Prosperous Peripheries

Cross-sectional and Longitudinal Explorations of the Determinants of Regionalism in Western Europe

By Rune Dahl Fitjar ©

Thesis submitted for the degree of PhD in Government

London, October 2007
Copyright

I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the PhD degree of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which case the extent of any work carried out jointly by me and any other person is clearly identified in it).

The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is permitted, provided that full acknowledgement is made. The thesis may not be reproduced without prior written consent of the author. I warrant that this authorization does not, to the best of my belief, infringe the rights of any third party.

[Signature]
Abstract

The study aims to explain differences in the levels of regionalism both between different regions and within individual regions over time. The existing literature focuses on globalisation and European integration as the main causes of changes in regionalism across time, treating the phenomenon mainly as a part of broader political developments. By overlooking internal developments in individual regions in this way, it is impossible to explain differences between regions. Another main strand of the literature focuses on cultural and ethnic differences, but these differences tend to be relatively static and thus unsuitable for explaining variation within individual regions over time. Instead, the thesis looks for answers to these questions in regional economies. One major hypothesis is that economically strong but politically peripheral regions will be better equipped to challenge the central state and have stronger incentives to desire control over their own resources.

A quantitative study across 212 Western European regions seeks to test the relationship between regionalism and a set of common explanatory variables, including the economic strength of the region. Variables such as cultural distinctiveness, geographical position, economic development, globalisation and Europeanisation are tested for their effects on the regional identities expressed by the population.

The findings of the quantitative study form the basis of a model of the causes of regionalism, which is further explored through case studies of Scotland and Rogaland, two regions that have experienced growth across time both in terms of economic development and globalisation. On this basis, the model predicts a growth in regionalism across time in both regions. These predictions are tested and confirmed, and an exploratory qualitative study examines why economic development and globalisation may have led to growth in regionalism in the two regions.
Chapter List

1. Designing a Study ....................................................................................................................... 13
2. How to Explain Regionalism .................................................................................................... 31
3. Reliable Measurement across Western Europe ........................................................................ 56
4. Why some Regions are more Regionalist than Others ........................................................... 82
5. Case Selection for Longitudinal Analysis .............................................................................. 108
6. Regionalism across Time in Scotland and Rogaland ............................................................ 128
7. Qualitative Assessment of the Model ..................................................................................... 159
8. Causes of Regionalism ............................................................................................................. 193
Bibliography ................................................................................................................................. 205
## 1. Designing a Study

### 1.1 Regions and regionalism
- 1.1.1 What is a region?  \(\text{\textbf{14}}\)
- 1.1.2 Regional identity  \(\text{\textbf{16}}\)
- 1.1.3 Regionalism  \(\text{\textbf{18}}\)

### 1.2 Theoretical framework
- 1.2.1 Centres and peripheries  \(\text{\textbf{19}}\)
- 1.2.2 Elites and masses  \(\text{\textbf{21}}\)
- 1.2.3 Bottom-up  \(\text{\textbf{23}}\)

### 1.3 Research design
- 1.3.1 Longitudinal and cross-sectional  \(\text{\textbf{24}}\)
- 1.3.2 Quantitative and qualitative  \(\text{\textbf{25}}\)
- 1.3.3 Nested analysis  \(\text{\textbf{26}}\)

### 1.4 Main findings

### 1.5 Chapter structure

## 2. How to Explain Regionalism

### 2.1 Globalisation
- 2.1.1 Capital and labour mobility  \(\text{\textbf{33}}\)
- 2.1.2 Glocalism  \(\text{\textbf{36}}\)

### 2.2 European integration
- 2.2.1 Trade and the single market  \(\text{\textbf{37}}\)
- 2.2.2 Multi-level governance  \(\text{\textbf{39}}\)
- 2.2.3 European identity  \(\text{\textbf{41}}\)

### 2.3 Party systems
- 2.3.1 Regional elections  \(\text{\textbf{42}}\)
- 2.3.2 National elections  \(\text{\textbf{43}}\)
- 2.3.3 Regional and national parties  \(\text{\textbf{44}}\)

### 2.4 Internal colonialism  \(\text{\textbf{46}}\)

### 2.5 Prosperity and regionalism
- 2.5.1 Fiscal incentives  \(\text{\textbf{49}}\)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.5.2 Economic centrality, political peripherality</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.5.3 Economic development and regional culture</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.6 Conclusion</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Reliable Measurement across Western Europe</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1 Defining the unit</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2 Surveying regionalism</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2.1 The Moreno question</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2.2 Eurobarometer</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2.3 Best of both worlds</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3 Assessment of the indicator</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3.1 Reliability</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3.2 Validity</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.4 Distribution on the regionalism index</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.5 Levels of regionalism in some European regions</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.5.1 Linguistic minorities</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.5.2 Islands</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.5.3 National capitals</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.6 Conclusion</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Why some Regions are more Regionalist than Others</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1 Operationalisation of independent variables</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1.1 Globalisation</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1.2 European integration</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1.3 Party systems</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1.4 Economic development</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1.5 Control variables</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2 Building a regression model</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2.1 Regression analysis</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2.2 Country dummies</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3 Conclusion</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Case Selection for Longitudinal Analysis</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.1 Context</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.1.1 Scotland: United, but not fully integrated</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.1.2 Rogaland: Peripherality in a centralised state</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2 Model predictions</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
8.4 Party systems ......................................................................................................................199
8.5 Economic development.....................................................................................................200
8.6 Implications for future research ........................................................................................203

Bibliography ................................................................................................................................205

Graphics ....................................................................................................................................221
Appendix A – Regionalism index scores.................................................................................222
Appendix B – Weighted least squares regression....................................................................223
Appendix C - Multicollinearity diagnostics..............................................................................225
# List of Tables

3.1 Regionalism index scores for surveyed countries in 1991 .....................................................64  
3.2 Index of regional political institutions ....................................................................................70  
3.3 Correlation matrix for regionalism and political institutions ................................................72  
3.4 Regions with highest and lowest regionalism index scores ..................................................74  
3.5 Regions with significant minority languages ..........................................................................76  
3.6 Island regions ............................................................................................................................78  
3.7 National capitals ........................................................................................................................79  
4.1 Member states’ distribution on the Europeanisation measure ..............................................85  
4.2 Top ten and bottom ten Europeanised regions ........................................................................86  
4.3 Top ten recipients of structural funds .....................................................................................87  
4.4 Ten most and least distinctive regional party systems ...........................................................88  
4.5 Distribution on the regional language index ...........................................................................93  
4.6 Distribution on the historical sovereignty index ......................................................................94  
4.7 Expected effects .......................................................................................................................96  
4.8 Examining the model of regionalism ......................................................................................97  
4.9 Predicted regionalism index scores ........................................................................................100  
4.10 Introducing country dummies ..............................................................................................102  
4.11 Clustered regression ..............................................................................................................105  
6.1 The *Daily Record*, content analysis .......................................................................................140  
6.2 The *Press and Journal*, content analysis ..............................................................................141  
6.3 The *Stavanger Aftenblad*, content analysis ..........................................................................153  
C.1 Variance Inflation Factor scores of model in tables 4.8 and 4.10 ........................................225
# List of Figures

3.1 Measurement model ..................................................................................................................67
3.2 Construct validity test ...............................................................................................................70
3.3 Frequency distribution on the regionalism index .................................................................73
4.1 A model of regionalism ..........................................................................................................106
5.1 Norway, map of administrative entities .................................................................................114
5.2 Rogaland, municipalities and geographic zones ..................................................................116
5.3 Development of Scotland’s relative GDPR per capita .......................................................119
5.4 Scotland, divergence from national party system .................................................................120
5.5 Foreign immigrant population in Rogaland, 1970-2002 ....................................................123
5.6 Development of Rogaland’s relative GDPR per capita ......................................................124
5.7 Rogaland, divergence from national party system ...............................................................126
6.1 Support for the Scottish National Party .................................................................................133
6.2 The *Stavanger Aftenblad*, articles focusing on Rogaland ..................................................154
7.1 Regionalism and prosperity in Scotland .............................................................................168
7.2 Regionalism and prosperity in Rogaland ..........................................................................182
B.1 Residuals by predicted values, model 1 .............................................................................224
B.2 Residuals by predicted values, model 2 .............................................................................224
Acknowledgements

Before the start of this project, I was told by several people that writing a PhD is a solitary process. To some extent, this is true. Writing down every word in this thesis, and thousands more that were edited out at some stage in the process, has been down to me, and me alone. At the same time, it would certainly not have been possible to complete the project without the help of several people who have guided me along the way. Without the assistance of the people who will be mentioned below, it would have been impossible to find the motivation, inspiration and morale to write the thesis, and I would have done an infinitely poorer job in deciding which words to keep, and which to throw out.

In terms of academic support, my supervisor Eiko Thielemann has been an invaluable asset throughout the research. He has provided me with swift, thorough and useful feedback on every paper, article or chapter that I have produced, and his advice has always led to improvements in my work. Eiko’s ability to see both the bigger picture and the crucial details has been essential in keeping me on track throughout the process. It was also Eiko’s idea to bring in Michael Bruter as the project advisor in the second year, and Michael’s considerable methodological expertise has been absolutely essential in designing most of the quantitative research in the thesis.

Although I have worked most closely with Eiko and Michael, I have also had the benefit of receiving advice and feedback from several other skilful researchers at the LSE. The PhD workshops in European Politics and Comparative Politics have been useful throughout the PhD, and the convenors have always made thorough comments on my papers from a wide variety of perspectives. David Soskice, Gwen Sasse, Abby Innes, Simon Glendinning, Rodney Barker, Sebastian Balfour, Willem Buiter, Robert Leonardi and Bill Kissane all gave solid and constructive feedback on my work. The same goes for the participants at the ECPR summer school on Regions in Europe at the European University Institute, Florence, including Jörg Mathias, Colin Williams, Howard Elcock, Josefina Süssner, Niels Lange and Michael Keating. The comments from reviewers and editors at Regional and Federal Studies and Scandinavian Political Studies, where parts of this research were published, have been highly useful in improving both my articles and the entire project, as have the academic
conferences that I attended in Linköping, Bergen and Belfast. Last, but not least, Jouni Kuha at the Methodology Institute has provided valuable insights into my approach to the cross-sectional part of the research, offering clear and sensible answers to all my questions.

The LSE provides access not only to world-class researchers, but also to world-class students and an excellent research student community. The quality of the discussion in the research workshops has been a result of the student participants as well as the convenors, and I would like to thank all the students who have contributed during these sessions. Whilst I have enjoyed the company and assistance of many people along the way, two of my fellow students deserve special mention here. Chiara Jasson has listened loyally to my accounts of the problems that arose and helpfully answered all my questions, as well as making constructive comments on several of the chapters. Just as importantly, she has also kept my confidence up throughout the last year and made me look forward to coming into work every day. Achim Göerres has been patient in answering all my questions about basic and not-so-basic statistics and helping me run the regression models, commenting on the chapters through several revisions, and being a close friend throughout.

For a Norwegian, doing a PhD abroad means overseas tuition fees and waving good bye to the salary that a PhD at home would provide. Doing a PhD in London also means that the living costs are almost as high as in Norway. Thus, financial assistance was necessary to even get started. The Norwegian Student Loan Fund and the LSE Research and Teaching Studentships have provided essential financial support, while the ECPR Mobility Fund, the LSE Postgraduate Travel Fund and Berentsens Legat in Stavanger have made generous grants. Most fundamentally, the economic security and support that my parents, Lillian and Roar Fitjar, have provided in backing me all the way have been essential in making it possible for me to attempt such a big project, and they have also had the patience to read and comment on a lot of the papers that I have written.

Finally, the two people who have kept me going throughout this project are my wife Camilla and my son Sebastian. They have kept my spirits up every day for the four and a half years that we spent in London, and I will always be grateful that they were there with me, making Sutton and Watford feel like home. They have given me love and security, as well as motivation, inspiration and morale. This is for them.
1. Designing a Study

The 20th century saw the victory of the nation-state over all other forms of political organisation. Empires and city-states have rescinded into history. Today, the principle of national sovereignty serves as the fundamental guide of international relations. The ideology of nationalism has reached all parts of the globe, and it is seen as natural that the world should be divided into nation-states, with each nation controlling their own state. However, over the past forty years there have also been signs that this might be about to change. Whilst states are still the most important actors on the world stage, the pressures of globalisation and international trade have reduced the states' capacities to control their environments. In Europe, the European Union has gradually extended its own authority, and it has now taken over many of the competences that were traditionally the responsibilities of its member states.

As the political authority of states has been gradually dispersed to international organs, their internal homogeneity has also come under pressure. Sub-national actors, such as regions, have begun to assert themselves on the international stage, with potentially severe ramifications for the economic and cultural coherence of the state. Growing spatial inequalities within states based on the success of some regions in attracting capital in the global market put pressures on national solidarity, and give regions an incentive to mobilise in protection of their own interests (Bullmann 1997:9). The effect of these historical developments has been to disperse political authority between the various layers of government to an extent not seen in Europe in the last seven centuries, according to Marks (1997:20).

Correspondingly, we have seen an explosion in the number of political science works dealing with regions and regionalism over the past fifteen years. Whereas political science, and especially the comparative politics sub-discipline, used to be almost exclusively preoccupied with states and nations, there is today a considerable body of literature on regions, cities and other sub-state levels of government. Much of this literature concerns regionalisation within the context of the European Union, focusing on new institutional phenomena such as regional information offices, the Committee of the Regions, multi-level governance and the "Europe
of the regions’ agenda. It is the developments towards regionalisation and its consequences for nation-states and for the EU that have been at the centre of interest, and beyond a general idea that the regions’ newfound importance is related to European integration, inquiries into the causes of regionalism have received comparatively less attention.

However, there is significant variation in the mobilisation of regions across different parts of the continent. In federal countries such as Germany and Austria, and regionalised countries such as Spain and Italy, regions have had strong power bases from which to organise, and they have naturally been at the forefront of the development. Nevertheless, even within countries, there are substantial differences in the degree to which the populations of different regions identify with their region, and hence in the extent to which they mobilise on a regional basis. What causes such differences between regions in their capacity to mobilise local populations? Equally, if regionalism has been growing in many parts of Europe over the last decades, what causes the levels of regionalism to vary across time within individual regions? This thesis will attempt to further the existing literature on these questions, with the aim of providing new insights.

1.1 Regions and regionalism

A generic problem in much of the literature on regionalism is the lack of clarity and agreement on what is actually meant by the term regionalism. It is a notoriously imprecise term that has been used to describe everything from decentralisation of political power to economic restructuring to the mobilisation of subnational identities. Even the term region poses frequent problems for researchers, as there is a wide range of definitions of this as well. It is therefore useful to clarify what is meant by these terms.

1.1.1 What is a region?

There is a lot of confusion among analysts and policymakers alike as to what constitutes a region. The definition of the term varies across state borders, and sometimes even across sectors and departments within the same state. For a student of international relations, the term refers to something else altogether. Even if one restricts oneself to sub-state regions, as in this thesis, the concept has at least four different meanings. One can conceive of regions as economic or cultural territories, or as units of economic planning or regional governance. The
regions as defined by these concepts rarely coincide, making the matter of definition a crucial one (Loughlin 1997:154).

Some of the findings of Eurobarometer 36.0¹, which is the main survey focusing on regional identities, illustrate the problems involved in defining a region. In the survey, respondents were asked to define their region in an open-ended question:

"People often call the area of their country where they live or where they grew up, “their region”, the region to which they belong. What do you consider to be “your region”, the region to which you belong?"

The results were coded according to whether the respondents stated a region at the NUTS 1, 2 or 3 levels². At first glance, this seems to be a natural starting-point for establishing what should be considered a region. After all, people living in a territory should be in the best position to determine which region they live in. Just like nations, regions are imagined communities whose territories must be defined by their members (Smouts 1998; Süssner 2002). On this basis, we could argue that a region should be included in the study if more than 50 percent of respondents considered it to be their region. This would be a simple and theoretically coherent way of defining a region.

Unfortunately, there seems to be little agreement on what a region is, even among local populations. Only in 58 of all the NUTS 1 and NUTS 2 regions included in the survey did a majority of the respondents agree on any one definition of their home region. These 58 regions constituted a biased subset of large regions that were concentrated in a few countries (Germany, Italy and Spain, along with a few French, Portuguese and English regions)³, and they also exhibited stronger regional identities than the average region. Furthermore, there was no uniformity with regards to what people did identify as a region. More often than not,

¹ The Eurobarometer series represent the only serious attempts at surveying levels of regional identity on a European level. There are six Eurobarometer surveys dealing with issues of regional identity, dating from 1971, 1978, 1991, 1995, 2000 and 2002. These provide an opportunity to compare levels of regionalism over time for at least some of the EU regions. Unfortunately, the regional origins of the respondents are classified differently in the oldest surveys, which were also not carried out in the countries that were not members at the time (i.e. Greece, Spain, Portugal, Sweden, Finland and Austria, plus the UK, Ireland and Denmark in 1971). I will return to the issue of how this data can be applied in chapter 3.

² NUTS is the Nomenclature des Unités Territoriales Statistiques, a uniform classification system that the European Commission introduced to make it easier to compare sub-state authorities across European countries. The NUTS system classifies regions as belonging to the NUTS 1, 2 or 3 levels according to their size.

³ In some of these cases, the agreement on the definition of a region is probably due to the fact that the sub-national administrative units are called “regions” in the country in question.
respondents from the same territories spread their answers evenly across a variety of units of different sizes, with a substantial proportion even identifying regions smaller than the NUTS 3 level. The conclusion must be that quite often, people simply do not know – or at least do not agree on – what a region is.

A way out of this quagmire is to focus on meso-level sub-state authorities. If one considers regionalism to be a strategy for regional political elites to augment their power vis-à-vis the central state, regional government structures must be taken as the starting-point. This is where the resources of regional political elites are to be found, and this is where their efforts at building a regional identity must begin. The two case studies covered in this thesis are both examples of meso-level sub-state authorities, and they are both the highest level of political unit beneath the central state in their respective countries.

1.1.2 Regional identity

The relationship between regionalism and regional identities can be a bit hazy. The two concepts overlap to some extent, and they are sometimes taken to mean the same thing. However, it is important to distinguish clearly between the two if one is to have a meaningful discussion about the causes of either.

The concept of regional identities refers to the feeling of belonging in a particular region. This is one of the many geographical and functional identities that people use to define themselves vis-à-vis others. Political scientists have traditionally focused on national identities, and the concept of multiple identities is therefore relatively recent in the literature. Yet, people have always had more than one identity. They are men, women, young, old, working-class, students, Japanese, Europeans and Londoners. These are all objective categories, but people may identify and feel a sense of common purpose with others who share the same characteristics. Indeed, in psychology it is widely believed that people need to identify with certain subgroups in order to establish a perception of ourselves and bridge the gap between the self and the outside world (Bruter 2004:25). According to Friedman, “they

---

4 There is obviously also a connection between levels of regionalism and the extent to which people agree on what region they live in. To some extent, people who do not know what a region is can be taken as evidence of its absence, as the region apparently does not exist to them.
provide the feelings of self-esteem and belonging that are as essential for human survival as food in the belly” (Friedman 2000:31).

Regional identities form part of this package, complementing other identities as well as competing with them for primacy. Yet, the extent to which a person identifies with his region varies, and hence, the levels of regional identity (i.e. the sum of regional identification among a region’s inhabitants) vary across regions and time. In tune with the definition of identity, one can say that the strength of a regional identity depends on the extent to which people feel that they belong in the region and see themselves as part of a group involving all the inhabitants of the region.

Whilst a person’s identity is essentially a subjective matter, it is unclear to what extent a person can actually choose which groups to identify with, and this issue is much too complex to allow any sort of thorough discussion here. The question of choice when it comes to regional identity maps directly onto the debate between subjective and objective definitions of nationalism. Gellner (1983) distinguishes between will and culture as two conceptually distinct bases of national identity, and it seems obvious that you cannot deliberately choose your cultural background or mother tongue. If you accept will as the basis of national identity, however, you do have to make a choice as to whether or not you actually want to be part of the nation, or of the imagined community in Anderson’s (1991) sense. However, it is questionable to what extent people consciously choose whether or not to identify with their region, and even more so whether there can actually be anything rational about that choice.

Nor can people freely choose which region they want to identify with. For instance, a person born in Germany of German parents and who continues to live in Germany cannot easily identify himself as French. Similarly, a person who is born and bred in Bavaria cannot suddenly decide to be Thuringian. Herein lies also the crucial distinction between national and regional identities. If a subnational identity coexists with a national identity, such that a person can be both Bavarian and German, it can be classified as a regional identity. If, on the other hand, the subnational identity is incompatible with having a national identity, the identity is national. For instance, many Basques believe that you cannot be both Basque and
Spanish at the same time, just like you cannot be both German and French at the same time. It is important to realise that this is a scale, so that there is a continuum of possibilities between identifying only with the region and identifying only with the nation. The distinction between a strong regional identity and a minority national identity can therefore be relatively blurred, and different people within an area may classify this as a region or as a nation, depending on the strength of their own identification with the area. This is the case for instance in Catalonia, where some Catalanists define themselves as “only Catalan”, and hence as nationalists, whilst others define themselves as “both Catalan and Spanish”, and hence as regionalists.

1.1.3 Regionalism

Whilst one may identify more with some people than others, these differences do not always translate into political action. A group identity is only politicised when it affects our judgments on political issues and our decisions about how to act politically (for whom to vote, for instance). This can be used to define regionalism: It is the politicisation of regional identity. Regionalists frame political issues with a basis in their regional identity, deeming the regional population to have certain common interests that they should advance as a group. This usually falls into one of two categories: Promoting the economic development of the region, or preserving a cultural identity that has become threatened by cultural standardisation (Rokkan and Urwin 1982:4).

This can often be achieved more effectively if the region is allowed more autonomy on internal matters. Regionalists therefore want to strengthen the regional layer of government through increasing the political and/or economic autonomy of the region within the national constitutional framework. They also tend to focus on the distribution of wealth and public expenditure between territories rather than between functional groups. The distribution between socio-economic groups within the region, for instance, is subordinated to the good of the region as a whole, as the various groups are considered to be cooperating for the common good.

---

5 At the most, you can be half German and half French, whereas there is no need for such qualifiers for a person who is both (100 %) Bavarian and (100 %) German.
If you may or may not be able to choose whether to have a regional identity, you do have to choose whether or not to be a regionalist. Working to promote a region entails action, and any action is the result of choice. You can, indeed you must, choose whether or not you will work to promote your region. Because it is a matter of choice, any explanation of regionalism must take into account the reasons for that choice. A cause of regionalism can only be a cause insofar as it affects the choice of whether or not to be a regionalist. It is therefore not only relevant, but completely necessary to consider the incentives for taking political action on behalf of a particular region.

1.2 Theoretical framework

Having established the definitions of the main terms, the next question is what makes regionalism and regional identities occur. Indeed, this will be the main topic of this thesis. Several theories on why regionalism grows and declines across time, and why some regions are more regionalist than others, will be presented in the next chapter. However, this section discusses the broader theoretical framework into which these theories all fit. It portrays how the political mechanisms of regionalism work and why it exists at all.

1.2.1 Centres and peripheries

Classic theories of state- and nation-building are based around the centre-periphery model, which was presented already some of the earliest known critical history books, such as the *Muqaddimah* by Ibn Khaldûn (1967:128ff, first published 1377). It later became one of the cornerstones of the modernisation theory paradigm in the 1960s, where the centre was often seen as the modernising force, bringing liberal values, democracy and capitalism to the traditional, backwards societies in the periphery (Randall and Theobald 1998:45). In the model, an elite of state-builders in the centre occupies surrounding territories and gains military control over them. These peripheries are then integrated into the administrative and economic system of the centre, as the states try to extract resources through taxation and to control trading patterns, limiting external trade and encouraging internal trade. Finally the population in the peripheries becomes loyal to the centre through a process of cultural assimilation during the nation-building phase. This view can be found for instance in Deutsch (1966) and in Almond and Powell (1966).
Lipset and Rokkan's (1967) ideas represent a modification of this picture, and have been popular among later writers. Their argument is also based on the centre-periphery model, but it accords a greater role to the periphery. In Lipset and Rokkan's model, the centre still attempts to gain control over the periphery in the political, economic and cultural spheres through the processes of state- and nation-building. However, the peripheries try to fight this colonisation by the centre and defend their own economic and cultural interests. Protests from the peripheries can focus on economic, political or cultural issues, and the structure of these protests is what shapes the cleavage structures and party systems of the states. In Lipset and Rokkan's view, the peripheries are not reactionary opponents of everything that is modern. On the contrary, they see democratisation and redistribution as the results of peripheral opposition to pressures from the centre. The periphery gains influence on the policy-making in the centre and a share of the spoils of economic production as a trade-off for surrendering to the political and economic dominance of the centre (Rokkan 1975:570ff).

In this perspective, regionalism is a natural reaction to the expansion of central authority. The peripheries react to the establishment of the state, and the dominance of its administrative and economic systems (Rokkan and Urwin 1983). The peripheries react in different ways against these efforts at colonisation, and the relationships between centre and periphery are thus shaped in different ways within individual states and regions. Keating (1998:27) sees territorial identities as being reforged during the establishment and consolidation of modern states. The patterns of territorial identity are formed by various crucial events in the history of the modern world, such as religious revival movements, local languages, literary revivals, economic developments and wars. All of these have different effects across the territories of the states, leading to internal differentiation and thus a potential for territorial mobilisation (Keating 1998:27). These kinds of theories are very useful in generating a general theory of what regionalism is all about. However, when it comes to growth or decline in regionalism over time, they can mainly explain why regionalism would grow during periods of fundamental expansions of the role of the state. On the other hand, changes that have occurred during shorter time periods after the end of the state-building era cannot be completely explained by these models. The mechanisms that make peripheries rebel against centres therefore needs to be further explained and they need to consider developments in the region proper as well as in the centre. Chapter 2 will present a number of such theories that seek to explain when and why peripheries might choose to rebel even if there is no dramatic expansion of central authority.
As an example of when fundamental changes in the role of the state have created the conditions for regionalism, the emergence of a welfare state in the late 19th and early 20th centuries can provide an illustrative example. For instance, the importance of preserving distinctive local cultures and languages grew with the establishment of national education systems. Such systems inevitably promote the culture of the centre, and if there are significantly different cultures in other regions, this can produce strains in the relationship between these regions and the central state. Issues of language and religion are especially crucial in this regard. The early 20th century saw an upsurge in regionalist and nationalist movements related to this matter. As the problem was resolved, however, the authority of the central state was restored and reinforced. The protest movements of the 1970s brought newfound legitimacy for regional and local cultures and languages, and this helped to create fertile ground for regionalist movements aimed at protecting local cultures from the expansion of the central state. This can include languages and dialects, minority religions and dissenter groups, local customs and traditions, and even a more abstract conception of a regional way of life. The crucial point is that the people in the region are aware of the factors that distinguish their culture from the central one (Vilar 1963:75, cited in Mény 1986:10).

1.2.2 Elites and masses

When political scientists discuss centres occupying and colonising, and peripheries opposing and fighting, these are all examples of actions. This raises the question of who acts, because centres and peripheries are obviously not single entities. They are groups of people, and in the case of the peripheries, these groups are only loosely organised, if at all. Thus, it is clear that peripheries cannot act. Centres are often organised as modern states, and therefore they do have mechanisms for action. Still, this action is instigated by individuals, within centres as well as peripheries. When researchers talk about centres and peripheries acting, and about regions who act, they are therefore actually referring to individuals acting on their behalf.

These individuals are called elites. Elites can be defined as people who have power within a society (Etzioni-Halevy 1993:19). In a region, this usually includes the political leadership of the region, the upper echelons of the regional administration, as well as the most influential business executives and academics in the region. These regional elites have the potential to
make rational and strategic decisions, influencing the direction of the regional political and economic development.

However, this does not mean that masses are completely powerless. Indeed, much of this thesis will focus on the mass level. For instance, indicators of public opinion in the regions will play a crucial role in the operationalisation of regionalism. The opinions of the masses are important because they determine what elites can and cannot do. This is most obviously the case when it comes to elections of the political leadership, but even between elections, elites do consider the opinions of the mass public when making decisions. If the opinions of the masses influence the actions of the elites, though, elites have an even bigger impact on the opinions of the masses (Etzioni-Halevy 1993:24). Public opinion can therefore in many ways be seen as a reflection of the balance of power between rival elite groups.

When faced with the expansion of central authority presented in the centre-periphery theory, the elites in the periphery logically have two major options: Resistance or cooperation. Central elites will often attempt to co-opt the peripheral elites, offering them positions and influence in the centre in return for the integration of the periphery into the centre. Alternatively, the peripheral elites can attempt to mobilise the masses in the periphery in opposition against the expansion of the centre. Both of these strategies will usually be present in any given region, as some elites ally with the centre, whereas others attempt to crush this alliance. The crucial aspect for the development of regionalism is where the balance of power between these two groups is struck.

When it comes to the mobilisation of the masses, elites will often seek to foment a common sense of regional identity that will ensure the continuous support and motivation of the masses in the struggle against the centre. In this way, regionalism can be used by local elites as a strategy towards their ends. They will try to promote the cultural and economic traits that distinguish the periphery from the centre, and rewrite the history of the periphery in the same way that nation-builders do. After all, it is not the differentiation factors that are crucial, but rather the consciousness of these factors (Vilar 1963:75, cited in Mény 1986:10). If the population in the periphery speaks a different language or share a different ethnicity from the centre, the opposition often takes on the form of ethnic conflicts or claims to national self-

---

6 This also means that the region is not a fixed entity. Its area has to be defined by the regionalist movement, and can be based around historical, geographical or administrative entities (Smouts 1998).
determination. However, even if the population of the periphery do not claim to constitute a nation, and merely seek to protect their own cultural traditions or economic interests, the same mechanisms are still at play. Keating (1988:8ff) shows how nationalist and regionalist movements can be difficult to distinguish because they fulfil the same function in many ways. In his view, both are “rational responses to the growth of the modern state and can only be understood as such” (Keating 1988:vii).

Explaining regionalism in this sense still leaves one major question to answer: Under which circumstances will the elites in the periphery choose to ally with the centre, and under which circumstances will they ally with the masses in the periphery? Furthermore, when will they want to change allies, thereby causing an upswing in regionalism? This thesis will argue that the outcome hinges on how dependent the region is on the central state. If the region has a lot of resources at its disposal, it will be more likely that the elites will oppose the expansion of the centre and attempt to control these resources themselves. On the other hand, regions that are dependent on the central state will more easily be colonised.

1.2.3 Bottom-up

Focusing on the behaviour of elites and masses within the region automatically puts the spotlight on the processes taking place within the regions themselves. It does indeed seem intuitive to study the processes within regions when seeking to explain why regionalism occurs, and it is completely impossible to explain variation between different regions without considering the developments within each of them. Yet, it is too common in the study of regionalism for the focus to be placed elsewhere. As will be discussed in the next chapter, the European Union has become a focal point for studies of regionalism, and many researchers seek the explanations for regionalism in the processes that take place at this level. Others focus primarily on the national level.

This study will focus explicitly on the developments within the regions themselves, thus adopting a bottom-up perspective on regionalism. This approach will enable it to explain why some regions deviate from the national norm, and why there is variation across different regions within the EU. Whilst developments outside the regions will be considered as explanatory variables, the focus will remain on the extent to which the regions have been affected by these influences, and on the response that they have elicited within the regions.
By focusing on the regional level itself, it is possible to get beyond sweeping generalisations about universal developments in European regions and on to a study of why some regions are mobilised and others are not, and why there are changes in the levels of regionalism across time within individual regions.

1.3 Research design

This study takes a broad perspective on regionalism. It seeks to explore whether some factors can affect regionalism regardless of context. Thus, it needs to explain why regionalism varies across both time and space. In order to achieve this, it is necessary to use a research design that makes it possible to approach the question from as many angles as possible. Therefore, this study uses a nested analysis design that combines a longitudinal and a cross-sectional analysis, and both quantitative and qualitative research methods.

1.3.1 Longitudinal and cross-sectional

All studies in the social sciences are comparative in some sense. Either, they compare across several different units (individuals, regions, states) at a fixed time-point in a cross-sectional design, or they compare within a fixed unit across an extended period of time in a longitudinal design. This is also true of most studies that seek to explain regionalism. Most focus on a single region and look for the explanation for the development of regionalism in the particular historical development of that region. However, a few choose a cross-sectional design instead, explaining why regionalism is more widespread in some regions than it is in others.

The main problem with comparing either across time or across space is that some variables do not actually vary a lot across time, whilst others do not vary a lot across space. For instance, there may not be a lot of variation in the degree to which different regions within a single state are embedded in the global economy, yet all of these regions can have experienced a massive growth in globalisation across time. Conversely, the ethnicity of a region is unlikely to change dramatically across time, yet the difference in ethnic composition can be substantial even between neighbouring regions.
This study seeks explanations for variations in the levels of regionalism across both time and space. Hence, it is necessary to bridge the gap between longitudinal and cross-sectional research designs. The study is therefore composed of two parts. The first part is a cross-sectional study across all EU regions, using four surveys from the 1990s and 2000s, and it will examine which variables are most useful in explaining variation in the levels of regionalism across space. The second part tracks the growth of regionalism in two particular regions across forty years, and it will analyse which variables can best explain variation across time. The lessons from both parts are then drawn together in an attempt to find generic factors that can be used to explain variation in regionalism across both time and space, and which therefore appear to cause regionalism.

For the purposes of analysing hypotheses about the causes of regionalism, there are clear methodological benefits to employing this combination of cross-sectional survey data and longitudinal content analysis in the operationalisation of regionalism. The twinning of research designs makes it possible to test the same hypotheses using two radically different methods, which will validate each other if their conclusions correspond. The triangulation of research methods combines the in-depth knowledge that a case study produces with the universality of a large-N study, and the instant picture of a cross-sectional study with the sequential nature of a longitudinal one. The different operationalisations of regionalism will also support one another to create confidence in the reliability and validity of the measures.

1.3.2 Quantitative and qualitative

Another classic divide in the social sciences is between scholars favouring quantitative and those favouring qualitative research methods. In the field of regionalism, qualitative methods have tended to dominate, although there are some exceptions (van Houten 2003; Martínez-Herrera 2005; Marks 1999). Interviews, analyses of policy documents and historiographic accounts are the most common tools for researchers in this field. One reason for this might be the lack of quantitative data available on the regional level, as most surveys are still conducted on the national level.

This study will rely on both quantitative and qualitative methods in its quest for the causes of regionalism. The cross-sectional study will rely exclusively on a quantitative, large-N regression analysis, but the longitudinal part of the thesis will combine quantitative indicators
with a qualitative interpretation of the causes of regionalism within each of the two case studies.

This triangulation of methods is useful in furthering knowledge. In this perspective, the quantitative study is used to establish which relationships exist between the independent variables and regionalism and how strong these relationships are. These findings are carried through to the qualitative study, where the dynamics of the relationships can be examined more closely. The quantitative study establishes what to look for in the qualitative study, which can then be used to address questions such as why and how these factors influence levels of regionalism.

1.3.3 Nested analysis

The decision to combine cross-sectional, large-N analysis with longitudinal case studies still leaves the question of how the various strands of the analysis can be combined most fruitfully. As Lieberman (2005) argues, not all mixed strategies are productive, and there are few guides for how methods should be mixed. Lieberman proposes a nested analysis approach, which this analysis follows to some extent. The idea behind nested analysis is that the large-N analysis should inform the approach to the case studies, with the aim of the case studies depending on the results of the large-N analysis. If the large-N analysis yields robust and satisfactory results, the aim of the case studies is to test the model developed in the large-N analysis. If the results are not robust, the case studies should aim at model-building (Lieberman 2005:437).

However, the approach in this study deviates from Lieberman’s proposals when it comes to case selection. A key aspect of Lieberman’s proposal is that the selection of cases should be made on the basis of their residuals in the large-N analysis, i.e. whether they are poorly or well explained by the model. There are three reasons for ignoring these suggestions in this case. Firstly, the aim of the case studies is to assess the potential of the model in explaining variations in the levels of regionalism across time, which requires a focus on regions where things have actually changed through the period studied. The large-N analysis focuses on a single time-point, and does not provide any information on the circumstances at any earlier or later dates. Secondly, some of the data points in the large-N analysis are relatively uncertain for individual regions, making them less useful as foundations for case selection. This is
particularly true for the dependent variable itself. The error terms are simply too large to make any solid claims about whether a particular region is on or off the regression line.

Thirdly, the theoretical foundation for selecting only cases which are well-explained by the model in a model-testing exercise seems questionable, as it is hard to see how the model could be refuted under such circumstances.

Instead, the cases analysed in the longitudinal part of this thesis will be selected in order to maximise their variation across time on the independent variables in the model derived from the cross-sectional analysis. The large-N analysis will develop a regression model of the main predictors of regionalism across space, and this model will be tested in two longitudinal studies of cases where the independent variables in the model is known or expected to vary substantially across time. The main aim of the case studies is to examine whether the development of regionalism across time conforms to the predictions that can be made on the basis of the regression model. It should be noted that the case selection aims mainly at ensuring variation within each region across time, rather than maximising variation across the two cases. This reflects the subsequent analysis of the two cases, which also aims at explaining variation across time in each case, rather than comparing across the two cases.

1.4 Main findings

This thesis will argue that regionalism is partly based on rational calculation of the costs and benefits of mobilising on a regional basis. The economic circumstances of a region play an important part in determining whether people will mobilise on a regional basis, and levels of regionalism can therefore vary across time as the region’s economic situation changes. This will be shown primarily through the relationship between economic development and regionalism, which this thesis will demonstrate both theoretically and empirically across time and space. However, it is also reflected in the relationship between regionalism and other economic factors, such as globalisation and European integration. Even the relationship between regionalism and the regional party system suggests a larger role for rationality in the explanation of regionalism than that usually afforded by theories which focus on cultural differences as the crucial explanation for regionalism.

The cross-sectional analysis explains variation in levels of regionalism across Western European regions. The study finds that a highly distinctive regional party system and a high
level of economic development are the two factors most likely to lead to regionalism, along with cultural and geographical variables such as having a regional language or not bordering the national capital. European integration also appears to be positively correlated with regionalism, whilst the effect of globalisation is less clear in the cross-sectional analysis.

The longitudinal analysis tests the model in order to examine how well it is capable of predicting variation in regionalism across time in two selected case studies, Scotland and Rogaland. The study finds a close association between economic development and regionalism across time in both case studies, leading to the conclusion that there is causal relationship between prosperity and regionalism. None of the other variables were as strongly associated to regionalism in both case studies, although European integration clearly played a part in the mobilisation of Scottish regionalism (or, more appropriately, nationalism) in the 1990s.

1.5 Chapter structure

The next chapter examines various factors that have been forwarded as explanations of variation in the levels of regionalism across time or space in the existing literature. The chapter focuses mainly on the variables covered by the new regionalism literature, i.e. globalisation and European integration, as well as on party systems and economic development, developing hypotheses that can be examined in the later empirical analysis. For each of these phenomena, its connection with regionalism is critically assessed, with the focus being on why and how they would affect regionalism. A key aim is to get beyond the cultural explanations of regionalism, which have been covered thoroughly by the existing literature, in order to examine which other variables have an effect on regionalism, in addition to culture.

The theories are then examined in the form of a cross-sectional, quantitative analysis. As part of this process, chapter 3 develops an operational definition of regionalism that can be applied across a large number of Western European regions. The operationalisation is based on the Moreno index, comparing respondents’ attachment to their regions with their attachment to their states. The chapter discusses the reliability and validity of this operationalisation, before presenting a range of descriptive data on the distribution of
regionalism across the regions covered in the set. The data is drawn from four separate Eurobarometer surveys conducted between 1991 and 2002.

Chapter 4 continues the cross-sectional analysis by operationalising the independent variables presented in chapter 2, and presenting descriptive data on each of them. The independent variables are used to develop a regression model of the causes of regionalism, which reveals the effect that each of the independent variables has on regionalism. The model shows that levels of regionalism are significantly higher in economically developed regions with distinctive party systems, and in regions which are closely integrated into the European Union. The impact of globalisation is less clear.

The model is taken forward to a set of longitudinal case studies that examine to what extent it can also explain variations in the levels of regionalism across time. In chapter 5, Scotland in the United Kingdom and Rogaland in Norway are presented as the two case studies, and the rationale for this decision is made clear. After introducing the two regions, the chapter presents data on their development across the period from the 1960s to the 2000s along each of the independent variables included in the regionalism model. This information can then be used to predict how regionalism will have developed over the same period, on the basis of the model.

The predictions are compared to the actual development of regionalism across time in the two regions in chapter 6. The chapter explores a range of indicators on the levels of regionalism at various time-points for each region, attempting to accurately describe the variation across time. In the case of Scotland, data from surveys, referenda and nationalist voting contribute to a fairly precise picture of the path of regionalism across time. A quantitative content analysis of two Scottish newspapers is also conducted, yielding similar results, and this method of analysis is carried forward to the study of Rogaland, where less data is available. The chapter concludes by comparing the actual development trajectory of regionalism with the predictions made at the end of chapter 5. The comparison shows that economic development was particularly successful in predicting the changes across time in Scotland and Rogaland, while globalisation and European integration were also broadly correlated with regionalism in the direction that the model predicted.
In chapter 7, the specific connections between regionalism and each of the independent variables are discussed. The impact of each variable is assessed for each of the case studies on the basis of a qualitative analysis of newspaper content and election manifestos, as well as secondary literature. The aim is to show how and why the variable may have had an effect on the levels of regionalism in the region. A large part of the chapter is devoted to the impact of economic development, as this variable was shown to have an effect in both of the case studies, as well as in the cross-sectional study.

Chapter 8 compares the findings from all of the empirical chapters in order to determine how important each of the theoretical factors is in explaining regionalism on a more general level. Comparisons across the two case studies, as well as information from the cross-sectional study, are used to establish the circumstances under which each variable affects regionalism, as well as which theoretical connections appear most plausible.
2. How to Explain Regionalism

This chapter will examine different theories about the causes of regionalism and the mobilisation of regional identities. Four variables that have been connected to regionalism in the existing literature will then be treated in separate sections: Globalisation, European integration, regional party systems and economic development. The discussion will highlight various aspects of the theoretical reasoning behind the connection between each of these variables and regionalism.

When inquiring into the causes of regionalism, it is important that the motivations of the actors involved are kept in mind. We need to ask why the people living in a certain region want more political autonomy for their region. Although elites may consider political power a goal in its own right, this aim – by itself – is unlikely to convince many ordinary people of the merits of a regionalist agenda. Power is an instrument, and people want power because they want to use it for some purpose. It is not self-evident in every case what this purpose might be, nor are a region’s interests necessarily best served by regional autonomy. We must therefore consider the end goals of a regionalist movement. These usually fall into two categories: Promoting the economic development of a region, or preserving a cultural and/or national identity that has become threatened by cultural standardisation (Rokkan and Urwin 1982:4). Whilst both of these rationales are usually found to some extent in every regionalist movement, there is a lot of variation with regard to how much emphasis is put on each.

The defence of cultural identity has been explored in depth in the literature on minority nationalisms and ethnic mobilisation, and it seems clear that regionalism is more prevalent wherever there is a distinct language, ethnicity or culture. Regions that have retained separate ethnic or national identities have demanded political self-determination as they have not accepted the legitimacy of a central state dominated by a rival ethnic group. The mobilisation of regions is thus construed as the battle of stateless nations for equal political rights with state-bearing nations. Looking at the European political landscape, this looks like a reasonable interpretation. Demands for devolution or independence have indeed been stronger in areas where most people define themselves as belonging to a stateless nation –
witness for instance the dissolution of Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union and the Czech Republic, or the regionalist movements in Spain and Belgium. Yet, these culturalist theories cannot appropriately explain why there is change over time in the levels of regionalism, both in general and in specific regions. While it is clear that culture and ethnicity are by no means immutable and objectively occurring phenomena, they still do not tend to change very quickly. The maintenance of ethnic boundaries is based at least on an idea of longevity, and it does not seem credible that these ethnic and cultural differences should have suddenly appeared at some point in the early 1970s, when regionalism started becoming a widespread phenomenon in Western Europe.7

As well as focusing on culture, it is necessary to consider the possibility that regionalism may be a more calculated political development than these culturalist theories suggest. It may be the case that regional political elites try to politicise the idea of the region when the region stands to gain something from it, and it may also be the case that regional publics mobilise on a regional basis when this is beneficial for the region. In this sense, regionalism may be based on a much more rational process than what is commonly assumed, and it may be a political movement that is set in motion when the circumstances of the region change.

For instance, the economic circumstances of a region may change profoundly over a fairly short period of time, and this can have important consequences for society. However, the economic and political causes of regionalism have not been explored to the same extent as the cultural ones, and more research is needed to explain how such factors can cause variation in regionalism across time and space. Various factors have been identified as possible causes of regionalism, ranging from globalisation and European integration to economic development, but it is not completely clear how these affect regionalism. This chapter discusses different economic and political variables that may be expected to cause regionalism on the basis of the existing literature in this field of research.

2.1 Globalisation

As technological developments have marched on, the world has gradually become smaller. Inventions such as the postal service, the radio, telegraph and telephone, television and the

---

7 For an alternative view, see Kuran (1998).
Internet have made it easier to communicate with people across long distances. Developments in boats, trains, cars and aviation, along with the construction of ever more roads and airports, have shortened travel times. This has made people, as well as goods and services, more mobile, and the global economy has become increasingly integrated. Arguably, the world has also become more integrated culturally, as cultural symbols and codes are increasingly shared by people across national boundaries. These changes, which can be labelled globalisation, have had wide-ranging effects on social and political systems, and they have also been connected to regionalism by several authors.

### 2.1.1 Capital and labour mobility

Taken together, the developments outlined above have led to a diminishing importance of territory in economic affairs. Globalisation certainly entails the weakening of states, as they are no longer able to control the economy to the extent that they used to in the face of increasingly mobile goods, services and labour. Some have even proclaimed that states are no longer meaningful units of economic activity (Ohmae 1995). This can be seen in a number of ways: The increase in international trade, the growth of transnational companies and other international organisations, and the establishment of international economic regimes through the GATT, and later WTO, agreements, as well as the Bretton Woods institutions.

The reduced importance of territory in economic affairs has led many to proclaim the end of territory in politics as well (Keating 1998:2). It is argued that a new, international, political space will arise to replace the existing variety of parallel national political spaces. As national borders lose their importance as boundaries for communication and trade, they will also lose their importance as boundaries for political debate. Public opinion and political cleavages will become international in nature, and political movements will encompass people of different nationalities. This will lead to a change of focus for masses and elites alike. Nation-states will no longer have any function, and they will disappear in favour of international governing bodies.

So far, these predictions have by and large failed to materialise. Instead of a diminishing importance of territory, we have to some extent seen a trend towards reterritorialisation of economic affairs (Keating 1999a:74, Brenner 1999a). By some accounts, territory is made even more important by globalisation. Scott and Storper (2003) argue that regional economic
specialisation has intensified as a result of globalisation, and that national economic
development will be even more geographically concentrated in the future.

Keating (1998:137) points to several factors linked to territory that continues to matter to
businesses: Businesses are more likely to set up industry in regions where the labour force is
skilled and flexible, and where there is a high degree of technological development. The
physical infrastructure also matters, and a high quality natural and built environment can be
an important pull factor, as can the presence of a network of complementary industries that
can act as suppliers or buyers. Cultural and political factors in the form of public institutions,
norms, values and social contexts also come into play. Even in purely intellectual activities
with no transport costs, the importance of interpersonal relationships and face-to-face contact
courage geographical proximity (Leamer and Storper 2001, Sonn and Storper 2003). Thus,
the sources of competitiveness are “embedded within territorially localized production
complexes […] which provide firms with place-specific clusters of non-substitutable
locational assets” (Brenner 2002:14), such as labour, technology and infrastructure.

However, there has been a change in the nature of territorialisation. This has led researchers
(notably Ohmae 1995, Scott 1998) as well as practitioners to consider regions the new
territorial economic units. Nation-states have lost the sovereign authority they once aspired
to, and sub-national units have in many cases established themselves as a new form of
territorial economic units. States are no longer regarded as the all-encompassing, all-
important political units (Brenner 1999b). Rather, regions and cities have assumed newfound
prominence as the cores of a new regionalism that sees the region as a unified actor
competing with other regions to attract inwards investment and promote economic

This creates an increasing emphasis on being proactive in the pursuit of regional economic
development. The new paradigm of regional economic development is therefore radically
different from old types of state-led top-down regional development policies. Today, regional
development is seen as the result of efforts originating in the region proper, and regions have
mobilised in order to generate economic development bottom-up. This has involved a
coalition between regional governments, local business interests, political parties and trade
unions, cutting across socio-economic cleavages to promote the interests of the region. This
territorial realignment is potentially an important factor in explaining the growth of regionalism across time.

In the new regionalist model, territory has assumed the position that class used to have as the basis for political cooperation and mobilisation (Mény 1986:3). Keating (1998:140) distinguishes between old and new paradigms of regional development based on this development. According to him, competition over the distribution of wealth within a region characterises the old model of regional development. This has largely given way to a system of competition between regions for the wealth of the nation. Classes cooperate within the region to promote the development of the entire region, as class solidarity has given way to territorial solidarity.

Although most regions are affected by these processes to some extent, there are still substantial differences in the degree to which regions are exposed to competition from other regions, depending on the mobility of the major industries, as well as levels of exports and foreign investments. Regions will also differ in their awareness of this competition, which is a necessary condition for globalisation to have any impact on regionalism. This awareness should be reflected in the creation or strengthening of institutions aimed at promoting the regional economy, which we would expect to see immediately preceding the growth in regionalism if these theories are correct.

The different effects of globalisation are also reflected in the various ways in which regions respond to their new role. Keating (1998:157ff) develops a typology of regional development strategies based on who takes part in the coalition that seeks to support economic development. The economic position of a region is an important structuring factor in determining which strategy a region will choose. Economically strong regions are likely to opt for a bourgeois regionalist strategy, with co-operation between local business elites and regional governments and agencies. Economic competitiveness, productivity and technology are the main focuses in this strategy, and distribution is left to trickle down. Underdeveloped regions are more likely to opt for the “sweatshop economy”, trying to attract businesses with cheap labour and few environmental and labour market regulations. The third model is the social democratic project, where competitive development is combined with redistribution. Organised labour and social movements play an important part in this coalition, along with businesses and government. Development is focused on employment generation and
investments in education. The final model is the nation-building project, which is an option available for regions aspiring to some form of national self-determination. In this model, regional economic development is regarded more as an instrument in the nation-building project than as an aim in its own right.

2.1.2 Glocalism

Whilst these economic connections between globalisation and regionalism have featured prominently in the regionalism literature, there are also some works in the globalisation literature that consider a more cultural impact of globalisation. Here, cultural consequences of globalisation, such as homogenisation, are considered to elicit a defensive response on the regional level, as people increasingly mobilise their local and regional identities in order to protect them from the threat of disappearance in a globally homogeneous culture.

Friedman (2000) is among the major proponents of this connection between globalisation and regionalism. In his view, the world can be interpreted as a struggle between the urge to modernise, symbolised by the robotised production of the Japanese car Lexus, and the need to belong, symbolised by the olive tree. As Friedman notes, “[o]live trees are important. They represent everything that roots us, anchors us, identifies us and locates us in this world – whether it be belonging to a family, a community, a tribe, a nation, a religion or, most of all, a place called home” (Friedman 2000:31). As modernisation in the form of technological progress has brought an increasingly global economy, our sense of belonging come under pressure. This necessitates a response, which Friedman calls “glocalism”. Consequently, in order to protect their culture and roots, people mobilise their regional and local identities.

Castells (1997) also sees territorial identities as essentially a defence mechanism against the pressures of globalisation, which leaves “people with no other choice than either to surrender or to react on the basis of the most immediate source of self-recognition and autonomous organization: their locality” (Castells 1997:61). In his view, the effect of globalisation is mainly to individualise, or even atomise, society, as local networks are increasingly eroded. This individuality makes some people feel insecure, and collective identities represent a “defensive reaction against the impositions of global disorder and uncontrollable, fast-paced change” (Castells 1997:64).
2.2 European integration

Another popular explanation of regionalism focuses on the effects of European integration. This is partly connected to the globalisation argument, as the EU economy may be considered a concentrated microcosm of the global world economy. Internationalisation of economic activities, as measured for instance by the volume of international trade, have been stronger between the EU member states than almost anywhere else in the world, and national markets have lost importance with the development of the common market. However, regionalism is also partly conceived as the result of a conscious political effort to strengthen the regions, with supranational institutions – notably the Commission – encouraging regions to mobilise in order to put pressure on the states from above and below (Bullmann 1997; Rokkan and Urwin 1982).

In terms of the centre-periphery model discussed in chapter 1, this can be interpreted as pressures from a new European centre in Brussels, turning the national capitals into European peripheries. This change of roles for the historical centres has left them vulnerable to pressures from below. As the states lose their extractive, distributive and homogenising capacities, regions get more room for manoeuvre. They now have the opportunity to redefine their economical and cultural position vis-à-vis the centre. Businesses in the periphery can choose to trade across borders instead of with the national centre. Identities become more fluent as people shift between a national, European, and regional identity. Through contact with people from neighbouring states, one may learn that the cultural cleavages are not as large as one had previously thought, and one may even find more in common with people from neighbouring regions in other states than with people from other regions in the same state. In this way, regional identities may be strengthened by the growing integration between European states.

2.2.1 Trade and the single market

In the economic sphere, the EU contributes to regionalism through providing a particular set of institutions, most notably the common market, that may serve as an alternative to the institutions of the nation-state and decrease peripheral regions’ dependence on the national centre. The states have lost control over their internal markets due to the integration into a single European market. No longer are all of the resources in a state controlled from the
centre, and no longer do the borders of the state constitute natural boundaries for economic activity. Instead, goods, services, labour and capital move freely across borders throughout the European Economic Area.

This is certainly important for regions where secession is a potential strategy. Dardanelli (2005a:141) argues that the single market can reduce the costs of secession for regions, as the EU would guarantee continued access to markets across the European Economic Area. This can reduce the fears of regional businesses that often produce for markets elsewhere in the state. However, reducing the costs of secession is likely to have an impact even in regions where it is not considered a valid option. By reducing the dependence of regions upon their respective states, European integration has improved the bargaining power of the regions, thus making it more likely that regionalism will grow.

Alesina, Spolaore and Wacziarg (2000) make a similar argument with reference to global economic integration, arguing that the size of the political unit no longer matters when restrictions to trade are removed. Smaller economies can more easily succeed in an open economy, where the size of the domestic market is irrelevant as producers have access to large external markets anyway. This makes secession a more viable option for regions. Indeed, as world markets have become increasingly open, the number of states in the world has also grown correspondingly, and hence the average state has become smaller (Alesina, Spolaore and Wacziarg 2000). Based on the same theoretical framework, Sorens (2004) demonstrates a connection between globalisation and support for secessionist political parties. While global markets are still far from open, the EU does present the same opportunities to regions within its boundaries, as the size of the economy makes little difference when there are no restrictions to trade within the EU. Birch (1978:335) also argues that the development of supranational organisations has cancelled out the economic advantages of large states.

This is reinforced by the direct support that the EU provides for some peripheral regions through structural funds, further decreasing their dependence on the state. Institutions create incentives for certain types of action that can be impossible to ignore for individual actors if they are sufficiently strong. This is arguably true in the case of the structural funds. Regional policies in the EU take the form of subsidies for poorer regions through the structural funds, through which the regions can gain direct access to EU funding. This creates powerful
incentives to mobilise in order to improve the region’s capacity to successfully manage the funds, as well as to increase the volume of transfers to the region. This pull should be especially strong among those regions that have a realistic chance of getting access to the structural funds, and it could be manifested in the form of establishing direct regional representation in Brussels through the paradiplomatic regional information offices. However, Marks, Nielsen, Ray and Salk (1996) have tested this hypothesis, and found that there is no relationship between pull-factors and regional representation in Brussels.

Two different empirical predictions can be drawn from this framework. The first is that regionalism will grow as people come to see the EU as an alternative framework to the nation-state. One would therefore expect to see a correlation between support for European integration and regionalism. The second is that there will be a growth in regionalism when regions benefit economically from European integration, and this would suggest a correlation between structural funds income and regionalism.

2.2.2 Multi-level governance

Politically, authority is also sifting away from the national capitals and towards the decision-making organs in Brussels. Within Brussels, it is the supranational organs, representing the Union as a whole, that secure an ever-stronger position. This includes the Commission, the Parliament, the European Court of Justice, and the European Central Bank (Hix 1999:327ff, Pierson 1998). In turn, these supranational institutions – notably the Commission – have been encouraging regions to mobilise, assisted by other europhile political forces. Loughlin (1996) argues that regionalist and European federalist ideologies historically have much in common. Many regionalists were European federalists, and many federalists were regionalists. This owes to the fact that both ideologies opposed the authority of the traditional nation-state (Loughlin 1996:142).

Within the framework of the European Union, supranational and regional institutions have therefore been important allies. Supra- and sub-state institutions have reinforced each other and put pressure on the states to delegate authority upwards and downwards in the political system (Rokkan and Urwin 1982). Bullmann (1997) shows how pressures on the nation-states from above have restricted their capacities to manage regional disparities within their borders. The regions have exploited this situation to establish themselves as an actor in their
own right on the European stage (Bullmann 1997:10). Through the creation of the Committee of the Regions and the opening of numerous regional information offices, the regions have emerged as important policy-influencing forces in the EU. This development has been encouraged by supranational institutions such as the Commission, eager to promote ever-deeper integration through reducing the influence of the non-federal organs (Loughlin 1996:154).

Wolczuk (2002) has shown how the development of an institutional culture within the EU has also had a diffusion effect on the countries in Eastern Europe. The requirements for a regional level of government in all member countries, along with the ideology of a Europe of the Regions, created powerful pressures for regionalisation in the efforts to “Europeanise” Eastern Europe. This also gave regional movements legitimacy to push forward with their claims (Wolczuk 2002:203f). The same logic is probably at play to some extent in other non-member states in Europe as well. The dominance of the EU countries in trade and geopolitics places a premium on adopting similar institutional arrangements even in non-member states.

The Commission also has another, more functional, reason to support the regions. The Commission is an institution of limited resources and wide jurisdiction. The main source of information about local issues is therefore the member states, and this creates a risk of bias in the information that Commissioners receive. The regional information offices have therefore been welcomed as alternative sources of information, providing a different perspective from the member states. This increases the independence and the political weight of the Commission, and reduces its dependence on the member states (Marks et.al 1996:186f). This has important consequences for regions, and the opportunities for paradiplomatic activities have brought a new dimension to regionalism (Keating 1999b:14).

The political pressure line of reasoning is theoretically attractive because it establishes a number of identifiable actors with a rational interest in promoting regionalism. It has therefore been popular in the literature, and many recent publications on regionalism pick up this theme in some form or another (e.g. Keating and Hughes 2003, Dosenrode and Halkier 2004, Sturm and Dieringer 2005, Hudson 2005, Kettunen and Kungla 2005).
2.2.3 European identity

One major asset for the states in relation to sub-state regions is the symbols of nationalism. An important ambition of the European project has been to counteract the effects of nation-building in the member states by creating an overarching European identity. This has seen the introduction of the European flag, a European hymn, and a common European currency. By challenging national identities, the EU aims to reduce the resilience of nation-states. The growth in European identity has been shown by several authors in recent years (Bruter 2005, Risse 2005, Lutz, Kritzinger and Skirbekk 2006). The EU institutions have been instrumental in creating a mass European identity over the last thirty years. In particular, the Schengen area and the Euro currency have recently contributed to the construction of a common European identity, but the introduction of common European symbols has also had an impact on popular identification. Although the study shows that citizens mainly hold a civic conception of European identity, there is also an element of cultural identification with Europe (Bruter 2005:166ff).

This may cause problems for national solidarity in the form of increasing tendencies of regions to focus on their own economic development as opposed to that of the entire nation. It may also cause increasing cultural differences within the nation-states, which may reinforce the tendencies towards regionalism. Increased geographical mobility has also brought people of different nationalities together, thereby helping to break down the barriers between them.

2.3 Party systems

Political parties and the competition between them have been a popular focus for political scientists working in a number of different areas, particularly within the various strands of new institutionalism. The dynamics of party competition can also be used to explain mobilisation of regionalism, above all in regions where the regional party system differs markedly from the national party system. In such regions, conflicts between the regional and national governments can serve as a basis for regional mobilisation, and diverging political preferences might be a powerful incentive for desiring regionalisation of power.
The terms “regional party system” and “regional voting” refer to the system of party competition within a region, whether the competition takes place in the context of regional or national elections. This reflects the strong connection between votes cast in elections for regional and national parliaments in most Western European regions, and elections in one arena often mirror political developments in the other. However, the mechanisms through which regional voting is likely to affect regionalism are different in the context of regional and national elections, and the discussion therefore needs to distinguish between these two types of election.

2.3.1 Regional elections

From the perspective of individual parties, regional voting can take two different forms. Parties can be either more or less successful in a particular region than in the country as a whole. In any given region, some of the parties will win a higher share of the regional vote than their countrywide share, whilst others will win a lower share of the vote. However, these differences usually become important only when the variation is large enough to produce a different majority or a different governing coalition on the regional than on the national level. In most countries with regional governments, some regions are run by a national opposition party. This can lead to a political dynamic between the regional and national government that is conducive to regionalism.

National opposition parties that are in position on the regional level have strong incentives to support the transfer of powers to the regional level in order to increase their power. These incentives grow with the security of the party’s position in the region and decrease with the strength of their position on the national level. If the minority party in a two-party system wins a majority in a particular region in every single election and loses all the elections on the national level by a clear margin, regionalisation of power might be their only realistic prospect for political influence. Such a party would have strong incentives to attempt to mobilise the regional public in favour of devolution. Assuming that political parties are not merely vote-seeking reflections of public opinion, but rather manage to influence the
electorate through promoting their political programmes, it is likely that these attempts will encourage a growth of regionalism in the region.

Developments in several democracies in Western Europe during the 1980s and 1990s support the hypothesis that opposition parties tend to favour regionalisation of power. Hopkin (2003:229) notes that Italy and Spain in the 1970s, France in the 1980s, and the United Kingdom in the 1980s and 1990s are examples of countries where national opposition parties have supported devolution, and later implemented it when they came into power. On a similar note, Ashford (1982:2) claims that “urging structural change is most often the argument of oppositions”, while governing parties rarely want to risk upsetting the party organisation through territorial restructuring. Even traditionally centralist parties can be compelled to support regionalisation when they dominate regional politics with few prospects of winning power at the central level, as witnessed for instance in the case of the Galician regional branch of the Spanish Partido Popular in the 1980s (Schrijver 2005:282).

Regional government by national opposition parties is also amenable to blame games. Regional politicians can reap rewards for their party on both the regional and national level through blaming the national government for any failures of regional policy or any grievances that the electorate may have. We might label this “vertical diffusion of responsibility” (McGraw 1990:121). Blame games became even more important during the welfare state retrenchment of the 1980s and 1990s, as blame avoidance strategies were crucial in the face of the high political costs associated with cutbacks in welfare (Pierson 1996). If the regional government convince the electorate that the national government is actually at fault, resentment towards the central state might start to grow, and people will be more likely to support regionalisation of power.

2.3.2 National elections

As opposed to regional elections, the effect of regional voting in national elections is mainly related to the parties that win a lower share of the regional vote than their countrywide share. Specifically, regionalism can be affected by the lack of support for large national parties that have spent a lot of time in office. If the party governing the central state is unpopular in a particular region, opposition towards it might lead to opposition to the central state as such.

9 Or through setting the agenda for political discussion (Riker 1993).
This could lead voters who feel that they are not represented by the central government to become opponents of the political system, in particular if the party stays in government for an extended period of time.

Opposition towards a political party that is dominant on the central level might also create incentives to regionalise political power. If the population of a territory consistently holds diverging political preferences to that of the majority central state population, regionalisation of power might be the only way in which these people can implement their preferred policies. From a rational voter perspective, one might even say that the most compelling argument for wanting to devolve powers to a regional government is if the regional government would pursue a policy programme that was closer to the voter’s preferences than that of a national government. If there is no difference between the policies of the regional and national governments, devolution of power would be pointless from a rationalist perspective, as the output would remain the same (Alesina and Spolaore 1997; Bolton and Roland 1997). Devolution would then be purely a question of economic efficiency.

2.3.3 Regional and national parties

From a territorial perspective, parties competing in a regional party system can be classified into two categories: Regional and national parties. While national parties claim to represent the entire population of the state, regional parties associate themselves with a territorially defined subgroup of the population. Although not a defining property, regional parties tend to propose candidates for elections only in the region or regions with which they are associated, while national parties compete in elections across most or all of the state. Regional party systems can involve competition between various regional parties, between regional and national parties, or between various national parties.

By their very nature, regional parties represent the politicisation of the regional level. They are necessarily based on a belief that the inhabitants of the region share certain common interests that benefit from being organised into a party political organisation. As such, regional parties are themselves symptoms of regionalism, at least among their supporters, and

---

10 Regional parties can be distinguished between those who accept the legitimacy of the larger nation-state, and those who “deny the national character of the entire state territory” (Lancaster and Lewis-Beck 1989:33). In the case of the latter group, the link to regionalism or regional nationalism is explicit. However, the former group also rely on a certain level of identification with the region and a sense of a common regional political purpose.
the level of support for regional parties could be seen as an indication of the level of
regionalism in the region. Regional parties themselves obviously try to convince more people
to become regionalist in order to improve their own electoral appeal, and to the extent that
they are successful, they could and should be seen as causes of regionalism. However, there
would be no market for a regional party if there was not at least some sense of common
interests or common purpose in the regional population a priori, and an increase in
regionalism due to an external cause would be likely to improve the appeal of the regional
party without the party in itself acting as the cause of regionalism. In this thesis, the support
for regional parties will therefore mainly be treated as an indication of levels of regionalism,
rather than as a cause thereof.

Whilst the existence of regional parties is mainly an indication of regionalism, the direction
of causality is reversed when it comes to the relationship between national parties and
regionalism. For the reasons outlined in the preceding two sections, it is useful to see
variations in the support for national parties across regions as factors that can cause
regionalism. Conversely, the support for national parties in a region is less affected by
regionalism than by a wide range of other factors. Individual characteristics that structure
people’s vote, such as income, education, occupation and age, are unevenly distributed across
different regions, and this accounts for a large proportion of the variation across regions in
the support for political parties. Indeed, some studies have even indicated that the variation
across regions is fully explained by the distribution of social and economic characteristics,
and that the regions themselves do not matter as such (McAllister and Studlar 1992:175).
However, later studies have revealed that voters do tend to evaluate how government policies
affect their regional economies, even beyond considering the effects on their personal
economies (Pattie and Johnston 1995).

Still, regionalism does appear to play a minor part in explaining regional voting patterns in
most regions, compared to factors such as average levels of income, the proportion of people
working in different sectors of the economy, and religiosity. Regional parties obviously
influence regional vote distinctiveness insofar as their very presence causes the voting
patterns to diverge from the national voting pattern. However, most regions do not have any
significant regional parties, and other mechanisms explain voting patterns in these regions.
Hearl, Budge and Pearson’s (1996) study suggests that unemployment and employment in
agriculture are crucial factors in explaining regional vote distinctiveness across most
countries in Western Europe. As most regional party systems are made up predominantly of national parties, this variable will be treated mainly as a potential explanatory variable in relation to regionalism in this study.

2.4 Internal colonialism

The internal colonialism school is responsible for bringing the relationship between economic development and regional identities into focus in the regional sciences. Notably, Lafont’s (1967) work on the regionalist revolution in France introduced the notion of a colonial relationship between centre and periphery within the metropolitan state. He portrays this relationship as one of exploitation, and goes on to establish a theory of regional mobilisation that has much in common with Marxist revolutionary theory. The theory is based on the proposition that the centre and the peripheries have different roles in the national economy. Economic power is based in the centre, and the role of the peripheries is essentially to provide the metropolis with raw materials. This leads to national differentiation, as the peripheries will usually specialize in only a few primary commodities or raw materials (Hechter 1975:30). Because of the exploitative nature of the relationship between core and periphery, they will never integrate economically or culturally, and the discriminated workers in the periphery will instead develop a sense of solidarity based on their shared position in the national economy. This paves the way for the development of a common identity in opposition to the powers that be in the centre, and the masses in the peripheries will revolt against the centre through revolution. This rebellion will be strongest in the most economically deprived regions, where the grievances are most acute, and the theory therefore proposes that regionalism will be stronger in poorer regions.

The internal colonialism argument can be seen as an application of the Frankian dependency theory paradigm (Frank 1967) to domestic politics. Hechter (1975:31) is explicit in establishing this theoretical connection. He claims that the colonial type of dependent development is not only found in overseas colonies. The relationship between core and periphery within a state works in exactly the same way. The peripheries are dominated by the metropolitan economy, and their function is essentially to provide the metropolis with raw materials. This leads the peripheries to specialize in only a few primary commodities or raw materials (Hechter 1975:30).
Given the similarities of their economic and political positions, Hechter argues that it is not unreasonable to expect the same social and political developments to take place in overseas and internal colonies. As the colonies in the Americas and Africa rebelled against the metropolis to claim independence, Hechter expects the same to happen in the internal colonies. The increased contact between the two will only lead to “a malintegration established on terms increasingly regarded as unjust and illegitimate” (Hechter 1975:34). This creates fertile space for the growth of regionalist movements in the peripheries.

However, as Keating (1988:12) points out, there is little empirical evidence that regionalism is actually more common in poor regions. On the contrary, rich regions tend to exhibit the stronger regionalist tendencies. There are also some theoretical weaknesses that hurt the argument of the writers in this school. One major problem is that the one-dimensional vilification of the centre as exploiters of the peripheries is far too simplistic. The peripheries gain as well as lose from their relationship with national centres, and although the centres may extract resources from the peripheries, they also aid their economies in many ways. The idea of a single economic centre where all meaningful economic activity takes place is also out of touch with the polycephalic reality of many modern states, as economic production is often spread across the territory, and does not necessarily coincide with the political centres.

2.5 Prosperity and regionalism

Indeed, the dispersion of production and the associated emergence of prosperous peripheral regions in many countries suggest that researchers should consider exactly the opposite relationship between regionalism and economic growth to that forwarded by the internal colonialists. Despite the empirical difficulties of the internal colonialism argument, its juxtaposition – that economic growth can be conducive to regionalism – has only rarely been developed into some sort of coherent theoretical argument. Keating (1988) touches on the subject in his critique of internal colonialism, stating that economically developed regions have tended to display stronger signs of regionalism. However, he never attempts to address the question of why this may be the case, or what the connections between economic development and regionalism may be. Considering that the theories around the effects of economic globalisation on regionalism are so developed, it is even more puzzling that so few writers have taken up this theme.
Rather than looking at economic development as a cause of regionalism, existing literature has to a large extent tended to focus on the reverse relationship, with regionalism contributing to economic growth. Much of this literature has its basis in Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti’s (1993) seminal study of civic culture and modernisation in Italy, where they forward social capital as a crucial cause of economic growth. Building on this conclusion, Keating, Loughlin and Deschouwer (2003) have argued that a common regional identity is crucial in creating the conditions for social cooperation and collective action necessary for economic development. Similarly, Leonardi’s (1990:21) study of Tuscany claimed that regional identity was crucial to building an institutional network that fostered economic development in the region. Later studies by Leonardi (1998:252) and Amin and Thrift (1994) have argued for the importance of institutions in regional economic development.

However, this study proposes focusing on the reverse side of this relationship, examining whether economic development might indeed be conducive to regionalism. So far, it is only the notion that direct fiscal incentives might cause regional publics to favour decentralisation or political autonomy that has received any attention at all from researchers. Yet, it does seem likely that economically advanced regions will exhibit regionalist tendencies. This is partly related to the strength of their bargaining positions. Economically successful regions are less dependent on the central state and better equipped to succeed on their own. However, in addition to the direct fiscal incentives, richer regions are also likely to desire a degree of political power that matches their economic importance within the state, which can be another incentive for politicising the region. A sense of economic power can even boost a sense of self-esteem that can justify such demands in the minds of the public. Finally, economic development can strengthen the cultural expressions of a region, which in turn provides an imagery on which regionalism can draw.

\[11 \text{ In their study, trust and cooperation are presented as the key reasons for civic culture’s effect on economic performance. These values are built up through social interaction. As people interact, they become confident that other people will not free ride. This builds trust, which ensures further cooperation, hence facilitating collective action. Thereby, the classic failures of market economies, such as the tragedy of the commons, are avoided, and the economy functions better. In other words, the more people interact, the better their region will perform economically (Putnam et al. 1993:167).}\]
2.5.1 Fiscal incentives

Most obviously, there is a direct fiscal incentive to demand economic and political decentralisation. Control over economic activities is one of the most important features of the central state. Indeed, one of the defining characteristics of a modern state is its monopoly of tax collection (Schumpeter 1961). Tax collection means economic capital is extracted from the territory, and redistributed among all the regions in a state. Whereas relatively poor regions benefit from transfers from the central state, the richer regions lose from this arrangement. This is likely to become a source of frustration in these regions, as they feel that they are paying heavily and getting little in return. Their populations may believe that their standard of living would be better if they did not have to fund the poorer regions of the state, and this can lead to demands for keeping more of the wealth locally. Acquiring regional control over tax collection would entail greater economic wealth for these regions.

This perspective has been developed into a rational-choice model of regional policies by Persson and Tabellini (2000), who argue that the economic calculations of the median voter in the region are crucial to whether regionalism will develop or not. These calculations need to consider the costs of transfers to other regions in terms of taxes, but also the benefits from public expenditure in the region itself. A region that is more prosperous than the national average might still benefit from receiving a higher share of government expenditure than other regions, and thus have no fiscal incentives to desire greater autonomy. A third factor that needs to be considered is the potential cost of setting up new regional institutions, which would add to the tax burden of the median voter. Finally, the relative distribution of resources on the regional and state level matters. If resources are distributed more evenly in the region than in the state, the regional median voter is likely to be richer than the national median voter, and he would therefore be expected to favour a lower tax rate. These differences in political preferences can be a powerful incentive to desire more political autonomy (Persson and Tabellini 2000:132ff).

A similar model is presented by Bolton and Roland (1997), who place more emphasis on the income distribution factor. They argue that different preferences over redistribution of resources are the foundation of decisions to separate. These can be traced back to differences in the distribution of income across the regions. An implication of this is that poorer regions might also desire political autonomy if it would lead to a different political leadership with
different redistributionary policies. Buchanan and Faith (1987) have developed another closely related version of this argument. Similarly, Bookman (1993:115) argues that grievances over the input/output balance can be a prime cause of regionalism in any region, rich or poor. While rich regions can claim that they are contributing too much, as outlined above, poor regions can blame their lack of development on the scarcity of public investments in the region. Indeed, he finds that economic considerations play a part in most of the 37 secessionist regions that he studies. However, Dion (1996) argues that while economic growth improves public confidence in secession, it also reduces grievances against the current political situation. The public may fear that changes in the political status of the region will have negative effects on the economy.

Gold (2003:7) suggests that the increased competition between regions brought about by globalisation provides a further incentive for regionalism in prosperous regions. In the battle to remain competitive and attract businesses, wealthy regions can no longer afford to subsidise poorer regions. If they were free of the responsibility of subsidising the poorer regions, they could redirect public funds to projects that would make them more competitive, such as infrastructure. This makes the option of increased autonomy or secession even more attractive. Zürn and Lange (1999:5) make a similar point, coining the term “welfare regionalism” to describe this mechanism.

The economic issue was at the core when Slovenia seceded from Yugoslavia in 1990-91, sparking the disintegration of the Yugoslav state. According to one observer, “many Slovenes felt that their economically productive republic [...] was contributing an unnecessarily high price for the operation of the federation” (Cohen 1993:59). Even though only 8 percent of the population lived in Slovenia, the republic contributed more than 25 percent of the federal budget of Yugoslavia. This was a source of frustration, which was exacerbated when economic difficulties hit the Balkans in the 1980s. A considerable majority of the population wanted to loosen the economic ties with the rest of the country, and in particular, they did not want to subsidise the poorer regions in the south of Yugoslavia. This led the political leaders of Slovenia to promote a system of asymmetrical federalism, and eventually to declare independence when it became clear that this could not be achieved (Cohen 1993).

The effect of prosperity is likely to be especially strong where it is the result of natural resource endowments. In such cases, local elites have an added incentive to mobilise the
population on a regionalist agenda in order to get control over the natural resources in the region. This is especially true where states claim ownership over the natural resources within its territory, and allow property rights and production rights over such resources to individuals and companies only at its own discretion. If the region is rich in resources, assuming regional control over those resources would be a potential source of revenue, as the spoils would not have to be shared with the rest of the country.

Among the natural resources, petroleum holds a special position in the contemporary world economy. Oil and gas are the most important sources of energy in the modern industrial world, and this has made them the most valuable natural resources. On top of this, the export controls of the main producers have contributed to keeping prices far above market clearing levels, allowing for even larger potential earnings. The value of these resources is likely to lead to regionalism in regions producing them, as the regions try to get control over local resources and keep more of the wealth in the region.

At least three other factors make petroleum regions especially likely to develop regionalist discourses. Firstly, when petroleum is discovered in an area, it is usually developed extremely quickly. The discovery of petroleum produces an economic shock that is strongly concentrated in the region. Keating (1998:27) touches on the capacity of economic shocks to cause political changes and new identities. He cites de la Granja’s (1995, cited in Keating 1998:27) account of Basque history as an example of this. Economic shocks are important because they are instantly noticed by the local population, and thus help to create an awareness of wealth in the area. This boosts regional self-esteem and pride. They also create a distinctive economy in the region, as the shock is concentrated in one particular area and does not affect neighbouring regions to the same extent. This makes it easier to define the region and to distinguish it from other regions in the state.

Whilst the boom leads to a rapid increase in the economic importance of the region in the national economy, the political importance of the region is likely to lag behind. This discrepancy between economic and political weight can be a source of frustration and lead to demands for status and political influence that matches the importance of the region in economic terms.
Secondly, petroleum requires a lot of technological expertise and a lot of capital that the newly established oil producer is unlikely to possess (Karl 1997). In the early stages, the state therefore depends on foreign companies and skilled labour to extract the petroleum. This leads to extensive immigration of foreigners to the region, making its demographic composition diverge from the rest of the country. This makes it easier to establish the cultural distinctiveness that regionalism thrives on. In addition to having a different type of immigrants than other regions, the influx of foreign skilled labour is also likely to affect the culture of the local population through social contact.

Finally, the market for petroleum is global, and hardly any other sector is as embedded in the global economy as the petroleum industry. This is also connected to the capital intensive and technologically demanding nature of the industry. The effects of globalisation are therefore likely to arrive in full strength in petroleum regions. Their economy is different from the national one, and this makes the region the most meaningful unit of economic activities and planning. In addition, they have to compete with other petroleum regions to attract investments and businesses.

**2.5.2 Economic centrality, political peripherality**

There is also a psychological effect of relative economic growth. When the periphery becomes economically more powerful than the centre, why should it be content to remain a periphery? On the contrary, we should expect prosperous peripheries to demand a more central position in political and cultural affairs, to match their economic power. These regions are also in a position to put power behind their demands, as they are less dependent on the central state and better equipped to succeed on their own (Treisman 1997:220). Economically advanced regions will therefore be more likely to exhibit regionalist tendencies.

Gourevitch (1979) presented a similar explanation for the occurrence of peripheral nationalism. He focused on whether the political leadership and economic core of a country coincided, noting that peripheral nationalism occurs when the political capital is in economic decline. However, he argued that this would only affect regions with “ethnic potential” in the form of a distinct language, institutions or historical traditions (Gourevitch 1979, see also Laitin 1991:144). Yet, from a more recent perspective, regions vying for political power in the EU are classified as having “a consciousness rooted in affluence, not in cultural identity”
This applies for instance to Baden-Württemberg and Rhône-Alpes – two of the self-proclaimed “Four Motors for Europe”.

This argument has been forwarded by Luis Moreno in the context of Catalan and Basque nationalism. In his words, both Catalan and Basque nationalism “could be seen as political manifestations of a vigorous and prosperous periphery, which contrasted with the inept and parasitical centralism of the Spanish state to which it was subordinated” (Moreno 2001:52), and this incongruity is key to understanding the territorial conflicts in the country. Although a distinct language and history was the foundation of Catalan nationalism, these cultural differences were politicised because of “the paradox that a politically subordinate territory of Spain had become the most vital centre of economic progress” (Moreno 2001:84). This non-congruence between political and economic powers [...] has traditionally nourished the centrifugal tendencies present in modern Spanish history” (Moreno 2002:399).

Similarly, this issue was famously exploited during Lega Nord’s rise to fame in Northern Italy. Although many political and economic factors combined to pave the way for Lega Nord, the region’s economic prosperity was definitely among the most crucial. According to Torpey, the hard-core supporters of the party were of the opinion that “northerners are good because they are wealthier and more valuable to society, while southerners are bad because they are economic losers” (Torpey 1994:314). The party also exploited the fiscal incentives argument above, seeking to convey to the electorate that the southern parts of the country were freeloaders, living off subsidies from the richer North. Consequently, the people in the north would be better off if they were to gain more autonomy or even secede from the Italian state (Bull and Gilbert 2001:14). The electoral success of the party shows that these sentiments resonated with large sections of the population in Northern Italy. Notably, the party’s strongholds are Lombardia and Veneto, two of the richest regions in the North.

2.5.3 Economic development and regional culture

In addition to affecting the politicisation of identity, economic growth can have an indirect effect on the development of the regional identity itself. In a growing economy, people are wealthier and have more money to spend on funding the popular culture sector. Successful businesses may for instance fund regional arts projects, allowing the cultural scene to develop. This may be important in order to attract human capital to the region, and hence
improve the labour pool for the businesses operating in the region. Political elites may devote public resources towards culture for the same reason, but they may also use this consciously in a bid to promote regionalism. In turn, successful regional cultural exports can reinforce the regional identity through making the identity itself as well as regional languages or dialects seem more attractive. The regional identity is reframed as forward-looking and successful, rather than as a relic of a distant past.

Several interpretations of the resurgence of Catalan nationalism in the late 19th century emphasize the link between economics, culture and nationalism. Catalonia was the first Spanish region to industrialise, and it was far more developed economically than the central areas of the country. Both McRoberts (2001:17) and Hargreaves (2000) argue that the economic resurgence around 1800 lay at the foundation of the revival (the so-called 

\textit{Renaixença}) of Catalan culture from the 1830s. The growth of Catalan literature, art and music subsequently sparked the creation of Catalan as a written language. This led directly to the political nationalism of the 1880s (Hargreaves 2000:24), with the indigenous language at the heart of Catalan identity (McRoberts 2001:139).

\subsection*{2.6 Conclusion}

This survey of the literature has shown that the main focus of regionalism scholars in recent years has been on globalisation and European integration. This is understandable as both of these themes are fashionable in modern political science, and it seems reasonable to expect both phenomena to be linked to regionalism. These two independent variables have been well-developed and there are a lot of empirical studies covering their various effects on the construction and development of regionalism.

However, the concentration on these two phenomena has led to other factors being overlooked. This is unfortunate, as neither globalisation nor European integration can provide a complete explanation of the development of regionalism. For instance, they are both inherently more suited to explaining variation across time than across space. In order to arrive at a fuller understanding of the causes of regionalism, it is necessary to expand one’s focus and consider other explanatory variables as well.
One such factor is economic growth, which has not been covered extensively in the literature. Several writers touch on the subject, but few have developed this into a coherent theory, and even fewer have examined the relationship empirically. Therefore, it is unclear what effect economic growth might have on regionalism, as well as through which mechanisms the two variables might affect each other. This study seeks to bridge this gap in the literature and examine the relationship between economic development and regionalism across time and space in order to produce empirical data on the effects of economic growth on regionalism.

The following chapters will attempt to operationalise these theories on regionalism and examine the effects of each of the variables on regionalism in Western Europe. A quantitative analysis in chapter 4 will focus on the extent to which each of these variables can explain the variation in levels of regionalism across different European regions. Subsequently, a longitudinal analysis of how regionalism has changed across time in two particular regions, Scotland and Rogaland, will examine the extent to which they can explain variation across time.
3. Reliable Measurement across Western Europe

The fundamental question in the development of a research design is how the hypotheses discussed in the literature review can be tested. In approaching this question, it is crucial to find a way to measure levels of regionalism within different regions. After all, it is impossible to explain why regionalism is more widespread in some areas than in others without knowing which regions do actually manage to mobilise their populations. Equally, it is impossible to explain why regionalism grows or decreases over time without knowing at what times regionalism is strong or weak. So far, little work has been done on the question of how regionalism should be measured, and there is therefore not a lot of data on the phenomenon. Most studies of regionalism focus on the strength of regional identities in certain regions, and explanations are usually informed by idiosyncratic developments in the history of these regions. Without data and a method for testing the theories, we cannot determine whether the findings are generalisable and reliable. For the field to progress, it needs theories that seek to explain the varying degrees of regionalism across different regions, as well as over time.

This chapter develops an operational measure of regionalism that can be applied across a large number of European regions, and it proceeds to use the Eurobarometer survey series to create a data set showing the distribution of regionalism across thirteen Western European countries. The measure is based on a set of questions covering popular feelings of attachment towards regions and countries. Once the reliability and validity of the measure has been established, the chapter presents some descriptive data on estimated levels of regionalism in a selection of European regions for illustrative purposes.

3.1 Defining the unit

The introduction to this thesis raised the question of defining the concept of a region, and it proposed dealing mainly with sub-state administrative units. When it comes to a cross-sectional quantitative analysis of regions in different countries, there are even further complications. Even focusing on political regions leaves a heterogeneous bunch of units. Among the European Union member states, there are hardly two states that have identical meso-level administration structures. The variations span from textbook federal structures in
Germany and Austria, via the complex asymmetrical federal, quasi-federal or regionalised 
systems of Belgium, Spain and Italy to a variety of regional government structures in unitary 
states. These range from multi-layered systems such as the nations and counties in the UK, 
and the régions and départements in France, to the simpler Swedish and Dutch systems. 
Finally, Luxembourg arguably constitutes a region with the status of a nation-state. In terms 
of size, regions range from almost 18 million inhabitants in North Rhine-Westphalia (more 
than many EU member states) to only 26,000 in tiny Leitrim County, Ireland.

The NUTS scheme does offer a system for classifying these regions. However, it groups 
together regions that have completely different functions, even to the extent of manufacturing 
regions for the purposes of statistical comparison. For instance, the NUTS 1 level includes 
some regions which can be straightforwardly classified as regions, including all the German 
Länder as well as some of the Italian and Spanish regions. In other countries, the NUTS 1 
regions are fabrications that have no roots on the local level. The Netherlands is crudely 
divided into North, East, South and West, and the same is true in England, Norway and parts 
of France and Spain. It hardly makes sense to classify these as regions, let alone to speak of 
any sense of regional identity towards them. There is no sub-national authority governing the 
“South West and South East England” region, indeed you would probably be hard pressed to 
find someone who even knows that such a region exists. Finally, Denmark, Greece, 
Luxembourg and Portugal do not even have any regions on the NUTS 1 level.

The NUTS 2 level is more useful, as it includes the meso-level regional authorities in most 
countries. In France, the Netherlands, Italy, Spain, Portugal and Norway the main units of 
regional governance are included on the NUTS 2 level. However, the German NUTS 2 
regions are groups of municipalities within each Land, so in this case it would make more 
sense to stick with NUTS 1 regions. Elsewhere, Ireland ends up with county conglomerates 
such as “Mid West (Limerick/Clare/Tipperary North Riding)” and “Midlands 
(Westmeath/Roscommon/Longford/Laois/Offaly)”, which can hardly be classified as regions. 
There is a similar problem in some areas of the UK and with some of the Danish regions, 
with “Sjælland Lolland-Falster Bornholm” suffering the worst transgression.

The best way to proceed seems to be by defining regions according to regional government 
structures, and to settle for NUTS 2 regions in most cases. However, NUTS 1 regions are 
obviously more appropriate in Germany, and Denmark and Luxembourg should be excluded
from the analysis on the grounds that they do not have any meaningful regions on the two highest NUTS levels. Ireland should probably also be excluded, as its historic provinces (Ulster, Connaught, Munster and Leinster), which are regarded as NUTS 1 regions, are hardly relevant outside the realm of sports\textsuperscript{12} (Loughlin 1997:152).

3.2 Surveying regionalism

As mentioned in the introductory chapter, most previous studies have taken a qualitative approach to the study of regionalism. As a result, a lot is known about the political dynamics of regionalist movements in individual regions. The literature can explain how these movements develop, what their political aims are, and what kind of institutions they usually set up, and why. However, when it comes to explaining the differences between regions where such movements are prominent, and regions where they are not, there is still a lot of work to be done. Existing studies can explain why regionalism has developed in particular regions, but they tend not to be able to produce generalisable theories on why regionalism is more prominent in some regions than in others. In order to achieve this, a more quantitative approach is needed.

There are some exceptions to the general rule that regionalism is studied qualitatively. For instance, van Houten (2003) presents a cross-sectional study of demands for regional autonomy in Europe, where he covers 83 regions in six countries. This study focuses on the demands of political elites, developing an index on the basis of two dimensions: Firstly, whether the political actors who demand autonomy form an opposition within the region or whether they are part of the regional government. Secondly, the level of political autonomy that these actors demand, focusing on whether they seek only spending powers, or taxing powers as well. In this way, regions where there are demands for autonomy can be classified on a scale from one to three.

This is a useful indicator when it comes to distinguishing between varying levels of regionalism in regions where there are demands for political autonomy. However, most regions in Western Europe do not have political elites demanding autonomy, and the majority of the regions would therefore score zero on this measure. Even though there are likely to be

\textsuperscript{12} With the obvious exception of Ulster.
substantial variation in levels of regionalism across regions where no important political actors demand autonomy, the indicator has no potential to measure such variation. Consequently, it is not able to provide information on the full variation in regionalism at the lower end of the spectrum.

In another study, Gordin (2001) focuses on the support for regionalist political parties in his analysis of 12 ethnoregionalist parties, adapting a Boolean analysis. However, as the low number of units in this study indicates, such parties are only present in a limited number of regions, and it is therefore not possible to study regionalism on a broader scale with this indicator. Brancati (2007) uses a similar dependent variable, but she increases the number of observations through using individual elections as the units in her analysis. In this way, she is able to analyse the variation in voting for regional parties across a large number of elections in 37 countries, twelve of which are in Western Europe.

Similarly, Sorens (2004) studies secessionist party vote share in fifteen regions (thirteen of which are in Western Europe) across 123 elections. The aim of his study is to examine the factors behind longitudinal variation in support for secessionist parties, rather than to explain secessionism as such, and he therefore limits his analysis to regions that have had secessionist parties across a twenty-year time frame. In a more recent study, Sorens extends his analysis to cover all regions in what he defines as well-established democracies with significant regional differentiation, while keeping the same indicator for his dependent variable (Sorens 2005). This leaves 431 regions, most of which do not have any secessionist parties.

While the above-mentioned authors present reliable models that explain variation in the support for regional, ethnoregionalist and secessionist parties, there are still problems with using these indicators as measures of regionalism. Regionalist mobilisation takes different forms across regions and only rarely involves the construction of regionalist political parties. Instead of forming a political party, regionalists may mobilise through regional branches of the national parties or even outside party politics. Furthermore, the regionalist parties themselves are not directly comparable across different regions. Their political profiles vary

---

13 Boolean analysis is a fusion of quantitative and qualitative methods, where the information (be it quantitative or qualitative) that the researcher has on each case for a given variable is coded as either 1 ("yes") or 0 ("no"). This allows for a formal process of generalising the findings through assessing whether each independent variable — or "condition" — is causally related to the dependent variable — or outcome — and if so, whether it is either a necessary or a sufficient condition in order to produce a given outcome. See Ragin (1987) for further information.
across several dimensions, from extremists to moderates, left-wingers to right-wingers, and catch-all parties to fringe groups. As a consequence, there may be substantial variations in the extent to which they attract non-regionalist voters. Similarly, regionalists may vote for non-regionalist parties in varying numbers depending on the profiles of the other parties in the political system as well as of the regionalist parties themselves.

There are several other quantitative studies of various aspects of secessionism and territorial conflict. Many of these are related to the Minorities at Risk (MAR) project. MAR indicators on anti-regime rebellion and intercommunal conflict have been used in several studies (Gurr 1993, Brancati 2006, Saxton and Benson 2006, Tranchant 2007), and they can be interpreted as indicators of regionalist conflicts to the extent that the movements are geographically concentrated. On the basis of the same data set, Walter (2006) analyses a dichotomous dependent variable covering the presence of an armed self-determination movement in an ethnic group. The indicators of group collective interests, which measure grievances over a range of political, economic and cultural issues among ethnic groups, have also been used in some studies (Fox 1999, 2001).

However, it would be highly problematic to use these indicators in a study of regionalism in Western Europe, where violent conflicts over territorial politics have been fairly rare and the vast majority of regionalist movements use peaceful, democratic means. Furthermore, it is not necessarily the case that levels of regionalism are higher in the regions that have the most violent regionalist movements. The Minority at Risk data set does therefore not seem particularly useful for the purposes of studying regionalism in Western Europe.

In order to overcome the limitations of existing quantitative indicators, it would be desirable to develop an operationalisation of regionalism that allowed for variation within the large group of regions with lower levels of regionalism. Survey data presents an opportunity to achieve this. This also has the benefit that it can capture attitudes towards regionalism at the mass level directly.

There are some studies that measure regionalism on the basis of survey data. Most of these have been based on surveys conducted in individual regions. However, the Eurobarometer series have included questions on regional identities at irregular intervals, presenting an opportunity to study variations in regionalism across a large number of regions. Between
1980 and 2003, four Eurobarometer surveys asked such questions, and this chapter will use data from all of these in order to develop a measure of regionalism. The four studies were conducted in 1991, 1995, 2000 and 2002. The chapter will combine data from all four surveys into an average measure of regionalism across the period. This means that it will not be possible to trace the evolution of regionalism across time at this stage of the analysis, but this approach will maximise the number of respondents from each region (and hence minimising the error term), which will strengthen the comparison across regions.

This still leaves the question of how to operationalise regionalism with the use of survey data. Existing surveys present two main possibilities, namely looking at absolute levels of regional identity, or at levels of regional identity relative to state identity. The following section discusses the merits of each of these approaches.

### 3.2.1 The Moreno question

In the search for a viable operational definition of regionalism, existing studies are a natural first port of call. There are several surveys that seek to measure levels of regionalism in individual regions, mostly where there are strong demands for political autonomy. In Spain, the Centro de Estudios de la Realidad Social carried out monthly national surveys between 1991 and 1995, and these are used by Moreno, Arriba and Serrano (1998) in their study of Catalan regionalism, as well as in Maiz and Losada’s (2000) study of Galician regionalism from 1984 to 1992. These surveys use the so-called Moreno question, which is a bi-polar scale asking respondents to compare their attachment to the regional community with their attachment to the state community. Respondents are given five answer options, for instance (in the case of Catalonia):

1. Catalan, not Spanish
2. More Catalan than Spanish
3. Equally Catalan and Spanish
4. More Spanish than Catalan
5. Spanish, not Catalan

The Moreno question is also used in studies of Scottish identity, for instance by Brown, McCrone and Paterson (1998), who create a time series from 1986 to 1997 by combining four
different surveys, all of which included the Moreno question. Similarly, De Winter and Frognier (1999) use the Moreno question in their study of Walloon regional identity from 1975 to 1996.

The Moreno question remains the most popular measure of regionalism for individual regions, but unfortunately, surveys that include it have only been carried out in a few regions. There are therefore few studies that attempt to use the Moreno question in a cross-sectional design. The above-mentioned study by Moreno, Arriba and Serrano (1998) does compare Catalonia with other Spanish regions, but it does not stretch beyond the national context. Martínez-Herrera (2005) covers five regions in three different countries, but he uses the Moreno question exclusively to compare the developments across time within each of these five regions and does not compare across the regions. It is therefore necessary to consider which questions are posed on a larger cross-sectional scale, and how these might be used in the study of regionalism.

3.2.2 Eurobarometer

As mentioned above, Eurobarometer have carried out a couple of surveys where regional identities have been explored. As opposed to the bi-polar Moreno question, which asks for relative attachment, Eurobarometer surveys ask respondents to rate their attachment to their region, as well as their town/village, country, the EC and Europe, on an absolute level. Respondents are asked “how attached do you feel to...” for each of these geographical levels, with the answer options “very attached”, “fairly attached”, “not very attached” and “not at all attached”. Compared with the Moreno question, the benefits of the Eurobarometer series is that they cover all regions within the European Union\(^\text{14}\) and they therefore allow for the construction of a much larger data set.

Marks (1999:73) develops an index on the basis of these alternatives, coding the alternatives with values from 1 to 4. Subsequently, he uses the averages as measures of the levels of regional identity, and compares this with levels of local, national and European identity. For these purposes, this approach works well. An alternative approach would be to focus on the proportion of the population who have strong regional ties, i.e. those that one could call

\(^{14}\) Although the set that is used here does not include Northern Ireland, Corsica and the French overseas departments, for which no data was available.
regionalists. These people should classify their attachment to their region in the highest of these categories. With this in mind, another possible operationalisation of the level of regionalism within a region would simply be the percentage of respondents stating that they are “very attached” to their region. For the time being, this will be referred to as the absolute index of regionalism. On both of these measures, regions are converted into the unit of analysis, and the responses of people living in the region are treated as a measure of the degree of regionalism.

However, both of these approaches run into problems because the quantification of attachment levels is highly subjective, and people are therefore not likely to agree on where to draw the difference between “very attached” and “fairly attached”. This has the result that some people state that they are very attached to all sorts of geographical units, whereas others do not consider themselves to be attached to anything at all. Indeed, if we study the relationship between “attachment to region” and “attachment to country”, there is a strong and significant positive correlation between them – a point picked up both by Bruter (2001) and Marks (1999:74) himself, among others.

Furthermore, there is a great deal of variation across different countries and regions with regards to how likely people are to quantify a given attachment as very high or fairly high. Table 3.1 compares the measures proposed through looking at the scores on each index at the statewide level in the 1991 Eurobarometer survey, which can be taken as an example here as this is the survey used by Marks. This study covered the eleven European Community member states at the time, as well as Norway. The first two columns in the table show the average scores on the absolute index and on Marks’ index. The Southern European countries come out on top on both of these indices, whereas Belgium and the Netherlands are among the lowest ranked countries. These findings seem fairly counterintuitive. Belgium has some of the most prominent regionalist movements in Europe, with consistent pressures for autonomy and successful regionalist political parties. Meanwhile, demands for regional autonomy are hardly widespread in Greece and Portugal (except for the islands of Madeira and the Azores), even though the regions hardly have any power at all in these countries at present. The reason for this outcome is that there seems to be a tendency towards stronger

---

15 Examining the indices with reference to statewide figures allows the estimates to be based on a large number of respondents – around 1000 for each state – thus making them substantially more accurate than if regional figures were used as the basis for comparison.
levels of attachment to geographical entities in general among Southern Europeans, whereas the Belgians and Dutch are less likely to quantify their attachment very highly.

Table 3.1: Regionalism index scores for surveyed countries in 1991:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Absolute</th>
<th>Marks’ index</th>
<th>Moreno</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>86.8</td>
<td>Greece 3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>70.5</td>
<td>Spain 3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>69.9</td>
<td>Portugal 3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>66.4</td>
<td>East Germany 3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>61.5</td>
<td>West Germany 3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Germany</td>
<td>60.8</td>
<td>Ireland 3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Germany</td>
<td>59.8</td>
<td>Denmark 3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>54.2</td>
<td>Great Britain 3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>50.8</td>
<td>Italy 3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>50.1</td>
<td>France 3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>46.3</td>
<td>Belgium 3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>40.5</td>
<td>Netherlands 3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>39.6</td>
<td>Average 3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>33.4</td>
<td>Average 3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>56.5</td>
<td>Average 3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. deviation</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>St. deviation 0.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Eurobarometer 36.0 and Marks (1999).

3.2.3 Best of both worlds

The optimal solution therefore seems to be combining the validity of the Moreno question with the data availability of the Eurobarometer series. This can be done by recoding the responses for the questions on respondents’ attachment to their regions and to their countries into a single variable covering their relative attachment to their region vis-à-vis their country. Here, a regionalist is considered to be someone who is more strongly attached to his region than to his country. Respondents who state a higher level of attachment with their region than with their country are classified as primarily regional identifiers16, and the proportion of primarily regional identifiers within a region can be used as the operational definition of the level of regionalism in that region. This measure will henceforth be referred to as the Moreno index. The last column in table 3.1 shows how the states included in the Eurobarometer

16 This would be equivalent to answering “Catalan, not Spanish” or “more Catalan than Spanish” on the Moreno question example in section 3.1.1.
survey rank on the Moreno index. Intuitively, these rankings conform more closely to what we would expect to see than the basic attachment scores on the absolute index\textsuperscript{17}.

The Moreno index suggests that regionalism is most widespread in Germany, Belgium and Spain, which is also where some of the most frequently studied regionalisms in Europe can be found. In Belgium and Spain, there are consistent demands from the regional level for more autonomy, whereas the German regions have been proactive in promoting the regional level in the EU. On this index, regionalism is least important in Greece, Denmark and Ireland. These are all small countries in terms of area, where local governments have been more important than regions as there is hardly room for a regional level between these two layers, and none of these countries have any prominent regionalist movements or political parties. The findings on the Moreno index therefore seem to broadly match the distribution of regionalist demands across Europe. On this basis, we can conclude that the Moreno index appears to be the most appropriate measure of regionalism, and this measure will henceforth be referred to as the “regionalism index”.

3.3 Assessment of the indicator

Whilst the data presented in table 3.1 provide some indication of the reliability and validity of the regionalism index measure, it is also necessary to conduct a more stringent examination of the indicator. Statistical tests of the reliability and validity of the index can determine more objectively whether it is an appropriate measure that can be carried forward into the regression analysis stage of the study.

3.3.1 Reliability

The reliability of the regionalism index can be examined through testing whether the estimates for individual regions are fairly stable across time. Whilst some variation in the levels of regionalism should be expected across the eleven years covered by the four surveys, the estimates should still remain broadly similar across time if the index is reliable. The four surveys can thus be combined to conduct a test-retest of the reliability of the regionalism index.

\textsuperscript{17} It should be noted that the absolute and the Moreno measures of regionalism are not significantly correlated. The Pearson correlation between the Moreno index and the absolute index based on the 1991 survey is actually slightly negative, although less than -0.1, which is far from statistically significant. This indicates that they do not actually measure the same thing, making the matter of which measure should be chosen very important.
index. It does seem likely that this test would underestimate the reliability of the index, given the long time intervals between the surveys, as well as the fact that the respondents are different in each survey. However, conducting a test-retest would still provide a broad indication of the reliability of the measure.

Running a reliability analysis of the four items returns a Cronbach’s Alpha\textsuperscript{18} score of 0.67. This is slightly below the common benchmark of 0.70, but still an encouraging result given the caveats outlined above. The Cronbach’s Alpha also does not offer the opportunity to weight the items by the number of respondents from each region in order to differentiate the regions according to the confidence of their individual estimates, as will be done in the subsequent regression analysis (see appendix B). The variation in the estimates is likely to be larger for regions with few respondents, and the Alpha score would therefore be expected to grow if these regions were given a lower weight coefficient when computing the score. Overall, the test-retest suggests an acceptable level of reliability for the regionalism index.

### 3.3.2 Validity

While it is crucial that the regionalism index is a reliable measure, it is equally important that it is a valid measure, i.e. that it actually measures regionalism. This section examines the connection between the regionalism index and the concept of regionalism, both theoretically and through an empirical test known as the construct validity test.

The operationalisation of the theoretical variable “regionalism” is based on the notion that regionalism is closely related to a preference for regional identification vis-à-vis state identification. People who identify more closely with the region than with the state are likely to favour vesting more power in the regional level of government than in the central level, as they regard the regional public to be a more appropriate demos. This assumption is based on two ideas: Firstly, a democracy requires agreement on the definition of the demos (Linz and Stepan 1996:26), or on the body of people who make decisions and for whom decisions are made. Secondly, the contemporary definition of the demos tends to be based on a sense of community or common identity (Gellner 1983).

\textsuperscript{18} Cronbach’s Alpha is a function of the number of test items and the average inter-correlation among them. It can be regarded as an expression of how similar the four distributions are to each other. An Alpha score of 1 would mean that all four distributions are perfectly correlated.
When the people of a region regard the state-wide demos as inappropriate for deciding over a policy area that affects the region, they will want to redefine the demos in order to make it congruent with the regional public\textsuperscript{19}. The regional public is then regarded as the community that is affected by the decisions made. On the contrary, if people do not feel any sense of identity towards the regional level, it is unlikely that they would favour devolving power to the regions as there would not be any reason why the various regions within a state could not be governed by the same national demos. In this perspective, the people of all regions are regarded as belonging to the same community.

Figure 3.1 presents the measurement model underlying the operationalisation of regionalism. The figure shows that the operationalisation is based on a formative measurement model, where the operational variable is predicted to influence the theoretical variable – i.e. regional identities are expected to influence the desire for regional autonomy.

**Figure 3.1 Measurement model**

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Regional Identity} & + \\
\text{National Identity} & + \\
\rightarrow & \\
\text{Regionalism}
\end{align*}
\]

Returning to the definition of regionalism presented in section 1.1.3, this operationalisation assumes that there is a strong and consistent relationship between regional identities and regionalism across different regions. On the other hand, the indicator is not able to capture variation in the politicisation of regionalism across different regions. It is therefore necessary to assume that regional identities are politicised in roughly equal proportions to their size. This assumption can be tested through the use of a construct validity test\textsuperscript{20}, which examines

\textsuperscript{19} It is worth noting that the definition of the relevant demos often depends on the policy area under discussion. However, levels of regional identity will affect opinions on which policy areas the regional demos should be allowed to govern.

\textsuperscript{20} Construct validity tests are used to examine the validity of formative measurement models. The validity of the indicator is tested by examining its correlation with a variable that is known to be closely correlated with the theoretical variable at stake.
the relationship between the indicator and a variable that is closely related to politicised
regionalism. In this case, there are solid theoretical reasons to expect desire for regional
autonomy to be correlated with actual regional autonomy. One of the central demands of
many regionalist campaigns is exactly the strengthening of political institutions, for instance
through devolution. Some such campaigns have indeed been successful as well, as witnessed
by the development of regional institutions in Belgium, Spain and the United Kingdom, for
instance.

The theoretical discussion presented regionalism as a phenomenon occupying the political
space between regional identities and regional political institutions. Regionalism is based on
regional identities, and it tends to lead to demands for strengthening the regional institutions.
If the construct validity test shows a strong correlation between regional identities and
regional political institutions, it is reasonable to assume that this captures the processes of
regionalism that take place between the formation of identity and the success of the political
campaign. If so, the index would be a useful indicator of regionalism.

In order to examine this relationship, the theoretical variable “regional political institutions”
must be operationalised as well. This requires a measure of the strength of regional political
institutions. Hooghe and Marks (2001:193f) provide the most thorough effort to construct an
index of regional institutions so far. Their index is a variation on Lane and Ersson’s (1994)
index of territorial autonomy, which has been popular among scholars. Hooghe and Marks
have built their index around four general themes: Constitutional federalism, special
territorial autonomy, role of regions in central government, and regional elections. This
seems like a useful way to conceptualise the institutional strength of regional governments.
However, as their index refers to levels of regional governance in states, a few modifications
are needed.

When the units of measurement are regions instead of states, the constitutional federalism and
special territorial autonomy dimensions can be combined into a single dimension measuring
the formal powers of the regional institutions. In states where some regions have special
powers, these regions will simply score higher on the dimension than other regions in the
same state. The dimension combining these two aspects of Hooghe and Marks’ index will be
labelled “autonomy” below. As this index is intended to measure the strength of regional
institutions as opposed to territorial autonomy, the power-sharing dimension in Hooghe and
Marks' index is also dropped. The index thus focuses on the extent to which regions govern themselves, and does not consider their power at the central level. Apart from this, the criteria on the index are identical to Hooghe and Marks (2001), with one point awarded for each of the following properties:

- **Autonomy**
  - The existence of a functioning regional tier of government.
  - Extensive authoritative competencies, including control over two or more of the following: Taxation, police, education policy (including tertiary education), cultural policy, transport and communications policy, economic development policy, local government, and determination of regional political institutions (e.g. administrative hiring, budget process, timing of regional elections).
  - Specific regional competencies that are constitutionally guaranteed.
  - A federal state in which constitutional change is co-decided by the central state and regions.

- **Elections**
  - The region has an elected assembly.
  - The regional assembly is directly elected.

Table 3.2 shows how the regions in the data set score on the index of regional political institutions. The scores diverge substantially from Hooghe and Marks, not least because individual regions are units. This means that in the case of the UK, for instance, the Scottish and Welsh regions score higher, whilst the English regions are awarded a lower score. As mentioned, Hooghe and Marks also do not count the Swedish län and the Finnish maakunnat as regions on the grounds that they should allegedly be classified as local governments. This is unreasonable as they are regarded as regions by the native populations, and both of them constitute a meso level of government above the municipality level. Hooghe and Marks argue that they have too few inhabitants to be classified as regions, but this is mainly due to the fact that Sweden and Finland are small countries. One does not exclude countries from comparative analysis solely on the basis that they are small, and therefore one should not exclude small regions either. Furthermore, the Nordic regions are among Europe's largest in area – another indication that they should not be classified as local governments.
Table 3.2: Index of regional political institutions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Autonomy</th>
<th>Elections</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium before 1989</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium 1989 – 93</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium 1993 – present</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France 1972 – 86</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France 1986 – present</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece before 1994</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece 1994 – present</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy – historic regions</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy – rest 1976 – 96</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy – rest 1996 – present</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madeira and Azores</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain – historical nationalities</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain – rest</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>England</td>
<td>0 – 1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0 – 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scotland, Wales before 1999</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scotland, Wales 1999 – present</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The construct validity of the regionalism index can then be examined by looking at the relationship between regionalism and political institutions. Figure 3.2 presents the rationale behind this validity test.

Figure 3.2 Construct validity test

```
Regionalism         Regional institutions
```

```
Regionalism index    Regional institutions index
```
An analysis of the correlation between the regionalism index scores and the regional institutions index scores shows that there is indeed a strong connection between these two indices. Correlating the average regionalism index scores across the four surveys with the regional institution scores for 2000 returns a Pearson’s R of 0.43, which is significant at the 99 percent confidence level.

The reasonably strong correlation between the indices measuring regionalism and regional institutions conforms to the theoretical expectations of a causal relationship between regionalism and political institutions. This suggests that both indices are valid measures of the underlying theoretical concepts that they relate to, and the regionalism index can therefore be taken to be an appropriate measure of regionalism in the analysis that follows.

**Caveat**

The validity test has made the assumption that regional institutions are mainly an effect of regionalism. However, there are some theoretical reasons to consider regional institutions as a cause of regionalism rather than a consequence thereof. One might expect regional political institutions to have a positive effect on the development of regionalism. It is easier to mobilise when there is a strong institution that can promote regionalism as well as serve as a basis for it. In regions with strong political institutions, it will also be a lot easier for regionalist elites to spread their message to the general population. This is particularly obvious in cases where the regional authorities control education policy, but there are also plenty of opportunities for regional institutions to celebrate regional culture and heritage through festivities and events of a more voluntary nature. The relationship between regionalism and regional institutions thus poses something of a chicken-and-egg conundrum. If institutions might indeed be a cause of regionalism, it is necessary to consider the possibility of including it in the regression model. However, given the strong theoretical reasons to consider it a consequence of regionalism instead, institutions could probably more usefully be seen as manifestations of past levels of regionalism. Including them in the model would in this case in effect be paramount to regressing regionalism onto itself, or at least to

---

21 As regionalism is hypothesised to influence regional institutions in the model, it seems reasonable to measure institutions at a later time-point than when most of the regionalism indices are measured. The equivalent Pearson’s R coefficients for the institutions index measured in 1990 and 1995 are 0.35 and 0.36, respectively, and both of these correlations are also significant at the 99% level.
using regionalism in the past to explain regionalism in the present, which would not be very interesting.

It is possible to draw further information from the longitudinal variation on the institutions dimension. If institutions were indeed a reflection of regionalism, the strength of the institutions might be expected to fall more into line with the levels of regionalism with time. Table 3.3 varies the time of measurement of both the institutions index and the regionalism index, examining how the correlations between the two develop across time. The data suggests that the distribution of institutions seem to be becoming more similar to the distribution of regionalism across time, as the correlations generally tend to become stronger as time passes on the institutions variable. On the other hand, we cannot draw any further information from the longitudinal variation on the regionalism dimension, as the coverage of the studies varies across time with implications for the inferred population.

Table 3.3: Correlation matrix for regionalism and political institutions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Institutions 1985</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutions 1990</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutions 1995</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutions 2000</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Measure: Pearson's R.
Numbers in bold: $\alpha < 0.05$ (correlation is statistically significant).

On the balance of evidence, this suggests that regionalism has a strong effect on the establishment of political institutions. If political institutions were to be included as an independent variable in the regression model there would therefore be a high risk of picking up feedback effects – in effect, using the institutionalisation of past levels of regionalism to explain present levels of regionalism. Strong political institutions will therefore be considered an effect of regionalism, and not a cause thereof, and hence not included in the later regression model.
3.4 Distribution on the regionalism index

The average regionalism index scores across all four Eurobarometer surveys in which this question was asked, are shown for individual regions in appendix A. A preliminary look at the data shows that the average region has an index score of 15.5, with a standard deviation of 7.8. The average scores across all four surveys vary from more than 45 percent primarily regional identifiers in the Basque Country to only 3.3 percent in Northern Savonia (Finland).

The distribution on the index is skewed to the right, with a high proportion of regions having relatively low levels of regionalism, and a few outliers exhibiting high levels. The skewness statistic for the average across the four surveys is 0.77, with a standard error of 0.17. Hence, the distribution is significantly skewed. Figure 3.3 shows the distribution of the regions on the average regionalism index.

The skewness suggests that the regionalism index follows a non-normal distribution, which might create problems for the least squares regression analysis. Better results might be obtained by analysing the logarithm of the index, assuming that it follows a log-normal distribution. The distribution of the logarithms is now skewed to the left, but it is less skewed than the index itself. The logged regionalism index has a skewness statistic of -0.38, with a

---

standard error of 0.17. Hence, the logarithmic transformation of the index will be taken as the dependent variable in the regression analysis in chapter 4.

3.5 Levels of regionalism in some European regions

Having established the reliability and validity of the index, some of the data derived from the Eurobarometer survey series regarding the distribution of regionalism across Western Europe can now be presented.

Table 3.4 shows the ten regions with the most extreme average values on either end of the scale. The list of the most regionalist regions contains several of the most frequently studied regionalisms in Western Europe, with the Basque Country, Catalonia, one Scottish and two Flemish regions all featuring in the top five. The top ten list further includes three German regions and two peripheral island regions in the Atlantic – the Canaries and the Azores. The list of the least regionalist regions includes only regions from Spain, Greece and Finland, and it is dominated by areas close to the capitals of these three countries, although the lowest ranking region on the measure, Northern Savonia, lies in the eastern central part of Finland, close to the Russian border.

Table 3.4: Regions with highest and lowest regionalism index scores

Based on average scores across all the four surveys, excluding regions with two scores or less

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The 10 most regionalist regions</th>
<th>The 10 least regionalist regions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Basque Country 45.4 (±6.6)</td>
<td>Northern Savonia 3.3 (±2.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Flanders 35.8 (±4.4)</td>
<td>Epirus 3.4 (±2.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highlands &amp; Islands 34.2 (±15.1)</td>
<td>Tavastia 3.7 (±4.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catalonia 34.1 (±3.7)</td>
<td>Madrid 4.0 (±1.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Flanders 34.1 (±4.0)</td>
<td>Castile la Mancha 4.1 (±2.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mecklenburg W Pom 34.1 (±4.3)</td>
<td>East Central Greece 4.1 (±1.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canary Islands 33.6 (±7.6)</td>
<td>Castile and León 4.9 (±2.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berlin 31.4 (±4.1)</td>
<td>Satakunta 4.9 (±3.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azores 31.2 (±9.4)</td>
<td>Cantabria 5.5 (±6.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saarland 30.9 (±10.1)</td>
<td>Murcia 5.7 (±4.4)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Figures in parentheses denote 95% confidence intervals for the proportions.
Spain appears to be the country with the highest degree of internal variation when it comes to regionalism. Three Spanish regions rank among the top seven, whilst five rank among the bottom ten regions on the index. The latter category includes the Castilian heartland, as well as two predominantly Castilian regions that border areas with higher levels of regionalism. This reveals the internal tensions within the Spanish state, where the dominant Castilian-speaking group seems to have become increasingly loyal to the state in response to pressures from non-Castilian areas for devolution or secession. The two highest-ranking Spanish regions, the Basque Country and Catalonia, have consistently demanded increased political autonomy and recognition of their special status since the creation of the Spanish state, and their regionalist campaigns are widely regarded by the Castilian population as threats to the integrity of the state.

The list of the most extreme cases throws up some categories of regions that might warrant a closer look. Several of the regions in the top ten are characterised by linguistic differences with the rest of the state, and it might be interesting to examine other regions that are in the same situation. It might also be interesting to compare the Canary Islands and the Azores with other island regions in Europe to examine whether islands differ from other regions with regard to regionalism. Finally, the appearance of capitals in both the top and bottom ten of the distribution merits a closer look at regionalism in European capital regions. The following sections present the distributions on the regionalism index within each of these categories.

3.5.1 Linguistic minorities

Table 3.5 presents a list of regions with significant minority languages. In this context, this means that either a majority of the regional population speaks a different language from the majority language in the state, or that there is a completely indigenous language in the region. This leaves 20 regions with significant minority languages covered by this study. It is interesting to note that 16 of these 19 have index scores above the series average of 15.5. The Basque Country and Catalonia are still in a league of their own when it comes to regionalist sentiments, but a large number of these linguistic regions score above 20 on the index.
Table 3.5 Regions with significant minority languages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Score (±)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Basque Country</td>
<td>45.4 (±6.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catalonia</td>
<td>34.1 (±3.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flanders*</td>
<td>29.7 (±1.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balearic Islands</td>
<td>27.8 (±10.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finnmork</td>
<td>27.3 (±26.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scotland*</td>
<td>26.5 (±4.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trentino Alto Adige</td>
<td>26.3 (±11.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brittany</td>
<td>24.0 (±5.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wales*</td>
<td>23.7 (±5.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Galicia</td>
<td>21.5 (±4.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aquitaine</td>
<td>20.5 (±5.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norrbotten</td>
<td>20.0 (±14.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wallonia*</td>
<td>19.7 (±2.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friesland</td>
<td>18.7 (±4.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sardinia</td>
<td>18.7 (±7.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Languedoc-Roussillon</td>
<td>16.1 (±5.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valencia</td>
<td>14.3 (±3.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friuli-Venezia Giulia</td>
<td>13.5 (±6.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ostrobothnia</td>
<td>12.2 (±6.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Karelia</td>
<td>9.7 (±5.7)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * = Weighted average for all sub-regions within Flanders, Wallonia, Scotland and Wales.

Among the regions featuring in the top half of this list are some of the less well-known nationalisms in Europe, such as Brittany and Trentino Alto Adige (South Tirol). The regionalism index scores are higher in both these regions than in places such as Wales and Wallonia, although the differences are not statistically significant. This shows that regionalism is still an important phenomenon in these regions even though there has not been a lot of focus on them in recent years. Even a well-known autonomist region such as Scotland only just manages to eclipse Brittany and Trentino Alto Adige on this measure. Compared to Wales, around three percentage points more of Scots claim a primary regional attachment, although the difference between these two regions is also not statistically significant.
It is also interesting to note the differences between the various regions within the Catalan language group. The traditional heartland of Catalonia is close to the top of the list, along with the Balearic Islands. However, regionalism does not appear to be as strong in the northern and southern peripheries of the Catalan Countries. Valencia scores below the series average on the index, and its population appears to identify more closely with the Spanish state, despite attempts to extend political autonomy and secure the independent status of the Valencian dialect of Catalan. Across the border, Languedoc-Rousillon also appears to be fairly well-integrated into the French state, although this data do not reveal whether this also holds for the Catalan-speaking minority in the region. The same is true for Sardinia, where Catalan-speakers also only make up a small minority of the population.

In Northern Europe, regional languages appear to be less of a factor for regionalist mobilisation. The two Finnish regions of Ostrobothnia and North Karelia are the lowest scoring of all the regions with minority languages in this study, and both have levels of regionalism that are lower than the series average. On the other hand, the northernmost regions in Norway and Sweden, which both have a minority Sami-speaking population, score substantially higher on the regionalism index. Finnmark in Norway is the fourth highest scoring region in this sub-set, whilst Swedish Norrbotten also score above the series average. However, for both of these regions, the data is based on a very small number of respondents, and the estimates are therefore highly insecure.

### 3.5.2 Islands

Islands can be quite different from other peripheral regions. Due to the more complicated communication with the mainland, and possibly the different way of life that islands encourage, it is easy to see how islands can develop separate identities. It is also easy to distinguish the borders of island regions, making it obvious for everybody where the region ends. Table 3.6 presents the regionalism index scores for the regions in Europe that consist exclusively of islands or groups of islands.
Table 3.6 Island regions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Score</th>
<th>(±)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Canaries</td>
<td>33.6</td>
<td>7.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azores</td>
<td>31.2</td>
<td>9.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balearics</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td>10.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sardinia</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sicily</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madeira</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gotland</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>16.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crete</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Aegean Islands</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There is a great deal of variation when it comes to the island regions of Western Europe. The more remote islands in the Atlantic tend to score fairly well on the regionalism index, with the Canaries and the Azores both among the top ten regionalist regions in the study. In both of these regions, more than three in ten respondents claim to identify more closely with their region than with Spain and Portugal, respectively. On the other hand, Madeira scores more modestly, rising barely above the mean with 17 percent primarily regional identifiers. Allegiance to the Portuguese state seems to be much higher there than in the more distant Azores.

Tucked in between the two Portuguese island regions in the Atlantic are the three island regions in the Western Mediterranean. Among these, the Balearics seem by far the most regionalist on the basis of this data, with more than one in four claiming to identify more closely with the islands than with the Spanish state. On the other hand, the Italian island regions of Sardinia and Sicily fail to rise much above the average for the set, despite the fact that both regions have separate languages and some political autonomy.

At the other end of the spectrum, the two Greek island regions of Crete and the Eastern Aegean Islands score well below the average on the regionalism index. In both of these regions, well under one in ten respondents claims to identify predominantly with the islands vis-à-vis the Greek state, and Greek national identity thus seems to have a fairly strong foothold on the islands as well. This might be due to the contents of Greek national identity,
which is certainly partly based on myths and imagery from the islands. Arguably, islands form a more important part both economically and politically of the Greek state than any of the other states in this study. It is therefore perhaps not surprising that the Greek islands differ from the rest of the set with regards to regionalism. The Swedish island region of Gotland also scores below the average on the index, although again, the estimate for this region is highly insecure given the low number of respondents.

3.5.3 National capitals

Contrary to the historic regionalisms considered above, national capitals are usually regarded as having low levels of regionalism. After all, in the classic centre-periphery theories discussed in chapter one, capitals are seen as conquerors of the other regions within the state and could be expected to remain loyal to their own creation. In centralist states, capitals also benefit economically from being a political centre, and one would therefore not expect them to favour decentralisation of power. Levels of regionalism in national capitals can thus say something about the extent to which the centre-periphery paradigm holds for people living in the centre across different countries in Europe. Table 3.7 presents a list of the average levels of regionalism in the ten national capitals for which we have data for at least two time-points.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National capitals</th>
<th>Average</th>
<th>Standard Error</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Berlin</td>
<td>30.1</td>
<td>±4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brussels</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>±3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Holland (Amsterdam)</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>±2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>London</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>±3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vienna</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>±2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ile de France (Paris)</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>±2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lazio (Rome)</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>±3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lisbon</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>±1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uusimaa (Helsinki)</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>±2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Central Greece (Athens)</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>±1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madrid</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>±1.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As the table shows, nine of the eleven capitals score below the series average on the regionalism index, with the exceptions being federal Berlin and Brussels. Berlin is an extreme outlier in this set, but the German capital has also had quite a distinct history in the post-war period. Under communism, West Berlin was isolated from both East and West Germany, and it seems that a distinct Berliner identity developed during this period and remains alive today. To a much less extreme extent, Brussels presents a similar story of being an enclave, isolated through geography from Wallonia and through language from Flanders.

Both Berlin and Brussels are capitals of decentralised countries, and a lot of political power is situated outside these capitals. The latter is also true for Amsterdam, which ranks third in this set. Whilst the Netherlands is a unitary state, the distribution of political power between Amsterdam and The Hague means that Amsterdam does not benefit from all of the advantages of being a capital city. Competition between various cities for primacy might also contribute to the development of regionalism in Berlin and Amsterdam, suggesting that there might be a difference between monocephalic and polycephalic states in this regard. However, Rome does not score particularly highly on the index despite it being the capital of a polycephalic country, and similarly, Vienna does not score very highly despite being the capital of a federal state.

The rest of the capitals cluster in the bottom half of the Western European regions, with the Greek and Spanish capitals distinguishing themselves as extreme outliers in the bottom of the set. Madrid is the most nationalist of the capitals, possibly as a reaction to the high levels of regionalism in other parts of the country, and together with Athens, it makes up the bottom end of the list.

### 3.6 Conclusion

By combining the data on regional and national attachment in the Eurobarometer survey series into an indicator equivalent to the Moreno index, it is possible to obtain a reliable and valid measure of the levels of regionalism across Western Europe. This allows for more generalisable conclusions regarding the distribution of regionalism across space, as well as more objective data on the levels of regionalism in particular regions. This chapter has presented some tentative data on the distribution of various types of regions on the
regionalism index, and this might provide some insight into how levels of regionalism vary across Western Europe.

In the next chapter, the operational definition of regionalism is taken forward in an attempt to provide an explanation of why regionalism varies across space. The hypotheses developed in chapter 2 will be tested by developing operational measures that can be used to explain variation in the levels of regionalism in a regression analysis. In this way, some of the most prominent theories of the causes of regionalism can be examined in order to achieve a greater understanding of how and to what extent they can influence regionalism.
4. Why some Regions are more Regionalist than Others

The average scores of all the regions on the regionalism index presented in chapter 3 form a distribution of average levels of regionalism across Western Europe in the period from 1991 to 2002. This distribution can be analysed in a cross-sectional regression design in order to determine which factors are most closely associated with variations in the levels of regionalism. In turn, this might give an indication about how well the various theories on regionalism can explain variation across space. This will provide a stepping-stone towards identifying some of the crucial causes of the development of regionalism in Europe.

In this chapter, the major theories discussed in chapter 2 are operationalised. The merits of the key theories on the causes of regionalism can then be tested by fitting these operational variables into a model that seeks to explain variation in the regionalism index scores. It is possible to examine each of the most prominent theories from chapter 2 by looking at how closely variables such as globalisation, European integration, party systems and economic development are associated with regionalism. The impact of each of these variables is then explored in a set of regression analyses that assess how well each of the theories can explain variations in the levels of regionalism across Western Europe.

4.1 Operationalisation of independent variables

The focus of this study is mainly on the recent political economy theories of regionalism, which focus on the global economy, European integration, party systems and economic growth. Hence, the regression analysis contains indicators for each of the four principal causal variables proposed by the literature review. The selected operational measures of globalisation, European integration, party systems and economic development will be discussed below. However, the analysis also needs to control for other variables that may have an impact on regionalism. The distributions in chapter 3 suggest that both linguistic differences and being a capital region can have an effect on the levels of regionalism in a region, and these relationships are also predicted by culturalist and centre-periphery theories on regionalism, respectively. These two indicators, as well as variables on population size
and on the region’s historical relationship with the state, form the control variables in this analysis.

4.1.1 Globalisation

Globalisation is expected to create incentives for regional mobilisation as a result of the blurring of national borders and the increased competition between regions for investments and labour. Whilst globalisation also encompasses the increased movement of people, culture and ideas, it is almost exclusively conceived in terms of the increase in international trade of goods and services. The most common operationalisations therefore use total trade as a proxy for globalisation, for instance by looking at the sum of exports and imports as a proportion of GDP (Garrett 2001:7). Unfortunately, figures on international trade are unavailable on a regional level in most countries, and it is therefore not possible to use this measure here. The same is true for foreign direct investments, which is another common proxy for globalisation.

Instead, one can look at a different aspect of the concept and use movement of people as a proxy for globalisation. The theory predicts globalisation to have an effect on the regional labour market, with successful regions becoming clusters of growing businesses. By looking at the number of people who immigrate into the region from abroad, we should be able to get an indication of how strongly globalisation affects the region. This variable therefore measures the annual number of foreign immigrants as a proportion of the region’s population. Eurostat (2004) provides data for most regions\(^{23}\) for at least parts of the period 1990-99, and by taking the average levels for the years in which data is available; it is possible to obtain a decent measure of relative levels of globalisation.

4.1.2 European integration

The theories on the impact of European integration on regionalism hold that the EU is increasingly becoming an alternative to the nation-state, thus undermining the traditional dominance of the national level in territorial politics. As discussed in chapter 2, there are three different aspects of European integration that can cause regionalism: Economic integration across national borders, transfer of political authority from the national to the

\(^{23}\) The data is not available on the regional level for France, United Kingdom, Norway and Finland. For all regions in these countries, the scores on the index are set as equal to the national average for the relevant country.
European level, and the construction of a European identity. The first two aspects of Europeanisation can be expected to vary mainly across time rather than space, and there are indeed no indicators on how individual regions have been affected by these developments. However, the third aspect, identification with Europe, can be expected to vary across regions. This can be measured by looking at the extent to which people in a region are willing to let the EU extend its political authority, based on the idea that citizens want to be governed by a unit that they identify with. The need to improve the legitimacy of the EU institutions was arguably a crucial part of the rationale behind the EU’s attempts at building a European identity (Bruter 2005:67ff), so this operationalisation should capture the concept reasonably well\(^{24}\). This rationale is also similar to the connection between regional identity and regional institutions, discussed in section 3.2.2. Furthermore, EU institutions are likely to be more successful in creating a new economic and political framework for the regions if the regional public actually supports the transfer of powers to the European level.

A useful operational measure of Europeanisation can therefore be obtained by examining respondents’ attitudes towards whether the nation-states or the EU should control specific policy areas. Eurobarometer 54.1 presented respondents with a list of 15 policy areas\(^{25}\). For each policy area, they were asked whether they thought it should be the responsibility of the EU or of national governments. By looking at the number of policy areas that the average respondent believes should be the responsibility of the EU, it is possible to get a measure of the extent to which the EU is seen as a viable alternative institutional framework to the central state, which conforms closely to the theoretical mechanisms predicted by the literature. On the state-wide level, the findings of this variable from the 2000 Eurobarometer survey are presented in table 4.1.

---

\(^{24}\) Another possibility would obviously be looking at survey questions where people rate their attachment to the EU. However, these questions face the same methodological problems as did the “absolute index” in section 3.1.2 in that the quantification of attachment is subjective and determined by cultural norms that vary across different regions.

\(^{25}\) In Eurobarometer 36, respondents were only asked about 12 different policy areas. The following policy areas were included in all three surveys: Security and defence, environment, currency, cooperation with developing countries, health and social welfare, education, broadcasting and press, science and technology, and foreign policy. In addition, the 1991 survey included questions about VAT, workers’ representation, and data protection, whereas the two most recent surveys included the following areas: poverty, unemployment, agriculture and fisheries, regional development, information about the EU, and culture.
Table 4.1: Member states’ distribution on the Europeanisation measure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>9.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>8.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>8.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>8.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>8.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>8.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Germany</td>
<td>8.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>8.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>8.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Germany</td>
<td>7.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>7.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N. Ireland</td>
<td>6.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>6.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>6.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>5.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>5.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>5.60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>7.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. deviation</td>
<td>1.23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Eurobarometer 54.1.

Regrettably, this measure is only available in three of the four Eurobarometer surveys (1991, 2000 and 2002). Hence, the indicator will contain the averages from these three years only, measured as the average number of standard deviation units away from the series mean.

The top ten and bottom ten regions on this measure are presented in table 4.2.

---

26 As Eurobarometer only produces data on the Swedish regions in the 1995 study, the Europeanisation measures for Sweden will be taken as being equal to the series mean for the average of the other three studies. In this way, they will not affect the parameter estimates in the regression analysis.

27 It is necessary to standardise the measures in this way because of the varying number of policy areas included in the various Eurobarometer surveys. As mentioned above, the 1991 survey only asks about 12 different policy areas, whereas the two more recent surveys ask about 15 policy areas. This results in the average for the 1991 survey being 6.0, whereas the 2002 survey has an average of 8.0. Because the data for Norway, Finland and Austria are based on only one or two of the surveys, the estimates need to be made comparable despite the variation in the average scores and standard deviations. This is done by defining each estimate as being equal to the distance from the mean measured in standard deviation units.
Table 4.2: Top ten and bottom ten Europeanised regions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Top ten</th>
<th>Bottom ten</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Umbria</td>
<td>North Trøndelag</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friuli-Venezia</td>
<td>Kainuu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Buskerud</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuscany</td>
<td>Burgenland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liguria</td>
<td>North Savonia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Galicia</td>
<td>Finnmark</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aquitaine</td>
<td>Satakunta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calabria</td>
<td>North Ostrobothnia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limburg (BL)</td>
<td>Telemark</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamburg</td>
<td>Nordland</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Source: Eurobarometer.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The top ten list is dominated by regions from Italy and Spain, which between them contribute seven of the eight most pro-EU regions in Europe. Italy alone provides five of these, with three North-Western Italian regions in the top five. The two Spanish regions at the top of the list, Cantabria and Galicia, are also in the northwestern part of the country. The list is completed by the French region Aquitaine, the Belgian province Limburg, and the German state Hamburg. As the other end of the spectrum, non-member Norway unsurprisingly provides a large number of the most Eurosceptic regions. Five of the ten most Eurosceptic regions in Western Europe are in Norway, and a further four are in Finland. In terms of geography, three of the four northernmost regions in each of these two countries are included within the list of the ten most Eurosceptic regions. The only non-Scandinavian region in the bottom ten is Burgenland, which runs along the South-Eastern border of Austria.

Structural funds

Whilst the Europeanisation variable looks at the effects of the construction of a European identity, it is also instructive to examine whether the union’s direct relationship with specific regions has fuelled regionalism. We can study the effects of the EU’s direct efforts at strengthening the regions through looking at whether there is any connection between the union’s structural funds expenditure and regionalism in the recipient regions. This variable is based on data from the 1999 annual report on the structural funds (European Commission 2000), and it measures the total payments to each region through all of the various objectives in the structural funds programmes for the period 1994-99. The indicator is adjusted on a per capita basis, with one unit being equal to € 100 per capita of structural funds payments. The
The top ten recipients of structural funds are presented in Table 4.3. If the EU structural funds have indeed succeeded in strengthening regionalism, we would expect regionalism to be more prevalent in the regions that have received the most such funds.

### Table 4.3: Top ten recipients of structural funds

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>La Rioja</td>
<td>39.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azores</td>
<td>26.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aragón</td>
<td>25.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asturias</td>
<td>24.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thrace</td>
<td>17.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cantabria</td>
<td>16.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madeira</td>
<td>15.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Macedonia</td>
<td>12.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saarland</td>
<td>10.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bremen</td>
<td>8.21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### 4.1.3 Party systems

Part of the purpose behind devolution of power is changing the policy outcomes. However, diverging policy outcomes depends to some extent on different parties being in power at the regional and national level. The likelihood of this occurring increases when the difference between the regional and national party systems increases. The distinctiveness of the regional party system is measured through comparing the distribution of votes on the regional level with the state-wide distribution. For each region, the regional party system is compared to the state party system through a formula known as the Lee Index (see Hearl, Budge and Pearson 1996 or Caramani 2002). The index measures the extent to which the election results in a particular region are different from the results in the country as a whole through summing the absolute differences between the state and regional level for the vote shares of each individual party. The sum is then divided by two in order to avoid double counting. The data is based on the parliamentary election that falls closest to 1995 in each country, and voting data for each constituency is recoded to develop a measure of the distribution of votes in each region.

---

28 This includes the following elections: France, Germany and Norway in 1993, the Netherlands and Sweden in 1994, Austria, Belgium, Finland and Portugal in 1995, and Greece, Italy and Spain in 1996. As data for the United Kingdom elections are only available at the level of individual constituencies, the UK regions are kept at the series mean so that they do not influence the estimation of the model. In the mixed German and Italian election systems, the data is based on the proportional party list vote.
region. The data is drawn from Caramani (1999) and from the Italian Ministry of Internal Affairs (Ministero dell’Interno 1996).

The Lee Index is somewhat vulnerable to the number of parties in the party system. Therefore, parties that do not achieve at least five percent of the vote in at least one region are omitted from the study. As the index measures absolute differences, variations in support for large parties have a stronger impact on the scores than similar variations for small parties. This is appropriate in this context as it is reasonable to expect regional differences in support for the major government and opposition parties to be more crucial for regionalism than similar differences for relatively insignificant parties. Similarly, parties that only feature in one particular region will receive a low share of the state-wide vote and hence contribute to a high index score. Table 4.4 shows the ten regional party systems in the study that are most distinctive from their respective state-wide party system, as well as the ten least distinctive party systems.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Top ten</th>
<th>Bottom ten</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wallonia (average)</td>
<td>Salzburg 1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bavaria</td>
<td>Östergötland 1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basque Country</td>
<td>Epirus 2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flanders (average)</td>
<td>Vorarlberg 2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lapland</td>
<td>Västra Götaland 2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catalonia</td>
<td>Thessalia 2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ostrobothnia</td>
<td>Uppsala 3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trentino Alto Adige</td>
<td>Champagne-Ard. 3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kainuu</td>
<td>Peleponnesos 3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saxony</td>
<td>Gelderland 3.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.4: Ten most and least distinctive regional party systems

Source: Caramani (1999) and Ministero dell’Interno (1996).

Unsurprisingly, the completely regionalised Belgian parties lead Wallonia and Flanders to the top of the list. Both regions have party systems that are unique to their specific region, without any state-wide parties contesting the elections. The parties thus achieve state-wide results that are on average slightly less (in Wallonia) or slightly more (in Flanders) than half their regional vote share. Thus, the absolute differences between the vote share in Wallonia and Belgium is around 60 percent, whereas in Flanders, it is 36 percent.
Between the two Belgian regions on the list are two regions where regionally organised parties win a higher share of the vote than state-wide parties. In Bavaria, the Christian Social Union achieved 51 percent of the vote, thus dominating the regional party system. As the party only ran in Bavaria, this equated to a country-wide vote share of only 7.3 percent. By comparison, the state-wide SPD, FDP and Greens took 42 percent in total. In the Basque Country, the regional vote was split between three different regional parties – the PNV, Eusko Alkartasuna and Herri Batasuna – which pulled a total of 46 percent of the vote in the election. Conversely, the state-wide PP and PSOE won only 44 percent, compared to 77 percent in the country as a whole. A further three regions in the top ten list are characterised by one large regionally organised party competing with the state-wide parties and winning a large share of the vote. These are the Convergència i Unió in Catalonia (30 percent), the Swedish People’s Party in Ostrobothnia (20 percent) and the Union für Südtirol in Trentino Alto Adige (8.5 percent).

The final three regions in the top ten do not have any specifically regionally organised parties. Rather, the vote share for the national parties is highly distinctive in these regions, with some state-wide parties enjoying substantially more success than others. In the two northernmost Finnish regions, Lapland and Kainuu, the Centre Party and the Left-Wing Alliance performed much better than on the state level, whereas the Social Democratic Party and the National Coalition Party fared much worse. In both regions, the Centre Party dominated, winning close to 40 percent of the vote, whilst the Left-Wing Alliance (on 25 percent in Lapland and 16.5 percent in Kainuu) was larger than the Social Democrats (19 percent in Lapland and 16.5 percent in Kainuu). In Finland as a whole, the Social Democrats were by far the largest party with 28 percent of the vote, compared to the Centre’s 20 percent and 11 percent for the fourth-placed Left-Wing Alliance. Finally, Saxony’s place in the top ten is explained by the fact that it was the strongest region for the CDU, and the weakest region for the SPD, in this election. The PDS also performed relatively well in Saxony.

The list of the least distinctive regional party systems features regions from five different countries: Austria, France, Greece, the Netherlands and Sweden. Thus, they cover a range of different party systems, from the Austrian three-party system to the more fragmented Dutch and Swedish systems. Notably, none of the bottom ten regions are capitals, although some are situated close to their respective state capitals (Uppsala, Peleponnesos and Champagne-Ardennes). Capitals tend to be rather distinctive areas, particularly in terms of the
composition of their electorate, and it is therefore not surprising that the election results are fairly different in capitals compared to the state-wide results.

**Regionalist parties**

In addition to the variation in support for national parties, the question of specifically regionalist parties is of particular interest in this connection. Regionalist parties have an interest in mobilising regionalism, as this is likely to increase their electoral support. Whilst the success of regionalist parties is to a large extent a function of regionalism itself, their existence as such might be regarded as being less dependent on regionalism. The variable is therefore a dummy that takes the value one if the region has a non-trivial ethnoregionalist party, and zero if it does not. In this way, it can examine whether the existence of regionalist parties has an impact of the levels of regionalism, regardless of whether or not they achieve electoral success. The ethnoregionalist parties are drawn from Lane, McKay and Newton’s (1997:138ff) handbook. Parties listed as ethnic in their classification are included, provided that they have a specifically regional basis.

**4.1.4 Economic development**

The theories provide contrasting predictions on the relationship between regionalism and economic development. Internal colonialism holds that poor regions will be likely to rebel against the state in order to improve their lot, whilst theories on prosperity and regionalism claim that prosperity provides fiscal incentives for mobilisation, boosts regional self-esteem, and is conducive to the development of regional culture.

In country level studies, economic development is usually measured in terms of gross domestic product (GDP) per capita. The equivalent of this for regions is the GDP per capita per region (GDPR) data calculated by most national statistical agencies, as well as by Eurostat on the European level. GDPR is basically a measure of how much each region has contributed to the national GDP, and it is therefore a useful tool for the purposes of testing the hypotheses presented in this thesis. The methods for calculating GDPR are presented in Eurostat’s *Regional Accounts Methods* (1995), and it is not necessary to go into these in any detail.

---

sort of detail in this chapter. In this chapter, GDPR will be used to measure of economic
development\textsuperscript{30}.

4.1.5 Control variables

As suggested by some of the distributions presented in chapter 3, cultural and geographic
variables continue to have an effect on regionalism. As previously outlined, these variables
are not the focus of this study as the aim is to get beyond cultural explanations and examine
causes with greater potential for change across time. The cultural and geographic variables
are therefore not treated as independent variables in this context. However, they may affect
the relationship between regionalism and the independent variables presented thus far, and it
is therefore necessary to control for their effects in the analysis of how the main variables
impact on regionalism. This section operationalises the four control variables linguistic
differences, historical relationship with the central state, centre/periphery and population in
order to produce indicators that can be included in the regression analysis.

Language

In the literature on cultural regionalism, linguistic differences are often quoted as the most
-crucial cultural difference that might lead to regionalism in a region (e.g. Anderson 1991).
Linguistic differences create strong incentives to desire regional autonomy, as the regional
institutions can be used to safeguard the status of the regional language and improve language
education. Linguistic differences also make integration more difficult, as the cultural
differences between the regional population and the national population are both obvious and
a barrier to communication.

In order to measure the impact of linguistic differences, an additive index will seek to capture
the importance and indigenousness of the regional language. The index is made up of the
following items, with one point awarded for each item:

\textsuperscript{30} Because the regional accounts data come from a variety of sources, which do not always use the same units of
measurement, the GDPR figures are divided by the GDP of the EU to provide a uniform measure. Wherever the
data has been available, GDPR has been calculated using purchasing power parities (PPP) in order to take price
differences between the regions into account.
- There is an indigenous regional language that is different from the dominant (plurality) language in the state.  

- The regional language is spoken by at least half the region’s population.

- The language is not the dominant language of any state.

Table 4.5 shows how the regions covered by this study rank on the regional language index. The seven regions that score the maximum three points all have a completely indigenous language that is spoken by a majority of the population. The relevant languages are Catalan (or Valencian), Gallego, Frisian, Friulian and Sardinian. The second highest category includes several other indigenous regional languages that are not spoken by a majority of the population, including most prominently Basque, but also Welsh, Breton, Gaelic and Sami. The remainder of this category is made up of regions where a majority of the population speak the language of a neighbouring state, such as Flemish (Dutch) and French in Belgium, Swedish in Finland and German in Northern Italy. The final category contains regions where a substantial minority of indigenous people are native speakers of the language of a neighbouring state.

---

31 The data on regional languages is mainly based on Mackenzie (1994). The indicator refers only to languages which are spoken by indigenous people, whilst excluding languages spoken among immigrant groups. Some very small languages (less than 15000 speakers) have been excluded, including Frisian in Germany, Tsakonian in Greece, and Croatian and Greek in Italy, among others. Sami has still been included as a minority language in Finnmark (Norway) and Norrbotten (Sweden) as Sami speakers constitute a substantial proportion of the population in these sparsely populated regions (but not in Lappi, Finland, where there are only 2500 Sami speakers). In the case of Belgium, both Flemish and French are counted as minority languages as both are distinctly regional languages for inhabitants in the respective regions.

32 This indicator distinguishes between languages that are embodied in a neighbouring state (for instance Swedish in Finland) and exclusively minority languages (for instance Catalan in Spain).
Table 4.5: Distribution on the regional language index

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>3 points</th>
<th>2 points</th>
<th>1 point</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Balearic Islands</td>
<td>Aquitaine</td>
<td>Alsace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catalonia</td>
<td>Basque Country</td>
<td>Burgenland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friesland</td>
<td>Brittany</td>
<td>Carinthia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friuli-Venezia Giulia</td>
<td>Brussels</td>
<td>Central Macedonia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Galicia</td>
<td>Finnmark</td>
<td>Finland Proper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sardinia</td>
<td>Flanders</td>
<td>Lorraine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valencia</td>
<td>Langued.-Rousillon</td>
<td>Navarre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Norrbotten</td>
<td>Nord-Pas de Calais</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>North Karelia</td>
<td>Piedmont and Aosta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ostrobothnia</td>
<td>Saxony</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Scotland</td>
<td>Schleswig-Holstein</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Trentino Alto Adige</td>
<td>Sicily</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wales</td>
<td>Kymenlaakso</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wallonia</td>
<td>Thessaly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Uusimaa</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Historical sovereignty**

The idea that a history of political independence can be conducive to the development of regionalist sentiments is fairly intuitive. Regions that have a history of independent statehood are likely to be less integrated into the state, and it also seems reasonable to expect them to desire a return of the political autonomy they once held. The problems of integrating with the state are likely to be present also in regions that have once been part of different states from the one that currently has sovereignty over the territory. The problems should be particularly acute in regions that have been included fairly recently into the state of which they are currently part.

An index of the region’s historical sovereignty seeks to capture the extent to which the region has historically been governed by itself or by other powers than the state of which it is currently part. This can be taken as an indication of the extent to which its history might serve as a basis for mobilisation. The index assigns the highest score to regions that have a fairly recent history as independent states, and the lowest score to regions that have formed part of the state since its establishment. Regions that have historically been part of several different states, fall somewhere in between these two extremes. The index is based around three criteria, with one point awarded if the region possesses each of the following characteristics:
- The region has not been part of the current state since its formation.
- The region was not part of the current state for the entire 20th century.
- The region has been an independent state.

The distribution on this variable is shown in table 4.6. Only one region covered in the study has been politically independent within the last 100 years – Crete, which was an independent republic from 1898 to 1913. The second-highest category is dominated by regions that changed hands at the end of one of the two World Wars during the past century, including several Greek regions, Alsatia and Lorraine in France; and Friuli-Venezia Giulia and Trentino Alto Adige in Italy. The category also includes some regions that have been independent after the formation of the state of which they currently form part, including Scotland, Bavaria and Baden-Württemberg. The final two regions in this category are Catalonia and the Basque Country, due to the statutes of autonomy that these regions enjoyed prior to the Franco dictatorship. The final category includes several regions that have older histories of independent statehood or of belonging to different states, including a large number of regions in Germany and Italy, where state-building was a late and gradual process.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>3 points</th>
<th>2 points</th>
<th>1 point</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Crete</td>
<td>Aegean Islands</td>
<td>Andalusia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Alsatia</td>
<td>Brandenburg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Baden-Württemberg</td>
<td>Epirus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Basque Country</td>
<td>Franche-Comte</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bavaria</td>
<td>Halland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Catalonia</td>
<td>Hesse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Central Macedonia</td>
<td>Jämtland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>East Macedonia</td>
<td>Langued.-Rousillon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Friuli-Ven. Giulia</td>
<td>Lombardy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lorraine</td>
<td>Mecklenburg W P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Scotland</td>
<td>Navarre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Thrace</td>
<td>Nord-Pas de Calais</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Trentino Alto Adige</td>
<td>N Rhine-Westphalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Piedmont and Aosta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Prov.-Alpes-C’d’A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Rhône-Alpes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sardinia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Saxony</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Saxony-Anhalt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Schleswig-Holstein</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sicily</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Skåne</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Thessaly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Thuringia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Tuscany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Valencia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Veneto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Västra Götaland</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

33 These indicators are based on Parker (1993).
Geography

Fundamental centre-periphery theories hold that states are formed as centres conquer and colonise surrounding areas, which subsequently form peripheries in the national states. From this perspective, one would expect resistance to the centre in the form of regionalist sentiments in the peripheries. The peripheries might be expected to want to take back autonomy over their own affairs, whilst centres should be expected to remain faithful to the state that they created themselves. This effect is captured by a dummy variable that distinguishes between regions that border the capital, and are hence classified as being in the centre, and those that do not.

Population

The population variable reflects the assumption that size matters, which is implicit in some of the literature on regionalism. For instance, some writers (such as Hooghe and Marks 2001) do not count regions in the Nordic countries as regions because they regard them as too small\textsuperscript{3}4, which certainly seems to reveal an expectation that a certain population size is necessary for the development of regionalism. One would also expect populous regions to be better equipped for autonomy, as they resemble nation-states to a larger extent. For instance, North Rhine-Westphalia, with its 18 million inhabitants, would have been a fairly large European country if it had been an independent state. Conversely, a small region might be expected to be more dependent on the central state, and it might be considered too small to be able to function efficiently as a unit of governance. The population variable tests these hypotheses by measuring the population size of the region (in millions) and examining to what extent it explains variation in the regionalism index scores. A separate variable measures the regional population as a proportion of the state population, in order to examine whether relative size matters.

4.2 Building a regression model

The operational measures of independent and control variables form a set of distributions that can be applied in a regression analysis to examine their ability to explain variations in the levels of regionalism across Western Europe. This will make it possible to test the central hypotheses about the relationships between various potential factors and regionalism, as well

\textsuperscript{3}4 See section 3.2.2 for a discussion of the merits of this argument.
as to look at the relative impacts of specific factors when we control for other possible explanations. Table 4.7 summarises the predicted relationships between each independent variable and regionalism, as discussed in chapter 2. As the table shows, each of the independent variables is predicted to have a positive impact on regionalism. The same is true for the control variables, which are listed in a separate column in table 4.7.

Table 4.7: Expected effects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent variables</th>
<th>Control variables</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Globalisation</td>
<td>Regional language</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for the EU</td>
<td>Historical sovereignty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structural funds</td>
<td>Periphery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vote distinctiveness</td>
<td>Population</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regionalist party</td>
<td>Relative size</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic development</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Using average regionalism index scores across four different surveys helps to reduce the likelihood of sampling error in the estimated levels of regionalism. However, as the distributions in chapter 3 reveal, there is still a fair amount of variation in the size of the confidence intervals across the regions covered in the analysis. This is due to the differences in the sample sizes from each region, and a consequence of this is that the error terms are not constant across all units in the survey. Therefore, it is necessary to calculate weights so that the regions with less certain estimates are given less weight in the calculation of the model. This can be achieved through the use of weighted least squares (WLS) regression. The technicalities of this procedure are explained in Appendix B. As discussed in section 3.3, the average regionalism scores do not follow a normal distribution. It is therefore also useful to transform them into logarithms for the WLS regressions, which assume a normal distribution.

4.2.1 Regression analysis
In table 4.8, each of the independent variables outlined above has been regressed on the logarithmic functions of the average regionalism index scores, and insignificant variables have been removed through the process of backwards stepwise selection until the model contains only variables that are statistically significant. Due to the small sample size of 212
units, a confidence level of 90 percent is taken as the benchmark. The “model 1” column contains the full model with all the independent variables, whereas the “model 2” column contains the parsimonious model that resulted from the stepwise selection.

Table 4.8: Examining the model of regionalism
Dependent variable: log (Regionalism index)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th></th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coeff.</td>
<td>S.E.</td>
<td>Beta</td>
<td>Coeff.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign immigration</td>
<td>0.035</td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.035</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for the EU</td>
<td>0.096</td>
<td>(0.050)</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structural funds payments</td>
<td>-0.014</td>
<td>(0.010)</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vote distinctiveness</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regionalist party</td>
<td>0.113</td>
<td>(0.122)</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional GDP per capita</td>
<td><strong>0.311</strong></td>
<td>(0.124)</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td><strong>0.333</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Control variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th></th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regional language index</td>
<td>0.148</td>
<td>(0.054)</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td><strong>0.182</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Historical sovereignty</td>
<td>0.051</td>
<td>(0.059)</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R. does not border capital</td>
<td><strong>0.283</strong></td>
<td>(0.069)</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td><strong>0.310</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population, millions</td>
<td>0.019</td>
<td>(0.013)</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td><strong>0.025</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative population size</td>
<td><strong>-1.008</strong></td>
<td>(0.321)</td>
<td>-0.20</td>
<td><strong>-0.984</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td><strong>1.678</strong></td>
<td>(0.146)</td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>1.601</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted $R^2$</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>212</td>
<td></td>
<td>212</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The figures in the columns denote (from left to right): Unstandardised regression coefficients, standard errors of the estimates, and standardised regression coefficients. Numbers in **bold**: $P$ (two-tailed) < 0.10. Multicollinearity diagnostics are shown in appendix C.

Overall, both the full model 1 and the parsimonious model 2 can explain around 56 percent of the variance in the logged regionalism index, as measured by the adjusted $R^2$ statistic.
Among the independent variables, one indicator related to each theoretical hypothesis has a significant effect on regionalism. Globalisation emerges as the strongest of the independent variables in both model 1 and model 2, measured in terms of the standardised regression coefficients. In both models, an increase of one point in the globalisation index would lead to an increase of 0.035 in the predicted logged regionalism index score, and the relationship is statistically significant. The second strongest independent variable is economic development, which also has a strong and significant positive impact in both models. In model 2, an increase of one point in the regional GDP as a proportion of the EU average leads to a growth of 0.33 in the predicted logged regionalism index score.

The impact of Europeanisation is somewhat weaker, and only one of the two variables is significantly related to regionalism. The main indicator, measuring support for the EU, has a significant positive impact in both models. In model 2, an increase of one point on the Europeanisation index would increase the predicted logged regionalism index score by 0.1. On the other hand, the structural funds variable does not have a significant impact on regionalism when the model controls for other variables. Indeed, the direction of the relationship even goes in the opposite direction of what was expected, as regions receiving more structural funds tend to be less regionalist than other regions. This is reasonable given the relationship between economic development and regionalism, as structural funds are mainly provided for the poorest regions. However, the findings do question the idea that structural funds income would lead to growing regionalism, particularly when structural funds expenditure does not appear to be associated with regionalism even when economic development is controlled for.

Differences in regional party systems also appear to be closely related to regionalism, as the relationship between the Lee Index and regionalism is significant and positive in both models. In model 2, an increase of 10 points on the Lee Index would increase the predicted logged regionalism index score by 0.1. On the other hand, the existence of specifically regionalist political parties does not appear to have an independent effect once the distinctiveness of the regional party system as a whole is controlled for. The relationship between the regionalist parties dummy and regionalism is positive, as expected, but it is not statistically significant.
Among the control variables, the centre/periphery variable has the strongest effect on regionalism, with peripheries scoring on average 0.31 points higher on the logged regionalism index when other variables are controlled for. Regional languages are also closely associated with regionalism, with an increase of one point on the regional language index resulting in an increase of 0.18 in the predicted logged regionalism index score. Both of these variables are significantly related to regionalism in both of the models. On the other hand, there does not appear to be a significant relationship between regionalism and historical sovereignty. The historical sovereignty index is positively related to regionalism, but not significantly so.

The two population variables relate to regionalism in somewhat contradictory ways. The analysis shows that large regions are indeed likely to be more regionalist, as expected, but the same is true for regions with a small share of the state population, once other variables are controlled for. It thus seems that there is a tendency for relatively high levels of regionalism in small regions in large countries, whereas lower levels of regionalism would be expected in large regions in small countries. It is worth noting that the two variables are closely connected, so that if one of them is removed from the model, the other one ceases to be significantly related to regionalism. The relationship between population size and regionalism does therefore appear to be fairly complex, and it is necessary to take relative as well as absolute population size into account.

As the regression model explains variation in the logarithmic transformations of the original regionalism index scores, the results are less straightforward to interpret than for an ordinary regression model. However, model 2 can be used to calculate predicted scores on the regionalism index for regions with specified values on each of the independent variables. This will make it easier to interpret the results in terms of the effect that each variable is expected to have on regionalism. Table 4.9 demonstrates how the predicted regionalism index scores change when each independent variable is specified as taking a low, average or high value, whilst all other independent and control variables are kept constant.
Table 4.9: Predicted regionalism index scores

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>Average</th>
<th>High</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Foreign immigration</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>14.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for the EU</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>13.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vote distinctiveness</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>13.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional GDP per capita</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>13.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Predicted scores on the regionalism index when all other independent and control variables are kept constant, whereas one independent variable is varied to the 10th and 90th percentile levels.

The score of 12.3, listed in the average column, represents the expected regionalism index score for a region that does not border the state capital and does not have a regional language, whilst it is precisely average when it comes to globalisation, Europeanisation, vote distinctiveness, economic development, and absolute and relative population size. The figures in the low and high columns then represent how the predicted regionalism index score changes when the relevant independent variable is varied to the 10th and the 90th percentile, respectively.

As already mentioned, globalisation was estimated to have the strongest effect on regionalism in the model, and varying the globalisation index score also has the strongest impact on the predicted regionalism index scores. Reducing the globalisation score from the average 4.9 to 1.2 results in a reduction of the predicted regionalism index score of 1.5 points. Conversely, increasing the score to 9.1 results in a growth of 1.9 in the predicted regionalism index score. The other variables have similar, but slightly weaker effects on regionalism. Reducing the Europeanisation index from -0.1 to -1.2 results in a drop of 1.3 in the predicted regionalism index, whilst increasing it to 0.9 results in an equivalent 1.3 point increase in the regionalism index. Economic development has almost precisely the same effect when the GDPR level is reduced to 0.61 or increased to 1.24 from the average 0.93. Finally, reducing the vote distinctiveness variable from an average 14.3 to 5.6 only results in a one point decrease in the regionalism index, whilst increasing it to a high 25.4 results in a growth of 1.4 points.
4.2.2 Country dummies

The regions in this data set constitute parts of various countries, and there is a chance that the effect of some of the independent variables depends on which country the region is in. Regions might cluster in groups according to their country, and the model could then be expected to fit in a reasonably similar way to all regions within any given country, while being a poorer fit when it comes to explaining variation across countries. This hypothesis can be tested by introducing a dummy variable for each country into the model. Through introducing country dummies, it is possible to check whether the model is capable of explaining variation within each country, in which case the independent variables will still have a significant impact on regionalism even when country dummies are controlled for. It is also possible to test whether the model can explain variation across different countries, in which case the country dummies themselves will not have a significant effect on regionalism.

In table 4.10, I have included such country dummies for each of the countries in the study. This produces a large increase in $R^2$, with the explained variance of the model increasing by 0.19 compared to model 2. When the country dummies are introduced, the model can explain 76 percent of the variation in the regionalism index. This suggests that the model has been underspecified, or that there is a substantial national element to the phenomenon of regionalism (the political structure and the political culture of the country might be part of this explanation).
Table 4.10: Introducing country dummies

Dependent variable: log (Regionalism index). Baseline for country dummies: France.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Country dummy model</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coeff.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign immigration</td>
<td>0.035</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for the EU</td>
<td>0.102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vote distinctiveness</td>
<td>0.010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional GDP per capita</td>
<td>0.333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional language index</td>
<td>0.182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R. does not border capital</td>
<td>0.310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population, millions</td>
<td>0.025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative population size</td>
<td>-0.984</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>0.857</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Netherlands</td>
<td>0.265</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>0.276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>0.167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>0.206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>-0.036</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>-0.142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>-0.164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>-0.302</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>-0.442</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>-0.598</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>-0.526</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.601</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R²</td>
<td>0.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>212</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Numbers in bold: P (two-tailed) < 0.10.

The country dummies broadly cluster into three or four different groups. Germany forms a separate cluster where regionalism is underestimated by the model compared to all other countries. Compared to the baseline France, the logged levels of regionalism in Germany are on average being underestimated by 0.86 by the model. At the other end of the spectrum, Greece, Spain and Finland form a cluster of countries where regionalism is overestimated by the model. Compared to France, the logged regionalism scores are overestimated by between 0.44 and 0.53 in these three countries. Most other countries form one large cluster around France, although the differences within this cluster are fairly large. Compared to France,
levels of regionalism in the Netherlands are also significantly underestimated by the model, with the logged index scores being underestimated by 0.27. There are also statistically significant differences between several other countries at the extremes of this cluster.

Returning to the variables in the model itself, three of the independent variables remain significantly related to regionalism. Europeanisation is actually even more strongly associated with regionalism once the analysis controls for the country that the regions are in, with the effect of an increase of one point on the Europeanisation index being more than twice as strong as in model 2. In the country dummy model, a one point increase in the Europeanisation index results in a growth of 0.21 in the logged regionalism index. Similarly, the effects of regional party systems are also stronger once countries are controlled for. An increase of 10 points in the Lee Index now results in a 0.13 point increase in the logged regionalism index, and the standardised coefficient has increased by almost one third. The relationship between economic development and regionalism remains approximately the same whether or not countries are controlled for, with only minor differences in the coefficients.

Conversely, the relationship between the globalisation variable and regionalism changes completely when country dummies are controlled for. The variable now actually has a negative impact on regionalism, although the relationship is not statistically significant. This is worrying as it suggests that the observed relationship between globalisation and regionalism in the previous models might have been an artefact of variations in average globalisation index scores across different countries. Certainly, one plausible explanation would be that the globalisation index actually picked up some of the impact of the country dummies, rather than being significantly related to regionalism in itself.

Two of the control variables still have a significant impact on regionalism, although controlling for countries has a diverging effect on them. The impact of the centre/periphery variable is drastically reduced, as peripheries now only score 0.17 higher than centres on the logged regionalism index once the other variables are controlled for, compared to 0.31 in model 2. On the other hand, the impact of regional language is strengthened, with an increase of one point on the index now leading to a 0.26 increase in the predicted logged regionalism index score, compared to 0.18 in model 2. However, the two population variables are no longer significantly related to regionalism once countries are controlled for, and the impact of
absolute population size actually changes direction and becomes negative in the country dummy model.

The analysis of the country dummies shows that the regions do indeed cluster around the countries in which they are located. It is possible to take this into account in the analysis by running a multi-level regression model where the regions are clustered by countries. The model would then be run on two levels: Firstly, as a set of regression analyses within each country; and secondly, as a regression across all countries. Unfortunately, it is not possible to assign weights to the different regions in the clustered regression analysis, and therefore all regions are treated equally in this model, regardless of their sampling variances. Therefore, the results need to be treated with caution. Table 4.11 presents the results of a multi-level regression model that clusters the regions by country.
Table 4.11: Clustered regression
Dependent variable: log (Regionalism index). Clustered by country.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Multi-Level Model</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coeff.</td>
<td>S.E.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign immigration</td>
<td>0.035</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for the EU</td>
<td>0.102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vote distinctiveness</td>
<td>0.010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional GDP per capita</td>
<td>0.333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional language index</td>
<td>0.182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R. does not border capital</td>
<td>0.310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population, millions</td>
<td>0.025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative population size</td>
<td>-0.984</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.601</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N | 212 | 212
R² – within | 0.28
R² – between | 0.41
R² – overall | 0.57
Sigma_u | 0.23
Rho | 0.28

The figures in the columns denote (from left to right): Unstandardised regression coefficients, standard errors of the estimates, and probability level. Numbers in bold: P (two-tailed) < 0.10.

The multi-level regression analysis produces similar results as the regression that controls for country dummies. However, the Europeanisation variable does not have a significant impact on regionalism in the multi-level model, although the relationship is still positive. The other variables retain their impacts on regionalism, with vote distinctiveness, economic development, regional language and not bordering the capital still having significant positive effects on regionalism. Relative and absolute population sizes are still not significantly related to regionalism. The same is true for globalisation, although its impact now resumes being positive.
Omitting the insignificant variables from the multi-level model does not change much in terms of the results, and the results of this are therefore not shown in the table. The same variables are still significantly related to regionalism, and no new variables become significant as a result of this operation. The only notable difference is that the significance level of the economic development variable is strengthened from 0.06 to 0.01.

In terms of the model as a whole, it can explain around 31 percent of the variation in the set. The model explains 28 percent of variation within countries, and 41 percent of the variation across countries on the regionalism index. The intraclass correlation coefficient, Rho, is 0.28, which means that once the other variables are controlled for, the correlation between different regions in the same country is moderate.

4.3 Conclusion

Figure 4.1 presents the model of regionalism on the basis of the cross-sectional analysis. It shows that regionalism is likely to be more prevalent in regions with a high level of economic development and highly regionalised party systems, and which are closely integrated into the European Union. All of these relationships are statistically significant even when country dummies are controlled for. There are also some indications that regionalism is more prevalent in highly globalised regions, although the evidence for this relationship is more insecure as the introduction of country dummies changed the impact of the variable. The uncertainty surrounding this relationship is indicated by a question mark in the model.

Figure 4.1: A model of regionalism
There is particularly strong evidence that regionalised party systems and economic development are closely related to the distribution of regionalism along the cross-sectional dimension. Both of these indicators were closely related to regionalism throughout the models, including when country dummies were controlled for and when the regression was clustered. It also seems likely that Europeanisation is related to regionalism on a cross-sectional level. Whilst this variable was not significantly related to regionalism in the multi-level regression analysis, it remained positive, and it was significantly positive across all the other models.

On the other hand, it is more difficult to reach a definitive conclusion on the relationship between globalisation and regionalism on the basis of this cross-sectional study. Globalisation did have a significant positive effect in the original regression, but its impact ceased to be significant and even turned negative when country dummies were controlled for. This might suggest that the original impact was a result of variations in average levels of globalisation across different countries, and it is still unclear how globalisation impacts on regionalism.

As the introduction of country dummies creates uncertainty around some of the results from the cross-sectional analysis, the model needs to be tested further. It is also interesting to examine how some of the variables that are closely associated with the distribution of regionalism across space perform in explaining regionalism across time. The following chapter will examine the model of regionalism in the form of longitudinal case studies. The cases have been selected to maximise variation across time in the levels of globalisation, economic development and Europeanisation. The developments along these variables will lead to a set of predictions about how regionalism has developed across time in the regions, and these predictions will be tested by a study that seeks to measure the levels of regionalism at different points in the recent history of the regions. The control variables regional language and centre/periphery will still be controlled for as they do not change across time, but additionally, the selection covers one region where there is an indigenous regional language and one region where the national language dominates, in order to examine how the model performs at different levels of this control variable.
5. Case Selection for Longitudinal Analysis

The cross-sectional analysis leaves some questions unanswered, both with regard to the regionalism model as a whole and when it comes to the relationship between globalisation and regionalism. This merits further testing of the model, and the next step of the analysis examines how the model performs when it is tested using a completely different research design. The following two chapters will test the model's ability to predict developments across time in two Western European regions. This serves two purposes: Firstly, it makes it possible to examine the similarities and differences between the variables that can explain variation in the levels of regionalism across space and those that can explain variation across time. Secondly, it allows the regionalism model to be tested on a new set of data, which will make the analysis more robust.

The regions are selected to maximise variation across time within each of the two regions, particularly with regard to the globalisation and economic development variables. On the other hand, it is not necessary for there to be variation between the two cases on these variables, because the case studies are used to explain longitudinal rather than cross-sectional variation. For these purposes, the case studies focus on the development of two petroleum regions since the 1960s: Scotland in the United Kingdom, and Rogaland in Norway.

As petroleum was discovered underneath the sea near both regions in the early 1970s, they have both experienced considerable changes in their economic fortunes and in their relations with the global economy. This combination of circumstances allows for the variation across time on the economic development and globalisation variables that is necessary to properly test the model.

While both regions have experienced fairly similar developments on the two above-mentioned variables, the processes of Europeanisation have been present in different degrees across the two regions. When the United Kingdom joined the European Community (EC) in 1973, a majority of the Norwegian public voted against joining in a closely contested
The longitudinal study of Scotland will thus reveal how Scottish nationalism was affected by its inclusion in the EC and the subsequent deepening of integration through for instance the Maastricht Treaty. Meanwhile, the longitudinal study of Rogaland will examine the development of regionalism across time in the absence of EC/EU membership.

When it comes to the final independent variable, party systems, it seems highly likely that there will have been some degree of variation on this variable across the forty years covered by the case studies. In every region, there is a degree of fluctuation in the support for the various political parties across time, and it seems unlikely that this will follow the variations on the national level across the entire time period. Hence, it was not necessary to select the cases on the basis of their values on this independent variable.

The regional language and centre/periphery control variables will still be controlled for in the case studies, as there have not been any changes to the status of either of these variables across the time period under study in any of these two regions. However, the two regions are also quite different with regard to the language variable, as Scotland does have an indigenous minority language, while Rogaland does not. Indeed, this is indicative of a broader difference in the history and culture of the two regions. Scotland would probably qualify as an ethnie in Smith’s (1986) understanding. It is a historic nation within the United Kingdom with a history of independent statehood and a distinct religious tradition, and it continues to define itself as a nation in its own right. Scottish identity has always been strong, and there are long traditions for the use of symbols such as flags, clothes, music and sports to express this identity. Rogaland, on the other hand, is certainly no ethnie. It is a much smaller region that forms part of the fairly homogeneous and integrated Norwegian nation, and there are no claims to nationhood within the region. It does not have any major historical symbols on which to base a regional identity, and it has no recent experiences of autonomy, nor indeed of regional political power to any significant extent.

The difference between the two cases in terms of their historical and cultural distinctiveness is interesting, as it allows us to examine whether the influence of other causal factors is

---

35 The mobilisation of the regional level in Scotland is regarded as a nationalist movement by most researchers, as well as by the Scottish public. Therefore, the term “Scottish nationalism” will be used throughout this thesis to refer to regionalism in Scotland. The term “regionalism” will still be used when referring to regionalism as a general phenomenon. The discussion will assume that the same theoretical framework can be used to explain both regionalism and Scottish nationalism.
different in regions with high and low degrees of regionalist historical legacies. In order words, it allows us to look at whether there is an interaction effect between culture and other independent variables, and if so, how this interaction works. The diversity in terms of culture and regionalist histories will also make the findings more generalisable, as they can tell us something about both “ethnic” and “ordinary” regions.

This chapter introduces the two cases, discussing their respective political and economic histories and present situations. The developments across the time period from 1960 to 2005 on each of the independent variables are then presented, in order to form a set of predictions with regards to the development of regionalism in each of the cases across the period. The predictions will be tested in the next chapter, in order to examine whether the model is useful in explaining changes in the levels of regionalism across time within individual regions.

5.1 Context

5.1.1 Scotland: United, but not fully integrated

The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland was formed in 1800, when the Kingdom of Ireland was united with the Kingdom of Great Britain. Great Britain itself had been formed in 1707, when Scotland united with England and Wales. Prior to 1999, the United Kingdom was a politically centralised unitary state, save for various attempts at devolution to Northern Ireland. Indeed, the UK regions were among the weakest in Europe in terms of their political autonomy. The country did not have any elected tier of regional government, and the regions were instead run by unelected regional assemblies with a fairly vague role in promoting economic development. Local government was and is run by elected councils, whose powers vary substantially across different types of councils (the main types are boroughs, districts, counties and unitary authorities).

However, Scotland did retain a certain degree of administrative separation under the terms of the Act of Union of 1707. The country retained its own legal system, Scots law, which to some extent is based on civil-law principles, as opposed to the common-law principles that underlies the legal systems of England and Wales, and Northern Ireland (Brown et. al 1998:2). Furthermore, the Scottish education system has remained separate and substantially
different to the English system in terms of the content of the syllabus as well as the length of study, with Scottish university degree programmes lasting for four years as opposed to three in England. The Scottish health system has also been organised independently. Finally, the Scottish Church (the Kirk) has remained independent from the state, and it follows a tradition of Presbyterianism that is decisively shaped by the Scottish reformation. The Church of England, on the other hand, is a state church under the British monarch and follows the Anglican tradition. In sum, this all meant that the Scottish society did not fully integrate with the English and Welsh to create a unified British society. Rather, the UK remained a state that consisted of several different civil societies (Brown et. al 1998:40). This was possible in part because the UK of the 18th century was close to the prototype of the liberal night watchman state, with responsibilities mainly in the areas of foreign policy, defence and justice, and it did not have any ambitions of transforming society.

The status of the Kirk is perhaps particularly important in this context, because prior to the establishment of the Scottish Office and the expanding role of the state, it played an important role in the social sphere, running many important welfare institutions. However, in the second half of the 19th Century, the state was expanding its influence on society, particularly with the emergence of a welfare state, and the influence of the Kirk waned. This led to demands for Scottish influence on the way in which these institutions were run in Scotland. In 1885, this eventually resulted in the creation of the Scottish Office as a distinct bureaucracy that would govern Scotland instead of the country being ruled by sectoral departments within the central administration. The Scottish Office ran the welfare state and acted as a state within the British state. It was accountable to the Secretary of State for Scotland, who was appointed by the UK Prime Minister and served in the central government. The Scottish Office has been regarded as a defender of the Scottish national interest (Brown et. al 1998:13), and its policies were often the result of negotiations between the government and Scottish civil society institutions, rather than dictated from London.

Scotland also retained its independence in many areas of symbolic importance. The country has continued to be represented by its own national sports teams in a range of international competitions, including the football and rugby world cups and the Commonwealth Games. Whilst Scotland uses the British pound, governed by the Bank of England, some Scottish banks are allowed to issue their own banknotes, with distinct Scottish imagery. The Scottish flag has also been widely used, along with several other national symbols.
The centralised nature of the UK was fundamentally changed by the devolution of power to the Scottish Parliament and the National Assembly for Wales in 1999. Whilst sovereign power remains vested in the central UK parliament, these two regions now have substantial powers to legislate in a wide range of policy areas. The UK can therefore now be classified as a regionalised unitary state. In Scotland, devolution established a Scottish Parliament with the power to legislate in all policy areas except those reserved by the central UK Parliament (mainly foreign, defence, economic and fiscal policies). Thus, the Scottish Parliament took over responsibility for all the policy areas that were previously governed by the Scottish Office, as well as gaining the right to vary income tax by up to 3 percent and potentially legislating in new policy areas (Lynch 2001:15). This makes it one of the most powerful regional assemblies in Europe in terms of the number of policy areas it controls. The Scottish Office itself was straightforwardly replaced by the Scottish Executive, which includes an administrative branch as well as a government appointed by the Scottish Parliament.

Scotland occupies the northern third of Great Britain and has five million inhabitants. Around 70 percent of these live in the Central Belt, which includes the capital Edinburgh and the largest city, Glasgow, as well as most other major cities. This also forms the economic centre of the country, with most of the major industries. The financial centre in Edinburgh and the computer technology industry in the Silicon Glen between Edinburgh and Glasgow are particularly important, whilst Glasgow remains an important seaport and manufacturing centre. The rest of the country is sparsely populated, but the third largest city, Aberdeen, is situated outside the Central Belt in the north-eastern part of the country, and it is the main centre for the UK petroleum industry, as well as a major fishing port. To the west of Aberdeen, the rural Highlands are the centre of most major whisky distilleries, another major export. In the late 19th and early 20th Centuries, the Scottish economy was strongly based on heavy industries, and the decline of these caused economic recession and pressures of structural adjustment (Brown et. al 1998:74). However, Scotland has completed its transformation into an economy based on services, technology and petroleum.

5.1.2 Rogaland: Peripherality in a centralised state

Norway has been a sovereign, unitary state for little more than a hundred years. It gained independence from Sweden as late as 1905, but by then the process of nation-building was
already well underway. Since Sweden took Norway from Denmark after the end of the Napoleonic Wars in 1814, Norway had been a separate entity under the Swedish crown (Derry 1973). The country had its own Parliament, its own language (adapted from Danish) and its own constitution. Rather than being integrated into the Swedish state, Norway was a colony, with most decisions being made in Oslo. The colonial bureaucracy had asserted its power and de facto ruled Norway independently of the Swedish metropolis, and after 1884, the Norwegian parliament took over the same position (Seip 1974:13). Oslo was therefore clearly established as the national centre by the time of independence in 1905, when it became the capital of an independent monarchy.

Norway was a late industrialiser in the Western European context, and the process of industrialisation did not fully start until the beginning of the 20th century. Even then, the country continued to rely on the export of fish as its main source of income, and it remained less urbanised than most other industrial countries. Forestry and agriculture has also employed a large number of people throughout the 20th century. The main industries were aluminium and hydroelectricity (Hodne 1975). The discovery of oil and gas resources on the Norwegian Continental Shelf in 1969 gave the impetus to an unprecedented period of growth, restructuring and modernisation in the Norwegian economy. By 1980, production of oil made up 15.7 percent of GDP, and Norway is now the world’s third largest exporter of oil. In 2001, revenues from oil accounted for almost a quarter of GDP and half of all exports, and the oil industry deserves most of the credit for making Norway’s GDP per capita the second largest in Europe (OECD 2002:21f, EIU 2002).

After declaring independence in 1905, Norway pursued a policy of neutrality that it managed to maintain through World War I. However, in World War II, Norway was occupied by Germany from 1940 to 1945. The Conservative and Liberal parties dominated domestic politics, and alternated in government until 1936, but after World War II, Labour won hegemony, and it managed to remain in office for twenty years. Since 1965, Labour has met competition from various coalitions of centre-right parties (Derry 1973). Norway applied for EU membership in 1972 and 1994, but the population narrowly rejected joining in popular referenda on both occasions. Voting patterns revealed an important cleavage between the mainly Europhile urban centres and the overwhelmingly Eurosceptic rural peripheries (Valen and Aardal 1995, Pettersen, Todal Jenssen and Listhaug 1996). However, Norway has been part of the EU’s internal market since its inclusion in 1995 into the European Economic Area.
Counties and provinces

In terms of territorial organisation, Norway is divided into 19 counties and 434 municipalities. Figure 5.1 shows a map outlining the 19 counties. For analytical purposes, the country is also often divided into five provinces, or landsdeler: Eastern, Southern, Western, Central, and Northern Norway. However, there are no administrative entities that correspond to these provinces. Western Norway consists of the counties Rogaland, Hordaland, Sogn og Fjordane, and Møre og Romsdal. These provinces are sometimes referred to as regions, which is confusing in this context. In this thesis, “regions” will refer to the counties, and “provinces” will refer to the five landsdeler.

Fig. 5.1: Norway, map of administrative entities

Counties and municipalities both have directly elected councils, but the county councils have limited powers and operate under strong fiscal constraints. The municipalities are also restricted in terms of taxation, but they do have a substantial degree of autonomy over local policy-making in areas such as education, care for the elderly, area planning and culture. In 2001, municipalities and counties spent 37 percent of total public sector expenditure, but most of this went towards welfare state obligations that were delegated to them from the central state. Health, education and social protection accounted for 78 percent of local government expenditure (Statistisk Sentralbyrå 2002:451).

Rogaland region

Rogaland is in the southwestern part of the country, and has 381,000 inhabitants. As a result of economic growth, the population has grown rapidly over the past 30 years, during which period Rogaland has had by far the fastest growing population of any Norwegian region. From 1970 to 2000, the population grew by 37.6 percent, from 260,000 in 1970 to 369,000 in 2000. No other regions had growth rates above 26 percent during the same period, and in the country as a whole, the population grew by 14.7 percent. Figure 5.2 shows a map of Rogaland, delineating its municipalities and geographic zones. The twin cities of Stavanger and Sandnes constitute the largest urban area, with 162,000 inhabitants. This is also where most industrial and service production takes place. The southern part of the region, Jæren, is a predominantly agricultural area, although short distances mean that an increasing number of commuters from Stavanger also live here. A total number of 246,000 people live in Stavanger, Sandnes and Jæren. Haugesund is the main city in the northern part of the region. 40,000 people live in the city, nearly half of North Rogaland’s 86,000 inhabitants. The main industries in this part of Rogaland are shipping and fisheries. Ryfylke, to the east of the county, is more scarcely populated and mountainous. Only 23,000 people live here, and the population is ageing: 26.3 percent of the population is over the age of 55, against 21.9 percent for the region as a whole (Statistisk Sentralbyrå 2002:73).
The economic history of Rogaland is a story of ups and downs. Since 1800, the region has experienced three major waves of growth and prosperity based around successes in different sectors. Between 1820 and 1870, herring fisheries and the related shipping trade made the region one of the wealthiest in the country. However, due to the domination of fisheries and agriculture, industrialisation got off to a late start in Rogaland. The period from 1870 to 1890 was therefore one of stagnation, as the region lost its dominant position in the fishing trade. When the region did industrialise, it industrialised explosively. Between 1900 and 1920, Rogaland almost trebled its share of national industrial labour, even though this was a period of rapid industrialisation in the entire country. The first major spell of industrialisation in Rogaland was again related to fisheries and shipping. The main industry was the canning industry, specialising in exporting canned brisling and mackerel. Shipping remained an important trade, and the region also became home to a burgeoning shipyard industry. However, all of these industries collapsed after 1920, when the reduced stocks of brisling in the North Sea severely hampered supplies, and the prices fell on the world market (Nordvik 1987). The period of stagnation lasted until 1970, when the discovery of petroleum in the North Sea made Rogaland the most prosperous Norwegian region apart from Oslo. In no area
have the effects of Norway’s economic transformation into a petroleum-exporting country been stronger than in Rogaland.

5.2 Model predictions

Ideally, the regionalism model should be capable of explaining variations in the levels of regionalism across time as well as space. Hence, the model that was developed on the basis of variation across space should also be able to explain variation in regionalism across time if it is truly a causal model. This proposition can be examined through studying how each of the independent variables have changed across time in individual regions, and using this information to make predictions about how this will have affected regionalism. The predictions can then be compared to how regionalism actually developed across time to assess whether the model can successfully explain variation in the levels of regionalism across time.

This section examines how each of the four independent variables from the regionalism model has changed through the period from the 1960s to 2000 in Scotland and in Rogaland. The variation in the independent variables is used to make a set of predictions about how regionalism will have developed in each of the two regions over the same time period. In the next chapter, these predictions will be compared to actual measures of the levels of regionalism in the two regions through the same period.

5.2.1 Scotland: European integration, British divergence

The recent history of Scotland is characterised by a growth in each of the independent variables of the regionalism model. The region has become increasingly integrated into the EU, and also increasingly optimistic about European integration. Meanwhile, the Scottish economy has retained its international perspective, and it has gone through periods of strong growth both in the 1970s and in the 1990s. There has also been an increasing tendency towards divergence between the Scottish and British voting patterns, in particular because of the Scottish rejection of the Conservative Party under Margaret Thatcher. Based on the regionalism model, the levels of nationalism in Scotland should therefore have gone through major changes since the late 1960s.
The Scottish economy has traditionally been quite global in nature. Its small population size has meant that the domestic market is not large enough to provide the basis for modern industries, and the economy has therefore been export-oriented (McCrone 1993:5). Early industrialisation also contributed to trade, migration and foreign investments being notable features (Mitchell 1997:406f). Scotland is still among the most export-oriented regions in the UK. According to Zürn and Lange (1999:21), Scotland accounts for more than 10 percent of UK exports, yet only around 8.5 percent of the population.

The proportion of immigrants in Scotland has increased gradually over the period from 1965 to 2005. However, the country has not been particularly heavily affected by immigration compared to other areas of the UK. In 1991, 2.5 percent of Scotland’s population were born outside the UK, whereas the foreign born made up 5.8 percent of the population in the UK as a whole. In 2001, the proportion in Scotland had risen to 3.3 percent, whilst the corresponding proportion for the UK had risen to 7.5 percent. In both of these years, Scotland had a lower proportion of immigrants than all of the English regions, except for the North East, although it did have a higher proportion of immigrants than Wales. The proportion of immigrants in Scotland grew at roughly the same rate as the proportion in the UK as a whole through the period from 1991 to 2001 (BBC 07.09.2005; Kyambi 2005).

As an early industrialiser, the Scottish economy relied mainly on heavy industries at the beginning of the 20th century. The decline of these industries subsequently led to an extended period of economic decline lasting well into the 1960s, and the regional GDP per capita stood at below 90 percent of the UK average as recently as 1967. The economy grew strongly in the late 1960s and early 1970s with the discovery of North Sea oil, having almost caught up with the national average by 1976, when the Scottish GDP was 98.5 percent of the UK average. Scotland maintained its relative economic position more or less until 1983, but suffered from economic decline through the last half of the 1980s. In the 1990s, the economy picked up again with the development of a knowledge-intensive economy, with the Glasgow-Edinburgh area refashioned as the Silicon Glen because of the new high-tech industries. By 1994, Scotland’s GDP even exceeded the UK average – a rare feat in the centralised British
Due to a lack of consistency in the wording of questions, it is hard to track the levels of support for European integration in Scotland across time using survey data. However, a comparison with data for the UK as a whole does provide a good indication of the development of attitudes towards the EU in Scotland. These suggest that Scots have become increasingly positive towards the European level. In the 1975 referendum, the support for continued UK membership of the EC was markedly lower in Scotland, at 58.4 percent, than in England (68.7 %) and Wales (64.8 %). Data from the British Social Attitudes Survey series suggest that Scottish views on European integration gradually converged with the rest of the UK, catching up in the mid-1980s. Since the late 1980s, the Scottish public have consistently been more positive about the EU than the English and Welsh.

---

36 All GDPR data in this section are drawn from Office for National Statistics (1996). It is worth noting that Scotland's GDPR excludes the production on the Continental Shelf, and hence any direct revenues from petroleum production are not credited to Scotland's GDPR. The same is true in the case of Rogaland, thus underestimating the extent of the economic boom in both regions post-1970.

37 From 1983 to 1991, the comparison between Scottish and British opinions refers to respondents agreeing that "Britain should continue to be a member of the EU". From 1993 to 1995, it refers to respondents agreeing that "Britain should be closer to EEC" and "Britain should do all it can to unite fully with the EU". From 1996 to 2000, the comparison refers to the respondents agreeing that "Britain should leave the EU" or that "Britain should stay in the EU and work to reduce the EU's powers".
The most obvious development in the Scottish party system since the 1960s is the emergence of the Scottish National Party (SNP) in the late 1960s. Whilst the SNP created a new political dynamic in Scottish politics that differed from the British political competition, its emergence is also essentially a cause of Scottish nationalism, and it must therefore be disregarded in an attempt at predicting the development of said nationalism. The Lee Index scores for Scotland therefore only consider the differences between Scotland and Great Britain in terms of the support for the national parties, i.e. the Conservatives, Labour and the Liberals. The development of this variable across the parliamentary elections from 1964 to 2001 is shown in figure 5.4. The data reveal a steadily increasing difference between the Scottish and British electorates, with the Lee Index growing steadily from 3.4 in 1966 to 16.5 in 1987, before dropping over the next decade to 9.7 in the 1997 elections.

**Fig. 5.4: Scotland, divergence from national party system**

Scotland has seen each of the four independent variables grow through the period from 1965 to 2005. Compared to 1965, Scotland in 2005 is more prosperous, more dependent on the global economy, more deeply integrated into the EU, and more distinct from the rest of the UK in terms of the distribution of support for political parties. The regionalism model would thus unequivocally predict that levels of nationalism will have grown in Scotland during this period. Yet, looking more closely at the developments along each of the four dimensions, it is clear that the growth in each variable has not been uniform. The Scottish economy grew
mainly in the early 1970s, and again in the 1990s, whilst it experienced a recession through most of the 1980s. The party system dissimilarity also grew during the 1970s, but it continued growing well into the recession of the 1980s, and declined during the early 1990s. Hence, these two variables predict different evolutionary paths for Scottish nationalism from the mid-1980s onwards, with the party systems variable predicting a growth and then a decline, whilst the economic development variable predicts precisely the opposite.

The European integration variable predicts a more steady development, with a gradual deepening of European integration, and a gradual growth of support for the EU, through the entire time period. Yet, key events such as the UK accession in 1973, the introduction of the Single European Market in 1986 and the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 should be reflected in growing levels of regionalism in the wake of these developments. Similarly, the globalisation variable also predicts a steady growth in regionalism through the period.

The evolution of Scottish nationalism through the period from 1965 to 2005 can potentially reveal a great deal about which of the independent variables from the model have had the strongest impact on the development of regionalism across time. The suggested paths of steady growth or growth interrupted by decline in the 1980s or in the 1990s form three separate predictions for how Scottish nationalism will have evolved through the period.

5.2.2 Rogaland: Economic and social transformation
Rogaland’s emergence in the 1970s as a centre for the international oil industry brought sudden changes to the region both in the shape of economic growth and in opening up the region to the global economy. If the regionalism model is correct, this will have improved the conditions for regionalism in the region, and it seems likely that there will have been changes in the levels of regionalism the wake of the economic transformation in the early 1970s. On the other hand, Rogaland has not been affected by European integration to a great extent, being part of a state that has not joined the EC/EU, and the regional party system has become more similar to the national system since the 1970s.

The regional economy has grown increasingly dependent on foreign investment over the past forty years. The principal reason for this is the discovery of petroleum resources on the Norwegian Continental Shelf in the North Sea in the late 1960s, a lot of which were located
off the coast of Rogaland. The region’s major city, Stavanger, soon became the country’s oil capital\textsuperscript{38}, home to the Petroleum Directorate, the state-owned oil company Statoil, and some thirty international companies in the period 1971-1973 (Nordvik 1987). The internationalisation continued as the development of the petroleum industry progressed, primarily caused by the demands for skilled labour imposed by the industry. For the same reason, the country welcomed foreign oil companies to partake in the development of the industry, and major international businesses such as Phillips, Mobil, Elf, Shell and Exxon set up large operations in Stavanger. In addition, a host of contractor and sub-contractor businesses operate in relation to the oil industry.

As a result of the demands for skilled labour imposed by the industry, immigration to Rogaland has soared since the start of the oil-age, particularly from the Netherlands, France, United Kingdom and the United States. In addition, the refugee and asylum population has grown steadily since the early 1970s, with Vietnamese, Bosnians and Turks making up the largest numbers (Pettersen 2003, 25). In 2001, around 22,500 foreign nationals lived in Rogaland, making up six percent of the population. Just under half of these were of Western descent, and 70 percent lived in the Stavanger area, which had the second largest proportion of immigrants in the country, behind Oslo (Lie 2002, 29). Figure 5.5 shows the increase from 1970 to 2002 in the proportion of the population who had no Norwegian-born parents. As the figure shows, the immigrant population in Rogaland has risen steadily throughout the period. Rogaland had a higher proportion of immigrants than the national average from approximately 1974 to 1994, but it has had a smaller proportion than the average since 1995. This is mainly due to the high concentration of immigrants in and around Oslo.

\textsuperscript{38} The petrolisation processes have obviously had a greater impact on the city of Stavanger than on the rest of the region. However, the region as a whole has certainly also been affected by the developments. Approximately 75 percent of the population of Rogaland live within one hour's travel from Stavanger, and another 20 percent live near Haugesund, where there has also been a considerable growth in petroleum-related employment. According to Smith-Solbakken (1997), most of the offshore workers were recruited from rural areas in Rogaland, mainly from fishing and farming communities.
The impact of these developments on the regional economy can be readily seen in the GDPR statistics on that the Norwegian Central Bureau of Statistics (Statistisk Sentralbyrå) has developed with irregular intervals since 1965. The data shows radical improvement in Rogaland’s contribution to GDP. From 1965 to 1993 – during a period where the national economy grew by almost 5 percent a year – GDPR grew from 88 percent of the national average in 1965 to 112 percent in 1993 (Statistisk Sentralbyrå 1970; 1998). In 1965, Rogaland’s production made up only 5.1 percent of the national GDP. By 1973, this figure had risen to 6.0 percent, and it remained stable around 6 percent throughout the 1970s and 80s. In the 1990s, Rogaland’s contribution to GDP was even stronger, varying between 7.5 and 8 percent. Although the population has risen during the same period, Rogaland’s GDPR per capita has also grown, as the region has gone from a GDPR per capita well below the national average to being the most productive region apart from Oslo. Figure 5.6 shows the development of Rogaland’s GDPR per capita as a proportion of the national average. In 1965, the region’s GDPR per capita was only 88 percent of the national average. By 1973, the region was at par with the national average, and it remained so throughout the 1970s. Since 1983, Rogaland’s GDPR per capita has been well above the national average, peaking at 112 percent in 1993, and averaging 107 percent in the period 1983 – 2000 (Statistisk Sentralbyrå 1970, 1978a, 1980, 1984, 1987, 1990, 1998, 2000a, 2000b and 2003). In most of the years for which data exist, Rogaland and Oslo/Akershus were the only two regions to record GDPR per capita figures above the national average. In short, apart from the centre, Rogaland is in a
league of its own among the counties when it comes to economic development as measured by GDPR per capita\textsuperscript{39}. These figures clearly show Rogaland's development from an economically disadvantaged, peripheral region to a position at the centre of Norwegian economy (Nordvik 1987:162). This is remarkable given the centralised nature of the Norwegian economy.

**Fig. 5.6: Development of Rogaland's relative GDPR per capita**

![Graph showing the development of Rogaland's relative GDPR per capita from 1965 to 2000.](image)


The increased production had a direct effect on the personal income of the average citizen in Rogaland. In 2000, the average worker had an annual income of 246000 Norwegian kroner. Only in Oslo/Akershus did the average worker earn more (Statistisk Sentralbyrå 2003). Among the major cities, Stavanger went from having the lowest average income in some years before 1970 to the highest in 1990. Oil-related production dominates the labour market, especially in and around Stavanger, where around 30 percent of the population probably work in businesses that are directly related to the petroleum industry (Melberg 1997:12ff).

\textsuperscript{39} This is true even though all offshore production is kept outside the account. This type of production has also risen sharply, and the “unallocated” share of GDP made up 24.7 percent in 2000, against 14.2 percent in 1965 (SSB 1970, 2003). Most of this can be attributed to offshore petroleum production in the North Sea, which overwhelmingly uses labour from Rogaland, is controlled from Stavanger, and takes place off the West Coast. Hjellum (2000) picks up this point, when he questions the rationale behind leaving out the offshore production. Even though the Continental Shelf is regarded as national territory, the resources as well as the labour are mainly Western Norwegian, according to him.
When it comes to European integration, one major objection is that Norway is not a member of the European Union, and so it would seem implausible that the EU would have had much of an effect. The country is indeed not very strongly affected by several of the EU-related developments hypothesised to have an effect on regionalism. Rogaland only has access to structural funds through its participation in Interreg programmes, and the direct pull from Brussels is thus not very strong in this case (Grindheim 2004:71f). Yet European integration has clearly affected Norway as well, most obviously through its membership of the single market through the EEA agreement. The country is also a signatory to the Schengen Agreement, which could be expected to aid the construction of a European identity in Norway (according to Bruter 2005:159, for instance).

However, data on European identities in Rogaland suggest that there has not been much variation on this variable that could explain the growth of regionalism in the region. The voting behaviour of the regional public in the referenda on Norwegian accession to the EU certainly fails to show any development in the construction of European identities in Rogaland. In both 1972 and 1994, a majority of around 55 percent of the region’s population voted against Norwegian membership of the European Community and EU, respectively (Statistisk Sentralbyrå 1995:56), making the region more Eurosceptic than the country as a whole on both occasions. Seven Norwegian counties had higher levels of support for membership than Rogaland in 1972, whereas in 1994, six did.

The regional party system in Rogaland has become increasingly similar to the Norwegian party system during the period from 1961 to 2001. Figure 5.7 shows the development of the Lee index of dissimilarity between the vote distribution in Rogaland and Norway in elections to the national parliament. Across this period, the Lee index dropped from a high of 18.0 in the 1961 election to a low of 10.2 in the 1993 election. The largest changes in the regional relative to the national party system took place between 1973 and 1989, when the index score dropped from 17.5 to 11.1. In contrast, the index scores were relatively stable until 1973, and again from 1989 onwards.
Fig. 5.7: Rogaland, divergence from national party system

The model provides contrasting predictions for the development of regionalism in Rogaland across time. The globalisation and economic development variables both clearly suggest that regionalism will have grown during the period from 1960 to 2000. In particular, the oil boom of the 1970s should result in a growth in regionalism, but a steadily growing economy and increasing globalisation throughout the period suggest that the levels of regionalism will have gone steadily up in the 1980s and 1990s as well. However, the party systems variable provides the opposite prediction, with the Rogaland party system becoming increasingly similar to the Norwegian system, particularly from 1973 to 1989. This suggests that regionalism will have declined gradually throughout the period. Finally, European integration has not changed a great deal through the period and should therefore not affect the levels of regionalism.

5.3 Conclusion

This chapter has presented the two cases Scotland and Rogaland, discussing their recent political and economic histories and presenting indicators of their evolution along each of the independent variables in the regionalism model developed in chapter 4. The model has subsequently been used to predict developments across time with regards to regionalism in the two regions. These predictions will now be put to the test against some indicators of
actual levels of regionalism in the two regions in the period from 1960 to 2005. The next chapter will examine whether the regionalism model is capable of explaining variations in the levels of regionalism across time within individual regions through assessing whether it can correctly predict developments in Scotland and Rogaland.
Various operational measures of regionalism were previously discussed in relation to the cross-sectional study, and chapter 3 developed a measure that provided reliable and valid data across a large number of regions in Western Europe. However, the regression analysis in chapter 4 also established the need for testing the model of regionalism in a different research design. The model test takes the form of a longitudinal study of regionalism in two cases, Scotland and Rogaland, and this chapter will provide data on how regionalism has developed across time in these two regions.

The analysis of longitudinal variation in the context of a particular case requires a different approach to measuring regionalism. The cross-sectional measure of regionalism relied on survey data, where respondents had stated their level of attachment to their regions and states. However, this approach is not available in the longitudinal study, as researchers have only recently started to survey regional identities and regionalist attitudes. The first surveys of popular attachment to the regional level in Rogaland were conducted as recently as the mid-1990s, and even then, the number of respondents was too low to allow for any meaningful conclusions to be drawn. The data on Scotland is more reliable, but even there, the Moreno question has only been asked since 1986. In order to compare levels of regionalism across time, it is necessary to measure past levels of regionalism in a reliable and valid way. This chapter raises several methods that can be used for such purposes, with the aim of describing the development of regionalism in the two regions as accurately as possible by combining the data collected through the various measures.

The chapter measures how regionalism has developed between the 1960s and the 2000s in Scotland and in Rogaland, showing that levels of regionalism are not constant in the two regions across time, and it successfully tracks the variations across the period. Through comparing the patterns of regionalism during the period to the predictions from the preceding chapter, it can be assessed whether the regionalism model can successfully explain variations in the levels of regionalism across time. The first section discusses the development of Scottish nationalism in the period from 1965 to 2005, i.e. from before the emergence of the
Scottish National Party (SNP) until after the establishment of a devolved Scottish Parliament. The chapter looks at various indicators of the level of nationalism at different time points, including referenda and survey material, the support for the SNP and data on the saliency of Scotland in regional newspapers, concluding that most indicators suggest a rise in Scottish nationalism across this period. In particular, Scottish nationalism appears to have grown strongly in the 1970s and 1990s. The second section presents data on the development of regionalism in Rogaland between 1960 and 2000, mainly on the basis of newspaper content analysis. The analysis shows that regionalism seems to have grown steadily in Rogaland through the period. The quantitative data are supported by references to institutional and political developments that are indicative of a rise of regionalism through the period.

6.1 Scotland: The path to Parliament

In the case of Scotland, there are a wide range of indicators that can provide an insight into the development of nationalism across time. In this chapter, I will look at four such types of indicators. Most obviously, the two referenda on devolution, in 1979 and 1997, provide the most solid measurement of opinions towards Scotland as a political community. These referenda are accompanied by a series of surveys measuring both attitudes towards constitutional change and political identification for a wider number of years. Furthermore, the development in support for the party political vehicle of Scottish nationalism, the Scottish National Party, also provides a valuable insight into changing levels of nationalism across time. Finally, a newspaper content analysis of two Scottish newspapers will determine how the position of Scotland has changed across time in the minds of its inhabitants.

6.1.1 Devolution referenda

The obvious change from the 1979 referendum on devolution of power, which failed, to the 1997 referendum, which was successful, provides a puzzle that has generated a degree of interest in the development of Scottish nationalism across time (e.g. Dardanelli 2005a). The referenda are probably the most solid measure of the extent of nationalist sentiments in Scotland. They encompass the entire voting population and voters had both the information and the time to make a considered decision as the referenda came at the end of political campaigns where one can assume that political learning had taken place. The potential impact
of the voting decision also contributes to a more considered decision, and allows the study to tap into revealed, rather than stated, preferences.

In addition to the outcomes of the referenda themselves, the very fact that they took place gives an indication of the levels of demand for constitutional change. Devolution was not a major issue in Scottish politics before 1965, but by the mid-1970s, the idea was backed by a clear majority of the Scottish public. Support was consistently stronger in surveys than in the actual referendum of 1979, but a majority of voters (51.6 percent) still supported the idea in the referendum in a turnout of 63.6 percent. However, the bill eventually collapsed due to a stipulation that 40 percent of the entire electorate needed to vote in favour. The desire for devolution never really disappeared, and surveys throughout the 1980s and 1990s showed strong support among the Scottish public. By the time a new referendum was held in 1997, the support for devolution had risen to a massive 74.3 percent, and as many as 63.3 percent voted in favour of giving the new parliament tax-raising powers, in a turnout of 60.2 percent (Lynch 2001).

6.1.2 Constitutional preference and identification in surveys

While the referenda provide the most solid measure, they only cover two time points and can give little information on the development of public opinion in between. Fortunately, the study of Scottish nationalism benefits from the availability of several surveys that track similar indicators across time.

The issue of constitutional preference itself is measured in a wide range of surveys between 1974 and 2003, which have been compiled into a time series by Martínez-Herrera (2005). This data shows that the proportion of Scots favouring independence remains fairly stable at around 21 percent through the 1970s, before increasing to a peak of 36 percent in 1986 and dropping off to 23 percent again in 1992. In the 1990s, the support for independence again increased steadily to a level of around 30 percent in the years since 2000. The support for home rule was very unstable through the 1970s, but stabilised in the early 1980s and started growing gradually from 1984 to 2000 (Martínez-Herrera 2005:325).

Several other surveys have attempted to measure relative identification with Scotland and Britain, mostly using the Moreno question. This was introduced in a survey in the Glasgow
Herald in 1986, and has since been used in fourteen different surveys by various researchers and in a wide range of context. Although the intervals have been irregular and the methodology and questionnaire frames have been different on each occasion, this still provides broadly comparable data across time.

Martinez-Herrera (2005:321) has compiled this data into a time series as well, showing a fairly stable level of relative identification with Scotland and Britain over the period from 1986 to 2003. The proportion of primarily Scottish identifiers remained reasonably constant throughout the period. On the other hand, the proportion of exclusively Scottish identifiers dropped steeply from 1986 to 1992, before it increased steadily through the 1990s, and subsequently started to decrease again after 2001 (Martinez-Herrera 2005:323).

Brown et. al (1998:208ff) look more closely at one of the surveys covered by Martínez-Herrera, the 1997 Scottish Election Survey, finding that Scottish identity is given prominence over British identity across all political parties, social classes, regions, religious affiliations and both genders. In terms of political parties, Scottish identity is, unsurprisingly, strongest among SNP supporters and weakest among Conservatives. However, twice as many Conservatives still give preference to their Scottish identity as do to their British identity. There are also slight differences when it comes to social class, with working-class people more likely to emphasize their Scottishness, and when it comes to religion, with Catholics appearing more likely than Protestants to identify as Scots. Scottish identity is also somewhat stronger in the central areas, particularly East Central Scotland, than in the peripheries.

The same authors also look at the connection between political identity and constitutional preference, finding a fairly strong connection. Respondents favouring independence were by far the most likely to identify themselves as Scottish, with 40 percent claiming an exclusively Scottish identity, and 80 percent a predominantly Scottish identity. However, there was also an overweight of Scottish identifiers favouring the status quo [prior to devolution], with 12 percent in this group identifying themselves exclusively as Scottish, and 35 percent as predominantly Scottish. Conversely, only 12 percent in this group identified themselves as predominantly British. Finally, among the proponents of home rule (i.e. devolution) 18 percent identified themselves as exclusively Scottish, and 61 percent as predominantly Scottish (Brown et. al 1998:211).
6.1.3 Nationalist voting

Besides demands for self-government, Scottish nationalism has also been reflected in the emergence of a political vehicle, the Scottish National Party, which has been a significant party in the Scottish political landscape since 1970. Of course, the SNP’s share of the vote does not necessarily equate to the share of nationalists in Scotland, as there will always be nationalists voting for other parties, as well as some non-nationalists voting for the SNP. However, the SNP is essentially a centrist political party, with social democratic, liberal and conservative elements to its programme, and it is mainly the nationalist foundation that separates it from the other parties. This makes the SNP vote a reasonable proxy for Scottish nationalism, and one for which there is more complete historical data than any alternative measures. Recently, the party has had a similar political platform as Labour, with the crucial difference that it advocated independence for Scotland (Brown et al. 1998), and its rise to electoral prominence thus demonstrates that there was considerable resonance for politicising the regional level in Scotland. The SNP has always been committed to the pursuit of an independent Scottish state, although the majority has also tended to favour devolution as a move towards that goal.

The SNP was founded in the interwar years, but it did not manage to elicit any widespread support before its major electoral breakthrough in 1970. In these elections, it won 11.4 percent of the Scottish vote – a share that was to rise to 30.4 percent by the time of the October 1974 elections (Leeke 2003:13). Figure 6.1 shows the percentage of the Scottish population who voted for the SNP, or the average annual support for the party in System 3 opinion polls in non-election years (data from Hassan and Lynch 2001). It should be noted that the growth in support for the SNP from 1979 to 1997 correlates with the growth in support for devolution. This indicates that the development of the SNP vote provides a useful proxy for variation in the levels of Scottish nationalism over time.
As the figure shows, the SNP vote started growing in the late 1960s, and reaching its peak in 1976. The support for the party subsequently fell as Labour fielded a proposal for devolution in the lead-up to the 1979 referendum, and it stabilised at around 15 percent in the 1980s. However, the party reawakened in the 1990s, growing gradually to 29 percent in 1997. The SNP then started to decline following the second devolution referendum.

6.1.4 Newspaper content analysis

In order to complete the picture of the development of nationalism, a longitudinal content analysis of Scottish newspapers can reveal additional information about the saliency of Scottish nationalism, and of Scotland as a community, across time. If there has been a change in the amount of space devoted to Scotland as a whole across time, it would provide an indication that the region has become more (or less) important in the everyday lives of its inhabitants through the period of study. Thus, the data can complement the other indicators to provide a more complete picture of the development of Scottish nationalism. This is
particularly important for the early part of the period, which is not covered by survey data and referenda. For this period, the data on the support for the SNP provides information on the politicisation of nationalism, but the newspaper data will supplement this with information on the position of Scotland in the broader society.

**Background**

In content analysis studies, documents, and not people, are the units of study. In quantitative content analysis, the mass of information that has been produced by the writing community is broken down into numbers that can be analysed using normal statistical methods. This is a process whereby much information is lost, but new information is also created. The statistical analysis reveals patterns in the texts that would not otherwise be apparent to us, and this can be helpful in the study of various empirical phenomena. In this regard, quantitative content analysis is similar to other quantitative designs, such as surveys.

Content analysis can be used to study the content in itself, but also the context in which it is produced. Through studying content, one can learn something about its writers, as well as its readers. Texts are means of communication between a sender and a receiver, and a text reveals both what a sender wants to communicate and how he thinks this message can be most effectively put across to the receiver. Through feedback, the receiver can also communicate to the sender what kinds of communication he wants to receive. This is for instance the case in the media industry, where the market provides a mechanism for readers to communicate to newspapers which kinds of material they find interesting. By watching its sales and circulation figures, the newspaper can adjust its contents to what the public want to read.

Bauer (2000) explains how a longitudinal content analysis design can be used to track changes in public opinion over time. He considers content analysis to be a form of public opinion research, as the texts express the values, attitudes and opinions of the community. Through newspaper archives, one can thus construct historical data to get an indication of public opinion in the past (Bauer 2000:135). A newspaper survives by covering the issues that concern its potential readers, and it has to stay in touch with public opinion to achieve success in the market. It is therefore reasonable to see the ideas expressed in a newspaper as a reflection of the public opinion among its readers at any given time.
Of course, the degree to which the newspaper content corresponds to public opinion might vary. An editorial change might for instance provoke a change in content without any change in public opinion, or a newspaper could differ from public opinion in certain areas whilst matching it more closely in others. Such considerations will have to be taken into account in the development of the research design, with particular notice to the validation of the research findings. However, the connection between a newspaper and its readership can broadly be expected to hold in most cases, and it has formed the core of a rich body of content analysis research into a variety of topics across the social sciences.

Apart from making it possible to measure public opinion in the past when other data are unavailable, content analysis also has the advantage that the act of measuring does not cause the data to change. In a survey, there is always a danger that the respondents will alter their replies in order to present themselves in a certain way. By contrast, quantitative content analysis measures data that has been produced independently of the study, and without its author knowing that it would be used for research purposes in the future. As such, it is “a nonobtrusive, nonreactive measurement technique” (Riffe, Lacy and Fico 1998:30). In the study of identity, this addresses one common criticism of quantitative research strategies, namely the suggestion that feelings of identity are too subjective to be amenable to quantification (e.g. Bruter 2004:23). With a content analysis design, we can apply a uniform definition of the terms across various cases, whilst at the same time studying the material more closely to gain a fuller understanding of its meaning.

Surveys also have limited potential in measuring the strength of identity beyond a limited number of alternatives, where a large proportion usually place themselves in the highest order category (“very strongly attached” in the Eurobarometer surveys, for instance). By exploiting the power of markets in measuring the intensity of demand, the content analysis design is able to overcome this problem. The audience a newspaper can expect to attract when publishing material about the region depends both on how many people want to read about the region and on how important this is to them. In turn, this means that the measure of regionalism produced by the content analysis will take into account the extent of regional identity as well as its intensity.

The notion that press coverage is an expression of public opinion is something of an inversion of the common perception in discussions about the role of the media in modern
society. It is often argued that the press influences public opinion, a view that has been prominent in media and communications research. However, Riffe, Lacy and Fico (1998:9) distinguish between content analyses that seek to explain the effect of the message, and those that consider content an expression of antecedent social conditions. Whilst there are certainly indications that the media do to some extent influence public opinion, it should also be clear that a newspaper that is completely out of touch with pre-existing public opinion would have a short life span in a market economy. Such ties to public opinion can be the result of conscious editorial decisions to provide the product that is in public demand, as well as of more subconscious judgments on the part of the journalists, who are influenced by their social and cultural context in their decisions about which stories to cover (Riffe, Lacy and Fico 1998:7).

Content analysis has its limitations with regards to comparing the extent of regionalism across different cases. Regional newspapers do not share the same environment in every region, and it might therefore be difficult to compare the results from content analysis studies of two different newspapers directly. The environment may of course also change over time within the same region, but external variables that may affect the results are likely to remain more similar within the same region over time than across different regions at the same point in time. The content analysis design is therefore probably more appropriate for tracking changes in the public opinion within a single region over time, and any study that seeks to use this design to compare the strength of regionalism across different regions should be wary of the need to control for external variables that may affect the results. Such issues may include the existence and strength of other regional media, as well as the extent of regional news in the national newspapers.

Notwithstanding these limitations, classical content analysis provides a systematic method for reducing the mass of data that a newspaper produces. This is achieved through sampling and coding the articles into a set of quantitative data. In this way, selection bias is minimized, and objectivity in the analysis of historical documents becomes possible. The next two subsections outline the design of the content analysis study in the case of Scotland, tackling issues of newspaper selection, sampling, coding, reliability and validity.
Newspaper selection

There is no single dominant newspaper that covers all sections of the Scottish market. Rather, there are several different newspapers that all have substantially different profiles and appeal to different segments of the population. The largest daily newspaper in terms of circulation is the *Daily Record*, with an average net circulation of 407,000 copies in 2005 (Audit Bureau of Circulation 2006). This is far more than any other Scottish newspaper, and it is only matched by the Scottish edition of the British newspaper *The Sun* (395,000 copies). The *Daily Record* is based in Glasgow and it is regarded as a down-market tabloid aimed at the working classes. It also has a distinct left-wing political outlook and remains affiliated with the Labour party.

Due to the size of its readership, the *Daily Record* should certainly be included in the newspaper analysis. However, the relatively segmented nature of its readership makes it difficult to make inferences about all of Scotland on the basis of this newspaper alone. Compared to the rest of the population, the *Daily Record* readership is more heavily located in urban areas and in the central areas of the country, less educated, more concentrated on manual labour and more left-wing. According to the National Readership Survey (2006), which covers the UK as a whole, it is read by 3.5 percent of respondents in the lower social classes (C2DE), but only 1.8 percent in the higher classes (ABC1)\(^40\). It would therefore be necessary to include an additional newspaper that would widen the representativeness of the selection.

The Scottish quality press lags far behind the tabloid newspapers in terms of readership, and the market is fairly evenly spread between four “broadsheet” (some have recently switched to a tabloid format) newspapers based in different areas of the country. The largest of these is the Aberdeen-based *Press and Journal*, with an average net circulation of 85,000 copies, followed by the Dundee-based *Courier & Advertiser* with 78,000 copies, the Glasgow-based *The Herald* (73,000) and the Edinburgh-based *The Scotsman* (62,000) (Audit Bureau of Circulation 2006). Although the latter two are often classified as national Scottish newspapers, whereas the former are classified as regional ones, all four papers mainly have a regionally defined readership, and the distinction therefore seems to be a result of the geographical location of their printing presses more than of their readership. All four rank far

---

\(^{40}\) This equates to a much higher proportion of Scottish readers, as little more than 8 percent of the inhabitants of the UK live in Scotland and the *Daily Record* hardly has any readers outside the region.
ahead of the largest selling English broadsheet in Scotland, which is *The Times* with a
circulation of 30,000 copies.

As the *Press and Journal* is the largest of the Scottish broadsheets, it is the most obvious
candidate for selection. However, it is also a suitable candidate because its peripheral north
east readership complements the central, Glasgow profile of the *Daily Record*. The *Press and
Journal* covers the Grampians, Highlands and Islands, i.e. the north and north east of
Scotland. Another consideration is that it is popular among both middle-class and working-
class readers across the political spectrum. According to the National Readership Survey
(2006), its market share is 0.5 percent of the British middle class population (ABC1), and 0.4
percent in the working classes (C2DE). The selection of these two newspapers therefore
makes it possible to cover as wide a range of the Scottish public as possible when making
inferences about their readership.

The study covers the years 1965, 1985 and 2005, which provide an even distribution across
the period of interest. This particular selection also avoids possible selection bias that might
have occurred from including time points close to the devolution referenda, which are in
themselves likely to have led to more stories in the press about Scotland as a political unit.
For the *Press and Journal*, the study analysed the main Aberdeen morning edition of the
newspaper.

**Research design**
The sampling method used was the constructed week, which has been shown both by
Stempel (1952) and by Riffe, Aust and Lacy (1993) to provide results that are remarkably
closer to population averages than any alternative methods. The same studies demonstrate
that two constructed weeks are sufficient to estimate the yearly news profile of a daily
newspaper. In the constructed week, one issue is included from each day of the week, thus
allowing the researcher to control for systematic variations in the content of the newspaper
over the different days of the week. The sampling procedure also made sure one issue was
sampled from each month, in order to control for seasonal variations. All text items within
each issue were then coded, excluding advertisements, comic strips and routine statistical
information. This yielded a sample of 4447 articles from the *Daily Record* (1030 articles
from 1965, 1157 from 1985 and 2260 from 2005), and 6094 articles from the *Press and
The articles were coded according to the geographical level referred to. Articles about specific places within the region, or about specific events happening at specific places within the region, were classified as local, or as national if they took place outside the region. Similarly, the European and international categories covered events occurring within or outside Europe. The study of the *Press and Journal* also looks at the proportion of articles dealing with the Aberdeenshire/North East/Grampian region, in order to compare the level of identification with this region to the identification with Scotland. As the *Daily Record* does not have any particular regional profile\(^4\), the study of this newspaper looks only at the proportion of articles dealing with Scotland.

This coding scheme obviously imposed a different standard on articles to be classified as regional compared to the other categories. Most regular news happens in specific places, e.g. a burglary, the construction of a hotel, or a sporting event. The proportion of articles in the regional category could therefore not be directly compared to the other categories to measure the importance of the region. However, by applying a strict definition to the regional category, its contents corresponded more neatly to the phenomenon that it sought to measure, namely regionalism. The purpose of the study was to compare the proportion of articles on the region over time, thus indicating the level of public attention towards the region.

**The Daily Record**

The analysis of the *Daily Record* showed a steady increase in the coverage of Scottish news stories across time, as table 6.1 indicates. The space devoted to stories about Scotland as a whole increased from 16.9 percent of all articles in 1965, via 19.0 percent in 1985 to 20.1 percent of the articles in 2005. The increase has mainly come at the expense of local news, and the *Daily Record* in 2005 appeared to be focusing more on stories concerning Scotland as a whole, and less on stories taking place in local areas within Scotland, than it did in 1965. The proportion of stories focused on the rest of Britain (this includes stories about Great Britain as a whole, as well as local stories from England and Wales) increased sharply from 23.3 percent in 1965 to 36.8 percent in 1985, but it had dropped to 24.9 percent by 2005.

\(^4\) Although the *Daily Record* is more popular in and around Glasgow, it aims to be a national Scottish newspaper, covering the entire region.
Table 6.1: The *Daily Record*, content analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Focus</th>
<th>1965</th>
<th>1985</th>
<th>2005</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>International</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>9.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>36.8</td>
<td>24.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scottish</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>20.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local</td>
<td>49.8</td>
<td>34.9</td>
<td>41.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1030</td>
<td>1157</td>
<td>2260</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Share of articles referring to different geographical units in each year, percent.
Source: Content analysis of the *Daily Record*.

Considering only news stories, i.e. excluding sports and culture news, as well as opinion pieces, the growth in focus on Scotland is even stronger. Whilst 16.1 percent of all news stories in 1965 related to the country as a whole, the proportion was 17.8 percent in 1985 and 20.6 percent in 2005. Most of the growth in focus has come in the shorter articles, with the focus on Scotland in single-column articles growing from 14.1 percent in 1965 to 19.0 percent in 2005, but the longer articles still focus more strongly on Scotland than the single-column articles and have seen a modest increase from 20.7 percent in 1965 to 21.6 percent in 2005.

The *Press and Journal* focuses less on Scotland than the *Daily Record*, but it exhibits the same tendencies of a growing focus across time. Whilst 7.3 percent of articles focused on Scotland in 1965, this proportion increased to 9.3 percent in 1985 and 12.5 percent in 2005, as shown in table 6.2. The focus on Scotland remains stronger than the focus on the Aberdeenshire region throughout the period, despite the closer geographical proximity of the latter, and the focus on Aberdeenshire does not appear to grow much over time. The difference in focus is therefore growing. In 1965 and 1985, there were around 55 percent more articles about Scotland than about Aberdeenshire, while the difference increased to 160 percent in 2005. Again, the growth in focus on Scotland comes mainly at the expense of local news, and it would appear that the newspaper focuses more on Scotland as a whole, and less on local news stories within Scotland, than it did before. The space devoted to stories from other parts of Great Britain remains fairly stable across time, whilst there is a moderate
growth in foreign news. Compared to the *Daily Record*, the *Press and Journal* focuses less on Scottish news, but more on local/sub-regional and European news.

### Table 6.2: The *Press and Journal*, content analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Focus</th>
<th>1965</th>
<th>1985</th>
<th>2005</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>International</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British</td>
<td>28.8</td>
<td>26.2</td>
<td>28.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scottish</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aberdeenshire</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local</td>
<td>50.3</td>
<td>47.8</td>
<td>46.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1654</td>
<td>1758</td>
<td>2682</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Share of articles referring to different geographical units in each year, percent.

Source: Content analysis of the *Press and Journal*.

Looking only at news stories makes little difference to the results, with the proportion of news stories focused on Scotland growing slightly more quickly, from 7.0 percent in 1965 via 9.3 percent in 1985 to 12.5 percent in 2005. The proportion of front page news devoted to Scotland has grown sharply over time, from 5.2 percent in 1965 to 12.1 percent in 1985 and 20.1 percent in 2005, and there has been a sharp drop in the proportion of British news on the front page, from 41.2 percent in 1965 via 32.8 percent in 1985 to 21.6 percent in 2005. The same trend also holds for back page news, although the variation is not as large across time as it is on the front page. In terms of column space, the vast majority of the *Press and Journal* articles from 1965 (78.9 percent) covered only a single column, and it therefore does not make much sense to compare the results on this variable across time.

**Summary**

The analyses of the *Daily Record* and the *Press and Journal* both show a steady increase in news stories relating to Scotland as a whole through the period of study. In both cases, this growth has to some extent come at the expense of local news stories, indicating that the coverage of developments in Scotland has taken on a more Scottish and less local perspective. As this development has taken place across two newspapers with very different profiles and readerships, the findings provide a strong suggestion that Scotland has strengthened its position in the minds of Scottish people.
The focus on Scotland is a lot stronger in the *Daily Record* than in the *Press and Journal*, which is perhaps not surprising given the former newspaper’s geographical location in the centre of the country. This might also suggest that nationalism is stronger among the less educated, working-class readership of the *Daily Record* than in the population as a whole. Indeed, both of these findings are reflected in the survey data mentioned earlier. The highest levels of Scottish identity are found in East Central Scotland, and the lowest in North East Scotland, and Scottish identity is also stronger among the working classes than in the higher social classes (Brown et. al 1998:211f).

### 6.1.5 Conclusion

Most of the indicators broadly point towards a growth in Scottish nationalism across the period of study, although the extent and timeline of this development are to some extent dependent on which indicator one looks at. The devolution referenda show that nationalism has grown from 1979 to 1997, whilst the content analyses suggest a uniform development of growing nationalism from 1965 to 2005, and these findings are consistent with each other. They are also both consistent with the developments of the SNP, whose share of the vote was substantially higher in 1997 than in 1979, and also grew from 1965 to 1985, and from 1985 to 2005.

However, the SNP data provides more detailed information of the developments between these time points, suggesting that the strongest periods of growth in nationalism were the early 1970s and the 1990s. The 1980s, on the other hand, saw a slight decline, or at least a levelling out, in nationalism, and there has also been a slight decline in nationalism since devolutionootnote{However, the performance of the SNP has improved radically since the conclusion of this study. The party won 31 percent of the votes in the 2007 elections to the Scottish parliament, making it the largest party in Scotland for the first time in its history.}. The survey data provides little information on Scottish identities in the period prior to the mid-1980s, but if one looks at the proportions of exclusively Scottish identifiers, they broadly support the story of a decline in nationalism in the second half of the 1980s, a steady increase throughout the 1990s, and a slight decline post-devolution. Similarly, the survey data on constitutional preferences also suggest a decline in the late 1980s and a steady
increase through the 1990s. However, this data does suggest that the first peak in nationalism did not occur until the mid-1980s, rather than in the mid-1970s as suggested by the SNP data.

In sum, all of the indicators appear to agree on the basic story outlining a growth in nationalism in the early 1970s and the 1990s, and a slight decline at least in the latter part of the 1980s and in the period post-devolution. However, for the period from 1975 to 1985, the data points in somewhat different directions, and therefore no firm conclusions can be drawn for this period. Still, it appears evident that there have been major changes in the levels of nationalism in Scotland across the time period under study.

6.2 Rogaland: A region constructed

Situated in the heart of the Bible belt along Norway’s south-western coast, Rogaland is not unaccustomed to being a centre of opposition to the Norwegian state. Indeed, the region was one of the most obvious examples of what Rokkan (1967) called the “counter-cultural” opposition against the expanding influence of the central state in the southern and western peripheries in the early 20th century. It is interesting to note that coincides with a period of strong economic growth related to the canning industry.

The peripheral reaction mainly took the form of a cultural opposition to the allegedly continental or international values of the central elite, and the response was a focus on religion and tradition. Specifically, the protests were concentrated around the counter-cultures in the peripheral southwest. These represented a cultural opposition to the values of the more central areas, and included elements of teetotalism, pietism, and a fight for the nynorsk version of written Norwegian. These movements came together in the Liberal Party, which later produced two major splinter parties; the Christian People’s Party and the Agrarian (later

43 The language dispute has historically been one of the most important sources of conflict between centre and periphery in Norway. During the nation-building era of the 19th century, the Norwegian elites recognised the need for a national language to replace Danish, which remained the written language in the country even though Norway went from Danish to Swedish rule in 1814. Riksmål evolved as the Danish language was modified to resemble the spoken tongue among the educated central elite. This later evolved into bokmål, which is used by 88 percent of the population today (Grendstad and Rommetvedt 1997:195). However, opposition to the supposedly foreign central culture from the peripheral West took on a linguistic hue, and landsmål was created as a competing form of written Norwegian. This language form was based on the spoken tongue in remote Norwegian villages, where foreign influence had been minimal, as it sought to capture the “natural” evolution of the Old Norse language spoken by the Vikings (Rokkan 1967:373ff). This later became nynorsk, which is used by 12 percent of the population, mainly in rural parts of Western Norway (Grendstad and Rommetvedt 1997:195).
Centre) Party. These three parties all had their strongholds in the western and southern parts of Norway, and they came to occupy a strategically important position between the Conservative and Labour parties in domestic politics.

As the southernmost of the four counties that make up Western Norway, the influence from the counter-cultural movements was strong in Rogaland. In Berge Furre’s words, the region was “the buckle of the bible belt” (Furre 1987:6, my translation). Rokkan (1967) shows that the temperance movement and the pietist movement were especially strong in Rogaland. The language dispute did not come to dominate politics in Rogaland to the same extent as it did in other parts of Western Norway, but in 1957, 85.8 percent of school districts in the region still used nynorsk. This was less than the average 94 percent in Western Norway, but still a lot higher than the national rate, which was at 49 percent. However, the proportion of nynorsk users in the population was substantially smaller than these figures indicate. The nynorsk districts are generally a lot smaller than the bokmål districts, as they are overwhelmingly located in rural areas. In the capital, Oslo, not a single school district used nynorsk. In Rogaland, the temperance movement was a lot stronger (Rokkan 1967:416). In a national referendum in 1926, 73.1 percent of the population opposed a motion to abolish a prohibition on liquor consumption. Only in Møre og Romsdal did the prohibition vote fare better (at 77.2 percent). This contrasted sharply with the central parts: In Oslo, 13.0 percent supported prohibition, and in the country as a whole 44.3 percent voted in favour of prohibition (Statistisk Sentralbyrå 1978b:647).

However, the strongest of the counter-cultures in Rogaland was the pietist movement, which had its core in the region. This movement embodied Lutheran orthodox movements, free churches and missionary societies, and it was primarily a reaction against the central authority of the State Church. Home of the missionary college, missionary organisations such as Det Norske Misjonselskap, and the layman’s movement, Stavanger has been called the religious capital of Norway (Furre 1992:364). Other parts of Rogaland were certainly no less religious. Since the popular movement around the Stavanger priest Lars Oftedal in the second half of the 19th century, religious political parties and charismatic religious movements have enjoyed widespread support across the region. The two Christian Democrat parties in Norwegian politics – the Moderates in the 1880s and 1890s and the Christian People’s Party since 1945 – have both had their strongest support bases in Rogaland (Rokkan 1967:400f). The same is true of several major religious associations that organised large parts of the
population in religious work, such as *Indremisjonen*, Bethania, and *Ynglingen* (Fossåskaret 1987:357).

All of the counter-cultural movements have lost ground in Stavanger since the 1960s. Melberg (1997) finds that participation in religious organisations dropped significantly from 1974 to 1994. Whereas in 1974, 16 percent of the respondents to a Stavanger survey stated that they participated actively in their local congregation and the same number were members of religious organisations outside the State Church, the corresponding figures in 1994 were 6 and 8 percent, respectively. Private religious activity decreased as well: Whilst 41 percent of the population in 1974 stated that they used to pray regularly, this figure had dropped to 23 percent in 1994 (Melberg 1997:50). She also finds indicators to suggest that support for teetotalism has dropped sharply in the same period (Melberg 1997:54).

Today, values and attitudes towards the traditional counter-cultures in the Stavanger area do not differ very much from those held by the general Norwegian population. Stavanger is no different from the country as a whole when it comes to levels of Christian faith, membership in religious organisations and attitudes towards abortion. Nor do levels of participation in religious services, or the proportion of teetotallers and of nynorsk users differ significantly from other major cities (Grendstad and Rommetvedt 1997:193ff).

Although neither Melberg (1997) nor Grendstad and Rommetvedt (1997) present any data for the entire region, it is reasonable to believe that the same trends are present, albeit to a lesser extent, in rural parts of Rogaland as well. The economic and social transformation relating to the oil industry has affected the entire region, distances are small, and a large part of the population lives in or around Stavanger. The only major counter-culture that affected rural parts of Rogaland without having much influence in Stavanger was the nynorsk movement, but it is now declining across the region. In 2001, only 16.9 percent of the population lived in a municipality that used nynorsk in the administration (however, this included 12 out of the 26 municipalities), and 28.3 percent of pupils in primary and lower secondary schools used nynorsk (Statistisk Sentralbyrå 2002:175, 461).

This would seem to indicate that the extent of peripheral protest has diminished in Rogaland with the passage of time, and perhaps even that modernisation has led to the disappearance of territorial conflicts. However, several developments over the past ten years indicate that this
is probably not the case. Territory seems to have reappeared as a force for political mobilisation during the 1990s, as political elites have increasingly sought to politicize regional identity for a variety of political purposes.

### 6.2.1 Indicators of a new regionalism

On the elite level, the construction of several agencies that seek to promote the regional economy suggests growing levels of regionalism. For instance, several municipalities in the Stavanger area, along with the county council, established ARNE (Arena for Regional Business Development and Entrepreneurship) in 1999 as a forum where business, capital and research are brought together to formulate common objectives. In 2002, the county administration itself initiated the business network “Innovasjon Rogaland”, which connects the major businesses in the region. Both of these are the results of a regionalist discourse that has convinced regional elites that they need to actively promote development in the region themselves instead of relying on the central state.

The new University of Stavanger is another major monument of the recent regionalist assertion in Rogaland. In the Norwegian system of higher education, there is a difference between universities, of which there used to be only four, and colleges. There are various colleges in Rogaland, but the region never had a university, although the College of Stavanger had tried to gain university status since the 1960s. However, not much progress was made until 1997, when the idea started to attract widespread support among local and regional elites. Instead of being the project of a limited group of academics, the campaign started to include local business interests, politicians from all political parties, and the local media (Stavanger Aftenblad, 23.02.2001). The main reason for this broad support from regional elites was the near universal consensus that a university would be pivotal in the development of the entire region, economically as well as culturally (Stavanger Aftenblad, 01.04.2003). The campaign was crowned with success when the University of Stavanger was formally opened on 17 January 2005. The university is a fundamental part of a long-term plan to transform Rogaland from an oil region into a knowledge region. Apart from the symbolic effect of having a university, which is believed to attract students and skilled labour, the university will be used proactively in the development of communications between the various academic institutes in Stavanger. For instance, director Per Dahl explained that his institution would “place considerable weight on having a good relationship with our environs
that can be a foundation for increasing knowledge and production in the region” (Stavanger Aftenblad, 21.08.2000) 44.

On the mass level, the reactions to the 2003 closure of the local beer brewery in Rogaland, Tou, were also indicative of regionalist mobilisation. Ringnes-Carlsberg decided in June 2003 to move production of the brand to Oslo as part of their long-term strategy of shifting towards large-scale production, As a result, large parts of the population moved to boycott all products related to the Ringnes-Carlsberg Company, encouraged by the media and local political and business elites. The boycott included several of the most popular Norwegian brands of beer, soft drinks and mineral water, along with international brands such as Pepsi, 7-up, Carlsberg and Guinness. The boycott soon gained widespread support, and sales of Ringnes-Carlsberg products in Rogaland almost halved within days of the decision, with regional newspapers bringing stories about people being harassed for including Ringnes-Carlsberg products in their shopping baskets. Their main competitor, Bergen-based Hansa-Borg Breweries, doubled their sales in the same period (Stavanger Aftenblad, 29.07.2003).

Why were the reactions against the restructuring of Ringnes-Carlsberg’s beer production so fierce? Obviously, people all over the world have an interest in maintaining industry and employment where they live. But in this case, there was more to it. The job question was suppressed, and the main issue at stake was the importance of maintaining ownership over local traditions and brands. The issue was framed mainly in terms of regional pride. In local understanding, “Oslo”, or the economic elite in the capital, had deprived the region of its beer making history and traditions. This is surprising, especially considering that only thirty years previously, Rogaland was noted mainly for its strong teetotal traditions as the heart and soul of Norway’s strong Lutheran temperance movement. Even the Stavanger Aftenblad, traditionally a major part of the temperance movement, moved to defend local beer culture. It printed a series of highly critical articles, and supported the boycott in editorials on 03.06.2003 and 05.07.2003. Within two months of the decision, two new local beers were on the market, both established in direct reaction to the closure of Tou Brewery and appealing heavily to regional identities in their marketing strategies.

44 All translations are those of the author.
Whilst all of these developments suggest that there has been a growth of regional identity in Rogaland, it is still difficult to assess the extent of this change. A more systematic attempt at quantifying levels of regional identity would also be necessary in order to test any hypotheses about the causes of the change. Therefore, a reliable and valid method for measuring regionalism is necessary. For this purpose, the next section discusses potential quantitative indicators of the levels of regionalism in Rogaland across time.

6.2.2 Towards a reliable measure

During the preparation for the case study on Rogaland, it soon became apparent that the inadequacy of existing survey data would be a major limitation. The only available data set on regional identities in Rogaland was the National Identity Survey, carried out by the International Social Survey Programme in 1995, so it was impossible to study trends in the strength of regional identities across time on the basis of surveys.

Furthermore, there are obvious limitations to the use of this survey to study regionalism even in a cross-sectional design. One major problem is that the National Identity Survey inexplicably failed to ask respondents to rate their level of attachment to Rogaland. They were only asked to indicate their attachment to their neighbourhood, city/municipality, and province, as well as to Norway and to Europe. This does not say anything about attitudes towards the region of Rogaland, and it was clearly necessary to look for data elsewhere. Moreover, only 117 out of the 1507 respondents in the survey were from Rogaland, and this is too few for any statistically significant results to be derived from the study. For instance, 32 percent of respondents from urban parts of Rogaland, compared to only 18 percent of respondents in the country as a whole, stated that they were “very strongly attached” to their city or municipality. However, due to the size of the error margins, it was still not possible to conclude with 95 percent confidence that people from urban parts of Rogaland were more strongly attached to their city than the national average. However, the survey does include some data that are relevant in this context. Respondents from Rogaland report stronger attachment to their cities and municipalities than respondents from other parts of the country. In particular, this is true of respondents from urban areas.

45 In Rogaland, 25 (±8) percent of respondents state that they are “very strongly attached” to their municipality, as opposed to 18 (±2) percent of respondents in the survey as a whole. This is above all an urban phenomenon: 32 (±12) percent of respondents from cities state that they are very strongly attached to their city, as opposed to 16 (±10) percent of respondents from rural areas. In the country as a whole, there is no major difference between

148
province, Norway and Europe, respondents from Rogaland do not differ much from respondents from other parts of the country. However, none of the results from this survey are significant at the 0.05-level, because of the small sample size.

More luck is had by Baldersheim (2003), who reports a survey from 1993 by Lawrence Rose that does ask about county attachment. In this survey, Finnmark and Vestfold are the only counties with higher levels of attachment to the county than Rogaland, but the differences between these counties and Rogaland appear too small to be statistically significant. In his interpretation of the overall variation in the data set, Baldersheim notes that the presence of large cities tends to depress levels of regional identity. It is therefore notable that levels of regional attachment are a lot higher in Rogaland, with 59 percent of respondents claiming to be strongly attached to the county, than in Hordaland and Sør-Trøndelag, where 47 and 46 percent, respectively, give the same response (Baldersheim 2003:297). Among the regions dominated by large cities, Rogaland clearly stands out as having the highest levels of regional identity.

Whilst these surveys leave a lot to be desired, they do still indicate that levels of regionalism are high in Rogaland compared to other Norwegian regions. However, they cannot say anything about whether levels of regionalism have increased or decreased over time, as there is only one time point to go by. There is no survey data that can say anything about levels of regionalism in Rogaland in the 1960s and 1970s. However, a quantitative content analysis

urban and rural areas: 18 (±3) percent of urban respondents and 17 (±3) percent of rural respondents from other counties than Rogaland state that they are “very strongly attached” to their municipality. The figures in parentheses denote 95 percent confidence intervals for the proportions. As these figures show, none of the differences are significant at the 0.05-level. Due to the small number of respondents from Rogaland in the survey, the confidence intervals are too large to draw any conclusions.

With regards to province, 22 (±8) percent of respondents from Rogaland state that they are “very strongly attached” to Western Norway, and as many state that they are “not very attached” to the province. Figures from other provinces show approximately the same results, with the exception of Northern Norway, where a higher proportion of respondents reports a very strong attachment to the province. Levels of attachment to Norway are very high in all parts of the country, and Rogaland is no exception. 48 (±9) percent of respondents from Rogaland state that they are “very strongly attached” to the country, as opposed to 51 (±3) percent in the country as a whole. Only 7 (±4) percent of respondents from Rogaland state that they are “not very” or “not at all” attached to the country, slightly more than the national share of 6 (±1) percent. There is also little difference in the number of respondents who report very strong attachment to Europe in Rogaland and in the country as a whole: 20 (±7) percent of respondents in Rogaland, and 19 (±2) percent of respondents in total, state that they are “very strongly attached” to Europe. Figures in parentheses denote 95 percent confidence intervals for the proportions.

For Finnmark, the high levels of regional attachment can possibly be explained in terms of the county’s geographical position in the extreme periphery, with large distances to the centre of the Norwegian state. Vestfold is the smallest Norwegian county in terms of area (aside from Oslo), with only 2200 km², and it could therefore be affected by the high levels of local attachment in Norway.
can provide an insight into the changes in regionalism over time. The next section presents the findings of such a study in the case of Rogaland.

6.2.3 Newspaper content analysis

The lack of data makes it a lot more difficult to study regionalism in Rogaland compared to Scotland, particularly when it comes to the situation before the 1990s. Before 1993, no surveys were carried out on regional identities in Norway, and there has never been a regionalist party that could provide an indication of variation in the levels of regionalism across time. Hence, the only way in which a quantitative measure of regionalism in Rogaland in the past can be developed, is through the analysis of written materials from the relevant period. For these purposes, the content analysis method provides a unique opportunity to construct a corpus of data on people’s identities and interests in the past, which can be analysed to track the development of regionalism. Given the lack of alternative data in the case of Rogaland, this becomes even more crucial than in the previous case study.

Newspaper selection

The study analysed a random sample of twelve issues of the main regional newspaper in Rogaland, the *Stavanger Aftenblad*, from each of three different years: 1960, 1980 and 2000. The *Stavanger Aftenblad* is widely read throughout the region: According to the Consumer and Media survey by TNS in 2005, the *Stavanger Aftenblad* has 187,000 regular readers out of a population of 318,000 over the age of 12 – a coverage of 59 percent (Futsæter 2005). No other regional newspaper comes close to these readership figures: The second-largest paper is the *Haugesunds Avis*, with around 85,000 readers, a large proportion of which live in neighbouring Hordaland. On these grounds, the contents of the *Stavanger Aftenblad* can be considered a good indicator of regional public opinion. It is reasonable to assume that a newspaper that dominates to such an extent in the region has been successful in writing about what people are interested in.

For each year of study, twelve issues of the newspaper were sampled using a random date generator, restricting the sample to two issues from every weekday and one from every month, as in the Scotland study. Again, all the content in the main newspapers and supplements were coded, excluding advertisements and other listings, as well as reviews of
TV programs, movies, music and cars, which do not usually relate to any particular geographical area. This yielded a data set of 4314 newspaper articles for analysis.

The design of the content analysis mainly follows that of the Scotland study, with the same key variables and coding criteria. As in the analysis of the Press and Journal, a distinction is made between two types of regions: The “regional” category included all articles that referred to Rogaland as a whole. Likewise, the “province” category included all articles that referred to Western Norway as a whole. Thus, the identification with the regional and province levels at different time points can be compared.

Reliability and validity
The reliability of this method depends on whether it is the content, rather than the coders, that determines the classification of content into categories (Riffe, Lacy and Fico 1998:105). This requires the categories to be clear and simple, which seems to be the case in the coding scheme proposed above. The reliability of the study can be tested using statistical measures for inter-coder reliability, whereby two or more coders code a random sample of the study data, and the agreement between them is tested. In the study of Rogaland, an inter-coder reliability test returned inter-coder agreement levels above the 80 percent benchmark stipulated by Riffe, Lacy and Fico (1998:128) for both the main variable and the control variables. The focus variable is of greatest interest, and came back with an observed agreement of 82.6 percent. This corresponds to a Scott’s Pi score of 0.75, which is weak, but acceptable in the development phase of a method. A closer look at the data reveals that 39 percent of the errors involved one coder classifying the article as international, whereas the other classified it as European. Providing better specification of these two categories, or simply collapsing them into one would therefore dramatically improve the reliability of the variable. The latter operation would increase the observed agreement to 89.4 percent, and the Pi score to 0.84, bringing the variable well into the acceptable reliability range for this type of research. When it comes to the crucial matter of whether articles were reliably coded to the regional category or not, this was clearly verified by the inter-coder reliability test.

---

48 Scott’s Pi is a measure of observed agreement after controlling for chance agreement, i.e. the proportion of agreement that is the result of the correct application of the categories instead of by chance. An alternative measure, Cohen’s Kappa, returns identical results in this case. Riffe, Lacy and Fico (1998:130f) provide an outline of how these test statistics are produced.
Issues of measurement validity are sometimes problematic in content analysis research. Do the studies really measure what they are supposed to measure? One common method of validation in content analysis is to examine whether they conform to the researcher's expectations. In this case, one can validate the findings by looking at whether the content analysis confirms the expectations of growing regionalism based on the qualitative study. There is also a strong case to be made for the face validity of the method. This is a matter of whether the measure makes sense as a proxy for the phenomenon under study. In this case, it is reasonable to expect a connection between attention towards the region and regionalism.

Regions are not naturally occurring phenomena; they have to be created in the public consciousness. Like nations, regions are imagined communities (Smouts 1998), and the more people talk about a region; the more the imagined community is reinforced. A community where everything that happens is viewed through the lens of the region is likely to be a regionalist community. It can be assumed that regionalists are more preoccupied with their region than non-regionalists, and it is obvious that it does not make any sense to talk about regionalism or regional identities in a region that no one cares about. This general preoccupation with the region is a sign that the region is at the forefront of peoples' minds, as well as a contribution to keeping it there. On the other hand, one could imagine a region that no one ever talks about. Such a region would cease to exist, and one could certainly not talk of any widespread regionalist sentiments.

The content analysis of the two Scottish newspapers above provides a test of the concurrent validity of the method, i.e. of whether the data derived from content analysis correspond to the data that other research methods produce. In the study of Scotland, the content analysis leads to similar conclusions as surveys and voting data on the development of nationalism across time, showing that there has been a rise in nationalism from 1965 to 2005. They also concur with survey data on the geographical and socioeconomic distribution of nationalists, suggesting that levels of national identity are higher in the centre than in the North-East, and higher among the working-classes than among the middle-classes.

Results of the analysis
The results show a clear increase in the number of articles focusing on regional issues over time. Table 6.3 shows the distribution of articles relating to each geographical level for each year of study. One can see that whilst only 5.6 percent of articles referred to Rogaland in 1960, this figure almost doubled, to 10.8 percent in 2000. This amounts to an increase of 93
percent. 1980 assumes a median position, with 8.7 percent of articles focusing on the region, a 55 percent increase from 1960. The increase in regional news is statistically significant for the period 1960-80 and non-significant for the period 1980-2000. A closer look at the data reveals that the associations remain with approximately the same strengths when controlling for article type (for example by excluding culture and sports articles) and for article size. This clearly indicates that there has been a growth in regionalism from 1960 to 2000, in line with what was expected.

Table 6.3: The Stavanger Aftenblad, content analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Focus</th>
<th>1960</th>
<th>1980</th>
<th>2000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>International</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>12.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td>30.1</td>
<td>31.3</td>
<td>26.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Norway</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rogaland</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>10.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local</td>
<td>32.3</td>
<td>38.6</td>
<td>43.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1068</td>
<td>1496</td>
<td>1750</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Share of articles referring to different geographical units in each year, percent.
Source: Content analysis of the Stavanger Aftenblad.

Figure 6.2 shows the increase over time in articles focusing on the region. The study also shows that the strongest growth occurred in the first half of this period, when the economic changes were most dramatic.
The study of regional papers also shows that Western Norway hardly gets any attention at all. There is simply no discourse on issues relating to the province, and in no year does even as much as one percent of articles refer to Western Norway. The province clearly seems to be irrelevant to the people of Rogaland. This confirms the indications from the survey data about a low level of Western Norwegian identity. Meanwhile, local issues continue to make up the bulk of the news, and also exhibit a solid rise through the studied period, from 32.3 percent in 1960 to 43.7 percent in 2000. Taken together, news about regional and local issues has gone from comprising 37.9 percent of the news in 1960 to 54.5 percent in 2000, an increase of 43 percent.

Surprisingly, it is not national news that has suffered a loss of interest. Granted, the data does indicate a slight fall in the focus on national issues; from 30.1 percent in 1960 to 26.1 percent in 2000, but this change is not significant at the 0.05-level. The main slump has come in the focus on international and, above all, European news. Whilst the number of articles within each of these two categories has been fairly constant throughout the period, the size of the newspaper has been increasing, and therefore, the proportion of European news in 2000 is little more than half of that in 1960: 6.5 percent versus 12.3 percent. International issues
exhibit a similar trend, going from nearly one fifth of the articles in 1960 to less than one eighth in 2000.

6.3 Assessing the model

The preceding two sections have provided data on how regionalism has actually developed across time in the cases of Scotland and Rogaland. These development paths can now be compared to the predictions made in section 5.2 in order to examine the capacity of the regionalism model in explaining variation across time.

The development of nationalism in Scotland largely corresponds to the overall predictions of the model. All of the indicators suggested that there would have been a growth in nationalism across the period, and this does indeed appear to have been the case. The levels of support for autonomy, for independence and for the SNP have all grown between 1965 and 2005, and the coverage of Scottish issues in newspapers has also gone up. The changes in public opinion have also been reflected in institutional changes, with the establishment of a devolved Scottish Parliament in 1999 serving as a major landmark.

A closer look at the trajectory of nationalism during the period reveals more support for some theoretical propositions than for others. The steady growth in globalisation and European integration is reflected in the overall trend towards higher levels of nationalism throughout the period, but neither of these variables can explain the shorter-term variations within the period. In particular, the decline in nationalism in the second half of the 1980s does not correspond to the predictions on the basis of these variables. The Single European Act of 1986 should not have corresponded with a decline in nationalism in the following years. On the other hand, the growing levels of nationalism in the wake of the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 match the predictions of the European integration variable.

The variables on economic development and party system dissimilarity provided more detailed predictions of peaks and troughs during the period. Overall, the development of nationalism matches the economic development curve quite well. Both of the strongest periods of growing nationalism – the early 1970s and the early 1990s – correspond to periods of growth in the Scottish economy, whilst the decline of the late 1980s is matched by an economic depression from 1983 to 1990. Similarly, the growth in party system dissimilarity
in the early 1970s corresponds well to the growth in nationalism, and nationalism starts to
decline at around the same time as party system dissimilarity in the late 1980s. However, the
growing nationalism in the 1990s is counter to the predictions of the party systems variable,
as the Scottish and British party systems actually became more similar throughout the period
from 1987 until the 1997 elections.

Overall, the model provides a fairly accurate prediction of the development of Scottish
nationalism in the period from 1965 to 2005. The growing nationalism throughout the period
reflects growth in each of the independent variables overall, suggesting that they are indeed
associated with variations in the levels of regionalism across time as well. At the level of
individual variables, economic development seems to have been most closely associated with
the evolution of nationalism throughout the period, whilst other variables can only partially
explain the developments that have taken place.

In the case of Rogaland, the development of regionalism in the period corresponds to the
predictions on the basis of the globalisation and economic development variables. There has
been a steady growth of regionalism throughout the period, which corresponds to growing
levels of globalisation as witnessed by an increasing presence of foreign companies and
foreign labour, as well as growing levels of immigration. The region has also gradually
become more prosperous during this period, evolving from a GDPR well below the national
average prior to the discovery of petroleum to becoming the richest peripheral region in the
country by the early 1980s.

However, the developments contradict the predictions of the party systems variable, as the
party system in Rogaland has become gradually more similar to the Norwegian party system,
in particular between 1973 and 1993. Divergence between the regional and national party
systems does therefore not appear to have any explanatory potential in this case, even though
the voting patterns in Rogaland remain fairly distinct by Norwegian standards throughout the
period. Neither does European integration appear to have played a major role in the
development of regionalism in Rogaland. Although ties between Norway and the EU have
become closer through the period, Norway is still not a member state, and it has therefore not
been affected by many of the policy initiatives aimed at strengthening the regions. In
Rogaland, there has also been a steady majority opposed to membership throughout the
period, and it does not therefore seem likely that the regional public would prefer the EU institutional framework to that of the Norwegian state in any way.

The model is broadly confirmed by the two case studies, as most of the predictions on the basis of the development of the independent variables are reflected in the actual development of regionalism. In particular, economic development and globalisation appear to be closely associated with levels of regionalism across time in both of the case studies. European integration also appears to be associated with levels of nationalism in Scotland, which is the only region that is actually a member, and this theoretical connection is therefore also supported by the case studies. On the other hand, the connection between party systems and regionalism in the cross-sectional study is not reflected in these longitudinal studies. Both the growing Scottish nationalism in the 1990s and the rising regionalism in Rogaland throughout the period are accompanied by convergence with the national party systems.

6.4 Conclusion

This chapter has tracked levels of regionalism across time in Scotland and Rogaland, building an account of how regionalism has changed in different time periods in both regions. Through comparing these to the predictions of the regionalism model, it has been possible to assess whether the model is capable of explaining variation along the longitudinal dimension. The results are mainly positive, although some variables are more closely associated with longitudinal variation in regionalism than others in these two cases. The effects of economic development, globalisation and European integration on regionalism are broadly confirmed by this analysis, whilst the effect of party system divergence is contradicted by the developments in the two regions.

The overall correspondence between the results of the cross-sectional and longitudinal analysis strengthens the model of regionalism. Three of the variables are correlated with variation in the levels of regionalism across both time and space, and these relationships manifest themselves through different research designs and methods. This leads to the conclusion that there is a relationship between regionalism and economic development, globalisation and European integration.
The next chapter probes these relationships further by examining the relationship between each independent variable and the development of regionalism in Scotland and Rogaland. Each theoretical relationship is critically assessed on the basis of existing literature and primary source material from newspapers and election manifestos. The main aim is to evaluate whether the effects of the independent variables follow the logic and mechanisms of the theoretical discussion in chapter 2. The quantitative analysis up to this point has established the existence of these relationships, but the next chapter will introduce a qualitative analysis that can contribute to the understanding of how the independent variables affect regionalism in the context of these two case studies.
7. Qualitative Assessment of the Model

The preceding chapter has confirmed that the model is related to regionalism across time as well as space. Variation in the levels of independent variables was related to variation in the levels of regionalism in the context of individual regions, and the model thus appears to have explanatory potential along both the cross-sectional and longitudinal dimensions. However, the longitudinal study was only able to examine the correlations between regionalism and the independent variables across time. This chapter analyses the relationships between the variables qualitatively, aiming to understand why and how they are related. It furthers the analysis of the case studies through discussing causality, rather than correlation. The discussion focuses on whether the theoretical connections proposed in chapter 2 can actually be discovered in the development of regionalism in the cases of Scotland and Rogaland.

The purpose of this chapter is mainly to explore these connections, rather than to confirm them. In each of the case studies, the argument that a particular independent variable has had an effect on the development of regionalism in that region is critically assessed. The analysis draws on qualitative data from regional newspapers and SNP election manifestos, as well as on secondary literature that provides accounts of how regionalism has been explained by other authors in these two cases.

The first section focuses on the role of globalisation, European integration, party system distinctiveness and economic development in the Scottish nationalist discourse. The discussion is informed by a qualitative content analysis of Scottish newspapers and SNP election manifestos, which illustrate how nationalist claims are justified and what kind of judgments they are based on. The findings indicate that European integration provides an important reason for the growth in nationalism in the 1990s, whereas economic growth seems to be a crucial reason in both the 1970s and the 1990s. The second section examines the development of regionalism in Rogaland in a similar way, using a qualitative content analysis of the Stavanger Aftenblad to produce data on the justification for regionalism in Rogaland. The findings suggest that economic growth has been the main driving-force behind the growth of regionalism in the region.
7.1 Scotland

The last chapter established that levels of nationalism have grown in Scotland, and that these developments correspond fairly well with the predictions of the regionalism model. However, this trend is not unique to Scotland. On a European level, there have been fairly strong developments towards growing regionalism across the continent, along with a growth in regional identities as well as an institutional strengthening of the regional level in many countries. Many regionalist movements can be explained by this general trend, and their individual developments are thus not particularly puzzling at all. The first question to be faced in the search for an explanation of regionalism is therefore whether one should look for endogenous or exogenous causes. If the developments in Scotland are only the result of exogenous developments affecting all of Europe, these factors should be expected to have a uniform effect on all regions in the United Kingdom. It is therefore useful to start by looking at whether developments on the central state level can explain what has happened in Scotland.

There has been a general trend of devolution in the United Kingdom under Tony Blair’s Labour government, with the introduction of assemblies in Wales in 1999 and in Greater London in 2000, along with several efforts at establishing a workable Northern Ireland Executive. These trends notwithstanding, there is little doubt that Scotland has been in the forefront of developments. The plans for devolution were in many ways a response to the strength of demand for it in Scotland, not least because Labour needed to win back votes from the SNP. The demands for a Parliament were certainly a lot stronger in Scotland than in Wales, with 74 percent voting in favour of a Scottish parliament in 1997, whereas only 50.3 percent (in a turnout of only 50.1 percent) voted in favour of a considerably less powerful Welsh Assembly. Compared to the English regions, the contrast is even stronger – in 2004, only 22.1 percent in a turnout of 47.7 percent voted in favour of the establishment of a regional assembly for North East England, widely considered the most regionalist of the English regions. As a result, the Labour government cancelled plans for similar referenda elsewhere in England.

Similarly, survey data confirm that feelings of national identity are a lot stronger in Scotland than in other parts of the UK. Brown et. al (1998:213) present data from the 1997
British Election Survey, showing that 61 percent of respondents in Scotland identified themselves primarily as Scottish, whereas 42 percent of those in Wales identified primarily as Welsh and only 24 percent in England identified primarily as English.

Even apart from the question of devolution, the British state has always acknowledged the need to treat Scotland differently from other regions, as witnessed by the considerable degree of administrative separation that Scotland has been afforded under the Scottish Office rather than through sectoral departments. Hence, national developments cannot properly explain the growth of regionalism in the Scottish case.

7.1.1 Globalisation: Building institutions to attract capital

While the processes of globalisation have affected all of the United Kingdom, it still seems likely that they could have had a stronger effect on Scotland. As mentioned, Scotland is one of the most export-oriented regions in the country, and it has traditionally had an open economy. This might be one reason why Scotland has developed an institutional infrastructure aimed at promoting the region’s position in the global economy, in accordance with the theories on globalisation and regionalism.

From the 1970s, there have been concerted efforts at promoting Scotland as an attractive place to invest. The Scottish Development Agency (SDA) was set up in 1974 to carry out industrial planning. It gradually lost influence through the 1980s, but was restructured as Scottish Enterprise in 1991, adopting a more market-based approach that focused on supporting private Scottish businesses. Meanwhile, another government agency, Locate in Scotland, was set up in 1981 in order to focus on attracting foreign investments. In 2001, it was replaced by Scottish Development International, which also incorporated promotion of Scottish exports. These agencies have frequently sought to mobilise particular aspects of Scottish identity that are seen as conducive to economic development, such as the education system and the Highlands landscape (Bond, McCrone and Brown 2003).

The regional organisation of these economic development agencies would seem to conform to the expectations of the globalisation thesis, and it certainly reinforces the point that the region is now seen as the most appropriate unit for economic development. This argument is made in the SNP’s 2001 election manifesto, which focuses on the need to “encourage the
relocation of high-skill, value-added international investors to our country” and claims that “because we stand for Scotland, we will be best placed to sell Scotland as a marketplace, as a holiday destination and as a key export partner” (SNP 2001:9). Thus, the party suggests that the region is the most appropriate unit for economic development, and focuses on the need for regions to be proactive in attracting investment and promoting growth, which is exactly what the theories on globalisation predict.

However, the establishment of economic development agencies seems to have been a reaction to growth in regionalism rather than a cause thereof. Rather than preceding the growth in Scottish nationalism, they have been established at times when Scottish nationalism has been at its peak, or in the middle of an upward or downward trend. It is also frequently suggested that nationalism was a crucial factor in the decisions to establish these agencies. The SDA was set up between the two general elections of 1974, and its creation has been interpreted as part of Labour’s strategy to win back votes in Scotland from the SNP (Mitchell 1997:409). Indeed, during the period between these two elections, “Scotland suddenly became very important to Labour and Scots voters found themselves lavished with attention” (Lynch 2002:129). The establishment of the SDA itself was proposed in the first-ever Labour manifesto for Scotland, created for the October 1974 election. Similarly, its restructuring into Scottish Enterprise has been seen as a way to address the Thatcher government’s political problems in Scotland. The SDA was considered by the Scottish public to be successful, but the government did not get the credit for this, and hence it needed to be restructured in order to become more closely identified with the Conservative government (Danson, Lloyd and Newlands 1989:72).

7.1.2 European integration: Independent in Europe

European integration has frequently been forwarded as one of the main reasons for the growth of nationalism in Scotland, not least because of the Europhilia of the SNP after the formulation of its “Independence in Europe” strategy in 1988. The party argued that the existence of the European Community would make the transition to political independence easier and provide economic continuity (Lynch 2002:187). In this framework, European integration offered a solution to the fear that the Scottish market would be too small under independence, reducing Scotland to the economic and political periphery of Europe. Through the Common Market, Scotland would have access to the same markets regardless of whether
it was part of the UK or not. According to the SNP, “the single market between Scotland and England is guaranteed by the 1957 Treaty of Rome and the 1987 Single European Act – not the 1707 Treaty of Union” (SNP 1992).

Politically, independence would mean a move away from the periphery as Scotland would be given its own seat at the negotiating tables in Brussels, rather than having to work through the British delegation. However, this still leaves the question of why these developments would have a greater effect in Scotland than in other parts of the United Kingdom. Institutionally, all regions within the UK are in the same situation with regard to their relationship to the EU vis-à-vis the UK. Even if one expects the impact to be different in a culturally distinct area such as Scotland, there should still not be any reason to expect a different development in similarly culturally distinct Wales. The only reason why the effects might vary across space would be if the attitudes towards European integration were different, so that the EU was seen as a favourable alternative to the UK in some parts of the country, but not in others.

As the data presented in section 5.2.1 show, the Scottish public have indeed been more positive about the EU than the English and Welsh since around the late 1980s. On the other hand, opposition to the EU seems to have been stronger in Scotland than in the rest of the UK during the 1970s and early 1980s. It would thus seem that European integration provides a reasonable explanation for the growth of regionalism in the late 1980s and 1990s, and this has indeed been offered as a key reason for the discrepancy between the devolution referendum results in 1979 and 1997. Dardanelli (2005b:337) argues that independence was held as a much more favourable option in 1997 than in 1979 because at the second referendum, it was regarded to entail continued membership of the European Union. In 1979, “independence in Europe” was not a meaningful option. While the support for devolution itself actually dropped from 54 to 43 percent from 1979 to 1997, the support for independence increased from 7 to 35 percent. This was almost entirely due to the existence in the surveys of the new independence in Europe option, favoured by 26 percent of the respondents (Dardanelli 2005b:329). Furthermore, the possibility of independence in Europe led many devolutionists to prefer independence to the status quo in 1997, whereas in 1979, they preferred the status quo to independence. This effectively neutralised the unionists’ argument that devolution would inevitably lead to independence (“the slippery slope argument”), which was so effective in making many a priori devolution supporters vote against devolution in the 1979 referendum due to the fear that it would eventually lead to secession.
However, European integration does not appear to offer an explanation for the growth of nationalism in the 1970s, when the EC was not seen as a good alternative to the UK. In the 1970s, the SNP was opposed to European integration, and the levels of Euroscepticism were higher in Scotland than in the rest of the UK. In the 1979 referendum, the issue of European integration was not utilised by elite actors, who did not consider it to be connected to devolution. The European dimension therefore did not make much of an impact on nationalism in the lead-up to the referendum. On the mass level, support for self-government was also linked to hostility to the EU (Dardanelli 2005a:75ff). Institutionally, the EC could not really be regarded as an alternative to the UK in the 1970s, as stipulated by the Europeanisation hypothesis. It would not have guaranteed market access before the Single European Act of 1987 paved the way for a common market.

Structural funds also fail to provide a sufficient explanation for the growth of nationalism in the 1970s, as they only started to become important from 1989 onwards – a couple of years after Scottish nationalism resumed its growth from the mid-1980s (see figure 1). On the other hand, some areas of Scotland did receive structural funds in the 1990s, and they might therefore be part of the explanation in this period. However, Dardanelli (2002:284) finds no evidence that the structural funds had any direct effect on nationalism. According to him, the structural funds issue was never raised in the pro-devolution discourse, and they seem to have affected nationalism only insofar as they have made public opinion more positively inclined towards the EU. Even here, the impact seems limited, as the turning-point for Scottish public opinion on the EU appears to have been the mid-1980s, which was before the structural funds had much of an impact.

### 7.1.3 Party system: Rejecting the Tories

Scotland has long had a distinctive party system from the rest of the UK, and this distinctiveness grew through the 1970s and 1980s. The most obvious manifestation of this is the SNP, whose successes in the 1970s and 1990s have been documented above. However, the Scottish party system differs substantially from the English and Welsh even if the SNP is kept out of the equation.
Most notably, the Conservatives have been weak in Scotland since the late 1960s, with their performance gradually worsening to the point that they did not return a single MP from Scotland in the 1997, 2002 and 2006 elections. It had not always been thus. In the general elections from 1951 to 1959, the Conservatives were the largest party in Scotland on every occasion, winning 50.1 percent of the vote at its peak in 1955. However, from the 1964 election onwards, they started losing ground. By the time of the 1979 election, the Tories won only 31.4 percent, which was ten points less than Labour and resulted in the Conservatives returning only 22 MPs compared to Labour’s 44 from Scottish constituencies. At the national level, this was of course the election that brought Margaret Thatcher to power, winning 43.9 percent of the vote – seven points more than Labour. The Conservatives’ performance worsened even further during their time in office from 1979 to 1997, with only 25.6 percent of Scots voting Conservative in 1992, compared to 41.9 percent in the UK as a whole. In the 1997 general elections that brought Labour back to power in London, as little as 17.5 percent of Scots voted for the Conservatives. At the national level, the party still won 30.7 percent of the vote (Hassan and Lynch 2001:349ff). The decline was uniform across social class, gender, age and religion (Brown et al. 1998:154).

Conversely, the Liberals and later the Liberal Democrats have had their stronghold in the northern and western peripheries of Scotland. The party has won seats in the country in all elections since 1950. However, in terms of its overall support in Scotland, the performance of the Liberals has not been markedly different from its performance in the country as a whole. Indeed, since its alliance with the Labour breakaway Social Democratic Party resulted in a national electoral breakthrough in 1983, the party have attracted a lower share of the vote in Scotland than in the UK as a whole.

Labour has been the dominant party in Scotland since the Conservatives started to lose support, and it has been the largest party in every election since 1964. The Labour vote did suffer from the growth of the SNP and the Liberals, and the party was down to 35.1 percent in the 1983 elections. However, this was still 7.5 percentage points more than its share in the UK as a whole, and indeed Labour’s share of the vote in Scotland has been higher than its UK share in every general election since 1974. The difference was biggest in the 1987 elections, when Labour won 42.4 percent in Scotland, compared to 30.8 percent in the UK as a whole (Hassan and Lynch 2001:349ff).
This state of affairs is often put down to the supposedly left-wing political culture of Scotland. Indeed, surveys do show that Scots tend to be more communitarian and have greater faith in the welfare state than British people in general. Brown, McCrone, Paterson and Surridge (1999:77) provide data on political values, showing that Scots on average are more socialist and more cosmopolitan than the English and Welsh. Indeed, the differences between Scots and the rest of the UK remain even if one controls for social class, education, religion or other social characteristics. They suggest that this is because Scottish political elites have managed to create a fusion of Scottish nationalism and socialism, so that “a feeling of ‘Scottishness’ goes along with left-wing values” (Brown et.al 1999:83). Both Labour and the SNP have combined nationalism and socialism in their political agendas, and this has made it difficult for Scots to be nationalist without also being socialist.

However, the differences in political values are still small in comparison with the large gaps in support for political parties, and it therefore seems unlikely that this can account for the entire difference in performance. Taking a different approach, several authors have pointed to Margaret Thatcher as an important source of the Tories’ misfortunes, and even of Scottish nationalism itself (Harvie 2004:219; Naim 2000:180). Certainly, Thatcher was extremely unpopular in Scotland, and the hostility towards her has perhaps increased even further since her resignation in 1990. The comparison with England is staggering. Although she was a controversial prime minister there as well, she still had a strong core of supporters. Indeed, the popularity of the Conservative Party did not begin to wane until she was forced out of office in 1990. Thus, Thatcher actually appears to have been fairly popular in England.

There are different opinions regarding what exactly it was about Thatcher that led her to become such an unpopular character in Scotland. Certainly, some specific policies were detested, such as the poll tax, which was introduced in Scotland one year before the rest of the UK. She also gained a reputation as a proponent of centralisation, overruling the Scottish Office on a number of occasions and reducing the freedom of local councils over housing and education policy. Yet, claims that she harmed the Scottish economy appear unfounded, as Scotland’s economic decline actually started in 1976, three years before Thatcher took office, and the revitalisation of the Scottish economy in the 1990s also took place under a Conservative government (see figure 7.1 in the next section). It therefore seems that the Scottish dislike of Thatcher stretches beyond her actual policies. To some extent, it appears to be connected with Scottish nationalism itself. Indeed, Thatcher herself attributes her
unpopularity to “the national question on which the Tories are seen as an English party and on which I myself was apparently seen as a quintessential English figure” (Thatcher 1993:624).

The best explanation of the Conservatives’ problems in Scotland may be that they have been regarded as the party of the political centre in the United Kingdom. The Conservatives have always been the most explicitly unionist party in Scotland – indeed, they were called the Scottish Unionist Party until 1965. They have espoused centralising policies and been opposed to devolution of power. This was certainly true of Thatcher, who was a fervent opponent of devolution and also reduced the powers of local councils during her time in government. Support for the Conservatives has therefore been hard to reconcile with nationalism, and for many people it has probably been synonymous with support for “London”. In many quarters, the party was even perceived as being anti-Scottish (Hopkin and Bradbury 2006:142). It thus seems that the distinctive party system has been mainly an effect of nationalism, rather than a cause thereof49.

7.1.4 Economic growth: Is it Scotland’s oil?

In the past, economic development has notably been used to explain Scottish nationalism by internal colonialist theorists such as Michael Hechter (1975) and Tom Nairn (1977), who argued that underdevelopment or dependent development led to a powerful convergence of economic interests and a shared culture. The problem with this line of reasoning was that Scotland was never actually underdeveloped or dependent on England, and indeed, as this section will show, nationalism has actually increased with economic growth.

The development of Scottish nationalism seems to have followed the conjunctures of the Scottish economy relatively closely. As mentioned earlier, all indicators suggest that nationalism grew most strongly during the early 1970s and the 1990s, and these were both periods of sustained growth in the Scottish economy, both in absolute terms and relative to the UK as a whole. Most indicators also suggest a decline in nationalism in the late 1980s,

49 In the literature, there is a fair amount of confusion as to the direction of the causal relationship in many accounts of this relationship. For instance, Nairn (2000) manages to label the opposition to the Conservatives as both cause and consequence of nationalism within the space of a few sentences, where he firsts quotes the poll tax as the crucial cause of devolution, before acknowledging the "national element in the aversion to Thatcherism" (Nairn 2000:220).
when the Scottish economy was receding. For the period from 1975 to 1985, the indicators on the levels of nationalism point in somewhat different directions. This corresponds to a period of economic stability.

Figure 7.1 shows the development across this period of the Scottish GDPR relative to the UK average, as well as the nationalism indicator for which the data set is most complete: The SNP’s support in the Scottish electorate\(^5\). As the figure shows, the SNP vote started to pick up at around the same time as the economy started to grow towards the end of the 1960s, and it peaked when the economy was at its strongest in the mid-1970s. The stagnation and subsequent decline in the 1980s was followed by an even stronger collapse of the SNP, before the party reawakened with the economic resurgence in the 1990s.

The coincidence of growth in nationalism and in relative economic fortunes makes it interesting to look more closely at relative economic growth as a crucial factor in explaining nationalism in Scotland. This section will discuss three different theoretical mechanisms through which relative economic growth may be conducive to regionalism, as presented in

\(^5\) This graph uses the same data as figure 6.1.
chapter 2. The crucial question is how each of these has been at play in Scotland. The analysis will examine the evidence that economic growth has provided a direct fiscal incentive for nationalism, generated disaffection with the region’s political peripherality, and boosted the development of regional culture.

Fiscal incentives
Traditionally, the fiscal balance has been regarded as an important argument against Scottish independence, and thus as a disincentive to nationalism. In the past, Unionists argued that Scotland was financially dependent on the UK, and the Scottish economy would therefore suffer if independence was ever to become a reality.

However, this started to change with the discovery of North Sea oil in the early 1970s. For the SNP, the oil argument was twofold. Firstly, it offered evidence that Scotland was not dependent on the UK at all. According to McCrone (2001:118), oil made the idea of an alternative Scottish future a real political possibility. The SNP argued that “arguments in financial terms against self-government are going to lack credibility in future when Scotland’s oil resources are recognised as of such immense magnitude as to put the advantages of independence beyond doubt” (The Scots Independent 1972:2, cited in Lynch 2002).

Secondly, it was argued that oil could make a substantial difference to the Scottish economy, whereas it would not make a big impact on the much larger British economy. In 1971, the SNP argued that “the discoveries could make a vast difference to our basic standard of living. [...] If we remain in the UK the benefits of Scottish oil will be marginal” (SNP 1971). This gave rise to the slogan “Rich Scots or Poor Britons”. Indeed, the party later considered the British state to be exploiting Scotland, arguing that most of the oil revenue was being used to fund tax cuts or infrastructure projects in England. The party’s 2005 election manifesto still argued that “[m]ore than 90% of the UK’s oil revenues come from Scottish waters. So it really is Scotland’s oil. Since 1997, Scotland has pumped over £35bn worth of oil revenues into Treasury coffers. Yet we have had precious little to show for it” (SNP 2005).

The slogan “it’s Scotland’s oil” became particularly effective, and has been highlighted as perhaps the most crucial reason for the growth of the SNP in the early 1970s, thus demonstrating that these sentiments were shared by a substantial proportion of the Scottish
population (Lynch 2002:123). This interpretation is supported if one considers some of the constituencies where the SNP experienced the strongest growth. Robert McIntyre’s success in the Stirling and Falkirk by-election in 1971—up 20.1 percent compared to 1970—can be attributed to the oil campaign, as McIntyre campaigned mainly on this issue, and even became the SNP’s oil spokesman. In the 1973 by-election in Dundee East, one of the areas which stood to gain the most from the oil boom, the SNP support grew to 30.2 percent, compared to 8.9 percent in 1970. Later in the same year, the SNP won Glasgow Govan with 41.9 percent of the vote, compared to 10.3 percent in 1970. This by-election took place only a few weeks after the oil crisis of 1973 and the corresponding price rises (Lynch 2002:127).

The balance of payments issue is still fraught with controversy, though, and far from everybody accepts the SNP’s arguments. As seen earlier, Scotland’s GDP has actually been lower than the UK average for most years. Furthermore, Scotland also enjoys higher levels of public expenditure than the rest of the UK under the so-called Barnett formula. This is partly due to the fact that Scotland is more sparsely populated than England, making it more expensive to provide public services. However, the costs of running the Scottish Parliament have also contributed to increasing public expenditure. According to *The Scotsman* (24.06.06), per capita public expenditure in Scotland in 2005/06 was £1503 higher than the average for the UK as a whole. The discrepancy had risen from £875 per capita when Labour came into power in 1997, and it is worth noting that the growing public expenditure in Scotland has accompanied a decline in Scottish nationalism since devolution51, which seems to support a fiscal balance explanation of nationalism.

The revelations about public expenditure led to a controversy over the subject—and not for the first time (Lynch 2001:24). Polls showed that around 70 percent of voters in England believed that the subsidy should be cut (*The Scotsman* 24.06.06). London mayor Ken Livingstone jokingly commented that the government needed to support London’s economy “so that we can continue to pay for the Scottish to live the lifestyle to which they are accustomed” (BBC 07.06.06). The SNP retorted that the figures excluded the revenue from petroleum, which, if included, would turn the balance upside down and show that it was actually the Scots who subsidised the rest of the country with around £3000 for an average Scottish family. According to the party, “Scotland could become one of the wealthiest nations

---

51 Again, the radical improvement in the SNP’s performance after the end of this analysis would seem to question this statement. See note 41.
in the world" if it were allowed to retain tax revenue from North Sea oil and gas (The
Scotsman 24.06.06). The party produced calculations showing that under devolution,
Scotland’s GDP per capita ranked 18th in Europe, whereas under secession – and with control
over the oil resources – it would rank 8th (SNP 2006).

Economic arguments are also used in other sectors, with financial services and high-tech
industries being forwarded as other sectors that would be better off without the Union, and
which are allegedly harmed by the UK government’s policies. According to observers
interviewed by Zürn and Lange (1999:15), the growing economic self-consciousness of Scots
was among the main reasons for the success of the 1997 referendum.

Economic centrality, political peripherality
In the twenty years leading up to the devolution referendum in 1997, the discrepancy between
Scotland’s economic and political position grew dramatically. As Scotland was becoming
more prosperous, in particular during the early 1990s, its political influence kept declining.
The Conservative governments under Thatcher and Major had little support in Scotland, and
their popularity kept declining throughout the period. This resulted in fewer and fewer
Scottish Conservative MPs for every election held, which naturally led to fewer Scots being
represented in the Cabinet and central government positions. This increased the sense of
peripheralisation, as Scots had less and less influence on government policy-making.

The political peripherality argument has been forwarded by several authors as one of the key
factors in building support for devolution (e.g. McCrone 2001, Brown et al. 1998). According
to these theories, the perceived democratic deficit of being ruled by a government that was
supported by an ever-smaller minority of the Scottish population laid the foundation for a
mobilisation on regional grounds (Brown et al. 1998). While grievances over political
peripherality have not been linked to economic centrality by any of these authors, it is
nonetheless interesting to note that the theories presented in chapter 2 predict peripherality to
become an issue in economically prosperous regions, which is indeed what happened in
Scotland in this period.

The democratic deficit was made all the more obvious by the fact that the Conservative
government appointed the Scottish Secretary, who was head of the Scottish Office. Hence,
the political leadership of Scotland itself was being decided by a political party that had little
support among the public. In this context, devolution was seen by many as a way to ensure that Scotland would always be ruled by Scots, and that the policies being implemented in Scotland would have the support of a majority, or at least a plurality, of the Scottish public.

However, since 1997 it has been increasingly difficult to sustain the political peripherality argument. Under Labour, Scots have acquired increasing influence in the central UK government. For instance, several important ministers in the Labour government are Scottish, most prominently the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Gordon Brown. Indeed, Prime Minister Tony Blair himself was born in Edinburgh. The leadership of the Liberal Democrats is also dominated by Scots, with the two most recent leaders of the party, Charles Kennedy and Menzies Campbell, both coming from north of the border.

In terms of parliamentary politics, the Scottish electorate was overrepresented in the UK parliament prior to the reduction of Scottish MPs in 2005. Scotland used to have around one MP for every 70000 inhabitants, compared to one for every 90000 in the UK as a whole. Indeed, the influence of Scots over UK, and since devolution even exclusively English, legislation, has increasingly been questioned in discussions over what is commonly known as the West Lothian question. With a growing number of policy areas being devolved to the Scottish parliament, the legislation in these areas at Westminster does not affect Scots at all, yet Scottish MPs retain the right to vote on them. Thus, Scottish MPs for instance helped introduce university top-up fees in England, although the Scottish Parliament had ruled them out in Scotland (BBC 27.01.04). This state of affairs has increasingly come under fire recently, with the Conservatives arguing that Scottish MPs should not be allowed to vote on legislation that only affects England (The Economist 08.07.06). The Scottish electorate has also gained direct control over several policy areas through devolution, as outlined above. In this situation, Scots cannot credibly claim to be politically peripheral anymore. This might account for the decline in nationalism since 1997.

Popular culture
As is often the case in regions experiencing economic growth, there has also been a revitalisation of popular culture in Scotland. Scottish cultural products have undergone something of a renaissance over the past twenty years, with Scottish literature, drama, music and arts becoming increasingly popular. Christopher Harvie likens the developments to the Scottish golden age of the 18th century Enlightenment, noting that “works about Scotland and
society of a seriousness rivalling anything printed in the place came from all the arts, as did scholars, artists and epicures” (Harvie 2001:496). The impact of popular culture on the development of nationalism in Scotland is also noted by several authors. According to Pittock (2001:141) “it is certainly the case that Scottish culture has been one of the aspects of a Scottish agenda which has created a marked divergence in the outlook and nature of debate in Scotland and England”. Harvie mentions the example of the Scottish Poetry Library, established in the early 1980s, as a cultural institution that “helped propel the Scottish constitutional movement” (Harvie 2001:521).

The processes were sparked by the literary revival from around 1980, with authors such as Kelman, Gray, Welsh, Warner and several others rising to fame. The large number of authors achieving international success has led some to argue that “[i]n terms of the novel, no period in Scottish culture has, perhaps, been as rich as the period between the 1960s and the 1990s” (Craig 1999:36). In his study, Craig finds strong elements of a Scottish literary tradition in the works of these authors, and he links this tradition explicitly to the development of nationalism, arguing that because of it,

“Scotland went on imagining itself as a nation and went on constituting itself as a national imagination in defiance of its attempted or apparent incorporation into a unitary British culture, a defiance which has had profound political consequences in the last decade of the twentieth century” (Craig 1999:36).

Several of the above-mentioned writers used Scots language or Scottish dialects rather than standard English. Scots was mostly used in representations of dialogue, but sometimes also in the narrative.

Slightly earlier, there was a revival of folk music. While this seems to have started in the 1950s, the golden age of Scottish folk music is mainly from the 1970s onwards, and it has carried on into the 1990s. One important consequence of this movement is that it has “helped the movement for re-acceptance of Scots language” (Munro 1996:177), which could certainly have had an impact on nationalism. More recently, Gaelic folk song has also been popularised by the success of bands such as Runrig and Capercaillie since the early 1980s, both singing in Gaelic language (MacLeod 1996). This has arguably contributed to making Gaelic fashionable, thus helping to turn around the rapid decline of the language. Hutchinson
(2005) discusses the revival of the Gaelic language since the 1970s, when the language manifested itself in several sectors of the modern arts.

The success was followed up by movies such as *Braveheart* and *Trainspotting*, both released in 1995. *Braveheart* is a fairly explicitly nationalist movie, based around the life of Scottish national hero William Wallace and portraying the battle against the English occupation of Scotland in the 13th century, and it also employs traditional tartan imagery. Even though it has been criticised for its historical inaccuracy and "Hollywood" perspective on Scotland, *Braveheart* was still exploited by the SNP to mobilise nationalist sentiments. As McCrone argues, "*Braveheart* may have been bad history but it made good politics" (McCrone 2001:128). On the other hand, *Trainspotting* portrays a picture of modern and urban Scotland, using mainly Scottish actors and crew. It does not have a nationalist agenda, but its international success and cult movie status made it a source of pride among many young Scots.

### 7.1.5 Causes of nationalism in Scotland

The analysis of the growth of nationalism in Scotland has failed to detect any effect of globalisation or party systems on Scottish nationalism. The mobilisation of the region for economic development seems to be more a result of regionalism than a cause thereof, as predicted by the globalisation hypothesis, and the hostility towards the Conservative Party also appears to be mainly an effect of regionalism. On the other hand, European integration seems to have had an effect on the development of Scottish nationalism in the 1990s, while it does not seem to have been a major factor in the growth of nationalism in the 1970s. Hence, it fails to fully explain the growth of nationalism in Scotland as well. Meanwhile, economic growth and prosperity remains closely related to the rise of nationalism across the time period under study. The resurgence of nationalism coincided with the upturn of economic fortunes from the late 1960s, related to the discovery of petroleum in the North Sea. However, the movement stagnated with the economic decline of the 1980s, only to pick up again with the renewed economic growth of the 1990s.

Economic prosperity has led to increasing disgruntlement about the perceived unfairness of current fiscal arrangements, with claims that the region is forced to fund poorer regions. This rhetoric is reinforced by the fact that the prosperity is based on natural resources, with claims
that the central state is squandering the region’s resources. There have also been demands for self-determination, particularly when Scotland was ruled by a Conservative government with limited support in the region. In sum, there is little doubt that economic growth represents a significant resource that regional elites can draw on in their attempts at mobilising the general public, as it provides a direct economic rationale for desiring more political power for the region.

7.2 Rogaland

Chapter 6 demonstrated the rise of regionalism in Rogaland from 1960 to 2000, both through a quantitative content analysis and through references to political developments reflecting a politicisation of the region. These developments are surprising, as Norway is not generally known for its regionalist movements. Survey data presented in section 6.2.2 suggested that levels of regionalism in Rogaland are high compared to similar regions elsewhere in the country.

Rather than a growth of regionalism in other parts of the country, recent trends have actually moved towards increasing centralisation and the disappearance of the regional level, along with attitudes and identities related to it. The institutional developments in Norway have gone in the opposite direction of the rest of Europe: Towards a dismantling of the regional level of government (Baldersheim and Fimreite 2005). The Norwegian counties have lost competencies, most notably in the health sector, and both the Conservatives and the Progress Party want to remove the regional level altogether and move towards a system of central and local governments only. Most other parties want to restructure the regional level into a system of fewer and larger regions with more competencies, possibly with the provinces as the core units. However, there is still a great deal of scepticism among commentators with regard to how powerful these regions will actually become. These developments have met little protest on the regional level, and there has indeed been little interest in them in the national media and among the public. To the extent that people care, there does seem to be a lot of support both for transferring responsibilities from the regional to the central level and for dismantling the regions altogether (Baldersheim 2003). Both the lack of protest and the lack of interest point towards a low level of regionalism in the country in general. In Rogaland, on the other hand, there has been a great deal of interest in the media and among political and business elites in how the regional level should be restructured, with demands
that the new regional level should be substantially strengthened in relation to the central level. This indicates that the developments in Rogaland should not be seen as part of a general Norwegian trend, but rather that one needs to look at developments that are specific to the region of Rogaland for an explanation of the growth of regionalism.

This section will look at each of the variables in the model of regionalism – globalisation, European integration, party systems and economic development – analysing to which extent each of them is useful in explaining the observed growth of regionalism in Rogaland. It will be argued that the massive economic growth that took place in Rogaland after the region emerged as Norway’s oil capital in the early 1970s has created the conditions for a mobilisation of regional identities in the region. As the region became richer, the incentives to mobilise on a regional basis grew, and the discourse on local grievances over shortfalls in public investments assumed greater resonance in regional public opinion.

7.2.1 Globalisation: A petrol-protected nation-state

Arguably, the growth in regionalism has gone hand in hand with globalisation in Rogaland. As discussed in section 5.2.2, the discovery of petroleum brought a large increase in the presence of foreign businesses and foreign labour in the region from the 1970s, and there has been a steady growth in the number of immigrants throughout the period.

Although petroleum has clearly led to an internationalisation of the regional economy, the developments only partially fit with the globalisation thesis. Rather than weakening the Norwegian state, the petroleum industry has provided the resources to protect the state from the consequences of global competition. The state has maintained control over the petroleum industry through its ownership of the natural resources and control over licences for exploration and production. Businesses are therefore forced to relate to the state – indeed to win its favour, as licences are awarded by politicians (on the basis of competence), rather than going to the highest bidder – and the scarcity of petroleum make exit an undesirable option on the extraction side of the chain.

However, the petroleum industry is still essentially global in nature, with most major companies operating around the world, and certain aspects of its economy are still highly mobile. This is above all true of the labour force, as reflected in the immigration data. This
has arguably had an effect on the regional culture, making it possible to construct a regional identity around the supposedly “international” nature of the region as opposed to the provincial nature of the Norwegian nation.

There has also been a tendency towards centralisation of planning, research and administration. In the processing stage, oil refineries are essentially mobile, as witnessed by the closure of Shell’s refinery in Tananger in 2000. The industry has also brought a service sector that is highly mobile, and there have been several successful exports from Stavanger in this sector over the last thirty years. In this perspective, it is clearly important for the region to remain competitive in the international market, particularly in relation to other oil hubs such as Aberdeen and Houston. Regional elites have placed a lot of emphasis on this in recent years, aiming to establish Stavanger as “the European Houston” (Stavanger Aftenblad, 10.11.2003; Reve 2003). In the domestic market, there is also competition from Oslo and several other cities for the location of businesses and investments.

Another focal point has been the desire to move away from the dependence on petroleum and establish a leading position in other sectors of the economy as well. The most concerted effort has been the attempts to build the brand “Matfylket Rogaland” – the food region – focusing on the farming and fishing industries, as well as research centres such as the Gastronomic Institute. The aim is that Stavanger will be an international centre for quality food. Similarly, Stavanger’s successful bid to be European Capital of Culture in 2008 represents a desire to focus on the development of culture in the region. Finally, the new University of Stavanger, mentioned in chapter 6, is also seen as part of a wider strategy to transform Rogaland into a knowledge region. These campaigns all reflect a new regionalist understanding in which Rogaland is seen as competing with other regions in a globalised world, and the focus on fashionable ideas such as knowledge and culture arguably also reveals a new regionalist perspective. The strategy also follows new regionalism in its focus on making the region desirable for skilled workers in order to attract human capital for local businesses.

Overall, it seems that the pressures of globalisation have had some impact on regionalism in Rogaland. As predicted by the theories, it is becoming increasingly important for regional policy-makers and businesses to cooperate in pursuit of economic development, and the region is seen as competing with other regions for investments and human capital. This perspective runs through the efforts to consolidate the leading position as a petroleum region,
and the attempts to gain importance in other sectors. On the other hand, these trends can also be seen as reflections of the growth in regionalism itself. The increasing identification with the region might well be the reason for the desire to join forces in working for regional development and increasing Rogaland’s prestige in different sectors of the economy.

7.2.2 European integration: The EU as a non-member

Although public opinion has been fairly stable in opposing Norwegian membership of the European Union, regional elites often claim that Rogaland is closer to Europe than other Norwegian regions. For instance, Stavanger’s application to become European Capital of Culture in 2008 characterised the region as “where Norway meets Europe” (Stavanger2008 2003:42). In 1993, it became the first Norwegian region to set up a regional information office in Brussels (a joint effort by regional and local councils, business organisations and research institutes). This has been used actively by regional elites as a symbol of the alleged European orientation of the region and the related need to loosen the ties to Oslo. In this perspective, the Brussels office represents an attempt to break the chain of command and establish a direct connection with the supra-national level – in this case, a supra-national level that the state itself is not even part of.

However, there is little to suggest that this connection between European integration and regionalism on the elite level has had any effect on the regional public. As mentioned, a majority of voters opposed EC/EU membership in both the 1972 and the 1994 referenda, and there were no suggestions in the membership discourse that Brussels would ever become an alternative to Oslo, other than as a warning by the no campaign. The content analysis also shows that the number of articles on European affairs remained fairly constant in absolute terms from 1960 to 2000. This translates into a decline in relative terms as the newspapers overall grew in size. There are no indications that European integration has had any effect on the rise of regionalism in Rogaland.

7.2.3 Party system: Labour’s vicious circle

Whilst the same parties have by and large been present in Rogaland as in the country in general, their respective strengths have traditionally differed quite markedly. In particular, Labour, which has been the largest party at the national level continuously since 1927, has
always had a lower level of support in Rogaland than at the national level. On average, Labour’s share of the vote in Rogaland between 1961 and 2001 has been 24 percent lower than the party’s share in the country as a whole. This proportion has been fairly stable over time, ranging from 20.6 percent (in 1993) to 27 percent (in 1981). Three times in this period (1981, 1985 and 2001), Labour was surpassed by the Conservatives as the largest party in Rogaland. Other left-wing parties have performed even worse in Rogaland, and neither the Socialist Left nor the various Communist parties have ever won a higher proportion of votes in Rogaland than on the national level. In total, the left-wing parties were supported by 25.8 percent fewer voters on average in Rogaland than on the national level in this period.

As mentioned, the main beneficiaries of this lack of support for the left have been the counter-cultural Liberal (Venstre) party and its splinter parties – in particular the Christian People’s Party (Kristelig Folkeparti, KrF). The KrF won almost twice as many votes in Rogaland as on the national level in the period 1961-2001 – it took 17.4 percent of the votes in Rogaland on average, compared to 9.7 percent in the country as a whole. This difference has decreased over time, and the party won only 53 percent more seats in Rogaland in 2001, compared to a peak of 145 percent more seats in 1969 (19.1 % in Rogaland and 7.8 % in Norway). The Liberals won 7.6 percent of the vote in Rogaland on average across the same time period, whereas the party took more than one third less than that in the country as a whole – 4.8 percent. This difference has also been reduced over time, and in the period 1993-2001, the party only took 25 percent more of the vote in Rogaland than in Norway as a whole. In total, the four centrist parties (including the Centre Party and the Liberal People’s Party) won 40 percent more of the vote in Rogaland than in the country as a whole through this period. This difference was comparatively higher in the 1960s and 1980s, while it was lower in the 1970s and 1990s.

Since its establishment in 1973, the Progress Party (Fremskrittspartiet, FrP) has also performed well in Rogaland. The party’s vote share in Rogaland has been a third higher than the national average in the period 1973-2001, with 10.7 percent in Rogaland compared to 8 percent in the country as a whole. This difference has declined as the party has grown in size over time, but in the period 1989-2001, the FrP still won 23 percent more of the vote in Rogaland than in the country as a whole. The rise of the FrP has been accompanied by a similar tendency in the fortunes of the Conservatives (Høyre), who have fared slightly better in Rogaland than on the national level in most elections since 1977, whilst the party’s share
of the vote in Rogaland was more than ten percent lower than the national average in the period 1961-1973. Overall, the two parties on the right have therefore moved from winning fewer votes in Rogaland than the national average until 1969 to winning more votes from 1973 onwards. In the period 1961-69, the right won 9.9 percent less of the vote in Rogaland than the national average, whilst the right has won 9.4 percent more than the national average in the period 1973-2001.

This divergence from the central level can be interpreted as both an expression of regionalist grievances and as a cause thereof. Labour has dominated Norwegian post-war politics to such an extent that the party has tended to be closely associated with the state itself. Supporting Labour has tended to be associated with supporting the state, and therefore regionalists opposing the centralising tendencies of the Norwegian state have tended to vote for other parties. On the other hand, the weakness of Labour in Rogaland has been mirrored by a weakness of Rogaland in Labour. The region has rarely supplied the party with promising politicians, and it has therefore been underrepresented in the Labour leadership and in Labour governments.

This has certainly contributed to the sentiment that Rogaland is being run from the centre, without sufficient control over its own affairs. For instance, when the 2000 Labour government was announced, the Stavanger Aftenblad (18.03.2000) ran an article about the region’s historical representation in Labour governments, under the headline “Closed for rogalendinger”. It concluded that Rogaland had been severely underrepresented in Labour governments, and slightly overrepresented in centre-right ones, compared to its share of the population. When the next Labour (coalition) government took office in 2005, it was the seventh time that the party announced a government with no ministers from Rogaland. Conservative MP Bent Høie commented that this was “the way it usually is in Labour governments, and that’s why little has been done for Rogaland when Labour has governed” (Stavanger Aftenblad 18.10.2005). As such, the low support for Labour has contributed to regionalist grievances in Rogaland. However, the fact that the difference in support for Labour in Rogaland and on the national level has declined over time suggests that this is not a sufficient explanation of regionalism in this case.

The support for the KrF and the Liberals are also a reflection of regionalism in Rogaland. As mentioned, the Liberal party arose from the counter-cultural movement that opposed the
international culture of the central elites. In Rogaland, the religious and teetotal electorate provided most of the support base for the party. The KrF was the result of a split in the Liberals, and as the name would suggest, it focused mainly on its religious constituents. In its own words, it was a reaction to the secularisation and materialism that was associated with the culture of the central elite. Above all, the KrF became the party of the independent Christian movements, outside the state church\textsuperscript{52}.

If Rogaland has traditionally been underrepresented in the Labour party, it has been overrepresented in the Liberals and the KrF. For instance, there has been at least one KrF minister from Rogaland each of the last three times the KrF has been part of a coalition government. In recent years, the KrF’s position in Rogaland has been undermined by a succession of unfortunate events. Firstly, in 2003, the county deputy mayor, Jan Birger Medhaug, was accused of rape by a former girlfriend. The party leadership sided with the girlfriend and suspended Medhaug from his place as the party’s first candidate for upcoming regional elections. However, Medhaug retained his popularity among the party faithful, and the strategy backfired on the KrF when he was later cleared of all allegations following a police investigation. Secondly, the regional party decided to place party leader Dagfinn Høybråten, from Oslo, at the top of the party list in Rogaland for the 2005 parliamentary elections to increase his chances of securing a place. This was regarded by many as an insult to the regional pride, and the media questioned his knowledge of the region (Stavanger Aftenblad, 08.09.2004; 26.11.2004). According to a survey by TNS Gallup at the time of the nomination, 37.8 percent of voters in the region said that they were less likely to vote for the KrF if Høybråten was the first candidate on the list, whilst only 2.4 percent said that they were more likely to do so (TV2, 15.09.2004).

In some ways, the support for the FrP fits less well with the regionalist sentiments. As mentioned earlier, the party wants to abolish the regional level of government, mainly for economic reasons. The regions’ current responsibilities would partly be taken over by the state and municipalities, and partly privatised. In this sense, the FrP appears to be a distinctly non-regionalist party. However, the party is also the main anti-establishment party in Norwegian politics, taking much of the protest vote (Aardal 2003). For voters in Rogaland,

\textsuperscript{52} The heritage of several of these movements can be traced back to the preacher Hans Nielsen Hauge, who opposed the monopoly of priests to preach the Gospel. Again, this movement represented an expression of direct opposition to the powers of the central elites. Hauge was from Eastern Norway, but he gained a large support base in Rogaland.
the support for the FrP can therefore be seen as a statement of protest against the central elites. In this way, the FrP may have taken over some of the counter-cultural aspects of regionalism in Rogaland. The party is also explicitly pro-market and ideologically committed to cutting taxes. This would result in less redistribution, and hence more of the resources would stay in the region. In this way, the support for the FrP to some extent also fits with the theories of economic regionalism, which will be the focus of the next section.

7.2.4 Economic growth: Petrolisation and regional self-esteem

The covariation between relative economic growth and regionalism is reasonably clear in Rogaland. Figure 7.2 shows the development of regionalism and relative GDPR per capita between 1960 and 2000, with the growth of regionalism accompanying the growth of the regional economy fairly well. The region was not very strongly politicised when the economy was doing poorly in the 1960s, but by 1980, regionalism was already picking up. The development continued with concurrent growth in regionalism and the economy until well into the 1990s.

Fig. 7.2: Regionalism and Prosperity in Rogaland

![Graph showing the development of regionalism and relative GDPR per capita between 1960 and 2000. The graph displays a clear positive correlation between the two, with regional focus and GDP capita increasing concurrently until well into the 1990s.]
The close correlation between economic growth and regionalism across time makes it interesting to look more closely at relative economic growth as a crucial factor in explaining regionalism in Rogaland as well. The remarkable growth in the region over the period of study makes it especially suitable for studying the effects of relative economic prosperity. The drastic economic transformation makes it possible to watch the changes as they happen, and to compare levels of regionalism before and after the change in a fairly straightforward fashion.

In order to establish the connection between these two developments, one must consider the ways in which economic growth and prosperity have been used to promote regionalism in Rogaland. The following analysis will establish the empirical connection between prosperity and regionalism by demonstrating how regional elites have used the region’s prosperity to construct a regionalist discourse that centres around two major arguments: Firstly, that the region is not getting its fair share of public investments considering what it pays in, and secondly, that the region’s political position does not match its economic importance. It will also show how economic growth has fundamentally changed the regional culture in a way that has furthered the regionalist cause, both by changing popular attitudes and by promoting regional cultural expressions.

**Fiscal incentives**

References to the region’s strong economy are often explicitly used in discussions about politics in Rogaland. Two statements made by regional representatives to the Storting in 2000 typify the way in which issues in regional politics are commonly framed. In a discussion about the lack of public investments and fund transfers, Conservative MP Jan Johnsen argued that “we knew already when our country was created that we would have to give some of our bread to others. But nobody thought that it would go this far” (*Stavanger Aftenblad*, 01.03.2000). Similarly, Jan Simonsen, of the Progress Party, commented: “We give the most and get the least in return. It is unreasonable that the state, through its transfers, should convert the richest region initially into the poorest” (*Stavanger Aftenblad*, 13.10.2000).

In particular, the economic card is often played in discussions over infrastructure investments, a topic which has been a focal point for the regionalists in Rogaland. The region receives a substantially smaller share of national infrastructure investments than its
population share would suggest, and this is a source of frustration at the perceived centralisation of the Norwegian state. For instance, Roald Bergsaker, the Conservative mayor of Rogaland, commented in 2003 that public funding for infrastructure in Rogaland fell well short of requirements. He suggested that the reason for this was that the region was too rich, or that it was too far from Oslo (*Stavanger Aftenblad*, 03.02.2003).

More pertinently for this debate, the elites of Rogaland are not satisfied with bringing the levels of infrastructure investment up to a par with the region’s share of the population. Rather, it is often suggested that Rogaland should receive a larger share of investments because of the region’s importance to the national economy. For instance, in an editorial under the headline “Rogaland gives much, gets little”, the *Stavanger Aftenblad* (09.10.2000) wrote: “Rogaland is one of the losers in the battle for public investments [in infrastructure], even though our region is at the top of the table when it comes to production”. In this way, a conflict with the centre is linked to the region’s economic strength to create a powerful regionalist discourse. The opposition to the centre is also highlighted in the tendency for regional elites to focus explicitly on comparing infrastructure grants to Rogaland with the capital, noting that a lot more is being invested in and around Oslo.

Although infrastructure is a divisive issue throughout the world, it is arguably especially important in Norway. Fjords, valleys and mountain ranges make road construction difficult, and the standard of the road network is therefore relatively low by European standards. On the western coast, there are several ferry crossings because of the many long fjords. For instance, there are three fjord crossings between Stavanger and Bergen, and seven between Stavanger and Ålesund. This makes communications between these cities difficult, and goods are likely to be transported via Oslo because of the prohibitive toll and ferry costs along the west coast (around 600 USD for a lorry between Stavanger and Ålesund, for instance). Rogaland itself is divided into three parts by the Boknafjord, with a half hour ferry ride needed to cross. This has always been a source of internal division in both Rogaland and Western Norway. Two major proposed road projects seek to overcome these divisions through building long underwater tunnels – *Ryfast* between Ryfylke and the Stavanger area, and *Rogfast* between the Stavanger area and Haugesund.

Comments on the subject have unmistakably taken on a regionalist hue. The projects are portrayed as necessary to build a strong region, to strengthen the links between Rogaland and
the other regions in Western Norway, and to oppose the centralising power of the capital (see for instance Stavanger Aftenblad, 31.01.2001, 04.01.2003). The county administration describes the rationale behind Rogfast as establishing Stavanger as the new hub for trade and transport between Western Norway and Europe, thus eliminating the need to send products via Oslo. It also notes that “Rogfast will also tie North Rogaland and South Rogaland closer together and contribute to making ‘the deep Bokna fjord’ less of a cultural cleavage” (Rogaland i Utvikling 2004).

The frustrations at the elite level are extended to the masses because these major infrastructure developments, along with several others in Western Norway, will be funded by road tolls. This makes the conflict particularly acute at the mass level. As the regional elites can deflect responsibility onto the central elites who do not give the region what it supposedly deserves, the issue feeds directly into regionalist sentiments at the mass level. As an example of this, the regional council presented figures in 2003 that showed that 70 percent of infrastructure developments in Rogaland would be financed by tolls in the future – more than any other region (Stavanger Aftenblad, 03.02.2003). Statements from regional political elites reveal a similar agenda. On one occasion when such figures were presented by the Stavanger Aftenblad (03.10.2000), head of the transport committee in Rogaland County, Ola Steensnaes (of the Christian People’s Party) commented that they confirmed that Rogaland had been ripped off. In a similar debate a year and a half later, head of the municipal administration in Stavanger, Ole Hetland, commented to the Stavanger Aftenblad (07.05.2002) that the lack of public responsibility for financing was disconcerting. The lesson is that the region would be much better off if it could retain control over the resources that it produces, instead of having to rely on the central state.

**Economic centrality, political peripherality**

Chapter 2 also noted the psychological effect of relative economic growth. Prosperous peripheries should be expected to demand a more central position in political and cultural affairs, to match their economic power. This mechanism is reflected in discussions about a variety of political issues in Rogaland, from central government representation to public broadcasting, by politicians across the ideological spectrum. When the 2000 Labour government was announced, for instance, Rogaland Labour’s Jone Handeland complained: “It is worrying that a county that – in terms of population and production – is so important, is not represented in the government” (Stavanger Aftenblad, 17.03.2000). Similarly, the
Stavanger Aftenblad described the more general scarcity of local representatives in central decision-making bodies, protesting that: “The oil and gas region, Rogaland, creates national values in the billions. But it is Oslo and Akershus that is represented on central boards, committees and agencies” (Stavanger Aftenblad, 05.07.2001). Finally, Stavanger’s Conservative mayor Leif Johan Sevland’s main argument when he tried to convince the government that the new national radio station, P5, should be based in Stavanger, was that the region did not get as much media coverage as other metropolitan regions, and that this “did not match the region’s role in the national economy” (Stavanger Aftenblad, 07.04.2003).

The nature of regionalism in Rogaland is clearly not nationalist. This is evident in the flexibility of the definition of the region. As discussed above, debates between abolitionists and revivalists over the structure of the meso level of government are ongoing, and the only thing that seems certain is that the current county structure will disappear. The political elites in Rogaland have taken a proactive approach to this, and regional parties have placed themselves squarely in the revivalist camp, often opposing the views of the national parties. The region has therefore already started to align itself with its three northern neighbours to make Western Norway one region. The Council of Western Norway was established in 2003, as part of the preparations for the expected national debates about the restructuring of the meso level. It sought to promote cooperation in the campaign for better infrastructure funding, and to support business and culture in the region.

The Council has also embarked on an ambitious strategy of region-building. Among other things, they have commissioned a major work on the history of Western Norway, which is to be written by historians at the academic institutions in the region. The editor of the work, Knut Helle, readily admits that the book will serve a political purpose: “That is not unusual for such a project. [...] In fact, it is the historian’s duty and responsibility to shed light on the past based on the needs of today” (Stavanger Aftenblad, 11.02.2004). The project was initiated by the president of the employers’ association (NHO) in Rogaland, and will be

---

52 For instance, the regional branch of the Labour Party has been vocal in its demands for regionalisation of power, even though the party is usually fairly centralist at the national level. The Rogaland Conservative Party has been in charge of the integration of Western Norway, with one of the most prominent regionalists, county mayor Roald Bergsaker, leading the line. At the national level, the Conservatives want to scrap the meso level altogether. Finally, the regional branch of the Christian People’s Party wanted the party to make regionalisation a key issue in the 2005 campaign, even though the national party did not even have an official opinion on the matter.
funded by a major regional bank, underlining the collaboration of political and economic elites in the promotion of regional identity.

The economic strength of the region is often portrayed as the main rationale for the creation of a region in Western Norway. For instance, Roald Bergsaker, leader of the Council and mayor of Rogaland for the Conservatives, comments to local magazine *Rosenkilden* that

"if we ask where values are created in this country, the answer is, no doubt, primarily in Western Norway. In my opinion, it is therefore both appropriate and reasonable that we try to ensure that more of the values created here in Western Norway remain in the region."
 (*Rosenkilden* 2003, 7).

Similarly, Ellen Solheim, who headed the KrF party list in regional elections in 2003, commented that "we have to develop together with those who are strong. The money we make here in the West go into the big state coffers. Then the state spends most of it in Eastern and Northern Norway, whilst us westerners have to beg for funds" (*Stavanger Aftenblad*, 23.08.2003). According to her former party colleague, Jan Birger Medhaug, "the day we have a united Western Norway, the central powers in Oslo will not be able to carry on with a policy that favours the East over the West" (*Stavanger Aftenblad*, 27.09.2003). This point of view is supported by the media. In an editorial, the *Stavanger Aftenblad* supports the development of closer interregional links because strong regions are a necessary counterweight to the centralist state. Again, the connection to a strong economy is made explicit: "With oil, fish, waterfalls and fjords, Western Norway is a great net contributor to the state. We do not have any reasons to go cap in hand" (*Stavanger Aftenblad*, 12.11.2003).

However, there are clear indications that this does not reflect any widespread sense of identity towards Western Norway at the mass level. As mentioned, all of the counter-cultural opposition movements that used to unite Western Norway have lost ground in Rogaland, and the region does not differ much from the rest of the country today when it comes to religiosity, alcohol consumption or language form.

The impact on cultural regionalism
The new form of peripheral protest in Rogaland differs substantially from the previous counter-cultural opposition both in its focus and its basis. The counter-cultural protests were
based around the notion that the region was “more Norwegian” than the internationalized centre, and aimed at the cultural values of the centre. As this chapter has shown, the new regionalism, on the other hand, focuses mainly on the economic development of the region, and it is closely linked to the sudden prosperity enjoyed as a result of Rogaland becoming the base for Norwegian petroleum production in the North Sea in the 1970s.

Chapter 6 discussed the processes of cultural change in Rogaland, which Grendstad and Rommetvedt (1997) call “petrolisation” in a direct attempt to link these developments to the economic changes in the region. There are indeed clear indications that this is related to the economic growth in the region, especially as the counter-cultures have an even weaker position among people who work in oil-related industries, especially offshore (Grendstad and Rommetvedt 1997:199). The analysis noted that petrolisation has led to a convergence between the region and the rest of Norway. However, the petrolisation processes have also contributed to cultural differences between Stavanger and the rest of the country on other dimensions, and its population today appears more modernist, open to change and liberal than the rest of the country. People in Stavanger are also more right-wing and more inclined to prioritise reward for effort over economic equality (Grendstad & Rommetvedt 1997, 228). This could reinforce the effect of economic growth in the region, as the prosperity-based regionalism agenda is distinctly non-egalitarian and emphasizes rewarding the economically productive regions. The changes that petrolisation has brought could thus increase the salience of the prosperity-based regionalism argument.

It seems likely that these cultural changes have taken place across the region, rather than being a limited Stavanger phenomenon. Smith-Solbakken (1997) explains how the offshore workers were mainly recruited from fishing and farming communities in the rural areas of Rogaland in the early stages of exploration and production. These local workers adapted well to the culture on the platforms, which were under American management and dominated by Southern US industrial culture, mainly because of the cultural similarities between the two groups. The farming and fishing communities in Rogaland have traditionally placed a strong emphasis on hard work, frugality and individualism – all traits that applied equally to the drillers that were imported from the Southern US. She describes this as a meeting between “cowboys from Texas and cowboys from Jæren” (Smith-Solbakken 1997). The cowboys from Jæren were also drawn to US pop culture – this was an area where American music, movies, cars and clothing were particularly popular even before the petroleum boom. In this
context, it seems reasonable to expect these workers to be affected by the American offshore culture, and also that they would contribute to the dissipation of this culture among non-offshore workers once they returned to their home communities.

**Popular culture**

In addition to affecting regional attitudes and perspectives, the economic growth has also contributed to the increasing prestige of regional culture. This is primarily related to the growing use of the regional dialect in public space. Unlike its Scandinavian neighbours, Norway has always been a country where dialects have had a certain status, and many people have preferred to speak in their regional dialects instead of adapting a more standardized form of spoken Norwegian for public usage (Venås 1998). However, the use of dialects was long restricted in written materials and public broadcast media. This has changed substantially over the past ten years, especially in Rogaland. Now, it is common for people to write informal texts in local dialect, particularly when using modern technology like e-mails and text messaging. These media have opened up a new sphere for informal writing. More often than not, young people from Rogaland today write text messages and informal e-mails using dialect (*Stavanger Aftenblad*, 09.02.2001).

In the mass media, the use of dialects is growing as well, mainly as a result of the demise of the state monopoly on TV and radio broadcasting. Whereas presenters were not allowed to speak in dialect during the NRK state broadcasting monopoly, the gradual opening for commercial radio and television since the mid-1980s has brought dialects into daily broadcasts. The main commercial television channel, TV2, encourages its presenters to use their own dialects, as do local radio stations (Roksvold 1998). These developments have subsequently forced NRK to reconsider its own policies on the use of dialects. To illustrate the radical change for television presenters, I am tempted to quote one of the successful recent cultural exports, the author Tore Renberg, at length. In a net meeting in 2004, he commented Stavanger’s cultural awakening thus:
"We live in a region [...] that in an extremely short period of time has experienced a shock to its self esteem. I can remember when I worked for NRK in '98 and '99. Once, I was walking down the hall, on my way to the studio. Then I heard a voice behind me: 'Renberg?' I turned around. The voice had spoken Stavangerian. But behind me, I could only see Einar Lunde [a news presenter]. So I kept walking. But the voice was there again: 'Renberg?' I turned around again. Nobody from Stavanger there. Just Einar Lunde. Then Einar Lunde stops me and starts speaking in Stavangerian. He told me that when he first started in NRK, everybody spoke the Oslo dialect, and if they didn't, they had to learn. He just wanted to tell me that I was lucky to be a presenter in NRK who was allowed to speak my dialect, and that it was neat, he thought. When I was a kid, Mia Gundersen [a Stavanger actress] did not appear very often on TV. Once, I think, when she sang 'Onna ei større vinga' by Asfalt. Sometimes, Stavanger-ensemblet were on TV, and I was glued to the screen. Otherwise, Stavanger was only represented on the weather map. Then came the oil" (Stavanger Aftenblad, 02.09.2004).

The latter part of Renberg’s account hints at another important development on the cultural scene in Rogaland, namely the fact that the Rogaland dialect also conquered the arena of popular music in the 1980s and 1990s. The economic prosperity of the region was probably important in allowing resources to be directed towards the cultural scene. The “Stavanger wave” became a well-known term in Norwegian pop music in the 1980s, referring to the sudden invasion of music charts by bands from Stavanger, starting with “Stavanger-ensemblet” in 1980. What is important for these purposes is not that music from Stavanger became popular as such, but that it embodied a new form of expression: The lyrics were in local dialect. Suddenly, local musicians stopped using standardised oral Norwegian in their music, opting instead to use dialect – and they were successful (Wold 2002). Bands like Mods and Asfalt followed up on the trend that Stavanger-ensemblet started, and although some major bands sing in English today, there is also a considerable amount of music in the Rogaland dialects. Nobody uses standardised Norwegian anymore. The cultural reassertion has also spread to other fields: In 2000, the term “Stavanger wave” resurfaced, this time to describe the growth of movies from the region (Dagbladet, 10.03.2000). In the period since 1980, cultural products in local dialect – music, movies, even literature – have achieved widespread success outside the local community for the first time.

7.2.5 Causes of regionalism in Rogaland

Whilst globalisation has arguably also had an effect on the rise of regionalism in Rogaland, the case study points towards economic growth as the main cause of the strong increase in regionalism since 1960. The region has not been very strongly affected by European integration, at least not in the ways hypothesised to affect regionalism, and there are no issues of language, culture or historical identity that can explain its regionalism. The only major
development that seems to be able to adequately explain the growth of regionalism is the advent of the petroleum industry, and the economic growth that followed in its wake.

The oil boom and the related economic and social changes have caused the economy and society of the region to differ from that of other Norwegian regions, thus making it easier for the local population to separate "us" from "the other". As a region becomes increasingly unlike the nation, the population will gradually develop a stronger regional identity. Rogaland has a clearly distinct economic structure from other Norwegian regions because it relies to such an extent on the petroleum industry. The immigrant labour relating to the oil industry may also have given it a distinct social structure.

This effect of economic growth is both direct and indirect. It is indirect in the sense that economic growth might make it easier to develop the cultural life in a region, and this may in turn help to build a regional identity and subsequently to promote regionalism. Economic growth is also important because it seems to boost self esteem, allowing the inhabitants to take greater pride in their region and become more assertive on its behalf. However, economic growth can also have a direct effect on the level of regionalism in that it makes it more rational to demand greater political autonomy and, particularly, economic independence. People seem more likely to politicise their regional identity if their region, and they themselves, will gain economically from this. In Rogaland, the politicians are open about this to the extent that they make their economic centrality an explicit argument in discussions about a range of political issues. In doing so, they create a powerful discourse that resonates strongly with the general public.

7.3 Conclusion

Despite being very different in terms of size, ambitions and cultural resources on which to base regionalism, the factors contributing to the development of regionalism across time are remarkably similar in both Scotland and Rogaland. Economic development appears to have played a key role in both cases, and for largely the same reasons. In neither region is the effect of economic growth restricted to the fiscal incentives of these developments, although this does play a part in both regions. Just as important is the impact of economic success on the regional self-esteem. It seems that political peripherality is unacceptable in an
economically central region. The cultural reawakening that has taken place in the wake of the economic boom has arguably also contributed to regionalism.

The case selection consciously included two regions with different relationships to the European Union, in order to examine whether European integration would interact with the other variables in any way. This does not appear to have been the case, but European integration has had an effect in its own right in the more recent surge of nationalism in Scotland. Thus, EU membership does seem to matter to the development of regionalism, and the institutional incentives that it provides can be crucial in building support for specific proposals such as devolution of power.

On the other hand, party systems were not shown to have any effect on the development of regionalism in any of these cases. On the contrary, it seems that the low levels of support for parties that have dominated national politics might be a result of regionalism itself. The Norwegian Labour Party and the British Conservatives are seen by many as opponents of regionalism, and voters tend to vote for other parties due to a concern for what is best for the region.

Finally, globalisation is to some extent correlated with regionalism in both regions. However, it is hard to see that the theories related to this variable contribute much to the understanding of the causes of regionalism in these two cases. In Scotland, the establishment of regional organisation to support the region in the global economy corresponds to the globalisation theories, but it seems likely that the establishment of these organisations is largely a consequence of nationalism, rather than a cause thereof. In Rogaland, the weakening of the central state never occurred in the manner proposed by the globalisation school, as the public ownership of the petroleum resources have forced businesses to relate to a powerful state that is far from being at the mercy of the whims of international capital. There has thus not been much need for the establishment of regional organisations, although some have still been created in recent years (such as ARNE in 1999 and Innovasjon Rogaland in 2002).
8. Causes of Regionalism

This thesis has explored possible explanations for variation in the levels of regionalism across both time and space, focusing mainly on economic factors that are prominent in the new regionalism literature, such as globalisation, European integration and economic development. The thesis has made a case for including economic development more prominently in the literature on the causes of regionalism, as this variable was found to be closely connected with levels of regionalism across time as well as space. The analysis concluded that levels of regionalism were likely to be higher in prosperous regions, controlling for the effects of other variables, and that they were likely to grow as levels of economic development grew. Prosperity was also found to be used as an argument for favouring the region in different political debates by regionalists in both Scotland and Rogaland.

A cross-sectional study developed a measure of regionalism that could be applied across a large number of European regions. This was achieved by combining the wide availability of data from Eurobarometer studies with the validity of the Moreno index of regionalism. The study collected data from four different Eurobarometer studies on the distribution of regional identities across the regions of Western Europe. It then went on to analyse the extent to which a number of different factors could explain the variation in levels of regionalism across the regions covered in the study through running a weighted least squares regression analysis on the average Moreno index scores across the four Eurobarometer studies. This led to the development of a model of regionalism, in which regionalism was held to be more common in regions that were strongly affected by globalisation and by European integration, had high levels of economic development, and where the regional party system diverged from the national party system.

The model was taken forward to a set of longitudinal case studies, which then sought to explore the extent to which the model was also valid in explaining variation in the levels of regionalism across time. The case studies used the knowledge gained from the cross-sectional study with regard to how each independent variable relates to regionalism to generate a set of
predictions of how regionalism would have developed across time in the cases Scotland and Rogaland. The subsequent analysis of how regionalism actually developed in the two regions suggested that the model provided reasonably accurate predictions of the development of regionalism, as the longitudinal studies showed that both Scotland and Rogaland have been characterised by a growth in regionalism over the past forty years. In particular, economic development turned out to be closely related to variations in the levels of regionalism across time. Globalisation and European integration were also found to be related to regionalism, whilst the hypothesis on party system divergence was contradicted by the results of the longitudinal analysis.

The qualitative analysis of the case studies could further explore the mechanisms involved in each causal relationship. As the cultural distinctiveness of the regions has remained more or less constant across the time period under study, these developments could not be explained with reference to culture. The fact that two regions with very different levels of cultural distinctiveness have undergone similar processes, also attests to this. While both globalisation and European integration were correlated with regionalism in the two case studies, the qualitative analysis found that they could only partly explain the developments in Scotland and Rogaland. On the other hand, economic development seemed to be closely related to regionalism. The analysis therefore explored in some depth the potential of relative economic prosperity as an endogenous variable that may explain the developments in the two regions, finding that it affected regionalism through creating fiscal incentives, building regional self-esteem and strengthening cultural production in the regions.

### 8.1 Cultural explanations

The cross-sectional analysis revealed that having a regional language is an important factor in explaining why some regions develop regionalism and others do not. The analysis found that levels of regionalism were higher in regions where a significant part of the population speaks a different language from that of the central state or where there is a completely indigenous regional language. In these cases, regionalism might be a way of protecting the language from extinction, or protecting its speakers from discrimination. However, a regional language can also be a proxy for more general differences in culture or ethnicity between the regional population and the rest of the country. Such differences could clearly be conducive to the
development of regionalism or regional nationalism, and they would certainly be a good basis for regional identity construction.

However, the cross-sectional analysis still revealed that language or other cultural differences cannot explain all of the variation in regionalism across space. Even when regional language was controlled for, the analysis still showed that globalisation, European integration, party systems and economic development were important predictors of the levels of regionalism in European regions. The case studies confirm this finding. In Rogaland, there was no distinct regional language at any point during the period, whilst in Scotland; the Gaelic language is declining in terms of the numbers of native speakers. However, the levels of regionalism in both regions still grew across time. Hence, it is necessary to look beyond cultural explanations in order to fully account for variation in the levels of regionalism across time and space.

8.2 Globalisation

The globalisation thesis holds that regions need to mobilise in order to fill the void created by the weakening of states. As borders open up, regions are increasingly pitted against each other in a competition to attract businesses. This requires them to build institutions, which will in turn promote regional identities. Inhabitants will also increasingly view their economic welfare as dependent on the success of their region in attracting capital, and territory will therefore replace class as the most important factor in political mobilisation. Labour and business interests will unite to promote the region in its competition with other regions, rather than struggle against each other for the distribution of resources within the region.

The cross-sectional regression analysis showed that the globalisation thesis might have its merits in explaining variation in levels of regionalism across Western Europe. The proxy on the proportion of foreign immigrants in the region was significantly related to regionalism in the main model, suggesting that regions that are heavily affected by globalisation, or at least by foreign immigration, tend to be more regionalist. However, the introduction of country dummies radically changed the relationship between globalisation and regionalism, posing

54 Even though the social status of Gaelic has arguably improved during the period, as has the status of Scots and of the Rogaland dialect.
questions about whether its significance in the main model might be an artefact of which countries the regions with high levels of immigration tend to be in.

In the case studies, there seems to be a correlation between globalisation and regionalism, but it is harder to argue that there is a causal relationship between the two variables. Although both Rogaland and Scotland appear more affected by globalisation than most other regions in their respective countries, globalisation does not appear to have been the driving force behind regionalism in either of the two regions. The theoretical expectation that the pressures of globalisation will force regions to mobilise for economic development as the central state is weakened might be a plausible explanation for the establishment of regional development agencies in the two regions at first sight. However, a closer look into the growth of regionalism and the reasoning behind the establishment of the agencies suggests that regionalism might actually be a cause, and not a consequence, of these institutional developments.

In Scotland, the Scottish Development Agency was set up when the SNP was at its peak in 1974, whilst Locate in Scotland was set up at the back of the failed 1979 referendum. The restructuring of the latter into Scottish Development International in 2001 also came just as levels of nationalism were peaking. None of these agencies seem to have led to a short-term growth in nationalism, and it is indeed noteworthy that on two occasions, the establishment or restructuring of regional development agencies takes place when nationalist pressures are at their highest. This makes it reasonable to suspect that the institutional developments are a consequence of growing nationalism, rather than increased global competition. Several interpretations in the existing literature also suggest that the central state created these agencies in response to pressures from Scotland for more administrative autonomy. Both the establishment of the Scottish Development Agency in 1974 and its restructuring into Scottish Enterprise in 1991 have been seen as attempts by the governing party to win votes in Scotland.

In the case of Rogaland, it is clear that the Norwegian state has not been very severely affected by globalisation, as the petroleum resources have shielded it from the consequences thereof. The petroleum windfalls have provided financial security for the state, and as the state retains ownership over the resources, companies are forced to relate to it. The Norwegian state was thus arguably strengthened, rather than weakened, over the period from
1970 to 2000, and there was never any power vacuum that the region needed to fill. However, the establishment of ARNE and Innovasjon Rogaland in 1999 and 2002, respectively, correspond well to the globalisation thesis, as do the efforts to diversify the regional economy and to preserve its position as a petroleum capital. Still, the longitudinal study of the growth of regionalism in Rogaland show that the growth in regionalism preceded the establishment of regional development agencies. The growing focus on the economic strategies of the region is also a fairly recent phenomenon. Thus, these developments appear to be as much a result of growing regionalism as of globalisation in Rogaland as well.

However, the growth in foreign immigration has been a notable development in Rogaland since the 1970s, as the region now has the highest proportion of foreign immigrants out of all the peripheral regions in Norway. This might have had an impact on regionalism, as the supposedly international culture and atmosphere is often viewed as a source of pride. It is therefore possible to argue that globalisation has had an impact on regionalism in Rogaland through influencing the regional culture, but this relationship is fairly different to most authors' theories on how globalisation affects regionalism. While the proportion of foreign immigrants has also been growing in Scotland, the region remains among the UK regions with the lowest levels of immigration. It therefore seems unlikely that immigration would be able to explain why regionalism has grown more quickly in Scotland than in the rest of the UK.

The analysis does raise questions about the theoretical predictions on the relationship between globalisation and regionalism. Indeed, foreign immigration was used as a proxy for globalisation in the cross-sectional analysis, and this appears to be the aspect of globalisation that is most clearly linked to regionalism in one of the case studies as well. Foreign immigration can influence the regional culture, and to the extent that the levels and national backgrounds of the immigrants vary across different regions within a state, this can increase cultural differences between regions within the same state. Regions with high levels of foreign immigration might view themselves as more international and cosmopolitan, and gain a sense of regional self-esteem on this basis. Such sentiments might in turn serve as a basis for mobilisation on regional grounds. Thus, the mechanisms behind the relationship between globalisation and regionalism might be quite different from what existing theories predict.
8.3 European integration

The theoretical discussion suggested that European integration would have an effect on regionalism as regions increasingly saw the Single Market and other EU institutions as a viable institutional framework that would reduce their dependency on the nation-state. Through the structural funds, regions have also gained an alternative source of funding, other than the central state. It was also noted that the EU has aimed consciously at strengthening the regional level in its pursuit of multi-level governance, as it was deemed necessary to weaken the dominant position of the nation-states in Europe. The growing sense of identification with the EU would also weaken the dominance of national identities and create space for regional identities to grow.

In the cross-sectional study, popular support for the EU was shown to have a positive effect on the levels of regionalism. Hence, there does seem to be a dynamic between support for sub-state and supra-state institutions, as the theories on European integration suggest. In regions where people want the EU to assume responsibility over a large number of policy areas, the levels of regionalism tend to be higher as well. On the other hand, the cross-sectional study did not find a significant relationship between structural funds and regionalism, and it does therefore not seem to be the case that the EU’s direct relationship with individual regions has any effect on regionalism.

In the case studies, Europeanisation seems to have had an effect in one of the cases. The growth of nationalism in Scotland in the 1990s cannot be explained without referring to the changes in Scots’ perspective on European integration through the 1980s. Towards the end of the decade, Scots began to see the European Union as a potential alternative to the Union with England and Wales, and the “Independence in Europe” paradigm highlighted the reduced importance of the United Kingdom in securing the economic development and political influence of Scotland. As the costs of exit were reduced, secession became a more attractive alternative, and the prospects of a break-up of the Union could no longer be used to deter Scots from voting for devolution.

However, Europeanisation does not seem to provide an explanation for the growth of Scottish nationalism in the 1970s. For one thing, the UK did not join the EU until 1973, several years after nationalism started to grow in Scotland. Scots also do not appear to have seen the EU as
a desirable alternative to the nation-state, as support for the EU was weaker in Scotland than in the rest of the country. Indeed, only 58 percent of Scottish voters were in favour of staying in the EU in 1975, compared to 68 percent in England. It seems likely that many of the opponents of the EU were nationalists, as the SNP were officially opposed to Britain’s membership of the EU.

Europeanisation also does not seem to have had any effect on the growth of regionalism in Rogaland. Of course, Norway is not a member of the EU, and nor do the Rogaland public want the country to join. In the two referenda on accession, a majority of 55 percent of the regional public have voted against membership on each occasion, compared to only 52 percent in the country as a whole. As such, there has also been little change in people’s perspectives on the EU across time that could explain the growth of regionalism.

In sum, European integration might have an impact on regionalism under certain conditions. The EU does provide an institutional framework that can reduce the costs of secession. However, the impact of this depends on how that framework is viewed by the regional public. If the public trusts the EU institutions, they might start to favour secession and devolution, and support for regionalism will grow, as in Scotland in the 1990s. In this case, public opinion towards the EU changed, and this helped foster regionalism. Dardanelli also acknowledges that the effects of Europeanisation in Scotland is connected with the fact that it was seen as a nation, both from within and from the outside, and that the constitutional nature of the United Kingdom being a union state made secession a more realistic alternative (Dardanelli 2002:289). On the other hand, European integration might not have the same impact on regionalism in the vast majority of regions that are not secessionist.

### 8.4 Party systems

It is interesting to note that the political parties that have tended to dominate in state-wide elections perform poorly in both Scotland and Rogaland. The British Conservatives have traditionally been among the most successful centre-right political parties in Europe, and it held office in Westminster for 35 of the 52 years between the end of the Second World War and the successful Scottish devolution referendum in 1997. However, its performance in Scotland has gradually worsened throughout this period, to the point where it did not win any seats at all in Scotland in the parliamentary elections since 1997. Similarly, the Norwegian
Labour Party has been the largest party – usually by far – in all Norwegian parliamentary elections since 1945, and it held office for 40 of the 56 years between 1945 and 2001. In Rogaland, it has consistently performed worse than at the national level, on average winning about one fourth less of the vote.

Whilst this might suggest that differences between the party systems at the regional and central levels might be an important cause of regionalism in these two regions, the most reasonable accounts of the diverging support for these two parties suggest the opposite causal relationship. In both regions, the divergence can be partly explained by differences in political preferences, with Scotland and Rogaland being more left- or right-wing, respectively, than their countries as a whole. However, the divergence in party support has been substantially larger than the divergence in political preferences, and it can therefore not entirely explain the unpopularity of these parties.

Instead, it is reasonable to interpret the lack of support for the state-bearing parties as a result of regionalism itself in both of these regions. In Scotland, the Conservatives have performed poorly because they have increasingly been seen as an English, or even English nationalist, party. Their centralising policies, and in particular the vocal opposition to devolution, have also contributed to their unpopularity in Scotland. Similarly, the Labour Party has been perceived as the party of the political centre in Norway, and the lack of representation for Rogaland in Labour governments have certainly not helped their performance in the region. Labour is seen as a centralising party, and they are an easy target for claims that they discriminate against Rogaland.

8.5 Economic development

Whilst the study manages to identify partial effects of globalisation and European integration in both the cross-sectional and the longitudinal studies, only economic development appears to be consistently related to regionalism across all parts of the analysis. The theoretical section predicted that regionalism would be higher in prosperous regions. This was due to the fiscal incentives to desire more autonomy, the discrepancy between economic centrality and political peripherality, and the growing funding of popular culture in prosperous regions.
In the cross-sectional analysis, economic development was significantly related to regionalism across all the models, even when controlling for country dummies as well as all of the other independent and control variables. Economic development therefore appears well equipped to explaining variation in the levels of regionalism across European regions.

In the case studies, it seems that a crucial reason for the variations in the levels of regionalism across time can be found in similar socioeconomic developments that have affected the two regions over the past thirty-five years. In both cases, the resurgence of regionalism coincided with the upturn of economic fortunes from the late 1960s, and it both cases this was related to the discovery of petroleum in the North Sea. In Rogaland, the economy grew steadily from 1970 onwards, and regionalism also appears to have grown steadily from 1960 to 1980, and from 1980 to 2000. As the regional GDP rose above the national average in the 1990s, the regionalist movement started to play an important role in the political life of the region.

Because of its ability to draw on the imagery of nationalism, Scottish regionalism gained more momentum than the Rogaland version. It grew quickly on the back of the oil boom in the early 1970s, peaking when the economy was at its strongest in the mid-1970s. However, the Scottish movement stagnated with the economic decline of the 1980s, when the SNP vote collapsed and other indicators provide mixed impressions of the development of nationalism. Nationalism subsequently picked up again with the renewed economic growth of the 1990s, leading up to the 1997 devolution referendum.

Having established this empirical relationship in the case studies, the preceding chapters identified three mechanisms by which economic growth in peripheral regions may cause regionalism. Firstly, economic development creates a direct fiscal incentive for desiring greater economic independence. The economic prosperity of these two regions has led to increasing disgruntlement about the perceived unfairness of current fiscal arrangements, with claims that the region is forced to fund poorer regions. This rhetoric is reinforced by the fact that the prosperity is based on natural resources, with claims that the central state is squandering the region’s resources. In Rogaland, the grievances centre around the levels of public expenditure in the region, with claims that the region does not receive its fair share of investments, particularly in infrastructure. In Scotland, the focus is on the other end of the chain, as the SNP has challenged the state’s claims to the petroleum resources in the North Sea, and called for control over the windfalls. The variation between the two regions is
related to the aspirations of the regionalist movements, as for Scotland, the petroleum resources make secession more viable. In Rogaland, there is no desire for secession and hence no claims for ownership over the petroleum resources. Instead, the economic development is used as an argument for increases in the amount of public resources that are devoted to the region.

Secondly, economic growth boosts the regional self-esteem of the inhabitants, encouraging people to challenge the asymmetry between political peripherality and economic centrality. In Rogaland, there are complaints about the region’s peripheral political position, which does not match its position in the national economy. The growing self-esteem on behalf of the region has led to a growing will to assert the political and economic importance of the region, and the demands for a reassessment of the situation have increased. In particular, there are claims that the region should be represented in government and other central positions in the state. There is also a campaign for more powers to be devolved to the regional level, which might involve a restructuring into larger regions. In Scotland, the feelings of political peripherality grew in particular during the Conservative administration from 1979 to 1997, which had limited support in Scotland. This resulted in a feeling that Scotland was being run by a government that it had not voted for – an idea that became known as the democratic deficit. As the political influence of Scots has increased with the Labour government since 1997, as well as devolution of power, the political peripherality argument has become less valid, and levels of nationalism have waned.

Thirdly, economic growth generates resources that can be invested in the cultural scene, which may in turn promote the construction of regional identity. While this study has not provided evidence of any direct relationship between economic and cultural growth, it is noteworthy that both regions experienced a cultural revival in the early 1980s. In Rogaland, the emergence of successful bands that used the regional dialect further boosted the regional self-esteem, radically improving the status of the dialect and its position in the national media. This has been carried on through movies and literature in recent years. In Scotland, the 1980s has been labelled the golden age of Scottish literature, and the release of the movies Braveheart and Trainspotting ahead of the devolution referendum in 1997 was also significant. The status of the Scots and Gaelic languages among the resident population has also improved.
In sum, there is little doubt that economic growth represents a significant resource that regional elites can draw on in their attempts at mobilising the general public, as it provides a direct economic rationale for desiring more political power for the region.

8.6 Implications for future research

This thesis has attempted to address some of the deficiencies identified in the existing literature on regionalism through employing a different research design than most previous work in this field. Analysing regionalism from a new perspective has the inherent benefit that it allows for new conclusions to be drawn and new lessons to be learnt. However, there are also drawbacks to this strategy, not least in terms of data availability, which has affected the confidence with which conclusion could be made in this research. The outcome has therefore been of an exploratory rather than a conclusive nature, and its main contribution is perhaps the development of an approach that future studies in the field can hopefully build on to produce new and more secure insights into how regionalism works.

The analysis has combined quantitative and qualitative research methods, building its conclusions to a large extent on survey data and quantitative content analysis. These data sources have been somewhat neglected in the study of regionalism, and some authors have even rejected the validity of survey data in this field. This thesis has presented a method for using survey data reliably and validly, and it has hence been able to draw on a rich source of cross-sectional data from across Western Europe. Hopefully, the analysis can inform other researchers of how these sources might be used, so that future studies in the field can have at least the option of using similar data. Since the early 1990s, researchers have had the benefit of regular surveys being conducted on issues related to regionalism, and this will hopefully solve the problems of data availability in the foreseeable future. These developments should make surveys an even more attractive source of data for researchers, whether they are conducting cross-sectional or longitudinal studies.

In the absence of historical survey data, the thesis presented quantitative content analysis as an option for constructing a corpus of data that could be used to analyse past levels of regionalism. While it would be costly and time consuming to use this method to create a complete time series over a number of years, it was nevertheless useful to be able to draw on quantitative data for a few selected years in the analysis of the case studies in this research.
The approach could be used in a similar way to construct a corpus of data on other regions where data availability is an issue, in order to avoid undue bias in the assessment of levels of regionalism in the past. Although this type of data neither presents any complete picture of the past in any way, nor allows for a sophisticated quantitative analysis, it could still be both instructive and helpful when used in combination with other sources of data to build an overview over how regionalism has changed across time.

The combination of cross-sectional and longitudinal elements in the analysis represents another departure from most of the existing literature in the field. Through combining the two approaches, this thesis has been able to examine which variables have an effect on regionalism across both time and space. This has allowed for the construction and testing of the regionalism model through different research designs, thus providing two different perspectives on regionalism within one thesis. While this has sometimes risked complicating the conclusions, it has also allowed for the study of independent variables that vary across time as well as those that vary across space, keeping in mind that these are not necessarily the same.

The cross-sectional study showed that there is a significant amount of variation in levels of regionalism across the continent. This suggests that it is necessary for researchers to consider the processes taking place within the regions themselves when attempting to explain regionalism. So far, much research on regions has focused on the national, European or global levels, which has made it poorly equipped to explain differences between regions within the same country. This study has focused on how external processes have affected individual regions, allowing for variation across regions in the impact of processes such as globalisation and European integration. It has also highlighted the inherently regional process of economic development as a highly significant predictor of regionalism across both time and space. It is necessary to look at the processes on the regional level itself in order to explain the developments there, which is a lesson that should be remembered for future research and theory-building in this area.
Bibliography


http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/spl/hi/uk/05/born_abroad/html/overview.stm

BBC 07.06.2006: “Mayor provokes anti-Scottish row”, available at

Belgostat (2004): ”Gross domestic product per resident (at current prices) - Ratio in relation
to the total of Belgium” at


Development: Reiteration, Recapture, Reinterpretation and Repudiation” in Nations

Bookman, Milica Z. (1993): The Economics of Secession. Basingstoke and London:
Macmillan.

Brancati, Dawn (2006): “Decentralization: Fueling the Fire or Dampening the Flames of

Brancati, Dawn (2007): “The Origins and Strength of Regional Parties” in British Journal of
Political Science, forthcoming.


Brenner, Neil (2002): “Decoding the Newest ‘Metropolitan Regionalism’ in the USA: A


Brown, Alice, David McCrone, Lindsay Paterson and Paula Surridge (1999): The Scottish
Electorate: The 1997 General Election and Beyond. Basingstoke and London:
Macmillan.


*Dagbladet*, 10.03.2000: “I ‘Mongoland’ går alle ting an”.

Danson, Mike, Greg Lloyd and David Newlands (1989): “‘Scottish Enterprise’: The Creation of a More Effective Development Agency or the Pursuit of Ideology?” in *Quarterly Economic Commentary*, vol. 14, no. 3, pp. 70-75.


SNP (2005): If Scotland Matters to You Make it Matter in May.


Stavanger Aftenblad, 01.03.2000: "Lite synd på ’rike Rogaland’".

Stavanger Aftenblad, 17.03.2000: "Rogaland forbørgått".

Stavanger Aftenblad, 18.03.2000: "Stengt for rogalendinger".


Stavanger Aftenblad, 03.10.2000: "Fikk 4 av 100 veikroner”.

Stavanger Aftenblad, 09.10.2000: "Rogaland yter mye, får lite”.

Stavanger Aftenblad, 13.10.2000: "Rogaland bør ha flere på Stortinget".
Stavanger Aftenblad, 31.01.2001: “Vil bygga ferjefritt til Bergen”.
Stavanger Aftenblad, 09.02.2001: “Tekstmeldinger ikke akkurat ordbok”.
Stavanger Aftenblad, 23.02.2001: “Kampen om universitetet”.
Stavanger Aftenblad, 05.07.2001: ”Et makttøst Rogaland”.
Stavanger Aftenblad, 07.05.2002: “Bompenger betaler 98 prosent”.
Stavanger Aftenblad, 04.01.2003: “Frå splitting til samling”.
Stavanger Aftenblad, 03.02.2003: “Rogaland på norgestoppen i bompenger”.
Stavanger Aftenblad, 01.04.2003: “Jubeldag for regionen”.
Stavanger Aftenblad, 07.04.2003: ”Sevland: - Stavanger vil ha P5”.
Stavanger Aftenblad, 03.06.2003: “Tou – prøve på forbrukermakt”.
Stavanger Aftenblad, 05.07.2003: “Øl og politikk”.
Stavanger Aftenblad, 29.07.2003: “Ringnes sør om ølvaner”.
Stavanger Aftenblad, 23.08.2003: ”Vil samle Rogaland til én kommune”.
Stavanger Aftenblad, 27.09.2003: ”-Vestlandet må gripa makta”.
Stavanger Aftenblad, 10.11.2003: “Fra Ekofisk til internasjonalt hovedkvarter”.
Stavanger Aftenblad, 12.11.2003: ”Ambisjonane aukar i vest”.
Stavanger Aftenblad, 11.02.2004: ”Historien skal riste fylkene sammen”.
Stavanger Aftenblad, 02.09.2004: ”Renberg om festivalbyen”. Available at
14:00.
Stavanger Aftenblad, 08.09.2004: ”Lokal liste, takk”.
Stavanger Aftenblad, 26.11.2004: ”Ville ikke besvare quiz”
Stavanger Aftenblad, 18.10.2005: ”Misnøye i Sp og SV i Rogaland”.
Stempel, Guido Hermann (1952): “Sample Size for Classifying Subject Matter in Dailies:
Sturm, Roland and Jurgen Dieringer (2005): “The Europeanization of Regions in Eastern and
Western Europe: Theoretical Perspectives” in Regional and Federal Studies, vol. 15,
o. 3, pp. 279-294.
Union” in Informationen zur Raumentwicklung, heft 4/5, pp. 199-206.
The Economist 08.07.2006: “A question that can no longer be avoided”.
The Scotsman 24.06.2006: “Backlash fear as spending gap grows”.

220


**Graphics**

Figure 4.1 (map of Norway) is a modified version of the “Norway, ‘fylke’ borders” map by Anne Mette Bjørgen and Jan Eri, available at [http://home.eunet.no/~jeri/maps.shtml](http://home.eunet.no/~jeri/maps.shtml) 26.08.2003 12:45.

Figure 4.2 (map of Rogaland) is a modified version of the “kart - Rogaland” by the government information portal norge.no: [http://www.norge.no/kart/Rogaland/default.asp?navn=Rogaland](http://www.norge.no/kart/Rogaland/default.asp?navn=Rogaland) 26.08.2003 12:45.
Appendix A – Regionalism index scores

Av. index scores across the four surveys (weighted), for regions with three or more scores:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Basque C.</td>
<td>45.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Flanders</td>
<td>35.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highlands</td>
<td>34.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catalonia</td>
<td>34.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mecklenburg</td>
<td>34.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Flanders</td>
<td>34.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canary Isl.</td>
<td>33.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berlin</td>
<td>31.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azores</td>
<td>31.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saarland</td>
<td>30.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saxony</td>
<td>30.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bavaria</td>
<td>30.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saxony-Anh.</td>
<td>29.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thuringia</td>
<td>28.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schleswig H.</td>
<td>28.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balearic Isl.</td>
<td>27.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bremen</td>
<td>27.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brandenburg</td>
<td>27.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamburg</td>
<td>27.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limburg, NL</td>
<td>26.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antwerpen</td>
<td>26.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SW Scot.</td>
<td>26.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trentino AA</td>
<td>26.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Scot.</td>
<td>26.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zealand</td>
<td>26.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limburg, BL</td>
<td>25.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lincolnshire</td>
<td>25.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namur</td>
<td>24.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Wales</td>
<td>24.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower Sax.</td>
<td>24.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brittany</td>
<td>24.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flemish Brab.</td>
<td>23.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxemb, BL</td>
<td>23.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Merseyside</td>
<td>22.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Wales</td>
<td>22.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liege</td>
<td>22.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baden-Wurt.</td>
<td>21.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tirol</td>
<td>21.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Derby Notts</td>
<td>21.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Galicia</td>
<td>21.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vorarlberg</td>
<td>21.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dorset/Som.</td>
<td>21.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N Rhine-W.</td>
<td>20.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Groningen</td>
<td>20.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poitou-char.</td>
<td>20.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northumberland.</td>
<td>20.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cumbria</td>
<td>20.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walloon Br.</td>
<td>19.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hesse</td>
<td>19.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grampine</td>
<td>18.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overijssel</td>
<td>18.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sardinia</td>
<td>18.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friesland</td>
<td>18.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sicily</td>
<td>18.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brussels</td>
<td>17.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gelderland</td>
<td>17.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madeira</td>
<td>17.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haute Norm.</td>
<td>17.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lancashire</td>
<td>16.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veneto</td>
<td>16.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Piedmont</td>
<td>16.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limousin</td>
<td>16.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provence</td>
<td>16.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Languedoc</td>
<td>16.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navarra</td>
<td>15.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Noord Brab.</td>
<td>15.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper Austria</td>
<td>15.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Molise Abr.</td>
<td>15.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N Holland</td>
<td>15.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centre, FR</td>
<td>15.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navarra</td>
<td>15.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hainaut</td>
<td>15.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cheshire</td>
<td>15.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dreke</td>
<td>15.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salzbourg</td>
<td>14.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La Rioja</td>
<td>14.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liguria</td>
<td>14.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emilia-Rom.</td>
<td>14.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Marche</td>
<td>20.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C Ostrobothn.</td>
<td>20.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valencia</td>
<td>20.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M Pyrenees</td>
<td>20.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flevoland</td>
<td>20.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andalusia</td>
<td>19.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pays d l Loire</td>
<td>19.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friuli-V. Giu.</td>
<td>18.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kainuu</td>
<td>18.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>London</td>
<td>18.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rhone-Alpes</td>
<td>18.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vienna</td>
<td>18.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Franche-Com.</td>
<td>18.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ile de France</td>
<td>18.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beds Herts</td>
<td>18.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cornw Devon</td>
<td>17.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ostrobothnia</td>
<td>17.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Styria</td>
<td>17.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leicestershire</td>
<td>17.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Umbria</td>
<td>17.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carinthia</td>
<td>16.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S Holland</td>
<td>16.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Yorksh.</td>
<td>16.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Mac.</td>
<td>16.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lombardy</td>
<td>16.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kent</td>
<td>16.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Anglia</td>
<td>16.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Maced.</td>
<td>15.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alentejo</td>
<td>15.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campania</td>
<td>15.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apulia</td>
<td>15.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manchester</td>
<td>15.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shropshire</td>
<td>15.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berks Bucks</td>
<td>15.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lazio</td>
<td>15.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utrecht</td>
<td>15.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basse Norm.</td>
<td>15.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berks Bucks</td>
<td>15.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N Karelia</td>
<td>14.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Avon Glouc</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower Austr.</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valencia</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Midland</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lorraine</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aragon</td>
<td>14.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Picardie</td>
<td>13.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C Finland</td>
<td>13.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Herefordshire</td>
<td>13.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Champagne</td>
<td>13.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basilicata</td>
<td>13.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centro, POR</td>
<td>13.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sussex Surrey</td>
<td>13.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humberside</td>
<td>13.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S Karelia</td>
<td>12.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thessaly</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calabria</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burgenland</td>
<td>12.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trace</td>
<td>12.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finn Proper</td>
<td>11.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aegean Isl.</td>
<td>11.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kymenlaakso</td>
<td>11.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pinkanmaa</td>
<td>11.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pajiat-Hame</td>
<td>11.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Essex</td>
<td>11.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extremadura</td>
<td>11.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lapland</td>
<td>11.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norte, POR</td>
<td>11.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Savonia</td>
<td>11.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peleponnesos</td>
<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murcia</td>
<td>10.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cantabria</td>
<td>10.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satakunta</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Castile Leon</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cast 1 Mancha</td>
<td>10.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC Greece</td>
<td>10.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madrid</td>
<td>9.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tavastia</td>
<td>9.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Epirus</td>
<td>9.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N Savonia</td>
<td>9.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

222
Appendix B – Weighted least squares regression

Although the Moreno index scores are based on the responses of 48,567 respondents across Western Europe, a major problem with using it as a measure of regionalism in individual regions is that there are fairly few respondents from each region. On average, there are 229 respondents from each of the 212 regions included in the study. For a quarter of the regions, the index score is based on the answers of 80 respondents or less. This leaves the measures of regionalism highly volatile for individual regions. Because of sampling errors, the confidence intervals are large for most regions, and it is therefore impossible to obtain equally reliable measures of the level of regionalism in individual regions.

However, this does not cause any major problems for the reliability of a cross-sectional study across all of the regions. The errors of the response variables will be absorbed into the residual term of the regression model, and since they are unbiased this will not cause the residual term to correlate with any of the variables in the model. We can safely assume that the errors will be randomly distributed between the regions, with no measurement bias in the design. It is just as likely that the score of a region be inflated whether it be rich or poor, more or less globalised, or have strong or weak institutions, et cetera. In statistical terms, therefore, the sum of errors for all possible samples will have a normal distribution.

The variation in the number of respondents from each region ($n_j$) does nevertheless mean that one core assumption of ordinary least squares regression cannot be met. Because $n_j$ varies between regions, the variance of the response variable will not be the same for all the regions, i.e. the errors are not homoscedastic. This problem has to be corrected by weighting the units to allow the regions with the smallest error terms to exert a stronger influence on the parameter estimates in the regression. This is easily achieved through the use of weighted least squares regression analysis with weights proportional to the inverse sampling variance of the regionalism index, using the formula $w_j = n_j/[P_j (1-P_j)]$ where $P$ is the proportion of primarily regional identifiers, $n$ is the number of respondents, and $j$ refers to an individual region.

An examination of the distribution of error terms in the regression models shows that the weighted least squares regression design successfully deals with the homoscedasticity problems in the analysis. Figures B.1 and B.2 show scatterplots of the distribution of error
terms along different predicted values of the logged regionalism index for models 1 and 2, respectively. In neither of the models does there appear to be any particular pattern to the distribution of the error terms.

**Figure B.1: Residuals by predicted values, model 1.**

![Figure B.1: Residuals by predicted values, model 1.](image)

**Figure B.2: Residuals by predicted values, model 2.**

![Figure B.2: Residuals by predicted values, model 2.](image)
### Appendix C - Multicollinearity diagnostics

Table C.1: Variance Inflation Factor scores of model in tables 4.8 and 4.10

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Country dummy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Foreign immigration</td>
<td>1.51</td>
<td>1.41</td>
<td>4.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for the EU</td>
<td>1.43</td>
<td>1.20</td>
<td>4.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structural funds payments</td>
<td>1.25</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vote distinctiveness</td>
<td>2.08</td>
<td>1.57</td>
<td>3.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regionalist party</td>
<td>2.28</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional GDP per capita</td>
<td>1.91</td>
<td>1.59</td>
<td>4.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional language index</td>
<td>1.80</td>
<td>1.53</td>
<td>1.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Historical sovereignty</td>
<td>1.63</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R. does not border capital</td>
<td>1.47</td>
<td>1.30</td>
<td>1.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population, millions</td>
<td>1.76</td>
<td>1.53</td>
<td>3.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative population size</td>
<td>1.87</td>
<td>1.68</td>
<td>4.03</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Variance Inflation Factor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>5.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Netherlands</td>
<td>2.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>3.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>3.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>1.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>4.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>1.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>2.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>4.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>4.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>2.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>7.32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table C.1 shows the variance inflation factors for the independent variables in the three weighted least squares regression models from chapter 4, examining whether there are
problems of multicollinearity in the regressions. In models 1 and 2, the VIF scores are low for all of the independent variables, indicating that there are no multicollinearity problems in these regressions. The introduction of country dummies results in a substantial increase in the VIF scores. However, no variable has a VIF score of more than 10, which is a common benchmark. Only the country dummies for Germany and Greece have VIF scores above the stricter criteria of 5, which signals that there may be multicollinearity problems related to the interpretation of these two country dummies.

The effect of multicollinearity is that it increases the standard errors of the individual parameter estimates, thus making them insecure and posing problems for statistical significance tests on the impact of each variable. However, when it comes to the country dummies for Germany and Greece, they were both significantly related to regionalism despite the potentially increased standard errors. Hence, multicollinearity does not appear to have created any problems for this regression analysis.