Discourses of World Kinship and the United Nations: The Quest for a Human Family

By
David Mole

A thesis submitted to the Department of International Relations of the London School of Economics for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

London, December 2009
SIGNED DECLARATION

I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the PhD degree of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work.

I authorise that, if a degree is awarded, copies of the thesis presented by me for examination for the PhD degree shall be deposited in the libraries of the London School of Economics and Political Science and of the University of London and that my thesis shall be made available for public reference, inter library loan and copying.

I authorise the School to supply a copy of the abstract of my thesis for inclusion in any published list of theses offered for higher degrees in British universities or in any supplement thereto, or for consultation in any central file of abstracts of such theses.

I authorise the School or its designated agents to make copies of my thesis for the purposes of inter-library loan and the supply of copies or for retention as the archival copy.

The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is permitted, provided that full acknowledgement is made. This thesis may not be reproduced without the prior written consent of the author.

I warrant that this authorisation does not, to the best of my belief, infringe the rights of any third party.

I understand that in the event of my thesis not being approved by the examiners, this declaration will become void.

Signed:

[Signature]

Date: 01/02/2010

February 1st, 2010
ABSTRACT

This thesis investigates the discourses of world kinship that are bound up in the founding documents of the United Nations such as the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. These discourses have constituted a sense of mission for the United Nations throughout its history. Building a human family from the fragmentary reality of world politics has become a widely stated purpose not just of the UN, but of politicians and NGOs through into the contemporary period.

In light of the impracticability of these sentiments, the thesis aims to trace their origins, meanings, and continued appeal. Beginning with the planning process of the United Nations, I show how the UN resulted from a highly exclusive State Department enterprise. The small planning circle believed that the organisation should be imbued with the most visionary ideals. Today the discursive landscape favours such statements as the ideal of the family of nations much less, and yet such discourse remains a resource for those seeking an idealistic vision of world politics.

I argue that kinship discourse endures because of its particular cognitive facility, but that its continued usage is problematic. Kinship discourses may be used flexibly to draw boundaries between in-groups and the 'Other' in world politics in ways that enable us to reconceptualise Schmittian decisionism. Further, understanding usages of kinship discourse presents us with an image of a world which is sometimes incapable of defining its interests and identity coherently. While being potentially useful tools for engineering emotive consensus, the modes of discourse employed are Western in nature and can easily slip into registers which are seriously counter-productive to UN projects. Thus, a case may be made that the UN, and world politics in general, will eventually rethink the notion that a 'human family' is the ultimate goal of international life.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Back in 2005 I applied for this PhD over a lunch of reheated pizza and the warm remnants of a bottle of white wine. It all seemed like such a jolly wheeze. The first twelve or eighteen months flew by and the questions I was thinking and writing about seemed perplexing and stimulating. Then, at some indefinable point, a creeping dread took hold. Not only did I have to ask interesting questions but I had to find ways to answer them as well. A kind of mental version of athlete’s foot set in as I pictured another year and a half of turning over the same problems again and again until I could resolve them.

About four hundred times along the route of researching and writing the final parts of this thesis I have gravely considered throwing in the towel and trundling off to do something simpler. Lack of funds, sleep and inspiration often convinced me that this was a crackpot undertaking. I realise now that have spent much of 2008 and 2009 rambling about chapter deadlines, burbling incoherently about kinship and metaphors and muttering darkly about the United Nations and an egg-shaped man called Leo Pasvolsky. A thousand times I have been trying to have sensible conversation with someone and found myself not talking, but just wittering. Wittering nonsensically like a castaway suddenly introduced to high society and stimulant beverages at the same time. What a nightmare. I apologise profusely to my family and friends for being distant, stressed and aloof during the last couple of years and for not being able to spend as much time with them as we would all like. Luckily it is now all over and I can hopefully remember how to function like a normal human being again. Left to my own devices I would have collapsed in a heap part way to the end of this project. I certainly would not have got to this point without:

Betsy’s gentle and understanding ability to deal with my worries and panics and to keep me feeling positive and focused. She has been an incredible emotional support. She has also listened to a whole host of rehearsals of the conceptual problems I had with the thesis and helped me see things in new ways.

Kim Hutchings’ wonderful knack of remaining calm and positive even despite missed deadlines and my tendency to waffle on paper and in person. Kim has been a tremendous guide throughout this whole process, and the most insightful and constructive critic imaginable.

Marilyn and Greg’s help, support, patience and trust from the beginning. I promise not to do something this stupid again!

Vicki and Dan for putting up with me when I have been irritable and overworked and for being such top housemates.

The great and universal family of wine-merchants of Kensington and Chelsea who variously decided to employ me so that I could fund this crazy scheme. Their friendship and humour has kept me sane. THANK YOU EVERYONE!
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Signed Declaration .............................................................................................................................2
Abstract ................................................................................................................................................3
Acknowledgments ..............................................................................................................................4
Table of Contents ...............................................................................................................................5

PART ONE – The UN and Universal Discourse: Problems and Approaches .........................................9
Introduction - Putting the UN’s Moral Vision in Question ...................................................................9

CHAPTER ONE - World Kinship Discourse, Selves and Others, and the UN’s Global Order .................19
1.1 The US and the UN Founding Documents ......................................................................................19
1.2 Discourses of World Community and the Human Family – Historical Sediments ..................21
1.3 Metaphors of Distinction in World Politics ....................................................................................28
1.4 The Use of Metaphor: Making Sense of the Public and the Private ............................................33
1.5 Kinship, Politics and International Relations: Rethinking Relationships ....................................36

CHAPTER TWO - The ‘Family of Nations’ Deconstructed and Reconstructed ......................................42
2.1 Constructing The ‘World’ ................................................................................................................42
2.1.1 Discourses and Discoursers .......................................................................................................43
2.1.2 The ‘Family of Nations’ as a Statement of Identity and a Normative Vision ..........................47
2.2 On Discursive Origins ....................................................................................................................50
2.2.1 Tracing Discourses ....................................................................................................................51
2.2.2 Discourse and the Self ................................................................................................................54
2.3 Inside/Outside and the Kinship Metaphor .......................................................................................57
2.3.1 Kinship and the Universal ‘Human’ ............................................................................................57
2.3.2 The Facility of Representational Beliefs in Semi-Propositional Content ...............................59
2.3.3 An Epidemiology of Representations? ......................................................................................61
2.4 What Do Discourses of Universalism Do? .....................................................................................64
2.4.1 The Emergence of ‘Man’ as Universal Object .........................................................................64
2.4.2 Friends/Enemies, Bios/Zoë .......................................................................................................66
2.4.3 Using Notions of the ‘Human’ in Universalist Discourse .................................................. 70
2.5 The Sphere of Kinship: Friend/Enemy Distinctions Rethought .......................................... 74

PART TWO - Creating the UN’s World-Kinship Discourse and Its Place in the UN Bureaucracy ........................................................................................................................................ 77

CHAPTER THREE - Uniting Nations: A Local Project for Global People .................................. 77
3.1 Acts of Creation and the Post-Conflict Moment .................................................................... 77
3.1.1 1945, The Second Chance ................................................................................................. 77
3.1.2 Institutionalisation: A Rational Response? ......................................................................... 81
3.2 Key Actors – The Planners of the New World Order ............................................................. 85
3.2.1 Franklin D. Roosevelt ......................................................................................................... 85
3.2.2 Secretary of State, Cordell Hull and Under-Secretary, Sumner Welles ................................ 89
3.2.3 Leo Pasvolsky .................................................................................................................... 93
3.3 Outside Influence? Limiting The Space For Debate ............................................................. 97
3.3.1 US Domestic Pressures for Secrecy .................................................................................. 97
3.3.2 America And Its Allies ....................................................................................................... 103
3.3.3 Making Up The Numbers .................................................................................................. 111
3.4 Discourses For The Post-War Moment .................................................................................. 116
3.4.1 An Unsurpassable Vision .................................................................................................. 116
3.4.2 Fear and The Desire for Unity and ‘Kinship’ ..................................................................... 122

CHAPTER FOUR - The Practice of Universal Philosophies: Translating WWII Ideology into Contemporary Policy .................................................................................................................. 125
4.1 The Problematic Survival of Kinship Discourse .................................................................. 126
4.2 ‘Bureaucracy’ as an Ideal Type ............................................................................................ 133
4.3. The UN as a Bureaucracy ................................................................................................... 137
4.4 Methodological Details of the Present Interview Data Collection ...................................... 147
4.5 Philosophy, Language and Values in the Contemporary UN Bureaucracy ....................... 150
4.6 Problems with Kinship Discourse – Ineffectiveness and Ethnocentricity ......................... 152
4.7 Building the ‘Family of Nations’ or, Kinship Discourse Isn't Working .............................. 155
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BOOKS AND ARTICLES</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARCHIVAL SOURCES BY COLLECTION AND DATE</td>
<td>325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WEB SOURCES</td>
<td>332</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX A: UN CHARTER</td>
<td>344</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX B: UNDHR</td>
<td>347</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX C: LEAGUE COVENANT</td>
<td>349</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX D: UNSC PROVISIONAL MEMBERSHIP</td>
<td>350</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
PART ONE – The UN and Universal Discourse: Problems and Approaches

INTRODUCTION - Putting the UN’s Moral Vision in Question

“...if our system is indeed the best, and my religion the truest, then keep me faithful to both of them, and bring the rest of humanity to adopt the same way of life...”¹

“today's world of strife is like a powder keg. In such a volatile environment, we need to do everything we can to keep differences, rivalries, hatred and ignorance from erupting into violence. But even that, vital as it is, is not enough...The Alliance (of Civilisations) gives us a chance. A chance to consign identity-based divisiveness to the past — something we should have done long ago. A chance to recognize our common humanity before it is too late.”²

The will to eradicate difference in the global inter-relation of human beings or to nullify the perceived ‘problems’³ that difference creates, are recurrent dreams in the history of world politics. As an entreaty to a divine power, a credo for a national sense of self, or a basis for political manifesto making, difference has been commonly addressed by war-makers and peace-makers alike as a problem to be solved, a divide that seems to demand to be bridged. For instance, the expansion of the sphere of Roman influence by military force was followed up by the policy of remaking the barbarian tribesmen of Gaul, Bithynia or Britain into dependable Roman citizens. The tutelary and missionary aspects of European colonialism from the Spanish conquest of the Americas through to nineteenth century religious expeditions in Africa and East Asia were invigorated by the same transformative zeal⁴. As Tacitus mockingly notes in his description of the transformation of the culture of Britain, the ‘gift’ of the ‘civilisation’ of the powerful is arguably imperium through uniformity: “(A)nd so the population was gradually led into the demoralising temptations of arcades, baths, and

sumptuous banquets. The unsuspecting Britons spoke of such novelties as ‘civilisation’, when in fact they were only a feature of their enslavement.”

Power, and particularly power which confers a feeling of absolute, hegemonic or moral authority, has the tendency to fuel such a will to uniformity, to integrate the ‘other’ into the group, to bestow upon them the gifts and insights which propelled the powerful to their exalted position. Following Todorov’s presentation of the dilemma of the ‘other’ in The Conquest of America, the conquistador is either a Las Casas or a Cortés, a converter or a killer, whose zeal may not be as jaded as that of Tacitus. The encounter, as Todorov describes, was filtered through two possible beliefs. Either ‘difference’ between the Spanish and the Indians was take as a mirage, the natives thus being ripe for transformation into Catholic subjects; or, on the other hand, if the natives’ alterity was perceived as being insurmountable, then, as Cortes asked: “(W)ho can deny that the use of gunpowder against pagans is the burning of incense to Our Lord?”

This binary logic is certainly helpful though not definitive. A significantly varied spectrum of responses to the other is observable, even within the period of the Spanish Conquest for instance. As Inayahtullah and Blaney sensibly point out, “the truly difficult work is to sort out the similarities and differences among processes of proletarianizing, feminizing, racializing, and...indianizing others.” In the encounter between powerful groups and weaker groups we are shown the potential range of human narrative practices, and that breadth is made all the more apparent, by the hubristic sense of self that often comes with power.

The focus of the present investigation is on perhaps the most imposing attempt yet made to ‘bring the rest of humanity to adopt the same way of life’, through the development of the universal moral project instantiated in the founding of the United Nations. Reflecting upon the increasingly fragile situation in Europe in the 1930s, the American Academy of Political and Social Science produced a series of yearly collections of articles by mainly American authors, debating the failure of “the American pattern of the European peace settlement of

---

1919 and the vast array of plans for a new peace that American scholars and politicians were already preparing for Europe. As one writer put it, this drive for peace planning in a war that had yet to begin (and in which most Americans in the late 30s and early 40s had no intention of being involved), was arguably demonstrative of “the puritanical devotion of Americans to quick solutions...and...other plans for saving humanity.” Planning by the US government for what would become the United Nations began in 1939, two years before America would decide to enter World War Two.

The outcome of the planning procedure was a set of documents closely modelled on the American Declaration of Independence and the United States Bill of Rights. The UN Charter and the UN Declaration of Human Rights in particular represent a grand manifesto purporting to provide “for the first time in history, a universal creed” for the improvement of humanity. As well as the establishment of an ‘enlightened’ sense of ‘mission’ in preserving peace, developing a common standard of human rights, and bringing the benefits of liberty to the colonial territories of the European Empires, the international machinery of the United Nations and its auxiliary bodies has long been discussed in terms of reinforcing and making more inclusive, a community, or ‘family’ of nations. The UN founding documents are monuments in a discourse which argues for the need for and the existence of, not only common human values and purpose, but also common substance and moral truth. They claim, by their very desire to apply to all human life, to represent the pinnacle of political goals, and an unsurpassable vision for the human future.

The first major thrust of this thesis is to examine the logical drive to universalism manifest in the rhetoric and doctrine of the United Nations, the second thrust is to explain the significance of metaphorisation of universal assimilationist rhetoric in terms of worldly kinship. The contribution of this work then, is a species of intellectual history of the UN, though not quite in the same vein as the UN’s own ‘Intellectual History Project’. While the

---

10 Feller, A. (1953) United Nations and World Community p30
works published by this project\textsuperscript{11} and various international organization scholars\textsuperscript{12} look at the UN’s intellectual contributions to global politics in the form of concrete norms, agreements or changes in policy established through some branch of UN endeavour, my focus is instead on a broader level of analysis. The concern of this thesis is that level of discourse which sits above the technical workings of UN bodies month by month or year by year. It is those statements of global vision, unity, notions of a desirable ‘human family’ - discourses which seem to encompass almost everything, but whose concrete meaning and referents are difficult to determine.

Along with Ricoeur, I take the stance that, when the investigator’s focus moves from linguistic analysis to discourse analysis, “the issue is no longer the \textit{form} of the metaphor...nor even just the \textit{sense} of metaphor...but the \textit{reference} of metaphorical statement as the power to ‘redescribe’ reality.”\textsuperscript{13} Ricoeur further insists, “(T)he metaphorical ‘is’ at once signifies both ‘is not’ and ‘is like’. If this is really so, we are allowed to speak of metaphorical truth, but in an equally ‘tensive’ sense of the word ‘truth’.”\textsuperscript{14} This notion of ‘tension’ inherent in metaphorical descriptions coincides with Vico’s maxim that human beings make their world in those instances or thought projects when complete understanding is lacking - ‘\textit{homo non intelligendo fit omnia}’. As Vico states, “when he (man) does not understand, he makes (things) out of himself.”\textsuperscript{15} As suggested above, the difficulty of grasping the vast totality of human political relations lends itself to metaphorical encapsulation harbouring a disjunction between the all-encompassing scope of statements of the world-as-family, and the lack of clarity of what such a notion really entails.

Forming notions that the world may be conceptualised in terms of family is a particular way of ‘organising our view’\textsuperscript{16} of global politics which demands explanation both in terms of how such a metaphor works and what it does when it is employed. Part of the method of

\begin{thebibliography}{10}
\bibitem{13} Ricoeur, P. (2003) \textit{The Rule of Metaphor: Multi-Disciplinary Studies of the Creation of Meaning in Language} p5
\bibitem{14} Ibid. p6
\bibitem{16} This formulation of the work of metaphor is attributable to Max Black and his seminal article ‘Metaphor’ in Black, M. (1962) \textit{Models and Metaphors: Studies in Language and Philosophy}.
\end{thebibliography}
providing such explanation is enabled by what James Fernandez recognises as the most important contribution of social anthropology to the study of metaphor, namely the "insistence upon the role of culture in the formation of metaphoric models with which various peoples reason." In other words, aspects of the usage of metaphor may be organised with relation to the values culturally placed upon components within the metaphor, in this instance, the meanings of 'family' within the Western culture that gave rise to UN rhetoric.

By virtue of its designation as the foremost (ideally) non-partisan international authority on matters of human welfare, the United Nations has been conceived as carving out a role of moral authority within world politics. The very fact of this authority places great importance on understanding the role of the grand visions of world unity held out by the UN in shaping the aims and practice of international politics. Further importance is added by the fact that this discourse, formally adopted in the UN founding documents has widely diffused and is today replicated time and again by political figures, the media and NGOs, as will be shown in later chapters. Metaphors of kinship – notions of the 'human family', the 'family of nations', 'international brotherhood' and so on – are a prevalent way of representing grand visions of world unity. I argue that such statements are of greater metaphorical import than other notions of unity - partnership, community and so on. They imply shared substance rather than simply alliance and thus speak not of the uniting of a world of different entities, but embody an envisioning of a world without difference. In this respect, they are among the most unrealistic of visions of the future.

I propose that the individualistic discourses of the post-Enlightenment West have suppressed the realm of kinship to a subservient position within cultural system of values. It is the private, feminised, insignificant partner to the masculinised world of economic and political action. This suppression leads us to assume that when we metaphorise politics in terms of kinship, this is meaningless linguistic felicity, that such assertions have no character or

---


13
meaning of their own other than an unequivocal positivity allied to notions of care and nurturance. Rather, I contend that the persistent reappearance of kinship in political discourse — from the ‘family’ of nations, to the human family, to international brotherhood or sisterhood — is significant for processes of dividing as well as uniting the world. Rather than being a side-issue, kinship is both a tremendously powerful way of conceiving of, and making patterns of, inclusion and exclusion in politics. Kinship discourses are highly politically significant because of the way that kinship as a symbol is constructed within Western social forms of knowledge. The sphere of kinship is conceived as the anti-political, anti-economic sphere. By holding out world-kinship as a future ideal we avoid practical consideration of present discordance within political life. Further, as Keally McBride argues, kinship, prefigured as the opposite of contractual, political relations, helps support the continuation of the self-serving liberal capitalist world which it symbolically opposes. Kinship cannot be the Utopian ‘alternative’ without the existence of that fractious political status quo by which it is defined. Thus, the idea of world-kinship (as symbolically conceived) logically supports the existence of the current order of self-interested politics and economics. Were that order not to exist, kinship could not have the positive valuation it enjoys in formulations such as the UN’s mobilisation of the notion of the human family.

The paradoxical quality of these discourses prompts the set of investigations of this thesis. On the one hand, the use of these metaphors in attempting to elide difference is vague, self-deluding and in some ways, presents a hoped-for state of international relations that might well be said to be impossible to reach and out of touch with present or historical conditions. These paradoxes raise the central questions to be tackled in the main empirical chapters:

1) How did the ‘universal’ ideals of kinship and brotherhood of the UN founding documents come to exist through the design process of the organisation?

2) Are such ideals as the human family as self-evident or useful in the work of contemporary UN staff as the planners of the organisation imagined they would be?

3) What are the typical modes of using kinship discourse to speak about world unity?

4) How do these metaphors compare with other ways of envisioning the world? What work are they employed to do?

5) Why do such metaphors make sense in certain contexts but not others, and why do they continue to hold appeal given their vagueness and Utopianism?
6) What cultural and historical meanings are embedded in such kinship metaphors?
7) Given their vagueness and ethnocentricity, how useful an ideal is ‘human kinship’ in today’s globalised world? Do we need more practical visions of world unity?

These questions are opened out more fully in the following two chapters. Chapter One introduces the universal ideals of the UN, and the paradoxes thrown up by speaking in universal terms in a divided world. It also opens the discussion of trajectories of thought that have inspired the UN master discourses, and the ways of relating to the world and the ‘other’ that are embodied therein. The latter parts of the chapter put forward in brief the argument that thinking of the world as kin and non-kin is not only cognitively and socially cohesive in Western modes of thought, but crucial as a mode of dealing with graded and ambivalent distinctions in a complex international sphere of allies and enemies. Chapter Two puts forward the philosophical and anthropological theory which underpins the gathering and analysis of the subsequent historical and political data.

The original contribution of the thesis stems from the novel methodological approaches taken to the analysis of the idea of the family of nations and associated concepts. The set of inquiries, while rooted in IR topics are very much anthropological and philosophical in nature. Questioning the notions of the family of nations at the heart of the UN project does not lead into an institutional history as such, or into specific study of the effectiveness of particular UN policies20. Even the works of the UN Intellectual History Project21 do not address the broadest social and philosophical assumptions which underpin the possibility of such an organisation existing in its present form. This is one gap that this thesis intends to fill. In looking at how and why the West believes in and uses the notion of the world-as-family, the UN is actually only a case-example. It is a critical example because, at the end of the Second World War, the Western world embedded this quixotic world family metaphor as

the grandest goal of the overarching world organisation that has become a global moral and political authority. Thus, rather than being a critique of, or laudatory for the UN based on practical assessment of its values and policies, my analysis is based upon the philosophical, political and social implications of this core goal of world-kinship which lies behind the UN's projects.

A second key contribution the thesis makes is in looking at the notion of kinship as a mechanism for espousing universal projects and values which actually divide the world. Several attempts at rethinking the work of Carl Schmitt have taken place in recent decades, but kinship discourses as principles of distinction have yet to be coherently addressed. This thesis fills that gap, suggesting that Western modes of conceiving of kinship as a social and anti-political ideal lend great flexibility to kinship as a way of making political decisions. Kinship can be used to exclude, but at the same time offer the potential for re-incorporation into the in-group. The multiplicity of ways of 'being' kin in Western formulations renders the Schmittian moment of decision unstable. ‘Kinship’ is defined both as a ‘natural’ marker of unchanging substance but also as a relationship based on behaving according to the character of relations expected of kin. Thus, decisions of inclusion and exclusion may be ambivalent and incomplete.

In the second part of the thesis, Chapter Three presents a detailed archival investigation of the history of the founding of the United Nations, and the derivations of the discourses embodied in its great texts. From this point in the thesis, empirical evidence is laid out to answer the above questions and advance the following key arguments. In this historical chapter, I highlight the very limited group of actors involved in the production of a vision that was purportedly derived from a global will. I argue that the ‘universal’ values of the UN were not produced through global consultation and dialogue, but that instead a systematic process of limiting external contributions to the planning process was made by the Roosevelt government. From this small circle, the conviction that the UN needed potent, emotive ideology to succeed and inspire the world was imbued into the founding documents.

Naturally the languages chosen reflected the Western, Christian backgrounds of most of the contributors.

Chapters Four to Six display original contemporary research focusing on the two principal strands of inquiry. Chapter Four looks at how UN officials themselves administer the global vision of the UN, and considers the disjunction between the feeling of the UN planners that kinship values were required at the centre of the organisation to motivate members, and the counter-productivity of such rhetoric in UN bureaucratic work today. Chapters Five and Six look at the political rhetoric used by the UN, NGOs and politicians in recent crises where attempts have been made to transform the edges of ‘civilisation’ to bring more peoples within the scope of membership of the ‘family’ of nations. These chapters map the contours of the overall discourses of human unity, comparing, for instance, usage of the now-hegemonic notion of ‘international community’ with kinship metaphors. Chapter Five looks at a humanitarian crisis in the shape of the conflict in Darfur between 2003 and 2005, where notions of responsibility to protect part of the human family were deployed. Chapter Six investigates the incarceration of terrorism suspects at Guantánamo Bay and modes of speaking of the limits of a putative human rights community or family. Here I show how the niches within discourse where kinship is deployed are quite specific. General, aspirational, and emotive statements are made and kinship performs a double movement of affirming the values of the in-group while contrasting these against the injustices perceived beyond that group. This said, I argue that Schmitt’s logic of decisionism may be reformed as outlined above, by considering the ambivalent character of distinctions made on the basis of kinship.

Chapter Seven explains in depth the relations of kinship to politics, and of kinship to the development in individual persons of the consciousness of social distance and the other. In particular, the characteristics of Western kinship that give meaning to the metaphorical connection between ‘family’ and ‘humanity’ are laid out. This discussion leads to the aspiration of the concluding Chapter Eight to form a constructive set of critiques of the deployment of kinship rhetoric in world politics. If we wish to explain vague feelings of commonality we must explain not only our desires to express these feelings, but also the mechanisms of language and social logic that enable ambiguity and imprecision to further the applicability of our practices of metaphor. It is the shortcomings of these practices, as well as
our failure to understand our drives to metaphorise the world in the ways we do, (to dream our dreams of world community, say) that cripple our universal projects, such as the UN, with ego- and ethno-centrism.

I argue thus that there are political and philosophical difficulties with envisioning world-making in terms of building kinship. This is a project which cannot be operationalised. These languages are anti-political, lulling the world away from confronting political discord or from addressing the conflict between liberal and communitarian impulses in the UN project. Such discourse, associated with colonial discourse of patriarchal patronage and religious idealism, lends negative symbolic capital to the UN around the world. Such discourse, I argue, shows the propensity in world politics to fall back on comforting ideational templates. Lest we should hold faith in the theorist's ability to define the interests of his or her subject of study, the following work on these vague and impossible discourses of kinship shows us a picture of world which is sometimes unable to define its own interests, values and principles in a coherent way even using the most 'inspirational' of languages at its disposal.
CHAPTER ONE - World Kinship Discourse, Selves and Others, and the UN’s Global Order

1.1 The US and the UN Founding Documents: Self-Evident Truths and Carpe Diem Politics

In the contemporary world, where uni-polar American hegemony has become the status quo, it is perhaps easy to forget the uncertain nature of the rights and visions outlined in the Charter of the United Nations. In this document and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, a language of equal human rights, the preservation of peace, national sovereignty, good neighbour politics, a reliance upon bureaucratic practice, and the exemplary role of the United States become manifest in a form proclaiming a universal set of truths. It can often seem in the Western world that everyone has agreed upon these ‘self-evident’ truths. However, when they are hastily invoked as part of the reason for interventionist wars for the purpose of regime-change, it acts to bring home to us what an attempt to engineer consensus and unity in the international can really mean.

It is important to remember that the confident, optimistic, indeed hubristic tones of the UN founding documents were not indicative of the popular perception of world politics in the mid forties. Indeed, as Carl Friedrich pointed out in 1948, the mood among the Western powers (the fountains of the philosophical grounding of the UN) “contrast(ed) with the mentality after World War I. Then, overwhelming public sentiment...held that the war ‘to end all wars’ had been won for good.” He presents a Gallup poll conducted in July 1946 wherein, in answer to the question “Do you believe there will be a (world) war in the next 25 years?”, 50% of French people, 48% of British people, and 69% of Americans responded in the affirmative. That such a set of documents could be produced and signed amid such general pessimism attests both to the paradoxically closed nature of the process of planning these articles of universal values, and to the desperate war-weariness of most of the nations of the world, most of whom had little input into the documents they would sign at San Francisco in 1945.

---

23 See Appendices A and B, respectively UN Charter and the UN Declaration of Human Rights. In particular, the preambles and initial articles of the two documents are instructive.
24 Friedrich, C.J. (1948) *Inevitable Peace* p3
25 Ibid.
The American domination of the planning of the League of Nations and the United Nations, ensured that values supposedly representative of the whole world, were given to the world by one powerful nation. Indeed many American authors on the eve of World War Two were by no means timid about proclaiming national desire to “apply the principles of our Constitution to the world” and to “prepare the people of the world for some such miracle as happened in Philadelphia in 1787.” As if to suggest that like a lackadaisical pupil, Europe had been 150 years too slow to catch on to simple principles, Clyde Eagleton wrote in the early months of World War Two: “(L)ike the United States under the Articles of Confederation, nations have learned that it is not so bad to work together in a common system...the next step (for humanity as a whole) is obviously that which the Confederation took when it transformed itself into a stronger system.”

The founding documents of the UN are the final expression of an increasingly confident American desire to build a new world order based upon principles of liberty and equality and a notion of the rights of man stemming not only from the desire to right the injustices of two world wars, but to bring the values of the American Revolution to the rest of the world. So thorough was the planning procedure for a “desirable world order” in the State Department, and so early did it commence (September 1939), that when in 1941 the Atlantic Charter was signed, even the British were hopelessly out of touch with what was underway in Washington. The British government sent a missive to the State Department shortly after the meeting of Churchill and Roosevelt with reference to the possibility of co-operation on a post-war international juridical structure. As Secretary of State Cordell Hull notes in his memoirs, the Department had to reply with a note letting the British know, to their annoyance, that their idea for an international juridical organisation would be subsumed within the State Department’s world organisation plan which by 1941 had already been two years in development. By the time the Dumbarton Oaks conference was organised in 1944, the State Department’s modestly titled ‘Tentative Proposals’ constituted “the only detailed

---

27 Ibid. p56
The British assented without many queries to what had been outlined and the Russians submitted a paper that was utterly overridden as it proposed that “talks should be limited to a proposed organization devoted exclusively to security.”

The founding texts of the UN display both a concern with the interconnectedness of a family of nations, and also a notion that there is a universal ‘human’, a standard for the lives of every person and the common values that each nation should strive to ensure for its people. The Declaration of Human Rights encapsulates these twin strands best in proclaiming that “the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom.”

1.2 Discourses of World Community and the Human Family – Historical Sediments

With the European powers shattered, the United States found itself in the position to lead the Western world (and by implication the whole world) for the first time in 1919. Recognition of a truly global role for the United States dawned. As Schlesinger argues, the American political paradigm began quickly shifting from a past moulded by “priding itself on its...distance from the conflicts and corruption of Europe” to a present marked by interdependence with Europe. Woodrow Wilson himself regarded the United States as the “chief interpreter to the world of those democratic principles, which can rid the world of injustice and bring peace and happiness.” While it may be claimed that the institutional model for the UN, the League of Nations, was a case where “the President’s principles conquered Europe,” it was not merely the idiosyncratic desire of one idealist. Rather, as Rob Kroes recounts, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century as their power came to eclipse that of the British Empire, Americans conceived of their own relation to their frontiers, to the ‘others’ beyond the border, to their mission in the world, as an “impetuous forward march of universalism, the universalism of human equality and human rights, symbolizing America as the usher of a new..."
world order.” As confidence grew and a sense of Europe’s moral bankruptcy increased through the years of warfare between 1914-1918, the desire to preserve the mythical ‘city on the hill’ behind the walls of Monroe Doctrine isolation was replaced by a briefly flourishing desire to give the benefits of American liberty to the world.

The Senatorial decision not to join the League plunged the USA back into isolationism. Meanwhile, the failings of the League to prevent, for instance, the Ruhr crisis of 1923, lent scepticism to grand supra-national projects. Throughout the isolationist 1920s, public commentators and scholars in the United States such as John Dewey and Walter Lippmann debated the viability of the concept of democracy, initially in a domestic context, and later with reference to the potential for world community. Dismayed by the control of ‘Big Business’ over government in an age of rapid industrial, capitalistic expansion, Lippmann in particular lamented the disintegration of the connection between the public and government. “Common interests” he claimed, “very largely elude public opinion entirely.” Dewey, on the other hand looked upon the disconnect between the public and government as only a temporary problem. He looked to the gradual process of greater interconnection made possible by more efficient transport and communication as one possible way to turn the face-to-face interactions which build the spirit of local communities into the bedrock for a sense of a ‘global public’. He hoped for “a diffuse and seminal intelligence” based on global communication to help to build a ‘Great Community’ in the world at large.

The fallout of the Great Depression brought the hopeful notion of a community of nations back to the fore in democratic states faced suddenly with expansionary nationalism from fascist states. Throughout the thirties, this notion became more prevalent in the public speeches of Franklin Roosevelt. Crisis upon crisis assailed the League of Nations, particularly the Japanese invasion of Manchuria, Italian aggression in Abyssinia and Hitler’s demilitarisation of the Rhineland. What began as another Monroe Doctrine set of statements


in praise of the unity of the New World against the failings of the Old, was expanded into a genuine discourse of world unity. The crises caused by aggressive nationalism, prompted Roosevelt’s struggle to motivate the American people to come to terms with the fact that the Monroe Doctrine of an unassailable haven protected by oceans, was now outdated.

In order to convince a recalcitrant public, we see Roosevelt beginning to employ a discourse that has remained at the heart of the American consciousness since its founding. In his famous ‘Quarantine Speech’ from 1937, he likened the Japanese to an “epidemic of physical disease” and urged the world to quarantine them in order to protect the health of the international community and for the “maintenance of international morality.” This sounded like too much of an ‘entanglement’ to American ears and was greeted with open hostility. His annual message to Congress in 1939 was veined through with a steely resolve that masked a growing desperation at the American people’s belief in their hemispheric refuge. At this point, we see the re-emergence of a discourse that FDR would surely have known was the best way to motivate the public. He called the United States “the last best hope of earth” and laid out his plan to be an arbitrator in global conflicts, but with no practical commitments towards peacekeeping. His Christmas message to the Pope stressed his appraisal of the increasing interconnectedness of humanity and he began to refer openly in 1940 to isolationism as “a helpless nightmare.”

Over time and through this growing reaction within his administration to the isolationism hanging over his country, Roosevelt had set the State Department, under Cordell Hull and Sumner Welles, to covertly bring about the mechanism of a US-driven interconnected world order. In addition to the peace-keeping that had been the intention of the League of Nations, they sought ways of organising economic re-ordering and international trusteeship at the moment of an anticipated wave of decolonisation. The Four Freedoms speech encapsulated

41 Donovan, F. (1966) Mr. Roosevelt's Four Freedoms: The Story Behind the UN Charter p15
42 Ibid. p16
43 Ibid. p19. Roosevelt envisaged the end result of isolationism as a “nightmare of a people lodged in prison, handcuffed, hungry, and fed through the bars from day to day by the contemptuous, unpitying masters of other continents.” See, Address at the University of Virginia, Charlottesville, VA, June 10th, 1940. Available at: http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=15965. Accessed on 10/12/2009.
what Roosevelt saw as the United States' traditional "faith in freedom under the guidance of God." "Freedom", he said, "means the supremacy of human rights everywhere."44

Through this period we note these same discourses appearing in American media culture and in academic and public debates. A collection of speeches and broadcasts was organised throughout the mid-to-late 1930s by Nicholas Murray Butler, the President of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, under the rubric of the 'Family of Nations'. Statesmen from around the world took part in annual Armistice Day broadcasts to argue for the common identity of man and the rhetoric of Roosevelt's policy re-emerges in some of their contributions. Richard B. Bennett, the Foreign Minister of Canada, made this comment in the Armistice broadcast of 1934 reflecting the 'Good Neighbor' policy outlined initially the year before45: "(S)ecurity based on armaments inevitably means war. Security based on good will and friendly, neighbourly relations, such as exist on this Continent of North American, insures peace."46 Further, we note in Butler's own 1937 speech at the Carnegie Endowment's European Committee in Geneva, the discourse the Roosevelt would use in 1939/40 of the Western Hemisphere as an example to the rest of the world. Butler spoke of the need to begin a 'worldwide federal experiment' rather than to continue with the divisive building of nations. He comments: "(I)t is interesting for an American to be able to point out that from the history of the United States may be found both guidance and encouragement in pursuit of this ideal."47

What Butler refers to is the period between 1781 and 1789 in American history, a time when, he claims, "every single problem with which the world is faced today presented itself in the lives of those 3,000,000 people organized into thirteen conflicting and competing states."48 The federalisation of America during those years is, for Butler, a "lesson which we of the American states can take to our brothers across the sea to show them how."49 It is almost a duplicate of the discourses present in the speeches and writings of Roosevelt's

44 Donovan, F. (1966) Mr. Roosevelt's Four Freedoms: The Story Behind the UN Charter p26
47 Ibid. p362
48 Ibid. p363
49 Ibid. p365
administration\textsuperscript{50}, and echoes the discourses of revolution from those years in the late eighteenth century. The linkage between the twentieth century and the eighteenth here exists in the voices of the writers before the Second World War. Their connections of their own experience to elements of American national myth are not direct reproductions of eighteenth century ideas. The fact that linkages are made however, alerts us to the fact that articles of discourse and meaning within discourse are indeed recyclable even given the disparate web of differences and continuities that relate the two periods.

In his preface to the pamphlet, 'Common Sense', Thomas Paine makes a forceful statement of the global intent and vision of the trans-Atlantic radicals. "The cause of America is in a great measure the cause of all mankind."\textsuperscript{51} The invigorating discourse of common humanity informs Paine’s greatest work, and is the bedrock of his thought. Without wishing to draw too stark a conclusion, the British imperial system - positing a ‘natural’ distinction between classes of people, and between rulers and subjects - is the antithesis of Paine’s viewpoint. Paine’s utter rejection of the hierarchical social systems of Europe is neatly expressed when he asks, “who is there in the world but man?"\textsuperscript{52} It is difficult to overstate just how remarkable a statement Paine is making, all the more so given his matter-of-fact tonality. Indeed, prior to the American and French Revolutions, most societies across temporal and cultural space had operated with strict concepts of internal differentiation that overshadowed a discourse of human commonality, if it were indeed, present. Such a discourse of intrinsic and common humanity which Paine helped popularise, was, Sturzo points out, something largely confined to the texts of religion. It speaks almost prophetically, addressing itself to the widest flock of all. The initial seeds of the conception of a common humanity in the Western world lie in Christianity\textsuperscript{53} and infuse directly into the US Declaration of Independence in the primary claim that that “all men are created equal...(and)...are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights.”\textsuperscript{54} The Roman world for instance, could have no comparable notion as


\textsuperscript{53} Sturzo, L. (1929) International Community and the Right of War p23/4

that of the equality of every man before God and in the eyes of the Divine Creator. This is a point that Paine uses in his argument for the ‘naturalness’ of the rights he champions. Liberty, equality and “the unity of man” are seen as steadfast rights that have been oppressed temporarily by the tyranny of class, arbitrary power and hereditary rule.

In the eighteenth century, Thomas Paine proudly proclaimed that the “American constitutions were to liberty, what a grammar is to language.” A grand sense of human renewal pervades Paine’s work, and also the writings of contemporaneous American statesman that remains a strong discursive referent in the ideas behind the world organisations of 1919 and 1945. Never afraid of the very boldest turn of phrase, Paine states that in a new independent America, “(w)e have it in our power to begin the world over again” and to create “an asylum for mankind.”

Alexander Hamilton addressed the people of New York in similar terms in the first of the Federalist Papers: “(I)t has been frequently remarked that it seems to have been reserved for the people of this country, by their conduct and example, to decide the important question, whether societies of men are really capable or not of establishing good government from reflection and choice.” This is the discourse of the political, moral and social experiment of the New World that is in evidence in the 1930s with Butler. Hamilton’s is a curt dismissal of the political efforts of humans throughout history and this is demonstrative of what Tocqueville calls “the idea of the indefinite perfectability of man.” A high level of equality in society, he claims, produces the notion that every person can improve themselves to a great degree, conditional only upon their ingenuity. Holding common humanity as the most prevalent knowledge complex, and rejecting subject positions defined by class, is arguably productive of the notion that the new country of the “western sons of liberty” could and should improve upon the societies that have gone before.

---

56 Ibid. p95
58 Ibid. p101
60 de Tocqueville, A. (2003 ed.) Democracy in America and Two Essays on America p521
In this sense the discourse of equality opens up conceptual space which was constricted by the limited possibilities of more hierarchical social structures. We might call the discourse of ‘America as example’ a derivative discourse of the discourse of human equality. Certainly though, this derivative discourse would seem a powerful motivator of potential American foreign policy, including the shaping of international institutions through the lens of the founding principles of the American state.

We have begun to tie the conceptions of humanity in the eighteenth and twentieth centuries together loosely around common discourses. It is not my ultimate aim to prove their similarity. A good many differences can be found between the projects undertaken by the protagonists in the late-eighteenth century and the 1940s and the documentary outcomes of their respective works. A surface reading of the UN Charter for instance reveals a gendered aspect (‘equal rights of men and women’62) that has a separate history. The influence of the two world wars is also patently clear, as is Roosevelt’s ‘Good Neighbor’ policy. The Charter is not a reproduction of the eighteenth century documents, but what should be highlighted is the continuing presence, during the planning procedure for the UN, of evidence that the discourses of the age of revolution still retained influence.

A universal vision then lies at the heart of the discourses of the founding texts of the United Nations. Obviously, the promotion of this vision does not sum up the work of an enormously diverse organisation. However, arising from the universal values that the UN is founded upon, are a number of paradoxes concerning the right to delineate the lives of others. Any universal vision must, by virtue of its claim to universality, hold within it the desire to transform those who do not conform. The ways we distinguish those within our sphere of values (universal or not) and those without, is the topic of the next section.

---

62 From the preamble to the UN Charter (1945). See Appendix A.
1.3 Metaphors of Distinction in World Politics: the Other and Processes of World-Making

"We the peoples of the United Nations determined... to reaffirm faith in the fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small... and for these ends... to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbours... have resolved to combine our efforts to accomplish these aims."  

Just six weeks separated the solemn agreement to these glorious aims in late June 1945 in San Francisco, and the first and only belligerent uses of nuclear weapons across the Pacific in August. Not only, as we saw in the previous section, were these 'universal' visions far from the result of universal debate and consensus, but they seemed to be aims to which even their primary authors did not wish to adhere. The deaths of nearly 200,000 Japanese civilians in the wake of the dawning of this 'new world order' attest to the fact that the claim to the equal worth of the human person had, in June 1945, some important caveats. A fascinating aspect of hastily made claims to universal values is how we relate to the 'Others' who we deem to be exterior to our vision. The 'Other' is crucial to all claims to universal values investigated thus far, indeed, the paradox of these statements of universalism, is their lack of universal applicability. This section looks at ways of relating to the 'Other' who fails to fit into the universal ideal, and the limits of popularly invoked modes of 'Othering'.

The proclamations of universal values touched upon so far (such as Paine's writings and the US Declaration of Independence) have emerged in times of crisis and were produced by groups faced by tyrannical oppression. Their proclamations of their equality to their social superiors in the order of the *status quo* were a revolutionary call for transformation and liberation. On the contrary, the declarations of equality after World War Two were made primary by those in a victorious position of great power. The discourses of the UN envisage a core of nations presumed to share the values enshrined in the key documentary statements and also, implicitly, assumed a remaining set of nations and people who have as yet, failed to agree to the common values and aspirations. It is these 'Others', against whom the United

---

63 From the preamble to the UN Charter (1945). See Appendix A.
Nations “have resolved to combine our efforts”\(^{64}\) in accomplishing the aims of equality, peace and security.

As Charlotte Girard argues, this assertion of commonality is “a necessary yet always fictional condition to achieve world-making.”\(^{65}\) Girard further asserts that claims to community, let alone kinship (as in the human family) are unnecessarily specific for delineating a social and political space in projects of world re-making. Girard’s argument, as will be shown in Chapter Four, is borne out in the experiences of UN staff. Languages such as that of the human family are not only described as being of little practical use in motivating support for UN projects, but actually may be counter-productive to consensus building. In fact, the world-making propensities of the United Nations, by infusing their discourse of unity with notions both of community and family, layered over a vaguer base of commonality, actually strengthen the boundaries and the exclusivity of their putative social space.

Couched in moralistic and semi-religious terms (“the advent of a world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief”\(^{66}\)), the foundational texts of the United Nations attempt to position, through their use of notions of community and family, any opponents as ‘Others’ who are in the minority, and in a morally negative position. What it is important to note however, is the mutability of the supposed boundary lines between the functioning core of nations, and the exterior Others who are deemed unbelievers in those universal principles required for the promotion of “social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom.”\(^{67}\) The prominent logics of making political distinctions, which are used in contemporary social theory often seem too rigid to make sense of the way the community of nations draws its boundaries of inclusion and exclusion. In particular, over the course of the following chapters, the mechanisms of kinship metaphors as principles of distinction will be contrasted with notions of Schmittian friend/enemy distinctions which have taken such a firm grip on IR scholarship. By way of introduction however, world-kinship metaphors are here situated with relation to Schmitt on the one hand and Said’s Orientalism on the other.

\(^{64}\) From the preamble to the UN Charter (1945). See Appendix A.


\(^{66}\) Preamble to the United Nations Declaration on Human Rights (1948). See Appendix B.

\(^{67}\) Preamble to the United Nations Charter (1945). See Appendix A.
This begins to locate the work of kinship discourse within the scope of common alternative principles of making distinctions in the world.

The practice of using a purportedly universal statement of commonality to define a standard for humanity would seem to be a Schmittian political decision *par excellence*. Schmitt's "insistence on the centrality on antagonistic relations" seems plausible in this statist proclamation which holds a distinct power to produce conforming subjects, and to deny the validity of other truths about the human condition. However, the United Nations, blessed with a position of great power and authority in 1945, made sure not to make an explicit friend/enemy distinction in its foundational rhetoric. Instead it went to great pains to proclaim a universalism that was, and remains, no reflection of world politics.

The reincorporation for instance, of Japan and Germany into the notional core of the international community over the past fifty years would seem to be an important example standing in contradiction to Schmitt's notion that defining a commonality (to use Girard's terminology) must be a question of the definition of the right to exist and the right to destroy the 'Other'. Indeed, as Mary Hampton has argued, a central component of the liberal internationalist (Wilsonian) impulse in American foreign relations since Versailles is the belief in the need to rehabilitate rather than destroy former enemies. The formulation of who lies within and without the conceptual boundary defined by the 'shared values' of the UN, is more complex than state-made notions of friend and enemy as Schmitt formulated them. It has already been noted that for the United States, the principal purveyor of those 'shared values', it was permissible to contravene them spectacularly in the cause of bringing a swift, if morally questionable end to World War Two. On the other side of the fence, the conceptual 'Other' has changed many times since 1945. In the planning process when the UN was being designed, the greatest stimulus, especially with respect to the insistence on common human worth and rights, was outrage at the Holocaust. Ending the war by decimating Japanese cities was justified by Truman in that "a beast had to be dealt with as a beast." Kennan's 'Long

---

69 Hampton, M. (1995) 'NATO at the Creation: US Foreign Policy, West Germany and the Wilsonian Impulse' in *Security Studies* 4(3) p616. As Hampton further notes, this rehabilitation impulse visible at Versailles and then later at San Francisco replicates in turn the rehabilitation of France after 1815 by the Concert of Europe.
70 Harle, V. (2000) *The Enemy With A Thousand Faces: The Tradition of the Other in Western Political Thought and History* p87
Telegram' of 1946 soon placed a supposedly expansionist, Godless power that was bent on world revolution as the arch-enemy of the liberty of the US/UN canon of values.71 Latterly, significant ‘Others’ have been embodied in discourses of radical Islamist terror groups, the ‘China Threat’72 discourse, and the supposed ‘barbarism’ of oppressive regimes and civil war making in sub-Saharan Africa.

Certainly the authority of being able to “make the Orient speak”73 is central to the elucidation of global world-making practices. “What he says and writes,” Said argues, “is meant to indicate that the Orientalist is outside the Orient, both as an existential and as a moral fact.”74 A great number of the discourses of Said’s ‘orientalism’ have been prevalent in Western discussion of the various threats to the vision outlined in the United Nations’ version of the future. The defining features of the orientalised ‘Other’ in Said’s discussion of early twentieth works of Louis Massignon and Hamilton Gibb75, are a-temporal stasis and an absence of progress76, and a reductive view of Arab society as in petrified thrall to its religiosity, with Islam having “an ultimate precedence over all life in the Islamic Orient.”77

In the diverse collection of international ‘Others’, we can define neither a common reason nor logic for their status as ‘Others’, nor a common policy towards them. As Said demonstrates, focusing only on the Western appreciation of the Islamic world, the corpus of knowledge built up to situate the ‘Other’ may claim that the latter is “antihuman, incapable of development, self-knowledge or objectivity, as well as uncreative, unscientific, and authoritarian.”78 Since 1945, multiple discourses have been mobilised to set various ‘Others’ as outcasts from the community and to situate their actions in opposition to a principle of ‘world’ orthodoxy, usually as embodied by discourses close to those of the UN.

71 Harle, V. (2000) The Enemy With A Thousand Faces: The Tradition of the Other in Western Political Thought and History p89. The object of Kennan’s telegram was, of course, the USSR.
74 Ibid. p21
76 An exemplar of the arguments put forward in Fabian, J. (1983) Time and the Other: How Anthropology Makes Its Object
78 Ibid. p296
Explanation for the malleability of the boundary of the acceptable members of the international community is hard to find either in Schmitt or Said. Friends have become enemies since 1945 and enemies have become friends. The socialist world could only tenuously be racialised, and it was represented as having little of the allure that led nineteenth century colonialists to feminise Africa or India. Far from a universal agreement on values, the United Nations has had to rationalise and confront an extraordinarily diverse set of challenges (Communism, war, civil war, genocide, terrorism, state collapse, people trafficking) which have seemed to contradict the idea of a shared value system in a bewildering variety of ways. And yet, a clear discourse of where the boundaries lie is maintained through political discourse and action and media rhetoric to the present day, of how Britain and America remain within the community despite warlike aggression, of how Zimbabwe is bordering on international pariah status and how much of the Muslim world is viewed with suspicion for wholly different reasons.

The metaphorisation of the core, value-sharing international community in terms of kinship has been neglected as a mode of the explanation of our principles of distinguishing the boundaries of that community. This is despite the prevalence of the use of this metaphor; as one author rightly sums up: "(D)eception of the human family as an ideal to be pursued is far from original. Indeed, it is so common as to be nearly a cliche." Rather than being a cliché however, both the prevalence of this metaphor and its commonplace dismissal are significant. A focus on the mutability of Western notions of kinship provides a useful additional model in seeking to explain the logics of seemingly capricious practices of boundary-making. Fictive kinship is a crucial but neglected mode of distinguishing ‘us’ and ‘them’ in world politics.

---

1.4 The Use of Metaphor: Making Sense of the Public and the Private

Many anthropological and sociological studies which have reflected upon the individualistic cultures and philosophies of the Western world, have noted the tendency for the domestic, private sphere of life to be placed in a conceptually inferior position to the sphere of political, public action. Indeed, an enormously diverse literature extends through philosophy, political science, history, gender studies and anthropology aiming at unpicking the assumptions and putative categorical division of the world that underpin, not only the suppression of the concern with kinship in favour of individualism, but also by association, the restrictive expectations upon the lives of women. As Terrell Carver writes: "(B)ehind public man there is a private world to which woman is consigned through omission, tradition, nature, and explicit theorization." As we argued, following McBride above, kinship in Western logic is conceived as the anti-political sphere. It is feminised and dismissed as irrelevant to politics. There are several modes of downplaying kinship, all connected to this symbolic association of kinship as a domain of anti-political life.

The implicit alliance of power, politics, public life, competition, cultural achievement and masculinity in opposition to an aggregation of weakness, kinship, domestic life, nurturing, natural instinct and femininity has remained a potent organising mode of Western social life that continues to provide feminist scholarship with a formidable scholarly task and political agenda. All of these categorisations and their unquestioned acceptance have been thoroughly critiqued in the past thirty years, and the study of kinship itself has come into question. The study of 'relatedness' has seemed to contain fewer assumptions about a notional domain of life, and a more reliable focus on discourse and practice of constructing relatedness rather than on the structures of kinship. It remains the case though that, as Jacqui Stevens notes: "(K)inship and political society are attended to simultaneously in discussions of 'primitive' or 'tribal' societies of Africa (and those pre-modern societies in Asia and the Americas that..."

---

82 See in particular, the reconfigurations of kinship studies made in response to Schneider, D. (1984) – A Critique of the Study of Kinship
resemble them), while a private/public heuristic is frequently relied on by political scientists to render invisible aspects of the (European) state. Where a new literature on Western kinship practices has emerged, it has been on subjects driven to the margins by mainstream society – creation of kinship in same-sex relationships, practices of adoption, abortion and the New Reproductive Technologies.

The implications of this ‘rendering invisible’ have been discussed at great length particularly in feminist scholarship on the triumph of the public and political sphere in becoming the legitimated and legitimating sphere in which rights and citizenship were first debated. Carole Pateman’s work on the grand Western tradition of political theory derived from a social contract between men is extremely persuasive in its explanations of two of the central implicitly masculinist premises of such theory in setting up the division between the public and the devalued private spheres. Firstly, she argues, the social contract in political life can only come about based on the favourable (for men) terms of the sexual contract of kin relations. Secondly, in Yuval-Davis’ words, the social contract represents changing the “hegemonic power relations in the society from a patriarchy, in which the father (or the king as a father figure) ruled over both other men and women, to a fraternity in which the men get the right to rule over their women in the private domestic sphere, but agree on a contract of a social order of equality among themselves within the public political sphere.”

Nevertheless, kinship has remained a prominent discursive symbol. However, the trajectories in which it is used still place it as the humblest, smallest level from which other modes of human interaction emanate. It is symbolically the ‘root’ of other modes of social interaction – without it, growth is impossible, yet it is the lowest part of the overall organism. Many works that deal with the metaphor of family, as applied to the universal human community, trace a simple analogy of the principle of social organisation from the family as the most basic kernel of affiliation upwards to the nation state and into the international domain. “Men achieve

---

84 Stevens, J. (1999) Reproducing The State p51
87 Ragone, H. (1994) Surrogate Motherhood: Conception in the Heart
89 Yuval-Davis, N. (1997) Gender and Nation p79
freedom and peace as their loyalties and their sympathies become progressively identified first with the family, then with the tribe, the state, the nation, the hemisphere, and finally expand to include the whole world. It is a mode of optimistic and simplistic extrapolation, and yet fails to explain upon which grounds such identifications may be possible, and on which grounds they may fail. Rational connections – division of labour, survival, nurturing – and connections of affection and identity are presumed to play a role in the transferral of association from the level of kinship to the level of the family of nations.

As a denigrated domain assumed to be irrelevant to political life, kinship has been long neglected in IR studies of discourses of affiliation and distinction. As Stevens says: “(A)nthropology is a discipline that studies kinship – the principles and meanings associated with rendering some insiders and others outsiders…. In the realm of international relations, where we might expect to find some serious interest in the practices that render some populations ‘us’ and others ‘them’, the most influential practitioners display hostility to such concerns.” Stevens’ own argument shows how reckoning kinship is central to the definition of membership of the nation state – “(E)very political society bases rules of inclusion and exclusion on invocations of birth.” Such an argument suggests the close relationship that political authority does indeed have to the definition of kinship, but with reference to the metaphorical practices of the putative family of nations, the only significance of birth is that it is claimed to equally confer and signify humanity.

Stevens’ argument alerts us to the fictive community of the nation, a group which is built (like kinship) in the interpretation and reconstitution of facts of reproduction and inter-generational continuity which may claim an historical ethnic core, a commonality of blood. In any case, the relationship of affect and identity that is claimed to be a feature of the modern nation is suggestively redolent of the sphere of affect and identity which supposedly characterises kinship as Western society characterises it in opposition to politics. Building imagined communities of nationhood, or, for the purposes of the case of UN, internationhood, are often projects founded, in words of Thomas Eriksen, on the belief that the

---

91 Stevens, J. (1999) Reproducing The State p52
92 Ibid. p269
members "have something profound in common – which could be described as metaphorical kinship."\textsuperscript{93}

The importance of kinship for the nation state is almost beyond question. Not only in the politics of representation in terms of national history and unity, but issues of citizenship, population control and even morality, are sites where states attempt to influence kinship. This section has pointed to reasons why the importance of notions of kinship in the international sphere has been downplayed. It is also clear that in terms of international practices of metaphor, our ways of making sense of the world, kinship is important in conveying a sense of the world unity that is desired, and the limits of the community that has been fostered at present. Kinship is, as Stevens notes, a way of rendering ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’, but it is much more than that. It should be clear that this is so in our prevalent use of kinship metaphors to speak in a double-edged way about a human family that has limits, but which we wish to make limitless. In an individualist culture where kinship is devalued, how might our use of kinship as a metaphorical goal for world politics be explained?

1.5 Kinship, Politics and International Relations: Rethinking Relationships

"The last few years have provided numerous examples of groups whose chart of kinship terms does not accurately reflect family attitudes, and vice versa. It would be incorrect to assume that the kinship system constitutes the principal means of regulating interpersonal relationships in all societies."\textsuperscript{94}

The imprecision of the metaphorisation of world politics in terms of kinship in Western writing on the United Nations, and in the discourses and documents of the UN and its planners, stands in stark contrast to the technical rule systems described by many early social anthropologists in their investigations of the kinship systems of stateless societies. In anticipation of a fuller discussion in Chapter Seven, this final section outlines four bases upon which it becomes possible for an extrapolation to be made between a notion of kinship and a notion of an inclusive human community.


\textsuperscript{94} Lévi-Strauss, C. (1963) ‘Structural Analysis in Linguistics and in Anthropology’ in Structural Anthropology Volume 1 p38
The notion of the ‘family of nations’ as expounded in the UN texts is a Western formulation. It does not encompass a great mass of kinship terms or structural rules, nor is it related to any specific notion of common descent other than on the level of the human species. This is where other authors may have been eager to draw simple and direct comparisons between Judaeo-Christian notions of the ‘children of God’ and current Western employment of notions of the family of nations. No descent structure, no putative root, delimits the latter notion, or sets apart a specific genealogical kinship group from others. In fact, the notion of the human family, metaphorical and imprecise as it is, is arguably reducible to three major principles. Western notions of a ‘kinship’ extensible to the whole world are prefigured upon a biological notion of defining kinship which is universalised by concepts derived from Western science of a genetic species commonality of all human. Secondly and in contrast to this first principle, membership of the kin-group entails responsibilities – such as listed in the UN Declaration on Human Rights and the UN Charter – and confers benefits and respected status. As Feller wrote of the new post-colonial signatories of the UN Charter during the Korean War: “eight of its members have achieved full independence, and for them, admission to the UN has meant in the fullest sense of the word, admission to the family of nations.” Thirdly, shared values outweigh considerations about shared substance. In other words, the group is often presented as a family made up of affection rather than rules and terminology.

As the quote from Lévi-Strauss at the start of this section makes plain, all kinship is a matter of both terminology and feeling, and yet, as the recent kinship studies work on the processual creation of bonds of kinship makes clear, modern Western notions of kinship revolve more around feeling than around pre-agreed rules. When David Schneider claimed that kinship had become a “non-concept”, he intended to bring anthropologists’ attention to the use of Western categories for the interpretation of indigenous kinship systems. In

---

96 Feller, A. (1953) United Nations and World Community p123
97 The work of Kath Weston and others on the creation of kinship in same-sex couple adopting families has demonstrated that the processual creation of kinship noted by common practices such as sharing financial burdens, common residence or food-sharing, operate equally in the West. See for instance, Carsten, J. (1995) After Kinship.
short, ethnographers were, he argued, inventing a domain of kinship to map onto local practices. This critique, though valid, turns ethnographic facts upside down. As McKinley comments: "it ignored the diminishing importance of kinship in Western culture, where it has virtually vanished" and also "that most other cultures still highly value kin ties." In a Western culture where we can talk about kinship based on a process of creating it through affection or shared values, we are free to apply the term 'kin' to any people we choose. In a culture where, as in Lévi-Strauss’s examples, ‘the kinship system constitutes the principal means of regulating interpersonal relationships’ it is not a case of free processual creation of kinship and relationships. Rather, it is a rule-governed process. In cultures where kin remain governed by rules situating a person with relation to the subject and prescribing patterns of behaviour consonant with relations of social distance, a free metaphorisation of global kin would both be impossible and non-sensical. Even in societies with more processual, practical modes of kin-creation (co-habitation, food-sharing etc.) where nevertheless well-observed rules govern the success of such a process, a metaphorical extension of a kinship claim to the entire globe would make little sense.

The rules of kinship in the individualist West have been partially broken down to leave a kinship sphere marked keenly by individual choice. We can claim as kin who we wish and it is this malleability of our notions of kinship that permits us to use kinship as a metaphor in world politics. Once the domain of kinship has been impoverished by individualism, it is used to express not the specifics of rules and identity, but the imprecision of feelings of affection, shared values and similarity. These flexibilities noted above constitute the first base for the patterns of applicability of kinship metaphor.

While the surface representations of Western forms of kinship may support such a notion, this ‘flexibility’ of use of kinship as a meaningful trope in Western societies does not render such formulations infinitely variable. Employing the given menu of meanings inherent in Western cultural understandings may encompass various modalities permitting subjects to

100 Ibid.
occupy differing subject positions. Whilst multiple uses of the notion of the family of nations derive meaning from fictive feelings of closeness, shared cultural and spiritual ties — ties explicitly created through affection rather than harbouring even the pretence of natural givenness — may also be derived from the implicit association with ‘natural’ subject positions within the family at the same time. In the above quotation concerning the admission into the family of nations of newly independent former colonies after the Korean War, a similar sense of patriarchal tutelage may be inferred as was explicitly used in the colonial era. As Freud\textsuperscript{102} reminds us, the very notion of family denotes patriarchy — male dominance of a female and offspring makes up the family unit. Freud notes that much early anthropological work on matriarchy observed that family nuclei rarely existed and were absent from kinship terminology. Women lived with children in separate houses, men with their brothers. The use of kinship metaphors to perpetuate colonial patriarchal relations will be further noted in the following chapters. Brysk, Parsons and Sandholtz\textsuperscript{103} review the widespread vestigial usage of such tutelary discourse and policies relating to post-colonial relations in the French Africa, Spanish Latin America and the British Commonwealth. They argue such parent-child constructions produce indulgence of aid and investment in former colonies, but also, more negatively, have lead to incursions upon the sovereignty of the former colony by the former coloniser. This production of a relationship of superiority by kinship metaphors and their lingering association with colonial discourse will be further examined in Part Three. This limited number of subject positions and symbols within western kinship thus constitutes the second base of their applicability.

The third and fourth bases of the UN use of the kinship metaphor explain less the possibility of its use, and more specifically, its desirability. The third base is entwined in the valuing of the kinship sphere in Western social thought. It has been noted how the domestic sphere has been politically debased, and categorised instead as a domain of natural care and support. The kinship sphere, in terms of public action, is deemed worthless, and yet in opposition to the public sphere, when it is portrayed in a positive light, it is in terms of the dependable affection, the support and understanding, the peace that is supposedly characteristic of the safe-haven of the family. In this way, the idealism of kinship, constructed in opposition to the

\textsuperscript{102} See Freud, S. (2001) 'The Return of Totemism in Childhood' in his \textit{Totem and Taboo}

\textsuperscript{103} See Brysk, A., Parsons, C. And Sandholtz, W (2002) 'After Empire: National Identity and Post-Colonial Families of Nations' in \textit{European Journal of International Relations} 8(2)

39
cutthroat world of politics and commerce, displays a host of favourable and attractive tropes for the creation of a new world at the end of a catastrophic conflict. When the UN Declaration of Human Rights speaks of the human family, a multiplicity of notions is embedded in the idea of kinship behind that metaphor which are necessary for the metaphor to convey the required idealist aspiration. Finally, as will be explored in detail in Chapters Two and Seven, the fourth base for the success of this metaphorisation helps to explain its cross-cultural appeal. It is not only the West that would wish for a human family, though for the reasons outlined above, there are specific ways that our notions and use of kinship prompt us to metaphorise politics in this way. Kinship relations are both cognitively extremely useful concepts to use in practices of metaphor and are psychologically important forming grounds for ways in which human beings learn to distinguish between the trusted and the untrustworthy. In terms of the metaphorisation of politics in terms of kinship, the very vagueness of what is meant by a human family helps to preserve this notion across cultures. Such a notion is ‘semi-propositional’\textsuperscript{104}, conveying an indistinct sense of a complete proposition of truth. It is therefore widely interpretable; a diverse selection of meanings can be derived from the simple ideas of ‘human’ and ‘family’ and this re-interpretation and continual debate and re-claiming of meaning ensures the continuation of the discourse. Kinship relations, in terms of the developmental stages of the socialisation of children, generally provide the first principles of distinguishing between ‘us’ and ‘them’ and as such form not only (in most cases) a comparable cultural representation of the ‘safe’ kin environment, but also the first template for practices of distinction between peoples.

Through the chapters that follow, I hope to show that the practice of metaphor in national and international politics needs further consideration. The metaphors we choose speak volumes about the concepts we assume to be true, the representations of the world that we believe in and the desires for the world that we hold. What is more, when we use metaphor, it is often, as in the case of the kinship of the international community, to speak in terms of notions whose value and meaning to us has diminished or is obscure. Metaphors, in their vagueness, may represent concepts which have become indistinct. Through metaphorical discourse, the effects of power can be transmitted in ways that are opaque. If an ideal of human kinship is held out by the West as a universal goal, it remains a kinship that has been

subjected to the vagaries of individual choice, and is blighted by underlying assumptions of patriarchal domination. It remains a sphere of life degraded by comparison to the public world of politics, the static ‘natural’ space of an undervalued version of femininity and a sphere whose image of security may be dubious indeed.

The next chapter lays out the theoretical foundations for the empirical work to follow. To analyse the various discourses that are in play in the later parts of the thesis, a series of frameworks need to be established to enable comparisons of discourse of numerous speakers in differing contexts. In order to be able to provide answers to the questions of why world-kinship discourses exist and what effects they have, a methodology for approaching discourse and discoursing subjects is fundamental.
CHAPTER TWO - The ‘Family of Nations’ Deconstructed and Reconstructed

2.1 Constructing The ‘World’

"human actions and relations are formed through a double hermeneutic: we identify what we do through an account of what we do; words and deeds are equiprimordial" 105

Seyla Benhabib’s formulation of the simultaneity of acting and speaking highlights that whichever strand of social theory, mainstream or critical, we may rely upon to apprehend the world, we are always confronted with actions and discourses together. The channels of causation may differ depending upon theoretical outlook, but the ways in which we talk about the world shape our actions in it, regardless of any ‘objective’ realities confronted by those actions. The central formulation of this commonplace notion under consideration here is, as was discussed in the previous chapter, the widespread political and cultural discussion of a putative ‘family of nations’. This particular discursive formulation as used in and after the formation of the United Nations, is formed in reference to long historical trajectories in the Western world. A fuller mapping of the continuities and innovations inherent in these trajectories will be necessary in order to situate the particularities of the discourse under scrutiny.

For now however, the primary task is to set out the theoretical tools with which to make a useful and reliable investigation of a discourse which, internationally is of great importance. Over the last fifteen years, it has been drawn to the fore in such global flashpoints as humanitarian interventions, pre-emptive wars for the purposes of regime change, and debates over the rights of political prisoners. What happens though, when we claim to trust in the transmission between, on the one hand, our discursive presentations of the world and of ourselves, and on the other hand, our political actions in the world? What sort of perspective allows us to investigate this transmission responsibly?

Discursive presentations of ‘reality’ — hallowed master-discourses with global reach, and everyday micro-discourses of self-situation — these are the prime foci of this thesis, and as such I am speaking in terms of Foucauldian analyses and ‘post-structuralism’ more so than conventional constructivism in an IR sense. However, in situating acts and actors in the context of a powerful discourse of human universalism that inspires and is manifest in a concept of a family of nations, my approach may conceived as largely constructivist. Many of the basic tenets of constructivism form part of my package of theoretical and methodological assumptions. In looking at discursive practices of individuals in creating the UN founding documents, or in the patterns of discourse produced in UN and political debates today, an understanding of the transmission between discursive resources and individual choices is required. In this respect, it is necessary to delineate my methodology in these enquiries from existing debates on the agency/structure problematic. Normative discourses such as that of the family of nations are deployed to make statements about the moral value of the speaker and the in-group and to construct a particular image of the world. Thus considering these discourses overlaps into the territory of constructivist concepts of norms and identity. The following sections situate this enquiry with relation to these constructivist concepts.

2.1.1 Discourses and Discoursers

Considering the discourse of common humanity as embodied in the UN-era entails investigating the problem of the creation and subsequent usage of this instantiation of discourse. Individuals created this ‘universal’ set of values and individuals and organisations choose to deploy these values in their discourse. However, the UN-era did not witness the invention of these notions of the human family, but only their re-invigoration by being set at the heart of the new international architecture. Is such a discourse (or implied norm, as constructivists might say) of human commonality fully a product of normative, moral, discursive structures and the historical developments thereof? Or alternatively, is its particular nature and formulation a consequence of the authorial agency of the human creators?

Contra to the methodological individualism of neo-realist and neo-liberal thinking in the IR mainstream, constructivists from the 1990s onwards “emphasize a process of interaction
between agents and structures; the ontology is one of mutual constitution, where neither unit of analysis — agents or structures — is reduced to the other and made 'ontologically primitive'.

As regards a basic principle in looking at the UN discourses, more subtle analysis might result from accepting this line of reasoning rather than vouching unquestioningly for the primacy of structures or agents. However, the recourse to claiming that a vague process of 'mutual constitution' is at work in all instances, is far from helpful given the plethora of speakers, subject positions and audiences which will be considered over the course of the following chapters.

As pointed out by Pettman, work by neo-realist scholars in the recent past has made an effort to re-incorporate a notion of relational co-constitution into a frame of analysis which still preserves the reified concepts of agency and structure to be used as the bedrock of naturalistic scienticising enquiry. In these terms, the concepts of agency and structure are quite distant from the universe of discourses and discoursers which are under consideration.

For Katzenstein, Keohane and Krasner, constructivism and rationalism are merely “different styles of analysis — ‘thin’ information for rationalists versus ‘thick’ norms and identities for constructivists.” While both they as rationalists, and the constructivists they discuss, apparently share a belief that human “beings operate in a socially constructed environment”, on issues of epistemology and the methodological implications for investigating structuring and structured ‘agents’, they claim that “no great differences divide conventional constructivists from rationalists.”

---

106 Checkel, J. (1998) "The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory" World Politics Vol.50, No.2
108 Katzenstein, P., Keohane, R., and Krasner, S. (1999) ‘International Organization and the Study of World Politics’ in their edited volume Exploration and Contestation in the Study of World Politics p42. Just as in the case of Alexander Wendt, these scholars remain instinctually ambivalent about giving up on empirical, objective inquiry, in other words, taking the science out of social science. Their work has often fought shy of taking an ‘ideas all the way down’ approach, and while leaving them open to accusation of adhering to too many rationalist assumptions, their commitment to the practical process of proving hypotheses in social science remains admirable. As will be later discussed, social anthropology suffered a self-flagellating episode in the 1980s and 1990s when, concerning issues of the potential philosophical impossibility of writing the experiences of others, ethnography itself as a practice fragmented. See Clifford J. and Marcus G. (1986) Writing Culture.
109 Ibid.
Social construction, in such a formulation, is invoked in name, but the implications of the idea for the status of agents and structures are neglected. The work of Giddens on 'structuration'\textsuperscript{111}, and Bourdieu\textsuperscript{112} on structured 'praxis' to name but two prominent examples, though produced in the 1970s, constitute a more sophisticated treatment of this question, and also would seem to fit in a more commonsensical way into the remit of constructivist project.

The enquiries into patterns of discourse presented in the following chapter involve subjects ranging from UN planners in 1940s to UN staff today, from political leaders to writers for global NGOs to Sudanese rebels. All of these speakers are aware of and use articles of common discourses such as that of the human family or the international community. The difficulty with labelling such discourses as 'structures' and assuming we can impute structuring processes to such discourses is that exactly the same discursive articles may be used, but given the varying social and temporal subject positions of the discoursing subject, the character of the discourse-as-structure may vary.

Furthermore, discourses such that of world kinship are both vague in terms of meaning and multivalent in terms of effects. It is not a simple process to discern why an agent deploys them. Also, as will be seen in the comments of UN staff in Chapter Four, it is often hard for actors to describe much more than some imprecise ideas about what these discourses mean. Rather, it is easier to trace the effects of discourses. Sometimes such discourses are deployed as rhetorical tools, sometimes as ways to politically position one's identity in relation to an 'Other'. There are multiple sources of inspiration for such discourses of the world-as-family and for the use of such concepts. These include religious associations, liberal ideologies, historical colonial templates, the cognitive fitness and flexibility of the notion of kinship. Thus in each instance of the use of discourse, the same article of discourse may produce multiple structuring effects and the individual discoursers may be agentive in multiple ways. Also, given the vagueness of the discourses in question, the meanings behind instances of the use of discourse may not even be clear — in other words, processes of agentive action or structuring may not always be apparent.


\textsuperscript{112} Bourdieu, P. (1977) Outline of a Theory of Practice
Thus, given the character of the enquiry as the analysis of multiple instances of practices and patterns of discourse, these reifications of agent and structure are not of great assistance. The individual has no easy relationship with discourse as such. The notion of a family of nations is instead arguably an excellent example of Sartre’s notion of a transcendent goal\(^{113}\). It is, in many ways, beyond the grasp of the individual to apprehend its meanings and import clearly, let alone to conceive (in each instance of the practice of discoursing) of the sediments of meaning which comprise the articles of discourse of which s/he is aware\(^{114}\). I investigate the instances of discourse in the following chapters therefore as processual interactions between Sartrean striving consciousnesses and the transcendent goal of a particular knowledge or state of being defined in ideas and discourse of world kinship. World kinship is present as an idea, a metaphor in discourse, and in its broadness and vagueness seems to represent almost an ineffable state of affairs. Present in the paradox of every statement of the family of nations is the transcendent goal of world-kinship and the fact of the political discord of the world. Every instance of world-kinship discourse is a practice of experimenting with a transcendent and impossible idea. This experimentation, as we said before, may have multiple motives and effects depending on the discoursers’ perception of the present and the future which is envisaged. We can, in this way, describe a very specific model of interaction, in which there is not ‘mutual constitution’ which presupposes separate entities, but a transcendence-facticity complex in which consciousness on the one hand, rooted in the facticity of existence, and transcendent ideas or discourse on the other hand, directly imply the existence of each other. In other words, the ‘horizon’ described by Gadamer can only exist as the horizon of a being\(^{115}\).

The merit of this perspective is that it allays questions of primacy in our modelling of the relations between agents and structures. They are captured and analysed simultaneously in any given moment. There is no structure without agents to perceive it and to bring its existence about in a given moment; in the same way there is no possible agent whose consciousness is not brought into being by its act of perception of social structures and other

\(^{113}\) See, Sartre, J.-P. (1943) Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology Part 2.3

\(^{114}\) In dealing with such vague discourses, the need to keep in play a conscious subject is vital. Sartre’s subject permits use to conceive of an individual experimenting with ideas and ideals beyond his/her understanding.


46
agents. It is the accumulation of these simultaneities which make up historical trajectories of discourse. Such a perspective is also attractive because the analysis of metaphorical practices laid out in later chapters reveals a wide variety of modalities of kinship usage, a diverse multiplicity of ways of manipulating the agreed meanings and symbols of various objects in the cultural constellation of kinship ideas. While the actual statements (written, spoken) may be items in a limited list of formulations, their diversity of usage bears out the importance of recognising the primacy of the individual consciousness interacting with the complexities of meaning that transform a set of statements into the dense web of discourse.

2.1.2 The ‘Family of Nations’ as a Statement of Identity and a Normative Vision

The universalist ideas embedded within the foundational texts and later actions of the United Nations make bold moves towards claims of common identity. This is at the very least, an intriguing claim and perhaps, in the broad sweep of human culture and conflict, a counter-intuitive one. However, it is not altogether a surprising emergence, given the dramatic context of the end of a global war. From the League of Nations to the UN to NATO, peace-building initiatives are natural habitats for rhetorical emphasis on shared interests and shared substance of some kind. This is not to say that this historical context causally explains the specific content of discourses produced. The introduction of a concern for ‘identity’ and ‘culture’ when explaining political phenomena is welcome in IR to tie theory to intersubjective levels of analysis and bring us away from assumed ‘interests’ based only on materialist judgements. However, this introduction has not been uniformly practiced as Daniel Green summarises: "(A) key fault line is between those who incorporate cultural elements as ‘variables’ within neopositivism and those who adopt culturalism holistically, viewing the world as ‘ideas all the way down’ in its full implications for ontology and epistemology.”

In Green’s formulation of a two-way addition of culturalist notions into IR, the former school of thought, the tentative, halting one, is the easiest to critique. In effect it is a stunted effort at ‘putting culture back in the picture’ with very little critical interest in the implications that a consideration of cultural variability might have for global politics. Scholars

---

such as Katzenstein\textsuperscript{117} for instance, operate with the broad notion of domestically constituted identity, formed with reference to domestic culture, being a determinant of state interests in the negotiating realm of the international. Critiques of this position emphasise the problematic nature of the essentialist reifications of the state, culture and identity. As Zehfuss claims, in a statement much closer to my own approach to the individual instantiations of discourse which make up a discursive terrain: “identities are continuously articulated, re-articulated and contested, which makes them hard to pin down as explanatory categories.”\textsuperscript{118}

This point is critical in investigating discourses of such imprecision as the notion of creating a family of nations. Multiple potential identities are created by the deployment of this discourse due to the various points of connection that such notions as the family of nations have with other discourses and discursive referents. As discussed at the end of the last chapter in the work of Brysk et al.\textsuperscript{119}, one prominent way of deploying the notion of the family of nations is in a colonial representation of the tutelage of colonial children by metropolitan parents. While this was (and remains) deployed in order to advance a caring, generous identity, it also advances an image of identity based on superiority and hierarchy in world relations. Because ‘kinship’ as defined in the Western formulations under investigation has so many overlapping meanings, the process of constructing identity out of this symbol must be examined based on case by case situation of practices of speaking within larger discursive parameters. Similarly, the discourse of family of nations cannot be simply said to be a ‘norm’ in international society, though its deployment is often normative.

The idea of the existence of ‘norms’ derives partly from reference to legalistic theories concerning human cooperation, and also partly from reference to rule-based approaches to interaction as a Wittgensteinian game in which linguistic formulations influence human behaviour by shaping an ‘inter-subjective context’. In the words of Kratochwil: “(N)orms...establish inter-subjective meanings that allow the actors to direct their actions towards each other, communicate with each other, appraise the quality of their actions,

\textsuperscript{117} Katzenstein, P. (1996) \textit{Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics}

\textsuperscript{118} Zehfuss, M. (2002) \textit{Constructivism in International Relations: The Politics of Reality} p92

criticize claims and justify choices.”

Even within the work of a prominent theorist like Kratochwil, there remains a tendency for ‘norms’, ‘rules’ and ‘values’ to be used “more or less interchangeably.” A perspective dominated by norms and actors, while paying lip-service to a belief in the inter-subjective creativity of possibility, still requires a strongly entity-focused outlook. Holding, as theorists like Kratochwil, and also Onuf do, that inter-subjective meaning is dependent upon rules, makes a mockery of any idea that agents and structures have been reconciled in these approaches. As Zehfuss astutely highlights, claiming that a particular action is the proven instantiation of a general rule, “obscures the responsibility of the subject.”

This is tantamount to showing that the subject who acts is a mere derivation from the rule-based structure. The metaphorical practices I highlight in the later case study chapters could not be said to bear out such a strict level of conditioning.

As a result, I am reluctant to use ‘norms’ as a concept of analysis in the derivation of discursive practices, though I would not deny the effects that may be felt by subjects attributable to social pressure which might be called ‘norms’. Speaking of norms presupposes numerous potentially untenable assumptions about the structure of society. Firstly, it presupposes consensus – an act implying a level of volition surely impossible if agents are indeed constituted by the pre-existing rules. Secondly, it presupposes power relations wherein the ‘normal’ interpretation of any given idea has come to attain its privileged status by processes that are never charted in conventional accounts of norms. In the case of the discourse of common humanity that is our prime object of analysis, it might be said that certain aspects of the United Nations formulation of this discourse are approaching the status of global norms, but these remain hotly contested. As such, by approaching these ideas, speech acts, and written formulations plainly in their discursive manifestations, I seek to avoid the value judgements of dealing with the concept of ‘norms’. I also wish to avoid the notion that these discourses will necessarily be confining - as they would certainly seem were I to construe them as norms, or in a normative light. As in the discussions on agency and structure, precisely the same articles of discourse may be analysed as normative in one

---

context, but not in another. This is once again due to the imprecision and flexibility of the metaphors at hand. The effects of this discourse, and reactions to it, will be crucial subjects of study, but I wish to leave the conceptual field open, as I noted previously, to genuine spaces of inter-dependency between consciousness and discourse.

In short, and to return to Benhabib's neat image at the start of the chapter, I take the issue of social construction of reality seriously because discourses, discursive effects, and actions are inseparable. The relation then, of individuals to discourse and their production and reproduction of discourses concerning their action is the matrix in which I seek out processes of identity formation.

### 2.2 On Discursive Origins

It is hardly enough, when considering the historical trails of discourses of human universalism, to make a comprehensive list of the popular touchstones within the scope of IR thinking. Paul Kennedy\(^1\)\(^2\)\(^4\), for instance, makes much of joining the dots between authors and groups whose ideas immediately might spring to mind in relation to hopes for a sense (and a practice) of common humanity. He lists the various Greek federations of states in the fifth century BC, the Stoics, the disciples of Confucius, Dante, assorted Catholic theologians of the mediaeval period, William Penn, l'Abbé de St. Pierre, the American Founding Fathers, Kant, and even Lenin. This serves to highlight, more than any genuine commonalities between these thinkers and writers, the point that we must be critical about our own ways of representing a discourse. It is clear that certain judgments and pre-figured choices condition the list that Kennedy makes. It is crucial to try to account for our own productions of particular groupings of ideas. In this section I aim to show how I understand discursive production and the relations that people ('discoursers') have to discourse. I shall also try to explain a method for studying discursive production, situate myself in relation to mainstream discourse analysis, and troubleshoot some of the critiques of this approach that emanate from more empirical standpoints in IR. A preliminary remark on the value-neutrality of 'discourse' as a concept is first necessary. I take a complex of statements of world kinship over the

---


---

50
course of this thesis, and I take them as 'discourse' simply in the fact that they are formulated, they are things said and things sayable. I wish to make no other blanket assumptions about this totality of statements. Parallels between certain of those statements will be drawn where appropriate, though the investigation as a whole reveals diversity of meaning within set formulations, rather than making attempts to coagulate these formulations into a monolithic 'discourse' and claim that all the statements have the same ideational roots or meanings.

### 2.2.1 Tracing Discourses

The formation of discourse and the political application of what we hold to be truths, are my central concerns. I seek to analyse a particular instantiation of a discourse of common humanity and trace the political and individual reactions caused by it. Having done that, it falls to explain the activating (objectivising and subjectivising) power that is transmitted through such a discourse. Foucault outlines three modes of delimiting a discourse which I intend to follow throughout. Firstly there are **criteria of formation**, namely, the set of rules which can explain and predict all objects, concepts, theories and operations of a discourse. Secondly come **criteria of threshold**, being details of the conditions required for the inception of the discourse, what modifications the discourse has undergone, and where new discourses have sprouted off from it. Lastly there are **criteria of correlation**, in other words, details of the sets of relations that set the discourse apart from and situate it amongst other discourses.

These are terms taken from a later, and less formal exposition of a method for investigating discourse than the *Archaeology of Knowledge*, and are products of a period when Foucault had begun to consider the mechanisms and articulations of power (manifest in discourse,

---


127 Foucault, M. (1972) *The Archaeology of Knowledge*
naturally) to be the most critical object for his work. In looking at the discourses of common humanity instantiated in the post-war institutional world order, the three aforementioned delimiters of discourse will be put to use in the following ways. Considering the criteria of formation, the main question to address will be what the critical object of this discourse might be. In other words, what is the 'human' at the heart of UN discourses of common humanity? How is this concept and object (and others besides) formed? We may describe such criteria of formation as notions of the meaning of kinship as a sphere of nurturance opposed to politics, or the meanings of the family as a sphere of protective patriarchy. These meanings and symbols help form statements within discourse. The criteria of threshold for these discursive productions will be outlined in the following chapter on the creation of the UN discourse during the Second World War in (predominantly) the State Department in Washington. What explains the particularities of this discursive emergence, authored at this particular time and under such particular circumstances? Such discourse has thresholds at the point where Judeo-Christian notions of the world-as-family or flock feed into modern discourse, or alternatively in the roots of colonial discourse of patriarchal tutelage of family of advanced and infantile states. Uncovering the criteria of correlation (how this discourse is situated among other discursive referents) will feed into the processual investigation of its inception - its threshold. Criteria of correlation may be discerned for instance in the relations between patterns of occurrence between world-as-family discourse and more bureaucratically hegemonic notions of the world as a community. How do such alternatives correlate? Where and for what purposes is kinship employed?

Foucault’s accounts of the creation of subjects are an important starting point for much of my work, because I am interested in looking at the production of discourses that emerge in history which amount to claims about the fundamental character of human values. Foucault admits openly to the study of technologies of power and technologies of the self which would seem to hold out a philosophical technique which need not be crucified on the problematic of ‘agency and structure’. Foucault focuses both on “technologies of power, which determine the conduct of individuals and submit them to certain ends and domination,

---

128 It seems more pertinent to rely on later Foucauldian work because the discourses under consideration in my work are prime examples of hegemonic master-discourses, like those of sexuality or government, which speak to the essence of what it is to be a subject of a power that aims towards universal reach or universal definition of subjective traits.
an objectivizing of the subject" and also "technologies of the self, which permit individuals to
effect by their own means or with the help of others a certain number of operations on their
own bodies and souls."\(^{129}\)

In fact, possibly my prime referent in terms of the oeuvre of Foucault is *The History of
Sexuality*. In a sense, considering a discourse of human universality that is idealist in the
extreme, every process of self-situation with reference to that discourse is a truth-telling
confessional. The confessional and later the medicalised incitements to speak of sex in the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries created a discourse of sexuality, but more pertinently, a
reflective self-fashioning. The confessional, and the confessional sciences (like
psychoanalysis) were "the formidable injunction to tell what one is and what one does, what
one recollects and what one has forgotten, what one is thinking and what one thinks he is not
thinking."\(^{130}\) In much the same way as the 'menace' of sex was controlled by power through
specification in discourse and confessional truth-telling, the 'menace' of discourses of human
difference that had produced such virulent ideologies\(^{131}\) in the 1940s, were controlled by
discourses of human commonality and new modes of truth-telling. Foucault's articulation of
discourse then, as the relay for the simultaneous subjectivising and objectivising processes
that form discursive subjects and in turn, new discourses, is the foundation of the
investigations I make into the sense of UN 'mission'.

Thus, I will be looking for the effect of discourse production, UN statements of mission, and
protocol on people who work for the UN. To what extent, as Dreyfus and Rabinow put it,
does this environment become a "mise en discourse (which) has placed the individual in a
network of power relations with those who claim to be able to extract the truth?"\(^{132}\) To what
extent does the gap between the great UN 'mission' and the myriad obstacles on the ground
force an internal questioning that shapes the subject in relation to that master discourse?


\(^{130}\) Foucault, M. (1979) *The History of Sexuality* Vol. I p60

\(^{131}\) One need only think of the actions predicated on notions of insurmountable human difference and gradation
which formed the immediate historical backdrop to the formulation of the UN founding documents – the Rape
of Nanking, the Great Purges and, in particular in American minds, the Final Solution.

The elasticity of Foucault's theory is critical for the success of the work undertaken in this study. Critics of discourse analysis and so-called post-modern approaches tend to see subjects as defined by the structures of already existing discourses. However, as the evidence of ethnographic work among individuals enmeshed in the political enactment of policies inspired by the discourse of human universalism shows, one cannot expect the uncomplicated formation of uniform subjects. Even less can one expect such subjects to relate in uniform ways to such subjectification. In effect the subject is a bricoleur whose relation to ideas of self is influenced by discourses which intersect. It is the task of the discourse analyst both to unpick the discourses, map the points of articulation between them, and to map the similarities and differences between the discursive bricolage of individual subjects, and thence to give a sense of their subjectivity.

2.2.2 Discourse and the Self

As was noted in critiquing the ontological indecision of some types of constructivist position, the relation between subjects and discourses is to be understood both in a Foucauldian fashion, but also through an existentialist perspective. The work of Sartre\textsuperscript{133} on transcendence-facticity complexes in human consciousness suggests itself strongly to work involving global normative discourses. A transcendent ideal is held before us in the discourses upon which the United Nations was founded, and yet, on the ground in peacekeeping operations, diplomatic missions, human rights negotiations and other UN work that aims at establishing in political and human relations the practical application of these ideals, the UN has to admit to an important gap between current actuality and ideal transcendental templates.

Though Sartre's existential philosophy as a whole is not central to the investigations which follow, one particular insight he offers helps us to close a gap which would seem to appear in these investigations of discourse. Naturally, in considering the creation by a group of Western individuals of a 'universal' discourse in the form of the UN founding documents, or the individual usages these global discourses in political circles today, one has to find a way to

\textsuperscript{133} Sartre, J-P. (1943) \textit{Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology}
conceptualise the relationships between individual subjects and discursive resources. Sartre’s portrayal of the individual as a consciousness which aims towards the transcendent while remaining rooted in the factual or the particular, closes the gap between the notional concepts of agency and structure, or Foucault’s notion of the subject and discourse. **Sartre gives us a model of the subject which is, in its very existence, a construction and a constructor of wider transcendent ideals and ideas.**

Sartre also forces us to focus on the individual practice of living and discoursing, of conceptually manipulating what exists in the present and what we desire for the future.

Using his classic example of the over-bearing café waiter, Sartre illustrates the idea of the being-for-itself acting out a role based on a transcendent template — a waiter playing at being a ‘waiter’ as is understood. The reality of the waiter’s actions pivot between the transcendent template to which he models his actions and the facticity of his abilities in a state of worldly immanence. The transcendent potentiality of the consciousness can only act in a state of facticity. The socially agreed upon, outward signs of sadness are brought up as another example. Gloomy facial expressions, sighs, tears, or quietude are not sadness itself in an absolute sense, neither are they one’s own particular sadness. They are attempts to act and bring into being sadness as felt in the ways the self comes to understand what sadness is. As Sartre puts it; “I am never any one of my attitudes, (or) any one of my actions.”134 The actor holds before him/herself a transcendental model of ‘self’ and plays at this role, matching his own actions to this objectified template. Thus, as mentioned before, the process of subjectification is continual and imperfect.

The authorial consciousness therefore is always in flight toward something. It is constantly placed in question by the fact of always referring to things outside itself (that of which it is conscious), and always in a state of not-being those things of which it is conscious.135 We are pointed towards the hollowness of consciousness and the tension between the ideal and the existing. Durkheim comments that “society can neither create nor recreate itself without creating some kind of ideal by the same stroke”136, and that in the form of ‘collective

---

134 Sartre, J-P. (1943) Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology p83
135 Ibid. p197
representations' "ideal society is not outside the real one but is part of it."\textsuperscript{137} Indeed, if we conceive of the international project of producing a cohesive community of affect in a loosely Durkheimian fashion, then in the same way as the individual consciousness strives towards transcendent models, and disintegrates by that striving, so does international society in the pursuit of universalism. In the example of trying to produce a universal community, the effort disintegrates in the violence of transforming the Other – betraying the principles of its universalist discourse.

An approach to discourse analysis and processes of subjectification then must be tempered by a concern with individualistic experience. The individual fashioning of self and the individual apprehension of discourse as fixed into a transcendent ideal means that we must be cautious when speaking of general processes of subjectification. Indeed, substantiation of such a claim is a difficult enterprise. The individuality of orientation towards the world personalises the experience of perception. The presences and truths which appear to me are contingent upon my own, and only my own, perspective and experience. The organisation of the world around and to us on a subjective level is not presented as fragmentary sensations which consciousness cements together. Rather, aspects of a person or a nation or for example, though presented to us sequentially are comprehended as a "whole, already pregnant with an irreducible meaning."\textsuperscript{138}

Our conscious bricolage of aspects of discourse, of Others and of the world, is the starting point for conceiving of the relationship between discourses and individuals through the notion of existential consciousness rather than as separate agents and structures. There is never any structure until it is perceived and this is always done by a self-producing consciousness dependent upon, conditioned by and in reference to, externalities. As Sartre puts it, by looking at individuals in terms of their consciousnesses we are focusing upon "a being such that in its being, its being is in question in so far as this being implies a being other than itself."\textsuperscript{139} This crisis of consciousness then requires a simultaneously constitutive frame of reference for our existence in the world. It also sows the seeds for representations of the world in terms of inside and outside, the 'me' and the 'not-me', representations which do

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{137} Durkheim, E. (1995) \textit{The Elementary Forms of Religious Life} p425
  \item \textsuperscript{138} Merleau-Ponty, M. (1962) \textit{Phenomenology of Perception} p25
  \item \textsuperscript{139} Sartre, J-P. (1943) \textit{Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology} p70
\end{itemize}
injustice to our never-ending creation within the world rather than division from it. The roots of these presentations are not in politics, as Schmitt would suggest, though they do form, as I shall show, the paradoxical disintegration of political discourses that aim at universal sameness.

2.3 Inside/Outside and the Kinship Metaphor

2.3.1 Kinship and the Universal ‘Human’

In almost all cultures, there is a conceived ‘outside’ — to the ancient Greeks, for instance, it was the realm of the ‘barbarians’ — a region whose inhabitants are thought of as something less than human. Concomitantly it is almost universally the case that throughout history and cross-culturally “each system of kinship is seen in its own context as the ‘natural’ or ‘god-given’ one.”

Societies have a tendency to refer to only themselves as ‘people’ or ‘the people’, and name their land, and their gods, to reflect their belief that they were the only existing, true, valid humanity. Whether in the relations between warring groups in a segmentary societal system, in the relations between the global North and South or in a simply theoretical perspective, we can see possible ways to argue that the source of the discourse of human unity must, in adopting a universalist standpoint, force (successfully or unsuccessfully) this universal vision on the ‘Other’. Agreeing upon one version of humanity is a denial of the discourses of other societies. The principle of distinction between the universal truth and all else, can lead to the hostile denigration of other regimes of truth – in particular when concerning claims over such primal values as what it is to be ‘human’. This is the danger inherent in the ‘problem of difference’ and an example of this peril is only too clear in the sardonic appropriation of the Wilsonian humanist striving to unification we find in Mein Kampf:

“Anyone who sincerely wishes that the pacifist idea should prevail in this world ought to do all he is capable of doing to help the Germans conquer the world... you would have to make up your mind to forget wars if you

---

would achieve the pacifist ideal. Nothing less than this was the plan of the American world redeemer, Woodrow Wilson... The pacifist-humanitarian idea may indeed become an excellent one when the most superior type of manhood will have succeeded in subjugating the world to such an extent that this type is then the sole master of the earth... So, first of all, the fight and then pacifism.**41**

If kinship systems provide a basic articulation of universal humanity in opposition to all else, then this very universality means that kinship distinction are metaphorised and extrapolated to form discourses at a political level. Similar paradoxes of contradiction and denial of competing discourses naturally inhere. As Delaney points out, in the Western tradition, the first Biblical notion of a patriarch is Abraham, a name meaning “the father of many nations.”**42** Principles of patriarchal kinship, generativity and nationhood stem from the story of Abraham. Crucial to the story are God’s demand in the ‘trials’ of Abraham for one lineage to be created, ‘the people’ so to speak, distinct from all others and favoured by God. The boundary of kin and non-kin is established in Genesis 17:10-11 through God’s demand for the mark of circumcision to “be a token of the covenant betwixt me and you.”**43** This classification is the primal mark of separation of a people from the rest of the world, and also the guarantee of their success as people – “a symbol of genealogical continuity and rupture.”**44** As David Schneider**45** has suggested, the act of creating kin groups, nations and religions (certainly in Western traditions) involves the same sense of dening the worth of the Other, the exterior. Ties that bind people within these groups are essentialised, often into discourses that claim universal truth or worth and are created in all three domains either by birth or by ‘naturalization’.

The story of Abraham establishes not only the principle of drawing kin/non-kin boundaries in the world, but also the paradoxical monarchy of patriarchal kinship inside a domain that is supposedly that of the chosen people. The chosen ‘people’ in Abraham’s story does not seem to include his wife Sarah, passed off to the Pharoah and to the king of Gerar, nor his abandoned son Ishmael and his sacrificed son Isaac. Where we would perhaps expect only

---

**41** Hitler, A. (2008 ed.) Mein Kampf p260/1


**43** Ibid. p449


care for the people/population within the kinship domain (a governmental relationship\textsuperscript{146}) and antagonism towards the outside, what is evident in patriarchal kinship of this sort is sovereign power within a sphere that is supposedly the chosen few. There is a certain violence in this kinship towards women and towards sons, towards the apolitical members of society who do not share in the power relationship with God, the defining source of the 'human'.

The same paradoxes flow through kinship, and up into the politics that we metaphorise using kinship as a mode of representation. The first and most direct political move to stem from the isolation of a kinship group from the rest of the world is that of claiming to be the chosen people. As Nietzsche comments in his discussion of the origins of morality, the Greek nobles described by Theognis called themselves the \textit{euthlos}, "according to its root (it means) one who is, who possesses reality, who is real, who is true."\textsuperscript{147} The powerful patriarchal groups in these examples claim authority from sources, whether religious or political, beyond the grasp of those who must simply contend with the existing system which maps throughout the domains of kinship, politics and religion. "(T)he head of the family is the father; the head of the nation is, normatively and often literally, a man; as father of the state; and the head of the religion is a male-imaged God, often referred to as father."\textsuperscript{148} It might seem natural then for these metaphorical transmissions between domains to be used to express common features of authority and distinction. The following section demonstrates further cognitive principles for the use of the kinship metaphor in politics.

\section*{2.3.2 The Facility of Representational Beliefs in Semi-Propositional Content}

As highlighted in Chapter One, political appeals to sentiments of kinship swirl around the era of the founding of the United Nations and NATO. This metaphorisation of political relations

\textsuperscript{146} See Foucault, M. (1991) ‘On Governmentality’ in Burchell, G. et al. (eds.) \textit{The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality: With Two Lectures by and an Interview with Michel Foucault}. The population is the critical unit of governmental management with the object of the maximisation of the potentiality of life.

\textsuperscript{147} Nietzsche, F. (1998) \textit{On The Genealogy of Morality} p13

is widespread culturally and historically and is a pervasive example of the "metarepresentational ability"\(^{149}\) of human beings, the facility of creating representations of states of being which are only available to our consciousness in the form of already existing representations. In other words, we can only make a representation of world politics rather than be in factual touch with it, and must then re-represent that in terms of kinship metaphors.

Such a conceptual move is a reflection upon one representation (politics), derived from a very much separate cognitive domain (kinship). Such crossovers are common. Sperber notes that one "may believe with total faith in the Holy Trinity, and yet be aware of the intuitive force of the idea that a father and son cannot be one and the same."\(^{150}\) Or equally, "understand why black holes cannot be seen, and yet feel the intuitive force of the idea that a big solid, indeed dense object cannot but be visible."\(^{151}\) Sperber evaluates this example by suggesting that a working knowledge of modern astrophysics fails to penetrate into the cognitive domain of naive physics. In the example of the Trinity, the cultural representation of Christian religious dogma fails to penetrate into the domain of naive kinship.

Thus, humans have the capacity for entertaining knowledge and making claims which appear to confound the domain-like structure of cognition on the one hand, but also the worldly checks and balances we might use to verify claims about the world. Many of the beliefs we articulate about the world, and our discourses of human unity would be one such example, fall into Sperber's category of cognitive relations to semi-propositional\(^{152}\) representations. A 'proposition' as defined linguistically, is clear-cut and can refer to only one sharply delimited thing. To believe in a proposition is an uncomplicated action. As Sperber says, "if it were true that the objects of belief necessarily were propositions, then we could only believe ideas which we fully understand."\(^{153}\) We might express a belief in a discourse of human commonality but not be able to accurately articulate what sort of proposition was intended in that statement. We could express our own version of the idea, and therefore demonstrate a

\(^{150}\) Ibid. p62
\(^{151}\) Ibid.
\(^{153}\) Ibid.
working understanding, explaining several aspects of the idea clearly and other aspects less clearly. The representation thus believed in, is taken into consideration as a semi-proposition.

Relating to semi-propositional statements cannot rationally take the form of a factual, testable belief, but must always be a representational belief. This cognitive nexus of semi-propositional statements about the world and our holding them in belief of a representational order is not simply vagueness. By offering weak criteria for the acceptance of a representation, it facilitates the processing of large amounts of information by opening up the potential for multiple interpretations of given statements. By permitting multiple interpretations, it acts “as a source of suggestion in creative thinking”\textsuperscript{154} and facilitates the domain cross-overs of metaphorisation that, as Sperber shows, “is a common experience of childhood, when lexical meanings are not fixed in our minds.”\textsuperscript{155} Kinship, as one of the earliest formed cognitive domains of understanding, forms a fertile ground for the creation of metaphorised semi-propositional representations of the world. Not only Sperber, but also Pascal Boyer provide a theoretical framework for discussing the transmission of cognitive connections between domains of representation into cultural connections of representation that become metaphorical discourses.

2.3.3 An Epidemiology of Representations?

My analysis in the coming chapters of the formation of the idea of the ‘family of nations’ through supranational discourse and action, is a genealogy in two important senses. In Foucauldian style I aim to chart the discursive history of the formulations of common humanity that inspire UN policy, and also the policy of the global hyperpower. The second task I wish to tackle is to provide an account for the discursive trajectory that provides a commentary, if not an explanation, for why this discourse linking kinship and international politics is so prevalent. In Foucault’s words “(T)he question proper to such an analysis might be…what is this specific existence that emerges from what is said…”\textsuperscript{156}

\textsuperscript{155} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{156} Foucault, M. (1972) \textit{The Archaeology of Knowledge} p31
Two methods of explaining the transmission of representations suggest themselves: either we seek to explain their dispersal across time through discourse analysis, or through reference to the quality and character of the concepts themselves. The first method consists of seeking out what Foucault calls the “episteme of a period...an open and doubtless indefinitely describable field of relationships” to explain, not through cause and effect, but through the opening of conditions for the emergence of particular statements in place of others. In other words, the explanation is extraneous to the representation, and is concerned with the purely social aspects of transmission of ideas. The second method seeks explanation internal to the ideas themselves. “To explain culture” as Sperber boldly puts it, “is to explain why and how some ideas happen to be contagious.” Both approaches can yield rich results but neither is sufficient alone. To produce a worthwhile characterisation of a powerful discourse, one cannot neglect its genealogy and the other discourses and cultural resources that it is tied to. Neither does a full picture with explanative value for the power and durability of a discourse emerge from merely a consideration of the situation of one discourse within its temporal and discursive parameters without an analysis of the content of the discourse and the content of the response to it by individual consciousnesses.

As Boyer makes clear, to argue for cognitive structuration of the transmission of representations should not lead us necessarily down a classic structuralist path in the footsteps of Lévi-Strauss. Indeed, the structuralist obsession with systematising into binary oppositions runs up against scientific contradiction — “(p)sychological research...has never found anything of the sort in the mental representation of concepts and categories.” Rather, all that cognitive anthropologists like Boyer seek to do is to grant recognition and an explanatory gesture towards common repertoires of cultural representations that are observable cross-culturally, but are usually lost in relativist ethnography.

For Boyer, the successful transmission of representations lies in the fact that they are "culturally fit" in the sense of a natural selection of ideas, by virtue of a combination of ontological sensibility and the memorable 'unnaturality' of the juxtapositions of representations from different cognitive domains. In other words, the cross-over metaphorisation discussed earlier is a potential source of memorable unnaturalness. The paradoxes inherent in talking of world politics as if it were kinship, of talking of the world as a family when it is in no way a family, adds to the potential for such representations to be transmitted through time.

Furthermore, Sperber and Boyer posit the psychological ease of application of representations as another factor in their potential for successful transmission. The necessary criteria for transferral between cognitive domains are narrative memorability, semi-propositional vagueness (leaving room for re-telling and re-interpretation — what Boyer terms, 'under-determination' of concepts) and a "psychologically fixed and universal basis" for the cognitive domain, meaning that is in regular use within our minds. This last point requires some explanation. To claim that there is a universal basis for the domain of kinship within human cognition is not to claim that patterns of kinship are universal. Rather, the point is that every human being thinks of kinship in some way, despite the cultural variability of those thoughts and narratives.

The attraction of extrapolating kinship metaphors to world politics is precisely on the one hand the multiplicity of meanings that can be attached, meaning that is a fertile ground for interpreting the world. On the other hand, it is an extrapolation of a cognitive domain that, though differently configured cross-culturally, is ever present. In summary, this metaphorical move is a semi-propositional meta-representation that is comprehensible to everyone. The very fact of the diversity of possible interpretations means that this metaphorisation is never incomprehensible, ideal in a sense for application to global institutional discourse. It reaches to a cognitive domain constantly in use, and a cognitive domain formed in the developmental

---

stages of each life. It reaches to a cognitive domain that, as we have already seen, is used to
delineate ‘the people’ from the non-people in the early history of most culture. In this sense
too it is psychologically powerful. The following section now returns more fully to political
claims about universal rights, values and the character of ‘man’. Our analysis of the
transformation from kinship metaphors to political divisions shows the latter to be based on
the paradoxical boundary between the (false) universal ‘inside’ and the ‘outside’ that is denied.
As we will fully demonstrate over the course of the following discussion, the flexibility of
kinship as a symbol opens up space to rethink Schmittian friend/enemy descriptions of the
boundary of the application of universalist discourse.

2.4 What Do Discourses of Universalism Do?

2.4.1 The Emergence of ‘Man’ as Universal Object

The preceding discussion of kinship noted how the division between kin and non-kin is
frequently transformed into a distinction equating kinship groups with the human. The
master-discourse of human universality of the world institutions though has spread through a
kinship metaphorisation to present the ideal of the ‘family of nations’. The cognitive facility
of this process has contributed to the success of this discourse, as has the power of the
institutional framework promoting this discourse. However, the unification of a discourse on
the life and rights of man has also been facilitated by the rationalisation of the ‘sciences of
man’ in the Western world since the Enlightenment. A unified discourse on man, mutated
into a ‘monument’ was enabled by the scienticising of a human object, which could be
studied simply and solely as a human object and acted upon by rationalising government.

As Foucault describes, prior to the seventeenth century, knowledge about man or the world
was garnered from processes of divination and interpretation of signs: “God, in order to
exercise our wisdom, merely sowed nature with forms for us to decipher.” The entire world

---

164 Foucault, M. (1972) *The Archaeology of Knowledge* p155
was conceived as a sacred text with signifiers present in the natural world that suggested
correlations with a divine plan. The status of a man within the world was significant of God's
value of that particular man. In this sense, the logic of a divinely approved hierarchy was self-
fulfilling. In the early seventeenth century, the notion of resemblance came under attack
philosophically and scientifically from Bacon, Newton and Descartes among others.
Resemblance was replaced by surer notions of identity and difference, measurement and
order.

Foucault explains the change through a shift in the notion of signs. Processes of signification
became capable of expressing probability and they became conventional as well as natural166.
Liberating Western thought from divine resemblance opened up processes of ordering and
the classification of man as a scientific unity. As Foucault writes: "(W)e are inclined to believe
that man has emancipated himself from himself since his discovery that he is not at the centre
of creation."167 From the particular determinants of any given person and his possibilities and
limits, imposed by the divine plan and the strictures of sovereign authority, we move to a
world where 'man' is a subject which can be defined in his unity and distinct from all else.
The weaker part of Foucault's analysis, his reification of tracts of time into the products
singular mindsets, is perhaps to be viewed with scepticism. However, as will later be
discussed in relation to a fuller analysis of the bases of Western notions of kinship, an
important aspect of the cultural application of kinship to politics in modern Western
discourses is the scientifically based notion of natural equality derived from seeing 'man' as a
species.

This scientific object 'man' then becomes a universal given that is at the root of the trans-
national institutional framework that espouses a 'family of nations' where the ties of kinship
are close between a functioning core of nations and non-existent in the case of relations to
states placed beyond the pale in terms of their relations to this human gold standard.
However, the fact that universalism does not brook contradiction works not only across the
putative boundary between worldly kin and those rogue Others, but it also purports to
establish an unchallengeable ideational monopoly within the bounds of its own sphere of nations.

In short, the paradox of universal political discourse is that while preaching commonality, it becomes repressive unilateral dogma, and establishes, not only hierarchy, but ideational monopoly or mon-archy. This logic of disintegration at the heart of claims to universalism addresses itself to the work on inclusion and exclusion by scholars from Schmittian backgrounds. In deciding upon a specific form for universal values, one defines the character of those decisions based upon a constituent negative. Engaging with Schmitt is critical here, especially given the wide-ranging effect that Schmittian perspectives have had on IR in recent years. Particularly with reference to the subject matter of Chapter Six, the War on Terror, Schmittian notions of the sovereign decision were widely invoked. Investigating metaphors of a sphere of world kinship presents an ideal opportunity to revisit and rethink the notion of the character of sovereign and their finality and effects.

In the concluding two sections, I wish to explore the differing but related practices of inclusion and exclusion that stem from claims based on a singular idea of what should constitute ‘man’. How has the idea of ‘man’ outlined above been put to use? How have other forms of universal characterisation of humanity worked in similarly paradoxical ways? I shall suggest that the practices of distinction rising out of these characterisations are less a derivative of political logic, but rather a transformation through metaphor, one of kinship experience.

2.4.2 Friends/Enemies, Bios/Zoë

Discourses of human universalism would seem to deny the need for principles of distinction between human beings, or between states. Yet, the making of claims about universalism has, until the present day, been conducted in a world divided by states, cultures, sentiments of alliance and fear. What is more, I wish to recognise and give credit to the dominating power of the discourses produced in certain powerful parts of the world — discourses capable of
overriding comparable or contrasting ones produced elsewhere. As we have seen there is a significant violence inherent in a discourse produced in an institutional setting with the power for significant dispersion of its ‘truth’, which proclaims a universal definition of the condition and aspirations of humankind. Distinction thus is at the heart of the formation of discourse in that the *sajable* emerges from a much wider field of possible discursive options which become marginalised. As Sartre says: “to posit as an ideal the being of things, is this not to assert by the same stroke that this being does not belong to human reality...?” Both politically and existentially then, the act of making universal claims is an act of bad faith and of discriminatory violence.

Further, in the aspiring tenor of the mission of the United Nations lies a blueprint for global transformation. To a certain extent, the universalism of the claims made seem inevitably to tend towards global homogenisation in pursuit of these ideals. These are the frameworks of our political age, but the notion of a radical distinction between those agreed on a standard of ‘humanity’ and those judged as yet exterior to this standard, prompted Schmitt to conclude that the only possible fate of those beyond the pale was destruction.

“*If he discriminates within humanity and thereby denies the quality of being human to a disturber or destroyer, then the negatively valued person becomes an unperson, and his life becomes no longer of the highest value: it becomes worthless and must be destroyed. Concepts such as ‘human being’ thus contain the possibility of the deepest inequality and become thereby ‘asymmetrical’.*”

What must be stressed in considering the metaphorical practice of constructing the world-as-family, is that it can establish a variety of exclusionary boundaries not limited to the creation of Schmitt’s ‘unperson’. Kinship discourse may be used, as previously discussed, by colonial powers to establish a ‘private sphere’ in international relations, a family of nations comprising a metropolitan ‘parent’ and colonial dependent ‘infants’. The upshot of this may be increased tutelage in the context of superiority/inferiority relations solidified by kinship metaphors, or the ‘private sphere’ notion may be employed to justify incursions on the sovereignty of the colonised nation on the part of the metropolitan parent unmolested and unmonitored by outside powers. On the other hand, kinship discourses may be used much more harshly, to

---

168 Sartre, J-P. (1943) *Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology* p81/2
define ‘unpersons’ in the case of wars, crimes against humanity and terrorism. As we will see in Chapter Six however, the dual bases of kinship determination, unchanging ‘natural’ commonality and contingent behavioural actions, render the Schmittian moment of decision incomplete. Even when we use kinship to exclude, an olive branch is offered based on changing behaviour. Thus though it would be unwise to reject this Schmittian position out of hand in light of the practical application of ‘state of exception’ politics in the contemporary political landscape, there is scope for rethinking. This rethinking is timely, for, as Agamben shows, a moralising homogenisation is not the only effort at work, but a tendency to normalise an appeal to a state of exception has also been developing. He discusses as an example, the extra-juridical status of Guantánamo Bay ‘detainees’ who are produced by the US Patriot Act as “un-namable and unclassifiable being(s).” Part Three thus contains an investigation of the relationship between the production of unclassified beings, and the ideas that constitute the identity of those on the ‘inside’ of the ‘universal’ boundary.

The United Nations formulations on the rights of man are particularly pointed examples of the construction of universal standards. In a sense, such decisions relate directly to a fundamental decision upon what ‘life’ is and means. Setting boundaries of human rights impinges on the moral standing and bio-political integrity all human beings. For Agamben, “the production of a bio-political body is the original activity of sovereign power.” This statement relates to the fact that, following Schmitt, Agamben defines the sovereign as he who decides upon the exception to the law, he who puts a person’s body outside the political domain. To use Chantal Mouffe’s terminology, the body placed beyond the pale of universalist sovereign claims falls outside the ‘rights group’ of the ‘demos’.

This terminology is not without significance. Dating from political re-structuring in the Cleisthenic reforms, the idea of ‘demos’ is a formulation of the ‘populace’, or more broadly, the ‘people’, in political and juridical terms. It was made, of course, with reference to individuals who remained excluded from political life – primarily women and slaves. This

173 For a neat summary, see for instance Formara, C. and Samons, L. (1991) – Athens from Cleisthenes to Pericles
principle of exclusion from political life is double-edged though. Not only must we consider the practical exclusion from 'deme' elections – participatory exclusion – but also the exclusion of being deemed 'apolitical life'. In Agamben's Greek terms, sovereign power makes the distinction as to where human and political life (bios) ends and where a pure state of bare, or natural life (zoe)\(^{174}\) is all that remains. In the Cleisthenic case, the individuals outside of the 'demos' could only be considered under the logic of property and possession. The Roman jural criterion of *homo sacer* – the criminal found guilty who forfeits his right to life – could be killed non damnatur\(^{175}\) having been legally committed to the underworld in lieu of his impending death. In a similar sense, the treatment of the zoë of women and slaves was an issue that bore no political consequences or accountability.

It is important to remember here that the apolitical status of women in our examples of ancient Jewish or Greek kinship cannot be elided in any sense with the apolitical fate of Holocaust victims or Guantánamo prisoners. Agamben and Schmitt are guilty of producing single-minded binary distinctions which fail to capture differing levels of exclusion based on relationship distance. Exclusionary decisions do not stem from politics alone. Kinship and politics mesh in the patrilineality of the Jewish and Greek examples, women are social kin, but the political dimension of kinship and the continuity of the kin group is not something in which they can be involved. Likewise, the assumption that Schmitt makes that being excluded necessarily leads to destruction, is unsubstantiated. As Butler states, "universalism is necessarily undone by the exclusion of particularity on which it rests."\(^{176}\) It must define itself against something and in doing so betrays the falseness of its claim to universality. But also, "(T)here is no way to bring the excluded particularity into the universal without first negating that particularity."\(^{177}\) This negation need not be destruction, but, as in the case of the optimistic universality of the UN discourse of common humanity, it may take the form of practices of transformation.

---


\(^{175}\) Ibid. p85


\(^{177}\) Ibid.
A discourse purporting to a universal claim to or defence of a model of human life such as the foundational texts of the United Nations, is set up as a manifesto for the transformation of an imperfect world. In effect then, the tendency of claims of an ideal human condition to reinstate divisions between bios and zoë, can lead to differing standards of the treatment of human beings that betrays the universalist tone of the discourse. As in Agamben's Guantánamo example, the treatment of prisoners rendered 'bare life' is justified by their supposed threat to the lives and rights of the majority. In effect, this resembles the justification for the Nazi Holocaust. Furthermore, the perceived apolitical nature of peoples beyond the core nations of the UN, provides leeway for the lack of accountability for 'collateral damage' caused during invasive military actions aimed at regime change.

Discourses justifying regime change or the reformation of political and social systems to fit the tenets of the humanising missions of Western institutions, reveal further paradoxes concerning the logical work of universal values. In apologies for collateral damage in conflicts conducted in the name of Westernised 'human' values like democracy or human rights, there is an attempt (as we will see in Part Three) made at identifying the common people of the invaded country with the mission of the invading or peace-keeping Western forces. The real 'enemy' within this discourse is the objectionable political system - communism or dictatorship, for instance. As we noted above, the boundary of inclusion and exclusion may appear differently depending on the character of the discourse of universality invoked. The logic of inclusion and exclusion then, when applied to political situations is particular rather than general.

2.4.3 Using Notions of the 'Human' in Universalist Discourse

While we have noted the propensity for universalist discourse to place certain groups into an apolitical state of being, we must be aware of the particular character of each instance of universalist discourse. The paths open for the placing of life into the zoë category are structured in and through discursive formulation and action and through the gradations of relationship/kinship distance inspiring these discourses. In the political formulations of the United Nations' defence of universal human values, the essences of human nature are
conceived in positive light – the world is potentially redeemable. The instances of failure to respect such rights can be glossed in terms of contingent aberrant regimes, open to re-structuration. To bring this into the starkest possible relief, it is worth contrasting the rhetoric during the second Iraq war with two historical examples predicated on somewhat different discourses of a universal goal for humanity. Firstly, I shall look at the transformative logics of the civilising missions of nineteenth century colonialism. Secondly, I will contrast these examples with the origin of the crusading ethic of Western intrusion in the Middle East, that of Urban II’s address at the Council of Clermont in 1095.

In the joint addresses by Tony Blair and George W. Bush from 10th April 2003 there are clear attempts to make a claim to commonality with the hopes and desires of the ‘Iraqi people’ while rooting the cause for Iraq’s lack of a “respected place in the world” in the Ba’athist regime. Blair makes the plainest distinction: “(o)ur enemy is Saddam and his regime; not the Iraqi people.” The hope of re-incorporating Iraq into the family of nations was always an express aim of the war, to bring the country back from isolation and fear and into the UN framework. Bush praises the ‘Iraqi people’ by referring to an imputed common human legacy derived from Mesopotamian history: “(T)he nightmare that Saddam Hussein has brought to your nation will soon be over. You are a good and gifted people - the heirs of a great civilisation that contributes to all humanity.”

At the height of European colonialism, a different sort of commonality was felt with the people of the colonized lands. The socio-biological notion of a Great Chain of Being “served as a powerful metaphor, for it conjured up a hierarchy of distinct varieties within (a single) humankind.” However, the unshakeable truth of the European version of humanity was that the undisputable acme, or the ‘telos’ if one thinks in terms of temporal evolution, was the European version of humanity. A singular discourse on humanity meant a singular pinnacle. This self-assurance allowed administrators such as Frederick Lugard, the British

---


71
governor of Nigeria in the early twentieth century to claim that Europeans were “custodians of the tropics” and “trustees of civilisation for the commerce of the world.” Such was the power of the message of one singular path for the improvement of humanity, that protests for the vernacularisation of education in British India in the 1890s, organised by Indians themselves, called for a greater application of “the universal spread of European enlightenment among the large mass of people and throughout all of India.”

On the other hand, the claim to universal See by Urban II is of a quite different order, diverging from the models of humanity in both the contemporary and colonial periods, which shared the scientific notion of ‘man as object’, even if differing in their applications of this bedrock of claims to commonality. In the account of the Council of Clermont given in the chronicle of Fulcher of Chartres, Urban introduced himself to the assembled nobles thus: “(m)ost beloved brethren: urged by necessity, I, Urban, by the permission of God chief bishop and prelate over the whole world, have come into these parts as an ambassador with a divine admonition to you, the servants of God.” Far from this bishopric of the whole world being a shepherding of common humanity though, it is a shepherding only of Christian ‘brethren’ whether in Western Christendom or in the besieged Eastern realm. Urban exhorts the Franks to relieve the suffering of Eastern Christians under Turkish and Arab oppression, calling these peoples without distinction “a despised and base race, which worships demons.” Such racial essentialism led the crusade to acts of brutality and destruction, not only in the Holy Land, but also en route in vicious attacks on Jewish populations in the cities of Germany and Eastern Europe. These acts, zealous overspills of crusading fervour has led this period in the early months of the crusade to be termed “the first holocaust.” In this sense, the formulation of ‘the infidel’ as the exception, the rejection of the “the Redeemer of the human race”, would seem a more radical and pessimistic principle of distinction – one that could only lead to the crusaders seeking the destruction (as Schmitt predicts) of their enemies.

---

185 Ibid.
187 Robert the Monk (1895) ‘Historia Hierosolymitana.’ In Munro, D.C. *Translations and Reprints from the Original Sources of European History*, Vol 1.2.
However, the First Crusade was not intended as a genocide, but as a strategic recapturing of the Holy Sepulchre and the restoring of freedom to the Eastern Church. In the testimony of the Council of Clermont given by Guibert de Nogent, who was actually present, he records Urban asking the nobles: "And you ought, furthermore, to consider with the utmost deliberation, if by your labors, God working through you, it should occur that the Mother of churches should flourish anew to the worship of Christianity, whether, perchance, He may not wish other regions of the East to be restored to the faith against the approaching time of the Antichrist."\(^{188}\) The possibility of redemption is held out just as in the political interventions of modern times, though in this case, it is redemption on an individual and spiritual level, rather than at a political and systemic level.

In these three cases, separated by a thousand years, leaders strive for a world that is yet to come. The character of their ideal model of the 'human' is markedly different in these discourses of a desired universal state of being. And yet, the universalist claims to truth about the human condition, which are culturally-specific in their respective origins, lead the projects of these leaders to career towards conflict from their very beginning. The critical mediaeval claim is that one Redeemer came to unite all the human race, but was rejected by some. The critical modern claim is that one standard of human rights and life, created by Westerners to unite all the human race, has been rejected by some in the contemporary case of rogue states, or has not been attained by some in the case of the colonized populations. Such discourses throw their users into paradoxes of hypocrisy and crises of identity. Those who fall within the bounds of these universalist discourses are often claimed as kin, those outside the bounds rejected as radically Othered non-kin or shows of incorporation are made that reveal the insubstantial nature of the original claims to commonality. The paradoxes of politics and the paradoxes of kinship are smaller and larger models of similar relationships of processually-made sentiment. Our capacity for metaphorisation permits transmissions between the two and also the creation of boundaries of differing permeability where the political nature of kinship distinctions is revealed.

\(^{188}\) Guibert de Nogent (1921) 'Historia quae dicitur Gesta Dei per Francos.' In Krey, A.C. The First Crusade: The Accounts of Eyewitnesses and Participants.
2.5 The Sphere of Kinship: Friend/Enemy Distinctions Rethought

The case made so far for the transmission of kinship to political relations of universalist discourses remains incomplete. To conclude, I intend to return to the phenomenology of experience and the cognitive formation of the kinship domain. Schmitt's friend/enemy distinction principle is less useful than the idea of a transmission between kin distinction and political distinction for two reasons. Firstly, there are many instances in human relations (which are broader than the political relations upon which Schmitt is focused) where an expression of distance, of Otherness, cannot be categorised by friend/enemy logic. Difference does not equal conflict; what is at stake is a lack of grounds for relationship, or a lack of feeling of relationship. It is perhaps indicative of the scientificty of the language of modern social science that relationships between states, say, are conceived as if we were discussing the relation of forces to objects, or the relations of different chemical substances. Our use of the language of relationship tends to deny the etymological kinship notion at work. A perceived distance from the Other or a lack of relationship to the Other is precisely that — a lack of perceived grounds for extending our kinship metaphors to the Other.

Secondly, Schmitt's logic of friend and enemy is assumed to be a cross-cultural given. Rather, to return to the existential and phenomenological perspectives with which I intended to place caveats upon the use of discourse analysis, I see an important distinction between people as made and practiced, and not as given over to a status by a specific logic. At the root of the transmission between kinship and politics are three key principles. Firstly, the kinship distinction as we have seen is the primary political action. Secondly, the existential crisis of consciousness discussed earlier, grounds the inevitable logics of failed universal transcendence in the face of external particularity. Thirdly, the metaphorical richness of gradations of kinship enables us to work past binary distinctions between inside and outside into actions of transformation, redemption, apoliticisation, negation, and assimilation as well as destruction of the Other. I wish to finally think about the socialisation process within the sphere of kinship in the developmental stages of life to draw together the strands of cognitivism and phenomenology that would seem to compete.
Christina Toren’s work addresses the mind not as a universal and pre-formed information processing tool, but through a phenomenological perspective. With reference to Piaget, she admits that certain ‘modules’ and ‘schema’ (the ‘domains’ for instance, of kinship, that we have already discussed) are present biologically in every mind-brain, but the elaboration of these domains means that each mind is a culturally bound construction. An embodied and social view of mind, as espoused by Toren, involves perceiving the mind as a production of the interaction between sociality and “autopoeisis” – the processual, embodied making of self, a creative bricolage of experience unique to the self. In a sense this is another way of conceiving of the matrix of consciousness and discourse discussed earlier. The very fact of being given a world to grow and develop into by the actions of parents and other adults prefigures the fact that the making of meaning within the social world is a process of both recreation and inheritance of meaning on the one hand, and transformation of meaning at the level of consciousness on the other.

What Toren shows in her ethnography of children in Fiji, is that the kinship domain, and the distinctions within it, are fertile learning grounds for the meta-representational domain crossing that occurs later in life when kinship metaphors are extrapolated. As Sperber argues, the ability to make semi-propositional statements about representations is an acquired skill. Toren highlights how kinship distinction expressed in terms of place and position during ritual ceremonies, are learnt first by children as rules articulated around simple axes of kin/non-kin and spatial position within the ceremony. The templates of differentiation are put in place cognitively using kinship examples before the child can explain the significance of why their uncle, say, sits above a non-relative in a *kava* ceremony. Around the practical axes of kinship and position form, in later years, an understanding of symbolic differentiation, and this ability was acquired through *experience* of ritual and not explicit teaching.

The sphere of kinship then furnishes principles of distinguishing between people and is a rich metaphor for the use of expressing ideas of inclusion and exclusion in politics. What we must

---

190 Toren, C. (2002) ‘Anthropology as the whole science of what it is to be human’ in Fox, R. and King, B. (eds.) *Anthropology Beyond Culture* p107
be aware of though is the very success of this transmission is based upon, not only pre-existing discursive guides to usage of the metaphor, but the combination of universality on the one hand and also phenomenological differentiation between use and understanding of kinship on the other. These factors, it should be remembered, are inherent in its structure as a cognitive domain. It is this combination, and its primal influence as a practical sphere of the socialisation of principles of distinction that makes it a successful metaphorical selection for extrapolation to political life. Its universality and flexibility as a cognitive domain unite and provide the most apt way to fashion our desire to speak of ourselves in universal terms\textsuperscript{192}, the inevitability of boundary drawing that that action entails, and the masking of the paradoxes of power both within and at the edges of our principles of distinction. Western aptness for extrapolating from atomistic individuals, proven to have a scientific shared genetic substance, eases the cognitive work of the world-as-family metaphor and, in denying otherness, extends its potential positive assurance to its infinite boundary. Armed with these methodological insights, the next chapter begins the empirical mapping of terrains of world-kinship discourse.

\textsuperscript{192} Discourse establishing a worldwide ‘family of nations’ centres the speaker implicitly within the sphere of common substance. Taking up a position exterior to the ‘international community’ for instance, is much easier. Kinship metaphors thus have an egoist element which adds to their appeal. The positive valuation of kinship as a sphere of nurturance and affection in Western complexes of meaning makes such discourse reassuring, and as will be later seen, it is often employed specifically to emotionally reassure as to the motives of actors.
PART TWO - Creating the UN’s World-Kinship Discourse and Its Place in the UN Bureaucracy

CHAPTER THREE - Uniting Nations: A Local Project for Global People

3.1 Acts of Creation and the Post-Conflict Moment: Writing History in the Rationalist Canon

3.1.1 1945, The Second Chance

As the surety of victory steadily increased throughout 1945, the San Francisco Conference set for April of that year came to be seen as a seminal moment in the re-defining of the way that the international order was to be governed. In his final State of the Union Address in January 1945, President Roosevelt concluded his speech with his hopes for the UN conference in terms which spelled out the transformation which he wished it to bring about. His final exhortation ran as follows: "(M)ost important of all – 1945 can and must see the substantial beginning of the organization of world peace. This organization must be the fulfilment of the promise for which men have fought and died in this war...We Americans of today, together with our Allies, are making history – and I hope it will be better history than ever has been made before."^193

Perhaps it is true in the way that the history of the twentieth century has been told and lived out, that this moment was given added importance by the notion that it was, in many ways, a second chance^194. The grand hope of a ‘war to end all wars’ had proven false and it was widely believed that important ‘lessons’ had either not been learned or had not been correctly

^194 See Divine, R. (1967) Second Chance: The Triumph of Inter-Nationalism in America During World War Two for a full exposition of this appreciation of and failure to learn from the 'lessons' of the First World War.
put into practice. On both sides of the Atlantic, debate in political circles, in the press and public media, and in influential study groups, contemplated in the most general terms why war had yet to be eliminated from the moral and political compass in the international sphere. Most particularly, as we saw in Chapter One, these discourses were highly prevalent in the United States where commentators in the inter-war period could lull themselves into a sense of detachment from the cockpit of Europe, and where the failure of the US Senate to ratify the League Covenant had left politicians with the sense that a new organization must be planned with greater care to ensure bipartisan American support.195

As charted in Chapter One, much was made in interwar discourse of the incendiary economic policies of protectionism that had been applied to try to lift nations from the grips of depression at the expense of collective freedom of trade between countries. Many portrayed these structural discriminations within the international system as the prime cause and excuse for the militarist expansionism of totalitarian states in Europe and Asia. Much was also made of the weakness of the League of Nations, and a great number of formerly idealistic internationalists such as FDR came to be “disgusted by the ways in which France and Britain consistently blocked the League’s efforts to respond effectively to aggression”196 throughout the 1930s. The failure to use force during the early months of the invasion of Manchuria in 1931 and the unwillingness to embargo shipments of oil during Mussolini’s campaign against Abyssinia have often been highlighted as key examples of a “myopic and irresolute”197 attitude by the Western powers. However, dismay among Americans at the policy of appeasement was tempered to a degree by the memory of the political refusal to countenance Wilson’s wording of Article X198 of the League Covenant in 1920. The major reason that Americans had shied away from making the global financial and military commitments required by the League system of collective security was precisely the same reason why

195 Especially concerned to get bipartisan support for the UN organisation and thus make up for America’s rejection of the League was Cordell Hull. Hull was an unsophisticated thinker in terms of international affairs but a giant on Capitol Hill and a past-master at engineering cross-party support. See Hinton, H. B. (1942) Cordell Hull: A Biography
197 Ibid. p12
198 See Appendix C, Covenant of the League of Nations. Article X established the principle of collective security and the commitment to preserve the territorial integrity of other members. The Senate objected to the burden this might be expected to place on the US as the most financially and militarily capable nation after the First World War.
Britain and France, as the main League powers, had often dragged their heels when swift action was necessary.

Perhaps the most problematic aspect of the League of Nations system was simply its name and reputation – those developments in international politics attributed to the League's 'failures' haunted the political generations of the 1940s. However, its underlying philosophy was seen as being both fundamentally commendable and, in practical terms, redeemable in the architecture of a new peace settlement. Indeed, Vice-President Truman made the firm proclamation in February 1945 that: "the only rational alternative to existing international anarchy lies in some reasonable form of international organization."199 In other words, Truman and his generation kept faith with the same institutional formula of organised supranational architecture that the League had embodied.

Such a statement, and much of the political and philosophical thought of humanistic Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment traditions and also religious traditions, has perceived war as the prime evil of society. Contra Clausewitz200, war is not an extension of policy, but an admission of the failure of reason and reasonableness – its violence is a social sin, its rupture through the social fabric a lamentable tragedy. From this perspective, the moment following a major conflict presents an opportunity to safeguard nations against a 'relapse' into a violent conflagration. This might fairly be characterised as a Wilsonian attitude – the leading power taking responsibility and employing an example of moral authority to re-organise the nations of the world. An ideal encapsulation of this attitude can be found in one of the first summary reference documents produced for debate on Sumner Welles' Subcommittee on Political Problems in July 1942: "(I)t may seem utterly Utopian at this time consider the possibility of the prevention of war. Nevertheless that is what the American soldiers fought for in the last war and a fighting for in this."201

---


In 1945 then, the post-conflict moment was imbued with massive significance. Not only had the conflict been the most all-encompassing in history, but powerful discourses portrayed it as being the catastrophic and doubly bitter result of failing to learn from the first global conflagration. Furthermore, the struggle had been dramatised by Manichean rhetoric of universal human freedoms and their potential destruction by totalitarian enslavement. American portrayals of the motives of the belligerent powers tended towards such formulations in spite of the diverse philosophical and political stances of the component nations of the Axis and Allied coalitions. As Hilderbrand rightly notes, this simplification and exaggeration was often orchestrated for political purposes: "(E)arly planning for a postwar security organization...had practical utility: it made American involvement in the war seem more palatable to those who doubted its immediate value...FDR’s response, like Wilson’s, was in part a public relations campaign to expand the importance of the war for Americans by transforming its ultimate purpose into something larger than the issues of the conflict itself – the establishment of permanent peace through postwar international organisation."202

The character of this post-conflict moment was presented as the most universally significant in history and the notion that this was an all-or-nothing war for a set of fundamental values was concretely enshrined in the international institutional framework designed to maintain the peace. Two questions must be addressed in order to proceed into the detail of the planning process with a clear notion of what is being examined. Firstly, how can we go about explaining the particular character of the response to this post-conflict moment? Secondly, how might the particular character of the moment of genesis manifest itself in the philosophies of the resultant institution? On the basis of tackling these questions it will be possible to present the planning process as a highly constrained and exclusive milieu producing purportedly universal discourses, principles and morals for the world after the war. Crucial to the planners, as we shall see, were the moral visions and values that were to be enshrined in the documents of the UN. This was not to be simply a political settlement but, as Eleanor Roosevelt said in reference to the Charter, “a guiding beacon”203 for the world.


This desire to morally re-make the world—set in stone in these great documents—echoes in contemporary discourse as we will see in Part Three. However, the expectations that value statements could bring the world together have perhaps not been as essential as the planners imagined. As will be shown throughout the coming chapters, usage of such Utopian and sentimental discourses as that of the human family has declined, while scholars and practitioners within the UN itself admit that employing notions like the family of nations may put them “at risk of sounding like members of the lunatic fringe.” The following sections thus investigate the process of how such discourses could be planted at the heart of the UN project.

3.1.2 Institutionalisation: A Rational Response?

In elucidating how I aim to explain the character of the response to the post-conflict moment in 1945, John Ikenberry’s sophisticated study After Victory is a useful foil. Ikenberry presents a detailed answer as to why, at this particular juncture in 1945, a highly institutional and supposedly multilateral response to managing the world after war emerges. Ikenberry himself contrasts his approach to strictly liberal institutionalist and constructivist positions. The former school of thought sees the trade-offs in negotiations over multilateral power-sharing as being motivated much in the way that rational economic exchanges are supposedly made. Actors perform cost-benefit analyses on their negotiating positions and seek to reduce uncertainty and transaction costs through the regularisation that comes with institutional organisation. A useful way to think of this perspective is, as Haggard and Simmons term it, a ‘functional’ notion of international agreement, where actors seek optimal functional utility through bargaining. The constructivist school, on the other hand, sees the institutional settlement after a war as a reflection (according to Ikenberry) of “the prevailing thinking among those party to the settlements about what the proper principles and purposes of

---

204 Author’s Interview 7, 24th November 2009. Original listings of interviews included in Examiners’ copies but removed in the present edition for the sake of confidentiality.


international order should be."\textsuperscript{207} Much liberal institutional theory argues that institutions matter most when hegemony is on the decline\textsuperscript{208}, but instead Ikenberry\textsuperscript{209} considers the policy of the creation of an institutional settlement as a rationalist policy move on the part of an \textbf{active} hegemon.

At the close of a war, Ikenberry argues, the winning state "acquire(s)...a sort of 'windfall' of power assets."\textsuperscript{210} Three options present themselves to the new hegemon: domination of the weaker states, abandonment of them, or the use of new-found power to create a long-lasting institutional order which favours the strongest state. Blessed with a huge power disparity in 1945, "(t)he US sought to take advantage of the postwar juncture to lock in a set of institutions that would serve its interests well into the future and, in return, it offered – in most instances quite reluctantly – to restrain and commit itself by operating within an array of postwar, economic, political, and security institutions."\textsuperscript{211} Strong states, he plausibly argues, desire to maintain their post-war position, weak states want to be assured that the strong will neither dominate, nor abandon them. The higher the power disparity, the more the strong will have an incentive to design an institutional system into which they can lock their weaker allies and former opponents. The higher the power disparity, the more the weak will have an incentive to wish to see the power of the strong harnessed and possibly regulated by a high level of global institutionalisation.\textsuperscript{212}

Ikenberry's work attempts to provide an explanation for the differences between the world orders created after the settlements of 1815, 1919 and 1945. Over the course of those historical junctures, the power disparity between the major hegemon (Great Britain in 1815, and the United States after the World Wars) and the rest of the world grew, as did the level of institutionalisation of the peace settlements. Ikenberry's argument that the greater the power

\textsuperscript{207} Ikenberry, G.J. (2001) \textit{After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars} p16
\textsuperscript{208} See for instance, Keohane, R. (1984) \textit{After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy}
\textsuperscript{209} Ikenberry's approach retains a primary concern to highlight strategic rationalism in such decision-making, but also introduces perspectives from historical institutionalism and its notions of the path-dependency of institutional settlements. For a neat overview of the latter see, Thelen, K. (1999) 'Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics' in Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 2, p369-404.
\textsuperscript{210} Ikenberry, G.J. (2001) \textit{After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars} p4
\textsuperscript{211} Ibid. p164
\textsuperscript{212} Ibid. p5
disparity the more a strong state has an incentive to pursue long term stability by way of institutional restraint seems sensible and credible. On the other hand, when power disparities are low, it would also seem reasonable to suggest a counter-argument that the leading state, in mortal fear of losing its slender advantage, would have little choice but to make institutional deals with its near-rivals. While Ikenberry looks to the contextual concerns of historical institutionalism, his three historical studies (1815, 1919 and 1945) are arguably not a conclusive set of test cases. Multiple variables are at work, and not simply power disparity.

Ikenberry rightly highlights the strategic utility for the US of an institutional settlement, and this is borne out by some of the statements of the UN planning committees. As Leo Pasvolsky noted, “the American people will probably be more inclined to support the necessary action by this Government in the interests of peace and security through the international organisation, than to support action...outside the organisation but in concert with only selected powers.”213 Ikenberry also correctly notes the weakness of the European states as being a significant factor in encouraging American internationalism particularly with reference to the potential threat of the Soviet Union to Western Europe.214 As Gaddis argues, in 1945 “the fear was not of American expansionism but of American isolationism.”215 This conception dovetails with the fact that the UN was a largely American project. It was not the outcome of the states of Europe banding together to institutionally secure themselves against the USSR – such a model fits NATO better perhaps. Nor was the UN planning simply the outcome of a grand constructivist debate on postwar principles. In fact, as the following sections show, the FDR administration took many steps to close down debate on principles, rather than open debate up. This enabled the US to craft an UN organization acceptable to its interests and philosophies without complication from outside interference.


214 One has only to recall Churchill’s ‘Iron Curtain’ address at Fulton in 1946 to find weight to add to this notion, recalling his concluding appeal for the “fraternal association” of Western democracies against the USSR. This speech is available at: http:/ /americanrhetoric.com/speeches/winstonchurchillissentossofpeace.htm. Accessed on: 13/09/2009.

Thus, the point at which I believe it is useful to diverge from, or add to Ikenberry's insights is in the overriding weight attached in his analysis to rationalist explanations for determining the character that decisions have when they become manifest as political realities. Ikenberry neglects, for instance, the influence that each of the peace settlements (1815, 1919 and 1945) had on each other. In the case of the relationship between the Concert of Europe and the Treaty of Versailles, the influence was likely to have been comparatively weak – the agreements were made over a century apart, the first entirely a European affair, the second hugely influenced by the United States as the new global power. The first was a balance of power treaty, the second an attempt at real intergovernmental organization in the establishment of the League of Nations. Contrary to this, in the case of the relationship between 1919 and 1945, the idea that Versailles was an example to the present generation in 1945 was extremely strong. In a sense ‘path-dependent’ thinking was critical in the philosophies of the 1945 settlement – Sumner Welles for instance insisted that his staff begin post-war planning by making exhaustive studies of the operation of the League of Nations in order to start modelling the new UN organization.216

While growing dependence upon institutionalisation is certainly a plausible strategic tactic for lessening losses and seeking to tie-in favourable relations, it is crucially also wedded to the ways in which nations have come, perhaps only in the past century, to seek international legitimacy. Given the contextual backdrop of the way the colonial, unilateral nineteenth century has been portrayed, multilateralism today is seen almost uncritically as being the only path to legitimate politics in the international sphere. Ikenberry neglects the fact that the American national history was founded upon a rejection of the self-serving type of power exercised by colonial Europe. American politicians have, almost always, wanted power with moral justification and with some self-assurring sense of legitimacy.217 In that sense, my focus on the postwar planning for the end of WWII is on how the US wished to lock in favourable power relations and legitimate them through the universal philosophies of the UN. By enshrining in a global institution truths and goals purporting to aid and speak for all


217 Legitimacy may be thought to derive from the fairness and rationality supposedly inherent in organised, multilateral, consensual politics. Pasvolsky's analysis above may be borne out by considering the outrage over US unilateralism in the Iraq War of 2003. Liberal Americans as well as America's European (and other) partners clamoured for any intervention to be carried out through UN channels.
mankind, the institutional settlement was an exercise in the legitimation of power. In this sense, the formulation of ideas and discourses is critical even to a strategic project that aimed to preserve US hegemony. To produce a full explanation of the particularity of the WWII settlement, both the rationalist aims of the planners, and the discourses in which those aims were couched require consideration. The following sections explore those aims and the foundations of the discourses of the UN, both with reference to the narrow group of actors involved in the planning, and the broader social resources of discourse which they drew upon to communicate their project.

3.2 Key Actors – The Planners of the New World Order and Their Ideational Backgrounds

3.2.1 Franklin D. Roosevelt

Critical to Franklin Roosevelt’s contribution to the underlying philosophy of the UN was the idealist strain of his personality that had inspired, in particular, the great wartime statements of intent such as the Four Freedoms and the Atlantic Charter. While part of the need for the Atlantic Charter was to give hope and direction to the countries fighting Hitler in Europe (and Roosevelt was certainly aware of the political weight of his words), this is not to say that he did not believe in the principles outlined. As his closest wartime confidante, Harry Hopkins claimed: “(Y)ou can see the real Roosevelt when he comes out with something like the Four Freedoms...don't get the idea that those are...catch-phrases.”218 FDR himself declared in a speech before the Canadian Parliament in 1943 that: “I am everlastingly angry only at those who assert vociferously that the Four Freedoms and the Atlantic Charter are nonsense because they are unattainable. If they had lived a century and a half ago they would have sneered and said that the Declaration of Independence was utter piffle...I would rather be a builder than a wrecker, hoping always that the structure of life is growing, not dying.”219

---

218 See, Sherwood, R. E. (1948) Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History p266
Roosevelt balanced idealism and pragmatism throughout his political career, and a number of classic biographies\textsuperscript{220} have weaved principally similar theses to explain the two apparent sides to FDR’s personality and political outlook.

Perhaps the most illuminating way to view the UN planning process is to contextualise it in relation to Roosevelt’s overall Presidential career. From 1933-45 Roosevelt was almost constantly assailed by crises – firstly the Great Depression and then a global war. Founding the UN was arguably the final of a series of great projects to remedy these domestic and international problems. Roosevelt plunged into office with the New Deal, followed this up with the Second New Deal, instituted Lend-Lease to help in the World War, took America into conflict with the Axis, and finally helped to found the UN. These great projects all bear similar characteristics borne, as scholars such as Abbott\textsuperscript{221} have argued, of Roosevelt’s Progressive-era background and influences.

All these efforts were centralised, ‘Big Government’ solutions imbued with an idealistic, moralistic rhetoric focused on transformation and radical improvement of social conditions. In other words, they were broadly the heirs of the Progressive-era policies of two of the men who had most influenced FDR in his early career. Of course, Teddy Roosevelt’s trust-busting attacks on monopoly capital and corruption were concerned “to set up a moral standard”\textsuperscript{222} for fair commercial practices. Woodrow Wilson’s establishment of the League of Nations was a highly idealistic plan and, in pushing for the nineteenth amendment in 1918 for women’s suffrage, he urged Senators to “do this just thing and show our women that you trust them as much as you in fact and of necessity depend upon them.”\textsuperscript{223} However, as George Mowry\textsuperscript{224}

\begin{footnotesize}

\textsuperscript{221} See for instance, Abbott, P. (1990) The Exemplary Presidency: Franklin D. Roosevelt and the American Political Tradition. Of course, given the Republican dominance of the 1920s and the failure of Progressivism to deal with crime and corruption in the ways that it had promised, Roosevelt could never term his 1930s projects Progressive. Instead he recommended them as ‘liberal’ solutions.


\textsuperscript{224} See Mowry, G. (1954) The Era of Theodore Roosevelt and the Birth of Modern America, 1900-1912
\end{footnotesize}
argues, the Progressivism of Teddy Roosevelt or Wilson was not simply idealism for its own sake, but was profoundly a problem-solving ethos, wherein new, rational, sometimes explicitly scientific methods of analysis were employed to investigate and solve discrete social problems for the moral and ethical betterment of society. This duality of practical but rhetorically moral action manifest in Big Government projects, was carried through into FDR’s approach to tackling domestic and international crises.

One way to separate these two facets of idealism and pragmatism is to look at some of FDR’s own pronouncements, in particular on a theme that demonstrated an important characteristic to his thinking. As Range records, whether on the issue of the ratification of the Treaty of Versailles, the implementation of the New Deal, or the issue of postwar planning, FDR most often sought to concentrate “on the development of general principles and the achievement of major objectives and...look(ed) upon many important matters as mere worrisome details that could be settled later by subordinates.”

In response to press conference questions in 1943 concerning government thinking on the postwar international architecture, FDR said: “(W)hen people ask the details about an objective, I say, ‘I am not interested’ or ‘I am not ready to talk’ or ‘We haven’t studied the methods and details.’” At the level of general objectives, Roosevelt could air his idealist, progressive desires to re-make the world. Many times he recognised realistic constraints upon his ideals, particularly in the opposition he expected to find to plans to enter the war, or to re-design the postwar international institutional architecture. Simply because contingent realities constrain us however, FDR did not (as his impassioned self-defence at Ottawa shows above), believe that humanity should give up on ideals. If the ‘Four Policemen’, for instance, were required to set up a stable world in which a more general organisation might not founder as the League had done, then that admission to power politics would have to be made. As Richard Nixon said of FDR, “he talked always in idealistic terms, but he was an operator.” This assiduous blending of idealistic statements with a keen awareness of the need for pragmatism is perfectly visible in his FDR’s ‘Four Freedoms’ address of 1941. Being one of his most idealistic

228 Nixon’s interviews with Douglas Brinkley, see Leuchtenburg, W. (2001) In the Shadow of FDR: Harry Truman to George W. Bush p173
pronouncements wherein he rallied opposition to dictatorship under the banner of a “moral order”, he nevertheless cautioned that the statement was “no vision of a distant millennium. It is a definite basis for a kind of world attainable in our own time and generation.” The same discursive juxtaposition of ideal and pragmatic imperatives is observable in the final article of the Atlantic Charter where nations are exhorted to abandon the use of force “for realistic as well as spiritual reasons.”

He did not believe that either the League or the nascent UN could be perfect, but that in principle they were, and should be, born of what he called “magnificent idealism.” Assessing the failure of the idealism of the League, he commented in his State of the Union Address in 1943 that “we have learned that we cannot maintain peace at this stage of human development by good intentions alone.” By the time of his 1945 Message to the Congress this message had been solidified and reflected the way FDR contributed to leading the development from uncompromising Wilsonian idealism to the more self-aware idealism that characterised the UN:

"Nations like individuals do not always see alike or think alike, and international cooperation and progress are not helped by any Nation assuming that it has a monopoly of wisdom or of virtue. In the future world the misuse of power, as implied in the term "power politics," must not be a controlling factor in international relations. That is the heart of the principles to which we have subscribed. We cannot deny that power is a factor in world politics any more than we can deny its existence as a factor in national politics... Perfectionism, no less than isolationism or imperialism or power politics, may obstruct the paths to international peace...the retreat to isolationism a quarter of a century ago was started not by a direct attack against international cooperation but against the alleged imperfections of the peace. In our disillusionment after the last war we preferred international anarchy to international cooperation with Nations which did not see and think exactly as we did. We gave up the hope of gradually achieving a better peace because we had not the courage to fulfil our responsibilities in an admittedly imperfect world."

---

232 Ibid.
FDR's role was to hold out the general ideals that would later be embodied in the UN. Thusly Hull wrote to Roosevelt when seeking approval for revamping the postwar studies section of the State Department, that the task of the whole planning staff and the new Presidential Advisory Committee on Postwar Foreign Policy would be “to translate into a program of specific policies and measures the broad principles enunciated in the Atlantic Declaration and in your other pronouncements of post-war policy.” In other words, the Rooseveltian mantra of grand, macro-level idealism supported by detail-oriented micro-level realist planning permeated the whole process. Delegating the detail to the State Department and maintaining a high-level of secrecy until the planning process was well advanced, had confronted all the potential obstacles and found answers to all possible objections, was the Administration’s prime method for ensuring that the infant wings of Roosevelt’s postwar ideals were not clipped.

3.2.2 Secretary of State, Cordell Hull and Under-Secretary, Sumner Welles

While Cordell Hull was involved in the early years of postwar planning until his declining health forced him into retirement in 1944, it has often been noted that (perversely for such a long serving Secretary of State) foreign policy was far from Hull’s speciality, and in many ways he was an unlikely supervisor for the germination of the UN. In fact, during the planning process, what turned out to be irreparable tensions grew up between Hull and his Under-Secretary, Sumner Welles, over the direction and leadership of the project. Welles, a good friend of FDR, and like his President a former Groton student, was a keen thinker on international issues and had been sent on missions to South America, Cuba and Japan by Wilson, and later to Europe in 1940 on behalf of FDR. Welles had proved himself to have nuanced appreciations for the US’s international role in the developing world crisis as early as 1937, when he outlined what came to be known as the Welles Plan in his first year as Under-Secretary. In a speech at the University of Virginia in July, Welles proposed a highly Wilsonian conception of ways to improve international stability including ‘international standards’ of behaviour, regular international conferences and reduction of arms and tariff...
barriers. Conversations with FDR subsequent to this address gave the President the ideas for his famous ‘Quarantine Speech’, and Welles later proposed in the autumn of 1937 a conference of all nations at the White House where neutral nations would guarantee to quarantine international aggressors. Welles had found a practical way to promote global stability without endangering American neutrality and Roosevelt much appreciated the creative thinking of his new Under-Secretary.

Indeed by 1943, as Schlesinger notes, Welles had assumed “a dominance over UN planning” that was “starting to embitter Hull.” Partly, FDR trusted the internationalist, swift-thinking Welles far more on UN issues than he did the cautious Hull. Welles and Roosevelt had known each other since childhood and Welles had been a page at FDR’s wedding. Woodrow Wilson and his idealist internationalism influenced both men equally and both owed their political careers to his influence. Wilson had given FDR his first central government position as Assistant Secretary to the Navy. Welles declared himself to be “thrilled to the depths of... (his)... emotional and intellectual being by the vision that Woodrow Wilson held out to us of a world order founded on justice and democracy.” Welles’ rhetoric throughout the war was characterised, in the words of Christopher O’Sullivan, by “idealistic pronouncements about freedom, self-determination and radical change” with “an aura of spiritual and moral zeal.” This idealism though, just as with FDR, remained practical and progressive in nature. Welles remained convinced in his own writings that his and Roosevelt’s decision to commence practical postwar planning at the earliest stage, (even downgrading their plans for the sake of simplification from universal organization to regional bodies based on the Inter-American Conferences of the 1930s) was critical to the task of ensuring US and international support for the new world order when the war ended. Welles “calculated that the war effort would be better sustained by moral arguments than by appeals to self-interest...his vision of the postwar order would allow American commerce to flourish alongside universal values and

ideals." He intended to use grand rhetoric to promote support for a new world order which would greatly benefit the United States' pragmatic interests.

Hull, conversely, lacked the drive and the expertise to tackle the mountain of issues which required consideration in the postwar planning process, especially when the planning staff was increased and the process shifted into top gear in May 1942. His political career prior to being named Secretary of State conspicuously included almost no foreign experience. He was principally credited with turning his legal nous to reforming the domestic taxation system under the Wilson administration. As Hoopes and Brinkley remark, Welles rather than Hull "was the first highly placed US official to make public reference to postwar aims; declaring that only an 'Association of Nations' could rebuild a shattered world" in a speech at the Norwegian Legation in Washington in July 1941. Further, Hull's frequent absences from Washington due to ill-health allowed control of the processes of planning to slip from his grasp. As we have seen, Welles had already stolen a march on the Secretary, pushing FDR to consider grand schemes for reordering the world even as early as 1937.

The initial list of advisors that Hull drew up when his Department was given the go-ahead to begin to develop plans for a post-war world organization in 1939 is telling, and perhaps unexpected. He lists five main sources: the Council of Foreign Relations in New York and the British Foreign Office are his two prime political sources. The rest of his list though is religious: the Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America, the Jewish Theological Seminary of America, and Pope Pius XII. Hull conceptualised his early work under the mantra of "endeavours for a righteous peace." However, it is clear that a grand world purpose along such shining moral lines was far from his initial thinking and is perhaps the product of triumphal hindsight when writing up his memoirs and a reversion to his default Episcopalian religiosity. The war in Europe throughout 1939 and 1940 prompted Hull and the State Department teams under his control to worry mainly about American trade interests and the distant possibility of Hitler, having conquered all of Europe, seeking control of the

242 For further details see Hinton, H. B. (1942) Cordell Hull: A Biography
245 Ibid. p1626
Western Hemisphere colonies of the European nations. His overriding concern in these early war years was that the US might have to extend heavy export subsidies to Latin American countries at taxpayers' expense in order to bolster their economies for their resistance to Hitler.\textsuperscript{246} In fact, the way in which Hull envisaged the interconnection of the world in the postwar period differed little from his 1930s obsession with the opening of a global free trade regime – even though this thinking (part of the Smoot-Hawley era protectionist problems) had been surpassed by the scope of other State Department ambitions in early 1940s. Hull was a man, according to Hoopes and Brinkley, “whose speeches...seemed like a train of twenty cars from which emerged only a single passenger. Hull’s single passenger was always the same – trade agreements.”\textsuperscript{247}

Uniting the world economically was safe ground\textsuperscript{248}, perfect for the “obsessive caution”\textsuperscript{249} of Hull. Desiring bolder thinking and leadership of greater energy, FDR increasingly turned to Welles, especially when Hull's health began to decline more rapidly in 1941. While Hull was given the chair of the Advisory Committee on Postwar Foreign Policy at the request of FDR, Leo Pasvolsky notes that that body was “not on record as having sent any formal recommendations to the President.”\textsuperscript{250} The main Advisory Committee met only four times (thrice chaired by Welles), whereas Welles' Subcommittee on Political Problems met sixty times and produced reams of study reports and literature and was the main organ for the debate and drafting of the UN Charter. Though Welles assumed the mantle of figurehead for political planning in 1942 and 1943 to the chagrin of Hull, he found his ideas on world organisation often blocked or transformed upon reaching the President or Hull.

Welles had been a Latin American specialist since the 1920s and was, in many ways, a regionalist when it came to world organisation. Having far more detailed geographical and historical knowledge of various areas of the world than his superior he tended to look at political problems in smaller, more detail-oriented focus. Problems over the fate of postwar

\textsuperscript{246} Hull, C. (1948) \textit{The Memoirs of Cordell Hull: Vol 2} p1629
\textsuperscript{247} Hoopes, T. and Brinkley, D. (1997) \textit{FDR and the Creation of the United Nations} p34
\textsuperscript{248} Hull's preoccupation with this safe ground is borne out in the analysis, and even the title, of Butler, M. (1998) \textit{Cautious Visionary: Cordell Hull and Trade Reform, 1933-1937}
\textsuperscript{249} Hoopes, T. and Brinkley, D. (1997) \textit{FDR and the Creation of the United Nations} p36
\textsuperscript{250} Untitled Memo, 4\textsuperscript{th} October 1944. Leo Pasvolsky Papers, Library of Congress, Washington DC. Box 5; Folder - International Organizations: State Department Work in International Organizations Prior to October 1943.
Poland say, were, in his eyes, strictly a matter for a European council and could not, Welles believed, be solved by reforming in generalist terms the moral principles or the trade patterns of the postwar world. While Welles had greater Departmental control during the formative years of 1942-3, the unitary philosophy of the UN came to embody less the ideas of Welles (or another arch-regionalist, Winston Churchill) and more the principled idealism of Hull and FDR, especially following Welles forced resignation in August 1943. At this point Hull reasserted control over the planning process, but was less than central in the day-to-day meetings.

While struggles over the conduct of planning were fought in the State Department, a disjunction opened between the outcomes of these battles and the views of the president himself. This was principally caused by FDR’s desire to delegate precise planning of the postwar architecture in order to devote himself to the task of winning the war. As Welles writes, “the President used frequently to say that he did not want to be drawn into the intensive studies of post-war settlements...he would say, ‘What I expect you to do is to have prepared for me the necessary number of baskets and the necessary number of alternative solutions...from which I can make my own choice.”

Thus disconnection appeared between the coalface of postwar planning and the highest echelons where the general principles were instantiated and modified. One constant factor throughout both the war years and Hull and Welles’ disagreements, enabled the executive and the State Department to regain unity of purpose between the principles coming from the top of the Administration, and the bureaucratic organisation of them lower down. This constant factor was Dr. Leo Pasvolsky.

3.2.3 Leo Pasvolsky

More than any other official involved in the UN planning procedure, Pasvolsky became indispensable once the planning had reached a stage when, after considerable research, solid

---

251 Welles was ousted as being homosexual after the leaking of information that he had solicited sexual favours from African-American busboys in 1940. The leak was instigated by Cordell Hull as revenge for Welles usurpation of his primacy within the State Department and carried out by William Bullitt Jr.. The rumours sufficed to destroy Welles’ career. See Welles, B. (1997) Sumner Welles: FDR’s Global Strategist p273-4

drafts of the structure of a potential organization could be finally produced\footnote{See Schlesinger, S. (2004) *Act of Creation: The Founding of the United Nations* ch 2}. Pasvolsky coordinated meetings for the State Department's planning bodies with almost every possible influential and interested party. When it came to presenting ideas to allied governments later on in the war, Pasvolsky was often *de facto* if not *de nomine* the chair, the chief negotiator, and the chief expert combined. Given the floating roles of 'Special Assistant to the Secretary' and 'Director of Special Research', he became the only official cognisant of all aspects of postwar planning. While many contributors to the planning process worked on one or two committees, and often attended infrequently or only during part of the six year process, Pasvolsky was present on whole plethora of committees, and attended almost all meetings from 1939 through to 1945.\footnote{A full account of Pasvolsky's overarching involvement is recorded in his papers. Especially useful is a full chronology of meetings of various subcommittees within the State Department, preserved in an Untitled Internal Memo dated 4th October 1944, Leo Pasvolsky Papers, Library of Congress, Washington DC. Box 5; Folder – 'State Department Work in International Organisations prior to October 1943'. Pasvolsky was a major contributor to Welles and Hull's Subcommittee on Political Problems, Isaiah Bowman's Territories Subcommittee, the Special Subcommittee on International Organization, and the Special Subcommittee on Problems of European Organization. Furthermore, he chaired the International Organisation Security Subcommittee. The only meetings he did not regularly attend were those of the Security Technical Committee which cross-reported with his Security Committee in any case, and the Special Subcommittee on Legal Problems wherein he could not claim expertise. Also, it is recorded here that the Drafting Group for the UN Charter was “constituted at the direction of Mr. Pasvolsky in July 1943”. It produced the Tentative Draft Text of the Charter of the UN just a month later in August 1943.}

Pasvolsky's background was in economic history, and, while living in the US during the Russian Revolution, he edited the journal 'Russian Review'. During the 1920s and 1930s, he was employed as a researcher at the Brookings Institute and published several books and articles on European war debts, reparations, communist economics, and Russian international relations, often in collaboration with Harold G. Moulton.\footnote{ 'Memorandum on Mr. Leo Pasvolsky' April 5th 1943', Oscar Cox Papers, Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park NY. Series I, Box 26. For further information on 'second-tier' figures such as Cox and their activities within FDR's Administration, see Woods, R.B. (1990) *A Changing of the Guard: Anglo-American Relations, 1941-1946*. Cox, a lawyer by training was a legal aide to Harry Hopkins, a prime draftsman of the Lend-Lease Bill, General Counsel to the Foreign Economic Administration and finally Deputy Director of the Foreign Economic Administration (FEA). See also Pasvolsky, L. and Moulton, H.G. (1932) *War Debts and World Prosperity*. It is likely that this memo on Pasvolsky was prepared for Cox's benefit as his postwar organization work would impact upon Cox's FEA.} As a journalist he attended the Versailles conferences to write about the economic aspects of the treaties for the New York press. Pasvolsky's background in international economics made him the perfect foil for Cordell Hull, whose policy concerns throughout the economically unstable 1930s meshed well with Pasvolsky's economic expertise. Indeed, such did Hull's dependence upon
Pasvolsky grow that, as John Parke Young, chief of the Division of International Finance recalled, Pasvolsky "had an office next door (to Hull), was in and out all day long. It was said that he was so close to Cordell Hull that Hull wouldn't lift a finger without first speaking to Leo."256

It was due to Hull's trust of Pasvolsky, and his own lack of knowledge of the actions of Welles' committees prior to the latter's resignation in summer 1943, that Hull pushed Pasvolsky forward to assume overarching control of the planning process in his stead. The economic focus of Hull and Pasvolsky lent itself to transition into appreciating political organisation in a unitary rather than a regionalist way. One of the most universally successful aspects of the international management of the League of Nations was the ILO257, and labour rights movements were one of the major discursive groundswells that inspired general movements towards the human rights that became enshrined in the UN institutional framework. Quite apart from this, Pasvolsky himself, in charge of the coordination of several committees, became the prime administrator of the planning process. His involvement within multiple bureaucratic arms, considering the problem of world order in terms of economics, politics, legal mechanisms, security measures, and moral principles led him when investigating the proposals of other governments, or even of subordinate staff, always to seek a unitary solution. Pasvolsky lost patience with British plans for regional councils or separate international court procedures or institutions. He recommended to Hull in 1943 that such disparate pieces of machinery be eschewed in favour of an institution which would derive authority and would make bureaucratic sense by virtue of being able to manage multiple aspects of world order "on a coordinated basis"258 and wrote to FDR in the same summer of 1943 that "the basis of international organisation should be worldwide rather than regional...there are grave dangers involved in having the world organisation rest upon...fully-

He believed that only a coordinated and singular institution backed by a singular and inspiring philosophy, "would be sufficiently flexible to carry out the special functions of...a transition from war to peace."  

In this sense, though hardly the moral inspiration for the UN's loftier purposes, Pasvolsky ensured that a unitary organisation could be in place that was worthy of the aims of Hull and FDR. In spite of this, Schlesinger argues, Pasvolsky had also become a committed Wilsonian internationalist during his work at the Versailles conference. He continued to push, for instance, for a universal Bill of Rights to be included at the San Francisco conference — one which defended the individual so robustly as to propose in Pasvolsky's draft to "constitute a part of the supreme law of each state." This retention of the moralism of his superiors in his drafting work came under criticism in later writings of Dean Acheson. It is due to the replacement of Welles by Pasvolsky as the foremost motor behind organising postwar planning that the influence of Welles' regionalism was cut off in late 1943. The drafts for the general structure of a UN to which Roosevelt finally decided to give his full support were Pasvolsky's August 1943 versions, not Welles earlier work. These drafts formed the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals and thereafter the preparatory documentation for the many nations at the San Francisco Conference.

---


264 These drafts are available in the Leo Pasvolsky Papers, Library of Congress, Washington DC. Box 3; Folders - General International Organization Documentation.
3.3 Outside Influence? Limiting The Space For Debate

3.3.1 US Domestic Pressures for Secrecy

A postwar organisation, indeed a new world order which purported to reflect the views of the vast majority of humankind – that majority who had not been turned by the militarism of totalitarian rule – might be expected to have been the product of a grand debate upon the common values that could be agreed upon by the diverse nations of humanity. With reference to the first major discussion between the Great Powers upon the subject, Hoopes and Brinkley state that “(l)deally, the discussions at Dumbarton Oaks would be conducted as a Socratic dialogue on the future of humankind.” Such an ideal dialogue was the initial goal of Welles’ reconstituted Subcommittee on International Organisation when it convened for its first discussion on ‘Preliminary Views on the Nature of Postwar International Organisation’ on 31st July 1942. The minutes record the general (and Wellesian) conclusion that “no international organisation can be sustained unless it has a wide popular appeal and is buttressed by a deep faith in its ideals.” However, the pragmatics of attempting to produce a sound and thorough document in the frenzied months of war, meant that the Dumbarton Oaks meetings amounted to the Four Powers (though mainly the United States) producing a plan on behalf of the world. In fact, a Socratic dialogue, the asking and answering of open questions upon the future of the postwar world, especially in terms of a concrete organisation, was, as FDR insisted from the very earliest attempts at postwar planning, a realistic impossibility.

Taking a cue both from their President and from the dangerous and unstable times, FDR’s Administration trod a difficult path between a strong desire to right the failings of Versailles and re-order the world once and for all, and the realisation that isolationism at home would block their plans and fear of a repeat of the failures of the 1930s would dog their every pronouncement. Indeed, within the Administration and the planning hub that was the State

Department, "the leitmotif of all the working parties and discussion groups...was over the right mix of ‘realism’ and ‘idealism’ that should be used in approaching postwar planning." The ‘idealism’ of discourse of a ‘new world order’ free from war and protecting a set of common, consensual human values had to be tempered in the planning by two ‘realist’ factors. Firstly, anti-internationalism in US domestic public and political opinion had to be nullified and a way had to be found to encourage a shift in the prevailing suspicion of overseas entanglements. In other words, a method was required to move the weight of opinion away from Monroe Doctrine isolationism and rejection of the travails of the outside world. Another historical narrative of the American national experience needed to be mobilised in order to motivate a real engagement with postwar problems: moral internationalism based on a notion of exceptionalism. Just as with the transformation of the war into a Manichean struggle for fundamental values, in the process of making a new world order, the FDR Administration could not rely on the American people simply wishing to take part, instead they mobilised the exceptionalist discourse and took the lead. Secondly, while the State Department in private consultation with Great Power allies professed that “the approach to the problem of permanent international organisation should be universal” in including representatives from all nations, no-one was under the illusion that this was even vaguely feasible or that many countries, in the middle of wartime, could spare the time and effort required for international debates on proposed world organisation.

On the domestic front, the FDR Administration could not risk their postwar planning project falling foul of isolationists in the Senate, Congress or public who could have been expected to treat the early start of the postwar planning program in 1939 as distinctly duplicitous on the part of an Administration which had spent the years 1939-41 actively distancing itself from charges of becoming entangled in the war. On the international front, full and open debate seemed impossible due to the circumstances of the war and also due to the differing visions that other nations would inevitably have for the postwar order. The nature of the

international values and ambitions of the Soviet Union was largely unknown. The question of
the continuance of imperial relations was clearly an area where the postwar vision for new
human values espoused in the United States, clashed dramatically with the views of countries
like Great Britain and France.

Thus, instead of a universal debate, the FDR Administration laid out the plans for the new
world order within a tightly controlled research and policy group. In effect, control of the
direction of the future international organisation which would overwhelmingly shape the
moral tone for values and policy throughout the entire world, lay in the hands of about
twenty officials in the FDR Administration, and specifically within the Department of State.
The initial "decision of December 27th 1939 to institute consultation by committee" of
postwar problems and policy recommended a "chosen body (that was) wholly
departmental." This decision resulted from a "discussion in Secretary Hull's office of a
proposal, prepared by Mr. Leo Pasvolsky" on that very same day. While at a preliminary
stage in 1940, the small scale of the staff and their generally low ranking made them a fairly
anonymous group. However, when some definite results were beginning to be produced by
the planning staff, White House Order 917-A, of 3rd February 1941 demanded official
secrecy for all postwar planning long before the US had looked certain to enter the war.

The planning staff was greatly expanded and re-organised in the wake of the United States'
being thrust into war by the Pearl Harbor attacks of December 1941, and the research remit
within the State Department splintered into increasingly in-depth specialisations. A letter
from Hull to FDR from May 17th 1942 rubber-stamped the dramatic shift of the planning
process into high gear. Hull also made clear in this letter than the State Department was to
maintain close control of general thinking on post war policy at a time when debate on the
nature of the postwar world was becoming widespread within Washington and in the nation
at large:

270 Undated Memo - 'Notes: restricted and secret'. Harley Notter Papers, NARA, College Park, MD. Box 1,
271 Report: 'II: Period of WWII', p.3. Harley Notter Papers, NARA, College Park, MD. Box 8, Miscellaneous
Subject Files 1939-50. Folder – Chronology 1939-41.
272 Undated personal records - 'Notes on Publicity re: Research Staff'. Harley Notter Papers, NARA, College
Park, MD. Box 11; Misc. Subject Files. Folder; Notter, Harley (Recollections).
"Since it is your further desire that all recommendations regarding postwar problems of international relations from all Departments and agencies of the Government be submitted to you through the Secretary of State, and that all conversations or negotiations with foreign governments bearing on post-war problems be conducted under your authority by the Department of State, I should appreciate it if you would cause the heads of the various Departments and agencies concerned to be apprised of your wishes."

Whilst this might seem merely like the Secretary trying to guard his patch, FDR himself acted to shut down the involvement of, for instance, the Secretary of Commerce Jesse Jones, when he set up his own internal Departmental inquiries into post-war issues in May 1942. In a letter to the President, Jones stated that “May 21st we had the first meeting for the consideration of preliminary steps to study postwar economic problems...It is our belief that industry itself must give some thought and study to its postwar problems.”

Four days after the receipt of this letter, FDR made a reply, not to Jones at first, but to Hull. His memo records: “I think there is a real danger in having Jesse Jones expand his thought as contained in this letter.”

In his letter replying to Jones, FDR made it clear that his opinion was that work on postwar problems by the Department of Commerce was unnecessary, he wrote that “there is a great danger of confusion if several committees...are set up” and if any work was to be considered by anyone on the subject of the commercial implications of postwar planning, “these studies...should be coordinated through Mr. Frederic Delano” — FDR’s uncle. This exchange reflects not only the desire of FDR and the State Department to maintain full control over postwar planning, but also betrays the fact that the Department of Commerce was most likely unaware of the long-standing State Department investigations into postwar economic problems and the President’s desire to keep postwar work confined to the State Department.

Through 1942, the planning procedure was diversified and the Division of Special Research staff was expanded. The concern for secrecy remained paramount. Even as confidence in the Allied war effort was increasing following the US Navy’s success at Midway in June, the
British defeat of Rommel’s Afrika Korps in November and the continuing defence by the Red Army of Stalingrad, the State Department sought to keep the postwar planning projects tightly under wraps. A memo from Leo Pasvolsky to his entire staff dated 22nd December 1942 issues harsh warnings about the need for secrecy. Battlefield successes, he said, had prompted “comments in published form, remarks of radio commentators” and “statements by various individuals” on the shape that the US might wish to impose on a world where the Axis had been defeated. In this climate of renewed debate he exhorted all personnel to “maintain the strictest confidence regarding our work”. Furthermore, he cautioned in strict terms that “the existence and organisation of the committees, and the thinking of the committees...are not under any circumstances to be the subjects of comment to anyone outside the members of the Division itself...In the event that the direct question is asked whether you are engaged in postwar studies, it is suggested that you say that you are examining problems arising out of the war”. And in addition to pretending that the committees did not exist and not speaking to outsiders, he urged that “(G)reat care and caution...be taken by members discussing our work among themselves within earshot of others to assure that no one will overhear.”

The project of maintaining the secrecy of the planning nerve centre was helpfully abetted by the fact that the State Department was run by a Secretary, Cordell Hull, who would never have been a likely shaper of the international political order. As Hoopes and Brinkley remark: “(R)ooselvelt had chosen him not for his qualifications in foreign affairs – he had none – but for his high standing and rapport with Senate leaders.” Though Hull was the early de nomine chair of many postwar planning committee meetings, his overall contribution in the day-to-day work of the committees in producing reports and research papers was surpassed by that of Sumner Welles and by the man who came to be at the nexus of the research in numerous committees, Leo Pasvolsky. Additionally, Hull’s health was failing throughout the 1940s and he regularly spent the winter in Florida, totally out of the policy loop of Washington. Pasvolsky wrote of a talk with Hull in April 1943 shortly before Welles was forced out: “he told me that he felt very much in the dark on the whole matter (of) general international

377 All above quotes from ‘Staff Memo no. 26. 22nd December 1942 - To The Members of the Staff and Consultants, from Leo Pasvolsky’. Harley Notter Papers. NARA, College Park, MD. Box 11; Misc Subject Files. Folder - Notter, Harley (Recollections).

101
The planning process was thus fragmented. Hull was nominally in charge until his resignation in November 1944; for much of the time in the early years of the war, however, Welles was the *de facto* driving force, and also assumed the position of Acting Secretary of State while Hull was away from Washington. Neither Welles nor Hull would see out the planning process, and this fragmentation of leadership meant that it was impossible for any one person to have full knowledge of the results of all the research and almost no one could be regarded as a great risk in terms of leaking information.

Only after the Allies had definitively turned the tide of war in 1944 did the Administration feel confident enough to involve Senatorial groups in debating questions of postwar policy. Roosevelt was reluctant to repeat Wilson’s mistake of isolating the legislative branch. However, the Senate and Congress were largely unaware until 1944 of the ongoing planning organised by the State Department. An indication of the faith FDR invested in the planning staff can be derived from the following selection of expenditures approved in 1942 and 1943.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expenses ($)</th>
<th>Date Approved</th>
<th>Stated Purpose</th>
<th>2009 ($) Equivalent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>397,000</td>
<td>28th May 1942</td>
<td>“expenses in connection with the Advisory Committee on Postwar Foreign Policy”</td>
<td>15,682,168.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>267,000</td>
<td>18th August 1942</td>
<td>“geographical assistance to the President’s Advisory Committee”</td>
<td>10,546,949.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>250,000</td>
<td>26th August 1942</td>
<td>“certain types of world maps...for postwar studies”</td>
<td>9,875,420.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>900,000</td>
<td>13th July 1943</td>
<td>“activities of the Advisory Committee”</td>
<td>29,385,621.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>250,000</td>
<td>15th July 1943</td>
<td>“for maps”</td>
<td>8,162,672.77</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

279 ‘Notes on a Talk with the Secretary, 19th April 1943’. Leo Pasvolsky Papers, Library of Congress, Washington DC. Box 7; Folder - Postwar Planning 1942-3.


282 Letter, FDR to Secretary of the Treasury, Hans Morgenthau Jr., 26th August 1942. President’s Official File, Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, NY. Folder - OF4720, Advisory Committee on Postwar Foreign Policy 1942-4. This letter also mentions the above expenditure of $267,000 submitted to the President on August 18th.

283 Record of these final two sums is found in memos from Wayne Coy in the State Department stamped on the above dates with FDR’s approval for transmission to the Treasury. See, President’s Official File, Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, NY. Folder - OF4720, Advisory Committee on Postwar Foreign Policy 1942-4.
However, much that the Congress might be expected to have at least some knowledge of these activities, a letter to Hull from Senator Raymond E. Willis of Indiana on 18th April 1944 suggests that the Senate had very little information at all regarding postwar planning. The Senator asked not only whether the State Department had done any work on postwar issues, but if so whether the Department staff engaged in such work might be disclosed to the Senate along with their ages and salaries. Hull’s reply came two months later on 15th June. He admitted that planning had been going on for a full four and a half years without the Senate’s knowledge and, while giving a list of some of the postwar planning personnel, confessed that “practically our entire staff participates to some degree” in postwar research.

3.3.2 America And Its Allies

Limiting the space for the debate of postwar issues was far from confined to the policy of insulating the State Department from other domestic parties. Before calling the Dumbarton Oaks Conference in summer 1944, the American planning procedure (as was noted in Chapter One) had largely been shielded even from America’s wartime Allies. Compared to the State Department’s ‘Tentative Proposals’, the debate of which became the Dumbarton Oaks Conference agenda, the proposals put forward by the British, Russians and Chinese were embarrassingly sketchy. This section investigates how America’s allies were presented with a thoroughly planned UN organisation as a fait accompli at Dumbarton Oaks in 1944, and how a lack of consultation prior to the meetings ensured that the Allied delegations arrived unable to substantially contribute to the discussions.

At the root of the planning process in the US was the stark strategic belief that “an International Organisation is...the most effective and economical way to maintain American security.” As a result of long-standing American suspicion of alliance politics, if the US was

to secure its future by an internationalist policy, legitimacy in terms of public support could only come if "(T)he international center of gravity...be increasingly shifted to the organisation." In the early stages of planning in 1941, consensus was reached that whatever international organisation was designed, it should bolster US vital interests and as such the US "should be placed on the senior partnership basis, or (the organization should be) under the protectorate of the United States." As such, the true extent of the planning process was partially shielded from the US's allies, and their attempts to find out about or revise American thinking on postwar organisation were regularly deflected.

An early instance of this reluctance to engage with allies came in February 1940 when Lord Lothian informed the State Department of the setting up of a government committee under Sir George Schuster to study problems surrounding the terms of peace, and asked about American thinking on the subject. Prior to the secrecy order mentioned above, Lothian was told of the existence of the Advisory Committee on Postwar Problems. However, a memo from the American embassy in London to Sumner Welles records that "the President replied, according to Lothian, that he thought it inadvisable for the two committees to collaborate." Even contacts on an unofficial level were inadvisable, Ambassador John Winant wrote, due to "the real danger that informal contacts and exchange of ideas might easily be construed as involvement in British war aims." Throughout the early part of the war, and before American military participation, the British Political and Economic Planning body asked for cooperation with American planners but was only given access to the non-governmental National Planning Association where peripheral topics of discussion were entertained such as the domestic issues for belligerent nations of defence budgeting and the wartime problems of consumer goods backlogs. When the British set up the Inter-Allied Committee on Post-war

---


290 Ibid.

291 Undated personal research notes. Adolf Berle Jr. Papers, Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, NY. Box 65; Folder - Postwar Plans 1939-44. It may be supposed from the archival context, especially the subsequent comment on Leith Ross' committee, that these notes date from 1941. We can thus conclude that British attempts at transatlantic dialogue were pushed around minor policy circles in Washington for two years while the US was...
Requirements under Frederick Leith Ross in 1941, the State Department planners looking on from Washington declared (unbeknownst to the British) that “it is envisaged that the new UN Committee would supersede the present Inter-Allied Committee.”

Throughout 1941, the State Department remained content to let the British organise research and postwar think-tanks of their own, though of course they paid little heed to them. Without substantial contact between researchers on the two sides of the Atlantic, their approaches by this time had substantially diverged. While the US had made extensive plans for the revitalisation of a League-type organisation called the UN, the British PEP by 1941 was producing plans on European Federalisation. The Foreign Office was at this time recommending that the postwar international system ought to be based around a strengthened Permanent Court of International Justice. Reaction to this within the State Department was withering: “a study of the Court question alone would not be particularly useful.” No effort however, was made to bring the British back in line with US thinking at this time – such effort was most likely to have been deemed superfluous. In fact, the British proposal of October 13th 1941 asking whether the US would like to participate in or be kept informed of debates on the PCIJ was left unanswered for nine months. After elaborating on their ideas in two further communications, London cabled on July 28th 1942: “(F)oreign Office asks when they may expect indication of Department’s views. Embassy suggests it would be helpful if Dept could indicate whether consideration is being given.” Within the State Department, their consideration was summed up by Harley Notter shortly before this making its mind up about joining the war. At this point, as we have seen, totally separate State Department initiatives were instituted whose committees did not debate, and seemingly did not care to consider earlier European ideas seriously at all. In many ways it would be difficult politically for the neutral Americans to have open dialogues on new world order with the British before joining the war, but their sidelining of European allies thereafter is more intriguing.

last enquiry: “there seems to me to be no question but that we are not prepared to engage in even informal discussion with the British.”

A similarly unresponsive attitude prevailed in 1943. Notter records that the Foreign Office submitted an inquiry on 8th April 1943 “concerning (the) nature of armistice terms we favoured.” While the British debated armistices and international courts, none of this international machinery would appear in the postwar architecture of 1945. Referring back to the requests on the subject of the PCIJ, the Foreign Office’s inquiry of April 1943 also prompted Notter to recall that “nothing has been done about the exchange of facts proposed by the British months ago.”

A decision had been made in September 1942 to agree to a factual exchange, but not a policy exchange, however even this was neglected for almost another year. Finally in July 1943, Pasvolsky and Welles sent British representatives a selection of study reports produced in the course of the work of the State Department planners. Far from being a succinct indication as to the results of the planning committees’ ideas for a UN organisation, Pasvolsky and Welles dispatched vague, preliminary, and sometimes even irrelevant study reports on such subjects as: ‘(T)he Upper Silesia Area: Industrial Factors’, ‘Commentary on the Italian Constitution’, ‘France’s Economic Relations with Her Empire’ and ‘The Proposal for A Polish-Czech Confederation’. British thinking on regional world organisation, deriving from Churchill’s ‘three-legged stool’ notion was given short-shrift within the State Department especially with the departure of Welles and the rise of Pasvolsky to pre-eminence, while further requests for talks on world organisation were rebuffed or neglected. Pasvolsky saw an excessive concern with European surrender terms and reparations as merely “ad hoc machinery for each particular

---

297 Letter, Notter to Durward V. Sandifer, 16th July 1942. Harley Notter Papers, NARA, College Park, MD. Box 19; Folder – Permanent Court - British Proposal (SCJ).
298 ‘Notes, Jan 1942-Dec 1943’. Harley Notter Papers, NARA, College Park, MD. Box 11; Postwar Planning, General. Folder - Notes, Jan 1942-Dec 1943.
299 Ibid.
300 The reports on Italy and Upper Silesia are included in a letter from Pasvolsky to Redvers Opie for forwarding to London, 12th July 1943. See Harley Notter Papers, NARA, College Park, MD. Box 79: Records of the Advisory Committee on Foreign Policy. Folder – Exchanges with the British (Gen. Folder).
301 The reports on France and Polish-Czech Federation are included in a letter from Welles to Lord Halifax, August 13th 1943. See Harley Notter Papers, NARA, College Park, MD. Box 79: Records of the Advisory Committee on Foreign Policy. Folder – Exchanges with the British (Gen. Folder).
303 ‘Notes, Jan 1942-Dec 1943’. Harley Notter Papers, NARA, College Park, MD. Box 11; Postwar Planning, General. Folder - Notes, Jan 1942-Dec 1943. In these notes, Notter records on August 11th 1943: “Clash over regional representation - Welles still insisting, Pasvolsky opposing.”
short-run function.” Pasvolsky believed, was beyond the range of a British government selfishly “seeking to limit British commitments to regions of special British interest, as opposed to universal general commitments.” As far as the Soviets were concerned, their thoughts hardly registered. A comprehensive report from August 1943 remarks that the “Soviet Union has given no direct expression of its views on the problems of international organisation, with the exception of the prevention of further aggression.”

Not all allies were taken to be so apathetic. By mid 1943, Pasvolsky was aware of the growing disquiet at the control the US might exert over postwar planning. He admitted that there existed “a feeling of uneasiness on the part of both large and small nations…especially on the score of our single-handed initiative and dominant position.” Other nations, he wrote, “feel that they should participate effectively in decisions leading up to the launching of any particular set of negotiations or conferences.” Participation and debate was scarcely conscionable though: “(E)ven if we were to agree to such procedural consultations”, Pasvolsky noted, “the process is likely to become increasingly difficult and cumbersome.”

305 Memo: Subcommittee on Security of Advisory Committee on Postwar Foreign Policy, August 11th 1943, response to aide-memoire sent by Foreign Secretary Eden to Sec. Hull through Ambassador John Winant proposing a ‘UN Commission for Europe’ to regionally manage relief, reparations, economic policy, armistice terms etc. Leo Pasvolsky Papers, Library of Congress, Washington DC. Box 3; Folder - International Organization: Memoranda for the President 1943-5.
309 Memo: ‘International Activities in which United States must participate to Re-establish and Maintain Peace and to Promote General Welfare’ August 9th 1943, p10. Leo Pasvolsky Papers, Library of Congress, Washington DC. Box 7; Folder - Postwar Planning 1942-3. These comments must be carefully considered with reference to the Senatorial confusion in 1944 referred to previously in this chapter concerning the planning process. Clearly the wider world suspected the US would be making plans, as they had in the period leading up to 1919. The wider world also contained many who were keen to make plans in concert with the US, but were rebuffed or
As the time approached when delegates of the four major powers were invited by the US to debate their plans for future world organisation, it became clear the State Department’s close guarding of their work had left the other delegations distinctly under-prepared. Indeed when the US proposed the Dumbarton Oaks Conferences, the British embassy in Washington registered alarm concerning the composition of the delegations. With the initial suggestion that the Secretary of State would lead the US delegation, the British Embassy wrote that “Mr. Eden is disturbed…because he anticipates…there would be questions in Parliament as to why he, Eden, is not taking part…there might be an impression that you (USA) are taking this whole matter much more seriously than we (GB) do.”

Revealing how far they lagged behind the US planners, Pasvolsky commented that “it has always been their (GB’s) thought that the discussions at this stage would be sufficiently preliminary to be carried out at what they call the ‘official’ level.” Of course, the ‘stage’ at which Britain was ready to discuss had long ago been superseded by the United States.

Two weeks before the conference, “a telegram from Mr. Harriman pointed out that the Soviet Foreign Office had not been able to have available for study a translation of (the US) basic document…and that the Russians had not contemplated an advance exchange of documents.” In their detailed arrangements, the State Department requested that “arrangements…be made with the British and Soviet groups so that they (would) make no statements unless the three heads of delegation approve” – a policy which would guarantee a US veto on the public statements of their allies. This was critical given the fact that the even the agenda and topics for debate set by the US was not to the liking of the other delegations. In particular, the British, Russians and Chinese all urgently wished to debate issues of international trusteeship, but this issue was taken off the agenda by the State Department “in

ignored. In this light it is well to remember that the Senate must have supposed that the State Department would be making postwar plans, but clearly had no details at all.


Ibid.


Ibid.

deference to the wishes of the Joint Chiefs of Staff who required further assessment of the strategic value of various territories which might be occupied by American forces at the end of the war.

Suspicion of the unilateral nature of planning for the postwar order became prevalent in public and academic arenas, especially based on the feeling that, as the path to world organisation began with the Atlantic Charter, the new world order was to be one dominated by Western principles and not universal principles. In the wake of the Atlantic Charter signing a group of eminent Americans thinkers, among them Quincy Wright, Margaret Mead and Walter White of the NAACP, sent a telegram to FDR on 16th January 1942 noting that “(A)lready enemies are using the Churchill visit as evidence of Anglo-Saxon will to dominance”. They went on to say that as “a spectacular demonstration that this is Armageddon of free peoples regardless of race or color, we urge that you arrange dramatic conference with Chiang Kai Shek and other leaders of yellow, brown and black millions throughout the world.” The writers of this telegram had their finger on the pulse of the State Department’s management of world order planning. As we have seen, the Soviets and Chinese were largely assumed to have no great contribution to make until they were permitted to join the conference at Dumbarton Oaks. On the other hand, the State Department assumed the British would have plenty of ideas, but that these ought to be rebuffed. In fact, six months prior to Roosevelt’s receipt of the warning telegram about Anglo-Saxon domination of the postwar order, Hull had sent a memo to the President on the Chinese approval of the Atlantic Charter but noting that “the ambassador complained that his Government has been largely neglected in recent acts and utterances of this Government.”

The eventual consultations gave the Allies opportunity to debate amendments to the American proposals, but due to the lack of communication earlier in the war, they remained

---


on a distinctly unequal footing, with the Chinese in particular treated as a very junior partner and accorded less attention and time to voice their ideas. Notes on the positions taken by Allied governments in late 1944 and even up to the weeks of the San Francisco Conference in Spring 1945 reveal underdeveloped thinking, a lack of specific understanding of the American documents, and often representatives sitting in discussions who had come unprepared and were still internally finalising their positions. While having spent much of the war trying to keep their powerful allies uninformed about their thinking on world organisation, the State Department followed a somewhat different policy with their less significant co-belligerents. They were actively co-opted to lend legitimacy to the nascent UN, while being held at arm's length in the same way as the Allies when it came to substantive input into the details of the structure and ethos of the organisation.

---

317 Pasvolsky’s Papers record this lack of international consideration of problems of international organisation and how out of step the US’s partners were with the highly developed ideas of the State Department. These disjunctions at meetings of the powers are often so substantial as to be comical. Just one week prior to the Dumbarton Conference, Pasvolsky records a summary of the positions of the thinking the State Department which runs to several thick booklets of proposals. Under specific headings he makes note of the proposals of allies with relation to the concrete US ideas. Under ‘General Character of an International Organization’ he notes British thinking as “basically similar” while the Soviets still push for a separate security organization. On ‘Membership’ he notes that the British have no ideas on the council other than that it “should be small and compact”. On the Assembly, he notes that the British have “no specific suggestion...with regard to the functions of the assembly”. The Soviet’s latest views, he records simply replicate the Moscow Declaration of the previous year. On ‘Relation to Non-Members’, the British have ‘no specific proposals’, for the Russians, he simply marks ‘none’. See report, ‘Basic Questions and Comparisons re: Tentative Proposals for a General International Organisation’, August 15th 1944, p1 and p12. Leo Pasvolsky Papers, Library of Congress, Washington DC. Box 1; Folder — International Organizations. Further, even a few weeks before the San Francisco conference, the allies were no closer to being in the loop. The US called a four day 4-Power Consultation on Amendments to the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals in late April 1945, just before the UN Conference in San Francisco. On the first day, Sunday 29th April, US changes were discussed. The British revealed that “they would have some changes to suggest (and)...hoped to have these available on Monday”. On Monday “the UK delegation was still studying its suggested changes” while Pasvolsky “suggested to Mr. Gromyko that in the event that the Soviet Union had any changes to suggest, they circulate them to the other members”. Tuesday saw still no British proposals, and was spent discussing more US ideas. For one hour and ten minutes on the final day Pasvolsky asked for a “brief review” of the British changes which had been aired late the previous evening after the Chinese delegate “had left the meeting”. This was done though no further debate of them is recorded before the Consultation finished. No debate of Russian or Chinese changes, if any were seriously proposed, is recorded. See ‘Meetings at the Fairmont Hotel, San Francisco, April 29th – May 2nd 1945. Notes on Four Power Consultations on Suggested Amendments to Dumbarton Oaks Proposals’. Leo Pasvolsky Papers, Library of Congress, Washington DC. Box 5; Folder — International Organizations: UN Proposals For.
3.3.3 Making Up The Numbers

When thinking on world organisation was in its embryonic stage in spring 1940, and before any decisions had been taken upon the shape or structure of any international body, Pasvolsky sent a memo to Hull to bring him up to date on his attempts to cultivate the favour of neutral states towards US-led planning of a new international order. “We have informed 40 neutral countries” he wrote, of US plans for “the creation of a sound foundation for a lasting world peace.”318 This in itself was a significant outreach in a world of around seventy nation states. Predictably perhaps, given the hope of much of the world that the US would join the war, Pasvolsky noted that “most of the replies...contain a request that we set forth our own ideas as a basis of discussion.”319 US plans to seek support from states in Western Europe and Scandinavia however, had to be put on hold as the Nazi Blitzkrieg overwhelmed them shortly after this early exchange.

As the Allies regrouped and the force of Hitler’s aggression turned from the Blitz in England to Operation Barbarossa in the USSR, they pledged an initially vague, but rapidly solidifying pact of war aims in the Atlantic Charter of August 1941 and the United Nations Declaration of January 1942. As Roosevelt commented in a press conference in 1945: “(T)he Atlantic Charter is a beautiful idea. When it was drawn up, the situation was that England was about to lose the war. They needed hope, and it gave it to them.”320 These declarations spurred hopes in countries large and small around the globe and the State Department, as Adolf Berle wrote to FDR on 5th January 1942, “received a huge stack of so-called ‘adherences’, ranging from...the Danish Minister whom we know and trust, to King Carol of Rumania whom we won’t even let into the country.”321 Of the more reliable signatories, Berle told FDR “if you

---

319 Ibid.
care to OK this I will, on their application, permit their signatures.\(^{322}\) A certain looseness of
criteria for being admitted by the US as a United Nations signatory was apparent even in
those immediately accepted. The Thai Minister in Washington for instance, Seni Pramoj\(^{323}\),
was, according to Berle “running a ‘Free Thailand’ movement all by himself”. The State
Department however, had no objection to his becoming a supporter of the UN Declaration
on behalf of his country even though Berle admitted “he does not represent very much.”\(^{324}\)
Though initially sceptical of the credentials of some of the ‘representatives’ of minor nations,
even those who merely led private interest groups or ex-pat forums, the State Department
left open the possibility of returning to their applications and permitting them to represent
their nations in the stead of anyone more officially qualified. As Berle remarked in the midst
of the initial flood of letters: “like Barnacle Bill the Sailor, we loves ‘em all and marries none
for the time being...”\(^{325}\)

Throughout the early part of America’s participation in the war in 1942 and 1943, postwar
planning had moved into high gear and the task of the State Department was to formulate
comprehensive plans, taking advantage of the relative preoccupation of other, less fortunate
governments. They would then be put to the Allies in complete and impressive detail.
American attempts to use the moral beacon of the Atlantic Charter and the hope of US war
aid as a bargaining tool for allegiance on future principles of world order continued apace. In
a policy that would have shocked British and French colonial administrators of the region at
the time, a telegram from the State Department to Cairo in 1943 records that “the American
Government would view sympathetically plans for Arab Union if these were developed by
the Arab peoples of their own free will and were in accord with the principles set for in the
Atlantic Charter.”\(^{326}\) While this policy eventually came to nothing, it was in this same period
that the US realised that their best hope of securing substantial numbers of independent
nations’ support for their UN projects lay not in Europe or the Far East. Those nations,

\(^{322}\) Memo, Adolf Berle Jr. to FDR, January 5th 1942. President’s Official File, Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, NY.
Folder OF4725, United Nations 1941-2.

\(^{323}\) See for background, Martin, J.V. (1963) — ‘Thai-American Relations in World War II’ in The Journal of

\(^{324}\) Memo, Adolf Berle Jr. to FDR, January 5th 1942. President’s Official File, Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, NY.
Folder OF4725, United Nations 1941-2. Both citations.

\(^{325}\) Memo, Adolf Berle Jr. to FDR, January 12th 1942. President’s Official File, Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, NY.
Folder OF4725, United Nations 1941-2.

\(^{326}\) ‘Telegram, State Department to Cairo’, October 26th 1943. Leo Pasvolsky Papers, Library of Congress,
threatened and oppressed as they were, might have been considered therefore perhaps the most receptive targets for the new principles that would found the UN. However, they had neither the time nor energy to engage with ideas of the postwar world until the menaces that violated their lands and peoples had been fully expunged. The easiest way to build a coalition of interested and easily influenced nations was for the US to look to the periphery of the conflict. The US looked to its own backyard, (which FDR and Welles had assiduously cultivated with the Good Neighbor policy in the 1930s) in South America.

Debates in the latter half of the war surrounding the establishment of the UN show a massive numerical weighting toward the nations of South America. A list from June 1943\textsuperscript{327} of the nations the State Department considered for non-permanent security council membership comprises thirty-nine nations, of these nineteen (49\%) were South and Central American states. Europe counted for nine states, Asia had one representative (Philippines), the British Dominions numbered five, and Africa and the Near East were conglomerated, counting for a further five states. Earlier the Department had suggested “excluding the Far Eastern group and the group of Near and Middle Eastern states because of the small number of states involved\textsuperscript{328}”, but this was fortunately rejected.

The South American states had, being on the very edge of both the Asian and Pacific conflict zones, much more time than states in Europe or Asia to engage with US ideas about future world organisation. The Pan-American Union organisation, a common heritage of republican government and an increasing trade relationship had throughout the early twentieth century brought about, as previously remarked in Chapter One, a notion of the Western Hemisphere and its republican peace, fortunately superior to the extremism of Asia and Europe. The US held out promises of special consultation on world organisation projects in return for supporting the war. As FDR said in a meeting with Pasvolsky and new Secretary of State, Stettinius in Autumn 1944; “we should take all the necessary steps to induce the...so-called ‘associated’ nations in South America to regularize their position by declaring war and thus

\textsuperscript{327} See Appendix D. A list of this kind is originally found in Annex I of ‘UN Protocol’, a report of June 3\textsuperscript{rd} 1943. See Sumner Welles Papers, Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park NY. Box 189 – Postwar Foreign Policy Files 1940-43, Folder 2 – UN Protocol.

\textsuperscript{328} See Minutes of meeting, ‘P-I-O 37 – UN Protocol for the War and Transition Period’, 1\textsuperscript{st} May 1943. Sumner Welles Papers, Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park NY. Box 189 – Postwar Foreign Policy Files 1940-43, Folder 4 – Subcommittee on International Organisation Minutes #1-43.
making themselves eligible for invitation" to conferences with the US planners. However, the character and content of these conferences soon seriously disappointed Latin American representatives. As Ambassador Carlos Martins of Brazil told Nelson Rockefeller and Stettinius, by autumn 1944 “Latin American relations were at a low ebb and that (he) was inclined to attribute this to their not having been taken into confidence on the world organisation.” The meetings he felt, were cosmetic and superfluous in character, and permitted no substantive contribution by the US's allies.

The conference of Latin American ambassadors hosted by the State Department in December 1944 was organised as a chance for the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals to be discussed by Latin American allies. Having not been invited to Dumbarton Oaks itself, the American Republics wished to debate all aspects of the UNO, even down to the revision of the name itself. However, as Pasvolsky and Rockefeller advised Stettinius, “the basic objectives of the conference…should be to satisfy the representatives of the American republics that many of the things they seek are in point of fact included in the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, and that the others were, after full consideration, rejected for good and sufficient reason.” In other words, no changes to the Proposals were to be admitted. On the first day of the Conference, Stettinius responded to the suggestions of the Latin American Committee on Coordination by admitting that the US could not “participate...

---

329 Memo of Conversation between FDR, Under-Secretary Stettinius, Leo Pasvolsky and State Department Legal Advisor, Green Hackworth, 15th November 1944. These are recorded as FDR’s words. Leo Pasvolsky Papers, Library of Congress, Washington DC. Box 5; Folder – International Organizations: UN Proposals For.


331 Mexico’s Chargé d’Affaires rejected the continued use of the term ‘United Nations’ as it would continue to connote its contemporaneous usage as a label for the wartime alliance. The Ambassador of Bolivia seconded this and proposed that “the final selection of a proper name for the organization might eventually be found by the people of the world”. The US was in no mood for such a slow democratic decision. These conversations are recorded in ‘Minutes of Meeting in Room 285 State Department on December 29th 1944, 3:45pm. Including the Secretary, Asst. Secretary Nelson A. Rockefeller, Chiefs of the Diplomatic Missions of the American Republics, Except Argentina and El Salvador and Certain American Officials’. Leo Pasvolsky Papers, Library of Congress, Washington DC. Box 2; Folder – International Organization: Conversations with Latin American Ambassadors JL-DE 1944.

in...recommendations at variance with the (Dumbarton Oaks) Proposals." Following this meeting of Ambassadors, the Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace was assembled in Mexico City as a further move to link the Latin American republics into the UN project. In a preliminary meeting at the American Embassy, US Ambassador George S. Messersmith was angrily asked by Mexican delegates Campos Ortiz and Manuel Tello "whether the US actually wished to have...any criticisms of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals which would presume to reflect the consensus of the Conference...whether in fact, the Conference could pass any critical report." The reply to the Mexican representatives was unequivocal, as Notter records: "it was remarked that the United States had in effect a gentleman's agreement among the major powers not to negotiate on the DOP's." The conference, had only been called in order "to secure...a general endorsement of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals." In the conference itself the US delegation wished to air an initial resolution for the acceptance of the DOPs but instead of proposing a motion themselves they wished to have the Mexicans do so. Accordingly, they issued a text of their resolution and a Spanish translation to the Mexican delegation for them to present as their own motion. This co-opting of the Mexicans to give a supportive example for other nations to follow backfired however, as Pasvolsky records: "to our utter consternation...the Committee on Initiatives received and reported out the Spanish text of our draft as a resolution prepared by the US delegation and marked with the word 'translation'."

In these exchanges with the South Americans, a dual policy then was revealed. The US desired numerical support for its plans, even if some the countries involved were relatively insignificant. The American Republics were drawn closer, but also kept at arms length in very

333 Minutes of 'Meeting of the Latin American Ambassadors Friday December 29th 3:45pm' - 'Response by the Secretary to Report from the Latin American Committee on Coordination presented by Ambassador Carlos Martins of Brazil'. Leo Pasvolsky Papers, Library of Congress, Washington DC. Box 2; Folder - International Organization: Conversations with Latin American Ambassadors JL-DE 1944.
335 Ibid.
336 Ibid.
direct ways when it came to real influence. What the US achieved, through these negotiations, and the shielding of its comprehensive planning from its more powerful allies, was the building of a detailed and unified vision and discourse which was to be presented as being consensual and universal. In fact, through the political practices of the FDR Administration, the germination of this vision of discourse was largely the product of a small group and their particular take on discourses of peace, morality and the human individual and human community. Up until the 1945 Conference, very little was permitted to dilute the American, Progressive, liberal, idealist character of the proposals and plans made and discourses favoured by the small circle of Administration planners.

The next section thus discusses two of the prime characters of discourse at the heart of the UN project which often become intertwined. Firstly, there is a notion that an ideal world is possible — the dream of the Four Freedoms made reality. Secondly, there is a mobilisation of positive metaphors of kinship, community and unity in a time of global strife when such virtues were never less apparent. In a sense, the project of the UN, by holding onto the latter in the darkest hours of war, had the strength to reach out for the former.

### 3.4 Discourses For The Post-War Moment

#### 3.4.1 An Unsurpassable Vision

In an address to the Pan-American Union in 1933, FDR remarked, in praise of the peaceful Western Hemisphere and in response to the re-emerging extremism in Germany, that; “(T)he 300,000,000 citizens in the American Republics are not different from other human beings...There are not wanting here all the usual rivalries.”

Donovan referred, of course, to the diversity of the Western Hemisphere, and made a general assertion as to the peaceable nature of the peoples of those nations and their concomitant (and, one might be led to

---

338 Donovan, F. (1966) *Mr. Roosevelt's Four Freedoms: The Story Behind the UN Charter* p12
assume, causal) republicanism. The difference from Old Europe, where Hitler had just taken power was, he said; “a new and powerful idea – that of the community of nations.”

The important cornerstones of the idealism of the UN began to be exercised in discourse through the interwar period. Certainly in the Americas both the aggression of Hitler and Mussolini, and the perceived weakness and irresponsibility of the Western Powers made it easy to take the moral high-ground, especially given the notion that Wilson’s vision and example at Versailles had been thwarted by Europeans. As Adolf Berle wrote in 1941, recent inter-war American “objectives and policies pursued...have been scrupulously free from politics” - a form of shorthand for selfish self-interest. He went on to eulogise America’s pursuit in particular of the Good Neighbor policy in relations with Latin America; their efforts to promote disarmament, or less ambitiously, policies of the possession only of defensive arms; their promotion of economic freedom of trade, as opposed to the narrow-minded protectionism of many European powers; and finally a general policy of “cooperation with all peace-seeking nations.” On the contemporaneous world conflagration, Berle wrote: “extreme nationalism, accompanied by deterioration in moral standards, led to armament races, armed conflict, and finally warfare extending to many parts of the world.”

After the US’s engagement as a belligerent, the moral high-ground of pacifism was exchanged for the discourse of fighting for a certain set of truths and freedoms and, as was noted earlier in this chapter, it was much easier, in an isolationist climate, to garner public support for the war if the reason for fighting was presented as a universal and moral cause, rather than simply to help England or France or China. Many of the influential political figures involved in the planning process or the public debate about the postwar order couched these freedoms in religious terms. One of FDR’s Four Freedoms, a key building block of the UN program, was freedom of worship. Hull’s consultation of religious leaders has already been noted. A diary entry from Harry Hopkins’ trip to Moscow in 1941 records him praying “for the victory of

---

339 Donovan, F. (1966) Mr. Roosevelt’s Four Freedoms: The Story Behind the UN Charter p12
341 Ibid.
342 Ibid.
343 This point was also apparent in the analysis by O’Sullivan (2008) of Sumner Welles’ wartime idealist rhetoric referred to earlier in this chapter.
right and truth” in the course of the war. In Sumner Welles Subcommittee on Postwar International Organisation, early minutes from July 1942 document that among the Committee members in the State Department, and at large in the American population: “many...are sure that all will be well if Christian principles are proclaimed and accepted.” These same minutes claim that Roosevelt’s Atlantic Charter and Four Freedoms “embody a widely accepted set of human values. They should be...stated ever more vigorously.”

Further public sources bolstered this fusion of war aims and religious morality including John Foster Dulles’ ‘Commission to Study the Bases of a Just and Durable Peace’. Its Six Pillars of Peace, published in 1941, include “religious and intellectual liberty” and an “international standard of morality.”

Quite apart from this strand of idealism, the UN has been famous for its encouragement of a universal standard of human rights – a concern strong enough to merit a separate Declaration in 1948. The discursive paths to this declaration came through the Atlantic Charter and the UN Charter as immediate precursors, but the earliest antecedent in the postwar planning procedure was in fact the Covenant of the League of Nations. Welles’ Committee’s second week of meetings resolved that “whether we like it or not...the search for ‘fair and humane standards of labor for men, women and children’ (Art. XXIII Covenant)...must again become a cardinal principle of international action.” The more modest aim of securing labour rights, as we have said, was a catalyst for a more sweeping set of guarantees. However, shortly after this commitment to overhaul the League of Nations provisions on human rights, a full international Bill of Rights had been drafted taking its prime inspiration from the US

---

344 Diary Entry, aboard HMS Prince of Wales, 10th August 1941. Harry Hopkins Papers, Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, NY. Sherwood Collection, Book 4 ‘Hopkins in Moscow’, Box 306.
346 Ibid.
347 See also, Arend, A. (1988) Pursuing a Just and Durable Peace: John Foster Dulles and International Organization.

118
Bill of Rights.\footnote{This full 26 Article document appears in Pasvolsky’s Papers on 3rd December 1942. Leo Pasvolsky Papers, Library of Congress, Washington DC. Box 3; Folder – International Organizations: General International Organization Documentation Book II: VII, Annex II.} This provision was sharpened later in the war as the issue of human rights came into the starkest global focus due to the gradual revealing of atrocities committed in the Holocaust in Europe and in the Japanese occupation of China.

Framing these ideals in terms of rights to be protected and the moral defence of liberty was critical for the UN planners. For this reason and to boost the moral authority of the UN organisation, Welles’ Political Subcommittee recorded that “it was believed that the \textit{preamble} of any new international charter ought to be couched in the strongest possible language.”\footnote{‘P-I-O 5: Application of International Trusteeship Through Regional Boards’, August 21st 1942. Sumner Welles Papers, Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park NY. Box 189 – Postwar Foreign Policy Files 1940-43, Folder 4 – Subcommittee on International Organisation Minutes #1-43. Original emphasis.} When it came to the preparation for the UN Conference in 1945, the delegation enlisted Archibald MacLeish, a long-time associate of the Administration, but also the Librarian of Congress and a Pulitzer Prize-winning poet, to work specifically on the preamble, where the virtues of the UN vision would be outlined. MacLeish remarked, on seeing the current draft in June 1945 that the preamble was in a “bad way”, “a...complete literary and intellectual abortion”\footnote{Letter, Archibald MacLeish to Stettinius, Alger Hiss and Pasvolsky, 8th June 1945. Leo Pasvolsky Papers, Library of Congress, Washington DC. Box 1; Folder – International Organizations (UN) Charter: Drafts, Proposals etc.}, having a “dry, academic and legalistic flavour.”\footnote{Letter, Archibald MacLeish to Stettinius, Alger Hiss and Pasvolsky, 9th June 1945. Leo Pasvolsky Papers, Library of Congress, Washington DC. Box 1; Folder – International Organizations (UN) Charter: Drafts, Proposals etc.} Writing to Stettinius, Hiss and Pasvolsky, he said, “I agree that the Preamble should be more than a piece of drafting. It should move men’s minds...It is impossible...to overestimate the importance of the preamble. The sentences of the Declaration of Independence which have influenced history, are the sentences of the first few paragraphs.”\footnote{Letter, Archibald MacLeish to Stettinius, Alger Hiss and Pasvolsky, 8th June 1945. Leo Pasvolsky Papers, Library of Congress, Washington DC. Box 1; Folder – International Organizations (UN) Charter: Drafts, Proposals etc.}

FDR, in one of the last acts of his life, also appointed Virginia Gildersleeve, Professor of Literature and Dean of Barnard College as a full delegate to the San Francisco Conference, where she was assigned to sit on the Committee dealing with the Preamble. Up to that point, in another aspect of the exclusive nature of the State Department’s UN planning, no
American woman had participated in any of the formal discussions. As Christy Snider writes:
“(T)he exclusion of women from Dumbarton Oaks led to angry responses by women’s organizations, like the AAUW and Congresswomen Clare Boothe Luce, Edith Rogers and Margaret Chase Smith.”
Gildersleeve records in her memoirs that fellow delegate Harold Stassen considered that “the Preamble should be short and moving and beautiful, something simple that every school child in the world could commit to memory.”
Acting on similar convictions, especially that the Preamble should have similar literary and moral power as the “perfect Preamble of the Constitution of the United States”, Gildersleeve set about making amendments to the “straggling, awkward sentences of the Smuts version” brought to the Conference by the Union of South Africa which had initially been placed before Committee I/1 which dealt with the Preamble. Admittedly, Marshal Smuts, in conference with the British, had pushed hard for what Peter Marshall has called “a statement of our human faith.” However, the New York college professor was able to re-exert American influence. She wrote of the Smuts preamble and its formulation of an agreement between ‘High Contracting Parties’ not as an inspiration or a help, but as “(o)ur greatest difficulty” in finalising a draft with the “beauty of wording” befitting the ideals of the new organisation.

In the following years, the statements of the Preamble to the Charter were added to, and in some ways surpassed, by those of the Declaration of Human Rights. Chief among the architects of that document was Eleanor Roosevelt. She wrote copiously of the need for the Declaration to be not a political or legal statement, but a moral and ideal statement of intention. Speaking of the Declaration she claimed that “we shall have done the equivalent of providing the compass for the ship...an instrument for determining the direction in which we...”

---

357 Ibid.
358 Ibid. p346.
360 Gildersleeve, V.C. (1954) Many A Good Crusade p344. Gildersleeve’s memoir makes a direct textual comparison of Smuts’ draft, her draft and the final Preamble. The tone of Smuts’ draft, much like a treaty of armistice, is greatly different from Gildersleeve’s draft which takes inspiration from the Declaration of Independence and the US Bill of Rights. A great deal of this influence comes through in the final UN documents.
361 Ibid. p345.
are going.” Political and military supremacy was not enough for the United States as a nation or as a prime sponsor of the UN. The world, Roosevelt insisted “requires moral and spiritual leadership” from the United Nations. In her newspaper column in 1946 she expressed her belief that, “if we are to have peace, there must be rise in spiritual leadership...there can be no permanent settlement of the problems that face us nationally and internationally without a real spiritual awakening in the world as a whole...One hears so much of power politics...We won’t get away from that until the people of the big nations say to their leaders, ’We want you to do the thing that is right, not for us alone but for humanity as a whole.’ That will not be said until the people are conscious that spiritual force must rule the world.”

The vision of UN claimed to be unsurpassable and to be universal, to represent both an ideal morality for the future and also the deep, true morality of the human race, even in times when that morality was obscured. MacLeish’s belief that positive visions and ideals were essential to the creation of harmony in world politics for instance, was not simply a notion he derived from a rejection of the dry drafts of the subcommittees. In 1938, reflecting on both economic and political failings in the international system, he wrote: “(W)ith no means, or with very few, men who could imagine a common good have created great civilizations. With every means, with every wealth, men who are incapable of imagining a common good create now ruin.” Coursing through men and women like MacLeish, Gildersleeve and Eleanor Roosevelt, all chosen (in different ways) by FDR to contribute to the UN project, is a similar conviction that the postwar moment called not only for political settlement but a literary, moral and spiritual statement of ideals for the world.

---

3.4.2 Fear and The Desire for Unity and ‘Kinship’

That familiar paradox of claiming to speak for all humanity in times of war is epitomised by the metaphorisation of the UN’s visionary world as a world of common kinship. Of course, in the 1940s, millions in their thought and actions violently contravened the principles which the UN planners ascribed to everyone. The notion of shared substance bolstered, and logically could compensate for, the vision of shared rights and principles that was so patently being violated during the years when the world was at war. In basic terms, bonds of kinship in a Western understanding can endure and provide solace due to their unequivocal positive valuation, even when the behaviour of members of the kin-group does not match social expectations of kin relations. The kinship metaphor spoke to the hope that an underlying common morality, deriving from shared substance, did still exist, even if the propaganda of totalitarianism had blinded many to its precepts.

The metaphor of kinship performed two particular roles when utilised in the era of UN planning. The first, as above, concerns when kinship was reached out to as the last and best supposed glue to bind a fractious humanity. For Flag Day 1942, President Roosevelt made first a national proclamation of war aims, then made a full speech on the state of the war, and then read a specially commissioned ‘Prayer For The United Nations’. In the proclamation, the paradox of a unity of human values is utterly apparent: “(I)n this planetary war,” he said, “we are part of a great whole: we are fighting shoulder to shoulder with the valiant peoples of the United Nations, the massed angered forces of common humanity. Unless all triumph, all will fail.” Logically speaking, from such a statement it would be hard not to conclude that forces opposing ‘common humanity’ were not extra-terrestrial. In the speech FDR made he claimed that; “(T)he belief in the Four Freedoms of common humanity – the belief in man, created free, in the image of God – is the crucial difference between ourselves and the enemies we face today”. The notion of the unitary nature of Creation, and the equality of life under God readily bolsters notions of human kinship as we will see further in the full analysis of Western models of kinship in Chapter Seven. Space is opened up by the

366 This dual basis of kinship, which lends it flexibility and applicability, is further explored in Part Four.
368 Ibid.
flexibility of Western notions of kinship for it to be used as a ready metaphorical substitute for some of the collective virtues attributed to the religious life. Indeed, in the prayer that was written for Roosevelt to read, it is striking how the support and solace of religion and of kinship are intertwined in a prayer which, at a desperate time, and transmitted to an uncertain and frightened people, pleads not only for divine guidance but for wholeness on Earth through a recognition and practice of kinship.

"Yet most of all grant us brotherhood, not only for this day but for all our years — a brotherhood not of words but of acts and deeds. We are all children of the earth — grant us that simple knowledge. If our brothers are oppressed, we are oppressed. If they hunger, we hunger. If their freedom is taken away, our freedom is not secure. Grant us a common faith than man shall know bread and peace — that he shall know justice and righteousness, freedom and security, and equal opportunity and an equal chance to do his best, not only in our own lands but throughout the world. And in that faith let us march, toward the clean world our hands can make."69

The kinship metaphor plays one further role in the planning of the UN, and in particular in the debates surrounding membership and the rights of members. In many speeches and documents alluding to worldwide shared values which we have encountered, the language used is that of common feeling, common faith, common humanity. However, when the issue of the particular group of nations who might merit inclusion within the UN group is raised, the notions of the 'community of nations' and the 'family of nations' are more prevalent. A memo from Harley Notter to Sumner Welles during the preliminary discussions of the Subcommittee on Postwar International Organisation put forward the argument for "automatic membership in an organised international system coterminous with the family of nations."370 Naturally, the kinship metaphor is a ready resource when ideas of group membership are being discussed, and the idealism of a peace-keeping organisation is well matched to the idealistic notions that Western society has assigned as default values to kinship in opposition to the public sphere. However, it is arguable that there is more at stake.

Dense concentrations of the use of kinship metaphors when planners and politicians discussed the entry into the UN fold of nations or peoples as yet under colonial rule. For

370 Memo, Harley Notter to Sumner Welles, 'Division of Special Research' August 7th 1942. Sumner Welles Papers, Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park NY. Box 189 – Postwar Foreign Policy Files 1940-43, Folder 4 – Subcommittee on International Organisation Minutes #1-43.
example, in a speech in Paris in 1948 in preparation for the unveiling of the UN Declaration of Human Rights, Eleanor Roosevelt commented: "(W)e have noted with particular interest...the work of the UN relating to the millions of people who are not yet fully self-governing. We believe that all possible assistance and encouragement should be given to them to the end that they also may play their full part in the family of nations."\(^{371}\) It should be remembered that the creators of this UN group, this ever-more inclusive family, were (with few exceptions), in every sense of the term, ‘founding fathers’ and the implicit patriarchy of this type of world-kinship discourse even enveloped a female speaker such as Eleanor Roosevelt. The application of the notion of the family by Westerners to the non-self governing peoples of Africa or Asia is hardly surprising. The metaphor re-inscribes notions of tutelage, of the child-like nature of the colonised population, of their having to grow and learn how to be a part of the family, and to abide by its patriarchal rules.

Notions of kinship and the unitary and unsurpassable vision of the UN then, play parallel roles in the legitimating of the organisation. Given the attention to the discursive force of the values of the UN, it is somewhat hard to look at institutional formation merely in cost/benefit terms. It is easy to see though, how discourse is the prop for aims and projects in the international sphere which are founded upon stark realpolitik. The following chapters seek to illuminate how the values enshrined in the key texts of the UN in the 1940s enable, inspire, or constrain those who carry out the UN’s mission in the contemporary world and how these discourses are employed in political contexts today. As we will see, the West-centric moralism of the 1940s, contrary to opinion at the time, is not taken to be essential to the work of the UN. Rather, Western moralising on the desirable image of world unity can be seen as useless, or even counter-productive in dealing with projects relating to non-Western groups. Nevertheless, usage of world kinship metaphors to envisage the world as a unified moral community group, is still prominent in contemporary politics. They are still used to

---

attempt to inspire, or in politically problematic echoes of the colonial tutelage formulations discussed above.

In the following case studies, the patterns of kinship metaphor usage in the current period are elaborated as contrasted with the current tendency to view international politics as the quest to build an ‘international community’. In the twenty-first century, we are perhaps (as the following chapter shows) more apt than were the generations of the early twentieth century, to question the Western and Christian underpinnings of some of the visions that exist in discourse for the way an ideal world should be organized and conceived. Bearing in mind the close circumscription of authorship of the ‘universal’ vision of the UN that has been revealed in this chapter, the roles of kinship in politics today can now be investigated and the political benefits and pitfalls of these very Western notions drawn out.
CHAPTER FOUR - The Practice of Universal Philosophies: Translating WWII Ideology into Contemporary Policy

4.1 The Problematic Survival of Kinship Discourse

The wartime milieu of the 1940s, moulded by global conflict and the memory of a previous global conflict, was a period dominated by rhetorical extremes both of depravity and grandeur in international politics. Exhortations of the values of nationalism and internationalism, brazen conquest and bold defiance of aggression, plumbed terrifying depths and reached towering peaks. Thus in the bleakest hours, as we saw in the UN Prayer, the notion of the world united and healed (in quasi-religious as well as pacifistic terms) as a family came to prominence. The family here plays the role of a highly culturally cohesive Western symbol of idealised unity. Seeing the far-reaching splendour of the founding documents of the United Nations in context of such a highly charged discursive milieu highlights why the UN was seen as being of necessity a statement not just of a new international institutional order, but as of a triumph of ideals. Drawing such universal ideals into monumental global documents laid down discursive sediment intended to solidify into the bedrock of a new global politics for the ages.

As will be discussed in later chapters, the emergence of kinship discourse in UN (and political) circles in the contemporary period can be closely correlated with statements of an emotive, general or aspirational register. Often also, the kinship metaphor, that unsurpassable vision of unity, is used to retell the mythic history of the UN and its mission. The UN’s own Intellectual History Project comments:

"Fewer than one member in ten of today’s human family was alive when the United Nations was founded in 1945. Even fewer were old enough to have followed those pioneering events in any detail. Sixty years later, the remarkable vision and creativity of the world organization’s founders should be recalled."72

---

This paper, and other works\textsuperscript{373} by the UNIHP, single out the UN’s idealism as ripe for praise in reforming the world order:

"(W)hat made the U N ’s design and establishment so remarkable was its broader ambition - for human rights on a global scale, for sovereign independence and freedom and democracy in all parts of the world, for improvements in living standards worldwide. Equally astonishing, when much of this lofty idealism was dismissed as little more than humbug, is that so much of this early vision has been achieved. No period in human history has seen so many people benefiting through advances in life expectancy, health, education, and living standards, as in the UN’s lifetime.\textsuperscript{374}

The merits of re-shaping and widening agreement upon diverse principles of international political life, rationalising and codifying procedure and holding out at least the threat of opprobrium or sanctions for defying such consensus, should be recognised. However, blanket statements such as those below, which concern the UN’s intellectual contribution to world politics, such as the remarks below, cannot be taken at face value.

"The intellectual contributions to ideas, analysis, and policymaking in the economic and social arenas have been among the UN’s most important achievements. They have had a significant influence on national and international action. This can be judged by the extent to which UN ideas have often set paths that others have followed. Perhaps the clearest examples are global conferences setting goals and benchmarks that many countries have chosen to follow and that have influenced their policies and outcomes."\textsuperscript{375}

The intellectual parameters of the UN-era are perhaps more complex than an initial reading of the work of the UNIHP would suggest. The UNIHP concerns itself largely with the concrete achievements of the UN through its history in advancing the theory and practice of world politics. In such a project it is perhaps easiest to locate the UN’s intellectual contributions by focusing on such issue-specific conferences, agreements, protocols, ‘goals and benchmarks’ instituted by the UN or under its auspices. This is a first level of intellectual contributions - a technocratic layer of new standards for law or behaviour in international politics, for example on issues of labour standards, human rights or environmental practices. The UN provides a forum for thought on such issues to be regularised and signed into agreement. The vision of world unity that is being investigated in this thesis however,

\textsuperscript{373} See for instance, Jolly, R., Emmerij, L., and Weiss, T. (2009) UN Ideas That Changed the World. Published by UNIHP.


\textsuperscript{375} Ibid.
represents a broader level of intellectual contributions. A vision is held out by the founding
documents of the UN of a unified world order of human kinship – a ‘spirit of brotherhood’
in the words of the Declaration of Human Rights. What kind of intellectual addition to world
politics is made by improbable images such as this? Its presence in discourse and its actual
meaning sometimes seems (as we shall see later in this chapter) obscure or taken-for-granted
to even those who would espouse it.

As we have uncovered in the preceding discussions, the prevalence of emotive uses of
kinship rhetoric, through the breakdown of the international economic and political system in
the 1930s and in the bleak struggle of the 1940s, was strong. The discursive landscape of the
interwar and wartime period remained coloured by the novelty and fragility of the modern
sense of internationalism. Notwithstanding the obvious example of Roosevelt’s sustained and
difficult battle against entrenched isolationism, Chamberlain’s characterisation of the
reluctant concern for and ultimate betrayal of the Czechs (“a quarrel in a far away country
between people of whom we know nothing”\textsuperscript{376}) is a prime instance of the preceding sixty
years of development of an organised international institutional architecture having precious
little impact upon the commitments and thinking of major powers when vital interests were
at stake.

In internationalist discourse of the 1930s and 1940s we have so far noted two features linked
to kinship metaphors. Firstly, great variance and experimentation with modes of expression
and secondly, greatly emotional, even Utopian formulations being expressed using fervent,
sometimes quasi-religious hopes for world kinship. Both these features are consonant with
the contested and fragile nature of the spirit of internationalism in this period, especially
when it was seemingly being betrayed by the failures of both the League and the Great
Powers. Two points maybe made by way of accounting for this character of the discursive
landscape. Firstly, much of the writings of this time were produced by individual journalists,
politicians, scholars, and informal \textit{ad hoc} study groups\textsuperscript{377} each of whom created their own
independent modes of formulating a notion of a unified world order. Nothing like the

Attempt to Prevent the Second World War p107

\textsuperscript{377} We might think of Butler’s Carnegie Endowment for International Peace studies, or those of the American
Academy of Political and Social Science.
massed bureaucratic output of the UN and the army of NGO reporters, replete with now-standardised formulas, existed. Secondly, as Beer and de Landtscheer argue[^378], metaphor acts as a reassuring device in that it is inherently a simplification. Thus, metaphorisation of politics (especially of hopes for the future of politics), may be expected in response to the contemporaneous perception of the calamities inherent in the collapse of internationalist spirit – beggar-thy-neighbor economic protectionism and rapacious nationalist warfare. Moreover, given the unequivocal positive valuation placed upon the notion of kinship in Western practices of political metaphors of unity, kinship images are deployed to be especially reassuring – holding out promises not only of common substance but with the attached affective behaviors (of love, care and respect etc.) that cement a Western idea of 'practiced' kinship.[^379]

The survival of expressions of the hope of building a human family is curious given the trajectory of world politics since the 1940s. The notion that the UN-era might lead to this Utopia was built upon the expectation of the resolution of Great Power conflict, the ability to manage and dispel the prosecution of small wars, the peaceful end of colonialism and the advancement of development, human rights and economic, cultural and social freedom and unity. Many of these objectives have been, at least in the eyes of a large number of scholarly and political commentators, frustrated[^380]. In bureaucratic branches of the UN, with specific and technical mandates, such starry-eyed and vague hopes are often, as we shall see presently, almost meaningless. What is more, over the decades of the UN's existence, human kinship


[^379]: Once again, full explanation of these symbolic associations is reserved for Chapter Seven where Western notions and usages of kinship as a metaphor are examined in detail.

discourse as an image of hoped-for world unity has been displaced by the notion of the building of an ‘international community’. This latter, as the following chapters will argue, has become a hegemonic representation of global unity. This present chapter then begins a series of investigations of the survival of world kinship discourse in the contemporary period.

The purpose of this and the following two case study chapters is certainly not to attempt a comprehensive history of examples of kinship metaphor usage from the 1930s through to the present day. In the sense of being organised around geopolitical and ideational bipolarity at the highest level, the Cold War period after the founding of the UN presents little overarchng change in the structural support for discourses of human commonality from the wartime period. David Campbell makes a similar argument with reference to the American continuity of deployment of identity/difference discourses relying upon such tropes as civilisation/barbarism and family metaphors\(^\text{381}\). This is to say that the functions fulfilled by the discourses of the human family as employed in such speeches as the Prayer for UN are fulfilled similarly in many world kinship statements made in Cold War rhetoric. In particular, two functional similarities of the discourse stand out regardless of whether the ‘non-kin’ are the fascist nations of World War Two or the Communist nations of the Cold War.

Firstly, the discourse is used to reaffirm the virtues of the in-group by portraying it in the light of the supposed positive values of a family. For instance, Margaret Thatcher emphasised the need for familial respect and tolerance among the Western European powers in forging closer trade and defence alliances. She commented in the conclusion of a speech in Bruges in 1988: “(L)et Europe be a family of nations, understanding each other better, appreciating each other more.”\(^\text{382}\) Similarly, President Eisenhower characterized an early Cold War vision of the family of nations as a sphere of harmony and freedom both within its bounds and with respect to those implicitly beyond it. Addressing the UN General Assembly in 1953, he said: “we hope that this coming conference may initiate a relationship with the Soviet Union which will eventually bring about a free intermingling of the peoples of the East and of the

---


West...we seek a harmonious family of free European nations, with none a threat to the other, and least of all a threat to the peoples of Russia.”383

The second functional similarity relates directly to dangers beyond the bounds of the family group and for the need therefore to expand its compass. Richard Nixon, in a paper written prior to his presidency but presaging his ‘opening’ of China while in office, argued: “we simply cannot afford to leave China forever outside the family of nations, there to nurture its fantasies, cherish its hates and threaten its neighbors.”384 This statement paints the space outside the family as one of frustrated exclusion and lawless vindictiveness. It echoes Sumner Welles’ Postwar International Organization committee sentiment that the US should build an “organised international system coterminous with the family of nations.”385 Organisation and communication bring common purpose within the family while dangerous isolation exists outside in which nations are perceived to fester in their disenfranchisement. Thus kinship performs the double work discussed further in Part Four, of simultaneously affirming the in-group while addressing the injustices of the out-group. Desires for the transformation of the exterior based on the extension of the virtue of the in-group flow from this pattern of discourse, as the following from Ronald Reagan’s fifth State of the Union Address encapsulates:

“family and community remain the moral core of our society, guardians of our values and hopes for the future... And we can enlarge the family of free nations if we will defend the unalienable rights of all God’s children to follow their dreams. To those imprisoned in regimes held captive, to those beaten for daring to fight for freedom ...we say to you tonight: you are not alone, freedom fighters. America will support you with moral and material assistance your right not just to fight and die for freedom, but to fight and win freedom — to freedom in Afghanistan; in Angola; in Cambodia; and in Nicaragua.”386

Reagan’s words recall the UN Prayer and its exhortation that through ‘brotherhood’ — a manifestation of a spirit of kinship - a ‘clean world’ of ‘freedom and security’ might be

384 Nixon, R.M. (1967) ‘Asia After Viet Nam’ in Foreign Affairs 46(1) p121
created. In both instances the ‘moral core’ of kinship is used as a symbol both to bring the in-group together and to justify its remaking of the world.

Aside from such commonalities, there is a second crucial reason why the contemporary period, rather than the 1950s or 60s, say, enables a new set of questions concerning the value and appeal of kinship metaphors to be launched. As will be shown throughout the empirical work of the following chapters, particularly with reference to the Darfur crisis and the War on Terror in Part Three, the vast proliferation of NGO commentary on contemporary world politics has transformed the discursive landscape in comparison to the mid-twentieth century. Most pertinently, the varied conceptions of the coming world order which have been presented thus far from the mid-twentieth century (family of nations, human family, international brotherhood, world society, human community) are largely standardised into a hegemonic formulation of the world as an ‘international community’ in the overwhelming mass of discourse produced by world NGOs in the current period. This has also become a standard term and conception of politicians and news media and its preponderance in the contemporary discursive landscape presents the opportunity to appreciate a different aspect of the particularity of the conditions of the continued emergence of kinship metaphors. Unlike in the mid-twentieth century, international discourse today does not only consist of the output of a few politicians, news commentators and interested scholars and amateur organisations, largely from Western nations. An army of genuinely international NGOs and advocacy groups use the diverse communications media of the contemporary period to produce a flood of discourse, and are largely reliant upon conceiving of the desirable shape of world order in terms of the ‘international community’. Nevertheless, kinship metaphors still are employed in certain contexts in spite of this hegemony of the notion of the international community. A critical thread of continuity between these different discursive landscapes is the timeless canon of the founding documents of the UN. Only a detailed comparison of the contemporary period with the purpose of the founding of the UN enables purchase on the problem of detailing the channels in which kinship discourse has persisted. The first aspect of this investigation then must be to unpick the UN’s special status as, on the one hand a colossal rational and technical bureaucracy that has changed immeasurably since its design in the years leading up to 1945, and also as the bearer of grand ideals expressed in universal, emotive and impractical language.
4.2 ‘Bureaucracy’ as an Ideal Type

As demonstrated in Chapter Three, the United Nations Organization was conceived not just as a dry debating chamber for the resolution of conflict and the promulgation of various forms of social and economic development. It was meant to be something "to move men’s minds" and to be the standard bearer of a new morality in global politics. This characteristic of the UN sharply contradicts one strand of popular critique of bureaucracy. As Paul du Gay writes:

"(T)he bureau is routinely conceived of as the one-sided expression of an ‘instrumental rationality’ which can sustain its identity only through repressing and marginalising its ‘other’ – the emotional, the personal, the sexual, and so forth. From this perspective, ‘bureaucratic culture’ is assumed to be based upon a series of ‘foundational separations and exclusions’ – between reason and emotion, pleasure and duty, public and private and so on – whose ‘absent presence’ erupts on to the organisational surface in the form of cumulatively disabling dysfunctions."

Getting to grips with the ‘UN as bureaucracy’, especially in light of the emotion and moralising bound up in its design and its values, requires a notion of an ideal typical bureaucratic standard. Of course, for many years, the starting point for even the broadest of comparative studies of bureaucracy has been the “seminal” work of Max Weber. Using Weber as a guide, Richard Hamilton presents an elegant investigation of the applicability of Weberian analysis to the contemporary United States. He summarises Weber’s characterisation of bureaucracy in five neat propositions. Bureaucracies are: “large and growing”, “impersonal”, “intrusive”, “tend towards monocratic rule” and are “directed by technically trained experts”. These characteristics embody the ‘rational-legal’ mode of authority of which the bureaucracy is Weber’s archetypal example. Further, ‘bureaucracy’, and its foundation upon ‘rationality’, may be conceived in several separate relations to society. As Page summarises, bureaucracy may be firstly a style of rule or authority wherein technically

---


389 McMillan, C. et al. (1973) ‘The Structure of Work Organisations Across Cultures’ in The Academy of Management Journal 16(4) p555. This article is itself a perfect example of the breadth of application for Weber’s studies of bureaucracy.

trained officials dominate by virtue of their expertise. It may be secondly be a system of conduct based upon the implementation of impersonal rules derived only from rational analysis or decision. It may thirdly be conceived as a social group — those who work in the bureaucracy.391

The Weberian ideal-typical bureaucracy benefited from "purely technical superiority" characterised by "precision, speed, unambiguity, knowledge of the files, continuity, discretion, unity, (and) strict subordination."392 Bureaucracy as a system and modus operandi is held by Weber to promote the "optimum possibility for carrying through the principle of specialising administrative functions according to purely objective considerations."393 Weber remarks that his ideal type of technical bureaucracy "develops the more perfectly, the more it is 'dehumanised', the more completely it succeeds in eliminating from official business love, hatred, and all purely personal, irrational and emotional elements which escape calculation."394 The separation of the bureaucracy from its social surrounding may be more completely manifested when the level of specialization and expertise of the bureaucracy far outstrips the competency of its political masters. This effect is likely to be exacerbated, as Peters writes, in the difficulty of "any political executive imposing its will upon the ongoing administrative offices"395 due to the fleeting nature of political administration in comparison to the stability and entrenchment of the bureaucracy. The latter, in theory396, is made up of career officials who are (much more than politicians) able to retain their official positions for a long period of time.

The historical expansion of the UN organization has, in some ways, borne out the Weberian model. During its Cold War years, the UN found itself under pressure from both sides in the geopolitical struggle. The United States, in thrall to McCarthyism in the early 1950s, suspected the UN Secretariat of harbouring communist spies and sympathies397, and most of the Americans working for the Secretariat were investigated by McCarthy or his Chief

393 Ibid. p975
394 Ibid.
Counsel, Roy Cohn. On the opposing side, the USSR felt outnumbered by Western powers\textsuperscript{398}, especially on the Security Council and, during the first ten years of the organisation’s life, used its Security Council veto eighty times.\textsuperscript{399} In this climate, Dag Hammerskjöld argued that for the organisation to be viable for the future, it needed to develop as “a truly international civil service, free from all national pressures and influences.”\textsuperscript{400} In other words, it needed greater bureaucratic neutrality and independence.

Growth of the UN bureaucracy, not only in terms of member state numbers, but in terms of the diversification of specialised agencies, has provided support for the Weberian notion that the valuation of rationality in modern society leads to greater levels of UN bureaucracy. Following the institution of the principal organs of the UN, further agencies such as the International Maritime Organisation (IMO), the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO), the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO) were added to the UN machinery.\textsuperscript{401} The supposedly independent, non-partisan UN, rather than self-interested nations states, is the more ‘rational’ choice for the administration of these international issues. As Peters notes, the more public a bureaucracy, the greater tend to be the levels of accountability required.\textsuperscript{402} The UN, whose public is international, thus may be seen as a highly rational choice for a role in global administration due to its cosmopolitan make-up and supposed political disinterest, and the high demands for accountability placed on it.

Further, in diversifying into more ‘managerial’ specialisations (such as intellectual property protection or the work of the World Meteorological Organisation) and away from the broadest vision of world re-making in the Charter, the UN follows a Weberian trajectory in the character of its authority. Alas, “Weber notes that over time, charisma tends to be


institutionalized and to be converted into rational-legal authority. From the charismatic creation of a new discourse and vision for world order, brotherhood and the building of a human family, the UN has sprouted multiple branches with narrow remits and specialized, technical, non-political functions. The fact of embedding a charismatic vision in a bureaucratic machine from the beginning has provided an institutional locus (backed by the moral and political rhetoric of those founding visions) for further administrative expansion.

Nevertheless, Weber’s ideal type methodology cannot be directly used to characterise discrete social phenomena, but only as a comparison. His ideal model of bureaucracy - that of Germany at the turn of the twentieth century, was not described as a template to be mapped onto other examples but as an archetype of the bureaucratic rationality. As such, we should expect to add to Weber’s outline, especially when dealing with a subject as large and complex as the UN. Indeed, there is much about the UN system, especially its haphazard founding, which speaks to both Weber’s conception of charismatic and bureaucratic impulses at the same time. To an extent of course, aspects of the virtues of Weberian bureaucracy mesh into the UN mission as laid out in the founding documents despite their visionary and impractical character, especially with reference to kinship discourses. Traits such as bureaucratic disinterest, expertise and neutrality may be seen to pave the way to just and respected decisions on the international stage. However, Weber’s work also does not go very far towards theorising aspects of intermeshing between the impulses characteristic of his discrete models. In the UN system, part charismatic in vision, but mostly bureaucratic in procedure, this is precisely the insight that is required. Moreover, internal differentiation within a bureaucracy cannot be dealt with simply by reference to ideal types. The following section then keeps in mind Weberian models while making more nuanced account of the tensions within the UN between rationality and objectivity of procedures on the one hand, and subjectivity and emotion in aims on the other.

---

4.3. The UN as a Bureaucracy

As Chapter Three demonstrated, the practice of institutional design in the case of the UN was neither based on inclusive nor objective debate. Further, the theoretical taken-for-grantedness of rational design of international institutions or organisations within IR has recently come under scrutiny. Alex Wendt, for instance, highlights two types of rationality inherent in the design of institutions such as the UN where significant historical sediment weighed upon the planners. Objective rationality, working upon the logic of consequences and interests, and subjective rationality based upon considerations of appropriateness.\(^4\) As Wendt notes, “the (subjective) rationality of institutional choices is always internal to the discourses by which collective-action problems are constituted.”\(^5\) In other words, the constitution of the moral backbone of the UN was hardly likely to be based upon a series of foundational separations of interests and consequences, but instead, on the constitution of a problem in international society being the lack of consensual moral guidance for international conduct. A certain shaping of desires, formats and beliefs is in evidence in the replication of, or deviance from, the language of the League Covenant, but also, as Robert Goodin argues, cliques of bureaucrats planning a morally charged institution may become enraptured by a “central animating idea.”\(^6\) Delivering or fighting for democracy, peace or equality through the new institution becomes more of a concern than designing an institution actually apt to objectively fulfil the interests of participating parties. Such a tendency was recognised early in the development of institutional theory by Robert Merton, who wrote: “(t)here may ensue, in particular vocations and in particular types of organisation, the process of sanctification”\(^7\) either of the institution in general or by bureaucrats of their roles within it.

In some ways then, the choice to instantiate a set of grand moral aims in the same bureaucracy as was to provide such practical global needs as hosting hard-headed Security Council meetings and organising the fight against preventable epidemic diseases is, in itself, somewhat counter-intuitive. A peace treaty might have borne the ideational baggage instead,

\(^5\) Ibid. p1024
\(^7\) Merton, R. (1957) *Social Theory and Social Structure* p202
leaving the bureaucracy as a purely technocratic machinery. Indeed, this separation, which in
the nineteenth century characterised international technical bureaucracy on the one hand, and
moral concerts and conferencing on the other, might have continued but for the fact the
Woodrow Wilson made his career prior to a move into politics as one of America's (and the
world's) most prominent theorists in the first wave of interest in the sociology of institutional
theory.⁴⁰⁸

The result of the design choices thus far investigated is an organisation positioned as an
attempt to act both as an organ of the progressive rationalisation of international affairs, and
also to act as a moral beacon. Or perhaps, to be more subtle, following Risse-Kappen’s⁴⁰⁹
insights, it might be more useful to speak of our investigation of the UN planning process in
terms of active feedback loops between designers and contemporaneous, already-existing
fields of design. Together, these shaped the formulation of the UN and the emphases placed
upon technical (non-political) questions, and political questions of the values of the
organisation. Processes by which the designers might themselves be 'designed' include: the
effect of historical sediment (so crucial in the present case) which shapes their values and
beliefs; the effect of previous designs, such as the League, influencing directly the
membership of 'expert' planning groups (recall Pasvolsky's Versailles experience); or, finally,
the process of design might open up new avenues of knowledge which place fresh constraints
on the pathways of overall design. As Wendt argues, “(c)alling attention to the effects of
designs on designers is a way to ensure the power of the latter remains accountable rather
than being taken for granted.”⁴¹⁰

From these feedback loops emerged an organisation aiming primarily at guaranteeing the
security of world order and positive action on human development through rationalising,
codifying and obtaining commitments on states' aims in foreign affairs. Of course, as has
been alluded to earlier, the unequivocal positive valuation of systematic rationalisation
perversely leads to that sense of sanctification Merton discusses. The Western world is
wedded to rationality not simply because it is rational to be so, but because it believes in

⁴⁰⁸ See for instance Wilson, W. (1889) The State and Federal Governments of the United States
P. (ed.) The Culture of National Security
rationality. There is then, a symbiotic relationship between the ‘removal’ of emotional and irrational elements in order to perfect a disintested bureaucratic form of administration, and an emotional surge of self-affirmation which lauds this purging and re-invigorates an emotional justification for the bureaucratic apparatus. Weber noticed that bureaucracy is “devoted to personal and functional purposes” but that “(T)hese purposes of course, frequently gain an ideological halo from cultural values...which appear as surrogates for a this-worldly or other-worldly personal master and which are embodied by a given group.”411 Furthermore, not only is an emotional attachment to rationality apparent, but also the veil of rationality may be used to disguise subjective processes. As Fineman writes: “sorting priorities and making sense of events are often fraught with anxieties, self-doubt and emotional preferences.”412 Because of these inbuilt emotional modes of conducting rational actions, Fineman concludes that: “what we term rationality in organizations is a remarkable facility to present – to ourselves and to others – emotionalized processes in forms that meet ‘acceptable’, ‘rational’ images of objectives and purpose.”413

The import of this symbiosis does not seem to impact Weber’s work as a whole however, and it is at such a juncture that the limitations of his ideal types are apparent. As Barnett and Finnemore state, “IO’s are eager to spread the benefits of their expertise and often act as conveyor belts for the transmission of norms and models of ‘good’ political behaviour....Officials in IO’s often insist that part of their mission is to spread, inculcate, and enforce global values and norms. They are the ‘missionaries’ of our time.”414 In other words, organisational planning that combined an explicit moral mission with the culturally assumed positive valuation of rationality attributed to bureaucracy, gives rise to an organisation prone to presenting itself as missionary. Two problems stem from this conjunction and will be confirmed in the evidence presented from UN staff at the end of the chapter. Firstly, the sense of mission or sense of values may stagnate due to its fusion with a rationalised form of organisation which tends towards social solidity, stability and specialisation. The routinization of the pursuit of narrow and specialised goals renders the overarching political values

413 Ibid. p12

139
irrelevant. Secondly, the principles of bureaucratic neutrality and value-laden mission can often act against each other in projects on the ground.

To elaborate on the first problem - the fixity of the bureaucratic system has been discussed by numerous scholars. Giddens remarks that "institutions by definition are the more enduring features of social life...giving 'solidity' across time and space."\textsuperscript{415} This argument may apply to the instantiation and solidification of a social institution, such as the notion of the family of nations, within an organizational setting. Or equally, it may apply conversely to the institutionalisation of an organisation, such as the UN, as it becomes embedded in social consciousness and practice over its lifetime. Weber noted that, due to its possession of rational authority, "(O)nce fully established, bureaucracy is among those social structures which are the hardest to destroy."\textsuperscript{416} Indeed, imagining purposive organisational realignment or even grand reformation of the value-structure of such a bureaucratic monolith as the UN, one can only conceive of tremendous upheaval and regression of all the projects for which there is no other current competent overseer. As Weber put it: "(T)he ruled...cannot dispense with or replace the bureaucratic apparatus once it exists, for it rests upon expert training, a functional specialisation of work, and an attitude set on habitual virtuosity."\textsuperscript{417} Furthermore, implicit in the rational logic of bureaucratic processes is a resistance to sea-changes in institutional assumptions. As Barry Hindess argues, a corpus of rational norms and processes of thinking and working within a bureaucracy tend to be self-perpetuating. Exceptions to norms are dealt with by processes of rationalisation and comparison back to the norm, which is reflexively reinforced by contrast to the discovery of new exceptions. In other words "there should not appear to be too many departures from the norm, and (it is important) that the departures can be explained away."\textsuperscript{418} There are fewer institutional costs involved in factoring in new exceptions, keeping every social fact divided into the rational and the irrational, than there is in the total recalibration of the rational framework that would be required on the occasion of admitting of the existence of that which was $a$-rational.

\textsuperscript{416} Weber, M. (1968 ed.) \textit{Economy and Society} Vol. 3 p987
\textsuperscript{417} Ibid. p988
This fixity of organisational structure, bolstered by faith in the unsurpassability of rational methods, is arguably problematic in a value-laden bureaucracy. An emotive valuation of the bureaucratic modus operandi means that values, just like technical structures, stagnate. Such fixity is perhaps enhanced in the case of the UN by its claim to be a singular, impartial seat of unsurpassable values; as Jeffrey Legro remarks: “(W)hen one organisation has a monopoly on expertise and no competitors, it faces less pressure to change and no checks on organisational biases”\textsuperscript{419}. In other words, not just the practices, but the values of the UN are made more resistant to change by virtue of the UN’s founding documents purporting to rationally establish an impartial and just organisation speaking ‘self-evidently’ for all peoples. This may be over-simplified, but the problem remains of the cohesion between rational structures and values which produces excessive inflexibility in those structures. As Wendt asks, “(T)he Rational Design framework defines rationality relative to a given conception of Self. This is fine for certain purposes, but what do we do if the Self will change as a result of our choices?”\textsuperscript{420}

This problematic can be examined in more detail by considering more deeply the make-up of the UN-as-bureaucracy. Johan Galtung constructs a useful typology of UN branches, dividing them according to two dichotomies – intellectually flexible/intellectually rigid; and politically progressive/politically non-progressive.\textsuperscript{421} As examples, he classes the World Bank and IMF as being of the intellectually rigid and politically non-progressive type, staffed as they are almost solely by economists and “not...working for the restructuring of the world system”\textsuperscript{422} in any way. UNCTAD, he argues, retains an economicist intellectual rigidity but works more for the political restructuring of the economic system and the closing of income gaps. Intellectually flexible, but non-progressive branches would include the ILO due to the diversity of its programs and staffing but its focus on ameliorating but not transcending the status quo of global patterns of employment. UNESCO and the WHO are Galtung’s examples of an intellectually flexible and politically progressive branches, UNESCO having

\textsuperscript{420} Wendt, A (2001) Driving with the Rearview Mirror’ in International Organization 55(4) p1035
\textsuperscript{422} Ibid.
“probably...the greatest variety when it comes to professional training and...disciplinary background” and the WHO campaigning for the “political commitment and action” necessary to deliver greater equality of health benefits across the world.

Galtung’s divisions highlight a crucial point concerning bureaucratic fixity in relation to the highest level of purpose or mission of an organisation like the UN. Just as was discussed with relation to the ‘intellectual contributions’ of the UN at the start of the chapter, there are two levels of contributions that the UN makes – the technical and legal agreements and advancements which it enables, and the vision of world order which it espouses. As Galtung reminds us, some of the bureaucratic positions within the organisation as it exists today permit of a degree of engagement with innovative thinking upon the purposes and practices of their branch and its mandate or remit. A great majority of positions however, do not reward or permit even this. None of Galtung’s examples touch upon the second level of the UN’s intellectual contribution to world politics – that of the character of an envisioned world order. The trajectories of this intellectual contribution (launched in the 1940s) and that of contemporary bureaucratic work are parallel but distant. They are related, but the opportunity of conjoining is difficult to envisage. Innovation in bureaucracy may well take forms such as those argued for by Alexander Styhre: entrepreneurial experimentation or scientific inquiry into new practices and opportunities are certainly encouraged in contemporary bureaucracy, contrary to the stolid Weberian model. However, such fluidity operates again on the first, but not the second level of intellectual contribution – questioning techniques but not overturning fundamental purposes.

On the second point of the cross-cutting actions of emotive values and bureaucratic rationality, Barnett and Finnemore highlight UN peacekeeping missions in Bosnia to show how the combination of purposes of an organisation may hinder instrumental action. Pressed into action by the “all necessary means’ provision of Security Council resolutions”, which, given the backlash to the failure to respond in time to the recent Rwandan crisis, carried more

---


142
than usual value-laden emotive zeal for intervention, the UN set itself the mission of delivering protection inside the warzone by setting up safe havens and the provision of humanitarian aid. Unfortunately, the UN’s cross-cutting bureaucratic desire to maintain neutrality, to abstain from ‘taking sides’ in the conflict led to contradictory policies which put blocks upon the increase of resources to deal with the numbers of people requiring UN protection and ultimately the failure to protect thousands from disease, hunger and persecution.

Two conclusions can be drawn from this case. As Barnett and Finnemore argue, this is a story of immobile, inflexible bureaucratic insistence upon the preservation of codified rules – the failing of the excessive rigidity of a great machine seized up with sunk costs. According to Scott, "(O)rganisational ecologists...assume that stability or, in their terms, inertia, is a normal state for organisations. Inertia is the product of such organisation-level processes as sunk costs, vested interests and habitualised behaviour." The lamentable lack of singular leadership in the Bosnian case meshes neatly with one of Weber’s characterisations of the Achilles heel of bureaucracy: "(A)n official who receives a directive which he considers wrong can and is supposed to object to it. If his superior insists on its execution, it is his duty and even his honour to carry it out as if it corresponded to his innermost conviction, and to demonstrate in this fashion that his sense of duty stands above his personal preference. This is the ethos of office. A political leader acting in this way would deserve contempt." On the other hand, one might argue, as do William Dürch or Richard Betts for instance, that UN purposes in this conflict (and others) are led astray by the confused priorities/statements and actions of its constituent member states who supply the money and materiel for intervention. Wherever the balance of blame might be thought to lie in any given case, bureaucratic failings or member states failings do not detract from the main thrust of the characterisation which the preceding discussion enables us to make of the UN system. Narrowly specialised in much of its work, and fragmented by the diversity of its member states, the emotive unity of the broad statements of UN purpose profoundly misfit the reality of the organisation and

---

429 See Betts, R. (1994) ‘The Delusion of Impartial Intervention’ in Foreign Affairs 73(6)
the reality of mobilising the organisation. This will be further confirmed by the following section from UN staff perspectives.

Conceived for a moment without reference to the idiosyncrasies of its design, the UN is, by virtue of its status within the international structures of power, a bureaucracy heaped with emotive, value-laden purpose. In a sense, these values, misrepresenting institutional unity as they do, still fill a void. Lacking the legitimate independent physical projection capacities of states, IOs such as the UN “do not command and control but rather inspire and inform”\(^{30}\). Or, unable to command and control, inspiration and information is all they can aspire to provide. In Scott’s words, IOs, as well as INGO’s “are themselves a product and serve as carriers of broader, worldwide cultural frameworks supporting rationalisation activities of many types. They function less as independent agents and more as enactors of social scripts.”\(^{31}\)

Returning to the emphases set out in Part One, it is upon discourse or ‘social script’ that the investigation of this and the following two chapters rests. In many ways, the planners of the UN, conditioned as we have seen\(^{32}\) by the institutional designs of the past and the discourses and historical sediments of the League-era, did indeed function less as independent designers and more as relays of pre-existing discourses and ideas. In a bureaucracy where attempts at rationalised programmes meant for achieving concrete goals in the world are central to the legitimacy of the organisation, what role can be accorded or what credit attributed to the passive perpetuation of discourses such as the notion of building the ‘family of nations’ where no actual method, means of achieving the goal, or even agreement as to the meaning of the discourse is to be found in the conscious workings of the organisation? Such discourses instead are ever-present but unexplained and seem to represent in their vagueness the very antithesis of what would be helpful to bureaucratic work as understood in terms of a Weberian archetype. Instead they represent and serve to legitimate what Weber called, “(T)he charisma of office – the belief in the specific state of grace of a social institution.”\(^{33}\) Here

---


\(^{31}\) Ibid. p131

\(^{32}\) For instance in Welles' careful studies of the League architecture with his planning committees. See O'Sullivan, C. (2008) *Sumner Welles, Postwar Planning and the Quest for a New World Order 1937-1943* p68.

Weber blends together impulses of two modes of his modes of authority, and in this respect he offers a more subtle way to conceptualise how the grand discourses of building human kinship serve to legitimise (one might even go so far as to say anoint) the bureaucratic projects of an organisation like the UN. They inspire respect and admiration, but (as will be further discussed in Chapter Eight) are catachrestic — they intentionally deceive by portraying the technical apparatus as capable of performing the charismatic miracle of turning a fragmented world into a family.

Intriguingly for the study of kinship discourses, and the notion of the UN as a means of binding together a wider and more inclusive human family and providing neutral arbitration in disputes, Weber makes a further comparison between such a bureaucratic overseer and the regulatory institution of the blood feud. I quote the following at length:

"Among purely political factors, the increasing demand of a society accustomed to absolute pacification for order and protection...in all fields exerts an especially persevering influence in the direction of bureaucratization. A direct road leads from mere modifications of the blood feud, sacerdotally or by means of arbitration, to the present position of the policeman as the 'representative of God on Earth'. The former means still placed the guarantees for the individual's rights and security squarely upon the members of his sib who were obligated to assist him with oath and vengeance."

The early anthropology of the blood feud, in common with the prevailing functionalism of the period, assumed this phenomenon to be always functionally regulatory. While this has been thrown out, still many more modern studies attest to the homeostatic potential of blood feuding practices.

The isomorphism Weber argues for between the sacred workings of the blood feud and the sacred respect for a bureaucratised, just, impartial, national or world policeman — two modes of social organisation apparently vastly divergent — suggests once more the potential depth of the unconscious transmission of kinship discourse from the small-scale management of genuine kinship relations into the highest strata of international contemporary politics.

---


145
Naturally this argument is provocative and is a reminder of the strengths and weaknesses of Weber's unique breadth of vision. By extension from a national to an international plane, his line of thinking posits that in just the same way as the controlled use of force, sanctions, or threats on the part of the international community through the UN apparatus (or even unilateral state action) is recommended as being on behalf of 'humanity', so the blood feud — regularised, rule bound, predictable — is often found to be respected as the one way that society (the 'people') can seek justice for their kin and stability among the humanity that makes up their social kin. It would be irresponsible to argue for this transmission as a social phenomena. However, the transmission Weber describes is, we should not forget, a mirror of the transmission that occurs in metaphorical practices. Language that describes action at the level of kin-groups is vastly extrapolated to the international level. The cognitive ability to make this transmission is apparent in usage of discourse.

The UN, then, at once rational bureaucracy and sacred beacon, upholds a social script of human kinship whose design can only partially be attributed to the intentions of the planners. Formulations of the world as family were not invented by them, but instead recycled, given new credibility and visibility. While conscious efforts were made to bring into being an organisation that would appeal to the emotions and the better natures of statesmen and citizens around the world, no recorded debate exists upon the choices of metaphors to be employed when envisioning the unity to come. This attests to the supposition that the culturally-agreed upon menu of linguistic options was and remains so well integrated in thought that no debate upon parameters was deemed necessary. So used to the notion of world-as-family were the planners that no explanation of this idea is ever given in their debates over the drafting of the Charter or the Declaration of Human Rights — it is only to be assumed that 'naturally' such formulations are to be employed to add emotive and moral weight to the linguistics of the documents.

The re-emergence of this formulation in the Millennium Development Goals, agreed in 2000, is striking in the combination of a superficial sense of grandeur with deeper, puzzling meaninglessness.
We solemnly reaffirm, on this historic occasion, that the United Nations is the indispensable common house of the entire human family, through which we will seek to realize our universal aspirations for peace, cooperation and development.

Finding the metaphor carried as far as to picture the UN as the human family’s ‘house’ is an extremely rare extension. As the final clause of perhaps the most widely referred-to document in the UN’s recent history – its contemporary restatement of its mission – it is the perfect illustration of the fact that this metaphor has lost little of its allure. The following section considers the idea of the unconscious continuity of this social script within the UN as a bureaucracy. As we have seen, these flighty metaphorical goals seem at odds with, or contributing little to, the UN’s main, technical work. Further, the discourses (which the planners believed so vital) seem to have contributed only tenuously, if at all, to bringing about the world unity they describe. In conditions where such discourses - which meant so much as hopeful ideals in the wartime period - are still perpetuated by the UN, how do those who work in the UN bureaucracy relate to such vague senses of mission?

4.4 Methodological Details of the Present Interview Data Collection

The following data set comprises a combination of interviews conducted with members of UN staff past and present, and work drawn from the UNIHP’s UN Voices study. Perhaps the primary concern in attempting to build up a picture of the meanings of the UN’s grandest discourses for UN staff was to focus on interviewees who were able to contribute in terms of understanding the UN as an active bureaucracy working in situations of ‘on the ground’ politics as well as policy development. Thus, the bulk of the investigation rests upon data from UN branches as the UNHCR and the UNDP which have both theoretical and very practical aspects to their work.


438 As will be shown in Part Four, kinship discourse is often employed to make an emotive shift in tone and register of speeches and rhetoric and thus positioned in climactic portions of addresses. Examples highlighted thus far include the UN Prayer and the MDGs. Further examples will be discussed in Chapter Eight.

439 Jolly, R., Emmerij, L. & Weiss, T. (2005a) UN Voices: The Struggle for Development and Social Justice. The UNIHP team interviewed seventy-three UN staff and associates. Sources drawn from this work are supplemented in the sections which follow by eight authorial interviews.
This small-scale project of bureaucratic ethnography was undertaken in order to delve into current concepts of discourse and policy especially with reference to the historical, ideational sediments which frame the UN project. The following sections thus ask questions of grand UN philosophy in relation to the practical experience of those who are, or have been, putting it into practice. The results of this inquiry form a basis upon which more detailed investigations into contemporary political discourse in Part Three, can be understood.

An obvious methodological problem in inserting this kind of work into a larger project concerned mainly with textual discourse analysis has to be the effect of the interpretation, and thereby distortion, of the words and opinions of subjects by the author. Such questions swamped post-Geertzian cultural anthropology in the 1980s. Early twentieth century anthropology had empirically sought answers to questions of the structure and function of social phenomena. It was assumed that rational causation could explain the appearance and character of the social lives of other societies. Structuralism and Geertz's interpretative school later considered social facts as symbols whose meaning could be derived by comparative analysis. By the 1980s scholars such as Clifford and Marcus, in their classic collection Writing Culture, questioned the ability of the sole fieldworker to represent in any authentic way the views of the diverse subjects of the society under ethnographic investigation. They raised the issue that the impartation of Western models, assumptions and biases would greatly compromise the value of any account of non-Western peoples written solely on the basis of the perceptions of a Westerner. This caused great disciplinary ruptures and for a time experimentations in multiple authorship were undertaken wherein the voices of members of the society were placed alongside the anthropologists comments. In time, a more mature set of considerations of the issues raised by the 'Writing Culture' revolution gave rise to more productive ways of proceeding than attempting to fragment authorship into confusing and directionless narratives and disjointed sets of vignettes. It would be just as

dissatisfying in this current investigation to attempt simply to stand back and let each UN subject 'speak for themselves'. Instead, as Gottlieb recognised when considering the various influences on authorship external to the fieldwork process itself, the real problem highlighted by the 'writing culture' debate was “an epistemological conviction that the fieldworker ought to make herself as invisible as possible in order to get at the 'real truth' of the culture 'out there'.”

By making researchers conscious of the genuine processes of co-construction of ethnographic data, the realisation dawned that “the more people in the anthropological team the less this increasingly problematic fiction is able to be maintained in any viable manner.”

In this sense, in the following discussion and in the chapters which follow concerning discourses surrounding the Darfur crisis and incarceration at Guantánamo Bay, the correlations between statements are not generally attributed to the 'truth' about a given society composed of UN staff. At specific and clearly marked points, the effects of the social and epistemic community upon the values of individuals may be related, but in the most part the analysis treats the relationship between the grand social scripts of our investigation and individual staff as being meaningful in two ways. Firstly, there is an important intersection at the level of the impact of grand discourse for the practice of overall policy. Secondly, at the level of the experiences of individuals in their working lives one can investigate the import of the grand discourses. Thus the following lines of inquiry are pursued to get at these intersections. Addressing the first point: how useful or meaningful are such discourses of unity in politically fractious operations or parts of the world? How well do they motivate, how well do they produce the vision they describe? In what cases are they divisive or counterproductive and on balance is their role negative or positive in general UN practice? Tailored to the second point: what purpose do grand discourses serve in the day to day work of UN officials? Are the cross-cutting negative effects of impossible ideological visions felt by individuals? How do they attempt to explain the persistence of such discourses which may have little concrete impact in the UN's work?

445 Ibid.
4.5 Philosophy, Language and Values in the Contemporary UN Bureaucracy

Perhaps the first and easiest question to answer in evaluating the role of grand discourses upon the UN as a working bureaucracy is to assess the perception of these historical relics and their relevance in everyday work. Given that the UN posits itself as a great moral arbiter of international society and upholds its founding documents as the unalterable principles guiding international politics, it would perhaps be initially surprising to find that most UN staff from the sample taken were either not inspired at all by the grand visions of the UN, or derived their inspiration and zest for their work from smaller and more achievable principles and actions. The grand ideals of the human family, or brotherhood were often dismissed by staff who claimed that “inspiration doesn’t come from the founding ideals” in terms of contemporary projects or that “these abstract ideals do not motivate anybody” due to their vagueness. Indeed even attempting to question staff on whether they were inspired by these ideals often drew laughter and reflexive self-questioning as to what sort of answer was expected. As one UNDP peacekeeping official asked “should I give you my honest answer? The honest answer is...I’m a bureaucrat” meaning that a sense of that typical bureaucratic detachment was her general modus operandi. A general lack of interest in the overall moral mission of the UN was confirmed by the comment that even prior to joining the bureaucracy she had “not a good picture of the UN and (it was) not a place where I aspired to work.”

When motivation or inspiration was attached to the grand visions of the 1940s, caveats tended to be expressed. One possible caveat was that such inspiration was couched in terms of an ‘official line’, as a policy evaluator of UNHCR remarked, “speaking for UNHCR again, we would say that we believe in a family of nations but we very much operate in a world of sovereign states and you are not going to have much credibility with states by emphasising the family of nations.” This comment also builds in the notion of the impracticability of working to build the family of nations. Many assumptions, on the parts of states especially, of what this creation of unity would entail involve greater federalisation and the curtailing of

446 Author’s Interview 1, 8th April 2009. Original listings of interviews included in Examiners’ copies but removed in the present edition for the sake of confidentiality.
447 Author’s Interview 6, 1st December 2009.
448 Author’s Interview 8, 2nd April 2009.
449 Author’s Interview 1, 8th April 2009.
sovereign rights and individuality. A second caveat which might be emphasised is that while a belief in the family of nations as a goal is expected, it is unclear exactly what it is one is supposed to believe. Questioned on the family of nations idea, one commentator exclaimed simply, "I'm not sure what that means to anyone today." 450 Or, to take another example, one UNHCR advisor spoke of the human family being "nice to talk about" while noting that the world "was certainly not there (an embodiment of family relations) in terms of nation states or even within nations." 451 A third caveat exists wherein defence of the idealism of the UN is made with relation to an attack on the politics of non-UN actors in the international system. For instance, one commentator claimed that he and his UNHCR colleagues "are trying to keep alive, I suppose, the ideals of the 1951 convention 452, in the face of constant opposition from states whom he accused of wanting far fewer demands placed upon them for the provision of aid to refugees than the 1951 Convention 453 originally required, but without proposing any "coherent alternatives" to that which they had already agreed. Another UNHCR official praised the openness and inclusivity of the UN in comparison to nation-states and NGOs, claiming that by permitting such figures as Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Colonel Gaddafi to speak in the General Assembly, the UN acted as an important "global pressure valve". He claimed that "the danger of not giving people a voice is that they are likely then to harbour a great deal of animosity internationally." 454

Causes of detachment from the ideal of the family of nations do not stop at its inherent vagueness and impracticability. A sense pervades many UN staff that this formulation is outdated or even absurd. One UN writer claimed that many political thinkers and UN staff would avoid the idea of the family of nations due to a "natural tendency to shy away from coming out with something that sounds preposterous." 455 Staff expressed the view that, contrary to the UNIHP's assertions above, the mixture of idealism and technical expertise in the UN did not confer special status to the UN's authority or mission. Rather it was noted that an amorphous desire to bring the world closer together permeated many of the

450 Author's Interview 2, 30th November 2009.
451 Author's Interview 5, 27th August 2009.
452 Author's Interview 1, 8th April 2009.
454 Author's Interview 4, 1st December 2009.
455 Author's Interview 7, 24th November 2009.
developments in international architecture from the late nineteenth century onwards. As one UNHCR staff member commented - “there is a similar mixture of idealism and pragmatism even in technical organisations like the International Postal Union”\textsuperscript{456} Further detachment maybe attributed to the sense of the UN failing to attain anything like its high ideals. The disjunction between discourse and capabilities, just in the same way as it leads states to despair of the UN, also leads staff to distance themselves from its most Utopian ideals of which the idea of world kinship is perhaps the most stark. Such resigned comments as “(I) do believe in it (the UN’s attempt to build the family of nations) to the extent to which one can with a degree of scepticism” and “if you didn’t have the UN, you’d have something just as bad”\textsuperscript{457}, attest to this institutionalised dubiousness. As one commentator in the UN Voices project remarked, the initial fervour of the UN founding document amounted to “a spirit that didn’t last very long.”\textsuperscript{458} In other words, though the generations of the 1940s were united in thinking that the UN bureaucracy needed strong moral statements in order to gain support and legitimacy, current staff find the grand notions of building a family of nations or working towards international brotherhood only vaguely inspiring and only tangentially relevant to their work. Further, as the next section shows, these discourses, which the planners expected to be so useful, are often argued today to be counter-productive in the UN’s work at improving the lives of the world’s citizens.

### 4.6 Problems with Kinship Discourse – Ineffectiveness and Ethnocentricity

Just as will be seen in the following chapters on Darfur and Guantánamo, the contemporary international organisational episteme is dominated by a massive rational, problem solving complex of bureaucracies and advocacy groups, much more so than was the case in the mid-twentieth century. Bureaucratic standards of expression of the goals of the IGO/NGO community have largely been fixed to remain as practicable and emotionally neutral as possible – this is manifest in the contemporary preference for the notion of the international

\textsuperscript{456} Author’s Interview 1, 8th April 2009.
\textsuperscript{457} Author’s Interview 8, 2nd April 2009.
\textsuperscript{458} Jolly, R., Emmerij, L. & Weiss, T. (2005a) UN Voices: The Struggle for Development and Social Justice p161/2. Interview with Robert Cox, ILO.
community over other visions of world order. In this context, speaking in impracticable and emotive terms of the family of nations occupies a discursive niche as a potent but risky linguistic choice. Two problems emerge in particular. Firstly, kinship metaphors are seen as ineffective tools for building consensus or unity of purpose. Secondly, they are seen to carry Western overtones, especially with relation to colonial images of parent metropolises and infant peripheries, or, as in the last chapter in Eleanor Roosevelt’s statement in Paris in 1948, Western powers situating themselves in the centre of the familial in-group and by virtue of their parental and tutorial aid to less developed nations, permitting them to become full members of the family. These discourses are still echoed by contemporary politicians, as the following chapters will show.

To elaborate: kinship metaphors can be used as a rallying call, but their aspirational and emotive tones can make the pronouncements of bureaucrats seem unrealistic, distant from actual politics, and lacking credibility, as the above reference to maintaining the trust of states would indicate. Many officials perceive the allure of discourses of international community and the family of nations but note also that “the more you use it, the less it means” and that in terms of working for UNHCR, it was crucial to be “quite careful in not pitching its case solely in terms of ideals.”459 As one UNDP officer noted kinship ideals in her experience have “no place...no place whatsoever” in dealings with states or in the development of most official documents, instead “we have to be very clear in our wording and objectives.”460 Working towards consensus and agreement on the basis of shared ideals can often waste valuable time according to one UNHCR policy advisor. He claimed that by trying to appeal to a sense of common ideals “you can get agreement on an intellectual level sometimes, but ultimately, you’ve got to get to the guys who have some influence and couch things in terms of political and economic benefits”461 in order to secure backing for UN projects. Lofty idealism, according to another former UN humanitarian advisor, can have shocking limits on the ground. Discussing violence in refugee camps he talked about the point at which, in the field, values become useless. Failing to reason with either side, he concluded that at times “you reach a point where this is not about principles, it’s simply about vengeance.”462

459 Author’s Interview 1, 8th April 2009.
460 Author’s Interview 8, 2nd April 2009.
461 Author’s Interview 5, 27th August 2009.
462 Author’s Interview 3, 8th December 2009.
words, though the generations of the 1940s were united in thinking that the UN bureaucracy needed strong moral statements in order to gain support and legitimacy, current staff relate to the grand notions of building a family of nations or working towards international brotherhood in highly ambivalent ways.

Taking up the second problem above, the philosophical limits of these discourses are a point of some contention in the commentaries of UN staff particularly with respect to the effect of kinship discourses and associated grand discourses of world unity in enhancing the exclusive Western-ness of the organisation. While a respect for the intentions of this Western corpus exists, as does an appreciation that the “principles are still valid” of the historical documents despite their age, the recognition that these principles “continue to be the type of norms that are still upheld internationally” is far from universally lauded. The perpetuation of such discourses, it is commonly stated, re-inscribes “a Western liberal approach to humanity from a Western dominated organisation.” Further, by virtue of the claim to unsurpassability of the UN’s grand goals, one commentator spoke of the rigidity of such ideals given their embedding within a transnational bureaucracy — “you have a Western set of rules and you live or die by them, accept them, or not, try to change them or whatever, at your peril.” As far as explanation for this rigidity is offered (other than to point to ‘rational’ or sunk cost bureaucratic reasons) one commentator argued that it was “perhaps an indication that the West hasn’t changed that much.”

This seems like an alluringly simply evaluation, and yet, I would argue that it points instead to a more complex failing of the process of embedding vague ideals of world kinship at the heart of a rational bureaucracy. As will be shown in greater detail in the following chapters, the West has indeed changed a great deal since the founding of the UN and the terrain of discourse in which the West speaks of its ideal image of the world has changed starkly. An illusion of fixity has been fostered however, by the institutionalisation of the kinship ideal within the myth and history of the UN mission. Part Three shows the general tendency in international political, NGO and media rhetoric for this formulation to slip out of use. UN staff themselves ascribe to it problems of ethnocentricity, its paternal redolence of a colonial...

---

463 Three citations from Author’s Interview 8, 2nd April 2009.
464 Author’s Interview 1, 8th April 2009.
465 Author’s Interview 8, 2nd April 2009.
gaze, its sentimentality and its inarticulacy, yet it has been preserved to re-inscribe those tendencies on what should be a dynamic and inclusive organisation. Further, as the next section discusses, these discourses have largely failed to deliver the widening of human unity that they describe and are not usually acted upon in serious ways by UN staff. The politicking of preparing projects and building coalitions to advance UN work, for instance towards its commonly agreed Development Goals, is best done with little reference to grand ideals. Even though one may argue that pushing towards the MDGs is a step towards building the family of nations, many UN officers find the negative capital attached to such sentiment to be either irrelevant or actually counterproductive.

4.7 Building the ‘Family of Nations’ or, Kinship Discourse Isn’t Working

To what extent then, in the practice of UN bureaucracy, have the discourses of world kinship been capable of producing what is described? Admissions abound that the United Nations or the international community is not only agreed upon certain technical standards or principles but is united around “human ideals centrally concerned with individuals and the rights of groups.” Apart from such pervasive agreements as the MDGs however, it is unclear how closely world unity discourses may fit into the conceptual space occupied by the supposed “common strategy and goal” which commentators claim for the diverse UN bureaucracies.

Many UN staff expressed the opinion that the discourses of world unity, even kinship, fostered by the United Nations over the past three generations have failed to reach out to political elites or the deeper social strata of much of the global periphery. A certain cynicism accompanied discussions of the limit of the international community or the family of nations. Rather, a pervasive sense existed that, being built upon Western values bolstered by claims to moral and rational unsurpassability, either it has been difficult for non-Western perspectives to carve change into the philosophical or bureaucratic architecture due to political blocks placed upon them, or else non-Westerners, by their alienation from the core values of the organisation, are less interested than Westerners in contributing to debates on these value sets. In terms of philosophical agreement, it seemed clear that UN staff were prepared to

\[466\] Author's Interview 4, 1st December 2009.
\[467\] Author's Interview 8, 2nd April 2009.
concede that “Western parties are all on the same page”\textsuperscript{468} though on most things relating to contributions towards the principles behind policy “China doesn’t get involved, nor Russia, the Arab states etc” and “the international community doesn’t include them most of the time, though we’d like it to... when we talk about the international community, we are talking about the Western donors whom you want to pay for things.”\textsuperscript{469} In essence this self-affirmation, making those from whom you need financial support feel needed and valued as community or even ‘family’ members is by turns both an extremely politic and helpful use for such grand discourse, but also a fairly cynical usage too. There is little sense of wanting to create a wider family here, simply to reassure those who place themselves ideologically at the centre of the functioning core as a matter of default due to the ethnocentric setup of the discursive parameters. As an interview in the UN Voices project confirms “the parameters (of the UN) are not defined by any of the Third World countries at all”\textsuperscript{470}.

Furthermore, it was common to find UN officials expressing open admissions that the constraints, beliefs and co-dependencies of their own bureaucratic community were more important than any outside input in formulating policy. Officials described a fairly closed community: “we’re all very similar and much more similar than to ‘normal people’ in our own countries”\textsuperscript{471} and within this sphere a tendency was to “gravitate toward your own region or nationality.”\textsuperscript{472} While a certain bureaucratic ‘groupthink’ might be expected given the supposed fixity and sunk costs of such an organisational system, more intriguing were responses to questions on relations between UN staff and officials from non-Western governments – officials whom, it would be supposed, may challenge UN philosophies. One official described having to threaten “public naming and shaming”\textsuperscript{473} of recalcitrant governments. Others commented upon government ‘disinterest’ and tendency towards vain obsession with individual measures instead of engaging in debate on the principles of UN action: “as long as they see their pet things in there, then they’re happy just to let you draft

\textsuperscript{468} Author’s Interview 8, 2\textsuperscript{nd} April 2009.
\textsuperscript{469} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{470} Jolly, R., Emmerij, L. & Weiss, T. (2005a) UN Voices: The Struggle for Development and Social Justice p209. Interview with Conor Cruise O’Brien, formerly Ireland’s Permanent Representative to the UN.
\textsuperscript{471} Author’s Interview 1, 8\textsuperscript{th} April 2009.
\textsuperscript{472} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{473} Author’s Interview 6, 1\textsuperscript{st} December 2009.
the rest.”  

Pacification with token gestures as a way to “bless their system” replaces any attempt to convince of the merits of UN principles. In cases of government engagement, the tendency towards remaining within what one official described as ‘concentric circles’ of bureaucratic society and norms, can still be reinforced – “government people...tend to have gone to the same universities as you...you gravitate towards each other that way.”

There is a great sense that the politics of working for UN agencies is not about promulgating or attempting to get outside parties to buy into the grand discourses of the institution. Rather, such attempts would be politically unfeasible and stir up hotly contested differences of philosophy which would lead to the breakdown of cooperation and the possibility of consensus. The task instead, when working with government partners is “just to get rubber stamps as you move along.” Commentators also denied having to or wanting to use the UN’s supposed position in the international moral high ground, to advocate principles based upon the unsurpassable claims of their organisational moral philosophy. Instead, on this question of attempting to exploit differences of opinion in order to advance the UN’s philosophical line, vehement denials were made. Concerning ‘project level’ disagreements over policy it was seen to be preferable to finesse the situation and circumvent or delay confrontation rather than to try to change the contrary views of third parties “it’s our job to manage the situation so it doesn’t get to the stage of disagreement” one UNDP officer related. Another related that these “constant attempts to balance relations with different stakeholder interests” was perhaps the most enjoyable part of policy development noting, “we play a double, triple or even quadruple game on this...we get things done by saying completely different things to different people.”

Not only does the bureaucratic machinery seek actively to avoid bringing world unity ideals into its dealings with states, but the opinion of UN officials on the unifying power of such discourses was generally found to be low. Staff spoke of the “polarisation between the West

---

474 Author’s Interview 8, 2nd April 2009.
475 Author’s Interview 6, 1st December 2009.
476 Author’s Interview 8, 2nd April 2009.
477 Ibid.
478 Ibid.
479 Author’s Interview 1, 8th April 2009.
and the Third World" and "ridiculous amounts of wrangling" due to the fact that, "on the member states side with their fundamentally world-different (sic) views, the principles divide a lot." It was also noted that the UN's highest ideals are often hijacked by the NGO community in ways which then, by their polarisation of debate, can hinder cooperation between member states. One example given was the promotion of a form of the 'Responsibility To Protect' (R2P) doctrine by the International Crisis Group. UN staff commonly saw such organisations (also Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch) as "aligning R2P too closely to the idea of humanitarian intervention instead of that being a last resort". The result of this distortion of debate, which had begun with an attempted reassessment of UN principles on human rights, was marked heightening of member state conflict due to many G77 nations developing "an issue with a problem of feeling their cultural sovereignty under attack." That strain of the grand ideals which promulgates a singular and uncompromising set of legitimate values and practices, when turned to spotlight the domestic responsibilities of developing world countries by a Western NGO adopting the Western language of the UN, provoked outcry and fractiousness.

More optimistically, the increased assertiveness of the G77, piqued by a sudden re-emergence of an interfering tendency at the heart of ideals of a singular standard for states relations as members of the family nations, may be positive force for overall UN reform in the longer term. That the "very divided family of nations" of the present may perhaps eventually reform a more inclusive and practical self-image and canon of ideals in reaction to the ethnocentrism and impracticability of the 1940s version, is a change only likely to come to pass due to increasing power and discursive assertiveness of non-Western states.

The translation thus far though, of 1940s ideals and ideology into contemporary bureaucratic practice has been hesitant and incomplete and many UN bureaucrats view the excesses of wartime ideals with scepticism, as a hindrance or an irrelevance. Many though still express an instinctual attachment to such "wonderful and idealistic" notions consonant with their

480 Author's Interview 2, 30th November 2009.
481 Two citations from Author's Interview 8, 2nd April 2009.
482 Author's Interview 1, 8th April 2009.
483 Ibid.
484 Author's Interview 8, 2nd April 2009.
485 Author's Interview 5, 27th August 2009.
persistence in discourse. The inarticulacy of the family of nations concept means that there has never been a coherent way to operationalise this vision. In many ways such an attempt would be nonsensical as well as impossible. This is perhaps the most pointed criticism to be made of the legacy left by the planners for the bureaucracy they created. In their ideals, they made sacred both practicable guidelines for international conduct, and also passive replications of social scripts, images of a promised land for which no political road-map could be drawn. Indeed, in the discursive sediment of these social scripts of the human family, most often the only possible road-map to reach this state of unity is a path of religious improvement and not political principle. It is perhaps little surprise then that this complex and contradictory legacy should be problematic for UN officials. Due to the changes in the discursive field of discussing human unity, bureaucrats often find it impolitic to use notions of human kinship in their work and find it difficult to explain the emergence of this rhetoric in documents relating to contemporary UN practice such as the MDGs. The two following chapters explore the discursive terrain not just of UN rhetoric but political and NGO rhetoric too, tracing the niches within discourse where kinship metaphors retain an important role in the structure of conceiving of the unity of purpose and substance of the world.
PART THREE - Case Studies of Languages of Inclusion and Exclusion: Metaphors of the Margins of the 'Functioning Core' in the Early Twenty-First Century

CHAPTER FIVE - Case Study One: The Darfur Crisis, 2003-5

5.1 Investigating the Political Usage of Kinship Discourse

In the investigations of Part Two, some defence for the employment of the notion of a functioning core of the international order has been outlined. A core set of principle beliefs and the shoots of a burgeoning structure of international institutions and political regimes were delineated by a closely-circumscribed group of politicians and political advisors and bound up within sets of languages of international shared substance, values and purpose. Nevertheless, as the previous chapter indicated, the normative languages which planners felt would be crucial to motivating international society to believe in the UN organisation may, in their West-centricity, be counter-productive in the work of contemporary UN bureaucrats. While clearly notions of the acceptable members of international society are fluid and contested, this is not to deny that the concept of a core group of nations driving and controlling the ethos of the world international institutions remains in play in political and popular discourse, and remains of great political and symbolic value.

This chapter, following on from the previous bureaucratic ethnography, looks at the operational workings of foundational discourses of the institutional international community at its putative margins. Our argument in Part One has been that logics of difference, especially when metaphorised in terms of kin and kin-community, admit of a plurality of responses towards those on the edges of the group. By the richness of their metaphorical content, kin metaphors construct the relations of the discoursing subject and their object of discourse in multiple potential modes of understanding that in turn permit diverse actions of power. The kin metaphor can play upon supposed notions of nurturance and safety and the
valuing of the (metaphorical) person, or, as further explored in the following chapter, equally
can be employed to re-impose hierarchy and dominance within the group. On the margins of
the group it can be employed to lend substance both to policies which demonstrate a
welcoming collective, or an exclusive one.

Two contemporary case studies where the limits of the human family/international
community are tested are thus presented, firstly international attempts to address the
humanitarian crisis in Darfur, and secondly the neglect of human rights in the prosecution of
the Global War on Terror. The aim of these case studies is to elaborate the potentialities of
world kinship discourse and investigate patterns of its employment among alternatives such
as 'International society' or 'international community'. As a statement within the discursive
field of the description of global opinion and decision-making today, the term 'international
community' is almost the blanket referent of choice in a dominant 'enunciative modality' for
speaking of the functioning core of the world and global opinion. As Foucault charts, an
'enunciative modality' is constructed from a particular type of discourse producer, inhabiting
a specific subject position in relation to his audience and may rely for his/her authority upon
a subject position within a particular institutional site. We are used, for instance, to political
figures, NGOs, print and television media mobilising the notion of a putative 'international
community' as the moral and political conscience and judge of world affairs. To take
instances from the current events of 2009, North Korean nuclear arms testing provoked
widespread tension and criticism from world leaders framed in most cases as an affront to the
international community. Gordon Brown commented that "(T)he international community
will treat North Korea as a partner if it behaves responsibly. If it does not, then it can expect
only renewed isolation". The Japanese Foreign Minister, Hirofumi Nakasone said of the
testing, "(A)s it is a violation of UN Security Council resolutions, [Japan] condemns and
protests it strongly. It is a challenge to the whole of the international community and
increases tensions." A month later the disputed Iranian election prompted US President

---

486 A mode of the production of meaning, given shape by the "various statuses, various sites, the various position
that he (the subject) can occupy when making a discourse", Foucault, M. (1972) The Archaeology of Knowledge
p54.

487 All above citations from 'World Unites to Condemn North Korea Nuclear Test' in Daily Telegraph, 25th May
2009. Available at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/northkorea/5388019/World-unites-to-
condemn-North-Korea-nuclear-test.html. Accessed on 30/10/2009. This article also cites President Obama's
take on the testing. He accused Pyongyang of "directly and recklessly challenging the international community"
Obama to declare that “(T)he United States and the international community have been appalled and outraged by the threats, the beatings and imprisonments of the last few days” as the Iranian regime cracked down on protestors.

In light of the findings of Part Two, discourse surrounding Darfur and the War on Terror can provide us with ways of mapping the survival of world kinship discourse in an era where the default mode of thinking of, and speaking about, global opinion and a vision of global unity is in terms of an ‘international community’. In particular these case studies seek to address the following questions. What patterns of usage for kinship discourse exist in the contemporary period? How are these patterns different from those in the era of the UN planners? What is kinship discourse in particular employed to do?

The first case study then concerns the political and ethnic conflict and humanitarian crises in the Darfur region of Western Sudan which came starkly to the notice of the international community in the early years of the twenty-first century. In this case, many of the freedoms and rights supposedly guaranteed to citizens of the international community have been lost to the Darfurians. Further, the marginalisation of Darfur by the Sudanese central government in Khartoum has (in some quarters) pushed the Sudanese nation state towards something approaching pariah status. For prominent Western governments and for international organisations though, the desire is for Sudan and Darfur to be re-incorporated as full and equally respected members of the ‘family of nations’. The second case study concerns an instance where those on the margins of the functioning core are felt to be a threat which needs to be excluded and isolated, rather than to have fallen outside the group as a result of misfortune. Here, the international reaction to the isolation of political prisoners of the War on Terror at Guantánamo Bay and the abuses of human rights at Abu Ghraib prison will be investigated.

---

and warned that “(S)uch provocations will only serve to deepen North Korea’s isolation. It will not find international acceptance unless it abandons its pursuit of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.”

The purpose and line of inquiry of these case studies must be carefully circumscribed. There is neither the need nor the space to rehearse comprehensively the politics of the international community’s responses to the Darfur crisis or the Guantánamo controversy. Instead, it must be remembered that the tracking of metaphorical practice is the crux of the exercise. At the dawn of the latest project for a truly international world order in the 1940s, kin metaphors held an important place in discussing glorious aspirations for world unity. In the following contemporary investigations, selections of discourses related to the events in question are analysed to suggest the work of various metaphorical devices and the potential motivations for the choices made by political actors in presenting the self and other at the margins of functioning core of international society.

Further, it should be remembered that the political debate in either the Darfur or War on Terror case contains examples of world kinship and community discourses used both for practices of inclusion and exclusion. It has been noted that a prevalent Western desire has been to re-incorporate Darfurians (inclusion) and to isolate rogue states and terrorists (exclusion). However, Western voices have also spoken in exclusionary terms about the Government of Sudan, and Western powers have attempted to democratise and thus re-include former terror sponsors such as Afghanistan. Thus it would be wrong to see the present Darfur case study as being solely a case of investigating kinship (and other) languages as means of pushing for inclusionary politics. The same applies to an uncritical association of the War on Terror with exclusionary politics.

The fact that Western desires, opinions and principles are at the root of the supposedly ‘universal’ languages and actions of the UN as an international moral arbiter, has the effect of presenting issues of world politics as being organised around a Western/UN orthodox perspective while on the sidelines sit various dissentions. Clearly this overlap and structure of perspectives is hugely prevalent, but not ubiquitous. Neither the UN nor the West can be taken uncritically as having singular voices. Nevertheless, the overwhelming potential of a Western/UN perspective (which presents itself in terms of universal normative values) to organise other viewpoints with relation to itself cannot be discounted. Analysing practices of inclusionary language separately from exclusionary language would fragment the logical sense of the politics of both case studies and so they are presented with relation to the existing
UN/Western orthodoxy which has seen Darfur as mainly a matter of re-inclusion, and the War on Terror as mainly a matter of security-minded exclusion. In each case it will be necessary to be mindful of linguistic practices which run counter to this hegemonic organisation.

5.2 Voices of humanity? The Escalating Debate Concerning Darfur: 2003-5

In making a case study of the international community’s response to the Darfur crisis of recent years, what is to be presented is a close analysis of how the conflict and ensuing humanitarian catastrophes have been discussed. The conflict itself, in the context of the Second Sudanese Civil War has roots in the attempted homogenisation of Sudan by the dominant Arab North – a struggle which has continued in various ways for several generations. Following years of persecution and marginalisation under the Bashir government, Darfurian rebel groups (principally the Justice and Equality Movement, or JEM, and the Sudanese Liberation Movement/Army, or SLM/A) began carefully planned and audacious attacks on Government forces and installations. The resulting backlash through scorched earth attacks on villages by 
janjaweed
militias in the summer and autumn of 2003 led to massive displacement of non-Arab Fur villagers and in 2004, the UN described the area as the scene of the worst humanitarian crisis in the world at that point. 2004 was marked by burgeoning international debate upon courses of action open to the international community and also debate over the classification of the conflict as genocidal. This initial phase of the conflict (quite separate from more recent upsurges) began to wind down as peace talks were

489 An excellent overview of the historical background to the conflict is provided in Johnson, D. (2003) The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars. This point is discussed in detail in Fake, S. and Funk. K (2009) The Scramble For Africa: Darfur – Intervention and the USA. See especially chapter 2. The authors raise the point that the racialisation (though based more on lifestyle than genetics or skin colour) of the population of Darfur was accelerated successively from the 1968 election onwards and later as part of Colonel Gaddafi’s Pan-Arabist Libyan expansionism. Also pertinent is the fact that part of the Government of Sudan need to foster ‘Arab’ 
janjaweed groups to conduct suppression of Darfur and thus intensify the racial element of the crisis was created by the previous plundering of Darfurian villages to fill ranks of the Sudanese army. Unlikely to turn on their own homelands, the GoS was backed into fostering specifically ‘Arab’ elements in order to try to bend Darfur to its will. See Natsios, A. (2006) ‘Moving Beyond the Sense of Alarm’ in Totten, S. and Markusen, E. Genocide in Darfur: Investigating the Atrocities in the Sudan p29-32

arranged in Abuja, Nigeria. It is from this phase that the majority of the discursive statements in this case study will be taken, with other foundational texts and later commentaries on the period brought in to lend contextual weight.

In particular, four types of statements will be analysed. Firstly I shall look at academic discourse on Darfur and the international community response. Much of the literature on Darfur has cast the conflict in terms of a putative history of failures to act in defending human rights in Africa, and much is made of comparisons with the Rwandan genocide in 1994. This first section will help to flesh out the discursive referents for contemporary discussions of Darfur though, as a proviso, it must be noted that such academic discourse does not represent an object of discourse in the thesis as a whole. To elevate it to an object of analysis alongside political speeches and rhetoric, the meeting minutes and writings of UN planners, or even the statements of UN officials would require a dilution of the analyses of the above categories of discursive output.

There is little purchase to be gained in the self-contained analysis of contemporary academic output. As will be seen, more depends upon the school of IR (or other disciplinary) thought of the author in determining the terminology used in contemporary writing - such is the weight of accumulated semantic association locked into the conceptual frames of the world favoured by various academic groupings. Further, comparing contemporary scholarship and the collections of writing from the 1930s and 1940s analysed in Chapter One would be somewhat misguided. Academic contributions to the international organisation/world unity debate in the 30s and 40s were mostly written by a combination of academics and political figures and, moreover, sponsored by political organisations and so tied into, and intended for, digestion by political classes. In contrast, the academic discourse in the following section refers more closely to a fairly insular community of academic debates than to deliberate engagement with political rhetoric.491

491 This argument has been made variously from several perspectives. Karin Knorr-Cetina (1981) pointed out in The Manufacture of Knowledge the motivation for academics to produce work which appeals to a closed community of peers rather than to readers outside of academia. This helps to manipulate an internal economy of advancement based on recommendations and reviews for publications, grants and promotions. Scholars in feminism and queer studies, such as the widely cited Messer-Davidow, E. (2002) Disciplining Feminism: From Social Activism to Academic Discourse have questioned whether academic modes of writing are sufficiently engaged with political processes and whether such engagement is structurally possible. Further work, such as
By contrast, the second and third types of statements, namely political rhetoric from Western nations on the one hand, and UN and NGO reporting on the other, will be considered as objects of discourse analysed in the broad scope of the thesis. Much of the debate surrounding Darfur has dwelt on issues of responsibility and has invoked notions of international collective will in spite of the difficulties that surrounded assessing and then acting upon the unfolding crisis. Bureaucratised and formalised reporting, negotiating and policy-making in all these fields tends to rely upon standardised formulations and tends to shy away from more emotive metaphorisations of the duties and aims which might be in play. I deal initially with the vast discursive background of fairly neutral statements and formulations of international crisis response. Following this, the chapter looks at the less frequently engaged language of kin metaphors and attempts to account for their role in the discursive landscape. Finally, sources of Sudanese discourse from both sides of the conflict are analysed. Both the aspirations and manifestos of the rebel movements and the international self-defence of the Government of Sudan are taken into account to help to frame more accurately the particularities of Western-global discursive patterns.

5.3 Contextualising the Crisis: Academic Treatments of the Initial Phases of Conflict

The first wave of academic commentary on the unfolding Darfur crisis began to be published in 2004, shortly after the extent of the suffering resulting from the retribution exacted by the Government of Sudan (GoS) and its proxy militias, was becoming known to the outside world and discussed in international arenas. Much of the literature situated the conflict within the scope of debates on the ‘responsibility to protect’ (R2P492) and in a historical trajectory.

stretching back through international events concerning attempted humanitarian intervention in the 1990s.

Prior to Darfur appearing on the international radar, most engagement with Sudan had been in the context of the long-standing conflicts and stop-start peace negotiations between the North and South. International concern had been intensified and the potential stakes upon the outcome of peace negotiations raised by the beginning of exports from the oilfields of the South through a newly developed pipeline to the Port of Sudan coast in 1998.

As captured by Randolph Martin in a 2002 article in Foreign Affairs, global interest in Sudan, and in particular, US interest in Sudan, was of a very different order to the ‘responsibility to protect’ debates that dominated discourse after the emergence of the Darfur crisis. The initial coup which brought Omar al-Bashir to power in 1989 plunged Sudan into both “pariah status” and economic decay. Martin, a director of the International Rescue Committee and an experienced voice on domestic and international politics in Sudan, wrote positively of Sudan’s gradual transformation in the years following the military coup. An “international charm offensive” included efforts at regional stability through the hosting of peace talks for the conflict in the Central African Republic and the conclusion of productive trade agreements with its other neighbours, especially Egypt. Slowly, throughout the 1990s, the Bashir government addressed the United States’ concerns that Sudan was sponsoring and aiding international terrorists, and expelled Osama Bin-Laden from the country in 1996. Further international conventions on the suppression of terrorism were agreed to by Sudan in 1997 and 1999.

At Martin’s time of writing he noted that “virtually all other nations of consequence — with the notable exception of the United States — now enjoy full diplomatic relations with

---

494 Ibid. p3
Notably however, the development of an international oil economy, with companies from Malaysia, China, France, Sweden and Canada (among others) involved in extraction in Southern Sudan, has helped Khartoum finance war against the South and later in Darfur. This upheaval and brutality throughout Bashir’s consolidation period may have been masked partially by a charm offensive but caused human suffering on a massive scale. As Heather Sharkey writes: ‘(T)he US Committee for Refugees estimates that from 1983 to 1998 two million Sudanese died from war-related causes (accounting for 20 percent of the Sudanese population), and more than 80 percent of the Southern Sudanese population had been displaced at different times.‘

While US economic sanctions, especially on American involvement in Sudan’s oil boom, remained in place consistently in the period leading up to the beginning of the Darfur insurgency, Martin chronicles a pattern of normalisation of US relations with Sudan throughout the early years of the Bush Administration. The 1998 American cruise missile attack, he argues, reflected American perceptions of Sudan formed in “dark days of turmoil” following the coup of the earlier 1990s – “more a visceral reaction to an outdated image than a calculated response to current information.” In the early 2000s, the Bush Administration made good headway in engaging further with Sudan, though it found itself pushed and pulled in contrary directions by various domestic pressure groups. The Christian Right and the Black Congressional Caucus urged aid to the South and condemnation of the North, while oil interests desired the lifting of trade sanctions on the North to open up trading opportunities. The Administration approved humanitarian aid missions, appointed a chargé d’affaires (working admittedly from Nairobi) and a special peace envoy in John Danforth. Martin urged the opening of diplomatic relations as a means of applying continued pressure on Khartoum over its human rights record, and to send a message to the South that outright

499 Preferential trading relations with Sudan, especially after the oil strikes of 2005 which doubled the country’s known reserves, would be a useful counterweight for the US and the Western world in general to the economic leverage on prices currently held by the OPEC cartel. See Fake, S. and Funk, K. (2009) *The Scramble For Africa: Darfur – Intervention and the USA* p57. Clearly the US at least is reluctant to take such a step no matter the attraction due to the moral compromise of association with the present Sudanese régime.
secession was not a policy Washington would support. The lifting of sanctions, he added, might be used as a substantial incentive to the successful conclusion of peace talks.

All through this period Darfur, marginalised, deprived and unstable as it was, barely featured in international concerns with Sudan. The spectacular SLM/A and JEM attacks on government posts and military aircraft at al-Fashir in April 2003 represented a more impressive blow against GoS forces than had been struck in twenty years of slow-burning insurgency in the South and the reprisals later that year were predictably harsh. However, despite the UN putting out an appeal for $139 million to help Darfurians cope with the ongoing GoS and janjaweed revenge attacks, throughout 2003 as Hugo Slim writes, “the world’s media were never mobilized, being editorially diverted by Iraq and physically prevented from entering Darfur by Khartoum’s news blackout.”

Only throughout 2004 did debate begin in earnest in the UN and in academia. Slim’s early, and oft-quoted article praised the fact-finding missions by NGOs, the UNCHR and OCHA as well as the United States’ innovative use of satellite images to show the devastation of torched villages in the wake of janjaweed raids. As international machinery sought to grasp the nature and magnitude of the conflict as well as what was at stake for the rebels and government, the urgency and thoroughness of data collection bears witness to what Slim refers to as a “consciousness unmistakeably influenced by the experience of Rwanda.” This is not an idle reference, for two important criticisms of the international response to the crisis as developed in academic commentary turn upon this linkage. Firstly, unfortunate practical decisions were made which hampered the international response in the heat of an attempt to

---

502 Ibid. p813. A conceptual connection with Rwanda was played up as a way to motivate responses to Darfur at the highest levels. It was, in this way hugely convenient and symbolic that the world’s notice was captured by Darfur in the year of the tenth anniversary of the Rwandan genocide. As pointed out in Mambani, M. (2009) Saviours and Survivors: Darfur, Politics and the War on Terror, far greater (numerically speaking) humanitarian catastrophes had occurred in the intervening period, most particularly in the Second Congo War. Despite this, it was the Darfur crisis that was framed by the international community as a second Rwanda and the anniversary was exploited to reinforce this connection. See for instance Annan, K. (2004) ‘Action Plan to Prevent Genocide’. Available at: http://www.preventgenocide.org/ prevent/ UNdocs/KofiAnnansActionPlantoPreventGenocide7 Apr2004.htm. Accessed on 02/08/2009. A near simultaneous statement was made by the US President. See Bush, G. (2004) ‘President Condemns Atrocities in Sudan’. Statement by the President. Available at: http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2004/04/20040407-2.html. Accessed 03/10/2009.
address the situation with greater decisiveness than had been generated in 1994. Secondly, important theoretical reflections by international bodies upon the Rwandan genocide and the implications for the rights and responsibilities of sovereign states vis-à-vis the international community played into, and in some ways hamstrung, the response to Darfur. These two post-Rwanda influences are critical to understanding academic commentary on the response to the crisis.

As regards the practical reactions to the unfolding conflict, substantial academic work throughout 2004 and 2005 reflected upon the conceptual situation of Darfur by international commentators within the context of the other conflicts that had wracked Sudan over the course of the preceding generation. Darfur, as Alex de Waal wrote in 2004, is possessed of "such a long history of internal migration, mixing and intermarriage that ethnic boundaries are mostly a matter of convenience."503 Whilst the Southern conflict might have been, in a vaguely responsible way, described as war between two sides of different religious and ethnic make-up, the Darfur crisis was never simply an adjunct to the attempt by the Northern establishment to hold down an Islamic state in the face of non-believing 'others' on the nation's peripheries.

Little heed was taken of these complicating factors by many in politics and even in academia. Scott Straus, while paying lip-service to the religious and ethnic admixture of Darfur, opened an article reflecting on the recent characterisation of the crisis as 'genocide' by the Bush Administration as follows: "(T)he primary perpetrators of the killings and expulsions are government-backed 'Arab' militias. The main civilian victims are black 'Africans' from three tribes."504 The government-backing of the janjaweed dovetailed neatly in contemporaneous concerns with state-sponsorship of fundamental Islam and terrorism, and references to the 'blackness' and 'tribal' nature of the 'Africans' is simply predictable pejorative treatment of African society.

504 Straus, S. (2005) 'Darfur and the Genocide Debate' in Foreign Affairs Jan/Feb 2005 p1. Regardless of the racial 'blackness' mentioned, even Straus' insistence on using the word 'tribes' would, to many post-colonial scholars and anthropologists, sound the alarms of unfortunate essentialism tied into colonial trajectories of understanding.
In the context of a ‘war on terror’ conducted largely for the neutralisation of extremist Islamic groups around the world, the US decision to label the conflict a ‘genocide’ (a decision which received scant support from other nations) was almost inevitably inflammatory. As Straus notes: “such a designation, it was long thought, would inevitably trigger an international response” and further “Darfur...provides a good test of whether the 56-year-old Genocide Convention, created in the aftermath of the Holocaust, can make good on its promise to ‘never again’ allow the targeted destruction of a particular ethnic, racial or religious group.”

However, such a dramatic response from the international community was not forthcoming for a number of reasons, not least the feeling engendered in Khartoum, that the US’s singular policy was an attack on its Islamic regime and a reversal of the thaw in relations that had occurred throughout the years leading up to the US removing Sudan in May 2004 from its list of states uncooperative in the War On Terror.

As de Waal summarises:

"The fact that the US media and government have mischaracterized the Darfur war as ‘Arabs’ killing ‘Africans’ has allowed Khartoum to portray it as (another) American conspiracy against Arabs. The US determination that genocide has been committed, while not substantively different, in its description of atrocities and responsibility for them, from statements by European and African leaders, has appeared to put Washington out on its own in its opposition to Khartoum. From the perspective of Khartoum (and indeed many other capitals in Africa and the Middle East) the genocide determination appears to be the cynical use of a new tool to legitimize US intervention and demonize Arabs. This has enabled Khartoum to revive the defunct Egyptian and Libyan initiative for reconciliation in Sudan, which is in effect a spoiler for the Naivasha and Abuja processes."

Still focused upon the successful conclusion of the Naivasha peace talks between Khartoum and the South in 2003, there was initial “international reluctance to include more parties in the delicate machinations for fear of making it unmanageable” and this saw the Darfurian rebel groups hosted by Chad in the initial attempts at ceasefire talks. Though the conceptual linkage of the Darfur crisis to the Southern conflict (especially through language associated with the war on terror) was highly unwise as Slim points out, a comprehensive effort to

address the disenfranchisement of Sudan’s margins was indeed necessary, and in their exclusion from Naivasha\textsuperscript{510}, the Darfurians felt neglected.

However, when talks were convened, it became clear that the theoretical fallout from the international failure in Rwanda clouded attempts at comprehensive progress. In the wake of Rwanda, the UN Secretary-General’s Special representative on Internally Displaced Persons, Francis Deng, produced two influential studies\textsuperscript{511} on the relationship between the primary responsibilities of sovereign governments to protect the human rights of their citizens and the secondary rights of international forces to intervene when that primary responsibility was not deemed to be upheld. Following the formulations of Deng’s work wherein the “obligation of the state to provide life-sustaining standards for its citizens must be recognized as a necessary condition of sovereignty”\textsuperscript{512}, further work was commissioned on the role of external powers when that obligation was not met. In particular, the Canadian government set up the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) in 2000. The ICISS report framed the question in terms less of the competing rights of States and interveners, but in terms of levels of responsibility of both to protect citizens: “the responsibility to protect looks at the issue from the point of view of those needing help; it acknowledges that the host state has primary responsibility for the welfare of its citizens and that intervention can only be contemplated if the state is either unwilling or unable to fulfil its responsibilities.”\textsuperscript{513}

Three stumbling blocks to comprehensive international aid came out of these theoretical investigations promoted by the inquest in Rwanda, and to the non-UN intervention in Kosovo in the late 1990s. Firstly, as Williams and Bellamy note, the initial UNSC resolutions on Darfur, particularly 1556\textsuperscript{514}, “firmly placed responsibility to protect the suffering Darfurians in the hands of the Sudanese government. This was in spite of the fact that most

\textsuperscript{510}The site of the talks between the GoS and the John Garang’s South Sudanese People’s Liberation Army which concluded a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) on the North/South conflict in 2005.


\textsuperscript{512} Deng, F. et al. (1996) p. xviii

\textsuperscript{513}International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (2001) The Responsibility to Protect p17

experts agreed that the Government of Sudan lacked the capability and will to quickly stop or disarm the janjaweed by force.\(^{515}\)

Secondly, the 'responsibility to protect' debate arguably clouded issues of longer-term strategy in talks between the Darfurians, the GoS and the international community. Getting the UN forced 'in' became a mantra, a panacea, almost seeming to be an end in itself, rather than a means to a greater goal. Hence debate was neglected, especially at Abuja, on the operational prospects for a UN force. Furthermore, the expectations of salvation led the Darfurians to hold unrealistic negotiating positions, and also the apparent international belief that only UN forces could alleviate the problems in the region left to the serious de-moralisation of African Mission In Sudan (AMIS) forces already present.

Thirdly, as de Waal shows, the parallels made in US NGO and media sources about 'saving' Darfur in the same way as Kosovo was 'saved', convinced many in Khartoum that the 'responsibility to protect' was a Trojan horse for US/UN ambitions to dismember Sudan.\(^{516}\) Mahmood Mamdani's recent criticism of the Save Darfur Coalition's dishonest coverage of the crisis aside,\(^{517}\) it is only necessary to remember that one of the most prominent early rallying slogans used by Save Darfur was, 'Out of Iraq, into Darfur'. Whilst such sentiment made sense to much of liberal America, coupled with Save Darfur's advocacy of unilateral US intervention, it is easy to see why such slogans would cause alarm in other corners of the globe, particularly in the Arab world. As Bellamy puts it, (following Wheeler's\(^{518}\) use of the notion of primary 'norm carriers'), the US and its allies, in the light of a \textit{post hoc} attempt to justify the Iraq war in terms of humanitarian concerns when the search for WMDs failed, were "unable to build consensus about collective action (in Darfur) at least in part...because of their diminished credibility as norm carriers."\(^{519}\)

\(^{515}\) Williams, P. and Bellamy, A. (2005) 'The Responsibility to Protect and the Crisis in Darfur' in \textit{Security Dialogue} \textit{36}(1) p32
\(^{516}\) de Waal, A. (2007) 'Darfur and the Failure of the Responsibility to Protect' in \textit{International Affairs} \textit{83}(6) p1046
\(^{517}\) See, Mamdani, M. (2009) \textit{Saviours and Survivors: Darfur, Politics and the War on Terror}.
\(^{519}\) Bellamy, A. (2005) 'Responsibility to Protect or Trojan Horse? The Crisis in Darfur and Humanitarian Intervention after Iraq' in \textit{Ethics and International Affairs} \textit{19}(2) p33
This explanation certainly demands attention, especially given official confirmation of the US government’s desire to try to negate the negative political capital of one humanitarian crisis caused in Iraq by solving one in Sudan. Stephen Kostas notes this tendency within the Bush Administration, drawing on testimony to the House Committee on International Relations by Lome Craner, Assistant Secretary for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor.\textsuperscript{520} He writes: “(T)he Bush Administration was eager to point to its leadership on Sudan policy to demonstrate that they could speak with authority on grave issues of human rights at a time when issues around the treatment of detainees, particularly at Guantánamo Bay and Abu Ghraib, threatened to strip the Administration’s voice of legitimacy on human rights issues.”\textsuperscript{521}

These practical obstacles and the botched attempts to conceptually tie Darfur to the memory of Rwanda led to frustration among NGOs, academics and Western publics as a gap between normative rhetorical exhortations and actual progress to resolve the conflict opened up. The following sections argue that the very languages which frame international visions of one united ‘world’ solving a problem in its midst do not, in many cases, provide necessary leverage to turn ideals into action. Indeed, as we have seen consistently throughout, especially in the closing sections of the last chapter, a discursive gap between on the one hand, the ideal of a united world (or even loftier and still more vague, a world-as-family), and on the other, the diversity of values and dissension from a united purpose that characterise modern international politics, is very much a feature of the way that ‘ideals’ and ‘reality’ face off against each other in the UN-era. The extent of this gap, as I will further argue in the following chapters, is potentially unhealthy for international relations and the effect of the use of kinship discourse to metaphorise unity in world relations often serves to widen that gap. One effect of this gap is noted in the Darfur case by Jerry Fowler as follows: “(A)fter calling for international cooperation ‘to liberate mankind from such an odious


\textsuperscript{521} Kostas, S. (2006) ‘Making the Determination of Genocide in Darfur’ in Totten, S. and Markussen, E. Genocide in Darfur: Investigating the Atrocities in the Sudan p116. Kostas also refers closely to testimony by the State Department’s Lome Craner which confirmed that he was pressed to try to assert leadership on Darfur to nullify criticism over Iraq and Afghanistan.

174
scourge', the Convention proceeds to define the crime of genocide in terms that, from the perspective of 'preventing' or 'suppressing' genocide, are problematic. It then offers only the vaguest sense of what should be done when genocide is imminent or actually underway.

By couching their motives in terms of the very loftiest of values, documents such as the UN Charter or the Genocide Convention purport to be unimpeachable and unchangeable statements of universal purpose for the ages. This renders it difficult for international society to address the weaknesses in such documents, as Fowler notes. Further, the repetition of these high values in times of crisis by UN figures or nation state politicians is taken to be a legitimate contribution to debates on solving political issues. As we have seen and will see further, these languages of idealism can be startlingly ineffective in motivating action and debate on genuine action can be stalled by speakers retreating behind the walls of these ideals, reinforcing their own self-image by restating them, while not addressing the particularities of individual political issues. The following sections now investigate the patterns of discourse observable in the Darfur case.

5.4 International Languages of Unity: International Community - The Bureaucratic Standard

"It is widely accepted that the Security Council has a legal right to authorize humanitarian intervention under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. There is also a partial consensus among some liberal states that there is a moral right to intervene without council authorization in extreme cases."

The rights of judgement vested in the UN Security Council are, despite great challenges to the authority and standing of that body throughout its history, an important part of the legal and even moral structure of international politics. The Council itself, through the Charter, purports to be (and by many is treated as if it does embody) the ultimate forum for the exercise of collective and consensual power. As a forum which is representative of a regularly rotated collection of powerful states, this contention holds some weight.

---

524 Bellamy, A. (2005) 'Responsibility to Protect or Trojan Horse? The Crisis in Darfur and Humanitarian Intervention after Iraq' in Ethics and International Affairs 19(2) p33-34
More dubious however, and the subject of this section, are the discursive practices which refer less specifically to the notion of a supposed moral arbiter in international politics. It is arguably the natural consequence of a body like the Security Council, (situated within an organisation like the United Nations) that it comes to represent more than it actually embodies. The UN makes institutional goals of the grandest of objectives, and the most sweeping of aspirations in its Charter purport to be the representative desires of the whole world. As Kofi Annan put it in a speech commemorating ten years since the Rwandan genocide, and in the midst of increasing debate on intervention in Darfur:

"Anyone who embarks on genocide commits a crime against humanity. Humanity must respond by taking action in its own defence. Humanity's instrument for that purpose must be the United Nations, and specifically, the Security Council."525

The Security Council as the UN's highest decision making body was originally endowed with specific jurisdictions and remits. It is not, however, the moral conscience of the world. As Gerald Caplan writes in tones of some despair over inaction in the case of Darfur: "the global powers-that-be are capable of almost infinite callousness and indifference to human suffering if geopolitical or political interests are not at stake. Calls for forceful intervention based on strictly humanitarian grounds... are simply irrelevant to those with the means to intervene."526

The Security Council, comprising powers of very different international outlooks and with diverse individual interests, has many roles but cannot always be expected to act as a singular moral authority. However, precisely this notion of the UN as a moral conscience often seems to be invoked in the international crises into which the Security Council is thrust. In this way, instead of addressing complaints or proposals specifically to UN persons or bodies, much political and NGO discourse metamorphoses the UN and the UNSC into an amorphous supranational catch-all – the 'international community'.

Tentative use of the term, and exploration of the meaning of the notion of 'international community' was made by scholars both in the early UN-era and in the era of the League of

Nations. In more recent times though, the notion has come to dominate the discursive field of statements made concerning global collective opinion or action. The shape of the discursive field today is much altered from those more experimental, hopeful writings around the time of the formation of the UN, when the embodiment of any sort of ‘international community’ was still a Utopian pipedream. Certainly today, those who might claim to be contributory voices to the community are politicians and bureaucrats. Those in the media who comment upon international bureaucracy are apt to speak of this bureaucracy as the physical embodiment of the ‘international community’. By the vast multiplicity of NGOs and IGOs (especially the many sub-branches of the UN) that exist today and are permanently staffed, a very real sort of bureaucratic community would seem to exist, and be made up of representatives of many countries of the world. By contrast the League of Nations, particularly in its early years, could hardly represent a permanent community representative of world opinion. Its staff met infrequently and they were few in number, received much less media comment and attention and were often members of rarefied classes within their home country.

Nevertheless, it is difficult even today to say what politicians, the public and the media in the Western world mean by the notion of ‘international community’. In spite of this vagueness, as discussed in the first section of this chapter, the term ‘international community’ has become almost the ubiquitous referent of choice in a dominant ‘enunciative modality’ for speaking about the putative institutional grouping which acts as the mouthpiece of world values and opinion. Contrast this to the plethora of works using such (now largely defunct) terms as ‘world society’, ‘world community’, ‘one world’, ‘world union’ that were produced in the early twentieth century. A distinct subset of this literature comprised highly personal,

---


529 Foucault, M. (1972) The Archaeology of Knowledge p54

speculative, Utopian and sometimes quasi-religious or explicitly religious treatises which presented not just plans for a new world order, but something closer to genuine visions or dreams. The selection of 'international community' as the dominant language for encapsulating visions of world consensus from the muddle of terms deployed in the mid-twentieth century does not necessarily mean that it is a significantly more precise concept.

As an example, George McGhee wrote, shortly after the end of the Cold War, that international community amounted to "the net effect of many overlapping efforts by people and nations all over the world based on the willingness to cooperate with and assist others in endeavours for the common good." The imprecision of such a statement is, in itself, quite impressive. What also is striking is the realisation that surely if an international community existed as McGhee defines it, then the Darfur crisis could not have lasted as it did without intervention from the overlapping efforts of people all over the world keen to end the suffering. The haziness of notions such as 'international community' helps them to seem like an easy cure-all for the problematic conflict between responsibilities to humanity and to one's individual society. As Linklater notes, "the primordial fact about humanity is the existence of cultural individualities" and not singularity of purpose or opinion, despite what the world unity discourses would persuade us.

Even relatively modern accounts such as this, have a tendency to utilise notions of international community as a panacea for world problems tied to unrealistic or religious visions of a peaceful future. As McGhee explains, his notion of international community is "an attitude of mind towards the relations between individuals and states, based in essence on the principle of the Golden Rule, which is a part of every world religion and which stems from instincts very deep in men." Such notions run aground of the historicist critique that "all universalistic codes inevitably reflect the preference of specific cultures or civilisations,"


534 Here presumably, McGhee refers to the idea of treating others as one would wish to be treated oneself.


178
which assume that their moral practices are valid for the entire human race.\textsuperscript{536} Yet, as Linklater further points out, historicism itself assumes trans-historical validity for its objections, and thus is self-contradictory. He concludes that notions of international community remain deeply problematic. One cannot run roughshod over the diversity of humanity in pursuit of a singular set of principles. On the other hand, to support diversity may be to give licence to the development of antagonistic forces which would destroy peaceful international cooperation. Speaking about the tension between obligations to humanity and to one’s culture, he notes that “none of the philosophical attempts to realize this objective (or to combine these approaches in a higher synthesis) has commanded any lasting consensus.”\textsuperscript{537}

These caveats have not halted the overwhelming consensus built in the post Cold War era that it is an ‘international community’, not a ‘world union’, a ‘world society’ or any other variant of these ‘megametaphors’ (to use Timothy Luke’s\textsuperscript{538} apt term), that we have today, or indeed, should aspire to build and further strengthen in the contemporary period. On the subject of the unfolding humanitarian crisis in Darfur, a vast proliferation of NGO papers, reports and recommendations was produced and formed some of the first and most immediate commentary as NGO workers could often get access denied to political actors. To consider a representative sample of this output, three of the major global human rights and global crisis NGOs, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and the International Crisis Group, produced heavily-cited reports on Darfur between 2003 and 2005 as follows.

Amnesty’s report from February 2004, ‘Darfur: Too Many People Killed for No Reason’\textsuperscript{539}, makes six references to the ‘international community’ (IC)\textsuperscript{540} and no characterisations of world comment, action or opinion under any other discursive formulation. Their July 2004

\begin{footnotes}
\item[	extsuperscript{536}] Linklater, A. (2007) \textit{Critical Theory and World Politics: Citizenship, Sovereignty and Humanity} p34
\item[	extsuperscript{537}] Ibid. p23
\item[	extsuperscript{540}] Hereafter ‘IC’ is often used as shorthand for ‘international community’.
\end{footnotes}
report, 'Sudan: At the Mercy of Killers: Destruction of Villages in Darfur'\textsuperscript{541} follows the same pattern, all three references using the same term. Their November 2004 paper, 'Sudan: Arming the Perpetrators of Grave Abuses in Darfur'\textsuperscript{542} likewise contains six international community references and no deviations from this formulation. Similarly, Human Rights Watch publications 'Darfur in Flames'\textsuperscript{543} and 'Empty Promises?'\textsuperscript{544} retain complete adherence to this pattern while their 'Darfur Destroyed'\textsuperscript{545} contains a single reference to 'world community' in a footnote along with five references to IC. Even more strikingly, the ICG produced five influential reports\textsuperscript{546} between July 2003 and March 2005 containing a total of ninety-eight uses of the IC characterisation with not a single deviation.

Many of the prominent political and IGO documents and speeches made upon the crisis reflect this same trend. The UN’s own ‘Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur’\textsuperscript{547} makes twenty-four IC references, three ‘world community’ references and uses no other formulations. Colin Powell’s statement to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee\textsuperscript{548} on September 9\textsuperscript{th} 2004 declaring that the conflict ought to be considered as genocide, exclusively relies on the IC formulation. Further examples, for instance from the


US House of Representatives and Senate debates on declarations of genocide might be noted along with many of the academic writings previous referred to, but this would only be to further labour the point.

The consistency and rigidity of this linguistic practice is somewhat startling, especially as noted above, given the vagueness of the notion of the ‘international community’, and even more so, given the variety of institutional locations and subject positions from which discoursing actors inflexibly mobilise this unwavering referent. As Nik Rose points out concerning the notions of civil society and community, “part of the attraction of these zones lies in their apparent naturalness: their non-political or pre-political status.” In stemming from a supposedly primordial basis of cross-cutting ties and sharing of values, the ‘community’ does not seem a construct of political machination, but acts as a politically neutral referent. The ‘natural’ construction of community (implicitly a consensual project) according to Rose “is not merely an ontological claim but implies affirmation, a positive evaluation.”

This attractiveness aside, those acts of speech and authorship where such rigidity is to be noted are fairly specific in the enunciative modality they embody. In this modality it is arguably of little surprise to find formulaic adherence to the part of the discourse (on practices of global opinion formation and decision making) which is dominant today. Looking back to the description of an enunciative modality given by Foucault helps to clarify the commonalities in these dominant discursive productions. It also suggests avenues for the investigation of other (rarer) parts of this field of discourse in the next section.

Foucault’s enunciative modality is constructed from the interrelation of the type of person speaking or author writing, their ‘institutional site’, and their subject position relative to systems of the transmission of knowledge and relative to other institutions and other subjects. In other words, in the aforementioned documents, our authors, their institutional

---


551 Ibid. p168
situations and their subject positions as discoursers are in many ways similar. All of the preceding documents are bureaucratic productions in some way, many will have been collaboratively written in the institutional context of ‘strategically neutral’ editorial/political rules of expression. The conveyance of apparently disinterested facts is crucial even to those documents where political advocacy is the primary purpose — a reasonable argument or condemnation, not an emotional appeal or vituperative denunciation, is what is sought. This is especially true given the nature of the documents themselves. Most are reports – designed to provide the factual information to convince a target audience of other bureaucrats – and this will inevitably shape the metaphorical choices made when addressing concerns to the arbitration of putative world authorities. In terms of the authorship and the subject position, which would seem to differ across UN, NGO and Governmental source production, it is perhaps instructive to remember that many NGO and IGO staff, along with foreign policy experts in national governments, have held previous employment in another part of the IC. In many ways, their interrelated subject positions taken as a collectivity, and also perhaps felt as lived-experience, construct a self-referential IC in a more meaningful way than their discourse, when digested by outsiders, can ever make specific.

In other words, (referring back to the notions outlined by UN staff in the final section of Chapter Four) the “concentric circles” of the bureaucratic community, where more commonality is experienced with other bureaucrats than with outsiders, would seem to be a domain of considerable homogeneity in terms of discourse produced and target audience expectations. Evidence for the effect of ‘groupthink’ which was also discussed by staff in Chapter Four would seem to be provided in the uniformity of discourse within the IC. The critique aired in the previous chapter of the difficulty of reform in entrenched bureaucracies rears its head again. The rigidity of discursive production we have encountered would seem to support Thomas Weiss’ lament that “analysts of international organizations have strayed away from paradigmatic rethinking. We have lost our appetite for big and idealistic plans because so many previous ones have failed.”

552 This is a tactic whereby the very essence of the efficient, disinterested bureaucratic body or department is cultivated for the purpose of gaining trust and political leverage. See Huber, G. (2007) The Craft of Bureaucratic Neutrality: Interests and Influence in Governmental Regulation of Occupational Safety ch1.
dream of the family of nations, we might argue that zest for new thinking has been lost because previous visions have proven too vague to understand or operationalise.

5.5 International Languages of Unity: Deviance from the Norm and the Place of Kinship in the Discursive Field

Describing the place within the discursive field of those enunciations of the global processes of opinion formation and decision-making which deviate from the IC norm, is now critical to the continuing investigation of the metaphorisation of politics and the functioning world core in terms of kinship. This interplay between dominant and less common forms of linguistic usage is what Foucault terms the pattern of “enunciative regularities” and he usefully notes that the regular and the imitative are just as active a part of discourse as the novel and the unusual. However, much as the dominant form we have just considered does active political work in describing and furthering a particular representation, it may be argued that in a discursive field so far weighted towards one dominant linguistic form (in the contemporary period) the choice to depart from it may reveal more specific political intentions of the discoursing subject than simply the repetitive neutrality of the IC formulation. Indeed the contextual situation of instances of the use of kinship metaphor would seem to suggest several types of statement where this linguistic choice may be made.

The IC formulation holds almost universal sway in fact-based reporting by IGOs, NGOs and political figures. Where however, in UN documentation, kinship metaphors are invoked, it is never in contexts where they are attached to technical detail, but instead to enunciate very general aims and principles. The UN Mission In Sudan (UNMIS) produced a Unified Mission Plan in 2005 as a comprehensive guide to the parameters of its work for peace and humanitarian assistance. The technical aspects of its work, and in particular relating to its liaisons with other named international or Sudanese bodies, were expressed with uniform IC references. However, at the very end of the document, aspirations for sustainable development in Sudan are tentatively outlined. In this context “the UN family has begun

554 Foucault, M. (1972) The Archaeology of Knowledge p145
work on several interrelated processes with the parties in support of sustainable development for the people of Sudan."556 Two markers of the use of kinship metaphor, which will be further explored, are pointed out in this instance. Firstly, very general principles are outlined in the final section of the UNMIS report — action on AIDS, economic governance, environmental sustainability, urban development, and so on. Secondly, the projects are future-oriented and highly aspirational with no fixed date for completion envisaged.

A third marker is also present, namely where the kinship metaphor is used as an expression of an emotional bond of human unity or as an expression of an emotional affront to that supposed unity. In the former instance, while much of the reporting of the Darfur crisis previously considered, deals with the statistics of ethnic cleansing in a fact-dependent style of advocacy which aims to be hard-hitting without recourse to necessarily emotional appealing, at points where the individual suffering of Darfurians is being conveyed to individual workers within the UN system, a more emotional style of communication is deployed. The UN Population Fund has undertaken some of the most emotionally-charged work in responding to the Darfur crisis and their training manual for the humanitarian prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse defines their mission as follows:

"Kind, caring, compassionate, civilized or charitable. Humanitarian aid is that assistance provided to populations in need due to disruption of their normal lives by natural factors (floods, drought, epidemics) or man made factors (war, genocide). The aid is meant to restore their dignity as human beings and demonstrate a sense of caring for them as part of the universal human family."

The technicalities of the work with victims of abuse is detailed in altogether more neutral tones but here, in making a definition of the role of the humanitarian worker, a combination of generality, aspiration and emotive content is brought together in the kinship metaphor. The notion of a process of re-incorporation of the oppressed into the welcoming arms of a human family — a notion that was initially taken up as a theme for the hoped-for moment of decolonisation at the founding of the UN — drives the emotive power of this instance of the

use of kinship metaphor. Incidentally, exactly the same formulation of re-incorporation (redolent of 1940s usage) was deployed by Tony Blair in a letter to EU heads of state in 2006. Blair wrote: "(W)e should urge the government of Sudan to rise to the challenge above (commitments to peace-making), make the right decisions to protect the people of Darfur, and put Sudan back in its rightful place at the heart of the family of nations." \(^{558}\) In the format of a personal letter, greater scope for the use of non-conventional linguistic usage, especially forms associated with great emotive impact, might be expected. In particular this applies to a political figure like Blair, infamous for frustrating his staff by his insistence on personally overseeing the writing of his speeches and statements\(^ {559}\).

By contrast, the metaphor is also emotionally invoked for the purpose of making emotive condemnations of the actions of groups, or especially states - notions of the trust, naturalness and unity of the international 'family' being betrayed by the actions of a few. This language of exclusion will be further investigated in the following chapter, but applied in Darfur case, a group of international lawyers, human-rights activists and writers convened by the Nobel Laureate Wole Soyinka, staged a mock trial of Omar El-Bashir in New York in 2006. Their damning verdict referred to Bashir's regime as a "deviant member of the family of nations"\(^ {560}\) and repeatedly invoked the notion of kinship to describe the duties of both African and international collectives in bringing the Sudanese state into line.

These three markers for the use of kinship discourse are not to be taken as predictive rules. That is to say that when these three markers are observed, it is not the case that a discoursing subject must rely on kinship metaphors. Rather when the conditions of the format or political purpose of the statements made are not demanding of such bureaucratic and fact-based regularity as to confine the writer to the hegemonic IC formulation, then alternative choices within the discourse may be made. Those statements that are of a general, aspirational and emotive order are often given greater emphasis by the positive connotations (as discussed in Chapter One) of the Western formulation of the kinship metaphor. Further, since kinship


\(^{559}\) See for instance the memoir of Blair's former chief of staff - Powell, J. (2008) Great Hatred, Little Room: Making Peace In Northern Ireland

relations (as defined in Western political thought) are often held out as an idealised behavioural model, the kinship metaphor in politics can be employed either to praise the actions of the international collective (acting like a family) or, as in the verdict of the Soyinka Tribunal above, to demand that the international collective face up to its responsibilities and do more to act like a family. As an example of the former, in the debates following in the wake of the UNSC mission to Darfur in 2006, the following comments reported in the minutes of the 5462nd Meeting of the Security Council, were made by the British representative, Sir Emyr Jones Parry. Herein, the kinship metaphor is used to lend praise to the food aid efforts of the UN, in the face of the difficulties caused by the incomplete and rushed Darfur Peace Accord which it had belatedly championed to much derision.

"He had heard many interlocutors describe what was wrong with the accord. It was not perfect, but it was the only agreement there was, and in the mission's (AMIS) view it should be implemented robustly. He encouraged those who had not joined the agreement to do so as soon as possible. In support of the accord, the UN family, particularly the World Food Programme (WFP), now had the largest food support operation in the world."\(^{561}\)

These characteristic markers of generality, open-ended aspiration (as opposed to detailed future-oriented planning) and emotionality, accord with the analysis of speaking of the world as family that was presented in Part One to help to explain what 'work' kinship metaphors are employed to 'do'. There is a critical gap, as will be fully elaborated over the course of the coming chapters, between what international discourses intend to do/mean with kinship metaphors, and the political effects that actually get played out. In short, and much in keeping with the observations of the UN staff in Chapter Four, kinship metaphors are attractive ideas, but not necessarily effective discursive tools.

At this stage, preliminary conclusions can be drawn about the work of kinship as a metaphor from the pattern of discourse noted above. Beer and de Landtscheer present an admirable catalogue of the potential reasons for deploying metaphor in political rhetoric. Particularly relevant to the present inquiry, they note that "(P)olitical leaders use metaphors as keys to

citizens’ sentiments, that is, by tying together a political reality (unity) with a commonly accepted positive valuation based on understandings of the positive meaning of kinship, politicians show support for their audience’s own value systems. In particular, metaphorising world politics as kinship is an especially powerful ploy as regards some of the principle uses for metaphor in international relations. Many scholars have noted that the structures of metaphorical deployment within languages suggest that among the deepest rooted metaphors are those deriving from the common human experience of embodiment. The most commonly cited ‘root’ or earliest metaphors are thus those derived from our spatial experience of our bodies within the world. As Lakoff and Johnson note: “the structure of our spatial concepts emerges from our constant spatial experience...concepts that emerge in this way are concepts that we live by in the most fundamental way.” These concepts include “up-down, in-out, front-back, light-dark, warm-cold, male-female.” Using the family as metaphor is widely seen to be a primordial metaphorical trait of the next remove.

Lakoff and Johnson argue that two of the most prototypical conceptualisations of change and causation in human expression “emerge naturally from as fundamental a human experience as there is, namely, birth.” Again, it is our embodied experience that presents us with a visual field which contains us, presenting us with the primordial concepts of ‘containers’ and ‘objects.’ The transformation of these two ideas represents the metaphorical extensions of causation, and is united, according to Lakoff and Johnson, in birth. “In birth, an object (the baby) comes out of a container (the mother). At the same time, the mother’s substance (her flesh and blood) is in the baby (the container object). The experience of birth...provides the grounding for the general concept of creation, which has as its core the concept of making a physical object but which extends to abstract entities as well.” Processes of conceptualising

565 Ibid. p57.
566 Ibid. p74
567 Ibid. p30/1 and 73. Lakoff and Johnson show how conceptualisations of change and making involve the transformation of these two concepts. Either the object comes out of the container/substance, or the substance/container goes into or makes up the object.
568 Ibid. p74.
such fundamental ontological bedrocks as creation and change may be argued to have roots in the embodied biological processes of living. Kinship, the creation of new persons and relations, is the primordial model for change in the processes of life. Similarly, Rigney reminds us that "(A)mong the most ancient of biological metaphors are those that depict social phenomena in the language of kinship and reproduction. Indeed, the earliest known written records, the ancient cuneiform texts of the Sumerians of Mesopotamia dating from the third millennium B.C.E., contain hymns and mythic tales that picture the social process of harvesting and storing grain as a metaphorical ‘marriage’ of the god of fertility to the goddess of the storehouse."\(^{569}\)

Part of the positive aura of the metaphorising of global efforts in humanitarian actions in terms of kinship (lent a specific niche in the discursive field by the three markers identified), is due to the idealised notion of kinship as a sphere of nurturing emotional bonds and common substance. Such an aura is given added weight by the Western construction of kinship as the social opposite to political life, wherein the breakdowns of respect for human rights and dignity apparently occur. Despite the fact that kinship metaphors are supposedly employed to “foster a feeling of connection”\(^{570}\) among the implied familial in-group, there are clear negative effects to this discursive tactic.

To think once more of the statement made by Jones Parry: in the context of the values of the international community being threatened by a failure to live up to stated ideals befitting a ‘family’, the reassertion of this image potentially works in two ways. Firstly, the image is supposed to re-motivate the community to act in the caring way fitting of the notion of family relations. Secondly, following Beer and de Landscheer’s argument, “(O)ne of the major functions of metaphors can be to reassure the audience. Metaphors may suggest that political issues are simple: they simplify complex situations and thereby give the audience a sense of confidence.”\(^{571}\) This effect is doubled in the case of kinship wherein, the reassuring effect is not only derived from the process of simplification but from the unequivocal positivity of valuations attached to ideas of caring, nurturing kinship. A double deception.


\(^{571}\) Ibid. p29
occurs when this language is used; politics is presented as simply a matter of acting like a family to solve political problems. In fact, one might motivate practical action better by addressing political problems by acting like politicians and recognising the complexity of issues at stake. Rather than motivate here, the rhetoric merely betrays the gap exposed earlier between high rhetoric to hide behind and inability to address the situation.

This stagnation of debate which spins its wheels in reasserting comforting but a-temporal ideals, is heightened when politics attempts to solve crisis moments by striving at unrealistic universal values like human kinship. As Zarefsky argues, labelling an event a crisis “creates pressure for consensus in support of whatever measures leaders advance as an appropriate response...it shifts the rhetorical landscape...it discourages deliberation itself.”572 Allied to this tendency towards rigidity in debate, attempts to address crises by reasserting the notion of the world as a united family and relying on tropes associated with the unchallengeable discourses of the grand UN founding documents, transforms the debate from one where multiple positions may be legitimately defended to one where disagreement with the orthodoxy is seen as negatively deviant573. Two factors then block kinship discourse from meshing with the actual particularity of contemporary problems. Due to the universalism of such discourse, its lack of specificity and over-generality is difficult to challenge. Secondly the effect of ‘crisis assertion’ is to rally consensus behind leading rhetoric, in this case the unchallengeable assertion that greater human kinship is required.

A further set of observations on the locus of kinship within discourses of common human purpose are worked through in further examples of languages of exclusion in the next chapter. Firstly, however, a discussion is presented of the interface between the international sphere which claims sovereign rights of decision-making in such cases of humanitarian intervention, and the aspirations of Sudanese parties, both in terms of the languages of

573 Ibid. p128. Zarefsky refers to the neat analysis of US Presidential elections by Donald Stokes and John Dilulio for guidance here. Stokes and Dilulio coin the terms ‘position issue’ where many legitimate positions may be occupied, and ‘valence issue’ where difference is seen as ‘beyond the pale’ deviance. For instance, law and order can be turned into an election ‘valence issue’ wherein any neglect of this topic can be portrayed as social irresponsibility and weakness in the face of crime. For further examples see Stokes, D. and Dilulio, J (1993) ‘The Setting: Valence Politics in Modern Elections’ in Nelson, M, (ed.) The Elections of 1992 p1-20.

189
resistance of Sudanese authorities to intervention, and the hopes of the Sudanese rebels of engagement with international aid.

5.6 Sudanese Languages of Self-Situation

These markers (generality, aspiration, emotionality) of discourse use notwithstanding, the patterns of linguistic choices we have noted rely implicitly upon a shared subject position, that of feeling oneself to be a part of the international community or inside the putative boundaries of the family of nations. These conceptual boundaries shift depending on the focus of any given debate on the duties and responsibilities of the community. The use of discourse in the above cases constitute the Sudanese Government as having lost its rights of membership or identity due to reprehensible actions – proving itself to be different. They also constitute Darfurians as exterior to the community in order that the community can come to their aid.

It is perhaps scarcely surprising to find the Sudanese government commenting on the crisis in sharply divergent ways from many other UN members. During the debates after UNSC Resolution 1556.requested immediate janjaweed disarmament, the GoS representative constituted his government explicitly as exterior, being targeted by the UN (and the US) unfairly:

"Would the Sudan have been safe from the Council even if there was no crisis in Darfur? Was the crisis a Trojan Horse? The Government was fully aware that some activists in the United States administration had worked to foster the rebellion. It had sound recordings of talks between rebel leaders and United States officials."

The attachment of discourse on the crisis to notions of neo-imperialism, by virtue of cherry-picking elements from discourse surrounding the United States' War on Terror, has been prevalent not only in the GoS defence of its own policies in the face of UN pressure, but also in statements made by the rebel movements themselves. As one member of the JEM's Legislative Council writes: "(T)he United States of America has been carrying the banner of

---

indicting JEM as an Islamic Movement without full scrutiny of JEM manifesto. Last year, the USA concluded economic sanctions against JEM president Dr Khalil Ibrahim Mohamed for no reason other than to prove to the international community that it is even-handed with its sanctions...The US' negative image of JEM emanates from a false Islamic phobia that has stricken the US leadership since the target attack of September 11. Certainly the JEM in particular received bad press in the US. Time magazine described the JEM as “a fiercely Islamic organisation said to be led by Hassan al-Turabi” whose overall goal was “the presidential palace in Khartoum and a stridently Islamic Sudan”. Turabi was commonly portrayed in US literary and political circles as being a close adherent to the philosophies of Al-Qaeda, sharing their “vision of a worldwide struggle to establish a pure Caliphate”. As noted in section 5.3, the peril of essentialising the crisis in the context of a time-period dominated by discourse generated by the War on Terror, germinated the theoretical seeds present within even the liberal ‘R2P’ discourse, (or notions of re-incorporation into the family of nations) causing the latter to potentially appear a neo-imperialistic project.

Statements of policy by the Darfuri rebel JEM and SLM/A are almost wholly focused on intra-Sudanese solutions to the marginalisation of Darfur and other parts of the Sudanese periphery. However, a certain level of opting into hegemonic discourse for the purpose of garnering international attention is noticeable in two contexts. Firstly, statements of policy made prior to the realisation that international agreement on aid to Darfur was unlikely to be quickly and simply acquired. These early appeals to the international community ran up against the same failure to motivate action or bring about consensus that alarmed Western commentators. Secondly, statements made at time when representatives of the JEM or SLM/A were engaged directly in talks with international parties.

As an example of the former, the SLM/A’s ‘Political Declaration’ of Spring 2003 pledges to “seek friendly relationships with the international community” and in return “appeal(s) to the international community to assist the people of Darfur with humanitarain relief to address

and ameliorate the serious and deteriorating humanitarian situation in the region."\(^{579}\) This initial appeal is not tempered by any expectations that it will fall on deaf ears; it is likely that early discussions with NGO operatives in the region led the rebel groups to expect that their cause would find enough international backing to exceed the tipping point required for concerted action. By contrast, and somewhat chastened by the lack of international support for their cause throughout 2003 and 2004 as shown above, the JEM’s 2005 manifesto paper ‘A Proposal for Change: towards a Sudan of Justice and Equality’ seeks Sudanese solutions to Sudanese problems and makes absolutely no mention of international actors or outside aid, other than the guarded (and implicitly defensive) proposal for the “institution of friendly relations with the outside world \textit{guided by principles of mutual respect}."\(^{580}\) Further to this note of suspicion of outside interference, the statement proposes that “(T)he National Army must be renamed to reflect its sole and primary role of protecting the country against outside intervention. Hence it should be renamed ‘Sudan Defence Forces’.”\(^{581}\) By contrast when the JEM were participating in the Oslo Donors’ Conference, again in 2005, the IC discourse was once more to the fore with the opening of their statements including an “appeal to the international community to assume its responsibility and work jointly with us for the reconstruction of Darfur.”\(^{582}\)

The patterning of linguistic choices is marked by the co-opting of hegemonic forms when the rebel groups wish to engage outside assistance. It is perhaps not surprising that it is the dominant IC formulation that is transmitted to those seeking to communicate in languages and political fora alien to them. As regards kinship metaphors, formulations emotively expressing outrage or solidarity are to be found but aspirational formulations of idealised kinship extending into a Utopian future are not to be found. What kinship formulations do exist to express in-group solidarity take not the idealised ‘family’ form, but the idea of brotherhood as its touchstone. For instance, the SLM/A condemned the divide and rule policies of Khartoum in this way: “(T)he monopolization of power and wealth led to the


\(^{581}\) Ibid. p7

institutionalization of the hegemonic policies of riverain Sudan’s dominating establishment. These were entrenched through the fuelling of ethnic and tribal wars, with the governments in Khartoum providing military assistance to some Arab tribes and organizations to fight against their non-Arab brethren, with whom they have peacefully co-existed for centuries.583 The Darfurian unity suggested in this passage is reinforced later by the recognition by the SLM/A that “Arab tribes and groups are an integral and indivisible part of Darfur’s social fabric who have been equally marginalized.”584

The notion of a Sudanese brotherhood as a community committed to non-violence within its bounds requires some explanation. It is both a discourse of equality and exclusion. Firstly, we need to look at the pronouncements of the rebels as they speak as Darfurians, not just as Sudanese or Muslims. Ladislav Holy’s classic study of the Berti of Darfur notes that the traditional recommendation for the choice of spouses in Darfur was overwhelmingly in favour of the marriage of the children of two brothers. Being a patrilineal society where justice and compensation for interlineage wrong-doing involves obligations for kin to support blood feuds585 against out-groups, the reason given for marrying the children of two brothers would be that the new spouses would be of the same lineage and therefore any quarrels between them could not spiral upwards into inter-lineage feuding586. In other words, brotherhood was the nucleus and symbol of a kinship system that was (internally at least) a non-violence community. Internal differences would be resolved without violence or divisive compensation claims587, but the community also embodied a group obliged to defend its own rights from outside interference.

As a symbol, the notion of brotherhood employed here (and more widely, it may be argued) carries different connotation than the notion of family. As Vrushali Patil claims, the connotations of family with the hierarchy of parents and children, has lent this formulation

584 Ibid. p3
585 This characteristic also applies in similar ways to other Sudanese groups such as the Nuer or Dinka. See for instance Evans-Pritchard, E. (1940) The Nuer: A Description of the Modes of Livelihood and Political Institutions of a Nilotic People. Deng, F. (1978) Africans of Two Worlds: The Dinka in Afro-Arab Sudan or Hutchinson, S. (1996) Nuer Dilemmas: Coping with Money, War and the State
587 Ibid. p130. The paternal kin or agregane group would resolve differences between members simply by treating the crime as a ‘sin’ and making communal offerings to reset moral equilibrium within the group.
especially to use in colonialist discourse. Studying debates in the General Assembly from 1946-60, Patil argues that the “colonialist powers and sympathisers largely resort to the kinship politics of paternal rule...the purpose of which is to teach and guide childlike, underdeveloped peoples.”\(^{588}\) Anticolonial speakers in the GA, especially from the developing world resented such ‘infantilization’. As Patil notes, “(R)ather than international relations being modelled on the image of parents and children...anti-colonialists argue that they should instead be modelled on the image of brotherhood.”\(^{589}\) Thus their discourse draws on the implicit equality of brothers as an alternative image of international politics. A relationship may be discerned between Sudanese cultural models of brotherhood as a non-violence community of equals and the choices made by anti-colonial speakers in the UN to demand a move towards international brotherhood as a more equal mode of international relations between the global North and South.

Secondly, this appeal from the Darfurians is directed in itself to the ears of President Bashir’s own clique, the ‘Muslim Brothers of Sudan’. Male-centred metaphors of ‘brotherhood’ and ‘brethren’ abound within both sides of the Sudanese conflict, offer some glimpse into the pervasive andro-centricity of the culture and the dominance of the public sphere by men. As Michelle Rosaldo argued, many of the anthropological examples of very gender-egalitarian societies are marked by loose separation between domestic and public spheres of life, a mixture of male and female responsibilities in each of those spheres and the existence of similarly developed networks of association in the public sphere for both men and women.\(^{590}\) Such equality is not represented in terms of the leadership of either the rebel movements or the high echelons of Sudanese government. Though we have noted the adoption of discourses of brotherhood in anti-colonial rhetoric from speakers from the global South in UN debates, the gender insensitivity has led to this discourse being largely dispensed with in the global North. Thus far in the case studies, no examples of this idiom from Northern sources have been presented other than in the 1948 Declaration of Human Rights. The


\(^{589}\) Ibid. p.4.

UNIHP comments that this language “would now be avoided as insensitive to the role of women.”591

This is not to make an essentialising indictment of Sudanese or Islamic or Global South society but merely to note that where a dominance of languages of brotherhood is indicated in any culture, this may reflect internal inequality. Using the example of revitalisation of the fraternal form of organisation in nineteenth century America, Mary Clawson argues that societies with powerful fraternal organisational cultures reflect underlying patriarchal dominance. She notes the “overwhelming popularity”592 of organisations such as the Knights of Labor, the largest union society of its time. Such societies “articulated a vision of unity and brotherhood among men of disparate social statuses.”593 Fraternalism, she argues, set up a network of channels for the distribution of social resources - power, capital, political favour - with which women could not compete. “In its use of kin-based imagery”, Clawson notes, “fraternalism invoked the moral community of the family.”594 However, the exclusivity of the fraternal organisations was a reinforcing agent of the male-dominance of the era. Fraternalism allied male-dominance with socially-oriented morals without having to derive those morals from the traditionally feminine family sphere. The ‘moral family’ could be male-only.

‘Brotherhood’ though for the rebels and the Khartoum Islamists may have multiple referents and meanings and vast pan-Islamic generalisations are not helpful. The West is used to conceiving of Muslim notions of ‘brotherhood’ as linked closely to Qutbist radicalism, as a warlike community of men bringing jihad to outsiders. However, Barbara Zollner charts in a biography of Hasan al-Hudaybi, second leader of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, that an important strain of Islamist thinking has rejected such philosophy. Hudabyi stressed that his thought for the purposes of the Brotherhood turned on a particular interpretation of the Qu’ran (4:59) which states that “if you differ in anything among yourselves, refer it to Allah.”595 While Qutbists used this to justify resistance to any secularism, Hudaybi believed

593 Ibid. p6
594 Ibid. p212
that "submission to the divine is the guiding principle" and that one need not follow the worldly leadership of an Islamic state if that state was sinful. Hudaybi "explicitly directs his words against the focus of (radical) Islamist interpretations, which argues that it is essential for the believer to actively engage in the establishment of an Islamic political system in order to remain part of the community of Muslims."\textsuperscript{596} He obliged his followers to show patience (sabr) and exercise peaceful opposition to outsiders, noting that "a Muslim who violates this obligation is a sinner (fasiq)."\textsuperscript{597}

Considering the military milieux in which rebel documents are produced, as well as the paternalism of Islam which is certainly more explicit than the largely implicit paternalism of contemporary Western (Christian) discourse, we see again the multiple possibilities of meaning inherent in kinship metaphorisation. As against Schmittian claims, we see that such language (in the Islamist case) may be turned violently against out-groups by unifying equals, but has the potential to resist that apocalyptic outcome. Seeds of ambivalence exist within purely Darfurian modes of meaning. As we saw earlier, the brotherhood may be the community which is enlisted in feuds, but also, as Holy shows, the kin group for the Darfurian Berti at least, is largely permeable. He notes that examples of kin groups accepting new members, and thus 'creating' new kin, are commonplace. Once a person participates in 'kin' obligations (especially helping with the group's diya or compensation payments to another lineage) in a village he has just moved to, he may be considered kin.\textsuperscript{598} Holy remarks, "(W)ithin maximal lineages the awareness of genealogical ties is vague."\textsuperscript{599} Thus "(A)n unrelated individual who lives with a group of people begins after a certain time to be considered their kinsman on the basis of his fulfilment of certain duties."\textsuperscript{600}

In sum, we see patterns whereby firstly, attempts to use kinship discourse in Western enunciative modalities are often imitated by those who sought to appeal to the outside world for aid in the Darfur crisis. An unbalanced discursive field, dominated by a hegemonic

\textsuperscript{596} Zollner, B. (2009) The Muslim Brotherhood: Hasan al-Hudaybi and Ideology p144
\textsuperscript{597} Ibid. p140
\textsuperscript{598} Perhaps confusing to Westerners, this is based upon not giving overwhelming precedence to 'biological realities' as the West does. The Berti and many other societies derive notions of kinship from locality, performance of obligations, giving of care and education and many other markers, along with notions of 'blood' ties.
\textsuperscript{600} Ibid. p170
formulation of a putative international community was taken up by rebel groups and the Sudanese representatives to the UN to engage in attempts to influence global opinion. However, both Sudanese parties stretched the boundaries of discourse on the crisis, incorporating statements from the internationally-agreed discourse on humanitarian intervention into other discourses. Elements of the intervention discourse were melded into resistance discourse in the context of the war on terror presented as a crusade against Islam. Here, the notions of idealistic collectivity expressed through kinship were switched from family motifs to notions of brotherhood within deeply Islamic organisations also most likely informed by Darfuri cultural kinship symbolism. Brotherhood here on the one hand means male-exclusivity, but on the other hand is a powerful resistance discourse. Not only with inspirational organisations like the Muslim Brotherhood, but, as Patil shows, even among UN delegates from the global South, brotherhood is a language of equality which resists the UN and its Western founders' notions of a patriarchal family of nations which implicitly infantilises the Southern ‘children’ of the world. Freud, speaking of Darwin's notion of a primal horde, imagines brotherhood similarly as a resistance to tyranny. He pictures a “violent and jealous father who keeps all the females for himself and drives way his sons as they grow up” eventually facing a destructive uprising from a band of brothers “composed of members with equal rights.”

On this basis, several preliminary conclusions can be summarised from the inquiry thus far. Firstly, purportedly universal, emotive ideals were felt to be essential to the success of the UN project of remaking the world. These decisions were taken by small political circles, largely within the American political and literary establishment. Secondly, such discourses, especially metaphors which liken global politics to kinship, are used much less in contemporary discourse than in the early history of the UN-era. Thirdly, UN staff attest to the vagueness and irrelevance of such ideals in practical UN work. However, they acknowledge a tie to the spirit of such discourses, though sometimes feel uneasy about their colonial, Western, sentimental and religious overtones. Fourthly, in spite of this, such discourses persist in the UN's own rhetoric and that of political speakers. Their attraction lies in their flexibility and their capacity to reassure, which is rooted in the unequivocally positive valuation placed, in Western social thought, upon the notion of kinship as used in this type of discourse. Fifthly,

---

the purposes and positions which these kinship formulations occupy are quite specific. They are marked by their generality, aspirational-nature and emotive character in envisioning world politics. The flexibility of kinship as a symbol enables Western forms of discourse to be used by non-Westerners, but also, non-Westerners may fall back upon the notion of brotherhood to fight for equality in world-kin relations, as opposed to quasi-colonial parent/child rhetorical formulations.

The interface between the Islamic world and the Western dominated 'international community', in the context of the isolation of political prisoners of the war on terror is now the focus of the following chapter in order to explore the outward facing uses of kinship as a mode of discussing exclusion, rejection and reforming those outside the collective. The tasks to be taken up in the succeeding chapters will be defined by the need to sharpen the markers for the positioning of Western kinship discourse elaborated in this chapter. Further, based on the finding of the Darfur and War on Terror case studies taken together, a full categorisation of the 'work' of kinship discourses can be drawn up. In particular, how does kinship work for purposes of exclusion as well as inclusion? How much more effective is it as a discursive trait than hegemonic formulations, or how much more dangerous and incendiary might it be? And, overlaid onto these questions, how might these analyses of kinship as a principle of distinction enable us to rethink Schmittian perspectives on decisionism in world politics?
CHAPTER SIX - Case Study Two: The War on Terror

6.1 The Double-Edge of Kinship

The Darfur crisis, in common with much of the historical trajectory of humanitarian interventions of the late twentieth century, turns (in discourse at least) on a central schematic representation of the international political arena in which the functioning core is compelled by the putative bonds of human commonality to reach out to a persecuted group. These representations, employing images of the family of nations and the building of a stronger and wider international community, are the incarnation of a liberal, Rortyan view of the purposes of democratic politics. As Rorty argues, "(T)he goal of this manipulation of sentiment is to expand the reference of the terms ‘our kind of people’ and ‘people like us’." The liberal, ‘pastoral’ mode of kinship discourse as we have seen, can be employed to mobilise support for such humanitarian projects of re-integration of the oppressed into the protective embrace of the human family.

The third critical party in such a schema is those deemed by international powers to be conducting whatever oppressive policies are seen to have severed a part of the human community from the notional core. In addressing this third party, even in cases like Darfur where the central action is one of humanitarian re-incorporation, the kinship metaphor may be put to use to condemn those who have ‘failed’ to act as befits ‘true’ members of the family of nations. An example from the aforementioned ‘Judgement on Genocide’ tribunal serves to illustrate the power and vehemence of kinship metaphors in such contexts and reinforces once more the three markers of generality, aspiration for change and emotionality highlighted previously:

---

"When a member of a family misbehaves, it is the duty of other family members to bring the miscreant into line. The Arab family has steadfastly refused to call Sudan to order. It has failed to call for Bashir's judgment for mass murder under the sacred laws of Islam. Indeed it has placed obstacles in the way of sanctions and his generally refused to allow stories and statements critical of Sudan to appear in its press. Nor has the African family, represented by the African Union, taken a seriously critical stance.

The United Nations has not been much more forthright or forceful. It has passed many resolutions with high-sounding words, but has failed to enforce them. When a deviant member of the family of nations flouts, indeed revels in the abandonment of the most basic norms of human decency, is there really justification in evoking the excuse that protocol requires the permission of that same arrogant and defiant entity to accept U.N. peacekeepers in its territory? When that family of nations, in its majesty assembled, declares its responsibility to protect citizens of any country whose human rights are being violated, can it consider its responsibility a serious matter if it requires the consent of the violator to stop the crimes?"^603

At the perceived margins of the functioning core of international society, three sets of practices and discourses then are apparent. Firstly, there are discourses of humanitarian reincorporation of those who have fallen outside of the normal protection of the community. Secondly, there are condemnations and attempts to punish or reform those whose miscreant actions have (temporarily) placed them in a position outside the community as objects of criticism or ostracism. Their status as temporary non-members of the consensus group places their rights in jeopardy until they have reformed in some way. These two sets of practices and discourses have been evident in the preceding treatment of the Darfur crisis. The second 'condemnatory' set of discourses gives way at certain points to discourses of pure exclusion; in essence, treatments of those parties in the international sphere who are deemed to be irredeemably beyond the pale in terms of boundaries of the value community of the human family. This second set of discourses locks into debates on, and practices of, international regime change. The third set of discourses however, has been mobilised when groups are judged as having committed actions so antithetical to, or posed such a threat to, the values and stability of the liberal international regime, that they must be securely confined, punished and may have fundamental rights denied to them. To explore further the terrain that bridges between the second and third of our sets of discourses at the margins of the functioning core, this chapter presents a consideration of the debates surrounding the international outrages and terrorist actions of the Global War on Terror and in particular, the exceptional practices.

of the United States in confining, abusing and torturing ‘unlawful combatants’ in Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib.

Similarly to the preceding case study, the object of the following investigation is a mapping of the discursive field in debates surrounding the prosecution of the War on Terror and the treatment of captives in the Guantánamo and Abu Ghraib affairs. Further, an account of the usage of kinship metaphors in this arena of exclusionary politics is presented. While politics at the margins of the functioning core may be inclusionary and exclusionary vis-à-vis the maintenance and adjustment of the boundaries of that core within discourse, this chapter will detail how the usage of kinship metaphors to include and to exclude form complementary, but not symmetrical patterns. Further light then, can be shed here upon the character of the notions of kinship as applied to world politics in comparing its positive (inclusionary) and negative (exclusionary) usage patterns.

Just as has been suggested throughout, the inherent flexibility of kinship as a cognitive tool for thinking about difference and identity leads to greater flexibility in policy options and the glossing of potentially incendiary cases of apparent ‘exclusion’, than decisionist theorists such as Agamben and Schmitt might suggest. This insight provides a helpful addition to recent critiques of applications of Schmitt to Guantánamo. Constructions of ‘we/they’ groupings by discourses of inclusion and exclusion are, I argue, much more contingent than Schmittian theory would suppose. In the final section of this chapter, I tie together the patterns of discourse noted in the Darfur and War on Terror case studies to outline what these examples suggest as to the overall potentialities of world kinship discourse in political debates in the contemporary period.

My argument is that Schmitt’s critique of liberalism and its tendency to universalise and moralise politics is indeed highly valuable. World politics indeed has a great deal to fear from such propensities, and world kinship discourse plays an important role as a prime instrument of such trajectories of framing politics. However, the practice of analysing discourse illuminates a reason for correcting some of Schmitt’s pessimism. Bringing into play discourses of idealised human unity is a moment both of ‘the political’ in a Schmittian sense of enacting a decision, and also a moment within a continuous stream of the practice of

---

politics. This duality is the result of the fact that although human unity discourses purport to make a decision upon the content of the in-group, no effectual mode of realising such discourses, in the moment of speaking, exists. Thus, rather than a one-way process whereby the speaker describes, and can effect, a decision upon the content of the international in-group, a two-way (or more) process occurs. In fact, the statement of the content of the international in-group is used instead politically (though not in a Schmittian sense) as part of an international dialogue that is, by its nature, unresolved and undecided. It is employed as a moral badge of honour, or a mode of attempting to induce shame and a change in conduct. Though possession traits of the 'decision', as we have seen from the beginning, such discourses exist in the register of the aspiration, the hope, and the dream. In this way, they are incomplete proposals at the same time as appearing to be decisions; it is in this sense that they are open for response in international political dialogue. Fuller implications of this insight will be developed as the terrain of discourse in the case of the War on Terror is laid out. First however, the purported linkages between Schmitt and the exclusionary politics practiced in the War on Terror require examination.

6.2 Legal Exception, Rights, and the Person: the Case of Guantánamo

Liberal and institutionalist critiques, of the detainment of 'unlawful combatants' at Guantánamo not to mention the of War on Terror in general, commonly frame their attacks by representing the Bush Administration's aggressive pursuits of global or national 'security' as the breaking waves of a new and dangerous tide of national sovereign unilateralism. Guantánamo has been, as Magnus Fiskesjö puts it, "a rift through which we can already see the sharp shadow of imperial sovereignty." Implicit in such critiques is a fear of the potential arbitrariness of sovereign power and the absence of the checks, balances and reasoned agreement of institutional modes of governance. In this case, the manifestation of these concerns came in the expansion of the powers of an American executive branch often judged to have Manichean, preconfigured notions of international threats and security.

---

605 Fiskesjö, M. (2003) The Thanksgiving Turkey Pardon, the Death of Teddy's Bear and the Sovereign Exception of Guantánamo p60
Indeed, given the design of the US Constitution specifically to enact the most carefully balanced separation of powers conceived in Western government up to the point of its signing, the tension between a democratic nomos and the state of exception is perhaps the most obvious in the American case. The following passage from Agamben’s *State of Exception* sums up the foundational concerns of the Constitution to institute both effective representative democracy and overriding executive power for times of crisis, but also to make these two branches ever dependent upon each other and ever in a productive state of tension.

“The place — both logical and pragmatic — of a theory of the state of exception in the American constitution is in the dialectic between the powers of the President and those of Congress... The textual basis of the conflict lies first of all in Article 1 of the constitution which establishes that ‘[i]f the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it’ but does not specify which authority has the jurisdiction to decide on the suspension... The second point of conflict lies in the relation between another passage of Article 1 (which declares that the power to declare war and to raise and support the army and navy rests with Congress) and Article 2, which states that ‘[i]f the President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States.’

As Agamben and others have argued, the state of exception is a paradigm or technique of government, invoked in times when the normative legal structure is under dire threat and only sovereign control is deemed sufficiently potent to address such a challenge. Following the notion that the War on Terror might be a misconceived project which can never be brought to successful conclusion (especially by the application of military force), some of the greatest concerns about detention at Guantánamo and civil liberty restrictions placed on citizens as part of a drive for greater anti-terror security, have been centred around the potential permanence of the state of exception in such a conflict. As Rens van Munster points out, US discourses of emergency in the War on Terror have modified expected notions of how dire a threat must be for a state of exception to be invoked. The changes in discourse might be summed up as “a move from defence to prevention, or from (addressing)
danger to risk.” In other words the threshold for determining national emergency is being lowered to a point where the historical distinction between peace and war is replaced by a permanent state of exception due to the view that threats are multivalent and amorphous. In illustration of this move, the National Security Strategy of 2002 promulgates adapting “the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of today’s adversaries” and declares that “(T)o forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act pre-emptively.”

Critiques of Guantánamo note the seemingly deliberate attempt to place prisoners (potentially linked to Al-Qaeda or the Taliban, though the Bush Administration has deemed it unnecessary to prove this openly) beyond the rule of national or international law; in Lord Steyn’s words, they have been placed in a “legal black hole.” Initially confined without even the right to invoke the writ of habeas corpus, Agamben argues that Guantánamo produces a “legally unnamable and unclassifiable being”. He continues: “(N)ot only do the Taliban captured in Afghanistan not enjoy status as POWs as defined by the Geneva Convention, they do not even have the status of persons charged with a crime according to American laws. Neither prisoners nor persons accused, but simply ‘detainees’, they are the object of a pure de facto rule, of a detention that is indefinite, not only in the temporal sense but in its very nature as well, since it is entirely removed from the law and from judicial oversight.” As a comparative measure of the exceptional nature of this detention, Steyn notes that an equivalent practice of deliberately placing persons outside the jurisdiction both of national and international courts and thereby denying a right to habeas corpus, has been illegal in English Law since 1679.

---

609 van Munster, R. (2004) ’The War on Terrorism: When the Exception Becomes the Rule’ in International Journal for the Semiotics of Law 17, p141
Notwithstanding independent reports by the International Committee of the Red Cross\textsuperscript{614} of systematic abuse of detainees at Guantánamo, members of the Bush Administration were at pains to defend the camp in principle as well as the more specific details of its practices of detainment and interrogation. Much turns on the notion of revising the notion of ‘war’ to bypass the restrictions of the Geneva Conventions and to increase the purview of executive power, prosecuting efforts against terrorism as ‘war’ rather than as the punishment of the crime of terrorist attacks. John Yoo, a Justice Department official, caught up in accusations over the ‘Torture Papers’\textsuperscript{615}, unconvincingly rationalises such a determination as follows: “(W)ere the attacks (World Trade Centre and Pentagon) organized and systematic enough to be considered ‘armed conflict’? The gravity and scale of September 11 surely crosses that threshold...Although it may seem circular, one way to know if the line between crime and war has been crossed is simply to note whether nations must turn to a military response.”\textsuperscript{616}

The justification above certainly would seem to have more than a hint of tautology about it. While advocating the need for “adapting the rules of war to provide a new framework to address the new enemies of the twenty-first century\textsuperscript{617}”, the process of adaption seems lopsided. US prosecution of ‘war’ entitles greater executive power and the restriction of information from domestic and international review. However, given the unorthodox tactics and formation of the terrorist organisations supposedly conducting systematic campaigning against the US, they are denied the rights to POW status. The overall formulation sets up the US as conducting a ‘war’ against a diffuse enemy which does not bear the hallmarks of a war-making power. Further, to quote President Bush: “(O)n September the 11th, enemies of freedom committed an act of war against our country”\textsuperscript{618}, but those enemies are deemed to be “violating every law of war”\textsuperscript{619} and therefore not actually prosecuting ‘war’ in a way that would guarantee them prisoners’ rights.


\textsuperscript{615} See Greenberg, K. and Dratel, J. (2005) The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib

\textsuperscript{616} Yoo, J. (2006) War By Other Means: An Insider’s Account of the War on Terror p9/10

\textsuperscript{617} Ibid. p17


\textsuperscript{619} Yoo, J. (2006) War By Other Means: An Insider’s Account of the War on Terror p17.
While the apparent opportunism of such formulations and the legal blackout extending over
detainees of disputed legal status has riled critics, the diverse mass of opprobrium cannot be
taken as a fully sound basis for considering the legal, let alone the rhetorical discourse
surrounding Guantánamo. Conservative authors such as Yoo make much of the intensive
legal work done to make certain, for instance, that no domestic or international body could
legally demand Geneva Convention protection, or rights to legal counsel, for detainees in the
War on Terror at Guantánamo. This somewhat misses the point made by many liberal critics,
and also fails to address the concerns of Colin Powell at the time of the institution of
Guantánamo detention, namely that the US perhaps had moral and political interests in
seeking to apply high and open standards in its treatment of detainees. While many legal
criticisms of Guantánamo have been blunted or nullified by the work of Administration legal
teams, moral criticisms cannot be addressed simply by legal self-protection.

Indeed, this line of defence from conservative authors points towards ways in which it is
necessary to be cautious in categorising Guantánamo as an arena wherein the force of the
nomos retreats to make way for pure sovereign power. Law, in the Schmittian schema, appears
to yield utterly to politics and such a “blending of executive, legislative and judicial powers in
one person or even in one branch of the government is ordinarily regarded as the very acme
of absolutism.” As Kaytal and Tribe frame it, Bush’s military order of November 2001,
which in part legitimated the redefinition of participants in the War on Terror, and thus
opened up the possibility of such unusual detention “installs the executive branch as lawgiver
as well as law-enforcer, law-interpreter and law-applier.” However, to criticise the
movement of law being replaced by sovereign politics by invoking Schmittian exceptionalism,
is somewhat irresponsible. Casting persons outside of the rights group of the human
community is a more complex process than many legal critics have assumed. In an incisive
article commenting on the notion that the practice of invoking the exception is becoming
increasingly the rule in contemporary international politics, Fleur Johns notes that while being
outside of the full reach of international and domestic jurisdiction on many matters,

---

620 US Department of State (2002), Memorandum to the Counsel to the President, Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs, by Colin L. Powell, Draft Decision Memorandum for the President on the Applicability of the
Geneva Convention to the Conflict in Afghanistan, 26th January 2002. Widely available online, or in Greenberg, K. and
Dratel, J. (eds.), The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib, p122.
Journal 111, p1266, quoting Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 11 (1957)
622 Ibid. p1265.
Guantánamo is a space where carefully administering law is crucial to a camp which exploits legal loopholes. She writes: “[F]ar from a space of ‘utter lawlessness’ then, one finds in Guantánamo Bay a space filled to the brim with expertise, procedure, scrutiny and analysis.” Even in Kaytal and Tribe’s categorisation of excess executive power above, that power is instantiated in an abundance of law-making.

Thus, there is a patent difference between an archetypal re-emergence of Schmittian sovereign power and the tactics of the Bush Administration in finding ways to argue for unusual practices of detainment and interrogation in the War on Terror. This difference is that which is perceptively pointed up by Kalyvas in his comparison of Schmitt and Weber’s notions of a leader’s legitimacy. While Schmitt argues for legitimacy deriving purely from sovereignty and thus the potential (and legitimate) abrogation of the constitution by the sovereign, Kalyvas contrasts Weber’s standpoint whereby democratic legitimacy remains much more closely tied to the leadership actively defending the law and the constitution. These may be suspended if it is to the benefit of constitutional survival, but such a practice requires some negotiation or persuasion. In this sense, Guantánamo cannot be taken as a simply sovereign refusal of law and a move into the domain of pure political decisionism. The attempts to justify Guantánamo politically by reference to the need for defence of the nation and the threat posed by the inmates (as we will see below) have been numerous and do not speak of an Administration operating with the confidence of unchallengeable sovereign authority. The attempts to work within existing legal frameworks to justify the camp’s necessity, the mobilisation of massive legal teams to make sure the camp could be insulated against charges of illegality – all these actions speak more of a set of measures requiring political justification which aim not at abrogating legal structures at all. At the very most, partial suspension of legal norms has occurred, but mostly, processes of disguised circumvention of norms or attempts to re-negotiate legal norms have been the prominent tactics employed.

In part, over-enthusiastic attributions of Schmitt and Agamben to War on Terror policies have been caused by some of the more sweeping statements, particularly of the latter. While

---

criticising the Bush Administration for 'de facto rule' (as quoted above), Agamben's work also makes clear that the state of exception is "neither external nor internal to the juridical order."\(^{625}\) Schmitt describes, in his Political Theology, that precisely in order to have a space of legal normality, the state of exception must be prefigured in law to shape the bounds of that normality.\(^{626}\) As a Department of Defense briefing of February 2004 outlined, inmates of Guantánamo were rigorously assessed by "analysts, behavioural scientists and regional experts"\(^{627}\) and a weighty set of guidelines\(^{628}\) for annual reviews of individual threat risk guided the camp release program. As some law has been unable to reach Guantánamo, so it can been seen as a political tactic to reinsert other law and regulation, both to concentrate authority in the executive branch but also, while doing so, reassure the wider world of the rationality of the detention procedures. As Peter Gratton\(^{629}\) neatly points out, Agamben, contra Arendt, has consistently characterised the camp\(^{630}\) not as apolitical (as some legal and liberal critics perceive) but as hyper-political. It is a space where the sharpest and most fundamental decisions on the limits of the body politic are made; a space created by and at the limit of the legal regime.

However, efforts (limited though they may be) at reinscribing Guantánamo with aspects of a legal regime for the sake of proving the accountability and rationality of the process of detention, limit the decisionism that is supposed to be at the heart of executive control of the camp. The rationale for Guantánamo is rarely, as suggested above, publicly expressed as one of sovereign decision, though that Constitutional power of the President as Commander-in-Chief is often invoked as the first line of explanation. As Johns notes, the "acts of the would-be sovereign...are characterized by repeated references to some higher source of competence

\(^{625}\) Agamben, G. (2005) State of Exception p23  
\(^{626}\) Schmitt, C. (1985) Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty p13  
\(^{630}\) Here the authors refer of course, not only to Guantánamo, but to 'the camp' as a historically grounded sociological space. One might think of the Soviet Gulag and the Nazi concentration camps as prime referents in the thought of Arendt and Agamben, but also recall deeper historical precedents such as those camps established under Kitchener's command in the Second Boer War.
and direction — actions justified and merited in the name of democracy, liberty, the American ‘way of life’ and even God. Johns further illustrates how, in briefing the press on the potential release of prisoners, Secretary of the Navy Robert England at first confirmed that he was the one to “make the ultimate decision” but then presented such judgements as impersonal and standardised, being “based on facts, data available…the best decisions a reasonable person can make.”

Johns sums up this move as follows: “the experience of decision-making reported by such figures as Secretary England seems, to a significant degree, to be one of deferral and disavowal — as though his job were more a matter of implementation than decision.”

From Johns’ argument then, it is important to recognise that ‘pure’ sovereign decisions or policies resulting from them may require politicking, disguising or nuancing when entering into discourse in an international sphere where proceduralism is almost universally held to be a guarantor of rationality and fairness. The original political relation may well be the ban, but when the international institutional architecture rests upon the principle of universal human inclusion within a rights and value-sharing collectivity, the action of excluding a portion of humanity from that collectivity cannot be discussed, let alone carried out, simply on the basis of sovereign decision. It is with this in mind that the workings of discourses of world unity and notions of a bounded family of nations must be understood. Simply employing such ideas does not automatically bring about the political groupings described, but may go some way towards erecting boundaries in the social interactions of international parties. In all instances, the effects of discourse are dependent upon such factors as the institutional sites of the speakers and audiences and the historical referents that may be triggered in such discourses. In the present case, a set of complementary discursive actions frames the creation (or attempted creation) of an exceptional group labelled ‘terrorists’. The values of those fighting terror are reaffirmed to make ‘just’ any force applied to defeat the enemy. These values are then inverted to describe the enemy and to provide rationale for their incarceration, interrogation, torture and destruction. Central then to this production of a

633 Ibid. p631
634 As claimed by Agamben, G. (1998) Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life
space of exclusion, in a world where such naked sovereign power is feared, are a number of discourses aimed at solidifying the identities of the belligerents. Firstly, there are discourses of the exceptional nature of the war on terror and of the ‘universal’ values of the alliance prosecuting it. Secondly, there are discourses of the failure of terrorist groups to respect, comply with, or even recognise such ‘universal’ values. Thirdly, justifications are made for the repercussions meted out to those who, by their deviance from international standards and expectations, either cast themselves out of the rights group of a common human community, or, must be forcibly cast out. Parallel to these political discursive representations of such a value conflict are those discourses which would take issue with this institution of a ban on a certain pariah group, be they international institutional voices, or voices representing those subject to this exclusion. It is to the political representations of the exclusion of terrorists from the common rights group that we turn first, before considering those discourses which would resist attempts made to exclude. On the basis of surveying this terrain of discourse, Schmitt’s critique of liberalism can be brought to bear to illuminate the potentialities and limits of world unity discourse in effecting political change, while these discourses themselves prove a tool for refining a productive engagement with Schmitt and the lacunae of his thought.

6.3 Negating Humanity: Discourses of Exclusion in the War on Terror, Guantánamo and Abu Ghraib

"People go to war because of how they see, perceive, picture, imagine, and speak of others; that is, how they construct the difference of others as well as the sameness of themselves through representation."

This well-rehearsed postmodern framing of the politics of conflict meshes easily into discussions of the War on Terror, since by greater necessity than in times of conventional warfare, modes of picturing ‘threat’ must be developed through the work of discourse. Threat, or a public belief in threat, cannot be taken for granted on behalf of any state government but may need to be cultivated. The enemy’s forces are not, metaphorically, visible at the gates to menace the population within. They are, by contrast, hidden and


210
diffuse, their offensive materiel is minimal or non-existent. Instead of conventional weaponry, the contemporary terrorist ‘enemy’ made use of civilian aircraft in their most devastating attack on September 11th 2001, and conspicuously neither Al-Qaeda, nor its supposed sponsors, were found in possession of WMDs.

In part then, and setting aside for the moment possible notions of the political manipulation of the perception of the level threat by the Bush Administration, it is perhaps not surprising to find that in a war with an enemy more amorphous than many encountered in modern history, an unusually diverse and sharply ‘othering’ mass of discourse has been generated to represent terror and terrorists. In particular, much of the political rhetoric explored in this section explicitly seeks to dehumanise the terrorist and to claim that the ideology, and even the existence of terrorism represents something existentially inimical to humanity and human society itself. Such ‘othering’ discourses naturally form part of the justification for ruthless prosecution of the War on Terror and of treatment of captives taken during the course of the conflict. Consonant with the findings of the previous chapter, at times when rhetoric seeks the most emotionally charged modes of expressing the existence of powerful common purpose, or the dire consequences of radical difference from that common purpose, kinship metaphors are invoked.

On the evening of September 11th 2001, in his address to the nation, President Bush stated “today our nation saw evil, the very worst of human nature.” Repeatedly in that address and in speeches thereafter, the notion of evil was attached to the terrorist organisations supposedly responsible for the World Trade Centre and Pentagon attacks. Bush used Psalm 23 to metaphorise his interpretation of the feelings of the nation: “(E)ven though I walk through the valley of the shadow of death, I fear no evil, for You are with me.” This became elaborated into a concept of bin Laden as “the evil one” and Al-Qaeda as “the evil

---

637 Ibid.

211
As Richard Jackson notes, “this language conforms to an explicitly individual theory of evil, where evil exists as a force of principle residing within specific human beings, rather than in a complex set of structural conditions.” Further, allied to the regular use of notions of ‘evil’ and ‘evildoers’, the more explicitly religious use of the idea of ‘evil ones’ (a popular evangelical reference to the Devil) demonises terrorists as being satanic rather than human entities. Rooting this notion of evil in the very nature of those committing attacks (as in Bush’s 9/11 address) “implies that the evil is eschatological and cannot be dealt with through destruction or a type of sacred cleansing.” Jackson quotes a wry and telling remark from Donald Rumsfeld in reference to the notion that his job was not to teach, improve, redeem or reform the terrorists, instead his task as Secretary of Defense was instead to destroy that instantiation of evil in the world. Rumsfeld said in an interview with USA Today: “(N)o one around the Pentagon’s going to change the nature of human beings.”

This movement to individualise the ‘evil’ threatening the international community also transported discourse away from the historical precedents which had, from the first, inspired the Bush Administration’s response to 9/11. Those attacks were immediately compared in US media and scholarly commentary to the Japanese assault at Pearl Harbor in 1941 and the link was made explicit by the Administration. In a speech to military commanders, Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz claimed, in a replication of Roosevelt’s 1941 wording that “September 11th has taken its place alongside December 7th as a date that will live in infamy.” Roosevelt had moralised American victimhood and called for its “righteous might” to rise against Japanese aggression. His portrayal of the enemy had, however, focused

640 Jackson, R. (2005) Writing the War on Terrorism: Language, Politics and Counter-Terrorism p66. This individualization of evil has also been a point of theological contention. While the King James Version’s Lord’s Prayer asked only to ‘deliver us from evil’, the Revised Version of 1881 and the American Standard Version based upon it asking God to ‘deliver us from the Evil One’.
641 See also New American Standard Bible, 1 John 5:19: “We know that we are of God, and the whole world lieth in the evil one.” Available at: http://www.keywic.ca/bibles/asv62.htm#C5V1. Accessed on 13/07/2009.
on their “dastardly” behaviour and the “treachery” of their actions rather than attempting to
describe them as innately evil. Equally with President Reagan’s “Evil Empire” discourse,
he made clear repeatedly in that much-quoted speech that what he conceived of was a
“phenomenology of evil” abroad in the world. It was to be properly linked to the political
system (the Empire) rather than to individuals themselves. He urged his listeners instead to
“pray for the salvation of all of those who live in that totalitarian darkness”. This
individualisation of evil does not though, as Jackson argues, lead un-problematically to
politics of the destruction of excluded individuals. As will be discussed further in the final
section, the values upon which world unity discourses rest do not easily permit of such policy
and, as a result in the prosecution of the War on Terror, a focus on hunting down individuals
is tempered by concerns for regime change that are more in keeping with historical US
policy.

Among other dehumanising tropes employed in political rhetoric, prominent especially in
discussions of Guantánamo has been the wedding of notions of otherness and evil to the
long-standing politico-legal category of ‘enemy alien’ to produce such representations as
‘alien terrorist’ – a term beloved of John Ashcroft, the Attorney General at the time of 9/11.
‘Enemy aliens’ have represented the ‘enemy within’ in times of war in the United States and
high-profile confinement or deportation of these groups (for instance Japanese-Americans in
World War Two or suspected communists in the Cold War) has been widely supported to
secure the supposed integrity of the nation. Bolstering the unspoken value-loading of the
citizen/good - ‘alien/dangerous’ dichotomy, Ashcroft noted that 9/11 was an illustration
that “aliens also come to our country with the intent to do great evil.” He instituted the
Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force with the pledge to “detain, prosecute, (and) deport

---

646 Citations from Roosevelt, F.D. (1941) Speech to the Congress of the United States, December 8th 1941. The
complete address is available at: http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/PTO/EastWind/Infamy.html. Accessed on
15/06/2009.

647 The following citations drawn from Reagan, R. (1983) Speech Before the National Association of
Evangelicals, Orlando, FL, March 8th 1983. Available at:

Discourse and the American Internment Camps’ in Discourse & Society, 6(3), p319-352

Ziglar, and Director of Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force, Steve McGraw, Department of Justice
terrorist aliens and this implicit dehumanising of foreign nationals filtered into the treatment meted out in Guantánamo.

A final group of major referents have been especially employed with respect to the framing both of terrorism in general and also more specifically to prisoners of the War on Terror to deny their humanity - namely metaphors likening terror and terrorists to lower forms of life or to harmful infections. Dennis Blair, Commander-in-Chief of the US Pacific Command spoke of the “cancer” of Al-Qaeda infiltrating the Middle East and Central Asia with its “spawn”. Similarly Bush likened terrorists to “parasites” whilst Colin Powell preferred to think of “the scourge of terrorism”. In setting up the War on Terror as “civilisation’s fight” against the barbarism of Al-Qaeda, the rhetorical door was opened not only for the labeling of terrorists as low forms of savage humanity, but also to deny their humanity and refer to them as animals, and in this respect language of a ‘hunt’ for terrorists could be used to characterise the prosecution of the War on Terror. The US Ambassador to Japan at the time of 9/11, Howard Baker, claimed that Al-Qaeda rejected “those values that separate us from animals.”

A political and media barrage of such discourse built up in 2001 and 2002, and, when revelations of prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib began to break in 2004, it was perhaps hardly surprising to find patterns of abuse consistent with dehumanising discourses chief among the outrages. Lacking legal personality, the prisoners of Abu Ghraib and Guantánamo found themselves in the same relation to their captors as animals to humans, dependent largely

---


upon goodwill for their humane treatment and survival. The following from Charles Brower’s discussion of the dehumanising of prisoners draws out the explicit linkages:

“Guards used open blades to cut away prisoners’ jumpsuits, from their necks to their thighs. This action represents a symbolic slaughter that created a sense of mortal terror among detainees. Having obscured their faces and removed their clothing – two highly distinctive human characteristics – guards ‘branded’ the prisoners like cattle, drawing words and symbols on their legs or buttocks. According to several accounts, guards forced prisoners to crawl like dogs on their hands and knees, to bark on command, and to follow their captors on leashes or strings. At other times, crawling prisoners served as ‘donkeys’ or ‘riding animals’, forced to bear fellow prisoners or guards on their backs. To complete the picture, Staff Sergeant Ivan Frederick reportedly forced on male detainee to masturbate near the open mouth of another male detainee, then remarked: ‘Look at what these animals do if you leave them alone for two seconds.”

As Thomas Pogge comments, it is “remarkable that our governments show so little interest in justifying, in moral terms, the great harms they are clearly inflicting upon innocent persons.” In the case of Abu Ghraib above, the Bush Administration simply tried to pass off abuse with an apology and frame it as a misrepresentation of American values in the War on Terror. Rumsfeld made the following statement to the Senate Armed Services Committee: “I feel terrible about what happened to these Iraqi detainees…Our country had an obligation to treat them right…To those Iraqis who were mistreated by members of U.S. armed forces, I offer my deepest apology. It was un-American. And it was inconsistent with the values of our nation.” As for Guantánamo, indefinite confinement and aggressive interrogation were justified by further characterisation of the evilness of the inmates. Rumsfeld again: “(A)nybody who has looked at the training manuals for the al Qaeda and what these people were trained to do, and how they were trained to kill civilians – and anybody who saw what happened to the Afghani soldiers who were guarding the al Qaeda in Pakistan when a number were killed by al Qaeda using their bare hands – has to recognize that these are among the most dangerous, best trained vicious killers on the face of the earth.” As Yuval Ginbar documents, the justificatory model for ‘enhanced interrogation techniques’ (including

---


215
waterboarding, sexual humiliation, prolonged isolation, beating and stress positions), has been the High Value Detainees model. This speculative model, of detaining and interrogating anyone who might have high value information, was motivated by the so-called 'One Percent Doctrine', wherein the Bush Administration was convinced to take as a credible threat any scenario of terrorist conspiracy which might have even a one in a hundred chance of actually existing. As fears of a second 9/11 attack escalated amid claims that Al-Qaeda might additionally have access to WMDs, the value of captives was grossly overinflated. During the search for WMDs and the attempt to build support for an invasion of Iraq, Dick Cheney reminded the American Association of News Editors of the Administration's view of the potential further threat from Al-Qaeda: "(W)e are dealing with terrorists...who are willing to sacrifice their own lives to kill millions of others."

Whilst legal scholars like Ginbar assess (and condemn) the moral implications of a model wherein the supposed information obtainable from a few captives may lead to the saving of many more innocent lives, it should be noted that the High Value Detainee model advanced by the Bush Administration provides no legitimate explanation either for the presence of some of the juvenile detainees at Guantánamo, or that large majority released to their home countries for 'continued detention' who have been since set free without charge, or the abuses and torture at Abu Ghraib and Guantánamo documented variously by human rights scholars. As one former US interrogator made clear, most of those rounded up by the military had little or no connection to active insurgency — "90 percent of the people that I saw were in my opinion innocent."

Indeed, though much legal work has been done to try to prove the case for redefinitions of 'torture', or to exempt detainees from the protection of the Geneva Conventions, the moral,

---


rather than legal justifications for abuse and torture have scarcely been taken on in political rhetoric other than, as seen above, in the context of sheepish or evasive apologies. Legal personhood has been denied and in discourse, as we have seen, human personhood has been denied in ways which have certainly contributed to the instances and particular character of some of the dehumanising abuses committed. The discourses discussed implicitly cast terrorists beyond the human rights group. Nevertheless, in mainstream US political rhetoric in the case of Guantánamo and the broader War on Terror, it is hard to find the sort of explicit rejections of terrorists' membership of the human community/family such as deployed in the Soyinka Tribunal with which this chapter began. Such a move, in a pressurised climate, would surely have been only further fuel to the fires of criticism of overbearing aggression and imperial-style presidency. This is not to say that such a formulation would be impossible, but there are several reasons explored below to anticipate and account for its absence in many sites within discourse. While eschewed by Bush Administration politicians in their high-profile policy statements, nevertheless this formulation has been employed elsewhere, though again by speakers not enmeshed in administrative politics or those enmeshed in UN rather than US Administration subject positions. Even here though, the emphasis is placed upon a voluntary self-exclusion rather than a sovereign exclusion. In a speech in Oxford in 2005, the then Saudi Ambassador to the US, Prince Turki Al-Faisal said:

"This terrorism is not based on Islam, but is a perverted cult ideology. Its followers have excluded themselves from normal society, from the human family, and placed themselves outside of reality to live out fantasies that have nothing to do with the real world." 666

Consider also the investigation in 2003 of Liberian President Charles Taylor by former Pentagon Inspector General David Crane, then working as a UN Special Prosecutor. Accusing Taylor of harbouring international terrorists and facilitating Al-Qaeda expansion in West Africa as a whole, Crane concluded his indictment by stating, "(W)e call on Taylor to rejoin the family of nations and turn over...any other indicted war criminals he is sheltering." 667 Herein, the possibility of rejoining the in-group is held out if only Taylor (who

was initially indicted on 654 charges) would behave cooperatively in handing over his supposed allies. Just as in Al-Faisal's statement, where perverted ideology is blamed for the beliefs which have cast some Muslim groups outside the human family, the possibility of redemption based upon different behaviour is held out.

Recalling the discursive terrain uncovered in humanitarian conflicts in Chapter Five, we noted a hegemonic notion of the 'international community' and a principal variant in notions of a kin community or human family responding to the crisis. It is interesting in the rhetoric of the Bush Administration in the War on Terror that not only are references to Al-Qaeda/terrorism's relationship to the 'human family' absent but so are references to AQ's relations to the 'international community'. Notions of their aggression against 'civilisation' or 'our way of life' are present, but in all instances, attempts to invoke greater international consensual response by using rhetoric that would imply collective opprobrium are quite guarded. In part, and especially by the time of Guantánamo, the notion that the international community was under threat from terrorism had somewhat evaporated. While 'Le Monde' was happy to claim that 'We Are All Americans' on 9/11, by 2004 a more unilateralist war was being undertaken. Calling on the international community or the family of nations to exclude terrorists or Al-Qaeda or the state sponsors of terrorism was a dead-end policy and rhetoric option for the Bush Administration by 2003/2004. However, as detailed below, in the earlier days of the War on Terror exactly this trajectory was followed in terms of generating support.

Given their later split from the greater part of the UN community over the invasion of Iraq, it is unsurprising that the Administration would be less inclined to speak on behalf of the international community in attempting to make sovereign decision statements as to the limits of that in-group with reference to the terrorist threat. By contrast, it is predictable that in a setting where he acts as the mouthpiece of the UN as the embodiment of the family of nations, David Crane would use this discourse. Also, as noted, the potential for kinship to be mobilised as a flexible sphere which can be rejoined after exclusion was unlikely to correlate with the fate the Bush Administration envisaged for their enemies.
6.4. Kinship, the Creation of Unity or Aspiration in the War on Terror

So as to further bolster the notion that the debate over the international community’s involvement with the War on Terror, and related abuses at Guantánamo and Abu Ghraib, are not part of the same humanitarian discursive register as those on crises involving supposed international ‘innocents’ such as in Darfur, a short consideration of NGO discourse, parallel to that conducted in the previous chapter, is instructive. As for the most important reports by Amnesty International, far fewer IC references, or any variations for describing the same putative collective, are present than in the Darfur reporting. The 202-page report ‘Human Dignity Denied’668, a summary of 3 years at Guantánamo, the recent Abu Ghraib revelations and suspected abuses during the Afghan war, makes only 5 references to the IC, and one further to the ‘international community of nations’. Many of Amnesty’s more focused reports make no mention of the IC whatsoever669. An identical pattern may be seen from the reporting and advocacy of Human Rights Watch for instance670. Meanwhile, the UN’s ‘Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism’ has produced critical reports671 with almost no reference to the opinion, or obligation of the international community, but rather


an emphasis upon the US's obligations with relation to customary (and actual) international law. This re-affirms the above argument that the unilateralist pursuit of the War on Terror and the failure to cultivate support for it, or even a consensus on the worldwide nature of the threat, conditioned discursive reluctance to reference the international community.

This said, at the start of the War on Terror, the UN made attempts to galvanise a sense of its institution, as a collective and a value-sharing group, being under threat from terrorism and chose the kinship metaphor to express this in the immediate moment of crisis.

"Academic speculation and suspected scenarios turned into grim reality imposing on all of us the responsibility not only to ensure that there is never again, anywhere in this world, a repetition of such an abomination but that we also strengthen our global institutions to co-operate as a human family against such common threats as terrorism." 672

Attempts to cultivate strong identity with the prosecution of a war for a set of values, such as has been observed in earlier chapters dealing with the period of the foundation of the UN, are apt to arise in times of crisis. At these times, emotions of fear and uncertainty pervade political discourse and leaders and organizations are apt to express more directly emotional appeals to fictive identity. At a General Assembly Special Session on Terrorism on October 1st 2001, Rudi Giuliani gave this appeal for support:

"But now it's up to the member states to enforce this and other aspects of the resolution, and for the United Nations to enforce these new mechanisms to take the financial base away from the terrorists. Take away their money, take away their access to money, and you reduce their ability to carry out complex missions.

Each of you is sitting in this room because of your country's commitment to being part of the family of nations. We need to unite as a family as never before - across all our differences, in recognition of the fact that the United Nations stands for the proposition that human beings we have more in common than divides us." 673

As was hinted at in the preceding chapter, it is somewhat easier for politicians to engage with kinship metaphors under a number of conditions. It is, as we have said, often employed as a highly emotional, aspirational discourse, used as a way of elaborating the broadest principles. As such, lacking rigour or detail and engaged with vague and emotional metaphorisation, it

can seem an irresponsible choice for politicians. When it is employed it is often in times of crisis, when extra emotionality is acceptable or required. It is more likely to be employed in ad hoc remarks or in remarks made by lesser figures, such as Al-Faisal and Crane above, whose comments are less likely to be subject to multiple bureaucratic revisions. It carries a ring of religiosity as will be explored in the following chapters, and as such is associated with the more openly religious climate of the early twentieth century and with contemporary politicians who profess religious leanings. In exactly the same format as his open letter to Darfur that has been commented upon, Tony Blair (famed for his disregard for submitting his ideas to scriptwriters’ editing) produced an open letter to Iraq which called, in a somewhat patronising pastoral register, for the re-incorporation of the Iraqi people into the family of nations:

“For too long the world ignored the plight of the Iraqi people. That was wrong. We know and understand that many of you live in fear of Saddam. We promise that the events of 1991 will not happen again. We have pledged to remove Saddam. And we will deliver. Once he is gone, we will help Iraq rebuild itself, and become once more a member of the international family of nations.”

In the case of President Bush, several statements from the immediate aftermath of 9/11 (including his State of the Union Address for 2002) while relying primarily on tropes of civilisation against barbarism, the strength and heroism of the American victim and so on, introduce, almost incongruously, comments relating to the need to maintain American strength and purpose starting from roots in the family.

“Terror, unanswered, can not only bring down buildings, it can threaten the stability of legitimate governments. And you know what -- we're not going to allow it. Americans are asking: What is expected of us? I ask you to live your lives, and hug your children.”

And further:

“We learned a good lesson on September 11th, that there is evil in this world...it’s essential that all moms and dads and citizens tell their children we love them and there is love in the world, but also remind them there are evil people.”

In the contexts in which these remarks appear — warlike pledges to hunt down the enemy — they are certainly unexpected. They seem to imply that so long as the American family institution remains good and strong, all super-structural political conflicts can be won based upon this foundation. In turn it allies American life with care, compassion and love in opposition to the evil of terrorism. It is certainly an emotional way of pushing Americans to believe in the core 'goodness' of their society, and once more we see kinship correlated with an unquestionable sense of the 'good'. Furthermore, Bush invoked family relations to inspire pride, a sense of unity and a sense of outrage borne of making the events of 9/11 into personal grief.

"Some will carry memories of a face and a voice gone forever. And I will carry this: it is the police shield of a man named George Howard, who died at the World trade Centre trying to save others. It was given to me by his mom, Arlene, as a proud memorial to her son. This is my reminder of lives that ended..."

"Every day a retired firefighter returns to ground Zero, to feel closer to his two sons who died there. At a memorial in New York, a little boy left his football with a note for his lost father: Dear Daddy, please take this to heaven. I don't want to play football until I can play with you again some day...Beyond all differences of race or creed, we are one country, mourning together and facing danger together."

More powerfully perhaps than in the hand-wringing of Darfur, the use of kinship to unite is seen when faced with external threat. Moreover, the instances we have described in this chapter have shown the limits of the use of kinship discourse. While it is openly used to invoke unity and in a variety of very different constructs (compare the statements by Bush above to some of the more formulaic statements referenced in previous chapters) it is less widely used to justify or describe exclusion. Exclusion is more commonly done in different (and in some senses more radical) ways such as the bestialisation of the 'other'. In exclusionary discourses meant simply to denigrate the 'other', no self-reference may be explicitly necessary. As will be discussed in subsequent chapters, kinship instead performs a double movement in re-affirming the value of the in-group while addressing injustice outside the group. This is not necessary if discourse about the other is simply used pejoratively. Crucial caveats are also placed upon the use of kinship discourse by dint of both its

emotionality and its flexibility. It is often used by high ranking leaders only by virtue of a context of crisis or because of a personal (rather than a controlled) choice of rhetoric. In other cases, such as when a leader speaks to an audience to whom s/he does not really feel accountable (Blair's letters to Darfur/Iraq) or holds a position of superiority over, a subject position of 'high-statesman' is often occupied in grand statements regarding the possibility of gaining entry into the family of nations.

When kinship is invoked to damn and to exclude, it often embellishes messages of genuine emotional anger and despair. Wole Soyinka’s admonition of the Sudanese government is a case in point, as also the words of Al-Faisal quoted above. Al-Faisal, in addition to his speeches in the UK in 2005, produced, with the former Archbishop of Canterbury, Lord Carey, and King Abdullah of Jordan, a message to the world’s Islamic community. The first citation below is taken from Al-Faisal’s afore-mentioned speech in Oxford in 2005, the second from the joint Amman Message:

"Their twisted vision is alien to the healthy body of the faith that holds the world’s Muslim community together. It is a wicked perversion of the common values of all faiths. But however hard it is, we have to acknowledge that there are those among our human family who are committing these deeds of horror and devastation and who do not see how evil and terrible they are — and they call themselves Muslims."

"There is no faith that condones the taking of innocent life and that celebrates suicide. The killing of innocent people is prohibited by all faiths. 'Thou shalt not kill' is one of the 10 commandments passed down to us all from the Prophet Moses in the Holy Bible. 'Whoever kills a person has killed the whole of humanity,' says one of the best-known Koranic verses. Suicide is a sign of an individual’s alienation from God and their alienation from the human family to which we all belong. This shared human bond, on which we are all so widely and clearly agreed is a bond that can transcend other divisions. Our deeply shared humanity unites us."

Chief among the observations that might be made here is that those who are deemed to have alienated themselves from God and the human family, are also, with reference to the first quotation, part of it. The boundary between the inside and outside is more complex than simply the product of decision. To even speak of it is deeply political, and what is more, it is


crucial to note that in the main uses of kinship to denounce and exclude (Soyinka and Al-Faisal/Abdullah) it is a fellow African or Muslim who feels able to tread these highly charged boundaries. Their comments are extremely powerful, even incendiary by virtue of their outraged invocation of the rupture of kinship, and one might argue that a notion of a genuine kinship broken that inspires them. Two factors limit the use then of kinship as a rhetoric of exclusion. Firstly, if used by a white politician concerning Africans or Muslims, it is likely in our postcolonial world that such comments would prove unacceptable. The case of Crane acting as UN Special Prosecutor is slightly different in that his position is given added impartiality by its institutional status, and his statements, while temporarily excluding, offered the olive branch of re-incorporation even to a dictator on trial. Secondly, the resonance of genuine kinship or commonality between the Muslim Faisal and the hardline Islamists for instance, could not meaningfully apply.

These examples demonstrate in some way the hollowness of the aspirational use of kinship to describe an imagined human commonality. They also demonstrate, as Johns argued, the careful hedging of the responsibility to decide upon the exception. Kinship either provides tools for the most bitter condemnation and exclusion of ones we feel have a close connection to us, or else a resource for focusing on positive unity while deploying other, less politically charged discourses for the purposes of othering. Kinship, as an expression of fictive human and political unity then, cannot be drawn upon or analysed without reference to our current social milieu. The notion of the denial of personhood is so strongly correlated with those atrocities which inspired the creation of our current international institutional philosophy, that a return to such discourses is potentially highly politically inflammatory. Only when a consensus upon denunciation has been formed may those in privileged subject positions like Woyinka or Al-Faisal invoke a breakage of kinship. Some of the purposes and rules of the use of kinship discourse then, have been outlined. The subject positions of kinship discourse and the unity of the notion of kinship, and hence its political value, still require a fuller sociological explanation.
6.5. Negotiated Practices of Kinship Discourse to Include and Exclude: A Rejoinder to Schmitt

A clear lesson from the discursive examples highlighted in this chapter must be that the establishment of Guantanamo say, or the justifications for torture methods during the War on Terror cannot be simply conceived as the return of a singular mode of sovereign decision-making. In fact, a plurality of attempts to create different types of exclusion, to envisage different states of exception, has been made during the War on Terror era.

Unquestionably, the alliance of the notion of kinship with an unequivocally positive moral valuation aids its applicability for defining the in-group in cases where such a group is threatened and also, because of this valuation, it implicitly heightens the potential for the out-group to be perceived as evil or wrong in their very essence. This meshes with Schmitt's expectations of the liberal era and Schmitt shows us better than any other theorist how the immutable valuation of kinship sits at the heart of the UN-era liberal order. Chris Brown summarises Schmitt's position as follows:

"Liberalism, he argues, seeks to moralise and legalise politics, reducing the political process to a set of morally authoritative rules, attempting, as it were, to take the politics out of politics. This is a doomed enterprise — in any political constitution what is crucial is the ability to decide upon the 'exception', the point at which the rules no longer apply — but it is also a pernicious enterprise, because it involves covering particular political interests with a cloak of morality, pretending that a political decision emerging out of the friend-enemy distinction is actually the product of a moral judgement that cannot be opposed without falling into moral turpitude."

This moralising is inflamed by the use of kinship discourse, which is implicitly and immutably valued as a positive moral category in its usages in international politics. In other words, the in-group, when discussed in terms of kinship is immutably given a 'good' moral valuation and thus the out-group implicitly acquires a bad/wrong/evil moral valuation. As will be fully discussed in subsequent chapters, this is an important 'double work' which separates kinship discourses from other discourses of exclusion. The potential danger of this moralisation of politics is aptly pointed out by Chantal Mouffe's argument that moralising closes down the possibility of legitimate disagreement with the hegemonic order in international society and that "when the channels are not available through which conflicts could take an 'agonistic'...


225
form, those conflicts tend to emerge on the antagonistic mode\textsuperscript{682} such as terrorism. She argues, following Schmitt, that under liberal moral hegemony, “moral condemnation replaces proper political analysis...the post-political perspective, by hindering the creation of a vibrant agonistic public sphere, leads to envisaging the ‘they’ as ‘moral’, i.e. ‘absolute enemies’”.\textsuperscript{683} There is plausibility in Mouffe’s argument and in the notion that moralising disguises politically motivated decisions on we/they groupings. However, in critique of this view, and as developed earlier, the case studies examined so far do not support the notion that discourses of exception and exclusion \textbf{necessarily} lead to the action of following through to embodying the decision.

Consider for instance, that thousands of Sunni Iraqis who formerly fought as insurgents against US forces and then changed sides to actively fight alongside the US-led coalition have recently been accepted into positions as policemen, officials and soldiers in the American-backed Baghdad government.\textsuperscript{684} Part of the incongruity of Schmittian perspectives for explaining such political episodes as the War on Terror or the Darfur crisis, lies in their peculiar temporality. In essence the Schmittian decision relies upon a political moment appearing to be suspended in time and singularly influencing the development of politics thereafter. In fact, while Schmittian decisions such as Bush’s military order of November 2001 referred to above, may pave the way for exceptional politics, a multiplicity of actions will succeed such an order and sets of actions and policies carried out on the ground will develop with reference to their own internal logics as well as to the sovereign command. Discourses and modes of action inevitably mutate faster and in more numerous directions than can singular sovereign decisions.

Moreover, the temporality of Schmitt’s characterisation of liberalism can be critiqued with reference to kinship as a mode of creating we/they distinctions in world politics. As explored further in the following chapter, world kinship discourse, especially in its religious incarnations, exists at the heart of the moralising modern liberal order but also dates back at

\textsuperscript{682} Mouffe, C. (2005) \textit{On The Political} p5
\textsuperscript{683} Ibid. p76
least to the pre-liberal order under Schmitt’s *ius publicum Europaeum*[^6]. Schmitt lauded the respect that existed between European states in the post-Westphalian era when princes were said to recognise “the opponent as an enemy on equal grounds – as a *iustis hostis*.”[^5][^6] However, notions of the in-group of the family of nations at that time, while preventing wars of annihilation in Europe, were tied to the limits of Christendom and the righteous exportation of the dominion of Christian nations, and thus gave rise to brutal and devastating colonial practices. While the notions of the morality of world kinship endure, the in-group is now vastly expanded and international agreement on equality of rights has removed such a space of exploitation as was plundered by colonial powers. Schmitt’s linkage of a change in political order, with a change in the mode of conducting politics and a change in morality is therefore problematic. The mode and expression of world kinship as a sphere of morality has changed little in terms of its content and character and the bases upon which the positive moral valuation of kinship has been made has altered little. Yet, the uses to which this discourse can be put in making rhetoric and policies of inclusion and exclusion have vastly changed in the post-colonial and post-world war eras.

The preceding case studies demonstrate that kinship may be taken to be an immutable moral symbol in world politics but its flexibility in usage means that the consequences of its deployment are not necessarily as dire in action as they are in discourse. The ‘agonistic’ disagreement that Mouffe highlights has not been quashed if one takes the full scope of these case studies in mind. In the War on Terror case, one might focus upon the sovereign decision to inter at Guantánamo, but one might also focus upon the barrages of criticism, the climb-downs, apologies and eventually the desire to close the camp. All this pressure has told upon the world power most able to act out its sovereign will without fear of backlash.

Further, while a certain ‘fire and brimstone’ appearance is often attached to exclusionary kinship rhetoric, unlike tropes of bestialisation for instance there are not necessarily suggested practices inflicted upon the ‘other’ which follow on from its use in discourse. This is due to its multivalence as a symbol – it can suggest too many practices to actually dictate a

predictable path of policy. In many ways, human kinship, or the lack of it, is particularly hard to operationalise due to the many meanings of kinship, as we saw in Chapter Four.

This multiplicity of meanings is, as argued in the following chapter, due to the long sedimentation of world kinship discourse in Western consciousness. Of course, kinship discourse endures the changes, even reversals, in policy of such crises as Darfur and the War on Terror. Policies can rarely be proved to be caused by such broad discourses. Nevertheless in order to maximise the productive potential of kinship discourse and to minimise its potential to add to stark othering in world politics, a greater appreciation of the Western-ness of those notions of kinship used in international political discourse, is required.
PART FOUR - Analysing the Impact of Kinship Discourses

CHAPTER SEVEN - Western Paradigms of the ‘International’: Politics, Religion, Community and Kinship

7.1 Terrains of Discourse in the Practice of World-Making: A Recapitulation

The groups of statements collected in the preceding chapters represent a diverse set of artefacts from an investigation of the use of kinship metaphor in discussing projects of post-Enlightenment ‘world-making’. World-making entails the creation and dissimulation of a notion of the ‘world’ or a state of affairs to be created, and the successive elaboration of this notion into a doctrine, a set of rules values and beliefs, and then practical actions to attempt to bring this ‘world’ into being in the midst of the anarchy of international affairs. These statements thus far have orbited around a nexus of international world-making in the body of the UN and the international community. These institutions are both ‘world-makers’ in our own times, and also the manifestation of the grand projects of world-making undertaken as a result of the two world wars.

At this stage, two further crucial points must be kept in mind concerning the notion of the Western-ness of the discourses in question. Firstly that, despite the purported universal truth inherent in the discourses of world unity investigated, there is nothing ‘necessary’ or ‘natural’ about the character of the formulations in which such ideals are expressed. The form of the discourse of the family of nations, for instance, is not expounded because it is necessarily the most ‘obvious’ or the ‘best’ representation of a notion of world unity. Secondly, though many differences between the expressions of Western versions of world kinship discourses have...

---


229
been noted, comparison with radically opposed projects of world-making point up some of the commonalities which adhere in these statements, in terms of the way in which the world-as-kin vision is structured and articulated. As an example, the world-making rhetoric of perhaps the greatest contemporary challenge to Western models of world politics, political Islam, might be considered.

Two contrasts are especially useful. Firstly we have noted the deployment of metaphors such as the family of nations or the human family, as ways of idealising international society. In these tropes, harmony and unity of purpose and substance are espoused but the fundamental individuality of nation states (in the family of nation idiom) or persons (in the human family idiom) is not questioned. A family in the Western sense we have become accustomed to dealing with, is comprised of separate persons. What is not proposed is a more comprehensive or ontological melding of the disparate parts of international society, only that they should embody common values in bringing a genuine family of nations into being. In the thought of political Islam following Sayyid Qutb however, such an international ontology is to be radically opposed. As Bernard Lewis wrote of Muslim scholarship in the mediaeval period, “(T)he division of the world into countries and nations, so important in the Western world's perception of itself and definition of its loyalties, is of comparatively minor importance in the world of Islam.”\textsuperscript{688} Qutb’s later rejection of the division of the world into nations is based upon the radical Oneness of the divine and the natural respectively. Just as there is one God in Qutbist thought, there can only be one Creation and the sovereignty of God over that unified creation should not be fragmented by the establishment of individual forms of authority such as nation states. Albert Bergesen frames it succinctly:

“The Western idea of a separation of institutional spheres, leaving Caesar's sovereignty to Caesar and God's sovereignty to God, is, for Qutb, a direct challenge to God. Such an assumption has tremendous consequences, for now ordinary, stable, non-aggressive political institutions, say an ideal perfect democracy, is not only not ideal or perfect, but is an aggressive act of taking worshippers away from God by establishing another deity (the State) that demands worship (obeying its laws).”\textsuperscript{689}

\textsuperscript{688} Lewis, B. (1982) The Muslim Discovery of Europe p60
Thus, idealising a family of nations is antithetical to this type of political thought. We can secondly compare the way idealisations of future world society models are used. As we have seen, the world kinship metaphor is deployed in a variety of institutional contexts but no program of action for bringing it about has been formulated. Indeed the notion is arguably too vague for that, and the sense of the discourse is more attuned to persuading sets of behavior or passively acculturating the family of nations as a common political emblem. Instead, the image of a unified community under God of Qutbist thought “cannot be achieved only through preaching” but the religious vision is to be brought about by direct political action. As Roxanne Euben notes of Qutb’s philosophy, contrary to a Western separation of religion and politics, “political life is not distinct from the realm of belief but is part of a divine and unitary substratum of existence.” In other words, as Qutb himself puts it, “Islam has a right to remove all those obstacles which are in its path so that it may address human reason and intuition with no interference and opposition from political systems.”

Whilst formative conclusions have been offered at each stage in our analyses of world unity discourses, it will be impossible to approach general statements as to the place of kinship in Western, liberal projects of world-making until the groups of statements collected are compared. Across the periods under consideration (pre-war, wartime, postwar and contemporary), the discursive terrain at all points is made up of descriptions of, and aspirations for, the state of international order. Many of these statements have not been made using metaphors of kinship at all, but kinship metaphors are still observed within the discourse, and thus a space for the use of kinship is present in each of these overlapping discursive fields. It is critical to note that the samples of discourse presented in the preceding chapters have been produced by men and women across time and occupying different subject positions. Also, it is important to remember that a discourse of ‘universal’ human values and aspirations presents the subject with a broad and elastic series of potential selections for making statements. While discourse and subject positions do constrain, the

---

dependence upon metaphor in making sense of an arena as vast and diverse as the 'international', in itself lends flexibility to discoursing subjects. In addition, as remarked previously, the cognitive modality of kinship, in particular Western notions of kinship, permits flexibility of expression and emotion.

In the statements thus collected then, we have noted a greater diversity of expressions present in the earlier discourses. The idea of discussing such a grand and presumptuous notion as 'world opinion' or the values for which humanity might strive was only ever current in political debate in times of crisis up until the institutionalisation, after World War Two, of an organisational machinery where 'world opinion' could be constituted and debated. Thus, from Paine and Hamilton to the urgings of Wilson at Versailles, to the collections of scholarly and political debate in isolationist America in the 1930s, the subject positions of such discourses shared a common character. The discourse experimented with ways of fostering common aspirations and values and of appealing to an apparently parochial and recalcitrant world populace.

In this sense, the appearance of a diverse range of metaphorical expressions is not surprising. Not only, in its formative stages, were the standards and expectations (or 'rules' in a more Foucauldian take) of such discourses as yet only weakly formed, but also in attempting to cajole governments and foster a sense of international responsibility against the backdrop of centuries of imperialist conflict, variations in the discourse may be expected as subjects sought more effective ways of putting their cases. Thus, prior to the foundation of the UN architecture, visions of ways of unifying sets of principles for the guidance of international affairs ranged from a standard of 'international morality', to asking for the world to follow the example of the American Federalists and seek out 'World Union' or 'World Federation'. America appealed to its 'brothers across the sea' to emulate the peaceable relations of the states of the American hemisphere to embrace a 'new idea' of a 'community

---

693 Jaeger, H. M. (2008) ""World Opinion" and the Founding of the UN: Governmentalizing International Politics", in European Journal of International Relations 14(4)
695 See for instance Streit, C. (1939) Union Now
of nations. The postwar planning committees sought a 'universal' solution to the problems they perceived in the international system. The Allies portrayed their war being fought by a 'brotherhood' standing up for the righteous principles of 'common humanity' and the metaphor of a 'family of nations' was commonly used to envisage the inclusive world order to be built after the end of the war, and especially to include newly enfranchised colonial populations.

In comparison, the contemporary discursive arena concerning the metaphorisation of an international collective bound together by common humanity and associated human values is more uniform. The UN, especially in times of crisis, still portrays itself grandly as 'humanity's instrument' but the notional 'international community' has largely replaced more diverse references in political circles to the human family, the community of nations and other such tropes. Where kinship replaces such dominant forms in discourse affirming the solidarity or aims of the 'international community', we have noted generality, future-orientation and emotional content as three predictive markers for the selection of this particular metaphor. In instances where kinship is invoked in denying membership of the human family, the politically incendiary nature of such a remark seems to require legitimating by virtue of the speaker sharing some common social identity with those to be outcast.

My analysis of this transformation of the discursive terrain here draws upon the notion of norm entrepreneurship advocated by several prominent small states theorists within IR. Not only relevant with regard to the historical context above, the experience of commentators surveyed in Chapter Four also supports the notion that the UN remains a more successful forum for generating agreement on international standards than it does on turning the norms it would espouse into common and unified action and policy. The UN and commentators advocating the high-minded values which have been institutionalised in the UN architecture, share some of characteristics that are notable in those states which may

---

697 From Roosevelt's address to the Pan-American Union, 1933, see Donovan, F. (1966) p12.
698 For instance in the UN Prayer, Chapter Three.
701 Skepticism of the conceptual value of 'norms' as an object of analysis was aired in Part One. As will be gathered from the discussion here however, I am merely considering 'norms' as standards of discursive usage. A 'discursive norm' then, is simply the most common formulation in discourse.
pursue norm entrepreneurship as political goal. As Christine Ingebritsen writes, it is “militarily weak, economically dependent” nations such as Scandinavian countries who fill international social roles as norm entrepreneurs. This description fits the UN just as well as Scandinavia. Unable to compete in the field of military competition for status, resources and territory, the ‘realist’ weakness of small states or militarily dependent organisations like the UN may, in the words of Neumann and Gstohl, predispose them to “favour discourses that institutionalize rules and norms” — in other words to advocate at least the regularisation and improved normative ethics of the social relationships in which they find themselves at a default disadvantage.

Two further observations can be drawn from this school of thought to reinforce our analysis of the development of UN world unity discourse. Firstly, as such scholars such as Rushton and Kille have argued, the position of high officials (particularly the Secretary-General) in the UN who command significant global media and political exposure, may often be one of moral and ethical leadership — creating, promoting or sustaining new and existing global discourses and ideals. Secondly, as described above, we see a process of whittling down of modes of expressing the world unity discourses over time. A broad set of referents were mobilised by a diverse and disjointed collection of academics, politicians, religious and judicial commentators in the mid-twentieth century to describe an amorphous dream of a new world order. Many of these referents have been jettisoned to leave a group of more stable terms favoured by speakers in highly entrenched, bureaucratic subject positions within the political sphere, NGOs and INGOs. Such a transformation corresponds to the typology of norm life-cycles advocated by Finnemore and Sikkink. Between their stages of norm emergence and acceptance, a so-called ‘tipping point’ is either passed or not passed depending upon the acceptance of the norm, or, in this case, the language (and form) in

705 Kille, K. (2007) The UN Secretary-General and Moral Authority: Ethics and Religion in International Leadership
706 Finnemore, M. and Sikkink, K. ‘International Norm Dynamics and Political Change’ in International Organization 52(4) p897
which a norm is expressed. Tied to the emergence of an international institutional architecture which was, at the time embryonic, many expressions of norms failed to cross the tipping point of international acceptance which is now fully formed in the mature set of institutions.

Naturally, though several generations separate the scope of statements covered in the preceding chapters, it is interesting to note that where kinship is invoked, or where in the contemporary cases, deviations from the hegemonic 'IC' formulation are recorded, we have often seen this to be in the case of comments made by individuals rather than organisations. Common to many of the instances of the invocation of kinship metaphors throughout the twentieth century is a subject position where discourse on international unity is employed in advocating improvements to the working of international society. Both the absence of international control by the failing League of Nations, and the stagnation and lack of will of the present day United Nations places individual politicians in the position of advocating change, and attempting to manipulate the possible options of discourses concerning visions of world order for maximum effect.

On the other hand, the most rigidly uniform discourse is produced today by NGOs and UN reports. Obviously in the 1930s and 1940s such a broad and deep bureaucratic discourse did not exist and in some ways then, when looking only at the statements made by individuals, the reduction in diversity of metaphorisations over time may not be quite so extreme. Today, the dominant formulation (IC) for discussing universal values and opinions holds its position based upon a number of factors. Once a linguistic formulation of a norm is reiterated in discourse by a cross-section of major actors\textsuperscript{707}, its legitimacy may become stabilised as the formalised nature of bureaucratic discourse leads to an infrequent cycle of re-evaluations of discourse. That is to say that the production of discourse in NGO and UN bureaucracies may indeed represent an instance of theoretical path-dependency. Taken in a broad sense, path-dependency may simply imply the conditioning of present circumstances by the decisions of the past. However, it may be more specifically defined as implying a cost of deviating in the present from the path set out by the decisions of the past. Following this

\textsuperscript{707} See Finnemore, M. and Sikkink, K. 'International Norm Dynamics and Political Change' in International Organization 52(4) p897. What I describe here is close to Finnemore and Sikkink's characterisation of a 'norm cascade'.

235
more particular mode of definition, Paul Pierson notes that institutional discourse can often become self-reinforcing in that, once established as norm, increasing returns accrue upon the use of the hegemonic discourse or modus operandi. He writes:

"(T)his conception of path dependence, in which preceding steps in a particular direction induce further movement in the same direction, is well captured by the idea of increasing returns. In an increasing returns process, the probability of further steps along the same path increases with each move down that path... the costs of exit — of switching to some previously plausible alternative — rise."\(^7\)\(^{08}\)

Partly, then, a discursive norm\(^7\)\(^{09}\) is selected for its functionality, but once this is coupled with a sense that it is not only the functional option, but the legitimate option, reversing the train of discourse is difficult\(^7\)\(^{10}\). Perpetuation of increasing returns in the context of NGO reporting for instance, might involve the success of one mode of framing a crisis in garnering support and funding for crisis management plans. With historical proofs accruing to 'prove' the success of one mode of reporting, it becomes less and less likely that approaches of reporting or advocacy will change. Not only this, but, as has been noted previously, the unequivocal moral value accorded kinship in political rhetorical usage can only lead to incurring costs for questioning or disavowing the essence of the sentiment expressed.

The place of kinship within the discursive field and the character of its usage then, has changed over time in part due to institutional factors. Literature produced in the early-mid twentieth century on the supposed coming of 'world government' or some other variation of new world order, commonly and liberally invoked such notions as the human family, the family of nations and the brotherhood of nations as a latent reality which today would probably seem hopelessly Utopian and naive. In part, of course, this can be put down to hopeful enthusiasm for a new way of conducting politics, but also, we should remember that the epistemic community responsible for much of this commentary was hardly a genuine representation of 'the international' but instead merely a manifestation of Western visions of

\(^{08}\) Pierson, P. (2000) 'Increasing Returns, Path-Dependence and the Study of Politics' in American Political Science Review 94(2) p252

\(^{09}\) Again, we refer to a norm in discourse simply as that which becomes 'normal' — a dominant pattern or formulation.

\(^{10}\) For further explanation see Mahoney, J. (2000) 'Path Dependence in Historical Sociology' in Theory and Society 29(4)
world order\textsuperscript{711}. As the community debating visions of world order has widened through the institutionalisation of the UN architecture, so the conditions for communication of such ideas have altered and this fact sheds light not only upon the use of kinship metaphor but also upon the relationship of kinship metaphor to blanket notions of the ‘international community’.

As noted in previous chapters, many invocations of kinship metaphor in the early twentieth century are situated in contexts where the sense of the metaphor is given resonance by association with either Judaeo-Christian religion on the one hand, or with a parental and pastoral imperialism on the other. In practical terms, the formulations of international brotherhood in the UN Prayer, and the association of kinship metaphors with the benevolent incorporation of colonial territories into the family of nations after the 1948 Declaration of Universal Human Rights, serve as prime examples. Conversely, references from contemporary case studies to kinship metaphors are more homogenous than those of the wartime period. As the potential audience for the proclamations of politicians has been increasingly widened, so the standardisation of discourse has increased. Just as it proves less incendiary (and also more meaningful) to have a Muslim deny the ‘humanity’ of other Muslims, or to have an African urge the human family to punish fellow Africans, so those metaphorical representations used by Western (and other) political figures in addressing a genuinely international audience, draw less explicitly on parochial cultural referents. We have noted already that the notion of ‘international community’ is a more value-neutral concept than those metaphors involving kinship, and thus finds itself fit for widespread dissemination.

In addition however, when kinship is invoked in the present day by Western figures, often, as demonstrated with Blair’s hopes for Iraq, it reproduces exactly an earlier form. To compare directly, Eleanor Roosevelt commented in 1948, “(w)e believe that all possible assistance and encouragement should be given to them to the end that they also may play their full part in the family of nations.”\textsuperscript{712} Such sentiments were echoed almost exactly by Tony Blair in the

\textsuperscript{711} A fine representation of this Western parochialism might be Walston, Sir C. (1919) The English-Speaking Brotherhood and the League of Nations

War on Terror: “we will help Iraq rebuild itself, and become once more a member of the international family of nations.”13 In effect, part of the sense of this statement is a form of phatic communication14 - an attempted establishment of positive relations to which aspirations (though empty and thus phatic) of human kinship are well suited - its function is simply in its reassuring sentiment. Or else, forms today are chosen which are tied less to Judaeo-Christian concepts of the building of a human community under God. The notion of brotherhood for instance has largely fallen away as Western discourse has become more attuned to gendering, to be replaced more commonly by the notion of the ‘family of nations’. Where ‘brotherhood’ as an aspiration for international politics does still dominate, is, as we have seen, in groups such as the Islamic rebels of Sudan whose enmeshment in international circles is incomplete, and to whom the connotations of equality embedded in the notion of brotherhood appeal.

Over the course of the history of the development of an institutional framework wherein a representation of ‘world opinion’ is enacted, an archive of statements concerning aspirations for human unity has been built up. This archival sediment is a discursive resource and, in part, constraint upon present day actors, and the constraining effects of bureaucratisation and the diversification of the audience of the ‘international community’ have certainly contributed to a demonstrable level of discursive homogenisation. In effect, the discursive experimentation of the pre-war period has been partly ossified and detached from its cultural roots in its institutional setting. When world leaders talk of human kinship then, to what extent is their discourse still representative of the values, meanings, functions and possibilities of a culturally ‘Western’ understanding of kinship? To put the question another way, it is certain that the political leaders making the statements so far examined are not representative examples of ‘Western’ culture, but rather of high level international political culture. To finally address the intricacies of what is at stake in the deployment of kinship

---


14 Malinowski, B. (1923) ‘The Problem of Meaning in Primitive Languages’, in Ogden, C.K and Richards, I.A., The Meaning of Meaning: A Study of Influence of Language Upon Thought and of the Science of Symbolism, p296-336. Malinowski’s notion of phatic communication is his functional explanation for all those instances of discourse between people when very little meaningful content is exchanged. His anecdotal comparison is the British obsession with discussing the weather. We do not do it in order to exchange meteorological information but merely to strike up conversation and engage human attention and contact.
metaphors in international politics it is necessary to pick apart the characteristics of ‘Western’
kinship and then in turn, the meanings latent within the metaphors used in political circles.

7.2 Kinship Studies and ‘Western’ Kinship in the Anthropological Canon

David Schneider, in his pioneering 1968 text American Kinship: A Cultural Account, argued
that the essence and uniqueness of American and Western kinship lay in its separation from
other modes of acting and being in the social universe. As Schneider saw it, most of Western
life (unlike many other cultures), was not kinship. He wrote:

“The kinship systems of modern, western societies are relatively highly differentiated as compared with the
kinship systems found in many primitive and peasant societies. By ‘differentiated’ I mean simply that kinship
is clearly and sharply distinguished from all other kinds of social institutions and relationships... in many
primitive and peasant societies a large number of different kind of institutions are organized and built as part
of the kinship system itself. Thus the major social units of the society may be kin groups – lineages perhaps.
These same kin groups may also be the property-owning units, the political units, the religious units and so on.
Thus whatever a man does in such a society he does as a kinsman of one kind or other.”715

Schneider is a vital source, perhaps the first anthropologist to provide tools by which the
West could study and find interest in its own kinship systems. As Feinberg notes, Schneider
was also responsible for insisting upon viewing kinship primarily as “a cultural system, not a
set of biological facts. Americans use biological relatedness as a symbol in terms of which
kinship is defined.”716 In other words, kinship is more properly analysed with relation to the
symbols and meanings and behaviours which natives of the culture attach to it, than as a
fixed system of social rules necessarily tied to a biological ‘reality’. In this sense, Schneider
intended to critique the earlier functionalist analyses of the kinship systems of less complex
societies wherein attempts were made to unravel the connections between kinship terms as
used, and underlying biological reality, in order to understand how ‘kinship’ structured social
roles and obligations. While Schneider’s focus on kinship closer to home helped to
reinvigorate the subject within anthropology, the logic by which he set up a notion of

---

Anthropological Relativism’ in Feinberg, R. and Ottenheimer, M.(eds.) The Cultural Analysis of Kinship: The
Legacy of David M. Schneider p8

239
Western kinship as opposed to other forms of kinship systems in some ways reproduces previous orientalising notions of non-Western ‘others’ whose lives were governed not by individual choice, but by their birth within a kinship system. Early to mid-twentieth century anthropologists saw kinship as an “irreducible principle on which...organized social life depends”\textsuperscript{717} in the non-Western societies they studied. By the mechanistic logic of structural-functionalism, anthropologists assumed that the presence of complex kinship accounts must point to a potent need for strong kinship structures in a given society. Notions of kinship clearly had a function – to organise a society wherein individuals could not organise themselves. This early fixation upon the kinship systems of non-Western societies placed these cultures subtly into a role as benighted throwbacks in relation to the modern West. Hereditary transmission of status, power, privilege or property in the contemporary West carries negative connotations of unfairness, corruption and nepotism. Thus, the ‘individualism’ of the West is supposedly characterised by meritocracy and rationality wherein members of society live “following the dictates of one’s conscience and not the dictates of one’s kinship group.”\textsuperscript{718}

This evolutionary trajectory from kinship to individualism, while problematic in anthropological accounts, is nevertheless relevant to a discussion of Westerners’ own ideas about their kinship system. Certainly most would recoil from the notion that kinship should once more be the organising principle for business or politics. Instead, kin relations are restricted in classic accounts to two planes, and in more current accounts, to three. In Schneider’s words “the cultural universe of relatives in American kinship is constructed to elements from two major cultural orders, the order of nature and the order of law.”\textsuperscript{719} This is to say that the cultural categories of Western kinship are based upon ties of consanguinity or affinity, birth or marriage, and these are reckoned in social situations as ‘natural’ expressions of identity and as legal expressions of right and responsibility. This duality has since been superseded in more recent work on cultural accounts of Western kinship. These latter have highlighted informants’ descriptions of the creation of ‘kinship’ and ‘family’ through affection and nurture parallel to, and quite separate from, notions of ‘blood’ relations by

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{717} Fortes, M. (1949) The Web of Kinship Among the Tallensi p340
\item \textsuperscript{718} Schneider, D. (1968) American Kinship: A Cultural Account pp. vi
\item \textsuperscript{719} Ibid. p27
\end{itemize}
‘nature’. Especially enlightening in this field have been studies of surrogate motherhood\(^{220}\) and the family arrangements of lesbian and gay couples\(^{221}\).

In a sense then, more contemporary work has overturned the long-held assumption that cultural classifications of kinship are built uniformly from the bases of self-evident natural and legal ties. However, many of the principle symbols, associations and meanings of kinship are not altered in situations where kinship is consciously created out of affection and nurturance. Since Western kinship builds its cultural understandings of consanguinity from notions of the biological ‘facts’ of sexual intercourse, the sexual act defines, primarily, the elements of the kinship structure. This is the case of the archetypal nuclear family. In such cases, but also more strikingly in less ‘traditional’ arrangements of relatives\(^{222}\), it is important to remember that **the terms of kinship structures are normative as well as descriptive.**

In Western contexts, this normativity revolves particularly around the ‘family’. As Schneider puts it: “the family as a symbol is a pattern for how kinship relations should be conducted.”\(^{223}\) Thus in American and Western kinship, sexual intercourse symbolises and is metaphorised in discourse as an expression of ‘love’ and in contradistinction to the public domains of work and money. ‘Love’ paradigmatically expresses a cultural standard for the expectation of the character of relationships within a family. This then, is the inbuilt root in Western kinship systems for the unequivocal positive valuation of kinship that we have discussed on numerous occasions in previous chapters. From this association, the derivation of chosen ‘kin’ — Kath Weston’s kinship of affection\(^{224}\) — is simply taking the normative part of the symbolic complex of the nuclear family and reproducing it without the biological connections, for example in the case of adoption.

A significant part of what makes such a move possible, is the way that understandings of kinship in the Western world pivot between, on the one hand, derivations (supposedly from ‘nature’ or biological reality) of status and identity, and on the other hand of the normative ‘content’ of kinship as a specific type of social relation and enduring bond of solidarity. Part

---

\(^{220}\) See Ragone, H. (1994) *Surrogate Motherhood: Conception in the Heart*

\(^{221}\) See Weston K. (1997) *Families We Choose: Lesbians, Gays, Kinship*

\(^{222}\) Such as in Ragone’s studies of surrogacy or Weston’s work on lesbian and gay couples and their families, referenced above.


\(^{224}\) Weston K. (1997) *Families We Choose: Lesbians, Gays, Kinship*
of the revisions of anthropological studies of kinship after Schneider dealt with the realisation that all societies, whether their folk culture recognises the existence of 'kinship systems' or not, balance, in varying degrees, accounts of personhood and social relations that are sometimes fixed and sometimes contingent. In Levy's account of Solomon Island kinship, the existence of a household based on biological parents and children is conditionally formed based on the choice of the parents whether to keep and raise the child. On the North Slope of Alaska, kin bonds can be formed by cohabitation regardless of notions of blood ties, and can be unmade by the effect of time spent apart.

Early anthropology had assumed that all kinship meaning and function derived in some way (as the Western system supposedly does) from the facts of nature. The misleading study of kinship was, according to Strathern, “the tracing of natural ties” as overlaid by cultural description. As contemporary anthropology both of Western and non-Western kinship or relatedness argues, the natural model is often an unnecessary distraction when seeking the meaning of the practices and discourses of kinship. While contemporary studies now acknowledge that all societies, Western and non-Western, manipulate and stretch notions of kinship beyond the scope of familial or biological relations, ideas of Western kinship are uniquely organised around dual key cultural poles relevant to the use of kinship metaphors in global politics.

Contrary to systems where kinship is strictly made and unmade through action, or more rigid systems where kinship denotes political roles and rights, Western models of kinship are capable of being used at the same time to denote feelings of permanent unity and also contingent expansion of the kin group based upon the fulfilment of the behavioural enactment of a relationship appropriate to the ‘family’. The tension between Western kinship’s dual poles, of permanent relations by virtue of shared substance, and contingent enactment of kin relation, aligns with the uneasy proclamations of human unity in political discourse. Conceptually, this is an aspirational unity contingent upon humanity behaving as

---

one, but at the same time what is expressed is the concrete notion that in fact, despite our
differences and failure to act as kin, humanity is indeed a kin universe.

Compartmentalised as a domain of affect, the manipulability of the notion of kinship-as-affection has enabled the transmission of the emotive form of the kinship metaphor to aspirational statements about world politics. In many ways this has been said to derive from the particular focus on individuality at the heart of Western, and especially English and American kinship structure. As Strathern has remarked, individuality, or treating persons as individuals first rather than as occupiers of places within an overarching system, is "the first fact of English kinship."728 High levels of independence and individuality have been noted in relation to the weakness of the influence of kinship ties upon English families surrounding such aspects of life as residence patterns, household economy and inheritance even in the Middle Ages.729 Further, as Olivia Harris notes, drawing on Alan Macfarlane’s history of English kinship in the diaries of the seventeenth century Essex vicar, Ralph Josselin, kinship terms, roles and sentiments have long been interchangeable with those associated with non-kin in a flexible understanding of the notion of ‘household’. Josselin treated and spoke of his close friends as kin, while also conversely taking in his genealogical sister as a servant at one point.730 As Harris writes: “kin terms in early modern England carry a moral and affective load; but on the one hand these meanings are not exclusive to genealogical kin, and on the other, even close kin could be incorporated in the household in a way which partially denied the special relation of kinship.”731 Thus there is no need to mobilise causal notions of the influence of Enlightenment rational individualism or modern declines of religious influence upon society to explain this compartmentalisation of kinship, merely to note the probable additions these social changes may have effected upon a flexible set of kinship traits and naming practices already present.

At the same time, from the notion that true, permanent kinship is bound up with shared substance derived from ‘nature’, statements about world kinship may be lent gravity,

---
especially in contexts where they are attached to Judaeo-Christian conceptions of the
derivation of human kinship. The dual legal and ‘natural’ bases of the ideas of kinship at
stake reinforce the applicability of those ideas to institutional settings like UN discourse. In
contrast to modes of othering such as bestialisation explored in Chapters Five and Six, the
legal and institutional framework of the international arena is discursively based upon the
defence of shared human kin. The UN speaks of itself as representing humanity against
inhumanity committed by other humans, but not humanity against beasts. Thus kinship is
able to re-affirming the value of the in-group whilst simultaneously addressing the other.
While accusations of barbarianism or bestiality are aggressive and sometimes shocking, the
international organisational architecture is not set up with reference to human and
barbarians, but is set up as a protection of the human kin group defined conditionally upon
‘human’ behaviour.

Western models then permit the discursive expression of kinship that is both supposedly
‘naturally’ immutable and also, being conditional upon behaviour, flexibly able to be
contracted and expanded. They permit us to feel that our world has a basic ‘natural’
coherence and kinship, but that this relation may be expanded or contracted to include those
who can truly act as kin towards us. They enable simultaneously discourses of reassurance in
the present and hope for improvement in the future.

7.3 Using ‘Western kinship’ as an Explanatory Tool: Assumptions,
Functions, Models

Central to the structural-functional analyses of kinship systems which dominated
anthropology in the mid-twentieth century, was the notion that kinship functioned to
perpetuate the order and organisation of society. Very much derived from the innovative
methodology of participant observation and based upon a single ethnographer spending a
considerable period of time immersed in native language and culture, the monographs

732 Chief among these: Radcliffe-Brown, A.R. (1922) The Andaman Islanders: A Study in Social Anthropology,
Evans-Pritchard, E. E. (1940) The Nuer: A Description of the Modes of Livelihood and Political Institutions of a
produced in this heyday of kinship studies have long been accused of representing synchronic snapshots of a functioning society, with no appreciation for how that society would change over time, or would cope with change. In such an explanatory methodology, aspects of social organisation were often ascribed a function, with the assumption implicit that no other social factor could possibly achieve the same necessary function. Every aspect of society thus found a rational and necessary role—a stance which bred eventual criticisms levelled at the authors for producing almost Panglossian tautologies.

Ascribing functions to the kinship metaphors used in the preceding case studies therefore cannot proceed blithely in the belief that such choices are always necessary and unavoidable in order for certain social functions to be achieved. The objects of study, it must be remembered, are articles of discourse not 'social facts'. Two points arise from this. Firstly, most discourses by their nature contain a range of possible options for communicating a certain set of ideas or propositions. Rather than attempting to explain why one social fact appears to achieve a given end, a broader analysis would place a set of propositions in relation to each other and attempt to account for the relative success or failure of ideas in given situations. In this, the influence of Sperber and Boyer's work on the cognitive 'fitness' of representations is key. Secondly, discourse, particularly of the highly metaphorical and future-oriented type under consideration, cannot be viewed as a simplistic transaction of information or desire in return for a required response. Discourse, and the practice of discoursing, is a contest wherein the subject may weigh the symbolic capital associated with various ways of portraying one's international intentions and aspirations in order to maximise the potential of achieving, for instance, support or sympathy, or inciting action from the international community.
That said, the preceding discussion of the character and traits inherent in Western modes of conceiving of the meanings of kinship and family bring us much closer to being able to ascribe potential functionality to the instances of metaphorical usage observed in the case studies. It should be clear that kinship metaphorisation often seems (apparently to discursing subjects due to their patterns of usage) an advantageous discursive move. It is also apparent that something of the same sense of world unity can be expressed by notions of 'community' and that thus, kinship does not have an exclusive function in conveying visions of common human values, substance or purpose. What has also been apparent though is that contextually, kinship metaphors are unlikely to be found to be completely interchangeable. In predictable contexts kinship metaphors are selected, principally as a way to move to a more emotive register of discourse from conventional and more neutral expressions of 'community'. In such contexts kinship displays an exclusive usage in the case studies presented. There is no other metaphorical resource drawn upon in the same way to move up to a higher emotional register in contexts of discussing world opinion and unity.

As we will see in the following chapter in discussions of shifts within speeches to the use of the kinship metaphor, kinship performs a double role when used to change the emotive register. Of course, discourses such as that of the bestialisation of the enemy are highly emotionally charged. However, such rhetoric acts only to negatively denigrate the out-group by incensing the in-group and its anger. Kinship on the other hand, emphasises the positive values and feelings of commonality of the in-group, directing these energies thence outward to address the injustices perpetrated upon it, or to reach out to the persecuted beyond its bounds. The suffering or evil on the outside is framed by the simultaneous affirmation and re-statement of the value of the in-group. To accomplish this kind of double-work, kinship is the prime resource in Western political rhetoric.

In contrast, one might think of what Michael Urban describes as the Russian 'hero-victim' complex as a similar rhetorical tool from a different social context. The heroism of the nation is affirmed by virtue of its inward 'spirituality' and 'selflessness'\textsuperscript{736} while at the same time righteousness is lent to the in-group by the injustices of Others turning it into a victim. Such a "cult of heroism" was noted by Mathewson in the Cold War as the prime trope used in

Russia to “drive men to the fulfillment of their public tasks.”737 It was also deployed to
honour not just individuals and the Russian collective as a whole, but in the case of specific
cities for their suffering and resistance during World War Two. Cities such as Leningrad were
designated ‘Hero City’ for their bravery in the face of the Nazi offensive.738 As Mathewson
points out, this deployment of the trope of heroism, often victimised heroism in Russia, has
“roots deep into the Russian past, specifically into the national literary tradition”739 which he
traces back to the seventeenth century. A powerful alternative for kinship formulations then
exists in Russian contexts for the double work of affirming the in-group and addressing
problems beyond the bounds of that group.

This option is scarcely in play in Western contexts. The specific Western ‘fitness’ of kinship
for use in certain discursive contexts, when combined with constraints upon the options
available in subject positions for the production of discourse which will be understood, can
lead to kinship discourse being a necessary and not just a probable or possible selection in
rhetoric.740 Perhaps the easiest example to use to illustrate this necessity of selection is, once
again, the UN Prayer. In the darkest days of World War Two, and the attempt to use quasi­
religious language to foster determination to believe in and work for the UN cause, only a
small number of metaphors of solidarity consonant with American religious language present
themselves. One is the in-group as a family, following for example 1 John 3: “(T)he Father
has loved us so much that we are called children of God. And we really are his children.”741 A
second might be the metaphor of the in-group as a ‘flock’. This however, positions the
speaker as superior to the addressees speaking to those who would blindly follow his/her
words. Further, in a speech designed to encourage determination and resolve, comparison to
sheep and connotations of timidity would be scarcely apt. As another alternative, attempts
might have been made to use the notion of the UN in-group as the ‘elect’. However, in this

737 Mathewson, R.J. (1953) ‘The Soviet Hero and the Literary Heritage’ in American Slavic and East European
Review 12(4), p506
739 Mathewson, R.J. (1953) ‘The Soviet Hero and the Literary Heritage’ in American Slavic and East European
Review 12(4), p506
740 In this sense, the notion of necessity described is not logical necessity — an automatic derivative of
preconditions, but the necessity which derives from elimination of other possible avenues. This latter ‘necessity
by elimination’ is applicable to discursive investigations which deal with a limited menu of sensible options for
linguistic formulations.
741 See 1 John 3, New Century Version. Available at:
case, the Calvinist overtones are less than inclusive and connotations of contemporaneous Nazi Aryan superiority discourses would be highly distasteful. In this sense, and in such contexts it is possible for kinship metaphors to emerge as the only suitable way to draw ‘we/they’ distinctions that would convey the requisite type of positive moral affirmation to the in-group in times of crisis.

In other words, conditions of usage are generated when two sets of constraints are in play. Firstly, the desired content of the proposition to be made must be quite specific, thus limiting discursive options. Secondly, the conditions of emergence, for instance the type of audience or political climate, must further constrain discourse options. When these two conditions are met, the flexibility and easy translatability of notions of kinship can often bring them to the fore over other, less flexible, discursive options.

As for kinship’s role as a sole resource for emotive variation on the theme of human community or unity, it would be easy to misinterpret this simply as self-evident. Other than the obsession with order required by the structural-functional paradigm, part of the explanation for early anthropologists’ fascination with kinship was the presupposition, or apparently self-evident assumption that kinship, being kinship, mattered more than other types of social relation. As Schneider writes in a later critique of the methodology of the study of kinship: “the single most important assumption on which the premise of the privileged nature of kinship and the presumed Genealogical Unity of Mankind rests... is the assumption that Blood Is Thicker Than Water.” As Schneider notes, this folk expression of the ‘thickness’ of blood is a central notion of Western culture, and, in any cross-cultural sense cannot be taken as an explanation for reliance upon kinship metaphor.

However, from early anthropological preoccupations with working to understand aspects of non-Western societies through comparisons of genealogies, it can be said that precisely because of the innate Western assumption about the ‘thickness of blood’, do the metaphors in our case studies gain meaning. W.H.R. Rivers’ famous charts of Torres Strait Island kinship743 sought out aspects of the characters of social relations and modes of organisation

---

743 Rivers, W.H.R. (1914) Kinship and Social Organisation
among the islanders, but translated native idioms into a structure based upon English notions of kinship and pedigree. The basis of Rivers' enquiry into indigenous kinship was thus the attempted establishment of relations of biological parenthood within a community, drawing up charts of relationships from a central concern for this Western starting point. While problematic as a social science methodology, this belief in the translatable nature of kinship relations and terminology into cross-culturally comparable grids, is based wholly upon the assumption that fundamental meanings within relations of kinship are universal. This assumption, Schneider writes: "is but a particular instance of the more general characteristic of European culture toward what might be called 'biologistic' ways of constituting and conceiving of human character, human nature, and human behaviour."

From the exposition of the traits of Western kinship in the previous section, it becomes clearer why kinship is fitted to a function as a heightened emotive register in discussing actions and aspirations of humanity. Western kinship notions, as we have said include derivations both from permanent biological ties and also contingent relations of affect, though, as illustrated by the 'thickness of blood' metaphor, there is an implicit cross-over assumption that biology denotes or conditions (or should do, at least) appropriate feeling of affect. It is the coupling of the belief in the self-evidence of a special emotive closeness of kinship ties, along with a belief in the biological universalism of comparable kinship that permits kinship metaphors to be used without explanation, as if the whole of humanity might naturally understand the implications of such usage. As the UN Declaration of Human Rights holds as its first article: "(A)ll human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood." A certain form of cultural imperialism is at work here, assuming, based upon Western folk models of the universality and naturalness of kinship relations, that the meaning of relations of 'brotherhood' should be self-evident. However, what is stake here are not notions of responsibility for providing a wife for your sister's son (a primary role of brotherhood in many of the cultures studied in early anthropological kinship

---

746 UN Declaration of Human Rights (1948) Preamble. Reproduced in Appendix B.
monographs), but a complex of the more vague emotions of affect symbolised in Western notions of the family: love, trust, respect, and especially equality. Also present in this loaded term is the quiet removal of women from these bonds to which the success of world society is to be entrusted. ‘Brotherhood’ is taken to mean all persons, but its reductive masculinity reveals vestiges of Christian andro-centric notions of the composition of the community simply by males.

Not only, as we have noted previously, do kinship metaphors derive meaning from religious association, but also, especially with the notion of brotherhood, an intellectual undercurrent of the mobilisation of the common man (and not, originally, woman also) is present in this UN Declaration ideal. As we saw in Chapter Five, fraternalism has been harnessed since the Middle Ages as an organisational emblem of guilds, unions and political associations. One might also recollect in this context that the re-politicisation of the value of fraternity occurred during the French Revolution. As William Scott writes, while the dream of liberty inspired the intellectual elites, the histories of the Revolution by liberal historians like Michelet present the politicised French lower classes as “proud bearers of their own uplifting values, notably those of equality and fraternity”, values which “grew from social roots, in the often grim experience of workers and peasants.” The poor man’s dream as well as the religious man’s vision, kinship metaphors employed in the institutional sites we have considered, present modes of shaping a moral valuation of a type of world unity that may be doubly patriarchal – either drawing unity from a patriarchal religion or from a set of guarantees of masculine rights as world-citizen-workers. This maps onto the patterns we observed with relation to brotherhood discourses used by the Darfuran rebels desperate for aid and equality, and the ‘family of nations’ discourse deployed in a patriarchal reassurance in Tony Blair’s Letter to Darfur.

Thus, the kinship language used in such articles as the 1948 Declaration conceals Western liberal historical baggage which requires some unpacking. The hidden patriarchal, male-

747 Or even in Holy’s study of the Berti, referenced in Chapter Five.
oriented referents belie a language which is presented as if it fairly and simply represented a self-evident set of claims that are to be made on behalf of all humans. It is valuable to note here in pursuing this example, that the Declaration of Human Rights is the most translated document in the world and is available in well over three hundred languages. An important discovery which anthropological methods should prepare us for, is that, while the language in which the Declaration was written speaks of the afore-mentioned liberal referents of brotherhood and the human family, these ideas, which are presented as universal, are not universally translated, even by the UN. In fact, while the English, French, Spanish and Mandarin versions, for instance, share references to the human family/la famille humaine/familia humana/仁人jiāng và spirit of brotherhood/esprit de fraternité/comportarse fraternalmente/di guān ji, one does not have to go far from the Anglo-French cradle of these ideas for these referents to be dropped. Indeed, even the German version does not permit of a direct translation of the notion of human family, instead relying on der Gemeinschaft der Menschen – the 'human community'.750 The assumption of universality even on agreeable direct translation of such 'universals' is misleading.

As a comparative exercise aimed at evincing the particularly Western, liberal characters of the understandings of kinship that have been discussed, it is useful to consider the ways in which distant cultures learn to use kinship metaphors to express relations of identity and difference far removed from the usual confines of close family. Rita Astuti's work on the learning of kinship discourse by children of the Vezo culture of Madagascar provides an excellent foil for the preceding discussion. Among the Vezo, Astuti tested the transmission from adults to children of folk discourses of Vezo kinship identity. The Vezo, a coastal fishing people, live in close proximity to the inland Masikoro, predominantly farmers. Children are socialised in a context where Vezo and Masikoro are presented as opposites. Children are praised when their actions show that they are learning Vezo traits and skills (mending nets, beachcombing, catching fish) and reprimanded by being accused of 'becoming Masikoro'751 when they stray from these ‘positive’ activities or misbehave in some way. Further inland, occupying urban

---


position as traders, and scarcely registering in the Vezo self/other schema (certainly not for children) are the Karany, inland urban traders and merchants.

Vezo folk culture holds that “people are what they are because of the place where they live, which in turn determines the activities they perform.” Astuti posed a series of scenarios to her informants in which members of different groups were to be adopted by other groups. She aimed to test the power of Vezo folk culture after having already demonstrated that Vezo can distinguish between traits passed on physically at birth and those learned in culture. Vezo adults displayed a capacity to reason consistently according to their folk culture that even in a hypothetical case where a Karany (by birth) was adopted into Vezo culture, they would, according to the adult respondents, become Vezo. On the other hand, children, socialised in a context of Vezo/Masikoro praxis, reasoned fairly consistently that a Masikoro child would ‘become’ Vezo by adoption. However, they significantly failed to be able to apply this cultural logic to the unknown Karany. In essence they had learned to mimic cultural kinship, but not to understand its extensible logic.

Two levels of understanding of ‘proximity to ego’ in social personhood are in play here. A primary mode of distinction appears to exist based simply upon the knowledge of not being born in one’s familiar locality and kinship group. Only after the age of approximately seven years, Astuti argues, do the conditions of cultural models of creating kinship consistently override the early developmental instinct to ally status and personhood simply to whatever traits birth and place may be thought to confer. In other words, the earliest cognitive models hold that humans have consistent rather than flexible identities.

This argument has been made in a more familiar capacity by Lawrence Hirschfeld in the context of an investigation of ‘human-kind competencies’ in American children. This term in effect denotes the ability of children to firstly recognise types of ‘kindhood’ such as race, gender or kinship, and secondly to understand differences between the transmissibility or variability of ‘kind’ characteristics. In Hirschfeld’s studies for instance, American preschoolers affirmed that “(A) substantial portion of children living in the United States

753 Ibid. p440
believe that behavioural proclivities, specifically those associated with occupational
categories, are as intrinsic, deep, and heritable as race. He argues that this is due to the
fact that "children's social categories are...constructed around physically prominent,
epistemically superficial, and politically naive features" and thus "reasoning about different
kinds of kinds tends to be quite similar." In short, gender, race, kinship, and even
occupation are differentiated similarly and may be loaded with a great deal of intrinsic and
immutable value if the physical markers seem to set that characteristic apart as being a
prominent example of a 'kind'.

This leads to two further points concerning the applicability of Western kinship models to
grand political discourse. Firstly, the recourse to such kinship metaphor either to include and
welcome or to exclude and condemn therefore can in no way be said to be 'natural'.
'Naturally', such complex cognitive steps are highly improbable. Instead it is a manifestation
of the particular flexibility of understandings of kinship. Secondly, looking closer at the adult
responses of Vezo informants, it proved more likely that they would follow their folk culture
of ascribing personhood to successful performance of role in the case of the Masikoro
adoptive other than the Karany. A greater stretch of folk metaphor is required the more distant the
'other' is. Thus, the prevalence of statements in international discourse about the kinship or
potential kinship of all mankind demonstrates a highly elastic understanding of kinship.
What is more, by stretching such a notion to its widest extent, the speaker aims at the most
impactful cognitive leap. Also, the conditionality of kinship expressed in such statement
matches a Western model for the creation of kinship. Unlike the Vezo, where the 'other'
must learn practical skills to become kin, Western models merely require subscription to the
values and character of relationships implicit in being kin.

---

p193
755 Ibid. p191
7.4 Chapter Data Compared To Western Models

In making a point-by-point analysis of the statements collected in the case studies, it is important first to recognise that what has been described thus far are certain of the archetypal characteristics present in kinship models as described by Westerners, but not a model purporting to be a structural unity or rigid system. Some defence of the notion of Western kinship models is clearly required.

By virtue of the narrowing of discursive input into the creation of the UN system as described in Chapter Three, reliance upon a notion of Western kinship may not be quite so difficult to defend. Many of the principle contributions and amendments proposed by non-Western allies were dismissed, and most of the amendments passed in debates prior to San Francisco were made by Western partners of the US and were, in any case, on matters of procedure and not philosophy. The drafting in particular of the preambles to the great UN documents, was solely conducted by Westerners. These documents, whether present day speakers are themselves Western or not, have, by their claims to universal value and validity, become hugely influential upon the emergent epistemic community of bureaucrats, the politicians and the international media.

As a new wave of kinship studies based on the relationality of Westerners has come to the fore in anthropology, a sharp analytic split between the types of 'person' supposedly present in Western and non-Western contexts has been recognised and problematised. Prior to this new wave in the 1990s and 2000s, a supposition was that there existed a "strong contrast between Western individualism and non-Western dividualism" though aspects of creative relationality have since been explored in Western contexts, famously in studies of New Reproductive Technologies. As another example, Strathern for instance, has considered the acquisition of 'identity' in Euro-American contexts through the practice of tracing of one's ancestry. As she notes: "knowledge creates relationships: the relationship come into being when the knowledge does." Picking up on this movement, it seems that the very

---

duality of Western modes of kinship understanding – the insistence on individuals defined by scientific biology but also the practice of extensible relationality, is the key to the work done by kinship discourse. Prior to the individualisation of the Western person, two of the key cognitive moves in the process of metaphorising world politics in terms of kinship were highly unlikely. Firstly, the recognition of human shared substance based on biological understandings of humans as a common species, laid open the potential for finally overturning historical discourses on the isolation of races. Secondly, and somewhat paradoxically, it is the Western individual who is at the heart of many of the more creative modes of ‘making’ kinship in ‘non-standard’ family relationships – a practical demonstration of the potentiality latent for the creation of kin of affect. Only by partial freedom from the constraints of kinship structures can the metaphorical and practical notion of ‘choosing’ to becoming kin be meaningful. Though this has been recently brought out in studies of homosexual couples or adoption, it was already latent in Western society with the increasing choice given to all individuals over time with reference to marriage and kin creation, the abolishment of practices of the arrangement of kinship and kinship as commodity exchange.

Thus a notion of Western kinship models bearing a duality of scientific individualism derived from ‘nature’, and freedom of extensibility by virtue of ascribing to the symbols of the character of proper kin relations, is a useful encapsulation of the heart of the discourses we have studied. This is particularly true given the power generated by these discourses in the thoroughly Western institutional settings in which they are espoused. However, I do not wish to try to portray an unchanging unity. At all points, I am concerned with ‘models’ and not ‘a model’. This is because, as discussed previously, parts of the kinship models are unexplained or implicit even to Westerners, as we saw in Chapter Four; each actor will mobilise parts of various models and discursive recourse according to the aim of his/her speech. What particularities then, are evidenced by the preceding case study data of kinship metaphor usage compared to what sociological studies would predict for Western models and how do these two data sets align?

Most prominently, the referents and symbols used are deployed in patterns which are highly predictable given what we would expect from the archetypes of Western kinship models. Numerous references are made, it will be recalled, to the symbol of the ‘family’. Once more,
akin to the example given above of the use of the notion of 'brotherhood' in the UN Declaration of Human Rights, the import of this symbol is taken to be self-evident. And yet, following Schneider, it is precisely those symbols most pregnant with implicit meaning in the constellation of symbols in Western kinship folk culture, that are chosen for use in such discourse. No references exist for those modes of kinship organisation that are no longer pertinent in Western society. There are no mentions of the human 'clan' or 'lineage' in the large quantities of political statements, NGO reports and official grand discourses that have been reviewed; instead the archetypal unit of organisation of Western culture, the 'family' is invoked. Though I have made a similar point previously, I will stress again that when a kinship metaphor is invoked to substitute for a notion of community, it is 'brotherhood' or the 'family' (implicitly headed by a man) rather than 'sisterhood' or even 'brotherhood and sisterhood', which is most commonly seen.

The markers of the loci within discourse where kinship is likely to be invoked (generality, aspirational and emotive content) match quite closely with the characters of Western models of kinship outlined thus far, and tally with the discursive purposes of the statements made. In effect, the international architecture which strives to create and represent world unity is still incomplete, and the frustrations with the current ineffectiveness of some of its aims place discoursing subjects in the same type of subject positions as those who earlier advocated world organisation as a remedy to international ills. At all points, the kinship metaphor is one of advocacy. It is used as a higher, and more powerful register of advocacy for the transformation of international anarchy into a state of unity. The markers of discourse usage studied map onto particular characteristics of the meanings inherent in Western kinship models.

Firstly, the emotive contexts in which kinship metaphors are invoked, tally with the position of kinship within Western notions of the location of social modes of organisation. Kinship is assigned an anti-political position and the family used a symbol of positive, affirming relations of care and inclusion. Consider as an example the statements by President Bush shortly after 9/11 - brimful of somewhat incongruous kinship references designed to re-affirm the goodness of the American way of life. Secondly, the generalised statements made using kinship metaphors are made in accordance with the unspecific nature of the creative
ways latent in Western kinship for 'becoming' kin. The ideals of the UN Declaration of
Human Rights are the ideal illustration of this. How does one evaluate a 'spirit of
brotherhood'? As an emotive discourse, kinship statements are not suited to rigorous styles
of factual description. Thirdly, the potential for poiesis in Western kinship, attached to the
manipulation of symbols of ways of being, rather than actual actions, lends itself to flexible
expansions and contractions of the putative kin group (the notion of the family is taken up
heavily by the nation-state79 as well as in invocation of world unity) and also to highly
speculative future-orientation in discourse. Fourthly, the positive attributes supposedly
inherent in kin relations make the discourse highly suited to the self-affirming discourses of
the UN and others (such as the statements of Emyr Jones Parry seen in Chapter Five), who
feel themselves to represent the human family. Fifthly, practices of ostracism using kinship
seem to be conditional upon both (mundanely) a political right to ostracise, and also (more
interestingly) upon some perceived kinship commonality with the condemned which is closer
than simply common humanity.760 The power of, and reluctance to use such metaphors is
connected to the institutional framework which presupposes universal personhood but also
is linked to the particular ways in which Western kinship models are able to be expanded and
contracted. One would initially think that the flexibility repeatedly outlined would negate the
power of a denial of kinship. Kinship, it would seem, can be remade. This flexibility does
indeed permit such statements and prevents a Schmittian policy of destruction of the non-kin
'other'.

However, this flexibility turns on the paradoxical duality of the notion of 'nature' that is
central to the 'Western-ness' of the kinship models at stake. On the one hand a particular
understanding of 'nature' furnishes a scientific claim to identify all humans as of common
substance. On the other, 'natural' relations of kinship in the private sphere are opposed in
Western political thought to the political relations of society and because of the way such
natural relations are positively valued, 'affect kin' can be produced by virtue of appropriate
behaviour and emotional feeling. These very Western notions seem on the one hand to make
human kinship a fixed group consisting of every biological human, and on the other hand a
group that may expand and contract depending upon behaviour in social relations. This

79 Especially enlightening on this subject is Herzfeld, M. (2005) Cultural Intimacy: Social Poetics in the Nation-
State
760 See statements by Al-Faisal or Soyinka, Chapter Six.
internal contradiction is key to the paradoxes of kinship discourse observed. While we have noted that kinship discourse may be widely employed due to the flexibility given to it by these contradictory impulses, this internal paradox may also be destabilising and may limit the effectiveness of the discourse. For instance, how can discourses of exclusion on the basis of failing to act like kin be taken seriously when a contrary part of the same discursive complex insists that all humans remain kin by virtue of biology, and regardless of behaviour in international society? Such discourse, which appears to work against itself, may not, especially given the views of UN workers themselves in Chapter Four, be anything close to as useful as one would hope either in cases of motivating positive action or disciplinary measures in international society. Thus, with this understanding of the limits of these discourses which the world has internalised since World War Two, we can look to complete a critical appraisal of the continuing presence of world-kinship ideals as central visions of the end-goal of international politics in the UN-era.
CHAPTER EIGHT - Conclusions

8.1 Is the ‘Human Community’ or the ‘Family of Nations’ a Helpful Aim in International Politics?

Thus far the discoveries of the inquiry may be summarised as follows:

i) Multiple modes of world kinship discourse exist to espouse universal standards to push towards world unity in the contemporary period. The diversity of types of usage is though, narrower than in the earlier years of the League and UN projects. Particular modes of usage include liberal inclusionary modes which draw on linkages between kinship and nurturance in Western social thought. This usage may also be used paternally to solidify a parent/child relation between nations within and without the functioning core of the family of nations. It may also be employed in hawkish conservative modes of excluding nations or individuals in order to deny rights.

ii) The ‘international community’ description of world unity has become a bureaucratic standard, but kinship discourse has emerged as a prominent alternative, especially employed in emotive contexts to argue forcefully for action or the defense of values in global politics. Kinship discourses are a powerful way of delineating we/they groupings in world politics, but, valued unequivocally positively in Western political thought, find more potential usages in discourses which are inclusionary than exclusionary. Inclusionary kinship discourses perform the double work of bolstering the moral standing of the in-group while addressing the Other. Based on the flexibility of the Western notion of kinship deployed in UN contexts, it is not necessarily a mode of Schmittian destruction of the Other, despite the theoretical denial of personhood that is implicit when kinship is employed to exclude.

iii) Kinship discourses were crucial motivators both in the War efforts of the era of UN planning, and in the values that the planners thought were vital for the success of the new UN organisation. Contrary to this perspective, it is the political role of the UN, rather than its specific value as a moral arbiter, that UN staff today prize. Many, while praising the moral
values of the UN, find the explicit formulations of the founding documents can actually hinder negotiation with non-Western groups, seeming anachronistic and ethno-centric.

iv) The complexity of the notion of kinship employed in these discourses leads to certain paradoxes and flaws which make it a vision of world unity which is hard to operationalise. Kinship pivots on a dual understanding of the concept of ‘natural’ human relations. It is at once taken to be measured by the action of affectionate behaviour and proved by biological substance, in other words, is contingent and universal at the same time. While the values which inspire the discourses have been increasingly globalised, the discourses themselves are contradictory and lead to contradictory applications.

From the birth of the UN-era to the present day, an insistent hope of a single united ‘world’ has been a cornerstone of political discourse at the international institutional level. In the wake of the destruction of fascism, the bases of a new liberal consensus were set down in the founding documents of the United Nations. Nazism had allied with Italian fascism and aggressive Japanese nationalism to enflame a truly global conflict and long-range weapons destroyed forever the hope that geography could provide any genuine isolation and safeguard. In response, the project of international organisation turned on the hope that a conception of the world as one connected locality could be allied to a rhetoric of shared values – a human community, and, one step further, of shared substance – a human family.

This grand discourse espouses a set of goals and visions so vague and so Utopian that it is hard to seriously imagine them ever being realised. More problematically though, many of the uses of discourses of human community or the human family do not speak of the future, but speak about supposed international consensus or opinion in the present when often to do so is an inaccurate (even fanciful) representation of the diversity and complexity of opinion in international society. It is such usage that Inderpal Grewal has termed ‘catachrestic’ discourse. That is to say that “the literal and the imaginary are confused deliberately” when speaking of the will of the putative international community. Gravitas is intentionally added.

to unilateral statements by the speaker claiming to speak for the global community, in this way “presenting an imperial threat (or warning, or desire) as a moral, global consensus.”

Such a language of false unity is politically problematic when it leaches from international institutional circles, or emanates from a US President or Secretary of State, for instance. The following example formed part of the US reaction to the Israel/Lebanon war of 2006. A press conference was given by George W. Bush and Tony Blair in the White House with the pair pushing for the deployment of a multinational force in Lebanon to help the government control Hezbollah and secure the concessions required for an Israeli withdrawal. As Bush put it:

"Prime Minister Blair and I agree that this approach gives the best hope to end the violence and create lasting peace and stability in Lebanon. This approach will demonstrate the international community's determination to support the government of Lebanon, and defeat the threat from Hezbollah and its foreign sponsors."

The continuing use of such catachrestic discourse perpetuates the entrenchment of the UN project within a closed circle (geographically and philosophically). Unfortunately, given the systematic constriction of input into the philosophical underpinnings of the UN, (Chapter Three) the more political interventions that are made by that organisation, or worse, by Western leaders in its name, the more this can seem to other nations as a form of 'value globalisation' – the exportation of a system of moral principles purporting to supersede local variants. As George Perkovich writes: “the general alienation of Muslim societies from the international mainstream may be the most pressing foreign policy challenge facing the United States today, but they are related to a broader disaffection with globalization, which is seen as a largely American project.” Writing to Bush in 2006, shortly before the outbreak of the Lebanon war, Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad argued:

"Don't Latin Americans have the right to ask, why their elected governments are being opposed and coup leaders supported? Or, why must they constantly be threatened and live in fear? The people of Africa are hardworking, creative and talented. They can play an important and valuable role in providing for the needs of..."
humanity and contribute to its material and spiritual progress. Poverty and hardship in large parts of Africa are preventing this from happening. Don’t they have the right to ask why their enormous wealth – including minerals – is being looted, despite the fact that they need it more than others? ... The people of the world are not happy with the status quo and pay little heed to the promises and comments made by a number of influential world leaders. . . . The people of the world have no faith in international organisations, because their rights are not advocated by these organisations.

Naturally, the political incentives for such a message on behalf of the Iranians at that time were considerable given the concern over the possibility of nuclear weapons development in Iran. However, just as pressing is the rhetorical space and hence political leverage, opened up to a figure like Ahmadinejad by the recourse to universalising on behalf of the Westernised discourse of the UN and its major powers. Such moralising discourse escalates the stakes of conflict by portraying the behaviour of nations opposed to UN thinking as an attack on the universal values of a moral human family. Further, the meaning of terms such as ‘international community’ and ‘family of nations’ helps, in Grewal’s eyes, to constitute “the negotiated and complicated notion of the ‘West’ as a space for coalitions and agreements among nations.” In other words, because the ‘West’ has dominated both the initial dissemination of this rhetoric and the linguistic standards of its later usage, whilst also managing the UN in its own image as the epitome of international cooperation, it has centred itself as the producer of a new regime of (arguably neo-colonial) international ‘truth’ and morality. While this argument dovetails neatly with the findings of the historical investigations of Chapter Three and the dissemination of family of nations discourse to non-Western speakers such as the Soyinka and al-Faisal in Chapter Six, it is still necessary to be cautious.

There is a significant difference between pointing out the traits of discourse that have Western referents in the context of international politics and claiming that the

---


767 Grewal's designation of the space of the 'West' is attractive and superficially but not completely substantiated or defended in her own writing. Her argument here takes its cues from postcolonial perspectives on world development during the UN-era and perhaps is seduced into marking the international community/UN as a cipher for the West without proper analysis. Throughout the course of the preceding chapters, we have demonstrated Western influence on the discourses that inspire the UN and have been adopted by the international community. This may well be argued to have created a regime of truth and morality, but to assert the unified political control of 'the West' over the agendas of vast multiplicity of different international decision-making bodies and regional organisations is unrealistic.
UN/international community is a cipher for the `West' in all senses. While we can isolate the influences of Western opinions on the UN in its creation and foundational discourses, it is difficult to look upon the UN today as being fully politically dominated by Western powers. This would be to present only part of a complex picture. The increasing power of the G77 for instance, is not only pushing for wide-ranging structural reform, but actively shaping the agendas of the General Assembly in particular.768

To return to the wrangling over Iran in 2006, its supposed nuclear development was harnessed with its connections to Hezbollah to cast its president temporarily as the *bête noire* of the international scene. In response, Israel's Foreign minister addressed the UN in a highly-charged speech:

"We (Israel) share the same values as the community of democratic states... there is a critical moral difference between the terrorists that hunt down civilians, and the soldiers that target terrorists, while trying to avoid civilian casualties. To protect its integrity, the international community must uphold this basic moral distinction... There is no greater challenge to our values than that posed by the leaders of Iran... The international community is faced with no greater responsibility than to stand against this dark and growing danger - not for Israel's sake, but for its own; for the sake of the values it claims to embrace; for the sake of the world we all wish our children to inherit... There is no place for such a regime in the family of nations.769"

Concurrent with the discursive markers noted in previous chapters, it is in the emotive, culminating sentiments of passages of speech wherein kinship metaphor is relied upon. Livni implicitly encourages action on regime change in Iran as a way of uprooting support for Palestinian terrorists in the wider context of the ongoing conflict with Israel. At a less tense juncture the following year, Livni built upon the assumptions present in her condemnations of 2006. Speaking of the implementation of a new 'road map' for peace she commented: "(A)s the parties take the risks for peace, we look to the international community and the Arab and Muslim world, to offer support, not to stipulate conditions.770 The hidden disjunction between universal visions of a human family and community, and the political

---

reality of a closed circle of the West and its allies is laid bare — the international community, the ‘moral’ world, cannot be thought to include the ‘Arab and Muslim world’.

This is a revealing and telling statement and the patterning of the usage of kinship discourse fits long-standing models for how this discourse is used. Livni reserves it until the final parts of her address, and kinship metaphors are used change to a more emotive tone to set out the general principles upon which she believes politics must move forward. Exactly this change of gear affected by using kinship metaphors in the closing parts of wartime speeches have been noted with the UN Prayer in Chapter Three. They were also a central feature of some of Woodrow Wilson’s greatest wartime oratory. In his Second Inaugural address in 1917, the first two thirds of the speech concerns dry, resigned catalogues of the burdens borne by the US at sea and by the Western Powers due to the aggression of Germany. After extensively listing these troubles, Wilson’s tone undergoes a huge shift to outline an uncompromising, searing manifesto of American principles as he paved the way for the war declaration that was to come just a month later. Wilson began this conclusion to his address by affirming a historic statement of liberal American principles using world kinship discourse. He spoke of “political stability of free peoples”, the “essential principle of peace”, and the belief that “peace cannot securely or justly rest upon an armed balance of power”. “Governments” he concluded, must “derive all their just powers from the consent of the governed, and...no other powers should be supported by the common thought, purpose, or powers of the family of nations.”

Reaching out to the notion of the backing of the family of nations for his ideas, Wilson’s speech pivots at this point into a more emotive register:

“We are being forged into a new unity amidst the fires that now blaze throughout the world. In their ardent heat we shall, in God’s Providence, let us hope, be purged of faction and division, purified of the errant humors of party and of private interest, and shall stand forth in the days to come with a new dignity of national pride and spirit.”


772 Ibid. p43
"The shadows that now lie dark upon our path will soon be dispelled, and we shall walk with light all about us if we be but true to ourselves—to ourselves as we have wished to be known in the counsels of the world and in the thought of all those who love liberty and justice and the right exalted."  

More clearly than in Livni’s address, and others that we have discussed, the family of nations discourse is here displayed as a moral support for the self-identity of the speaker. The principles of the American nation are directly affirmed by the implicit consent of the family of nations in the linkages made in Wilson’s speech. This metaphor then is used to pivot into an emotive register to attempt to inspire action. Brent Steele has argued (though for different purposes), that discourses of the values of international community – the very bedrock of Wilson’s and Livni’s claims to the moral and political high-ground in the above examples – may be tied more closely to the ontological security of the speaker who claims to represent the international community, than the desire to carry out in practice the Utopian aims of such a discourse. Such ideals provide a sense of “biographical narrative” for many of the global North states at the heart of the value community of the ‘family of nations’, and would seem to accord with the rhetorical positioning and ‘double work’ role of kinship discourse in the statements above. In other words, attempts to motivate states to save others, or to condemn and act against others may be rooted in a sense of collective responsibility or a duty derived from the expectations of the ‘community’. Indeed, perhaps the greatest meta-narrative of commentary upon the UN (and also League of Nations) era has been the failure of this supposed international consciousness to overcome the self-interest of nation-states.

Upon this fact, Steele builds the convincing argument that “using some assumed responsibility a targeted state has to ‘collective identity’ commitments...as the basis for persuasion (towards policy decisions internationally) can actually serve to distract the argument and stall action” as powerful states will often “scoff at” the notion of subordinating their vital interests. Instead, Steele claims that a more effective method of

776 The notion explained in Chapter Seven, that kinship discourses re-affirm the value in-group at the same time as addressing the other.

265
inciting states to act may be to point out the disjunction between their supposed international principles and their lack of supporting action, thereby making powerful states seem to be failing their own ideals and lacking in resolution or the strength to alter international affairs. In the wake of the Asian tsunami of 2004, Jan Egeland\textsuperscript{78} accused the wealthy nations of 'stinginess' in their aid donations. Immediately after these comments, which did not refer to the US specifically, American TV and print media and then the Bush administration sprang into defensive overdrive regarding contributions to UN aid efforts. Within days the government pledge for tsunami relief had been multiplied by a factor of twenty. In Steele's words, Egeland's comments “generated American insecurity over America's actions compared with America's historical biographical narrative.”\textsuperscript{79} This mode of using 'reflexive discourse' (addressing the self-identity claims of a state) to generate international action may be a quicker and more useful way of speeding up international cooperation.

Time will tell whether Steele's argument as to the efficacy of reflexive discourse approaches in the debating chambers of the UN may hold water in future crises. It seems persuasive in terms of the inaction over the tsunami and Darfur crises for instance. However, Steele deals exclusively with the notion of the values of the 'international community' which, as we have seen is a standard, amorphous bureaucratic discourse often eschewed in moments when speakers really desire to lay out their emotional commitment to an issue. Certainly it is key to note that in the crucible of a wartime existential threat, the most powerful motivational speeches we have seen (the UN Prayer, Wilson's Inaugural) made liberal use, not of bureaucratic standards, but alliances of kinship, religion and highly emotive discourse, driving the US rapidly into the conflict in 1917 and providing the backdrop for US advances in the Pacific following success at Midway.

Nevertheless, Steele's issue of biographical narratives is crucial. More starkly than in the cases of modern humanitarian interventions which Steele discusses, the UN philosophical framework drawn up in the 1940s by a small State Department circle can certainly be said, on the basis of the work done in Chapter Three, to chart the limited input to the founding UN documents. This framework exists primarily as a statement of the particular articulation of

\textsuperscript{78} At the time, the UN Under Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordination.

\textsuperscript{79} Steele, B.J. (2007) "Making Words Matter: the Asian Tsunami, Darfur, and ‘Reflexive Discourse’ in International Politics." In International Studies Quarterly 51, p916

266
values held by a narrow group of Westerners. It cannot be said to be either the result of consensual principles derived from global discussion, or a particularly focused address to those ‘Others’ outside the embrace of the purported value system. Also, while clearly the influence of nationalist tyranny haunts the great UN documents, as does the spectre of those to be ‘saved’ from colonialism, much the greater parts of these texts are not addressed directly, as a peace treaty at the end of a war would be, to those ‘others’ who (along with their values) have been vanquished or those who may be liberated. Rather the texts self-referentially affirm the rectitude of the values of the writers and catachrestically universalise the supposedly inevitable liberal dawn of those values. This, of course, was in the face of a world where authoritarian rule remained in the statistical majority of the nation states of the world. From this perspective, the paradox at the heart of this discourse is more evident. The self-referential nature of the wording of the discourse lends it the sense of being impossibly singular and difficult to operationalise. On the other hand, the boldness of making such statements, in spite of the manifold opposition at the time in the state of global politics, is part of their inspirational appeal as noted in Chapter Four.

The potential negative impact of the catachrestic nature of such discourse is particularly sharpened when the linguistic choices are those of kinship. Firstly, the kinship metaphor draws the supposed ‘unity’ of the international collective tighter, emphasising commonality not only of those values and expectations upon which ‘community’ may be built, but also of the personal ‘substance’ which builds kinship. This is especially apparent given the noted emotive contexts in which the kinship metaphor is invoked – a greater propensity to use the most emotive of kinship registers occurs in times of existential threat (viz. Bush after 9/11, Wilson in this chapter). This presents a more complete way of excluding the Other by denying his/her human personhood and as such can fuel inflammatory discourse such as that of Livni above. We should not forget that the flourishing of the discourse of the family of nations, in the context of the colonial encounter, defined a global sphere of a European based ‘family’ with “semi-sovereign, unequal or uncivilised”780 states on the periphery. As

---


267
Gerry Simpson notes, colonial policy towards the non-family periphery was to respond with the “terrors of the law" to reform such states, including legally justifying colonial warfare.

Secondly, such linguistic choices reinscribe an association between the most universal positively valued marker of identity (membership of the family of nations) with a set of Western political beliefs which purport to present the ideal type for contemporary political organisation. In other words, centring the human family on itself, the UN is discursively fixed, due to the power and influence of its prominent members and their rhetoric, as a physical and philosophical nexus which perpetuates a Western claim to produce more complete truths about the needs, values, and indeed the taxonomic knowledge of the actual extent of humanity. Though one might object to this theoretically, the UN commentators in Chapter Four praised the UN’s dissemination of standards and expectations about the common standards of behaviour that would constitute world kinship.

Thirdly, the use of kinship metaphors renders accurate exposition of what really unites or divides the UN community and those outside it of secondary importance. This meshes with Schmitt’s critique of the tendency to unhealthy over-moralism in liberal political society and its denial of necessary antagonism. Specific issues of contention, or the accurate elucidation of principles of alliance are elided in discourses with as much moral baggage as those of the human community or even stronger, the human family. As Michael Donelan writes, in an early consideration of the notion of the community of mankind, “sentimental aggregation takes the place of reasoning." Precisely this tendency to gloss over the substance of supposed ‘families’ and ‘communities’ in world politics emerges due to the unthinking and unequivocally desirable valuation of the notions of community and family in Western social philosophy. An unhelpful pervasion of meaningless community statements is generated in Western contexts as Miranda Joseph notes: “(B)ecause it carries such positive connotations, community is deployed by any and everyone pressing any sort of cause.” Stripped of meaning by their vagueness, such discourse still has instrumental value. Western “capitalism

782 See Foucault, M. (1970) *The Order of Things* ch 1-3. Taxonomy here refers to a Foucauldian concept of producing ordering schemas for dividing up the world and telling ‘truths’ about its component parts.
and, more generally, modernity depend on and generate discourses of community to legitimate social hierarchies.\textsuperscript{785} Joseph’s assertion accords well in cases of blanket statements purporting to speak for the international community or stand up for the values of the family of nations as conceived in the unquestioningly positive light of their place in Western social philosophy. Practical notions of how to bring the political goals of, for instance the Islamic world and the West, closer together are subordinated by the value-focus of community and human kinship statements particularly given the general and emotive usages of the latter. Kinship discourse is perhaps more at fault than IC discourses due to the double work of kinship in automatically re-affirming the values of the in-group whenever it is invoked. Instead of speaking about the present and solutions to its problems, kinship discourses simply posit an unattainable future and seduce the speaker by affirming the positive valuation of his/her in-group.

Fourthly, kinship language (rejected as unhelpful by UN workers as we saw in Chapter Four) does not contribute to furthering the UN’s other laudable foci on securing individual liberty and rights. Since the image of world kinship in play in UN discourse is a Western construction, attempting to build that kinship value system cognitively, focuses thought on valuing ‘those who think like us’ – those who can act towards us as Western notions of kinship prescribe. Such valued ‘others’ are the building blocks of a wider kin group.\textsuperscript{786} In contrast, many of the UN’s most valuable messages as an organisation cross-cut this cognitive move of valuing similarity of thought by celebrating the development and nurturance of a diversity of world-views.

\textsuperscript{785} Joseph, M. (2002) \textit{Against the Romance of Community} p. viii. This point is taken up again with reference to the work of Keally McBride in the latter part of the chapter. By prefiguring kinship as a positive anti-political domain we conceptually perpetuate the injustices of the public sphere by requiring it in order to define by contrast our notion of caring kinship.

\textsuperscript{786} An introduction to the Western ethnocentricity of the kinship images in play was presented in Chapter One and elaborated in Chapter Seven. The full explication is completed in chapter seven. By endowing the UN with a motive for the construction of a world order of human kinship based on Western ideas, the organisation is intellectually set up to favour those who replicate in word and action, these discourses – who speak and act as willing family members. By participating in these Western discourses and echoing their sentiment in action, the human family is embodied and widened since a substantial part of the process for creating ‘kin’ in this model is behavioural. It is conditioned upon the display correct (caring, supportive) affective relations. In this way, a discursive tyranny operates. The only way to be a part of the overarching project of bringing about a new international order is to utilise these discourses and, in doing so, become included. The discourse group is coterminous with the kin-group. One practices being kin by talking about being kin.
Consonant with this observation, Mousseau and Mousseau have argued that using organising notions of social relationships with strangers based upon kinship logic, unfortunately returns speakers to a cognitive modality with a “stronger interest in discriminating against strangers from out-groups and abiding by the orders of group leaders.” While critiques of individualist capitalism may associate market societies with the competitive institutionalisation of inequality, Mousseau and Mousseau demonstrate that the economic expectations of capitalist Westerners may pre-figure more of a respect for strangers than do social logics of reciprocal exchange based on kin, not contract groupings. On the one side of their dichotomy is an archetype of contractual exchange. This is said to be “explicitly quid pro quo, voluntary by all parties without coercion and unfettered by social obligation. Contract terms set by a market using the impersonal forces of supply and demand are equally available to all strangers.” On the other hand, they characterise reciprocal kinship exchange thus: “individuals are in some sort of social relationship...transactions include favours among groups of friends or family members and among common members of clans, tribes and religious groups.” The behaviour said to arise from this arrangement is highly exclusive of outsiders: “(i)ndividuals dependent on reciprocity with an in-group will routinely look foremost to the in-group for choices and opportunities...However, it is informal and depends not on the enforcement of any contract...but on the lasting strength of the individual’s relationships with the group...The individual member thus has a strong incentive to share the values and beliefs of the group and do whatever he or she can do to strengthen its power.”

In sum, recourses to dependence upon in-group logic (epitomised by the closest possible in-group of the family) deprives speakers steeped in Western (and especially Anglo-Saxon/American) traditions of one of the most useful conceptual tools which the West can call its own. Instead of playing to the strengths of social conceptions which encourage

---

788 Their assignment of the term 'Western' to one mode of capitalist economy is problematic. Anglo-American individualistic capitalism might well mesh into their argument correctly. However, European corporatist capitalism, often centred around family businesses, mixes kinship and capitalist logics.
790 Ibid.
791 Ibid.
neutral, rationalised mediation of the expectations of the atomised self and stranger, too often those languages are resurrected which encourage partisan in-group logics of practice.

Fifthly, kinship discourse, by offering a symbol and promise of the very best and most positively valued sets of behaviour for international society, can lead to a credibility gap opening up between discourse and reality which can mean that allies lose faith in the UN project. In 1997, the year that China re-took control of Hong Kong and the Clinton Administration made a succession of commercial overtures to Beijing, Taiwan complained to the US and UN: "(W)e were told that the UN would be the family of nations, bringing peace, and helping the former colonial countries in Africa and Asia gain freedom and independence"792, and demanded to know why the UN and US were not standing up for Taiwan's independence in the face of aggressive Chinese posturing.

Parallel to the practical reasons why kinship metaphors can often be distinctly unhelpful in international discourse, there exists a profound philosophical tension in the insertion of in-group logics into a philosophical system informing the UN, which is essentially fixed upon the individual and the state-as-individual. This has been hinted at in the discussion above of the tension between the emphasis on singular kinship discourse tending towards uniformity in the world, and much of the UN's work to help retain the diversity of the world's nations and cultures. These tensions were initially noted in the responses of UN staff in Chapter Four, but the deeper philosophical tensions can now be examined.

8.2 Does the ‘Human Community’ or the ‘Family of Nations’ Represent a Cohesive Philosophical Goal for International Politics?

Scholarship concerning the inconsistencies of the UN and its Charter, and the practical difficulties faced by the UN in retaining influence and relevance in the Cold War era and the post 9/11 era, has provided prisms through which to interrogate the viability of principles of the institution. Rather than rehash these lines of inquiry, the issue here is to confront the outcome of the exclusive authorship of the founding documents where a thorough presumption of the primacy of individual needs is overlain with an incongruous cosmopolitan moral framework which poses as communitarian. Specifically, the UN is concerned to be the champion of the individual human rights of people everywhere as human beings. However, the UN was designed and still operates not as a body with direct responsibility for the rights of the world’s citizens, but in a world dominated by sovereign states. The UN explicitly respects the rights of sovereign states in a classically communitarian sense of permitting the communities of the world to be self-regulating. Despite these liberal individual and communitarian bents to the Charter, the kinship discourse we have looked at, (and other more general moral principles and aims of the Charter) constitutes a set of deeply cosmopolitan hopes for unification of values, purpose, even substance of the human community as the end goal of the UN project. This paradoxical mixture is graphically demonstrated by the following Articles of the Charter. The desire for a communal consensus against human rights abuses falls between the two stools of the individualism of the human person to be protected, and the individualism of the sovereign state to be respected – the authors could countenance the abandonment of neither:

"Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII."

"With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of ..."


people's, the United Nations shall promote universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.\(^95\)

"All Members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in co-operation with the Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55.\(^96\)

Unlike the League of Nations, the UN has never been catastrophically hamstrung by this patent inconsistency such that overall belief in the organisation has collapsed. In this, the UN-era perhaps has Great Power Security Council support to thank. Certainly little philosophical innovation at the level presently under discussion, marks the UN project as being of greatly improved conceptual robustness. The continued presence of these contradictions has opened a path for a history of storms of criticism which has tracked the UN in the same way as the League, though with less damaging effect. Such criticism is especially apparent when (as in the Darfur example) the UN's actions, while often providing global public goods which have no other possible provider in the world of self-interested nation-states, still fall short of the grand sweep of its moral mission. Writers and advocates in the early twentieth century, as we have seen, attempted to resolve this problem by arguing that the successor to the League ought to be an organisation aimed at world government. In other words, they aimed to resolve the philosophical inconsistency of attempting to unite concern for individual and communitarian particularist rights, with Utopian cosmopolitan discourse. They saw a means to this end in removing the major practical obstacle to the building of a human political community – the nation-state. In order to better understand the philosophically compromised hybridity of the UN structure that emerged from the planning process, the following sections investigate further the historical treatments of the problems of world community that formed the immediate backdrop to the planning process in the US, particularly the aforementioned debates between John Dewey and Walter Lippmann on the necessity of a global community and a global public. While the character of the system of states may have altered over the lifetime of the UN due to increasing economic and globalisation and the broadening and deepening of what Roland Robertson terms "consciousness of the world as a whole"\(^97\) through the development of international media,
little has been attempted at the international institutional level to hasten a thorough revision of the oligarchic anarchy of state power. Though international presences in the field of health, education and peacekeeping are tolerated by states, the toleration is always conditioned upon the temporary nature of these forms of intervention. The UN remains, all the way down to its name, an association of states-as-individuals.

Accepting the limits upon the active capacity of the organisation in such a way, while still retaining a moral philosophy centred around an unsurpassable cosmopolitan set of principles, embeds into the organisation a contradiction most vividly visible in times of crisis. Precisely at times of crisis when the moral mission of the UN is held up as the brightest beacon to lead the international community, the disjunction between the promise of its cosmopolitan ideals and the limits of the UN's acceptance of state individualism, produce wrangling and accusations which often prove highly costly in terms of stalling potential action. Using kin metaphors to hyperbolise the cosmopolitan reach of UN ideals widens this disjunction and further stretches the expectations latent in discourse to unrealistic levels, as noted in the impassioned but unrealistic Taiwanese complaints against the US above.

Moreover, the kin metaphor, being located on the cosmopolitan side of the international vocabulary of the UN-era, is a powerful and emotive aid, not only for advocating humanitarian assistance, but also may be mobilised by nation-states (the UN having no independent offensive forces) for military expeditions which state their missions in humanitarian terms. As a bystander to such adventures, but touting the banner of the philosophies which inspire them, the UN is backed by its own contradictions into a corner where it appears toothless compared to its constituent parts and is reduced to managing the fallout. Fairly, or not, the UN is frequently crucified for not organising action, for instance over Darfur, and failing to live up to its ideals. On the other hand, when a nation state such as the US takes these matters into their own hands, for instance over Iraq, the international community and the UN must look carefully at the contradictions of their own philosophies when attempting to distance themselves from the consequences of unilateral military intervention. In justifying invading Iraq after all, the US did not invent a panoply of new discourses, nor use exclusively American ones. As well as striking out in defence of its own
‘security’, it revamped those global humanitarian discourses enshrined in the UN, which were designed by Americans sixty years ago.

Grand UN rhetoric, after all, purports to be the values of the human community and is derived from historical attempts to reconcile liberal individual and global cosmopolitan impulses in the desire to organise the world as it has globalised technologically and economically over the course of the twentieth century.\(^7^{98}\) The project of the UN planners can be thought of in terms of Michael Walzer’s characterisation of the communitarian (as opposed to liberal) political philosophy: “interpreting) to one’s fellow citizens the world of meanings that we share.”\(^7^{99}\) This ‘community’ has been posited as a fact of international life and metaphorised in multiple hyperboles since the founding of the UN and in the decades before, as the League crumbled. The First World War had seemed to prove the fruitlessness of managing world politics by means of unstable alliances wherein common purposes were only negative (the prevention of conflict) rather than positive (the sharing of ideals). In interwar America, the cradle of the UN planners of the 1940s, the idea of fostering wider senses of public community culminated in a high profile debate between Walter Lippmann and John Dewey. In an age of the introduction of mass-production and global corporations, increasingly interconnected global commerce and international travel, Lippmann argued that the ‘public’, that idealised institution that had been the scales of judgement for the first American communities of the eighteenth century, was now a phantom, a “spectator in the back row.”\(^8^{00}\) Lippmann reflected the concerns of Rousseau’s republican ideal: “(W)hat people, then, is a fit subject for legislation? One...already bound by some unity of origin, interest, or convention, has never yet felt the real yoke of law; one that has neither customs nor superstitions deeply ingrained...one in which every member may be known by every other.”\(^8^{01}\)

---

\(^7^{98}\) One might argue that the economic and technological globalisation occurred under the noses of the world’s politicians and the international organisation’ attempts to institute common human values are the concomitant push towards political globalisation.


\(^8^{00}\) Lippmann, W. (1925) The Phantom Public p13

Dewey similarly opined the degeneration of the public based on the assumption that, as Daniel Tröhler notes, “politicians no longer governed, but that ‘Big Business’ did.”

On account of this impersonal force severing the public from those who represented it, no true community (bound by shared moral agreements) existed any longer because the will of the people was not able to be enacted. Dewey took it that modernity had built a ‘Great Society’ based on the “ideology of individualism, the dominance of capitalism, (and) the uniformity of human beings.” Unlike Lippmann, Dewey did not believe that the erosion of communitarian politics and the public was permanent, but instead sought ways to transform the ‘Great Society’ domestically, into a ‘Great Community’ worldwide.

Predictably, as a great theorist of education, Dewey stressed the need for communication and development of pedagogic and humanising social organisation as central to building any sort of community. This was, in some ways, based upon a nostalgic images of American communities of the eighteenth century and a forerunner to Habermas’s models of idealised communicative democracy. Clearly however, such a community at a global level cannot be formed on the basis of actual face-to-face communications. None of the experience of being a community can be replicated, in Dewey’s eyes, at the global level, simply by asserting that such a human community exists. “Fraternity, liberty and equality isolated from communal life are hopeless abstractions. Their separate assertion leads to mushy sentimentalism or else to extravagant and fanatical violence which in the end defeats its own aims.” Instead Dewey reinforced the implicit link between kinship and community, working not simply at the level of metaphor, but in the practical formation of humanised individuals — “(D)emocracy must begin at home, and its home is the neighbourly community.” And further: “(T)n its deepest and richest sense a community must always remain a matter of face-to-face intercourse. This is why the family and the neighbourhood...have always been the chief agencies of nurture.” Dewey argued that the surest basis of community was neither liberty (“independence of social ties...dissolution and anarchy”) nor equality (“a creed of mechanical identity”) but

---

803 Ibid. p160
806 Ibid. p213
807 Ibid. p211

276
bonds of “fraternally shared experience.” Dewey wrote: “(I)t is more difficult to sever the idea of brotherhood from that of community, and hence it is either practically ignored in the movements which identify democracy with Individualism, or else it is a sentimentally appended tag. In its just connection with communal experience, fraternity is another name for the consciously appreciated goods which accrue from an association in which all share, and which give direction to the conduct of each.”

Though Dewey bound kinship metaphors to his idealisations of local communities, he recognised that the character of the global Great Community could never aim to be a grand replica of fraternal local communities writ large. Instead he envisaged only “free and mutual communications between informed people, who thus form a public and regulate the relationships between local associations.” At this level, interwar scholarship, news media and politicians’ calls for a closer knit family of nations or human community, and the UN grand rhetoric which echoed and solidified these sentiments, stretched the connection between kinship and community to the extent of philosophically exceeding the communitarian notions they supposedly relied upon. In the contexts of the original questions asked by Dewey, Lippmann and others, aiming to unite a ‘human family’ is absurd while aiming to create a global public, “a diffuse and seminal intelligence” based on communication, is not.

Through the supposition of a human community (and further through the supposition of unsurpassable moral authority), the UN planners rolled out a forcible cosmopolitan doctrine purporting to apply principles to all people as ‘human’ individuals. As David Morrice states, such philosophy is concerned with the “objective justification of universally applicable political principles.” In fact, the UN documents rarely hint at any need for justification at all, so ‘objective’ are the principles and so “inherent” are the “equal and inalienable rights of

---

810 Ibid. p218
811 Ibid. p150
all members of the human family"^{815} taken to be. As we have seen in the case of the Lebanese conflict however, the language of family and community is still used to divide the world into ‘us’ and ‘them’. By providing a language purporting to universal validity and morality, the import of these claims is potentially extrapolated to the highest degree. Of course, the UN’s founding rhetoric was formed in response to the atrocities of the Axis in World War Two, while Livni’s exclusion of the Iranians in the statements at the start of the this chapter is a we/they distinction made on the basis of somewhat less dire division. Nevertheless, it is Livni’s **choice** to invoke precisely the rhetoric institutionalised in response to World War Two that maps these discourses together and brings echoes of the universal import of the moral founding of the UN into her condemnation of Iran. What Morrice refers to as the “communitarian meta-ethical claim, that morality is relative to community”^{816} is tacitly acknowledged in world politics where we can use universal human community/family discourses to position certain portions of humanity as being outside that ‘universal’ group.

Its cosmopolitan overtones and assertions notwithstanding, the world the UN confronts is still one where the following Rawlsian question and problematic remains relevant:

> “how is it possible that there can be a stable and just society whose free and equal citizens are deeply divided by conflicting and even incommensurable religious, philosophical and moral doctrines?...In such a society, a reasonable comprehensive doctrine cannot secure the basis of social unity, nor can it provide the content of public reason on fundamental political questions.”^{817}

Recognition of separate, existing, community-based doctrines of moral action is still present in UN and global political discourse despite assertions that what purports to represent moral orthodoxy is universal. Rawls, though this may be contested, argues that the necessary action for ending this disjunction between the ‘truth’ of cosmopolitan discourse and the ‘truth’ of community based moral beliefs, would be oppressive: “(I)f we think of political society as a community united in affirming one and the same comprehensive doctrine, then the oppressive use state power is necessary for political community.”^{818} He refers to the

---


^{817} Rawls, J. (1993) *Political Liberalism* p133/4

^{818} Ibid. p37
Inquisition’s defence of Christian orthodoxy by way of example, but invasive projects of democratic state building today such as in the War on Terror may fit just as well.

The closed circle of the UN planners produced a discourse wherein the principle tenets are more completely sensible and justifiable when taken as products of the community of ideas of which the authors were a part. Introducing languages of universality borne out in metaphors of community and kinship which, in spite of their benevolence, stand antithetical to the liberal individualism of the UN-era world, has not been wholly productive, especially when we bear in mind the frustrations of UN staff themselves as outlined in Chapter Four. While such people generally expressed allegiance to, and admiration for, such universal values, seldom do they find them to be useful in the way the planners expected and moreover often they find them counter-productive in convincing governments and citizens around the world to back or participate in UN projects. The same frustration may be noted over cases such as the inactivity during the Darfur crisis. These languages may be used to cut across respect for difference and diversity, whilst also closing down channels for debate on the philosophical fundamentals of the UN mission which members of UN staff have often lamented as inflexibly Western. On the positive side, as the speakers in Chapter Four also noted, the UN has also presided over a period without total global war in which its grandest principles have gradually been entrenched as political norms in increasing numbers of new and old democratic states across the globe, while reliable partners of these international values have been made even in some of the world’s remaining autocracies. The institutional stability and greatly broadened membership of the UN has certainly increased its ability to act as a forum for generating consensus on international norms. It is far from clear however, given the similarity of the normative visions of the League and the UN, that the grand principles of the latter can be directly credited with such successes. Overall political stability is too historically contingent to be attributed wholly to normative lessons of international politics, even those painfully learnt not once, but through two world wars.

The Charter, presented as a fait accompli by the Sponsoring Powers at San Francisco, was problematic to many middle and lesser ranking states, but, due to the continuing global conflict, only token opportunities for debate were granted. As David McKendree Key wrote in 1954 during proposals for Charter review, “many states had accepted Charter provisions
to which they had strong objections on the understanding that there would be opportunity to
review these provisions at the end of ten years.\textsuperscript{819} The 1945 Charter made provision that
"(l)…a conference has not been held before the tenth annual session of the General
Assembly…the proposal to call such a conference shall be placed on the agenda of that
session."\textsuperscript{820} However, "disillusionment"\textsuperscript{821} with the UN, especially over Soviet ability to veto
much of its work, while initially leading to widespread desire for reform, did not eventually
lead to such a conference being held. As Shirley Scott notes, having consulted public opinion,
US political leaders, especially John Foster Dulles, began to express doubts as to whether
Charter review would amount to anything other than giving rein to “starry-eyed amateurs
who wish to advance the millennium of which they were deprived by the bungling of the
Founding Fathers in San Francisco."\textsuperscript{822} In the event, in a climate where the major powers had
great reservations about review (the US feared enflaming tensions with the Soviet Union, the
UK feared having to make further concessions over decolonisation) the review that had
originally been keenly desired by the smaller powers was discussed in muted debates in 1955,
put off, and never seriously taken up again.

Parading the supposed dawn of a ‘new world order’ using grand languages of unity in
documents which have never been submitted to revisions from the whole UN membership,
the UN-era has asserted as present and existing, a global political and moral consensus which
is an end goal but not yet a reality. Consonant with this grand rhetoric and the absence of
global wars of the devastation witnessed prior to the UN’s formation, the appearance of a
seismic shift towards consensus has been presented in international discourse. Closer and
more widespread consensus on many issues certainly has been enabled by the presence of a
large scale international institutional network. However, grand rhetorics of the universal UN
family and community open up languages for the overestimation of the transformation of
politics in the UN-era. The UN’s first forty years were overshadowed by the great

and Social Science} 296, p152
\textsuperscript{820} Charter of the United Nations, Article 109(3). Available at:
and Social Science} 296, p153
\textsuperscript{822} Dulles in conversation with Canadian diplomats: ‘The Permanent Delegate of Canada to the United Nations,
New York to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa, 4 February 1954, A AA1838 851/10/1 Pt2’
in the Past' in \textit{Australia and New Zealand Law and History E-Journal} 2005, p75

280
geopolitical and ideological conflicts of the Cold War, and numerous wars have proliferated in the post-colonial Global South, often involving powers from the North. Only the restraint of the exercise of power between the nations of the functioning core might be safely attributed to the sense of community touted as characteristic of UN era.

Even this closed ‘family’ of Western democracies, springing from the Western core of the wartime allies, may be thrown into question. As Christopher Layne shows, pre-UN conflicts between democracies were avoided perhaps more based on realist concerns than the solidarity of common democracy. Post-UN, the solidarity of anti-communist fear and a closer intertwining of economic fortunes have been more commonly advanced rather than notions of ‘community’ for such a functioning core of peace. Theories of the democratic peace provide multiple explanatory mechanisms which avoid any notion of emotive bonds or community. Rasler and Thompson, for instance, list prominent explanations of democratic peace such as economic growth and interdependence, satisfaction with the status quo which has favoured them in the past as well as several variants based on the notion of avoiding war due to the restraining power of an enfranchised citizenry. Citizens in liberal democracies may benefit from strong civil society which can lobby against warlike policy, they have the ability to punish the makers of rash and costly foreign policy by electoral rejection and the transparency of open democracy means that unpopular decisions cannot easily be taken without public outcry. Even in strands of democratic peace theory which emphasise normative, shared-value contributions to creating zones of peace, this is almost always given as a partial, not full explanation. John Owen, for example, strongly argues for the contributions of liberal values to democratic peace. His model however, shows the effects of values in producing not only direct anti-aggressive ideological constraints on policy,

---


824 Even works such as Risse-Kappen, T. (1995) *Co-operation Among Democracies: The European Influence on US Foreign Policy* which focus on the common identity bonds forged between the Western Allies do so in context of more realist explanations for solidarity.


but also institutional constraints. Liberal values establish institutions which promote debate or lobby against government.

Attempts then to mobilise change ('to stir men's minds' as Archibald MacLeish desired) on a global scale through such rhetoric as human kinship has proven much more difficult and complex than the planners imagined. Even in Owen's argument, which heavily privileges the contribution of value statements, the transmission between statements of value and 'men's minds' is only a small part of the picture. Philosophical confusion dogs such rhetoric even within the functioning core and only peace within that core has been fostered, though whether this can be attributed to such sentiments is unlikely. Transmitting such a comprehensive doctrine in a meaningful way outside of the functioning core without a broader consensus upon the value system at its heart, has proved problematic especially in the latest round of militaristic adventures (such as Iraq and Afghanistan) in the name of the values at the core of the UN/Western mission. Further, in recent times, the language of kinship specifically has been appropriated by organisations which have radicalised its meanings, rather than making them more universally viable.

8.3 The Flourishing of the Human Family Discourse – Religious Retrenchment

Despite the charted decline of references to world kinship in NGO and political circles in the recent and contemporary period, kinship discourses have remained central and flourished in religious circles, especially Christian circles. By situating kinship discourses as the prime referent of religious circles, this contributes to the reluctance (observed in Chapters Four to Six) of political and NGO speakers to use these referents, isolating them in a religious zone of anachronism and at the extreme fringes of politics. Kinship discourses again decline in usefulness to political actors as, through the patterns we have observed, they have become a less common formulation in the political mainstream in the UN-era. We might then take a wholly negative view of the founding entrenchment of kinship metaphors in the UN project

---

as unnecessarily tying symbolic referents of the Western Christian model of the patriarchal family to the international architecture of the new world order. We might see the contemporary trends of increasingly selective and cautious usage of kinship rhetoric in political arenas on the one hand, and increasingly visible radical kinship rhetoric used by religious institutions and fringe organisations on the other, as a path into revision of the language of the founding documents in a positive way. If the religious adoption of kinship discourse eventually leaves documents such as the UNDR and the Charter seeming sentimental, anachronistic and politically unsound because of their ties to discourses with substantial religious resonances, then perhaps the documents can be redrawn to find more inclusive, realisable, practical goals for united efforts that will better suit and better motivate the world to address the new challenges of the twenty-first and twenty-second centuries.

Bearing out the notion of the problematic lack of review of the Charter and the core philosophies of the Declaration of Human Rights, allied to the narrow (almost exclusively American) original authorship, 1990 saw a parallel declaration of human rights adopted by forty-five of the foreign ministers of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference - The Cairo Declaration of Human Rights in Islam.830 This outcome had stemmed from the resurgence of statements of unique Islamic identity in particular on behalf of the new Islamic Republic of Iran in the early 1980s. In 1981, their Ambassador to the UN, Said Rejaie-Khorassani, called the Universal Declaration of Human Rights “a secular understanding of the Judeo-Christian tradition”831 which could not be fully adopted without trespassing upon Islamic law. He later expounded at the UN General Assembly’s Third Committee in 1984:

“In his delegation’s view, the concept of human rights was not limited to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Man was of divine origin and human dignity could not be reduced to a series of secular norms [...] certain concepts contained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights needed to be revised. [Iran] recognized no authority or power but that of Almighty God and no legal tradition apart from Islamic law. As his delegation had already stated at the thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly, conventions, declarations and resolutions or decisions of international organizations, which were contrary to Islam had no validity in the Islamic Republic of Iran [...] The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which represented a secular

understanding of the Judeo-Christian tradition, could not be implemented by Muslims and did not accord with the system of values recognized by the Islamic Republic of Iran.\(^{832}\)

These outbursts, and the Cairo declaration which crystallized them, presented a criticism of the legitimacy of single set of principles on human rights which echoed earlier Soviet criticisms of a lack of cultural tolerance\(^ {833}\). While it might seem easy to dismiss Islamic challenges as a mingling of religion and politics which the UDHR was designed to avoid, the criticisms were sufficient for the UN to sponsor a conference on ‘Islamic Perspectives on the UDHR’ for the 50th anniversary of that document in 1998\(^ {834}\).

The import of the critique can be taken in two ways. Firstly, the wide-ranging nature of the Islamic disaffection may be taken as proof of the offensive Western Judaeo-Christian bias of the UN system. Particularly, one might tag the use of kinship rhetoric as having specific links to Judaeo-Christian religion. However, it is interesting to note that the Islamic document itself has a slight reformulation of the familiar kinship rhetoric of the UNDR as its own Article One: "(A)ll human beings form one family whose members are united by submission to God and descent from Adam. All men are equal in terms of basic human dignity and basic obligations and responsibilities, without any discrimination on the grounds of race, colour, language, sex, religious belief, political affiliation, social status or other considerations."\(^ {835}\) Further, aside from this Islamic critique it is worth noting that the organisations such as the Red Crescent work in tandem with the Christian Red Cross and judiciously maintain their ‘Seven Fundamental Principles’\(^ {836}\), adopted in 1965, as highly pragmatic statements avoiding any world kinship discourses, aspirational ideals or any discourse which could be construed as being Judaeo-Christian in inspiration. Not only does this demonstrate that the Islamic critique of the Cairo declaration is not sufficient to prevent Islamic cooperation in large scale INGO work, but also that **international institutions with**

---

highly moral missions do not, to be successful, require grandiose and unrealistic rhetoric of world kinship or unity of values to accomplish great improvements in the welfare world society.

This is not to dismiss outright the need for a sense of mission. As Stephen Hopgood charts in his investigation into Amnesty International, the challenge for such organisations is precisely balancing sacred, disinterested respect for their values, with active interests in the profane world of politics to maintain moral and political authority. Hopgood describes the ethos of Amnesty and its founders as a “secular religion” of bearing witness to the abuses of human rights. This disinterested ethic, refusing to take sides or give political advice, has, he argues, “helped to make and shape morality”\textsuperscript{837}, and by their example, the initial ‘keepers of the flame’ have drawn political activists to the cause. He cautions however that “impartial morality must become consequential to be practical”\textsuperscript{838} but notes also that as soon as an organisation seeks political authority and interests, it becomes wedded to a particular conception of those interests which may alienate others. This is the position we have acknowledged with reference to UN values. Both Amnesty and the UN are treated as sacred objects and as spurs to practical action. As Hopgood notes, an organisation only concerned with timeless, disinterested values would become a “museum piece”; one only concerned with the contemporary tides of politics would “ossify...from within.”\textsuperscript{839} Precisely these tensions open up the space for the Islamic critique of the UN and also the ability of religious organisations to cooperate with the UN.

At the heart of the Cairo Islamic critique are two factors. Firstly, especially in the Iranian case, is the desire to establish the supremacy of \textit{shari'a} as the fount of decisions upon the rights of the individual and the community. In a sense, this decision is inward-facing - \textit{shari'a} represents an ideological system all of its own – and there is little other than compromise on meanings, semantics and thereafter policy, that the wider international community can contribute to such a turn. If the UDHR and the UN more broadly is deemed illegitimate because of its not being rooted in \textit{shari'a}, then there is very little possible dialogue or refutation available on this point. Concerning the second factor, the issue of the UDHR

\textsuperscript{837} Hopgood, S. (2006) \textit{Keepers of the Flame: Understanding Amnesty International} p216
\textsuperscript{838} Ibid. p213
\textsuperscript{839} Ibid. p223
being a secular version of Judaeo-Christian theology, the question of debate across cultures opens up again, and the situation of kinship discourse once more becomes central since, more than anything, it is in using the language of kinship that the secular (and therefore supposedly universal) aims of the UN become entrenched in Judeo-Christian discourse on world-making.

As Brent Nelsen argues with relation to the rhetoric surrounding the establishment of the European Community in the decades after the Second World War, the Catholic Church institutionally and philosophically provides a strong tradition of notions of supranational authority, both moral and political:

"Catholic universalism — with its desire to bring the whole of humanity into the Christian community, its insistence on the visible nature of that community, and its reliance on universal papal authority backed by medieval notions of universal empire — provided the ideological justification for a world without sacrosanct national borders."^{60}

Allied to this observation, it has been the Holy See which, over recent decades, has been the most consistent high-profile advocate of the notion of the human family, the world-as-family and the need for the strengthening of family-like ties among the disparate and conflicting groups in the world. Unlike in the cases of debates on UN policy and international crises involving political leaders, ambassadors, NGOs and news media, wherein languages of kinship formed an exceptional alternative to prevalent notions of international community, in the contributions of the Holy See, kinship discourse is almost ubiquitous, and squarely rivals the prevalence of IC references.

In the case of the Darfur crisis, the Vatican representative to the UN called the humanitarian disaster a "deep scar on the human family."^{841} At the start of the War on Terror, the Vatican strenuously advised against the US prosecution of invasive war. The pope sent a mission to Baghdad in February 2003 under Cardinal Roger Etchegaray. In discussion with La Repubblica that month, the cardinal stated: "(T)he war would be a catastrophe in all senses. In the first place it would have serious consequences for the people of Iraq and further, it

---


would render more and more difficult the completion of the UN's efforts towards unifying
the human family."\(^{842}\) John Paul II also turned on the terrorists in his Easter message of
2003, demanding "an end to the chain of hatred and terrorism, which threatens the orderly
development of the human family."\(^{843}\)

For many years the Vatican's most public messages have been saturated with references to
the building of the 'human family' to the extent of becoming a marked motif of the discourse
of the Holy See when addressing world affairs. Multiple addresses on World Peace Day in
the pontificates of John Paul II and Benedict XVI have stressed the fostering of a sense of
the world as a 'human family' as critical to strengthening zones of peace across the globe.
Benedict's most recent address\(^{844}\) in 2009 referenced the notion liberally, while his 2008
message took for its theme, 'The Human Family, A Community of Peace\(^{845}\). This address
reinforced the 'natural' transmission upwards and outwards of the positive associations of the
Western/Christian notion of the nurturing nuclear family to a model for nurturing a peaceful
world family:

"The language of the family is a language of peace... The social community, if it is to live in peace, is also
called to draw inspiration from the values on which the family community is based. This is as true for local
communities as it is for national communities; it is also true for the international community itself, for the
human family which dwells in that common house which is the earth... A family lives in peace if all its
members submit to a common standard: this is what prevents selfish individualism and brings individuals
together, fostering their harmonious coexistence and giving direction to their work. This principle, obvious as it
is, also holds true for wider communities: from local and national communities to the international community
itself."\(^{846}\)

Benedict's later address to the UN General Assembly in April 2008 made numerous
references to the notion of human family including the guarded assessment that "(t)hrough

\(^{842}\) Etchegaray, R. (2003), author's translation. Original text: "La guerra sarebbe una catastrofe sotto tutti gli
aspetti. Innanzitutto avrebbe gravi conseguenze per il popolo iracheno e poi renderebbe sempre più difficili gli
sforzi che l'Onu compie per l'unità della famiglia umana". Available at:

\(^{843}\) John Paul II (2003), Urbi et Orbi Message, 20 April 2003. Available at:
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/messages/urbi/documents/hf_jp_ii_mes_20030420_easter-

\(^{844}\) Benedict XVI (2009), 'Fighting Poverty to Build Peace', 1st January 2009. Available at:
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/messages/peace/documents/hf_ben-xvi_mes_20090101_peace-

http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/messages/peace/documents/hf_ben-xvi_mes_20071208_xli-

\(^{846}\) Ibid.
the United Nations, States have established universal objectives which, even if they do not coincide with the total common good of the human family, undoubtedly represent a fundamental part of that good.”

John Paul II's address to the UN in 1995 using similar language of building a shared awareness of being a family of nations and many other addresses by the late pope, particularly on World Peace Day in 1998, 1994 and 1979 employ strong usage of such language.

Further, the Vatican has addressed such events as the establishment of the International Criminal Court and the recent 60th anniversary of the signing of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in the same terms. In debates on the setting up of the ICC, the papal legate Archbishop Renato Martino commented that:

"The Holy See supports every effort to establish effective juridical structures for safeguarding the dignity and fundamental rights of individuals and communities. Such structures however can never be sufficient in themselves; they are only mechanisms which need to be inspired by a firm and persevering moral commitment to the good of the human family as a whole...Those who are responsible for violations of the most heinous crimes which offend the conscience of the human family, the crimes which will fall under the jurisdiction of this Court must be made to accept their responsibility in accordance with universal norms...It is indeed the right of society to manifest, by means of law and juridical structures, those objective and eternal values which protect and order the human family and human dignity. As an instrument of justice, such a Court must be conceived as a means of seeking not revenge but the restoration of that right relationship within the human family which will lead to reconciliation."

In a similar vein, the Permanent Observer of the Holy See to the Office of the United Nations and Specialized Institutions in Geneva took the opportunity of the 60th anniversary of the UDHR to re-affirm the kinship language of that original document. As the Catholic News Agency reported:

"The prelate then encourage(d) the U.N. and its specialized agencies "to faithfully translate the principles of the Declaration into action by supporting States in the adoption of effective policies truly focused on the rights


and sense of responsibility of everyone.” “Every human being,” he went on, “has the right to an integral development and the sacred right to live in peace.” Human rights are not solely the “entitlement to privileges,” but are “rather the expression and the fruit of what is noblest in the human spirit: dignity, aspiration to freedom and justice, search for what is good, and the practice of solidarity.” “In the light of the tragic experiences of the past and of today,” he concludes, “the human family can unite around these values and essential principles, as a duty toward the weakest and needier and toward future generations.”

Such consistent usage of the kinship metaphor points back towards the aspirational markers identified in earlier chapters. The Catholic Church (and also other Christian groups851) is naturally better placed to speak of vague, future-oriented hopes than are politicians. Whilst Islamic and other critiques of the UDHR might founder due to the weakness and similar ethnocentrism of the alternatives proposed, the replication of the kinship discourse of the founding UN documents by religious groups serves to vindicate the charge that parochial (local and theological) religiosity is woven into what are supposed to be secular and universal statements. Whether the inspiration for such replication is to be found in the local religion itself (in this case Islam) or in the globalisation of UN rhetoric, such that it is now difficult for other cultures to think outside its premises, is not of real importance here. What is of importance is the act of replication of a discourse which aspires to be, but cannot be, universal. In fact, one might even argue that the common monotheism of Christianity and Islam, each with a requirement to conceive of one people (God’s people), predispose them to replicate each other’s notions of a universal human community.

Further, these kinship discourses, with their propensity to be used for expressing a new dawn of unqualified hope and benevolence (due to the unequivocally positive connotations of kinship in this discourse) are further deployed in more extreme contexts. Notions of the centrality of the human family to divine planning for the world are at the heart of the creed of the Prelature of the Holy Cross and Opus Dei: “(T)he family—the great human family, and each of the families that make it up—is one of the natural instruments desired by God so
that men and women could cooperate in an orderly way with his creative decree. God's will in counting on the family in his plan of salvation was confirmed, as time went on, through the various covenants that Yahve established with the ancient patriarchs: Noah, Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob.  

The discourse of the human family also finds itself expressed in a plethora of religiously oriented organisations, some simply pastoral in nature, others making real efforts to build memberships and funding for the bringing about of a true spirit of 'kinship' among the peoples of the world. Articles and appeals disseminate this discourse online, DVDs and CDs of sermons are sold and classes of spiritual self-improvement offered. The following extended example from the charitable/spiritual organisation ‘World Blessings’ forms a perfect illustration of the ends to which this discourse can be put, mixing notions of the human family with UN-esque espousal common individual rights on the one hand, and dreams of ‘spiritual light’ and ‘destiny’ on the other:

("There are pivotal ideas that have changed the destiny of mankind and shaped its future...Such is the understanding of the oneness of the human family, of mankind - an idea that has been part of human consciousness for ages, yet one that has not attained its full status as being real or relevant until today, when the planetary body itself is in danger, and when new possibilities appear within the hearts of many who are being influenced by expanding spiritual light upon the Earth. The idea of the human family relates not only to its essential oneness in terms of the basic needs and rights of every individual upon the Earth - the need and right to food, shelter, and a way of life free from fear. The idea of the human family relates also to the understanding that there is a basic kinship among mankind, a basic essence that we share together so that in heart, mind, body, and spirit, there is more that joins us than that separates us."

Revealing the dual markers of Western notions of kinships detailed in the previous chapter, the writer links notions of oneness to the biological commonality of needs and substance highlighted by a scientific outlook, with the deployment of kinship not as a nexus of inside/outside distinctions based solely upon status, but on truth of commonality 'emerging from the heart'.

---


"This perception, when taken to a deeper level of truth and reality, has radical consequences. For it means that we cannot separate the world any longer into those we love and those we hate, those who are with us and those who are against us. Indeed, we must find a way to achieve common ground even with those we hold profound differences with, recognizing their humanity, recognizing, that they, too, have the same underlying structure of needs and desires that define all that is human. We are in the process of discovering, today, not a new truth about the physical, biological, or chemical structure of what it means to be human - although advances in science are revealing a great deal in these areas as well. Today, we are discovering a truth that emerges from the heart."

This discourse then explicitly bridges from the notion of the human family in two simultaneous directions. Firstly, in mirroring the hopes of the UN documents and the political discourse in the crisis case studies considered earlier, the writer links the positive connotations of family relations within the world community to notions of the defence of liberty, rights and individual freedom consonant with the points of value-commonality of UN 'mission' and American 'values' which have been recently advanced in the War on Terror.

"This truth emanates a sense of compassion, a desire for peace, a longing for honesty and an end to deception, an aversion to all that limits or restricts the rights of individuals to live freely. These ideals, illuminated by spiritual light, are glowing more brightly within the human heart, so that structures and policies that are detrimental to the right of individual freedom are being questioned, policies that have been long established that have contained hidden motives or agendas are being uncovered, and practices that are restrictive to human liberty are being exposed."

The discourse finally pivots back into religious and spiritual tones in assertions of great vagueness. In these contexts, the invocation of the yawning metaphorical chasm between the family and the world, perhaps shows up best its potential power at the same time as its profound hollowness. Overlain with unequivocal positivity, it is appealing to both speakers in mainstream contexts like the UN, but also in more radical wings of debate such as in the writings of the spiritual and religious groups referred to here. Shot through at the same time with multiplicities of meaning and little coherent political application, it can seem simply escapist. Reliant upon a particular construction of kinship as a sphere opposed to the public world of politics in Western social thought, this is precisely how this discourse functions to lead us out of the compromises, failings and divisions of politics towards a transformed future. It is in such contexts where the political work of nations and the UN imperils itself, by opening a credibility gap between its words and actions. This is due to, firstly, the very ambition of its moral mission, and secondly, the use of kinship metaphor which pivots so easily into Christian/new-age ethnocentrism and anti-political escapism.
“An idea whose time has come may have been present in awareness long before this. It may even have been one commonly referred to, yet without understanding the full consequence of its emergence into the light of day. Such is the idea of the ‘human family’, one in mind, heart, and spirit, waiting to recognize itself as one in body as well. For this ‘body’ of the human family is nothing other than the essence of Divine life and Divine energy that has lived within each human soul from the beginning of time. It is the essence of truth and of purity that has remained at the core, no matter what the exterior self has displayed. This Divine essence which links all in ‘body’ as well as in mind and heart, means that there is no longer an ‘outsider’ or ‘other’ that we may declare as such. This is the new and radical truth whose time has come. It has not yet fully arrived on the human scene, but is waiting in the wings. It is waiting for each one to awaken to the full meaning of being One.”

It should not be supposed that this example is unique. Hundreds of Christian organisations from the United States to Africa, employ the same referents. Moving beyond Christianity, we noted already the Islamic Cairo Declaration’s adoption of the notion of the human family. It is also a favourite referent of the Dalai Lama in many of his global addresses along with the notions (equally dispersed), of brotherhood and sisterhood. With regard to these non-Christian sources, the question is raised as to whether their replication of these discourses means that they are still being used in the same Western Christian way that they were originally set down from older historical referents by the UN planners. In some ways, given the spread of the English language through globalisation, it is difficult to make a precise judgement. One may for instance, delineate several prominent symbols of the Western Christian ‘family’ and attempt to map them onto instances of discourse. The emphasis in Euro-American discourse of brotherhood and not sisterhood (compare to the Dalai Lama’s equal and complementary use of these terms) suggests the patriarchy and andro-centricity characteristic of Christianity. Parental discourses (such as Blair’s messages to Iraq and Darfur) placing less developed states in the position of children, again suggests pedagogical patriarchy. The valuation of kinship and the human family as a nurturing sphere connotes with the valuation of anti-political femininity in Western political thought.

While the spread of English globally means that syntactically, non-Westerners often replicate the forms of kinship discourse as derived from Western Christian ideas, it is impossible to claim that all replications of these modes of discourse are instances of the

---


855 Several are listed at note 853, this chapter.

deployment of Western Christian symbols. What we can show is that specific pathways exist for the symbols of the archetypal Western Christian family (dominant patriarch, nurturing mother, children brought up within a nuclear family mould under parental tuition) to be mobilised frequently. Furthermore, regardless of which religion replicates such discourses, if this replication continues concurrent with the continued favouring of IC discourses instead by political speakers, there may be scope for redrawing the terms of the UN founding documents both to reflect political culture and to better motivate practical action rather than espouse visions of kinship which increasingly seem only suited to religious discourses.

This is not to say that altering the UN’s ways of formulating its sense of mission would be a path to solidifying a secular/religious divide in global discourse about the future shape of world order. As Hopgood8 reminds us, drawing on Durkheim’s Elementary Forms of the Religious Life, sacredness and religiosity are borne out of collective attitudes towards social ideas and phenomena. Thus the mundane emblem of the family can be turned into a sacred value. ‘Secular’ speakers and organisations may always treat their own motives and ideals with a kind of religious respect. One may treat the notion of universal human rights or the rational authority of the international community with a kind of religious awe. However, the Western political circumstances of the UN’s founding are betrayed in its retention of discourses of human family in its touchstone documents. A similar ideational soil gave rise to these discourses as to those used in the institutionally religious discourses above. To alter the UN’s mission statements away from replicating these quasi-religious formulations would open up space for either more inclusive formulations based on genuine world debate, and/or more practical ones. Negative political capital could be removed from the UN organisation while opening space for new sentiment to crystallise around a set of value formulations actually formed by inclusive world support.

---

8 Remind us, drawing on Durkheim’s Elementary Forms of the Religious Life, sacredness and religiosity are borne out of collective attitudes towards social ideas and phenomena. Thus the mundane emblem of the family can be turned into a sacred value. ‘Secular’ speakers and organisations may always treat their own motives and ideals with a kind of religious respect. One may treat the notion of universal human rights or the rational authority of the international community with a kind of religious awe. However, the Western political circumstances of the UN’s founding are betrayed in its retention of discourses of human family in its touchstone documents. A similar ideational soil gave rise to these discourses as to those used in the institutionally religious discourses above. To alter the UN’s mission statements away from replicating these quasi-religious formulations would open up space for either more inclusive formulations based on genuine world debate, and/or more practical ones. Negative political capital could be removed from the UN organisation while opening space for new sentiment to crystallise around a set of value formulations actually formed by inclusive world support.

---

8.4 Moving beyond the 1945 ‘Consensus’ – What is Possible and What Difference Would it Make?

Critiques then of the discursive framework of the UN founding documents, both in its purporting to universality and its deployment of notions of fostering human kinship, have been advanced. To summarise: firstly, the ‘consensus’ of 1945 was, and remains only partly consensual and sometimes, as in the Islamic and Soviet cases, even the importance or relevance of central notions in the mission statements of the UN cannot be agreed upon. Allied to this, because of the largely Western and American basis of the UN’s values, when questions like US unilateral action over Iraq arise, the replication that occurs between UN and US ‘values’ gives the world community little ideological (to say nothing of political) footing upon which to refute calls for unilateral action, unless they are somehow to speak in UN debates but eschew UN discursive formulations. Legal channels of course remain, but these are often too laborious to make an impact in immediate political debates.

Secondly, adding aspirations of kinship to UN mission statements, with the attached connotations of indefinite virtue and religious overtones, only widens the credibility gap opened up by the catachrestic disjunction between lofty ideals and political problems which are hard to reconcile. These metaphors in their particular character of allying aspirational tones of the affective character of social relations to be forged, with a presupposition of the universal individual, also reinforce the ethnocentricity which we saw cause frustration among commentators in Chapter Four who are involved intimately with the organisation.

Thirdly, kinship discourse, marked by generality, emotive tones and future-orientation lends itself as we have seen, not only to uses rooted in Christian notions of the flock-as-family, but also to more extreme discourses of general spiritual unity. All poles of this continuum, from mainstream to extreme are, by use of a kinship which opposes politics in Western thought, escapes from the entanglements of political discord. This tendency for kinship discourse to become flighty, idealistic and impractical does the authority of political discourse containing these languages few favours.

Fourthly (as discussed in Chapters One and Seven with reference to the work of Keally McBride), the prefigurement of a modern Western notion of idealised kinship as a polar opposite of public political and economic activity is problematic if this ideal vision is then
supposed to be used to model an ideal state of international relations. Because of this
dependence on particular notions of public politics and economics "revalorizing the family,
as it is currently imagined, is not an effective way to offer an alternative to liberal capitalism."\(^{858}\) In other words, idealised relations of kinship as posited in the UN documents as models for
the healing of the fractured world of 1945, require the sort of paternalistic, aggressive
capitalism (which today renews tensions based upon widening income inequality and
environmental degradation) to have any meaning. We cannot understand world kinship as
being a valuable state of affairs without its antithesis of competitive, grasping politics and
economics playing a major role in world politics and giving a constitutive sense of contrast.
Kinship could not conceivably mean anything positive without these negatives existing. The
ideal must have the evil in order to have meaning and thus can never replace it but must
always remain in constitutive tension with it. Thus, the paradox of the incompleteness of
these UN discourses finds another explanation. By their patterns of valorisation of kinship as
opposed to politics and economics, none of these valorised ideas can ever find resolution
because of their constitutive tension.

All these problems then result from the ossified, unsurpassable discourse of the UN
documents. Further, the cognitive facility and positive valuation of kinship metaphors, allied
to English linguistic spread in the UN-era, keeps speakers returning to problematic world
kinship discourse. Such discourse, hamstrung as it often is by its vagueness and inoperability,
can be used, as in Brent Steele’s example (and also the speeches made by Emyr Jones Parry
noted in Chapter Five, not to mention the earlier Wilsonian use of these discourses) to
motivate the members of the nation states or the international community at the UN, to act
to retain their self-image as proponents of humane politics around the globe. This remains
of colossal benefit, though its beneficence, reliant upon particular notions of humanity,
remains incomplete, and the tendency for kinship discourse to depoliticise current politics by
overwriting them with self-affirming and deluding Utopian visions, is problematic.

If we also consider a rival version of the use of world-as-kinship metaphor in the Cairo
agreement, the failings of the UN version may not seem so grave. The Cairo document holds
that the human family can only be inclusive as far as a community of believers extends. To

recall the kinship metaphor usage of Article One cited earlier, "(a)ll human beings form one family whose members are united by submission to God." For all the difficulties in extending a meaningful notion of the UN's Western version of the notion of world kinship around the globe, it is far more flexible than this Islamic version which would require wholesale religious conversion. Thus, those modern traits of Western kinship, in particular the insistence on the possibility of creating 'kin' relations just as much by performing the proper actions of affection as by inhabiting proscribed status relations, serve the UN discourse well. This allows condemnation of a rogue power to be followed by redemption - options for reforming the world are kept open and may be pursued in tentative increments. It makes sense in this logical system to cast out and allow back in, based on changing behaviour. While this leads to cross-cutting condemnations and welcoming over time, contra Schmitt, never does a decision made in discourse necessarily find a way to follow its logical conclusion in terms of operationalising policy based on statements in discourse.

Part of the difficulty of acting upon the critiques made above is hinted at by the failure of the review conference of 1955, wherein most of the key issues to be debated were practical concerns on the running of the institution rather than questions of adding to the philosophical underpinnings. That proposed conference was deemed to be impossible because of the lack of belief that new consensus could be smoothly reached without further enflaming Cold War tensions. Attempts at wholesale review of the philosophy of the UN remain, even today, difficult to envisage though many advocate it. Not only are the principles of the UN supposed to be unsurpassable and designed to provide a steady compass through the tempests of history, but also as Kent Kille writes, "(t)he UN-Secretary-General has long been viewed as a vital source of moral authority." As the UN struggles once more for credibility amid inaction over Darfur, Lebanon and most recently the war in Gaza of 2009, to question its own proudly held moral framework would be tremendously

860 See for instance, Malloch-Brown, M. (2008) 'Can the UN Be Reformed?' in Global Governance 14(1). The former Deputy Secretary-General argues that perhaps a full scale global conflict is required to trigger a similar zest for international reform as was apparent in 1945. For a wide-ranging analysis of institutional reform encompassing structural and philosophical topics see, Weiss, T. (2009a) What's Wrong With the UN And How To Fix It.
861 Kille, K. (2007) (ed.) The UN Secretary-General and Moral Authority: Ethics and Religion in International Leadership p24
difficult, especially, as we saw in Chapter Four, according to those enmeshed in the UN bureaucracy. This though, is a credibility gap that the organisation has many times over failed to bridge.

The allure of a single, steadfast morality has been strong throughout the UN's history. The Western powers have craved its backing to their own ontology in the face of threats from Communist and Islamic challenges, but still grievous compromises have to be made in the name of extending such a unitary standard. In an article commenting upon the failure to protect human rights abuses in Darfur, Joseph Loconte, writing for the conservative Heritage Foundation think-tank notes that: "(T)he United Nations prides itself on its ethos of universalism: It is a body with no standards for membership—and no penalties for betraying its highest ideals. It gives equal voice to dictatorships and democracies. So brutish states such as China, Zimbabwe, Saudi Arabia and even Sudan (widely accused of ethnic cleansing and genocide) serve as members in good standing on the Human Rights Commission."

Loconte quotes Shashi Tharoor, UN undersecretary-general for communications, in defence of this: "(Y)ou don’t advance human rights,” he argues, “by preaching only to the converted.”

This much would seem to be true, though Loconte's aversion to 'brutish' states impeding or corrupting the UN is perhaps wide of the mark, and the delays over Darfur for instance, cannot be blamed solely on this point. What criticisms, in the final analysis, can be securely fixed upon such discourses are perhaps less of the damage they have done, than the good they have never been able to do, despite their grand promises. The terrain of discourse has shifted quite considerably in the lifetime of the UN and, by institutional rules, as well as by dint of the unchallengeable character of those founding documents devised by those few planners, the UN's guiding principles have not changed with wider discourse. As we have seen throughout the preceding empirical chapters, kinship discourse has been displaced in the political mainstream, and, as the commentators in Chapter Four confirmed (backing up the patterns observed in political discourse in subsequent chapters) kinship discourses are today seen as unrealistic, anachronistic, and may be avoided by those seeking to make

---

863 Ibid.
progress on UN projects. Their persistence in the political domain is now confined to emotive, aspirational and general statements, often quite disconnected from policy-making and often unable to motivate action when political interests or factions oppose it. Further, their substantial entrenchment in religious discourse can afford negative political capital in secular organisations like the UN. These transformations in discursive terrain would suggest that when, finally, in fifty, or one hundred and fifty years, the Charter and other founding UN documents are reviewed, it would seem likely that kinship references will decrease or remain the same rather than increase, unless world politics in the meantime becomes a matter for figures of religious authority once more. Perhaps that general world consultation and consensus which was conspicuously absent in the planning process in the 1940s, could be mobilised to generate more representative and more politically current modes of expressing the practical and practicable goals of the international architecture as it faces up to the urgent needs for partnership, not necessarily kinship, over issues such as long term nuclear disarmament, poverty reduction and environmental and population challenges.

The world kinship discourse at the heart of the UN project for the last three generations has held out to the world an unfulfilled promise — a promise which it is difficult to even understand how to fulfil. It is a reminder that aspects of politics, by their conceptual nature are often incomplete and incapable of being completed. This insight is an important addition to considerations of the thought of Carl Schmitt in international political thought. His concept of the moment of decision is also left incomplete by kinship discourses where closing the loop of inclusion and exclusion is impossible. The way that these notions of kinship have been shown to operate — opening kinship to everyone based on ‘natural’ biological sameness, while at the same time being able to close off the in-group based upon a lack of ‘natural’ ‘kin-like’ behaviour — denies the possibility of authoritative sovereign decision because the dual simultaneous modes of constructing the boundary to be decided upon mean it is never static. For IR in more broad perspectives, the contradiction and incompleteness of these discourses that are at the centre of the ethical principles of a great part of the globe and its most prominent international organisation, show us a great deal about the notions of interests and identity. Many schools of IR thought from realism to radical constructivism base their enquiries upon the assumption of the fixity of notions of interests and identity. As we have seen however, grand statements of universal global
principles may be produced under fickle circumstances and the complexity of discursive inputs which contribute to such principles may fill their articulation with contradiction. World kinship discourse thus arguably shows that the world is sometimes (even in the instances when it purports to be the most certain) incapable of defining its interests, identity and principles in ways that can be coherently acted upon.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

BOOKS AND ARTICLES


Bellamy, A. (2005) ‘Responsibility to Protect or Trojan Horse? The Crisis in Darfur and Humanitarian Intervention after Iraq’. Ethics and International Affairs 19(2) 31-54.


303


International Organization 51(1), 31-63.


313


317

NATO.’ In Katznstein, P. The Culture of National Security. New York: Columbia
University Press.


Robert the Monk (1895) ‘Historia Hierosolymitana.’ In Munro, D.C. Translations and
Reprints from the Original Sources of European History, Vol 1:2. Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania.


Farmington Hills, Michigan: Charles Scribner’s Sons.


Farmington Hills, Michigan: Charles Scribner’s Sons.

In Holborn, L. (Ed.) (1948) War and Peace Aims of the United Nations Vol II: From
Casablanca to Tokio Bay January 1, 1943 – September 1, 1945. Boston, Massachusetts:
World Peace Foundation.

Roosevelt, F D. (1945) ‘Annual Message About the State of the Union to the Congress,
January 6th, 1945’. In Holborn, L. (Ed.) (1948) War and Peace Aims of the United
Nations Vol II: From Casablanca to Tokio Bay January 1, 1943 – September 1, 1945.
Boston, Massachusetts: World Peace Foundation.


Weiss, T. (2009a) What’s Wrong With the UN And How To Fix It. Cambridge: Polity Press


ARCHIVAL SOURCES BY COLLECTION AND DATE

Berle, A. Jr.

Undated personal research notes. Adolf Berle Jr. Papers, Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, NY. Box 65; Folder – Postwar Plans 1939-44.


Cox, O.

‘Memorandum on Mr. Leo Pasvolsky’ April 5th 1943’, Oscar Cox Papers, Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park NY. Series I, Box 26.

Hopkins, H.

Diary Entry, aboard HMS Prince of Wales, 10th August 1941. Harry Hopkins Papers, Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, NY. Sherwood Collection, Book 4 ‘Hopkins in Moscow’, Box 306.

Notter, H.

Undated personal records - 'Notes on Publicity re: Research Staff'. Harley Notter Papers, NARA, College Park, MD. Box 11; Misc. Subject Files. Folder; Notter, Harley (Recollections).


'Notes, Jan 1942-Dec 1943'. Harley Notter Papers, NARA, College Park, MD. Box 11; Postwar Planning, General. Folder - Notes, Jan 1942-Dec 1943.


Letter, Notter to Durward V. Sandifer, 16th July 1942. Harley Notter Papers, NARA, College Park, MD. Box 19; Folder – Permanent Court - British Proposal (SCJ).


'Staff Memo no. 26. 22nd December 1942 - To The Members of the Staff and Consultants, from Leo Pasvolsky'. Harley Notter Papers. NARA, College Park, MD. Box 11; Misc Subject Files. Folder - Notter, Harley (Recollections).

Letter, Pasvolsky to Redvers Opie, for forwarding to London, 12th July 1943. Harley Notter Papers, NARA, College Park, MD. Box 79: Records of the Advisory Committee on Foreign Policy. Folder – Exchanges with the British (Gen. Folder).

'Notes, Jan 1942-Dec 1943'. Harley Notter Papers, NARA, College Park, MD. Box 11; Postwar Planning, General. Folder - Notes, Jan 1942-Dec 1943.

Letter, Welles to Lord Halifax, August 13th 1943. Harley Notter Papers, NARA, College Park, MD. Box 79: Records of the Advisory Committee on Foreign Policy. Folder; Exchanges with the British (Gen. Folder)


Pasvolsky, L.

Memo, Leo Pasvolsky to Cordell Hull, 'Suggestions for the Secretary’s Conversation with the Secretaries of the Treasury, Commerce and Agriculture regarding our Consultations with Neutrals', 29th February 1940. Leo Pasvolsky Papers, Library of Congress, Washington DC. Box 1; Folder – International Economic Relations 1940-1.


'Notes on a Talk with the Secretary, 19th April 1943'. Leo Pasvolsky Papers, Library of Congress, Washington DC. Box 7; Folder - Postwar Planning 1942-3.


Memo: Subcommittee on Security of Advisory Committee on Postwar Foreign Policy, August 11th 1943, response to aide-memoire sent by Foreign Secretary Eden to Sec. Hull through Ambassador John Winant proposing a 'UN Commission for Europe' to regionally manage relief, reparations, economic policy, armistice terms etc. Leo Pasvolsky Papers, Library of Congress, Washington DC. Box 3; Folder – International Organization: Memoranda for the President 1943-5.


Memo of Conversation between FDR, Under-Secretary Stettinius, Leo Pasvolsky and State Department Legal Advisor, Green Hackworth, 15th November 1944. These are recorded as FDR’s words. Leo Pasvolsky Papers, Library of Congress, Washington DC. Box 5; Folder - International Organizations: UN Proposals For.


Roosevelt, E.


Roosevelt, F.D.


President’s Official File, Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, NY. Folder - OF4720, Advisory Committee on Postwar Foreign Policy 1942-4.


330


Welles, S.


WEB SOURCES


333


336


342

APPENDIX A

Selected Articles of the Charter of the United Nations

PREAMBLE

WE THE PEOPLES OF THE UNITED NATIONS DETERMINED

• to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and
• to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small, and
• to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained, and
• to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom,

AND FOR THESE ENDS

• to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbours, and
• to unite our strength to maintain international peace and security, and
• to ensure, by the acceptance of principles and the institution of methods, that armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest, and
• to employ international machinery for the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all peoples,

HAVE RESOLVED TO COMBINE OUR EFFORTS TO ACCOMPLISH THESE AIMS

Accordingly, our respective Governments, through representatives assembled in the city of San Francisco, who have exhibited their full powers found to be in good and due form, have agreed to the present Charter of the United Nations and do hereby establish an international organization to be known as the United Nations.

CHAPTER I: PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES

Article 1

The Purposes of the United Nations are:

1. To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace;
2. To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace;
3. To achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion; and
4. To be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends.

Article 2

The Organization and its Members, in pursuit of the Purposes stated in Article 1, shall act in accordance with the following Principles.
1. The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members.

2. All Members, in order to ensure to all of them the rights and benefits resulting from membership, shall fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the present Charter.

3. All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.

4. All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.

5. All Members shall give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the present Charter, and shall refrain from giving assistance to any state against which the United Nations is taking preventive or enforcement action.

6. The Organization shall ensure that states which are not Members of the United Nations act in accordance with these Principles so far as may be necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security.

7. Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.
APPENDIX B

Selected Article of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights865

PREAMBLE

Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world,

Whereas disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of mankind, and the advent of a world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people,

Whereas it is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human rights should be protected by the rule of law,

Whereas it is essential to promote the development of friendly relations between nations,

Whereas the peoples of the United Nations have in the Charter reaffirmed their faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person and in the equal rights of men and women and have determined to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom,

Whereas Member States have pledged themselves to achieve, in co-operation with the United Nations, the promotion of universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms,

Whereas a common understanding of these rights and freedoms is of the greatest importance for the full realization of this pledge,

Now, Therefore THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY proclaims THIS UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS as a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations, to the end that every individual and every organ of society, keeping this Declaration constantly in mind, shall strive by teaching and education to promote respect for these rights and freedoms and by progressive measures, national and international, to secure their universal and effective recognition and observance, both among the peoples of Member States themselves and among the peoples of territories under their jurisdiction.

Article 1.

- All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.

Article 2.

- Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on the basis of the political, jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to which a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-self-governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty.
APPENDIX C

Selection from Covenant of the League of Nations

THE HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES,

In order to promote international co-operation and to achieve international peace and security
by the acceptance of obligations not to resort to war,
by the prescription of open, just and honourable relations between nations,
by the firm establishment of the understandings of international law as the actual rule of conduct among Governments, and
by the maintenance of justice and a scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations in the dealings of organised peoples with one another,

Agree to this Covenant of the League of Nations.

ARTICLE 10.

The Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League. In case of any such aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression the Council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled.

APPENDIX D

UN Protocol June 3rd 1943: Annex I, Proposal for an 11 Member Council

United States, Great Britain, USSR and China as permanent members plus:

2 from Group of 9 European States: Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Greece, Iceland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Yugoslavia.

2 from Group of 19 American States: Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela.

1 from Group of 5 British Dominions: Australia, Canada, India, South Africa, New Zealand.

1 from Group of 5 African/Middle Eastern States: Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Iraq, Liberia.

1 from Group of 1 Asian State: Philippines.

867 Annex I of 'UN Protocol', a report of June 3rd 1943. See Sumner Welles Papers, Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park NY. Box 189 – Postwar Foreign Policy Files 1940-43, Folder 2 – UN Protocol. The version of the list of nations to be included in plans for the security council which is reproduced here had already undergone six revisions. The protocol first appears in Welles papers on April 22nd 1943 and was amended on May 1st, May 5th, May 6th, May, 13th, and May 20th.