The Rules of the Game:
Allende's Chile, the United States and Cuba, 1970-1973.

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Abstract

This thesis is an international history of Chile and inter-American relations during the presidency of Salvador Allende. On the one hand, it investigates the impact external actors and international affairs had on Chilean politics up to and immediately following the brutal coup d'état that overthrew Allende on 11 September 1973. On the other hand, it explores how the rise and fall of Allende’s peaceful democratic road to socialism affected the Cold War in Latin America and international affairs beyond. Based on multi-archival research, online resources and interviews conducted in Havana and Santiago, it places Chile – and the regional and international context in which Allende existed – at the heart of a story that has too often been told from Washington’s perspective and in isolation from the history of Latin American and Third World politics. It argues that the direct significance Allende’s Chile had for Latin America – and more specifically, the Southern Cone – between 1970 and 1973 was to reinvigorate a battle for control of the continent between those who sought socialist revolution and those who wanted to destroy it.
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## Abbreviations

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<th>Description</th>
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<td>AMRE</td>
<td>Archivo General Histórico, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, (Chilean Foreign Ministry Archive), Santiago.</td>
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<td>AMRE-Brasilia</td>
<td>Arquivo Histórico, Ministerio de Relações Exteriores, (Brazilian Foreign Ministry Archive), Brasilia.</td>
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<td>API</td>
<td>Acción Popular Independiente (Popular Independent Action)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ARA</td>
<td>Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State, United States</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency, United States.</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDP</td>
<td>Chile Declassification Project, Freedom Of Information Act Reading Room, Department of State.</td>
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<tr>
<td>CODE</td>
<td>Confederación Democrática (Democratic Confederation).</td>
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<tr>
<td>COMECON</td>
<td>Council for Mutual Economic Assistance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CREST</td>
<td>CIA Records Search Tool, NARA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSD</td>
<td>Castro Speech Database.</td>
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<tr>
<td>DGLN</td>
<td>Departamento General de Liberación Nacional (General National Liberation Department), Ministry of the Interior, Cuba.</td>
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<tr>
<td>DIA</td>
<td>Defense Intelligence Agency, United States.</td>
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<td>DOS</td>
<td>Department of Defense, United States.</td>
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<td>G77</td>
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<tr>
<td>IBRD</td>
<td>International Bank of Reconstruction and Development.</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDB</td>
<td>Inter-American Development Bank.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENU</td>
<td>Escuela Nacional Unificada (Unified School System).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ERP</td>
<td>Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo (Revolutionary Army of the People).</td>
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<tr>
<td>EEUU</td>
<td>Los Estados Unidos, (The United States).</td>
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<tr>
<td>EXIMBANK</td>
<td>Export-Import Bank, United States.</td>
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<tr>
<td>FD</td>
<td>Frontline Diplomacy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G77</td>
<td>Group of 77.</td>
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<tr>
<td>JCR</td>
<td>Junta Coordinadora Revolucionaria (Revolutionary Coordinating Junta).</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAP</td>
<td>Military Assistance Programme.</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAPU</td>
<td>Movimiento de Acción Popular Unitario (Movement of Popular Unitary Action).</td>
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<tr>
<td>MINCEX</td>
<td>Ministerio de Comercio Exterior (Cuban Ministry of External Trade).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MININT</td>
<td>Ministerio del Interior (Cuban Ministry of the Interior).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINREX</td>
<td>Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores (Cuban Foreign Ministry).</td>
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MIR Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionario (Movement of the Revolutionary Left).
MRE Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores (Chilean Foreign Ministry).
NIEO New International Economic Order.
NARA National Archives and Record Administration.
NPMP Nixon Presidential Materials Project.
NSC National Security Council.
NSCF National Security Files.
NSC IF National Security Council Institutional Files.
OAS Organisation of American States.
OEA Organización de los Estados Americanos, (Organisation of American States).
OLAS Organización Latinoamericana de Solidaridad (Organisation of Latin American Solidarity).
PCCh Partido Comunista de Chile (Chilean Communist Party).
PDC Partido Demócrata Cristiano (Chilean Christian Democrat Party), Chile
PN Partido Nacional, (National Party), Chile.
PS Partido Socialista, (Socialist Party), Chile.
SRG Senior Review Group, National Security Council (USA).
TNA The National Archives, Kew, London.
UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.
UP Unidad Popular (Popular Unity).
WHD Western Hemisphere Division (CIA).
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Chile and the Americas
Introduction

On the night of 4 September 1970, Fidel Castro was in the offices of Cuba’s official newspaper, *Granma*, when he heard that his friend, Salvador Allende, had narrowly won Chile’s presidential elections. After instructing the newspaper’s front page to proclaim the “Defeat of Imperialism in Chile”, he signed a copy for Allende. Castro then called the president-elect at dawn to congratulate him on what he considered to be the most important revolutionary triumph in Latin America since his own victory a decade before.¹

A day later, Allende stood elated before hundreds of thousands of supporters and declared that Latin America and countries worldwide were looking towards Chile.² When asked how the United States should respond to his victory, Allende replied that the United States needed to “understand” that Latin America could not live indefinitely in “misery and poverty” while financing the “richest and most powerful country in the world”.³

But in Washington, President Richard Nixon and his National Security Adviser, Henry Kissinger, did not ‘understand’; they were outraged. Nixon demanded that the CIA “save Chile!”⁴ And Kissinger, who had dismissed the “South” as being of “no importance” a year before, now changed his mind.⁵ In his view, Allende’s victory posed “one of the most serious challenges ever faced in the hemisphere”. According to him, it had a bearing on “the developing world; on what our future position will be in the hemisphere; and on the larger world picture, including our relations with the USSR.”⁶ The South, it seemed, had suddenly become very important for the future of inter-American relations, the Third World and the Cold War.

Why Allende’s presidency assumed such global importance and the implications this had both for Chile, the Americas and the world beyond is the subject of this thesis. On the one hand, it investigates the impact external actors and international affairs had on Chilean politics up to and immediately following the brutal coup d'état that overthrew Allende on 11 September 1973. On the other hand, it explores how the rise and fall of Allende’s presidency affected the Cold War in Latin America and beyond. Primarily, Chile’s left-wing coalition government transformed the balance between revolution and reaction in the Western Hemisphere and, as such, the thesis predominantly focuses on Chile’s regional context. However, as an international history of Chile, it also investigates Latin America’s place within broader global developments, such as the emergence of East-West détente and the growing North-South divide in world politics.
The early 1970s was a moment of seeming change in the international system. The rules of the game of world politics appeared to be changing; East-West tensions were diminishing, Latin American nationalists were asserting their independence and the Third World was simultaneously rising to demand a more equitable share of the globe’s power. Within Chile, the rules of socialist revolution were also challenged. Together with the left-wing coalition he led, Allende proposed *La Vía Chilena al Socialismo*—a Chilean road to socialism by constitutional and peaceful means, which undermined both the idea that communism was undemocratic and the notion that only armed struggle could lead to revolution. Indeed, Allende repeatedly argued that *La Vía Chilena* was the first new model for building socialism since 1917. But this model failed, and as the US scholar Paul Sigmund noted, the next three years saw a “breakdown in the observance of the constitutional ‘rules of the game’” that had traditionally governed Chilean politics. By September 1973, the struggle over Chile’s future was determined by what increasing numbers of participants saw as a life and death struggle. While politics were absolutely transformed within Chile, however, very little changed with regards to the relationship between North and South or East and West, where the dependency of the weak endured and ideological conflict at the centre of the Cold War prevailed.

In the post-Cold War world, historians have been examining the past from new angles, asking questions about the core preoccupations of Third World states during the latter half of the twentieth century. While the Cold War battle between capitalism and communism did not dictate all regional developments, growing access to historical sources in Africa, Asia and Latin America have shown that it had a profound impact on the way in which societies throughout the global South developed and the manner in which their leaders conceptualised their goals. Rather than a sideshow to a bipolar superpower rivalry, the Third World also played an important role in shaping international politics in the latter half of the twentieth century. It was in Latin America, Africa and Asia where the ideological divisions at the heart of the Cold War led to revolutionary upheaval and counterrevolutionary backlash (with and without superpower intervention), and where the hot wars of the Cold War were fought with weapons, funds and assistance from abroad. It was also in their responses to revolutionary transformations and conflicts in the Third World that leaders in Washington and Moscow came to understand, adjust and reformulate their struggle against each other. The Cold War did not revolve solely around Washington, Moscow and Europe; it was truly global and it was at least partly conditioned by the relationships within the southern hemisphere as well as between the great powers and weaker Third World states. To study the conflict in the
southern hemisphere is therefore not merely to “widen the stage” and bring in needless “extras”, as Anders Stephanson has suggested, but rather to gain an understanding of the central driving forces and nature of the conflict.\textsuperscript{10}

Allende’s narrow victory in a three-way race for the presidency reverberated around a world divided by the ideological schisms of the Cold War and had instant repercussions for Chile’s relations with Washington, Moscow and Havana. Three years later, the experience and failure of \textit{La Via Chilena} became the focus of intense debate and disagreement within, as well as between, left-wing parties worldwide as different lessons were drawn and acted upon. Henceforth, memories of the failure to deliver peaceful revolution in Chile – and the devastating impact Pinochet’s coup had for hopes of revolutionary transformation in Latin America – contributed to the way that struggles between communism and capitalism evolved in countries as far apart as Italy and Nicaragua, and in regions as distant as the Southern Cone and Southern Africa.

In hindsight, Allende’s ambitious project to overthrow capitalism and transform international economic relations through peaceful democratic means appears hopelessly idealistic. Yet as the former \textit{Washington Post} journalist, John Dinges, argued, all those who study the history of Latin America during this period need to appreciate “one improbable fact”: that “radical social revolution was a real possibility for millions of people, colouring everyday life with hope or dread depending on the circumstances and political views of each individual”.\textsuperscript{11} While the potential success of regional revolution during the Cold War years was wildly exaggerated, Allende’s election was clearly \textit{perceived} as a progressive step towards a revolutionary future both by those who heralded it and by those that dreaded its consequences. As Raymond Garthoff argued in his seminal study of détente, “in international politics, actions and policies are based not only on objectively perceived national interests and objectives, but also on subjective perceptions of interests and intentions of others”.\textsuperscript{12}

When Allende assumed the presidency, the Cold War struggle between capitalism and socialism in Latin America was most clearly represented by the battle between the United States and Cuba as the polar opposites of reaction and revolution. Prior to the Cuban revolution, US anti-communism and exaggerated fears of Soviet influence had already led Washington to oppose leftist forces, bolster right-wing dictators and establish a regional security framework.\textsuperscript{13} After 1959, these same fears were intensified by Fidel Castro’s revolutionary example. By 1970, opposing Cuba’s influence had prompted President John. F. Kennedy to launch the Alliance for Progress as a means
of protecting the region from revolution, and his successor, Lyndon B. Johnson, to continue and expand major US interventions in Chile, Brazil, British Guiana and the Dominican Republic, not to mention extensive operations against Castro himself. Faced with this counter-revolutionary offensive in the 1960s, especially after the Cuban Missile Crisis, the USSR increasingly accepted the region as a US sphere of influence, tried not to provoke Washington’s hostility and prioritised non-ideological economic ties over riskier support for socialist revolution. As far as Moscow’s leaders were concerned, Latin America was a place where revolution would progress more gradually, through class-alliances and constitutional means, and in two stages (national bourgeois and then socialist). Their analysis of the balance of forces in the region during the mid-1960s thus led Moscow to oppose Cuba’s radical attempts to ignite socialist revolution ahead of time through armed insurgency.

Despite successive failures, Cuba’s revolutionary state offered a radical and consistent challenge to the United States influence in the hemisphere during the 1960s. Combining ideas of social justice that had come to prominence during Cuba’s nineteenth century struggle for independence with Marxism and anger at US interventions in Latin America, Havana’s revolutionary leaders extolled defiant, radical nationalism and an internationalist commitment to accelerate Latin America’s ‘second independence’. Prior to assuming power, Fidel Castro had called for Cuba to become the “bulwark of liberty” in the Americas and acknowledged his “destiny” would be to wage a “much wider and bigger war” against the United States. Besides the struggle to free Cuba, and as Piero Gleijeses, the historian of Cuba’s “conflicting missions” against the United States in Africa, has acknowledged, “history geography, culture and language made Latin America the Cubans’ natural habitat, the place closest to Castro’s and his followers’ hearts”. Manuel Piñeiro, head of Cuba’s Latin America policy for three decades after the revolution, explained:

[W]e are an inseparable part of Latin America. Our revolution is a part of the Latin American revolution. Each of our triumphs makes the fraternal countries stronger. Every Latin American victory strengthens our revolution. Our battle won’t have ended until all of the peoples of Our America have freed themselves of the neo-colonial yoke.

Although it was the most intense theatre of confrontation between Washington and Havana
in ideological (but not practical) terms, the story of US-Cuban ‘conflicting missions’ in the Americas has not yet been fully told. Overall, Cuba’s Latin American offensive against US influence in Latin America was far more restrained than in Africa, which Gleijeses ascribes to the perceived risks involved and problems of promoting insurgency as opposed to working with sovereign leaders. Even so, according to US intelligence sources, the Cubans trained 1,500 to 2,000 Latin Americans in guerrilla warfare and politics between 1961 and 1964. Throughout the 1960s, the Cuban government also embarked on numerous (but disastrous) efforts to support and spark armed revolution in Colombia, Argentina, Peru Venezuela, Guatemala, and Bolivia. In 1967, at the height of Cuban interventionism, and just before his death in Bolivia, Ernesto ‘Che’ Guevara urged Latin American revolutionaries to fight decisive cumulative wars against the United States (‘two, three, many Vietnams’).

While it is beyond the scope of this thesis to examine the nature of this struggle in its entirety, what follows is the next chapter of it: both countries’ involvement in Chile between 1970 and 1973. By this stage, Cuba was scaling back its support for guerrilla insurgency in the region and the United States was distracted by its entanglement in Vietnam. Yet in late 1970, the struggle between them for influence and prestige in Latin America began a new phase. Henceforth, Havana strove to safeguard Allende’s democratically elected government and Washington tried to overthrow it whilst both simultaneously endeavoured to change the balance of power in the region towards revolution or away from it. In this struggle, the Chileans themselves were not passive actors, subverted by outside forces; rather they themselves orientated their country towards revolution. And although the size and significance of their roles differed, Brazilians, Bolivians, Peruvians, Uruguayans, Argentineans and members of the Soviet bloc also played important roles.

Despite the vast amount that has been written about Allende’s Chile, there has been no multidimensional history either of how Chile fitted within the inter-American system or of the extent to which Allende transformed Washington and Havana’s regional agendas. The most recent secondary work on Chile from an international Cold War (as opposed to purely US) perspective is Jonathan Haslam’s *The Nixon Administration and the Death of Allende’s Chile: A Case of Assisted Suicide* published in 2005. In certain respects, Haslam’s approach to the topic of Chile’s international relations during the Allende years is similar the one adopted in this thesis. He explores Cuba’s growing influence in Chile from the 1960s onwards and Castro’s interaction with *La Vía Chilena*, the polarisation of Chilean society between Left and Right as a reflection of global Cold
War tensions, the way in which United States intervention exacerbated Allende’s difficulties and Allende’s failed attempts to enlist Soviet support for his presidency. He also makes use of many of the same new sources (albeit with the addition of East German and Italian Communist Party sources, and with the omission of interviews with key Cuban participants, the Chilean Foreign Ministry’s correspondence with its embassy in Washington and recently released Nixon Presidential and State Department files at College Park, Maryland).

However, there are a number of key differences between Assisted Suicide and what follows. Firstly, Haslam’s exclusive focus is on the rise and fall of Allende’s presidency whereas this thesis has a wider framework, looking not only at how international actors operated in Chile during the Allende years but also how events in Chile operated in shaping their policies towards Latin America and the Third World. The significance of the findings presented here is to offer new insight into the impact that international tensions in Chile had for international relations elsewhere in the Southern Cone, and how Allende’s election transformed the Nixon administration’s approach to Latin America. Secondly, there are a number of differences in our analyses of the Cuba-Chile relationship. Haslam has drawn on US and East German intelligence sources to argue that Castro’s relationship with Allende was disrespectful, subversive and tense; he describes the Cubans in Chile from 1970 as waiting “ominously and somewhat impatiently in the wings, the perennial ghost at the feast, a standing alternative to the Allende experiment”.26 This thesis suggests that the relationship was more respectful despite significant disagreements about arming the Chilean Left a year earlier than Haslam is aware of. Significantly, the thesis, in contrast to Assisted Suicide, details the Cubans’ preparation for the coup and experience during it, details which offer considerable insight into Havana’s commitment to Allende, Castro’s readiness to participate in a prolonged resistance to military forces, and the coup leaders’ belief that expelling Cubans from the country was a prerequisite to the successful toppling of Allende’s government. Finally, one of Haslam’s main contributions to the historiography on US-Chilean relations is his suggestion that in mid-1973, Nixon and Kissinger sidestepped the CIA and used the Pentagon’s contacts with the Chilean military to embark on an ultra-secret operation to oust Allende from government. Consequently, Haslam argues that “the US government was the architect of the coup”.27 Yet as chapter six of this thesis examines in more detail, this intriguing argument remains inconclusive. It is also a contention of this thesis that acknowledging the White House’s skulduggery tells us only part of the story of the administration’s role in killing off the Popular Unity government, and that the interagency
contingency planning for a successor regime that began over a month before the coup took place tells us a lot more. Not only was consensus more frequent than disagreement when it came to the Nixon administration’s hostility towards Allende, but it was also significant in determining Washington’s subsequent policies aimed at integrating Pinochet’s dictatorship into regional and international politics.

Ever since Allende’s presidency, when disclosures emerged of multinational and US government pressure against Chile, intense debate has centred on the extent to which Washington was responsible for Allende’s failure. Whilst there is broad consensus that the United States cannot be held exclusively responsible for La Vía Chilena’s failings, extensive declassification of US documents has led historians to eagerly re-examine – or (re) expose – US intervention in Chile. Overall, a narrow historiography of blame for Allende’s downfall has continued to dominate discussion; who knew, what they knew, when, and with what purpose have been the main channels of enquiry, with particular emphasis on Kissinger’s undeniably immoral support for subverting democracy and on the extent of his responsibility in trying to prevent Allende’s inauguration. (In this regard, the notion of Allende’s “assisted suicide” is the latest in what will undoubtedly be a continuing debate). But as the historian, Jussi Hanhimäki, has argued, “it would be a great shame if the sudden explosion of available archival materials simply served to highlight Kissinger’s role and did not do the proper job of placing him in context”. Indeed, as he persuasively argues, “the important story…is not whether he was the all-powerful conspirator and manipulator…but the wise practitioner of realpolitik” but rather “why certain policy options prevailed over others, how the implementation of policy functioned, and why it produced positive or negative (long- and short-term) results”.

This thesis aims to expand the parameters of analysis for examining the international history of Allende’s Chile. In a private conversation with Allende on the occasion of his inauguration as president, US Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs, Charles Meyer, asserted that bilateral relationships were “not only played in a direct and immediate way but also in multilateral arenas”. Yet what was the multilateral arena that confronted Allende and how did it impact of domestic Chilean politics?

In seeking to untangle Chile’s international relations during the Allende years, this thesis addresses four under-studied topics. First, it examines the Nixon administration’s intervention in Chile in the context of its policies towards Latin America and discusses Washington’s efforts to
isolate Chile internationally. In studies of Nixon’s regional policy, the well-known story of US intervention in Chile has generally been treated as the case study. Beyond this, it is generally agreed that Latin America was not ‘important’ to Nixon and Kissinger in the early 1970s besides their general preference for military leaders and disdain for expropriation of private US investment. Far more is known about Washington’s regional policies and support for the counter-revolutionary terrorist network ‘Operation Condor’ in the mid-1970s. Yet recently, declassified documents relating to other parts of the Nixon administration’s Latin American policy suggest that isolating Chile was part of a far larger regional approach before the Condor Years that has heretofore not been understood. Bringing these disclosures together, in addition to extensive new archival research, this thesis examines the extent to which Washington’s Latin American policies were connected as well as how and why Washington opposed Allende in the hemisphere.

The second subject of enquiry is the significance that other events, states and actors in the Southern Cone had for Chile. If Allende’s election was the second most important revolutionary advance in Latin America after Cuba, his overthrow was the second most important victory for counter-revolutionary forces after the Brazilian coup in 1964, where the reformist regime of João Goulart was toppled by a right-wing military dictatorship. Since the Chilean coup in 1973, many have pointed to parallels between the means and ends Brazil’s military leaders had used to seize power and those used by the Chilean junta that overthrew Allende. The role – albeit vaguely defined – played by Brazil’s military dictatorship in Chile and Latin America either as a model for conservative military leaders or as a direct sponsor was also noted at the time. When a right-wing coup in Bolivia in 1971 occurred, the Cubans certainly blamed US imperialism and its military “gorillas” in Brazil. This thesis asks to what extent these counter-revolutionary events were related to each other and how, if at all they affected La Via Chilena.

Third, the nature of the Chile-Cuba relationship is analysed. Thirty years after Sigmund lamented the “unfortunate” lack of information “about the intervention of the other side” we still know relatively little about Havana’s involvement in Chile even though Cuba is commonly regarded to be the other “extreme” of Chile’s “internationalization” during Allende’s presidency. With key exceptions, the history of Cuba’s foreign policy since 1959 has suffered from a lack of access to archival sources. Although Cuba’s leaders view the process of declassifying all documents of the post-1959 period with reluctance, Havana’s Latin American policies are treated
with exceptional sensitivity. Particularly controversial are longstanding questions about Cuba’s armed assistance and training to regional left-wing parties, including those in Chile.

There are two broadly conflicting views of Cuba’s role in Chile. On one hand, the Cubans have been depicted as subverting Chilean democracy and establishing a base in Chile for supporting regional insurgency.\(^4^4\) On the other hand, left-wing Chileans have argued that the Cubans not only failed to offer enough arms to defend the revolution, but that they “abandoned” Allende to his fate.\(^4^5\) In his recent book on Cuba, Richard Gott suggests that Castro found Chile’s constitutional road to socialism an “unnerving” challenge, but that the Chilean far Left posed an unwanted problem in the context of Cuba’s realignment with Moscow, and that his visit to Chile in 1971 was a “serious embarrassment” to both him and Allende.\(^4^6\) The clearest evidence we have regarding Castro’s own views of the relationship he had with Allende are his comments to Erich Honecker in 1974, which suggest deference (in actions, if not opinion) to Allende’s leadership.\(^4^7\)

But the Cuban relationship with Allende deserves clarification. Who was in charge? Were the arms that Cubans delivered to Chile given to protect Allende’s constitutional mandate or to launch revolutionary violence and seize power? In his seminal work on Cuban foreign policy, Jorge I Dominguez argued that Havana’s leaders “are neither dogmatic or stupid: they have learned from past mistakes”.\(^4^8\) But the lessons of a decade of foreign policy in Latin America they took to Chile and what they learnt as a result of their involvement in that country have not yet been fully investigated. Sandwiched between Che Guevara’s death and Havana’s intervention in Angola, Cuba’s foreign policy in the late-1960s and early 1970s deserves more attention.

Finally, this thesis examines Allende’s foreign policy.\(^4^9\) Ever since Allende’s death historians have sought to understand exactly who he was by examining who his international friends were. Yet because Allende simultaneously embraced Castro and sought amicable relations with the United States, proclaimed non-alignment but journeyed to the USSR in search of aid and gave sanctuary to Latin American revolutionaries while promising not to export revolution, tying Allende and the heterogeneous coalition he led to neat categorisations has proved impossible. Some scholars have alluded to an ad-hoc – even “schizophrenic” – approach to revolution, the UP’s lack of preparation to deal with “predictable” problems or, as Haslam, has argued, Allende’s “stunning naïveté regarding the capacity (though not the will) of the United States government to overthrow a government elected in a constitutional manner”.\(^5^0\) The Chilean scholar, Joaquin Fermandois, argues that Allende had no real understanding of international politics but that he had “unconditional
admiration" for Cuba’s revolution, which transformed itself into a “concrete model” or “paradigmatic horizon”. He claims Allende was “bewitched by Castro”. By contrast, Carlos Fortin, a senior Chilean diplomat under Allende later described Chile’s foreign policy during these years as one of “principled pragmatism”. He acknowledges that the Chilean government believed “a modus vivendi was possible” with the United States, and that it acted to avoid isolation and manage conflict without sacrificing ideals. Recently, Allende’s foreign policy has also been depicted as a passive instrument of the KGB’s goals to expand its influence in Latin America. Yet together these contradictory interpretations leave considerable room for re-examination. How did Allende believe he could juggle relations with the socialist world and the United States? Where did he believe Chile fitted within Latin America and, beyond this, the promising world of the early 1970s?

Although it is nestled between the Andes and the Pacific at the southern-most tip of the Americas, global events had had a profound influence on Chilean politics before 1970. As Latin America’s dependency theorists of the 1960s and the Chilean Left pointed out, the health of Chile’s export-orientated economy was conditioned by fluctuations in global markets. Cold War crises, such as the Korean and Vietnam Wars also had substantial impact on the price copper, Chile’s principal export. Moreover, as some of the young Chileans that would work closely with President Allende recounted, the Cuban revolution, the war in Vietnam, student protests in Paris and the emergence of the Third World imbued them with enthusiasm and a sense that their country’s political developments were part of a major shift in global politics. As one such Chilean recalled, by the late 1960s they believed that “world revolution” would be determined in the Third World, that the world was undergoing profound transformation, and that Allende’s election was part of this change.

Allende’s victory in 1970 was a personal triumph. He had previously campaigned for president three times, leading coalitions of Chile’s two principal left-wing parties, the pro-Soviet Communist Party (PCCh) and his own more heterogeneous party, the Socialist Party (PS). In 1970 he also represented the more moderate Radical Party (PR), the Christian left-wing party, Movement of Popular Unitary Action (MAPU), and two smaller parties, Popular Independent Action (API) and the Popular Socialist Party (PSP). Together they formed the heterogeneous Unidad Popular (Popular Unity or UP) coalition and elected Allende as their candidate.

Salvador Allende had a clear concept of what he wanted an ideal world to look like before he assumed power: he wanted the United States and former colonial powers to compensate poorer
nations for their past exploitation, and he believed in radically transforming global politics to give weaker nations a more equitable say. As such, the UP’s foreign policy shared a number of characteristics that the political scientist, Siba Grovogui, has identified as being common among post-colonial states in the global South. He argues that foreign policies of Third World nations were not merely “a trickle down convergence with Western states” but an alternative approach to international relations. “Postcoloniality” in foreign affairs, as he terms it, attempted to “eradicate the bases of inequity and injustice in the international system or Western-imposed structures of power, interest, and subjectivity” and to “use foreign policy as a means not necessarily to exclusive power but to emancipation and survival through collective renegotiation of the ethos of global politics. Its purpose was to restore integrity and dignity to the postcolonial entities”.57

For Chile – which had, after all, gained its independence from Spain in the early nineteenth century – fighting for ‘dignity’ as part of a ‘second independence’ meant eradicating US economic penetration of the country. From the 1920s until the late-1960s, four US companies had dominated 80-90 percent of Chile’s large-scale mining. After a period of intense foreign investment in Chile during the 1950s, President Eduardo Frei (1964-1970) began the process of nationalisation by buying out 51 percent of the country’s Gran Mineria.58 But by 1970, foreign investors still controlled a quarter of Chilean industry.59 Meanwhile, Chile had rising unemployment, inequality and poverty. Explaining why a country rich in copper and mineral resources had “failed” to solve the “grave crisis” facing Chilean society, Allende and the UP pointed to Chile’s economic dependent status and accused “imperialist exploitation” of stealing Chile’s riches.60 “By nationalizing copper, we shall cease to be poor”, a Communist Party slogan promised during Chile’s 1970 presidential elections.61

Allende’s commitment to nationalising Chile’s raw materials and eradicating US influence in Latin America was longstanding. As a junior minister in Pedro Aguirre Cerda’s Popular Front government in the late 1930s, Allende had regarded himself as participating in a struggle to secure Chile’s economic independence.62 In the 1940s, he condemned Washington’s tolerance and support for dictators in the region.63 In the 1950s, he joined a broad spectrum of Chileans who denounced the overthrow of Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala.64 Then, throughout the 1960s, he was a vehement critic of the Alliance for Progress, on the grounds that this did not solve Latin America’s “basic problem”: its dependency.65
Castro’s revolution reaffirmed Allende’s beliefs. As if to prove his allegiance to the ideals Havana’s leaders espoused, but distinguish himself from their means, he often exhibited Che Guevara’s dedication to him that read: “To Salvador, who by other means is trying to obtain the same”. He later explained to Régis Debray that in Cuba and Vietnam he had found inspiration in “a united people, a people with political conscience, a people whose leaders have moral strength”. In a speech he gave whilst in Havana in 1962, he also proclaimed that the enemy of the Chilean people was the same enemy Cuba faced, ‘Yankee imperialism’:

Cuba is not alone. Cuba has the solidarity of all the oppressed peoples of the world! We are with you because your revolution which is Cuban and national is not only your revolution but the revolution of all oppressed peoples...as a people you have opened, in words and in action, a great road of liberation in Latin America.

Castro’s struggle against external hostility and for socialist revolution radicalised him further. He recommended that Castro’s Second Declaration of Havana, which rebuked the United States’ role in Latin America and prescribed that the “duty of every revolutionary” was “to make revolution”, should be the region’s “Magna Carta”. He broke off his friendship with the Venezuelan leader, Rómulo Betancourt, due to differences regarding Cuba. And following his visit to Havana for the Tricontinental conference of Third World revolutionary and national liberation movements in 1966, he was one of those who proposed the formation of the Organización Latinoamericana de Solidaridad (Organisation of Latin American Solidarity or OLAS). He also probably aided the armed revolutionary struggles in Latin America during the 1960s financially and logistically. Publicly, at least, he proclaimed that “militant[s] of the Latin American revolution” had “a legitimate duty and honour to lend...solidarity – human and ideological – to militant compañeros of the same revolution”.

Allende also firmly believed in socialist revolution as a means to modernisation. Speaking in the 1950s, he had stated:

We believe with profound sincerity that the destiny of humanity is that marked out by the road of socialism. We believe it not just because it represents technological and economic progress but also because of its different concept of communal life, because it puts the common heritage at the service of all – culture, technology, wisdom and science; and because of its respect for the human personality and for the humanism that socialism has at its heart.
When Allende questioned Chile’s “backwardness” almost twenty years later, it still provided answers. “We know from our own experience”, he declared, “that the real reasons...are to found in the system, in this dependent capitalist system which counterposes the rich minority to the needy majority internally and the powerful nations to the poor nations externally... But the day has finally come to say enough – enough of economic exploitation, enough of social inequality, enough of political oppression”. As he told the UN General Assembly, he believed international action had to be aimed at:

...the serving the man who enjoys no privileges but who suffers and toils: the miner in Cardiff and the fellah in Egypt; the cocoa farmer in Ghana or the Ivory Coast, and the peasant of the plateaus of South America; the fisherman in Java and the coffee farmer in Kenya or Colombia. International action must reach the two billion underprivileged, those whom the communist has the obligation to bring up to the level of the modern world and to reaffirm the dignity and worth of the human person.

In prescribing socialism as a route to economic development, equality and emancipation, Allende contributed to what Forrest Colburn has termed the “vogue of revolution in poor countries”. The new Chilean government shared a view of historical inevitability that drew on Marxist notions of progress; what the scholar Robert Malley describes as “a well-defined, if misinterpreted, progression of events: from the fall of the colonial order to independence and to the victory of ‘revolutionary’ Third World movements”. Indeed, Allende referred to his victory as “a monument to those who fell” in Chile’s “social struggle, who sprinkled with their blood the fertile seed of the Chilean revolution.” Looking towards the dawn of a new world order, Allende’s Foreign Minister, Clodomiro Almeyda Medina, would later argue to the Organisation of American States (OAS) that “the current of history” tended “to strengthen the efforts of developing countries” and aid their efforts to close “the gap...that irrationally separates the developed capitalist world from the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America”.

By the late-1960s, Allende described three different groups in the world: the super-developed (“ultradesarrollados”), the socialists and the Third World. He characterised the second group as being on the same side as the latter (rather than the latter serving the needs of the former). He saw Chile and all of Latin America with the exception of Cuba as falling into the third group, where “practically all the misery” in the world could be found. And Chile’s new government saw the world shaped by “the battle between progressive and renovating forces, on the one hand, and
imperialism and its allies, on the other", between exploited and exploiters, poor and rich. It was this division of the world, as this thesis shows, rather than a strict division between East and West, which conditioned Allende's worldview and determined his international relations.

Looking back more than thirty years later, this thesis offers a new international history of Allende's Chile that brings Chile, Cuba, its regional context and the global Cold War context to the forefront of its analysis. In examining Santiago’s interactions with Washington and Havana, its focus lies predominantly with the individuals that shaped US-Chilean and Chilean-Cuban relations. The Popular Unity government was far from homogenous. Both the Socialist Party and the Communist Party had their own historic and individual relations with parties and states around the globe. Yet, first and foremost, the thesis is a diplomatic history; an account of the key components of state-led policies. And with respect to the UP’s relationship with Cuba and the United States, the sources consulted for the purpose of writing the thesis demonstrated that it was Allende who ultimately determined policy and shaped the bilateral relationships between Santiago and Washington, and Santiago and Havana.

The thesis draws on new archival sources, interviews, published speeches, memoirs, collated documents, press articles and secondary works. By far the most extensive (albeit scattered) collection of archival material is in the United States. In addition to the thousands of documents relating to US covert intervention and human rights abuses in Chile released in the late 1990's as part of the online ‘Chile Declassification Project’, the Nixon administration’s National Security Council files, presidential materials and State Department records are also now open at the US National Archives II in College Park, Maryland, online at the National Archives and Records Administration Archival Database and partially published in Foreign Relations of the United States document collections.

But as Louis A. Perez has argued, only by incorporating Latin American viewpoints and sources can we understand the true nature of the word ‘relations’ and the guiding factors that have driven inter-American ‘relationships’. The declassification of documents at Chile’s Foreign Ministry archives provided the opportunity to write such a history. Of particular importance for this thesis, were miscellaneous Memorandum files and the records of secret, confidential and ordinary correspondence between Santiago and Chile’s embassies in the Washington and Havana. A further collection of the Chilean embassy in Havana’s files from this period that were not transferred back to Santiago after the coup can also be found at Casa Memorial Salvador Allende in Havana. Brazil’s
Foreign Ministry Archives have also partially released files related to the period (though confidential and secret files are still classified). Furthermore, over the last decade, General Augusto Pinochet’s arrest in London, the thirtieth anniversary of Allende’s presidency and the Chilean coup reawakened interest in the period. Subsequently, Chilean, Cuban and other Latin American protagonists have added important new testimonies to an already rich collection of memoirs pertaining to the subject. In the context of these new circumstances, the Centro de Estudios Publicos in Santiago has also published invaluable collections of Soviet archival documents and some of those belonging to the Chilean Left.

In addition to these documentary sources, the author conducted extensive interviews in Santiago, Washington and Havana with key protagonists of the story. To date, all histories of Cuban involvement in Chile have been written using non-Cuban sources and most of the Cubans who engaged in hours of conversations with the author – among them Allende’s son-in-law and Cuban intelligence official, Luis Fernández Oña – did so on the record for the first time, conscious that by keeping silent, their roles in Chile were being distorted and risked being forgotten. Although there are no alternative sources on Cuba’s involvement in Chile at the moment, interviews can be problematic historical sources. In an effort to ensure information gained through them was as accurate as possible, the author conducted numerous separate interviews with the individuals involved and utilised documents found elsewhere to jog memories and clarify ambiguities.

Even with these sources, there are still vast gaps. Despite numerous requests for at least partial access to Cuban documents, Havana’s archives remain closed to scholars. Sadly, one of the key players in the story of Cuba’s Latin American policy, Manuel Piñeiro, also died in 1998 just before he was due to offer his testimony on the subject. There also remain a number of questions regarding the relationship between Cuba and the Soviet Union and their policies towards Chile’s revolutionary process, but until Havana and Moscow fully declassify documents, the relationship cannot be fully clarified. On the other side of the Cold War divide, many documents – or redacted parts of documents – relating to Washington’s covert operations and the Pentagon’s links to military leaders in Latin America are also still unavailable. Finally, not only do historians not have access to Allende’s presidential papers and the UP parties’ confidential files, but there is widespread agreement that most of these papers were destroyed either immediately prior to and/or during the Chilean coup by the Left itself or that they were destroyed by the military when it seized power.
Based on what is available, this thesis argues that the direct significance Allende’s Chile had for South America between 1970 and 1973 was to reinvigorate a struggle for control of the continent between those who sought revolution and those who wanted to destroy it. Within Chile, outsiders – Cubans, Brazilians, far Left revolutionaries as well as the United States – provided the fuel both in financial and conceptual terms for the way in which it was fought. Additionally, in their struggles against each other, the Chilean Left and Right also looked abroad with fear or for inspiration. Rather that focussing on one external power, therefore, the international history of Allende’s Chile must be understood as a multidimensional struggle (grossly uneven as it was) between a confluence of local and external actors divided – as John Dinges argues – by either their ‘dread’ or ‘hope’ for radical social change in the region. To persist in looking at US-Latin American relations from Washington’s vantage point alone, as many historians of the Cold War in the Americas have tended to do, is to give the United States the power to dominate Latin America’s history. As one scholar has put it, “if the defeated are silenced, only triumphalism on the one hand, and resentment, on the other, can result”. 

Cuba’s inability to protect Chile’s democratically elected president was not the result of Havana abandoning Allende. This thesis also suggests that claims that Castro aimed to subvert La Vía Chilena are misguided. Havana’s involvement in Chile was difficult and, increasingly, a diversion from an otherwise evolving foreign policy that accepted socialist revolution to be a more distant dream than Cuba’s leaders had heretofore believed. But Cuban personnel were in Chile until the day of the coup, and were prepared to fight to defend Allende’s government. As historians have pointed out since the 1970s, the timing of Cuban arms deliveries and military training in Chile occurred before serious military plotting against Allende began. But as the thesis demonstrates, the potency of the ‘subversion’ idea clearly lies in Washington’s calculated efforts to ‘play up’ Cuba’s involvement in Chile as a means of discrediting Allende. The relationship between Cuba and Allende was intimate, bilateral and enduring, and based on a personal friendship between Castro and Allende forged over a decade before 1970. The Cubans saw Allende informally every weekend right up until September 1973. 

This is not to say that the Cuban-Chilean relationship was without intense disagreement or that Cuban involvement in Chilean affairs was always appreciated or positive. After being elected in 1970, the new Chilean president invited Cubans to Chile to help him, desperately sought Castro’s approval, and yet firmly rejected Havana’s tactics for building socialism. And Cuban policies in
Chile were ultimately rooted in respect for Chile's sovereign leader. As such, Allende's control over Cuba's involvement in the country and Havana's relationship with the far Left was both far stronger and more effective than other historians have suggested. Allende may have been "emotionally" attached to the socialist ideal and to the far Left, as Haslam has argued, but he stood firm in his aversion to violent means and in his faith in revolution "at no social cost" for Chile – so much so that he instructed the Cubans not to help him on the day of the coup, sacrificing his life rather than leading mass-resistance against those that attacked him and only half-heartedly contemplating military preparations to defend his government. Faced with his inflexibility, the sheer difficulty of defending La Via Chilena against the numerical power and strength of Chile's Armed Forces and an effective propaganda campaign against the Cubans that limited their scope for manoeuvre, Castro was powerless to resist Allende's overthrow.

An examination of both Chile's domestic and international relations between 1970 and 1973 supports later reflections by Chilean left-wing leaders that Allende was optimistic about what he could achieve and naïve when it came to the United States. During Allende's first six months in power, he and the diplomats he chose to rely on, tended to give US officials the benefit of the doubt when they pledged to work with Chile's new Popular Unity government. As we shall see, together with analyses of Nixon's difficulties in Vietnam and faith that Allende's democratic credentials would lessen Washington's aversion to socialism, these verbal promises appeared to disorientate Santiago into believing it had more room to manoeuvre than it actually had. Despite longstanding distrust for Washington and evidence of the US' past interventions in Latin America, Chileans demanded that they be allowed to 'dissent' without suffering the consequences of doing so, and insisted that bilateral relations be dealt with in isolation from wider global concerns. Regardless of the merit of their propositions, there was little to suggest that this would be feasible especially given Allende's universalist message and Chilean threats to turn to the Soviet Union should the US fail to provide assistance. When, in 1972, it became clear that Washington's public 'correctness' was a cover for underhand hostility, Allende then focused on protracted negotiations with Washington as a means of playing for time while he tried to find alternative sources of financial support. But the UP's leaders largely failed to develop a cohesive foreign policy for overcoming weaknesses. Chile's policy towards the US was an ad-hoc, often confused and a reactive strategy that was only partially successful in containing conflict and disastrous at avoiding US hostility altogether. Allende clearly overestimated the power of Chile's example to alter Washington's foreign policy behaviour, and the
extent to which Chile could rely on Third World or Latin American unity. And in the end, as this thesis will show, the Chilean president’s attempts to negotiate with the United States – the ‘pragmatic’ part of his international strategy – weakened his position, gave Washington greater power, and did nothing to hide his pursuit of radical transformation worldwide.

The new Chilean government clearly had few attractive alternatives. Salvador Allende lacked sufficient economic, military or political power to launch a decisive attack on US imperialism. His hopes of attaining unconditional independence from the region’s hegemonic power should also be understood in the context of the uncertainties of the early 1970s and the United States’ conscious (very effective) efforts to deceive the Chileans. Like many others throughout the global South, Allende believed that the Cold War superpower battle had used ideological disputes as a pretext for economic greed and neglect of the global South, but that this would no longer be a suitable pretext for intervention in the era of peaceful-coexistence and negotiation. As this thesis shows, Allende appears to have believed in the possibilities détente offered, and demonstrably underestimated the central ideological conflicts at the centre of international politics.

For the United States, Allende was more than an isolated threat. This thesis agrees with the many scholars that have explained the US’ animosity towards Allende as being based on the impact that La Vía Chilena could have on the global East-West balance of power. However, in contrast to previous arguments which suggest Latin America was not ‘important’ to the “big game” of détente and that it was ending the war in Vietnam that absorbed Nixon and Kissinger’s foreign policy, this thesis argues that from September 1970 onwards, what happened south of the United States was a significant – and sometimes even an ‘urgent’ – concern to the White House. Indeed, more than merely an ambiguous marker on the global geo-strategic superpower contest, the Nixon administration interpreted Allende’s election primarily in terms of its consequences for Latin America’s already unstable and shifting balance of forces. Examining Nixon’s Chile policy in the context of this broader regional framework gets to the core of US intervention in Chile. US regional policy rapidly evolved after Allende’s election towards ‘saving’ the region as a whole and the United States’ power to shape its destiny. To argue that the Nixon administration henceforth had a sophisticated or comprehensive strategy towards Latin America would be to exaggerate the pre-planning that went on in Washington. Yet particularly as a result of Nixon’s intervention in policy formulation, the US opted for a strategy during the early 1970s to contain Allende and Castro’s
example by improving relations with Brazil and employing tactics of strategic compromise in areas where the risks of forceful opposition outweighed the consequences of regional hostility.

Rather than merely an example of Cuban subversion or the "the ultimate case study of morality – the lack of it – in the making of US foreign policy", then, US intervention, Kissinger's criminality and Cuba's relationship with Chile should, as Hanhimäki argues, be placed in context. Past focus on Kissinger's disregard for democracy has eclipsed Nixon's role in formulating policy towards Latin America. It has also exaggerated the extent to which the State Department was shut out of policymaking when it came to Chile or led along a "path...deeper and deeper into the jungle" of immorality as one scholar argued at the time. As this thesis argues, policymakers throughout the administration regarded Chilean developments as a 'loss', actively participated in the process of subverting Chilean democracy and welcomed Allende's overthrow, even if they disagreed on the best means of achieving it.

The thesis is structured chronologically. Chapter one examines how Havana and Washington interpreted Allende's election and what motivated them to pursue the subsequent policies they did. In exploring the way Cuba and the United States approached Latin America prior to this moment and immediately after it, the chapter argues that Allende's victory reflected and exacerbated a moment of upheaval in inter-American politics. Henceforth, the Nixon administration gave up its so-called 'mature partnership' with the hemisphere and, whilst having previously embarked its very own new 'mature' approach to revolutionary transformation in the region, Castro became enmeshed in trying to save Allende's life and safeguard his peaceful democratic revolution. Although both countries felt constrained by the international environment they confronted, two months after Allende's election, they were both intimately involved in Chile's future and in fighting a new reinvigorated Cold War struggle in the Southern Cone.

Chapter two turns to focus on Allende's outlook and Chile's international relations during his first nine months in power. Although Allende acted cautiously because he expected the United States to be hostile, he simultaneously advocated the transformation of inter-American relations and enthusiastically re-established relations with Havana. Partly this was because the double-edged 'cool but correct' policy that Washington had embarked on meant Chileans found it difficult to gauge the US' position. Yet, by mid-1971, Chileans were suspicious of indications that the US appeared to be courting conservative military forces in the region. Despite Washington's private denials that it was trying isolate Chile in the region, this was exactly what it was doing. Indeed, as
Chile adjusted to the outside world the battle between revolution and reaction in the hemisphere evolved.

The latter half of 1971 marked a turning point for Chile, for its relations with the United States, for the balance of power in the Southern Cone and for Cuba’s standing in Latin America. Chapter three examines these developments and the fallout that Allende’s nationalisation programme had for Chile’s external relations. It details the UP’s growing realisation that it faced US economic aggression and details its international diplomatic campaign aimed at changing Washington’s behaviour and winning external support. Whilst the situation in Chile turned gradually against the UP, Allende’s tour of Andean Pact countries in late 1971 was a success in bolstering his international aims and Chile’s external support. But the United States’ hostility towards Allende’s government grew, especially as Chileans portrayed his expropriation policies as an example for others to follow. Chile’s growing ties with socialist countries also confirmed Washington’s hostility towards him. A coup in Bolivia, an electoral defeat for Uruguay’s left-wing coalition and growing ties between the US and Brazil served to ease Washington’s fears of revolution in the Southern Cone. Meanwhile, Castro toured Chile, becoming convinced that Allende would face a military confrontation. His stay dramatised Cuba’s involvement in the country and became a watershed in terms of Cuba’s analysis of Chile’s revolutionary potential.

Chapter four examines the international and domestic battles that Allende fought during the first ten months of 1972. In this period, the Chileans’ realised that détente did not offer Allende the space to implement his peaceful road to socialism. Not only did Santiago face an economic war with Washington, but Allende’s hopes that the global South would obtain a better deal from the global North crumbled. As economic nationalists in the region turned to Washington and counter-revolution swept the Southern Cone, the United States contemplated a more flexible regional policy to isolate Chile and bolster its own prestige. For the United States and Havana it was plain that earlier fears of losing the region or hopes of transforming it were dissolving. By October 1972, Chile’s economic deterioration, vicious opposition and the UP government’s own fragmentation put Allende’s hopes of a peaceful transition to socialism in jeopardy. Furthermore, the Cubans increasingly disagreed with the president regarding which direction he should take.

Chapter five discusses Allende’s efforts to solve the crisis he faced by looking outside Chile. In late 1972, Allende’s quest to find solutions to Chile’s economic needs in Moscow failed and he found himself increasingly dependent on Washington to change its policies. As Allende’s allies
abroad began dissecting the reasons for his likely defeat before it happened, his enemies feared he might succeed, or that the far Left would force him to seize authoritarian control of the country. The Nixon administration, fearing that exposure would bring international condemnation, domestic repercussions in the US and the possibility of enhancing Allende’s chances, confined itself to exacerbating the UP’s challenges rather than intervening decisively to overthrow him. Overall, by this stage Washington was far less worried about Latin America than it had been in late 1970 and US officials concluded that even with Allende, the Southern Cone had not been ‘lost’ as Nixon feared it would be when Allende had been elected.

Chapter six examines the interaction between international actors and Chilean politics in the months immediately before and after Allende’s overthrow. It suggests that the United States was hesitant to speed up the moment it had been working towards for three years while other international actors, most notably Brazil, were far more involved. The United States’ most significant role in determining Chile’s fate occurred after 11 September 1973, when it sprung into action to help the junta and encourage co-ordination between regional counter-revolutionary leaders. Crucially, by examining the Cubans’ experience as one of the junta’s key targets, the chapter also explores the wider international dimensions of the battle for Chile that occurred. Ultimately, it suggests that the coup leaders’ ferocity against Havana’s embassy in Santiago was the result of fears that Cubans would – and could – mobilise a sizeable resistance. However, as we shall see, Cuba had neither the capacity nor Allende’s permission to intervene more decisively.

Rather than starting with the UP’s failure – and the Cubans’ inability to avert it – and working backwards, the thesis emphasises the hopes and fears that characterised the international history of Allende’s presidency from the start. All the characters involved in this story – both revolutionaries and counter-revolutionaries – were intensely ideological in their responses to developments in Chile and driven by profound self-belief. For Castro, Allende and Nixon as well, supporting revolution and counter-revolution abroad was also about protecting their own systems of government at home. As one scholar has argued, if the state is the “most effective vehicle and resource for the propagation and implementation of an ideology that it embodies” then “a threat to its security is...by extension a threat to its ideology” and vice-versa. In providing assistance to the Chileans they supported, Washington and Havana also consistently both believed that they could do a better job of saving Chile from each other than their Chilean allies. Despite debates about methods and the scale of the threat posed by Allende within the Nixon administration, at no
stage between 1970 and 1973 did policymakers in Washington doubt the desirability of bringing Allende down. And the Cuban leaders’ own revolutionary experiences – both triumphs and failures – led them to believe that they were wiser, more capable revolutionaries than their apparently inexperienced Chilean comrades.

When faced with conflicting advice at home and abroad, Allende stuck firm to his personal hope that Chileans, Latin Americans and the world beyond would eventually – even after his own death if need be – be persuaded of the merits of socialism and democracy. Yet the international history of Allende’s Chile is a story of the clash between the high ideals of the actors involved and the rules of the game of domestic and international politics. At each level, the ideals that Allende championed had little space to succeed. At home, he refused to countenance breaking the rules of constitutional politics for the sake of revolutionary change, even if others were prepared to transform them entirely. And abroad, particularly in the Global South, the ideological clashes at the heart of the Cold War continued to determine the contours of international politics even as the great powers attempted to persuade the world that they did not.
Chapter One: From Mature Partnership to Mortal Struggle

Shortly after Salvador Allende’s election, Castro vowed to save Allende and Nixon pledged to overthrow him. These diametrically opposed reactions reflected a larger struggle between Cuba and the United States to determine the destiny of Latin American politics, society and economic development. Havana celebrated Allende’s election as a regional victory against imperialism and evidence of a new revolutionary wave in Latin America, whereas Washington viewed it as a ‘loss’ in a global struggle against communism. Indeed, Nixon believed Chile to be one component in “a mortal struggle to determine the shape of the future of the world” in which there was “no acceptable alternative to holding Latin America…a key area in the struggle.”1 As he told the National Security Council two days after Allende’s inauguration, Chile, like Cuba, might have “gone”, but Latin America had not. “We want to keep it”, Nixon instructed, thereby linking US policy towards the region as a whole with Washington’s subsequent destabilisation of Chile. 2

When placed in context of US-Latin American relations since the nineteenth century and the zeal of Washington’s counter-revolutionary interventions since 1945, the White House’s alarmist reaction was hardly surprising. Nixon’s pledge to embark on a “mature partnership” with Latin Americans disappeared a year after he made it and Allende’s democratic credentials were ignored in favour of a heroes and villains approach to the region where any vestige of socialism (especially when linked to Cuba) was fought unsparingly. Kissinger certainly believed that when faced with a crisis in a revolutionary period, the US should act first and think later.3 Racially driven opinions of Latin Americans and the US’ profound self-belief that it had the answer to hemispheric problems also drove its policy. The predominant view in the United States was that North Americans were not only wiser and more capable of government, but that they had a duty to save reckless, vulnerable Latin Americans. The President, and many of his closest advisers maintained democracy was “a very subtle and difficult problem” for ‘Latins’.4 Nixon – hardly the pillar of open democratic governance himself– believed Latins “governed in a miserable way” and should be saved from themselves.5 As Kissinger infamously retorted during the Chilean presidential elections, “I don’t see why we should let a country go communist just because of the irresponsibility of its own people”.6

Like US decision-makers, the Cubans in charge of hemispheric strategy had moral and ideological certitude that their own revolutionary path offered a route for Latin America to follow. They championed revolution and regional integration as a route to social justice and independence.
But by 1970, Havana was in the process of re-evaluating its approach to regional affairs after successive revolutionary failures in the region. Havana had always regarded Chile as unique, hoping Allende’s different means of achieving similar ends could succeed. Although these were distinct from those that Cuba advocated in the 1960s, when Allende won in 1970, the Cubans celebrated his victory as evidence that the tide of Latin American history was moving in the direction of independence and socialism.

Besides the regional dimensions of US and Cuban policies towards Chile, Chilean domestic politics determined the policies adopted by Nixon and Castro. What an Allende presidency would actually look like, what his chances of success were and what the consequences of pursuing the ‘wrong’ policy might have on the Chilean political process divided policymakers in Washington and Havana. Because Allende had only received 36.4 percent in a three-way presidential race, he had to wait for a congressional vote on 24 October to confirm (or deny) his victory. In the intervening weeks, Havana responded positively but cautiously to the future president’s request for help while Washington launched covert operations, known to a select few as ‘Track I’, to prevent his confirmation. Meanwhile, Nixon – who mistrusted the bureaucracy for having allowed Allende to win in the first place – risked US exposure and civil war in Chile by instigating a second track. ‘Track II’ aimed to provoke a coup by fuelling a putschist plot against Chile’s constitutionally minded Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, General René Schneider. Indeed, the story of Schneider’s subsequent murder and details of Tracks I and II are well known thanks to US Senate Select Committee investigations in 1975 and the persistent endeavours of scholars to get to the truth of Washington’s wrongdoing ever since.7

Rather than re-treading this ground, this chapter focuses on determining why the Nixon administration intervened against Allende and how this related to Washington’s regional policies before and after September 1970. In detailing Cuba’s approach to Chilean affairs, the chapter also investigates how Chile fitted within Cuba’s regional policies. It argues that Cuban, and to a lesser degree US, involvement is best described as interaction rather than intervention. Neither Havana nor Washington could have pursued the policies they did without Chilean allies and both were constrained in their actions by those in Chile that they collaborated with. Both the Cubans and the Americans were also responding to shifting hemispheric trends and the lessons they drew from the 1960s, which limited their options and shaped their subsequent Chilean adventures. As Kissinger argued, the way policies were ‘packaged’ was important.8 However, the ‘correctness’ deemed
necessary by the US and Cuba hid the beginning of a bitter struggle between them and their respective allies to save Allende’s presidency or overthrow it.

“Rapidly intensifying change”

Allende’s election reflected and enhanced the possibility of radical change in Latin America. When Nixon’s National Security Council had discussed policy towards the region a year earlier, it had addressed the problem of “rapidly intensifying change”. Latin America faced exploding population growth, economic underdevelopment, inequality, political instability and growing military intervention in politics all of which led many in the US to conclude that revolution (of one form or another) was “inevitable”. Rising frustration with the pace of development, anger at US interventionism and resentment towards a world economic system that seemed destined to ignore their needs contributed to a surge of nationalism. In this context, the Nixon administration pondered how to “reinvigorate” its so-called ‘Special Relationship’ with Latin America. Meanwhile, Castro eagerly welcomed signs of inter-American tensions as evidence that the struggle against US imperialism was advancing despite previous setbacks.

Like Allende, Latin Americans who wanted international economic and political reform in the late 1960s generally saw the United States as responsible for exacerbating underdevelopment, poverty and inequality. In Peru, Bolivia and Panama, nationalist revolutionary military leaders took power, adding a new dimension to inter-American relations. All three challenged US influence in their countries and opened ties with the USSR. Their moves were symptomatic of a general Latin American consensus emerging in the 1960s, which placed the struggle against economic dependency and underdevelopment – as opposed to inter-state conflict – at the centre of questions of national security. In May 1969, Latin American ministers attended a conference in Viña del Mar, Chile, designed to establish a common Latin American position vis-à-vis the new Republican administration in Washington. The ‘Consensus of Viña del Mar’ formalised Latin American frustrations with progress towards development goals and disdain for inequality within the inter-American system. Led by Chile’s Foreign Minister, Gabriel Valdés, conference delegates posited that Latin America was underdeveloped because it was financing the United States’ development. They also emphasised the principle of non-intervention as a guiding principle for inter-American relations and argued US aid should no longer be tied to purchasing US goods or issued on the grounds that the recipient adopted “one determined political, social and economic model”.

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Nixon was unsympathetic and affronted when Valdés delivered the Consensus to him in June 1969.\textsuperscript{14} However, a month later, his National Security Council concluded that although the ‘Special Relationship’ had deteriorated, it “ought” to exist and that the US should foster “a community of independent, self-reliant states linked together in a friendly and mutually beneficial relationship”.\textsuperscript{15} Policy analysts noted that nationalism posed, “a significant threat to US interests, particularly when taken in conjunction with a Soviet presence and a Soviet willingness – partial or hypothetical – to offer itself as an alternative to Latin dependence on the US.” Beyond the US’ political, economic and security interests, they also concluded the US had an “enlightened self-interest and humanitarian concern for economic and social development”.\textsuperscript{16}

These conclusions drew on an inter-agency study on the region (National Security Study Memorandum or NSSM 15) and a more alarmist report submitted to the administration about the US’ position in Latin America by Governor Nelson Rockefeller. In 1969, Nixon had sent Rockefeller on a Latin American mission to report on regional developments. The latter drew cataclysmic conclusions, warning, “the moral and spiritual strength of the United States in the world, the political credibility of our leadership, the security of our nation, the future of our social and economic lives” were “at stake”. If the “anti-US trend” were to continue, he foresaw the US being “politically and morally isolated from part or much of the Western Hemisphere”. And he insisted that because the United States’ relationship with the region had an important “political and psychological value” beyond traditional strategic interests, “failure to maintain that special relationship would imply a failure of our capacity and responsibility as a great power.”\textsuperscript{17}

However, until Allende’s election, these conclusions drifted beneath the surface of Nixon’s foreign policy priorities. The president was informed and immensely ideological about the region.\textsuperscript{18} But Viron Peter Vaky (‘Pete’), Kissinger’s assistant for Latin American Affairs, recalled that his “heart and soul” were focused on Vietnam, détente and openings to China.\textsuperscript{19} His bureaucracy was also divided with regards to major policy changes in the hemisphere and his chief foreign policy advisor, Henry Kissinger, was not only uninspired by what happened in the “South”, but also largely ignorant of Latin American affairs.\textsuperscript{20} At the NSC’s meeting on Latin America in October 1969, Nixon’s National Security staff advised him to state that political and military issues were for “illustrative purposes. Not as urgent as economic issues”.\textsuperscript{21}

Following this NSC meeting, relatively few issues were resolved. Nixon agreed to untie aid to Latin American countries but held firm to his belief that private enterprise and foreign investment
were the answer to development, launched limited economic sanctions against Bolivia and Peru, and insisted that Washington continue assisting Latin American military leaders (albeit more discreetly). While evidence of US pressure against Peru brought outcry in Latin America, private businesses decried what they perceived to be a soft approach to expropriations that threatened $12 billion of US investments in the region. But their complaints and the specifics of Nixon’s instructions were left pending whilst the State Department’s Bureau of Inter-American Affairs (ARA) crafted a new regional approach to diminish—private business derided its ‘apologetic’ tone—complaints of US interventionism and profiteering. On 31 October, Nixon publicly unveiled an “Action for Progress” and “mature partnership” with the region. “If our partnership is to thrive, or even to survive”, Nixon warned, “we must recognise that the nations of Latin America must go forward in their own way, under their own leadership’. Indeed, the ARA’s director, Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs, Charles Meyer, told a US congressional committee “Dissent among friends is not a disaster, and tolerance of differences is no tragedy”. For the time being, Nixon and Kissinger were not interested or worried enough about ‘dissent’ to disagree.

Meanwhile, Castro embraced signs of ‘dissent’ in the inter-American system. ‘New dynamics’, as Cubans termed the rise of revolutionary nationalism, appeared to indicate a new—albeit significantly different—phase of revolution was on the horizon. The Cubans acknowledged this phase would be slow, but observed that Latin Americans were exerting independence and crucially, for an island suffering the results of economic sanctions, seemed to be reconsidering Cuba’s isolation. Explaining why Havana embraced a variety of non-Marxist leaders after a decade of denouncing them as reactionaries, a key protagonist of Cuba’s policy towards Latin America recalled that Cuba did not unilaterally change its policies, but rather responded to regional transformations.

However, by adapting to local conditions and working with a broad assortment of regional actors, Havana’s approach to Latin American did change. During the 1960s Havana’s inflexible brand of revolution had widened divisions among the region’s left-wing. In March 1967, Castro attacked the Venezuelan Communist Party along with “shilly-shalliers, and pseudo-revolutionaries”. And the Venezuelan Communist Party denounced Fidel’s “role of judge over revolutionary activities in Latin America, the role of the super-revolutionary” and “his claim to be the only one who decides what is and is not revolutionary in Latin America”. Che Guevara’s Bolivian adventure, which was Cuba’s biggest foreign policy venture before its involvement in
Chile, had been quite literally the least-worst alternative that Havana had considered for launching revolution in Latin America in 1966. Following his failed mission to the Congo, Guevara had been impatient to embark on another revolutionary campaign preferably in Argentina but otherwise on its border. Although he had regarded Bolivia as a suitable base for pursuing guerrilla operations in Argentina and Peru since 1963, there were multiple reasons why fermenting a Bolivian revolution in 1966—or a continental war from Bolivia—was impracticable. As Régis Debray later explained, a tree bearing revolutionary fruits on a continental scale needed a seed of armed insurgency with roots and the “the guerrilla [in Bolivia] had nothing in common with the horticulture.”

Following Che Guevara’s death, Havana’s leaders reviewed their Latin America policy. As Cubans examined the continent’s shifting dynamics, Castro began to talk about many roads to revolution and adopt a more careful policy. Luis Fernández Oña, a Cuban intelligence officer who served in Chile during Allende’s Presidency described Cuba’s representatives abroad in the early 1970s as “more conscientious”; no longer revolutionaries “of impulse” but rather “revolutionaries of the heart and thought”, schooled in revolutionary theory. In line with Soviet leaders, the Cubans grew particularly interested in the role that nationalist military elites could play. Thus, although Havana continued to support far Left revolutionary movements such as Uruguay’s urban guerrillas, the Tupamaros, it also established contacts with Peru’s military regime and embraced the Chilean Christian Democrat government when it opened up to the island. A year before Allende was elected, Santiago also re-established commercial relations with Havana, signing a trade agreement worth $11 million in early 1970.

Castro’s growing patience regarding the ultimate pace of Latin America’s revolution was partly a result of Cuba’s domestic situation. By the late 1960s, it became clear that his hopes of skipping stages of socialist revolution had been idealistic. Castro publicly admitted responsibility in July 1970:

We leaders of the Revolution have exacted too high a price [in] doing our apprenticeship… More often than not we made the mistake of minimizing difficulties, and complexity of problems… The going will be harder than it seemed at first. Yes… building socialism is difficult… learning to build the economy is much more difficult for revolutionaries than we imagined.
From 1970, Castro acknowledged a need to “proceed slowly so as to reach our destination soon, slowly so as to reach our destination well...slowly so as to reach our destination safely.”37 After Soviet-Cuban relations had reached an unprecedented low in 1967-8 over Cuba’s approach to Latin America and Cuban disdain for what it saw as Moscow’s half-hearted support for Third World allies, a number of factors had persuaded Castro to seek a rapprochement with Moscow.38 His decision was influenced by Cuba’s perpetual fear of US intervention, Moscow’s warning that the Soviets would not intervene militarily if Castro provoked the United States in Latin America or the latter intervened in Cuba, and the USSR’s curtailment of oil shipments to the island in late 1967.

The extent to which Castro’s rapprochement with the USSR from 1968 onwards transformed Cuba’s regional policy is debatable. Cubans maintain Moscow never had any decisive role in directing Havana’s relations with Latin America and to a large degree this is borne out by what we now know about the Soviet-Cuban relationship.39 Even after Soviet-Cuban relations began to improve towards the end of 1968, Castro still did not feel completely secure. “Will the Warsaw Pact divisions be sent to Cuba if the Yankee imperialists attack our country...?”, Castro asked as he simultaneously endorsed the invasion of Czechoslovakia.40 To make Cuba safer, and the hemisphere less threatening, Cubans felt they had to pursue their own, independent efforts in Latin America to end their isolation and secure their revolution’s future.

However, the Soviet Union was certainly pleased with Castro’s new approach to the region. In early 1970, Moscow’s diplomats approached State Department officials and Latin American ambassadors in Washington to announce the arrival of a “new Castro” who had “matured”, was “willing to live in peace and harmony with his neighbours” and “prepared for a more responsible role in international affairs”.41 As Havana’s subsequent policy in Latin America clearly moved more in line with the Soviet Union’s, this opened up possibilities of co-operation, perhaps most extensively in Peru.42 Cuba’s enthusiasm for Peru’s new nationalist military government and efforts to build ties with it began almost immediately after Velasco Alvarado came to power in 1968.43 Later, Fidel Castro would personally tell one Chilean diplomat he was “very especially interested” in Velasco Alvarado, whom he considered a man of the Left.44 The new military leaders in Lima, Panama City and La Paz were hardly Marxists. But Havana regarded their nationalisation projects and social reform programmes as a progressive step towards economic and social justice.45

The prospect of revolutionary transformation in Chile in 1970 contributed to hopes that revolution in the Southern Cone was possible. One month before Chileans went to the polls, Castro
formally acknowledged the ballot box could lead to socialism. Yet the extent of Cuba’s involvement in Allende’s presidential campaign is unclear. Both in the 1964 and 1970 presidential elections, the CIA launched an extensive, negative propaganda campaign equating an Allende victory with a Castroite dictatorship. The CIA also later estimated that Cuba gave $350,000 to Allende’s 1970 campaign. But Cuban operations in Chile had become difficult since 1964 when Chile severed diplomatic relations, relying mainly on Chileans visiting Havana to provide detailed information on developments there. Indeed, the Cuban intelligence officers that played the largest role in Allende’s Chile only arrived in Santiago after the presidential elections. As one later recalled, the Cubans “played so that Allende would win”. And in 1970, playing to win meant keeping a low profile.

As presidential campaigns in Chile got underway, the US and Cuba were busy readjusting their policies in Latin America. Yet, the substance underlying Nixon’s ‘mature partnership’ or the ‘new Castro’ was still unclear and untested. Both clearly had domestic and self-interested reasons for changing track in the region. The Nixon administration wanted to safeguard US influence and appease critics of US foreign policy. Castro wanted financial and political backing from Moscow and Latin America at a time when his revolutionary project appeared to be in trouble and the pressure of US hostility continued unabated. But primarily, both US and Cuban adjustments were admissions of past failures to spread their respective ‘enlightened self interest’ throughout the region. For Washington and Havana, therefore, Allende’s election – coming at a moment of change – marked a new focus in a struggle to reassert their position in the hemisphere.

Intimate Ties and Cuban Celebrations

As he later told Chilean crowds, Castro enthusiastically welcomed Allende’s victory as having “demonstrated the strength of [Cuban] ideas”. Even though La Vía Chilena was the opposite of the revolutionary strategies of violent insurgency the Cubans had championed in the 1960s, it was undoubtedly perceived as a victory for the cause of socialism and Latin America’s emancipation. By 1970, Cuban revolutionaries and their Chilean counterparts could look back on more than a decade of friendship and at least some internationalist collaboration in Latin American revolutionary struggles. However, Cuba’s relations with the Chilean Left were complicated and spread between Chile’s various, often antagonistic, left-wing parties. Rather than having a fixed
contingency plan for their policy towards an Allende presidency, Havana’s leaders also adjusted cautiously to events as they unfolded. In the weeks after the Chilean presidential elections, Allende’s personal request for Cuban security assistance began what would be Havana’s intimate involvement in Chile. Yet for the time being, Havana’s help was limited as Castro and his Chilean comrades feared more eager Cuban involvement could fuel opposition to Allende and undermine Havana’s new ‘maturity’ in the hemisphere.

Havana had always approached Chile as a unique case in Latin America without the pre-requisites or the need for rural insurgency. Two-thirds of Chile’s population lived in towns and cities, it was one of the most industrialised countries in Latin America, its established left-wing movement participated in a stable constitutional democracy and the two main parties, the Communist Party (PCCh) and the Socialist Party (PS) were traditionally committed to peaceful means of achieving power (at least in their own country). When Che Guevara had pored over maps of the region to decide where he could locate a guerrilla motor to power a continental revolution, he had not seen Chile as a viable location. With its arid desert in the north and Patagonia in the south, its climate extremes and its isolated position between Argentina’s Armed Forces over the Andes and the Atlantic on the other side it was never regarded as being a good base for a guerrilla movement. As Cuba’s deputy prime minister, Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, noted later, Chile had always been “one of the few exceptions” where peaceful democratic revolution was possible.

Castro’s revolution had a profound impact in Chile. In the early 1960s, Havana had established close contacts with Chilean Communist and Socialist Party leaders even though many of the young Cubans who arrived in Chile during these years (among them Cuban intelligence agents) were often frustrated and culturally bemused by Chilean ‘formality’ and the ‘strictness’ of the PCCh’s devotion to legalistic revolution. Relations between Havana and the Socialist Party (PS) were closer in ideological and practical terms. As the Chilean scholar, diplomat and politician Heraldo Muñoz explained:

The Cuban Revolution symbolized and synthesized the essential tenets of [Socialist] party thought on international affairs...Cuba constituted a nationalist, anti-imperialist, popular, anti-capitalist and Latin-Americanist experience...Chile and Chilean Socialists could identify fully – that is, politically, culturally, geographically, historically, and economically; unlike the various nationalist-populist experiments in Latin America, Cuba was to build socialism from below and not as the imposition of foreign troops, within the Western hemisphere and merely ninety miles away from the United States.
Many PS militants went spontaneously to Cuba in the early 1960s to support the young revolution. Carlos Chain, a Cuban intelligence officer working in Chile in the early 1960s, recalls that this help was “powerful”\(^5\). Before – and with more difficulty, after – diplomatic relations were severed in 1964, Cuban intelligence officials also passed through Chile to coordinate Havana’s support for revolutionary movements.\(^5\) The PS fully endorsed Cuba’s revolution and also backed Castro’s revolutionary struggles abroad. Paradoxically, weeks after Che Guevara’s death and amidst the profound affect this had, the PS’ Congress approved of and decided to adopt armed struggle.\(^5\)

An added dimension to Cuba’s ties to Chile arose in 1965, when the Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionario (MIR) was established. Formed by young, educated students in the southern city of Concepción, this far Left party was wholeheartedly Cuban-inspired. Although US intelligence analysts believed its strength to be exaggerated and its appeal “far more miniscule” than press articles suggested (they purported to have 3,000 members by 1970), the MIR’s campaign of urban violence and mobilisation undermined the efforts by the PCCh and PS to gain power peacefully.\(^5\) Cuba’s support for the MIR and Latin American revolutionary struggles complicated its relations with the PCCh. From 1960 on, this relationship and the PS’ sympathy for Havana’s revolutionary tactics became core issues in intra-Left struggles in Chile. As late as August 1970, one PCCh publication attacked the MIR as an organisation of “terrorists”.\(^5\)

After 1968, however, Cuban-PCCh animosity had lessened as Cuba reduced its emphasis on armed struggle and moved closer to Moscow. By this stage, Havana had distanced itself from the MIR’s actions. As Chile’s future Chargé d’affaires in Havana remembered, members of the MIR – or Miristas as they were known – enchanted the Cuban leadership, reminding it of their own youthful revolutionary fervour.\(^6\) But increasingly, Cuba limited its support to funding the MIR’s newspaper, Punto Final and instructed Miristas to finance their own insurgent activities.\(^6\) Finally, in February 1970, when the MIR decided to offer Allende “critical support” and suspended military activities, Cuba encouraged them.\(^6\)

Allende was the key to Havana’s ties with Chile even before he became president. As a Senator he denounced Washington’s aggression against Cuba, vociferously supported Castro’s revolution and was sympathetic to MIR (to which his nephew Andrés Pascal belonged and his daughter Beatriz was closely linked). Before 1959, Carlos Rafael Rodríguez had established a direct relationship with him whilst living in Santiago. This contact had opened doors when in early 1959,
Allende arrived in Havana to see what Cuba’s revolution and its leaders were like. When he met Castro and Che Guevara, he was impressed. Over the next decade, this relationship was cemented as a result of Allende’s numerous visits to Cuba, his participation at the Tricontinental conference, his role in the formation of OLAS and his practical as well as moral support for guerrilla movements in Latin America. The most important meeting between Allende and Castro occurred during one weekend in late 1967 at a house in Manzanillo, at the foothills of the Sierra Maestra. Luis Fernández Oña, who attended the meeting – along with Piñeiro – recalls that the friendship between Allende and Castro grew as they talked about ideology and the future. During this trip Beatriz, who accompanied her father, also became romantically involved with Oña, whom she married just before Allende assumed power. In February 1968, Allende also inspired Havana’s unswerving gratitude when he accompanied the three Cuban survivors of Che’s guerrilla column in Bolivia, out of Chile to safety following their escape into that country. Around this time, a group of Chileans had also established a Chilean branch of the Bolivian Ejército de Liberación Nacional (National Liberation Army or ELN) to help reinvigorate guerrilla struggle in Bolivia after Che’s death.

By 1970, therefore, the links between Allende and the Cuban leadership were intimate and long-standing. But Allende’s democratic victory sparked intense debate about the future in Havana. Would Congress confirm his victory? Would Allende be able to consolidate the ‘illusory power’ of the presidency if the reins of real power were still in the hands of the oligarchy, the bourgeoisie and
the military? Could the president-elect protect himself sufficiently from counter-revolutionary forces and their international backers?67

While this debate ensued in early September, Allende’s daughter Beatriz and his private secretary, Miriam Contreras Bell (with whom Allende was romantically involved) arrived in Havana to ask for assistance in guaranteeing the future president’s safety. Allende’s advisors feared he could be assassinated and wanted to create a well-trained armed personal escort.68 During his presidential campaign, Allende had relied on a small group to protect him, which included young militants of the PS, members of the ELN and close personal friends.69 But this group had only eight pistols, no means of transport and only four safe houses. Because of their weaknesses, Allende had relied on foreign intelligence supplied by the Mexican and East German embassies, military contacts, the UP’s parties and the MIR for information about potential plots against him.70 Although Allende later told Régis Debray that there had been two attempts on his life, it would appear that no immediate incident prompted his fears. Instead, Allende distrusted Chile’s “bourgeoisie’s political police”, feared an attack from a “foreign intelligence service” and took heed of rumours flying around Santiago that the Armed Forces could launch a coup.71

Castro believed that he could help and was immediately willing to do so. In the eleven years since coming to power, his own security apparatus had grown substantially to counter the real and persistent threat of assassination or attack by Cuban exiles and the CIA. The nature of Cuba’s policy towards Latin America in the 1960s meant that those at the head of policy formulation were also militarily trained, skilled in the art of covert operations abroad with experience in revolutionary internationalism.72 Indeed, since 1964, when all countries except Mexico in the region had severed relations with Cuba, Cuba’s Foreign Ministry closed its Latin American department and intelligence operatives had taken over.73 However, at least until Allende had been confirmed as president, Castro insisted on caution, fearing that the discovery of Cubans in Chile could provoke a counter-revolutionary backlash against Allende and the Cubans. He therefore only sent three Cubans to Santiago to assess exactly how the Cubans could help.74

Thus began a collaborative partnership between Cuba and the new Chilean president. On 25 September, Oña was one of those that arrived clandestinely in Santiago as part of a delegation to a Pan-American congress of veterinary scientists.75 All three Cubans were part of the Departamento General de Liberación Nacional (General National Liberation Department or DGLN) at Havana’s Ministry of the Interior. This department, which had coincidentally been established just prior to
Allende’s election, replaced the Ministry’s ‘Technical Vice Ministry’ in supporting revolutionary and anti-imperialist struggles in Latin America and the Third World and was to be separate from the General Directorate of Intelligence (DGI) led by Ramiro Valdés. Even after Chile re-established diplomatic relations with Cuba and developed bilateral state-to-state and trade relations, the DGLN was in charge of policy towards Chile. Castro and Manuel Piñeiro, the head of the DGLN, were in control, with Ulises Estrada, a senior intelligence officer, who directed the DGLN’s new Chile desk directly below them.

Once in Chile, the parameters the three Cubans had for effective action were minuscule. Although Ona had instructions to interview Allende about his aims and strategies for dealing with obstacles he was likely to face, finding time and a safe place was difficult. The Cubans stayed in a safe-house and when venturing out (mostly at night) they tried not to speak lest they revealed their Cuban accents. When Oña finally journeyed to meet Allende in a mutual friend’s home, he only escaped identification by armed policemen when they stopped the car he was travelling in but failed to ask for his papers. Then after the interview was conducted, it took weeks for the tape of it to reach Castro and Piñeiro, as no secure route of transmitting information back and forth to Havana had yet been established.

The three Cubans’ capacity to bolster Allende’s defensive bodyguard – soon to be known publicly as the GAP after the president described it as Group of his Personal Friends (Grupo de Amigos Personales) – were therefore also initially limited. Yet the Cubans believed the GAP urgently needed help. Oña recalls that when he arrived the bodyguard “knew nothing” and had far fewer weapons (“a little pistol, two little pistols”) than right-wing paramilitary groups. In the hope of benefiting from the MIR’s preparations for armed struggle and integrating the MIR into Chile’s constitutional road to socialism, Allende invited the party to join the GAP after winning the presidency. Later, members of Castro’s own personal escort pertaining to Cuba’s Tropas Especiales also arrived to join the GAP, direct it, offer logistical training (in Cuba and Chile) and provide it with weapons. But this support would only come later.

Cuba saw its involvement in Chile immediately after Allende’s election as risky but necessary. Havana was restricted by sensitivity to Cuban ‘intervention’ in Chilean affairs, Castro wanted more information about Allende’s future plans, communication between Santiago and Havana was problematic and the three intelligence officials immediately sent to Chile had inadequate cover stories to justify their prolonged presence in Santiago. While the parameters of
Cuba’s collaboration with the president-elect were being worked out, the fundamental principle governing Chilean-Cuban relations over the next three years was established. Allende would be in charge and Cuba would respect his sovereign authority. Beyond this relationship, Havana opted to maintain separate relations with different Chilean left-wing parties, a decision that was feasible while the Left was united but which would become complicated if the struggles between their different prescriptions for revolutionary progress surfaced.

For the time being, Cuba was hopeful but uncertain of the UP’s chances. In the six weeks after Chile’s elections, although Havana judged that Allende was adequately supported by the majority of Chile’s Armed Forces, it believed he faced potential danger either from right-wing paramilitaries or the CIA. But while the Cubans suspected that the United States was already involved in undermining Allende’s victory in September and October, and although rumours of a possible coup to stop Allende overshadowed Chilean politics, their limited resources meant that they did not have definitive intelligence on CIA activities or the ability to counteract them. Ofna recalls that no one contemplated for a second a scenario in which the Right – aided or not by the United States – would kill the Commander-in-Chief of Chile’s Armed Forces to provoke a coup and prevent Allende’s inauguration.

**Panic in Washington**

Although Nixon’s foreign policy team was notoriously divided, all US officials agreed Allende’s election was “bad news”. What they differed on was how bad it was and what policies the United States should adopt to counteract it. Some voiced concern that Washington’s chances were slim and warned that misguided intervention would be worse for Chile and the United States than doing nothing. However, the White House disagreed. Nixon firmly believed Allende would “end up like Castro” and that there would “not be another free election in Chile”. He later explained that he had seen Allende’s election as a test of US power, more subtle, but comparable to the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Vietnam War and tensions in the Middle East. But stopping a democratically elected Marxist in Washington’s backyard at a time when the US was trying to present itself as a ‘mature’ partner in Latin America and a superpower committed to peaceful coexistence was awkward. On the one hand, the administration faced pressure from multinationals to intervene more forcefully and on the other, it was clear to all that overt intervention to oppose a democratically elected president was not permissible. Accordingly, the administration covertly used an array of money,
diplomacy, psychological and economic warfare and arms deliveries to stop Allende’s inauguration. Only when these efforts appeared to have failed did the administration start to consider a longer-term future and define exactly how Allende would affect US hemispheric interests and its global struggle against communism.

The White House retrospectively believed Allende’s victory could have been averted. Before the election a lack of direction from the White House and bureaucratic reluctance to compromise Washington’s new ‘low profile’ in the region meant that efforts to stop Allende’s election were not as extensive as they had been in 1964. Compared to over $3 million six years earlier, the CIA provided $700,000-$1 million on a “spoiling” operation against Allende, including a propaganda offensive equating him with Soviet tanks rolling into Santiago and Cuban firing squads. Agency officials also advised the US multinational company, International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation (ITT) on the best means to channel $350,000 to Alessandri, a figure that was matched by funds delivered by other US businesses during the period before September 1970. Beyond this, Kissinger ordered an interagency study on the ramifications of an Allende victory (NSSM 97), which concluded, “no vital interests were at stake” and an Allende victory would present “no tangible economic losses”. It did, however, argue that it would represent “considerable political and psychological costs” to “hemispheric cohesion” and a “definite psychological advance for the Marxist idea”. These conclusions notwithstanding, the administration largely decided to wait and see what happened.

When Allende won, inertia turned to panic. Kissinger had discarded any *modus vivendi* with an Allende government as a “straw man” two weeks earlier. “Its basic assumption – that Allende is interested in accommodation”, he argued, was “so doubtful” it was “meaningless”. Shortly after the election, Robert Hurwitch of the Inter-American Bureau at the State Department (ARA) was called before the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. As Deputy Assistant Secretary for Latin American Affairs, John Crimmins, recalled, Hurwitch “was really shaken up”; the Board’s members “were really violent” and “couldn’t understand how we didn’t arrange the election”. Kissinger certainly characterised the Chilean election as a “sad record for the ARA” and a result of “wissy-washy” bureaucrats. Later, he lamented having trusted the bureaucracy this “once”.

Four days after Allende’s victory, Kissinger urgently assembled the 40 Committee to see if anything could be done to reverse the election. As the decision-making body responsible for overseeing US covert operations, this was the immediate forum for policy deliberations prior to the
election and after it.95 Kissinger was chairman of the committee, which comprised Nixon’s Attorney General John Mitchell, Deputy Defence Secretary David Packard, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Thomas Moorer, Deputy Under Secretary of State U. Alexis Johnson, and the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) Richard Helms. On this occasion, Assistant Secretary Charles Meyer, Pete Vaky and members of the CIA’s Western Hemisphere Division were also present. Another pivotal actor was the US ambassador in Santiago, Edward Korry, who was not present, but whose alarmist assessments of the situation—considered “excellent” by Kissinger—fuelled discussions.96 A day after the election, the ambassador had defined Allende’s election as a “grievous defeat” for the United States that would have a “profound effect on Latin America and beyond”.97

In discussing options, the majority of those present at this meeting agreed on two things. Firstly, Washington could not intervene overtly for fear of exacerbating hemispheric hostility to the United States, damaging the United States’ credibility as protector of democracy worldwide and bolstering Chile’s far Left.98 Secondly, Allende was likely to establish an authoritarian Marxist regime after he was inaugurated.99 Those in the State Department and the NSC who argued against blocking Allende covertly did so because they were concerned Allende might end up being the “lesser of two evils”; better than provoking civil war in Chile by blocking Allende and the fallout in Latin America of a Dominican Republic-type invasion of Bay of Pigs-style debacle.100 Thus, the administration instructed all diplomatic posts to emphasise the US government’s “painstaking non-involvement” while it examined covert options.101 Uncertain of what they could achieve at this early stage, Kissinger, Mitchell and Pentagon officials insisted on acting before it was too late.102 From 8 September, therefore, the 40 Committee concentrated on “political persuasion” to get Chile’s Congress to vote against Allende and the chances of Chilean military intervention to stop Allende’s inauguration.103 Washington’s policy from this point forward oscillated between these two choices.

Primarily, the United States focussed on “backstopping…Chilean efforts”.104 In Washington, Augustín Edwards, a right-wing Chilean businessman and owner of El Mercurio newspaper, met Nixon to remonstrate against Allende’s victory.105 In Santiago, President Frei approached Korry in order to have “direct private access to the highest levels” of US government.106 When political ploys had failed by late September, the 40 Committee expanded operations to encourage an ‘in-house coup’ by which Frei would dissolve his cabinet, invite military leaders to take over the government and, then, call new elections. But Washington was hampered by a “lack of coordination” between the Chileans they relied on and the speed of events.107 Thus, after 22
September, the US tried to unilaterally create a “climate” of economic and political instability to provoke action. The CIA ordered its station in Santiago to launch psychological warfare, to “employ every stratagem, every ploy, however bizarre, to create internal resistance” and instructed officers to use “all resources in terms of human contact, propaganda or denigration” to persuade Frei to move. As Kissinger explained to the 40 Committee on 6 October, Nixon wanted “no stone unturned”. Ultimately, however, Frei vacillated and constitutionally-minded military leaders refused to act. On 14 October, the 40 Committee finally heard there had been “no pulling together” to block Allende and no “coup climate” existed.

Meanwhile, Nixon had instigated a second, more desperate attempt to overturn Allende’s election – Track II. On 15 September 1970, he had instructed DCI Helms to “save Chile!” using the “best men we have” working “full time” without concern for the “risks involved”. Helms was to use “$10,000,00” and “more if necessary” but avoid embassy involvement. The following day, a Special Task Force was created to ensure faster, more secretive action supervised by Kissinger and comprising the CIA’s Western Hemisphere division, its Deputy Director of Plans, Thomas Karamessines and selected Pentagon officials. Although Track II was not very different from Track I in aims, it did not depend on political elites’ co-operation but rather focussed on retired officers and paramilitaries. As well as a response to Edwards’ plea, Track II originated in Nixon and Kissinger’s distrust for the bureaucracy. As Kissinger argued to the president, overturning Allende’s victory was “going to be a long-shot” as it was, without the “handicaps of well-meaning but unprofessional activism, of lack of coordination and of bureaucratic resistance”.

Primarily, however, the White House acted because Nixon and Kissinger feared the regional consequences of an established communist regime in the Southern Cone. Speaking in Chicago on 16 September, Kissinger argued that a communist “take over” in “a major Latin American country”, adjoining Argentina (“deeply divided”), Peru (“already...heading in directions that have been difficult to deal with”) and Bolivia (“also gone in a more leftist, anti-US direction”) would “present massive problems” for the US and “the whole Western Hemisphere.” In the president’s view, once Allende took power, a “Red Sandwich” could consume the continent, whose leaders were “frighteningly” naïve about international communism. Economic concerns were less of a worry to Nixon; as Kissinger explained to the 40 Committee “if higher authority had a choice of risking expropriation or Allende accession, he would risk the dangers of expropriations”. Compared to the State Department, Nixon also showed he was not hesitant to lobby other
governments about Allende’s threat. During a tour of Europe in late September 1970, he agreed with the Italian President, Giuseppe Saragat, that “Allende ‘did not exist’; behind him was the Communist Party”. In conversation with Pope Paul VI, Nixon explained the Chilean situation was “serious, but not lost” and that “the US was doing what [it] could to help those fighting Communism”. He also asked the Pope to “discreetly influence the situation”. The Pope said he would try.

But the CIA’s ‘best’ was not enough. In late September, Langley was on guard for any “target-of-opportunity situations fraught with promise”. When Track I operations revealed that Allende’s Commander-in-Chief Schneider would not participate in an ‘in-house coup’, Track II focussed on removing him. On 14 October, Kissinger was told that the chances of stopping Congress confirming Allende’s election were “one-in-twenty-perhaps less”. But two days later, the CIA instructed its station in Santiago that efforts to overthrow Allende “by a coup” would “continue vigorously” afterwards. Paul Wimert, Washington’s military attaché in Santiago delivered $50,000 and three weapons to one group of officers on 20 October. He later recalled that money “wasn’t guided. It was like a Xmas party - throwing some here, some there”. Finally, on 22 October, two days before the Chilean Congress were due to meet, another group of plotters the CIA was in contact with mortally wounded Schneider in a botched kidnapping attempt. When Nixon called Kissinger on 23 October, he heard the event had not “triggered anything else”. “The next step”, Kissinger explained, “should have been a government take-over” but that the Chileans involved were “pretty incompetent”.

Whilst dismissing the Chileans as incompetent, Kissinger took on the job of preparing the United States to ‘save’ Chile. Realising that the formulation of a comprehensive strategy against Allende would require unity and direction, he established White House control by calling an urgent National Security Council meeting. But first, as Vaky advised Kissinger, the administration needed to define the threat Allende posed. Kissinger therefore assembled the NSC’s newly established Senior Review Group (SRG), comprising the same members as the 40 Committee and tasked with ensuring issues were “sharply defined” before NSC meetings.

When the SRG met on 14 October 1970, its members broadly agreed that Allende posed a psychological, ideological and potentially geo-strategic threat to the United States, Latin America and the world. “All agreed” that Allende would have an “anti-US bias”, would work to “eliminate” US influence, “establish linkages with USSR, Cuba and other socialist states [sic]” and “certainly
give refuge to subversives from other countries”. Challenging conclusions reached before the election that “no vital interests” were at stake in Chile, Kissinger argued, “it depends on how you define…vital interests”. And Deputy Secretary of Defence, David Packard, argued that if Washington gave the “appearance of doing nothing in the face of a communist takeover” it would “create [a] bad impression” throughout Latin America. Chile’s distance, relative poverty and size hardly posed an objective strategic or economic threat to the world’s biggest superpower. But as far as Kissinger was concerned, “the shape of the future” generally depended “ultimately on convictions which far transcend the physical balance of power”.128

When the SRG met again five days after the Chilean Congress had confirmed Allende as president by 153 to 42, Under Secretary of State John Irwin II noted that “no-one” wanted Allende “around for another six years”. Thomas Moorer also argued that Allende posed a threat to hemispheric defence (“extreme gas pains”) by potentially giving the Soviet navy access to the southern Pacific. But Irwin spelt out the difference between Nixon’s pursuit of détente and emphasis on negotiation with communist countries, and its hostility to a Socialist government in Chile; Chile was in the United States’ “back yard”. Irwin acknowledged that the US government had to “take into account” its dealings with East European communist states and consider the impact US action could have on Washington’s relations with Latin America overall. But he accepted that as long as the US was not blamed and that efforts were “effective”, “State would be happy to see…action, covert or otherwise, that would hasten his departure”.131

As well as pulling the bureaucracy together to formulate policy towards Chile, Kissinger targeted Nixon at a time when the president was distracted by US congressional elections by underlining Chile’s potential impact on US domestic politics. Indeed, the president believed that the Cuban revolution had cost him the 1960 presidential election and feared ‘another Cuba’ could destroy his chances of re-election. Arguing that Chile could be “the worst failure of our administration – Our Cuba by 1972”, Kissinger delayed the NSC meeting by one day to discuss policy formulation with the president.132 Before the meeting he also outlined his concerns to Nixon, arguing Allende’s democratic election was “more dangerous” than Cuba; an “insidious” model for Latin Americans, Italians or the French seeking socialism via the ballot box. Amidst a range of crises that absorbed his attention in late 1970, Chilean events took on enormous significance; what happened in the south, Kissinger argued, would have bearing on Washington’s “own conception” of its “role in the world”.134
As if to back this up, Kissinger sent Nixon a memorandum he had received from General Vernon Walters entitled “Future Courses in Latin America”. In Kissinger’s words, it was “directly related to the Chile problem”. As the US’ Defence Attaché in Paris, Walters was a key player in the back channel Vietnam peace negotiations. He also had a close relationship with the president, having accompanied Nixon on his disastrous vice presidential tour of Latin America in 1958 and his presidential tour of Europe in September and October 1970. In 1964, he had also played a key role in inducing Brazil’s military coup and advised successive US presidents on Latin America. Walters now argued that the situation in the region was “deteriorating steadily” and that “coddling of leftists…in Chile [he referred to Alliance for Progress aid to Frei’s centre-left government] has been proven a failure.” He argued the US was “engaged in a mortal struggle to determine the shape of the future of the world” in which there was “no acceptable alternative to holding Latin America”; the region’s “resources, the social and economic problems of its population, its proximity to the US” all made it “a priority target” for Washington’s enemies and a “key area” in the global Cold War. When Nixon read this memorandum he wholeheartedly agreed: “K” he scribbled, “read the Walters memo again + see that it is implemented in every respect”.

Allende’s election therefore propelled the White House to re-examine Washington’s regional policies. Like Castro, the Nixon administration had been unprepared for Allende’s election but unlike the Cubans, Washington had pursued a desperate, imprecise – and disastrous – policy. But failure in the short-term had prompted Nixon and Kissinger not only to seize control of the US’ Chile policy, but also to redirect its relationship with the hemisphere. As far as Nixon and Kissinger were concerned, in a global struggle to resist communism, Washington needed to rescue Chile and bolster the United States’ influence in the region. Indeed, compared to more wary State Department officials, the president and his National Security Advisor exhibited no hesitancy regarding what they should do. However, while the White House’s conclusions were more apocalyptic, its fear of Allende and the international significance his election could have, was broadly shared throughout the administration. Consensus more than controversy characterised the SRG’s discussions in October 1970. A majority of policymakers mistakenly believed Allende’s victory was the precursor to an authoritarian Marxist state and distorted Allende’s constitutional road to socialism to fit models of communism elsewhere. Like the Cubans, US policymakers believed that La Vía Chilena’s potential success or failure could significantly alter the continent’s destiny and their struggle to determine the world’s future.
Packaged Policies

As Cuban and US delegations attended Allende’s inaugural celebrations, their countries’ policies towards Chile’s future government were simultaneously being refined. Behind the scenes in Santiago, Allende and Cuban leaders laid the groundwork for re-establishing diplomatic ties.

Meanwhile, back in Washington, Kissinger urged Nixon to prevent any “steady shift toward the modus vivendi approach”. The question that confronted US decision-makers was how to undermine what Kissinger called Allende’s “game plan” to establish an authoritarian Marxist regime through democracy and deception. As Kissinger acknowledged, US policy towards Chile’s democratic president would “test…the credibility of [its] rhetoric” in arguing for democracy that it should not fail. Indeed, both Cuba and the United States paid special attention to how their policies towards Chile were tailored to suit international, domestic and Chilean audiences fearing that their ultimate objectives of supporting Allende’s future presidency or destroying it could only succeed if they were perceived as acting ‘correctly’.

Although Castro overrode his own wish to attend Allende’s inauguration, Cuba was well represented by high-level officials. Its delegation was led by deputy prime minister, Carlos Rafael Rodríguez, and included Cuba’s future ambassador to Chile, Mario García Incháustegui, as well as the three Cubans who had already been in Chile clandestinely for over a month. Yet Havana issued words of caution to the new Chilean government. Cuban news agencies specifically avoided classifying La Vía Chilena or Allende in ideologically Marxist terms. And Castro advised the president-elect not to be “too revolutionary” or “ignite” continental revolution. The Cuban leader had told Beatriz Allende a month earlier that he hoped “all the conflict situations in Latin America” would still be blamed on him. Echoing Cuba’s own shift towards a slower, safer path to socialism, Carlos Rafael Rodríguez told Chileans not to let their “impatience to fulfil all the needs of the people…induce [them] to try and do more than…technical, political and economic resources” allowed. Castro also urged Allende to wait (“not to worry if he had to wait six months, a year, or two”) before establishing formal ties with Cuba.

However, the incoming Chilean administration immediately re-established diplomatic relations with Havana. The move was hardly surprising, given Allende’s election promises and national support for such a move. After discussions with the Cuban delegation in Chile, Havana gained its first diplomatic opening in Latin America on 12 November 1970. This move also gave...
Cuban intelligence officials a legitimate reason to be in Chile and move around freely. As Oña, who became Havana’s Chargé d’affaires, later remembered, Diplomats “sent me flowers!”

Meanwhile, the US sent a low-key delegation to Allende’s inauguration headed by Assistant Secretary Meyer, while more important policy decisions were taking place in Washington. Nixon, Kissinger and Rogers concurred that by sending Meyer with an oral message from the president, Washington could be as “cool as possible and still polite”. Indeed, Allende was encouraged by Meyer’s visit. When the new president met Meyer on 4 November, the latter promised to convey his impressions of the president’s “sincerity” and “cordiality” to Nixon when he returned to the US on 6 November. Indeed, one Chilean diplomat observed that Meyer had “acquired a far more rational and well informed impression” than others in the United States he had spoken to. On his return to Washington, however, Meyer did not stand up for Allende. He told the 40 Committee, “very few Chileans accurately evaluate the Allende threat to Chile – they believe the ‘Chilean character’ will somehow miraculously preclude a Marxist take-over of the country”.

By this stage, the decision had already been made not to leave the situation to chance. As Kissinger had warned Nixon a day after Allende’s inauguration, the “dangers of doing nothing” were “greater than the risks…in trying to do something”. But Kissinger also appreciated certain parameters for action. “We clearly do not have the capacity to engineer his overthrow ourselves in the present circumstances”, he acknowledged. “The question” he stated, was “whether there are actions we can take ourselves to intensify Allende’s problems so that at a minimum he may fail or be forced to limit his aims, and at a maximum might create conditions in which a collapse or overthrow may be feasible”. As Kissinger informed Nixon, it was “a question of priorities and nuance” between those who urged a policy of “damage limitation” and those who wished to “prevent” the dangers Allende posed.

The State Department advocated limiting damage through engagement. Its recommendations closely reflected the Latin American viewpoints its diplomats abroad had garnered through consultations. Although the region was split with regards to Allende’s likely alignment with Moscow and export of revolution, the general consensus was that obvious US intervention could encourage such trends. The Peruvian Foreign Ministry counselled, “patience and restraint”, Venezuelan President Rafael Caldera Rodríguez warned Washington to be “careful” and Mexico’s Foreign Minister, Antonio Carrillo Flores, urged a US “posture of courage, serenity and confidence”. Overall, the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research concluded that
US "over-reaction", could “push Chile away from the inter-American system” as it had previously
done to Cuba.151 Three days before the NSC meeting on Chile, the State Department’s Latin
American Bureau therefore advised Secretary Rogers that he should push for “flexibility” to take
advantage of Allende’s challenges rather than giving Allende an imperialist enemy and alienating
hemispheric nations. In contrast to Kissinger, the ARA argued that the “manner in which the U.S
treats Chile under a democratically-elected Marxist President in a hemisphere where a key current
issue is U.S domination”, could “incur even more serious losses” than Allende himself.152
Ultimately, at the NSC meeting, Rogers argued that the US should work on “bringing him [Allende]
down...without being counterproductive”.153

Kissinger “basically” agreed on the need to be publicly “correct”. 154 He advised Nixon to
“oppose Allende as strongly as we can...taking care to package those efforts in a style that gives us
the appearance of reacting to his moves”.155 Kissinger, Nixon and the Pentagon also wanted to
bolster counter-revolutionary forces in the region, strengthen ties with them and ensure they
understood Washington’s covert hostility. “If [the] idea gets around in Brazil and Argentina that we
are playing along with All[ende] we will be in trouble”, Kissinger warned Nixon; there was a
“risk” of “appearing indifferent or impotent to the rest of the world”.156 Nixon’s strong endorsement
of Vernon Walters’ memorandum three days before the NSC meeting is the clearest indication we
have of the president’s views and prescriptions for US policy towards Latin America. By instructing
Kissinger to implement Walters’ recommendations “in every respect”, Nixon accepted that “instead
of telling the nations of Latin America that their only mission [was] internal security,” the US had
to “give them a sense of participation in the defence of freedom” worldwide. The US should “make
clear” its “commitment to help them achieve their aspirations” and “increase, not reduce” the US’
program for military sales, assistance and friendly understanding. He also agreed that the US should
“move actively (not necessarily openly) against...opponents.”157
When the NSC addressed Chile, Nixon translated this advice and his own personal instincts into a call for reinvigorated attention to Latin America:

Let’s not think about what the really democratic countries in Latin America say – the game is in Brazil and Argentina...I will never agree with the policy of downgrading the military in Latin America. They are power centres subject to our influence...We want to give them some help. Brazil and Argentina particularly. Build them up with consultation. I want Defense to move on this. We’ll go for more in the budget if necessary...Privately we must get the message to Allende and others that we oppose him...Brazil has more people than France or England combined. If we let the potential leaders in South America think they can move like Chile...we will be in trouble...We’ll be very cool and very correct, but doing those things which will be a real message to Allende and others.158

On 9 November Nixon’s rambling instructions were enshrined in National Security Decision Memorandum 93. It outlined a policy to “maximise pressures on the Allende government to prevent its consolidation and limit its ability to implement policies contrary to the US and hemisphere interests.” It also provided a framework for a new regional strategy to contain Allende’s Chile and build up US influence, instructing, “Vigorous efforts...to assure that other governments in Latin America understand fully that the US opposes consolidation of a communist state in Chile hostile to the interests of the United States and other hemisphere nations, and to...encourage them to adopt a similar posture”. The president also prescribed closer relations with “friendly military relations” and
“Close consultation…with key governments in Latin America, particularly Brazil and Argentina, to coordinate efforts to oppose Chilean moves.”

The NSC meeting was therefore a means by which Nixon and Kissinger clarified and imposed a new regional policy as part of a tough line against Allende. It also outlined Nixon’s views on nationalism and anti-Americanism in the hemisphere. The president was angry that the United States was constantly being asked for economic assistance and support but received little thanks. Instead of advocating a low-profile to defend Washington against mounting charges of intervention, he reaffirmed the very conditional and paternalistic approach that the ARA’s ‘mature partnership’ had dismissed a year before. Laying down the rules of the game he stated:

No impression should be permitted in Latin America that they can get away with this, that it’s safe to go this way. All over the world it’s too much the fashion to kick us around. We are not sensitive but our reaction must be coldly proper. We cannot fail to show our displeasure. We can’t put up with ‘Give the Americans hell but pray they don’t go away.’ There must be times when we should and must react, not because we want to hurt them but to show we can’t be kicked around. The new Latin politicians are a new breed. They use anti-Americanism to get power and then they try to cozy up. Maybe it would be different if they thought we wouldn’t be there.

Nixon also personally instructed the kind of punishment he wished to see unleashed directly on Chile. On 6 November, he instructed his administration to give Allende economic “cold Turkey.” A Covert Action Programme annexed to NSDM 93 also provided an overarching framework for the CIA’s political activity in Chilean domestic politics. It aimed to maintain and enlarge contacts with the military, support the non-Marxist opposition, assist the anti-Allende Chilean media outlets, launch black operations to divide and weaken the UP, and to disseminate propaganda throughout Latin America, the US and Europe against Allende. Notably, this involved instructions to “play up” Cuban and Soviet involvement in Chile. Given the haphazard response to Allende’s election, NSDM 93 also established a new decision-making structure to oversee policy towards Chile; the SRG would meet monthly “or more frequently” and together with an Ad-Hoc interagency working group on Chile, it would monitor operations.

As the tension of the election period diminished in Santiago, the internationalisation of Chilean politics was therefore just beginning. The Cubans proceeded with cautious enthusiasm, conscious that a closer association could burden Allende with counter-revolutionary hostility in the
hemisphere that they themselves had suffered. Meanwhile, the Nixon administration chose a
delicate double-edged ‘cool but correct’ policy to guard against provoking anti-Americanism in
Latin America or bolstering Allende’s position in Chile. Although Chile was the only stable
democracy in the Southern Cone surrounded by military regimes, this did not determine
Washington’s policies. It did, however, have an impact on the means the world’s self-proclaimed
champion of ‘freedom and democracy’ would use to undo Allende’s free and democratic victory.
Crucially, the extent to which both Cuba and the United States’ policies towards Allende appeared
‘correct’ would be a major factor in their future involvement in Chile.

Conclusion

When, a week after Allende was inaugurated, he shook the foundations of the Cold War order in the
hemisphere by re-establishing diplomatic relations with Castro’s Cuba he reinforced the impression
that his presidency signalled a turning point for Latin America. For Havana, this exemplified the
new possibilities for progressive (and possibly even revolutionary) change in the region. For
Washington – caught out by the speed of Allende’s decision despite his election promises – this was
a further warning of how precarious US influence in the hemisphere had become. But for the
political parties that now made up Chile’s coalition government, it was a move destined to underline
Chile’s independence in accordance with long-standing aims. Although the region had been awash
with new trends and bubbling nationalism before this moment, towards the end of 1970, Allende
brought a changing situation into focus, initiating a reinvigorated struggle for influence in the
Southern Cone.

Although Cubans did not foresee Allende’s democratic road to socialism as applicable to
other countries in the hemisphere, Chile became the best example of progressive change in the
region. It both improved Cuba’s continental position and promised to usher forth social and
economic transformation in the direction of socialism. Like the US, Cuba pursued a double-edged
covert and public policy. And rather than impose its agenda, Havana opted for a mature, relatively
cautious partnership with Allende in the belief that this was the best way of helping him survive and
succeed. But underlying this ‘maturity’, the Cubans continued to believe in the inevitability of
revolution. What changed was their analysis of how and when this would occur. As Castro would
explain a year later to a Chilean journalist:
This continent has a child in its womb and its name is revolution; it's on its way and it has to be born, inexorably, in accordance with biological law, social law, the laws of history. And it shall be born one way or the other. The birth shall be institutional, in a hospital, or it will be in a house; it will either be illustrious doctors or the midwife who will deliver the child. Whatever the case, there will be a birth.164

The natural corollary of this rising nationalist and revolutionary wave in the Southern Cone, however, was the growth of counter-revolution. Despite hopes in Havana and panic in Washington, Allende did not signify the United States’ ‘defeat’, but merely the beginning of its resurgent influence in the Southern Cone. For now, Washington’s ‘correct’ tolerance of Allende’s new government masked the true sense of the tragedy felt by the White House. Behind rhetoric about a new ‘mature partnership’, Washington simultaneously embarked on a new counter-revolutionary mission in Latin America to ‘bring Allende down’ and redirect the region’s future.
Chapter Two: In Pursuit of Radical Transformation

Allende’s inauguration not only transformed the political landscape of Chile, but also shifted the way the country projected itself internationally. The new Unidad Popular government promised to assert Chile’s “full political and economic autonomy”, establish diplomatic relations “with all countries, irrespective of their ideological and political persuasion”, and offer “effective and militant solidarity” with “people fighting for freedom and the construction of a socialist society”. It also pledged to “assert” Latin America’s “identity” throughout the world. On the occasion of his inauguration, Allende proclaimed his goal was “liberty”.

But Allende was not only dedicated to redefining Chile’s place in the world system. He also wanted to radically transform the system itself. He championed an overhaul of inter-American relations and identified with the Third World’s quest to establish a new international economic and political order. He also rejected tying Chile to a Cold War East-West framework and hoped that the lessening of Cold War tensions would allow his government to succeed. Chile’s new Foreign Minister, Clodomiro Almeyda, explained to the Organisation of American States that changes occurring in the world had increased “the relative weight of the social forces fighting for international peace and justice” in Latin America; “happily”, he noted detente offered “promising conditions to reframe the problem of inter-American relations”.

However, the international context Allende faced was complex and potentially dangerous. With only 36.4 percent of the vote and in the shadow of René Schneider’s murder, the Chilean president warned supporters that it would be even more “difficult to consolidate…victory and to build a new society” than it had been to win Chile’s presidential election. On the day of his inauguration he added that he was “well aware” that “the right of peoples to choose their own form of government [was] accepted only on paper”; that the “powerful” made “their influence felt in a thousand different ways”. Later, Almeyda described the UP’s foreign policy as having been an “obligatory…dimension” to La Vía Chilena; a means of securing a favourable international environment and avoiding outside interference either from the US or conservative regional powers. Chile’s distance from the Soviet bloc, historic tensions with its neighbours (all of whom had military governments in 1970), its relative political and economic weakness, and the possibility external aggression could magnify the UP’s domestic challenges, meant that a carefully formulated
foreign policy was important. In order to neutralise hostility towards it, the UP therefore opted for a policy of assertive engagement with Washington, whilst pursuing ‘ideological pluralism’ as a basis for its international relations with particular emphasis on hemispheric relations.

In examining how Chile’s new government interacted with the outside world, this chapter focuses on how Allende approached the inter-American system and how he envisaged his relationship with the United States. As we shall see, the UP’s foreign policy was a calculated compromise between ‘obligatory’ defensive aims and radical desires to transform inter-American affairs and the world economic system. Combining these two strands, Allende publicly explained that Chileans would “raise [their] points of view” to initiate a “dialogue” leading “to a new concept of inter-American relations”. He therefore pushed for a “realistic” relationship with Washington that avoided “inessential questions” clouding “friendly” relations.

However, Allende’s hopes of persuading the United States to look on him favourably were miscalculated. Like Chile, the United States wanted to avoid a public confrontation. But as far as Washington was concerned, ideology and Chile’s new relations with Cuba were far from ‘inessential’. From November 1970 onwards – even as Allende settled into government – it was precisely for these reasons that Washington pursued covert rollback in Chile and tried to contain him internationally. Allende was thus handicapped from the outset, especially as Nixon’s ‘cool but correct’ stance disorientated the new Chilean government.

In early 1971, Chilean suspicions that the US was trying to isolate Allende in Latin America grew. An uneasy regional divide between Washington, Santiago and their respective allies was emerging, revolving around Santiago’s search for ‘ideological pluralism’ in international affairs and Washington’s efforts to uphold ‘ideological frontiers’ in Latin America. The struggle between US and Chilean visions for the inter-American system would mainly take place in public forums and diplomatic corridors. But there was also an ominous military component to Washington’s strategy compared to a vague affirmation of sustaining assistance to military leaders a year before. To a greater extent than Chile suspected, the Nixon administration had embarked on a new, urgent, Cold War struggle to court military and conservative forces against Allende, who, together with Castro, appeared poised to radically transform the inter-American system.
Allende’s promise to recapture ‘Chile for Chileans’ involved redefining his country’s relations, particularly with the United States. However, in November 1970, exactly what his international position would be was not immediately clear either to outsiders or the UP itself. Allende had not been shy about advocating revolution or opposing US ‘imperialism’ before 1970. Indeed, it was not just a domestic agenda that obliged the new Chilean government to look beyond its frontiers, but also profound ideas about the world that motivated them to do so. Once in power, the new Chilean president wanted a foreign policy that stayed loyal to his beliefs and avoided external intervention or regional isolation. The UP therefore chose a policy of ‘healthy realism’, which it hoped would allow Allende to survive and succeed. With regards to Allende’s core aims – relations with Cuba, nationalisation of Chile’s copper mines and identifying his country with the Third World’s demands to overhaul international economic relations – he remained firm to his principles.

When the Organisation of American States’ Secretary General, Galo Plaza, met Allende just before his inauguration, the president-elect issued what Plaza called a “tirade against the OAS”. But he explained that rather than leave the organisation, Chile would work from inside it in a “constructive, but uncompromising” manner. When asked by Plaza how he would describe his aims to the world, the Secretary General recorded Allende as explaining, “his ideological principles were firmly grounded in Marxism, but not as untouchable dogma.” Allende defensively denied his government would be “Marxist or Communist” on the grounds that not even the USSR had established communism and not all the parties in the UP were Marxist. Instead, in Plaza’s words, Allende described his government as:

...a Chilean-style reformist regime, not patterned after Cuba, Russia or Czechoslovakia. He cited, as the best proof of the direction that his government would take, his impeccable democratic credentials...he was not a khaki-clad guerrilla coming down from the mountains with rifle in hand. Fidel Castro was a close personal friend of his and he admired him in many respects, but he did not intend to be a Fidel Castro, and Chile was not Cuba... he pointed out that Chile had a solid political structure that was lacking in Cuba, and that he was democratically elected as a constitutional president, while Castro was a dictator who took power by force.  

The new president, who clearly wanted to reassure potential enemies, explained that while Chile wished to expand relations with “all nations of the world”, it would remain firmly within the Western Hemisphere and wanted good relations with the United States.
Indeed, Allende did not want to decisively realign Chile to the East. He looked to Moscow for support, but not tutelage. Within the UP, the Chilean Communist Party (PCCh) had intimate links with Moscow, receiving $400,000 from it in 1970 (as opposed to $50,000 ten years earlier). Yet the Socialist Party’s identity was based on its opposition to the PCCh’s pro-Soviet stance and, as a member, Allende argued the need to find Chilean – as opposed to Soviet – solutions to his country’s problems. During his presidential campaign in 1964, he had explained that Chile’s copper exports to Western Europe meant that independence from the US did not automatically mean dependency on the USSR. Almeyda recalled that Chileans generally believed that Moscow tacitly recognised Latin America as a US sphere of influence after the Cuban Missile Crisis and that socialist countries would have limited logistical capacities to intervene in support of the UP if the US decided to intervene. Thus, although Allende clearly wanted to improve relations with the Soviet bloc, he wanted to take advantage of détente to seek the benefits of ties from East and West.

By immediately re-establishing diplomatic relations with Cuba, Allende very clearly underlined Chile’s new independence. The Chilean Communist Party Senator, Volodia Teitelboim, proclaimed that the UP’s victory would have been “absolutely inconceivable” without the Cuban revolution. Allende also told Radio Habana Cuba he had “learnt” from Cuba and promised, “in the corner of South America”, there were people ready to “begin to advance along their own path, different from that of Cuba, but with the same goal”. Indeed, for Allende, and even the PCCh, the decision to re-establish relations with Cuba was automatic and non-negotiable.

When relations were re-established, eight or nine intelligence officers from Cuba’s General National Liberation Department (the exact number and identity are unknown) took up diplomatic posts at the new embassy to handle Cuba’s relationships with Chile’s left-wing parties and the presidency. Above Luis Fernández Oña, Juan Carretero (otherwise known by his alias, ‘Ariel’) was the most senior Cuban representative in Chile, having played a key role in co-ordinating Che Guevara’s Bolivian campaign. The DGLN’s Chile desk officer in Havana, Ulises Estrada, also travelled to Santiago twice a month to oversee operations and deliver or collect sensitive communications. At the governmental level, Cuban Foreign Minister Raul Roa, Cuba’s Ministry for External Trade, Cuban Ambassador Mario García Incháustegui, and Cuba’s Cultural Attaché, Lisandro Otero, were responsible for developing commercial, scientific, technological and cultural exchanges.
The evolving Chilean-Cuban economic relationship, which built on trade agreements signed before Allende came to power, hardly transformed either country’s trading patterns, but both countries viewed it as conceptually significant. In late January 1971, a delegation led by Cuba’s Vice-Minister for External Trade, Raul León, arrived in Chile to expand commercial relations. He subsequently signed a three-year trade agreement on 12 February 1971, which was followed, on 1 August, by a ‘Basic Agreement on Scientific and Technological Cooperation’. Chileans involved in negotiations emphasised the value of these evolving ties as an example of a different type of economic relations. Traditionally, they noted, international scientific and technological cooperation had been “vertical” – between more developed and less developed nations. By contrast, Santiago wanted to establish more “beneficiary” “horizontal” ties, which analysts suggested responded “much better...to the real interests of development...than the other [vertical] type” that were so often shaped by ulterior motives of profit and control.  

Besides new ‘horizontal’ ties with Cuba, Allende expanded Chile’s identification with developing countries outside Latin America, building on Chilean economists’ long-standing involvement in Third World economic organisations. In doing so, Allende contributed to the radicalisation of the global South and its rising demands for greater international economic and political equality. Chile’s involvement in Third World forums such as the Group of 77 (G77) increased and Chile also enthusiastically joined the Non-Aligned Movement as a full member in 1971. Joining Peru’s president, Velasco Alvarado, Allende became a leading voice of Latin America’ growing identification with the Third World. The ‘Latin American Round’ of North-South talks in the early 1970s was a reflection of this, including a G77 meeting in Lima in October 1971, the third United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in Santiago and a Non-Aligned Foreign Minister’s meeting in Guyana in 1972. 

In advocating radical transformation of the inter-American system, Allende maintained there was “no ideological identity” between Latin America and the US. “The United States is interested in maintaining the current world situation, which has allowed it to attain and strengthen its hegemony”, he argued. He declared, “Latin America, as a dependent and underdeveloped region” had to “break” with this status and that the ideology of the peoples of the region should be “progressive, reformist or revolutionary, favourable each case to change”. Yet breaking that dependency was complicated. “To create a new society”, he noted, the “experience” of “advanced nations” could “help...greatly in our efforts towards self-improvement”.
Based on his own experience, Castro echoed these conclusions, warning the new president “at all costs” to “avoid a falling out with the United States”. He urged his friend to “remain in the dollar area”, maintain “traditional relations in marketing copper” and stay in the OAS. Raul Roa, also advised Chile’s Chargé d’affaires in Havana not rush into re-establishing relations with East Germany at the cost of relations with West Germany, which could provide better trade and technical assistance. Similarly, after conversations with García Incháustegui, one Chilean diplomat advised Chile’s Foreign Ministry that only with “cold pragmatism” would it be possible to “modify an external trade regime”. Altering Chile’s economic relations was not the issue, he advised; it was “how to do it” that mattered.

Allende expected some form of US hostility towards him. In an interview with Régis Debray in early 1971, he explained that Cuba’s experience had “indisputably” shown what the lengths imperialism would use to defend its interests. He also considered Peru’s nationalisation dispute with Washington beginning in 1969 as demonstrating imperialism’s “cruelties” in Latin America. Allende also deeply distrusted Washington’s ambassador in Santiago, Edward Korry, whom he privately held responsible for having driven Chile to “the verge of disaster with his biased and distorted reports” before his inauguration.

The question the UP faced was whether it could prevent US hostility. The new Chilean government regarded direct US military intervention as unlikely because of the Vietnam War, but by no means discarded the possibility that Washington could intervene by proxy. The incoming government thus scrutinized official statements and press reports about the Nixon administration’s approach to Chile. At times, Santiago’s diplomats succumbed to a tendency of exaggerating their country’s importance in determining US foreign policy. Chile’s ambassador in Washington warned that the Cienfuegos crisis that had erupted in September regarding Soviet submarine bases in Cuba had been a “fantasmagórico” designed by the Pentagon to coincide with Allende’s election, re-emphasise the dangers of communism in the hemisphere and warn Moscow not to intervene. In fact, the events were unrelated despite Kissinger’s later attempt to link them in his memoirs. Not only did Kissinger confuse the chronology of events (the crisis occurred after Allende was elected, not before), the Cienfuegos crisis was instantly perceived as a US-Soviet issue and resolved bilaterally. It was certainly never discussed when policymakers were formulating their policies towards Chile.

However, during Allende’s first months as president, Santiago also had concrete evidence of
US hostility.\textsuperscript{33} From the information they gathered, Chilean diplomats in Washington concluded the Nixon administration viewed Allende’s government as “the antithesis” of US prescriptions for development in Latin America.\textsuperscript{34} Nixon failed to send a customary message of congratulations to Allende, the US unilaterally dismantled meteorological observation installations on Easter Island weeks before Allende’s inauguration, the Export-Import Bank dropped Chile to its lowest credit rating, and at the end of February 1971 Washington abruptly cancelled a scheduled the US nuclear aircraft carrier \textit{Enterprise}’s visit to Chile only a day after Allende publicly announced it.\textsuperscript{35}

Chileans also received warnings from Washington that US ‘correctness’ was contingent on Allende’s foreign policy. In early January, during a televised press conference, Nixon ‘coolly’ but ‘correctly’ stated that although Chilean events were not something the US was “pleased about”, it respected the principle of non-intervention. However, he added a caveat, explaining US aid programmes would only continue “as long as Chile’s foreign policy is not antagonistic to our interests”.\textsuperscript{36} A month later, when Nixon stated he was “prepared to have the kind of relationship” with Allende that Allende was “prepared to have” with the US, Santiago’s embassy in Washington concluded that while not a “severe warning”, the US clearly did not want accommodation.\textsuperscript{37}

In this context, Allende assembled an experienced and balanced foreign policy team. He appointed a Socialist Foreign Minister but ensured his deputy was from the more moderate Radical Party.\textsuperscript{38} He also had strong links with established Chilean diplomats and respected their advice. Allende even offered to let Frei’s Foreign Minister, Gabriel Valdés (who was a friend of his), remain in his post.\textsuperscript{39} Although Valdés refused on account of his allegiance to the Christian Democrat Party (PDC), his assistance and that of confidants such as the career diplomat, Ramon Huidobro, helped smooth over the transition of governments. Prior to Allende’s inauguration, for example, Valdés had taken Almeyda to the United Nations to meet key personalities in international politics.\textsuperscript{40} Although relations between the UP and socialist countries were also conducted on a party-to-party basis, the traditional structure of the Foreign Ministry was also maintained and Allende gave it his full support.\textsuperscript{41} Finally, the new Chilean president worked with Chileans who had risen in the ranks of international financial organisations; the “elegant left”, as the Chilean historian, Joaquín Fernandoids labelled them.\textsuperscript{42} As recalled by one such Chilean economist who would later serve Allende at New York’s COFRO offices, Allende’s first choice for ambassador to Washington was the Inter-American Development Bank’s (IDB) former president, Felipe Herrera, but he was forced to reconsider as certain members of the UP thought he was too centrist. Instead, Allende
chose Orlando Letelier, a former IDB functionary and young Socialist who had lived in Washington for ten years.\textsuperscript{43}

Allende’s confidants remember him as understanding that Chile could not, at least yet, “fight the giant”.\textsuperscript{44} The majority of the UP accepted that strategic aims of advancing world revolution would be best served in the short term by focussing tactically on securing Chile’s revolutionary process. “The only way to restrain our adversaries”, Almeyda explained, “was to try and neutralize them, divide them, negotiate with them; to compromise and even retreat tactically in order to avoid collision or confrontation, which could only have a negative outcome for Chile”. But not everyone in the UP agreed. Years later, Almeyda recalled “a small minority” in the new government tended towards a “primitive battle instinct”, seeing “every conflict as a test of strength” and a decisive means of challenging imperialism. This minority argued a conflict with the United States “could bring political results” and “stimulate greater internal political support for the government”.\textsuperscript{45} In the end, the majority and Allende triumphed. On the occasion of his inauguration celebrations, Allende had insisted that throughout Chile’s “permanent battle for liberation...justice and equality”, Chileans had “always preferred solving social conflicts by means of persuasion and political action”; the nation’s coat of arms ‘By Reason or Force’ put “Reason first”, he underlined.\textsuperscript{46}

Without the inclination or the power to use force as a means of asserting Chile’s independence, Allende chose to try and reason with Washington. Allende optimistically declared that relations with United States would be conditional on Chile’s ability as a sovereign state to, “to differ, dissent and negotiate from different points of view”.\textsuperscript{47} In late December 1970, Almeyda also told the Chilean Senate that the UP would try to “reduce” areas of conflict with the US “to the minimum” and would adopt a policy of “healthy realism”.\textsuperscript{48} But in trying to reason with the US and make relations more ‘healthy’, Almeyda revealingly told Washington’s ambassador in Santiago that he “followed Mao’s advice in separating short-term tactics from longer-term strategy” and hoped Washington did “not fall in the trap” of seeing “each specific problem...as part of global strategies”.\textsuperscript{49}

From the inside looking out, Allende was clear he should be allowed to ‘dissent’ and, at least initially, was hopeful that he would be able to. For someone who so vehemently disagreed with Washington’s policies towards Latin America and the Third World, this took a leap of faith in the power of Chile’s unique democratic experiment to win US policymakers over. Not ‘fighting the giant’ did not mean did not entail renouncing his Third Worldist, Latin Americanist and anti-
imperialist principles. The improvement of the Third World’s international economic and political standing were natural corollaries to Allende’s domestic promises of social justice and emancipation. However cautiously Allende moved, this obviously placed him at odds with the United States and the international economic and political systems it upheld. The challenge of redefining inter-American relations, befriending Cuba, denouncing injustices of the world economic system and expropriating foreign companies in Chile without a painful divorce with Washington would be difficult. If the UP recognised the consequences of failure could be costly, it did not fully understand how costly or how difficult the task of calculating what costs would be.

Deceptive Dialogue

Chileans had limited success in redefining their relations with the United States because at least initially they found it difficult to gauge Washington’s policy towards them. Although Allende urged US officials to avoid a global Cold War framework when dealing with Chile, this framework was the key to Washington’s policies. Indeed, ‘healthy realism’ could only work if the United States reciprocated it. As Chileans had expected, Allende’s nationalisation policies became a central topic of bilateral US-Chilean dialogue in early 1971. The new Chilean government made a case for dialogue on the basis that nationalisation programmes could and should be treated as isolated economic issues between Santiago and private US companies rather than harbingers of governmental confrontation. Yet, Santiago was deceived into thinking this was the key to its broader relations with Washington. Nixon certainly believed private investment was the answer to development, faced aggressive lobbying from multinationals and was eager to protect investments in Chile. But much to the disdain of multinationals affected, his policy was founded on Chilean socialism’s threat the US’ great power credibility, status and image rather than its finances.

One cornerstone of Allende’s presidential campaigns between 1952 and 1970 was nationalisation. Copper, “the salary of Chile”, as Allende termed it, accounted for 80 percent of Chile’s foreign exchange earnings and was the focus of his nationalisation programme. In 1969, the Christian Democrat President, Eduardo Frei, had embarked on ‘Chileanization’ of the country’s copper mines, purchasing 51 percent of the US copper company Kennecott’s share in El Teniente mine and of a second company, Anaconda’s share in Chuquicamata and El Salvador mines. Allende argued that this did not go far enough. In promising to “free Chile from subordination to foreign capital”, the UP’s ‘Basic Programme’ promised this would “secure rapid...economic growth” and
redistribute wealth. Nationalising Chile’s raw materials was a means of re-directing profits towards the battle against poverty and inequality. As Allende told Régis Debray, “economic independence” was a necessary precursor to political independence and “unquestionable power” of the majority of Chile’s population.

At the end of 1970, the UP sent a constitutional amendment to Congress to establish state control of Chile’s copper mines and enable expropriation of foreign companies working them. Ties between private US companies operating in Chile and the US government, and US government insurance for private investment overseas, meant that any action against the former would almost certainly affect relations with the latter. Yet, both as a rhetorical strategy and in practice, Santiago’s strategy was to try and divide US government and business. At the beginning of February, Washington had sent Santiago soft but direct threats. In a demarche Ambassador Korry delivered to Almeyda, Washington “advised” the Chilean government to have early conversations with North American businessmen and emphasised the US government’s responsibility to safeguard US investments. Meanwhile, he was privately lobbying “influential Chilean politicians”, “spelling out possible international consequences of confiscatory nationalization and what consequent radicalization of Chilean politics would mean”.

By the end of February 1971, the Chilean embassy in Washington acknowledged that copper nationalisation had become an “important preoccupation” for the Nixon administration that could justify a hard-line policy towards Chile. To lessen this preoccupation, and speaking on the president’s behalf, Almeyda had approached Korry to express hope that the United States would “isolate problems such as copper” and avoid them becoming “inflated by ideological or global considerations”. He added that he hoped the type of nationalisation disputes that had spiralled in US-Cuban relations after 1959 could be avoided. Korry noted a “kind of pragmatism… when confronted with the possibility of firm confrontation”. There was “a chance of a deal”, he advised Washington, but noted that the “essential question” was whether the US wanted one. By late March, the lessons Korry had drawn translated into more direct US warnings. After a further meeting between the ambassador and Almeyda, the Chilean Foreign Ministry observed that Washington was “now exercising a certain pressure over the Government of Chile” to modify its nationalisation project. A Chilean diplomat present at the meeting considered this threat to be “serious and unsatisfactory”.

Allende’s attempt to ensure Chile’s relationship with the United States government
remained ‘healthy’ was hampered by uncertainty regarding the exact “problem” he would face. The president was certainly not at any time “cockahoop with the ease his political potions” were having, as Korry suggested. Chilean diplomat, Ramon Huidobro, recalls attending one of at least three special meetings that Allende called at the start of his presidency to debate this issue. One conclusion reached was that the UP should prioritise gaining full national support. Meanwhile, Chilean diplomats in Washington were tasked with investigating the legal and political implications of nationalising Chile’s mining industry. In February and March, the UP received two reports on US responses to nationalisation programmes in Mexico, Iran, Guatemala, Brazil and Cuba. These spelt out that US law – including the ‘Hickenlooper Amendment’ of 1964 – required “adequate, prompt and effective compensation”, within six months. Yet, lawyers underlined Washington’s proclivity to deal on a “case-by-case” and “country-by-country” basis, advising Santiago it was “impossible to predict the precise moves” the US would take. As late as July, Letelier reported to Santiago that State Department officials exhibited “extreme caution” regarding nationalisation, which made it “difficult to get a pronunciation ‘a priori’ regarding the measures that it could adopt.”

Meanwhile, Letelier was fooled into believing the US wanted a dialogue with Allende and Chilean diplomats concluded Allende still had space to establish a working relationship with the United States, pursue his nationalisation programme and rearrange the balance of power between them. In February, Chile’s embassy in Washington surmised that US leaders “evidently” had no fixed policy towards Chile or “if they did it was only a rough draft”. Deputy Assistant Secretary for Latin American Affairs, John Crimmins, told Letelier, “there was a major disposition on the part of the US government…to resolve [any future] problems”. Days later, on 23 March, Kissinger “emphasised” to Letelier “that his Government did not wish in any way to interfere with the internal affairs of Chile” and Letelier wrote to Almeyda that the meeting had been “much more positive than…hoped”. Kissinger had even gone as far as to state twice, in a forty-minute meeting, that the way Allende was leading the new Chilean process was “worthy of great admiration”. Based on their analysis of Kissinger’s pivotal position in Washington’s foreign policy establishment, Chilean diplomats considered this assurance to be highly significant. As a result of these conversations and Chilean efforts to publicise the democratic nature of La Via Chilena, Letelier wrote to Santiago that the “stridency” of US groups that had raised the “communist danger” of Allende’s Chile was “melting” along with the snow in Washington.
Yet, there were two key problems with Letelier’s analysis. Firstly, the Chileans’ inability to get an exact indication of US reprisals undermined their ability to avert them. Secondly, focusing on nationalisation policies to determine Washington’s approach to Chile diverted the UP’s attention away from understanding the Nixon administration’s fundamental concerns.

In early 1971, US policymakers were undecided about how to deal with the issue of copper. What concerned them was whether to become directly involved in negotiations or to let private companies negotiate for themselves. US officials distrusted the Chileans. On 17 February, following Almeyda’s approach to Korry, Kissinger had questioned whether Allende “really” wanted “to avoid a confrontation over copper” or “to delay” a confrontation until he was “better prepared”. Was Allende trying “to suck the U.S government into the negotiations” so that he could “bargain for leverage in other areas, or ultimately pin the blame for his actions” on the United States? The NSC had three major concerns regarding direct negotiations with the UP: how they would affect the companies’ chances of achieving compensation, what the implications of failure would be on the administration’s ‘correct but cool’ policy and whether they would undermine Washington’s “economic sanctions” against Allende. When the SRG met in February, it decided to postpone a final decision. But in order to try and influence the character of Chilean nationalisation programmes, it engaged the UP in dialogue, offering Korry “as an “intermediary”. On 23 March, Kissinger had personally conveyed this position to Letelier emphasising that the administration did not consider this to be a political or governmental issue. Washington “already had a sufficient amount of enemies abroad”, he insisted, without “transforming Chile into a new enemy”.

Notwithstanding Kissinger’s platitudes, the Nixon administration was simultaneously pursuing a comprehensive destabilisation campaign in Chile in line with NSDM 93. As Acting Chairman of the NSC’s Ad Hoc Working Group on Chile, John Crimmins, concluded, “restraint” was not “synonymous with passivity or inaction.” In November, the administration embarked on giving Allende ‘cold Turkey’ by instructing US representatives at the Inter-American Development Bank and the World Bank to work behind the scenes to delay action on Chilean loans and pose awkward questions about the UP’s economic programmes. The government informed business and labour leaders of its “discouraging view of developments in Chile” and the State Department had also immediately instructed its Agency for International Development (AID) and the Export-Import Bank “to withhold” US loans and investment guarantees “until further notice”. Overall, compared to the $110 million AID administered to Chile between 1968 and 1970, Chile would receive
approximately $3 million during Allende’s presidency. Similarly, between his election and his overthrow in 1973 IDB loans totalled $2 million compared to $46 million in 1970 and the World Bank approved no loans at all between 1971 and 1973 compared to the $31 million granted between 1969 and 1970.\(^7\)

Simultaneously, the 40 Committee launched its Covert Action Programme inside Chile to boost opposition parties. US policymakers focussed on strengthening the biggest of these, the PDC, and improving its chances in Chile’s municipal elections in April 1971. Intervening in municipal elections was nothing new; in 1969, Washington had expended $350,000 to help the PDC.\(^7\) However, in 1971 denying the UP a majority in an election widely regarded to be a “plebiscite” on the government was a key priority.\(^7\) On 28 January 1971, the 40 Committee therefore granted $1,240,000 to support the PDC’s media outlets and a “vigorous electoral effort to maintain the morale” by providing evidence of “party vitality”.\(^7\)

But when Chileans went to the polls on 4 April, the UP gained 49.74 percent, a sizeable increase compared to Allende’s election six months earlier. The results indicated the success of the UP’s domestic programme that, by April, had achieved a partial redistribution of income, a modest decrease in unemployment and inflation as well as garnering support for its nationalisation and agrarian reform programs. But the results were by no means decisive. The CIA also claimed success, concluding that the denial of a UP outright majority, the restoration of the Chilean oppositions’ confidence and the opposition media’s growing strength were all the “fruits of U.S. government financial assistance”. And the CIA congratulated itself on achieving this without significantly raising Allende’s suspicions.\(^7\) Although US intelligence analysts did not see the future as being “necessarily bright” and acknowledged that Allende would probably “attempt to fulfil his promise to ‘make haste slowly but implacably’ in carrying out his revolution”, it contented itself that his opposition was “buying time and remaining viable”.\(^7\)

All the while it was denying economic aid to Chile’s democratic government and boosting Allende’s opposition, Washington focussed on courting Chile’s Armed Forces, which it believed were important for “potential future action” against Allende.\(^8\) When the issue of Chilean requests for Foreign Military Assistance came up in February, the Pentagon underlined why it continued assistance:

1) strengthen our influence in the Chilean military services and thus attempt to harden resistance to communist domination of Chile; 2) increase Chilean dependence of U.S. sources of supply for spares; and 3) pre-empt
A day later, on 17 February 1971, the SRG decided to grant $5 million of an allocated $7 million in Foreign Military Sales (FMS) credit for Chile for the forthcoming year. As Kissinger commented to Rogers, the administration was going “out of [its] way to be nice to the Chilean military”. Overall, an examination of Washington’s covert policies makes a mockery of Allende’s hopes of redefining US-Chilean relations along healthier but realistic lines. The Chileans may have been suspicious of Washington, but they were clearly one step behind understanding US policy. While Washington issued warnings regarding underlying rules governing the relationship between them, these were frustratingly vague. Washington’s strenuous efforts to avoid exposure were relatively successful in blocking Chilean attempts to fathom the boundaries they faced. Over thirty years later, Crimmins was surprised to hear how effective and unified the Nixon administration’s message had been especially considering the animosity between the State Department and the NSC that plagued Nixon’s administration. By contrast, Chile failed to convince US policymakers and as the UP adjusted itself to government, US officials were already adjusting Washington’s policy in Latin America.

**Ideological Pluralism vs. Ideological Frontiers**

Santiago and Washington were mutually suspicious about each other’s policies in Latin America. Allende’s election and the re-establishment of Cuba-Chile relations contributed to the impression of a rapidly changing hemispheric order. And both Chile and the United States wanted to readjust the Southern Cone to suit their own national and international aims, focussing predominantly on winning over the Southern Cone’s major powers, Argentina and Brazil. On one side, Santiago championed ‘ideological pluralism’, underlining the coincidence between Allende’s international aims and regional powers’ resistance to US dominance and/or worries about Brasilia’s new assertive regional foreign policy. On the other side, Chilean developments conditioned the outcome of a major strategy review regarding the US’ policy towards Brazil (NSSM 67). Kissinger also ordered new reviews of Washington’s approach to Latin America. As he admitted to Letelier in March 1971, he wanted to overcome his “ignorance” of the region.

Washington’s perception of Chile as a regional problem was reinforced when Allende re-established diplomatic relations with Cuba. Henceforth, undermining Allende was immediately
entangled with the bigger goal of containing Castro and ensuring the US’ ability to influence the inter-American system. The news Peru and Bolivia might be interested in following Chile’s move magnified Washington’s sense of vulnerability. At the end of November, the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) noted that the “catching” nature of Chile’s move could grow, especially “if the international militancy of both Cuba and Chile” did “not become more pronounced”, which it judged as “unlikely”. Indeed, the INR lamented OAS members appeared “impressed...by the decline in Cuban material support for Latin American revolutionaries since Che Guevara’s death”.

Although the Nixon administration concluded it could do “nothing practicable” to reverse Chile’s decision, it explicitly urged hemispheric nations to uphold Castro’s isolation. In early December, Kissinger had told the SRG that he refused to take any proposal to the president that would “soften” the US’ Cuba policy. But when Latin American leaders met in Mexico for President Luis Echeverría’s inauguration later that month, OAS Secretary General, Galo Plaza, began consultations with leaders about reviewing Cuba’s isolation. On this occasion, as the Brazilian Foreign Minister later concluded, US-Brazilian “firmness” had “substantially diminished pressures” to review Cuba’s isolation. In January 1971, the State Department reaffirmed Washington’s position, instructing ambassadors to contact host governments accordingly. The administration insisted that lifting sanctions would “compromise the collective security concept of the inter-American system”, “gratuitously present Castro with a badly needed and prestigious political and psychological victory over the OAS” and “relieve some of the economic pressures [on Cuba]...thus risking an increase in Cuban subversive activities in the Hemisphere”.

At the same time, Washington began to “build a case as actively and effectively as possible” against Chile. As a means of discrediting Allende’s independence and democratic credentials, CIA station chiefs to discuss “suitable [intelligence] items” with US Ambassadors for dissemination to journalists and politicians throughout Latin America. In particular, Washington wanted to “play up” the notion that Chile was awash with Cuban and Soviet agents who were assuming control of Chile’s security services “for both internal and external subversion”. Although US policymakers in Washington had little concrete information about Cuban involvement in Chile – relying on what NSC staffer, Viron Pete Vaky, recalled as suppositions of what “what most surely would happen” – Washington’s strategy was effective as a means of attacking both Allende and Castro’s prestige.
throughout the hemisphere at the same time.95 Certainly, Brazil’s ambassador in Santiago relied purely on press reports to craft an alarmist telegram about Cuban subversion in Chile to Brasilia.96

Santiago was acutely aware that its relations with Cuba were a source of potential tension with the United States and conservative regional powers. As well as Nixon’s public reference to Allende’s decision as a “challenge” to inter-American “values”, Galo Plaza informed Chilean officials that the State Department had “paralyzed” a Colombian initiative to review the Cuba question.97 Nixon’s private comments to one Bolivian diplomat, that he had a “major interest” in working more closely with countries in the region due to the “new political configuration” in Latin America, was also relayed to Chilean officials.98 Based on US press reports and conversations with government officials, the Chilean embassy in Washington concluded that some were trying to isolate Chile “as the black sheep of the [inter-American] family”.99

Santiago’s fears of being isolated were exacerbated by Washington’s regional diplomacy.100 In early 1971, Chilean diplomats warned of US attention to Peru as a “signal” that the administration was trying to divide Chile from its neighbour.101 Allende’s Ambassador in Lima, Luis Jerez Ramirez, surmised that Peru was a “fundamental piece” in Washington’s attempt to regain and maintain its “past hegemony” in South America. Although this actually exaggerated the US’ attention to Peru at this stage, the ambassador was worried enough to caution the Foreign Ministry that it should “seriously” consider the possibility that Washington could use Lima as a “wedge” against regional integration.102

Following a meeting of US diplomats to Latin America in Panama in March, Chilean press articles also falsely alleged that Allende possessed a US document proving that Washington was trying to isolate Chile. The Chilean Foreign Ministry immediately denied this document existed and issued a statement downplaying the possibility Chile could be isolated, insisting that by maintaining relations with all relations it could be sure that “whatever cloudy proposal to isolate Chile” would fail.103 Behind the scenes, however, diplomats continued to speculate about “US consultations to blockade Chile”.104

The Chilean Foreign Ministry paid “special attention” to evidence of growing ties between Washington and Brasilia. Following Assistant Secretary Charles Meyer’s visit to Brazil in March 1971, Brazilian press reports and at least two Chilean dailies noted that he and Brazil’s Foreign Minister had discussed “Cuban infiltration in Chilean internal affairs” and the future “transformation of that country into a base of support for the export of terrorism and subversion”.105
Signs of an evolving US-Brazilian relationship coincided with Brazil’s diplomatic offensive in Latin America, including its own efforts to improve relations with Peru. Accordingly, Allende’s ambassador in Argentina suggested that the US was “distributing different geographic regions of the world” to specific countries. Chile’s ambassador in Brasilia also warned that the “campaign” to undermine Chile’s prestige had been launched and that Chile was threatened by a new collaborative partnership between the US and Brazil, its “unconditional political ally”. Ambassador Raul Rettig concluded that the United States wanted to “recuperate lost territory in Latin America or, in the worst-case scenario, not continue losing it” but was reluctant to be the one to intervene directly in Latin American affairs. He further surmised that Washington could take “advantage” of Brazil’s regional diplomatic offensive to prevent another Cuba. He therefore urged Santiago to build the best possible relations with countries in the Andean region as an “antidote”.

From the start of his presidency, Allende had emphasised Chile’s membership of the ‘Andean Pact’, a group established in 1969 comprising Chile, Peru, Colombia, Ecuador and Bolivia, which aimed for economic integration and development. In December, the UP signed up to the group’s ‘Decision 24’, an agreement to regulate foreign investment and decrease external control of the members’ industrial production. Almeyda later admitted that Chile’s main purpose in doing so was political. Member states did not have a history of commercial relations; when the pact was signed their exports to each other amounted to only 2.85 percent of the Pact’s exports as a whole and their mutual imports accounted for only 4.8 percent of total imports. Indeed, as Almeyda recalled, some in the UP believed that rules to try and transform this balance of trade were economically unwise. Supporting greater integration and showing “an active and visible Chilean loyalty to the process” was ultimately considered “important” for political reasons.

Allende also emphasised a policy of ‘non-intervention’ and did not actively support Latin American revolutionary movements once he assumed the presidency. Santiago only reluctantly gave political asylum to 70 Brazilian left-wing revolutionaries in January 1971 as part of a hostage deal on “humanitarian” grounds. Rather than emphasising revolutionary solidarity, the Chilean Foreign Ministry wanted to avoid Allende’s enemies misrepresenting the event to damage Chile’s “external image”. Allende told foreign journalists that it was “difficult to conceive” how Chile could export La Via Chilena in countries with no political parties, workers organisations, or a parliament. And in April 1971, Almeyda carefully tailored a speech to the OAS in response to conversations Chileans with US officials and representatives at the organisation. He emphasised
Allende’s democratic methods, respect for non-intervention and rejection of foreign interference, underlining Chile’s “sober” approach to foreign affairs and rejecting the idea that Allende had international leadership pretensions. With regard to Cuba, Almeyda defended Allende’s actions by pointing to Mexico’s relations with the island and pointing to Havana’s ever more “artificial” isolation.\(^1\)\(^4\)

However, the UP’s regional policies were far more ambiguous to outsiders than the Chilean Foreign Ministry and Allende proclaimed. Partly, this was the consequence of the heterogeneous nature of the UP. At the Socialist Party’s Congress in January 1971, its new leader, Carlos Altamirano, publicly declared Uruguayan and Brazilian revolutionaries would “always” receive “asylum from oppression” and support from “comrades in arms” in Chile.\(^1\)\(^5\)\(^\text{1}\) Indeed, when Chilean Left publications vociferously welcomed the 70 Brazilian that arrived in Santiago in January 1971, this caused what one US diplomat later referred to as “a marked chilling of already cool relations” between Santiago and Brasilia.\(^1\)\(^6\) Allende also clearly had obvious sympathy for Latin American far Left movements. As his friend, the Chilean writer and diplomat, Gonzalo Rojas Pizarro described, Allende had the body and mind of a democratic statesman and the heart of a revolutionary.\(^1\)\(^7\) When in mid-1971, the British ambassador in Uruguay, Geoffrey Jackson, was kidnapped by Tupamaros, London discreetly asked the Chilean president to appeal for his release. As Britain’s ambassador in Santiago noted after he met Allende, the president was “very good at making those with whom he talks feel that he is fundamentally on their side”.\(^1\)\(^8\) Allende appeared to want:

\[
\text{\ldots the best of both worlds. He has hoped for a great boost for himself as president of Chile and as leader of the Latin American left... he would not do anything to embarrass the Tupamaros and he might indeed be able to help them both by facilitating a satisfactory arrangement over Jackson and by presenting them and the left-wing in general in a relatively good light. He also wants to gain credit with us: he is anxious to be on good terms with the Europeans, and we are particularly important as Europeans and also as an influence on the US. Allende is certainly in some trouble with the Chilean extreme left. It may be true he has to proceed very carefully with them and with the Tupamaros.}^{1\text{1}}\text{9}\]

If Chile’s regional position was ambiguous to outsiders, so was the United States’. In March 1971, Chilean diplomats privately challenged US officials about forging an anti-Chilean coalition against Santiago. Unsurprisingly, Crimmins “absolutely, totally and categorically” denied “the existence of a document destined to propose any measure against Chile”.\(^1\)\(^2\)\(^0\) Kissinger also told Letelier the idea
of a US policy to isolate Chile was “absolutely absurd… with no foundation”.\textsuperscript{121} It would seem that Letelier was taken in. Based on these categorical assertions, he advised the Chilean Foreign Ministry not to “make the sin of fervent civil servants who denounce with alarm the normal activities of the North American leaders who visit these countries”. He urged Almeyda not to underestimate the value of the high-level personal assurances he had been given.\textsuperscript{122}

However, as in the case of US-Chilean bilateral relations, the Chileans had every reason to be suspicious. Although there were differences in Washington regarding the extent to which it should rally counter-revolutionary forces against Chile in Latin America, the whole administration wanted to contain Allende’s influence in the hemisphere.\textsuperscript{123} The Ad Hoc Inter-Agency Group on Chile recommended that although anti-American Latin American nationalism made it imperative to limit “U.S. visibility”, there were still ways of “assuring the degree of U.S. leadership”. Specifically, it advocated a “behind-the-scenes” role for itself, “encouraging Latin Americans to take the initiative but, if necessary, feeding suggested initiatives to them.”\textsuperscript{124}

As it had so often done in previous decades, US leaders believed that preserving loyalty to Washington and safeguarding the hemisphere from revolution was synonymous with building up Latin America’s military institutions and anti-democratic strongmen. Indeed, the president’s orders to pay special attention to Brazil had determined the culmination of a Program Analysis for the country commissioned over a year earlier (NSSM 67). Nixon and Kissinger paid close attention to Brazil as a potential partner in Latin America and emerging economic power in Third World even before Allende’s election.\textsuperscript{125} But in doing so, they faced opposition from the State Department, which was cautious about close ties with the especially repressive regime of General Emílio Garrastazu Médici that had taken power in 1969. Seeking to disentangle the US from Brasilia in the face of congressional pressure, those who had compiled NSSM 67 had stressed Brazil’s relatively unimportant strategic significance as an international military power. They argued “the only [important] use of Brazilian military forces” was “UN and OAS peacekeeping operations” and that “no threat to Brazilian or American security justifies any U.S military assistance to Brazil”.\textsuperscript{126}

However, when the SRG met to discuss NSSM 67 on 1 December 1970, they did so in the context of Chilean events and with NSDM 93 in mind. On the surface, the SRG approved a “Selective Support” option.\textsuperscript{127} But discussion at the SRG meeting inevitably drifted to Allende’s impact and those involved in the lengthy review process failed to persuade the White House that it would be “a mistake” to gear the US’ relationship with Brazil to fighting Allende.\textsuperscript{128} In January
1971, a Country Analysis and Strategy Paper (CASP) prepared by the US embassy in Brasilia summarised the shift in thinking that had taken place:

The fundamentally most important US interest in Brazil is the protection of US national security through the cooperation of Brazil as a hemispheric ally against the contingencies of: an intra-continental threat, such as a serious deterioration in the Chilean situation (example – Chile adopting a Cuba-style ‘export of revolution’ policy) or the formation of an Andean bloc which turned anti-US; or an admittedly more remote extra-continental threat, such as Soviet penetration of the South Atlantic. The danger posed by recent events in Chile and Bolivia establishes a hemispheric security threat which did not exist at anywhere near the same level as this time last year. The maintenance, therefore, of Brazil as a potential ally in hemispheric security affairs could be of critical interest to the US...129

Allende’s election and the Chile-Cuba relationship also provided ammunition the White House to direct US policy towards Brasilia.130 Kissinger had pre-empted the SRG meeting by asking his new assistant for Latin American Affairs, Arnold Nachmanoff, to provide him with an evaluation of how “to improve relations with Brazil”.131 His assistant advised that if “Latins [saw] economics as overwhelming”, the US would have “to try to lift their sights to bigger concepts and historical problems – but if necessary ... address their concern for economic development” and be “as forthcoming” as possible regarding the provision of military equipment. He also recommended that Washington should “pay more attention” to “matters of style and consultation.”132 Shortly after the SRG meeting, Nixon instructed Kissinger that he wanted Brazil’s President invited to the US by July 1971.133

The Pentagon took advantage of this shifting regional focus to enhance military ties with the hemisphere and stop scheduled reductions of Military Group personnel in Latin America.134 The day before the SRG met to discuss Brazilian policy, Secretary of Defence, Melvin Laird, had argued to Nixon that reductions were “inconsonant with...[NSDM 93’s instructions] to increase and maintain close relations with Latin American military leaders”. As an alternative, he called for a “coordinated plan” by the Departments of State and Defence “for increasing the strength of the Military Groups on a selective basis...as quickly as possible.”135 When Laird informed Kissinger of progress on ‘upgrading’ military assistance at the end of December, Kissinger welcomed the news, adding he wanted to “make sure” Latin Americans understood the US was the only place they should go in search of security and military supplies.136 Indeed, Crimmins noted that the Pentagon tended “to be uneasy with the restraints imposed by the risks of playing into Allende’s hands
through becoming too overt. Against these risks they set those of appearing to Latin America and the opposition to Allende in Chile to be weak and indecisive." 137

A week after the SRG meeting on Brazil, Kissinger also ordered a review of the US military presence in Latin America. 138 At the US Army School of the America’s in the Panama Canal Zone, Latin American military leaders continued to be trained in fighting communism. In 1971, 146 Chileans (the number would rise to 257 by 1973) were among those taking courses on counter-guerrilla operations, the use of informants, counterintelligence, subversion, counter-subversion, espionage, counterespionage, interrogation of prisoners and suspects, handling mass rallies, populace and resources control, psychological operations, raids and searches, riots, surveillance, terror and undercover operations. 139 Nixon would also personally intervene to stop plans to phase out the US Armed Forces’ Southern Command (SOUTCOM). 140 But throughout the administration, the message that more attention should be paid to military leaders was loud and clear. The Interdepartmental Group on Inter-American Affairs concluded that “U.S military missions, attaché staffs, training, and other programs” were “effective” for “serving the purposes of contact and influence” with a value “beyond their purely security or military” worth. To clear up any ambiguity the study recommended sending “definitive guidance removing any doubts about the permissibility, propriety and desirability of utilizing mission personnel and attaches for purposes of influencing host governments’ military leaders toward U.S foreign policy objectives”. It also prioritised overcoming legislative restrictions on military sales and recommended “Latin American requirements...be accorded a sufficiently high priority in relation to other regions”. 141

Brazil’s military leaders eagerly reciprocated the Nixon administration’s concerns about the shifting regional balance. Washington’s ambassador in Brasilia, William Rountree, reported one Brazilian Vice Admiral as having spoken “at length and almost emotionally in support of US-Brazilian cooperation in naval and other military fields”. “Emphasizing dividends” of previous US-Brazilian cooperation, Vice-Admiral, Sylvia Figueiredo, gave Rountree “extensive survey” of “dangerous potentialities in Latin America, including Andean states and Uruguay” and reported that disillusioned Chilean naval officers were in contact with their Brazilian counterparts. 142 In early February, during a meeting with Secretary Rogers, Brazil’s Foreign Minister, Gibson Barbosa raised concerns about the Southern Cone. Although he argued that direct intervention in Chile would be “counterproductive”, he urged Brazil and the United States to “work together to meet the threats posed by these developments...(1) to counter the Chilean situation; (2) to help rebuild
friendship for the United States which has waned in certain sectors in Brazil and (3) to reinforce
trends in Brazil toward a return to responsive political institutions."143

Indeed, it would seem that Brasilia was even more worried about Allende than Washington,
and as Nixon feared, Brazilians doubted the US’ commitment and ability to curtail either leftist
gains in Chile or beyond. Brazil’s ambassador in Santiago, Antonio Castro da Câmara Canto
observed the United States was unable to move against Allende due to new Chilean government’s
“able diplomacy”, Washington’s preoccupation with Southeast Asia and the frictions it had with
other Latin American countries. He regretted that the UP’s legal, constitutional approach gave the
United States nothing to “protest”. While the US was wary of repeating the same mistakes it had
made in 1959, Câmara Canto suggested Santiago had absorbed the lessons of Castro’s experience
and with the “tonic” of “caution”, was managing its relationship with the US far better than Havana
had.144

As well as underlining their concerns regarding Chile, the Brazilians simultaneously tried to
direct US attention towards South America as a whole. When Foreign Minister Barboza met
Rogers, he had stressed concerns about Allende’s impact on Peru, Bolivia and Uruguay, the latter of
which “was of particular concern to Brazil” because of “marked leftist gains”.145 The White House
certainly paid increasing attention to Bolivia and the left-leaning military government of Juan José
Torres that had taken power the previous October, and what it regarded as Bolivia’s “highly
unstable and deteriorating situation”.146 Torres had closed a US satellite tracking station in the
country and expelled US labour organisations and the Peace Corps while Bolivian students seized
US properties causing $36,000 worth of damage.147 Although these actions were often the result of
local factors, US officials interpreted them as a rejection of Washington’s influence and losses in a
zero-sum game with the East.148 Indeed, the US ambassador in La Paz, Ernest Sirucasa, regarded
the rising spectre of “Russian control and/or excessive Russian influence” as having transformed
Bolivia’s “unimportance”. He urged his superiors to consider how it might “prevent” Bolivia
becoming “a satellite of the Soviet Union”.149 By June 1971, Kissinger, regarded the Bolivian
situation as “urgent”.150

Nevertheless, the Brazilians still considered the US to be responding slowly to events. In
mid-June, the Brazilian ambassador in Washington complained to Kissinger that the US was
subordinating closer state-to-state relations for a “Junior Chamber of Commerce approach” in the
region.151 A month later, following concerns raised to the US that Washington was poised to
negotiate with Allende, US official reassured Brazil of their “deep and undiminished” “concern” regarding Chile, conveying desires to “maintain close consultation” with Brazil “and others”. 152

In contrast to the burgeoning ties between Washington and Brasilia, US efforts to court Argentina were less successful. With fears of left-wing insurgency in their own country, Argentina’s right-wing military leaders clearly had concerns about Allende, his implications for Argentinean politics and Latin American affairs. When Washington consulted Buenos Aires about possible arms sales to Chile, Argentine officials were grateful but no dialogue occurred between Washington and Buenos Aires as it did with Brasilia regarding inter-American affairs. 153 Although this was because Argentineans were highly suspicious of US-Brazilian relations and feared Brazil was seeking to bolster its position vis-à-vis Argentina, it was also a result of active Chilean diplomacy. 154 Santiago placed special emphasis on relations with Buenos Aires. 155 “We sincerely want – I would say passionately – to mend the only pending border dispute we have with our neighbour…as quickly as possible”, Almeyda told the OAS General Assembly in April 1971. 156 In a battle against isolation, Chile’s vulnerable border with Argentina was a key concern and Chile’s ambassador in Argentina, Ramon Huidobro, recalled that Allende worried Washington would use potential animosity to “provoke conflicts”. 157 Huidobro therefore repeatedly assured Argentina’s Ambassador in Santiago, Javier Teordoro Gallac Saravia, that the UP wanted good relations with Argentina. 158

Allende’s visit to Argentina in July 1971 was the culmination of intense diplomatic efforts to reach an understanding. A month prior to this, Argentina’s Foreign Minister, Pablo Pardo had met Allende and noted that the latter was “extremely friendly”. 159 The Argentinean Foreign Ministry subsequently briefed President Alejandro Lanusse Gelly that Allende was “a serious and respectable man” committed to resolving territorial disputes. 160 At Salta on 24 July, both presidents signed an agreement centred on the principles of non-intervention, peaceful resolution of bilateral disputes and the importance of “friendship and co-operation”. 161 As the Washington Post noted, the meeting was an “important blow to Latin Americans who seek to quarantine the newly socializing states”. 162

Despite this achievement, it is clear that important ideological frontiers in the inter-American system remained firmly in place. By mid-1971, the balance of power in South America was in a state of flux. In June, Letelier wrote that the Nixon Administration had “continued the policy of not having a policy” towards the region: “Despite economic problems with Peru, Bolivia
and Chile”, he suggested, Nixon had been contained and accepted co-existing with different opinions and actions in Latin America. While these differences could have been a “motive for serious conflicts” in the past, he noted that repercussions of the Vietnam War had increased Washington’s “wisdom and maturity”. In a public speech in July 1971, Castro also proclaimed that the United States was “a lot more fragile, and as a consequence much more limited, in its possibilities for intervention in and crushing of revolutionary Latin American processes”. Yet, Castro’s proclamations were premature. Allende’s election had provoked a rapid reassessment of US policy towards Latin America, offering ammunition to those that had previously been urging a more hard-line approach towards the region.

Conclusion

By mid-1971, Chile’s relationship with the outside world had been readjusted rather than redefined. The UP’s success in April’s municipal elections, national support for the new government’s nationalisation programme and Allende’s triumphant visit to Argentina all contributed to a sense of hubris. Allende’s profound belief in the direction of history towards emancipation, development and equality, fortified his emphasis on reason and persuasion as tools for transforming Chile’s relations. Reason – rather than force – appeared to have worked to gain him power, so why would it not serve to achieve his goals and persuade Washington of the legitimacy of his cause? Shortly after coming to power he insisted that by reaching power democratically, he had been able to “pre-empt” US hostility. And as one of his aides recalled, after assuming the presidency, Allende aimed was “to get together and talk” with his potential enemies. Even so, when Allende met Argentina’s President, Alejandro Lanusse, in July 1971, he “expressed great apprehension” at the prospect of “punitive actions on the part of the US government” to his nationalisation programme. After nine months in power, the new Chilean government was still unsure exactly how the Nixon administration perceived Allende’s democratic road to socialism and concerned about the prospect of US hostility.

Chile’s new government welcomed the international climate of the early 1970s as providing space for the UP’s domestic and international project. Allende hoped that the so-called ‘end of the Cold War’ and evidence of US weaknesses, as exposed by its ongoing war in Vietnam, would allow Chile to simultaneously maintain friendly relations with the United States, improve relations with Western Europe, expand relations with the Soviet bloc and forge partnerships with nationalists

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throughout the Third World. Despite being suspicious of US actions, the emergence of economic nationalists in the Andean region also appeared to offer possibilities for radically transforming the inter-American system (or at least redefining Chile’s international relations more easily). Hoping to take advantage of these dynamics and reassure those who feared a Socialist president, Allende thus laid down a ‘realistic’ framework that temporarily muffled his more ambitious international aims. Yet ‘ideological pluralism’ was neither a guarantee for the success, nor an assurance that Washington would abandon efforts to impose ‘ideological frontiers’ against Chile.

Despite Allende’s hopeful reading of world affairs and his private efforts to persuade Washington not to categorise Chile as a Cold War problem, this was the inescapable reality he faced. Nixon and Kissinger’s pursuit of détente was a way of managing what they perceived to be the growing limitations – at an economic, political and military level – of US power rather than a means of relinquishing Washington’s global struggle against communism. In bringing ‘peace with honour’ to America’s withdrawal from Vietnam, the White House had actually escalated US military operations, wanting to reassert the impression of Washington’s strength at the moment of defeat. By asking key regional allies to take on more of the burden of regional defence as part of the ‘Nixon Doctrine’, Nixon and Kissinger hoped that indirect force and resolve would make up for US weakness. In mid-1971 this framework was not yet fully developed. In Brazil, the US found a willing but impatient ally – even more ideologically repelled by what Allende represented and eager to ensure that the United States recognised the dangers confronting the hemisphere. At this stage, the US neither delegated responsibility to Brasilia nor informed it of Washington’s own aggressive covert operations and psychological warfare against Allende. However, this would change. In the overall balance of power in the world, as Kissinger later explained, any “subtle change in the psychological balance of power could be decisive” and it was, increasingly, his priority to ensure that the United States remained a credible leader in the battle against radical opposition.168

In this context, Santiago’s room for manoeuvre was thus more constrained from the outset than the Chileans hoped. Sceptics in Washington and Brasilia viewed his ‘healthy realism’ with incredulity and fear. Allende’s life-long vociferous campaign against US ‘imperialism’, the UP’s manifesto pledge to rid Chile of capitalist exploitation, not to mention his identification with Cuba in the 1960s, did not disappear overnight when he became president. Although Allende had no direct means or intention of affecting the heightening struggles between revolution and counter-revolution in Bolivia and Uruguay, keeping Cuba at a distance or denouncing left-wing movements
in Latin America would have involved betraying his ideology and abandoning the past. Consequently, like the US, Chile’s new leaders tried to downplay their real intentions. But this was highly ambitious especially when members of the UP coalition refused to be tied to prescriptions of ‘caution’ in their public support for armed revolutionaries. And by re-establishing relations with Havana as quickly as he did and by inviting Cubans to assist in matters of intelligence and security, Allende also exacerbated the very fears within Chile and the region that Washington was simultaneously trying to nurture and that he (and Castro) had hoped to avoid.
Chapter Three: "In a Revolution Not Everything is Rose-Coloured."

During the latter half of 1971, Allende’s fortunes changed. As the Chilean government advanced nationalisation and agrarian reform, it faced confrontation at a domestic and international level. For those watching inside and outside Chile, exactly what kind of socialism Allende hoped to establish, whether his peaceful democratic road was going to work and how the Unidad Popular government – or those on the far Left linked to it – proposed to avert failure if it did not were ambiguous. In June, the US ambassador in Santiago observed, “hidden tensions of the accelerating race between action and reaction” had surfaced.¹ Surveying the situation during his epic twenty-five-day visit to Chile six months later, Fidel Castro commented on the UP’s difficult road ahead. Drawing on the words of Cuba’s nineteenth century hero, Jose Martí, he told Chilean crowds:

...in a revolution not everything is rose-coloured...the road that revolutionaries propose for humanity in the future is rose-coloured!...But we revolutionaries can’t speak of any rose-coloured present...we revolutionaries can speak of a present of self-denial, a present of work, a heroic, sacrificial and glorious present.²

The stakes at play in implementing La Vía Chilena and the sacrifices these entailed rose in late 1971. Parliamentary opposition to the UP, paramilitary violence, rumours the Armed Forces might intervene against Allende and growing divisions in government all overshadowed Allende’s peaceful revolution.

Chile’s foreign relations during this period affected, and were affected by, domestic developments. The UP’s nationalisation of Chile’s copper mines in July 1971 and Allende’s subsequent decision to deduct ‘excess profits’ from compensation to US companies soured relations with Washington. The United States’ earlier knee-jerk freeze on financial assistance to Chile had had more to do with general assumptions than the policies he had already implemented. When Allende finally nationalised copper, however, it provided a useful excuse for evidence of ‘incorrect’ US pressures on Chile. Faced with declining foreign exchange reserves and US economic sanctions, the UP publicised its aims and vulnerability internationally in the hope of changing Washington’s attitude and diversifying Chilean trade. During these six months, Allende travelled to Argentina, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru while his Foreign Minister toured European capitals from East to
West, visited the Soviet Union, Algeria and Cuba, and addressed the UN and a meeting of the Group of 77 (G77) in Lima. They suggested that what was occurring in their country was relevant to all countries in the Third World seeking independence and development, either by reflecting their aspirations or as a direct example. Chileans also received visiting delegations from around the world as curiosity regarding Chile’s revolutionary process soared. But Allende’s application to renegotiate Chile’s external debt in November 1971 reflected the UP’s domestic economic difficulties. A month later, when Castro visited Chile, his presence also added fuel to Allende’s opposition.

Washington’s policymakers were increasingly uncomfortable with Allende’s international standing. To them, Chile embodied the fusion of ‘snowballing’ Third World nationalism and falling Cold War dominoes, thereby underlining the growing challenges to US influence. Within Latin America, Allende’s call for ‘one voice’ to challenge US imperialism and Castro’s growing prestige heightened Washington’s fears of ‘losing’ the region, especially when many leaders in the continent appeared sympathetic to Chile’s revolutionary process and Cuba’s return to the inter-American system. Whilst simultaneously improving and nurturing US-Brazilian relations, US attention shifted to other states in South America in a new phase of its counter-revolutionary campaign. On a wider scale, Allende’s nationalisation policies led the Nixon administration to harden policy towards expropriation in the Third World.

The drama that unfolded within Chile, between Santiago and Washington, in Latin America and along the North-South divide centred on disagreements regarding the best means of structuring a just society. The struggle between Allende, Nixon and Castro to determine Chile’s future and the destiny of Latin America was played out on a regional and international stage. In an effort to win hearts and minds, leaders battled to prove or disprove each leader’s moral and political legitimacy and the extent to which they were responsible for threatening peaceful co-existence. Arriving in Chile in November 1971, Castro stated that he hoped Nixon was watching the clamorous welcome he received. Meanwhile, US officials blamed Chilean expropriations for animosity with Santiago. But while they also attempted to blame Allende for his growing domestic crisis, Chileans simultaneously tried to woo global audiences, blaming US economic aggression and greedy capitalists for Chile’s economic and political difficulties.
Reasoned Rebellion

Allende hoped ‘reason’ and the power of Chile’s democratic example would persuade outsiders to accept *La Via Chilena*. As a means of improving Allende’s position and furthering systemic change worldwide, Santiago identified itself increasingly with the Third World and economic nationalists in Latin America. The UP also began publicising its growing insights regarding US hostility in the hope of changing Washington’s policy towards Chile and the global South.

However, Allende hit considerable obstacles. From mid-1971 onwards, alarm bells sounded in Santiago about Washington’s policies and Chilean diplomats sensed that the White House was driving policy for political as well as economic reasons. But Santiago’s ambassador in Washington, Orlando Letelier, also acknowledged that uncertainty regarding Chilean compensation to expropriated copper companies was not “helpful”. In bracing itself for the domestic and international repercussions of nationalisation policies, the Chilean government employed diplomacy, hoping to take advantage of détente to limit Washington’s ability to take an overly ideological stance against Chile.

In mid-1971, Santiago acknowledged that the United States’ ‘correct’ attitude masked deeper hostility. In May, the UP had applied for an Export-Import Bank (Eximbank) loan worth $21 million to purchase three Boeing aeroplanes for Chile’s state airline, LAN-Chile. When Santiago received no response to its application after two months but Washington showed no such delay in granting credits to Chile’s Armed Forces, Santiago’s leaders got suspicious. Allende had been “personally preoccupied” about the issue from the start, instructing Letelier to raise Chile’s “restlessness” with US government and Eximbank officials. But despite Chilean embassy requests for information and State Department reassurances that this was not a “political issue”, no progress was made. On 7 July, four days before the Chilean Congress passed Allende’s nationalisation bill, Eximbank’s president, Henry Kearns, informed Chilean representatives that a decision depended on Chile’s future nationalisation programme, thereby tying this government institution directly to protecting private US companies. Letelier concluded there was “no doubt...Eximbank was backed at a high political level”. During a meeting in August, he reported Kearns was “evidently nervous, repeatedly consulting a document...by his side”. Accordingly, Letelier warned Kissinger that a frozen United States’ position in this case had “negative implications” for US-Chilean relations. But in private, the ambassador acknowledged that the UP’s nationalisation programme “clouded” its position in Washington.
Deducting ‘excess profits’ from compensation – the Allende Doctrine, as it was later known – was a radical move, but a logical expression of his ideology. ‘Decree 92’, which made the UP’s constitutional amendment law, underlined Chile’s right to “rebel” against an “unjust” system that benefited hegemonic powers and business and contributed to “underdevelopment and backwardness”. Indeed, Allende called it a “definitive” moment in Chile’s quest for “economic independence”. The Chilean government firmly echoed growing Third World insistence that industrialised countries should compensate the developing world for past exploitation and help the latter to free itself from dependency. The Socialist Party and one of Allende’s closest confidants, his daughter Beatriz, strongly encouraged him. According to Cuba’s commercial attaché, the president and Beatriz made a deal whereby she promised Allende her painting by the Cuban artist, René Portocarrero, that he had so often admired on the condition he found a way to nationalise copper without paying “a centavo” of compensation. When he announced his ‘excess profits’ ruling, he collected the painting.

On 28 September, Allende finally announced that ‘excess profits’ were those between 1955 and 1970 above 12 percent of a company’s book value. This principally affected two US mining companies, Kennecott and Anaconda, which had respectively reaped average annual profits of 56.8 percent and 21.5 percent. On 11 October, as widely expected, Chile’s Controller General confirmed that when these ‘excess profits’ were deducted from compensation deemed payable, his country was actually owed money.

It was around this time that Allende warned supporters that imperialism was not “a paper tiger” but rather “very vigorous and aggressive”. By this point, Santiago had already embarked on an international diplomatic campaign to counteract reprisals for its move by legitimising Allende’s actions in the eyes of other potential creditors and trading partners. As Letelier had summarised weeks earlier, “our strategy continues to be one of promoting the most support possible for Chile, not only in Latin America, but also amongst important sectors of this country [the US], for the most difficult moment in our relations with the US that will be without doubt President Allende’s decision regarding Kennecott and Anaconda’s excess profits.”

By exposing the US’ restrictive credit policy, Letelier suggested Santiago could prove the US had thrown the “first stone” in the escalating conflict between them. When Eximbank had publicly announced it would indefinitely defer a decision on the Boeing loan in early August, Letelier judged that this could be “conveniently used…to cushion” the “impact” of Allende’s
announcement. The Chilean embassy therefore leaked information to influential journalists and Democrats, attributing US-Chilean tension to Washington's own "erroneous attitude". Efforts to "divulge" US financial pressure and defend Chile's position also took advantage of the prominence - second to Cuba in Latin America - that Chile had acquired in the US since Allende's election.20

The Chileans' diplomatic campaign also optimistically used international forums and legalistic armour as weapons to ward off charges against Allende's programme. The UP clearly lacked financial means to survive economic sanctions or the domestic power-base to resist pressure against its reforms. But it could emphasise Allende's adherence to constitutional procedures and internationally recognised principles enshrined in the G77 'Charter of Algiers on the Economic Rights of the Third World' (1967) and promoted by the Non-aligned Movement. Indeed, rather than acting against international law, as critics charged, Chilean spokesmen insisted that international law actually 'protected' Chile.21 Citing UN resolution 1.803 from 1962, the UP pointed to international recognition of the "inalienable right of all states to dispose freely of their wealth and natural resources" in the "interest of national development". Crucially, Santiago also underscored the resolution's stipulation that expropriating countries should determine what compensation they offered.22

Allende also warded off isolation by persuading Andean Pact countries that a socialist Chile did not threaten them. To win support, he had toured Ecuador, Colombia and Peru in August and September.23 In Ecuador, he described his message as "rebellious but reasoned" and received understanding from a government already at odds with Washington over the sovereignty of territorial waters.24 Almeyda also recalled that Colombia's conservative Foreign Minister, Alfredo Vásquez Carrisoza, showed comprehension, interest and sympathy.25 Formal communiqués at the end of all Allende's visits included denunciations of foreign intervention and underlined every country's rightful sovereignty over their natural resources.26

Beyond purely defensive aims, the trip was also an opportunity to advance Allende's more ambitious international goals. Throughout, he called on Latin Americans to unite and speak with "one voice". In Quito, Allende told the press he believed in socialism and that if others did not, Chile would "convince them" through its example.27 At a presidential banquet to welcome him to Colombia, Allende stated unequivocally that Latin Americans could not "tolerate" having economic policies "dictated" to them any more. He proclaimed that Latin America was now "a dynamic reality", edging along a predetermined historical "path of...liberation - social, political and
economic". As the US Ambassador in Bogotá argued, Allende’s “actions...indicated that he was holding up Chile as a model for...Latin America to follow” even if he professed Chile’s revolutionary road was “not exportable”. Indeed, Allende later explained to the Chilean journalist, Augusto Olivares:

The exploited peoples of the world are conscious of their right to life. And this is why the confrontation [between revolution and counter-revolution] goes beyond our own frontiers and acquires universal meaning. Latin America will one day be free from subjugation and have its rightful voice, the voice of a free continent.

Almeyda also emphasised Chile’s international significance as a test of a wider North-South struggle when he addressed the UN General Assembly and a G77 conference in Lima in October. Reproving the State Department’s insinuation that Chile’s nationalisation policies could have “adverse effects” on developing countries, the Foreign Minister repeatedly argued that Third World aspirations were “intimately linked and complemented by” separate countries’ own efforts to harness “natural, human and financial resources” for developmental purposes.

The G77 (comprising 96 countries by 1971) and the UN were logical forums for Chile to seek collective strength and propel Allende’s international aims forward. During his speeches in October 1971, Almeyda spoke of the growing “feeling frustration and impotency” in Latin America and bemoaned “grotesque evidence” of the “contrast...between words and deeds” in the battle against underdevelopment. Nixon’s imposition of a 10 percent surcharge on all imports in mid-1971 amidst the US’ own economic difficulties had added to the Third World’s perception of a “crisis”. As the G77 hoped to formulate a united position before the forthcoming UNCTAD III conference in Santiago, Almeyda called upon delegates to “define...points of attack”,

...the fundamental task of developing countries is to work to modify the international political and economic structure that has assigned them the role of servitude...If this structure does not change this could result in stagnation and violence. Nothing is obtained through postulating, or even by achieving partial solutions...if we do not comprehend that it is the nature of the system of international relations itself that needs to be reformed...the struggle of backward and dependent countries to reach their emancipation and full economic, political and social development...[is] defined by the battle between the forces that sustain and defend the current social and international structure of the world, and those that strive to destroy it.
However, the tenor of Chilean (and Peruvian) demands widened Third World divisions regarding how to deal with the global North. While Almeyda demanded a “dialogue” comprising equally of “negotiation, confrontation and denunciation”, other countries – especially poorer African nations – shied away. As the British ambassador in Lima observed, the meeting “sharply” demonstrated the increasing polarisation of forces between “aggressive”, “extreme” countries like Peru and Chile, and more cautious conservative African and Asian nations. In the ambassador’s words, their differences meant that “drawing up a ‘shopping list’” for UNCTAD had become “arduous and unexpectedly time-consuming” but ultimately, the “‘wild men’ were headed off.” The poorer African nations, another British diplomat surmised, “[appreciated] the no nonsense mood of President Nixon’s administration.”

Allende’s own appreciation of Nixon’s mood meant he prioritised diversifying Chile’s economic relations rather than backtracking. By the end of 1971, ‘ideological pluralism’ – the cornerstone of Allende’s foreign policy – had found its expression in Chile’s membership of the Non-Aligned Movement, courtship of conservative regional powers like Argentina and Colombia, new commercial relations with North Korea and North Vietnam, and diplomatic relationships with Cuba, Nigeria, China, East Germany, Libya, Mongolia, Tanzania, Guyana, Albania, Hungary, Equatorial Guinea and Madagascar. In mid-1971, Allende had also sent delegations to East and West Europe, the Soviet Union and China in search of trade and economic assistance. Almeyda spent six weeks touring East and West European capitals, the Chilean Central Bank’s President spent two and a half months in Eastern Europe and Soviet, East German and Romanian trade missions arrived in Santiago. By the end of 1971, Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania had pledged credits for industrial projects and Allende had secured Soviet credits amounting to $95 million – just under $40 million more than those granted to Frei but never taken up – for machinery, equipment and industrial development. Chile’s economic ties to the PRC also grew, consisting of a three-year agreement for copper exports worth $70 million annually until 1975, a $2 million loan following Chile’s earthquake in July and an arrangement for Beijing to import nitrate.

In improving relations across previous Cold War divides, Santiago’s foreign policymakers also hoped that they could take advantage of a “favourable” moment in international relations. Following the White House’s announcement that Nixon planned to go to China in early 1972, Letelier wrote of the “end of the Cold War”. As a result of what he termed a “new world reality”, a new “Latin American reality” and the US’ declining position in region, Chilean analysts believed
the Nixon administration was “playing a policy of equilibrium”, worried “excessively hard actions...would only make the North American position in Latin America more fragile”. In a meeting with a visiting US academic at the end of 1971, Allende referred to Nixon’s dealings with China, Russia and Yugoslavia as an indication that Chile could work with the US. Unlike other communist states Nixon was dealing with, he insisted, his own brand of socialism was constitutional.

However, Santiago undermined the already tenuous benefits to be gained from the ‘end of the Cold War’ by exaggerating Chile’s ability or desire to turn to the East when speaking to US officials. In spite of expanding ties with socialist countries, the UP faced technical and logistical obstacles of swapping US-modelled industry, transportation and supply routes to the East. Thus, although the Vice President of LAN-Chile visited Moscow in September 1971 to seek loans following the Eximbank-Boeing decision, the UP ended up paying $5.5 million in cash the following year for a Boeing aeroplane. Allende also refused Soviet offers of arms sales. Following a tour of Warsaw Pact countries in September 1971, the president’s emissary, General Guillermo Pickering, concluded disadvantages outweighed the advantageous sale terms offered. As well as “logistical complications” of purchasing Soviet weapons, he argued that Chileans could “not escape...implicit psychological factors” of purchasing weapons from the USSR and the implications this would have internally and internationally.

By late 1971, even without Soviet arms purchases, Santiago was growing acutely aware of Washington’s already obvious hostility. When he met Almeyda in October, Secretary Rogers made his counterpart “uncomfortable” by issuing “stern” warnings regarding compensation. Washington’s Ambassador at the UN, George W. H Bush, also admitted to his Chilean counterpart that the US was trying to block the Chilean economist Felipe Herrera’s candidacy to be the organisation’s Secretary General. In November, when Allende announced a moratorium on debt payments and applied to re-schedule repayments, this compounded Chile’s vulnerability. Letelier accurately judged that Nixon’s new Treasury Secretary, John Connally would make external debt negotiations difficult. And in December, when Nixon’s personal envoy to Latin America, Robert Finch, commented that Allende’s government “wouldn’t last long”, Almeyda privately complained to the US ambassador in Santiago that it was not “international practice” to talk about the overthrow of a government one had ‘good’ relations with.
But Allende’s persistent hope that the United States’ would understand his rebellion based on his reasonableness or give up its unreasonable pressure on his government had been naïve. Allende could not seek the economic benefits of a working relationship with the US while simultaneously calling for the destruction of US-led world economic order. And even with their growing appreciation of US hostility, the Chileans only gained a partial understanding of the extent of Washington’s destabilisation campaign against Allende. Furthermore, when the UP nationalised copper and announced his excess profits ruling he provided a pretext for reprisals. In this context, Chilean attempts to offset the fallout from expropriation, Santiago’s expectation for what détente could offer and calculations regarding the degree of the US’ international frailty were overly simplistic, especially in the light of Washington’s growing preoccupations regarding Third World nationalism and the threat of communism in Latin America.

Crime and Punishment

In late-1971, a growing impetus to punish Allende in Washington clashed with fears that this could bolster Santiago’s growing international prestige. As a result of Chilean diplomacy, a basic tenet of Washington’s policy towards Chile – that it would be publicly ‘correct’ – was challenged. Meanwhile, Chile’s nationalisation policies strengthened the hand of those in Washington arguing for a tougher stance. Kissinger thus called three strategy reviews between June and November 1971 to examine how it should adjust to the shifting balance with Santiago. The question that increasingly dominated discussion was who – the US or Chile – would be blamed for Allende’s growing difficulties. Despite voices lobbying Nixon to defend US economic interests, the overall consensus in foreign policymaking circles was that the US had to be cautious. But at no stage did Washington contemplate abandoning destabilisation policies in Chile or its regional counter-revolutionary offensive, especially given Santiago’s developing relationship with Cuba, his Third World appeal and Santiago’s overtures to the Soviet bloc.

Nixon subscribed to using a carrot and stick in Latin America. In private, he advocated a “program of reward and punishment – not openly but just quietly”, rewarding countries “when they start acting properly!” But this well-worn tactic clashed with Nixon’s promise to untie economic aid from political and ideological conditions. Rather than a ‘mature’ or ‘partner-like’ relationship with Latin America, Washington’s officials generally regarded the region with disrespectful disdain.
Looking back on nationalist and revolutionary ferment during the early 1970s, Nixon’s ambassador at the OAS Joseph Jova recalled that Secretary Rogers “didn’t understand Latins”.

He felt there was too much hot air, and…anti-Americanism. I remember, I used to say, ‘Remember what Don Quixote said…when they were attacked by dogs, or unfriendly villages, or something of that sort of thing’…Don Quixote…rode off quietly without even replying. And, of course, the Arabs have the saying that the dogs bark when the caravan marches on. So some of these things you have to realize were just part of the game.”

However, in late 1971, Allende’s growing international standing fuelled US fears about what would happen if it rode into the sunset. Years later, Jova explained that Washington feared it could face a “formidable” threat if Chilean “leftist ideas” spread to countries like Mexico.

Washington’s relationship with Allende was increasingly perceived both in the US and the Third World as a test case of the United States’ commitment to development, democracy and détente. Yet the Nixon White House subordinated all three to a continued ideological struggle against communism as a political, economic and geo-strategic project. Following Allende’s election, Kissinger had ordered a study of US policy towards Latin America (NSSM 108). When the State Department reported that regional challenges to US interests were “not…serious”, Kissinger’s Assistant for Latin American Affairs at the NSC, Arnold Nachmanoff, disagreed. He advised Kissinger that while Latin America’s situation by itself was “tolerable”, the decline of Washington’s influence was “more excessive and more rapid” than the study suggested. Moreover, in his view, the State Department had inadequately considered “where Latin America fits into our global policy”:

The loss of US influence in Latin America and an increase of Soviet influence in what is perceived throughout the world as our backyard, will affect the global balance of power in political and psychological terms, if not necessarily in strategic terms…If Southeast Asia is the most imminent test of the Nixon doctrine, Latin America may well be its most serious test in time. The pressures for intervention should there be two or three Chiles or Cubas in our backyard would undoubtedly be high.

When the SRG met to discuss NSSM 108 in August, they discussed how to “ameliorate anti-US nationalism or at least eliminate its negative effects”, “contribute to greater economic progress” (but at the same time “encourage more realistic expectations of such progress”), “encourage a clearer
perception of the mutuality of US and Latin America interests” and “limit or protect against the increasing Soviet diplomatic, trade and military presence in the region”.\textsuperscript{55} As a result of the meeting, the SRG approved a Military Assistance Programme grant of $9.3 million for 1972 and Kissinger tasked the bureaucracy with re-examining their conclusions about US objectives in Latin America, focussing particularly on more “intensive utilization of different bilateral approaches”.\textsuperscript{56}

Meanwhile, US policymakers were unsympathetic to Allende’s efforts to straddle Cold War divides. Although, observing that Soviet credits were “not always immediately or fully implemented”, the State Department was sceptical of the UP’s professed non-alignment.\textsuperscript{57} In Ambassador Korry’s view, Allende was unacceptably attempting “to enjoy all worlds, capitalist, nationalist and revolutionary, populist and ideological.”

Almeyda can in Moscow seek association with COMECON at the same time that Chile pursues uninterrupted flows from the IDB, IBRD and the EXIM...Allende can call for the best possible relations with the US while stating that his foreign policy is based on creating a special relationship with...the socialist world. He can invite Castro to Chile while arranging for a prior journey to Colombia...Perhaps it was a slip of the lip...when he referred to his government once...as representing the ‘Popular Democratic Republic of Chile’.\textsuperscript{58}

Indeed, Allende’s efforts to change the rules governing socialist development and Chile’s international relations were widely rejected by US policymakers. Nixon explicitly categorised Chile’s government as a “communist dictatorship – elected, but communist”.\textsuperscript{59}

The Chilean government exacerbated Washington’s Cold War fears both inadvertently and carelessly. The Pentagon had feared that the Boeings Chile wanted would service a direct route between Chile and Cuba and had argued against granting credits on the grounds that it did not want to help spread Cuban subversion in the Southern Cone. Although Washington had warned UP officials of these concerns in early 1971, a bigger issue was not made of it because the State Department insisted on avoiding charges of blackmail.\textsuperscript{60} However, Letelier’s private insinuations that Chile would be forced to turn to the Soviet Union if it could not buy Boeings created the impression that the Chileans were trying to blackmail Washington as a means of getting more assistance.\textsuperscript{61} By August US intelligence analysts concluded that although Allende and Soviet leaders had been “careful” to avoid provoking Chile’s “isolation a la Cuba”, closer ties were inevitable; the Soviet bloc would “probably help Allende in an economic crisis” and Moscow would “continue to cultivate channels of influence” in Chile.\textsuperscript{62} And when Kissinger spoke to Letelier, he
underlined that the US was suspicious of Allende’s “identification of interests with other great powers.”

Against the broader Cold War concerns of pushing Chile towards the East or open confrontation with Washington by being overtly hostile, the White House faced growing pressure from business leaders and the Department of the Treasury (not initially included in policy formulation towards Chile but admitted to discussions in June 1971) to issue severe punishment against Allende for his nationalisation programme. A month before Chile’s Congress passed Allende’s nationalisation bill, Treasury Secretary, John Connally, had seized on the issue to demand an in-depth study of US policy towards expropriation (NSSM 131). He advised Nixon that Chilean events were part of “snowballing” expropriations in Latin America and the Caribbean, which could not “be handled in a piecemeal fashion.” To change the “behaviour” of nationalists – and especially Allende – he urged Nixon to use “financial pressure” to “assure satisfactory settlements”. Nixon was receptive to Connally’s message and as a result, he had personally been the one to instruct Eximbank to withhold loans “pending [an] urgent review” of US expropriation policy.

However, not everyone agreed that financial imperatives should take precedence over a more nuanced approach to Chile and Latin America. State Department officials denounced Connally’s push to automatically punish all expropriating states severely. Deputy Assistant Secretary for Latin American Affairs, John Crimmins, called it a “frontal attack on the basic concepts” of the Nixon administration’s Latin American policy, which upheld political flexibility rather than economic interests as being paramount. When the SRG had debated whether or not to grant the Eximbank loan, Kissinger had also argued against an immediate restrictive policy (at least until given a pretext) on the grounds this might give Allende a “political issue” to rally support. In the latter half of 1971, this more cautionary approach to balancing punishment for nationalisation policies with the broader strategic end of overthrowing Allende in the long term was shared by Ambassador Korry and intelligence analysts, especially when Allende’s economic difficulties increased and they were keen to avoid giving the UP a “scapegoat” for them. In September, the Ad Hoc Interagency Working Group on Chile reported to the SRG that as feared, the Eximbank-Boeing case had given Allende his first “effective basis for rallying support”. It also concluded that there was “no possibility” US copper companies would receive “adequate compensation” regardless of US intermediary efforts. While the Working Group rejected direct negotiation on the basis this
would strengthen Chile’s image as a new model of a ‘democratic’ Marxist state”, it also continued to warn against open confrontation on the grounds this would improve Chile’s stance as a “popular cause in Latin America and elsewhere in the underdeveloped world, with corresponding disadvantage” to Washington.72

Consequently, Washington chose an in-between, more flexible, stance towards Third World expropriation than Connally had proposed. While Treasury Department spokesmen outlined new restrictive measures on US assistance, on 8 October 1971, Nixon agreed to NSDM 136, which prescribed the “presumption” Washington would punish any state that expropriated private US companies without “reasonable steps to provide compensation”.73 Even though the new guidelines excluded Eximbank operations, the US’ tougher overall stance towards expropriation was now used to justify Washington’s obvious economic pressure on Chile.

Meanwhile, US officials tried to silence Chilean complaints. The State Department voiced “immense preoccupation” and at a private dinner party, Kissinger pulled Letelier to one side to insist the United States was “not intervening in Chile”. Eximbank’s position was not a “political matter”, but rather a “natural reaction” to questions of nationalisation and compensation, he argued. The Chilean ambassador replied sceptically that he could not reject such a “categorical” assertion.74 These assurances were calculated. As Under Secretary Irwin summarised, the US was interested “to allow dynamics of Chile’s economic failures to achieve their full effect while contributing to their momentum in ways which do not permit [the] onus to fall on us”.75

As the US and Chile entered into a blame game with each other, the deterioration of Chile’s economy exceeded Washington’s hopes. By August 1971, the UP faced a drop in foreign exchange reserves (from $345 million in November 1970 to $200 million). Its 30 percent spending increase, a disruption to agricultural production caused by land reform, problems in replacing disappearing credits, an unpredictable drop in copper prices from 84 cents during Frei’s administration to 49 cents in 1971, and a spiralling consumer demand all undermined the UP’s pledge to bring prosperity to Chileans and made it ever-more reliant on external assistance.76 Although Washington deemed Allende’s financial difficulties not “exclusively” the result of US efforts, the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chile concluded that US policy had been a “fairly good success”; Allende’s victory was not “irreversible” and “economic pressures” had begun to “take their effect”.77 As Washington’s new ambassador in Santiago, Nathaniel Davis, concluded in November, the deterioration of Chile’s economy had come “upon them [Chileans] faster than they themselves were prepared for”.78
While economic pressures mounted, US policymakers financed Allende’s opposition. In response to direct Chilean requests, Nixon approved $700,000 for Chile’s leading opposition paper, *El Mercurio* in September. The CIA also continued its black operations to discredit *La Vía Chilena* and divide the Chilean Left. “Where possible”, the CIA station informed Langley, it was playing up Allende’s links to the far Left outside government, implying that the MIR was the president’s “covert action arm…when he has to step outside constitution to accomplish his objectives”. Washington also stayed in close contact with Chilean opposition politicians. During one conversation with Assistant Secretary Meyer in October, ex-President Frei repeatedly “urged” the US to maintain “the closest possible relationship with the armed forces” and noted, “the Chilean people and their neighbours would understand this even if all other relationships were to be cut off”. On a separate occasion, Frei shared the US ambassador in Santiago’s concerns that the Chilean military, “was a rather hermaphroditic body which Allende massaged seductively”.

Even so, in late 1971, rumours of military plotting circulated in Santiago. By this stage, the CIA had assembled a collection of agents within the Armed Forces and had daily information on plotting. Although the CIA’s Station in Santiago acknowledged it could not induce a coup unless military leaders took “the initiative”, they were eager to encourage them. But at the end of 1971, CIA Headquarters rejected the station’s recommendations to “work consciously and deliberately in the direction of a coup”, “establish [a] covert operational relationship” and discuss the “mechanics of a coup” with “key units”. With no approval from higher authorities, and fearing the negative implications of a botched coup attempt, William Broe, Chief of the CIA’s Western Hemisphere Division demurred:

> We recognize the difficulties involved in your maintaining interest and developing the confidence of military officers when we are only seeking information and have little or nothing concrete to offer in return…There is, of course, a rather fine dividing line here between merely ‘listening’ and ‘talking frankly about the mechanics of a coup’ which in the long run must be left to the discretion and good judgement of the individual case officer. Please err on the side of giving the possibly indiscreet and probably uncontrolled contact little tangible material with which to accuse us.

Although communication was therefore curtailed to the imprecise world of ‘good judgement’, State Department officials strongly advocated continued links with the Armed Forces. Meanwhile,
Washington's embassy in Santiago reported sectors of Allende's opposition were attempting “to prod [the] military into taking sides”. 88

Meanwhile, contacts with Latin American military leaders had begun to bear fruit. In late August 1971, Bolivia’s nationalist military leader, Juan José Torres, was overthrown by a right-wing coup. Available evidence suggests more than a coincidental link between Kissinger’s earlier concern with the situation in Bolivia and events that followed. There are indications that CIA and Pentagon officials were involved in plotting and on the first day of the coup, the US Air Force gave its communications system to the coup’s leaders. 89 Afterwards, Kissinger personally pushed for closer ties with Colonel Hugo Banzer, a leader with close links to the Pentagon. 90 But if Washington was directly involved, it joined Brazil and Argentina in what one scholar has described as a “multinational coup”. 91 At the very least, Nixon acknowledged Brazil’s “help” in Bolivia. 92 According to Brazil’s Ambassador, Hugo Bethlem, Brasilia feared Bolivia would become a socialist dictatorship directly aided by the USSR. Direct Brazilian plotting against Torres had begun in 1970 and following a failed coup attempt, Brazilian intelligence had given Banzer a plane and weapons to escape Bolivia. 93

At the end of 1971, Brazil also ‘helped’ Washington forestall a left-wing victory in Uruguay. In what was widely feared might be a repeat of Allende’s victory in Chile, Nixon appreciated Brasilia’s efforts to “rig” Uruguay’s elections. 94 Whilst advocating US operations to “blunt” the left-wing coalition, Frente Amplio’s chances, the US’ embassy in Montevideo had also welcomed cooperation between Uruguay’s security forces and Brazil and Argentina. 95 Before the election, Brazil had also stationed military units on Uruguay’s border and formulated plans to invade should sabotage fail. 96 When Uruguayans went to the polls on 28 November, the ruling Colorado party and its candidate Juan María Bordaberry overwhelmingly defeated Frente Amplio. 97

Less than a week later, the Washington-Brasilia axis was strengthened when President Médici arrived in the US. Nixon was eager to ensure that Médici enjoyed his visit and Kissinger later reassured the president that Médici – whom he called “impressive” – had been “really very impressed” by Nixon. 98 Privately, Kissinger had underscored the “paramount importance” Washington attached to relations with Brasilia when he met Médici, while the latter suggested any disagreement between them “should be considered a ‘lovers’ quarrel”. 99 Publicly, Nixon toasted Médici by saying “where Brazil goes, Latin America will follow”. Crimmins recalled that this was highly embarrassing for the State Department given domestic sensitivities to US-Brazilian relations
and Latin American suspicions that Brasilia was positioning itself as a regional hegemón at Nixon’s behest.99

However, Nixon’s faux pas reflected the White House’s desires to have Brazil as a strong partner and model in Latin America. After his own meeting with the president, Nixon described Médici as “a class leader” expressing his “wish” to Rogers that Médici was “running the whole continent”. The Secretary concurred.100 When Médici arrived in the US, Brazil was experiencing its third year of 9 percent economic growth. Despite inequality in Brazil (its poorest 80 percent received 27.5 percent of its GNP), Nixon held the country up as proof that private investment and political authoritarianism paid off.101 It also fitted the Nixon Doctrine’s attempt to share the burden of regional defence against communism with key allies. Following Médici’s visit, the Washington Post observed that “after years” of what appeared to be no US Latin American policy, one seemed to be evolving.102

Of course, by this stage the United States’ pro-Brazil policy had been in place for over a year. Consequently, the regional balance looked decidedly more fragile for Chile and Cuba than it had done a year earlier. Whilst visiting Chile in late August, Cuba’s Foreign Minister Raul Roa emphasized the Bolivian coup was “an American battle” rather than, “exclusively Bolivia’s”; an “objective lesson for revolutionaries throughout the hemisphere”.103 As Castro also acknowledged, “partial imperialist victories” in Bolivia and Uruguay, demonstrated a mobilised and strengthened “imperialist intention” to “restrain” the new revolutionary struggle in Latin America.104 The lessons for Chile were ominous.

A broad US Cold War agenda to secure the growth of capitalism worldwide and uphold the United States’ position vis-à-vis communism at a geo-strategic and psychological level drove Nixon’s policy towards Chile and Latin America. Despite differences regarding the acuteness of the threat posed by Latin American developments, Washington disapproved of Chile’s ties with the Soviet bloc and Cuba, and feared the prospect of more ‘Chiles’ and ‘Cubas’ in the region. Yet the challenge of adjusting US policy to the UP’s nationalisation policies whilst winning back the region divided the administration. Whilst the Department of the Treasury urged automatic retribution on financial grounds, the State Department and Kissinger were worried this would fuel charges of intervention, bolster Allende’s appeal and encourage Soviet intervention to save the UP. The question of compensation came just at the right time so that it could continue denying ideological considerations drove its policy in the supposedly non-ideological era of détente. For now, the
administration proceeded with cautious determination to transform the direction of Chilean and Latin America politics, and to warn Third World nationalists not to follow Allende’s path. And in the battle for legitimacy and support between Washington and Santiago, US policymakers could point to a range of factors causing Allende problems. By the end of 1971, these included not only the cost of the UP’s economic policies and popular discontent, but also Castro’s extended tour of Chile.105

“A Symbolic Meeting of Two Historical Processes”

Fidel Castro received a clamorous welcome when he landed in Santiago on 10 November 1971. One Chilean Communist Party member recalled her “heart nearly ripped in two” as she watched Fidel drive by on a five-hour tour of the city.106 The visit was not only a clear affirmation of the evolving ties between Havana and Santiago, but also an obvious turning point in inter-American affairs, signifying Cuba’s formal return to hemispheric diplomacy. According to Allende, Chile and Cuba now stood on the “front lines” of Latin America’s struggle for independence, constituting “the vanguard of a process that all Latin American countries” and “exploited peoples of the world” would eventually follow.107 Commemorating the first anniversary of his government, Allende proudly noted,

This year we Chileans did more than the Cubans did during their first year of the Cuban Revolution, and that is not intended to the detriment of the Cubans. When Fidel Castro comes here I am going to ask him and I know what the answer will be. Let it be known for the record that we made our revolution at no social cost. I can say that there is no country in the world which has carried out its revolutionary process without social cost.108

When he arrived in Chile, Castro described, his trip as “a symbolic meeting between two historical processes”.109 But if Castro had arrived hopeful he left preoccupied and rather than confirming Allende’s achievements, Castro exacerbated his difficulties. Castro differed from Allende and the PCCh with regards to the speed revolutionary transformation should take, the merits of using violence, and the freedoms that Allende bestowed on the opposition. When asked to comment whether Chileans had, indeed, done more than Cubans in the first year at the end of his tour of the country, Castro prevaricated, arguing it would be “completely inadmissible” to make calculations and comparisons between the two different revolutionary processes; he merely said that in Chile the
process was much more “tiresome and laborious”. Whereas the whole Cuban system had collapsed in 1959, Castro explained that the revolutionary process in Chile was still developing and faced more obstacles. Indeed, he increasingly believed confrontation with a foreign-aided opposition was inevitable and doubted Allende’s ability to survive a battle between ‘Socialism and Fascism’.

A year after the re-establishment of Cuba-Chile relations, governmental and extra-governmental ties between Havana and Santiago had grown substantially. In Cuba, Chile had become a celebrated cause and the focal point for cultural, economic and social exchange projects. At a ceremony to commemorate the tenth anniversary of the Bay of Pigs in April 1971, the Chilean embassy in Havana had reported that Chile received “prolonged applause; the Cuban leader’s speech had appeared to be paying “tribute to Chile” rather than commemorating the revolution’s victory. On this occasion, Castro had also publicly pledged Cuban “sugar…blood, and…lives” to help Chile’s revolutionary process. And by the end of 1971, state-approved collaborative projects in agriculture, fishing, housing, mining, energy, health provision, sport and publishing had been established. In the space of only one year, the University of Havana had new formal links with five separate Chilean universities.

Bilateral trade between Cuba and Chile had also grown. Whereas the UP expended $13 million on Cuban imports in 1971, it proposed to import 150,000 tons of sugar at the cost of $44 million in 1972 and Cuba agreed to import goods worth just over $9 million (including a 100,000 cases of wine worth $750,000 despite the Cuban population’s preference for rum). Meanwhile, the Cubans approached Chileans regarding the possibility of joint mining projects, with a view to increasing Cuba’s copper production from 4,000 up to a possible 30,000 tons a year. Cuba’s Minister for Mining, Pedro Miret, showed “reiterated interest”, explaining that the Soviet bloc lacked expertise and had not been very forthcoming with technical assistance. Cuba’s national airline also began direct flights between Santiago and Havana in June. However, by the latter half of 1971, the incompatibility of both countries’ economies combined with the UP’s growing financial difficulties limited the new ‘horizontal’ relationship. By the end of the year, earlier optimistic estimates for Chilean exports were replaced by far lower estimates. Instead of exporting 2,000 tons of garlic, for example, Chile acknowledged it could only provide 150 tons.

However, the evolving diplomatic relationship between Havana and Santiago brought tangible benefits for both countries. Through their embassy in Havana, Chileans were able to develop ties with African and Asian diplomats accredited there. Via Santiago, Cuba also re-
established links to Latin America. At the UN in October 1971, Almeyda abandoned relative caution, proclaiming Chile would do “everything possible” to overturn Cuba’s isolation, whose people “by different roads” were following “the same objective as Chile of building a socialist society on American soil.” Communication between Havana and Latin American revolutionary movements also improved as they were now conducted within Chile. Furthermore, Cuba’s new embassy in Santiago allowed Havana to develop economic relationships with Argentine and Peruvian businesses. Cuban representatives made secret trips across Chile’s borders into those countries with Allende’s knowledge and with tacit support from Argentine and Peruvian authorities. Private Chilean companies also provided a channel for Cuban purchases in the outside world (Castro’s Cuba even managed to purchase Californian strawberry seeds through a surrogate Chilean business whose crops were eventually destined to serve Cuban ‘Copelia’ ice creams).

The UP also benefited from its relationship with Cuba. At the beginning on 1971, the UP’s leaders had begun to discuss how they might respond to a coup. Although the UP was divided on the issue of military preparation, according to testimonies of those involved, early (but basic) contingency plans were revised both by those who supported some form of armed struggle and those, like the PCCh’s leader, Luis Corvalán, that refused to countenance its relevance for the Chilean context. Allende’s constitutional Commander-in-Chief, General Carlos Prats, whose participation was considered pivotal, also saw the plans. In January 1971, the PS had also covertly approved the
creation of an organisational ‘Internal Front’, a ‘Commission of Defence’ with a military apparatus and intelligence wing, and commitment to strengthening the president’s bodyguard, the GAP. Members of this new defensive structure concluded that the peaceful transition to socialism via democratic means was doubtful, that confrontation was probable and that because the Armed Forces increasingly believed they had a political role to play in the country, the UP was unlikely to last its mandated six years in power.

Following Allende’s request in 1970, the Cubans had helped develop this new security apparatus, assisted Chilean intelligence services and strengthened the GAP. Members of the GAP later testified that at the beginning of 1971, they had received one .30 machinegun, eight UZI submachine guns, forty MP-40 submachine guns, twelve P-38 automatic pistols and twelve Colt pistols. In early October, the CIA reported that thirty Chileans were receiving training in Cuba “in security matters…at the Cuban department of state security school” with another thirty being recruited to “depart soon”, claiming this provided the foundation for a “substantial guerrilla force”. By November 1971, the CIA’s station in Santiago reported that Cuban funds and firearms meant, “the haphazard collection of sidearms formerly used by GAP members has almost been totally replaced by Cuban-provided .45 caliber Colt automatic pistols, 9mm Browning automatic pistols and Czech P-38 automatic pistols”. Indeed, the CIA’s new information about Cuban operations meant that in late 1971, it abandoned its policy of fabricating stories of Cuba’s role in the country and began passing “verifiable” information to Chilean military leaders.

With Allende’s knowledge, the Cubans were also training and arming carefully selected members of the MIR, the PS, the PCCh. Rather than being simultaneously administered by Havana in one concentrated effort to build up the coalition government’s forces, training and arms were given on a separate individual basis to different parties. Allende’s private cardiologist also recalled that the Cubans gave him a pistol so that he could step in for the GAP when the latter was unable to protect the president. (During Allende’s trip to Colombia he had smuggled the gun nervously into a presidential banquet.)

Meanwhile, however, Allende insisted on constitutional means for furthering Chile’s revolution. In this respect, Allende’s relationship with the MIR was a growing problem. Although a rapprochement between the MIR and the PCCh had taken place in December 1970, an open tactical split between the parties (armed revolution or constitutional channels), visibly widened in August 1971. Allende was reportedly “very depressed feeling that the MIR would soon get out of hand,
that the armed forces would have to be brought in to control them, and that the country may be on the brink of a civil war".128 Within the GAP, tensions between PS militants and Miristas came to a head when the MIR was suspected of stealing the bodyguards’ arsenal for its own purposes. In late 1971 it was therefore excluded from the GAP, which henceforth comprised PS militants only.129 On the first anniversary of the UP government, the president referred to his opposition as, “troglostyles and cavemen of an anticommunism called upon to defend the advantages of minority groups” but warned that “victory is in unity”; “Let us not permit extremism” he urged, and demanded the Left found “the language” to “unite all revolutionaries” against its ever more powerful enemies.130

The Cubans apparently supported the restructuring of the GAP, favouring the PS over the MIR, but working to improve relations between arguing left-wing factions.131 For now, Allende did not object to Havana’s continued relationship with the MIR as the Cubans ultimately gave their loyalty to him. The Chilean press quoted Castro’s call for “true revolutionaries” to “abandon romanticism for [the] more humdrum tasks of building [the] revolution’s economic and social foundations”.132 But the Cubans’ association with Allende and their not-so-secret involvement in forming the GAP was used against him. Chile’s opposition press falsely accused Cubans of assassinating Frei’s Minister of the Interior, Pérez Zujovic, in June 1971, an event that radicalised sectors of the Armed Forces against Allende.133 Chilean Senators also denounced the size of Cuba’s embassy, which the British also regarded as “sinister” and “heavily weighted with officials engaged in subversive and intelligence operations”.134 The right-wing tabloids, already long-since engaged in trying to discredit the government, also began denouncing the GAP as violent assassins. On the eve of Castro’s visit, the National Party’s paper, La Tribuna, ran front pages that warned of “Santiago plagued with Armed Cubans” and pictured a gigantic military boot warning that “tyrants” were descending on Santiago.135

Castro thus arrived in Chile as Allende’s first anniversary celebrations were already turning sour. The Director of Chile’s Foreign Ministry, who had visited Cuba in mid-1971, told the British ambassador that Castro was “enormously interested in Chile, and has devoted a disproportionate amount of time to conversations with visiting Chileans.” He and other Chilean moderates hoped Castro would “be impressed both by Chilean democracy and institutions and also by the Chilean balance between the various power groups in the world”.136 The timing of such a visit had been discussed since September 1970 but the Cuban leader had hoped the UP would consolidate its position before he arrived.137 Cuba’s domestic situation also probably determined that he did not
visit sooner. Indeed, it took six months after Allende had sent the Communist Senator, Volodia Teteilboim to Havana specifically to invite Castro. When he arrived, Allende clearly wanted Castro’s support and approval. At a Cuban embassy reception, Allende told the assembled guests that there were only two things he could not tolerate in life. One was a look of displeasure from his daughter, Beatriz. The other was a scolding from Fidel.

Castro used the visit for extensive field research initially offering neither wholehearted praise nor disapproval. In the course of his twenty-five days, he spoke to government ministers, UP leaders, military leaders, students, miners, trade union leaders, the clergy and members of Allende’s parliamentary opposition. He visited the Chuquicamata copper mine in northern Chile, paying detailed attention to copper production and spent hours discussing the Sierra Maestra campaign with fascinated Naval officers whilst on route to Punta Arenas in the south. Prensa Latina journalist, Jorge Timossi, who accompanied Castro throughout his visit, recalls that they would meet each night to discuss the day’s events until three of four in the morning before getting up a few hours later to continue his visit. As Fidel insisted during his farewell speech at Santiago’s national stadium, he was not a teacher, but had come to “learn”. In a separate interview, the Cuban leader suggested that, as he was a “visitor who comes from a country in different conditions, who might as well be from a different world”.

Castro encountered stark differences between Cuban and Chilean revolutionary processes. The space the UP gave to the opposition bothered him. The free press launched open and vicious attacks against Castro, not only claiming he was intervening in internal Chilean affairs but also labelling him a homosexual. The immense and unusual length of Castro’s visit exacerbated tensions and allowed this sort of criticism space to grow, especially as the Cuban leader continued to be vague about the date of his departure, even to Chilean government officials. These extra pressures contributed to tensions already in train before he arrived. On 1 December 1971, Chilean women and right-wing paramilitary forces staged the first of what would be known as the ‘Empty Pots’ demonstrations when wealthy women protested incredulously about their limited access to food supplies. Nevertheless, violence ensued and Allende was forced to call a State of Emergency and a weeklong curfew in Santiago. He could not deny that Castro’s presence in Chile had fuelled hostility. He told Chilean journalist Augusto Olivares it was only “logical”; Castro’s visit had “[revitalised] the Latin American revolutionary process”.

106
However, the Cuban leader concluded that the UP had not adequately mobilised its supporters to meet such a counter-revolutionary offensive. Towards the end of his stay, he gave up his earlier circumspection, took on a more instructive tone and, based on examples he drew from Cuba’s revolutionary experience, issued firm public warnings of the challenges the UP faced. The key question, he insisted, was whether “fascist elements” in Chile would “resign themselves to the structural changes” in Chile or “resist with violence”. One CIA informant in Santiago reported that Castro privately advised UP leaders that revolutionary counter-violence (within universities and as a means of disrupting the women’s marches) was necessary if they wished to establish socialism in Chile. He reportedly added that the UP should not be concerned about possible injuries or deaths, as “confrontation is the true road of revolution.”

Whether or not he did offer this private advice, his public speeches towards the end of his trip conveyed a similar (even if not as direct) message. He repeatedly reminded crowds of nineteenth century Chilean nationalists who had pledged to “live with honour or die with glory”. While the Chileans argued their country’s unique situation allowed them to embark on a new route to socialism, he insisted they could not avoid the “laws of history”. Urging the importance of unity “from the bottom of [his] heart”, Castro pleaded with all sectors of the UP coalition and the MIR to unite behind Allende and “prepare” for the struggle with reactionary forces that lay “just around the corner”. He concluded there was “still a great deal to do” and instructed Chileans to “arm the spirit”.

Throughout, Castro appeared to be saying that as a result of Cuba’s experiences, he knew how to play by the rules of revolution in Chile better than the Chileans. After all, as he put it, Cuba had survived mud “higher than the Andes” being thrown at it. When he referred to the Cuban Missile Crisis, he also proudly stated the Cubans had “all decided to die if necessary, rather than return to being slaves”. In contrast to vulnerable Chileans, Castro explained Cubans were safe from intervention because imperialism knew and respected the fact that “men and women are willing to fight until the last drop of blood”.

Allende generally accepted Castro’s analysis of his difficulties. He warned Chileans of the “fascist germ…mobilizing certain sectors of our youth, especially in the universities…women are used in protest demonstrations…the events are similar to those experienced by Brazil during the Goulart administration”. He also spoke of Cuba and Chile facing “identical enemies, foreign and domestic”; the “hand of imperialism” was “[incubating] fascist groups”.
Yet, different Chileans received Castro’s advice in different ways. In Fidel’s presence, Allende explicitly staked his life on fulfilling *La Via Chilena*:

> Let those who want to turn back history, those who want to ignore the will of the people, know that I am not a martyr, but I will not retreat one step. Let them know that I will leave La Moneda only when I have fulfilled the task entrusted to me by the people...only by riddling me with bullets can they stop me from fulfilling the people’s programmes.159

But beyond this, as US Ambassador Davis noted, Allende’s promise to meet “counter-revolutionary violence with revolutionary violence” was “left...hanging in the air.”160 The president spoke of combating the opposition through constitutional means and issued a plea to curb pre-emptive violence on the grounds this could provoke the enemy. Indeed, he spent much of his farewell speech emphasising the differences between Cuba and Chile, arguing the UP’s opposition was a minority, underlining Chile’s democratic freedoms and pledging faith in the constitutionality of Chile’s Armed Forces.161 Within the UP coalition, the PCCh also called for consolidating the UP’s position, advocating dialogue with the PDC and keeping Chile’s revolution within legal bounds. By contrast, many Socialist militants regarded the right-wing demonstrations against Castro’s presence as legitimating the need for armed training in operational tactics, explosives and firing.162 The question that lay ahead was how Allende would negotiate between these two outlooks.

The Cubans did not wait to prepare themselves for the battle they saw as looming on the horizon. One night, Castro went to Cuba’s embassy despite the curfew. There, he spoke about his concerns until dawn with Cuban diplomatic personnel congregated in a darkened patio.163 Surveying the embassy at 2am, Fidel Castro was appalled by the building’s defensive capabilities; “I could take this embassy alone in 2 hours!” he exclaimed. He therefore instructed the embassy to prepare to withstand a direct attack and during a secret visit in early 1972, Manuel Piñeiro, head of Cuba’s DGLN, oversaw planning. Henceforth, Cuban diplomats undertook construction work to make space for medical facilities and provisions so the embassy could survive a battle. Cuba’s cultural attaché, commercial attaché and his wife remember arriving at work in the morning dressed in diplomatic clothing and then changing into “work clothes”. They would then spend days or nights digging beneath the embassy to create a sizeable cellar.164

The day Castro left Chile he told a group of journalists that he departed more of a “revolutionary” than when he had arrived. He stated that the Chilean experience had motivated him
 anew to develop his “revolutionary character”. Having witnessed the battle between revolutionary and reactionary ideas, he spoke of how the privileged “maintained their domination” with ample resources and “lies”. Was Castro “disappointed” with the UP government which he did “not consider...to be sufficiently revolutionary” and, therefore, “doomed to fail”, as the CIA concluded? Looking back on events over thirty years later, Luis Fernández Oña disputed this assessment, arguing instead that Castro was “preoccupied...anyone who has ever travelled to see a friend and discovered he was sick would return worried about that friend’s health”.

Following Castro’s departure, and in the context of Santiago’s State of Emergency, the president warned a rally of thousands of the “difficult days” ahead, emphasising “escalating” foreign opposition. The UP also issued a ‘Declaration of December’ detailing an “international conspiracy” against Chile. On the other side of Chile’s political divide, the PDC’s new leader, Renán Fuentevalba, addressed a rally describing Allende as subservient to Castro, denouncing Castro’s “interference” in Chilean affairs and attacking the UP for stoking up class hatred and tolerating illegal armed groups such as the MIR and the GAP. He also berated the UP’s foreign policy as “cultivating an increasing sick attitude toward the US”, arguing that Allende sought “gradually to insert Chile within the orbit of those socialist countries commanded by [the] USSR”. Just as Allende’s domestic aims transcended Chile’s borders, therefore, his foreign policy had growing implications within Chile.

The situation in Chile in December 1971 clouded Allende’s promises for a rose-coloured future. In arguing that La Vía Chilena was still a process, not a successful revolution like Cuba’s, Castro implied that it was dangerously reversible. Castro’s obvious support for Allende gave the Chilean leader revolutionary credibility throughout the socialist world and a powerful ally in the quest to transform Latin America. However, this had drawbacks. The diverse nature of the UP coalition meant that Allende could not please everyone especially as the divisions within Chile’s society grew. And while it is clear that Castro’s trip did not cause either the growing strain within the Chilean Left or the opposition’s rising confidence, his presence in Chile stimulated anti-communist forces, leaving the UP’s constituent parties arguing over his advice. Moreover, Castro’s zeal for socialist transformation and his purported restraint tended to contradict each other. Although the Cuban leader emphasised his respect for Chile’s own revolutionary path, the sheer length of his visit and the instructive tone of his advice gave ammunition to Allende’s enemies.
Nevertheless, Cuba’s return to inter-American diplomatic affairs via Chile proved Washington’s efforts to isolate Castro in the continent had failed. Indeed, Fidel’s visit to Chile was a major step in Cuba’s re-integration in Latin America. In mid-December, Peru (backed by Chile) unsuccessfully proposed that the OAS reassess its policy toward Castro. It pointed to a new “panorama” in inter-American relations and the senselessness of trying to sustain Cuba’s isolation. Friends and foes thus considered Cuba’s return to the Inter-American ‘family’ only a matter of time. However, the question that dominated thinking in Washington, Havana, Santiago, Lima, Brasilia and Moscow was exactly what the inter-American ‘family’ would look like and who controlled its destiny.

Conclusion

A year after Allende had assumed the presidency Chile and Latin America faced a battle between revolution and reaction, that bore little resemblance to the era of peaceful co-existence being heralded elsewhere. From the early days of the Cold War when statesmen quarrelled over the spoils of war in Europe, a new generation in a distant part of the world were engaged in an intense ideological struggle over their region’s future and concepts of social, political and economic justice. For many, Chile appeared to be the marker of what that future would hold. But the kind of socialism Allende was aiming for, the possibility his peaceful democratic road could bring about this socialism and how Chile’s increasingly divided left-wing would respond if it did not were far more confused at the end of the year than they had been six months earlier. Whilst some lauded the achievements of La Via Chilena, others predicted military intervention, civil war or the establishment of an authoritarian Marxist state. The counter-revolution in Chile and the Southern Cone was also taking shape, focussing on the region’s Armed Forces and private investment as the answer to the global South’s needs. As Washington’s new Ambassador in Santiago noted on Christmas Eve, the UP had “lost momentum” for the first time since taking office.

Allende’s considerable achievements along the path to socialist transformation were therefore muted. On the first anniversary of his inauguration, Allende announced 2.4 million hectares of land had been expropriated and 900,000 extra Chileans received benefits. Despite US economic warfare against Chile, the government had increased spending, Chile’s GNP grew by 8.3 percent, industrial production rose by 12.1 percent, wages increased and employment grew by 45 percent. However, the sustainability of such advances and spending, and the exact speed they
should take were problematic. While the far Left encouraged land seizures and miners went on strike for even higher wages, Allende’s authority to control socialisation was undermined. When coupled with the depletion of foreign exchange reserves, a decline in copper prices and the disappearance of US credits without any others already secured to replace them, *La Via Chilena* became increasingly fragile as a viable new model of development. US analysts were unsurprisingly disdainful of Allende’s economic policies. As Under Secretary Irwin wrote to Kissinger on 22 December 1971, the “element in doubt is not what will happen but who will be blamed”.176

After Allende expropriated US companies without compensation, Nixon could more easily justify financial pressure. Of course, this belied the central thrust of US policy as established in November 1970 and distorted the timing of such a decision. The Chilean government was gradually becoming aware of this. During his farewell speech to Castro Allende warned those who were contemplating interfering in Chile that Chile was “not a no-man’s land. Chile belongs to the Chileans. Its people after years and years of suffering, duty and hope, have come to power”. He also stated that anyone who thought they could block the UP’s path “through threats…pressures…restricting our credits or…thwarting our possibilities of refinancing our foreign debt” were “mistaken”.177

But the question was to *which* Chileans Chile belonged. Different sectors of Chile’s population wanted different kinds of society and sought different external sponsors to help them. The interaction between local and international actors took on a whole new dimension in the latter half of 1971. While the Cubans began delivering limited caches of arms to the Left, Washington’s funds and economic sanctions fuelled the political confrontation. In doing so, the US found receptive partners; Frei, for example, repeatedly thanked US officials for the “sophistication” of its policy towards Chile, remarking that Chilean democrats had “benefited enormously”.178 However, where the risks of more decisive intervention – as in the case of accelerating military plotting – outweighed the potential gains of challenging Allende, the United States sat on the sidelines, turning the screws on Chile’s economy and waiting for events to take their course.

Havana’s involvement in Chile was also determined by the nature of the situation it faced and the actors it worked with. Castro believed Allende’s democratic mandate and his unique position at the head of Chile’s fractured left-wing was pivotal to Chile’s revolutionary success. But Castro’s visit revealed contradictions between Cuba’s partnership with the president, its support for *La Vía Chilena* and its simultaneous support for the far Left. When Castro had arrived in Chile,
Chile's left-wing parties had welcomed him as the embodiment of revolutionary success, the champion of Latin America’s struggle for independence and a representative of the brave new world that seemed destined to materialise in the early 1970s. Allende and the MIR both valued their links with Havana, sought Cuba’s support and hoped for Castro’s approval. But as the political situation in Chile deteriorated and their positions widened, Castro could not simultaneously satisfy both. Meanwhile, to the PCCh and Radical Party members, Castro’s involvement in Chile’s revolutionary process, his extended stay and encouragement to the far Left were more than a hindrance than a help. While Fidel’s visit was quite clearly a turning point regarding Cuban analyses of Allende’s prospects, by adding an extra – and particularly powerful – voice into the growing debate regarding Chile’s revolutionary future, the Cuban leader added fuel to an already confused struggle among the Left over the best route to socialism.

Elsewhere, on the international stage, Allende’s campaign to obtain worldwide support was effective. Even US observers had to agree it had been a “major achievement”: the UP government had been “sensitive about its international image”, vigorously avoided international isolation and ensured “support and sympathy in any possible confrontation with the United States”. As Davis noted, Chile had “neutralized hemisphere qualms about its Marxist credentials”, with the “exception of Brazil’s conspicuous coolness, and the new government in Bolivia.”179 At the end of 1971, Allende heralded the dawn of a new world. The world was “changing”, he proclaimed:

The American empire is showing signs of crisis...The dollar has become nonconvertible. Apparently, the definitive victory of the Vietnamese people is drawing near. The countries of Latin America are speaking the same language and using the same words to defend their rights.180

But at the end of 1971, the character of the new world order that to so many seemed destined to jump into the United States’ retreating position was undefined. The Soviet Union’s pursuit of détente was partly a reflection of its own economic difficulties and despite Washington’s financial strains, Moscow looked to improving trade with the West as a viable solution to shortcomings. A year earlier, Castro had also recognised that the pace of socialist revolution would be slower and despite Cuba’s celebrated revolutionary success worldwide, Havana’s leaders were simultaneously undergoing decisive transition towards Soviet-style institutional and economic reform as a means of shoring up past failures to deliver more. Meanwhile, within the vast Third World grouping of the G77, 96 nations struggled to agree on how they should approach developed countries and what they
wanted to achieve. And in Latin America, the idea of ‘one’ voice that did not include Brazil or Bolivia and united the immensely different economic and political nations of Chile, its Andean Pact neighbours, Argentina and Cuba were ambitious.

Beyond the evolving architecture of superpower détente, peaceful-co-existence in the Third World was tenuous. As the war in Vietnam continued, the ideological animosity conditioned US-Chilean relations, the Chileans’ international strategy magnified Washington’s fears that it was losing global prestige to Allende. The White House remained tied to the notion that its ability to exert its influence over Latin America was a test of its great power prestige and obsessed with the possibility of growing communist influence in the hemisphere and the Third World. But at this point, Washington’s policymakers were divided on exactly how to deal with the global South. Compared to the blanket categorisation the Department of the Treasury wanted to impose on all states that nationalised property, Kissinger and the State Department preferred to choose – depending on ideological affiliations – when and how Washington responded to nationalists, thereby dividing the US’ challenges and lessening the immensity of its global challenges. In this respect, Cuba and Chile stood out as the antitheses of Washington’s designs for Latin America and for the Third World in general. As Nixon argued, Allende may have been elected but as far as he was concerned, his government was essentially communist. And this is what mattered.
Chapter Four: Battle Lines

Allende saw his efforts to transform Chile as one frontline in a battle between the world’s poorest peoples and its richest nations. In 1972, the nature of the battleground on which it was fought appeared to be changing. For many Third World nations, the lessening of East-West tensions suggested that the international community – and particularly the global South – could now concentrate on the battle for economic development. As a Chilean diplomat explained, Latin America was interested in the United States gaining a “full understanding of its problems and anxieties of underdevelopment, misery and illiteracy”.¹ Yet, precisely what benefits the South – and Chile – could get out of détente was unclear at the start of 1972.

Allende’s Chile and the United States assumed diametrically opposed positions in the North-South battles of the early 1970s. As Allende told thousands of delegates who gathered in Santiago for UNCTAD III, Chileans were not only supporting the quest for restructuring the international economic and political order, they were practising it with “deep conviction”.² Chile was fighting an increasingly obvious battle against private US companies and Washington over questions central to the North-South debate such as economic sovereignty and its external debt burden. Consequently, Chile acquired growing prestige in the global South. But the sympathy Chile accrued was not enough to safeguard La Vía Chilena. By the second half of 1972, the Chilean government also acknowledged that in practical terms, it stood alone within the Third World and that it needed developed countries’ assistance.

The enormous disparity in terms of wealth and power gave the United States an obvious advantage when it came to undermining Chile’s chances of forging a regional or Third World coalition against it. While the US rejected the notion of negotiating its world role at Allende’s behest, the prospect of investment and assistance it could offer allowed Washington to retain influence in the global South. As far as Washington was concerned, the US had a duty to prevent Third World leaders adopting the wrong development path as well as a responsibility to ensure Allende and Castro were undermined as global statesmen and revolutionary examples. Faced with Castro’s growing status throughout Latin America and the Third World, the Nixon administration thus encouraged key allies to take a stand against Havana. Meanwhile, Washington singled out
Chile’s deteriorating economic performance as a prime example of what unwise policy decisions could lead to.

As evidence of US hostility towards Chile mounted and Chileans compared their situation to other Third World nationalists, Santiago concluded that Allende was a special victim of Washington’s ideological fears. When critics questioned the double standards between Nixon’s summit meetings with Mao or Brezhnev and the United States’ continued isolation of Castro, State Department officials prevaricated, stating “consistency” was “a simplistic basis for addressing this complex question”.3 Indeed, throughout 1972, US officials repeatedly reassured right-wing leaders that détente with Beijing and Moscow would not extend to Havana.4 Beyond superpower relations and Nixon’s opening to China, Latin America’s Cold War – and the ideological battle at the heart of it - was very much still alive. Santiago increasingly realised détente did not apply to Chile and that it merely changed the way US interventionism occurred.5 As Allende’s ambassador in Beijing noted, détente “arbitrarily de-ideologised” the language of international politics.6

What the UP termed “a battle of ideas” raged in Chile.7 In May 1972, Allende explained to Congress that, “the big question” regarding Chile’s future revolutionary process was whether institutionalism “could open paths to socialist transition”.8 To succeed in ensuring it did, the UP needed to persuade the majority of Chile’s population about the merits of La Vía Chilena. Although Allende told Chilean military commanders that he would not accept the formation of paramilitary groups on the Left or Right, evidence of armed groups and Cuban arms shipments continued.9 By mid-1972, the Chilean president publicly identified himself with the legalistic PCCh, curbed Havana’s relationship with the MIR, spoke out against the threat of civil war and co-opted loyal members of the Armed Forces into government. But increasingly, Allende was walking a fine line between staying true to his ideals and neutralising his critics.

By October 1972, Chile faced a political and economic crisis in Chile. With mounting financial difficulties and without any immediate sign of Soviet support, Allende prioritised dialogue with Washington as a means of reducing pressure on the UP. As Washington’s analysts concluded, Allende wanted to “keep the door open to at least limited US government assistance and to prevent active lobbying by the US against Chile in the international financial field”.10 In this regard, Chile’s position was indicative of the limitations dependent Third World nations faced when trying to chart an independent course. Within Latin America, at least, the United States still had considerable
power to administer lifelines, or impose hardship on any country that dared to challenge its influence, prestige or authority.

I ideological Battles and Economic Warfare

In early 1972, Allende simultaneously faced growing domestic difficulties and embraced a rising international status. In January, ex-President Frei described democracy in Chile as walking along a "razor’s edge". He told Washington’s ambassador in Santiago, Nathaniel Davis, that he was concerned not only about Allende’s “will” to govern democratically, but also his “ability” to do so.11 Right-wing paramilitary violence and the far Left’s call to overthrow constitutional restraints undermined peace in Chile. Additionally, Allende’s parliamentary opponents blocked constitutional government proposals and launched a vigorous campaign to denounce the UP’s economic failings.12 Having promised ‘liberty’ and economic development, Chile’s deteriorating economic performance was a growing indictment of La Via Chilena. Although UP officials attempted to stem a rising financial deficit by diversifying Chile’s trade relationships, fighting US economic aggression increasingly absorbed Santiago’s attention. In Orlando Letelier’s words (and in the opinion of many contemporary commentators), Chile was fighting a “true economic war” against the Nixon administration.13 Faced with bilateral, multilateral, covert and overt pressure – but still unaware of the scale of it – Allende increasingly presented his battle for economic emancipation and independence as reaching beyond Chile’s frontiers. Indeed, Santiago strove to transform the character of US imperialism in an effort to safeguard Chile’s revolutionary process whilst simultaneously accelerating Third World development worldwide.

Amidst a growing atmosphere of confrontation at the beginning of 1972, the UP concluded that it had so far been remiss about winning an ideological battle against its enemies. At the coalition’s national convention in February, government leaders therefore vowed to persuade Chile’s population of the advantages of the government’s revolutionary programme. In a Communist Party document leaked to the press, the party called for “intensified political and ideological warfare against the enemy”.14 However, despite the coalition’s pledge not to divide supporters, the UP was vulnerably splintered.15 At the same time as battling their enemies, left-wing parties struggled openly against each other to win the tactical initiative that would determine Chile’s future revolutionary road. On the one hand, the PCCh blamed the government’s weaker position on “ultra leftist...excesses”.16 On the other, the PS’ Central Committee explicitly demanded the
overthrow of Chile’s bourgeois capitalist system, which it believed did not “serve to construct socialism”.17

Faced with these divisions, Allende struggled to impose his own preference for peaceful democratic revolution. He condemned his own party’s arguments, insisting “the shortest road to qualitative transformations” did not involve “a break and the destruction of constitutionality” but rather, “the urgent task” of “[convincing], through revolutionary action, example, [and] effectiveness, the great majority of the population”.18 The strength of those opposed to his constitutional road on the left and the right, made this task exceedingly difficult. Evidence that Chileans were exploring non-democratic means of achieving their aims grew in 1972. On the extreme Right, the paramilitary group Patria y Libertad – calling itself the “vanguard” in the fight against international communism in defence of Christian civilisation – donned riot gear, called for military intervention against Allende and began training civilians for civil war.19 On the extreme Left, the MIR denounced government vacillation and demanded the government prepare for open conflict.20

The UP’s economic performance became a focus of Chile’s political battles. As US Ambassador Davis observed, food shortages were becoming a “significant psychological (but not nutritional) problem” for the wealthy, serving as an “effective pretext” for anti-government demonstrations, “whose basic motivation was political”.21 By April 1972, Chile had less than $100 million in foreign exchange reserves and government spokesmen admitted a 10 percent increase in the cost of living since January. Opposition leaders also pointed to Chile’s predicted budget deficit of $600-700 million by the end of the year, of which only $300 million accounted for debt repayments the UP was endeavouring to reschedule.22 As the State Department concluded, the role of economics was “virtually the same as, and intimately connected with...the political sphere”.23 Crucially, the decline of the economy was more of an issue for Allende’s enemies than his supporters. At the grassroots level, opposition spokesmen remarked with some surprise that, “the poor and humble voter never talked about food but always about liberty.”24 However, US economic aggression coupled with the UP’s own failing strategies undermined Allende’s chances of also convincing the ‘great majority’ of the same cause.

Chilean foreign policy was increasingly shaped by economic needs. Primarily, Santiago wanted to alter the retributive position towards Chile and gain new external credits. But in their dealings with the US government and battles with expropriated US companies, the Chileans often
had to play a game of catch-up, unsure whether to believe the hard-line Treasury officials or more moderate State officials, and struggling to fend of mounting lawsuits imposed against them by private US companies.\textsuperscript{25} It was around this time that Chilean experts on past legislations and legal affairs replaced political representatives in negotiations, with Allende’s blessing.\textsuperscript{26} Yet even with a more technical approach to resolving Chile’s financial battles, Santiago’s position was weakened by Nixon’s tough stance on expropriation and Allende’s refusal to overturn his ‘excess profits’ rule.\textsuperscript{27}

In early 1972, with Chile and Peru in mind, the US Congress passed the González Amendment that required US representatives in International Financial Institutions to vote against loans to countries where expropriation occurred without ‘adequate compensation’. Reflecting on the pressures ranged against Chile, Letelier strongly endorsed the view that the US had substituted “Dominican gunboat-diplomacy” for “credit diplomacy” as a means of intervention.\textsuperscript{28}

Accordingly, Santiago needed to diversify trade and attract alternative sources of credit. Rather than seek dependency on Moscow, foreign observers noted that the Chilean Foreign Ministry continued to hope for a healthy balance between what it saw to be the four power blocs in global affairs, the United States, Western Europe, China and the Soviet bloc.\textsuperscript{29} Certain UP leaders clearly still distrusted Moscow. In early 1972, Carlos Altamirano, General Secretary of the Socialist Party, even exhibited “nothing but scorn for the Russians and their system” to Britain’s ambassador in Santiago. According to Altamirano, Castro had privately lamented Cuba’s dependency on the USSR to him whilst in Chile. The Cuban leader reportedly told Altamirano, “he had no alternative but to turn to the Russians”, but found them,

...extraordinarily slow-moving and rigid. Every time he asked for urgently needed equipment he was told that he could not have it for several years because all supplies had been allocated well in advance and changes could not be made without wrecking the current plans. Castro wanted to build up trade with Western Europe and also said that he would like to restore relations, particularly in the economic field, with the United States, though of course the Americans would have to accept him...[and] this would [not] be possible as long as Mr Nixon was President.\textsuperscript{30}

Despite these doubts, in January, Allende had written to Brezhnev vaguely accepting an invitation to visit the Soviet Union, but strongly emphasising his hopes that the imminent arrival of a high-level Soviet delegation in Chile would increase Soviet-Chilean economic ties.\textsuperscript{31} During subsequent
talks, the Chileans outlined ambitious proposals for expanding trade and aid from the Soviet bloc with no immediate results.

Elsewhere, Santiago’s economic health – and its ability to maintain good relations with potential creditors in Europe – depended on Chile’s ability to reschedule external debt payments. At this point, Chile had the second highest per capita debt in the world ($2.56 billion) and, crucially, the US was just under $1 billion of its repayments thereby giving it a means to sabotage Santiago’s chances of favourable renegotiation. Indeed, as they prepared to meet with their creditors in multilateral negotiations in Paris, the Chileans had evidence that the US might not participate and/or sabotage Santiago’s position. Consequently, before multilateral negotiations began in April, the Chilean Foreign Ministry instructed its diplomats in Europe to contact host officials in order to “prevent US manoeuvres”.

In March 1972, there was suddenly ample evidence of US hostility the Chileans could use to undermine Washington’s position. At the end of the month, the New York Times published documents pertaining to the International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation (ITT) that detailed Washington’s efforts to prevent Allende’s inauguration and create economic chaos in Chile. In Letelier’s words, the revelations also revealed the “unimaginable” ties between the Nixon administration and big business. But the fortunate timing of the disclosures strengthened Chile’s position in the forthcoming debt negotiations and the Nixon administration’s discomfort was obvious to Letelier. The Chilean ambassador argued to US officials that Allende’s relative restraint was evidence of the UP’s good faith. Privately, Letelier reasoned that holding back would give Santiago, “cards in their hand to play later on” in what was increasingly perceived would be a protracted struggle against Washington.

Meanwhile, Allende employed a mixture of compromise and attack. Compromising had domestic consequences and few tangible rewards. In February Allende had decided to pay compensation to Braden Copper Company, a subsidiary of Kennecott, after State Department officials indicated the renegotiation of Chile’s debt depended on this. But Davis observed, the decision “was reached with extreme difficulty by an ill-coordinated Chilean leadership”. Many on the Left regarded this as retreating from Allende’s promise to assert Chile’s independence. After hearing the president was paying, Allende’s daughter, Beatriz, called her father and insisted he return the Portocarrero painting she had given him when he nationalised copper. As the UP’s opposition looked for any fuel to criticise the government’s economic record, Letelier also
specifically urged Almeyda and Allende to keep IMF reports, necessary for rescheduling Chile’s debt, private.40

Simultaneously, Santiago took advantage of Chile’s growing prominence worldwide to advertise the UP’s plight. For defensive and offensive reasons, the government emphasised Chile’s central position in a broader North-South struggle over the structure of international economic relations. Allende had particularly high hopes for UNCTAD III, which was held in Chile between April and May 1972. This was to be the largest conference on trade and development ever held, comprising 141 delegations and giving the UP an opportunity to show the world Chile’s democratic character.41 Chilean diplomats insisted that transforming global trade and creating a better situation for worldwide economic development was “a similar and parallel fight” to the one going on in Chile. As the Brazilian ambassador in Santiago acknowledged, the conference appeared to offer the UP Third World “recognition”. 42

Before UNCTAD III, Allende sent his ambassador in Geneva, Hernán Santa Cruz, to capitals in West Europe and the Third World (including thirteen African nations), to emphasise the UP’s commitment to the conference. In London, Santa Cruz emphasised “constructive...negotiation rather than confrontation”.43 In Dar-es-Salaam, he focused his message on the need to confront US control of International Financial Institutions.44 Six months earlier, Almeyda had publicly stated that as well as “conventional” negotiations, he hoped the global South would use its “moral authority” to confront and denounce “the incongruence and irrationality” of an unjust international system.45 At the opening session of UNCTAD III, Allende proclaimed that he subscribed to a “Third World philosophy”, which stood for recuperating national resources from foreign ownership and sustainable development against cultural and economic imperialism. He also denounced multinationals in light of the ITT revelations (conspicuously refraining from mentioning the US by name).46 However, while delegates pledged their support to Chile in its economic battles, the British ambassador in Santiago was dubious his message reached all delegates. To him, even this restrained denunciation made it an “extreme demagogic speech” that “probably divided rather than helped the developing world.”47

As the spotlight hovered over Chile, the question that concerned Santiago – and Washington – was whether Allende could capitalise on his international prestige to undermine his enemies and win friends. Domestically, the absence of a definitive end goal for La Via Chilena, or left-wing consensus about the ultimate shape of Chilean socialism, had ominous consequences for the UP’s
battle of ideas. And internationally, Santiago found itself reacting as fast as it could to mounting financial pressures. As the Third World leaders gathered in Santiago to confront the world economic system, their divisions undermined the South's collective strength. Allende was one of only a few leaders that decisively challenged the international capitalist system in words as well as deeds. But Chile's deteriorating economic and political situation weakened the effectiveness of his challenge. Moreover, viewed from the United States, Allende's identification with the Third World, combined with revelations of US intervention in Chile, reaffirmed US policymakers' fears about losing an international battle for prestige and influence. If the Nixon administration had opted for even tougher sanctions against Allende, his efforts to court international sympathy might just have been more rewarding. But instead, Washington stepped shrewdly away from greater confrontation.

"Good-guys-versus-bad-guys"

Policymakers in Washington were clearly worried that Allende could use UNCTAD III to bolster his international and domestic position. As the State Department observed, Allende was "increasingly positioning himself as leader of [the] Third World". According to Kissinger's new assistant on Latin American Affairs, William Jorden, this event, the ITT revelations and the forthcoming debt negotiations had the potential to affect Washington's earlier "assumption" that time was on its side. Indeed, in what he described as the overall balance between "him [Allende] and us" in Chile, Latin America and beyond, policymakers feared Allende's position was growing stronger.

Faced with this situation, the Nixon administration was divided as to what strategy to follow. Whereas hard-liners prescribed financial retribution, moderates emphasised selective compromise to dampen Allende's accusations. In April, the State Department spelt out Allende's threat:

...combining independence from US influence and sweeping social change carried out with a show of legalistic deference to pluralism, has inherent appeal in Latin America. The extent to which this appeal is manifested in political developments in other countries will depend on the evident success or failure of the Allende regime, and whether Allende can persuasively attribute his difficulties to external factors. The implications for US strategy are clear.
From early 1972 onwards, the administration increasingly favoured flexibility where it was deemed useful against Allende, and more broadly against signs of growing Cuban and Soviet influence in the hemisphere. Both in Chile and Latin America, the Nixon administration focussed on what one CIA official observed to be an evolving “good-guys-versus-bad-guys” battle.1 In this battle, all non-Marxists – be they democrats, business leaders, nationalists or military leaders – would be used in a battle against all forms of revolutionary change.

When the Nixon administration reviewed its policy towards Chile at the beginning of April, those arguing for greater flexibility in dealing with Allende gained the upper hand. Earlier that year, Secretary Connally had complained to Nixon that the State Department was poised to renegotiate Chile’s debt. Subsequently, the president had placed the Treasury Department in charge, instructing that he was against any rescheduling.2 Indeed, ‘deterrence of expropriation’ was known throughout Washington as “one of the cardinal objectives” of Nixon’s foreign policy from January onwards.3

Yet by April, the balance between Santiago and Washington – and the administration’s efforts to deny giving Allende an excuse to rally support – appeared precarious. The State Department and Jorden considered the ITT affair a “setback”, warning that UNCTAD III and the OAS General Assembly offered Allende useful platforms to attract “sympathy”.4 Accordingly, Jorden advised Kissinger that it was “a good time” to get Washington’s “ducks in a row”. Henceforth, Treasury officials were informed that debt negotiations would be dealt with in the context of Washington’s “overall relations with Chile” and because they were likely to resist a more “flexible position”, Jorden advised Kissinger to make clear that broader goals would now take precedence over “strictly financial objectives”.5

These ‘broader goals’ centred on bringing Allende down effectively without damaging the US’ global position vis-à-vis the socialist world. As Kissinger’s deputy, Alexander Haig, was advised, “more than purely econ[omic] factors” were “involved”; the United States’ stance on Chile’s debt burden could end up being a “major determinant of C[hile]’s relationship with communist countries”.6 To avoid boosting Allende’s prestige, ex-president Frei also privately urged Washington not to “torpedo” debt negotiations and Ambassador Davis warned his superiors not to risk giving Allende a “credible and emotionally overwhelming foreign threat”. Failure to maintain “normal” relations with Chile, Davis argued, coupled with the deterioration of Chile’s economy might lead Allende to “press harder for larger-scale [Soviet] bloc aid...in desperation”.7
Just before the SRG met to review policy towards Chile, Davis elaborated that as a result of the ITT revelations, the UP could now “persuasively argue” that US was “attempting to deny Chile necessities of life” to bolster Allende’s domestic consensus. 

This was the context, in which Senior Review Group agreed the US should participate in Paris Club negotiations in April 1972. Partly due to Chilean diplomacy, the State Department had noted that European creditors appeared willing to settle with Chile without offering the US “meaningful support”, placing the Washington’s position in “serious danger”. Decision-makers also calculated that rescheduling Chile’s debt would not solve Allende’s economic problems. 

Subsequently, although the State Department predicted it would be “virtually impossible to achieve prompt solutions”, Washington put pressure on Santiago’s position by linking US co-operation in Paris with compensation for copper companies. As US policy officials had hoped, by inserting a clause relating to compensation into the Paris Agreement, Washington gained a lever to use against Chile. The rewards from a partial agreement with Santiago, Jorden had advised before the negotiations started, were that Chile would still have to renegotiate future debts. “If at that time she has not lived up to her obligations of debt and compensation”, he argued, “we can take a tougher line – and be in a much stronger international position to do so”.

On 20 April 1972, the US consequently signed the Paris Agreement, giving Chile a three-year deferral on 70 percent of its debts owed between November 1971 and December 1972 and the opportunity to reschedule debts for 1973 at the end of the year. The agreement also stipulated that Chile was to reschedule remaining repayments with individual creditors. Washington’s conviction that it had restored an unfavourable balance of power was also bolstered by evidence of Allende’s desire to reduce US-Chilean animosity. On the eve of the Paris talks, after learning details of ITT’s intervention, Allende had nationalised the company’s holdings. Yet, rather than an act of war, Davis later recalled that Almeyda and Allende made “separate, repeated calls with long, conciliatory explanations…and promises the experience of copper companies would not be repeated”.

While the Nixon administration tried to sustain the illusion of a ‘cool but corret’ stance, it continued to sabotage the UP’s democratic chances. Over the course of 1972, the CIA monitored and penetrated a group of military plotters in Chile, and provided the Chilean Armed Forces with $2.2 million in military assistance (instead of a proposed $900,000 and double the assistance for 1971). Meanwhile, the US congratulated itself on helping boost the Chilean opposition and the private sector’s “confidence and capabilities”. The 40 Committee was particularly keen to ensure
the opposition’s “effectiveness” in Chile’s congressional elections the following year. US diplomats thus worked to “reduce friction” between the UP’s two leading opposition parties, the National Party and Christian Democrat Party. And by joining forces in 1972, these two parties more effectively undermined Allende’s constitutional power, denouncing Chile’s economic troubles and the growing spectre of violence.

As it turned out, growing tensions in Chile overshadowed the UNCTAD III conference. As delegates sat down to discuss the finer points of international economic relations, outside anti-government protestors staged demonstrations whilst Miristas burned US flags and demanded a “revolutionary wave” to engulf Chile to expel the US delegation. The situation inside the conference hall was also disappointing. One participant later described UNCTAD III as a “gigantic farce”. The North defended the international economic order while the South only managed to get hazy commitments on aid. Later, Algeria’s Foreign Minister, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, noted that “the road of Third World economic emancipation...does not run through UNCTAD” but rather depended on the South’s own efforts. From Washington, Letelier acknowledged that UNCTAD proved the Third World’s task of transforming the world economic system was going to be long, with “scarce” prospects of success. He therefore advocated the promotion of “more limited, solid, stable and also more realistic nuclei, at regional and sub-regional levels, like the Andean Pact.”

Yet, by 1972, Andean solidarity and collective action was tenuous. As US analysts concluded, the “prospects for limiting Chile’s influence on Peru” were “good”, on account of a historic rivalry between both countries and the Peruvian military’s inherent suspicion of Chile’s Marxist policies. Investors abroad welcomed the Pact’s apparent new “flexibility” on the restrictive rules it had previously placed foreign investment. And after an initial year of activity, international observers noted a “depressing” “lull” had overtaken the group. By the end of 1971, trade within the Pact had increased by $100 million reaching a total of $160 million but commentators were unimpressed, especially as Peru’s exports to member states were actually decreasing. Chile and Peru were also rumoured to be resisting new imports that competed with local industries. Although the UP was politically committed to the Andean Pact, Chile’s economic situation affected its participation. Forced to focus on essential imports to save its depleting foreign exchange reserves, the UP could not comply with the Pact’s stipulations for economic integration. Indeed, when Andean Foreign Ministers met in Lima in June 1972, they could confirm commitment
to ‘ideological pluralism’ and an ‘Andean Spirit’ on “political, economic, cultural and social issues”, but little more.  

Reviewing the region in mid-1972, US analysts saw Latin America as being divided between three different models of development: Chile’s, Brazil’s or an “indecisive mix” of the two. When the State Department asked US ambassadors to define which model their host country veered towards, it underlined the drawbacks of Santiago’s example:

We doubt that the Chilean economic model can be followed for very long without authoritarianism, if only because of the need under it for forced restriction of consumption to achieve capital formation in combination with rapid and forced redistribution of wealth. The Brazilian model is also probably more likely to entail authoritarianism than is the indecisive mixture of the two...dissatisfaction with the results of any one of the three models could lead to a move to one of the others. But movement from the Chilean model back to one of the others is more difficult than movement the other way.  

In June 1972, when Connally toured Latin America, visiting countries such as Venezuela and Peru but leaving Chile out of his schedule, Letelier concluded that he was laying down the “rules of the game”. Indeed, the ambassador informed Santiago of an altered, and more defined US regional policy emerging. “It is...not a mystery that the White House’s preferences lie with the governments that favour private investment and combat any ‘Marxist’ shoot. The cases of Brazil and Mexico...do not need more commentary”, Letelier later informed Almeyda.  

Chilean diplomats were increasingly aware they faced a more pressure from the United States than other regional nationalists for ideological reasons. Lima had nationalisation disputes with Washington, growing relations with socialist countries and its leaders vociferously called for international economic reform but faced less hostility. Mexico’s President, Luis Echeverria, was another of Allende’s allies in the North-South debates of the early 1970s. Yet whilst defending Allende’s sovereign right to determine compensation, Echeverria had privately told Allende that he disagreed with the Chilean president’s socialist goals when he had attended UNCTAD. Chilean diplomats were also rightly concerned about Echeverría’s private relationship with the United States.  

During the Mexican President’s visit to Washington in June 1972, he had been receptive to Nixon’s emphasis on the advantages of private US investment and his hope that Latin Americans would take “responsibility” for protecting that investment. He told his guest that “it would be very
detrimental...to have the Chilean experiment spread through the rest of the continent”; the hemisphere would be “very unhealthy”. Nixon and Luis Echeverria also discussed mutual fears of Castro, the Soviet Union and China. Whilst congratulating Nixon on his trips to Beijing and Moscow, Echeverria acknowledged the PRC and USSR’s continuing menace in Latin America; he had “observed it in Mexico and...directly in Chile, and in every Latin American country in one form or another”, he told the US president. Echeverria also warned of the dangers of Castro’s alternative model for economic and social development. In line with the Nixon Doctrine, the US president urged his guest to “let the voice of Echeverria rather than the voice of Castro be the voice of Latin America”. According to the US president, if “poison afflicts one part of the body, it eventually is going to affect the other. If the poison of communist dictatorship spreads through Latin America, or the poison of unrest and...revolution spreads through Latin America, it inevitably will infect the United States.”

However, throughout 1972, efforts to contain Castro in Latin America and the Third World were flailing. As a reflection of imminent diplomatic opportunities, Cuba’s Foreign Ministry reopened its Latin America department in mid-1972 for the first time in eight years. Manuel Piñeiro’s department, the DGLN, still retained control of regional policy and Cuba’s Armed Forces were central to a burgeoning relationship with Peru’s military leaders, but this move clearly signalled Cuba’s policy reorientation to march changing circumstances in the region. Beyond Latin America, Havana’s status in the Third World was also growing. Castro visited Guinea, Sierra Leone and Algeria in 1972, and following Cuba’s entrance into the G77 in 1971, Cuban Foreign Minister, Raul Roa, led a large delegation to UNCTAD III, despite Havana’s cynicism regarding the global South’s chances for negotiated transformation.

Cuba could afford to be sceptical. By the end of 1972, it was in a uniquely favourable situation within the developing world on account of Soviet economic support. Despite his frustration’s with Moscow, Castro’s decisive rapprochement with the USSR and his visit to Moscow in June had led to membership of the Soviet bloc’s Council for Mutual Economic Assistance and five new major treaties with Moscow would be established later that year. These deferred debt repayments, increased trade and established a new flow of economic assistance to the island. Against allegations that Cuba was turning its back on Latin American integration, Castro insisted that the inadequacies of regional economic integration gave him no choice. When “the
hour of the revolution" arrived in Latin America, he had earlier insisted, Cuba would prioritise regional ties.87

By 1972, Cuba accepted continental socialist revolution was a long way off. In August, Piñeiro explained:

The prospects for Latin American liberation now appear to be medium- or long-term. We must prepare ourselves to wait – to wait as long as necessary: 10, 15, 20 or even 30 years. We must prepare to repulse the enemy in all fields...And, of course, we must prepare to help to speed this process of revolutionary transformation as much as possible...keeping in mind that the struggle will be a particularly long one in the ideological field and that imperialism is giving ever-greater importance to the subtle weapons of penetration and domination. This means that we must continue delving into the principles of Marxism-Leninism, revolutionary ideas, the study of great problems of history and political problems of the present day.88

While it prepared for the long wait, Havana focussed on signs of divisions between Latin American nationalists and the United States. In its own ‘good-versus-bad’ struggle against US imperialism, where once he had seen only reactionaries, Castro proclaimed that Havana was “encouraged by any expression of rejection of imperialism, any expression of opposition, any expression of a desire for national independence which may lead to deep contradictions and, one day, to revolution.”89

In this respect, the Cubans – and the Soviet Union – paid special attention to Peru’s nationalist military government. From Washington, US analysts pointed to “considerable evidence” that Moscow was “working to increase its influence in Latin America”, “[desired] the loosening of ties between the US and Latin America and the creation of an atmosphere of hostility in the region toward the US”.90 By 1972, the KGB was collaborating with Peru’s intelligence service, the Servicio de Inteligencia Nacional (SIN) and Cuba undoubtedly helped.91 For two years already, Castro, Piñeiro and the DGLN had had an “ad-hoc” programme that brought together the Cuban Ministry of Public Health and Cuba’s Ministry of Construction to deliver internationalist assistance to Peru after its earthquake in 1970 and, simultaneously, to develop ties and influence with Lima’s leaders.92 Finally, on 8 July 1972, Peru re-established full diplomatic relations with Cuba. Havana nurtured this relationship, looking after visiting Peruvian delegations at the highest-level whilst working with what Chilean diplomats called “surprising speed” to help Lima set up its new embassy. Indeed, Santiago’s ambassador in Havana speculated that if the two were in a position of competing for attention, the Cubans would prioritise helping Lima’s embassy over Chile’s.93 With
the exception of Chile, where Allende’s revolution was increasingly beleaguered, Cuba’s more flexible regional policies towards different forms of progressive change appeared to be bearing fruit. Indeed, the Cuban leadership increasingly combined commitments to Chile with growing attention to other – more hopeful – progressive regimes. As Luis Suárez, a DGLN analyst at the time, recalled, the Cubans focussed on both process “sometimes more on one, sometimes more on the other”. Crucially, however, Havana was now no longer isolated in the hemisphere; as Cuban Foreign Minister Raul Roa proclaimed, there were now three types of revolution in Latin America: Cuba’s, Chile’s and Peru’s.94

Yet the strength of this new panorama was threatened by the relatively greater financial assistance the US could provide compared with Cuba or the Soviet bloc as a whole, and by Washington’s evolving interest in dividing nationalists from socialist countries. In late 1972, the Nixon administration began to reappraise its own policy towards Peru in the hope of containing socialist influence. In September 1972, the Interdepartmental Group for Latin America compiled National Security Study Memorandum 158, which listed among the US’ goals at in Peru, the “enhancement of the US image as a power prepared to support responsible reform and to accept diverse approaches to achieving such reform”, “limitation of Chile’s influence as a model for other countries” and “stemming the growth of Soviet, Cuban and PRC influence in the Hemisphere at US expense”.95 Fearful that the economic sanctions Washington had applied against Peru since the expropriation of IPC in 1969 had “contributed to Peruvian assertions of independence”. NSSM 158’s authors advocated reducing that pressure.96 Intelligence analysts suggested that as the Peruvians had gained only limited assistance from socialist countries, the prospects for private investment were “improving” and that Lima “needs and wants more from the US”.97 The Interdepartmental Group also underscored the “desirability” of distinguishing between Peru and Chile; “the threat to all our interests, including the investment interest”, NSSM 158’s authors argued, “is manifestly greater in Marxist Chile than it is in non-Marxist Peru… Differentiation would deprive the Allende Government of the politically useful ‘protective cover’ that being lumped with Peru would provide, thus making a hard line on Chile more readily accepted elsewhere.”98

Over the course of 1972, the Nixon administration was clearly increasingly conscious that it had to counteract Allende on an international stage and divide Santiago from potential supporters in Latin America and the Third World. Not only did Washington have to undo damage caused by
evidence of US intervention in Chile, but US-Chilean relations also became entangled in a North-South struggle to determine the future shape of development. In this respect the US was able to exacerbate and play on Chile’s differences from other Latin American nationalists. When the SRG met at the end of 1972, President Nixon agreed to new initiatives to resolve the IPC case with a view to being able to ease pressure against Peru, although for the time he being deferred ceasing all sanctions on Lima. Following the disappointments of UNCTAD and in the context of the USSR’s failure to meet their development needs, Washington would find nationalists in the region increasingly accommodating. Washington did not actually have to deliver any significant assistance; as Letelier argued, Nixon’s record of helping developing nations revealed “serious transgressions” from his promises. But countries like Mexico and Peru still opted for seeking individual assistance from Washington as opposed to relying on collective confrontation. And increasingly Chile would join them.

By late 1972, Washington seemed to have won back its initiative when dealing with Allende. By agreeing to bilateral debt negotiations, the US welcomed Chilean officials into a drawn out process with no promises of concessions. Compared to Washington’s growing ties with Latin American nationalists, Santiago faced a complex situation. On the one hand, the UP’s ideological attachment to socialist development and its identification with Havana and Moscow destroyed its chances of a meaningful deal with Washington. But on the other, the growing ideological divisions amongst Chile’s left-wing parties and evidence of obstacles on the path to building socialism disheartened Allende’s external communist backers. As Allende struggled with the mounting challenges against him, the big choice he faced was whether to embrace confrontation with his domestic and international enemies or – like Washington had decided earlier that year – to employ short-term tactical flexibility for the sake of longer-term gains.

**Walking a Fine Line**

Amidst growing Chilean economic and political difficulties, Chileans of all persuasions looked abroad for models that might lead their country to better future. While the Right looked to Washington and Brazil, Allende received conflicting advice from Havana and Moscow. To a large degree, the differences in their stances reflected what they felt they could offer. Moscow and Chile’s Communist Party called for pragmatic restraint and economic consolidation while Havana sympathised with those preparing militarily to face confrontation, believing this was pivotal to any
successful attempts to save Chile’s revolutionary process. Although Cuba’s respect for the Chilean president’s sovereign authority still conditioned its involvement in the country, the Cubans increasingly felt trapped in their ability to help defend the UP. Meanwhile, Cuban involvement in Chile was becoming increasingly problematic for Allende. Using allegations of Cuban subversion, Chile’s right-wing attacked the government whilst Washington pointed to Santiago’s support to Latin American revolutionaries as a pretext for US support for counter-revolutionary dictatorships in the Southern Cone. When, in mid-1972, Allende finally opted to follow a more pragmatic course, this did not persuade the UP’s opposition or Allende’s critics on the far Left. It also failed to convince Moscow to grant Santiago the kind of financial assistance Allende requested. Accordingly, Santiago’s leaders increasingly came to believe that Allende’s success – if not his survival – depended on Washington.

The conflicts plaguing Chile’s left-wing had reached a crisis point in May 1972, when the MIR had led members of the UP in open defiance against Concepción’s Communist governor and a student died during intra-Left clashes. On the surface, the UP had officially declared it would cease contacts with the MIR until it stopped its divisive tactics. But as the Communist Party Senator, Volodia Teitelboim, argued Chile’s revolution had “no reason to be bathed in blood”, Altamirano demanded Allende accelerate socialist transformation. Meanwhile, the opposition ridiculed the notion that the UP and the MIR could be divided. El Mercurio pointedly asked “what authority… the defenders of continental armed subversion and those who admire Fidel Castro’s regime without any reservations” had to criticise others who had “taken up the same revolutionary flags”. Opposition leaders also informed US embassy officials of their plans to launch a “campaign of intensive scandal-mongering” to attack Allende where he was most vulnerable: his “image and credibility” as a democrat.

As part of this campaign, the opposition used Cuba’s involvement in Chile to attack the government. Davis welcomed the opposition’s “considerable skill” at “exploiting” “minor occurrences” as breaking stories of Cuban arms transfers and the Chilean opposition’s ability to turn ITT revelations “into a broader investigation into all foreign influence (meaning especially Cuban support for subversion)”. The opposition had ample means of dissemination; the opposition media controlled 115 out of 155 radio stations, four out of six national newspapers and fifty out of sixty-one regional newspapers. They also had opportunities to seize on. When packages on board Cuban passenger aircraft had been unloaded at Santiago’s airport without passing through customs
in early 1972, this caused a public outcry that lasted for months. Because government officials were at the airport on the day the aeroplane had arrived, the opposition used the incident to impeach Allende’s Minister of the Interior, Hernán del Canto, and the Head of Chile’s Police Investigations Branch, Eduardo Paredes.107

As Havana’s role was scrutinised, it was therefore circumscribed. The Cubans sympathised with those who advocated stepping outside the confines of constitutional legality. As Castro explained to a visiting French politician, “the Chileans would not be able to stay where they were” if they wished to make a socialist revolution and would have abandon the “swamp of institutions” that bogged them down.108 However, although Allende had “great confidence” in the more legalistic PCCh, which sanctioned only minimal defensive military preparations, Chile’s president was reluctant to let the Cubans arm the Socialist Party. As Castro later privately explained, Allende was “afraid that they would one day take to the streets with machine guns”.109

At the end of May, Allende had also asked Cuba to suspend its military assistance to the MIR. Ulises Estrada received news of Allende’s decision whilst he was in Romania accompanying Castro on his tour of Eastern Europe. He flew immediately to Santiago in an effort to try and persuade the president to change his mind. Despite the MIR’s open defiance of the government, the Cubans argued that it would play an essential role an impending confrontation and should not be excluded from preparations to defend the revolutionary process. Thus, when he arrived in Chile, Estrada threatened Allende that if Cuba could not arm the MIR it would suspend training the Communists and Socialists in what turned out to be “a very long conversation”.110

The compromise Estrada reached was that Cuba would continue training the MIR, but would provide no new arms unless there was a coup, at which point the Cubans would hand over a stockpile that they would now immediately begin assembling in Santiago. Henceforth, the Cubans also urged the MIR’s leader, Miguel Enríquez to be “careful” about attacking the government whilst Miristas journeyed to Cuba’s Piñar del Río province, west of Havana, for two-month training exercises.111 However, as Estrada testified years later, training was carried out in small separate groups that knew nothing about each other to avoid detection.112

These precautions notwithstanding, the Chilean Left was already being infiltrated by opposition and military intelligence. In August, Frei told Davis that the PDC had begun to “organize an effective intelligence-security arm” to counter the “growth and arming of Socialist, Communist and Left extremist paramilitary brigades”.113 Earlier that year, he had also warned that the PDC had
information “Bolivian exiles, Cubans, Eastern Europeans and other leftist foreigners” were working for Chile’s intelligence services.\textsuperscript{114} Chile certainly became a place of curiosity, refuge and solidarity for revolutionaries around the region and reliable evidence suggests that limited numbers of Latin American revolutionaries received training in Chilean camps.\textsuperscript{115} By the end of 1972, many of Uruguay’s Tupamaros sought refuge in Chile and Brazilian left-wing exiles in Chile numbered approximately one thousand by 1973.\textsuperscript{116} Allende knew and met with Latin American revolutionary leaders whilst he was president, including Tupamaros who often joined his intimate Chilean and Cuban friends at El Cañaveral, his private secretary’s weekend home.\textsuperscript{117} However, when in August 1972, Argentinean political prisoners belonging to the \textit{Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo} (Revolutionary Army of the People or ERP) hijacked a plane with 92 passengers and landed it at Santiago’s airport, Allende was put in a difficult position.\textsuperscript{118} This not only provided Allende’s opposition with evidence of links to ‘foreign extremism’, but even when Santiago sent the prisoners to Cuba, this also temporarily damaged his working relationship with Argentina.\textsuperscript{119}

Speculation also abounded about the Chilean Left’s intervention in Bolivia. To Santiago’s horror, US Defence Secretary, Melvin Laird, publicly used such allegations to justify increased US military spending programme in the country.\textsuperscript{120} Despite being a convenient justification for increased spending, Washington actually had no precise or compelling intelligence. Instead, the State Department noted, “some extra-legal support, principally from the Socialist Party, has already been given, and aid to subversives from Castro or other sources will almost certainly transit through Chile” but acknowledged there was “no known direct GOC support for subversives against other neighbouring countries”.\textsuperscript{121} Even Brazil privately acknowledged Cuba’s support for revolutionary movements in the hemisphere had diminished.\textsuperscript{122}

However, as Allende strove to deny intervention in neighbouring countries, the United States bolstered the region’s counter-revolutionary dictatorships. Kissinger regarded Bolivia’s right-wing dictator Hugo Banzer as a “friend”. During his first year in power, the US increased aid to Bolivia by 600 percent and the White House intervened to ensure economic aid would not be conditional on La Paz’ fiscal performance.\textsuperscript{123} Kissinger’s assistant, William Jorden, argued Banzer’s “heart [was] in the right place” and that Bolivia had “progressed nicely” by expelling Soviet personnel and cracking down “hard” on “leftists”. Indeed, Washington was struggling to keep up with Bolivia’s right-wing dictator. Despite receiving extensive economic assistance and 45 percent of Nixon’s Military Assistance Programme (MAP) expenditure for Latin America,
Washington received "complaints" of "too little too late". These complaints notwithstanding, and compared to earlier Brazilian preoccupations, Brasilia's Foreign Minister now remarked favourably on increased US support to Bolivia when he met Secretary Rogers. In September 1972, he reflected on the "much improved" situation in Uruguay where the Tupamaros' leadership had "virtually disappeared" following a government crackdown with Brazilian and Argentinean help (in just three months, Uruguay's civilian-military regime took 2,600 prisoners). Foreign Minister Barboza noted the Southern Cone's revolutionary "snowball had been reversed" and that the Chile's road to socialism was nearing its end. As he told Rogers, Chile in 1972 resembled João Goulart's final days in 1964.

As the tide turned against Chile's revolutionary process at home and abroad, Allende had found it hard to attract external assistance or pull his government together. Allende had dismissed his controversial Minister of the Economy back in June and appointed the more pragmatic Communist, Orlando Millas, to deal with Chile's financial difficulties. But abroad, Moscow was increasingly reluctant to bail out the UP. Allende's curious decision to send the anti-Soviet radical Socialist Altamirano to the USSR in June in search of assistance must not have helped, especially as it occurred only a month after Brezhnev's summit with Nixon. Rather than being governed by superpower relations alone, however, the Soviet leadership was disdainful of the UP's performance. A report by the Latin American Institute at Moscow's Academy of Sciences commissioned by the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party in mid-1972 described the Chilean situation as "uncertain and unstable". The report predicted the months ahead would be "agitated and tense", concluded that the UP only had partial political power and that Chilean parties had no fixed ideas, means or potential for launching Chile on a road to socialism in the foreseeable future.

The Soviets also regarded the Chileans as being wildly optimistic about what the Soviet Union could provide. In early 1972, the UP had proposed increasing trade between Chile and the USSR from 7.8 million rubles in 1971 (achieved mainly as a result of Soviet wheat and tractor exports) to $300 million a year by 1975. The Chileans also suggested that they would pay for immediate Soviet imports after presidential elections in 1976 whilst selling Chilean products to Moscow and demanding immediate payment in hard currency. As those who compiled the Institute's report noted, the Chilean plan implied the USSR would have to comply with conditions it had not granted any other developing country. Considering the USSR was desperate for grain itself
in 1972, Soviet leaders were not attracted by providing long-term credits to export “great amounts of products of primary necessity, and scarce in the USSR”.

By August, Allende was warning supporters about the inadequacies of Soviet bloc aid to meet Chile’s economic needs. He warned that socialist credits for industrial investment and future economic development would take “two or three years” to be effective. In the meantime, Santiago needed urgent hard-currency loans. In conversation with a US embassy official, a Chilean lawyer with contacts in the UP government described Orlando Millas, was an “astute and able man”.

He realizes that Chile’s economic problems are grave and that a solution will require credit from abroad. The extent to which this help will be provided by the Soviet Union is limited...the only alternative, therefore, is for Chile to restore its financial relations with the West, particularly the US. Millas, who like most Chilean Communists is above all a pragmatist, will have no ideological difficulty in moving in this direction...[and] realizes that the kind of financial relations he desires will not be possible unless there is progress in solving outstanding bilateral economic problems between Chile and the US.

It was in this context that Allende paid increasing attention to his relations with Washington. With the prospect of negotiations ahead, Allende did not rally support as a victim of US aggression as much as he could have done. Chilean officials clearly perceived the US to be “playing dirty”. By mid-1972, Chilean properties in the US had been ransacked and Chilean diplomats were using voice distorters during telephone conversations and conducting conversations outdoors to avoid being overheard. The Chilean embassy was also burgled, but intruders ignored valuables and stole a list of subscriptions to embassy publications as well as four radios that staff had been using to muffle sensitive conversations. The Chileans suspected the US government and/or multinationals were behind the robbery, especially when a similar burglary took place at the Watergate complex a month later. But they kept conspicuously quiet about the affair.

But by late 1972, Washington and Santiago’s dispute had escalated rather than diminished. In August, Chile’s Special Copper Tribunal against Allende’s ‘excess profits ruling’ had rejected US copper companies’ appeals. Chilean diplomats had feared the consequences of this predictable decision, rescheduling debt repayments with other Paris Club creditors as quickly (and therefore not always as satisfactorily) as a means of demonstrating Chile’s international
But after the Tribunal’s ruling Chile’s negotiating position weakened and Kennecott increased its pressure on Chile by embargoing copper shipments entering Europe.

In response to a US note that insisted compensation as a prerequisite for bilateral talks, the Chilean Foreign Ministry delivered an angry reply to Davis in October filled with previously unexpressed frustration and recrimination. It underlined Allende’s strict adherence to constitutional procedures, rejected undermining Chilean democratic processes by overturning Allende’s ‘excess profit’ ruling and accused the Nixon administration of “economic aggression”, “incomprehension and hostility”. Davis was so worried that the note’s language could lead to open confrontation, he secretly (and successfully) begged UP representatives to consider rewording it. Indeed, despite their mutual distaste for the other’s position, Allende and the Nixon administration still ultimately wanting to avoid open conflict. Looking back, Allende’s financial representative in New York recalls that Chileans were “probably naïve” in thinking that by talking and putting cards on the table they could resolve US-Chilean disputes. But towards the end of 1972 the Chileans clearly had few alternatives.

Back home, a three-week truckers strike in October paralysed Chile. Although the UP blamed US imperialism for fuelling the strikes, Washington probably did not direct the campaign, which was heterogeneous and, at least initially, not led by the parties the CIA was funding. However, US financial support to the private sector was undoubtedly channelled to strikers and, as the 40 Committee acknowledged, helped “dramatise” Allende’s challenges. As a result of the strike, Allende increasingly faced demands to prepare to defend the revolution by force. In the cities factory workers formed what became known as ‘cordones industriales’ (industrial belts) to maintain Chile’s industrial output and secure the control of state owned properties. Meanwhile, the MIR’s leader, Miguel Enríquez convened a secret meeting in southern Chile with the ERP, and Tupamaros to discuss the prospect of launching a united regional revolutionary guerrilla war.

It was not just the far Left that was talking about violent confrontation; leaders of all political persuasions had been warning of civil war or a military coup for months. Speaking to university students at the end of August, Allende had described himself as “horrified” by both prospects. “Although we would win…and we would have to win” a civil war, he proclaimed, Allende warned that “generations” would be scarred and Chile’s “economy, human co-existence and human respect” would be destroyed. Despite the president’s warnings, student, women and paramilitary groups had continued to mobilise whilst sabotage attacks on the country’s
A member of the Nationalist Party confided to a CIA officer that although it had “financed and created” Patria y Libertad, the paramilitary group had gotten “too big for its britches” and was out of control. In mid-September, the PCCh’s leader, Luis Corvalán, had also warned the Soviet ambassador in Santiago that a coup was a “real danger”.

When Allende ended the trucker’s strike by bringing the Armed Forces into government, he took a risk by politicising military leaders and making their cooperation central to La Vía Chilena’s survival. By this stage, the leader of the PS’ military apparatus, Arnoldo Camú (or Agustín) privately described the coup-minded leaders —golpistas — as being influenced and inspired by a Brazilian model. Indeed, a sector of Chilean military plotters increasingly believed the military had a vital role to play in defending Chile against Marxism. Ascribing to the National Security Doctrine Brazil’s military leaders adhered to, the leader of coup plotting in mid-1972, General Alfredo Canales, believed political parties could ultimately only slow down the installation of a Marxist dictatorship. As members of the Left testified over thirty years later “the debate inside the Armed Forces was well known”. Yet beyond wanting to bring the military on board to defend the UP’s constitutional mandate, Allende’s government did not spend time studying the nature of thinking within, the divisions between, and the implications of the rapidly growing politicisation of Chile’s Armed Forces.

As documentary maker, Patricio Guzmán, noted in his documentary film of the same name, the October strike was the start of a decisive ‘battle for Chile’ that would ultimately end on 11 September 1973. Havana urged Allende to risk mobilising his supporters to face his increasingly powerful enemies and stood ready to assist. But in an increasingly volatile situation, Allende still refused to contemplate either abandoning democracy or sacrificing his revolutionary goals. For the time being Allende had restored control of the country. But he continued to face a bitter struggle between local actors about the power to determine society and Chile’s place in the world. The Chileans at the heart of this battle increasingly sought support and inspiration abroad either in Cuba and Moscow or Brazil and the United States. To greater and lesser degrees, these countries reciprocated, adding their own particular brand of advice to the struggle for Chile. Although it was far from clear that outsiders could solve Chile’s political crisis at the end of 1972, Allende increasingly looked abroad for assistance. The UP’s failure to make good its promises of swift development, prosperity and independence meant that the pressures to find solutions or scapegoats for obvious failings mounted. Yet while Allende optimistically hoped to get help both from East
and West without compromising either his ideals or Chile’s independence, his country’s relatively weak position in an unequal world, combined with the UP’s political and economic difficulties made it hard for him to exert leverage on either.

**Conclusion**

By November 1972, Allende acknowledged that détente did not apply to Latin America. When asked for an analysis of the approach to Latin America a second Nixon administration might take, Letelier concluded,

> The current administration has been characterised by the practical thaw regarding certain socialist nations. This could be interpreted as a favourable signal for Chile, if the White House’s policies towards Yugoslavia or Romania were applicable to Latin America. However, the result of the election in Chile in September 1970 notably displeased Nixon. Dr Kissinger’s declarations about the ‘domino theory’ for Latin America (September 1970), the absence of a protocol greeting to President Allende and the president’s own declarations that the new Chilean government ‘was not to his liking’ but that ‘he accepted it’ as a matter of respect for the Chilean people’s will, reveal serious and profoundly different reservations from those that can be found with other socialist nations located outside the continent.151

Santiago had grown to recognise that it received special treatment from Washington compared to other economic nationalists in the Third World. Allende’s message certainly inspired other nations throughout the global South and in turn they condemned US intervention in Chile and sympathised with his quest for economic development. However, the UP’s unique socialist democratic experiment found itself precariously out on a limb in 1972. As UNCTAD’s former secretary, Gamani Corea, noted, the organisation’s Third World members were ultimately more concerned with links to industrial nations in the East and West rather than with global bodies as a means of accelerating their country’s development.152 While other nationalists defaulted to traditional patterns of trade and aid, reaping the benefits of the United States’ growing efforts to work out bilateral solutions with key countries, this denied Allende the commonality of purpose and solidarity he sought in pursuit of his revolutionary aims.

While the UP examined how it could survive within a far more rigid international setting than it had initially foreseen, its demands for justice were steadfastly denied in Washington and ignored by Moscow. As Soviet leaders distanced themselves from Chile’s failing attempts to build
socialism, US officials stalled bilateral negotiations. Indeed, Chilean boldness in 1972 reaffirmed the Nixon administration’s belief that Allende was anti-American, economically damaging and ideologically repellent. For Santiago and Washington, Chilean-US bilateral negotiations on the horizon were pragmatic necessities rather than a reflection of any ideological commitment. Fighting for survival or victory meant employing tactical retreat and by this point, both Washington and Santiago realised they did not want a painful divorce. However, during 1972, the gulf that separated them widened considerably as neither Allende nor Nixon contemplated compromising their ideals.

Although the Nixon administration was caught up in the high-level diplomacy of détente during 1972, this did not mean Washington ignored the hemisphere. Certainly, the US president was star struck by his summit meetings with Mao and Brezhnev and condescending of Latin America’s ‘importance’. Yet, he remained preoccupied about fighting the Cold War in the region. US policymakers continued to be concerned about how events south of their borders affected the United States’ credibility a superpower, the strength of its ideological convictions and the global balance of power in a world that appeared to be shifting away from the certainties of an earlier bipolar Cold War era. Thus, when Nixon urged the Mexican president to let his message triumph above Castro’s in Latin America, he not only hoped this would help ward off the ‘poison’ of Chilean and Cuban influence, but that his counterpart would contribute to spreading US ideas of economic progress and its prescriptions of order in the hemisphere.

In return, Echeverría urged the US president “for a whole new shaping or recasting of American policy vis-à-vis Latin America”. Beyond the Allendes and Castros of the hemisphere, others clearly worried about the drift in the United States’ commitment to regional development. By the late 1960s and early 1970s economic nationalists on the Left and Right viewed security not only in terms of external strategic threats but increasingly in terms of economic stability and development. In this respect, the hemisphere’s Armed Forces increasingly regarded themselves as playing a key role in politics. For them, defending their countries was increasingly a geo-economic as well as a traditionally geo-strategic question. Within Chile, as the UP’s economic record deteriorated, battle lines were drawn between nationalists and a government that purported to be bringing independence, sovereignty and prosperity to the country. Crucially, by the end of the year, Allende was perceived as leading Chile to precarious dependency on external sources of funding.

The United States did not countenance regional aspirations that threatened US prescriptions for economic development. And Washington used the threat of estrangement or promise of co-
operation as a means of maintaining influence over Latin America. By virtue of the instincts instilled by the Monroe Doctrine of claims to exclusive influence in the region, it feared Latin American countries’ voluntary separation from the US as threatening its own political, economic and strategic security. But it is doubtful whether a more flexible posture would have established Soviet control over the hemisphere, for even Allende with his deep antipathy for US imperialism sought Washington’s help and understood the drawbacks and limits of Soviet support. He clearly wanted freedom and demanded he be allowed to dissent, but needed Washington to secure an easy passage towards revolution by granting credits and approval.

Indeed, Latin Americans generally had to work within the confines of US economic, geo-strategic and cultural sphere. Directly challenging the logic of this system and trying to negotiate an amicable separation or, in extreme cases, a favourable divorce, was consistently proved as being unfeasible. To a large degree this stemmed from traditional patterns of trade and industrial development, which once established, proved difficult to undo. But it was also because their geographic position coupled with the limited resources other great powers could provide made negotiating an end to their dependence unsustainable. Only Castro, by tying himself firmly to the Soviet bloc and embarking on a new (but in his estimation, still unsatisfactory) dependence was able to survive dislocation from the US. But even Cuba – the ‘first free territory of the Americas’ – has consistently struggled to re-establish trade relations with the US, albeit in ways that will not compromise its sovereignty.

The question facing Allende in late 1972 was where exactly Chile fitted within this uncompromising world and whether it could find a workable alternative to US dominance. In late 1972, Allende’s former Economics Minister, Pedro Vuskovic, remarked that in Chile, “the problem of power is still unresolved and this is the key problem of any revolution”. The battle for economic independence was unavoidably a struggle for economic success, and two years after Allende had assumed the presidency, also a question of survival. Both at home and abroad, economic battles were political and political struggles were fought by economic means.
Chapter Five: Crossroads

By the end of 1972, it was clear that Allende’s hopes of transforming inter-American relations, winning concessions for the Third World and redefining Chile’s international position had been wildly optimistic. He still ardently believed that his country should be able to act independently in an ideologically divided world without punishment and understood his country’s experience as one that had universal significance. He also continued to think that the force of his message, together with his democratic legitimacy and the morality of his cause would persuade the world – and the US – that Chile deserved a better deal. Yet, as 1973 approached, Washington’s policy in Latin America, a lack of unity in the Third World and an intransigent global North undercut his dreams. Moreover, his domestic political and economic difficulties meant that his message was distorted. Two years after his election, Chile’s international significance appeared to be an example of a failing development model, an unworkable road to socialism and a victim of imperialist aggression rather than a shining beacon of peaceful revolution and independence. His universalist goals were thus increasingly subsumed in a struggle to safeguard his revolutionary process.

Allende stood at a crossroads between success, survival, failure and disaster. As he embarked on a tour of Peru, Mexico, the UN, Algeria, Moscow and Cuba in November 1972, he hoped that he would be able to shore up international support and win La Via Chilena some time. Yet, he would come back disappointed. Subsequently, all those with an interest in Chile looked forward to 4 March 1973, when Chilean congressional elections were to give Chile’s population a chance to deliver its verdict on the UP. Although the results were far more favourable for Allende than many had predicted, this event did not provide any easy solutions either. Concurrently, from December 1972 onwards, Allende was fruitlessly trying to reach an understanding with the United States and restrain US hostility.

The more dependent Allende became on ‘normalising’ Chile’s relationship with the United States, the more significant Washington’s role appeared to become for his presidency. On the eve of Allende’s international tour, his ambassador at the UN warned Washington’s representative that the whole of Latin America was watching the evolution of US-Chile relations expectantly as a test of whether Washington could or would work out a relationship with the region comparable to the “excellent” ones it now had with the Soviet Union, China and Western Europe.
Notwithstanding the worldwide attention US-Chile relations received, however, Chile’s experience was no longer as pivotal to inter-American relations as UP officials imagined. Within Latin America, the tide that had once seemed poised to wash over the continent had been reversed, and beyond the hemisphere, Moscow increasingly viewed *La Via Chilena* as a lesson of what could go wrong in a revolutionary process. Indeed, from October 1972 onwards, the USSR publicly referred to Chile as seeking “free and independent development on the path of democracy and progress” rather than actually building socialism. With its own economic problems and increasing commitments to Cuba, it was not prepared (or able) to bankroll the Chilean economy. Santiago was therefore forced to rely on building ties elsewhere. By mid-1973 Allende had secured enough assistance in Latin America, West Europe and the socialist world to offset US economic sanctions. Yet this balancing act was regarded as being far from sustainable.

In this lonely context, the United States was, therefore, more central to Chile than Allende had ever hoped it would be. All the while, Washington refused to countenance any favourable settlement with Santiago and exacerbated his challenges, actively encouraging Allende’s parliamentary opposition, sympathising with military plotters, and aggravating Chile’s economic crisis. However, just as Allende’s sympathisers increasingly believed he would fail, the Nixon administration began to fear that Allende might just succeed, especially after Chile’s congressional elections in March 1973 gave the UP a boost of political legitimacy. Henceforth, US policymakers grew to fear both that prolonged democratic rule might not reverse Chile’s socialisation, and that if military plotters moved they might be defeated.

**Playing for Time and Sympathy**

In November 1972, Allende urgently sought international economic and political support. As he prepared for his trip abroad, he hoped that by relaying evidence of Chile’s battle against ‘imperialist aggression’ he could persuade the Soviet bloc to help and incite Washington to change its policy. Accordingly, the UP attempted to magnify Chile’s visibility and shift its policy decisively towards playing a Cold War game to force the East, and West, to treat Chile better. Alluding to the international struggle the UP faced, Chile’s national poet, Pablo Neruda, a PCCh member, and until February 1973, Allende’s ambassador in Paris, referred to his country as a “silent Vietnam.” Allende also believed Chile’s position was the epitome of a Third World battle against imperialism for “social liberation, the struggle for well-being and intellectual progress, and the defence of
national identity and dignity”. But if he was to survive as president and to succeed in building a road to socialism he needed funds and time to consolidate his position at home.

As 1973 approached, Chilean diplomats were under pressure to renegotiate Chile’s debt for the following year and find external hard currency credits. The UP’s industrial production had grown only slightly in 1972, the copper mining industry had faced 67 stoppages of work, Chile faced a growing consumer demand and was dangerously dependent on external funds to replace US credits. And due to financial difficulties, imports in 1972 ($150 million) were $200 million lower than they had been in 1970. Chile also faced Kennecott’s embargoes on Chilean copper in Europe and lawsuits against the UP, which Letelier likened to a “judicial blitzkrieg”. At home, the UP announced the beginning of a ‘war economy’ of rationing, tighter clampdowns on a growing black market and state control of essential products.

Santiago’s policymakers hoped that Allende’s tour – and particularly his visit to Moscow – would alleviate the UP’s economic problems. The UP was unsure what the Soviet Union would offer. Letelier unsuccessfully suggested that Allende should visit Moscow first so that he would be in a better position when he visited the UN either to use positive outcomes of the trip as a lever against the US, or to “calibrate” his posture towards accommodation if results were negative. In preparation for Allende’s USSR visit, the PCCh’ Secretary General, Luis Corvalán, led a delegation to East Germany and Moscow to discuss future assistance to the UP. On route, Allende sent this pro-Soviet leader with years of good relations with Moscow to Havana to consult the Cubans on how to deal with Moscow. One Cuban who was present at the meeting recalls that Castro was dismayed at the Chilean’s lack of detailed technical knowledge to win over the Soviets. Based on his experience of dealing with Moscow, Castro quizzed Corvalán on his figures for hours and concluded he knew more about Chile’s economic situation than the Chilean sitting in front of him.9

Santiago was also unsure how Allende’s global tour would affect relations with the United States. In November 1972, Chilean policymakers debated whether Allende should use his trip to New York to try and meet with Nixon. Letelier noted that a bigger strategy choice regarding whether Chile should harden its attitude or focus on accommodating US demands was at stake. By this stage, he believed that Chile should abandon its search for a modus vivendi and argued against Foreign Minister Almeyda’s proposal to try and “impel” a new bilateral dialogue through a summit meeting. He believed such a meeting would fail to change the United States’ inflexible stance towards Chile. Instead, Letelier urged the Foreign Ministry to concentrate on using Allende’s UN
appearance as a public “tribunal” for denouncing multinational and US government pressure; as he argued, US officials were used to “grease and honey”.12

Despite Letelier’s advice, the itinerary of the trip remained the same and Foreign Minister Almeyda’s decision to gamble on trying to organise a summit held firm. The message Letelier delivered to US Ambassador Davis emphasised that the US and Chile had reached a “crossroads”. He argued that a meeting between Nixon and Allende was a “last chance” to diffuse bilateral tensions before relations soured further and Santiago turned East. If Letelier was privately unconvinced, Davis was unimpressed. He wrote to Rogers that Chile appeared to be playing a misguided Cold War game and offering only “formulas of contact”.

The present Chilean effort has overtones of stage-setting for a repetition of the myth of Castro’s 1959 visit to Washington. We are already aware of the…concept of the ‘the last chance’ before Chile turns to the East. There is some truth in Letelier’s allegation that this trip will be seen as a shift to the socialist camp. He also is probably right when he says it will make things harder. It is sad that the Chilean govt has structured it that way if not with care at least with weeks of tinkling cymbals…13

Unbeknownst to Santiago, the State Department had already unequivocally rejected a summit two weeks before Letelier approached Davis on the grounds this would raise Allende’s profile.14 Besides this, Washington viewed Allende’s tour calmly. Compared to earlier worries that Moscow might bail Allende out of his economic difficulties, the Nixon administration believed the trip had scarce prospects of satisfying “in any significant way either his political or economic requirements”. Intelligence analysts believed that Allende still hoped to resolve bilateral disputes with the US during pre-scheduled talks in December, even if they surmised Allende sought international sympathy as a “useful backdrop” for these negotiations.15 As seen from Washington, Allende wanted to improve his chances of renegotiating Chile’s debt by shifting “blame” for his economic performance to “imperialist aggressors”.16 US government officials therefore pressurised news agencies to avoid interviewing him.17

However, Allende’s speech to the UN General Assembly on 4 December resonated loudly around the world and according to news reports, he received a standing ovation similar only to those received by the Pope and President Kennedy.18 During a televised press conference in Mexico prior to arriving in New York, Allende had promised his speech would be a “call for moral force against injustice similar to the moral effect of calls to end [the] ‘Vietnam genocide’”.19 And once at the UN,
he appealed to the "conscience of the world", publicising Chile’s “financial strangulation” and blaming the “drastic elimination” of credits for damaging Chile’s economy. Allende also detailed the “perversion” of international agencies (being used as individual states’ “tools”) and denounced multinational corporations that drove “tentacles deep” into sovereign countries whilst earning obscene profits from the Third World ($1.013 billion from Latin America, $280 million from Africa, $366 million from the Far East and $64 million from the Middle East). Chile’s problems were part of “a long and ominous history in Latin America” of “imperialism and its cruelties”, Allende insisted:

Ours is not an isolated or unique problem: it is simply the local manifestation of a reality that goes beyond our frontiers and takes in the Latin American continent and the whole Third World. In varying degrees of intensity and with individual differences, all the peripheral countries are exposed to something of this kind...imperialism exists because underdevelopment exists; underdevelopment exists because imperialism exists.20

In keeping with the idea of using the UN as a ‘tribunal’, Allende also made a case for his defence. He explained that Chile had been “forced” to adopt a new development model to solve poverty, inequality and dependency, as well as justifying his ‘excess profits’ ruling by citing international law and detailing the profits private companies had accrued. He did not explicitly denounce the US by name but he may as well have done. As he proclaimed, Vietnam had “taught the world that the abuse of power saps the moral fibre of the county that misuses it...whereas a people defending its independence can be raised to heroic heights by its convictions” and by “resisting the physical violence of the world’s mightiest military and economic machine”.21

The Nixon administration was affronted and unsurprisingly unsympathetic to Allende’s speech. At a last-minute meeting at the Waldorf Hotel between Allende and the US Ambassador at the UN, George W.H Bush, the latter tore Allende’s arguments apart. “I told him that we did not consider ourselves ‘imperialists’ and that we still had a deep conviction that our free enterprise system was not selfish but was the best system – certainly for us, though we had no intention to insist on it for others”, Bush recorded. He told Allende that although there had been “excesses from time to time” this system did not “bleed” people when it went abroad; “it was the best way to provide a better standard of living for all.” Bush also rejected Chile’s tactical attempts to distinguish between US government, US companies and US people. Owing to a “deep conviction in the free
enterprise system” he told Allende that “the people, the government and the system” were “interlocked”. If the Chilean president had any hopes of pressuring US officials into making concessions with his speech, he must have walked away with them shattered.

When Allende arrived in Moscow two days later after a brief stop in Algiers, he was unsure what he would achieve. After two weeks of conversations with Soviet Communist Party leaders, Corvalán was struggling to reach an agreement. When he had raised the possibility of Soviet bloc assistance to East Germany’s leader, Erich Honecker, unenthusiastically reminded him that the GDR had other foreign expenditures to juggle, including $100 million a year to North Vietnam. Soviet leaders were divided about Chile on the eve of Allende’s arrival. The KGB had a grim view of the situation in Chile while the Soviet Communist Party’s ideologues were in favour of helping to consolidate the UP’s revolutionary road. As the Russian historian, Olga Ulianova, has argued, it would seem that ultimately, Moscow declined to help more because it lacked faith in Allende’s project and was financially unable to commit to ‘a new Cuba’.

In an effort to raise the stakes of not helping Chile, Allende repeated Neruda’s claim that his country was a “silent Vietnam” – “without the roar of aeroplanes or grenade explosions” – at a Kremlin banquet thrown in his honour. But despite ample quantities of vodka to wash down disappointments, the visit fell short of Chilean hopes. Allende’s cardiologist, Oscar Soto, recalls that his boss was “not happy at all”. In his Kremlin suite, he commented loudly to any of the walls that were listening that he would leave Moscow early; “the Soviet compañeros don’t understand us!” he complained. He was right. Moscow did not need Chilean copper, could not comprehend the UP’s chaotic management of its economy, or its failure to use previous Soviet credits granted to Chilean industrial development.

Rather than receiving enough to counter Chile’s $220 million foreign exchange deficit for 1973, Allende left with instructions to resolve conflicts with Washington and promises of economic assistance that fell far short of hopes. Instead of hard currency loans, the Chileans received a new credit of $45 million and agreements using previously agreed credits to increase the USSR’s technical assistance in developing Chile’s copper, chemical and fishing industries. Yet Santiago did not want Soviet technology, which it considered as being incompatible with Chilean industry. Allende also felt betrayed. “I never imagined that they [the Soviets] were going to do this to me”, he lamented to the Chilean diplomat, Ramon Huidobro, who vividly recalls the Chilean president describing himself as having been stabbed in the back.
On his way to Cuba, the Chilean president stopped in Algeria again where he met President Houari Boumedienne. As well as exchanging views on Third World issues, the Algerian president pointedly asked what the situation was inside Chile’s Armed Forces. As Almeyda later recounted, Boumedienne was unconvinced by the notion of constitutionality among Chilean military leaders. Apologising for his frankness, he ominously argued that the UP’s political experiment would fail if it did not stamp out all counter-revolutionary vestiges in its military institutions.30

Finally, Allende arrived in Havana where he was treated to mass adulation.31 On 13 December, Fidel and Allende addressed what the Chilean Chargé d’affaires in Havana enthusiastically recorded as an “incalculable magnitude” gathered at the Plaza de la Revolución.32 Castro welcomed Allende as a leader who had shown Cuba the “most steadfast friendship” since 1959. He likened the imperialist aggression Chile faced to the situation that Havana had encountered (even if he underscored his country’s experience had been far worse). “We [have] lived that experience and know about the reserves of energy, self-denial and heroism that exist in the people”, Fidel knowingly explained. But he also warned that “revolutions do not emerge as a whim of men but as the result of historical processes”, insinuating that Allende would not be able to dodge a class struggle and a confrontation with counter-revolutionaries. Castro finished with pledging Cuban “blood”, “bread” and 40 tons of the Cuban populations’ sugar rations to help Chile’s revolution. “We must launch a gigantic wave of solidarity around the brother Chilean people”, he instructed, explaining “what they have tried to accomplish with bombs in Vietnam they are trying to accomplish in Chile by economic asphyxia”.33

Allende had finally got the recognition of his country’s international significance that he desired and thousands cheered in support.34 Yet he was also uncomfortable. Prior to stepping up to the podium, his doctor observed his boss more nervous than he had ever seen him. The Chilean president was intimidated by speaking in this setting after Fidel.35 When he did, Allende paid tribute to Cuba’s revolutionary martyrs and the historic ties between Chile and Cuba. He thanked the Cuban people profusely, lambasted those who attacked his revolution and expressed gratitude for the Order of José Martí President Dorticós had awarded him earlier that day.36 Chile’s Chargé, Gonzalo Rojas Pizarro, proudly noted that the speech “showed the unquestionable personality of an American combatant and an authentic Marxist-Leninist”.37 However, it is not clear that Castro was so convinced. In a separate telegram, and in contrast to the public comparisons between both
countries’ revolutions, he acknowledged that the two leaders had privately debated the differences of their revolutionary programmes.  

Moreover, Cuba’s understanding brought limited help; sugar and blood could not solve the UP’s immediate economic problems, which were even causing problems for Havana and Santiago’s bilateral relationship. In November 1972, Castro had personally complained to Corvalán that he was unhappy with Chilean delays in fulfilling trade agreements. While Cubans were insistent on moving the pace of negotiations forwards, the UP lagged behind and the Cubans voiced concerns that Chilean firms were not selling products at a competitive rate to Havana. The celebrated idea that these two developing countries could work together to solve problems of development, was increasingly revealed as untenable.

Back in Santiago, there was “little consensus” about what Allende’s trip had achieved. The main focus of press speculation was on whether the USSR might possibly help Chile more than official communiqués had suggested. As Davis noted, while the UP was “gratified at [the] warmth, enthusiasm and respectful hearing Allende’s ‘David and Goliath’ portrayal seem[ed] to be eliciting abroad”, most of Allende UN’s speech was “old hat to Chileans” and he reported that nothing “noteworthy” had come out of the president’s visit to Havana.
Chile was thus back to square one, namely to working out its differences with the United States. As the Chilean Foreign Ministry faced bilateral negotiations with US officials in December, it defined Chile's overall strategy for dealing with the US as being “to ‘win time’ so as to continue simultaneously consolidating the Chilean process.” Policymakers rejected “total confrontation” with Washington as “inconvenient” and dismissed the “possibility of a wide agreement or understanding” as unlikely. Instead, they opted for a strategy of managing conflict. Santiago’s tactical approach, as defined by Chile’s Foreign Ministry, was to “induce a change” in the United States’ rigid position on compensation and try to move discussion towards broader political issues. As the Chileans noted, Nixon’s re-election in November 1972 meant they would have to “live with each other” at least until Chile’s presidential elections in 1976.

By the end 1972, the UP’s chances of exerting enough leverage against Washington to induce it to change its policies seemed slim. Although Allende had never wanted to ally himself wholeheartedly with the USSR, economic necessities had driven him to seek solutions to the UP’s problems in Moscow. The advice he received to resolve Chile’s dispute with the US was consistent with Chile’s own continuing efforts and thus offered nothing substantially new to hold on to. In fact, rather than increasing economic assistance to Chile, the Soviet Union reduced it from $144 million in 1972 to $63 million in 1973. From the end of 1972 onwards, Chilean policy towards the United States was therefore far more careful in an effort to persuade Washington to compromise. For Santiago, finding a solution to Chile’s relations with the United States was clearly an ad-hoc process predicated on what alternatives Allende had at the time. But successive last-minute efforts to delay a showdown and a strategy of playing for time demonstrated Allende worked towards progressively closer horizons as his options diminished.

“Slowing down the Socialization of Chile”

The CIA defined its overall task in 1973 as “slowing down the socialization of Chile”. Indeed, while US policymakers stalled progress in negotiations, Washington subverted Chile’s democratic process. Chile’s forthcoming congressional elections were widely considered as having the power to decide whether Chile’s future would be shaped by democracy, dictatorship (on the Left or the Right) or a civil war. But Allende’s international grandstanding had raised the profile of Washington’s role in Chile, increasing the risks that intervention posed. Congressional
investigations in Washington about ITT’s relationship with Nixon’s administration and the growing Watergate saga (with its link to the Chilean embassy break-in) also raised awkward questions about the White House’s covert operations. Therefore, when the outcome of the March elections led those who opposed Allende to increasing desperation, the costs Washington faced by intervening had risen. Henceforth, US policymakers were unsure how to speed up Allende’s downfall without offering the UP a pretext to hypothetically seize authoritarian control.

Washington obviously had no intention of making bilateral negotiations with Chile easy. Its hesitant agreement to enter into them in the first place had hinged on avoiding a confrontation with an internationally prominent Third World leader, denying Allende a scapegoat and what was considered to be the remote possibility of gaining compensation for copper companies. The Nixon administration also clearly doubted Chile’s sincerity. As Rogers had advised Nixon in November 1972, he saw “no evidence” Allende was “prepared to offer meaningful concessions” or that hard-liners in his coalition would let him act on these if he did. The US therefore entered bilateral talks pessimistically, armed with the clause they had inserted into the Paris Club agreement explicitly linking compensation to any ‘normalisation’ of US-Chilean economic relations.

When delegates met on 20 December, Assistant Secretary Charles Meyer opened proceedings by thanking the Chileans for having brought “spring to Washington” on account of Washington’s unusually warm weather. Yet the temperature inside the negotiating room dropped over the next two days when both sides failed to even map out a route of resolving disputes. Although each side promised to “leave ideology aside”, this belied what the disagreements were about. As Letelier himself acknowledged, differences revolved around contradictory “conceptual” approaches to economic development and international relations. More specifically, the Chilean delegation insisted on the US easing its discriminatory economic policies and accepting that Allende was unwilling to re-write Chile’s constitution to overturn his nationalisation policies. But US delegates maintained that the “stone” blocking progress was Chile’s refusal to pay compensation. On the last day of discussions, the Chileans proposed submitting all disputes to unbinding arbitration along the lines of an unearthed bilateral treaty from 1914. But with Christmas festivities looming, delegates suspended talks until the New Year.

After these talks, Allende gathered Letelier, Almeyda, UP party leaders, and legal experts in Santiago to discuss options. In focussing on the 1914 Treaty, policymakers reasoned that it offered an unbinding framework that could comprise a range of topics instead of compensation alone. They
regarded such a framework as an unlikely means of ‘solving’ the conflicts, but a useful means of ensuring disputes would not overshadow Chile’s wider international relations, especially with Paris Club negotiations scheduled for January. Another advantage of the treaty, the Foreign Ministry noted, was that it placed the US in the position of defendant, thus turning the tide on the balance of legal cases against Chile. Indeed, by formulating arguments based on international law, Santiago hoped to receive backing from Third World countries in similar situations.  

For the time being, the abortive meeting in Washington offered Santiago short-term gains. Chilean diplomats noted that it produced a “positive climate” in Paris and disarmed US obstruction to a favourable deal. When the Paris Club also decided to suspend any decision pending an IMF report on Chile’s economy this eased immediate pressure on Chile to resolve its disputes with the US or comply with Washington’s demands. In early February, having previously worried about US delaying tactics, Allende instructed Letelier to postpone a second round of talks until after Chile’s congressional elections.  

By the end of February, the US ambassador in Santiago observed that waiting for the elections had given Chilean politics a “brief Indian summer”, placing a virtual “moratorium on political decisions”. The UP’s parties acknowledged they had slim chances of securing a resounding majority. Faced with economic and political upheaval, the Left believed it would be difficult to match, let alone improve, the UP’s 49.7 percent gained at municipal elections in 1971. But Allende clearly needed to avoid the opposition winning two-thirds of the vote that would enable it to block his congressional veto. Less than two weeks before the election, the Soviet Foreign Ministry predicted the UP’s defeat. It concluded that even if the opposition did not win two-thirds, “a political storm [tempestad]” would follow within 48 hours.  

The UP coalition campaigned divided. At an informal lunch in early 1973, Allende reportedly slated parties for being “parochial, pursuing their own individual and party interests instead of those of the Unidad Popular.” A week before the election, an internal MAPU document leaked to the press exposed the extent of the split in government. MAPU joined the PS and the MIR in condemning the PCCh’s “centrist” position and questioned the UP’s ability to survive without external support. Loans from the Soviet Union and other East European countries would “keep the ship afloat” until end of April 1973, it warned. But MAPU calculated that afterwards, Chile faced an “explosive” situation and would be “unable to pay for debt servicing, necessary foodstuffs importation, or imported raw materials”. Looking ahead, the party decided not to “abandon ship”,

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but, instead, to “turn the wheel as far left” as possible, “to prevent the boat from sinking, but to learn how to swim just in case.”

International observers following the elections joined Chile’s populace in regarding them to be the country’s most important for “decades”. Voters had a marked choice between socialism and capitalism broadly represented by a contest between UP and the opposition’s purpose-built coalition, Confederación Democrática (CODE) that comprised Chile’s Christian Democrat and National parties. Ambassador Davis had reported, “the feeling of ‘its now or never’” growing daily among opposition ranks since the beginning of the year. He also observed Chilean “society’s deep attachment to electoral politics” and preference for solving Chile’s political crisis “by constitutional means”. At the very least, CODE expected Chile’s economic predicament would diminish the government’s political strength and US analysts optimistically agreed.

Besides the March elections, the CIA had suspended all covert operations planning beyond March at the beginning of 1973. During the five months leading up to the elections, the 40 Committee had committed $1,602,666 to help the opposition fight an “optimum campaign”. And looking back, the CIA congratulated its station on an “effective” and “outstanding” campaign. Davis had argued effectively against supporting unrealistic golpista plots that risked rallying voters around the UP. However, just over a week before the election, the CIA station in Santiago noted it was “by no means in a position to assure” the opposition would win two-thirds of the vote “regardless of…financial input”. Of crucial importance was how 800,000 newly enfranchised [18-to-21 year olds and illiterates] voters would position themselves. As the election neared, US optimism gave way to pessimism as the CIA concluded that there was “little prospect of a conclusive [election] outcome” and that the UP would probably win 38 percent.

The UP’s impressive showing at the polls therefore left the US “disappointed”. Not only did the UP win 43.39 percent of the vote, but in doing so, it picked up two seats in the Senate and six seats in the Chamber of Deputies. As foreign diplomats observed, this “psychological victory” enthused Allende with “a good quota of oxygen and legitimacy.” Contrary to predictions, Chilean opposition leaders and US analysts also observed that ideological and class affiliations – rather than economic factors – had determined the outcome. Ex-president Frei bitterly reasoned that the “poor had not yet felt the full effects of Chile’s plight”. They “never did eat much meat” he derided in private; “standing in lines was to some degree a ‘social occasion’ and not the frustration and annoyance it was for the middle class”. Ambassador Davis was a little more understanding. He

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wrote to Washington that the poorest half of the population was “materially better off” under the UP and “doubtless prepared to pay some economic price” for an “enhanced sense of dignity and satisfaction of putting down the upper classes.” As observers concluded, the UP’s campaign of encouraging voter loyalty along class lines and equating a vote for CODE as a vote for civil war had been effective. “This government is shit but it is mine” ran one UP slogan painted across Chile’s walls. With newfound confidence, Altamirano demanded, “now more than ever, advance without compromising.”

However, in the immediate aftermath of the elections, foreign observers were not clear exactly how and where Chile’s political future would advance to. Certainly, the divisions in Chilean society and the issues that political opponents fought over were ingrained as ever. The Soviet Foreign Ministry thus described the outcome as merely sustaining an “unstable equilibrium” whilst the CIA’s station chief warned “the line up for the future [was] still quite fluid.” What remained unclear to many was what direction the anti-Allende struggle would take now that the elections were over.

Washington’s enthusiasm for supporting Allende’s democratic opposition waned from March onwards. Because the country’s economic difficulties had brought seemingly limited political rewards, the PDC focused its subsequent campaign on wooing lower income voters to undercut the UP’s traditional support base. However, as it did, US intelligence officers warned of an inevitable leftward trend in Chilean politics and the implications this might have for Chile’s 1976 presidential elections. By April, the CIA station noted:

Frei has reached the conclusion that throughout the so-called Third World the traditionalist capitalist system is not capable of realizing development goals and aspirations. Frei has also been impressed over relative success and rapidity in which Allende…has dismantled previously existing bastions of economic power…Frei recognizes that he cannot reverse much of what the UP has done.

Apart from the fear that it might be too late to stop the socialisation of Chile, Washington’s decision-makers had growing doubts about the PDC as a reliable ally. US intelligence analysts regarded ‘socialist communitarianism’, to which the majority of the PDC increasingly subscribed, as being “clear only in its rejection of free enterprise”. Thus, although CIA analysts predicted the US would be “asked to provide…massive financial and economic support” to a hypothetical PDC government after 1976, they saw limited benefits in complying for the US.
The obvious alternative to political means of bringing Allende down was to work harder at encouraging military intervention. From March onwards, the CIA’s station in Santiago persistently urged its superiors to “keep all options open...including a possible future coup”. The station’s chief, Ray Warren, argued that this would not mean abandoning support for Chile’s political parties, private businesses and the media. Rather, he argued that all could play a significant role in creating an “atmosphere of political unrest and controlled crisis” to “stimulate” military intervention. However, the most immediate obstacle to a successful coup lay within the military itself. Chile’s Armed Forces were not only divided, but Davis also observed that the UP’s electoral success had reaffirmed a preoccupation of being “confronted by the risk of large scale bloody action against elements of the civil population”. Faced with this context, Warren advocated establishing “a secure and meaningful relationship with a serious military plotting group” as a means of forging a military “consensus” and “[inducing] as much of the military as possible...to take over and displace the Allende government”.

The CIA station received a negative response. Back in the US, analysts were questioning “the risks involved in desperate remedies [supporting a coup]”. Among the risks they discussed was the prospect of an “abortive coup or bloody civil war”. Those who compiled a CIA budget proposal at the end of March argued that the administration had to be “objective” about the prospects of success however “sympathetic” they were to the increasingly “desperate” Chilean private sector. “[U]nless it becomes clear that such a coup would have the support of most of the Armed Forces as well as the CODE parties”, it cautioned that the CIA should avoid backing a military coup and make clear to Chilean contacts this position.

If the CIA regarded the “outlook for Chilean democracy” as “bleak”, this was not, as one would assume, because the prospect of military intervention loomed ahead. Instead, CIA analysts warned danger lay in it not happening at all and the slim prospects that the US would obtain “more than Pyrrhic victory” in 1976. Intelligence officials and members of the Nixon administration faced with deciding what the US’ role should be in this context were keenly aware of the limitations of Washington’s power and excessively nervous about Allende’s ability to resist his opponents. There were obviously differences within the Nixon administration about how to ensure Allende’s failure. As it had done since 1970, US policy oscillated between political and military alternatives for bringing Allende down. Whilst Washington’s leaders hesitated about taking the risks involved in accelerating coup plotting, the CIA continued collating information that might be valuable to
military plotters in the event of a coup such as arrest lists, intelligence of government installations
and the UP’s contingency plans to resist military intervention. However, overall, the Nixon
administration decided to wait and see how the situation in Chile evolved.

Waiting for spring

For Allende, the brief Indian summer of the election period immediately gave way to a difficult
Chilean autumn and winter, and with them, the return of political insfighting, looming confrontation
and ever-greater economic crisis. From March onwards, the Chilean president also had fewer
options both domestically and internationally. Chilean military leaders who had joined Allende’s
cabinet in October 1972 left government after the elections as planned but remained on the sidelines
of Allende’s presidency. Meanwhile, tensions clouding Chile’s future were as intense as they were
because the stakes involved in the participants’ choices were so high. By early 1973, they were
framed openly in Chile – and analysed in detail abroad – as choices between democracy and bloody
civil war, between socialism and fascism or between Marxist dictatorship and a liberal
constitutional democracy, always of course, depending on where you stood within the Chilean
political spectrum.

The problem underlying Allende’s presidency and the UP’s ability to survive in government
was the lack of an obvious end goal and an agreed route by which to achieve it. Following the
government’s electoral success, the PS received criticism for having lacked faith in the political-
institutional road. However, Allende’s hopes of unifying his coalition behind the democratic
process and reaching an alliance with the PDC remained elusive. Differences among the Left were
so great that Chile’s Commander-in-Chief, General Prats, had written to each coalition party after
the election warning them that their divisions aggravated their problems and favoured the
opposition. At the end of March, Allende pleaded for “vertical discipline”.

The question of unity also concerned the UP’s international allies. From Moscow, the Soviet
Foreign Ministry concluded that the UP’s future depended on unity, overcoming economic
difficulties and attracting support from the widest sector of the population as possible. As Pravda
indicated, the Soviets believed “ultra leftists” and “adventurers” were responsible for weaknesses.
Although the Cubans sympathised with the PS and the MIR’s analysis of what needed to be done,
they were also increasingly concerned that the far Left’s open attacks on Allende undermined
Chile’s revolutionary process. Looking back on the period two years later, Armando Hart, a leading
figure in Cuba’s Communist Party, praised the MIR and acknowledged its links to Cuba, but alluded to differences in opinion “regarding the ways in which it related with other forces on the Left” and the MIR’s “methods, places and moments to employ revolutionary violence”. What concerned the Cubans was not their call to arms, but how to make this count in defending the government. Believing that Allende was pivotal to Chile’s revolutionary process, Havana’s leaders ultimately stood by the president. Attending the PS’s 40th anniversary celebrations in April 1973, Cuban deputy prime minister, Carlos Rafael Rodríguez warned:

...if Cuba was able to defeat the most powerful imperialism in history, this was because our revolutionary forces – within which the differences were not few and the tradition of honourable rivalries was not small – overcame these and established unified control, discipline and a common programme...there is no revolutionary alternative to the Popular Unity government and President Allende...To postulate policies that divide the working and popular forces that Socialists and Communists guide together is not to open a path towards a deeper revolution, but to open breaches where the enemy can penetrate.

Privately, however, the Cubans continued to urge Allende to prepare more decisively for an armed confrontation. According to Carlos Chain, Cuba’s Deputy Foreign Minister, Castro responded angrily to a group of Chilean women – among them Allende’s sister, Laura Allende – who visited Havana around this time. When they spoke of being ready to fight until Santiago’s river Mapocho flowed with revolutionaries’ blood, the Cuban leader relied, “this is not what we want!” As they tried to persuade Allende to accelerate defensive preparations, the message the Cubans delivered to the far Left was to wait, to unite behind Allende and to prepare effectively for the oncoming conflict.

In the aftermath of the March elections, the prospect of some sort of conflict appeared ever more likely. Throughout the country, streets were barricaded, students clashed, Molotov cocktails were thrown and smoke bombs were planted. Indeed, members of the president’s bodyguard recall being on the alert for “every noise, every car that passed”. The struggle to determine Chile’s future was most obviously reflected in a struggle over the government’s proposal for a new Unified Education System (ENU) in April. This proposition had little to do with ideology and more to do with addressing a long recognised crisis in Chile’s educational system. However, to the opposition – and, crucially, outspoken military leaders who publicly heckled the UP’s Education Minister – the ENU epitomised the imposition of Marxist thought on a new generation of Chileans.
Despite Allende's continued message that socialism would ultimately pay off, economic difficulties also mounted. In the first four months of 1973, inflation soared, the black market prospered, industrial production fell by 7.1 percent, car production was down 20 percent compared to the previous year and agricultural production had fallen by 25 percent. In April, as striking miners descended on Santiago, forecasters predicted the cost of living in May would be considerably worse.

In an effort to ease Chile's financial pressures, Allende remained focused on trying to reach some sort of agreement with Washington. Crucially, those who encouraged him included General Prats who reportedly advised the president Chile was “not within the Soviet sphere of influence geopolitically and that further damage to US-Chilean relations” would “seriously affect its national security.” In March he had encouraged Allende to “decide on the government’s future course so that the armed forces can determine their position.” Yet Allende’s commitment to US-Chilean negotiations predictably received criticism as well. Following the breakdown of bilateral talks the previous December, the far Left had begun to insist on a posture of “demand” not “compromise”; an end to what the MAPU called “negotiated dependency.”

As seen from Washington, however, Allende’s ‘compromise’ rang hollow. US officials regarded the offer of unbinding arbitration along the lines of the 1914 bilateral treaty unenthusiastically. As Davis argued, Chileans’ purported “flexibility” was “an oasis shimmering in the distance”. During the bilateral talks in December and then in March, US delegates voiced concern that the Chileans’ vague 1914 framework was “cosmetic”, with no guarantees of compensation for the copper companies. But the US’ position was by no means more conciliatory. As the Nixon administration had prepared for a second round of bilateral talks at the end of March, it had dodged either accepting or rejecting the Chileans’ proposal. When delegates finally met, US representatives also disingenuously dangled US rapprochement with China and the socialist bloc as an example of what could be achieved through direct bilateral negotiations.

Arguments over the process for resolving differences hid the central issues at the heart of the US-Chile dispute. Why was détente not an option for Chile, Letelier demanded? He pointed to the UP’s good relations with countries of different ideological persuasions (he mentioned Colombia) and challenged the US to change its inflexible position towards Chile. He pointed to a “positive” international climate for accommodation and drew attention to the “thaw in the Cold War and the elimination of ideological frontiers”, a “ceasefire in Vietnam, the opening of links between the U.S.
and socialist bloc countries, the establishment of offices in China”. However, the US representatives firmly underlined compensation as the sticking point between them despite Chileans efforts to place emphasis on growing evidence of US intervention and economic pressure against Allende as the true ‘rock’ in the path to progress. Indeed, days before the talks got underway the US Senate had begun hearings on ITT’s role in Chile, unearthing what the Chilean Foreign Ministry labelled “irrefutable evidence” of US intervention. In the end, after two days of going round in circles and US delegates refusing to accept the 1914 framework, the negotiations collapsed.

When Chilean delegates (minus Letelier) returned to Washington, they publicly blamed the US for the gridlock. In Washington, policymakers were surprised by denunciations but unrepentant. Rogers described Chilean comments on the talks as “major distortions”, which he deemed to have been a “semi-final” “calculated decision to provoke a ‘confrontation’”. He speculated that the UP believed it was in a stronger position after the election and US Senate hearings on ITT, that Chile was likely to use the forthcoming OAS General Assembly to denounce Washington and that tactically, the Chileans probably regarded the situation “as good...as they can expect it to be”.

However, this assessment was only an approximation of one part of the UP coalition’s position, and both Allende and the Chilean Foreign Ministry remained keen to avoid further confrontation. Acknowledging that the impasse had “substantially limited” its strategy of playing for time and managing conflict without tying Santiago down to any type of decisions, the Foreign Ministry called for an “imperative” and “immediate” examination of Santiago’s policy towards Washington. Allende also called Letelier urgently back to Washington to hear his estimation of what might be done to salvage the situation. The ambassador’s subsequent conversation with Davis revealed the importance La Moneda placed on rescuing the talks. Letelier argued that Washington’s apparent “180 degree turn” towards a hard-line position had been a “bombshell” for the Chilean government. He pleaded with the US to offer “understanding and flexibility”. “Allende genuinely needs time to work it out”, Davis reported, “Letelier understood that the president’s deep internal difficulty was not the fault of the US, but it was nevertheless a reality”.

As a result of this conversation, the White House reluctantly agreed to pull away from the brink. In early April, Davis received authorisation to approach UP government officials and emphasise that the US had not categorically rejected arbitration but was merely studying options. Later that month when Almeyda visited the OAS in Washington, US representatives held informal
talks with him that paved the way towards reopening negotiations. As Rogers noted, Letelier and Almeyda had become “more flexible” and were willing to hear US counterproposals.\textsuperscript{110} Indeed, back in Santiago, although Allende accused the US of “direct intervention in Chile”, he declared, “in spite of everything, Chile is prepared for dialogue”. If new talks resulted in nothing, he added it would not be Chile’s “fault…It is obvious that we are right. In this way we show the world we are prepared to talk”.\textsuperscript{111} But in private, the Chileans began to give way. Between April and June, when delegates met for a third round of negotiations in Lima, the UP tentatively began to explore the possibility of accepting some of the United States’ demands, set forth in a counter-proposal to the 1914 framework.\textsuperscript{112}

By this stage, Allende and the Chileans loyal to him within the government had limited faith in their ability to transform the United States’ policy towards Chile. A Foreign Ministry study of US-Chilean relations in April had acknowledged that Washington’s approach to Allende was based on an uncompromising global agenda. The UP’s nationalisation policies had had a profound effect on “the imperialist system of the capitalist multinational monopolies of which the United States is the center”, analysts recognised. Beyond this it concluded:

...the very existence and actions of the Chilean government are damaging to US national interests in Chile, and...its example can have great influence on power relations in Latin American and on the Third World in general; but even more than that...[Chile] can be a serious setback for US power and prestige in its major relations with the great powers and can harm its global plan (underway during the past two years) to set up a new world order favourable to the imperialist system and to the United States as its dominant power. In a sense Chile succeeds Vietnam, in a way, as another borderline case...principally because, as international examples of the fight against imperialism, the wards of national liberation have no had the real effect that the Chilean experience...has today in reinforcing and extending anti-imperialist action around the world.\textsuperscript{113}

By the time it was written, the Chilean Foreign Ministry study of Allende’s global threat to the US was wildly exaggerated. The Nixon administration had certainly been motivated to undermine Allende on account of his ‘example’, ‘influence’ and ‘impact’ in Latin America and the Third World. In September 1970, the administration had also been swayed by fears regarding Allende’s implications on the United States’ international prestige, the encouragement the UP’s victory could have for Western European communists and its relations with other great powers. However, two and a half years later, Allende’s weakening position at home and Chile’s awkward international balancing act had lessened this threat. Rather than freeing up space for Allende to embark upon a
peaceful road to socialism in an ideologically divided world, détente altered the rules of the confrontation between the superpowers and made the USSR more cautious about helping one of Washington’s enemies.

In this context, Santiago’s efforts to diversify trade and secure credits outside Moscow and Washington were relatively successful. By mid-1973, Chile had managed to replace the US credits it had lost since 1970. In view of its own aims of extending a regional economic influence, and despite simultaneous efforts to undermine Allende within Chile, Brazil gave Chile lines of credit worth $30 million in 1973, on top of $65 million offered in 1972.114 Chile also received emergency shipments from Mexico, Argentina and Western Europe to help its trade deficit and used Mexican credit worth $20 million to buy grain from the US.115 Yet, this situation was by no means ideal. Back in February, Zhou Enlai had written to Allende warning him that it was “very dangerous to depend too much on foreign assistance”. When Allende had replied two months later, he spelt out the “tremendous difficulties facing a small country” like Chile “which is very far from being self-sufficient”.116 Indeed, by mid-1973, US intelligence analysts concluded Chile was still dependent on “political favors” and faced “day-to-day strains in trying to maintain imports at a politically acceptable level”.117

Sitting next to Ramon Huidobro’s wife on his way home from a visit to Argentina in late May 1973, Allende voiced his concerns about surviving as president. “If I can get to spring” he told her, “I can save myself”.118 Allende’s chances of saving his government revolved around Chilean domestic politics. But his government’s ability to remain in power also depended on finding long-term financial solutions abroad. In what turned out to be the last few months of his presidency, Allende therefore focussed on US talks as the principal solution to Chile’s financial difficulties. Henceforth, Washington and Santiago were locked in a negotiation process that one side regarded as an adequate vehicle for hiding its ulterior motives and the other began to depend on. However, as Letelier himself admitted during the tense US-Chilean negotiations in March, it was “vague and unrealistic to try and obtain solutions for which the objective conditions do not exist”.119 Indeed, Washington and Santiago’s leaders were fundamentally unable to understand each other, especially when it came to their separate analyses of the inter-American system.
Incomprehension

By mid-1973, Chile’s universal significance was not the shining example Allende had hoped it would be. Chile had become a celebrated victim of foreign intervention and faced ineluctable dependency on external assistance. Although Allende received pledges of solidarity from around the world in his battle against external economic aggression, this meant little when it came to his long-standing aims to reshape the inter-American system. As far as the Chilean Foreign Ministry was concerned, US citizens showed indifference towards Latin America and a “lack of comprehension” towards nationalism in the developing world, which they perceived as “anarchy” and “ingratitude”. However, in Latin America the balance of power was shifting away from Chile and the notion of constructing ‘one’ regional voice to challenge Washington. In fact, the Nixon administration was increasingly shoring up its position in Latin America, enthusiastically observing that despite continued Chilean efforts to encourage systemic change, Santiago could not significantly undermine the US’ power and influence throughout the hemisphere.

Allende’s campaign to encourage radical transformation of the inter-American system accelerated when Almeyda addressed the OAS General Assembly in April 1973. In an “emotional speech”, he vigorously denounced the inequality within the organisation and the fictitious identity between Latin America and the United States. He emphasised Latin American “frustrations” that Washington “lined up with the rich countries, not with hemisphere”. He also urged the OAS to dismantle “fossils of the Cold War” like the inter-American Defence College and continued sanctions against Cuba. Yet the Chilean proposals antagonised conservative members of the organisation and to Washington’s delight, Chile was “wor[n] down” by the “spirit of consensus”. The result was relatively weak resolution on the principles governing relations between American states and the initiation of a review process to study the issue further. In Washington’s opinion, this was “quite acceptable and “better…than we had expected”.

Indeed, by mid-1973, the Nixon administration calculated that regional counter-revolutionary victories combined with the UP’s mounting difficulties in Chile made it unlikely Allende would open the floodgates of communism and revolution on the continent. The State Department was largely in control of the administration’s policy towards Latin America by this stage, indicating that it was not the urgent priority it had been intermittently since late 1970.
Certainly, the White House designed Washington’s overall thrust towards the region, which included embracing Brazil, fighting communism and supporting military leaders as pillars of control and stability. But under this general rubric, and with Watergate consuming Nixon’s time, State Department officials’ earlier arguments for flexibility in the Americas increasingly held sway.

Following Almeyda’s challenge at the OAS, the State Department made a concerted effort to improve its position in the hemisphere by persuading critics that it had rejected paternalism. Before the OAS’ meeting in Lima on the future of the inter-American system, Rogers toured eight Latin American countries. During his trip, he wrote to Nixon that Washington’s problems in the region were “either soluble or manageable, posing no dangerous threat”. The president was “very pleased” and advised the Secretary to shake off any angry demonstrations he might encounter: “as one who went through this in 1958 in Lima and Caracas”, he said, “Welcome to the Club!” As it turned out, however, Rogers did not face many hostile demonstrations. US initiatives in South America since 1970 had smoothed his passage. The Secretary acknowledged that the adjustments Washington had made to its policy towards Peru— including a decision to waive previous suspensions of arms sales — had made the visit a “success”. In Brazil, Rogers noted relations with that country were “probably the best they have ever been”.

Rogers achieved far less pleasing – though by no means particularly worrying – results when he met Allende on 25 May in Argentina. In fact, the shifting balance of power in the hemisphere meant that the meeting was an aside; a US-Chilean matter and an appendage to a hemispheric policy no longer as concerned about the regional implications of Chilean developments. The meeting was solicited by Rogers and took advantage of them both being in Buenos Aires for the inauguration of Argentina’s new democratically elected president, Hector Campora. But it was also unauthorised by the White House and accomplished little by way of easing the strained relationship between both countries. Instead, Allende and Rogers each pressed upon each other the merits of their own governments’ actions and the error of the other’s ideals. Indeed, whilst conveying platitudes about wanting good relations, the two men detailed core US-Chilean disagreements. Fundamental differences regarding notions of independence, imperialism, economic and political systems of government and US-Chilean relations shone through. And while both stated the value of democracy and freedom, it was clear each had profoundly different concepts of the validity of each other’s commitment to liberty and democratic governance.
In seeking to bolster their claims vis-à-vis the other, Allende and Rogers’ arguments centred on the way they interpreted political, economic and social upheaval in Latin America. In making his case against ‘economic imperialism’ in Latin America, Allende insisted he was not alone. He pointed to “a definite, palpable feeling running in Latin America…that there must be change”; “something must have happened for this welling up of feeling to have come about in Latin America”, he insisted. Conversely Rogers threw the blame for regional underdevelopment back on hemispheric nationalists. Eschewing notions of US ‘paternalism’ and directly challenging Latin Americans to “do things for themselves”, he then laid down rules for this independence. “The US welcomed nationalism”, he said, but only “as long as it was constructive.” Nixon’s new Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs, Jack Kubisch, was also present at this meeting and recorded Rogers as questioning the “purpose” of “negative” or “anti-US” nationalism:

The Secretary pointed out that in his travels to different parts of the world, particularly to countries such as Yugoslavia and Romania, the authorities consistently said that they wanted closer ties with the US: they urged the US to have closer relations and for the USA to encourage Americans to go to their countries. They seemed to trust us. They didn’t make speeches against the US – in fact, usually the opposite. But this was where problems came up in our desire to be friends with Latin America. We felt there had to be a change in climate…it was a mistake for developing countries to act as if profits were evil.129

Faced with incomprehension, the Chileans viewed Rogers’ Latin American trip with impatience. The Chilean Foreign Ministry predicted that beyond a “thaw” in US-Peruvian relations, the US was likely to continue its “benign neglect, courting the continent with official visits and studies that allow it to gain time and not do anything positive”.130 Although Santiago considered Rogers’ meeting with Allende to have been a useful opportunity to chase up progress on US-Chile talks, beyond this, Allende’s advisors regarded it as pointless.131 Rogers had certainly refused to concede any ground to the notion that the US’ position might be wrong; compared to Allende, “the US had a system that worked” he argued.132 But Chile’s leaders disagreed. In an analysis of the US’ Latin American policy, Chilean Foreign Ministry officials lamented that by continuing to regard foreign investment as a generous way of ‘helping’ regional states and safeguarding their profits, Washington missed a “central problem” at the heart of inter-American relations. Reflecting on Nixon’s recent speech to the US Congress, the Foreign Ministry commented that the president
appeared more and more to be sounding like a “public relations” spokesman for private US companies whilst simultaneously disregarding hemispheric needs.\textsuperscript{133}

When OAS delegates met in Lima in July 1973 to discuss the inter-American system’s future, Chile’s representative, Luis Herrera, denounced the glaring “fallacy” of inter-American unity.\textsuperscript{134} When Davis complained about the speech to Letelier – recently appointed as Chile’s new Foreign Minister – the latter insisted that he had not given Herrera any “specific” instructions and argued Chile had enough differences with the US, without trying “to create additional difficulties”.\textsuperscript{135} Two days later, when Herrera addressed delegates in Lima he was notably more “restrained”. As Washington’s ambassador in Lima recorded, Herrera now emphasised Chile did not want the US out of the OAS, but wanted the organisation to “engage [the] US and Latin bloc on more equitable terms, reflecting fundamentally contradictory interests and encouraging positive, fruitful dialogue”.\textsuperscript{136}

However, the main problem with Chilean hopes of impelling transformation of the inter-American system was the absence of any cohesive ‘Latin American bloc’. At the Lima meetings, US diplomats observed a “great many, sometimes contradictory, Latin ideas” and were unimpressed by the “concept of Latin American unity” either politically or in the approaches regional states adopted towards the “conceptual framework of the inter-American system itself”. They did, however, acknowledge a “general support...voiced for Peruvian concepts of economic security.” But despite Chilean efforts within a subcommittee on the OAS’ structure, US observers reported Santiago’s initiatives as having “floundered...when great majority of delegates demurred” about reaching hasty decisions.”\textsuperscript{137}

Whilst the Chileans were striving for change, the US was working with, and through, Latin American allies to undermine their position. “We will need...cleared counter-proposals of our own...some of which can presumably be voiced by friendly governments”, one US diplomat advised the State Department with reference to yet more future talks scheduled for later that year.\textsuperscript{138} One such ‘friend’ US policymakers believed it could “count on” was Bolivia.\textsuperscript{139} Another was obviously Brazil, whose cooperation in the inter-American system was highly valued.\textsuperscript{140} Seen from afar, as Peru’s president, Velasco Alvarado, had told Rogers two months earlier, the United States put too much “faith” on Brazil.\textsuperscript{141} Be that as it may, Brasilia clearly shared important US interests in Latin America. Moreover, as subsequent events would prove, the Southern Cone was already moving rapidly towards Nixon’s preferred Brazilian model for governance and economic growth.
Since Allende had come to power in late 1970, Santiago and Washington had stood poles apart regarding their views on inter-American affairs. To a large extent, many Latin American nations shared Allende’s frustration with the United States’ policies in the region. But Allende’s ability to convert the ‘palpable’ feeling he described to Rogers into concrete change was dependent both on Latin American unity and Washington’s propensity to negotiate the underlying principles of its foreign policy. Despite the promises of an end to ‘paternalism’ that the Secretary of State delivered throughout the region, as Rogers had had insisted to Allende, the United States believed that because its system ‘worked’ and that this – or at least something similar – was the best system for Latin America to follow. Washington thus retained a fiercely paternalistic attitude towards the region, tolerating nationalism if judged ‘constructive’ and relying on loyal states to ‘feed’ its prescriptions for development throughout the hemisphere.

Conclusion

At each political turn that he took in his last year in office it seemed as if Allende met a dead-end. In late 1972 and early 1973, Chile found itself precariously drifting between East and West, powerless to influence systemic change and losing face amongst those that had earlier shown Allende sympathy. Having gone from largely trying to avoid Cold War categorisations, Santiago then earnestly tried to fight the Cold War. But his much-anticipated trip to Moscow and his attempts to induce Washington to change its attitude failed. Santiago’s efforts to get Nixon to abide by his rhetoric of international peace when dealing with Chile were also futile. Allende continued to face a dilemma that had greeted him when he came to office: how to oppose the United States’ policies in Chile and the hemisphere but avoid its wrath and whether to seek dialogue or accept that open confrontation was inevitable. To a large extent, events had overtaken Chile’s foreign policy strategies and aims. The UP government had little but disdain for what it believed Washington stood for as a superpower and as the centre of global capitalism. But Allende also accepted that as a weak country in a dependent capitalist world, Chile could not risk an open breach, especially given his domestic fortunes. The policy that Chile followed towards Washington was therefore an oscillating strategy that swung between managing conflict and avoiding it; privately appealing to Washington and publicly denouncing US conduct. But Allende was reluctant to consider undermining Chilean sovereignty by going back on the ‘excess profits’ bill his country’s Congress had unanimously passed.
The United States was unimpressed with Allende’s efforts to play Washington off against Moscow and impelled by profound certitude in its chosen path. When they had been driven to seek détente with the Soviet Union and China to solve their own problems in Vietnam and ease the costs of continued international tension, Nixon and Kissinger had been impressed by indications that Moscow and Beijing were keen to work with them and awestruck by the power of those that they went to negotiate with. But in Santiago they saw ingratitude, weakness and proof that socialism was misguided. What surprised them, therefore, was what relative insignificance Chile’s economic difficulties had on the election results in March. When Chileans appeared unlikely to recognise the error of their ideals and Allende’s democratic opponents seemed destined to move ever further to the left, Washington singled out a coup as the only way it could truly ‘save’ Chile.

In spite of the obstacles Allende faced and the president’s own fears about lasting through Chile’s winter months, the end of Allende’s government was by no means pre-determined. In the eyes of his opponents, Allende’s strength and his ability to neutralise his enemies was clearly exaggerated. His manoeuvres between different factions of the Left and his efforts to placate his opponents (particularly in the military) were growing ever more difficult. In mid-June 1973, US intelligence analysts concluded Washington “lack[ed] powerful and reliable leavers” to determine the future shape of that country’s future. It predicted that Chile’s future over the next two or three years fell under three alternatives: a political standoff between Left and Right, consolidation of Allende’s government or, a repudiation of it by military intervention. Its conclusion was that the first of these alternatives was the “most likely”, while the second two were “roughly equal to each other”.142

Alluding to uncertain months ahead, Davis reported that, “chance, blunder, or the winter food riots that are widely predicted...could conceivably lead to ignition and the coup possibility has to be considered”.143 The Cubans, however, were more convinced. As far as Havana was concerned, the only way to resist what it saw to be an inevitable coup was to mobilise Chile’s population and prepare them for the confrontation that loomed on the horizon. However, although Allende faced an ever more inward spiralling circle, he refused to take a different non-democratic or violent road.

The interrelationship between domestic politics and Santiago’s interaction with the world beyond Chile’s borders had grown steadily more significant after 1970. On the one hand, this continued to be predicated on the basic needs of survival. The UP’s ability to draw on class loyalty may have provided it with electoral strength and moral legitimacy but it did not solve the question
of power, let alone the basic necessities of a functioning state. As the UP’s economic policies faltered and the middle and upper classes in Chilean society took to hoarding food and bolstering the black market, Allende appealed for external economic support to meet his country’s growing import needs. In this respect, his dynamic foreign policy towards Latin America, Europe, the Soviet bloc and China paid substantial dividends by diversifying commercial relations just enough to offset the disappearance of US credits. Yet this was an increasingly desperate race against time rather than a sustainable solution.

On the other hand, Allende’s position in the world, the manner in which his foreign friends responded to him and the way he approached his external enemies all contributed to the arguments raging within Chile regarding the future of the government’s revolutionary project. Chile’s far Left advocated confrontation as a means of forwarding revolutionary progress. And Chile’s right-wing grew increasingly horrified by Cuba’s involvement in the country and Santiago’s alienation of the United States. As General Prats had warned Allende, the military in particular, was waiting for the government to define its international position once and for all so its leaders could decide where they stood. As the government struggled to maintain a semblance of progress within the confines of constitutional democracy and limited extra-legal military preparations for a possible conflict, the opposition in Chile gathered force to stem the supposed irreversibility of a forthcoming Marxist dictatorship. In doing so, Allende’s opponents were supported not only by Washington but also encouraged and inspired by counter-revolutionary regional forces in the Southern Cone.
Chapter Six: Endgame

The battle that took place in Chile between June and September 1973 was a struggle to define what Chile was destined to be: a socialist democracy, a bourgeois democracy, a dictatorship of the proletariat or a military dictatorship. As Chileans looked to the future, they asked where Chile should fit within the world and who its international friends should be. Allende had come to power promising to recover ‘Chile for Chileans’; to redefine Chile’s place in the world and radically transform the international political and economic system it found itself in. The dictatorship that followed abandoned Allende’s embrace of the Third World and Cuba, together with Allende’s aspiration to become a worldwide beacon of peaceful socialist transformation. As Chilean historian, Joaquin Fermandois, has noted, the “modern utopia” some outsiders saw in Allende’s Chile transformed into a celebrated “anti-utopia”.¹

There were, however, some similarities between the pre- and post-coup regimes. Allende sought US acquiescence and assistance for this project and the government that took over did the same. Both also saw economic progress as a fundamental component of their country’s national security. But the reactions they received from Washington and the solutions they prescribed for Chile’s economic, political and social development could not have been more different. The Chile that emerged was a distorted imitation of its former self, assuming a different place in the world as a willing member of the United States’ backyard, an implacable foe of international communism, an aspirant of capitalist prosperity and an internationally condemned dictatorship.

Over thirty years later, many are still baffled by what happened on 11 September 1973. How did Chile – a country renowned for its democracy – become a repressive dictatorship that lasted nearly two decades and cost thousands of lives? In seeking answers, many pointed at US imperialism. Although the Nixon administration celebrated the coup, however, it is now clear that US sympathy for coup plotters did not translate into a precise policy of support. Its destabilisation policies undoubtedly intensified Allende’s challenges. Evidence of US intervention in Chile, together with Chileans’ own advertisement of the economic aggression they faced also brought worldwide attention to Washington’s interference while Allende was still in power. Thus, no one was surprised – and everyone knew to whom he referred – when Allende, in his last ever radio address, blamed “foreign capital and imperialism, united with reactionary elements” for having “created the climate” for the coup.² Kissinger himself admitted the US “created the conditions as
great as possible” Y3 Yet in the months before the military eventually struck, Washington responded hesitantly whilst planning for its aftermath. Indeed, the strength of US involvement in the brutal transformation of Chile came after 11 September.

As Chile became a theatre of the struggle between revolution and reaction on the continent from mid-1973 onwards, an array of hemispheric actors played a significant role in determining its outcome. Besides the US and Cuba, Brazil, Uruguay, Bolivia and Argentina, far Left revolutionary movements and regional business leaders became intricately involved. This was partly because Chileans of different political persuasions asked them to be, but it was also because their own ambitions drew them into the conflict. Allende was convinced that imperialism was behind the opposition’s attacks, the strikes that yet again crippled Chile in the months before his overthrow and the right-wing paramilitary groups that threatened civil war. Meanwhile, the Chilean military expected an inevitable battle with what they later (albeit fantastically) described to be ‘15,000 foreign armed extremists’ and their allies on the Chilean Left.4 Due to their fear of Cubans stationed in Chile, the coup leaders waged battle against the Cuban embassy and chased Cubans out of Chile as a matter of urgency. Subsequently, after overthrowing Allende, one of the junta’s priorities was to seize control of Chile’s international policy and radically reorient it.

It is these international dimensions of 11 September 1973 that are the focus of this chapter.5 This is not a story of decisive intervention from outside masterminding local events. Cuba was frustrated with Allende’s refusal to accept its advice and Washington failed to decisively organise coup plotting. Indeed, it was the Chilean military – not Washington – that decided to act. And despite Cuban preparations to face an armed battle, Allende and the Chilean Left were the ones ultimately unable to defend the revolutionary process they had initiated.

Before examining the coup and evaluating its consequences, however, we must first return to Chile and to Allende’s international relations in the months prior to the coup. In mid-1973, one Chilean diplomat optimistically referred to “an irresistible avalanche” of Latin American and Third World demands transforming inter-American relations.6 As events would prove, Chile’s experience in September 1973 foretold an ominous future for the Left and Third World nationalists around the globe. In the last few months of Allende’s presidency, the stage was indeed set for an avalanche, but it was one that would demolish Chilean democracy for two decades and destroy the chances of socialist revolution in that country and the Southern Cone.
Map of downtown Santiago.
Hesitancy

After Chile’s congressional elections in March 1973, preparations for an impending showdown on the Left and Right had become more urgent. The Nixon administration clearly sympathised with coup plotting. But the United States was frustrated by its progress, especially when a military putsch at the end of June failed to bring Allende down. Meanwhile, US decision-makers debated, disagreed and hesitated about taking a decisive role in plotting or provoking a coup by bankrolling the private sector’s strikes. What concerned those that resisted more involvement was not only the consequences exposure could have for the administration’s standing in the US and abroad, but also the prospect that failure would undermine its three-year campaign to destroy Allende’s government. By contrast, other international actors stepped up their assistance to coup plotters. Indeed, Brazilians most forcefully encouraged and supported golpistas and their civilian supporters, whilst disgruntled Chilean military leaders increasingly looked to Brasilia’s regime as a model.

In the United States, policymakers were cautious not to pin too many hopes on news of coup plotting in Chile. By early May 1973, the CIA reported that plotting was “probably” occurring in “all three branches of the services”, with the Air Force and Navy ready to “follow any Army move”. However, for the time being, analysts acknowledged the military was divided between constitutionalists and golpistas, and that Chile’s constitutionalist Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, General Carlos Prats, would block any move. It was in this context that on 1 May 1973, the Director of Central Intelligence, James Schlesinger, instructed the CIA’s Santiago station to “defer” action “designed to stimulate military intervention”8 Despite avid protest from the CIA’s station chief, Ray Warren, the DCI categorically rejected pleas to reverse his instructions, insisting that Washington needed “more solid evidence” the military would move and that it had political support before acting.9 The exact reason for these instructions is unclear. The British historian, Jonathan Haslam, has argued that the DCI’s instructions were the result of a White House decision to deliberately cut the CIA out so that it could separately arrange a coup. Based on reliable – yet anonymous – interview sources, he suggests that Nixon and Kissinger henceforth gave more secretive assistance coup plotters (especially Naval plotters) through US military attachés in Chile coordinated by General Vernon Walters.10

If Nixon did decide to bypass the CIA, he took a risk because, except for the CIA station in Santiago, government agencies – including the Pentagon – did not rate a coup’s chances. When CIA and State Department officials discussed US covert operations in early June, Nixon’s new Assistant
Secretary of State for Latin American affairs, Jack Kubisch, concluded “a military coup seemed to be a non-starter” due to the lack of determination among plotters and a general Chilean predilection for “compromise”. A CIA representative concurred. Those present also agreed that spiralling domestic criticism of the administration’s covert operations enhanced the risks of greater involvement. Harry Shlaudeman, recently appointed as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Latin American Affairs after being Deputy Chief of Mission at the US embassy in Santiago, reported, “the Chileans were fighting Allende on their own initiative, the decisions were theirs. The little edge that we were giving them with our financial assistance was critical”. Yet he argued that the US was “not and must not get into the position of saving them”.11

The Nixon administration’s fears of failed military intervention in Chile soared, when on 29 June, an attempted coup against Allende failed to overthrow the Chilean government. During the Tancazo, as it later became known, Chile’s Second Armoured Regiment advanced on Santiago’s city centre only to be confronted by General Prats leading loyal sectors of Chile’s Armed forces and Chilean left-wing resistance.12 To the Left’s delight, and the Right’s dismay, left-wing parties had succeeded in distributing arms, silencing the opposition’s radio stations and maintaining communication between themselves and the population.13 Yet, by showing itself as capable and defiant, Chile’s left-wing also gave its tactics for resisting military intervention away.14 Plotters analysed their actions closely while the military ordered infiltration of UP parties and the president’s bodyguard, the GAP.15

Yet in the days and weeks after the Tancazo, US intelligence deliberated the future and how Washington should respond. In a memorandum to the CIA’s Western Hemisphere Division Chief entitled “What now?” one intelligence officer admitted it was hard to predict the next “few months”.16 The Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) also reported that despite an “apparent breakdown in government” that was likely to “encourage…planning”, serious plotting had not “gone beyond the planning stage”.17 By contrast, US intelligence services warned that left-wing parties were arming; if continued “for any length of time”, the situation would favour the UP, one officer reported.18 Over a month later, the situation remained as confused as ever. As one CIA informant returning from Santiago explained, “none of our people has a clear solution to the Allende problem...All feel a sense of frustration”.19 Although the CIA by now had contact with the group of plotters that would launch Chile’s September coup, US intelligence agencies continued to fear that military plotters would hesitate for too long, or that they would eventually compromise.20

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As one CIA analyst speculated in August, “events over the next few months may take a new turn, or – in typically Chilean fashion – the crisis may simply continue”.21

As it tried to find a ‘solution’, Washington avoided Santiago’s desperate pleas and kept up international economic pressures against Allende.22 In his new position as Foreign Minister, Letelier implored the US to resolve financial disputes “rather than wait for…[a] hypothetical successor government”.23 Even the PDC’s ex-presidential candidate, Radomiro Tomic, urged Davis to “come forward with some spectacular gesture” (he suggested tires or 2000 trucks for strikers).24 However, when the World Bank considered issuing a loan to help Allende in July and August, the State Department launched a diplomatic campaign – providing “extra ammunition” where necessary – to block it.25 Although Washington failed to convince all Paris Club members to back its obstruction to the loan, Chile’s creditors also refused to stand up for Chile and, in the end, the World Bank deferred its decision.26 Crucially, for Chile’s international position, European creditors were losing patience with Chile’s inability to meet even rescheduled debt repayments.27 At a Paris Club meeting in mid-July 1973, only Sweden (an observer to the talks) had defended Chile’s request to defer 95 percent of repayments.28 Both hard-line and moderate creditors were “anxious to be repaid”, wary of creating a “dangerous precedent” and insistent on stabilisation programmes in Chile before agreeing to any rescheduling.29

Whether or not economic assistance at this stage would have significantly improved Allende’s chances is doubtful. By August, attention inside Chile and outside it as well was focussed on the military as the key determiner of Chile’s future. At the beginning of the month, the DIA reported that approximately 40 percent of the Army and Chile’s armed police service, the Carabineros, remained loyal to Allende.30 David Atlee Philips, Chief of the CIA’s Western Hemisphere Division, noted that the “key piece in the puzzle” was the Army, the branch of the Armed Forces where the US had the least influence.31 However, in late August, the opposition media, right-wing politicians and army wives launched a vicious campaign against its leader, General Prats, finally encircling his house, brandishing white feathers and labelling him a ‘chicken’ for not supporting military intervention.32 When he finally resigned on 23 August, US analysts clearly held out little hope that his replacement would join the plotters. Certainly, no one in Washington had any guarantees that this man, General Augusto Pinochet, would back a coup, or assume the position he later did. A day after he assumed control of Chile’s Armed Forces, the DIA
described him as lacking in "prestige and influence" and "unlikely to wield...authority and control".33

In this situation, the Nixon administration hesitated. As Allende faced crippling strikes and successive cabinet resignations, Washington pondered whether or not to help strikers and right-wing paramilitary forces to provoke a coup. The US had already given Allende's opposition a total of $6.5 million over the course of the previous three years, but decision-makers were divided as to whether to expand operations.34 On one hand, Ambassador Davis strongly opposed such a course. Chilean left-wing accusations of CIA intervention had risen significantly in July and August, thereby increasing the risks of counter-productive exposure.35 “Now, even more than previously”, Davis had written in early August, “it serves our interest to avoid giving the Allende regime possible pretexts for open confrontation”.36 On the other hand, Kissinger personally challenged why the risks were “unacceptable” and asked for a costing of increased support to the private sector.37 Only when Assistant Secretary Jack Kubisch threatened to resign over the issue did Kissinger back down.38 Finally, on 20 August, the 40 Committee allocated $1 million for Allende's opposition and the private sector on the condition that Davis approved its allocation. But despite ever more urgent attempts to circumvent restrictions by the CIA station and, by this stage, Langley too, the funds were not delivered.39

By contrast, foreign investors in Brazil, Argentina and Bolivia actively supported Chile's private sector and Patria y Libertad.40 Military leaders throughout the Southern Cone were also believed to be actively conspiring with coup plotters. What turned out to be three weeks before the coup, UP officials denounced suspicious military movements on the Bolivian border.41 Since Banzer's coup, the country had been effectively used by the Right to channel arms into Chile and General Arturo Marshall, who had plotted against Schneider in 1970, resided in Bolivia.42 In mid-1973, Patria y Libertad's leader, Roberto Thieme returned to Chile after having travelled to Bolivia, Paraguay and Argentina in search of support. Once in Chile again, he vowed to initiate an urban guerrilla war against the government.43 Brazil's ambassador in Santiago also propositioned Davis about “cooperative planning, interembassy coordination, and joint efforts” to overthrow Allende, which among other evidence led the US ambassador to later conclude he had “no real doubt” the Brazilians supported and coached plotters.44

Although there is no evidence to suggest the US accepted the offer or encouraged the Brazilians, there is also no indication that Washington was critical of them. On the contrary, US
policymakers increasingly emphasised the potential benefits of Brazilian assistance to a future military government. The parallels between an impending showdown in Chile and the Brazilian coup did not escape commentators at the time; the private sector funded opposition parties and paramilitaries, women’s groups aggravated anti-government tension and the spectre of foreign subversion was vociferously played up. Chile’s politicians were also receptive to Brazil’s example. As Washington’s ambassador in Brazil at the time of the 1964 coup later recalled, Frei clearly discussed his belief that Chile needed “a Brazilian solution” with him.

As pressure on the military to intervene mounted, Nixon was embroiled in the growing Watergate crisis in Washington and Kissinger was busy concentrating on his new appointment as Secretary of State. On 6 September Kissinger called Davis to the US to offer him a new position in the State Department. But Davis recalled being desperate to get back to Santiago when reports reaching Washington during his stay suggested a coup might be imminent. Even so, Kissinger kept him waiting two days. “So there’s going to be a coup in Chile!” the new Secretary exclaimed when they finally met. Both agreed obvious US involvement should be avoided.

The Nixon administration’s imprecision and hesitancy to speed up the very goal it had sought for three years in these months is curious. It is conceivable that Davis was called back to Washington to remove him and the obstacles he placed on US assistance to coup plotters, although the obvious implications of this move are unclear. Amidst fears US government involvement could damage Nixon’s domestic standing further, speculation that the military might never move, the chances of failure if it did and the risk of giving Allende a pretext to hypothetically seize authoritarian power, the administration held back. Amidst the CIA Station’s growing frustration and efforts to entice Washington to act more firmly, the White House may well have been secretly intervening along a separate track to facilitate and encourage plotting. If Vernon Walters was in Chile this would confirm greater involvement than the available declassified record suggests. He certainly had enough contacts with Brazil’s military, and experience in aiding coup plotters that overthrew Goulart in 1964, to co-ordinate support to the plotting group with them. But even if this were the case, it is clear that plotting was neither exclusively US-inspired or predominantly Washington driven.

The increasing politicisation of Chile’s Armed Forces leading up to the coup and the growing pressure on its leaders to overthrow Allende grew rapidly in the final months of Allende’s presidency. Fearful of Cuban intervention in Chile, Admiral Ismael Huerta Díaz, wrote in his diary
months before the coup that Chile had become a "tragic" "laboratory" for "foreign ideologies, foreign personalities" that had taken over Chilean politics and institutions to utilize them for experimenting their un-Chilean "theories" of revolution. Pinochet, who was viewed by the CIA and the DIA not only as loyal to Allende but also as an ineffectual golpista, would be the key to the coup's success when it was eventually launched on 11 September. Days after he assumed the role of Commander-in-Chief, Chilean military leaders targeted him and urged him to take action. Pointing to divisions within the UP, and between opposition leaders, they lamented that the "political party had become more important than the country", that "respect for human life" had been lost, and that "the number of foreign extremists active in Chile" had reached "an unsupportable limit". By their very nature, the Armed Forces were "ideologically…antagonistic" to Marxism, the authors of this memorandum insisted, and they signed off by imploring Pinochet to decide on Chile's fate. 

Impending showdown

As Chile loomed towards confrontation, the ambitious domestic and international goals Allende had championed three years earlier dissolved. Already well before the Chilean coup, much of the international Left saw Allende as a hapless victim rather than as a determined challenger of US imperialism. Kissinger's assistant for Latin American affairs wrote on 29 August 1973, "other governments that, at one time, were inclined to look on the Chilean experience as a likely model" were "disillusioned". (During Allende's time in office, Chile's indebtedness had grown by a staggering $800,000 for each day of his government.) Among those deeply frustrated with the progress of La Via Chilena, were the Cubans. Nevertheless, they continued to play a decisive role in Chile as intimate advisers to Allende and Chile's left-wing parties, hoping that Allende would survive. But the quality of their advice was dependent on their influence over the Chileans and the situation they eventually faced. Although Havana had long-since expected Allende would have to face confrontation and had repeatedly warned its Chilean colleagues of this, events did not go according to Cuban plans. By this stage, the Cubans in Chile had become prime targets themselves, thereby limiting their scope of action in the country, their strategies for defending Chile's revolutionary process were frustrated by Allende's guidelines and they failed to detect the coup until it was already underway.
Following the Tancazo at the end of June, the Soviet Foreign Ministry had warned that an “open armed battle” was a serious possibility, but that the UP had no united policy towards Chile’s Armed Forces. Earlier that year, Zhou Enlai had pointedly asked Almeyda about the military when the latter visited China, asking if Allende had “back-up plan”. Almeyda had to admit that he did not. Calls for expanding Poder Popular – ‘Popular Power’ a loosely defined network of worker and neighbourhood-led grassroot organisations – mounted. Yet, the relationship between the government and Poder Popular was ill defined. As Davis had written in mid-May, “While Chilean politics is still by and large played under the old rules these rules are under new challenge.” Speaking to an Italian Communist Party member, Luis Corvalán similarly remarked that the UP had “destroyed a rotten system...which worked”, but had not yet “succeeded in mastering” the situation that replaced it.

In this context, Havana fast-forwarded arrangements for an impending conflict. After the Tancazo, all but a few Cuban women and children were evacuated from Chile. As Luis Fernández Oña remembers, Havana was “super convinced” the military would launch another coup. Consequently, at the end of July, Manuel Piñeiro and Carlos Rafael Rodríguez arrived in Chile to deliver a letter to Allende from Castro. Their presence sparked a congressional investigation and fears about the purpose of the visit. The letter referred to the need for Allende to prepare for confrontation. Yet it is the beseeching tone of Castro’s advice that is most revealing. He implored Allende to face a confrontation head on as the leader of mass resistance. “Do not for one second forget the formidable force of the Chilean working class”, Castro insisted. He suggested that the workers could “paralyse” a coup, prevent vacillation and – if its actions were precise – decide Chile’s fate. Rather than apologise for the Left’s forces, Castro argued, “the enemy should know that it [Chile’s working class] is warned and ready to enter into action.” Castro also reminded Allende that his leadership was “above all...the key to the situation,” and he signed off asking how Havana could help.

It was around this time that Allende asked Cubans to prepare plans for defending the presidential palace and his residency, Tomás Moro. Allende had been clear for two years that in the event of a military attack he would go to La Moneda. Cuba’s immediate concern was the strategic vulnerability of these locations. La Moneda was (and is) a particularly vulnerable low-level building surrounded by taller ones. “From a military point of view, it was a disaster!” and “indefensible”, Oña recalled. If Havana had been in charge of strategic decisions, it would have sent Allende to
lead a prolonged resistance from the outskirts of the city where workers had begun organising themselves to resist an attack.\textsuperscript{63} Castro, it seems, was in no doubt that Allende would “fight to his last breath”, as he told India’s Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi, on the eve of the coup.\textsuperscript{64} But if so, he wanted the president’s final battle to be prolonged and effective.

However, the Cubans could not alter Allende’s determination to confront military intervention from the presidential palace, as president. In the end, Estrada recalled that “it was his country”, and the Cubans “had to respect him”.\textsuperscript{65} However, when Allende showed the Cuban plans to Prats, then still Commander-in-Chief, and General José Maria Sepulveda, head of Chile’s \textit{Carabineros}, he was angry.\textsuperscript{66} In Estrada’s mind, this clearly undermined Allende’s defence and risked leaks to plotters. To date, it is not known whether Pinochet saw the plans when he succeeded Prats or what exactly they proposed. However, the GAP began stockpiling weapons (including bazookas) at La Moneda and Tomás Moro with Cuban help in the months prior to the coup.\textsuperscript{67}

Looking back, Estrada believes that this visible preparation contributed to the power and brutality of the military’s coup. In his opinion, military plotters clearly knew that the means and the will existed to resist any attack and that is why they used such brutal force.\textsuperscript{68}

The Cubans also bemoaned Allende’s indiscretion because it compromised Cuba’s position in Chile. The anti-government press was already stoking fears that Havana was preparing the government to launch a pre-emptive coup. In the early hours of 27 July, when Allende’s naval aide, Captain Arturo Araya, was shot dead, the press instantly – and wrongly – pointed the finger at Oña and members of the GAP.\textsuperscript{69} Havana’s alleged smuggling of arms in boats of sugar that arrived after April 1973, Piñeiro and Rodríguez’s trip and the Cubans’ supposed complicity in the escalation of violence in the country all fuelled propaganda and violent attacks against them. At least 7 bombs targeted Cuban embassy personnel, their business connections, and on one occasion, a school for Cuban children in Santiago in the months before the coup.\textsuperscript{70} Cuba’s trade mission was a favourite target and Havana’s commercial attaché remembers that every night women surrounded his house beating saucepans.\textsuperscript{71} Meanwhile, psychological warfare was employed. “Remember Jakarta”, read one message posted to the Cuban Embassy and painted on walls throughout Chile, evoking the memory of the annihilation of over 500,000 Indonesian Communist Party members in 1965.\textsuperscript{72} By 1973, embassy personnel, including Cuba’s cultural attaché, had received advanced arms training, carried pistols, changed houses at night to avoid vulnerability and some were assigned members of Cuba’s \textit{Tropas Especiales} to guard them.\textsuperscript{73} In late August, when Juan Carretero was called back to
Havana to fortify the Cuban Foreign Ministry’s new Latin American department, Castro sent Estrada to Santiago permanently to take over his post and manage preparations to withstand a coup. Havana also instructed the Cubans in Chile not to allow themselves to be registered by the military checkpoints that appeared across Santiago, a task that became increasingly difficult.74

Although the opposition exaggerated the extent of Cuban involvement in Chile, Havana certainly facilitated Chilean left-wing military preparations. According to Chilean testimonies compiled almost thirty years later, the PS’ military apparatus had received three arms deliveries “from the island” by September 1973, of which exactly half was given to the GAP. These comprised two hundred AK-47 assault rifles, four P-30 submachine guns, eight UZI submachine guns, six Soviet RPG-7 anti-tank rocket propelled grenade weapons (each with nine rocket launchers), thirty-six P-38 automatic pistols, thirty-six Colt pistols and two recoilless guns.75 Estrada maintains that the number of weapons Cuba gave the Chilean Left overall was significantly higher. According to him, the Cubans had delivered a combined total of 3,000 arms to the MIR (before May 1972), the PCCh and PS and, to a far lesser extent, MAPU. In total, he remembered that they also gave armed training to “hundreds” of Miristas and a total of nearly 2,000 Chileans, both in Chile and Cuba.76 Yet even if these latter recollections are more accurate, Castro later privately lamented that the Chileans took “far fewer” weapons than Havana had “wanted to give them”. He explained to East Germany’s leader, Erich Honecker, that weeks before the coup the Cubans had stockpiled “enough weapons for a battalion” in the Cuban embassy comprising of “automatic weapons, antitank weapons” but that when it asked the PCCh to collect them, “they never did”.77 The Cubans also had weapons stored at the embassy and in a safe house for the MIR. Yet there was no clear strategy for distributing them in the event of a coup. Smaller collections of arms were also hidden around the city in locations specified by maps in key leaders’ possession. Indeed, in order to maintain secrecy and security, the Left’s ability to resist the coup was precariously reliant on these key individuals.78

Defying Cuban advice to unite behind Allende, the far Left vociferously advocated confrontation with the opposition and fuelled right-wing fears of subversion. After the Tancazo, the MIR called for “Popular Dictatorship”.79 In August, it also covertly joined Bolivian, Argentine and Uruguayan revolutionaries, in establishing an alliance aiming to launch armed revolution throughout the Southern Cone, the Junta Coordinadora Revolucionaria (Revolutionary Coordinating Junta or JCR).80 Yet the Cubans’ growing disillusion with the far Left led it to
reportedly believe it was, “playing at revolution without any realism.” In early August, the Chilean Navy announced that it had uncovered a left-wing conspiracy within its ranks involving Altamirano, the MIR’s leader, Miguel Enríquez, and MAPU’s leader, Oscar Garreton. The three leaders were subsequently put on trial, but they were unrepentant, insisting that it was the military itself should stand in the dock. The MIR also claimed naval officers arrested on charges of subversion were being tortured (they probably were).

Devastatingly, provocative action on the far Left and the military’s effective infiltration of the left-wing made its preparations transparent. Even before the Tancazo, US intelligence sources reported the PCCh had drawn up new plans for “expanding...military potential”. “The intention is to create, as soon as possible, a network of paramilitary units throughout Chile”, the CIA concluded, noting that “offices and public buildings” would be given “weapons for their defense, or for attack purposes when necessary”. It also knew the party’s “self-defense mechanism” was coordinating with other UP paramilitary groups and that it had been “trained by Cuban security experts”. Later, in early August, the CIA reported PS militants were on “alert 2 status”, one step before an “emergency”. According to US intelligence, this meant they were instructed to remove “all files from PS offices at all levels” and each militant was given a two-digit “codename” that only cell leaders could identify. Those with “paramilitary instruction” were “urged to select persons sympathetic to the party in their neighbourhoods for possible training as neighborhood defense forces.” In the event of an emergency, cell leaders would “contact the militants by telephone or messenger with further instructions”. Indeed, for over a month before September all left-wing centres of potential resistance – factories, schools, neighbourhood groups – jumped between alert statuses ranked from 1 to 3.

On the far Right, the Chilean government’s intelligence sources reported that Patria y Libertad was receiving training from members of the Armed Forces and that meetings between PDC Senators and military leaders were occurring in Air Force hangers. In August alone, right-wing paramilitaries launched 316 attacks and members of the Armed Forces began taking control of Santiago, Valparaiso and Punta Arenas. Meanwhile, the Armed Forces ruthlessly invoked an ‘Arms Control Law’, passed in October 1972, against the Left. By the end of August, violent raids took place every day, hardly touching right wing arsenals. Chile’s Armed Forces also patrolled the streets in Santiago and began registering workers and residents in slums across the country.
Accordingly, the tenor of the far Left’s proclamations rose. Two days before it took place, Altamirano declared that revolutionaries had to ‘strike back’. Referring to Allende and the PCCh’s recent last-ditch efforts to reach an agreement with the PDC, he insisted that insurrection could not be fought “through dialogues”. Instead he exaggeratedly proclaimed the Left had “a combative force which nothing and nobody can contain”.90

In reality, however, the Left’s combative force was far weaker. The Chilean situation was so tense, and the government’s position so weak, that members of Allende’s bodyguard, the GAP stopped carrying weapons just in case they were captured by the military. According to the GAP’s survivors, the group had 68 members by this stage (spread out between Allende’s escort, personnel at Tomás Moro and El Cañaveral). Yet this group believed it would have to shoulder the burden of any resistance to a coup, which they knew the Left did not have the force to contain.91 They later testified that the PS believed it could count on 45 men with armed training, 90 to 100 ‘special operatives’ and between 15 and 20 intelligence agents.92 In this situation, the GAP became openly critical of Allende for having failed to mobilise the population and prepare decisively for an attack. Allende had an anti-insurrectional plan drawn up by the Armed Forces, ‘Plan Hercules’, that would bring 1,000 Carabineros to Santiago to restore order. But this did not count on revolutionary forces.93 On 26 August, the president gathered all members of the GAP together and explained he would not compromise the people’s mandate he had been given.94

But Allende clearly recognised the precariousness of his situation. Three days after he met the GAP at El Cañaveral, Allende cancelled his much-anticipated trip to the Non-Aligned Conference in Algiers and the possibility of visiting five additional African nations (Zambia, Tanzania, the Republic of Congo, Zaire and Guinea).95 Earlier, he had expressed enthusiasm about attending and his hope of combating Third World dependency. “We think that the Non-Aligned countries represent economic and political potentials of great significance”, he wrote.96 But now he informed President Boumedienne of Algeria Chile’s situation was “serious” and that imperialism was helping those who attacked his government.97

Since joining two years earlier, Chile’s prestige within the movement had grown. At a preparatory conference in Kabul earlier in 1973, Santiago had been assigned the task of preparing selected papers for Algiers. In mid-August, representatives from twenty countries also met in Santiago to discuss the implications of foreign investment and sovereignty over natural resources.98 Chile also pushed for the movement to establish economic security mechanisms to deal with cases
of economic aggression. Instead of Allende, Almeyda represented Chile at the conference in Algiers. As chair of the Foreign Minister’s economic committee he was regarded to have “substantially changed” the “final form, if not substance” of economic resolutions reached at Algiers, which formed the basis for the Third World’s subsequent demand for a New International Economic Order a year later. However, behind the scenes, Boumedienne spoke of Chile’s peaceful road to socialism as being nearly over. He told his Chilean guest that as far as he could tell, Chile’s Armed Forces would intervene sooner rather than later. Allende clearly feared the worst but was seemingly calm. Nine days before the coup he told family members that he was prepared to die if need be. He invited a Chilean historian to La Moneda to discuss the story of the Chile’s left-wing reformist President José Manuel Balmaceda who had committed suicide in 1891 when his progressive reforms had failed. He also gave cases of his private papers to Luis Fernández Oña so that he could send them back to Cuba for safe-keeping or burn in the event of a coup. And Allende personally advised his doctors to make sure their families had contingency plans and passports prepared. On 8 September 1973, Allende’s closest friends, including Estrada and Oña, gathered at El Cañaveral above Santiago to celebrate his daughter, Beatriz’s birthday. On this evening, Allende played a game of chess with Prensa Latina journalist, Jorge Timossi, who recalls the president remarking that the situation was “ugly” and that he was “running out of pawns.”

Unbeknownst to Allende and the Cubans, on the day they assembled at ‘El Cañaveral’, Pinochet agreed not to oppose a coup. When the CIA received news on this day that military intervention was imminent, its station warned there was still a chance that Allende could manoeuvre his way out of the “most serious threat” he had faced. But it also surmised that Allende’s “time could run out” if he did not know he was “facing a 10 September deadline”, which crucially he did not. On 9 September, Captain Gustavo Leigh and Pinochet signed a note that Admiral José Toribio Merino sent them agreeing that the coup would actually take place on the eleventh. “This is our last opportunity”, Merino wrote, indicating to Pinochet specifically, that if the latter did not rally all Santiago’s forces to this cause from the first instance, they would “not live to see the future”. The next day, Monday 10 September, the US embassy – having been told that the coup would take place the next day – stood by cautiously ready to help. Having returned to Santiago the day before, Davis told Washington he had advised the Chilean Navy the embassy was “flexible and
ready [to] satisfy any requirement” with regards to pre-scheduled US-Chilean Naval exercises due to take place the next day. “At this moment”, Davis wrote, “our best posture is to continue about our business … US initiative would be difficult to explain and probably misinterpreted”.111

During Monday 10 September, Chile’s Armed Forces successfully batted away government enquiries about troop movements.112 Based on rumours Moscow had picked up in Western capitals about a coup, Corvalán made a number of phone calls. But he reassured the Soviet embassy this was a “false alarm”.113 Although the Cubans were frustrated by the PCCh’s belief in the constitutionality and loyalty of the majority of Chile’s Armed Forces, they also had no information a coup would be launched on the eleventh. The stumbling block between expecting a coup and knowing it would happen was Pinochet. Like US analysts, the Cubans and their Chilean allies had never suspected he would be one of the coup leaders.114 Both the PS and the PCCh leaderships agreed he should succeed Prats and the Left trusted him. Allende had even invited him to El Cañaveral in mid-August for a barbeque where he had mingled with members of the GAP and participated in a shooting contest with Allende. As one of the GAP’s members who was there recalled, no one imagined what would happen next.115

As night fell over Santiago on 10 September, US officials were expectantly waiting to see what would happen. On this evening, “a key officer...planning to overthrow President Allende” finally asked a US official if Washington “would come to the aid of the Chilean military if the situation became difficult” but the official refused on the spot commitment.116 Across town, Allende and the Cubans all went to bed unaware what awaited them. Oña and his wife, Beatriz, were uncharacteristically at home rather than at Tomás Moro because their daughter Maya was sick and they had decided not to leave her at one of the safe houses they frequently used.117 When news of troop movements towards Santiago from Los Andes military base reached Allende and his closest advisors gathered at Tomás Moro at around nine o’clock that evening, they made a number of calls to the very military leaders who were waiting in the wings to intervene and were assured nothing was abnormal. “We would not have slept for months if we had had to attend every rumour”, Allende said, and having finally been placated with the story that troops were only mobilising in case of disturbances at Altamirano and Garreton’s Naval conspiracy trial the next day, he went to bed at 2.30am.118

The Chilean Left was not only unaware that a coup was being launched until it was too late, but it was also hopelessly unprepared to face the military onslaught that followed. No plans to
launch a pre-emptive strike existed and estimates of left-wing armed units ready to seize control of
the country were wildly exaggerated. The power potentially ranged against them was vast; Chile’s
Armed Forces numbered 87,000 in 1973. The left-wing’s military preparations were also
uncoordinated and severely weakened by the arms raids in the weeks leading up to the coup. There
also does not appear to have been a joint Cuban-Chilean plan to defend the government. Rather,
there was a general expectation that the Cubans would assist if the time came. Although their
embassy remained a central point of reference to the various sectors of the Chilean Left, in the
context of fragmented left-wing planning, the Cubans had become dislocated and unable to direct
any decisive countermeasures for a coup. Ultimately, Havana’s role depended on Allende to take
decisive action to unite these forces and request the Cubans’ help. But this never came. “The only
option was to try and arm the popular forces”, Castro later told Honecker; “Naturally it would have
been dangerous, but it was more dangerous to do nothing...For the enemy was mobilized, the
fascists were mobilized, and the masses were nowhere to be seen because the government had not
mobilized them”. In trying to prepare the Chilean revolutionary process for a military attack,
Havana contributed to the radicalisation of Chile’s situation. Certainly, evidence that the Left was
arming, and the Cubans were helping, frightened military leaders. As Merino’s message made clear,
those who prepared to crush Chile’s democracy believed the coup they launched would be a matter
of life and death.

The Avalanche

At 1am on 11 September, Washington’s Defence attaché in Santiago reported that the morning was
“apparently the planned time for a coup attempt” but suggested Allende might still be able to see
off the crisis. But how? The contingency plans the Left had drawn up depended on forewarning
so that advancing troops could be cut off before they reached La Moneda. By dismissing news of
troop manoeuvres and trusting in military leaders, Allende missed an opportunity to pre-empt the
somewhat nervous plotters. The Cubans’ logistical room for manoeuvre was also restricted. Their
embassy was strategically vulnerable, which made it easy for paramilitaries and soldiers to cut it
off. The Cubans, therefore, had no easy way of distributing the arms they had been stockpiling for
the MIR, or of leaving unscathed. Meanwhile, Allende fulfilled the promise he had made two years
earlier when Castro visited Chile that he would only be removed by La Moneda riddled with bullets.
However, if what happened was not completely unexpected, the way this happened – the ferocity with which it took place – certainly shocked Allende’s government and the world beyond.

Just before 6am (after the Chilean Navy took the Chilean port of Valparaiso), Estrada was informed of the military’s actions by telephone. He immediately left for the embassy where he set off a chain of phone calls around Santiago conveying the code word, “lapis”. This meant that a military coup was underway and Cubans were to leave their houses immediately. There was not even enough time for Cuba’s commercial attaché to collect sensitive documents or money from his office. Estrada also alerted Altamirano and the Communist Deputy Chief of Police Investigations, Samuel Riquelme. According to Estrada’s recollection, both had some trouble grasping the magnitude of what was happening. Estrada also spoke to Miguel Enriquez, to inform him that Cuba would not immediately be able to distribute weapons to the MIR.

By 7.30am, approximately one hundred Cubans had arrived at their embassy. The building was sealed off, arms were distributed and most embassy personnel assumed assigned defensive positions. By this date, the embassy was a fortress awaiting siege. It was treated as Cuban territory, and hence it was to be defended “until the last man”. From the outside it looked like an unassuming adobe house dwarfed by taller buildings. But inside it had amassed food supplies, the building’s swimming pool had been concreted over to conceal a tank of water, and in a recently dug cellar Cubans had stockpiled basic medical supplies to cater for the wounded and quicklime to hide the smell of any decomposing dead. In all, they calculated they had provisions to last a month. Meanwhile, a group of Cubans (as yet, its size is unknown) prepared arms and transport to leave for Chile’s presidential palace to fight beside Allende.

Across town, Allende arrived unscathed at the presidential palace at 7.30am carrying the gun that Fidel Castro had given him that he would later use to commit suicide. Twenty-three members of the GAP accompanied him and between them, they carried a collection of arms, including AK-47 assault rifles, an indeterminable number of sub-machine guns and two or three bazookas. Having gradually gathered that all three branches of the Armed Forces were acting together and that he could not count on the Carabineros to defend him, Allende issued a radio broadcast at 8.45am explaining that the situation was “critical”. But to those who were listening he proclaimed he had “no alternative” but to defend the Chilean revolutionary process and fulfil his mandate. He warned those “who wished to turn back history and ignore the will of the majority in Chile” that he would take no “step backwards”. Inside the presidential palace, documents were burnt as a matter of
priority, arms were distributed and defensive positions were assumed\textsuperscript{130} Over the next hour and a half, a strange mix of the GAP, the President’s closest advisers, government ministers, doctors and journalists assembled and just before 9am, Beatriz arrived.

When she did, her father asked her to call the Cuban embassy and instruct Cubans not to go to La Moneda. In Allende’s mind, this was to be a Chilean conflict, and aware that the world was watching, he did not want a battle between the Cubans and Chile’s Armed Forces at the presidential palace.\textsuperscript{131} Around this time, Miguel Enríquez also called Allende and offered to join him, but the president responded that the MIR should fight in the streets as it had been pledging to do.\textsuperscript{132} Even if the MIR or a group of Cubans had set out at this point, it uncertain whether they would have reached La Moneda. One truck containing members of the GAP and arsenal never arrived.\textsuperscript{133} Later that morning, when the MIR offered to go to the palace and take Allende to lead a resistance from the outskirts of the city, Beatriz explained that Allende would never leave the palace.\textsuperscript{134} After the junta broadcast an ultimatum at 9.30am that if he did not leave by 11am, the palace would be bombed, Allende stood firm.\textsuperscript{135} Reflecting on the tension that had built up in Chile prior to this day, Beatriz recalled that her father “felt a certain sense of relief that this moment had arrived”. He felt “freed from the uncomfortable situation” of being “president of a popular government” while “the armed forces used the so-called Arms Control Law to oppress workers”.\textsuperscript{136}

Yet, although he was clear what his own position was, the position Allende expected the workers to take, was less obvious. In his last radio message, broadcast at 9.10am, Allende had seemingly improvised an elegant farewell to the Chilean people conveying a vague message of restraint and resilience:

\begin{quote}
The people must be alert and vigilant. You must not let yourselves be provoked, not let yourselves be massacred, but you must also defend your conquests. You must defend the right to construct through your own effort a dignified and better life…These are my last words and I am certain that my sacrifice will not be in vain, I am certain that, at the least, it will be a moral lesson that will punish felony, cowardice and treason.\textsuperscript{137}
\end{quote}

Inside La Moneda, Allende assumed a metal helmet and took personal charge of distributing weapons and ammunition. Those that accompanied him knew that they faced a battle that they were unlikely to win but only as the morning progressed did they come to fully understand the extent of the awesome power ranged against them. At 9.15am, there was an exchange of gunfire between
soldiers stationed outside the palace and those within it, which grew fiercer when tanks arrived at La Moneda and began firing on it at 10am.138

At around the same time, back at the Cuban embassy – which kept abreast of developments via telephone contact with the palace and Prensa Latina offices opposite La Moneda – two unarmed members of the MIR, one of whom was the president’s nephew, Andrés Pascal Allende, managed to reach the embassy. Upon arriving, they demanded to be given at least some of the MIR’s arms. However, Estrada, who was effectively in charge of operations, believed this would have been “irresponsible”. Between 10 and 11am, around 50 members of Patria y Libertad had closed off the embassy’s cul-de-sac with burning Mobil petrol drums.139 Estrada’s decision was therefore based on his fear that any such arms would be seized. Only because others did not hold this view, did the two members of the MIR leave the embassy with two donated pistols to defend themselves and somehow (it is not clear how) manage to survive.140

By midday, 200 soldiers from Chile’s armed forces surrounded the embassy, occupying neighbouring buildings and cutting it off completely.141 Accordingly, Estrada ordered the embassy’s radio plant and its codes be destroyed in case the building was overrun. Similarly, documents were burnt (with candles); if and when the Cubans needed to leave Chile, they needed the thirty crates these were stored in to smuggle their own weapons out of the country.142 Later, in the embassy’s backyard, Ofna also set fire to Allende’s private papers.143 The embassy also communicated with Chileans holed up at the Cuban ambassador’s residence by phone, which was surrounded by Patria y Libertad with at least one bazooka pointed at it from a workman’s hut outside.144

Throughout the morning, Chile’s population listened to the junta’s radio declarations to learn what was happening (government radio station were silenced by the Air Force). US embassy personnel were also listening, waiting either for Allende to resign or La Moneda to be bombed. Having arrived at the embassy diagonally opposite the palace, Davis sent regular reports to Washington detailing events and news he received from the radio.145 Across town, at his residence, Davis’ wife and daughters were also glued to the radio. Just before midday, Hawker Hunter jets passed overhead. Davis’ wife later remembered:

It was an eerily beautiful sight as they came in from nowhere. The sun glinted on their wings. There were only two. Still in formation, they swung gracefully through the sky in a great circle, and then they tipped and dove...one bomb each...then, a gentle curve upwards...146
Those inside the palace faced the grim reality of those ‘eerily beautiful’ bombs. Moments before the bombing, Allende had forced women to leave the building. The group that remained took whatever cover it could with a limited number of faulty gas masks. For twenty minutes, the palace was hit by at least 8 bombs. Then, over the next hour and a half, the resistance exchanged fire with the military, using two bazookas against the tanks. Yet their efforts, together with sniper fire from pro-government forces in the Public Works building next to the presidential palace, were in vain. Just before two o’clock, the Army stormed the building and found Allende dead.

Despite preparations over the course of three years to defend the government in exactly this situation, the Chilean Left crumbled when the coup struck. The PCCh’s newspaper, _El Siglo_, heard of the military’s intervention just in time to order readers to their “combat position!” But many did not know where they should go. Still uncertain of the nature of the situation they faced, leaders from the PCCh, the PS and the MIR had met at 11am to decide what they should do. But they could not agree and the arms in their possession were limited. Enriquez, unable to access Cuban arms, believed he could assemble 400 militants by four o’clock but calculated only 50 would be ready for combat.

A key problem for the UP’s parties was that communication broke down. The Cubans explain this breakdown as the responsibility of party leaders, and a consequence of the compartmentalisation of trained militants. According to Cuban accounts, one PCCh leader also failed to alert militants of the location of stored armaments. At five o’clock, Estrada also fiercely rebuked Altamirano when he called the embassy to enquire where the MIR was fighting so that he could join them. Not only had Altamirano called on an open telephone line, but Estrada also believed it was very late to be organising the armed resistance that he had been recklessly boasting about.

The Cubans were also too tied up with their own difficulties to be able to offer more assistance. At least two gun battles ensued between the Cuban embassy and Chilean Armed Forces on 11 September. The fiercest took place at midnight when Oña attempted to leave the embassy so he could escort Allende’s wife and daughters to the ex-president’s innocuous burial in Viña del Mar. Despite prior arrangements with the military and explicit instructions for him to leave the building for this purpose, troops opened fire on Oña when he opened the door. Timossi recalls a Vietnamese diplomat who witnessed the battle telling him that he had never seen professional
armed soldiers running backwards as fast as the Chilean troops did on that day. Eventually, the military called a ceasefire and Ona left. The losses suffered by the Chilean military are still unknown. On the Cuban side, two Cubans, including the ambassador, were wounded.

The vindictive targeting of Cubans by Chilean military and paramilitary forces is revealing in terms of their priorities and fears. Throughout 11 September, coup leaders threatened to send tanks and jets to bomb the embassy. A Cuban merchant vessel, Playa Larga was also heavily attacked by sea and air near the port of Valparaiso. When the military raided factories and neighbourhoods, they hunted down all foreigners as a matter of priority. But no other embassy faced the same pressure as the Cuban embassy. The Soviet embassy was surrounded briefly a day after the coup but escaped the military’s wrath. Transcripts of Pinochet’s conversations with the coup’s other leaders on the day of the coup also reveal that Allende’s ties with Cuba were influential in determining his mindset. He personally insisted on inserting a clause into the military’s radio declaration pointing the finger at “foreigners who have assassinated our people”, and at “foreigners who have intervened here on our territory”. Amidst organisations for Allende’s burial he had also commented that the body should be “put in a box and loaded onto an aeroplane, that the burial take place elsewhere, in Cuba.”

The junta immediately broke off diplomatic relations with Cuba, urgently wanted the Cubans to leave Chile and were quite clearly afraid of engaging them in confrontation. Although the Cubans also wanted to leave, they did not trust the military to guarantee their safety and they wanted to safeguard their interests in Chile. Thus whilst Cuban diplomats bombarded foreign embassies worldwide to demand “safe conduct” for their colleagues, frantic negotiations went on in Havana and Santiago to organise their departure. What concerned the Cubans was how to safeguard the arms they had stored for the MIR, how to take their own arms with them without them being discovered and how to protect Max Marambio, a Mirista at the embassy on the day of the coup whom the military refused to let leave.

Eventually, Havana entrusted Sweden’s Ambassador, Harald Edelstam, with Cuban interests. When this left-wing Swedish aristocrat, with experience of covert operations during World War II, arrived at the embassy, Estrada led him down to the cellar where the Cubans had stored the arms they wanted to distribute to the MIR. Estrada remembers that although Edelstam was shocked at the quantity, his attitude was “magnificent”. He immediately agreed to protect Marambio, safeguard the arms and help distribute them as soon as possible. For the time being, he
covered the cellar’s trap door with a sofa and vowed to sleep on it.167 Meanwhile, on 12 September, the Cubans collected documents and money from Cuba’s commercial office, rescued those that had not been able to get to the embassy from their safe houses and packed their empty diplomatic crates with Cuban arms.168

Cubans later recalled it was pure luck that a Soviet plane was at Pudahuel airport to fly them out of Chile.169 It was only because Soviet personnel were neither vulnerable or being asked to leave that they could donate their plane. The only other country the junta immediately broke relations with was North Korea on the grounds that these two countries had “actively intervened in internal national politics”170. Although the discovery of North Korean arms at Tomás Moro served as the pretext, Pyongyang’s leaders knew nothing about the weapons (the Cubans had brought North Korean weapons into the country because the USSR and Eastern Europeans had put restrictions on Cubans donating their weapons to Chile).171

Cuba’s three-year mission in Chile thus came to a disastrous end far more abruptly than the Cubans themselves had anticipated. Their improvised escape and the extensive embassy preparations for withstanding a prolonged struggle reveal that the Cubans had never expected them to have to abandon the country like this. On 13 September, 142 Cubans and a few of their intimate Chilean friends landed at Havana’s international airport. Although Fidel was in Hanoi, Raúl Castro and Cuban President, Osvaldo Dorticós, embraced them while foreign ambassadors stationed in Havana and hundreds looked on.172 Yet Havana had slim hopes that the coup in Chile would be reversed. Although Marambio and Edelstam, together with Argentine Monteneros clandestinely in Chile, delivered approximately 300 arms to the MIR in the weeks after the coup, these did not offer any decisive solutions to the desperate situation Chile’s left-wing faced. The junta’s fear that the Cubans could lead mass resistance, nurtured over the course of three years of psychological campaigns to play up Cuban involvement in Chile, were exaggerated. Even with prior knowledge and unity, it is far from certain whether a few hundred (or even a few thousand) partially trained militants could have resisted the combined military force of Chile’s Armed Forces. In the weeks after the coup, 7,000 prisoners were held in the National Stadium and, in the first three months of the dictatorship the new regime killed 1,200 more.173 Even the CIA acknowledged that the junta “planned” “severe repression” to “stamp out all vestiges of communism in Chile for good”.174
New Friendships

One week after the Chilean coup, Cuba’s representative at the United Nations, Ricardo Alarcón, labelled Nixon the “intellectual author” of the military’s intervention. Chile’s new regime certainly looked like Nixon’s most-favoured ally in Latin America, Brazil’s dictatorship. But as one external observer noted, there was a “major difference”: “the level of oppression…Chile’s military junta has not only utilized the experience of Brazil but leapfrogged the early experimental stages of the Brazilian process”. Washington played a role in encouraging the new Chilean dictatorship to learn to the lessons from Brazil. Indeed, although their intervention was probably not needed, US contingency planners had been examining ways of persuading a hypothetical military regime to seek close relations with Brasilia even before the Chilean coup took place. Meanwhile, policymakers in Washington – among them, the previously reticent Davis and members of the State Department – also paid considerable attention to how to ensure a potential military regime succeeded.

The day after the coup, the State Department instructed Davis to discreetly convey Washington’s “desire to cooperate” and “assist” the junta. As Kissinger himself privately argued, “however unpleasant”, the new government was “better for us than Allende”. Over a month before the coup took place, intelligence analysts had predicted that Allende’s “demise” would be “psychological setback to the cause of doctrinaire socialism in the hemisphere” and that his successors would “be favourably disposed toward the US” and to foreign investment.

Pinochet also wanted to “strengthen…friendly ties with the US” and contacted the US embassy in Santiago on 12 September as a means of doing so. He had clearly not communicated his plans to Washington before and, notably, he now played up Allende’s alleged pressure on the Army to purchase Soviet equipment as a lever to extract adequate assistance. US officials were impressed with what they saw. On 14 September US intelligence sources noted somewhat belatedly that he was “decisive” and “prudent…the priority concerns are to restore order and economic normalcy. Political reform apparently will wait”. The DIA also later described him as “very businesslike. Very honest, hard working, dedicated”. Davis went as far as to call him “gracious and eloquent”.

The embrace US officials gave Pinochet was predetermined even before Washington became acquainted with him. Predicting a violent confrontation between coup leaders and UP supporters, the US had primarily wanted to ensure that the military would succeed in defeating its
opponents. On 1 August, CIA analysts had noted, “repressive measures would be necessary” to quell “strikes, demonstrations, and other forms of protest”. A “favourable” scenario they listed was one in which “after some, perhaps considerable, bloodletting, Chile could eventually achieve a greater measure of political and social stability”.184 By early September, the US’ Ad-Hoc Interagency Working Group on Chile had concluded that “a united military could control violent resistance” but warned that this would not be assured if thousands of armed workers seized factories and marched downtown. Accordingly, the US was willing (though at this late stage still not completely ready) to step in by providing riot control equipment, supplying Chile by military airlifts (from Panama), food and other “minimum essential” assistance. On 8 September, the Working Group urged items already requested by the Chilean military under FMS credits be delivered rapidly. So as to lessen charges of supporting coup leaders, varied and complex scenarios were simultaneously explored to see how the US could respond positively to expected requests for foodstuffs and financial assistance. The Working Group calculated that the new government could not “possibly succeed without very substantial external help” and recommended the US be “prepared...through special congressional action if necessary, to provide substantial additional resources”.

As predicted, after 11 September, Chile’s new regime asked Washington for help. Davis concluded that the Chilean military ascribed to a National Security Doctrine that prioritised economic stability and a “healthy social structure” as essential pillars of defence. “[U]nder the broader interpretation, most recently enunciated by former army CINC general Carlos Prats”, the ambassador observed, “officers [had] looked on in anger as they saw the Allende government plunge Chile into economic disaster and increased foreign dependency, and watched the UP parties and extreme left elements actively seek to undermine traditional military precepts of discipline and chain of command.”186 After Allende’s overthrow, military leaders were explicit about what they needed to create this ‘healthy’ society. Top of their list was equipment – 1,000 flares, 1,000 steel helmets, portable housing – to put down resistance to the coup, equip draftees and deal with the large numbers of prisoners they detained. The Chilean Air Force also asked the US to send medical supplies. In sharp contrast to his worries about precipitating a coup before it took place, Davis now advised Washington to “accommodate” requests, albeit as “discreetly as possible”.187 Meanwhile, Orlando Saenz, a Chilean businessman who had led strikes against Allende with influence in the new regime approached a US official in Nairobi. He spelt out that Chile needed $500 million until
the end of 1973 ($200 million for imports, $300 million for debt payments) and indicated that the new government sought credits from US banks as well as “very” confidential talks with US copper companies.188

Washington delivered as much assistance as it deemed possible without attracting undue attention and condemnation. On 21 September, Foreign Minister Admiral Ismael Huerta expressed his “deep appreciation” when Washington agreed to send an airlift of supplies worth $100,000.189 Kissinger also privately conveyed his support for the junta to Huerta when the latter visited the UN in mid-October 1973. US policymakers underlined their intention to be as “helpful as possible” in arranging meetings with New York banks.190 When Kubisch met Huerta on 12 October, he promised the “widest collaboration” and later that day Kissinger expressed his “best wishes...for the success of the Chilean government”.191 Huerta also recorded the new Secretary of State as stating, “emphatically that US policy would not be modified by mistaken information in the press”, which condemned the military regime’s brutality.192 When Pinochet approached Davis in Santiago on the same day, emphasising that Chile was “broke” and needed “help getting on its feet”, the ambassador “reiterated assurances”.193

By the end of October 1973, Washington had given Pinochet a loan of $24 million for wheat purchases (eight times the total commodity credit offered to Allende’s government) and in 1974, Chile – which accounted for 3 percent of Latin America’s population – received 48 percent of US ‘Food for Peace’ (PL480) grants to the region.194 In the three years that followed, Chile assumed a preferential status in Latin America as a recipient of 88 percent of US AID’s housing guarantees and was granted $237.8 million by the Inter-American Development Bank. Pinochet’s government also became the fifth best customer of US military equipment.195

The CIA also established close ties with the military regime’s new security and intelligence services. In early 1974, General Walters, by then, Deputy Director of the CIA, invited Manuel Contreras, the head of Chile’s new secret policy agency (the DINA), to Washington where in the latter’s words he learned about “how to do national intelligence”.196 As the former Washington Post correspondent, John Dinges, concludes, the US also had an “amazingly complete and intimate details” about the regional counter-revolutionary terrorist network comprising of six Southern Cone dictatorships that Pinochet formally established in late 1975 under the name ‘Operation Condor’.197

The United States had clearly not expected the Chilean military to be as ideologically driven or effective as authoritarian leaders. Back in August 1973, intelligence analysts had noted that they
were “not as politically minded” as their Brazilian or Peruvian counterparts and had questioned their ability due to the “difficulty” they had faced “in formulating a coordinate plan to overthrow Allende”. Indeed, three days before the coup, the Interagency Group on Chile commented there was, “no indication of any widespread sense of ‘mission’ among the Chilean military to take over and run the country”.

To instil such a ‘mission’ among Chile’s military leaders and to ensure that they received the necessary equipment to carry it out, Washington encouraged the junta to collaborate with Brazil. This was also a way to reduce pressures on – and exposure of – US assistance. Before the coup, US policymakers had suggested that if the Chileans asked for “easily identifiable US equipment – ie. helicopters etc.”, Washington “would first seek to encourage support from other Latin American countries – Brazil”. Immediately after the coup, US policymakers re-emphasised this, noting that “for financial and technical as well as political reasons”, the US should lead “part of a larger effort of various international and other sources of assistance”. Surveying other Latin American countries that might be “disposed” to help, analysts predicted that Brazil would be “particularly important because of its likely ideological identification with the new GOC and its substantial and growing economic strength.”

When Davis conveyed US desires to assist the new Chilean regime with countering “urban terrorism”, he insisted “Chile’s Latin American friends” had “considerable experience…in this area” that the junta could draw on. Similarly, Huerta recorded Kissinger as insinuating to him that Chileans should acquire military equipment in Brazil if it was needed “urgently”. And as Davis observed in late October, “in regard to third country channelling of aid”, Pinochet was “showing considerable understadint [sic]”.

Southern Cone countries were predictably inclined to help. Pinochet later recalled that the Brazilian Ambassador in Santiago personally extended recognition to the junta early on 11 September. “We won!” Canto reportedly exclaimed. The Brazilians then offered the Chilean junta immediate help with suppression, working as advisors to the new regime, as well as interrogating and torturing prisoners themselves in Chile’s National Stadium. The Brazilians in Chile especially targeted Brazilian exiles. Meanwhile, Brasilia conducted an immediate review of how to extend lines of credit, reportedly offering the junta, “significant economic assistance in the near future…$50 million or more” days after the coup. Bolivian newspapers also reported the expulsion of 315 Bolivian ‘leftists’ from Chile. And US diplomats reported that in context of over 300 Uruguayans in Chile, a group of hard-line military leaders in Montevideo were hoping the
Chileans would “take care” of the Tupamaros. Without any US coordination, planes from Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia Uruguay and Ecuador arrived with provisions for the new regime days after the coup.

Chile’s neighbours also did their best to bolster the incoming regime’s international standing together with Washington. When Huerta appeared at the UN in October 1973, Brazil’s permanent representative at the organisation helped draft his speech. Days after the coup, the State Department had sent instructions to Santiago, emphasising that Chile would need to defend itself eloquently in international forums. Subsequently, a Chilean Foreign Ministry spokesman told Davis that the new regime was “deeply appreciative” for advice on this matter. In the months that followed, the US also helped launch a propaganda offensive justifying the junta’s actions. But overall, according to Davis, Pinochet showed “sensitivity to the need for both US and GOC caution in development of overly close public identifications”. The dictator informed the US ambassador that he would send Chilean civilian leaders to the US to alleviate “Chile’s public image problem”.

The junta had expected to be applauded in Latin America and the West for its battle against communism but found itself isolated and condemned. Chile’s new ambassador in Washington surmised that the US public’s hostility towards the new regime was not just about the junta, but rather the result of ongoing battles between Congress and the Executive in the context of Watergate and Vietnam. Indeed, in the immediate aftermath of the coup, Nixon dismissed press speculation that the United States was involved in the coup as “crap” and Kissinger moaned the “filthy hypocrisy” of those that condemned the new military regime. “In Eisenhower’s day it would have been celebrated!” he bemoaned. It was an “absurd situation where we have to apologize for the overthrow of ... a government hostile to us”, he privately complained. Yet, at the time, Kissinger acknowledged he had to be cautious about what he said. “To get in to this [Chile], even in executive session,” Jorden counselled, “will open a Pandora’s box... once a precedent of discussing CIA activities before the Foreign Relations Committee is established, no programs in other countries will be immune”. What followed in 1974 and 1975 – the publication of two Congressional reports Covert Operation in Chile, 1963-73 and Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders – confirmed his fears. As on scholar has since argued, henceforth US foreign policy suffered from a “'Chile syndrome' – supplementing the Vietnam syndrome of national reticence to US military intervention in distant lands”.

194
The coup had dramatically altered Chile’s place in the world as well as Cuban and US positions in Latin America. In the Southern Cone, Allende’s hopes of redesigning the inter-American system backfired completely. Instead of continental revolution, growing ranks of counter-revolutionary forces emerged from the ruins of the left-wing tide of the 1960s and the early 1970s to create a new anti-revolutionary order in the Southern Cone. This shifting regional balance of power provided more than a backdrop to events in Chile. It was a directly related – though by no means exclusively – to Allende’s election, presidency and demise. A month after the junta came to power it had bilateral, and multilateral help from the US and conservative forces in the region. Washington had got what it had wanted from the start of Allende’s presidency: it had helped ensure victory in the mortal struggle to determine Chile’s future and keep Latin America firmly within the US’ backyard. As Davis noted a month after the coup had taken place, “grosso modo Chile has been shunted out of the column of left-leaning Third World admirers of the Soviet Union.”

Conclusion

The international history of Allende’s overthrow is a far more complex story than a simple case of ‘who did it?’ To appreciate its significance we need to ask why foreigners got involved in the battle for Chile and with what consequences for that country, the hemisphere and beyond. A confluence of local and international actors driven apart in a battle between socialism and capitalism shaped the Chilean coup in 1973. Although neither Chile’s victors or vanquished were manipulated from abroad, the decisions they made were directly conditioned by what they perceived to be an international battle going on within their country and region. Indeed, instead of being the decisive turning point in the defeat of revolution in the Southern Cone, the Chilean coup was one pivotal moment in a larger counter-revolutionary wave beginning in mid-1960s. As a senior member of Cuba’s Communist Party argued after the Chilean coup, to understand the rise and fall of Allende’s Chile, one needed to understand what the Americas and world situation looked like in the early 1970s.

US intervention in the final months of Allende’s presidency was a messy reaction to events on the ground rather than a simplistic tale of the White House masterminding the Chilean coup. Considering the fragmented direction of US policy at this crucial moment in Chilean politics and in US-Chilean relations overall, it is not surprising that historians and commentators alike have
agonised over the United States’ direct responsibility for the coup itself. In fact, a number of key questions remain unanswered and may never be solved such as Walters’ involvement.

However, what we now know is even less palatable than Nixon and Kissinger working alone to overthrow Allende. Once a military coup or the fall of Allende’s government seemed a decided possibility, the whole Nixon administration took calculated decisions to help a repressive military dictatorship survive and consolidate its hold over its citizens. Washington also enthusiastically propounded a continental support system between similar dictatorships. More than any smoking gun that proves US responsibility for the coup, contingency planning before it took place and the actions that followed tell a far more uncomfortable story of willing complicity throughout Washington’s foreign policymaking establishment in securing the junta’s dictatorship and encouraging the formation of a regional right-wing network.

Meanwhile, the story of Cuba’s role in Chile before the coup took place, and as it unfolded, is one of growing frustration, despair and impotency. The Cubans who participated in events suggest that if Havana had been in charge in 1973 (or even earlier for that matter) it would have made different, better, strategic decisions. In what Castro perceived to be a zero-sum game between revolution and reaction, Havana advocated a life and death struggle that, however costly, would eventually lead Chile and Latin America closer to socialism. The alternative, as far as the Cubans were concerned, was decisive defeat and untold suffering. Thus, while Allende preferred to symbolically sacrifice himself at La Moneda instead of mobilising his supporters to fight a bloody civil war, the Cubans were willing to risk the consequences of fighting back. Although many of the Chilean Left shared the analysis of what needed to be done, Havana knew that uniting the Left by this stage would be near impossible and that without Allende on board to lead a resistance struggle, the possibilities of it succeeding would be slim. Crucially, however, Allende did not ask the Cubans to intervene.

However, despite their certitude that the coup was coming, the Cubans misjudged Pinochet and failed to pre-empt the coup. It is impossible to tell what would have happened had Cubans been able to change the course of Chilean events. More effective resistance to the coup may well have put off the counter-revolutionary onslaught as Havana had hoped and Washington feared. But the result of civil war would have been scores of casualties and destruction; probably even more than the junta unleashed. Moreover, as it turned out, it would seem that rather than dissuading the coup leaders to act, the growing possibility of a left-wing combative force, the spectre of Cuban
involvement in preparing it and the prospect of an impending showdown propelled them to act. Their targeting of the Cuban embassy and all foreigners, factories and poor neighbourhoods, together with the ruthlessness with which they did so, illustrates the wildly exaggerated fear of what the Cubans and the Left could achieve. Indeed, for the Chileans on the Left and the Right, the coup was conceptualised as a struggle between life and death. In the event, the sheer imbalance of forces, the military’s ability to attack without being detected, the Left’s fragmentation and its lack of preparation determined who won.

In the week before the coup, it was perhaps Allende who saw with most clarity what awaited him (if not his country), He had, indeed, run out of chess pieces to outmanoeuvre his opponents. As he fought his final battle, he was amazed by the traitorous actions of some of his military commanders and shocked by unified power ranged against him. But he was also certain about what he would do and convinced that once dead, he and his presidency would acquire a new universal significance for revolutionaries and democrats around the globe.
Conclusion

In his last radio address on 11 September, Allende mentioned history four times. He summoned it as a moral judge against those who overthrew him and looked forward to history’s eventual and inevitable progress towards socialist revolution.¹ Allende’s sense of history, and his place within it, was a crucial factor in explaining why he went to La Moneda and why he committed suicide instead of resigning. Turning to those that accompanied him as the aerial bombardment of La Moneda started, Allende proclaimed this was, “how the first page of history is written. My people and Latin America will write the rest”.² His belief in history’s pre-determined path spurred him on to believe that his failure to bring socialism peacefully to Chile would only be a temporary setback on the inevitable road to revolution; “Sooner rather than later”, he promised, “the great avenues through which free men walk to build a better society will open”.³

In the end, however, the path of history was not his to decide. Chile’s transformation on 11 September 1973 was a painful wrench from the past that would only begin to unravel when the country returned to democracy in 1990. In the Southern Cone tens of thousands were murdered and disappeared by right-wing dictatorships during the 1970s and 1980s. And rather than the worldwide “pre-eminence” Allende had promised to restore his country to in 1964, Chile acquired infamous notoriety.⁴ Latin American, socialist, liberal and Third World leaders condemned the military’s brutality.⁵ In India, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi maintained that Allende had befallen a danger “common to all developing countries” of “external forces and domestic elements colluding together”.⁶ Meanwhile, from Berlin to Tanzania, Paris to Rome, and Montreal to Honduras, fingers pointed at Washington rather than Chileans as the architects of the coup.⁷

Rejecting Allende’s aims, the military regime that succeeded him prioritised economic growth over equality, installing a neo-liberal economic structure that is largely still in place today. The junta returned over 200 state-owned firms to private hands (half of those nationalised by Allende) and welcomed multinationals back. Then, following a slow and precarious start, Chile’s economy grew at an average annual rate of 7 percent between 1976 and 1981.⁸ As they had done in the case of Brazil’s military regime, outsiders praised the junta’s economic record when compared to what had gone before. Other Latin American leaders – together with growing numbers of Third World states – also increasingly accepted
IMF stabilisation measures in return for US assistance and re-doubled their reliance on external loans. But quantitative gains hid qualitative failures. During the late 1970s, inequality soared and the region became indebted beyond all reasonable means of paying its creditors back.9

In retrospect, Allende’s overthrow only days after the Non-Aligned Conference in Algeria seemed to spell out an ominous future for the global South’s hopes of transforming international economic relations. Prior to this, Chile had contributed to the growing economic orientation of the Third World. With the majority of former colonial areas of the world nominally independent by the 1970s and with Cold War tensions apparently diminishing, the Third World focussed increasingly on guaranteeing economic security for its member states and re-writing the rules of international economic relations as a means to definitive political power. Indeed, after Algiers, the global South formally demanded a New International Economic Order (NIEO) in 1974. As one participant recalled:

The Algiers summit was a sort of watershed...It was the high point of awareness of their own potential; of their conviction that they had no option but confrontation with the forces that opposed them; and of their burgeoning belief that the fragility of détente would expose them increasingly to interference, subversion and worse. East-West rapprochement had restricted peace to the prosperous countries of the world, while the economic condition of the developing countries sharply deteriorated, with the exception of the oil-producing areas.10

Despite contributing to the radicalisation and fight for economic independence in the Third World, Allende became an example not of what the global South could achieve but a patent example of the constraints the global South faced in an inflexible world system. By the 1980s, the NIEO had collapsed amidst divisions in the Third World, the intransigence of developed industrial nations and a staggering debt crisis and global recession.

As the majority of its allies in the Third World turned to market reforms, the Soviet Union placed even greater emphasis on forging ties with growing right-wing market economies. By the late 1970s, Argentina and Brazil were the first and second recipients of all CEMA aid to the Third World.11 With the exception of Soviet-Cuban relations, the ideological component of Moscow’s ties with Chile during the Allende years and its decision to sever relations with the junta stood out as different to ongoing and developing ties with right-wing dictatorships throughout in the Americas. A week after the coup, the Soviet Union’s desire to
assume a leading role in mourning Allende’s death within the international communist movement and the West, combined with the relative insignificance of Soviet-Chilean economic relations, led Moscow to break relations. However, Moscow’s leaders were cautious about holding the US accountable for Chilean events. In the months that followed the coup, Anatoly Dobrynin, the Soviet ambassador in Washington, appears to have approached US officials privately to exert leverage on the junta on only one issue, the release of Chilean Communist Party leader, Luis Corvalán.

The Chilean coup provoked introspective discussion throughout the communist world. Debates focussed on what Allende’s overthrow meant for strategies of winning power and building socialism. Soviet analysts ascribed the coup primarily to the Chilean Left’s mistakes (and particularly those of the far Left). Yet, together with the PCCh, they also concluded that a revolution needed the means to defend itself, which led them to focus on armed struggle within Chile during the 1970s and 1980s. In Western Europe, where the UP’s victory had initially been enthusiastically welcomed as a potential model, Allende’s failure provoked division regarding the lessons Communist Parties should draw. In Italy, the Secretary General of Italy’s Communist Party, Enrico Berlinguer, laid out a new strategy for ‘Historic Compromise’. His ideas – that the Left would have to make concessions to the centre, work within institutional structures and embrace pluralism as an end in itself – were heavily shaped by the UP’s experience. Elsewhere, the Portuguese Communist Party concentrated on its relations with the armed forces as a means of resisting ‘another Chile’ after the unexpected fall of Portugal’s dictatorship in 1974. Thus, Kissinger’s earlier fears that Allende would spread communism to Western Europe seemed to come alive anew now driven by the implications of Allende’s death. He warned the Spanish Foreign Minister that the Communists would “try do move quickly because they’ve learned from Chile that if they move too slowly we will do something…it’s suicide just to let events take their course”. Indeed, the Soviets used the same reasoning when they invaded Afghanistan. In 1980, Brezhnev explained that “to have acted otherwise would have meant leaving Afghanistan prey to imperialism, allowing the forces of aggression to repeat in that country what they had succeeded in doing for example in Chile, where the people’s freedom was drowned in blood”.

Instead of allowing events to take their course in Latin America in the early 1970s, the US had very successfully bolstered counter-revolution without making any significant
compromises on developmental assistance. A week after the Chilean coup, Kissinger told Mexico’s Foreign Minister that he wanted a “more active” US Latin American policy. However, the new Secretary of State privately agreed with his predecessor, Dean Rusk, when the latter suggested that by merely “flattering” Latin Americans ("take them [Latin American Ambassadors] on a boat ride, give them some drinks"), Kissinger could offset charges of US neglect for development concerns in the hemisphere. According to Assistant Secretary Kubisch, Kissinger “confessed he really didn’t know much about Latin America” when he took up his post at the State Department, and scheduled weekly meetings over three months to “learn” more. In October 1973, Kissinger also initiated a ‘New Dialogue’ for the Americas, calling upon “friendly nations” to advance “co-operation”. Referring to “dramatic changes” in the United States over the past decade he acknowledged that the US could no longer “overpower” its “foreign policy problems” as it had in the past. “[W]ithout understanding”, he added, “we can do very little”. Behind the scenes, however, Kissinger resisted Latin American demands to transform US regional policy, compromise on issues of economic assistance, promise non-intervention or give preferential access to US markets. As Kubisch recalled, the idea of the ‘New Dialogue’ had been to show “things were once again going along very well between the United States and Latin America, there was great rapport, great understanding”. Compared to 1970, Washington had certainly had a new mutual understanding with the Southern Cone, where it nurtured dictatorships and encouraged their crusades against the Left.

On the other side of Latin America’s Cold War divide, Allende’s overthrow had disastrous implications for Cuba’s hope of revolution in Latin America. Reflecting on “recent setbacks” in early 1974, Manuel Piñeiro warned that “even harder times” awaited revolutionaries. He warned DGLN officers that imperialism was “moving, changing its façade and maintaining a strategic offensive in Latin America that is sometimes called a fascist coup and at other times called the New Dialogue”. In three short years, Allende had died, Torres had been overthrown, Uruguay’s Tupamaros were on the run, and even as Havana set up an embassy in Buenos Aires after the re-establishment of Cuban-Argentine relations in mid-1973, the Cubans predicted a return to military dictatorship was not far off. The Chilean coup, therefore, strengthened rather than created a growing counter-revolutionary wave already sweeping the Southern Cone.
Henceforth, Cuba’s leaders concluded the region did not have objective conditions for successful revolution. When far Left revolutionary movements in the Southern Cone moved from Chile to Argentina in November 1973 to kick-start continental insurgency, Castro was reluctant to help, reportedly calling the *Junta Revolucionaria Coodinadora* “a waste of time”.

Indeed, by 1975, the CIA calculated that Cuban support to insurgent groups was at its “lowest levels since 1959” and that “Havana [saw] external military intervention – a war between Peru and Chile for example – as the only possible, though somewhat unrealistic way of unseating Chile’s military government”. Speaking privately to Allende’s doctor after the coup, Piñeiro certainly dismissed hopes of reversing Chile’s coup for at least a decade. Surveying the situation throughout the region after Allende’s death, Piñeiro promised that historical progress could not be “erased by torture or other crimes”. But with implicit reference to *La Via Chilena*, he also dismissed socialism could triumph with “reformist formulas, such as ‘bloodless revolutions’”. Quoting Castro, he argued “revolution and social change require[d] a revolutionary dictatorship”. As seen from Cuba, Allende’s overthrow proved that the rules of revolution involved discipline, intolerance of opposition and military fortitude. In April 1974, Piñeiro instructed that more than ever there was a need to “channel any doubts...through the party; and declare an open war on liberalism, using the Marxist-Leninist principle of criticism and self-criticism to cleanse our ranks”.

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Cuba-Chile strategy meeting, post 11 September 1973, Cuba. From left to right around the table: Fidel Castro, unidentified, Ulises Estrada, Manuel Piñeiro, Beatriz Allende, Luis Fernández Oña, Carlos Altamirano.
In Latin America, Castro worked with the regional dynamics he confronted. Havana had not lost everything in the region when the Cubans fled Chile. Allende’s re-establishment of relations with Cuba in 1970 had signalled the beginning of the end of Castro’s isolation in the hemisphere. Prior to and during Cuban involvement in Chile’s revolutionary process, Havana was simultaneously developing a more complex and multifaceted regional policy. By July 1974, Piñeiro explained to DGLN employees that Cuba was now “employing flexible tactics”; it would be “childish” not to take advantage of the fact that sectors of the national bourgeoisie in the region were “adopting attitudes that clash objectively with U.S. policy” due to their “secondary economic contradictions with imperialism”. Piñeiro argued that forming relationships with these actors favoured revolutionary progress by promoting “organization, strengthening and preparation for the final battle to seize political power.” Havana undoubtedly exaggerated the outcome these clashes could have. Yet by 1975, OAS sanctions against Cuba had been lifted and Havana had new relations with Panama, Venezuela and Colombia. Added to relationships established with Peru and Argentina in 1972 and 1973 respectively, these new openings in the hemisphere brought substantial financial rewards (Argentina granted a $1.2 billion credit to Cuba in August 1973). As one informed observer of Cuba in the 1970s argued at the time, Castro’s revolution had “come of age and, learning from its mistakes under Soviet influence” had “become increasingly pragmatic and institutionalised…the romanticism of the 1960s has apparently come to an end”.

However, the Cubans’ pragmatism by no means meant that it rejected principles of revolutionary internationalism. After less than 150 Cubans left Chile in 1973, it was in Southern Africa where Cuba’s international role was most extensive, dramatic and successful. With slim prospects for revolution in Latin America, Castro redoubled Cuba’s already substantial assistance to Africans fighting for independence and socialism. Between 1975 and 1976, he sent 36,000 Cuban soldiers to fight alongside the MPLA in Angola’s civil war, followed by 16,000 to aid Ethiopia in 1978. Africa had certainly not been the Cuban leaders’ priority when they seized power in 1959. However, partly as a result of their disappointments in Latin America, and partly as a result of the particular circumstances in Africa this is where, far away from home, they were able to make the most decisive impact on the struggle against imperialism.
As the battle between the United States and Cuba continued in Southern Africa first, and then with renewed vigour in Central America during the 1980s, Cold War tensions rose once more. Along with the bloody wars that followed, human rights and a competition between capitalist and socialist economic models of development in the Third World also took centre stage in a new phase the battle between East and West. Within this context, the international battle for Chile – a sliver of land nestled far away from either superpower – came to prominence as a lesson in a new phase of this global confrontation even if the lessons people drew from Allende’s Chile depended on who they were and what they wanted to learn. “Distant and small though it is”, one of Kissinger’s advisors told him in 1974, “Chile has long been viewed universally as a demonstration area for economic and social experimentation. Now it is in a sense in the front line of world ideological conflict”.

In examining Allende’s presidency within its regional and international context, this thesis asked how and why Chile acquired such profound international significance during this period, what implications *La Via Chilena* had for the world and how international actors and global trends affected developments within Chile. As previous chapters have shown, Allende’s international impact was not merely a condition imposed from outside, but also a consequence of the Chileans’ own worldviews and foreign policy. Allende enthusiastically invited outsiders to look at Chile as an example of socialism being attainable by peaceful democratic means. Later, he asked for their support in resisting outside pressure and surviving a frontline battle in a global struggle against capitalism for social justice, equality and liberty. Like Castro before him, Allende sought to safeguard his revolution by changing the world rather than sacrificing his cause.

But Allende was optimistic. From the outset his attempt to assert Chile’s independence was doomed to suffer from the limitations of being a weak and economically dependent state and a revolutionary country in the United States’ backyard. His most direct challenge – the ‘excess profits’ ruling – was perhaps the United States’ greatest asset in being able sustain its hostility. More broadly, by trying to revolutionise Chile and transform its international relations he antagonised the forces he wished to overthrow without establishing any effective means of consolidating power or defending himself. Although Allende knew he faced an uphill struggle, at least initially, he appears to have disregarded his instinctual distrust of the United States and the experience of successive US anti-democratic interventions in Latin America. He also
appears to have placed a great amount of faith in the potential strength of the Third World to change the world’s economic system.

Allende’s optimism can be explained by examining the hopeful situation in Latin America and the world in the early 1970s, and by understanding Allende’s belief in the power of Chile’s revolutionary road. Allende was clearly not alone in hoping to change the world or in believing that the global South’s future was marked out by a progressive march towards a more equitable, just and dignified future. One commentator observed that during the 1960s and early 1970s, Third World leaders had an “almost mystical belief in the utility of global conferences”. More importantly, the examples of Cuba and Vietnam appeared to prove that it was possible for smaller revolutionary states to challenge the United States and survive. And Allende believed that he had a significant advantage over these two states when it came to avoiding Washington’s hostility: his constitutionality. Armed with the legitimacy of his democratic victory and his convictions regarding the force of historical progress, he believed that he could change the rules governing US hegemony in Latin America, gain compensation for past exploitation and avoid reprisals through persuasion. He and the majority of his government knew they had to placate Washington, reassure regional powers and play down his support for hemispheric revolution. However, the era of détente persuaded them that Chile’s reasoned rebellion would be far more likely to be understood and accepted than previous examples of rebellion before him. Far from the Soviet bloc and surrounded by military regimes, Allende therefore insisted on avoiding open confrontation, managing disputes and playing for time and space to consolidate La Via Chilena.

However, Allende’s policies failed disastrously to stop US aggression towards Chile. In a limited fashion, the UP constrained the United States’ hostility through able diplomacy. Within the Paris Club, the US cooperated with debt renegotiation out of fear that to do otherwise would allow Allende to rally support against Washington at home and attract international support. But whilst Allende and the Chilean Foreign Ministry gained time and tried to manage its confrontation with Washington rather than face it head on, Santiago lost its initiative to embarrass the Nixon administration into changing its policies. Overall, Allende’s foreign policy was often contradictory and more often than not an ad-hoc response to the situation he encountered. By depicting his struggles against Washington as one with ‘universal’ significance, Allende lost the ability to claim that nationalisation policies, for example, were
isolated, economic issues rather than a broader geo-political challenge to the United States. Furthermore, the Latin American and Third World unity he sought as the basis for collective strength proved elusive. As Allende’s experience demonstrated, the world in the 1970s was still very much dominated by 'vertical' ties between the developing world and the superpowers. And Allende had neither the advantage of attracting the favours of both East and West, nor the leverage afforded by belonging to either Moscow or Washington’s camps.

US policy towards Chile was driven by a profound fear that Allende posed an ideological threat to the United States in its global struggle against communism. Even before Allende had even been sworn in as president and before his nationalisation policies were clear, the White House was bent on overthrowing him and unwilling to even contemplate accommodation as it believed in the potency of communism to bring about irreversible change. As Kissinger wrote before he became National Security Advisor to Nixon, the US faced an "age of revolution" and had to treat "a series of more or less unrelated upheavals" as part of the same global threat. “The temptation is great to treat each issue as an immediate isolated problem which once surmounted will permit the fundamental stability of the international order to reassert itself. But the crises...are symptoms of deep-seated structural problem...the age of the superpowers is nearing its end".39

In this era of challenges, Washington tolerated nationalism and even a degree of anti-Americanism but only if it was essentially rooted in capitalism. The Nixon administration saw the world divided into two broadly defined parallel tracks for structuring society, economics and politics. On one side lay capitalism either in various guises of liberal democracy or authoritarian dictatorship. And on the other side lay communism of whatever sort, be it a dictatorship of the proletariat or, as in the case of Allende, a pluralistic liberal democracy. As far as Nixon was concerned there was little possibility of altering the pattern of logical progression along either track, which would ultimately lead Latin America (once ‘mature’ enough) towards the United States or towards the Soviet Union. As one who Nixon admired, trusted and listened to, General Vernon Walters, later explained, “authoritarian rightist regimes always disappear eventually. They have never been able to perpetrate themselves. Communist regimes, once they seize power, never let it go.”40 Of course, the mistake the Nixon administration made in Chile, was to disregard Allende’s commitment to constitutional government and the anomaly of La Vía Chilena.
Washington’s Cold War battle against communism magnified the nation’s quest for influence, profit and prestige that had shaped its approach to the region before 1945. It was clearly also formulated by leaders who believed in their racial and cultural superiority to save the Latin Americans from themselves. As we have seen, these assumptions and instruments of dominance shaped its Cold War battle in the hemisphere during the early 1970s. Through economic influence and military schooling, by taking advantage of Latin Americans’ dependency on trade and aid from the US, and by fuelling local conflicts with money and propaganda, successive presidents mobilised regional allies to fight against communism, and bolstered murderous regimes as the good guys in a simplistic heroes and villains reading of continental affairs. As US policy towards Allende shows, factors of financial investment and strategic control were important, and Nixon clearly sympathised with the Department of the Treasury’s concerns regarding expropriation. But ultimately, Nixon feared communism as a contagious ideological project of which nationalisation of industry and state control of the economy were crucial ingredients of an all-encompassing ‘poison’, as Nixon put it.

By looking at the Nixon administration’s approach to inter-American affairs as a whole, the nature of the US’ policy towards Allende and the motivations behind it become clearer. The separate concerted efforts it made to curtail left-wing advances in the region were part of one whole. Despite the White House’s lack of interest in Latin America, prior to Allende’s election there was a moment of soul searching within the Nixon administration regarding how to recalibrate Washington’s position in the hemisphere and to lessen hostility towards it. The year before Allende was elected, Assistant Secretary for Latin American Affairs, Charles Meyer, had stated that in Latin America, “dissent among friends is not a disaster”. Allende’s problem was that he was never considered a friend. Indeed, the State Department’s subsequent policies demonstrate that dissent was only open to non-Marxist nationalists. After Allende’s election, even the more moderate and nuanced analysts in the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs reverted to anti-communist stereotypes for Allende. As Meyer’s prognosis of the Chilean situation in November 1970 or Davis’ avid support for the junta after 11 September show, it was by no means only Kissinger, Nixon, the CIA and hard-line military officials who wanted Allende overthrown and increasingly believed the ‘solution’ to his democratic government lay in the military.
It is impossible to understand the Chilean coup without understanding its hemispheric and international context. In looking outside Chile to other regional powers, local actors found inspiration, but also dread of what they wanted to avoid. The influence of Cuba and Brazil – the two extremities in regional politics – served to polarise and radicalise Chilean politics. Chilean actors saw the mirror image and power of their foreign enemies in their local opponents. Allende regarded his opposition within Chile to be servicing the interests of US imperialism while those who fought against his government saw the UP’s leaders as Soviet stooges and Cuban agents. Indeed, both the Left and the Right conceptualised themselves as nationalists fighting to return Chile to Chileans. Allende pictured himself as freeing Chile from US capitalist exploitation. Pinochet justified outlawing Marxist parties by blaming the “foreign doctrine of Marxism” for having driven Chile to chaos. In this context, the opposition media’s skilful manipulation of Cuba’s role in Chile helped by funds and intelligence feeds from the CIA (false and true), were highly effective in drumming up fear among an already highly charged and divided population.

Cuba’s revolutionary credentials, the belief of others in those credentials, and Allende’s association with Havana ironically undermined Chile’s revolutionary chances. From the moment that Allende was elected, Castro was conscious that the Chilean leader would have to tread carefully and that his own association with La Via Chilena could undermine Allende’s chances. But especially when he saw Allende running into difficulty, Castro believed that caution had to be accompanied by determined force to defend the revolutionary process and push it forward – at the risk of exposure and death if need be. From 1970, he accepted that revolution had to be slower than he had previously hoped, but he also recognised it could achieve nothing if not first guaranteeing safety. However, the Cubans’ strategies in Chile to ensure that Allende could govern safely, failed due to their inability to control the Chilean situation they faced and the actors they worked with. Those in Chile willing to take up Castro’s advice and eager for Cuban assistance did so in an uncoordinated way, aggravating tension in the country and undermining Allende’s position. Meanwhile, the Cubans stood firmly by their mandate of supporting Chile’s democratically elected president. Indeed, Castro’s decision not to subvert Chilean sovereignty meant that the Cubans eventually had to leave Chilean revolutionaries to their fate in accordance with Allende’s wishes.

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Relations between Castro and Allende were a logical expression of both leaders’ ideals and the manifestation of more than a decade of intimate ties. Both shared a commitment to socialism as a means of solving the problems of underdevelopment and inequality and were bound by the belief that the United States’ exploitation of the region’s resources had undermined progress and independence. Allende admired Castro and felt humbled by his example, was inspired by Cuba’s defiance of US pressure and determined that Chile would become the second ‘free territory of the Americas’. He also believed that in a global struggle between rich and poor, exploiters and exploited, he and Castro were fighting the same cause against the same enemies forging a “vanguard of a process that all Latin American countries” and “exploited countries” would eventually follow. By exploring the relations between Castro and Allende, it therefore no longer seems adequate to talk of Cuban ‘intervention’, but rather, we must begin to explore how Havana’s own ideological goals ‘interacted’ with those of other actors in the region. As well as formulating a foreign policy towards Latin America based on ridding the region of US economic and political dominance, it was also an inspiring alternative for those that wanted to break the chains of dependency on Washington. Like other revolutionary leaders, Allende went to Havana to seek support, recognition and inspiration, joining a collection of democrats and dictators, civilians and military leaders, nationalists, revolutionaries, Soviet style communists and extremist guerrillas. Peru’s non-Marxist military ambassador in Havana after 1972 described Castro as a “lighthouse that illuminates, gives faith and hope to oppressed peoples of the world who struggle for their liberty and their independence.” Although the lessons these leaders took away were as diverse as the nature of their goals to begin with, they all went to marvel at the only Latin American country to have wrestled with the United States and survived.

However, Allende was never prepared to conform to Castro’s prescriptions in Chile. The Chilean leader was an advocate of socialist revolution and a determined challenger of US imperialism before Castro had even reached adolescence. Although he was deeply impressed by Che Guevara, invited Tupamaros and Cuban revolutionaries to his weekend home and carried the rifle Fidel gave him to La Moneda on the day of the coup, he was a committed democrat dressed in a formal suit and stubbornly wedded to Chile’s proud constitutional history. Thus, when Castro argued Allende’s road to socialism was unlikely to succeed if the president did not learn the right lessons from history – and in particular, Cuba’s history –
Allende refused Castro's advice. Increasingly, therefore, the intimate relationship between Havana and Santiago became an intense debate regarding the best means of bringing about socialism. Castro and Allende stood poles apart on questions of winning power, retaining it and converting it into progressive systems of government. And however 'mature' and less impulsive, the Cubans who were involved in Chile during these years came from very different experiences to their Chilean colleagues, having spent their formative years fighting guerrilla warfare in the Sierra Maestra and participating in revolutionary struggles throughout Latin America. Perhaps because of these experiences, and their direct encounters with US sponsored tyranny in the region, they saw far more clearly what lay ahead than the Chileans they worked with. As Ulises Estrada explained, "revolutionaries fight to live. We are not afraid of death and this is why we do not die". Yet in Chile, on 11 September, Allende determined he did not want the Cubans (or Chileans that matter) to pay the ultimate sacrifice in defending Chilean democracy.

Washington's disrespect for democracy during these years effectively diminished Allende's chances of success by undercutting Chile's economy, bolstering his opposition and boosting an effective psychological campaign against the UP. The United States' long-term anti-communist policies in the Americas - the training and indoctrination of thousands of military leaders to think of security in terms of a global struggle against communism and combating internal subversion - also bore fruit in Chile, where Washington successfully courted military leaders. But as the scholar, William Sater, has argued, it is "patronizing to argue that a professional military, keenly aware of the government's nationalist traditions and jealous of its autonomy would become a passive instrument of a foreign government". Kissinger later remarked to Algeria's President Houari Boumediene that the world gave the United States "too much credit" for the coup. As US analysts themselves observed, economic instruments were not nearly as effective as Washington expected they would be for undercutting Allende's democratic legitimacy. As the previous chapters have demonstrated, the United States was unable to shape Chilean politics as easily as it wanted to, was consistently frustrated by the Chileans it worked with and worried about the consequences of failure. In the end, US policymakers' worries wildly exaggerated the potency of Allende's ability to survive. The UP's public disintegration and lack of a unified strategy of building socialism, countering their opposition either politically or militarily was devastating. As Kenneth Maxwell and many
others have argued, in relation to the story of Allende’s overthrow, “this story cannot be told only in terms of US involvement”.47

Re-examining the story of Allende’s government from different perspectives demonstrates clearly that Washington was not the only pivot around which inter-American relations revolved. However, historians’ ability to understand the broader dimensions of the Cold War struggle in Latin America in more detail will ultimately depend on the declassification of documents in the region, particularly in Cuba and Brazil. When this happens, it is hoped this thesis will act as a springboard for further research in a number of key areas. Firstly, beyond the ‘the Chile chapter’, Castro’s policies towards Latin America, and Cuba’s interaction with hemispheric developments, clearly need further examination and explanation. Secondly, historians need more information about the other extremity of Latin America’s Cold War, namely the right-wing military leaders who took up arms against the Left and the relationships between them. Both the Cubans and the Americans that led foreign policy towards Latin America during this period witnessed a clear solidarity between military leaders in the hemisphere founded on a mutual distrust for civilian politicians and a shared analysis of the region’s threats.48 Thirdly, to understand the early late 1960s and early 1970s, we need to know more about the nationalist states in Latin America that stood between Cuba and Brazil, like Mexico and Peru. Not only would it be interesting to understand more about how Lima and Mexico City saw Allende as affecting their own aims, but it would also give us a better understanding of attempts made during this period to integrate Latin American with Third World movements.

Finally, future research into the international history of the global Cold War needs to be directed more broadly towards a greater understanding of how different areas of the global South affected each other. Rather than understanding events in Latin America as a sideshow to the international developments in the early 1970s, it is important to appreciate the interaction between different regions of the world and the part they played in larger global trends. Not only does this help us comprehend what lay at the core of trends like détente and the growing North-South divide in world politics from the perspective of the great powers, but it also explains the relevancy of Nixon’s pursuit of ‘world peace’ and the Third World’s struggle for economic and political development for other areas of that globe. As this thesis has demonstrated, the Cold War ideological struggle between socialism and capitalism was fought in southern areas of the
globe by peoples of the South for reasons pertaining to the global South such as economic progress and development, justice, freedom and dignity. Rather than separate entities, the North-South struggle and the East-West divide affected each other and determined the way they were fought. The goal for historians is to understand the coincidence of these two trends in international relations, the growing role played by Latin America in Third World politics during the early 1970s, and the way in which local conflicts in one area of the world such as Chile impacted on the thinking and actions of regional actors far from their shores.
Endnotes.

Introduction


3 Allende, Interview with Peter Gzowski, 4 September 1970 published as “Election Day Interview with Canada’s CBC Radio”, AR, p.44.


6 Memorandum, Kissinger to Nixon, 5 November 1970, Box H029, National Security Council Institutional Files, Nixon Presidential Materials Project, College Park, Maryland, USA [Hereafter NSCIF/NPMP].

7 Intelligence Note, State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), “Chile’s Popular Unity—A Model for Others or a unique experiment?”, 30 June 1971, Box 2196, Record Group 59, (General Records of the Department of State, Subject and Numeric Files, 1970-1973), National Archives and Record Administration [Hereafter: RG59/NARA].


16 J.G Blight and P. Brenner, *Sad and Luminous Days: Cuba’s Struggle with the Superpowers after the Missile Crisis* (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2002).


20 Gleijeses, *Conflicting Missions*, pp.377-8. Gleijeses claims that less that forty Cubans fought in Latin America during the 1960s compared to over one thousand Cubans who went to Algeria, Zaire and the Congo, and Guinea-Bissau.

21 ibid., p.23.


26 Haslam, Assisted Suicide, pp.75, 126, 153.

27 Ibid., p.230.


33 Most accounts of US intervention in Chile acknowledge a plan to isolate Chile diplomatically but do not go further. See Covert Action, p.27 and Kornbluh, Pinochet File, pp.82-87.


40 On the “Brazilianization of Chile” and Brazilian involvement see G. MacEoin, *Chile, The Struggle For Dignity*, (London: Conventure, 1975) and Davis, LTY, pp.331-333.


47 Gleijeses, *Conflicting Missions*, p.221.


49 To date, the Chilean historian, Joaquin Fermandois, has conducted what is the most comprehensive survey of the period, drawing on interviews, Chilean archival documents and published material, Fermandois, *Mundo y Fin de Mundo*. On Soviet-Chilean relations see Miller, *Soviet Relations with Latin America* and O. Ulianova, “La Unidad Popular y el Golpe Militar en Chile: Percepciones y Análisis Soviéticos”, *Estudios Publicos*, vol.79 (2000). Another invaluable examination of the UP’s foreign policy conducted by ex-Chilean diplomats and scholars with documents is *La Politica Exterior Chilena Durante el Gobierno del Presidente Salvador Allende 1970-1973*, edited by J. Vera Castillo (Santiago: Ediciones IERIC, 1987) [Hereafter: PEC].


56 Alejandro Cid as quoted in Quiroga, *Compañeros*, p.63.

57 S. N Grovogui, “Postcoloniality in Global South Foreign Policy” in *The Foreign Policies of the Global South*, pp.32, 46.

58 For a detailed examination of Chile’s copper industry and successive efforts to gain control of it, see Sigmund, *Multinationals*, pp.131-178.


Allende, 1944, as quoted by J.E. Garcés, Prologue, OE-SA, p.22.


Allende, 1944, as quoted by J.E. Garces, Prologue, OE-SA, p.22.


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Colburn, Vogue of Revolution. By his definition of revolutionary transformation, Colburn does not include Chile in his list of Third World states that underwent successful revolutions but his analysis of the intellectual mentalité that revolutionary elites around the world adopted is particularly useful for understanding the ideas that Chilean revolutionaries drew from, pp.5-6, 8-9.


Almeyda, Speech to OAS General Assembly, San José, Costa Rica, 15 April 1971, PEC, p.432


All online documents have been accessed over the period 2003-7. Documents belonging to the ‘Chile Declassification Project’ can be located by date after selecting declassification tranches and using the ‘List All’ function.


Documents from this period have not yet been indexed. At present they are filed by document type (Oficios, Telex, Aerogram), classification (Confidenciales/Ordinarios), direction of correspondence, (Enviados/Recibidos), country and year.


With very few exceptions, all interviews conducted by the author were taped. When interviewees preferred interviews not to be taped, detailed handwritten notes were taken at the interview and then immediately afterwards. As with all other documents, translations are the author’s own.

On the best account of Cuba’s role to date as seen from non-Cuban perspectives, see Haslam, *Assisted Suicide*.


On underlying questions see Miller, *Soviet Relations with Latin America*, pp.127-9.

On the burning of Allende’s papers see author’s interview with Luis Fernández Oña, 16 December 2004, Havana [Hereafter: Oña Interview (2)] and Soto, *El Ultimo Dia*, pp.69-70, 73.

Dinges, *Condor Years*, p.41.

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Author’s Interview with Luis Fernández Oña, 2 May 2006, Havana. [Hereafter: Oña Interview (6)] and Estrada Interview.


Chapter One: From Mature Partnership to Mortal Struggle.

1 Memorandum, Vernon Walters to Kissinger, 3 November 1970, enclosure, Memorandum, Kissinger to Nixon, 5 November 1970, Box.H029/NSCIF/NPMP.


Nixon to Daniel P. Moynihan, 7 October 1971, Conversation: 116-10/Nixon White House Tapes/NPMP.


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Agenda Annex, “The Setting for policy Choice”, enclosure, Memorandum, NSC Staff Secretary, Jeanne Davis, to the Vice President et al., 13 13 October 1969, Box.H040/NSCIF/NPMP.


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34 Author’s interview with Luis Suárez Salazar, 10 December 2004, Havana, [Hereafter: Suárez Interview (1)], Berrios, “The USSR and the Andean Countries: Economic and Political Dimensions”, p.349.
37 Castro, Speech to Plenum of Basic Industrial Workers, 9 December 1970, CSD.
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41 Memcon, Mario Campora, Argentine Embassy and Robert I. Funseth, Coordinator of Cuban Affairs, DOS et al., 9 April 1970 and Memcon, Igor D Bubnov, Counselor, Soviet Embassy, Vladimir A Romanchencko, First Secretary, Embassy of USSR, Lev. C Ilyin, First Secretary, Soviet Embassy and Madison M Adams Jr, Economic Officer, Office of the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs, State Department, 11 May 1970, Box.223/RG59/NARA.
42 On KGB activities in Peru see, Andrews and Mitrokhin, Mitrokhin Archive II, pp.60-4.
43 Suárez Interview (1).
47 Covert Action in Chile, pp. 15, 20, 22 Oña was not able or willing to clarify this matter, replying only that economics did not correspond to him. Author’s interview with Luis Fernández Oña, 9 December 2004, Havana. [Hereafter: Oña Interview (1)].
48 Oña Interview (3).
49 Oña Interview (1).
51 Piñeiro recalls that Argentina, Bolivia and Peru were the key countries considered. Suárez, Manuel Piñeiro, p.12 and Oña Interview (6).
52 Rafael Rodríguez as quoted in Summary of Press Conference.
53 Author’s interviews with Carlos Chain, 8 December 2004, Havana [Hereafter: Chain Interview] and Jose Vierra, 28 April 2006, Havana [Hereafter: Vierra Interview].
55 Chain Interview.
56 Author’s interview with Pedro Martínez Pizarro, 15 December 2004, Havana. Pizarro recalls first meeting Ulises Estrada in Chile prior to 1964 when he was serving as a Political Counsellor at the Cuban Embassy in Chile.
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60 Author’s interview with Gonzalo Rojas Pizarro, 1 November 2004, Chillán [Hereafter: Rojas Pizarro Interview].
61 Haslam, Assisted Suicide, pp.27-9.
On MIR decision, Quiroga, *Compañeros*, p.50. Cubans dismiss the importance of their role in making this decision for the MIR. Oña Interview (1) and Estrada Interview.


Oña Interviews (1, 3).

Suárez, *Manuel Piñeiro*, p.26 and Quiroga, *Compañeros*, pp.26-7. Three members of the Chilean ELN were given the mission of getting the Cubans out of Bolivia. Despite being involved publicly, exact details of Allende’s personal involvement in this event have, to this day, not been clarified. However, it would appear that his role was far more pivotal than previously assumed. By “coincidence”, Oña was in Santiago clandestinely when the survivors escaped to Chile and recalls that as President of the Chilean Senate, Allende immediately ensured the survivors were treated correctly and freed from police custody. Allende then focussed on how the survivors could leave Chile. He agreed with Cubans that if they flew out of Chile, they were vulnerable to possible CIA intervention. Oña remembers poring over maps with Allende to discuss the route out of Chile that they could take. The Cubans had a small plane, a tank of fuel and a pilot but not enough to go far. Finally, Allende accompanied the survivors publicly on another plane to Tahiti where the Cuban Ambassador in Paris collected them. Oña Interview (1).


Quiroga, *Compañeros*, pp.51, 54.

Oña Interview (3) and Quiroga, *Compañeros*, pp.47-8.


Author’s interview with Carlos Amat, 24 April 2006, Havana. [Hereafter: Amat Interview].

Oña Interviews (2, 4-5).

“Luis Fernández Oña, el yerno cubano” and Oña Interviews (4-5).

Oña Interview (2) and Suárez, *Manuel Piñeiro*, p.97, n.1.

Estrada Interview, Oña Interviews (1-5) and author’s interviews with Lisandro Otero, 18 December 2004, Havana [Hereafter: Otero Interview], and Michel Vazquez Montes de Oca and Nelly A Cubillas Pino, 11 September 2005 [Hereafter: Vazquez/Cubillas (1)]. Prior to Chile, Estrada was assigned to accompany Guevara out of Africa and in organizing and taking part in Che’s Bolivian adventure. Estrada, Testimony, Casa Memorial Salvador Allende, Havana, 2003. See also, Estrada, *Tania*, pp.17-21.

Oña Interviews (3, 5).

Oña Interview (6) Unfortunately, the author has not seen/heard this interview. Oña believes it to be the most detailed interview in existence with the president-elect about his aims after being elected.

Oña Interview (1).


Oña Interviews (1-5), Estrada Interview and Quiroga, *Compañeros*, p.58.

Estrada Interview, Oña Interviews (1-5), Vázquez/Cubillas Interview (1), Suárez Interview (1) and author’s interviews with Isabel Jaramillo Edwards, 24 November 2004 and 21 September 2005 [Hereafter: Jaramillo Interviews (1 and 2)] and with Oscar Soto Guzmán, 7 July 2005, Madrid [Hereafter: Soto Interview (2)].

Oña Interview (1).

Oña Interview (3).

Records of the Staff Secretary: NSDM Working Files, Minutes, Senior Review Group (SRG) Meeting on Chile, 14 October 1970, Box.H289/NSCIF/NPMP.

Records of the Staff Secretary: NSDM Working Files, Minutes, SRG Meeting on Chile, 29 October 1970, H289/NSCIF/NPMP and Memcon, Nixon and Pope Paul VI, 28 September 1970, Box.467/NSCIF/NPMP.

89 Covert Action, pp.1, 9, 13, 22.
90 NSSM 97 as quoted in Kornbluh, Pinochet File, p.8
91 Talking Points, Kissinger, SRG Meeting on Chile, 18 August 1970, Box.H047/NSCIF/NPMP.
92 Crimmins Interview.
93 Telcon, Kissinger and Rogers, 24 October 1970, Box 7, Henry A. Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts (Telcons), National Security Council Files, NPMP [Hereafter: Telcons/NSC].
94 Telcon, Kissinger and Rockefeller, 26 December 1970, Box.8/Telcons/NSCF/NPMP.
95 This group was formed by Eisenhower and was known as the 303 Committee under Johnson. Hitchens, The Trial of Henry Kissinger, pp.16-18.
96 Memorandum for the Record, Frank Chaplin, “Minutes of the Meeting of the Forty Committee, September 8 1970”, September 9, CDP-NSC, [Hereafter: Minutes, 40 Committee Meeting, 8 September 1970].
99 Intelligence Memorandum, Directorate of Intelligence, “Situation Following the Chilean Presidential Election”, 7 September 1970, CDP-NSC and Minutes, 40 Committee 8 September 1970. For State Department views see Intelligence Note, Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), 1 October 1970, H048/NSCIF/NPMP and Telegram, Robert Hurwitch to the Secretary, 3 November 1970, Box.2201/RG59/NARA. For Defence Department views, see Telcon, Kissinger and Laird, 10 October 1970, Box.7/Telcons/NSCF/NPMP.
100 Minutes, 40 Committee Meeting, 8 September 1970, Memorandum, McAfee to Johnson, 8 September 1970 and Memorandum, Vaky to Kissinger, 14 September 1970.
101 Telegram, SecState to All American Republic Diplomatic Posts, 10 September 1970, Box.18/Record Group 84, American Embassy Files, Santiago/NARA.
102 Minutes, 40 Committee Meeting, 8 September 1970.
103 “HAK Talking Points- Chile” enclosure, Memorandum, Vaky to Kissinger, 7 September, CDP-NSC.
104 Memorandum, Vaky to Kissinger, 14 September 1970.
107 Memorandum, Vaky to Kissinger, 14 September 1970 and Memorandum, Vaky to Kissinger, 16 September 1970, CDP-NSC.
108 Intelligence Telegram, David Philips (CIA Chile Task Force) to CIA Station, Santiago, 27 September 1970, CDP-CIA (filed as 28 September).
109 Memorandum for the Record, “Minutes of the 40 Committee, 6 October 1970”, 7 October 1970, CDP-NSC.
110 Memorandum for the Record, “Minutes of the 40 Committee, 14 October 1970”, 16 October 1970, CDP-NSC.
111 Quotations from Handwritten Notes, Helms, 15 September 1970, Pinochet File, p.36.
112 Memorandum, Kissinger to Nixon, 17 September 1970, enclosure, Memorandum, Vaky to Kissinger, 17 September 1970, CDP-NSC.
113 Kissinger, White House Years, p.673.

222
115 Minutes, 40 Committee Meeting, 6 October 1970.

116 On allusions to this lobbying, see Walters, Silent Missions, p.566 and Kissinger, White House Years, p.675.

117 Memcon, Nixon and Saragat, Rome, 27 September 1970, Box.467/NSCF/NPMP.

118 Memcon, Nixon and Pope Paul VI, 28 September 1970 and Memorandum, Haig to Kissinger, 28 September 1970, Box.467/NSCF/NPMP. Nixon also urged the British Prime Minister, Edward Heath to defer loans to Chile, Record of a Meeting Between the Prime Minister and President Nixon, 3 October 1970, Prime Minister’s Files [Hereafter: PREM] 15/714/TNA.

119 Intelligence Telegram, Philips to CIA Station, “Need Station New Possibilities”, 27 September 1970, CDP-CIA.

120 Intelligence Telegram, CIA Headquarters to CIA Station, 16 October 1970, CDP-CIA.

121 Paul Wimmert, Interview with CNN, 21 February1999, online at www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/coldwar/interviews/episode-18/wimert1.html

122 Telcon, Kissinger and Nixon, 23 October 1970, Box.7/Telcons/NSCF/NPMP.

123 Minutes, 40 Committee, 14 October 1970, CDP-NSC.

124 Memorandum, Kissinger to Nixon, 18 October1970, enclosure Memorandum, Vaky to Kissinger, 18 October 1970, CDP-NSC.

125 Memorandum, Vaky to Kissinger, 16 October 1970, Box.H048/NSCIF/NPMP.

126 National Security Decision Memorandum 85, Box.H219/NSCIF/NPMP.

127 Records of the Staff Secretary, Minutes, SRG Meeting on Chile, 14 October 1970.


129 Records of the Staff Secretary: NSDM Working Files, Minutes, SRG Meeting on Chile, 29 October 1970.

130 Minutes, SRG Meeting on Chile, 14 October 1970.

131 Minutes, SRG Meeting on Chile, 29 October 1970.

132 Quotation from Memorandum, Dwight Chaplin for H R Haldeman, 4 November 1970, Box.H029/NSCIF/NPMP.

133 Memorandum, Kissinger to Nixon, 5 November 1970.

134 Memorandum, Kissinger to Nixon, 18 October 1970.


136 Memorandum, Walters to Kissinger, 3 November 1970.


139 Letter, Osvaldo Dorticós, President of Cuba to Allende, 1 November 1970, Embajada de Chile en Cuba 1970/AMRE.

140 Author’s interview with Jorge Timossi, 14 September 2005, Havana [Hereafter: Timossi Interview].

141 Quotation from Memcon, Alekseev and Teitelboim, 14 October 1970, p.411. Allende also recounted Castro’s counsel to Plaza, Memcon, Galo Plaza and Allende, 2 November 1971, Tomás Moro, enclosure, Memorandum, Rogers to Nixon, 29 December 1970, Box.2196/RG59/NARA.

142 Rafael Rodriguez as quoted in Summary of Press Conference.

143 Quotation from Memcon, Plaza and Allende, 2 November 1971. See also, Castro as quoted in Memcon, Alekseev and Teitelboim 14 October 1970. Castro was similarly advising the Peruvians to wait. Oficio, Jorge Edwards, Chargé d’affairs, Havana to Almeyda, 10 December 1970, Cuba/1970/AMRE.

144 Oña Interview (2).

145 Telcon, Kissinger and Rogers, 30 October 1970, Box.7/Telcons/NSCF/NPMP


147 Memorandum for the Record, “Minutes of the Meeting of the 40 Committee, 13 November 1970”, 17 November 1970, CDP-NSC.
Chapter Two: In Pursuit of Radical Transformation.

11. Ibid.
13. Allende cited the UK, France and Germany as key markets for Chile, receiving 400,000 tons. Allende, July 1964, published as “Cómo vamos a nacionalizar el cobre”, *OE-SA*, p.234.
17. Estrada Interview.
19. Oña Interviews (1-5), Otero Interview and Vázquez/Cubillas Interview (1) and Soto Interviews (1-2).
cientifico-tecnica chileno-cubana”, Private Collection, Casa Memorial Salvador Allende, Havana [Hereafter: CMSA].


Allende, “Inaugural address”, AR, p.61.

Memcon, Plaza and Allende, 2 November 1971.

Oficio, Edwards to Almeyda, 10 December 1970, Cuba/1970/AMRE.

Telex, DelChile GATT to MRE (Direccion Economica), 8 December 1971, CMSA [underlined in original].

Allende as quoted in “Allende habla con Debray”, p.32.


Memcon, Plaza and Allende, 2 November 1971.

Almeyda, “Foreign Policy of the Unidad Popular”, p.84.


Kissinger, White House Years, p.654.


Oficio, Letelier to Señor Ministro, 1 March 1971, Oficios Conf/R/EEUU/1971/AMRE.

Davis, LTY, pp.27-8, Covert Action, p.35 and Telex, MRE to EmbaChile Washington, 2 March 1971, Telex.E:1-367/EEUU/1971/AMRE. On indications of US hostility, see also, Díaz Casanueva, “Política Multilateral del Presidente Salvador Allende en sus Aspectos Políticos y de Derechos Humanos, a la Luz de las Experiencias de un Embajador”, PEC, p.170. Although the Easter Island incident was probably unrelated to Nixon’s policy to undermine Allende, the White House was directly responsible for cancelling the Enterprise visit. Kissinger noted that he did not want Allende to be able to “use it to say they have great relations with us”. See Telcons, Kissinger and Zumwalt, 24 February 1971, Kissinger and Rogers, 25 February 1971 and Kissinger and Laird, 25 February 1971, Box.9/Telcons/NSCF/NPMP. On Chilean complaints to Washington regarding both incidents as evidence of hostility see Telex, MRE to EmbaChile Washington, 14 October 1972, Telex.E/EEUU/1972/AMRE.

Letter, Sánchez to Señor Ministro, 8 January 1971 Oficios Conf/R/EEUU/1971/AMRE.

Telex, EmbaChile Washington to MRE (Gabinete Ministro), 26 February 1971, Telex.R:1-400/EEUU/1971/AMRE.

Author’s interview with Aníbal Palma, 23 October 2004, Santiago [Hereafter: Palma Interview]

Huidobro Interview (2). Although Castro advised Allende to keep Valdés on, Huidobro insisted this was Allende’s decision. E-mail correspondence with with the author, 16 February 2005. On Castro’s advice see Memcon, Plaza and Allende, 2 November 1971 and Memcon, Alexseev and Teitelboim, 14 October 1970.

Huidobro, a career diplomat and Allende’s close confidant, stayed at the Ministry with Almeyda for two months until he arrived in Buenos Aires as Chile’s ambassador. Huidobro Interview (2).

Fermandois, Mundo y Fin de Mundo, p.360 and author’s interview with Ramon Huidobro, 18 October 2004, Santiago [Hereafter: Huidobro (1)], Huidobro Interview (2) and Díaz Casanueva, “Política Multilateral del Presidente Salvador Allende”, p.168.

Fermandois, Mundo y Fin de Mundo, pp.361-2.

Urrutia Interview (1). Urrutia recalled that he suggested Orlando Letelier to Allende as an alternative. Speculation about Herrera also reached the public domain. See “Allende May Offer Chilean Post to Inter-American Bank Head”, New York Times, 8 October 1970.

Huidobro Interview (1) and Urrutia Interview (1).

Almeyda, “Foreign Policy of the Unidad Popular”, pp.80-81, 84.
Allende, “Inaugural address”, AR, p.58.


Record of Conversations, Korry and José Toha, Chilean Minister of the Interior, 8 February 1971, Telegram, Korry to SecState, 9 February 1971, Box.18/RG84/NARA.

On lobbying and Nixon’s views see Subversion in Chile, pp.22-103, 96, 46, 53.


Popular Unity Programme, AR, pp.270-1.

“Allende habla con Debray”, p.40.

Telegrams, Rogers to AmEmbassy, Santiago and Korry to SecState, 1 February 1971, Box.18/RG84/NARA. See also Record of Conversation, Almeyda and Korry, 1 February 1971, Memorandum, 2 February 1971, Memorandos/Dirección Economica, 1967-1974/AMRE.

Telegram, Korry to SecState, 4 February 1971, Box.18/RG84/NARA.

Telex, EmbaChile Washington to MRE, 26 February 1971.

Telegraph, Korry to SecState, 9 February 1971.


Telegram, Korry to SecState, 9 June 1971, Box.2193/RG59/NARA.

Huidobro Interview (2). Huidobro cannot remember exactly who participated but says that at the meeting he attended there were 6 or 7 people present including Letelier, Almeyda and Allende’s Minister in charge of mines, Orlando Cantuarias (PR).

Oficio, Letelier to Señor Ministro, 23 April 1971, Oficios Conf.R/EEUU/1971/AMRE.

Memorandum, William R Joyce to Mr Navarro, 30 March 1971, Oficios Conf.R/EEUU/1971/AMRE.

Telex, Letelier to MRE (Gabinete Ministro), 6 July 1971, Telex:R:1-400/EEUU/1971/AMRE.

Oficio, Sánchez to Señor Ministro, 3 February 1971, Oficios Conf.R/EEUU/1971/AMRE.


“HAK Talking Points – Chile SRG Meeting”, 17 February 1971, Box.H052/NSCIF/NPMP.

Ibid and Memorandum, Nachmanoff to Kissinger, 16 February 1971, Box.H052/NSCIF/NPMP.

Memorandum, Kissinger to The Under Secretary of State et al., 25 February 1971, Box.H052/NSCIF/NPMP.


Memorandum, Crimmins (Acting Chairman, Ad-Hoc Working Group on Chile) to Under Secretary Irwin, 19 December 1970, Box.2201/RG59/NARA.


Kornbluh, Pinochet File, p.84. See also Covert Action, p.34.

Covert Action in Chile, p.57.
Memorandum, Helms for The 40 Committee, 15 March 1971, enclosure, Memorandum, Chaplin to Kissinger, 17 March 1971, CDP-NSC and Nachmanoff to Kissinger, 28 January 1971, CDP-NSC.

Covert Action in Chile, p.59 and Memorandum, CIA for the 40 Committee, 21 April 1971, CDP-NSC

Memorandum, CIA for The 40 Committee, 21 April 1971, enclosure, Memorandum, Nachmanoff to Kissinger, 11 May 1971, CDP-NSC.

Memorandum, CIA for The 40 Committee, 21 April 1971.

Covert Action Program for Chile, 17 November 1970.


Memorandum, CIA for The 40 Committee, 21 April 1971.

Memorandum, CIA for The 40 Committee, 21 April 1971, enclosure, Memorandum, Nachmanoff to Kissinger, 11 May 1971, CDP-NSC.

Memorandum, CIA for The 40 Committee, 21 April 1971.

Covert Action Program for Chile, 17 November 1970.


Memorandum, CIA for The 40 Committee, 21 April 1971.

Record of Conversation, Letelier and Kissinger, 23 March 1971.

John Plank, “We Should Start Talking to Castro”.


Intelligence Note, INR, “Latin America: Chile’s Renewed Relations with Cuba- A Potential Problem for the OAS”, 30 November 1970, Box.2199/RG59/NARA.


Memorandum, Alexis Johnson to Rogers and Irwin, 8 December 1970, Box.2201/RG59/NARA. On Nixon’s refusal to contemplate altering Washington’s Cuba policy see Minutes, NSC Meeting, 6 November 1970.


Telegram, DOS to All American Republic Diplomatic Posts, 22 January 1971, Box.2199/RG59/NARA.

Telegram, DOS to All American Republic Diplomatic Posts, 15 November 1970 and Memorandum, Kissinger to The Under Secretary of State et al., 10 December 1970, Box.H050/NSCIF/NPMP.


Vaky and Crimmins Interviews.


Record of Conversation, Pablo Valdés (Encargado de Negocios) and Antonio Sánchez de Lozada, Bolivian Ambassador, Washington, 8 February 1971, Oficio, Valdés to Señor Ministro, 9 February 1971, Oficios Conf.R/EEUU/1971/AMRE.

Telex, Valdés to MRE (Gabinete Ministro), 26 February 1971, Telex.R:1-400/EEUU/1971/AMRE.

Telex, Valdés to MRE, 26 February 1971.

Oficio, Luis Jerez Ramírez, Chilean Ambassador Lima, to Señor Ministro, 25 March 1971, Oficios Conf.E/EEUU/1971/AMRE; See also Oficio, Jerez Ramírez to Señor Ministro, 13 April 1971, Oficios Conf.E/EEUU/1971/AMRE. On US-Peruvian relations see Airgram, Belcher, US Ambassador Lima, to DOS, Box.2196/RG59/NARA. Belcher acknowledged that US-Peruvian relations have improved but states this was for “reasons other than Peruvian reaction to the Allende election.”

Telex, Pedro Vuskovic Bravo (Ministro Subrogante de MRE) and Daniel Vergara Bustos (Under Secretary of the Interior) to Letelier, 13 March 1971, Telex.E:1-367/EEUU/1971/AMRE.


Oficio, Raul Rettig to Señor Ministro, 27 March 1971, enclosure, Oficio, MRE to EmbaChile Washington, 15 April 1971, Oficios Conf.E/EEUU/1971/AMRE. Rettig reported that Brazil had given Peru $10 million credit and that businesses in Sao Paulo were studying investment worth up to $30 million.


Oficio, Rettig to Señor Ministro, 26 March 1971, enclosure, Oficio, MRE to EmbaChile, 15 April 1971.

Diplomatic Report No.338/72, FCO, 19 April 1972, FCO7/2174/TNA.

Almeyda, “Foreign Policy of the Unidad Popular”, p.88

Ibid. p.81

Memorandum, 15 January 1971, enclosure, Oficio, MRE to Señor Embajador, DelChile, OEA, 19 January 1971, Oficios Ordinarios/OEA/1971/AMRE.

Conferencia de Prensa del Presidente de la Republica, Compañero Salvador Allende, 5 May 1971, Discursos/AMRE.

Almeyda, Speech to OAS, 15 April 1971, PEC, pp.427-437 and Telex, Herrera to MRE (Gabinete Ministro), 1 April 1971 Aerograma y Telex/OEA/1971/AMRE.

Special Report, FBIS, “Cuban and Other Communist Views of Chile: Elements of Competition with the Cuban Mode”l”, 15 March 1971, CDP-CIA,

Airgram, Davis to DOS, 22 August 1973, Box.2134/RG59/NARA.

Rojas Pizarro Interview.

Telegram, Hildyard to FCO, 14 June 1971, FCO7/2091/TNA.

Letter, Hildyard to JM Hunter, Latin America Department, FCO, 30 June 1971, FCO7/2091/TNA.

Record of Conversation, Letelier and Crimmins, 17 March 1971. See also Telegram, SecState to AmEmbassy Santiago, 18 March, Box.18/RG84/NARA.

Record of Conversation, Letelier and Kissinger, 23 March 1971.


Crimmins Interview.

“Study of Options for U.S. Strategy Concerning Chile’s Future Participation in the Organization of American States”, enclosure, Memorandum, Crimmins to Kissinger, 4 December 1970.

Spektor, Equivocal Engagement, pp.43-80.

“Brazil Program Analysis (NSSM 67)”, enclosure, Memorandum, Wayne Smith to Kissinger, 3 December 1970, Box.H049/NSCIF/NPMP.

Letter, Edward M Kennedy to Rogers, 25 March 1971, Box.2134/RG59/NARA.

Memorandum, Irwin to Rogers, “Policy Toward Brazil”, c.1 December 1970, Box.2134/RG59/NARA and Memorandum, Wayne Smith to Kissinger, 27 November 1970, Box.H049/NSCIF/NPMP.


Memorandum, Smith to Kissinger, 27 November 1970.
Chapter Three: “In a Revolution Not Everything is Rose-Coloured”.

1 Telegram, Korry to SecState, 9 June 1971, Box.2193/RG59/NARA.
4 Draft letter, Almeyda to Rogers in Telex, Letelier to Almeyda (in Lima), 1 September 1971, Telex.R:401-839/EEUU/1971/AMRE. See also Jaramillo Interview (2).
5 Telexes, Letelier to Almeyda (exclusivo), 11 August 1971 and Letelir to MRE (Gabinete Ministro), 12 October 1971, Telex.R:401-839/EEUU/1971/AMRE.
6 Telex, Letelier to Almeyda (exclusivo), 5 August 1971, Telex.R:401-839/EEUU/1971/AMRE.
11 Oficio, Letelter to Señor Ministro, 10 August 1971, Oficios Conf:R/EEUU/1971/AMRE.
12 “Decreto No.92, firmado por el Presidente de la Republica de Chile, Salvador Allende Gossens, Relativo a las Rentabilidades excesivas de las empresas de la gran mineria del cobre afectadas por la nacionalizacion”, 28 September 1971, PEC, pp.409-410.
13 Allende, 15 July 1971 published as “Palabras del Presidente de la Republica, Compañero Salvador Allene, en la ceremonia de firma del decreto que promulga la reforma constitucional que permite la nacionalizacion del Cobre”, PEC, pp.408-409.
15 Vázquez/Cubillas Interview (1). Vázquez and Cubillas recall that the Cubans advised Chile throughout the nationalisation process and encouraged Allende to negotiate with the companies. On PS pressure see Special National Intelligence Estimate: “The Outlook for Chile under Allende”, 4 August 1971, CDP-CIA.
16 Allende, “Address to the United Nations General Assembly”, AR, pp.203-4. Allende stated that Anaconda and Kennecott mines reaped $774million in ‘excess profits’. This was then deducted from the compensation figure of $333 million determined by Chile’s Controller General.
18 Allende, 30 September 1971 as quoted in AR, p.22.
19 Telex, Letelter to Almeyda (exclusivo), 8 September 1971, Telex.R:401-839/EEUU/1971/AMRE.
20 Telexes, Letelter to Almeyda (exclusivo), 11 August 1971, 13 August and 21 August 1971, Telex.R:401-839/EEUU/1971/AMRE. See also Record of Luncheon offered by the Chilean embassy, attended by Marilyn Berger (WP), Benjamin Welles (NYT) George Gedda (AP) Ricardo Utrilla (France Press, Juan

24 Allende, Speeches in Quito 25 August 1971 and Guayaquil, 27 August 1971, Voz, pp.53, 86. See also, Telegram, Burns, AmEmbassy, Quito, to SecState, 26 August 1971, Box.2193/RG59/NARA.
25 Almeyda, Renencuentro con mi Vida, pp. 194-5.
26 "Declaracion Conjunta suscrita entre los Presidentes de la Republica del Ecuador, Jose Maria Velasco y de la Republica de Chile, Salvador Allende Gossens" Quito, 26 August 1971; Declaración Conjunta suscrita entre los Presidentes de la Republica de Colombia, Misael Pastrana Borrero y de la Republica de Chile, Salvador Allende Gossens", Bogotá, 31 August 1971; "Declaración Conjunta suscrita entre los Presidentes de la Republic del Perú, Juan Velasco Alvarado y de la Republica de Chile, Salvador Allende Gossens", Lima, 3 September 1971, PEC, pp.469-480 and Almeyda, Speech to UN General Assembly, 1 October 1971, PEC, p.371.
29 Telegram, Allen, AmEmbassy, Bogotá to SecState, 1 September 1971, Box.2193/RG59/NARA.
31 Almeyda, Speech to UN General Assembly, PEC pp.368-371.
33 Almeyda, Speeches to UN General Assembly, 1 October 1971, and G77 Meeting, Lima, 29 October 1971, PEC, pp.370, 399. On the Third World’s lack of progress, see R. AMortimer, The Third World Coalition in International Politics, p.35.
34 Almeyda, G77 Meeting, 29 October 1971, p.400.
36 Diplomatic Report, No.532/71, 18 November 1971 and Telegram, Morgan to FCO, 10 October 1971, FCO61/836/TNA.
37 Memorandum, Baker-Bates, UN (E & S) to MacInnes, 22 November 1971, FCO61/836/TNA.
38 PEC, p.547.
39 Special NIE, 4 August 1971, and Fermandois, Mundo y Fin de Mundo, p.384.
40 Miller, Soviet Relations with Latin America, p.138.
41 Oficio, Letelier to Señor Ministro, 10 August 1971, Oficios Conf.R/EEUU/1971/AMRE.
43 Record of Conversation, Almeyde and Hollis Moore, President of Bowling Green State University, Letter, Hollis to Nixon, 12 November 1971, Box.2193/RG59/NARA.
44 Telexes, Letelier to Almeyda, 5 August and 11 August 1971.
45 Miller, Soviet Relations with Latin America, pp.140-1.
47 Memcon, Almeyda, Rogers, Letelier, Díaz Casanueva and Nathaniel Davis, 4 October 1971, Waldorf Hotel, Telegram, USMissionUN to SecState, 6 October 1971, Box.2193/RG59/NARA.
49 Telex, Letelier to MRE, 30 November 1971, Telex.R:401-839/EEUU/1971/AMRE.


Jova Interview, FD.

Briefing Memo, Nachmanoff to Kissinger, 17 June 1971.

Memorandum, Nachmanoff to Kissinger, 11 August 1971.

Memorandum, Kissinger to The Under Secretary of State et al., 18 August 1971, Box.H178/NSCIF/NPMP.

Memorandum, Nachmanoff to Kissinger, 14 June 1971, Box.H056/NSCIF/NPMP.

Javier Urrutia, a financial advisor to the Chilean embassy in Washington involved in the Boeing negotiations recalled Santiago was interested in more profitable US and Europe routes for the Boeings. Javier Urrutia, e-mail correspondence with author, 3 December 2005.


Handwritten notes, Nixon to Kissinger on Memorandum, Kissinger to Nixon, 9 June 1971 and Kissinger to Nachmanoff on Memorandum, Nachmanoff to Nixon, 14 June, Box.H056/NSCIF/NPMP.

“HAK Talking Points for SRG Meeting on Chile”, 3 June 1971 and Memorandum, Kissinger to Nixon, 9 June 1971, Box.H056/NSCIF/NPMP.

74 Record of Conversation, Letelier and Kissinger, 5 December 1971.
75 Memorandum, Irwin to Kissinger, 22 December 1971, Box.289/NSIF/NPMP.
77 Paper, Ad Hoc Interagency Working Group, “Chile: Strategy Review”, enclosure, Memorandum, Jeanne W. Davis to The Under Secretary of State et al, 8 September 1971, Box.H220/NSCIF/NPMP.
78 Telegram, Davis to SecState, 7 December 1971, CDP-NARA.
79 Memcon, Manuel Sánchez, La Prensa (Santiago) and John W Fisher, ARA, 26 October 1971, Box.2194/RG59/NARA and Intelligence Telegram, CIA Station to Director CIA, 28 August 1971, CDP-CIA, Memorandum for the Record, William Broc, Chief Western Hemisphere Division [Hereafter: WHD], 30 September 1971, CDP-CIA and Memorandum, Nachmanoff to Kissinger, CDP-NSC.
80 Intelligence Telegram, CIA Station, Santiago to DCI, 19 August 1971, CDP-CIA.
81 Memcon, Frei and Meyer, Waldorf Towers, New York, 23 October 1971, 26 October 1971, Box.2193/RG59/NARA.
82 Record of Conversation, Korry and Frei, 9 October 1971, Telegram, Korry to SecState, 11 October 1971, Box.2197/RG59/NARA.
83 Covert Action, p.37.
84 Despatch, Chief of Station [Hereafter: COS], Santiago to Chief, WHD, 3 November 1971, CDP-CIA and Intelligence Information Special Report, 9 November 1971, CDP-CIA. On monitoring and speculation about key players, see Intelligence Telegram, CIA Station, Santiago to Director, 31 August 1971, CDP-CIA. Of those mentioned, Major General Pinochet is noted as favouring a coup but happier to “close eyes to events”.
85 Despatch, COS, Santiago to Chief, WHD 12 November 1971, CDP-CIA.
86 Despatch, Chief of WHD to COS, Santiago, 1 December 1971, CDP-CIA.
87 Memorandum, Irwin to Kissinger, 22 December 1971.
88 Telegram AmEmbassy Santiago to SecState, 14 December 1971, Box.2198/RG59/NARA.
90 Handwritten note, Kissinger on Memorandum, Hewitt to Kissinger, 4 March 1972, Box.232/NSCIF/NPMP. Banzer was a graduate of the School of the Americas and a former military attaché in Washington. On CIA involvement in coup plotting, see McSherry, Predatory States, p.55.
91 McSherry, Predatory States, p.55.
92 Telephone Conversation, Nixon and Rogers, 7 December 1971, Conversation 16:36/Nixon White House Tapes/NPMP and Memcon for the President’s File from Henry Kissinger, 20 December 1971, “Brazil Helped Rig the Uruguayan Elections” edited by C. Osorio, online at National Security Archive, at http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB71/
94 Telcon, Nixon and Rogers, 7 December 1971 and Memcon for the President’s File from Henry Kissinger, 20 December 1971, “Brazil Helped Rig the Uruguayan Elections”;
95 Airgram, Ortiz (US Embassy, Montevideo) to DOS, 25 August 1971, “Brazil Helped Rig the Uruguayan Elections”.
96 McSherry, Predatory States, p.56.
97 Kissinger also mentioned Médici was “anxious” to establish “that special arrangement” with Nixon but to date no evidence exists regarding what this consisted of. Telcon, Kissinger and Nixon, 8 December 1971, Box.12/Telcons/NSCF/NPMP.
98 Memorandum of Meeting, 8 December 1971, Blair House, between Emilio Garrastazu Médici, Mario Gibson Barbosa, Jose Araujo Castro, Kissinger, Vernon Walters, Nachmanoff, Box.911/NSCF/NPMP.
99 Crimmins Interview.
100 Telcon, Nixon and William Rogers, 7 December 1971, and Telcon, Nixon and John Connally, 8 December 1971, Conversation 16:44/Nixon White House Tapes/NPMP.
136 Record of Conversation, Director General, MRE and Hildyard, Letter, British Chancery, Santiago to Latin America Department, FCO, 15 November 1971, FC07/1991/TNA. On Castro’s attention to Chile see also Suarez Interview (1), Estrada Interview and Oña Interviews (1-5).
139 Author’s interview with Volodia Teitelboim, 5 November 2004, Santiago.
140 Vázquez/Cubillas Interview (1). See also Debray as quoted in Haslam, Assisted Suicide, p.32.
141 Author’s interview with Carlos Gomez, 24 October 2004, Los Andes, Chile and Oscar Soto Guzmán, Washington DC, 29 April 2005 [Hereafter: Soto Interview (1)] See also Álvarez, De América Soy Hijo y a Ella me Debo.
142 Timossi Interview.
144 Castro, “Conferencia de Prensa”, 3 December 1971, Cuba-Chile, p.494, 520 and “Interview with Allende and Castro”, AR, p.130.
147 “Interview with Allende and Castro”, p.130.
149 Castro as quoted in Intelligence Information Cable, 2 December 1971, CDP-CIA.
156 “Interview with Allende and Castro”, p.133.
157 Allende, “Farewell address”, p.140
159 Allende, “Farewell address”, p.141-2.
160 Ibid, p.138 Telegram, Davis to SecState, 3 December 1971, Box.2197/RG59/NARA.
161 Allende, “Farewell address”, pp.135-145.
162 Quiroga, Compañeros, p.76.
164 Vázquez/Cubillas Interview, Otero Interview and Estrada Interview.
166 CIA Intelligence Information Special Report, enclosure, Memorandum, Thomas Karamessines, Deputy Director of Plans to DCI Helms, “Cuban Disappointment with the Chilean Experiment”, 31 May 1972, Central Intelligence Agency Records Search Tool (CREST), NARA.
167 Oña Interview (3).
168 Allende, 20 December 1971 as quoted in Telegram, Shlaudeman to SecState, 21 December 1971, Box.2194/RG59/NARA.
169 “Declaration of December” as quoted in ibid.
170 Renean Fuentealba, 16 December 1971, as quoted in Telegram, Shlaudeman to SecState, 17 December
1971, Box.2194/RG59/NARA. On Fuentealba’s election at the PDC National Junta on 27-28 November
1971, see Telegram, Davis to SecState, 29 November 1971, Box.2194/RG59/NARA.
171 Telex, Luis Herrera, Chilean Delegate, OAS to MRE, 14 December 1971 and 15 December 1971,
Aerogramas, Telexes/OEA/1971/AMRE. OAS members voted 7 in favour, 13 against and 3 abstained.
172 INR Intelligence Note, “Cuba: New Orleans plus Kosygin Equals What?”, 8 November 1971,
Box.2223/RG59/NARA.
173 Telegram, Davis to SecState, 7 December 1971 and Telegram, Crimmins to AmEmbassy, Rome, 14
December 1971, Box.2193/RG59/NARA.
175 Collier and Sater, History of Chile, pp.336-345.
176 Memorandum, Irwin to Kissinger, 22 December 1971.
177 Allende, “Farewell Address”, p.141.
178 Telegram, Korry to SecState, 11 October 1971, Box.2197/RG59/NARA.
179 Airgram, Davis to DOS, 24 December 1971, Box.2197/RG59/NARA.
180 Allende, “First Anniversary of the Popular Government”, AR, p.22. See also Almeyda, Speech to the
G77, 29 October 1971, PEC, p.403.

Chapter Four: Battle Lines.

1 Record of Conversation, Fernando Bachelet, First Secretary Chilean Embassy, Washington, and Maynard
Toll, Assistant to Senator Edward Muskie, 19 January 1972, enclosure, Oficio, Letelier to Señor Ministro,
3 Robert Hurwitch as cited in Telegram, DOS to All American Republics, 20 September 1972,
Box.2223/RG59/NARA, Rogers as cited in Telex, DelChile OEA, “Subsecretario dice” to Almeyda
(exclusivo), 12 April 1972, Aerog y Telex/OEA/1972/AMRE and Telex, Valdés to MRE (Gabinete
Ministro), 15 March 1972, Telex:R/EEUU/1972/AMRE.
4 Telegram, AmEmbassy, Montevideo to ScState, 3 March 1972, and Memcon, Celso Diniz, Minister,
Brazilian Embassy and Marvin J Hoffenberg, Economic Officer, ARA/CCA, 2 December 1972, 5
December 1972, Box.2223/RG59/NARA.
5 Oficio, Letelier to Señor Ministro, 23 June 1972, Oficios Conf:E,R/EEUU/1972/AMRE.
6 Oficio, Armando Uribe, Chilean Ambassador, Beijing, to Señor Ministro, 10 February 1972, enclosure,
MRE to Letelier, 6 March 1972, Oficios Conf:E,R/EEUU/1972/AMRE.
Chilena Vista por la Izquierda”, pp.412-419.
8 Allende, Message to Congress, 21 May 1972, published as “La Vía Chilena al Socialismo y el Aparato de
10 Special NIE, 4 August 1971, CDP-CIA.
11 Telegram, Davis to SecState, 26 January 1972, Box.2194/RG59/NARA.
12 “Serio Quebranto de la Economía Nacional”, 15 March 1972, “Temas Economicas”, 29 April 1972 and
13 Record of Conversation, Letelier and Irwin, 24 March 1972, Telex, Letelier to MRE (Gabinete Ministro),
24 March 1972, Telex:R/EEUU/1972/AMRE, Informe, Central Committee, PCCh as quoted in “Balance
de Exitos; Batida Contra las Fallas.”, El Siglo, 16 March 1972, Mil Dias:1, p.319 and J.F Petras, and R.
14 Internal Document, Political Commission, PCCh as quoted in Airgram, Davis to DOS, 11 February 1972,
Box.2194/RG59/NARA.
16 Internal Document, Political Commission, PCCh.


Telegram, Davis to SecState, 20 March 1972, Box.2198/RG59/NARA, Airgram, Davis to DOS, 27 April 1972, Box.2194/RG59/NARA.

Telegram, Davis to SecState, 7 December 1971 and Telegram, Crimmins to AmEmbassy, Rome, 14 December 1971.

"Temas Economicas", El Mercurio, 29 April 1972, Mil Dias:I, pp.369-373 and Memorandum, Jorden to Kissinger, 10 April 1972, Box.H064/NSCIF/NPMP.

Options Paper, DOS, "Next Steps Options on Chile", 4 April 1972, enclosure, Memorandum, Jorden to Kissinger, 10 April 1972, Box.H064/NSCIF/NPMP.

Telegram, Davis to SecState, 26 January 1972, Box.2194/RG59/NARA.


Urritia Interviews (1-2).


Oficio, Letelier to Señor Ministro, 2 June 1972, Oficios Conf:E,R/EEUU/1972/AMRE.


Record of Conversation, Hildyard and Altamirano, 27 February 1972, Letter, Hildyward to Hankey, 8 March 1972, FCO7/2212/TNA.


Circular Telex, Hugo Cubillos, Dirección Económica, MRE to EmbaChile Washington, 8 January 1972, Telex:E/EEUU/1972/AMRE. See also Directorate of Intelligence, Weekly Review, 3 December 1971, CDP-CIA. In February 1972, Chile also rescheduled payments to private US banks. Davis, LTY, p.72

For ITT documents as see Subversion in Chile.

Telex, Letelier to MRE (Relaciones Internacionales), 21 March 1972, Telex:R/EEUU/1972/AMRE.

Telex, Letelier to MRE (Para Conocimiento Inmediato Ministro), 27 March 1972, Telex:R/EEUU/1972/AMRE.

Record of Conversation, Letelier and John Fisher, 6 January 1972, Telex, Letelier to MRE (Dirección Económica), 6 January 1972, Telex:R/EEUU/1972/AMRE.


Vázquez/Cubillas Interview (1).

41 Circular Telegram, FCO, 5 May 1972, FC059/795/TNA and Telex, Herrera to MRE (Gabinete Ministro), 13 April 1972, Aerog y Telex/OEA/1972/AMRE.
43 Memcon, Parsons (FCO), Lam (DTI), Williams (ODA), Kemmis (DTI), Kater-Bates (FCO) and Hernán Santa Cruz, 28 January 1972, FC059/794/TNA.
44 Telegram, AmEmbassy, Dar-es-Salaam to SecState, 22 February 1972, Box.2913/RG59/NARA.
45 Almeyda, Speech to G77, 29 October 1971, PEC, pp.405-6.
48 Options Paper, DOS, 4 April 1972.
49 Memorandum, Jorden to Kissinger, 10 April 1972.
50 Ibid.
51 Memorandum, Rob Roy Ratliff (CIA) to Kissinger, 16 June 1972, CDP-NSC.
52 Davis, LATY, p.74.
54 Memorandum, Jorden to Kissinger, 10 April 1972. See also Options Paper, DOS, 4 April 1972.
55 Ibid. [Underlined as in original].
56 Memorandum, Ashley Hewitt to Haig, 23 February 1972, Box.H289/NSCIF/NPMP.
57 Telegram, Davis to SecState, 28 February 1972, Box.2193/RG59/NARA. See also, Davis, LATY, p.77.
58 Telegram Davis to SecState, 1 April 1972, Box.H064/NSCIF/NPMP.
59 Options Paper, DOS, 4 April 1972.
60 Telegram, Davis to SecState, 28 March 1972, Box.H064/NSCIF/NPMP.
61 Options Paper, DOS, 4 April 1972 and Analytic Summary, NSC, enclosure, Memorandum, Jorden to Kissinger, 10 April 1972.
62 Memorandum, Jorden to Kissinger, 10 April 1972.
63 Davis, LATY, p.77.
64 Covert Action, pp.37-39.
65 Memorandum for 40 Committee, 21 January 1972, CDP-NSC.
66 Memorandum for the 40 Committee, 6 April 1972, CDP-NSC.
67 Memorandum for the 40 Committee, 15 August 1972, CDP-NSC.
68 Telegram, Davis to SecState, 17 May 1972, Box.2198/RG59/NARA.
70 Mortimer, The Third World Coalition in International Politics, pp.35-6.
71 Bouteflika (1972) as quoted in ibid., p.37 On similar Chilean conclusions see Prats, Memorias, p.263.
72 Oficio, Letelier to Señor Ministro, 11 August 1972, Oficios Conf:E,R/EEUU/1972/AMRE.
74 Diplomatic Report No.338/72, FCO, 19 April 1972, FC07/2174/TNA.
75 Letter, W.R McQuillan, British Embassy, to Latin America Department, FCO, 12 June 1972, FC07/2174/TNA and Almeyda, "Foreign Policy of the Unidad Popular", p.88.
76 Letter, Antony Walter, British Embassy, Lima to Robson, FCO, 3 July 1972, FC07/2174/TNA.
77 Airgram, S/PC DOS to All ARA Diplomatic Posts, 8 June 1972, Box.404/RG59/NARA.
78 Telex, Letelier to MRE, 6 June 1972, Telex:R/EEUU/1972/AMRE. Unfortunately, the author has not yet seen records of Conally's tour.
79 Oficio, Letelier to Señor Ministro, 13 October 1972, Oficios Conf:E,R/EEUU/1972/AMRE.
80 Telex, Letelier to MRE, 6 June 1972.
81 Record of Conversation, McBride, US Ambassador, Mexico City and Mexican Foreign Minister, Rabasa, Cable, McBride, to SecState, 26 September 1973, Electronic Telegrams, State Department Central
Foreign Policy Files, at NARA: Access to Archival Databases (AAD) http://aad.archives.gov/add/ [Hereafter, DOS:CFP].
84 Amat and Vierra Interviews. Between 1964 and 1972 there were only “a couple” of Latin American specialists at MINREX.
85 Vierra Interview.
86 Mesa-Lago, Cuba in the 1970s, pp.20-1.
87 Castro, 26 July 1971 as quoted in Erisman, Cuba’s International Relations, pp.53-4.
89 Castro as quoted in Oficio, Vega to Señor Ministro, 17 May 1972, Oficios Conf/Cuba/1972/AMRE.
90 NSSM 158.
91 Andrew and Mitrokhin, Mitrokhin Archive II, p.63.
92 Suárez Interview (1).
93 Oficios, Vega to Señor Ministro, 13 September 1972 and 24 July 1972, Oficios Conf/Cuba/1972/AMRE.
94 Suárez Interview (1) and Raul Roa as cited in Oficio, Vega to Señor Ministro, 10 July 1972, Oficios Conf/Cuba/1972/AMRE.
95 NSSM 158.
96 Ibid. The United States’ policy of “non-overt pressure” on Peru included a freeze on US Government bilateral assistance, including Eximbank lending, lobbying of US banks to put financial pressures on Peru and a discreet position against Lima at the IBRD and the IMF.
97 Annex to NSSM 158, enclosure, Memorandum, A Arenales INR/RAA/OD to Bloomfield, ARA/NSC-IG, 6 September 1972, Box.H193/NSCIF/NPMP.
98 NSSM 158. On the differentiation in the minds of policymakers between Peru and Chile, see Vaky Interview. For a previous study of the differentiation, see also M.L Cottam, Images and Intervention: US Policies in Latin America (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1994).
99 Memorandum, Peter M Flanigan and Kissinger to Nixon, 28 December 1972, Box.H237/NSCIF/NPMP.
In 1973, Nixon sent a special representative to Lima, Jim Greene, to negotiate with the Peruvian government and in February 1974, Washington agreed to ease economic pressure on Peru in return for $150 million as full settlement for IPC. Memorandum, Thomas R. Pickering, Executive Secretary DOS, to Brent Scowcroft, 13 September 1973, Box.2196/RG59/NARA.
100 Oficio, Letelier to Señor Ministro, 13 October 1973.
102 Teitelboim, Speech to Chilean Senate, 10 May 1972 as cited in Airgram, Davis to DOS, 19 May 1972, Box.2194/RG59/NARA.
104 Memcon, Felipe Amunategui, Third Vice President, PDC, Richard Schwartz, USAID and Arnold Isaacs, US Embassy, 4 May 1972, enclosure, Airgram, Davis to DOS, 17 May 1972, Box.2194/RG59/NARA.
105 Telegram, Davis to SecState, 2 May 1972, Box.2197/RG59/NARA and Memorandum, Jorden to Kissinger, 10 April 1972.
106 Quiroga, Compañeros, p.107.
107 Telegram, Davis to SecState, 26 June 1972, Box.2197/RG59/NARA and “Constituida Comision Para Investigar la Internacion Illegal por Aviones Cubanos”, El Mercurio, 4 April 1972, Mil Dias:1, p.333. Whether these crates contained weapons has not yet been convincingly proved or disproved. Pinochet’s dictatorship published apparent proof in retrospect that they contained weapons but Lisandro Otero, Havana’s Cultural Attaché insists that these boxes did contain the works of art for an exhibition he was organising, as the Cuban embassy asserted at the time. Otero Interview.
108 Castro as quoted by Alain Peyrefitte, French UDR Party, public statement, 24 September 1972, Santiago, Telegram, Davis to SecState, 26 September 1972, Box.2196/RG59/NARA.

Estrada Interview. Allende’s decision can be narrowed down to 26-30 May on account of Estrada’s recollection of being in Romania when he found out.

Estrada Interview and author’s interview with a former member of the MIR, who would prefer to remain anonymous. Besides the MIR, Quiroga asserts that two groups from the GAP travelled to Cuba in 1972, one at the beginning and one at the end of the year for one week and 15 days respectively. Quiroga, *Compañeros*, p.90.

Estrada Interview.

Record of Conversation, Davis and Frei, 16 August 1972, Telegram, Davis to SecState, 19 August 1972, Box.2193/RG59/NARA. It is very likely these claims were exaggerated in an effort to induce the United States to intervene.

Record of Conversation, Davis and Frei, 15 March 1972, Telegram, Davis to SecState, 16 March 1972, Box.2193/RG59/NARA.

Dinges, *Condor Years*, pp.50-1.

Gaspari, *Ditadura Derrotada*, p.357, McSherry, *Predatory States*, p.57, Cable, Davis to SecState, 28 September 1973, DOS:CFP.

Jaramillo Interview (2) and Oña Interview (5).

“Avión con Guerrilleros Argentinos Llegó a Chile”, *La Tercera de la Hora*, 16 August 1972, *Mil Dias:1*, pp.528-430.

Huidobro Interview (2). See also Bautista Yofre, *Misión Argentina*, pp.267-9.

Telex, Letelier to MRE (Dirección General), 8 June 1972, Telex:R/EEUU/1972/AMRE.

Gaspari, *Ditadura Derrotada*, p.348 and Options Paper, DOS, 4 April 1972. The author has found no evidence that the US used this route to channel arms to Chile’s right-wing. Instead, sources cited suggest weapons came from Brazil and Argentina.

Memcon, Celso Diniz, and Marvin Hoffenberg, Economic Officer ARA/CCA, 7 September 1972, Box.2223/RG59/NARA.

Handwritten note, Kissinger on Memorandum, Hewitt to Kissinger, 4 March 1972, Box.232/NSCIF/NPMP. At the end of 1972, the IMF finally insisted on the devaluation of Bolivia’s peso and La Paz froze wages at half the level of rising living costs, Lehman, *Limited Partnership*, pp.165-6.

Memorandum, Hewitt to Kissinger, 4 March 1972, Box.232/NSCIF/NPMP.

Memcon, Rogers and Barboza, 29 September 1972, Waldorf Hotel, Telegram, USMission, UN to SecState, 6 October 1972, Box.2130/RG59/NARA and Gaspari, *Ditadura Derrotada*, pp.349-351.

Memcon, Rogers and Barboza, 29 September 1972.


Miller, *Soviet Relations with Latin America*, pp.139-140.


Allende, 7 August 1972 as quoted in Telegram, Davis to DOS, 9 August 1972, Box.478/RG59/NARA.

Edmundo Eluchans as quoted in Memcon, Jorge Ross (Businessman), Joaquin Figueroa (ex-General Manager Mina Andina), Orlando Saenz (President SOFOFA), Javier Vial – (President FENSA), Edmundo Eluchans (Lawyer), Davis, Joel W Biller, Acting DCM, US embassy, and Calvin C Berlin, US Commercial attaché, 26 July 1972, enclosure, Airgram, Davis to DOS, 2 August 1972, Box.2197/RG59/NARA.

133 Urrutia Interviews (1-2) and Huidobro Interview (1).


Telexes, Almeyda to EmbaChile, Washington, 5 September 1972 and Letelier to Almeyda (exclusivo), 29 September 1972, Telex:R/EEUU/1972/AMRE and Record of Conversation, Subsecretary Orlandi,


Ibid., Record of Conversation, Orlandi and Davis, 18 October 1972 and Davis, LTY, pp.102-3.

Record of Conversation, Letelier and Hennessy, 29 September 1972, Telex, Letelier to Almeyda, 29 September 1972, Telex R/EEUU/1972/AMRE.

Urrutia Interviews (1-2).


Memorandum for the 40 Committee, 10 October 1972, CDP-NSC.

Dinges, Condor Years, pp.50-1.

Telex, Davis to SecState, 22 August 1972 Box.2198/RG59/NARA, Telegram, Davis to SecState, 15 September 1972, CDP-NSC and Record of Conversation, Davis and Frei, 16 August 1972.

“Si Hubiera Guerra Civil la Ganaríamos”, djo S.E., La Tercera de la Hora, 31 August 1972, Mil Dias I, p.441.

Quiroga, Compañeros, p.84

Memcon, Gustavo Alessandri Valdes, Second Vice-President (PN) and Arzac, 28 July 1972, enclosure, Airgram, Davis to DOS, 23 August 1972, Box.2194/RG59/NARA.

Conversation, Ambassador A V Basov with Corvalán and Teitelboim, 13 September 1972 published as “Conversación del embajador A.V. Basov con Luis Corvalán y Volodia Teitelboim”, “Chile en los Archivos de la URSS”, pp.441.

Quiroga, Compañeros, p.121.

Ibid, pp.82, 116-7.


Vuskovic as cited in Memorandum for the 40 Committee, 15 August 1972, CDP-NSC.

Chapter Five: Crossroads.

1 Quotation from Record of Conversation, Diaz Casanueva and Bush, 15 November 1972, Telegram, Bush to SecState, 15 November 1972, Box.2193/RG59/NARA.

2 Pravda, 23 November 1972 as quoted in Miller, Soviet Relations with Latin America, p.132.

3 P. Neruda, Incitación al Nixonicidio y Alabanza de la Revolución Chilena (Santiago: Quimantu, 1973) and Allende, Speech at Kremlin Banquet, 6 December 1972, published as “Palabras del Presidente de la República de Chile, Salvador Allende Gossens, pronunciadas en la Cena Ofrecida en su Honor en el Kremlin, Moscú”, “La Izquierda”, p.491.


5 Letelier, Press Conference as cited in Cable, Davis to SecState, 13 March 1973, DOS:CFP. On Chile’s industrial production during the UP years, see Sigmund, Multinationals, pp.158-169.


7 Cable, Davis to Rogers, 13 March 1973, DOS:CFP.

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46 Briefing on Chile Elections, CIA, 1 March 1973, CDP-CIA and Memorandum for Deputy Director for Plans, 18 November 1972, CDP-CIA.
47 Memorandum, Rogers to Nixon, 15 November 1972, Box.2193/RG59/NARA.
49 Ibid. and “Minuta”, 26 December 1972.
53 Telegram, Davis to SecState, 21 February 1973, Box.2196/RG59/NARA.
55 Allende as quoted by Phillipe Mengin, architect in Memcon, Mengin and Judd L Kessler, Regional Legal Advisor, 23 January 1973, enclosure, Airgram, Davis to DOS, 30 January 1973, Box.2197/RG59/NARA.
56 Telegram, Davis to SecState, 1 March 1973, Box.2196/RG59/NARA.
57 Telegram, Davis to SecState, 21 February 1973, Box.2196/RG59/NARA.
58 Airgram, Davis to DOS, 24 January 1973, Box.2196/RG59/NARA.
59 Telegram, Davis to SecState, 21 February 1973, Box.2196/RG59
60 Airgram, Chief, WHD Division to COS, Santiago, 12 January 1973 and Cable, COS, Santiago to Chief, WHD, 13 February 1973, CDP-CIA.
61 Cable, CIA Station, Santiago to CIA HQ, 8 February 1973, CDP-CIA, Memorandum, James Gardner (INR/DDC/OIP) to William McAfee (INR/DDC), 27 February 1973, CDP-NSC, Memorandum, Chief WHD to DCI, 29 March 1973, CDP-CIA and Information Report, CIA, 28 February 1973, CDP-CIA.
62 Cable, Chief WH Division to COS, 14 March 1973, and Cable, CIA HQ to CIA Station, Santiago, 6 February 1973, CDP-CIA.
63 Record of Conversation, HQ Officers and Davis, 10 January 1973, Cable, CIA HQ to CIA Station, Santiago, 10 January 1973, CDP-CIA.
64 Airgram, COS, Santiago to Chief, WHD, 21 February 1973, CDP-CIA.
65 Central Intelligence Bulletin, Directorate of Intelligence, 22 February 1973, and Intelligence Report, CIA, 28 February 1973, CDP-CIA.
66 Cable, Chief, WHD to COS, Santiago, 14 March 1973, CDP-CIA.
67 Telegram, Davis to SecState, 6 March 1973, Box.2196/RG59/NARA. Martínez Corbalá, Instantes de Decisión, p.78 and Bautista Yofre, Misión Argentina, p.325.
68 Telegram, Davis to SecState, 23 March 1973, Box.2194/RG59/NARA and Memorandum Chief, WHD to DCI, 29 March 1973, CDP-CIA.
69 Record of Conversation, Davis and Frei, 15 March 1973, Telegram, Davis to SecState, 16 March 1973, Box.2196/RG59/NARA.
70 Telegram, Davis to SecState, 23 March 1973.
71 “Ahora mas que nunca avanzar sin transar”, Las Noticias de Ultima Hora, 9 March 1973, Mil Dias:1, p.600.
73 Memcon, Claudio Huepe, PDC Deputy and Arnoldo Isaacs, (US Embassy), 14 March 1973, enclosure, Airgram, Davis to DOS, 30 March 1973, Box.2194/RG59/NARA.
74 Cable, CIA Station to DCI, 26 April 1973, CDP-CIA.
75 CIA Memorandum, 30 June 1973, CDP-CIA.
76 Cable, COS to DCI, 14 March 1973, CDP-CIA.
77 Telegram, Davis to Rogers, 23 March 1973.
78 Cable, COS to DCI, 14 March 1973.
Chapter Six: Endgame.

1 Fermandois, Mundo y Fin de Mundo, p.393.
3 Telcon, Kissinger and Nixon, 16 September 1973, Box.22/Telcons/NSCF/NPMP.
The number 15,000 surfaced before the coup among military plotters. CIA Information Report, 9 July 1973, CDP-CIA.  


Herrera, as quoted in Cable, AmEmbassy Lima to SecState, 12 July 1973.  

Information Report, CIA, 2 May 1973, CDP-CIA.  

Cable, DCI to CIA Station, Santiago, 1 May 1973, CDP-CIA.  

Cable, DCI to CIA Station, 2 May 1973, Cables (2), CIA Station to DCI, 2 May 1972, CIA Station to DCI, 7 May 1973, Cable, CIA Station Santiago to DCI, 25 June 1973, Cable, CIA Station, Santiago to DCI, 26 May 1973, CDP-CIA.  

Haslam, Assisted Suicide, p.171, 211, 219. The DIA and CIA appear to have had similar intelligence on plotting. However, so many documents remain redacted that it is impossible to identify exactly who they were talking to. See Information Report, USDAO/Santiago to DIA Washington, 18 May 1973 and DIA Intelligence Summary, 24 May 1973, CDP-DOD.  

Record of Meeting, ARA-CIA, 11 June 1973, Memorandum James Gardener (ARA) to William McAffee (INR/DDC), 11 June 1973, CDP-NARA.  


Quiroga, Compañeros, pp.95-6.  


Quiroga, Compañeros, p.97.  

Memorandum for Chief, WHD, “Chile – What now?”, 30 June 1973, CDP-CIA.  

DIA Intelligence Summary, 5 July 1973, CDP-DOD.  

Intelligence Telegram, 23 July 1973, CDP-CIA.  

Quotation from Memorandum, David Atlee Philips to Deputy Director of Operations, “Recent visit of [redacted] to Santiago”, 13 August 1973, CDP-CIA.  

Covert Action, p.39.  

Intelligence Memorandum, “Consequences of a Military Coup in Chile, 1 August 1973, CDP-CIA.  

Record of Conversation, Kubisch and Valdés, 24 July 1973, Cable, SecState to AmEmbassy, Santiago, 26 July 1973, DOS:CFP.  

Record of Conversation, Davis and Letelier, 4 July 1973, Cable, Davis to SecState, 4 July 1973, DOS:CFP.  

Record of Conversation, Davis and Tomic, 24 August 1973, Airgram, Davis to DOS, 29 August 1973, Box.2193/RG59/NARA.  

Cable, SecState to AmbEmbassy, Wellington and Canberra 6 August 1973, DOS:CFP.  

Cable, Wood, AmEmbassy Wellington, to SecState, 13 August 1973, DOS:CFP.  

Cables, Annenberg, AmEmbassy London, to SecState, 6 July 1973 DOS:CFP.  


Cable, Rogers to AmEmbassy Wellington and Canberra, 6 August 1973. On UK views of Chile’s “dismal” economic performance to this point, see Letter, G.J MaGillivray, Bank of England, to Hunter, FCO, 26 July 1973, FC07/2426/TNA.  

DIA Intelligence Summary, 2 August 1973, CDP-DOD.  


See Otero, Razón y Fuerza, pp.16-24 and Davis, LTY, pp. 196-198.  

DIA Intelligence Summary, 24 August 1973, CDP-DOD.  

Memorandum for the 40 Committee, enclosure, Rob Roy Ratcliff to Kissinger, 10 August 1973, CDP-NSC.  

Ultima Hora published a list of embassy staff supposedly working for the CIA on 15 August. Cable, Davis to SecState, 15 August 1973, DOS:CFP and Davis, LTY, pp.190-1.  

Cable, Davis to SecState, 10 August 1973, DOS:CFP.  

Kissinger as cited in Memorandum, Richard T Kennedy to Kissinger 15 August 1973, CDP-NSC and Jack Kubisch Interview (1989), FD.
40 Davis, LTY, pp.152-4. On possible private Argentine sources of funding for Chilean paramilitary organisation Fuerzas Nacionalistas de Ataque (FNA) see CIA Information Report, 28 August 1973, CDP-CIA.
41 This was denied by Banzer. Cable, Brewin, AmEmbassy, La Paz to SecState, 24 August 1973, DOS:CFP.
42 Gaspari, Ditadura Derrotada, p.348 and Davis, LTY, p.154.
43 Prats, Memorias, pp.394-6 and Intelligence Telegram, 23 July 1973, CDP-CIA.
44 Davis, LTY, pp.331-332.
45 "Chile Contingency Paper: Possible Military Action", Ad Hoc Interagency Working Group on Chile, enclosure, Memorandum, Pickering to Scowcroft, 8 September 1973, Box.2196/RG59/NARA [Hereafter: IG Contingency Paper, 8 September 1973]. On DOS' desire to be in a position to "influence the situation, see also Kornbluh, p.112.
46 Leacock, Requiem for Revolution, Chapters 9-10.
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50 Ismael Huerta Díaz, c. July 1973, as quoted in Fernandois, Mundo y Fin de Mundo, p.357
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53 Sigmund, Multinationals, p.167.
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57 Corvalan to Pajetta (PCI) as quoted in Haslam, Assisted Suicide, p.175.
58 Otero Interview, Oña Interview (2) and Vazquez/Cubillas Interview (1).
59 Oña Interview (2).
61 Quiroga, Conpañeros, p. 83.
62 Oña Interview (1).
63 Oña Interview (1) and Estrada Interview.
64 Cable, Schneider, AmEmbassy New Delhi, to Kissinger, 15 September 1973, DOS:CFP.
65 Estrada Interview. On Allende’s aversion to civil war see Laura Allende as quoted in Davis, LTY, p.244.
66 Estrada, Testimony, 2003, CMSA.
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69 Cable, Davis to SecState, 30 July 1973, DOS:CFP.
70 Estrada, “Allende’s Death In Combat” Tricontintal, p.10 and Oña Interview (1). See also, Timossi, GA, p.95.
71 Vazquez/Cubillas Interview (1).
72 Otero, Razon y Fuerza de Chile, p.58, Estrada Interview and Timossi, GA, p.96.
73 Otero Interview and Oña Interview (1).
74 Oña Interview (2).
75 Quiroga, Conpañeros, pp.251-2. According to these testimonies, they also had fifty Walther P-50 submachine guns that did not come from the Cubans.
76 Estrada Interview. Estrada says Havana trained and armed ten MAPU members before the coup.
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