood "...without comprehending the nature of the linkages between national economies and the world economy, and changes in such linkages."⁴² Internationalization is seen as the process which is engendered when there are changes in the transaction costs which facilitate flows of goods, services and capital. Therefore, international trade and investment have expanded and have forced changes at the national levels. Since domestic institutions are an expression of domestic preferences and are designed to achieve these preferences there will be changes from the influence of the international.⁴³

In another dimension of the debate, Skidmore and Hudson made the case for a theory of foreign policy behavior that shows how

³⁹ James Rosenau, *Linkage Politics: Essays on the Convergence of National and International Systems* (New York; Free Press, 1969); Karl W. Deutsch et al., *Political Community in the North Atlantic Area: International Organisation in the Light of Historical Experience* (Princeton, N.J; Princeton University Press, 1957) and Ernst B. Hass, *The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social, and Economic Forces, 1950-1957* (Stanford, California; Stanford University Press, 1958).

⁴⁰ For example Peter Katzenstein, "International Relations and Domestic Structures: Foreign Economic Policies of Advanced Industrial Societies," *International Organisation* 30: (Winter 1976) and Robert Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, *Power and Interdependence* (USA; Longman, 2001).

⁴¹ Robert O. Keohane and Helen V. Milner, eds., *Internationalization and Domestic Politics* (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1996). They argued that interdependence focused on the international level.

⁴² *Ibid.*, p.3.

⁴³ *Ibid.*

differences in domestic forces can change foreign policy in states.⁴⁴ Skidmore and Hudson argue beyond the traditional foreign policy analysis approaches that are limited to the state structures and decision-makers, as these approaches accept "...the traditional realist distinction between the political processes governing the making of domestic and foreign policies."⁴⁵ It is suggested that what is missing is consideration of the role of domestic politics in foreign policy where the influence of societal groups is treated as a variable. Such an approach considers how organized groups try to influence state policy and how state decision-makers relate to these groups. Skidmore and Hudson identified three models for state-societal relations and foreign policy – statist, societal and transnational.

However, Putnam argued that these attempts are limited and must move beyond mere observation and cataloguing of relationships and "...seek theories that integrate both spheres, accounting for the areas of entanglement between them."⁴⁶ Putnam offered the 'two-level game' as a way of understanding the politics of international negotiations. This approach argues that at the national level, domestic groups seek to enhance their interest by pressuring governments who themselves try to consolidate their power by building coalitions among these groups. At the international level, governments seek to use their contact to satisfy domestic demands while limiting the adverse consequences of international developments.

Putnam introduced a significant departure in early attempts to bridge the gap by rejecting explanations that treat one level as the dominant influence and the other as an intervening variable. Instead the 'two-level' approach argued that statesmen are doing two things at once –

⁴⁴ David Skidmore and Valerie M. Hudson, eds., *The Limits of State Autonomy: Societal Groups and Foreign Policy Formulation* (United Kingdom; Westview Press, 1993).

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

⁴⁶ Putnam, *Two-Level Games*, p. 436.

exploiting domestic and international politics simultaneously. The chief executive of the country is seen as 'Janus-faced' because concerns from both levels are balanced in a 'doubled-edged' diplomacy.⁴⁷ Where the two logics do not coincide, the chief executive has the autonomy to resolve them. Thus, Putnam uses all three levels of analysis and goes beyond the agent/structure polarization.

Writings using a historical materialist approach have argued for a totality shaped by the socio-economic context which in turn determines all areas of human activity. According to Halliday, "...there is no 'international system', or any component activity.....abstracted from the mode of production."⁴⁸ Using the concept of 'international society as homogeneity', Halliday refers to "...a set of norms shared by different societies and which are promoted by inter-state competition."⁴⁹ This homogeneity is the product of international pressures on states to conform to an internationally defined standard in their internal structuring. Therefore, despite states attempting, or wanting, to have distinct policies and particular modes of functioning within their national boundaries, there is a compelling logic from outside forcing states to conform. According to Halliday, this approach allows for an understanding of the "...relations between the internal structure of societies and the international."⁵⁰ By bringing the concepts of both the internal and the external into the analysis, it is possible to examine "...what happens within states and societies and....the interaction of international activity with domestic legitimacy and stability."⁵¹ This

⁴⁷ Andrew Moravcsik , "Introduction – Integrating International and Domestic Theories of International Bargaining" in *Double-Edged Diplomacy*, ed., Peter B. Evans et al (Berkeley:CA; University of California, 1993).

⁴⁸ Halliday, *International Relations*, p. 60.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 94.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 95.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*

approach still affords importance to states since homogeneity is promoted by inter-state competition

Wallerstein's notion of a single world-economy offers a different conception of a totality which encompasses both the domestic and the international despite the diminished significance given to the domestic. Wallerstein suggested that we use the concept of 'historical system' – long-term, large-scale wholes within which concepts have meanings.⁵² He explains that,

[i]t is a whole which is integrated, that is, composed of interrelated parts, therefore in some sense systematic and, with comprehensible patterns. It is a system which has a history, that is, it has a genesis, an historical development, a close...⁵³

The capitalist world-economy is the contemporary historical system which is based on the motive of capital accumulation. This historical system, which developed in Europe, expanded to encompass the entire social and physical space of humanity, creating all major institutions in its image. Thus, all the major institutions are either shaped or created by it and are not permanent or relatively fixed structures insulated from the workings of the capitalist world-economy. In world-systems analysis, the entire globe is operating within the framework of a single social division of labor which is capitalistic in nature.

Wallerstein's approach provides an understanding that allows the system to be seen as having a single logic with all the parts functioning to fulfill that logic. The state as a product of the system has a particular function which is not delineated by its disaggregated appearance. In essence, the state is a political institution which enforces the social division of labor. The notion of a totality of domestic and international finds unambiguous expression in the explanation that,

⁵² Wallerstein, *World Economy*, p. 27.

⁵³ Ibid.

social reality is centered in the workings of the world-economy, and we will not be able to analyze intelligently any social phenomenon, however “micro” it may seem, without placing it as an element constrained by the real system in which it finds itself.⁵⁴

Another historical materialist approach is provided by Cox with the notion of historical structures as particular spheres of historically located totalities. There are three levels or spheres which are interrelated as

[c]hanges in the organization of production generate new social forces which, in turn, bring about changes in the structure of states; and the generalization of changes in the structure of states alters the problematic of world order.⁵⁵

However, the relationship is not all unilinear and a fuller representation of historical processes requires that they be considered in relation to each other. This highlights the interaction of the international and the domestic. Further, a state’s *raison d’etat* is defined by the configuration of its social forces and is manifested externally and internally. Thus, “[t]here is a practical connection between the effort of a state to organize its society and its effort to maintain itself and pursue its goals in the interstate context.”⁵⁶ Similarly, changes in the form of the state are related to changes in the structure of the world order and must be used to explain changes in the social relations of production. There is a ‘parallelism’ which is mutually reinforcing.

Another approach that has sought to bridge the international and domestic lies in the use of ‘international society’.⁵⁷ This approach, drawing upon the work of English School Rationalism utilized the concept of ‘domestication of the international system’.⁵⁸ It suggested that

⁵⁴ Ibid., p.12.

⁵⁵ Cox, *Social Forces*, p. 220.

⁵⁶ Ibid., p.107.

⁵⁷ Clark, *Globalisation*, p. 29.

⁵⁸ Caporaso, *Great Divide*, p. 24. This approach uses the work of Hedley Bull.

if the international system is anarchic with sovereign interacting states, then 'domestication' implies a process towards a 'governmentalized' and rule-governed system. According to Suganami's 'domestic analogy', the similarities between the domestic and the international are such that, "...the conditions of order within states are similar to those between them; and that therefore those which sustain order domestically should be reproduced at the international level."⁵⁹ This approach sees the integration as requiring the removal of the conditions that define the two separate spheres. The test of a single system is in the establishment and functioning of institutions for the formulation, interpretation and implementation of laws and the creation of a hierarchy of norms which are binding on all parties.

Other conceptions of integrating international and domestic politics have developed in approaches outside of political science and are now contributing to a productive synthesis of ideas that can only enrich the study of international politics. One such intervention has been by social constructivism rooted in the belief that ideas are responsible, more or less, for the shaping of social reality. Applied to IR theory, constructivists see norms as shaping the identity of states which consequently determines state interests. Logically, as norms change so do identity and interest and ultimately state policies and relations. Like all major theoretical approaches, constructivists differ on whether to favor the international structure,⁶⁰ agency⁶¹ or use a synthesis of structure and agency⁶². However, the approach of Reus-Smith described

⁵⁹ Hidemi Suganami, *The Domestic Analogy and World Order Proposals* (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1989), p.1.

⁶⁰ For example Martha Finnemore, *National Interest in International Society* (Ithaca; Cornell University Press, 1996).

⁶¹ For example Peter Katzenstein, *Cultural Norms and National Security* (Ithaca; Cornell University Press, 1996).

⁶² For example Christian Reus-Smith, *The Moral Purpose of the State* (Princeton; Princeton University Press, 1996).

as 'holistic constructivism' seeks to integrate the domestic and the international spheres of activity.

Reus-Smith utilizes what he called a 'constructivist philosophy of history' comprising four central tenets to examine how change takes place within the international system.⁶³ Firstly, ideational structures are as important as material structures in shaping individual and collective action; secondly, ideational structures shape actors' social identities; thirdly, actors' social identities inform their interest and fourthly, most importantly, structures and agents are mutually constitutive. Understanding change in the international system must move beyond the assumption that change is necessarily associated with the changes in sovereign status and that the forces driving change are materialist. Instead, to understand change requires a look at the normative structure of the international system. According to Reus-Smith, "...the normative structure comprises three elements - a hegemonic conception of the moral purpose of the state; an organizing principle of sovereignty; and a norm of procedural justice."⁶⁴ Therefore, from a 'holistic constructivist' approach, changes in the normative structure change the social identity of the state which in turn changes the constitutional structure. This gives rise to a recursive process which integrates the internal and external.

Another insertion into IR theory has been the re-emergence of a historical sociology of international relations with the work of Neo-Weberian Historical Sociology also offering explanation beyond the theoretical divide of the domestic and international.⁶⁵ Writing in that

⁶³ Christian Reus-Smith, "The idea of history and history with ideas" in *Historical Sociology of International Relations*, eds., Stephen Hobden and John M. Hobson (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 2002).

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p.136.

⁶⁵ Hobson, *The State*. Neo-Weberian approach is seen as the second wave of Weberian Historical Sociology (WHS) in contrast to a realist inspired first wave of writers such as Theda Skocpol, *States and Revolutions* (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1979)

vein, Hobson sought to provide an approach that addresses the separateness of state to state, and state to society in international relations theory by depicting states, "...as variously embedded or integrated within domestic social relations as well as international relations..."⁶⁶ Hobson's argument rests on what he calls a paradox argument – that to bring the state back as an independent actor in IR requires that society and international society also be brought back in. Therefore, unlike conceptions of state autonomy, the presence of strong social actors enhances state power rather than weakens it. Therefore, instead of a trade-off between state power and social forces in an 'either/or' approach, there is an inclusive 'both/and' logic and there is a shift of analysis from 'state or non-state forces' to 'states and non-state actors'.⁶⁷

Using Mann's conception of a non-reductionist state,⁶⁸ Hobson offers a 'structurationist' synthesis of structure and agency. Thus, the domestic and international are integrated through the 'constitutive state' and the co-constitution of state and society/international society. The state is placed within an international/national vortex in which the structures of the mode of production, world economy and international state system, "... are mutually embedded that they shape and determine one another."⁶⁹ Structures both constrain and enable state capacity and accordingly international and national structures become 'realms of constraint' and 'realms of opportunity'. States therefore use both domestic and international realms as resources to enhance their power

and Charles Tilly, *The Formation of National States in Western Europe* (Princeton; Princeton University Press, 1975).

⁶⁶ Ibid., p. 204. The more embedded a state is the greater the capacity to govern effectively and to conduct international relations.

⁶⁷ John M. Hobson, *The Wealth of Nations: A Comparative Sociology of International Economic and Political Change* (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1997).

⁶⁸ Michael Mann, *The Sources of Social Power*, vol. 1, (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1986).

⁶⁹ Hobson, *The State*, p. 210.

or interest in the respective realms. According to Hobson, "...the state is a *Janus-faced* entity, with one face looking to the international and global realms and the other facing the domestic arena."⁷⁰

Hobson's analysis highlights two significant premises – firstly, the internal attributes of states and state-societal relations are necessary for explaining international politics and; secondly, states are not passive consequences of structures and non-state actors, but constitute and are constituted by domestic and international structures.⁷¹ The structurationist model of the 'constitutive' state and global politics gives birth to a 'neo-integrationist' approach to international politics.⁷² A 'neo-integrationist' approach rejects the idea that the domestic and international realms are separate or there is a one-way linkage and purports that "...there is a seamless web that envelops them and binds each of these realms together."⁷³ The state is seen as 'territorially promiscuous' because it is located in that international/national vortex where it can play both realms to enhance its interests and/or power, adapt or conform to the structures. In the process, the realms become mutually embedded. Accordingly, states develop 'exit strategies' and 'adaptive strategies' that highlight the power of the state and the structural constraints that states face.⁷⁴

The functioning of the state in two realms from a 'neo-integrationist' approach gives rise to a conception of international politics as an "...increasingly integrated global spatial architecture" and to a theoretical position that "...gives relatively equal ontological weighting to international and global social, normative, economic and political

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Hobson, *Wealth of Nations*, p. 272-275.

⁷² Hobson, *The State*, p. 223-235 and Hobson and Holden, eds., *Historical Sociology*, p. 63-81.

⁷³ Ibid., p. 230.

⁷⁴ Ibid., p. 230-234.

structures on the one hand, but also the state and state-society relations on the other.”⁷⁵

The above approaches all provide exciting possibilities for alternative conceptions of IR and new research programs. For example, Putnam’s approach offers the utility of the janus-faced chief executive and the use of all three levels of analysis. However, the difficulty is that it is ahistorical and represents a framework that can only be used for analysis of a particular period or event. It is limited to situations where the Chief Executive is empowered to act and has the space to engage in international negotiations. Clearly, it cannot be applied to the state in a colonial situation. Further, Putnam’s approach has no holistic conception of the international system or of the system’s defining characteristics.

Historical materialism offers the notion of a totality of social reality where social existence is not disaggregated but presented as possessing a single defining characteristic of a capitalist logic. There are two benefits of such an approach. Firstly, it locates all the parts as constituting a whole. The state, whatever its form, is not an isolated historical occurrence and must be analyzed in the context of the whole. Secondly, it presents social reality as developing in accordance with the changing mode of production. Therefore, it has both historical specificity and a logic of change. However, the difficulty of some uses of historical materialism is the primacy given to some levels or spheres of activity or the level of determinism given to capitalistic as the source of all action.

Constructivism goes in the other direction to offer the ideational structure as the primary logic for change in society. It has utility, certainly in the case of Reus-Smith, in offering an integration of the domestic and international and providing an understanding of change and history. However, there is an overemphasis on the role of ideas in

⁷⁵ Ibid., p. 234.

accounting for change whilst the economic framework within which social existence takes place becomes too inconsequential.

Neo-Weberian Historical sociology (NHS) offers a second wave of Weberian historical sociology that through Hobson offers a more complex non-realist view of international politics. The greatest strength of the approach of Hobson is the use of a structurationist approach that argues that the state-society complex constitutes, and is constituted by, both the domestic and the international. At a broader level, the use of historical sociology within international relations offers significant advantages to achieving the objectives of this thesis.⁷⁶ Neo-Weberian historical sociology allows us to understand the present as a product of the past and to recognize that whilst it is important to study the past to understand the present; the present is itself a representation of its own historical conjuncture of social forces.

There are three difficulties with Hobson's neo-integrationist approach. Firstly, he has not provided a conception of the prevailing logic of the international system in its present historical mode. Secondly, he has not adequately accounted for change within the international system and between systems. Thirdly, it focuses on the state as being constitutive within the domestic and international but leaves the society grounded in the domestic.

Having analyzed the above, it is established that the first task for rethinking IR as constituting the domestic requires an understanding that sees the international system as an integrated system with both domestic and international dimensions. In that integration academic arguments on the state and society cease to be 'either' and become 'both' with the state and society each having a janus-faced character.

⁷⁶ Historical Sociology in IR is defined as "...a critical approach which refuses to treat the present as an autonomous entity outside of history, but insists on embedding it within a specific socio-temporal place..." (Hobson and Holden, eds., *Historical Sociology*, p. 13). This definition is itself contentious as Hobson deliberately seeks to problematise the traditional historical sociology approach in its application to IR.

2.3 Reconceptualising the State

It was earlier established that the second task is to conceptualize the central concept in international relations - the state. According to Halliday, “[i]nternational relations as whole takes as given one specific definition, what one may term the national-territorial totality. Thus the state...comprises in conceptual form what is denoted visually on a map - viz. the country as a whole and all that is within it: territory, government, people and society.”⁷⁷ This succinct description exposes the grave sin of much of IR theory in accounting for the nature of the state. This difficulty arises because of the academic division between international relations and political science and has been referred to as the double life of the state, “...whereby political science or comparative politics deals with the ‘internal’, whereas International Relations is the study of the ‘external’ relations of the state.”⁷⁸

The above definition drawing upon international law and political theory served as a useful abstraction for international relations at a time when explanation centered on a ‘billiard-ball’ conception of the world. Consequently, non-state actors and the nature of state-societal relations that can help explain the international behavior of state are implicitly left out. It has already been shown in the previous section that traditional IR theory does not adequately provide for a new theorizing of the state.⁷⁹ Avoiding the exhaustive debate in other disciplines on the nature and form of the state, it is not difficult to look beyond the boundaries of IR for alternative conceptions that appear more relevant to the contemporary world.

⁷⁷ Halliday, *International Relations*, p. 78.

⁷⁸ Clark, *Globalisation*, p.17.

⁷⁹ The debate on the state has also characterized other disciplines notable political science and sociology. It is interesting that whilst IR has been arguing to bring in society to overcome systemic explanations, sociology and political science have been arguing for a movement in the opposite direction - to reduce reductionism or social embeddedness.

Arguing for a second wave of Weberian Historical Sociology, Hobson identified six principles that are needed for an adequate theory of the state, society and international relations.⁸⁰ These include a study of history and change; multi-causality; multi-spatiality; partial autonomy of power sources and actors; complex notions of history and change; and a theory of state autonomy and power. This approach allows IR theory to overcome many of the shortcomings of traditional theory as well as those of sociological definitions.

Mann's formulation of an IEMP model sought to fulfill these principles and provide a concept of the state and international system which is of greater utility in understanding international politics.⁸¹ The model argues that the four sources of power – political, economic, ideological and military – are all partially autonomous and seek to influence and in the process mutually structure each other. There are instances where one or two sources of power may predominate and determine the character of the state and system. The model also recognizes the multi-spatiality of the system as the various levels – sub-national, national, international and global – also affect and structure each other. Thus the state crosses the 'Great Divide'.

Hobson also using historical sociology suggested an approach that presents the state as embedded or integrated in both domestic social relations and international relations and so forming a 'constitutive' state.⁸²

Cox arguing from a critical historical approach recognizes that a generic concept of the state is limited in its use to explain international politics. Instead, it is of greater utility to focus on the distinctive forms of the state. Social forces shape the form of the state as "a particular

⁸⁰ John Hobson, "The Historical Sociology of the State and the State of Historical Sociology' in *International Relations*" *Review of International Political Economy* 5; 2 (xx) p. 286-96.

⁸¹ Mann, *Social Power*, vol. 1.

⁸² Hobson, *Wealth of Nations*.

configuration of social forces defines in practice the limits or parameters of state purposes, and the modus operandi of state action..."⁸³ This approach suggests that forms of the state are historically contingent and that it is the state that ensures the production process. However, the state is constrained by its position and relative power in the world order and acts with only relative autonomy defined as its *raison d'état* – a product of consistent notions of national interest and modes of conduct. Thus the form of the state, "...is a product of two configurations of forces: one, the configuration of social classes within a historic bloc; the other, the permissiveness of the world order."⁸⁴

Halliday in examining the potential of sociological definitions of the state points out that an alternative conception allows questions and research programs different from the traditional totality approach. A typical sociological definition is given by Skocpol who describes the state as, "...a set of administrative, policing and military organizations headed, and more or less well coordinated, by an executive authority."⁸⁵ The use of such a sociological definition provides many advantages for alternative theorizing of IR that go beyond the immobility caused by a 'black-box' understanding of the state.⁸⁶ This also overcomes the attribute of coherence to institutions given in totality approaches.

Firstly, it is now possible to open for analysis many separate concepts that are befuddled in the traditional notion of the state but are critical for the task of this thesis. For example, we differentiate between the state and society – the set of institutions referred to by Skocpol and those beyond their control; between state and government – the set of institutions and the executive authority that provides leadership; and

⁸³ Robert W. Cox, *Production, Power and World Order* (New York; Columbia University Press, 1987), p.105.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, p.148.

⁸⁵ Skocpol, *States*, p. 29.

⁸⁶ Halliday, *International Relations*, p. 80-83. The following is taken from his account of the advantages of rethinking the state.

between state and nation – the set of institutions and extent of their control, spatially and culturally. We are able to recognize that the state can have two sets of relationships and operate in two spheres of activity. It can relate to society, government and nation on the one hand and other states and non-state actors on the other. However, such a differentiation still raises the fundamental question of what do we mean by the state in international politics – is it the ‘national-territorial representation’, is it the voice of the government, is it a powerful bureaucratic voice carried through the institutions, or is it a representation of society.

Secondly, it allows for an alternative view of the origin and development of states and the inter-state system. The traditional view of the state supposes an ahistorical conception and limits an assessment of different paths or trajectories of its origin and growth. By analyzing the state as a set of institutions it is now possible to understand the context and the rationale for the emergence of states. We can now ask new research questions such as did the origin of the institutions have an external influence; if so, for what purpose; how has the state structure changed and under what conditions; and are the state and society serving external or internal interests.

Thirdly, a new conception allows an examination of who controls the institutions and for what purposes. Therefore, the state can be seen as the expression of a range of interests ranging from a particular sectoral interest to an autonomous expression of national interest. It can also be seen that the state in its behavior may not be the expression of the national interest but rather that of a particular social group and that international behavior can change from time to time. It also indicates that the state can use its relationship in either sphere to enhance its capacity and promote its interest.

Whilst recognizing the possibilities that are open for new IR theorizing there are some difficulties with strict sociological definitions.

Firstly, as the state is seen as a set of institutions, it is not clear which are considered part of the state and which are not. Secondly, there is the case of the level of autonomy given to the state. The state is sometimes seen as having tremendous capacity to be autonomous and insulated from social forces and, on the other hand, as embedded in society with little autonomy.

2.4 Moving Forward – A Critical Historical Approach

It has been ^{argued} illustrated that it is necessary to move beyond traditional approaches to study the origin and evolution of the post-colonial state and society if we are to provide a broader and profounder explanation of the state and its relationship with the international system. Further, there are ontological aspects of states and social existence that originate in the 'international' but which cannot be accounted for using these traditional approaches. Therefore, as we take snapshots of the state and society we can provide an account of their actions and roles in constituting and being constituted by the international system. Yet, most of these accounts have not incorporated the historical emergence of the state and society as critical to understanding their nature and, importantly, the character of the international system. The effect of the international ^{realm on} shaping the state-society complex and the effect of changing state-society complexes on the actions of the state in the international system remains largely unexplored. The challenge therefore is to apply an approach which best offers the opportunities to achieve that intellectual task.

2.4.1 An Alternative approach to IR theory

We identified that a fundamental weakness with traditional IR theory was the epistemological approach that leads to problem solving theorizing and consequently to ahistorical approaches to understanding the state and society. Therefore, the first step to formulating a new

approach is to move from a methodology for acquiring knowledge that is based on a separation of knowledge from practice. All forms of human association stem from man's basic association for production and since knowledge is built up by interacting individuals, knowledge depends upon the development of production and other forms of social activity and relationships.⁸⁷ Thus, knowledge is intrinsically linked with its material setting. This is in direct contrast to the positivist's approach to theory that sees a separation between theory and practice.⁸⁸ In positivist approaches, "[t]he factual material or subject matter is provided from without; science sees to its formulation in clear and comprehensible terms, so that men may be able to use the knowledge as they wish."⁸⁹ Theory is then seen as theory in itself divorced from its time and space.

The alternative approach to positivism sees the world as perceived by the individual as the product – present and continuing – of the society as a whole. Therefore, the activities of the individual – theoretical and practical – are not the result of a self-determining knowledge of a fixed object but of a continually changing reality of which the individual is part. The origin of objective facts, the use of conceptual frameworks to understand these facts and the function of these frameworks in social life are not separate from the process of theorizing. Accordingly, understanding social life must not involve the separation of object and subject or values from research. To do otherwise is to adopt a traditional approach that, "...view parts as separate from wholes and reifies parts as isolated things in themselves, as causes separated from effects, as subjects separated from objects."⁹⁰ Such an approach argues for an

⁸⁷ Maurice Cornforth, *The Theory of Knowledge* (US; International Publishers Co., 1971).

⁸⁸ Max Horkheimer, *Critical Theory. Selected Essays*, (New York; The Continuum Publishing Company, 1995).

⁸⁹ *Ibid.* p.196.

⁹⁰ Doug Lorimer, *Fundamentals of Historical Materialism* (Australia; Resistance Books, 1999).

emphasis on presenting reality as only generalized facts that can be empirically observed and proven.

Within IR theory, neorealism represents the epitome of such a positivist approach to understanding and knowledge.⁹¹ For Waltz, the basic approach for formulating a theory of international relations is to seek laws that establish relations between variables or concepts. These relations must be more than just incidental but rather a repeated occurrence with an expectation that they would hold in the future. A theory becomes a statement that explains such laws. The statement is based on assumptions that are nonfactual but are necessary to make explanation possible and depends on the usefulness of the explanations. In addition, Waltz explains that theories must separate realms of activity to explain although the emphasis is not on, "...whether it is useful. And usefulness is judged by the explanatory and predictive powers of the theory that may be fashioned."⁹² From that perspective, the nature of world politics cannot be understood by examining the multiple and differentiated internal dynamics of states and society as the central concern for this is the descriptive level. It is for that reason that Waltz favors a systemic theory that explains the recurrences and repetitions but thereby denying continual change.⁹³

However, a new theorizing in IR requires that understanding goes beyond the assumptions and what is taken for granted as facts in traditional theory. Horkheimer teaches "to look beyond the facts;...to distinguish the superficial from the essential without minimizing the importance of either..."⁹⁴ Critical theory, Cox explains, "does not take institutions and social and power relations for granted but calls them into question by concerning itself with their origins and how and whether

⁹¹ Waltz, *Theory*.

⁹² *Ibid.*, p. 65.

⁹³ *Ibid.*

⁹⁴ Horkheimer, *Critical Theory*, p.xiv.

they might be in the process of changing.”⁹⁵ All concepts must be historically located and constantly changed to reflect the realities of social existence. Thus, whilst Waltz’s approach is ahistorical, since it seeks repetition and recurrence or a permanent present, critical approaches are concerned with a continuing process of historical change of which both parts and whole are centrally involved. This feature makes a critical theory approach most appropriate for this thesis.

Further, the assumptions that are held by the traditional approach for explanation are subject to question by critical theory and examined for a holistic understanding of social reality. For example, the notion of the post-colonial states as weak and undeveloped is not taken as a constant but instead is examined for the origin of the weakness, the source of the continuity of that situation and even possibilities for transformation. Critical theory must be a theory of history and of the continuing process of historical change. Framing such an approach within critical theory is the first step to a new broader understanding of international politics.

2.4.2 Fundamentals of a Critical Historical Approach

A critical historical approach starts with the explanation by Marx that,

the first premise of all human history is the existence of living human individuals. Thus the fact to be established is the physical organization of these individuals and their consequent relation to the rest of nature.⁹⁶

Humans create and sustain society through the fundamental activity of all human groups in the production of its material

⁹⁵ Cox, *Social Forces*, p. 208. Cox counterpoises ‘problem-solving theory’ and ‘critical theory’.

⁹⁶ Karl Marx and Freidrich Engels, *The German Ideology* (Moscow : Progress Publishers, 1976).

subsistence.⁹⁷ As societies transform in the quest for human survival and humans seek to satisfy their material and cultural needs, so does the organization of production and then the corresponding social relations, social structures and ideas that facilitate social life. Society is in a constant state of development as the organization of production and ideas themselves provide impetus for further development.⁹⁸

It is important to understand the role of ideas – and thus consciousness – in the development and transformation of society. Social life is created by living conscious people who in everyday life pursue their aims and goals, however they exist within a broader structure of society determined by the stage of development of the material productive forces. For example, the society of slavery and plantation owners is not the same as the society of the hand-mill and the feudal lord nor is it not the same society as that of the steam-mill and the industrial capitalist. Ideas and consciousness are shaped by the conflict between the material productive forces and the relations of production. However, Marx explained that it is necessary to distinguish between the material transformation of the conditions of production and the ideological forms in which people become aware of the conflict in society and struggle for change.⁹⁹ Therefore, despite the ideological fight for change, based on ideas and consciousness, no social order passes away until the productive forces have created the conditions for transformation.

The notion of contradiction is needed for a critical historicism as it provides the knowledge that contradictions give rise to conflict which serve as the process of renewal and continual remaking of social relations.¹⁰⁰ The notion of contradictions giving rise to conflict that

⁹⁷ Maurice Cornforth, *Historical Materialism* (New York; International Publishers, 1985).

⁹⁸ Lorimer, *Historical Materialism*.

⁹⁹ Karl Marx, *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, vol. 1 (Harmondsworth; Penguin, 1976).

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*

propels change is based on four fundamental principles.¹⁰¹ Firstly, understanding that parts can only be parts to the extent that there is a whole in which a part exists. Therefore, a whole is an integrated set of relationships of heterogeneous parts that have no prior existence as parts. Secondly, the properties and characteristics of the parts are acquired by being part of the whole. Once a unit becomes part of a whole, it is transformed. Thirdly, since humans are both object and subject, and recreate each other by interacting change is a characteristic of all parts. Finally, because of continual change, the whole is not inherently balanced or harmonious.

The attempt to account for state and society within IR theory requires that the historical nature of the state and society be examined. The critical historical approach must offer a number of advantages over other approaches. Firstly, it must locate the emergence of state and society within a framework for action that exposes the conflict and contradiction and thereby highlights the process of change. Secondly, the framework must be able to provide an integrated conception of social reality. Thirdly, it must be able to incorporate the role of ideas, the organization of production and social institutions that emerge during the process of interaction.

Appropriately, using a Coxian approach this framework can be referred to as an historical structure that represents a configuration of forces brought about by thought patterns or ideas, human institutions and material conditions that continually change over time.¹⁰² The structure is historical and not fixed in time. These structures do not direct action but restrict and pressure individuals, groups, states and assemblage of states. Material capabilities refer to the natural resources, wealth, equipment, technology and organisational forms that lead production. It is obvious that material capabilities can be improved in

¹⁰¹ Lorimer, *Historical Materialism*.

¹⁰² Ibid. Cox built on the Gramscian notion of 'historic bloc'.

some respects and represent the fundamental productive force. Ideas are both thought patterns that people hold across social groups and are commonly or 'intersubjectively' held and the collective images held by different groups of people of the social order. These ideas, which are historically conditioned and are conceptions of reality or consciousness, can serve as sources of agreement and conflict between states and groups of people. Institutions refer to bureaucratic mechanisms that seek to 'stabilize or even perpetuate a particular order'.¹⁰³ Institutions are critical as they can become the battleground for conflict over ideas, but also appear as the legitimizing mechanism that avoids the need for force to ensure compliance. These forces, brought about by thought patterns or ideas, human institutions and material conditions, are reciprocal in effect and attain a particular configuration within each sphere of action. The strength of any force can be determined by an examination of the particular sphere of action in the specific historical instance.

It has been noted that understanding the relationship between the 'domestic' and the 'international' requires a move beyond traditional conceptions within IR theory. Specifically, IR theory must conceptualize international relations as a totality that integrates the 'domestic' and the 'international' spheres of activity. IR theory must acknowledge a dialectical unity between the international and the national. Using a critical historical approach now allows for an examination of the various spheres of activity in separation and totality. In separation, the spheres of action are examined in relation to their existence as part of the totality, and, in totality, the spheres are examined in terms of the influence of the totality in shaping their characteristics and nature.

It is a totality, though not in the sense of an undifferentiated social space but spheres of action that are integrated, and generate processes

¹⁰³ Ibid.

which influence each other. The influence can be linear, for example, when the colonial state imposes labor restrictions on colonial society. However, the influence can also be through other spheres as when social forces, generated by contradictions in imperial countries, become transnational through the world order and support efforts to strengthen the labor movement in colonial societies. In addition, the fact that spheres of action are not mutually exclusive and can incorporate other spheres, makes this approach particularly useful to understand how a sphere of action can have different relationships with other spheres. For example, the state can seek to control social forces by legislative methods yet in its interaction with world order it can be constrained by the material conditions or ideas which exist at that level.

Despite the presence of a few non-capitalist national formations, the character of the totality is determined by the logic of the pursuit of profit or the principle of maximizing capital accumulation thus defining it as a capitalist system. This is a concrete historical description and it can be argued that previous international systems may not have been capitalistic and future systems may not be. Whilst it is debatable when the capitalist international system emerged, that is of little significance for this thesis. It is sufficient to accept that most accounts place the discovery of the New World at the end of the fifteenth century as within the emergence of the capitalist system. Accordingly, all production activities, institutions, or ideas are related to this logic either in conformity and legitimization or in conflict and contradiction. Therefore, it is evident that the components are not related in the sense of being determined by the logic but rather they have no abstract or isolated existence or rationale. Economic production sets the context for all action including critical action. Despite the logic that fuels the expansion of the totality, there are national differences and deviations, even occasional anti-systemic tendencies. These are fuelled by the prevalence of ideas and institutions which themselves are a product of

contradictions within capitalism. This suggests that we must avoid being trapped into a base-superstructure reductionism but recognize that there is a broader framework within which action takes place and allows for understanding historical change.

3

Understanding Post-Colonial State and Society – The Caribbean Experience

The previous chapter argued that the existing conception of the state in traditional IR theory was inadequate for a thorough understanding of international relations. It also made a case for a new approach to IR theory to allow for the international influences on state-societal relations to be explained. The validity of that case becomes more apparent when accounting for the emergence of post-colonial societies that were a direct product of the expansion of Western European society.

State-societal relations have always been significant in determining, and in turn have been influenced, by the nature and international relationships of states. This reflects the point made in the previous Chapter that rather than see the 'state as totality', it is of greater utility to see the 'state as janus-faced'. Altering the conception of the state then makes it possible to examine both, domestic and international, dimensions of the state.

This Chapter seeks to lay the basis for understanding the interplay between the international system and the domestic state/society complex in post-colonial Caribbean states. The discussion begins with the view that the state is a product of a particular historical context that produced distinct configurations of state and societal structures and consequent state-societal relationships. The Chapter looks at the examples of the classical European state and of the post-colonial state in the Caribbean to highlight that there are distinct differences in the paths

to state formation. The modern European state and its relationship with society was the consequence of a long historical process that through geographical advantage, imperial conquest, cultural assimilation and indigenous political circumstances fashioned its own distinctive features. Therefore, the modern European state shows that though state-societal relations are influenced by the international, the domestic is highly influential. Its nature is described by Jackson as possessing empirical statehood. On the other hand, the Chapter will show that the colonial state, a product of colonialism designed to ensure colonial domination was influenced more by external developments despite the significance of internal factors. Its nature is described by Jackson as having limited empirical statehood and more judicial statehood. The Chapter further provides a general overview of the influence of colonialism, as a process of state formation, in shaping the state and society in post-colonial societies. The Chapter will lay a firm basis to show that colonialism was responsible for the condition of limited empirical statehood. The Chapter ends with a framework for an analysis of the interplay of domestic and international spheres and their consequent influence on the evolution of state-societal relations.

3.1 The State - Conceptual Issues

It has been noted that the state is a social phenomenon, contingent upon historical processes. It is historical in two senses. Firstly, it did not always exist. Therefore, conceptions of the nature and forms of the state have been an evolving process. The movement from stateless to state societies highlights the rationale of the state – the exercise of supreme authority. This highlights the second sense in which

the state is historical. It changes through time and is determined by historical conditions and circumstances.¹

Understanding the modern state is a bewildering exercise. Mann quite aptly points out that the state is a messy concept.² In fact, it is so messy and contentious that Ferguson and Mansbach suggest that "... it is practically useless as an analytical tool and as a building block for theory."³ Yet according to Held there is "... nothing more central to political and social theory than the nature of the state, and nothing more contested."⁴

Essentially, definitions contain two levels of analysis - what states look like and what states do. Hall and Ikenberry offer a composite definition that contains three elements - a set of institutions; these institutions as the center of defined territory that is known as society; and the monopolization of rule making within the territory.⁵ Dunleavy and O'Leary provide an organizational and a functional definition - the state as a collection of institutions of recent historical origin and the state as institutions with stated purposes and objectives or consequences.⁶ It is also argued that theories of the state can be separated by normative theories or philosophy - what is desirable or what the state ought to be - and descriptive-explanatory theories - what the state actually is.⁷

¹ Stuart Hall, "The State in Question" in *The Idea of the Modern State*, ed. Gregor McLennan, David Held and Stuart Hall (Milton Keynes; Open University Press, 1984).

² Michael Mann, "The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms and Results" in *States in History*, ed. John A. Hall (Oxford; Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1986).

³ Yale H. Ferguson and Richard W. Mansbach, *The State, Conceptual Chaos and the Future of International Relations Theory* (London; Lynne Reinner Publishers, Inc., 1989), p.1.

⁴ David Held, "Central perspectives on the Modern State" in *The Idea of the Modern State*, ed. Gregor McLennan, David Held and Stuart Hall, (Milton Keynes; Open University Press, 1984).

⁵ John A. Hall and G. John Ikenberry, *The State* (Milton Keynes; Open University Press, 1989).

⁶ Patrick Dunleavy and Brendan O'Leary, *Theories of the State. The Politics of Liberal Democracy* (London; The Macmillan Press Ltd, 1987).

⁷ Ibid.

However, there remains a greater difficulty of even understanding what is meant by the state. Vincent identifies three difficulties to understanding the state – empirical; historical; and conceptual.⁸ Empirical refers to the difficulty of pointing out what is ‘the state’. There is evidence of different structures, of political institutions, of cultures and other political practices but there is no specific model. Historical refers to the continuity of structures that are called states. Questions can be asked on whether there is an evolution of the structure. Conceptual refers to the personification that is given to the state giving it a ‘totality’ and in the process incorporating other social formations such as society and government to be the same as the state.

In the simplest way, the state can be seen, as a set of institutions that emerged out of the historical circumstances of societies and became accepted as the mechanisms through which social life is coordinated within an enforceable area. The state is therefore an historical phenomenon and a product of human interaction and organized living and not a product of nature and thus ahistorical in existence.⁹ Clans and kinship did have simple forms of organization, which served as government but did not require a state. Therefore, not all societies in history have had a state.¹⁰ However, some form of government is inherent to society.¹¹ The notion of society suggests some form of organized living and whether by collective decision-making or traditional hierarchies based on various rationales, semblances of government existed in state-less societies.

It was the historical movement from simple societies to sophisticated societies, centered on production for distribution, which gave rise to the specialization of functions and to the first elements of the

⁸ Andrew Vincent, *Theories of the State* (Oxford; Basil Blackwell, 1987).

⁹ Gregor McLennan, David Held and Stuart Hall, *The Idea of the Modern State* (Milton Keynes; Open University Press, 1984).

¹⁰ Hall and Ikenberry, *The State*.

¹¹ Dunleavy and O’Leary define government as the process of making rules, controlling, guiding or regulating.

state. To suggest that it is a product of history is not necessarily implying that the state is natural and linear. Not all societies move from nomadic and pastoral ways of life to institutions of the state in a normal and natural process of social development. However, it is clear that once societies began to adopt characteristics of settled living and production became more than subsistence, the attendant requirements of maintaining that way of life created the elemental feature of the state – institutions or mechanisms of co-ordination. However, the degree of ‘stateness’ and nature of the state are shaped by the particular historical circumstances of each society.

Yet a definitive feature of the state that inspired its emergence is its advantage over all other social forms of organization to mobilize and organize resources for war and the appropriation of surplus capital through taxes or other forms of payment.¹² In the context of the modern world system, defined as a capitalist system, Wallerstein views the state as, “...the most convenient institutional intermediary in the establishment of market constraints...in favor of particular groups.”¹³ Wallerstein further explains that beyond such an instrumental view is the fact that all social institutions including the state in its evolution will assume lives of their own with various groups using it to promote their own interests and having personnel with a selfish interest in the functioning of the institution.

The nature and functioning of states – what the state should be and what the state is - have always been a reflection of the social and economic experiences that shaped their emergence and evolution. Likewise, the nature of state-societal relations is rooted in the historical circumstances guiding the evolution of the state and society. The following examinations of the Western European and Caribbean

¹² Perry Anderson, *Lineages of the Absolutist State* (London; NLB, 1974).

¹³ Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Politics of the World-Economy* (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1984), p. 30.

experiences highlight how two different historical trajectories produced two different forms of state and consequently state/society complexes.

3.2 The Origin of the state: the Western European Experience

To speak of a European experience in state formation is fraught with difficulty from the outset in delineating the geographic space under examination. It is also highly problematic to suggest that there was an identical lineage followed by all European states. It is precisely the difficulty of treating the European process as homogenous that highlights that the process was predominantly endogenous compared to the colonial experience that was dominantly exogenous. However, we can accept for analytical purposes the proposition that the process of state formation in Western Europe can serve as a representation of the emergence of the classical state form which is also the prevalent form of state that constitutes the inter-state system. Therefore, we can examine the Western European state in its broad historical evolution rather than in its disaggregated specific territorial and temporal forms. The rise of the European state is examined for the sake of understanding the emergence of the European state as an intense process of state building which characterized the pre-industrial period and contrasts with the imposition of the colonial state which did not enjoy the same organic development.

The modern European state can be linked to the early semblances of bureaucratization and centralization in the Graeco-Roman city-states.¹⁴ Though a contested idea, it is undoubted that these states shared the modern day feature of a defined territory, specific population, idea of citizenship and a conception of the rule of law. The reliance of these states, though with variances, on slave labor with its limited

¹⁴ Whilst it is customary in Eurocentric accounts of history to trace the defining mark of development of western civilization in the great Greek city-states, it is inconceivable that the origins of much practice and thought in the city-states were not influenced by Egyptian civilization that was the cradle of civilization for more than 10,000 years before the city-states.

productivity resulted in an expansion that was fuelled by geographic conquest rather than economic. The spoils of war – plunder, tribute, and slaves – spurred the reproduction of the Greek city-states.

The stimuli for the emergence of these Greek city-states were located in the advantages of their geographic location and their coastal character.¹⁵ Trade was based on the convenience of marine transportation and the basin of the Mediterranean provided a natural advantage.¹⁶ Coming out of the classical period, these cities were based on an agrarian economy earning income from corn, oil, and wine produced from outside the city limits in the rural areas.

That ancient civilization invented the slave mode of production as a distinct, dominant, and systematic part of the production process.¹⁷ The consequence was dramatic for the advancement of the civilization, for slavery alone as the ultimate form of surplus extraction “...could free a landowning class so radically from its rural background that it could be transmuted into an essentially urban citizenry that yet still drew its fundamental wealth from the soil.”¹⁸ This conception of labor, based on slavery, itself created limits on the productivity of the city-state. Accordingly, the expansion of the city-states was essentially by geographic conquest and not economic advancement.

These city-states featured, each onto itself, rudimentary though advanced notions of politics and participation through the practice of direct democracy and provided vivid evidence of the early signs that state power was founded in law and of the notion of constitutional government. It is in the city-states that we observe the emergence of the

¹⁵ Perry Anderson, *Passages From Antiquity to Feudalism* (London; Verso, 1996).

¹⁶ William McNeill, *The Rise of the West* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1963).

¹⁷ Anderson explains that slavery existed before in other civilizations but took the form of debt or penal labor. There was no legal concept of slaves as chattel property and the slave mode of production did not serve as the predominant form of surplus extraction. They served as a residual work force. However, Greek society transformed classical notions of slavery.

¹⁸ *Ibid.* p. 24.

popular Assembly of citizens and the Council of elders that had executive powers. However, it is important to note that in Athens, the crystallization of the Greek *polis*, did not possess any separate or distinct state apparatus and was based on the refusal of having specialized or professional administrators outside of the general citizenry. Therefore, "...Athenian democracy signified, precisely, the refusal of any such division between 'state' and 'society'."¹⁹

The rise of Rome represented a similar pattern to the rise of the Greek city-states but differed in that it retained its aristocratic political structure and never engaged in the democratization that Greece enjoyed. Whilst there were popular modifications to the constitutional evolution of Rome, the nobility always maintained power. Other distinct features of early Rome are instructive for understanding the subsequent development of the state and the shaping of state-societal relations in Europe. Unlike Greece, the Romans sought to unite with existing city-states by integrating their troops into the Roman army and sought to offer them relief in peace and in war. The Romans also developed the 'large-scale slave latifundium' largely owned by the nobility unlike the Greeks who engaged in small-scale oligarchic control of land and production and engaged in coastal economic activity.²⁰ The large-scale use of slaves meant that more persons were available for military action and encouraged the territorial expansion of the Roman Empire.

The most fascinating development in the early Roman Empire was the emergence of a legal system that was unprecedented in antiquity. It was initially concerned with the informal relations of exchange and agreements between private citizens. It introduced the notion of absolute ownership of property and laid the legal basis for commercialized production and exchange of commodities.

¹⁹ Anderson, *Passages*, p. 43.

²⁰ *Ibid.* p. 61.

In summary, the movement of the Graeco-Roman world from antiquity to the full-fledged city-state highlighted significant endogenous developments that were to define state-societal relations. Anderson summarizes, “[j]ust as Greek civilization had been the first to disengage the conditions and rights that had always prevailed before it, so Roman civilization was the first to separate the pure colour of ‘property’ from the economic spectrum of opaque and indeterminate possession that typically preceded it.”²¹

The nature of the classical civilizations as imperial empires from the Greek to Macedonian to Roman Empires suggests a high level of engagement and interaction as they spread and enveloped new territories each with their own endogenous characteristics. Similarly, it has been argued that the emergence of the next distinctive phase of European societal development – Feudalism – was a synthesis of the Roman Civilization and Germanic traditions. The Germanic tribes were encountered, as the Roman Empire moved westwards, as simple settlers with a primitive mode of production. Prolonged exposure to Roman civilization induced changes including the emergence of trade and the requirement to produce for sale; the rise of a new merchant class; and the introduction of social and political changes to the traditional system of the Germanic tribes. Of particular note was the emergence of a ‘retinue’ system of warriors by chiefs, which by its characteristic feature of cutting across tribal lines laid the basis for the qualitative shift from clan to feudal order.²²

Without engaging in the unresolved debate of the degree of influence of the respective Roman and German legacies, suffice it to note that the emergence of feudalism across Europe was a synthesis of both legacies each rooted in a long historical development that, importantly, survived the Dark Ages. Wallerstein points out that feudalism emerged

²¹ Ibid. p. 67

²² Edward A. Thompson, *The Early Germans* (Oxford; Clarendon Press, 1965).

from the disintegration of the Roman Empire that in itself was never total or legal.²³ According to Anderson the nature of the feudal monarchy was “...a mutable amalgam of the Germanic war leader, semi-elective and with rudimentary secular functions, and the Roman imperial leader, sacred autocrat of unlimited powers and responsibilities.”²⁴

As a composite system, there was not a pure feudal system as such nor did feudalism emerge at the same time or lasted the same period of time throughout Europe. France was the closest to a ‘pure’ form of feudalism whilst feudalism brought to England by the Normans never developed. Germany had a belated experience whilst Italy never lost the heavy influence of the city-states.

Feudalism can be described as a mode of production in which the relationship between producer – the peasants – and the means – the land – was based on a specific social rather than market relationship. The peasants were not the owners of the land and the lord had the proclaimed legal right and the political means to extract surplus. The system of lords utilizing a dependent peasantry through land grants provided localized sources of power and authority. The feudal system was based on a long line of mutual obligation between lords, nobles, and serfs that eventually led to the monarch. Each level, itself a geographic area, represented a successive layer of authority and loyalty to a higher level. Each level claimed a degree of political authority and the consequent right to be obeyed.

A number of significant features of feudalism, in general, highlight the nature of the societal relations and the interplay of forces which assisted in the development of the state. The hangover of production patterns from earlier periods, for example communal lands and village property, created an overlapping system with different forms of land

²³ Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Modern World-System 1* (London; Academic Press Inc., 1974).

²⁴ Anderson, *Passages*, p. 131.

ownership that served peasant resistance. Secondly, the existence of cities and urban settlements assumed a new character. Under feudalism, the cities could no longer be easily controlled by the noble landowners as they now attained an autonomous and highly developed character. Their large concentration of capital and people became an economic and political force that would help to undermine feudalism.²⁵ Thirdly, the head of the feudal system – the monarch – was not in a position of comparable strength to earlier examples of monarchical rule. The monarch had no direct political relationship or control of his subjects and depended upon the relationship with lords. In a paradoxical way, the monarch was the final center of authority but did not have any direct authority. Therefore, royal authority always had to be asserted against parcellised authority bases that limited the possibilities for a centralized and permanent state apparatus. According to Wallerstein the lords of the manor thrived when the state was weak and did not support its strengthening “...if they were not in weakened condition in which they found it more difficult to resist the claims of central authority and more ready to welcome the benefits of imposed order.”²⁶

The defining relationship between ruler and subject was transformed, for as the demands of governing increased the feudal ruler found the returns from his vassals were not sufficient to meet the costs. Barrington Moore surmises that the advance of commerce in the cities and the demand for more taxes produced three different responses in Europe that led to different political trajectories.²⁷ However, the constant demand for more revenue forced the monarchies to summon ‘Estates’ – special assembled bodies – to raise taxes.²⁸ Thus the ‘Estates’ served the

²⁵ Wim P. Blockman, “State Formation in Preindustrial Europe” in *Cities and Rise of States in Europe A.D. 1000 to 1800*, ed. Charles Tilly and Wim P. Blockman (Oxford; Westview Press, 1994).

²⁶ Wallerstein, *World-System*, p. 28.

²⁷ Barrington Moore jr., *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*, (London; Penguin Books). He notes different paths in England, France, and Russia.

²⁸ These estates comprised the nobility, clergy, and urban merchants.

will of the monarch to expand the fiscal base but also provided some control over the monarchy.²⁹

The transformation to absolutism took place within the economic and political conditions of the fifteenth century. The decline of the agrarian feudal economy, demographic changes, and the significant increase in wars proved decisive and shaped a new state-societal relationship.³⁰ Wallerstein recognizes that the rise of the absolute monarchy was timed with the emergence of a European world-economy.³¹ The rise of commercial agriculture and expansion of trade helped finance new state bureaucracies whilst these bureaucracies were huge consumers and guarantors of the new mode of production.

The rural malaise and depopulation of the period or 'crisis of feudalism' occasioned numerous peasant revolts that led to attempts to restore internal order in territorial states, as rivals to the cities or city-states, particularly in the fifteenth century.³² The absolutist state was seen as a response to the crisis of 'feudalism' as an economic mode of production and was a move to a more centralized power. According to Wallerstein, the monarchs of the sixteenth century used four major mechanisms to strengthen their rule: bureaucratization; monopolization of force; creation of legitimacy; and homogenization of the subject population.³³ It is necessary to take a closer look at these mechanisms to see how the final elemental features of the modern state emerged.

The emergence of a bureaucracy was a powerful addition to the monarchs in the sixteenth century as it represented both a means of raising much needed money and it induced the professionalisation of the state machinery. The bureaucracy under feudalism, manned by nobles carried inherent nobility clientelism. Increasingly, elements of the

²⁹ Anderson *Lineages*; Wallerstein, *World-System*.

³⁰ *Ibid.*

³¹ Wallerstein, *World-System*.

³² The period of Louis XI in France; Henry VII in England and Ferdinand and Isabelle in Spain.

³³ Wallerstein, *World-System*.

bourgeois entered the bureaucracy and with a bureaucracy now capable of taxing to meet its cost and generate a surplus, the monarch was able to finance a standing army.

Such an army comprised primarily of mercenaries who were from the lower social ranks, formerly unemployed and usually foreign. In fact, the recruitment of mercenaries was part of both state building through the establishment of a standing army, and the development of capitalism through the emergence of intermediaries as recruiters and thus entrepreneurs. A standing army became a major economic activity as consumers of goods and as a source of employment. However, the greatest benefit to the monarch was the tremendous capacity to absorb restless vagabonds, to suppress banditry and peasant rebellion and to ensure the payment of taxes.

The issue of legitimacy for the absolutist state carries tremendous significance for comparison with the early modern state. Absolutism did not mean that the monarch had unlimited powers in the sense of tyranny or despotism but rather that he was not constrained by law. Therefore, the monarch had the last say on matters of dispute with other interest groups. It was that right which the monarch possessed which made it absolutist and legitimate. In any event, the capacity of this early form of the state did not lend itself to any absolutist powers. The monarch embodied the state and it is through him and the divine right of kings, that legitimacy was sought. Blockman similarly explains that rulers made huge efforts to "...develop cults around their dynasties, national saints, and national myths."³⁴ Later, the legitimacy of the modern state would be based on the collective national will.

Wallerstein explains that the movement towards nationalism or the national collective sentiment took place within the framework of

³⁴ Blockman, *State Formation*, p. 242.

mercantilism and that its greatest advocates were the bourgeoisie.³⁵ The shaping of a national will required that the population be transformed into a culturally homogenous group and with increasingly centralized power in the state.

Therefore, the period of absolutism in some parts of Europe witnessed the coalescing of smaller and weaker territories into larger ones and the emergence of territorially defined limits for law, order, and security. It represented the rise of the state as a unit of political expression and the establishment of boundary lines for demarcation. Barrington-Moore identifies a number of institutions that came out of feudalism which differentiate feudalism from other societies and in particular carried a legacy from medieval society to modern western society.³⁶ Correspondingly, the growth of trade and commerce undermined the feudal structures and introduced, together with newly defined territories, the character of national economies. Bureaucracies expanded and begun to act as state bureaucracies. Also evident is the emergent inter-state system as these 'national territories' began to conduct formal relations.

The decline of absolutism, as the localization of power within the monarchy and the royal courts, paved the way for the emergence of the modern state. Tilly argues that after 1800, the state building process in Europe changed and moved towards the consolidated state (or nation-state) with nationalism becoming the political ideology.³⁷ The pivotal role was played by the emerging commercial classes, and then professional and bureaucratic classes and the proletariat. Capitalism was beginning to take root and the new found source of power – based on the

³⁵ Wallerstein, *The Modern World-System*.

³⁶ Moore jr. *Social Origins*. He identifies the notion of immunity of some groups from the power of the ruler, the right to resist unjust authority, and the conception of a contract.

³⁷ Charles Tilly, "Entanglements of European Cities and States" in *Cities and the Rise of States in Europe, A.D. 1000 to 1800*, ed. Charles Tilly and Wim P. Blockman, (Oxford; Westview Press, 1994). Nationalism was either state-led or state-seeking.

acquisition of wealth – was to determine the new social and political system.

This represented the rise of the modern state – a bourgeois constitutional state. It was a process crystallized in the course of history, as the European International Society spilled beyond, to encompass previously untouched societies. The features of the modern state are best captured in Weber's description as,

possessing an administrative and legal order subject to change by legislation, to which the organized activities of the administrative staff, which are also controlled by regulations, are oriented. This system of orders claims binding authority...over all action taking place in the area of its jurisdiction. It is thus a compulsory organization with a territorial basis. Furthermore, today, the use of force is regarded as legitimate only so far as it is either permitted by the state or prescribed by it....The claim of the modern state to monopolize the use of force is as essential to it as its character of compulsory jurisdiction and continuous operation.³⁸

Pierson identifies eight features from Weber's definition of the state: monopoly control over use of violence; territoriality; sovereignty; constitutionality; impersonal power; public bureaucracy; authority/legitimacy and citizenship and adds a ninth feature of taxation.³⁹ However, three notable elements of the notion of the Weberian modern state are worth considering. Firstly, the state now takes the distinct form of a nation-state where there is an internal sense of community presided over by 'binding authority' by the state. It logically represents that internal community in relation to other communities. Secondly, its binding authority is based on an 'administrative and legal order' that is pursued by an administrative staff. Thirdly, the notion of a right to be the supreme and sole authority is persistent in all accounts of the state and, more so, in the modern state. The defining characteristic

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Christopher Pierson, *The Modern State* (London; Routledge, 1996), p. 8-9.

seems to be the emphasis on state's authority – its rightful claim to obedience from its subjects.

3.3 The Origin of the state: The Caribbean Experience

Unlike the origin of the European state that was rooted in the contiguous expansion of political units, the colonial state was introduced to the Caribbean as part of the conquest and settlement of the New World and lasted until the granting of Independence almost five hundred years later. The colonial state lasted from the early sixteenth century mercantilist Europe with a dismantling feudal order and absolutist state to the middle of twentieth century Europe with monopoly capitalism and liberal democracy characterizing the political order.

Consistent with mercantilist practices, the Caribbean islands served as reservoirs of exotic items, such as tobacco and sugar, that were traded and sold at high prices in Europe. Another value of these territories was their strategic position for political and military reasons. The attempts to settle and further exploit the possibilities that these islands offered resulted in the annihilation of the indigenous population through disease or brutality as the Europeans sought to utilize them as a source of labor.⁴⁰ That action destroyed all significant indigenous social forms and provided the Europeans with a clean page upon which to write history. ⁴¹ The colonial power attained the effective concentration of power and unlike other regions did not have to contend with indigenous people with competing loyalties.

Consequently, it was the need for labor for the emerging plantation structure as the dominant form of social organization that introduced the barbarous slave trade and transport of hundred of thousands of Africans

⁴⁰ Eric Williams, *From Columbus to Castro. The History of the Caribbean 1492-1969*, (London; Deutsch, 1970). This occurred in the early sixteenth century.

⁴¹ S Mintz, *From Plantations to Peasantries in the Caribbean*, (Princeton; Focus Caribbean, 1984).

to the Caribbean. Thomas explains that "...[t]his slave status meant that the mode of production was clearly determined by the colonizing power, and was in no way a natural outgrowth of the development of the indigenous communities in the New World."⁴² Whilst the plantation was called a 'total institution'⁴³ and represented a state in itself, the reality of colonial control necessitated the emergence of a simple state structure to fulfill two broad functions.⁴⁴ Firstly, the nature of the master-slave relationship and the imperialist rivalries required a military and naval presence in the region. Secondly, international trade and social life in general required that there be linkages and infrastructure throughout the territories including ports, custom warehouses, custom offices, and military facilities. The state therefore first emerged in the Caribbean as an institutional requirement for the existence of plantation slavery as a social and economic system.

Such a rudimentary state structure was known as the 'Old Representative System' and had its colonial purpose to maintain law and order and ensure that the colonies continued their role in the production of sugar, trade and providing strategic advantage for Britain. Thomas explains that "...as long as the colonial slave mode of production was in ascendancy, the plantation remained the dominant institution and the colonial office was all powerful, so that the local territorial state could only develop very slowly."⁴⁵ Whilst Thomas may be right in recognizing the subservience of the state in economic matters, it is important to note that in political matters there were instances of local exercise of power that led to numerous conflicts. Free blacks and coloureds objected to

⁴² C.Y. Thomas, *The Rise of the Authoritarian State in Peripheral Societies* (London; Heinemann Educational Books Ltd, 1984), p. 10.

⁴³ George Beckford, *Persistent Poverty: Underdevelopment in the Plantation Regions of the World* (London: Oxford University Press, 1974). The plantation was total as it provided all permissible needs of the slave and dominated all aspects and throughout their lives.

⁴⁴ Thomas, *Authoritarian State*.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p.13.

their social subordination based on colour, and the local planter class objected to issues relating to defence expenditure, imperial trade regulations and customs-house fees.

According to Goveia, there was a strong tradition of local autonomy enjoyed by the planter class that gave rise to dual bases of political power.⁴⁶ Riviere provides a number of reasons for the possibility of both Thomas's thesis and Goveia's claim of dual sources.⁴⁷ Firstly, in many instances the Caribbean was always used as the testing ground for what became policy throughout the Empire. Hence, variations in what was allowed in the early and later periods of colonial practice. Secondly, the high level of absentee ownership meant that there was no strong or large indigenous capitalist class to agitate for interests separate from that of the metropole where the owners were based. The dependence of the local planter class on the imperial power for defence ensured that local autonomy was not disruptive to the existing colonial order. Thirdly, before the 1790's there was a mutuality of interests between the Imperial State and the planter class as the colonies were a valuable source of capital accumulation. After the 1790's with the decline of slave plantation agriculture and the rise of industrialization, the cost of trade with the colonies became a burden and caused increasing differences in policy prescriptions and local autonomy ceased to exist.⁴⁸

Notwithstanding the local conflicts and the contentions between the colony and Imperial State, the form of the state, its functions, and its relationship to society were determined in the last instance by the Imperial State whose concerns were to preserve the social and economic

⁴⁶ Elsa Goveia, *Slave society in the British Leeward Islands at the end of the Eighteenth Century* (New Haven; Yale Univ. Press, 1965).

⁴⁷ Bill Riviere, *State Systems in the Eastern Caribbean* (Institute of Social and Economic Research: Jamaica, 1990), p. 24. He describes this environment as one of "...mutually-compatible dual power" which formed the basis of local autonomy.

⁴⁸ It should be noted that local autonomy is not the same as 'relative autonomy' as the state is very instrumentalist at this stage.

relations based upon plantation slavery, and to protect the colonies from foreign threats.

The emancipation of the slaves created a new group of freed persons who constituted the majority of the population. The emergence of that majority group gave rise to new dynamics in the society. The practice of slavery had developed deep hatred and suspicion between the whites and blacks that were no longer restrained by the power that the planters had enjoyed on the plantations and in the wider society. There were also concerns about the future viability of the plantations unless labour was readily available and affordable. The establishment of an independent peasantry had to be controlled rather than encouraged.

Other social developments linked to the changes in the mode of production influenced the evolution of the colonial state. There was the introduction of indentured labourers from India to work on the estates as a safeguard against the black workforce holding the plantations to ransom with their labour. In addition, as the society expanded and created increased opportunities for a middle class of merchants and educated professionals, the state necessarily had to play a greater role in regulating commerce through legislation and regulation. The freed society increasingly made demands for social services such as schooling, housing and health care which were previously the responsibility of the plantation. The Imperial State became more concerned with the increasing demands on the post-emancipation state structure and rising costs of administration which it insisted should be financed by the colony.

As noted earlier the 'old representative state' was highly reactionary and opposed any action that the local planters felt was not in their interest. The elementary state of the pre-emancipation colonies would give way to a more rigid and coercive state with the emergence of the highly authoritarian Crown Colony Government (CCG). Riviere identifies the possibility of non-white control of colonial assemblies as

the prime reason for the introduction of CCG.⁴⁹ The white population was declining because of migration due to the collapse of the plantations whilst the non-white group of professionals and landowners began to satisfy the enfranchisement requirements. Local Assemblies were abolished and legislation was framed by the Imperial State on the advice of the Governor who was also sole executive authority. A Council was appointed comprising planters and merchants to advise the Governor. Riviere further summarizes the action as "...a collaborative effort by colonial and metropolitan ruling classes to frustrate a perceived alteration in political relations and, in effect, the coming into being of a new social order."⁵⁰ There appears to be a clear equation of class, race and state power.

However, there can be an alternative explanation for the emergence of CCG considering that the conquered, as against settled, colonies had CCG before the Emancipation. Quite simply the Imperial State wanted to avoid the earlier difficulties that it had with the settled colonies when the British Parliament sought to pass laws for implementation. The developments that led to Independence for the American colonies and some incidents in the West Indies indicated that such an exercise should only be undertaken in great emergencies.⁵¹ In the case of the conquered colonies, the Imperial State was guided by the treaties of capitulation to treat the remaining nationals of the previous power as equals but as expected did not want persons of a competing power to be formulating laws. However, in the case of the settled colonies and the introduction of CCG after emancipation, it appears that with the reactionary nature of the local ruling elite and the new configurations of a freed society, it was in the interest of the Imperial State to take control of the state apparatus

⁴⁹ Riviere, *State Systems*. However, CCG was first implemented in all the conquered colonies like Trinidad and St.Lucia and never had any extended experience with ORS.

⁵⁰ Ibid. p. 39.

⁵¹ D.J Murray, *The West Indies and the Development of Colonial Government, 1801-1834* (Oxford; Oxford University Press, 1965). This point is further highlighted in the next Chapter.

to avoid any chaos and turmoil in the colonies.⁵² However, the Governor maintained contact with the planter class as many of its members served as advisors and some on the Executive Council. In any event, the social circle of the Governor would include the planter class who were all white.

Such a political apparatus was constantly under challenge as the plantation system continued to decline. Planters increasingly blamed the imperial state for this decline and put more pressure on the Imperial State for assistance and modifications to the system. The decline in the plantations also witnessed an expansion of economic activity as the peasantry grew in the islands. The state became more active compared to its laissez-faire character in the slavery period. The state, although on a limited scale, was involved for the first time in building roads, schools, and providing health care.

However, as the class structure became more defined with an expanding middle class of businessmen and professionals, the pressure for democratization of CCG intensified. By the early twentieth century, the demand for self-government was accentuated by the returning servicemen of World War 1 who were now considered middle class. This enlightened group sought to link with the working class that was beginning to show discontent with the living and working conditions under colonialism. This represented the first signs of an emerging alliance between the middle class and the working class. The Imperial State noted the rising levels of agitation and modified CCG to allow for increased participation from the middle class. Returning servicemen were also instrumental in leading the establishment of workingmen associations or trade unions to represent the interest of workers. The colonial state faced a greater challenge to meet the needs of a restless society with a majority black population left out of the political, economic and social and development process.

⁵² CCG was introduced in Jamaica after the Morant Bay Rebellion of 1865.

It was the confluence of above circumstances that led to the labor unrests of the 1930's. These riots would put colonial rule in crisis and force the Imperial State to reconsider the policies that had guided imperial rule. The famous Moyne Commission was established to investigate the circumstances that gave rise to the riots and unrests and to make recommendations to the Colonial Office for redress. The Commission Report would serve as a blueprint for the future conduct of colonial policy in the Caribbean.⁵³

It became obvious that the self-government of the colonies could no longer be denied because of the increasing strength of the anti-colonial movement whilst the coercive mechanisms of control were now undermined. Similarly, it was obvious that economic exploitation no longer required political control the exercise of which was becoming a heavy burden within the colonies having the international implications. The challenge was to find a smooth transition to dominant domestic political forces without disrupting the economic relationship of the colonies within the global division of labor.⁵⁴ The response of the Imperial State was to introduce measures gradually to contain the militancy of the revolutionary social groups. Land settlement schemes were used to pacify the peasantry; the working class was tamed by the bargaining and compromises of trade unions; and universal suffrage and political parties contained the nationalist fervor of the middle class. By 1954, every adult had the right to vote and be part of the political process.

The attainment of adult suffrage would transform the nature of the relationship between state and society. In the first instance, the states were controlled through the legislature dominated by working class representatives. The demands continued for the complete state apparatus including the executive organs to be controlled by persons

⁵³ The recommendations would not be considered for implementation until after the War.

⁵⁴ Riviere, *State Systems*.

elected by the people. With the introduction of the Ministerial system of Government, the states were controlled by working representatives with a working class programme. The legislative agenda gave priority to working class issues and the main concern of this government was to redress the deficiencies of colonial rule that gave rise to the unrest of the 1930's. The Secretary of State was still required to approve all legislation and programmes of the Government. The state apparatus gradually became dominated by local persons reflecting an indigenous agenda. The state became more active in social and economic development programmes but remained dependent on the Imperial State for most of the financing.

In the earlier periods, the Imperial State held a policy that the colonies were to be self-financing with grant-in-aid provided for these colonies that were unable to balance their budgets. With an increasingly active state in new areas of activity, the Imperial State through the Commonwealth Welfare and Development Fund provided most of the funds for such expansion. However, the greater autonomy enjoyed by the colonial state does not mean that it was able to chart its own path in the international system. Its influence was restricted to internal issues and limited to activities that did not seek to disrupt the colonial relationship or the nature of involvement in the international system. However, the notion of national self-determination was rapidly becoming a norm of the international system. This was produced by factors which included the anti-colonial attitude of the United States and the Soviet Union, although for different reasons, and the lobbying efforts of former non self-governing territories such as India and the Philippines.

The Imperial State faced the dilemma of possessing colonies in an age of anti-colonialism and facing mounting criticism in international fora for the economic and social conditions of the colonies. At the same time, the colonies were no longer serving the economic interest that they once served. The international economy was more integrated and the control of production processes no longer required direct political control

of territories. The colonies were continuing to be an economic burden for the Imperial State especially with the expansion of the state into social and economic development activities. Moreover, it would be easier for the Imperial State to reduce its financial contribution to independent territories than to colonies. In addition, the Imperial State was caught in a societal debate between the persons who favored dismantling the remnants of the Empire and those who still believed in its inviolability. The Imperial State faced two major considerations in terminating its colonial control. Firstly, the colonies held geopolitical importance in the context of the Cold War. Secondly, the Imperial State feared international criticism for having abandoned its colonies if there had not been any popular wish for their independence.

It was against this background that the West Indies Federation was agreed to by the colonies and the Imperial State and formed in 1958. The Federation collapsed in 1962 and paved the way for the emergence of the independent state in the Caribbean.

The movement towards independence in the West Indies took two paths – those that went directly to independence and those that went through associated statehood. The larger territories, Jamaica, Trinidad and Guyana, commenced discussions with HMG after the collapse of Federation on the way forward to independence.⁵⁵ In the case of Barbados, there were many attempts at a Federation with the smaller islands of the Windward and Leeward Islands which failed and eventually led to separate independence. The smaller islands of the Windward and Leeward Islands were deemed unviable for independence. The Imperial State invented a three-quarter way house to independence which in its opinion provided 'statehood in association with Great Britain'. The colonies had full internal self-government but HMG retained responsibility for defence and external affairs. The 'association' was

⁵⁵ Guyana was not part of the West Indies Federation.

considered voluntary as the arrangement provided for the state to terminate it once it followed certain constitutional procedures. In that regard, it was not considered colonial by the Imperial State. Although the states accepted 'associated statehood' under objection as they were asked to accept it or independence for which they felt they were not yet ready.⁵⁶

The Constitutional provisions of associated statehood were similar to that of an independent state including the entrenchment of fundamental rights that were not in the colonial constitution, and the practices and procedures to safeguard a democratic government. The state was fully empowered to legislate and formulate its own development programme and was responsible for internal security. The Imperial State explained that it was accepting responsibility for defence and external affairs, as they were too expensive and demanding for small states.⁵⁷

When independence was finally provided, it was in the context of a change in imperial policy that allowed the Associated States to request HMG to terminate the association, as none would have been able to meet the constitutional requirements to terminate it on their own. It can be seen that these colonies became independent as part of the decolonization process which had shifted the criteria for statehood from economic viability to the universal right of self-determination of colonial peoples. Coming out of colonial circumstances, these territories were essentially backward dependent-capitalist economies. They had no internal capacity for capital accumulation required for the provision of civilized living for their population. Worse, the economies were geared towards the export of capital. The expectations of the population were exaggerated due to the state of deprivation engendered by colonialism and the promise of politicians agitating for self-government. The state

⁵⁶ Minutes of Legislative Council Meeting, 28 June 1966. Presentation by Chief Minister John Compton. This point is developed further in Chapter 6.

⁵⁷ FCO 43/14, Arthur Bottomley's Address to Statehood Day Celebrations in St. Lucia, 1 March, 1967.

now became an arena for political contest between a number of groups each with their own particular interest rather than the unified quest for national development. The state, now an international actor, is expected to accept the 'rules of the game' as determined by bilateral and regional arrangements and the institutional framework of the international system.

3.4 Colonialism and the shaping of state-societal relations

The post-colonial state in the Caribbean, unlike the modern state of the Western European legacy, did not enjoy a long historical unfolding propelled by powerful endogenous factors. It is rooted in an evolution that began with an early strong state designed to fulfill a particular purpose – colonial domination. According to Thomas, "...the foundations of the modern state lie almost exclusively in the historical process in which these territories were incorporated into the European colonial empires."⁵⁸ Conversely, the examination of the emergence of the modern state in Western Europe highlighted the peculiar historical conditions and consequent differing structures that evolved and laid the basis for the modern state. Of particular significance was the role played by the dynamics of the emerging capitalism and an indigenous capitalist class, "...by creating a State to provide the framework and laws and various institutions for the development of capitalist relations of production."⁵⁹ It is now obvious that historical circumstances of all states are different and linear evolutionary explanations or expectations cannot suffice to account for the emergence and development of new states.⁶⁰ Instead, any

⁵⁸ Thomas, *Authoritarian State*, p. 9.

⁵⁹ Riviere, *State Systems*, p.18.

⁶⁰ For example Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman, *The Politics of the Developing Areas*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1960); David Easton, *A Systems Analysis of Political Life*, (New York: Wiley, 1965); and Edward Shils, *Center and Periphery: Essays in Macrosociology*,(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975).

understanding of new states must be located in the historical circumstances of these states.

The above examination of the emergence of the post-colonial state demonstrates that there were a number of significant differences with the emergence of the Western European state. Firstly, the post-colonial state was a creature of the international system in the sense that its legitimacy and right to exist were the consequences of political decisions by the community of nations. The Western European state was the product of a long historical process of state formation that had separate criteria to justify its viability and right to exist.⁶¹ Secondly, the colonial state was an establishment of a state that was rationalized for the purposes of the colonial power and the minority white planter class. In effect, the economic and social condition of the majority of the population and by extension the welfare of the colonies was not a primary concern of the state. The process of state formation was deliberate compared to the process of formation of the classical state in Europe where most of the features were unintended consequences of rivalries in Europe. Accordingly, Tilly recognizes two paths to state formation. Firstly, a process of expansion where political units extended their power as happened in Europe, and, secondly, a process of deliberate creation of new states by existing states.⁶² Postcolonial states fall into the second process. Thirdly, as the colonial state was designed for a particular purpose it was a tool of domination throughout its existence. There existed a distinct separation between society and state at the inception and despite any later constitutive influences, the state remained disjointed from the society. The only threat for replacing that state came from another colonial power unlike many countries in Europe where

⁶¹ Robert H. Jackson, *Quasi-states: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World*, (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1990).

⁶² Charles Tilly, "Theories of Political Development" in *The Formation of National States in Western Europe*, ed. Charles Tilly (Princeton; Princeton University Press, 1975).

local struggles overthrew existing political orders and monarchs.⁶³ Fourthly, in Europe, nations and amalgamations of nations created state structures as their central organizing units while post-colonial states were required to create nations and often times with disastrous consequences.

Post-colonial societies shared the experiences of colonialism, albeit, of varying forms and have through the attainment of independence entered the community of nations as equal sovereign states. The experience and consequences were not uniform. The conduct of colonial policy of Britain, Spain, France and Holland differed with each having a distinct legacy. Colonial societies were different in their size, geography, economic and social structure, and population. Africa possessed a large mass of people coupled with strong ethnic lineages with a land area bigger than Europe. Asia likewise possessed a large population and land mass but with less distinct ethnic diversity and in the case of India possessed the elements of an indigenous state. Latin America was the fabled 'El Dorado' with a land mass and civilization that stood with a stable social and political system. The Caribbean comprised small islands with limited populations that were essentially seafarers and did not display signs of social and political advancement brought about by a settled civilization. Yet, within each global region there were as many differences therefore making it easy to find comparable experiences producing diverse consequences. Such diversities point to the folly of categorizing the colonial experience as a single and uniform encounter with Europe.

However, Clapham in describing the Caribbean experience argues that what "...was distinctive about colonialism ... was the thoroughness and brutality with which it destroyed the indigenous Amerindian

⁶³ The Haitian Revolution of 1791 and Haitian Independence in 1804 were exceptions.

societies.”⁶⁴ It was thus possible to implement European-oriented economic, political and social structures with impunity.

Notwithstanding the above, Clapham identifies a number of similarities which defined the post-colonial state.⁶⁵ Firstly, colonialism created territories where none had existed before. This consequently disrupted indigenous state formation. Secondly, colonialism created a political structure and an associated bureaucracy to manage it. These structures were used to control colonial peoples with the threat of force hanging as a persistent deterrent to rebellion. Thirdly, a colonial economy was introduced as an extension to metropolitan capitalist expansion. Fourthly, a new set of attitudes and patterns of relations was established among colonialised peoples. These all served to ensure colonial control.

Whichever the experience of colonialism, the state was essentially a structure of control. The evolution of the state to the contemporary period has been a legacy of this colonial past. The state is recognize as a legitimate political force because of its power and not necessarily because it espoused commonly held views or is a representation of the desires of its citizens. The institutions of colonialism passed from one hand to the next at independence without changing their mode of functioning. It simply involved a change of personnel.

This brings to the fore the debate on the state in post-colonial societies, though centered on Africa and Asia, that was in some respects a restatement of the Marxist debate on the autonomy of the state in capitalist societies.⁶⁶ The state in post-colonial societies can be defined by three critical features. Firstly, Alavi argued that the metropolitan bourgeoisie undertook a bourgeois revolution in the colonies through the

⁶⁴ Christopher Clapham, *Third World Politics. An Introduction* (London; Croom Helm, 1985), p. 13.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ See Ralph Miliband, *The State in capitalist society* (London : Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1969).

establishment of a bourgeois state and its attendant framework.⁶⁷ However, that process was more than a reproduction of the state structure of the metropolitan country itself and involved establishing an apparatus that could dominate all indigenous social classes. Thus, it is argued that the 'superstructure' is overdeveloped relative to the 'structure'. According to Alavi,

[t]he post-colonial society inherits that overdeveloped apparatus of state and its institutionalized practices through which the operations of indigenous social classes are regulated and controlled.⁶⁸

Alavi controversially goes further and argues that there are three propertied exploiting classes – the indigenous bourgeoisie, the Metropolitan neo-colonialist bourgeoisie, and the landed classes. Because of the underdeveloped nature of the indigenous bourgeoisie, they cannot subordinate the highly developed state apparatus which was the mechanism of control of the imperial state. Under the tutelage of the imperial state, the state was an independent mediator of the competing, but not necessarily conflicting, interest and demands of the three classes. This autonomous nature allows the neo-colonialist bourgeoisie to continue to pursue their interests in post-colonial societies. The state acts, through a military-bureaucratic oligarchy, to maintain the social order.

The second feature of the state is that it assumes a "...new and relatively autonomous economic role, which is not paralleled in the classical bourgeois state."⁶⁹ That economic role required that the state appropriated surplus capital and utilize it for economic development as determined by the state. Saul introduces a third feature which produced

⁶⁷ Hamza Alavi, 'The State in Post-Colonial Societies: Pakistan and Bangladesh', *New Left Review* 74, July-August 1972.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 350.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 351.

the debate on the nature of the autonomy of the post-colonial state.⁷⁰ In the case of the classical state, the state, which served as the symbol of unity and appropriates the role of a cohesive ideological force, emerged over a period of time as the society developed. This representation of unity serves to justify the status quo and mode of production. In the case of the post-colonial state, this characteristic had to be created for the state. Therefore, the state and those who manage the state apparatus are not autonomous but serve a particular function – the facilitation of metropolitan interests.⁷¹

In the case of the Caribbean, there are a number of differences in the colonial experience that require a modification in the specifics though not the essence of the argument. Firstly, the extermination of the indigenous inhabitants brought an imported labor force that existed as slavery with the state apparatus a powerful domination mechanism and not an institution that had any concern with indigenous capital formation. The state served the interest of the landed class and the metropolitan bourgeoisie. It existed to ensure profitability of the colony. After emancipation, the control task was less coercive and considerably easier as the freed persons did not have traditional lineages to return to as the source of cohesion and resistance. Therefore, community and family ties as competing sources of loyalty were developed after emancipation but never became powerful sources of resistance except in isolated cases. Secondly, because of small size, limited resources and an undeveloped indigenous bourgeoisie, the state placed a greater dependence on external sources for surplus capital, became even more separated from society, and showed greater willingness to serve metropolitan interests. Thirdly, at independence the state apparatus became the locus of power for a middleclass political leadership that

⁷⁰ John Saul, 'The State in Post-Colonial Societies: Tanzania', *The Socialist Register* 1974.

⁷¹ Ibid.

sought to serve a growing indigenous bourgeoisie and to maintain links with external interests as the main source of surplus capital to secure power.

Notwithstanding these qualifications, Clapham is correct in pointing out that the distinguishing factor of the third world state is the combination of its power and its fragility.⁷² In its power component the state is a source of benefit to the ruling class and their protection against discontent. The state is particularly notorious in this regard as "...the state provides a source of power and wealth entirely disproportionate to that available from any other organised force in society..."⁷³ This explains why control of state institutions is the prime target for the competition between various groups manifested in varying political forms - political parties, interest groups, revolutionary movements, the military, etc. Control does not necessarily mean that the apparatus is manned by members from the group exercising control but rather state personnel act in the interest of that group.

The absence of state and society merging as the common manifestation of a set of shared values is seen as "...central to the character and role of the third world state."⁷⁴ This was unlike the formation of national states in Europe, as Tilly noted it involved "...the large role of alternating coalitions between the central power and the major social classes within the subject population in determining the broad forms of government."⁷⁵ The replacement of colonial officials by locals did not coincide with a process of indigenization of the state to create loyalty to the political process which followed. The state was complied with because it represented power and not because of an organic unity with the society in which it existed. In a sense, it was still

⁷² Clapham, *Third World*. Clapham identifies that the defining commonality of third world states is that they are postcolonial states.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, p. 40.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 42

⁷⁵ Tilly, *National States*, p. 632.

alienated from the society though integral to the functioning of that society. Following independence, the state was passed onto indigenous leaders that initiated a process of competition rather than loyalty among various interest groups. The fragility of the state is a consequence of this feature and is seen as the weakness of legitimacy.⁷⁶ It is this feature of fragility that undermines the public political sphere of postcolonial states.

The reality of the postcolonial state is that despite its power it has to compete with other forms of social organization for the loyalty of individuals and control of their lives. Migdal identifies these organizations as ranging "...from small families and neighborhood groups to mammoth foreign-owned companies."⁷⁷ The extent of social control exercised depends on the ability of the organizations to "...deliver key components for individuals' strategies of survival."⁷⁸ Strategies of survival are essentially individuals' activities for survival that include satisfying needs for food, shelter, clothing and, importantly, a belief system of what is acceptable. It satisfies not only action for personal survival but also the individual sense of belonging and group identity. The ability of the state to exercise social control depends on its ability to 'deliver the goods'. The inability of the third world state to 'deliver the goods' is recognized by Jackson as a condition of quasi-states.⁷⁹

The establishment of the colonial state imposed on societies another organization seeking to exercise social control but having to compete with others that had an organic link to society. The alien form of the state created a conflict with existing modes of social control and survived because of the coercive force that it possessed. The conflict with other organizations continued into the contemporary period and is

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ Joel S. Migdal, *State in Society* (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 48.

⁷⁸ Joel S. Migdal, *Strong Societies and Weak States. State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World* (New Jersey; Princeton University Press, 1988), p. 27.

⁷⁹ Jackson, *Quasi-states*, p. 21.

reflected in instances such as differences over the socialization role of the family and the school; whether the state or the church should decide on moral issues e.g. contraception, marriage; who should decide on the balance between development and the environment. The difference between postcolonial state-society relations and that of developed states is the manner in which conflict occurs and the avenues for resolution. This depends upon the level of integration between the state and society for which little exists in the third world state.

However, the state is not entirely an institution for providing benefits or for contributing to the control of the society. Having institutionalized its social relations and relationships of command and obedience the state can assume the role of mediator between other organisations themselves striving for social control, e.g. in industrial disputes. The state is able to perform this role primarily because of its information, communication and technological capacity and the ascendancy of its executive and judicial branches.⁸⁰ Since the legitimacy of the state depends upon its acceptance by other social organisations there is a conscious effort by the state to regulate the activities of these organisations. There is a constant play of repression, co-option and reward in the bid to secure support.

Generally, postcolonial state-societal relations centre on competition among numerous organisations or forms of social relations to exercise social control over the individual with the state seeking to attain the position of predominance. The peculiarity of postcolonial politics lies in this constitution and the actions undertaken by the state to achieve supremacy. Such actions include defending its right to exclusive responsibility for foreign affairs. By attempting to shut off the rest of society from forming relationships outside the state, it becomes an advantage to the state to possess a monopoly on the potential and actual

⁸⁰ M. Kaplan, "The Theory of the State and the Third World" in *The State in Global Perspective*, ed. A. Kanzancigil (Great Britain; Aldershot, 1986), p. 288.

benefits of these relationships. The conflict between the state and other social organisations extends beyond the domestic to include the international where many other forces are involved.

3.5 State-Societal Relations in the Postcolonial Caribbean – A Framework for Understanding in IR

Traditional explanations of the nature of the state have focussed primarily on international factors and taken the state as totality which give an unbalanced account of the impact of the various forces shaping state-societal relations.

In the case of the Eastern Caribbean, the decisive role played by colonialism in establishing the state and society requires that a framework for analysis that moves beyond the international and the form of the state. The framework must seek to untie the three strands of the Gordian knot of state-societal relations – the international system, state form, and domestic society. These three spheres are needed to understand how the dialectical relationship between state and society is shaped and how the dialectical unity between the international and the domestic remained in constant evolution.

In the previous chapter, the case was made for international relations theory broadening its scope to include other dimensions of states' existence and relationship in the international system. Accordingly, consideration of society within IR theory and a rethinking of the constitution of the state were requirements for a new IR theorizing. As noted, an approach to understanding state-societal relations can be based upon Cox's view that production creates the material basis for all social existence and the organization of production affects all social life including the state. However, it is recognized that the state is the framework for the organization of production. Therefore, production creates power which power determines the form of production. To understand such a role it is no longer sufficient to treat the state as a

'black-box'. Instead, a critical historical approach must unclot its functioning to expose its multi-dimensionality and its multiple overlapping and intersecting relationships with the international system and domestic society. Accordingly, the notion of Hobson's 'constitutive state' as a janus-faced entity that is embedded in both domestic social relations and international relations, becomes very valuable.

Cox also explained that particular configurations of social forces define the limits and parameters of state purpose and how the state operates. However, the state is constrained by its power and relative position in the international system and acts only with relative autonomy. Therefore, the state and its consequent relationships are products of the configuration of social forces and the permissiveness of the world order. As was pointed out, in the case of the colonial state the international system was less permissive in allowing autonomous action when compared to the Western European state. This disposition rooted in the colonial experience, continues in the contemporary period.

Therefore, the process of understanding the nature of postcolonial state-societal relations is to establish a framework for research using a critical historical approach as outlined in the previous chapter. The framework will provide for understanding:

- (a) the rationale for establishing colonies and the role that economic considerations played;
- (b) the origin of the state and the extent to which it was a mechanism to pursue the objectives of the imperial state;
- (c) how economic and political realities in the imperial state and the international system influenced imperial policy towards the colonies;
- (d) how the changing international normative framework influenced imperial policy and colonial policy;
- (e) the functioning of the state according to the permissiveness of the international system. For example, it is necessary to identify

the position of the state in the international system throughout the periods of study. For example, did the state moved from being a producer of raw materials to becoming industrialized?

(g) how state institutions related to society in terms of governance and economic and social development over the periods of study;

(h) how the state has been influenced by external ideas and approaches to governance and development;

(i) how the various social forces interacted to shape and control the state structure from slavery to independence. This will highlight which class the state represented at various historical moments but also the extent to which the state served as a transformative force;

(j) the extent to which leadership of the state at the various historical periods was accountable to the society it governed;

(k) the possibilities for societal actors to participate in the policy-making process;

(l) the extent of state control over institutions and individuals within society and how independent is society in decision-making and action;

(m) the sources of support for societal institutions.

Such a framework will help in understanding how the relationship between state and society in St.Lucia originated and was shaped by historical forces. More importantly, it will highlight the interplay between domestic and international forces as fundamental to that process.

4

State and Society: from Imperial Domination to the establishment of the Colonial State

As highlighted in previous chapters, the nature of the state-society relationship must take into account the relationship between international and domestic influences, drawing upon the historical development of the state and society, in order to highlight their changing nature. In examining the earliest state-society relationship in Saint Lucia - the plantation state/society complex - the discussion starts with interplay between the mode of insertion into the prevailing international system, with its distinctive political and economic features, and the internal configuration of a slave society. This relationship was transformed as a changed international system allowed for the emancipation of slaves, and created a new domestic political and economic configuration characterized by free labor.

This Chapter follows the outline as indicated in the Introduction. The first section will examine the origin and nature of the plantation state-societal relationship, thus illustrating the dominance of exogenous factors in that period. The second section will explore the occurrence of the transformative event – Emancipation – pinpointing the role of both external and internal influences. The third section demonstrates how external and internal forces responded to the transformative event, and the resulting state-societal relations.

4.1 The Plantation State-society Relationship

The emergence of the plantation state-society relationship – the earliest state-societal configuration - was associated with the expansion of the emerging European system of states. The arrival of Columbus in the New World started a 'colony race', pitting the major European powers against each other in the quest for trading power and naval supremacy. The Spanish were lured by the search for gold and valuables on the Latin America mainland and were not motivated to battle for control of these territories. The English and French, on the contrary, were in search of territories to grow crops which were in high demand in Europe.¹ Tobacco was the early staple crop, but a variety of other crops such as cotton and ginger were later exported to Europe.

The establishment of colonies as sources of tropical produce required the introduction of a particular socio-political framework consonant with that purpose. In the early stages of colonialism, as agricultural production involved light production and trade was minimal, the framework was loose. However, as sugar was introduced involving intensive production practices and significant trade, a socio-political framework was introduced emphasizing control and domination of the labour force and trading practices. Therefore, there is a link between the economic and political motives of the imperial state and society, and the nature of state-societal relationship that emerged in the colonies.

4.1.1 British Colonial Expansion and the Emergence of the Plantation Economy

Wallerstein explains that early English colonization in the West Indies was always seen as a dubious endeavour. The Spaniards were thought to have the best islands and the English saw plunder as a more

¹ Ralph Davies, *The Rise of Atlantic Economies* (London; Cox and Wyman Ltd, 1973).

profitable venture.² However, that attitude changed after 1600 with the decline of Spanish prestige and the need to search for raw materials and strategic supplies.³ The first English attempt to settle in the West Indies was in Saint Lucia in 1605 which failed due to the hostility of the Carib Indians.⁴

The decline in Spanish power allowed other naval powers to challenge her supremacy in the New World and to establish colonies of their own.⁵ Apart from the search for raw materials, the establishment of the system of 'imperial preference' - where goods from the metropolis and exports from the colonies got preferential treatment - served as a motive for the imperial powers to have colonies.⁶ In addition, imperial powers recognised additional benefits in the colonies as an attractive source of investment for metropolitan investors and for the establishment of naval and military bases for use in time of war against rivals.

The English attempt to establish colonies was influenced by the demand for sugar, which was increasing as drinking tea and coffee became fashionable. Walvin highlights, "...[i]n 1700-1709 the British per capita consumption of sugar was 4lb; by 1780-1789 it had tripled and in 1800-1809 had risen to 18lb..."⁷ Rising demand could not be met by existing sources of supply in Brazil, the Canary Islands and Sicily.⁸ With Virginia as a cheaper source for tobacco, planters increasingly turned to sugar cane as the preferred product for cultivation. Therefore, sugar cane production, which began as an item for trade by the English in 1637 in

² Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Modern World-System I* (London; Academic Press Inc., 1974). The actions of privateers like John Hawkins and Sir Francis Drake were sanctioned by the Crown and funded by London financiers.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Eric Williams, *From Columbus to Castro: the History of the Caribbean* (London; Deutsch, 1970).

⁵ Richard S. Dunn, *Sugar and Slaves, The Rise of the Planter Class in the English West Indies 1624-1713* (London; Jonathan Cape, 1973).

⁶ Richard Hart, *From Occupation to Independence* (London; Pluto Press, 1998).

⁷ James Walvin, *Black Ivory. A History of British Slavery* (London; HarperCollins Publishers, 1992).

⁸ David Watts, *The West Indies: Patterns of Development, Culture and Environmental Change since 1492* (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1987).

Barbados, expanded on an unprecedented scale and intensity throughout the Caribbean.⁹

The plantation system required the use of a large-scale labour force that was not readily available from the islands. Earlier attempts to use indigenous people and Europeans did not prove successful. In fact, the indigenous people were virtually exterminated in the early phase of European colonization. Between 1649 and 1655, 12,000 prisoners of war were sent to Barbados from Ireland and Scotland.¹⁰ European indentured workers were tried but the conditions of employment were too harsh and life expectancy was low. The obvious choice was African slaves, already used successfully to grow sugar cane by Spaniards on the mainland and by the Dutch in Brazil. In any event, it was cheaper to purchase an African slave than to hire a European labourer.¹¹ They had proven to be sturdier, more resistant to the climate and cost less to feed and clothe.

The initial capital outlay for a sugar crop was high, so small-scale involvement was uneconomical. The spoilage of cane required that the conversion to sugar had to be done quickly.¹² Thus, for sugar to be a commercial and profitable commodity, it had to be grown under plantation conditions, the entire process located in a single area. . Importantly, sugar production required the use of expensive mills, the smallest requiring at least a hundred acres of sugar for efficient operation.¹³ The plantation economy advanced quickly. In Barbados,

⁹ Watts, *West Indies*.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ F.R. Augier, S.C. Gordon, D.G. Hall and M. Reckford, *The Making of the West Indies* (Trinidad; Longman Caribbean, 1960). It is pointed out that the cost of the services of a European labourer for ten years was the cost of an African for life plus ownership of his offsprings.

¹² Davies, *Atlantic Economies*.

¹³ Ibid.

within twenty years to 1667, 11,000 small holders involved in tobacco had dwindled to 745 large plantation owners producing sugar.¹⁴

The emergence of the plantation system established a new society in the colonies based on an economy whose "...efficient scale of operations required a large concentration of fixed capital, and the owner of the capital wanted a completely subordinated and rigidly disciplined labour force."¹⁵ The production of sugar was so overwhelming, that the main features of the economy were defined in terms of the growth of sugar production. Consequently, the features of state and society that emerged did so because of the needs of sugar production under slavery.

The first attempt at cultivation in Saint Lucia was in 1651 with tobacco, ginger and cotton.¹⁶ These were replaced by cocoa and coffee at the turn of the century as they became more lucrative. The long spell of intercolonial rivalry took its toll on the development of the plantation system in Saint Lucia.¹⁷ Most damaging were the frequent evacuations of settlers when the opposing power took over.

The first sugar plantation in Saint Lucia was established by the French in 1765 and by 1780, at least fifty were established.¹⁸ The devastation of the hurricanes of 1780, wars between France and Britain, and the French Revolutionary War ruined the development of the plantation system.¹⁹ It was not until 1803, when the English captured

¹⁴ Williams, *Columbus to Castro*.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 257.

¹⁶ Henry Breen, *St. Lucia. Historical, Statistical and Descriptive* (London; Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., 1844).

¹⁷ There were fourteen exchanges for Saint Lucia. The island was interestingly named 'Helen of the West' after Helen of Troy in obvious reference to its strategic utility. Breen described the Port of Castries as one of the safest and most extensive in the Antilles. He observes that because of the direction of the wind not more than one ship can enter at a time but the largest fleet can ride safely at anchor within the basin and stand out to sea within short notice. He quotes Admiral Rodney in a letter to the Earl of Sandwich encouraging the acquisition of Saint Lucia in 1778, as there was "...none equal to the Carenage of Saint Lucia, or so secure and capable of being defended, which alone is of the utmost consequence to a maritime power."

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹ B.H. Easter, *St. Lucia and the French Revolution* (Castries; Voice Publishing Co., 1965). Easter notes that St. Lucia was rewarded the title of Ste. Lucie la Fidèle for her support

the island that the focus on rebuilding the plantation system took priority. In 1789, there were 43 sugar plantations. By 1843, that had increased to 81, all of larger sizes.²⁰

The significance of sugar production is reflected in the fact that Barbados became the richest English territory in the Americas.²¹ Jamaica's external trade with Britain was larger than New England, Montserrat was higher than Pennsylvania and Antigua surpassed Carolina.²²

Generally, the colonies were invaluable to the expansion of English colonialism. According to Walvin,

British industries and farming disgorged volumes of produce to pay for the slaves and to feed and maintain the colonial settlements. All was controlled by an increasingly powerful state. And on the backs of the slaves there emerged a massive, lucrative and apparently unending flow of economic well-being; the maritime fleet expanded beyond imagination; ports and cities grew from simple villages to international trading centers; banking and insurance boomed like never before.²³

The Imperial State became increasingly interested in its colonies, as their profitability as sugar producers became apparent. Consequently, the English sought to end the Dutch monopoly of trade by enacting the Navigation Act of 1651. The Navigation Acts were laws passed to ensure that the profits of colonies were kept by the colonial power. These Acts established *the mercantile system*, which provided the tropical produce in demand in Europe and raw materials. As a reward, producers received protection from other powers, a secured market and a regular supply of European goods. Trade was only permitted using colonial ships and

of the French Revolution and sent a representative to the Convention. Castries was renamed Félicitéville.

²⁰ Breen, *St. Lucia*.

²¹ Watts, *West Indies*. It is estimated that England earned £4 million between 1656 and 1676 from taxes alone from Barbados sugar.

²² Williams, *Columbus to Castro*.

²³ Walvin, *Black Ivory*, p. 7.

ports. The Acts were to ensure that, "...the West Indies must produce what we in England want, and want what we produce."²⁴

That arrangement undoubtedly favoured the colonial power. Beyond having an assured market, the colonies had no bargaining space for prices, nor did they have a choice to buy cheaper goods from Europe. This system established a number of economic linkages in Britain, including: merchants, financiers, brokers, insurance agents, traders and shippers. The profit from sugar in the West Indies was greater than any other crop cultivated in Europe or America. Sugar was king. Its commercial advantage was an attractive prize, leading to persistent conflict among imperial powers, as they vied for possession of the colonies. For example, Saint Lucia changed hands fourteen times between 1639 and 1803.

Generally, the English imposed heavier taxes on trade than the French did. Importers in England were required to pay heavy import duties on all colonial products, especially sugar. In addition, planters were required to pay the 4.5% export duty from 1663 that was used to fund the colonial state. Despite the difficulties facing planters with uncertain sugar prices, hurricanes, rising slave costs, and higher operational costs including loan repayments, the West Indian colonies were still England's most valuable possessions as a source of revenue and of goods. According to Watts, "[t]he national trade figures for 1700 indicate that 14% of all imports into England and Wales then came from the West Indies, as opposed to only 6% from North America: and 11% of exports, including re-exports, went to each area respectively."²⁵

After 1700, the demand for sugar in England increased as the price of tea decreased and Scotland became part of a political union with England to become Great Britain in 1707. Sugar production in the

²⁴ Quoted in Watts, *West Indies*, p. 191.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 271.

British colonies trebled between 1700 and 1760.²⁶ The mercantile system was eventually replaced by a complex, but highly profitable triangular trade pattern. Manufactured goods in Europe were shipped to Africa to pay for slaves, who were then transported to the New World in exchange for sugar and other tropical products for the metropolitan capitals. The middle stage, involving the purchase and sale of slaves, was the most profitable section. For example, from 1698 to 1707, the Royal African Company made an overall transactional gain of 61%.²⁷ The triangular trade brought tremendous benefits for merchants, financiers, manufacturers and ports in England. Both Bristol and Liverpool developed into the busiest ports in the world, while products from Manchester and the Lancashire region became featured items in West Africa.²⁸ Further, Walvin argues that the triangular trade incorporated an even greater global trade as, "...textiles from India, crowne shells from the Maldives (used as currency in West Africa), European wines and luxuries – all and more found themselves bought and battered..."²⁹

The importance of trade was highlighted in the period from 1750 to 1775, one of rapid economic growth for both French and British West Indian colonies. Exports to England and Wales increased to 19% in 1750-1, and 25% in 1772-3 of all imports. Exports to the British West Indian colonies accounted for 9% in 1750-1 and 15% in 1772-3 of all exports from England and Wales.³⁰ Annual profits on estates were over 10% in Barbados and the Leeward Islands, but closer to 15% in Jamaica.

The settlement of the Seven Years War after 1763 devastated the triangular trade and contributed to the fate of the plantation system in the British West Indies. The possession of St. Dominique and Cuba by

²⁶ N. Deere, *The History of Sugar*, Vol. 1. (London; Chapman and Hall, 1949).

²⁷ Williams, *Columbus to Castro*.

²⁸ James Walvin, *Sugar and Slaves – The British Colonial Experience* (Manchester; Manchester University Press, 1992).

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 41.

³⁰ Ralph Davis, *English Overseas Trade, 1500 to 1700* (London; Macmillan Publishing Co., 1973).

France, led to a significant demand for slaves and consequent increase in price. The cost of transatlantic crossings to and from British colonies increased appreciably, forcing planters and merchants to make their own arrangements for direct sourcing at cheaper rates. However, it meant that slave ships were returning to Britain empty, which increased the price of slaves further. The collapse of the triangular trade had far reaching effects as "...in Liverpool 12 of the 30 leading slave-trading companies had ceased operations by 1778, largely because West Indian planters could no longer meet their payments to them, owing to the severe financial indebtedness of their own which had incurred."³¹

The examination above highlights how international influences led to the establishment of the colonies, and the rationale for their existence. However, the greatest impact on the colonies was in the domestic configuration, designed as a supporting framework to serve their economic role profitably.

4.1.2 The Emergence of the Colonial State

The establishment of political structures in the colonies was based on the belief that the colonies were an extension of sovereign territory, and which required the establishment of similar English society institutions.³²

The first form of political control of colonies involved the granting of proprietary rights to the first Earl of Carlisle in July 1627. That right gave the Earl overall control of islands 10 to 20 degrees West, thus empowering him to make laws "...with the Consent, Assent, and Approbation of the freeholders of the said Province, or the greater part of them thereunto to be called."³³ The Earl delegated his authority through

³¹ Watt, *West Indies*, p. 277.

³² Michael Crafton, *Empire, Enslavement and Freedom in the Caribbean* (Ian Randle Publishers: Jamaica, 1997).

³³ Quoted in Hume Wrong, *Government of the West Indies* (Oxford; Oxford University Press, 1923), p. 28.

Governors “to do all....things.... according to the laws and laudable customs of England.”³⁴ Each Governor established a Council of nominated persons who were dependable for support to serve as the executive in the colony.³⁵

The end of Commonwealth Government in England transformed political control of English colonies. Islands were now ruled by a Crown-appointed Governor and nominated Council vested with executive powers. The Governor, Council and elected Assembly were vested with legislative power. The legislature was able to pass laws “...provided they be not repugnant to our laws of England, but agreeing thereto, as near as the conditions of affairs will permit.”³⁶ In effect, these local laws could not affect the status of the territory, economic relationships or military issues. However, whilst in theory the Governor was granted regal powers, in practice, he was limited in the exercise of his powers.³⁷ Accordingly, he was required to act with the advice and consent of his Council.³⁸

The legislature was modeled on the English system and called the Old Representative System (ORS). The Council performed a dual function as advisory body to the Governor, and as upper house in the legislature. The Assembly functioned with similar rights and privileges as the House of Commons, claiming sole rights to initiate taxation. That policy proved to be the source of much contention in the functioning of colonial legislatures. All laws had to be given the vice-regal assent by the Governor, and sent to England for scrutiny of the Privy Council and Board of Trade. Laws considered a hindrance to trade were not passed.

The Assembly was elected with suffrage determined by property and capital. Throughout the colonies, the Assemblies sought ways to

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Initially there were only two settled colonies – Barbados and St. Christopher.

³⁶ Quoted in Augier et al, *West Indies*, p. 50. Also Fredrick Spurdle, *Early West Indian Government* (New Zealand; Fredrick Spurdle, 1962).

³⁷ D. J. Murray, *The West Indies and the Development of Colonial Government 1801-1834* (Oxford; Oxford University Press, 1965).

³⁸ Spurdle, *West Indian Government*.

circumvent outright imperial control. The interest of the planters and of the Imperial power did not always coincide and was the source of bitter conflict throughout the eighteenth century. A simple example was the contrasting attitudes towards newly acquired territories. For established planters, it was always a case of rejecting more sources of sugar, and thus competitors. For the Crown, new territories meant more territory for strategic reasons and more markets for export and taxes.

The Assembly was aided by the strength of the planters' lobby in London, based on their economic affluence and the profitability of the colonies. There are numerous examples of the power of the West Indian lobby influencing British Government policy, including the Molasses Act of 1733 and Sugar Act of 1764.

By the end of the eighteenth century, the settled colonies, which were largely controlled by colonists, followed the Old Representative System (ORS). To the colonists it was their right and duty to participate in government. Whatever the source of the authority, the colonists saw that the institutions were established because of their right as Englishmen based on "...birthrights inherent in His Majesty's most loyal and dutiful subjects...founded on the law of Parliament."³⁹

During the Revolutionary War and Napoleonic Wars, Britain conquered a number of territories. Final handovers were settled with the Treaty of Paris in 1814 and the Congress of Vienna in 1815. Saint Lucia was one of the conquered colonies and would have for the first time a settled political framework for its governance.

By then, it had been established that the British Parliament would not play an active role in the formulation of laws for the settled colonies. Parliament in Britain learnt from experience especially in war time and the American War of Independence that, "...unless we have the concurrence of the colonies themselves, all that we can do in the way of

³⁹ Quoted in Murray, *Colonial Government*.

internal regulation was not worth a straw.”⁴⁰ Over time, it would lead to the view expressed by Sir Philip Francis that “...the transcendental power of parliament to make laws for every part of the British Empire....is not, in prudence, to be used on ordinary occasions, when the subordinate powers of legislation can act with equal effect in their several departments. It is a right reserved for great emergencies.”⁴¹ Thereafter, the role of the Parliament was to exercise general supervision.

Therefore, the new colonies would have to be governed by giving greater control to the Crown from the onset.⁴² It required a sacrifice of the notion that the English institution of old representative system was the best form of governance for colonies. Accordingly, a new political structure was established in the form of Crown Colony Government. The only limitation on the Crown was the need to respect the articles and terms of capitulation, and that the inhabitants of the territory were to suffer no discrimination compared to other subjects of the Crown.

Accordingly, the political framework which emerged for Saint Lucia after final determination of ownership in 1816 was shaped by the early Terms of Capitulation of 1793. These allowed the French civil justice system and Roman Catholic religion to continue. However, the criminal law system would be discontinued.

The French had a greater influence than the English in shaping the early colonial political structure, largely due to longer periods of occupation. On the occasions of British occupation, a military officer would be placed in charge under the control of the Commander-in-Chief in Barbados. From the mid-seventeenth century, the island was controlled by the *French West India Company* and other private interests and annexed to Martinique until it was declared neutral in 1723.⁴³ The French system remained in place until the first civil British Governor was

⁴⁰ Henry Dundas, Parliamentarian, quoted in Murray, *Colonial Government*.

⁴¹ Sir Philip Francis, Parliamentarian, quoted in Murray, *Colonial Government*.

⁴² Trinidad and St.Lucia.

⁴³ Breen, *St.Lucia*.

appointed in 1801. The Governor was assisted in the civil administration of the colony by a *Conseil Supérieur*. It consisted of twelve 'respectable' inhabitants, who performed administrative, legislative and judicial functions.

From March 1802 to June 1803, the French again controlled the island and introduced significant additions to the state structure. In addition to the *Conseil*, a Captain General who served as a Governor General, a Colonial Prefect who acted as a Financial Secretary, and a Grand Judge who acted as an Attorney General, were added.⁴⁴ These officials were mostly resident in Martinique.

The restoration of British rule in 1803 was followed by a return to the structure of 1801 until 1816. That structure lacked clarity of roles and was plagued with many conflicts between the civil administrator with the authority to represent the Crown interests and the *Conseil*. The latter possessed, and was accustomed to exerting, extensive powers. In 1816, a new system was introduced. Known as Crown Colony Government, it relegated the *Conseil* to the position of Court of Appeal. Financial and administrative functions transferred to the Governor, who was aided by an executive and legislative body, known as the Privy Council comprising five principal planters.

The new structure caused increasing difficulties because of the limited legislative powers and the accumulated executive functions which the planters had in the exercise of their duties. In 1832, the Privy Council was abolished. Separate legislative and executive bodies were then established. The Executive Council consisted of: a Governor, Colonial Secretary, Attorney General, Colonial Treasurer and Protector of the Slaves. The Legislative Council included: members of the Executive Council, a Chief Judge and five principal proprietors appointed by the

⁴⁴ Ibid.

Crown.⁴⁵ In 1838, modifications were made to the Executive Council. The role of Protector of Slaves was abolished and the offices of Colonial Secretary and Treasurer consolidated. The Legislative Council also changed, the Chief Justice being replaced by the Collector of Customs and two other people appointed at the Governor's discretion.

Under Crown Colony rule, the Governor held extensive powers, which he exercised effectively. He presided over the Executive and Legislative Councils, but was not bound by their rulings.⁴⁶ There was little opportunity for planter interests to be advanced, unless it coincided with imperial objectives. The Governor was primarily concerned with maintaining the military infrastructure and facilitating trade with England. Planters did not see the Governor as representing their interests especially on matters of taxation. In the final analysis, the colonial state always represented the imperial interest and then the planter interest when it did not conflict with imperial interest. There was little consideration of the slaves or other interests except to ensure law and order.

Trinidad and Saint Lucia were the only two colonies in which the Crown had complete control of the legislative and executive processes. Both provided fitting reasons for Crown Colony Government without elected assemblies as both were undeveloped colonies, had a foreign population and different religion.⁴⁷ The Governors of Trinidad and Saint Lucia were able to implement colonial policy with less resistance, as they could always secure legislative and financial support. No other colonies were able to pass amelioration laws and complete the emancipation process as quietly or avoid colonial deadlocks that characterized the old representative colonies.⁴⁸

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Wrong, *West Indies*.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

4.1.3 The Constitution of Colonial Society

A West Indian plantation colony was a number of autonomous units relating to a central authority in the colonial state which represented the Crown. Socially, a plantation was a total institution; it sought to provide all that the slave needed and to extract all that the owner could from the slave. The strategy used was based on fear and force, rather than incentives. The slaves, who were seen as chattel, outnumbered the whites and created a persistent atmosphere of fear in the society. The importation of slaves in the Caribbean started slowly, but surged, as large-scale or plantation sugar cultivation expanded, peaking at 38,000 plantations in 1807.⁴⁹

The plantation required the establishment of a social structure geared to the plantation economy. The plantation was the main social instrument through which the slaves were transformed "...into beasts of burden who might provide an economic return to their owners."⁵⁰ Slaves were nurtured into the ways of plantation life and slavery through the gang system. Walvin explains that, "[i]n the West Indies the sugar slaves were divided into gangs, a highly efficient labor system designed to squeeze from them the maximum of effort. It was also a key method for the control and discipline of crowds of slaves."⁵¹

The social hierarchy on the estate was defined by the slave system and the plantation occupational structure. Whites occupying the upper tier were differentiated by occupation and property ownership. Slaves, occupying the lower tier were differentiated by their role on the plantation, previous rank in Africa, and place of birth. Though slaves were primarily responsible for the provision of manual labour, there were slaves who became artisans and domestics. Treatment of slaves also

⁴⁹ Crafton, *Empire*.

⁵⁰ Walvin, *Black Ivory*, p. 71.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 93.

varied according to role. Generally, the manual or field slaves worked the hardest and were most severely treated.

Beyond the obvious historical details of the brutality meted to slaves on plantations, there is an equally important contribution of slaves in the urban areas or towns that shaped society in the colonies. This phenomenon was associated with early nineteenth century slave society. Most urban slaves were domestics who had greater interaction with whites than plantation slaves. It was also different in that whites outnumbered slaves in the urban areas. Urban slaves provided all kinds of services from washing, cooking, skilled tradesmen, fishermen, drivers, to nurses.⁵² Significantly, the urban areas developed slave vending. In some cases, planters used some slaves as higglers to earn extra income, but in most cases, it was independent economic activity to sell off extra supplies grown on slave plots.⁵³

The whites who dominated plantation life established an elite called the "plantocracy". In contrast, this new status did not reflect their original standing in Britain. . Instead, the 'plantocracy' were characterized by men searching for adventure and greater wealth beyond their shores.⁵⁴ After establishing their plantations, these men returned to England to enjoy their newfound wealth, but left their property in the hands of agents and overseers. This form of 'absentee-ownership' has been noted to affect efficiency on estates and brought harsher punishment to the slaves.

Most planters enjoyed a lavish lifestyle in contrast to the brutish life suffered by the slaves. One in three Africans did not survive the first three years of plantation life.⁵⁵ However, as the supply of slaves slowed and the prices increased, the planters shifted from an emphasis, and

⁵² B.W. Higman, *Slave Populations of the British Caribbean 1807-1834* (Baltimore; The John Hopkins University Press, 1984).

⁵³ Walvin, *Black Ivory*.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

included female slaves among their acquisitions. . Slave breeding became an essential activity, guaranteeing an alternative supply of slaves. The policy ensured the improvement of living conditions for slaves, leading to the construction of slave villages on the edges of plantations.

In the early years of slavery, special plots of land and time were provided to slaves to grow their own supplies for subsistence. However as sugar prices and demand increased, planters sought to convert all fertile lands to sugar cultivation. The consequences were disastrous, as “[i]n most islands slaves went hungry.....Slaves fainted in the fields, had difficulty working properly.....Starving slaves sometimes eat dangerous plants or unripe food; some died and many more fell ill. Much of the problem was caused by the zealous cultivation of more and more sugar.”⁵⁶

Significantly, the laws reflected the state-social relations instituted for the orderly management of the plantations as units of production, and colonies as possessions for profit. On the estate, the planter had unbridled authority, with little legal restraint. Unlike the French *Code Noir*, or the Spanish *Siete Partidas*, the English did not have an inherited body of slave laws to guide the treatment of slaves. Accordingly, the laws reflected what was required to ensure the survival of the plantation system.⁵⁷

The laws relating to slaves were the definitive statements of the relationship of the slave to the state and society. Goveia points out that, “[o]n the basic idea of the slave as property, a whole system of regulations had been built up. Some laws concerned the disposal of the slave as property; others governed the actions of slaves as an aspect of public order. Some gave slaves a species of legal protection.”⁵⁸

⁵⁶ Ibid., p. 82.

⁵⁷ E.V. Goveia, *The West Indian Slave Laws of the 18th Century* (United Kingdom; Ginn and Company, 1970).

⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 22.

Each colony passed laws, usually severe, for the capture, pursuit and punishment of runaway slaves, including crimes of conspiracy and rebellion. Laws were also passed to punish slaves for theft and the charge of hitting a white person, punishable by whipping or death. Until the eighteenth century, very few colonies recognized the willful killing of a slave as murder. There were also laws restricting the economic activity of slaves, to ensure that their masters did not experience competition. Slaves could not give evidence against a white person but, ironically, could against another slave. Goveia summarizes that, “[e]arly English slave law almost totally neglected the slave as a subject for religious instruction, as a member of a family, or as a member of society possessing some rights, however inferior. In so far as the slave was allowed personality before the law, he was regarded chiefly, almost solely, as a potential criminal.”⁵⁹

Planters lived in perpetual fear of slave uprisings and rebellions, aware that their mostly due to the appalling treatment to which slaves were subjected. Slaves were fully cognizant of the fact that their livelihoods were determined by their owners, but were always prepared to escape inhumane existence. Planters responded with brute force, which included hanging, breaking on the wheel and maiming as deterrent.⁶⁰

Violence was an integral part of the system and was seen as necessary and vital to keep the system of slavery in place. Walvin explains that, “...[s]o all-encompassing was the role of violence in the slaves’ lives, that it is difficult to see the boundary between abnormal and normal behavior towards them.”⁶¹ The necessity of violence to maintain the slave system was, however, a contradiction of the system, as it served to feed slave revolts and the popular movement in Britain to end slavery.

⁵⁹ Ibid., p. 25.

⁶⁰ Richard Hart, *Slaves Who Abolished Slavery, Vol 1. Black in Bondage* (Jamaica; Institute of Social and Economic Research, 1980).

⁶¹ Walvin, *Black Ivory*, p. 250.

4.2. Emancipation as a Transformative Event

This section examines how external and internal factors led to the abolishment of slavery, making it a transformative event in the development of the state and society. Blackburn identifies four reasons for the abolition of slavery.⁶² These are the pressures of slave revolts; the declining significance of slavery for the British economy; the need for the British Government to address a national political crisis at a time of massive popular protest and the evolution of abolitionism to correspond with the emergent bourgeois thinking of a new social order. Other explanations for the abolition of slavery range from: the work of abolitionists such as the Quakers⁶³; the rise of industrial capitalism⁶⁴; the actions of slaves⁶⁵; to an expression of middle class social and political reform.⁶⁶

Generally, it can be shown that the abolition of slavery was part of a broader process of social, political and economic reform in Britain which achieved initially the abolition of the slave trade. As the national crises intensified, the conditions for reform improved and eventually led to the abolition of slavery. From another perspective, emancipation can be seen as "...one society successfully imposing its view of morality, justice and social relations on another."⁶⁷ It might be more appropriate to summarize that slavery ended in the colonies at the confluence of social and political forces all linked to the rise of industrialization and the domestic pressures of slave revolts. Importantly, the dismantling the

⁶² Robin Blackburn, *The Overthrow of Colonial Slavery, 1776-1848* (London; Verso, 1998).

⁶³ David Brion Davis, *The Problem of Slavery in the Age of Revolution, 1770-1823* (Ithaca, N.Y. ; Cornell University Press, 1975).

⁶⁴ Eric Williams, *Capitalism and Slavery* (Chapel Hill; The University of North Carolina Press, 1944).

⁶⁵ Hart, *Slaves*.

⁶⁶ Thomas Haskell, "Capitalism and the Origins of the Humanitarian Sensibility" in *The Antislavery Debate*, ed. Thomas Bender (California; University of California Press, 1992).

⁶⁷ David Eltis, "Abolitionist Perceptions of Society after Slavery" in Walvin, *Slavery*, p.195.

slave system was a historical moment in the transformation of the production pattern of the plantation system. Correspondingly, the entire social and political structure changed and established a new relationship between state and society.

In this discussion, three major factors are presented: international economic changes, social and political changes in Britain and slave resistance in the colonies. These factors highlight the view that the movement to abolish slavery in the colonies was part of an international movement that emerged in the 1780's from Germany to Brazil.⁶⁸ However, it was only in Britain that it became a massive social and political movement. Coupled with the internal realities of the colonies, emancipation would establish the context for a new state-societal relationship.

4.2.1. International economic changes and the collapse of the Plantation Economy

A number of significant changes in the economic positioning of the colonial powers forced a rethinking of the strategic importance of slavery as a mode of production in the British West Indian colonies. Historical evidence shows that the plantation system in British colonies was in decline from the late eighteenth century. The French were in control of the sugar market in Europe and producing sugar at cheaper cost than British colonies.⁶⁹

The settlement of the Seven Years War underlined the strength of the planters lobby in Parliament. The group lobbied for the imperial state to relinquish power over Martinique, Guadeloupe, St. Dominique, St. Lucia and Cuba, in favour of the undeveloped islands of Grenada, Dominica, St. Vincent and Tobago. This was seen as an attempt to avoid

⁶⁸ Seymour Drescher, "Public Opinion and the Destruction of British Colonial Slavery" in *Slavery and British Society 1776-184*, ed. James Walvin (London; The Macmillan Press, 1982).

⁶⁹ Augier, *West Indies*.

possessing colonies with high sugar output that would increase competition for established plantations. However, in contradiction, it was the settlement of the War, through the Treaty of Paris in 1763 that contributed to the decline of the 'plantocracy' in the period leading to emancipation.⁷⁰ New colonies generated an increased demand for slaves, although supplies were already in decline. As the value of slaves increased, so did the hardship as plantations sought to extract maximum output from them.

The outbreak of the American War of Independence would have a devastating impact on the British colonies, as supplies were cut off and prices soared to five times the normal price.⁷¹ In addition to the increase in price of supplies, the colonies suffered from trading difficulties. These included the resurgence of privateering activity which decreased the amount of sugar reaching England from 131,000 casks in 1774, to 76,000 in 1778. Insurance rates increased by 23% of the value of cargo and freight rates by 50%. Even duties on imported colonial produce were doubled to help finance the War.⁷² Despite the increase in the price of sugar, the profitability of the colonies decreased significantly, sending many plantations bankrupt.

The beginning of the nineteenth century heralded a further slump in sugar production, which affected profitability in the colonies. A glut in the market decreased the prices of sugar, but saw a continued rise in taxation, as Britain sought to finance the Napoleonic Wars. Planters faced higher prices for supplies from North America, as their availability became restricted, and the cost of purchasing slaves soared. The decline in estate labour also affected sugar production and further the decline of planters.

⁷⁰ L. Ragatz, *The Fall of the Planter Class in the British Caribbean, 1763-1833* (New York: Octagon Books, 1963).

⁷¹ *Ibid.*

⁷² Watts, *West Indies*.

It was becoming apparent that the economic rationale behind slavery would be challenged. The importance of the West Indian plantation economy as the centerpiece of the British Empire was slowly declining. Annual production in the West Indies was now valued at 4.8% of the total value of production of goods in the Empire in 1812, decreasing to 2-3% by 1830.⁷³

The decline can be attributed to many factors. Firstly, overproduction of sugar throughout the colonial world caused a reduction of price in the market. In the West Indian colonies, sugar output increased from 168,000 tons in 1812 to 202,000 tons in 1828.⁷⁴ Secondly, peacetime served as an occasion for Britain to find new markets and new sources of supplies beyond the Empire. Therefore, high production and low prices coincided with the colonies declining importance in metropolitan trade.⁷⁵ From 1804-6, at least 21% of British exports went to the West Indies. However, from 1824-6, exports had dropped to 11%.⁷⁶ Meanwhile, exports to Asia and Latin America experienced significant increases.

As life became more arduous, absenteeism increased considerably, reaching a mean level of 70% throughout the colonies.⁷⁷ The absence of planter-owners worsened the situation, as estate managers did not show the same industry as owners to the management of the plantations.

However, beyond those market issues there were structural and geographical realities that disadvantaged the West Indian colonies and precipitated the decline of the plantation economies. Williams recognizes that the small-scale size of the British West Indian plantation economy, with its small plantations and fewer slaves suggests "...an economy

⁷³ Blackburn, *Colonial Slavery*.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

⁷⁵ Williams, *Columbus to Castro*.

⁷⁶ Blackburn, *Colonial Slavery*.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

geared to subsistence production.”⁷⁸ Obviously, these economies could never compete with the economies of scale of Brazil, Cuba, India and St. Dominique. Once preferences were removed or taxes increased, the future was doomed. There was also the persistent damage caused by hurricanes. A hurricane can destroy the entire crop of one island because of its small size whilst only affect a portion of the crop on the islands of Cuba and St. Dominique and never affect Brazil which is outside the hurricane zone. Lastly, Williams highlighted the hostility of certain vested interests towards imperial policy on colonial trading.⁷⁹ For example, because of the exclusive system, shipping interests were forced to pay foreign shippers to ship to Britain. Even the port of Liverpool, which benefited from the slave trade, rejected the slave trade in 1833. By then the port served cotton producers in the United States, who shipped their goods to textile factories in Manchester. There were also refiners who wanted increased amounts of sugar imported to Britain since the West Indian colonies could not meet their demand.

The decline of the plantation economy encouraged new imperial attitudes toward the utility and value of the West Indian colonies. The economic circumstances had created an environment in both Britain and the colonies where slavery became untenable – socially and politically.

4.2.2. Social and Political Reform in Britain and consequences for Colonial Slavery

The emancipation movement drew inspiration from the same society which had earlier accepted these barbaric practices. Blackburn highlights that anti-slavery sentiments, as well as primitive abolitionism, can be traced back to the Middle Ages.⁸⁰ However, despite the popular aversion to slavery in Europe, the imperatives of the plantation economy, and increasing profits, led to an acceptance and promotion of Negro

⁷⁸ Williams, *Columbus to Castro*, p. 284.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*

⁸⁰ Blackburn, *Colonial Slavery*, p. 36.

slavery. As noted in the previous section, the decline of the colonies created a situation whereby the action of various institutions coupled with new ideas on morality, justice and social relations swayed opinions.

Early intellectual arguments provided impetus for growing dissatisfaction with the treatment of slaves in the New World. Hutcheson, in 1775, provided the most radical argument that slavery and the slave trade were violations of justice and of Christian morality.⁸¹ A more radical position later denounced slavery on the basis that a person can never lose their liberty and carries that right everywhere. Any sale of a person is therefore void. Criticism of slave labor was heightened with the use of economic arguments by Adam Smith in 1776 although the treatise was more a critique of mercantilism, than slavery.⁸² The most comprehensive scholarly argument was made by Millar in 1771. He argued that the introduction of personal liberty would make individuals more industrious.⁸³ Millar further argued that the cost of maintaining a slave is far more than paying a free man in proportion to his work. Undoubtedly, Millar was expressing the views of an emerging bourgeois order.

Accordingly, Davies summarized "...that by the 1760's broad changes in cultural values had undermined traditional and religious and philosophic justifications for slavery."⁸⁴ The evolution of an anti-slavery, which became international by the end of the eighteenth century, reflected the ideological needs and interest of various groups and classes.⁸⁵ Davies's approach is very instructive. He argued that the abolition movement was always related to the need to legitimize free wage labour. In Britain, it was an instrument of hegemonic control by the

⁸¹ Francis Hutcheson, *A Short Introduction to Moral Philosophy* (Glasgow; Printed by R. & A. Foulis, 1747).

⁸² Adam Smith, *The Wealth of Nations* (London; G. Bell & Sons, Ltd., 1921).

⁸³ John Millar, *The Origin of the Distinction of Ranks* (Indianapolis; Liberty Fund, 2006).

⁸⁴ David Brion Davis, *The Problem of Slavery in Western Culture* (New York; Cornell University Press, 1966), p. 446.

⁸⁵ Davies, *Age of Revolution*.

proponents of wage labour. In response to the terrible working conditions of English labourers, referred to as 'Lancashire slaves' by radical voices, these early abolitionists drew a line between the moral contrast of the free and slave worlds. It was thought that the British system of labour had found a balance between freedom and order, and could be a measuring rod for other harsher systems. Therefore, for these abolitionists, the objective was to "...transform black slaves into cheerful, obedient and grateful labourers, whose wants could be satisfied only by working voluntarily for wages."⁸⁶ The consequence of that motivation was, undoubtedly, to internationalize wage labour.

The role of the Quakers is therefore instrumental in understanding the impetus of the anti-slavery movement and its link to a nascent social and economic order. Quakers were debarred from holding political office but were very wealthy and successful in business including the triangular trade. According to Davies, "[t]he very embodiment of the capitalist mentality, the English Quakers were in the vanguard of the industrial revolution."⁸⁷ They constituted the bourgeois elite, and combined their fight for a new economic order with the need for corresponding new social institutions and social rights. Increasingly, the conditions of slaves became a central concern of the Quakers and they were instrumental in the fight for the abolition of the slave trade and later the emancipation of the slaves.

Despite the traditional aversion to bondage in English society and Western Europe generally, objections to slavery only became a serious issue in the metropolis, as the imperial order faced a crisis. An understanding of that context shows the influence of this external development on the abolition of slavery in the colonial world.

The emerging Hanoverian State displayed the nascent political power of the mercantile capitalists and landed oligarchy. The state was

⁸⁶ Ibid., p. 165.

⁸⁷ Ibid., p. 45.

expected to protect all private property and the liberty and rights of all 'free-born Englishman'.⁸⁸ This served the purpose of the colonists, who used the claim as the justification for colonial assemblies with the right to legislate for themselves.

The imperial crisis began after the success of the Seven Years War. The colonies recognized their significance in the war effort and with the defeat of the French, placed greater demand for concessions to the colonies.⁸⁹ The coalescence of patriotic politics and ideology during the war fragmented into differing expectations and demands. In England, it took the form of a challenge to the established political order. Within the colonies, it took the form of greater legislative rights for resident Englishmen. The loss of the North American colonies was a blow to the Empire, which provided an impetus for radical politicians against the ruling elite and in favor of more representative and manufacturing-oriented politics. The ruling elite recognized that reform was necessary if the revolutionary successes of the colonists were to be contained.

After many defeats, the reform movement would incorporate the anti-slavery call, which included the slave trade and slavery in the colonies. It was based on the incompatibility of the call for metropolitan liberty and the existence of colonial slavery.⁹⁰ Anti-slavery eventually became a popular movement with a national character. It is instructive that Granville Sharp, a Quaker who founded the *Society for Effecting the Abolition of the Slave Trade* was also a member of the *Society for Promoting Constitutional Information*. The early defeat of the Society in lobbying parliamentarians for abolition reflected the strength of the West Indian Planter. As the abolition movement rallied significant popular

⁸⁸ Blackburn, *Colonial Slavery*, p. 74.

⁸⁹ The colonies contributed to the financing through increase taxes on colonial products and provision of supplies. The North American colonies were also useful through their naval construction facilities.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*

support, its approach changed from lobbying parliamentarians to demonstrating massive public support.

By the end of the eighteenth century, the international political environment was favorable for abolition of the slave trade. Earlier, it was thought that any unilateral action by Britain would strengthen France in the colonial battles. By 1772, the North American colonies and Denmark had abolished the slave trade. The international normative framework was slowly changing making it easier for the decision to be made in the British Parliament. That change was fueled by the view that the trade was not profitable, and not necessary as slaves can adequately reproduce and was therefore not justifiable. However, it can be argued that the Parliamentary concession to end the slave trade was an attempt by the ruling oligarchy to mitigate the popular movement for democracy, and reestablish supremacy over the emerging bourgeois class.

The abolition movement again went through a lull after that victory as the political climate subsided. In 1830, the Anti-Slavery Society accelerated the call for immediate emancipation and like the early attempts to abolish slavery, the success of this resurgence was rooted in the political crisis of the time. The period 1824-32 was one of economic dislocation and social distress in Britain, with the oligarchic state seen as corrupt and rooted in landed interest. It was also felt that the government should seek to include greater representation, by extending the franchise and should focus on the growing significance of industrialization and manufacturing. It was felt that the economies of the West Indies could recover if free labor existed as in India. Planters were seen as creating a brutal and immoral system to make profits whilst the anti-slavery movement provided a moral dimension to the call for reform.

The years 1830-2 witnessed a massive outpouring of workers through the Political Unions, as workers called for parliamentary reform and universal manhood suffrage. The call for an end to slavery was

intrinsically linked to the reform programme.⁹¹ Although radicals and democrats did feel, at various times, that anti-slavery calls were a distraction from domestic problems. Nevertheless, anti-slavery added a humanistic appeal, which enabled the mobilization of a cross section of the public. Davies explains that the anti-slavery movement provided the parameters for an emerging consensus and "...succeeded in making a sincere humanitarianism an integral part of class ideology, and thus of British culture."⁹²

The election of 1832 was decisive, as the new franchise and reforms allowed a significant number of abolitionists to be elected. Before the Emancipation Act was finally passed in August 1833, two conditions detailed by the planters had to be met. Firstly, a compensation package had to be agreed to in the form of a grant, rather than loan. Secondly, arrangements had to be made to ensure a regular supply of labour in the post-emancipation period. Hence, the particular state-societal relations that emerged.

In the end, the popular wish of the reform movement was achieved.

Walvin best captures the sentiments:

[t]o end slavery would be to strike a blow for reform; it would be a step towards a more just society. It would assuage the Christian conscience, would exonerate the sense of national virtue, please the supporters of new economic theories and confirm the justice of popular demand. An end to slavery would unite more Britons than any other issue. It was a victory for morality, for religion and good economic sense. Who but the most unreconstructed planter could argue with that?⁹³

4.2.3. Domestic Influences – the effect of Slave Resistance

The social and economic dynamics of the colonial society played a significant part in ending slavery. News of its success in ending the slave trade increased opposition to the system of slave labour by slaves and

⁹¹ Blackburn, *Colonial Slavery*.

⁹² Davies, *Age of Revolution*.

⁹³ Walvin, *Black Ivory*, p. 306.

freed 'coloureds'. The number of free people of colour began to increase, placing greater pressure on colonial authorities to dismantle the system of social discrimination.⁹⁴ In Jamaica, free 'coloureds' even retained the services of an agent in London, who represented their interest, calling for civic rights for slaves and themselves.⁹⁵

The spread of religion among slaves and free 'coloured' by the Nonconformist Churches also played a role in destabilizing the system. Despite being required to teach obedience and hard work, the planters were concerned with the teaching of Nonconformist missionaries that a person cannot serve both a temporal and spiritual master.⁹⁶ Religious teaching was also blamed for slaves' reluctance to work on Sundays.

The contribution of slaves to the abolition of slavery through revolts and unrest was a constant reminder of the volatility of the system. More than any other group, the action of the slaves made it difficult to continue slavery. It can be speculated that even in the absence of popular unrest in Britain, the increasing difficulty of maintaining slavery would have rendered the practice burdensome.

Despite overwhelming odds and brutal punishment for resistance, slaves were able to demonstrate their inherent rejection of bondage. In territories where maroon resistance was successful in disrupting normal life on plantations, island authorities were quick to negotiate agreements with the maroons to halt raids on plantations and to hand over escaped slaves.

Slave revolts were devastating for the colonial authorities, particularly in the two decades preceding emancipation. Referring to the increasing slave revolts, Crafton described them as constituting, "... a crescendo of resistance, each one more extensive, disruptive and

⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁵ Mavis Campbell, *The Dynamics of Change in a Slave Society: A Socio-political History of the Free Coloureds of Jamaica* (London; Madison, 1976).

⁹⁶ Ibid.

influential than the one before.”⁹⁷ The revolts shattered the confidence of the planters whilst serving as a source of pride for the slaves.

Slave revolts also fed on two distinctive developments.⁹⁸ Firstly, as the number of ‘creole’ slaves increased the homogeneity and understanding and, correspondingly, the ability to coordinate a response against slavery increased. Secondly, the number of slaves who could read increased and they became more aware of the developments in Britain and were motivated by the prospects of emancipation. Slave revolts became more sophisticated and demonstrated a high level of planning and execution. The major revolts in Barbados in 1816, Demerara in 1823 and Jamaica in 1831, were testimonies to a new phase of slave resistance. In each case, public opinion in Britain was intensified against slavery.

4.3 Shaping the Colonial State-Society Relationship

Findings stated above have shown that the establishment of colonies was part of the process of expansion of European society, guided by an emerging capitalist system of production. The early colonial state and society were creations of the imperial state to support the plantation economy as, the most efficient system of production.

The eventual abolition of slavery was the culmination of a process where a new social and political order came to ascendancy in Britain, and eventually Europe. Fed by the logic of the greater profitability in free trade and wage labour, the bourgeois order utilized the humanistic appeal of anti-slavery in its battle to destroy the old English state. The appeal of the anti-slavery movement increased as reports of treatment of slaves and slave revolts reached England. The planters obviously stood in opposition to the emerging imperial moods, but eventually gave way to the political authority of the imperial state.

⁹⁷ Crafton, *Empire*, p. 283.

⁹⁸ Walvin, *Black Ivory*.

The passing of the Act of Emancipation can be seen as Britain addressing a major domestic issue that threatened to destroy its social and political order. However, it can also be seen as another step towards the universalizing of a British conception of morality and social relations. Britain had "...by its visible economic success and by its navy, managed to effect a momentous change across national borders...into condemning the slave trade as repugnant to the principles of humanity and universal morality".⁹⁹ As it did with the slave trade, Britain sought to impose the anti-slavery doctrine on all other powers. The anti-slavery movement was both a reflection and source of the internationalization of political and social norms on the acceptable exercise of authority and appropriate forms of labour organization.¹⁰⁰

Therefore, when the bondage of nearly three-quarters of a million people ceased on August 1, 1838, it was with the expectation that they would become free persons in new sugar producing societies sanctioned by a nascent political, economic and social order.¹⁰¹ However, the construction of that new society was conceived with a fundamental contradiction. The basis of slavery had been the necessity of tying labour to the estates, to ensure sugar production and the profitability of the sugar trade. It was a system based on force and violence with degrading work a symbol of inhumanity. Yet, it was expected that freed persons would gleefully remain on plantations to work. Rightfully, the planters were fearful that after emancipation, the slaves would choose subsistence cultivation instead of wage labour on the estates, bringing social chaos once the bonds of control were removed.

In the case of Saint Lucia, on the announcement of emancipation, the Governor reported that the "...planters and managers appear [to]

⁹⁹ Fredrick Cooper, Thomas Holt and Rebecca Holt, *Beyond Slavery* (Chapel Hill; University of Northern Carolina, 2000), p. 8.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁰¹ CO 255/3. In St. Lucia apprenticeship ended with an Ordinance passed on 13 July 1838.

calmly resigned to the consequences...they appear apprehensive only that the apprentices will not give them a sufficient quality of labor.”¹⁰² The imperial authorities sought to assure the planters that emancipation would be conducted in a way to ensure that they still had a labour supply, and that they would be protected from a revengeful freed population.

There was also an expectation that emancipation would transform the societies into thriving enterprises of free wage labourers and an industrious peasantry.¹⁰³ Much of that expectation was the result of the abolitionist campaign, which argued that free labour was more efficient, and that once freedom was attained, labour would thrive as it had done in Europe. The slave was expected to become a rational and disciplined being after two hundred years of demeaning socialization which denied self discipline and degraded the value of work. The preparation for a new society was to take place within six years of apprenticeship. The Colonial Governments, having the Act as the guide, were allowed to finalize the details of emancipation and prepare for that new era.

The state-societal relations which emerged were a reflection of the interplay of the external influence of the liberal imperial approach, defined by the new bourgeois order; and internal influences of the conservative planter resistant to give up their privileges, and the freed persons seeking to end all forms of bondage.

4.3.1. Imperial Policy as the Framework for State-societal Relations

The new colonial state-society complex constructed within the framework outlined by imperial policy, underlined the dominance of external factors in that period. Such a policy was not static or homogenous, but represented a multiplicity of views, approaches and

¹⁰² CO 253/44/88. Letter to Secretary of State 2nd August 1833.

¹⁰³ Walvin, *Black Ivory*.

changing economic realities. Whilst there were significant external influences, including British trade and the role of the Colonial Office, there were internal influences such as the economic interests of the planters to consider.

As mentioned above, the post-slavery society was expected to be a showcase of the efficiency of a system of free labour over slave labour, and the emergence of a more civilized society. Eltis notes that there were two prevailing views among abolitionists on the way forward for the colonies after slavery.¹⁰⁴ Firstly, the Brougham model which envisaged an evolution towards the English system of small farmers renting from landlords, producing a wider range of produce and dismantling the plantation system. The two class social system being replaced by a multi-tier social system. The second model, the Buxton model, which was more favoured, involved a continuation of the plantation system. It would have all the attendant social features required to keep and, if necessary, force workers to stay on the estates. However, Lord Howick, a leading advocate of emancipation, in a memorandum written in 1832, outlined his views which became the official colonial policy.¹⁰⁵ The memo identified the central problem to be solved with emancipation was to get the slaves to continue working on the estates, after the fear of the whip is removed. It also observed that even if the planters could afford higher wages that would not prevent the slave from moving from estates, especially if land was readily available. He proposed as a solution: the imposition of a high tax upon land as "...the means of enabling the planter to continue his business when emancipation shall have taken place..."¹⁰⁶

There were always concerns about the possibility of success in transforming post-slavery societies, particularly the level of freedom to be accorded to former slaves. The British Emancipator opined that "...those

¹⁰⁴ Eltis, *Abolitionist Perceptions*.

¹⁰⁵ Williams, *Columbus to Castro*.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 329.

who have hitherto monopolized rule and authority and freedom in the colonies will make a general and determined effort to retain their dominion and to fix on the negro a yoke as heavy as that from which he is about to be delivered.”¹⁰⁷ These concerns were all confirmed by missionaries based on observations that the planters were denying the freed persons their rights.¹⁰⁸

The response of the slaves to emancipation was not the dreaded social unrest as expected from the former slaves rather it was the planters that sought to create an atmosphere of uncertainty. On 19 August 1834, the Governor of Saint Lucia proclaimed ‘...the tranquility of the colony...’ and warned “...persons against spreading false reports calculated to disturb the public mind.”¹⁰⁹ The Governor identified the behavior of the ex-slaves as consistent with the occasion but he “...had to neutralize the effects of much injudicious conduct on the part of the white inhabitants.”¹¹⁰ He had to insist that there was no need to have a display of military force, as reports to him from planters of widespread unrest were found to be exaggerated, and in fact, the former slaves had accepted freedom with reasonable behaviour.

According to a contributor to the Select Committee, the freed men were as industrious as everyone was, when treated fairly, and would falter if only they were not paid enough. The planters were at fault as they “...still imagined that they could behave under the new regime as it had under the old. If only employers were prepared to treat the freedmen the same way they would have British labourers, they would have nothing to fear.”¹¹¹

Like the earlier period leading to emancipation, the development and leadership of the Colonial Office played a significant role in shaping

¹⁰⁷ Quoted in Howard Temperley, *British Anti-slavery 1833-1870* (London; Longman, 1972), p. 112.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁹ Proclamation No 8/34.

¹¹⁰ CO 253/46, Letter to Secretary of State, 26 August 1834.

¹¹¹ Quoted in Temperley, *Antislavery*.

the direction of the colonies. Lord Stanley, as Secretary of State, thought that once slavery was ended government would be centred in the colonies and "...prevent the collision between the Executive and the colonists."¹¹² The role of the Governor would be to ensure that "...administration was impartial, efficient and economical. Wider issues of education and religious instruction were not the concern of the Colonial Office."¹¹³

Whenever governments changed, the conception of the role of the Colonial Office and colonial governments also changed. After 1834, there was a refocus on reforming the Colonial Office, to make it more efficient in executing colonial policy. As it relates to governance in the post-emancipation period, there were two main views – either government should be subjected to the direction and control of the Colonial Office, or full authority should be granted to all the colonies' representative institutions.¹¹⁴

Emancipation had addressed a short-term problem in Britain, but failed to address issues of governance and structure in wake of the new social order.. The Emancipation project was not a holistic conception. For such a transformational event, there was no programme for the incorporation of new persons, who had suffered generations of disadvantage, into a new society. The Act created a new category of person through apprenticeship who was neither free, nor a slave in a colonial society that wanted him to remain a slave. The Act contained general guidelines with the colonial government required to provide the specifics. Murray quite correctly states that, "...after emancipation the British Government was not concerned to be the master of developments, instead matters would be left to be decided.....by the course of events."¹¹⁵

The most critical decision taken by the Imperial Government in the post-emancipation period up to 1844 addressed the protection of sugar

¹¹² CO 112/18, Secretary of State Stanley to Lt. Gov. Smith 22 February 1834.

¹¹³ Murray, *Colonial Government*, p. 21.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 229.

from the colonies. Again, the decision highlights how domestic politics in the metropole served to shape the society in the colonies. The Navigation Acts had been an instrument to protect imperial interests two centuries earlier, but now became necessary to act in the imperial interest by its removal. It was clear that the favoured tropical products, especially sugar, were no longer cheaply obtained from the West Indian colonies. The duties charged varied, but were normally about 63s per hundredweight for non-British produced sugar, compared to 24s for British-produced.¹¹⁶ The initial attempts to remove the duties split the abolitionist movement in Britain. The abolitionists included free traders from the rising middle class and industrialists seeking reform. Yet the link between sugar and slavery caused a hesitation to support the abolition of duties on slave-produced sugar in non-British colonies.¹¹⁷ The Government lost a parliamentary vote in 1841 as its opponents joined the abolitionists to support a motion against the removal of duties on sugar. However, the anti-slavery centres of Northern England were supportive of removing the duties.

It was clear that it was only a matter of time before the issue would be back in the forefront of domestic politics. The reality of international trade highlighted that Britain was already importing slave-produced goods from Brazil and Cuba, and exporting goods to these countries. By 1846, the Sugar Duties Act was passed to gradually remove all preferential duties for sugar from British Colonies. With protest from the West Indian interests and colonial assemblies, the removal was phased, being fully implemented by 1852.¹¹⁸

Whilst producers in Brazil and Cuba rejoiced as production increased, the consequences for the colonies were disastrous. According to one account, “[t]he estates are now on the verge of ruin and if the

¹¹⁶ Temperley, *Antislavery*.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁸ Augier, *West Indies*.

proposed equalization of slave and free grown sugar be carried out into full effect there is no prospect of any favourable change..."¹¹⁹ It was clear that sugar production in Cuba was on a scale incomparable with the West Indies and allowed for economies of scale and reduced unit costs. Large-scale production on flat terrain also led to mechanization which was difficult in the small islands. Finally, Cuba still used slave labour, which though proven more expensive, was available when needed, compared to cheaper free labour that was not usually available. The Sugar Act devastated the sugar industry which was already in decline and led to the abandonment of some colonies as productive sugar producers at a time when sugar producers were adjusting to the inclusion of free labour as part of the state-societal relationship.

4.3.2. Free Labour and the emergence of a New Colonial Economy

The period of apprenticeship represented an intense struggle between the planter class, colonial state and the freed society, in defining free labour and its role in a new colonial society. It was also the first testimony of the distribution of political power in the post-slavery configuration. The period was characterized by two conflicts. Firstly, conflict between a bourgeois imperial policy, which favored free trade and less protection for West Indian sugar and had liberal views on justice and morality, and a conservative planter class, which favored the retention of the status quo. The second conflict was between free labor and the colonial state which laid the basis for the emergence of a new colonial economy and the material conditions for the existence of the black majority population.

The planters expected the apprenticeship system to provide a solution to the feared problem of labor shortage by requiring laborers to

¹¹⁹ George Blyth (a missionary) to Scoble (Secretary to the Foreign and British Antislavery Society) quoted in Temperley, *Antislavery*, p. 162.

commit a number of hours of free labor to the planters.¹²⁰ However, the system allowed the laborers to charge for their labor outside these hours and that provided the opportunity for the first instance of bargaining between freed persons and the colonial state that set the wage limit. Whilst it was not a level playing field, it was the first opportunity for blacks to press for some measure of recognition of power by withholding their labor if they were not satisfied.

From all accounts of the Governor of Saint Lucia, the apprenticeship system started well and faced no expected problems.¹²¹ However, it soon became necessary for legislation to be passed for the policing of apprentices, and to control the level of absenteeism through the creation of the Rural Police Establishment.¹²² The following year, legislation was passed punishing persons who employed or harboured runaway apprentices.¹²³

Apprenticeship highlighted the major contradiction in the emerging society – the planter class seeking to secure the lowest labour cost against a labouring class, with the freedom to sell its labour, but no political power. The planters were relentless in exploiting the powerless apprentices, and sought to use their political power and influence to control the aspirations of the apprentices for better conditions of work.

By 1835, punishment of apprentices for withholding labour by unauthorized local magistrates was such a problem, that the Secretary of State was informed.¹²⁴ These magistrates were reminded by the Governor, that it was beyond their competence to sentence apprentices, as only Stipendiary Magistrates had such power.¹²⁵ Lord Glenelg directed

¹²⁰ Ordinance No. 4/34.

¹²¹ CO 253/46, Letter to Secretary of State, 3 November 1834; CO 253/52, Letter to Secretary of State 3 October 1836.

¹²² Ordinance No. 10/34.

¹²³ Ordinance No. 8/35.

¹²⁴ C.O. 253/46, Letter to Secretary of State 16 December 1835; Letter to Secretary of State 26 December 1835.

¹²⁵ Circular to Justices of the Peace, 25 November 1835.

that the Governor take action "...to obtain redress for apprentices who had been illegally punished, or to censure any of the magistrates by whom acts so evidently illegal had been done."¹²⁶ Before receipt of the instructions, another incident by a magistrate resulted in suspension.¹²⁷ There was also evidence of deliberate wrongful designation of apprentices as praedial and non-praedial, so that fewer apprentices would be freed than anticipated in 1838.¹²⁸ Lt. Governor Bunbury reported that there were extensive errors in the Registry and that the books were made up in a disgraceful manner.¹²⁹ He accordingly requested permission to conduct a commission of inquiry.

There was an inherent incompatibility between a free labour arrangement and the traditional practices of plantation production. The availability of slaves had encouraged planters to acquire as many slaves as necessary for production which became excessive during the planting season. There was no optimization of labor. With a free labor force, the planters expected the same but laborers not required out of season would have to fend for themselves. Clearly, a seasonal demand would not be sufficient for freed persons with responsibility for their livelihood. Once the apprenticeship system ended and the stipulated weekly hours were no longer in place, laborers found their own livelihood on their own terms.

Freed persons were already becoming attracted to the new forms of economic activity centred on small-scale agriculture and retail trading. Retail trading became popular for urban slaves, as it represented a move to an activity that provided sufficient independence from association with servitude. Notwithstanding the colonial state representing the more liberal imperial state, it still sought to protect the economic interests of

¹²⁶ C.O. 254/10, Despatch No. 464 from Lord Glenelg to Lt. Governor Hill, 1 February 1836.

¹²⁷ C.O. 253/46, Letter to Secretary of State, 12 January 1836.

¹²⁸ Praedial apprentices were field slaves whilst non-praedial were non-field slaves.

¹²⁹ CO.O. 253/57, Letter to the Secretary of State, 12 December 1837.

the planters, and restrict the economic independence of the blacks. Therefore, the colonial state attempted to restrict any movement away from agricultural production. For example, the production of charcoal for export was made illegal on the basis that, though it was more profitable, freed persons were neglecting their crop cultivation and causing a rise in the price of provision.¹³⁰ Although Lord Glenelg overruled the Proclamation citing that "...it was questionable policy to compel them to abandon the more lucrative employment."¹³¹ The efforts of the colonial state was even more striking, as the last Ordinance passed before the end of apprenticeship sought to control entry into services, such as jobbers, porters, hucksters and pedlars.¹³² The significance of the Act was not the orderly management of the trade, but the low wages set and the high cost of obtaining a license to operate.

Lt. Gov. Hill in a dispatch answering inquiries from Rt. Honourable Spring Rice on the effects of free labour on the colony noted the distressing financial situation that would first discourage any capitalist to invest in Saint Lucia, but adds that even if done "...the limited population would render such a measure abortive."¹³³ He explained that less than a twentieth of the island was under cultivation and that no estate had a sufficient labour force and urged emigration as a solution to the labour problem.

It was not surprising then, that the Colonial State would seek to enact legislation to curtail the availability of land to freed persons. The first Ordinance sought to "...regulate the disposal of Crown lands, to make provision for the proper administration of uncultivated estates and to appoint Commissioners for carrying out these matters into effect."¹³⁴ The preamble of the Ordinance was bold in its reasoning as to the

¹³⁰ CO 255/3, Proclamation No. 3 of 1837, 4 December 1837.

¹³¹ CO 254/12, Despatch of 14 February 1838.

¹³² CO 255/3, Ordinance of 30 July 1838.

¹³³ CO 253/49, Letter to Secretary of State Lord Glenelg, 23 November 1835.

¹³⁴ CO 255/3, Ordinance 7/36 of 1 August 1836.

necessity of the Act, stating that the increase in fugitive slaves and manumitted apprentice labourers had led to an increase in the unemployed and vagrant population who became squatters. Among the objectives of the Ordinance were to set prices ensure that all territory to be cultivated is well cultivated; and to provide against any undue and unnatural depreciation of land and property.

Notwithstanding, the apprenticeship period did not last as planned. The intention of freeing all non-field apprentices on August 1, 1838 became a complete abolition of the program. Three main reasons can be provided. Firstly, the plans of the Imperial Government for a transition period of training for freedom were not unfolding as envisaged. Secondly, there was the fear of a backlash when the non-*praedial* apprentices were freed in 1838 and others remained in limited bondage. Thirdly, and probably most importantly, the abolitionist movement increased its campaign against the system fuelled by the reports of the stipendiary magistrates and missionaries on the treatment of apprentices by planters.

The apprenticeship system was not abolished by the British Parliament, but by the colonial assemblies acting on a directive from the Secretary of State for the Colonies. It may be that the Imperial Government was fearful of another protracted battle in Parliament and prospect of resentful public opinion. After all, motions calling for an immediate end to apprenticeship were defeated in February 1838 in the House of Lords, and in May 1838 in the House of Commons.¹³⁵ However, it showed the conviction of the Colonial Office that the apprenticeship system was not working and full freedom should be granted to all. That can be compared with the opposition of the planter class to any termination of the system.

¹³⁵ Temperley, *Antislavery*.

The planters in Saint Lucia objected to the termination of apprenticeship by petitioning the Secretary of State and causing so much uncertainty, that the Governor of the Windward Islands travelled to Saint Lucia to ensure passage of the Ordinance. The termination of apprenticeship was a classic example of the Imperial State overlooking the interests of the planter. This represented the decline of the planter class as an economic force, and exposed the greater concern of the Imperial State to avoid any unrest in its colonies which could affect public opinion at home. The Petition called the proposal "...an act of injustice unprecedented in the history of the British Empire."¹³⁶ The planters complained that they had agreed to the Act of Emancipation of 1834 because they were assured of the services of the apprentices for six years and it was part of an agreement with the Crown. They further complained that they had invested hugely since 1834 in their estates because of the six-year guarantee of labour. Apprenticeship was terminated in Saint Lucia by the Assembly with the Governor of the Windward Islands sitting in to ensure passage.¹³⁷

This change brought about the critical issue of sourcing labour after the end of apprenticeship. In the territories where there was uncultivated land, planters who experienced a decline in available labour were forced to rely on immigrants from India and China. They were known as indentured servants. In territories where land was scarce, planters were able to engage in negotiations to hire free labour or engage them through other arrangements. In Saint Lucia's case, the available labour force was 10,238.¹³⁸ Less than one twentieth of the island was cultivated.

The resolution of the conflict between free labour and the planter class was the establishment of the peasantry as a social and economic

¹³⁶ CO 253/61, Petition to Secretary of State, 24 May 1838.

¹³⁷ Ordinance 34/38.

¹³⁸ Watts, *West Indies*.

force. This feature differentiates the West Indian peasant from the classic understanding of the 'peasant'.¹³⁹ In the case of Saint Lucia, peasant development started largely through the practice of the *Metayage System* of cultivation. *Metayage* was first introduced into St. Lucia in 1840, later spreading to some other islands, after 1847.¹⁴⁰ It was only in St. Lucia that it became an essential component of export agriculture.

The difficulties of labour cost, availability and the lack of capital for the estates, led planters to adopt *Metayage* as the dominant form of production. Yet, the *Metayage System* became a powerful tool of empowerment for the labouring class. Historically labour sharing (*koudmen*), communal ownership and product sharing was part of rural life.¹⁴¹ According to Adrian, "...these types of land acquisition, ownership and cultivation were conditioned by French law and customs...hence, the planter opted for a system of agriculture with principles that were familiar to the agrarian labouring class."¹⁴²

The conditions of a *metayage* contract varied from estate to estate, but contained some common elements.¹⁴³ The metayer was provided with land for a period (usually six years) to grow, maintain and cultivate a particular. The metayer was also provided with land on the fringes for his house, provision gardens and animals; while the planter provided all major capital expenses; planters had the right to superintend the cultivation of the crop; to pay workers according to market prices, less

¹³⁹ Woodville K. Marshall, "Notes on Peasant Development in the West Indies since 1838," *Social and Economic Studies*, Vol. 1 No. 3. The West Indian peasant did not have long established ties and tradition to the lands nor was it the rural dimension of old civilizations.

¹⁴⁰ Peter Adrian, *Metayage, Capitalism and Peasant Development in St. Lucia 1840-1957* (Jamaica; Consortium Graduate School of Social Sciences, 1996); Breen, *St. Lucia*. The *metayage* was a French form of sharecropping where the metayer would be provided with land and all requirements including tools by the landlord who in turn would be given provisions in lieu of rent.

¹⁴¹ The *Koudmen* is a practice of help provided by family and friends for which no money is paid.

¹⁴² Adrian, *Metayage*, p. 16.

¹⁴³ C.O. 253/79, Stipendiary Magistrate Report, Grey to Stanley, September 11, 1843.

any advances and the planter could take legal action for the termination of the contract.

The system permitted a half share of produce in the early phase, but changed to a two-thirds, then four-fifths in favour of the metayer.¹⁴⁴ What was most significant about *metayage* was that the metayers received their share in cash, but not kind. They were, therefore, able to penetrate the export market through the planter.

The system of *metayage* though created for the advantage of the planter, transformed the lives of many freed persons. Breen, who served as an Official Member of the Legislative Assembly and as Registrar of the Court, described what he saw as the worst feature of the *metayage* system as,

the direct tendency to give an undue and overstrained impetus to the growth and accumulation of wealth among the labouring population; to induce consequent habits of indolence; by lowering the condition of the landowner, and elevating that of the labourer, to place both on a footing of equality; thereby to increase the number of small farmers¹⁴⁵

Whilst it has been argued that *metayage* could be seen as a system of exploitation of freed persons, there is evidence of its role in producing a new agrarian class.¹⁴⁶ Adrien provided sufficient evidence of the superiority of *metayage* for capital accumulation compared to wage labour, as the metayer was able to earn monies from the sale of his surplus provision, from working on the estate and his *metayage* share. The metayer was also able to increase his labor input, if needed beyond his family, by using the traditional *koudmen*.¹⁴⁷

The system was not without its difficulties, and as was customary, the framework initially favoured the planter, despite the efforts of the

¹⁴⁴ Ibid.

¹⁴⁵ Breen, *St.Lucia*, p.302.

¹⁴⁶ For an account of *metayage* as a form of exploitation see J. Davy, *The West Indies Before and Since Emancipation* (London; Frank Cass, 1854); Issac Dookhan, *A Post-Emancipation History of the West Indies* (London; Collins, 1977).

¹⁴⁷ Adrien, *Metayage*.

Stipendiary Magistrates. Contracts were deliberately written vague and ambiguous to favor the planters. With no legal provisions for *metayage*, legal redress was impossible. Despite the best efforts of the planters to discourage and frustrate any attempts to pass legislation for the practice, in 1850 an Ordinance was passed to protect the metayers.

Notwithstanding, the *metayage system* provided a mechanism for social change, as many labourers were able to accumulate capital to purchase their own lands and stimulate the emergence of an independent landowning class of smaller proprietors. Metayage became the only significant vehicle for the empowerment of many freed persons in the immediate post-emancipation period. Glaringly, it was not an initiative of the Colonial State or Imperial Government.

4.3.3. The Creation of a Free Labour Society

In as much as the slave society required a specific framework to facilitate economic, social and political control, so did the post-emancipation period require a framework to create and facilitate a free labour society. The shaping of the new state-societal relationship was based on the successes of creating a free labour society. That process was started with the apprenticeship period with its main task to discipline the labourers, the establishment of law and order and provision of welfare.

In attempting to discipline the labourers, the Imperial State seemed concerned not to excite the abolitionist or humanitarians in Britain, and sought to restrain any attempt at abuse from the planter class. Yet, the Imperial State was careful not to undermine the status of the planter class, while maintaining control of the black population. In the end, the colonial state was allowed to create a framework that sought to balance the two considerations. Accordingly, the Emancipation Act provided for Stipendiary Magistrates who were agents of the Imperial Government and expected to function primarily as 'guardians of public

order', especially as it was feared that with the blacks freed and the slave laws and estate discipline no longer in place, it would lead to an increase in crime and social disorder. However, they had a more important function to ensure that the freed persons fulfilled their obligation to the planters and vice versa. According to Burns, the apprentices were required to work honestly, avoid insolence, and remain faithful to their contracts.¹⁴⁸ In return, planters would ensure that they would receive food, clothing, lodging, medicine and an allowance for their extra labour. Importantly, it was also intended that civil rights would be gradually introduced to freed persons, who would be taught how to use them by government agencies, whilst planters learn "...to make the necessary modifications...to bring about the transformation from a slave, to a full wage-paying mode of production."¹⁴⁹ In essence, the Magistrates supervised the apprenticeship arrangements and the preparation for a new labour market.

However, the apprenticeship system was a failure. The slaves saw it as a continuing denial of their full freedom, while the planters saw it as compensation and therefore, the right to exact the utmost from apprentice labourers.¹⁵⁰ Augier notably recognizes two reasons for the failure of the Special Magistrates.¹⁵¹ Firstly, they were not provided with the resources required to fulfill their duties. Secondly, the magistrates were required to operate within a framework established for expected post-emancipation difficulties, rather than for development planning. That framework was not compatible with an apprenticeship programme. Accordingly, the Magistrates spent more time addressing issues of discipline, rather than planning for the social development of a new society.

¹⁴⁸ W.L. Burn, *Emancipation and Apprenticeship in the British West Indies* (London; Johnathan Cape, 1937).

¹⁴⁹ Watts, *West Indies*, p. 470.

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁵¹ Augier, *Making of West Indies*.

The second task of establishing law and order through the enactment of new laws was seen as necessary to reshape the society and to bring it under the control of the colonial state. Its objective was to move from having each plantation as a society in itself, or to construct a national society. According to Lord Glenelg, the Colonial Secretary, “[s]ociety...is more open to civilizing influences, more directly under the control of Government...and altogether is in a sound state, morally, politically and economically, than if left to pursue its natural course.”¹⁵²

The freed persons were no longer the responsibility of the planter. Previously, the welfare and well-being of the slaves were largely within the charge of the planter. After 1838, the freed persons became subjects of the Crown, now the responsibility of the Imperial Government and Colonial state. Hall brilliantly captures what should have been the rightful configuration of the post-emancipation society,

[e]state slaves would become the general populaces of free people looking to their governments for the provision of justice and of the very basic elements of social welfare by which a citizen is shielded from the total destitution which may arise from injustice, old age, or physical or mental incapacity. Freedom would also carry with it the right to choose between different occupations and different masters, and it might well be necessary for that right to be protected in a society just emerged from bondage.¹⁵³

The new set of social laws in Saint Lucia was the result of the interplay between the Colonial Office and the local legislature. The Colonial Office was vigilant of the laws passed by the local legislature and was very interventionist.

Augier explains that the laws passed,

were all calculated to discourage any movement of workers away from the estates. There were harsh measures against vagrancy, taxes to discourage small scale landholding, and high rates for licences to traders and dealers; these attacked the main alternatives to work on

¹⁵² Dispatch, 30 January 1836 quoted in Cooper et al, *Beyond Slavery*.

¹⁵³ Douglas Hall, *Five of the Leewards 1834-1870* (Barbados; Caribbean University Press, 1971), p.15.

the estates. There were also efforts to introduce contracts which would hold the labourer on the estate for long periods.¹⁵⁴

The first laws focused on ensuring that the planters were provided with their labour needs and that a police force was in place to maintain order. As required by the Act of Emancipation, the local legislature enacted that praedial apprentices with provision grounds were to provide forty hours per week of compulsory labor and those without grounds were to provide forty-five hours.¹⁵⁵ At the same time, another Act was passed for the acquiescence of minority praedial apprentice labourer to ensure that once a majority of labourers agreed to provide extra hours of labour, all labourers would be compelled to work. The minority did not have the right to withdraw their labour and the penalties for absenteeism would apply if they did not work.¹⁵⁶

There were also concerns about planters being able to safeguard their existing supply of labour, during apprenticeship and after its end. An Ordinance was passed to punish persons who employed or harboured runaway apprentices on the basis that they had contracts with planters who depended on them.¹⁵⁷ In 1838, another Ordinance was passed to make it illegal for anyone to “seduce or take away any Menial-Servant or Servant in Husbandry, Artificer, or other labourer, who shall be under either a general or special hiring or engagement with any other person.”¹⁵⁸ A few days later another Ordinance was passed which prevented boat-captains, boat-men, domestic servants and other labourers from being enticed into signing contracts to work in other colonies..¹⁵⁹ In this case, the concern was more than the loss of labour, although it was claimed that the persons left behind dependents who

¹⁵⁴ Augier, *The West Indies*, p.172.

¹⁵⁵ CO 255/2, Ordinance 4/34 of 19 August 1834 .

¹⁵⁶ CO 255/2, Ordinance 5/34 of 19 August 1834.

¹⁵⁷ CO 255/2, Ordinance 8/35 of 9 July 1835.

¹⁵⁸ CO 255/3, Ordinance passed 30 July 1838.

¹⁵⁹ CO 255/3, Ordinance passed 23 July 1838.

were not provided for, and who became destitute. It was also claimed that some left in debt. Persons wanting to leave the island were required to follow a long process to receive a certificate of departure, which included advertising their intention to leave the colony in three consecutive editions of the Gazette.

The second objective of the new laws was to ensure that there was effective control of the movements and activities of the apprentices and freed persons through the establishment of the rural police to regulate the activities of apprentices.¹⁶⁰ The Ordinance created four classes of offences by apprentices: indolence, carelessness or negligence in performing their work; absence from work and running away from the services of the employer; drunkenness and disobedience of lawful commands; and conspiracy, or open resistance to the lawful commands of their employers.

Another major piece of legislation to facilitate social control provided for the policing of the town of Castries and was gradually extended to include other towns in later years.¹⁶¹ Initially, it was motivated by the increase in manumitted apprentices and freed persons assembling in Castries. Among other provisions, it provided for the arrest of any idle or disorderly person on the streets after nine o'clock at night; the prevention of beating of negro drums;¹⁶² the prevention of selling of produce without permission; and the prevention of purchase of produce except at the Market. The Act was made more restrictive and defined as idle and disorderly, and subjected to one-month imprisonment, anyone who could not wholly or in part maintain themselves, anyone who begged, anyone who pedaled without authorization and any group of twelve or more assembling to dance without permission from the

¹⁶⁰ CO 255/2, Ordinance passed 31 December 1834.

¹⁶¹ Ordinances passed 24 August 1835, 3 November 1840 and 23 January 1844.

¹⁶² The Secretary of State objected to this inclusion. Despatch of 15 February 1836.

Attorney General. ¹⁶³ A rogue and vagabond was described, and liable to three months in Jail, as anyone who wandered about and lodged in a deserted building, occupied land without permission and had no visible means of subsistence and anyone involved in any indecent exposure.

The emphasis on control was very evident when on the eve of the end of apprenticeship new provisions were made to control freed persons in the rural areas and to establish rural constables. They were designed "...for the preservation of peace and good order throughout the island, and more especially on the several plantations, estates and places."¹⁶⁴ It was a rigid provision that allowed any two Justices of the Peace, at the behest of the owner, manager or person in charge of the estate to appoint persons with full authority to arrest offenders for disturbing the public peace, tumult, riots, trespass, misdemeanors, and felony.

The third task of creating welfare support for the freed persons was treated as a minority concern. The Act in abolishing apprenticeship prevented planters from evicting from the plantations those persons who were willing to work on the estates and had not committed any offence and required planters to provide three months tenancy for those who had committed an offence.¹⁶⁵ Furthermore, it provided that in the case of diseased and infirmed persons, the planter was to provide lodging, clothing, food, and medicine unless that person had relatives to do so. Significantly, if the planter could prove he did not have the means, the freed persons would be maintained at the expense of the colony.

The only other example of welfare legislation provided for the Colonial State to maintain all those who were poor, impotent, old, blind and not able to work and having no means of subsistence; and all children up to eight who were born bastards and whose mothers cannot

¹⁶³ CO 255/2, Ordinance 9/36 passed 29 August 1836.

¹⁶⁴ CO 255/3, Ordinance passed 30 July 1838.

¹⁶⁵ CO 255/3, Ordinance passed 13 July 1838.

provide for them.¹⁶⁶ The Act provided for vacant lands to be set apart for the industrious and occasional poor, who might be able and willing, but could not find employment.

There was significant concern with education such that the Lt. Governor finally recommended that the Imperial Government provide schools for Negro education.¹⁶⁷ A Committee of the Legislative Council, appointed on 19 May 1837, noted that there were two schools, in Castries and Soufrière, on the national school system funded partly by voluntary contributions and partly by the Lord Bishop of Barbados.¹⁶⁸ As most apprentices were Catholics, they were not admitted to these schools. Two planters operated private schools, one in English and the other in French, to educate their apprentices. The Committee recommended that schools be built in Castries, Gros Islet, Soufrière and Vieux Fort and for His Majesty Government and public funds to meet the cost. The situation was so deplorable that the Lt. Governor made a special appeal to the Colonial Office for help.¹⁶⁹

The colonial priority in shaping the post-emancipation society is highlighted by the assessment of the Attorney General that there was no hospital, no workhouses or any other such establishment maintained by public interest. In contrast, there were two houses of correction in Soufrière and Vieux Fort and one jail in Castries.¹⁷⁰

4.3.4 Governance in Colonial Society - Domestic and Imperial Government Interplay

There were three main issues with the political development of the state and its relation to society. Firstly, what would now be the role of the colonial state in governing the new society; secondly, what would be the

¹⁶⁶ CO 255/3, Ordinance passed 27 July 1838.

¹⁶⁷ CO 253/55, Letter of 14 April 1837 to Secretary of State.

¹⁶⁸ CO 253/55, *Report of the Committee for Promoting Education amongst the Children of the Labouring Population*, 15 July 1837.

¹⁶⁹ CO 253/55, Letter to the Secretary of State, 15 July 1837.

¹⁷⁰ CO 253/67 Letter from Attorney General to Governor, 25 February 1837.

role of the Colonial Office in the direct government of the colony; and, thirdly, the response of colonial society to the new relationships.

As a Crown Colony where the Governor ruled by Ordinances, it was easier for imperial policy to shape the relationship between state and society, than in colonies where Assemblies led through legislation and approval of monies. As mentioned earlier, the institutionalization of Crown Colony Government in Trinidad and Saint Lucia was a direct result of experiences with the old colonies that the imperial state wanted to avoid. Colonial society was left out of government except for the representation of the planters as non-official members. However, the conflict between the non-official members of the Legislative Council and the Governor was constant and bitter, and reflected the separation between the sentiments of local representatives and the Imperial Government.¹⁷¹ It can be argued that the Imperial Government was more concerned with either the circumstances of the wider populace, which was outside of the political process and more likely to revolt and cause embarrassment, or its obligations under the capitulation agreements whilst the non-official members were concerned with the interests of the English planters.

A typical example of conflict highlighted that contest between the domestic interests and the imperial state. In debating a draft order for altering and amending the administration of justice in Saint Lucia, there was a concern by the non-official members over the continued use of French laws in the courts. An alternate plan was proposed, which recognized an English system using the English language.¹⁷² In applying a casting vote, Governor Hill observed that members, "...were travelling entirely out of their way in making the presentation" and that "...the non-official members shall recollect that the present Draft was bought before

¹⁷¹ The persistent conflicts led to two non-official members being suspended over their actions in relation to tax measures. CO 253/67, Letters to Secretary of State, 4 February 1839 and 6 February 1839.

¹⁷² C.O. 256/3, Minutes of Legislative Council, 16 November 1835.

them by the directives and expressed instructions of the Rt. Honourable the Secretary of State.”¹⁷³ Smith in response vented the feeling of non-official members by indicating that they were not obliged to pass every bill that the Secretary of State thought was necessary, and that they as non-official members, did not have the same interest in the colonies as the official members.¹⁷⁴

The colonial state also played an active mediating role between the imperial state and the planter class in financing development in the society. The critical question was how social or development projects would be financed. There appeared to be a determined effort by the Imperial State not to use its own resources for the maintenance of the colony. For example, the mass of freed persons was no longer the responsibility of the planters as they had been as slaves, and looked to the state for social support, particularly for medical services, education and subsistence. The infirm, aged and young were particularly disadvantaged. The Imperial Government remained firm in the view that the provision of these services had to come from local revenue. However, Saint Lucia was already experiencing severe financial difficulties with the Legislative Council submitting a request to the Secretary of State for £18,000 to help meet recurring budget deficits.¹⁷⁵

In another instance, a formal loan application was made for £10,000 to meet the debts of the colony to creditors.¹⁷⁶ The differences between the Imperial State, the Colonial State and the planter interests were also highlighted in the approach to solve the debt problem. The Colonial Office agreed to arrange a loan but required evidence of a willingness and ability to repay. The application by the Governor was accompanied by an Ordinance to raise custom duties on all goods, except

¹⁷³ Ibid.

¹⁷⁴ Ibid.

¹⁷⁵ Dispatch No. 12 of 6 March 1834.

¹⁷⁶ CO 253/51, Application of 18 January 1836.

British linen, wool or cotton goods, to repay the loan.¹⁷⁷ Instead, the Non-official Members requested a grant of £14,000 and a reduction of taxes to deal with the problem.¹⁷⁸ The Petition of the Non-official Members claimed that the Crown had a responsibility to pay off the debt, as it was the result of a policy to use the colony to make a trial of the emancipation measures from 1826.¹⁷⁹ Earlier in 1834, a petition had been forwarded to the Secretary of State from forty-five planters objecting to high taxes. According to the planters the taxes would,

complete the ruin of the wretched planter, and this at a moment when the fabric of colonial society is shaken to its foundation by the introduction of a great fearful experiment....and firmly protest against the exorbitant salaries paid to the person carrying out the Executive Government of such a colony as Saint Lucia .¹⁸⁰

In fact, non-official members went further to suggest that since the colony had a greater military role than a role for the production of sugar, the Imperial State should also pay the salary of the Lieutenant Governor.¹⁸¹ The statements of revenue and expenditure show that the colony was never able to raise sufficient revenue to meet the cost of administering the colony.¹⁸² The measures forced by the Imperial State only served to increase hardship on the population, frequently causing conflict between the planters and Governor.

Another persistent issue in the relations between colonial state, imperial government and society was reconciling the different imperial influences on the development of colonial state and society in Saint Lucia. The case of the use of language is instructive. French remained the official language until 1 January 1842 when after numerous complaints from the English elite, especially in judicial proceedings, the Imperial Government finally agreed to a change. The articles of

¹⁷⁷ Ordinance 15/36.

¹⁷⁸ C.O. 253/51, Petition of 30 January 1836.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid.

¹⁸⁰ C.O. 253/46, Petition to Secretary of State.

¹⁸¹ Ibid.

¹⁸² Appendix 1.

capitulation ensured that French customs, religion and laws would be continued in the ceded territories and therefore, the Imperial Government had an international obligation to retain the French language. The most active opponents were judges and planters, who frequently addressed the Lt. Governor to make a case for the use of English in the Royal Courts.¹⁸³ However, the majority of inhabitants, mainly French, was against any such action and also petitioned the Lt. Governor.¹⁸⁴ The Lt. Governor informed the Secretary of State of a decision to use English in the Courts and even issued a proclamation enforcing the use of English.¹⁸⁵ However, it was revoked a few days after.

Breen, a former Official Member of the Legislative Council, arguing for the English elite, explained that the continued use of French was an obstacle to British interests and insistence of French by its users, encouraged anti-British sentiments.¹⁸⁶ Interestingly, after ten years of petitions and postponements, when finally adopted, only two members of the Bar were competent to plead in English before the Courts.¹⁸⁷ Freed slaves spoke a French patois, laced with African derivatives, which was the language of the majority. It was quite clear that any change in the use of French as the official language of the Courts, would be a major disadvantage to the black majority.

Another issue was the guarantee of the right to religious worship. Again, the Imperial Government was obliged to respect the Treaty which permitted the practice of Catholicism.. The Catholic clergy had a powerful role in the colonies serving a quasi-political role of "...sole curator of parish registers under ancient French law."¹⁸⁸ The Clergy was responsible for registering all baptisms, marriages and burials. Until 1838, there were three clergymen on the island. The end of slavery and

¹⁸³ CO 253/46.

¹⁸⁴ CO 253/46, Petition to Lt. Governor, January 18, 1834.

¹⁸⁵ Proclamation of February 22, 1834.

¹⁸⁶ Breen, *St. Lucia*.

¹⁸⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 215.

apprenticeship saw a request for an increase by the inhabitants.¹⁸⁹ Plagued by funding difficulties, the Church proposed that a suitable allocation be made from the general revenue of the colony. After a protracted struggle, it was approved by the Colonial Office in July 1842 on condition that priests receiving salaries should be of British birth.¹⁹⁰ Such a proposal was opposed by the local Protestants, who did not want to be taxed to support the Catholic Clergy and petitioned the Government to that effect.¹⁹¹ In the end, the view of the Colonial Office was implemented.

The only significant change to the political structure of Saint Lucia during 1834-44 was in the relationship with the Imperial Government. Lord Glenelg, citing the recurring disputes and controversies in the colony,, indicated that the colony would now fall under the jurisdiction of the Governor of the Windward Islands located in Barbados.¹⁹² Based on successes in other colonies, he felt that "...the vicinity of a superior authority, personally aloof, and yet near enough for prompt arbitration...effected the suppression of the petty controversies which were formerly so frequent."

Breen noted the benefits from having a controlling power nearby for emergencies and for the avoidance of sending dispatches to the Colonial Office for references of form rather than substance¹⁹³. However, Breen recognized many deficiencies including the delay and loss of time to act on measures as any dispatch for Saint Lucia would go to Barbados for transmission. Proposals of significance inevitably resulted in exchanges between Barbados and Saint Lucia before being sent to the Colonial Office. Finally, in 1839, Lord Genelg further downgraded the level of Imperial representation. In his view to cut the expenditure of the

¹⁸⁹ CO 253/46, Letter to Secretary of State, 15 November 1842.

¹⁹⁰ Breen, *St.Lucia*.

¹⁹¹ CO 253/46, Petition forwarded to Secretary of State.

¹⁹² CO 254/12, Despatch to Colonel Bunberry, 15 February 1838. It appears that this was a result of the dispute between the Chief Justice and respective Governors.

¹⁹³ Breen, *St.Lucia*.

colony on imperial appointees, he stated that the Lt. Governor's role could be performed by the Senior Officer in command of the British Troops.¹⁹⁴

It appeared that the colonial state, as the representative of the Imperial Government, was constantly in conflict with the planter's interest and their representatives. However, there were many occasions when the colonial state became an instrument of the planters as it passed legislation to favor them. In the final analysis the colonial state was not ready to fundamentally change the standing of the local planter elite in favour of the local black majority. Most notable were the occasions when the Colonial Office intervened to direct amendments to legislation that had been passed. A noteworthy example was the previously mentioned attempt to curtail the production of charcoal by apprentices and freed persons that was opposed by the Imperial Government and caused planters to complain bitterly. There were also cases with Justices of the Peace who had their powers progressively reduced. These Justices of the Peace were all local white inhabitants who tended to act in the interest of the planters. There was also the famous case of Ordinance No. 3 of 1835, which provided for the Royal Court to make orders for certain additional privileged supplies to estates in Saint Lucia.¹⁹⁵ The previous legislation allowed the Judges to order supplies for clothing, feeding, and estate hospitals on behalf of apprenticed labourers. The new Ordinance sought to include other estate requirements used by apprentices such as tools and equipment. The Secretary of State, Lord Aberdeen, disallowed the Ordinance because these supplies were the responsibility of the planters.¹⁹⁶ However, the most glaring case was the institution of the Poll Tax on all male inhabitants aged between 16 - 60

¹⁹⁴ CO 254/12, Despatch from Secretary of State, 28 January 1839.

¹⁹⁵ CO 255/2, Ordinance passed 8 February 1835.

¹⁹⁶ CO 254/10, Despatch of 2 April 1835.

years.¹⁹⁷ The Secretary of State disallowed the Ordinance because it was not considerate of those who were able to pay, and those who were not. It was unfair to the apprentices since they were bound by law to give up a certain number of hours and to be paid for more hours at a fixed rate.¹⁹⁸ Instead, it was proposed that the planters pay for their workers. The Council responded by proposing that the planter receive labour in return, and that the payment of the tax by planters be postponed. The Colonial Office also rejected the proposal and directed that the Governor collect the payments.¹⁹⁹

4.4 Conclusion

The above account presents some significant findings towards the general examination of the interplay of external and internal factors in shaping the nature of the state and society in post-colonial societies. In general, the examination showed the role played by the rise of ideas such as free enterprise and the end of slavery, the role of institutions such as the Colonial Office, the Colonial State and the Imperial State, and the importance of material conditions such as the plantation mode of production, the trade patterns and the imperial state and society interests. Significantly, the period examined highlighted the dominance of external factors in establishing the state and society, thus defining the state-societal relationship.

This thesis started with Jackson's reference to the absence of empirical statehood in post-colonial states as the role and place of these societies were examined in their contemporary setting. In response it was argued that a shortcoming with traditional IR theory was a historical approach, which does not account for the origin of state and society. This Chapter showed that the origin of the state and society was rooted in the

¹⁹⁷ CO 255/3, Ordinance No. 3/36 passed 11 May 1836.

¹⁹⁸ Co 254/10, Despatch of 8 April 1835.

¹⁹⁹ CO 254/10, Despatch of 28 August 1835.

process by which the colonies of the New World were incorporated into the British Empire. The establishment of colonies was the result of the expansion of European society, driven by a quest for national supremacy and greater economic opportunities.

These early colonies had rudimentary state structures as long as they were military posts. Society was defined by a similarly loose structure. These structures were dominated by the imperial state, through the military command and imperial society, as English adventurers and financiers were given proprietary rights to establish settled colonies. This was the period of the decimation of the indigenous society and the construction of a new state-societal configuration.

The transformation of these colonies from trading and military outposts into agricultural colonies created the conditions for the emergence of more defined state-societal relations from the looseness of the military outpost configuration. As the production technique changed from tobacco to sugar the social and political framework of the colonies became more defined. Therefore, the society and state were structured to legitimize the existence of the plantation system and the control of trade. Importantly, the virtual disappearance of indigenous people suggests that the resultant state and society were not natural offshoots of the indigenous communities of the colonies, but were extrinsic structures controlled by external forces.

The particulars of the early State in Saint Lucia were externally defined by the acquisition of the colony by Britain from France. The Treaty of Capitulation provided for the preservation of certain French privileges – religion and language – which would have a lasting impact. The State could not replace Catholicism with Protestantism and was even forced to finance the survival of the religion. Similarly, French as a language had to be maintained and English was not named the official language of the island until 1848. This may explain why French 'Kewyol' remained the language of people in rural areas and of the working class.

In both cases - religion and language - the white elite opposed the Colonial State and Imperial State. It was clear in this instance that Imperial State was not always acting to satisfy the demands of the local landed elite class. However, it can be argued that when English was made official, it only served to accentuate the conflict and distinction between the state and society.

The early state in Saint Lucia represented direct control by the Imperial State with Governors ruling by directives and orders in the Legislative Council. Saint Lucia was governed under the Crown Colony System. As there was not an elected element, there was no indigenous source of state power; instead, state power flowed from the imperial state. The state was primarily externally determined and, in reality, was a minimalist state with a preoccupation for law and order. The Plantation State, at it may be called, also functioned to maintain the defense of the colonies to safeguard trade. The state did not have any relation to the majority of the population - the slaves - who were seen as chattel and the responsibility of the planters. Whilst not suggesting the need for participation in state affairs by society, it must be noted that the state existed for two reasons - to maintain the plantation system and the preservation of trade. Nonetheless, the state did show concern with the treatment of the slaves and often in conflict with the planter class. The appointment of a Protector of Slaves was one action of the colonial state, under the instruction of the Imperial State, to avoid abuse of slaves. It is important to note that the Imperial State would take such action as the reports of the Missionaries on life in the colonies often caused indignation in England. This shows that imperial society also played an early and increasingly important role in the evolution of the state and society in the colonies.

Similarly, the nature of the society is linked to the requirements of the plantation system. As a total institution, the plantation was largely autonomous and functioned as a self-contained economic unit. There

was a rigid stratification system on and off the estates, with the majority of the population comprising slaves with no societal rights except minor legal protection. The planter class expected little of the state, except the maintenance of law and order, defense of their trading rights to Britain and upkeep of the colony. In fact, there were frequent disagreements between the State, professional and planter classes over the priorities and actions of the State, especially on issues relating to taxation.

The best expression of the relationship between the state and society was in the laws of the colonies. The laws were primarily concerned with the slave as property, the action of the slaves relating to public order and legal protection for slaves. There was a total neglect of the slave as a person, member of a family or having rights outside the plantation. The slave was property and did not exist outside the plantation. *The aforementioned summed the rationale of the state in relation to society – a preoccupation with securing the framework for a profitable plantation system.* That framework was secured with violence, which encouraged the dismantling of the slave system, as it inspired slave resistance and stimulated the mood for change in the Imperial society. This represented a fundamental contradiction within the plantation society, and produced the conflict that led to emancipation.

The emancipation of the slaves was a transformative act that qualitatively changed the nature of state and society. Emancipation was part of the internationalization of wage labour and the emergence of international norms on the acceptable exercise of authority. These powerful exogenous forces could no longer be contained, and when combined with slave resistance, accelerated the dismantling of the slave system. The Colonial Office played a significant role in ensuring that the provisions of the Emancipation Act were implemented through directives to the Colonial State. However, the planter class was opposed to a free labour system, and eventually accepted a 'compensated' arrangement. Emancipation was the seminal point in the evolution of the state and

society. The establishment of wage labour heralded more defined capitalistic relations between state and society. Therefore, the form and rationale of the state had to be adjusted to meet the requirements of the new configuration. Likewise, a new society was created which included freed persons with rights as individuals who were no longer to be seen as property.

The freeing of the slaves established a new society, but not necessarily what was expected of a free society. The amelioration of the conditions or aspirations of the slaves never seemed to be the focus, as they were seen simply as a labour force, whilst the freed persons had their own pretensions on shaping the society. According to Crafton,

for ordinary slaves freedom meant being free to be small farmers, working for the plantations, if at all, only for wages and on their own terms. They wanted to live in family units, to have ready access to land of their own, and to be free to develop their own culture, particularly their own syncretised religion.²⁰⁰

However, society remained subservient to the state, both colonial and imperial. The Imperial State continued to serve as a mediator between the Colonial State and majority of society, especially as the colonial state moved from its incipience to assuming broader functions and responsibilities. The society was dominated by the small planter elite who were also present in the legislature by virtue of property ownership.

The post-emancipation colonial state is seen to expand its functions to facilitate the transition to a free labour system. This defined the nature of the state-societal relationship. The state extended its coercive activities especially in rural and plantation areas, its judicial activities increased with more legislation and for the first time the state became concerned with social issues. The social activities of the state were a qualitative change in its character and reflected the concerns of imperial state and society for the construction of a more humane post-

²⁰⁰ Crafton, *Empire*, p. 301.

emancipation society. That sentiment was in keeping with the emerging norms in Europe, which decried the slave trade and the brutal treatment of slaves. On the other hand, the local planter class showed little concern for the treatment and welfare of the freed persons. Instead, there was a preoccupation with securing a labour force at the cheapest cost and ensuring that freed persons did not enjoy any disruption in social norms which could threaten the status quo. However, the colonial state remained firmly rooted in its imperial function by securing the imperial interests whether it was the continuation of sugar production, protected Crown Lands, ensured law and order, facilitated trade and safeguarded the strategic role of the colonies.

Accordingly, the post-emancipation colonial state increasingly became the venue for an intense struggle to define the contours of a new relationship. The pre-emancipation state was minimalist and, with the exception of the planter class participation in the Legislature and keeping law and order, had little relations with the majority of society. The new configuration produced a number of conflicts which shaped that new relationship between state and society. Firstly, there was a struggle between the elite planter class and a new agrarian class which challenged the planter's dominance in the agricultural sector. That class also threatened the long-term survival of the plantations by diverting available labour. Planters were forced into the metayage system as a compromise to ensure the availability of labour and restrict the emergence of an independent black landowning class. The state was often seen by the planters as the mechanism to manage the conflict to their satisfaction.

Secondly, there was a struggle between the elite – planter and large commercial interests - and an emerging middle class of professionals and small businesspersons and an urban working class. This struggle was essentially about the emergence of a new economic configuration against an old order centred on the needs and the practices of the plantation

economy. Professionals and small businesspersons increasingly looked to the state to facilitate their expansion, opposing attempts to increase taxes and regulate their emergence. They were also becoming more politically ambitious, opposing the nominated members being selected from the planter class. The black urban working class – porters, seamen, traders, etc – were seen as undermining the plantation labour force and was subjected to rigid control by the state. The emergence of the black working class in urban areas ignited other issues within society, specifically, their social and economic conditions.

Thirdly, there was a struggle between the imperial interests and the elite. This struggle was centered on the planter class intent on securing all the privileges of the slavery period and demanding greater control of the state apparatus. In effect, the state was seen as the viable political instrument to ensure the status quo. In many cases, the colonial state acted in opposition to the planter class in pursuance of imperial directives. The reluctance by the imperial state to give greater control to the local elite may have provided the freed persons and professional middle class with more space to influence social, political and economic development. Although, the majority of society – the freed persons – remained outside the political process and were alienated by the state as these persons did not see the state to be exercising authority on its behalf or in its interest. Their distrust was not aimed at the imperial state, but the colonial state which they saw as representing planter interests.

The state-societal relationship of the post-emancipation period in Saint Lucia showed a gross failure of the Imperial Government to focus on shaping a new society that regarded the freed person as a worthy subject, with the same rights and privileges as English subjects. Nor was the Imperial Government concerned with the social and economic advancement of persons who had been subjected to almost three hundred years of degradation. Whereas the imperial state was concerned

about the inhumane treatment of freed persons, the evidence of the laws passed showed a preoccupation with establishing control of the freed persons as a labour force, while safeguarding the privileges of the planter class. In many instances, the imperial state had to intervene to override the colonial legislature. In the process, the abysmal social and economic conditions of the freed population were not addressed, leading to intense conflict which demanded imperial involvement. Yet, whenever the Imperial Government intervened, it was to maintain the notion of a civilized colonizer in the context of a humanitarian minded British public and to safeguard imperial interests, defined by international prestige rather than value of trade. The fundamental disjuncture between an infant state structure and a destitute society with high expectations was not addressed. The notion of developing empirical statehood was not an issue giving rise to conflict and the transformational period in the evolution of the state-societal relationship.

5

State and Society: From Crisis of Colonial Rule to Political Enfranchisement

The last Chapter examined the role and position of West Indian colonies in the wider colonial setting, paying particular attention to the development of state-societal relations. It demonstrated that state and society originated from colonialism. For two hundred years, as the sugar industry grew and prospered, the colonies became the jewels of the British Empire. A large part of British commercial wealth came from the "...dominance of the slave trade and exploitation of the sugar plantation of the West Indies."¹ During this period, colonies were so valuable, imperial powers were prepared to go to war to secure their interests, and acquire new territories.. However, domestic changes, in Britain, in the colonies, and international obligations forced a rethinking of colonial policy and demanded a new approach to administering the colonies. The earlier account of the post-emancipation period showed that as prosperity diminished, so did interest. As the great age of imperialism in Asia and Africa took root, the Caribbean became a 'neglected estate'.² Other areas of colonial endeavour became more important. Interest now centred on ensuring that the colonial legislatures did not compromise the imperial interests of Britain. In 1865, Crown Colony governments were imposed on all British West Indian colonies, with the exception of

¹S.R. Ashton and David Killingray, eds. *The West Indies*, Series B vol.6 of *British Documents on the End of Empire*, (London; The Stationary Office, 1999), p. xl.

² W.D. McIntyre, *Colonies into Commonwealth* (London; Blandford Press, 1966).

Barbados and British Guiana. The state of the colonies would lead Joseph Chamberlain to describe them as the 'Empire darkest slum'.³

The second transformative period will be analyzed to show how the international framework for colonial rule began to change and coupled with the evolving political and social doctrines in Britain forced changes in imperial policy. The impact of imperial policy was accentuated by the debilitating social, economic and political situation in the colonies which generated new social forces that transformed colonial rule. This transformation created a new state-societal configuration.

The period was characterized by a challenge to the existing state-societal configuration which was described as the crisis of colonial rule in the West Indian colonies. The challenge to colonial rule, both external and internal, culminated in widespread riots and social unrest which undermined the stability of colonial rule. The imperial state reacted by examining the domestic causes of the social unrest and formulated a comprehensive remedial programme to remedy the deficiencies of colonial rule. The conflicting and complementary interaction between the imperial response and the domestic reaction gave rise to a new state-societal relationship characterized by the political empowerment of society.

Like the previous, this chapter has three sections. The first section will examine the nature of the colonial state-societal relationship in the period leading to the 1930s and will highlight the dominance of exogenous factors although showing an increasing role for domestic social forces in that period. The second section will examine the occurrence of the transformative event – the labour unrest – highlighting the role of both external and internal influences. The third section demonstrates how external and internal forces responded to the transformative event, and the consequent state-societal relations.

³ Ashton, *West Indies*.

5.1 State-Societal relations leading to the Labour Unrest

After World War I, the colonies were placed high on the agenda of the imperial state, not for their prosperity, but for their poverty, and the inevitable consequences of the contradictions inherent in the structure of the societies. It was a view held that “[t]he British genius for colonization is an article of faith.”⁴ Yet, the condition of the West Indies, the oldest tropical colonies and for almost two centuries the most profitable was a shame on the colonial conscience. The colonies had become the ‘pocket paupers of empire’.

It was claimed that imperial responsibility was guided by notions of trusteeship and the strategic advantage of possessing colonies in the global arena. Therefore, colonial policy was informed by two general considerations – that Britain had a moral and humanitarian responsibility to ensure the progress of colonies, and that colonies should contribute to British strength and prosperity.⁵ It was assumed that these considerations were reconcilable, and often achieved through colonial policy. By the 1930’s, the twin principles of colonial policy no longer seemed in harmony in most parts of the British Empire. In the case of the West Indies, there seemed little hope for colonies that were overly dependent on sugar produced at a cost higher than market price and had dismal social provisions in education, health and housing.

There was no prosperity for the population, both coloured and European. There is little evidence to show that the colonies, at this stage, were still prime value as markets for exports, or as a source of cheap raw material. The colonies were largely underdeveloped, and the majority of the population, the freed coloureds, pointed to colonial control as the

⁴ W.M Macmillan, *Warning from the West Indies* (Faber and Faber Limited; London, 1936), p. 13.

⁵ A.N. Porter and A.J Stockwell, *British Imperial Policy and Decolonisation 1938-64, Vol. 1* (Macmillan Press; London, 1987).

cause of their deprivation and destitution. If after three hundred years of colonial rule the socio-economic conditions were so dreadful, then the colonial system had to be overthrown.

Colonial policy was in crisis, and could not serve either of the twin pillars. That crisis would expose the contradictions of colonial society and undermine the colonial order. The colonial state, though an extension of the imperial state, also functioned to safeguard the interest of the planter and commercial elite. The last chapter highlighted that though not present the control of these interests was achieved 'absentee proprietorship'. However, the colonial state was always ready to confront the privileged classes to ensure that the majority of the population was not agitated to the point of rebelling against the colonial order. However, that colonial crisis was so overwhelming that it led to the transformational events of the 1930's and the consequent attempt to reform colonialism.

5.1.1 Imperial International Relations and the implications for Colonial Policy

For over three centuries, Britain had stood dominant in international affairs because of her possession of colonies for trade and resources, and her naval supremacy, which established the framework for imperial policies. The end of slavery, examined in Chapter 4, was highly motivated by changes in ideas which prevailed in imperial society and consequently changed the general attitude to the importance of colonies in the West Indies. The doctrine of free trade had played a significant role in influencing the end of slavery and shaped colonial policy into the twentieth century. It was Smith's view that restrictions on colonial industry violated the most sacred rights of mankind, and capital which was spent on the colonial trade could be better invested

elsewhere.⁶ The conflict brought about by this economic doctrine was reflected in the struggle between the rising middle class that favoured the expansion of commerce and the aristocracy that favoured colonial protectionism.⁷

That view of economic policy influenced a group of reformers who felt that freedoms should extend beyond commerce to the political sphere. For these reformers, the doctrine was that colonial freedom and self-government were compatible with being part of the Empire. Interestingly, during this period, the Colonial Reformers were arguing for the rights and freedom of the white settler colonies, whilst the humanitarian movement was arguing for trusteeship for the coloured races.⁸

An alternative view of colonial policy later emerged which called for empire unity and consolidation. This new thinking was supported by the Disraeli leadership at the end of the nineteenth century.⁹ However, the attempts at consolidating the British Empire failed, and the self-governing white colonies were officially named as Dominions in 1907, to distinguish them from the Crown Colonies and India.¹⁰

The Dominions were white dominated colonies, except South Africa, in temperate areas and sparsely populated where settlers established permanent homes. In the case of the West Indies, the colonies were small islands and were never truly settled as permanent homes for whites, but served the purposes of trade and military strategy. The persistence of planter absenteeism highlights that observation. When enough money was made or hard times were faced, most whites returned to the

⁶ Adam Smith, *An Inquiry into the nature and causes of the Wealth of Nations* (G. Bill and Sons, Ltd.; London, 1921).

⁷ Rita Hinden, *Empire and After* (London; Essential Books Ltd., 1949).

⁸ Ibid. The humanitarian movement was inspired by the French Revolution and as illustrated in the last chapter played a significant role in the abolition of the slave trade and the emancipation of slaves.

⁹ Disraeli speech in 1870 called the Crystal Palace speech is thought to mark the beginning of a new imperialist era in the Empire.

¹⁰ William McIntyre, *Colonies into Commonwealth* (London; Blandford Press; 1966).

metropolitan capitals until times were more favourable. The majority class of non-whites was never seen as capable of ruling themselves, a perception that influenced the colonial relationship with the non-white colonies. Such a prevailing doctrine was also reflected in the intellectual writings of the time. John Stuart Mill who had worked in the East India Company argued that the populations of the dependencies were not sufficiently advanced to be granted representative government and suggested that a "...vigorous despotism is in itself the best mode of government for training the people in what is specifically wanting to render them capable of a higher civilization."¹¹

The end of the nineteenth century and the early twentieth century introduced significant changes in the practice of colonial rule by colonial powers through the adoption of international conventions to standardize colonial administration. Of note are The Berlin Act of 1885, The Brussels Act of 1890 and the Covenant of the League of Nations. These Conventions provided general principles for colonial administration and sought to set limits on the exploitation of subject populations. The League of Nations, through its mandates system also sought to ensure equality for all sovereign states to share in the advantages of having colonies.

It was easier for international agreement on some issues such as suppressing the slave trade, prohibiting forced labour, control of traffic of arms and liquor, and the provision of essential public works and services.¹² However issues of administrative policies, attitudes towards racial and language problems, commercial policies and colonial finance were highly contentious. Labour issues became one of the most persistent forms of external pressure on the imperial state. Britain became a member of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) as part

¹¹ J.S. Mill, *Considerations on Representative Government* (London; Longmans, Green, and Co, 1872).

¹² Royal Institute for International Affairs, *The Colonial Problem* (London; Oxford University Press, 1937).

of the structure of the League of Nations and was required to apply minimum standards regarding labour in its colonies.¹³ The reaction of the imperial state was to resist all requests by the ILO for information, thus rejecting their call for the same regulations on labour to be applied to all colonies.¹⁴ However, the persistent pressure from the ILO forced the Colonial Office to take a tougher stance towards colonial governors who showed reluctance to promote labour legislation. It is clear that this was the beginning of the international framework undermining the colonial order, which strengthened local demands for better conditions and pay for workers.

Within the British political arena, colonial policy was supposed to be insulated from the ideological difference of party politics and was "...an expression of the undivided national will."¹⁵ Therefore, whilst there were minor changes in legislative composition and administrative arrangements for the colonies, there were no structural changes to the colonial relationship with the West Indian colonies. There was no consideration of ending the colonial relationship. Instead, by the early twentieth century, colonial policy was now guided by two imperatives. Firstly, the focus of the Imperial State was on the 'scramble for Africa', and the rise of Asia as the new source of trade and wealth. Secondly, it was thought that the coloured majority was not capable of governing themselves.¹⁶

The emergence of the British Labour Party provided a new doctrine for influencing imperial policy towards the colonies. The philosophy of the Party was guided by two schools of thought – humanitarian thinking

¹³ Porter and Stockwell, *British Imperial Policy*. The ILO established a committee of experts on native labour in 1924.

¹⁴ CO 323/941, Minute by Mr Ormsby to Sir S. Wilson, 24 August 1925.

¹⁵ W.M. Macmillan, *The Road to Self-rule. A Study in Colonial Evolution* (London; Faber, 1959), p. 253.

¹⁶ Described by C.L.R. James as the 'myth' which governed British thinking on the colonies. Therefore, independence had to be given in stages according to the preparedness of colonial peoples for it. C.L.R. James, *Nkrumah and the Ghana Revolution* (London; Allison & Busby, 1977).

and a radical internationalist dislike for imperialism.¹⁷ This led the Labour Party to take a strong position on self-determination and the protection of the rights of native people from exploitation.¹⁸ This is in comparison to the two trends within the Conservative Party of a prideful imperialist tradition, coupled with a belief in the viability of the Empire and a more moderate realistic belief of the inevitability of decolonization.¹⁹ Both Conservative trends saw the party as the 'party of empire'.

The end of World War I initiated a domestic crisis in the colonies as many colonial people from the West Indies who joined the British armed forces became sensitized to new ideas on race equality and democracy.²⁰ That sensitization, aided by new forms of communications through film and radio, and the spread of education and growing nationalism in Europe, served as an inspiration for the emerging middle class in the West Indies. The knowledge attained by these people ignited the spark for greater participation in government and for responsibility for law making.

The post-World War I period also witnessed the emergence of the Mandates System as the mechanism for the administration of colonies that "...have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States which formerly governed them and which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves..."²¹ Though only a few colonies were under the Mandates System, what was important was that the standards of administration became the international norm for judging colonial practice.²² Public opinion, which began to demand stringent accountability in colonial practice, led to an approach by colonial

¹⁷ Hinden, *Empire*.

¹⁸ As reflected in the two major documents on the colonial issue – *The Empire in Africa: Labour's Policy (1926)* and *Labour and the Nation (1928)*.

¹⁹ David Goldsworthy, *Colonial Issues in British Politics* (Oxford; Clarendon Press, 1951).

²⁰ The Imperial state was faced with unrest and insurrection in Ireland, India, the Near and Middle East. In the West Indies, there were increasing demands for self-government and greater economic assistance.

²¹ Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

²² Hinden, *Empire*.

administrations characterized by 'sins of omission rather than of commission'.²³

Incidentally, at the same time that the British Government was under pressure from the ILO to extend its labour legislation to the colonies, the Colonial Office was becoming concerned that the Labour Party would be increasing its questioning in Parliament on labour conditions in the colonies.²⁴ After attending the First British Guiana and West Indies Labour Conference, F.O. Roberts recommended that the Labour Party select a group of members to study West Indian issues in order to have an advantage in discussions with the Colonial Office and in Parliamentary debates and questions.²⁵ The Labour Government of 1929-31 attempted the first series of guidelines on labour issues for the colonies, and was responsible for advocating the end to penal sanctions in labour contracts and for the recognition of trade unions.²⁶

By the 1930's, it was being suggested within the League of Nations that as part of universalizing policies towards colonies, all colonial powers should abandon their exclusive rights to colonial areas and incorporate them under the Mandates Systems.²⁷ In response, British Prime Minister Baldwin explained that the dependencies would not welcome mandate status, as they were proud of their British subject status and wanted to remain part of the British Empire.²⁸ However, by then the international mood for the administration of colonies had changed, making the maintenance of colonies a vital economic consideration.

²³ Sins of commissions rather than sins of omission meant that colonial powers preferred to be accused of inadequate action rather than instigating wrongful acts against colonial people.

²⁴ CO 323/941. Minute by Mr Ormsby-Gore to Sir S. Wilson 24 August 1925.

²⁵ Neal R. Malmsten, "The British Labour Party and the West Indies," *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, 5, no.2, (1977). F.O Roberts was the representative of the British Labour Party and Trade Union Congress.

²⁶ Porter and Stockwell, *British Imperial Policy*.

²⁷ Royal Institute, *Colonial Problem*.

²⁸ Ibid.

5.1.2 The Impact of Imperial Economic Policy on the Colonies

Beyond the framework of international relations, imperial economic policy was instrumental in determining colonial policy. The basic economic activity of the colonial system – preferential trade – gave way in the early twentieth century to an open-door policy of trade within the British Empire.²⁹ However, the West Indian colonies were allowed to establish a preferential trading regime with Canada from 1913, to compensate for the decline in the American market, due to the Americans annexing Puerto Rico, and the granting of preferences to Cuba and the Philippines.³⁰ Trade with Canada became a major component of economic activity for the West Indian colonies and it is instructive that by 1927, Canada was now the leading trading partner with the West Indies with sugar obtaining 4s. 8d in the Canadian market compared to 3s. 8d in the British market.³¹ The United States market was also emerging as an important market for agricultural export and as a source of tourists. This represented the shifting of emphasis from Britain as the dominant trading partner, to the incorporation of other markets. However, by 1932, through the Ottawa Agreement, imperial preference was restored as the dominant economic trading practice.

The economic relationship between colonies and colonial powers in the early twentieth century expanded to include the financing of investment in the colonies. The early period of colonial development did not require significant financing except to meet the cost of establishing settlements and providing supplies. However, the later mechanization of production and the expansion of economic activities, including building infrastructure, attracted private and public investors. In this regard, the Colonial Development Fund was created “...for the purpose of aiding and developing agriculture and industry in certain colonies and protected and

²⁹ F.V Meyer, *British Colonies in World Trade* (London; Oxford University Press, 1948).

³⁰ Ken Post, *Strike the Iron*, Vol.1 (New Jersey; Humanities Press, 1981).

³¹ H.V. Wiseman, *A Short History of the British West Indies* (London; University of London Press, 1950).

mandated territories, and thereby promoting commerce with or industry in the United Kingdom.”³²

In the case of the West Indian colonies, the greatest investment was in roads, bridges, railways, administrative buildings and public works. Thus, the economic role of the colonial state up to the 1930’s was restricted to the supply of essential services.³³ More so, it was funded from the revenues of the colonies, or raised through loans on the London money market at high interest rates.³⁴ The level of external investment from 1900 to 1933 was the lowest in the British West Indies, when compared to other regions.³⁵ Imperial assistance was restricted to the Colonial Loans Act, 1899 and the Colonial Stock Act, 1900 to attract investment, which was limited due to the high repayment cost. In fact, the Colonial Office did not establish the appropriate machinery and expertise to promote economic and industrial development in the colonies until 1934, when the Economic Department was created. This reflected the persistent differences between the Colonial Office and the Treasury on approaches to economic development in the colonies.³⁶ The Colonial Office seemed to favour the need for a significant fund that could be used to finance long-term development projects. The Treasury was firmly opposed to such a view and preferred investment that could contribute to relieving unemployment in Britain in the short-term.³⁷

The severity of unemployment in Britain after World War I led to increasing support for colonial development as a means of relieving unemployment. This led to the use of emigration, through the Empire Settlement Act, to encourage settlement overseas and the reciprocal

³² *Colonial Development. Memorandum Explaining Financial Resolution, 1929.* (Cmd. 3357).

³³ Royal Institute, *Colonial Problem.*

³⁴ Hinden, *Empire.*

³⁵ Royal Institute, *Colonial Problem.* British West Indies was £17,515,000, British Africa was £334,180,000; British East(Malaya and Ceylon) was £127,884,000.

³⁶ S.R. Ashton and S.E. Stockwell, eds. *Imperial Policy and Colonial Practice 1925-1945* (London; HMSO, 1996).

³⁷ CO 323/1016/8, T. Jones to Sir Grindle, 12 October 1928.

trading preferences to promote imperial products. In addition, the Imperial Government was asked to provide more loans and grants to colonies to facilitate the purchase of imperial products.³⁸ The increase in production "...would benefit the colony, develop markets for British goods, and enhance the purchasing power of individual inhabitants in the Colonies, with future benefits to British trade."³⁹

As unemployment deepened in the late 1920's, colonial economic development was increasingly seen as a solution, despite the objections of the Treasury. The passing of the Colonial Development Bill in 1929 provided for the establishment of the Colonial Development Fund, to be administered by the Colonial Development Advisory Committee (CADAC), was seen as a tool to promote colonial economic development, and to relieve unemployment in Britain. Therefore, projects and schemes must not encourage competition, or promote industrialization. According to Lord Amery,

the colonies are essentially agricultural and producers of primary commodities. It is not very probable, or indeed, very desirable in the interests of the populations themselves, that industrial development should be unduly accelerated in their case.⁴⁰

In consequence, the economic condition of the West Indian colonies in the period leading to the unrest of the 1930's is best captured by the famous observation of Professor Macmillan that, "[a] social and economic study of the West Indies is ... necessarily a study of poverty."⁴¹ The period during which the colonies brought huge profits and thus prestige and glory was over. The decline that began before Emancipation accelerated with the emergence of free trade and the loss of privileges within the British market. The post-war boom experienced by the

³⁸ Michael Havinden and David Meredith, *Colonialism and Development* (Routledge; London, 1993).

³⁹ Winston Churchill quoted in *Ibid.* p. 141.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.* p.169-70.

⁴¹ Macmillan, *West Indies*, p. 37.

colonies collapsed by the mid-1920's as wartime inflation, excessive reliance on sugar and a decaying social and economic system took its toll. The price of sugar declined from 60s per cwt in 1919 to 30s in 1923 and 5s. 3d in 1935.⁴² There were similar drops in the prices of cotton, fruits, coffee and tobacco. The international crisis of the early 1930's would aggravate the dire situation with disastrous consequences. Unemployment and low wages prevailed everywhere whilst migration from rural areas to towns intensified. The colonial state was in crisis, as the prices of exports collapsed and brought greater pressure on the imperial state to meet increasing expenditure.

In Saint Lucia, as was the case in other colonies, the basic problem was the very low price received for agricultural exports, resulting in curtailment of employment, which affected the working class most.⁴³ According to Palmer, "...prices have fallen, freights costs have risen, cost of imported goods has increased, and consequently the circulation of money amongst the labouring classes has diminished."⁴⁴ The 1930's brought about a severe decline in the coaling services at Port Castries. Hundreds of persons were made unemployed, as ships moved from coal to other forms of fuel, and other ports became more competitive. One such port was St.Thomas which was made a duty-free port by the Americans. Sugar was also in rapid decline, while agricultural production was only aided by the growth of the banana industry. As was the practice in previous decades, the colonial state resorted to revenue generation through increased taxation, a practice that brought greater hardship for the poorer classes.

The economic decline of Saint Lucia was worsened by population growth, occasioned by natural increase and loss of migration opportunities to Panama, Cuba and the United States. Migration had

⁴² Wiseman, *Short History*.

⁴³ CO 950/405, Memo of Labour Commissioner, Hon. George Palmer to Moyne Commission. Undated.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.* p. 2.

served as a significant safety valve by reducing pressure for employment, for land to be available and by providing sources of remittances for destitute families in the colonies. The economic decline aggravated social deprivation and became the basis for a political challenge to the colonial state by domestic society.

5.1.3 Political challenge and the failure of Colonial Policy

In the early twentieth century, challenges to the state came from coloured, colonial middle class people, who demanded greater legislative representation. Prior to 1918, trade unions were illegal in the West Indian colonies. This was based on laws formulated in the state-societal configuration of the post-emancipation period to prevent freed men from uniting to demand better wages.⁴⁵ By the 1930's, the political situation was beginning to be dominated by the intense agitation of the coloured working class majority for improved working conditions and the professional middle class for political enfranchisement and control of the colonial state.

The Imperial State claimed the need for political control of the society, through Crown Colony government (CCG), for three reasons – to establish efficient administration, to provide impartial government between competing classes and to protect the blacks from the whites and from themselves.⁴⁶ However, the rationale for continuing with CCG was clear to the Imperial State. The Assemblies, which were white oligarchies, were incompetent and could not ensure stable government, was seen as an embarrassment to the imperial state.⁴⁷ Secondly, the possibility of coloured persons attaining the property rights to be able to vote meant

⁴⁵ Richard Hart, *Origin and Development of the working class in the English-speaking Caribbean 1897-1937* in Malcolm Cross and Gad Henman, eds. *Labour in the Caribbean. From Emancipation to Independence* (London; Macmillan Publishers Ltd., 1988).

⁴⁶ Roy Augier, 'Before and After 1865'. *New World Quarterly*, Vol.2, No.2, 1966.

⁴⁷ Morley Ayearst, *The British West Indies. The Search for Self-Government* (London; George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1960).

that the black majority could assume political control. Undoubtedly, the latter realization convinced the Assemblies and the local planter class to keep the CCG. According to Hart, the white planter had been persuaded that, "...the British Government would offer greater protection for their property and privileges than they could provide for themselves."⁴⁸

Crown Colony Government was popular because it was amenable to public opinion in Britain which was more enlightened than the West Indian legislatures which were noted for their reactionary tendencies.⁴⁹ Public opinion was desirous of greater imperial control to resist what many saw as planter abuse. However, the power wielders were not accountable to the people they served, but to a distant imperial state. As all administrative posts were reserved for Englishmen, West Indians were not given any political responsibility and CCG represented the strengthening of imperial rule in the region.⁵⁰ The structure and rationale for CCG was the basis for the numerous conflicts between the white oligarchy and the imperial state on the distribution of political power.

The case of Saint Lucia is illustrative. The island was formally incorporated into the Windward Island Federation in 1873, though it appeared mainly for administrative reasons and for savings on imperial expenditure. Unlike the Leeward Islands Federation, each island in the Windward Islands maintained their legislature and government. There was one Governor, resident in Grenada, and an administrator for each island. Only the planter class had a voice in the nominated Legislature, as a minority, and had what could be described as "...some degree of representation without a corresponding degree of responsibility."⁵¹ The

⁴⁸ Richard Hart, *From Occupation to Independence* (Jamaica; Canoe Press University of the West Indies, 1998), p. 84.

⁴⁹ Elizabeth Wallace, *The British Caribbean. From the Decline of Colonialism to the end of Federation* (Toronto; University of Toronto Press, 1977).

⁵⁰ Denis Benn, *Ideology and Political Development* (Mona; ISER, 1987)

⁵¹ Royal Institute, *Colonial Problem*, p. 238.

Durham Report had recognized a serious deficiency in such an imperial policy, as it allowed persons - the planters - who had no chance to accept responsibility for government to act as an opposition in championing causes that challenged the colonial state, and to advocate positions that they would never have to pursue as a government.⁵² As a result, the history of the legislature was one of constant conflicts between the Executive and the non-official members, as the planters sought to defend their interest, and resist any attempt to give power or privilege to the working and middle classes.

The emergence of local political agitation was part of a regional movement for representative government. The efforts intensified after it was agreed that Grenada, would receive a measure of representation through a partially elected Legislative Council.⁵³ The St.Lucia Representative Government Association was formally established in 1921, after an initial attempt in 1919. The Governor explained that the first attempt did not excite a sufficient number of people, and faltered, until the decision to grant Grenada constitutional change motivated a revival.⁵⁴ The Association was essentially middle and professional class controlled, with its actions focused on political advancement. After numerous meetings, the Association petitioned the Secretary of State, requesting a Legislative Council of a majority of elected members, and an Executive Council made up equally of elected and nominated members, presided over by the Governor.⁵⁵

It is interesting to note that among the reasons given for such a request, was that the system of selecting advisers to the Government was

⁵² Durham Report, quoted in Ibid.

⁵³ CO 321/317, Memorandum of Administrator to Secretary of State, 1 August, 1921. Grenada's proposal was accepted because it was felt that there it already had a number of elected municipal bodies and the peasantry as an electorate was not revolutionary.

⁵⁴ CO 321/317, Confidential Despatch from Administrator to Governor of the Windward Islands, 16 June, 1921.

⁵⁵ CO 321/317, Petition to the Secretary of State from St.Lucia Representative Association, 11 June 11, 1921.

no longer tolerable in civilized communities, and that in the neighbouring French, Dutch and American colonies at least partially elected legislatures were in place.⁵⁶ The members also noted that the public had an indifferent attitude, almost approaching contempt for the unofficial nominated members who are not representative. These members were not seen as being accountable to the Governor, who selected them, or to the taxpayers on whose behalf they acted.

The petition, which was opposed by the Administrator and Governor, highlighted the nature of the relationship between colonial state and society.⁵⁷ Firstly, they claimed that Saint Lucia was unsuited to such reform, since it had not had sufficient experience with representative institutions. Secondly, it was not possible to find an adequate number of well-known persons for elections. Thirdly, the level of illiteracy was so high that most persons did not understand what representative government meant whilst those with education and property did not want it. Fourthly, the petition was a minority view with 2.25% of the population, of which 20% were women of the servant class.⁵⁸ Finally, some of the persons involved were of French descent, so were not viewed as loyal subjects.

After a period of intense agitation by the Representative Association, the Secretary of State informed the Association that the Rt. Honourable Wood, who would be undertaking a tour of West Indian colonies, would deal with the issues, as part of changes to all the colonies. In his Report, Wood first noted that there was no call for 'responsible government' and even if it was requested, it could not be granted. Instead, Wood identified a call for 'elective representation' which was motivated by the effects of the War in spreading democratic sentiments, the return of learned professionals and others from abroad

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ CO 321/317, Confidential Memo from Administrator to Governor, 16 June, 1921.

⁵⁸ The Association explained that they left out all government employees and all persons who signed with an 'X' and they had the support of persons from all sectors.

with a broader view of life, the history of representative institutions present in the colonies, and the fact that the United States had bestowed representative institutions to Cuba and the Philippines.⁵⁹ Wood outlined that the intention of reform in the West Indies was to ensure "...on the one hand that control of the Secretary of State must continue in effective form and on the other that the movement towards elective representation must be met."⁶⁰ Two stages were outlined towards that objective - the reduction of the majority of nominated unofficial members by bringing in some elected unofficial members, and then the shift from a majority of official members to a majority of elected and nominated unofficial members.⁶¹ In the second stage, there would be local autonomy, but in cases declared to be 'essential to the good government of the colonies' the Secretary of State would be allowed to confirm or disallow.

Every effort was made by the colonial state, influenced by the planter and commercial class, to stifle the move to representative government. The Administrator, clear in the view that the society was not ready for elective government, argued that "...the introduction into the Legislative Council of an elective element (even a minority) would be dangerous to the best interests of the colony no matter how representative the demand for it..."⁶² Even when concessions were made by the imperial state in order to award some form of representation, the class nature of the political struggle was exposed. In that instance, a Committee established to make proposals to the Secretary of State on granting a measure of representative government, agreed unanimously,

⁵⁹ *Wood Report*.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.* p. 8.

⁶¹ 'Official members' were imperial representatives and 'unofficial members' were the local representatives.

⁶² CO 321/317, Despatch from Administrator to Secretary of State, 1 August, 1921.

that the qualifications to be an elector were too low in Grenada, and should be raised considerably in the case of Saint Lucia.⁶³

The eventual modification to the Crown Colony system in Saint Lucia meant that the Legislative Council now comprised five official members, the Governor, when present in the colony, the Administrator, three unofficial nominated members and three unofficial elected members.⁶⁴ The right to be elected and to vote was dependent on clear property ownership and income earning capacity. The Legislature was modified again in 1931, to comprise three ex-officio members, three nominated officials, three nominated officials and three elected unofficial members.⁶⁵ After the first stage of worker unrest, the Legislative Council was further changed to consist of the Governor, three ex-officio members (the Administrator, Attorney-General and Treasurer), three nominated members and five elected members.⁶⁶

It was clear that the changes were not radical, but consistent with the notion that the coloured majority was not capable of making the right choices on representation and was not suitable to be elected. It also ensured that political power was only given to the propertied class. Most importantly, the changes sought to achieve the objective "...to preserve unimpaired the ultimate control of the Secretary of State."⁶⁷

The failure of colonial policy was most telling in the social and economic conditions of the majority of the population. It was clear that the initial opposition to Imperial rule was driven by the white population. It was borne of the belief that as Englishmen, they too had a right to be elected and to elect their representatives. The inclusion of the coloured population was a strategic move to demonstrate wider support than there

⁶³ CO 321/321, Despatch of Governor to Secretary of State, September 7th, 1922. The Committee included persons from the Legislative Council and the St.Lucia Representative Government Association.

⁶⁴ St.Lucia (Legislative Council) Order in Council, 1924.

⁶⁵ Colonial Report, 1933.

⁶⁶ Colonial Report, 1936.

⁶⁷ Wood Report, p. 9.

really was. The Representative Government Association made it clear to Wood that they did not have any grievances, but that their agitation was motivated "...on the ground that those who were taxed should have some voice in the selection of persons who were called upon to tax them."⁶⁸

For the coloured majority, the failure of colonial rule was not manifested in political development, but in the absence of the basic requirements for civilized living. Lewis noted that though wages and cost of living varied from island to island, the levels were so low, that subsistence was at an appalling standard.⁶⁹ In Saint Lucia, male agricultural workers received 1/- to 1/6 per 9-hour day, sugar factory workers received 2/- to 2/6 per 12-hour day, while domestic females received 9/- to £1 per 56-70 - hour month.⁷⁰ The consequence was evident "...in the ragged clothing, dilapidated housing, and undernourished condition of the masses and their children."⁷¹ In addition, the colony suffered from chronic unemployment with over 8,000 unemployed persons.⁷² The unemployed lived off their gardens and in the off-season fed on imported foodstuff. Palmer indicated that he did not know how the unemployed got money to purchase essentials and "...lives at the mercy of providence."⁷³

The dilapidated housing was endemic to the colonies and outside the estates there was a marked absence of any planned settlements. The Colonial Engineer in Saint Lucia drew to the attention of the Moyne Commission, the critical problem of slums that arose because of the lack of planning of Negro settlements.⁷⁴ Rental of property was too expensive

⁶⁸ Ibid. 20.

⁶⁹ Arthur Lewis, *Labour in the West Indies: The Birth of a Workers Movement* (London; New Beacon Books, 1977).

⁷⁰ Saint Lucia Blue Book 1935.

⁷¹ Lewis, *Labour*, p. 15.

⁷² CO 950/405, Memo of Labour Commissioner, Hon. George Palmer to Moyne Commission.

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ CO 950/402, Memo of Colonial Engineer, Mr. Wright North to Moyne Commission.

for labourers, so they built shacks instead.⁷⁵ It was remarkable that, up until the 1930's, almost a hundred years after slavery ended, there had not been any housing programmes to accommodate the thousands of coloured people who were now free. There were no sewers and the state of waste disposal was deplorable. There was little consideration for the quality of water which was made available. The situation became so dire, that an appeal had to be made to the Imperial Government to provide small sums to homeowners to improve the quality of water by shifting from drinking from polluted rivers to saving rain water in tanks.⁷⁶

Given the low wages and high unemployment, especially seasonal, malnutrition was prevalent.⁷⁷ Poor dieting and deplorable environmental conditions created one of the most insalubrious regions in the colonial world, despite its natural beauty. The population, especially the coloured labouring class, was prone to the effects of numerous diseases with malaria, typhoid fever, yaws, hookworm and venereal diseases being widespread.⁷⁸

Although education was compulsory, the law was not enforced because of the lack of school space and the distance children had to travel. In 1938, there were 45 denominational primary schools and 2 secondary schools.⁷⁹ There were no government schools, but the government paid the salaries of the primary school teachers and provided grants to the two secondary schools. Palmer observed that such was the effect of poverty on education that in homes where there was more than one child, that clothing was shared. One child would use it one day, the

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ CO 950/399, Memorandum on Medical and Sanitary Matters to Moyne Commission.

⁷⁷ CO 950/405, Memo of Labour Commissioner, Hon. George Palmer, to Moyne Commission.

⁷⁸ St.Lucia Blue Books, 1930-35.

⁷⁹ Colonial Report 1938.

other the next to enable all the children to attend school.⁸⁰ School records showed a low attendance of students.⁸¹

A commission appointed to investigate primary and secondary education in the West Indies noted that its primary education was the least progressive in the British Empire in terms of resources spent, training of teachers and relationships with other educational institutions.⁸² The situation was made worse in Saint Lucia because of low spending, its denominational status as Catholic and because of language differences.⁸³ In other colonies, the Anglican Church provided the resources for educational development, but was reluctant to do so in Saint Lucia because of the low numbers of Anglicans. Education was based on the English Language, which was not the first language of the majority of people on the island. In the 1921 Census, it was noted that 56.5% of persons spoke only Kwéyòl.⁸⁴ There were no technical schools or even agricultural schools for training, despite agriculture being the dominant economic activity. The call for vocational training and an agricultural school was a common theme in presentations to the Moyne Commission.⁸⁵

Generally, there was no legislation to address social conditions relating to housing, health, workmen's compensation, or provisions for sickness or old age pension.⁸⁶ Lewis explained that West Indian colonial governments were concerned with planter interests, and showed little

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ St.Lucia Blue Books, 1930-35.

⁸² CO 884/13/19. *Education in the West Indies*.

⁸³ CO 256/45. The Annual Education Report of 1951 mentions that the Lobb Commission of 1917 recognised that in comparison with the whole of the West Indies, St.Lucia was spending less on primary education than any other colony.

⁸⁴ CO 321/317, 1921 Census.

⁸⁵ CO 950/400, For example, the presentations by the Youth Delegation and by Mr. C.A. Beaubrun.

⁸⁶ Colonial Report 1938.

desire to redress these conditions, especially as they only affected coloured people.⁸⁷

The colonial society in Saint Lucia during the period leading to the unrest was a volatile confluence of an impoverished and agitated majority population, a self-interested elite which controlled the state and an imperial state, which saw the survival of its Empire for strategic reasons and prestige.

5.2 Labour Unrest as a Transformation Event

The above account of the social, economic and political situation in Saint Lucia clearly demonstrates the prevailing crisis of colonial rule. The ruling planter class stood in opposition to the state as a result of the denial of political rights and the fact that the sugar industry was in decline. In addition, the professional and commercial classes were fighting for greater political involvement, whilst the black majority faced social destitution. The 1930's witnessed an intensified challenge to the colonial order that ignited a decolonization process, and the disintegration of the British Empire. There were two major issues which characterized the challenge. Firstly, the collapse of the international trading and financial systems, followed by the Great Depression, generated a conflict over the management of flows of capital and goods. The Empire provided Britain with a network of countries that enjoyed preferences to the benefit of Britain. Understandably, the United States aspired to dismantling such a system of preferences. Simultaneously, it was a strategic period for the Soviet Union to intensify its anti-imperialist campaign against Western colonial powers. Secondly, the crisis within the colonies brought about by economic dislocation and the rise of a nationalist class which was determined to achieve self-government self-governance.

⁸⁷ Lewis, *Labour*.

Therefore, the challenge to colonial rule took the form of international support for the anti-colonial struggle and domestic upheavals aimed at overthrowing the colonial system. This crisis forced the British Government to appoint the Moyne Commission with a clear intention to transform colonial rule and create a new state-societal relationship in the colonies.

5.2.1. International Politics and the Anti-colonial Struggle

The early anti-colonial struggle received its greatest international support in the successes of the Russian Revolution in the 1920's. Although in theory, early Communist thought recognized the historical necessity of colonialism and its role as an objective progressive process.⁸⁸ Throughout the early writings of Marx and Engels and the deliberations of the Communist Internationals, it was very clear that the debate on the national and colonial question was heavily contentious.⁸⁹ It was not until the early 1920's that Lenin advocated a new understanding of the role of colonies, based on the equality of all peoples and their inherent right to secession as independent states. Support for the anti-colonial struggle was based on the principle that every nation had a right to secede, but any relationship should be voluntary and guided by equality of rights and status.⁹⁰

The growing disgruntlement of colonial peoples and the disappointment with the pace of an anticipated European revolution in the 1920's led to a new approach to the colonial question. The colonies assumed a significant role in Soviet foreign policy, with the objective that "[t]he socialist revolution of the industrial workers and the national-democratic uprisings of the colonial middle and lower classes would thus

⁸⁸ Demetrio Boersner, *The Bolsheviks and the National and Colonial Question* (Connecticut; Hyperion Press, Inc., 1957).

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ Hinden, *Empire*.

form the two component parts of a single world-wide invincible force.”⁹¹ The increasing unlikelihood of a European proletarian revolution forced greater Soviet attention on the colonies to produce national-democratic revolutions as a means of weakening the capitalist world.

Throughout the West Indies, there was evidence of the influence of Marxist information and involvement. Publications included pamphlets on *‘How to organize a struggle’*, *‘How to organize and educate the working masses’*, as well as messages addressed to *‘The workers and oppressed people of the West Indies’*.⁹² In fact the fear of Bolshevik involvement in inciting agitation in the colonies started from the early 1920’s, and led the Secretary of State to request an investigation in Saint Lucia.⁹³ In the 1930’s, there was significant propaganda material coming from the Communist Party of the United States, which had a large number of black people, including West Indians, in its membership. It was believed that some communist agitators were involved in the coal strikes of the early 1930’s were also using the Italy/Abyssinia War to mobilize.⁹⁴

Another external influence on the anti-colonial struggle came from the geographical proximity of the colonies to the United States, as the expansion of its economy promoted unofficial commercial and political relations with the West Indian colonies. The ongoing economic crisis in the colonies encouraged the large-scale movement of people to the United States to seek employment, and in the process, established a large Diaspora of West Indians in major cities. The rise of organized labour, the growth of Pan-Africanists views and the movement of West Indians to and from the American mainland influenced anti-colonial sentiments in the colonies.⁹⁵ In addition, activists were conscious of the relations

⁹¹ Boersner, *The Bolsheviks*.

⁹² George Belle, *The Struggle for Political Democracy: 1937 Riots in Cynthia Barrow-Giles Introduction to Caribbean Politics* (Kingston; Ian Randle Publishers, 2002).

⁹³ CO 321/317, Secret Letter to Administrator, 16 August, 1921.

⁹⁴ CO 321/362/8, Report from Governor to Secretary of State, 5 November 1935.

⁹⁵ Roy S. Bryce-Laporte and Delores M. Mortimer, *Caribbean Immigration to the United States* (Washington, D.C.; Smithsonian Institution, 1983).

between America and its colonies, and the modalities that existed for consultation on colonial policy. Even the Moyne Commission recognized the importance of this influence, which is why it visited the American colonies, citing this model as worthy of consideration.

Another powerful influence on the rise of the anti-colonial struggle in the West Indian colonies was the impact of Marcus Garvey's teachings. Garvey argued that the lack of political power was responsible for the social, economic and cultural deprivation of black people. Garvey established a formidable international organization, the United Negro Improvement Association (UNIA), which had millions of members throughout the United States, Latin American, Africa and the West Indies. The UNIA had commercial, religious, political, and educational arms, which provided political education and hope for oppressed blacks ostracized from the colonial order. In fact, most of the emerging grass roots leadership in the West Indies were ex-Garveyites or active Garveyites.⁹⁶ The UNIA espoused black pride and consciousness, and inspired blacks to rise against the colonial system and overcome their problems through organized political activity.

5.2.2. Labour Unrest and Political Action

The initial response of the working class to their problems was centred on industrial protest demanding better pay and working conditions. The middle class on the other hand, was preoccupied with issues centring on representation in the legislature, and control of the state apparatus.

The dispossession of the middle class was most evident in their minimal participation in government and lack of representation in the legislative bodies. By the 1930's, significant changes had been made to the Crown Colony Government system, but influence remained within

⁹⁶ Belle, *1937 Riots*.

the planter and commercial classes. Government was seen as ensuring law and order which had a repressive function. The fundamental responsibility was "...the maintenance of a climate conducive to the well-being of investors in London and their agents in the colonies."⁹⁷

The prevalence of white persons controlling the public service increasingly bred opposition from the growing educated middle class of coloured people, who felt that they were equally capable of administering their own affairs. Further, the failings of colonial projects and programmes did not provide any justification for Whitehall civil servants to head public departments.⁹⁸ The choice of Whitehall civil servants over local people, even when less qualified, was seen as racist, which in turn fed the local Representative Government Association and the black consciousness movement.⁹⁹

The end of WWI signalled the commencement of a period of unrest throughout the West Indian colonies. In Saint Lucia, returning soldiers had a significant role to play in such agitation, some of whom were persuaded to emigrate to avoid any problems.¹⁰⁰ The effect of the agitators was more telling in Saint Lucia, because unlike other islands where most workers were ^{employed} agricultural and away from the town, ^{otherwise} most of the labourers were employed carrying coal or doing work in the town.¹⁰¹

There was a general wave of strikes in early 1920, which included coal carriers, bread boys, the steamer crews and the employees of the Castries Town Board.¹⁰² However, the most significant strike was undertaken by twenty-two police constables, who were demanding higher

⁹⁷ J.M. Lee, *Colonial Development and Good Government* (Oxford; Clarendon Press, 1967), p. 8.

⁹⁸ The Moyne Commission recognized the serious deficiencies with imperial civil servants and made specific recommendations to upgrade the quality of persons sent to the colonies.

⁹⁹ CO 321/362/6, Letter from Hon. Augier McVane to Lord Rhyader, 16 August 1935.

¹⁰⁰ CO 321/310, Despatch from Governor to Secretary of State, 6 March 1920.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² CO 321/310, Confidential Memo from Administrator of Saint Lucia to Governor, 23 February 1920.

salaries.¹⁰³ In response, the Administrator requested the assistance of a warship, the constables were fired, whilst a sum of £5 was granted to each officer who had remained loyal. The continued presence of the warship H.M.S. Constance also served to quell all intention of strike action that still existed. Racial or class antagonism towards the Police appeared to play a part in the action of the police officers. They were described by the Governor as "...young Policemen, none of them having three years service, and a large proportion of them are worthless, and associates of the worst characters in Castries."¹⁰⁴ It was also reported that there was open contempt for the Police by the local press and members of the 'better classes'.

The unrest of 1920 seen as the work of one group of agitators, related to the Universal Negro Improvement Association, led the Administrator to conclude that though the high cost of living was used as an excuse, the main cause was racial antipathy.¹⁰⁵ The solution to the unrest was seen in simple repressive terms – position ships close to the islands, and if the situation got worse, station a few soldiers on land to curtail any thoughts of rioting.

Throughout the 1920's there was an atmosphere of unrest on sugar estates and among coal carriers. The next major strike started on 3 January, 1929, when coal carriers requested an increase from 1d to 2d per basket. The coal merchants refused, threatening to send the coal steamers away to dispose of the coal. Despite representation from members of the Legislative and Executive Council, the workers remained adamant. The situation seemed to worsen when it was reported that labourers in the sugar factories were planning to strike in solidarity.¹⁰⁶ The Administrator requested a warship as a display of force to end the

¹⁰³ Ibid. The Force had 76 Non-Commissioned Officers.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., p. 3.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid. See also CO 321/310, Secret Memo from Chief of Police to Administrator, 21 February 1920.

¹⁰⁶ CO 321/339/1, Despatch of Administrator to Secretary of State, 16 January 1929.

strike. The presence of 'H.M.S. Heliotrope' proved useful for the colonial state, as workers returned to work two days later.¹⁰⁷

The strike aroused tremendous concern among the planter class, with members of the Legislative Council requesting that the warship remain as a demonstration of force. Instead, the Governor expressed confidence in the Police Force and requested the establishment of a Volunteer Force to avoid calling warships whenever there was trouble.¹⁰⁸ The concern of the local elite was reflected in the opinion of the owner and Editor of the 'Voice' that they were "...sitting on a volcano which might erupt at any time."¹⁰⁹

Like the 1920's, the early 1930's witnessed persistent stoppages in work and growing labour unrest. As news of unrest in other colonies reached workers, it seemed to embolden them to pursue similar action. On 4 November 1935, coal workers went on strike, following disturbances in Saint Vincent, where a number of persons were killed and injured. The Governor did not hesitate to declare a state of emergency and summon a warship.¹¹⁰

The coal workers representatives requested that their wages be doubled. The demand was denied by the Governor on the grounds that the coaling companies were not profitable, and any wage increase, would destroy the industry.¹¹¹ As a form of appeasement, the Governor offered to establish a Commission of Inquiry to examine working conditions and make recommendations for redress. Interestingly, the Governor lamented the failure of workers to make representation before striking. The workers' response that they were not able to meet with the

¹⁰⁷ CO 321/339/1, Despatch of Governor to Secretary of State, 8 January 1929.

¹⁰⁸ CO 321/339/1, Confidential Despatch from Governor to Secretary of State, 23 January 1929. The Volunteer Force was disbanded during World War I as most of the able persons went to the frontline and those who returned were not interested in regrouping.

¹⁰⁹ CO 321/339/1, Report of Administrator to Governor, 2 February 1929.

¹¹⁰ CO 321/362/8, Telegram from Governor to Secretary of State, 4 November 1935.

¹¹¹ CO 321/362/8, Report of Meeting Between the Governor and Representatives of the Coaling Industry, 5 November 1935.

Administration was reflective of the relationship between state and society – the absence of avenues for the majority of society, the labouring class, to influence the state.

On 5 August 1937, the biggest strike occurred, as several hundred agricultural workers protested for higher wages, following similar action in Trinidad, Barbados, Jamaica and British Guiana.¹¹² At a meeting with the owners of the estate, it was pointed out that there was a fear that if an increase were granted, other small and unprofitable estates would be affected resulting in increased unrest and discontent.¹¹³ The seriousness of the situation warranted a Legislative Council meeting, where the unofficial members requested the Governor to summon a warship, and for a naval aeroplane to fly over disaffected areas.¹¹⁴ These official members, all of the planter class, claimed that the strikes were influenced by events in the other colonies, and feared that the strikers would riot and destroy property.

The Governor offered to establish a Commission of Inquiry into the Minimum Wage Order and noted that, plantations were evading the minimum wage requirements by paying per task, and even employing children.¹¹⁵ By September, the strikes spread to workers on the Road Works Project and on certain Banana estates.¹¹⁶ The strikes finally ended when an increase in the wage level for agricultural labourers was agreed and implemented, pending the final report of the Commission.¹¹⁷

¹¹² CO 321/374/10, Confidential Despatch of Administrator to Governor, 12 August 1937. The owner of Roseau Estates, Joseph Duboulay estimated between 1300-1500 workers were on strike.

¹¹³ CO 321/374/10, Confidential Despatch of Administrator to Governor, 7 August 1937.

¹¹⁴ CO 321/374/10 Confidential Despatch of Administrator to Governor, 12 August 1937.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.* The Commission of Enquiry was established on 10 August with no representation from the striking workers but included the owners and members of the Legislative Council.

¹¹⁶ CO 321/374/10, Despatch of Administrator to Governor, 3 September 1937.

¹¹⁷ CO 321/374/10, Telegram from Governor to Secretary of State, 24 September 1937.

5.2.3. Imperial State Response – the Moyne Commission

The riots and unrest of the 1930's forced the Imperial Government to consider investigating the state of the West Indian colonies and to institute ameliorative measures. However, there was no commitment that Britain would meet the resources required for sustained improvement. The initial view of the West India Department was that no case for a general commission had been made and whilst the idea was politically attractive, any large-scale improvement required significant expenditure which was not likely to be approved.¹¹⁸ However, an alternative view supporting the establishment of a Royal Commission argued that the unrest might continue to give the impression that unrest and riots were a colonial problem.¹¹⁹ In addition, the strategic interest of the United States in the West Indies and their desire to paint a dark picture of British colonialism were seen as important considerations.

The decision to appoint a Royal Commission was hastened by the expectation of a question in Parliament on that subject.¹²⁰ In doing so, the Secretary of State for the Colonies warned Cabinet that the Commission's recommendations would involve more expenditure, and it made no sense to send out a Royal Commission and reject its proposals on financial grounds.¹²¹ Interestingly, it was stated that part of any monies needed would come from increased taxation in the colonies, reflecting the continued belief that the colonies should provide for themselves. Cabinet approved the establishment of the Commission, with the understanding that more finance would be necessary.¹²²

The Commission members were appointed in August 1938, and from October 1938 to March 1939 undertook a tour of the Caribbean investigating the social, economic and political conditions that gave rise

¹¹⁸ CO 318/433/1, Memorandum of West India Department, 20 May 1938.

¹¹⁹ CO 318/433/1, Minute by Sir John Campbell, 23 May 1938.

¹²⁰ CO 318/433/1, Conclusions of Cabinet Meeting, 15 June 1938.

¹²¹ *Ibid.*

¹²² *Ibid.*

to the unrest. The recommendations were designed to reform the colonial relationship with the Imperial State accepting greater responsibility for the development of the state and society in the colonies.

The declaration of war in September 1939 disrupted ^aMcDonald's momentum to reform colonial policy and practice, despite the Secretary's directive that social development activities should not be affected.¹²³ In light of the War, every policy and action had to serve the imperial interest first. In fact, the colonies had to be mobilized to contribute both human and material resources to defend the British Empire.¹²⁴ The War forced a rethink of the urgency to redress the colonial situation and in particular generated an inter-departmental debate on the wisdom of releasing the Moyne Commission Report.

It was argued that the Report contained several sections that portrayed the Empire in an unfavourable manner, and could be used for hostile propaganda. On the other hand, there was caution that with the general expectancy pending the Report, any delay could lead to more unrest. In addition, withholding the Report would lead to speculation that its contents were worse than what actually existed, and that the Commission would object to a delay, having already mitigated the severity of its statements.¹²⁵ In the end, the concerns of war predominated, and only the recommendations of the Commission were published. At the same time, a Statement of Policy on Colonial Development and Welfare was presented in Parliament.¹²⁶

The recommendations were a comprehensive response to the disturbances in the West Indian colonies. The highlight of the Report was the establishment of a West Indian Welfare Fund of £1,000,000 annually

¹²³ CO 691/174/42154/1, Circular Telegram from the Secretary of State to all Colonial Dependencies, 15 September 1939.

¹²⁴ CO 691/174/42154/1, Circular Telegram from the Secretary of State to all Colonies, 22 September 1939.

¹²⁵ CO 318/439/9, Note by C. Carstairs, Acting Principal Secretary, West Indian Department of the Colonial Office, 6 January 1940.

¹²⁶ House of Commons Debate, 1939-40, vol 361, cols 41-42, May 1940.

for twenty years, to be administered by a Special Comptroller who was independent of West Indian Governments.¹²⁷ In summary, the Report was the most detailed attempt to reform colonial policy and compensate for centuries of systemic and deliberate neglect of the social and economic development of the colonies.

In Education, the Commission's main recommendations were the establishment of more schools and teacher training colleges, and the provision of free meals and clothes for poor children. In public health, it advocated the training of nurses, centralizing medical facilities and promoting preventive medicine. It proposed to clear slum areas and provide government-financed rural housing projects. The Commission recommended laws to protect Trade Unions and the right to peaceful picketing. Proposals were made for Labour Departments and Wage Boards to be created, and workers compensation to be enacted. Similarly, the proposals for economic development were also extensive and included an increase in the sugar quota, improving imperial preferences, developing peasant agriculture, and facilitating land settlement schemes. For political development, the Commission recommended universal adult suffrage, greater elected representation in the executive, but suggested that power should remain with the Governor.

However, despite the extensiveness of the Moyne Commission, it did not reflect the aspirations of the masses that had revolted. The Moyne Commission itself concluded that the

disturbances can only be regarded as a symptom of which the principal causes are low earnings and irregular employment...and ...the discontent...is...no longer a mere blind protest against the worsening of conditions, but a positive demand for the creation of new conditions that will render possible a better and less restricted life.¹²⁸

¹²⁷ West India Royal Commission Report, (Cmd. 6607, June 1945).

¹²⁸ Ibid. p.197.

Yet the recommendations, though having a social welfare bias, failed to address the fundamental issue of sustainable economic development of the region.¹²⁹ Lewis argued that the Commission attempted to repair the social fabric of colonial life without seeking to replace the social fabric.¹³⁰ Therefore, it paid little reference to economic equality, and projects had a rural bias seeking bit-by-bit improvements in agriculture and social services. The Colonial Development and Welfare Organization, established to implement the recommendations, was staffed by Englishmen and had little indigenous input.

The approach to reforming colonial rule and building the future state and society was built on the old assumption,

that a pattern of social life has been achieved in the past which, given a few administrative reforms, is adequate for the needs of any people; that if troubles arise anywhere, all that is necessary is that the British way of life should be more fully understood and more closely followed.¹³¹

5.3 Reformed Colonialism and a New State-societal Relationship

The response of the British to the crisis of the colonial order was to offer a reformed relationship. The earlier opposition of the Treasury to the Commission was based on the fear that any addition of welfare spending would undermine the historical practice of insisting on colonial self-sufficiency and would put a strain on the Exchequer.¹³² However, the unrest in the West Indian colonies had led to public embarrassment and a political necessity to support colonial development, in particular welfare spending. Further, the Colonial Secretary, Malcolm MacDonald,

¹²⁹ Gordon K. Lewis, *The Growth of the Modern West Indies* (New York; Modern Reader Paperbacks, 1968). Lewis noted that recommendations were similar to the programmes advocated by West Indian Labour Parties which were only taken seriously because they came from the Moyne Commission.

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*

¹³¹ Thomas Simmey, *Welfare and Planning in the West Indies* (Oxford; Oxford University Press, 1946), p. 238.

¹³² Porter and Stockwell, *British Imperial Policy*.

was committed to colonial reform, and his attention went beyond the West Indies to effect change in all colonial policy.¹³³ The Secretary intended to use the outcome of the Commission's work as part of a broader scheme for a new imperial policy. That new scheme would be implemented within a new political framework. According to Fraser,

the central concern was to devise the institutional mechanism that would ensure the implementation and supervision of the new colonial dispensation – a process that envisaged a token increase in representation at the level of colonial government and a policy of greater participation by colonial elites in colonial administration.¹³⁴

The Moyne Commission's recommendations, whatever their shortcomings, changed colonial practice which led to the construction of a new state-societal relationship in the West Indian colonies.

5.3.1. International Framework as the Context for British Colonial Policy in the Caribbean

The reform of the state-societal relationship in Saint Lucia took place in a changed international context, occasioned by World War II and the allied victory. Most significantly, the United States and the Soviet Union emerged as superpowers, and unfolded a Cold War characterized by an intense ideological battle between capitalism and socialism. The emergence of the United Nations as the embodiment of world opinion and order, and in practice as the source of international law, would have a significant impact on British colonialism.¹³⁵ Such an international framework helped define the contours of the new state-societal relationship.

The decline of Britain as the dominant world power was most evident by the early victories of the Fascists and the threat that Britain

¹³³ Ibid. See Also Aston and Stockwell, *Imperial Policy*.

¹³⁴ Cary Fraser, *Ambivalent Anti-colonialism: The United States and the genesis of West Indian Independence, 1940-1964* (Connecticut; Greenwood Press, 1994). p. 12.

¹³⁵ Daniel Philpott, *Revolutions in Sovereignty. How ideas shaped modern International Relations* (Princeton; Princeton University Press, 2001).

faced for its own survival. At the same time, the United States was concerned about the change of events in Europe and was fearful of German occupation of the colonies in the Western Hemisphere.¹³⁶ In May 1940, Prime Minister Churchill formally requested materiel and the assistance of forces from the United States. Finally, an agreement was formalized between Britain and the United States in September 1940 to exchange materiel for bases in the colonies. Earlier, the United States was able to secure an agreement with Hemispheric Foreign Ministers to establish a trusteeship to administer all colonies, should there be an attempt to transfer ownership to any other European power. The meeting also agreed that the United States would be allowed to act unilaterally to occupy the colonies if it were deemed necessary.¹³⁷

The assistance of the Americans, noted for their anti-European colonialism, in the fight against Fascism was not without demands for changes in the British Empire. The 'bases-for-destroyers' deal transformed the context for colonial policy in the West Indies. It implied a derogation of Britain sovereignty in the colonies, and formally opened the door for an American presence in the colonies.¹³⁸ The formal involvement of the United States was extended when the British finally agreed to an American economic mission to the colonies, although for the Americans it was an investigation of the implications of American occupation if it became necessary.¹³⁹

The Americans were adamant that the future of the colonial empire would have to be addressed before its involvement in the War was intensified. It was no secret that the Americans thought that British

¹³⁶ Fraser, *Anti-Colonialism*.

¹³⁷ Ibid. The meeting was held from July 21 to July 27, 1940.

¹³⁸ David Reynolds, *The Creation of the Anglo-American Alliance 1937-41* (London; Europa Publications, 1981).

¹³⁹ Even after having agreed, the British tried to stop the visit of the Taussig Mission. It was only after the American pointed out that the Moyne Commission was allowed to visit American colonies that the British agreed. The Mission was undertaken in November 1940.

imperialism "...obstructed free trade, prevented self-determination and reinforced the worst features of Britain's class-ridden society."¹⁴⁰

The Atlantic Charter sought to resolve differences on the future of the colonial empire by defining "certain common principles in the national policy of their respective countries on which they base their hopes for a better future for the world."¹⁴¹ There existed acute differences between the Colonial and Foreign Offices during the War on the nature of the colonial relationship that should exist after the War. Similarly, there were numerous debates on the role of America in the colonial empire. The Colonial Office sought to exclude the Americans even while the imperial government gave in to many of the American demands especially transferring the responsibility of defending the West Indian colonies to America.¹⁴² The difference over the influence of America in colonial policy was demonstrated in the formation of the Anglo-American Commission.¹⁴³ Despite the opposition of the Colonial Office, the Imperial State agreed and promoted the Commission, as necessary to assist in rehabilitating the Caribbean colonies and encouraged American participation in domestic issues during the War.¹⁴⁴

The American strategic context changed at the end of the War as the focus of the power struggle was in Central and Western Europe. The Americans were willing to accept the continuation of colonial bonds in the Caribbean as the safeguard for their hemispheric interest.¹⁴⁵ The

¹⁴⁰ Porter and Stockwell, *British Imperial Policy*, p. 26.

¹⁴¹ The Atlantic Charter, *Joint Declaration by the President and Prime Minister*, p. 12. August 1941. The Charter caused differences between the Colonial and Foreign Office especially over Article 3, which was believed to be a submission of the rights of Empire. Churchill later explained that it only referred to countries under Nazi control.

¹⁴² Reynolds, *Anglo-American Alliance*. Anthony Eden, Foreign Secretary, accepted that Britain had compromised its sovereignty in the colonies but that it had no choice.

¹⁴³ Fraser, *Anti-colonialism*. The Anglo-American Commission was an American idea to institutionalize Anglo-American cooperation in the Caribbean.

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.* American troops were used to put down unrest in St. Lucia and the Bahamas in July 1942.

¹⁴⁵ This is evident by the acceptance of the European position on colonialism in San Francisco and the establishment of the Caribbean Commission including France, Britain and Netherlands to coordinate development in the region.

Caribbean Commission became the mechanism through which the United States was able to influence colonial policies of various European powers in the hemisphere. The Americans were contented with British attempts to reform colonialism rather than create a vacuum for the Soviet Union, with a stated anti-colonial philosophy, to encourage and strengthen independence movements in the Caribbean region. With the experience of the majority of the former colonies becoming strident anti-colonialists and leading the decolonization process, the Imperial State became concerned with ensuring that the West Indian colonies did not give allegiance to the Soviet Union. In the context of the Cold War, the Imperial State had to find a balance between decolonization and maintenance of its influence in the colonies.

The greatest criticism of colonialism was within the United Nations which began to increase from the late 1940's, as India and other South Asian countries joined the body. Britain was required to provide information on its custody of the colonies to the Secretary-General and was frequently criticized by the General Assembly. In many instances of granting independence, foreign policy officials in Britain cited UN criticism. According to Philpott,

to UN criticism, as to other criticism, Britain responded by insisting rhetorically on its ideal of gradual self-government and exceeding it in practice. Again and again, it fretted about its reputation, irritated and surprised that it should be so challenged.¹⁴⁶

5.3.2. A New Imperial Economic Policy and Persistent Underdevelopment in the Colonies

The approach to economic development of the colonies in the post-1938 period was initially influenced by the debate between the United States and Britain, especially at the First West Indian Conference. The Americans wanted a complete diversification of the economies and promotion of intra-Caribbean trade immediately whilst the British

¹⁴⁶ Philpott, *Sovereignty*, p.186.

wanted to wait until after WWII to diversify and to reduce preferences for sugar. The British, obviously considering its sugar interests in the colonies and in London, objected to such economic development plans.¹⁴⁷ Despite the differences, the Conference did issue a comprehensive joint declaration on economic policies and procedures.¹⁴⁸ Following on the work of the Conference, the Caribbean Commission promoted a number of projects for the economic development of the colonies.¹⁴⁹

In contrast to the liberal international economic order advocated by the Americans in the 1930's, the post-war framework was a reinforcement of mercantilism. Such a framework was necessary for the economic revival of the British economy, through the sterling area. For the West Indian colonies, it meant that any restructuring needed to promote economic development would be disregarded. In a public announcement in Saint Lucia, the Secretary of State made it clear that there would be little substantial change to economic policy following the War.¹⁵⁰ The supply of goods from overseas would not improve, and production for consumption and export, would be maintained at the highest level. However, development projects that were deferred would be executed.

After the War, the economic policy for the colonies was modified to expand colonial production and export to the dollar area, and to restrict all imports that were made wholly or largely of dollar materials, including those from the sterling area.¹⁵¹ Britain was able to serve as the centre for the receipt and disbursement of dollars. The policy was designed to integrate the colonies into a system that would restore Britain's economic

¹⁴⁷ CO 1042/101, Report to Secretary of State on the First West Indian Conference, 21-30 March 1944.

¹⁴⁸ Annette Baker Fox, *Freedom and Welfare in the Caribbean. A Colonial Dilemma* (New York; Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1949).

¹⁴⁹ The most significant was the Caribbean Tourist Development Plan.

¹⁵⁰ St.Lucia Gazette, 30 June 1945. *Statement of Secretary of State on Economic Position in Period Immediately After Cessation of Hostility.*

¹⁵¹ St.Lucia Gazette, 13 March 1948, *Statement from President of Board of Trade on the Use of Hard Currency in the Sterling Area.*

and financial standing.¹⁵² The policy was so exploitative that Howe stated that it "...may well have been the most oppressive form of economic imperialism yet seen in British tropical colonies, carried out with a combination of self-interest, myopia and liberal good intentions."¹⁵³ Similarly, the trading pattern was turned into Great Britain's advantage at the expense of cheaper and easily obtainable goods from the United States.¹⁵⁴

The conflict with West Indian colonies over economic policy was accentuated when a delegation sent to London in 1950 to appeal for an increased sugar quota was rebuffed. The imperial response was that colonial farmers were not entitled to the same assistance as British farmers and that they should seek more assistance from colonial governments.¹⁵⁵ This response was taken as a grave insult and signalled the attitude of the imperial state to resolving the issue of economic development.

The absence of any systematic policy for economic advancement was also reflected in the failure of the Imperial State to address in a structural approach, the unemployment situation plaguing the coloured majority. In Saint Lucia, the colonial government was forced to expand its public works programme to absorb all surplus labour. The feeder road and school building programmes became the largest sources of employment after agriculture. In addition, the colonial government continued to encourage migration to solve the unemployment situation. During the War, the Imperial Government encouraged migration to the

¹⁵² Ibid. *Press Statement on Import Restriction in British Colonies*. The restrictions on importation of goods to secure balance of payments was relaxed in 1948 to allow imports from UK and other colonial territories provided it does not affect sterling balances. The restrictions no longer applied on goods such as coal or capital equipment from the UK.

¹⁵³ Stephen Howe, *Anticolonialism in British Politics: the left and the end of Empire 1918-1964* (Oxford; Clarendon Press, 1993).

¹⁵⁴ CO 256/45. Annual Administration Report 1951. Imports from the UK was \$2.9 million and the rest of the Empire \$2.2 million while the US was only \$0.4 million. Exports showed a similar pattern. This was in sharp contrast to the 1920's and 1930's.

¹⁵⁵ Fraser, *Anti-colonialism*.

United States through organized contractual labour schemes. After the War ended, the policy continued as the Department of Labour in Saint Lucia continued to organize labour schemes to Curacao, Aruba, Panama, the United States and the French Territories. After most countries discontinued the labour schemes, the Imperial State allowed increased migration to its territory.¹⁵⁶ The economic impact of remittances was significant for working class families and the economy.¹⁵⁷

Agricultural diversification did have some success in developing a major second export. The increasing significance of bananas compared to sugar, as an export crop is noted as "...in 1956 sugar production increased by 25% on the 1954 figure and in value by \$288,788, banana exports rose by 16% in production and by a total of \$1,030,799."¹⁵⁸ Bananas was expected to become the major crop, as it had a ready export market; the active involvement of a producer organization; supportive government policy; and required a regular labour force to maintain production.¹⁵⁹ Bananas were also a peasant crop, which encouraged larger smallholdings outside of the established plantations and represented the first step in breaking the dominance of plantation agriculture.

However, the greatest deficiency in economic development was the continued reluctance of the imperial government to pursue an industrialization programme for the West Indian colonies.¹⁶⁰ The Bentham Commission appointed in 1945 had discouraged industrialization in Jamaica and similarly, another Commission in 1952 discouraged any programme of industrialization.¹⁶¹

¹⁵⁶ CO 256/60, Annual Labour Report 1956. Migration to the UK increased from 217 in 1955 to 693 in 1956.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid. Remittances through the Post Office increased from \$52,705 in 1955 to \$208,790 in 1956.

¹⁵⁸ CO 256/50, Annual Labour Report, 1956.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid.

¹⁶⁰ Lewis, *Labour, Simey, Welfare and Planning*.

¹⁶¹ Terrence Farrell, "Arthur Lewis and the case for Caribbean Industrialisation," *Social and Economic Studies*, Vol. 29, No.4.

The opposition to industrialization was rooted in the imperial approach, conscious or otherwise, that the West Indian colonies were best suited to be producers of raw and agricultural products and to be a market for manufactured goods from Great Britain. The economic difficulties in Britain in the early 1920's had generated concern in the Treasury over increasing industrial development in the colonies, especially the Far East and fear of a spread to other regions.¹⁶² This led to a practice of limiting industrialization to some colonies.

Eventually, criticism and the realization of the impossibility of sustaining a welfare programme on an agricultural economy contributed to imperial rethinking. In addition, the pressures for overseas expansion of investment after the post-war recovery led to the Overseas Resources Development Act to support private investment through the Colonial Development Corporation which operated on a commercial basis.¹⁶³ This period coincided with the onset of colonial governments granting privileges, including tax exemptions to investors.¹⁶⁴

Economic development in the West Indies was also affected by the colonial administration which was inept and principally served imperial commercial interests. The Colonial Office was criticized for failing to improve the administration of the colonies to undertake development projects and the failure to reduce the influence of expatriate commercial interest.¹⁶⁵ Fraser summarized that "...through, design and default, economic transformation in the West Indies was hindered by colonial policy."¹⁶⁶ The absence of any systematic economic transformation programme to address the fundamental cause of distress in the colonies resulted in a perpetuation of economic underdevelopment. In the final

¹⁶² Ashton and Stockwell, *Imperial Policy*.

¹⁶³ Fox, *Freedom and Welfare*.

¹⁶⁴ One such provision in St.Lucia was The Hotels Aid Ordinance No.17 of 1948.

¹⁶⁵ D.J. Morgan, *Developing British Colonial Resources, 1945-1951*, vol.2 of *The Official History of Colonial Development* (London; Macmillan, 1980).

¹⁶⁶ Fraser, *Anti-colonialism*, p. 80.

analysis, the dearth of economic opportunity denied any emergence of confidence in the state as a tool for advancement of the population.

5.3.3. Social Development under Reformed Colonialism

The move to reform colonial policy actually started with the succession to office by Secretary MacDonald, and preceded the release of the recommendations of the Moyne Commission. The deteriorating social situation in the colonies and the drive of MacDonald, led to the first act of reform by the establishment of a Social Services Department in March 1939. In addition, the Colonial Office considered establishing social services departments in the colonies to coordinate implementation of welfare projects.¹⁶⁷ The second act in July 1939 was to recommend new colonial legislation to guide development that abolished the requirement that all schemes must promote commerce or industry in the United Kingdom, and to expand the Colonial Development Fund.¹⁶⁸

The implementation of the Moyne Commission recommendations began with the Commonwealth Development and Welfare Act (1940), which provided for a fund to replace the Colonial Development Fund and offered greater possibilities for social development in the colonies.¹⁶⁹ It was noted during parliamentary debates that not much could be done until after the War, with the exception of the West Indies.¹⁷⁰ The Fund provided £1,250,000 for projects in the West Indies and for the Development and Welfare Organisation to be established. The Fund had limited success in the colonies, disbursing only £1,147,500 by 1944 out of £22,000,000 for which authority was provided.¹⁷¹

¹⁶⁷ CO 852/190/10, Note of Departmental Meeting, 16 December 1938.

¹⁶⁸ CO 852/250/10, Minutes of a CO Departmental Meeting, 31 July 1939.

¹⁶⁹ CO 859/19/18, Letter from MacDonald to Sir J Simon, 11 October 1939. This Act was followed by the 1945 Act.

¹⁷⁰ CO 859/81/10, Minutes of meeting on Wartime Colonial Development and Welfare Expenditure, 28 February-13 March 1941.

¹⁷¹ D.J. Morgan, *The Origins of British Aid Policy, 1924-1945*, Vol. 1 of *The Official History of Colonial Development* (London; The Macmillan Press; 1980). Morgan provides

Notwithstanding, the construction of a new societal configuration in Saint Lucia was linked to the recommendations of the Commission. The obvious backwardness of education ensured that it became an immediate priority for social reordering, with provisions for training of teachers and instructors, enhancing administrative capability and infrastructural development. Teachers were trained in Trinidad and Barbados in areas such as domestic science and handcraft. The Education Department expanded to monitor and inspect the conditions of schools. It is worth noting that by 1951, of forty-eight public schools, only three met the basic colonial standards and were all built from provisions of the Fund.¹⁷²

The number of children attending school and the rate of attendance increased, as greater emphasis was placed on education. School attendance was 70% in 1954 up from 60% in 1949.¹⁷³ The availability of scholarships was expanded, offering more working class students the opportunity to undertake further education, including a special scholarship established for women.¹⁷⁴ The increased training for Saint Lucian public servants and the availability of scholarships accelerated the development of an indigenous core of technical expertise that started to replace imperial civil servants.

In health, there was a noticeable increase in the monies allocated by the colonial state for new programs. The colony witnessed significant improvement, particularly in the reduction of malaria and tuberculosis. From the destitution facing the colony in the 1930's, the most remarkable improvement was the reduction in the death and infant mortality rates, and in the death rates for tuberculosis, disease of early

an extensive discussion on the many problems faced to spend monies allocated for the West Indies.

¹⁷² CO 256/45. The standard required that 70% of all students on roll should have access to desks and chairs.

¹⁷³ CO 256/48, Annual Education Report 1954.

¹⁷⁴ Ordinance No. 43 of 1953.

infancy and malaria.¹⁷⁵ These improvements can be attributed to the provision by government of medicines that were previously available only to those who could purchase them. Spraying of dwelling areas to eradicate mosquitoes clearly had a beneficial effect, and the commencement of a dry skimmed milk distribution programme for all infants was also significant.¹⁷⁶ The establishment of the Public Health Engineering Unit was important to address health issues and alleviate the conditions in the slums. The Unit was well known in working class areas for building drains, footpaths, garbage disposal, erecting public latrines and public baths, and providing concrete pit slabs for home latrines.

Housing for estate workers was given increased attention with the establishment of the Sugar Labour Welfare Fund Committee which assumed responsibility for constructing housing schemes for estate workers.¹⁷⁷ The managements of the estates in Roseau, Cul De Sac and Dennery were quite generous in providing the land for the schemes.¹⁷⁸ The Government enacted a series of legislative measures to guide housing improvement and established the Central Housing Authority in 1946 to control housing and planning in the entire colony.¹⁷⁹ The Government also became involved in constructing housing schemes particularly in Castries, after the major 1948 fire and the Soufrière Fire of 1955.¹⁸⁰

¹⁷⁵ CO 256/48, Annual Health Report, 1954.

¹⁷⁶ CO 256/49, Annual Health Report, 1955. Reported cases of malaria fell dramatically from more than 6000 in 1952 to 3225 in 1953. Deaths from tuberculosis fell from 76 in 1952 to 47 in 1955, death from malaria cases from 109 in 1952 to 53 in 1955.

¹⁷⁷ The Committee is financed by a cess imposed on every ton of sugar exported and is concerned with improving housing for sugar workers.

¹⁷⁸ CO 256/45, Annual Labour Report, 1951.

¹⁷⁹ The Town and Country Planning Ordinance (No. 10 of 1945); The Slum Clearance and Housing Ordinance (No. 11 of 1945); and The Land Acquisition Ordinance (No.12 of 1945).

¹⁸⁰ The Castries Housing Scheme was built with loan funds provided by the Colonial Development Corporation. Soufriere Schemes was financed by the local government.

Beyond improvements in social welfare, there were attempts at social empowerment. The co-operative movement became an area of interest, as the Secretary of State issued a memo in 1944 on the development of the co-operative movement in the colonial dependencies.¹⁸¹ The co-operative movement in Saint Lucia was revived by the Co-operative Societies Ordinance, No. 17 of 1946. Saint Lucia became the first colony to have a comprehensive ordinance to cover all types of co-operatives, and was unique in making it compulsory to set up education committees in each society to undertake educational and propaganda work.¹⁸² By 1953, there were three credit societies, one co-operative store and a number of producer, marketing and processing societies.

Despite the attempts of the imperial government to redress the destitute living conditions, there were glaring deficiencies in undertaking social welfare programmes that still threatened the relationship between state and society. Firstly, its primary concern was the shifting of financial responsibility for programmes, started by the CD&W Fund, to the local government or even worse, termination.¹⁸³ This was part of the debate on the relevance of the Development and Welfare Organisation which initiated projects and programmes then shifted the responsibility to the colonial state for continuation. The debate was brought about by the continued economic plight of the colonies, as the colonies were unable to meet the cost of maintaining the programmes.¹⁸⁴

Secondly, the housing shortage was worse for the working class and was exploited by landowners and commercial interests. In 1942, the Executive Council sought to restrict the freedom of property owners to increase rent, but faced continual stalling from the Legislative Council

¹⁸¹ CO 256/47, *Report on Co-operative Development, 1953*.

¹⁸² *Ibid.*

¹⁸³ Noted examples were the scheme for the provision of schoolbooks to primary school students that was terminated in 1951 and the Social Welfare Department funding which was terminated in December 1950.

¹⁸⁴ Morgan, *Colonial Resources, 1945-1951*.

which largely served the interest of the planter class.¹⁸⁵ The rental cost was high, while living conditions were generally low, in particular that of the working class.¹⁸⁶ Despite the increases in wage rates from 1949, the cost of living and house rental increased further.¹⁸⁷ The housing shortage continued to be an urgent problem up to 1955 as the cost of building materials and rental increased. This had a serious implication for working class housing.

Thirdly, whilst significant improvements were made to reduce malnutrition and infant mortality, there was no school meal programme to address the serious absenteeism among working class children. The infant nutrition programme was started after 1951, and was made possible by funding from UNICEF to distribute skimmed milk powder.¹⁸⁸ Similarly, the large-scale Insect Control Programme which complimented earlier measures, and had tremendous success in reducing malaria, was started with the assistance of UNICEF and WHO in 1953.¹⁸⁹

Fourthly, there were still inadequate school places by 1955 and despite improvements in school attendance, there were numerous problems such as "...irregularity of attendance due to poverty and a shortage of food; ill-health of the pupils, the necessity for greater interest to be taken by parents and shortage of school equipment."¹⁹⁰ There were no programmes to alleviate the extensive illiteracy among the population, nor was there any emphasis on teaching agriculture in schools, despite the background of the colonies.

Generally, the attitude of the majority coloured population remained apathetic towards the work of the colonial government. In a noted instance, members of the community who were asked to co-

¹⁸⁵ Minutes of Legislative Council Meeting of 19 December 1941.

¹⁸⁶ CO 246/45, Annual Labour Report, 1951.

¹⁸⁷ CO 256/50, Annual Labour Report, 1955. With a 1939 base figure of 100, the index was 279 by December 1955. CO 256/50, Annual Labour Report, 1955.

¹⁸⁸ Ibid.

¹⁸⁹ CO 256/47, Administrative Report, 1953.

¹⁹⁰ CO 256/48, Annual Education Report 1954.

operate on a school improvement project refused because they felt that the school belonged to the Government.¹⁹¹ Such an attitude demonstrated that the population did not see themselves as owners of or even participants in the development process. It was a case of the colonial government, under the control of the British Government undertaking programmes and projects for the population. The black majority was yet to feel a sense of attachment to the colonial state and its functioning.

5.3.4. The Labour Movement as Institutionalized Opposition

One of the most significant changes in the state-societal relations during the post-1930s was the institutionalization of the labour movement as a social force. The workers unrest in the 1930's, similar to the situation in other parts of the Empire, accelerated the adoption of regulations to address the demands of the labour movement for better working and living conditions. The mechanism used to settle the demands of workers for better pay was controlled by the colonial state, through The Labour (Minimum Wage) Ordinance, No. 5 of 1935 and amended by No.3 of 1937. The Ordinance provided for the Governor-in-Council, *i.e.* through Executive Council Order, to fix the minimum wage in respect of any occupation, if the Governor was satisfied that it was too low and an increase was in the public interest. Accordingly, as a means of settling strike action, the Governor issued Orders for coal workers, agricultural labourers and shop assistants.

As unrest began in the colonies, the Colonial Office sent a despatch requesting the colonial government to, "...review their arrangements for the supervision of conditions governing the employment of labour in the territories under their administration."¹⁹²

¹⁹¹ CO 256/45, Annual Education Report 1951.

¹⁹² CO 323/1429/9. Secretary of State Despatch No. 1, 9 November 1935.

However, the Governors were unresponsive despite the unrest intensifying and extending to other workers.

By 1937, the Secretary of State expressed the view that it was necessary for all colonial governments to ensure that workers got a fair share of the improvements in the financial positions of the colonies.¹⁹³ Colonial governments were urged to establish labour organizations to supervise all labour relations, including agricultural labour and to address other issues affecting workers. The Imperial State was concerned that many international conventions relating to labour had not been addressed in the colonies. Colonial governments were similarly urged to ensure that necessary legislation was in place to implement all conventions signed by the imperial state which applied to the colonies.¹⁹⁴

A number of local commissions established after continued unrest suggested that unrest occurred because there was no mechanism for discussion between employers and workers.¹⁹⁵ The Secretary of State finally insisted that labour departments be established and rather than be given marginal status should be seen as one of the most important departments.¹⁹⁶ Despite the stalling efforts of the planter-controlled Legislative Council, the Department of Labour in Saint Lucia was created by the Labour Ordinance, No.14 of 1938.¹⁹⁷ It is noticeable that the duties did not include many concerns raised by the Secretary of State in the 24 August 1937 despatch. However, legislation was passed to amend

¹⁹³ CO 323/1429/9. Secretary of State Despatch to Colonial Governors No. 3, 24 August 1937.

¹⁹⁴ Ibid. In particular, the regulation of contract labour and eliminating penal sanctions from master and servant legislation. Both of these issues were to be addressed by the ILO in 1939.

¹⁹⁵ CO 950/1. Memorandum by Colonial Office West Indian Department for the Moyne Commission, 20 May 1938.

¹⁹⁶ CO 850/135/12. Secretary of State Despatch to Governors No. 16, 5 September 1938.

¹⁹⁷ Colonial Report, 1938.

the conditions of contract and repeal the penal clauses that had existed.¹⁹⁸

The efforts to empower the labour movement in the 1930's were frequently given momentum by the directives of the Colonial Office and served the purpose of overcoming planter and commercial interests. In 1940, Lord Moyne clarified the necessity for colonial governments to have 'reasonable facilities' in place for the establishment and activities of trade unions, to qualify for funding under the Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1940.¹⁹⁹ As was the case with colonial practice, legislation varied according to the local situation, but was usually based on legislation passed in the United Kingdom.²⁰⁰

In Saint Lucia, the institutionalization of labour was furthered with the Trade Dispute (Arbitration and Inquiry) Ordinance, No.15 of 1940. The Ordinance established a mechanism for the settlement of trade disputes and for the Governor to establish a Board of Inquiry to examine such matters and any other economic or industrial condition.

The most significant step towards legitimizing trade unions and industrial action was taken after the Trade Union and Trade Dispute Ordinance, No. 4 of 1948 law was passed.²⁰¹ The legislation made it legal for workers to form trade unions to serve as their bargaining representatives in industrial disputes. Further, peaceful picketing was legalized and employers were required to allow workers to engage in peaceful acts to dissuade other workers from working. Undoubtedly, this was the most valuable achievement in laying the foundation for the emergence of institutionalized opposition to colonial rule, or from another perspective to institutionalize opposition to colonial rule.

¹⁹⁸ Employers and Servants Ordinance No.29 of 1938.

¹⁹⁹ CO 859/49/14. Circular Despatch from Lord Moyne to Colonial Governors, 12 July 1941. The initial despatch was sent by Lord Lloyd on 10 September 1940.

²⁰⁰ For example the Trade Union Act, 1871; the Trade Disputes Act, 1906; and Trade Dispute and Trade Union Act, 1927.

²⁰¹ The Election of 1947 increased the number of labour movement sympathizers on the Legislative Council.

However, the debate on the Bill showed that the planter class while conceding on the recognition of trade unions, which was now universal, was more concerned with the emergence of political movements and the association of unions with them.²⁰² The planter representatives argued to make it illegal for trade unions to finance political movements. It was finally compromised that such an objective had to be approved beforehand, by resolution of the members of the trade union.

The period after 1948 witnessed an increase in labour legislation as the colonial government became more accommodating of labour issues. Amendments were made to a number of existing labour laws, including workers compensation. Another feature of the post-1948 legislation was the emergence of collective bargaining and wage increases resulting from joint negotiations.²⁰³

Despite that, a series of strikes took place on the sugar estates in 1952 as workers rejected negotiated wage rates. It is significant that this took place after the first elections under universal adult suffrage in 1951. A commission of inquiry established to investigate noted that the strikes were due to a number of reasons, including the high expectation of workers caused by one candidate during the campaign, and the reduced role of the major union which was now more focused on politics.²⁰⁴ This demonstrates the increasing shift of the coloured leadership from labour leadership to political leadership, and control of the Colonial Government. In response, the Labour Advisory Board which included government representatives, who were also labour leaders and trade union representatives', forwarded recommendations that were significantly more progressive, compared to the efforts of previous bodies. These included establishing a Wages Council, Work Committees at the sugar estates, appointment of Labour and Welfare Officers at the

²⁰² Minutes of Legislative Council Meeting, 30 March 1948.

²⁰³ Annual Administration Report 1951.

²⁰⁴ Annual Administration Report 1952.

workplace, and payment of bonuses from profits to workers. The Colonial Government, which was still controlled by the Governor, accepted all the recommendations, except the payment of bonuses, as it believed that profits should remain with the employers for reinvestment.

Despite the militancy of workers, employers still circumvented the law. With limited staff, the number of inspections by the Labour Department were few. When offenders were caught, it was difficult to prosecute as workers were forced to give statements favouring the employer, or faced dismissal.²⁰⁵ There were no laws protecting employees when they were called to give evidence. However, the balance of political power was clearly shifting towards the workers from the commercial class as was made evident by seventeen instruments of labour legislation being passed in 1952 to address the terms and conditions of employment.

5.3.5. Reform of the Colonial State

The other area of significant change was in the political management of colonial society with the fall of the planter government. Even before the Moyne Commission had been appointed, gradual constitutional reform had been proposed by the Wood Commission to satisfy the increasing demands of the middle class for representative government within the West Indian colonies. The related occurrence of labour unrest provided added impetus, and eventually led to the granting of self-government.

The Saint Lucia (Legislative) Order in Council of 1936 constituted a new Legislative Council that expanded the elected element.²⁰⁶ To satisfy the concern that the elected members might hinder the functioning of government, the Governor was given reserve powers to ensure the passing of legislation that was felt necessary to control government

²⁰⁵ Annual Administration Report, 1951.

²⁰⁶ Colonial Report 1938.

finances, and also in the public interest. The Executive Council comprised official and unofficial members, none of whom were elected, or represented the majority of the population. .

The membership of the First Legislative Council reflected the dominance of the planter and commercial classes in the legislative process. With the exception of official members who were sent by the Colonial Office, all others had landed or commercial interest. Even the nominated unofficials were two planters and one businessperson. The Council was noted for its reluctance to advance any legislation that was not in its best interest. For example, an attempt by the Governor to pass a Land Tax Bill in 1940 was strongly opposed by the Legislative Council as it argued that rather than tax the land to raise funds, what was needed was a land policy to encourage the use of the land.²⁰⁷ The Colonial Government had tried to enact a similar bill in 1890 and 1908, but withdrew due to intense opposition. A resolution was introduced in 1946 for the levy of a tax on land by the elected member for the South Constituency, a lawyer with labour sympathies..²⁰⁸ Reflecting the class basis of the issue, the member noted that in the villages and towns it is accepted that land should be taxed to maintain the society. However beyond the boundaries of the towns and villages, some people argued that a different principle should apply.²⁰⁹ On that occasion, the vote in Council was tied with the official members asked not to vote and the Administrator withholding his support. A land tax was finally passed in 1949, as a Land and House Tax by a Council more sympathetic to working class demands.²¹⁰ Another famous action of the Council was the stalling of the Rent Restriction Ordinance in 1942. The Ordinance sought to restrict the freedom of landlords to increase house rents. In

²⁰⁷ The Governor proposed a Land Tax on unutilized land to assist in balancing the budget.

²⁰⁸ By then the Council was reconstituted after the 1944 elections and presided over by a more conservative Administrator.

²⁰⁹ Minutes of Legislative Council Meeting, 26 September 1946.

²¹⁰ Land and Tax Ordinance No. 29 of 1949.

frustration, the Administrator noted that the Bill had been before the Council for two years but could not be passed.²¹¹ The planter and commercial interests ensured that the Bill was not passed, as they felt it limited the economic power of landlords.

The election of 1944 witnessed the first significant move towards labour leadership at the level of the Legislative Council with the election of Allen Lewis and Francis Carasco, both of whom were from the middle classes, and a lawyer and businessman, respectively.²¹² The men were active in the labour movement, advocating issues on the working class agenda. It was also clear that by 1945, the demands by the public for better representation and a more concerted challenge to imperial control were being undertaken by the Council. For example, the announcement by the Administrator that the Secretary of State had appointed the elected member, a businessman, for the North Constituency as a senior unofficial member, led to intense derision from other elected members.²¹³ In debate, the point was made that there was no objection to the choice of person but to the procedure followed, and the continuing situation of other elected members having lesser precedence to nominated members. One member informed the Administrator that they had already decided among themselves that the appointed member, whenever the occasion arose, would speak on behalf of the elected members. In effect, they had constituted themselves as a united body for engaging the Administrator and officials and in practice became an opposition. In response, the Secretary of State, though insisting on the right of the Crown to appoint as it saw fit, reviewed the order of precedence and gave elected members precedence over nominated members.²¹⁴

²¹¹ Minutes of Legislative Council Meeting, 19 December 1942.

²¹² Allen Lewis, a lawyer, would later become the first Chairman of the St. Lucia Labour Party at its formation in 1951.

²¹³ Minutes of Legislative Council Meeting, 27 April 1945.

²¹⁴ Co 256/43, Message from Administrator, 18 February 1946.

The distrust of imperial rule was becoming so acute that the Governor appealed for the support of elected members, but denied that the reserve powers of the Governor served to discourage full participation of elected members.²¹⁵ Governor Grimble explained that the "...aim had been, rather, to encourage you in the responsible use of the powers which you yourselves command, and to enlist you in teamwork with the Administration."²¹⁶ For example, the Governor appealed for elected members to assist in the 'banishment of false mistrust' caused by delays in implementing development projects. Finally, the Governor appealed to the public not to treat the Commonwealth Development and Welfare Fund personnel as "...common interlopers..." but "...with high courtesy due to friends and helpers..."²¹⁷

On the initiative of the Colonial Office, discussion on representative government was furthered at the level of the Government of the Windwards, with the hosting of the Windward Islands Conference on Constitutional Reform.²¹⁸ The Conference advocated a liberal programme for advancing representative government: including recommendations to have unofficial members of the Executive chosen from elected members of the Executive Council; introduction of the Committee System to be chaired by elected members; awarding universal adult suffrage through a literacy test; restricting the Governor's reserve powers; advancing Federation at the level of the West Indies and Windward and Leeward Islands; and allowing absolute freedom of speech in the Legislative Council.²¹⁹

²¹⁵ CO 256/43, Address by Governor Grimble to Legislative Council, 1 November 1945. He noted that the powers had never been used in St.Lucia and only once in the Windward Island since 1936.

²¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

²¹⁷ *Idem.*

²¹⁸ The Conference was held in Grenada from 16 to 18 January 1945.

²¹⁹ St.Lucia Gazette, 30 January 1945. Many of the recommendations were taken from the Moyne Commission Report and some had already been implemented in other colonies. A Resolution on the Amalgamation of the Leeward and Windward Islands under a single government was passed on 2 May 1946.

Meanwhile the level of dissatisfaction of elected members within the colonial state intensified. The Secretary of State, responding to a refusal by the Council to approve the increase in pay for Appeal Judges, threatened to direct the Governor to approve the increase. The Elected Members argued that they should have been consulted before the increase was awarded, and not asked to approve it as a formality. The Elected Member for the South Constituency, Honourable Allen Lewis, claimed that the threat of the Secretary of State was, "...a very, very serious allegation against the responsibility, the capacity and the ability of the members of this Council."²²⁰ At the same meeting of the Council, a resolution was passed by all elected members calling on the Secretary of State to expedite approval of all schemes forwarded by the colony, so that implementation could commence. Members were also critical of the Administration for its inability to implement numerous projects and schemes that were approved, but delayed.²²¹

The election of September 1947 saw an expansion of working class representation on the Council, when for the first time a nominated member came from the labour movement. However, the final demise of the planter government took place after intense lobbying by the labour movement, including petitions to the Secretary of State for universal adult suffrage to be granted. Finally, the Legislative Council was reconstituted in 1951, with the Administrator as President, the Crown Attorney and the Financial Secretary as ex officio members, three nominated members and eight elected members.²²² The Executive Council was also reconstituted with the Administrator, the Crown Attorney and the Financial Secretary as ex officio members; one nominated member of the Legislative Council, and three elected

²²⁰ Minutes of Legislative Council Meeting, 8 April 1947.

²²¹ Minutes of Legislative Council Meeting, 10 July 1947.

²²² St. Lucia (Legislative Council) Order in Council, 1951.

members.²²³ For the first time, elected members had a clear majority over the ex officio and nominated members in the Legislative Council. The presence of three elected members on the Executive Council marked the beginning of responsibility by the Executive to the Legislature.

The election of 1951 was held under universal adult suffrage and was contested on a party basis with the working class. The St. Lucia Labour Party won four of the eight electoral constituencies, and other labour interests winning two seats.²²⁴ This marked the shifting of complete control of the colonial state to labour leaders, who would now be represented in the Executive Council. The first Legislative Council meeting after the elections of 1951 is instructive of the relationship that existed between the planter class and the labour movement. Honourable James Luc Charles, a member of the Labour Party, pointed out that the ultimate aim of the working class political struggle was Self-Government with Dominion Status within the British Commonwealth.²²⁵ It was clear that the planters and commercial classes, aggrieved by the victory of the labour movement, expected their stewardship to fail. Honourable Charles asked for a burying of the political hatchet and noted that, "...the electorate have made their choice, the first such popular choice in our political history, and this choice must be respected, though it may not meet with general approval."²²⁶ In response, the senior nominated member, a planter, expressed the hope that "...no political party nor in fact anyone will look upon the Nominated Members as persons who have been placed there by Government for the purpose of thwarting the Elected Members and preventing them from achieving the just aspirations of the electorate."²²⁷

²²³ Article 9 of the Royal Instructions, 10 August 1951.

²²⁴ The other major party the People Progressive Party (PPP), a conservative party, won two seats and two other seats were won by Independents, who were also labour activists.

²²⁵ Minutes of Legislative Council Meeting, 13 October 1951.

²²⁶ Ibid. p. 6.

²²⁷ Ibid. p. 7.

The ensuing period would be characterized by the struggle between the working class movement and vested commercial and planter interests in pursuit of a programme to improve the conditions and lives of the majority, who felt cheated by the colonial order.

The Executive Council was further expanded in 1955 to include four elected members. However, the most fundamental change in the state structure during that period was the introduction of the Ministerial System in March 1956, when three elected members from the Executive Council were appointed Ministers by the Governor. Each Minister was responsible, in the Legislative Council, for the functioning of the Department assigned to him. This effectively commenced the accountability of the Executive Council to the elected Legislative Council. The representatives of society were now also responsible for the governance of the society.

5.4 Conclusion

The nature of the state-societal relationship in Saint Lucia during the period under review showed the dominance of external factors, although they highlighted an increasing role for internal factors, compared to the previous period. The rise of internal forces can be clearly traced from the pre-1930s riots, to the granting of universal adult suffrage in the 1950's. The political empowerment of domestic society represented a significant achievement towards the integration of state and society.

Three external factors can be seen as significant in shaping the relationship that led to the riots and unrest of the 1930's. Firstly, the accession of Britain to a number of conventions, in particular the ILO agreements, and the rise of the British Labour Party forced a greater focus on the working and living conditions of the majority coloured class. The emergence of a fraternal relationship between the British Labour Party, the Trade Union Congress and labour representatives in the

colonies led to more questions raised in the British Parliament, and greater agitation for change in imperial policy. On the other hand, labour sympathizers in the colonies were emboldened by the support given by British politicians.

Secondly, the West Indians who served in World War I were exposed to new ideas on political participation and racial equality. The experience of serving in Europe provided a new political sensitization which encouraged them to form alliances with middle class professionals to agitate for change upon their return.

Thirdly, imperial economic policy failed to ameliorate the living conditions of the majority and increased resentment towards the colonial order. The failure by the imperial state to implement a systematic economic plan showed the declining interest in the colony as an economic asset. Once the colonies were no longer seen as providing a steady flow of profits and other regions became more profitable, it was obvious that possession was motivated by strategic reasons and empire prestige.

As conditions worsened, the calls for self-government and improved living conditions increased. The conditions created three distinct conflicts in the colony - the attempts by the planter elite for greater control of the colonial state; middle class attempts to increase participation in colonial government and state; and the calls from the working class for better wages and working conditions. These conflicts provided the motive force for a transformation in the state-society relationship.

Politically, only the planter class had any representation in the Legislature, based on a limited franchise, and resisted any attempt to broaden that franchise. That achievement was itself the product of years of agitation for greater local influence in the functioning of the colonial state. Whereas local planter representation was a qualitative achievement in an earlier period, it was now limiting and a source of

conflict. The middle class intensified its call for increased elective representation in the Legislature but wanted more than political participation as they thought that they had the education and skills to play a greater role in the public service. On other hand, the Imperial State had consistently claimed the need for political control of the society to establish efficient administration, to provide impartial government between competing classes, and to protect the blacks from the whites and from themselves. It was obvious that the Imperial State wanted control as the Assemblies, which were white planter oligarchies, were incompetent and could not ensure a stable government which was an embarrassment to the Imperial State. There was fear also among the planter elite and colonial state that should coloured people attain the property rights to be able to vote, the black majority would assume political control. This realization convinced the Assemblies and the local planter class to accept the system with its limited franchise, rather than continuing to fight for change. For the Imperial State, CCG was already acceptable among public opinion in Britain, which usually wary of the reactionary tendencies of the West Indian planters. That notwithstanding, there remained conflicts between the white oligarchy and the imperial state on the subject of distribution of political power.

The intensification of calls for greater political participation, from the middle class, resulted in the assignment of the Wood Commission to study the political situation and make recommendations. This was the first major concession by the Imperial State to reform the colonial state and to allow an expanded elected element. It meant that the middle class now had an opportunity to participate in the state apparatus, as there was little likelihood of becoming nominated members. Despite such progress, Wood admitted that the object of his work was to ensure that the Secretary of State maintained control of the colonial state. In other words, the attempt was really to find a more sophisticated manner of control. Even then, the colonial state apparatus led by the Governor

sought to stifle any attempt at reform which would allow greater middle class participation through an expanded elected element.

More importantly, the debilitating economic and living conditions led to increasing demands from the black majority, for higher wages. It is instructive that their struggle, unlike that of the middle class, was not aimed at political control of the state but at economic betterment. Saint Lucia, like many of the other West Indian colonies, was facing acute poverty in the 1930's arising from the decline of the sugar industry and its failure to pursue a sustainable economic development policy. The consequence was economic backwardness, suffered by the coloured majority, as employment opportunities declined in the coaling industry. In addition to economic hardship, there was increasing social destitution faced by the black majority living in urban areas of Castries.

The state of the colonies led to the crisis of colonial rule, and to widespread riots and social unrest. The labouring class calls for higher wages and better working conditions culminated in social unrest. The failure of the imperial state to adequately respond encouraged an alliance between the working and middle classes. The demands soon became more than a labour issue, and included a call for greater political participation for the working class in the functioning of the colonial state. Unlike some of the larger colonies where the labour struggle was taken over by middle class professionals, the working class struggle in Saint Lucia was led by trade union working class leaders, although there were a few elected representatives who were middle-class professionals with Labour sentiments. The immediate response of the colonial state was to use force to quell all disturbances, actions that were sanctioned by the imperial state. This highlighted the commitment to ensure the survival of the colonial order. Notwithstanding, the agitation of the working and middle classes made existing colonial rule outmoded and forced a transformation.

This Chapter has highlighted that the transformational events of the 1930's were part of a regional movement for change in colonial rule, and better working and living conditions. It also thrived on the growing international sentiment against colonial rule, and an emerging right to self-determination of colonial peoples. These events took place on the eve of another WW I which momentarily shifted the focus of the imperial state, and created a new context within which to address the crisis of colonial rule.

Two external forces shaped the rethinking of imperial policy towards the colonies. Firstly, the weakening of the largest imperial power, Britain, politically, militarily and economically by World War II meant that its political influence was under greater challenge, and political actions were increasingly criticized. Secondly, the emergence of anti-colonialism as a sentiment to characterize new standards in the administration of states, received support from the two new superpowers, USSR and USA, and became the clarion call of oppressed colonial people, giving new direction in the struggle against colonial rule. The anti-colonial struggle was also fuelled by the emergence of an international black consciousness movement that sought to fight racism, and the institutionalized oppression of black people. The rise of anti-colonialism as a movement was significant in providing ideological direction and guidance to the domestic struggles throughout the colonial world. Colonial peoples were now able to refer to an identifiable source of their backwardness, and claim the institution of new arrangements for self-rule as a way out.

Whatever the arguments against the Moyne Commission, the imperial response resulted in a comprehensive programme of ameliorative measures that dramatically changed the colonial state-societal relationship. An unprecedented social welfare programme was undertaken to relieve the state of destitution that existed. Living conditions and social opportunities were increased for the black majority,

the concerns of workers were given attention at least at the legislative level, and the call for greater political participation received support.

Amongst the most significant changes, were the rights granted to workers to organize themselves and agitate for improvements in their wages and conditions of employment. Whilst, this did not always result in higher wages and better conditions for the workers, they now had the constitutional right to demand such improvements.

Other significant changes were the rights to organize political parties and increased space for elected members to participate in the legislature. This gradual reform of the colonial state allowed the middle class professionals and small business people to become part of the state apparatus and represented the beginning of the end for planter government. Noticeably, the majority population was still isolated. Interestingly, as middle class involvement was increased the powers of the Governor were also increased to ensure the safe passage of legislation. This reflected the concern of the imperial state that the impending conflict between the planters and the middle-class representatives should not stall the functioning of the colonial legislature or impair the imperial interest in stability and order.

A significant development took place in 1947 when a labour representative was nominated to the Legislative Council. That represented another shift from planter control to labour control. Eventually, universal adult suffrage provided the opportunity for the working class and labour representatives to take control of the Legislative Council. The shift to labour control was completed when the elected members were also given responsibility for the executive functioning of the colony. This was a fundamental transformation in the nature of the colonial state and its relationship to the society.

It meant that the colonial state was now in the hands of a legislature elected by a majority of society. The final decision on all matters still came from the imperial state but there was greater local

autonomy and the shaping of local power. It also meant that the planter's authority, as elite rule and as a political force in manning the state, was destroyed. In terms of the government of the colony, there was also a corresponding shift to local control, as the executive was chosen from the legislature, and imperial control of the government was being dismantled. Undoubtedly, the conditions were right for the creation of a domestically empowered state with institutional authority and ability to improve the lives of its citizen, in keeping with Jackson's notion of empirical statehood.

Notwithstanding the above, two conditions existed within the state and society which militated against the advancement of the colony towards empirical statehood. Firstly, changes in social and political development was not matched by the economic policies adopted by the imperial state in the immediate post WWII period. It can be argued that such policies were needed for the revitalization of the British economy, but did little to revive fortunes in the colonies, especially with the ailing sugar industry. The absence of any programme of industrialization, or a systematic approach at economic viability for the colonies, was a gross deficiency in relationship between the Imperial State and the colonies. At the domestic level, although there were improvements in welfare, the absence of sustained economic development undermined the confidence of the majority in the colonial state. It was also noted that imperial state was never interested in pursuing an industrialization programme for the colonies as a basis for economic self-sufficiency.

Secondly, it can be argued that granting political and social rights was an easier way for the imperial state to curtail the unrest and control the fermenting desire to overthrow the colonial order. The colonial state was still largely influenced by the planter elite, as an economic force and they sought as usual to stifle the empowerment of workers and the labour movement. The Secretary of State still controlled the major decisions affecting the colonies, and the imperial state continued to be

blamed by the coloured political leadership for restricting the development of the colony.

6

State and Society: From Associated State to International Actor

Chapter 5 assessed the crisis of colonial rule and the consequent domestic response to the riots and social unrest. The imperial response through the Moyne Commission sought to reform colonialism and consequently laid the basis for a new state-societal configuration. Social discontent, though abated, continued as the imperial response was seen as inadequate and lacking urgency. Political activities, now legalized, were centred on anti-colonialism primarily through the call for greater self-rule. This led to the third transformative period which immediately followed the period of reformed colonialism which lasted from 1945 to the 1960's. The period which will be examined lasted from the mid-1960's to the mid-1980's witnessed the most distinctive change in the international system, with the institutionalization of national self-determination, which had emerged as a sentiment after WWI, as a right for all colonial peoples.

As with the two previous chapters, three distinct features of the transformational period will be examined: the nature of the existing state-societal relationship, highlighting the external and internal forces involved in shaping that relationship; the origin and nature of the transformative event; and the consequent state-societal relationship. This Chapter has additional significance because the imperial state, in the first case instance, decided that the small states could not be granted sovereign statehood, so instead instituted a three-quarter way house to

sovereignty. Therefore, the examination of the state-societal relationship will be a review of the process leading to the granting of Associated Statehood, and the impact of that experiment on the development of the state and society. Finally, the chapter will examine the influences – domestic and external – that led to the granting of independence and the effect on shaping the state and society.

6.1.0 Imperial Policy and Decolonisation in Saint Lucia – Impact on State and Society

The period after 1945 witnessed a dramatic change in the criteria for acceptance of territories as independent states in the international system. The realities of Cold War politics and independence movements ensured that a new international norm emerged which pressured imperial powers to accept the aspirations of colonial peoples for independence, as a right and not a privilege. These realities would transform the international system and provide the motivation for smaller colonies like Saint Lucia to move towards independence and emerge as international actors. This background highlights the role of international influences – the emergence of decolonization as a norm within the UN - and American concerns in shaping imperial policy and the eventually granting of the first steps of decolonization. The first steps, through associated statehood, provided a new state, but left the issues of economic viability and international enfranchisement of the state unanswered.

6.1.1 International Relations and the context for Imperial Policy

The acceleration of decolonization within the British Empire, which begun after World War II, was inevitable as the mood within the international system, encouraged by the Soviet Union and the United States, for different reasons, was to end colonial empires. The general

response of Her Majesty's Government (HMG)¹ was to decry the claims of anti-colonialists who focused solely on political evolution as the measure of advancement for colonial territories.² Instead, HMG argued that self-government should be granted according to the particular circumstances and people should be trained and equipped socially, economically and politically, for eventual self-government.

Following on the decisions at the Yalta Conference, the San Francisco Conference led to agreement on three Chapters in the United Nations Charter dealing with decolonization.³ Accordingly, Britain and other colonial powers had the responsibility to transmit certain information to the Secretary-General relating to the non self-governing territories. International pressure on colonial powers was intensified, when in 1946, the first session of the General Assembly passed a resolution requesting that the Secretary-General include a statement in his annual report on the state of the non self-governing colonies.⁴ The colonial powers were not in agreement with such a resolution, as they felt that the Charter requested updates for information purposes, and not for the general study of the General Assembly. This appeared to the colonial powers as an attempt by some countries to pursue political objectives through the colonial issue, although it appeared that many former colonies were involved. For example, the Philippines noted the absence of a suitable mechanism to implement Chapter XI of the Charter and proposed a World Conference of Non Self-Governing Peoples, where the colonial powers would not be represented. Regardless, the tone and

¹ HMG is used interchangeably with the imperial state henceforth simply because primary documentation makes reference to the actions of the imperial state as that of the HMG. It allows for ease of reference in all citations.

² Secretary of State, House of Common Debate, Vol. 391, Col. 49, 13 July 1943.

³ Chapters XII and XIII dealt with the international trusteeship system and Chapter XI dealt with non-self-governing territories.

⁴ D.J Morgan, *Guidance towards Self-Government in British Colonies, 1941-1971*, vol.5 of *The Official History of Colonial Development* (London; The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1980).

intent of the anti-colonial lobby at the United Nations stimulated the international movement towards decolonization of all territories.

Decolonization became an urgent issue at the United Nations in 1960, with the adoption of a resolution calling for immediate steps to end colonialism. The United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1541 (XV) provided guidance to all colonial powers that other than being granted independence, a country could also be considered as self-governing if it established a free association or integrated with an independent state, and did so by free choice expressed through democratic processes. In these cases, countries had the option to proceed to independence if they could demonstrate that this was the popular will.

However, by 1963 the United Nations General Assembly considered the Report of the Group of Twenty-Four which showed mounting anxiety over the increasing independence of smaller territories. The Committee requested that the General Assembly consider the progress of these countries to independence and the "...possibility of international assistance in order to facilitate the exercise of their rights to independence."⁵ Despite the concern with the viability of small countries becoming independent and the need for international assistance, the pressure for decolonization was intensified.

Another influence affecting imperial policy was US policy and attitudes towards decolonization in the Caribbean. The US Government was supportive of the Federation, provided some limited aid and participated in a joint US/UK/Canada economic mission to the Eastern Caribbean in 1961. However, the collapse of the Federation, the anti-aid mood of Congress and US bureaucratic differences led to a termination of direct US involvement with the British colonies.⁶ Whilst the U.S. Government had not yet taken any position on the new initiatives after

⁵ Morgan, *Self-Government*, p. 203.

⁶ FO 371/185004, no.10, *US Policy in the Caribbean*, Despatch from Sir P Dean to Mr. Brown, 29 November 1966.

the collapse of the Federation, a high-ranking State Department official had indicated that they would not welcome the creation of any politically and economically weak federation, and would not want to see a possible federation of the seven smaller colonies, given independence.⁷

It appeared that the Americans had not focused on the decolonization process in the Caribbean, presuming instead that the status quo would be maintained. They had seen the British presence as a stabilizing influence and expected a continued guarantee of British interest in the security of the Southern Hemisphere. However, the granting of self-government to the Bahamas and British Honduras caused some alarm about the possibility of communist, and in particular Cuban, influence in the region.⁸ Sunderland stressed that the Americans would be disappointed if there was a diminution of British responsibility in its area of longest historical interests, which was also an area closest to the US.⁹ By the end of the 1960's, the US became worried that the arrangements proposed by HMG would allow the smaller territories to vote themselves into independence and establish mini-states, and at worst become 'little Cubas'.¹⁰ Concerned that the reaction of the US would be a reluctance to grant aid to these territories, the Foreign Office lobbied for the proposed Act to include a clause which would ensure that Associated Statehood could only be terminated by a difficult two-thirds majority in Parliament and in a referendum.¹¹

⁷ FO 371/173580, no.2, Letter from IJM Sutherland to AR Thomas on the concerns of the State Department, 7 January 1964. The high-ranking official was W C Burdett, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, US State Department. At that stage, there was consideration of Grenada merging with Trinidad and the remainder of the seven small territories forming a Federation.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ FO 371/184567, no.269, Minute by HAF Hohler, 5 December 1966. The proposed arrangement was the granting of associated statehood through the West Indies Act of 1967.

¹¹ Ibid. Associated Statehood was established as a semi-autonomous relationship between the smaller colonies and Great Britain.

The 1960's was also a period of inter-departmental conflicts within the State Department which led to an ambivalent US policy towards the region.¹² The colonies were under the Bureau of European Affairs, whilst the independent territories in the Western Hemisphere fell under the Inter-American Bureau. The conflict finally ended with the colonies falling under the ambit of the Inter-American Bureau.

The crux of US policy in the region was clearly articulated by President Johnson in 1965 with the declaration that the "American nation cannot, must not and will not permit the establishment of another Communist government in the Western Hemisphere."¹³ The Americans used the opportunity at the Antigua Conference in 1966 to assure all the colonies that they would endeavour to provide aid and have a closer relationship with them.¹⁴ These developments led to a feeling in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) that America was developing a new relationship with the colonies, which should be welcomed. It was also felt that if the British proved unable to ensure that the colonies remained faithful to the Western camp, the Americans would step in and take any action necessary to prevent communist infiltration.¹⁵

6.1.2 Imperial Policy and the Decolonization Process

The decade of the 1960's witnessed the preoccupation of imperial policy with the constitutional future of the smaller colonies in the pursuit of a balance between the international pressures for decolonization and the stated obligation to assist the colonies to become self-governing. The official post-war policy of Britain was to,

¹² S.R. Ashton and David Killingray, eds. *The West Indies*, Series B vol.6 of *British Documents on the End of Empire*, (London; The Stationary Office, 1999).

¹³ *Ibid.* p. 720.

¹⁴ FO 371/185004, *US Policy*. The Antigua Conference was held to discuss the Tripartite Economic Survey which is discussed later in this section. The assurances were necessary as the Inter-American Bureau had taken over colonial affairs and was no longer interested in the Tripartite Economic Survey.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

guide the colonial territories to responsible government within the Commonwealth in conditions that ensure to the people concerned both a fair standard of living and freedom from oppression from any quarter.¹⁶

The Secretary of State also explained that a territory would only become independent if it had a viable economy and could defend its own interests.¹⁷ Whilst the policy for larger colonies seemed quite clear, since they were capable of achieving independence, the peculiar situation of smaller colonies became the subject of investigation for a Committee of Enquiry into Constitutional Development in the Smaller Colonial Territories in 1949. The main objective of the Committee was to “[e]nquire into the present constitutional position of the smaller Colonial territories and the probable trend of their future political development...”¹⁸ The Committee concluded that there was little prospect for these territories becoming independent as apart from the strategic importance of some of them, they had few resources to maintain self-government. However, the official responses from various departments were most unfavourable to the recommendations of the Committee.

By 1951, in a new statement of colonial policy, the Secretary of State, Mr. Oliver Lyttelton, declared that in addition to building the institutions necessary for self-government, HMG would be pursuing the economic and social development of the colonies to keep pace with their political development.¹⁹ This position was a slight change in approach as it suggested that political development could and was proceeding at a faster pace than other components. Colonies were accordingly categorized as those capable of achieving full independence, those that

¹⁶ *The Colonial Empire, 1947-1948*, Cmd. 7433, June 1948, Para.3.

¹⁷ C.A. (48) 12, 8 December 1948. Memorandum by the Secretary of State on the Constitutional Development of Smaller Colonial Territories.

¹⁸ Morgan, *Self-Government*, p. 35.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

by forming units could become capable of achieving independence, and those that fell into neither category.

There was little concern with the future of small colonies in the West Indies as they were part of the second category and would be part of the West Indies Federation.²⁰ Discussions were held in 1961 to ensure that the smaller territories of the Leeward and Windward Islands had parity of status within the Federation.²¹ Though the smaller territories wanted immediate self-government in the same way as the larger territories had, the Imperial State decided that it would be granted only as part of an independent Federation. The Federation was formed in 1958 but collapsed in 1962 giving way to a successor attempt to form a 'Federation of the Eight'.²² When that attempt also failed, the smaller colonies of the West Indies were drawn back into the broader considerations of the HMG on the future of smaller colonies.

Meanwhile, HMG was concerned that few federations and mergers had been formed, the effect of which would mean that numerous small countries would request to become members of the Commonwealth. A working party was established to examine, inter alia, possible constitutional forms for these smaller colonies to satisfy the requirement of Chapter XI of the United Nations Charter to achieve self-government in all dependent countries.²³ A draft policy was finally circulated to all relevant departments, and revised for discussion at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers meetings of 1964.²⁴ The draft policy recommended the granting of independence to all territories capable of achieving it;

²⁰ The West Indies Federation was formed in 1958 and comprised the British colonies excepting Guyana, Bahamas, Cayman Islands, Turks and Caicos Islands, and Bermuda.

²¹ *Report of the Leeward and Windward Islands Constitutional Conference, June 1961*(Cmnd. 1434, 1961).

²² CO 1031/3374, no.1 'Federation in the Caribbean: predictions and possibilities', Memorandum by G.W. Jamieson. The eight were the Windward and Leeward Islands and Barbados.

²³ Cabinet Office File 10/4/83/1, Part 2. Note of Sir Norman Brook, 17 October 1961.

²⁴ DO (O) (64) 16, 23 March 1964.

granting 'free association' to others not capable of achieving it; and changing the nomenclature used for colony to avoid international criticism.²⁵

Meanwhile, Secretary of State Mr. Greenwood undertook a tour of the East Caribbean to hear views on proposals for a Federation for the smaller territories. In a submission to the Overseas Policy Committee, he noted that although the territories no longer had the strategic and commercial value for Britain, which they had had in the eighteenth century, they were in an internationally sensitive area close to America which made them attractive to hostile interests.²⁶ He noted the diverse opinions on and lukewarm response to Federation, and noting the importance of the potentially dangerous situation recommended four possible constitutional futures - a strong Federation; a weak Federation; two Federations of Leeward Islands and Windward Islands to later join with Barbados; and independence for Barbados with a kind of 'free association' with Britain for the others.²⁷

As a follow-up, a Conference on Colonial Policy was held in July 1965 to explore arrangements for territories that did not wish or would not be able to sustain independence, or were unlikely to be part of a federation or integrate with other territories.²⁸ The Conference produced a White Paper which proposed negotiations for free association of the smaller territories, as integration with Great Britain was not a possibility.

It is worth noting that throughout these discussions, there were differences between the various departments of Whitehall on the process of decolonization. This was especially highlighted over the contents of the proposed White Paper on Decolonization. According to Morgan, "[r]arely

²⁵ Morgan, *Self-Government*.

²⁶ CAB 148/20, OPD (65)51, Memorandum by Mr. Greenwood.

²⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁸ CAB 21/5295/5, annex, Conference on Colonial Policy, 8-11 July 1965. The Conference was held for only Governors, Whitehall officials and other imperial administrators.

in Whitehall had argument been so powerfully marshalled against a proposed White Paper...”²⁹

6.1.3 The Granting of Associated Statehood

The above account demonstrates the desire of HMG to find a solution to its colonial dilemma – escaping responsibility for the colonies, avoiding international criticism for abandoning the territories, and still protecting its strategic interest in the context of the Cold War. The next step in the decolonization process sought to resolve the dilemma and represented a significant stage in the development of the state and society in Saint Lucia. The proposed solution involving granting ‘Statehood in Association with Great Britain’ was intended to grant sovereignty beyond self-government, but not full sovereign statehood. In effect, the smaller colonies would now become responsible for their social and economic development. The state/society complex was to function as a fully viable and independent entity, but with autonomous no international role.

The Legislative Council of Saint Lucia, after debating the future constitutional status of the island following the abandonment of the Federation efforts, formally requested the granting of full internal self-government by 1 January 1966.³⁰ The request was made because the “...ministerial form of government wherein the powers of the members elected by the people of Saint Lucia are limited to an extent inconsistent with present political maturity.”³¹ The request presupposed the ‘traditional status’ of self-government, where Britain would have responsibility for external affairs and defence, have ultimate power over the constitution and be held responsible for the government of the territory. It is noteworthy that the territories did not ask for

²⁹ Morgan, *Self-Government*, p. 236.

³⁰ Minutes of Legislative Council Meeting, 24 September 1965.

³¹ *Ibid.* p. 10.

independence, as they still wanted access to imperial aid. According to the Chief Minister, the colony was facing desperate poverty which was,

inherited from a colonial power that has exploited us, our people and our land, for their profit; and now the easy way to get out of it, as cheaply as possible is to give you independence. If we were passing a resolution today for Independence, we could get it.³²

The request of the Legislature meant that there would still be a colonial relationship in the understanding of the United Nations. Therefore, Britain would continue to be held internationally responsible for the development of the territory yet would no longer be in control of the day-to-day functioning of the government machinery. The leadership of the colony was more interested in the control of decision making for the colony. It was felt that self-government would remove the "...humiliations which only members of the Executive Branch of Government, past and present understand....the humiliation we get at the hands of the Colonial Office."³³

HMG was hesitant to agree; instead, the Secretary of State desired a constitutional relationship that in his view "...would be satisfactory both to Britain and to the people of the territory in the longer term."³⁴ It was argued that the traditional grant of self-government was only appropriate for territories that were near to independence but not for territories unlikely to attain independence.³⁵

At that stage, it was clear that Britain no longer wanted responsibility for the territories especially as they would not have control of the local administrative machinery under self-government and feared that HMG may frequently have to intervene to resolve difficulties. The

³² Ibid. p. 14.

³³ Ibid. p. 22. Presentation by Minister for Communications.

³⁴ FO 371/179142, no.5, Letter from Sir H Poynton to Sir P Gore Booth on future constitutional arrangements, *Enclosure: 'The constitutional future of the Leeward and Windward Islands'*.

³⁵ *Report of the Windward Islands Constitutional Conference, 1966* (Cmnd. 3021, June 1966). Response of the Secretary of State to an explanation as to why the traditional form of self-government was not offered.

British wanted a relationship that did not have any 'colonial stigma', but would not compromise on the broader concerns of political stability and ideological expansion of Communism. It was proposed by HMG to enter into a 'voluntary' association with the territory that would assume full power over its constitution and government, except for defence and external affairs.³⁶ In such a constitutional arrangement for the states, the constitutional provisions to ensure democratic practices were to be entrenched and the procedure to declare independence unilaterally was to be entrenched even deeper.³⁷ However, HMG would have the power to legislate, if required, in pursuit of its responsibilities for defence and external affairs. Further, whilst not having the power over the decisions of the associated state, the HMG could refer any executive action of any territory to the courts for determination of its constitutionality, with its decision having the force of law. In a sense, the courts would become the impartial arbiter, a role traditionally performed by the Secretary of State. HMG also had the right to terminate the association at anytime, after giving six months notice and obtaining Parliamentary approval.

In the view of HMG, this represented significant progress towards satisfying international pressure for decolonisation, while relieving itself of the difficulties of responsibility for the territories' development. Sir Poynton explained that,

we have no great commercial or defence interests in these islands any longer; and the ties that we have with them are largely cultural, moral and sentimental. Our principal ally, the United States is, however, very sensitive about anything that happens in these territories and would not welcome a situation developing in which Britain withdrew and left seven potential little Haitis or Cubas on their door-step.³⁸

³⁶ Ibid. *Enclosure, Constitutional Future*.

³⁷ Unilateral declaration of independence would require a long period of public discussion and two-thirds support in the Legislature and from voters in a referendum. It was this provision for unilateral declaration of independence which made the association 'voluntary'.

³⁸ FO 371/179142, no.5, Letter from Sir H Poynton to Sir P Gore Booth on future constitutional arrangements,

For HMG, the new approach would be acceptable to all concerned parties. The colonial state would be under the control of the majority middle and working classes and this arrangement met their desire for total internal self-government with responsibility and power. It satisfied the concern of the US Government over the possibility of numerous small independent states in the region, giving rise to more 'Haitis' and 'Cubas'. It met the geopolitical concerns of the imperial state on defence issues and the participation of these new states in the international arena in a period of Cold War tension. It also ensured that constitutional issues, would be resolved by the courts, or at least provides a legal basis for the use of force if necessary.

Accordingly, a Windward Islands Constitutional Conference was held to examine the general nature of the relationship with the Imperial State under 'associated statehood' and the particular constitutional provisions for each territory.³⁹ However, Saint Lucia's delegation requested full internal self-government in the conventional manner with the option to review after a few years to decide if to proceed to independence on their own, in association with Britain, or with other territories in the West Indies.⁴⁰ The Secretary of State rejected that approach and indicated that either the British approach was accepted, or full independence would be offered immediately.⁴¹

The representatives of the territories were of the view that the discussion on constitutional advancement should consider arrangements for trade, aid and immigration, as they feared that they would find themselves in a less favourable position. It was strongly felt that the opportunity to fashion a new relationship should be used to strengthen

³⁹ *Constitutional Proposals for Antigua, St. Kitts/Nevis/Anguilla, Dominica, Saint Lucia, St. Vincent, Grenada* (Cmnd. 2865, December 1965).

⁴⁰ Minutes of Legislative Council Meeting, 28 June 1966. Presentation by Chief Minister John Compton.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*

their position and ensure their viability.⁴² Saint Lucia's delegation argued that constitutional advancement without a supporting economy would not make the constitution meaningful nor would it safeguard democracy.⁴³ HMG insisted that an increase in aid was not feasible, but that allocated aid should be used more effectively. HMG also agreed that the Caribbean Division of the Overseas Development Ministry would assist to rationalize the use of aid.⁴⁴ It appeared that this was another missed opportunity for HMG to ensure that colonies were placed on a path of economic viability.

The West Indies Act of 1967 provided for the conferment of a new status of association with the United Kingdom. It was clear that the unanimous adoption by the Legislature in Saint Lucia of the new Constitution was an act under duress. There was no possibility to change any provision as agreed at the Constitutional Conference even if the Legislature was in opposition. Even worse, HMG had allowed only a few provisions to be negotiated. A legislative member captured the common feeling by denying that the status of independence, in association with Britain was free and voluntary "...a fraud, an imposition...it is a dictation."⁴⁵

The official assessment was that the negotiations for Associated Statehood were bitter and hostile and left an unfavourable atmosphere for a new relationship that should be based on mutual trust and understanding.⁴⁶ The public was apathetic to the negotiations as it was noted that it was only with the arrival of Statehood Day and the prospects of celebration that any interest was shown by the public. According to the Briefing, "...even so the jubilation with which the end of

⁴² *Windward Islands Constitutional Conference.*

⁴³ Minutes of Legislative Council Meeting, 28 June 1966.

⁴⁴ *Windward Constitutional Conference.*

⁴⁵ Legislative Council Meeting, 28 June 1966. Presentation by Minister for Communications.

⁴⁶ FCO 43/125, Confidential. Briefing to Hon. Herbert Bowden, 24 February, 1967.

colonialism was welcome might be viewed as strangely lacking.”⁴⁷ An earlier intelligence report had highlighted that the Labour Party had advised its supporters not to take part in any celebrations and had accused the Secretary of State of betraying the Labour Party.⁴⁸

However, in ending the colonial relationship, HMG felt that it was the best arrangement, in the absence of a Federation, as it would limit HMG expenditure on the territories, and would encourage international responsibility for the region.⁴⁹ HMG explained the new arrangements to the US Government and sought their support within the United Nations as a full measure of self-government.⁵⁰ However, the concept of ‘Statehood in Association with Great Britain’ did not receive recognition by the United Nations, since it was not seen “...as constituting effective decolonization, especially as there was no popular expression of self-determination.”⁵¹

6.1.4 The Emergence of an Autonomous State

A critical aspect of statehood is the capacity of the state to determine the power relations in society and to execute policy. Whilst the attainment of associated statehood was short of independence, it still represented the achievement of internal self-government and the emergence of a semi-autonomous state. For the first time, the structure and functioning of the state would be controlled by local interest and accountable to the local legislature. This in effect ended over 150 years of colonial rule. The constitution proposed to the states was modelled on the Westminster system.⁵² However, after the Constitutional Conferences, each constitution was modified to satisfy the local demands

⁴⁷ Ibid. p. 2.

⁴⁸ FCO 43/125, Secret. Saint Lucia Intelligence Report, 1 March 1967.

⁴⁹ Morgan, *Self-Government*.

⁵⁰ FO 371/184566, no.54. Letter from Mr. Stewart to Mr. Rusk, 29 April 1966.

⁵¹ Tony Thorndike, “The Politics of Inadequacy”, *Social and Economic Studies*, Vol.19, No.1.

⁵² *Constitutional Proposals for Antigua, St.Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, Dominica, Saint Lucia, St.Vincent, Grenada*, Cmd. 2865, (London; H.M.S.O., 1966).

of the respective states. The intention was to have a constitution and model for a permanent rather than transitional government.⁵³ The Constitution provided the framework for a state that was significantly different to the Crown Colony state in the entrenchment of fundamental rights, the role of the Head of State, and the executive provisions to secure basic democratic rights. However, an examination of the Constitution of the Associated State in Saint Lucia highlights how the demands of the Saint Lucia Delegation produced a distinct constitution that satisfied the ruling elite. Under the new state structure, the Head of State was the Governor, but unlike the Colonial Governor or Administrator, this was now a ceremonial post and a symbol of national unity. Under the Westminster System, that person must function above the narrow interests of party politics and have fairness of judgment, but most importantly, must be seen by the people to be independent and not subject to partisan persuasion. However, the Constitution did not provide any formal procedure to select a Governor and thus satisfy the necessity for selecting an impartial person. The constitutional proposals made provision for the Secretary of State to be guided by the Chief Minister when advising Her Majesty.⁵⁴ It was recommended that the term of office would be five years. The agreed provision allowed the Governor to, "...hold office during Her Majesty's pleasure..."⁵⁵ It was felt that such a provision which provided a time limit, actually allowed for the appointment of the Governor to be subjected to the preferences of the party in power. This stands in opposition to the national image that the Governor ought to represent.

The impartiality of the Governor is most obvious in the role that is played in safeguarding the democratic practices by which elections and

⁵³ Urias Forbes, "The West Indies Associated States: Some Aspects of the Constitutional Arrangement" in *Social and Economic Studies*, Vol.19, No. 1, March 1970.

⁵⁴ *Constitutional Proposals*.

⁵⁵ *Saint Lucia Constitution Order, 1967* (S.I. 1967, No. 229), s.32.

constituency delimitation takes place. Therefore, in most other Associated States' Constitutions, the provision allowed the Governor to appoint Supervisors of Elections, who were not politically influenced, or in the case of Dominica, for the Governor to exercise general supervision and control. In the case of Saint Lucia, the Supervisor of Elections was appointed by the Public Service Commission after consultation with the Premier.⁵⁶ Given that the Public Service was not safeguarded against impartiality and the need for the approval of the Premier, there would always be questions regarding the objectivity of the Supervisor. Similarly, the provisions for the delimitation of constituencies had the least safety devices in the case of Saint Lucia. Unlike most other associated states where the delimitation of constituencies was handled by an independent agency, in Saint Lucia it was handled by a standing committee of the House of Assembly.⁵⁷ There was no attempt to hide or mitigate any partisan considerations, a significant difference from the permanent non-political mechanism under the Westminster model. This was another example of the entrenchment of the ruling political elite through the formulation of a new constitution.

There was also a divergence from the model in the mechanism for appointment of the Public Service Commission. This Commission is highly significant in small societies where the public service is the largest employer and is responsible for implementation of governmental plans and projects. In effect, the public service must not be the place for the repayment of political support, nor show political biasness in the functioning of the institutions of the state. The provisions were generally common for all associated states. In the case of Saint Lucia, the Public Service Commission was appointed by the Governor on the advice of the Premier. The Constitution made it impossible for elected politicians and public officers, or persons recently employed as public officers to become

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Ibid. s. 49.

members, and fixed the period of service. Once in office, however, it was also made difficult to remove members from their positions. However, there was no independence given to the Governor to act on his or her considered judgment. It allowed the Premier to make as many partisan recommendations as was felt necessary.

From the above, it was clear that the imperial state was not anxious to enforce provisions that made the acceptance of associated statehood more difficult. Local political leaders were allowed to modify the proposals once the idea of associated statehood was going to be accepted with the colonial-type limits extending to defence and foreign affairs. It appeared that since control of external affairs and an economically viable state were not going to be provided, then at least greater domestic political control, as requested by these leaders, would be provided. The Government, led by the United Workers Party (UWP), indicated its satisfaction with the proposed Associated Statehood Constitution and according to the Chief Minister, “[t]here is nothing too much in it...what we felt should be enshrined in the Constitution, has now been enshrined in the Constitution and it is a Constitution that I ask this Honourable House to approve.”⁵⁸ The imperial state did not seem concerned with structuring a state that gave meaning and expression to the fundamental rights of citizens which was entrenched in writing. This concern should have been foremost given the historical experience of the colonies and the separation of the society from the functioning of the state. Instead, the associated state was designed to continue the practice of politics without participation.

Another critical aspect of sovereign statehood is the international role of the state – the capacity to participate as an actor in the

⁵⁸ *Proceedings and Debates of the Meeting of the House of Assembly*, 20 October 1978. p. 2. The United Workers Party won the 1964 elections and comprised a splinter group from the Saint Lucia Labor Party called the National Labour Movement (NLM) and a disintegrating planter/business interest group calling the Peoples Progressive Party (PPP).

international system. This role involves responding to a number of externally induced demands for state-to-state relations as well as domestically determined needs for external support. However, it was clear that the new constitutional arrangement which provided statehood to Saint Lucia, though in association with Great Britain, was designed to solve the decolonization dilemma and address the concern of having small states existing within the international system. The formula provided full internal self-government but limited the most fundamental characteristic of independent statehood – international recognition of independence. Whilst in private HMG officials expressed concern about the islands becoming ‘little ‘Cubas’, in public the official explanation was less patronizing. The Secretary of State explained that Britain met the, “...legitimate demands for maximum degree of internal autonomy, while at the same time recognizing your difficulties in providing the costly accompaniments of independence in the exercise of defence and external affairs...”⁵⁹ In effect, the responsibility for external affairs and defence was presented as a deliberate delegation of responsibility to HMG.

HMG had the ultimate say in external affairs consistent with the discussions at the Constitutional Conference, which informed the Agreement signed with each associated state on the Delegation of Authority in External Affairs.⁶⁰ It was that Agreement that defined the embryonic, though restrictive, international role for the state in Saint Lucia. It allowed Saint Lucia to apply for full membership of the UN Specialised Agencies and similar organizations of which the UK was a member. Saint Lucia was restricted to signing trade agreements that only dealt with the treatment of goods, and to negotiating and concluding agreements, if agreed to by HMG, of a purely local nature with other independent Commonwealth countries in the Caribbean, other

⁵⁹ FCO 43/14, Arthur Bottomley Address to Statehood Day Celebrations in Saint Lucia, 1 March, 1967.

⁶⁰ FCO 43/31, Agreement on Delegation of Authority in External Affairs.

associated states and colonies. There was greater latitude for agreements of a financial, technical, cultural or scientific nature but these had to be agreed to by HMG. The Saint Lucia Government was required to inform HMG of all its actions under delegation and to accept the decision of HMG where any disagreement arose. Finally, HMG agreed to train officials in the conduct of external affairs and defence. The international role of the state was expanded to allow contact with consular officers from third countries to perform their duties if only that consular officer was provided with permission by HMG. These duties only related to protection of nationals of that country and the promotion or protection of trade between that country and the associated state.⁶¹

The first concern for HMG in separating an international role from autonomous self-government was with the phrasing of new international agreements, which would be silent on territorial application and taken to apply to the associated states since HMG was responsible for their external affairs.⁶² HMG was fearful that the states, with full internal authority, might not implement the provisions of HMG agreements, which in effect would prove embarrassing. Some of the agreements might not apply to the states in question who may lack the capacity to implement them. The matter was settled with the UN making it clear that all treaties signed by HMG which were applicable to associated states before 'Association Day' would remain in force. However, concerning future treaties, the associated states would have to be *consulted* if it applied to them, which would then be ratified in their name.⁶³ Any agreement that was ratified without reference to any particular state would not apply. It is noteworthy that the provision was

⁶¹ FCO 43/30, Proposals of Interdepartmental Working Party on External Affairs of Associated States.

⁶² FCO 43/28, Letter from M.G. Winton to A.D. Watts, 28 February 1967.

⁶³ FCO 43/28, Letter of UK Permanent Representative to the UN to the UN Secretary-General, 12 October 1967.

made for HMG to 'consult', rather than 'sign with the consent of the associated state'.

Another instance of HMG attempting to define the international role of the associated states arose when the states sought membership of the Commonwealth. It had been decided at the 1965 Commonwealth Prime Ministers Meeting (CPMM) that the associated states could join Commonwealth organizations in their own right and attend meetings dealing with matters of concern to them.⁶⁴ However, there was no agreement on their participation at the CPMM. Guyana objected to their exclusion, stating that entire region governed by one Prime Minister was insufficient.⁶⁵ The British had objected to their inclusion because there would be too many representatives at the meeting and more importantly, the obligations that would be discussed would not apply to the associated states. Guyana argued that the states were not colonies and the responsibility for defence and external affairs, which Great Britain had, was akin to a treaty arrangement.⁶⁶ HMG informed the Commonwealth Secretariat that the Associated States would not be full members of the Secretariat, but could participate in all Secretariat meetings, except those dealing with organizational, budgetary or political matters.⁶⁷ All invitations to meetings should be issued through HMG.

In the areas of international trade, HMG insisted on the need for HMG approval before the associated states could agree to any arrangements. In the first such instance, HMG insisted that it was required to provide permission to sign the treaties establishing the Caribbean Free Trade Area (CARIFTA) and the Eastern Caribbean Common Market (ECCM). In the case of CARIFTA, HMG permission was

⁶⁴ FCO 43/27, Memorandum from R.Walker to all British Government Representatives, 24 April 1967.

⁶⁵ Guyana had noted that Rhodesia had been allowed to attend CPMM although it was not independent nor was a member of the UN.

⁶⁶ FCO 43/27, Letter from Prime Minister Burnham to Prime Minister of Great Britain, 8 June 1967.

⁶⁷ FCO 43/27, Letter from R.Walker to T.W. Aston, 5 May 1967.

necessary because it involved other independent Caribbean territories. In the case of ECCM, which was established among the associated states and the colony of Montserrat, permission for signing was given at the final moment. It was given "...on the understanding that finalization of the common external tariff will be the subject of prior consultation with HMG because of international implications."⁶⁸

The limited role given to the associated states betrayed the fact that they were not independent or sovereign, which would accentuate the desire for full statehood.

6.1.5 External Concerns for Economic Viability

Another critical aspect of statehood is the capacity of the state to meet the expectations of its citizens or at least to deliver their needs. The vital question was whether in granting self-government through associated statehood, and thus ending imperial responsibility, HMG would ensure economic viability. Throughout colonial rule, from slavery to reformed colonialism, the majority of the population in the colony suffered from economic deprivation and social destitution. Accordingly, the persistent argument against granting independence to the smaller territories was their inability to achieve economic viability. The argument moved from a genuine concern in the mid-twentieth century, arising from the riots and unrest of the 1930's, to a fear that if given independence, the lack of economic viability could lead to little 'Haitis or Cubas'. In the context of the Cold War, that was a major concern for the US. It was also an acknowledgement that economic viability was vital for the attainment of sustainable and independent statehood.

In the last days of colonialism, the issue of economic development was linked to the belief that the Federation was a panacea. It was no secret that the British wanted a Federation in order to reduce their own

⁶⁸ FCO 43/44, Confidential Memo from British Government Representative to all Premiers, 30 April 1968.

financial burden.⁶⁹ In fact, the motivation for all integration attempts was always to reduce reliance on the Imperial Exchequer – either to impose ‘grant-in-aid’ status in the golden period of colonialism or to achieve economic viability in the age of decolonization. With the Federation in place, the British hoped that the more prosperous colonies would come to the aid of their poorer neighbours. This issue, like so many colonial issues, was characterized by disagreement between the Treasury and the Colonial Office over the level of aid to be distributed to an independent Federation. It was also thought that with an independent Federation, the US which had greater strategic interest would be willing to contribute a larger portion of aid.⁷⁰

The United States’ concern regarding the viability of the Eastern Caribbean colonies to withstand communist infiltration led to their suggestion that a tripartite survey be undertaken to formulate a joint approach to the economic problems of Barbados and the Leeward and Windward Islands.⁷¹

The Survey was commissioned by the Governments of the United Kingdom, Canada and United States “...to formulate plans for the achievement of economic viability and to suggest priorities for the next five years...”⁷² The study also examined the potential for further economic co-operation among the islands. It represented the only attempt to address the issue of economic viability as a precondition to independence. Before the 1930’s, the Imperial State’s primary concern was with the colonies ability to balance their budgets and the need for ‘grants-in-aid’, while the post-1930’s saw the introduction of social welfare projects to redress the grave social conditions of colonial neglect.

⁶⁹ S.R. Ashton and David Killingray, eds. *The West Indies*, Series B vol.6 of *British Documents on the End of Empire*, (London; The Stationary Office, 1999).

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

⁷¹ F.O. 371/185004, *US Policy*.

⁷² Ministry of Overseas Development, *Report of Tripartite Economic Survey of the Eastern Caribbean* (HMSO; London, 1967), p.iii.

Interestingly, it was undertaken before Britain gave up its responsibility for development of the colonies with the granting of associated status and that it was tripartite. It was reasoned that once associated status was granted, the Imperial State would no longer have the sole duty of ensuring the economic viability of the territories. This explains why HMG wanted to make it an international issue, or at least one where the US and Canada had an equal stake.

The Report of the Survey Group focused on the obstacles to economic growth, the expenditure and policies required to overcome them, and the priorities for the next five years. This constituted the strategy for development which would achieve economic viability.⁷³ The islands were seen as having two distinct features in their economic structure which had to be addressed. Firstly, there was a high disproportion between the large size and the rate of growth of the population, and the 'uncertain availability' of land, capital, skills and enterprise. Secondly, the islands had a propensity towards foreign trade with a heavy reliance on the export of a single crop.

The solution to the first feature was to reduce the population growth though the effect would not be immediate. The other option was to attract growth industries that needed little land but would attract capital and skills, and earn foreign exchange. In that regard, the accelerated development of the tourism industry, which was ideal for the region with its natural attributes and close proximity to the North American market, was highly recommended. Possibilities for industrial development were seen as limited in the short- to medium-term, as no industrial base existed in the islands. Restraints were identified as the domestic market size and scale of production, obstacles to trade in the region, competitive tax concession among islands, unavailability of skilled labour, lack of financial institutions and transportation costs.

⁷³ Ibid. The following account is based on that Report.

Agriculture was identified as critical for the provision of employment, to expand exports and to substitute imports.

The second feature involved two issues. Firstly, the practice of importing items such as capital and consumer goods, and therefore, the need to pay attention to food crops that could be produced locally. The other more important issue was the heavy focus of each island on the export of a single product – sugar or bananas with few prospects for expanding the markets. The Report noted that neither of the two crops could compete in the world market, while the UK market, though protected, was limited. Similarly, all the other traditional crops had little prospect for expansion. The Group estimated funding for projects needed to attain economic viability over the five-year period at £ 40,693,000.

Specifically, in relation to Saint Lucia, the Report noted that bananas made up 80% of the island's exports. However, it advised a responsible expansion policy that focused on improving the quality of the fruit. It noted that developing the potential of other areas of agricultural production, by the expansion of fisheries, land tenure reform, irrigation and agricultural credit, was critical for viability.

The tourism industry was seen as having tremendous potential for development with a large number of good hotel sites. An expansion in hotel beds and development of the former military airport would also contribute to the development of a sizeable tourist industry.

The Report suggested that in the case of Saint Lucia, industrial development should be encouraged to the maximum as there appeared to be substantial possibilities for light industry. However, these were import substitution of wood products, imported processed meats, vegetables and fruit products. The specific restraints on industrial development would still be a concern. There were concerns raised by the survey group regarding the level of education, poor health services and water supply, as these would impact on any efforts to achieve economic viability.

The Survey Group identified the financial needs of Saint Lucia to attain economic viability at £8,741,000, over a five-year period.

Both Houses of Parliament referred to the Survey as part of the debate on approving the West Indies Act. Parliamentarians in approving the Bill, recognized the difficulty of the challenges raised by the Survey Group, but seemed content that the new status – associated statehood – given to the islands would stimulate the islands themselves to manage their own economic development.⁷⁴ There was no attempt to ensure that the colonies pursued a programme that would ensure they attained economic viability, which was the motivation for the survey. Nor did the imperial state make available the resources identified to pursue a path towards economic viability.

6.2.0 Independence as a Transformative Event

The issues discussed above highlighted that the experience of associated statehood was always going to be transitional, for while it provided the first autonomous state structure for self-government and was given a limited international role, the experience failed to meet the expectations of the associated state as an avenue to promote its economic development. It was this sentiment that led to the call for national independence and self-determination.

When introduced, associated statehood was presented as a political relationship for territories that were unlikely to achieve independence.⁷⁵ By 1972, the FCO's view was that associated statehood was not expected to last forever, although the territories would be reluctant to exchange it for independence unless they were sure that seeking independence would not disadvantage them.⁷⁶ However, two main arguments were put forward to justify a request for national

⁷⁴ Morgan, *Self-Government*, p. 278.

⁷⁵ See Footnote 34.

⁷⁶ FCO 44/635, *Briefing Notes for Anglo/US Talks on the Caribbean*, 7-8 February 1972.

independence. Firstly, it would enhance the capacity of the state to promote its development. Secondly, the denial of independence was incompatible with international practice. In any event, HMG was prepared to grant independence as it was satisfied that the associated states were becoming an increasingly heavy burden. One major concern for HMG was the international perceptions that HMG was forcing independence.

This section examines the interaction between external influences – the imperial state and the international system – and the domestic forces that led to independence. In the final analysis, the emergence of the state as a sovereign international actor was not a societal aspiration, but represented the convenience of the Imperial State and the ambitions of the ruling elite that controlled the Colonial State.

6.2.1 Changes in Imperial Policy and the End of Imperial Rule

The fear of the smaller territories becoming 'little Cubas' was a persistent concern for the Americans and HMG. Ironically, it was this concern which would provide the final impetus for a change in colonial policy and which encouraged the demand for national independence. Before associated statehood was granted, a survey of the internal security capacity was requested to ascertain the ability of the territories to ensure political stability. In the case of Saint Lucia, it was assessed that the operational organization was fully comprehensive and effective.⁷⁷ The internal security competence of the Police Force was rated as considerable. On the eve of associated statehood, a review of the political situation found that there were no external forces at work that pose a subversive threat.⁷⁸

⁷⁷ FCO 43/48, *Confidential Survey of the Police Forces in the Eastern Caribbean*, November-December 1966.

⁷⁸ FCO 43/48, *Confidential. The Current Situation in the Caribbean*, 27 January 1967.

Soon after associated statehood was granted, there were difficulties with the St. Kitts/Anguilla arrangement, as Anguilla refused to be ruled by St. Kitts and unilaterally seceded. This brought the issue of internal security and the responsibility of HMG to the fore.⁷⁹ In response, officials in the FCO considered the possibility of passing legislation to intervene in the event of a breakdown of constitutional or democratic government, especially in the case of a Communist takeover.⁸⁰ It was noted that HMG no longer had such responsibility and could only intervene if requested by a state, and if considered appropriate in the circumstances by HMG.

The issue of internal security was forced on the agenda again as the United States expressed concern about the internal security of the Associated States and its expectation that HMG would preserve stability.⁸¹ The response of HMG to the growing security concern was to make the Overseas Police Adviser available to advise all states and to encourage the establishment of a Regional Police Reserve, to which Antigua and Saint Lucia had already agreed.⁸² That initiative was never pursued as it was noted that Governments did not want to spend money on security as it did not win them votes. In the end, the idea was not pursued.

Significantly, HMG effected a change in policy, in response to the Anguilla experience, as the Cabinet agreed to a new approach to the associated states.⁸³ The aim of the new policy was to "...transfer to viable new political and economic units or to other friendly governments the responsibilities for those Caribbean territories which do opt to remain as

⁷⁹ St. Kitts/Nevis/Anguilla became an associated state on 27 February 1967. On 30 May 1967, the contingent of St. Kitts Police on Anguilla was ejected by islanders claiming that they would not be ruled by St. Kitts.

⁸⁰ FCO 43/27, Memorandum from M.G. de Winton to Mr. Hall, 5 July 1967.

⁸¹ FCO 43/48, *Confidential. Internal Security in the Associated States*. Memorandum from T R M Sewell to Mr. Godden. 9 April 1968.

⁸² FCO 44/149. *Confidential Briefing Note*. Minister of State Visit to the Caribbean, 29 October 1969.

⁸³ FCO 44/149. *Secret. Steering Brief*. Minister of State Visit to the Caribbean, 29 October 1969.

colonial dependencies.”⁸⁴ The aim was to get these associated states to integrate or better yet, persuade the US or Canada to take responsibility for these territories, using a ‘carrot and stick’ tactic.⁸⁵ The ‘carrot’ approach was to indicate that HMG had no intention to force integration, but would assist such efforts and give assurances that aid would not be affected by the change in constitutional status. HMG would encourage other governments especially Canada to participate. The ‘stick’ approach was to indicate that a state-by-state review would be undertaken and any state lagging behind in integration efforts would be informed that HMG would consider terminating association after two years and review aid contributions.

The imperfections of the associated statehood approach were now clear to HMG, especially after the Anguillan experience. Not only were the states not taking their internal security seriously but when HMG intervened at the request of St. Kitts, the level of insularity was so high, that it created difficulties with Parliament, the press and international opinion. Secondly, associated statehood was not accepted by the UN, while states continued to express their dissatisfaction with the external affairs arrangements.⁸⁶

By 1971, the policy towards independence of the associated states was made more definitive after a visit to the region by the Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs. It can best be described as a policy of abandonment. The Minister recommended to Cabinet that it “...adopt a consistent policy in the Bahamas and Associated States of encouraging them towards independence without necessarily insisting on a referendum in every case.”⁸⁷ In addition, attempts at Federation should be abandoned as they were doomed to fail but if any state pursued it,

⁸⁴ Ibid. p.1. The main candidates were the US, Canada and Trinidad.

⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ FCO 44/473. *Confidential. Policy in the Commonwealth Caribbean*, 15 March 1971.

then the attempt should be supported.⁸⁸ It was noted that the territories no longer held a strategic interest for Britain, but lay in the shadow of the United States, who should now determine their future.

The first attempt to implement the new policy started with Grenada. Premier Gairy complained to the Secretary of State on the necessity of a two-thirds majority in a referendum as a requirement for independence.⁸⁹ Interestingly, the Secretary of State responded that if independence was the main issue at the next General Election, and Gairy won a clear majority, he would then be willing to discuss independence. This signalled the transformation of the existing policy, and opened the door for the independence of the associated states.

Gairy's party won 13 of the 15 seats in the elections, so he duly requested independence under Section 10 (2) of the West Indies Act of 1967, which placed the responsibility to terminate associated statehood on HMG. A Constitutional Conference, attended by governments and opposition parties, was held, where discussions centred on approving an independent constitution. Despite the late withdrawal of support from the opposition, Grenada was granted independence by HMG terminating the association.

6.2.2 State-Societal Conflict and the attainment of Independence

Unlike Grenada, the other associated states were not intent on seeking independence. Saint Lucia indicated a wish for independence, but only as part of a larger territory.⁹⁰ In repeated throne speeches, the official policy announced was that associated statehood was a transitional process, which would eventually lead to full independence, and that Saint Lucia would become independent as part of a political

⁸⁸ FCO 44/473. *Confidential. British Interest in the Caribbean.* Report by Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs. 15 March 1971.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*

⁹⁰ FCO 44/635. *Confidential. Record of Talks on the Caribbean with a United States Delegation.* 7 February 1972.

union of West Indian states.⁹¹ It should be noted that the pursuit of political unity was one of the avenues to achieve independence as provided by the Act of 1967, rather than for its intrinsic necessity. For example, following the 'Petit St. Vincent Initiative', the Premier announced that, "[m]y Government will continue this quest until the final goal of independence, through unity, is achieved."⁹²

The Independence of Grenada in 1974 dramatically changed the political landscape as HMG sanctioned another route to independence and, consequently, diminished the possibility for independence through unity. Therefore, the Government of Saint Lucia announced that "...if our endeavours at political unity manifest no hope of success within the next two years, my Government will be presented with no alternative but to seek national fulfillment alone."⁹³ In 1975, the Government announced that it was unlikely to reach a political union that would lead to independence and all Associated States had agreed with the full backing of the independent Caribbean countries to seek independence separately.⁹⁴ This would be done by requesting the termination of association in accordance with Section 10(2) of the West Indies Act. Independence was said to be a right as,

under the unrelenting stimulus of world opinion in an age of growing awareness of human dignity, the process of freeing subject colonial peoples has proceeded to the point where our own West Indian islands are involved.⁹⁵

The Government promised to discuss the timing and procedure for requesting the termination of association with political parties represented in Parliament, and to seek the "broadest measure of approval on the form and contents of a Constitution."⁹⁶ These actions

⁹¹ Throne Speeches of Governors, 1968-1973.

⁹² Throne Speech by His Excellency, Mr. Ira Simmons on 20 December 1972.

⁹³ Throne Speech by His Excellency, Sir Allen Lewis on 30 December 1974.

⁹⁴ Throne Speech by His Excellency, Sir Allen Lewis on 18 December 1975.

⁹⁵ Government of Saint Lucia, *The Approach to Independence* (n/a; n/a).

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*

were to take place before negotiations commenced with HMG. The approach outlined by the Government suggested recognition of the need for the widest support for independence for HMG to grant independence under Section 10(2). HMG had repeatedly stated that its policy was neither to impose independence on those who did not want it, nor was its intention to delay independence for those who wanted it but that it must be the wish of the people concerned. However, the opposition party, the St. Lucia Labour Party (SLP) objected to any immediate request for independence as they felt that they had not been consulted, that the Government had no mandate to seek independence and that the people had not been consulted.⁹⁷

Instead, the Government passed a resolution in the House of Assembly requesting HMG to terminate the association under Section 5(4).⁹⁸ The Opposition argued that this request was inappropriate and unconstitutional, as Section 5 (4) did not provide the means to achieve independence. Clearly, the Government was trying to circumvent the requirements of Section 10(1) for a two-thirds majority in a referendum and in the House of Assembly, and of Section 10(2) that required HMG to be satisfied that there was popular support. The attempt by the Government was probably reflective of the recognition of its precarious position after the General Election of 1974, where the ruling party, the United Workers Party, won 10 of the 17 seats and 53.5% of the popular vote.⁹⁹ It was obvious that the Opposition was a powerful force and any popular support for independence would not be forthcoming without the active support of the opposition.

⁹⁷ "Reply by the Leader of the Opposition at the Saint Lucia Constitutional Conference," *Crusader*, 5 August, 1978. The *Crusader* was allied to the Saint Lucia Labour Party which was a left-leaning party.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.* Section 5(4) provided for HMG to alter the constitution of an Associated State or parts of the constitution or alter any law that alters the constitution.

⁹⁹ The initial election results showed 9-8 for the ruling party. The recount gave a seat to the ruling party which was contested in the High Court and was in doubt for three years. See Rick Wayne, *It will be Alright in the Morning* (Saint Lucia; Star Publishing, 2003).

The announcement by the Government to seek independence from HMG was done against the background of a highly charged domestic political environment. The General Election of 1974 was held against charges by the opposition party that the voting list was flawed. For example, the number of people on the voters list for the 1969 General Election was 44,868, declining to 39,815 for the 1974 General Election.¹⁰⁰ In addition, the preliminary announcement of the results of the 1974 Election showed that the ruling UWP had lost a seat by one vote.¹⁰¹ However, a recount disclosed that the UWP candidate had won by 36 votes. The resultant legal action lasted over three years, but ended in favour of the ruling party.

The Opposition announced that it would embark on a campaign of political mobilization until the electoral list was revised, and the basic tenets of democracy were in place. The Opposition claimed that the Government was abusing state institutions such as the state radio station, the Police through its Special Services Unit (SSU), and the Electoral Office for electoral advantage. The result was an intensive campaign of political action particularly aimed at the Prime Minister, and against corruption in Government.¹⁰² In addition, the independence announcement came at the height of the fallout of the oil crisis of 1973. Prices were skyrocketing, crime was on the increase, tourism and agriculture were in decline, and there was tremendous social and economic uncertainty. According to one review,

It was in this highly combustible atmosphere that the premier of Saint Lucia had announced his intention to seek independence from Britain. Almost immediately, there was strong resistance from the opposition party-particularly from the radical Odlum-Josie wing. They called on the premier to settle the independence question by referendum. When he refused, the SLP radicals led protest demonstrations islandwide-

¹⁰⁰ Saint Lucia Labour Party, *Independence? Do it Right. Let the People Decide* (Castries; Voice Press, undated).

¹⁰¹ See footnote 97.

¹⁰² Rick Wayne, *Foolish Virgins* (California; Star Publications, 1986).

which often resulted in clashes with the heavily armed Special Services Unit.¹⁰³

The highly charged political atmosphere made independence a partisan issue as the views of most people coincided with their party affiliation. The SLP supporters argued that they did not officially oppose the principle of independence but that it should be done the right way through consultation with the people and with their assent. They argued that the Premier could not guarantee democracy and act in the best interests of the people. The ruling UWP supporters argued that independence was necessary, that Saint Lucia had been preparing since 1967 for independence, and that independence was necessary for its continued development.

The Saint Lucian Government and Opposition were invited to hold informal talks with HMG in April 1977 on future constitutional changes, which concluded with a request that the Government of Saint Lucia prepare a consultative document indicating the reasons for independence and the constitutional changes that they wished to propose.¹⁰⁴ A further meeting would be organized to review the consultation process. The Government released a Green Paper outlining its case for independence.¹⁰⁵ It argued that Saint Lucia should not be left behind in an 'inferior constitutional status' whilst other associated states proceeded to independence; neither was the country too small to seek independence; nor was she too poor; and that Saint Lucia's economic performance was the best among the associated states. Strangely, the Green Paper stated that the existing constitution was satisfactory and no substantial change was necessary. Interestingly, the Government also argued that if Saint Lucians rejected independence, the United Kingdom

¹⁰³ Ibid. p. 5.

¹⁰⁴ Saint Lucia Labour Party, *Independence?*

¹⁰⁵ Government of Saint Lucia, *The Approach to Independence*.

would not hesitate to invoke the provisions of Section 10(2) of the West Indies Act if approached by the elected Government.¹⁰⁶

The Opposition claimed that there was no popular will for independence and public reaction to proposed independence was overwhelmingly adverse.¹⁰⁷ Citing four reasons, the Opposition Party stated that: there was no compelling reason why Saint Lucia should become independent; the people are convinced that the burden of independence would be unbearable and only worsen the economic situation; the status of Saint Lucians living overseas would be of grave concern, if independence was achieved; and the history of the Government since Associated Statehood had been one of gross neglect of the needs of citizens and denial of their fundamental rights. The opposition also argued that the Government was using independence to reinforce itself in office.

Notwithstanding the partisan nature of the campaign led by the Labour Party, the society was bitterly divided over the independence issue. A follow up Conference was held in London in March 1978 to discuss the outcome of the consultative process. In a Press Release from the FCO, it was explained that "...the process of consultation would be consolidated and, as a part of this, the Government of Saint Lucia would publish for public discussion a draft constitution for an independent Saint Lucia."¹⁰⁸ If satisfied, the Minister of State Ted Rowlands would call a constitutional conference after four months.

The Labour Party's interpretation of the discussions reflected the division within the society. It reported that the Minister of State was not satisfied that there had been adequate consultation and declined to make a decision on the request for termination of association, or accede

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

¹⁰⁷ Saint Lucia Labour Party, *Independence?*

¹⁰⁸ *Crusader*, 18 March 1978.

to announcing a date for independence.¹⁰⁹ Instead the Party claimed that,

the world recognizes that in many colonial countries including Saint Lucia, it is the metropolitan government which had to fill in the role of champion of the colonial people against the excesses and intentions of their leaders.¹¹⁰

The period following the July 1978 Constitutional Conference was characterized by an intense contest between society (those who opposed independence), the state and HMG. The opposition maintained that the consultative process had not been extensive and where consultations had been held, the majority of persons were hostile to independence.¹¹¹ They further argued that the constitutional positions presented by the Government were not representative of the few submissions of the public, or the consultations where they had taken place. The Opposition noted the trend of Caribbean Governments not to consult their people on important issues, even when the law required them to do so, and appealed to HMG not to give in to the demands of the Saint Lucia Government. HMG was asked to act in "...accordance with the West Indies Act and the guiding principles enunciated by the British Government, [that there] be clear evidence indicating that they have said yea or nay to independence because the choice is theirs."¹¹² The Labour Party undertook to organize a number of public marches throughout the country to demonstrate to HMG that the Premier was not consulting the people.¹¹³

On the other hand, Premier Compton asked HMG to use the precedent established by granting independence to Dominica and Grenada to grant independence to Saint Lucia. He further assured HMG

¹⁰⁹ Ibid. *Labor's Delegation Press Release.*

¹¹⁰ Ibid. *Compton's Fails Again!*

¹¹¹ *Report of The Saint Lucia Constitutional Conference, 1978.* (Cmd. 7328), p.16.

¹¹² Ibid. p. 8.

¹¹³ *S.L.P. Plans Public Marches, The Voice, 21 November 1978.*

that Saint Lucia would retain the Queen as head of state and remain within the Commonwealth.¹¹⁴

HMG concluded that as a follow-up to the constitutional talks, the FCO legal advisers would prepare a draft constitution for submission to the Government. The procedure for the final determination of independence was unclear. According to Minister Rowlands, the constitution would be brought before the House of Assembly and HMG would be informed of the wishes of the Government, Opposition and people and "...it will be for Her Majesty's Government to take appropriate action in the light of these views and wishes."¹¹⁵

Despite the acute division in the society, the Draft Constitution was brought before the House of Assembly for debate on 24 October 1978. The debate was along party lines with Parliament voting its approval by majority in the House of Assembly but with the Opposition voting against its adoption. Independence was granted on 22 February 1979. There were few attempts to ascertain the wishes of the people, except through the partisan positions of the elected parliamentarians, partisan political gatherings and a few submissions by some educated and interested persons.

6.3.0 The Impact of Independence in Saint Lucia - A new State-societal Relationship

The above account demonstrates that the attainment of independence did not represent the common aspiration of state and society. In fact, the arguments of the Opposition that independence should be decided by the people and that a general election should be called, with the subject of independence at its forefront, remained unheeded.¹¹⁶ Five months after independence, the ruling party lost the

¹¹⁴ *Constitutional Conference, 1978.*

¹¹⁵ "Statement made by Mr. Ted Rowlands, M.P." *Crusader*, 29 July 1978.

¹¹⁶ *House of Assembly*, 20 October 1978, p.24-26. Elections was due within six months of independence.

general election in a landslide victory for the Saint Lucia Labour Party. Undoubtedly, the transition to independence was not characterized by a thorough preparation of state and society. HMG was intent on relieving itself of the colonial burden, whilst the political elite saw the opportunity to reinforce political rule. The state was now independent and sovereign, and fully assumed its role as an international actor, providing a new configuration of forces to shape the nature of the state and society.

The move towards independence was not a societal aspiration in the sense that it was driven by the society as a necessary stage in its development. There was little societal involvement in the decision to seek independence and it appeared to be an initiative of the political elite that controlled the state. The view that there was no 'quest' for independence was reinforced by the fact that HMG had already adopted a policy of colonial divestment from its remaining colonies.¹¹⁷ However, there were discussions with some societal organizations such as the Chamber of Commerce, Bar Association and Employers' Federation regarding the Draft Constitution, but not with the required scope and depth of societal involvement necessary for such major constitutional change.¹¹⁸ However, there was public support for the view that there had not been satisfactory social and economic progress as an associated state, and independence would bring greater opportunities.¹¹⁹ It was thought that the capacity to develop independent relations with other countries would facilitate financial and technical assistance not forthcoming from the British.

As Independence Day approached, national discontent increased as public servants took industrial action against the Government in pursuance of higher wages and better working conditions. Independence

¹¹⁷ Interview with Cletus Springer, Former Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Planning and Development. 29 September 2004.

¹¹⁸ All persons interviewed held the view that there was little societal involvement in discussions on independence.

¹¹⁹ Interview with Cletus Springer.

would be accepted not as a national achievement but as national division in the midst of national industrial unrest and major political opposition, including threats of civil unrest. The celebrations were clearly partisan-based and reflected that it was pursued by and for political interests rather than motivated by national sentiment. Whatever the national sentiments, the state was an international actor, imbued with sovereignty and self-determination, and finally able to join the international community.

6.3.1 Independence and the shaping of an international role

With independence, the Prime Minister also became the Minister of Foreign Affairs until later changes took place. Even when the Prime Minister was not the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the role was still associated with him. It was a feature of the immediate post-independence period in the Caribbean for prime ministers to assume the position of foreign minister since they felt they were best able to deal with foreign affairs.¹²⁰ This was rooted in the colonial experience, as the Colonial Office prior to independence would communicate with the Chief Minister on matters of foreign affairs relating to the colony. This was more pronounced in the case of the associated state, as certain responsibilities for foreign affairs were given to the premier. It appeared logical that he would be best suited to the portfolio of minister of foreign affairs.

The experience of Saint Lucia shows that there was a communication gap between the Ministry and the Minister of Foreign Affairs. From 1982-86, the Prime Minister is reported to have visited the Foreign Ministry twice, allowing the Permanent Secretary to make day-to-

¹²⁰ Interview with Earl Huntley, Former Permanent Secretary – Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 3 June 2004. Mr. Huntley served as the first Permanent Secretary in the Ministry.

day decisions while major decisions remained his responsibility.¹²¹ Further examples are given of the Foreign Ministry being bypassed in the decision making process, with foreign ministry officials informed by other foreign ministries and by ambassadors of the plans, actions and decisions of the Prime Minister.

The approach to foreign relations was made clear from as early as the Constitutional Conference in July 1978. Premier Compton had explained to the Conference that, “[f]ull sovereignty will not be for us a cause for seeking to strut on the international stage. We have no illusions of impending international grandeur.”¹²² The approach to foreign policy following independence was restricted to relations with traditional partners and requests for grant assistance for specific state projects.¹²³ There was no formulation of a foreign policy or a broadening of the search for new sources of support. Although the policies of the short-lived Labour Party became more focused as the Government sought to broaden its diplomatic relations beyond the traditional Western partners of Britain, US and Canada.¹²⁴

It was understandable that as the issues involved in foreign relations increased, other functional ministries would be involved in foreign policy. However, the Prime Minister, who also served as Minister of Finance and Planning, ensured that all projects for external aid or financing were identified through his ministry and then channelled to the respective ministries for implementation.¹²⁵ The Foreign Ministry served protocol functions, whilst a powerful Ministry of Finance and Planning identified projects and facilitated external assistance, while the Prime Minister determined all major decisions on foreign policy and on the receipt of foreign assistance.

¹²¹ J. Braveboy-Wagner, *The Caribbean in World Affairs. The Foreign Policies of the English-speaking States* (Boulder, Colo.; Westview Press, 1989).

¹²² *Report of The Saint Lucia Constitutional Conference, 1978*. (Cmd. 7328), p.13.

¹²³ Interview with Earl Huntley.

¹²⁴ These included Cuba, Iraq, Hungary and Scandinavian countries.

¹²⁵ Interview with Earl Huntley.

The attitude of the society in Saint Lucia to foreign affairs was one of total indifference. Much of this indifference was due to an ignorance of the foreign relations policy of Saint Lucia by the wider society, the media and even the foreign ministry, but more importantly, issues of foreign relations were not presented for public consumption, particularly in Parliament or during electoral campaigns. Outside of the state apparatus, the educated elite appeared to have a similar disengagement from foreign policy.¹²⁶ In fact, given the style of dominant personality politics, it was difficult to imagine the extent of involvement that an educated elite would have been allowed. If it did occur, it would have most likely been those with informal social links who supported the Prime Minister.

The isolation of foreign affairs from the established state-societal relations was indicative of the purpose that independent statehood served. By maintaining its isolation, the state was able to establish its own policies and priorities in the conduct of international politics, without the need to be accountable to the society, or to consider societal pressures when shaping foreign policy. For example, the voting patterns and positions adopted by the government at international meetings were not provided for public consumption. The isolation of society from the conduct of foreign policy allowed the state to establish a monopoly in obtaining external assistance that provide benefits for the population. It was no surprise that every externally funded project becomes a major showpiece to boast of the efforts of the government to provide for the population and to seek re-election.

6.3.2 National Development Policy and the Role of International Aid

The pursuit of independence was seen as critical for the economic development of Saint Lucia. In fact, the early quest for self-government

¹²⁶ Ibid.

involved the right of the majority to vote and have a say in managing their affairs was seen as necessary to overcome deprivation and economic backwardness. In 1964, the Chief Minister in announcing the termination of grant-in-aid described it as the end of a period of pain, penalties and humiliation.¹²⁷ At the Constitutional Conference in 1966, the Chief Minister made the case that constitutional advancement without a supporting economy was useless, which clarified the strategy for requesting full internal self-government instead of statehood. As that case was rejected, it was stated that Saint Lucia was accepting statehood with Britain with caution until "...HMG recognizes the need for realism in settling the economic basis for meaningful advance in the Constitutional advance of our territory."¹²⁸ Therefore, the pursuit of constitutional advancement was justifiable if only it could overcome the "...frustrations and delays which we experience in our efforts to get ourselves to the twentieth century."¹²⁹ From as early as 1969, the Government had expressed the view that "...nationhood, through Associated Status, creates a limitation on our sovereignty, while it denies us access to sources of capital sorely needed for our development..."¹³⁰ Independence represented an attempt to place the tools of development firmly within the control of the state. In 1978, the Premier in introducing the resolution for the request to HMG to terminate the association indicated that "...independence is sought primarily to place in the hands of the duly elected representatives of the people all the instruments of power which are needed for this country's development."¹³¹

By being granted Associated Statehood, Saint Lucia was able to secure loans with the approval of HMG but grant funding was limited from only Britain and Canada. The lack of recognition as an independent

¹²⁷ Address by Hon. George Charles at the Budget Meeting of the Legislative Council, 25 February 1964.

¹²⁸ Minutes of the Legislative Council Meeting, 28 June 1966. p. 39.

¹²⁹ Ibid.

¹³⁰ Government of Saint Lucia, *Independence*.

¹³¹ Proceedings and Debates of the Meeting of the House of Assembly, 20 October 1978.

state and insufficient international rights and privileges, undoubtedly limited the island's possibilities. Similarly, Saint Lucia was not able to benefit significantly from the membership of multilateral lending agencies and other overseas development agencies.

It was very clear from the attainment of associated statehood, that the state would assume responsibility for promoting economic development to redress the deficiencies of colonialism. The absence of a developed national bourgeoisie and low levels of foreign private investment reinforced the belief that the state must play the leading role. The state became a major employer and, through its capital works, a significant contributor to Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The capital works programme was heavily financed by British aid until 1970 when the Canadian Government announced an aid package of \$13.7 million over five years for capital works.¹³² The importance of grants for financing development was marked in the post-1967 period but begun to decline from the mid-1970's.¹³³

In the post-independence period, the state assumed an even greater role in promoting economic growth and development.¹³⁴ However, this required increases in central government expenditure.¹³⁵ The role of the state, in its broadest sense, was exemplified in the increases in expenditure of the consolidated public sector, which includes statutory bodies and parastatals, such as the Central Water Authority, Electric Company, Port Authority, and the National Development Corporation.¹³⁶

¹³² British Development Division, *Saint Lucia: Economic Survey and Projections*, (Barbados; BDD, 1970).

¹³³ Ibid. See also Arnold M. McIntyre, *The Economies of the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States in the 1970's* (Barbados; ISER, 1986). Grants represented over 10% of government revenue up to 1975.

¹³⁴ McIntyre, *Economies*.

¹³⁵ World Bank, *Saint Lucia. Economic Performance and Prospects* (USA; The World Bank, 1985). Total expenditure and lending increased from EC\$59.9m in 1977/78 to EC\$90.64m in 1979/80 to EC\$139.80 in 1983/84. Current revenue increased from EC\$51.65m in 1977/78 to EC\$72.35m in 1979/80 to EC\$111.3m in 1983/84.

¹³⁶ Ibid. Total expenditure and lending increased from EC\$105.63m in 1977/78 to EC\$165.50m in 1979/80 to EC\$245.25m in 1984/84.

A significant feature was the increase in current expenditure, especially on personal emoluments, suggesting an increase in employment, as well as in wages and salaries and retroactive payments due to union agitation. Wages and salaries increased from \$22.23 million in 1977/78 to \$44.2 million in 1979/80 to \$114.5 million in 1983/84.¹³⁷ These represented 45.6%, 49.3% and 54.4% respectively of current expenditure.

The role of the state as the engine for economic development led to significant increases in expenditure for capital projects to improve the infrastructure for growth, reduce unemployment and redress social deficiencies. As early as 1968, the Government loaned EC\$2m to finance road construction, water supplies and other infrastructural works.¹³⁸ The capital expenditure for the public sector increased from EC\$22.72m in 1977/78 to EC\$28.91m in 1979/80 to EC\$41.45m in 1984/85.¹³⁹

These increases required revenue, which could be earned through current revenue, grants and loans. In the case of Saint Lucia, central government current revenue was healthy and experienced tremendous growth after independence.¹⁴⁰ Most of the revenue came from increasing indirect taxes from import duties, export duties and exchange taxes reflecting the openness of the economy and the high levels of reliance on imported goods. This is in contradistinction with direct taxes which are more politically sensitive and which society is less willing to accept. The state had never made direct taxation the major source of revenue as the production base was very small and would not have brought in much revenue. The emphasis on import substitution also tended to encourage

¹³⁷ Ibid. The Saint Lucia Labor Party which won the July 1979 elections provided significant increases in wages and salaries to public servants. Salary increases were a contentious issue in the election campaign.

¹³⁸ British Development Division, *Saint Lucia*.

¹³⁹ World Bank, *Saint Lucia*.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid. Current revenue of central government increased in real terms from EC\$51.65m in 1977/78 to EC\$72.35m in 1979/80 to EC\$111.3m in 1983/84.

taxes on imports but not the agricultural or the emerging tourism sectors.

The role of grants in financing development was not as marked as would be expected after independence. In 1968 and 1969, grant funding represented 14% and 13.8% respectively of revenue.¹⁴¹ However, despite absolute increases it represented 10.1% in 1977/78, 12.63% in 1979/80 and 7.7% in 1983/84 of revenue.¹⁴² However, the sources of grant funding increased to include the United State Agency for International Development, Canada International Development Agency, European Development Fund, Organisation of American States and the World Bank.

The major source of financing of the fiscal deficit was through borrowing from local and foreign sources. Saint Lucia's external public debt, excluding debt to the International Monetary Fund and the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank, was US\$8 million in 1977, US\$14.2 million in 1979 and US\$31.2million in 1984.¹⁴³ It was clear that low public sector current account surpluses and the high cost of modern infrastructure forced an increasing reliance on foreign financing of economic development, with greater reliance on loans as opposed to grants.

Accordingly, economic policy and politics were linked to aid and foreign loans. Aid became a mechanism for economic development, to meet shortfalls of revenue and, more importantly, for the political survival of the state. Development projects were used to satisfy the political demands of constituencies as the state had control over their form and location. It was a repeated complaint of opposition parties that the Government neglected opposition areas and ensured that only Government constituencies' concerns were addressed. Projects involving water distribution, low cost housing, electricity distribution, road

¹⁴¹ British Development Division, *Saint Lucia*.

¹⁴² World Bank, *Saint Lucia*. It should be noted that an independence grant was provided in 1979 and rehabilitation support was received after Hurricane Allen in 1980.

¹⁴³ *Ibid*.

construction and recreational facilities were known to be highly political.

Despite the occurrence of partisan benefits in development projects, there was a wider consequence of strengthening the legitimacy and capacity of the state. Projects such as the construction of health centres, fisheries facilities, road construction in banana areas, industrial factory buildings and school buildings demonstrated the state's attempt to pursue its stated economic development plans and meet the needs of the population.

6.3.3 International Politics of National Economic Management

Economic growth has historically depended upon trade in agricultural products in an international market, though protected, and private direct investment. It was noted in the previous section that the state assumed a greater role in the impetus for growth after independence. Despite the desire not to be dependent on Britain, there was no attempt to pursue any radical economic policy to disengage from the existing structural relationship. The dependent relationship built through colonialism and so heavily blamed for the backwardness of the colonies, was allowed to continue.¹⁴⁴ As appendages of Britain, the colonies developed as economies geared towards satisfying metropolitan interests rather than developing endogenous economic growth capacity.¹⁴⁵ They were dependent on the rest of the world especially Britain for markets, capital, supplies, a relationship which determined levels of employment and production. Consequently, the colonies were not resilient to changes taking place in the international economy.

¹⁴⁴ Many dependency theorists and the New World Group in the Caribbean provided academic explanations for the causes of underdevelopment in the third world.

¹⁴⁵ See George Beckford, *Persistent Poverty* (New York; Oxford University Press, 1972); Lloyd Best, "A Model of Pure Planation Economy", *Social and Economic Studies*, Vol. 17, No.3, September 1968; Alister McIntyre, "Some issues of Trade Policy in the West Indies", *New World Quarterly*, Vol. 2., No.2, 1966 and C.Y. Thomas, *Monetary and Financial Arrangements in a Dependent Monetary Economy: a study of British Guiana, 1945-62* (Mona; ISER, 1974).

The Government in Saint Lucia continued to increase its role in facilitating development commensurate with the increasing autonomy provided by the imperial state. In practice, that role was limited to putting in the infrastructure for economic growth and social investment, as there was little capital investment in direct productive activity. Whilst some other states were engaging in import-substitution policies, the Saint Lucia did not venture into state ownership, nor did she implement a programme of direct support for local entrepreneurs to spur industrialization. The emphasis was on an investment policy centred on attracting foreign investors through incentives and basic infrastructure, such as factory buildings for rent.¹⁴⁶ There was the hope that investors would bring in capital, skills and new technologies which would establish an industrial base.

Although the manufacturing sector grew as a contributor to GDP from the 1960's to 1984, it remained small in relation to agriculture.¹⁴⁷ Manufacturing was primarily centred on assembly enterprises that had little added value and was geared towards the export market. These enterprises were attracted by the incentives offered. The only tangible benefit was low wage employment for people who would otherwise be unemployed. Meanwhile the dependence of the island's economy on imports intensified after independence.¹⁴⁸

The insistence to remain incorporated in the established economic relationships may have been related to the nature and significance of the two main earners. The state was so entrenched and dependent on its structural relationship established during the colonial period that its stability and survival were predicated on the continuation of that relationship.

¹⁴⁶ World Bank, *Saint Lucia*. The approach to industrialization was supposed to be based on the industrialization model outlined by Sir Arthur Lewis.

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.* In the 1960's, manufacturing contributed less than 5% of GDP, by 1977 it was 8.8%, and in 1984 it was 8.9% of GDP.

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

The first income earner was the export of bananas to the protected United Kingdom market. Bananas replaced sugar as the main export crop in the early 1950's and became the largest contributor to GDP. In 1967, bananas accounted for 80% of exports, but in 1985, only 50% of domestic exports.¹⁴⁹ The banana industry was also important for the society because of its peasant-based nature. Unlike sugar cane, bananas did not necessarily need large estate holdings but could flourish in family-held plots. By 1984, the state began a policy of breaking up the plantations which were formerly owned by the multinational, Geest Industries, for resale to small farmers. Geest decided to remain in the high-end activities of distribution and marketing whilst moving from the high risk and uncertain production role. The cultivation of bananas led to a process of empowerment of rural residents as many came to own land, and thereby a means to prosperity. There were about 7,000 active registered members of the Banana Growers Association in 1985 with over 75% of farmers having plots of 10 acres or less, although small farmers accounted for only 10% to 20% of production.¹⁵⁰

Bananas also offered another powerful advantage over sugar, in that its weekly production pattern provided weekly wages for farmers as against the seasonal harvest of most other crops. There was a high level of cash flow within the economy and to the farmers. In 1985, the banana industry was contributing over EC\$1 million per week directly to the local economy, with half the population depending on the industry.¹⁵¹ However, the prices of bananas fluctuated widely depending on demand in the UK and the value of the pound. Notably, the farmer received significantly lower prices, after deductions by Geest and the Banana Growers Association (SLBGA) for their services.¹⁵² The economy in Saint

¹⁴⁹Ministry of Overseas Development, *Economic Survey*; World Bank, *Saint Lucia*.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid.

¹⁵¹ Ibid.

¹⁵² For example, in 1983 the average price was EC\$0.77 per pound, the SLBGA was paid EC\$0.42 by Geest and the farmer EC\$0.18 by the SLBGA.

Lucia rested upon the preferential treatment of bananas in the UK market, the significance of which discouraged any attempt to deviate from the established economic relationship.

The second income earner, tourism, emerged as another critical component of the economic development policy of the independent state. It was noted that tourism was identified as early as 1967 to be the sector with the greatest potential to lead the development process.¹⁵³ The tourist sector expanded from tourist expenditure of EC\$2.27 million in 1965, to EC\$33.4 million in 1979 and EC\$ 42.4 million in 1984. In addition to the fragility of the industry, as shown after the hurricane of 1980 when visitor arrivals collapsed, the industry was heavily dependent upon external factors. For example, the success of the industry was dependent upon the economies of the home country. Importantly, the tourist infrastructure was also heavily dependent upon foreign investment.

State involvement had been restricted to creating the conditions for investment and tourism promotion rather than directly investing in constructing hotels, restaurants and tourist attractions. The industry was experiencing rising costs as it was highly dependent on fuel prices, fluctuating exchange rates, and the cost of imported goods. Despite the successes of the tourist industry, it remained in the early 1980's an industry that offered seasonal employment to most workers. It was also an industry with a high foreign exchange leakage rate as most consumed goods were imported and most business were based on packaged tours. However, it offered increasing opportunities for employment.

Despite the buoyancy of the economy in the late 1970's, led by high banana prices and the expansion in tourism, increasing unemployment had been a feature. Unemployment was estimated at 14%

¹⁵³ Ministry of Overseas Development, *Economic Survey*. nd - 1967

in 1975 but increased to 25% in 1983.¹⁵⁴ Agriculture employed 40% of the labour force, manufacturing 8%, and the tourist industry 12%.¹⁵⁵ The government sector was a significant employer, with its permanent staff of 4,300 in 1985 or about 13% of workforce.

The above account highlights the link between economic development and the realities of the international relationship. It illustrated the fact that many Eastern Caribbean islands suffered dramatically from the depression of the early 1980's, although Saint Lucia fared much better because of the high prices afforded to bananas. Similarly, when prices dropped the country likewise suffered. Importantly, there was no need for the state, unlike Jamaica, Trinidad and Guyana, to enter into negotiations with the IMF for any structural adjustment programmes. However, there were concerns expressed on the instances of default of payments and the accumulation of arrears by the state.¹⁵⁶ Generally, in the period immediately after independence, the state was able to utilize its increased ability to mobilize external financing and exploit its dependence on the preferential treatment of bananas and the tourism industry to meet the promise of a new day after the dawn of independence. It was also noteworthy that at a time when many third world countries were attempting to break from the dependency cycle, by experimenting with various non-traditional approaches to development, Saint Lucia remained committed to the incorporation of the island's economy in the international economic order.

6.3.4 Independent State Structure and implications for Domestic Society

The attainment of independence was supposed to grant society the tools that would shape its policies and programmes for the development

¹⁵⁴ World Bank, *Saint Lucia* [nd]

¹⁵⁵ Ibid.

¹⁵⁶ World Bank, *Saint Lucia* [nd]

of the island.¹⁵⁷ Instead, it appeared that independence placed greater power in the hands of the state, and by extension the Government. The shaping of the state structure, through a new constitution, did not indicate a commitment by the Government to create a mechanism for greater control or input in policy making by society. Nor did there appear to be a concern for 'good governance' – practices and procedures, necessary to ensure that government carries out its business honestly and efficiently. In most cases, where concessions were made, it was the result of agitation from the Opposition.

The process of consultation requested by HMG should have allowed for individuals and organizations to comment and participate in the shaping of the Constitution. Despite the view that HMG was in haste to agree to independence for the associated states, it is to its credit that it had insisted that the Government in Saint Lucia engage the public in dialogue on a draft constitution.¹⁵⁸ Although the Opposition expressed their disapproval of the procedures towards independence and the level of consultation, they maintained a constructive approach to the formulation of a constitution that reinforced fundamental rights and freedoms and allowed for more democratic provisions. Of the changes made to the Draft Constitution, "...the most important of these were the establishment of a Parliamentary Commissioner, an Electoral Commission and a Constituency Boundaries Commission, all proposals put forward by the Opposition."¹⁵⁹

The attitude of the UWP Government was consistent throughout, in that it was satisfied with the Associated Statehood constitution and was reluctant to make any significant changes that the Opposition felt were necessary to promote democracy.¹⁶⁰ For example, the Opposition

¹⁵⁷ Proceedings and Debates of the Meeting of the House of Assembly, 20 October 1978.

¹⁵⁸ *Constitutional Conference, 1978.*

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.* p.1.

¹⁶⁰ *Proceedings and Debates of the Meeting of the House of Assembly, 24 October 1978.*
An examination of the Committee Stage discussion of the Draft Constitution reveals the

requested a Senate to act as a review chamber in the Legislature consisting of persons elected from a list of individuals recommended by community organisations. At the Constitutional Conference, the Government objected and instead proposed that the dormant provisions of the existing constitution that provided for nominated members, with the majority to be appointed on the advice of the Prime Minister, should be activated at Independence.¹⁶¹ The Chief Minister conceded that the Senate was one provision that he felt the public had demanded but maintained that the Prime Minister should advise on the nomination of the majority.¹⁶² The Government also had difficulty in accepting that the Prime Minister should consult the Leader of the Opposition on the appointment and removal of the Chairman and Members of the Public Service Commission, before advising the Governor-General. In addition, the Opposition's proposal that a person should not serve more than ten consecutive years as Prime Minister was not accepted.

It was noteworthy that in the deliberations of Parliament, to consider the Draft Constitution, many outstanding issues from the Constitutional Conference were settled in the Government's favour by use of the parliamentary majority. For example, the appointment of the Public Prosecutor on the advice of the Prime Minister was strongly rejected by the Opposition. The Opposition argued that the Judicial and Legal Services Commission did not need to consult the Prime Minister as political intervention can influence the appointment.¹⁶³ The matter was settled by majority vote in Parliament in favour of the Government. Another significant issue dealt with was the handling of a declaration of a state of emergency. It was agreed at the Constitutional Conference that the law would be consistent with the provisions of the Trinidad

persistent approach to deny any attempt to change the constitution in any fundamental way.

¹⁶¹ *Report of The Saint Lucia Constitutional Conference, 1978.* (Cmd. 7328).

¹⁶² Proceedings and Debates of the Meeting of the House of Assembly, 24 October 1978.

¹⁶³ *Ibid.*

Constitution for a statement to be made to Parliament within three days providing an explanation for such action. However, Parliament approved the provision included by the Government despite the objection of the Opposition that it was not consistent with the decision made at the Conference.¹⁶⁴

Notwithstanding the above, the Independence Constitution removed all control by HMG of the domestic structure of the state and any political conditionality within the Constitution. However, the State would retain the Privy Council as the final appellate court in the absence of a regional appeals court. The state had achieved autonomy and international enfranchisement but despite a new structure, the historical separation with society was maintained. Instead, the power and control of the ruling elite was strengthened.

The immediate post-independence period was one of intense political agitation occasioned by the public reaction to independence and industrial unrest relating to wage increases. The change of Government in July 1979 was almost inevitable given the heightened tensions and anti-government sentiments which prevailed. The period between 1979-81 was one of unprecedented turmoil caused by a leadership struggle within the SLP. The struggle led to the break up of the ruling party and left the government with a single seat majority in Parliament. Similar to the period after the 1974 Elections, there were nightly public political meetings and a high level of mobilization of supporters by the UWP and the newly formed Progressive Labour Party (PLP). The Government faced frequent public demonstrations amidst claims of corruption and abuse of power. Eventually, the Government collapsed and was replaced by an interim government until the General Election in May 1982.

Despite these political aberrations, Saint Lucia and the Caribbean have been generally known for a high level of political accountability,

¹⁶⁴ Ibid.

respect for basic human rights and the basic practices of democracy. The international community has tended to focus on other regions where there are greater concerns about politically motivated killings, torture, imprisonment without trial, denial of multiparty electoral democracy, and restrictions on forming political parties, holding of public meetings and publishing newspapers. Issues such as holding free and fair elections and the transfer of power from ruling party to opposition are not usually of such gravity to concern the international community.

This is not to suggest that there were no concerns with governance but rather that there was a general absence of systematic armed suppression and genocidal use of force. Instead, successive Governments were able to be coercive using sophisticated techniques of control, exploiting existing poverty and dependency among the population and the historical separation of state and society. These techniques included the selected use of force, nepotism to silence critics, strategically placed development projects, government contracts granted to favoured companies in exchange for campaign financing, and legislative powers used to control protest and freedom of the press. This explains the absence of major civil unrest and coups. The sovereignty and national self-determination of the state, by its membership of the international community of states, gave the state a primacy that was exercised in favour of the government, with little fear of external intervention.

It can be noted that the foundations of democracy were not built on an educated citizenry or the fostering of civil society groups but on a manufactured state framework and a society which was able to avoid disintegration despite, and in spite of, the state's coercive nature. In the post-independent period, the state did not become an instrument of transformation as the historical nature of the state was merely reinforced. Whilst the society had always been dependent on the state for the delivery of services satisfying needs and expectations, there had also been a tradition of struggle for survival, which itself insulated the state.

For example, the informal economy of speculators and local trading of produce represented the most vibrant attempts of society to survive despite the state. The success of these struggles for resources and survival may explain why there has not been civil unrest as the state has generally not intruded on and controlled that sphere. The growing significance of the drug trade is another component of the informal economy, which represents an alternative strategy for survival, though in constant conflict with the state. The opposition to the Police by members of communities where drug busts take place is instructive of the relationship between state and society and the strategies for survival of poor communities.

6.3.5 Transnationalisation of Domestic Society

The colonial status of Saint Lucia meant that the emergence of civil society organizations aiming to shape and influence social life was always constrained by the need for the imperial state to control the affairs of the colony. It can be argued that the first attempts to build an autonomous civil society organization began with the establishment of trade unions.¹⁶⁵ However, from the 1970's to the early 1980's, a number of organizations emerged which sought to mobilize domestic society and deliberately influence the functioning of the state. These organizations showed a greater concern for issues such as social marginalization, poverty reduction, community empowerment and the environment.¹⁶⁶ The establishment of many of these groups can be attributed to homogeneity – the process by which similar concerns, norms and institutions are spread throughout the international system.¹⁶⁷ Among

¹⁶⁵ Interview with Embert Charles, Former Director of the Folk Research Centre, 4 November, 2004.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid.

¹⁶⁷ Halliday, *Rethinking International Relations* (London; Macmillan, 1994). For example, the National Youth Council was formed in 1985 during the United Nations International Youth Year. The Women Crisis Center was formed after a number of regional and international meetings on domestic violence.

these groups were the National Youth Council (NYC), National Women Organisation, Women Crisis Centre, Mothers and Fathers Groups, Folk Research Centre (FRC), and the National Farmers Association (NFA). The range of concerns and interests of these groups offered an opportunity for greater interaction between state and society to complement the functioning of the state. There existed little co-operation and more confrontation, which was probably due to the autonomous nature and mobilizational potential of these groups, and the possibilities for co-operation within opposition parties and civil society.¹⁶⁸ The area of greatest concern to the state was the capacity of these groups to propose alternative policies, offer policy where none existed, and their ability to deliver programmes to clients outside of the state apparatus.¹⁶⁹ The functioning of these groups became very popular and many of them appeared as alternative ministries of government. Free from bureaucratic and political control, these groups found it easier to function and were quicker to respond to the needs of their members. The independent state found itself building alliances to address many social and economic issues.

The increasing strength of domestic society lay not only in its capacity to mobilize people or to fill the vacuum created by the shortfalls of the state but also in their link with an emerging transnational civil society. It was that link of domestic society with a global commonality addressing concerns such as human rights, gender equality, good governance, and the environment which strengthened domestic society. In addition, the state found itself forced by international conditionalities,

¹⁶⁸ Incidents of confrontation include the non-recognition of the NYC by the Ministry of Youth in 1985 because of its leadership; the NFA's mobilization of farmers to influence agricultural policy; and the National Women's Organisation's call for the removal of the Minister of Women Affairs and for changes in discriminatory legislation.

¹⁶⁹ For example the NYC Draft Youth Policy (1987); the Folk Research Centre's wide range of cultural activities; and the NFA's facilities to assist small farmers.

to include domestic society in its planning process and even in delegations attending international gatherings.¹⁷⁰

The strengthening of domestic society in Saint Lucia through its interaction with a transnational civil society can be analyzed at two levels – the normative and the institutional. The normative level was facilitated by the dissemination of information through the media and exchange of information by fraternal organizations. The global communications network allowed individuals to learn of events, and the opinions and activities of others across the globe. The effect was to provide domestic society in Saint Lucia with the information capacity to act, as well as attain a frame of reference against which they could assess their own work and the performance of the state. Trade Unions had on occasion called upon their regional counterparts, the international grouping of their affiliation and the International Labour Organisation to alert them to the practices of the state and to request their solidarity. The women groups were able to compare existing legislation in countries where sister organizations existed to campaign for reform.¹⁷¹ Networking with fraternal organizations outside the country was an established part of the programming of social groups within domestic society.

The other level of strengthening operated through organizational and programme support provided to groups through international funding agencies. In the case of Saint Lucia, the limited monetary and trained human resources available to social groups were an inhibition to their functioning. The NYC, NFA, FRC, Crisis Centre and the National Trust received funding from a number of international funding agencies, for example HIVOS, OXFAM, CUSO and HelpAge. Such assistance has enabled these groups to establish an institutional base for their functioning and enhanced their organizational capacity. It has also

¹⁷⁰ Interviews with Cletus Springer and Embert Charles.

¹⁷¹ Such legislation included the treatment of women as in Saint Lucia teachers were dismissed on their second pregnancy if unmarried.

enabled them to bring in human resources to assist in their programming where such expertise could not have been found locally. Therefore, issues such as human rights, gender equality, environmental conservation, and youth rights were increasingly introduced from the outside. Some of these issues were also emanating from international governmental organizations and forums in which the independent state was influenced by the views of domestic society.¹⁷²

Therefore, the independent state began to face a domestic society strengthened by its interaction with a global civil society and advocated norms and values which are upheld by the inter-state system but appear in opposition to state interests. The transnationalisation of domestic society represented a means by which the moral concerns of Western civil society came to shape domestic policy. In most cases, these concerns – women, environment, and human rights – had been supported by Western governments, as policy issues within the community of nations. In particular, action on these issues had become a pre-condition for grants and loans from Western governments and financing institutions. In other instances, positions adopted at international fora forced the state to accept these concerns. The consequence was that the independent state in Saint Lucia found itself having to find an accommodation with domestic society in order to satisfy criteria for aid and mitigate international criticism. This effectively accelerated the process of integrating state and society.

6.4.0 Conclusion

This Chapter further shows the increasing influence of the domestic in shaping the state and society. The role of the international remains significant but the domestic has assumed greater influence in shaping the state-societal relationship. This period also highlighted the

¹⁷² Interview with Cletus Springer. For example, UN-sponsored Conferences on Population, Environment and Development, Women, and Social Development.

process of by which the society was being strengthened which in turn weakened the state and allowed for greater integration. Three significant processes can be identified which demonstrated how the interplay of international and domestic influences has shaped the relationship between the state and society.

Firstly, it demonstrated the leading role played by international forces in propelling the anti-colonial movement towards demands for self-government and improved living and working conditions, which influenced the changes in imperial policy towards the colonies. This eventually led to independence. Secondly, it showed the failure of colonial policy to create a sustainable economic framework for the state and to provide civilized living conditions for the population, thereby accentuating the crisis of confidence in the state. It also explained the context for the failure of the independent state to embark upon a development policy that would address the criticisms that were historically levelled at the colonial state. Thirdly, it identified an emerging trend of transnationalisation of domestic society which transformed the capacity of society to challenge the independent state. In effect, society was able to influence the state in its policy formulation and execution, which started to ease the historical separation of state and society.

After 1945, the role of international forces became more significant in encouraging groups that were critical of colonial rule to embark upon anti-colonial action. The consequence was the emergence of an international norm which saw independence as a right to be enjoyed by all nations, although concern was raised about the viability of small states as independent entities. Ironically, that norm did not seem to have inspired the state or society in Saint Lucia. The anti-colonial call remained for self-government and right of the Imperial State to meet development needs, rather than for independence. The social, political and economic conditions experienced by the majority black population had encouraged the struggle against colonialism, but it was for better

working and living conditions and more control of the government of the colony.

The attainment of independence was an externally motivated decision as the imperial state sought to rid itself of its colonial ties. It was clear by the 1970's, that smaller colonies were not able to demonstrate economic viability but the imperial state was equally not willing to accept responsibility for their development. The failure to get associated statehood accepted as a form of decolonization, and thereby relinquish all responsibility, was a major set back for the imperial state. The growing concern with the issue of security in the associated states virtually provided the final impetus for the imperial state to disengage with the smaller colonies of the Caribbean.

The Chapter highlighted that the challenge for the Imperial State was to find a balance between the international pressures for decolonization and the obligation to assist the small colonies to become self-governing. The initial imperial policy was that a state should only become independent if it had a viable economy and could defend itself. This was a clear recognition that economic viability – the ability to provide the concrete benefits of sovereign statehood – was necessary before independence could be provided. The failures of the federation attempts, as a means of addressing economic viability, ensured a continued concern with what should be done with small colonial states like Saint Lucia.

HMG solution by granting the smaller colonies 'Associated Statehood with Britain' which represented a three-quarter way house to independence was not accepted by all colonial states. Saint Lucia did not want associated statehood or independence but instead requested the granting of the traditional form of self-government. It was clear that the colonial state wanted to have continued access to imperial aid and to hold Britain responsible for its development. At the same time, the local government wanted complete control of the colonial state. The new

arrangement of associated statehood satisfied British needs, but not those of colonial states, including Saint Lucia. At the Constitutional Conference, Saint Lucia noted that constitutional advancement, without a supporting economy would be meaningless and suggested that any constitutional discussion should be linked to trade and aid talks. HMG refused to provide more aid and recommended rationalization of available aid. While the colonial state did not want associated statehood, the only other option was independence, which was less desirable. The greater concern of society was social and economic development and reflected the concern for advancing the social and economic development of the colony. On the other hand, it was another attempt by the imperial state to address the issue of empirical statehood through economic viability. Instead, HMG sought to control defense and foreign policy, which satisfied its strategic interest in the context of the Cold War. The effort at economic development was made more difficult as the challenge of managing economic development required international assistance, and the conduct of international relations. The nature of associated statehood restricted such state practice and served as another conflict between HMG and the associated state. The attempt by the Americans to lead a tripartite survey, as the basis for pursuing economic viability was not followed with an implementation programme of action.

The attainment of independence provided the state with an international role and the right to conduct its own foreign policy. The Chapter showed that the state did not use these new opportunities to define an effective foreign policy which exploited all possibilities for developmental assistance. Instead, the state pursued a course of maintaining contact with traditional Western countries. Undoubtedly, it was the pursuit of a safe policy which did not offend the United States. It was noticeable that the international role of the state was defined by and centred on the Prime Minister. There was no public discussion or announcement of foreign policy actions or international obligations of the

state. Yet, independence was presented to the society as a necessity to source capital needed for national development.

In reality, international aid as a part of the national development policy was not as significant as expected. However, the state did expand its role as the engine of growth, but relied on external borrowing as the source of capital. Development projects were a frequent a source of contention, as opposition political forces claimed that they were being used to entrench the ruling party. Regardless, the expansion of activity did enhance confidence in the state and in its capacity to deliver.

Confidence in the state was also increased by the expansion of both the banana and tourism industries. The banana industry, which was dependent on preferential treatment in the UK market, expanded rapidly, occasioned by high prices and a high exchange rate against the English pound. The fickle nature of the dependence on the banana industry was reminiscent of the sugar industry. The banana industry was significant for the development of the society as it involved smallholdings and provided weekly cash payments. On the other hand, tourism development was not inclusive of local society except as workers at the hotels. The involvement of the state was restricted to creating the conditions for investment and tourism promotion rather than directly investing in constructing hotels and restaurants. Consequently, the state remained in the dependent mono-crop agricultural framework and had little involvement in strategic ownership of the tourism sector. Whilst, the society benefited from the expansion in the banana and tourism industries, the fundamental structural deficiencies of dependency and underdevelopment of the economy were never addressed. There was no national economic development policy aimed at eliminating the structural dependency created by colonialism, or to satisfy the aspirations of the society for greater economic control.

Despite the disappointments, in terms of the development of the state, associated statehood aided the emergence of a semi-autonomous

state. The state was now controlled by local interests and accountable to the local legislature. At the domestic level, the society was not part of the move towards associated statehood. The only significant involvement was from opposition forces who wanted to ensure that the governing elite did not entrench their power. Associated statehood transformed the relationship of the society to the state, in that it provided some constitutional provisions for the functioning of a democratic government and entrenched the fundamental rights of the citizen, although in practice the society did not have a significant influence. However, the changes were far reaching compared with the colonial state but failed to serve as the mechanism for participatory politics. The absence of an educated and mobilized citizenry required that the new state facilitate greater participation. Therefore, the new state failed to give meaning and expression to citizen's participation in the political development of their society, which would overcome the historical experience of the colonies and the separation of the society from the functioning of the state. The new state structure continued the practice of politics without participation.

The decision to seek independence coincided with the attempts of HMG to disengage totally from the smaller colonies. The Anguillan experience highlighted the difficulty in ensuring political stability and the recognition that Britain could not evade responsibility as long as the decolonization process was not complete. This explains why Britain adopted its policy of abandonment where colonies would be encouraged towards independence without holding a referendum.

The decision by the state in Saint Lucia to seek independence, further divided the society, as opposed to uniting it. . The governing elite argued that independence was necessary for development, while the opposition interpreted such policy as a move to entrench themselves in power, especially as there were no public call for independence during that period. The eventual attainment of independence was not a national

cf Bermuda

achievement but was rooted in (national) discontent about partisan politics. This served to reinforce the separation of state and society and increased the empirical statehood deficit.

Another consequence of independence was the greater power placed in the state and by extension the Government rather than empowering citizens to control the state structure. The state structure remained unchanged from associated statehood, whilst the process towards independence divided loyalties to the state and retarded the acceptance of institutions and symbols of nationhood. Again, this was another lost opportunity to address the historical separation of state and society but instead, independence reinforced political power in the hands of the ruling party, through the Government. Notwithstanding, at the level of the state, historical experience had led to undoubted acceptance of the customs and practices of democracy, though not always performed to the letter and spirit of the constitution. At the level of the society, although there was no allegiance to the state or demonstrated nationalism, there was an acceptance of constitutionalism and rule of law.

The conflict created by the separation of state and society and deficiencies in economic and social development encouraged civil institutions within domestic society to expand their contact with civil institutions in other countries which assisted in addressing societal concerns. That vacuum created by the shortcomings of the state, began to be occupied by organizations that were produced by the citizens themselves. The state found itself having to compete with strengthening civil institutions comprising people that has historically been left outside its functioning and always treated the state as alien. The role of a transnational civil society in aiding the strengthening of domestic civil society was significant. Domestic civil society organizations received both information and organizational support to facilitate their work. In addition, these transnational civil society institutions had a significant

effect on Western society and encouraged Western governments to internationalize their concerns at international fora.

Undoubtedly, the rise of an organized civil society with transnational links and the pressures from international institutions accelerated the integration of state and society.

7

State-Society Relations: Providing Understanding within an IR Framework

This thesis examined the historical evolution of the state and society in a post-colonial setting to show the interplay of external and domestic factors in shaping that evolution. This examination was undertaken against the claim that post-colonial states lacked the features of classical states and possessed 'limited empirical statehood'. In studying the evolution of the state and society, the thesis highlighted the origins of 'limited empirical statehood' as identified by Jackson and its direct relation to external factors.¹

In his account, Jackson noted that there are classical states possessing the traditional attributes of sovereign statehood and there are quasi-states that lack the institutional features of sovereign states. This thesis claimed that Jackson's use of a totality approach to understanding the nature of the state in the inter-state system was inadequate as the internal conditions of the 'quasi-states' are recognized but taken for granted and their historical evolution is ignored. Therefore, Jackson's explanation remains rooted at the level of the international system and the state remained a monolithic entity that is not subjected to scrutiny. This thesis has shown that to understand how limited empirical statehood exists, the evolution of state and society must be studied in its historical context. In order to achieve that objective a different IR framework to Jackson's was used.

¹ Robert Jackson, *Quasi-states: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World* (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1990).

7.1 Utility of a new IR framework

This thesis argued that to study the evolution of state and society, IR theory had to be broadened beyond its traditional conceptions to allow for analysis that dismantles the state and brings in the society as a unit of analysis. It must also allow domestic forces to be accepted as useful for explanation in accounting for the nature of states in the international system. The use of a new IR framework achieved three valuable theoretical achievements and was only possible by going beyond the black-box of the state in IR.

Firstly, the use of a critical historical approach in this thesis meant that post-colonial states as units of analysis were not examined as pre-determined entities with a stated national interest of survival but as products of the inter-state system. This approach allowed the study of colonial state formation, and the analysis of the internal features of the state to comprehend the consequences of state formation and its incorporation into the system. The state became important both as a domestic and as an international actor which broaden the scope of enquiry to accommodate such an expanded notion of the state. It was possible to examine the state as an incipient state during colonial expansion; as a plantation state serving the interests of the imperial state and planter; as a reformed state after the 1930's; and as a national state after independence. In all cases the state was shown as having a 'janus-faced' character where it faced both internal and external influences. By highlighting the janus-faced nature it meant that varying influences were examined at various historical periods. Therefore in the first period of examination, the state was heavily influenced by the external, which was colonial expansion. The second period showed the increasing role of the internal, which was the reaction to the colonial crisis and the riots. The period showed the disengagement of direct external control and the shift of responsibility to domestic sources of

power. The third period showed the growing influence of the internal as the state is forced to integrate with domestic society.

Secondly, using a critical approach allowed theoretical space to highlight other constitutive actors, understanding how they interact and the levels of interaction. This approach created what Rosenau described as an enlarged space for the study of IR.² In the case of St.Lucia, rather than taking the state for granted, the thesis was able to bring in more sources of action and influences that shaped the state, and show how the state and other influences shaped society. Therefore, using the Coxian notion of historical structure a framework was used which allowed for the identification and examination of various sources of action on the development of the state and society.³ The consequence is that the colonial state was examined not in isolation but in relation to colonial society and the international system. This satisfied Hobson's view that the state must be seen as constitutive, since it is integrated within domestic social relations as well as international relations.⁴ For the state to be studied in its relation to the society and the international system, the definition of the state was moved from its monolithic conception which was necessary to characterize IR as a separate discipline. Instead, the state was conceived as the unity of its two dimensions – the 'state as external' and the 'state as internal'. This followed Clark's suggestion that the state be treated as the common but contested ground that brings the international and national together.⁵ The state was analyzed as a set of institutions headed by an executive authority and responsible for the ordering of social relations. In this

² James N. Rosenau, *The Study of Global Interdependence: Essays on the Transnationalisation of World Affairs* (New York; Nichols, 1980).

³ Robert Cox, 'Social Forces, States and World Order' in *Neorealism and its critics*, ed., Robert Keohane (New York; Columbia University Press, 1986)

⁴ John Hobson, *The State and International Relations* (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 2000).

⁵ Ian Clark, *Globalisation and International Relations Theory* (Oxford; Oxford University Press, 1999).

definition, the functioning and rationale of the institutions, the material conditions that determined the social relations, and the ideas that guided the executive authority all became important.

Thirdly, a critical approach to understanding the state highlighted the importance of historical specificity, meaning that the conditions - material, ideational and institutional - that existed at the time shaped social existence. Therefore, the examination of the evolution of the state and society in Saint Lucia was unfolded as continuing processes which had to be interpreted in each instance for their changing forms in specific reference to the determining conditions of the time. The critical approach treated social reality as an interrelated whole which required that the state be studied alongside its social and economic relations. The state in Saint Lucia was studied in its relation to the society and the international system at three levels of interaction or spheres of activity - the social forces which are generated at the domestic level; the changing forms of the state; and the nature of the inter-state system. This fact was reflected in Cox's notion of a totality of historical structures within three interrelated levels of activity. A persistent feature was observed at all three levels of activity - the conflicts caused by the material conditions, contesting ideas, and the functioning of institutions. These conflicts led to the transformative events and shaped state-societal relations. For example, it can be observed that the origin of the state was rooted in the demand for sugar in Europe; the movement to end slavery was the product of the decline of the sugar industry and the rise of new conceptions of human dignity; the riots of the 1930's was driven by poverty and deprivation in the colonies and the rise of trade unions as workers institutions; the attainment of independence was influenced by the decolonization movement and the role of the FCO in terminating the relationship with the colonies.

Focusing primarily on the evolution of the state and society and the forces that shaped that evolution during the three periods, it is clear

that the essential difference between classical and post-colonial states was the experience of colonialism as practiced by European society in the fifteenth century. This reinforced Tilly's view that there were two paths to state formation and that the post-colonial state was the product of a process of deliberate creation of new states by existing states. Therefore the existence of limited empirical statehood in post-colonial states is recognized as a failure of colonial rule and as the product of the internationalization of the sovereign state as the most efficient mechanism for the maintenance of the states-system. This failure produced three political achievements as theoretical milestones elemental to the transformation of state-societal relations in Saint Lucia. Firstly, the establishment of a free labor market arising from the ending of slavery and the granting of the right to choose one's form and place of work. Secondly, the emergence of the masses as a political force capable of influencing social and political development through the attainment of adult suffrage after the riots of the 1930s. This created the context for the emergence of the citizenry as a political entity. Thirdly, the attainment of a place in the global community of nations and the ascription of nominal equality in the global system after independence. This arose from the intense anti-colonial sentiment in the international system.

7.2 The Origin of State-Societal Relations – Colonialism and External Dominance

The state in the St. Lucia was a product of the expansion of the European states-system - an external influence. The origin of the state and the early relationship with the society was largely influenced by an external influence, in this case the colonial experience. Colonialism was an unbridled attempt by European national powers to acquire possession to satisfy the demand for products, valuables and naval prestige. The colonial experience meant the subjugation of the colony to imperial

economic, social and political control to serve imperial purposes. It was a statement of the strength of a monarch and state to possess colonies. However, different powers developed differing colonial policies which in turn shaped their relationship with the colonies.

In the case of the British, it was first an attempt to thwart Spanish power by conquering their possessions, then the establishment of agricultural colonies for producing tobacco and sugar. As military stations, there was no need for a state structure and it was satisfactory to have a military structure that sought to organize defense. It was the demand for tropical products, in this case tobacco, which introduced the need for an embryonic state as planters needed the infrastructure such as roads and warehousing and facilities for trade such as ports and customs clearing. However, the shift to sugar cane cultivation provided the break with the embryonic state and impelled the establishment of a more elaborate state structure. Sugar became a major commodity for trade and the plantation represented the primary focus for production of sugar for exchange on the world market. Significantly for the emerging state and the creation of societal relations, sugar production had a distinct mode of production centered on the use of brutal force and subjugation of the African labor force.

The state as a imperial creation to facilitate imperial needs in tropical products and trade is reflected in the early establishment of the state. The first elementary state structure in St.Lucia under settled British colonialism was Crown Colony Government which served to coordinate the establishment and maintenance of basic facilities and to ensure order. The fundamental role of the state was the maintenance of slavery and order. The early state had to guarantee a level of order and social stability necessary for the maintenance of the structures and relations of economic production based on the plantation system. This was largely achieved through the threat and, in some cases, use of force.

In addition, it was shown that the legal framework was designed to ensure the survival of the plantation system.

During that period, the influences on the state were dominantly external. The Imperial State's primary concerns were to ensure the profitability of the colonies by maintaining order and, most importantly, the possession of colonies as a display of imperial and economic power. The local planters though, were less concerned with the possession of colonies as a geopolitical concern and focused more on social control and economic prosperity. This divergent motivation was often the cause for conflict between the imperial state and the planter class. As the issue of economic prosperity was seen by planters as a responsibility of the Imperial State, the planters established lobbies in London and Parliament to fight their cause. This reflected the reality that the locus of power was really in London with the colonial legislature vested with little real power. Therefore, local planters expected and demanded that the Imperial State ensure that the trading policies and financing facilities were in place to ensure their profitability. There was benefit for the Imperial State as increased supply meant increased taxes and more shipping which meant good news for the Imperial Treasury. Even in their divergent objectives, there was common ground to ensure the survival of the plantation system.

The seed for the separation of society from the state was borne in that early period. Separation did not mean the literal disjointing of state from society. State and society exists in constitution to each other. There cannot be a state without a society although it is possible to have a society without a state. In this case, the early colonial state was not a product of society but a colonial imposition designed to safeguard the plantation system and served the interests of the minority landed class and imperial interests. Therefore it was separated from the majority who were slaves. The state's relation to the majority was to ensure social control by using force and the legitimization of racism.

The issue of race achieved its own dynamic in the evolution of state-societal relations. Beyond its economic role, racism became an ideological explanation for the existence of the social order and for the separation of state and society. Blacks who were enslaved were not seen as capable of managing themselves and had no role but to serve as subjected labour. This was the reason for deeper racial sentiments from the local elite compared to the metropolitan ruling class. An example is the objection of the local planter class to the abolition of the slave trade in 1807 and the dismantling of the slave system even after it was no longer economically viable. Therefore, beyond all economic and political arguments, it meant that blacks were not seen as capable human beings and had no legitimate existence outside the plantations.

However, the use of force became a source of major conflict between the Imperial State and the local planter class with the colonial state set in between. The treatment of slaves became a constant cry for the anti-slavery lobby in the attempt to end slavery. The imperial state was always more progressive than the colonial state on matters relating to the treatment of blacks, both freed and enslaved.

It is noticeable that during the early period the colonial state had no economic role except to facilitate conditions for imperial possession of the colonies reflecting the dominance of external forces. It also reflects the attainment of empirical statehood was not a consideration in the establishment of the state. The colonies were oriented to import their needs and export their primary products, which were in demand in Europe. The surpluses were kept in Britain and used to help finance burgeoning capitalist enterprises and other investments. The colonies developed what is best known as 'absentee ownership' as plantation owners hired British managers to oversee their estates while they participated in the expansion of business at home. From the above it is obvious that there was no development of an indigenous bourgeoisie that controlled any wealth or economic power. There was a large managerial

class active in managing the estates, banking and retail but they were not the owners of the businesses.

The emancipation of slaves in 1838 was a seminal historical achievement as it brought about new economic relations that transformed economic, social and political relations in Saint Lucia. The role of external factors was dominant in the emancipation process as highlighted in role of the Colonial Office, Parliament and imperial society. The end of slavery was a necessary outcome of the growth of capitalism and the emergence of new ideas on morality and justice in Europe. The high cost of maintaining a slave mode of production and the logic of having a larger buying market for industrial goods encouraged the end of slavery and establishment of a free labor market.

Despite the dominance of external influences, it is worthy to note that slave revolts represented the early rise of domestic society influencing state-societal relations. These revolts made the maintenance of slavery expensive to the imperial state both in actual costs and in having to resist antislavery sentiment in imperial society. Such a sentiment was based on new views on morality and justice rooted in the emergent bourgeois thinking of a new social order and associated with the rise of capitalism. That thinking influenced the massive social and political movement in Britain and changed imperial policy towards the colonies.

The terms and conditions for the emancipation of slaves and the establishment of a free labor market are other examples of how the early state-societal relations were shaped by the 'external' and were resisted by local interests. For example, the emancipation of slaves created a problem of labor for the planters as freed persons occupied the abundant lands available and hence gave rise to the emergence of the peasantry. Whilst the planters' labor problem was solved with the interim arrangements of indentureship, the peasantry would become an economic problem as their productive capacity became a source of

competition in the export of commodities. The planters then had the additional concern of controlling the ownership and occupation of lands. Interestingly, the differing ways in which the peasantry was established in various islands would influence the new state form though in degree rather than kind. But it was clear that emancipation of slaves and the creation of a freed society represented the end of external dominance and the rise in the importance of domestic influences on the development of the state.

7.3 The Development of State-Societal Relations – Rise of Internal Influences

The post-emancipation period witnessed the expansion of activity that gave birth to conflicts that would further shape the state giving more scope for domestic influences and integrating more of society into its sphere of existence. For example, the emancipation of slaves and consequent creation of a peasantry, through the metayer system, opened up the society by spreading commodity relations beyond the plantations. In addition, as the state increased its level of activity for the ordering of social relations and the provision of needs for an increased population, the functioning of the state changed. Under the plantation system the plantation engaged the labour of the slaves, was responsible for the welfare of the slaves, provide its own security and was a total institution. With the establishment of a free society, it was the responsibility of the state to provide a range of new services and functions. It meant that the state had greater responsibility and increased decision-making though not more autonomy from the Imperial State as decisions were either directives from the Colonial Office or had to be approved by the Secretary for the Colonies. This increased responsibility and power made control of the state more important than in the pre-emancipation period and set the stage for an intense struggle between the planter class and the imperial state. The only domestic political force remained the planter

class because of its economic power and a limited franchise that allowed it to influence the legislature and government. On the other hand, the role of the imperial state, through the Colonial Office, was vital in protecting the interests of the newly-freed persons. For the imperial state that was an important task in the face of an enlightened imperial society that continued to lobby for better treatment of ex-slaves.

The state in Saint Lucia increased its^s scope of engagement with colonial society as it managed the development of a free labor market, governed a free society with the majority being ex-slaves and enforced the indentured labor program. It also had to monitor and control the emerging peasantry comprised of ex-slaves who opted for agricultural self-employment. The colonial state became more active compared to its laissez-faire approach in the previous period. The state now assumed responsibility for education, roads, health care and became more involved as a regulatory body by enacting laws to regulate business activity.

The other distinctive change in the state was the considerable strengthening of the coercive arm of the state. Voluntary militias were abandoned in favor an established police force. The judicial system started to consider a wider range of issues including land disputes, money exchange and resulting from the growth of commerce. The system for land control and settlement patterns was developed with 'Crown Lands' becoming the dominant form of land ownership. A rigid labor regime was developed to control the emerging free labor force. Persons were evicted from plantations for withholding labor. Movement from estate to estate in search of the best terms of employment was outlawed and emigration from colony to colony was prohibited. Investments in education and public health became more of a concern with the large number of freed persons. Finally, the Colonial Office insisted on a system of taxes and duties to finance colonial state activities.

At the international level, capitalism was established as an international system as national economies became more integrated. The global division of labor was clearly demarcated between industrialized countries and the producers of raw materials. The role of agricultural producers like Saint Lucia was marginal and was insignificant among producers of raw materials as large-scale mining was in great demand. Saint Lucia, like other smaller islands, experienced a continuous decline of the plantation sector and gave rise to the dominance of the peasantry. It was also the period of great diversification into other areas of investment such as shipping, telecommunications, rum distilling, and retail trade. However, the investments were led by multinational companies and were all foreign owned. The manufacturing class that emerged in Britain was not replicated and production remained in a precapitalist state. There was no indigenous accumulation of capital for development and surpluses were transferred to the Britain. Critically, neither the state nor society was given the impetus to develop an autonomous capacity to meet the needs of the citizenry.

By the turn of the twentieth century, there were a number of other significant developments that shaped state-societal relations and transformed the political configuration of Saint Lucia. Firstly, the class structure of the colony became more defined. The growing middle class comprising professionals and businessmen began to realize that their interests would be advanced by control of the political apparatus. Yet, they faced exclusion by the planter and colonial elite. That class also included non-whites, which reinforced the opposition to their inclusion. Increasingly, their concerns took the form of nationalist aspirations and they sought allies in the emerging working class. Many of their members served in World War I and gained first hand knowledge of the democratic advancements that took place in Britain. Secondly, the establishment of the representative association represented the rise of organized domestic society as a challenge to the state. Led by the middle-class it challenged

the Imperial and Colonial States and demanded an expansion of the franchise and greater representation in the Legislature and in the State apparatus. It was an attempt to break planter influence in the legislature but not to establish universal participation. Thirdly, deteriorating social and economic conditions served as fertile ground for discontent and anti-colonial activity among the working class. The establishment of a labor market led to both the formation of a numerically superior working class and a large number of unemployed. In that context, the trade union became a standard feature of the political landscape of the colony based on the experiences in Europe. The support of the British Labour Party and the Trade Union Congress was instrumental in the development of trade unions in the colonies. The rise of trade unions accentuated the challenge of society against colonial rule.

The Moyne Commission was an attempt by the Imperial State to address the deficiencies of colonialism in the West Indian colonies and represented an example of the interplay between external influence and the increasing role of internal influences in shaping state-societal relations. The Commission paved the way for the legitimization of trade unions and political parties and eventually adult suffrage. Following on the emancipation of slaves, the implementation of the Moyne Commission recommendations was the second most significant external influence on shaping state-societal relations.

Adult suffrage, one of the recommendations of the Moyne Commission, was a historic achievement in the political evolution of Caribbean colonies as it ushered in the involvement of the masses in the political process. The provision of adult suffrage was an acknowledgement that direct colonial political control would no longer be the future form of control in the colonies. However, this does not suggest that colonies were free to determine their own mode of insertion into the international system. In that period after WWII, self-determination was emerging as a universal norm and imperial control

would have to be more sophisticated. Therefore, Riviere is right in arguing that a strategy that was based on continued colonial subservience in the global economy had already been defined.⁶ Thomas also recognized four elements of that strategy which were all present in St.Lucia.⁷

The first element of the strategy required that economic development policies place emphasis on either production of low value-added import substitution utilizing cheap labor that required foreign capital or continued reliance on agriculture. In the larger territories there was some semblance of an industrial base emerging, however the smaller territories remain heavily agricultural based. Secondly, foreign capital control required a local capitalist class that could serve as a collaborator in investment. The intention was to develop a class that would be tolerant and accommodating and not an indigenous class that promoted local entrepreneurship. Thirdly, the establishment of parliamentary democracies based on the Westminster model and a gradual phasing of the system to ensure that there was sufficient nurturing of the practices and the principles of representative politics. It should be noted this was in denial of emerging movement of mass politics that tended to favor participatory politics. Finally, the administrative apparatus of the state was reinforced to ensure that it was capable of accomplishing the other elements of the strategy. Therefore, public institutions were focused on maintaining law and order, revenue collection and encouraging foreign capital.

Another important internal influence was the use of the principle of self-determination as the basis for the call to end colonial rule. Increasingly colonialism was seen as a crime that constituted a violation of the Charter of the United Nations, the Declaration on the Granting of

⁶ Bill Riviere, *State Systems in the Eastern Caribbean* (Institute of Social and Economic Research: Jamaica, 1990).

⁷ C.Y. Thomas, *The Rise of the Authoritarian State in Peripheral Societies* (London; Heinemann Educational Books Ltd).

Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, and the principles of international law. The case against colonialism was extended by the UN to recognise nationalist struggles for self-determination as legitimate and resistance against self-determination as contrary to the UN Charter. All colonies now had the right to request independence and therefore recognition by the international community and if suppressed to call upon the support of other states against the involved colonial power. There was now a clear basis in international politics for determining the emergence of new states as sovereign states. This also showed that despite the rise of internal influences, external considerations were still important in understand the evolution of the state.

Importantly, it can be argued that the use of the principle of self-determination to achieve independence of the Caribbean territories was not the attainment of the status of viable statehood but international recognition of the right to exist as a state. This thesis has shown that the Imperial State did not seek to address the issue of economic viability as the basis for viable statehood. In fact, Saint Lucia did not request independence when it was granted but wanted the imperial state to address the issue of viability. What the domestic state, by then controlled by local interests, wanted was greater self-government with imperial responsibility for development.

With independence the Colonial Caribbean pursued three distinct strategies towards economic development: traditional export of primary goods; import-substitution industrialization; and 'industrialization by invitation' which was export-oriented.⁸ The Eastern Caribbean islands, including St.Lucia, were conditioned by their limited size and instead remained rooted in their traditional export trading ties with mainly metropolitan countries and an undiversified domestic economy.⁹

⁸ Riviere, *State Systems*.

⁹ Carl Stone, Patterns of Insertion into the The World Economy: Historical Profile and Contemporary Options, "Social and Economic Studies, Vol. 32, No. 3 (Sept). The

Therefore, countries like St. Lucia maintained a place as a supplier of tropical products. However, the islands continued to have a high level of foreign capital control in other spheres of economic activity such as banking, tourism, shipping, utilities, insurance and manufacturing which continued the high incidence of capital repatriation.

The absence of an indigenous capitalist class capable of leading capital accumulation for domestic development ensured a continuation of dependence on foreign capital. The independent state did not seek to develop and development path predicated on state ownership of production to facilitate accumulation of capital for national development. The state found itself mediating between a multi-strata business class – propertied class, merchants, manufacturers, and small entrepreneurs primarily in services – to ensure the survival of the existing order. Thus, the state has ensured the continuation of the inherited economic order and the place of the state in the global capitalist system as a producer of primary products.

With the attainment of independence, the state was recognized by the society as the major provider of the needs of citizens for adequate material and social existence regardless of its capacity. In fact, the ruling party had provided the argument that the colonial state was the source of deprivation and self-rule would address societal deficiencies. However, as explained above the state was not in any position through domestic capital accumulation or economic activity to satisfy the needs of the majority of the population.¹⁰ This deficiency provided fertile ground for the emergence of practices of patronage and clientelism as a means of maintaining political support.

In addition, after independence the state became an arena for contest between previously united domestic forces. The commonality of

difference with the larger territories only exposes a dependency in degree rather than kind.

¹⁰ The state is also limited in its capital accumulation because of the small tax base from which it raises revenue.

the nationalist cause against colonial rule gave way to fragmentation of the national independence aspirations. The contending parties disagreed on independence as each thought they had the rightful claim to lead the nation into independence and that additional power would only entrench the ruling party. Such disunity came at a time of increasing social demands from the working class and underprivileged causing any possibility that independence would bring greater state legitimacy to be rapidly eroded. Unlike the European state that came about after a long historical evolution and represented the coalescence of state and nation, the post-colonial state was established after a long history of separation of state and society and represented a crisis of legitimacy as it is not designed to meet the needs of its domestic society. The state assumed a powerful role in reshaping and refashioning the social structure. The state therefore finds itself in a schizophrenic relationship with foreign businesses, as it has to engage in a frontal verbal attack on their operations to elicit the support of the poor and disadvantaged but the economy was not structured to encourage the development of an entrepreneurial class.

Similarly, the state apparatus was not transformed to address the historical baggage of a disjuncture between state and society. Historically, the colonial bureaucracy was seen as an enforcer of colonial policy. In the transition period to independence, the bureaucracy was reinforced as an institution of reactionary thought and was accountable to itself rather than the public. The heavy reliance on rules and procedures served to contain the aspirations of the society and actions of the nationalist politicians. The bureaucracy was bereft of any creativity. At a general level, the state structure was not transformed to allow for greater societal participation or influence in decision-making. Unlike the European state, there few active civil society groups influencing public policy. Mills is correct in the view that the bureaucracy was designed to focus on maintaining law and order and collecting revenue and not to

manage a dynamic and creative process as was needed after independence.¹¹ Significantly, one of the mechanisms used to bypass that bottleneck has been the establishment of state enterprises and statutory bodies and the expanding role is reflected in the level of state financial resources that are channeled towards their work.

One outstanding notion of the nature of post-colonial states and the relationship between state and society merits mention. Stone refers to the relationship of patronage and clientelism, which arises when the state similarly cannot meet the expectations of most citizens.¹² There is no doubt that the post-independent state in St.Lucia exhibited these qualities. Politicians used the limited resources and economic possibilities to secure the support of persons for political reasons and along party lines. The state machinery became a valuable object for control and vital for the distribution of material benefits.

With independence, the state was able to establish its own transnational links to secure resources for its development agenda. These external links increased the capacity of the state to deliver and increased its legitimacy within society. However, it was always contended that the ruling party utilized these development projects for the purpose of reinforcing their rule. Beyond the official governmental structures, institutions in society established transnational links with other civil society institutions that have empowered society in its relationship to the state. Such links have led to the view that society is actually pursuing an agenda that is determined and shaped from outside, and in the process adding a new dynamic to the state-societal relationship.

However, beyond a donor-inspired or transnational agenda, the society is also able to mobilize locally to influence the state to respond to

¹¹ Gladstone Mills (ed) *Training of Public Officers in Barbados, The Leeward Islands and the Windward Islands. Report of a Conference held in Barbados.* Quoted in Riviere, *State Systems.*

¹² Carl Stone, *Democracy and Clientelism in Jamaica* (New Brunswick, N.J. : Transaction Books, 1980).

societal concerns. Some of these may be issues that the state has consented to enforce through international conventions and society demands application. Society also develops transnational links that assist persons in formulating their own 'strategies for survival' and in the process reinforce the fragility of the state.

Whilst historically decision-making in postcolonial states has been with the exclusion of the society, there is a process of gradually including elements of society. This represents the gradual integration of state with society, where the state appears to have an organic link with society seeking to meet the needs of society and shaping its institutions to incorporate society in decision making and allocation of resources. This was glaringly absent from the early periods of state building.

7.3 State-Societal Relations - Implications for Empirical Statehood

The nature of state-societal relations in St. Lucia is rooted in the social and political experience of colonialism which lasted until independence. That experience not only created a state and society, as against modifying existing ones, but was so imposing as to stifle any integration between the state and society. In the period leading to independence and after, there was no attempt to break the stranglehold of an inherited colonial state-societal relationship but instead the local political elite sought to exploit the existing relations to perpetuate their hold on political power. The first step to pursuing 'empirical statehood' – the integration of state and society - was never pursued by the state. It is another development within the evolution of the international system – the growth of a transnational society - that is forcing the integration.

The end of slavery in 1833 did not provide any fundamental change in the role of the vast majority of the population in the political

development of the society. The strengthening of Crown Colony government after the end of slavery placed greater power in the hands of the Crown as necessary to protect the masses from the abuses of the propertied class. In contrast, the general movement towards greater democracy which accompanied the decline of the landed aristocracy in Europe was not replicated fully in the colonies as the state continued to be an instrument of colonial control. It was not until after World War I that there were increased calls from the emerging middle class comprising largely of professionals and merchants for greater equality in the executive, constitutional reform and democratic institutions. At this stage of colonial experience, St. Lucia could not be considered as having a state which represented its society – it was a creation of the imperial society and remained under imperial control.

In discussing the distribution of power in third world societies, Migdal argued that what existed was a weak state versus a strong society.¹³ Equally Migdal highlighted a separation of state and society. However, this observation was largely based on the African reality and suggested the existence of a *mélange* of social ties which competed with the state for loyalty. The colonial state in Africa was required to compete with other forms of social bonding which had existed for centuries. The situation in the Caribbean and in St. Lucia was different. The society was a manufactured society with the vast majority of the population having no indigenous links to the islands. There were no existing loyalties for the colonial state to compete with and the control of the state was virtually absolute. Loyalties in the St. Lucian society developed in spite of,

¹³ Joel S. Migdal, *Strong Societies and Weak States. State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World* (New Jersey; Princeton University Press, 1988).

but also because of, the colonial state. The absence of any powerful lobbying groups in the political process outside of the commercial interest groups and the trade unions is due to a legacy of individualism and survival bred by the colonial system and the subsequent exploitation of this legacy by the new local political elite.

The shape of the new state after 1979 was based on a strict adherence to the Westminster System but because of the absence of a similar evolution which characterized the system in England, there was no inherited coalescence of state and society. In the absence of popular political participation, the state continued to be controlled by the party with the best electoral machinery usually determined by the material well-being of the party and not by the conscious actions of citizens.

With the expansion of educational opportunities to a greater section of the population it was inevitable that the more educated and more conscious individuals in the society would create organisations of similar interest to each other. The period of the 1970's and 1980's witnessed a growth in social organizations with interests in culture, farmers, youth, women, environment and community development. The state has not sought to utilize the existence of these organizations to facilitate the development process but instead seeks to stifle their emergence to avoid a diminution of state power.

The case-study of St. Lucia shows that the strength of the state was in the inheritance of a state apparatus that was designed^{as} an instrument of control for colonial purposes. The consequence of such a system was to create a social setting where the rest of society was alienated from the functioning of the state and at independence the state was faced with the

task at independence of establishing its legitimacy. This weakness is seen as the absence of empirical statehood.

Notwithstanding the nature of the state-societal relations in St.Lucia, the society cannot be described as a subservient society. The society is not characterised by docility but rather an indifference to the functioning of the state. This is not to suggest that people do not expect the state to provide educational, housing, health or employment opportunities. Rather, the legacy of slavery and a colonial state which was never in existence for the benefit of the wider society created a society which developed its own modes of survival outside of the apparatus of the state. Such modes of survival are deeply rooted in familial, kinship and communal relations. !!

Thus, the ability of the society to survive without the state makes the task of establishing legitimacy more difficult for the state. However, the activities of organisations within the society are not restricted to sourcing domestic means to assist individuals to meet their needs. Despite the effort by the state to establish a monopoly in foreign relations, there is an unfolding contest with civil society to extend their sources of benefit. In summary, there exists in St.Lucia a strong state that utilizes its right to participate in the inter-state system to reinforce itself while the society historically separated from the state is empowered by the growth of its interaction beyond the boundaries of the state. It is the growth of this interaction that serves to challenge the state and force integration between state and society.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Secondary Sources - Books

- Adrian, Peter. *Metayage, Capitalism and Peasant Development in St.Lucia, 1840-1957*. Jamaica: Consortium Graduate School of Social Sciences, 1996.
- Almond, Gabriel and James A. Coleman. *The Politics of the Developing Areas*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960.
- Allison, Graham. *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*. Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1971.
- Allum, Percy. *State and Society in Western Europe*. UK:Blackwell Publishers, 1995.
- Anderson, Perry. *Lineages of the Absolutist State*. London: NLB, 1974.
- *Passages From Antiquity to Feudalism*. London: Verso, 1996.
- Ashton S.R. and S.E. Stockwell, eds. *Imperial Policy and Colonial Practice 1925-1945*. London: HMSO, 1996.
- Ashton S.R. and David Killingray, eds. *The West Indies, Series B vol.6 of British Documents on the End of Empire*. London; The Stationary Office, 1999.
- Augier, F.R. and S.C. Gordon, D.G. Hall and M.Reckford. *The Making of the West Indies*. Trinidad: Longman Caribbean, 1960.
- Ayearst, Morley. *The British West Indies. The Search for Self-Government* London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1960.
- Baker-Fox, Annette. *Freedom and Welfare in the Caribbean. A Colonial Dilemma*. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1949.
- Barrow-Giles, Cynthia. *Introduction to Caribbean Politics*. Kingston: Ian Randle Publishers, 2002.

- Blackburn, Robin. *The Overthrow of Colonial Slavery 1776-1848*. London: Verso, 1998.
- Beckford, George. *Persistent Poverty*. London: Oxford University Press, 1974.
- Bender, Thomas ed. *The Anti-slavery Debate*. California: University of California Press, 1992.
- Benn, Denis. *Ideology and Political Development*. Mona: ISER, 1987.
- Boersner, Demetrio. *The Bolsheviks and the National and Colonial Question*. Connecticut: Hyperion Press Inc., 1957.
- Burn, W.L. *Emancipation and Apprenticeship in the British West Indies*. London: Johnathan Cape, 1937.
- Burton, John. *The Study of World Society: A London Perspective*. USA; International Studies Occasional Paper No.1, 1974.
- Breen, Henry *St.Lucia. Historical, Statistical and Descriptive*. London: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., 1844.
- Bryce-Laporte, Roy S. and Delores M. Mortimer. *Caribbean Immigration to the United States*. Washington, D.C. : Smithsonian Institute, 1983.
- Campbell, Mavis *The Dynamics of Change in a Slave Society: A Socio-political History of the Free Coloureds of Jamaica*. London: Madison, 1976.
- Caporaso, James A. *Across the Great Divide: Integrating Comparative and International Politics*. Florence Italy: EUI Working Papers, RSC No. 97/58, 1997.
- Carr, E.H. *Nationalism and After*. London: Macmillan, 1945.
- Clark, Ian. *Globalisation and International Relations Theory*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.
- Clapham, Christopher. *Third World Politics. An Introduction*. London: Croom Helm, 1985.

- Cooper, Fredrick, Thomas Holt and Rebecca Holt. *Beyond Slavery*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 2000.
- Cornforth, Maurice. *The Theory of Knowledge*. US:International Publishers Co., 1971.
- *Historical Materialism*. New York: International Publishers, 1985.
- Cox, Robert W. *Production, Power and World Order*. New York; Columbia University Press, 1987.
- *Approaches to World Order*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
- Crafton, Micheal. *Empire, Enslavement and Freedom in the Caribbean*. Jamaica: Ian Randle Publishers, 1997.
- Cross Malcolm and Gad Henman, eds. *Labour in the Caribbean. From Emancipation to Independence*. London: Macmillan Publishers Ltd., 1988.
- Davies, David Brion. *The Problem of Slavery in Western Culture*. New York: Cornell University Press, 1966.
- *The Problem of Slavery in the Age of Revolution, 1770-1823*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1975.
- Davies, Ralph. *The Rise of Atlantic Economies*. London: Cox and Wyman Ltd., 1973.
- *English Overseas Trade, 1500 to 1700*. London: Macmillan Publishing Press, 1973b.
- Davy, J. *The West Indies Before and Since Emancipation*. London: Frank Cass, 1854.
- Deere, N. *The History of Sugar, Vol.1*. London: Chapman and Hall, 1949.
- Deutsch, Karl W. et al. *Political Community in the North Atlantic Area: International Organisation in the Light of Historical Experience*. Princeton: N.J; Princeton University Press, 1957.

- Dookhan, Issac. *A Post-Emancipation History of the West Indies*. London: Collins, 1977.
- Dunleavy, Patrick and Brendan O'Leary. *Theories of the State. The Politics of Liberal Democracy*. London: The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1987.
- Dunn, Richard S. *Sugar and Slaves. The Rise of the Planter Class in the English West Indies 1624-1713*. London: Jonathan Cape, 1973.
- Easter, B.H. *St.Lucia and the French Revolution*. Castries: Voice Publishing Co., 1965.
- Easton, David. *A Systems Analysis of Political Life*. New York: Wiley, 1965.
- Evans, Peter B. et al., eds. *Double-Edged Diplomacy*. Berkeley:CA; University of California, 1993.
- Ferguson, Yale H. and Richard W. Mansbach. *The State, Conceptual Chaos and the Future of International Relations Theory*. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc., 1989.
- Finnemore Martha, *National Interest in International Society*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996.
- Fraser, Cary. *Ambivalent Anti-colonialism: The United States and the genesis of West Indian Independence, 1940-1964*. Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1994.
- Goldsworthy, David. *Colonial Issues in British Politics*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1951.
- Goveia, E.V. *The West Indian Slave Laws of the 18th Century*. United Kingdom: Ginn and Company, 1970.
- *Slave Society in the British Leeward Islands*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965.

- Gramsci, A. *Selections from the Prisons Notebooks*, ed. and translated by Q. Hoare and G.N. South. London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1971.
- Hall, Douglas. *Five of the Leewards 1834-1870*. Barbados: Caribbean University Press, 1971.
- Hall, John A. ed. *States in History*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1986.
- Hall, John A. and G. John Ikenberry. *The State*. Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1989.
- Halliday, Fred. *Rethinking International Relations*. London: The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1994.
- Hart, Richard. *Slaves who Abolished Slavery, Vol.1 – Blacks in Bondage*. Jamaica: Institute of Social and Economic Research, 1980.
- *From Occupation to Independence*. London: Pluto Press, 1998.
- ^{Er}Has Ernst B. *The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social, and Economic Forces, 1950-1957*. Stanford: California; Stanford University Press, 1958.
- Havinden, Michael and David Meredith. *Colonialism and Development*. London; Routledge, 1993.
- Higman, B.W. *Slave Populations of the British Caribbean 1807-1834*. Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1984.
- Hinden, Rita. *Empire and After*. London: Essential Books Ltd., 1949.
- Hobden Stephen and John M. Hobson, eds., *Historical Sociology of International Relations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.
- Hobson John M. *The Wealth of Nations: A Comparative Sociology of International Economic and Political Change*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.
- *The State and International Relations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.

- Horkheimer, Max. *Critical Theory. Selected Essays*. New York: The Continuum Publishing Company, 1995.
- Howe, Stephen. *Anticolonialism in British Politics: the left and the end of Empire 1918-1964*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993.
- Hutcheson, Francis. *A Short Introduction to Moral Philosophy*. Glasgow: R. & A. Foulis, 1753.
- Jackson, Robert. *Quasi-states: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.
- James, Allan. *Sovereign Statehood: The Basis of International Society*. London: Allen & Unwin, 1986.
- James, C.L.R. *Nkrumah and the Ghana Revolution*. London: Allison & Busby, 1977.
- Kanzancigil, A. ed., *The State in Global Perspective*. Great Britain: Aldershot, 1986.
- Katzenstein Peter. *Cultural Norms and National Security*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996.
- Keohane, Robert. ed. *Neorealism and its Critics*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1986.
- Keohane, Robert O. and Helen V. Milner, eds., *Internationalization and Domestic Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
- Keohane Robert O. and Joseph S. Nye, *Transnational Relations and World Politics*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1972.
- *Power and Interdependence*. USA: Longman, 2001.
- Lee, J.M. *Colonial Development and Good Developoment*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967.
- Lewis, Arthur. *Labour in the West Indies. The Birth of a Workers Movement*. London: New Beacon Books, 1977.

- Lewis, Gordon K. *The Growth of the West Indies*. London: Modern Reader Paperbacks, 1968.
- Lorimer, Doug. *Fundamentals of Historical Materialism*. Australia: Resistance Books, 1999.
- Macmillan, W.M. *Warning from the West Indies*. London: Faber and Faber Limited, 1936.
- *The Road to Self-rule. A Study in Colonial Evolution*. London: Faber, 1959.
- Mann, Michael. *The Sources of Social Power*, Vol.1. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986.
- Mansbach, Richard, Yale H. Ferguson, Donald E. Lampert, *The Web of World Politics*. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1976.
- Marx, Karl. *The German Ideology*. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1976.
- *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, Vol.1. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1976.
- McIntyre, Arnold M. *The Economies of the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States in the 1970's*. Barbados: ISER, 1986.
- McIntyre, W.D. *Colonies into Commonwealth*. London: Blandford Press, 1966.
- McLennan, Gregor, David Held and Stuart Hall, eds. *The Idea of the Modern State*. Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1984.
- McNeill, Williams. *The Rise of the West*. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1963.
- Meyer, F.V. *British Colonies in World Trade*. London: Oxford University Press, 1948.
- Moore jr., Barrington. *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*. London: Penguin Books, 1967.

- Morgan, D.J. *The Origins of British Aid Policy, 1924-1945*, Vol. 1 of *The Official History of Colonial Development*. London: Macmillan, 1980.
- *Developing British Colonial Resources, 1945-1951*, Vol.2 of *The Official History of Colonial Development*. London: Macmillan, 1980.
 - *Guidance towards Self-Government in British Colonies, 1941-1971*, Vol. 5 of *The Official History of Colonial Development*. London: Macmillan, 1980.
- Morgenthau Hans J. *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1993.
Ced
- Migdal, Joel S. *Strong Societies and Weak States. State-Societal Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1988.
- *State in Society*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.
- Miliband, Ralph. *The State in Capitalist Society*. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1969.
- Mill, J.S. *Considerations on Representative Government*. London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1872.
- Millar, John, *The Origin of the Distinctions of Ranks*. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2006.
- Mintz, S. *From Plantations to Peasantries in the Caribbean*. Princeton: Focus Caribbean, 1984.
- Morse, Edward L. *Modernisation and the Transformation of International Relations*. Canada: The Free Press, 1976.
- Murray, D.J. *The West Indies and the Development of Colonial Development, 1801-1834*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965.

- Philpott, Daniel. *Revolutions in Sovereignty. How ideas shaped Modern Internal Relations*, Princeton: Princeton University, 2001.
- Pierson, Christopher. *The Modern State*. London: Routledge, 1996.
- Porter A.N. and A.J. Stockwell, *British Imperial Policy and Decolonisation 1938-64 Vol.1*. London: Macmillan Press, 1987.
- Post, Ken. *Strike the Iron, Vol.1*. New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1981.
- Reus-Smith Christian. *The Moral Purpose of the State*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996.
- Ragatz, L. *The Fall of the Planter Class in the British Caribbean, 1763-1833*. New York: Octagon Books, 1963.
- Riviere, Bill. *State Systems in the Eastern Caribbean*. London: Institute of Social and Economic Research, 1990.
- Reynolds, David. *The Creation of the Anglo-American Alliance 1937-41*. London: Europa Publications, 1981.
- Royal Institute for International Affairs *The Colonial Problem*. London: Oxford University Press, 1937.
- Rosenau James N. *Linkage Politics: Essays on the Convergence of National and International Systems*. New York: Free Press, 1969.
- *The Study of Global Interdependence: Essays on the Transnationalisation of World Affairs*. New York: Nichols, 1980.
- Shils, Edward. *Center and Periphery: Essays in Macrosociology*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975.
- Simmey, Thomas. *Welfare and Planning in the West Indies*. Oxford University, 1946.

- Skidmore David and Valerie M. Hudson, eds., *The Limits of State Autonomy: Societal Groups and Foreign Policy Formulation*. United Kingdom: Westview Press, 1993.
- Skocpol, Theda. *States and Revolutions*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979.
- *Bringing the State Back In*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985.
- Smith, Adam. *The Wealth of Nations*. London: G.Bell & Sons, Ltd., (1776) 1921.
- Snder Richard C., H.W. Bruck and Burton Sapin, *Foreign Policy Decision Making: An Approach to the Study of International Politics*. New York: Free Press, 1962.
- Sorensen, Georg. *Changes in Statehood. The Transformation of International Relations*. New York; Palgrave, 2001.
- Spurdle, Fredrick. *Early West Indian Government*. New Zealand: Fredrick Spurdle, 1962.
- Suganami Hidemi, *The Domestic Analogy and World Order Proposals*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989.
- Temperly, Howard. *British Anti-slavery 1833-1870*. London: Longman, 1972.
- Thomas, Edward A. *The Early Germans*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965.
- Thomas, C.Y. *Monetary and Financial Arrangements in a Dependent Monetary Economy: A Study of British Guiana, 1945-62*. Mona: ISER, 1974.
- *The Rise of the Authoritarian State in Peripheral Societies*. London: Heninemann Educational Books Ltd., 1984.
- Tilly, Charles. *The Formation of National States in Western Europe*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975.

- Tilly, Charles and Wim P. Blockman eds., *Cities and Rise of States in Europe A.D. 1000 to 1800*. Oxford: Westview Press, 1994.
- Vincent, Andrew. *Theories of the State*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987.
- Wallace, Elizabeth. *The British Caribbean. From the Decline of Colonialism to the end of Federation*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977.
- Wallerstein, Immanuel. *The Modern World System*, Vol. 1. London: Academic Press Inc., 1974.
- *The Politics of the World-Economy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984.
- Waltz, Kenneth. *Theory of International Politics*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1986.
- Walvin, James. *Black Ivory. A History of British Slavery*. London: HarperCollins Publishers, 1992.
- *Sugar and Slaves - The British Colonial Experience*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992.
- Watts, David. *The West Indies: Patterns of Development, Culture and Environmental Change since 1492*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987.
- Wayne, Rick. *It will be Alright in the Morning*. St.Lucia: Star Publishing, 2003.
- *Foolish Virgins*. California: Star Publications, 1986.
- Wong, Hume. *Government of the West Indies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1923.
- Williams, Eric. *Capitalism and Slavery*. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1975.
- *From Columbus to Castro: The History of the Caribbean*. London: Deutsch, 1970.
- Wiseman, H.V. *A Short History of British West Indies*. London: University of London Press, 1950

Secondary Sources - Articles

Alistair McIntyre, "Some issues of Trade Policy in the West Indies", *New World Quarterly*, Vol.2, No.2, 1966.

Hamza Alavi, "The State in Post-Colonial Societies: Pakistan and Bangladesh", *New Left Review* 74, July-August 1972.

John Hobson, "The Historical Sociology of the State and the State of Historical Sociology in International Relations", *Review of International Political Economy* 5; 2.

John Saul, "The State in Post-Colonial Societies: Tanzania", *The Socialist Register* 1974.

Lloyd Best, "A Model of Pure Plantation Economy", *Social and Economic Studies*, Vol.17, No.3.

Neal R. Malmsten, "The British Labour Party and the West Indies", *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth*, 5, No.2 (1977).

Peter Katzenstein, "International Relations and Domestic Structures: Foreign Economic Policies of Advanced Industrial Societies", *International Organisation* 30 (Winter 1976)

Roy Augier, "Before and After 1865", *New World Quarterly*, Vol.2, No.2, 1996.

Terrence Farrell, "Arthur Lewis and the case for Caribbean Industrialisation", *Social and Economic Studies*, Vol. 29, No.4.

Tony Thorndike, "The Politics of Inadequacy", *Social and Economic Studies*, Vol.19, No.1.

Urias Forbes, "The West Indies Associated States: Some Aspects of the Constitutional Arrangement", *Social and Economic Studies*, Vol.19, No. 1.

Woodville K. Marshall, "Notes on Peasant Development in the West Indies since 1838", *Social and Economic Studies*, Vol.1 No. 3.

cf his
Ph.D
thesis

Primary Sources

CO 112
CO 246
CO 253-256
CO 318-323
CO 691
CO 850-859
CO 884
CO 950
CO 1031
CO 1042

FCO 43-44
FCO 371

Annual Administration Reports, 1951- 1952

British Development Division, *St.Lucia: Economic Survey and Projections*.
Barbados: BDD, 1970.

Colonial Reports, 1930-1940.

Crusader Newspaper, 1977-1980.

Government of Saint Lucia, *The Approach to Independence*. (n/a: n/a)

Legislative Ordinances of Saint Lucia, 1830-1840; 1945-1955.

Interview with Cletus Springer, 29 September 2004.

Interview with Embert Charles, 4 November 2004.

Interview with Earl Huntley, 3 June 2004.

Minutes of St.Lucia Legislative Council Meetings, 1920-1966.

Proclamations of Governor of Saint Lucia, 1830-1840.

Proceedings and Debates of the Meeting of the House of Assembly, 1978.

Report of the Tripartite Economic Survey of the Eastern Caribbean
(London: HMSO, 1967).

St.Lucia Constitutional Order, 1967 (S.I. 1967).

St.Lucia Gazette 1939-1945.

St.Lucia Year Book, 1982.

St.Lucia Blue Books, 1930-35.

St.Lucia Labour Party, *Independence? Do it Right. Let the People Decide.*
Castries: Voice Press, undated.

Throne Speeches by His Excellency, Sir Allen Lewis, 1972-1977.

Voice Newspaper, 1977-1980.

World Bank, *St.Lucia. Economic Performances and Prospects.* USA:
The World Bank, 1985.

Colonial Development. Memorandum Explaining Financial Resolution,
1929. (Cmd. 3357).

Constitutional Proposals for Antigua, St.Kitts/Nevis/Anguilla, Dominica,
St.Lucia, St.Vincent, Grenada, 1965 (Cmd. 2825).

Report of the Leeward and Windward Constitutional Conference, June
1961 (Cmd. 1434).

Report of the Windward Islands Constitutional Conference, 1966
(Cmd.3021).

Report of the St.Lucia's Constitutional Conference, 1978 (Cmd. 7328).

The Colonial Empire, 1947-1948 (Cmd. 7433).

West India Royal Commission Report, 1954 (Cmd. 6607).