Governing Parties and Southern Internationalism: a neoclassical realist approach to the foreign policies of South Africa and Brazil, 1999-2010

Candice Eleanor Moore

A thesis submitted to the International Relations Department of the London School of Economics and Political Science for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
London
September 2011
To my parents, Christopher and Valie Moore
DECLARATION

I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the MPhil/PhD degree of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which case the extent of any work carried out jointly by me and any other person is clearly identified in it).

I consider the work submitted to be a complete thesis fit for examination.

I authorise that, if a degree is awarded, a paper and/or electronic copy of my thesis will be deposited in the British Library of Political and Economic Science and that, except as provided for in regulation 32 it will be made available for public reference and inter-library loan. I authorise that by submitting my thesis to the Library, the Library is permitted to digitise it to assist in the long-term preservation and accessibility of my thesis.

I authorise the School to supply a copy of the abstract of my thesis for inclusion in any published list of theses offered for higher degrees in British universities or in any supplement thereto, or for consultation in any central file of abstracts of such theses.

The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is permitted, provided that full acknowledgement is made. This thesis may not be reproduced without my prior written consent.

I warrant that this authorisation does not, to the best of my belief, infringe the rights of any third party.

SIGNED: CANDICE ELEANOR MOORE
ABSTRACT

The international relations literature on internationalism in foreign policy has not taken account of the internationalist methods and motives of countries of the developing world. This thesis aims to correct this absence through an analysis of Southern internationalism, as evidenced by the foreign policy approaches of South Africa and Brazil in the first decade of the 21st century. By utilising a neoclassical realist approach to the study of the emergence of new powers, the use of internationalism as a foreign policy tool is interrogated as a response both to domestic imperatives, such as perception and identity, and systemic constraints and opportunities. Central to the analysis is an examination of the role of governing parties in foreign policymaking, both as key actors in determining policy, and as the sources of ideational constructs, in this case ‘internationalism’, that have a bearing on foreign policy.

Foreign policymakers are limited in their perceptions and responses to external threats and opportunities by the domestic institutional structure, as well as by external threats and opportunities. In South Africa, responses are often limited to rhetoric, owing to limited resource extraction capacity, in spite of the highly centralised foreign policymaking structure under Mbeki. In Brazil, constitutional checks and balances also limited the state’s responses to external stimuli under Lula; yet, these responses, when they are implemented, can be more forceful owing to greater resource capacity. The ‘new Southern internationalism’, propounded by both South Africa and Brazil, is a function of domestic politics and external pressures, as evidenced by the Haiti case. These findings make a contribution to advancing the analysis of emerging powers, their trajectory and intentions in international relations, as well as the extent to which governing parties can influence foreign policy outcomes, and under which conditions.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Nothing that preceded the years of writing this thesis prepared me for the experience. I would like to begin by thanking the British Commonwealth Commission for providing me with the opportunity to study at one of the foremost research institutions in the world, the London School of Economics and Political Science. I was awarded a three-year scholarship, including funding for one research trip. The British Council, notably, Ms Claire Farnsworth, administered this award not just with efficiency, but with greatest sensitivity. I would further like to thank the Oppenheimer Memorial Trust for extending to me the resources to spend a further full year in London. I am also grateful to the International Relations Department at LSE for supplementing my funding with research studentships in 2007-8, 2009-10 and 2010-11, as well as funding part of my research trips to South Africa in 2007 and Brazil in 2008. I would like to thank the Abbey Santander Trust for funding my 2010 short trip to Brazil.

In matters academic, I would like to thank my supervisor, Dr Chris Alden, for his time, patience, and encouragement; and numerous readings of this text. I thank my high school history teacher, Mrs Melanie Enslin; my undergraduate university Politics professor, at the former Rand Afrikaans University, Deon Geldenhuys; and, my first mentor, Professor Raymond Suttner. I would like to thank the busy staff at the Ministry for External Relations in Brazil for arranging and keeping appointments with me; as well as the staff at the University of Brasilia and PUC-Rio; and, the staff of the International Office of the Partido dos Trabalhadores in São Paulo, along with the staff of the South African Embassy in Brasilia. I also thank the participants in the North-South Dialogue/Foreign Policy Analysis seminar of the IR Department at LSE for their insightful interjections on my work over the years.

I spent a semester as a Mellon Lecturer at Rhodes University in Grahamstown, South Africa. I thank Prof Paul Bischoff for his interest and discussions during that time. I thank Professor Chris Landsberg for many discussions on South Africa’s foreign policy and for reading the Conclusion. I thank Mehmet Ozkan and Professor Kim Hutchings for the readings they provided. I thank Prof Margot Light for her early guidance and support. I thank all who allowed themselves to be interviewed. Any remaining errors and oversights in the work are, of course, my own.

For their friendship, some since the beginning, and some more recent, but no less cherished, I thank Lillian Zhang, Jasmine Gani, Claire Beaugrand, Zeynep Kaya, Kevork Oskanian, Matthew Arnold, Uzzi and Nancy Ohana, Hanspeter Heinrich, Shuxiu Zhang, and Miriam Allam. My special thanks go to Chris Desmond who was a friend from the first day, gave me funding ideas at a crucial time, and finally encouraged me to finish. I thank my friends in Brazil, Leonardo Alves, Mauriccia Oliveira, Annabel Haslop and Maria. I thank the staff and residents of the International Lutheran Student Centre in Bloomsbury, where I lived from August 2007 to December 2010. I especially thank David Lopes Perez, Lester Geroy, Emilie Barnett, Kinga Koren, Sairat Noknoy, Noppawan Siriphol, Miriam Campbell, Adela Krupova and Pui Chan. For caring about the well-being of one of hundreds of students and area employees who patronise their establishment every
day, I thank the staff of Wright’s Bar for remembering the way I drink my coffee and ensuring that I was never hungry. I would like to thank Henry Radice and Serena Sharma for a productive, enlightening, and stimulating year co-editing *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* in 2006-7. Thanks go to Martina Langer of the IR Department for her efficiency and friendliness, as well as the staffs of the LSE Library, and the Senate House Library.

For their love, support, and never asking, ‘When will you be done?’, I would like to thank my family. My close-knit family endured my absence for four years. My parents to whom this thesis is dedicated, my mother Valie, who still encourages me, and my father Christopher, whom I lost during the writing of this thesis while on fieldwork in Brazil, are the dubious beneficiaries of this humble vote of gratitude. It pales into insignificance beside all they have selflessly given my sisters and me. My sisters, Chanelle Moore and Nadine Stow, a doctor and teacher, respectively, give me so much inspiration daily. My nephew, Nikolas, makes everything worthwhile. My grandparents, all of whom passed away before I started this project, deserve my thanks and to be remembered for never wavering in their love and support of my academic efforts while I was growing up. My brothers-in-law, Grant and Evan, are owed thanks for understanding ‘what we may and may not ask Candice about her PhD’. I thank my dear extended family member, Dorah Mose, for lifelong love and encouragement.

Ultimately, there have been very many occasions on which I doubted very deeply whether this was a goal worth pursuing. I faced many uphill battles in all areas of this endeavour. However, my faith in God has been the rock on which I have leaned most heavily. I thank God for replenishing my personal and professional resources on more occasions than I can remember. It is not easy being a scientist and a Christian, but I am fortunate to be both scientist and Christian, rather than scientist alone.

Candice Eleanor Moore

*Johannesburg, 2011*
# LIST OF SIGNIFICANT ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABC</td>
<td>Agência Brasileira de Cooperação</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>African National Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRIC</td>
<td>Brazil, Russia, India, China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAMEX</td>
<td>Câmara de Comércio Exterior</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CARICOM</td>
<td>Caribbean Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDES</td>
<td>Conselho de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CODESA</td>
<td>Convention for a Democratic South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COSATU</td>
<td>Congress of South African Trade Unions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPLP</td>
<td>Comunidade dos Países de Língua Portuguesa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CUT</td>
<td>Central Única dos Trabalhadores</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DA</td>
<td>Democratic Alliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFA</td>
<td>Department of Foreign Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIRCO</td>
<td>Department of International Relations and Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPKO</td>
<td>Department of Peacekeeping Operations, UN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSM</td>
<td>Dispute Settlement Mechanism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSN</td>
<td>Doutrina de segurança nacional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMBRAPA</td>
<td>Empresa Brasileira de Pesquisa Agropecuária (Brazilian Agricultural Research Cooperation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESG</td>
<td>Escola Superior de Guerra</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FARC</td>
<td>Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOCAC</td>
<td>Forum on China-Africa Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRA</td>
<td>Front de Résistance de l'Artibonite</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRELIMO</td>
<td>Frente de Libertação de Moçambique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FTAA</td>
<td>Free Trade Area of the Americas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G-77</td>
<td>Group of 77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEAR</td>
<td>Growth, Employment and Redistribution Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GIA</td>
<td>Governor’s Island Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GTI</td>
<td>Grupo de Trabalho Interministerial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IBSA</td>
<td>India-Brazil-South Africa Forum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICBL</td>
<td>International Campaign to Ban Landmines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICC</td>
<td>International Criminal Court</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LRA</td>
<td>Lord’s Resistance Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAPA</td>
<td>Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Supply</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDC</td>
<td>Movement for Democratic Change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDIC</td>
<td>Ministry of Development, Industry, and Foreign Trade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MERCOSUL</td>
<td>Mercado Comum do Sul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINUSTAH</td>
<td>United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNF</td>
<td>Multi-National Force for Haiti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPLA</td>
<td>Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MST</td>
<td>Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAFTA</td>
<td>North American Free Trade Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAM</td>
<td>Non-Aligned Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCACC</td>
<td>National Conventional Arms Control Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEC</td>
<td>National Executive Committee of the ANC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEPAD</td>
<td>New Partnership for Africa’s Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIEO</td>
<td>New International Economic Order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NP</td>
<td>National Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPT</td>
<td>Non-Proliferation Treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NWC</td>
<td>National Working Committee of the ANC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAS</td>
<td>Organization of American States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPEC</td>
<td>Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDT</td>
<td>Partido Democrático Trabalhista</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PMDB</td>
<td>Partido do Movimento Democracia do Brasil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POLISARIO</td>
<td>Frente Popular de Liberación de Saguía el Hamra y Río de Oro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSDB</td>
<td>Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT</td>
<td>Partido dos Trabalhadores</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RDP</td>
<td>Reconstruction and Development Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SACP</td>
<td>South African Communist Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPLM</td>
<td>Sudan People’s Liberation Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWAPO</td>
<td>South West African People’s Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNCTAD</td>
<td>United Nations Commission on Trade and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIH</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Haiti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNTAET</td>
<td>United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USTR</td>
<td>United States Trade Representative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WSF</td>
<td>World Social Forum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZANU-PF</td>
<td>Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZAPU</td>
<td>Zimbabwe African People’s Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZEC</td>
<td>Zimbabwe Electoral Commission</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abstract</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acknowledgements</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List of Significant Acronyms and Abbreviations</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Part I: Analytical Framework</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 1: Introduction</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 2: The State and Southern Internationalism: The evolution of a concept</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 3: The State, Internationalism and Governing Parties: A neoclassical realist approach to FPA for emerging powers</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 4: State Structure, Governing Parties and Foreign Policymaking for Emerging Powers: The cases of South Africa and Brazil</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Part II: Case Studies: South Africa and Brazil</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 5: Rhetoric and Restraint: The State, the ANC and internationalism in South African foreign policy</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 6: Rising Without Sabre-rattling? The PT and Brazil’s internationalist foreign policy</td>
<td>191</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter 7  The New Internationalists? South Africa, Brazil, MINUSTAH and the exile of Jean-Bertrand Aristide

Part III:  Thematic Discussion and Conclusions

Chapter 8  Neoclassical Realism, Internationalism, and the New Emerging Powers

Appendices

Appendix 1:  List of Brazilian Presidents Since 1930 302
Appendix 2:  Chronology of Major South African Events 303
Appendix 3:  Chronology of Major Brazilian Events 307
Appendix 4:  Haiti Chronology of Events 311
Appendix 5:  Selected South African Internationalist Foreign Policy Actions, 1999-2008 313
Appendix 6:  Selected Brazilian Internationalist Foreign Policy Actions, 2003-2010 328

References  348
Part I: Analytical Framework
Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1. Context

The challenge to growing American unilateralism following the terror attacks of September 11, 2001, opened a new chapter in international politics. As much as it provided an avenue for the full expression of American military supremacy through the wars subsequently initiated by that country, the period following the attacks raised profound questions about the future of the multilateral security system, international trade, and assistance for development, among others. At a more fundamental level, the climate posed new questions about the types of power that would continue to hold currency in the international system of the twenty-first century, and hence, what balances of power would look like going forward. It was in this first decade of the twenty-first century that certain states of the developing world became more assertive in countering the tendencies toward unilateralism, great power negligence, and their own marginalisation, while at the same time enjoying spurts in economic growth and development, and the consolidation of democracy.

Since the intensification of globalisation after the Cold War – economic globalisation, the globalisation of the ideas of democracy and human rights, and technological globalisation – the opportunity has been created for a number of large developing states to join the mainstream of the mainly Northern-dominated global economy, and also to speak with a stronger moral voice on many of the world’s most pressing issues. The relaxation of economic barriers and the liberalisation of economies the world over during the 1990s ushered in a period of phenomenal growth for countries such as India, China, South Africa, Mexico and Brazil. This is largely the context in which this century’s emerging powers have been analysed: as an economic phenomenon. Little attention has been paid, with the exception of India and China, who occupy ‘rough’, or highly militarised, neighbourhoods, to the
broader strategic foreign policy approaches of these powers, and how, more narrowly, they conduct themselves outside the domain of economics.¹

What is it to be an ‘emerging power’?² What determines ‘emergence’ in the new international setting that has prevailed since the end of the Cold War? In the flurry of acronyms which have attended the rise of new regional and, potentially, global powers, analysts have lost sight of the foreign policy trajectories and systemic environment that makes possible the emergence of new powers. Have the states identified as new powers consciously sought to become great powers, or regional powers? What are the domestic decision-making environments that condition their rise? What are the external opportunities and constraints?

These themes – of a new world order, of rising economic strength and responsibility, of global justice, and of old-fashioned power politics – have been scantly addressed in relation to the new emerging powers.³ South Africa and Brazil, in particular, have sought to frame their foreign policies in mostly conciliatory terms, premised on moral concepts, such as international justice, solidarity, multilateralism and equitable representation of the developing world in global decision-making forums. The rise of new powers has historically been accompanied by great dislocation, instability, and often violence in international politics. Yet, the projection of these two new regional powers in Africa and Latin America, respectively, has been attended by a new type of international politics, characterised

² The terms ‘emerging power’ and ‘intermediate power’ will be used interchangeably in this thesis. While the term ‘middle power’ will also be used along with the two terms aforementioned, it is noted that there is a considerable literature that has been spawned by this category of power in international affairs, but that this does not affect the use of the term here. This will be discussed briefly in Chapter 2.
overwhelmingly, yet not completely, by the “diplomacy of generosity” and internationalism. The extent to which this new politics – largely devoid of sabre-rattling and arms races - is a figleaf for ‘business as usual’ hegemonic designs is an important question for International Relations.

Much of the behaviour of these states is consonant with predominant norms of international society (characterised by respect for human rights, democracy and the free market), leading to a positive view of their potential impact on the challenges of global governance. They are also perceived as ‘forces for good’ in their immediate regions, by external powers hoping to exercise influence, though not always by their neighbours. This thesis forms part of the response to a call in the literature to “focus less on the BRICs [Brazil, Russia, India, China] as a group, and more on the complex processes of change and “bricolage” that have been taking place within each of the emerging states in the global order”. This is because each state is subject to “a complex process of breaking down and reassembling old and new ideas, [while] values and policies are melded together to produce something qualitatively different, …work[ing] against the notion that today’s emerging powers will simply be absorbed within an expanded version of a liberal Greater West”.

---

4 This term was used by former Brazilian president, Lula da Silva, to describe his government’s policies in South America. See Paulo Roberto Almeida, “Never Before Seen in Brazil: Luís Inácio Lula da Silva’s grand diplomacy”, Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional, 53, No. 2 (2010): 160-177: 161.

5 In this thesis, the academic discipline International Relations will be denoted by the use of upper case, while international relations as foreign affairs will be denoted by lower case.


8 Ibid.: 64.
This introductory chapter frames the research puzzle, outlines the research objectives of the thesis, as well as its argument, and methodology. Reasons are provided for the case selection of South Africa and Brazil, as well as Haiti; and, the broader significance of the research is explained. The chapter closes with an outline of the structure of the thesis.

1.2. Research Objectives

The research question to be addressed by this thesis is:

To what extent does internationalism condition, i.e. limit, the foreign policies of South Africa and Brazil?

What will count as examples of ‘internationalism’? They will be instantiated by cases in which governments commit resources, both material and political, to international action that has no immediate material benefit for the state in question. This includes committing troops to multilateral peacekeeping operations; disbursing aid; and, adopting strong positions on conflicts and crises that have no immediate and direct impact on their material position, i.e. affecting their security or economic growth prospects. A more detailed discussion of internationalism is provided in Chapter 2.

The thesis examines the extent to which two leading leftist movements as political parties have influenced the foreign policies of the states they govern, otherwise similarly placed in international affairs, affecting their determination to act with restraint on issues of international importance, privileging the peaceful resolution of disputes, the primacy of multilateralism, the principle of non-interference, and solidarity with the developing world. The research objective is to account for divergence in the levels of influence of Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT) and the African National Congress (ANC), and how this affects foreign policy outcomes.

9 The terms ‘non-interference’ and ‘non-intervention’ are used interchangeably in this thesis. They refer to a belief in diplomacy as the key method by which a state may attempt to influence the behaviour of other states, on the basis of mutually-recognised sovereignty and self-determination. The moral rectitude and legal permissibility of intervention, as well as the extent of actions that qualify as intervention, are a matter of scholarly and international political debate.

10 PT will at times also be referred to by its English name, the Workers’ Party.
Hence, shifts in the international balance of power and the domestic political structures of each state (independent and intervening variables, respectively) are key to understanding the resulting form of internationalism (dependent variable). That the two parties concerned originated on the left of the political spectrum is significant for the expectations that these beginnings have generated. In economics, they were expected to have implemented policies involving deep state engagement in the domestic economy, along with far-reaching welfare and wealth redistribution policies. In foreign relations, as will be discussed in later chapters, their respective arrivals in power were met with trepidation and uncertainty in some quarters, while they were hailed by progressive observers. This is due to an expectation of the rejection of foreign economic control by governments of the left, as well as solidarity broadly with the developing world.

The categories that will be utilised to examine levels of governing party influence on foreign policy are new categories introduced here, namely: institutional freedom and legitimating power. Institutional freedom refers to the nature of the links between the governing party and key state foreign policy institutions, giving an indication of the degree to which power is centralised in the governing party, or in its leadership. Legitimating power, meanwhile, refers to the degree to which key individuals of the governing political parties are able to justify and win support for particular international actions or foreign policy preferences.

While both ANC and PT forged extensive links abroad during their respective struggles for democracy, and while each at one time enjoyed the undiluted support of a broad array of civil society forces and ‘new social movements’, at home and further afield, the extent to which each party as government is able to command both institutional freedom and legitimating power in domestic society is contingent upon the array of domestic and international forces. The concepts of institutional freedom and legitimating power directly pertain to the latitude, or freedom of action, enjoyed by the government of the day, or indeed, the state, in extracting and mobilising national resources for foreign policy purposes. This notion of latitude is a key contribution of the neoclassical realist framework, which utilises relative state power as a determinant of foreign policy outcomes (see Chapter 3).
Foreign policy is “a goal-oriented or problem-oriented program by authoritative policymakers (or their representatives) directed toward entities outside the policymakers’ political jurisdiction”.¹¹ In a more comprehensive sense, it is also comprised of those actions which, expressed in the form of explicitly stated goals, commitments and/or directives, and pursued by governmental representatives acting on behalf of their sovereign communities, are directed toward objectives, conditions and actors – both governmental and non-governmental – which they want to affect and which lie beyond their territorial legitimacy.¹²

Hence, foreign policy comprises purposive action that is expressed or conducted by way of policy – in words and action – and takes place across international boundaries.¹³ ‘Major foreign policy actions’ are classed here as those that entailed the deployment of military forces, or the allocation of monetary and other (i.e. personnel) resources, by the state.

The research question is prompted by a number of empirical and theoretical observations and ‘puzzles’. They will now be addressed in turn.

- The first puzzle concerns the meaning of ‘internationalism’ outside the West. Internationalism as a concept in the International Relations (IR) literature has been marginalised, associated as it is with the ‘idealism’ or ‘liberalism’ that has traditionally been given short shrift by realist scholars who have dominated IR. The concept has been labelled ‘fuzzy’ and ‘empty’, but enjoyed a new resurgence in the popular imagination of the West in the early to mid-1990s, when it became the self-conscious foundation of foreign policy in a number of Western states, from New Labour’s Britain, to the Nordic states.¹⁴ The concept has hardly ever been applied to states of the developing world in mainstream IR, however, even as much of the foreign policy activity of prominent developing countries since the onset of independence in the middle of the last century clearly fit the internationalist bill. Related to this theme, and potentially enveloping it, is the general

---


¹³ Ibid., 335.

¹⁴ This will be explored in detail in Chapter 2.
antipathy of the IR literature to any concept of ethical action on the part of developing countries in foreign policy. Developing countries have been deemed too busy crafting a precarious survival to be concerned with ‘post-modern’ issues of state identity and true solidarity (i.e. not based on mutual defence of bad governments). The activities of Cuba during the Angolan civil war, for example, are often cast in the shadow of Moscow, in spite of the recent emergence of documentation proving that Castro acted largely independently in engaging Cuban troops in Angola. Implicit in this absence is an assumption that developing states adopt expansive foreign policies only to serve aggressive or selfish ends. Only recently has light been shed upon ideas of international order and global justice emanating from the non-Western world.

- The second puzzle is that foreign policy analysis (FPA), generally focused on the developed world, has lagged behind developments in the emerging centres of regional and global power. A primary assumption driving the FPA literature on the developing world, including today’s emerging powers of India, Brazil, Malaysia and South Africa, has been that of state weakness. This view is undermined by the growing agency of large developing countries in international politics today, to the point where global governance initiatives increasingly depend on their participation. In 1983, Bahgat Korany remarked with disappointment on the paucity of works dealing explicitly with foreign policymaking in the developing world, in spite of the growing

---

16 ‘Expansive’ is defined by the OED as “able, [or] tending to expand; …having a wide range and comprehensive”. It is used here in distinction to ‘expansionism’ in foreign policy, which is defined as “advocacy of, or furtherance of, a policy of expansion, esp. of territorial expansion”. The latter is usually undertaken by means of military aggression. Why this is not applicable to the recent foreign policy strategies of two emerging powers is the broader subject of the thesis. Hence, ‘expansive foreign policy’ as used in this thesis is a synonym for ‘activist foreign policy’, and is used to denote foreign policy strategies that are far-reaching and wide-ranging, both in terms of geographical spread and issue areas.
importance of this group of states, whether as a ‘social movement’ within the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), or as a narrower grouping, the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) cartel, which had held the global economy to ransom in the 1970s. Nonetheless, a number of studies have since emerged, considering the gamut of peripheral polities in international relations and their foreign policymaking. By no means an extensive literature, besides selected volumes examining ‘Third World’ foreign policy, it does include categories such as ‘revolutionary foreign policy’, the foreign policy of ‘modernizing states’, as well as the foreign policy of ‘new states’.

• A third puzzle to be addressed is the role of domestic actors other than the state in the formation of foreign policy, even in the most centralised of foreign policymaking environments. Why do states similarly placed in international politics choose different paths to power? This question calls for an opening of the ‘black box’ of foreign policymaking: the domestic environment. The last two decades of the twentieth century saw two notable movements of the Left come to power in Brazil and South Africa, after many years of domestic and international political activism. Were they able to exert the same type of menacing presence to Northern (especially American) interests so feared of Castro and other leftist leaders for most of the twentieth century? If not, why not? Does the domestic political landscape, and the daily struggles that animate it, bear any resonance for the international relations of states?

• The fourth puzzle is that of intermediate states and ‘emergence’ as a great power in the current international order. An underlying assumption of the thesis is the changed ‘social’ environment in which contemporary states operate, in which the rules of great power have changed since the end of the Cold War. While the development of nuclear capabilities was almost universally

frowned upon by developed and developing countries during, and in the
immediate aftermath of, the Cold War, there appears to be a selective and
grudging acceptance of the development of these capabilities by the allies of
the Western powers, such as India and Israel, for example. In this context,
alternative means of power projection have been sought by aspiring powers,
and this has conditioned the rise of new powers, eager to present their
emergence as peaceful and responsible.

• The fifth and last puzzle to be engaged by the thesis is the theoretical
development of studies of developing countries in international politics. While there is
not yet consensus on the existence of a multipolar world, there is certainly a
realisation that new powers are emerging to challenge the United States and
its allies as architects of international order. Thus, while the United States
still presents a salient systemic variable as the world’s sole superpower, there
is more room currently than there was within the Cold War’s bipolar system
for the expression of national interests by smaller, yet ‘system-affecting’ states. Neoclassical realism can fill a gap in this area, helping to shed light on
the foreign policy preferences and choices of states in the developing world,
centred on the role of the state in this process, a vacuum which has been
identified by neoclassical realist scholars.

1.3. FPA in the Developing World: State of the Art

Theoretical development on and in the developing world has always lagged behind
its developed world counterparts. The non-Western developing world has typically
been marginalised in international relations. Subsequently, studies of developing
countries as actors on the international stage have been limited to particularistic
considerations of strategic significance, their economic underdevelopment, and their

\[\text{Robert Keohane devised a hierarchical categorisation of states in which 'system-affecting states are those that "cannot hope to affect the system acting alone [but] can nevertheless exert significant impact on the system by working through small groups or alliances or through universal or regional international organizations". Robert Keohane, "Review: Lilliputians’ Dilemmas: Small States in International Politics", International Organizations, 23, No.2 (1969): 291-310: 295.}\]

prime positioning as case studies on violent conflict. Foreign Policy Analysis in the developing world has followed a similar pattern.

Four major sets of problems – analytical, conceptual, theoretical and practical - appeared to hamper attempts to conduct systematic studies of foreign policymaking in the so-called Third World.

**Analytical Problems**

A feature of FPA for the developing world was the resort to political economy approaches to account for the foreign policy of ‘fragile’ and ‘dependent’ societies. This simply substituted one single-factor approach, psychological reductionism, for another, political economy. While it explained some foreign policy decisions by developing countries, its utility waned with the rising economic power of certain developing states, which consequently experienced an increase in policy autonomy.

A further analytical problem was the attempt to apply theories generated within the European and North American contexts to the developing world, taking for granted the existence of seemingly unproblematic categories, such as ‘the state’, ‘balance of power’, ‘alliance’, and others.

**Conceptual problems**

A key conceptual issue was how outputs were defined, i.e., what exactly was meant by ‘outputs’ – whether behaviour/discrete acts or objectives, or both. Korany argued that an exclusive focus on discrete acts - a behavioural approach - would preclude the identification of “a meaningful body of foreign policy” rather than merely an agglomeration of state actions.27 Such an approach would also make it difficult to

---

identify cases – and these were numerous – where foreign policy goals and outputs did not coincide (i.e. foreign policy failure). To mitigate these problems, foreign policy output could usefully be divided into three components (which will be utilised here):

1. general objectives and verbal strategy that provide the rationale for the country’s global postures and orientation;
2. routine actions: e.g. economic transactions, cultural agreements, pattern of diplomatic representation
3. turning-point decisions (in areas of international conflict and cooperation), e.g. to impose an economic boycott; launch a war, recognise a new govt., etc.\textsuperscript{28}

The examination of each of these components poses its own problems. General objectives and verbal strategies are often devoid of detail and measurable outcomes. However, they do provide an idea of which priorities guide foreign policy makers, and the ideational universe that delimits possibilities in a given foreign policy. This thesis will examine general objectives and verbal strategy (contained in election manifestoes and government strategic plans, for example) to gain an understanding of broad foreign policy goals and orientation for South Africa and Brazil.

Routine actions will be downplayed for the purposes of this thesis, apart from giving an approximate guide to the volume of relations between states. Routine actions do not require modifications of foreign policy, and therefore do not signify key issues for foreign policy decision-makers.

A turning-point decision, such as the decisions by South Africa and Brazil to become involved in Haiti, albeit in different capacities, will be examined in Chapter 7 of the thesis. This analysis will take place at a societal, rather than an individual, level. This is in keeping with the theoretical components of the thesis that examine the impact of the governing party and Foreign Ministries on foreign policy decisions. Thus, the significance of the Haiti case for this thesis lies in its

\textsuperscript{27} David Wurfel and Bruce Burton (Houndmills, Basingstoke: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1990): 27.
\textsuperscript{28} Ibid., 33.
representation of a ‘turning point’ decision in the practice of South Africa’s and Brazil’s foreign policies in the period under consideration.

Theoretical problems

In its approach to causality, the classical, realist perspective sought to ascribe single factors, either the search for power or the defence of the national interest, as determinants of foreign policy. This approach was superseded by the comparative foreign policy approach that incorporated a wider array of factors, multiplying the levels of analysis (by incorporating structural factors and domestic political factors, in addition to unit-level factors such as the search for power and the defence of the national interest). In addition, the inclusion of the additional two levels complicated the single-factor explanation advocated by the realist approach. The search for ‘power’ for example, was problematized in light of the state’s search for security (a distinction highlighted by the divergent ‘offensive’ and ‘defensive’ realist approaches: The search for power characterised the former, while the search for security characterised the latter). The second factor, the defence of the national interest, was questioned in terms of which sub-national grouping was ultimately represented by the ‘national’ interest; as well as the extent to which the ‘national’ interest is subject to “the ‘legitimate’ demands of [the state’s] international environment.”

A further concern centred on the ‘how’ question, or the decision-making process. In this area, Korany noted a significant lack in Third-World studies of the actual foreign policy decision-making process. This lack was not only filled by a disproportionate emphasis on the psychology of a single key decision-maker, as alluded to earlier, which easily became a substitute for “the analysis of social complexity, political fragmentation, … and external networks,” a “great man” theory of foreign policy in the developing world. It was confirmed by a belief in the ‘inapplicability’ of Allison’s bureaucratic politics model of decision-making in the Third World setting. Unlike polities in the developed world, the developing world was only rarely considered a site of sophisticated levels of bureaucratic

29 Ibid., 29, 24.  
30 Ibid., 30.  
31 Ibid., 30.  
32 Korany, “Foreign Policy Decision-Making Theory”, 41.  
33 Ibid., 56.
politics and political lobbying. This literature has been updated, however, to include a number of studies on developing countries of great depth and complexity.\textsuperscript{34} It remains limited, however, in terms of its interaction with IR literature, a gap this thesis seeks to fill by utilising the neoclassical realist approach in the study of the foreign policies of two major developing countries.

\textit{Practical problems}

A number of empirical changes have joined the challenges facing researchers of the foreign policies of the developing world. Along with substantial, if uneven, economic growth across the Global South, has come the prospect of increased complexity in foreign policy choices, and in the institutions deciding upon and implementing foreign policy. Economic growth, has not only ushered in greater diplomatic complexity (not least, economic diplomacy), it has offered some states considerable policy autonomy and a relaxation of dependence on external factors in the making of foreign policy. This has made it possible for foreign policy to serve higher-order needs than the basic needs of ‘survival’, whether political or economic, and arguably to begin to defend, with material support, more philosophical and humanitarian interests.

The impact of globalization on state powers and agencies in developing countries has not been uniform, with some agencies, especially finance or trade bureaucracies, gaining at the expense of others.\textsuperscript{35} In addition, the emergence of new forms of diplomacy – such as ‘niche’ diplomacy or middle power diplomacy - are attributed to the increasing need of peripheral states to adapt to their international context.\textsuperscript{36} Another significant development in the last twenty years has been the democratisation of a number of former Third World states. This has led to an expectation of increased accountability and transparency in foreign policymaking. It has also had the effect of complicating the already vague notion of ‘the national


\textsuperscript{35} Maurice East and Justin Robertson, eds., \textit{Diplomacy and Developing Nations: post-Cold War foreign policy-making structures and processes}. (Abingdon: Routledge, 2005).

\textsuperscript{36} Justin Robertson, “Introduction: The research direction and a typology of approaches”, in ibid., 1-36: 4.
interest’, as greater numbers of sub-national groupings become increasingly vocal about their foreign interests, or the domestic implications of the state’s foreign relations.

Hence, the ‘Third World’ is no more uniform than it was at the height of this label’s use. However, the persistent trait of a subjective sense of marginalisation from power equations in international politics, along with unrelenting challenges of economic development, retain the relevance of the ‘Third World’ or ‘Global South’, if not as an objective, quantifiable reality, then at least as a collective mentality, or identity. More than an identity, the category still serves as a ‘political platform’ embracing development, fairer trade and transparent, accountable global financial practices, along with the democratisation of multilateral institutions.

The shortcomings highlighted in the approaches described above may potentially be overcome, or at least limited, by the neoclassical realist approach to foreign policy analysis. This is not a unified approach, but the emerging tradition bears some hallmarks that are beginning to render it a distinct theoretical perspective in the analysis of foreign policy. It embraces a multi-level, multi-variate analysis of foreign policy, including the global-, state- and individual-levels of foreign policymaking.

1.4. Outline of Argument

Given the preference for military restraint and greater levels of international diplomatic engagement by the new emerging powers, the question arises whether internationalism as a foreign policy perspective conditions the foreign policies of emerging powers, and if so, to which extent this is the case. The thesis proceeds by presenting the progress of internationalism as a foreign policy outlook since the turn of the twentieth century, especially from the perspective of the Global South.

---

This is followed by the presentation of the case for neoclassical realism as an approach with which to make sense of internationalism in foreign policy, by answering the secondary question, *Why do states with especially limited resources (i.e. developing states) adopt expansive foreign policies?*

There are a few potential answers to this question. These include answers drawn from the realist, liberal and constructivist theoretical perspectives. First is the potential of threat. The likelihood of attack by a neighbour could propel an expansive foreign policy. This is the theoretical position of defensive realism, a branch of structural (or neo-) realism. In this approach, states seek to gain greater control over their environments as a way of reducing the likelihood of attack, in response to a threat. Therefore, states expand only when faced with insecurity.\(^{40}\) In the words of Kenneth Waltz, a famously defensive realist, states should seek only ‘an appropriate amount of power’.\(^{41}\) Defensive realists recognise restraint in states’ actions stemming from three factors:

- A fear that balancing will occur on the part of neighbours and enemies of over-expansive states.
- The offence-defence balance favours the defence, i.e. the non-aggressor.
- Even where conquest is feasible, costs outweigh benefits.\(^{42}\)

For each of these factors, restraint stems from systemic dynamics, and is related to material measures, i.e. the fear that other states will out-arm the state in question; the fear that the aggressor will be short-changed; and the fear that the costs of conquest will be greater than its profits. This approach does not leave open the possibility that restraint could stem from within the state, given that it is still a structural approach to international relations.

As enunciated by offensive realists like John Mearsheimer, states should do all they can to accumulate as much power as possible anyway and pursue hegemony, to


\(^{42}\) Ibid., 75-76.
ensure their own survival, regardless of how imminent a threat appears. This is an unlikely answer to the question posed of the two case studies, as they each occupy relatively peaceful environments. Brazil has not seen inter-state war within its immediate region since the 1867 wars with Paraguay and Argentina, and South Africa has occupied a less volatile region since the change of government in 1994. Power accumulation for its own sake is not how South Africa and Brazil have elected to project their influence, and each state has been remarkably reticent in its projection of power regionally.

Realism also bequeaths the concept of polarity – or how the number of great powers in the system affects relations between states - to the analysis of rising powers. Comparative capabilities and how powers rise are determined by their material resources, and, according to classical realists, by the social bases of national power. States have access only to expendable state power. Balancing is dependent both on the external agglomeration of power through alliances, and the internal build-up of capabilities through economic growth and national development, not to mention the development of indigenous arms industries, and the less tangible social base of national power.

Related to this interpretation is that power is an end in itself, the view of Classical Realism. States seek power in order simply to become more powerful, more influential and less susceptible to the predations of greater powers. Small powers seek power to become intermediate powers; and, intermediate powers pursue power to become great powers. The concepts of prestige, honour and recognition, are implicated in this answer to the question posed above. This is highly plausible in an analysis of South Africa and Brazil because it accounts for the reliance on repetitive tropes of ‘belonging’ and ‘rightful place’ evident in the speeches and public utterances of the national leaders of South Africa and Brazil. Yet, it does not account for their arguably muted paths to power. Furthermore, the realist opposites of balancing and bandwagoning also do not go far enough in accounting for the behaviour of emerging powers: they are too narrow. In formations such as BRIC,

44 Zakaria, *From Wealth to Power*. This concept is elucidated further in Chapter 3.
emerging powers Brazil, Russia, India and China, have banded together to pursue their collective interests, ostensibly in opposition to US and other Western influence on international markets and politics, and as a counterbalance to Western trade. Yet, this does not encapsulate all of their behaviour in relation to the US. There exist simultaneously areas of co-operation and accommodation. Proponents of the ‘soft-balancing’ thesis bring much to bear on the analysis of intermediate powers. ‘Soft balancing’ is described as the use of “non-military tools to delay, frustrate, and undermine aggressive unilateral…policies [of the superpower]”. Yet, not all actions that appear to constitute soft balancing, e.g. the formation of the India-Brazil-South Africa Forum (IBSA) and expansion of the BRICs grouping - may actually be a response to US unilateral action. They may stem from the domestic or regional – rather than systemic – level. It is also necessary not to lose sight of the coordination challenges for these states, as well as abiding suspicions between them, such as those between India and China, for example.

A second theoretical possibility for answering the question is drawn from the liberal approach to international affairs. Here, domestic – or unit-level – reasons may be adduced for the adoption of expansive foreign policies in the presence of resource restraints. States’ primary motivations for action are profit and the well-being of all citizens, thus these actions are attenuated by domestic imperatives. These may include, the domestic system of government and how threats are processed and perceived, as well as how government authorises the possible responses to threat; and, importantly, domestic conceptions of a state’s role in international relations. The cases of South Africa and Brazil are highly amenable to this interpretation, given that each state is a democracy, and has expressed solidarity with poorer developing countries on the basis of its own domestic experience with poverty, and marginalisation in international politics. These perceptions are especially associated with the Left of centre governments that have held power in South Africa and Brazil since the end of the twentieth century, the African National Congress (1994-present) and the Partido dos Trabalhadores (2003-present), respectively. However,

47 From a gloomier perspective, democratisation has also been thought to bring out the worst in ruling elites, predisposing transitional states to war and aggression. This, too, is not an accurate depiction of the foreign policy behaviour of democratic intermediate
liberalism alone cannot account for muted emergence strategies, as both states have been criticised for decidedly illiberal postures toward human rights-violating states, such as Cuba and Myanmar. In addition, at the domestic level, there has not been a noticeable opening of participation in the policymaking process by either Brazil or South Africa, giving short shrift to ideas of the democratisation of foreign policy.

A third set of reasons why under-resourced states would adopt wide-ranging foreign policies, and commit resources to them, lies within the constructivist approach to international relations. Here, the primary motives for states’ international actions are identity-related. Constructivists emphasise a social ontology that gives rise to motives for action that diverge from rationalism. States may conduct actions that stem from sensitivity to the logic of appropriateness, rather than rationalism’s logic of consequences.48 Hence, states may commit to costly international action as the result of a perception by leaders that it is the correct, or appropriate, thing to do for a given identity, whether it is the identity of ‘great power’, ‘responsible power’, or ‘emerging power’. These actions may include, but are not limited to, participation in peacekeeping activities, granting aid, and seeking permanent representation in the United Nations Security Council. Such actions may also be motivated by a conviction that the community to which the state owes moral or ethical duties extends beyond the nation state, and includes the wider community of those who share certain characteristics, such as poverty or race or marginalisation from international affairs.

Yet, while identity accounts for much in the foreign policy postures of South Africa and Brazil, it cannot account for how, whether, and over what duration of time, structural features of the international system bring about change in the foreign policies of these states.

For these reasons, neoclassical realism represents a sharp analytical tool with which to examine the foreign policies of emerging powers. Neoclassical realism is a tradition of scholarship in IR theory that has been gathering pace over the last two

decades. More a collection of works than an established theoretical tradition, it combines the neorealist approach to international politics, as popularised by the structural realism of Kenneth Waltz, with a rich account of the state more common to classical realism. In this way, systemic constraints on state behaviour are mediated through the domestic agential power of the state, resulting in varying state power resources for states that are similarly placed in international politics. The approach thus helps to account for the impact of shifts in relative power capabilities between states, and how these shifts are interpreted and processed by domestic actors. It thus provides an interactive account of foreign policy outcomes, comprising both systemic and unit-level factors (see Chapter 3).

‘Mobilisation’ and ‘extraction’ are two domestic strategies pursued by all states, identified by Mastanduno, et al. in their discussion of a ‘Realist Theory of State Action’. ‘Mobilisation’ refers to economic measures to enhance national wealth, while ‘extraction’ refers to the conversion “of wealth into power by taxing, requisitioning, or expropriating social resources”. These resources are allocated to military expenditure, aid donations, dues payable to international organisations and other international activities. Part of the argument advanced here is that the mobilisation and extraction of national resources or state power has not been a straightforward task for intermediate states. While traditional realist conceptions of intermediate states privilege their relative capacity to conduct international actions, neoclassical realism adds a domestic/societal dimension, along with the key variable of perception, including self-perception, such that hard power is not necessarily consonant with state power. State power is hard power (or national power) mediated by domestic social forces.

Internationalism has traditionally entailed strong, principled stances on international issues such as conflict, poverty, and multilateral institutions (see Chapter 2). Yet even these positions are mediated by a government’s domestic context, and a government may prefer muted actions to more decisive action, in a bid to avoid risk, both in the domestic political context, and in the external context. Domestic politics constrains government initiatives that are “strong in intensity and

commitment”: “in other words, the government engages in *low-risk behaviour and often avoids changes in policy*”, in order to accommodate political opposition to its policies.\(^{50}\)

This is just one of three possible alternatives that a government has in dealing with political opposition to its chosen foreign policy. The other two are ‘mobilisation’\(^{51}\) through legitimation of the regime and its policies; and, ‘insulation’, through the marginalisation of opposition. All three alternatives can have clear consequences in foreign policy outcomes. Accommodation may see a government being able to win over its critics, either by adopting a more muted line (avoiding *risk*), or by ‘paying off’ opposition with side-payments. Legitimation of the regime sees leaders discrediting their adversaries, potentially resulting in more forceful foreign policy actions. Accommodation is the focus here because it is more prominent in parliamentary democracies or factionalised ruling parties. Legitimation reflects a strategy of greater coercion, where opponents cannot be co-opted, and also tends to occur in periods of great political instability. Insulation, meanwhile, is a common strategy for political leaders hoping to “deflect or reduce domestic constraints on their foreign policy choices”, by closing the issue off from public scrutiny and debate.\(^{52}\)

Neoclassical realism will thus be utilised as a theoretical framework for analysing the strategies of emergence of South Africa and Brazil, respectively. This framework is developed in Chapter 3. With a shift in power at the system level as a central assumption, the hypotheses guiding the enquiry are as follows:

**Hypothesis 1:** The greater the institutional freedom and legitimating capacity of the governing party, the more autonomy inheres in key decision-making structures, the closer the model approximates neorealism’s unitary actor. Decisions to allocate resources to international issues will be based on hard power considerations and


\(^{51}\) The term ‘mobilisation’ is used here in a different sense to that employed in the remainder of the thesis. Here it is used by Hagan to denote a potential instrument used by governments for managing opposition to foreign policy, while the usage in the rest of the thesis refers to the proactive promotion of national wealth and military strength for a given purpose, in this case foreign policy. Where the first meaning is intended, this will be indicated.

exercised more frequently, *where the state possesses the resources to do so. The state will act in line with neorealism’s predictions, behaving competitively and aggressively.  

**Hypothesis 2:** The lesser the institutional freedom and legitimating capacity of the governing party, the less autonomous and more porous is the decision-making process, the more the model approaches a pluralistic decision-making system. Decisions to allocate resources to international issues will be delayed, and subject to numerous bargains and negotiations. They will occur less frequently, and will have to balance the interests of various factions, *even if the state possesses the resources to act. Internationalism as a risk-avoiding set of actions will take priority.*

This set of hypotheses would be called into question if a state exhibited low degrees of international activism, preferring to focus on domestic issues, even while under the rule of governing parties with extensive freedom to act, and with high public legitimacy, with a middle-range position in international affairs.

It would also be called into question where a governing party is weak in relation to domestic political institutions, and with low public legitimacy, but is still able to conduct an activist foreign policy, using state resources for disparate goals.

This study seeks to analyse the role of the internationalism subscribed to by governing parties in the state foreign policies they manage. The independent variable is the shift in international relative power positions. The intervening variable is the structure of the state, especially the capacity of the governing party to influence outcomes according to its preferences. The dependent variable is the resultant foreign policy direction on specific international issues.

*Independent variable (X):* Middle-range power and material capability in international politics (relative position).

*Dependent variable (Y):* How the state ultimately chooses to project its power or expand its interests.
Intervening variable ($X_i$): The ruling party and its legitimating ideologies, along with the extent of its freedom of action in formulating foreign policy. This includes an account of the interaction between the ruling party, the legislature, the executive and the foreign policy bureaucracy in forging broad lines of foreign policy strategy. These interactions are analysed through the lenses of two categories: institutional freedom and legitimating capacity.

The causal factor of special theoretical interest is the role of the ruling party, given that it provides the head of state, and numerous other foreign policy functionaries, as well as the overall legitimating national discourses. If the governing party is found to be theoretically significant then this means that greater care should be taken, in plotting the trajectory of future rising states, of the ideologies and values espoused by the ruling party of a state, rather than its leader exclusively. Neoclassical realism predicts that states would seek to address an imbalance of power, but that they would possess differing abilities to do so, and various constraints on their action. The claim is posited here that the governing party is key to mobilising and extracting these abilities.

South Africa and Brazil each represent a ‘tough’ test of the neoclassical realist approach, because each state occupies a relatively peaceful environment, and the United States, a historical ‘offshore balancer’ in both the Southern African and South American regions, has been largely absent from both during the period under consideration. Each state may thus have been expected to expand their reach and seek to fill power vacuums in their regions. That neither state has selected aggressive expansion – as might be predicted by neorealism – is explained by domestic factors, such as prevailing ideologies and party politics, in addition to systemic factors and power balances.

Thus, where governing parties domestically face opposition or the threat of opposition, they are less likely to engage in international activism. State power requires a stable social base for its projection abroad.
The role of left-leaning political parties in government and their influence on foreign policy in combination with state institutions may only account for a small variation in eventual foreign policy outcomes. It is not possible to account for the whole spectrum of action.

The argument developed by this thesis is thus three-fold: 1. That internationalism is a feature of the foreign policies of certain developing countries; 2. That internationalism fulfils both domestic and international purposes, by serving the interests of the governing party; and, 3. That internationalism is an approach to international affairs that limits the capacity and propensity of intermediate states to respond to threats and opportunities. In summary:

The argument developed here is that Leftist governing parties, in the presence of systemic and domestic constraints, under-determine the responses of states to external threats and opportunities.

1.5. Methodology

The primary methods employed in the writing of this thesis are qualitative. These include the consultation of government and party documents, interviews with individuals close to the foreign policymaking process of both the South African and Brazilian governments, and the political parties - in some cases, the same individuals - and consulting secondary literature. There was no problem translating written Portuguese, while Brazilian diplomats, academics and party officials dealing with International Relations are fluent in English, therefore translation was not necessary in these cases. Field research was conducted over the course of two trips to Brasília and Rio de Janeiro in May, 2008 and July, 2010, respectively. The first trip to Brazil lasted one month, while the second lasted one week. Interviews were also conducted in Johannesburg in June 2007, while some interviews with academics and a former South African cabinet member, Dr Essop Pahad, were conducted telephonically.

Attempts to reach Mr Jean-Bertrand Aristide were unsuccessful, as were attempts to reach Mr Lula da Silva, Prof Marco Aurélio Garcia, Mr Samuel Guimarães Neto and Mr Mbeki and his deputy Foreign Minister, Mr Aziz Pahad. It was generally challenging to obtain clarity on government motives for given actions, especially from those close to the decision-making processes. Those at a distance, but still
involved in policy implementation, such as diplomats, were slightly more forthcoming. It was nonetheless possible to gauge from published speeches, biographies and newspaper articles the types of calculations that entered into the making of certain decisions. In the Brazilian case, the Western analyses of Brazilian foreign policy were slightly more critical and objective than those by Brazilian scholars and diplomats. In the South African case, diplomats were, unsurprisingly, defensive of South African positions, but scholars were more critical and objective. A full list of interviewees may be found in the reference list at the end of the thesis.

The methodology of analysing the extent of internationalism as a conditioning factor in foreign policy is to assess the divergence between the foreign policy traditions of the governing parties, ANC and PT, respectively, and the position of the state on certain issues, and as evidenced in policy planning documents and annual reports over time. This divergence, whether large or small, is mediated by the extent of the governing party’s dominance in society, and measured by the extent of its control over domestic political institutions related to foreign policymaking, along with the success with which it can justify its policy proposals. With Almeida, it is recognised that while “programmes and proposals for action are often too generic and vague to permit evaluation of their content”, the best way to examine policy positions is by looking at broad international relations themes contained in the campaign platforms of presidential elections contested by PT [and ANC], and the principle statements of its candidates contesting or holding electoral office (as president)”.

The thesis is a comparative foreign policy study to the extent that what is being compared are the behaviours and foreign policy rhetoric of two states similarly placed in international politics during the period under consideration. Both states opted for heightened diplomacy and rhetoric focused on equitable representation in multilateral institutions, the peaceful settlement of international disputes, non-interference in the domestic affairs of other states, and South-South solidarity. How did their respective domestic political and economic contexts contribute to these

outcomes? Which instruments have they used to gain influence in international politics, and with what impact on their foreign relations?

The methodology employed makes extensive use of the analysis of discursive elements of foreign policy, recognising that intermediate power activism does not depend solely on material capabilities, but also on the domestic and international legitimation of these actions.

The use of the comparative case study method is justified by the need to understand the international behaviour of two states that share many similarities, and to understand their actions as a class of action, i.e. internationalist action, in international affairs. The method for this form of comparison is to ask the same set of questions of each case, namely:

- What is the role of internationalism in foreign policy?
- How do domestic institutional arrangements promote or inhibit the self-interested actions of governing parties or leaders in foreign policy?
- What is the history of internationalism in each state’s foreign policy, and with respect to its governing party?
- How do perceptions of state strength affect the decisions to engage in activist foreign policies?
- Which forms of international action are most likely to match the domestic policymaking context, i.e. the ease or difficulty of resource mobilisation and extraction?

1.6. Why South Africa and Brazil?

Internationalism as an underlying foreign policy assumption, as acts instantiated in international activism in the foreign policies of South Africa and Brazil between 1999 and 2010, comprises the unit of analysis. This is because South Africa and Brazil are two states among the group of newly-emerging powers who have, by and large, eschewed the development of hard power for the furtherance of their international goals, leading to the puzzle as to why this should be the case, and
whether the internationalism long espoused by their ruling parties, ANC and PT, respectively, plays any role in this. While they have been at peace with their neighbours for the period under consideration, they have participated in international conflicts, either as mediators, or as troop-contributors to multilateral peacekeeping missions. Faced with roughly the same international position – regional hegemon, continental powerhouse, upper middle income developing country – South Africa and Brazil have responded - by and large - similarly to their international threats and opportunities. This temporal period is, furthermore, the period that has seen the heightening of South African and Brazilian activism on international questions, and coincides with the premiership of the noteworthy leaders of two large and influential leftist movements in each country. Where they differ, on the intervening variable, is that while Brazil plays host to a Presidential electoral system where alliances need to be painstakingly constructed for electoral primacy, South Africa is a parliamentary democracy, in which a single party, the ANC, is dominant.

For the most part, other domestic factors are, for the purposes of this study, held constant. South Africa and Brazil are both marginal recipients of Official Development Assistance (ODA), in spite of each country playing host to a fifth of its population living in poverty. 54 This affords some measure of independence in foreign policymaking. Military spending as a proportion of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is comparable at 1.7 percent for South Africa and 1.8 percent for Brazil. This is lower than other states considered intermediate states, such as Malaysia (2%), Turkey (2.8%), India (3%), China (2%) and Russia (4.3%). 55 Brazilian and South African societies both faced chronic inequality during the period under consideration, with two of the highest Gini coefficients in the world. Domestic politics in both polities have thus been driven by the issues of development and economic growth, employment and redistribution, and foreign penetration of the domestic economy. A key point of similarity is the effect of race-based considerations on society, which has played a significant – yet different - role in national identity for both states. The percentage of Brazil’s population considered to be ethnically white is 53.7 percent, while mixed and black constitute some 45

54 As noted in Table 1, this figure only fell dramatically for Brazil near the end of the period under investigation.
55 World Bank, World Development Indicators.
percent. In South Africa, Blacks constitute 79 percent, with the rest comprised of whites, coloureds and other groups. Africa and African heritage have played a role in the foreign policy outlooks of both the Mbeki and Lula administrations.

Key points of difference relate to the size of the economy and domestic political structure. Brazil is the eighth-largest economy in the world, while South Africa is the 31st-largest. Brazil has a Gross National Income (GNI) per capita of USD8 070, while South Africa’s is USD5 760 (see Table 1). This affects the study by influencing the types of diplomatic instruments each state has access to. Its effects are limited, however, by the comparable position in the global system of states occupied by the two countries. Domestically, Brazil plays host to a presidential political system, while South Africa operates a parliamentary proportional representation system. This difference in domestic state structure affects the cohesion of central government, and the ease with which wide-ranging legislative reform can be undertaken.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Brazil (upper middle income)</th>
<th>South Africa (upper middle income)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>GDP</strong> (current, in USD)</td>
<td>1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>586,863,191,445</td>
<td>1,573,408,702,182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Population</strong> (Growth rate, %)</td>
<td>168,000,000(1,5)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

59 Ibid.
61 Ibid., 70.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Brazil (upper middle income)</th>
<th>South Africa (upper middle income)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Net ODA received (% of GNI)</strong></td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Exports of goods and services (% of GDP)</strong></td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Imports of goods and services (% of GDP)</strong></td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Poverty headcount ratio (% of population)</strong></td>
<td>21.5 [2003]</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Inequality (GINI coefficient)</strong></td>
<td>59</td>
<td>55.0, 75th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Military expenditure (% of GDP), world ranking</strong></td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.8, 88th</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Brazil and South Africa compared

In answering the question, ‘Why South Africa and Brazil?’, it is also important to outline the reasoning underlying the choice of Haiti as a case study, in which the foreign policies of both South Africa and Brazil may be compared. The Haiti crisis of 2004 represents a ‘turning point’ foreign policy decision for South Africa and

---

Brazil, because in engaging in this crisis, extending beyond rhetoric and routine actions, both states accepted sizeable responsibilities far beyond their regions. The crisis offers an opportunity to analyse how and to what effect resources in the South African and Brazilian states, respectively, were mobilised, extracted and allocated for a foreign policy goal that did not have an immediately perceptible impact on their objective national interests. Unlike the question of Palestinian statehood, for instance, on which both states have been outspoken supporters, Haiti was not a historical concern of either. The island also lies beyond the traditional spheres of influence of both states, although admittedly, it is geographically closer to Brazil, and hence instability would pose more of a security threat, despite not being an immediate threat. The involvement of both in the Haiti crisis ignited the ire of critics at home, and represented unpopular, and confusing, foreign policy choices.

1.7. Proposed Contribution of Current Work

The thesis produces two conclusions: State structure, especially the nature of the relationships between governing parties, the executive and the legislature, plays a significant role in how states respond to international threats and opportunities. Also, the trajectory of intermediate states is contingent upon both systemic and domestic factors.

With a range of systemic constraints – normative, security/military, economic, and environmental – the traditional paths to power for emerging or great powers are hindered in numerous ways. In the normative realm, nuclear weapons development is frowned upon by Western and non-Western states alike. Security/military expansion competes with the pressing needs of national development as a national priority. Economically, the dominance of the market has rendered states increasingly docile, if complicit, in the face of the increased domestic presence of foreign investors and multinational corporations. Lastly, the climate change negotiations between North and South have sought to impose limits on the extent to which developing states can cause harm to the environment in the process of industrialisation.
The findings of this research will shed light on the role played by governing parties of the left in informing and directing states’ foreign policies. These findings will be generalisable to the extent that a state has the capacity for activist, independent foreign policy; and are availed of international opportunities, presented by openings in the management of global affairs by the great powers. It is of utility in understanding why certain states pursue certain strands of foreign policy, and also provides guidance as to the conditions under which political parties may be influential in the making of foreign policy, especially foreign policy that is independent and autonomous of the influence of any external power. The findings will not apply to states that cannot formulate foreign policy independently. It is more likely to be applicable to those states that possess the resources and inclination to be able to choose how they respond to external stimuli, or more broadly, middle or intermediate powers in international affairs.

By way of addressing the five puzzles outlined earlier, this research bears resonance for five broad areas:

- **IR theory**: IR theory has paid scant attention to emerging powers, a lack that neoclassical realism may potentially fill. While numerous studies have been conducted on the rise of Western states in history, there are not many book-length treatments with an explicit theoretical focus on less ‘traditional’ emerging powers, or indeed those that have risen in recent years, post-9/11, and indeed, post-Cold War. In addition, there are no major studies to date that apply a neoclassical realist approach to emerging powers outside the West.

- **FPA**: The role of governing parties in determining national foreign policy priorities and perspectives is under-represented in the foreign policy analysis literature. Especially in the light of Latin America’s ‘Pink Revolution’ of the early 21st century, in which a number of states came under the leadership of governments of the left, it is vitally important to understand the extent to

---

63 While it is recognised that there are numerous country studies of foreign policy, there are few that analyse the emergence of new powers from outside the western world. A few recent exceptions are: Sumit Ganguly, ed., *India as an Emerging Power* (London: Frank Cass, 2003); Alistair I. Johnston and Robert S. Ross, eds., *Engaging China: the management of an emerging power*. (New York: Routledge, 1999); James I. Matray, *Japan’s emergence as a global power* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 2001).

which domestic institutional arrangements allow or constrain the capacity of
governing parties to significantly change foreign policy. Neoclassical realism
will provide a sound analytical tool for analysing both the domestic and
systemic factors conditioning the rise of intermediate states.

• Brazilian foreign policy: there are few critical treatments of Brazilian foreign
policy under the Lula administration. Most studies, conducted by Brazilian
scholars, in Portuguese, tend to accept as given Brazil’s ‘exceptional’ status
in international politics, without questioning how this came to be, whether it
is sustainable, and why this has been the chosen foreign policy outlook of
Brazilian governments, especially the civilian governments since 1985.

• South African foreign policy: while there is a surfeit of critical study of
South Africa’s foreign policy since the end of Apartheid, owing largely to
widespread disillusionment in the academic community with both the
formulation and implementation of this area of public policy, South Africa’s
foreign policy has only on occasion been subjected to theoretical and
historical scrutiny.

• The international response to the Haiti crisis, which experienced its apex in
2004 with the removal of Jean-Bertrand Aristide from power has not been
treated by scholars of international relations, in spite of its relevance for the
United Nations and new models of peacekeeping, and its contentiousness
for highlighting divergent positions between the UN and the major powers
on one hand, and the region’s major interstate organisation, the Caribbean
Community (CARICOM), on the other.

1.8. Chapters Outline

The thesis is arranged as follows:

Part I presents the analytical framework, and comprises four chapters. Following
the introduction, Chapter 2 presents Southern internationalism as a mode of

65 An important exception, by a Canadian scholar, is Sean Burges, “Consensual
Hegemony: Theorizing Brazilian Foreign Policy After the Cold War”, International
Relations, 22, Issue 1 (2008), among other works by the same author.
66 See for an example of a theoretical treatment Paul Williams, “South African Foreign
Policy: Getting Critical?”, Politikon, 27, No.1 (2000); and Roger Pfister, “Gateway to
international victory: the diplomacy of the African National Congress in Africa, 1960-
expansive, activist foreign policy that has characterised the actions of large states of the developing world since at least the middle of the last century. It also seeks to contextualise this approach to foreign policy in the light of the internationalism practiced by Northern states, and within a larger approach to state action based on ethics and framed by cosmopolitanism.

Chapter 3 analyses whether an internationalist stance is the result of state strength or state weakness, building on concepts found within the neoclassical realist approach to state capacity as a determinant of state behaviour. Chapter 4 presents an analysis of the foreign policy decision-making process in each case study country, reflecting on the institutional freedom of the governing parties, domestic intra-governmental relations, and authority chains, for their potential influence on foreign policy outcomes.

Part II presents the two case study chapters, Chapters 5 and 6, on South Africa and Brazil, respectively, along with a third chapter, Chapter 7, that examines how each state mobilised and extracted resources in response to a ‘typical’ Third World crisis, and how domestic policymaking arrangements and perceptions helped or hindered responses to the Haiti crisis of 2004. Chapters 5 and 6 provide expositions of the dynamic of growth in state power and growing national interests on the parts of South Africa and Brazil, respectively. Chapter 7, meanwhile, examines one example of a culmination of these respective processes: engagement in the Haiti crisis that reached boiling-point in 2004.

Part III comprises Chapter 8, the concluding chapter that draws together the findings and key theoretical and empirical implications for Southern internationalism, and foreign policymaking in South Africa and Brazil, respectively.
Chapter 2: Internationalism in the Global South: The evolution of a concept

Our own freedom as a people is diminished when another people are not free. Thus we have a continuing responsibility to make whatever contribution we can to the struggle for the birth of the new world order that is so spoken of, so that the peoples of the world, including ourselves, live in conditions of democracy, peace, prosperity and equality among nations. In pursuing these objectives, we must be careful to avoid great power arrogance and conferring [sic] ourselves a misplaced messianic role.

Nelson Mandela, President of South Africa, 8 January 1996, marking the 84th anniversary of the founding of the African National Congress (ANC)67

There will only be security in a world where all have the right to economic and social development. The true path to peace is shared development. If we do not want war to go global, justice must go global.

Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, President of the Republic of Brazil, 19 September 2006, at the opening of the General Debate of the 61st Session of the UN General Assembly68

Introduction

‘Internationalism’ is a concept that is only cautiously applied to the foreign policies of countries of the developing world. Nonetheless, as will be shown in this chapter, aspects of what has been in the past referred to as ‘internationalism’ in foreign policy, are discernible in the foreign policies of a few large developing democracies today. What is meant by internationalism is not static, and even the observations made in the current work about developing countries should be factored into understandings of what internationalism broadly comprises at the start of the twenty-first century.

The so-called ‘rise of the rest’ has brought to the fore once again the questions of global inequality, global responsibility, and other issues associated with the North-South divide that reached its apex in the 1970s.69 Appearing to meet this challenge in new and inventive ways, are a few large developing countries who have accepted the mantle of representing the interests of the developing world in their foreign policies and in their multilateral negotiating positions. These states include Brazil,
India, China and South Africa. Their approaches to issues as diverse as climate change, humanitarian intervention and technology transfer, have been tinged by historical ‘anti-imperialism’, acting in tandem with expanded global economic reach and reliance on multilateral institutions to broaden their diplomatic scope. At the same time, the internationalism of the Western democracies has come under increasing pressure in recent years, employed as it has been, in the service of military interventions in among others, Kosovo, and recently, Libya.

Clarifying the concept of internationalism in foreign policy has important implications for a number of areas: theoretically, there is no in-depth exploration of internationalism in the foreign policies of developing countries, with most of the research having been conducted on the internationalist foreign policies of the ‘classical’ like-minded middle power states, namely, the Nordic countries, along with Canada and Holland.  While the link between domestic social-democracy and internationalism has been more or less firmly established in these cases, these studies do not shed light on the motivations of less wealthy polities for internationalist foreign policies. In addition, there is little research being conducted on the intellectual influences on, and contributions made by, foreign policymaking in the developing world. Foreign policymaking in the former third world is largely seen either as a knee-jerk reaction to the environment occupied by the state in question, or as a concession to ideology. That is to say, it is brushed aside either as the performance of survival and realpolitik, or as empty ideology. For policy purposes, studying the foreign policies of these countries – now referred to as ‘emerging powers’ - provides a better understanding of their motivations, as well as

70 Cranford Pratt, ed., Middle Power Internationalism: The North-South Dimension (Quebec: McGill-Queens University Press, 1990); Cranford Pratt, ed., Internationalism Under Strain: The North-South policies of Canada, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1989); Olav Stokke, ed., Western Middle Powers and Global Poverty: The determinants of the aid policies of Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden (Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1989). These volumes were all outcomes of the same research project, The Western Middle Powers and the Global Poverty Project, established in the early 1980s.
potentially providing indications of their future plans and how to manage relations with them.

It should still be noted that to study any form of idea or ‘ideology’ in foreign policy is to engage in a cautious task of ascribing motives to actions, where direct causal arrows cannot always clearly and accurately be drawn. Furthermore, as Robert Cox noted in 1979, “(i)deological analysis is… a critic’s weapon and one most effectively used against the prevailing orthodoxies which, when stripped of their putative universality, become seen as special pleading for historically transient but presently entrenched interests”72. To what extent ‘internationalism’ in the developing world73 serves as ‘special pleading for…transient interests’ is a question that has been analysed before, with reference to the establishment of the OPEC oil cartel, the calls for a New International Economic Order (NIEO), and more recently, the leadership assumed in multilateral trade negotiations and certain peacekeeping operations by large developing countries such as India, Brazil and South Africa. Internationalism is an ‘ideal type’ category of foreign policy orientation, and as such there are many real-world variants and limitations on its practice. Nonetheless, it is still possible, and indeed necessary, to analyse the impact of professed internationalism on the foreign policies of states of all types, as it is in the name of internationalism that many far-reaching foreign policy decisions are made.

73 The terms ‘Third World’ and ‘developing world’ are used interchangeably in this thesis. I have chosen not to enter the worthy debate on the labelling of this group of countries, but to allow my arguments to rest on the assumptions of 1) a common perspective with regard to international economic relations, and 2) colonial histories, to serve as my guide in using these terms. My analysis will proceed to two countries that have unequivocally identified with the developing world. For further discussion of the terminology, see Mark T. Berger, “The end of the ‘Third World’?”, *Third World Quarterly*, 15, No.2 (1994), and Leslie Wolf-Phillips, “Why ‘Third World’? Origin, Definition and Usage”, *Third World Quarterly*, 9, No4 (1987). The World Bank defines ‘Developing countries’ as “countries with low or middle levels of GNP per capita [USD755-USD9,265 in 1999] as well as five high-income developing countries – Hong Kong (China), Israel, Kuwait, Singapore, and the United Arab Emirates” (World Bank website, Glossary). The Bank justified the inclusion of the latter five in spite of their high per capita income because of the structure of their economies, or because of official positions taken by their governments A further reason for my reluctance to define the Third World and list the countries that inhabit it, is because the thesis questions precisely the use of the idea of the ‘Third World’, and its attendant ideologies, in the furtherance of specific foreign policy aims.
The chapter proceeds with a general examination of the concept of ‘internationalism’ in international thought. A periodised history of internationalism from just before World War I to the post-Cold War period is provided. This is followed by an interrogation of the question of what ‘internationalism’ may mean when in it is not employed in the service of ‘Western’ values and goals – given that the term has come to be synonymous with quintessentially ‘Western’ foreign policies. Doubt over precisely this question has led some to question which side ‘emerging powers’ are on in the international normative landscape. However, it has also opened the way for a ‘new’ internationalism as embraced by large developing countries. Owing to the prominence of the state in developing country foreign policy discourses, the role of the state in the internationalism of the South will be analysed. The discussion of the state ties this foreign policy trend to domestic developments within developing countries and highlights the utility of internationalism as a foreign policy tool for emerging states. Just before concluding, some critiques of Southern internationalism are discussed.

2.1 Which internationalism?

The key dividing line in scholarly and political conceptions of internationalism is that between its substantive and procedural aspects. There are additional concerns stemming from an internationalist commitment in international politics, such as the rate and type of change envisaged for the international system, and the tension between maintaining the peace and defending the law. A discussion of these questions forms the focus of this section.

‘Internationalism’ has been described as applicable to “any outlook, or practice, that tends to transcend the nation towards a wider community, of which nations continue to form the principal units”\(^\text{74}\). For Fred Halliday, it is

and most important, that these two processes, and their interaction, are broadly to be desired, ‘a good thing’.75

More substantively, internationalism refers to “the idea that we both are and should be part of a broader community than that of the nation or the state”.76

An earlier, and very influential interpretation came from the student of imperialism, J.A Hobson, for whom it was characterised by “its assumptions of rationality, the harmony of interests and the possibility (or inevitability) of progress in human affairs”.77 For Lawler, internationalism is “a philosophy of foreign policy constructed around an ethical obligation on the part of states actively to pursue authentically other-regarding values and interests”.78 There is thus broad agreement on internationalism compelling action extending beyond the nation, or the state, and having ethical foundations.

In a narrower, procedural, sense, ‘internationalism’ is also the name given to an international political programme. This programme, it may be argued, has universally been seen as an antidote to the pitfalls of an anarchical international system, through its commitment to finding means of peaceful coexistence between sovereign states. Through the ages, the programme has assumed different forms, depending on how threats to international peace and security are conceived. Internationalism has traditionally been suggested as a ‘middle way’ between ‘realism’ and ‘universalism’.79 While for realists conflict is inherent in a system composed of independent states, without a central overarching authority, ‘universalists’ place greater store in ‘the essential unity of mankind’, regardless of the divisions imposed by ‘international relations’ and state sovereignty.80 Yet, internationalism appears to accept the inevitability of conflict between states, while still seeking peaceful means of conflict mediation.

---

78 Ibid., 441.
‘Internationalism’ has thus been associated both with the prospect of ethics in international affairs, and with the mechanisms for ameliorating the practice of international affairs by power politics, for example, through greater economic interdependence and greater reliance on international law and institutions. These views may be arranged on a continuum, from conservative (solidarist to pluralist) conceptions of internationalism, which emphasise security and state sovereignty; and more radical conceptions, predicated on far-reaching ideological convictions (which can also be solidarist or pluralist). The first type, solidarist-conservative, is exemplified by the solidarity of western Europe after World War II in opposing Communism, embodied in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), along with the federalist plans for the European Community. Pluralist conservative internationalism was evident in Allied cooperation with Stalin in the drawing up of the plans for the post-war order, especially the constitution of the permanent membership of the UN Security Council (UNSC). Examples of solidarist radical internationalism include the African group in the UN General Assembly (UNGA) during the 1970s, when similar identities converged on specific international interests, such as the ending of apartheid in South Africa and the introduction of fairer trading practices with the North. Pluralist radical internationalism was typified by NAM, which accommodated both Western-aligned and Soviet-aligned member states, in spite of its ‘non-aligned’ appellation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conservative</th>
<th>Radical</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Solidarist, e.g.: NATO, plans for European Community</td>
<td>Solidarist, e.g. African group in the UN General Assembly in the 1970s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pluralist, e.g.: Allied cooperation with Stalin after WW2, UNSC</td>
<td>Pluralist, e.g. NAM, with its accommodation of Western-aligned and Soviet-aligned states</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 1: Continuum of Internationalist views

---

81 Goldmann, *The Logic of internationalism.*
83 As shown by Alden et al., through its first 25 years of existence, the NAM membership trod a careful path between moderation and radicalism in order to maintain their unity of purpose and the continued existence of the organization as an alternative to the East-West rivalry. See Alden, et al., *The South in World Politics*, especially Chapter 2.
According to Goldmann, internationalist outlooks may be seen as either inward-looking or outward-looking.\textsuperscript{84} Outward-looking programmes may be further divided into particularist and universalist programmes. If a programme is outward-looking and particularist, it seeks the holder’s own good and the propagation of his own values; while universalist programmes tend to seek the realisation of values deemed to be universally applicable. This is proposed in the current chapter as the distinction between the internationalism of the developed and developing worlds. While the internationalism of the advanced countries has sought to propagate values such as democracy and market capitalism, the internationalism of the developing world has long sought to protect the rights of individual states to govern themselves in the manner that each saw fit. While this position often fell prey to despotic self-interest, its perspective is nonetheless worth closer analysis (see Section 2.3).

The universalist outlook itself may be divided into a conflict-oriented outlook, and a coexistence-oriented outlook. For Jens Bartelson, this is a question about the ultimate objective of systemic transformation:

\begin{quote}
Whereas some have regarded and perhaps still would regard internationalism as a way to bring about the victory of one set of universal values over rivaling ones, others would regard internationalism as a way of reconciling competing value systems in a pluralist world.\textsuperscript{85}
\end{quote}

Thus, what separates these two is the premium placed upon peace and security: while peace is the highest end of the coexistence-oriented outlook, for the conflict-oriented outlook, other values may take precedence, such as justice or equality, or human rights and democracy.\textsuperscript{86}

\textsuperscript{84} Goldmann, \textit{The Logic of Internationalism}: 2.
\textsuperscript{86} Goldmann, \textit{The Logic of Internationalism}: 3.
INTERNATIONALISM AS A PERSPECTIVE ON INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

Figure 2: The Concept of Internationalism

Finally, the coexistence-oriented form of internationalism may be radical, aimed at substantial transformation of the international system, potentially leading to the establishment of a world government. More moderate aims seek gradual change in international life.

Internationalism may assume coercive or accommodative forms. In its accommodative form it involves a commitment to the reduction of the likelihood of international conflict through the operation of international rules, including both legal and non-legal norms. It is therefore involved in the creation of rules, the institutionalisation of non-legal rules; and, the enhancement of compliance with international rules.\(^{87}\) The accommodative aspect of internationalism takes for

\(^{87}\) Ibid., 28-38.
granted that states will always have incompatible interests, by virtue of their structural environment and composition. In its coercive form, however, internationalism aims to reduce these incompatibilities. Internationalism in its coercive form involves an attempt to replicate the techniques of small group social control in the international system of sovereign states. \(^{88}\)

It may be difficult both to maintain peace and uphold the sanctity of international law, however, as keeping the law may involve punitive measures. This is known as the “Internationalists’ Dilemma”. \(^{89}\) States from the former developing world have particularly come under fire in recent years for their apparent disregard of the requirements of the maintenance of international peace and security through their insistence on alternative means of conflict resolution. The traditional institutional means of conflict resolution have in some instances been seen as corrupted by the influence of past and present imperial powers. Thus, certain initiatives, such as South Africa’s diversion of the Myanmar question from the UNSC during its 2007-8 tenure as a non-permanent member, have invited heated criticism. An alternative view may see this action as part of an internationalist project to strengthen the machinery of multilateralism, so as not to place overwhelming power in the hands of a UNSC widely perceived to be unrepresentative, and undemocratic. \(^{90}\)

Thus, in answer to the question posed as the title of this section, ‘Which internationalism?’, large developing countries, it is suggested, have sought to embody an internationalism in their foreign policies that is outward-looking, universalist, coexistence oriented, and moderate. This means that a duty for international action is recognised; action is predicated on the universal values of statehood (as opposed to humanity); peace and security represent higher values than the triumph of any particular value; and, change sought is moderate and gradual.

In order to gauge the significance of internationalism as practised by the developing world, it is instructive to trace the trajectory of internationalism in the twentieth century. This is the subject matter of the following section.

\(^{88}\) Ibid., 45.  
\(^{89}\) Ibid., 50.  
2.2 A Periodised History of Internationalism

2.2.1 Early conceptions

Liberal internationalism was characterised, from the eighteenth century onward, by optimistic ideas based on the belief that “independent societies and autonomous individuals can through greater interaction and cooperation evolve towards common purposes, chief among these being peace and prosperity”. This was a persistent strain of internationalism, evident in the ideas of Adam Smith and his peers during the Scottish Enlightenment; again in the nineteenth century and its belief in free trade; and, once more in the twentieth century in the plans for the League of Nations, and its successor, the United Nations.

This was an internationalism that as often as not eschewed world government and encouraged the emergence of sovereign nation-states, but which saw the satisfaction of national demands as a precondition for the emergence of a more cooperative international order.

Hence, this was neither (yet) a cosmopolitan internationalism, nor one that looked forward to a world government, but one that retained the value of independent nation-states and an apparent grip on the ‘realities’ of international power politics.

The socialist internationalism of Marx was decidedly outside the bounds of the repressive and brutal state of the time (the autocratic monarchies of the mid-19th century). It was an international solidarity with an interest in socialist revolutions and independence movements. The internationalism Marx envisaged would have been required to repel any attempts by reactionary states to quell democratic and socialist movements. Hence this was an internationalism of the international working class qua class, both universalist and radical in its intent. It was not yet a state project, and was, in fact, competing with the state.

During and after World War I, internationalism was seen as the basis for thinking about the prospects for international government, in terms of a moral emphasis on ‘the need for a new international consciousness’. Embodied in this international consciousness was the idea of progress and the conviction that a positive

---

92 Ibid.,
transformation in the anarchical international system was possible, so that it would better resemble domestic order, which was more conducive to the pursuit of collective goals. World War I represents a neat dividing line between the moral drift toward internationalism and an internationalism established more firmly (it was hoped) in real-life institutions. When moral force, predicated on rationalism, failed to prevent the catastrophic Great War, attention turned increasingly to institutional means, such as the League of Nations, of preventing international warfare. Today’s developing countries participated in these projects: South Africa and India as members of the British Empire delegation, and as participants in their own right, and Brazil as an independent state, along with Haiti, China, Liberia and a number of South American countries, even if only as ‘powers with special [as opposed to general] interests’, or participants who could only be present on issues where their interests were directly at stake.  

It may be said that it was the onset of two world wars that, paradoxically, rendered the objectives of liberal internationalism more ambitious. The reliance on moral progress and rationality had not prevented the outbreak of major war, and efforts were set in train to establish institutions that could preclude the resort to war for the future resolution of disputes. Since commerce, now found to be quite compatible with warfare, was not enough to stem the tide of violent conflict, more stringent standards would have to be set and institutionalised. This did not bode well for a pluralist international society, which had just become more diverse with the rise of Japan.

2.2.2 Cold War

The primary referent of internationalism during the Cold War was the group of middle powers, namely the Nordic states – Denmark, Norway and Sweden, along with Australia, Holland and Canada. Lawler characterises the Nordic internationalism as one practiced by states who “established a reputation for having foreign policies that were ‘more responsive to cosmopolitan values and

---


internationalist considerations than...those of many other states". This was particularly unusual during the Cold War period, characterised as it was by the height of power politics. What was noteworthy about these states was their activism in the name of multilateralism, a law-governed international society, and the primacy of the UN in maintaining international order in the face of a polarised international system. Scandinavian internationalism was reasoned away by Realists as a response to their smaller stature and comparative military weakness.

The key historical features of this internationalism were: Law, Organisation, Exchange and Communication. Each of these aspects has been given varying emphasis by different approaches to internationalism. What appears to have changed in the middle of the twentieth century are the ends to which internationalism was adopted as a foreign policy stance. While traditional analyses focus on peace and security as the end sought by internationalism, the adoption of particular foreign policies by certain developed states in the middle of the last century gave a new objective to internationalism. In addition to being set up as a response to the problem of “solving the problem of anarchy without replacing anarchy with hierarchy”, internationalism became the response to the new challenge of how to bring about global economic justice in the absence of a global authority, without harming the individual economic interests of states: in short, a reformist internationalism. This problem arose in tandem with the independence and underdevelopment of formerly colonised Asian and African states. It stemmed from the traditional internationalist concern of ameliorating conflict, but was here based on the assumptions that “international exchange reduces the likelihood of war: (1) by making states increasingly dependent on one another; and (2) by making international relations increasingly complex”. This form of internationalism was ultimately successful in staving off heated North-South conflict.

98 Ibid., 104.
100 Ibid., 4.
101 Ibid., 41.
2.2.3 Post-Cold War

The immediate aftermath of the Cold War, accompanied by the apparent ‘end of history’ – the triumph of democracy and market economics – saw the emergence of a more muscular internationalism. This was supported by the strengthening of the United Nations Security Council’s role in international peace operations (although eventually the UNSC would prove an obstacle, for example, to US unilateralism), as East-West rivalries subsided. Western states, especially the United States and Britain, became more willing to use force to intervene in conflicts, and more aggressive in the pursuit of spreading democracy.

Anthony Lake, National Security Adviser in the Clinton administration (1993-2001) described US foreign policy at the time as ‘pragmatic Wilsonianism’, and characterised it as aiming at “expanding democracy and free trade, at defending democracy from its foes, at quarantining repressive and pariah states, and at protecting and promoting human rights”.¹⁰² This may be compared with the writing of a US philosopher during the closing stages of WW1 about internationalism: “It is therefore the duty of the great nations to assume responsibility for the educational and economic development of backward portions of the earth, in order that the world can become prepared for an internationalism based upon the principle of equal political, social, and economic opportunities for all men”.¹⁰³ Among the weaknesses of this perspective of internationalism are: selective implementation owing to limited resources; blind implementation of processes and policies in diverse cultures; and the potential for abuse by bellicose leadership.

This form of internationalism underpinned international interventions in response to humanitarian crises, such as that undertaken by Western nations of NATO in 1999 in Kosovo, for example. The very idea of an agreed-upon concept of human rights in whose name states could go to war represented a landmark for liberal assumptions of progress in the international system. Progress, that is, both with reference to individual claims as against state claims, and with regard to what is

perceived as a gradual dilution of the ‘moral significance’ of national boundaries, or the claims that individuals of one state can make against all states.

These post-Cold War shifts in internationalism, marked less by *laissez-faire*, than by a muscular interventionism, have signalled the onset of a crisis in classical liberal internationalism. The distinctive Nordic internationalism of the Cold War period has begun to diminish and diverge in the company of more numerous, more aggressive, Western internationalisms. Academic discussion and the policy of internationalism after the Cold War has been animated by debates on interventionist foreign policies conducted by the US and Britain. These policies have, in turn, formed part of political cosmopolitan debates about the proper boundaries of ethical action, and the boundaries of the state’s responsibility. Internationalism has also been associated with terms such as ‘progressive foreign policy’ and ‘ethical foreign policy’. The present work maintains the link of this literature with the state’s prominent role in internationalism, and its preoccupation with if and how the state can realise, nationally and internationally, concepts of the global good (for the moment taken as given). This trend is noted in recent work on the internationalist foreign policies of the Nordic countries, analysing the domestic demands for this foreign policy stance, and to what uses it has been put. This research is necessarily comparative and brings into focus the close relationship between domestic politics and foreign policy. Bergman has developed an apparently strong contention linking domestic levels of welfare provision with international commitments to welfare in the Nordic countries. This approach focuses on advanced industrialised economies and cannot account for the ways in which developing countries fashion their accounts of internationalism. Little has been written on the internationalism of the developing world, the ideas that gave rise to solidarity, and how they are implemented; yet, third world internationalism

---

107 Bergman, “The Concept of Solidarity”.
remains a rallying cry in contemporary international relations, especially as a potential foil for latter-day Western interventionism.

2.3 Internationalism and solidarity outside the West

Internationalism has long been a feature of the foreign policies of significant states in the developing world. This form of internationalism came to be characterised by four key features, namely: solidarity among developing states (or South-South solidarity); commitment to the non-use of force in the resolution of international conflicts; a commitment to non-interference in the internal affairs of other states; and, the commitment to multilateralism.

Solidarity has been a defining feature of the foreign policies of developing states since the early years of independence. ‘Solidarity’ is defined as “Holding together, mutual dependence, community of interests, feelings, and action”. This perspective informed the aforementioned internationalist foreign policies of the Nordic states during the latter decades of the Cold War. Yet, from the case of Cuba’s involvement in Angola’s civil war between 1975 and 1976, to widespread support for Palestinian statehood, what are here termed ‘third world internationalisms’ have been narrowly defined and infrequently analysed in the International Relations literature.

The primary elements of a distinctly ‘Third World’ internationalism began to crystallise at Bandung in 1955, at the Asian-African Conference. The realisation of their common concerns in international affairs led African and Asian leaders to start meeting in the late 1950s, and to begin to constitute a common identity distinct

---

111 The declassification of Cuban government documents relating to the mid-1970s mission in Angola lent credence to the contention that this mission was not conducted upon the instigation of the USSR, and hence was not a clear example of socialist internationalism. See ‘The National Security Archive: Conflicting Missions: Secret Cuban Documents on History of African Involvement’. Accessed at: http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB67/ on 11 December 2007.
from the world of the imperial powers. This position gave rise to the formation of the Non-Aligned Movement in 1961. The movement was based on the principles of: peace and disarmament; independence and self-determination; economic equality; cultural equality; and, universalism and multilateralism.¹¹³

Transnationalism – an early solidarity between not yet independent nations - retained the primacy of the ‘nation’ in whose name, in many cases, independence had been won, yet signalled the strong solidarity across national boundaries of all formerly subject peoples. Once independence had been achieved, however, the principles of solidarity shifted to embrace a commitment more in favour of the international sovereignty of the newly-independent states, encompassing their rights to national development and the recognition of their status as equals in international politics. This was encapsulated in the principles broadly contained in the *Panchsheel,* agreed to between China and India over the Tibet issue, but later extended to relations more broadly in the developing world. While the pre-eminence of the state is one key point of divergence, another potential reason for the divergence in internationalisms between the developed and developing worlds is the scepticism with which the developing world held the ‘normative’ proclamations of the West.¹¹⁴

The development of *multilateralism* as a key tenet of third world internationalism occurred through the early institutional support offered to African and Asian states’ by their membership of the institutions of the United Nations, especially the General Assembly.¹¹⁵ There, they were singled out as a distinctive group, based on the following:

Their aversion to condemnation or denunciation of the communist world; their determination to prevent the transformation of the United Nations into a Cold War arena;

¹¹⁴ This is noted in the case of India by Rhada Kumar, “India as a Foreign Policy Actor – Normative Redux”, CEPS Working Document No.285, February 2008. Centre for European Policy Studies, 1.
their stress on peaceful settlement, negotiations, and conciliation between the two superpowers; their hostility to alliances; their professed reliance on moral suasion and the force of world public opinion instead of physical coercion ... They play the role of modifying some of the decisions of the great powers by affecting their expectations in the competition which involves the small countries. It is in this manner that these minor states may be said to be influential.116

These states were able to mobilise on major issues of significance to them, including decolonisation and the South Africa issue. NAM was joined by the Group of 77 (G77), formed at the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in 1964.

Bandung entrenched the principles of *non-interference and respect for sovereignty*, at least in theory, in the relations of the developing world. The southern internationalism it engendered was further underscored by ‘(a)n almost physical feeling of solidarity and shared humiliation’.117 It had domestic resonance, too. Amrith has shown how, in the case of Singapore, internationalism created a space where the highly racialised public sphere could be transcended — thereby potentially, at least rhetorically, undercutting its negative effects. More recently, it may be argued that internationalist discourses in the Global South serve a domestic inclusionary function once more. While liberal economics has been accepted as a national development course in the face of decades of unsuccessful populist economics on the part of ruling parties in selected states of the Third World, Marxist outlooks on the international economic, social and political environments are parlayed into a transcontinental ‘Southern’ internationalism, potentially uniting government elites and grassroots activists in opposition to northern neoliberal economics,118 to the benefit of governing parties (this will be discussed further in the case study chapters, Chapters 5 and 6).

118 It would be erroneous, however, uncritically to liken mass transnational mobilisations against globalisation (of the types seen at Seattle in 1999 and Genoa in 2001, and the various World Social Forums) with state-led internationalism in the Global South, as suggested by some commentators (See Lawler, “The Good State”, 439-440). While both suffer the shortcoming of lacking the sanction of the ‘voiceless’ to be their ‘voice’, they are representative of vastly different interests and international objectives. While they have achieved some success in tandem, as in the international campaign to ban landmines (ICBL), they remain divided on various issues, such as land redistribution, and in some cases, environmental policy.
The concepts of ‘neutrality’, ‘non-alignment’, ‘Southern solidarity’ and ‘South-South co-operation’ have all been used with reference to the international actions of the third world as a collectivity. It is worthwhile to separate these concepts from the concept of ‘internationalism’ as used in the thesis. To begin with, ‘neutrality’ was never a feature of the positions adopted by developing countries in collective forums such as the Asian-African Conference of 1955, or the Non-Aligned Movement. Non-alignment referred primarily to the right reserved by the newly-independent states not to declare their support in advance for either the East or West blocs on international matters.\(^{119}\) Non-aligned states remained vigorously charged with international questions, however, and did not simply seek to avoid affiliation with the East or West. Neutrality, meanwhile, is the “legal status that arises from the abstention of a state from any participation in a war between other states”.\(^{120}\)

‘Southern’ or ‘Third World’ solidarity is an amorphous concept related to the support (mainly political and economic) offered to countries lacking in industrial development, with a shared colonial experience and a perspective of marginalisation in international affairs, by countries sharing these qualities. Finally, ‘South-South cooperation’ took form from the end of the 1960s onward, and was inspired by dependencia perspectives advanced by South American scholars. It was evident in the desire of developing countries, recognising a subservient role in relation to the advanced industrialised economies, to de-link from these economies and forge stronger economic ties among themselves, which they assumed would be less exploitative and more relevant to their development. South-South co-operation has taken the form of capital flows and trade contacts, though these have never come close to matching the established contacts with traditional Northern economic partners.

Third World internationalism, not unlike the internationalism identified with large developing states earlier, is a distinct foreign policy posture that assumes the developing world as its focal point, and emphasises the issues of international economic justice and development; questions of equitable international political

\(^{119}\) Karefa-Smart, “Africa and the United Nations”, 765

representation; and peaceful mechanisms of international conflict resolution. It is characterised chiefly, but not exclusively, by: a commitment to solidarity with the developing world; a commitment to the peaceful resolution of international disputes; a commitment to multilateralism; and, a commitment to non-interference in the domestic affairs of other states.

It is in this context that contemporary influential developing states are seen as ‘heirs to Bandung’. It was within the post-Cold War, ‘Global War on Terror’ framework that, paradoxically, an opportunity arose for certain larger developing countries to exercise a measure of leadership on particular international questions. This stemmed, in part, from a perceived lack of legitimacy on the part of the most powerful states, namely the US and Britain. It may also be attributed to both the growing visibility of emerging economic powers, and from the exhibition of sensitivity from the developed world that followed terror attacks on their territories, and, the subsequent search for partners in the renewed objectives to reduce global inequality, perceived to be linked to terrorism, and other global problems, such as the management of the global economy and climate.\footnote{See Statement by G8 leaders, and the leaders of Brazil, China, India, Mexico and South Africa following the terrorist attacks on London, 07/07/05.}

Therefore, while in the developed world internationalism has largely been linked to solving traditional security problems in the international system, for the developing world, there are the additional focuses of increasing their international representation, particularly concerning multilateral institutions, and increasing their autonomy through greater numerical strength, and by the provision of alternatives (whether for financial or other material support) to potentially exploitative relations with established powers.\footnote{This is not to assert that South-South relations may not be exploitative. For example, the methods used in South Africa’s pursuit of its commercial interests in Africa have been met with considerable controversy from within the Continent. See John Daniel, Varusha Naidoo and Sanusha Naidu, “The South Africans have arrived: Post-apartheid corporate expansion into Africa”, in State of the Nation 2003-4, eds., John Daniel, Adam Habib and Roger Southall, (Cape Town: HSRC Press, 2004).} These qualities imbue the contemporary emerging powers with the same features as erstwhile ‘middle powers’. In the literature spanning the turn of the 21st century, middle powers were seen to be playing more diffuse roles on a multiplicity of issues. Cox identified four key attributes:
An ability to take a certain distance from direct involvement in major conflicts, a sufficient degree of autonomy in relation to major powers, a commitment to orderliness and security in inter-state relations and to facilitating of orderly change in the world system…  

Indeed, while there is no clear definition of middle power in the literature, there is broad agreement on its behavioural and functional characteristics, and the ascription of this label to certain large developing states, such as India, Brazil and South Africa. Internationalism is a key feature of middle power foreign policy.  

Contrary to the pursuit of ethical foreign policies in developed parts of the world, where they reflect the ‘exhaustion of modern politics’, rapidly industrialising developing countries, even the most internationally competitive members of this group, are still caught up in the challenges of these modern politics: the politics of development and progress, leaving little political room for deliberation on ethical foreign policies. Yet, what may be termed ‘ethical’ foreign policies, in the sense that these policies appear to be based on some normative foundation, but do not appear to accrue immediately perceptible benefits to the country, have increasingly been practiced by emerging developing countries, in face of sometimes stern opposition from domestic quarters. 

According to Lawler, 

the principal challenge now for any resuscitated internationalist alternative to the dominant narrative of Western foreign policy is an investigation of what kinds of national context can generate an internationalist discourse sufficiently sensitive to the cultural complexities of the contemporary world or contemporary multi-ethnic states and to the dangers of a presumptive moral universalism.  

This is indeed the claim of the ‘new’ Southern internationalism: that the national contexts that can provide a measure of this sensitivity are those that have 

---

125 See Pratt, Middle Power Internationalism and Internationalism Under Strain; as well as Stokke, Western Middle Powers.  
experienced international marginalisation, and those that are facing challenges of development and political articulation themselves; those who have fallen prey to moral universalism, and those who seek to resist it.

2.4 Internationalism and the State

What role is there for the state in Southern internationalism? In recent years, it has appeared that ‘global civil society’ has assumed much of the responsibility for representing the interests of the Global South. This was evident in protests such as the Battle for Seattle in 1999, and in more recent campaigns to cancel Third World debt, and to raise the profile of international development issues in developed countries. In addition to this, rightful scepticism may be attached to any attempt at ideological posturing and solidarity on the part of certain states in the developing world, whose records of democratic governance are not unblemished. As noted earlier, however, it was in the name of the state and independence for peoples subject to colonialism that earlier forms of internationalism in the developing world took shape. As Brennan notes, “Good dialectical sense would suggest that a political form born in the epoch of colonial conquest [the state] might play some role in resisting the next stage of imperial hegemony”.

The state in the South is a valuable vehicle for the practice of internationalism, as will be shown in this section, although some important challenges still remain.

Each era of internationalism since its apotheosis after World War I has had cause to re-fashion itself in response to its assumptions about the state. As Sylvest notes, prior to the outbreak of World War I, a conception of internationalism prevailed which had little to do with the state. The term ‘internationalism’ was first used in English in the 19th century, to denote a range of relations, from transnational relations of any kind, to specific liberal concepts of imperialism (the moral conception) and has most frequently been linked, with reference to the early twentieth century, to the calls for the establishment of international institutions in

---

130 Sylvest, “Continuity and Change”, 265-266.
the face of anarchy in the international system (the institutional conception).\(^{131}\) Although the term was initially more frequently used to denote cooperation between individuals, groups and nations, and emphasized the development of international law, it was not necessarily concerned with cosmopolitan ideas of transcending the state.\(^{132}\) The foremost example of internationalism in the closing decades of the nineteenth century was the international labour movement, the International Workingmen's Association (the First International), which Halliday directly implicates in the coining of the term ‘internationalism’. After World War I, the nation-state returned to favour as the “most important building block”\(^{133}\) in the internationalist view of politics. This was accompanied by a centralisation of domestic politics following the war.\(^{134}\)

This commitment to the state as the primary vehicle of internationalism found resonance in the independence and nationalist struggles of many states of the former Third World. This commitment to the state, combined with the notion of ‘solidarity’, are, however, two features that have resulted in the de-emphasis of human rights – a prominent feature of liberal internationalism - in ‘Southern’ internationalism. Starting at Bandung, a dual, potentially conflicting, discourse was peddled, of transnational solidarity on questions pertaining to the independence of colonised nations on the one hand, and the near-silence on colonised minorities on the other. Highly salient is the fact that third world internationalism was conceived in the context of struggles for decolonisation; hence, there were significant impediments to it being thought of in any terms but statist ones.

Afro-Asian solidarity coalesced around their respective struggles for independence: “The fundamental consensus of Bandung was an emphasis on the absolute sovereignty of the post-colonial state”.\(^{135}\) Thus, at a time when European states were commencing the process that would lead to the eventual negotiation of a measure of their respective national sovereignties, through the launch in 1951 of the European Coal and Steel Community, in Africa and Asia, expressions of political modernity were taking place in the non-negotiable form of the independent, post-

\(^{131}\) This distinction is Sylvest's, "Continuity and Change".
\(^{132}\) Sylvest, "Continuity and Change", 266.
\(^{133}\) Sylvest, "Beyond the State?", 73.
\(^{134}\) Ibid.: 73.
\(^{135}\) Amrith, "Asian Internationalism", 560.
colonial state. The commitment to the sovereignty of the state was even embraced in the call for a New International Economic Order in the 1970s, a demand that limited the issues of contention to states.

Just as it did among industrialised countries, the dialectic relationship between nationalism and internationalism played out in newly-independent states, with its effects both in the international arena and domestically. Importantly, while it would be anachronistic to speak of ‘internationalism’ existing between Africans and Asians before the end of colonialism in the middle of the last century, the roots of later internationalism, embodied in what would become state foreign policies, can be traced to the ideologies and convictions of sub- and pre-nation state formations, such as political parties (like the African National Congress in South Africa, and the Indian National Congress in India): here, the roots of internationalism were nationalist. Hence, this form of internationalism prized the hard-won sovereignty of developing countries, even at the expense of individual human rights. This strand of internationalism was exemplified by the principles of the Panchsheel, which included, as aforementioned: mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty; non-aggression; non-interference in each others’ internal affairs; equality and mutual benefit; and, peaceful coexistence.

The question has been raised whether international solidarity still requires the nation-state. This question is highlighted by the entry into government of the left in a number of pivotal states worldwide, a trend that has arguably changed the nature of the state, and potentially, the nature of solidarity. However, “(The State offers) a manageable (albeit top-heavy) site within which the working poor can make limited claims on power, and have at least some opportunity to affect the way they are ruled”. The North-South divide still animates a variety of major international issue areas, such as the global climate talks, the stalled Doha Round of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), and a number of conflicts on which developed countries differ with the developing world. The state is still being vociferously contested in many so-called Third World locales: it is still a treasured

---

136 Ibid.
137 Cox, “Ideologies and NIEO”, 259.
138 Brennan, “Cosmopolitanism and Internationalism”.
139 Ibid., 75.
goal for Palestinians, for example. In terms of international law, furthermore, the state is the only unit recognised to act in the name of a nation, and therefore has noted powers of representation, whatever its shortcomings. Hence, it may be argued that the state retains its significance as a vehicle of international solidarity.

Realism in foreign policy, placing a premium on the jealousy with which states guard their sovereignty in the anarchical international system, remains the countercide of traditional internationalism for developing countries. This has been evident in recent years in the opposition to humanitarian interventions voiced by certain developing countries, such as South Africa, India and China, who all disapproved vocally of NATO’s attacks on Serbia in 1999; and, most recently, BRICS opposition to military action by NATO in Libya.

Thus, internationalism may be considered a set of instruments of diplomacy at the disposal of states, while it also plays a role in defining the goals of foreign policy. It has ideational components, such as South-South solidarity, and multilateralism, along with instrumental components, such as commitment to the non-use of force, and to non-interventionism. While these two elements may be difficult to separate in practice, there are times when the instrumental use of internationalism is evident at the expense of its strong moral content. This has been the basis of the strongest critiques of Southern internationalism.

2.5 Critiques of Southern Internationalism
The classical challenges to these defences of Third World, or Southern, internationalism retain some of their force, however. The realist challenge is presented in the form of state interests, such that states can never seen to be acting altruistically, but always governed by some commitment to the national interest. Southern governments have repeatedly vindicated these challenges in recent years, whether by the African Union’s sheltering of Sudanese president, Omar al-Bashir, after his indictment on war crimes by the International Criminal Court (ICC), or by lack of censure of illiberal governments by Southern-dominated institutions of the UN. EH Carr’s ‘realist critique of internationalism’, while he did not have large developing states in mind, made the case that calls for solidarity “come from those
dominant nations which may hope to exercise control over a unified world”.¹⁴⁰ The claim that ‘we are not just for ourselves, we are ‘international” could easily be used as justification for expansion, or some other forms of material benefit. “‘International order’ and ‘international solidarity’”, noted Carr, “will always be slogans of those who feel strong enough to impose them on others.”¹⁴¹

Of equal significance here are the post-structuralist critiques questioning liberal cosmopolitanism’s ‘homogenising universalism’ and ‘linear progressivism’.¹⁴² Through its commitment theoretically, or in practice, or both, to the sovereign independence of other states, and the principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of others, internationalism as it emerged in the developing world, while it may be a victim of numerous others, does not fall prey to these weaknesses. As Lawler has suggested, ‘classical internationalism’, undertaken by states, could be the sought-after middle ground between idealistic cosmopolitanism and flagrant interventionism as seen in Iraq in 2003.

The form of solidarity that is hailed to defend the supra-national interests of large developing countries is most often limited to the shared humanity of the immediate region, or continent – or at a stretch, impoverished people worldwide. The commitment to equality of all people and to democratising multilateral institutions, as well as bringing about equitable international economic arrangements is born of this conviction. In recent years, these convictions have come up squarely against the settled norms of the Western international order, as this order has come under increasing threat from diverse cultural approaches and interpretations of international order; and, indeed, from the manner in which it has been defended by powerful Western states, too (mainly in the form of military interventions). Not unlike a number of other developing and formerly ‘non-aligned’ governments, for example,

many in Brazil and in particular many who later were associated with the Lula government suspected that the liberal norms of the 1990s concerning human

¹⁴¹ Ibid., 80.
rights, democracy, and free markets had been used in selective ways to reflect narrow national interests.\textsuperscript{143}

In addition, since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, many have suspected Washington of exploiting new security threats to mobilize support at home and abroad for the projection and expansion of US power.\textsuperscript{144}

Therefore, while the times have changed, solidarity among governments of the developing world still appears to be working at cross-purposes to the international goals of the advanced industrialised democracies of the West. What is a point of concern for the latter is that many of these developing countries now also embrace democracy and have made giant leaps in terms of development, with the potential to increase their influence on their regional neighbours and other developing countries, and in the world financial system. This extends also to their claims to represent the developing world in important international negotiating forums. The question becomes one of whether these states have changed to accommodate the international normative order as propagated by the West, or whether they have sought to adapt that order to their own conceptions of order.

\textbf{Conclusion}

Internationalism is a strident political force in contemporary global politics. In spite of its somewhat vague conceptual clarity, it forms a key component – especially since the end of the Cold War - of the foreign policies of a number of great powers and intermediate states. The developed and developing worlds have typically been divided over whether to pursue the substantive, proselytising aspects of internationalism (also labelled ‘liberal internationalism’), or the procedural, institutional aspects of internationalism.

This chapter has sought to show how internationalism has come to the forefront of the foreign policies of certain influential developing states. While it shares much with traditional forms of internationalism witnessed in the foreign policies of a number of social democracies during the Cold War, there is also much that is different with reference to this variant of internationalism. The relationship between


\textsuperscript{144} Ibid.
domestic welfare arrangements and foreign policy is not as stark, for one. A second is the divergent views on state sovereignty and non-intervention. The concept of internationalism in the foreign policies of countries of the Global South has coalesced around four key tenets, namely: solidarity, multilateralism, non-interference and respect for sovereignty, and non-violent means of conflict resolution.

Southern internationalism, cultivated since the early decades of the last century, has been shown to be more than mere ideology, serving instead as an enduring cornerstone of foreign policy for many developing states of all sizes. Southern internationalism may be a potential successor to Western internationalism, which has endured a crisis since the end of the Cold War: a crisis of legitimacy and implementation. The Southern response is an internationalism of accommodation rather than coercion, and internationalism as a mechanism for the coexistence of divergent values and national cultures, rather than a vehicle for the propagation of specific values.

However, this stance is far from unproblematic. One of the main tensions involved in the analysis of internationalism in the foreign policies of developing countries is that the attendant cosmopolitan assumptions that such policies rest on are considered to be the products of modern outlooks on international life. Countries of the developing world are typically considered to be grappling with the establishment of the first modernist principle of international life, sovereignty or statehood, and the strengthening of their jurisdiction over clearly delimited geographical territories. There is also still much scepticism attached to the attribution of internationalism to the foreign policies of the developing world.

With growing domestic resources, large developing countries that project cosmopolitan foreign policy goals, such as the democratisation of multilateral institutions, the equity of the international financial architecture, and the respect for diversity in international relations, increasingly square up to pressures of self-interest and power, pillars of the realist domain of international relations. How to make theoretical sense of these tensions – and a proposed solution – are the subject of the following chapter.

Introduction

Why do states with limited disposable resources commit to foreign policies that require the mobilisation and extraction of national resources in areas that do not represent obvious threats or opportunities? Internationalism in the foreign policies of intermediate states poses a puzzle for analysts of foreign policy. Given the uncertainty regarding the internationalist credentials of large and powerful developing states, it appears necessary to devise, or apply, a theoretical approach that could account for the role of internationalism, and other-regarding behaviour by states of the developing world that marries their emergent role (in terms of capabilities) with their particular outlook on foreign policy.

This chapter makes the case for internationalism as practiced by large states in the developing world, as a foreign policy instrument aimed at enlarging the scope of interests of a state, and hence its scope of activity; raising its international diplomatic profile (allowing it to ‘punch above its weight’ in international affairs); and, increasing the extent to which it can influence smaller states and powers. While it may appear counter-intuitive, internationalism as a tool of foreign policy in this way achieves a comfortable fit with the realist, especially the classical realist, outlook on international life, which privileges competition for scarce positional resources – such as “prestige, status, political influence, leadership, political leverage, a positive trade balance or market shares”. These are all hallmarks of the foreign policies of contemporary emerging powers. While classical realism would disavow any commitment of the state to those living beyond its borders, neoclassical realism, through the introduction of unit-level variables, highlights the role played by political leadership and unit-level characteristics in determining the trajectory of

foreign policy. The latter include ideational components, which may involve the state in responsibilities to those beyond its confines.

Yet, emerging powers do not operate within a vacuum. They are constantly cognisant of their relative position in international politics. Brazilian presidents and diplomats, for example, have made repeated reference to Brazil’s ‘rightful place’ in the global order; while other emerging powers are acutely aware of their regional status and how they are perceived by their neighbours.

The emergence of new actors on the international political scene, adopting classical pro-developing world postures, while growing rapidly in economic terms and playing pivotal regional security and diplomatic roles, has muddied the way intermediate, or ‘middle’ powers, are discussed and analysed. These are no longer small, advanced capitalist democracies, with homogeneous populations and strong corporatist relations between state and society. They are multiethnic, developing countries with mixed records on democracy, and with specific ideas about their desired roles in international relations. Some of the prevailing discourses about the international relations of second-tier states (both developed and less developed) have invoked their propensity to be different sorts of power than the great powers that outrank them in material capability, and often in diplomatic influence.  

This difference stems from their place within the international hierarchy of states, as well as their own domestic responsibilities and historical trajectories. As noted in Chapter 2, emerging developing states seek, among other things, to distance themselves from ‘imperialist’ behaviour. They seek solidarity with the developing world, and also to underline the centrality of multilateral institutions to international order. Much of their claim to representivity in global institutions rests on their past and present experiences with underdevelopment, and their ability to translate these into a bridging capability between the developed and developing worlds. They also claim to seek the resolution of global issues that affect the majority of the world’s people. The extent to which this is possible, however, is determined by systemic

constraints and national interests. Thus, both the system- and state-levels are crucial
to understanding the foreign policies of intermediate states.

The extent to which ‘moral’ discourses of ‘solidarity’ and pluralism in international
relations serve very narrow, national interests is a matter for further investigation. A
number of intermediate states sought permanent seats on the UN Security Council
when permanent membership of this body came under review in 2005, the 50th
anniversary of the UN. In addition, some intermediate states, including South
Africa, Brazil and China, have clearly positioned themselves as representatives of
the developing world. While the anti-imperialism and anti-colonialist stance of the
early independence period have vanished in all but rhetoric, the question still
remains why emerging powers have sought, in the main, to tread a careful path
around established powers, such as the United States. Some have even resisted the
temptation to develop ‘hard power’ capabilities and the means to project them.

It seems necessary, therefore, to find a way to account for the upward trajectories of
certain intermediate powers, that takes into account both structural factors, such as
balance of power (changes in relative capabilities), that limit action,148 as well as the
dominant ideas in domestic society that affect how each state views its threats and
opportunities in formulating foreign policy.149 This chapter will outline a theoretical
and methodological framework for examining the impact of a pacific, yet resource-
intensive (not limited to material resources), internationalist outlook on emerging
states’ foreign policies.

As noted by Taliaferro, there at least three key factors influencing state power – or
the “variation in extractive and mobilization capability affect[ing] states’ ability to

148 Structural factors are not only limiting factors; they may also be constitutive factors, in
the sense that they set guidelines for what is possible in terms of upward mobility of
states in the international hierarchy. In the current international climate, for example,
nuclear arms are frowned upon by the major powers as a means to increase national
status. This is notwithstanding the ambiguity of certain allies, like India and Israel, whose
nuclear status has been tacitly accepted. Structure may create opportunities as well as
constraints.

149 Randall Schweller provides a compelling early account of the significant differences
between status quo and revisionist states with his ‘balance-of-interests’. This framework
takes explicit account, within a realist paradigm, of unit-level factors affecting alliance
behaviour, thus combining structural and domestic factors in accounting for state action.
See Schweller, “New Realist Research”.
adjust to shifts in their international environment”\textsuperscript{150}, namely: state institutions, nationalism and ideology.\textsuperscript{151} It is upon this basis that an analytical space is found for the role played by governing parties in the formulation of foreign policy, both as holders of the levers of political power, and as repositories of ideology guiding foreign policy.

As important as governing parties is the role of political leadership. Leaders do not operate in isolation, and they cannot focus on one context, to the exclusion of others.\textsuperscript{152}

Leaders define states’ international and domestic constraints. Based on their perceptions and interpretations, they build expectations, plan strategies, and urge actions on their governments that conform to their judgements about what is possible and likely to maintain them in their positions. Such perceptions help frame governments’ orientations to international affairs. Leaders’ interpretations arise out of their experiences, goals, beliefs about the world, and sensitivity to the political context.\textsuperscript{153}

Furthermore, “Whether and how …leaders judge themselves constrained depends on the nature of the domestic challenges to their leadership, how the leaders are organised, and what they are like as people.”\textsuperscript{154}

The immediate political vehicle within which leaders, such as Thabo Mbeki of South Africa, and Lula da Silva of Brazil, constructed their foreign policy strategies was the political party structure that brought them to power, and sought to perpetuate its own tenure in power. This thesis operationalises their position by way of two variables, institutional freedom\textsuperscript{155} (or the degree to which power is centralised in an individual or the governing party), and legitimating power (or the degree to which individuals or political parties are able to justify particular international actions). This party political structure is in turn located within a state structure that either

\textsuperscript{150} Taliaferro, “State Building for Future Wars”, 488.
\textsuperscript{151} Taliaferro, “State Building for Future Wars”, 487.
\textsuperscript{153} Herman and Hagan, cited in Neack, 2008: 49.
\textsuperscript{154} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{155} This factor is synonymous with John Hobson’s ‘high domestic agential power’ or ‘high institutional autonomy’, which leaves the state, and in the current context, the political party, relatively free to pursue its foreign policy interests, with minimal significant domestic opposition. See John M. Hobson, The State and International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
underlines a party’s dominance, such as a parliamentary system, or one that limits it, such as a presidential system.

Intermediate states have made a scant impact on mainstream International Relations theorising. The key developments in theorising about these states have centred upon their middle power status, and more recently, their possibilities of acting as different types of power. Neorealism overlooks lesser powers altogether. Liberalism has, however, been able to account for both the domestic factors influencing the international outlooks of intermediate states, as well as the centrality of multilateralism to their foreign policies. The theoretical outlook that is able to account for both systemic and domestic determinants of states’ foreign policies is found in the neoclassical realist approach to foreign policy analysis. As noted by Taliaferro, “Neoclassical realism suggests that state power – the relative ability of the state to extract or mobilize resources from domestic society as determined by the institutions of the state, as well as by nationalism and ideology – shapes the types of internal balancing strategies a state is likely to pursue”.¹⁵⁶ Zakaria adds that state power is “that portion of national power the government can extract for its purposes and reflects the ease with which central decision makers can achieve their ends”.¹⁵⁷

This chapter proceeds in four sections. First, in response to the possible puzzlement that might greet a theoretical association between internationalism in foreign policy and neoclassical realism, a discussion of ethics and realism in foreign policy analysis is conducted. This is followed by an exposition of three key contributions of the neoclassical realist approach and their place in the thesis. Finally, the role of governing parties and leading individuals in resource mobilisation and extraction is interrogated. The chapter concludes that by combining the strengths of system-level and unit-level analysis, it is possible to gain deeper insight into what motivates internationalist foreign policy approaches by intermediate states. In addition, and more importantly, combining material-structural and ideational factors in an analysis avoids the untenable and false dichotomy that is frequently established with regard

to seemingly altruistic or ‘ethical’ foreign policy, viewed by some as a contradiction in terms.

3.1. What has morality to do with it?

Chapter 2 made the case for a divergent internationalism in the developing world since the middle of the twentieth century. As noted by some analysts, however, this form of solidarity and internationalism often served to protect deviant regimes from international censure, as well as to increase the global prestige of otherwise insignificant states. To what extent, then, is internationalism really about ethics?

For large developing countries – or so-called ‘emerging powers’ – the case may be made that adopting internationalism as a foreign policy approach has more to do with domestic restraints and limited capabilities than actually diffusing a given ideology, liberal or otherwise. This is especially true since the demise of the empirical category of ‘Third World’ since the 1970s. Thus, the key tenets of internationalism highlighted in Chapter 2, namely:

- Commitment to the peaceful settlement of international disputes
- South-south solidarity
- Commitment to multilateralism, and
- Respect for the principle of non-interference

combine to increase the relative power capabilities of intermediate states, while potentially reducing the challenges to resource extraction and mobilisation. By committing to the peaceful settlement of international disputes, states are able, especially in their immediate geographical regions, to forestall the use of force, for which they may not be militarily and strategically prepared. Maintaining a predictable and stable international environment also contributes toward economic stability and growth for emerging economies. Seeking increasing engagement with countries of the developing world diversifies trade opportunities for emerging markets and also strengthens their bargaining capacity in multilateral settings, where the strength of numbers may win important concessions or resolutions. The commitment to multilateralism is an important ‘force multiplier’ in the diplomatic strategies of intermediate states, as they are able to some extent to mitigate the
power of great powers, such as the Permanent Five members of the UN Security Council. Finally, respect for the principle of non-interference assists in limiting the scope of great power action within weaker states, and also protects the constituencies of rising regional powers from interference in their domestic affairs.

Recent realist scholarship recognises the centrality of ethics to the realist political tradition. Indeed, Classical Realism has been singled out for possible synergies with more normative approaches to international relations, \(^{158}\) given its recognition of the social bases of national power, and its more differentiated view of the state, compared to neorealism. \(^{159}\) Hence, classical realism is not entirely dismissive of international morality, while it may have been sceptical of it. \(^{160}\) Neorealism, on the other hand, would not take international morality into account at all, as this would be characteristic more of an international society of states – whose existence it denies – than an international system, and also because neorealism does not entertain the possibility that states have any other option but to obey the dictates of a self-help anarchical system in which any but selfish actions, in the national interest, would be punished by conquest or similar losses. This thesis, in positing a place for internationalism in a neoclassical realist approach to the rise of emerging powers, finds a place for a specific international outlook in the foreign policy calculations of states. Internationalism, an ethical stance, is a domestic-level factor that mediates the state’s responses to external challenges and opportunities.

This thesis, in examining the foreign policy postures of two emerging powers, faces a choice between internationalism as a form of morality in international politics, and internationalism as a cloak for the national interest, or, realpolitik. Brown has argued, however, that this is a false dichotomy, as states may rarely, if ever, be expected to act without any regard for self-interest, and it is quite plausible to expect that states, like human beings, face complexity in their motivations for action: interest and


\(^{159}\) See John Hobson, “Chapter 2: Realism”, in The State and International Relations. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, for a comparison between the classical realist and Waltzian neorealist conceptions of the state.

ethics may underpin the same foreign policy outcome.\textsuperscript{161} As a practical measure, furthermore, he argues that “(a)ny judgement about the ethical status of a particular foreign policy programme has to be made in the round, and not simply in one area”.\textsuperscript{162}

A neoclassical realist framework does not exclude internationalism, to the extent that internationalism may be regarded as both a feature of domestic ideology, used for placating political allies domestically, and as a tool for building followership internationally. It may simply be regarded as another instrument of international policy, and a vehicle for the pursuit of self-interested goals.

Scholars in the neoclassical realist tradition, carrying the mantle of classical realism, have made great strides in furthering understanding about how ideas and power are often inseparable components of foreign policy, by focusing on unit-level and system-level influences on foreign policy outcomes. These themes are examined in the following section.

### 3.2. Neoclassical realism: Conceptual and Theoretical Issues

Neoclassical realism represents an attempt to synthesise the strengths of classical realism and neorealism in a parsimonious theory of foreign policy that may be applied to states of any size or ranking in the international hierarchy. Although neoclassical realism utilises realism’s focus on the anarchical state system as the key determinant of foreign policy, it includes a more open approach to the roles of perception and domestic politics than does the traditional neorealist position. Its adherents emphasise that neoclassical realism is not a theory of international politics. Instead, it is a theory of foreign policy analysis. Neoclassical realism seeks precisely to re-insert the state between systemic dynamics – such as the relative distribution of power - and foreign policy outcomes. Its assumptions about the state, in turn, derive primarily from classical realism. This is so because neoclassical


\textsuperscript{162} Ibid., 29.
realists theorise a state that is more responsive to domestic imperatives and thus more constrained by them.¹⁶³

The aspects of the neoclassical realism research agenda that are directly relevant to this thesis are:

- The international structure as a decisive factor in the foreign policy calculations of states;
- The differential between national power and state power; and,
- The nature of unit-level intervening variables, in this case governing parties, individual leaders, and perception.

Each of these aspects is now discussed in turn.

### 3.2.1 The systemic dimension

The primary system characteristics affecting the choice of foreign policy goals and means include: system polarity, the distribution of power in the system; and, the rules of the game.¹⁶⁴ The systemic dimension of international life is highly relevant to intermediate states. Intermediate states gain their identity from their position relative to other states. They are either stronger than the weaker states, or weaker than their more powerful counterparts. At the same time, the relative distribution of power in the system affects foreign policy decisions because a change in relative distribution might necessitate a responsive action by an intermediate state, either within its own region, or extra-regionally. The balance of power dynamic frames the perceptions and decisions of decision-makers at the unit level. This dynamic employs two central assumptions: 1) Anarchy – or the lack of any central deciding power - as a constraint on states’ behaviour; and, 2) The relative distribution of power among states.

As noted by Taliaferro, however, neorealism, by avoiding analysis of the internal characteristics of states, completely overlooks their differential capacity to respond to shifts in the balance of power:

“Waltz’s theory assumes that units have an unlimited capacity to extract and mobilize resources from domestic society. For balance-of-power theory, what matters is a state’s aggregate power, the sum of its economic, potential, and military capabilities”.165

Nonetheless, this relative distribution of power among states is what decision-makers perceive when they consider the state’s position in the international system. The distribution of power in the system affects the extent to which states can attain their goals. Their goals, in turn, are determined by their own national capacity and the extent to which this can be mobilized and extracted by central decision-makers.166

Mobilisation, recall, refers to economic measures to enhance national wealth, while ‘extraction’ refers to the conversion “of wealth into power by taxing, requisitioning, or expropriating social resources”. These resources are directed toward military expenditure, aid donations, dues payable to international organisations and other international activities.167

State goals range from the bare essential ‘survival’ to aggrandizement of national power. Emerging powers seek recognition from established powers; improved access to overseas markets; and, the increased ability to participate in system-affecting decision-making. Therefore, threats can also be framed in terms of these goals. However, in providing dynamism to the framework, it is posited, with Zakaria, that where states experience significant growth in their material resources, they tend to redefine their political interests abroad, “measured by their increases in military spending, initiation of wars, acquisition of territory, posting of soldiers and diplomats, and participation in great-power decision-making”.168 Thus, growth in material resources links the classical measure of state strength – physical resources – with a conception of changing national interests in response to this growth, through the mechanism of perception.

166 Zakaria, From Wealth to Power. Zakaria illustrates how the US emerged as a world power at the turn of the twentieth century in response to the consolidation of executive and state power domestically, rather than as a response to external threats.
168 Zakaria, From Wealth to Power, 3.
In neoclassical realism the system acts as a ‘container’ of state action. Systemic pressures are nonetheless open to interpretation, meaning that “systemic incentives and threats, at least in the short run, are rarely unambiguous”.\(^{169}\) In addition, there is rarely ‘a’ single, correct response to systemic incentives, and actions taken by states may often have the opposite effect to that intended.\(^{170}\) As Hagan contends, while foreign policy is “an inherently political process”,\(^{171}\) the international environment is the ultimate container for how the state leadership forms its foreign policy. This is ultimately still a highly deterministic view, but one that as will be seen later, is highly pertinent to the position of middle- or intermediate powers.

However, the story becomes more complicated in the developing world, where most emerging states are located today. Growth in material resources, under Leftist administrations, such as those of the ANC in South Africa and PT in Brazil, would imply large-scale state-directed programmes aimed at wealth redistribution. However, as will be shown in the individual case study chapters, this has taken place on a limited scale. Close relations between these governing parties and the labour movements in their respective countries have only had a limited impact on foreign policy, but larger structural issues, such as state capacity or national power, affect the projection of strength by these two rising powers (See Figure 3).

\(^{169}\) Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Steven E. Lobell and Norrin M. Ripsman, “Introduction: Neoclassical realism, the state, and foreign policy”, in Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy, eds. Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009): 28-29.

\(^{170}\) Ibid.

Systemic Constraints:
Anarchy
Relative Distribution of Power

Unit Level:
Degree of autonomy of central decision-makers in a context of growing material power resources
(change in relative distribution of power)
- Mobilisation capability
- Extraction capability
- Role of governing party (Left-oriented)
- Rising economic capacity
  - INSTITUTIONAL FREEDOM of governing party
  - LEGITIMATING CAPACITY of governing party

Figure 3: Schematic Representation of Neoclassical Realist Approach to Emerging Powers

Neoclassical realism downgrades realism’s assumption of states’ search for security as a driving force of international politics. According to Rose, an early exponent of the approach as theory, “Instead of assuming that states seek security, neoclassical realists assume that states respond to the uncertainties of international anarchy by seeking to control and shape their external environment”.172 In other words, states attempt to decrease levels of uncertainty, but not necessarily through the acquisition of arms and by building the capability to make war. States still seek the means for survival, but territorial gains and existential threats do not form the core of their security concerns. With special reference to the two countries under consideration here, Brazil has not seen major war since the middle of the nineteenth century, while post-Apartheid South Africa has not faced any major military threats from outside its borders.

Economic and security issues feature as major factors for emerging states in seeking to ‘control and shape their external environment’. One of these factors is their ability to participate in multilateral decision-making. While this aspect of internationalism is dismissed by realism, or more generously viewed as dependent upon powerful states’ interests, it is a vital component of the foreign policies of

intermediate states. Regionalism and maintaining leadership within their immediate regions is another important means of limiting uncertainty. A third way to limit uncertainty for emerging powers is to diversify commercial linkages so that financial crisis in one part of the international market poses limited threat to the domestic economy.

In recent accounts of the new post-Cold War multipolar order, scholars are divided over the extent to which potential powers are balancing against or bandwagoning with the United States, the sole superpower in the system.\(^\text{173}\) Problems in conducting such an analysis include doubt over how balancing is measured, although Waltz allowed for both internal (domestic growth) and external balancing (alliance-formation). There too, it is doubtful whether the formation of negotiations coalitions in the World Trade Organisation, for example, constitute the formation of an ‘alliance’ against US interests, as they are not military in nature. There are no doubt shifts in the relative distribution of power globally, as the rapid economic growth of China, India and Brazil attest to. The extent to which they affect their regions, let alone the system, is yet to be fully grasped.

While the system is broadly conceived as anarchical, the consequences of anarchy are not predetermined, and individual states “may differ in their ability to control the policy agenda, select policy options, or mobilize resources to respond to systemic incentives”.\(^\text{174}\)

### 3.2.2 The differential between national power and state power

The most important modification that neoclassical realism makes to neorealism is the acknowledgement that “\(\text{(u)nit-} \text{level variables constrain or facilitate the ability of all types of states – great powers as well as lesser states – to respond to systemic imperatives}\)”\(^\text{175}\)


\(^{175}\) Taliaferro et al., “Introduction”, 4, emphasis added.
Neorealism’s emphasis on the system as a determinant of foreign policy remains; but events and perceptions at the unit-level condition the responses of states to external stimuli:

Specifically, [neoclassical realism] seeks to explain why, how, and under what conditions the internal characteristics of states – the extractive and mobilization capacity of politico-military institutions, the influence of domestic societal actors and interest groups, the degree of state autonomy from society, and the level of elite or societal cohesion – intervene between the leaders’ assessment of international threats and opportunities and the actual diplomatic, military, and foreign economic policies those leaders pursue.176

*State power* is thus hard power, or brute *national power* – the sum of a state’s military, economic and social capabilities as traditionally considered by neorealists – mediated by domestic forces. Taliaferro defines state power as “the relative ability of the state to extract or mobilize resources from domestic society as determined by the institutions of the state, as well as by nationalism and ideology”.177 With Zakaria, it is noted that,

Although classical realism correctly focuses on the nation-state as the principal actor in world politics, it inadvertently obscures an important distinction. Statesmen, not nations, confront the international system, and they have access to *only that fraction of national power that the state apparatus can extract for its purposes*. Therefore, according to the hypothesis of … state-centred realism, statesmen will expand the nation’s political interests abroad when they perceive a relative increase in state power, not national power.178

Implicit in the neoclassical realist approach is the idea that state power is contingent. This prompts the questions: what produces and conditions state power? Is it based on material capabilities, such as a large economy or military? Which social forces and relationships affect the projection of state power? As noted by Mastanduno, et al,

The sources of national power are many – political, economic, military. The ability to project this power abroad hinges in important respects on the deftness of the state officials in cultivating public opinion, educating the citizenry, and bolstering the authority of government institutions.179

---

176 Ibid., 4.
178 Zakaria, From Wealth to Power, 35. Emphasis added.
Classical realists argued for an approach to national power that included its social base. According to Carr, “Power over opinion is … not less essential for political purposes than military and economic power, and has always been closely associated with them. The art of persuasion has always been a necessary part of the equipment of a political leader”. Astute leadership is an important component of the translation of ‘static’ national resources into potential state power. The ideas held by these individuals thus play an important role in the policy process. It is to this question – of leadership, political parties and key domestic actors - that we now turn.

3.2.3 Unit-level intervening variables: The role of governing parties and leaders

Foreign policy decisions are taken by an individual or a group of individuals, who are connected to society through their elected office, along with other incentives to select and implement certain policies over others. This elected office derives from the domestic political structure that establishes legitimate authority over the state, and may be parliamentary or presidential. The individual or group of individuals tasked with taking foreign policy decisions is referred to as a Foreign Policy Executive (FPE) in some of the neoclassical realism literature. It is also known as the ‘decision unit’ in FPA. A ‘decision unit’ is “a set of authorities with the ability to commit the resources of the society and, with respect to a particular problem, the authority to make a decision that cannot be readily reversed”. Differences from state to state in national extractive capacity will result from different decision-making and –implementing rules within the state, such as the extent to which government is centralized, the nature of the party system with respect to democratic accountability and cohesion, and the relationship between the governing party and

---

the executive (i.e. Lead ministries) – in other words, the state structure (to be discussed in Chapter 4).

The role of leadership should not be overshadowed by a general account of how the executive manages power in systems where governmental power is divided between various branches. Leadership is a distinct aspect of foreign policymaking in intermediate states. This is because individuals become more important to the policymaking process in the presence of three enabling factors:

- when they enjoy a concentration of power;
- when systemic, domestic and bureaucratic forces are in conflict or are ambiguous; and,
- in conditions of change or fluidity, because of their ability to act more decisively than large bureaucracies.184

“Where there is “uncertainty” about threats and how to deal with them, governments’ responses will depend upon how leaders perceive and interpret the threats based on their own belief systems”.185 Leaders, no matter the extent to which policymaking is concentrated in one individual, should be placed within their domestic political context, in order to gauge their latitude of action and the extent of the support they enjoy for international engagements.

A number of studies have assessed the role of political parties in foreign policymaking.186 While the roles of opposition political parties generally have been assessed in terms of their nuisance potential in the implementation of foreign policy, the specific contributions – whether ideological or otherwise – made by governing parties have not been the subject of much FPA research. Nor has there been, generally speaking, the recognition of the possibility of governing parties

184 Byman and Pollack, “Bringing the Statesman Back In”, 141-142.
facilitating ‘alternative’ diplomatic relations that run parallel to, if not always in tandem with, state diplomatic arrangements.187

However, it is not only the ruling party that matters, as Ripsman notes, executive autonomy derives “not merely from the form of democracy (i.e. its institutional structure), but also from the decision-making procedures and procedural norms that govern the conduct of foreign security policy”.188 The less autonomous the executive, the further away from neorealism’s unitary state one gets. Paradoxically, other research has found that in parliamentary systems, executives tend to trump legislatures, while in presidential systems, presidents are not as autonomous as might be expected.189 This compels a narrowing of one of the objects of analysis, the decision unit, and privileges the ruling party as an object of analysis.

Governing parties form part of the second image of foreign policymaking, at the level of the state. While they are not synonymous with the state, they comprise an important component of the state, and governing parties may ‘pay’ for injudicious foreign policy decisions by being voted out of power.190 Furthermore, analysts frequently look to the nature of the governing party for indicators of the potential trajectory of a state’s future foreign policy. Governing parties also represent an important interface between the public and foreign policy. While their influence may be limited when they rule by coalition, or where foreign policy decisions may be vetoed in a parliamentary system, their impact on determining the course of foreign policy is significant. This impact is mediated through the executive and its role in determining foreign policy. The governing party thus forms a central component of the Foreign Policy Executive – both through its ideology and key


188 Ripsman, “Domestic Interest Groups”, 177.


190 This does not occur frequently, however. The one recent and frequently-cited case that comes to mind is that of Centre-Right Jose Maria Aznar’s Popular Party, that lost the Spanish General Election in March 2004, owing to its policy of participating in the Iraq War, and its conduct following the Madrid train bombings by terrorists. Wilkinson, Isambard. 2004. “Election blow to Bush’s war on terror”, in The Telegraph, accessed online at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/spain/1456911/Election-blow-to-Bushs-war-on-terror.html on 11 August, 2010.
individuals - located at the “intersection of domestic and international political systems, and can act internationally for domestic reasons or domestically for international ends”. 191

As argued by Jennifer Sterling-Folker, conflict groups (that are generally the basis of realism’s ontology of international relations) cohere around shared conceptions of identity, and not mere profit. 192 Therefore, there is more to a coalition’s foreign policy perspective than opportunities for economic loss and profit. It is also possible to include notions of solidary and identity. 193 These two coalitions could very well be engaged in deeper struggles in the process of national group identity formation. This process, as Sterling-Folker argues, is “intimately linked into internal subgroup competitions for state control, …”. 194 What is more, these subgroup competitions for control of the state and its outward posture involve decisions about resource allocations. These questions become all the more pertinent in growing developing countries with problems of wealth distribution and overall socio-economic development.

Party influence is, of course, also determined by the nature of the given party itself, and the relations of accountability and cohesion within its ranks. Governing parties have frequently to forge coalitions with outside partners, with whom they have to make concessions, although they also depend on the support of allies who share their ideological convictions. As governing parties, they face both domestic and external challenges to their rule. The degree of salience they ascribe to each arena will likely determine their foreign policy outlook.

The analysis of governing parties, their ideologies and leadership, as well as the extent of the influence they are able to exert on foreign policy, are valuable in an

191 Lobell, “Threat Assessment”, 56.
192 Sterling-Folker, Jennifer, “Chapter 4: Neoclassical realism and identity: peril despite profit across the Taiwan Strait”, in Neoclassical Realism, the State and Foreign Policy. Eds., Lobell, Steven E., Norrin M. Ripsman and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).
193 The notions of ‘identity’ and ‘solidarity’ appear alien to a realist framework. Numerous theorists have called for greater dialogue between theorists of identity (mainly in the Constructivist approach to IR) and realism. See J. Samuel Barkin, “Realist Constructivism”, International Studies Review, 5, Issue 3 (2003), and a forum in response to this article, “Bridging the Gap: Toward A Realist-Constructivist Dialogue”, in ISR, 6, Issue 2.
194 Sterling-Folker, “Peril despite profit”, 115.
analysis of the foreign policy formulation process. They also provide important clues about the levers of power in society, and what the priorities of the national community are. Even debates challenging governing party interpretations of threats and justifiable means of achieving international goals shed light on contending views of domestic priorities. This is a key variable in the capacity of states to respond to international threats and opportunities. While governing parties may not be able to shift course entirely on foreign policy, for various structural, historical and cultural reasons, they still play an important role in defining national threats, and in determining the best of use of the means to resist them.

The main concern here is not with electoral politics and the variations in public opinion on foreign policy in developing countries. Rather, the main concern of the thesis is the personal and institutional impact of key individuals in governing parties in the states considered, upon foreign policy. A second key concern is with the process of how certain party principles, or foreign policy platforms, are converted into national foreign policy, resulting in foreign policy choices that may be predicted neither by a strict realist approach, nor a strict liberal approach.

**Operationalising the variables**

The key variables regarding the role of governing parties in this framework are as follows:

- **Institutional freedom** to convert national power into state power, i.e. latitude to mobilize national resources and extract them for foreign policy purposes. This freedom is gauged by the following factors, among others: the relationship between the executive and legislative branches of government; the size of the numerical majority of the governing party in the legislature (where the legislature possesses some power over the foreign policymaking process); the relative strength of various components of the executive, such as the presidency and the relevant ministries. This is a variant of state structure arguments in foreign policy analysis.

- **Legitimating power** to convert national power into state power, i.e. reasons for international action or a given foreign policy activity resonate with the governing party’s own stated views and principles, or with those of the broader society. Legitimating power depends on factors such as shared identity, reasoned
argument, and rational cost-benefit analyses. Clearly, this could be a double-edged factor, as party values (regime survival) could be in competition with societal values (national survival): which hold the day? How does this affect the implementation of a foreign policy action? As noted by Taliaferro, “The ability of states to extract resources from society is not simply a function of the strength of institutions: it also depends on leaders’ ability to raise and maintain support for national security strategies”.\textsuperscript{195} Legitimating power tends to vary with the perception of external threat by the public, as well as the extent of social cohesion generally, and the level of ideological inclination in society.\textsuperscript{196}

These two variables more than any others determine the conversion of national power into state power, and indeed the \textit{mobilisation} and \textit{extraction} of national resources for foreign policy purposes. For this reason, the focus on the cognitive universes, or ‘operational codes’\textsuperscript{197} of individual leaders is not primary in this study. A leader’s beliefs about the limits of politics, the weight of history, and the nature of politics and political conflict, while important, are ultimately only a minor factor relative to his ability to win the mobilisation and extraction of state resources for foreign policy. The latter two abilities depend upon the leader’s place in a legislative system, and his legitimacy in the eyes of his constituents and those who control the levers of state power.

How can we hypothesise foreign policy outcomes from the relative strength of governing parties in mobilising and extracting national power? With a basic assumption of a shift in relative power:

**Hypothesis 1:** The greater the institutional freedom and legitimating capacity of the governing party, the more autonomy inheres in key decision-making structures, the closer the model approximates neorealism’s unitary actor. Decisions to allocate resources to international issues will be based on hard power considerations and exercised more frequently, \textit{where the state possesses the resources to do so}. The state will act \textit{in line with neorealism’s predictions, behaving competitively and aggressively}.

\textsuperscript{195}Taliaferro, “State Building for future wars”, 489.
\textsuperscript{196}Taliaferro, “State Building for future wars”, 491.
\textsuperscript{197}George, Alexander, cited in Neack, \textit{The New Foreign Policy}, 60.
**Hypothesis 2:** The lesser the institutional freedom and legitimating capacity of the governing party, the less autonomous and more porous is the decision-making process, the more the model approaches a pluralistic decision-making system. Decisions to allocate resources to international issues will be delayed, and subject to numerous bargains and negotiations. They will occur less frequently, and will have to balance the interests of various factions, even if the state possesses the resources to act. Internationalism as a risk-avoiding set of actions will take priority.

### 3.3 Why neoclassical realism?

The advantages of applying the FPA theory of neoclassical realism to the study of middle power foreign policies are manifold. To begin with, by giving a privileged position to the state, without excluding the determining role of system variables, neoclassical realism is useful for the study of young democracies in which the state still plays a dominant role as a site of competition for political power, influence and material rewards. This means that narrow interests face less opposition when presented as state interests, because of the lack of a tradition of participation and questioning of foreign policy choices.

A second advantage of using neoclassical realism for the analysis of foreign policymaking in intermediate states is its propensity to illuminate seemingly ‘irrational’ policy choices and outcomes, by bringing into focus the second-tier (Putnam’s two-level game)\(^{198}\) on which policymakers act. In new democracies, particularly under leftist regimes, there may be high expectations of accountability by governments, high-stakes for re-election, and close scrutiny of the economic repercussions of foreign policy decisions, for example, which all impact upon eventual foreign policy outcomes.

Third, new democracies or rising powers are equally cognisant of and sensitive to the perceptions of the ‘international community’, generally, though not exclusively comprised of advanced, industrialised democracies. As Gorjão has shown, the

---

nature of interim or transitional governments cannot explain their foreign policy decisions independently. Perceptions of the international community, especially related to the legitimacy of outgoing previous regimes, may provide incentives to incoming administrations for foreign policy change, for example.¹⁹⁹

A fourth advantage is the theory’s cognisance of the agency of individual leaders in the middle power activism of large developing countries. Unlike the middle power activism of the ‘traditional’ middle powers of the global North, which largely derived from state-society pressures on foreign policy,²⁰⁰ mediated though political parties and religious organisations, individual leaders, as seen in Chapter 2, have been prominent in forging internationalist foreign policies in the developing world. Yet, the neoclassical realist approach does not fall prey to the ‘charismatic leader’ approach to foreign policymaking in developing countries, criticised by Third World scholars for psychological reductionism, and bearing a disproportionate amount of the explanatory burden in older theories of FPA in the developing world.²⁰¹ In this way, too, middle powers are not submerged as they are by neorealism’s ‘great power’ bias. The additional variables of perception, and relative power highlight the potential significance, on any given international question, of even the smallest state.

It might be argued that there is some potential for tension in using a realist theory to account for ‘internationalist’ or liberal postures in international politics. In fact, there is none. The basis of such criticism would be that it would be highly unlikely for ideas to trump interests in determining courses of action in foreign policy. Thus, any ideas - or ideals - proffered as the basis for international action would merely be masking rational state behaviour typical of the realist paradigm. The reality is that international action based upon, or cloaked in the language of, ideals may be in a state’s best interests as it seeks to build diverse coalitions in international negotiations, and render its external environment more predictable. For example,

²⁰⁰ Notable leaders acted as guides for Northern internationalism, too. These include Lester Pearson of Canada and Olaf Palme of Sweden. Yet, domestic society in both Canada and Sweden was overwhelmingly in favour of the internationalist foreign policies promoted by these leaders. (See Black, 1992). This is the case to a far lesser extent in the global South, as will be shown in Chapters 5 and 6.
legalistic approaches to international conflicts, such as the use of the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism, and the obstruction of the expansion of the UNSC’s remit, may be the recourse of the weak, but they still constitute means of surviving the vicissitudes of the international system.

**Conclusion**

Ever since the rise to prominence of second-tier states in international multilateral negotiations in trade, the environment, nuclear weapons and regarding humanitarian intervention in the 1990s, observers have been interested by the interplay of power and principle in their stances. This dynamic has been affirmed by the allocation of greater levels of resources to international aid projects and multilateral peacekeeping initiatives. While emerging powers such as Brazil and South Africa have enjoyed growth in the last two decades, they have only marginally improved on poverty levels at home, and meeting a myriad of social and economic needs. Much of this tension has taken place under the rule of governments of the Left, whose priorities may have been expected to lie with domestic constituencies. Instead, many of these notions of justice, equality and poverty alleviation have been exported abroad in foreign policies that appear to expand the traditional ambit of developing states. Why has this been the case, and have ethics anything to do with Southern internationalism?

Born out of an enduring concern for the variation of states’ responses to similar international conditions, neoclassical realism provides an ideal theoretical perspective from which to approach the trajectories of emerging powers. Neoclassical realism as a theoretical approach to foreign policy analysis is solidifying its presence in the sub-field, but would benefit from being tested by application to second- and third-tier states. The three central contributions of neoclassical realism utilised in this thesis are: 1. The systemic dimension of foreign policymaking as a key factor; 2. The difference between national power resources and state power; and, 3. Unit-level intervening variables.
The neoclassical realist framework sets aside a place for the analysis of perception and the competition among ideas in the domestic politics of foreign policymaking. This renders the latter highly amenable to subjectivity and the agential power of individuals and groups, such as ruling parties, in the governing apparatus of a given state. In this way, the constraints and opportunities presented by the international system – the distribution of capabilities, the offense-defense balance, and the balance of regional and global power – are mediated by the nature of state-society relations domestically. This means that emerging powers’ capacity for emergence is mediated simultaneously by domestic imperatives and international considerations, and that their internationalism, or greater activism, paradoxically, should not be seen as an unequivocal indicator of state strength.

Ruling parties depend upon institutional freedom and legitimating power to give meaning and allocate resources to their interpretations of external threat, or shifts in the balance of power, globally or regionally. Their choices of pacific foreign policies may have as much to do with the constraints they face domestically, as with their own proclivities toward internationalism, and concerns with justice in foreign policy.

Thus, where ruling parties enjoy great degrees of institutional freedom and legitimating power, the state will approximate neoclassical realism’s unitary actor model, and decisions to engage in expansive foreign policy will be frequent. Levels of internationalism will be low. Conversely, where ruling parties enjoy lesser institutional freedom and face challenges in justifying their foreign policy goals, engagement on international issues will not be as frequent, nor as intense in terms of resource allocation. The latter scenario would prevail as governing parties seek to avert the costs of domestic opposition to a foreign policy decision or posture.

Neoclassical realism holds many advantages for a study of this nature, among them, elevating the state once more as the locus of foreign policy analysis, as opposed to the faceless forces of globalisation that gained currency in recent decades; bringing into focus the dual contexts in which statesmen act, along with the roles of perception and individual leadership, all of which are central to the foreign policy
conduct of intermediate states. In the following chapter how these variables interact in the two case study countries, South Africa and Brazil, is discussed.
Chapter 4: State Structure, Governing Parties and Foreign Policymaking for Emerging Powers: The cases of South Africa and Brazil

Introduction

By the middle of the last decade, governments of varying hue of leftist ideology were in charge of a growing collection of states worldwide. This trend was no more evident than in Latin America, where, by the time Fernando Lugo became president of Paraguay in August 2008, nearly every state on the continent was under Leftist leadership. The Cold War provided a framework in which the potential ascent to power of movements and political parties of the Left was constructed as a threat to the values of the free world, represented by the US and its allies. The threat was based on the assumption that governments of the Left were sponsored by the USSR, and subject to Communist infiltration. This threat was frequently met by intervention, and other attempts to undermine Leftist movements and governments. For other states not as firmly ensconced in the North Atlantic alliance, however, government of the Left represented progressivism, international solidarity, and the prospect of state-supported development. Quite apart from the Cold War connotations of Leftist government, ideologically leftist administrations in the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada and even the United States, have created scholarly and popular expectations of foreign policy guided by ‘progressivism’ and internationalism. These expectations are based on assumptions that Leftist governing parties can automatically translate their progressivism into a ‘force for good’ internationally, and that conservative governments are more subject to the dictates of Realpolitik than doctrine, but these assumptions are open to question.

The key contribution of the neoclassical realist approach to foreign policy, as illustrated in Chapter 3, is that it accepts the causal primacy of systemic factors in affecting foreign policy, while making conceptual room for the influence of domestic dynamics, such as state-society relations, perceptions, ideas and personality, on the capacity of states to respond to challenges and opportunities stemming from their external environment. How can this assertion be made more

practicable and analytically relevant for the foreign policy analysis of large developing countries?

Governing parties are pivotal actors in determining policies that state officials will implement for the duration of the former’s tenure in government. However, foreign policy appears to be an area of still marginal significance to the electoral fortunes of political parties in developing countries. This may mean that stances on international issues are comparatively under-developed in party manifestoes, and that they generally feature low on the priority lists of political parties contending for power. Or it could indicate that state bureaucracies, such as External Affairs ministries, have a high degree of autonomy in deciding the broad contours of foreign policy, and that continuity would prevail over radical change. It could point to newer democracies allowing greater freedom for governing parties to define threats and mobilise national resources to avoid them or challenge them.

The extent to which governing parties, progressive or otherwise, are able to influence foreign policy perceptions and outcomes depends to a considerable extent on the pre-existing institutional make-up they encounter upon entering power, and how they are able to manipulate these institutional structures to their own ends. Governing parties are, of course, not monolithic. They are, as with any other collectivity of human beings, populated by a variety of interests, norms, values and responsibilities. Nonetheless, they enter government on a series of platforms, elaborated during elections, sometimes explicitly related to foreign policy. The extent to which these are implemented, or to which they change existing policy, is an important measure of their influence on foreign policy outcomes. Intra-party dynamics, such as the extent of democracy within the party, and the role of political leadership, are also central to the eventual influence of political parties on foreign policy formulation. Part II (Chapters 4, 5 and 6) will analyse the extent to which ruling party preferences (conceptualised as ‘internationalist’ postures) in South Africa under Mbeki and in Brazil under Lula, have been translated into national foreign policy goals and outcomes.

The aim of this chapter is to elucidate the means whereby the two governing parties ruling the countries under examination in this thesis, the ANC of South Africa, and
PT of Brazil, respectively, exert influence on foreign policy. Neoclassical realism highlights the role of unit-level factors, including state structure, which is here translated into the relationship between governing parties, the legislature and the executive in the formulation of foreign policy. In keeping with the path highlighted by the previous chapter, this chapter seeks to provide some empirical weight to neoclassical realism's focus on the state structure as a variable between systemic processes and foreign policy outcomes.

Governing parties form a link between the executive and its foreign policymaking duties on one hand, and domestic constituencies on the other. Domestically, Leftist parties undergoing structural change often involving shifts to the right on economic questions, along with increasing marginalisation of ‘radical’ voices during political horse-trading, require the means to placate their populist and progressive constituencies. These means include material and ideational resources. Material resources are supplied by the cultivation of followership in potential economic markets with new trading partners; while ideational resources are supplied by the cultivation of solidarity with the former ‘Third World’, and activism on specific issues currently framed in a ‘North-South’ language, such as the Palestine question, and international trade negotiations. This claim supposes that governing political parties alone are responsible for foreign policymaking. The reality, as will be made clear in the sections to follow, is that governing parties make foreign policy decisions that must be implemented by foreign policy bureaucracies often of long standing and substantial traditional autonomy, though this may vary from case to case. The bargains entered into have important implications for foreign policy and the relationship between the governing party and its constituents.

By all accounts, similar sentiments of triumph greeted the impending accession of ANC and PT to political power in South Africa and Brazil, respectively. Both are parties historically identified with the struggle for democracy in their respective polities. And both parties have been closely associated with workers’ movements: the ANC with the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), with which it is currently in a governing alliance; and PT with the Central Única dos Trabalhadores.

More detailed accounts of each case will be provided in Chapters 5 and 6, respectively.
(CUT), the main trade union confederation of Brazil. Foreign policy has presented something of a dilemma for each party, as their legacy of struggle has incurred debts in inconvenient places. At the same time, their professed commitments to social and political rights domestically have generated high expectations about their conduct in international affairs. Each party has sought to meet this challenge by proclaiming foreign policies based on the internationalist principles of solidarity with the developing world; the peaceful resolution of conflicts; the primacy of multilateralism; and, the promotion of democracy and human rights.

This chapter is divided into two main sections, dealing with South Africa and Brazil, respectively. Each section details the institutional arrangements for foreign policymaking and the constitutional and intra-party dynamics affecting foreign policymaking, before discussing the general historical international outlook of each state. The central aim of this chapter is to highlight the institutional framework within which each governing party operates regarding foreign policymaking. The question of the evolution of each individual party’s foreign policy positions will be addressed in the case study chapters.

4.1. South Africa: Internationalism, all the ANC’s way?

Foreign policy has famously been a non-issue in the electoral politics of South Africa. Analysts noted how even the government’s policies on Zimbabwe and HIV/AIDS – which saw it fall foul of its allies in COSATU and the South African Communist Party (SACP) – failed to put a dent in its showing in the 2004 general election, which it won by a margin of 69.68 percent. By the same token, the persistence of the ‘quiet diplomacy’ policy in the face of opposition from the ANC’s alliance partners in an election year gave a fair indication of the locus of foreign policymaking, and how much would be yielded by state president Thabo Mbeki.
Indeed, on the subject of Zimbabwe, the positions of the ANC and COSATU were especially polarised, with the union movement taking strong stances on Zimbabwe’s crisis, while the South African government preferred more muted options.

Contrary to what may have been expected, the foreign policy of the new South Africa, as crafted by the African National Congress in cooperation with the apartheid-era Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), did not depart in substance too far from the geopolitical thrust of the outgoing National Party (NP). As noted by Evans, “In a series of policy documents and statements during 1992-3, the leaders of the organisation ditched their long-standing commitment to ‘liberation politics’ and began the process of policy convergence with the New Diplomacy [of the outgoing NP]”.207 This was facilitated by intensive international involvement in South Africa’s policymaking processes, and the Party’s concern not to lose foreign commitment to its reconstruction plans. The ANC was also hamstrung by the transitional arrangements it inherited. These included the Government of National Unity (GNU), which was in place from the first democratic election in 1994, until the close of the first Parliament in 1999.208

Nonetheless, the complexities of regional politics aside, the ANC stated at its National Conference in 1992, that “The foreign policy of a democratic South Africa will be primarily shaped by the nature of its domestic policies and objectives directed at serving the needs and interests of our people”.209 It was re-iterated by the Deputy-Director General of DFA in 2004, that South Africa’s international involvements in continental peacemaking initiatives, for example, were “an extension of South Africa’s domestic policy”, and aimed in the long-run “at promoting the creation of wealth and peace and security in South Africa”.210

207 Graham Evans, “South Africa in Remission: the Foreign Policy of an Altered State”, The Journal of Modern African Studies, 34 (1996): 258. The New Diplomacy, crafted by the then-Director General of DFA, Neil van Heerden, was a means for the National Party to ‘lock-in’ South Africa’s commitment and hegemony in Southern Africa, by committing the state to greater economic involvement, regardless, it was reckoned, of its political leadership.


210 Parliamentary Monitoring Group, 1999. “Minutes of meeting: Economic Affairs Select Committee: Briefing by the Department of Minerals and Energy and the Department of
These incipient foreign policy principles were born of uncertainty. One aspect of this uncertainty in the closing stages of the apartheid era derived from the party level. Evans interprets the ANC’s failure to come to terms with balancing its loyalties to the anti-colonial struggle and choosing its own economic path on one hand, and to advancing development domestically, along widely accepted standards (global capitalism) internationally, to the failure of the organisation to re-calibrate its loyalties and theoretical bearings after the fall of Communism in 1989.211 (This will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5).

The policymaking process since the end of Apartheid may usefully be divided into two distinct phases: a phase of transition and a phase of consolidation.212 During the transition, which lasted roughly from the end of the 1980s with the first overtures by South African government intelligence personnel to the ANC in exile, neither side could claim an outright victory. The consequent political settlement, referred to variously by analysts as a ‘pacted transition’213 and an ‘elite transition’214, entailed a number of far-reaching compromises by the African National Congress, most notably, and crucially, in the economic sphere. Nonetheless, transformation – of policymaking instruments and outcomes – was a priority for the incoming Government of National Unity, of which the ANC was a majority member. According to van Nieuwkerk, a number of immediate policy changes were introduced. Importantly, the focus of government policy across all sectors became, at least in theory, the needs of the black majority.215 Consolidation, meanwhile,

---

211 Evans, “South Africa in Remission”, 255.
entailed the restructuring of certain government processes, in a process called ‘integrated governance’, and in foreign policy, the development of a more visionary and settled international outlook.

Yet there is a persistent sense, in numerous analyses of South African foreign policy, that an expansive, activist foreign policy was expected of South Africa. In spite of its state of internal fluidity and transformation, South Africa’s overwhelming dominance of Southern Africa – the cessation of military campaigns notwithstanding – created expectations of its responsibilities in the region and beyond.216 But why did the state opt instead for a middle-range foreign policy, heightening its diplomatic presence, but remaining muted in its projection of material power?

4.1.1 Institutional Arrangements for Foreign Policymaking: Consolidation under Mbeki

The role of the Legislature

In South Africa, legislative power is held by a parliament composed of two chambers, the National Assembly and the National Council of Provinces (NCOP). The National Assembly represents the people, while the NCOP represents the provinces in a decentralised (yet unitary) system of government.217 The National Assembly can pass legislation on any matter. Such legislation must then be ratified by the upper house. According to the Constitution, when exercising its legislative authority, Parliament “is bound only by the Constitution, and must act in accordance with, and within the limits of, the Constitution”.218 The National Assembly is comprised of 350-400 members who serve for 5-year terms, on the basis of proportional representation. It maintains the power to consider, pass, amend or reject legislation, as well as the duty to retain oversight of the executive, and any other organ of state.219 The NCOP is comprised of a single delegation from

---

218 Ibid., Section 44(4).
219 Ibid., Section 55.
each province, consisting of 10 delegates. Proportional representation ensures that a number of parties may compete for seats in the legislature, and results in a fractured and populous party-system, in contrast to first-past-the-post electoral systems. In South Africa, this situation is over-compensated for by the dominance of the ruling African National Congress, which, by virtue of its overwhelming election victories and the weakness of the opposition, dominates Parliament.\textsuperscript{220}

The nature of South Africa’s multiparty transition from apartheid rule meant that a multiplicity of voices, especially those of the ANC and its alliance partners, weighed in on the initial foreign policy-making process. After 1994, the Government of National Unity went as far as initiating a consultation process engaging civil society “through a series of public meetings and the circulation of a discussion document”.\textsuperscript{221} These inputs did not contribute to the publication of a White Paper on Foreign Policy as expected, but they helped to highlight new potential foreign policy directions (e.g. the human security paradigm), and also to legitimise the new foreign policymaking institutions.\textsuperscript{222}

In practice, parliament retains a largely reactive role in foreign policy, although the extent to which this is true depends on the issue.\textsuperscript{223} Parliament’s role was amplified somewhat in the past by the oversight function of the Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs. As widely noted, for a brief period in the immediate aftermath of the first all-race elections, this committee under chair and ANC member Raymond Suttner was active in questioning the premises of South African foreign policy, as well as the pace of transformation of the Department of Foreign Affairs. For one thing, the Committee took a dim view of the small budget set aside for the

\textsuperscript{220} There is some controversy over the ascription of the label ‘dominant party’ to the ANC. Those in favour express misgivings over levels of internal democracy within the ANC, the appointment of party members to key state positions and its broader moves to stifle debate in society and the media. Those against the label, meanwhile, consider it hostile and racist, asserting the ANC’s popularity as the reason for its overwhelming victories in elections. See Roger Southall, “The ’Dominant Party Debate’ in South Africa”, \textit{afrika spectrum}, 40, No.1 (2005).
\textsuperscript{221} Alden and le Pere, “South Africa’s Post-Apartheid Foreign Policy”, 13.\textsuperscript{222} Ibid., 13.
\textsuperscript{223} A distinction should be drawn at this point between parliament’s role in foreign policy making, and its own international activities. Examples of the latter include discussions with regional and international counterparts. These relations and activities are beyond the scope of this thesis, and will therefore not be covered.
establishment of diplomatic missions in Africa early on. The predominant pattern since then, however, has been one of limited engagement. One parliamentarian has attributed this to “parliament’s uncertainty about its role in the foreign policy process”; and, also to executive domination of foreign policy. Another possible reason is the under-resourcing of parliamentarians’ capacity to develop the necessary expertise to play a more active role in foreign policy initiation. The proportional representation electoral system is another important political limitation on parliamentarians’ involvement on foreign policy issues. Because ANC MPs (who are in the majority and hence could prove most effective) are elected on a party list, they have little incentive to challenge government positions, or to champion specific issues, and so exhibit greater loyalty to the Party leadership.

A further crucial dimension of Parliament’s activity (or more aptly, inactivity) on foreign policy is its inability to introduce money bills. This right is reserved for the executive, in the person of the Minister of Finance. Therefore, any foreign policy initiatives requiring large disbursements of funds, including those not related to any international crisis, may – if not introduced by the Department of Foreign Affairs - only be introduced by the Finance Minister, who is already a privileged associate of the President by virtue of his presidential appointment, further entrenching executive control of foreign policy. Parliament’s primary point of influence of foreign policy budgetary questions is the Department of Foreign Affairs Budget Vote, during which allocations of funds for the conduct of foreign relations are made. In accordance with South Africa’s growing continental and international responsibilities from 2001 onward, this amount grew incrementally each year, by an unusual 27% in 2001/2, 13,32% in 2002/3, and a sizable 35% to reach R5,6 billion (US$716m at 2011 rates) in Mbeki’s last year as president, 2008.

---

226 Ibid., 303.
227 Ibid., 296.
While this figure is small in global terms, and in comparison to other state expenditure, it experienced rapid growth during Mbeki’s tenure.

*The role of the Executive: The Presidency*

As noted by a proximate observer, “…in the case of South Africa, it is not so much the executive branch overall that dominates foreign policy as the presidency”. The Mbeki period was a period of centralisation and consolidation of foreign policymaking. This accompanied a sharpening of South Africa’s foreign policy goals and vision, along with institutional streamlining that centralised the policymaking power of the Presidency. Paradoxically, while this state of affairs had the potential to give the ANC a prime position in the formulation of foreign policy, it accompanied a process of distancing between Mbeki and the party’s rank and file, ultimately with disastrous results for his presidency.

Mbeki presided over a restructuring of the Office of the President upon his election in June 1999. This process formed part of a broader move toward ‘integrated governance’, that brought the private offices of the President and Vice-President, the Cabinet Office and the Policy Coordination and Advisory Services Unit under the tutelage of a single Director-General (Chief Administrator) in the Presidency, the Mbeki-acyolyte, Rev. Frank Chikane.230

Key individuals involved in policymaking under Mbeki included: his Foreign Minister, Dr Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma, who served throughout his two terms of office; Director-General of the Department of Foreign Affairs, Dr Ayanda Ntsaluba (2003 – 2011); Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Aziz Pahad; and, Advocate Mojanku Gumbi, legal adviser to the president. At least two of these individuals, Zuma and Pahad, held high office in the ANC (as members of the National Executive Committee, or NEC). More than this, they emanated from ‘the same ANC political school’ as Mbeki, forging a strong strategic link.231 This ‘school’ comprises ANC cadres who spent a significant period of time living in exile during apartheid, and may be argued to have held more outward-looking (or, somewhat

229 Ibid., p297.
Western-oriented) views of international affairs. Hence, Mbeki had managed, both politically and institutionally, to streamline the making of foreign policy virtually in his own image. As noted by van Nieuwkerk in 2006, “The Presidency as the primary locus of policy now sets goals and is the architect of an overarching vision and foreign policy philosophy”.

The role of the Executive: The Department of Foreign Affairs

According to the Constitution, the national executive is responsible for the negotiating and signing of all international treaties. However, these agreements are only binding upon ratification by both houses of Parliament. The Department of Foreign Affairs is further tasked with the following key mandate: “To formulate, coordinate, implement and manage South Africa’s foreign policy.”

In the years after 1994, not only was the transformation of government policy a requirement, but the very instruments of policymaking and implementation required substantial modification in order to carry out the new mandate of a democratically elected majority government. The DFA was a key instrument in reforming foreign policy. Transformation of this institution faced challenges on ideological and institutional fronts. This posed a particular problem given that the nature of the broader political transition had secured the jobs of apartheid-era civil servants for at least five years after the first democratic elections. This meant that “public policymaking had to involve new civil servants working next to apartheid-era functionaries”.

Not only did this combine differing levels of experience and expertise, it also forced the co-existence of divergent worldviews. The differences between them have frequently been described as ‘internationalist’ vs. ‘neo-...

---


233 Ibid., 116.

234 Ibid., 292.


236 These provisions formed part of the so-called ‘sunset clauses’ appended to the interim constitution of South Africa to give assurances to the white population, lapsing after a period of time. Examples included entrenched seats in a new Government of National Unity (GNU) and stipulations protecting jobs held by whites in the civil service. SA History Online, accessed online at http://www.sahistory.org.za/pages/library-resources/online%20books/soul-of-nation-constitution/chapter7.htm on 9 April, 2010.

mercantilist’,

238 or ‘revolutionary’ vs. ‘pragmatic’, with officials representing the apartheid state symbolised by the latter labels, and those who had participated in the liberation struggle represented by the former.

The DFA as an institution was furthermore burdened with tensions surrounding the attainment of racial and gender equity. According to Alden and le Pere, “By 2000 while most of South Africa’s career diplomats were black the total (non-politically appointed) staff complement of missions abroad remained skewed: 40% were black and 60% white”.239 With the appointment of ANC stalwart Alfred Nzo as the first post-apartheid foreign minister, the department was further perceived to be lacking in dynamic and assertive leadership. The institution, from a broader government point of view, had been weak and un-influential historically. This was especially the case since the early 1980s when PW Botha’s State Security Council became the locus of much of South Africa’s foreign policy decision-making in its campaign of military coercion across its borders. In addition, already evident in the last decade of apartheid “[p]arliament played no role in foreign policy and the role of Cabinet tended to be limited to acquiescence or approval”.240

During the transition, “[the Ministry’s] internal divisions and inertia, together with competition from other actors, conspired…to make it peripheral to the shaping and influencing of policy during the Mandela years”.241 Alden and le Pere characterise the multiplicity of actors attempting to shape, determine and implement policy as the main problem afflicting South Africa’s foreign policymaking in the immediate aftermath of apartheid. Nathan adds that some of these actors, particularly the apartheid-era officials “repudiated the need for a comprehensive and systematic foreign policy”.242 This resulted in a foreign policy that was frequently characterised as being ‘ad hoc’, ‘haphazard’, ‘inconsistent’, ‘ambiguous’, and lacking in

---

238 Alden and le Pere, 2003: 14.
239 Ibid., 14.
241 Alden and le Pere, “South Africa’s Post-Apartheid Foreign Policy”, 15.
‘coherence’.\textsuperscript{243} DFA’s institutional weaknesses co-existed with its intensifying competition with sister-bureaucracies, the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI)\textsuperscript{244} and the Department of Defense (DoD).

### 4.1.2. ANC and foreign policymaking: Contradictory trends in a changing party

A curious phenomenon that became increasingly apparent during the Mbeki presidency was that in spite of foreign policy decision-making and its broader formulation being centralised in the office of the State President (who was also the party president), the period also witnessed the gradual isolation of the African National Congress from the policymaking process. This is attributed by scholars to two parallel processes taking place within the organisation since at least 1997, the year Thabo Mbeki became ANC president, and two years before he became State President. They are: the modernisation of the party, and the growing distance between the party leadership and the rank-and-file,\textsuperscript{245} resulting in detrimental effects for accountability and internal democracy.

In its seminal post-Apartheid document, ‘Ready to Govern’, published in 1992, the ANC announced that under its leadership, in the area of foreign policy, “(a) democratic South Africa will actively promote the objectives of democracy, peace, stability, development, and mutually-beneficial relations among the people of Africa as a whole, as well as a Pan African solidarity”.\textsuperscript{246} It also stated that “ANC policy will contribute to the democratisation of international political and economic relations, and so help secure a global context within which a democratic South Africa will be able to coexist peacefully and to cooperate on a democratic basis with its neighbours in the region and further afield”.\textsuperscript{247}

\textsuperscript{243} Some accounts include: Nathan, “Consistency and inconsistencies”; Black and Wilson, “Rights, region and identity”.\textsuperscript{244} See Marie Muller, “Some observations on South Africa’s economic diplomacy and the role of the Department of Foreign Affairs”, Institute for Global Dialogue, Occasional Paper No.27, (October 2000).\textsuperscript{245} Richard Calland, \textit{Anatomy of South Africa: Who holds the power?} (Cape Town: Zebra Press, 2006), especially Chapter 5; and William Gumede, “Chapter 2: Modernising the African National Congress: The legacy of President Thabo Mbeki”, \textit{State of the Nation 2008}, (Durban: HSRC Press, 2008).\textsuperscript{246} African National Congress, 1992.\textsuperscript{247} Ib\textsuperscript{id}. 117
The party’s commitment to the promotion of human rights in particular, as set out in Nelson Mandela’s article in *Foreign Affairs* in 1993, set it on a potential collision course with its African neighbours and other long-term supporters of the liberation struggle, such as Cuba and Libya. Following the public relations and foreign policy disasters over the Nigerian affair in 1995, the South African government, sought to modify its principled stances on certain international issues by funnelling its responses through multilateral institutions. One observer went as far as to sketch the new-found emphasis on multilateralism close to the end of Mandela’s tenure as a ‘cover’ for the country’s retreat from its strong human rights position. Nonetheless, the end of Mandela’s presidency saw South Africa’s status substantially elevated as a peace-broker, mediator and examplar of negotiated settlements, in the international community.

Yet, a palpable tension remained between realism and idealism, between the country’s perceived commercial, trade and political interests and its aspirational role as a moral crusader for human rights and democracy. The institutions of foreign policymaking were seen by many in the ANC to be unresponsive to the concerns of the majority of South Africans, and dominated in the middle ranks by old-regime officials. Reconciling these differing foreign-policy priorities and institutional tensions became an overriding objective of the incoming government in 1999.

With the consolidation of public policymaking after the ANC’s resounding victory in the 1999 general election, South Africa’s foreign affairs vision became the function of the insights and worldviews of a small number of individuals, most if not all of them, high-ranking members of the ANC. This exclusivity was underscored by the departure of the National Party, the former governing party, from the GNU in 1996, and by the expiration of this transitional condition in 1999. The new institutional makeup, termed ‘integrated governance’ (see p114 of

---


251 The Government of National Unity (GNU) was a temporary arrangement in terms of South Africa’s interim constitution of 1993-1996, whereby any political party claiming at least 20 seats in the National Assembly could send a member to Cabinet and participate
this chapter) sought to streamline policymaking processes across all sectors, with the effect of centralising decision-making within an expanding Presidency. This was in sharp contrast to the multiplicity of voices mentioned earlier as having played a key role in the immediate aftermath of apartheid.

All the while, the Party was growing gradually distant from the consolidated centre of power in the Union Buildings, the site of the Presidency. One of the main institutional links between the African National Congress and the foreign policymaking process remained the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on foreign affairs, as well as those committees that deal with cognate issues, such as trade and defense. Owing to the ANC’s sizeable parliamentary majority, however, along with strict party discipline and a lack of resources, the level of oversight provided by these committees is negligible. Even ANC MPs have lamented the limited extent to which they have influence over the foreign policy process.\(^{252}\) Indeed, the ANC’s head of International Relations for the period under consideration, Ms. Mavivi Myakayaka-Manzini, appeared to have very little to do with the intricate and centralised policymaking machinery during a July 2007 interview.\(^{253}\) Under Mbeki, there appeared also to be a fine dividing line between the ANC Executive (or NEC and National Working Committee members, to be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5), and the rank and file of the ANC parliamentary caucus. Calland notes that “(t)here are…serious limitations on the power of the caucus, many of which reflect the same political constraints [as experienced by MPs more generally]”\(^{254}\)

The following overarching substantive priorities were confirmed by Cabinet, and again in the President’s 2007 State of the Nation address, as guidelines for South Africa’s foreign policy:\(^{255}\)

1. Consolidation of the African Agenda


\(^{253}\) Interview with Mavivi Myakayaka-Manzini, July 2007.

\(^{254}\) Calland, Anatomy of South Africa, 117.

2. Strengthening of South-South Co-operation
3. Strengthening of North-South Co-operation
4. Participation in the Global System of Governance
5. Strengthening of Political and Economic Relations

South Africa’s gradual distancing from the explicit commitment to human rights in its foreign policy, and the strengthened commitment to more procedural features of internationalism can thus be read through the domestic process of change, which the ANC has undergone, along with the centralisation of political power in the office of the President. Foreign policy has not been immune to these tendencies. To minimise political risks stemming from reckless international action – such as actions that alienated South Africa’s neighbours – the ANC leadership looked to more muted action, such as a new focus on multilateralism, to project its foreign policy interests. As has been illustrated in the preceding chapter, however, internationalism does not obviate the interests of the state. It is possible both to be a ‘force for good’ in international politics, while pursuing state interests. However, the extent to which state interests and not party interests were being pursued is a question on which little light has been shed. Internationalism has been a response both to ideological components within the ruling party’s make-up, and to limitations imposed by the institutions of state. Hence, the party did not have its own way on foreign policy, but this did not imply the strength of the legislature or executive, broadly speaking. The Presidency, and especially the state president, came to play pivotal roles in foreign policy formulation.

4.1.3. International Outlook

The new South Africa was born in a specific international setting. The debates that had proceeded within the ANC were silenced – momentarily – by its unbanning, and the need to make rapid decisions about policy as the government of a new South Africa. The ANC had benefited from all of the liberal tendencies in a world that was rapidly becoming unrecognisable to the realist approach to international affairs. The beneficiary of the pressure exerted by a global human rights lobby that stretched from Lagos to London, and from New York to New Zealand; and of the
institutional power of ‘the darker nations’\textsuperscript{256} in the United Nations General Assembly; the ANC came to appreciate and value these components of the international system: the global human rights discourse, international civil society, and multilateral forums. Yet, the demands of national development, and its own electoral machine, placed new challenges in its way. While accepting funding from various quarters, and still under a self-imposed burden of obligation to its erstwhile supporters in Libya, Cuba and Indonesia, the ANC was forced to dilute some of its early commitments to human rights in its foreign policy. It also accepted, both domestically and internationally, the prevalence of the market economy, and globalisation, as the dominant factors in national development.

The primary threat to South Africa, according to the Department of Foreign Affairs,\textsuperscript{257} was any threat posed to the newly-won democracy. The Department of Defence underscored this by noting in its 1998 Defence Review that for South Africa there is an “absence of a foreseeable conventional military threat”.\textsuperscript{258} For this reason, the ANC sought to make economics the focus of its relations with its neighbours, and also to ‘lock-in’ the support of neighbouring countries for democracy – and particularly the African National Congress as the government of South Africa. Democracy could only prosper, and not be overturned,\textsuperscript{259} by securing the acquiescence of neighbouring states. This is perhaps one major reason why South Africa has resisted antagonising Robert Mugabe. In fact, the South African government feared major security disturbances emanating from Zimbabwe during the height of state-society tensions in that country in 2008.\textsuperscript{260} Hence, the rationality that is frequently viewed as implicit to Realism, has not been far from South Africa’s calculations about its foreign policy. What has appeared to belong to the domain of ideology, the notions of ‘African solidarity’ and ‘liberation credentials’, disguise clear-headed calculations about South Africa’s security interests. Threat perception is therefore a function of both material and ideational factors of national security.

\textsuperscript{256} This term is Vijay Prashad’s. See Vijay Prashad, \textit{The Darker Nations: A People’s History of the Third World.} (New York: The New Press, 2007).
\textsuperscript{257} Ambassador N. Genge, Chief Director: Policy, Research and Analysis, Department of Foreign Affairs, interview, July 2007.
\textsuperscript{258} Department of Defence. 1998. South African Defence Review, Chapter 1, 7.8.
\textsuperscript{259} Remarkably this fear was still harboured in July 2007.
\textsuperscript{260} Unnamed government source, July 2008.
Some of South Africa’s accomplishments in the international arena under the Mbeki administration included the formalisation of a continental agenda resulting in the launch of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and the creation of the African Union (AU) to replace the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). Alas, the potential contradictions inherent in the principles underlying these projects appear not to have been examined closely by the engineers of the projects. Numerous commentators have described the ‘ambiguity’,\(^\text{261}\) ‘inconsistency’,\(^\text{262}\) and paradoxical nature\(^\text{263}\) of South Africa’s foreign policy. Foreign policy appeared to favour a number of different and often conflicting trajectories. Human rights and democracy promotion competed with African solidarity; and a tacit – though at times open - acceptance of globalisation was at times supplanted by virulent anti-globalisation rhetoric. A few analysts sought to view these contradictions through the prism of competitive domestic politics, while others preferred to examine these tensions more broadly in terms of the long-overlooked facet of identity.\(^\text{264}\) A closer look at institutional dynamics brings a sense of constraint to the expectations created by South Africa’s expansive foreign policy pronouncements. With limited resources, contradictory political cultures and identities, and competing – and in the case of DFA, marginalised - bureaucratic agencies, South Africa’s haphazard internationalism since the end of apartheid becomes more intelligible.

### 4.2. Brazil: The concession of foreign policymaking to Partido dos Trabalhadores?

In Brazil, the election of Luiz Inácio Lula Da Silva, leader of the Workers’ Party, in October 2002, upon his fourth attempt, signalled “paradigmatic change in the social, economic and political spheres” of Brazil.\(^\text{265}\) The popular euphoria that greeted this event – especially that of PT observers on the Left – buoyed far-

---

\(^{261}\) Black and Wilson, “Rights, region and identity”.

\(^{262}\) Nathan, “Consistency and inconsistencies”.


\(^{264}\) Black and Wilson, “Rights, region and identity”.

reaching expectations of what PT was to achieve upon finally reaching the Palácio do Planalto, the seat of government in Brasília. One of Lula’s first tasks was to reassure the markets, which had expected the worst from the election of the former union leader. For a number of reasons, however, in spite of winning the election by the largest margin ever in Brazilian history, and securing the votes of some 52 million voters, Lula and the PT were not autonomous in determining the outlines of Brazil’s foreign policy.

As noted by Hurrell,

“For many on the left (especially in Europe), for many inside Brazil, and for many in the developing world, the assertive foreign policy of the government of President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (Lula) is seen as a progressive force in global affairs”.266

This distinctive assertiveness, compared to the preceding twenty or so years of foreign policy practice, has been attributed to a variety of factors. These include: Brazil’s search for recognition, its rapid levels of economic growth after a decade of stagnation in the 1980s, and in some cases, the influence of the governing party, PT, and the personal diplomacy of President Lula da Silva.267

Typifying most accounts of Brazil’s international relations is a description of its search for international recognition, and to be accorded its ‘rightful place’ in international society. This is a goal that is seated at the centre of the psyche of the Brazilian nation, derived from the country’s auspicious beginnings as the seat of the Portuguese Empire in Latin America during the Napoleonic conquest of Europe in the first decades of the nineteenth century. As proclaimed by the famed abolitionist, Joaquim Nabuco, at the end of that century, “Brazil does not want to be a nation morally isolated, a leper, expelled from the world community. The esteem and respect of foreign nations are as valuable to us as they are to other people”.268

This sentiment is common to a time when Brazil’s elite commenced its preoccupation with the country’s image in the world. The cultivation of this image also happened to be a strong argument against the maintenance of the slave trade and

---

267 Lilian Duarte, interview, March 2010.
slavery. Even Brazil’s participation in the two World Wars was coloured by the hope of increasing its international status through a valuable contribution to the Allied war efforts. So much so, that on the occasion of each War’s ending, Brazil’s leadership was deeply convinced of the country’s entitlement to permanent recognition of its status in the post-war institutions, the League of Nations, and the United Nations Organisation, respectively. The goal of recognition has continued to be a driver of Brazilian diplomacy, since the institutionalisation of the diplomatic service by the Baron de Rio Branco at the end of the nineteenth century, and throughout the independent republic’s history, to the present day. However, as noted by Celso Lafer, Foreign Minister under President Fernando Henrique Cardoso, for Brazil this was not an expansionist nationalism. For Rio Branco, Brazil’s primary goal was the reduction of power disparities that rendered Brazil vulnerable. These disparities were not to be conquered externally, through expansion, but internally, through development.

For this reason, Brazil’s search for international recognition has seldom been conducted with force, and has instead relied on a legalistic tradition of diplomacy and multilateralism. As noted by Lima and Hirst, “Brazil’s desire to influence international rules and regimes and to be considered a major player has been understood principally in terms of its soft power: it has consistently eschewed the development of hard power, and especially of military power”. The Brazilian elite’s concern with the country’s international image is even credited with the eventual return to democracy after two decades of military rule, from 1964 to 1985: “The elite was highly aware of their country’s image abroad, just as they had been since the nineteenth century. As a group, they identified strongly with the North Atlantic democracies”.

So how, then, has a rapidly growing Brazilian state resisted the temptation to exert its power in a militaristic and confrontational manner on the international scene, choosing instead the path of multilateral institutions, international law, peaceful

---

270 Lafer, A identidade, 84.
272 Skidmore, Brazil, 185.
resolution of disputes, and solidarity with the developing world? Does the search for recognition capture this unexpected outcome accurately, or are there additional factors to consider? Before analysing the factors, it is necessary to examine the foreign policymaking machinery in Brazil during the period covered by this thesis, the first and second Presidential terms of Lula da Silva.

In the first instance, as previously noted, despite winning the Presidency by a landslide margin, Lula’s party did not succeed in winning a majority in Congress. This meant that alliances had to be sought with a multitude of other parties in order for measures to be passed. Presidential powers were also curtailed by new legislation that sought to limit the President’s capacity to issue decrees, along with his influence over the Central Bank. These external limits, and discordant tendencies within the party itself, placed constraints on the extent to which a united PT could implement its vision for Brazilian politics, both domestic and international. By the time it won its first Presidential election, the Party had evolved considerably from its beginnings as a catchall socialist workers’ movement. In fact, by this time its foreign policy prescriptions did not deviate far from those traditionally emphasised in Brazilian diplomacy. These included national independence; sovereignty; non-interference in the internal affairs of other states; and, equality with other states. The substance of PT’s imprint on foreign policy has been characterised as more evident in the area of rhetoric and the practices of the party leadership, than in any major changes in the grand lines of foreign policy. Yet, the ‘minor’ flourishes associated with PT’s influence have had a major impact on how Brazil is viewed internationally, and in the means it has chosen to project itself abroad. The significance of these ‘minor’ flourishes has been amplified by Brazil’s regional and contemporary global context. PT’s scepticism of the US-initiated Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA, or ALCA in Spanish and Portuguese), and its proximity to Hugo Chavez and Evo Morales assumed greater importance in a South America


275 Ibid., 88.

276 To be discussed in detail in Chapter 5.
that was seen to be experiencing a ‘Pink Revolution’ led by leaders of the political left, potentially threatening to US interests.

4.2.1. Institutional Arrangements for Foreign Policymaking: Party above Policy?

The role of the Legislature

In Brazil, legislative power is exercised by the National Congress. The Congress is a two-house Chamber, comprised of a Chamber of Deputies and the Federal Senate. Members of the Chamber of Deputies are directly elected and serve for 4-year terms, while those of the Senate, also directly elected, serve for 8 years. Decisions of each house are by majority vote. Legislative power over the foreign policy process in Brazil tends to be more reactive than continuous. The legislature only possesses the competence to “decide conclusively on international treaties, agreements or international acts which result in changes or commitments that go against the national property”;\(^\text{277}\) and to “authorise the President of the Republic to declare war, to make peace and to permit foreign forces to pass through the national territory…”.\(^\text{278}\) Within the legislative branch of government, there are standing committees for foreign affairs in both the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies. The treaty approval prerogative of the Senate was expanded by the 1988 Constitution. All international financial agreements, such as those with the IMF and foreign banks, must be approved by the upper house, whereas prior to the 1988 Constitution, approval by the executive was exclusively required. Therefore, Lula entered the Palacio do Planalto with fewer executive powers over foreign policy than his immediate predecessor, Cardoso, and the Presidents of the military regimes, but this did not necessarily hamper his grasp on foreign policy formulation.

According to the Brazilian Constitution of 1988, Brazil’s international relations are to be governed by the following principles:

- National independence


\(^{278}\) Ibid., Article 49.2.
• Prevalence of human rights
• Self-determination of peoples
• Non-intervention
• Equality among states
• Defense of the peace
• Peaceful settlement of conflicts
• Repudiation of terrorism and racism
• Cooperation among peoples for the progress of mankind
• Granting of political asylum.  

The 1988 Constitution is notable, furthermore, for in addition to having formalised democracy, it actually reflected the influence of conservative elements in Brazilian society – those who desired no, or only gradual change from military rule - for example by entrenching numerous military prerogatives that had the effect of freezing civil-military relations in democratic Brazil. This founding feature of modern democracy in Brazil should not be underestimated in calculations about foreign policy formulation in the democratic administrations since 1985.

The role of the Executive: The Presidency
As stated in the 1988 Constitution, the responsibility for formulating foreign policy is vested in the Executive. According to an early observer writing during the military dictatorship, “The Brazilian executive has exceptionally wide powers to handle the big issues of foreign policy and to shape Brazil’s foreign relations – powers that Western industrial countries customarily grant their leaders only in times of war”. While much has changed since the dictatorship ended formally in 1985, this aspect of Brazilian policymaking by and large remains the same, in spite of the expansion of the Senate’s treaty approval prerogative.


The Presidency makes foreign policy in consultation with the Foreign Ministry, represented by its Secretary-General, and on occasion by senior diplomats on their own geographical areas of expertise. While PT itself does not feature in an institutional sense during the foreign policymaking process, certain major PT figureheads retain some influence on the foreign policymaking process. Among these, in addition to the President and his international affairs adviser, is the disgraced former Presidential Chief-of-Staff José Dirceu, who is known to hold anti-America and anti-free trade positions and is a key figure in PT.

The post of foreign affairs adviser in the Presidency has traditionally been occupied by a senior diplomat. This created a ‘natural bridge’ to the Foreign Ministry, as the office-holder would serve as a source of information for the President, in an almost perfunctory role. Under the Lula administration, since 2006, this position has instead been held by a member of the PT leadership, Professor Marco Aurélio Garcia. Garcia had previously served as interim leader of PT, and had been pro-active in “defining and even implementing certain lines of Lula’s foreign policy.”

Strictly speaking, neither the President’s Special Adviser for International Affairs, nor the Secretary-General of Itamaraty have historically had substantive roles in forming or implementing foreign policy. Where the Secretary-General has played a role in the formulation and implementation of foreign policy, this has mainly served to support the diplomatic process. This departure under the Lula administration had reverberations within the foreign policy establishment, leading to early rumours of discord between Garcia and Foreign Minister Celso Amorim. A division of labour later evolved, which saw Garcia take responsibility for the more delicate ‘ideological’ aspects of Brazil’s foreign policy, such as relations with Hugo Chavez, and other issues involving fellow ‘Leftist’ governments of South America; while Amorim dealt with ‘technical’ aspects relating to international trade.

---

282 Personal communication with a senior Brazilian diplomat.
283 See personal blog of Jose Dirceu: [http://www.zedirceu.co.br](http://www.zedirceu.co.br)
287 Almeida, “Uma nova ‘arquitetura’ diplomática?”.
negotiations, for example. This division risked promoting two parallel, and potentially conflicting, foreign policy agendas for Brazil, while at the same time diversifying its diplomatic options.

On the one hand is the party-to-party diplomacy of PT, exhibited to great effect during the Venezuelan crisis of 2002, the year of Lula’s ascent to power. This crisis saw the despatch of Garcia to Venezuela, even before Lula had assumed the Presidency, in an attempt to mediate between Hugo Chavez and the opposition. In addition, some reports stated that Lula had played a pivotal role in convincing President Cardoso to approve emergency shipments of 520,000 barrels of oil to Venezuela. The shipment helped to ease the effects of a crippling strike in protest at Chavez’s rule in December 2002. On the other hand is the official diplomacy of the Brazilian state that seeks to disavow entanglements in the domestic affairs of other states. Keeping these two ‘tracks’ of diplomacy separate has become increasingly difficult for the government, as it faces accusations of keeping ‘bad’ company on account of the Party’s relations with leaders of the Left in Latin America.

The role of the Executive: Itamaraty (Ministry of External Relations, MRE)
Itamaraty’s influence on the exercise of Brazilian diplomacy is a historical cornerstone of Brazilian foreign policy. The Foreign Ministry has a significant - yet not always decisive – role in the process of foreign policy formulation and implementation. The last major analysis in English of this formidable institution was conducted by the eminent Brazil scholar, Ronald M. Schneider, in 1976. Now as then, “Not surprisingly, the Foreign Ministry …tends to respond somewhat defensively to the suggestion or even the implication that it is not the central actor in the Brazilian foreign-policy process”. A commonly held view is that Itamaraty has been a conservative force in Brazilian foreign policy, owing to its recruitment

---

289 Schneider, Brazil.
and socialisation practices, as well as to its relative isolation from other ministries and non-state actors. This aura of conservatism is underlined by a perceived respect for tradition, and an *esprit de corps* engendered by the diplomatic lifestyle and its steep requirements for entry.

Fontaine described Itamaraty as follows:

> It is nationalist, but more pragmatic than romantic. It is oriented toward Europe and not America. It emphasizes preservation of good relations with old friends, but not at the expense of making new ones. It entails a desire for a larger Brazilian role on the world scene, but it does not exaggerate the nation’s present prospects for world power.\(^{290}\)

Itamaraty has indeed been a force for continuity in Brazilian foreign policy. In recent years, however, its autonomy and dominance over the foreign policy process – though never beyond question – have come under increasing pressure. While the Foreign Ministry’s influence has tended historically to wax and wane, depending on the personalities holding power in government, and in the institution, respectively, it has been noted that with the increasing demands on diplomacy brought by globalisation, Itamaraty has found it challenging to keep up. Already in 1976, once military ‘decompression’, or a moderate form of liberalisation, had been set in train by the government of Ernesto Geisel, ‘the foreign service [found] itself…becoming less important, not more important, at a time when foreign affairs [was] really beginning to matter for Brazil’.\(^{291}\) This loss of importance was attributed to the increasing mismatch between Brazil’s international economic goals, and its inadequate diplomatic capacity in this area.\(^{292}\) Itamaraty was not equipped to engage in the complex economic negotiations Brazil required to diversify its economic relations at the end of the 1970s, when the phenomenal growth from earlier in the decade was beginning to slow.

This trend was strengthened in the early 1990s, under the leadership of Fernando Henrique Cardoso, who presided over an increasing internationalisation of the Brazilian economy, and therewith the diversification of Itamaraty’s role in international trade issues. Cardoso oversaw the inclusion of “new voices” in

---

\(^{290}\) Fontaine, cited in Schneider, *Brazil*, 67.

\(^{291}\) Schneider, *Brazil*, 95.

\(^{292}\) Ibid.
consultative councils, as well as the strengthening of the Chamber of International Commerce (Câmara de Comércio Exterior, CAMEX), which was not linked to the MRE, but to the Ministry of Development, Industry, and Foreign Trade (MDIC). The process was reversed, however, early in Lula’s tenure. Under pressure from domestic constituencies (primarily within PT) to take a tougher stand on the prospects for Brazil’s negotiation of the FTAA, Lula re-instated the leading role of MRE in trade policy and negotiations. According to Mario Marconini, former Brazilian Foreign Trade Secretary (1999) “By doing so, the President expected to end whatever power struggle might be occurring within the government while making clear to society who called the shots on the FTAA and related trade matters.” It would appear that for Lula, the task of maintaining a hold on the course of negotiations would have been easier to achieve by bringing it under the primary influence of MRE. Stemming from this decision, Brazil was represented in top-level international trade negotiations by the Foreign Minister, Celso Amorim.

In areas other than international economics and trade, Itamaraty has had to share its workload. Some of the ministries concerned include: MDIC, the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Supply (MAPA), as well as the Ministries of the Environment and Agrarian Development. Specifically, the Environment Ministry took the lead in formulating Brazil’s position in Copenhagen for the COP-15 summit in 2009, while the Agrarian Development Ministry has shaped Brazil’s proposals on family farming in global trade negotiations.

In the past, Itamaraty has tended to act as a balancer in Brazilian foreign policy across a number of issues. Hudson notes Itamaraty’s role when in 1995 Brazil’s economic sector, led by the Department of Planning, decided to impose quotas on imported vehicles. Aware of the potential negative consequences for Brazil’s partners in the Southern Common Market, or Mercado Comum do Sul (MERCOSUL), Itamaraty intervened and lighter measures for MERCOSUL.

295 PT, A Política Externa do Governo Lula.
members were negotiated. Recent research has tended to argue for a certain, if measured, decline in the relative influence of Itamaraty in foreign policymaking. By the same token, as there are no political appointees below the strategic level of the organisation, it is an institution that is relatively difficult for new governments to penetrate, and remains a professional diplomatic corps.

The role of Secretary-General in Itamaraty was occupied for much of both the Lula administrations by Samuel Guimarães Neto. Guimarães was appointed within 10 days of Lula’s accession to office in 2003, and proved a somewhat controversial choice. His activities breached the traditional limits of the Secretary-General role, as, while in office he occasionally took to writing on subjects in a manner deemed to be ‘beyond the limits of diplomacy’. This led to his characterisation by the conservative Brazilian press as an ‘ideologue’ of the new lines of foreign policy being promoted by PT. In actual fact, Guimarães ‘is not a PT man’. He may better be described as a career-diplomat ‘national-developmentist’ of the old ‘independent foreign policy’ school, initiated during the Presidency of Getúlio Vargas. Guimarães, in this way, serves as a link between Brazil’s foreign policy under Lula, and earlier independent foreign policy postures from the middle of the twentieth century onward.

The expansion of Itamaraty was expedited by Lula, and was evident in the growth of Brazil’s complement of representation abroad. In 2002, just before Lula took office, Brazil had 150 missions abroad. By the end of Lula’s tenure in 2010, this number had grown to 230. Accordingly, the number of diplomatic personnel increased from 1,000 prior to the Lula administration, to 1,400 by the end of 2010.

297 Cason and Power, “Presidentialization”, 135.
298 Lilian Duarte, Brazilian Political Officer, Brazilian Mission in London, interview March 2010.
299 Guimarães had made numerous public pronouncements in which he spelled out his opposition to the FTAA, and to Brazil’s participation in the negotiations.
300 Cason and Power, 2009: 98.
301 interview with Giancarlo Summa, former head of external communications, PT, July 2010.
4.2.2. What is good for the party is good for the state? PT’s influence on Brazil’s foreign policy

To which extent has PT been able to influence foreign policy, and by which means? Schneider noted in 1976 that, “The political parties are not significant factors in foreign policy-making. In terms of influence, the parties range between nonexistent and marginal”.

As an accompanying observation, scholar-diplomat Paulo Roberto Almeida noted in 1992 that parties paid similarly marginal attention to foreign policy issues in their manifestos and political platforms. This resulted from a number of factors: the primacy of domestic issues, the fluidity of the party system at the time, and the professionalism and impermeability of MRE. The increasing visibility of Congress in foreign policy issues has demanded greater involvement by political parties on foreign policy, however.

An important measure of PT’s influence on foreign policy is the extent to which ‘class’ and redistributive issues have been raised to the level of foreign policy. Before this can be ascertained, it is important to examine the means of influence the party exerts on the policy process.

PT’s founding documents made scant reference to international relations. Its Charter of Principles, which served as a precursor to its Manifesto released in 1980, stated simply that the Party were “looking to use [their] moral authority and politics to try to open a way for all workers”. Its manifesto stressed that workers desired ‘national independence’, and that the only true condition for ‘national independence’ would be the rule of the State by the working masses. The manifesto concluded with an affirmation of PT’s “solidarity in the struggle of all oppressed masses of the world”. It is telling that PT has only recently, close to the end of

303 Schneider, Brazil, 137.

It may be argued that prior to this, PT’s foreign policy – to the extent that one existed - had been conducted in a haphazard fashion, adhering to the traditional positions of the party, dating from its incarnation as a militant socialist party. Much intellectual vigour and structure was provided by Itamaraty’s Secretary-General, Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães, who issued a number of publications, while he held the post of Director of the Institute of International Relations of the Foreign Ministry’s training institute, dealing with various sensitive issues in Brazilian foreign policy, along lines highly synonymous with the PT position. For example, his dissident views on Brazil’s continued participation in FTAA negotiations with the United States were published while the negotiations were still ongoing. The publication of these views resulted in Guimarães’ redeployment by the Foreign Minister.

PT’s former Secretary for International Affairs, Valter Pomar, admits that one of the key measures of influence of the party on foreign policy is the positioning of ‘affiliated individuals in key posts’. Another instrument of influence is the party’s manifesto. The impact of party preferences on Brazil’s foreign economic policy have been uneven, with the translation of key constituents’ disapproval of the FTAA not extending to other areas, such as the continuation of the Doha Round. As noted in the PT document *A política externa do governo Lula*, the Brazilian government’s position on pressing toward the conclusion of the Doha Round, to include the positions of less-developed countries, is not supported by key sectors of the party’s social and political base, such as the CUT.

Another important contribution of the party, which depends heavily on party cohesion, is the voting patterns of members of Congress, and their activities in Congress’s Commission for International Relations and National Defense.

---

306 Email correspondence with diplomat and academic, Prof. Paulo Roberto Almeida, 30 May, 2010.
307 Valter Pomar, email correspondence, July 2010.
308 Email correspondence, Valter Pomar, 1 July, 2010.
Interestingly, one proposal placed before the Commission by the PT representative for Rio de Janeiro State, Fernando Gabeira, called for the Government’s condemnation of the imprisonment in early 2003 of 77 Cuban dissidents, and for speedy action by the Government in pursuit of their release.\textsuperscript{309} What is interesting about the PT representative’s remarks on this matter, is that they show an awareness of, and intent to utilise, PT’s capacity to interfere in the domestic affairs of neighbouring states through party-political links. This is in stark contrast to Brazil’s official position of non-interference in the domestic affairs of other states. PT recognises the governments of Colombia and Mexico, but holds strong links with opposition movements, namely Pólo Democrático Alternativo (PDA) and Partido do Acción Nacional (PAN), respectively.\textsuperscript{310}

As the state president cannot simultaneously hold executive office in a political party, this acts as a measure of limitation of party influence on foreign policy, as a measure of distance is created between the President and the party he represents. PT is adamant that Lula’s foreign policy has not been a petista foreign policy. “The foreign policy of the Lula government is positively evaluated by the PT membership, as there are many similarities between it and international policy advocated by the Party”\textsuperscript{311}. This is ostensibly in response to criticism that Brazil’s foreign policy has become highly ideologised under the Lula administration. This may be true as PT and its ideological soulmates, CUT and Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra (MST), for example, have not had things their own way. MST have not succeeded in convincing the Lula administration to increase the pace of land redistribution. Instead, funds earmarked for the expropriation and redistribution of unutilised land were redirected toward the financing of Brazil’s external debt.\textsuperscript{312}

\textsuperscript{309} Report on Activities 2004, p47.
\textsuperscript{310} PT, no. 72 and 73.
\textsuperscript{311} PT, no. 71.
4.2.3. International Outlook

Brazil’s international outlook is coloured by a fervent nationalism and the accompanying desire to occupy a position of status in international society. Under Lula, a social agenda has risen to prominence within Brazil’s foreign policy. Threat perception, according to some analysts, is hence primarily in terms of “economic and not military/security motivations”.

Yet, this perception makes light of the tense battles Brazil has engaged in over the potential diminution of its sovereignty in the Amazon, and other environmental questions. Security as a motive should not be discarded altogether, but should be expanded to take in Brazil’s concern with maintaining its freedom of action in the Amazon, and its desire to balance the influence of ‘the other Left’ represented by Chavez in Venezuela and Morales in Bolivia. Brazil has also been a thorny client of the International Atomic Energy Agency, refusing to allow full access to nuclear facilities, and even labelled “a serious challenge to the IAEA’s authority”. There are some concerns over Brazil’s future nuclear intentions.

Considering the factors enumerated above, it appears that the monolithic impression created by Itamaraty’s longstanding prominence as the cornerstone of Brazilian foreign policy is being somewhat undermined. This position is being eroded by the profusion of new actors in Brazilian foreign policy, especially at the federal level. The inclusion of other ministries, which have the necessary skills at their disposal, means that Itamaraty requires an update of its relevance to the increased pace of economic, environmental and agricultural diplomacy in which Brazil is involved. Partido dos Trabalhadores has been able to manipulate neither foreign policy nor public opinion in its favour as easily as the expectation of its two comfortable electoral victories in 2002 and 2006 might generate. Brazilian foreign policy principles outstrip both Itamaraty and PT in longevity, and have served the country reasonably well over nearly two centuries. Therefore, there would be understandable reluctance to make major changes to these principles.

313 Lima and Hirst, “Brazil as an intermediate state”, 22.
It may be the case that it is precisely this precarious balance of domestic forces, between conservatism and progressivism, that determines the Brazilian posture in international relations. Military governments of the 1964-1985 period were unable to pursue expansive foreign policies, beyond the extension of bilateral relations with certain countries of the developing world. Even under its period of dramatic economic growth, by 10 percent each year, during the first half of the 1970s, Brazil did not engage in excessively expansive foreign policy.

It has been noted that the end of the Geisel presidency in 1979 brought ‘opening’ in Brazilian foreign policy; namely, a willingness to depart from the foreign policy influence of the United States and to consider the place of Africa and other parts of the ‘Third World’ in its foreign policy (terceiro mundo). This may have been a consequence of Brazil’s economic shocks at the hands of the OPEC cartel during the 1970s, as well as a desire by the military leadership to chart a course independently of the US.

Mullins highlights at least seven core influences on Brazil’s foreign policy:

- Desire for recognition
- The interests of Latin America
- Its continental scale
- The search for economic development
- Its international environment, particularly its relationship with the US
- Dealing with the legacy of the military, and
- International/multilateral institutions.  

Ideas of exceptionalism long present in Brazil’s foreign policy had their inception with the relative peace of Brazil’s independence from Portugal in 1822, compared to the bloody wars waged by its Spanish-speaking neighbours. This exceptionalism has been articulated in a variety of postures since then. It was evident in Brazil’s continuation of the slave trade and slavery itself long after the practices became an international outrage in the mid-19th century. It was supported by Brazil’s

---

317 Ibid., 77.
318 Slavery was finally abolished in 1888.
linguistic distinction from its Spanish neighbours. In the 20th century, Brazil’s sense of its own exceptionalism left political and diplomatic elites bitterly disappointed over the country’s failure to secure permanent seats in the post-war machinery for world peace, following both world wars. Brazilian exceptionalism continues in the 21st century in Brazilian officials’ message that Brazil seeks friends in the international community, and in its commitment to global ‘social’ issues.

**Conclusion**

Both ANC and PT came to power with resounding popular mandates and with long histories of international activism in the name of democracy in their respective countries. Their prospective foreign policies were awaited with great expectation by observers who identified with the left, while others looked on with trepidation.

Institutional dynamics long-present and some newly developed under their tutelage, along with structural constraints in the global political and economic environment have, however, circumscribed the extent to which each party could freely direct the foreign relations of the state. In Brazil, and in South Africa, while foreign policymaking is the preserve of the executive, the legislature retains weak constitutional powers, depending on their interpretation by the government of the day, to veto unpopular international commitments. The role of the political party is primarily to provide ideological and intellectual guidance to the overall vision of foreign policy.

Based on the evidence presented in the preceding discussions, it appears that for the ANC, despite the centralisation of foreign policymaking power by Thabo Mbeki, and the appointment of high-level ANC members to key posts in the foreign policy bureaucracy and the Presidency, it was in Mbeki’s image, and not that of the party that foreign policy was made. By building the institutional context – a strong Presidency alongside subservient Ministries – Mbeki was able to exercise a high degree of autonomy over foreign policy priorities and commitments. The Department of Foreign Affairs has played a marginal role, along with Parliament.
For Brazil, meanwhile, while PT’s foreign policy ambitions have had to co-exist with Itamaraty’s foreign policy pedigree in managing Brazilian foreign policy, the party has contented itself with ‘parallel’ diplomacy based on party links for the more delicate aspects of its foreign policy innovation. Itamaraty has by and large been left to do what it does best, which is to defend Brazil’s national interests using the time-honoured tools of traditional interstate diplomacy. These include, non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states; a commitment to the peaceful resolution of conflicts; and a commitment to the preservation and strengthening of multilateralism in international affairs. A clear recent addition under the guidance of a PT President has been the cultivation of South-South relations, a fourth component of internationalism.

Where do these observations about South Africa and Brazil leave the discussion on neoclassical realism and the extraction and mobilisation of resources? Clearly, in the South African case, the Presidency is strong, but this does not imply state strength and the ease of resource mobilisation and extraction. The requirements for the conversion of national power to state power may be met by the ANC’s institutional freedom in the person of the President (reinforced by his status as Party president). This institutional freedom was strengthened by the continuing appeal of Mbeki’s foreign policy. On one hand, as the distance between Mbeki and the rank-and-file of the ANC increased, the legitimacy of his public policies declined. However, this was experienced to a lesser degree in foreign policy, compared to, for example, health policy, over the availability of HIV/AIDS treatments, and in economic policy, over the introduction of the neo-liberal Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) policy. Mbeki enjoyed some measure of support on his Zimbabwe policy as was evidenced by the resounding cheer that greeted Robert Mugabe’s attendance of his second inauguration in 2004. This was not a view shared by COSATU and the SACP, however, as will be seen in Chapter 5.

In Brazil, meanwhile, PT was engaged in constant battles to win Congressional support for important domestic initiatives, such as political reform and social

---

319 While the case of Zimbabwe may be cited as an example of Mbeki’s foreign policy winning ANC rank-and-file approval, this cannot be done with confidence. The position of the ANC, and indeed the tripartite alliance, was never monolithic on this issue, in spite of Mugabe’s rousing welcome at Mbeki’s second inauguration in 2004.
welfare measures. The party’s relationship with its constituency was changing rapidly in face of the needs of electoral democracy: PT crafted a move away from the left and toward the centre on economic policy. The increasing interest of important trade sectors in foreign policy meant that the government, in order to appeal to the right, had to make important concessions to the business sector. Hence, PT enjoyed less institutional freedom in deploying the state’s resources for foreign policy commitments. It held strong legitimating power to justify Brazilian commitments abroad, however, in the context of the Brazilian elite’s longstanding desire to win a more influential place for the country in international affairs.

Under the Lula administration, balancing the requirements of international recognition and domestic alliance-building, while remaining true to at least some aspects of PT’s traditional posture, has led to a foreign policy that maintains the basic traditional principles of Brazilian foreign policy, yet leaves room for the freedom of action of the executive in determining the emphases of the foreign policy of a PT-led Brazil.

In the case of South Africa’s foreign policymaking, the absence of a strong institutional counterweight in the executive (viz., a powerful foreign ministry) does not preclude the existence of basic foreign policy principles. However, by centralising the policymaking machinery, as well as narrowing the political base of influence, Thabo Mbeki was able to ignore critics of his foreign policy, from both left and right. The party’s influence was ultimately negligible compared with that of Mbeki’s ideas and subjectivities. Compared to Lula’s position, Mbeki enjoyed few institutional constraints. South Africa’s parliamentary system inherited with the political transition gave way to centralising moves by Mbeki in order to shore up the Presidency. This was not as simple in the Brazilian context, although key foreign policymaking functions did move to the Planalto Palace, and were embodied in key individuals appointed to strategic posts.

The following two chapters, examining South Africa and Brazil, respectively, detail the limits and constraints on the projection of state power by these two intermediate states.
Part II: Case Studies: South Africa and Brazil
Chapter 5: Rhetoric and Restraint: The State, the ANC and Internationalism in South Africa’s Foreign Policy

“…South Africa will not be indifferent to the rights of others. Human rights will be the light that guides our foreign affairs”.
Nelson Mandela, 1993, Foreign Affairs

When I look around the world, I see very few countries with greater potential to help shape the 21st century than the new South Africa.
Warren Christopher, 1996

Introduction

In terms of traditional, material, measures of capability, South Africa has fared relatively well over the last two decades. As the largest and most industrialised economy on the African continent, along with ever growing commercial interests, South Africa has been labelled an ‘emerging middle power’, a ‘continental powerhouse’ and ‘regional hegemon’, to name a few. These labels all point to the country’s position of pre-eminence in Africa, as a potential leader, engine for economic growth, and force for peace. South Africa experienced a surge in its yearly GDP growth rates, from negative territory (-0.3% in 1990) in the early 1990s, to 4.3% by 1996, and 5.5% one year before the end of Thabo Mbeki’s presidency in 2007. Most significantly, and controversially, the executive engaged in a strategic arms procurement exercise in 1999, initially valued at some R29 million (about US$4 million at the time), in spite of the contraction of its conventional forces in line with the defence posture outlined in 1998. The weapons procured were geared towards ‘primary’ missions, and deemed unsuitable to the ‘secondary’ missions in which South Africa was more likely to participate, i.e. peacekeeping

---

322 Schoeman, “South Africa as an Emerging Middle Power”.
missions and disaster relief. Yet, in the 17 years since the first all-race elections held in 1994, inaugurating not only a new administration, but a new political dispensation for South Africa, there is broad agreement outside of government that the country has failed to project itself adequately as a positive, decisive influence in regional, and to a lesser extent, in continental, and global, affairs.\textsuperscript{325} In the latter two arenas, South Africa’s foreign policy has been deemed a measured success, through its expanded role in international politics following decades of isolation.

This should not be a puzzle for a state emerging from decades of diplomatic isolation and economic underperformance, but for the fact that statements of expansive ambition are liberally scattered throughout South Africa’s post-1994 foreign policy strategic plans.\textsuperscript{326} These include the centrality of human rights, conceived as ‘beyond the political, embracing the economic, social and environmental’; ‘the promotion of democracy world-wide’; and the striving for ‘the fundamental reform in the governance and management’ of global multilateral institutions.\textsuperscript{327} Yet, in a 1996 Green Paper policy document, the government recognised that

the world’s reaction [of support and admiration for South Africa’s peaceful democratisation] does not represent an indefinite continuation of the unique relationship…Many expectations about South Africa’s international role have been created, but at the same time many demanding responsibilities have been assumed.\textsuperscript{328}

The literature on South Africa’s activist, internationalist foreign policy is extensive.\textsuperscript{329} Yet it curiously omits to examine the ideational and political role

\textsuperscript{326} Patrick Bond, \textit{Talk left, walk right: South Africa’s frustrated global reforms} (Scottsville: University of Kwa-Zulu Natal Press, 2006); “Cosatu slams foreign policy”, in \textit{Business Day}, 12 April 2011.  
\textsuperscript{327} See, for example, Department of Foreign Affairs Strategic Plans 2006-2009, 2007-2010, 2008-2011.  
\textsuperscript{328} Department of Foreign Affairs, Stratrategic Plan 2006-9, 2006; pp7-9.  
played in this foreign policy posture by South Africa’s dominant political party and the only majority governing party of a free South Africa, the African National Congress. The ANC plays a key role in the generation of interests at the national level, by virtue of its dominance of South Africa’s political life, and by the ‘dual mandates’ of key government figures as central party figures. The governing party - its culture, history and relations internally, and with other actors in society – plays a significant role in the mobilisation and extraction of resources for foreign policy.

South Africa’s foreign policy has yet to be consolidated into a “codified foreign policy doctrine”, and each foreign policy decision is, as yet, still adopted “on its merits within a prescribed normative framework”. Indeed, it was a goal of the erstwhile Department of Foreign Affairs to enlist public engagement in the detailing of such a foreign policy doctrine. To this end, consultative exercises were conducted with non-governmental actors and intra-governmentally, in an attempt to streamline South Africa’s foreign policy goals, from 1994 onward. Nonetheless, the declared normative framework within which foreign policy decisions have been taken is made clear by documents available on the Department website and the repeated rhetorical declarations of state officials. For example, President Mbeki declared in his 2004 State of the Nation address:

All major current international developments emphasise the importance of constructing a new world order that is more equitable and responsive to the needs of the poor of the world, who constitute the overwhelming majority of humanity.

Numerous authors have sought to explain what they perceive as incoherence and vacillation in South Africa’s foreign policy. There have also been a number of attempts to account for South Africa’s choice of a ‘middle power’ role in its

330 On this point, Nathan is in agreement. See Laurie Nathan, “Interests, ideas and ideology”, *African Affairs*, 110, Issue 438 (2010): 17. Alden conducted an early analysis of the foreign policy of the ANC just before it assumed power, but there has been no consideration of the party’s influence on South Africa’s foreign policy since. See Alden, 1993.


international orientation. Most of these accounts, in documenting South Africa’s increased international engagement since 1994, make the mistake of equating this activism with a role for South Africa as a ‘force for good’ in international society. Heightened engagement in international institutions is then held up as a standard against which South African foreign policy’s ethical outcomes are judged. This is not only to confuse cause and effect, but also to conflate two parallel, but not necessarily related, processes. Increased engagement in multilateral organisations and the signing of international agreements, while they serve to underwrite the existing normative international order, do not preclude self-interest on the part of an international actor. There exist a number of plausible reasons, often – but not exclusively - rooted in domestic politics, why a state would enmesh itself to a lesser or greater extent in international regimes. This observation calls into question an optic that has often been used in attempts to describe South Africa’s international re-integration: that of the uncomplicated diffusion of liberal values.

This assumption acted as the backbone of critiques in the literature that viewed South African foreign policy as a failure in relation to liberal values propagated by Western states. Indeed, these values – such as respect for human rights - were incorporated within the country’s own renowned constitution, and the foreign policy statements of all governments since 1994, not to mention statements on continental governance that it has assisted in drafting. This notwithstanding, not enough attention has been paid to how decision makers perceive their environment, and to what extent they are able to extract resources for the implementation of their preferred foreign policy: the central questions of foreign policy analysis. This chapter makes an argument for the return of the state to analyses of South African foreign policy, incorporating the insight of perception as generated by key policymakers. The claim is made that the worldviews and interests of the governing party and its key members, form a central component of the perceptual lens through which foreign policy strategy is determined; and, that changes to the foreign policymaking process under President Thabo Mbeki greatly enhanced the extent to which the state was theoretically able to extract resources for its preferred

333 For an example of analyses committing this error, see: Merle Lipton," Understanding South Africa’s foreign policy: the perplexing case of Zimbabwe", South African Journal of International Affairs, 16, No.3 (2009).
334 See, for example, the Constitutive Act of the African Union, 2000.
foreign policy. At the same time, the limits imposed by the international environment, at the regional level and further afield, as perceived by the decision makers should be taken into account for South Africa’s foreign policy choices in recent years.

This chapter draws on the idea that identities generated at the domestic level influence how states behave internationally, by influencing perceptions of the external environment. The key identities generated at the domestic level in South Africa under the African National Congress governments may usefully be divided into three categories, according to different levels of analysis, which will be discussed in subsequent sections.

This chapter has as its main objectives an outline of the internationalist position in South Africa’s foreign policy, and an analysis of how shifts in state power have affected the country’s ambitions in the international realm. A further objective is to analyse the means by which national resources for foreign policy were mobilised and extracted during Mbeki’s tenure as president. The temporal focus is the presidency of Thabo Mbeki (1999-2008), the architect of South African foreign policy under the new South African regime, first as the ANC’s Head of Department of International Affairs in exile, then as Deputy President under Nelson Mandela (1994-1999), and finally as state president.

The chapter is organised as follows: first links will be highlighted between South Africa’s current internationalism and historic internationalist trends in its foreign policy. This is done in order to pose the question whether South Africa is geopolitically predisposed to internationalism in its foreign policy, and to establish a continuous link spanning apartheid and democratic government. This is done in order to highlight the deeper structural factors at play in conditioning the international perspectives of South Africa’s foreign policymaking elites through time. This is followed by an exposition of ANC foreign policy evolution from the organisation’s time in exile to its assumption of power in South Africa in 1994. The evolution of ANC foreign policy has faced criticism both from within and outside the tripartite alliance (the ANC’s alliance with COSATU and the SACP), with intra-alliance opposition proving more significant owing to the nature of South Africa’s
electoral system. The following section examines Nelson Mandela’s foreign policy legacy as a backdrop to the foreign policy approach of Thabo Mbeki. Next, using the categories of ‘institutional freedom’ and ‘legitimating capacity’, the ANC’s capacity for influencing foreign policy is measured. Finally, in the section ‘Resource Mobilisation and Extraction Under Mbeki’, Mbeki’s foreign policy trajectory is examined in terms of shifts in state power. ‘State power’ has previously been described as “the relative ability of the state to extract or mobilize resources from domestic society as determined by the institutions of the state, as well as by nationalism and ideology”.

The key claim made in this chapter is that while the African National Congress engendered great expectation by way of its liberation movement history, and the wide support it had garnered worldwide in the struggle against apartheid, it was only able to implement a foreign policy of measured ambivalence and restraint, given the nature of the highly unequal, and still divided, society it came to govern, in addition to its own capacity limits and the limited resources of the state.

5.1. South Africa: A ‘structural’ internationalist?

In a contribution to an edited volume on the early years of the presidency of Thabo Mbeki, Hein Marais cautions against a rush to ‘periodise’ the post-apartheid era. This is attributable to the importance of the ‘vector…of macroeconomic policy’ in the transformation, and this has not changed much at all. This observation prompts the broader reflection that South Africa’s foreign policy posture under a democratic dispensation should not be too readily divorced from historical trends in foreign policy and orientation, apartheid’s worst decades of 1950-1980 notwithstanding. This is because South Africa’s material position in the regional division of labour has not changed significantly in the last century. The country is still the strongest economy in the region, and one of the most attractive destinations for foreign investment as well as a major consumer of immigrant labour. Yet, in

---

335 Taliaferro, “State Building for Future Wars”, 467. See also Chapter 3 of current work.
337 In 2009, South Africa was the third-largest recipient of FDI in Africa, with US$ 5.7b, behind Angola (US$13.1b) and Egypt (US$6.7b). African Economic Outlook. “FDI
global terms, it is not a major player on the international scene, ranked 31st in terms of GDP by the IMF, behind countries such as Turkey, Iran and Venezuela. The country’s internal market is small by global standards, a situation compounded by high poverty rates, necessitating the cultivation of markets abroad.

South Africa was a colonial possession first of the Netherlands, and then of Great Britain for most of its 300 years under white minority rule. The country became independent of Britain in 1910, and in 1961 it withdrew from the Commonwealth (under pressure from member states over apartheid) and became a republic, under its own head of state, a prime minister. This was done mainly with a view to protecting and enhancing the autonomy of Afrikaner development within South Africa, already predicated on the separate development and apartheid policies of the National Party. With the National Party’s entry into power in 1948, and its reprehensible policies of formal apartheid, the South African government became progressively more marginalised from international life. Campaigns against the treatment of Indians in South Africa were waged by the Indian government in the General Assembly of the United Nations. In addition, there was strident opposition to South Africa’s position on South West Africa (discussed below). The country was ultimately suspended from the UN General Assembly (in 1974) and never joined the Organisation of African Unity. However, the government maintained strong links with the Western capitalist powers, namely the US and UK, because of South Africa’s perceived role in inhibiting the spread of Communism in southern Africa, in the former case, and for various historical and economic reasons, in the latter.

Because of its domestic policies, the South African government operated with a ‘siege mentality’ in most of its international relations, seeking to defend itself from Communist and Black African subversion emanating from within the country or outside of its borders. As noted by Barber and Barratt, “The overriding aim of South African governments [between 1945 and 1988] was the preservation of a white controlled state, although the means employed to maintain white power and

---


identity changed as the challenges increased”. Ideologically, any identification with the developing world was not compatible with the National Party’s policies of racial segregation at home. Nonetheless, South Africa did seek to foster relations with certain developing countries – African countries in particular - including some of its regional neighbours such as Botswana, Lesotho and Malawi, in order to shore up its diplomatic support in the UN, and on the continent. Some countries that maintained relations with South Africa included Ivory Coast and Israel. South Africa was regarded as a ‘pariah’ state in the developing world, however, and so was not in the position to claim any solidarity with it. Besides, under the National Party government, the Party identified with the West and saw itself as the ‘last bastion of Western civilisation’ in Africa. The various National Party governments did perceive a unified fate with Africa, however. This was entwined, at times, with the future of the Portuguese colonies to the east (Mozambique) and west (Angola); and, in a broader and more pertinent sense, in the economic prospects represented by Africa as a market for South African commerce. This position had been formalised by Prime Minister BJ Vorster’s ‘outward movement’ pro-Africa foreign policy, launched in 1966. Indeed, as noted by Vale and Maseko, underlining the argument advanced here,

“The notion that their presence should feature in African affairs seems to...have been a constant thread in the rhetoric of successive South African leaders, irrespective of colour or ideological hue”.

From 1980 onward the country was active in a policy of ‘destabilisation’ of its neighbours in Southern Africa, turning increasingly to “force rather than diplomacy” to quell the threat posed by the ANC in exile. The latter was hosted by Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe, among others. South Africa was also involved in military operations in Angola and South West Africa. South Africa illegally retained South West Africa after World War II, despite an International Court of Justice advisory opinion and General Assembly resolution

---

340 The aims of ‘outward movement’ were to diversify diplomatic and trade links, but this was not limited to Africa. Africa formed the focus of the policy, however, where the goals were to promote peace and mutual interests, while refraining from interference in domestic affairs. See Barber and Barratt, *Search for Status and Security*, 125.
While South Africa retained its UN membership until 1974, and thereby benefited from the legitimacy afforded by multilateralism, it undermined the concept by failing to implement the opinions of the international community regarding both Namibia and its own domestic policies.

The African National Congress came to power in South Africa following the first all-race election in 1994. The relative calm surrounding the electoral process – which was, however, not without its own controversy and low-grade civil violence – marked the high point of a period of intense struggle between revolutionary and reactionary forces, underscored by race - in South African society that had continued for much of the twentieth century. These forces have continued to animate South African politics well into the first two decades of democratic governance. The question of how to manage national economic development has featured as a major sticking point in the struggle, where revolutionary forces are represented by those desiring far-reaching redistributive change in society, and reactionary forces represented by those who seek the maintenance of the market-oriented status quo, whether whites or blacks hold the levers of economic power.

Yet the foreign policy of the African National Congress upon its accession to power in 1994 did mark, in some respects, a sharp turnaround in South Africa’s international posture. The country eschewed military means of resolving conflicts, and in a decision taken under the last apartheid government in 1990, its nuclear capability was unceremoniously dismantled. Although this decision was not taken by the new ANC government, and was in fact taken, in the view of some, to forestall the possibility of an ANC government possessing nuclear weapons, no attempt was later made to reverse it. In fact, the ANC took a principled decision in favour of ‘blending down’ South Africa’s enriched uranium, rather than see it sold

to the United States, with the attendant possibility that it could still be used in nuclear weapons later on.\textsuperscript{346}

With the end of apartheid, South Africa immersed itself in a reinvigorated international role. Following its marginalisation as a pariah state, the country’s image was rehabilitated as the transition to democracy progressed, sometimes too rapidly for the ANC’s purposes or preparedness. Between 1994 and 2000,

South Africa … joined, rejoined, or acceded to around forty-five intergovernmental organizations and multilateral treaties. It also committed itself heavily to the reform of the UN, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank, and to the possibilities of South-South cooperation in the framework of the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation and the Zone of Peace and Cooperation of the South Atlantic.\textsuperscript{347}

The country also accepted a number of multilateral leadership responsibilities and the hosting of a number of important international meetings. (For these, and a list of internationalist actions taken by the South African government under Mbeki, see Appendix 5). For analysts, dual state-level and systemic influences were at play: “This wider multilateral role [was] both a function of a deep-rooted internationalist commitment among the ruling party and a reflection of responsibilities being foisted on South Africa by high peers…”\textsuperscript{348}

Similarly, for Alden and le Pere,

This acute sense of global mission, in contrast with other post-transition regimes in Eastern Europe and Latin America, is the product of South Africans’ own sense of accomplishment in having successfully navigated the transition, coupled with the international expectations of its continental role, as well as liberation-movement idealism and residual solidarity politics.\textsuperscript{349}

Therefore, South Africa’s internationalist posture was to some extent ‘built-in’ to the country’s geopolitical positioning and its natural endowment of resources, along

\textsuperscript{346} Ibid., 33.
\textsuperscript{348} Ibid., 48.
\textsuperscript{349} Alden and Le Pere, “South Africa’s Post-Apartheid Foreign Policy”, 71.
with successful industrialisation that had taken place under the apartheid governments from the 1960s onward. By the turn of democracy in 1994, it was thus a classical realist candidate for expansion, especially given the absence of any major regional challenger, and its economic predominance over the region, and much of the continent. Not only did it appear that greater engagement by South Africa in African – especially Southern African - and global affairs would not be discouraged, it was expected.

As noted by then-Deputy President, Thabo Mbeki, in 1995,

A distinguishing feature of South Africa is the sustained interest of the rest of the world in the future of South Africa. The depth of this interest is not only confined to government but includes ordinary people. They have not disengaged from South Africa. The strength and the persistence of the international focus on South Africa puts the South African government under pressure to contribute positively and constructively to the global community.350

“Thus, observers point to a striking continuity in foreign policy praxis (though not in its rhetoric) between the final years of the apartheid regime and the succeeding ANC government”.351 The continuities in objectives and foreign policy behaviour include the mercantilist thrust of foreign policy in southern Africa. Döpcke shows how South Africa’s Africa policy could actually have structural roots, founded in the economic relations with African states that were cultivated by the Apartheid regime, especially in terms of exports in the early 1990s.352 He argues, in fact, that foreign policy reorientation (especially with respect to Africa) took place “well before the regime change”.353 More than this, the foreign policy reorientation under the last apartheid administrations, away from military coercion, in favour of more political and diplomatic means, had the added – not insignificant – benefit of bringing about a shift in the balance of forces in the Botha government that eventually paved the way for more determined efforts in reaching out to the ANC, and the minor

352 Ibid., 281.
353 Ibid., 302. Emphasis added.
reforms undertaken in the mid-1980s. It fell to de Klerk to complete the power shift and reduce the influence of the State Security Council in the foreign policymaking decision-making process. This held major significance for the political future of South Africa, as it reduced the influence of ‘hawks’ in government decision-making.

But why, armed with this sense of mission, the ANC’s heritage as Africa’s foremost liberation movement and a fair amount of international goodwill, did South Africa not always act in accordance with the expectations its policies generated? In order to answer this question, it is necessary first to interrogate the internationalist history of the ANC and its early years in government.

5.2. ANC’s foreign policy evolution and its critics: institutional freedom and legitimating power

5.2.1. Old wine into new bottles: External Mission into ‘national’ mission

One of the key observations about the African National Congress in the closing years of apartheid and its aftermath is the organisation’s struggle, not unlike other African liberation movements, to conduct the transformation to political party. This observation holds resonance for the ANC’s conduct of foreign policy because it speaks to the enduring perceptions utilised by key foreign policy decisionmakers in all of the ANC administrations since the end of apartheid. This section traces the evolution of the foreign policy positions of the African National Congress, with special reference to the closing years of apartheid and the early years of its role as the governing party of South Africa.

What are the key perspectives of the African National Congress on South African foreign policy, and how has the organisation’s recent history influenced these perceptions? This section argues that the nature of the ANC’s international agency in exile; and, the variable and intermingling cultures of the organisation in recent decades, have resulted in a particular organisational outlook, and specific

perspectives on international relations. Because of Thabo Mbeki’s central role both in government and in the ANC during his presidency, along with his many writings available on the ANC’s website, it is possible to reconstruct some of the key perceptual lenses employed in foreign policy decision making.

The ANC had of necessity to evolve a more sophisticated agency as a foreign policy actor because of its banning by the Apartheid state in 1960. The organisation subsequently moved underground and into exile, with the bulk of the responsibility for maintaining its existence in the hands of its External Mission.\[355\] The initial tasks of the External Mission were to establish and consolidate itself; raise funds; represent the ANC at international organisations; and, attend to the more secret task of arranging training bases in a number of African countries for recruits of Umkhonto we Sizwe (Spear of the Nation, also referred to as MK), the armed wing of the ANC.\[356\] The need for international support, both material and ideological, compelled the organisation to clarify its ideological standpoints and political approaches early on. Two concepts gained central importance: those of non-racialism, engineered to no small extent by the ANC’s alliance partner, the South African Communist Party, and ‘Marxist Pan-Africanism’, also a consequence of SACP influence. The ANC came under fire for its non-racial stance in an African atmosphere of independence from colonial rule and fervent Pan-Africanism in the 1960s, and struggled to win recognition as the sole representative of South Africa’s oppressed Black population. Meanwhile, the ANC-in-exile’s Marxist orientation secured the crucial support of the Soviet Union, but did not win it any favours among Africa’s pre-eminent ‘Nationalist Pan-Africanists’ of the 1950s and 1960s, namely Kwame Nkrumah and Julius Nyerere.

For much of its existence prior to its unbanning in 1994, the main focus of ANC foreign policy, as such, was three-fold: “to isolate South Africa by publicising the injustices of apartheid and to call for the imposition of sanctions, while also forging political and ideological alliances with sympathetic states and other liberation movements in support of the armed struggle”. A third objective was that the ANC be


recognised as the ‘sole legitimate representative’ of the ‘oppressed people’ of South Africa.\textsuperscript{357} This last objective was by no means easy to attain, as the ANC competed among African states with the splinter group, the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) for this title.\textsuperscript{358} This outward orientation, indeed placement of the ANC \textit{outside} the key arena where it was attempting to bring about change, had some impact on the subsequent policies of the ANC in government, and resulted initially in great dislocation for the Party regarding the type of foreign policy an ANC-in-government would pursue. Hence, while the \textit{organisation’s} foreign policy had been fine-tuned by the middle of the 1990s, the ANC itself had not given enough thought to the nature of the external relations of a ‘normalised’ South African state.\textsuperscript{359}

Uncertainty over which policy direction to take – and significant identity-influencing factors - derived from the party, national and international levels, as well as historical context.

\textit{Party level}

At the party level, three distinct ideological traditions on international affairs have been noted: the liberal internationalist (1912-1960); the socialist/Marxist-Leninist/solidarist (1960-1993); and the neoliberal/pragmatic (1993 onwards).\textsuperscript{360} “While these paradigm shifts correspond to a chronological progression with one phase periodically succeeding the other, usually in response to external stimuli…in policy terms they overlap”.\textsuperscript{361} ‘Liberal internationalism’ in the early years of the ANC’s existence was conditioned by a domestic policy of peaceful petition of the South African government. The ANC was at this time still an elitist political association, with limited political goals. Failing to obtain opportunities to meet with

\textsuperscript{359} Interview with Prof. Anthoni van Nieuwkerk, January, 2010.
\textsuperscript{361} Graham Evans, “South Africa’s Foreign Policy After Mandela: Mbeki and His Concept of An African Renaissance”, \textit{The Round Table}, 88, No. 352 (1999).
SA government representatives in South Africa, the ANC sought common cause with independence and anti-colonialist movements elsewhere in Africa, and in Asia, and also to make its case to Western powers. In 1919, an ANC delegation made the journey to the Paris Peace Talks at Versailles. In 1927, the ANC’s Josiah Gumede travelled to Brussels to represent the organisation at the League Against Imperialism. In the midst of World War II, basing their arguments on provisions for self-determination contained in the 1942 Atlantic Charter, the ANC leadership sought to internationalise its struggle, as encapsulated in the document, *Africans’ Claims in South Africa*[^362^], adopted at the Annual Conference of the ANC in 1943.

Ever more heavy-handedness by the state and the eventual banning of the ANC in 1960 prompted a crucial change in its international approach, already alluded to in earlier paragraphs: the ANC in exile became responsible for the continued existence of the organisation as a whole. Alliance with the superior strategic and organisational capabilities of the SACP imbued the ANC with an ideological hue at a decisive point in world history, the height of the Cold War. Organisational culture and processes also underwent dramatic change, inspired by Leninist vanguardism and democratic centralism, and well as the basic necessity of survival in exile. This period, which would last until the closing years of apartheid, derived its international successes in part from the ANC’s successful framing of apartheid as a ‘crime against humanity’. While the ANC would not have described itself as such, it was adopting a solidarist[^363^] conception of international society. While suspicious of the West and aware of the limits of the United Nations - the main propagators of ‘human rights’ - the organisation nonetheless subscribed to a view that human rights were indivisible, and that the South African situation impinged on the morality of the

[^362^] Ellis and Sechaba argue that the ANC was, in fact, uncomfortable with the internationalization of its struggle, given that this “ran somewhat counter to its nature and tradition. It had always been an organisation little concerned with events outside South Africa and without any ideology or political programme beyond a broad African nationalism.” See Stephen Ellis and Tsepo Sechaba, *Comrades against Apartheid: The ANC & the South African Communist Party in Exile* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992): 42. Nonetheless, circumstances compelled it to adopt this mode of action. See the document at: [http://www.sahistory.org.za/pages/library-resources/official%20docs/preface-african-claims.htm](http://www.sahistory.org.za/pages/library-resources/official%20docs/preface-african-claims.htm).

[^363^] ‘Solidarism’ is defined as a conception of international society that “assumes that individuals are its ultimate members and that they have rights and duties in international law: individuals are legitimate subjects and not objects of international society…[it implies] a universal standard of justice and morality”. See Nicholas J. Wheeler, “Pluralist or Solidarist Conceptions of International Society: Bull and Vincent on Humanitarian Intervention”, *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 21, Issue 3 (1992): 468.
ANC solidarity was not only born of principle, but of necessity, as it drew upon the expertise and material assistance of patrons as far afield as Northern Ireland (the IRA)\textsuperscript{364} and Cuba.

The assassination of the military leader, Chris Hani, in April 1993 muted the voice of an important constituency in the ANC, namely the MK cadres who had gone into battle for the liberation movement and endured many arduous years in exile in various African countries. In fact, “(w)ith Hani’s untimely death the ANC was burying not only …one of the most ardent voices of radicalism in the organization, Mandela was also symbolically burying the organization’s previous incarnation as a liberation movement”.\textsuperscript{365} However, this was not a clean break, as exile and underground cultures have continued to vie for dominance in the ANC as a political formation.

Mandela’s personal prestige and international status helped to mask many of the contradictions in thinking within the organisation at the time. As a sample, there were the differences between those who had been socialised politically within the country – the so-called ‘in-ziles’ – and those who had been active in conducting the struggle abroad, the exiles, which heavily influenced the political culture within the party. The ANC leadership realised in 1991 that it required a “systematic reappraisal of foreign policy”.\textsuperscript{366}

The third period, labelled ‘neoliberal/pragmatic’ by Evans, cannot be neatly encapsulated, as it is still in progress, with its postulates hotly contested by the ANC and its allies. While it appears that in the aftermath of apartheid the ANC did come under the influence of global neoliberal ideology as diffused by training programmes of the IMF and its loan disbursement requirements, this was not an unproblematic acceptance by the Party.\textsuperscript{367} This periodisation brings the narrative more or less up to date with the chronological focus, and the analytical subject, of this thesis.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{364} Ellis and Sechaba, \textit{Comrades Against Apartheid}, 106.
\item \textsuperscript{365} Alden, “From Liberation Movement to Political Party”, 78.
\item \textsuperscript{366} Evans, “South Africa in Remission”, 255.
\item \textsuperscript{367} See Taylor, \textit{Stuck in Middle GEAR}.
\end{itemize}
**National level**

At the national level, ANC foreign policy was confounded by two factors: a lack of resources and the new democratic political environment. The demands of economic development at home had to be balanced with the demands of an activist foreign policy in defence of human rights and towards promoting democracy. Conceptions of the national interest had to be subjected to democratic scrutiny as one important component of a progressive foreign policy. In addition was the suggestion that for a society characterised by inequality, foreign policy should take a low priority in the allocation of national resources, giving higher priority to distributive justice domestically. \(^{368}\)

It is generally underestimated, or underplayed, just how contingent were the negotiations and transition processes in South Africa. Southall has noted that predictions about post-Apartheid South Africa’s foreign policy were ambitiously predicated on the assumption that democracy was assured. Neither analysts nor practitioners took into due account the extent to which South Africa’s incremental moves toward a democratic dispensation (and of which type) that was at no point irreversible, had an impact on the type of foreign policy the country was able to pursue. \(^{369}\) This view provides a valuable insight into why South Africa’s ‘human rights’ foreign policy gradually became one of measured pragmatism, in response to various domestic economic imperatives, from investment opportunities, to funding prospects for the ANC. It also provides some idea of the resource mobilisation and extraction challenges posed for the ANC by its assumption of power in a country almost on its knees economically, and in dire need of social and political reform. As an indication, between 1985 and 1994 South Africa was a net exporter of capital. The country declared a debt standstill in 1985 and faced an unfriendly international environment in the last days of apartheid, with IMF loans drying up and the maturity structure on older loans shortening owing to political pressure from the US anti-apartheid lobby. The country ran a current account deficit of some R2bn in


1994, placing tangible limits on the ambitious agenda of the future foreign policy of the incoming government.

**International level**

Internationally, ANC foreign policy was on the back foot by the time the party came to power in 1994. During apartheid, the ANC’s relations with wealthy Western nations were based on the mobilisation for sanctions aimed at crippling the South African economy. When Western governments lifted sanctions soon after De Klerk’s 1990 speech unbanning the ANC, well ahead of the ANC’s timetable, and with disregard for its stated conditions for their removal, the party’s position was weakened and it was forced to adapt rapidly to new international realities. These included the supplanting of ‘geopolitics’ by ‘geo-economics’ in the aftermath of the Cold War (meaning less support for its cause) and, probably most importantly, the realisation that the economic and political alternatives represented by the Soviet Union had disappeared. This meant that the ANC did not find much support in the West, not only for its plans for keeping pressure on the government during the crucial negotiations phase, but also for its proposed interventionist economic policies at home.

The organisation accordingly amended its foreign policy to accord more closely with the dictates of the ‘New Diplomacy’ paradigm of the then-Director-General of the Department of Foreign Affairs, Neil van Heerden. This policy was one of the first efforts by the apartheid regime to change its approach to Southern Africa following the destabilisation of the 1980s. Henceforth, the security apparatus was marginalised in determining foreign policy (as discussed in section 5.1, p154), leading to a more conciliatory, economics-focused foreign policy in the region. “The ostensible objective of the New Diplomacy was to open up the region to South African

---


371 These conditions were contained in the ANC’s ‘Harare Declaration’, which outlined the ANC’s negotiating plan with the South African government. They included: ‘the adoption of a new constitution and the termination of all armed hostilities’ (Articles 21.6 and 21.7). See Thomas, The Diplomacy of Liberation, 170.

372 Alden, “From Liberation Movement to Political Party”, 74.
commerce and trade, but the ulterior goal was undoubtedly to tie the hands of any future ANC-led government with respect to South Africa’s geopolitical position as regional hegemon”.\textsuperscript{373} It represented a shift of style (diplomacy instead of coercion) by the National Party government, but the ‘substance’ of regional economic hegemony remained in place.\textsuperscript{374} It sought to establish South Africa’s role as the pre-eminent power in southern Africa. Meanwhile, “(i)n a series of policy documents, the ANC recognized the dramatic changes in the international society, the collapse of its long-time ally, the Soviet Union, and the rise of a new multi-(or uni-)polar international order under capitalist socio-economic hegemony and dominated politically by the United States”.\textsuperscript{375} Thabo Mbeki, the Head of the ANC’s Department of International Affairs, recognising, for the time being, the importance of ‘world opinion’, pronounced on the country’s future prospects and its context,

South Africa will achieve a transition to a non-racial democracy during a period when there is a general universal tendency towards the establishment of political systems whose features include multi-party democracy, respect for individual human rights and movement away from centrally planned economies.\textsuperscript{376}

There is agreement by some authors that “an internal ANC consensus has proved to be elusive on issues such as the role which human rights considerations should play in the conduct of external relations”.\textsuperscript{377} To complicate matters, the ANC as a political party sought to continue its own track of foreign relations, albeit with changed priorities from the struggle era. Even once in government, it viewed inter-party relations at the international level as an important means of achieving some of its international (and party political) objectives.\textsuperscript{378} This enabled the party to continue many of its more controversial relations, especially with leaders such as Suharto, Castro and Qaddafi, keeping them ‘separate’ from questions of national foreign policy.

\textsuperscript{373} Evans, “South Africa in Remission”, 255.
\textsuperscript{374} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{375} Döpcke, “Foreign Policy and Political Regime”, 308.
\textsuperscript{377} Ibid., 39. Also see Nathan, “Interests, ideas and ideology”.
\textsuperscript{378} ANC, 1997. “Developing a Strategic Perspective”, online.
The organisation’s main shortcoming was thus in failing to separate its state responsibilities from its commitments as a political party and again, from its politics as a liberation movement. Although its identity as a ‘liberation movement’ was the basis for high expectations from the international community about the ANC’s approach to human rights, it was, paradoxically, used by the party to justify a number of associations considered ‘dubious’ by the West, and human rights activists globally.

As the party entered Mbeki’s two terms as state president, its internationalist stance was exposed to the harsh light of day by the growing tensions within the tripartite alliance. The ANC’s allies further to the left of the political spectrum, and those based in civil society, were progressively seen as the carriers of the banner of internationalism and progressivism, while the party itself acted within the limits and upon the motivations of governing power. “In this sense, the changes wrought by Mbeki have been inspired by large doses of pragmatism and moderation in recasting South Africa’s role in a manner more commensurate with its size”.379

To appreciate Mbeki’s task, however, it is worthwhile to consider the institutional and policy context that served as a backdrop to his modifications, by analysing the Mandela foreign policy.

5.3. Mandela’s foreign policy: unsettled notions of security, the national interest, and the limited resource of international acclaim

By 1994, the year of the first all-race elections, it was generally expected in the West, given the role played by one of the largest international advocacy campaigns in history, and the nature of the ANC’s struggle, that human rights and democracy-promotion and protection would form a cornerstone of the new government’s foreign policy, or at least that South Africa would be a force for positive change in Africa. As noted by The Economist in 1995, “Ever since Nelson Mandela was elected…foreigners have dreamed of him as a continental troubleshooter”.380

379 Alden and le Pere, “South Africa’s Post-Apartheid Foreign Policy”, 72.
Hopes were pinned on more than Mandela, however, as the country’s successful “negotiated revolution” raised hopes that the model itself could be emulated elsewhere in Africa.\(^{381}\) The general warmth and sense of goodwill that attended South Africa’s emergence from decades of isolation obscured the tensions that would be inherent in a position of international messianism, and which would raise thorny challenges for the country’s political leadership for some years afterward. These tensions mainly revolved around what the ‘national interest’ would comprise. For example, would ‘national development’ take precedence over repaying debts incurred by the apartheid state? In addition, there was the debate between the competing normative regimes of the global human rights discourse on one hand, and African/liberation movement solidarity, on the other. In the final analysis, this debate concerned who the ultimate referents of national security doctrines were, states or people. Thus, while there was great expectation, there still remained the questions of which norms to adopt, and the difficult discussion of which commitments would take precedence was continually postponed.

At an institutional level, it has been well-documented how little the executive was accountable to the legislature as Mandela’s presidency wore on. This did not present much of a change from the pre-1994 scenario, however. As noted by Raymond Suttner, former chair of the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Foreign Affairs (1994-1997), the executive’s foreign policy decisions under apartheid were highly insulated from parliamentary scrutiny and input. This was owing to a tradition of exclusive foreign policymaking, involving the Head of Government and the Foreign Minister; as well as the secrecy that attended South Africa’s foreign policy decisions in the dying days of apartheid. Suttner linked the institutional weaknesses and disjuncture during Mandela’s presidency to the incoherent foreign policy that resulted:

> The failure to talk to one another before important decisions makes it harder to have good relations [between the Foreign Ministry and Parliament]. It impedes the type of common reflection on policy that is needed to move away from \textit{ad hoc} approaches to foreign relations.\(^{382}\)

Much of Mandela’s tenure as President of South Africa is portrayed as a period of fluidity with respect to public policy, especially foreign policy, during which greater emphasis was placed on national reconciliation. Mandela’s 1993 article in the journal *Foreign Affairs* is routinely cited as the starting point of the story of post-apartheid foreign relations.\(^{383}\) There are very few discussions that consider how the choice of a human rights-based foreign policy became a plausible – or even an expected – one for the African National Congress (ANC), given its close relations with states such as Cuba and Libya, during its three decade-long liberation struggle; and its lukewarm relationship with the United States and United Kingdom, owing to their accommodation of South Africa’s apartheid regime; not to mention the organisation’s own patchy history of human rights abuses in exile, and in its prosecution of the armed struggle.\(^ {384}\) There is the additional factor of competing cultures and ideological traditions within the ANC that rendered policy coherence difficult at the best of times.

For Nelson Mandela,\(^ {385}\) the six pillars of South Africa’s future foreign policy were to be:  

- The centrality of *human rights* to international relations, embracing economic, social and ecological rights, in addition to political rights;  
- The value of *democracy promotion*  
- The centrality of *justice and international law* in the relations between nations  
- Internationally-agreed, *non-violent conflict resolution* mechanisms  
- The centrality of *Africa* to South Africa’s foreign policy concerns  
- The dependence of economic development on *international cooperation* in an ‘interdependent’ world.

This ambitious list sought to balance state rights with human rights, and economic rights with political rights. It served to notify the international community that the

\(^ {383}\) Mandela, “South Africa’s Future Foreign Policy”.

\(^ {384}\) Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report, Section 5: Findings and Recommendations, Chapter 3: Holding the ANC accountable, pp641-669. An important new contribution to this analysis is made in Matthew Graham, “Coming in from the cold: The Transitional Executive Council and South Africa’s reintegration into the international community”, *Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*, 49, No.3 (July 2011).

‘new’ South Africa would be a different kind of state from apartheid South Africa; and almost seamlessly positioned the country within the prevailing international discourse on a ‘new world order’, characterised by the rule of international law, the primacy of human rights and great power peace. Moreover, the sixth point on the list conceded – albeit without labelling it as such - the constraining influence of ‘globalisation’, whose perceived all-pervasiveness was gradually to take hold of the collective imagination of the top ANC leadership through the early 1990s and beyond.\footnote{For a detailed discussion of this process as it related to the acceptance by the ANC top leadership of neoliberal economic ideas, see Taylor, \textit{Stuck in Middle GEAR?}, Chapters 3 and 4.}

Two elements of the post-liberation history of the ANC combined to create dilemmas for the organisation, however. These were: its dubious legacy of a ‘miracle’ transition from apartheid, which was set up as an example to others; and, South Africa’s material power, which resulted in high levels of dependence by other countries in the region, along with trepidation concerning how the government would conduct itself in its ‘backyard’.

In one sense, much was expected of South Africa, both in its immediate region, and on a global scale, because of its relatively peaceful transition; and because of its position as the pre-eminent power in sub-Saharan Africa. It was expected to be a positive ‘force’ and yet it had to show great sensitivity and circumspection in how it projected this force. In the few years on either side of the transition, because there was a great deal of uncertainty and a lack of clarity about the form that the ‘moral high ground’ would take – whether loyalty to African politics or to new global norms – this was a period of uncertainty, and great expectation – for South African policymakers and practitioners.

An early indicator of the direction South Africa was inclined to take was given by the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP). Before this state-driven development programme was shelved in June 1996, it featured prominently in the self-perception of the South African government. This was most noticeable in the 1996 Department of Foreign Affairs Green Paper (Discussion Document). The RDP was central in positioning South Africa’s relations with its neighbours, and
with more wealthy donors in the Global North, adding “a further dimension…to South Africa’s relations with the international community”.

The Document sought the regionalisation of the programme for broader impact in Southern Africa, as well as the popularisation of the goals of the RDP in a bid to win financial support. A member of DFA was seconded to the RDP office to strengthen coordination between the two areas of government, giving an indication of the need for pragmatism and planning in South Africa’s foreign policy.

In spite of new policy directions, however, Mandela was seen as making important foreign policy decisions by relying largely on his own instincts and judgements. An anecdote told by Raymond Suttner bears out this contention. Suttner, the first Chair of the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Foreign Affairs, and a long-time ANC member, asserts that the timing of South Africa’s switching of official diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to China in 1996 was the sole prerogative of Mandela. While Mandela as an individual became a valuable resource in the diplomacy of the first ANC government, this was a double-edged sword as illustrated when limits to his usefulness became apparent, as in the Saro-Wiwa crisis in Nigeria; and his stature also delayed South Africa’s mutation into ‘just another country’, relieved of the baggage of high international expectation. Perceptions by decision makers of South African ‘exceptionalism’ both posed the potential for overstated foreign policy ambitions, and for the appearance of ‘smugness’ about South Africa’s relatively peaceful transition and elevated position in international society.

Hence, Mandela’s presidency, steeped in moralism and an almost cosmopolitan international outlook that was supported by a degree of international goodwill, provided the perfect foil for what was to come in the pragmatic foreign policy of

389 Interview with author, 4th July, 2007, Johannesburg.
Mbeki. In a condition of flux, with state institutions still being formed, Mandela was in no position to allocate resources to foreign policy projects of whatever type. Moral stands were by then not as costly as they would later become, with the exception of the Nigeria debacle which indeed proved politically costly, and foreign policy itself was still characterised by uncertainty and the personal magnetism and impact of Mandela.\textsuperscript{392}

5.4. Influence as a function of institutional freedom and legitimating power

Measuring the ANC’s influence on foreign policy outcomes is facilitated by an analytical division between various points of contact between the Party and the policy process. These include,

a. party diplomacy;

b. the personal or presidential diplomacy of Mbeki, and other key individuals;

c. the party policy-making process; and,

d. State Institutions: The Department of Foreign Affairs and Parliament.

Influence over foreign policy implies that foreign policy would change from an expected starting point, after interventions by the party structure or leadership. The proposed starting point is the classical realist prediction of international expansion following growth in national power evident during Mbeki’s terms of office (1999-2008). Each of the aforementioned analytical categories will be discussed in turn.

a. Party diplomacy

While diplomacy is considered to be “negotiations between political entities which acknowledge each other’s independence”,\textsuperscript{393} this level of the ANC’s international relations merits attention. The primary reason for this is that the by now well-known ‘symbiotic’ relations between political and business figures in South Africa leave the democratic system open to exploitation by less-than-savoury transnational interests, and pose the potential for undue influence of the country’s foreign policy in ways that benefit the party, to the detriment of state interests. This reality also


complicates the task of separating clearly the ANC’s foreign policy from South Africa’s foreign policy.

The ANC runs a sophisticated network of party-to-party and party to business contacts worldwide. Some of these links have been revealed in insalubrious circumstances, as for example, the ANC’s alleged ‘diplomacy’ in the Iraq ‘Oil for Food’ scandal (as detailed below). Other links are more in line with the party’s progressive image, such as its membership in the Socialist International (SI), a worldwide organisation of some 170 social democratic, socialist and labour parties.394 The centre-left orientation of the party also secured the South African government’s participation in successive Progressive Governance Summits.395

In recent years, especially in light of a number of corruption scandals, such as the involvement of an ANC front company, Imvume, in the Iraq Oil for Food scandal, and the allegations of funds derived from wrongdoing in the notorious 1999 arms deal destined for the ANC, much of this aspect of the party’s relations with the outside world have been wrapped in an ever tighter veil of secrecy. This has prompted calls by domestic civil society actors for transparency in the allocation of funds by private donors to political parties, a call that is resisted by the major South African political parties, including the ANC.

The ANC has conducted diplomacy on the Zimbabwe issue, through direct party contacts with both ZANU-PF and the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). This has formed part of a ‘good cop, bad cop’/ ‘quiet diplomacy’ approach under Thabo Mbeki,396 which nonetheless bore little fruit. This approach was vindicated to some extent, however, by showing that indeed, the ANC was keeping channels of communication with Robert Mugabe open by refraining from

---

395 The Progressive Governance Summit is an annual conference of the Network for Progressive Governance. Membership is by invitation only, changing as government leadership changes. Current members of the Network include: Argentina, Brazil, and South Africa. The United Kingdom was a member under Labour leadership. See http://www.pgs.gov.za/history.htm.
engaging in ‘megaphone’ diplomacy. This in itself, Mugabe’s continuing disastrous rule notwithstanding, may be considered a measure of success in an otherwise cheerless effort, considering that any more strident measures might have had altogether more disastrous consequences.\textsuperscript{397} ANC also maintains links with numerous other former liberation movements in Africa and abroad, that potentially influence the direction of South African foreign policy. Examples of this include its links with MPLA (Angola), FRELIMO (Mozambique), SWAPO (Namibia) and even the SPLM in Sudan. The Party’s historical links with ZANU-PF’s liberation-era rival, ZAPU, have been partially blamed for Mbeki’s failure to win the respect and cooperation of Mugabe during his facilitation of a resolution to the Zimbabwe crisis.

\textbf{b. Personal and presidential diplomacy}

Nelson Mandela’s renown as a statesman of global acclaim lent itself to personal diplomacy to such an extent that he was able single-handedly to spearhead DFA’s mediation in the extradition of the Lockerbie bombers from Libya for trial at Scottish courts in The Hague.\textsuperscript{398} The institutional obstacles encountered by the Department of Foreign Affairs during the transition to democracy and afterward, lent Mandela the ability to act independently in implementing South Africa’s foreign policy. While for his part, Mbeki attempted to rely more on multilateralism, the centralisation of foreign policy formulation in the presidential office afforded South Africa’s second democratically-elected president a central role in this process. According to one observation, “The presidency, the primary locus of policy, has been entrenched through formal institutionalisation and a marginalisation of party interests, so that it now sets not only foreign-policy goals, but is the sole architect of an overarching foreign-policy vision”.\textsuperscript{399} This is not to be confused with the role of the party, as it is widely noted that Mbeki effected a gradual distance between himself and the party in the making of public policy. This distance became increasingly apparent in the disjuncture between the ANC and Mbeki on important foreign policy issues, such as Zimbabwe, for example.

\textsuperscript{397} For the debate on the merits of South Africa’s ‘quiet diplomacy’ approach, see James Hammill and John Hoffman, “Quiet Diplomacy or Appeasement? South African Policy towards Zimbabwe”, \textit{The Round Table}, 98, Issue 402 (2009).
\textsuperscript{399} Alden and Le Pere, “South Africa’s Post-Apartheid Foreign Policy”, 72.
Thabo Mbeki was frequently lampooned in the press for being a ‘foreign policy president’ or ‘absentee president’, and indeed was widely seen as being more adept at dealing with foreign affairs than with domestic issues. While this criticism was often justified, it missed a valuable point about Mbeki. In the aftermath of the Mandela presidency, and the deep affective and ideological resources Mandela had access to, Mbeki succeeded in articulating a broad, and possibly more sustainable, vision for South African foreign policy, and much of his early presidency was spent publicising, and cultivating support for, this vision. The merits of his ideas, as well as those of his approach, along with their personal and institutional underpinnings, have been debated at length, but these ideas contributed substantially to the formation of a distinct South African state identity. Mbeki’s personal and presidential diplomacy were infused with the ideas of race, African nationalism, and what some have termed “racial nativism”, “an idea that the true custodians of African culture are the natives”. These ideas coloured key decisionmakers’ views of South Africa and its place in the world.

Mbeki’s ideas about Africa’s insertion as an active player in international affairs, which gave rise to his African Renaissance project, have also been linked to the more imprecise idea of personal, national and continental ‘self-determination’. The African Renaissance had three aims: to prove Africans’ ability to govern democratically; to assert the value of African-ness; and, to restore African agency to the decisions over its destiny, for example in the resolution of conflicts (‘African solutions to African problems’) and in the cultivation of the economic conditions for prosperity.

These notions informed the implementation of foreign policy at the departmental level, as Dr Manelisi Genge, Head of the Policy, Research and Analysis Unit in the Department from 2002 to 2008, affirmed. He noted that under Mbeki ‘colonialism’

---

401 Mangcu, *To the Brink*, 2.
and indeed, ‘anti-imperialism’ had attained new significance in South Africa’s state identity, as domestically, Mbeki had resuscitated the label of apartheid as ‘colonialism of a special type’. Indeed, Mbeki and the ANC also used this terminology (‘global apartheid’) to describe the state of global socio-economic inequality. Use of the term almost immediately forged solidarity between other formerly colonised states, particularly those still undergoing development.

Unfortunately for Mbeki and for the fate of South Africa’s image abroad, this new state identity was not an uncomplicated one, and the very image of corrupt and inept African leadership Mbeki had attempted to challenge was confirmed, and indeed caricatured, by his own action and inaction, notably on AIDS and Zimbabwe. This does not diminish the power of this identity as a perceptive lens through which Mbeki and his closest advisers weighed decisions about South Africa’s international activism, however. In fact, Western criticism may have strengthened these perceptual lenses.

c. The party policymaking process

The African National Congress’s highest decision-making body is the 5-yearly National Conference. One close observer of the ANC draws a distinction between decisions taken by government office-holding party members, and those taken by the decision-making structures of the ANC as a whole. This means that major decisions that do not form part of resolutions emanating from National Conferences, or that are collective decisions of the NEC (the highest decision-making body between Conferences), are in fact the decisions of components of the organisation that do not necessarily enjoy the assent of the broader membership. This was most clearly evident in the monumental struggle over the replacement of

---

404 Interview with the author, 24 July, 2007, Pretoria. ‘Colonialism of a special type’ is a term that described South Africa’s unique situation in which the colonial ruling class – usually located in the metropole – and the oppressed colonial majority were located in the same country. Adapted from O’Malley, Padraig. No date. Website of the Nelson Mandela Centre of Memory and Dialogue. Accessed at: http://www.nelsonmandela.org/omalley/index.php/site/q/03lv02424/04lv02730/05lv03005/06lv03132/07lv03140/08lv03144.htm on 5 September, 2011.
the social-democratic Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) national economic development programme, with the neoliberal GEAR economic policy. As a prominent and notorious example, Mandela and Mbeki had presented GEAR in 1996 as a *fait accompli*, citing the non-negotiability of ‘globalisation’ when it was clearly the position of the organisation at large that “(w)hile globalisation is a reality, it is not a fixed and unchallengeable process in which there are no alternatives”. The introduction of GEAR heightened an already-simmering debate within the tripartite alliance about the future direction of domestic economic policy, and started to strain relations between the ANC and its alliance partners.

The ruling party exercises significant influence on decision-making structures, notwithstanding the occasional independent political stances of individual senior party members. This is because the same individuals occupy key decision-making positions in both the Executive (President, Deputy President, most Cabinet Ministers and some Directors-General) and in the ruling party, especially the National Executive Committee and the smaller National Working Committee.

According to Ebrahim Ebrahim, a senior ANC member, who also served as Chair of the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Foreign Affairs,

> Policy comes from the ANC, from the resolutions passed at the ANC congress, to the NEC (it has a subcommittee on foreign affairs) which meets every 2 months. It starts with the President’s report, which always includes international affairs. Then there is general discussion. It can make recommendations, amendments, and critiques. For example, on the question of Nepad and the Renaissance, which came from the Presidency, it was discussed by the NEC and then endorsed.

While the Party’s apparently democratic policymaking processes may allow for considerable grassroots input on a wide array of policy questions, from local branch, to Regional Executive Committee, to NEC, Lodge identifies an important anomaly in the social identity of the ANC:

> The social character of its following prompts the ANC to maintain that it provides ‘a disciplined force of the left’, representing ‘the needs and aspirations of the

---


overwhelming majority of South Africans, many of whom are poor’, despite its growing financial dependence on big business.\textsuperscript{409}

In this way, the party’s policymaking system is somewhat vulnerable to the influence of well-resourced lobbyists and campaigners.

However, not only is the ANC party machinery, especially at election time, highly dependent on large disbursements from the private sector within South Africa that remain undisclosed. It is also the beneficiary of funding from other controversial sources, such as the governments of China and Malaysia, with at times negative consequences for transparency in policymaking. (See sub-section a.)

d. DFA and Parliament

There are thus two competing trends at play: on one hand, institutional freedom was gradually won as the consequence of the African National Congress’s unquestionable political hegemony in South African society, and the increasing blurring of the lines between state and party, with the appointment of central party figures or people close to the President in pivotal state institutions. At the polls, the party regularly won majorities in excess of 66%, translating into overwhelming majorities in parliament. On the other hand, this freedom was not necessarily won for party positions, as Luthuli House (as ANC party headquarters in Johannesburg is known) became increasingly marginalised from the policymaking apparatus with Mbeki’s consolidation of his own political position. Thus, while the ability to act with progressively less opposition to policy proposals was being enhanced, this was not necessarily in favour of the party. As Chothia and Jacobs note,

The major losers in the restructuring of the presidency, and its effects on policymaking and the exercise of political power, are parliament and the ANC... But it is the position of the ANC as a political entity relative to the presidency that has been the most negatively affected. As the president builds the capacity of his executive office, so the ANC’s capacity dwindles. Mbeki wants officials at ANC headquarters to be managers, dealing with organisational matters such as errant branches and building election machinery rather than with political issues.\textsuperscript{410}

\textsuperscript{409} Ibid., 192.
At the helm of DFA were two individuals who were seamlessly aligned with Mbeki’s foreign policy vision, Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma as Minister, and Ayanda Ntsaluba as Director-General, or administrative head, of the Department. Aziz Pahad, brother of Mbeki’s closest confidant and Minister in the Presidency, Essop Pahad, served as Deputy-Minister, joined by Sue van der Merwe, who has never enjoyed a high political profile, for Mbeki’s second term. This ensured that there were few bureaucratic struggles between the Presidency, the Party and the Department of Foreign Affairs over the direction of foreign policy during Mbeki’s term of office. DFA remained largely inconspicuous.

The National Assembly was similarly sidelined. In the 1999 election, the ANC won 266 out of 400 possible seats in Parliament. The Party gained 13 more seats in the overwhelming 2004 election victory, taking its tally to 279. This means that ANC members, elected to parliament on a party-list basis, and hence more accountable to party bosses than to local constituencies, comprise the bulk of parliamentary committee membership, intended as oversight of the Executive. However, a member of parliament has recently noted that “parliament’s role in the foreign policy decision making process is virtually absent”, and that, “(e)ven parliamentary debate between the ruling and opposition parties on matters of foreign policy tends to be limited with one or two exceptions”. Instead, it seems that debates between the ANC and the opposition regarding foreign policy are conducted in the media, with each attempting to score political points against the other for an apparently more ‘principled’ stance adopted. While the Parliamentary Hansard records that searching questions were raised by opposition parliamentarians, they were often treated with disdain, and even annoyance, by the Executive. For example, in response to the question raised by leader of the Official Opposition (Democratic Alliance), Tony Leon, to the Minister of Foreign Affairs,

What is the total cost to date to the Government for:

(a) Accommodation,
(b) Living expenses,
(c) Transport,

(d) And other associated costs relating to the residence in Pretoria of Jean-Bertrand Aristide, former president of Haiti?,

the following response was given:

1. The South African Government provides accommodation and services to former president Jean-Bertrand Aristide equivalent to those provided to a South African cabinet minister.
2. The South African Government generally owns the accommodation and assets provided for utilisation with regard to the residence in Pretoria of former president Jean-Bertrand Aristide and the costs related thereto, like those of Cabinet Ministers, are integrated into the operations of Government.412

Transparency is increasingly becoming an issue in the framing of South African foreign policy priorities, as few answers have come to light about the hosting of former President Aristide, for example, as well as the alleged intended despatch of weapons to Haiti at the height of that country’s political strife in 2004.413 The South African Ministry of Defence made fleeting reference, however, to a request from CARICOM for arms for Haiti.414 In addition, in spite of a general public outcry over the denial of a visa to the Dalai Lama by the South African authorities in March 2009, the decision was not reversed. This heightened speculation that South Africa’s foreign policy was being heavily influenced by consideration for its extensive trade relationship with China.415

5.5. Criticism from other political parties and movements

The legitimating power of the ANC, whether the party as a whole, or Thabo Mbeki its leader, to frame threats to South Africa’s security, and to mobilise resources for its preferred foreign policy outcomes was further limited by political opposition, depending on its source. There are two main sources of criticism of overall policy direction, or more broadly, ‘opposition’, to South Africa’s internationalist foreign

policy. One, which is less significant from the Party perspective, is the opposition from those outside the tripartite alliance. This strand of opposition includes, but is not limited to, the parliamentary opposition, which is led by the Democratic Alliance (DA), a right-of-centre political assemblage of traditionally-white, middle class opposition to the ANC. It can, however, “trace its lineage through a liberal tradition of parliamentary opposition to apartheid”. One of its progenitors, the Liberal Party of South Africa, was headed by the esteemed politician, Helen Suzman.

In August 2007, the DA leader, Tony Leon, lamented the loss of South Africa’s ‘reputation as an international moral beacon’. This was evident, he claimed, in South Africa’s ‘misplaced solidarity’ with governments such as those of Cuba and Iraq; and also in the South African government’s unhappy record on Zimbabwe. However, by this time, the ANC, and Thabo Mbeki in particular, had become quite impervious to the criticisms of the media and the parliamentary opposition. Contrast this with a time, at the height of the Abacha crisis in Nigeria under Mandela, when the government switched policy to take a tougher line against the Abacha regime. Black noted,

> With domestic critics decrying the apparent naivety and ineffectiveness of its quiet diplomacy, South Africa’s government now became an international hard-liner in the call for stern punitive measures against the Nigerian regime.

The second source of opposition emanates from within the tripartite alliance. While this opposition reached its apex on the Zimbabwe issue, its effects were minimal, as they did not threaten the alliance in any significant sense. COSATU has remained a member of the alliance and as noted earlier, the ANC performed even better in subsequent elections. In direct contravention of government’s ‘quiet diplomacy’ on Zimbabwe, COSATU staged a ‘fact-finding’ mission to Zimbabwe in 2004. The

---


5.6. Resource Mobilisation and Extraction under Mbeki (1999-2008)

\textit{Structural context}

In terms of a neoclassical realist analysis, the starting point is a change in relative power distribution; or at least a perception by decisionmakers of such change. The structural environment that greeted Thabo Mbeki’s ascent to power in 1999 was riven with challenges. Domestically, the economy was attempting a recovery from the global financial crisis of 1998, inflation stood at around 8 percent, and the country had endured its first experience of the vagaries of the international capital markets, as R42 billion in investment capital (inflows and outflows) changed hands over 7 months in 1998.\footnote{Chris Stals, Speech at the 52\textsuperscript{nd} Congress of the South African Nurserymen’s Association, Johannesburg, 17 May, 1999. Accessed at: \url{http://www.bis.org/review/r990519a.pdf} on 9 May, 2011.} Politically, Mbeki had just won a resounding mandate as President of the ANC at the organisation’s National Conference of 1997.

Meanwhile, US President Bill Clinton had, in April 1998, completed the first African tour by a sitting US President for 20 years. The visit was aimed at promoting the Africa Growth and Opportunity Bill, a trade facilitation policy for African states to enjoy preferential treatment in the US market; and democratisation on the continent.\footnote{BBC News. 1998. “Clinton starts African tour”, Monday March 23, 1998. Accessed online at: \url{http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/62091.stm}} Nigeria, one of Africa’s largest states and a competitor with South Africa for continental leadership, was in the throes of post-Abacha reconstruction, and Uganda, another potential rival, was engaged in talks aimed at resolving its domestic conflict with the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). South Africa’s immediate neighbourhood was simmering in the aftermath of the Lesotho crisis, which saw South Africa intervene in the neighbouring state under the auspices of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) to support the government of Pakalitha Moshili in September 1998, resulting in the deaths of some 130.
Globally, the United States and its allies were comfortably ensconced at the pinnacle of a world order they felt increasingly confident to design. This was the case to such an extent that NATO authorised an attack on Yugoslav (Serbian) troops in Kosovo in March 1999, in a bid to end the humanitarian crisis there. The post-Cold War world appeared to be ripe for the long-awaited ‘democratic peace’, facilitated by the diffusion of liberal values and the growing interdependence of the global economy. Yet, the growing economic strength of China, displacing the threat posed by Japan in the 1980s, was a harbinger of future challenges to US supremacy.

Through a neorealist lens, hence, the world was in the midst of a ‘unipolar moment’ – the duration of which, in any event, could only be short-lived as new challengers emerged. This scenario, as discussed previously, implied new responsibilities for intermediate powers and strong states in different regions of the world. While the US and its allies were interested in the promotion of democracy and a world safe for commerce, they showed in their reluctance to act in Rwanda in 1994, that they would be selective in their engagements in far-flung crises. It is in the context of this structural environment that Mbeki commenced his tenure as President of South Africa, and in which the present analysis begins. The discussion in the next two sections follows a chronological order, and discusses events and factors affecting state institutions related to foreign policy formulation; ideology and nationalism, all determinants of state power.

**National Power and State Power in Mbeki’s First Term: 1999-2004**

*After reconciliation, delivery: Consolidation of the State and a Visionary Foreign Policy*

A barely noted historical fact is that the South African state inherited by the African National Congress when it assumed power was little more than an apartheid-era relic. To the first democratic parliament, under the presidency of Nelson Mandela, fell the enormous task of reworking the country’s statutory environment, to

---


“elaborate and put in place the transformation policies [the country] needed”.\textsuperscript{424} While an interim constitution had been devised by the Conference for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) in 1993, prior to the drafting of the new Constitution, adopted in 1996, policies to guide the transformation of South Africa’s political, economic and social environment had now to be devised, and implemented.

Hence, the key aim of Thabo Mbeki’s first term as state president was the ‘implementation’ of various policy proposals developed during his tenure as deputy president under Nelson Mandela. While Nelson Mandela’s term of office was seen as emphasising ‘reconciliation’, Mbeki’s was widely expected to be characterised by a more ‘normal’ approach to political conflict and the building of political support.\textsuperscript{425} However, Mbeki’s tenure started uncertainly in spite of his overwhelming predominance within the ANC. This seemingly strong position saw him propelled to the Party leadership at the 50th National Conference at Mafikeng in 1997.\textsuperscript{426} A demanding context shaped by three factors marked the uncertainty of the early days of his administration: succeeding the superlative statesman, Nelson Mandela; the dramatic and exaggerated impact of increased global economic interdependence, or ‘globalisation’; and, the intractability of South Africa’s own socio-economic problems.\textsuperscript{427}

Mbeki’s sense of purpose was revealed in a far-reaching restructuring of the state’s policymaking organs during his first term (see Chapter 4). In terms of its overall vision and mission, foreign policy appeared to acquire a clearer rationale, as it became more aligned with the ANC’s dramatic switch from its domestic Reconstruction and Development Programme, to the Growth, Employment and Redistribution Strategy in 1996. In foreign policy, this shift signalled that

\textsuperscript{424} Thabo Mbeki, Presidential Speech at 51\textsuperscript{st} National Conference of the ANC, Stellenbosch University, Stellenbosch, 16 December, 2002. Accessed online at: \url{www.anc.org.za} on 1 November 2010.
\textsuperscript{426} For detailed accounts of Mbeki’s path to power within the ANC, see Mervyn Gumede, \textit{Thabo Mbeki and the Battle for the Soul of the ANC}; Gevisser, \textit{The Dream Deferred}.
\textsuperscript{427} Jacobs and Calland, \textit{Thabo Mbeki’s World}, 15.
South Africa under Mbeki had decided to engage more earnestly and vigorously with the forces of globalisation as a means of improving economic growth, generating employment and addressing inequality.  

In other words, this contentious domestic shift was designed to align South Africa’s development model, in its domestic and international dimensions, with the perceived requirements of globalisation. This meant greater openness to new economic partnerships with ‘non-traditional’ partners, and a new quiescence on the part of South Africa’s foreign policy, in a bid to win foreign investment.

The new president appeared to limit the impact of this demanding context by consolidating his own political position, and by strengthening the ANC’s political hegemony in South African society. This was achieved by wholesale changes to the management and organisation of the ANC: the party’s ‘modernisation’. In 1998, the Secretary-General, deputy Secretary-General, and Treasurer positions within the organisation became full-time positions, and became competitively remunerated.

Moreover, the Presidency of the ANC likewise became more powerful, with the president accorded the responsibility of appointing leaders of provincial administrations, over and above the wishes of ANC provincial party structures, which were usually under their own elected leadership. Contrary to views that prevailed by the end of his presidency, Mbeki presided initially over a professionalisation of the bureaucracy at Luthuli House, and was seen to be “governing South Africa more through the organization”. Indeed, it may be argued that Mbeki sought out the ANC less and less as his tenure wore on because of its culture of democracy. Some research on mass parties has argued that where there is a tension in a mass-based party between ‘ideological’ activist community and ‘pragmatic’ electorally oriented leadership, a loose coupling emerges, where it is quite easy for example, for delegates to participate in conferences, but the importance of conferences as decision-making bodies diminishes. Indeed, Mbeki

---

initiated a proposal to make National Conferences five-yearly instead of three-yearly occasions.\textsuperscript{\footnote{Gumede, “Modernising the ANC”, 38.}}

Meanwhile, the decade following the implementation of the government’s controversial GEAR macroeconomic policy in 1996 proved to be one of the best in terms of macroeconomic indicators in South Africa’s history since the 1960s. The budget deficit and inflation were brought to sustainable levels, along with the level of public debt.\textsuperscript{\footnote{Iraj Abedian, “Towards a post-GEAR macroeconomic policy for South Africa”, in “Trajectories for South Africa: Reflections on the ANC’s 2\textsuperscript{nd} National General Council’s discussion documents”, Policy: Issues and Actors (Special Edition), Vol. 18, No.2, ed., Omano Edigheji (Johannesburg: Centre for Policy Studies, 2005): 6.}}

However, these years were also marked by straitened times in the tripartite alliance between the ANC, COSATU, and the SACP. The clearest example of the limits on expendable state power to effect a certain policy outcome is South Africa’s position with respect to the Zimbabwe question, a crisis that became increasingly heated with that country’s 2000 Parliamentary elections. While South Africa was widely deemed to be the country most likely to be able to exert the leverage on Zimbabwe required to bring about change in Mugabe’s actions and policies, it was hamstrung in its capacity to conduct active intervention in the travails of its neighbour to the north.

According to a number of analysts, a major factor preventing Thabo Mbeki from supporting the position of the MDC, was his hesitance to be seen to be approving the rise of a union movement to political prominence, and potential leadership of Zimbabwe, during a time of heightened dissent within the tripartite alliance at home.\textsuperscript{\footnote{See Andrew Feinstein, After the Party: Corruption, the ANC and South Africa’s Uncertain Future (London and New York: Verso, 2009): 108. Also, Mbeki, Moeletsi. 2007. “Interview with political analyst and brother of South African President, Moeletsi Mbeki”. Transcript. Sunday 18 March, 2007. Accessed at: \url{http://skynewstranscripts.co.uk/transcript.asp?id=335} on 9 May, 2011.}}
his support for Mugabe against the MDC. Some in the ranks of COSATU and the ANC spoke covertly of whether Thabo should even see out his two terms.\footnote{Feinstein, \textit{After the Party}, 108.}

Indeed, by the first half of 2005, the SACP was ‘examining its options’ regarding remaining in the alliance, even prior to Mbeki’s dismissal of Zuma in mid-2005, to which it was opposed. Yet, the organisation decided against abandoning the ANC at a congress held in April that year.\footnote{Independent Online. 2005. “Communists elect not to run own poll race”. April 11, 2005. Accessed online at: \url{http://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/communists-elect-not-to-run-own-poll-race-1.238425}, on 27 February, 2011.}

Mbeki’s first term presented a perfect opportunity for the launching of a number of key foreign policy initiatives. First among these was the adoption of the AU Constitutive Act in July 2000, in which Mbeki was instrumental. Mbeki was also at this time constructing his socio-economic plan for Africa, which would later metamorphose into NEPAD. This was the foreign affairs project on which Mbeki expended much of his time and energy, travelling in Africa, and making representations to the G8 and the Association of Southeast Asian States (ASEAN) to obtain global support. South Africa also took a leading role in establishing the Pan-African Parliament, one of the new continental institutions, and won the right to host it. Further resources were allocated to Mbeki’s African Renaissance when the African Renaissance and Co-operation Fund Act was promulgated in 2001.\footnote{The fund consists of money appropriated by Parliament, in addition to other sources. In 2006, the amount allocated by the South African parliament was R150 million. See African Renaissance and International Co-operation Fund Accounting Officer’s Report for the year ended 31 March 2007. Accessed online at: \url{http://www.dfa.gov.za/department/report_2006-2007/arf%20report.pdf} on 16 March, 2011.}

Although this Fund does not utilise South African resources exclusively, they do comprise a substantial component. Mbeki’s first term was also marked by South Africa’s leading role in mediating an ending to the civil war in the DRC.

\textit{In summary}, Mbeki’s first term saw him preside over an increasing centralisation of political power in the Office of the State President. This started a process of alienation between himself and the ANC rank-and-file and alliance partners. Mbeki’s strengthened position enabled him to mobilise resources for grand gestures at the continental level, such as initiating the African agenda, and presidential diplomacy associated with it. He was unable, however, to deal successfully with
South Africa’s major foreign policy pre-occupation, Zimbabwe. This was owing to the sensitivity of the Zimbabwe issue for domestic politics, given that a key protagonist in the crisis was a political party with roots in the labour movement, the very type of opposition Mbeki feared most at home.

**National Power and State Power in Mbeki’s Second Term: 2004-2008**

**Material Power into Political Interests**

The dual themes of the ANC’s 2004 election campaign were “A Better Life for All” and “A People’s Contract”. These slogans signalled the urgency with which the party would seek to fulfil its domestic and international goals in its third term as the governing party of South Africa. For foreign policy this was interpreted as incremental increases in the annual appropriation to the Department of Foreign Affairs (from R2,3 billion in 2003/4 to R4,3 billion in 2007/8).439 Large amounts of funding were also made available by the National Treasury for additional spending, such as the construction of the Pan-African Parliament (R113 million), which South Africa won the bid to host. Additional resources were allocated to South Africa’s incipient development aid initiative, the African Renaissance Fund.

Thus, the executive faced little credible opposition in securing funds for the expansive goals of South Africa’s foreign policy. The Department of Foreign Affairs was not the only beneficiary, as the Department of Defence also received allocations which underwrote the maintenance of South African troops in at least four countries, Comores (2006), Burundi (2006-7), DRC (2006-7) and Darfur/Sudan (2006). ANC dominance in parliament was a secondary factor in this low level of opposition, as Parliament, too, voiced concerns about its marginalisation in deployment decisions.440 More important was the integrated governance system, and the dominance by the ANC’s NEC of the Executive. A key step in favour of solidifying South Africa’s capabilities and modalities for participating in international peacekeeping operations was the 1999 “White Paper

on Participation in International Peace Missions”.

This document sought to clarify the terms of engagement of South African troops, police and civilians in international peace missions. Yet, within a decade, it was up for review, owing to the rapid growth of South Africa’s continental peacekeeping responsibilities. (See Table 2)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>1 455</td>
<td>1 430</td>
<td>1 230</td>
<td>1 242</td>
<td>1 248</td>
<td>1 248</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea and Ethiopia Burundi</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>339</td>
<td>620</td>
<td>626</td>
<td>604</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1</strong></td>
<td><strong>123</strong></td>
<td><strong>1 579</strong></td>
<td><strong>1 686</strong></td>
<td><strong>4 477</strong></td>
<td><strong>4 358</strong></td>
<td><strong>4 462</strong></td>
<td><strong>4 900</strong></td>
<td><strong>4 016</strong></td>
<td><strong>4 860</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: South African participation in peacekeeping operations

While South Africa’s continental activities, and broader multilateral action proceeded apace, there was one issue on which the government was consistently understated in its public diplomacy: Zimbabwe. This culminated in Mbeki’s often quoted “Crisis? What Crisis?”, remark in relation to the withholding of election results by Zimbabwe’s Electoral Commission (ZEC) after the 2008 presidential poll.

By 2005, however, serious disagreements between COSATU and the government in the international arena were tabled in COSATU’s Review of 2004. These included

---


COSATU’s disapproval of free trade agreements slated for conclusion with India and China, as well as the policy of ‘quiet diplomacy’ with respect to Zimbabwe. To cap a difficult year for Mbeki, he was forced to dismiss his deputy president, Jacob Zuma, following the guilty verdict in the trial of Zuma’s financial adviser, Schabir Shaik. Zuma’s dismissal dealt a serious blow to Mbeki’s already questionable popularity within the ANC’s traditional constituency, and marked the beginning of a downward spiral for Mbeki’s own political fortunes, and, some have argued, for the ANC itself. In the press, and among religious groups, Mbeki was lauded for his decision on Zuma, however. In September 2005, some of the ANC’s more nefarious links to international crime and corruption were exposed in a UN report on the Iraqi Oil-for-Food scandal. The ANC’s involvement in this issue, through a front company tasked with raising money for the party, Imvume, shed new light on the party’s (and the South African government’s) position against the invasion of Iraq in 2003, as the UN inquiry claimed that the Iraqi government had used its dealings with Imvume as a lever to influence South Africa’s foreign policy. Indeed, the report shed light on the significance of the fact that, in April 2003, during the invasion of Iraq that had commenced in March, the ANC launched a vociferous popular campaign, titled ‘Stop the War’, the first and only international issue it had seen fit to mobilise on since the end of apartheid.

By the end of 2006, Mbeki was in a stronger position on international affairs, however. South Africa strengthened its ties with two major non-Western powers, Russia and China. Mbeki hosted Vladimir Putin on a state visit, which addressed, among other issues, the sale of nuclear fuel and technology to South Africa. South Africa had also managed to secure a deal with China, limiting the latter’s textile exports to South Africa, preceded by the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation

---


(FOCAC) Conference in November. The year ended with an announcement by UNCTAD that South Africa was the largest recipient of FDI in Africa in 2005, spurred mainly by the acquisition by Barclays plc of South Africa’s ABSA bank.447 On the flipside of the coin, South African commerce was also extending and diversifying its role in the African market, including acting as a valued partner to commercial interests from outside the continent.448

Also in 2007, the Heiligendamm Process had begun to entrench South Africa’s position, along with that of other intermediate states, as important partners in global governance. Domestically, the South African economy was at a high point, enjoying growth rates of some 4.9 percent for 2006. This was accompanied by growth in a number of sectors crucial to the South African economy – namely, construction, finance, transport and communication – and, a decline in unemployment figures.449 Yet, the relevant decisionmakers remained cognisant of the danger of over-extending South Africa’s capabilities. In responding to questions regarding possible South African military involvement in Somalia, the Minister of Defence noted,

“(I)t is not in the interests of Africa, nor South Africa, that we over commit ourselves seeing that South Africa is already rather over committed in Darfur, Burundi, the DRC, the Comoros.”450

At the same time, South Africa’s multilateralism started to assume a strong legalist complexion as Mbeki’s second term progressed. Representations made by South Africa’s ambassador to the United Nations, Dumisani Kumalo, increasingly brought down the wrath of Western powers and international human rights organisations during the country’s tenure as a non-permanent member of the Security Council (2007-8). South Africa’s position in the UN, was repeatedly seen as giving cover to governments of dubious reputation, such as the military junta in Myanmar and South Africa’s neighbour to the north, Zimbabwe. South Africa acted to preclude draft resolutions condemning human rights abuses in both states on the pretext that the Security Council was not the appropriate forum for the discussion of the human

---

447 Factual data in this paragraph is mainly derived from the Economist Intelligence Unit South Africa Country Reports: September and December, 2006.
448 In 2007, the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) purchased a 20% stake in South Africa’s Standard Bank Group for US$5.5bn. See Standard Bank website.
rights situation in these countries. Giving South Africa’s reasons for refusing to endorse the resolution against Myanmar, which called for the release of all political detainees and an end to military sexual violence, proposed in January 2007, Ambassador Dumisani Kumalo stated the following:

- That it would compromise the “good offices” of the Secretary General, at that time providing a ‘channel for private and confidential communication’ by Professor Ibrahim Gambari, the UN’s special envoy to Myanmar;
- That the matters raised in the resolution would “be best left to the Human Rights Council”; and,
- That the resolution would take the Security Council out of its mandated jurisdiction of ‘dealing with matters that are a threat to international peace and security’.

Mbeki underscored this statement in an interview with the national broadcaster, affirming that,

I am sure we will continue to insist…that the Security Council functions in a manner within a framework that is defined by international law. It can’t be the first one to break the law and put any matter on the agenda that it wishes.

South Africa’s multilateralism also favoured regional actions over multilateral interventions. This was also adduced as a reason for the country’s refusal to support the resolution against Myanmar. In the statement declaring its non-support of the UNSC Resolution against the military junta, Kumalo noted that a further factor influencing South Africa’s stance was the fact that ASEAN Ministers, meeting on 11 January 2007, had stated that Myanmar was not a threat to its neighbours.

Likewise, Mbeki promoted the idea of ‘African solutions to African problems’. South Africa deferred to the African Union’s decision not to abide by the ICC indictment of Sudanese president Mohammed al-Bashir, in spite of being a signatory to the Rome Statute.

---


Mbeki’s last full year in office, 2007, represented a bleak point in an already chequered tenure. While real GDP was growing at a steady pace, and the SACP had decided in favour of the tripartite alliance in the first half of the year, Mbeki was ousted as ANC president in a shocking, but not entirely unexpected, defeat at the ANC’s 52nd National Conference at Polokwane in December. Thus commenced a period of ‘lame duck’ presidency that was to end with his unceremonious dismissal by the ANC, presented as a ‘resignation’, on 20 September, 2008.

*In summary,* Mbeki’s second term witnessed a consolidation of South Africa’s international profile, with an increase in South Africa’s engagements in Africa, and a concern by top officials to engage in manageable operations in which South Africa could make a difference. Mobilising and extracting resources for these purposes was not hindered by any meaningful opposition. South African policymakers committed to giving meaning to the phrase ‘African solutions for African problems’ by engaging in peacekeeping and police reform in a number of African states. The need for international validation appeared to be dispensed with as the country adopted stronger stances against ‘Western unilateralism’, especially during its term of non-permanent membership of the UN Security Council.

**Conclusion**

Bringing back the state to analyses of South Africa’s post-apartheid foreign policy entails an engagement with issues of state capacity, and the ability of the governing class to mobilise and extract resources for foreign policy, based on its perceptions of relative power shifts in international relations. South Africa’s internationalism has, to a significant extent, been influenced by its position in the global political economy, as a small industrialising state, highly dependent on capital from the developed world, and on the markets of its neighbours for manufactured goods and commodities. This positioning and level of development predisposes the state to an outward posture, and one that seeks to limit conflict, especially destabilising violent conflict.
The ascent to power of the African National Congress, Africa’s oldest liberation movement, complicated its assessment of South Africa’s post-apartheid external environment. From viewing important sections of the international community as ideologically opposed to it, it needed to begin to cultivate links with global powers as potential markets and investors in South Africa’s reconstruction. This challenge endured, along with durable – and often contradictory - perceptual lenses, to confuse South Africa’s early foreign policy under Mandela. Mbeki’s presidency wrought fundamental changes in both the vision guiding South African foreign policy, and the institutional machinery for its implementation. Available resources for an ambitious foreign policy outlook that included the African agenda, reform of the multilateral institutions, and South-South cooperation, however, remained in short supply.

Owing to the nature of South African politics, in which the ANC, and its alliance partners, COSATU and the SACP, comprise the dominant political formation in the country, it is within the limits of this alliance that the process of legitimation is most significant. In other words, intra-alliance opposition is the main source of opposition to the ANC. Thus, to answer the question: to what extent does internationalism influence the foreign policy of South Africa, it is required to work inside the context of the dynamics of the tripartite alliance, and the room for manoeuvre of the ANC within bureaucratic institutions, especially the Department of Foreign Affairs, during the two terms of Thabo Mbeki, the most activist period of post-apartheid South Africa’s foreign policy.

The strengthening of the state machinery in relation to society, and the centralisation of foreign policy to an ever greater extent in the President’s office create the expectation of sharper perception and more purposive action on international questions, away from internationalism. However, this did not occur in South Africa, owing to resource constraints, and the domestic political context, in which the ANC was dominant, but still required the support of its political allies.
Chapter 6: Rising without sabre-rattling? The PT and Brazil’s internationalist foreign policy

“...Brazil has asserted its international ambitions without rattling a saber.”

Newsweek, April 18, 2009

“It appears that Lula has given economic policy to Wall Street and foreign policy to PT.”

Moisés Naím, editor of Foreign Policy, March 2008

“What is striking about Brazil’s great-power claims is that they are framed almost entirely in economic (and, to a lesser degree, cultural) terms. Whereas the other BRICs have invested in hard power, Brazil has traditionally devalued its military, instead emphasizing multilateral cooperation within international institutions.”

Patrick Stewart, The National Interest, July 7 2010

Introduction

Brazil is the largest economy in South America, and the tenth-largest in the world. The country’s diplomatic elite has long been guided by the ‘continental proportions’ of Brazil, and the ever-present foreign policy objective of winning for Brazil its ‘rightful place’ in international politics. Referring to Brazil as the ‘country of tomorrow’ has become a truism. Yet, even under a number of military governments from 1964 to 1985, Brazil’s changing power profile did not lead to aggression in the projection of its power abroad. This is a function both of how threats are perceived by the political class, and of Brazil’s relatively peaceful relations with all ten of its neighbours. Furthermore, Brazilian decision-makers have long been divided in their allegiances to a bifurcated national identity: identification with the West, and with the Third World.

Under Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Brazil’s president from 1995 to 2002, foreign policy assumed a posture of what some analysts term ‘autonomy through participation’. This was a way, according to the policy’s proponents, for Brazil to exercise more control over its future, by actively participating in the framing of new

---

international norms and regimes.\textsuperscript{454} This was in contrast to the President’s predecessors’ proclivities to distance Brazil from the overweening influence of great powers. In doing so, the Cardoso foreign policy, implemented by his foreign ministers Luiz Felipe Lampreia (January 1995-January 2001) and Celso Lafer (January 2001 – December 2002), sought to foster an international environment that was “as institutionalized as possible”.\textsuperscript{455} This form of foreign policy projection was based on Cardoso’s overriding conviction that a paradigm shift had occurred in international relations. This shift entailed the necessity of seeing movement in the global power balance less in terms of military or strategic influence, and more in terms of economic, commercial, and cultural projection:\textsuperscript{456} the ascendency of so-called ‘soft power’. This view came to epitomise the international outlook of those sectors of the Brazilian economy with external exposure. It also culminated in an acceptance of US primacy in international affairs, and the concomitant need to foster a strong, close relationship with the White House. It was not completely pliant, however, as Cardoso’s foreign policy, dubbed ‘critical convergence’ by Lampreia\textsuperscript{457} emphasised liberal convergence, but was still wary of international power asymmetries.

For Lula, on the other hand, foreign policy came to be characterised as ‘autonomy through diversification’ defined as follows:

an adherence to international norms and principles by means of South-South alliances, including regional alliances, and through agreements with non-traditional partners (China, Asia-Pacific, Africa, Eastern Europe, Middle East, etc.), trying to reduce asymmetries in foreign relations with powerful countries; at the same time, the maintenance of regular and good relations with developed countries, cooperating with them in international organizations and reducing their power.\textsuperscript{458}

This signified a change in international outlook for Brazil, with South America, South-South partnerships, and an ‘anti-imperialist’ inclination assuming new primacy in Brazilian foreign policy. This is in contrast to Brazil’s ‘traditional’ foreign policy principles centred upon a legalistic, ‘Grotian’ approach to international affairs, one that prizes multilateralism, non-intervention and the ‘sovereign

\textsuperscript{454} Tullo Vigevani and Gabriel Cepaluni, \textit{Brazilian Foreign Policy in Changing Times}. Translated by Leandro Moura (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2009): xi.
\textsuperscript{455} Ibid., 54.
\textsuperscript{456} Ibid., 54. This is the view of Roberto Abdenur, a career diplomat who was subsequently critical of the foreign policy of the Lula administration.
\textsuperscript{457} Ibid., 58.
\textsuperscript{458} Vigevani and Cepaluni, \textit{Changing Times}, 86, and 81-100.
integration of the state in foreign relations. This prompts the question to which extent PT has influenced Brazil’s foreign policy trajectory, and in which ways the governing party has conditioned the responses of the Brazilian state to external challenges and threats.

The literature on Brazil’s foreign policy has by and large neglected the role of the governing PT in the formulation of foreign policy options and the ratification of foreign policy means. Furthermore, it is only in recent years that greater attention has begun to be paid to the ‘realist’ dimension of Brazilian foreign policy, firmly attached to notions of ‘the national interest’. Many analyses have, however, chosen to focus on ‘soft power’ in Brazilian foreign policy, and on the country’s distinctiveness as a ‘peaceful’ rising power.

Foreign policy is, of course, not a blank slate on which PT has been able to write its own account. A constant and moderating force in Brazilian foreign policy is the highly-respected Ministerio dos Relações Exteriores, which has managed the country’s foreign relations with professional astuteness and competence since the days of the Baron do Rio Branco, at the turn of the twentieth century. However, the extent to which even this venerable institution, colloquially known as Itamaraty, has been permeated by the ‘ideological’ tendencies of PT, and its consequent effects on foreign policy, came increasingly under the spotlight during the two Lula administrations.

This chapter operationalises the neoclassical realism (NCR) framework established in Chapter 3, along with the institutional dynamics described in Chapter 4, to conduct an analysis of the extent of internationalist influence on the foreign policy


of Brazil. In this discussion, Brazil’s experiences with internationalism in historical perspective are analysed. This will facilitate an appreciation of the longstanding traditions and cyclical nature of some ideas in Brazilian foreign policy. An examination of the salient features of Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s foreign policy will be conducted. This is followed by an analysis of Partido dos Trabalhadores in the foreign policy field. The third section discusses resource mobilisation and extraction for Brazil’s activist foreign policy under Lula.

What is the connection between Brazil’s chosen method of power projection and the influence of a new governing party, PT, on foreign policy? How can neoclassical realism explain Brazilian foreign policy under the Lula administrations? The two Lula administrations, which governed Brazil from 2003 to the end of 2010, constitute the period under consideration for this case study. ‘Major foreign policy actions’ are classed as those that entailed the deployment of military forces, or the allocation of monetary and other (i.e. personnel) resources, by the Brazilian state. An internationalist approach to foreign policy does not make cast-iron predictions about foreign policy. Nonetheless, it claims that international disputes will be settled by non-violent means; that military deployments will be made multilaterally, rather than unilaterally; that solidarity with the developing world will be favoured; and, that the diplomatic norm of non-interference will be adhered to in most cases.

6.1. Brazil: An ideological internationalist?

Brazil’s continental dimensions, plentiful natural resources, and linguistic singularity in Spanish South America render it a rather insular national community. This insularity has led Brazilian political leadership throughout the last two centuries to cultivate for the nation an identity of exceptionalism and potential grandeur in international affairs.\footnote{Lima and Hirst, “Brazil as an intermediate state”, 21.} Brazil’s beginnings as a Portuguese colony, the temporary establishment of the Portuguese court at Rio de Janeiro during the Napoleonic campaigns in Europe, and its relatively peaceful experience of nation-building, are all factors in this pervasive sense of exceptionalism.
Brazil's foreign policy history into the first decade of the 21st century could usefully be divided into 6 significant phases, some overlapping (see Figure 4). The first phase, initiated by the birth of the republic in 1889 and terminated by the outbreak of World War I in 1914, represented a period of unquestioned proximity to the United States, under the tutelage of the Baron do Rio Branco. As Rio Branco, Brazil’s first Minister of Foreign Affairs, sought to wean Brazil from dependence on the United Kingdom, he forged closer relations for Brazil with the United States.

Phase 1: Territorial Diplomacy (1889-1917)

Phase 2: Limited Outward Projection (1917-1945)

Phase 3: Active Outward Projection (1960-1963)


Phase 6: Active outward engagement (2003-present)

Figure 4: Phases of Brazilian Foreign Policy, 1889-present

Greater detail has been entertained in discussing the history of Brazilian foreign policy, than has been on South African foreign policy, in the belief that there exists a stronger – though still contested - ideational continuity in Brazilian foreign policy from the days of Rio Branco to the present, than existed in South African foreign policy over the course of the twentieth century, owing to minority rule.

This period came to an end during the First World War as Brazil sought a more assertive and independent role for itself in international affairs. Underpinning this shift was a renewed sense of recognition-seeking, both for Brazil’s membership of the Western world, as well as for its contribution to the war effort on the side of the Allies. In a deeper sense, the 1920s marked the birth of a truly indigenous Brazilian cultural awareness, which “rejected further imitation of foreign models”. This rejection was accompanied by a newfound sense of disillusionment with the structure and process of international politics. The disappointment of their failed attempts to secure a permanent seat on the Council of the League of Nations highlighted the hierarchical nature of international relations for Brazilian diplomats. This hierarchical view of the international system permeated their views on disarmament, as well as their suspicion of the great powers more generally.

From the 1920s onward, the pattern of Brazil’s foreign policy may usefully be seen as a contest between the two concepts of selfhood entertained by its elites for much of the twentieth century. On one hand, the country sought its identity and physical security in close alliance with the US, and the ‘Western’ world more generally. On the other, leaders during certain periods sought to construct Brazil as a member of the Third World, emphasising its commonalities with Africa and Asia, by way of poverty and underdevelopment. Both approaches had their sources in domestic politics, and also served divergent functions on the domestic scene. While identification with Africa, and the Third World more broadly, served to underscore the regime’s foreign policy autonomy, close association with Western powers served to underline Brazil’s exceptionalism and distinctiveness in Latin America, and its upward development trajectory.

The overarching structure of the Cold War drew important distinctions between domestic groups on foreign policy. Those who favoured proximity with the US, and hence, ‘traditional’ foreign policy, saw the Cold War in terms of a struggle between Communism and capitalism. Those who adopted the ‘nationalist’ position, on the other hand, saw the primary conflict as one between the developed and developing

466 Ibid., 342.
What emerges from an examination of Brazil’s foreign policy throughout the twentieth century is that the ‘departures’ identified as novel in the twenty-first century are really a return of tendencies in Brazilian foreign policy that started to emerge in the 1950s, during the presidency of Juscelino Kubitschek (JK) (1956-1961).

During JK’s presidency, a number of large industrial projects were undertaken in Brazil, including the construction of the new capital city, Brasília, in the interior. These public works projects resulted in large balance of payments deficits for Brazil, which JK sought to alleviate by seeking new opportunities for Brazilian commerce in overseas markets. This initiated a period of tentative outward expansion for Brazil, especially in the direction of the hitherto neglected continents of Africa and Asia. This was a marked difference from its main foreign policy thrust for the first half of the twentieth century, which sought to avoid the uncertain consequences of action, and preferred a measured ‘inaction’, and focus on established Western powers.

Brazil’s ‘traditional’, risk-averse mode of conducting its international diplomacy had many critics, however. At the ideational level, Brazil’s unquestioning allegiance to the US was seen as problematic by the new breed of Brazilian nationalists. Also, those who sought more pragmatism and the pursuit of Brazil’s national interests grew increasingly frustrated by Itamaraty’s ‘legal-historical’ approach to international diplomacy. At the national socio-economic level, the exigencies of economic development were placing pressure on the government to seek new outlets for Brazilian commerce. The concepts of ‘National Security’ and ‘Development’ became virtually entwined around this time, emphasised by the *Doutrina de Segurança Nacional* (DSN). This National Security Doctrine, as embellished by the military *Escola Superior de Guerra* (ESG) – the repository of strategic thinking in Brazil – could “be summarised into the “binomial” of security and development”, that has played a role in the formulation of Brazilian foreign policy guidelines ever since.

---

468 Ibid, 80.
469 Ibid.
471 Kai Michael Kenkel, “New tricks for the dogs of war, or just old w(h)ine in new bottles? - securitisation, defence policy and civilian control in Brazil, 1994-2002”,
This dilemma – the choice between conservatism and diversification - influenced much of Brazil’s foreign policy outlook, from the time of the Kubitschek presidency into the twenty-first century. Along with the establishment of Petrobrás in 1953, JK ushered in a period of greater national awareness, amplified popular interest in foreign policy, and an expanded internal market. Most importantly, “nationalism gained converts and influence in policy formation”, at least until the coup in 1964.\textsuperscript{472} Traits of the political left in foreign policy, evident in the rejection of foreign economic control, also began to make their appearance.\textsuperscript{473}

The security/development binomial was notably less perceptible during periods of high ideological fervour in foreign policymaking, such as characterised the presidency of Jânio Quadros and his successor, João Goulart (1961-1964). During this period some decisions – viewed as extreme by conservative factions among the Brazilian elite – were taken that jeopardised Brazil’s standing with its most important strategic partner, the United States. This included the granting of a national order of honour to Ché Guevara, and a refusal to toe the US line on Cuba. Brazil maintained an independent foreign policy under Quadros (it resisted even joining NAM, although it became an observer), to the consternation of the United States, which was funnelling resources to the country in the form of the ‘Alliance for Progress’, designed to win Brazil’s and other Latin American countries’ compliance during the Cold War.

The foreign policy of the military regime was by no means uniform, but withdrawal and conservatism in the immediate aftermath of the coup of 1964 until about 1967, was succeeded by commercial expansion and pragmatism which lasted, arguably, well into the period of democratic government. The ‘national interest’ and the ‘diplomacy of prosperity’ were permitted a return to the focus of foreign policy by the East-West détente of the late 1960s-1970s.\textsuperscript{474}

Under the first military government of Castello Branco, Afro-Asian relations were demoted in favour of a rapprochement with the United States, which had offered


\textsuperscript{472} Selcher, \textit{The Afro-Asian Dimension},10-11.

\textsuperscript{473} Ibid.,: 11.

\textsuperscript{474} Ibid., 29.
support for the military coup. From 1967, however, under Arthur da Costa e Silva, a return was made to ‘independent foreign policy’, although the term was only used again in 1970 by Emílio Médici. During this period, Brasil adopted a more assertive position in international affairs. Among others, it adopted a stance against industrialised nations on pollution at the 1972 UN Conference on the Human Environment; refused to sign the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty; and, concluded a nuclear deal with West Germany in 1975. With impressive economic growth in the early 1970s, Brazil was able to establish its incipient foreign aid programme, thereby adding financial resources to its global outreach begun so tentatively under Kubitschek in the 1950s and Quadros and Goulart in the early 1960s.476

Assessing Brazil’s foreign policy posture over time, therefore, there are two key observations that can be made about the country’s foreign policies with respect to the developing world. First, the ‘social’ dimension evident in Lula’s foreign policy is not new to Brazil’s foreign policy tradition. There has long been a focus on economic development, and, moreover, viewing underdevelopment as a function of disadvantageous global economic structures. What has changed from one administration to the next is the perception of the extent of the required reform. Second, solidarity with the South appears to be more of an elite interest (limited sections of the elite) than an organic national concern in Brazil. For much of the twentieth century, Brazil’s interests did not coincide neatly with those of the developing world, with the result that Brazilian policymakers were utilising the idea of Southern solidarity for purposes of launching commercial programmes of international penetration, or, as in the case of trade in agricultural goods, building a core of support in multilateral negotiating forums for wholesale change of trading practices that were disadvantageous to its own trade. An example of conflicting interests was the competition in cocoa and coffee exports, on which the Brazilian economy was heavily reliant until the 1960s.477

Southern solidarity was also important, in the Cold War context, in terms of enacting an independent foreign policy. This policy was initially run ‘cheaply’ based

476 Selcher, The Afro-Asian Dimension, 4-35.
on so-called ‘cultural diplomacy’, with few resources available to commit to the opening of new embassies and material assistance to developing countries. This position only started to change in the 1970s, with the dramatic change in Brazil’s own domestic economic situation, which saw GDP growth rates in excess of 10 per cent per year. As a corollary to this, Brazilian society has not changed sufficiently for broader changes in identity to take place, identity changes that would underpin stronger solidarity with the Third World in foreign affairs.

Fry has noted that the manner in which ‘race’ is constructed in Brazil militates against the mobilisation of ‘blackness’ even in domestic Brazilian society:

> The history of the black movement in Brazil has largely been the history of not-resoundingly-successful attempts to construct a black identity to which people of color would feel impelled to adhere.\(^{478}\)

Hence ‘solidarity’ has been carefully crafted as a tool for building consensus and broad-based support for the country’s initiatives in multilateral organisations. The domestic political tensions over Brazil’s leading role in the establishment of UNCTAD in 1964 bore testimony to this divide. While those who favoured strong ties with the US feared UNCTAD’s founding would antagonise the US, those in favour of an independent foreign policy (polsita externa independente, PEI), were content with the prospect of demonstrating autonomy in foreign policy, and playing a strong hand in negotiations with developed countries over the structure of the international trading system. Brazil hoped, especially in the mid-1960s, to build hard-line coalitions on trade (with other developing countries). This would serve a dual purpose of using multilateralism as a ‘battering ram’ in negotiations with the US, and opening the way at home for the introduction of far-reaching reforms, a political goal of the Goulart government.\(^{479}\)

The two concepts of selfhood – Western and Third World - in Brazilian foreign policy that have vied for primacy in the twentieth century have been brought into sharp relief by the juxtaposed presidencies of Fernando Henrique Cardoso (FHC), and Luiz Inácio ‘Lula’ da Silva. While both leaders claimed to be flying the flag of


‘progressive’ politics internationally, some salient differences in their approaches to foreign policy are identifiable. The following section will analyse some pervading features of diplomacy and foreign policy under FHC as a backdrop to the analysis of PT and its role in Brazil’s internationalism under Lula.

6.2. Changing perceptual lenses from FHC to PT

The claim has been made often enough that Brazilian foreign policy has tended at times to neatly reflect the requirements of domestic economic models. This was evident during the pursuit of Import Substitution Industrialisation (ISI), whose emphasis on domestic production and technological development underpinned the drive in the 1960s for a number of foreign policy initiatives, especially independent foreign policy and the diversification of overseas trade partners.480

In this light, Cardoso’s foreign policy can be seen as an external support for the domestic policies of trade and investment liberalisation, encapsulated in the phrase ‘economic pragmatism’. Economic pragmatism was characterised by an “emphasis [on] monetary stability and external constraints, even at the expense of growth, increased employment, and the redistribution of income”481. Its international dimension – a key component of the approach - was the search for international credibility, especially with the international financial institutions (IFIs) (which entailed loyalty to structural adjustment programmes); and, an emphasis on multilateral trade negotiations and trade conflict resolution.482

For at least one observer, foreign policy under Cardoso had “evolved under a predominantly reactive and defensive pattern”.483 The economic model implemented by the Cardoso regime tended heavily toward neo-liberalism. The measures enacted, including “the liberalisation of domestic finance, foreign trade,
exchange rate movements and the capital account of the balance of payments”, left the Brazilian economy increasingly vulnerable to international political and economic changes, and to the exigencies of international finance. Thus, the Brazilian analysts, Vigevani and Cepaluni, argue that Cardoso’s foreign policy “sought to internalize, absorb, and consolidate the liberal changes that globalization brought to international society during the 1990s, in contrast with the failure of the Collor de Mello administration and the hesitancy of the Itamar Franco administration in this regard”). In spite of Collor conducting far-reaching economic liberalisation, this was not seen to ‘pay off’ with regard to Brazil’s relations with the US. The country was still placed on the US Trade Representative’s (USTR) ‘watch list’ in 1991 for its position on the manufacturing of pharmaceutical products under patent.

The overarching premises of Cardoso’s foreign policy posture were: to increase Brazilian participation in the framing of international norms and regimes in order to institutionalise the country’s external environment as far as possible, with Brazilian interests in mind (with MERCOSUL having a central role); and, extending opportunities for trade with the largest international markets. This meant that ‘legalisation’ of the international environment – both by Brazil’s increasing adherence to international regimes, and by its increased participation in the formulation of such regimes – would provide Brazil with an “international legal reference point”. This move ostensibly sought to remove ‘politics’, at least superficially, from Brazil’s international actions, thus maintaining its good relations with as many nations as possible. By way of example, Brazil has famously been one of the states parties to have made most frequent recourse to the Dispute Settlement Mechanism (DSM) of the WTO.

In keeping with the first premise, even the institutionalisation of Mercosul was left to wane relative to the higher priority of institutionalising the rapidly evolving global

---

485 Vigevani and Cepaluni, Changing Times, 53.
486 Ibid., 40.
487 Ibid., 56.
multilateral trade liberalisation organisation, the WTO. In pursuit of the latter, relations with smaller markets were downgraded, while those with traditional trading partners were prioritised. In fact, the WTO was underlined in Brazil’s national planning document, PPA 2000-2003, as a vital component of the country’s economic diplomacy. It may be argued that under Cardoso, Brazil’s perception of its place in the international balance of power was a conservative one. This was underpinned by a precarious exit from a dire domestic economic situation, engineered by Cardoso himself during his tenure as Finance Minister in the last years of the Franco administration.

As far as relations with the US were concerned, Cardoso enjoyed warm personal relations with US president Bill Clinton, and more broadly recognised the primacy of the United States in international affairs following the fall of Communism and the successful Gulf War campaign of 1990. Brazil maintained a ‘critical convergence’, however, which entailed broad agreement with the dominant liberal tendencies in international society, alongside a strong adherence to the goal of increasing Brazil’s autonomy and freedom of action in international affairs. In this way, Cardoso was hesitant to be seen to be fulfilling US policy interests in South America, such as assisting Colombia in its battle against FARC.

Cardoso’s foreign policy did not stray far from the traditional paradigm of Brazilian foreign policy, based on historico-legalism and economic diplomacy. It tended more toward a ‘moderate multilateralism’, and a dialogue with a number of international partners, while emphasising the primacy of the US among international partners. The clear divide between the multilateral trade negotiating tactics of the Cardoso and Lula administrations was the shift away from “arid technocratic negotiations

---

488 Ibid., 56 and 70. This stance – multilateralism preferred to regionalism - was adopted for three reasons, according to Celso Lafer: its better prospects for democracy; the possibility of joint action spread over a larger number of actors; and, the possibility of ‘variable geometry’ or conducting liberalisation at variable paces, according to national requirements.


490 This term was coined by Luiz Felipe Lampreia, and cited in Vigevani and Cepaluni, Changing Times, 58.

and conflict resolution under the WTO”, toward greater emphasis on the social and environmental implications of multilateral trade policy. Under Lula, critiques of the multilateral trade and finance systems were linked to greater calls for international social projects, such as hunger and disease eradication, and the broader consideration of the challenges of the developing world.

The competence of Itamaraty, in whom much of the initiative for Brazilian foreign policy rested, was seen by Cardoso as a means of exploiting niches in international politics. It helped that Cardoso held a special affection for the institution, having acted as Minister of Foreign Affairs under Itamar Franco for a brief period from 1992 to 1993. In addition, Cardoso’s own reputation as a social scientist of some international standing – in spite of what seemed like a wholesale migration in his ideological perspective – assisted in ‘rehabilitating’ the international image of Brazil, ushering in a period of ‘presidential diplomacy’ that would continue during the Lula administration.

Presidential diplomacy under Cardoso and Lula have been marked by divergent tendencies, however, as Cardoso prioritised relations with developed countries, while Lula has placed greater emphasis on South-South cooperation. According to Lula’s international relations adviser and one-time President of PT, Marco Aurelio Garcia, Cardoso’s presidential diplomacy was a ‘masking’ mechanism, which ensured the visibility of the leader of the government, even while this failed to lend strength to the country. Presidential speeches, so often celebrated abroad, proved little more than rhetoric.

While Cardoso frequently spoke out against the effects of globalization, furthermore, his domestic policies went far in facilitating them. This fact limited the Cardoso government’s ability to mobilise and extract resources for expansive foreign policy actions. Domestic economic stability was a priority. Put differently, the readiness to accept the costs and obligations of the pursuit of international objectives did not gain significant ground during the Cardoso era, either among Brazilian society or within the State.

492 Faro de Castro et al., “Globalization and recent political transitions”, 485.
493 Cason and Power, “Presidentialization”, 122.
495 Vigevani and Cepaluni, Changing Times, 68.
Brazil under Cardoso thus required a low-cost means of defending its national interests; this meant that it could not accept large costs for the provision of regional or global goods, such as institutionalising MERCOSUL. During Cardoso’s term, external threats to Brazil were minimal, and the primary policy issue for the Brazilian government was the task of stabilising the domestic economy. This entailed considerable limits on Brazil’s foreign policy, including only muted opposition to increasing US unilateralism by the end of Cardoso’s presidency in 2002. Nonetheless, Brazil grew increasingly obdurate in the FTAA negotiations, citing differences with the US on intellectual property rights, and access to US markets in steel and farm produce.

A number of factors combined to ease Brazil’s external environment under Cardoso. While the US was less able to exert influence on South American affairs, having its hands full with the North American Free Trade Association (NAFTA) and Haiti, Brazil was slowly emerging as a regional hegemon, as it managed to break away from decades of parity with Argentina, owing to the latter’s economic woes. Rapprochement with Argentina was a primary factor in Brazil’s continental rise. Lesser regional actors, while expanding their capabilities, were highly constrained by incomplete political transitions and rampant poverty. Two further factors in the regional balance of power were the increasing prominence of geostrategic issues, such as control of certain ocean passes, and the incipient involvement of external powers, such as China. As noted by Morris as early as 1989 in his discussion of the geostrategic significance of the Straits of Magellan,

496 Under Cardoso, for example, the military expenditure as a percentage of GDP remained steady, and at a level highly approved of by the military (1.8% throughout his tenure). This policy is attributed to Cardoso’s desire to avoid the slightest conflict with the military in order to pursue his economic stabilisation without let or hindrance. See João R Martins Filho and Daniel Zirker, “The Brazilian Military under Cardoso: Overcoming the Identity Crisis”, Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, 42, No.3 (Autumn 2000): 144.

497 This did not preclude Cardoso’s pronouncement in mid-2002 that Bush was still “in a learning stage” on the subject of foreign policy in Latin America. See Tony Smith, “Bush looks Cardoso in the eye on free trade, but Brazil stands firm”, in Associated Press Worldstream, March 31, 2001.

498 Ibid.


Brazil’s military capabilities are growing more potent. So too are other states of South America, including Argentina and Chile, improving their armed forces. This proliferation of military power throughout the region tends to offset Brazil’s emergence by building a new regional balance of power around military deterrence rather than Brazilian pre-eminence. Greater autonomy of all regional actors tends to result, which is reinforced by the decline in the traditional U.S. hegemonical (sic) role.\(^\text{501}\)

More than two decades later, Brazil has continued to capitalise on its continental scale and expansive domestic market to be not only the largest economy by some distance in Latin America, but also one of the top ten economies worldwide. In 2008, Brazil boasted a GDP of USD1.5 trillion.\(^\text{502}\) This dwarfed that of its neighbours (see Table 3 below). However, it is in the diplomatic arena that the most significant shifts in the balance of power have occurred. The primary ‘objective’ threats facing Brazil in the security sphere, during Cardoso’s presidency, as in Lula’s, were those posed by transnational movements of people, drugs and small arms and light weapons. In the meantime, Brazil has also found itself, as a consequence of the PT presidential election victories of 2002 and 2006, at the centre of an ideological battle for the left of regional and hemispheric dimensions.\(^\text{503}\)

The rise of Hugo Chavez’s ambitions for a Bolivarian revolution in Latin America has set the Brazilian cat among the populist left pigeons of Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador. This ‘battle’ acquired further significance with the rising tensions between US-backed Colombia and Venezuela in 2009-10.

Thus Cardoso’s approach to foreign policy was clearly more conservative, and respectful of US hegemony in international affairs. Indeed, the first task of diplomacy was seen as being “primarily didactic in nature”, educating national actors about globalization and facilitating its acceptance as an international (and domestic) ‘reality’.\(^\text{504}\) Indeed, Hurrell has suggested that in terms of his view of the impact of globalisation, Cardoso should be classed a ‘hyperglobalist’: the pressures on states to

\(^{501}\) Ibid., 192.

\(^{502}\) World Bank. 2011. World Development Indicators.


\(^{504}\) Lessa et al., “Política externa planejada”, 93.
While the Cardoso administration was coming under increasing pressure for its handling of various domestic issues, including the economy and the issue of land redistribution, PT was preparing itself for a more prominent national role, by attempting finally to secure victory in the 2002 elections, after 3 previous failed attempts. This included relaxing its policy on cross-party alliances, and generally ‘normalising’ its approach to Brazilian politics. It also made room for moderate

---

506 Combined spending on healthcare and education, as a percentage of GDP. Correct for 2007.
shifts in its approach to Brazil’s international relations. This evolution is the focus of the following section.

6.3. PT’s foreign policy evolution and its critics: institutional freedom and legitimating power

‘Rupture is Necessary’? PT and the limits to change in Brazilian Foreign Policy

In January 2003, Lula and the Workers’ Party entered government in a two-fold straitjacket, imposed by IMF austerity on one hand, and its own domestic deals with centrist parties in order to be able to pass legislation in Congress, on the other. As an internal party matter, foreign policy had come a long way from the party’s clear distaste for ‘imperialism’ in its founding document from 1980, and its later promises to place a moratorium on foreign debt payments if it came to power. While foreign policy was not one of the party’s key platforms in its four presidential campaigns (three of them unsuccessful), it was one of the fronts on which PT had to fend off attacks on its presidential ambitions, especially in the 2002 campaign. These attacks, admittedly, were sparked in response to calls by the far left in PT for Brazil to terminate its arrangements with the IMF and renounce the repayment of Brazil’s foreign debt\(^{509}\).

The domestic context, especially Brazil’s political system, militates against rapid and far-reaching policy changes in any public sphere. This is in part a vestige of the transition to democracy, which allowed much of the old elite to retain positions of power and prestige in national, state and local government.\(^{510}\) Furthermore, national and state politics sometimes appear to operate on different axes, especially given wide income and education-level disparities in Brazil. Institutional freedom in terms of formulating and implementing foreign policy is thus limited for any governing party, owing to the Congressional system, and the primacy of Itamaraty in foreign policy implementation. The state, with PT in government, also laboured under a legitimacy deficit in foreign policy, as notable sections of the foreign policy

\(^{509}\) Statements to this effect were contained in the document “A Ruptura Necessária” (A Necessary Break), discussed at PT’s XII National Convention in December 2001. See Graieb, 2002.

community continually questioned the wisdom of the PT government’s international stances. This section traces the evolution of the foreign policy positions of PT, with special reference to its transition from opposition party to governing party, and particular individuals who have played a key role in foreign policy decision-making in the two Lula governments.

The evolution of PT’s foreign policy positions

Partido dos Trabalhadores was established in the forge of union politics in the industrial heartlands of São Paulo in 1980, under a lathe-operator who would eventually become president of Brazil, Luiz Inacio ‘Lula’ da Silva. PT’s foreign policy platform during its early years was based on autonomy for Brazil, which included distancing the country from international commitments, such as the repaying of debts, along with adherence to certain international agreements such as the NPT.

As noted by Almeida, PT itself gradually became reconciled to greater responsibility for Brazil in the international arena, in a long journey from its inception with socialist undertones in the early 1980s, to its presidential campaign of 2002.511 This change was characterised by a perceptible shift from ‘the battle against imperialism and global capital’, to an outlook more accommodating of the international order and international finance. This was clearly necessitated by the demands of electoral politics (extending the party’s electoral appeal) and coalition-building, as well as Brazil’s external economic context at the end of the 1990s. PT needed both funds and allies to run successful campaigns in the weak Brazilian electoral and party system.512

In addition, Brazil’s precarious international financial predicament by the early years of the 21st century meant that any Brazilian government would have to be on good terms with the international financial institutions, and take a more accommodating view of global capital. Authors have noted the changes and concessions that have

512 The key text on the nature of Brazil’s political party and electoral systems is Scott Mainwaring, Rethinking Party Systems in the Third Wave of Democratization: The Case of Brazil. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999).
been required of PT as a party of the opposition entering government. This story has been told from various angles as it affects PT’s domestic policies, but few analyses examine its impact on PT’s, and Brazil’s, foreign policy.

PT’s policies and pronouncements in the early 1980s characterised it as a typical Latin American party of the left. While foreign policy was not explicitly mentioned in the Party’s founding document, the ‘Plan of Action’ appended to it enumerated solidarity with all oppressed peoples; mutual respect between nations; the deepening of international cooperation; and, the promotion of world peace as the Party’s primary international concerns. Chief among the party’s guiding principles was that of solidarity, solidarity stemming both from struggles over workers’ rights in the party’s early years, and from later struggles as part of a more unified Brazilian opposition movement. However, “the assumption of executive responsibility at the state and municipal levels, and gradually increased contacts with like-minded political parties and syndicates of the northern hemisphere, helped to give PT’s leadership an appreciation of the limits and possibilities of governmental action.”

In a general sense, the prior tone of recriminations and critiques, containing negative and accusatory proclamations, with respect to “markets”, the international financial institutions, and the policies of the United States, became more measured and balanced, revealing a genuine preoccupation with governabilidade and foreign relations, from the perspective of the real possibility of victory in the elections of October 2002.


---

514 An exception is the discussion by scholar-diplomat Prof. Paulo Roberto de Almeida.
515 Keck notes how the labour movement was not initially as enamoured of the idea of a ‘unified opposition’ as perhaps other segments – the liberal elites, students and intellectuals – of the opposition to the military were. However, “There was a convergence between the opposition elites’ need for mass momentum and the new labor leaders’ need for recognition; they helped each other.” This is an important secondary source of the commitment to solidarity in PT. See Margaret E. Keck, The Workers’ Party and Democratization in Brazil. (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1992): 41.
516 Almeida, “A Política Internacional do PT”, 90.
517 Ibid., 93.
The document was debated and approved at the Party’s fourth Congress, held in February 2010. In addition to solidarity, the policy mentions two further central principles of PT foreign policy: plurality and Latin-Americanism. PT argues that owing to its own history of plurality, of bringing together numerous ideological and political strands, it prizes plurality in international life. It also claims a significant difference in Brazilian foreign policy in this regard since 2003: “We do not have relations only with those who “think like us”; but also with those who, regardless of minor or major ideological differences, face political problems similar to those we face in the international arena”.519

Underlining the Party’s promotion of Latin Americanism, there is the recognition that Brazil’s global role is strongly linked to the future of Latin and South America.520 In addition, regional integration is considered an integral dimension of Brazil’s foreign policy for the purpose of building regional autonomy and resisting “foreign meddling”,521 as well as to safeguard and fortify national development strategies which would eventually founder in isolation.522 The emphasis on regional integration is framed in the assumption that “the development of Brazil is linked to the development of its neighbouring countries, [and] is the best way to overcome some of the fears and prejudice that exist in some neighbour (sic) countries”.523

For Marco Aurélio Garcia, adviser to the President on foreign policy, the national project embraced by PT called for the framing of a new foreign policy. This policy has three central components, namely: social inclusion; a more wide-ranging democracy; and the assertion of national sovereignty “within a Latin American context”.524

520 Ibid., 32.
521 Ibid., 31.
522 Ibid., 7.
523 Ibid., 31. This view is confirmed by Marco Aurelio Garcia, who writes that, “…any national project had to be coupled with the regional, for sustained national development now needs to be closely linked to the growth of the whole South American zone”. See Marco Aurélio Garcia, “Brazilian future”, in OpenDemocracy, 16 July 2003, accessed online at: http://www.opendemocracy.net/democracy-think_tank/article_1367.jsp on 30 September, 2010.
524 Garcia, “Brazilian future”.
A number of scholars are agreed that the ascent of Partido dos Trabalhadores to power in 2003 after three prior attempts at winning the presidency, signalled a perceptible change in Brazil’s foreign policy. There is less agreement on the extent of these changes. For Soares de Lima and Hirst changes are embodied in “the inclusion of the social agenda as a major topic of foreign affairs”, along with Brazil’s greater emphasis on the reform of the major multilateral institutions and its unease with the unequal distribution of power and wealth in these institutions.\textsuperscript{525} For Vidigal, the changes are four-fold, both diplomatic and economic in nature, and characterised by:

- Greater emphasis on the internationalisation of Brazilian firms;
- Diversification of the country’s international ties;
- Stronger action in multilateral organisations; and,
- Adoption of the non-indifference principle.\textsuperscript{526}

For Almeida, the greatest changes occurred in discourse and in practice, rather than in the broad lines of Brazilian foreign policy.\textsuperscript{527} While juridical commitments to principles such as ‘non-interference’ and respect for state sovereignty remained, it was in implementation that new divergences appeared.\textsuperscript{528}

Even heading into Lula’s (relatively late) campaign for re-election in 2006, PT was subdued on the international goals of the party, apportioning only a small section of the party manifesto to this topic. It limited these to Brazil’s accentuation of its sovereign presence in the world; the continued importance of multilateralism through reform of the UN and UNSC; and, the campaign for fairer economic, financial and commercial arrangements to benefit developing countries. Other goals included the commitment to the fight against world hunger, and in favour of peace, as well as the perennial priority of South American integration. Relations with African countries were singled out for special importance, while relations with

\textsuperscript{525} Lima and Hirst, “Brazil as an intermediate state”, 22.
\textsuperscript{527} Almeida, “A Política Internacional do PT” 88.
developed countries would continue on the basis of sovereignty and mutual respect.\textsuperscript{529}

By 2010, according to the Party, the main areas of thematic consonance between the Party and the Brazilian government were:

\begin{quote}
the defence of world peace, respect for the sovereignty and self-determination of peoples and nations, the democratic reform of international institutions, advocacy of regional integration, south-south alliances and relations, and the promotion of human, economic, cultural, environmental and social rights.\textsuperscript{530}
\end{quote}

PT affords the Brazilian government the opportunity to operate a parallel foreign policy. How it does this and to what effect are important questions. By engaging the opposition parties in neighbouring countries with governments led by the right, such as Colombia and Mexico further north, PT maintains a presence in the politics of neighbouring countries through its quiet support of leftist movements. As affirmed by its foreign policy statement of 2010,

\begin{quote}
From the regional point of view, the PT will strive – in compliance with the Brazilian and each country’s law – to make sure that the Latin-American left will not lose any government to the right; and will also contribute to accelerate the regional integration process and persist on the road to structural changes.\textsuperscript{531}
\end{quote}

A survey of the literature on PT’s evolution as a political party, particularly after its ascent to power in 2002, almost creates the illusion of inevitability of the changes PT has experienced. First, in its efforts to become a vote-maximising party, and then as a party-in-government, PT’s adaptations have been numerous and well-documented.\textsuperscript{532} It is important not to lose sight, however, of the historical contingency of PT’s accession to power, and of its conduct in power. Just a few months prior to Lula’s election victory in 2002, “the BBC compared Lula to Cuba’s Fidel Castro and Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez, calling him a “veteran left-wing

\textsuperscript{531} Ibid., 26
leader…espousing a populist political agenda”.

A Lula presidency was feared for the possibility that he might “try to mobilize a region-wide, populist, antimarket, and anti-American movement”.

Moderation in Brazilian foreign policy, the watchword of its Foreign Ministry for most its history, was absent from the extrapolations of the mainstream media in the US and elsewhere. While PT has suffered charges of ‘ideologising’ foreign policy, it would seem that the foreign policy favoured by its candidate has remained in step with the broad contours of Brazilian foreign policy.

However, as noted previously, PT does not have things all its own way. Andrew Hurrell sees Brazilian foreign policy over the two Lula terms as the result of a confluence of two traditions: those of PT and Itamaraty. One strand draws on what is referred to here as the ‘internationalist’ worldview of the Party, while the second emanates from the more traditional, ‘nationalist’ approach of the Foreign Ministry. In terms of PT’s internationalist worldview, Lula’s legitimacy to act purposively on the world stage and his own personal standing derive from PT’s social commitments at home and its efforts to fulfil these commitments. According to Marco Aurélio Garcia, “Without the successes of his social policy, Lula would not be as respected internationally”. PT’s worldview has ultimately combined with Itamaraty’s unique brand of nationalism that emphasised Brazil’s national identity as an autonomous, peace-loving nation, and its interests as a developing country in solidarity with other developing countries. The extent to which this confluence supports expansionism and activism in international politics, is, however, a function of decision-makers’ power to mobilise and extract national resources for foreign policy. This, in turn, hinges upon the extent of their institutional freedom and legitimating power, the subject of the following section.

---

534 Ibid.
6.4. Influence as a function of institutional freedom and legitimating power

As noted by Almeida, in his analysis of the political and institutional role played by Brazilian political parties in the formulation of foreign policy, political parties – ruling or otherwise – have had minimal to marginal influence on the making of foreign policy in the Brazilian system. This is not a Brazilian curiosity, but a phenomenon that occurs across a wide spectrum of state types and political regimes. Ronald Schneider first noted of Brazil that, “Political parties are not significant factors in foreign policy-making”. The main contact that political parties had with foreign policy issues occurred in the institutional context of Congress, where members of the legislature could veto any international accords entered into, or actions conducted, by the state.

As the ruling party, however, PT has had the opportunity to shape foreign policy in a more direct manner, an opportunity that it has seized. This has been the result of the fluid international environment that the party entered, as well as the change represented by Lula in the form of his personality and his political heritage. Under Lula, it was noted, for the first time in decades, if not ever, “foreign policy was conceived and conducted under the overriding influence of non-professional diplomats”, “with PT’s ‘foreign policy’ as the dominant element in Brazilian foreign policy since the beginning of the da Silva government…”.

Other observers are at pains to point out, meanwhile, that national policy can never be held hostage to party dictates. This holds true on certain questions. The Brazilian state has had to tread cautiously around Hugo Chavez, for example, while PT as a political party - prior to its migration to the political centre - once held ideals not dissimilar to Chavez’s. However, PT has continued its own brand of diplomacy by strengthening relations with Leftist governments in South America, in countries including Venezuela, Cuba and Bolivia. The party has also worked to strengthen relations with other parties and movements of the left in South America, through its establishment of the Foro do São Paolo in 1990. As claimed in PT’s most recent

539 Almeida. “Brazil and Non-intervention”, 162.
foreign policy document, it was the first Brazilian political party to include the goal of regional integration in its political agenda.\footnote{\textit{Secretaria de Relações Internacionais, “The Workers’ Party (PT) international policy”, Text submitted for debate and decision of the IV Congress of the Workers’ Party in February 2010.}}

Measuring PT’s influence on foreign policy outcomes is facilitated by an analytical division between various points of contact between the Party and the policy process. These include,

a. party diplomacy;

b. the personal or \textit{presidential} diplomacy of Lula, and other key individuals;

c. the party policy-making process; and,

d. Congress.

Each of these will be discussed in turn.

\textbf{\textit{a. Party diplomacy}}

There is barely any scholarly consideration of the international policy of PT.\footnote{\textit{One exception is the aforementioned text by Almeida, “A política internacional do partido dos trabalhadores”. The following analysis draws upon this work to some extent.}} Yet, PT has maintained a concern with the international dimensions of its domestic struggle since at least the establishment of its Secretariat for International Affairs in 1984. The Party was deeply involved in providing solidarity and material support to anti-dictatorship struggles throughout Central and South America and the Caribbean during this decade\footnote{PT, “The Workers’ Party International Policy”, 6.}. This ‘party diplomacy’ is made possible by a series of “privileged links and alliances between the progressive and leftist movements which were formerly in the opposition [in Latin America]”.\footnote{Almeida, “Regional and Global Strategies”, 173.} PT has been involved in party-level diplomacy in a number of ways. It maintains a network of relations at the regional level with other political parties, social movements, intellectuals and institutions in an effort to pluralise the regional integration process.\footnote{PT, “The Workers’ Party International Policy”, 10.} Important initiatives in this regard are the \textit{Foro de São Paulo}, the World Social Forum (WSF), and the Hemispheric Social Alliance.
Foro de São Paulo’s establishment was sponsored by PT in 1990, around the same time that PT’s international profile was on the ascendant due to Lula’s strong showing in the 1989 Presidential election. This was a difficult period for political parties of the left in Latin America, owing to the adoption of neoliberal economic policies by many governments of the region. In addition, socialism faced a global crisis initiated by the fall of the Soviet Union. The forum is a gathering of leftist, progressive, and popular political parties and other organizations from Latin America. It has come under fire from Brazilian critics because of the membership of Colombia’s guerilla movement, FARC.

PT was indirectly instrumental in the establishment of the WSF. Although the Party does not formally belong to the Organizing Committee of the Forum, “[i]t’s importance stems from the fact that many of the key civil society organisations involved in the process are somehow related to or sympathetic towards it, and that it controlled the hosting city and state governments” at the time of the inaugural meeting.

The Hemispheric Social Alliance, meanwhile, was a network of “trade unions, NGOs and social movements”, spanning North and South America, that formed in 1997 to oppose corporate agendas in the negotiations for the FTAA initiated in 1994 in Miami. According to PT, “[the Alliance] strives to foster exchange and consensus-building regarding the design of an in-solidarity regional integration project”.

Domestically, PT militants (militantes), as party members are referred to, have been instrumental in the organisation of unofficial referendums on major international questions, such as Brazil’s position on its foreign debt obligations when Lula came to power in 2002; as well as whether or not negotiations for the FTAA should proceed, also in 2002. In fact, the FTAA was a significant theme in Lula’s 2002

---

election campaign, a rarity for a foreign policy issue in Brazilian politics, with the party committed to Brazil’s withdrawal from the negotiations should it enter power. Other international goals were evident during the campaign:

PT’s discourse also included the need for Brazil to diversify its bilateral relations with large countries and regional powers, clearly with counter-hegemonic ends in mind, and the sense of strengthening multilateralism in the economic, political and strategic-military arenas.549

b. Party individuals in key posts
In a far less documented fashion, moreover, PT – more in the person of Lula da Silva, than by any overarching party machinery – has managed to steer Brazil’s esteemed Foreign Ministry in its preferred direction. With the appointment of sympathetic individuals to key posts, such as Celso Amorim as Minister of External Relations, and Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães as Secretary-General of Itamaraty550, Lula ensured that his vision for Brazilian foreign policy would be in safe hands. Guimarães, a career diplomat of 40 years by the time of his appointment as top administrator in Itamaraty has been described as a throwback to another era. As an uncharacteristically outspoken diplomat, he held some strong views during his tenure as Secretary-General of Itamaraty, from 2003 to 2009. According to Brazil’s Veja magazine, he “hates the idea of FTAA, detests globalisation, doesn’t like economic liberalisation, and believes in imperialism…”.551 He is also described as being a ‘militant defender of the Third World’. However, Guimarães’ role has been likened more to ‘executor’ than ‘formulator’552 of foreign policy, when compared with those of his then-superior, Celso Amorim, and Marco Aurélio Garcia, foreign affairs advisor in the presidency. Another individual whose name is mentioned as part of the President’s close foreign policy circle is José Dirceu,553 who was Lula’s former Chief of Staff and resigned following the mensalão scandal554 of 2005. In

550 Guimarães had previously been dismissed under Cardoso as president of the Institute for the Research of International Relations (IPRI) of the Foreign Ministry, under pressure from the US, for his views on the FTAA.
552 Ibid.
553 Almeida, Paulo Roberto. 2010. Email correspondence with author.
554 The mensalão scandal took place in 2005. It involved the alleged payment, with the knowledge of senior PT party figures, of governing coalition members in the Chamber of Deputies, in order to persuade them to vote for legislation proposed by PT. The scandal came close to threatening Lula’s re-election in the 2006 presidential election.
spite of his resignation, Dirceu retains a prominent role in Brazilian politics. He was a key member of Lula’s centrist *Articulação* faction in PT.

Foreign Minister Amorim had previously served in the post during the Itamar Franco administration, from May 1993 to December 1994. Already during this period, observers noted that elements of *política externa independente* returned. Also, Mercosul came to be seen more as a balance to the US in the Southern Cone, rather an instrument for international insertion, as it had previously been seen. Amorim is highly-regarded for his role in spearheading Brazil’s multilateral negotiating position in the WTO, which saw higher levels of confrontation with the US and the EU over the content of the Doha Development Round. The Minister openly declared his affiliation with PT in September 2009.

Operating beyond Amorim and the confines of Itamaraty, in the President’s Office was Marco Aurélio Garcia. The significance of Garcia’s position as Presidential International Relations Advisor is that he has frequently played an ambassadorial role on behalf of the President, but has not faced the requirement of approval by Congress, which is the fate of all potential Brazilian ambassadors. Garcia has been credited with conducting some of Brazil’s key diplomatic endeavours in South America on behalf of the President, but beyond the limits of traditional diplomacy. A key example of this was his dispatch to Venezuela in the midst of the political crisis in that country in March 2002, even before Lula’s inauguration as President. This was an initiative that, unsurprisingly, stoked the ire of experienced diplomats.

The sociological aspect of these relations is highlighted by Giancarlo Summa, a close observer of PT in Brazil. Summa sketches the picture of ‘leftist’ movements in South America, and the nature of relations between leading figures. These close networks, he argues, which were scarcely written about when they concerned the spread of the ‘neoliberal’ orthodoxy in the 1990s between Harvard and Chicago.

555 Vigevani and Cepaluni. *Changing Times*, x.
558 Interview, Giancarlo Summa, Rio de Janeiro, July 2010.
alumni, have been the subject of much recent conjecture about the contemporary Latin American left by those who fear its influence. It is by virtue of such networks that Marco Aurélio Garcia, Lula’s foreign policy advisor, has been able to maintain good relations, and further Brazil’s national interests, along with PT’s, in neighbouring countries.

However, the prominence of these individuals tends to overshadow an important factor, namely the lack of depth in PT’s foreign policy expertise. With the publication of a comprehensive foreign policy document for the first time in 2010, the relative unimportance of this policy area to PT’s fortunes (compared to more pressing domestic issues of education, land redistribution, and social welfare) was underscored.

c. The party policymaking process

Positions on foreign policy are developed in cooperation with the International Relations office of PT. They are submitted to the Congress of the Party and the Party’s National Directorate for ratification. The International Relations office has a broad mandate to propose, develop and maintain Workers’ Party positions on international issues, ranging from regional integration, to PT positions on foreign elections. More than this, it is responsible for a range of international activities to sharpen the profile of PT abroad. It is not clear to which extent Lula initiated policy, or whether the bulk of this responsibility fell to Garcia and the Party leadership, and to a lesser extent, Pinheiro. Once Party positions were established, however, it is reasonable to assume that they became subject to the twin dynamics of institutional freedom and legitimating capacity outlined more broadly in this section.

560 It should be noted that Lula was not PT president while he was President of Brazil. While he remains an Honorary President of PT – a position he could not hold while serving as Brazilian President – the following served as party presidents during his two terms as State President: José Genoino (2002-2005), Tarso Genro (2005) (interim), Ricardo Berzoini (2005-2006), Marco Aurelio Garcia (2006-2007) (interim), Ricardo Berzoini (2007-2010), and José Eduardo Dutra (2010-2011). List obtained from Wikipedia, ‘Partido dos Trabalhadores’, accessed at: http://pt.wikipedia.org/wiki/Partido_dos_Trabalhadores on 26 June, 2011.
d. The Party in Congress

While PT was the largest party in Congress following the 2002 elections with 81 seats, increasing to 83 seats in the 2006 election, it required the cooperation of other parties to pass legislation in the 513-seat Chamber of Deputies. As noted in Chapter 4 (p.126), Congress has largely had a retroactive role in foreign policymaking, so the Party’s role is limited to providing and winning cross-party support for treaties and agreements entered into by the executive, as well as for the approval of the President’s selection of ambassadors. Nonetheless, this has not diminished the role of the legislature in foreign policy.

One prominent example is the Chamber of Deputies’ long and drawn-out process of confirmation of the Executive’s approval of Venezuela’s accession to Mercosur in June 2006. The Chamber of Deputies, controlled by PT and parties allied with it, ratified Venezuela’s accession within a year of the accession protocol being agreed by Heads of State. With potentially far-reaching effects for Brazilian trade with Venezuela, regional relations, and the promotion of democracy in South America, the Senate delayed the vote on Venezuela’s accession to Mercosur. Approval was only secured in December 2009, prompting searching questions for Brazil’s role in the regional integration process in South America. Among these are how democracy can be strengthened from the regional perspective in the face of compelling economic motives for increased trade and enhanced regulation of commercial relations. As an indication of this dilemma, Venezuela was at this time extending its reach into the Brazilian extractive industries, with a 40% stake in a new oil refinery in north-eastern Brazil. Opposition Senators had cited the increasing suppression of democratic liberties in Venezuela as not being consonant with Mercosur’s democracy requirement for member states. The episode also revealed the limits of Lula’s and PT’s control over foreign policy after the taking of initial decisions by the executive.


6.5. Criticism from other political parties, movements and diplomats

Brazil’s ‘adventurous’ foreign policy under Lula came under attack from various quarters. The most vocal of these were the political right – embodied by the media, political figures from the opposition, and career diplomats – as well as certain components of the business sector. Roberto Abdenur, Brazil’s ambassador to the United States until 2007 and a 44-year career diplomat, for example, expressed the view that, “There is a generalised sentiment that today diplomats are promoted according to their political affiliation and ideology, and not according to their competence”. Abdenur saw Lula’s foreign policy as ‘contaminated’ by anti-Americanism and ideological orientation. This ideological influence or ‘indoctrination’ was seen to be peddled in a few ways: the compulsory reading of ‘ideological’ books; and, the rapid promotion of those sharing the leadership’s ideological views.

Other criticisms of PT’s influence were based on the unclear ends of its foreign policy, with objectives being described at best as misplaced messianism on the part of Brazil, and at worst, as a vehicle for the promotion of Lula. Lula’s emphasis on South-South diplomacy, in particular, was not popular with business sectors and career diplomats, who could not see the utility of close alliances with India and China, all the while recognising the need for partnership. Brazil’s recognition of China as a market economy in 2004, in exchange for little in return, was considered to be one of the Lula administration’s greatest foreign policy blunders. PT’s sponsorship with Castro of the Foro do São Paolo, as well as close relations with Cuba, have also been continuous sources of criticism. A third aspect of criticism is the politicisation of foreign policy, subjecting decades-old principles of Brazil’s international relations, such as non-intervention and its commitment to sovereignty, to the caprices of PT’s party-level relations. Thus, Almeida notes that while the end of the military dictatorship saw a return to traditional adherence to non-interference, the arrival of the Lula administration saw the gradual adoption of a

564 Ibid.
565 Almeida, Roberto. E-mail correspondence. 2010.
566 Revista Veja. 2007.
selective approach to the principle, embodied in the new phrase \textit{não indiferença} (‘non-indifference’).

The primary channels of criticism were the media\footnote{568} and Congress, where divergent views coalesced around outspoken individuals.

In summary, criticism is levelled at PT’s foreign policy at a number of levels, namely the institutional level and the extent of its ‘indoctrination’ of Itamaraty; the foreign policy formulation level, which is seen as being ‘top-down’ and exclusive, leaving room only for those few PT functionaries (close to Lula) with international relations exposure; and finally, in terms of substance, where the anti-Americanism and anti-imperialism of PT’s foreign policy are seen as obstacles to Brazil’s interests in the region and beyond.


The fact that Brazil, as a rapidly rising power in South America did not respond in a manner predicted by the neorealist paradigm to a number of significant changes in its external environment is not attributable to the fact that Brazil is a different \textit{kind} of state. As this chapter claims, it is more fruitful to see Brazil’s responses to changes in its external environment in terms of its own available resources and capabilities, and indeed, in terms of the perspectives – and perceptions – of key decisionmakers. The discussion in the next two sections follows a chronological order, and discusses events and factors affecting state institutions related to foreign policy formulation; ideology and nationalism, all determinants of state power.

\textbf{Structural Context}

The main global and regional structural changes to take place during and around the administration of Lula were the following:

\footnote{567} See Roberto Almeida, “Brazil and Non-Intervention”. See also Brazil’s position at the Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly on the responsibility to protect, 23 July, 2009. Accessed online at: \url{http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/Brazil_ENG.pdf} on 7 March, 2011.

\footnote{568} The editors of \textit{O Estado de São Paulo} and \textit{Veja} were particularly antagonistic toward Lula and his foreign policy. See Paulo Roberto Almeida, “Uma nova ‘arquitetura’ diplomática?”, 106.
the 2001 attacks on the United States resulted in a significant downgrading of Latin American relations in US foreign policy, with the exceptions of Mexico and Colombia. At the same time, this event and its consequences created the opportunity for greater activism by intermediate states in international affairs, as partners in global governance.

- the growing ideological appeal of Hugo Chavez’s Venezuela and the acquisition of greater military capabilities by Venezuela. This was accompanied by the widespread resurgence of left politics and politicians in the region: the simultaneous election of Gutierrez in Ecuador and Evo Morales in Bolivia in 2006 affecting the balance of reformism and radicalism in the region.

- the involvement of offshore actors, such as China and Iran, becoming major trading partners, China far more so than Iran, influencing political and international relations dynamics in the region. Not least was China’s significant contribution to Brazil’s economic growth through a burgeoning trade relationship. In 2009, for example, it was reported that China had surpassed the US to become Brazil’s largest trading partner. Total trade between Brazil and China reached US$3.2bn in April that year.  

- The decline of Argentina’s economic strength and influence in the region.

Arguably, each of these factors on their own, and undoubtedly all taken together, served to provide a motivation for Brazil to shore up its international position, by adopting a more assertive stance in international politics, potentially strengthening its military apparatus, and strengthening its partnerships with likeminded states. Brazil’s domestic economic situation was stabilised by Cardoso’s Plano Real. However, economic growth had stagnated below 2% for the duration of his tenure.

The election of Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva and the Workers’ Party in 2002 signalled for many a potentially radical change, both in Brazil’s economic and international policies. Indeed, Lula’s electoral campaign was predicated on the concept of ‘Change’, marking a departure from the policies of Cardoso. Most analyses highlight Brazil’s foreign policy approach of the Lula years as a broad continuation of Brazil’s

---

traditional foreign policy outlook: in favour of multilateralism and conflict-averse. This approach misses much else that has transpired in Brazil’s foreign policy of the last ten years, especially the growing capacity of the state for mobilising and extracting resources for a more assertive foreign policy, and what this might portend.


Balancing domestic interests and state power in the first term

The aim of this section is to examine how internationalism as a foreign policy posture has fared under the PT government (For a list of internationalist actions undertaken by the Brazilian government under Lula, consult Appendix 6). Widely-held views hold that Lula ‘gave foreign policy to PT’, implying that Brazil’s foreign policy became more closely aligned with the tenets of, if not worker internationalism, then broader leftist internationalism. This would entail subscription to traditional features of leftist foreign policy, such as commitment to the principle of non-intervention; commitment to multilateralism; aversion to the use of force in settling international disputes; and, co-operation with and assistance for the countries of the developing world.

Indeed, cultural or identity-based explanations of Brazil’s foreign policy, as illustrated in section 6.2 (‘Brazil: An ideological internationalist?’), emphasise the longstanding commitment in Brazil’s international outlook to just such policy guidelines. A norm of the peaceful resolution of international disputes having been established under the reign of the Baron do Rio Branco at the cusp of the twentieth century, was gradually strengthened over the decades, resulting in few cases of Brazil’s armed intervention in any international disputes, and strong condemnation of international conflicts and their resolution by the use of force outside multilateral machinery.

The major structural changes within Brazil’s immediate region at the time of PT’s ascent to power created an environment for the country that appeared at the same time to be more permissive and more threatening. Regional dynamics were more permissive owing to the pre-occupation of the United States with its wars in the
Middle East, but they also appeared more threatening because of Brazil’s and the region’s economic situation, and the consequent social dislocations and their political repercussions. This, in turn, led to a significant militarization of US policy in Latin America – although with a focus “narrowly targeted at particularly troubling or urgent situations”570 – a potential power vacuum in the region that neorealist theory would predict that Brazil, as a pretender to regional hegemony, however muted, would seek to fill.

PT entered power on a triumphant wave, with Lula securing 61.3% of the popular vote in a second-round run-off with PSDB candidate José Serra. Da Silva’s election, and the rise to power of the party of the workers, PT, was described as “a paradigmatic change in the social, economic and political panoramas of Brazil”.571 Indeed, it was the first time in Brazil’s history that a party of the Left572 had been voted into power, after a history of reversals in Brazil; and the first time that a rank outsider from the traditional political elite was elected president. The noted Brazilian sociologist Darcy Ribeiro had noted how Brazilian history comprised a continuous battle between the elites and the poor, with even the 1964 coup a product of elite trepidation over the possible consequences of Quadros and Goulart’s populist policies.573 While Lula’s victory was resounding, the capacity of the Party to give effect to long-held foreign policy principles was limited both by the institutional handicaps imposed by its comparative weakness in the legislature; initially slow economic growth; an uncertain relationship with the military; as well as the party’s own weakness in the foreign policymaking domain.

Lula’s first term started off in an understated fashion, when considered in the light of his resounding victory in the second-round run-off presidential vote.

572 Lula was not the first leftist President of Brazil, however. The presidency of João Goulart in 1961 was associated with the interests of the left. Yet, he was not voted into power, and his accession to the presidency after the resignation of his predecessor, Jânio Quadro, mobilised massive opposition from the military, and political quarters. See Leslie Bethell, “Chapter 2: Politics in Brazil under the Liberal Republic, 1945-1964”, in The Cambridge History of Latin America: Volume 9, Brazil since 1930, ed., Leslie Bethell, Leslie (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008): 139-140.
573 Darcy Ribeiro, The Brazilian People [O Povo Brasileiro]. Translated by Gregory Rabassa. (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2000). This theme has been a leitmotif in Brazilian history and society, also famously dissected in sociologist Gilberto Freyre’s The Masters and the Slaves.
Institutionally, PT’s hand was weakened in the policy realm, in spite of it becoming the largest party in the Chamber of Deputies (Lower House), with 91 seats out of a possible 513. In the Senate (Upper House), it obtained 14 seats out of a possible 81. It still needed to form alliances with the centrist parties in order to attain its legislative goals. Furthermore, PT only won the governorships of 3 minor states: Piaui, Acre and Mato Grosso do Sul.

The Brazilian political system, while characterised by party fragmentation and weak party discipline, was by Lula’s 2002 presidential victory otherwise beginning to show signs of consolidation and institutionalisation. In one of its first measures in government, PT established the Conselho de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social (CDES) (Council for Economic and Social Development) in 2003. This body would serve as a consultative organ of the Presidency and civil society, and at the same time as an institutionalised channel of negotiations of pacts between different social actors and the government, on the agenda of economic, political and social reform. It was initially criticised for the preponderance of PT members among its number.

In terms of economic policy, PT’s hands were tied by undertakings the party had made to the Brazilian people (in Lula’s Carta ao Povo Brasileiro) and to the international financial community prior to taking power, along with agreements signed with the IMF by Cardoso in the closing months of his tenure. Brazil would be committed to a medium-term framework in terms of which IMF financing of $30bn was secured by the Cardoso government during its last days. This framework committed the incoming administration to, amongst others, fiscal discipline, a floating exchange rate and inflation targeting. This was highly restrictive to any structural changes mooted by PT in its election manifesto, and placed major

574 Hunter, “The Normalization of an Anomaly”, 457. See also Panizza, “Boring Country?”.
limitations on its capacities for wealth redistribution through employment creation, social services and land reform. In a broader sense, the global economy was still in the shadow of the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States in 2001, resulting in slowed demand for Brazilian output internationally, and diminished inward investment. According to UNCTAD figures, FDI into Brazil declined from $22.5bn in 2001 to $16.6bn in 2002, by more than a quarter.579

PT’s own public legitimacy, and legitimacy in government, was based on social policy promises, especially poverty reduction and the improvement of social equity conditions,580 which were notoriously poor in Brazil. These goals were, however, relegated to secondary importance after fiscal stability and reducing the deficit in the early phase of Lula’s first term. A number of observers assumed that foreign policy focus on ‘social’ goals such as various campaigns against hunger and poverty, would somehow deflect domestic attention from the government’s economic conservatism in the domestic arena.581

Civil-military relations, long a controversial subject in Brazil’s domestic politics, were productively advanced582 under Cardoso. Yet, the military’s new role in society was still under construction, and the armed forces were therefore not a viable instrument of foreign policy by this time. Indeed, a decade earlier, Brazil was rather cautious about engaging its military abroad, abstaining in July 1994 on Security Council Resolution 940 which first authorised the use of force to restore Jean-Bertrand Aristide to power in Haiti.583

In terms of Brazil’s regional context, while the new PT government immediately started to enjoy the support of fellow Leftist governments, such as those of Cuba and Venezuela, relations with its most powerful neighbour and most important

582 Filho and Zirker note how the creation of a Ministry of Defense under civilian leadership in 1998, and the promulgation of the Law on Disappearances, which reconsidered the question of military amnesty for torture and disappearances during the 21-year regime, represented progress in civil-military relations. See Filho and Zirker, “The Brazilian Military Under Cardoso”, 148.
trading partner in the region, Argentina, were considerably strained by Brazil’s unilateral decision to float its currency in 1999. Nonetheless, Lula’s first trip abroad as President-elect in December 2002, was to Argentina, followed by Chile. This was succeeded by meetings with George W. Bush in the US and Vicente Fox of Mexico by year’s end. In terms of a ‘regional balance of power’, an opportunity had been created by US preoccupation with its ‘war on terror’ at that stage confined to Afghanistan, and its subsequent heightened militarization of relations in South America. Brazil was in no position to capitalise on this opportunity for leadership, however. The outgoing administration had been lukewarm toward the mooted Free Trade Area of the Americas, and yet it struggled to instigate progress on its own preferred option for regional integration, MERCOSUL. This was owing to Argentina’s financial weakness, and Brazil’s own foot-dragging on institutionalising MERCOSUL as a customs union. This was not unusual for Brazil, however, as it had not shown much interest in its immediate region historically. The region became increasingly significant as the 1990s and 2000s wore on, however, as Brazil had made South American integration one of the cornerstones of its foreign policy, beginning with the Collor administration.

Thus, overall, the Brazilian government under PT had some difficulty in the early part of Lula’s first administration in mobilising national resources for any purposes, let alone foreign policy. While Lula’s popular mandate was large, and his personal popularity by far exceeded that of PT from the start, his ability to convert this into resource mobilisation and extraction capability was hampered by the political, economic and international contexts of his arrival at the Planalto Palace.

In these four years of Lula’s first administration, Brazil sought ontological security as a country of the developing world. By this is meant that Brazil identified with the developing world in a number of significant gestures. First, it voiced its strident opinion on the US operation in Iraq, one of the most vocal voices in this regard. This was tempered by a strong position on Iraq’s failure to comply with earlier UN resolutions. It was outspoken on the Israel-Palestine question, became an observer at the League of Arab States, and also started opening new embassies in Africa, in

São Tomé and Principe, Ethiopia and Cameroon, among others. Brazil abstained from voting on Cuba’s human rights record in the UN’s new Human Rights Commission. It asserted its leadership of the Community of Portuguese Language Countries (*Comunidade dos Países de Língua Portuguesa, CPLP*), whose members are mainly in the developing world.

In terms of its rational choices, it sought to maximise its diplomatic exposure, choosing to chart an independent course in foreign policy, all the while maintaining a strong bilateral relationship with the United States. Brazil sought to capitalise on its prime position as a ‘buffer’ state in South America, between the US and Venezuela, and later other radical leftist governments in the region, such as that of Evo Morales, which came to power in 2006; and that of Rafael Correa, inaugurated in 2007. It was unable to avoid negative outcomes in its relations with the US, in retaliation for some of its positions, however. Brazil indicated, in July 2003, for example, that it had no intention of signing the bilateral agreement proposed by the US to grant immunity for American citizens in the ICC. Brazil was subsequently one of a number of states to lose US economic military assistance through the effects of US legislation designed to undermine the ICC.\(^{586}\) Still in 2003, Lula affirmed his commitment to a new compact for South America, by signing the ‘Buenos Aires Consensus’ with Argentine President Nestor Kirchner.

The US view of Brazil as a buffer was not replicated within the region, however, as Brazil increasingly looked like a leader without followers. This was underlined by Morales’ nationalisation of Bolivia’s natural gas reserves in 2006, instigated by Chávez in the view of some. This move had a large impact on Brazilian interests, where Petrobrás, the national petroleum company, was heavily exposed. It also revealed a major cleavage between nationalists and internationalists. This was seen by the Western mainstream press and Brazilian right-leaning media as the biggest challenge in the area of foreign policy for Brazil during the Lula administration. Lula’s first response, however, was tepid, asserting Bolivia’s right to sovereignty over its national resources. Nonetheless, he pledged to defend Petrobrás’ rights

---

under international law, and in a manner that promoted regional stability and solidarity. Analysts of the left saw in Lula’s response a grander scheme to maintain regional stability for the continued inward flow of global foreign investment, while those of the right saw it plainly as part of a leftist conspiracy against Brazilian national economic interests, facilitated by the Lula government’s foreign policy.

In 2004, Lula launched, along with Jacques Chirac of France and Ricardo Lagos of Chile, the ‘Action Against Hunger and Poverty Campaign’. Within IBSA, in addition, a Fund for the Alleviation of Poverty and Hunger was established in 2004, to finance community health projects in developing countries. The major foreign policy action of Lula’s first term was the decision to engage Brazilian troops in the UN Mission in Haiti, MINUSTAH. This represented a major mobilisation of state power – personnel and political capital – for a foreign policy objective. As will be discussed in Chapter 7, however, the goal which this action sought to realise was a lofty one indeed, as it represented the aspirations of the Brazilian elite since the birth of the Republic in 1889: international recognition as a key player in international affairs, through the attainment of a permanent UN Security Council seat. With the impending 50th anniversary of the UN and the debates over its reform, Brazilian decision-makers noted an opportunity for Brazil’s candidacy as one of the proposed new members of the Council. Indeed, on a visit to Brazil in 2004 just ahead of Brazil’s deployment of troops in Haiti, US Secretary of State Colin Powell called the country a “serious candidate” for a possible seat on an expanded Council.

In summary, during Lula’s first term Brazil’s foreign policy outcomes were largely, almost squarely, in the area of internationalism, couched in rhetoric. Brazil was earnestly expanding its ties with a diverse group of developing countries; it

---


emphasised the principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of other states; it emphasised peaceful resolution of international conflicts; as well as multilateral approaches over regional or unilateral approaches to pertinent international questions, such as trade. This reflected a domestic situation in which PT’s political position was precariously poised. The party was in no position in Congress to utilise political capital on international issues, and therefore was satisfied with strong internationalist gestures. On one issue, it did make an allowance, namely the deployment of troops as part of the UN Stabilisation Mission in Haiti. The timing of this deployment was crucial, given Brazil’s desire to be seen as a responsible and capable regional player. In Lula’s second term, with Brazil’s economic fortunes improving markedly, and Lula’s own domestic and international popularity soaring, Brazil was able to translate a greater proportion of national power into state power for foreign policy purposes.

National Power and State Power in Lula’s Second Term: 2007-2010
Consolidating the Brazilian State and National Interests in the Second Term

Lula’s second term was marked by a greater assertiveness in foreign policy that often contradicted the principles of internationalism espoused by the PT. There was a greater sense of purpose in the country’s foreign engagements, a tempered move away from internationalism, in spite of what appeared to be greater rhetorical – and even in some cases, material – commitment to it in principle. The strengthening and institutionalisation of the state, and PT’s control over it, meant that accommodation of divergent social and political strata, while still a political necessity, was less obvious in the domain of foreign policy, especially foreign security policy. This could be seen in the form of greater assertiveness about Brazil’s economic interests in its dealings with neighbouring countries; the stronger declaration of national autonomy in the updating of national security principles and military materiel; and, the manner of Brazil’s engagement in Haiti (to be discussed in Chapter 7).

590 The National Strategy of Defense: Peace and Security for Brazil was released in 2008. Some of the highlights of this document are the proposed unification of Brazil’s Armed Forces under a joint command; the reservation of the right to the development of
Lula was inaugurated for his second term as President of Brazil on 1 January, 2007. The second term got off to a slow start, with Lula delaying the announcement of his cabinet until the end of March, a decision that is customarily announced within three to four weeks of the presidential inauguration. PT’s hegemony in Congress was uneven, complicating the process of assembling the Executive: while forces allied to Lula controlled more than 60% of Congress, there was much intra-alliance tension to manage among the various political parties.591

During a few months spanning the end of the first term and the start of the second, the President’s foreign affairs adviser, Marco Aurélio Garcia, served concurrently as interim president of PT, as the party president Jose Genoíno was forced to resign under a cloud of corruption allegations. By the departure of Genoíno, along with the earlier resignation of José ‘Zé’ Dirceu, Lula’s Chief of Staff, Lula lost two of his most loyal generals in the Articulação ‘centrist’ faction of PT.592 At the same time, however, never in Brazil’s history has the governing party held such proximity to foreign policy as when Garcia held the dual roles of PT President and presidential foreign affairs adviser.

In terms of the growth of national power, the Brazilian economy was poised to grow from the sound base provided by Lula’s first term, which in turn, consolidated on the foundation left by Cardoso’s economic stabilisation policies. According to the Economist Intelligence Report in early 2007, economic conditions at this stage were the most solid than for any other president in recent Brazilian history.593 Brazil’s international reserves by the end of the first year of Lula’s second term, stood at

---

592 Articulação has been the dominant faction, or tendência, in PT since 1995. It is distinguished by its comparative moderation on economic and ideological issues, as well as the Party’s approach to elections and electoral alliances. The major tendencies are: Left Articulation, Social Democrats, Socialist Force and Workers. There are other, smaller regional expressions. See Carlos Graieb, “Vai ser preciso segurar”, in Veja online, Edição 1774, 23 October, 2002. Accessed online at: http://veja.abril.com.br/231002/p_038.html on 5 October, 2010.
US$180 bn, compared to US$85 bn the year before.\textsuperscript{594} To consolidate and expedite growth, the government launched \textit{A Programa de Aceleração do Crescimento} (PAC, growth-acceleration programme) at the end of January.

In the military sphere, the government started to turn its attention to the development of a defence posture for Brazil. This included Lula’s presidential decree of September 2007, calling for the establishment of a Ministerial Committee to propose a National Strategy of Defence. The drafters of the report were the Minister of Defense, Nelson Jobim, and the Minister Head of the Secretariat for Strategic Affairs of the Presidency, the philosophy professor, Roberto Mangabeira Unger. They noted that, in the context of Brazil’s twenty years under military dictatorship, from 1964-1985, this act marked an unprecedented insertion of defence issues and the organisation of the military onto the national agenda.\textsuperscript{595} Until then, the military’s role in society was ill-defined, given its historical retention of the prerogative to intervene in politics should conditions necessitate it. Raising the issue to the level of national debate was an achievement in itself, given the customary reticence of the military on the discussion of any revision of its role in society.\textsuperscript{596}

Among other things, the Strategy report called for “the redefinition of the role of the Ministry of Defence and the listing of strategic guidelines related to each Military branch, specifying the relations that should prevail among them”.\textsuperscript{597} The document further called for a re-nationalisation of Brazilian defence supplies. Brazilian military expenditure increased steadily from USD17,614m in 2003, to reach USD28,096m by the close of Lula’s second term in 2010. This figure did remain constant as a percentage of GDP, however, varying between 1.5 and 1.6 percent over the same period.\textsuperscript{598}

According to Michael Shifter, a vice president of the Inter-American Dialogue, a policy research group in Washington, speaking at the time,

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{594} World Bank, Data: Brazil, accessed online at: \url{http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FI.RES.TOTL.CD}, on 1 October 2010.
\item \textsuperscript{598} SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, accessed online at: \url{http://milexdata.sipri.org/result.php4} on 18 April, 2011.
\end{itemize}
Brazil’s vision of its military’s role fits well with the country’s growing international seriousness and economic and institutional capacity...It is seeking to be a more cohesive national power, and that requires exercising full control over its vast territory and borders.\textsuperscript{599}

Echoing this opinion, Hurrell states that since 2004, Brazil “has shown a renewed interest in accelerating and protecting its indigenous technological development and reviving its nuclear energy program”.\textsuperscript{600}

In further indications of Brazil’s growing material power, in January 2008, Brazil became a net foreign creditor for the first time.\textsuperscript{601} During the Lula presidency, the country opened 33 new embassies, 19 new consulates and 5 new permanent missions to international organizations, including the International Atomic Energy Agency and the United Nations Human Rights Council,\textsuperscript{602} signalling firm monetary commitments to a more activist role in foreign affairs.

Brazil faced a different regional context from that which greeted the inception of Lula’s first term. The election of Evo Morales in neighbouring Bolivia at roughly the same time as Lula’s re-election resulted in some disquiet in Western capitals over Latin America’s perceived ‘Left turn’.\textsuperscript{603} Brazil’s value as an interlocutor between the US and the Leftist governments of Chavez, Morales, and Correa of Ecuador, increased in this environment, giving it more latitude in foreign policy to challenge the United States on certain strategic issues. At the same time, Brazilian policymakers felt the need to make a greater effort to counterbalance the influence of Venezuela and Chavez’s radical anti-American stance. This need was perhaps

\textsuperscript{600} Hurrell, 2010: 63.
\textsuperscript{602} Hurrell, “Brazil and the New Global Order”, 60.
underscored by increased military spending by Venezuela and its acquisition of billions of dollars’ worth of military hardware in recent years.\textsuperscript{604}

On balance, Brazil’s relations with its neighbours entered a new phase as the country sought to become more proactive in defending its economic interests. During 2008, relations with Ecuador became strained over that country’s unilateral decision to suspend debt repayments to Brazil. In addition, President Correa expelled Odebrecht, a major Brazilian construction firm, from the country in October. Brazil’s strained relations with its neighbours were exacerbated by President Lugo of Paraguay’s challenging of the status of Paraguay’s debts to Brazil. To complicate matters, Brazil’s neighbours Venezuela, Bolivia and Chile had commenced upgrading their militaries.

However, Brazil was not limited to its region, as in November 2009, President Mahmoud Ahmedinajad, in a highly controversial gesture, became the first Iranian president to visit Brazil. In March 2010, during a trip to Israel, Lula voiced his opinion on the Middle East Peace Process, appearing to offer his services as a facilitator. And, to underscore the unwieldy growth of Brazilian diplomatic ambitions even further, Lula facilitated, along with Turkey, a deal on procedures for a nuclear fuel swap with Iran. This move was greeted with disdain by the United States.\textsuperscript{605}

In summary, during Lula’s second term, a palpable change occurred in Brazil’s foreign policy posture. While Brazil’s international activism proceeded apace, its regional context became thornier, rendering the discourse and practice of internationalism more difficult to implement. At the same time, the government seized the opportunity to seek to shore up Brazil’s international position by revisiting the country’s defence strategy and placing relations with its neighbours on a more calculated footing. Domestically, the Workers’ Party had improved its position considerably following the 2005 \textit{mensalão} scandal, and was beginning to look forward to the candidacy of Lula’s successor in the 2010 presidential election. Lula’s

\textsuperscript{604} Reuters, “US concerned over Venezuela-Russia arms deal”, 14 September 2009.

personal popularity was consistently high according to polls taken in the months preceding the October 2010 election. Economic indicators were strong during Lula’s second term, meaning an increase in brute national power. Lula’s personal popularity and growing outspokenness on international issues lifted Brazil’s international profile. This, combined with the synergy between the government’s foreign policy goals, its outreach to the military, and popular support for Brazil’s international outlook, ensured a progressive conversion of this national power to state power.

Conclusion

Internationalism, comprising non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states; the peaceful resolution of disputes; a commitment to multilateralism; and, South-South diplomacy, have each long enjoyed primacy in the Brazilian foreign policy outlook, with emphasis varying according to the political dictates of the time. Brazil’s foreign policy outlook adopted subtle, yet significant changes in the transition from Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s administration to that of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. While foreign policy became more internationalist, and invested in international engagements, the influence of PT should not veil the revisions in self-perception, and in perception of the international environment, experienced by Brazil’s decision-making elite during Lula’s two-term tenure. Cardoso sought to bring Brazil back to global respectability (seen as proximity to Western powers) in the international sphere, to accompany and support his success in rebuilding the domestic economy. Lula, for his part, sought to diversify Brazil’s foreign relations, and adopt a decidedly ‘anti-imperialist’ outlook.

The structural environment that greeted PT’s rise to power might have created an expectation of vigilance and heightened suspicion of Brazil’s neighbours. However, the opposite transpired: Lula extended a hand of friendship to Chavez, and Bolivia’s nationalisation of its oil reserves was similarly met with a muted response by Lula. While the first term of the Lula administration was thus dedicated to preserving Brazil’s credibility in the eyes of the international community, the second presented an opportunity for greater attention to be paid to questions of national defence and national interest. This was facilitated by the propitious economic context the
country enjoyed, and by the apparent success of its attempts to diversify its commercial contacts, thereby rendering it more of an autonomous and independent actor. Domestic constraints on Lula’s foreign policy included the limits imposed by a fractious Congress over which PT had varying amounts of influence. While these limits persisted into the second term, Lula’s personal popularity heightened Brazil’s image abroad and underlay ever more ambitious foreign policy goals, including forays into the Middle East peace process and the Iran nuclear power issue.
Chapter 7: The New Internationalists? South Africa, Brazil, MINUSTAH and the exile of Jean-Bertrand Aristide

“Maybe our media and opposition will ask again how much does it cost, who is going to pay and what is in it for us. For us, the saving of lives, stopping wars and contributing towards peace, democracy, human rights and development cannot be reduced simply to rands and cents. What is in it, for us, is peace.”

South African Foreign Minister, Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma, on South Africa’s participation in peacekeeping in Burundi.606

“Quem defende novos paradigmas nas relações internacionais, não poderia omitir-se diante de uma situação concreta.”607

Lula da Silva, Speech at the 49th General Assembly, 21 September, 2004, in reference to Brazil’s participation in Haiti.

Introduction

South Africa and Brazil represent two prominent examples of Southern states embarking on internationalist foreign policies, whether for structural or unit-level reasons, or a combination of both. In this chapter an examination of a case of international crisis in which both states were involved provides a unique test case of each of their actions and their motivations, where it has been possible to uncover these. Haiti represents a ‘turning-point’ decision for each country, in the sense that it required the allocation of resources – military, political, and economic - to an international issue. A turning point decision, as noted in Chapter 1, is distinct from a state’s general objectives and verbal strategies; and, routine actions conducted by a state’s diplomatic machinery.

The case of state failure in Haiti, and the measures taken by South Africa and Brazil, are examined to shed light on their motivations and capacities in an area in which neither can be said to have had pressing national interests. What is at stake in their respective responses to the crisis? What can neoclassical realism tell us about it? Haiti represents a significant opportunity for the appraisal of internationalism in the foreign policies of South Africa and Brazil. This is because it involves another ‘Southern’ or developing state; assistance required the choice of sides in the conflict,
along with forms of external intervention; as well as a choice on their respective stances on the promotion of democracy and non-interference.

While the crisis in Haiti has been referenced frequently in terms of its domestic dimensions, the aspects of relevance to International Relations have seldom been highlighted, and this will form part of the contribution of this chapter. It is important to note that the MINUSTAH mission, due to the novelty of its mandate (relating to multidisciplinary or ‘second-generation’ peacekeeping) and the circumstances under which it was approved and deployed, has been contested from the start, and the subject of polemical debate in the peacekeeping and international human rights literature. The focus of this chapter is the foreign policy formulation dimension of specifically the involvement of South Africa and Brazil, as two states seeking to portray an internationalist posture in their foreign relations.

The present chapter revolves around the crisis wrought by the deposing of the democratically-elected government of Jean-Bertrand Aristide in 2004, and its international implications. This crisis had been at least a decade in the making. It ultimately saw two very different modes of Southern engagement deployed. South Africa displayed solidarity with Jean-Bertrand Aristide, first through the attendance of the bicentennial celebrations of the Haitian Revolution by President Thabo Mbeki, and second, by offering exile to Aristide upon his ouster in 2004. Brazil assumed the leadership of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), relaxing longstanding terms of its engagement in UN missions in order to lead the mission.

This case is selected for a number of reasons. It represented a turning point in the foreign policies of both South Africa and Brazil, under Mbeki and Lula, respectively. For both countries, it was a decided turn away – though not an isolated instance -

---

608 For an exception, see von Einsiedel and Malone, “Peace and Democracy for Haiti?”.
610 Nineteen states have contributed troops to the MINUSTAH mission under the leadership of Brazil. Fifty-one states have contributed police personnel. See MINUSTAH website.
from their repeatedly-stated commitment to non-interference. In the South African case, it involved the commitment of national political and material resources for the reported assistance (through the attempted provision of arms and the presence of a South African vessel in Haitian waters months prior to Aristide’s ouster) and exile of the Haitian leader in South Africa, outside its core foreign policy focus areas of Southern Africa and Africa. In the Brazilian case, the country conducted a modification of its longstanding policy of engagement of Brazilian troops in international crises. How did domestic and systemic factors combine to lead these two leaders to take these positions? And, how much was new in their respective, and collective, approaches to Haiti? The timing of the crisis and the responses of these two states should be noted: debates regarding the reform of the UN Security Council were at a high point, ahead of the 2005 UN Millennium Summit where this would be a central topic of discussion.

The chapter is sub-divided as follows: Following a brief background of the case, the approaches of South Africa and Brazil, respectively, are presented. The nature of their involvement, how it complies with internationalism, and the domestic and international implications are analysed. This is followed by an appraisal of ‘Southern’ engagement as distinct from other, mainly ‘Northern’ engagements in international crises.

7.2. Background

Haiti has a long history of political instability. Since its independence from France as the first Black republic in 1804, it has never had a prolonged period of stable, representative government. In the twentieth century, the country was under US occupation between 1915 and 1934, and was subsequently led by dictators, until the first democratic elections were held in 1957. These elections, on whose legitimacy doubt was cast by widespread fraud and the presence of the Armed Forces, brought to power the Duvalier dynasty,\(^{611}\) which ruled Haiti from 1957 to 1986. ‘Doc’ Duvalier was succeeded by his son, ‘Baby Doc’, for almost three decades of brutal misrule and corruption.

\(^{611}\)Ricardo Seitenfus, “Keeping the Peace and the Lessons of Haiti: Collapse or Rebuilding of the State?”. (2007)
Elections were held in 1990, ushering in two decades of further intense international involvement in Haiti’s affairs, much of it necessary. Monitored by the UN and the OAS, the elections brought to power the young Catholic priest and exponent of liberation theology, Jean-Bertrand Aristide. Starting well and attaining modest success initially, Aristide’s rule increasingly incited opposition through its growing authoritarianism and personal nature. On 29 September 1991, Aristide’s government was overthrown by Raoul Cédras, the commander of Haiti’s armed forces.

Exiled to Venezuela, Aristide won international backing, through the UN and the OAS, for his eventual return to Haiti. A pivotal source of support was the Clinton administration in the US. This support included a trade embargo on the Cédras regime in Haiti imposed by the OAS, as well as diplomatic action under the auspices of the UN. On 16 June 1993, the Security Council imposed mandatory sanctions on the country, preventing the trade of weapons, oil and petroleum products with Haiti by UN members. Sanctions were lifted when negotiations between Aristide and Cédras resulted in the Governor’s Island Agreement (GIA). The GIA provided for “a new civilian government, the suspension of sanctions, the deployment of UN peacekeepers, an amnesty, the retirement of Cédras, and the return to power of Aristide.” The agreement foundered because of the disingenuousness of Cédras, whose thugs prevented the landing of the UN peacekeepers who constituted the UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH). His return thwarted, Aristide lobbied for stronger measures against Cédras. These included the reimposition of sanctions by the UN as well as a naval blockade of Haiti. Furthermore, on 31 July 1994, in terms of UNSC Resolution 940 (1994), the UN authorised a US-led multinational force (MNF) under Chapter VII. This was to be followed by a Chapter VI UN peacekeeping operation. By mid-September of that year, the US had gathered 19 UN member states in the operation, amounting to a total of 2 000 troops, to join a 20 000-strong US force within the MNF.

Much of this background is derived from Einsiedel and Malone, “Peace and Democracy for Haiti?”.

On this occasion the force was able to deploy without resistance, paving the way for Aristide’s return. The handover from peace restoration to peacekeeping operation (from MNF to UNMIH) took place in March 1995. UNMIH comprised 6,000 troops and about 800 civilian police officers.

The democratic credentials of the presidential election five years later in 2000, which saw Aristide returned to power were hotly disputed, with even the OAS registering its misgivings about the poll. It is upon this basis that domestic and international calculations of support or opposition to Aristide’s removal in 2004 hinge. While some human rights activists have painted Aristide as the villain, some African and Caribbean states, and commentators on the left worldwide, tended to view Aristide as the legitimate leader of Haiti, in terms of the outcome of the 2000 elections. From the latter perspective, Aristide’s removal from power in 2004 was a clear interruption of democratic government in Haiti, buttressed by foreign assistance.

Nonetheless, by January 2004, Aristide was reduced to governing by decree. Tensions were rising in Haiti, after six months of violent protests against the government. Violence escalated with the decision of the Front de Résistance de l’Artibonite (FRA, or the Artibonite Resistance Front) based in the northern city of Gonaïves, to begin a military campaign against the government on 5 February 2004. Joining ranks with Louis-Jodel Chamblain, a prominent member of Cèdres’ death squads, FRA’s leader Guy Philippe commanded an estimated 500 former members of the Haitian Army (whom Aristide had unwisely disbanded but not disarmed in 1995), a coalition called Front pour la Libération et la Reconstruction Nationales (FLRN, or the National Liberation and Reconstruction Front).

614 The OAS declined to dispatch observers to the Haitian Presidential and Senatorial elections of 26 November 2000, as the poll went against the Organisation’s position that elections only be held under conditions of ‘national accord’. Such accord was absent, stemming from irregularities in the country’s two previous elections, on 21 May 2000, and in 1997. Opposition parties comprising the Convergence Démocratique called for an annulment of the 21 May elections, and refused to participate in the November elections, which they described as ‘illegal’. See ‘Third Report of the Mission of the Organization of American States to Haiti, Visit of the Assistant Secretary General to Haiti, February 6-10, 2001. Accessed online at: http://www.oas.org/xxxiiga/english/docs_en/report3_haiti.htm on 4 December, 2010.  
615 Armed Conflict Database, International Institute of Strategic Studies, accessed online at:
In less than a month, soon after the celebrations commemorating the bicentennial of Haiti’s independence from France in 1804, this coalition was able to overrun most of Haiti. At this point, according to Einsiedel and Malone, “Aristide latched on to a populist distraction, an attempt to extract from France compensation for the reparations that had been imposed on Haiti by Paris in the nineteenth century as indemnity for the dispossessed French colonists post-independence”.

The main international mediator at this stage of the crisis was CARICOM, along with the governments of the United States, Canada and France. In January 2004, CARICOM hosted a meeting in the Bahamas between members of the opposition and the heads of government of the Bahamas, Jamaica and Trinidad. The meeting resulted in a draft set of conditions that Aristide should meet in order to end the political stalemate in Haiti. These conditions were as follows: disbanding of armed gangs, establishment of rules governing political protest, an agreement with the opposition as to who should be the next prime minister, the creation of an electoral commission, and the setting of a date for legislative elections. The literature appears to be divided over the efficacy of these talks arranged by CARICOM. Some analysts see Aristide’s failure to implement all of the reforms agreed to at the CARICOM meetings under the threat of sanctions as a cause of escalating violence later in January 2004.

Others, meanwhile, see these provisions as marginal, last-ditch efforts that the opposition placed little faith in, in any event, even, in some cases refusing to lend credibility to Aristide by participating. Even the calls of CARICOM and the OAS for the UN Security Council to take ‘urgent’ measures, including the despatch of troops, fell on deaf ears. The UNSC rejected an appeal from CARICOM on February 26 for the dispatch of international peacekeeping forces, only acceding to the request after the departure of Aristide.


Einsiedel and Malone, “Peace and Democracy for Haiti?”, 163.


Einsiedel and Malone, “Peace and Democracy for Haiti?”, 165.

Dionne Jackson Miller, “Aristide’s Call for Reparations From France Unlikely to Die”, in InterPress Service News Agency, 12 March, 2004. Accessed online at: http://ipsnews.net/interna.asp?idnews=22826 on 8 December, 2010. Some observers saw in this reversal France’s extreme antipathy toward Aristide based on the reparations demand, while the latter’s significance was downplayed by others.
Instead, France and the US were more disposed toward joining forces in exerting pressure on Aristide to step down. Finally, Aristide departed Haiti for exile on 29 February 2004. The circumstances under which this occurred are the subject of conjecture, with Aristide claiming he was kidnapped, a charge denied by then-US Secretary of State, Colin Powell. On the same day, UNSC Resolution 1529 authorized the immediate deployment of a Multinational Interim Force (MIF), comprising 3 000 troops, for 3 months. This operation would be replaced by a UN peacekeeping mission, the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). The transition phase was marked by an unfortunate lack of commitment shown by the major powers, which had spearheaded Aristide’s ouster, and uncertainty regarding the locus of power in Haiti.

Given that the foreign relations of both South Africa and Brazil over the last decade have been played out in such ideological/rhetorical terms as is evident in Chapters 5 and 6, it is necessary to examine the deeper issues implicit in Haiti’s complex international history, rather than simply the recounting of ‘facts’, and thus where the engagement of these two emerging powers fits. Since the first US occupation of Haiti between 1915 and 1934, the country has been portrayed as a key site of US imperialism. Indeed, writing of the 1994 invasion to restore Aristide, Cynthia Weber has noted,

United Nations authorization of U.S. actions in Haiti allowed the United States to decorate its regional effort with flags of many nations…As the list of member states in this force grew to more than thirty, it appeared less and less like a “genuine” response by the international community to the Haiti situation and more and more like the artificial, dissimulated cover for U.S. regional activity that it was.

621 Einsiedel and Malone, “Peace and Democracy for Haiti?”, 164 and Armed Conflict Database.
Weber and others argued that the ‘multilateral’ operation gave poor cover to a purely US regional activity designed to stem the flow of refugees from Haiti into the US.  

The second significant feature of the current UN mission in Haiti is that it is a foreign intervention, ostensibly to bring about order, when in the first place, it occurred to underwrite and facilitate governance for an illegitimate regime. This is a highly sensitive issue in the national and international psychologies of both South Africa and Brazil. MINUSTAH is an example of an evolution in UN peacekeeping away from “observing a ceasefire in a war between two countries and toward facilitating a peace accord and internal stability”. Essentially, the mission represents a clear shift in the direction of ‘peace enforcement’ followed by ‘peace-building’, the latter defined by former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali as “comprehensive efforts to identify and support structures which will tend to consolidate peace and advance a sense of confidence and well-being among people”. MINUSTAH was authorised to include some 6 700 military personnel, 1 622 police, 550 international civilian staff, 150 UN volunteers, and about 1 000 local civilian staff. In terms of its original mandate, MINUSTAH was established:

to support the Transitional Government in ensuring a secure and stable environment; to assist in monitoring, restructuring, and reforming the Haitian National Police; to help with comprehensive and sustainable Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programmes; to assist with the restoration and maintenance of the rule of law, public safety and public order in Haiti; to protect United Nations personnel, facilities, installations and equipment and to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence; to support the constitutional and political processes; to assist in organizing, monitoring, and carrying out free and fair municipal, parliamentary and presidential elections; to support the Transitional Government as well as Haitian human rights institutions

623 Ibid., 115. 
624 Howland, “How MINUSTAH Falls Short in Haiti”, 466. 
and groups in their efforts to promote and protect human rights; and to monitor and report on the human rights situation in the country.628

Given this background, the manner of participation for each emerging power was conditioned by both structural and unit-level factors. The next two sections outline each set of circumstances and their resulting policies.

7.3. South Africa’s strategy on Haiti: A neoclassical realist restraint?

7.3.1. The Nature of South Africa’s Involvement
The peculiarity of South Africa’s involvement in the Haiti crisis is that it is markedly devoid of any transparent, accessible decision-making process, moreso than any other decisions of state, which have usually tended anyway not to be laid bare to public scrutiny. This points to the personal nature of the decision – and the institutional freedom and legitimating capacity enjoyed by South Africa’s President Mbeki - to engage in the crisis. This issue was not debated in Parliament prior to major decisions, such as those to dispatch arms to Haiti and to grant asylum to Aristide and his family, being taken.

For a number of reasons, South Africa’s involvement in the Haiti crisis assumed more restrained proportions than that of Brazil, discussed below. Already, Mbeki’s decision to travel to Haiti to participate in the country’s bicentennial anniversary of independence was injudicious. By early 2004, immediately preceding these celebrations, and following them, anti-Aristide protests were growing and becoming increasingly violent.629 Mbeki’s visit, as described by the government news agency, BuaNews, “was to consolidate the African Renaissance with Africans in the Diaspora and highlight the Haitian revolution as an important milestone in African history”.630 Aristide was offered asylum by South Africa after Morocco and Taiwan had denied it.631

628 Ibid.
629 Einsiedel and Malone, “Peace and Democracy for Haiti?”, 163.
Mbeki’s own interpretation of the situation was briefly offered in his weekly online letter, *ANC Today*. A few months after the revolt and deposing of Aristide, he wrote:

> The central purpose of the counter-revolution is to halt and reverse the long-delayed democratic revolution in Haiti, guarantee the positions of the privileged few, and ensure the continued oppression, disempowerment and impoverishment of the millions of poor Haitians. In many respects, the 2004 counter-revolution in Haiti was not dissimilar to the counter-revolution in Chile in 1973, which resulted in the overthrow of the Allende government, the death of the President, and the installation of the Pinochet military dictatorship. 632

Thus was the President’s concern, and by implication, South Africa’s, framed in terms of a struggle in Haiti for democracy and economic, social and political development and equality; and, significantly, of the centrality of Aristide and his supporters to this struggle:

> From his election in 1990, President Aristide and other patriots have been engaged in a complex and difficult struggle to establish the stable democratic system that has eluded the First Black Republic since its birth 200 years ago. They have also sought to ensure that this new democracy should address the interests of the majority of the people, the black urban and rural poor. 633

Mbeki also conveyed his opinion on UN Resolution 1529 thus:

> What was and is strange and disturbing about this Resolution is that it is totally silent on the central issue of the unconstitutional and anti-democratic removal of the elected Government of Haiti. It says nothing about the notorious figures who achieved this objective, arms in hand, killing many people. 634

This gives some indication of the South African government’s stance on the prospect of assisting in multilateral initiatives to stabilise Haiti. While it was open to CARICOM’s interpretation of events, it viewed the UN Security Council’s position with scepticism.

News reports also contended that South Africa had attempted to dispatch a consignment of arms to assist in the defence of the Aristide government. According


633 Ibid.

634 Ibid.
to the leader of the Parliamentary Opposition, Tony Leon of the Democratic Alliance, Mbeki had authorised a South African airforce plane to carry supplies in support of Aristide’s government in its last days. The plane reportedly had a shipment of 150 R-1 rifles, 5,000 bullets, 200 smoke grenades and 200 bullet-proof vests.\textsuperscript{635} Parliament was indeed informed in December 2003 of the deployment of South African troops to “assist the Government of Haiti in celebrating two hundred years of its independence and victory in the struggle against slavery in the Americas”.\textsuperscript{636} A total of 139 personnel were deployed, along with 1 combat support ship, 1 harbour patrol boat, and one helicopter. It was not clarified how this deployment would assist in a celebration. The expected costs were R2m, at the expense of the Department of Foreign Affairs.\textsuperscript{637}

Aristide is viewed with equal amounts of sympathy and opprobrium on the two sides of the debate about his leadership of Haiti. In spite of his deteriorating human rights record, he was seen as an anti-establishment, anti-elite figure\textsuperscript{638} for his espousal of ‘liberation theology’ and a ‘priority option for the poor’. Indeed, his largest support base was among the poor and dispossessed of Haiti, mirroring that of the ANC in South Africa. This provided a strong ideological background for South Africa’s decision to participate in the Haiti crisis in the manner that it did.

\textbf{7.3.2. How does it comply with internationalism?}

South Africa’s engagement on the Haiti question has a mixed record as an intervention along the lines of southern internationalism. While the rhetoric employed by the African National Congress, through its President, Thabo Mbeki, and the government, made much of the democratic and populist credentials of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide, there remained some question marks over the


\textsuperscript{637} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{638} Hausotter, “The Uses of Peacekeeping”, 150.
transparency of the actions taken and the extent to which they contributed to an amelioration of the situation in Haiti.

In spite of the request for assistance to Aristide’s government reportedly coming from CARICOM, the underhanded manner in which the South African government responded, by promising arms and ‘equipment’, would not have contributed to a non-violent resolution of the conflict. For this reason, the action had to be kept away from the glare of public and parliamentary scrutiny.

Mbeki did not make any statements regarding Aristide’s calls for reparations from France, an issue that would lend itself patently to the Southern internationalist agenda. This may be attributed to his stance on the issue domestically, where he opposed calls for apartheid reparations by sectors of South African society, on the basis that they would deter the foreign direct investment on which his economic policy heavily depended. His foreign minister, Dr Dlamini Zuma, however, lauded Aristide’s courage, declaring in the 2004 DFA Budget Vote, “President Aristide dared to speak for the poor of Haiti. He dared to ask for compensation to correct a historic injustice”.

7.3.3. Domestic implications

The domestic implications of South Africa’s engagement in the Haiti crisis were scarcely registered in the public domain. The main voices of opposition were those of the opposition in parliament, who had access to privileged information about the country’s involvement. They called for the denial of entry to South Africa to Aristide. As neatly expounded by Mbeki in his weekly online ANC newsletter, ‘Letter from the President’, on the occasion of Aristide’s 51st birthday, and in a manner only he could perfect, “As much as they did not know of President

Aristide’s birthday, our people will be ignorant of all …that is happening in Haiti”.\textsuperscript{642}

This ignorance was not helped by the lack of government transparency on the matter. The Minister of Foreign Affairs was famously tight-lipped about the extent of the expenses Aristide’s sojourn in South Africa was costing the state\textsuperscript{643} and the rationale for the state’s offer of asylum. The Democratic Alliance supplemented its enquiries in Parliament with a letter to the chairman of the National Conventional Arms Control Committee (NCACC), Professor Kader Asmal, asking whether a permit had been granted for the export of the arms and equipment to Haiti.\textsuperscript{644} A further complicating factor was whether personnel had been dispatched in respect of the equipment, in which case this would constitute a deployment of South African troops abroad, an action that requires Parliamentary oversight.

On 13 May 2004, the ANC commended the decision of the Cabinet to accede to CARICOM’s request for Aristide’s asylum in South Africa. It noted that, “The decision was a reasonable and responsible response to a request from a regional multilateral body that has long been seized with the resolution of the crisis in Haiti”, and that “South Africa has a responsibility to assist in whatever way it can to achieve a peaceful and lawful resolution of Haiti’s current crisis”.\textsuperscript{645}

7.3.4. International implications: A case of neoclassical realist restraint?

The primary international consequence of Aristide’s asylum in South Africa was his physical removal from the Caribbean, where his presence was viewed by the US and

\textsuperscript{642} Thabo Mbeki, “State of the Nation Address”, \textit{Parliamentary Hansard, 6 February 2004.}
his enemies in Haiti as potentially incendiary.\[646\] Immediately after being deposed in Haiti, Aristide was relocated to the Central African Republic (CAR). He was subsequently exiled, upon his own request, to Jamaica. From Jamaica, he received an offer of asylum from the South African government, acting on the request of CARICOM.

The asylum of Aristide and his family in South Africa was seen as one consequence of President Mbeki’s commitment to the idea of an African diaspora,\[647\] an important new component in African continental initiatives, one on which many resources are expended, and where the Caribbean is a particular focus. Just prior to the onset of the crisis, Mbeki extended an invitation to AU leaders to join Haiti’s bicentenary celebrations in January 2004. The Caribbean was seen as an important arena of extending the links between the African continent and Africans abroad. Indeed, it was the region of the world on which the AU’s focus first turned for its objective of strengthening relations and solidarity with the people of the African Diaspora. As Mbeki stated,

The celebration of the bicentenary of the Haitian Revolution and the Decade of Liberation in South Africa during the same year, 2004, must serve to inspire all Africans to act together and decisively to end their poverty, underdevelopment, dehumanisation and marginalisation.\[648\]

Yet, South Africa resisted the temptation to become more actively involved in the Haiti crisis.

---


7.4. Brazil’s strategy on Haiti: a classical Realist expansion?

7.4.1. The Nature of Brazil’s Involvement

Brazil stepped into the breach, pledging troops for the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), after France and the US had scaled back their military involvement on the Caribbean island. Brazil along with other Latin American countries, it is noted, “came forward with significant offers of peacekeepers for the first time in a UN operation in the Western Hemisphere”.

According to Ambassador Gonçalo Mello Mourão, head of the Department for Central America and the Caribbean at the Ministry of External Relations (MRE), Brazil’s decision to participate in MINUSTAH was based on consultation with Caribbean and Latin American partners:

It was a major foreign relations decision on the part of Brazil. As a major foreign relations decision, it was of course taken at the most high level, by the President himself. This is a step that was taken after consultations. The role of MRE…was to gather a coincidence of views as far as Latin American and Caribbean countries were concerned. So, our first concern in engaging in MINUSTAH was to get a common vision from the continent…mostly Latin America and the Caribbean countries. Argentina, Chile, Uruguay in the first place, and then others came. Today you have Peru, Paraguay, Bolivia, Ecuador, Guatemala. They are all part of the military presence of Latin America in Haiti. They represent more than half of the military presence there.

Moreover, the country’s legislators sanctioned Brazil’s participation, as the Brazilian Congress supported the decision with a majority of 266 votes in favour and 118 against. Legislative Decree No.207 of 19 May 2004, approved by the President of Brazil’s Congress, formalised Brazil’s commitment to the Mission, a constitutional necessity. One vocal opponent to Brazil’s participation in the operation was the power-broker, Bahia representative, and right-wing politician, Antônio Carlos Magalhães. Magalhães voiced his dissent in terms of Brazilian national priorities.

650 Interview with the author, Brasília, July 2010.
lying within the country, “because the government needs to correct its internal situation, and then…seek to establish itself as an international authority”. Similar reservations were noted by other opposition parties, and even some of PT’s coalition partners such as Partido do Movimento Democratico Brasileiro (PMDB). Legislative support was ultimately ornamental, as one deputy noted, because prior to the vote in Congress, Brazilian troops were already headed for Rio de Janeiro from their various regional bases, destined for Haiti.

On 6 November 2004, Brazil announced that it would bolster the UN peacekeeping force that at the time numbered barely 2,800. Brazil’s contribution raised the overall size of the operation to 5,500 soldiers, and it also committed to staying in Haiti until the presidential elections, planned for that month. This enabled the UNSC to extend MINUSTAH’s mandate to June 2005. According to Prof Kai Michael Kenkel, a scholar at Rio’s PUC-Rio University, the pressures for Brazilian action derived from two key levels. First, in the UN Security Council, the United States and France had substantial interests in stabilising Haiti, but were limited in their own capacity for doing so. At the Brazilian national level, a shift in favour of greater engagement in foreign policy was already underway, with the entry to power of Lula in 2003.

The request or application for participation in multilateral missions usually comes from MRE, so it is easy for the decision to become subject to international political imperatives. Compare the situation in Mexico, for example, where this decision is

---


656 Interview with the author, July 2010.
taken by two branches of the armed forces, the Ministry of the Navy and the Ministry of Defence.\textsuperscript{657}

The military mission is not the sole aspect of Brazil’s engagement in Haiti. The country has also despatched police officials and civilians. In addition to this, in a bilateral context, Brazil has made extensive use of technical cooperation, through the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (Agência Brasileira de Cooperação, ABC), to augment its engagement in the reconstruction of Haiti. Along with India and South Africa, its partners in the IBSA Fund, Brazil has financed a recycling plant in Port-au-Prince, for example.\textsuperscript{658}

In more general terms, it is noted that peacekeeping became part of the policy of civil-military reform in Brazil, but also that with reform of the political role of the military in Brazil, diplomats obtained an additional instrument in the service of foreign policy, namely the ability to deploy troops on peacekeeping missions.\textsuperscript{659} Hence, peacekeeping commitments served a domestic purpose in Brazil, helping to integrate the military under civilian command – an essential component of the democratisation process that commenced in 1982, and it served a purpose on the international stage, by providing Itamaraty with additional measures for asserting Brazil’s credentials as an emerging power.\textsuperscript{660} Service abroad provided by the Haiti crisis arrived at an opportune time for the redefinition of the military’s identity in terms of external missions, rather than internal missions, such as pacifying and protecting the Amazon, for example.

At the systemic level, as noted by Hirst,

\begin{quote}
The types of responsibilities assumed by the South American countries in Haiti are closely connected to a new set of expectations imposed upon middle income countries (MIC) with consolidated democratic institutions and with values that are
\end{quote}


\textsuperscript{658} Amorim, “Overview”, 226.


\textsuperscript{660} Velasquez, “Brazil and Mexico in Comparative Perspective”, 372.
set by the international community. In fact, Argentina, Brazil and Chile (ABC) have softened their previous foreign policy anti-interventionist postures, assuming new responsibilities that seek to secure the regional political agenda while offering an innovative approach to post-conflict intervention.

In the particular case of Haiti, it has been noted that, as a sign of the international times, “peace building and peace promotion became an explicit component of [MINUSTAH’s] agenda”; and, “the onus for external intervention was premised not exclusively on the preservation of international peace and security, but instead on the responsibility of the international community to protect civilians”.

Thus, Brazil’s much-vaunted approach in Haiti – which, besides, came under much criticism in some quarters – must be seen in the context of a paradigm shift in multilateral approaches to security, and not solely in the context of Brazil’s own pronouncements of ‘business unusual’ in Haiti.

Brazil’s leading role in MINUSTAH is a significant step away from the manner in which it has pursued its multilateral engagement in peace operations in recent years. As such, it should be seen in the light of the country’s traditional stance with respect to peacekeeping operations. Brazil’s participation in operations under the auspices of the UN falls broadly into two significant periods: the first, from 1957 to 1967, when it engaged in six operations; and the second, from 1989 to the present, each corresponding with the moments of increased UN participation in maintaining international peace and security. The former period corresponded with the UN’s era of ‘classical’ peacekeeping operations, while the latter has been characterised by ‘second-generation’ peacekeeping.

Perhaps more instructive for the purposes of the current argument are the cases in which Brazil has declined to contribute troops to UN missions. In the first set of cases, Brazil has not had a tradition of participating in multinational forces authorised by the UN Security Council, especially where rules of engagement are not clear-cut (as opposed to forces under the auspices of the UN, created by UN

resolutions). A primary example of this was the refusal of the Gêulio Vargas government in June 1951 to accede to a US request to contribute troops for the Korean War. Similarly, under FHC in 1996, Brazil refused a UN request to contribute troops to the Multinational Force in Zaïre, following an attenuation of the crisis there. By contrast, Brazil acceded to participation in a multinational intervention force in East Timor in 1999, in support of the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), on the back of a referendum which had unequivocally expressed the popular will, and with the consent of the Indonesian government. High levels of violence after the referendum resulted in the need for a military force to restore peace and support the work of UNTAET. Brazil contributed only through the despatch of its contingent of 50 military police, which were already in the country as part of UNTAET.

Thus, Brazil’s leadership of the MINUSTAH mission is a departure on a number of grounds from its traditional stance on foreign deployment of Brazilian troops:

- Haiti departs from the linguistic affinity of past Brazilian engagements, which tended to take place, if not in Portuguese-speaking countries, such as Angola, Mozambique and Timor Leste, then in countries of South or Central America.
- The Brazilian government, throughout its history of participation in external peace missions, has sought very explicit terms of engagement when deploying troops abroad. These include: impartiality, the consent of the host government, the non-use of force (excepting in cases of self-defence), and a clear mandate from the United Nations Security Council. Where these conditions have not been met, more often than not, Brazil has declined involvement.
- Haiti lacked a clear political settlement by the time MINUSTAH replaced the Multinational Interim Force. In fact, the political uncertainties of the case represented the ‘original sin’ of the Mission.

---

664 Brazil has engaged in two peacekeeping operations outside the ambit of the UN, however. The first occasion was the Dominican Republic in 1965-66 and the second on the Peru-Ecuador border from 1995 to 1999. See Fontoura, *O Brasil e as Operações de Manutenção da Paz*, 210.
666 Ibid., p220-221.
667 This term is Hirst's. Hirst, "South American Intervention in Haiti".
Brazil’s leadership of MINUSTAH is more a testament to the pursuit of Brazil’s ‘national interest’ by unreconstructed nationalist diplomats, than to the ingenuity of PT. PT itself was caught napping on Haiti, and admits it is a case of a development in Brazilian foreign policy where “the government has taken the initiative and [which] the Party still has not been able to track adequately”. 668

7.4.2. How does it comply with internationalism?

An earlier chapter established internationalism as characterised by the following features:

- Non-intervention in the affairs of other states
- South-south solidarity
- Non-violent resolution of disputes, and
- The centrality of multilateralism.

Brazil’s involvement in Haiti has been seen by its supporters as a vindication of a new ‘Southern’ internationalism. While leadership of MINUSTAH may be seen in terms of South-South solidarity, the Mission may also be seen as the organised victimisation of a hapless polity through the underwriting of an undemocratic change of government, with great power support. The Mission also represents a shift in Brazil’s decades-old policy of non-interference in the domestic affairs of other states. Brazil has now adopted a policy of ‘não indiferença’/non-indifference. This paradigm shift, while viewed cynically by critics, as a cover for a new interventionism, has been described by a Brazilian diplomat as:

a way of emphasizing the responsibility of the international community when faced with humanitarian disasters and crises, including those resulting from hunger, poverty and epidemics. These are humanitarian catastrophes that can be prevented or mitigated through political will and short, medium and long-term cooperation...‘Non-indifference’ calls for enhanced South-South cooperation and innovative financing mechanisms, which complement traditional sources of financing for development. 669

However, Haiti was not merely a humanitarian engagement, it was a patently political one.

Brazil has also sought to distance itself from any notion that it is promoting a ‘solution’ in Haiti. Instead, Brazil is very worried about not being seen as a country that is interfering with other countries or with the policy of the region as far as [the Haiti question] is concerned…The nature of Brazil’s presence there is that we try to enforce (sic) the Haitian society so that they can build the country they want. We didn’t want to impose our culture, we didn’t want to sell our merchandise…we went there to help them help themselves. So that’s the spirit of [Brazil’s] presence in Haiti.670

While much has been debated about the ‘novelty’ of Brazilian approaches to peacekeeping in Haiti, it must be borne in mind that Brazil is an expanding regional power with clear foreign policy statements on the kind of international order it favours. In recent years, it has begun to develop the capabilities to shape such an order, first through ‘soft’ means, such as its economic diplomacy and ‘Southern’ engagement in UN peacekeeping operations, but more recently, also by way of traditional ‘hard’ power. “In the final years of the Cardoso administration”, for example, “the defense budget rose by the year 2000 to some $17.8 billion, which was “more than the rest of South America combined””.671 In 2000 Brazil also acquired a replacement aircraft carrier from France – the only country in South America to boast this attribute.672 In 2007, it was reported that Brazil sought to develop a nuclear-powered submarine.673 While on the one hand, even Brazil’s diplomats have conceded that participation in the Mission in Haiti has been motivated to no small extent by the country’s UNSC aspirations; on the other, it “reflects Brazil’s attempts to expand its area of influence to the Caribbean, and

670 Ambassador Mourão, interview with the author, July 2010.
672 Both of Argentina’s light aircraft carriers have been decommissioned. See Wikipedia. “List of aircraft carriers by country”, accessed online at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_aircraft_carriers_by_country on 7 September, 2011.
position itself as a regional power in Latin America and the Caribbean in the medium-term”.

The opportunity to project power in the Caribbean was expedited by the withdrawal from the scene of the traditional powers, the US and France. Brazil had been heartened by its recent engagement in East Timor, and by the prospect of permanent member status in the UN Security Council. Unable to justify unilateral engagement for a number of reasons, Brazil sought to ‘multilateralise’ its involvement in Haiti. Thus, it sought the cooperation and agreement of its regional neighbours, as well as the countries of CARICOM. CARICOM had been deeply engaged in facilitating a mediated solution to the crisis by attempting to coordinate meetings between Aristide and the opposition, hence its membership was predictably not initially in favour of MINUSTAH, which it saw as underwriting an illegal government.

7.4.3. Domestic implications

How was engagement in Haiti justified by the relevant domestic actors, i.e. Itamaraty and PT? What have been the consequences in terms of domestic politics for PT and for the Brazilian government?

Brazil’s intervention in Haiti, through its military leadership of MINUSTAH and involvement in training of police, along with technical cooperation was a polarising issue in the foreign policy community, and in Congress, particularly among opposition parties, Partido da Frente Liberal (PFL), Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira (PSDB) and Partido Democrático Trabalhista (PDT), along with some political analysts, journalists and academics.

The engagement in MINUSTAH in a leadership position was sold in terms of solidarity of the Brazilian people with the Haitian people, and the capacity of Brazil

---

675 Hirst, “South American Intervention in Haiti”, 103.
to share its experiences of securing urban territories and bringing them under state
control, which became a major component of MINUSTAH’s mandate.

A close examination of Brazil’s recent history in peacekeeping operations and other
similar international engagements reveals a number of domestic factors that have
enabled a more ‘muscular’ foreign policy, albeit only with tangible results evident in
the Haiti case. Haiti represented the consonance of interests of two major actors in
the deployment: Itamaraty and the military.\footnote{See also The Economist. 2010. “Brazil and peacekeeping: Policy, not altruism”, 23
September, 2010. Accessed online at: \url{http://www.economist.com/node/17095626} on 7
December, 2010.} Indeed, this was the key to action, that key sectors of Brazil’s foreign policy community and the military – still a major
player in this arena – agreed on the importance and utility of Brazil’s engagement
and leading role in MINUSTAH. PT’s only say in the matter as a political party
would be voiced through its representatives in Congress. Its leadership, Lula, Garcia
and Dirceu, meanwhile, held the monopoly on what would be considered actions of
‘solidarity’ conducted by Brazil.

Meanwhile, from the broader left the argument was made that Brazil’s leadership of
MINUSTAH was a big mistake. The engagement was attacked on various fronts:
that it was a military engagement was an odious development for Brazil’s leftist
intelligentsia, which had itself been victimised in the past by the country’s military;
the fact that Brazil was underwriting an un-elected government, which had taken
the place of an elected, if flawed, government; as well as the idea of intervening in
the domestic affairs of a fellow Latin American state, when Lula had been elected
on the platform of defending sovereignty and the right to self-determination.\footnote{Verena Glass, “Brasil no Haiti será laranja dos EUA, dizem ativistas”, in \textit{Carta Maior},
While leftist sections of PT, such as Valter Pomar’s Red Hope Faction \textit{(A Esperança é Vermelha)} did not oppose involvement overall, military engagement was criticised.
According to Pomar, when asked by the largest-circulation daily \textit{Folha de São Paulo},
how he saw Brazil’s presence in Haiti:
For reasons of principle, I consider that agreeing to participate in MINUSTAH was a mistake. I argue that the military presence should be replaced as soon as possible by cooperation that is exclusively civil, social, technical and humanitarian.\footnote{Folha Online. 2007. “Leia íntegra das respostas de Valter Pomar”. Folha.com. accessed online at: \url{http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/folha/brasil/ult96u349895.shtml} on 5 December 2010.}

While the Left was marshalling its principled opposition to the Mission, the Brazilian state (comprised of its various agencies and ministries) had long been working out the modalities for a smoother functioning of engagement in peacekeeping operations. Already in 1993, an Interministerial Working Group (\textit{Grupo de Trabalho Interministerial, GTI}), was convened in order better to coordinate the Brazilian government’s response to requests for troop contributions to peace missions. The GTI comprised representatives from Itamaraty, the Ministry of Justice, and the Armed Forces, along with Congressional Deputies. The group’s tasks were generally focused on actions and suggestions that would streamline the process of mobilising troops and resources, and indeed, increase their efficiency in the UN system by facilitating greater Brazilian involvement in the UN’s Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO).\footnote{Fontouro, \textit{O Brasil e as Operações de Manutenção da Paz}, 223.}

The mobilisation and extraction of resources for foreign policy – in this case, peacekeeping operations - was further facilitated by the integration of the three Chiefs of Staff in a unitary Ministry of Defence, by the Constitutional Amendment 23 of 9 February 1999.\footnote{Ibid., 229.} This allows for greater co-ordination between the Military, the Navy and the Airforce. As noted by Velásquez, “the extent to which civilian governments can deploy troops abroad is determined by how much control they exercise over the military branches”.\footnote{Vasquez, “Brazil and Mexico in Comparative Perspective”, 365.} In the Brazilian case, as in others, legal and budgetary constraints represented the two major obstacles in mobilising for participation in peacekeeping operations.\footnote{Fontouro, \textit{O Brasil e as Operações de Manutenção da Paz}, 275.} Politically and ideologically, however, Brazil’s Constitution of 1988 is more permissive than both the diplomatic traditions of Itamaraty, and the stance of PT. Underlining this, José Genoíno, a PT Deputy, introduced a Bill in 1997, proposing to strengthen the legislative oversight of the dispatch of troops abroad. Up to then, the Constitution had been interpreted as...
giving near-automatic assent to the requirements of the UN Security Council, through the country’s ratification of the UN Charter.  

7.4.4. International Implications: A clear case of classical Realist expansion?

Brazil could not justify unilateral engagement, or mobilise and extract the required resources, for a unilateral operation in Haiti for reasons of domestic and international legitimacy, financial constraints, and its own foreign policy philosophy. As alluded to earlier, the Haiti mission was seen, particularly by the left, as an imperialist intervention in the service of US interests. This would have been, and indeed was in some quarters, vehemently opposed as a foreign policy priority for a historically independent-minded Brazil, and moreover, one governed by a workers’ party of the left. Internationally, Brazil could not justify acting on its own in Haiti because it had long been a staunch opponent of the use of force in resolving international crises, and of interference in the affairs of sovereign states.

Nonetheless, the gap left by the US, which was “bogged down in Iraq, burnt by the failed coup against Chávez in 2002, … counting down to the 2004 election, [and] chary of another military engagement”, created an opportunity for Brazil at an important moment in its quest for permanent representation on the UN Security Council. It is widely understood, in sources ranging from media reports to speeches by Deputies in Congress, that Brazil's primary motivation for engaging in the Haiti crisis has been its intention to secure a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, or at least to bolster its credentials as a major and dependable player in multilateral peace operations.

Seven years after the inception of the Mission, it is not clear what Brazil has gained from its involvement in Haiti. For one thing, the Mission almost backfired as Brazil faced a raft of allegations of human rights violations through its subduing of the Port-au-Prince slums in July 2005. The Mission has also enjoyed mixed results, allowing for an election in 2006, but failing to pave the way for a deeper
entrenchment of democracy in Haiti, and to secure and effectively distribute international funds for Haiti’s reconstruction. The January 2010 earthquake, which claimed at least 250,000 lives from a population of 10 million, also dealt the country a heavy blow. The country elected a new president, Michel Martelly, by a landslide margin in April 2011.

Brazil’s engagement can be seen as an example of a realist expansion, more especially, an offensive realist expansion. Brazil responded to the call for leadership of MINUSTAH not in response to any clear threat, but in response to expanded interests, and a changed perception of how to attain its ‘rightful’ place in international politics: from courting acceptance as a ‘respectable’ state aligned with Western interests, to seeking to assert the new power of an emergent Brazil in a ‘concrete situation’.

7.5. Southern Modes of Internationalist Engagement?

As noted by Alden and le Pere, it is rare in IR scholarship that developing countries are accorded agency in the literature on regional or international hegemony. They add that,

Local forms of nationalism…are denied and any attendant aspirations for the extension of power towards their respective geographic regions are seen as nothing more than the ‘hidden hand’ of international capital.686

At the other end of the spectrum, approaches to the activism of former developing countries in multilateral peace missions and mediation in international crises focus on these events as ‘new’ departures, presented as holding great promise for the future of interventions and external engagement in crisis situations. The truth about ‘Southern’ internationalism may lie somewhere between these two views.

The South as a collective has acted with agency, and has been hailed as a ‘norms leader’, helping to solidify international norms in three major areas:

- Sovereignty and non-intervention

Universalism, and
• International decision-making.  

Central to this approach to international politics has been a mode of action that has seen the South act as a ‘pressure group’, enabling change in international politics without resort to structural power.  

Now that certain Southern states are able to avail themselves of structural (or material) power, the dynamics of their collective politics have changed.

More recently, within the policy and academic circles of Southern states engaged in activist foreign policies, a view has appeared to crystallise among some sections that is optimistic about Southern engagement in international crises as being somewhat qualitatively different from that of the North. This perception of difference has been based on the following factors:

• The ‘awareness’ and greater sensitivity of Southern policymakers to ‘realities on the ground’;
• Partnerships with non-governmental organisations;
• Foundations in necessity and innovation (‘demand-driven’), as opposed to purely geostrategic calculations, or ‘national interest’;
• Foundations in “principles of solidarity and cultural affinity”, rather than security imperatives; and,
• Aid based on “non-conditionality, solidarity, empathy, and sensitivity to multi-cultural values”.

‘Southern’ modes of engagement, their proponents argue, should be distinguished from older, ‘Northern’ modes of engagement. They are based on a deeper and more empathetic approach to the domestic economic, social and political problems of host countries. A similar argument was made with respect to ‘Southern aid’ from

---

687 Alden et al., The South in World Politics, 3.

688 Ibid., 7.


690 Ibid.

691 Ibid.
the mid-1970s onward, with the assumption that aid from the developing world to the developing world would be more sensitive to the needs and contexts of destination societies. However, Southern aid was found, with few exceptions, to be no less odious and top-down than aid from the advanced industrialised states. Likewise, ‘Southern’ forms of international engagement are often no different from traditional ‘Northern’ interventions. Activism by Southern states within other developing states should be seen in the context of the domestic and systemic, material and ideational, realities that frame these actions.

South African engagement in Haiti has been premised on Haiti’s centrality in a particular mythology of African self-determination and independence, as the first independent Black republic. Haiti’s physical distance from South Africa also meant that the ANC government could give vent to its internationalist proclivities, while facing limited consequences domestically, both as a result of strident rhetoric regarding the situation, and of the covert offers of assistance to Aristide’s government. The government also found itself acting within the framework of an ‘African’ response to the crisis, formed both by the like-mindedness of other African states on the issue, and by the importance of the African Diaspora in the official discourse of the African Union. This was a vital source of support for its actions, that they be seen as legitimate by African states.

South Africa’s response therefore had a mixed resonance within South Africa. Its relevance was almost purely symbolic, given the undertones of anti-imperialism and solidarity with a fellow developing country. Domestic political considerations work in two ways: on the one hand, they provide or withhold legitimacy for controversial international engagements. On the other, meanwhile, they are themselves influenced by international action that may bring praise or recognition for the government of the day. In this case, the decision to engage in Haiti was largely insulated from public scrutiny, thereby averting most of the criticism it might have attracted, until Aristide arrived in the country.

A prominent official discourse on the part of the Brazilian government regarding its involvement in Haiti, meanwhile, is the idea of the novelty of the Brazilian engagement, as well as its distinctiveness from the typical interventions by ‘Northern’ states. This novelty, according to the Ministry of External Relations, stems from the Brazilian component of the Mission’s foundations in solidarity with the Haitian people. This idea has extended to Brazil’s trilateral initiative with South Africa and India, situated in Carrefour Feuilles, a town in Haiti, comprising a flagship project of the IBSA Trust Fund. This novelty implies that Brazil seeks the good of Haiti and not exclusively its own benefit by engaging in MINUSTAH. It was severely undermined by continued accusations of human rights abuses against the Brazilian contingent.

To return to the discussion initiated in Chapter 2 on internationalism as a basis for the examination of South Africa’s and Brazil’s foreign policies, we are reminded that:

large developing countries [or countries of the South] have sought to embody an internationalism in their foreign policies that is outward-looking, universalist, co-existence oriented, and moderate. This means that a duty for international action is recognised; action is predicated on the universal values of statehood; peace and security represent higher values than the triumph of any particular value; and, change sought is moderate and gradual.

It was shown in Chapter 2 how the crisis of Western [or Northern] liberal internationalism during the 1990s and beyond, as well as pressing challenges to global governance, created conceptual and policy vacancies that allowed for the increased participation in international questions by non-traditional powers. This latter, Southern internationalism was thus characterised as being informed by two key elements, namely: the pre-eminence of the state, and the commitment to solidarity. Both factors are prominent in the history of internationalism in the developing world. Two additional factors are the commitment to multilateralism and non-violent resolution of disputes, which were also salient features of Western internationalism prior to the more adventurous foreign policies of Western powers.

---

695 Chapter 2 of the current work, 59.
after the end of the Cold War. While these principles may appear unproblematic in theory, they involve a tension between the foreign and domestic policies of developing states. As noted in Chapter 2, the cosmopolitan assumptions at the root of Southern internationalist foreign policies are considered to be the products of ‘modern’ outlooks on international life. Yet, developing countries are typically considered to be still grappling with the establishment of the first ‘modern’ principle of international life, sovereignty or statehood, and the strengthening of their jurisdiction over clearly delimited geographical territories. With high numbers of unemployed, gross income disparities, and numerous other socio-economic challenges, the justification for foreign policies that recognise international duties and obligations that require the allocation of state resources is potentially problematic. This was not the case for the first wave of middle powers from the West, whose vast domestic social welfare schemes, and the relations between state and society on which they were predicated, served as inspiration for their activist foreign policies.

**Conclusion**

The engagement of South Africa and Brazil, respectively, in the Haiti crisis stimulated a number of foreign policy debates in these countries. The sight of two avowedly internationalist states becoming involved in Haiti’s seemingly irresolvable crisis spurred questions about what intervention would look like when spearheaded by Southern states whose foreign policies were guided by ‘internationalism’, including the peaceful resolution of disputes; a commitment to multilateralism; non-intervention; and, South-South solidarity.

Proponents of involvement on both sides sought to emphasise the uniqueness of Southern engagements. South Africa, for its part, acted, it would appear, largely on the whim of President Mbeki. As Mbeki noted in his weekly newsletter, South Africans had little knowledge of the crisis unfolding in Haiti and South Africa’s engagement served to edify a policy issue (the mobilisation of the African Diaspora abroad) that was central to Mbeki’s plans for Africa’s renewal. The concept of ‘African Renaissance’ and its accompanying plans had already been criticised for being developed out of the glare of public scrutiny and without public participation,
so this was an issue area that was doubly distant from the South African political scene, and by extrapolation, the ANC’s election prospects and the health of its alliance with COSATU and the SACP.

The engagement in Haiti served PT’s interests, in spite of the fact that the party was caught unawares by the Brazilian government’s decision to deploy, and in some quarters was highly critical of it. It helped to cement the left-of-centre profile of President Lula, by the presentation of Brazil’s leadership of MINUSTAH as an act of solidarity with a fellow developing state. With the change in Brazil’s foreign policy outlook that attended the ascension of PT to power, pursuit of the credentials for UNSC permanent membership became more urgent under Celso Amorim. However, the decision to deploy was not a decision that could be approved by the executive alone; it required the approval of Congress. Surprisingly, given Brazil’s history of commitment to non-interference, and the nature of Aristide’s departure, this was obtained by a large majority, but was nonetheless a ‘torturous’ process. Brazil’s conduct at the head of the mission has come under extensive criticism, both domestically and abroad. This has been noted as a factor that limited Brazilian troops in their actions to pacify notoriously dangerous sections of Port-au-Prince – a factor that was ultimately overcome, with dire consequences in July 2005 and again in December 2006, in the Cité Soleil area of the capital.

Ultimately, internationalism in each case trod very different paths, in spite of South Africa and Brazil’s relatively equal diplomatic and political distance from the Haiti crisis. On the part of South Africa, decisions to engage in the Haiti issue, whether by the reported attempted dispatch of arms to assist Aristide, or by the granting of asylum, or “visitor status” to the former President and his family, were taken above the political fray. The only opposition to the decisions came from opposition parliament members and the issue barely entered the public realm of debate. In the Brazilian case, it had to struggle against the domestic obstacles to its implementation, and could not rise above domestic politics, given the media interest

697 Ibid.
in the engagement, and the congressional opposition to it (both from PT and its opposition).
Part III: Thematic Discussion and Conclusions
Chapter 8: Neoclassical Realism, Internationalism, and the New Emerging Powers

Introduction

Since the turn of the twenty-first century and the epoch-making events that have coloured the last decade, most notably the September 11 attacks on the United States, and the wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, and most recently, Libya, observers of international politics have witnessed sea-changes in the relations between states, and in the global distribution – and understanding – of power. It would not be wrong or overly cautious to reserve judgement on these changes and their long-term impact. It would be wrong, however, to delay an attempt at analysis of how powers emerge in the contemporary international environment, and of how new developments in what was long considered the world’s periphery – Africa, Latin America, and Asia – are shaping multilateralism, the legitimacy of interventions, and security dynamics. In relation to these issues, the concept of ‘internationalism’ has migrated to a central place in the foreign policy debates of a number of states, large and small, since the end of the Cold War. While IR scholarship has focused extensively on these debates in the developed world, it has scarcely taken note of their progress in the developing world, as noted in Chapter 2.

In the discussion of internationalism as it is manifest in the developing world, a number of dichotomies and tensions arise. The first of these is that between pragmatism and principle. This is by no means exclusive to the debate within the developing world, but in the global economic periphery, the question is complicated by the challenges of domestic economic development and the commitment to certain principles of national and international wealth redistribution. There has been a longstanding battle within the ideological fields of domestic politics in these countries for supremacy, fought between politics of the left and centre-right. ‘Internationalism’ has been the province of the left. In the introduction to an anthology of South African Communist Party documents published in 1980, on the 60th anniversary of the movement in South Africa, Dr Yusuf Dadoo stated that, ‘socialism’ and ‘internationalism’ “have been the watchwords of the South African
Communists” for all of the movement’s history”. These categories have been blurred as the internationalism of new leaders in the developing world proved itself to be noticeably in favour of globalisation and capitalism. Domestic debates were mirrored in concerns that surfaced in foreign policy. These included whether supporters of neo-liberal economic models would prove victorious over those who favoured socialist mechanisms of ownership of the means of production and redistribution. This was reflected in the debates over relations with ‘established’ trading partners should be pursued at the expense of the cultivation of new relations in uncharted territory, such as China, Africa and the Middle East: forging a ‘new geography’ of world trade, largely centring upon the ‘Global South’.

Another important tension lies in the area of human rights vs. state sovereignty. The developing world as a whole has been markedly slower in accepting emerging derogations from the non-intervention norm, such as the ‘humanitarian intervention’ or ‘responsibility to protect’ argument, for example. While at the regional level, strides have been made in Africa (AU Constitutive Act) and in South America (Charter of OAS), at the state level, especially on the part of large and influential states, there is still great reticence to take bold measures on interventions, unless they are sanctioned by the United Nations, and with clear guidelines for engagement.

The foreign policies of two emerging powers under the leadership of influential leftist movements provide pause for consideration in the current international order. Many have looked to South Africa and Brazil for a hint of a ‘new’ way of conducting foreign affairs, largely spurred on by their own pronouncements and history. The search for international justice has tended to begin with the emerging powers of the global South, aware as they are of the hardships caused by poverty and marginalisation owing to their own national experiences.

Much of the scholarly discussion of the foreign policies of these emerging powers has suffered the same fate, dependent upon the foreign policy declarations of the


policymaking elites of these states. Steeped in internationalism, these states have sought to cloak their actions in a veneer of morality and justice. They represent a potential in international politics, as suggested by Andrew Hurrell, for a ‘middle-range ethics’,\(^7\) defined by a reticence to impose universal moral strictures on all peoples. Yet, guided by basic considerations of what is just and equitable for all the world’s people.

It should not be forgotten, however, that these are still states, with wills to power and wills to survive, wills grounded in legitimacy ultimately sourced from domestic society. In seeking to make sense of South African foreign policy and Brazilian foreign policy, the large majority of analysts, native or foreign, have utilised the lens of ‘politics unusual’ in assessing the emergence and projection of these states. This has served only to sequester them from the rest of foreign policy analysis, as special states, which have different international priorities to those held by the ‘traditional’ great powers. It is akin to accepting without question the doctrine of ‘China’s peaceful rise’ propagated by the Chinese government. While allowance may be made for the fact that these states may represent a new set of values in international politics, room should also be left for them in traditional analyses of foreign policy based on realist principles, incorporating systemic dynamics and power considerations.

8.1. Discussion of Findings and Contribution of Current Work

The thesis, as foreshadowed in Chapter 1, produces two broad conclusions: State structure, especially the nature of the relationships – legal and institutional – between governing parties, the executive, and the legislature, plays a significant role in how states respond to international threats and opportunities. Also, the trajectory of intermediate states is contingent upon both systemic and domestic factors.

Five key themes were introduced in Chapter 1 as lying at the heart of the present enquiry. They are:

• The nature of internationalism outside the West;
• The weaknesses of FPA with regard to the foreign policy of states in the Global South;
• The role of domestic politics, especially governing parties, in shaping the capabilities of states to respond to systemic imperatives, such as relative changes in international power;
• Alternative routes to power in the contemporary international context; and,
• The broader question of the continuing poverty of International Relations theory with respect to the foreign affairs of the developing world, encompassing two specific areas, namely the marginalisation of the developing world from studies of internationalism; and, the overlooking of agency in the developing world.

To what extent does internationalism condition the foreign policies of South Africa and Brazil? An unspoken question in contemporary commentaries on the changing world order is ‘whose side are they on’?, in reference to emerging powers such as South Africa, Brazil and India. While their multilateral activism is sometimes viewed as a threat, it has roots in the attempts to manage complex domestic challenges and competing foreign policy demands. The type of ‘internationalism’ that results, whether conflictual or cooperative, bears great significance for the future of regional and global order. What this analysis has aimed to steer clear of is the typical dichotomising of periphery-core relations in terms of West/capitalism/human rights/democracy v. Non-west/socialism/repression/autocracy. The choices for emerging powers such as South Africa and Brazil have been couched largely in these terms, both by their own respective domestic critics and proponents, as well as the international mainstream media, characterised by the Economist, for example. Yet, little account is taken of domestic politics and the differential between national power and expendable state power. As has been shown in Chapters 5 and 6, decision-makers do not always have access to the required state resources for the implementation of foreign policy. Furthermore, ideational and identity-related

commitments have a substantial impact on how leaders respond to international crises.

*How can FPA better account for developments in foreign policy formulation in the developing world?* FPA’s agenda in the developing world requires broadening. Dependency, state weakness, and erratic leadership are no longer the defining characteristics of peripheral polities. State structure, individual leadership, and most significantly, ideas, grand strategy and new forms of agency are key determinants of foreign policy in the developing world, as elsewhere. Internationalism in foreign policy has been shown by this study to be a significant variable determining the goals and instruments of state action by developing countries.

*How do domestic politics, especially governing parties, affect international outcomes?* For both the ANC in South Africa and the PT in Brazil, an anti-imperial posture is an important feature of international identity. This derives from historical and cultural factors at the national level. Where governing parties have made large concessions on economic policy, acquiescing in liberalisation, it appears that they have reserved the arena of foreign policy for the rhetoric and practice of anti-imperialism. State structure, and the dominance of each respective party within their given political systems, further determines their capacity to legitimate their foreign policy stances, and to secure the resources for the pursuit of foreign policy projects. This, in turn, is a key determinant of a state’s route to power in the contemporary international order.

South Africa and Brazil, have sought to limit the perception of threat that their regional dominance projects. South Africa under Mbeki selected a route to power predicated on recognition as an influential African voice, speaking for the African continent at large, but resisting the urge to throw its weight around. Lula’s Brazil also opted for a peaceful path to power, still reserving its rights to expand its interests and broaden its diplomatic instruments at a later stage, by channelling resources toward certain indicators of ‘hard power’, such as nuclear submarines and adopting a harder line on the unfairness of the nuclear proliferation regime.
The thesis has made a contribution to the *International Relations literature* on two emerging powers of the developing world. By seeking to theorise the foreign policy motivations of two large developing states, an attempt has been made to broaden the empirical reach of neoclassical realism, and to test its prescriptions with respect to politics in the periphery, thus bringing the periphery into the mainstream. Agency in global politics exercised by developing countries needs to be taken into account in analyses of contemporary international order, especially as developing countries and developed countries seem to adopt divergent positions on the nature and norms of this order.

This study has contributed to a theoretical integration of the foreign policies and international trajectories of two emerging powers in the contemporary international context. Going beyond a comparison of two sets of foreign policy, the thesis has presented a competition of theoretical perspectives to explain the behaviour of intermediate states, and then settled on one perspective, neoclassical realism, to make a contribution to the retrieval of IR theory for the analysis of peripheral states and regions. Neoclassical realism has yet to be applied to the foreign policy strategies of any state in the Global South.

Brazil, and to a much larger extent, South Africa, have been left behind by the mainstream literature on emerging or intermediate states, and that on internationalism as a foreign policy instrument. Hence, each candidate state for such a study is typically analysed in isolation, in terms of its own foreign policy objectives, strategies and obstacles. This leads to a myopic view of how such states develop – and frame and re-frame their foreign policies – in response to systemic imperatives.

The research objectives stated at the outset were to account for the extent to which internationalism, mediated through Leftist governing parties, conditions foreign policy responses in South Africa and Brazil. Hence, the key variables were the international distribution of power at any given stage ($X_1$), and domestic political structures of each state ($X_2$), on the one hand, and the resulting form of internationalism on the other ($Y$).
The resulting statement that the findings of this thesis have given rise to is:

the framing of foreign policy objectives in expansive terms and the allocation of resources to foreign policy goals in South African and Brazilian foreign policy is positively related to favourable perceptions of the state’s relative power position, and positively related to the extent to which governing parties are able to mobilise and extract material, institutional and ideational resources in society.

In the context of Latin America’s ‘Left Turn’ or ‘Pink Revolution’, and continuing security crises in Africa, presenting acute foreign policy challenges for major powers such as the United States, it is important to understand how global, regional and domestic dynamics affect the eventual foreign policy behaviour of key regional states.

Yet, the key contribution of this thesis has been its highlighting of the study of governing parties and how their location within the domestic political structure impinges upon their possibilities for influencing and directing foreign policy. While the literature has noted the influence of political parties and governing regimes on foreign policy, in terms of state structure and levels of opposition, it has not shed as much light on the governing party as a repository of ideational direction and alternative diplomacy. The governing party, complete with its ideological tendencies, coalition strategies, and power political sensitivities, within a neoclassical realist framework, is important to our understanding of unit-level factors impinging on state responses to external challenges and opportunities.

8.1.2. Linking empirical evidence with theory

The main difficulty with the evidence at hand was the degree of objectivity that it was possible to access at any given time from those who were closest to the making of political decisions. Brazilian diplomats and the South African ex-minister interviewed were generally promoting the official line, and this made it more difficult to draw inferences about state behaviour and the perceptions of statesmen from those closest to them.
Overall, with reference to both case studies, two patterns may be discerned. The first is that rhetoric and the allocation of resources have been relatively easier to deploy for issues more distant from the prime, regional, locus of each state’s interests. Second, the influence of the ruling party in any general, institutionalised, sense is limited, for different reasons in each case. This means that while the ruling party may exert control primarily through the structure of the political system (as in South Africa), or through a number of strategically-placed individuals (as in Brazil), its leverage is conditioned by institutionalised practices and material constraints occurring at the bureaucratic, national, regional, and international levels. Leaders have more traction in specific contexts.

At the bureaucratic level, Mbeki faced few limits, owing to his institutional restructuring resulting in a strengthened state presidency. He faced limits at the national level because of resource constraints on South African foreign policy; at the regional level because of the legacy of liberation politics and struggle-era loyalties, as well as South Africa’s reticence to act as a hegemon in Southern Africa. Internationally, an expansive foreign policy was welcomed and expected as long as it conformed to Western interests.

For Lula, meanwhile, the limits of the bureaucratic level were overcome by the positioning of like-minded individuals in key decision-making roles. While discontent over foreign policy simmered in some quarters of Itamaraty, at the top, there were few obstacles to the Lula foreign policy. Nationally, expansiveness in Brazil’s foreign policy was facilitated by a growing economy and by an accommodating and longstanding national goal of winning recognition and status for Brazil. The regional context proved more limiting, as Brazil struggled to win followers for its leadership in South America. Finally, at the international level, Brazil’s increasing resources provided the platform for a wider range of global interests, but also led the country somewhat astray from its traditional foreign policy postures and interests.

In theoretical terms, the institutional freedom and legitimating power enjoyed by ruling parties ultimately affect the resource mobilisation and extraction capabilities of the state, meaning that activism in foreign policy is subject to these forces.
In South Africa, the intervening variable of state structure permitted greater activism in foreign policy, but this policy was deprived of the requisite material resources. While under Mandela there was a sense that South Africa retained the goodwill of the international community – a view backed up by large disbursements of donor funds\textsuperscript{702} to the South African state and civil society in the immediate aftermath of apartheid’s overturn – Mbeki, cognisant of the fact that this would not continue indefinitely, ushered in a more pragmatic stance. Indeed, a report commissioned by the Presidency in 2003 confirmed this stance thus:

The danger of [South Africa] over-extending itself became more pronounced, particularly with president Mbeki taking the lead in 1998 (sic). For example, in light of the enormity of the task at hand, some analysts question whether government’s Africa policy … is sustainable. Playing an active continental and international role tended to stretch the capacity of the DFA to the limit – a difficult issue to manage, given the domestic requirement for civil service transformation.\textsuperscript{703}

Government’s response to this was a greater centralisation of foreign policymaking, through the implementation of the cluster system, or ‘integrated governance’, which had the side-effect (intended or unintended) of increasing the influence of the Presidency. In neoclassical realist terms, the mobilisation and extraction power of the state increased markedly at this time.

In Brazil, meanwhile, the more diffuse nature of political power, by way of the federal state, in spite of the centralising figure of the President, meant that approval for foreign adventures had to be obtained from the National Congress, in which no single party holds an outright majority. PT’s legitimating power in society has always been contingent, owing to its leftist credentials and Lula’s three previous attempts at the Presidency before finally winning the 2002 election. The roles are almost reversed in Brazil, compared to South Africa, in the sense that PT lacks depth in foreign policy thinking, while Itamaraty is steeped in history and in safeguarding Brazil’s noteworthy and often-praised diplomatic legacy. In South Africa, meanwhile, the ANC and Thabo Mbeki in particular, acted as the ideological centre


of South Africa’s foreign policy, while the DFA served a more instrumental function.

At the regional level, each state faced complex challenges in which responses had to be carefully calibrated not to offend, and not alienate regional partners. It should not be overlooked, of course, that each of these countries’ activist foreign policies has to some extent facilitated the other’s. Because the multilateralism of coalition-building has been such an inherent feature of the foreign policies of South Africa and Brazil, each has been able to turn to the other on occasion as a ‘force multiplier’ of its foreign policy resources. This is exemplified in the establishment first of IBSA in 2006 upon the initiative of Mbeki and Lula; and, latterly, with South Africa’s acceptance into the BRIC group of emerging economies at the end of 2010.

What has made the pursuit of ‘internationalist’ foreign policies possible at all is the personalisation of foreign policy. This is not a reference to populism, but to the centralisation of foreign policymaking within the executive, and the association of international goals with the personal and political struggles of the policymakers. This is related to the histories of the governing political parties, as well as the personal ideological commitments of the leaders of government. This means that foreign policy is subject to institutional changes, in addition to social, political and economic imperatives. A key contribution is rendered by governing parties, who, because they operate in new democracies, and were for so long excluded from political power, retain autonomous interests and ideas, separate from ‘established’ sites of political power.\(^{704}\) This is highly significant to their behaviour in government, and as has been shown, in formulating foreign policy. In the cases of both ANC and PT, these autonomous interests and ideas have seen the parties continuing with parallel diplomacy even while holding the reins of state power.

8.1.3. South Africa

In attempting to answer the question to what extent does internationalism influence the foreign policy of South Africa, what emerges is a picture far more complex than any that has been yielded thus far by analysts of South African foreign policy. Internationalism, while very much a vestige of the ANC’s heritage and history as a

\(^{704}\) I am grateful to Dr Chris Alden for pointing this out.
liberation movement, has assumed more nuanced tones in the foreign policy of an ANC in government. This was especially true in the context of the closing years of Mbeki’s presidency, as the ramifications of the 1999 arms deal, the controversy surrounding the government’s handling of HIV/AIDS and the Zimbabwe issue, all conspired to unsettle the ideological hegemony of the ‘African nationalist’ faction within the organisation. At the same time, it appears that for reasons of political and economic expediency, ‘African nationalism’ is retained as the guiding philosophy of ANC domestic and foreign policy, with the government preferring to tread carefully around the domestic political crises of its neighbours, especially Zimbabwe and Swaziland. A more consistently solidarist and Marxist outlook on international affairs, as the ANC possessed in exile, and indeed as some sections of the ANC and its alliance partners still subscribe to, would result in greater activism on human rights and economic equity issues in the southern African region and further afield. The ANC in government, while holding the perception of a hostile, unipolar world, dominated by the USA and its allies, is hamstrung – and limited to rhetoric – by its economic-industrial context and the development blueprint it subscribes to. This route to development is predicated on foreign investment and South Africa’s outward economic orientation, and thus requires favourable relations with the world’s major economic players.

The literature on South Africa’s activist, internationalist foreign policy curiously omits to examine the role played in this foreign policy posture by South Africa’s dominant political party and the only governing party of a free South Africa, the African National Congress. The ANC plays a key role in the generation of interests at the national level, by virtue of its dominance of South Africa’s political life, and by the ‘dual mandates’ of key government figures as central party figures. However, the ANC has not influenced South African foreign policy postures in the manner that would have been predicted by its liberation struggle heritage, and its early statements on foreign policy. The ANC in government, under Thabo Mbeki, did not manage to successfully chart a visionary course at the same time as retaining pragmatic prerogatives.

The primary source of institutional and political opposition to the ANC came, not from the Department of Foreign Affairs, or the oversight mechanisms of the
legislature, nor from the parliamentary opposition, but from within the governing tripartite alliance. Perceptions of state power varied depending on the issue at stake. State power appeared less unassailable on matters closer to home, and which posed a threat to the unity of the ANC and the tripartite alliance, prompting foreign policy decision-making that shied away from conflict and the potential use of force. Further afield, the South African government under Mbeki, gave full vent to its Africanist and anti-imperialist impulses, even going as far as to agree to despatch a consignment of arms to Haiti, and to recognise Western Sahara, potentially hastening the break-up of a fellow-African state, Morocco.

One of the central contentions of this thesis is that benign, or ideological as opposed to material perceptions of threat to the nation entertained by the African National Congress as South Africa’s governing party, as well as its various leaders, particularly Thabo Mbeki, prevented the ANC from acting in more expansive ways with respect to enlarging South Africa’s international engagement, and also militated against the country’s selection of aggressive means for the pursuit of its international goals. This was a function of two processes: the centralisation of key decision-making capacities in the office of the President; and, the mounting uncertainty over the legitimating power of the ANC in South African society.

On the one hand, decision-making power was progressively centralised under Thabo Mbeki, particularly in the Presidency. On the other, the ANC’s legitimating power – the ability to justify significant policy decisions - came increasingly into question, and, indeed declined, as its economic policies fell foul of traditional allies and constituencies. The latter had therefore to be periodically assured that the ANC remained a natural ideological and political partner. Foreign policy was used for this purpose.

Classical realism predicts that as national power increases, a state will expand its international engagements. South African foreign policy complied with this prediction, but not in the manner predicted by realist theory, as it limited aggressive projections of national power. Compared to Mbeki’s first term, during which he assembled the instruments of state power after the formative Mandela years, his second term was more decisive in terms of allocating resources to foreign policy.
South Africa expanded its engagements in both material (financial) and rhetorical senses. Along with the opening of some 70 new embassies, especially in Africa, and the establishment of an African Renaissance Fund\textsuperscript{705}, among other resource allocations, the South African government expanded its scope of interest in international affairs. This was achieved by making pronouncements on, and committing resources to, matters as diverse as the political crisis in Haiti, and the Israel-Palestine peace process, amongst others. The country was better able to engage in activism and adopt assertive positions on certain issues that were more distant from its immediate purview, such as the Palestine-Israel and Morocco-POLISARIO questions, than those closer to home, such as Zimbabwe. Two reasons – one international, and one national - may be adduced for this: First, the South African leadership preferred to take more decisive action on issues further afield because the leadership was hesitant to be cast in a negative light, as an ‘imperialist stooge’ in the southern African region. Second, it appeared to be easier to build coalitions – or at least avert significant opposition - on ideological issues further afield, than to broach political questions, with consequences for South Africa – and the political dominance of the ANC - closer to home.

South African foreign policymakers, while paying lip-service to internationalism as a guiding principle in foreign policy, were careful to chart a course in foreign policy, labelled ‘pragmatic’, that would limit its political costs and increase its political gains as far as its own electoral alliance with the labour movement and the communist party were concerned. One major exception here was the Zimbabwe question, where security (i.e. external) concerns may have exceeded political (i.e. domestic) concerns in importance for key decision-makers.

8.1.4. Brazil

While Lula’s victory in the 2002 presidential election was resounding, the capacity of the Party to give effect to long-held foreign policy principles was limited by the institutional handicaps imposed by its comparative weakness in the legislature;

\textsuperscript{705} Act 51 of 2000 created the African Renaissance Fund, “for the purpose of enhancing international co-operation with and on the African Continent and to confirm the Republic of South Africa’s commitment to Africa”.
initially slow economic growth; an uncertain relationship with the military; and its own weaknesses in foreign policy formulation.

Both the independent variable and the dependent variable underwent changes during the period under consideration. Establishing any kind of causal relationship depends on the kinds of links that may be established between these variables. On the one hand, the institutional makeup of foreign policymaking changed with the changing fortunes of PT, the attention Lula was able to pay to foreign policy, and the nature and level of the issues at hand. Concerning the dependent variable, internationalist outcomes – those favouring non-violence, non-interference, south-south solidarity and multilateral approaches – varied depending on the issue area, its geographical location, and the nature of the interests at risk.

To return to the questions posed earlier: What is the connection between Brazil’s chosen method of power projection and the influence of a new governing party, PT, on foreign policy? How can neoclassical realism explain Brazilian foreign policy under the Lula administration?

While the nature of Brazil’s political system afforded PT less institutional freedom on a micro-level, the pervasiveness of party ideological positions appeared to have a trickle-down effect on Brazil’s foreign policy approach, resulting in Brazil’s diplomacy being seen as more anti-American, and anti-imperial than before. The period of government of PT has also attended a greater emphasis by Brazil’s foreign policymakers on the country’s projection as a strategically important power on a global scale. Inherent, historical anti-Americanism has replaced the revised view of the balance of power in the Western hemisphere that underpinned the relatively easy acquiescence of Cardoso in US supremacy. The latter position is now habitually questioned by government officials and spokespeople.

PT has not had the depth of expertise in foreign relations to exploit fully the opportunities provided by being in power. What it has lacked in depth, however, it has made up for in the personal and presidential diplomacy of Lula who left office as Time magazine’s “Most Influential World Leader”. Evolving from its position in the opposition, to a party of government, PT’s foreign policy stance has become
more pragmatic, without losing sight of its core constituency on the left, the
dispossessed and voiceless poor. Because of Brazil’s socio-economic challenges,
PT’s legitimating power on foreign policy questions that required the allocation of
financial resources was intricately linked to the party’s domestic successes and
failures.

However, PT’s internationalism is not a concession to purely its constituencies of
the left. This is for a number of reasons: institutional, ideological and sociological.
Institutionally, PT is such a ‘broad church’, comprising the recognition of various
tendencias, that there is perhaps not such a monolithic ‘left’ identity of the party
around which it coheres, and to which it feels accountable. Ideologically,
internationalism has not formed a fulcrum of PT’s left credentials. The international
sphere is not an arena of salient importance for the party’s performance. This is
linked to the last point: international relations have not been an issue of particular
electoral importance in Brazil, although this situation is slowly changing. This means
that foreign policy decisions have a very small constituency, comprised of the
export industries and Brazilian investors in overseas markets, along with the ‘foreign
policy community’ of diplomats, academics, the media, and non-governmental
organisations.

Brazil has selected a ‘strategy of emergence’ that entails the employment of
multilateralism, multipolarity, and the search for membership of key clubs and
groupings. Also, “(b)y opting for continued market liberalism in 2003, Lula may
have “saved Brazil for capitalism”…, but this does not mean Brazil has become an
easy or accommodating partner”706. Ultimately, the fact that Brazil has become
more ensconced in the global capitalist system has not led to a dilution of
nationalism. To the contrary, it has sharpened the Brazilian foreign policymaking
elite’s search for international autonomy.

Has the ‘swing to the left’ palpably changed Brazil’s foreign policy? It would be
excessive to argue that it has. Brazil has maintained many of the hallmarks of
foreign policy for which it was esteemed prior to the Lula administration, and has
undoubtedly raised its international profile since PT’s accession to power in 2003.

Brazil has projected itself more, but not in the manner expected. Lula’s first term was a period of political uncertainty, and flux, given PT’s arrival in power after three prior attempts. The deployment to Haiti as part of MINUSTAH was an important milestone for Brazil, facilitated by both a structural power vacuum, and the confluence of domestic interests, political and military, in seeing Brazil press for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council.

By the second term, however, with increased levels of resources made available by strong economic growth rates under Lula, the country’s interests expanded further. This resulted in an incremental strengthening of Brazil’s military capabilities. PT’s second term in power saw further economic gains, and an updating of Brazil’s security posture in the National Strategy of Defense of 2008. It was only with the end of Lula’s presidency that it was easier to perceive a falling into line of Brazil’s ‘hard power’ with its rhetoric. While expanded interests in foreign policy were enunciated at the start of the Lula administration, it is only with the changed perception of leading decision-makers, and the marked improvement in Brazil’s economic resources that a truly nationalist, and less internationalist, foreign policy can be pursued.

8.2. Neoclassical realism and new powers: Metatheoretical and theoretical issues

The basic proposition of the realist tradition in International Relations is that state action is motivated by the search for power. This has been modified by successive generations of scholars, most notably by Kenneth Waltz, who inserted the international system or structure as a causal factor in state behaviour. Later realists, like Walt and Mearsheimer, raised security and power to a position of prime motivator of state action. Neoclassical realism, combining the classical realist conception of the state, with neorealism’s holistic ontology and focus on structure, underlines how state actions are contained by the structure they occupy, but determined

at the unit-level, where the state holds varying degrees of agential power (or state power).

Although it could account for the results of change (whether more or less systemic stability, depending on systemic polarity), accounting for change in power structures and distributions of power in international politics was a difficult task for neorealism, predicated as it is on a foundational claim of continuity, or at least, repetition, in international affairs. Neoclassical realism has provided answers on the conditions of states’ emergence as powers, as well as their potential trajectories, by opening the ‘black box’ of the state, and examining the factors conditioning state power both domestically and abroad.

By showing how the similar location of South Africa and Brazil in the international distribution of power has constrained their broad foreign policy goals as intermediate states, and how domestic politics has determined their choices, this thesis adds to the growing body of literature within the neoclassical realist tradition. By combining analyses of state structure and the international distribution of power, it is possible to gain valuable insight into how intermediate states judge or perceive their relative position in international politics, and how they select among options to exploit their position.

As noted earlier, a neoclassical realist framework does not exclude internationalism, to the extent that internationalism may be regarded as both a feature of domestic ideology, used for placating political allies domestically, and as a tool for building followership internationally. It may simply be regarded as another instrument of international policy, and a vehicle for the pursuit of self-interested goals.

Much of the scholarship on peripheral states is located within area studies, and divorced from the mainstream of IR scholarship. This results in the simultaneous marginalisation and exoticisation of peripheral polities and their international relations. Neorealism assertively distanced itself from considering the politics of developing states, or indeed, any states that were not at the pinnacle of the international polar structure, and therefore not determining of it. As Waltz noted in his focus on structural concepts, he was emphasising how they “help to explain big,
important, and enduring patterns”, of which second- and third-tier powers clearly had no part. Neoclassical realism analyses the impact of changes in relative power on the foreign policies of states, and is therefore particularly apposite as a framework for the analysis of rising powers and emerging states.

Applying neoclassical realism to two formerly peripheral polities provides an opportunity for the theory on FPA for the developing world to be updated. As noted in Chapter 1, a key point of departure for the FPA literature on the developing world has been that of state weakness. This has precluded discussion of concepts such as ‘grand strategy’, strategies of emergence, and international agency, which are all now at the disposal of formerly peripheral states, owing to their expanded material capabilities. There is also much more information available about the circumstances influencing foreign policy decisions in the developing world – to some extent, because of the advent of democracy – than hitherto.

South Africa and Brazil each represent a ‘tough’ test of the neoclassical realist theory, because each of these states occupies relatively peaceful regional environments, and the United States, a historical ‘offshore balancer’ in both regions, has been largely absent from both during the period under consideration. It might have been expected, therefore, that South Africa and Brazil would take advantage of such a scenario to expand their reach (economically, militarily and diplomatically) into the respective regions over which they currently tower in economic and military terms. However, foreign policy expansion depends on policymakers’ perceptions of their place in the international context, as well as how they perceive shifts in the relative distribution of power, regionally and globally. Expansion also depends upon whether, and how, decision-makers are able to mobilise and extract national power or resources, converting it into state power. That neither state has selected aggressive expansion – as might be predicted by neorealism – is explained by domestic factors, such as prevailing ideologies and party politics, in addition to systemic factors and power balances.

These conclusions mean that the dominant mode of analysing middle powers, chiefly as expressions of the diffusion of liberal economic and political principles,

710 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 70.
falls short of capturing the full gamut of motivations of the behaviour of these states. While the exclusive focus on multilateralism as a ‘force multiplier’ in the foreign policies of emerging states is a compelling liberal account of their conduct, the limits of the diffusion of liberal values become apparent when intermediate states use international organisations to prevent actions or resolutions that may be prejudicial to their allies or trading partners. An example of the latter is the failure of both South Africa and Brazil to censure Cuba in the UN’s Human Rights Council.

8.3. Future directions: South Africa

In utilising the relationship between resources and the ends to which they are put as an analytical framework, it appears that South Africa is severely constrained by its domestic capacity problems. It is not sufficient that the ruling party, the African National Congress, dominates the state. Ultimately the fruition of its foreign policy plans depends heavily on the material resources (national power) and their conversion into state power. Thus, South Africa appears to be set for a prolonged period of internationalism based on rhetoric, notwithstanding – or even underlined by - its recent inclusion with other emerging economies within the BRIC grouping.711

The departure of a significant source of ideational power for South African foreign policy, former President Thabo Mbeki, will also act as a restraint on adventurism. By the same token, it may potentially have provided the opportunity for a decentralisation of foreign policy, though this development is not to be taken for granted. There is also the question of whom policy has been decentralised to: the state bureaucracy, the party elite, or faceless presidential advisers? There is an increasing trend toward uniformity of political conviction (or the pretense of such) in the current administration of President Jacob Zuma, while a clear and coherent foreign policy outlook is struggling to emerge. The parliamentary opposition is becoming increasingly meticulous in its oversight of foreign policy decisions, but this still does not appear to be a significant source of policy opposition for the ANC government. While the highly controversial and costly – not only in economic terms

711 South Africa’s GDP at the end of 2009, a year before being invited to join BRIC, was $285.3bn, while Brazil’s stood at $1.57tn, Russia’s at $1.23tn, India’s at $1.31tn, and China’s at $4.99tn. Source: World Bank Data.
arms purchase of 1999 appeared to equip South Africa for ‘primary’ missions, the political leadership is still hesitant to throw South Africa’s military weight around. This was in evidence recently with Jacob Zuma’s reticence to support a campaign of military intervention in Ivory Coast, and even failing to choose a side, following the disputed November 2010 run-off election in that country. Although a close struggle-era relationship between the ANC and Laurent Gbagbo was cited as another reason for this.

South Africa’s transformative agenda is also held hostage to misplaced ideas of Southern solidarity and anti-Western imperialism. Although these notions are firmly derived from the ANC’s own struggle history, they will require some re-working, which has not yet properly taken place, in the foreign policy of a sovereign state seeking a leadership role in African continental and global politics. The agenda appears to be held captive by a near-paranoia about being seen to act as a hegemon or as a power acting in its own interests. This is a reflection of South Africa’s recalibrated perception of its own power in Africa after the Nigeria debacle, and the failure of its Zimbabwe policy. The country withheld any comment against Hosni Mubarak, in spite of attacks by the Egyptian state against peaceful protesters in that country’s January 2011 change of government, calling only for “the Government and people of Egypt to seek a speedy and peaceful resolution to the current crisis”, thereby hedging its bets. On Libya, South Africa displayed disastrous incoherence in foreign policy formulation, more a function of domestic disarray than any other factor. As a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council, the country voted in favour of Resolution 1973 authorising a ‘no-fly zone’ over Libya – acting against all of its own foreign policy principles and past practice. In apparently attempting to make amends, South Africa has refused to recognise Libya’s interim leadership, the Transitional National Council, and to unfreeze Libyan assets for the Council’s use. More significantly, South Africa failed to provide leadership, of either


713 As shown in the current work, and additionally, in the work of Laurie Nathan, an expert on South Africa’s defence and foreign policies. See Nathan, “Interests, Ideas and Ideology”, 19.

a political or material nature, in the context of African initiatives to resolve the conflict. In spite of President Zuma’s personal visit to Qaddafi in May 2011, South Africa squandered a rare opportunity to channel the AU stance on Libya into the eventual UNSC position. Indeed, the text of Resolution 1973 makes scant reference to the AU at all. The downside of Mbeki’s personalised diplomacy – in spite of the broader vision it articulated for South Africa’s foreign policy – is thus its subjectivity to the changed political climate.

As the chapter on South Africa has illustrated, the country’s foreign policy decision-makers appear to be stuck in a quandary of both ideational and material capacity dimensions. This situation may be gradually changing with the presentation to Parliament of a White Paper on South Africa’s Foreign Policy, “Building a Better World: The Diplomacy of Ubuntu”, in May 2011, the fruit of a two decades-long process. The South African state under the ANC has taken more decisive action on issues that strengthened its political position domestically, and has refrained from involvement on issues that might have threatened its dominance internally. Thus, South Africa’s leadership should be wary of over-cautious irrelevance. It was recently embraced by the BRIC formation of states, but many questions – about South Africa’s economic power, and its relative global presence - abound regarding the reasoning behind this move.

Moving forward from the research framework initiated in the current enquiry could pose questions relating to bureaucratic and sectoral struggles over foreign policy within the South African government. The mobilisation and extraction of resources for foreign policy depend both on material capabilities and ideational resources. Greater attention could be paid to South Africa’s structural environment, and the type of foreign policy behaviour it predicts. The presence of competitor-hegemons such as Nigeria, the potential impact of the ‘new’ Egypt, and the ever-increasing presence of external powers such as China, India, Brazil and Turkey, provide additional variables for the computation of South Africa’s external threat or vulnerability, all the while mediated by the perceptions of key decision-makers. As is the case with Brazil, South Africa’s reticent regional hegemony and Africa-first

foreign policy, should not be allowed to obscure analysis of its broader, more expansive, foreign policy objectives.

8.4. Future directions: Brazil

The uppermost echelon of Brazilian foreign policy leadership under Lula was single-minded in its objective of raising Brazil’s international profile after the comparative pliancy of the Cardoso years. While ideational factors, stemming from the confluence of the nationalistic Ministry of External Relations and the anti-imperialist Workers Party, certainly contributed to Brazil’s new activism, financial stability and incremental economic growth, along with the improvement of domestic consumption, helped to propel Brazil’s international ambition, and to provide the country with the all-important resources to fulfil it.

Brazil’s growth is nowhere near that of China or India, but under PT, Brazil may be expected to continue to consolidate and expand its involvement in international questions. This is particularly plausible given the increasing domestic popular support\(^716\) for Brazil’s heightened status in international society. Under Brazil’s new president, Dilma Rousseff, the relationship between the military establishment and the executive will become all the more important in the determination of Brazil’s international goals and indeed, Brazil’s international identity, which has hitherto been crafted remarkably – for a state that experienced military rule for 20 years - free of militarism. The increasing dependence of the national government on the military for pacifying the Amazon, and defending Brazilian sovereignty there, reserves for the army a special place in Brazilian security discourse once more. This is underlined by the recommendations of the unprecedented Brazilian *National Strategy of Defense* of 2008, which included emphasising the indigenisation of Brazil’s arms supply; and, re-visiting the question of compulsory military service, among other issues.\(^717\)

---

\(^{716}\) The former Foreign Minister, Celso Amorim, cites a Pew Poll indicating that some 78 percent of Brazilians supported the manner in which Brazil’s foreign policy has been conducted in recent years. See Amorim, “Overview”, 239.

It is also plausible to expect that as Brazil selects the path of more purposeful power projection, in terms of military doctrines and military hardware, it will be veering away from the traditional principles of PT, which are still predicated on non-violence and internationalism. The replacement of personnel at the top of the foreign policy decision-making structure following the 2010 elections will also bear significance for self-perceptions of Brazil’s international role. With the departure of Celso Amorim and Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães, obstacles are removed to closer collaboration with the US on questions of mutual interest, such as Brazil’s acting as a counterweight to Venezuela in the region, the creation of markets for ethanol, and Brazil’s pursuit of a seat on the UN Security Council. Overall, a realistic expectation may be cultivated that Brazil’s internationalist posture in international relations may be giving way to a more muscular projection of power, but that perhaps the biggest danger it faces is, in the words of *The Economist*, hubris.\(^\text{718}\)

The institutionalisation of Brazil’s external outlook has been borne out by the fact that Brazil’s international posture has not suffered major changes resulting from the departure of Lula, Amorim and Guimarães from the key foreign policymaking posts. While Dilma Rousseff, Brazil’s new president, is not as visible a diplomat as Lula was, Brazil has held true to its time-honoured principles of international diplomacy. The country abstained from voting on UN Resolution 1973 that authorised a ‘no-fly zone’ over Libya in March 2011. This was in line with the position of other major emerging powers, and with Brazil’s historical opposition to the use of force in international disputes.\(^\text{719}\) The anti-imperialist bent remains, with Brazil eager to support the bids for statehood first of South Sudan, which it was the first country to recognise; and of Palestine, whose bid it recognised in November 2010. Domestically, however, Rousseff’s position has also weakened, both in Congress, where PT depends on an unwieldy coalition, and in the Executive, where four Ministers had resigned by August 2011.\(^\text{720}\) While the President is expected to act more pragmatically in the region, and in relation to Western powers, key portfolios have been given to protagonists of the Lula foreign policy. While Samuel


\(^\text{720}\) Economist Intelligence Unit Country Report, Brazil: September 2011.
Guimarães is Brazil’s General Representative to MERCOSUL, Celso Amorim was appointed Defense Minister in August 2011.

In the field of academic research, there are many prospects for innovating research presented by Brazil’s emergence, and its connection to domestic political processes. Using the current research as a basis – particularly the variables of institutional freedom and legitimating capacity – it will be possible to interrogate the impact of other social actors, such as the military, on a state’s prospects for and means of emergence. It will also prove productive to conduct studies over a more extensive duration of time of variations and continuities in Brazil’s international outlook, and how perceptions of external threat, along with domestic constraints and capabilities influence changes in foreign policy outlook. There is no question that Brazil, like South Africa, presents a unique face of emergence to the international community. The principles on which it self-consciously bases its foreign policy in abstraction are admirable and inspire a measure of confidence for a new way of conducting international relations. However, researchers must go beyond Brazil’s claims of ‘friendship’ with all nations and ‘incidental’ political and economic gains to gain a better understanding of Brazil’s objectives and available means in the Western Hemisphere, and in Africa, to better inform the policies of all interested parties, both those who rely on Brazil as an international partner, and those who compete with it for new markets and international prestige.

8.5 Concluding remarks

Activism by large developing states on issues such as landmines, trade, and military interventions – for humanitarian or other purposes - rendered the early years of the twenty-first century ripe with anticipation about the new world order that was taking shape following the decade of drift and US unilateralism that followed the Gulf War of 1990-91. Emerging states from the developing world were seen as bearers of some measure of moral stature because they claimed to speak for the marginalised, impoverished and disempowered of international politics. However, these moral positions have needed to be re-examined in the light of growing

national capabilities and therewith, national interests. As Neorealism has proven barren in analyses of developments in international relations since the end of bipolarity, it is important that unit-level factors: states’ motivations, interests, and domestic capabilities, are subjected to greater scrutiny by way of understanding their trajectories in international affairs, and their likely responses to external threats and opportunities.

It has been a goal of the framework presented here to underscore the contingency of emerging states’ responses to international challenges and advantages. The external environment may present opportunities for expansion – whether in terms of territory or interest – but what determines expansion is state power, or the capacity of the state to convert its national capabilities, measured in traditional ‘hard power’ terms, into the ability to project power abroad. This relies on numerous domestic factors – material and ideational - many of which the governing party of a state has privileged access to.

Hence, the mobilisation and extraction of resources in South Africa and Brazil, as shown by the preceding discussion, entails managing the domestic party political process, which includes the management of material and ideational resources. The change of leadership in both countries has provided a test for the ideas presented here. While the highly personalised, centralised decision-making structure engineered by Mbeki has prejudiced South African foreign policymaking since his resignation, leaving it without a clear goal and centre, Lula left the well-oiled machinery of Itamaraty still in place when his second term expired. This points to a sound platform for Brazil’s projection of power, both regionally and further afield, depending on the future relations between the foreign policy and military bureaucracies, and the Presidency. In South Africa, the centrality of Mbeki to the foreign policymaking machinery during his tenure as president, at the expense of the institutional development of DFA, has left foreign policy vulnerable to sectional interests and incoherence following his departure.

In the final analysis, in addition to the relative distribution of power, ideas, individuals and institutions are all crucial elements of the foreign policies and trajectories of emerging powers. The discussion entertained by this thesis is thus
suggestive of implications for the ‘revisionist/status quo’ debate. However, what the foreign policy conduct of South Africa and Brazil has highlighted is that challenging the status quo of international politics is far more a political than a military, or economic, exercise. As Hurrell has noted, “What counts as ‘status quo’ or ‘revisionist’ is itself politically contested”. It is no longer prudent to ascribe status quo characteristics to the dominant states in the system. The behaviour of some second-tier states, which often seeks to strengthen international procedural machinery, has often in recent years been automatically construed as opposed to Western interests. Meanwhile, little discussion is entertained regarding how Western interests, often in pursuit of solidarist internationalist goals, such as human rights and democracy-promotion, exert pressure on the founding norms of international life, Westphalian principles of non-intervention, for example.

As others have noted, while Neorealism ascribes theoretical prominence to the system in determining state motivations, it does not provide much guidance on whether states will be revisionist or status quo states. While, in terms of Neorealism, we can be certain that states are motivated by the goal of survival under anarchy, we cannot know which actions this motivation prompts them to take. For a more comprehensive understanding, it is necessary to examine state-level characteristics and motivations. Internationalism is a mediating influence on foreign policy calculations, to the extent that national leadership is able to mobilise and extract national resources for foreign policy. Internationalism provides important ideational frameworks through which decision makers view their capabilities and responsibilities in international life.

APPENDICES
Appendix 1: Brazilian Presidents since 1930*

October 1930 – November 1930: Augusto Fragoso, Isaías de Noronha, and Mena Barreto

3 November 1930 – 29 October 1945: Getúlio Vargas (dictatorship)
29 October 1945 – 31 January 1956: José Linhares
31 January 1946 – 31 January 1951: Gaspar Dutra
31 January 1951 – 24 August 1954: Getúlio Vargas (civilian government)
24 August 1954 – 9 November 1955: Café Filho
9 November 1955 – 11 November 1955: Carlos Luz
31 January 1961 – 25 August 1961: Jânio Quadros
7 September 1961 – 1 April 1964: João Goulart
2 April 1964 – 5 April 1964: Ranieri Mazzilli
15 April 1964 – 15 March 1967: Castelo Branco
15 March 1967 – 31 August 1969: Costa e Silva
15 March 1979 – 15 March 1985: João Figueiredo
15 March 1985 – 15 March 1990: José Sarney
15 March 1990 – 29 December 1992: Fernando Collor de Mello
29 December 1992 – 1 January 1995: Itamar Franco
1 January 1995 – 1 January 2003: Fernando Henrique Cardoso
1 January 2003 – 1 January 2011: Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva
1 January 2011 – Present: Dilma Rousseff

* Periods denoted in bold print indicate the years of the military dictatorship.
Appendix 2: Chronology of Major South African Political and Economic Events

1480s: Bartholomew Dias becomes the first European navigator to travel around the tip of South Africa

1497: Portuguese explorer Vasco da Gama lands on the coast of Natal, to the east of the country

1652: Jan van Riebeeck of the Dutch East India Company founds the Cape Colony at Table Bay

1816-1826: Shaka Zulu founds the Zulu empire

1835-1840: Boers leave the Cape Colony in the ‘Great Trek’ and found the Orange Free State and the Transvaal in the interior

1867: Diamonds discovered at Kimberley

1877: Britain annexes the Transvaal

1879: British defeat the Zulus in Natal

1880-1881: The First Anglo-Boer War

1886: Discovery of gold in the Transvaal, triggering a gold rush

1889-1902: The Second Anglo-Boer War

1902: Treaty of Vereeniging ends the Second Anglo-Boer War. Transvaal and Orange Free State become self-governing colonies of the British Empire

---

725 Author’s own compilation, based on various sources, including: BBC News, accessed online at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/1069402.stm on 13 August, 2010.
1910: Formation of the Union of South Africa, uniting the former British colonies of the Cape and Natal, and the Boer republics of the Transvaal and Orange Free State

1912: Native National Congress, later re-named the African National Congress, formed

1913: Repressive Native Land Act introduced, reserving 7% of South Africa’s land for black ownership

1914: Founding of the National Party

1918: Establishment of the secretive Broederbond to advance Afrikaner interests

1919: Former German colony South West Africa placed under South African administration by the Trusteeship Council of the League of Nations, following the Versailles Peace Treaty

1948: National Party wins general election; commencement of policy of Apartheid

1960: Sharpeville massacre in March heightens political tensions

1961: Establishment of Mkhonto we Sizwe, the armed wing of the ANC
South Africa is declared a republic and withdraws from the British Commonwealth

1960s: International pressure against the South African government and its policies increases

1963-1964: Rivonia Trial, in which ten ANC leaders are tried for sabotage and treason

1964: Nelson Mandela sentenced to life imprisonment

1966: Assassination of Hendrik Verwoerd, the ‘father of apartheid’
1976: Soweto uprising

1983: Formation of the United Democratic Front (UDF), an umbrella anti-apartheid organisation

1984-1989: Township revolt and a state of emergency

1985: Founding of Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU)

1989: FW de Klerk replaces PW Botha as State President

1990: ANC unbanned; release of Nelson Mandela after 27 years’ imprisonment

Independence of Namibia

1991: Start of the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA)

1993: Agreement is reached on an interim constitution

1994: First non-racial democratic elections; Nelson Mandela becomes State President; a government of national unity is formed and South Africa is re-admitted to the Commonwealth and UN. Remaining sanctions are lifted.

1996: Hearings of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission commence

Adoption of the new constitution by parliament

1999: ANC wins second all-race general election; Thabo Mbeki assumes the presidency

2001: Multinational pharmaceutical companies take the South African government to court for contravening patent laws by importing generic AIDS drugs.

Durban hosts UN World Conference against Racism

2002: Right-wing plot against the state uncovered as a result of bomb explosions in Soweto and Pretoria
2004: ANC wins landslide election victory, ushering in a second term of office for Thabo Mbeki

2005: Deputy President Jacob Zuma is relieved of his post, in the midst of a corruption case implicating his financial adviser.

2006: South Africa becomes the first African country, and the fifth worldwide, to allow same-sex unions.

2007: ANC’s 52nd National Conference at Polokwane, Limpopo Province, elects Jacob Zuma party president, placing him in line to become state president following the next general election, pending the outcome of a corruption case

2008: A wave of xenophobic violence sweeps the country resulting in a number of deaths and the return home of some migrants.

A judge throws out the corruption case against Zuma, clearing the way for his election as state president

Resignation of President Thabo Mbeki over allegations he interfered in the corruption case against Mr Zuma. Kgalema Motlanthe, ANC deputy leader, is chosen by parliament as president.
Appendix 3: Chronology of Major Brazilian Political and Economic Events

1500: Portuguese explorers claim present-day Brazil for the Portuguese Crown

1822: Emperor Dom Pedro I, son of the Portuguese king, declares independence from Portugal

1888: Slavery is abolished

1889: Monarchy overthrown; establishment of a federal republic, the ‘First Republic’

1930: Revolt places Getúlio Vargas at the head of a provisional revolutionary government

1937: Vargas leads a coup and installs himself as dictator, initiating a social welfare revolution under the banner of the ‘Estado Novo’ (‘New State’)

1939-1945: Brazil joins the war effort on the side of the Allies in 1943, after initially declaring itself neutral.

1945: Vargas is deposed in a military coup. Elections are held, along with the inauguration of a new constitution that returns power to the states. The birth of the ‘Second Republic’

1951: Vargas is elected president

1954: Vargas commits suicide, after the military gives him an ultimatum to resign or be overthrown.

1956-61: Presidency of Juscelino Kubitschek during which Brazil achieves rapid economic growth, but at the expense of its economic independence, by incurring massive debt. The new capital, Brasilia, is built in the interior, and opened in 1960.

Author’s own compilation, based on various sources, including: BBC News, accessed online at: [http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/1231075.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/1231075.stm) on 12 August, 2010;
1960: Jânio Quadro is elected president, but resigns after seven months, plunging the country into crisis. He is succeeded by his left-wing vice-president João Goulart, whose constitutional powers are curtailed following fears by the military of his populist policies.

1964: Military coup, supported by the CIA, deposing Goulart. The period of military rule is associated with repression, but comparatively milder than that experienced in other South American military dictatorships. It is also a period of rapid economic growth and industrialisation (based on import substitution).

1974: Ernesto Geisel becomes president, ushering in a period of decompressão, or gradual liberalisation of the political system, including limited political activity and elections.

1979: Establishment of Partido dos Trabalhadores in Sao Paulo

1982: Brazil defaults on payment of its foreign debt

1983: Establishment of Central Única dos Trabalhadores, affiliated to PT

1985: Tancredo Neves elected first civilian president in 21 years but falls ill and dies shortly after his inauguration. He is succeeded by his vice-president, Jose Sarney

1986: Sarney introduces the Cruzado Plan in a bid to control inflation, but when price freezes are lifted, inflation skyrockets.

1988: Drafting of new constitution; limitation of presidential powers, and extension of the legislative powers. Voting age is reduced from 18 to 16.

1989: In the first direct presidential elections since 1960, Fernando Collor de Mello is elected President. Economic woes continue and foreign debt repayments are suspended once more.
1992: Earth Summit is held in Rio de Janeiro. Collor resigns after being impeached. He is later cleared; succeeded by vice-president Itamar Franco.

1994: Eminent sociologist and development theorist Fernando Henrique Cardoso is elected president following his massive popularity as Finance Minister and success in helping to bring inflation under control.

1997: Constitution is amended to allow the president to run for re-election; a maximum of two consecutive terms.

1998: Cardoso is re-elected; Brazil receives a rescue plan from the IMF following the financial crisis of East Asia.

2000: Brazil’s 500th anniversary

2002: Members of MST occupy President Cardoso’s family ranch

2002-2003: Lula wins presidential election by a landslide, heading Brazil’s first left-wing government for 40 years. His inauguration pledges include political and economic reforms, and the eradication of hunger.

2004: A wave of land invasions in April tests the agrarian policy of the Lula government.

2005: Mensalão corruption crisis rocks PT, followed by a wave of resignations reaching high up into the executive, including the President’s Chief-of-Staff, Jose Dirceu.

2006: In spite of corruption scandal, Lula is re-elected.

2007: Government recognises for the first time human rights abuses carried out under the military dictatorship. More than 500 people are believed to have been killed or ‘disappeared’.
Renan Calheiros, speaker of the Senate and a key Lula ally resigns to avoid impeachment following a long-running corruption scandal.

2008: Environment Minister Marina Silva resigns following conflict with the government over its Amazon policy.

Brazil turns down an invitation from Iran to join OPEC

2009: Brazil pledges an offer of $10 billion to the IMF, to assist developing countries with credit
Brazil and Paraguay reach a deal over the Itaipu hydroelectric plant
The government announces that it will establish a truth commission to investigate abuses committed under military rule.

Major blackouts in Rio and Sao Paulo

2010: Lula makes controversial diplomatic forays into the Middle East and Iranian nuclear questions.

PT wins its third consecutive presidential election, with Dilma Rousseff replacing Lula in office.
Appendix 4: Haiti Chronology of Events

1 January 1804: Independent republic of Haiti declared after overthrow of French rule by revolt. Haiti is the first independent Black republic in history.


1986: Flight of ‘Baby Doc’ Duvalier

16 December 1990: Jean-Bertrand Aristide wins 67 per cent of the vote in Haiti’s first free and fair elections.

September 1991: Military coup ousts Aristide.

July 1994: UNSC authorises deployment of 20,000-strong multinational force, mainly comprised of US marines, to facilitate the return of Aristide.

October 1994: US intervention

1995: Election of René Préval, first democratic transfer of power from one elected leader to another in Haiti’s history.

November 2000: Aristide elected for second term by landslide.

29 February 2004: UNSC adopts resolution 1529 (2004), authorising MIF

30 April 2004: UNSC adopts resolution 1542, establishing MINUSTAH, to take over from MIF on 1 June 2004.
31 May 2004: Jean-Bertrand Aristide and his family arrive in South Africa

January 2006: Elections postponed for the fourth time.

February and April 2006: Elections bring Rene Preval to power.

14 May 2006: Préval inaugurated as 55th President of Haiti.

27 August 2006: Hurricane Ernest hits Haiti.

January 2010: Earthquake devastates Haiti, leaving nearly 200 000 people dead.

November 2010-April 2011: First- and second-round Presidential elections. Michel Martelly elected president by a landslide.


March 2011: Days before the second-round election, Jean-Bertrand Aristide returns to Haiti.
# Appendix 5: Selected South African Internationalist Foreign Policy Actions 1999-2008

## 1999

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Actions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>Calls for ceasefire in Sierra Leone, supports government of Ahmed Tejan Kabbah. Deputy President Mbeki dismisses reports that South Africa will send troops to war-torn Angola. On British PM Tony Blair’s state visit to South Africa, President Mandela acts as a mediator between Blair and Muammar Ghaddafi regarding the extradition of the PAN-AM bombers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>16: President Mbeki’s inauguration following the ANC’s victory in the second democratic election.  25: In his speech at the opening of South Africa’s second democratically-elected parliament, Mbeki calls for a new world order and pledges South Africa’s commitment to Africa in foreign policy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>10: Signing of the Lusaka Cease-fire Agreement for DRC, in which South Africa played a major role in negotiating and drafting. Mbeki reacts angrily to Britain’s decision to sell off vast amounts of its gold bullion reserves.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>Mbeki hosts talks with Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda, regarding the civil war in the DRC.  28: Final draft of South Africa’s ill-fated arms purchase package is delivered to President Mbeki, for consideration by Cabinet the following week. The 19th SADC Summit, with Mbeki as Chair, takes place in</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Maputo, Mozambique, debating trade and development issues, as well as diplomatic measures to end conflicts in Angola and DRC.

**September**

9: Extraordinary Summit of the OAU calls for the establishment of an African Union (AU).

**October**

South African delegation, headed by President Thabo Mbeki, attends former President Julius Nyerere’s funeral in Tanzania.

**November**

President Mbeki is appointed the first Chair of the Commonwealth, a newly-created position. 728

**December**

South African government mulls extradition of Ethiopia’s former military leader Haile Mengistu Mariam, who faces charges of crimes against humanity in Ethiopia. 729

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2000</th>
<th>January</th>
<th>SADC Protocol on Trade enters into force.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>February</td>
<td>South Africa assumes the chair of the Commonwealth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>March</td>
<td>South Africa hosts the World Conference on HIV/AIDS 11: Constitutive Act of the AU adopted during the Lomé Summit of the OAU.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>April</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>May</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>June</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>July</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>August</td>
<td>28: Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi, in which South Africa has played a major role, is signed, without two rebel groups.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>September</td>
<td>South Africa establishes an embassy in Kigali.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>October</td>
<td>Mbeki, in the leaked text of a speech, accuses the CIA, Western governments and international drug firms of conspiring against him over his AIDS-denialist position.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>November</td>
<td>The Abuja Treaty, establishing the African Economic Community (AEC) is ratified by</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Several African leaders meet in Mozambique for a meeting chaired by President Mbeki to revive the collapsed peace process in DRC.

President Mbeki addresses the opening session of the Islamic Summit Conference in Doha, Qatar.

**December**

Donors’ conference for Burundi held in Paris; US$440 million pledged.

South Africa and MERCOSUL pledge freer trade. Mbeki receives Brazil’s highest civilian order, the Southern Cross.

---

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2001</th>
<th>January</th>
<th>President Mbeki unveils Millennium African Recovery Programme (MAP) at the World Economic Forum in Davos.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>February</td>
<td>27: AU Act ratified by the South African Parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>President Mbeki authorises a defence force rescue mission to flood-hit Mozambique. South Africa also provides food and medication.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>March</td>
<td>2: Establishment of the AU in Sirte, Libya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>South Africa despatches troops to DRC as part of the UN Mission.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>April</td>
<td>South Africa concludes its tenure as chair of UNCTAD.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>May</td>
<td>South Africa hosts the UN World Conference Against Racism in Durban.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>June</td>
<td>South Africa becomes a member of the OAU/AU troika for a period of three years.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>July</td>
<td>President Mbeki and five other SADC regional Heads of State attend a two-day summit in Harare, aimed at resolving conflict in Zimbabwe.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>September</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
October 29: The first contingent of a battalion of 700 South African troops arrives in Bujumbura, Burundi as part of the transitional government agreement.

November

December

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2002</th>
<th>January</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SA’s use of Mozambique’s Cahora Bassa dam said to be ‘unbearable’.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Parliament passes International Criminal Court Act, committing South Africa to the Rome Statute.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>President Mbeki hosts the Spier Presidential Peace Retreat for Palestinian and Israeli officials and peace activists.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Deputy President Jacob Zuma is despatched to Angola to discuss the country’s political and material needs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mozambique and South Africa sign transport agreements to ease the flows of passengers and goods into the two countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>South Africa assumes chair of the OAU.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9: AU launched in Durban, South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Preservation of Timbuktu manuscripts project is launched with Mali.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>South Africa hosts the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) in Johannesburg.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Parliament approves 4 bills to enhance the effectiveness of the intelligence services, in partial</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

November

Mandela acts as mediator in Burundi conflict, overseeing the installation of a three-year transitional government.

South Africa opens an embassy in Bamako, Mali.

Mbeki addresses the closing session of the ASEAN summit, promoting NEPAD.

December

2003

January

February

Protocol on African Court of Justice adopted by the Assembly of the African Union in Maputo, Mozambique.

A dinner is held in honour of Sudanese President Omar El Bashir in Pretoria.

South Africa hosts Nigerian President Obasanjo on a state visit.

South Africa's term as Chair of the Non-Aligned Movement ends.

March

April

South Africa donates R93.5 million to the WFP to improve food security in Zimbabwe, and a further R12 million to combat the spread of foot-and-mouth disease in the country.

Final session of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue (ICD) takes place at Sun City, North West Province in South Africa. Global and Inclusive Agreement on the Transition in the DRC is endorsed

May

South Africa despatches a rescue team to Algeria to assist with rescue operations following an earthquake which left more than 2,000 dead and 8,000 injured.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Events</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>23: South Africa participates in multinational mediation in Sao Tome e Principe following the coup there.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Asian and African Subregional Organisations’ Conference is held in Bandung, Indonesia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>President George W. Bush of the USA visits South Africa. Issues on the agenda for discussion with Mbeki include bilateral economic relations, NEPAD, African conflicts, Zimbabwe, the global war on terror and AIDS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>President Mbeki conducts a state visit to Jamaica in order to address CARICOM on NEPAD.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>9: Signing of the peace agreement between the Burundi Government and the Forces for the Defence of Democracy, in which South Africa played a leading negotiating role.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>President Mbeki pays a state visit to India.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>DA criticises troop deployment in Burundi. Would cost R679m in 2003, R564m in 2004, R771m in 2005 and about R600m in 2006. No help from UN and other donors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>During the China-Africa Cooperation Forum Meeting in Addis Ababa, China reaffirms its support for the objectives of NEPAD.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>President Mbeki conducts a state visit to Canada. Canada is the first country to create a fund to support NEPAD, the C$500 million Fund for Africa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mbeki hosts Brazilian President Lula da Silva.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mbeki pays a state visit to France.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>January</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>March</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>South Africa to train South Sudan officials; add 800 more troops to peacekeeping force in Darfur, to join the 500 South Africans already there, satisfying UN requirement for a full SA battalion on the ground. Indian president, APJ Abdul Kalam, visits South Africa. South African government defends exiled Ugandan opposition leaders, Kizza Besigye, and his right to hold meetings in South Africa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>South Africa becomes a member of the AU’s Peace and Security Council.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>A presidential Bi-National Commission between South Africa and DRC is established in order to serve as a legal framework for the management of post-conflict reconstruction and development projects in that country.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>August</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>Inauguration of Pan-African Parliament, South Africa. South Africa chairs the AU’s Post-Conflict Reconstruction Committee on Sudan. SA had already committed to the training of SPLM leadership. Mbeki addresses the UN General Assembly’s 59th session, addressing among other issues, the promotion of NEPAD; support for the Middle East peace process; and, expressing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
October

South Africa participates in a trilateral agreement with Cuba and Rwanda, funded by the African Renaissance Fund, for the training of Rwandan doctors in Cuba.

December

### 2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>January</th>
<th>February</th>
<th>March</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>South Africa supports ECOWAS position on restoring Togo to constitutionality following Eyadema’s death.</td>
<td>South Africa makes a contribution to Guinea-Bissau through the UNDP trust fund.</td>
<td>31: South Africa sends a National Observer Mission to observe Zimbabwe’s 6th Parliamentary elections. The elections are found to be “credible and reflective of the will of the people of Zimbabwe”. South Africa despatches police officials to work closely with the Congolese police force and co-operates with Britain and the Netherlands to assist the Congolese government with the integration of the national force.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>April</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
partisanship in favour of President Laurent Gbagbo. The Pretoria Agreement is signed.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>By 6 May, South Africa had deployed 294 troops in Sudan as part of the UN mission, along with 18 members of the South African Police Services.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>South Africa sends a Military Advisory and Monitoring Team to Ivory Coast. South Africa participates in the second South Summit in Doha, Qatar.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>South Africa despatches an electoral observer mission to Burundi for its elections on 4 July, concluding that they are conducted in a transparent manner. South Africa also provided election materials for the 2005 election and referendum. South Africa, along with Indonesia, is instrumental in the launch of the New Asia – Africa Strategic Partnership (NAASP) in Bandung on the 50th anniversary of the Bandung Conference.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>South Africa opens an embassy in Brazzaville, Republic of Congo.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>South Africa participates in the Conference of the Parties (CoP) of the Convention against Transnational Organised Crime in October 2005.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>South Africa opens an embassy in Conakry, Guinea.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>R13 million is allocated for tsunami disaster relief. South Africa joins the Wassenaar Agreement, a conventional arms and dual-use technology control regime.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>South Africa participates in the Conference of the Parties (CoP) of the Convention against Transnational Organised Crime in October 2005.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>South Africa receives Bolivian President Evo Morales on a state visit.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>South Africa establishes a diplomatic mission in Burkina Faso.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>South Africa extends deployment of 950 members of the SANDF as part of the ONUB to March 2007. South Africa's Minister of Safety and Security, Charles Nqakula, is appointed facilitator of the Burundi Peace Process. South Africa also extends the deployment of 46 SANDF troops in Ivory Coast to 31 March, 2007.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>14: South Africa provides 680 troops for AU force in support of elections in Comores. By this month, South Africa had contributed 1,409 troops to the UN Mission in the DRC. By this month, South Africa had sent 437 troops as part of the AU force in Darfur.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Month</td>
<td>Event</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>SANDF provides support to the CAR government in repelling attacks from northern rebels. President Mbeki meets President George W Bush in Washington. The two leaders discuss the status of bilateral political and economic relations; conflict resolution and peacekeeping in Africa; and, multilateral cooperation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>January  South Africa assumes its non-permanent seat in the UNSC, following elections held in October 2006 in the UNGA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>February Chinese President Hu Jintao visits South Africa, marking the inauguration of the ten-year China-SA diplomatic relations celebrations; a boost for SA-China strategic relationship. South Africa attends the International Conference of Solidarity with the Saharawi People in Tifariti. South Africa opens an embassy in Cotonou, Benin.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>March SA assumes the Presidency of the UNSC for the month of March 2007. SA ends silence on Zimbabwe and urges Mugabe to ‘respect the rule of law’. This, after continued silence following the arrest and torture of Tsvangirai and others. Levy Mwanawasa of Zambia was the only African leader to speak out in stronger terms. In the financial year 2006-7, South Africa commits international transfers of some R17 million in response to requests for humanitarian aid from the Republic of Guinea and Djibouti, following flash floods in that country. South Africa participates in the AU Observer Mission for Mauritania, monitoring the constitutional referendum in</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Month</td>
<td>Events</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>2006, legislative and municipal elections in December 2006, and presidential elections in March 2007. Cabinet approves a request from the African Development Bank (ADB) for South Africa to contribute towards clearing Liberia’s unpaid debt to the bank (about US$ 3.6 million, or 6.25% of requested amount). President Mbeki attends Ghana’s 50th anniversary independence celebrations in Accra.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>South Africa supports the lifting of the AU’s suspension of Mauritania’s membership following a coup there in August 2005. Deputy Foreign Minister Aziz Pahad hosts a senior Sri Lankan delegation in Pretoria, with the purpose of sharing South Africa’s constitutional experiences. The meeting takes place in the framework of South Africa’s Road Map of Engagement, a contribution to conflict resolution in Sri Lanka.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>South Africa approves the extension to July 2007 of the deployment of 70 SANDF members to Mozambique. The purpose of the deployment is to provide military assistance in the clearance and demolition of unexploded ordnance devices. President Mbeki attends the inauguration of President Umaru Yar’Adua of Nigeria. President Mbeki pays the first visit by a South African Head of State since 1994 to Hanoi, Vietnam. South Africa hosts a delegation of the Movimiento al Socialismo, the majority party of Bolivia, as</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
part of an offer to assist Bolivians with institution-building and constitution-drafting.

President George W. Bush authorises the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR). South Africa is allocated R6 billion for a 4-year period.

### June

Dr Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma hosts an AU meeting on the situation in the Comoros, including forthcoming elections.

### July

South Africa’s cabinet approves the deployment of five SANDF members as part of an AU mission in Northern Uganda until March 2008.

### August


### September

President Mbeki leads a South African delegation to the 62nd session of the UNGA. He addresses the UNGA and the UNSC meeting hosted by President Nicolas Sarkozy on *Peace and Security in Africa*.

### October

Second IBSA Summit takes place.

### November


South Africa announces its intention to provide financial assistance to Palestine for capacity-building projects until 2010.

### December

Humanitarian assistance totalling R500 000 was disbursed to Haiti and Bolivia.

### 2008

**January**

Inaugural session of the South Africa-China Strategic Dialogue between foreign ministers of the two countries. The launch of the dialogue marks 10 years of SA-China relations, since South Africa switched from recognition of RoC to PRC.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| February | Kuwaiti deputy premier visits South Africa to advance bilateral ties.  
An agreement formalising the establishment of the Arab League Office in South Africa is formalised. |
| March | President Mbeki attends the 40th Independence Day celebrations of Mauritius in Port Louis.  
South Africa’s Cabinet extends the mandate of SANDF members in Northern Uganda participating in an AU mission.  
South Africa despatches a relief consignment (worth some R4 million) to Kenya, in response to an appeal for emergency support following the December 2007 election-related violence.  
AU Post-Conflict and Reconstruction Committee on Sudan, headed by Minister Zuma, visits Sudan. |
| April | President Mbeki hosts President Kabila of the DRC for the 5th Bi-National Commission. South Africa’s assistance to the DRC is broadly based on five priority areas: health, education, water and sanitation and infrastructure, with security sector reform a priority.  
President Mbeki pays an official visit to India, to participate in the inaugural Africa-India Partnership Summit.  
South Africa hosts the Durban Review Conference, the follow up to the World Conference Against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance. |
| May | South Africa’s cabinet approves the deployment of 15 SANDF members to CAR.  
President Mbeki leads a government and business delegation to Qatar.  
IBSA Ministerial Meeting takes |
place in Somerset West, South Africa coincides with IBSA’s first joint naval exercise.

**June**
- Ethiopian President Meles Zenawi conducts a state visit to South Africa.
- South Africa hosts a special meeting with Government leaders of Burundi to discuss the consolidation of peace in that country.
- Nigerian President Umaru Yar’Adua conducts his first state visit to South Africa.

**July**
- Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak pays his first state visit to South Africa.

**August**
- SADC Summit held, South Africa assumes Chair of the Summit. The SADC FTA and Protocol on Gender and Development are launched.
- Deputy President Mlambo-Ngcuka leads a South African delegation to the 17th International AIDS Conference.
- The first Turkey-Africa Summit, under the theme “Solidarity and Partnership for a Common Future” is held in Istanbul. South Africa is represented by Deputy President Mlambo-Ngcuka.

**September**
- President Mbeki pays a visit to Sudan, holding talks with President El Bashir.
- Minister Dlamini Zuma addresses the UNGA in New York.

24: President Mbeki’s term of office is terminated.

**October**
- 3rd IBSA Summit in New Delhi.

**November**

**December**
### Appendix 6: Selected Brazilian Internationalist Foreign Policy Actions, 2003-2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 2003 | January | The Brazilian government condemns terrorist attacks in Tel Aviv that caused 23 deaths.  
Brazil’s government expresses concern at North Korea’s withdrawal from the NPT.  
Brazil sponsors the creation of the OAS Secretary-General’s Group of Friends of Venezuela.  
Lula attends the World Social Forum in Porto Alegre.  
Lula attends the World Economic Forum in Davos. |
|       | February | USP/Itamaraty Cooperation Project in support of Timor Leste is launched.  
MERCOSUL ministers reaffirm their repudiation of terrorism and WMD in a joint statement.  
The Brazilian government affirms its reservations regarding the use of force in Iraq and requests a peaceful resolution of the issue, in accordance with international law.  
Brazil condemns terrorist attack in Colombia.  
Brazil requests the WTO DSM to establish a panel to examine the US's cotton subsidies. |
|       | March | Brazil sponsors consultations to identify possible support measures for Guinea-Bissau during its political and institutional crisis.  
Mahathir Mohamed visits Brazil  
Brazil opens an embassy in Sao Tome e Principe, the last CPLP state without standing Brazilian diplomatic representation.  
The Brazilian government “deeply regrets” the commencement of military operations against Iraq. |
<p>| May  | Amorim visits 6 African nations: Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Sao Tome e Principe, Angola, South Africa and Namibia. The Framework Agreement for Tobacco Control is approved in Geneva, after talks presided over by Brazil. |
| June | Lula participates in G8 meeting in Evian. Brazil and South Africa sign a defense cooperation agreement. IBSA is established “in order to promote regular political consultation on matters of common interest”, 733 Brazil signs the Framework Agreement for Tobacco Control, the first multilateral mechanism of public health negotiated in the World Health Organisation (WHO). Brazil was instrumental in the framing of this agreement. Lula attends the 24th MERCOSUL Summit in Asuncion. Lula conducts a state visit to the USA. Brazil attains observer-status at the Arab League. Lula attends a Summit of the Andean Community, the first time a Brazilian president is invited to do so. |
| July | Brazil affirms that it has no intention of signing the bilateral |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>Agreement proposed by the USA to grant immunity for USA citizens in the ICC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Brazil contributes two transport planes to the Multilateral Interim Emergency Task Force in Bunia, DRC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Brazil requests the establishment of a WTO DSM panel on European sugar export subsidies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Brazil achieves victory in the WTO against US steel safeguards.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lula attends the Summit of Progressive Governance in London. The UK again voices its support for Brazil's UNSC permanent seat candidacy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Brazilian government condemns and “strongly opposes” the military coup in Sao Tome e Principe.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Minister Amorim presides over the Eight Council of Ministers of CPLP in Coimbra, Portugal.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>An External Relations and National Defense Chamber of the Council of Government is established in order to present guidelines and articulate interministerial actions abroad.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Brazil and Chile, in a joint statement, affirm that it is necessary “to update and revitalise” the UN system.734</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Brazil and other developing nations present a proposal at the WTO for agricultural talks in the Doha Round.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>Brazil establishes international health cooperation with Burkina Faso.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The President of the Socialist International, Antonio Guterres, visits Brazil.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Brazil is instrumental in the establishment of the G20 at the WTO Cancun Ministerial</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Conference. The Conference ends in failure.

Brazil expresses regret over the military coup on Guinea-Bissau.

Lula opens the 58th General Assembly, and Brazil makes a donation to the World Fund to Fight Hunger and Poverty.

Brazil and its partners in the New Agenda Coalition make a statement regarding disarmament in New York.

**October**

- Brazil requests the WTO DSM to establish a panel to examine the customs classification of salted chicken cuts by the EU.
- Brazil ratifies the Olivos Protocol for the Settlement of Disputes in MERCOSUL.
- Lula signs the ‘Buenos Aires Consensus’ with President Nestor Kirchner of Argentina.
- Brazil and Argentina send a joint commission to La Paz to follow the political crisis in Bolivia.
- Brazil is elected a 9th time as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council for a two-year mandate (2004-2005).
- International Socialist Congress opens in Sao Paulo.

**November**

- President Lula conducts his first tour of Africa, visiting five countries: Sao Tome e Principe, Angola, Mozambique, Namibia and South Africa.

**December**

- Lula travels to the Middle East, visiting five countries: Syria, Lebanon, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt and Libya. The last visit by a Brazilian Head of State occurred in 1876.
- Brazil hosts a G20 Ministerial Meeting for the coordination of positions for the WTO’s Doha Round.
- Lula attends the 25th MERCOSUL Summit.
- Brazil sends humanitarian assistance to earthquake victims.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Events</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>January</td>
<td>Lula visits India; the Preferential Trade Agreement between MERCOSUR and India is celebrated. Lula holds meetings in Geneva with Presidents Chirac of France and Lagos of Chile, along with Kofi Annan, to discuss initiatives to fight hunger and poverty.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>February</td>
<td>Lula attends the 12th Summit of the G15. Brazil agrees to contribute to efforts for the stabilisation and reconstruction of Haiti after the ouster of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>March</td>
<td>Brazil donates medicines to earthquake victims in Morocco. First meeting of IBSA joint trilateral commission in New Delhi. The Brazilian government condemns terrorist attacks in Madrid. The government reaffirms its commitment to the “one China policy” and expresses disquiet over a Taiwanese referendum regarding the acquisition of advanced weapons. Amorim visits London to discuss UN reform with foreign secretary, Jack Straw. Brazil condemns the assassination of Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, spiritual leader of Hamas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>April</td>
<td>Brazil responds frostily to assertions that it is concealing its nuclear plans. Brazil’s electoral commission provides support to the government of Guinea-Bissau for its parliamentary elections. Brazil abstains on a resolution regarding the human rights in Iran.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Month</td>
<td>Event</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>Diplomatic representation is established in Ramallah, West Bank. Brazil condemns IDF activities in the Gaza Strip. Lula visits China with a business delegation and in Shanghai, proposes a “new geography of world trade” (^{735}) G20 countries make their joint proposal on agricultural market access. First Brazilian contingent participating in MINUSTAH is despatched.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>2: Brazilian troops depart for Haiti, as MINUSTAH is officially launched. Brazil hosts 11(^{th}) UNCTAD General Conference in Sao Paulo.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>Lula attends the 26(^{th}) MERCOSUR Summit in Puerto Iguazú, Argentina. Brazil announces that it will participate in two environmental projects in Lebanon, at the request of the UN. Lula conducts his second tour of Africa, visiting Sao Tome e Principe, Gabon and Cape Verde. Brazil supports a UNSC resolution that demands an embargo on international arms trade to Darfur.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>Lula visits Haiti and Brazilian troops serving in the UN mission there.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>The Brazilian government expresses condemnation at the terrorist actions conducted in North Ossetia, Russia.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{735}\) MRE, 2006: 64.
Brazil is successful in its cotton dispute with the US in the WTO.

Meeting of world leaders in New York to promote the Action against Hunger and Poverty. This is a joint initiative of Brazil, Chile, France, and Spain.

Germany, India, Japan and Brazil establish the Group of Four (G4) in New York with the objective of promoting UN reform and their own candidacy as permanent members.

Brazil opens an embassy in Addis Ababa.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>October</th>
<th>On a visit to Sao Paulo, US Secretary of State Colin Powell states that Brazil is a “solid candidate” for the UNSC.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Brazil seeks to promote its own Ambassador Luiz Corrêa for the position of WTO Director-General.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Brazil condemns the terrorist attacks in the Sinai Peninsula, Egypt.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Brazil is victorious in the WTO DSM panel on EU export subsidies for sugar.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Brazil despatches humanitarian aid to the governments of Grenada and Jamaica.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil is elected for a three-year mandate in the UN’s ECOSOC, from 2005-2007.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| November         |                                                                                                            |
| December         |                                                                                                            |
|                  | Minister Amorim visits five African countries: Cape Verde, Guine-Bissau, Senegal, Nigeria and Cameroon.    |
|                  | Brazil sends humanitarian aid to Guyana following heavy rains.                                            |
|                  | Lula attends the World Social Forum in Porto Alegre, hosting a conference titled “Global Call
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| February | Lula attends the World Economic Forum in Davos, signing a co-financing programme for Haiti with the World Bank.  
Brazil opens an embassy in Yaoundé, Cameroon.  
Brazil expresses regret at North Korea’s suspension of the six-party talks, as well as the country’s announcement that it possess nuclear weapons.  
Lula visits Venezuela and signs a declaration with President Hugo Chavez for the implementation of the Brazil-Venezuela Strategic Alliance.  
In an effort to enlarge Brazil’s relations with the Arab world, Amorim visits Jordan, Palestine, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Qatar, Kuwait, Tunisia and Algeria. |
| March | 1: Brazil assumes the pro-tempore presidency of the UNSC.  
Second IBSA Joint Commission takes place in Cape Town.  
Brazil opens an embassy in Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania.  
G-4 countries welcome the UN Secretary-General’s Report “In Greater Freedom: Towards Security, Development and Human Rights”. |
| April | Brazil receives a delegation of the Caribbean Community regarding its programme for combatting AIDS.  
Lula conducts a third visit to Africa, stopping in Cameroon, Nigeria, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau and Senegal. On Gorée Island, Senegal, the President asks the African people’s forgiveness for the suffering imposed by slavery.  
UNSC mission, headed by Brazil’s Permanent Representative to the UN, visits Haiti. |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| May  | Brazil agrees a Protocol of Understanding regarding credits grants for Angola, amounting to $580 million.  
Honduran president, Ricardo Maduro, visits Brazil and affirms his government’s interest in “receiving technical cooperation for the production and use of biofuels”.  
Brazil hosts the first South American and Arab Countries Summit (SAAC). A Framework Agreement on Economic Cooperation between Mercosul and the Gulf Cooperation Council is signed. |
| June | 35th meeting of the General Assembly of the OAS in Fort Lauderdale, USA.  
Marco Aurelio Garcia arrives in Bolivia on an observation mission, in light of the political crisis in that country, and calls by the opposition for nationalisation of natural gas and oil reserves.  
Brazil joins a mission of |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>July</th>
<th>Observers from the CPLP in the presidential elections of Guinea-Bissau.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Minister Amorim participates in the International Conference on Iraq in Brussels.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Brazil donates a batch of 3.7 million vaccines against yellow fever to Peru.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fifteen years of <em>Foro do São Paulo</em> are celebrated in São Paulo.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lula participates in the G8 extended dialogue in Gleneagles, Scotland, joined by the leaders of South Africa, China, India and Mexico.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Brazilian government expresses its “strongest condemnation” of the terrorist attacks in London.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>G4 foreign ministers meet in London, joined by the Foreign Minister of Ghana, and approve a consensus on the need to enlarge the UNSC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Amorim attends G20 Ministerial Meeting regarding the WTO in Dalian, China.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>French-Brazilian declaration is issued regarding innovative financing mechanisms for development.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>Brazil praises the decision of the Israeli government to persist with its disengagement plan in the Gaza Strip.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>IBSA presidents meet in New York City.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>During the UN’s 60th anniversary celebrations, Lula participates in the High Level Debate on Development Financing, as well as special meetings of the UNSC and the UNGA regarding the Millennium Goals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Minister Amorim makes the opening statement at the 60th UNGA general debate.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
|            | Minister Amorim visits Haiti for consultations with Haitian
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>Lula travels to Russia for meetings with President Putin. Brazil sends food and medicine to the populations of El Salvador and Guatemala, as well as Pakistan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>US President George W. Bush conducts a working visit to Brazil. A Brazilian Permanent Mission to the IAEA is established. Brazilian embassies open in Khartoum and Malabo. Amorim participates in talks about the WTO in Geneva and Arusha, with the African Union.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>Brazil grants 500 voting booths on loan to electoral authorities in Dominican Republic for use in elections there. Brazilian embassies open in Cotonou, Benin and Nassau, Bahamas. Lula participates in the 29th MERCOSUL summit in Montevideo. The political decision to promote the accession of Venezuela to the bloc is made. Minister Amorim leads the Brazilian delegation to the VI Ministerial Conference of the WTO in Hong Kong. For the first time, a ministerial meeting is held among all of the groups of developing nations in the WTO: G20, G33, ACP countries, the African group, small economies and less developed nations. Brazil receives an award from the UNDP, “Special Recognition for South-South Solidarity” for its contributions to Asian countries affected by the tsunami at the end of 2004.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Brazilian embassies open in Lomé, Togo and Colombo, Sri Lanka.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 2006 | January | Brazilian trade balance figures are issued, revealing that almost 54% of Brazilian sales are to developing countries.  
13: President-elect of Bolivia, Evo Morales, visits Brazil. Lula attends his inauguration later in the month.  
18: Brazilian Mission to the CPLP is established in Lisbon.  
25: Brazil sends observers to Palestine parliamentary elections.  
31: Minister Amorim attends the International Conference on Afghanistan in London. |
|       | February | 8-12: Lula conducts a fourth visit to Africa, making stops in Algeria, Benin, Botswana and South Africa. In Pretoria, Lula attends the Summit of Progressive Governance.  
Brazil recognises the victory of René Préval in Haiti’s Presidential elections.  
Minister Amorim attends the Ministerial Conference in Paris on Innovative Sources of Financing and Development, an event linked to the Action Against Hunger and Poverty. |
|       | March | 7-10: Brazil hosts International Conference on Agrarian Reform and Development of the FAO.  
28-31: The 27th Extraordinary Session of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights is held in Brasilia.  
Brazilian government sends 14 tons of food to Ecuador, following floods in that country.  
Lula conducts a state visit to Great Britain. |
<p>|       | April | Brazil signs a Memorandum of Understanding with Ghana for |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>3: Lula defends Bolivia’s sovereignty, following that country’s nationalisation of its hydrocarbon sector, affecting Petrobrás investments. Brazilian embassies open in Lusaka, Zambia and Conakry, Guinea. Brazil is elected to the UN’s Human Rights Council for a two-year period, with 165 votes out of 191. Technical negotiations for Venezuela’s membership of MERCOUR are completed in Buenos Aires. Brazil is elected to join the UN Peacebuilding Commission. Brazil hosts High Level Meeting on Haiti.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>France and Britain re-iterate their support for Brazil’s candidacy for permanent membership of the UNSC. Brazil recognises the independence of Montenegro. Brazilian embassy opens in Gaborone, Botswana. 30: Diplomatic mission of solidarity travels to Dili, Timor Leste.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>Brazil condemns missile tests by North Korea. Brazil hosts the Second Conference of Intellectuals from Africa and the Diaspora. Brazil condemns Israel’s actions in South Lebanon against Hezbollah. Lula attends G-8 Summit in St Petersburg, as part of its broader dialogue with developing countries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Month</td>
<td>Events</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>Lula attends <strong>30th MERCOSUR Summit</strong> in Argentina, the first attended by Venezuela as a full member.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>International Conference of Donors for Haiti is held in Port-au-Prince.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Two-and-a-half tons of medicines are delivered to Lebanon by way of humanitarian donation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Brazil offers $500,000 in aid to Lebanon, and a further $500,000 to the Palestinian Occupied Territories.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High Level Meeting of the G20 is held in Rio, with the aim of relaunching the WTO Doha Round of talks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Prime Minister Manmohan Singh visits Brazil, the first such visit by an Indian Chief of Government in 38 years. This is followed by the first IBSA Summit, held in Brasilia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Brazil delivers humanitarian aid to victims of a volcanic eruption in Ecuador.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Minister Amorim attends the NAM Summit in Cuba.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lula addresses the <strong>61st General Assembly</strong> of the <strong>UN</strong>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Implementation of the International Central Office for the Purchase of Drugs to Treat AIDS, Malaria and Tuberculosis (UNITAID). The initiative is sponsored by Brazil, Chile, France, Norway, and the United Kingdom.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>Brazil condemns nuclear test carried out by North Korea.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The first IBSA Summit meeting is held in Brasilia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>A Multidisciplinary Brazilian Mission is dispatched to Lebanon.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Debts of Bolivia, Guyana, Haiti,</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>First Africa-South America Summit is held in Abuja, Nigeria. The event approves an action plan to enhance South-South cooperation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>President Rafael Correa of Ecuador visits Brazil on his first international visit as state president. Brazil condemns the decision to carry out the death sentence on Saddam Hussein.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>Lula attends the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, offering concessions for the success of the Doha Development Round.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>US President George Bush attends a bilateral meeting with Lula in São Paulo.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>Relations between Lula and Chavez are slightly strained over Brazil's ethanol agreements with the United States. Lula rejects criticism that ethanol production, promoted by Brazil, would raise regional food prices. Lula conducts a state visit to the US.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>Pope Benedict conducts a five-day visit to Brazil, meeting with Lula twice. Lula authorises the Brazilian government to buy a generic version of an AIDS drug produced by Merck Pharmaceuticals, bypassing its patent on the product. Lula declared the provision of the medication to be “in the public interest”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>MERCOSUL Summit held in Asunción, Paraguay. Lula conducts a three-day visit to India, agreeing with Indian officials on the goal of quadrupling bilateral trade by</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Month</td>
<td>Event</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>2010 to $10 billion per year. The leaderships of both countries affirm their similar stances on global trade and the environment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>Lula defends Iran’s nuclear rights following a speech at the UN General Assembly.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>Lula defends Iran’s nuclear rights following a speech at the UN General Assembly.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>Lula conducts a four-state tour of Africa, stopping in Burkina Faso, Congo, Angola and South Africa. He urges Africa to join the “biofuel revolution”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>Petrobrás announces a find of between 5 billion and 8 billion barrels of light oil and gas at the Tupi oil field, 155 miles offshore of Brazil.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>Lula offers assistance to Colombia in negotiating the release of hostages held by rebel militants. Lula visits Bolivia, promising new investments, ostensibly in a bid to undercut the influence of Hugo Chavez in the country, and protect Brazil’s gas supply. Bank of the South is launched in Buenos Aires by six Latin American presidents, including Lula.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2008</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>Lula conducts a visit to Haiti, and pledges to seek broader support for reconstruction efforts in that country.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>Brazilian engineering firm Odebrecht is expelled from Ecuador, along with Furnas, a Brazilian energy company. Brazil recalls its ambassador from Quito.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>Brazil tightens its defence policy on the border with Paraguay, following attacks against Brazilian farmers. Brazil's new stand creates tensions with Paraguay. Brazil signs a military and aerospace industry co-operation agreement with Russia, whose President Medvedev is visiting the country. Lula attends a G20 ministerial meeting in Sao Paulo, Brazil. Leaders pledge to make international financial institutions more democratic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>The Brazilian government unveils a new defense strategy. Brazil signs a USD11 billion dollar deal with France to purchase 50 military helicopters and five submarines, and one nuclear-powered vessel. President Raul Castro of Cuba visits Brazil, his first trip abroad as Cuba's head of state. Lula urges the US to lift its trade embargo on the country. 16-17: Brazil hosts the Summit of Latin America and the Caribbean on Integration and Development.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>January</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Brazil opens embassies in Saint George (Grenada), Saint Johns (Antigua and Barbuda), Muscat (Oman), Pyongyang (North Korea), Baku (Azerbaijan) and Dhaka (Bangladesh). Humanitarian assistance provided to Gaza, an aircraft carrying 6-8 tons of medicines and food.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>Assistance provided to Cuba, Haiti and Honduras following natural disasters. Food aid also provided to Zambia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>Hosting UK Prime Minister, Gordon Brown, Lula blames wealthy countries for the global financial crisis, and appeals for the resumption of the Doha trade talks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>Technical and medical assistance despatched to Bolivia in its battle against dengue fever.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>Donation of shelter materials to assist flood victims in Namibia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>First BRIC Summit takes place in Yekaterinburg, Russia, attended by the Heads of State of the BRIC countries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>Donation of shelter materials to assist flood victims in Namibia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>Donation of shelter materials to assist flood victims in Namibia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>Ousted Honduras President Manuel Zelaya takes refuge in the Brazilian Embassy in Tegucigalpa. Brazil declines membership of OPEC, citing Brazil’s reluctance to become a crude oil exporter, favouring instead the export of refined products. Lula attends the G20 Summit in Pittsburgh, USA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>Rio de Janeiro wins the bid to host the 2016 Summer Olympics. Lula attends the Second Africa-South America Summit in Venezuela.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad conducts a state visit to Brazil.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>24: Lula conducts his last official trip to Cuba, his third in two years, and meets with former President Fidel Castro.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>Brazil rebuffs US requests to back UN sanctions against Iran. Lula conducts a tour of the Middle East, including Israel.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2010

| January    | 24: Lula conducts his last official trip to Cuba, his third in two years, and meets with former President Fidel Castro. |
| March      | Brazil rebuffs US requests to back UN sanctions against Iran. Lula conducts a tour of the Middle East, including Israel. |
and the Palestinian territories.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>18: Brazilian President Lula da Silva and Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan broker a nuclear fuel swap deal with Iran. Lula visits Russia, appealing to President Medvedev to defend reform of the UN Security Council.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>Lula criticises the West for losing an “historic opportunity” to negotiate with Iran on its nuclear programme, following the imposition of new sanctions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>Brazil offers asylum to Iranian woman sentenced to death by stoning. Lula conducts his final tour of Africa, visiting Equatorial Guinea, Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia, and the World Cup in South Africa. Lula misses a G20 meeting in order to oversee flood relief efforts in Brazil’s north-east.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>In spite of his imminent departure from office, Lula is seen to be underplaying his hand in reining in Chavez following tensions between Venezuela and Colombia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>Lula defends Wikileaks and offers his solidarity with Wikileaks founder Julian Assange.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---


REFERENCES

List of Interviews

Brazil
Lilian Duarte, Political Officer, Brazilian Embassy London
Ambassador Gonçalo Mourão, Head of Central America and Caribbean Desk, MRE
Mr Valter Pomar, Head of International Office, PT
Prof Monica Regina Soares da Lima, Professor of International Politics, IUPERJ
Prof Alcides Vaz, Professor of International Politics, UnB
Prof Paulo Roberto Almeida, diplomat and professor of International Politics
Prof Kai Michael Kenkel, Professor of International Relations, PUC-Rio
Mr Giancarlo Summa, former PT Electoral Public Communication Officer

South Africa
Professor Raymond Suttner, former head of Parliamentary Committee for Foreign Affairs
Dr Essop Pahad, former Minister in the Presidency
Dr George Genge, Acting Head of Policy, Research and Analysis Unit, DFA
Ms. Mavivi Manyakayaka-Manzini, ANC International Office Head
Prof Anthoni van Nieuwkerk, Professor of Defense Studies, WITS Business School
Mr Peter Fabricius, International Affairs Correspondent, The Star
Ms Annabel Haslop, Deputy Ambassador to Brazil

Literature


Armijo, Leslie Elliott. 2007. “The BRICs countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) as Analytical Category: Mirage or Insight?”, in Asian Perspective, Vol. 31, No. 4, pp7-42.


BBC Monitoring.


______, 12 April, 2011. “Cosatu slams foreign policy”.


______. Speech at the 49th General Assembly, 21 September, 2004, in reference to Brazil’s participation in Haiti.


______. *Annual Report, 2001/2.*

______. *Annual Report, 2002/3.*

______. *Annual Report, 2008/9.*

______. *Strategic Plan, 2006-9.*


Domínguez, Jorge I. and Juan Lindau. 1986. “Chapter 5: The Primacy of Politics: Comparing the Foreign Policies of Cuba and Mexico”, in Bahgat, Korany (with


Fleury, Sonia. 2006. ‘O conselho de desenvolvimento economico e social do governo Lula.


Mullins, Martin. 2006. *In the Shadow of the Generals: Foreign Policy Making in Argentina, Brazil and Chile*. Ashgate: Aldershot.


Oxford English Dictionary.


Seitenfus, Ricardo. 2007. “Keeping the Peace and the Lessons of Haiti: Collapse or Rebuilding of the State?”.


Socialist International Website. [http://www.socialistinternational.org/about.cfm](http://www.socialistinternational.org/about.cfm)


Statement by G8 leaders, and the leaders of Brazil, China, India, Mexico and South Africa following the terrorist attacks on London, 07/07/05.


World Bank Data: Brazil.

World Bank Data: South Africa.

World Bank, World Development Indicators.

Wright, William Kelley. 1918. “Ethical Aspects of Internationalism”, in International


London.

Legacy: Formalizing Democracy While Gutting Its Essence”, in Journal of Third

online at: http://www.theindependent.co.zw/local/21394-brazil-joins-the-fray.html
on 14 June, 2011.