The Utopian Vision of the Total State in the 20th Century with special reference to Zamyatin, Aldous Huxley and George Orwell

by

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ABSTRACT

In past centuries, images of utopia have tended to reflect the hopes and aspirations of their writers, however forlorn those hopes might be, but in the present century, it is common for visions of utopia to reflect the fears of contemporary society. The anti-utopian writers of the twentieth century hold that the perfectly regulated society can only be imposed upon mankind through oppression, since perfection cannot exist in nature. Man lives in a world of contingency and choice, and attempts to render the life of men wholly predictable can only result in the deformation of humanity, through the extinction of human morality and creativity. Moreover, the anti-utopians assert, there can be no final, incontrovertible definition of perfection. The truth of the rulers of the perfect state is no more than dogma. Utopian happiness consists merely in total submission to this dogma, in abandonment of autonomy and absorption into a corporate identity. The citizen of utopia lives in 'a perpetual childhood of prescription', and if he is happy, his happiness is the happiness of a child, who is spared the burden of uncertainty and choice and responsibility.

Of the anti-utopians under review, Zamyatin, Orwell and Huxley, Zamyatin's is the least ambiguous interpretation of the anti-utopian thesis, since Zamyatin is the most profoundly individualistic of the three writers. Orwell's total state differs from the others, in that it is intended as an expression of pure power, and not as an instrument for procuring corporate happiness. In Huxley's work the ambiguity is
pronounced, since he offers both an anti-utopia and a utopia, which in part reflect, and in part contradict, one another. But despite differences in interpretation, all three writers consider that autonomous man, whether a credible or an incredible figure, has no place in utopia.
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Introduction - The Changing Shape of Utopia

In this foreword to my thesis I am concerned not with utopias which have, however imperfectly, been instituted in the physical world, but with the variety of utopian theories which has emerged throughout history. I shall start with a general discussion of utopianism, and shall then propose a set of criteria from which a taxonomic framework can be derived. I shall suggest that the beliefs traditionally associated with the various forms of utopianism have become weakened in the present century. Finally I shall discuss the nature of modern conceptions of utopia, particularly as envisaged by the utopian satirists.

(a) Traditional visions of utopia

To presume to dream on behalf of all mankind is an act of supreme confidence. The utopian advances a theory of society which is intended to solve the problems, and satisfy the wants, of the whole of humanity, however much those wants might need to be purified and redefined. This is not to suggest that the utopian is necessarily an optimist: few utopians have believed that mankind would choose to follow the prescribed path to perfection. The utopia, no less than the anti-utopia, may be an expression of condemnation of the present, an admonition that society is set upon a course which may lead to disaster. The element of moral and social criticism in both Plato's Republic and More's Utopia is readily discernible. Yet the utopian, however profound his pessimism may be, retains a confidence which the anti-utopian does not: he assumes the existence of a transcendant ideal
of human perfection, to which man may aspire if he will but follow certain, rationally derived rules, which reflect a fundamental truth about man's place in the natural order. That is, the utopian contends that the belief in human perfectibilism is rooted in both reason and nature. It is the rejection of this contention which has found expression in the utopian satires, the 'anti-dreams', of this century.

In order to derive an explanation for this rejection, I shall examine the major strains of thought which have underpinned utopian theories in the past. I shall propose five basic principles upon which utopianism has traditionally been founded. These principles are not necessarily mutually consistent. They may contain, exclude or overlap one another. But they may be found either singly or in combination underlying all the utopian models of earlier centuries.

The five categories I have isolated are:

1. Belief in man's ability to aspire to the Good through Reason
2. Belief in the existence of a divine plan, under which humanity will be drawn towards perfection
3. Belief in the existence of a rational law of progress governing history
4. Belief in the power of the sciences to harness nature for man's material benefit, thus liberating him to pursue perfection
5. Belief in the capacity of the social sciences to provide precise answers to all human problems.
1. **Belief in man's ability to aspire to the Good through Reason:** for Plato, the corollary of this belief is the theory that the wise should rule in the cause of Truth and Virtue. Plato, following Socrates, held that no man errs willingly. Once a man has perceived Truth, he will naturally choose to follow Virtue. From this it follows that those who have wisdom to perceive correctly should be the rulers of society. Plato envisaged a society founded upon a principle of threefold stratification, built after Nature, to reflect the tripartite division of the human soul. It is the task of the philosopher to bind his society to the ultimate Truth. Those who have not the mental capacity to perceive Truth for themselves are to be conditioned into the habit of virtuous action by the Guardians. For Plato, the virtue of the common citizen is different from that of the philosopher. It consists, we are told in the Gorgias, in acting appropriately in all circumstances, since all life depends upon intercommunication and reciprocity, which is the basis of all human attachments. The ordinary citizen, then, is unaware of the ethical imperatives which direct and modify his actions, yet he is induced, by felicitous social arrangements, to hold right opinions, and to contribute to the harmony of the state. In this way, he attains happiness, since, Plato asserts, happiness and virtue are inseparably linked.

Plato did not, of course, believe in any historical law of progress which would draw men inevitably to the Good State. No such theory could be accommodated within the Greek conception of cyclical time. Nonetheless, the Platonic concept that no man errs willingly
informs a strongly progressive theory of human perfectibilism which arose during the Enlightenment.

The utopianism of such writers as Godwin, Owen and Fourier is founded upon a belief that Reason will inevitably lead man towards truth and virtue, although, it should be added, Fourier's conception of Reason is idiosyncratic, in that he equated it with instinct.

The utopianism of Godwin and Owen was founded upon a form of rationalism and naturalism prevalent during the Enlightenment, which postulates that man is fundamentally good, and if removed from a corrupt environment will understand and act upon ethical precepts through his powers of reason. As Barbara Goodwin comments, this 'Reason' is not to be construed as representing merely the human capacity for rational thought; it also entails man's susceptibility to truth, and his ability to accrete and process knowledge. 'Two kinds of rationality seem to be involved in all intentional action', she writes. 'Firstly, that mental reasoning process which centres on the ability to manipulate language and logic. Secondly, there is what will here be referred to as purposive rationality ...... Godwin's definition of rational action illuminates the special qualities which the utopians attributed to purposive reason ...... He would maintain that perfected purposive rationality reflects an existing order in the external world which is empirically knowable'. The utopian, then, assumes a necessary structure which relates objects in the social and natural worlds, and constructs his belief system upon the absolute truths which are revealed to him through his conception of this structure.
2. **Belief in the existence of a divine plan, under which humanity will be drawn towards perfection:** this premiss underlies a specifically Christian variant of utopianism, although, of course, such a belief is no part of orthodox Christianity, where the doctrine of man's original sin precludes a belief in earthly perfection. Utopianism can here be seen as constituting a direct response to divine injunctions. The rules for attaining perfection are held to be laid down in holy writ, and man has only to follow them to achieve God's purpose.

One of the most influential of the heretical utopians was Joachim of Fiore, a twelfth century monk. Joachim envisaged the course of history as falling into three stages, reflecting the separate parts of the Divine Trinity. The first age was the Age of the Father: this was the kingdom of law, where man was related to God through fear. The second age was the Age of the Son: this was the kingdom of grace, where man was related to God through faith. In the third age, which was yet to come, men would finally become 'friends to God', being related to him through love. This final age was to be the Age of the Holy Ghost, the kingdom of grace abounding. Thus Joachim looked forward not to the Second Coming of Christ, but to a Third Coming of God, this time in the form of the Holy Ghost.

Joachim's vision of history was important because it allowed men to focus their attention not on the terrors of the Last Judgment, but on the prospect of an earthly paradise, on the advent of a period of terrestrial history in which freedom and love would reign. The Church was dominated by corrupt men, but mankind as a whole was progressing towards an age where the ethical and spiritual ideals of Christian man would finally be realized.
Joachim's conception of the nature of history should not be confused with evolutionary theories of historical progress. Joachim believed that the third stage of history, the Age of the Holy Ghost, would necessarily be born of a bitter conflict between the old and the new, between the iniquity and corruption of the rulers of the Church and the enlightened zeal of those who sought to reform it. The commitment of the Spiritual Franciscans, who took upon themselves the rôle of reformers, was 'to a practice of what they conceived as the absolute perfection here and now. They believed that their own struggle to preserve the Rule and Testament of St. Francis in every syllable was part of a cosmic conflict, that the crisis of evil must rise in a crescendo before the Church could pass over Jordan and that their rôle was to safeguard the spiritual treasure of the future. Theirs was not the optimism of an evolutionary view of history, but a cataclysmic: step by step the situation must worsen until the seventh tribulation; then the tremendous miracle of the reformacio would happen', Marjorie Reeves writes. On Joachim's interpretation of history, then, the 'kingdom of grace abounding', the Golden Age to come, was a new birth, which could be preceded only by degeneration and destruction.

Myron P. Gilmore distinguishes two distinct reform movements which emerged in Europe after the Middle Ages. The first, he states, was inspired by Franciscan and Dominican mysticism, and from the 'apocalyptic hopes of those heretics and prophets who had appeared outside the orthodoxy of the late mediaeval church'. This apocalyptic movement had taken as its inspiration the Book of Revelation,
and other texts from the New Testament. There was a widespread conviction that the world was moving into its final stage before the Second Coming, and that man's duty was to perfect himself as best he could for the world to come. In accordance with the teaching of Odo of Cluny and others, enclosed communities were set up, governed by principles of poverty, asceticism and humility. These communities were intended to provide spiritual preparation for the celestial paradise which was imminent. The second reform movement which Gilmore distinguishes is of a very different nature to the apocalyptic reform movement. It took as its inspiration the new Greek and Hebrew learning, which centred upon man's rational faculties, and emphasized the importance to society of an intellectual aristocracy. It was rationalist and non-heretical. Neo-platonism, Gilmore states, 'was to the humanists what Aristotelianism had been to the Thomists'. It emphasized nature, rather than grace, and ethics rather than contemplation. The Christian humanists held that 'the nature of man, fundamentally good although corrupted by original sin, was capable of improvement by an intellectual discipline ..... In the minds of many of the humanists a new program of education was not only necessary; it was all that was necessary ..... This was perhaps the first significant appearance of a hope which has recurred again and again in western thought and has remained one of the outstanding characteristics of the evolution of European civilization. It appeared in the sixteenth century, in the Age of Enlightenment, and again among those liberal utilitarians and devotees of progress in the nineteenth century who were the heirs of the Enlightenment'.³
Among the sixteenth century Christian humanists was Sir Thomas More, who Gilmore writes, expressed the rational humanist position with great clarity: 'There are some who through knowledge of things natural (that is rational) construct a ladder by which to rise to the contemplation of things supernatural; they build a path to Theology through Philosophy and the Liberal Arts'. More's Utopia is the embodiment of his ideals. It is based broadly on a monastic framework, and is guided by principles of piety, scholarship, modesty, simplicity and restraint.

3. Belief in the existence of a rational law of progress governing history: the conviction that progress was an all-powerful, omnipresent motive force in history was emphatically expressed by Turgot in 1750, and was held to be based on empirical evidence. Man had only to look at history to see how humanity had emerged from barbarism into the light, and so must continually progress to ever greater heights. Louis Sebastien Mercier's L'An 2440, written in 1771, was the first utopia to celebrate this newfound optimism. Mercier prophesied progress towards a blissful world order, where peace, harmony and tolerance would reign.

Belief in the inevitability of human progress also informed the work of Owen, Fourier, Godwin, St. Simon, Condorcet and others. It was largely inspired by the rapid pace of contemporary progress in the field of science and technology.

Another, and ultimately more potent, theory of historical
necessity was, of course, that advanced by Marx in the nineteenth century. Although Marx opposed utopianism, denouncing the grand designs of Owen, St. Simon and Fourier and their fellows as mere political escapism, he nonetheless conceded that they seemed to have stumbled upon some important truths about society. However, Marx held that the method of the utopians was that of the visionary, rather than of the scientist. Marx claimed to offer a scientifically precise theory, distilled from a painstaking study of the complex interplay of socio-economic forces throughout the course of history. His theory, he maintained, would demonstrate to mankind how best it might exploit those forces, and hasten the solution of the conflict. Marx is not to be regarded as being himself a utopian. He was impatient of utopian thinking, and while he predicts inevitable progress towards a final stage when all men will be equal and free, he does not offer any detailed descriptions of the shape of the society which will follow the withering away of the state. Nonetheless, his theory of historical necessity has been available to others as a buttress for utopian aspirations.

A third variant of the belief in historical progression, which also emerged during the nineteenth century, was that inspired by the work of Charles Darwin. Darwin's theory of natural selection was taken over and distorted by social scientists and polemicists, and made to support conclusions quite unintended by Darwin himself. Under the influence of Herbert Spencer, a theory was developed which equated organic evolution with progress. To the Social Darwinists, evolutionary theory seemed to indicate beyond doubt that certain
groups and races were approaching ever nearer to perfection, while others were in decline. The utopian William Delisle Hay envisaged a society in which the 'rising race' (the British) would come to eliminate all the 'lower races' of mankind, and thus give force to the Darwinist (or rather, Spencerian) principle that only the fittest should survive.

4. **Belief in the power of the sciences to harness nature for man's material benefit, thus liberating him to pursue perfection:** the first of the utopias founded upon this belief were those of Bacon and Campanella, in the 1620s. The same belief permeated the utopian writings of the Enlightenment, when the pace of scientific progress gave rise to a growing sense of confidence in the ever-expanding power and ingenuity of the human mind. There appeared to be no limit to man's ability to conquer nature, and thus to escape the constraints of material necessity. The liberating power of scientific knowledge and technological expertise was a recurrent theme in utopian writing until the time of H.G. Wells.

5. **Belief in the capacity of the social sciences to provide precise answers to all human problems:** during the Enlightenment, a growing conviction arose that man had only to observe the advances made in the field of science and technology to recognise that similar progress could be achieved in the social sphere, if only the same precision and expertise were to be employed. St. Simon and others held that the
application of the calculus within the field of human relations would ultimately secure for man exact solutions to all social problems. Condorcet wrote, in The Progress of the Human Mind, 'It is easy to see how imperfect is the present analysis of man's moral and intellectual faculties; how much further the knowledge of his duties, which presumes a knowledge of the influence of his actions upon the welfare of his fellow men and upon the society to which he belongs, can still be increased through a more profound, more accurate, more considered observation of that influence; how many questions have to be solved, how many social relations to be examined, before we can have precise knowledge of the individual rights of man and the rights that the state confers upon each in regard to all ..... Do we not see the necessity of acquiring a precision that these elementary truths cannot possess so long as they are absolutely general? ..... Are we yet in possession of any precise rules for selecting, out of the almost infinite variety of possible systems in which the general principles of equality and natural rights are respected, those which will best secure the preservation of these rights, which will afford the freest scope for their exercise and their enjoyment, and which will moreover insure the leisure and welfare of individuals, and the strength, prosperity and peace of nations? The application of the calculus of combinations and probabilities to these sciences promises ever greater improvement, since it is the only way of achieving results of an almost mathematical exactitude, and of assessing the degree of their probability or likelihood ..... Without the calculus, these sciences would always remain crude and limited for want of instruments'.
Condorcet further maintained that the introduction of a new, universal, scientifically precise language, would be of immeasurable benefit to mankind. Through the use of this new language it would be possible to subject moral concepts to precise scrutiny, and thus to attain certain truth. Condorcet sought an infallibility hitherto found only in mathematics, as did Condillac. 'True science' was thus to take over the role formerly ascribed to 'true religion' as a sure guide to human perfection. Man, for Condorcet, as for many of his utopian contemporaries, was conceived as being naturally good, and moreover constantly growing in mental, and therefore moral, capacity. Once he had achieved certain knowledge of the strategies which society should adopt, he would assuredly gain perfection.

(b) The undermining of utopian beliefs in the twentieth century

As I have argued, a dominant theme in the utopian forms of earlier centuries was a belief in a transcendent good, which was accessible to man through Reason. Moreover, from the time of the Enlightenment onward, there was an accompanying belief that man was inevitably progressing towards perfection, both mentally and spiritually. Man was indeed Lord of his Universe. However, by the end of the nineteenth century, man's confidence in his unique and natural ability to attain perfection was already under considerable pressure.

Paradoxically, it was man's accumulation of knowledge, both of the natural world and of society, a factor which had earlier served as a buttress for theories of perpetual rational and moral progress, which gradually came to undermine his confidence in his power to achieve perfection.
As Stephen Gould writes, 'Each of the major sciences has contributed an essential ingredient to our long retreat from an initial belief in our own cosmic importance. Astronomy defined our home as a small planet tucked away in one corner of an average galaxy among millions; biology took away our status as paragons created in the image of God; geology gave us the immensity of time, and taught us how little of it our own species has occupied'. Gould's contention is that since the days of Copernicus and Newton, man's anthropocentric vision of the universe has come to bear less relation to accepted truth, although the process of rejection of this vision has been slow and painful.

Moreover, in the twentieth century, man's old pursuit of certainty and constancy has encountered an unforseen check. The theories of Einstein have overturned hitherto incontestable truths. Time can no longer be regarded as being susceptible to unambiguous measurement at any time throughout the universe, so that any given point is everywhere the same. Relativity theory shows that time is modified by changes in the gravitational field; space is modified by the objects it contains. The neat, mechanical model of the universe offered by Newtonian physics has been superseded. All is flux and change. Ironically, Einstein himself was unwilling to accept all the implications of his theories. Although he contributed much to the theory of quantum mechanics, 'he spent the closing decades of his life trying to show that the uncomfortable consequencies of the theory that he had helped to create were not inescapable'. It was the 'philosophically fuzzy' nature of quantum mechanics, its probabilistic component, which Einstein
found unacceptable. We can either calculate the velocity of an electron in its path round the proton, or we can plot its position at a given moment, but we cannot do both. This element of untidiness and uncertainty was offensive to Einstein.

In the field of human psychology, too, theoretical developments over the past century have served to undermine man's faith in his ability to find precise answers to the problems of life. Freudian theory has called into question man's belief in his own rationality, raising instead the spectre of the dark arcana of the subconscious mind. Moreover, Freudian theory casts doubts on man's ability to found a perfect civilisation, rooted in nature, and dedicated to the achievement of harmony and felicity. Man's social relationships, Freud contends, are imbued with 'cultural frustration', since civilisation is founded upon renunciation of instinct, and therefore entails the generation of pain and guilt.

Modern conceptions of the world, it seems, hinder the utopian in his quest for certainty, immutability and absolute Truth. Science, the great liberator, has not invested humanity with the omniscience it sought, nor is it likely to do so. It has, of course, enabled man to harness the environment to an extent which would have astounded the optimists of the Enlightenment. But absolute mastery over nature has eluded man: instead, man has had to learn from the less fortunate results of his earlier hubris, that he, like any other creature, is dependent upon the physical resources of his fragile world. Moreover, technology has shown itself to be an ambiguous force for progress. Machines can liberate man; they can as easily enslave him. Wells's
automated paradise had already begun to arouse feelings of repugnance by the 1930s.

In the field of the social sciences, the quest for certain solutions has encountered further checks. The breakdown of the framework of religious belief has led to the fragmentation of the naturalist system of ethics, leaving behind a group of concepts which now have to find a new validation, divorced from the context from which they originally arose. We are left with moral pluralism. This pluralism is reflected in the organisation of the social sciences themselves. Social science now recognizes competing models, and any such model will supply a rationally coherent connection between actions and purposes, and between purposes and beliefs. The utopian ideal of a unified science of society, revealing an absolute truth, has not been realized. Social science reveals only competing moral truths, or ideologies.

The utopians of earlier centuries assumed that it was possible to discover absolute truths about man, either from divine scripture, or through painstaking empirical research. From these truths, it would finally be possible, with the aid of scientific techniques, to deduce truths about the optimum shape of society. But in the present day, the limitations to the power of scientific procedures, and especially mathematical procedures, to overcome human problems, is acknowledged even among scientists. J.Z. Young writes, 'The very fact of separating out precise, logical propositions about complex situations presupposes that such separations are possible, without loss of some features that are essential for the solution of real
human problems ..... Systems of computerized thinking have mostly followed logicians in assuming that the processes of the brain can be usefully categorized by abstract entities .... The assumption involved in such a method is that the essential features of statements, whose truthfulness is in question, can be captured in simple symbols. We try to define our terms to ensure this, but the biologist, like the sociologist, finds many situations so complicated that simplification produces distortion. There are no simple answers to most of the questions that arise in everyday life ..... The use of abstract classes has obviously given sensational increases in control of nature, especially through mathematics .... (but) if we simplify problems by logical or mathematical analysis we are liable to lose as well as to gain .... Logic, mathematics, and computers represent potentially dangerous reductionisms'.

A third attack upon the foundations of utopianism has been brought about by the undermining of historicist assumptions. Theories of the inevitability of progress towards ultimate perfection have been cast into doubt by the course of history itself. Social Darwinism was, as I have already argued, based upon a radical misunderstanding of Darwin's work. Those who considered that the 'forces of evolution' would carry favoured sections of humanity forward to perfection gravely misread Darwin's intentions. Darwin was reluctant to use the term 'evolution', because of its popular connotations, preferring instead the phrase, 'descent with modification'. Orthodox Darwinism reveals not an inevitable tide of progress, but the part played in the development of a species by chance mutation and random changes in the natural environment.
Lastly, material manifestations of Marxist theory reveal no unified vision of the perfect state, but rather a plurality of competing visions. There is no single structure shared by all the Marxist states. Neither is there any evidence of a single sequence of historical events which leads inexorably to the institution of the Marxist state. Each has followed its own, unique historical path.

(c) **New images of utopia**

If it is accepted that the spirit of confidence which supported the utopian theories of the past has been undermined, then it must follow that the utopias of the present century will take on a form very different from that of their predecessors. The utopias of the past were diverse in nature. They were the embodiment of a wide variety of beliefs, desires and dreams. Yet it was generally assumed that utopia was natural to man, it was the true city, to which men might be drawn, perhaps by the forces of history, or by moral persuasion, or through increased knowledge and perception. If today the confidence of these earlier builders of utopias has been seriously undermined, then visions of the utopian state in this century will no longer appear as man's natural home, to be accepted by all who have wit or grace enough to perceive the truth. What, then, will be the shape of the new utopia? And how will it be possible to compel man to accept it?

There are two further principles underlying utopianism, which I have so far omitted to discuss. Neither entails belief in a divine
purpose for man, nor belief in any theory of natural progress. Most significantly, neither entails belief in man's natural goodness, nor, indeed, in his capacity for making moral judgments at all. It is my contention that it is upon these two principles, perhaps in combination with others, that the fictional utopias of the modern world are founded, both in the utopian satires, and in B.F. Skinner's prescriptive utopia, Walden Two. Huxley's mystical utopia, Island, is sui generis, but even here, traces of these two principles may be discerned.

The first is the belief that a supreme legislator will arise, who will guide the destinies of his state. Such a legislator will supervise the social and political arrangements of the state with watchful detachment. He will be in the state but not of it. Such is the Legislator of Rousseau's Social Contract. The figure of the deus ex machina, the omnipotent ruler, remote from all human accountability, able to change or abandon laws at will, has haunted the consciousness of man in the twentieth century, following the experiences of Stalinist Russia and Nazi Germany. Where a demi-god rules, the citizens are deprived of their status as moral beings. The total power of the rulers predicates the total powerlessness of the ruled. The whole duty of the subjects of a demi-god is unconditional and unreflective obedience. And, to extend Lord Acton's maxim, if absolute power corrupts absolutely, so too does absolute powerlessness.

The second concept underlying modern visions of utopia is the theory that man is infinitely malleable. This is the principle
of the behaviourist school of psychology, and it lies at the heart of Skinner's *Walden Two*. Again, under this theory, man is no longer considered to have any innate moral capacity. Experience in the present century has taught that total malleability implies total susceptibility to techniques of conditioning and manipulation, to oppression and to deformation.

A utopia founded upon belief in the omniscience of a semi-divine ruler, and upon belief in total human plasticity cannot pretend to any form of democracy. All power necessarily radiates from the top. Men are no more than inchoate matter, to be moulded and fashioned in such a way that their desires and needs exactly accord with the societal arrangements laid down by the ruler. Such are the imaginary states of Orwell's *Nineteen Eighty-Four* and Huxley's *Brave New World*. So, too, is the perfect state depicted in Zamyatin's *We*, although Zamyatin's anti-utopia is more complex, in that it is a powerful parody of the traditional utopia, inflexibly committed to precisely computed ideals of Reason, Happiness and Virtue. It is powered by the old belief that all human problems are ultimately susceptible to mathematical solution, and that thus the whole of life can be rendered predictable.

It is the elimination of human unpredictability in the perfect state which appears as the main concern of many of the writers of anti-utopian fiction in the twentieth-century: Zamyatin in *We*, Aldous Huxley in *Brave New World*, E.M. Forster in *The Machine Stops*
and David Karp in One. Ferdinand Mount defines this concern in the following words: "Human beings are not like a stable chemical substance, which may be refined to the nth degree of purity .... The reformer sketches out his plan for the perfecting of this or that institution. But the reaction of the human material is unpredictable, as volatile as any explosive .... This unpredictability is such a striking fact that all progressive theorists of any stature have had to take account of it. And they have all chosen the same method — the silencing of the human material. Rousseau's Legislator, the Benthamist tradition of the social engineer, the Communist tradition of the dictatorship of the proletariat, all work on the assumption that the mob must not be allowed into the planning office. For if the common people are allowed to participate, they will exercise their human freedom to make mistakes. And once that freedom is permitted, progress will be neither sure nor necessary .... The first necessity for progress is silence...."

The conviction of the twentieth century utopian satirists is that utopia is established only through an act of violation, through an attempt to constrain nature, and to empty man of his rationality, his passions, and all that serves to identify him as human. The new citizen of utopia is the hollow man, bereft of the pride which might enable him to endure the necessities and the vicissitudes of the world, the imperfections of social life, and his own inadequacies with some sort of nobility — bereft, too, of that self-denying thirst for virtue, and for the achievement of universal well-being which typified the citizen of the older utopias, possessing simply the passive capacity to react mechanically to threats, or to give the appropriate conditioned response to external stimuli.
The utopian satirists have reacted against particular materialisations of utopia in the modern world, and by extrapolating and intensifying certain tendencies which they have observed in society, they have sought to present an admonitory picture of the life of man as it might be in the future. But the scope of their condemnation spreads further than this. It is a condemnation of the utopian project as such. The utopian, they say, is committed to an inflexible vision of the nature of social perfection. He is unconcerned with the perceived characteristics and requirements of men in the world about him. Instead, he pretends to a knowledge of the Universal Man. The utopian satirists seek to depict the condition of the particular man, as it might be if he were to become subordinated to the requirements of any theory of social perfection. No man, they say, can with dignity consent to become a figment in another man's dream.

If we accept the conclusion of the utopian satirists that belief in the utopian project has no basis either in reason or nature, then we must accept the corollary that any attempt to institute utopia must entail a radical revision both of the world of nature and of the human mind.

In Part I of my thesis, I shall review the general nature of the utopian enterprise, with particular reference to the critical standpoints adopted by the three writers, Yevgeny Zamyatin, Aldous Huxley and George Orwell.

In Part III, I shall assess the problems posed by man and the natural world to the architect of utopia, and also the strategies devised for overcoming these problems, as they present themselves in the work of these three writers.
References


7. B.B.C., Radio Three: *Conversation between Professor Martin Klein, Yale Univeristy, and Professor Abraham Pais, Rocke­feller Institute, under the direction of John Maddox*, 1980.


Part I (i) The anti-utopian critique

In this section of my thesis I shall discuss the anti-utopian critique in general terms and the particular response to utopianism to be found in the work of Zamyatin, Orwell and Huxley.

I have chosen to refer to the total states of Orwell's Nineteen Eighty-Four, Zamyatin's We and Huxley's Brave New World as 'anti-utopias'. This is not a wholly satisfactory neologism, but it has the virtue of being the one in the most common usage. Some writers prefer the term, 'dystopia', but while this may be linguistically superior, it is still not beyond criticism. Fictional models of the total state, whether proposed for adoption or rejection, exist, after all, 'nowhere'. It can be argued that the word, 'dystopia', and its opposite, 'eutopia', should apply only to states which are extant in the real world.

The anti-utopians challenge the validity of certain assumptions, which are fundamental to utopian thinking: firstly, the utopian assumes that it is possible to devise a 'perfect state', in which perfected man may be sustained and perpetuated. This, in turn, takes it for granted that there can be general agreement as to the nature of perfection, both of man and of society. The utopias depict enclosed systems where there is no possibility of self-exclusion. Alternative philosophies are debarred, and, as far as possible, rendered unthinkable. A common element in all utopias is that the state of affairs described is presented as being self-evidently desirable, incorporating and pre-empting all rational critical response. Even where the utopian exposition is presented in the form
of a dialogue between a citizen of utopia and an outsider, the fictional critic of the proposed social arrangements is invariably portrayed as being irrational, insensitive, weak or frankly malevolent. The clear implication is that whoever rejects the proffered perfection, does so only as a result of his own folly, insensibility or iniquity. It is presumed that the state has discovered the ultimate truth, valid for all time, about how society should be constructed. Each utopia is a total state, the embodiment of a closed system of thought. There is a central postulate to which the state is committed, and from which all rubrics governing social conduct are derived. The dogma of the state cannot be refuted, since all criticism is reinterpreted to conform to the linguistic and conceptual conventions of the dogma, and thence contorted into a corroboration of its internal logic. There are strong affinities between the dogma of the total state and religious dogma, and this is a subject to which I shall return later in this sub-section.

This primary assumption of the utopians, that it is possible to arrive at a universally acceptable ideal of perfection, is wholly rejected by the anti-utopians. It would, they maintain, be impossible to define social perfection in such a way that the validity of one's definition would be manifest to all men in all ages. Thus the shape of any proposed utopian society could never be established through reasoned argument, followed by general agreement. The 'perfect state' would only be taken to be desirable by all, once coercion, and probably the application of eugenic techniques and mechanisms for social conditioning and control, had purged society of all
dissident elements. Moreover, the use of such methods would have to be institutionalised, since, in the natural course of events, new generations of critics and sceptics would always arise, to muddy the ideological purity of the state.

The anti-utopians, then, deny the possibility of defining social perfection in any way which would find universal concurrence. Moreover they contend that the nature of men is such that no society dedicated to the expression of a single conception of perfection could possibly promote the well-being of all, since men are by nature diverse in talents and temperament. Thus, if all were to be induced to conform to one fixed pattern of excellence, few would be in a position to achieve self-fulfilment. Only those who, by natural good fortune, reflected their society's preconceptions of human perfection would be able to employ their particular talents, and express their mental and emotional aspirations, adequately.

The anti-utopians consider that those who construct 'perfect states' are concerned exclusively with man as a social being. The ideal of individual self-realisation as a human need, a 'good', is alien to utopian thought. The well-being of the individual citizen is perceived as being co-terminous with the well-being of the state. No private needs are recognized, and the achievement of perfect social harmony is the first, and perhaps the only, consideration. That which serves to promote social cohesion is axiomatically good, and that which underlines human particularity is bad, since it is seen as constituting a threat to the unity of the state.
Excluded from this particular criticism of utopianism are the
arcanide societies pictured by such writers as William Morris. In
*News From Nowhere*, Morris depicts a dream society where individual
fulfilment is prized, and from which the oppressive machinery of the
centralised state is entirely absent. Absent, too, are the realities
of modern life: industrialisation, scarcity, militarism, drudgery
and overcrowding. Also absent are the contingencies of human life:
illness, ugliness, incapacity and ill-will. Morris's vision is one of
self-regulating, pastoral simplicity, of a world where work is accom­
panied by aesthetic satisfaction, and where humanity is steadily pro­
gressing in beauty and kindliness. Such visions of perfection will
fall outside the scope of this thesis, since they do not depict
closely constructed perfect states, but rather, loosely knit, idea­
lised communities. Morris's work, and the work of similar writers,
is of heuristic value: as such, it does not attract the criticism
of the anti-utopians. Morris offers no 'blueprint', and no precise
'solutions' to human problems.

Writing of *The Soul of Man under Socialism*, by Oscar Wilde,
Orwell expresses the view that Wilde's 'Utopian and anarchistic'
vision of Socialism fails to take into account the realities of the
world. Moreover, Wilde seems to overlook the fact that the transi­
tion to Socialism will be uncomfortable. But, Orwell writes, 'Wilde's
pamphlet and other kindred writings - *News From Nowhere*, for instance -
...... have their value. They may demand the impossible, and they may
- since a Utopia necessarily reflects the aesthetic ideas of its own
period - sometimes seem 'dated' and ridiculous, but they do at least look beyond the era of food queues and party squabbles, and remind the Socialist movement of its original, half-forgotten objective of human brotherhood'.

In the work of such writers as Morris, the individual is at the centre. But it is significant that in most utopian fiction, the individual is barely characterised. He seems to exist only in relation to his function in the social system, and his satisfaction lies solely in his fulfilment of his rôle as citizen. So, too, does his virtue.

This brings us to the second assumption inherent in utopianism which is challenged by the anti-utopians. This concerns the concept of human perfection. Here the anti-utopian critique is complex: anti-utopians reject the concept of human perfectibility, and they reject also the utopian vision of morality. The anti-utopians hold that the human individual lives in a world where good and evil co-exist inevitably. He is therefore faced with making moral choices, and while, through the making of such choices, he may become 'better', there is no possibility of his becoming 'perfect'. Moral aspiration will take different forms for different men in different circumstances, and moral action is always the result of personal deliberation.

But in the 'perfect state', all possibility of choice is removed, and thus 'moral action' is no longer a concept of any worth. The 'virtuous act' requires no courage, no prior deliberation, no discernment and no self-discipline. It is simply a
habitual reaction to a given set of stimuli. The citizens of utopia act 'morally', that is, in such a way as to promote social stability and to enact the belief system of the state, simply for lack of any capacity to do otherwise. The morality of utopia is essentially passive, and therefore, paradoxically, amoral. And the new 'perfect man', the inhabitant of utopia, is necessarily inhuman, having been deprived of all the recognisable qualities of the human being - uniqueness, unpredictability and the power of choice.

For a behaviourist like B.F. Skinner, the contention that man would be deprived of the power of moral choice in a perfect society is based on a false premiss. Skinner does not consider that man is capable of exercising independent judgment, whether for good or ill, and arriving at a decision as to how he will act. Skinner contends that in every society, every separate human action, whether deemed virtuous or vicious, is merely a piece of conditioned behaviour. The important task for man is to devise an ideal conditioning programme. Man, for Skinner, is infinitely malleable, and without innate characteristics of any kind. He is no more than the totality of his responses to his physical and social environment. If a man is correctly conditioned, his action will be appropriate to the needs of his society. In Skinner's utopia, *Walden Two*, the perfectly regulated society has automatically produced the perfectly regulated citizen.

The behaviourist, armed with the conviction that man is infinitely malleable, has no problem in devising a perfect state, except, of course, for the obvious problem as to who shall condition
the conditioners who set up such a state, since a perfect conditioner must himself have been perfectly conditioned. This is a problem of which Skinner is aware in writing Walden Two, although he will not allow himself to admit that it is logically insoluble. The important thing, for Skinner, is to encourage men to discard unhelpful concepts, such as the idea of 'free will', and study the positive implications of the concept that man is infinitely malleable.

The anti-utopian writers do not, of course, reject Skinner's contention that man is malleable. They have themselves devised 'perfect States', and human susceptibility to manipulation is a precondition for the founding of a total state. Anti-utopian fears are aroused precisely because men are manipulable. Orwell, indeed, subscribed to the view that the infant mind is a tabula rasa, wholly vulnerable to the imprints of the adult world (see Part II (i) Note 16 below). The contention of Skinner's which the anti-utopians do reject is the claim that human misery could be cured once and for all if a carefully constructed, centralised system of conditioning could be introduced. This, for the anti-utopians, would itself constitute the ultimate human misery. Man, they hold, is vulnerable to good and bad influences alike, and his independence of will, the source of his morality, is precariously founded. Within the totally regulated state, man would be subject to the grossest deformation, since he would inevitably be deprived of freedom of will and judgment. Man's ability to guide his own destiny, already limited by social necessity, chance events, corporeal frailty and outside influence, would be wholly sacrificed within the context of utopia. The citizen of such a state would be not man but machine.
The happiness which utopia is intended to afford is only bought at the price of freedom, then. Three quite distinct but interrelated questions arise here. Firstly, is it possible to arrive at a universally valid definition of happiness? Secondly, a paradoxical question, would utopian happiness make people happy? Thirdly, is the provision of universal happiness an appropriate goal to which the rulers of the state should aspire?

With the exception of Orwell, whose imaginary state does not aspire to the provision of mass happiness, and who does not therefore need to discuss the nature of human felicity, the anti-utopians deny the existence of any generally acceptable image of happiness. Happiness, they hold, is not to be equated either with pleasure or with ease. Happiness, they believe, takes different forms for different individuals, and even for the same individual from moment to moment. The individual should be free to choose from situation to situation and from day to day just what it is which constitutes happiness for him. The anti-utopians thus reject general definitions of happiness.

The answer to the second question is more complex. The anti-utopians fear the type of mindless, uniform, mass-produced happiness which they consider would be provided in the perfect state. To say that freedom is necessary to men is to say that their individual needs vary, and that a common happiness would be no happiness at all for many individuals - unless they were forced through conditioning to lose their personal characteristics. There are two quite distinct fears here: either conditioning will be unsuccessful, and individuals
will be made miserable and frustrated by the uniform 'happiness' provided by the state planners, or it will be successful, and depersonalized men will glory in their submission to the soothing control of the state machine. The most pessimistic anti-utopians hold the second view.

The 'happiness' offered in utopia is not individual happiness, which may come and go in response to an infinite variety of stimuli, and which cannot be regarded as being a permanent state. It seems instead to lie merely in release from frustration, struggle and indecision. Utopia deprives its citizens of the possibility of unassuaged desire. Thus, in Huxley's *Brave New World*, desires are artificially aroused and then accorded instant gratification. No dissatisfaction is allowed to remain. Any lingering sense of unease is soothed away with soma, the state-provided tranquilising drug. In Zamyatin's *We*, human physical requirements have been so standardised and regulated, and human emotionality has been so successfully quenched, that all desire is dead. The citizen attends to the needs of his body as impassively as if he were conducting the routine maintenance of a machine under his charge. Zamyatin held that happiness, which is necessarily imperfect and fleeting, lies in contrasts, and that man, who is not a component in a mechanical system, nor an ant in an ant-hill, requires the stimulus of desires, pains, struggle and change if he is not to be beset by boredom and apathy. Zamyatin's assessment of human motivation is supported in the writings of J. Z. Young. Young writes, 'Workers as different as psychoanalysts, psychologists, and physiologists have sometimes suggested that the aim of the behaving animal is repose ....... I believe that such a view underestimates the directive or aimed action of the programs that the
hypothalamus and core brain dictate. The continuation of life is possible because the actions of the individual are aimed not at reducing excitation but at obtaining those materials and situations that are needed. When such pursuits are effective the individual receives the reward of satisfaction and discontinues that particular activity. The search is not for absence of excitation but for the fulfilment of a need.²

The idea that human happiness lies not in achievement, but in struggle, not in certainty, but in imagination and speculation, not in the absence of desires, but in the desires themselves, is, of course, not an exclusively twentieth century idea. It occurs notably in Dostoeievsky's Notes From Underground, a book which Hillegas considers to have influenced Zamyatin profoundly.³ Dostoeievsky writes that one may shower man 'with all earthly blessings, plunge him so deep into happiness that nothing is visible but the bubbles rising to the surface of his happiness, as if it were water; give him such economic prosperity that he will have nothing left to do but sleep, eat gingerbread, and worry about the continuance of world history - and he .... will jeopardise his very gingerbread and deliberately will the most pernicious rubbish, the most uneconomic nonsense, simply and solely in order to alloy all this positive rationality with the element of his own pernicious fancy. It is precisely his most fantastic daydreams, his vulgarist foolishness, that he wants to cling to, just so that he can assert (as if it were absolutely essential) that people are still people and not piano-keys'.⁴ Surprisingly, the idea that happiness lies in the act of desiring occurs also, in a
very different context, in Rousseau's *La Nouvelle Héloïse*, a book which is intended to convey utopian, rather than anti-utopian, sentiments. There is every reason to suppose that Rousseau genuinely admires the perfectly regulated domestic utopia which his characters, the Wolmars, establish at Clarens, and that he wishes to advance it as a pattern for emulation. Yet he allows his fictional heroine, Julie de Wolmar, to deliver the most cogent attack upon the concept of utopian happiness. Julie writes, in a letter, 'Tant qu'on désire on peut se passer d'être heureux ... et l'inquiétude qu'il donne est une sorte de jouissance qui suplée à la réalité, qui vaut mieux peut-être. Malheur a qui n'a plus rien à désirer! ... Celui qui pourrait tout sans être Dieu serait une miserable creature; il serait privé du plaisir de désirer; tout autre privation serait plus supportable'. (For as long as one desires one can pass for being happy .... and the disquietude which it gives is a sort of enjoyment which adds to reality, which is perhaps worth more. Woe to him who has nothing left to desire! .... One who could achieve everything without being God would be a miserable creature; he would be deprived of the pleasure of desiring; any other privation would be more bearable).  

Abruptly, in the act of describing the unalloyed bliss of her life at Clarens, Julie repudiates it. To live without pain is not a human condition she writes; to live thus is to be dead. She continues, "Je ne vois partout que sujets de contentement, et je ne suis pas contente; une langueur secrète s'insinue au fond de mon coeur; je le sens vide et gonflé ... l'attachement qu j'ai pour tout ce
qui m'est cher ne suffit pas pour l'occuper; il lui reste une force inutile dont il ne sait que faire. Cette peine est bizarre, j'en conviens; mais elle n'est pas moins réelle. Mon ami, je suis trop heureuse; le bonheur m'ennuie'. (I see nothing but causes for contentment about me, and I am not content; a secret longing is insinuating itself into the depths of my heart; I feel it empty yet swollen within me .... the attachment I feel for all who are dear tome does not suffice to fill it; it still retains a useless power, which it does not know how to employ. This pain is strange, that I agree; but it is nonetheless real. My friend, I am too happy; happiness bores me.)

It seems that Rousseau, more than any other writer, seems to have combined a utopian veneration for order, harmony, stability and rational perfection, with a Romantic intuition of the supremacy of the imagination, and regard for the individual, which leads him to reject utopias even as he builds them.

For the utopian, the individual has importance only as a component of a mechanistically perfect whole. There is no room within that whole for individualistic endeavour or personal aspiration. The utopian sees the raw, inchoate, unspecialised material with which he must work in his chosen task of building the perfect state. This material must be ordered, quantified, systematized and rendered predictable, so that perfection can be realized. It is assumed that within the perfectly ordered, predictable, harmonious whole, the citizen will necessarily achieve his highest function, and in so doing, he will be happy.
The anti-utopians reject this conception of happiness; they also reject the idea that it is appropriate for the rulers of the state to seek to provide universal happiness. All agree that the state should provide a framework in which justice is promoted, and innovation and self-fulfilment are encouraged. Within such a framework, individual happiness is at least a possibility.

Clearly, happiness as defined by utopian standards, and happiness as envisaged by the anti-utopians, are two very different states. While the corporate happiness offered by utopia seems to be no more than freedom from anxiety and desire, happiness as seen by the anti-utopians seems to come closer to Mill's conception of happiness - the happiness of striving towards higher levels of consciousness and higher states of self-realization. Mill records how he asked himself, at the time of his mental crisis, 'Suppose that all your objects in life were realized; that all changes in institutions and opinions which you are looking forward to, could be completely effected at this very instant: would this be a great joy and happiness to you?' And to this question, which is the question posed by all the anti-utopians, 'an irrepressible self-consciousness distinctly answered "No!"'7 Happiness, for the anti-utopians, is neither static nor passive. It is intimately connected with human creativity, and with a restless desire to seek out new challenges to human ingenuity and endurance. It has to do with the heightening of human consciousness. But, in the anti-utopian view, the happiness compulsorily prescribed in the utopian state would be no more than a means for pacifying the populace, for lowering their consciousness of self, and thus for sap­ ping their individual will; it would be merely a tool for enslavement.
Dostoevsky's Underground Man declares, 'As for my personal opinion, I find it somehow unseemly to love only well-being. Whether it's a good thing or a bad thing, smashing things is also sometimes very pleasant. I am not here standing up for suffering, or for well-being either. I am standing out for my own caprices and for having them guaranteed when necessary. There is no place for suffering in farces, for example, I know that. It is quite inconceivable in a millennium: suffering is doubt, negation, and what sort of millennium would it be of which one could have any doubts? All the same, I am certain that man will never deny himself destruction and chaos. Suffering is the sole cause of consciousness'. Consciousness, in the Underground Man's view is supremely important to man, and man would not choose to exchange it for any gratification. If ever a perfected state is established, where all human problems are held to have been solved, 'there will, of course, be nothing left to do, much less to learn. All that will then be possible will be to shut off one's five senses and immerse oneself in meditation'.

Zamyatin also holds that to accept the passive brand of happiness offered by the perfect state is to accept a living death. In Zamyatin's We, the rulers of the perfect state are systematically seducing the citizenry into total submission by affording them a life where no cares, uncertainties or desires ever trouble their tranquility. One of a band of rebels against the state attempts to arouse her fellow citizens from their lethargy into a recognition of their growing enslavement. Scornfully she warns them, 'You will be fed with pastry-dough happiness until you can't swallow another mouthful, and you, with
your bellies full, will doze in peace, in an organized way, all snoring metronomically'.

The figure of the rebel, or dissenter, in the anti-utopias is invariably of central significance. It is possible to see, in the anti-utopian form, a restatement of one of the prominent themes of classical tragedy. The dissenter, a troubled and lonely figure, grows in self-awareness to the point where he can no longer accept the secure anonymity of communal life. Thereafter, he follows a course which he knows will lead him to untimely death. In his act of self-assertion, he negates the principles upon which his society is founded, thus revealing their weaknesses. He remains stubbornly aware of his uniqueness and power of choice in a world where orthodoxy proclaims him to be no more than a meek constituent of a harmonious whole. In terms of the prevailing system of belief he is more than a mere dissenter; he is a dangerous heretic.

In anti-utopian fiction, an analogy is commonly drawn between the repression of religious orthodoxy and the repression of the orthodoxy of the total state. The anti-utopian writers make frequent use of religious imagery. Membership of a perfect society, they believe, demands the attitude of mind normally associated with membership of a religious community. The utopian state imposes doctrinal purity upon its citizens, and assumes power not merely over their speech and actions, but also over their thoughts. Rejection of the state ideology is not simply subversive: it is heretical. The citizens must surrender themselves utterly to the guidance of the state, and accept its dogma with unquestioning faith. Utopia is for the regenerate,
the true believer. It is Paradise Regained. The heresy of the dissenters in the anti-utopias lies in their continuing awareness of their own moral freedom.

All the writers under review equate religious orthodoxy with bigotry, oppression and stupidity. Dogma, the mechanisation of human thought, is set against free, creative thought. A common centrepiece in anti-utopian fiction is a scene of confrontation between an inquisitorial figure and the figure of the heretic. For the anti-utopians, the battle for the human mind fought out between the interrogator and the dissident in the total state, in the name of political orthodoxy, is a repetition of the battle between the Inquisitor and the heretic, in the name of religious orthodoxy. The figure of the heretic is of supreme importance in anti-utopian fiction, since while the heretic survives, the power of the state is less than total, and the possibility of change remains alive.

The anti-utopians hold that the rejection of imposed orthodoxy is a noble and necessary activity, whether against church or state. They believe that man expresses his humanity in his ability to question and to deliberate. In all the anti-utopias, the heretic has social as well as personal significance. His act of self-authentification is of value in itself, but it also has implications for humanity as a whole. However, the anti-utopians do not all share a common conception of the nature of heresy. For Orwell, Huxley and David Karp, heresy comes into being only in response to some abnormal repression in society. They denounce societies which impose a closed political and moral system upon the individual. Rather than extolling the value of heresy in itself, they advocate the destruction of those orthodoxies which give the concept of heresy meaning.
The Inquisitor in David Karp's One declares that 'Heresy in a free society is meaningless and feeble. But in a society that is rigidly joined, heresy is an explosive force .... Eventually we must erase the concept of individuality. Ultimately we must come to the stage where no man bears a separate, private identity .... and when that happens .... (we) will be forcing up into the light all the buried egos, all the hidden heresies'.

But for Zamyatin, the author of the most cryptic and complex of the anti-utopias, heresy has a unique significance. The heretic is the necessary mutant in society. He is the sole remedy against stagnation. 'Most of mankind', writes Zamyatin, 'suffers from hereditary sleeping sickness, and victims of this sickness (entropy) must not be allowed to sleep, or it will be their final sleep, death'. In another essay, he writes, 'Today is doomed to die - because yesterday dies, and because tomorrow will be born .... The world is kept alive only by heretics: the heretic Christ, the heretic Copernicus, the heretic Tolstoy. Our symbol of faith is heresy'. Zamyatin holds that heresy must necessarily arise as a vitalizing force in every community, in every age, if humanity is to survive.

Alone among the writers of anti-utopias, Zamyatin was himself a heretic, and his book, We, was created as an example of heretical literature. Zamyatin believed that it was the duty of the writer to challenge the preconceptions and conventions of his society. 'True literature can exist only where it is created, not by diligent and trustworthy officials, but by madmen, hermits, heretics, dreamers, rebels and sceptics .... When a writer must be sensible and rigidly
orthodox ... there can be no bronze literature, there can only be a paper literature, a newspaper literature, which is read today, and used for wrapping soap tomorrow.¹²

Although the anti-utopians draw parallels between religious and totalitarian orthodoxy, they consider the possibilities for imposing the new orthodoxies to be far greater. The old, historical religions had power to mould the perceptions of their adherents, and those whom they oppressed, within a rigid framework. Historical and scientific facts could be suppressed, and artistic expression constrained, where they were deemed likely to cast doubt upon that framework. But in the total state of modern times, the writers consider, technological advances have placed the rulers in a stronger position than ever before to impose their view of reality upon the world. Once the total state has established its secular dogma, this new creed becomes the new reality. Ultimately, all creative thought is stifled, alternative states become unimaginable, and alternative modes of thought inconceivable.

In his biography of Father Joseph, Cardinal Richelieu's chief political assistant from 1614 to 1638, Aldous Huxley declares that the church, under Louis XIV, established in seventeenth-century France a state which enforced so high a degree of conformity, that it was saved from totalitarianism only for lack of contemporary technological expertise.¹³

Orwell argues that the church has always exercised its influence 'against freedom of thought and speech, against human equality, and against any form of society tending to promote earthly happiness'.¹⁴
And in Nineteen Eighty-Four, he draws a parallel between the ruling Party of the despotic state, and the Catholic Church. Both, he says, are adoptive organisations, and the endurance of their power lies in their ability to ensure 'the persistence of a certain world view and a certain way of life, imposed by the dead upon the living.'

Orwell, then, like Huxley, rejected the constraints imposed by religious orthodoxy: but his rejection is more profound than this. Orwell and Zamyatin, together with H.G. Wells, who constructed both utopian and anti-utopian models, all seem to have rejected not only the tyranny of religious orthodoxy, but also the tyranny of an omnipotent God.

Richard Gerber suggests that in Orwell's Nineteen Eighty-Four, it is possible to detect a hostility not only towards totalitarian systems, but also towards the Christian religion. Gerber writes, 'On the surface it is doubtlessly a savage political satire in which the individual is opposed to the party collective. But there is more than this .... It almost seems as if Orwell .... had filled his political satire with unconscious or half-conscious meanings of a different kind .... Nineteen Eighty-Four has the age-old symbolic structure, and even phraseology, of resistant man's breakdown and conversion to some power which we generally call by the name of God'. And in Orwell's work there is certainly a suggestion of an anarchic rejection of all forms of authority over the human mind, temporal or spiritual.

In Zamyatin's We, also, it seems that it is not merely rigid orthodoxy which is condemned: in a bitterly satirical scene between
the Benefactor of the perfect state and a heretic, the Benefactor exclaims, 'What about the Most Merciful God of the Christians, Who is charking all the contumaceous over the slow fires of Hell - is he not an executioner? Or take autos-da-fé and living torches .......
And yet, just the same ..... this God was .... glorified for ages as the God of Love. An absurdity? No: on the contrary, it is a patent, written in blood, attesting the ineradicable common sense of man. Even when he was a shaggy savage he grasped that true, algebraic love for humanity is infallibly inhuman, and that an infallible sign of truth is its cruelty....'17

H. G. Wells shares Zamyatin's revulsion at the concept of an all-powerful God, necessarily an accessory to human crime, if not its instigator, by virtue of his omnipotence. Wells describes the moment of his rejection of such a deity in The Happy Turning: 'I had dreams of torture and cruelty. One made me an atheist .... one day I read a description .... of a man being broken on the wheel over a slow fire, and in my sleep it flared up into immeasurable disgust. By a mental leap which cut out all intermediaries, the dream artist made it clear that if indeed there was an all-powerful God, then it was he and he alone who stood there conducting this torture. I woke and stared at the empty darkness. There was no alternative but madness, and sanity prevailed. God had gone out of my life. He was impossible'.18

It is interesting that for Wells, as for Zamyatin, Christ is heretic rather than deity, an ally to humanity, rather than an implacable tyrant. Zamyatin numbers Christ with 'the heretic Copernicus'
and 'the heretic Tolstoy' (see above); Wells wrote of Christ as 'a congenial companion', whose 'scorn and contempt for Christianity' were profound beyond description. This image of Christ as heretic is not new: it was elaborated earlier by Dostoievsky, in Ivan's poem of the Grand Inquisitor, in The Brothers Karamazov. It is not Christ, but the all-powerful paternal deity whom Zamyatin and Wells reject.

But the problem of divine omnipotence, and therefore, surely, divine prescience, has deeper implications for the anti-utopian, since it is intimately connected with propositions about free will and determinacy. Stephen Clark discusses this problem in his review of Anthony Kenny's The God of the Philosophers: 'Can God now make a past event to have occurred? Perhaps, but in such a world all talk of past and future and the present time must founder: all times are simultaneous (as they are for Boethius's timeless God) ..... If God foreknows or knows immutably what men will do (are doing) then men are not free in any sense that exculpates their Creator. If there is genuine indeterminacy in human affairs, then even God cannot know what he will do; that would be to know for certain a thing that is not certain. If He does know, then there is no indeterminacy: we may have liberty of spontaneity (that we do as we wish), but not of indifference (that we could do otherwise).'

For those who condemn the total state, questions of free will and determinacy are crucial. The rulers of all the total states under review are omnipotent, in that they have total control over all the means for civic coercion and civic education within their states,
and there are no areas of human activity which are left unplanned. The rulers of the anti-utopian states of Zamyatin and Orwell may also lay claim to omniscience, since they have the technological equipment necessary to hear and perceive every event, no matter how trivial, which occurs within the state. But in Orwell's anti-utopia, omniscience seems to go beyond that which is afforded, in explicable terms, by technology. Orwell's Party leader, O'Brien, appears to have the power to perceive men's thoughts, and even to foreknow them. Orwell's O'Brien comes closer to godhood than do any of the other rulers of the perfect state created by the anti-utopians.

The anti-utopias are statements of rebellion against the subjugation of autonomous man, however he may be defined, in the real world; but more than this, the anti-utopias of Orwell and Zamyatin are statements of rebellion against the very concept of the subjugation of the human will, whether to powers which are earthly, or to those which are supernatural. As I shall argue, there is equivocation on this point in the work of Huxley. The extent to which the writers consider the will to be essentially capable of free action differs from author to author, and this I shall discuss in Part II (iv) of my thesis.

But each of the anti-utopians, to a greater or lesser extent, seeks to re-assert the worth of the individual, and of human freedom, creativity and dignity. Each from his own standpoint affirms that the individual is ethically prior to the collectivity, and possesses, as a distinguishing feature of his humanity, some power of choice, however impaired and limited this may be. They contend that within
the perfect state, individual volition would have to be suppressed in the cause of order and predictability, and that this would necessarily lead to the suppression of humanity itself.

The fear of the anti-utopians is complex: on the one hand, they hold that utopianism rests on assumptions about man and society which are radically misconceived, and therefore does not reflect reality; yet on the other hand, they are aware that it may be all too possible for utopian systems to be imposed upon society. The old fear - the fear of the utopians - was that man's egoism was invincible, and would thus prevent his ever attaining perfection. But the new fear is that man's apprehension of himself is fragile, and that the citizen of utopia might be induced at last to relinquish his own identity entirely, and with it the source of his morality. Thus he would become no more than a featureless fragment of a perfectly regulated whole.

The anti-utopias under review are not simple expressions of a reaction against over-mechanisation, high technology and an excess of state intervention, and the conflict between utopian and anti-utopian should not be seen as being merely a disagreement between those who favour a highly organized state and those who favour the minimal state. As will become clear, none of the three writers who are the subject of this thesis in fact advocates the minimal state. The disagreement between the utopian and the anti-utopian concerns above all the nature of man.

In the next section of this thesis, Part I (ii), I shall give a
general introduction to the four works with which I am mainly concerned: Zamyatin's We, Orwell's Nineteen Eighty-Four and the anti-utopia and utopia of Huxley, Brave New World and Island.
References


2. Programs of the Brain, op.cit., pp. 139/140.


6. Ibid., p. 528.


17. We, op.cit., p.204.


Part I (ii) Introduction to the three writers under review

The three anti-utopias with which I am primarily concerned in this thesis, Yevgeny Zamyatin's We, George Orwell's Nineteen Eighty-Four and Aldous Huxley's Brave New World, were all written within thirty years of one another. They are probably the best known and most influential anti-utopias of modern times. The first of the anti-utopias, We, was written in 1920 (although not published until 1924), the second, Brave New World, was written in 1931 (published in 1932), and the last of the three anti-utopias, Nineteen Eighty-Four, was written over the period 1945 to 1948, and published in 1949. Each of the writers was responding, at least in part, to tendencies he observed in the world about him, when he constructed his cautionary picture of a possible future. But the shape of the picture each presents is, of course, conditional upon his own interpretation of the nature of society, and his own estimation of the nature of human needs and aspirations. Thus, while there are clear affinities to be discerned between the anti-utopias of Zamyatin, Orwell and Huxley, some of which may possibly be attributable to direct influence or shared common influence, there are also important disparities between them.

The fourth book which will be discussed at length in this thesis is not an anti-utopia, but a utopia: Aldous Huxley's Island, written in 1961, and published in 1962. It is of especial interest that Huxley should have written both an anti-utopia and a utopia, and this is a point which I shall discuss later in this section.

Zamyatin's We, and Huxley's Brave New World and Island, all depict societies dedicated to the pursuit of universal happiness and
harmony. We is, perhaps, the purest interpretation of the anti-utopian thesis. In it, Zamyatin describes a world where man and machine alike are merely inter-related components of a precisely regulated, mathematically perfect, mechanical whole. Of We, Zamyatin wrote, 'This novel is a warning against the two-fold danger which threatens humanity: the hypertrophic power of the machine and the hypertrophic power of the state'.

Orwell's Nineteen Eighty-Four differs radically from the two other anti-utopias, We and Brave New World: Orwell describes an imaginary state dedicated not to the pursuit of common happiness, but to the pursuit of power. It has some affinities with the imaginary world of Huxley's Ape and Essence. In all the anti-utopias, freedom is sacrificed, but in the imaginary state of Orwell's Nineteen Eighty-Four, Oceania, as in Ape and Essence, freedom is crushed through overt acts of brutality. In neither case is it exchanged for happiness. The rulers of Oceania exert power entirely for its own sake.

Orwell admired Zamyatin's We, and even tried to arrange for its publication in England, in 1949. Yet in many ways, We and Nineteen Eighty-Four appear to parody one another. The central character in Zamyatin's book is oppressed by a society on which a rigid, mechanical system of 'perfect rationality' has been imposed. He suffers the ultimate psychic mutilation when his imagination is surgically destroyed, by order of the state: Orwell's central character, on the other hand, lives in a chaotic nightmare world, where fact and fantasy are indistinguishable. There is no longer any rational framework within which the citizens may orient themselves, and structure their lives.
Orwell's main character is finally deprived of his humanity when his rationality is crushed out of existence.

Zamyatin's *We* takes the form of a diary, written by one of the perfect state's top mathematicians, who is known as D-503, who appears at first to be a perfectly programmed 'number', ideally integrated into his society. His happiness is unclouded, and lies in perfect conformity, and in the security of a totally predictable world order. No individual thoughts or emotions of any kind disturb his peace of mind, and he glories in the geometrical perfection of his infinitely knowable world, with its all-encompassing timetables and lists of rules. The One State of Zamyatin's anti-utopia is constructed entirely of glass, so that all activity is public, and each individual action is no more than a carefully planned process in the functioning of the state machine. The members of the state are not distinguished from one another by the possession of names. They are simply allotted numbers, the males with a consonant for a prefix, the females with a vowel. Thus they are known not as people, or citizens, but as 'numbers'.

In the first entry in D-503's diary, he writes that a group of numbers is about to set forth from the One State in a rocket, the Integral, of which he is himself the designer, to carry forth the perfect culture which they have developed to other planets, where men may be still in the 'savage state of freedom'. Should the inhabitants of these other planets fail to recognize the great benefit they are about to receive, they will be 'compelled to be happy'.

\[\text{D-503}\]
glories in the task ahead, but during the course of his diary, it becomes apparent that he is not as perfectly adapted to his society as he has believed he is. He meets a female number, E-330, to whom he is disquietingly attracted, who arouses within him his imagination, and thus his emotions and passions, until he is ready to join in rebellion against the state. E-330 contends that humanity can survive and progress only through a never-ending series of revolutions, and that a static society is locked in a living death.

As disorder mounts in the One State, the ruler, known as the Benefactor, recognizes that if the perfect state is to survive, imagination must be permanently eradicated. Scientists discover that it is possible to isolate the area of the brain which generates imagination, and to cauterize it, thus providing a final solution to the problems of the state. All citizens are urged to undergo the operation, and many co-operate. Those who resist are rounded up and forced to submit. The final entry in D-503's diary is made after he has been subjected to fantiesectomy. He is once again calm, as anonymous as a blank sheet, devoid of any capacity for criticism, emotion or moral judgment.

Zamyatin considers the imagination to be the mainspring of individual freedom. For as long as the central character of We remains devoid of imagination, he is perfectly adjusted to his mechanical world. But once imagination has developed within him, he is a potential subversive. His peace and certainty are shattered, and he is appalled and exhilarated at his new apprehension of self-hood, at the pain of being a whole person, self-determining, vulnerable to love, jealousy, doubt and dreams.
For Zamyatin, it is the imagination which creates the heretic, the sole agent, in his view, for rescuing humanity from everlasting entropy.

It was Zamyatin's belief in the need for a never-ending series of revolutions which brought him into conflict with the Soviet authorities. Zamyatin was born in Lebedyan in 1884. In the early years of the twentieth century, he was a Bolshevik, but he left the party before the Revolution. He wrote We in 1920, by which time he had already become a target for official criticism. His fundamental belief in artistic freedom prevented him from adhering to the official party line. Thus he could not arrange publication of We in Russia, and it received its first publication, in English translation, in New York, in 1924. Two years later, a Czech edition was published, and this was in turn retranslated into Russian, and distributed among dissidents in Moscow, and among Russian émigrés in Europe. This aroused the wrath of the Russian Association of Proletarian Writers, a party-sponsored literary group in Moscow, and although the new Russian version of We had been circulated without Zamyatin's permission, he was held to be fully responsible. An intensive campaign was launched against him, and publication of all his works was blocked. At last, in despair, he appealed to Stalin for leave to go into exile. This appeal was granted, largely through the intercession on Zamyatin's behalf of Maxim Gorky, and Zamyatin left Russia, ostensibly to receive medical treatment in Paris, early in 1932. He was never to return.

During the First World War, before Zamyatin wrote We, he spent a period of two years in England, and it was here that he became
interested in English literary forms. In particular, he became attracted to the novels of 'sociofantasy' of H.G. Wells, about whom he published two essays, one in 1922 and one in 1924. Zamyatin wrote that Wells's sociofantastic novels were 'almost solely instruments for exposing the defects of the existing social order, rather than building a picture of a future paradise'. The only novel of Wells which did not please him was Men Like Gods, which had just been published, and which Zamyatin regarded as being atypical. It was Wells's early scientific fantasies and anti-utopias, mostly written in the 1890's, which attracted Zamyatin's admiration. 'The elements of classic utopia are absent from Wells's work', Zamyatin wrote, '...... Static well-being, petrified paradisiac social equilibrium, are logically bound with the content of a utopian work; hence the natural consequence in its form - a static plot and absence of story line. In Wells's sociofantastic novels the plot is always dynamic, built on collisions, on conflict .... In adopting the form of the adventure novel, Wells deepened it, raised its intellectual value, and brought into it the elements of social philosophy and science. In his own field - though, of course, on a proportionately lesser scale - Wells may be likened to Dostoievsky, who took the form of the cheap detective novel and infused it with brilliant psychological analysis'.

In We, Zamyatin adopted the form of Wells's 'sociofantastical' novel, using it as a vehicle to express his own concerns for the plight of men and of society, and infusing it with his own artistic
brilliance. Hillegas, in his book on H.G. Wells, claims that the 'anti-utopian tradition after Wells pivots on We'. 5

Wells's work has excited both admiration and contempt, but even his detractors allow that his influence has been profound and extensive. 'Is it not a sort of parricide for a person my age (thirty-eight) to find fault with H.G. Wells?' wrote George Orwell, one of Wells's most persistent and mordant critics, in 1941. 'Thinking people who were born about the beginning of this century are in some sense Wells's own creation .... I doubt whether anyone who was writing books between 1900 and 1920, at any rate in the English language, influenced the young so much. The minds of all of us, and therefore the physical world, would be perceptibly different if Wells had never existed'. 6

Yet Wells's utopianism exasperated Orwell. Wells, he thought, confused 'mechanical progress with justice, liberty and common decency'. 7 Orwell had some respect for Wells's early anti-utopia, The Sleeper Awakes, but he was fundamentally opposed to Wells's world-view. 'In any book by Wells .... you will find passages of the same kind ... "the machines, our new race of slaves, will set humanity free" .......' Orwell wrote. 'Barring wars and unforeseen disaster, the future is envisaged as an ever more rapid march of mechanical progress .... machines to save work, machines to save thought, machines to save pain; hygiene, efficiency, organisation - until finally you land up in the by now familiar Wellsian Utopia, aptly caricatured by Huxley in Brave New World, the paradise of little fat men'. 8
Aldous Huxley claimed that he originally intended Brave New World to be a parody of Wells's Men Like Gods, although subsequently the book took on a rather different form. There are, in fact, far closer parallels to be drawn between Brave New World and The Sleeper Awakes. In both anti-utopias, the lower caste of society is deliberately retarded and conditioned so as to provide the state with a race of uncomplaining machine-minders. Moreover, children are reared centrally, in vast state creches, which are fitted with mechanical nursing devices. But Orwell and others think that Huxley was influenced not so much by Wells as by Zamyatin. Huxley always denied all knowledge of We, but Hillegas writes that he considers it likely 'that the erudite Huxley somewhere at least heard of We and then forgot he had when he wrote Brave New World .... certainly Brave New World seems very indebted to We for Wellsian details'. Orwell is more blunt: 'I think Aldous Huxley's Brave New World must be plagiarized from it to some extent', he wrote. 'The first thing anyone would notice about We is the fact - never pointed out, I believe - that Aldous Huxley's Brave New World must be partly derived from it. Both books deal with the rebellion of the primitive human spirit against a rationalized, mechanized, painless world, and both stories are supposed to take place about six hundred years hence. The atmosphere of the two books is similar, and it is roughly speaking the same kind of society that is being described, though Huxley's book shows less political awareness and is more influenced by recent biological and psychological theories.'
Huxley's *Brave New World* was published in 1932. Like Zamyatin's *We*, it explores the tension between the concept of perfect happiness and the concept of freedom. He prefaces it with a quotation, in French, from Berdyaev's *The End of Our Time*. Berdyaev considers that utopias, which at one time were thought unrealisable, are now seen as being all too realisable. Men will come to dread utopia, and long to return to a non-utopian society which is less perfect and more free. He goes on to say, 'It appears that liberty is bound up with imperfection, with a right to imperfection'. Huxley states unequivocally in *Brave New World* that where perfect happiness becomes the goal for society, freedom, and with it, religion, love, art and science, will inevitably be cast out. He describes a world where perfect stability and mass happiness have at last been achieved, a world where all men's physical wants are satisfied, where all doubts, anxieties and fears are efficiently stilled through the judicious administration of drugs, where indiscriminate and unrestricted sexual activity is officially advocated, where the necessary supply of citizens is quantitatively and qualitatively controlled through eugenic procedures, and a rigid social hierarchy imposed from the moment of conception, where social unrest has been eliminated through the use of conditioning techniques, to the end that everyone shall like 'his inescapable social destiny' - a world, in short, where all notions of self-realization and self-determination have been rendered nugatory.

Huxley's imaginary state, the World State, is ruled over, or, rather, managed, by the World Controller, Mustapha Mond. The citizens
are bred in the laboratory, in test-tubes, and their intelligence level is pre-ordained at conception. They are divided into five groups, the Alphas forming the highest caste, and the Epsilons, the lowest. Though sexual activity is unrestricted, parenthood is banned; the state has total control over pro-creation. As in Zamyatin's One State, all aspects of life are efficiently planned, so that unpredictability can be avoided. The complaisance of the citizenry is secured through the provision of soothing drugs and sensual pleasures.

The stability of the perfect state is temporarily disturbed by the intrusion of the Savage, who has been brought up in an Indian reservation, beyond the boundaries of the World State. His mother came originally from the World State, and she has longed always to return, but the Savage is appalled by all he finds there. In his rebellion he is joined by Helmholtz Watson, an Alpha, and an Emotional Engineer, who, in any other society, would have been involved in the world of literature. Instead he writes advertising slogans and conditioning slogans for the World State. The final rebel, who is a very reluctant heretic, is Bernard, who is also an Alpha, but does not quite conform to the Alpha pattern of physical excellence, owing to an accident in the laboratory, before he was born.

The key scene in the book takes place between Mustapha Mond and the Savage. Mustapha Mond gives an eminently reasonable account to the Savage of the workings of the World State. He explains why freedom must be sacrificed in the cause of happiness and stability. Finally, in a burst of frustration and defiance, the Savage is led to exclaim, 'But I don't want comfort. I want God, I want poetry, I want real danger, I want freedom, I want goodness. I want sin'.

13
It would be hard to find a clearer statement of rejection of perfectibilism. Yet thirty years after writing *Brave New World*, Huxley constructed a utopia of his own, *Island*.

David Lodge, in his review of Hillegas's book of Wells, comments, 'Wells wrote anti-utopias before he wrote utopias, and the question is why did he change in this direction? .... The reverse shift is not so uncommon .... Wells seems to have started off disillusioned and later embraced optimistic "illusions" ......' A similar question might be asked in the case of Huxley: Why should Huxley, who, in *Brave New World* upheld man's right to be unhappy but free, later come to regard as a possibility the construction of a perfect society, dedicated to human happiness, where men could yet be free.

Three possible explanations may be considered here, any or all of which may have some validity. It may be that Huxley's decision to write a utopia of his own indicates a significant change in his aspirations and convictions, which took place after he had written *Brave New World*, and before he wrote *Island*. Or it may be that in *Island*, he considers that he has succeeded in providing a genuine solution to the problems posed in *Brave New World*. Lastly, it is possible that *Island* is to be seen primarily as an introspective work, as Huxley's attempt to come to terms with his own psychology, rather than as a full-blown utopia. These possible explanations will be discussed more fully in Part II (iv) of this thesis).

When Huxley wrote his introduction to the new edition of *Brave New World* in 1946, he expressed a dissatisfaction with certain aspects of the book. It no longer seemed to him satisfactory that the Savage
should have been faced with only two alternatives: life in the World State, or life on an Indian reservation. Such a choice, wrote Huxley, is not a fair one. It is a choice between 'an insane life in utopia, or the life of a primitive in an Indian village, a life more human in some respects, but in others hardly less queer and abnormal. At the time the book was written this idea, that human beings are given free will in order to choose between insanity on the one hand and lunacy on the other, was one that I found amusing and regarded as quite possibly true'. Huxley now considered that the Savage should have been offered a third alternative: life in a society where economics and politics were decentralized, where science would be used in the service of man, and where religion would be the conscious and intelligent pursuit of man's Final End, the intuitive knowledge of the immanent Tao or Logos, the transcendent Godhead of Brahman. This society, envisaged by Huxley in 1946, is obviously the model for his own utopia.

In Huxley's World State, the citizens are fashioned, conditioned and controlled by means of the techniques - eugenic, genetic, physiological and psychological - of the biological sciences. These techniques are effective at such a fundamental level, that there is no need for any overt coercion. Men have been physically taken over; they are made, owned and serviced by the state. In the utopian state of Huxley's Island, which is called Pala, the biological sciences still have an important role to play. Eugenic techniques are still practised, and hallucinogens are still distributed to the populace, although their use is no longer obligatory, and their use is now said
to enhance religious experience. As in the World State, the citizens of Pala are subjected to a carefully devised programme of conditioning. The end to be achieved by this is, of course, not the same, but it is possible to detect a certain uneasy congruence between the two societies. In Brave New World, the prevailing doctrine, Fordism, guarantees social cohesion and happiness: in Island, Eastern mysticism fulfils this function. The timeless, drug-assisted, orgiastic hedonism which passes for happiness in the World State has been exchanged for timeless, drug-assisted mystical ecstasy in Pala.

The anti-utopian state envisaged in Orwell's Nineteen Eighty-Four differs profoundly from Huxley's World State. The possible future world of which Orwell warns is dedicated not to hedonism, but to brutality. Orwell considered that Huxley's book was a 'brilliant caricature' of its time (the early 1930s) but that it probably cast no light on the future. 'No society of that kind would last more than a couple of generations, because a ruling class which thought principally in terms of a "good time" would soon lose its vitality. A ruling class has got to have a strict morality, a quasi-religious belief in itself, a mystique', Orwell wrote in July, 1940.17

Orwell admired Jack London's The Iron Heel. London, he believed, had a clear understanding, as early as 1907, of the dangers facing mankind. London possessed, Orwell considered a 'streak of savagery' which enabled him to grasp something which Wells and Huxley could not: he recognized that hedonistic societies do not endure. He also recognized, perhaps instinctively, the brutal side of human nature.18 Orwell himself could accept violence as a part of life to a
degree and with an openness which would have been impossible for Wells. Writing in 1940, Orwell welcomed the revolution which he believed to be inevitable within a short space of time. 'I daresay the London gutters will have to run with blood', he concluded. 'All right, let them, if it is necessary'. Like London, Orwell could contemplate the prospect of a revolution in which blood was shed without any particular horror. [See Conclusion, note 10.]

Orwell was a writer of intense political commitment, whose political involvement was practical, rather than theoretical. He was a self-acknowledged Socialist, who hated the Communist Party, gave very wary support to the Labour Party, and had favoured the Anarchist cause in the Spanish Civil War. This is not at all to say that Orwell lacked a coherent political outlook: he drew attention to the short-comings of those states which professed Socialism, while betraying the ideals which he believed to be fundamental to Socialism. He expressed an unfailing concern for the preservation of political rationality and honesty, for the promotion of Socialist ideals, and for the protection of the integrity of language. As a journalist, he reacted with swiftness and sensitivity to changing political conditions, warning of possible dangers, and drawing attention to the failings, as he saw them, of politicians and intellectuals alike: the breaches of faith, the verbal deceit, the acts of political dishonesty and the betrayals of common sense. He regarded Socialism as the only hope for Britain in the future, but he did not consider that there was, as yet, any genuinely British Socialist movement capable of attracting
general support. He was not a Marxist, since he considered Marxism to be 'a German theory interpreted by Russians and unsuccessfully transplanted to England', that possessed 'nothing that really touched the heart of the English people'.

Orwell's Nineteen Eighty-Four, started during the summer of 1945, was not finished until late in 1948, owing to Orwell's ill health. He was never entirely satisfied with its final shape, but he believed that the message he had tried to convey was an important one. The book was intended to serve as a warning against the spread of totalitarian ideas, but it was interpreted by many people as representing an attack on Socialism. This Orwell firmly denied. Although he had termed the prevailing ideology of his imaginary state, 'Ingsoc' (an abbreviation for 'English Socialism') he was at pains to explain that what he condemned was not Socialism itself, but a corruption of Socialism, in which principles of equality and brotherhood had been totally abandoned.

'My recent novel is NOT intended as an attack on Socialism or on the British Labour Party (of which I am a supporter) but as a show-up of the perversions to which a centralised economy is liable and which have already been partly realized in Communism and Fascism', he wrote 'I do not believe that the kind of society I describe necessarily will arrive, but I believe ..... that something resembling it could arrive. I believe also that totalitarian ideas have taken root in the minds of intellectuals everywhere, and I have tried to draw these ideas out to their logical consequences. The scene of the book
is laid in Britain in order to emphasise that the English-speaking races are not innately better than anyone else, and that totalitarianism, if not fought against, could triumph anywhere.  

Orwell believed that intellectuals were chiefly to blame for the drift towards totalitarianism. They accepted its principles far more readily than did the mass of people, in Orwell's view. Although, in the main, they had opposed Hitler, they had only done so at the price of accepting Stalin. 'Most of them are perfectly ready for dictatorial methods, secret police, systematic falsifications of history, etc., so long as they feel that it is on "our" side', he wrote. Intellectuals accepted totalitarianism, he believed, in the name of a specious 'realism', which led them to abandon all moral sense. Ultimately, perhaps, ordinary people would come to accept the views of the intellectuals, and then totalitarianism would become inevitable.

The point which had to be understood by Socialists, Orwell thought, was that the Soviet regime was not truly collectivist, and if Socialism were ever to be established in England, the failings of the Soviet system would first have to be exposed. In the preface to Animal Farm, he wrote 'In my opinion, nothing has contributed so much to the corruption of the original idea of Socialism as the belief that Russia is a Socialist country .... For the past ten years I have been convinced that the destruction of the Soviet myth was essential if we wanted a revival of the Socialist movement'. The major failing of the intellectuals was, in Orwell's view, that they had done much to support the Soviet myth, when they should have been working to destroy it, so that true Socialism could emerge.
Orwell considered that the 'managerial class', by which he meant the scientists, teachers, technicians, journalists, bureaucrats and professional politicians, was fascinated by the idea of the totalitarian state. Such people believed that totalitarianism would favour them as a group. The aristocracy would be eliminated and the working class would be firmly suppressed under such a system. 'The English russophile intelligentsia', he wrote, '.... wish to destroy the old, equalitarian version of Socialism and usher in a hierarchical society where the intellectual can at last get his hand on the whip'.

Orwell was interested in the predictions of James Burnham, whose books, The Managerial Revolution and The Machiavellians, were the subject of an essay by Orwell. Burnham, basing his arguments on ideas drawn from Machiavelli, Mosca and Pareto, wrote that experience had shown that such concepts as democracy and equality were against nature. Man had always established a hierarchical form of society under a ruling elite, and no other form of government could be sustained. Hitherto, there had been a circulation of élites, but there were signs that a new, permanent élite was now emerging. The world would come to be divided into two or three super-states, closely resembling one another, each of which would be internally self-sufficient; thus there would be no need of external trade. The super-states would be of roughly equal strength, so none would be able to conquer the others, but a series of skirmishes would take place continuously along the frontiers dividing the states from one another. The new élite of 'managers, scientists and bureaucrats' would destroy old-style capitalism, but would hold the working class in permanent
subjection. 'Something rather like "Communism" would prevail everywhere'. Such a world would represent the final stage in the circulation of élites.

The picture presented by Burnham appalled Orwell, and Burnham's ideas obviously influenced Orwell when he was writing Nineteen Eighty-Four. Discussing his anti-utopia in a letter, Orwell wrote, 'What it is really meant to do is to discuss the implications of dividing the world up into "Zones of Influence" ...., and in addition to indicate by parodying them the intellectual implications of totalitarianism'.

Orwell wrote that the idea of "Zones of Influence" came to him in 1944, at the Teheran Conference, but it was surely Burnham's Managerial Revolution which crystallized the idea for him. Shortly after the Conference, in February, 1945, Orwell wrote, 'Already, quite visibly and more or less with the acquiescence of all of us, the world is splitting up into the two or three huge super-states forecast in James Burnham's Managerial Revolution. One cannot draw their exact boundaries as yet, but one can see more or less what areas they will comprise. And if the world settles down into this pattern, it is likely that these vast states will be permanently at war with one another, although it will not necessarily be a very intensive or bloody kind of war. Their problems, both economic and psychological, will be a lot simpler if the doodlebugs* are more or less constantly whizzing to and fro'.

Orwell's imaginary state is called Oceania. The ruling élite of Oceania is the Inner Party, which accounts for some two per cent

*doodlebugs - flying bombs in Second World War
of the populace. The Inner Party is the 'brain of the state'. The members of the Inner Party do not live in luxury, but they do enjoy certain privileges denied to the Outer Party, the next stratum of society, which accounts for a further thirteen per cent of the populace. The Outer Party members are the 'hands of the state'. They live under constant surveillance by the Thought Police, and through closed circuit television cameras. Below them come the 'Proles', who make up eighty-five per cent of the population. They are excluded from the Party, and are not subjected to political indoctrination, since they are wholly apathetic, and pose no threat to the durability of the state. A rudimentary nationalistic fervour is whipped up amongst them from time to time, through the dissemination of war propaganda. To maintain their minds in a state of listless compliance, the Party provides them with vapid amusements: obscene films, mechanically produced pornography, stultifying books and newspapers, and above all, the mindless excitement of gambling. Such things are, however, forbidden to the Party members, on whom a fanatical puritanism is imposed.

The leader-figure of Oceania is Big Brother, whose pictures stare down from every wall. He is an infallible, invincible God, seemingly immortal, omnipresent. The arch-enemy of the state is Emmanuel Goldstein, who had once been a leading figure in the Party, close to Big Brother in importance, but had been cast out for rebellion and heresy. Goldstein is thus the fallen angel, a new Satan, against whom all hatred can be directed.
The thinking of Oceania is governed by the principle of the identity of opposites: thus every Party member is acquainted with three basic slogans: War is Peace, Freedom is Slavery and Ignorance is Strength. This mode of thinking is termed 'doublethink'. Doublethink allows the Party leaders to adjust truth from day to day, and still to sustain the unwinking credulity of Party members.

The plot of Nineteen Eighty-Four concerns a Party member, Winston Smith, who works in the Ministry of Truth, where false propaganda is produced. He meets a girl, Julia, who works in the Fiction Department, manufacturing novels by machine. He at first avoids her, thinking her to be a spy or informer, but gradually they gain confidence in one another. They form a sexual relationship, which is heretical in Oceania, and finally run the supreme risk of renting a room where they can meet together, in the Proles' quarter.

Winston is also drawn to make contact with a member of the Inner Party, O'Brien, whom he believes may be a member of an underground organisation. O'Brien allows Winston to continue in this belief, and lends him a book, exposing the true nature of the state, purportedly written by Goldstein.

Predictably, Winston and Julia are arrested, and after weeks of physical and mental torture, Winston is brought to O'Brien for interrogation. O'Brien succeeds in destroying Winston's capacity for rational thought, and also his capacity for human love. But the process of destruction is still not complete. The last stage of Winston's 'cure' takes place while he is sitting in a cafe, after his release from custody, gazing at the image of Big Brother on the
telescreen. His surrender is perfect, and his subjection to the state total, when in a moment of gin-soaked enlightenment he suddenly experiences an access of love for Big Brother. He is at last worthy of death: physical extinction must be preceded by psychic annihilation for the triumph of the Party to be perfect.

Despite the obvious pessimism of Nineteen Eighty-Four, Orwell retained a belief in the desirability of progress towards a free and equal society. He had contempt for those who suggested that all innovation was impossible. 'It is not very difficult to see that this idea is rooted in the fear of progress', he wrote. 'If there is nothing new under the sun, if the past in some shape or another always returns, then the future when it comes will be something familiar. At any rate what will never come - since it has never come before - is that hated, dreaded thing, a world of free and equal human beings. Particularly comforting to reactionary thinkers is the idea of a cyclical universe, in which the same chain of events happens over and over again. In such a universe every seeming advance towards democracy simply means that the coming age of tyranny and privilege is a bit nearer'.

Oceania is a very imperfect state. As Orwell himself explains, the rulers of Oceania, having successfully overthrown capitalism, have failed to establish equality and collectivism. In this sense, Orwell's anti-utopia is less pessimistic than that of Zamyatin. In Zamyatin's One State the goals of equality and collectivism have indeed been achieved, in a very extreme form. The perfect state has been realized.
The picture of human degradation presented by the three writers with whose work I am concerned takes on very different forms. There are, however, certain points of congruence. All three writers condemn rigid orthodoxy, all condemn technological tyranny, and the destruction of privacy, and all condemn the corruption of language. Both Huxley and Zamyatin also condemn the substitution of mass happiness for freedom.

The most obvious disparity between the various anti-utopias is that between Orwell on the one hand and Huxley and Zamyatin on the other: Orwell did not consider that the total state would offer happiness in place of freedom. He held that freedom would be crushed by the instilling of fear and anxiety.

But a less immediately apparent rift occurs between the anti-utopias of Orwell and Zamyatin, and that of Huxley. Both Orwell and Zamyatin emphasise the responsibility of the individual to seek to join with others to overthrow tyranny. The heretics in Oceania and in the One State attempt to engage in active rebellion, designed to bring about the destruction of the total state. Their desire is to wrest power away from the rulers of the state, and thus to alter society. But the heretics in Huxley's World State have no political consciousness. They are sent into exile, where they may exercise their individuality without harming society, and once they have become accustomed to the idea of leaving the World State, they are well satisfied. The one heretic who does not go into exile, the Savage, escapes from the state by killing himself. Similarly, in Huxley's *Ape and Essence*, the heretics escape to join a dissident community, beyond
the reach of the state. In Zamyatin's *We*, the heretic E-330 specifically excludes the option of joining the primitive community who live in contentment beyond the walls of the One State. The destiny of the heretics of Zamyatin and Orwell is to seek to change their society, however impossible this may seem to be, not to attempt to retreat from it.

Huxley seems finally to have rejected Western man, and with him the whole of Western culture. Philip Thody remarks that in his introduction to Krishnamurti's *The First and Last Freedom*, Huxley wrote, 'A world in which ideas did not exist would be a happy world'. Huxley seems to have reached the conclusion that although free speculation may be intellectually stimulating, it is socially damaging. Man, through his ingenuity and his ability to generalize and theorize, has exploited and corrupted the natural world. This ingenuity is, of course, an essentially human characteristic, but Huxley seems to suggest that if man is to live in peace and joy, seeking mystical fulfilment, he must become less ingenious, less creative and more conforming and accepting.

The three writers under review represent quite separate traditions of thought from one another, and this is reflected in the nature of the fears expressed in their writings. Briefly, Orwell feared the eclipse of rationalism; he depicts a state ruled by terror, dedicated to ritualism, irrationalism, bigotry and dishonesty. Although a professed Socialist, Orwell saw himself, as a writer, as belonging necessarily to the liberal tradition. He was a rational humanist, with a streak of anarchism. He prized reason, liberty of conscience,
rigorous intellectual honesty, unpretentiousness and common sense, and had an especial contempt for cant, dogma and all devices designed to separate men from the objective truth. Zamyatin feared the suppression of feeling: he portrays a world where nature has been excluded, and where a grotesquely bloated mathematical rationalism has engulfed the whole realm of human thought. In the One State, thinking has been replaced by precise computation, and the multiplication tables serve as the new Creed for society. Zamyatin prizes the passions and the will as the source of human freedom, whereas Orwell prizes rationality. He values nature, self-expression and creative energy, and he perceives the imagination as being the sole generator of both creativity and conscience. In this he follows the Romantic tradition. Huxley feared the power of the biological sciences to transform man: his anti-utopian state is governed by technologists, psychologists and publicity experts. But, in a different form, all of these reappear in Huxley's utopia, Island. Huxley came to reject most categories of Western thought, including Rationalism, Romanticism and Freudianism. He turned increasingly towards Eastern mysticism and the philosophy of non-attachment. He feared the misuse of the arts and sciences, he feared the misuse of man's spiritual drive. He feared the body, society and death. He feared progress in any Western context. Both his anti-utopia and his utopia proclaim the dissolution of the individual; in Brave New World, the individual is diffused into his society, and in Island, he is diffused into the mystic Void.

Orwell still hoped for the establishment of a Socialist society, which would somehow avoid the mistakes of earlier repressive régimes which called themselves Socialist. Zamyatin held that man progresses
through an infinite series of revolutions, and hoped that men would recognize the need to keep alive heretical thought. But Huxley combined a general philanthropy with a fastidious distaste for human nature.

Writing not of Huxley but of Gandhi, Orwell gave the following view of the philosophy of non-attachment:

'In this yogi-ridden age, it is too readily assumed that "non-attachment" is not only better than a full acceptance of earthly life, but that the ordinary man rejects it because it is too difficult: in other words that the average human being is a failed saint. It is doubtful whether this is true. Many people genuinely do not wish to be saints, and it is probable that some who achieve or aspire to sainthood have never felt much temptation to be human beings. If one could follow it to its psychological roots, one would, I believe, find that the main motive for "non-attachment" is a desire to escape from the pain of living, and above all from love, which, sexual or non-sexual, is hard work. But it is not necessary here to argue whether the other-worldly or the humanistic ideal is "higher". The point is that they are incompatible. One must choose between God and Man, and all "radicals" and "progressives", from the mildest Liberal to the most extreme Anarchist, have in effect chosen Man'.

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References


3. We op.cit. p. 19.


9. The Future as Nightmare, op.cit., p.186 (n.2)


15. Introduction to Brave New World, op.cit., p. 7.

16. ibid., p. 8.


18. ibid., pp. 46/47.


27. ibid., p.520.
29. ibid., p.121.
Part II - Introduction - Utopia and the "artificial Adam"

'To sequester out of the world into Atlantic and Utopian polities, which never can be drawn into use, will not mend our condition; but to ordain wisely in this world of evil, in the midst whereof God hath placed us unavoidably .... Here the great art lies, to discern in what the law is to bid restraint and punishment, and in what things persuasion only is to work. If every action which is good, or evil in man at ripe years, were to be under pittance, and prescription, and compulsion, what were virtue but a name, what praise could be then due to well-doing ....? Many there be that complain of Divine Providence for suffering Adam to transgress; foolish tongues: when God gave him reason, he gave him freedom to choose, for reason is but choosing; he had been else a mere artificial Adam ......

This passage from the Areopagitica of John Milton will serve very well as a summary of the arguments of the anti-utopians.

Firstly, the heroic voyage to Utopia is seen as being no more than a timid retreat from a world where Good and Evil are inevitably and inextricably intertwined, and where the sense and significance of each is derived by reference to the other. In his satirical work, Les Hauteurs Béantes, the Russian writer, Alexandre Zinoviev, condemns utopianism for failing to recognize the necessary interdependence between Good and Evil in the following words: 'Tous les inventeurs d'utopies commettent tous la même erreur, comme un sel homme. Ils oublient tout simplement que les aspects positifs et négatifs d'une réalité sont engendrés les uns comme les autres par une même structure
sociable. Les uns ne vont pas sans les autres .... Les utopies sont des contradictions logiques, en raison même de la façon dont elles sont construites. C'est pourquoi justement elles sont irréalisables'.

('All devisers of utopias make the very same mistake, to a man. They forget, quite simply, that positive and negative aspects of a given reality are both engendered by the same social structure. They cannot exist on their own .... Utopias are logical contradictions, because of the very way in which they are constructed. That is exactly why they are unattainable'.)

Secondly, while it is conceded that in human affairs there is an area in which it is quite proper for certain, specific actions to be precluded under threat of legal sanction, it is also considered that there is another, and wider, area of life in which legal compulsion should have no place. The art of the statesman consists in his being able to distinguish the two areas of life - the public and the private - the one from the other.

Thirdly, it is argued that freedom of choice is essential to man, since it is the expression of his reason, without which he is less than human. The man who is not free to exercise choice, but who is retained in 'a perpetual childhood of prescription', is a mere simulacrum of man. This argument is very closely related to the first. Recognition of the co-existence of Good and Evil is a pre-condition for moral action. Milton writes, 'It was from out of the rind of one apple tasted, that the knowledge of good and evil, as two twins cleaving together, leaped forth into the world. And perhaps this is that doom which Adam fell into of knowing good and evil,
that is to say of knowing good by evil. As therefore the state of man now is ,... I cannot praise a fugitive and cloistered virtue, unexercised and unbreathed, that never sallies out and sees her adversary, but slinks out of the race, where that immortal garland is to be run for, not without dust and heat. Assuredly, we bring not innocence into the world, we bring impurity much rather; that which purifies us is trial, and trial is by what is contrary'.

In the anti-utopian states devised by Zamyatin, Orwell and Huxley, the possibility of choice, that is, of moral action, has been excluded. There is no area of life which is not subject to official regulation. All power has been drained from the populace and concentrated at the centre. Its exercise is pure, untempered by the restraints afforded by formal political and legal institutions. There is no legislative body, since the shape of society, and of the nature of civil obligation, has been established for all time, and there is no possibility of recourse to legal arbitration or mediation, since there is no recognition of any conceivable set of circumstances in which there could be cause for contention. The total state is the embodiment of a single set of principles, which are to remain forever inviolate.

The total power of the ruler entails the total subjection of the ruled. But the means by which this subjection is secured and maintained varies in accordance with the nature of the principles upon which the imaginary state is founded: in the One State of Zamyatin's We, a formal rationalism governs men's lives. Every human
activity is subjected to quantification, computation, and statistical analysis. Freedom is excluded because it is untidy. Oppression is impersonal and mechanical. In Orwell's Oceania, however, rule is arbitrary. Human rationality is suppressed, and fear and hatred drive out freedom. Oppression is overt and physical. In Huxley's World State, power is maintained in yet another way: management has replaced government, and freedom is rendered impossible, at least for the mass of citizens, since they have been subjected to physical modification, and deliberately adapted to the needs of the state. To a lesser extent, this is also true of the citizens of Huxley's utopia, Pala. All are subject, in some sense, to biological oppression.

But while the anti-utopians portray states where the elimination of freedom has been successfully achieved, they nonetheless consider that the concept of the total state is contrary to the nature of man, and of his environment. 'Artificial Adam' can be created and sustained only within an artificial world, where reality has been reconstructed.

If utopia can be constructed only against nature, it must follow that whoever wishes to devise a utopian state must first encounter and overcome certain fundamental problems. In this section of my thesis, I shall discuss the variety of ways in which these problems have been conceived and 'solved' in the imaginary states proposed by the three writers with whom I am concerned. The problems I have isolated concern (i) the nature of man's perception of reality, (ii) the conception of time as the enemy of utopia, (iii) the natural world and the human body in relation to utopia, (iv) the individual will in relation to utopia, and (v) the status of the arts and sciences in utopia.
References


Part II  (i) Utopia and the subjugation of human perception

'We boast our light; but if we look not wisely on the Sun itself, it smites us into darkness .... The light which we have gained, was given us, not to be ever staring on, but by it to discover onward things more remote from our knowledge .... There be who perpetually complain of schisms and sects, and make it such a calamity that any man dissents from their maxims. 'Tis their own pride and ignorance which causes the disturbing, who neither will hear with meekness, nor can convince, yet all must be suppressed which is not found in their Syntagma'....

For the anti-utopian writers, as for Milton, man's quest for truth is eternal. No final, all-embracing conclusions can ever be reached. The findings of one generation are open to reappraisal by the next. But in the perfect state, they hold, the search for truth can no longer be allowed to proceed. The utopian believes he has revealed the whole extent of the truth. He offers a final, false solution to the insoluble. Truth, in utopia, is ossified into dogma.

The utopian ruler must impose a single vision of reality. The citizen's apprehension of truth must accord, in all respects, with the orthodox conception of truth offered by the state. Only in this way can the mechanical efficiency of the state be safeguarded. There is no particular system of thought which is uniquely and ideally appropriate for adoption and promulgation in the utopian state; what is of supreme importance is that the mode of perception adopted by the state should be universal and exclusive.
Each of the three anti-utopian states of Zamyatin, Orwell and Huxley is founded upon a different system of perception. In Orwell's Nineteen Eighty-Four, the state imposes a corporate, subjectivist vision of the world. Truth is merely a property of the state mind, unrelated to the passage of events, or to the substance of objects, in the physical world. The Inquisitor, O'Brien, terms the official mode of perception, 'collective solipsism'.\(^2\) In Zamyatin's We, however, truth is equated wholly with mathematical certainty. All that which is not susceptible to quantification and calculation is dismissed as meaningless. 'Everything great is simple', declares D-503. '.... The only things unshakable and eternal are the four rules of arithmetic. And only morality which is built upon those four rules will prove great, unshakable, eternal. This is the ultimate wisdom'.\(^3\) For Zamyatin's D-503, mathematical symbols have a substance and a reality which living people do not. Finally, in Huxley's Brave New World, the concept of truth has been discarded altogether. 'Truth's a menace', declares Mustapha Mond, the Controller of the World State. The happiness of the masses can only be secured at the cost of truth, he explains.\(^4\) In the World State, each citizen is instilled with that vision of the world which is appropriate to his place in the social structure. The value of any statement about the world is held to lie not in its truth or falsehood, but in its utility or uselessness. Language has been deprived of ethical or philosophical significance. It is merely a tool in the service of the behavioural conditioner.

The capacity of language to disclose or conceal reality, and to enhance or confound mutual understanding, has interested utopian
and anti-utopian thinkers alike. From the time of the Enlightenment onward, men have dreamed of constructing a perfectly precise language, comprehensible to all, which would bind men together in a common perception of reality.

Writing of Leibnitz's project of a universal character, Jonathan Cohen describes the functions it was intended to perform in the following terms: 'It would provide .... a "logistic" treatment of science in general, a simplified system of symbolism for the exact expression of all actual and possible knowledge. And it would serve as an instrument of discovery and demonstration. The first two purposes could be achieved on Leibnitz's view by devising a notation in which each single or basic symbol represented a simple concept and complex notions were expressed by combining the appropriate symbols in one way or another. The number of fundamental symbols would thus be as small as the number of primitive concepts in human thought, so that the notation, together with its vocalisation, could be learnt in a few weeks. Moreover, throughout the world, science would be developed in the form of a single, unified encyclopaedia, scientists would be able to attain the same degree of rigour in metaphysics and morals as in geometry or analytics, and nothing chimerical would ever be written down'.

In this dream of Leibnitz it is easy to find the seeds of Zamyatin's nightmare notion of a world where moral precepts would be mathematically computed, and human compassion would have no place.

The Enlightenment ideal of a new, universal language was adopted, in the present century, by H.G. Wells. But Wells differed from Leibnitz, in that he did not consider that such a language should
be perfect, in the sense of being static. As Zamyatin noted, the imaginary states of Wells were dynamic, rather than static. (See Part I (ii) note 4). And Wells was well aware that a 'perfect' language would be inflexible, and therefore unsuitable in the type of ideal world which he envisaged. Utopians usually made the mistake, in Wells's opinion, of advocating the development of a 'scientific language .... without ambiguity, as precise as mathematical formulae, and with every term in relations of exact logical consistency with every other .... a language with all the inflexions of verbs and nouns regular, and all its constructions inevitable, each word clearly distinguishable from every other word in sound as well as spelling'. But Wells considered that such a language would actually limit the scope of communication. 'The language of utopia', he wrote, 'will no doubt be one and indivisible; all mankind will, in the measure of their individual differences in quality, be brought into the same phase, into a common resonance of thought, but the language they speak will still be a living tongue, an animated system of imperfections, which every individual man will infinitesimally modify. Through the universal freedom of exchange and movement the developing change in its general spirit will be a world-wide change; that is the quality of its universality. I fancy it will be a coalesced language, a synthesis of many'.

Such was Wells's prescription for a universal language in 1905, when he wrote A Modern Utopia. But by the time he wrote The Shape of Things to Come, his ideas seem to have undergone some modification. Language, in the latter utopia, is certainly not static, but its growth is officially controlled, for the purpose of achieving
'increasing delicacy and precision of expression'. 'Criticism, in the form of the "Dictionary Bureau", scrutinises, but permits desirable additions' to the language. The aim is for language to be brought 'to a new level of efficiency'. Wells, who had earlier valued the allusive and evocative properties of language, and had considered that individual interpretation would serve only to enrich the common store of language, now appears to favour order and formality. He seems not to consider that human freedom may be threatened, where a government chooses to exercise exclusive control over the development of language. Nor does Wells perceive the potentially sinister implications inherent in his proposal for a Language Discard organisation. In Wells's imaginary future world, this institution has been set up to collect obsolete terms, or those which have lost their original meanings, and to eliminate them from current usage. But the organisation has come to acquire another function: 'the enquiry into these changes and preferences and abandonment's has led 'very directly into an exhaustive analysis of the primary processes of human thought'. In The Shape of Things to Come, Wells expresses the belief that utopia will be finally attained only once man has undergone mental reconstruction. This 'rearrangement of the association systems of the human brain ... brings with it ... the prospect of at present inconceivable extensions of human mental capacity'.

Both Hillegas and Steinhoff consider that Wells's conception of a utopian language was utilized by Orwell, when he came to write Nineteen Eighty-Four. Certainly parallels can be drawn between Wells's utopian language scheme and Orwell's Newspeak, and Steinhoff offers
evidence which indicates that Orwell could well have been influenced by Wells. Orwell collected pamphlets on Basic English, among which is C.K. Ogden's *System of Basic English*, written in 1934. This pamphlet is itself written in Basic English, and it includes a 'translation' of the section of *The Shape of Things to Come* which is concerned with 'Language and Mental Growth'. Steinhoff claims that Ogden's pamphlet, and particularly the excerpt from Wells's utopia, 'gave Orwell the design for a language like Newspeak, and, more important, examples of what could be done with its eight hundred words'.

*Newspeak* is the official language of Orwell's Oceania. It is designed so to limit thought processes that ultimately thoughtcrime (the conception of ideas alien to state dogma) will become an impossibility. Undesirable words are discarded, or heretical connotations stripped from them, so that the human brain may be robbed of the conceptual apparatus needed for the generation of unorthodox thoughts. All new words invented by the Party have highly specific meanings, and care is taken that they should not acquire any subsidiary meanings inimical to the Party vision. It is the Party's purpose not merely to impose its own vocabulary upon the subjects of Oceania, but to ensure that alternative modes of expression cease to exist. Thus the minds of the citizens will ultimately come to contain only those mental images which serve to reinforce Party dogma.

Orwell considered that control over language can constitute a very potent weapon in the hands of those who wish to exercise control over thought processes. He was deeply interested in language; its
perversion seemed to him to constitute one of the major threats to human rationality. He considered that where language is mutilated, freedom of thought becomes impossible.

'Totalitarianism has abolished freedom of thought to an extent unheard of in any previous age', Orwell wrote. 'And it is important to realize that its control of thought is not only negative, but positive. It not only forbids you to express - even to think - certain thoughts, but it dictates what you shall think, it creates an ideology for you, it tries to govern your emotional life as well as setting up a code of conduct. And as far as possible, it isolates you from the outside world, it shuts you up in an artificial universe in which you have no standards of comparison'.

This is the situation of Orwell's central character, Winston Smith, in Nineteen Eighty-Four. Winston Smith's greatest misery is that he has no one with whom he can share his ideas, and thus verify his conception of reality. Locked in his 'artificial universe', he is desperately and constantly aware of the unsystematic nature of his own thought processes, and although he tries laboriously to order his internal arguments rationally, he has little faith in his powers of reasoning. This sense of mental inadequacy causes him to fear for his own sanity. Since he cannot formulate and articulate his ideas openly, he ceases to be able to structure them within his own head.

Orwell believed that it was impossible to sustain freedom of thought within the total state, because freedom of thought and freedom of speech are inseparably linked. He held that no man can indefinitely
preserve an independent line of thought without the mental support of others. 'The fallacy is to believe that under a dictatorial government you can feel free inside', he wrote. '.... Why is this idea false? I pass over the fact that modern dictatorships don't, in fact, leave the loopholes that the old-fashioned despotisms did; and also the probable weakening of the desire for intellectual liberty owing to totalitarian methods of education. The greatest mistake is to imagine that the human being is an autonomous individual. The secret freedom which you can supposedly enjoy under a despotic government is nonsense, because your thoughts are never entirely your own. Philosophers, writers, artists, even scientists, not only need encouragement and an audience, they need constant stimulation from other people. It is almost impossible to think without talking .... Take away freedom of speech, and the creative faculties dry up'.

Orwell likened the total state to a theocracy, in which the individual is required to adapt his thoughts to conform with the official creed. Yet he drew a distinction between religious dogma and the dogma of the total state. Although the mediaeval Church in Europe dictated what men should believe, it at least allowed men to retain the same set of beliefs from birth to death. 'The peculiarity of the totalitarian state is that though it controls thought, it does not fix it', he wrote. 'It sets up unquestionable dogmas, and it alters them from day to day. It needs the dogmas, because it needs absolute obedience from its subjects, but it cannot avoid the changes, which are dictated by the needs of power politics. It declares itself infallible, and at the same time it attacks the very concept of objective truth'.

In Nineteen Eighty-Four, Orwell describes a state where the citizens have been reduced to the level of infants, permanently anxious to think and do what is required of them, yet unable to discover and understand the nature of the orthodoxy to which they must adhere. Orwell appears to have believed that the human mind, in infancy, is featureless and utterly defenceless, a palimpsest, on which society may inscribe at will. 'The weakness of the child', he wrote, 'is that it starts with a blank sheet. It neither understands nor questions the society in which it lives, and because of its credulity, other people can work upon it, infecting it with the sense of inferiority and the dread of offending against mysterious, terrible laws'. For Orwell, this belief in human malleability was a source of pessimism and foreboding.

The citizens of Orwell's imaginary state, Oceania, are bereft of any confidence in their own powers of observation and reasoning. The Party which governs them claims to be infallible, and disguises its frequent changes of policy and its errors of judgment by substituting propaganda for objective truth. Party members must be ready at all times to forget 'by instinct' that which it is necessary for them to forget, while at the same time registering subconsciously the reason why it is necessary for them to forget, and the circumstances in which it might become necessary for them to remember again. This form of self-hypnosis is termed Doublethink. With Doublethink it is even possible to hold two mutually exclusive opinions at the same time. The citizen must exercise total control over his thought processes at all times. He must accept that reality is no more than the convenient fiction offered by Party rhetoric at any given moment. Thus
the basis for human rationality is destroyed, and sanity is redefined. The sane man in Oceania is he who can unhesitatingly accommodate his mind to the contortions of the Party rationality.

In a manner strikingly reminiscent of Orwell, Arthur Koestler describes his experiences in Stalinist Russia, in 'the magic world of "double-think"', in the following words: 'I reacted to the brutal impact of reality on illusion in a manner typical of the true believer. I was surprised and bewildered - but the elastic shock-absorbers of my Party training began to operate at once. I had eyes to see, and a mind conditioned to explain away what they saw. This 'inner censor' is more reliable and effective than any official censorship .... It helped me to overcome my doubts and to rearrange my impressions in the desired pattern. I learnt to classify automatically everything that shocked me as 'the heritage of the past' and everything I liked as 'the seeds of the future'. By setting up this automatic sorting machine in his mind, it was still possible in 1933 for a European to live in Russia and yet to remain a Communist. All my friends had that automatic sorting machine in their heads. The Communist mind has perfected the techniques of self-deception in the same manner as its techniques of mass propaganda. The inner censor in the mind of the true believer completes the work of the public censor; his self-discipline is as tyrannical as the obedience imposed by the régime; he terrorises his own conscience into submission; he carries his private Iron Curtain inside his skull, to protect his illusions against the intrusion of reality'.

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Koestler does not suggest, of course, that this method of thinking is peculiar to the orthodox in Stalinist Russia. Like Orwell, he considers that the apparatus for self-delusion will be brought into operation wherever a society is governed according to the precepts of some closed system of thought, that is, wherever observable facts have to be refashioned to suit the terms of an infallible creed. For both writers, totalitarianism is both the cause and the result of the eclipse of the rational mind.

The passage by Koestler quoted above was written in 1954, and it is reasonable to suppose that at that time he was familiar with Orwell's Nineteen Eighty-Four, and that he drew on the Orwellian conception of double-think when he came to structure his own account of his personal experiences under totalitarianism.

In Nineteen Eighty-Four, Orwell envisages a world in which the boundaries between fact and fantasy have been dissolved, and where the concept of objective truth has ceased to have meaning. The state requires its citizens to accept without question the subjective vision of reality which the Party devises from moment to moment, to protect its claim to infallibility. As this conception offers no stability, the individual citizen is thrown in upon himself, in an effort to direct his own thought processes so that they may accord with the Party rationality. Thus, although all subjects of the state are compelled to share a common conception of reality, this has the effect, not of uniting them, but of severing them one from another. The citizens are deprived of the sense of security to be found in the sharing of a common body of empirical knowledge, accessible to all,
and unaffected by the passing convenience of Party leaders. Individual survival depends upon the subject's ability to ignore the evidence of his senses, and interpret the shifting demands of Party dogma. Communication exists solely between the subject and the power centre. The citizen cannot allow himself to open his mind to the opinions and apprehensions of others, since they may run counter to Party doctrine. Thus relations between individual citizens are characterised only by emotions of suspicion, fear and hatred.

While in Nineteen Eighty-Four, the concept of objective truth is destroyed, in Zamyatin's imaginary One State, it is man's subjective appreciation of reality, his individual capacity for interpretation, which has been sacrificed. Men are regarded as being homogeneous beings, whose actions are totally predictable. Immutable facts exist, as they do not in Orwell's Oceania, but the capacity of the individual citizen to respond to those facts in his own way is destroyed. In the One State, the whole of life has been assessed, quantified and incorporated into one static, all-inclusive model. Everything knowable is known. Every human question has been provided with a precise, incontrovertible answer. 'Truth' has been irrevocably established. The One State takes no cognisance of the imponderable and the immensurable.

While the rulers of Oceania sustain their vision of reality through the exercise of physical oppression, in Zamyatin's One State, such primitive and haphazard cruelty has no place. Acts of oppression are not gratuitously performed, as they are in Orwell's Oceania. Punishment is meted out to those who disturb the perfection of the One State's arrangements by thinking and acting as unique beings.
In the One State, the rationality of machines has replaced the rationality of men. The human capacity to speculate, to question, to doubt and to choose, has been suppressed. Most of the citizens are content. They are no longer called upon to adjust to unpredictable occurrences in their lives, nor do they have to suffer the anguish of desires and indecision. They have no need of thought. With machine-like precision they perform their allotted functions, guided by mindless habit, rather than by human intelligence.

Human adaptability and creativity have been extinguished in the One State. The citizens are so conditioned that they have no awareness of their own existence as discrete beings, able to exercise independent volition to achieve individual aims. The actions they perform in their daily lives are without personal significance. This is demonstrated in an account given by D-503, Zamyatin's central character. He recalls that in the period shortly after the founding of the One State, an experiment was carried out, in which three labourers were released from their work in the factory for one month, to see how they would choose to occupy themselves. D-503 describes how the three labourers, the 'manumitted ones', removed from their usual surroundings and deprived of their habitual occupations, 'kept loitering around their customary place of work and peeping within with hungry eyes; they would stop in the public squares and for hours on end go through the motions which, at set times during the day, became an actual physical need: they sawed and planed the air, or clanged and pounded with invisible sledges upon invisible ingots'. Thus, although the One State is
said, by its rulers, to be founded upon perfect rationalism, the manu-
mitted workers are no longer capable of independent reasoning. They
perform movements which are rational in one given set of circumstances
only. Within their usual environment, the three men are efficiently
functioning parts of a rational whole, but withdrawn from that environ-
ment, they are incapable of adapting their actions to suit their new
surroundings.

The dogma of Zamyatin's mechanically perfect state invests col-
lective abstractions with reality, while physical human entities are
regarded as real only in relation to the collectivity which subsumes
them. Morality is shaped by a mathematical system of ethics, under
which the citizen, or 'number', is reduced to the level of a term in
an equation. 'Pity based upon arithmetical illiteracy was something
that was known only to the ancients', D-503 writes in his diary. 'We
find it mirth-provoking'. He describes how ten factory workers have
just been killed while the rocket motor of the 'Integral' was being
tested. 'At the first try (= blast) something like half a score of
the numbers working on our site hadn't been fast enough in getting
out from under the exhaust - and absolutely nothing was left of them
except a few tiny nondescript fragments and a little soot. With pride
I record here that the rhythm of our work was not broken even for a
second by this, not a man was startled, and we and our lathes went
on with our rectilinear or circular motions with the same precision
as if nothing had happened. Ten numbers represented hardly
1/100,000,000th of our One State: for the purposes of practical
calculation this is an infinitesimal of the third order'. Under the ethical system of the state, the citizen is without significance, and without rights. D-503 remarks that the sole right of the citizen is to receive punishment, 'No number among us should renounce, or should dare to renounce this sole - and hence the most precious - right of his', he writes. 'Even among the ancients, the more mature ones knew that the source of right was force, that right was a function of force. Well, here is a pair of scales. On one is a grammme, on the other a ton; I on one, We, The One State, on the other. Is it not clear, then, that the assumption that the I can have some rights or other in relationship to the State, and the assumption that a grammme can counterbalance a ton - why these two assumptions absolutely amount to one and the same thing. Hence the allocation: the rights to the ton, the duties to the grammme, while the natural course from nullity to grandeur is to forget that you are a grammme and to feel that you are a millionth part of a ton'.

D-503, himself a mathematician, is at ease only in the world of mathematical symbols and formulae. Solids must be redefined for him in abstract terms before they can arouse his perception. Accordingly, he perceives his fellow citizens not as solid people, but as symbols. O-90, the woman with whom he is registered by the state for sexual relations, presents no problems for him. She is 'made up entirely of circumferences', and her mouth, too, is round like an 'O'. To D-503 she is nothing, a nought, never actually perceived by him. It is also possible that the image of the circle which is associated with O-90 in the mind of D-503, is to be seen as the symbol of perfect regularity,
the image of perfection, in the sense understood by idealistic philosophers such as Plato. Certainly, for D-503, 0-90 is without ambiguities or imperfections, utterly simple, and therefore demanding no effort of understanding on his behalf. D-503 fails to recognize 0-90's innate unorthodoxy, just as he fails to recognize the Guardian, S-4711, as a subversive, and a fellow conspirator of E-330's. S-4711 is 'formed in a double curve, on the nature of the letter S'. For reasons which he is unable to comprehend, D-503 finds the presence of S-4711 obscurely disconcerting. He senses that there are certain ambiguities surrounding the figure of S. Superficially, the facts are clear: S-4711 is a Guardian, constantly concerned to keep D-503 from drifting into subversive action. D-503 is aware that wherever he goes, S is always watching his movements, and he writes 'It is gratifying to feel somebody's vigilant eye upon one, lovingly guarding one from the least mistake, from the least erring step'. Yet in practice, although S is always present when D-503 commits an indiscretion, S uses his official power not to have D-503 arrested, and removed from society, but to protect him from suspicion. D-503 wonders whether S has 'some secret purpose' in sparing him. There are further inconsistencies which trouble D-503: S is a constant, and obviously intimate, companion of E's, and D-503 is obscurely aware of 'some sort of thread between them'. This perplexes him. He writes, 'I am constantly aware of this thread - I still don't know its nature, but some time or other I shall unravel it'. D-503 suddenly becomes convinced, for reasons which he cannot define, that S is registered in E-330's name for sexual relations. This in
itself is disturbing and unexpected, but the link between S and E is something more significant than a purely sexual link, he senses. D-503 does not really want to have his suspicions crystallised for him: when E-330 takes him on an illicit journey beyond the Green Wall, in company with other dissidents, he catches a momentary glimpse of S-4711 moving among the crowd. This image is so incongruous to him, that he later dismisses it from his mind entirely.27

The shape of S-4711 is itself significant for D-503. For him, the curve is geometrically unsatisfactory, suggesting imprecision, and S is formed like a double curve. 'The line of the One State is the straight line. The great, divine, exact wise straight line - the wisest of lines!', D-503 observes.28 It is possible that Zamyatin intended that the curve of S-4711's shoulders should suggest the shape of a question mark. Thus S-4711 would stand as a symbol of doubt and uncertainty for D-503. In his satirical essay, Paradise, Zamyatin wrote, 'Doesn't the very curve of the question mark - - suggest the Great Serpent, tempting the blessed inhabitants of the ancient paradise with doubts?'.29

But it is the appearance of E-330 which most profoundly disturbs D-503's equanimity. She at once fascinates and repels him. Describing her face, D-503 writes, 'I perceived a strange combination: dark eyebrows, quirked high at the temples; an acute triangle of mockery; and two deep, small wrinkles from the nose to the corners of the mouth: another triangle, coming to an apex. And these two triangles somehow contradicted each other, placing upon the entire face that disagreeable, irritating cruciform X: it was a crossed-out face'.30 E-330 is an enigma, defying neat, mathematical solution. She is X, the unknown quantity.
D-503 needs to believe that he perceives the whole of reality, including the thoughts of others. 'We constantly live in full sight of all, constantly bathed in light and surrounded by our glass walls that seem woven of corruscating air. We have nothing to conceal from one another', he writes. Yet this total transparency reveals nothing to D-503. He is incapable of perceiving others as separate entities. Rising in the morning in his glass cubicle, he seems to see nothing but repeated reflections of himself, stretching off into infinity in every direction, as all the members of the state rise at the same instant, and dress in unison in identical clothes.

Zamyatin uses the image of transparency, and of glass, to express a paradox. Whereas ordinarily it might be taken to symbolise revelation, within Zamyatin's framework, it symbolises the illusory. It is only when fog descends upon the city, dissolving the transparency of the glass walls in its opaqueness, that D-503 becomes aware of the presence of separate, solid forms, moving about within the buildings. In his diary he notes, 'There were no longer any buildings: the glass walls had deliquesced in fog, like small salt crystals in water. If one looked up from the pavement, the dark figures of those inside the buildings appeared like particles suspended in some phantasmagorical milky solution; some were dangling low, but one saw them on higher and higher floors up to the tenth.'

D-503 desires to penetrate into the minds of others, so that there shall be no mysteries for him. He laments the fact that 'human heads are opaque, and the only windows into the interior - the eyes - are tiny'. When he looks into the eyes of 0-90, it seems to him
that they present no problem. They are 'blue crystal', and resemble open windows. Within them he is reassured to find no complexities, 'nothing extraneous, unnecessary'. But the emptiness he encounters when he penetrates her eyes is delusory; it is no more than a reflection of his own insubstantiality and emptiness. 0-90's mind is closed to him. By contrast with 0-90's eyes, the eyes of E-330 trouble him. They are dark and mysterious, and within them he seems to see somewhere a fire raging. Her eyelids seem to him like blinds, which she lowers over her secret thoughts. E-330 is not transparent, and her eyes reveal to him only the reality of a mind which is incomprehensible to him. He is seized with an irrational fear, when, catching sight of his own reflection in E-330's eyes, he has a sudden impression that he is himself imprisoned within them.

D-503 is himself like glass, inert, unable to transmit or retain images. He is without the capacity for perception. But with the growth of his imagination, under the influence of E-330, he begins to acquire sensitivity to his surroundings. Bewildered at the changes he senses in himself, he visits a doctor, who draws an analogy between the mind of D-503 and a mirror. A mirror reflects passing images, but retains nothing, he explains, 'But just imagine that through the application of some sort of fire this impenetrable surface has suddenly softened, and nothing any longer glides over it - everything penetrates it, into that mirror world we eyed with such curiosity when we were children ...... that which is within the mirror is within you ...... a cold mirror reflects, rejects, whereas my suppositious mirror absorbs, and retains a trace through all time of all things that have affected it'. The fire which has softened D-503's mirror is the fire which he has seen burning within the eyes of E-330.
The image of the mirror, and the world beyond it, occurs elsewhere in D-503's 'mirror'. A secret path to the primitive world beyond the Green Wall is approached through the mirrored door of a clothes closet in the House of Antiquities, an ancient house, which has been preserved as a museum. As in the case of D-503's 'mirror', beneath the smooth surface of the glass mirror on the closet door, lies another reality, hidden from view.\(^38\)

D-503 comes to suspect that beneath the surface of his familiar, abstract world of mathematical laws and neat formulae lies another, perverse, unquantifiable world, which is perhaps more real and solid than his own. From childhood onwards, he has been tormented by the concept of irrational numbers, and of infinity. He needs the reassurance of simple calculable fact. As his imagination develops, he finds himself beset by the incomprehensible. 'For every equation, every formula in the superficial world, there is a corresponding curve or solid. For irrational formulae, for my \(\sqrt{-1}\), we know of no corresponding solids; we have never seen them. But that is precisely where the horror lies; these solids, though unseen, do exist, inevitably, ineluctably, because in mathematics, as if on a screen, their whimsical, prickly shadows - irrational formulae - pass before us: and mathematics and death are never in error. And if we do not see these solids in our universe, on the surface, there does exist - there must inescapably exist - on entire immense universe of their own there, below the surface'.\(^39\) D-503 becomes obsessed by the conviction that the cool, harmonious transparency of his glass world masks a world of movement, emotion and nature, which contains all that is 'riotous,
blood-red, shaggy', And he also suspects that the veneer of crystal-line perfection which passes for reality in the One State is frail, and may be burst apart at any moment. 'Everything is greenish-glassy', he records in his diary, 'but this is some sort of different, fragile glass; not our sort, not the real glass - this is a thin glass shell, and under that shell everything is swirling, rushing, humming'.

Zamyatin's image of the glass city, symbolising the ultimate extinction of privacy, is foreshadowed in Dostoievsky's Notes From Underground. The narrator of Dostoievsky's book envisages 'a Palace of Crystal, eternally inviolable', which will come into being as an embodiment of the perfectly rational state which is to come. But, he confesses, 'Perhaps I fear this edifice just because it is crystal and eternally inviolable, and it will not be possible even to put out one's tongue at it in secret'. For the utopian, perfect transparency offers the promise of perfect communication, perfect understanding, perfect unanimity and perfect truth. But for Dostoievsky, as for Zamyatin, the cost of transparency is loss of self. It is enslavement.

As Starobinski has pointed out, the concept of transparency is especially significant in the work of Rousseau. In Rousseau's Rêveries, as in La Nouvelle Héloïse, the same ideal can be perceived, the ideal of la belle âme, self-knowing, all-knowing, perfect in its limpidity.

Of La Nouvelle Héloïse, Starobinski writes, 'Ce grand roman de la transformation des coeurs poursuit, à travers sa dimension critique, un but utopique de transformation du monde'. (This great
novel of the transformation of hearts, pursues, through its critical
dimension, a utopian goal of the transformation of the world). In
this book, Rousseau's fictional characters have established at Clarens
'une sorte de république privilégiée, supérieure par ces institutions
au monde qui la précédait et qui l'encercle. Cette république n'est
que l'expansion "politique" des belles âmes qui ont résolu de mettre
leurs destins en commun'. (a kind of privileged republic, superior
by reason of its institutions to the world which preceded it, and to
that which encircles it. This republic is nothing other than the
expansion into the political field of the 'noble souls', who have
resolved to unite their destinies).

Les belles âmes of Clarens are depicted as having achieved an
inter-relationship of perfect transparency and harmony. They pass
their time in wordless communion, in which the thoughts and emotions
of each are continually and silently accessible to all. St.-Preux,
one of the group of intimate friends, describes in a letter a morning
he has just spent 'dans une immobilité d'ecstase ..... réunis et dans
le silence, goûtant à la fois le plaisir d'être ensemble et la douceur
du réceuillement. Que de délices de cet état sont connues de peu de
gens! .... Mon Dieu! qu'une main serrée, qu'un regard animé, qu'une
étreinte contre la poitrine, que le soupir qui la suit, disent de
choses, et que le premier mot qu'on prononce est froid après tout
cela! ... Il est sûr que cet état de contemplation fait un des grands
charmes des hommes sensibles'. (transfixed with ecstasy ....
reunited in silence, savouring at the same time the pleasure of being
together and the sweetness of reconciliation. How few people know the
delights of this condition! O God! How much is said through the clasp of a hand, an animated look, a close embrace, and by the sigh which follows it! .... Certainly this state of contemplation constitutes one of the greatest charms of life for men of sensitivity).

But in contemplating this ideal of transparency, certain questions need to be answered. Would the dissolution of inter-personal barriers, and the consequent eradication of misunderstanding and human isolation, perhaps not also entail the sacrifice of individual integrity? Is it conceptually possible for a man to be at the same time perfectly and permanently receptive to the thoughts of others, and yet to retain the capacity for generating original thoughts? And would not the capacity for rational deliberation cease to exist if one's embryonic thoughts, one's rudimentary impressions and one's unpolished judgments were perpetually seeping into the minds of others? Would not this mutual invasion entail loss of liberty? Does not the very possibility of individuality lie precisely in opacity, in privacy? The anti-utopians consider that perfect transparency would lead to a form of corporate consciousness, a lack of personal differentiation, and thus to a loss of the power of thought itself. There would be nothing left to communicate.

One of the harshest critics of the ideal of transparency, and of *la belle âme* was Hegel, as Starobinski comments: 'On connaît la sévérité de Hegel envers la "belle âme": l'objet qu'elle croit devant elle, c'est encore elle-même. Quand elle pense le tout, elle ne pense que sa propre transparence, et finalement son propre vide, son inanité inconsistante: "Comme conscience, elle est divisée dans l'opposition
du Soi et de l'objet qui, pour elles, est l'essence, mais cet objet est précisément le parfaitement transparent, il est son Soi, et sa conscience n'est que le savoir de soi. Toute vie et toute essentialité spirituelle sont revenues dans ce Soi". La belle âme crée un monde pur, qui est sa parole et son écho qu'elle perçoit immédiatement. Mais "dans cette pureté transparente", elle va "s'évanouir dans une vapeur sans forme qui se dissout dans l'air". Elle perd toute réalité et, s'épuisant en elle-même, elle se volatilise dans l'extrême abstraction. Pour Hegel, qui vise sans doute Novalis, mais aussi le Rousseau des Rêveries à travers Novalis, la transparence est une perte de soi, une stérile réassertion de l'identité Moi = Moi' (The harshness of Hegel towards the concept of "la belle âme" is well known: the object which it believes to be before it is forever itself. When it thinks of everything, it is really only thinking of its own transparency, and finally, of its own emptiness, its inconsistent foolishness: "As with consciousness, it is divided into opposition between the Self and the object which is, for it, the essence, but this object is precisely transparent perfection, it is its Self, and its consciousness is only knowledge of itself. The whole of life and spiritual being have returned into this Self". La belle âme creates a pure world, which is its word and its echo which it immediately perceives. But in this transparent purity, it will "vanish in a formless vapour which dissolves itself into the air". It loses all reality, and dissipating itself within itself, it evaporates into extreme abstraction. For Hegel, who no doubt has in mind Novalis, but also the Rousseau of the Rêveries, through Novalis, transparency is a loss of self, a
sterile reassertion of the identity "I am I"). For Hegel, the concept of the transparent, noble soul is fraudulent. It is logical nonsense.

As Starobinski remarks, Rousseau compared his heart to a crystal. 'Une fluidité qui ne s'écoule pas, et qui, par conséquent, s'est stabilisée hors du temps'. (A liquid substance which does not flow, and which consequently has stabilised itself outside time).

In the same way, in We, the crystallisation of D-503's heart removes him from time and death (and thus from reality). When he is in the company of E-330, D-503 feels his heart melting and flowing once more: 'I was a crystal, and I was dissolving in her, in E-. I felt with perfect clarity how the polished facets defining me in space were dissolving .... in her; I was becoming smaller and smaller - and at the same time expanding, increasing more and more, becoming more and more unencompassable', he writes. Time and movement (and the certainty of death) have thus been reintroduced into D-503's life by E.

Starobinski comments that it is no surprise that the process of vitrification was of great interest to Rousseau. In Starobinski's view, 'La technique de la vitrification est inséparable d'un rêve d'innocence et d'immortalité substantielle. Transformer un cadavre en verre translucide est une victoire sur la mort et sur la décomposition des corps. C'est déjà un passage à la vie éternelle: "Ce n'est pas seulement dans le règne minéral que Becher établit sa terre vitrifiable; il en trouve une toute semblable dans les cendres des végétaux .... et une troisième bien plus merveilleuse dans les animaux. Il assure qu'ils contiennent une terre fusible, vitrifiable, et de
laquelle on peut faire des vases préférables à la plus belle porcelaine. Par des procédés sur lesquels il garde un grand mystère il en a fait des épreuves qui l'ont convaincu que l'homme est verre et qu'il peut retourner en verre de même que tous les animaux. Cela lui fait faire les plus jolies réflexions sur les peines que se donnaient les anciens pour brûler les morts ou les embaumer et sur la manière dont on pourrait conserver les cendres de ses Ancêtres en substituant en peu d'heures à des cadavres dégoûtants et hideux, des vases propres et brillants, d'un beau verre transparent ....'48 (The technique of vitrification is inseparable from a dream of innocence and physical immortality. To transform a corpse into translucent glass is a victory over death and over the decomposition of the body. It is already a path to eternal life: "It is not only in the realm of mineral substances that Becher establishes his vitrifiable substance; he detects a similar substance in the ashes of vegetation .... and a third, far more amazing substance in the animal world. He is certain that they (animals) contain a fusible, vitrifiable substance, from which one could make vases superior to the finest porcelain. By processes about which he is very secretive he has carried out tests which have convinced him that man is glass and that he could return to glass just as all animals could. This leads him to the most charming reflections about the trouble to which the ancient peoples put themselves, in burning the dead and in embalming them, and in the manner in which one would be able to preserve the ashes of one's ancestors by substituting for the disgusting and hideous corpses, in a few hours, clean and shining vases, of a beautiful transparent glass ....").
With this 'dream of innocence and immortality', which Starobinski holds as being associated with the desire for transparency, there goes another dream, the dream of omnipotence.

Ultimately, to wish to be transparent is to wish to be invisible. And with this wish, as Starobinski comments, goes a concomitant desire for super-human power. In his Réveries, Rousseau wrote, 'Si j'eusse été invisible et tout-puissant comme Dieu, j'aurais été bienfaisant comme lui .... Si j'eusse été possesseur de l'anneau de Gygès, il m'eût tiré de la dépendance des hommes et les eût mis dans la mienne'. 49 Starobinski adds, 'Devenir invisible: c'est le point où l'extrême nullité de l'être se convertirait en un pouvoir sans limite'. 50 ('If I had been invisible and all-powerful like God, I should have been beneficent like him .... If I had been the possessor of the ring of Gyges, it would have drawn me out of dependence upon men and brought them into dependence upon me' .... To become invisible: that is the point where ultimate nullity of being is converted into limitless power). Here is a clear expression of the utopian dream of flight from the frustrations and inadequacies of the natural world, and of social relationships, into a world where omnipotence, and thus invincibility, is a possibility.

In Zamyatin's We, D-503 himself transparent, and indistinguishable from his transparent world, experiences the illusion that he is the divince creator of his universe, that he has transcended physical limitations and become a facet of supernatural power. As he takes part in the Daily March of the One State he gazes around him in rapture, for an instant seized with the confidence of an invisible
deity. He writes, 'I saw the irrevocably straight streets, the ray-spurt ing glass of the roadways, the divine parallelepipeds of the transparent dwellings, the square harmony of our grey-blue ranks. And so it struck me that it had not been the generations upon generations before me but I - precisely I - who had conquered the old God and the old life: that it was precisely I who had created all this. And as if I were a tower, I was afraid to move my elbow lest I send the walls, cupolas, machines tumbling in a cascade of fragments'.

It is only when D-503 has acquired consciousness of himself as a corporeal entity that he can begin to perceive reality, and his relation to it, and his progress toward humanity is very slow. The loss of transparency is very painful to him.

Transparency, for Zamyatin, is to be equated with insubstantiality. The citizens of the One State, supposedly locked in perfect communion with one another, are unable to achieve any real intimacy because they fail to see one another. As in Orwell's Oceania, in the One State, ceaseless physical propinquity and the abandonment of privacy are accompanied only by mental isolation. But whereas in Oceania, the citizens are driven apart from one another by fear and suspicion, in the One State, they are isolated by their lack of substance.

In the One State, as in Oceania, there is no love or affection, but neither is there any hatred. Any manifestation of emotion, whether positive or negative, is regarded as being clearly symptomatic of an inner sickness. D-503 expresses the orthodox reaction to emotion in
the following words: 'I felt an unpleasant (sickly) contraction, linked with a feeling of pity within my heart (the heart is nothing but an ideal pump: to speak of compression, contraction, in connection with a pump's suction of a liquid is a technical absurdity; hence it is clear to what an extent all these loves, pities, etc., etc., which bring about such a contraction, are essentially absurd, unnatural, sickly)'.

52 The rationality of the One State proclaims man to be no more than a component in a vast, perfect machine. Human biological needs are recognized and satisfied, under state supervision, in order that men may function efficiently; but under the state's definition of the nature of man, the concept of human emotional need is incongruous. The ideal is for man to think 'philosophically-mathematically'.

53 Thus power in the One State is exercised through the suppression of human emotionality. The state has imposed a vision of reality under which emotion does not exist. Orwell, who read and admired Zamyatin's We, seems not to have fully understood this. Orwell was impressed by Zamyatin's 'intuitive grasp of the irrational side of totalitarianism - human sacrifice, cruelty as an end in itself, the worship of a leader who is credited with divine attributes'.

54 Here perhaps Orwell assumes too close a congruence between Zamyatin's analysis of the nature of control in the utopian state and his own. The ritual which exists in Zamyatin's total state is essentially mechanical; it is not intended to arouse group hysteria, as it is in Orwell's Oceania. Nor is the cruelty displayed in the One State random and irrational.
In Orwell's Oceania, matters stand very differently. Reality is distorted through the suppression of man's rational faculties, and thus the emotional side of human nature is thrown into prominence. But the unpredictable force of human emotion would present problems for the ruler of the total state, if it were not contained and directed. In Oceania, emotion expresses itself in gnawing anxiety, and this anxiety is subsequently nurtured and exploited for the purposes of the state. There is no law, and therefore, theoretically, nothing is illegal. Paradoxically, retribution is meted out not in response to some criminal action already committed, but as a punishment for some possible future deviation from the official orthodoxy. 'A Party member is required to have not only the right opinions, but the right instincts'. In this way, he will be able to exercise crimestop, a habit of mind which will prevent his slipping into facecrime or thoughtcrime. The naturally orthodox person, or goodthinker, 'will in all circumstances know, without taking thought, what is the true belief or the desirable emotion', but for all citizens, an elaborate programme of 'mental training' in childhood will make him 'unwilling and unable to think too deeply on any subject whatever'. Each Party member is required to be 'competent, industrious and even intelligent within narrow limits, but it is also necessary that he should be a credulous and ignorant fanatic, whose prevailing moods are fear, hatred, adulation, and orgiastic triumph'. This state of mind is fostered by the harsh puritanism of the state. Love, desire and affection are outlawed, and emotion must be channelled into outbursts of rage and vicious hatred, which the state directs against pre-determined targets, or into demonstrations of blind adoration of the
state. Emotional energies can also be transformed into war hysteria and fanatical nationalism, since the vast superstate of Oceania is continually at war with its neighbouring superstates. This warfare is artificially stimulated solely for the purpose of fortifying domestic control. In Oceania, the potentially subversive power of human emotion has been so harnessed as to become the dominant force by which the ruling elite's vision of reality is sustained.

While all emotion is perverted into fear and hatred in Oceania, and subsequently utilised for the purposes of the state, in Huxley's World State, in Brave New World, emotional energy is transformed into mindless sensuality, and then dissipated. The citizens of the World State have been tamed by pleasure, and for the most part they relinquish their human capacity for judgment, for emotional attachment, for endurance and for anguish without regret. As far as possible, the state contrives to convert complex, and potentially subversive, creative and emotional drives into simple, undifferentiated sexual drives, which can be stimulated and satisfied as necessary. Sexuality remains purely at the infantile level of self-gratification, and is devoid of emotional content. There is no interpersonal commitment, and, as in Oceania and the One State, the citizens are rendered incapable of intimate communication with one another, despite the enforced communality of their lives.

The inhabitants of the World State are genetically bred and psychologically conditioned to perform certain fixed functions in the life of the state, and they accept the contorted vision of their
nature, needs and capacities decreed by official dogma without question. The state provides them with a euphoria-inducing drug, soma, with which are they taught to anaesthetise their sensibilities in times of unavoidable stress and tension. The managers and conditioners who control the World State ensure that individual perception of reality can be dulled whenever the cause of harmony and stability so dictates.

The citizens of the World State escape the risks normally inherent in life. They experience no anguish, no indecision, no pain and no fear. They also experience no love and no inspiration. The World State is a land of lotus-eaters. 'Reality, however, is something from which people feel the need of taking pretty frequent holidays', Huxley remarks drily in his introduction to Brave New World. Yet in Huxley himself there seems to have been a similar desire to escape reality, at first suppressed, but later readily apparent.

In Brave New World, soma stands condemned as a poison of the mind. In one of the key scenes of the book, the outsider, John Savage, affirms his allegiance to the cause of freedom and humanity by destroying a quantity of the drug. 'I'll teach you; I'll make you be free whether you want to or not', he exclaims to the uncomprehending populace. Yet Huxley's attitude to drug-taking is equivocal. A year before writing his anti-utopia, Huxley wrote, in his essay, Wanted a New Pleasure, 'If I were a millionaire, I should endow a band of research workers to look for the ideal intoxicant. If we could sniff or swallow something that would, for five or six hours each day, abolish our solitude as individuals, atone us with our fellows in a glowing exaltation of affection, and make life in all its aspects seem not only worth living, but divinely beautiful and significant, and if this heavenly, world-transforming drug were of such a kind that we
could wake up next morning with a clear head and an undamaged constitution - then it seems to me all our problems ..., would be wholly solved and earth would be paradise'. It is hard to distinguish this imaginary drug from the soma of Brave New World, or the Moksha-medicine of Island. Huxley wrote his utopia, Island, between 1956 and 1960, during a time when he was himself experimenting with the use of mescaline and L.S.D. Huxley claimed that with the use of such drugs he could experience 'a transcendence of the ordinary subject-object relationship. A transcendence of the fear of death. A sense of solidarity with the world and its spiritual principle'. The inhabitants of Pala achieve a similar sensation. They feel themselves to be 'blissfully one with oneness' in their moksha-taking ceremonies.

The words Huxley wrote in 1931, in the passage from Wanted a New Pleasure quoted above, are very revealing. Throughout his life, with increasing intensity, Huxley craved the possibility of a retreat from immediate experience. His desire is not to 'make life worth living' - this would require some programme of action - but to 'make life seem worth living'. He longs to escape loneliness, the difficulties of personal relationships and dread of death. This longing seems to be a significant element in utopianism, and this is a theme to which I shall return later in this thesis.

Island is a utopia dedicated to the pursuit of man's Final End. It is a utopia built as a remedy against human isolation and loneliness. There is a bizarre and improbable correspondence between Huxley's Island and Kurt Vonnegut's Slapstick. The ironic utopia which crystallizes at the end of Vonnegut's bleak and nihilistic
comedy is founded upon the slogan, 'Lonesome No More'. As in Island, in Slapstick drugs are used to ease man's sense of isolation and reconcile him to his neighbours. As in Island, personal attachments are dissolved in generalised goodwill and charity, and lastly, the Mutual Adoption Clubs of Huxley's Island find their distorted reflection in Vonnegut's artificially extended families in Slapstick. Such congruity is surprising: in style and content, Slapstick and Island have nothing in common. Yet each is essentially a response to a Romantic sense of isolation in a secular age.

What is remarkable in Huxley's later work is the importance he attaches to Eastern mysticism. In 1926, in Jesting Pilate, he had cast scorn upon the 'pure-souled Oriental mystics who, we are told, are to leaven the materialism of our Western civilisation'. At this stage, Huxley considered that transcendentalism had been cynically introduced by the rulers of India to keep the poverty-stricken masses in a compliant state. In 1928, in Do What You Will, Huxley rejected transcendentalism and mysticism as being merely an attempt to escape from reality. He considered that all efforts to devise a unified and consistent world view were meaningless; absolute oneness was no more than absolute nothingness. However, in 1937, in Ends and Means, he had revised this view so far as to write that 'the mystical experience testifies to the existence of spiritual unity underlying the diversity of separate existence'. As Philip Thody points out, the difference between the views expressed in Ends and Means and Do What You Will could hardly be greater.
Huxley's acceptance of mysticism in later life does not seem to have reconciled him to the human condition. In Island, his pessimism is as profound as ever. Although Pala is depicted as being a place where men may live together in happiness and affection, one of the inhabitants remarks that 'every good Buddhist knows that begetting is merely postponed assassination'. One must do one's best to 'get off the Wheel of Birth and Death' and avoid, by the use of contraceptive techniques, 'putting superfluous victims on to the Wheel'.

Death is still the Eternal Horror for Huxley that it always was. But in Island Huxley allows himself the comfort, which earlier he had eschewed, of believing that mysticism and Moksha-medicine may provide some escape from the pain of experience.

The dogma of Pala denies the existence of the individual as a unique and permanently separate being, and thus denies the validity of individual perception. Truth exists not in the physical world, but in the mystical world beyond appearance and beyond language.

In Pala, life is seen as being merely a preparation for death, and thus for reunion with the One. The individual perceives reality only through the 'temporary death of the ego' in mystical experience, which may be induced either through contemplation or through the use of drugs. The philosophy of the islanders is set out in a book, written by the founder of the community, Dr. McPhail. 'Dualism ... Without it there can hardly be good literature. With it, there most certainly can be no good life. "I" affirms a separate and abiding me-substance, "am" denies the fact that all existence is relationship and change. "I am". Two tiny words; but what an enormity of
untruth".66 Consciousness of self, in Huxley's utopia, as in Zamyatin's anti-utopia, is outlawed in the name of a higher unity. In Huxley's two imaginary worlds, the World State and Pala, the range of techniques used to achieve social stability is remarkably similar. In both states, economic hardship has been extirpated, in both, sexuality is stimulated, in both society is eugenically controlled, the use of drugs is encouraged, and children are subjected to social conditioning. The techniques are applied in very different ways, to achieve different ends, and the societies which they support have little in common, but in each case the citizen's ability to order his life according to his own vision of reality is impaired. The founders of both societies operate from the premise that man must be provided with some means whereby he can 'take a holiday' from the reality of the physical world.
References

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16. Ibid., Vol. 4, p.421.
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24. Ibid., p.129.
25. Ibid., p.141.
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36. Ibid., p.42.
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56. Ibid., p.169.

57. Ibid., p.155.


64. Aldous Huxley, A biographical introduction, op.cit., p.80.

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66. Ibid., p.181.
Part II (ii)  Utopia and the subjugation of time

As has been argued in the previous section, for the anti-utopians, truth is not a finite commodity, to be seized and preserved inviolate from one generation to the next. Truth is an object of ever-lasting quest, and man reveals his humanity in his ceaseless struggle to disclose new aspects of reality.

In the Areopagitica, Milton wrote, 'Well knows he who uses to consider that our faith and knowledge thrives by exercise, as well as our limbs and complexion. Truth is compared in Scripture to a streaming fountain; if her waters flow not in a perpetual progression, they sicken into a muddy pool of conformity and tradition'. A man who possesses the truth passively, without thought or deliberation, simply because he has received it at the hands of his rulers, may not claim to be a man of truth, Milton contends. 'A man may be a heretic in the truth; and if he believe things only because his Pastor says so, or the Assembly so determines, without knowing other reason, though his belief be true, yet the very truth he holds, becomes his heresy'. But in the frozen landscape of utopia, Milton's 'streaming fountain' is stilled. Truth is immutable and static, to be accepted without struggle and without contention. There can be no 'perpetual progression' of ideas.

The citizen of utopia must be compelled to accept only the current dogma. He must ignore the lessons of the past, and he must refrain from imagining a possible future, founded on principles different from those of his own time. In the world of classical mythology, the two sons of the Titan, Iapetus, Epimetheus (he who reflects upon
past events) and Prometheus (he who foresees future events) are both cruelly punished for their audacity. The power of criticism, and therefore, conceivably, of rebellion, which is bestowed by the possession of hindsight or foresight, is recognized as posing a threat to the established order. In the same way, the rulers of the utopian state perceive a need to suppress all knowledge of the past, or speculation about the future. Time is the enemy of utopia, since utopia is a land of unchanging vistas, of unaltering ritual, regulated only by the cyclical time of night and day. Cognizance of the linear time of history would belie the supposed perfection of utopia, disclosing pre-utopian modes of existence, betraying the utopia's past weaknesses and failings, and offering the prospect of new and undiscovered fields of experience in the future. The utopian must seek to suppress the flow of history, since the only true utopian time is 'now'.

At the simplest level, a conflict exists, for the utopian ruler, between the past and the present, between the vanquished values of former times, and the new syntagma of utopia, for although, in space, there may exist no alternative social, political and ethical systems to rival those of utopia, yet such alternative systems certainly exist in time. The rulers of utopia, therefore, seek to effect a total severance between past and present.

In Aldous Huxley's World State, the rulers have 'mounted a campaign against the past' by suppressing all the art, literature, and scientific, religious and philosophical writings of former times, and by destroying all historical monuments and museums. The citizens are
taught to regard the intellectual conceptions and the cultural practices and customs of earlier civilizations with fear, amazement and disgust. The pre-utopian past is seen as being merely an unpleasant aberration. The citizens of the World State have also to learn to reject the material products of the past, since the health of the state's economy depends upon their providing a ready market for a constant stream of new, disposable goods. Thus in Huxley's imaginary state, rejection of the past is based upon material as well as ideological grounds. In this, the World State differs from the One State of Zamyatin, and from the anti-utopian state of Orwell, Oceania.

While in Huxley's World State the past has been systematically obliterated, in Zamyatin's One State, the past is regarded with amused tolerance, tinged with incredulity. The inhabitant of the One State is taught to regard himself as a new being, unrelated to his forbears. Thus the products of the past, which are preserved in the House of Antiquity, are regarded as mere objects of curiosity, the detritus of some remote and alien species. Similarly, the ideas, emotions, achievements and creations of the pre-utopian age inspire merely ridicule and disdain.

A symbolic confrontation between past and present is a recurrent theme in anti-utopian writing. A living remnant of pre-utopian times intrudes into the complacent monotony of utopian life, disturbing its smooth conformity. In Wells's early anti-utopia, The Sleeper Awakes, the past is embodied in the person of Graham, the Sleeper, who emerges from a two-hundred-years' sleep to confront Ostrog, the personification of the new utopian era. Graham is a living reminder of past hopes,
values and aspirations. He is the reliquary of half-remembered dreams. As such, he becomes the focal point for rebellion against the new order. Similarly, in Brave New World, the past becomes incarnate in the figure of the Savage, who comes to utopia from a small Indian encampment, which lies remote from the state, its boundaries sealed by an electric fence. The Savage disturbs the peace of the World State by expounding fragments of the doctrines and values of a buried age, which he himself only imperfectly comprehends. His presence in utopia, and his evident contempt for the beliefs and practices of the World State, serve to provoke a ripple of rebellion. Through him, the rebel Helmholtz Watson is enabled to recognize and accept the nature and extent of his own unvoiced dissatisfaction. Finally, in We, the past is perpetuated in the persons of the race of wild, pagan people, overgrown with hair, who live in the woods beyond the glass wall which surrounds the city. These strange descendants of a pre-utopian race serve to remind the rebels of the passions which men have forfeited in the new, perfectly rational utopia.

In Orwell's Nineteen Eighty-Four, there are no such survivors from a pre-utopian age, although the Proles have been less changed by events than has the rest of society. The one remaining symbol of the past is the small, glass paperweight, enclosing a pink curl of coral, which Winston and Julia keep in their secret room. Winston says of the paperweight, 'I don't think it was ever put to any use. That's what I like about it. It's a little chunk of history that they've forgotten to alter. It's a message from a hundred years ago, if one knew how to read it'. This 'chunk of history' is crushed beneath the boots of
the secret police, when Winston and Julia are finally arrested in their hideout,

Oceania, unlike the total states of Huxley and Zamyatin, is not a static, perfect state. It is a repressive, totalitarian state, founded upon terror, and ruled by power politics. Zamyatin's One State and Huxley's World State are not political states; they are societies, shaped and controlled according to a fixed dogma, where history fails to happen. But in Oceania, the flow of events continues. Decisions are made, battles are fought, and party leaders rise and fall. Consequently, history poses problems for the rulers of Oceania, which are not encountered by the rulers of the One State or the World State.

The rulers of Oceania recognise that it is necessary for them to suppress or distort historical fact in order to perpetuate their own power. They have not simply to bury the past, as in Huxley's World State. They have also to recreate history from day to day. Thus, past events are held to have no objective existence. O'Brien reminds Winston Smith of a Party slogan: 'Who controls the past controls the future: who controls the present controls the past'. The Party controls the past by altering historical records according to present requirements, and also by training its members to forget that any such alterations have been made. It is the duty of each Party member to adjust his memory to accept the current account of a series of historical events as permanent truth, no matter how often it may have been rewritten. Winston reads, in the proscribed book, purportedly by Goldstein, which O'Brien lends him, that the Party has a need to suppress historical knowledge, partly because history
provides standards of comparison, but also because a factual account of historical events catalogues the failures of political leaders as indifferently as it recounts their triumphs; it exposes their shifts in policy, their errors in judgment, and their betrayal of professed Party ideals. History, in Oceania, is therefore rendered mutable. 'And since the Party is in full control of all records and in equally full control of the minds of its members, it follows that though the past is alterable, it never has been altered in any specific instance. For when it has been recreated in whatever shape is needed at the moment, then this new version is the past, and no different past can ever have existed.'

It is not only in Nineteen Eighty-Four that Orwell expresses his concern for the integrity of historical fact. He believed that truth was invariably an early casualty in power politics. Writing in 1943, Orwell declared that there was already a 'world movement' in the direction of the total state. 'Already history has in a sense ceased to exist, i.e. there is no such thing as a history of our own times which could be universally accepted', he wrote. Even in Britain, Orwell was disturbed to find a tendency to distort historical fact for the sake of political expediency. Writing in Tribune in 1944, he noted that history was frequently falsified by the simple procedure of changing the order of occurrence of a sequence of events. In this way, a wholly new impression could be given, favourable to whichever cause one chose. 'It doesn't matter so long as we keep our eyes open and see to it that the lies do not creep out of the newspapers and into the history books', he wrote.
The destruction of history for political ends is a prominent theme in *Nineteen Eighty-Four*. Winston Smith works in the Ministry of Truth, and is himself charged with the duty of falsifying historical records so that they accord with the current Party truth. Winston despises all the material with which he works. The old versions of history seem to him as unsatisfactory and as far removed from truth as the new ones. Thus he approaches his work with the dispassionate intellectual pleasure of the problem-solver. Inconvenient historical records are discarded in the 'memory hole' beside his desk, and for the most part Winston gives them no further thought. Laboriously, he invents new fictions, which will, for a time, replace the old ones. But although Winston performs his work efficiently, he is a natural heretic. Within his mind, there is no psychic equivalent of the 'memory hole'. He is unable to believe the lies which he creates. He is incapable of doublethink. The disposal of old records, and the invention of new ones, is, for him, a mere mechanical act, which has no bearing on the reality of a past sequence of external events.

It is the Party's claim to be able to obliterate the past which most frightens Winston. He realizes that his sanity depends upon his being able to resist the idea that the past is mutable. 'If the Party could thrust its hand into the past and say of this or that event, it never happened', Winston reflects, then that would be 'more terrifying than mere torture and death'.

Winston is determined to cling on to sanity, and to the idea of objective reality, in order to be able to guard the human heritage for
the sake of coming generations. But in Oceania, the transmission of ideas and knowledge between generations is no longer feasible, for two quite distinct reasons. Firstly, the state has arrogated to itself alone the right to instruct the young, and secondly, there no longer exists any generally accepted body of knowledge which may be expected to remain constant. Time has been splintered into dissociated fragments, and only the moment exists. Men and events flicker in and out of existence, and only the Party endures. The individual entity may leave no mark upon his society. The citizen alone is without substance. He may hope to attain salvation only if he can annihilate his personal identity, and so fuse himself with the body of the state that he no longer has any separate existence. In this way, he may partake of the collective immortality of the Party. The individual, O'Brien tells Winston, is no more than a cell in an everlasting body, the body of the Party. O'Brien admits that he himself is growing weaker, but adds that this is without significance, since 'the weariness of the cell is the vigour of the organism'.

Strangely, O'Brien's conception of corporate immortality has similarities with Orwell's own. Orwell held that morality in the West was based upon the Christian belief in personal survival after death, and that as this belief was eroded, so morality was eroded with it. He then postulated the idea that it might be possible for a new, non-religious belief in the collective immortality of humanity to fulfil the same function. 'Man is not an individual', Orwell wrote. 'He is only a cell in an everlasting body, and he is dimly aware of it. There is no other way of explaining why it is that men die in battle ....
they are aware of some organism greater than themselves, stretching into the future and the past, within which they feel themselves to be immortal. People sacrifice themselves for the sake of fragmentary communities - nation, race, creed, class - and only become aware that they are not individuals in the very moment when they are facing bullets. A very slight increase in consciousness, and their sense of loyalty could be transferred to humanity itself, which is not an abstraction.\(^9\)

Orwell's argument is unsatisfactory on several counts: firstly, 'humanity' is indeed an abstraction, if it is to be taken to mean anything other than a heterogeneous collection of separate entities. Secondly, there are many explanations which might be given as to why it is that men die in battle, and none is susceptible to proof. It is strange that Orwell should assume that volition is necessarily involved. Thirdly, there is no reason to suppose that the human species will prove any more durable than any other species, past or present. Orwell rejects the Christian belief in personal immortality as illogical, yet belief in the collective immortality of humanity is similarly rooted in faith, rather than in logic. Moreover, if Orwell is correct in his assumption that it is belief in immortality which has underpinned morality in the Western world, then it is precisely belief in individual immortality which has done so. The price of individual salvation is individual moral responsibility. The Christian ethical system is founded upon recognition of the individual as the ultimate unit, to be saved or damned according to personal conduct. A belief in collective immortality would more readily support a belief in collective moral responsibility. Such a belief would not be acceptable to
Orwell. Moreover, where man is held to be 'only a cell in an everlasting body', it is an easy matter for the state to contend that a cell should be sacrificed for the health of the organism. Such is the morality of Orwell's Oceania.

It may be that the conception of immortality which Orwell wishes to promote lies less in the sentiment that individual men are merely expendable fragments of immortal humanity, than in the belief that there is value in the continuous accretion of human knowledge and experience over time, and value too in the contract of obligation which binds one generation to the next. But perhaps this is to cast Orwell's thought in too Burkean a mould. There is no indication to suggest that Orwell was directly influenced by Burke. Perhaps the case is rather that Orwell had a presentiment that consciousness of self, and a sense of the reality of personal existence, is reliant upon the continuity of a stream of recollection, and that thus, by extension, the reality of the existence of humanity as a whole can only be demonstrated through the faithful recording of the course of historical events. The individual self, and individual memories may die, but for as long as humanity remembers, it lives. In Orwell's *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, he depicts a world where such continuity is no longer possible. The coherent links between past, present and future have been ruptured, and with them has gone the atheist's vision of immortality.

Winston Smith is told that on his death, he will be expunged from memory. 'You must stop imagining that posterity will vindicate you, Winston', O'Brien tells him. 'Posterity will never hear of you.
You will be lifted clean out from the stream of history, ..., Nothing will remain of you; not a name in a register, not a memory in a living brain. You will be annihilated in the past as well as in the future. You will never have existed. In Oceania, whoever resists the Party becomes an 'unperson'. On his death, every trace of his existence is erased. It is not simply that he is forgotten; reality is so rearranged that the fact of his physical existence at any point in space and time is obliterated. With increasing anguish, Winston seeks to reassure himself that he does exist, and that the fact of his existence cannot be subject to alteration at a later date. But he is told by O'Brien that he is already non-existent, that he is 'outside history'.

The abolition of history in Oceania has the effect of destroying the possibility of rational thought. The individual's apprehension of past, present and future, his conception of causality, and his ability, therefore, to make rational judgments, have been destroyed. The citizen must learn to suppress memory, and even to recall that which has never happened, should the state require him to do so. Time no longer orders past, present and future. The denial of the objective reality of historical fact, and the deliberate falsification of the chronological relations between events, has mutilated the human capacity for reason. For Orwell, totalitarian thinking is closely linked with a rejection of the reality of the past, and it is clear from his general writings, how much he despised those who live 'in a continuous present, a minute-to-minute cancellation of memory'.

Whereas in Oceania the rulers perceive a need to control the past in order to perpetuate the rule of the Party, in the anti-utopias
of Huxley and Zamyatin, the situation is more complex. Here the rulers aspire to control not merely history, but time itself. This difference arises because the One State and the World State are designed as perfect states, and perfection must always be at the mercy of time. Oceania is founded upon no blueprint for perfection. It is governed from day to day, according to the shifting dictates of an impoverished Realpolitik. Historical events continue to occur. All that is required for the preservation of state power, is that the citizens should be prevented from perceiving and recording them correctly. Oceania, as an imperfect state, still exists within the flux of time, and history persists, under a patina of lies. But in the perfect states of Zamyatin and Huxley, it is the category of time itself which is problematical. Here the rulers perceive a need to transcend the temporal altogether, and stem the flow of history.

History records a progression of events in time, but in the perfect state there are no events. The perfect state is static, whereas history is necessarily dynamic. In Zamyatin's We, D-503 declares that 'the ideal exists where nothing any longer happens'. History ceases at the inception of the perfect state, since history is an account of change, and where perfection is held to exist, all change is synonymous with decay and degeneration. 'Every change is a menace to stability', as Mustapha Mond, the Controller of Huxley's World State, remarks.

In the World State, 'characteristics remain constant throughout a lifetime'. Just as there can be no change or evolution for society, so there can be no development for the individual citizen. Old age has been conquered through the application of hormone treatment, and scientists are seeking to secure means for hastening the
onset of puberty for the lower castes of society, so that they may assume their state-appointed duties at the earliest possible age. Citizens are required to retain an infantile mentality throughout life, since it is recognized that any citizen who developed mature critical faculties and aspirations could constitute a threat to social stability. Similarly, in Zamyatin's One State, the citizen does not develop or mature once he ceases to be a child. He merely becomes his allotted rôle in society. He is unaffected by the passage of time, since there are no events in his life, no experiences to be undergone, and no alterations in his environment which might arouse him from his inertia. For the orthodox citizen, each day is as featureless as that which has preceded it, and that which will come after it. D-503, looking forward to his routine appointment with his state-approved sexual partner, O-90, is placidly confident that the meeting will produce no surprises for him: 'Everything will be simple, regular and limited - like a circle'.

The rulers of the World State and of the One State have modified the nature not merely of history, but of time. Whereas ordinarily time spans the development, evolution and decay of men and institutions, in the perfect state there are no beginnings, no periods of maturation and change, and no endings. Men no longer register epochs, or plot the course of eras, since there are no longer any distinct eras and epochs to delineate. No point in time is endowed with any particular significance. Time has become circular.

In Zamyatin's imaginary state, time, the inexorable corrupter of perfection, has at last been denatured. The measurement of time
may serve quite different functions. It may be used for the chronological ordering of a sequence of unpredictable events, spanning eras, as in the world of history, or it may be used for the making of precise calculations of time intervals between carefully controlled events, as in the science laboratory. It is the scientist's conception of time which is promoted in the One State, since commitment to the ideal of perfection, and therefore of immutability, precludes the apprehension of time as the medium in which historical events succeed one another in an unregulated sequence. D-503 speaks of each citizen as having 'an inner metronome' which keeps him aware of the time, and orders the rhythm of his daily life. But this metronome can do nothing to inform him of the broader category of time, which spans history. Time in the One State is subject to precise computation. It has been so exactly regulated that each hour of the day, with the exception of the Personal Hour, enfolds and circumscribes its own state-prescribed activity. The rulers of the One State have drawn up a Table of Hourly Commandments, under which every movement of the members of the state is regulated and synchronized. Life has become a protracted time-and-motion study exercise. D-503 writes, 'I cannot conceive of a city that is not girt about by a Green Wall, I cannot conceive of a life that is not enrobed in the figured chasubles of the Tables of Hourly Commandments'. The citizens of the One State are prisoners in time and space, immured within the rigid framework of the Timetables as surely as they are within the Green Wall which surrounds the city.

The substitution of scientific time for historical time in the
One State has the effect of severely restricting the vision of the citizens. But in Orwell's Oceania, neither scientific nor historical time has any place. Oceania is a land of chronological chaos, in which the minds of the citizens are reduced to corporate insanity.

The significance of the category of time, in any speculation about the nature of the world, has been recognised by philosophers, scientists and theologians alike. As Russell writes, in the present century, since the publication of Einstein's theories, scientists have come to revise their view of time, and also of matter and existence. The modern physicist has come to apprehend the reality of events over time as surpassing the reality of matter itself. Russell concludes, 'Events, not particles, must be the "stuff" of physics. What has been thought of as a particle will have to be thought of as a series of events. The series of events which replaces a particle has certain important physical properties, and therefore demands our attention; but it has no more substantiality than any other series of events that we might arbitrarily single out. Thus "matter" is not part of the ultimate material of the world, but merely a convenient way of collecting events into bundles'.

Under this view, existence is events in time.

Conceptions of the nature of time are always intimately related to conceptions of the nature of existence. Man's apprehension of time is as old as his apprehension of death. In time is movement and change, and therefore birth, growth, degeneration and death. But opposed to conceptions of time are conceptions of eternity. Time, in the general sense, is man's conscious experience of duration, his subjective
impression of pastness, presentness and futurity. The mind is aware of a present sense experience, together with the remembrance of earlier sense experience, and the anticipation of sense experience yet to come. Thus the experience of time is related to the experience of events. No significance can be attached to the notion of wholly 'empty' times, nor is it possible to imagine different points in time for which there is no correlate in the world of events, nor of points in time which have no sequential relationship. Total emptiness belongs not in time, but in eternity.

The concept of eternity frees the human mind from the world of ceaseless flux, and allows it to dwell upon the fixed and motionless, the incorruptible, where there is neither life nor death. It is in the world of motionless Eternal Being that the One State aspires to reside.

Plato, in the Timaeus, contrasts the Eternal, which is accessible to pure knowledge, with the Temporal, which is accessible to the senses and to reason. He describes how the Demiurge created the world, establishing it in time, which he also created, and which is circular. Before the creation of the world, Plato writes, there were no days, nights, months or years. There was simply immobile perfection, the static world of Being. In the world of Being there is no past, present or future, for such concepts describe 'the process of change in time'. Our corporeal world of Becoming is only an imperfect copy of eternal, perfect reality, and the time in which it exists is also an image, which 'in its measurable cycles imitates eternity'.19
Russell explains the Greek idea that time is connected with illusion, while eternity is related to immutable truth, in the following way: 'Mathematics is ..., the chief source of the belief in eternal and exact truth, as well as in a super-sensible world. Geometry deals with exact circles, but no sensible object is exactly circular; however carefully we may use our compasses, there will be some imperfections and irregularities. This suggests the view that all exact reasoning applies to ideal as opposed to sensible objects; it is natural to go further and to argue that thought is nobler than sense, and the objects of thought are more real than those of sense perception. Mystical doctrines as to the relation of time to eternity are also reinforced by pure mathematics, for mathematical objects, such as numbers, if real at all, are eternal and not in time. Such eternal objects can be conceived as God's thoughts. Hence Plato's doctrine that God is a geometer .... Rationalistic religion as opposed to apocalyptic religion has been, ever since Plato, very completely dominated by mathematics and mathematical method'.

Such 'rationalistic religion' is the dogma of Zamyatin's One State. In Zamyatin's anti-utopia, the abstract world of mathematical calculation obscures the spatio-temporal world of men. Humanity has been lifted out of the dimension of time into eternity, and now sits 'side by side at the same table' with God. Mortal, material, individualized men, inevitably imperfect and changeable, have faded from sight. Man the abstraction, divine and perfect, survives forever, transfixed outside the span of time.
D-503 looks forward to the day when 'the crystallization of life' will be complete, to the day when fluid time will have been wholly transmuted into frozen eternity. The metaphor of crystallization and dissolution recurs frequently in We. D-503 compares himself to a crystal (see Part II(i) note 47) and in his sudden unwelcome passion for E-330, he seems to feel himself dissolving in her, losing his still, immutable perfection. Elsewhere in his diary, D-503 writes of the 'blue blocks of frozen air' which are being loaded on to the Integral, the rocket in which the members of the One State are to set forth to colonize the universe. Again, the crystalline blocks of which the entire city is constructed appear to D-503 to be like 'blocks of blue ice'. He experiences a sudden stab of panic, when a momentary trick of the light lends to the hard, immobile glass the appearance of a swollen river, which is about to burst through its winter layer of ice. 'That's the way it happens in spring', he writes, 'when you are standing on the river bank, expecting everything to start cracking, surging, swirling, rushing at any moment; minute after minutes passes, however, yet the ice remains stationary, and you yourself feel that you are swelling....'. A moment later, he is ashamed at this sudden access of fear. There is, after all, he comments, 'no icebreaker that could possibly break the most translucent, the most solid crystal of our life'.

The image of icy, immobile 'perfection' also occurs in the Areopagitica. Reflecting upon the plight of a society where every aspect of human conduct was closely regulated, and where individual choice and conscience would have no part to play, Milton writes, in
bitter irony, 'How goodly, and how to be wished were such an obedient unanimity as this, what a fine conformity would it starch us all into! Doubtless as staunch and solid a piece of framework, as any January could freeze together'.

While the ubiquitous glass of the One State symbolises the insubstantiality of the perfect world, it also represents the ice of perfect psychological entropy. The One State is destined by its rulers to become frozen in lifeless perfection, beyond time, eternally changeless, its citizens locked in an everlasting present.

Zamyatin's fear of entropy of the mind is matched by a fear of entropy in the physical world on the part of H.G. Wells and Aldous Huxley, both of whom were influenced by T.H. Huxley. The spectre of the Second Law of Dynamics stalks through the writing of Aldous Huxley, and is perhaps at the heart of his utopia, Island. In a letter which Aldous Huxley wrote to Gervas Huxley in 1963, he comments, 'Growing old gracefully - it isn't easy when the physiological machine starts to break down .... One learns the Second Law of Thermodynamics by direct experience'. Similarly, in Island, the central character, Will Farnaby remarks, 'One thinks one's something unique and wonderful at the centre of the universe. But in fact one's merely a slight delay in the ongoing march of entropy'. Farnaby, describing the death of a favourite aunt, says, 'Instead of flouting it, a little piece of her body started to obey the Second Law of Thermodynamics. And as her body broke down, the soul began to lose its virtue, its very identity'.

H.G. Wells's dread of entropy is less personal than that of Aldous Huxley. From T. H. Huxley, who taught him at the Normal School,
in South Kensington, Wells inherited a belief in the inevitability of cosmic catastrophe. The earth, he knew, was steadily cooling, and the time must come when entropy would reign, and when life on earth would be extinguished forever. But Wells could not accept that humanity's unenviable plight was without remedy. Like T. H. Huxley, he believed that man should fight nature, and force it to work for his benefit. He nursed a desperate belief that it could be possible for science to provide solutions for man's problems. He was not convinced that this would happen, but he was convinced that man had a duty to try to make it happen. Cosmic destruction, he suggested, could be avoided if men used science to enable them to escape to other planets, or to pass beyond the space/time confines. One of the inhabitants of Wells's A Modern Utopia confides in a visitor to the state, 'I think very much of the "Night of this World", the time when our sun will be red and dull, and air and water will lie frozen together in a common snowfield where now the forests of the tropics are steaming'. He goes on to speculate 'whether it is God's purpose that our kind should end, and the cities we have built, the books we have written, all that we have given substance and a form, should lie dead beneath the snows'. 'One night', he adds, 'I sat up and told the rascal stars very earnestly how they should not escape us in the end'. By the time Wells wrote Men Like Gods, his confidence appears to have become stronger. In this book, Mr. Barnstaple, the visitor from Earth, remarks, 'It has been a belief in our world that at last there must be an end to life because our sun and planets are cooling and there seems no hope of escape from
the little world upon which we have arisen. We are born with it and we must die with it. That robbed many of us of hope and energy: for why should we work for progress in a world that must freeze and die?'

But the response of the utopian citizen to whom he addresses this question is reassuring. There is no need for either the human race or the utopian race to perish, he asserts, for both 'have hardly begun!' Mr. Barnstaple is told that for centuries, Utopian philosophers and scientists have been 'criticising, revising and reconstructing their former instinctive and traditional ideas of space and time, of form and substance', and in consequence, 'the limitations of space which had seemed forever insurmountable' are breaking down.

Wells's fear of entropy also finds expression in The War of the Worlds, where Martians are driven from their planet, as Wells believed we should ultimately be driven from ours, by the inexorable power of the Second Law of Thermodynamics. Similarly, fear of cosmic disaster also colours Wells's The Time Machine. In this book, the Time Traveller finally reaches a point on his chronological journey where life has almost entirely ceased to exist. Fearfully he turns for home. The last living thing he sees is a bloated, tentacled creature, adrift in a blood-red sea. Here is the image evoked by T. H. Huxley in his Evolution and Ethics, of the 'Protococcus of red snow'.

But while Wells feared the principle of maximum entropy in the physical world, Zamyatin feared 'psychological entropy', the death of
the mind. Zamyatin's analogy is powerful: entropy operates in closed, stable systems. As time passes, the amount of free energy available for activity in such a system is gradually dissipated. For energy to be made available, there must be certain physical differences, differences in temperature or density, for instance. As entropy increases, all these differences are smoothed away, until ultimately the system reaches a state of unrelieved homogeneity, at a temperature barely above absolute zero. In Zamyatin's One State, absolute happiness, the goal of the state, is equated with absolute entropy. Its temperature, D-503 remarks, is -273 degrees. 'Isn't it clear to you', E-330 remonstrates, 'that it is only in differences - differences! - in temperature, only in thermal contrasts, that life lies? But if everywhere, throughout the universe, there are only equally warm - or equally cool - bodies, they must be thrust out of the way - so that there may be fire, an explosion, Gehenna'.

Zamyatin held that just as the whole of life in the physical world depends upon thermodynamic instability, so does the life of the mind depend upon political and social flux. He also believed that human progress follows a dialectical path, and that there can be no final revolution to end all revolutions, since revolution is the means by which the world receives the new sources of energy needed to dispel mental entropy. 'The law of revolution is red, fiery, deadly, but this death means the birth of new life, a new star', he wrote. 'And the law of entropy is cold, ice blue, like the icy interplanetary infinities ..., The sun ages into a planet .... And if the planet is to
be rekindled into youth again it must be set on fire .... When the flamm­ing, seething sphere .... cools, the fiery magma becomes coated with dogma — a rigid, ossified, motionless crust'.

In Zamyatin's One State, even the sun itself is imprisoned; its light gleams palely through the cold glass bricks of the buildings, 'bluishly crystalline and equable'.

E-330 tells D-503, 'There are two forces in this world - entropy and energy. The first leads to beatific quietism, to a happy equili­brium, the other, to the destruction of equilibrium, to excruciating perpetual motion. It was entropy which our .... ancestors, the Christians, worshipped as a god'.

In the eternal conflict between God and the forces of order, unity and perfectionon the one side, and the Devil, with the forces of freedom, individuality and unpredictability on the other, Zamyatin is unhesitatingly on the side of the Devil. (See Part I(i) note 17) The revolutionaries in the One State call themselves the 'Mephis'; they join with the primitive people beyond the Glass Wall in pagan rituals, and their symbol is fire, the fire of Mephistopheles and Prometheus conjoined. This fire represents the energy which alone can drive out entropy. E-330 herself is depicted as a demonic figure. Her eyebrows flick upwards at the outer corners, in the semblance of minute horns, and the symbolic fire of the Mephis blazes always within her eyes. (see Part II (i) note 36)

In Zamyatin's imagery, perfection and God are equated with inac­tivity and timelessness, while the Devil represents energy, activity,
life and change. Similar imagery is employed by Dostoievsky, in The Brothers Karamazov, where the Devil appears to Ivan in a nightmare, and claims that through his existence, as a contrary force, he is responsible for the existence of life. The Devil has been told that he must continue to exist, since without him 'there would be no events, and it is imperative that there should be events', The Devil is also equated with activity in Wells's The Undying Fire. Here Wells recounts a dialogue between God and Satan, in which Satan claims to be the bringer of history and adventure, 'the spirit of life'. 'Without me, time and space would freeze into crystalline perfection', Satan argues. This passage from The Undying Fire was read and admired by Zamyatin, who quotes it in his essay, Paradise, published in 1922. But Zamyatin's conception of the human need for contrasts in life, for energy and movement, was expressed very much earlier, by William Blake, in The Marriage of Heaven and Hell. Here Blake writes, 'Without contraries is no progression. Attraction and Repulsion, Reason and Energy, Love and Hate, are necessary to human existence. From these contraries spring what the religious call Good and Evil. Good is the passive that obeys Reason, Evil is the active springing from Energy. Good is Heaven. Evil is Hell ..... Energy is only life, and is from the body, and Reason is the bound and outward circumference of energy. Energy is eternal delight! For all these four writers, the Devil is seen as the intruder who first dares to shatter the perfect harmony of paradise, disrupting eternity, and introducing life and time. In Zamyatin's We, E-330 is the diabolic force of free energy which invades the closed, entropic perfection of D-503's world, transforming, for a
brief period, the useless stable system of the One State into a useful, unstable one. In disturbing the glacial purity of eternal paradise, E-330 reinstates history, a progression of events.

A sense of the tension between the temporal and the eternal suffuses the thought of Aldous Huxley, particularly in his later writings. Huxley's growing acceptance of mysticism led him to conclude that enlightenment lies in the apprehension of the reality of Eternal Being, as opposed to the illusion of the spatio-temporal world. In both his utopia and his anti-utopia, the inhabitants of the imaginary state are offered, through the use of drugs, the means to escape the confines of time and sample a small experience of eternity. In Brave New World, a doctor explains to John Savage the benefits to be received from taking soma: 'Soma may make you lose a few years in time .... but think of the enormous, immeasurable durations it can give you out of time.. Every soma-holiday is a bit of what our ancestors used to call eternity'. At the time of writing Brave New World, Huxley was critical of those who elect to go 'popping off into eternity', as is clear from the Savage's condemnation of the practice. Yet in the paradise of Island, the hallucinogenic drug, Moksha-medicine, too, bestows its own gift of release from time and the physical world. Will Farnaby, when he takes Moksha, experiences a sense of being diffused into light, a light that is 'infinitely here and timelessly now'. He loses all sensation of corporeal existence, and knows only a 'luminous bliss, only a knowledgeless understanding, only union with unity in a limitless, undifferentiated awareness'. This, he concludes, is 'the mind's natural state'. The inhabitants of Pala also find
release from the temporal world in mystical contemplation. Gazing at the image of Shiva-Nataraja, the Lord of the Dance, they sense that he is 'dancing through time and out of time, dancing everlastingly and in the eternal now. Dancing and dancing in all the worlds at once'.

As he embraced mysticism, Huxley became convinced that man's highest desire should be to remove himself from 'the Wheel of Birth and Death' (see Part II(i) note 66) and escape into eternity. This is explicit in Island. But the same conviction colours a much earlier work, Time Must Have a Stop, written in 1945. Here a generous, self-indulgent character, Eustace Barnack, dies, and is offered the choice of merging himself into the timeless Void of perfect enlightenment, or returning to the world of life and death and physical sensation. He chooses to accept reincarnation, even though he foreknows that his life on earth will include much that is horrific. Huxley implies that through weakness, hedonism and carnality, Eustace Barnack has chosen to condemn himself on his own Judgment Day. He has deliberately renounced the impersonal bliss of eternity for the miseries of the temporal world of the senses.

In Island, Huxley offers two utopias, one terrestrial, one ethereal, the first of which has instrumental value only. Huxley's ideal of ultimate perfection is not embodied in the physical, temporal world of Pala, with its carefully devised social arrangements, its genetic management and its training programmes: Pala is no more than a base, from which the inhabitants can launch themselves into the true utopia of the luminous, undifferentiated Void which lies beyond time.
References
1. Areopagitica, op.cit., p.81.
4. Ibid., p.199.
5. Ibid., p.170.
8. Ibid., p.204.
11. Ibid., p.217.
13. We, op.cit., p.39.
15. Ibid., p.54.
16. We, op.cit., p.95.
17. Ibid., p.28.
21. We, p.72.
22. Ibid., p.39.
23. Ibid., p.150.
24. Ibid., p.121.
25. Ibid., pp.121/122.
29. Ibid., p.243.
31. Ibid., p.213.
33. Ibid., pp.272/3.
35. We, op.cit., p.170.
37. We, op.cit., p.34.
38. Ibid., p.161.
42. Brave New World, op.cit., p.125.
44. Ibid., p.173.
Part II (iii)  Utopia and the subjugation of Nature and the body

In *A Modern Utopia*, H.G. Wells wrote that a good society must be founded upon notions of justice, but 'there is no justice in Nature'. Wells, following T.H. Huxley, considered Nature to be amoral, and indifferent to man. T. H. Huxley argued that so far, the forces of evolution seemed to have been working in man's favour, and this had led some men to a belief in the inevitability of human progress. But ultimately, evolution would work against man, and at last come to discard him altogether. The world had evolved in a way which was haphazard, provisional and unstructured. Moreover, man's brain, instincts, thought processes and language were all of a similarly fortuitous nature. Therefore, there was no natural foundation for human morality. Man must establish ethical systems for the ordering of human life in defiance of Nature.

Sharing T.H. Huxley's vision of the nature of the world and of mankind, Wells came to believe that man's only hope of redemption lay in the possibility that science and technology might liberate man from the random disabilities and imperfections with which Nature had encumbered him. He held that while evolutionism had cheated man of his vision of a mechanically ordered, purposive world, it was at least possible that science might restore something of that vision. Men might attempt, with the tools of science, to impose rational order, precision and predictability upon a world which was by nature purposeless, subject to chance and change. Science might enable man to overcome the imperfections of his own nature, and of the world in which he found himself. It might also liberate man from want,
ignorance and folly, and from the need for ceaseless toil. It might defeat Nature, and allow the establishment of utopia. It is Wells's brand of scientific utopianism which is parodied in Aldous Huxley's *Brave New World* (see Part I (ii)), although it is apparent that Aldous Huxley, like H.G. Wells, was positively influenced by the ideas of T.H. Huxley.

In the imaginary states of Aldous Huxley, Wells and Zamyatin, man's physical environment, and the nature of man himself, have been tamed and perfected, stripped of inconvenience and unpredictability. It is the purpose of the rulers of utopia to mould humanity according to a single pre-determined model. But Nature cannot be expected to co-operate with this design. Rather, it must be prevented from undermining the achievements of organized human endeavour. The randomness of Nature must be replaced with the symmetry of human planning. Where facets of Nature are allowed to persist, their intrusion upon civic life must be subject to the closest regulation.

Only in Orwell's imaginary state, Oceania, is there no positive design to exclude Nature. Whereas in Huxley's World State and Zamyatin's One State, the rulers recognize a need to defend the perfection they have created from the assaults of Nature, in Oceania, there is no perfection to protect. Human personalities are, of course, warped and mutilated by terror, but the repression in Oceania is general, undifferentiated and devoid of ideological commitment. It's sole purpose is to sustain the rulers in power. The world of Nature, therefore, is never specifically considered as an area for particular attention.
In the perfect state of Zamyatin's We, however, Nature in all its manifestations is excluded. The rulers of the One State exercise total control over the physical environment, and also over human nature. Both are transformed, as nearly as possible, into mechanical systems. D-503 speaks of 'the great Machine of the State'. He also refers to his own brain as 'a chronologically tested, sparkling mechanism, without a single speck of dust'. The free energy of Nature must be prevented from invading the enclosed, perfect mechanical system which is the One State, and transforming its character, since such an invasion could only bring degeneration. Moreover, the perfect mathematical rationalism of the human mind must be protected against invasion by man's emotional and sensual nature.

The entropy of the One State is sustained by the devise of the Green Wall, which surrounds the glass city, isolating the perfect machine world from the 'irrational, hideous world of trees, birds and animals'. Zamyatin's wall stands between the natural and the artificial, between the world of senses and the world of reason, and between man-as-animal and man-as-angel.

The symbol of the Wall is also to be found in Dostoievsky's Notes From Underground. Here, the Wall represents the 'laws of nature', an obstruction, a limitation upon human freedom, which is to be resisted, however hopelessly. 'What have the laws of nature and arithmetic to do with me, when for some reason I don't like those laws of twice two?' demands the narrator of Dostoievsky's book. 'As if a stone wall really were a soothing influence and really did carry a message of peace, simply because it is twice two .... The point is to
understand everything, to realize everything, every impossibility, every stone wall; not to reconcile yourself to a single one of the impossibilities and stone walls if the thought of reconciliation sickens you'. Similarly, in We, the poet, R-13, tells D-503 that his knowledge is nothing but a form of cowardice. D-503 wishes to 'wall in the infinite'. He cowers behind a barricade of facts, afraid to look over and see what lies beyond.

The Wall is of great significance to D-503. 'Walls are the basis of everything human', he writes. 'Oh the great, divinely limiting wisdom of walls, of barriers! The wall is, probably, the greatest of all inventions. Man ceased to be a wild animal only when he had built his first wall. Man ceased to be a wild man only when he had built the Green Wall ...' The Wall preserves the perfect rationalism of the One State. Without it, D-503 remarks, man would be 'still in the savage state of freedom'.

But the free energy of Nature is not to be so easily excluded. Small, symbolic fragments of Nature continue to intrude. The fog comes down, blurring the sharp contours of the geometric buildings, dissolving the gleaming glass, and lending for a brief moment the sensation of forbidden privacy. From beyond the Green Wall, in Springtime, 'the honeyed yellow pollen of certain flowers' comes drifting into the sterile city, to settle on the lips of the citizens, sweetening them, and 'interfering with logical thought'. Again, in Autumn, insidious filaments of gossamer float invisibly across the Wall on the still air, to catch importunately against the skin, disturbing equanimity. Walking near the Green Wall one day, D-503 is troubled by the sight of
an animal, in the 'raging ocean of greenery' beyond the glass barrier. 'Turbidly, dully, the blunt muzzle of some beast showed through the glass', he recalls; "its yellow eyes persistently kept repeating the same unvarying thought which was incomprehensible to me. For a long while we looked into each other's eyes, those shafts from the superficial world into that other world under the surface. And a thought began stirring within me: 'But what if that yellow-eyed creature, living its uncalculated life among its ridiculous, dirty heaps of leaves, is happier than we are?'" On another occasion, D-503 is about to go to the Bureau of Guardians, to fulfil his obligations as a dutiful citizen, and report his illicit relationship with E-330. But on the way he is met by 0-90, who presents him with a sprig of lilies-of-the-valley, which she has collected from the Botanical Museum. The incongruity of the flowers irritates and disturbs him. He is readily dissuaded from going to the Bureau of Guardians, but when later the scent of the lilies-of-the-valley penetrates his senses, reminding him of his lapse from orthodoxy, he is filled with bewilderment and confusion. Such intimations of the world of Nature are extraneous to the perfect, mechanical system, just as for D-503, untidy passions and free, spontaneous thoughts are extraneous to the human mind.

The schism between the world of reason and the world of the senses is reflected within the citizen himself. D-503 becomes aware that he contains within him two quite separate entities. The first
is D-503, the perfectly logical mathematician, a passive, contented citizen of the One State. The second is his sensual self, non-rational and rebellious. He writes, 'I saw into myself, deep within me. There were two Is. One was my former self, D-503, the number D-503, while the other,... Up to now he had merely shoved his shaggy hands just a little out of the shell, but now all of him was crawling out; the shell was cracking, any minute now it would fly into smithereens'.

D-503 is permanently disturbed by the appearance of his 'shaggy hands', which are, he says, 'a vestige of a savage epoch'. They remind him of the hidden animality within him, which menaces his machine-like perfection.

Hair is symbolic of the animal side of man's nature in We. Beyond the Green Wall of the city lives the race of primitive, hair-covered people who have descended from the survivors of an earlier epoch. They have lost the outward characteristics of civilised man, and live as animals, in the world of the senses. They are wholly a part of Nature, while the inhabitants of the One State exist against Nature.

Of Zamyatin, Orwell wrote, 'It is evident from We that he had a strong leaning towards primitivism'. But here Orwell appears to have misread Zamyatin's imagery. (See also Part II(i) note 54.) Certainly, in Zamyatin's We the image of the enclosed perfect Machine of the One State is set up in opposition to the image of the free world of Nature. But Zamyatin's book is not to be construed as a call for a return to some pre-industrial, natural existence. This option is quite explicitly excluded by Zamyatin. Although he stresses the
importance of that which is animal in man, he nonetheless gives equal importance to the reasoning, non-sensual side of human nature. D-503 becomes fully human only once he has recognized the two distinct halves of his nature. With the resurgence of his animal self, he becomes aware of his capacity for love, pity, hatred, jealousy, happiness and despair. As a complete human being, rational and sensual, he experiences for a brief period a state of heightened consciousness. In fear and consternation, he discovers that he has 'an incurable soul'.

At one point, D-503 urges E-330 to escape with him to live with the forest people beyond the Wall, but E-330 rejects this alternative. The survivors of the pre-utopian race represent those elements in humanity which have been sacrificed in the perfectly rational One State, but they too are incomplete, she explains. They are creatures of Nature, who have 'preserved warm, red blood under their hirsuteness', whereas the artificial citizens of the One State have become 'overgrown with ciphers'. But they live a pre-moral, animal life, undifferentiated from one another except by the colour of their pelts. They are free only as animals are free: that is, they are free, as the members of the One State are not, to experience emotions, and to receive and interpret the evidence of their senses. But they are not free to develop their minds. For man to become fully human again, E-330 tells D-503, his reasoning self and his emotional self must become reunited. The forest people, she explains, 'are the half we have lost. You have H₂ and O, but in order to have H₂O - streams,
seas, waterfalls, waves, storms - it is necessary for these halves to unite'. Zamyatin does not have the illusion that man will discover his true self only if he returns to Nature. Man-as-animal and man-as rational-being are both less than man. Zamyatin is not a primitivist, as Orwell supposes.

Orwell also suggests that Zamyatin's *We*, 'is in effect a study of the Machine, the genie that man has thoughtlessly let out of its bottle and cannot put back again ....' Zamyatin is attacking 'the implied aims of industrialisation', Orwell considers. There is some truth in this suggestion: Zamyatin was indeed concerned to warn humanity against 'the hypertrophic power of the machine'. (See Part I(ii) note 1). In an over-industrialized society, man is wrested from the world of nature, and becomes, in effect, a servant of the machine. But at a deeper level, Zamyatin warns society against the 'hypertrophic power of the state', that is, the power of the state to determine the exact structure of men's lives, to proclaim immutable truths, and to mechanize the human mind, by transforming creative, critical thought into fixed dogma.

Zamyatin's One State differs from the anti-utopian states of Orwell and Huxley, in that official dogma positively demands the conquest of Nature. Because of the ideal of rational, mechanical perfection to which the One State is committed, the defeat of Nature is necessarily entailed in the construction of the state. Any intrusion of Nature is a stain on the purity of the state's perfection. But the suppression of Nature in utopia can serve practical, as well as ideological ends. The power of Nature can be harnessed for the service of the state. Thus in *We*, D-503 boasts, 'The ancients permitted the sea
to pound doltishly against the shore around the clock, while the millions of kilogrammetres imprisoned in the waves were utilized merely to warm up the emotions of enamoured couples. Out of the enamoured susurration of the waves we have obtained electricity; from a feral beast spattering foam we have made a domestic animal'.

In the utopias of Wells, the conquest of Nature is primarily intended to serve such practical ends. The controlled power of Nature is to eliminate hardship from men's lives and expand the range of human possibilities. But in Men Like Gods, the suppression of Nature seems, in addition, to be related to matters of taste. Nature is not so much excluded, or harnessed, as refashioned. New species of plants have been bred, and old ones have been adapted or exterminated. Similarly, some species of animals have been adapted to the requirements and taste of the utopian society, and others have been rendered extinct. Carnivores have been refashioned as herbivores, to serve as domestic ornaments. Horses seem to have been disposed of altogether. Dogs have been debarked. Nature has had its claws pared, and has been made acceptable to man.

In Huxley's Brave New World, the suppression of Nature seems to rest entirely upon pragmatic considerations. There is no ideological reason why the inhabitants of the World State should not continue to enjoy the natural world. There are however, economic reasons. Mustapha Mond explains that at one stage in the history of the World State, members of the lower castes were conditioned to enjoy
the countryside, so that they would 'consume transport' to get there,
whenever possible. However, it was discovered that once in the
country, the citizens consumed nothing else. They were content with
the sight of the flowers and trees, 'Primroses and landscapes',
Mustapha Mond explains, 'have one grave defect: they are gratuitous.
A love of nature keeps no factories busy. It was decided to abolish
the love of nature'. Accordingly, the infants of the lower castes
in the World State are conditioned to hate flowers. Instead they are
encouraged to consume transport to travel into the countryside to engage
in expensive outdoor sports, requiring much elaborate and costly
equipment. Mustapha Mond's discourse leaves no doubt in the mind
that if means could be found for making the citizens pay heavily
for the privilege of looking at flowers and landscapes, a love of
Nature would soon be instilled once again into the populace.

It is Aldous Huxley's anti-utopia, Brave New World, rather
than Zamyatin's We, which is most centrally concerned with, in Orwell's
phrase, the implied aims of industrialization'. (See 17 above) Certainly
Zamyatin presents a picture of an over-industrialized society, where
Nature is firmly suppressed in the cause of efficiency. But Zamyatin's
nightmare is more complex than this: it is a nightmare of a total
state where the human mind is constrained by the exigencies of a sterile
dogma, which pretends to perfect scientific accuracy, and proclaims
itself to be irrefutable. Despite his evident sympathy for Zamyatin's
work, Orwell tends to coarsen Zamyatin's arguments, Orwell's exegesis
of We is at best incomplete,
We is a statement of condemnation of the narrowness of vision which proceeds from a sterile, formal rationalism, divorced from sensibility. Zamyatin is no 'primitivist', condemning scientific progress as such. He was himself a scientist, and the revolution in scientific thought initiated by the theories of Einstein excited him no less than the revolutions in the artistic and political world. But he considered that the imagination which could generate new thought was rooted as firmly in emotional man as in reasoning man.

In We, reason is set up in opposition to the senses and the emotions, which are thus excluded as sources of human comprehension and understanding. But Zamyatin considers that no such sharp distinction between man's intellectual and his emotional capacities is justified. The human functions of cognition, perception, emotion and volition are all engendered by the same complex, internally co-ordinated mental structure. In this conviction, Zamyatin has the support of the modern physiologist, J.Z. Young. Zamyatin holds that rationalism ceases to be rational when it insists upon excluding the evidence of the senses and of the emotions from its calculations, and pretends, for the sake of simplicity, that the troublesome irregularities of human nature do not exist. Only a false, dogmatic rationalism insists on measuring the immensurable, or on forsaking the real for the comfort of a set of neat abstractions.

Just such a false rationalism appears to be the target of criticism in the mind of the statistician, M.J. Moroney, when he writes,
'It is true that it is extremely difficult to interpret figures when they relate to some concrete problem. It is equally true that it is extremely easy to do arithmetic. Herein lies the real difficulty. Averages can be calculated to nineteen places of decimals with astonishing ease. When the job is done it looks very accurate. It is an easy and fatal step to think that the accuracy of our arithmetic is equivalent to the accuracy of our knowledge about the problem in hand. We suffer from 'delusions of accuracy'. Once an enthusiast gets this disease, he and all who depend on his conclusions for their welfare are damned'. There is, Moroney considers, 'more than a germ of truth in the suggestion that, in a society where statisticians thrive, liberty and individuality are likely to be emasculated. Historically, Statistics is no more than a State Arithmetic, a system of computation by which differences between individuals are eliminated by the taking of an average'. Zamyatin's anti-utopian state is surely the statistician's quintessential paradise.

While Zamyatin's One State is founded upon 'delusions of accuracy', the guiding principle of Huxley's World State is Fordism. This Huxley describes as a system of thought which demands 'that we should sacrifice the animal man (and along with the animal, large portions of the thinking, spiritual man) not to God, but to the Machine. There is no place in ... the modern industrialized world for animals on the one hand, or for artists, mystics, or even finally, individuals on the other'. Huxley intended to warn society of the threats to individual freedom posed by over-organization and modern mechanization, and also by the
irresponsible use of applied science, especially in the field of the biological sciences. The misuse of the biological sciences could, he contended, 'modify the natural forms and expressions of life itself'. Brave New World, he wrote, was about 'the advancement of science as it affects human individuals'. His anti-utopia is a description of a society where scientific techniques have been applied in such a way as to 'recreate human beings in the likeness of termites'.

Huxley became convinced that modern totalitarianism would ultimately come to repress men, not by using the methods of terror, as Orwell presumed, but through the use of techniques of persuasion and manipulation. He believed that the use of Pavlovian conditioning procedures, together with the applications of strict eugenic controls and the judicious use of drugs, would finally force men to embrace their degradation with an infantile joy.

But although Huxley feared the power of the biological sciences to alter the nature of human beings and of their environment, and demonstrates this fear with appalling clarity in Brave New World, he was never opposed to the concept of selective breeding. Here, Huxley's views lie close to those of H.G. Wells. Both writers appear to condemn the use of eugenic techniques in their anti-utopian writings, yet both advocate a form of selective breeding in their utopias.

Both Wells and Huxley would seem to be open to the charge of inconsistency. However, both would argue that they accepted the practice of selective breeding in principle, while rejecting its misuse. Both writers were agreed that unless science intervened, an inevitable
process of genetic degeneration would degrade the human stock. Thus Wells condemns the eugenic measures taken in the anti-utopian world of The Sleeper Awakes, but advocates eugenic programmes of his own in A Modern Utopia and Men Like Gods. The difference for him seems to lie in the character of the society which the eugenic practices are designed to support. In The Sleeper Awakes, Graham, the Sleeper, is told by his guide, 'The world is no place for the bad, the stupid, the enervated. Their duty is to die. The death of failure! This is the path by which the beast rose to manhood'. The 'failures' in Wells's anti-utopian state are prevented from breeding for the good of the species. In this book, selective breeding is to be seen as an expression of the bleak inhumanity of the imaginary state. Yet, stripped of its ironical connotations, the passage quoted above could equally well appear in A Modern Utopia. Here again, the 'failures' in society are forbidden to breed. In a progressive society, Wells says, prospective parents have to reach a 'certain minimum of personal efficiency'. In these circumstances, 'the birth of a child to diseased or inferior parents and contrary to the sanctions of the State will be the rarest of disasters'. The state will 'exercise a right of forbidding or sanctioning motherhood'. The women of the modern Utopia are to be paid a wage for child-rearing, by the state, this wage to be increased where a child is found to have abilities above the average. Wells writes, 'In the civilized State, it is now clearly possible to make the conditions of life tolerable for every living creature, provided the inferiors can be prevented from increasing and multiplying'.
Selective breeding in utopia is designed to protect perfection against degeneration. Neither Wells nor Aldous Huxley seems to have been able to understand the humanitarian and libertarian arguments against such practices. Huxley shared with Wells a belief that human progress could only be maintained if 'the hereditable qualities of the progressing population were improved (or at any rate changed in a specific direction) by deliberate breeding'. This was asserted by Huxley in an essay written a year before he wrote Brave New World. Despite his powerful defence of 'the animal' in man, in Brave New World, Huxley, like Wells, possessed a utopian desire to transform Nature, and force it to produce predictable results.

In his book, Brave New World Revisited, Huxley expresses a fear that 'inborn biological differences' may ultimately be sacrificed to cultural uniformity. Employing the terminology of W. H. Sheldon's theory of physiological types, Huxley continues, 'The differences between individuals are so great ... An extreme endomorph .... will retain his sociable viscerotonic tendencies, an extreme mesomorph will remain energetically somatotonic through thick and thin, and an extreme ectomorph will always be cerebrotonic, introverted and over-sensitive'. In Brave New World, Huxley presents an admonitory vision of a society in which the natural variations between people have been smoothed away. But by the time he wrote Island, Huxley no longer seems to have been so concerned to preserve 'inborn biological differences',

Huxley's interest in Sheldon's physiological types persisted, and is a prominent feature in Island. But in Island, Huxley no longer seems to consider that human diversity predicates a need for a free
society. Rather, he seems to consider that the existence of individual diversity lays a responsibility upon governments to provide an extensive range of courses of remedial treatment. Somatotyping is now the basis for determining a child's basic physiological type, so that appropriate treatment may be given. In Pala, each child undergoes 'blood tests, psychological tests, somatotyping, an E.E.G.' to determine his particular brand of individuality, whereupon 'appropriate treatment is started immediately',\textsuperscript{31} The mesomorphs (a type, incidentally, to which Helmholtz Watson, in \textit{Brave New World}, indubitably belongs) are regarded as constituting a potential danger to society throughout life, unless their active, forceful temperament is controlled at an early age. Their drive, dynamism and desire for action must be systematically sublimated for the good of society. Accordingly, they are set to wood-chopping, rock-climbing and other hard physical pursuits. Huxley seems to have accepted without question the link between physiological and mental attributes which Sheldon proposed. He seems also to have taken it as axiomatic that society is most endangered by the energetic, aggressive type of personality. His fear of aggressiveness, however, is not universally shared. Koestler considers that aggressiveness is necessary to the 'social reformer, satirist, artist and thinker'. He writes, 'A well-meaning but woolly ideology, which has become fashionable on the rebound from the horrors of the last decades, would proclaim aggressiveness in all its forms as altogether damnable and evil. Yet without a moderate amount of aggressive individualism there could be no social or cultural progress'.\textsuperscript{32}

Another type of person deemed to be in need of treatment in Pala
is the 'Peter Panic' type. Children of this type reach maturity at a later stage than the average child, and in consequence, they are regarded as being potentially dangerous to society, as the mesomorphic children are, unless adequately and promptly treated. Diagnosis of the 'Peter Pans' is effected through the use of wrist x-rays, presumably to assess the rate at which the child's ossification process is taking place. Once discovered, the 'Peter Pans' are given three pink capsules a day, to speed up the maturation process. It is difficult to maintain, in these circumstances, that 'inborn biological differences' are valued and preserved in Huxley's utopian society.

Pala is a paradoxical paradise in many ways. Diversity is said to be highly valued, yet certain physiological types of person are judged to be in need of modification from childhood onward. The claim is made that people of all levels of ability are equally prized in society, yet there is selective breeding for intelligence; it is said that men are free, yet all are so ably conditioned from the school-room onward that they emerge uniformly mystical; it is said that human relationships are at their most exalted, yet children are, in many cases, sired by artificial insemination from deep-frozen sperm stock, in order to improve the race, and sexual relationships are so depersonalized as to become the 'psycho-physical means to a transcendental end'.

The eugenic methods adopted in Pala would seem to introduce a measure of genetic uniformity, to reinforce the cultural uniformity
provided by conditioning techniques and medical procedures. Aldous Huxley shared with his brother Julian a fear that the general level of intelligence in the Western world was falling, owing to 'better medicine, more congenital deficiencies passed on'. Accordingly, in Pala, steps are taken to halt this decline. Highly gifted males are encouraged to bequeath their sperm to posterity, and the general intelligence level of the populace is said to be rising steadily in consequence. Couples can 'take a shot at having a child of superior quality', if they choose, and most of them do. There is a central bank of 'superior stocks ... of every variety of physique and temperament'. Here Huxley lies close to Wells, whose work he parodied in Brave New World. Wells considered human reproduction to be too important to be left to the random whims of Nature, while Huxley considered that the supposed decline in human potential was the result not of purposeless Nature, but of human intervention in the evolutionary process. But both reach the same conclusion: eugenic measures must be introduced as a positive means for improving the genetic pool. The Palanese are committed to raising the general level of intelligence. 'Give us another century, and our average I.Q. will be up to a hundred and fifteen', one of the Palanese tells Will Farnaby, who replies sourly, 'Whereas ours, at the present rate of progress, will be down to about eighty-five'. There is no suggestion that the use of selective breeding in Pala is restricted entirely to those cases where there is a risk of genetic transmission of abnormality or disease through the male line. Control of genetic potential is an essential constituent in the utopian programme of Huxley, as of Wells.
Alone among the writers under review, Orwell makes no mention of the need of the rulers of the total state to have control of breeding. This is because, in Orwell's anti-utopia, all that the rulers desire is to wield absolute power. For this they need only to remove all possibility of individual freedom from their citizens. There is no concomitant need for them first to secure power to determine the character and range of the mental and physical attributes of those whom they are to repress. The citizens of Oceania are born as disparate individuals, but they are soon repressed by terror into cowering uniformity.

While in Orwell's Oceania, the citizens are standardized through fear, in the World State of Huxley's *Brave New World* and the One State of Zamyatin's *We*, the citizens are fashioned from conception for the life they are to lead. In *Brave New World*, selective breeding is used for the establishment of a rigidly hierarchical society. This stratification is designed to match the labour requirements of the state. The citizen is no more than his rôle. Significance attaches not to the individual, and his personal attributes and idiosyncracies, but to the relationships between the strata of society. Each man is fixed in his prescribed social category from conception to death. The lower ranks of society are completely undifferentiated mass men, cloned, constrained, and conditioned to lead identical lives.

In *We*, however, the One State uses selective breeding to further quite different ends. Zamyatin's anti-utopian state is not hierarchical in structure. The dogma of the One State proclaims that all men are equal, interchangeable parts of a mechanical whole. Thus eugenic
procedures are employed to secure the absolute uniformity of the citizens. Paternal and Maternal Norms have been established, and only those members of the state who conform to these Norms are allowed to reproduce. It is hoped that eventually all physical and mental variations will have been bred out. D-503 looks forward to the day when 'even the noses of all' will be identical. With an irony which D-503 does not perceive, the poet, R-13, tells him, 'We are the most fortunate arithmetical mean. How do you fellows put it - the integration from zero to infinity, from the cretin to Shakespeare...'. It is the contention of the architects of the One State that for as long as individual differences are allowed to persist, there will inevitably be envy among men. Total perfection lies at the point where identical citizens, identically reared, lead identical lives. When this has been achieved, all occasion for envy will have been finally eliminated.

The problem of envy is also recognized by the rulers of Huxley's World State. Here the problem is potentially a serious one, since the citizens are deliberately bred to have widely differing capacities, and to lead wholly different lives, according to the stratum of society to which they are assigned. However, the members of each social category are conditioned from birth to consider their own position in life to be the best possible one, 'Liking what you've got to do. All conditioning aims at that: making people like their unescapable social destiny', Mustapha Mond remarks.

In Huxley's Pala, too, the problem of envy might be expected to arise, since breeding in Pala, as in the utopias of Wells, is designed for the purpose of raising the general level of intelligence, and thus
'the best' are reserved as the prime breeding stock. However, to avoid the possibility of envy, the citizens are taught that all are of equal value to society, despite differences in intelligence and ability, and that those who lack intellect, may well be endowed with a deeper spirituality in compensation. This argument is unsatisfactory, however, since if all were truly deemed to be of equal worth, it would not be thought necessary for men of limited intelligence to have to consider fostering the children of 'superior' genetic stock, instead of fathering their own children.

Pala is not, of course, a total state in the sense that the anti-utopias of Huxley, Orwell and Zamyatin are. The citizens still have privacy, and they still have some element of choice in their lives, even in the matter of selective breeding. They still retain some control over their own bodies. They may choose sexual partners, and they may bring up their own children.

In the anti-utopian states, however, the citizen is no longer the possessor of his own body. He is merely its trustee. The state has control over his conception, his rearing, his eating and sleeping habits. The state has power to facilitate or prohibit his sexual gratification, and to assess his suitability or otherwise for procreation. If it so wills, the state may submit his body to degradation and torture, and decide the time and manner of its death.

It is, of course, commonplace for the community to exert some control over the bodies of its individual members. Laws against drug abuse, abortion, prostitution and suicide are common to many societies. Similarly, there are laws regulating matrimonial behaviour. The
citizen does not have absolute freedom to use his body at all times as he deems fit. But in the imaginary anti-utopian states, the individual has no indefeasible rights over his own body. He merely has an absolute obligation to preserve his body as a perfectly functioning component of the corporate whole for as long as the state requires him to do so.

The body of the citizen of the total state belongs to the community. His physical life may be one of enforced hedonism, as in Brave New World, of featureless moderation, as in We, or of brutalizing asceticism, as in Nineteen Eighty-Four. In each case, the individual is deprived of the right to choose how he shall order his own physical life.

The citizen of Zamyatin's One State has an absolute duty not to jeopardize his health in any way. 'All numbers ... are duty bound to sleep at night. This is as much a duty as working during the day. Sleep is necessary if one is to work in the daytime. Not to sleep at night is criminal'. Citizens are also forbidden to dream, since dreaming is a sign of psychic disturbance. Each citizen must chew each mouthful of food the requisite number of times, and all eat the same food, an artificial substance, derived from naphtha. Citizens must eschew all potentially noxious substances, on pain of death: 'The One State is merciless to all who poison themselves with nicotine and, especially, with alcohol ... The rapid destruction of a few is more rational than giving to the many the opportunity of working their own ruin'. All citizens are compelled to join in the Daily March
of the One State, so that they may obtain the requisite amount of exercise. And if any member notices any symptoms in himself of ill-health, he is obligated to report for medical treatment.  

While no citizen of the One State may wantonly expose his body to risk, neither may he choose to withhold his body from danger, if the state requires him to undertake hazardous work. His death or mutilation in the course of his work is of no consequence (see Part II (i) note 19), yet he has no right to choose to undertake any enterprise which might result in his bodily harm. The rebels of Zamyatin's One State deliberately consume alcohol and nicotine, and expose themselves to danger in the wild world beyond the protective glass wall, as an expression of revolt. The most desperate expression of rebellion against state control over the body occurs in Brave New World, where the Savage rejects the obligatory hedonism of the World State in the bizarre and psychologically ambivalent act of self-flagellation.

Since the body of the citizen of the total state is public property, he no longer has any right of privacy. The actions of his body are no longer personal actions; they form part of communal action. Similarly, his mind is public property. No private perceptions, beliefs, hopes, memories or judgments are permitted. Both mind and body must remain open to others.

The abolition of privacy is a constantly recurring theme in utopian writing, and is even apparent in Rousseau's description of the idyllic world of the Wolmars at Clarens, in La Nouvelle Héloïse. Julie takes care that the members of her household staff live constantly
in the public gaze, since, as she explains, 'Ce n'est point dans les assemblées nombreuses, où tout le monde nous voit et nous écoute, mais dans des entretiens particuliers, où règnent le secret et la liberté, que les moeurs peuvent courir des risques'.\textsuperscript{44} (It is not at all in large congregations of people, where everyone observes and hears what we say, but in private converse, where secrecy and freedom hold sway, that morals are set at risk). Julie regards with the deepest suspicion any servant who shows a propensity to slip away from the communal activities she arranges for her household, and find privacy.

In Zamyatin's transparent city there are listening membranes beneath the glass paving of the streets. The Guardians, whose duty it is to conserve uniformity, move anonymously among the populace, recording any deviations in speech or behaviour. In Orwell's Oceania, secret police, informers, two-way television scanners and listening devices are installed in every building, so that any change of habits, any sign of eccentricity or any indication of mental stress may be observed.

Informing is enjoined as a duty and a praiseworthy activity in both Oceania and the One State. Similarly, in Rousseau's Clarens, the servants are encouraged to denounce one another to their employers. It is asserted that 'M. et Mme. de Wolmar ont su transformer le vil métier d'accusateur en une fonction de zèle, d'intégrité, de courage, aussi noble ou du moins aussi louable qu'elle l'était chez les Romains'.\textsuperscript{45} (M. and Mme. de Wolmar knew how to transform the vile trade of the informer into a function of zeal, of integrity, of courage, as noble, or at least as praiseworthy as it was among the Romans).

Although for most utopian writers, as also for Rousseau, privacy
is abolished in the cause of preserving social control, for Wells, the question of privacy is seen differently. Certainly, in the imaginary world of Wells's *A Modern Utopia*, privacy has been eroded in the cause of efficiency, but Wells did not consider that restriction of privacy was a matter of any great concern to man. Simply, Wells did not consider privacy to be a fundamental human requirement. Privacy in former ages, he contended, did not exist, nor was it necessary, since men were homogeneous, and therefore felt no embarrassment or disquiet in one another's company. In the future, more advanced society, Wells held, men would once again be at ease with one another, since eugenic breeding would have produced a race of men of greatly enhanced intelligence and social grace. A desire for privacy, Wells suggested, is no more than a symptom of faulty breeding and social dislocation.\(^46\)

In Zamyatin's *We*, the homogeneity among men which Wells believed to have typified earlier societies has once more been restored, albeit in a very different form. Men perform, without embarrassment, the routine actions of their identical daily lives, under the unceasing, though indifferent, gaze of their fellows. Only one concession is made to the human desire for privacy: during the Sexual Hour each day, those who have been allotted permits for sexual union are allowed to lower the blinds in their glass rooms. It is, incidentally, during the temporary privacy of the Sexual Hour that the rebels frequently conduct their acts of revolt, and plan their insurrection. Within the context of Zamyatin's *One State*, it is strange that the sexual act alone should be singled out as an activity worthy of privacy, since it involves no
true intimacy, and is regarded by the rulers of the One State as being an act in every way comparable with other bodily acts, such as eating and urinating.

In the imaginary total states, the state exercises control over every aspect of human sexuality. State control over the body begins at conception in the imaginary worlds of We and Brave New World. The state predetermines the physical nature of the individual, his capacities and his limitations. After birth, of course, the use of conditioning procedures reinforces the effect of the eugenic measures.

In Huxley's World State, conception and embryonic development take place within the laboratory, and in both the World State and the One State, as in the imaginary state of Wells's The Sleeper Awakes, mechanical mother surrogates replace human parents during the child's formative years. In the One State, once a child has been born, no further link exists between parent and child. Parenthood, and consequently familial love, have been abolished. When D-503 feels himself to have been betrayed by E-330, he yearns for the comfort of maternal affection. 'If only I had a mother - as the ancients did: a mother of my own - yes, precisely, my own', he cries in anguish. 'And if only I were, as far as she was concerned, not the builder of the Integral, and not a number, D-503, and not a molecule of the One State, but a bit of common humanity, a bit of her own self ... if she would only hear what no one hears ...',

While in Huxley's World State and Zamyatin's One State, parenthood has ceased to exist, in Orwell's Oceania, the family persists,
in a perverted form, but suspicion, hatred and fear typify all family relationships. Children are taught, at an early age, to despise their parents, to spy on them, and to betray them to the Party. In Oceania, love is transformed into loathing, and married couples unite briefly and with mutual disgust, solely for the purpose of producing the children required of them by the state.

Parenthood, in Zamyatin's *We*, is of course, conditional upon the prospective parents having achieved the right degree of mediocrity. O-90, D-503's state-registered sexual partner at the beginning of the book, is smaller than average, and is therefore forbidden parenthood. Yet she longs to have a child, and finally decides, in desperation, to have a child by D-503, even though she is aware that such an act of defiance is punishable by death. Although it is never recognized by those around her, O-90 is constitutionally and irredeemably a heretic, a fact of which she is herself unconscious. She makes no positive decision to rebel, or to induce others to rebel, yet in the One State she is by nature unorthodox, an outsider. O-90's decision to have a child, even though it should lead to her death, is not 'rational' but emotional. It is a bodily imperative which she is powerless to resist. She lives by emotion rather than by reason, knowing no other mode of living, and she feels for D-503 an inextinguishable love which is both unwelcome and also treasonable.

Sexual love, which, like parental love, could lead to a division of loyalties, and undermine the total power of the state, is outlawed in all the anti-utopias. In *Brave New World*, mass sexuality is
stimulated and then instantly gratified. The sexual drive is thus depersonalized, and assumes a ritual quality. Love becomes corporate sensuality. Promiscuity is positively encouraged, to avoid the development of any serious emotional commitment. In Nineteen Eighty-Four, sexuality is wholly repressed, and in We, it is closely regulated. In the One State as in Huxley's World State, all are sexually available to all, and no one has the right to prefer one partner to the exclusion of others, or to withhold himself from another citizen. But certain formalities have to be completed before a sexual liaison may proceed, and the state informs the citizens on which days they will be permitted to conduct their sexual activities.

The rulers of the One State hold that 'Love and Hunger rule the Universe', and that therefore, those who would govern the world must first conquer both love and hunger. Having succeeded in vanquishing Hunger, the founders of the One State turned their attention to Love, D-503 writes. 'In the end this elemental force was likewise conquered - i.e. it was organized, mathematized - and .... our historic Lex Sexualis was promulgated: "Every number has the right of availability, as a sexual product, to any other number". As for the rest of it - well, that is already mere technique'. Thus the Lex Sexualis rationalizes love, which has 'accounted for countless and excessively silly tragedies' in past ages. Sexual activity now consists in the enjoyment of a 'harmonious and pleasantly useful organic function'. Thus Love has been denatured, refashioned as a perfectly regulated function of the state, devoid of disruptive sexual passion. Moreover, just as the institution of Paternal and Maternal Norms, and the consequent elimination
of physical and mental variations, is designed to eradicate envy from society, so too is the Lex Sexualis, since in former times, as D-503 says, 'the love of some was striven for by many, while the love of others wasn't striven for by any'. Devoid of the burden of personal commitment, and the possibility of pain, sexuality in the One State, as in Huxley's World State, is reduced to the level of simple, infantile enjoyment.

In Zamyatin's One State, there is no room either for the ascetic or for the libertine. While sexual love is prohibited, sexual gratification is included in the timetable as a mandatory activity. The citizens of the One State are regarded as being isomorphic beings, endowed with identical bodily needs, to be met in the state-approved manner. In the cause of physical health and well-being, the citizen must copulate at the required times, and at no other times, just as he must eat and sleep at the ordained times. Standardized citizens, with standardized appetites are accorded standardized satisfaction.

The passion that D-503 feels for E-330 is criminal, because it is a particularized emotion, because it is 'anti-reason', and because it is an expression of his entire self, mind and body. He is no longer an undifferentiated and obedient molecule of the One State. Sexual love accomplishes within him the fusion of his two 'Is'. Man-as-animal and man-as-poet unite. D-503 is appalled by the emergence of his hitherto unrecognized, shaggy, animal self, by the birth of his body, but he is also appalled by the growth of his poetic imagination under the influence of love.
While in Zamyatin's conception of sexual love, as expressed in *We*, body and mind find expression, in Huxley's vision of love, the body is never fully accepted. The imperfect, corporeal, human entity is judged unworthy as an object of love in utopia and anti-utopia alike. Huxley's philosophy of non-attachment colours both *Brave New World* and *Island*.

In *Brave New World*, two opposing conceptions of sexuality are presented. Firstly, there is the mindless sensuality of the inhabitants of the World State, which Huxley clearly rejects, and secondly, there is the fleshless, abstract, inwardly-directed romanticism of the Savage, for which Huxley appears to have considerable sympathy. The Savage expresses an ardent devotion to the ideal of love. He has no desire or capacity to accept the reality of another person, but only a curiously depersonalized need to experience the emotion of love. The loved person is no more than an object, the fetish to which he hopes he can attach his dreams.

In *Island*, the body is again rejected, as sexuality becomes a force not for personal commitment, but for transcendental release, for obliteration of the self in mystical union with the One. Physical love is recast as religious experience. In Pala, personal thought and emotions are considered irrelevant. 'What I personally think is beside the point', Susila, one of the Palanese, explains to Will Farnaby, 'All that matters is what I may impersonally experience while I'm living, when I'm dying, maybe when I'm dead'. Yet where the personal is held to be of so little account, how is it possible to form human
relationships? The impersonal Palanese extends his cosmic love over all others, for the sake of the eternal spirit present in all men, and seeks to help them and himself to achieve man's Final End of dissolution in the Void. But the question must arise as to whether love has any positive meaning in a society where man has been so conditioned as not to be able to choose dislike, or indifference, as an alternative response to love, or whether the highly selective intimacy of friendship could survive in a society awash with unremitting charity.

In Pala, no one has to contend with the problems entailed in relating to disparate and diverse individual entities. This is so for two reasons. Firstly, the rough edges of individual temperament are all filed away during the child's period of education. There is no need for true tolerance. Those who appear immature are given hormonal treatment to assist the ageing process; those who are considered to be too physically robust and active are allotted long periods of arduous physical exertion, for fear they may use their surplus energy in aggressive acts. All children are conditioned by their educators to acquire a broadly similar view of the world. When Will Farnaby arrives in Pala, he is greeted on all sides by the joyful pedagogy of eager mystics, intent upon sharing their enlightenment with him. It is by no means clear how such a society as that depicted in Pala would be able to meet the needs of an active, self-assertive humanist, for whom transcendentalism had no meaning. Secondly, for the citizen of Pala, the difficulties which may attend any real and enduring human contact are removed, since there is never any necessity for anyone to have to persevere with a temporarily unsatisfactory relationship, and make it
work. The people of the island are divided into Mutual Adoption Clubs, consisting of some twenty to twenty-five family units each. At the first sign of any conflict between parent and child, the child leaves home, and is fostered within a surrogate family more to his liking. 52 Neither parent nor child has to learn to adapt to the changing needs of the other. The personal commitment involved in familial relationships is of no great importance in Pala.

There is a further reason why Huxley's idealized vision of marital and familial relationships in Island is unsatisfactory. As mentioned earlier, Huxley fails to consider the possible changes in human relationships which might be expected to arise from the adoption of eugenic techniques. In Island, he describes a society supposedly ruled by enlightened love, yet the acceptance of selective breeding programmes requires scientific detachment, rather than inter-personal commitment. It is hard to understand why the institution of marriage has been preserved in Huxley's imaginary island, since it seems to have outlived its functions, in generally accepted terms. Women elect to bear the children of men long dead, husbands foster these posthumous tributes to a dead man's superiority, and children are no longer the fruit of conjugal affection, but of scientific curiosity. 'My baby might grow up to be a painter - that is, if that kind of talent is inherited. And even if it isn't, he'll be a lot more endomorphic and visceretonic than his brothers or either of his parents, which is going to be very interesting and educative for everyone concerned', declares the mother of one of these little living relicts, with the clinical detachment of an experimental scientist, rather than the tender acceptance of a parent. 53
Sexual relationships in Pala are also typified by an attitude of detachment. Sexual activity is therapy for the soul, to be learnt joyfully and expertly at school, as part of the normal curriculum. Slower pupils are allotted an older instructor, who will teach the necessary techniques.

In its most exalted form, love-making evolves into maithuna, a ritualized form of self-restraint in the cause of spiritual enlightenment. Maithuna is the 'yoga of love', and is considered, at least among the female Palanese, to be far superior to sexual union. Radha, a young Palanese nurse, declares, 'For women - all women, and I don't care what you say about sweeping generalizations - the yoga of love means perfection, means being transformed and taken out of themselves and completed'. If Radha's heroic assertion is to be taken as representing the truth, then conditioning in Pala must indeed be effective, to produce such unblemished unanimity among an entire sex.

For Huxley, the 'yoga of love' replaces the 'yoga of resentful addiction ... of lust and self-loathing that reinforces the self and makes it yet more loathsome', which he seems to suggest typifies sexual relationships in the non-utopian world. Palanese love is far removed from the earthly, compulsive passion for another individual person, which Huxley appears so to dread and despise. Essence has finally overcome ape in Island, and the body is firmly rejected.

In Orwell's work, there is no mystical rejection of the body, but acceptance of the physical nature of man does not appear to be complete. Orwell's apprehension of the body is clouded by ambiguities.
Sexuality, in Nineteen Eight-Four, is presented as an anarchic force, as a power for political liberation, ultimately destructive, rather than creative. The sexual act is primarily an act of retribution. Winston confides in Julia that he had at first suspected her of being a member of the Thought Police. 'I hated the sight of you ... I wanted to rape you and then murder you afterwards. Two weeks ago I thought seriously of smashing your head in with a cobblestone', he admits. He is exultant when Julia tells him that she has had many lovers. 'Listen. The more men you've had, the more I love you .... I don't want virtue to exist anywhere. I want everyone to be corrupt to the bones', he tells her. The fact that Julia enjoys the sex act in itself delights Winston. 'That was above all what he wanted to hear. Not merely the love of one person but the simple undifferentiated desire: that was the force that would tear the Party to pieces'.

Love, for Winston and Julia, is rebellion against the Party. Winston reflects that he 'would gladly infect the whole lot of them with leprosy or syphilis' if he could. 'Anything to rot, to weaken, to undermine!' Just such an apprehension of the potentially destructive power of the sexual act is apparent in Günter Grass's Dog Years, where the central character, Walter Matern, as a self-appointed Angel of Vengeance, conducts a private campaign of insurrection against the Nazi regime through the dissemination of 'anti-fascist gonorrhoea'.

Orwell's Winston Smith gradually comes to love Julia, and to feel tenderness towards her, yet for Orwell, as for Grass, sexuality in the total state is to be seen as a power for defilement, as much as for fulfilment.
The body is, for a time, useful to Orwell's Winston Smith, as an instrument for revenge, but ultimately is an inevitable source of degradation, an obstacle to human dignity and integrity, a burden upon the mind and upon the will.

Orwell draws a radical distinction between the physical and the mental in his writing. In Nineteen Eighty-Four, he seems to suggest that in the last analysis there is no moral strength which may outweigh the weakness of the body, and that this must always be a source of shame. It is the body's vulnerability to pain which leaves the mind ultimately defenceless, to be moulded into whatever shape an oppressor may desire. Man may delude himself for a while that his will is free, but human morality is only as strong as bodily frailty will allow. Finally, the body will succumb to pain, dragging the mind down with it.

Of Winston Smith, Orwell writes, 'He thought with a kind of astonishment of the biological uselessness of pain and fear, the treachery of the human body which always freezes into inertia at exactly the moment when a special effort is needed .... It struck him that in moments of crisis one is never fighting against an external enemy, but always against one's own body .... Even now ..... the dull ache in his belly made consecutive thought impossible. And it is the same, he perceived, in all seemingly heroic or tragic situations. On the battlefield, in the torture chamber, on a sinking ship, the issues that you are fighting for are always forgotten, because the body swells up until it fills the universe, and even when you are not paralysed by fright or screaming with pain, life is a moment-to-moment struggle against
hunger or cold or sleeplessness, against a sour stomach or an aching tooth'.

In Nineteen Eighty-Four, the body is portrayed as the enemy of the soul. Despite his atheism, Orwell is a dualist. But whereas the Christian ascetics whom he seems at times to resemble equate moral frailty with voluptuousness, Orwell suggests that man's ultimate moral weakness arises not from his inability to control his desires, but from his inability to control his aversions. Morality may be learnt in childhood through the experience of pleasure and pain, but pain becomes the most effective tool whereby his morality may be destroyed, Orwell's Winston Smith finds the desire to avoid pain to be stronger than love, or the regard for truth. Under pain, he discovers, there is no moral principle which may not be surrendered. Only the instinct to preserve the body from pain, which is the strongest instinct in man, as in all other sentient beings, is unconquerable. Where there is pain, Orwell states, there are no heroes. Man's only hope of preserving his morality lies in his being able to avoid situations where his weakness may be exploited.

Orwell's conception of the 'treachery of the human body' is open to criticism. Neither pain nor fear is 'biologically useless'. The capacity for self-preservation in man, as in any animal, depends upon their existence. Neither man nor Nature is to blame. The true enemy of the tortured man is his torturer, not his own body, and the mind of the torturer is surely more culpable than the body of the victim. The torturer is exploiting and misusing man's natural mechanism for
survival, and forcing it to function in ways unintended by Nature, or by any conjectural Creator.

It is likely that Orwell's personal experience of pain and ill-health coloured his vision. Towards the end of his life he became impatient with his body. There were many ideas which he still wished to express in books and articles, yet physical debility and pain prevented him from doing so. It is perhaps significant that Orwell portrays Winston Smith as a man not unlike himself - a man of frail build, with a chronic cough. Winston is also tormented by a varicous leg ulcer and an indifferent digestive system. He is permanently aware of his body as an obstruction. During periods of intense mental effort, the importunities of his body constantly threaten his powers of concentration.\(^6^1\) Winston regards his body with mild disgust, and at first expects Julia to share this distaste. 'I'm thirty-nine years old. I've got a wife that I can't get rid of. I've got varicose veins. I've got five false teeth', he tells her. 'Can you still bear to look at me?'\(^6^2\)

But for Julia, the body is paramount. She can enter into a physical relationship without reserve. It is the drive to exert one's mental energies which she cannot comprehend. She is incapable of sharing Winston's mental anguish. Of Julia, Orwell writes, 'In the ramifications of Party doctrine she had not the faintest interest. Whenever he (Winston) began to talk of the principles of Ingsoc, doublethink, the mutability of the past, and the denial of objective reality, and to use Newspeak words, she became bored and confused and said that she
never paid any attention to that kind of rubbish .... If he persisted in talking of such subjects, she had a disconcerting habit of falling asleep....' Winston recognizes that mental orthodoxy presents no real problems for Julia. 'In a way, the world-view of the Party imposed itself most successfully on people incapable of understanding it. They could be made to accept the most flagrant violations of reality, because they never fully grasped the enormity of what was demanded of them, and were not sufficiently interested in public events to notice what was happening. By lack of understanding they remained sane. They simply swallowed everything, and what they swallowed did them no harm, because it left no residue behind ....'  Julia remains sane. Her memory of past events is so imperfect that she is unaware of the constant revision of historical records, and is unaware of the inconsistencies of Party dogma. She cannot join with Winston in constructing any reasoned critique against the state. Her capacity for criticism lies solely in an innate, animal shrewdness, which enables her to recognise that the Party deliberately represses sexuality in order to induce the war hysteria and adulation of Big Brother, which holds the state together.

It is evident that Orwell has a certain contempt for the character of Julia. She is, Winston tells her, 'a rebel from the waist downwards'.  Julia's heresy is merely physical, whereas Winston Smith's is of the mind. It is Winston's constant pursuit of rationality which truly threatens the state. O'Brien dismisses Julia's rebellion as of little account. Questioned by Winston Smith about the fate of Julia, he replies contemptuously, 'She betrayed you, Winston. Immediately - unreservedly. I have seldom seen anyone come over to us so promptly'.  
'It was', O'Brien comments, 'a perfect conversion, a textbook case'. Julia's case is simple because there is no mental rebellion to suppress, but with Winston, 'conversion' is much harder to achieve. He is finally defeated only when unreasoning, unbearable physical panic robs him of his mind, and leads him to betray both love and rationality itself.

In both *We* and *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, the body is oppressed by the state, in the cause of the maintenance of total power. But the conception of the nature of that oppression offered by the two authors is very different, as is their conception of the nature of the body, and of sexual love. In Zamyatin's *We*, subjugation of the body is primary; in *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, it is only secondary. In the One State, the rulers suppress man's animality for fear that passion may cloud the perfect rationality of the state. But in Oceania, the body is oppressed so that rationality may wither. It is the subjugation of Winston's mind, rather than his body, which is O'Brien's supreme task.

For Zamyatin's D-503, it is the arousal of the body which quickens and sustains love, and allows human development. The body is crucial in *We*, since Zamyatin holds that human consciousness is born of a synthesis of mind and body, of reason and passion. In the One State, love is an incongruity; it is an illness to be eradicated. D-503 experiences the growth of love as an unexpected flowering, which fills him with ecstasy and pain. He writes, 'I'm not prudent, I'm ailing, I'm afflicted with a soul ... But then, isn't all florescence an ailment? Isn't it painful for a bud to burst?'. Love in *We* is defeated only when D-503 has been purged of his animality, following the destruction
of his imagination. With love and animality is sacrificed humanity. But in *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, the situation is reversed. Love is betrayed by the body which formerly acted as its medium of expression. So too is rationality. Man's body is revealed as an inescapable source of weakness and moral corruption.

R. D. Charques wrote, in his obituary of Orwell, that Orwell 'believed in the reality of "the worst thing in the world". It was, he was inclined to think, the extinction of the human spirit by terror, which he knew to be a commonplace of totalitarian rule'. Zamyatin feared that in the total state, man would become no more than a machine, without thought or feeling, his actions wholly directed according to the tenets of some official dogma. But Orwell feared that in the total state the human mind would finally succumb to the terror and pain of the body.

Here there is a fleeting similarity between the thought of Orwell and that of Aldous Huxley. Huxley refers repeatedly in *Island* to the potentially corrupting effects of physical pain. Will Farnaby recalls the death through cancer of a favourite aunt, whose personality was warped and disfigured through the experience of pain and physical degeneration. Yet Huxley does not consider that this state of affairs is irremediable. There is, he suggests, a solution to the problem of man's bodily frailty. In one of the most important scenes in *Island*, the death is described of a Palanese woman, who, like Farnaby's aunt, is suffering from cancer, but who is nonetheless transfigured by mystical enlightenment and self-transcending joy. Asked if her pain is severe,
the dying woman replies, 'It would be bad, if it were really my pain. But somehow it isn't. The pain's here; but I'm somewhere else. It's like what you discover with the moksha-medicine. Nothing really belongs to you. Not even your pain'.

The citizen of Huxley's perfect state is somehow diffused into Nature, so that his 'I' and his 'not-I' are intertwined, and neither is of independent significance. Thus the inhabitant of Pala escapes the limitations and disabilities of ordinary mortal man. In Huxley's temporal paradise, the nature of man and of the world is regulated for the attainment of certain specific goals but in his ethereal utopia, there is no distinction between man and the cosmos. Individual consciousness of separateness is an illusion. Thus man need no longer fear conquest through pain, or through the inexorable power of the Second Law of Thermodynamics. He is One with all the physical processes of the natural world, and with the timeless spiritual world beyond Nature.

Such a solution to the problem of man's vulnerability to pain and fear as that offered by Huxley, is, however, without significance to a Western humanist, such as George Orwell.

Orwell's conception of human love, vulnerability and morality is informed by his belief that 'Man is the measure of all things, and that our job is to make life worth living on this earth, which is the only earth we have'. For Orwell, man is inevitably an earthly creature, whose imperfections, like his virtues, are part of his humanity. But Huxley believes it is possible to transcend the limitations of earthly life.
The world which Huxley describes in *Island* seems ultimately to be a world beyond pain, degeneration and death, but a world also beyond love, friendship and humanity, as envisaged in Western thought. Pala is an island of saints.

Huxley's ideal of impersonal love appears to resemble that of Gandhi, whom Huxley much admired. As I have argued earlier in this section, it is difficult to see how friendship, or sexual or familial love could have any deep significance in Pala. This absence of close personal attachment is probably, however, crucial to Huxley's ideal of perfection.

In this *Reflections on Gandhi*, Orwell writes, 'For the seeker after goodness there must be no close friendships and no exclusive loves whatever. Close friendships, Gandhi says, are dangerous, because 'friends react on one another' and through loyalty to a friend one can be led into wrongdoing. This is unquestionably true. Moreover, if one is to love God, or to love humanity as a whole, one cannot give one's preference to any individual person. This again is true, and it marks the point at which the humanistic and the religious attitudes cease to be reconcilable. To an ordinary human-being, love means nothing if it does not mean loving some people more than others ....' Gandhi's attitude to human relationships, Orwell considers, 'is perhaps a noble one, but, in the sense which - I think - most people would give to the word, it is inhuman. The essence of being human is that one does not seek perfection, that one is sometimes willing to commit sins for the sake of loyalty, that one does not push asceticism to the point
where it makes friendly intercourse impossible, and that one is prepared in the end to be defeated and broken up by life, which is the inevitable price of fastening one's love upon other human individuals'.

'No doubt', Orwell concludes, 'alcohol, tobacco and so forth are things that a saint must avoid, but sainthood is also a thing that human beings must avoid'.

The target of Orwell's criticism here seems to be not so much the Christian conception of sainthood, as the Eastern ideal of the holy man, non-attached, liberated from personal love, experiencing only the anxiety-free emotion of goodwill to all. When Orwell writes that one should be 'prepared in the end to be defeated and broken up by life, which is the inevitable price of fastening one's love upon other human individuals', he does not mean that love 'inevitably' leads to suffering, but rather that anyone who loves, in Western terms, offers hostages to fortune. The person loved may fall ill, or die, or may decide to reject one's love, in which case anguish will inevitably follow. The only way to avoid this possibility is to have no one for whom one truly 'cares'. In the Western Christian tradition, caring for others, and suffering on their behalf, is fully accepted, at least by many thinkers. But for Gandhi, and for Aldous Huxley, this type of individual commitment is regarded as being inferior to a sentiment of generalized charity, which leaves the 'lover' non-attached and free from care. Huxley's utopia seems to be founded precisely upon this way of thinking, and from this it follows that he is able to countenance such practices as selective breeding and infant conditioning - practices which are repugnant to a Western individualist such as Orwell.
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37. We, op.cit., p.25.
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43. Ibid., p.50.
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45. Ibid. p.347.
46. A Modern Utopia, op.cit., p.29.
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49. Ibid., pp.37/38.
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53. Ibid., pp.194/95.
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55. Ibid., p.271.
57. Ibid., p.103.
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60. Nineteen Eighty-Four, op.cit., p.85.
62. Ibid., p.98.
63. Ibid., pp.127/128.
64. Ibid., p.127.
65. Ibid., p.208.
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68. Island, op.cit., p.263.
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Part II (iv)  Utopia and the subjugation of the individual will

'What a man needs is simply and solely independent volition, whatever that independence may cost and wherever it may lead ....', declares Dostoievsky's Underground Man, 'If the formula for all our desires and whims is some day discovered - ..., what they depend on, what laws they result from, how they are disseminated, what sort of good they aspire to in a particular instance, and so on - a real mathematical formula, that is, then it is possible that man will at once turn from a man into a barrel-organ sprig or something of the sort; for what is man without desires, without will, without volition, but a sprig on the cylinder of a barrel-organ?'

Dostoievsky's vision of a mechanically perfect world, where the possibility of individual volition is eliminated, has clearly influenced Zamyatin, but all the writers under review consider that the construction of the total state will entail, in some form, not only the subjugation of the human body, but also the subjugation of the human mind, that is, the suppression of the human will, and consequently, the destruction of the possibility of moral action. The success of the total state, they maintain, depends upon its power to obliterate individual entity.

Such fears are recognized, and rejected, by Skinner, who writes, in Beyond Freedom and Dignity, 'We are told that what is threatened is "man qua man", or "man in his humanity", or "man as Thou not It", or "man as a person not a thing". These are not very helpful expressions, but they supply a clue. What is being abolished is autonomous man - the inner man, the homunculus, the possessing demon, the man defended by the literature of freedom and dignity.
'His abolition has long been overdue. Autonomous man is a device used to explain what we cannot explain in any other way. He has been constructed from our ignorance, and as our understanding increases, the very stuff of which he is composed vanishes. Science does not de-humanize man, it de-homunculizes him, and it must do so if it is to prevent the abolition of the human species. To man qua man, we readily say good riddance. Only by dispossessing him can we turn to the real causes of human behaviour. Only then can we turn from the inferred to the observed, from the miraculous to the natural, from the inaccessible to the manipulable'.

For Skinner, then, anti-utopian fears for the loss of autonomy are misconceived, since man deludes himself when he claims to be the possessor of free will. Skinner, who holds that man is simply an agglomeration of conditioned reflexes and responses to external stimuli, can contemplate with equanimity the institution of new and more inclusive programmes of conditioning. For him, manipulation is inevitably the very stuff of social life; all that matters is that it should be directed by those who know what is best for society (see Part I(i)).

In the One State of Zamyatin's We, autonomous man has indeed been abolished. The One State is a homoeostatic organism, in which man and machine are programmed to perform in perfect unity. Human action is automatic, resembling mechanical action, as is illustrated in D-503's tale of the 'Three Manumitted Ones' (see Part II(i) note 18). All opportunity for deliberation, and for choice, has been eliminated in the One State, in the name of perfect order and precision. Thus the
human will has been rendered nugatory, since it is the function of the will to determine upon a course of action, after reviewing competing options.

The citizen of the One State is no more than 'a sprig on the cylinder of a barrel-organ'. He serves without question the perfect mechanism of which he is a part. His mind is in total repose. Recalling the sight of the men and machines in his factory, D-503 remarks, 'All this was just one unit: humanized machines, machine-perfect humans. This was the loftiest, most staggering beauty, harmony, music .... I was shoulder to shoulder with them, welded with them, caught up in the steel rhythm. Their motions were measured, ...... their foreheads mirror-smooth, unclouded by the insanity of thoughts'.

Virtue in the One State lies in self-effacement. At first, D-503 is content with his rôle as an ideally functioning part of a harmonious whole. He describes the sensations he has felt during the Daily March of the One State with awe and humility: 'We walked along, a single, million-headed body, and within each of us was that meek joyfulness which probably constitutes the life of molecules, atoms or phagocytes'. Following the birth of his imagination, however, D-503 comes to wonder whether he is, after all, not a dutiful phagocyte, protecting the vast organism of the state from infection, but rather a microbe, menacing the health of the system.

As mentioned earlier, in Part I(ii), Zamyatin considers the imagination to be the fount of individual freedom. Under its influence
D-503 becomes conscious of himself as an entity, differentiated from all other entities, having a discrete existence and following a unique course through life. This self-consciousness is so new to him that he believes it to be a form of illness, and this impression is confirmed when he is told that he has contracted 'an incurable soul'. In Zamyatin's view, there is an indissoluble bond between the soul and the imagination.

D-503 is confused and embarrassed by his sudden self-awareness. He becomes acutely conscious of his own body, of his arms swinging awkwardly at his sides, and of the sound of his footfall on the glass pavement. He becomes sensitive to the pain and elation of violent emotion, of love and pity and anger and despair. And in anguish and incredulity, he recognizes in himself the capacity for heretical thought and action. All this seems strange and unnatural to him. It leaves him exposed and unprotected. In his diary, he writes, 'I was conscious of myself. But then, consciousness of self, awareness of individuality, pertains only to an eye with a speck of something in it, to an infected finger, to an aching tooth; when an eye, a finger, a tooth is sound each seems non-existent, as it were. Is it not clear that consciousness of self is only a disease?'

In his conception of the necessary link between imagination and the human consciousness which gives rise to conscience, Zamyatin is following an earlier tradition. In A Defence of Poetry, Shelley writes, 'A man, to be greatly good, must imagine intensely and comprehensively; he must put himself in the place of another and of
many others; the pains and pleasures of his species must become his own. The great instrument of moral good is the imagination.\textsuperscript{7} The corruption of society, in Shelley’s view, proceeds through the initial corruption of the imagination, ‘It begins at the imagination and the intellect as at the core, and distributes itself thence as a paralysing venom, through the affections into the very appetites, until all becomes a torpid mass in which hardly sense survives’.\textsuperscript{8} It is possible that Zamyatin read Shelley’s \textit{Defence of Poetry}, and was to some extent influenced by Shelley’s vision. Zamyatin read widely in English literature, and certainly there are affinities between Shelley’s conception of the unique significance of the faculty of imagination and Zamyatin’s own. Similarly, both writers attest the value of the arts, in their capacity to minister to the imagination, and thus to nourish human sensibility and moral awareness. This will be discussed further in the following section (Part II (v)).

Rousseau also testifies to the significance of the imagination in the development of human consciousness, but his work reveals a marked equivocation. Rousseau both extolls the virtue of imagination as the source of human creativity, and condemns the capacity of imagination to engender social discord. In the \textit{Rêveries}, Rousseau describes his years of retreat from the constraints and obligations of social life. Here he suggests that the world of introspection and solitary fantasy is the finest of all possible worlds. Lost in imaginative contemplation, Rousseau felt himself freed to experience the uniqueness of his own mind, secure from the encroachments of the minds of others. Similarly, in \textit{La Nouvelle Héloïse}, Julie asserts
that 'le pays des chimères est en ce monde le seul digne d'être habité ....' (The land of fancy is the only place worthy of habitation in this world). Julie finally decides to die because her 'imagination has nothing left to do'. But here, of course, there is ambiguity. The neatly ordered, prosaic world from which Julie is escaping is a world created in Rousseau's own imagination. In *Emile*, the ambiguity is even more striking. It is suggested, at one point, that the perfectly reared, eponymous hero may choose, like Rousseau, to immerse himself in solitary fantasy. Here Rousseau appears to suggest once more that 'the land of fancy is the only place worthy of habitation'. Yet elsewhere in *Emile*, the inference to be drawn is very different. Emile is to marry a girl called Sophy, who is to minister to his needs, and act as the protector of his psychic perfection. Sophy has been indoctrinated from infancy for a life of self-abnegation, force-reared like a Strasbourg goose for Emile's personal delectation. Her education has been designed to inhibit the development of her personality, and prevent her from acquiring tastes and desires unsuitable to her rôle. Yet unaccountably, at the last moment, Sophy threatens to reject the rôle for which she has been cast. Against all expectations, her imagination has survived, to preserve in her a vestige of the power of choice. Sophy conceives of the possibility of finding someone other than Emile, a lover of her own choosing, who will more faithfully reflect her own thoughts and desires. Here the contradictions inherent in Rousseau's thought are at their most apparent. In order to preserve his narrative line, Rousseau intervenes in his own script, to redesign the importunate figure of Sophy. 'Let us give Emile his Sophy', Rousseau writes, 'let us restore this sweet girl to life and provide her with a less vivid
imagination and a happier fate. I desired to paint an ordinary woman, but by endowing her with a great soul, I have disturbed her reason. I have gone astray. Let us retrace our steps.  

Thus Sophy's single, illicit spasm of autonomy is stilled by fanti-sectomy. It is, incidentally, interesting to note that for Rousseau, as for Zamyatin, there is an indissoluble bond between the imagination and the soul.

Rousseau is fully conscious of the importance of the imagination, and for the reason that he values it, he fears it. In his view, for the solitary man of genius, imagination, and the capacity for independent moral judgment which springs from it, are to be prized. But for the citizen of the perfectly regulated state, imagination is otiose, and even perhaps pernicious.

Just as Rousseau's Sophy is purged of will and imagination at one blow, so too is Zamyatin's D-503. Through the forcible excision of his imagination, he is cured of soul and will forever. Automatic virtue is restored, and consciousness and conscience are destroyed. D-503, like Sophy, is now merely the personification of his rôle. As far as he can tell, he is entirely happy.

The total state of Zamyatin's We is founded upon the premise that man requires above all to be rescued from the agony of choice and compelled to be happy. The Benefactor, who rules over the One State, asks D-503, 'What have men, from their swaddling clothes days on, been praying for, dreaming about, tormenting themselves for? Why, to have someone tell them, once and for all, just what happiness is, and then weld them to happiness with chains .... The ancient dream of Heaven
.... Remember, in Heaven they no longer know anything of desires, or pity, of love; there you will find only the beatified ones, with fantasiesectomy already performed on them (that is the only reason they are beatified) - the angels, the servants of God'.

The influence of Dostoievsky upon Zamyatin is here very apparent. Dostoievsky's Grand Inquisitor, in The Brothers Karamazov, describes how 'men were given paradise, they wanted freedom, and they stole fire from heaven, knowing perfectly well that they would become unhappy .... Man has no more agonizing anxiety than to find someone to whom he can hand over with all speed the gift of freedom with which the unhappy creature is born'.

The orthodox citizen of Zamyatin's One citizen has gladly surrendered his will and embraced the servitude of paradise. As mentioned in Part I(i) note 17, and Part II(ii) note 39, for Zamyatin, as for Dostoievsky, man became truly man only after he had rejected perfect order and unthinking rectitude for freedom, and the possibility of error. The Devil is the bringer of the knowledge of Good and Evil, and therefore of morality. Before the Devil's intervention, the passive virtue of man testified merely to his lack of the faculty of imagination. He was innocent only in the sense that he could envisage only one course of action. The citizens of the One State are 'simple of heart and innocent like Adam and Eve'. There is 'none of that crazy, jumbled stuff about Good and Evil; everything is .... childishly, paradisiacally simple'. The One State has given 'God a helping hand in overcoming the Devil for Good and all. For it was the Devil who
impelled mortals to transgress against the interdict, to taste of pernicious freedom'.

If Zamyatin's Devil stands as a symbol of freedom and morality, so too, according to Shelley, does Milton's Devil, in Paradise Lost. Shelley writes, 'Milton's Devil as a moral being is as far superior to his God as one who perseveres in some purpose which he has conceived to be excellent in spite of adversity and torture, is to one who in the cold security of undoubted triumph inflicts the most horrible revenge upon his enemy, not from any mistaken notion of inducing him to repent of a perseverance of enmity, but with the alleged design of exasperating him to deserve new torments'. Blake has a similar perception of the moral superiority of Milton's Devil, and offers the following explanation: 'The reason Milton wrote in fetters when he wrote of Angels and God, and at liberty when of Devils and Hell, is because he was a true Poet and of the Devil's party without knowing it'.

Certainly, Milton, like the anti-utopians, was content to live in a world where Good and Evil necessarily co-exist, since Good can only be recognized by contrast with Evil, and certainly he valued above all the freedom to make moral choices. In the Areopagitica, he wrote 'Give me the liberty to know, to utter, and to argue freely according to conscience, above all liberties'.

Zamyatin's Devil stands emphatically for individualism. D-503 comments that the Christians of ancient times rightly perceived that consciousness of self proceeds from morbidity, and that 'meekness is a virtue while pride is a vice; they also understood that We is
from God while I is from the Devil'. D-503 regards his new-found self-awareness as a sin against the divine perfection of the state. He believes that it will be his lot to 'burn forever', and yet, to his horror, he is conscious that he does 'not want to be saved'.

Like Dostoievsky, Zamyatin despises the static bliss of perfect order. He contends that man is fully human only in the dynamic world of change and choice. The individual must be free to perceive the world through his own eyes, and to make whatever choices may seem appropriate to him, whether those choices should contribute to his well-being or to his misery. In We, E-330, like Dostoievsky's Underground Man, asserts her right to act according to her own will, no matter what her chances of success. 'What is it to you', she cries, 'if I do not wish to have others do my wishing for me, if I wish to do my own wishing - if I wish for the impossible?' The orthodox citizen of the One State chooses to accept the bondage of corporate happiness. Thereafter there are no choices for him to make. But E-330 refuses to surrender the anguish of conscious choice for the ataraxia of utopia.

For both Zamyatin and Dostoievsky, the exercise of free will is an end in itself, requiring no telic justification. Through the exercise of individual volition, man affirms his humanity, they consider. In the perfect state, every act of the individual will is automatically an act of rebellion, and though at times it may appear wanton, perverse or destructive, yet it is valid in itself. The act of rebellion in the perfectly rational state removes itself beyond the requirements of formal rationality.
In the World State of Huxley's *Brave New World*, as in Zamyatin's *One State*, corporate consciousness has replaced individual consciousness, and self-determination is an empty concept. The self in the World State is made in the test-tube and in the state nursery. The citizen enters the world as a socialized being. He has no choice as to how he shall develop. The intelligence level, habits, physique and tastes of each stratum of society are fixed by the eugenics specialists and the social conditioners. No citizen may choose to reject his rôle, and seek to develop his own personality as he sees fit.

Among the lower orders of human life in the World State, the uniqueness of the individual is wholly sacrificed. 'Ninety-six identical twins work ninety-six identical machines .... standard Gammas, unvarying Deltas, Uniform Epsilons'. Workers are cloned in batches from a single egg. The resultant 'twins' are mere replications of one another. They live their lives in unison, tending the same machines and sharing the same programmed pastimes.

When he wrote *Brave New World*, it was Huxley's intention to describe a society in which science had been used in such a way as to 'recreate human beings in the likeness of termites'. (See Part II (iii) Note 25). The citizen of the World State is bred and conditioned for docility and compliance. He is equipped to perform only that narrow range of duties for which the state has fashioned him. Like a termite, he has no will of his own, but merely contributes to the expression of the corporate will of the community. In the World State, the citizen performs his allotted tasks automatically, having no capacity to do otherwise. He experiences no desire to escape the narrow confines of his existence, since he has been programmed to be content with his 'inescapable social destiny'. (See Part II(iii) Note 39).
In the World State, the mind of the citizen is wholly fashioned by the state. From earliest infancy, the child's capacity for independent judgment and therefore independent volition is eroded through the persistent assault upon his developing mind of the conditioning slogans of the social engineers. The citizen's conception of himself and of his relationship to others is remorselessly moulded by the external suggestions which he receives in childhood, until finally there is no space left in his mind for original thought. As Mustapha Mond explains to a group of students, 'At last the child's mind is these suggestions, and the sum of the suggestions is the child's mind. And not the child's mind only. The adult's mind too - all his life long. The mind that judges and desires and decides - made up of these suggestions. But all of these suggestions are our suggestions! ..... Suggestions from the State'.

In Brave New World, behavioural psychology is used wholly for the subjugation of the human will, but in writing Island, Huxley sought to describe an imaginary world where the biological sciences would no longer be used for the humiliation and repression of man, but for his enrichment. Just as, in Pala, eugenic techniques are used not to provide stultified machine-minders and consumers, but to improve the quality of the human stock, so also in Pala, Pavlovian conditioning procedures are used not to force men to embrace their 'inescapable social destiny', but to imbue them with love of humanity. Yet the use of conditioning techniques, even for the most beneficent of motives, must surely raise ethical questions, since it entails the diminution of human freedom. It constitutes an attempt to modify
humanity, and to control the shape of its future development. Thus man's opportunity for self-determination is restricted. In Pala, as in the World State, there is an assault on the self.

For Huxley, this is of no great consequence. The self, however it may be defined, is of small significance. As noted in Part II(i), Huxley considered consciousness of selfhood to be rooted in delusion. (See note 67). The citizen of Pala desires to 'catch a glimpse of the world as it looks to someone who has been liberated from his bondage to the ego'. Positive consciousness gives way to passive receptiveness. For the individual thus conceived, self-enactment and self-expression are empty concepts. The self is dissolved in transcendental union with the universe. In Pala, it is explained, the citizen is 'mainly concerned with what people are on the level that's beyond individuality'.

In writing Island, Huxley attempted to effect a reconciliation between social happiness and individual freedom, yet an examination of the book raises doubts as to whether this 'reconciliation' would have been possible had Huxley adhered to his earlier conception of the nature of the individual, and of independent volition, as expressed in Brave New World. In the World State, the citizens are deprived of their capacity for independent judgment in the cause of orderly social conformity. The rulers of the World State expel all those who, despite their training, have become 'too self-consciously individual to fit into community life .... who aren't satisfied with orthodoxy. Who've got independent ideas of their own'. Of the three dissidents
in *Brave New World*, the one whom Huxley seems most to admire is Helmholtz Watson, yet Watson, as argued in Part II(iii), is unquestionably a mesomorph, and thus of the physiological type which is deemed to require early remedial treatment in Huxley's Pala. Watson is very active, with a powerful physique, strong personal loyalties, an aggressive intellect, and a temperament which leads him to act spontaneously and physically in an emergency. His desire is not for ease and stability, but for hardship and unpredictability. He needs the stimulus of 'a thoroughly bad climate', to encourage him to use his energies to their best advantage. He longs for a world which will offer him 'ridiculous, mad situations', which will inspire him to write great literature. He desires to do something 'intense and violent'. From the utopia of the World State, he goes with enthusiasm, not to a perfectly organized society, regulated according to principles of love, harmony and mystical union, but to a haphazard community of brilliant misfits, where he may at last be surprised out of the boredom of programmed bliss, to attain unimagined levels of personal fulfilment. In this new environment, Huxley seems confident, Watson's individuality will find full expression.

Whatever Huxley's intentions in writing *Island*, he fails to guarantee the individual freedom of those who, like Helmholtz Watson, are 'too self-consciously individual to fit into community life'. For those who are impatient with any form of orthodoxy, there can be no appropriate utopia. Only a modified Watson would be suffered to survive in Pala. This would be of little significance, were it not that Huxley
had such obvious admiration for the independent-minded Watson, when he created the character in 1932.

As mentioned in Part II(iii), by the time Huxley wrote Island, he seems to have come to an unquestioning acceptance of Sheldon's theory of physiological types (see note 30), and under this theory, Helmholtz Watson, as an undoubted mesomorph, would be diagnosed in childhood as constituting a potential threat to society. Thereafter, his life would be one of imposed physical hardship, of 'strenuous and violent tasks', and the mandatory peril of hazardous rock-climbing courses. He would have no choice but to confront danger, and to involve himself in arduous physical activity. 'Better court the danger of killing yourself than court the danger of killing other people, or at least making them miserable. Hurting them because you're naturally aggressive and too prudent, or too ignorant, to work off your aggression on a precipice', as one of the architects of Palanese society explains. But in Helmholtz Watson, Huxley has created a character for whom self-determination is of paramount importance. Watson, escaping from a world of slothful hedonism, deliberately chooses a life of physical hardship and possible danger, but how would he react if such a course were to be imposed upon him by others, as in Pala, as an essential ingredient of his conditioning programme? Would there be any savour left in state-approved daring and obligatory recklessness? Might not the truly independent-minded mesomorph choose to reject the state's plans for him, deciding perhaps that to pit his energies against the state would be more agreeably audacious than to pit them against the forces of nature? Surely, the perils which
Watson faces must be of his own choosing, since it is fundamental to his nature that he has 'independent ideas of his own?' There is a final point which Huxley seems not to have considered: might not the automatic assumption that every mesomorph is ipso facto a potential murderer arouse in men such as Watson a resentment which would actually cause them to become a possible threat to society?

Helmholtz Watson's self-awareness and will for self-determination render him an unsuitable citizen either for the World State or for Pala. In both utopias, the self is absent. In the World State, the ego is repressed, and in Pala it is disregarded. There is no place for the concept of individual volition in the perfect world of Island, just as there is none in the negative utopia of Brave New World, for how is it possible to exercise one's will, when one is 'released from bondage to the ego'? In Huxley's Pala, the boundaries of the self have become dimmed; there can be no act of will, since there is no actor.

In Orwell's Oceania, as in the total states of Huxley and Zamyatin, the self has been defeated. But whereas in the World State and the One State, the self has been traded against the prospect of eternal ease and security, in Oceania, the citizens receive no compensatory rewards for their subjection. Indeed, the subjection of the citizens is the only purpose for which the state has been constituted. The sole interest of the rulers of Oceania is in wielding power.

Orwell constantly sought an explanation as to why men should continue to desire power over others when they no longer had any
economic motive for doing so. In Orwell's review of the work of James Burnham (see Part I(ii) note 26), he wrote, 'Drudgery persists, class distinctions are probably re-establishing themselves in a new form and individual liberty is on the down-grade: but as these developments are now technically avoidable, they must have some psychological cause .... The question we ought to ask is: Why does the lust for naked power become a major human motive exactly now, when the dominion of man over man is ceasing to be necessary?'

Orwell rejected as facile Burnham's assumption that socialism is unrealizable because the desire for power is an innate human quality, and because some vague historical law decrees that human societies shall always be arranged hierarchically. Orwell believed that socialism was possible, yet for some reason the drive for power seemed to be stronger than the drive for equality.

In Nineteen Eighty-Four, Winston Smith is troubled by the same question. He understands very well how the Party has established its reign of terror, yet he cannot understand why they have chosen to do so. Under interrogation, he is challenged by O'Brien to offer a reason why the Party should be so determined to maintain itself in power. Winston believes that O'Brien will tell him that the Party rules for the good of the masses, who do not want freedom, and cannot endure the anguish of uncertainty, responsibility and choice. He believes that O'Brien will assert that the Party leadership has consciously renounced its own hopes of happiness in the cause of wielding dominion over the weak for their true benefit. Such is the argument
of Zamyatin's Benefactor, of Dostoievsky's Grand Inquisitor, and of Huxley's Mustapha Mond. 'You are ruling over us for our own good', Winston suggests tentatively. But O'Brien quickly and brutally undeceives him: 'The Party seeks power entirely for its own sake. We are not interested in the good of others; we are interested solely in power. Not wealth or luxury or long life or happiness: only power, pure power ..... We are different from all the oligarchies of the past, in that we know what we are doing .... The German Nazis and the Russian Communists came very close to us in their methods, but they never had the courage to recognize their own motives. They pretended, perhaps they even believed, that they had seized power unwillingly and for a limited time, and that just around the corner there lay a paradise where human beings would be free and equal. We are not like that. We know that no one ever seizes power with the intention of relinquishing it. Power is not a means, it is an end. One does not establish a dictatorship in order to safeguard a revolution; one makes a revolution in order to establish the dictatorship. The object of persecution is persecution. The object of torture is torture. The object of power is power ....' 29

O'Brien describes the Party's goal thus: a world where horror and pain will become daily more intense, a 'world of victory after victory, triumph after triumph: an endless pressing, pressing upon the nerve of power .... Always there will be the intoxication of power, constantly increasing and constantly growing subtler'. 30 Although, in his essay on Burnham's work, written in 1946, and cited above, Orwell had repudiated the notion that desire for power is an
innate and ineradicable human drive, in Nineteen Eighty-Four, he seems to suggest that the lust for power is perhaps the most profound and the most enduring of all human drives.

In order to share in the collective power of the state, the citizen of Oceania must lose himself in the corporate body of the Party. The orthodox citizen is no longer an entity, capable of exercising reason and judgment. He is the creature of the state. Winston is told by O'Brien, 'The command of the old despotisms was "Thou shalt not". The command of the totalitarians was "Thou shalt". Our command is "Thou art".'

O'Brien explains to Winston that all rulers ever desire is power - power over human minds and bodies, and thence power over matter, since once the rulers have gained control over the minds of their subjects they can create their own laws of nature. The citizen of Oceania exists only through the Party. He thinks with the Party's corporate mind, accepting and supporting the Party's shifting vision of reality. Devoid of self-hood, the orthodox citizen abandons independent judgment and volition, and enters the schizoid world of doublethink. During the course of Winston's interrogation, O'Brien demonstrates to him his own capacity to believe or disbelieve, forget or remember, entirely at will.

The will in Oceania bears little resemblance to the concept of the will as it is normally defined. Firstly, the will is corporate, rather than individual, serving only the purposes of the state. Secondly, belief appears to be wholly susceptible to control by the
will in Oceania; the will, in effect, exists for no other purpose than to regulate belief. Thirdly, the will is wholly detached from reason, being no more than an instrument for self-delusion. Fourthly, the will appears to control the action both of the conscious mind, and of the unconscious mind, which are brought into elaborate interplay in the complex process of doublethink. Doublethink involves on the one hand conscious discrimination, as the mind adjusts to accommodate new articles of faith, rejecting or repressing conflicting evidence, and on the other hand, automatic credulity, unquestioning acceptance, which registers no inconsistencies, and accepts as eternal truths the ephemerae of Party dogma.

The heretic in Oceania is the man who, like Winston, is incapable of doublethink. The heretic must be so emptied of his former self that he will surrender to the Party of his own free will, out of love for Big Brother. Winston is told, 'What happens to you here is for ever .... Never again will you be capable of ordinary human feeling. Everything will be dead inside you ..... You will be hollow. We shall squeeze you empty, and then we shall fill you with ourselves'.

It is in the annihilation of heretics that the state expresses its power.

The paradox of power in Oceania arises from the fact that for the Party the wielding of power is gratifying only when it is accompanied by coercion, repression and brutality. The rulers need to bring populace to total submission, to automatic acceptance of Party rule. They need to exercise total control over the will and over the thought...
processes of the people. Yet once this has been accomplished, the concept of power loses its meaning.

O'Brien explains to Winston Smith that power expresses itself in the continuing suppression of all resistance. One man asserts his power over another by making him suffer. This is the only sure testimony that power is being exercised. 'Obedience is not enough. Unless he is suffering, how can you be sure that he is obeying your will and not his own? Power is in inflicting pain and humiliation'.

The desire of the Party is to terrorize the populace into utter subjection, to leech them of will and individual consciousness. Yet once this is achieved, the psychic pleasure of the oppressor ceases. The dutiful citizen, in embracing his subjection, and in becoming a mere receptacle for the will of the Party, ceases to be a victim of oppression. He becomes diffused into the state, partaking of its corporate power. As O'Brien explains, 'The individual only has power in so far as he ceases to be an individual .... alone - free - the human-being is always defeated .... But if he can make complete, utter submission, if he can escape from his identity, if he can merge himself in the Party, so that he is the Party, then he is all-powerful and immortal'.

It is the totally submissive, will-less citizen who sustains the power of the state. Without his complicity, the state as an instrument of total oppression would cease to exist. Yet it is the heretic who breathes life into the concept of power, who invests it with meaning. He creates power in becoming its unwilling victim. If the will of all were to be captured by the Party, then there would be none to
oppress. Coercion would cease to exist. If all were to be absorbed into the body of the Party, losing all sense of individual distinction, then there would be no further need of persecution or surveillance. Such a situation would be acceptable in Huxley's World State, or in Zamyatin's One State, where the prime aim is to maintain a stable, perfect state, but in Oceania, where the will of the state can express itself only in acts of sadism and oppression, it would be intolerable.

In all the total states, the heretic is repressed, but in the One State, and in the World State, repression is not an end in itself. Zamyatin's Benefactor and Huxley's Mustapha Mond look forward to the time when heresy will have been totally expunged. But in Oceania, the Party requires the presence of the heretic, whose mind is, for a time, his own. The heretic is the necessary object of repression. The protean mind of the dutiful, will-less orthodox Party member is impervious to mental assault. O'Brien tells Winston that 'the heretic, the enemy of society, will always be there, so that he can be defeated and humiliated over again .... Goldstein and his heresies will live for ever. Every day, at every moment, they will be defeated, discredited, ridiculed, spat upon - and yet they will always survive.35

The relationship between the torturer, O'Brien, and the victim, Winston Smith, is complex and ambiguous. In some ways, it is a far more intense and intimate relationship than that which exists between Winston and Julia. O'Brien has strength, intelligence and a depth of understanding which arouses Winston's respect. Julia can inspire love in Winston, but never respect, and, as mentioned in Part II(iii),
it is evident that Orwell himself had little respect for the character of Julia, whereas in O'Brien he has created a character worthy of both respect and hatred.

It is perhaps a fault of Orwell's Nineteen Eighty-Four that Winston's love for Julia, which is so crucial to the plot, is never wholly credible. Winston's greatest anguish arises from his sense of mental isolation, but this Julia can never fully comprehend. She can offer him physical warmth and comfort, but she cannot assuage his pain. But when Winston meets with O'Brien, he is at once conscious of 'a link of understanding between them, more important than affection or partisanship'. Most significantly, the diary in which Winston expresses his most secret, heretical thoughts, is written not for Julia, who would fail to perceive the nature of his miseries, but 'for O'Brien - to O'Brien'. With Julia, Winston can experience the communion of bodies, but O'Brien offers the prospect of the communion of minds. Winston needs another mind which is capable of encompassing the same thoughts as his own, so that he need no longer suffer alone the burden of sanity in an insane world. O'Brien alone understands him, and he needs above all to be understood, even if that understanding should be used for his destruction. O'Brien has the power to destroy him, a power which Julia could never possess.

One of the most abhorrent and disturbing features of Orwell's account of Winston's degradation at the hands of O'Brien, is the feeling of love, gratitude and admiration for O'Brien, which, through psychic necessity, Winston retains, even while he is undergoing torture. Of Winston Orwell writes, 'He opened his eyes and looked
up gratefully at O'Brien. At sight of the heavy, lined face, so ugly and so intelligent, his heart seemed to turn over. If he could have moved he would have stretched out a hand and laid it on O'Brien's arm. He had never loved him so deeply as at this moment .... The old feeling, that at bottom it did not matter whether O'Brien was a friend or an enemy, had come back. O'Brien was a person who could be talked to. Perhaps one did not want to be loved so much as to be understood. O'Brien had tortured him to the edge of lunacy, and in a little while, it was certain, he would send him to his death. It made no difference. In some sense that went deeper than friendship they were intimates: somewhere or other, although the actual words might never be spoken, there was a place where they could meet and talk ...\textsuperscript{37} From this passage, it seems clear that Winston's love for O'Brien, however grotesquely inappropriate it must seem, is the fruit of his passion to be understood, and for this reason far outstrips all other loves. Is it not then dramatically implausible that the act which heralds Winston's ultimate defeat should be his renunciation of his love for Julia? Julia has at this point come to appear irrelevant.

Winston has the impression that the mind of O'Brien contains and surpasses his own. It can accommodate the Party orthodoxies along with an understanding of Winston's heresies, the Party rationality, along with Winston's heretical rationality. It contains both sanity and insanity. O'Brien is able to follow Winston's thought processes perfectly; he can absorb them, pervert them, and overlay them with the Party logic in such a way that Winston is incapable of
finding his way back to lucidity. Like an implacable god, O'Brien reads all Winston's thoughts, and foresees his failings. Indeed, O'Brien perceives the heretical nature of Winston's mind almost before Winston himself is aware of it, and he deliberately ensnares Winston into acts of revolt. Here there is perhaps an echo of Paradise Lost, where the heretic Satan is, in Shelley's words, 'exasperated to deserve new torments' at the hands of Milton's God. (see note 15 above.)

Superficially, Nineteen Eighty-Four appears to be the most profoundly pessimistic of the anti-utopias, since it depicts a world where pain, hatred, squalor and brutality have annihilated the human will. Yet it may be that its very lack of redeeming features makes it ultimately less menacing than either Brave New World or We.

The citizens of Oceania are quite without liberty, but this is because the state has taken possession of their will by force. But the citizens of Zamyatin's One State and of Huxley's World State have gladly surrendered their freedom in the cause of ease and stability. They have long since ceased to recognise the fact of their own slavery.

There is, writes Rousseau, 'no subjection so complete as that which preserves the forms of freedom; it is thus that the will itself is taken captive'.38 The World State and the One State bear within them the seeds of durability, because the mass of citizens have no sense of being coerced. Sultified by mindless contentment, the citizens presume that the desires of their rulers naturally reflect the true nature of their own desires. Only the dissident is troubled
by his loss of liberty. For the orthodox citizen of Zamyatin's One State, the Guardians inspire only reverence and gratitude. They are 'guardian angels', whose 'onerous and exalted work' it is, to direct the steps of the potentially fallible citizens along the path to perfection. In the total states of both Zamyatin and Huxley, the people have all their wants supplied, they are spared the bother of having to cope with complex human relationships, and they are absolved from the responsibility of moral judgment. The citizens of the World State are enslaved through their hedonism, and those of the One State, through moral and intellectual indolence. Both embrace their servitude without question. But the citizens of Oceania are enslaved and spiritually mutilated by fear alone. Every human instinct is repressed but the instinct to wield power, and only those who by nature have a pathological love of power can hope to find any satisfaction. Even for them, life is dingy and insecure, and there is the constant probability that they themselves will become the victims of the next wave of oppression. A society which offers nothing but unmitigated despair and terror to the vast majority of its members cannot, surely, remain viable forever?

Moreover, the largest section of society in Oceania, the Proles, are excluded from the Party. No effort is made to control their minds through the methods of doublethink, since it is presumed that they have not the capacity to rebel. Yet the Proles exhibit a stolidity and an endurance which may enable them to outlast the terrified and disorientated mental cripples of whom the Party is composed.
It is not certain whether Orwell himself considered that the type of society he described in *Nineteen Eighty-Four* was capable of survival. Within the book itself, O'Brien says that Winston Smith is 'the last man', 'the guardian of the human spirit', and he asserts that once Winston has been brought to inevitable defeat, humanity will die with him. Yet this statement of O'Brien's conflicts strangely with his claim, minutes earlier, that the heretic is an eternal figure in society, who, once vanquished, will always re-emerge, only to be vanquished yet again (see note 35 above). If Winston's defeat is intended to imply the final defeat of the human spirit, then the survival of Oceania is, of course assured.

However, in his other writings, Orwell indicated that he considered that the type of society which he described in *Nineteen Eighty-Four* must ultimately fail. Writing of the theories of James Burnham, Orwell concluded, 'Certain rules of conduct have to be observed if human society is to hold together at all ..... The huge, invincible slave empire of which Burnham appears to dream will not be established, or if established, will not endure, because slavery is no longer a stable basis for human society'.

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5. Ibid., p.94, p.148.
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8. Ibid., p.29.
9. La Nouvelle Héloïse, op.cit., p.528, p.524.
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12. The Brothers Karamazov, op.cit., Vol. 1, pp.278, 298.
13. We, op.cit., p.72.
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22. Ibid., p.34.
24. Ibid., p.209.
26. Ibid., p.64, p.147, p.179.
31. Ibid., p.205.
32. Ibid., p.206.
33. Ibid., p.214.
34. Ibid., p.212.
35. Ibid., p.215.
36. Ibid., p.24, p.68.
37. Ibid., pp.202/3.
38. Emile, op.cit., p.84.
part ii (v) utopia and the subjugation of the arts and sciences

if dominion over the minds of the citizens of utopia is to be complete, then the state must undertake to control human creativity in all its forms. it is recognized by the rulers of utopia that, left to themselves, the arts and sciences may undermine dogma, and serve as a force for social disruption. men have been constructing systems of censorship for as long as they have been devising perfect states. the censor is a familiar, and perhaps an inevitable, figure in utopia, although his presence may not always be consciously acknowledged. even in the gentle paradise of william morris's news from nowhere, fine art is excluded. there is an abundance of beauty, and craft flourishes on every side, but the decision has been made that the art of the perfect society must always serve utility, and somehow the creative artist has withered away.

utopian criticisms of art fall into three main categories. firstly, art is considered to be against reason, secondly it is considered to be against utility, and thirdly, art is held to be against public order. if art is to be permitted to survive in utopia, it must therefore be wholly transformed.

one of plato's major criticisms of the arts centres around the immensurability of artistic creations. that which cannot be measured offends against both reason and order, and cannot therefore be satisfying to man's highest faculties, plato considers. 'measure and proportion are everywhere connected with beauty and virtue', plato declares in the philebus, but these qualities are lacking in the arts.
Plato seems to detach beauty wholly from the arts, allying it instead with harmony, precision, immutability, reason and necessary truth. 'If arithmetic and the sciences of measurement and weighing were taken away from all arts, what was left of them would be, so to speak, pretty worthless', Plato's Socrates comments. Artistic creation generally, he says, employs only man's lower faculties - the ability 'to conjecture, to drill the perception by practice and experience'. 'Music', Socrates maintains, is full of conjecture; 'it attains harmony by guesswork based on practice, not by measurement; and flute music throughout tries to find the pitch of each note as it is produced by guess, so that the amount of uncertainty mixed up in it is great, and the amount of certainty small'.

It is in Zamyatin's We that the utopian desire for rationally perfect art is most aptly satirized. Music, in the One State, is produced by the 'musicometer'. It consists of 'crystalline chromatic scales converging and diverging in endless series - and the summarizing chords of the formulae of Taylor, of McLauren; the full-toned, squarely massive passages of the Pythagorean theorem; the pensive melodies of an expiring oscillatory movement; vivid cadences, alternating with the pauses of Frauenhofer's lines - the spectral analysis of planets ....' 'What grandeur!' D-503 muses, 'And how self-willed the music of the ancients, restrained by nothing save wild fantasies......'

The imaginary world which Zamyatin portrays in We, is a world the lineaments of which were already perceived by Shelley in 1821, when he wrote his Defence of Poetry. 'To what but a cultivation of
the mechanical arts in a degree disproportioned to the presence of the creative faculty, which is the basis of all knowledge, is to be attributed the abuse of all invention for abridging and combining labour, to the exasperation of the inequality of mankind? Shelley asks. We lack imagination, and the 'poetry of life', he suggests, and thus 'our calculations have outrun conception; we have eaten more than we can digest. The cultivation of those sciences which have enlarged the limits of empire of man over the external world, has, for want of the poetical faculty, proportionally circumscribed those of the internal world; and man, having enslaved the elements, remains himself a slave'. The human mind is now attempting 'to exalt over the direct expression of the inventive and creative faculty', the 'application of analytical reasoning to the aberrations of society'. Thus 'it has arisen that the discoveries which should have lightened, have added a weight to the curse imposed on Adam'.

Shelley, like Zamyatin a century later, challenged the utopian assumption that art is without value to man. 'Poets have been challenged to resign the civic crown to reasoners and mechanists .... It is admitted that the exercise of imagination is most delightful, but it is alleged that that of reason is more useful', he wrote. But poetry can serve a higher utility for Shelley, since 'whatever strengthens and purifies affections, enlarges the imagination, and adds spirit to sense, is useful' in this higher sense. Shelley considered that the lower utility is best served by reasoners and mechanists, who are important within their proper sphere: '.... they have their appointed office in society .... They make space and give time. Their exertions are of the highest value'. They serve 'that which banishes the
importunity of the wants of our animal nature, the surrounding men with security of life, the dispersing of the grosser delusions of superstition, and the conciliating such a degree of mutual forbearance among men as may consist with the motives of personal advantage'.

But the 'reasoners and mechanists', Shelley held, ought not to 'deface .... the eternal truths charactered upon the imaginations of men'.

He believed that the influence of the 'mechanist', whose task is to abridge labour, and of the 'political economist', who seeks to combine labour, should be mitigated with the influence of imagination, or paradoxically, even greater inequality would arise, as, he considered, was already the case in England.  

'The cultivation of poetry is never more to be desired than at periods when, from an excess of the selfish and calculating principle, the accumulation of the materials of external life exceed the quantity of the power of assimilating them to the internal laws of human nature'. For Shelley, poetry is the type of thought which must inform all other modes of thinking, 'it is that which comprehends all science, and that to which all science must be referred'. For Shelley, as for Zamyatin, the human faculties of reason and of imagination must always exist in combination. As stated in Part II(iv) of this thesis, there exists no proof that Zamyatin ever read Shelley's *Defence of Poetry*, but Zamyatin's vision of the nature of man is certainly closely related to that of Shelley. There is, moreover, an interesting congruity in the imagery employed by the two writers: for both Shelley and Zamyatin, the creative imagination is symbolised by a glowing
ember. Shelley writes, 'The mind in creation is as a fading coal, which some invisible influence, like an inconstant wind, awakes to transitory brightness'. This brightness is 'inspiration', and if it could be preserved 'in its original purity and force, it is impossible to predict the greatness of the results'. And in Zamyatin's We, the symbol of the Mephis, those who have kept imagination alive, is fire. Beyond the Green Wall, etched upon a rock, is the emblem of the Mephis 'a crude depiction: that of a winged youth with a transparent body, and in the place usually occupied by the heart' there is 'a dazzling ember, smouldering with a dark red glow'.

The same fire burns within the eyes of E-330: D-503 sees 'an oven flaming, sparks, tongues of flame licking upward', when he looks at her. (See also Part II(i) notes 36 and 37).

The creative imagination which is prized by Shelley and Zamyatin arouses grave disquiet in the utopian. Plato was much disturbed by the nature of the artistic drive. Art is engendered by inspiration rather than by reason, Plato wrote, and though this inspiration may be divine, yet it is possibly also insane. (See note 26 below.) In the Apology, Socrates describes how he has asked eminent artists to explain the nature of their most profound works, but discovered that none is able to do so. 'So I learned', Socrates concludes, 'that not by wisdom do poets write poetry, but by a sort of genius and inspiration; they are like diviners and soothsayers, who also say many fine things, but do not understand the meaning of them'.

For Plato, the artist constitutes an especial danger to society because he creates in freedom, by a process which cannot be rationally
understood, nor therefore adequately controlled. If the artist is not to be altogether banished from the perfect state, the nature of his work, and of its genesis, must be entirely altered, so that his art presents only a corroboration of the common vision of the world endorsed by state dogma. He must offer no personal insight, no unique interpretation of the human condition, no surprising, extra-rational revelation.

It is the personal element in art which is not to be tolerated in utopia. The artist may arouse emotions and aspirations which are dangerous to the state. He may stimulate inconvenient desires and dissatisfactions. Art, no less than history, may provide a standard of comparison, thus undermining social stability by promoting doubt and questioning. At the simplest level, the artist may undermine the authority of the state by presenting facts which belie state dogma.

'I have always maintained that every artist is a propagandist', Orwell wrote. 'I don't mean a political propagandist. If he has any honesty and talent at all he cannot be that. Most political propaganda is a matter of telling lies, not only about the facts but about your feelings. But every artist is a propagandist in the sense that he is trying, directly or indirectly, to impose a vision of life that seems to him desirable'. In the view of Orwell, Zamyatin, and the anti-utopian Huxley, the artist presents a unique and personal vision of the world. He can never be wholly assimilated into his society. In the total state, where independent thought is judged to be heretical, his presence is impermissible.

Since the rulers of the total state perceive art as a potential
threat to social order, they seek either to banish it, or else to harness it to the service of the state. But if art is to be used to enhance, rather than to undermine, social stability, it must first be removed entirely from the personal sphere, and taken into the collective sphere. Art as free self-expression must cease to exist, and the state must establish rigid criteria to define the area of acceptable art. Art is depersonalized in the total state. At the intermediate level, it emerges as folk art, or craft, the work of the anonymous many, rather than the work of the known individual. Visual art is reduced to formal design. Verbal art is invariably edifying. Music is simple, traditional and restrained. Such is the art of Huxley's utopia, Pala; it is the art prescribed by Plato - hieratic, didactic, useful and worthy. Another possibility is that art may be taken over by bureaucrats, as in Brave New World. The ultimate depersonalization occurs where art is no longer the product of men at all, but of machines. All elements of freedom and unpredictability are here extinguished. Such a situation is described in Nineteen Eighty-Four, where books are constructed by machine in the state Fiction Department, and in We, where music is mechanically produced in the Music Factory.

For both Orwell and Zamyatin, there is an intimate connection between art and freedom. The artistic imagination, Orwell wrote, 'like certain wild animals, will not breed in captivity'. It is the imagination which, in Zamyatin's One State, is seen as constituting the major threat to social order. Art is not only engendered by imagination, it also stimulates the imagination. In the One State imagination, which frees the mind from the confines of the world of observable fact, is regarded as being an infirmity. The art of the
One State has therefore been reconstituted, devoid of imaginative elements.

Yet although Orwell and Zamyatin both set a high value on the imagination, and contrast the freedom of art with the slavery of dogma, they do not share a common conception of the nature of the artistic drive, neither is there agreement between them as to what properly constitutes art. For Orwell, artistic imagination emanates from the intellect, but for Zamyatin it is essentially non-rational.

'There are two priceless fountainheads in man: brain and sex', Zamyatin wrote. 'From the first proceeds all science, from the second - all art. And to cut off all art from yourself, or to force it into your brain would mean to cut off .... well, yes; and to remain with only a pimple'. In *We*, Zamyatin describes a state where art has been wholly 'forced into the brain'. Consequently, it has ceased to be art, as defined by Zamyatin.

For Zamyatin, then, art is the product of transformed sexual energy. (Here there are echoes of Freud). Art is essentially non-rational, and poetry is perhaps the most pure and potent art-form of all. Zamyatin pays poetry the same tribute as that paid by Plato: both recognise it as a prime force for the destruction of the established order. 'There is', Plato remarks, 'a long standing quarrel between poetry and philosophy'. Poetry has the power to charm men into the ways of passion and disharmony. If, Plato states, 'you admit the honeyed muse in epic or lyric verse, then pleasure and pain will usurp the sovereignty of law and of the principles always recognized by common consent as the best.'
It is the poetic imagination which is most harshly repressed in Zamyatin's One State. 'We have gentled and saddled that once wild element of poesy', D-503 writes in his diary. 'Nowadays, poesy is no longer the unpardonable shrill clamour of a nightingale - poesy is service to the state, poesy is utility'. E-330 remarks that the poets of ancient times were more powerful than the princes of their age. 'Why weren't they isolated, exterminated?' she asks ironically. Poetic language possessed a unique power in Zamyatin's view. For him, the form of language was as significant as its content. He considered that the language proper to his own generation was essentially poetic. 'The old, slow, creaking descriptions are a thing of the past', he wrote. 'Today the rule is brevity - but every word must be supercharged, high-voltage. We must compress into a single second what was held before in a sixty-second minute. And hence, syntax becomes elliptical, volatile'.

Yet while Zamyatin was concerned with the emotive power of artistic language, with 'the enormous, magnificent force of artistic words', Orwell was primarily concerned with language as communication, that is, with the rational power of words. Orwell believed that it was the duty of the writer to impart his particular vision of the truth with integrity and clarity. He was impatient of obscure or enigmatic language, and was ruthlessly critical of pretentious or evasive prose. But he seems at times to have been unable to perceive that language can be cryptic, allusive and indirect without being empty or meretricious. In particular, he seems to show scant appreciation of the character and capacity of poetic language, and of the validity of
Poetic imagery. For this reason, he comes to the startling conclusion that poetry could well survive, in a totalitarian age, whereas prose writing certainly could not. The prose writer, Orwell wrote, 'would have no choice between silence and death. Prose literature is the product of rationalism, of the Protestant centuries, of the autonomous individual'. Orwell seems not to have made any very clear distinction between poetry verse and folk ballad. 'Good verse', he wrote, 'unlike good prose, is not necessarily an individual product.... Verse - and perhaps good verse of its kind, though it would not be of the highest kind - might survive under even the most inquisitorial régime. Even in a society where liberty and individuality had been extinguished, there would still be a need either for patriotic songs and heroic ballads celebrating victories, or for elaborate exercises in flattery: and these are the kinds of poem that can be written to order, or composed communally, without necessarily lacking artistic value. Prose is a different matter, since the prose writer cannot narrow the range of his thoughts without killing his inventiveness.... The weakness in Orwell's position here is obvious. Firstly, he denies to the poet the sense of honour and integrity which he assumes to be characteristic of the good prose writer. He seems to assume that the poet can become a venal apologist for a despotic régime without compromising his art. This is because he considers poetry to be basically without content. 'A poem is an arrangement of sounds and associations, as a painting is an arrangement of brushmarks. For short snatches, indeed, as in the refrain of a song, poetry can even dispense with meaning altogether', Orwell comments. 'It is easier
for a poet than for a prose writer to feel at home in an authoritarian society. To begin with, bureaucrats and other "practical" men usually despise the poet too deeply to be much interested in what he is saying. Secondly, what the poet is saying - that is, what his poem "means" if translated into prose - is relatively unimportant even to himself. The thought contained in a poem is always simple.... 21 It does not, apparently, occur to Orwell that it is unreasonable to suppose that the 'truth' contained in a poem can necessarily be conveyed through the medium of prose. Moreover, he ignores the historical fact that poetry, visual art and even music, none of which can have a prose equivalent, have all been subject to proscription in authoritarian societies. It must follow, then, that the "sense" conveyed by non-prose art forms is sufficiently apparent to the censors for them to be able to determine which works shall be allowed to survive, and which shall be suppressed.

Orwell's vision of poetic language is restricted. He is sensitive to a limited range of the spectrum of poetic expression only. Thus, in his review of Zamyatin's We, Orwell fails to recognize the essentially poetic idiom of the book. He merely remarks that We is badly constructed, and unduly complex, with 'a rather weak and episodic plot'. 22

In Orwell's view, poetry is not necessarily to be regarded as a part of art at all, since art is 'the product of rationalism'. He couples poetry with 'certain arts or half-arts, such as architecture'. 23 For Orwell, prose literature is really the whole of art. It is the intellectual force of language which he values, and in Nineteen
Eighty-Four, it is language as a medium for crystallizing rational thought which is destroyed. But for Zamyatin, it is the emotive power of language which is of prime importance. Art in Zamyatin's One State has been drained of all emotional content, and taken wholly into the realm of the intellect. Thus it has become emasculated. The citizens of Zamyatin's One State are emotionally crippled because their rulers have destroyed the dangerous force of beauty, and substituted mere utility. The art which is destroyed in the One State is that same art which Plato banished from his Republic - imaginative, imprecise, limitless, turbulent and free. And the art which survives in the One State: art as utility and art as moral exhortation, is of the same order as that which is allowed to survive in the Republic.

In his conception of the nature of art, Zamyatin follows the premises of the Platonic tradition, although, of course, his final conclusions are diametrically opposed to those of Plato. Art, Zamyatin agrees with Plato, is against reason. It is also against perfect order and harmony. But it is for precisely this reason that Zamyatin wishes to preserve art as a weapon against entropy.

Plato excludes from his perfect world the art which is the product of the emotions and of the senses; as such it is inferior to the products of the rational mind. Art, Plato considers, is illusion and trickery. It conjures up images and fantasies, and thus obscures the truth. Any work of art, whether visual or verbal, is inevitably inferior to the material objects which it represents. Similarly, in Zamyatin's One State art is regarded as mere idle fancy. The One State prizes 'facts only'. Only that which can be measured
has existence. Art belongs beyond the Green Wall, in the world of the emotions. It is otiose in the perfectly rational One State. In the Republic, Plato comments, 'Every sort of confusion ... is to be found in our minds, and it is this weakness in our nature that is exploited, with a quite magical effect, by many tricks of illusion, like scene-painting and conjuring ... . Paintings and works of art in general are far removed from reality, and ... the element in our nature which is accessible to art and responds to its advances is equally far from wisdom'. Plato's Socrates goes on to explain that man need no longer be led into delusion by the arts. 'We are no longer at the mercy of apparent differences of size and quantity and weight; the faculty which has done the continual measuring and weighing takes control instead. And this can only be the work of the calculating or reasoning element in the soul.'

This higher 'calculating or reasoning element' has taken total control of art in Zamyatin's One State.

In the One State, as in Plato's Republic (see note 10 above), art is condemned because it is held to be engendered by some kind of insane intuition, altogether opposed to reason. In the Ion Plato suggests that poetic inspiration is divine in origin, but it is none-theless madness. Poetry is invariably the fruit of some holy insanity, and can never be engendered by the reasoning mind. '... All good poets, epic as well as lyric, compose their beautiful poems not by art, but because they are inspired and possessed. And as Corybantian revellers, when they dance, are not in their right minds so the lyric
poets are not in their right mind when they are composing their beautiful strains: but when falling under the power of music and metre they are inspired and possessed; like Bacchic maidens who draw milk and honey from the rivers when they are under the influence of Dionysus but not when they are in their right mind. And the soul of the lyric poet does the same, as they themselves say; for they tell us that they bring songs from honeyed fountains, culling them out of the gardens and dells of the Muses; they, like the bees, winging their way from flower to flower. And this is true. For the poet is a light and winged and holy thing, and there is no invention in him until he has been inspired and is out of his senses, and reason is no longer in him: no man, while he retains that faculty, has the oracular gift of poetry'.

Plato is acutely sensitive to the beauty of poetry, yet poetry remains for him a menace to the well regulated society. The inspired poet can know no reason or restraint, and his art is not susceptible to rational control. It is without measure or order. Similarly, in Zamyatin's perfect state, the rulers have taught men to regard the flights of free, artistic inspiration experienced by the artists of former times as being irrational, inexplicable, and therefore dangerous. A lecturer in the Music Auditorium of the One State exclaims with pride, 'By merely turning this handle any one of you can produce up to three sonatas an hour. Yet what toil and moil your ancestors had to go through to attain this sort of thing! They could create only by working themselves into seizures of inspiration - some unknown form of epilepsy ....' And D-503, gazing at the 'sterile, irreproachable'
cloudless sky, is moved to remark, 'How extremely primitive in matters of taste were the ancients, since their poets could find inspiration in those absurd, sloppily shaped, foolishly jostling masses of vapour'. In the One State, a cloud may be of scientific relevance, but it can never arouse the imagination of the poet.

The wild force of inspiration has been stilled in Zamyatin's perfect world, since the mathematician has replaced the composer as the fabricator of music, and poetry has been safely taken into the hands of the state. State Poets 'poetize death sentences', and write Odes to the Benefactor. Their poetry is no more than sterile dogma, devoid of art or originality. Such, for Zamyatin, is the poetry of the total state, poetry which Orwell seems to suppose can possibly yet retain 'artistic value'. (See note 20 above). One of the most poignant ironies of Zamyatin's book is that D-503 wholly fails to perceive the rebellious misery of the State Poet, R-13, a poet who appears to D-503 to be performing his official functions with faultless efficiency and perfect dedication.

Art in the One State, as in Plato's Republic, is held to be against order and harmony. Art, like vice, is restless and energetic, while divine reality is motionless and external. For Plato, as for the rulers of the One State, 'the ideal exists where nothing any longer happens'. Art, therefore, if it is to be permitted to exist at all, must be subject to rigid control. Dramatic poetry, Plato asserts, 'waters the growth of passions which should be allowed to wither away, and sets them up in control, although the goodness and happiness of
our lives depend on their being held in subjection .... One who lends an ear to it should rather beware of endangering the order established in his soul'. Art, then, is by nature a menace to stability. In Zamyatin's perfect state, too, the rulers recognize this danger. Accordingly, they have conditioned the citizens of the One State in such a way that they are incapable of responding to the dramatic and emotional power of the art of former times. The creative works of earlier generations are presented to the citizens as objects worthy only of derision. Thus divine harmony is preserved.

Plato and Zamyatin agree, then, that art has power to undermine the established order, both within the mind of the individual citizen, and within the state. But while for Plato this is good reason for attempting to protect man and society from the power of the arts, for Zamyatin, it is the best possible reason for determining to preserve and promote the arts. Within Zamyatin's symbolism, the artistic imagination is the source of free energy which alone has power to banish psychological entropy. Zamyatin holds that it is the artist's duty to fire the imagination of others, and thus to shatter the complacent circularity of the closed perfect system. 'Harmful literature is more useful than useful literature', Zamyatin wrote, 'for it is anti-entropic. It is a means of combating calcification, sclerosis, crust, moss, quiescence'. In the One State, art has been deprived of its anti-entropic function. Instead, it has been re-designed so as to become itself a force for complacency, for stasis and for quiescence. Beauty, in Zamyatin's perfect state, is held to lie
in 'unfreedom', in the rhythmic, inhuman precision of machines, in mathematical exactitude and in the perfectly predictable cadences which issue from the Music Tower, during the daily March of the One State. 'Only that is beautiful which is rational and utilitarian; machines, boots, formulae, food etc.', D-503 declares. He is lost in admiration at the sight of the regular sequence of rhythmic movements performed by the machines in his workshop. It appears to him as 'a grandiose mechanical ballet'. He decides that the dance is beautiful in that it is 'non-free' motion, and the 'profound meaning of the dance' lies 'precisely in absolute, aesthetic submissiveness, in ideal non-freedom'. And he concludes that 'the instinct for nonfreedom is organically inherent in man from times of old'. For D-503, the purest art is to be found in the 'divine beauty' of mathematics, and in the 'wondrous universe' of the multiplication tables. Art in the One State is the fruit not of the emotions and of the imagination, but of the 'calculating or reasoning element' in the human brain. It proceeds from dianoia, not eikasia. It is no longer image-ridden and magical: it is orderly, rational, impersonal and useful.

The art of utopia is traditionally useful, rational and didactic. Such is the art of Huxley's Island. In Pala, fine art has been banished, since art which has the power to arouse unpredictable emotions is not to be countenanced in utopia. The great store of classical literature has either been repressed or revised. Thus the tragedy of Oedipus has been purged of its tragic elements, and reappears as a vehicle for the moral instruction of children. The play is performed by puppets, rather than by human actors, since Huxley, like Plato,
considers that it is harmful for one man to imitate the thoughts and feelings of another. The only art which survives in Huxley's Pala, apart from educational art, is folk art, the product not of individual inspiration but of collective tradition. In Island, Huxley condemns all art which is not conducive to inner harmony and to social stability.

But Huxley is ambivalent in his conception of the nature of acceptable art. The condemnation of fine art which appears in Island, where art is proclaimed to be incompatible with philosophical truth and with social stability and welfare, had appeared in satirical form in Huxley's Brave New World. In Huxley's anti-utopia, the Savage laments the eclipse of the fine arts in the World State, but he is told by Mustapha Mond, 'You can't make tragedies without social instability. The world's stable now. People are happy .... You've got to choose between happiness and what people used to call high art. We've sacrificed high art'. It is ironical that Huxley himself was willing to make such a sacrifice thirty years later, when he wrote Island.

While fine art is abolished in both the World State and Pala, the nature of the art which remains in the World State is quite unlike that which survives in Pala. The art of Pala, following the traditional model, is designed to promote high moral values. It is state propaganda. In this way, it directly serves social stability. But the art of the World State, while still serving social stability, is not of a moral nature. In the World State art is an instrument for the arousal and control of human emotion, rather than for its suppression. Pornography is the new art of the World State. Similarly, in Orwell's Oceania, mechanically produced pornography
is used as an instrument for the control of the Proles. It is the artistic, rather than the libidinous, which has the power to corrupt and unsettle the citizen of utopia. Consequently, 'high art' becomes the new pornography, to be locked away from curious eyes. The art of Huxley's World State and of Orwell's Oceania is far removed from that of the traditional utopia. The morality of Huxley's World State is nowhere directly served by art. Didactic art lingers, perhaps, in a vestigial form, in the slogans of the social conditioners of the state, but there are no moralistic tales and poems, as there are in the One State and in Pala. In Orwell's Oceania, the state has no ideals and no higher moral purpose which art could serve. Consequently, there can be no didactic act.

Art is banished from Orwell's Oceania for reasons of Realpolitik, because the state cannot tolerate the dissemination of truth. There is no attempt, as there is in the One State and in Pala, to translate art into a more noble, rational and useful form. Orwell's Oceania does no, of course, pretend to be a perfect state. It is merely a total state. As such, it is totally unrelated to the Platonic model. Its rulers rule by simple oppression. They do not utilize the persuasive powers of language to sustain their dominion. Instead, they destroy language as a vehicle for truth. Newspeak is designed to restrict communication and pare down thought to the level of dogma. It is a language so impoverished and distorted that only the sentiments of state orthodoxy can be expressed. It is the perfect instrument for the prevention of literature, and for the destruction of freedom and truth.
Both Orwell and Zamyatin hold that truth is the first concern of the writer. They do not share Plato's view that art obscures truth. Art, they maintain, reflects and illuminates truth. It is not, they consider, in a free, imperfect society, where a multitude of opinions and beliefs is allowed to flourish, that art acts as a force for deception and obfuscation, but in a closely regulated, repressive society, where the shape and content of literature is determined by the censors. In the Republic, Plato's Socrates assures Adeimantus that in the ideal state they will allow only 'the poets and story-tellers of the more austere and less attractive type, who will reproduce only the manner of a person of high character, and in the substance of their discourse 'conform' to the rules laid down.' In this way, Socrates believes it will be possible to protect the eternal, immutable truth inherent in the structure of the state from the corrupting powers of the feckless, beguiling artist. But the anti-utopians consider that there is no piece of state orthodoxy, no officially accepted pronouncement about the nature of man and society, or about the nature of perfection, which should remain immune from the critical assessment of the artist. It is the personal apprehension of truth which concerns the anti-utopians. The writer must always express the truth as it appears to him, that is, his inner truth. He must not be silenced through fear of offending against established visions of reality. Today's generally accepted truth is tomorrow's lie, Zamyatin maintains. In his essay, The Day and the Age, Zamyatin comments, 'Truth is the first thing that present day literature lacks.
The writer has drowned himself in lies; he is too accustomed to speak prudently, with a careful look over the shoulder. This is why our literature fulfils so poorly even the most elementary function assigned to it by history - the task of seeing our astonishing unique epoch, with all it contains of the revolting and the beautiful, and recording it as it is. Plato considered that artists should be employed by the state; in this way, the truth could be safeguarded. But the anti-utopians hold that once an artist becomes a hireling of the state, truth will be destroyed. No state will employ a man to tell the truth. 'Writing of any consequence can only be produced when a man feels the truth of what he is saying', Orwell wrote. 'Without that, the creative impulse is lacking'. For Orwell and Zamyatin, art must be a personal statement.

It is not merely the objective truth of the journalist and the historian which is sacrificed in the total state, the anti-utopians maintain. It is also the artistic integrity of the imaginative writer. Orwell wrote, 'So far as freedom of expression is concerned, there is not much difference between a mere journalist and the most 'unpolitical' imaginative writer. The journalist is unfree, and is conscious of unfreedom, when he is forced to write lies or suppress what seems to him important news: the imaginative writer is unfree when he has to falsify his subjective feelings, which from his point of view are facts. He may distort and caricature reality in order to make his meaning clearer, but he cannot misrepresent the scenery of his own mind: he cannot say with any conviction that he likes what he
dislikes, or believes what he disbelieves. If he is forced to do so, the only result is that his creative faculties dry up. As Sartre wrote, the allegiance of the professional writer must be to 'the dignity of words', and not to the dogma of a political system, which distorts language for its own ends. The validity and integrity of words as bearers of meaning must be preserved if literature is to survive. Orwell, like Sartre, believed that every work of art expresses some form of commitment on the part of the writer, and that this commitment must always proceed from the inner convictions of the artist. Art must never be the servant of dogma. 'You cannot really sacrifice your intellectual integrity for the sake of a political creed - or at least you cannot do so and remain a writer'. Orwell stated.

Samyatin and Orwell share a common regard for the preservation of truth in art, but there are, of course, disparities in their conceptions of the nature of art, and of its demise in the total state. Orwell envisages, in Nineteen Eighty-Four, a world where brutal repression, savage censorship and the state control of language crush literature out of existence, and society is awash with lies. Zamyatin, on the other hand, envisages a perfectly regulated world, where creativity and originality are driven out, partly, indeed, by censorship, but mainly by the pervasive apathy and narrowness of vision which inform the society which he describes. The citizens of the One State are oppressed by the predictability of their world, and by its featureless uniformity. They have lost the capacity to generate the art which would liberate them from their immutable paradise. Virtue, in the One State, lies in total conformity. 'It is clear', E-330 remarks ironically, 'that to be original means standing out from others. Consequently,
to be original means violating uniformity. And what in the idiotic language of the ancients was called being banal means among us only the fulfilment of one's duty.43

Zamyatin's conception of the fundamental importance to humanity of artistic expression, and also of the human need for the stimulus of the unexpected, is endorsed by the physiologist, J.Z. Young. Young writes, 'Play and art both express a need for surprise and for change. This feature is especially important if we are looking for the emotional basis for originality ..... Aesthetic creation and enjoyment are fundamental features of human life. They are activities in which the brain is operating in the same way as it does in daily life, but as it were at a higher level of intensity. All human perception is a form of creative activity .... The activities that go to the creation and enjoyment of works of art are .... quintessentially those by which the brain, working every day as a creative agent, synthesizes input from the world to make a satisfactory life. This is why I say that for human societies the creative aesthetic and artistic activities are among the most important things we can do ... The creations and satisfactions of art include and symbolize both our individual acts of perception and the expression to others of what we perceive. These are the very brain actions that give us the powers of communication by which we obtain all the rest, food, shelter, sex, and social life .... The artist arouses needs and satisfies them. His work is not an impractical luxury, but is closer than that of any other labourer to meeting the continuing long-term needs of man. We
are all symbol-creating creatures by the very working of our brains. Art assures us that our activities are proceeding satisfactorily, and symbolizes the fact that life is worth living. For Young, as for Zamyatin, the life of men and of societies cannot proceed satisfactorily if art is excluded.

While the three writers under review, Zamyatin, Huxley and Orwell, hold that art must inevitably perish in the total state, they also believe that ultimately science will fare little better. However, science possesses some natural advantages within the totally regulated society which art lacks.

Firstly, science, particularly applied science and technology, has natural utility. The scientist has a practical role to play in the promotion of the aims of the state. His special knowledge enables the state to refashion the environment in accordance with the needs of the political programme. Thus the scientist serves the state, whereas, the writers maintain, the artist may not directly serve the state, if he is to remain an artist. The artist serves society only when he serves the truth, and tries to create the best art of which he is capable. But this form of service is precluded in the total state.

Secondly, the work of the scientist requires no popular audience. The scientist works in a small, highly specialized domain, and he has little direct contact with the populace. But the artist requires open access to the public. His work, freely created, should be accessible to all who are disposed to receive it. In the total state, the artist
is a dangerous and indiscriminate communicator. His work can be received, not only by the highly specialized, rigorously trained mind, but potentially by all minds.

Thirdly, following Plato's conception of the nature of the human soul, while art is engendered by man's lower faculties - by his emotions and senses - science is the product of the higher elements in the soul, since it is the product of human rationality. Thus it is that science, of a kind, survives in Zamyatin's One State, while art is banished beyond the Green Wall.

Yet the mind of the scientist, as of the artist, is creative, and the scientist, no less than the artist, needs imagination if he is to bring fresh perspectives to his interpretation of the world about him. Science in utopia, like art, is ultimately sterile. As Mustapha Mond, himself a former scientist, explains to the Savage, in Huxley's Brave New World, 'We don't want to change. Every change is a menace to stability'. This is why, he adds, the controllers of the World State are 'so chary of applying new inventions. Every discovery in pure science is potentially subversive; even science must sometimes be treated as a possible enemy .... It isn't only art that's incompatible with happiness, it's also science. Science is dangerous; we have to keep it most carefully muzzled .... Truth's a menace, science is a public danger. As dangerous as it's been beneficent ..... We can't allow science to undo its own good work. That's why we so carefully limit the scope of its researches .... We don't allow it to deal with any but the most immediate problems of the moment. All
other enquiries are most sedulously discouraged ... It hasn't been very good for truth, of course. But it's been very good for happiness. One can't have something for nothing. Happiness has got to be paid for'. 45

In the total state, science, like art, must act as the servant of dogma. It is merely another instrument for social control. Scientists develop the conditioning techniques necessary for the maintenance of cultural uniformity, and the eugenic techniques required for the control of breeding. In Huxley's Pala, as in the World State, the scope of science is severely restricted. Research is limited to the sphere of the biological sciences in both cases, and is primarily directed towards the perfecting of eugenic procedures. There is also research in the fields of ecology, psychology and agriculture in Pala. The citizens of Huxley's utopia have 'followed the road of applied biology, the road of fertility control and the limited production and selective industrialization which fertility control makes possible, the road that leads towards happiness....' 46 The science of Pala is a science devoid of curiosity. It is designed to support happiness, and, as Huxley says, 'happiness has got to be paid for'.

Palanese science is not, of course, to be equated with the science of the World State. Moreover, it serves to support a social system very different from that found in Huxley's anti-utopian state. But in both societies, scientists follow state-approved procedures to produce the limited results required of them by state policy. Science, chained to the demands of the state, is finally no freer than art.
Orwell, like Huxley, considered that scientific freedom could not long outlive the death of artistic freedom. Scientists, he believed, were too ready to condone attacks upon artistic freedom, believing themselves to be immune from similar harassment. Initially, Orwell believed, this might be the case: scientists might escape repression since their work was useful to the state. 'Provided they steer clear of dangerous subjects such as psychology, scientists are privileged persons.... For the moment, the totalitarian state tolerates the scientist because it needs him', Orwell wrote. But he believed that ultimately, once the total state had become firmly entrenched, the position of the scientist would become similar to that of the artist: he would lose his intellectual freedom. The scientist, Orwell suggested, would do well to recognize that 'any attack on intellectual liberty, and on the concept of objective truth, threatens in the long run every department of thought'.

Science in Orwell's Oceania has ceased to exist except for certain branches of research necessary to the Party in its search for improved methods of social control. There is no longer any word to express the general concept of science. Newspeak is a tool for the prevention of science as for the prevention of literature. Some psychological and physiological research persists, to enhance the proficiency of the torturers. There is also work in the field of physical chemistry and biology for the development of new techniques of mass extermination. But there is no intention that these new techniques shall ever be put into use: the sham warfare which flares up continually along the frontiers which divide the three super-states must never be allowed to
result in conclusive victory. None of the superstates could, in any case, achieve a victory, since all are of broadly similar strength. The purpose of the warfare is partly to arouse nationalistic fervour against an external enemy, and partly to use up the material products of industry, so that living standards can be kept at an artificially low level. War hysteria and needless poverty are promoted by the Party as a means for holding the people in subjection.

Orwell's attitude to war is interesting and unusual. He considered that war, or the possibility of war, was vital to the survival of science, and moreover of rationality as a whole. 'In the past ... war was one of the main instruments by which human societies were kept in touch with physical reality', Orwell wrote. 'So long as defeat meant the loss of independence, or some other result generally held to be undesirable, the precautions against defeat had to be serious. Physical facts could not be ignored .... War was a sure safeguard of sanity, and so far as the ruling classes were concerned it was probably the most important of all safeguards. While wars could be won or lost, no ruling class could be completely irresponsible'.

Orwell believed that the logistics of warfare made it imperative that a certain empirical habit of thought should be maintained. This acted as a safeguard for rationality. Where exact calculations had to be made, reality could not be wholly ignored or distorted. The end of serious warfare, on the other hand, would perhaps lead to the extinction of the habit of mind which made scientific thought possible. 'Hitler ... can't say that two and two are five, because for the purpose of, say, ballistics, they have to make four', he wrote.
'But if the sort of world I am afraid of arrives, a world of two or three great superstates which are unable to conquer one another, two and two could become five, if the fuhrer wished it'.

Orwell's contention that there is a necessary link between the capacity of a nation to wage traditional warfare, and the 'survival of the habit of mind which makes scientific thought possible' is hard to defend. Orwell was well aware that both Stalinist Russia and Nazi Germany were fully capable of fighting a genuine war, while fostering the most grotesque irrationalities in domestic policy. He seems to blur the distinction between accurate computation and the broader concept of rationality. It is perfectly possible to ensure that 'two and two make four' in the weapons research establishment and in the munitions factory, while insisting that they make five in the field of political and social life, and in the broader field of science. Perfectly efficient weapons were being created while the doctrines of Lysenko, and theories of Aryan supremacy were being hailed as the ultimate scientific truth.

While science in Orwell's Oceania has practically ceased to exist, in Zamyatin's One State, science is fostered, and mathematical precision governs all conduct. Yet science serves only to confine the lives of the citizens, and arrest social development. The design of the rulers of the One State is to standardize the lives of all. Ultimately, they intend to colonize the entire universe, and standardize that also. Physical and mechanical science provides the means for this end. Science provides the identical glass cells in which the members of the state are housed; it provides their standardized food,
a derivative of naphtha; it equips the vast, impersonal nurseries, and furnishes the teaching-machines, which serve to indoctrinate the young for life as homogeneous fractions of the social whole. Finally, it provides the medical and technological knowledge required for the performance of the operation of fantiesectomy, a procedure by which all human ingenuity is quelled.

Zamyatin held that the great scientist, like the great artist, is he who has the courage to break away from accepted patterns of thinking through a leap of the imagination. Science, like art, can overturn official truth, and can thus act as a force to dispel psychological entropy. In his essay on Literature, Revolution and Entropy, Zamyatin associates, the names of Galileo, Darwin and Einstein, with those of Schopenhauer, Dostoievsky and Nietzsche. All were, for Zamyatin, generators of new thought, creators of fresh mental energy. But the science of Zamyatin's anti-utopian state, uncontaminated by creativity or originality, and wholly enslaved by state policy, has become a force for entropy.

The anti-utopians hold that neither the arts nor the sciences can survive the death of intellectual freedom. Both are properly the product of the individual mind, which can find no expression in the total state. Orwell holds that the extinction of the arts and sciences will entail the elimination of truth and rationality, and therefore of the human mind, as it is now apprehended. Zamyatin maintains that the arts and sciences are above all expressions of creative energy in an otherwise torpid world. The suppression of this source of energy must result in the arrest of human progress, and the stagnation of human thought. For both writers, loss of creative freedom entails the eclipse of humanity.
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2. Ibid., 56A.
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6. Ibid., p.48.
7. Ibid., p.49.
8. We, op.cit., p.155.
9. Ibid., p.159.
10. Plato, Apology, 22B/C.
15. We, op.cit., p.77.
16. Ibid., p.43.
18. We, op.cit., p.77.
20. Ibid., p.170.
24. We, op.cit., p.220.
27. We, op.cit., p.33.
28. Ibid., p.21.
29. Ibid., p.55.
30. Ibid., p. 39.
33. ibid., p.61.
34. Ibid., pp.21/22.
35. Ibid., p.75, p.76.
37. Plato, Republic, op.cit., p.83.
38. The Day and the Age, in A Soviet Heretic, op.cit., p.113.
40. Prevention of Literature, op.cit., p.166.
43. We, op.cit., p.43.


49. *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, op.cit., p.159.

Conclusion

In this thesis I have argued that while the utopias of earlier centuries were, despite their diversity, the products of confidence, the utopias of the present century are largely the product of despair. The various assumptions which supported the utopian aspirations of the past have lost their credibility. New images of the utopian state have arisen, in which the old utopian ideals of harmony, unanimity of purpose and faultless regularity are extended and elaborated to the point of parody. The new utopians are without faith in either the feasibility or the desirability of the goal of the perfect state. Utopia is no longer considered to be the natural home of enlightened man; thus 'perfection' can only be instituted by force. In the bleak visions of the perfect state offered by the three writers under review, the emphasis is no longer upon the delights which would accrue to man in the Good Society, but upon the machinery of oppression which would be required to maintain such an institution.

As I contended in the Introduction to Part II of this thesis, the bones of the anti-utopian case are all to be discerned in the Areopagitica of John Milton: we live in a world where Good and Evil necessarily co-exist, and where the nature of the one can only be discovered by reference to the nature of the other. The quest for Truth is man's highest task, but it is an unending quest, and no man may lay claim to have concluded his search, and to have taken possession of permanent, unquestionable Truth. Others will always follow who will
refine and amplify his findings. In order to pursue Truth, man must be free to choose, but in utopia, One Truth has replaced all competing visions of reality. All possibility of free enquiry is at an end. In utopia, awareness of moral freedom is heretical, for utopian happiness is born of moral torpor, and perfect harmony is dependent upon the perfect pacification of the populace. It entails the sacrifice of will, desire, uncertainty, and all that has been held to be authentically human. 'Reason is but choosing', and man bereft of the power of choice is 'a mere artificial Adam', doomed to live in 'a perpetual childhood of prescription'.

The perfect state - the state which seeks to fashion the morality of its citizens according to a single ideal of perfection - is finally no more than the total state, for Milton as for the twentieth-century anti-utopians. In the Areopagitica, Milton offers a picture of the extent and quality of social control necessary to such a state, which, in its mordancy and wit, rivals any of the visions of the writers of the present century: 'If we think to regulate printing, thereby to rectify manners, we must regulate all recreations and pastimes, all that is delightful to man', he writes. 'No music must be heard, no song be set or sung, but what is grave and Doric. There must be licensing dancers, that no gesture, motion, or deportment be taught our youth but what by their allowance shall be thought honest; for such Plato provided of; it will ask more than the work of twenty licensers to examine all the lutes, the violins, and the guitars in every house; they must not be suffered to prattle as they do, but must be licensed
what they may say. And who shall silence all the airs and madrigals that whisper softness in chambers? The windows also, and the balconies must be thought on, there are shrewd books, with dangerous frontispieces, set to sale; who shall be the rectors of our daily rioting? And what shall be done to inhibit the multitudes that frequent those houses where drunkenness is sold and harboured? .... Who shall regulate all the mixed conversation of our youth, male and female together, as is the fashion of this country, who shall appoint what shall be discoursed, what presumed, and no further? Lastly, who shall forbid and separate all idle resort, all evil company? These things will be, and must be; but how they shall be least hurtful, how least enticing, herein consists the grave and governing wisdom of a state'.

For the anti-utopian writers, as for Milton, the role of the state is to encourage men to choose wisely, and not to make that 'wise choice' on their behalf. Ultimately, choice is with the individual citizen, and he may choose to reject the state's advice. Without this possibility, morality is dead.

The anti-utopian writers hold that in the perfect state, all that is apprehensible to human consciousness - man's apprehensions of the nature of the world, and of time, and of the human body and the human mind, and all the products of human creativity - the arts and sciences, will be subjugated to the demands of a single dogma. Utopia is no more than the instantiation in the real world of a closed system of thought. And they also hold that in the present century, the new orthodoxies, powered by the new technology, will be imposed far more readily than the old orthodoxies. Utopia has become probable.
But as I have attempted to show, in the course of this review of the ideas of Zamyatin, Huxley and Orwell, while the three writers hold many beliefs in common, there are also significant variations in their visions of the nature of man and of society. Zamyatin's is the purest interpretation of the anti-utopian thesis. In the work of Huxley there is ambivalence, as there is, to a lesser extent, in the writings of Orwell.

For Zamyatin, it is clear that to live on the earth, man has to accept his physical and mental nature, with its capacities and also with its limitations. He has to accept that he is mortal, that he exists in time, and time will bring death and corruption. He has to accept responsibility for his own actions, and the burden of guilt that this acceptance brings, because he has to accept that he is free to exercise choice. He also has to accept his own isolation, his physical separateness from others. All these factors in human life are revealed through self-consciousness.

But utopia offers an avenue of escape from Zamyatin's comfortless world. It is the eternal city, in which man can abandon consciousness of self, individuality, loneliness, guilt, anguish, death, corruption and fears of judgment. Utopia answers a psychological need. It is a bastion against personal annihilation. Man can choose - and this will be his last act of choice - to become dissolved into an impersonal, eternally changeless organism. Thus he need no longer be aware of himself as a perishable entity. The defeat of old age is a common feature in fictional utopias and anti-utopias alike. In Wells's
anti-utopia, The Sleeper Awakes, the hedonistic citizens live in full vigour and beauty until they are ready to melt into voluptuous extinction in the euthanasia parlours. Similarly, in his utopia, Men Like Gods, no one is old, enfeebled, ugly or diseased. The world of beautiful people continues - ungrieving, unaware and unchanged by the influx and efflux of individual entities. A lack of personal awareness numbs the mind against the fact of personal annihilation. The centre of gravity of utopia is in the state, which is eternal, and not in the tiny, temporal individual being. There is no sense of past or future, so no occasion to lament those who have gone, or anticipate those who are to come.

Aldous Huxley, sharing Wells's terror of personal extinction and of the Second Law of Thermodynamics, finally came to embrace the utopian solution. At the time when he wrote Brave New World, Huxley was concerned to warn society of the cost to humanity entailed in the establishment of the perfectly harmonious state, but at last he seems to found the acceptance of time and mortality and individuality too painful to bear.

Huxley came to decide that consciousness of self is mere illusion: all that exists is the Eternal Now of the Void. Man must do his best to get off the Wheel of Time, and escape into the featureless, impersonal chasm of Eternity, which is the true utopia. For Huxley, 'Time Must Have a Stop'. It is significant that a death scene is central both to Brave New World and to Island. In Brave New World, Linda slips gracelessly and ignominiously from life in a haze of soma,
under the curious gaze of a Bokanovsky group of chattering midgets. In Island, Lakshmi is tutored in the techniques of the Yoga of Dying, as she carefully charts her course from the world of time into the world of Eternal Being. Death remained for Huxley the Eternal Horror, which threatened to rob life of all meaning. And release from this Horror cannot be found while consciousness of individual existence persists.

With Orwell, the situation is more complex. Utopianism is for him to be equated with a shameful hedonism. Like Zamyatin, Orwell accepted a world of contingency and change and corporeal frailty, where Good and Evil forever co-exist. 'Perhaps some degree of suffering is ineradicable from human life', he wrote, 'perhaps the choice before man is always a choice of evils, perhaps even the aim of Socialism is not to make the world perfect but to make it better. All revolutions are failures but they are not the same failure'. Orwell here appears to share something of Zamyatin's conception of the revolutionary nature of social change, but there is nonetheless an ambiguity in Orwell's writings which is entirely absent from the writings of Zamyatin. Within Orwell there appear to be two warring desires: the desire to remain separate, self-conscious, moral, free and creative, and the desire to belong, to abandon the unequal struggle for autonomy, and to become absorbed, to 'partake of collective immortality'. (See Part II(ii) notes 8 and 9).

This is discussed by Alan Sandison, in his book, The Last Man in Europe. Sandison writes of Orwell that 'alongside his empiricism
and independence runs not only guilt and a strong consciousness of
the burden of his individuality, but also a fascination with the pros-
pect of handing the responsibility over to some corporate care'.

This 'fascination', ultimately a fascination with the nature of domi-
ination and submission, is especially apparent in Nineteen Eighty-Four,
in Orwell's disquieting exposition of the developing relationship
between O'Brien and Winston Smith. Reference has been made to the
ambivalent quality of this relationship in Part II(iv) of this thesis,
at note 37. Sandison writes of Orwell that he has 'committed himself
to an empirical individualism where man's moral and spiritual integ-
ity, historically authenticated, depends on the basic freedom of a
direct confrontation between the individual and the data of his experi-
ence, and on his sustaining his place in "the stream of history".
For his own good he is clamped to "objective reality". But the strength
this demands of the individual is enormous and the temptation is strong
to return at whatever price into that larger identify from which,
in the heresy of individualism, he has alienated himself. This temp-
tation manifests itself in most, if not all, of Orwell's books but
most powerfully in the unequal conflict between Winston Smith and the
absolute and authoritarian Party in Nineteen Eighty-Four, where the
nostalgic mirage of the Golden Country, as it is called there, ('A
landscape I've seen sometimes in a dream'), is the last illusory
reflection of the Golden City'.

When Orwell first alludes to Winston's vision of the Golden
Country, the significance of the symbol is unclear. The simple,
pastoral landscape which Winston half-remembers from his early youth seems perhaps to represent for him the lost possibility of freedom and warmth and love. At this stage, the 'Golden Country' is linked in Winston's mind with images of Julia. But towards the end of the book, the equation which Sandison makes between Winston's (or Orwell's) yearning for the 'Golden Country' and his desire for absorption into a 'larger identity' becomes quite explicit. Now it is clear that the 'Golden Country' is a world of easeful conformity. It represents a release from the anguish of autonomy and personal identity. Broken by torture, Winston allows himself to experience the peace of surrender to absolute power: 'How easy it all was! Only surrender, and everything else followed. It was like swimming against a current that swept you backwards however hard you struggled, and then suddenly deciding to turn round and go with the current instead of opposing it. Nothing had changed except your own attitude: the predestined thing happened in any case. He hardly knew why he had rebelled .... Everything was settled, smoothed out, reconciled. There were no more doubts, no more arguments, no more pain, no more fear .... He walked easily, with a joy of movement and with a feeling of walking in sunlight. He was not any longer in the narrow white corridors in the Ministry of Love, he was in the enormous sunlit passage, a kilometre wide, down which he had seemed to walk in the delirium induced by drugs. He was in the Golden Country, following the foot-track across the old rabbit-cropped pasture. For as long as he can retain his mind intact, Winston is determined to preserve his individual entity, and to resist
diffusion into the immortal body of the Party. Yet he is at the same time tormented by the desire to submit to O'Brien, and to meet with him 'in the place where there is no darkness'.

While it is apparent that Orwell's fears and aspirations for humanity are expressed through the thoughts and words of his character, Winston Smith, the victim of oppression, yet there is more than a shadow of respect, perhaps even of envy, for the character of the oppressor, O'Brien, who is all-powerful, courageous, omniscient and convinced of the rectitude of his actions in the service of the Party. And O'Brien is, above all, blessed with the gift of immortality, which arises from his being wholly of the Party, a 'cell in an everlasting body'. (See Part II(ii) note 8). Orwell shares with his creatures, O'Brien, a rigorously disciplined intellect, and a contempt for hedonism and for all physical and moral softness. And Orwell, despite his obvious horror of oppression, and his humane concern for the welfare of mankind, has, like O'Brien, the capacity to tolerate brutality when it is set to serve some higher purpose. Writing in 1940 of the revolution which he believed to be both desirable and imminent, Orwell commented, 'I dare say the London gutters will have to run with blood. All right, let them, if it is necessary'.

It is obviously true that O'Brien, unlike Orwell, glories in acts of violence, yet, within O'Brien's contorted logic, such acts are justified, since they serve to promote the continuing and increasing power of the immortal Party. It is possible to detect in the character of O'Brien, a fleeting and distorted reflection of the darker side of Orwell's nature. O'Brien offers,
in an extreme form, a solution to the problem of loneliness and guilt and mortality, a solution so terrible that it is to be instantly rejected.

Finally, for Orwell, escapes into immortality through obliteration of the Self are not to be contemplated. It is, after all, the Self which he is determined to preserve. Entry into the corporate immortality of timeless utopia is conditional upon the act of abandonment of Self, and Orwell, unlike Huxley, finds this cost unthinkable. For him, the Self is made real and preserved in the world of time; it achieves a kind of immortality in the continuing course of history, in memory and in written reports. This is the only solution possible.

Only in the work of Zamyatin is there no sense of the seductive appeal of utopian solutions. For Zamyatin, there is no temptation to abandon the pain of heresy and seek absorption in the timeless, impersonal bliss of orthodoxy. 'Every today is at the same time both a cradle and a shroud', he writes: 'a shroud for yesterday, a cradle for tomorrow .... Today is doomed to die - because yesterday died, and because tomorrow will be born. Such is the wise and cruel law .... Today denies yesterday, but is a denial of denial tomorrow. This is the constant dialectic path which in a grandiose parabola sweeps the world into infinity. Yesterday, the thesis; today, the antithesis; and tomorrow the synthesis'.11 For Zamyatin, the passage of time and the passing of generations is to be welcomed. He accepts the inevitability of a never-ending cycle of birth and death, of an infinite series of revolutions. Today dies that tomorrow may be
born, and our ideas and aspirations must also die, so that those of our children may be born. Only in this way, Zamyatin holds, can the world be recharged with energy, and thus avoid descent into entropy. Zamyatin is the true anti-utopian, the iconoclast, eager to destroy received orthodoxies, so that new orthodoxies may arise, to be destroyed in their turn, and replaced by others. As Alex Shane comments, Zamyatin's conception of the nature of human progress is fundamentally Hegelian, and for Zamyatin, 'the key figure of the Hegelian dialectical spiral is the heretic who rejects the accepted canons, be they social, political, scientific, religious, or artistic, and looks ahead to the future. Without him, progress would be impossible'. Within Zamyatin's conceptual framework, 'The world is kept alive only by heretics'.

Zamyatin wrote that it is only in differences that life lies. (See Part II(ii) note 35). He was, like Milton, appalled at the blind conformity and narrowness of vision which pass for perfection in the closely regulated state. Like Milton, Zamyatin scorned the 'fantastic terrors of sect and schism', which he perceived in his society. For the anti-utopian, 'perfection' consists, paradoxically, in dissension and innovation and honest scepticism. It is not the product of uncritical minds, united in pursuit of a single, common goal. Milton wrote, 'Where there is much desire to learn, there of necessity will be much arguing, much writing, many opinions; for opinion in good men is but knowledge in the making ..... There must be many schisms and many dissections made in the quarry and in the timber, ere the house of God can be built. And when every stone is
laid artfully together, it cannot be united into a continuity; it can but be contiguous in this world; neither can every piece of the building be of one form; nay rather the perfection consists in this, that out of many moderate varieties and brotherly dissimilitudes that are not vastly disproportional, arises the goodly and the graceful symmetry that commends the whole pile and structure'.15
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1. Areopagitica, op.cit., p.62, pp.48/48 (see Introduction to Part II, notes 1 and 3).

2. ibid., pp.59/60.

3. Island, op.cit., p.244.


6. ibid., p.168.


8. ibid., p.223, pp.224/5.

9. ibid., p.196.


13. ibid., p.51.


15. ibid., pp.93/93 and p.94.
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