

**Formal and Informal Relations Between  
UN Headquarters, Permanent Missions and NGOs  
- A Social Network Analysis**

**Anja Kallmeyer**

**The London School of Economics and Political Science  
Department of International Relations**

**Submitted for the MPhil/PhD degree**

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*Anja Kallmeyer*

New York, 24<sup>th</sup> August 2009

## Summary

NGOs have long been active at the UN, making the organisation a unique venue for analysing the work of NGOs, and how they cooperate with other NGOs, the UN and its member states. After major UN conferences it appeared as if NGOs had become part of the UN machinery, a perception reinforced by the growing number of accredited NGOs, and the positive language of partnership used by the UN itself to describe its relationship with NGOs.

On the basis of a social network analysis, this study shows that individual success stories do not translate into a pervasive influence of NGOs at the international level, and more specifically as analysed here, at the UN. There are no formal arrangements for NGO participation at the most important UN organs, the Security Council and the General Assembly. Attempts in the past to establish such mechanisms failed because of the strong resistance of member states. As for informal cooperation, it remains patchy and undermined by a high degree of mistrust between NGOs and the UN, particularly when it comes to member state representatives. The replacement of major conferences by summits with very limited NGO participation, and the failure of the Cardoso Panel to expand NGO rights, further suggests a backlash in UN-NGO relations. Bearing in mind that global governance calls for a stronger role of NGOs in international affairs, and that UN conferences are often mentioned as key venues for global civil society action, the study warns that concepts of global governance and global civil society should only be used with caution.

The author used to work for the UN Non-Governmental Liaison Service in New York, advised the Office of the Under-Secretary-General in the Department of Economic and Social Affairs on NGO matters and served as the Assistant Secretary of the Committee on NGOs of the Economic and Social Council.

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## List of Acronyms

CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CIEL	Center for International Environmental Law
CONGO	Conference of NGOs in Consultative Status with the UN
CS	Civil Society
CSD	Commission on Sustainable Development
CSOs	Civil Society Organisations
DAW	Division for the Advancement of Women
DDA	Department for Disarmament Affairs
DESA	Department of Economic and Social Affairs
DSD	Division for Sustainable Development
DPI	Department of Public Information
ECOSOC	Economic and Social Council
FES	Friedrich Ebert Foundation
FFD	Financing for Development
GA	General Assembly
GPF	Global Policy Forum
H.E.	His Excellency
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Authority
IMF	International Monetary Fund
ILO	International Labour Organization
INGOs	International Non-Governmental Organisations
INTGLIM	International NGO Task Group on Legal and Institutional Matters
JUNIC	Joint UN Information Committee
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
NGLS	Non-Governmental Liaison Service
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organisations
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ODA	Official Development Assistance

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OHCHR	Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
OIP	Office of the Iraq Programme
PrepCom	Preparatory Committee of a UN conference
PS	Private Sector
SG	Secretary-General (of the United Nations)
SC	Security Council
TANs	Transnational Advocacy Networks
UN	United Nations
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNFPA	United Nations Fund for Population Affairs
UNMOVIC	United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission
WFM	World Federalist Movement
WFTU	World Federation of Trade Unions
WSSD	World Summit on Sustainable Development
WTO	World Trade Organization



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## 1 Theoretical Framework for the Analysis of the United Nations, NGOs and Their Interconnectedness

The world today witnesses a growing interdependence and globalisation, a steady increase in the number of NGOs, and growing networks in a broad variety of forms. Depending on political standpoint and ideology, NGOs are either lauded or criticised. Most of the discussions have in common that they concede some or even considerable influence on governments and international organisations to the work of NGOs. Taking into account different interests, actors and the distribution of power and resources in the political arena, it has to be asked what is the exact impact or contribution of non-governmental actors in world politics. On the one hand, senior officials in international organisations and even some scholars proclaim that NGOs are important partners nowadays, indispensable to the work of the organisations and to tackle today's global problems. On the other hand, NGOs are often hindered in their work and not treated as equal partners. Quite to the contrary, they are often denied access to important information as for example UN documents or meetings on UN grounds. Their efforts are often derided, and they are seen as unaccountable and non-transparent by member states and scholars alike. This is partly due to the lack of empirical information from the field and an incomplete documentation of non-governmental activities.

Therefore, one should attempt to paint a more balanced and informed picture of the work of NGOs. Academic treatment of NGOs ranges from an almost omnipresent power of non-governmental organisations by the globalist view to the denial of their role and importance by the state-centric view. The truth can probably be found somewhere in the middle of a complex meshwork of constituencies, interests, power, and resources.

The aim of this study is to unveil some of the underlying structures of how NGOs and the UN interact with each other and work together. For this purpose a social network analysis will be employed, taking into account relevant actors at the UN headquarters with the surrounding permanent missions and the NGO community.

Although network analysis was suggested as a promising way of generating new insights by well known scholars, as for example Risse, Keck and Sikkink (Risse 1995, Keck and Sikkink 1998), it has not yet made its way into mainstream international relations literature. The lack of empirical evidence hampers the systematic analysis of the work of NGOs, the structure of their cooperation among themselves and with other actors, and their contributions in the international arena and at the UN.

Two key areas of the work of the United Nations will be analysed in this study: development and security. Financing for development and sustainable development, as well as Security Council reform and targeted sanctions will serve as case studies.

## **1.1 NGOs in World Politics**

### **1.1.1 NGOs at UN Headquarters**

Since NGOs and their relations with the UN Secretariat are the subject of this analysis, this section gives an introductory overview of the specific features of NGOs at UN headquarters and describes the environment they operate in.

In addition to the global and regional aspects of the work of non-governmental actors, there is also the local aspect which has to be taken into consideration. NGOs are mostly based in one country and therefore subject to national regulation, and political and cultural influences. What is the local grounding of organisations compared to the overarching transnational and global linkages? This study takes a closer look at the local environment of these organisations which is in this case New York City. There is evidence that Americans identify strongly with the town they live in (Anheier et al. 2001: 304), and we can also identify New York as one of the international headquarters of NGOs with very specific and pervasive cultural, political and economic features. Since we are dealing with a group of NGOs based in New York City, it will be useful to look at the specific local conditions for NGOs at UN headquarters.

For NGOs in the United States, Salamon (1992) adds a legal and country-

specific criterion to the definition of NGOs<sup>1</sup> which is the tax-exempt status. There are two different categories. NGOs which would like to apply have to file form 1023 or 1024 with the Internal Revenue Service. Form 1023 is reserved for organisations engaged in religious, charitable and scientific activities, as well as those devoted to public safety testing and the prevention of cruelty to children and animals. These organisations are typically referred to as 501(c)(3) organisations because they are regulated by section 501(c)(3) of the tax code; in addition to their exemption from Federal Income Tax, they are also eligible to receive tax-deductible gifts from individuals and corporations.

Like other global cities, New York is a centre of finance, culture, mass media, and non-profit governance. Global cities are increasingly linked together, as digital nodes in a globalised computer network. New York is “first among equals” in this organisational environment, particularly for international non-profit organisations which almost always maintain a strong presence here (Salamon 1992: 237-238).

In this context it also has to be considered how dominating American culture and values are for the work of local NGOs at the UN.

Sassen (2002) presents global cities as micro-sites for diverse political action, as a space for the formation of new global policies. Their infrastructure provides NGOs with a grid of strategic places to gain more visibility. High network intensity paired with a strong technological capacity turn them into a particularly enabling environment. In this well connected environment a nexus between the global and the local level can be found. As Sassen puts it: “large cities localize global civil society in people's lives” (Sassen 2002: 218).

With the exception of the definitions of NGOs, recent literature approaches often start with a relatively precise account of NGOs and their activities, but then draw conclusions on a much higher macro-level (e.g. global governance and global civil society), arguably more based on political desiderata than on empirical evidence.

Older literature takes a more pragmatic approach, describing what NGOs do

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<sup>1</sup> The different definitions of NGOs are discussed in 1.1.2.



and then analysing on the basis of these findings their position vis-a-vis the state or international organisations.

Merle (1987) analysed the status of NGOs at the United Nations, and comes to a rather bleak conclusion. Regarding the status of NGOs, it is largely seen as a failure that their rights within the consultative status framework have not yet been extended (Merle 1987: 317). The discussions surrounding this issue point to a lack or loss of confidence and trust from member states.

Although these sources seem to be dated considering their publication date, their description of UN-NGO relations still seems to hold true, thereby putting into question the value of the concept of global civil society, because in this description states are still in control over the relations with NGOs.

Another important issue in the discussion surrounding NGOs and their activities, which often raises suspicions with member states and the public, is that of non-governmental accountability. Unfortunately, many scholars ignore that with the accreditation to international organisations NGOs can be held accountable for their actions (Jordan and van Tuijl 2006). They have to report to the organisation on their activities, membership, and sources of funding, and can be sanctioned if they do not comply with the regulations of the organisation.

At the United Nations NGOs have to lay open information about their organisational structure when they apply for accreditation.<sup>2</sup> These mechanisms will be explained further in chapter three. For their business, funding and contacts, NGOs rely on their good reputation which can also be used as a way or mechanism to hold these organisations accountable.

Peter Willetts (2000) addresses the problem of how to evaluate the relationship between NGOs and UN Headquarters from a legal perspective. He looks at the development of the consultative status arrangements for NGOs beginning with the UN Charter, moving on to ECOSOC, UN conferences, and the efforts of NGOs to gain access to the General Assembly.

He concludes that there is in fact a development from a solely consultative

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<sup>2</sup> For more information see: [www.un.org/esa/coordination/ngo/](http://www.un.org/esa/coordination/ngo/).

relationship to a partnership (Willetts 2000: 208). The new way of how NGOs are dealt with in recent UN documents and statements, what Willetts calls “the new language of the 1990s” (Willetts 2000: 206), is the reason why he comes to this conclusion. He considers this revolutionary in a sense that NGOs have become a third category of subjects in international law: the partners are equal because each has legal personality, not because they have the same rights and obligations. In his view this is a positive development, because the relations “between governments and international NGOs within intergovernmental organisations are a contribution to democratic global governance” (Willetts 2000: 207). One could question what the value of legal personality is, if it does not come with equal rights and obligations. Whilst it is true that there is a shift towards a more positive language on NGOs and their activities, one has to examine if that is truly mirrored in the relations between the UN and NGOs, or, if this is only rhetoric to serve the purposes, interests, and agendas of member states. Later on this study will look at the empirical evidence regarding the relations between the UN and NGOs.




Figure 1: De facto and aspired relations between UN, NGOs, and Permanent Missions.

### 1.1.2 Definitions of NGOs

Up to now, NGOs have been discussed in different contexts, but how do we capture, how do we define the nature of these organisations which are said to take up more and more space in international affairs? It is common knowledge today that the number of NGOs has been increasing considerably over the years.<sup>3</sup>

They are active in diversified issue-areas from classics such as labour rights and the environment over human rights to biotechnology and the global economy.

Scholars usually adopt different approaches to the definition of NGOs according to their subject area. Of course, as a result, many different definitions exist.

The first definition used in connection with NGOs at the UN is taken from Weiss and Gordenker (1996). Here NGOs are formal organisations which are self-governing, private, and non-profit without the ability “to direct societies or to require support from them”, existing above and beneath governments (Weiss and Gordenker 1996: 19 - 20).

There are a myriad of other definitions of NGOs, and some examples will be presented here to give an overview of the variety.

In the UN context the international character of NGOs is often emphasised as a criterion for organisations which are considered to be legitimate. Therefore, a definition of international NGOs (INGOs) is required here. The Union of International Organisations<sup>4</sup> has listed a number of criteria defining INGOs, including aims, membership, governance and financing. The aims have to be international in character and manifest the intention to engage in activities in at least three states. Membership has to be drawn from individuals or collective entities of at least three states. It must be open to any qualified individual or entity. The constitution of the organisation must provide permanent headquarters and make provisions for the election of governing bodies and officers. The headquarters and the officers should be rotated regularly among the member states. The structure of the voting procedures should be organised in such a way that no national group could

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<sup>3</sup> For more details see chapter 3.1.1.

<sup>4</sup> For more details see <http://www.uia.be/node/318936>.

gain control over the organisation. Financial contributions should be derived from at least three different states. The UN employs a similar criterion when looking at applications of NGOs for accreditations: Contributions to the organisation must come from several countries.

As a consequence, many American organisations do not fall under this definition because their membership is often mostly American, and their funds usually come from American sources (for example, members and foundations).

It has to be added that in practice the criterion of the international nature of organisations is not as decisive as one could assume from the definition. In international organisations it is usually only required that the organisation in question is not unduly influenced by one nationality or religion.<sup>5</sup> Therefore, there are definitions which weaken this criterion. Skjelsbaek (1971) thought it sufficient that organisations be made up of members from only two states (Skjelsbaek 1971: 420).

Another definition is derived from research on the non-profit sector which is often used with some changes and different emphasis in different contexts. Salamon, Anheier et al. (1999) present five common features of NGOs. The organisations have to be institutionalised with a formal structure. They are private in a sense that they are separate from the state. The organisations are not profit distributing. That means that they do not return any profits to their managers, owners or shareholders. They are self-governing and in control of their own affairs. Membership in these organisations is voluntary. They often consist at least partly of voluntary contributions in human resources and money.

A recent definition, merging sociological and legal aspects, comes from Martens (2002). After a short historical introduction with a description of the use of the term with respect to the United Nations (Martens 2002: 271), she goes on to describe the legal and then the sociological approach. The latter seems more comprehensive and will be elaborated below.

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<sup>5</sup> This is common practice at the UN when the organisation decides to grant consultative status to NGOs.

The sociological definition contains different components, one of them the emphasis on the fact that NGOs are not governmental. Often the term is associated with negative connotations, as for example being against government. Therefore, some scholars suggested a term with a more positive meaning, such as “necessary to governance organization” (Martens 2002: 277). This element is critical as it plays into the suspicions governments have towards NGOs and the threatening nature of NGOs as perceived by governments. Criteria of the sociological definition include that they have to be non-profit making entities, non-uninational and non-violent in their goals. The pursuit of these goals should distinguish them from terrorist, guerrilla or liberation organisations. Since only non-violent groups are discussed here, it is useful to maintain this criterion.

At the UN NGOs are mostly seen as international entities, although in practice this might not always be reflected in the nature of the organisations which are actually accredited to the UN. Furthermore, to distinguish NGOs from more spontaneous forces and movements, the element of stable, permanent organisational structures should be added to the definition.

Martens concludes with the following definition of NGOs: “NGOs are formal (professionalised) independent societal organisations whose primary aim is to promote common goals at the national or international level” (Martens 2002: 282).

It has also to be kept in mind that the perceptions of NGOs are subject to change over time, especially with regard to their relationship with states and international organisations. Procedures of accreditation and patterns of interaction have changed over the last decades and should be incorporated in future discussions. These changes will be discussed further in chapter 3. Even with this in mind, it will be difficult to come up with a definition which could cover at least a majority of NGOs due to their immense diversity.

The most relevant defining elements for NGOs at the UN are a formal structure, not for profit activities, political and financial independence and an international focus. These elements largely determine if an organisation's application for accreditation is going to be successful.

### **1.1.3 Roles and Functions of NGOs**

As diverse as the organisations are their roles and functions<sup>6</sup>. The latter depends on the mission, size, reputation, and resources of the NGOs. They range from monitoring to contracting in humanitarian projects. Often NGOs can command great legitimacy and they are seen as trustworthy by the public. The categories selected here represent the most relevant to the work of the United Nations.

- Monitoring

NGOs serve as watchdogs. They monitor the work of the governments and/or international organisations. They follow up on the outcomes of conferences and their implementation, and they have a close look at developments within these organisations.

- Awareness raising

NGOs point to abuse and violations of human rights in different countries. Reports are published, information is posted on websites. They provide information on the economic and social conditions in developing countries and new trends in developed countries. Examples here are the Amnesty International campaigns on human rights abuses and the Social Watch Report of 2003 in which local NGOs describe social, economic and political developments in their own countries. This information is then widely distributed through various media channels and networks.

- Agenda-setting

Due to their independence, NGOs are able to bring new ideas to the forums of international affairs. Government officials and staff of international organisations are often not able to articulate new ideas because they are perceived as too radical and inappropriate. NGOs to the contrary have the freedom to bring up issues and to lobby for their cause. Therefore, some issues on the international agenda originate mainly from non-governmental sources, sometimes with some support from a few progressive member states. Examples in

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<sup>6</sup> Weiss and Gordenker (1996: 42) present a comprehensive overview of the potential roles and functions of NGOs from geographic range over governance and thematic focus to outputs.

this category are international taxes, such as the carbon or Tobin tax, or the concept of human security.

- **Setting of values and norms**

Due to the values of constituencies and staff, organisational goals, and specialist knowledge, NGOs often bring new or forgotten values to the fore. These organisations often represent the interests of minorities, experts, and more progressive political agendas. They are credible to international organisations and the public because of their distance to the political mainstream, which is often perceived as corrupt and unable to deal with changes on the national and international levels. NGOs often propagate emancipation on an international level, gender mainstreaming, and a more equitable distribution of resources nationally and internationally. They argue for worldwide solidarity and compassion with human beings around the globe. The Jubilee 2000 Campaign and the Global Call for Action Against Poverty were able to change attitudes and policies on poor countries' debts and poverty.

- **Policy-making**

Sometimes it is possible for NGOs to have an impact on policy-making. It is not a rare occurrence anymore that NGO representatives act as consultants for government agencies or are invited members in governmental delegations. Their impact is clearly visible in the International Campaign to Ban Land Mines, a principal mover in the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty, or the Coalition for the International Criminal Court which was indispensable to the creation of the Treaty of Rome in 1998.

- **Advocacy**

Non-governmental actors choose one or multiple issues they want to get involved in and want to represent. These can include populations in developing countries whose human rights are violated or regions affected by environmental degradation. For this purpose different means are employed to achieve an improvement for the constituencies in question. Governments are lobbied, information is gathered and widely distributed and media representatives are

approached. Important examples here include indigenous peoples' and women's rights.

- **Treaties: development and implementation**

NGOs participate regularly in the preparatory processes of UN conferences where new international treaties and plans of action are adopted. Through the lobbying of government delegations, networking and coalition-building NGOs are able to make their voices heard. They place issues on the agenda early on in the process. Later on their influence can often be traced in the adopted documents. Their impact has become particularly visible in the field of environment and development. The contribution NGOs make here can be seen as a more concrete sub-set of the agenda-setting category which usually focuses on specific processes and their implementation and not on more general and overarching issues as under agenda-setting.

- **Education**

NGOs often engage in outreach activities, present their knowledge to the public, and publish reports which are widely known. In addition, they produce flyers, handbooks, and information kits on different issues for different audiences. They also organise trainings and workshops for the public or for specific constituencies. Many trainings take place in the area of humanitarian aid and emergencies.

- **Source of information and expertise**

Many staff members of NGOs possess in-depth knowledge of particular international issues. They often have a higher level of education and even worked in academia. Information gathered by NGOs is usually first-hand showing a broad knowledge of context and background, especially at field level. It is often a welcome and necessary alternative or supplement to official sources.<sup>7</sup> Networks of NGOs can function as epistemic communities (Risse-Kappen 1995) and often contribute to the diffusion of knowledge on the national and international level.

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<sup>7</sup> Information coming from NGOs has to be seen in the political context for which it will be used as it is a tool to achieve certain outcomes.



- Sub-contracting

NGOs are often used for the implementation of humanitarian, development, and technical projects. This is due to better non-governmental access to and knowledge of conditions in the field. Especially the World Bank makes use of the services offered by NGOs. One criticism regarding this procedure is the instrumental use of NGOs by international organisations and governmental agencies as well. Some fear that NGOs are co-opted by government agendas which are often detrimental to the well-being of the people concerned.

One should distinguish between (1) the use of NGOs as technical contractors to deliver development and humanitarian aid, and (2) the role of NGOs in the implementation of treaties and programmes of action which can consist of the implementation of projects, but also entails reporting to intergovernmental processes and some limited influence on policy-making within these processes.

Means of communication often shape how roles and functions are met and fulfilled. The progress in communication technology has led to a widespread access to and use of media such as telephone, facsimile, e-mail and internet. These tools help to bridge long distances and facilitate communication and cooperation. Access has been made easier not only by the spread of these technologies, but also by their decreasing costs over the years. There are specialised providers for the non-profit sector now who cater to their specific needs.

While telephone and facsimile have mainly served as instruments of communication and transmission, the internet has taken on more functions. Websites distribute information easily without incurring high costs. They inform a broad audience from students to diplomats. This draws attention to manifold issues and raises awareness for different problems and affected constituencies. Homepages are also used for fundraising, and electoral and legislative lobbying.

Through e-mail and the distribution of information through websites, networking and coalition-building efforts are facilitated and can reach more

people than ever before. Interested individuals and groups can become involved more easily and mobilisation of people becomes easier.

The changes in communication technology have also changed the patterns of communication: Telephone used to allow only a one-to-one communication. Broadcast and print media are examples for few-to-many communication. Today with the internet, with tools such as listservs and social networking sites, we can speak of a many-to-many communication. This trend clearly facilitates political dialogue and mobilisation. Political blogging can serve as one example for this trend.

#### **1.1.4 Global Governance**

The United Nations is often seen as a place where global governance takes place.

State-society issues play into the question of governance generally and global governance more specifically. The Commission on Global Governance<sup>8</sup> defines governance as the “sum of the many ways individuals and institutions, public and private, manage their common affairs”. This involves a continued process of cooperation during which diverse and competing interests have to be accommodated. It includes formal as well as informal arrangements surrounding people and institutions. The Commission views governance issues not only as being in the realm of states but as also involving NGOs, multinational corporations and the media. The inclusion of other actors in addition to the state came about through the perceived weakness of the state in many areas from internal social welfare concerns to the control of economies and global markets.

Global governance is composed of many dynamic and complex processes adapting to constantly changing environments. Attention should also be drawn to the fact that with the concept of global governance we move into the realm of the normative, what is desirable in the view of a specific group of people. The Commission's long-term view includes the wish for a strengthened United Nations as a universal forum to discuss global

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<sup>8</sup> For more information see <http://www.sovereignty.net/p/gov/gganalysis.htm> and <http://www.libertymatters.org/globalgovernance.htm>.

problems.

NGOs are integrated as important agents for change and channels for diverse interests coming from many different stakeholders. The Commission emphasises their growth over the last decades and their increasing contributions in various fields. This development mirrors the growing awareness of the need for popular participation in governance at every level. NGOs therefore have to “occupy a more central place in the structures of global governance [...]”<sup>9</sup>.

The Commission on Global Governance also speaks about the “emergence of a vigorous global civil society” which leads to another important thread in the discussions on NGOs in international affairs: the emergence of global civil society which will be defined and discussed later on in this chapter.

Weiss (2000: 795) observed that “many academics and international practitioners employ 'governance' to connote a complex set of structures and processes, both public and private, while more popular writers tend to use it synonymously with 'government'”. The first part of this description applies well to the United Nations with its broad membership and wide range of mandates. The complexity increased considerably and continuously since the foundation of the organisation, and it was compounded by the onset of globalisation. This also implies that there are not necessarily defined mechanisms to enforce governance which raises questions regarding the distribution of power and accountability.<sup>10</sup>

According to Keohane (2002: 3), “governance can be defined as the making and implementation of rules, and the exercise of power, within a given domain of activity”. Global governance then refers to “rule-making and power-exercise at a global scale, but not necessarily by entities authorised by general agreement to act.” States, religious organisations, business corporations, intergovernmental and non-governmental organisations can

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<sup>9</sup> The fifth chapter of the Commission's report “Our Global Neighborhood” deals with the UN and the role of civil society within the UN system: [www.libertymatters.org/chap5.htm](http://www.libertymatters.org/chap5.htm).

<sup>10</sup> Although governance is still closely connected to the activities of governments (Rosenau and Czempiel 1992) which is evident at the UN through the decision-making powers of its members and the close link between UN mandates and national interests.

be involved as actors in global governance. Global governance consists of strategic interactions among entities which are not organised in formal hierarchies. In this context Keohane is especially concerned about accountability, and how to strengthen the mechanisms to put it in place. There are several forms of accountability: electoral, hierarchical, supervisory, legal and reputational accountability. An accountability relationship can be defined as “one in which an individual, group or other entity makes demands on an agent to report on his or her activities, and has the ability to impose costs on the agent. We can speak of an authorised or institutionalised accountability relationship when the requirement to report, and the right to sanction, are mutually understood and accepted” (Keohane 2002: 12).

The definition of the Commission is important because it describes the UN as a forum for global governance and it includes NGOs in this governance structure. Keohane adds the criteria of accountability and power-exercise which are especially relevant at the UN with its multitude of actors with different forms of power. A combination of the two provides a relatively complete definition which is easily applicable to the UN and NGOs. It conveys the tension between a normative claim for a stronger role for NGOs in global governance and the intergovernmental reality at the UN where member states are the decision-makers.

Rosenau (1995: 13) sums up the concept in his definition as “global governance is conceived to include systems of rules at all levels of human activity – from the family to the international organisation – in which the pursuit of goals through the exercise of control has transnational repercussions”. He sees the United Nations and governments as central to global governance, but there are more actors and activities to take into account. The inclusion of the family and the international organisation calls for a broad approach to grasp and analyse the subject. The meaning of control and regulation also needs to be redefined in the global context. The analysis of such activity often includes the description of global social movements, civil societies, international organisations, the changing capacity of states to regulate their affairs, private organisations, public-

private partnerships, and transnationalism.<sup>11</sup>

It is often said that international organisations are the least accountable among all the actors in world politics. But one should bear in mind that these organisations are accountable to their member states, and they are always subject to the scrutiny of non-governmental organisations and the media. Due to the latter, they are also in a relationship of reputational accountability. In comparison, transnational networks of non-state actors are less accountable because of their dispersed constituencies and activities (Jordan and van Tuijl 2006).

## 1.2 Civil Society

Civil society is one of the most cited theoretical concepts whenever NGOs are discussed. It has long historical roots coming mostly from the stage when nation-states were developing. Its key concepts include human equality and a rights-based society. Nowadays, it is mainly defined as the sphere above the individual and underneath the state.

Civil societies can be seen as the national policy space where NGOs are grounded, financially, culturally, and politically. From the national level upwards towards the international, contacts are built and issue-areas are developed. Usually organisations have to achieve some success in national civil societies before they move up in their activities to the international level. Therefore, the civil society roots of NGOs are very important.

As definitions for NGOs abound, the same is true for definitions of civil society. Some examples will be presented here shortly, followed by a brief history of the term.

Hyden (1997: 18), for example, emphasises the political side of civil society by pointing out that civil society connects the individual with the public realm and the state. A broader understanding of the term can be found in the address to the National Press Club by US Senator William Bradley (1995). He compares society as a whole to a three-legged stool. Government, market, and civil society make up these three legs. He emphasised the

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<sup>11</sup> As exemplified in O'Brien et al. (2000), Lipschutz (2006), and Ronit and Schneider (1999).

importance of a healthy and solid civil society as a space where communities can be developed and maintained successfully, and as a support for the whole country.

This use of the term fits well into the broader context of seeing civil society as the third sector. Some criticise that civil society should take the third place after the state and the market. Scholars in development studies, as for example Tandon (2003), maintain that in fact civil society should come first because of its inherent democratic principles. A more general definition is offered by Michael Bratton (1994: 2). He defines civil society as the "sphere of social interaction between the household and the state which is manifest in norms of community cooperation, structures of voluntary association, and networks of public communication". The norms mentioned in the definition are trust, reciprocity, tolerance, and inclusion. Bratton also highlights another important term in this context which is social capital.

Many of the criteria described above can be traced back to early concepts of civil society. Hobbes, as one of the earliest writers on civil society, saw the benefit of civil society in providing physical security. Locke welcomed the restraints on arbitrary power through civil society. Ferguson followed the Roman ideal promoting active interest in government and the polity. By introducing the distinction between state and society, Hegel provided us with one of the main elements of the definition of civil society. The concept of civil society pertains to public activity only. De Tocqueville admired the richness in public life in America.

The guarantee of individual liberties can only be provided through a strong associational life as one of the most important factors. In his view, freedom and equality depend on active associations. The distinction between civil society and economic activities was later on drawn from the work of Gramsci.<sup>12</sup>

The development of civil society was often seen as positive, a way to strengthen civil and political rights and democracy. One could thus come to the conclusion that it would be desirable to have a stronger impact of civil

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<sup>12</sup> For a discussion of the above please refer to Anheier et al. (2001: 12), and Cohen and Arata (1992).

society in the international community and the UN. The opposite seems to be the case given the limited participation and influence of civil society actors at the UN.

Since the interdependence between all social actors has significantly increased, it should be questioned if this concept still adds value to the analysis of NGO activities today. It is rather trivial to state that organisations are made up of individuals. A large body of literature exists, especially in social movement theory (e.g. Tarrow 1998 and 2002), discussing the motivations of individuals why and how they join organisations or become activists. Here we touch upon an important basic constituting element of political organisation and activism. Some NGOs for example start out in the home of an individual who is particularly concerned about an issue concerning international affairs. Secondly, it was mentioned earlier that it is often difficult to disentangle state and society. Examples here are the influences of public opinion, the media, and NGOs. More specifically, NGOs are often on national delegations at international events, obtain funding from governments, are government contractors and interact with the state in many other ways. The definition of the space between the individual and the state seems overly simplistic and undifferentiated to help analyses today. A structural view of different patterns of interactions among the various social actors might yield more insight. Social network analyses allows for such a view.

### **1.2.1 Global Civil Society**

Anheier et al. (2001) devote an entire series to the concept and operationalisation of *global civil society*. For their purposes they define global civil society as "the sphere of ideas, values, institutions, organisations, networks, and individuals located between the family, the state, and the market and operating beyond the confines of national societies, polities and economies". They conclude by defining the concept as being "ultimately normative" (Anheier et al. 2001: 17). The work of the yearbook is based on three assumptions: Firstly, global civil society constitutes a new social reality. Well-known examples of NGO action, like parallel summits, resistance against the Mutual Agreement on Investment,

are used here to support the first proposition.

Secondly, the authors put forward that "global civil society both feeds on and reacts to globalisation" (Anheier et al. 2001: 18). This is surely true in a sense that NGOs react to political and economic trends in today's world and to a growing interconnectedness across borders, facilitated by recent developments in communication technology. In the third proposition the researchers acknowledge the fact that the concept of global civil society remains fuzzy and contested which, of course, does not help to operationalise or measure this construct.

The transposition of social, political and economic processes to the global is still highly contested. Even in the maybe least contested field of a global economy we can find strong evidence against globalisation. Companies are still led from nationally located headquarters, mostly dominated by the national culture (which often happens to be American), and subject to national jurisdiction, rules and regulations (Hirst and Thompson 1999: 9). The same goes for NGOs. Only a few are truly global, because they branched out globally or they are only based on the internet and therefore accessible globally. It should be understood as well that many North - South issues such as the digital divide and trade barriers are counter-arguments to anything global.

Therefore, some scholars (Florini 2002, Keck and Sikkink 1998) argue against the global in global civil society and rather prefer the term transnational. The authors of the yearbook (Anheier et al. 2001) admit that this is closer to the empirical truth, but still they maintain their preference for the global.

They downplay the weak empirical foundation and maintain the decisive normative content the term which is scientifically questionable, because without evidence we are in the realm of political desiderata, but not in the realm of scientific social inquiry. The weakness of their global position is even underlined in their own words: "'global civil society' might overstate what is really out there" (Anheier et al. 2001: 16). Global civil society, in their view, should fulfil the purpose of "taming' globalisation" (Anheier et al. 2001: 16-17). Questions why globalisation supposedly needs taming, in which way and exactly who decides about this process are left open. The role which



global civil society should play in this is also not specified.

Since the yearbook also pursues methodological goals, this begs the question how we can capture and measure the phenomenon of 'global civil society'. It has been mentioned briefly that this poses almost an impossible challenge. How are we going to measure a fuzzy and highly contested concept for which even its supporters say there is hardly any empirical evidence? One way to attempt to measure the phenomenon would be to try to disaggregate it, for example through a series of empirical studies of NGO participation in the work of international organisations since this is often seen as part of what makes up global civil society.

Its normative nature puts it also at risk of becoming tautological: defending it as a good thing or a worthy cause because the values embraced by it are the ones one supports. A more precise definition would be helpful in finding the appropriate empirical indicators. The authors of the yearbook blame these methodological difficulties on methodological nationalism. This is certainly a problem which has to be addressed, but it applies basically to all empirical research in international relations. Data from official sources, be it national governments or the United Nations, are often dated, partial and omit facts which might hurt country x or y. To gather more data on recent trends pertaining to more than one country, different organisations in different countries, and their linkages, one can only encourage social scientists around the world to collect more empirical data on national state-society issues, and their possible transnational or even global connections. One method to look at today's interdependence and linkages is social network analysis to uncover the underlying structures of today's world. This study will later discuss in depth the value and feasibility of social network analysis.

There are other criticisms which come to mind when looking at the first two propositions of the yearbook and the supposedly supporting data.

The contradictions already start with the definition of the concept as being "ultimately normative" (Anheier et al. 2001: 17). At the same time the authors have a very concrete, quantitative aim, namely operationalising and measuring the term. Difficulties are bound to arise when a researcher tries to measure the normative content of a concept. How do we measure ideas?

As it is phrased in a previous passage this concept can be viewed to include the "aspiration to reach and include citizens everywhere and to enable them to think and act as global citizens" (Anheier et al. 2001: 17). Here we enter into the realm of politics which is distinctly different from the realm of social sciences.

It is not established how the examples of their first assumption describe this supposedly new social reality of a global civil society. It is not elaborated on how these examples make up global civil society. Parallel summits do not always have global participants in attendance. (This is, by the way, often one criticism regarding UN conferences. Organisations from the South are chronically underrepresented due to a lack of resources.) Resistance and activism are often not truly global in their reach and composition. Another argument for the existence of global civil society brought up is the membership growth in international NGOs (INGOs). But when we look at the table showing the growth of INGO membership (Anheier et al. 2001: 5) we can see that growth in some regions is not as strong as in others. Japan, Oceania and South Asia show only a slight increase from 1990 to 2000. The question is, if we speak of a globalised world, should we not assume a strong growth in all regions of the world. Again the question comes up if scholars should talk about globalism or rather about transnationalism. The authors deliver the answer themselves a few sentences later: "one of the most striking findings of the Yearbook is that global civil society is heavily concentrated in north-western Europe" (Anheier et al. 2001: 6). This statement would rather make it a limited European civil society. With regard to the UN in this context, one has to understand the importance of equitable geographical distribution for member states. In analogy, Southern NGOs are underrepresented at the UN which almost automatically takes away from the potential influence of all NGOs at the UN, because there are more accredited and active organisations from the North and developing countries feel that the voices of their societies are neglected.<sup>13</sup>

Another table of the yearbook can be linked to this problem area. Table R25

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<sup>13</sup> Figures to elaborate on this will be presented in the third chapter.

(Anheier et al. 2001: 304) presents a measure for geographical identification from the European and World Values Survey. For the purpose of these surveys it was asked "Which of these geographical groups would you say you belong to' first of all?" Respondents could choose among these categories: locality or town, region, country, continent, world. Most answers were for locality/town, then followed by country - across all countries. The exact percentages for the United States, for example, are: 38.1% for locality/town, 12.1% for region, 30.2% for country, 3.7% for continent, 15.9% for the world. This is hardly an indicator for a new global consciousness or the outreach of global civil society to global citizens. Quite the opposite is the case, it speaks for the importance of the local and the national. This finding also raises broader questions regarding the global in global governance. If the local is more important than the global, how can one expect more influence for NGOs, and especially international NGOs at the UN. One would have to assume that NGOs can play a bigger role at the national level.

Keohane (2002) advanced some scepticism regarding global civil society in a similar vein. Due to the state of the world today, after 9/11, antagonisms between different religions and political systems erupted. Therefore, we cannot speak of a common value system among all people of the world as it is often portrayed in the literature on global civil society. Of course, there are trans-border relations in many different aspects of life but they are not as pervasive as some scholars would like to make us think (e.g. Keck and Sikkink 1998). The world is still divided.

Schechter (1999: 2) broadens the scope of inquiry by stating that it must be synthetic and multidisciplinary drawing from many different fields. After a brief history of the concept of civil society, he adopts a more Tocquevillian or Hegelian definition with: "those forms of association among individuals that are explicitly not part of the public, state apparatus, the private, household realm or the atomistic market". Moving to the global level he acknowledges that the term global civil society is rather vague. For some it only seems to mean the participation of NGOs in major United Nations conferences, as for example the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED). Global civil society comprises a

multitude of very diverse organisations with diverse interests, values and norms. He adds another feature for global civil society coming from Richard Falk's definition (Schechter 1999: 68), namely the extension at the level of the individual of responsibility and compassion on a global level with the goal of eradicating oppression, inequality and violence. This phenomenon distinguishes itself from other developments in that it is not centrally organised.

He points to the advantages of the concept of global civil society compared to other approaches such as 'new multilateralism' or 'globalisation from below': Global civil society emphasises the "grounding in societal processes as opposed to state-centred, institutionalised political one" (Schechter 1999: 70). With Featherstone he cautions, that the understanding of society in the term global civil society can hardly be compared to the sociological notion of the term. This notion is based on a state-centric society with shared norms and values. In this debate Florini (2000: 7) suggests the slightly different term of 'transnational civil society' pointing to the fact that we do indeed see the phenomenon of transnational links, but that these connections can hardly be described as global in any sense.

Scholte (1999) suggests that the difficulties with the term global civil society originate from the different traditions of the civil society concept. His definition of global civil society encompasses the following elements: civic activities that address trans-world issues, involvement of trans-border communication, global organisation, and work on a premise of supra-territorial solidarity. According to Scholte, an organisation is already part of global civil society when it fulfils one of the criteria listed above.

The transnational nature of interactions is an important criterion and a more realistic one given the difficulties of achieving a global level in interactions and organisation.

Taylor (2002) finds an appropriate assessment in his interpretation of global civil society. In his view the concept suffers from weak description and inadequate theorisation. Global civil society as a relatively common term today is no more than many phenomena lumped together: globalisation,

growing networks of NGOs, and social movements. His question how to fill the normative vacuum created by Anheier et al. (2001), among others, is justified. Taylor (2002: 341) paraphrases the concept as "emerging multiorganisational field marked by innovative network forms and transformative purpose". But how can the concept be approached in an more sensible way? Obviously the sum of country-by-country descriptions of civil societies around the world does not add up to a global civil society. This is one approach within third sector, prominently represented by Lester Salamon et al.'s (1999) *Global Civil Society: Dimensions of the Nonprofit Sector*. It is of course well exemplified that civil society is growing in each country so that one could speak of a "global associational revolution" but not of a global civil society. As mentioned earlier, there are arguments from sociology against the concept of global civil society. Taylor (2002: 342) cites two examples. According to political sociologists this concept cannot be used as a means for analysis. Firstly, there is no global state, thus no global civil society. Secondly, the main sociological preconditions for the emergence of a global civil society do not exist. The current infrastructure is not sufficient, and social networks for the formation of transnational identity and culture are neither strong nor extensive enough. The persistence of national, linguistic, and cultural differences also argue against a coalescent global civil society. Tarrow already stated earlier (1998) that the prospects for global civil society are indeed weak.

Taylor's (2002) way forward offers a global approach for a global phenomenon. He suggests combining several tracks in approaching the dynamic multi-organisational field of global civil society. Linkages between protests on the streets and institutional lobbying, NGOs and social movements, power relations, and the transcendence of national and state processes should be taken into account. The possibility of a global civil society can only be captured through the analysis of multiple levels and actors. Analyses in all the areas mentioned above have to be merged to gain a better understanding of how civil society actors interact on the international level.

Due to the underrepresentation of Southern NGOs at the UN and a

persisting imbalance in the power structures of the membership, the UN and NGOs participation at the UN make hardly a good case for global civil society.

Last but not least, the concept of global civil society seems to imply a form of non-territorial or supra-territorial governance (Coleman and Wayland 2006), while even international politics are still firmly rooted in national interests and domestic policy-making.<sup>14</sup>

Other scholars discussed recent developments in international affairs involving civil society in different terms. Wapner (1996) calls a specific area of activities of environmental organisations "world civic politics". In his view the lobbying of governments by transnational environmental activist groups does not cover the whole truth about environmental activism. Other arenas can be found under what has been labelled global civil society. These arenas are located in the civic dimension of what Wapner calls "world collective life". Phenomena, usually described as constituting globalisation like interdependent markets and developing common value systems, are for him proof of the "formation of a thin, but nevertheless present form of global civil society" (Wapner 1996: 4). His definition is slightly different from that of the Global Civil Society Yearbook: "the slice of associational life that exists above the individual and below the state, but also across national boundaries" (Wapner 1996: 5). With this foundation Wapner defines world civic politics as follows: "The idea of world civic politics signifies that embedded in the activities of transnational environmental groups is an understanding that states do not hold a monopoly over the instruments that govern human affairs but rather that non-state forms of governance exist and can be used to effect widespread change" (Wapner 1996: 7). According to Wapner the problems in this area will not be settled until scholars move away from the focus on the relations between NGOs and the state to include the civic dimension of NGO activities into their considerations. It remains somewhat unclear why the civic dimension of NGO work cannot be realised in activities targeted towards the state. Also it has to be questioned

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<sup>14</sup> In the case of the UN no decisions are taken without instructions from the capitals of member states.

if the term of world civic politics only applies to environmental politics. More generally, the question would be if and how civil activities differ from each other in different issue-areas.

Boli and Thomas (1999) use the term "world culture" to describe a convergence in cultures and norms around the globe. This development has been helped by increasing numbers of INGOs and the growing number of inter-organisational linkages. INGOs create the public sphere where world-cultural discourse is taking place. Items for the world agenda and the world cultural framework are shaped in this context. World culture can be studied by analysing INGO structures and activities.

Again, the way of operationalisation is not entirely clear. Boli and Thomas (1999: 14-15) state that "like all cultures, world culture becomes embedded in social organization". This would mean that there is no limitation to the civil society. Multinational companies surely create a similar sphere where a world-cultural discourse can take place, for the example when we look at global reach of logos and brands.

Coming back to the question of empirical support for these concepts, their backing in social reality, it is obvious that what they describe is empirically speaking largely the same: NGOs engaged in activities in manifold issue-areas. Therefore, it is dubious if the wealth of terms and concepts really adds to the body of knowledge or helps with the description of our complex and interdependent world today. What is called for is a search for patterns and structures in the manifold descriptions to arrive at a clearer picture and a better starting point for useful operationalisations of concepts.

To develop a better concept, we need to build a foundation of information and data on what NGOs are and what they do. There is no sufficient empirical evidence available yet. Therefore, this study will add systematic and structural findings on UN-NGO relations to the debate and lofty concepts, as for example global civil society, will have to be revisited.

Despite the criticism and the discussion of the existence of a global civil society, it is relevant here because it is often used to describe NGO

involvement at the UN (e.g. participation in conferences) and in international affairs (e.g. in the development of global solidarity).

The literature reflects the growing number of NGOs, their visibility and their perceived influence. The evolution of their actions and activities can be traced in the relevant literature. The engagement by NGOs at the international level contributed to the development of the concept of a global civil society. Their role and influence in international politics, however, remain contentious. The empirical analysis carried out for this study will give a more comprehensive perspective on NGOs in international politics at the United Nations.

### **1.3 Interorganisational Networks in IR Scholarship**

As we have seen in the previous sections, networks are often used as a metaphor for emerging linkages across borders and actors. They serve as a descriptive measure for transnational advocacy networks and as an element of broad concepts like global governance and global civil society.

But they are more than a mere metaphor for describing the increasing interdependence in a globalising world. They provide us with set of tools to describe emerging structures and patterns in social interaction.

This section will start with a short account of the applications of social network analysis in international relations so far. Most studies here have been undertaken for economic issues: trade, development, but also include military intervention, treaties and mass political conflict.

Brams (1966), for example, looked at diplomatic missions, total trade volumes, and joint memberships in intergovernmental organisations among 119 countries in 1963 and 1964 in order to analyse transaction flows between nations. He concluded that trade flows were more sensitive to disruptions than institutionalised diplomatic and treaty relations (Knoke 1993: 191).

Snyder and Kick (1979) combined Bram's diplomatic exchange data with



binary matrices of exports, treaties, and military interventions in the 1960s. Their findings supported the core-semiperiphery-periphery image proposed in Wallerstein's world system theory. The core nations maintained strong trade linkages to all other blocks in the system, while the periphery blocks were integrated into the world economy only through the ties to the core.

Hafner-Burton and Montgomery (2005) analysed the role of preferential trade agreements in conflict prevention. Their findings confirmed that trade institutions can keep the peace under special circumstances among states with relatively equal social positions within the international political economies. On the other hand, trade institutions can contribute to inequality and thus lead to an increased likelihood of violent conflict.

Studies in this field pertaining more to the subject of this study include Tilly (1978) regarding social movement strategies and Laumann and Knoke (1987) about coalition partners and the mobilisation for collective action.

Generally speaking, the analysis of relations is useful for the analysis of power and power relations. The centrality of the relational element in the definition of power becomes clear in Max Weber's definitions of the term: "'Power' is the probability that one actor within a relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability rests. [...] We understand by 'power' the chance of a man or a number of men to realise their own will in a social action even against the resistance of others who are participating in the action" (Knoke 1993: 1). This concept of power, exercised in social interactions and relations, has been further explored and elaborated in many studies. It is important to bear in mind that power and power structures are developed within relationships.

One dimension of power is influence which is often defined as "the occurrence when one actor intentionally transmits information to another that alters the latter's actions from what would have occurred without that information" (see for example Parsons 1963). Knoke (1993: 7) concludes that: "When considering power relations among many actors in a large political system, the idea of a social network is helpful". One important unit of analysis here is the concept of roles. The role of a person is created by his or her position in diverse social interactions. It consists of expectations,

as well as rights and duties.

Thus the different roles NGOs and member states assume at the UN determine their relationship and the distribution of power. Member states negotiate resolutions and allocate funds. NGOs give statements and lobby delegates trying to potentially influence negotiations and other decisions. The imbalance of power is obvious.

### **1.3.1 Social Networks**

#### *1.3.1.1 Concept and Definitions*

In sociology network analysis is used to detect, describe and analyse emerging social structures. It incorporates two significant assumptions about social behaviour:

Firstly, any actor typically participates in a social system involving many other actors, who are significant reference points in one another's decision. The nature of relationships therefore affects the actors' perceptions, beliefs, and actions.

Secondly, it points to the various levels of structure in a social system. Structure here means "regularities in the patterns of relations among concrete entities" (Knoke and Kuklinski 1982: 10).

Network analysis is a powerful tool for painting a systematic picture of global social structures and their components. It recognises the embeddedness of social actors and is thus able to detect emergent social phenomena that are not existent or visible at the individual level. Its capacity to illuminate entire social structures and to also comprehend particular elements within its structure makes it especially valuable.

Relations in this context are not an intrinsic characteristic of either subject taken in isolation, but are an emergent property of the connection or linkage between units of observation.

Attributes on the other hand are intrinsic characteristics of people, objects, or events.

Relational measures capture emergent properties of social systems that cannot be measured simply by aggregating the attributes of individual members. Furthermore, such emergent properties may significantly affect

both system performance and the behaviour of network members. For example, the structure of informal friendships and antagonisms in formal work groups can affect both group and individual productivity rates in ways not predictable from personal attributes such as age or experience.

Relations are the building blocks of network analysis. Relations have both content and form. Content refers to the substantive type of relation represented in the connections (e.g. helping, supervising). Relational form, on the other hand, refers to properties of the connections between pairs of actors (dyads) that exist independently of specific contents. Two basic aspects of relational form are (a) the intensity or strength of the link between actors, and (b) the level of joint involvement in the same activities. Relations can take the form of transactions, communication, boundary penetration, instrument, sentiment, authority/power or kinship (Knoke and Kuklinski, 1982: 15-16). A network is generally defined as a specific type of relation linking a defined set of persons, objects, or events. Different types of relations identify different networks even when imposed on the identical set of elements. The set of persons, objects, or events of a network can be called actors or nodes. Hereby the researcher has to take into consideration that for a network analysis both the relations that occur and those that do not exist have to be taken into account.

Structures vary dramatically in form, from the isolated structure in which no actor is connected to any other actor, to the saturated structure in which every actor is directly linked to every other. But network analysis contains a further explicit premise of great significance: The structure of relations among actors, and the location of individual actors in the network have important behavioural, perceptual, and attitudinal consequences both for the individual unit and for the system as a whole.

#### 1.3.1.2 *Reputation and Trust in Networks*

In sociology networks are often analysed and discussed in terms of trust, exchange of resources, power relations and access. These categories are

also relevant in many areas of IR.

The establishment of trust and exchange relations is important to all networks, trans-governmental, transnational advocacy or global public policy networks. Both features are a prerequisite to the development of networks and cooperation. Access is important for transnational actors to gain entry to their targeted country. It is also an important issue for non-governmental actors who lobby international organisations. The power resource and power relations are basically omnipresent in international relations: in the debate on hegemony, foreign policy, and the question of the influence of non-state actors, just to name a few.

In order to get an impression of the value of these concepts some sociological studies will be used to introduce them.

In *The Emergence of Exchange Structures* Kollock (1994) examines the role of reputation as well as the level of trust as important factors in the formation of stable exchange relations. In addition, it is important to look at the situation of the actors involved, if their environment is determined by uncertainty or security. Today we can assume conditions of uncertainty in exchange relations. Results from this study can be of relevance when one thinks of attitudes towards NGOs. They are sometimes considered to be non-transparent, threatening, or unreliable which then negatively effects their relations with governments or international organisations.

Distribution of power and information asymmetries can affect relationships. Ongoing experience and regular interactions are thought to increase trust in exchange relationships. The frequency of interactions can be influenced by the reputation of the actors involved. Reputation is defined here as a characteristic or attribute ascribed to one person by another. The experiment used here to demonstrate the impact of the different factors on the emergence of an exchange relationship was a situation where the different actors had to choose partners they wanted to trade with.

The hypothesis that the highest trustworthiness rating is for the most frequent exchange partner could be supported by the results. This corresponds to the intuitive assumption that interaction is more likely with somebody we trust. If we transfer this finding, then NGOs would only have a chance to enter into interaction with governmental or intergovernmental

actors if they are trusted. For the variable reputation, one would assume that, in the trading situation of this experiment, the buyers concern for the reputation of the seller is high and the seller's concern for its own reputation is higher than that of the buyer. This was also confirmed by the experiment (Kollock 1994). That translates into the concern of governments and academics for the financial and human resources, as well as activities of nongovernmental actors. On the other end where NGOs often act as the "seller" of ideas, values, norms, and policies, they are very interested in building a good reputation for themselves.

Besides it could be ascertained that commitment, average level of trust, and the concern for one's own and others' reputation were significantly higher in a context of uncertainty.

Thus all these variables are particularly important in today's interdependent and complex world for actors who try to build networks. Since scholars often point to the significance of shared values and norms within networks, it is noteworthy that there was also a moral element which seemed to influence the outcome of the experiment. Disappointments during trading were punished with no further interactions in the future and shaming. Again that may mean that NGOs who have not lived up to the expectations in a network may be excluded from future campaigns. It is therefore possible that endogenous solutions to dyadic dilemmas based on such qualities as commitment and reputation could create the trust and solidarity necessary to solve collective dilemmas (Kollock 1994: 340). This could possibly mean that the creation of trustworthiness and a good reputation could help to solve problems of collective action like the provision of global public goods, and improve cooperation.

Markovsky et al. (1988) take a closer look at power relations in exchange networks. An exchange network is according to Cook et al. (1983: 277) a set of actors, a distribution of values resources among those actors, for each actor a set of exchange opportunities with other actors in the network, a set of historically developed and utilised exchange opportunities called exchange relations, and a set of network connections linking exchange relations into a single network structure. Power in exchange relations depends on the positions which are occupied by the actors within the

network. Positions are locations in a network occupied by actors and linked by relations. Power can also be conceived "as a structurally determined potential for obtaining relatively favourable resource levels" (Markovsky et al.: 224). It can be asserted that potential power determines the use of power. Generally speaking the power distribution within a network determines the exchange relations of the network. Power in an exchange network is in addition a possibility to avoid disputes which would mean exclusion.

Marsden (1983) concentrates on the meaning of access for the relations in a network. An access network describes the available channels for exchange. Actors who are favourably located in the access network are able to inflate the exchange value of their resources in transactions with peripheral actors. That may translate into a situation where an NGO which is at the centre of network may have better chances to realise its ideas than an organisation located at the periphery. There are different mechanisms which can possibly generate networks with restricted access. Two particularly important mechanisms are ideological similarity and embeddedness. Ideological similarity may lead to unwillingness on the part of the actor to form even ephemeral coalitions with other actors whom he/she ideologically opposes even if his/her interests suggest that an exchange would be mutually beneficial. Pre-existing networks bring about embeddedness for the actors involved. It is self-evident that social relations depend on opportunities for interaction. The formal structure of organisations provides opportunities for contacts between actors which in turn makes the use of particular relationships for coalition formation more likely. Thus it can be expected that pre-existing networks do create a form of "social inertia", a situation where one central actor considers only certain other actors as potential exchange or coalition partners. Again, mutual trust is one of the preconditions for exchange. This is especially valid for interactions in the political system where no medium of exchange has been formally institutionalised. The development of informal norms or existing traditions can help to guarantee the value of exchanges. If there are no such guarantees the difficulty of developing and maintaining trust can be severe. To control these kinds of situations actors often restrict the set of actors with

whom they interact.

It can often be observed that NGOs only choose known and trusted partners for cooperation in campaigns. Governments or international organisations are often hesitant to engage with NGOs because they are not trusted and no previous experiences could speak in favour of the engagement. In summary, limited physical access and social access cause restrictions for future potential exchanges.

The introduction of variables like trust, access, reputation, and power to the analysis of networks can yield systematic and useful insights into the structures and relations of networks which would also allow for some generalisation beyond the analysis of single case studies.

Networks have also been discussed extensively by Manuel Castells in his famous trilogy. As he puts it aptly in the first volume of his trilogy *The Rise of the Network Society* (1996: 469): "Networks constitute the new social morphology of our societies". He also argues that the extension of networks we are dealing with today has been made possible by the new information technology paradigm which greatly facilitates the expansion of network structures domestically as well as internationally. Castells (1996: 470) uses a simple definition of networks as "a set of interconnected nodes". They are nowadays the determining structures in inclusion and exclusion in societies. Although there is no doubt that networks existed in earlier times the dimensions of present networks expand through entire social systems. Inclusion and exclusion in these networks are determined by the ability to maintain communication between all nodes involved. Another factor enabling successful communication structures are shared values and performance goals.

Compared to Keck and Sikkink (1998), Castells (1996) and Urry (2002) use the term network in a broader framework of social inquiry.

More exotic approaches include for example the presentation of networks as a rhizome: "a subterranean plant growth process involving propagation through the horizontal development of the plant stem" which has been taken up by social movements activists as a good depiction of their work (Clever 1999: 3). A Mexican scholar suggests to use the term "hammock" instead of

network because the latter evokes the image of a net which captures things whereas a hammock is more supportive than a capturing structure (Cleaver 1999: 13).

Risse-Kappen (1995) acknowledging the importance of networks, recommends a network analysis approach for future research in transnationalism. Accordingly he suggests: "Network analysis as developed in organisational theory should provide a better tool to study the interactions within international institutions than the traditional focus on intergovernmental bargaining" (Risse-Kappen 1995: 281). Beyond this suggestion, he is mostly concerned with the promotion of an appreciation of the interaction between states and transnational actors to move beyond the notions of state-centred versus society-dominated (Risse-Kappen 1995: 281). He describes transnational relations as influenced by domestic structures and international institutions. Existing structures of governance not only constrain transnational actors but they also enable them (Risse-Kappen 1995: 281-283).

### **1.3.2 Policy Networks**

#### *1.3.2.1 Concept and Definitions*

Kenis and Schneider (1991) define policy networks as policy making arrangements characterised predominantly by informal, decentralised, and horizontal relations. This concept emphasises that the relations among participants are not determined by hierarchies. The actors of the network are interdependent but formally autonomous. Policy networks are characterised by a patterned distribution of decision making powers. They refer to the collective action of organised corporate actors, interest groups, and state agencies, and thus to inter-organisational relations in public policy making.

Although policy networks are mostly horizontal, they are not completely located outside asymmetric power relations or interdependence.

One important feature of policy network studies is that they treat public



policy not as mainly determined by state agents. Quite to the contrary, non-state actors have an important role to play which coincides with the general trend of the growing importance and inclusion of non-governmental organisations in world politics. Although it should be mentioned that this approach originally was used to look at strategic interactions within states only (Coleman 2001), Katzenstein (1978) took policy network studies to another level. He advanced the concept of a policy network as linkages between broad social categories. It is a meta-structure integrating different forms of governance, building a symbiotic relationship between state and society. Policy networks are therefore mechanisms of political resource mobilisation in situations where the capacity for decision making, program formulation, and implementation is widely distributed among non-governmental and state actors.

As social networks, policy networks can be described through their actors, linkages and their boundaries. They include a more or less stable set of public and private actors. The links between the actors serve as communication channels, for the exchange of information, expertise, trust, and other policy resources. Boundaries of given policy networks are not primarily set by formal institutions but through processes of mutual recognition, depending on functional relevance and structural embeddedness. Policy networks can be seen as integrated hybrid structures of governance.

### 1.3.2.2 *Application and Discussion*

A policy network approach is called for when one looks at a diverse set of actors, governmental and non-governmental, public and private. It is useful for the analysis of hybrid structures of political governance. It is often applied to problems in foreign policy analysis (for example multilevel networks: Krahmman 2003), economic and trade issues (Coleman 2001), and the environment (Streck 2002).

Advantages of policy networks are their ability to create synergies in the policy-making process, to react fast and effectively to new challenges at hand, to pool resources and to exchange experiences (Streck 2002: 4).

Streck analyses three case studies in environmental governance: The World Commission on Dams (WCD), The Global Environment Facility (GEF), and the "Flexible Mechanisms" of the Kyoto Protocol. The WCD was mandated to undertake a global review of the effectiveness of large dams for development and to establish acceptable guidelines for future decision making on the construction of dams. The Commission managed to create an (informal) standard against which future projects could be measured. Thereby the WCD contributed to international consensus building and standard-setting.

The GEF provides financing for investment and technical assistance in five focal areas which are: global warming, biodiversity, international waters, ozone depletion, and organic pollutants. One achievement of the Facility is its ability to build bridges between different institutions and their different forms of policy-making. Responsibility for example is shared among the implementing agencies UNEP, UNDP, and the World Bank. The GEF has also been lauded for the inclusion of NGOs on different operational levels. The value of institutionalising alternative perspectives was recognised. NGOs are invited to contribute to consultations, observe council meetings, become involved in working groups, provide data and independent analyses, and to undertake fundraising activities.

The flexible mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol created a platform for public-private networks to develop, execute, finance, and supervise projects. These mechanisms promote the development of international implementation networks.

For all the examples presented here, international organisations played an important role in facilitating and supporting global public policy networks. Due to the open, flexible and transparent nature of their processes and structures, global public policy networks can help to find alternative solutions to current problems in policy-making. They are able to mobilise resources relatively fast. They are well equipped to deal with governance problems of complex economic, social and political systems. Public policy networks can help to bridge the gap between different governmental and non-governmental actors. The functions of these networks include the settings of standards and agendas, dissemination of knowledge, and the

creation of alternative implementation mechanisms. They strengthen global governance and its legitimacy through the inclusion of non-governmental stakeholders, and provide thus an addition to intergovernmental cooperation. One limitation of policy networks is their dependence on existing international organisations through which they can operate.

In addition to the global public policy networks described above, there are several other types of policy networks.

There are trans-governmental networks which are informal networks of government officials or transnational public agencies like the Basel Committee and City Alliances. WSSD partnerships are a sub-set of policy networks which are usually created around a specific issue, and a clearly defined group of participants. In the context of the World Summit on Sustainable Development, these so called type II partnerships are considered to be policy networks to implement legal and political agreements in the field of sustainable development.

One example from the area of economic issues is the contribution from Coleman (2001) on agriculture. Coleman used the policy network approach for a case study on agricultural trade. He examines the increasing internationalisation of policy making in agriculture. This is an interesting case, because agriculture is still a highly subsidised sector and controlled to a large extent by national regulation. The national control came under growing pressure over the last thirty years. He showed in his case study that globalisation encouraged the emergence of transnational policy networks. In the beginning this process was supported by a transnational epistemic community. Surprisingly, these recent networks are less open to non-state actors.

### **1.3.3 Social Networks and Policy Networks - Two Approaches in Comparison**

For the purpose of this study the sociological approach to network analysis has been chosen. As the name indicates policy networks are mainly concerned with public policy making and decision making in public policy.

But for a comprehensive analysis of UN-NGO relations it is not sufficient to look only at the policy making dimension of the relationship. Often even the

existence of the policy making element can be doubted, and one has to fall back on a more inclusive and comprehensive form of analysis. Social network analysis allows for a more complete analysis of relationships which are not limited to policy making. It is also important to have a closer look at all the existing links and what they mean. Policy making is just one element which comes rather late in the development and existence of networks. At first other conditions have to be met and other interactions take place prior to policy making in networks. It is therefore necessary to describe the existing links and the meaning they carry first before one moves on to more complex processes like policy making. Before policy-making activities can take place a relatively stable relationship and trust have to be established. Issue-areas have to be identified and agreed upon for action. The necessary resources have to be mobilised and applied. Then actions, such as lobbying and campaigns, have to be undertaken to influence policy-making.

As mentioned above policy networks are predominantly informal, decentralised, and not hierarchical (Boerzel 1997: 1). This is clearly not the case for the networks of this study. They are often determined by asymmetric relations and a high degree of centralisation. In addition, policy networks often include corporate actors which are not relevant for this study. Social network analysis allows for a more comprehensive treatment of the relations between NGOs and the United Nations. This approach helps to unveil the relations which are often not visible without an empirical analysis. Aspects like trust, access, and distribution of power can be better accounted for with the social network approach.

## 2 Hypotheses and Methodology

### 2.1 Introduction

Well established in other social sciences like sociology and anthropology, social network analysis is a relatively recent addition to the methodological repertoire in international relations. In international relations it is most prominently used for the analysis of global policy networks and transnational advocacy networks. Since it is a relatively new method in international relations, its merits are not yet as clearly recognised as in other social science disciplines. The advantage of social network analysis is that it is well tested. There is a wide range of tools available for this method which are well described (e.g. Knoke and Kuklinski 1982).

As we have seen in the previous chapter, networks are often used as a metaphor for emerging linkages across borders and actors. They serve as a descriptive measure for transnational advocacy networks and as an element of broad concepts like global governance and global civil society. Networks seem to be omnipresent, they are the catchword of the day.

But they are more than a mere metaphor for describing the increasing interdependence in a globalising world. They provide us with set of tools to describe emerging structures and patterns in social interaction. Over the last decade structures of cooperation between UN headquarters and NGOs in New York emerged. They are often not as visible as relations or negotiations among member states, and social network analysis is a suitable method to observe these relations.

Gordenker and Weiss (1996: 34) rightly state that these networks and relationships “are carried on by people”, and thus their analysis calls for an approach which takes the personal nature of this phenomenon into account, and networks are often readily associated with NGOs (Gordenker and Weiss 1996: 35). Thus the authors conclude that “it [network analysis] would seem a most promising technique for analysing the function of transnational NGOs” (Gordenker and Weiss 1996: 36).

In contrast to Keck and Sikkink (1998), this study will employ the social network analysis method actually based on an empirical analysis in order to

obtain data for the description and analysis of the relationship between NGOs and UN Headquarters.

As described in the first chapter, NGOs are often seen as an emerging major influence in international politics. The hypotheses below will break down the concepts of influence and cooperation into elements used by social network analysis to give a broader and more realistic picture. Contrary to many case studies and their findings in international relations, NGOs in particular voiced their concern and discontent with the level of participation and influence in UN policy-making at headquarters.

In addition to the survey carried out, UN documents, NGO websites and the observation of UN and NGO meetings will complement the empirical foundation.

The unit of analysis are three groups: NGOs, permanent mission and UN headquarters. These groups are represented by senior officials who determine policies and practices.

## **2.2 Social Network Analysis in IR**

Network analysis has been applied to a variety of questions in international relations, from trade patterns (Brams 1966) to policy-making at the European level (Krahmann 2003).

It is particularly suitable for analysing the work of the UN because of the important role informal relationships play in the organisation. A network analysis yields a more realistic and comprehensive insight into the day-to-day work of the organisation.

This study looks at UN-NGO relations, its dimensions and impact. NGOs, UN headquarters and permanent missions in New York and their interactions are analysed here.

### **2.2.1 Dimensions of Social Networks**

It is often said that cooperation and alliances are more of an ad hoc nature today than formal and institutionalised. In the words of John Clarke, project manager of the Secretary-General's Panel of Eminent Persons on Civil Society: "The world nowadays does business in a different way than 50

years ago. Now, work is done in a more ad-hoc way.”<sup>15</sup> There is a tendency to build coalitions in addressing global issues, spanning central governments and other actors. This corresponds with the features of network structures which can change with the next interaction.

The dimensions of social networks presented in this study are both relevant elements of the current academic debate and of the specific case of the cooperation between United Nations headquarters and the NGO community in New York.

The sub-sections will deal first with the different dimensions of the concept and then apply the concept to the network structures between NGOs and the UN.

Communication, exchange, trust, advice and cooperation are the building blocks of networks. They will be used to show that there is no empirical evidence for a partnership between the UN and NGOs and that the influence of NGOs is limited. Less interaction between NGOs and the UN means less opportunity structures for cooperation.

#### 2.2.1.1 *Communication*

Communication is at the core of every human interaction. It determines the structure and direction of networks. Communication is often conceptualised in the form of face-to-face, telephone, fax, e-mail, and mail contacts. It measures how often people talk to each other or communicate via e-mail or regular mail. It is the basis needed for any kind of exchange to take place.

The frequency of these contacts determines the strength of relations. A high frequency speaks for a strong relationship and a low frequency accordingly for a weak relationship. For the direction of the communication it is important to establish who initiates the contact. Information on who is the initiator in a network also tells the observer about the positions, hierarchies, and power structures in a network.

All actors involved at the UN depend on communication. Partners for communication are often chosen according to social and geographical proximity and rank.

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<sup>15</sup> Discussion with John Clarke and Zehra Aydin, Secretary of the Cardoso Panel, in 2005.

NGOs often share common interests, political goals and their staff members have a similar background. They pursue similar goals in their engagement with the UN.

It is therefore assumed that NGOs are closer to each other than to the UN and member states. Therefore, one can expect them to communicate more often with other NGOs. When there is less communication with the UN and member states, there are less opportunities to influence policy.

### Hypotheses

1. Communication occurs more frequently among NGOs than between NGOs, UN headquarters and permanent missions.
2. Communication is initiated in most cases by NGOs.

#### *2.2.1.2 Exchange*

Classical exchange theorists like Blau (1964) refer to social exchange as reciprocal acts of benefit, in which individuals offer help, advice, approval and so forth to one another without negotiation of terms and without knowledge of whether or when the other will reciprocate. These exchanges necessarily entail uncertainty and risk: the other might never reciprocate or might do so very minimally. But rather than endangering social exchange, Blau (1964) and Lévi-Strauss (1969) argued that the risk and uncertainty inherent in this reciprocal exchange are essential for the development of trust and commitment. Another's trustworthiness can be demonstrated only when exchange occurs without the explicit "quid pro quo" of transactions that stipulate returns, and without the assurance of binding agreements.

NGOs share common interests and they often have a similar organisational structure as well. These aspects facilitate exchange. Therefore, it is assumed that the level of exchange between NGOs is higher than with permanent missions and UN headquarters.

##### *2.2.1.2.1 Information Exchange*

The exchange of information is one dimension of social exchange. It can be either a good which is traded or a resource which is used to assess the



value of potential or already existing partners. Information is one of the goods which are exchanged in networks. This exchange has to build on and use existing communication structures.

In the setting examined here information is a key resource. The availability of information is crucial for the work of NGOs and the United Nations alike. Information which is exchanged here includes UN documents, policy proposals, field reports, and information about meetings.

For the UN it is more important to obtain information about the situation in the field and innovative research and policy suggestions, whereas for NGOs it is of interest to obtain official UN or member states information.

### Hypotheses

3. Information exchange takes place mostly among NGOs and to a lesser extent with UN headquarters and permanent missions.

4. Information exchange is mostly initiated by NGOs.

#### *2.2.1.2.2 Exchange of Resources*

The exchange of resources often takes place in order to achieve a certain position within the network or to secure a specific partner.

It occurs less often than the exchange of information. Due to limited funds, neither the UN nor NGOs have the means to be able to exchange a lot of resources.

If one can speak of an exchange of resources, one will have to look at goods such as UN and other documents, reports, books, papers, and meeting space, which can be obtained without investing additional funds and which often become more valuable through sharing with members of a network. For example a widely shared report can become the basis for a joint campaign.

### Hypotheses

5. It is assumed that the exchange of resources only occurs occasionally.

6. Exchange of resources takes place mostly among NGOs, and only in a few cases between NGOs, permanent missions and UN headquarters.

### 2.2.1.2.3 Human Resources

The exchange of human resources or its overlap is often discussed in the literature with regard to interlocking directorates, i.e. that directors are part of boards of different companies at the same time.

Human resources are often exchanged or pooled for specific projects which require more than the resources usually available. These projects include large campaigns, vigils, outreach and research activities. NGOs often join forces on such occasions.

Exchange of human resources between the UN, permanent missions, and NGOs often occurs for major UN conferences. Representatives of NGOs serve as experts in delegations of member states. Responsible UN departments, offices and programmes often ask for the expertise of NGO representatives.

Over the last decade or so it became a common practice for foreign ministries and UN agencies to employ experts from civil society. Examples for this form of exchange can be found in the fields of human rights, development, and humanitarian assistance.<sup>16</sup>

### Hypotheses

7. For the case of UN-NGO relations at UN headquarters it is assumed that this kind of exchange only occurs among NGOs.

### 2.2.1.3.2 Financial Resources

Although often tested in scientific studies and settings this is hardly a relevant exchange category for UN-NGO relations at Headquarters. Of course, there is substantial contracting out to NGOs in humanitarian assistance and development aid, but other than that there is hardly any exchange of financial resources.

One exception here are the funds administered through the UN Non-

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<sup>16</sup> One example from the field of development is the inclusion of German NGO representatives in the German delegation to the UN Commission for Social Development. (Interview with Jens Martens, Global Policy Forum Europe, February 2006)

Governmental Liaison Service (NGLS) for the participation of developing country NGOs in UN conferences. The money comes from member states, for example, Canada and Sweden who strongly support civil society involvement at the United Nations.

Since this study does not include foundations, Southern NGOs or financial flows, this category was only mentioned in order to obtain a complete picture. No hypotheses were developed for financial resources.

#### *2.2.1.3.3 Advice*

Advice is a form of exchange which mostly takes place at the informal and personal level.

Advice is information specifically targeted towards the solution of a perceived problem. NGOs share similar interests and often pursue similar goals at the UN. It is therefore expected that exchange of advice is most frequent among NGOs and occurs only on a limited basis with a few individuals from permanent missions or UN headquarters.

Advice among NGOs is given on issues such as how to proceed regarding NGO access at UN Headquarters, how to improve relations with permanent missions or how advance certain reform issues like, e.g. Security Council reform.

#### Hypotheses

8. The exchange of advice occurs mostly among NGOs and less frequently between NGOs, UN headquarters and permanent missions.

9. The exchange of advice among NGOs is mutual.

10. The exchange of advice between NGOs, UN headquarters and permanent missions is dependent on demand and need. It is initiated by either side on a case by case basis.

#### **2.1.4 Co-operation**

Co-operation evolves with regular interaction, the development of commitment and trust and mutual interest in common ventures. It becomes manifest in joint projects or campaigns and builds on all the dimensions previously mentioned in this chapter.

Opportunity structures for interaction have to be provided for or built. In the context of UN-NGO relations this means that NGOs should have the same access rights for UN premises as UN staff and delegates. This is oftentimes not the case, especially when high-level meetings are taking place.

The question of trust is also very important in this context. Representatives of member states tend to distrust NGOs for a variety of reasons. They are seen, and often feared, as a threat for government policies, as an agent for change in public opinion, as opposition, and participants in street riots. From the point of view of member states, all of these are arguments against NGO involvement in UN diplomacy. Diplomatic attitudes often adapt slowly to changes in the outside world, and thus it might take more time before UN delegates become aware of changes in their countries with regard to civil society which can reflect on foreign policy. But there are some signs over the last six years that delegations become less hesitant to meet and speak with NGOs. This was a slow development developing over many meetings. Delegates had the opportunity to see that NGOs do not have to be the rioters from the street, but that they can be as well distinguished experts in their own right in fields which are of interest to member states and diplomats. Some delegations also realised over the years that NGOs do not have to be a threat to their sovereignty, but that they are able and willing to complement the work of governments. All these factors lead to cooperation in selected cases.

With the development of trust actors are now able to engage with one another, to find the overlap in interests, which can then lead to common projects and mutual benefits.

Given the lingering mistrust and remaining access issues, it can be assumed that cooperation between NGOs is easier to achieve and therefore more frequent than with permanent missions and UN headquarters.

### Hypotheses

11. Cooperation takes place mostly among NGOs in order to be able to better achieve their goals.

12. Cooperation between NGOs, UN headquarters and permanent missions are rare and occur only when there is an overlap of interests.

#### 2.1.4.1 *Impediments to Co-operation*

Inequality in any way often prevents cooperation. Differences in access structures lead to imperfect opportunity structures. Due to the fact that NGOs, for example, are not allowed anymore in the Delegate's lounge at the UN, informal opportunities for cooperation with delegations can be missed. The lack of opportunity structures is even more obvious if one considers that NGOs are not allowed at all, or only to a limited extent, to observe the sessions of the General Assembly or the meetings of the Security Council.<sup>17</sup>

The unequal distribution of information can lead, in less formal and diplomatic settings alike, to misunderstandings and mistrust which in turn leads to missed opportunities for cooperation.

Often NGOs are not informed in a timely manner about UN events. Consequently, they are not able to participate. Government initiatives at the UN are often developed behind closed doors without informing NGOs. Thus, NGOs are not able to present their potential input in this matter.

In UN-NGO relations we are dealing with relatively big numbers of potential actors on the governmental as well as the non-governmental side. It is a well-known phenomenon from studies in collective action that large groups often fail to provide a collective good because members of the group speculate that other members will provide the desired good and therefore, no member will initiate and take care of the provision of the good.

However, social movement literature shows us that this free-riding effect can be overcome by motivation, strong ties, and common values.

#### Hypotheses

13. Unequal access impedes cooperation.

14. Unequal distribution of information makes effective cooperation more difficult.

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<sup>17</sup> After the attacks of 11 September 2001 access was considerably reduced due to security concerns. Member states also often restrict access to certain meetings or areas of the UN premises when sensitive negotiations are ongoing.

### **2.1.5 Trustworthiness**

Trust develops in continued interactions and it relies on expectations of benign behaviour based on inferences about a partner's personal traits and intentions. Reciprocal exchanges enable trust. In reciprocal exchanges actors' contributions to the exchange are separately performed and non-negotiated. Actors initiate exchanges individually, by performing a beneficial act for another (such as assistance or advice), without knowing whether, when, or to what extent the other will reciprocate in the future. Because choices are made individually, benefits can flow unilaterally. When these choices turn out to be successful and individual acts are reciprocated trust develops. Partners are seen as trustworthy when they reciprocated acts successfully over time.

Trust grows stronger in cases of continued reciprocal exchanges under conditions of uncertainty and risk.

NGOs are often seen as trustworthy because they lobby for causes which are thought to be good like human and economic rights and they are perceived as being a democratic voice with connections to the common people. The UN and its member states derive their trustworthiness from their formal legal status, which in the case of governments of member states are derived from election results.

Trust is measured here as a composite of reliability and maintenance of confidentiality, where appropriate, on the level of the individual.

How this plays out in the relations between these groups, and how far trust has developed and how it is distributed will be seen in the analysis of the empirical data. It is assumed that trust is higher among NGOs than between the three groups because the flow of information is much higher between NGOs and familiarity with one another is also higher among NGOs.

#### Hypotheses

15. Trust is higher within groups than across groups.
16. Therefore, trust levels are higher among NGOs than between NGOs, UN headquarters and permanent missions.

### **2.1.6 Hierarchies**

Hierarchies develop in a network through the unequal distribution of resources, different roles and reputations, and different positions. The actor in a network who is in possession of more or better information is able to form and dominate relations with others at his will.

Although NGOs are often called partners by UN officials, it is assumed that a closer look at the existing structures at United Nations headquarters with its organs and departments leads to the conclusion that traditional structures with the nation-state on top are still largely in place.

Hierarchies are measured through the perceived status of the actors in the decision-making processes. Given the power differentials and the decision-making role of member states, it is assumed that hierarchies still exist. Due to availability of resources and differences in political weight, organisations take up different positions in social structures and hierarchies.

#### Hypotheses

17. Despite the official partnership language in UN-NGO relations, hierarchies still exist and are perceived as such.

18. Member states with their permanent missions are on top of this hierarchy, followed by UN bodies and staff. NGOs are at the bottom of this structure.

19. Hierarchies also exist within the three groups, which makes the matter more complex.

## **2.2 Development of Social Networks**

For the development of social networks several conditions have to be met. Specific opportunity structures have to be in place. Potential nodes of the network have to have the opportunity to meet and interact. Here in this case this is given through the proximity of NGOs and permanent missions to the UN and some overlap in interests.

Relevant elements which draw on the categories above are described below. These elements present a sequence of necessary prerequisites which have to be met in order for a functioning network to develop.

### **2.2.1 Access**

The actors have to have the opportunity to enter into interactions with each other. Ideally there should be no restrictions to interactions. Actors should be free to choose their counterparts for cooperation or defection. This entails also free access to information about the other actors. Imbalances in the distribution of information lead to differential power structures and positions in the network. For the case of UN-NGO relations that would mean that UN staff and delegations are in a better position than NGOs because the first two have better access to information and UN grounds.

Access, regular interaction and trust then build the base for potential cooperation.

### **2.2.2 Regular Interactions**

Interaction means the encounter between two potential exchange partners, which may or may not be consummated, depending on whether the interactants trust one another (Macy and Skvoretz 1998: 639). The realisation of interactions depends also on the social and geographical proximity of prospective exchange partners.

Regular interactions are a prerequisite for the development of trust and cooperation. The “shadow of the future”, i.e. the prospect of future interactions keeps partners from defecting as they risk retaliation or loss of reputation if they do.

These conditions, social and geographical proximity and reiterated interactions, lead to embeddedness of relations which enables trust and cooperation later on in the relationship.

The embeddedness is given for the UN-NGO relations this study is looking at. All the relevant actors are located around or at the UN, and they are likely to meet on a regular basis.

### **2.2.3 Trust**

Trust develops over time with repeated interactions as the embeddedness of relations grows. Trust grows stronger in situations where conditions of uncertainty and information imbalances prevail. Both conditions apply to the



UN as for example decisions of member states are hard to predict and influences coming from the home countries cannot be assessed appropriately.

There are signs that trust actually developed between the United Nations and NGOs. There are a few examples when NGOs were integrated in conceptual and decision-making processes. These will be described in the fifth chapter.

## **2.3. Methodology**

### **2.3.1 Feasibility**

In contrast to Keck and Sikkink (1995) this study will demonstrate how easy it is to carry out a social network analysis. The realisation takes some preparation as the researcher has to acquire a thorough knowledge about the natural setting he or she would like to examine. Many studies in social network analysis take an experimental design approach which is somewhat easier as the study of the natural setting is not necessary.

An overview of all the relevant actors should be acquired in order to be able to capture the whole network during the interview process and to evaluate if all the required data have been obtained.

Through the use of telephone interviews and online questionnaires even seemingly insurmountable geographical distances can be bridged easily nowadays.

The preliminary overview for this research has been achieved through the study of about thirty NGO websites and pre-test interviews. Information on the organisations has usually been easy to obtain. All of these NGOs are very active at the UN. The generation of empirical data through a network analysis yield valuable additional and systematic insight which would not be available through plain observation alone or the analysis of case studies alone.

### **2.3.2 Sampling**

There are mainly two strategies on how to obtain network data. The first is to present a roster of the study population to each person, asking for the

nature and frequency of their contacts with each other. The second is to let respondents create their own lists of contacts in response to a name generator such as "Who are your closest contacts?". The second strategy might turn out to take too long during the interview as the respondents have to think of potentially long lists of contacts. This can be dealt with effectively through preparing a list of possible contacts before the interviews. In this case the researcher has to prepare carefully this list in order to avoid missing data. The respondents should also be allowed to add contacts to the list to obtain information on the whole network.

For the interviews in this study, the respondents were asked at the end of the questionnaire for their key contacts and to indicate in which respect the contacts are relevant to them. Here it is important to gather enough information in order to be able to link the network data to the quantitative data obtained before.

For this snowball sampling method the interview process starts with an individual in a central position who is asked for his key contacts. The cited contacts are then interviewed and asked for their contacts. This process continues until some proportion of the individuals cited as key contacts have already been interviewed.

This procedure allows the people in the studied population to define the boundaries of their network themselves. The forward tracing method of snowball sampling is useful when the expected network is not too large and the contacts are not too distant from one another.

### **2.3.3 The Questionnaire: Questions and Answers and their Categories**

The questionnaire is divided in two parts.<sup>18</sup> The first part collects quantitative data and the second part the network data. The questions are organised in clusters: frequency and nature of contacts, advice, trustworthiness, hierarchy, cooperation, and network.

To introduce the survey, the respondents were asked for their personal assessment of the importance of networking.

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<sup>18</sup> The complete questionnaire can be found in the annex.

The first part of the questionnaire then starts with questions regarding the form and frequency of interaction between NGOs, the UN and permanent missions ("How often do you have contact with representatives from NGOs, permanent missions, UN headquarters", "How does the contact take place in most cases?" "Why do you meet with representatives from NGOs, permanent missions and UN headquarters"). The answer categories for each question are divided to obtain separate answers for the three groups namely NGOs, UN Headquarters and Permanent Missions. It is also asked who initiates the contact ("Which side initiates the contact in most cases?"), and why the contact is made. The quality of the contacts is specified, if they are formal, informal or personal. In order to find out more about the significance of informal relations the respondents are asked to assess the importance of informal relations and networking.

Then questions follow regarding the nature of the exchange of information ("How often do you exchange information with representatives from NGOs, permanent missions and UN headquarters?", "Who provides the information in most cases?", "What kind of information do you exchange?"), cooperation in projects ("Please give a brief description of up to three projects which you would consider as most significant and name important participants if possible.", "Who initiated the project(s)?"), and exchange of advice ("Would you consider asking somebody for advice who is working for a NGO, permanent mission, or the UN headquarters?", "What kind of advice do you ask for?". Before the last question, and second part, which asks for the key contacts, respondents are asked to evaluate their relations with NGOs, UN headquarters and permanent missions ("In your opinion, how trustworthy in general are people who are working for NGOs, permanent missions, UN headquarters?", "Who do you think is in control of the relations between NGOs, permanent missions and UN headquarters?", "How would you judge the influence coming from the cooperation with NGOs, permanent missions, UN headquarters?").

The questions were designed to cover the relevant dimensions of social networks: the form of interactions, exchange of information and advice, and cooperation. In addition, the respondents were asked to evaluate the trustworthiness of their respective partners.

### **2.3.4 The Interview Process**

The interview process started with a key actor who was chosen because of his outstanding leadership role in the NGO community at United Nations headquarters. He was asked for his key contacts. The contacts given in the interview were then interviewed themselves.

The key actor, as well as his key contacts, are all located in close proximity to UN headquarters, they are accredited with the UN, their work is relating to the UN and they are closely monitoring the work of the organisation.

Although the individuals named are usually very busy most of them agreed to be interviewed. NGO representatives were mostly keen to speak with the interviewer because of their own interest in the topic. Therefore, the interviewer was able to obtain complete data on the NGOs involved in the network surveyed here. Due to questions of confidentiality and loyalty, UN staff and especially representatives from permanent missions were more difficult to interview. There are two reasons for this: (1) NGO representatives were hesitant to name their contacts in UN departments and permanent missions because they were afraid they might lose them. (2) It is more difficult to convince staff from permanent missions and UN departments to take part in interviews. This is a sensitive issue area where staff is often hesitant to share relevant information without consulting with senior officials. Some UN officials could be convinced to participate off-the-record, but unfortunately, no interviews could be conducted with staff from permanent missions.

For a social network analysis ties that are not visible or do not exist at all are as important as the ones which can easily be observed. Thus the lack of contacts with permanent missions or the fact that they were not available for interviews is useful in the analysis of the relationship. This does not raise questions regarding the precision of the method. It merely indicates that there is an absence of certain nodes and different levels of trust and cooperation within the network. Anheier (1987: 579) noted on missing data in social network analysis that "the intriguing aspect of missing data in network analysis is that they reveal conceptually significant characteristics of the social structure under consideration".

It shows that the relations of trust and cooperation among NGOs are stronger than with UN headquarters or permanent missions. These findings will be analysed and assessed in depth in the fourth chapter.

It was the aim of the interview process to obtain network data from individuals at the highest possible level. For NGOs these were mostly the executive directors of the organisations, for the UN senior professionals (P5 – D level), and for permanent missions interview with at least counselor level staff was envisaged. These individuals represent their organisations and determine policies.

For the first two groups this was largely successful, but not for the last.

Due to the lack of network data for links with UN headquarters and permanent missions, the data will be completed with available data on meetings and cooperation from the websites of NGOs, permanent missions and UN departments, and the reports of the High-Level Panel on UN-Civil Society Relations.

## **2.4 The Case Studies**

The case studies have been chosen for their relevance to the work of the United Nations and NGOs. Development and security are two of the key areas and pillars of the work of the UN. Both areas are of particular interest to civil society because of their impact at the national and local level.

Juxtaposing the case studies with the analysis of the overall relationship in the social network analysis will yield a more complete picture. It shows that there are areas in the work of the UN which NGOs were able to influence and where there was a high level of cooperation. However, this does not seem to change or improve the overall status of NGOs in intergovernmental organisations.

They rather seem to highlight the patchy nature of cooperation between the UN and civil society and civil society's influence at the UN and have to be seen as exceptions in the overall picture. Cooperation and impact are limited to a few processes and examples are presented in the case studies.

With the Millennium Declaration and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) the development agenda is penetrating the whole UN system, determining many of the agendas and work programs of UN departments, programs, funds and agencies. For the implementation of these goals the funds have to be generated and secured, thus the relevance of financing for development which is also mentioned in the ninth goal of the MDGs.

The long-term success of the UN development agenda can only be guaranteed when the efforts to achieve these development goals are sustainable in the long run.

Both financing for development and sustainable development are useful case studies because they exemplify in different ways the status of NGOs at the UN. In the financing for development process an unprecedented case for NGO participation was made. They were asked for their input early on in the process through a questionnaire distributed to the NGO community by the responsible UN department. NGOs were also invited to participate in the Working Group on Financing for Development.

The sustainable development process is exemplary because of the participation of so called major groups, representing a wide range of civil society groups, and the innovative multi-stakeholder dialogues. These are positive and exceptional cases for cooperation and the involvement of civil society at the UN.

Collective security is at the heart of the UN with the Security Council. If the UN is widely recognised for its successes or failures it is in the field of security.

One of the most controversial issues in this area over the last decade or so is the reform of the Security Council. Devised after the Second World War and without any changes to its membership structure since then, it is often seen as representing obsolete power structures. Many suggestions have been made how to reform the important UN body. A multitude of proposals have been made regarding the enlargement or re-arrangement of its memberships. Suggestions include forming one single European seat in the Council to represent all the EU members together, giving member states a

seat for their large populations, or including Japan and Germany as permanent members.

No agreement could be reached so far on how to reform the Security Council or how to improve geographical representation adapted to the requirements of today's world.

NGOs often supported one proposal or another, sometimes in cooperation with member states. The issue has not always been very present or high on the agenda at the UN, but NGOs continued to work on this issue and pushed for the reform process to move forward. This process brought about some interesting coalitions between member states and NGOs which are worthwhile to examine in more detail later on.

Another issue which is much debated is the question of sanctions and the form they should take. The United Nations is often criticised on the grounds that the sanctions which are imposed are not efficient or even harmful to civilians. Out of these criticisms suggestions developed on how to improve sanctions. The concept of smart or targeted sanctions was brought up as a means to improve this tool. NGOs are active in developing this concept further and in lobbying for the use of targeted sanctions.

## **2.5 Conclusion**

Social network analysis is a relatively new tool in the study of international relations. There is ample evidence from other disciplines in the social sciences which show the benefits of such a tool. It is ideal to identify underlying interactions and structure which are not always readily available through other methods.

The work of the United Nations and NGOs relies heavily on informal and personal contacts – an ideal environment to apply network analysis. Networking is used to influence policies and decision-making. Prime examples here include the involvement of civil society in the financing for development process because of its inclusion in the early stages of the process, and the World Summit on Sustainable Development because of its innovative partnership models.

Sanctions and the work of the Security Council have been prominent targets for NGO lobbying and examples where networks made a difference and had some influence.

The interviews conducted covered the exchange of information, advice, resources, cooperation and perceived hierarchies. The interview process started out with one of the key actors from the groups to be analysed. The interviewees were asked for their key contacts. The contacts are the nodes and were used to map the network.

The network covers relevant actors in the fields of development and security which are two core areas in the work of the United Nations.



### 3 NGOs at the UN. History and Assessment

The relations of NGOs with the United Nations have a long history and take many different forms. They are regulated and managed through a number of UN departments and bodies and their mechanisms, processes, and rules. One of the most important mechanisms here is the accreditation process with the Economic and Social Council as it gives NGOs the most comprehensive formal engagement with the UN. There are many other ways for NGOs to enter into relations with the UN, e.g. through association with the Department of Public Information (DPI) or through accreditation with specific UN conferences. But one has to bear in mind that this relationship is still determined by consultative arrangements and not by a partnership as this chapter will show.

This chapter will also provide the background against which the empirical analysis of the fourth chapter will be assessed as it describes the formal arrangements for NGO participation at the United Nations.

#### 3.1 History and Development: NGOs at the UN. From the Charter Until Today

Current literature in IR often does not show a realistic picture of NGOs and their relations with the United Nations as evidenced by the present study. NGOs are often portrayed as powerful opponents to nation states which in many cases undermine state power. As any other political actor, they are often criticised for their lack of transparency and accountability.

A look at the relevant UN documents can help to correct faulty images. The rising numbers of NGOs and their extended sphere of influence show their increased importance vis-à-vis the state and international organisations. But the picture has to be painted in a much more differentiated manner with the help of empirical and primary evidence.

The history of NGOs at the United Nations started with Article 71 of the Charter.<sup>19</sup> Through this article the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC)

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<sup>19</sup> The Charter of the UN can be found here: <http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/>.

was enabled to make arrangements with NGOs if their activities are relevant to the work of the Council.<sup>20</sup>

Even this small provision was in question during the negotiations of the Charter. The draft of the UN Charter had no provision for NGOs. In 1945, when the Charter was to be finalised, a group of US NGOs, some official consultants to the US delegation, and a few international NGOs, led by the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), lobbied hard. They obtained several important amendments, widening the range of issues the UN would cover and upgrading ECOSOC to the status of principle organ. A new article – Article 71 – then provided NGOs access to ECOSOC.

First attempts to bring Article 71 to life were heavily influenced by Cold War disputes, but a growing list of organisations was able to obtain consultative status with ECOSOC despite fairly restricted practices laid down by ECOSOC.

WFTU also took the position when the Charter was drafted that NGO access should be expanded to the General Assembly. It demanded, with the support of France and the Soviet Union, a permanent seat and the right to vote. Not surprisingly, many governments objected, and it was decided that NGOs would be kept out of the General Assembly and would not have equal status with governments.

On the basis of the United Nations Charter, the Economic and Social Council started to develop consultation practices with NGOs. On the 27<sup>th</sup> of December 1950, according to ECOSOC resolution 288 B (X) these arrangements were finally made official.

The year 1968 brought trouble for the NGOs involved at the UN. The New York Times published articles which said that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was funding a few NGOs that had consultative status with ECOSOC. This led to a major review of ECOSOC relations with NGOs. The result of this process was a revised version of the statute, ECOSOC Resolution 1296 (XLIV). Many countries, especially developing countries,

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<sup>20</sup> The article reads “The Economic and Social Council may make suitable arrangements for consultation with non-governmental organizations which are concerned with matters within its competence. Such arrangements may be made with international organizations and, where appropriate, with national organizations after consultation with the Member of the United Nations concerned” (<http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/>).

complained that Western member states were co-opting NGOs for their Cold War battles. More regulations regarding these issues were included in the resolution. On 23<sup>rd</sup> May 1968, ECOSOC Resolution 1296 (XLIV) was adopted.

The main right given to NGOs in Resolution 1296 was the opportunity to give presentations to ECOSOC and its permanent and ad-hoc committees. NGOs with consultative status also have the right to become accredited to UN conferences.

In 1981 the ECOSOC Committee on Non-Governmental Organisations made several suggestions on how to improve UN – civil society relations: (1) The Committee requested stronger participation of NGOs in UN conferences; (2) The procedures of the involvement of NGOs in different UN organs and committees should be clarified and harmonised; (3) Cooperation between the UN Secretariat and NGOs should be broadened; (4) NGOs should be encouraged to increase their participation and consultations at the regional level. These proposals were presented to ECOSOC in 1983.

In the early 1990s consultations were held to change Resolution 1296. One main concern was to gain access to the committees of the General Assembly. The Committee on Non-Governmental Organisations set up a working group to look into these issues. This group was open to all member states and NGOs had access through the Committee. In 1992 its final report was published. The report advanced the proposal that the number of NGOs accredited with ECOSOC should be limited in order to be able to establish a better communication and to improve service provision from the UN to NGOs. This proposal was not successful and ECOSOC embarked on a complete review of Resolution 1296 in February 1993.

There were several reasons for the review: The UN Secretariat complained that it was overwhelmed by its functions concerning NGOs like accreditation and other connected administrative processes. In 1992 the UN Conference on Environment and Development invited new national and local NGOs who did not meet the ECOSOC definition for NGOs. This called for a reconsideration of the criteria NGOs have to meet for accreditation with the UN. It was hoped that more NGOs from developing countries could be brought into the system.

An Open-Ended Working Group was established, but it was unable to conclude the work successfully and ECOSOC finalised the work.

Resolution 1996/31 was then adopted in July 1996.<sup>21</sup> This resolution regulates the consultation of NGOs with the Council and NGO participation in international conferences. The main questions addressed during this process were the involvement of national NGOs, re-arrangement of the categories for consultative status, accreditation and rights of NGOs in UN conferences, and, last but not least, access to the General Assembly, the Security Council and the Bretton Woods institutions.

Among other provisions of the resolution it allows NGOs in general and special consultative status to attend public meetings of the Council and its subsidiary bodies as observers. Those on the roster may have representatives present at such meetings concerned with matters within their competence.

Written statements relevant to the work of the Council may be submitted by organisations with general consultative status and special consultative status on subjects in which these organisations have a special competence. These written statements have to follow strict rules.

In some cases oral presentations by NGOs are permitted during meetings. The ECOSOC Committee on Non-Governmental Organisations can recommend organisations of the general consultative status category to the Council to make an oral presentation.

Where non-governmental organisations have been invited to participate in an international conference convened by the UN, their accreditation is the prerogative of Member States, exercised through the respective preparatory committee. The accreditation process should be preceded by an appropriate process to determine their eligibility.

NGOs in general consultative status, special consultative status and on the roster, that express their wish to attend the relevant international UN

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<sup>21</sup> The full text of the resolution can be found under <http://www.un.org/esa/coordination/ngo/>. It describes the principles governing the consultative arrangements, consultations with ECOSOC and its subsidiary bodies, participation of NGOs in UN conferences, and the procedure for suspension and withdrawal of consultative status.

conferences and the meetings of the preparatory bodies for these conferences will as a rule be accredited for participation.

Other NGOs wishing to be accredited may apply to the secretariat of the conference. The secretariat of the conference is responsible for dealing with the accreditation requests by NGOs.

Resolution 1996/31 could not solve these issues, and especially NGOs were not satisfied with the outcome. Issues which remained a concern were the limitations of accreditation and privileges, and the lengthy and politicised accreditation procedures. As a result ECOSOC recommended that the General Assembly should examine the question of the participation of non-governmental organisations in all areas of the work of the UN taking into consideration the contribution of NGOs to UN conferences.

Willetts (1999: 249) described the difficult situation at this time as follows: "The NGO community had no specific proposals to take to New York, and among the permanent missions at the UN headquarters the status of NGOs became intensely controversial. [...] Despite the debate and detailed committee work in the three reviews, the official procedures specified in three versions of the statute have remained virtually the same as the consultative arrangements adopted in the late 1940".

The last sentence of this quotation still holds true for the relations of the United Nations with NGOs today. Resolution 1996/31 is also still in use today.<sup>22</sup>

### 3.1.1 Statistics

The numbers for associated and accredited NGOs are on the increase ever since NGOs were granted participatory rights by the United Nations. This is due not only to a higher number of newly founded organisations at the national level and societies which allow for more participation by their citizens, but also due to a move from the national to the global level. More and more NGOs seek to get involved at the international level as they recognise that issues of transnational concern can be better dealt with in

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<sup>22</sup> Information for this section is drawn from Peter Willetts (1996), available at <http://www.staff.city.ac.uk/p.willetts/NGOS/CONSSTAT.HTM>.

cooperation with the UN and other organisations from around the globe. Information on the numbers of NGOs involved with the Department of Public Information (DPI) and the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) will be presented in 3.1.1.1.

### *3.1.1.1 NGOs in Consultative Status with ECOSOC and in Association with DPI*

The number of NGOs accredited with the UN has increased tremendously since 1946. Forty-one NGOs were granted consultative status with ECOSOC in 1946. The number of accredited NGOs in 2006 was 2,719 and is still on the increase.<sup>23</sup> This puts a considerable strain on the UN Secretariat and NGO sections which deal with accreditation and other administrative issues.

A strong increase in accreditations occurred between 1968 and 1992 from a total number of 180 to 744. In the nineties the numbers increased again from 744 in 1992 to 1938 in 1999. One reason for this increase were the major world conferences.

Interesting is also the geographical distribution of accredited NGOs. Most of them come from Europe (39%) and North America (30%). Only a small percentage comes from Asia (14%), Africa (10%) or Oceania with a meagre 1% of organisations accredited with ECOSOC.

There were some changes in the geographical distribution of NGOs in the recent past. Significant changes took place in the percentage of organisations from Asia and Africa. In 1996 Asian NGOs made up 9%, African NGOs only 4%. These numbers increased in 2002 to 14% for Asia and 10% for Africa respectively.

In 2006 there were over 1,533 NGOs associated with DPI.<sup>24</sup> The capacity for information-dissemination is a unique criterion for all the NGOs associated with DPI.

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<sup>23</sup> Figures on accredited NGOs with ECOSOC can be found at: [www.un.org/esa/coordination/ngo/](http://www.un.org/esa/coordination/ngo/).

<sup>24</sup> Figures on associated NGOs with DPI can be found at: [www.un.org/dpi/ngosection/](http://www.un.org/dpi/ngosection/).

The number of associated NGOs with DPI also increased considerably over the years. In 1968 there were only 204 associated NGOs listed. Due to a regular review process the number of associated NGOs fluctuates to some extent. In 2001 the number reached a high point with 1,672 associated NGOs and then decreased again to 1,365 in 2003.

	ECOSOC	DPI
1946	41	
1968	180	204
1992	744	
1999	1938	
2001		1,672
2003		1,365
2006	2,719	1,533

**Figure 2: Numbers of registered NGOs with the UN.**

Recently it can be noted that more and more newly associated NGOs come from developing countries which is desirable in order to obtain a more equitable geographical distribution among associated NGOs. Efforts such as trainings and advisory missions have been undertaken by the relevant departments to reach out to NGOs in the South. Member states repeatedly emphasised the need for the organisation to strengthen their efforts to bring Southern NGOs to the UN.

### **3.1.2 Mechanisms for Association and Consultation**

There are several associative and consultative mechanisms which allow NGO participation at the United Nations Secretariat. They differ in requirements and privileges.

DPI (Department of Public Information) offers a relatively easy access to the UN system to NGOs which are willing and able to help to disseminate information on the UN.

Consultative status with ECOSOC (Economic and Social Council) is more complex and accordingly more difficult to obtain. Accreditation with ECOSOC allows for specific inputs to the work of the Council depending on the fields of expertise.

In addition, accreditation mechanisms exist for several other UN commissions and specialised agencies.

There are no institutional consultative arrangements for NGOs with the Security Council or the General Assembly. NGOs can be consulted by the Security Council only if requested by a member state, a process which is called the Arria formula and will be explained later on.

There were concerted efforts by NGOs to obtain at least some form of consultative or observer status with the General Assembly. But until now there are hardly any spaces available for NGO representatives who would like to attend meetings of the General Assembly.

In addition, there are accreditation and thus participation opportunities for specific processes at the United Nations, often around major UN conferences. NGOs can also seek accreditation with UN agencies, funds or programmes. However, it is problematic that the application requirements and processes are not uniform. This makes it sometimes difficult for NGOs to participate as effectively as possible. It is often difficult to obtain information on accreditation procedures in a timely fashion. Rules and regulations often depend on the composition of the responsible secretariats and the host countries. Efforts to unify accreditation procedures across the different processes have not been successful so far.

#### 3.1.2.1 *Department of Public Information (DPI)*

The United Nations recognised early on the importance of NGOs for the information activities of the organisation. The Department of Public Information was established in 1947 and at that early stage the General Assembly already instructed DPI in its resolution 13 (I) to: "...actively assist and encourage national information services, educational institutions and other governmental and non-governmental organisations of all kinds interested in spreading information about the United Nations. For this and other purposes, it should operate a fully equipped reference service, brief or



supply lecturers, and make available its publications, documentary films, film strips, posters and other exhibits for use by these agencies and organisations.”<sup>25</sup>

This extract from resolution 13 (I) already shows the services available to NGOs. These services will be described in more detail further down in this section. Later on in 1968, the Economic and Social Council, based on Resolution 1297 (XLIV) of 27 May, called on DPI to associate NGOs, and thereby helped to implement its Resolution 1296 (XLIV) of 23 May 1968 which stated that an NGO “...shall undertake to support the work of the United Nations and to promote knowledge of its principles and activities, in accordance with its own aims and purposes and the nature and scope of its competence and activities.”

NGOs associated with DPI disseminate information about the activities of the UN to their members and constituencies. This contributes to building a knowledge base at the grassroots level and to mount support for the work of the UN.

The dissemination of information by NGOs includes but is not limited to: publicising UN activities around the world in such areas as peace and security, economic and social development, human rights, humanitarian affairs and international law. NGOs also promote UN observances and international years by the General Assembly to focus world attention on important issues of concern to humanity.

NGOs who wish to become associated with DPI have to meet a specific set of criteria to be eligible. They have to (a) share the ideals of the UN Charter, (b) operate solely on a not-for-profit basis, (c) have a demonstrated interest in United Nations issues and proven ability to reach large or specialised audiences, such as educators, media representatives, policy makers, and the business community, (d) have the commitment and means to conduct effective information programmes about UN activities by publishing newsletters, bulletins, and pamphlets; organising conferences, seminars and round tables; and enlisting the cooperation of the media.

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<sup>25</sup> For more details see [www.un.org/dpi/ngosection/about-ngo-assoc.html](http://www.un.org/dpi/ngosection/about-ngo-assoc.html).

An NGO that meets the above mentioned criteria can apply for association with DPI by submitting an official letter of intent, which should be accompanied by six samples of recent information materials. References from UN Departments, UN Programmes, Specialized Agencies and UN Information Centres are a great advantage in the application process. The DPI Committee on Non-Governmental Organisations will then review and decide on the applications during their scheduled sessions. Applicants are then notified of the Committee's deliberations. Associated NGOs are allowed to designate one main and one alternate representative to the Department of Public Information.

Association with DPI constitutes a commitment on the part of NGOs to the effect that they are expected to devote a portion of their information and outreach programmes to promoting knowledge and awareness of the United Nations' principles and activities. In addition, they are expected to keep the DPI/NGO Section informed about their activities by regularly providing samples of their information materials relating to the work of the UN. Furthermore they are encouraged to maintain regular contact with the United Nations Information Centres.

DPI provides a number of services to its associated organisations.

The DPI/NGO Section at UN Headquarters organises in collaboration with the DPI/NGO Executive Committee the Annual DPI Conference for Non-Governmental Organisations. This event brings together senior officials from the UN system, NGOs, academia, and media representatives to discuss global issues.

There are also weekly briefings for NGOs on a wide range of issues. Speaker at these events are senior UN officials, Member States delegates and NGOs with expertise on the particular issue addressed at the briefing.

One very important function of the DPI/NGO Section is the provision of ground passes which grant one main and one alternate NGO representative access to all open meetings of UN bodies, to DPI photo, film and audio libraries, to the Dag Hammarskjold Library, and, as observers, to the meetings of some 22 NGO committees organised by the Conference of NGOs (CONGO).

NGO associated with DPI are represented through an 18-member DPI/NGO

Executive Committee. This Committee consists of NGOs from different parts of the world whose representatives in New York are elected for a period of two years. It has a liaison and advisory capacity which is supported through a number of standing committees and sub-committees. There are among others the Nominations Committee and the World Wide Web Committee. In addition, it is presently discussed to form a communications committee on partnership issues between NGOs and Missions. The Executive Committee collaborates with the DPI/NGO Section on events, programmes and initiatives of mutual interest, including the Annual DPI/NGO Conference mentioned above.

The DPI/NGO Section is well regarded among NGOs, and DPI staff is considered to be helpful by the NGO community. The information provided by the DPI/NGO Section is helpful, and the issuance of ground passes is usually fast. In most cases DPI is the starting point for NGOs that would like to get involved in the UN system. The procedures to get associated with DPI are relatively easy and straightforward. The process of obtaining association with DPI does not take too much time and resources. In return it offers easy access to UN meetings, staff, and delegates. Access is one crucial prerequisite for influencing UN policy-making and lobbying. It has to be emphasised though, that associated NGOs are not integrated into the work of the UN system in any way. Their representatives are not entitled to any privileges, immunity or special status.

### 3.1.2.2 *Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC)*

NGOs can apply for accreditation with ECOSOC.<sup>26</sup> The application process here is more complex than for association with DPI, but the benefits are usually considered by NGOs to be significant.

To begin the process of applying for consultative status, an organisation must submit a letter of intent to the NGO Section of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs. Once the NGO Section receives the letter of intent an application package will be sent to the NGO. Complete

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<sup>26</sup> Detailed information regarding these provisions can be accessed under: <http://www.un.org/esa/coordination/ngo/>.

applications consist of an application form, a questionnaire, the constitution or charter of the organisation, its statutes and by-laws, a certificate of registration, a recent financial statement and samples of publications. Applications are only accepted in English and French, the working languages of the UN Secretariat. This can in some cases keep organisations from developing countries from applying as they do not have the human capital or financial resources to translate their documents.

The application process can be time-consuming. For example, a complete application which is received by the Secretariat before June 1, 2004 will be taken up and considered by the Committee on NGOs in the year 2005.

Before an application is submitted to the Committee it will be checked and often additional information is required.

When an application becomes part of the agenda of the NGO Committee a letter is sent to the NGO informing it of the upcoming session and inviting it to send no more than two representatives to be present during the session. The presence of NGO representatives in the room is in no way mandatory and it does not imply any advantages. NGOs simply have the right to be present when their applications are being considered. Considering the cost involved in travelling to New York most NGOs do not attend the first time they are being considered. If the application raises many questions from member countries and is deferred to another session, NGOs might consider it useful to be present at the following session in order to be able to reply in person and avoid being deferred again.

Among other requirements for obtaining consultative status are the following: The activities of the applying organisation must be relevant to the work of ECOSOC. The NGO must have been in existence (i.e. officially registered) for at least two years in order to apply. The NGO must have a democratic decision-making mechanism, and the major portion of the organisation's funds should be derived from contributions from national affiliates, individual members, or other non-governmental components. The fulfilment of these criteria often turns out to be decisive for the success or failure of an application and it can come under intense scrutiny, especially if the organisation is working in a sensitive area.

The Committee meets twice a year to decide which NGOs applying for consultative status it will recommend to ECOSOC. It is often the case that the Committee has questions regarding the funding, activities, or purpose of the applying organisation, and the NGO in question should answer all the questions as soon as possible in order to avoid further delay or a rejection of its application.

It has to be pointed out that the Committee only submits recommendations to ECOSOC in the form of a report. When the Council finally decides on the Committee's recommendation to grant consultative status, the Secretariat notifies the organisation of the outcome.

NGOs can be granted consultative status in three different categories: general, special or roster. NGOs which are active in many fields relevant to the work of ECOSOC will be given general status. NGOs which can only contribute to the work of the Council in a few areas will be granted special consultative status, and NGOs with expertise in only one area relevant to ECOSOC would get roster status.

General and special status come with more privileges, e.g. to speak and submit written presentations to ECOSOC, but also with a responsibility, namely to submit a report to the Committee every four years. This report should include information on their activities in general, as well as the contribution to the work of the UN in particular. These reports will also be reviewed by the Committee, and sometimes the content of the report can lead to a change of status depending on the concerns of the Committee members.

Therefore, although the contrary is often assumed, there is a mechanism to hold NGOs accountable, and it is sometimes used by the Committee to withdraw consultative status if the members agree that the organisation does not meet the criteria for accreditation with ECOSOC any longer.<sup>27</sup>

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<sup>27</sup> Three relatively well known examples when the consultative status was withdrawn or there were some other investigative measures undertaken against NGOs include several national federations of lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender people (LGBT), the Transnational Radical Party (TRP), and Freedom House. The first two examples included the suspension of consultative status, and the last led to further investigations of the work of the organisation. Allegations ranged from pedophilia over interference in

NGOs in consultative status with ECOSOC may designate individuals to represent them at meetings at the UN. The number of representatives allowed for one NGO is currently limited to five in New York.

It is clear that regulations pertaining to NGOs at the UN are necessary, considering their ever increasing numbers. However, this application process, which can be highly political, and the consultative status as such do not support the assumption that NGOs are partners of the UN.

#### *3.1.2.2.1 Committee on Non-Governmental Organisations*

The NGO Committee is a standing committee of ECOSOC. It was established in 1946 by Council resolution 3 (II). Members of this Committee come from 19 countries: five members from African States; four members from Asian States; two members from Eastern European States; four members from Latin American and Caribbean States; and four members from Western European and other States. They are elected every four years. Its mandate is set out in ECOSOC resolution 1996/31. The main tasks of the Committee comprise the following: (1) The consideration of applications for consultative status and requests for re-classification submitted by NGOs. (2) The consideration of quadrennial reports by NGOs in the General and Special categories. (3) The implementation of the provisions of Council resolution 1996/31 and the monitoring of the consultative relationship. (4) Any other issues which the ECOSOC may request the Committee to consider.

The Committee work suffers from an intense workload. Insufficient human and financial resources affect its functioning negatively and hinder an effective dialogue between delegations and non-governmental representatives. Committee members are often bound by other duties and are unable to spend enough time with NGO representatives and their organisations.

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the affairs of member states to conspiracy with terrorists. More information on these cases can be found under [www.ilga.org](http://www.ilga.org), <http://www.radicalparty.org/welcome2.html>, and [www.freedomhouse.org](http://www.freedomhouse.org).

The accreditation process is often politicised to a degree which makes it difficult for well qualified groups to obtain consultative status. This is especially true in the field of human rights. On the other hand, it is possible that organisations are supported by specific delegations and thus are granted consultative status although their qualification is in question.

#### *3.1.2.2.2 CONGO – Conference of Non-Governmental Organisations in Consultative Relationship with the United Nations*

Although CONGO is not a UN body, it is of importance to NGOs accredited at the UN, and many UN departments choose to consult with CONGO as it represents quite a large number of NGOs.

CONGO is an independent organisation uniting NGOs with consultative status at ECOSOC.<sup>28</sup> It assists NGOs in promoting their common aim of supporting the United Nations Charter, and works on behalf of NGOs to further develop the consultative status.

CONGO's mandate is (1) to safeguard the rights of NGOs to speak, and to have their voices heard at the UN, (2) to assist its members with access and participation at UN legislative processes, (3) to facilitate dialogue between the UN and NGOs, (4) to inform its members of UN and NGO activities and initiatives, (5) to disseminate information, (6) to strengthen NGO activities through the presence of CONGO NGO Committees, and (7) to create NGO partnerships and networks in and among regions.

For over 50 years, CONGO has been actively promoting the involvement of NGOs in the working of the United Nations. CONGO's aim is to reach out to NGOs across the globe, especially to NGOs from developing countries, to build stronger civil societies.

Besides committees and working groups on issues like indigenous populations, youth and human rights, the Conference also deals with access and partnership issues. From within the NGO community it is seen as a useful platform to network and to develop strategies to realise common goals. It also facilitates dialogue with the United Nations system as it is able to speak with one voice for many member organisations.

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<sup>28</sup> For more information on CONGO see [www.ngocongo.org](http://www.ngocongo.org).

### 3.1.2.3 Security Council

There are no formal provisions for interactions with NGOs within the Security Council framework. Members of the Council insist on their prerogative to hold closed consultations and to preserve the classical structure of high diplomacy which used to involve only a few selected states. These structures no longer mirror today's globalising world. Some states have different positions in the world than after World War II. Other actors like NGOs and multinational companies gained in influence and importance. Therefore, reform proposals for the Security Council did not only include suggestions concerning the composition of member states but also regarding the inclusion of non-state entities.

The Arria Formula is one attempt to include other actors into the work of the Security Council. It is an informal arrangement that allows the Council greater flexibility to be briefed about international peace and security.

The formula is named after Ambassador Diego Arria of Venezuela who devised it. In 1992, during the crisis in former Yugoslavia, a Bosnian priest came to New York and asked to meet with various council members individually. Only Ambassador Arria agreed to meet with him. Arria was so impressed by the priest's story that he felt that all Council members should hear it too. Of course, it was impossible to get the Council to agree to hear this testimony in its official sessions. So Arria simply invited Council members to gather over coffee in the Delegates' Lounge. Many attended, the meeting was a success and thus the Arria Formula was born. It has been used frequently since then and assumed growing importance since it was first implemented in March 1992.

Today, Arria Formula meetings take place almost every month and sometimes more than once. Attendance is typically at a very high level (permanent representative or deputy). The meetings are announced by the Council president at the beginning of each month or whenever organised as part of the regular Council schedule. The meetings are provided with full interpretation by the Secretariat. No Council meetings or consultations are scheduled at a time when the Arria Formula meetings take place. So the Arria Formula is an interesting mixture of informality and formality. It allows



the Security Council to sidestep its secretive Rules of Procedures and open itself in a limited way to the outside world.

Many UN member states support the Arria Formula and see it as a positive development. In fact, the "Razali Proposal" for Security Council reform, developed by former General Assembly President Razali Ismail and made public in March 1997, proposed "greater use" of the formula "to facilitate consultations between members and non-members of the Council."<sup>29</sup> The formula has also been supported in various speeches in the General Assembly.

Beginning in 1996, some elected members of the Council sought to broaden the use of the Arria Formula, to include NGOs and other non-state representatives. Unfortunately, some delegations, notably the UK and Russia, insisted on a continued restricted use. No permanent member supported change. They preferred to use the Formula to hear only the points of view of heads of state and other officials. They opposed briefings to hear NGOs and other non-official voices. Elected members argued that such voices are precisely the reason the Arria Formula was invented, since officials can address the Council at its formal meetings. The first clash over the Arria Formula came in the fall of 1996, when Ambassador Juan Somavía of Chile sought to organise a meeting for Council members with several humanitarian NGOs. When resistance developed over the use of the Arria Formula, Somavía negotiated another formula for such a meeting, which came to be known as the Somavía Formula. The Somavía Formula included members of the ECOSOC bureau and the bureaus of the General Assembly Second and Third Committees and it was chaired by the head of the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs. It was put into practice on February 12, 1997, when three humanitarian NGOs -- Oxfam, Médecins sans Frontières, and CARE -- briefed the Council. But this formula has not been used again, largely because delegations not on the three bureaus objected to being excluded. Instead, interest returned to reviving the Arria Formula.

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<sup>29</sup> For more information on the Arria Formula see [www.globalpolicy.org/security/mtgsetc/](http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/mtgsetc/).

In August and September of 1997, a dispute arose in the Council over a proposal by Portugal to invite Amnesty International Secretary General Pierre Sané to give an Arria briefing. As a result of pressure by Permanent Members, Portuguese Ambassador Antonio Monteiro of Portugal arranged a "modified" version of the Arria formula. The meeting with Sané, finally held on September 15, was called an "ad hoc" event, since some delegations refused to agree to it being accorded Arria status. About the same time, according to reliable reports, the Secretariat list of past Arria briefings was deleted from the UN computer, presumably at the insistence of powerful delegation(s).<sup>30</sup>

Because the previous agreements about Arria briefings had been reached in consultations and in any case were informal, there was no official record as to what Arria briefings were supposed to be and what their rules were. Behind closed doors, the Council began discussing the issue, at times somewhat acrimoniously. Portugal, in an effort to boost the broad interpretation of Arria briefings, organised an Arria Formula briefing with Arria himself in mid-October 1997. This allowed for a full discussion of the issue. The liberals' interpretation was put forward forcefully, supported by Arria himself. They argued in part that heads of state and other officials could and should be heard by the Council in its regular sessions, as provided for in the Charter, while Arria Formula meetings should be used for a broad range of different voices. But the meeting did not resolve the issue. After the meeting with Sané there were no further briefings by NGOs and unofficial voices for well over two years.

Finally, as the Council began to adopt more open procedures and more flexible meeting arrangements in the fall of 1999, the possibility of arranging an NGO briefing under the Arria formula arose again. Sentiment had shifted among Permanent Members, notably in the UK delegation, where a new ambassador and new government were considerably more favorable to consultations with NGOs. On 12 April 2000, the Council held its first regular

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<sup>30</sup> Most information on the formula was prepared by Global Policy Forum: The Arria Formula. [www.globalpolicy.org/security/mtgsetc/](http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/mtgsetc/), Proposal for Broad Use of the Arria Formula, 1997 (presented to the Security Council in October 1997). [www.globalpolicy.org/security/mtgsetc/ariatext.htm](http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/mtgsetc/ariatext.htm).

Arria Formula briefing in several years with NGO leaders, once again with leading humanitarian NGOs. During the year, the Council held two additional briefings with NGOs and it would seem that the way is open for regular use of the formula for this purpose.

The Arria Formula evolved in yet another important way in 2000. For the first time ever, the Council permitted other member states to attend Arria Formula meetings. This arrangement did not permit other members states to speak, but it gave them important access to information. They could attend the briefings on condition that they wrote to the President of the Council asking for permission to attend. Some feel that the Council should be able to invite all parties to provide briefings in its regular sessions. In the future, this may become possible. In the meantime, the Arria Formula has provided a very valuable and flexible instrument for the Council to obtain information and to hold dialogues with important parties in the international community.

The Arria Formula has useful advantages which can complement the work of the Council. The advantages are mainly its informality, ad hoc nature and flexibility.

Informality enables Council members to discuss matters with invited personalities in an informal and closed setting. The Arria Formula meetings are neither formal sessions of the Council nor informal consultations of the kind in which the Council conducts its daily business. As informal discussions the Arria formula meetings never have written records, nor time constraints, nor are they guided by any specific norms. However, this does not mean that they are not governed by the chair according to commonly accepted procedures for any UN meetings. Another distinction is the fact that the meetings are normally not chaired by the President of the Council, but by the delegation taking the initiative of inviting the guests.

The Arria formula meetings are ad hoc and take place whenever they are deemed useful or necessary by any member of the Council who undertakes to organise them. Other members do not have to decide upon or to agree to the holding of such meetings, nor on who will be the guests, or the matters to be dealt with. The country which undertakes to organise such a meeting

is actually only inviting the other members to attend and everyone is free to accept or decline. Naturally, the purpose of the meeting presupposes that the organiser will seek at least a tacit acquiescence from all other members, and also the cooperation of the presidency to schedule the meeting for a time suitable to other Council members in order to insure the maximum turnout.

The Arria formula is flexible regarding the rank and role of invited guests. Some examples for invited guests in the past are: Heads of State, representatives of regional organisations, representatives of NGOs, and a judge.

On 5 March 2002 Oxfam International gave a presentation to Council members within the Arria formula framework. In this case the meeting was sponsored by the Permanent Mission of Singapore. The presentation dealt mainly with the humanitarian situation and trade in conflict diamonds in Angola. Oxfam has been working in Angola since 1989 and developed a special expertise in this area.

NGOs have a long history of pressing for more access to the Security Council. In their view they can provide valuable insight in the fields of humanitarian assistance, conflict prevention, and peacebuilding. Over the years they could also win the support of some member states. Notably the Portuguese Ambassador Antonio Monteiro spoke in favour of a dialogue of the Security Council with NGOs in 1998. In his speech to the General Assembly on the Report of the Security Council he emphasised the mutual benefits coming from cooperation with NGOs. He called upon member states to make use of the sources of information and services offered by NGOs.

Besides these mechanisms NGOs tried to establish a dialogue on a purely informal basis. A group of NGOs formed the NGO Working Group on the Security Council which is now meeting regularly with Council members. The development and function of this working group will be described and discussed in depth in chapter 4.

### 3.1.2.4 General Assembly

Similarly to the Security Council, NGOs are trying to obtain access to the General Assembly. As described in the paragraph on access issues later in this chapter, there are only very limited spaces available to NGOs who would like to observe the sessions of the General Assembly.

As a response NGOs came together in a taskforce (International NGO Task Group on Legal and Institutional Matters, INTGLIM)<sup>31</sup> to find ways to gain more access to the deliberative organ of the United Nations.

In the United Nations Charter<sup>32</sup> functions and powers of the General Assembly are described in Article 10: "The General Assembly may discuss any questions or any matters within the scope of the present Charter or relating to the powers and functions of any organs provided for in the present Charter, and, except as provided in Article 12, may take recommendations to the Members of the United Nations or to the Security Council or to both on any such questions or matters:"

The reference to any other organ of the United Nations also includes the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). According to Article 71 of the Charter, ECOSOC "may make suitable arrangements for consultation with non-governmental organisations [...]". Therefore, NGOs are of the opinion that they should be allowed more access rights within the General Assembly framework.

The work of NGOs was recognised within the context of follow-up processes to the World Summit for Social Development, the International Conference on Population and Development and the Global Conference on the Sustainable Development of Small Island Developing States.

During the special session of the General Assembly on the implementation of the outcome of the World Summit for Social Development and Further Initiatives (United Nations 2001), for example, NGOs were (1) allowed to make statements in the Ad Hoc Committee of the Whole of the special session, and (2) to make statements in the debate of the plenary of the special session. In a third point the General Assembly decided that the

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<sup>31</sup> Information on INTGLIM is available under: [www.wfm.org/intglim](http://www.wfm.org/intglim).

<sup>32</sup> The Charter of the UN can be found here: <http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/>.

arrangements concerning the accreditation and participation of non-governmental organisations in the special session will in no way create a precedent for other special sessions of the General Assembly. This restriction is important as it points to the need to find a coherent procedure for accreditation and participation issues for all special sessions or conferences.

For the implementation of the Programme of Action of the International Conference on Population and Development and for the implementation of the outcome of the Global Conference on the Sustainable Development of Small Island Developing States, the General Assembly stressed the need for the effective participation of actors of civil society, particularly non-governmental organisations. In that context the General Assembly invited the President of the General Assembly to propose to member states appropriate modalities for the effective involvement of civil society actors in the special session.

In the follow-up to the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development the General Assembly decided that major groups, as identified in Agenda 21 and represented by non-governmental organisations in consultative status with the Economic and Social Council and on the Roster, would be invited to participate in the plenary meeting of the nineteenth special session of the General Assembly in the debate on an overall review and appraisal of the implementation of Agenda 21. Major groups which could not be accommodated here should get the chance to address the Ad Hoc Committee of the Whole of the Special Session.<sup>33</sup>

From the point of view of inclusion and participation of NGO in these processes it can be seen as difficult that the General Assembly refused to create uniform rules for all the processes. This does not facilitate dialogue with or participation by NGOs. This only creates insecurity as to what extent NGOs are allowed to participate.

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<sup>33</sup> For more details see [www.un.org/esa/sustdev/documents/agenda21/english/agenda21toc.htm](http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/documents/agenda21/english/agenda21toc.htm).

Despite the fact that NGOs are lauded for their efforts in the preparatory processes and the conferences, the General Assembly did not deem it necessary to establish general rules for NGO accreditation and participation. This double standard, on the one hand officially appreciating the work of NGOs and on the other hand refusing to institutionalise and unify NGO accreditation and participation, is again obvious when NGOs were denied the right to monitor the UN General Assembly Open-Ended Ad Hoc Working Group on Integrated UN Conference Follow-Up. Only one member state supported the principle of NGO participation in this case despite the heavy lobbying efforts of INTGLIM. The Working Group would have been an appropriate forum to clarify and unify the issue of NGO participation, but member states chose to let this chance pass. Also, the lobbying of the second and third committees of the General Assembly has not been successful.

Of course, these efforts are ongoing and the completed review by the High-Level Panel on UN-Civil Society Relations provided a good foundation for a more lively debate around this issue in the future.

A more innovative form of engagement with NGOs, civil society and the private sector are hearings which have been held at UN Headquarters in 2005 under the auspices of the General Assembly. Less than perfect arrangements have led to a need and demand for NGO input into a number of political processes. Two examples will be used to illustrate this.

As a follow-up to the Millennium Summit in 2000 a stocktaking exercise in the format of another summit took place in September 2005 in New York. The wide range of issues discussed included governance issues, development goals, human rights, and peacebuilding. The decision to hold this meeting in the form of a summit meant the exclusion of NGOs. Different from UN conferences which provide for the participation of NGOs and other external actors, summits are closed events. Due to the importance of the 2005 meetings there were efforts from NGOs and staff within the Secretariat to open up the event, but member states decided against it and only two speakers, one from civil society and another one from the private sector were

	ECOSOC	DPI	SC	GA
Formal/Informal	Formal	Formal	Informal	Formal/Informal
Privileges	Right to speak and/or submit written statements  Participation in Conferences and Commissions	Access to UN grounds and documentation	Speaking rights on demand under the Arria Formula	Speaking rights on demand at Special Sessions and Hearings  Ad-hoc participation in special events
Potential Impact on UN policies	Medium/High	Low	High	Medium/High

**Figure 3: Major Points of Access for NGOs at UN Headquarters** ECOSOC = Economic and Social Council, DPI = Department of Public Information, SC = Security Council, GA = General Assembly

allowed to give presentations during the summit. Instead, to generate more input for the summit and to satisfy the demand for participation, hearings with NGOs, civil society and the private sector were organised in June 2005. The two-day event was attended by 200 NGOs who gave presentations and engaged in dialogue with member states on such issues as the Millennium Development Goals and human rights. In addition, 1000 NGOs were allowed to observe the event. This event was the first of its kind and largely seen as a success by NGOs, member states and the UN. As a result of this meeting a summary of NGO views and the discussions was prepared and later submitted to the summit as input to the review.

Some NGOs criticised the limited impact of the hearings, others welcomed the opportunity and asked for hearings to be held before all major UN summits.<sup>34</sup>

<sup>34</sup> Mithre J. Sandrasagra, 2005: NGOs Hope First Date Wasn't Just a One-Night Stand, Inter Press Service 24.06.2005. ([www.globalpolicy.org/ngos/ngo-un/ga/2005/0624\\_firstdate.htm](http://www.globalpolicy.org/ngos/ngo-un/ga/2005/0624_firstdate.htm)).



Similarly to the meeting in 2005, hearings with NGOs, civil society and the private sector were held in July 2006 in the run-up to the High Level Dialogue on International Migration and Development in September 2006.<sup>35</sup> A summary of the event was prepared and submitted to the High Level Dialogue. Issues discussed here range from human rights of migrants, remittances, and gender.

### 3.1.2.5 *UN Secretariat and Departments*

Engagement with NGOs differs considerably depending on the departments and their focus. Many departments of the United Nations as well as agencies, funds and programmes established focal points for NGOs and NGO liaison officers to facilitate dialogue and cooperation. These focal points handle inquiries from NGOs and provide guidance on participation in UN processes.

The UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA) maintains strong and diverse relations with civil society. Especially strong are the ties in the divisions of Financing for Development (FfD), Sustainable Development (DSD) and the Advancement of Women (DAW).

NGOs were integrated in the Financing for Development process from the beginning. Early on DESA circulated a questionnaire to NGOs asking for their input to the process. Important contributions could be expected in the delivery of new and creative ideas on how to generate funds for development. Proposals in this field included international taxes on short-term financial flows, currency transactions or air traffic. These are suggestions which are widely supported within the NGO community, but only accepted by a very few member states. It is also clear that NGOs are needed to bring the funds to the grass root level. The Financing for Development process will be described in depth in chapters 2 and 4.

DSD maintains ongoing partnerships with NGOs and eight other groups of civil society organisations to implement the Agenda 21. A focal point coordinates this work.

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<sup>35</sup> For more information see: [www.un.org/esa/population/migration/hld/index.htm](http://www.un.org/esa/population/migration/hld/index.htm).

DAW works closely with NGOs to implement the Beijing Programme of Action and to fight discrimination and violence against women. Several thousand NGOs and associations of women are regularly engaged with DAW. The division maintains a focal point for the coordination with and outreach to non-governmental actors.<sup>36</sup>

All of these divisions bring NGOs to the UN on a regular basis to participate in events and negotiations as appropriate.

Other UN departments and offices which maintain focal points for NGOs include the Department for Disarmament Affairs (DDA), the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), and the Office of United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR).

DDA maintains an active relationship with civil society actors involved in disarmament. It facilitates the participation of civil society in large conferences serviced by the Department, for example, the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conferences, as well as the follow-up to the 2001 Conference on the "Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects". DDA also engages civil society organisations in peace education activities on an ongoing basis.

OCHA engages primarily with international NGOs and civil society networks that focus on humanitarian issues and its meetings provide opportunities for NGOs to participate in consultations. OCHA has involved NGOs in advocacy work at all stages of disaster reduction, including preparedness, prevention and impact mitigation.

It is clear that these offices have a strong interest in the monitoring and project implementation capacities of NGOs in the field, but not so much in their conceptual input at Headquarters level.

OHCHR works with a wide range of actors, including NGOs, academic institutions, indigenous people and the private sector, to enhance commitment to human rights as widely as possible. NGOs are often the conduit for the submission of complaints on alleged human rights violations. NGOs in consultative status with ECOSOC participate as observers in the sessions of the Commission on Human Rights/the Human Rights Council.

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<sup>36</sup> For more details see [www.un.org/womenwatch](http://www.un.org/womenwatch).

NGOs also contribute to the work of the UN treaty bodies and the Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council by submitting information (UN-NGLS: 2005)

This seems to be a trend throughout the UN system. NGOs are welcome partners in the field but not at headquarters. There are many channels for NGOs to implement projects and programmes at the field level, but there are less, and less effective channels, to participate in the decision-making and policy-making processes.

#### *3.1.2.5.1 Access to UN Grounds*

Access to UN grounds is a sensitive issue which is often hotly debated.<sup>37</sup> Access to the UN Secretariat comes with association with DPI and with accreditation with ECOSOC.

Entry into and access to UN headquarters is guided by a strict set of rules established and controlled by the UN Security and Safety Service which has been tightened in recent years. This development was caused by terrorist threats, but it is also rooted in the sentiment that member states do not seem to be very comfortable with having NGOs around at UN headquarters at all times.

Members of NGOs with valid ground passes may enter the UN through the NGO doorway at the visitor's entrance at 46<sup>th</sup> Street and First Avenue where a security check is carried out.

There are several restricted areas on UN premises where NGOs are not allowed. These include the General Assembly Hall (except the fourth floor balcony), chambers on the second floor (except when NGOs are specifically invited to attend meetings there and are given a special pass), the North Delegate's Lounge (except in the company of a delegate from a Permanent or Observer Mission or with a special pass), any floor above the fifth floor of the UN Secretariat building (except in the case of an appointment with a UN official), and media areas.

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<sup>37</sup> Comprehensive information and analyses are available at <http://www.globalpolicy.org/ngos/ngo-un/accessindex.htm>.

Within the UN buildings NGO representatives have to comply fully with the requests and instructions of UN officials and security staff.

These restrictions show clearly that NGOs are neither seen nor treated as partners, although they are often called partners in UN documents or statements. Regulations determining NGO access are changed arbitrarily at the whim of member states or security staff without consulting NGOs. It is also an expression of the exercise of state power towards non-state actors. The activities of NGOs are thereby fundamentally impaired.

NGOs rely heavily on face-to-face interactions for their work. They have no formal role in the UN decision-making processes. Therefore, in order to influence the decision-makers, they need the access to delegates and staff on UN grounds.

Therefore, access issues are high up on the agenda of NGOs who are active lobbyists at UN Headquarters.

### 3.1.2.6 *Non-Governmental Liaison Service (NGLS)*

The UN Non-Governmental Liaison Service acts as a hinge between the UN system and NGOs. It is often a first place to turn to for NGOs and UN offices who would like to learn more about each other or would like to get involved in one way or the other.

The idea of facilitating dialogue is embodied in the NGLS mission statement: "The Non-Governmental Liaison Service (NGLS) promotes dynamic partnerships between the United Nations and non-governmental organisations. By providing information, advice, expertise and support services, NGLS is part of the UN's effort to strengthen dialogue and win public support for economic and social development."<sup>38</sup>

NGLS was established in New York in 1976. One year earlier NGLS opened its office in Geneva. Both offices were staffed by a number of organisations (e.g. UNDP, UN/DPI, and the World Bank) and government representatives from several Scandinavian countries. The goal was to have a small unit within the UN that could reach out, and work with, national and international

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<sup>38</sup> For more details see [www.un-ngls.org](http://www.un-ngls.org).

NGOs working on issues on the UN agenda. This was seen as a supplement to the consultative relations of the UN with mostly international NGOs.

In the late 1970s and early 1980s NGLS gained recognition from more UN agencies, programmes and funds. They were willing to sponsor NGLS activities while at the same time benefiting from the service. NGLS's work was mainly in the field of information and communications. Therefore, its funding was mainly provided by the information divisions of UN organisations. Accordingly, it became an inter-agency project of the Joint UN Information Committee (JUNIC). JUNIC became later the governing body of NGLS.

In the 1990s NGLS played an important role in the series of UN world conferences supporting the NGO dimension of these events. The support consisted of information and communication initiatives and facilitating and funding the participation of developing country NGOs in the processes. NGLS worked closely with conference secretariats in the process. In recognition of NGLS's role at the 1992 Rio Summit and its follow-up, the Secretary-General requested the General Assembly to provide financial support for NGLS from the regular budget.

During these years NGLS also continued to develop its outreach activities to provide advice, guidance and strategic information to its sponsoring agencies regarding the improvement of their relations with the NGO community.

In 1998 an independent review affirmed the value of NGLS, and it was renamed an inter-agency programme. In the same year the above mentioned mission statement was adopted.

Since 1988 UNCTAD has acted as NGLS's administering agency. The role of "lead agency" for NGLS rotates every two years among sponsoring UN organisations. For 2004-2005 DESA was the lead agency. In the past UN-DESA, UN/DPI and UNFPA have been acting as lead agencies for NGLS.

The work programme of NGLS can be divided into three segments: (1) information outreach, communications and publications, (2) support to UN organisations, secretariats and offices in their own work with NGOs, (3)

support to NGOs that seek constructive engagement with the UN, including financing and facilitating the participation of developing country NGOs in UN conferences and processes.

Information activities include a newsletter, in-depth briefings on UN activities and events, development dossiers as well as a handbook and a guide for NGOs describing UN organisations with contact information. In addition, there are sometimes stand-alone publications like the highly demanded @Ease with E-mail. There is also a series written entirely by African development activists and experts called Voices from Africa. NGLS publications are distributed in hard copy to over 7,000 NGOs. They are also available from the NGLS's website.

Support to the UN system is often provided in the form of substantive collaboration with the Secretariats of the WSSD and FFD. NGLS also convenes informal meetings of NGO liaison officers from across the UN system to discuss challenges and best practices.

NGLS supports NGOs with advice and guidance on how to interact with the UN. It also provides orientation and briefing sessions for NGOs at major UN events, as well as practical services like room bookings and general logistical support.

One important element of NGLS support for NGOs are the funding opportunities for NGOs from developing countries. Funding is used by NGOs to attend major UN conferences and events. One important feature of the system employed by NGLS is that the selection of the beneficiaries is devolved to the local level, respecting a specific set of criteria such as relevance and competence, willingness to share, and gender balance. This devolves accountability to the local level and breaks the link between the source of funds (usually bilateral donors) and who gets funded. During NGLS's testimony on its work to the ECOSOC review that led to resolution 1996/31, a number of industrialised and developing country governments expressed appreciation for the NGLS funding model.

Since the Rio Summit in 1992, when NGLS was requested to do this work by the Summit organisers, NGLS has funded well over 3,000 NGO representatives from developing countries, or over 300 per year on average.

Sometimes NGOs raise the money from bilateral donors and ask the funding to be managed independently by NGLS.

NGLS is a highly trusted interlocutor both for the UN system and the NGO community. One sign of its success is the consolidation of NGLS as an inter-agency programme over the years. It is an important node where information comes together which is relevant for both the UN and NGOs.

Although NGLS is highly regarded among NGOs one has to bear in mind that it is part of the UN system. It can only support NGOs to a certain extent, and it has to be careful with criticism towards member states. Therefore, it can serve as a more or less neutral facilitator of communication and dialogue but it is still dependent on the political will of member states for its funding and for the agreement on its functions.

### **3.2 NGOs and Member States at the UN<sup>39</sup>**

The relations between non-state actors and states, their changes and tensions, are often discussed in the current literature.<sup>40</sup> This paragraph takes a look at how NGOs and member states interact at the UN, or more precisely at the UN rules and regulations governing these interactions. It is often brought forward that the influence and increasing power of NGOs are eroding the power of states.

But at the UN the classic hierarchy is still intact as states possess the decision-making power in the inter-governmental processes. They are the main actors and decide upon the participation of non-state actors and its modalities.

The United Nations is an international organisation which consists of states as members. Although the UN Charter speaks for the peoples of this world, governments and state representatives make up the membership of the organisation.

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<sup>39</sup> Although there are no formal relations between these two groups outside of the UN, it is useful to look at the different rights, obligations, and privileges of NGOs and member states to understand the position of NGOs at the UN. This comparison will be especially helpful to evaluate the rhetoric of partnership between NGOs and the UN.

<sup>40</sup> For a brief summary of some of the major issues in this area see Weiss and Gordenker (1996: 30)

That means that member states have, unlike NGOs, access to all areas at UN headquarters, and to all meetings and documents. Member states are on the UN committees, the boards and main bodies. They possess the decision-making power and their authority is laid down in international law.

NGOs depend on the goodwill of member states at the UN. This starts with the accreditation process, over to access to information and UN grounds, and to participation in UN conferences.

It is relatively easy for less political NGOs to be granted consultative status. If NGOs are known to be critical of issues like human, economic, social or cultural rights their application can turn into a lengthy resources devouring process with many difficult and unpleasant questions.

NGOs are sometimes under the impression that some member states would like to keep information from NGOs or to keep them away from meetings even when they are not closed.<sup>41</sup> Participation and accommodation of NGOs at UN conferences depend largely on the responsible secretariat and the host country where the conference takes place. If NGOs with their parallel events are situated at some distance from the main venue, their lobbying efforts and other activities are greatly impaired, as was the case at the women's conference in Beijing in 1995.

On both sides one can find misconceptions, a lack of understanding of one another, and particular interests which disturb dialogue and cooperation.

Member states often feel threatened by NGOs in their authority and privileges. States have multiple tasks and roles to tackle and are therefore under pressure from many sides, whereas NGOs often pursue only a very specific set of goals.

Over the last ten years one can observe some changes in the attitudes of member states. They are willing to meet with NGOs on a regular bases and support selected causes brought forward by NGOs.

Still member states are very careful to maintain their decision-making powers and authority within the United Nations system. Without radical reforms and more thorough changes in attitudes NGOs will not be able to gain more access and influence at UN Headquarters.

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<sup>41</sup> Personal discussions with NGO representatives in 1998, 2005 and 2006.



### 3.3 The "New Language" Towards NGOs

Successful NGO campaigns have led to recognition of non-governmental influence in international policy-making. International organisations need NGOs as contractors to carry out services at the grass-root level, as providers of new and innovative ideas and as a democratic voice. This is also reflected in the language which is used towards NGOs. UN reports and speeches tend to describe NGOs as indispensable partners whose activities are mostly laudable and for the good of the international community.

At the Annual DPI/NGO Conference in 2002 Deputy Secretary-General Fréchette said "the United Nations had reached out as never before to new partners, and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) held a unique place in those endeavours." The theme of this event was "Rebuilding Societies Emerging from Conflict: A Shared Responsibility" (Fréchette 2002: Address to 55<sup>th</sup> Annual DPI/NGO Conference, New York, 9 September 2002).

In 2003 at the DPI/NGO Conference Louise Fréchette even upgraded NGOs from partners to "very good friends of the United Nation" whose "support is very much appreciated" (Fréchette 2003: Address to 56<sup>th</sup> Annual DPI/NGO Conference, New York, 8 September 2003).

In his address to the General Assembly on the opening of the 52<sup>nd</sup> session on September 22, 1997 Kofi Annan said: "We aspire to a United Nations that recognises, and joins in partnership with, an ever more robust global civil society, while helping to eliminate uncivil elements like drug traffickers, criminals and terrorists [...]" (Annan 1997: Opening Address of the 52<sup>nd</sup> Session). In his January 1998 address to the World Economic Forum, the Secretary-General continued to say "[...] peace and prosperity cannot be achieved without partnerships involving governments, international organisations, the business community, and civil society." He also admitted that "[...] the United Nations is at present inadequately equipped to engage civil society and make it a true partner in its work" (Annan 1998: Address to the 1998 World Economic Forum).

But no measures have been taken so far to improve the situation and even the High-Level Panel on UN-Civil Society relations did not bring institutional changes.

The new language will be examined carefully and critically and later on contrasted with empirical evidence on the situation of NGOs at the United Nations.

Before looking at the concrete examples, the concept of partnership used at the UN will be examined. This will be followed by a set of criteria non-state actors deem necessary for a fully functional partnership.

The needs of the United Nations and member states for partnership with civil society are increasing, but they are not well defined. Demands on the UN system have increased in a time of decreasing availability of government resources for humanitarian and development assistance.

NGOs are longstanding partners in the field of humanitarian aid and development assistance. They have often better access to communities and a higher degree of legitimacy. The UN obviously appreciates the non-governmental support in these areas, but conceptual and institutional contributions at headquarters level do not seem to be warmly welcomed.

Terms like partners and stakeholders create the illusion of ownership in UN affairs for civil society actors but in reality they are still bound by accreditation procedures and consultative status. Despite the usage of new terms the rules for NGOs are still the same and UN rules and regulations do not put NGOs on an equal footing with UN officials or delegates of member states.

Civil society actors would like to see a different approach to this partnership issue to fill this term with an appropriate meaning. A group of NGOs suggested the terminology of sustainable partnerships. These partnerships should be defined in a constructive manner to be effective. They should have the following qualities: mutual recognition of participation, transparency, inclusion, neutrality and integrity of actors, diversity, mutual respect amongst partners, flexibility that allows for initiative, and accountability.

Before such a partnership can be build operationally a number of conditions would have to be met. Ways would have to be identified how NGOs can associate with the work of, and partner with, the UN system on a daily basis. Specific technical means should be made available by which UN Headquarters and agencies can access NGO input and information and vice

versa. It might also be helpful to identify existing partnerships that can serve as potential models for enhancing NGO effectiveness and contribution to the work of the United Nations.

Prerequisites for the development of a true partnership involve also the clarification of issues like broadened access for NGOs at the UN and clear and transparent accreditation mechanisms.

### **3.4 Panel of Eminent Persons on United Nations Civil Society Relations**

Kofi Annan recognised the need to review the relations of the UN with civil society. This is not only due to the changed structures of and need for governance today, but also due to the multitude of new actors in global politics.

Therefore, the Secretary-General highlighted the engagement of civil society and announced in his report to the 57<sup>th</sup> General Assembly that he would “assemble a group of eminent persons representing a variety of perspectives [...] and recommend improvements for the future in order to make the interaction between civil society and the United Nations more meaningful”.<sup>42</sup> Panel members include, among others, such prominent figures from civil society and academia such as Manuel Castells, Birgitta Dahl, Peggy Dulany, Andre Erdos and Kumi Naidoo. Its main task was to develop practical recommendations on how to improve the cooperation between the United Nations and civil society. The Panel was chaired by Fernando Enrique Cardoso and its project manager was John Clarke.

The work program of the Panel consisted of broad consultations on a local, regional and global level. In addition, there were targeted consultations and smaller meetings with selected experts. The priority list for these meetings includes the following groups: parliaments, local authorities, private sector and foundations. In September 2003 consultations took place with New York based UN NGO/Civil Society Focal Points, New York based NGOs, including chairs of CONGO committees.

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<sup>42</sup> United Nations, 1997: Strengthening the United Nations. An Agenda for Further Change. (A/57/387).

NGOs saw this process with mixed feelings. On the one hand they support a revision of their relations with the UN. On the other hand relations with NGOs were not a priority for the Panel, but improving dialogue with national parliaments, foundations, and the private sector. John Clarke, the project manager, was particularly interested in strengthening relations with parliaments. Thus NGOs feared that their concerns do not really get heard during this process, although some New York based NGOs see the free access to the UN official document system (ODS) as a major achievement of 2003.<sup>43</sup>

The final report of the Panel was issued in June 2004. UN-civil society relations were also an item on the agenda of the General Assembly in September 2004 and a draft resolution was tabled by Brazil, but the draft was not adopted.<sup>44</sup> It seemed that the Secretary-General Annan underestimated the antagonism and resistance of some governments (Willetts 2006), and the report was poorly received.

The Panel agreed to avoid a “one size fits all” approach. There are general principles which should be considered, but a context-specific approach should be applied. Overall, the recommendations of the panel would be designed to contribute to enhancing the performance of the UN and its agencies. This entails engaging the full weight of the global community of civil societies in a meaningful way in the normative, policy-making work of the UN and multilateral processes and at the same time strengthening the UN’s performance. It will seek to advance a new mode of working and a new paradigm which it believes should provide a foundation for how the UN evolves its relations with civil society. This could be titled in various ways the “multi-stakeholder partnership” or “constituency participation” mode.

It was the view of the Panel that the key objectives of the UN cannot be achieved by engaging national governments only. The Panel believes that there is a compelling case for this and that it is already emerging. For this emerging reality they provided the following reasons:

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<sup>43</sup> For more details see Global Policy Forum (2004): NGOs win ODS Access. [www.globalpolicy.org/ngos/int/un/access/ods/2004/0126victory.htm](http://www.globalpolicy.org/ngos/int/un/access/ods/2004/0126victory.htm).

<sup>44</sup> For more details see [www.globalpolicy.org/reform/initiatives/panels/cardoso/index.htm](http://www.globalpolicy.org/reform/initiatives/panels/cardoso/index.htm).

(1) Until a few years ago, major global initiatives were likely to start with formal inter-governmental agreements reached through traditional deliberative processes. Now they are just as likely to be based on joint initiatives taken by a group of like-minded actors from different backgrounds (national governments, local authorities, civil society actors, private sector entities). (2) Such strategic alliances complement the traditional approach, they do not displace them. They are often effective because they focus on specific problems, are action-oriented and do not have to await a global consensus to realise changes. (3) Such coalitions include global policy networks (e.g. the coalition on landmines) and operational partnerships (e.g. the Global Fund to Fight Aids, Tuberculosis and Malaria). (4) New mechanisms for engaging with non-governmental actors, and a new language is needed to make the most of these new opportunities. This, and the emerging role of civil society in matters of global change and global governance, set the challenge for how UN bodies and the wider UN system approach matters of engagement with civil society. (5) The new mode requires more emphasis on the convening, facilitating and empowering roles of the UN – providing safe spaces for interaction across geographic, sectoral and cultural divides.

Although the panel was clear that on-going civil society engagement in the formal inter-governmental processes of the UN is vital (and indeed should be expanded), it believes that this must be supplemented by paying more attention to situation-specific engagements with the full spectrum of actors relevant to specific issues and occasions.

Civil society actors should have more diverse channels to contribute to UN matters. This might ease the demand to engage formally through the ECOSOC process. However, realistically there will continue to be a high demand for formal accreditation to take part in the global meetings of the UN. To meet civil society demands the current accreditation processes need to be streamlined and made more transparent and consistent, with greater emphasis on factors relating to the competence and relevance of civil society actors to specific forums. The Panel established a sub-group to consider how to address this issue.

The Panel also seeks to clarify the rights of civil society and the corresponding responsibilities. It should be considered to encourage civil societies to define codes of conduct and to exercise self-discipline.

It is likely that panel members will develop specific proposals among others on these issues: (a) establishing an office or unit working closely with the Secretary-General to promote civil society engagement and the partnership approach, (b) establishing a special fund – met from both donor contributions and UN sources – to enhance the capacity of developing and transition country civil society organisations to engage with the UN, (c) developing mechanisms to identify and disseminate throughout the UN system lessons from good practices in civil society engagement and partnerships, (d) enhancing the Security Council's engagement with relevant CSOs (The draft proposals on this were broadly endorsed as a realistic set of measures.), (e) developing more systematic UN relations with parliaments and associations of parliaments, (f) opening opportunities for civil society participation in meetings of the General Assembly, its committees and special sessions, (g) developing other measures, in addition to the fund, to enhance Southern civil society participation in UN activities, (h) exploring other measures to enhance the capacity of the UN to engage with civil societies, including staff training and skills development, (i) developing proactive UN roles to promote government – civil society dialogue to help to overcome barriers of confidence and trust, (j) engaging with the private sector beyond partnership issues to address UN- private sector- civil society engagement to enhance corporate social accountability, and (k) encouraging civil society actors to promote and strengthen multilateralism. The Panel will also consider the merits of establishing a special Rapporteur or Envoy for Civil Society Matters in order to urge governments and specialised agencies to engage constructively with civil society.

It is obvious from these statements and proposals that the confusion surrounding the concepts and definitions of non-governmental and civil society actors is not only problematic in the academic discussion. Here it is even more urgent and necessary to find clear definitions. Definitions in this

context set the boundaries for organisations who will be included or excluded in UN matters in the future.

The suggestions evolving around new modes of civil society participation, the multi-stakeholder partnership or the constituency participation, do not help to clarify the question about who will be allowed in. It would be helpful to define rights for participation for the different groups separately to account for their individual strengths and weaknesses. NGOs are particularly concerned that the influence of the private sector will become overwhelming within the UN system.

There is also a danger of over-emphasising situation-specific engagements over institutionalised processes. The first are more susceptible to being politicised and to being used for particular interests.

Other specific proposals, e.g. regarding civil society engagement with the Security Council or the General Assembly, do not seem realistic as NGOs are lobbying for more access to these bodies for many years now.

The Secretary-General reacted to the report of the Panel with his own report (A/59/354)<sup>45</sup> in which he emphasised the role of NGOs over other external actors which came as a relief to the NGO community.

Despite acknowledging the growing relevance of NGOs and their networks, he stressed the fact that the UN will remain an intergovernmental body where decisions are taken by member states. He recognised several themes of the Panel report as crucial for the development of UN – NGO relations: (a) making the UN a more outward-looking organisation, (b) connecting the global with the local, (c) improving NGO accreditation, (d) enhancing country-level engagement with NGOs, (e) establishing a trust fund to increase the participation of NGOs from developing countries, and (f) the improvement of the Secretariat's relationship with NGOs and increased participation of NGOs in intergovernmental bodies.

By 2006 there had only been progress on one of these elements. UNDP improved interaction with NGOs and civil society in its country offices and introduced specific focal points for NGOs.

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<sup>45</sup> For more details see [www.un.org/reform/civil-society.html](http://www.un.org/reform/civil-society.html).

### 3.4.1 Report on the Survey of the Panel

In addition to the broad consultation process, the Cardoso Panel developed a questionnaire to be filled out by civil society actors. It was available online from the Panel's website and the report on this survey is based on the responses obtained by December 2003.<sup>46</sup>

The results of this survey are interesting in two ways: First, to show some criticisms regarding existing arrangements for formal NGO participation and to point to possible ways to improve the arrangements.

The Panel is mandated to canvas the experiences related to the UN and its relationship with civil society actors, private sector and parliaments in order to make practical recommendations to the Secretary-General on potential improvements. The responses from this questionnaire are presented in the report and will assist the Panel to better understand the wide range of experiences at all levels. Qualitative questions have been analysed and are presented in this report together with the answers to the quantitative questions and a few quotations.

The questionnaire starts with some general questions about the nature of participating organisations, such as their geographical scope and their formal affiliation with UN bodies and processes. 45 percent of the respondent organisations are active at the local or national level and another 45 percent are international in nature. The other 10 percent are regional organisations. Most of the organisations (42 percent) are accredited with ECOSOC, 35 percent are accredited with a UN conference and 31 percent are associated with DPI.

The questionnaire then moves on to questions about best and worst experiences with the UN and asks about lessons learned in the relations with the UN.

The best experiences reported here include access to meetings and the media, the sharing of ideas and communication, the possibility to interact with delegates, and networking and good cooperation among NGOs.

Worst experiences refer in many cases to NGO participation in UN conferences including inappropriate accommodation for NGOs, invitations

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<sup>46</sup> For more details see [www.globalpolicy.org/reform/initiatives/panels/cardoso/index.htm](http://www.globalpolicy.org/reform/initiatives/panels/cardoso/index.htm).



on a short notice, limited access to meetings and delegates, and a lack of coordination among NGOs.

The next question deals with the influence organisations have had through their involvement in UN bodies or processes. Responses here do not present a clear picture. Most organisations seem to perceive their influence not to be very high, but they would rather say they have a medium impact.

Involvement with UN bodies and processes is perceived as increasing the influence of the organisations. The accreditation with ECOSOC is seen as particularly helpful as it helped to increase the legitimacy and reliability of the organisation. Participation in conferences and the related processes helped to increase the visibility of organisations, especially from developing countries. Various other forms of impact have been reported: successful advocacy work, influence on summit outcomes, text and language in documents, and awareness raising for new issues.

Barriers to successful work in UN matters have been described with the lack of access to decision-makers on the global level, a lack of necessary skills such as lobbying and constructive dialogue and insufficient funding for smaller groups from developing countries.

It is noteworthy in this context that personal relations are decisive for the outcome of interactions with the UN system and its staff. Many organisations state that personal relations matter, and that the interaction and impact have first and foremost been achieved through these and not through clear processes within the UN. The dependence on personal relationships can also create problems: "The links with agencies depend on the interest of the staff. When staff in UN agencies moves or changes the links break" (Secretary-General's Panel of Eminent Persons on Civil Society 2003: 7). The potential for direct interactions with government officials without interruption is seen as a major advantage of UN events such as conferences.

Dialogue, correspondence and exchange of ideas between civil society organisations, UN staff and government representatives are often mentioned as the key preconditions for having an impact: "When global civil society works in strategic political partnership with a large number of like-minded governments the combination is capable of equalling a

“superpower” in international decision-making” (Secretary-General’s Panel of Eminent Persons on Civil Society 2003: 10).

It is also pointed out that civil society should get involved in the early stages of decision-making processes. Civil society groups need to identify policy paths years in advance, when initial discussions between and within governments are underway, but since this is not always a transparent activity it is often very difficult for civil society to participate. One particular negative voice thinks civil society influence to be an illusion: “It becomes an illusion to think that there is an influence in inter-governmental processes. The diplomatic mechanisms are designed precisely to prevent active participation of NGOs” (Secretary-General’s Panel of Eminent Persons on Civil Society 2003: 11).<sup>47</sup> This points to the problem that diplomacy as a whole needs to change to accommodate civil society demands.

Responses often mention the lack of coordination among NGOs as a major impediment to having an impact on the work of the UN. NGOs should at least be able to speak with a more coherent voice if they are unable to find one voice. This underlines the need for successful networking strategies and dialogue among NGOs.

The report concludes with some civil society recommendations on how to improve UN-civil society relationships. There is the call for a more independent UN liaison service which is well funded to perform its functions. The ECOSOC accreditation process should become depoliticised, fair and more transparent. This is especially of concern to small organisations from developing countries who find it hard to devote the necessary time and to fulfil the same criteria as bigger organisations from the North.

### **3.5 Legitimacy and Accountability of NGOs at the UN**

NGOs are often accused of being the opposite of the values they would like to represent: transparent, accountable, and democratic.

This argument is often used, also at the UN, as an excuse for not expanding NGO participatory rights. This paragraph takes a closer look at whether this

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<sup>47</sup> The complete survey can be found at: [www.un-ngls.org/orf/survey\\_report.doc](http://www.un-ngls.org/orf/survey_report.doc).

argument holds true with regard to the mechanisms in place which are defining NGO participation. When an NGO applies for association or accreditation at the UN, it has to submit information on its activities, organisational structure, membership and funding. This information is made available in UN documents. It is checked by the responsible secretariats and there is often a follow-up regarding open or arising questions coming from the submitted applications.

In the case of an application for ECOSOC accreditation NGOs are then scrutinised again by the members of the Committee on NGOs who often ask their ministries at capitals to check if the information provided with the application is correct and to provide additional information. This procedure might not always be fair due to political pressure, but it surely forces NGOs to share information, and to be transparent and open. During this process, as mentioned earlier, it is expected from NGOs to answer all questions in full and in a timely manner.

In addition, many NGOs maintain websites which mostly provide all the necessary information. Often annual reports are available which describe the activities of the organisation. However, these reports often lack detailed figures on the sources of funding and personnel.

Once organisations are accredited or associated with the UN, most of them have to submit reports on their activities and their contribution to the work of the UN to the reviewing committees. This is a responsibility of NGOs which is taken seriously by the DPI and ECOSOC committees. Failure of submitting these reports can lead to a withdrawal of consultative status from the organisation concerned.

The submission of the reports also leads to a continued discussion of the work of accredited NGOs. If there is a doubt that an organisation could be in violation of UN rules, it is most likely that this will result in an end of the consultative relationship with the UN for the organisation.

NGOs applying for consultative status with ECOSOC are required to have democratic decision-making procedures in place and they might be asked by the Committee to elaborate on this issue. NGOs are not elected like governments, but their selected constituencies demand service delivery as

well and funding can easily be lost if organisations do not live up to their goals.

### **3.6 Conclusion: Where Are We Today?**

Despite the new language of partnership of the United Nations with civil societies, the access and accreditation structures are still stuck in outdated perceptions of diplomacy which are not viable anymore today.

De facto relations of the UN with civil society are still determined by consultative arrangements and not partnerships. Models for partnership with civil society still have to be developed, taking into account the differences within and among civil societies. It is likely that this will be a long and difficult process within the UN. The concept of civil society is still largely determined by Western views of democracy, freedom, human rights and participation. NGOs from developing countries are still underrepresented at the UN and for them it is even more difficult to make their voices heard. Many member states do not agree with the concept of civil society. Authoritarian traditional regimes can hardly be expected to embrace NGOs fighting for democracy and human rights. Therefore, opening up the relationship between the UN and NGOs will take many different learning processes at the national and international levels. At the national level, various NGO activities to improve the lives of the local populations ought to be recognised and appreciated. Participation of NGOs in national policy-making should be made possible if useful. At the international level communication and training would be necessary to inform UN staff and delegates more thoroughly about the work of NGOs and possibilities for cooperation.

NGOs, on the other hand, have to understand the different roles states have to play on the national, regional, and international levels to fulfil their responsibilities towards their own constituencies and in inter-governmental processes.

The UN is in a difficult position as the organisation is the forum where all the expectations and roles of state as well as non-state actors come together. The UN is expected to accommodate these expectations, and, of course,

this leads to occasional disappointments on both sides. But since states still have the decision-making powers, the balance in this supposed partnership is tilted in their favour.

The paradox is already obvious in the Charter of the United Nations. The preamble<sup>48</sup> with “We the people [...]” suggests a thoroughly democratic nature of the organisation. But the Charter goes on to define the rights and privileges of states which are represented at the UN through their governments.

### 3.6.1 Implications for State-Society Relations

As pointed out above, states possess the decision-making powers at UN Headquarters. NGOs are allowed in under specific regulations that officially do not put them in a position to partner with states. Most NGOs have no ambition to replace states in general or to undermine their authority and power. With their engagement at the UN and their accreditation with UN bodies they accept to a certain degree the status quo. NGOs are usually interested in achieving change on a set of issues, and they even need states for the changes to be implemented.

At the UN the question of how to define civil society is as important as in academia. The most recent UN addition to this discussion comes from the UN Panel of Eminent Persons on UN-civil society relations. The Panel now prefers to define civil society as “constituencies of concerned groups” (UN press release NGO/527 2003). This is rather vague and gives the UN considerable leeway on which entities should be included. One could argue that different non-state entities engaged at the UN would need different regulations. Small grass-root organisations surely have different needs than foundations or business entities. NGOs fear that their limited rights could be eroded if business were granted more access at the UN.

Rather than choosing a very broad definition, separate definitions and regulations should be found for each group. NGOs, parliaments and

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<sup>48</sup> The preamble of the UN Charter can be found here:  
<http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/preamble.shtml>.

business, just to name a few examples of non-state actors at the UN, have very different contributions to offer to the UN and should be treated accordingly.

Global civil society is also a term which is often used at the UN. The organisation is universal in its membership of states, but with regard to civil society actors it is a far way from being global. There are still not enough NGOs from developing countries involved at the UN. Numbers of accredited or associated NGOs from developed countries are much higher than those from developing countries.

There are efforts underway to change this imbalance, and these seem to show at least some effect as numbers of developing countries NGOs are increasing. To increase these numbers further it would be helpful to facilitate accreditation, provide information in a timely manner, and increase funding for participation from developing countries in UN events.

The description of the formal relations and existing arrangements for NGOs at the UN show a top-down approach. Member states and UN staff decide on who gets access to the UN and who does not. The rules and regulations governing these arrangements are developed and adopted by member states and the relevant implementing UN entities. There are hardly any consultations with civil society on these matters, and NGOs are usually unable to influence these processes.

The formal arrangements are still rigid, limited and restrictive. Therefore, informal relations and arrangements become more important in how the UN and NGOs interact. Informal arrangements and networks provide NGOs with the opportunity to potentially influence decisions by member states and the UN and they often lead to better access for NGOs to delegations and UN meetings. These arrangements are less restrictive, more fluid, and often demand-driven as the UN and member states often draw on NGO expertise for the implementation of certain programs, as for example the Agenda 21 and the MDGs, or if information is needed on countries in conflict.

One informal network and its structure and activities will be described and analysed in the next chapter.

## 4 Informal Relations

### 4.1 Introduction

The importance of informal relations for the work of the United Nations, and its engagement with civil society and NGOs, leads inevitably to the creation of social networks. Cooperation, negotiations and agreements rely upon informal contacts and networks.

The appropriate method for measuring such informal networks is a social network analysis which helps to detect social structures which are not always immediately apparent. This method allows for the analysis of the participants in a network and how they interact.

Network structures as well as their content shed light on the nature and strength of the relationships in question.

The status of international law gives the organisation leeway in its work (Blau 1969: 239). A regulation in all areas with laws and procedures as found in bureaucracies at the national level is not feasible at the United Nations, because it would interfere and collide with the sovereignty of member states.

The lack of regulation changes the political processes. Laws are not available to protect these processes. Therefore other forms of guarantees are necessary. Informal norms and processes become more important. Trustworthiness and the reputation of the other actors play a crucial role (Marsden 1983: 691). The establishment and development of trust between actors is the foundation for functional and effective networks (Kollock 1994: 313).

All social relations depend on opportunities for contact. The formal structures of organisations, in this case the United Nations, serve to provide opportunities for contacts between actors. These opportunity structures make the formation of certain networks more likely.

Practitioners, especially within the NGO community, emphasise the importance of networking for their work. It is seen as very important and the only way to influence policy-making and decision-making. It is vital to consolidate lobbying efforts, cooperation and it adds useful different

perspectives on issues. Networks are a necessity. They are informal and informative.

It is obvious that there are many prominent examples where NGOs successfully influenced or worked together with member states and the UN, but the question is: what does the relationship look like in everyday life, beyond the major events and campaigns like the ban of land-mines or the Global Call for Action against Poverty.

The network analysed here is a relatively small group made up mostly of NGOs active at the UN. These organisations are seen as key NGO actors at the UN, which is the reason why they have been chosen. The analysis will take a systematic look at the interactions of these NGOs with the UN. The emphasis is on the structure of the relations among them. Determining the structure of the relations will help to define the network, what it does and its influence.

Case studies of issue-specific NGOs and their networks can be found in the fifth chapter.

## **4.2 Organisations in the Network**

The organisations involved in the network in question can be roughly divided into three groups: (a) international organisations with a liaison office in New York, (b) faith-based organisations, and (c) US-based organisations active in certain issue-areas.

The international organisations are in the majority and include the following organisations: Médecins Sans Frontières, Amnesty International, Oxfam, Human Rights Watch, World Federalist Movement, Care International, Peace Action International and CONGO. These organisations have liaison offices in New York to lobby and work with the UN. Their offices are often quite independent from headquarters and the work they are doing depends more on the agenda of the UN. The second largest group is made up of faith-based organisations, and these are: the Quaker UN Office, United Methodist Office for the UN, Lutheran Office for World Community, World Council of Churches, Mennonite Central Committee, and the Presbyterian Church. Their relationship with the UN often grew out of humanitarian



concerns and then developed a broader scope. The third group is the smallest and consists of the following organisations: Global Policy Forum, ECAAR (Economists Allied for Arms Reduction) (now EPS: Economists for Peace and Security), Lawyer's Committee for Nuclear Policy, UNA-USA, and the NGO Committee on Disarmament. Their main focus is security-related matters. Only Global Policy Forum and the United Nations Association of the US (UNA-USA) cover a wider range of issues.

The network often comes together around UN reform processes, such as the reform of the Security Council, UN – civil society relations or system-wide coherence. The NGO Working Group on the Security Council is one important tool NGOs use to develop ideas and to interact with member states.<sup>49</sup> They form a core of NGOs based in New York which regularly interact with the UN. This core network can be extended if needed. If there is a special perspective or field of expertise required, it can reach out to other organisations, in and outside of New York. It also adds to the legitimacy of the goals of NGOs when additional organisations, especially from outside Europe or North America, are included in lobbying efforts. One example when the New York-based network reached out to other organisations is the response to the UN High-Level Panel on System-Wide Coherence.<sup>50</sup>

To give a better idea of the NGOs involved in the network and what they do, the organisations will be described briefly below.

#### *Global Policy Forum*<sup>51</sup>

Global Policy Forum's (GPF) mission is to monitor policy making at the United Nations, promote accountability of global decisions, educate and mobilise for global citizen participation, and advocate on vital issues of international peace and justice. GPF responds to a globalising world, where officials, diplomats and corporate leaders take important policy decisions

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<sup>49</sup> For more information see <http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/ngowkgrp/index.htm>. The working group will be analysed in more depth in the fifth chapter.

<sup>50</sup> NGOs reacted in a statement to the Secretary-General's report "Delivering as One". More information can be found at: <http://www.globalpolicy.org/reform/initiatives/panelindex.htm#coherence>.

<sup>51</sup> For more information on the organization see <http://www.globalpolicy.org>.

affecting all humanity, with little democratic oversight and accountability. GPF addresses this democratic deficit by monitoring the policy process, informing the public, analysing the issues, and urging citizen action. GPF focuses on the United Nations – the most inclusive international institution, offering the best hope for a humane and sustainable future. GPF is a non-profit, tax-exempt organisation, with consultative status at the UN. Founded in 1993 by an international group of concerned citizens, GPF works to strengthen international law and create a more equitable and sustainable global society. The organisation places a heavy emphasis on networking to build broad coalitions for research, action and advocacy. GPF's main office is strategically located across the street from UN headquarters in New York. GPF is in many ways the critical driving force in mobilisation and analysis and it is at the core of the network. Its leading becomes especially clear in the development and organisation of the NGO Working Group of the Security Council<sup>52</sup>. GPF, with the World Federalist Movement, is very actively involved in the debate around improved access for NGOs at the UN. The organisation is very critical towards the policies of the UN and members states and this critical attitude makes up part of its reputation in the NGO community. GPF is respected by UN staff and delegations for its critical assessment and independence, and the information provided on its extensive website which is an important informational tool for the diplomatic community in New York. The organisation is funded by membership fees, donations from interested individuals and grants from a small number of foundations.

### *Médecins Sans Frontières*<sup>53</sup>

Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) is an international humanitarian aid organisation that provides emergency medical assistance to populations in danger in more than 70 countries. In countries where health structures are insufficient or even non-existent, MSF collaborates with authorities such as the Ministry of Health to provide assistance. MSF works in rehabilitation of

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<sup>52</sup> The NGO Working Group on the Security Council will be discussed in-depth in the fifth chapter.

<sup>53</sup> For more information on the organisation see <http://www.msf.org>.

hospitals and dispensaries, vaccination programmes and water and sanitation projects. MSF also works in remote health care centres, slum areas and provides training of local personnel. All this is done with the objective of rebuilding health structures to acceptable levels. MSF has been setting up emergency medical aid missions around the world since 1971.

It is part of MSF's work to address any violations of basic human rights encountered by field teams, violations perpetrated or sustained by political actors. It does so by confronting the responsible actors themselves, by putting pressure on them through mobilisation of the international community and by issuing information publicly. In order to prevent compromise or manipulation of MSF's relief activities, MSF maintains neutrality and independence from individual governments. The organisation also tries to ensure that the majority of funds raised for its work comes directly from contributions from the general public. In this way, MSF guarantees equal access to its humanitarian assistance. MSF brings a humanitarian and field perspective to the network, and it is well respected for its efforts in the field.

#### *Amnesty International*<sup>54</sup>

Amnesty International (AI) is a worldwide movement of people who campaign for internationally recognised human rights. AI's vision is of a world in which every person enjoys all of the human rights enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other international human rights standards. In pursuit of this vision, AI's mission is to undertake research and action focused on preventing and ending grave abuses of the rights to physical and mental integrity, freedom of conscience and expression, and freedom from discrimination, within the context of its work to promote all human rights. AI is independent of any government, political ideology, economic interest or religion. It does not support or oppose any government or political system, nor does it support or oppose the views of the victims whose rights it seeks to protect. It is concerned solely with the impartial protection of human rights. AI has a varied network of members and

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<sup>54</sup> For more information on the organisation see <http://www.amnesty.org>.

supporters around the world. At the latest count, there were more than 2.2 million members, supporters and subscribers in over 150 countries and territories in every region of the world. Although they come from many different backgrounds and have widely different political and religious beliefs, they are united by a determination to work for a world where everyone enjoys human rights. AI is a democratic, self-governing movement. Major policy decisions are taken by an International Council made up of representatives from all national sections. AI's national sections, members and supporters are primarily responsible for funding the movement. No funds are sought or accepted from governments for AI's work investigating and campaigning against human rights violations.

AI brings a global human rights perspective and a strong campaigning track record to the network. Its strong international reputation helps the organisation to gain access to UN meetings, staff and delegations, and it is often able to channel information from the NGO community to the UN.

### *Oxfam*<sup>55</sup>

Oxfam is an independent organisation, registered as a charity, and part of a global movement to build a just and safer world. It is a catalyst for overcoming poverty. To achieve the greatest impact, the organisation works on three inter-linking fronts: saving lives by responding swiftly to provide aid, support and protection during emergencies, developing programmes and solutions that empower people to work their way out of poverty, and campaigning to achieve lasting change. Oxfam works at all levels from global to local, including international governments, global institutions as well as with local communities and individuals, to ensure that everyone's rights are fulfilled and protected.

Oxfam provides an important nexus between aid in emergencies and sustainable strategies for development and poverty eradication. Similarly to AI, with its strong international presence the organisation carries more weight at the UN.

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<sup>55</sup> For more information on the organization see <http://www.oxfam.org>.

*Human Rights Watch*<sup>56</sup>

Human Rights Watch (HRW) is dedicated to protecting the human rights of people around the world. It supports victims and activists to prevent discrimination, to uphold political freedom, to protect people from inhumane conduct in wartime, and to bring offenders to justice. The organisation investigates and exposes human rights violations and hold abusers accountable. It challenges governments and those who hold power to end abusive practices and respect international human rights law. It utilises the public and the international community to support the cause of human rights for all. Human Rights Watch is an independent, nongovernmental organisation, supported by contributions from private individuals and foundations worldwide. It accepts no government funds, directly or indirectly. With AI it aims at strengthening the human rights architecture of the UN. The UN, an especially the recently created Human Rights Council, is one of the global priority issues of Human Rights Watch.

*Quaker UN Office*<sup>57</sup>

The Quaker United Nations Office, located in Geneva and New York, represents Quakers through Friends World Committee for Consultation (FWCC). Since the founding of the United Nations in 1945, Quakers have shared that organisation's aims and supported its efforts to abolish war and promote peaceful resolution of conflicts, human rights, economic justice and good governance. FWCC, which links Quakers around the world, has had consultative status with the United Nations' Economic and Social Council as an international non-governmental organisation since 1948. In July 2002, FWCC was moved from special status to general status. By this move, the UN has recognised that FWCC do work of importance in a very broad range of international concerns. QUNO staff also work with other multilateral organisations, such as the World Trade Organisation, International Labour Organisation, World Bank, International Monetary Fund and others relevant to our areas of concern. It brings expertise for a broad range of issues to the

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<sup>56</sup> For more information on the organisation see <http://www.hrw.org>.

<sup>57</sup> For more information on the organisation see <http://www.quno.org>.

network, from peaceful conflict resolution over economic rights to good governance.

*Economists for Peace and Security (formerly ECAAR)<sup>58</sup>*

Economists for Peace and Security (EPS) is an international network of thirteen affiliated organisations promoting economic analysis and appropriate action for peace, security and the world economy. It seeks a world whose people are secure, free from fear and want, where economies distribute goods and services efficiently and for the benefit of all. The organisation works locally, regionally and internationally to reduce the military burden, and to effect policy changes that can build a more just and peaceful future. It supports efforts to create economic incentives for peaceful relations, to promote collective approaches to conflict and security problems, to encourage the submission of international disputes for negotiation, arbitration, judicial settlement to the United Nations or other multinational institutions. It undertakes rigorous economic analysis to present just, and peaceful policy alternatives, to organise meetings and seminars, publish articles, exchange opinions with scholars, and government and non-government representatives, and to cooperate with like-minded organisations in other professions. It provides an alternative perspective on conflict and disarmament. EPS is not as strong as a player in the network, but it can provide a valuable economic perspective on disarmament and security.

*United Methodist Office for the UN<sup>59</sup>*

The United Methodist Office for the UN provides the United Methodist Church (UMC) with a distinct opportunity to address the international community about the Social Principles and resolutions adopted by the UMC General Conference. The Office's engagement in international affairs aims

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<sup>58</sup> For more information on the organisation see <http://www.epsusa.org>.

<sup>59</sup> For more information on the organisation see <http://www.umc.org> and [http://www.wunm.com/organizations/religion/methodist\\_office\\_un.htm](http://www.wunm.com/organizations/religion/methodist_office_un.htm).

to help United Methodists across geographical divides and political contexts to develop lines of social action that are faithful the mission of the UMC. The office focuses on many issues, including women's and human rights. The UMC affirms the right of women to equal treatment in employment, responsibility, promotion, and compensation and affirms the importance of women in decision-making positions at all levels of Church life. Furthermore, the office strengthens the UMC's efforts in supporting women in all aspects of society by upholding the basic rights of all people. One fundamental principle of the UMC is the emphasis on connections or "connectionalism".

An example of connectionalism is the work around the world, whether it is a new university in Africa or bicycles for Cuban pastors, it is the work of "the connection", as opposed to the work of a single congregation.

#### *Lawyers' Committee for Nuclear Policy*<sup>60</sup>

Founded in 1981, the Lawyers' Committee on Nuclear Policy (LCNP) is a national nonprofit educational association that uses national and international law to promote peace and disarmament. LCNP has been a vital link between policy makers, legal scholars and activists.

It provides legal information and analysis to policy makers, diplomats, activists, and the media on disarmament and international law and publishes books, articles and discussion papers for policy makers, lawyers, legal scholars and laypeople. The LCNP also works through international organisations, including the UN and the International Court of Justice to promote peace and disarmament.

#### *Lutheran Office for World Community*<sup>61</sup>

The Lutheran Office for World Community represents the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America and the Lutheran World Federation (LWF) at the UN. The Lutheran Office for World Community is a ministry of the

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<sup>60</sup> For more information on the organisation see <http://www.lcnp.org>.

<sup>61</sup> For more information on the organisation see <http://www.elca.org/advocacy/international/>.

ELCA's Church in Society unit. The primary task of the Lutheran Office for World Community is to gather information of interest and concern to Lutheran churches worldwide, including the ELCA, and utilise it in the church's social ministry response. This information can range from what the UN is doing to help refugees, children in need, preserve the environment, etc., to what the UN is doing to help countries proceed with elections or protect and defend human rights. Thus the office follows events, including preparations for world conferences, in a rather wide range of geographical areas and topics. The agenda fluctuates with the international one to a large degree. The information gathered helps the churches -- the LWF and the ELCA -- determine their humanitarian aid response as well as their public policy statements.

#### *UNA-USA*<sup>62</sup>

The United Nations Association of the United States of America (UNA-USA) is a not-for-profit membership organisation dedicated to building understanding of and support for the ideals and vital work of the United Nations among the American people. Its educational and humanitarian campaigns, including teaching students in urban schools, clearing minefields and providing school-based support for children living in HIV/AIDS-affected communities in Africa, allow people to make a global impact at the local level. In addition, its policy and advocacy programs stress the importance of nations working together and the need for United States leadership in the United Nations. The association is affiliated with the World Federation of United Nations Associations. The UNA-USA is dedicated to educating, inspiring and mobilising Americans to support the principles and vital work of the United Nations, strengthening the United Nations system, promoting constructive United States leadership in that system, and achievement of the goals of the UN Charter. UNA-USA has more than 175 chapters and divisions across the country and nearly 20,000 members. These members carry out programs and campaigns at the local level through events, educational promotions and fundraising.

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<sup>62</sup> For more information on the organisation see <http://www.unausa.org>.



At the UN one of the priorities of the organisation is the relationship between the UN and civil society and the private sector. It is important to the network because of its ties to the US government and in more in general to the people of the US. This in turn leads to a distancing of UNA-USA from the rest of the NGOs in the network who are very keen on maintaining a safe distance from governments.

### *World Council of Churches*<sup>63</sup>

The World Council of Churches (WCC) is the broadest and most inclusive among the many organised expressions of the modern ecumenical movement, a movement whose goal is Christian unity. The WCC brings together more than 340 churches, denominations and church fellowships in over 100 countries and territories throughout the world, representing some 550 million Christians and including most of the world's Orthodox churches, scores of denominations from such historic traditions of the Protestant Reformation as Anglican, Baptist, Lutheran, Methodist and Reformed, as well as many united and independent churches. While the bulk of the WCC's founding churches were European and North American, today most are in Africa, Asia, the Caribbean, Latin America, the Middle East and the Pacific. For its member churches, the WCC is a unique space: one in which they can reflect, speak, act, worship and work together, challenge and support each other, share and debate with each other. As members of this fellowship, WCC member churches are called to the goal of visible unity in one faith and one eucharistic fellowship to promote their common witness in work for mission and evangelism, to engage in Christian service by serving human need, breaking down barriers between people, seeking justice and peace, and upholding the integrity of creation. The work of the WCC is financed by contributions from its member churches and funds received from church-related organisations, foundations and individuals. The Council also receives income from investments, rentals of offices in the Ecumenical Centre in Geneva, fees for courses at the Ecumenical Institute, and sale of WCC publications.

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<sup>63</sup> For more information on the organisation see <http://www.wcc-coe.org/>.

*NGO Committee on Disarmament, Peace and Security*<sup>64</sup>

The Committee facilitates the participation of NGOs in formal disarmament meetings at the UN, such as the General Assembly debates and review meetings of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). This is a central function of the NGO Committee, as the main liaison between the NGO community and the UN Secretariat, and active partner of both. The Committee assists the UN Secretariat with NGO accreditation, conducts orientation and citizen diplomacy training, organises briefings with key delegates and journalists, and arranges NGO presentations and special events within and outside the UN. It also advocates for a broader NGO role in the UN system. No one can doubt the importance of the formal participation of civil society in disarmament negotiations: witness NGOs' precedent-setting role in obtaining a convention banning anti-personnel land mines. In order to pressure their governments to take constructive action, NGOs require timely and nuanced information. The Disarmament Time produced by the Committee is the only publication providing full and timely coverage of UN disarmament news. Distributed free at UN headquarters in New York and Geneva and mailed to other decision-makers, it offers primary information of use to lobbyists, legislators, researchers, NGOs and the interested public. Many delegations use Disarmament Times as a key source for reporting to their capitals. The NGO Committee on Disarmament, Peace and Security holds panel discussion on arms control and disarmament issues particularly during the time the First Committee, the Disarmament and Security Committee, is in session in the fall and also in the spring when the Disarmament Commission meets. These for a provide a way in which NGO proposals and NGO expert advice can be introduced into the discussion that takes place at the UN. Most panels have both NGO experts and delegates as participants. Increasingly, throughout the year, the Committee is also holding discussions on initiatives to resolve conflicts in the Middle East, in South Asia, and elsewhere. The majority of NGOs interested in peace and disarmament never visit the UN headquarters, but the success of their work and their influence with governments are greatly

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<sup>64</sup> For more information on the organisation see <http://disarm.igc.org>.

enhanced by knowing what happens on the ground. The Committee participates in electronic networks and online correspondence with hundreds of NGOs worldwide. The NGO Committee on Disarmament, Peace, and Security has received support over the years from several foundations. These include: the Ploughshares Fund, Ford Foundation, Boehm Foundation, John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, Stewart R. Mott Charitable Trust, Newman's Own, and the Rockefeller Foundation. The Committee also receives support from individual missions to the UN and from individual donors and membership fees. The Committee is an important contributor in the field of disarmament and security and is involved in meetings of the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs on a regular basis.

#### *World Federalist Movement*<sup>65</sup>

The World Federalist Movement (WFM) is determined to exercise rights and responsibilities as citizens of the whole world in order to achieve the high purposes of the United Nations. World federalists view the world as one society embracing all of humanity in all its diversity. WFM affirms that the ideals and principles of community life which are basic to civilised existence can and must be applied to international relations. To this end, it calls for urgent progress in developing the democratic world institutions of law by which the world's people and nations can govern their relations to assure a peaceful, just, and ecologically sustainable world community. These institutions must have actual and sufficient authority to make and enforce law in their given jurisdictions in accordance with the basic federalist principle of subsidiarity, which is the division of political authority and jurisdiction between different levels of government and the solving of problems at the level at which they occur, in general at the most local level possible. For this is the essence of world federalism: to seek to invest legal and political authority in world institutions to deal with problems which can only be treated adequately at the global level, while affirming the sovereignty of the nation-state in matters which are essentially internal. Its objective is a world order in which the legitimate rights of nations to self-

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<sup>65</sup> For more on the organisation see <http://www.wfm.org>.

determination are balanced by and consistent with the collective rights of the global community to protect and advance the common good of humanity. Its objective is also to have not only governments but individuals recognise their obligation to uphold and affirm world law through allegiance to these institutions. It is the citizen who is finally the rightful source and subject of the authority of world law. Individuals, whether heads of government or ordinary citizens, must be accountable under due process of world law for crimes against humanity.

The WFM brings a unique democratic perspective to the network with a particular input regarding questions of good governance and accountability. It is one of the key actors in the network, especially in the areas of NGO access and UN reform.<sup>66</sup> The Movement has been very successful in obtaining important information and documents from the UN. It gained international recognition through its involvement in the Coalition for the International Criminal Court. WFM serves as the international secretariat of the Coalition.<sup>67</sup>

#### *Mennonite Central Committee*<sup>68</sup>

The Mennonite Central Committee (MCC) works around the world in areas such as education, health, agriculture, peace and justice issues, relief work and job creation.

Wherever possible, MCC works with the regions local partners. Usually these partners are local church groups, including Mennonite, Brethren in Christ and other churches. Other local partners include women's groups, farmer's cooperatives and government agencies. MCC sees its role as a facilitator, not as a controller of projects and programs. In North America, MCC also works with local agencies; MCC operates few programs of its own, instead placing volunteers with existing agencies.

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<sup>66</sup> After the 2005 UN Summit the WFM created a website (<http://www.reformtheun.org/>) entirely devoted to the monitoring and tracking of the UN reform process. It provides important up-to-date information on UN reform and is used widely by the UN and NGOs.

<sup>67</sup> More information on the Coalition for the International Criminal Court can be found at <http://www.wfm.org/site/index.php/articles/17>.

<sup>68</sup> For more information on the organisation see <http://mcc.org>.

Support for MCC's worldwide efforts comes from individuals. Donations also come in the form of relief sales, thrift shops, and donations of food grains. The MCC has not a strong position in the network, but it brings a relief work and social policy perspective to the network.

Its main contribution to the network is in the areas of humanitarian crises, sanctions, and relief work.

### *CARE*<sup>69</sup>

Founded in 1945 to provide relief to survivors of World War II, CARE is now one of the world's largest private international humanitarian organisations, committed to helping families in poor communities improve their lives and achieve lasting victories over poverty. It is a leading humanitarian organisation fighting global poverty. It places special focus on working alongside poor women because, equipped with the proper resources, women have the power to help whole families and entire communities escape poverty. Women are at the heart of CARE's community-based efforts to improve basic education, prevent the spread of HIV, increase access to clean water and sanitation, expand economic opportunity and protect natural resources. CARE also delivers emergency aid to survivors of war and natural disasters, and helps people rebuild their lives. Its mission is to serve individuals and families in the poorest communities in the world. Drawing strength from our global diversity, resources and experience, we promote innovative solutions and are advocates for global responsibility. The organisation facilitates lasting change by strengthening capacity for self-help, providing economic opportunity, delivering relief in emergencies, influencing policy decisions at all levels, and addressing discrimination in all its forms. CARE contributes its expertise in humanitarian aid and post-conflict reconstruction to the network.

### *Peace Action International*<sup>70</sup>

Peace Action International, the result of the merger of two organisations, SANE and The Nuclear Freeze, has effectively mobilised for peace and

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<sup>69</sup> For more information on the organisation see <http://www.care.org>.

<sup>70</sup> For more information on the organisation see <http://www.peace-action.org/>.

disarmament for fifty years. As the nation's largest grassroots peace and justice group, it achieved results in different, important areas: from the 1963 treaty to ban above ground nuclear testing, to the 1996 signing of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, from ending the war in Vietnam, to blocking weapons sales to human rights abusing countries, and eliminating funding for new nuclear weapons, Peace Action and its more than 100,000 members have been, and continue to be, at the forefront of the international movement for peace. It is the nation's largest grassroots peace network, with chapters and affiliates in 30 states. It is organised to place pressure on Congress and the Administration through write-in campaigns, internet actions, citizen lobbying and direct action. Through a close relationship with progressive members of Congress, the organisation plays a key role in devising strategies to move forward peace legislation, and, as a leading member of United for Peace and Justice and the Win Without War coalition, it lends its expertise and large network to achieving common goals. Through its Peace Voter campaigns, it informs voters about their choices in both local and national elections, by highlighting different candidates' stances on issues relating to peace. The annual Congressional Voting Record gives credit to those in Congress who voted for a peaceful future, while holding accountable those who voted for larger Pentagon budgets, for spending tax dollars on nuclear weapons, and for wars of aggression and occupation. Peace Action recognises that real change comes from the bottom up and the organisation is committed to educating and organising at the grassroots level.

### *Presbyterian Church*<sup>71</sup>

The Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) has approximately 2.4 million members, 11,100 congregations and 14,000 ordained and active ministers. Presbyterians trace their history to the 16th century and the Protestant Reformation.

Through individual gifts, programs across the world like these are made possible: Missionaries establishing a home for street children in Brazil,

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<sup>71</sup> For more information on the organisation see <http://www.pcusa.org/>.

evangelising college students in Ethiopia, providing vital medical care to the neglected elderly in Lebanon and training youth in the United States to be missionaries of tomorrow.

The diversity of the issues covered by these organisations and the different levels of activism they are engaged in, from the grassroots level to the international, create synergies and strength for the network. They can bring expertise to the UN on issues ranging from humanitarian assistance over poverty eradication to disarmament. Due to their involvement at the national, local and grassroots levels, they can also bring perspectives of different stakeholders to the UN.

Two important actors from the NGO community in New York seem to be absent from the core network. One is the Women's Environment and Development Organization (WEDO)<sup>72</sup>, a leading women's organisation in New York, which advocates women's equality in global policy through a variety of programs on gender, governance, human rights, security and development. The second is the International Peace Academy (IPA)<sup>73</sup>, which is an influential, independent, and international institution dedicated to promoting the prevention and settlement of armed conflict between and within states through policy research and development.

Although WEDO addresses issues such as UN reform and UN development processes, the organisation cooperates in its daily work mainly with women's rights activists and other women's organisations, as for example the Women's Parliament Forum and the African Women's Economic Policy Network (AWEPON). It also makes a strong effort to bring voices of women from developing countries to the UN. It is certainly noteworthy that the network analysed for this study does not have a strong gender component.

IPA, on the other hand, is known to work closely with governments on research and policies, which is often seen by other NGOs, which like to appear independent and keep their distance from governments, as cooptation. Because of this IPA is not regarded as a trustworthy partner by many NGOs.

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<sup>72</sup> For more information on the organisation see <http://www.wedo.org>.

<sup>73</sup> For more information on the organisation see <http://www.ipacademy.org>.

### 4.3 Presentation of Empirical Findings

The data were collected using a standardised questionnaire in face-to-face and telephone interviews. The survey applied an ego-centric approach, starting with one individual from the NGO community. The contacts given during the first interview were then used for further interviews to map out the network. Twenty NGO representatives were interviewed.<sup>74</sup>

The questionnaire consists of two parts.<sup>75</sup> The first part is quantitative and contains questions regarding the frequency, nature and content of contacts. The second part captures the network. The respondent is asked to provide a list of contacts and relate them to the quantitative questions in the first part.

Given the lack of contacts from Permanent Missions or the United Nations, the answers reflect mostly the perspective of NGOs. This non-response can be explained by two factors:

(a) There are not too many contacts in Permanent Missions or at the United Nations deemed close or important enough to be mentioned.

(b) Due to the often loose, formal or often confidential relationships with the Secretariat and Permanent Missions, the NGO representatives did not feel comfortable to disclose their contacts.

Formal interactions are defined as occurring mainly in the context of official UN meetings. They provide some opportunity structure for networking, but are not as valuable as informal contacts. Informal contacts are often off-the-record, personal, and confidential which means that they often yield more information than formal contacts alone.

Both explanations indicate that there are close relationships among NGOs, but not with Permanent Missions or the United Nations. A sign that there is either no partnership or not a very strong, informal one. This fact will be further analysed in the conclusion of this chapter.

#### 4.3.1 Frequency and Nature of Contacts

NGO representatives interact daily or up to three times daily. Interaction with Permanent Missions is less frequent and takes place mostly on a

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<sup>74</sup> A list of interviewees can be found in the annex.

<sup>75</sup> The questionnaire can be found in the annex.



weekly basis. Only one respondent reported daily and monthly interaction. Contact with UN Headquarters takes also place weekly in most cases. Most contacts with NGOs, Permanent Missions and the UN are face-to-face, underlining the importance of personal and informal interaction.

In a similar vein, confirming the importance of informal relations and the strength of the relations among NGOs, is the description of the nature of the contacts. Interaction with other NGOs is mostly described as informal, while the interactions with Permanent Missions and UN Headquarters are often described as formal. Confirming the informal nature of the relations, most respondents know other NGOs personally, while there are only a few personal contacts with Permanent Mission or UN staff.

NGOs initiate contact with member states or the UN in most cases. The direction of the initiative, from NGOs to Permanent Missions and the secretariat, show that there is a lack of reciprocity, a sign that there is no partnership based on mutual exchange.

When asked about the reasons why contacts are sought out with other NGOs, Permanent Missions or the UN, the most frequent answer was exchange of information and collaboration on one or more specific projects. Information and collaboration evolve mainly around UN processes and events.

#### **4.3.2 Density**

The distribution and nature of contacts indicate that a higher level of density of interaction exists among NGOs.


In terms of the distribution of contacts, the network data show that eight NGOs are at the centre of the network with an equal standing. They have been mentioned most frequently and interact with each other more often than with other organisations. The next ring of organisations is made up of three NGOs, with another four organisations at the periphery.<sup>76</sup>

The organisations at the core of the networks are the most active and engaged in terms of mobilisation of other organisations and trying to

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<sup>76</sup> Organisations which have only been mentioned once are not included in the analysis as they are hardly relevant for the work of the network.


establish more and deeper contacts with the UN and member states to open up access for NGO participation at the UN. They also often initiate projects and campaigns, as for example on Security Council reform and NGO access.



**Figure 4: Clusters of NGOs according to closeness**

AI = Amnesty International, CO = CONGO, GPF = Global Policy Forum, HR = Human Rights Watch, IP = Peace Action International, LA = Lawyers' Committee for Nuclear Policy, LU = Lutheran Office for World Community ME = Médecins sans Frontières, OX = Oxfam, PR = Presbyterian Church, QU = Quaker UN Office, UA = UNA-USA, UNA-USA, WC = CCIA/World Council of Churches, NGO Committee on Disarmament, WF = Word Federalist Movement

Global Policy Forum and the World Federalist Movement are key actors because of the broad range of issues they are dealing, the good reputation they enjoy and their ability for critical analysis. Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch are important partners because of their international



**Figure 5: NGOs, Countries and UN Departments According to Closeness.**  
 NGO = grey, country = yellow, UN= blue, NGOs: AI = Amnesty International, CO = CONGO, GPF = Global Policy Forum, HR = Human Rights Watch, IP = Peace Action International, LA = Lawyers' Committee for Nuclear Policy, LU = Lutheran Office for World Community, ME = Médecins sans Frontières, OX = Oxfam, PR = Presbyterian Church, QU = Quaker UN Office, UA = UNA-USA, UNA-USA, WC = CCIA/World Council of Churches, NGO Committee on Disarmament, WF = Word Federalist Movement; UN Departments: DD = DDA (Disarmament), DE = DESA (Economic and Social Affairs), DP = DPA (Political Affairs); Member States: AR = Argentina, CA = Canada, EU = European Union, SA = South Africa, US = United States of America

clout and reputation in the field of human rights. The United Methodist Office and the World Council of Churches are well respected for their activism in humanitarian affairs and their support for the NGO community at large.

They are also well respected by the UN, member states and the media for their expertise and activism.

When NGO representatives were asked which permanent missions and UN departments are especially important for their work, three departments were mentioned frequently: DESA (Department of Economic and Social Affairs), DPA (Department of Political Affairs) and DDA (Department for Disarmament Affairs). The most relevant countries or groups of countries mentioned were: the EU, Canada, Malaysia, Argentina, the US and South Africa.

The three departments and the member states mentioned are especially important for NGOs for a number of reasons. The member states are considered friendly states because they are known to be open to and to support NGOs and their concerns and issues. These states are supportive because they have either strong civil societies at home or share common interests with NGOs.

DPA and DDA are mostly relevant because of the substantive work they are doing which is of interest to NGOs. DESA is furthermore important because it services the NGO Committee of the Economic and Social Council which grants accreditation to the Council and for its innovative ways of engaging civil society in sustainable development and financing for development processes.

#### **4.3.3 Testing of Hypotheses**

The hypotheses were chosen to describe how NGOs, permanent missions and UN headquarters interact and to determine the nature and strength of their relationship. The quantitative and network data collected confirm all hypotheses. It is therefore safe to draw the conclusion that the relations between NGOs are much stronger than the ones between NGOs and UN headquarters and permanent missions. The initiative in the relationship with the UN comes mostly from NGOs. Findings suggest that there is no partnership between the two. A partnership would mean that the relations

between all parties are equally strong and that the initiative does not only come from one side.

4.3.3.1 *Communication*

Communication is generally informal in nature, and the means are mostly face-to-face meetings and telephone calls. Nineteen out of twenty respondents said that most of their communication takes place face-to-face; with only one respondent listing phone calls as his primary form of communication.

NGOs communicate more often with each other than with permanent missions or UN, indicating closer and denser relations among NGOs than with other actors (Figure. 6). Eighteen out of 20 respondents communicate daily with NGOs. Two respondents communicate with other NGOs several times per day. Most respondents (18) have weekly interaction with permanent missions, often during UN briefings or meetings. The majority of respondents (17) also have weekly interactions with the UN.

Nineteen of the interviewees responded that NGOs initiate the contact with permanent missions and UN headquarters in most cases.




Figure 6: Frequency of contact of NGOs with other NGOs, Permanent Missions (PM), and United Nations departments (UN).

The figures confirm both hypotheses. Communication does occur more frequently among NGOs than between UN headquarters and permanent missions and communication is initiated by NGOs in most cases.

Communication is the foundation of functional relationships. The imbalances in the findings indicate that the relationship is not mutual, but that it takes more effort on the part of the NGOs to engage the UN and delegations.

#### 4.3.3.2 *Exchange*

Regular and reliable exchange strengthens relationships and creates trust. It also defines the content of the relationships.

Informational networks are often not as strongly integrated as networks which serve more functions than just the exchange of information. Cooperation and the exchange of tangible resources, such as money or manpower create more opportunities for interaction and thus stronger ties.

##### 4.3.3.2.1 *Information Exchange*

Information is exchanged with NGOs, Permanent Missions and UN headquarters on a regular basis. However, the exchange of information occurs more often among NGOs. Responses show that NGOs exchange information daily among themselves whereas the exchange is less frequent with permanent missions and the UN secretariat and often takes place on a weekly or monthly basis.

The exchange is mostly mutual. If information is provided in an exchange relationship, information is usually offered in return.

UN documents, statements by delegations and UN officials are exchanged most frequently, followed by information on UN meetings and reports on specific issues.

Representatives also stated that a higher level of trust leads to a more meaningful exchange of information. As it appears that there is lower level of trust between NGOs and permanent missions and the UN respectively, this can be seen as one potential explanation why there is less information exchanged between NGOs and permanent missions and the UN.

Other information exchanged includes dates of meetings, contact

information and analytical or political documents prepared by NGOs or UN departments.




Figure 7: Purposes for interaction. Information exchange of NGOs with other NGOs, Permanent Missions (PM), and United Nations departments (UN).

NGOs often do not have many resources at their command, so that information becomes more important as a commodity, and since relevant information is often not easy to obtain from a political organisation such as the UN, it is a very sought-after and valuable commodity.

#### 4.3.3.2.2 Exchange of Resources

Given the limited resources, human and monetary, available to NGOs, one can expect the exchange of resources to be limited. If there is an exchange of resources, it is usually more significant because of the scarcity experienced by many smaller NGOs, or liaison offices at the UN for bigger organisations.

The empirical findings confirm that the exchange of resources is limited and only occurs occasionally due to the fact that NGOs do not have many

resources available and that there is only rarely a transfer of resources from the UN or member states to NGOs at headquarters.

#### *4.3.3.2.2.1 Human Resources*

The exchange of resources becomes relevant in the context of joint projects or campaigns. It is usually expressed in staff time devoted to a particular project. It is difficult to quantify and is often determined by the size of the offices of the NGOs involved. Participation in meetings is a good indicator for the involvement of an organisation. It is common practice among NGOs that all organisations are represented during meetings.

For projects with permanent missions or the UN, their involvement is usually limited in terms of representation and time. In most cases the initiative comes from NGOs. It usually takes quite a lobbying effort on the part of NGOs to get a member state or UN department involved. Only rarely are projects initiated by the UN without prior involvement of NGOs. Again, a sign that the relationship between NGOs and the UN is lopsided and that there is no mutual partnership. Developments on the national level, such as the inclusion of civil society representatives in delegations and the limited participation of NGOs as experts at special events are not mirrored in the daily work of the UN.

Therefore, one can say that for the case of UN-NGO relations at UN headquarters there is very limited exchange of human resources with the UN and only some among NGOs, which usually occurs in the context of common projects.

#### *4.3.3.2.2.2 Financial Resources*

Similarly to human resources, the exchange of financial resources plays hardly any role among NGOs due to the limited resources available. They also seem to be less important in relationships which are mostly informal and based on mutual interests rather than the exchange of tangibles.

Financial resources only become more relevant when NGOs work together on specific projects. The contribution of NGOs to these projects often comes in the form of information, expertise, political support and staff time, but



hardly in the form of money. The funding often comes from foundations or, in fewer cases, from friendly and interested member states or UN department or programs.

One example here is the support by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation for a paper and an event on NGO participation at the UN.<sup>77</sup>

#### 4.3.3.3 *Advice*

The extent to which nodes in a network seek advice from each other is another indicator for the strength of relationships.

Nineteen respondents indicated that they seek mostly professional advice, and one respondent stated that professional and personal advice is sought.

There is general openness to asking NGOs, Permanent Missions and UN Headquarters for advice. Most advice sought is of a professional nature, often regarding policies, joint campaigns or coordination. Some respondents reported that there are less instances of advice being sought from UN headquarters, and if UN staff is asked for advice, NGOs often proceed with caution. NGOs often fall back on other NGOs for advice.

As with the exchange of information, NGOs often seek advice from other NGOs on a daily basis while they report to seek advice from permanent missions and UN headquarters on a weekly or monthly basis depending on demand. Thus it can be confirmed that the exchange of advice occurs mostly among NGOs and less frequently between NGOs, UN headquarters and permanent missions.

It is understood among NGOs that the exchange of advice is mutual and creates stronger bonds and more trust among the organisations. The absence of mutuality in the relations with the UN and permanent missions show a lesser degree of trust and links with NGOs.

The need for advice from other actors often arises during campaigns around concrete issues or specific UN events (for example the Millennium Campaign to garner support for the realisation of the Millennium Development Goals or the mobilisation of women's group to support UN

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<sup>77</sup> The paper which was an outcome of the meeting can be found under: <http://www.globalpolicy.org/ngos/int/un/access/2006/0328participation.htm>.

efforts to integrate women in post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding) and is therefore based on need and demand. Accordingly, the demand for advice can come from all the actors involved. Nonetheless, it occurs more frequently and regularly among NGOs.

#### 4.3.3.4 *Co-operation*

Most NGOs state that they cooperate with other NGOs, permanent missions and UN secretariat on a number of projects, but most of these projects are carried out in cooperation with NGOs. Nineteen out of twenty respondents stated that the majority of projects are initiated by NGOs. Prominent examples include the NGO Coalition for the International Criminal Court, the NGO Working Group on the Security Council, the UN Financing for Development process and the NGO access initiative. Most NGO projects are carried out in partnership.

Co-operation with NGOs is characterised by most respondents as very beneficial. Relations with the permanent missions and the UN are seen as beneficial. A few respondents qualified their statement by pointing out that co-operation partners have to be chosen carefully, especially when they come from permanent missions or the UN since there is a risk of co-optation. Reputation plays a very important role in the work of NGOs and they cannot afford to be linked to certain agendas of member states. The main reasons given why NGOs choose to cooperate are coalition-building, campaigning, networking, agenda-setting, advancement of the goals of the UN and improvement of international governance.

The finding that most projects are carried out in cooperation with NGOs supports the hypothesis that cooperation takes place mostly among NGOs. However, the organisations do not only use cooperation to better achieve their goals, they also use it to contribute to the work of the UN.


While all respondents agreed that there is co-operation with all three groups, most of them said that it is mainly NGOs they are working together with. Cooperation between NGOs and permanent missions or UN headquarters on the other hand is not as common and oftentimes evolves around specific UN processes or issues, such as Security Council reform or financing for development, when there is an overlap of interests and a common goal.

#### 4.3.3.5 Trustworthiness

Trust is crucial to the development of functional and effective networks.

NGOs are usually seen as very trustworthy as their work is considered to be more transparent than that of the UN or member states. Members of the UN staff are also seen as trustworthy depending on their positions and the strength of the relationships. Most respondents felt that the level of trustworthiness depends on the political circumstances and the nature of the relationships. One respondent saw member states as less trustworthy because of national interests determining the relationship.

Regular interaction, the experiences derived from such interactions and reputation lead to the assessment of trustworthiness. Examples include the work of the NGO Working Group on the Security Council in which NGOs work closely together with each other and meet regularly with ambassadors to the UN and regular interaction with UN staff during meetings.



**Figure 8: Perception of trustworthiness. Permanent Missions (PM), United Nations departments (UN).**

NGOs also reported that there is still a lack of trust towards them from the UN and member states, despite years of successful and, at UN headquarters, mostly unproblematic interaction. The lack of trust can be

explained with the different positions NGOs and member states occupy in the international community, different agendas, different methods of work, and overlapping constituencies. NGOs are often seen by member states as unaccountable. Their political agendas, e.g. human rights, women's rights, are often perceived by member states as a threat. Member states have larger constituencies and a different set of roles in governance than NGOs have. Their constituents are mainly the population of the respective country. NGOs often have smaller and selective constituencies and are accountable to them. Their constituents include members and donors.

The development of relations between the UN and NGOs shows that more interaction and more cooperation often leads to a higher level of trust and to a better understanding of the other side and should therefore be encouraged.

#### 4.3.3.6 *Hierarchies*

Most respondents (19) clearly stated that member states and their permanent missions to the UN are in control of the relationship with NGOs. One respondent sees the relationship of NGOs with the UN as a process and was reluctant to talk about hierarchies in this context. There is no real access to the UN in terms of policy-making and decision-making. There is also no power for NGOs or any kind of control over the decision-making processes at the UN. NGOs are pushing for more participation and oversight, but without much success. The rights of NGOs were extended with resolution 1996/31, but without changing the power structures within the organisation. NGOs which are accredited with ECOSOC are often seen as more powerful than the ones associated with DPI, because the first have the right to submit statements to an intergovernmental body.

NGOs can gain some influence either by initiating concrete projects or by participating in specific processes, such as sustainable development or financing for development where NGOs and other civil society roles were given a role by the intergovernmental process. The strong position of member states can be softened at times through concerted lobbying efforts or campaigns.

Nonetheless, the conclusion is that classical hierarchies are still intact with member states at the top of the UN hierarchy.

NGOs see the main reasons for this as rooted in the limited formal relationship that NGOs have with the UN, in the official rules and regulations, and in the nature of the organisation as an intergovernmental body. The membership of the UN consists of member states, not NGOs. Accordingly, the influence of NGOs is limited.




Figure 9: Hierarchy and power structures at the UN.

When NGOs are asked how they judge the influence coming from the cooperation with different actors, the cooperation with other NGOs ranks highest in terms of its perceived influence on their work. This perceived influence includes both the effect on their own work (i.e. higher visibility) and

the influence gained in their lobbying and campaigns. Both factors interact: A higher visibility often leads to more successful lobbying. The influence derived from cooperating with permanent missions and UN secretariat is considered to be strong to very strong, but limited because it occurs less frequent and is often less visible and prominent.

#### **4.4 Discussion: Relevance of Empirical Findings for the Role of NGOs at the UN**

The findings clearly indicate stronger relations among NGOs than between NGOs and the United Nations. There is a higher level of cooperation and trust among NGOs than in their relationship with the United Nations or member states.

The role of NGOs in policy-making is clearly overestimated. The basis for such an influence, namely regular and meaningful interaction with the UN Secretariat and member states, is often not given. Many relevant UN meetings (e.g. of the General Assembly and the Security Council) are still closed to NGOs and do not allow for participation from NGOs. Recent examples for this overestimation of NGO influence include, but are not limited to, the minor role for civil society in the recently created Peacebuilding Commission<sup>78</sup>, the exclusion of NGOs and civil society in the follow-up plenary meeting to the Millennium Summit in 2005, and the disappearance of the report and the resolution on UN-civil society relations from the agenda of the organisation. There is still a lack of trust between NGOs on the one hand and member states and the UN on the other hand. There was some improvement over the years. More member states and UN departments now talk to and cooperate with NGOs. However, there is still a lingering feeling of distrust. It is often not clear to member states who NGOs represent and what they stand for. Other concerns include contentious issues, such as human rights, sexual and reproductive rights, governance issues NGOs feel strongly about and lobby for at the UN.

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<sup>78</sup> The Commission only allows for limited consultation with civil society. In paragraph 21 of General Assembly Resolution 60/180 which created the Peacebuilding Commission, the Commission is encouraged to consult with civil society, which is considered to be weak language.

NGOs have their own issues when dealing with member states and the UN. Reputation is crucial. Cooperation always carries the risk of getting too close to governments and national agendas. The independence of NGOs is at stake. The network of NGOs analysed here has always been especially careful to maintain a certain distance from governments and to always voice their concerns about how member states operate at the UN.

The assessment of NGOs that member states and their governments are still on top of the hierarchy at the UN, and thus the sole decision-makers, unambiguously show that there is no partnership in place. Given the absence of NGO issues, such as access or improving participation, from the UN agenda, it is safe to assume that member states do not have an interest in partnering with NGOs. The disappearance of the draft resolution on the recommendations of the Cardoso Panel is very telling in this respect. There is no political will or desire to enter into a closer relationship with NGOs. With the absence of major UN conferences there is also no space for NGOs to push issues or access to the UN. The replacement of conferences with summits since 2000 led to a further exclusion of NGOs from the work of the UN. Only a few NGOs and other civil society representatives were invited to the Millennium Summit in 2005. This is not only a problem regarding NGO participation, but also in terms of mobilisation of stakeholders for important ongoing UN processes such as the Millennium Development Goals.

Access plays an overarching role in UN-NGO relations which affects cooperation, and the perception of hierarchies and power structures. Limited access of NGOs to UN negotiations and meetings reduces opportunity structures for cooperation and is often criticised by NGOs in this respect. Limited access to UN meetings and premises also clearly shows who is in charge, and member states often use their power to exclude NGOs from meetings or to make access to the premises more difficult for NGOs.<sup>79</sup>

There is also a considerable difference between the roles of NGOs at headquarters and in the field. In the field they are often implementing entities for the UN carrying out development and humanitarian assistance. Funding flows from the UN and governments to NGOs for this purpose and

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<sup>79</sup> For a comprehensive overview of the issue and examples of access restrictions see <http://www.globalpolicy.org/ngos/ngo-un/accessindex.htm>.

this is clearly formalised through, often very detailed, contractual service arrangements and memoranda of understanding. Cooperation is very concrete and results-oriented. At headquarters, on the other hand, relations are less defined, and often based on informal ad-hoc arrangements which often comprise less tangible outputs such as an exchange of information or expertise or a normative and weak influence on agenda-setting and activities. The latter is often closer to a moral oversight function than to a mutual cooperation or partnership.

It is important to bear in mind that the NGO network analysed in this study carries some weight and is well known and respected, but even the influence of such a relatively important group of NGOs, at least at UN headquarters, is limited and it can only be effective when there is some overlap of interest with member states and the UN in such issue-areas as development and peace and security. It is also important to note that these very different organisations mobilise around UN agendas and events and in this respect the UN fulfils an important function in civil society mobilisation.

## **4.5 Conclusion**

### **4.5.1 What Does the Empirical Evidence Mean for Network Analysis in IR**

Social network analysis can be applied successfully whenever informal structures or relationships determine organisations and politics. It can find practical application in such areas as the study of international organisations, diplomacy and negotiations. It allows for a systematic structural analysis of all actors in international politics, how they are connected and what these connections mean for international relations.

The emphasis on the importance of informal personal relationships in the work of the UN call for a scientific approach which takes this aspect into account.

Contrary to Keck and Sikkink (1998), a social network analysis is not particularly costly or time-consuming compared to other quantitative and qualitative methods. With the right preparation, identification of contacts through internet sites and list servers, interviews can be conducted via



telephone or in writing with a standardised questionnaire, which keeps costs and the investment of time and staff resources to a minimum.

Networks are often assumed to be unstable and ephemeral, but the network analysed here has been very stable and evolving over the last ten years. The reasons for this development are manifold. Firstly, the individuals in the network know each other personally, often for a very long time. The spatial proximity creates more frequent and better opportunity structures for interaction. The NGOs share common political interests and often even come from a similar social and cultural background. They also share the UN and the agenda of the organisation to mobilise around. All of these elements, in addition to a high level of trust led to a sustainable and functional network which has been able to expand its relations with the UN to a certain degree.

#### **4.5.2 What Does the Empirical Evidence Mean for such Concepts as Global Governance and Global Civil Society**

What is strangely absent in the network examined here is the global. There are only very few isolated mentions of contacts who are not located in New York. It mostly consists of Americans, and it is firmly rooted in the American culture and society. The structure of the network is local, however, many of the issues taken up by it are international and global in nature. The local composition is an indicator for weak global interconnectedness of this particular community. Truly global networks would be needed to address the global agenda of the UN. In some issue-areas such transnational networks surely exist, as for example around the Millennium Development Goals through the globally active Millennium Campaign, or human rights through the activities of Amnesty International around the world. It also seems to indicate that it is easier to mobilise locally than globally, even in a more and more globalised world.

If one accepts NGOs as actors in global governance, one would probably have to see their structure as a conglomerate of local and national organisations with some international linkages to either organisations abroad or to other networks who are operating globally. Global governance in terms of NGO involvement is thus far from being global. The fact that the

geographical distribution of accredited NGOs at the UN is not global confirms this. Southern NGOs are still underrepresented at the UN when it comes to accreditation numbers and participation in meetings and events, although efforts are being made to achieve a geographical balance.

One can draw analogue conclusions for the concept of global civil society. Global linkages between civil societies seem relatively weak and rare which make concept of a transnational civil society more realistic. Seeing the limitations of the global nature of NGO participation at the UN, one can conclude that it does not interfere with the sovereignty of states as put forward by Lipschutz (1992).

One main conclusion is that the activities of NGOs often do not contribute to the explanation of normative and theoretical concepts such as global civil society and global governance. The UN might be seen as a place for global governance, but it is limited to member states, largely without the participation of NGOs, especially without NGOs from developing countries.

This also confirms a state-centric traditional view in which NGOs have no particular role to play and international organisations are part of an institutionalised relationship between states and their governments. Bearing this in mind, a look at the influence of NGOs on governments at the national level could present a more complete picture.

An empirical analysis of the interaction of NGOs with other international organisations, such as the World Bank, the World Trade Organisation, the International Labour Organisation, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and the European Union could provide a more complete picture in order to be able to operationalise global governance and global civil society, among other elements, through the participation of NGOs in international organisations. Given the lack of a major mobilisation of civil societies or mass protests, one could expect to find a similar situation there.

## 5 Case Studies

### 5.1 Introduction. Empirical Findings of the Case Studies

Different UN processes show a varying degree of NGO involvement and thus the influence of NGOs also varies from process to process with different outcomes.

Below four case studies taken from two core areas of the work of the UN, development and security, will be examined. These case studies are: financing for development, sustainable development, the reform of the Security Council and the evolution of targeted sanctions.

It has to be borne in mind that these processes have been chosen because of their innovative mechanisms for NGO and civil society participation and the tangible impact NGOs had. They are by no means representative of the relationship between the UN and NGOs as a whole and have to be seen as exceptions. They thus confirm the patchy nature of cooperation between the UN and civil society and its limited influence. It has to be borne in mind that the most important organs of the UN, the Security Council and the General Assembly, have no formal, institutionalised arrangements for the participation of NGOs.

With the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and the follow-up to the financing for development and sustainable development processes, development issues touch all areas of UN activities. This trend will grow even stronger over the next few years with the implementation of the MDGs. With ongoing crises in the Middle East and Africa, security issues and how to deal with them appropriately on a multilateral level are high on the agenda of the United Nations.

On the system level the organisation has to deal with questions regarding the appropriate structure of the relevant body, namely the Security Council. Questions on equitable representation and expansion have often been posed but not answered so far. It is legitimate to ask how to structure the Security Council in order to make the body more suitable to deal with the present challenges and NGOs are asking many questions and made many recommendations in this context.

On a more instrumental level the UN has to find ways to improve its tools on how to deal with threats to collective security and violent regimes. The tool of sanctions has to be improved so that it becomes more efficient and targeted. Here NGOs have also made a variety of suggestions for improvement.

### 5.1.1 Financing for Development

Traditional ways of funding development aid have not been successful over the last decades. Official development assistance (ODA) has still not reached the levels agreed upon on many occasions. Foreign direct investment does not benefit the poorest of the poor as expected. New ways to fund development aid had to be found. In this situation the Financing for Development Division of the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs turned to civil society representatives to ask for their input. The initiative of the Department allowed civil society better access to UN meetings and staff, and thus brought about opportunities for interaction and cooperation. A trusted and innovative relationship between the UN and civil society ensued in this area. It was hoped that innovative proposals like the Tobin tax could also find some support at the UN in order to be able to generate more funds. The questionnaire which was distributed to NGOs and other civil society actors yielded many new suggestions. Although still far from being realised, now even some proposals regarding international taxes find the support of a few member states.<sup>80</sup>

Questions regarding funding are the first to be addressed when discussing development strategies. Issues relevant here include international financial flows, official development assistance (ODA), foreign direct investment and the mobilisation of domestic resources.

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<sup>80</sup> In recent years there has been some progress on the issue of international taxes. France and Chile started implementing air ticket taxes in 2006. This development came about in the context of the Brazilian anti-poverty campaign. Detailed information on this initiative can be found under <http://www.globalpolicy.org/socecon/glotax/general/index.htm>.

These are questions which are raised not only at the UN, but also in cooperation with the Bretton Woods Institutions (BWIs), as for example during the yearly Spring meetings between the UN and the BWIs. NGOs and other civil society actors seek to provide input for these processes.<sup>81</sup> Civil society actors not only fight for and advocate higher levels of ODA, but they also fight for alternative ways of generating the required funds. They proposed different forms of international taxes like the Tobin tax and a carbon tax. International taxes are highly contested at the UN and among member states and only find a few supporters. NGOs also call for a comprehensive reform of architecture of international organisations which are dealing with these issues, and they demand a higher level of transparency and accountability of the international financial institutions.

The Financing for Development process culminated with the conference on this matter in 2002 in Monterrey, Mexico. The preparatory process with the involvement of NGOs will be presented here. Given the often close and restricted nature of UN meetings, the involvement of civil society in the preparatory process and the conference itself was innovative and allowed for greater civil society contributions.

In March 1998 the Second Committee of the General Assembly met to provide an opportunity for delegations to give their initial views on topics that should be addressed in the preparatory process. They also suggested key groups of stakeholders that they wished the Secretariat to contact on their behalf to obtain ideas, research studies and other inputs that could benefit the preparatory process. NGOs were among these stakeholders.

During the Spring and Summer of 1998, the Bureau of the Second Committee hosted a series of informal briefings for delegations, the Secretariat, media and NGOs. These informal briefings provided delegations with the opportunity to examine a number of issues relating to financing for development in an open and reflective manner.

In July 1998 Kofi Annan also promoted the cooperation between the World Bank, the IMF and UNCTAD at the high-level segment of ECOSOC.

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<sup>81</sup> There is limited civil society participation in these meetings. A handful of civil society representatives are allowed to make statements, as recorded in this 2007 ECOSOC press release: <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs//2007/ecosoc6262.doc.htm>.

In Fall 1998, the delegations in the Second Committee held an open debate on the establishment of the Ad-Hoc Open-ended Working Group. Subsequently the General Assembly adopted by consensus resolution 53/173 which called for the Ad Hoc Open-ended Working Group to determine the “agenda, form and scope” of the high level event. In 1999, this Working Group on Financing for Development was mandated by the General Assembly to undertake an in-depth examination of all the inputs received and to formulate a report for the next session of the General Assembly on the “agenda, scope, and form” of the final event.

Unprecedented in UN-NGO relations, NGOs were allowed to make statements before the Ad Hoc Working Group on Financing for Development. One of the NGOs giving a presentation in front of this forum was the Quaker United Nations Office represented by Lori Henninger. She promoted a broad view on this issue suggesting that issues of peace and development would have to be addressed simultaneously in order to be dealt with successfully. In February 1999 NGOs also addressed the Vice-Chairpersons H.E. Kamalesh of India and H.E. Sucharipa of Austria of the Working Group in a letter requesting “the fullest possible NGO participation” and stating that “a high level of transparency and participation would strengthen the process” (Ad Hoc Open-Ended Working Group on Financing for Development 1999). This unprecedented access, participation and interaction laid the ground for the impact civil society had in terms of a more comprehensive approach which is oriented towards the implementation of previous commitments.

The first working session of the Ad Hoc Working Group (9 – 11 February 1999) was opened with statements by the Secretary-General, the President of the General Assembly and the President of ECOSOC. In March the Working Group scheduled eight informal sessions to review the major issues. Before these informal consultations took place, there were two public events. On 15 March 1999, a panel brought together two business leaders and two NGO leaders who addressed selected issues. The panelists were from Deutsche Bank, Lehman Brother, the Center of Concern and the Fifty Years is Enough Coalition. On the afternoon of the same day, the Vice-Chairpersons of the Working Group and delegations

held an open dialogue with members of the ECOSOC accredited NGO community on the forthcoming series of informal discussions. The first set of informal sessions on the high-level event took place from 16 to 19 March 1999.

A further panel discussion was held on 1 April 1999. The participants came from the International Center for Law in Development, Israel Infinity Venture Capital Fund, Department of Government at Harvard University and the Center for International Environmental Law (CIEL). From 5 to 8 April 1999 the Working Group held its second set of informal discussions. On 30 April a second dialogue with civil society was held.

On 4 May 1999 the Working Group held its third informal session. A preliminary listing of major related forums and processes was distributed to delegations at the third session. There were again informal meetings from 12 – 14 May which were concluded by the request of the Vice-Chairpersons to Mr. Libran Cabactulan (Minister of the Republic of the Philippines) to facilitate negotiations on the draft report to the General Assembly. From 20 to 26 May the facilitator convened working sessions on the possible agenda and scope of the 2001 consultation.

Following these consultations the Working Group adopted its report which included recommendations to the General Assembly on inter alia the “agenda, form and scope” of the event to be held in 2001.

At the Preparatory Committee’s March 2000 organisational session, the Bureau of the Prepcom presented its report on the possible modalities for all stakeholders in the FfD process. This report followed the January 2000 report on the same subject by the Secretary-General. At its conclusion, the Preparatory Committee agreed to move forward with the intergovernmental consultations with the World Bank, the IMF and the WTO, schedule a series of meetings to advance the substantive work of the Prepcom, and set in motion arrangements for the involvement of NGOs and the private sector.<sup>82</sup>

On 12 May 2000 the Bureau convened open-ended informal consultations on the agenda of the 2001 event. On May 18 the Bureau hosted a briefing open to all interested delegations and accredited NGOs.

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<sup>82</sup> The arrangements have been approved in General Assembly resolution 54/279.

From 30 May to June 2000 the Preparatory Committee met to consider the second report of the Bureau and the progress report by the FfD co-ordinating Secretariat.

In October 2000 the FfD Preparatory Committee met to review and approve the list of NGOs to be accredited to the FfD process and the list of participants in the hearings.

The General Assembly welcomed the business and civil society hearings and appreciated the outcome.

In February 2001 the Secretary-General informed heads of state and government on the status of the FfD process. The initial replies indicated a high level of commitment to the political process.

The second session of the Preparatory Committee took place from 12 to 23 February 2001 and the third session concluded in October of the same year. In summary, civil society participation was allowed in the following events during the preparatory process: NGOs were accredited to the organisational session, and the second, third and fourth session. In addition, hearings with civil society took place in November 2000.

The International Conference on Financing for Development was held from 18 to 22 March 2002 in Monterrey, Mexico. It was the first United Nations hosted conference to address key financial and development issues. The conference was attended by fifty heads of state or governments, over 200 ministers as well as leaders from the private sector and civil society, and senior officials of all the major intergovernmental financial, trade, economic and monetary organisations.

The Monterrey Conference also marked the first quadripartite exchange of views between governments, civil society, the business community, and the institutional stakeholders on global economic issues. These discussions involved over 800 participants in twelve separate roundtables. The Summit heard statements from the organisers of the Civil Society Forum, the International Business Forum and the Parliamentarians Forum. Major new announcements on ODA levels were made by the European Union and the United States. The outcome document, the Monterrey Consensus, was adopted by acclamation at the summit segment of the conference.



The participants in the roundtables consisted of forty-eight government delegations, eight institutional stakeholders, seven civil society and seven business sector representatives.

Over fifty-five side-events took place during the conference week. Participants in these seminars and workshops were invited to submit their statements for the FfD website. There were also four independent forums on Financing for Development. The Civil Society Forum took place from 14 to 16 March 2002. In addition, Parliamentarian, Local Authorities, and International Business Fora took place during the conference.

As a follow-up to the conference the UN, the World Bank and the IMF with the WTO should address issues of coherence, coordination and cooperation. These meetings should include an intergovernmental segment to address an agenda agreed on by the participating organisations, as well as a dialogue with civil society and the private sector.

From the Monterrey conference, six key interrelated thematic areas emerged which continue to guide current FfD models. These six areas include the mobilisation of domestic financial resources, the mobilisation of international private resources, trade, international financial cooperation (mostly in the form of ODA), external debt relief, and systematic issues related to coherence and consistency. The outcome document from the Monterrey conference included a number of important action points, however the broad consensus reached at the conference was that in order to be most effective, FfD must address the effective use of trade and investment opportunities to help countries fight poverty while also fostering a holistic and coherent approach involving the collaboration of all relevant entities. The conference also underscored the importance of increased trade liberalisation and its benefits to emerging economies.<sup>83</sup>

As already mentioned above, prior to the Monterrey conference, an NGO Forum was held at the same venue from 14-16 March 2002. A general consensus was reached at this forum that NGOs would play an important role in the implementation of follow-up measures agreed upon at the

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<sup>83</sup> Financing for Development – Building on Monterrey. DESA :New York 2002.

Monterrey conference, both in their role in encouraging government action within each particular NGOs relevant domain or area or expertise, and also as partners that would work with governments and assist their work in successfully reaching Millennium Development Goals. These organisations are not part of the Monterrey Consensus reached by member states, they instead issued what is known as the Monterrey Declaration which includes alternative proposals to those agreed upon in the Monterrey Consensus.

Key points from the Monterrey Declaration include:

- Human rights, as they are included in the Human Rights instruments of the United Nations and the ILO, should be the overarching framework and the objective to which these institutions, the World Bank, the IMF, the WTO should be accountable to.
- Currency transaction taxes must be collected as a means of financing development and as a means of stabilising the international financial system.
- The framework of any financial support should include the principles of accountability, transparency, good governance and democratic civil society participation.
- No conditionality in ODA, debt and national development plans.

Since the release of the Monterrey Declaration and the reaching of the Monterrey Consensus, much has been done to implement Financing for Development programs, and a great deal of this work has involved the active participation of relevant NGOs and members of civil society.

One pertinent cooperative effort between governments and civil society is the Cities Alliance which operates out of the World Bank Headquarters in Washington D.C. Complied of members from Brazil, Canada, Ethiopia, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Sweden, South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The main objective of the alliance is to bring cities together for dialogue with bilateral and multilateral agencies and financial institutions in the hopes of developing sustainable capital investment strategies.<sup>84</sup>

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<sup>84</sup> Meeting Report, Regional Multi-Stakeholder Consultation on "Financing Access to Basic Utilities for All", 11-13 December 2006. Brasilia, Brazil.

Another important effort along this same vein has been the establishment of the Public Fund for Compulsory Saving (FGTS) established by the Government of Brazil. The FGTS was created with dual purposes in mind, both as a safety net that would provide insurance to dismissed urban workers and also as a means to fund important updates and expansions to critical urban infrastructures such as water, sanitation, and housing. It is notable however, that only portions of the FGTS have been distributed as of January 2006.<sup>85</sup>

Perhaps the most important civil society group to engage in the Finance for Development process has been The New Rules for Global Finance Coalition which is comprised of NGOs and academics. At the forefront of this organisation's work have been efforts to advocate for increased coherence among global financial institutions. In the time period leading up to the 2005 World Summit, New Rules held informal consultations from November 2004 to September 2005. From these consultations, a number of key areas of deficiency were highlighted including the need to integrate all development funding and initiatives and to tailor them to specific country situations; the need for increased input from African countries in the decision making boards of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund; the need for universal access to banking and financial services; the need for more symmetry and balance within the World Trade Organisation, especially for those in developing nations who are often left out of bilateral and regional consultations where important decisions are reached; and increased representation within the OECD by developing countries, which often go unrepresented.

In preparation for the 2005 World Summit, The New Rules for Global Finance Coalition made eighteen core recommendations for heads of state, representing the most significant collaboration of NGO's and civil society members in the Finance for Development arena to date.<sup>86</sup>

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<sup>85</sup> Report on the Expert Group Meeting on "Financing Basic Utilities for All". 26-27 June 2006. New York, NY.

<sup>86</sup> Final Report and Recommendations derived from Multi-Stakeholder Consultations Organized by New Rules for Global Finance Coalition. 14-16 September 2005.

The question of appropriate levels of NGO intervention in Finance for Development schemes, as well as generally has been a pointed subject of debate in many academic circles. Habib and Kotze (2003) suggested that “NGOs’ role in the present order can only but be seen as useful fig leaves to cover government inaction or indifference to human suffering.” However, NGOs play more than just a token role in keeping development programs focused and rather shoulder an essential role in keeping governments accountable in their execution of development agendas. A clear example of important civil society contributions towards development was the collaboration of the World Bank together with academics from the Universities of Cape Town and Stellenbosch, and other research organisations in formulating and executing South Africa’s Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) policy in conjunction with the ANC directly after the fall of apartheid. These organisations made tangible contributions to re-development on a massive scale and speak to the continued importance of civil society engagement in development programs such as Finance for Development.

In addition to the NGOs already mentioned above, a wide range of other organisations and actors are engaged in the Financing for Development process. They include trade unions, universities, foundations and other international organisations such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. One important organisation representing the trade unions is the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU).<sup>87</sup> The ICFTU does not only deal with issues of labour rights, human rights, poverty reduction and globalisation, but also with general issues pertaining to the work of the UN such as access for external actors, reform and governance. Although the ICFTU is not a core player in the network analysed in chapter four, it is certainly a key actor in terms of engagement and active participation in UN meetings and events.<sup>88</sup> Universities engaged in the FfD process include for example Oxford University and American University.

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<sup>87</sup> For more information on ICFTU see <http://www.icftu.org>.

<sup>88</sup> Although the ICFTU is strictly speaking not an NGO, since its membership consists of trade unions, it is recognised by the UN as an NGO and accredited with ECOSOC as an umbrella organisation.

The Friedrich Ebert Foundation (FES) has been a key player in the process, especially in the follow-up to the Monterrey Conference and in the organisation of multi-stakeholder dialogues. FES functions as a broker and continues to bring NGOs and civil society organisations together for meetings and the preparation of policy papers. Other important NGOs involved in the process and its multi-stakeholder dialogues include Center of Concern and the North-South Institute. Center of Concern mainly promotes global economic and social justice and democratic economic policy-making.<sup>89</sup> The North-South Institute is an independent, non-governmental research institute.<sup>90</sup> Its key areas of work include finance, debt, development, trade, labour, migration, governance and civil society.

As can be seen from the NGOs mentioned above, there is no direct overlap with the New York network of NGOs. Sometimes all of these organisations come together to present their common position on major issues on the UN agenda, as for example in response to the UN system-wide coherence initiative, which affects many different fields of activity of the UN, such as women, environment, peacekeeping, and a unified UN presence at the field level.

FfD NGOs often concentrate on finance and economic and global justice issues, and they are therefore often more involved in the work of the international finance institutions such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Trade Organization, rather than at the UN. This explains their absence in the network analysed in this study.

### **5.1.2 Sustainable Development**

The concept of sustainable development brings together different economic, social and environmental aspects to address problems of globalisation like environmental degradation, lack of access to water and sanitation, and missing or insufficient economic and social rights.

Ten years after the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development the situation needs to be re-assessed and the progress of the

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<sup>89</sup> More information on the organisation can be found at <http://www.coc.org>.

<sup>90</sup> More information on the organisation can be found at <http://www.nsi-ins.ca>.

Agenda 21 was due to be evaluated at the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg in 2002.

Broad public participation in the implementation is a fundamental prerequisite of sustainable development. Agenda 21 thus recognises the specific roles of nine major civil society groups in distinct chapters: women, children and youth, indigenous people, non-governmental organisations, local authorities, workers and trade unions, business and industry, scientific and technological communities and farmers.

Agenda 21 also stipulates the need for new forms of participation at all levels to enable a broad-based engagement of all economic and social sectors in making sustainable development happen. This may include, but is not limited to, participation in identifying problems, designing and applying solutions and monitoring results, as well as having access to information on all types of sustainable development issues and activities. Paragraph 23.2, Chapter 23, Section III of Agenda 21 specifies this broad-based engagement of civil society.

Civil society participation is thus integrated in the implementation of the programme. This integration can be explained by the broad interest of the public in these issues and the strengths and influence of related social movements, such as the labour and environmental movements.

However, these major group categories are problematic. They put very different groups, e.g. NGOs, business pressure groups, and grassroots organisations under one big umbrella. NGOs have to go through lengthy accreditation procedures whereas the other groups are able to obtain accreditation more easily through this sustainable development process. There is also some potential overlap between these groups. The major groups of women, children and youth and scientific and technological communities can also include organisations which are formally registered and accredited as NGOs. Participation of civil society is considered desirable, but once again the UN approach lacks precision in specifying and defining the relevant groups.

Chapter 27 of the Agenda 21 deals with the role of non-governmental organisations in sustainable development. It requests a strengthened role of non-governmental organisations as partners for sustainable development.

The reason for this request is the, as perceived by many, vital role NGOs play in the shaping and implementation of participatory democracy. Society, governments and international bodies should develop mechanisms to allow NGOs to play their partnership role responsibly and effectively. With a view to strengthen the role of NGOs as social partners the UN and governments should initiate a process, in consultation with NGOs, to review formal procedures and mechanisms for the involvement of NGOs at all levels from policy-making and decision-making to implementation. The UN system should draw on the expertise and views of NGOs in policy and program formulation and implementation and evaluation. It should also provide access to accurate and timely data and information.

Participatory approaches are one of the main features of the sustainable development process.

Representatives from all major groups, including NGOs, participated in the four Preparatory Committees. The tenth session of the UN Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD) acted as global Preparatory Committee (Prepcom) for the Johannesburg Summit. Participation meant access for major groups and provided them with opportunities to shape the process and to provide inputs to make it more inclusive.

More than 8,000 participants representing accredited major groups attended the World Summit on Sustainable Development. Their views and experiences were presented at thematic panels, high-level roundtable discussions, multi-stakeholder dialogues, side events and briefings and through statements made from the floor. There were also a multitude of independent parallel events.

The WSSD preparatory process was based on the participatory practices of the Commission on Sustainable Development and provided representatives of accredited organisations opportunities to contribute to the work of the Prepcom. Multi-stakeholder dialogue segments were held during the second and fourth Prepcoms and involved participants from all nine major groups.

On the final day of the conference a high-level multi-stakeholder event took place whereby major groups reiterated their commitment to continue their work in the field of sustainable development. Throughout the official process more than 250 partnership initiatives were announced. The concept of

partnership within the framework of the sustainable development process will be elaborated in detail later on in this chapter.

Multi-stakeholder dialogues are a unique feature of the Commission on Sustainable Development's participatory mechanisms. These dialogues enable direct interactions between governments and major groups on specific topics, and have been increasingly accepted as part of the intergovernmental process, rather than as an ancillary event taking place on the margins of negotiations. They provide opportunities for major groups to express their concerns and discuss them with governments. Such exchanges help to promote meaningful participation of major groups in the intergovernmental decision-making process. Preparations for multi-stakeholder dialogues are also conducted in a multi-stakeholder environment through a steering committee composed of key major groups networks and the CSD Secretariat.

A multi-stakeholder panel was held at the beginning of Prepcom I in April 2001 at UN Headquarters in New York to allow major group representatives to present the views of their constituencies at the organisational discussions. Statements were made by representatives of each major group and a report on the expected contributions of major groups to the WSSD was submitted for consideration at Prepcom II.

A two-day multi-stakeholder dialogue including representatives from all major groups was held during the course of Prepcom II (28 January – 8 February 2002, UN Headquarters, New York). Dialogue papers were submitted by each major group to the meeting addressing the issue of sustainable development implementation. The third Prepcom (25 March – 5 April 2002, UN Headquarters, New York) did not include a multi-stakeholder dialogue segment. During Prepcom IV (27 May – 7 June 2002, Bali) another two-day multi-stakeholder-dialogue took place, including all major groups and focusing on capacity building and partnerships for implementation. Again, dialogue papers were submitted for discussion.

At the World Summit on Sustainable Development (24 August – 4 September 2002, Johannesburg) major groups were invited to participate in a number of plenary sessions and other official events.

Despite strong civil society participation in the event, NGOs were mostly



disappointed with the outcome of the conference since it did not build on the achievements of Agenda 21.

Partnerships for sustainable development – voluntary, multi-stakeholder initiatives aimed at implementing sustainable development – were an important complementary outcome of the World Summit on Sustainable Development. At its 11<sup>th</sup> session in May 2003, the Commission on Sustainable Development reaffirmed that these partnerships contribute to the implementation of intergovernmental commitments, recognising that partnerships are a complement to, not a substitute for, intergovernmental commitments. This statement shows that partnerships with civil society organisations are still subordinate to the governmental actors and are not an end in itself but only valuable and admissible if asked for and agreed upon by member states.

Although governments recognised and encouraged the relevance of partnerships for sustainable development by referring to them 46 times throughout the WSSD Programme of Implementation, unfortunately, even in this context the term partnership and its meaning is not much elaborated.

The partnership initiatives are completely voluntary, may take various forms, and there is no formal selection process.

DESA maintains a database and registry of partnerships on their website. The CSD Partnerships database was first launched in February 2004, in response to a request from the Commission on Sustainable Development at its 11<sup>th</sup> session. The information contained in this online resource is based on voluntary self-reports from registered partners. A majority of these initiatives were initiated in the context of the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development and its follow-up. Member states often expressed their satisfaction with the partnership concept because of its inclusion of multiple stakeholders and its transparent presentation in the database.

An analysis of these partnerships in May 2006<sup>91</sup> showed the following characteristics. 1293 NGOs are involved in partnerships. The vast majority of partnerships cover Africa, and Asia and the Pacific. Most of them are global in

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<sup>91</sup> For more information see the DSD website:  
<http://webapps01.un.org/dsd/partnerships/public/welcome.do>.

scope. Primary themes are education, the change of unsustainable patterns of consumption and production, energy for sustainable development, the development of an institutional framework for sustainable development, means of implementation (trade, finance, technology transfer), and protecting the managing the natural resource base of economic and social development.

The relevance of these partnerships remain limited to the operational level and, despite their success, they did not contribute to a strengthened role for civil society in UN policy-making, but they are rather an extension of the work of the UN and a tool for implementation.

Important NGOs involved in the sustainable development process in a meaningful and ongoing way include the Northern Alliance for Sustainable Development (ANPED), Third World Network (TWN), Environment Liaison Centre International, Women and Environment and Development Organization (WEDO), and Sustainable Development Issues Network (SDIN). With the exception of WEDO and TWN the organisations all have a strong focus on sustainable development and the environment. There is not much overlap with the network examined in chapter four. WEDO and TWN are once again the exceptions. They have been mentioned once in the survey of the New York network. The reasons for this are most likely the broader focus of their work and their good reputation at the UN and across the world, which is especially true for TWN. WEDO is also located in New York which makes communication and cooperation with the other organisations easier.

When comparing the financing for development and sustainable development processes, the latter appears to be stronger in terms of NGO and civil society participation and inclusion through the implementation of Agenda 21 and the partnership concept which is, on the operational level, relatively successful and well respected in this context.

Both processes had to struggle with the inclusion of multiple external actors and each found a different mechanism to deal with them. In Financing for Development it was the multi-stakeholder dialogues which brought NGOs, civil society, the private sector and governments together in meetings and briefings. In sustainable development the partnership model was introduced

for the nine major groups which produced more tangible results than the multi-stakeholder dialogues in FfD, and which are well documented in the database run by the DESA Division for Sustainable Development.

The participation of different external actors led to some contentious discussions on the roles and responsibilities of the different groups. NGOs criticised in particular that the private sector was allowed to sit with them at the same table. Concerns were voiced over the potential for undue influence exercised by the private sector with all its riches, and NGOs called for specific regulations for the participation of the private sector beyond the ten non-binding principles of the Global Compact Office.<sup>92</sup> It points to the need for a clear definition of the rules and responsibilities for all external actors involved in the work of the UN. So far such a definition only really exists for NGOs through ECOSOC.

In conclusion these two UN processes were relatively successful in including NGOs and other external actors, but these success stories did not translate into a broader expansion of NGO rights or participation in the Economic and Social Council or the General Assembly. This shows that NGO participation is easier to achieve in processes which concentrate on one issue and which do not set a precedent for a stronger NGO participation in general.

### **5.1.3 Security Council Reform**

Over the last thirty years the composition and the working methods have been a recurring theme in UN reform efforts and contentious debates about the work of the Council. The size and composition of the Council and the veto power are among the most discussed reform issues, and among those which have not been successful so far despite many efforts and attempts at the reform of the Council. A more equitable representation of member states and more transparent working methods are often recommended to make it more effective and accountable.

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<sup>92</sup> Some of these concerns were eloquently expressed in this article of March 2001: <http://www.globalpolicy.org/reform/2001/0504skep.htm>. NGOs often bring forward that companies do not share the values represented by the UN, and often are at the root of global problems such as human rights violations and environmental degradation.

NGOs took a strong interest in the work of the Council and often lobbied for more transparency and participation in its work.

One example for the NGO interest and cooperation between a member state and NGOs is the case of Italy's intervention. Italy felt threatened by the prospect that Germany could become a member in an expanded Security Council and Italy would thus become an outsider in the EU with regard to Security Council membership. Through several meetings and the exchange of positions on this issue, the Italian Ambassador Fulci decided to side with Global Policy Forum, a leading NGO from the NGO Working Group on the Security Council. The Italian position gained legitimacy through the NGO support. Now Fulci would not only be seen as a diplomat pushing for the Italian proposal but as somebody who was searching for a reasonable independent solution regardless of national interest. The NGOs gained in return the support of a member state giving their voice more power. The Italian Permanent Mission even put a link to Global Policy Forum on their website promoting the common proposal. Of course, this could also be qualified as an instance where an NGO has been co-opted for a national proposal but it also opened some doors of Permanent Missions for NGOs.<sup>93</sup>

Proposals for Security Council reform concern mostly the composition of the Council, its working methods and the veto power of the five permanent members.

NGOs mostly agree that the Security Council must become more open, democratic, consistent and accountable, and less a geopolitical instrument of the major powers.

In 1993 the General Assembly decided to establish an Open-ended Working Group to consider all aspects of the question of increase of the membership of the Security Council and other matters related to the Council. In 2000 heads of state and government adopted the UN Millennium Declaration, by which they resolve, *inter alia*, "to intensify our efforts to achieve a

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<sup>93</sup> Information obtained during discussions with the director of Global Policy Forum in 1998.

comprehensive reform of the Security Council in all its aspects".<sup>94</sup> In 2002 the General Assembly decided that the Open-ended Working Group should continue its work and submit a report to the Assembly. From 14 to 16 October 2002 the General Assembly then considered the question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and other matters related to the Security Council.

The Working Group considered the decision-making process in the Security Council, the expansion of the Council, as well as its working methods and the transparency of its work.

As of June 2003 the Working Group noted that a provisional agreement had been reached on a large number of issues, but pointed out that substantial differences remained.

This unresolved issue of the Security Council reform triggered quite a number of reform proposals from delegations and NGOs alike and some examples will be presented here.

One prominent example comes from Ambassador Razali of Malaysia who chaired the Working Group in 1997. His reform paper noted that the effectiveness, credibility and legitimacy of the work of the Council depend on its representative character. To achieve this end he underlined that the members of the Security Council should be elected with due regard to their records of various contributions to international peace and security and to geographical distribution.

Razali therefore suggested increasing the membership of the Council from fifteen to twenty-four by adding five permanent and four non-permanent members. The five new permanent members should be elected according to the following pattern: one from the developing states of Africa, one from the developing states of Asia, one from the developing states of Latin America and the Caribbean, and two from industrialised states. The four new non-permanent members should consist of one member from Africa, one from Asia, one from Eastern Europe, and one from Latin America and the Caribbean.

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<sup>94</sup> Please see the Millennium Declaration, paragraph 30, at <http://www.un.org/millennium/declaration/ares552e.htm>.

In order to facilitate the effective functioning of the Council, the use of veto should be discouraged. The new permanent members should have no provision of the veto power. Many member states consider the use of veto anachronistic and undemocratic and called for its elimination. This request corresponds with the demands of many NGOs who see the veto as a relic from the time after the Second World War.

Razali suggested a number of recommendations on how to enhance the transparency of the Council. He recommended for example the institutionalisation of consultations between the President of the Security Council and the President of the General Assembly, greater recourse to open meetings, greater use of the International Court of Justice and greater use of the Arria formula to facilitate consultations. Razali was open to the expansion of consultations with NGOs which is shown in his support for the Arria formula, and he was largely seen as friendly and supportive by NGOs.

Of course, there were a multitude of other proposals for Security Council reform. Nordic countries, for example, took an initiative in the early nineties to broaden consultations with troop contributors. Well known in this context are the efforts of Japan and Germany to become members of the Security Council. This proposal had the support of the United States, Britain and France, but many other countries opposed it.

It is an obvious imbalance in the composition of the Council that four of the five permanent members are Northern and industrialised countries. Nigeria, Brazil and India would like to become permanent members and have campaigned actively for seats. But their regional rivals are staunchly opposed for a myriad of reasons.

Most reformers want to increase the size of the Council to enable it to be more representative of different regions, countries of different sizes and other criteria of diversity which are characteristic of the UN as an organisation. Some member states, like the United States, Britain and France, prefer a careful approach to the expansion of the Council. They argue that a larger Council would become awkward and inefficient - regardless of other contributing factors like the veto and hierarchical power structures.

In order to avoid the ineffective use and even abuse of the Council, reformers proposed different systems of checks and balances. Citizen representatives could monitor the work of the Council. The World Federalists and others even suggested directly elected citizen assembly. Although this alternative is not very realistic, NGOs might be able to put outside pressure on the Council and its members. The NGO Working Group on the Security Council might be able to play such a role.<sup>95</sup>

Early in 1995, James Paul of Global Policy Forum assembled a small group of NGOs in New York to organise an "NGO Working Group on the Security Council." The founders included Amnesty International, Earth Action, the Lawyers Committee for Nuclear Policy, the World Council of Churches and the World Federalist Movement. The new Working Group was conceived as a forum to discuss Council reform. It was agreed that Paul would serve as Chair and that Global Policy Forum would organise the Group's activities. The Group in this phase sought to attract as many NGO members as possible and it envisaged holding large public meetings. In 1995 it held two public meetings of this type, but it also organised several private meetings with delegates to seek advice and support. Ambassadors Razali Ismail of Malaysia and Colin Keating of New Zealand - both recent Council members - especially encouraged the group during this phase. Beginning in early 1996, the Group decided to organise dialogues between NGOs and Council members, while not entirely abandoning reform questions. The Working Group approached Ambassador Juan Somavia of Chile, who had just joined the Council. He expressed strong interest and he eventually agreed to speak to a public NGO meeting during his presidency of the Council in April. In May, the Working Group organised another public meeting with Council Ambassador Nabil Elaraby of Egypt. Later in the year, in early November, the Working Group organised a meeting with several delegations to discuss the annual report of the Council to the General Assembly. This latter meeting was convened with the quiet backing of Ambassador Razali, then

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<sup>95</sup> The members of the NGO Working Group on the Security Council and its Steering Committee can be found in the annex. The Global Policy Forum website provides a transparent overview of the work of the Working Group at <http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/ngowkgrp/index.htm>.

servicing as General Assembly President. It foreshadowed the future format of the Working Group, because the leadership of the Working Group only invited a select group of NGO representatives -- those with special interest and expertise on the Council. Twelve delegates, including four ambassadors, attended this event, along with nineteen NGO representatives. All agreed it was a great achievement. Taking inspiration from that success, Working Group Chair James Paul wrote a letter to incoming Council President Paolo Fulci of Italy in late November, proposing that Council Presidents provide a regular briefing each month to NGOs. The Council took this proposal very seriously and discussed it immediately. In spite of strong advocacy by NGO-friendly delegations, the Council decided that the president should never meet officially with NGOs. As a compromise, the Council agreed that delegates could meet NGOs in their national capacity to report on their views of the work of the Council. At the insistence of some Permanent Members, it was agreed that Council presidents would not meet with NGOs, even in their national capacity. Ambassador Fulci summoned Paul and announced the outcome. He expressed his own regret that the Council had not gone further, proposing that he meet with the Working Group as soon as his presidency was over, to establish the new possibilities opened up by the compromise decision. Subsequently, Paul and the Working Group leadership decided that a limited-member "Consultation Group" should be formed to seek regular meetings with outgoing or incoming Council presidents. They felt that only a group of well-respected organisations, with a clear interest in the Council and an expert representative, could command the attention and time of busy Council ambassadors. Ambassador Fulci met with the Consultation Group in January 1997 in the first of this new series. Paul met privately with other ambassadors to explain the process and persuade them to meet with the group. The Swedish Ambassador agreed, but others were less forthcoming. In early April, Paul met with Ambassador Antonio Monteiro of Portugal, who was just beginning his term as Council President. Monteiro expressed his great enthusiasm for the NGO effort and promised his solid backing. Counsellor Ana Gomes of Portugal, another strong supporter of the NGO effort, soon offered to give the Working Group regular briefings. The first of



this series took place in May, as Gomes provided a report on the Portuguese presidency. In the following months, Gomes continued to provide informative briefings, while she and the ambassador persuaded other Permanent Representatives to meet with the Working Group. The Working Group started to meet with delegates about twice each month, once with the outgoing president and once with Gomes or another delegate. This structure of regular meetings -- or "briefings" as they were often called - set the form for the Working Group (WG) in its later evolution. The meetings typically lasted for an hour and a half, beginning with a statement by the delegate and followed by a question-and-answer period. The NGOs were learning about the Council in this phase and their advocacy role was limited. But some sessions were very lively, particularly those with Gomes, who clearly enjoyed the process. In early September of 1997, Ambassador Monteiro met with Ambassador Bill Richardson of the United States at the beginning of the US Council presidency. Monteiro mentioned to Richardson that he was meeting later in the day with the WG and encouraged Richardson to meet with the group himself. Richardson immediately arranged a breakfast meeting with the group -- during his presidency. He thus partly overturned the understanding that the Council had reached less than a year before. Richardson met the NGOs not as president but as US ambassador ("in his national capacity"), but his gesture proved an important breakthrough. It opened the way for other delegates to follow suit, as Ambassador Somavia did during his presidency the following month (October). A precedent had been set. In 1998, with further help from the Portuguese, the WG met increasingly frequently and enlarged the number of delegations it met, including even the hesitant Chinese. The ambassadors of Portugal, Sweden and Slovenia hosted lunches for the WG during their presidencies, signalling unprecedented support. Informal NGO contacts with delegations grew more routine as NGO members of the WG reached a far higher level of expertise on the inner workings of the Council - a body that functioned mostly in private, behind closed doors. Though the WG had established its closest relations with the Council's elected ("non-permanent") members, it also met and developed cordial relations with all five permanent members as well. In 1998 it became clear that the

“Consultation Group” was synonymous with the Working Group. The Group decided that it must formalise its procedures and its leadership. An election was held in the summer and Paul was confirmed as chair, with Catherine Dumait-Harper of Médecins sans Frontières as Vice-Chair. Six others were elected to form a Steering Group. The Steering Group met to establish membership criteria for new applicants and to consider the future development of the Working Group. During 1999, in spite of the departure of the Portuguese from the Council, the WG further increased the rhythm of its work. No single delegation assumed the role of Portugal, but a number of delegates proved to be strong friends and allies, including Ambassador Robert Fowler of Canada, Ambassador Peter van Walsum of the Netherlands, Ambassador Danilo Türk of Slovenia, and Ambassador Fernando Petrella of Argentina as well as their delegations. The UK, under Ambassador Jeremy Greenstock, adopted a cordial approach, while Ambassador Alain Dejammet of France proved positive as well. China increased its engagement, though slowly. In 1999, delegations also began to invite the working group chairman James Paul to private receptions at the end of their Council presidencies, providing an exceptional opportunity for informal communication. In many other ways, relations deepened between delegations and the WG and its members. Altogether, the WG held 45 events in 1999, 32 of them meetings with Council members. In December, the WG held its first reception, which many delegates attended.

During 2000, the process flourished. Meetings continued at a rapid pace, but NGO advocacy steadily increased. Since the Working Group itself did not take positions on substantive issues, members formed ad hoc groups to work on advocacy topics such as Iraq sanctions, conflict diamonds, and the crises in Angola, Sudan and Sierra Leone. Several NGO groupings wrote letters to the Council. In the Spring, in response to a long campaign by the Working Group, the Council agreed to hold an Arria Formula briefing with NGOs, a step that permanent member delegations had vigorously opposed. Two more Arria briefings followed later in the year. Council members also consulted with NGOs in preparation for thematic debates during their Council presidencies. The tone of interaction between delegations and the WG had changed from formality to an often collegial and friendly

interchange. Information and opinion flowed easily in both directions. The Working Group appeared to be firmly established as part of the Security Council landscape.

The number of meetings with Council member steadily increased over the years from sixteen in 1997 to forty-three in 2006.<sup>96</sup> The number of meetings with senior UN officials increased from zero in 1997 to five in 2006.

There is a high overlap between the members of the Working Group and the members of the network as described and observed in chapter four. In terms of members and content, it can be concluded that the Working Group makes up the stable core of this network. Since the Working Group has been mostly stable in its composition over the years, worked together successfully, and expanded its activities, it contributes to the stability of the whole network showing that networks can be stable over time and do not have to be ephemeral as it is often suggested.

The stability of the working group and the increased number of meetings with representatives from member states and the UN clearly increased its influence.

#### **5.1.4 Targeted UN Sanctions**

The Security Council is mandated to pursue action with respect to threats to peace, breaches of peace and acts of aggression. Sanctions are one tool to pursue this.

There are few restrictions on the types of sanctions the Security Council can mandate for whatever objectives it deems as falling under chapter VII of the Charter. Broad sanctions became contentious after the international community saw their devastating effects on the Iraqi population and after the realisation of the fact that they often do not have the intended effects on the regimes they are trying to influence and improve.

In addition to detrimental humanitarian effects and general questions regarding efficiency, another challenge the UN faced when imposing sanctions was technical implementation. Prompted by a senior UN official in

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<sup>96</sup> Detailed tables and analyses of these meetings can be found at <http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/ngowkgrp/wgmtgs.htm>.

charge of sanctions implementation, the Swiss government was the first to take up this challenge in 1998.

The Swiss Department for Economic Affairs brought together government experts, lawyers, bankers, academic experts and diplomats from New York to discuss the challenges of targeted financial sanctions. In 2001, the Swiss government asked the Watson Institute<sup>97</sup> of Brown University to produce a manual that summarises the main technical results of what was later called the Interlaken Process. The manual analyses the major concepts developed in the context of targeted financial sanctions and contains a large number of practical suggestions on the legal and practical implementation of various types of financial sanctions (e.g. asset freeze, withholding of credits, restrictions of transactions). Participants in the Interlaken Process also developed a sample resolution with a standardised text for possible adoption by the Security Council and formulated a standard enabling law. The purpose of this model is to allow the speedy implementation of UN sanctions by governments without the need to obtain the consent of national parliaments for each particular case.

Taking the Interlaken Process as a starting point, the German Foreign Office agreed to support a series of follow-up meetings, focusing on arms embargoes and travel-related sanctions. Arms embargoes were chosen for the Bonn-Berlin Process as they represent the most frequently used type of UN sanctions. The Foreign Office chose an NGO, the Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC)<sup>98</sup>, to organise the process. The main results and recommendations of the process are contained in a brochure produced by BICC, which was presented, alongside the manual on financial sanctions mentioned above, to the members of the Security Council in October 2001.

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<sup>97</sup> The Watson Institute for International Studies ([www.watsoninstitute.org](http://www.watsoninstitute.org)) is accredited as an NGO with ECOSOC. It has special consultative status since 2005. One of its programmes focuses on global security.

<sup>98</sup> The BICC ([www.bicc.de](http://www.bicc.de)) deals mainly with issues such as arms, peacebuilding and conflict. Its goal is to promote peace and development through the efficient and effective transformation of military-related structures, assets, functions, and processes.

Experts in the Bonn-Berlin Process proposed clearer formulations for the resolutions that set out the obligations for member states, listed requirements for comprehensive implementation by national governments, suggested the improvement of the UN's monitoring capacity, and stressed the importance of technical assistance for states lacking the capacity to enforce UN sanctions.

Already at the final meeting of the Bonn-Berlin Process, the Swedish government announced that it would carry on the deliberations on sanctions reform in the Stockholm Process. Like the German government, it also charged a non-governmental actor with the follow-up process, namely the Department for Peace and Conflict Research at Uppsala University<sup>99</sup> which organised a series of meetings in 2002. The Stockholm Process focused on three implementation-related issues. The first was to improve the operations of the sanctions committees that are normally established as part of a sanctions resolution. The second task was to develop standard government guidelines to implement a number of types of targeted sanctions, including financial sanctions, arms embargoes, travel-related sanctions, and sanctions on selected commodities, such as diamonds. The third issue taken up in the Stockholm Process was the review procedure to identify the proper targets for smart sanctions, to effectively isolate decision-makers and elites responsible for the implicated policies and to be able to react to evasive measures by them.<sup>100</sup>

In addition to a group of liberal countries, such as Canada, Switzerland, Germany and Sweden, NGOs and academic experts have had a major influence on sanction reform. Human Rights Watch (HRW)<sup>101</sup>, for example, has issued a number of reports on the humanitarian impact of sanctions and denounced sanction breakers. Sanctions on conflict diamonds were put on the international agenda by NGOs and they mobilised governments and the

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<sup>99</sup> The Department for Peace and Conflict Research ([www.pcr.uu.se](http://www.pcr.uu.se)) conducts peace research and offers courses in peace and conflict studies.

<sup>100</sup> A good overview can be found in Brozoska's review essay (2003) on the development smart sanctions at the UN.

<sup>101</sup> HRW monitors and analyses the use and effects of sanctions on a regular basis.

public around these issues. Academic experts and representatives of private business participated in the various reform discussions and have also been appointed to expert group monitoring specific embargoes.

The prevalence of academic institutions in the development of the concept of targeted sanctions is striking. However, many NGOs rallied behind the new concept, lobbied for it at the UN and thus gave it more weight and exposure. Global Policy Forum for example, a key organisation in the network, is a strong proponent of targeted sanctions which minimise the negative impact on the general population in the affected countries.<sup>102</sup> Other organisations in the network, as for example the Mennonite Central Committee and the Quaker UN Office, followed suit.<sup>103</sup>

## 5.2 Conclusion

The case studies show that several factors have to come together for NGOs to have an impact in intergovernmental processes at the UN. NGOs have to mobilise around an issue, lobby member states and show their presence at the UN. Formal possibilities for participation of NGOs have to be available and NGOs have to mobilise. All case studies were quite innovative in the way in which they included NGOs and civil society.

Financing for development was the first UN process to consult with NGOs in its conceptual stage. The main contribution of NGOs was in the contribution to the mobilisation for increased ODA and the introduction of international taxes. Civil society analyses also contributed to a better picture of the role of the private sector in development finance.

Sustainable development has a broad range of stakeholders as mandated in the Agenda 21, and thus opened up participation to NGOs and other external actors. This helped to disseminate the ideas of sustainable development and resulted in a wide range of initiatives in this area. It helped to develop a better, albeit not comprehensive, understanding, application

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<sup>102</sup> GPF outlined its recommendations for the use of targeted sanctions in different policy papers. One comprehensive example can be found at <http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/sanction/jpreccs.htm>.

<sup>103</sup> Cooperation in this area and a common understanding were expressed in a 2002 report on the sanctions imposed on Iraq (<http://www.globalpolicy.org/reform/2001/0504skep.htm>).

and implementation of a partnership concept among major groups, and between major groups and the UN, as demonstrated in the DSD partnership database. It also provided the international community with examples on what a fruitful and concrete cooperation with NGOs and other external actors can look like.

The reform of the Security Council draws quite some interest from NGOs and is often used as an opportunity to lobby for the opening of the Council to NGOs. The impact of NGOs has been limited in this respect. The comparative advantage of NGOs lies more in bringing experiences and expertise from the field to the UN and in alerting member states to crises around the world. The NGO Working Group on the Security Council with its now regular meetings with Council members and senior UN officials helped to build trust and a better relationship between NGOs and member states and the working group members are now able to hold more open dialogues with delegates on security-related issues.

The development of targeted sanctions relied heavily on the expertise of NGOs and academia and key recommendations have been developed by two universities and the BICC. Information provided by NGOs on the humanitarian impact, especially in Iraq, contributed considerably to the reform and improvement of the UN sanctions system.

All examples show that the political will of member states, an opening of formal UN structures and mobilised NGOs and civil societies have to come together to achieve change.

It is striking that there is little overlap between the NGOs involved in these processes. This shows that there is a high degree of specialisation and division of labour. The results of the survey in combination with the case studies indicate that there is a core network of NGOs in New York which mostly deals with general issues such as UN reform and access to the UN, and that there are other groupings of more specialised NGOs which focus their attention and resources on specific issues and items on the UN agenda.

The processes described in the case studies were successful in terms of civil society engagement because they allowed for access, laid the groundwork for exchange and cooperation, trust developed and therefore

civil society was able to influence these processes. However, the influence and relatively high level of cooperation remains limited to these examples. Civil society organisations have not been able to use them to expand their influence to include other processes or to the policymaking level in the Economic and Social Council itself. Access, cooperation and influence remained limited to the meetings and conferences described above.

As noted above, there is little overlap between the NGOs and civil society organisations involved in the case studies, with the exception of the NGO Working Group on the Security Council, which may be one reason why cooperation and influence remains limited. It seems that networks need to be better integrated and consolidated in order to broaden the scope of influence.

While the case studies show that civil society can indeed participate in and influence UN processes, they also clearly show the limitations of such engagement. Viewed in combination with the findings of the network analyses, it confirms the patchy nature of cooperation and the limited influence.



## 6 Discussion and Conclusion

### 6.1 Introduction

A more active civil society across the world, protests and enhanced participation mechanisms at the UN and other international organisations in the nineties drew attention to the work of NGOs and their influence. This development led to a wave of research on the issue, consisting mostly of case studies and normative reflections on the role and status of NGOs in international affairs.

Beyond this analysis, it is hard to find a more systematic account of what NGOs are doing. To be able to understand this, one has to understand the political nature of such an undertaking. The politicisation takes place at several levels:

To obtain funding and to expand their membership and sphere of influence, NGOs have a keen interest in portraying themselves as strong and influential. Concepts such as global governance and global civil society give the work of NGOs more meaning and a global character. However, there is a careful balance to be struck. NGOs also rely in their work on a critical moral authority and some evidence of influence is also needed to secure funding and support from targeted constituencies.

The UN is in a more difficult position as it has to balance a large number of different interests and implement a countless number of mandates and programs. The organisation often requires input from civil society in the form of expertise or to give more legitimacy and weight to the work of the UN. But due to the intergovernmental nature of the organisation it is not able to fully engage civil society because member states are reluctant, for a variety of political and cultural reasons, to allow the UN to become more outward-looking. Ad hoc arrangements are often the result, which neither serve the UN well nor satisfy the demands of NGOs.

Member states and their respective governments often emphasise and confirm their sovereignty at the UN and the fact that the organisation is intergovernmental. Yet, public opinion often pressures them to take the views of NGOs and other civil society organisations into account.

Governments might also pursue goals which might be easier to achieve with the help of NGOs and to improve their reputation.

In addition, one also has to take into account that academia is always in search of a new concept or theory, and sometimes loses sight of empirical realities. There is the understandable ambition to develop a new grand theory, and a broad and global approach, as in global civil society and global governance, seems to be particularly attractive, but it also needs to be borne in mind that, so far, these concepts are mostly normative and empirically underdeveloped.

Beyond the common criticisms of the work of the UN and NGOs, namely a lack of accountability and legitimacy, there is a multitude of other factors and political agendas which play into the analysis of UN-NGO relations. Therefore, an empirical analysis is useful to shed light on the interdependence and intentions of all actors involved.

As shown in the network analysis in the fourth chapter of this study, the relationship between NGOs and the UN is still ambivalent, with conflicting demands and interests. The popular rhetoric of working in partnership with civil society does not withstand empirical analysis. There has been some improvement in the relationship between the UN, member states and NGOs. This is largely due to the emergence of social movements which span the globe, a higher degree of interconnectedness of people and organisations, and the major UN conferences in the nineties.

Reasons for the non-existence of such a partnership are a lingering mistrust on both sides, diverging interests, and a lack of opportunity structures for NGOs to participate in policy-making at the UN Secretariat.

## **6.2 NGOs, the UN, and Global Governance**

The idea of global governance, how to govern our common affairs collectively, often includes and demands a more central role for NGOs. Civil society is often seen as a progressive agent of change, working towards justice and peace. The question is how NGOs can be included, if at all, in global governance in a constructive and feasible way.

International organisations are often seen as the prime venue for global governance as they provide the forum for a large number of countries to meet, discuss and negotiate international problems.

The membership of most international organisations consists of states only which raises the question of what role there is for NGOs in these organisations. Legally, they cannot be part of organisational decision-making and governance structures because this is the prerogative of states, and they are usually very protective of the status quo. One exception is the International Labour Organisation with its tripartite structures. Its governing body includes worker members and employer members in addition to governments. Another, albeit a weaker one in terms of participation is UNAIDS, the UN programme on HIV/Aids. UNAIDS is guided by a programme coordinating board which includes five NGO representatives. Both are good examples for best practices in participatory governance in international organisations.

However, this leaves NGOs often with limited possibilities to engage with the organisations, and accordingly their influence is relatively weak.

Ways around this dilemma include the lobbying of delegations and UN staff and the provision of information and expertise which might influence decision-making and can be quite effective at times, but all these tools are not very effective or stable as they depend largely on the good will and demand of the recipients.

Therefore, it is accurate to say that NGOs have been able to influence some UN processes, as for example financing for development and sustainable development, but it would be overly optimistic to conclude that NGOs are able to influence UN policy-making in general.

Developments such as further democratisation and expansion of participatory practices at the national level could feed back into the practices at the international level. South Africa and Mexico granted civil society more rights and participation in national politics which is clearly reflected in their supportive and open attitude towards NGOs at the UN.

This could lead to the conclusion that the best way to influence global

governance is through the national level. Surveys<sup>104</sup> show that NGOs and civil society at large can be very successful in influencing and even shaping policies at the national level. A bottom-up or trickle-up approach seems thus a good potential strategy to influence policies at the international level as well. Although one could probably expect a slow process before tangible effects are aggregated and visible in international organisations and by extension in global governance. Another important aspect to consider in this respect is that these changes would have to come out of developing and developed countries to avoid an imbalance which would lead to tensions at the UN.

However, from a UN perspective it would be easy to make the case for a stronger NGO and civil society participation: After all the preamble of the Charter of the UN states “We the peoples of the United Nations determined [...]”<sup>105</sup>, and it is undeniable that the implementation of ambitious programs in economic or social development, peacebuilding and the protection of the environment require the full support of all stakeholders.

In the debate around global governance we also have to bear in mind, that it is more a normative concept rather than one which is actually operationalised by the international community. There is no single international entity which can assume the responsibility for global governance.

### **6.3 NGOs at the UN – a Global Civil Society?**

When we look at the available figures on NGO participation at the UN, the question has to be answered with a clear “no”. Southern NGOs are underrepresented in terms of the number of accredited NGOs from the South as well as in terms of participation in UN meetings and events. If one looks at different UN meetings, as for example the Commission on the Status of Women or the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, one could

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<sup>104</sup> A comprehensive overview of a number of national surveys is presented in a 2007 CIVICUS publication (Global Survey of the State of Civil Society. Volume 1: Country Profiles.)

<sup>105</sup> For the complete text of the Charter and its history see <http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/history/>.

be led to believe that the colourful assembly of people and organisations could be close to a global civil society. But the geographical distribution is still uneven, and not global.

From a normative perspective, global civil society is often described as made up of individual bonds of solidarity and shared ideas. One can certainly find that among NGOs at the UN, but evidence of a few transnational and regional contacts and networks does not make a civil society global, and distinct differences in perceptions, attitudes, and ideas among NGOs still persist, even among organisations which work together closely.

It is striking that many of the most visible and active NGOs are from North America and Europe with only a few exceptions coming from the South. They largely define the dialogue with the UN through meetings with delegates, campaign letters and analytical papers. It is also these influential Northern NGOs which have the best access to the UN meetings, staff, and delegations as they often have liaison offices at UN headquarters.

Similarly, the network analysed for this study confirms this. It is local and mainly dominated by US or US-based organisations. This is often met with suspicion by delegations from developing countries who interpret this as, more or less, hidden and undue US influence. It should be added that although many of the most active organisations are indeed from the US, they do often consult with networks around the globe on issues such as the UN Millennium Development Goals and UN reform. There is no doubt that with the professionalisation and institutionalisation of NGOs a group of networked organisations developed, and they became more influential, relatively speaking, and distanced themselves from other organisations. It also has to be borne in mind that self-organisation in the non-profit sector and mobilisation of citizens for a variety of causes have a strong tradition in the US which, in this context, is probably an advantage compared to other societies.

If one wants to attempt to define a civil society at the international level, and taking all the above factors into account, defining it as transnational would

probably be more accurate. This is not to say that in the future a global civil society might not emerge, assuming a progressive globalisation and increasing international interconnectedness.

#### **6.4 The Relationship between NGOs and UN Member States as an Indicator for the State-Society Relationship in General**

While there was an improvement in the relations between NGOs and member states and states are now more open to meet with and talk to NGOs, it is hardly a partnership or even a good working relationship. The relationship is good and functional with only a few “friendly” and supportive states, as for example with Mexico, France, Germany and the US. Especially among the G77 countries, as for example India, Pakistan, Sudan, Iran, there is still a strong resistance to work with NGOs and to expand participation for them at the UN which became particularly evident during the readings of the draft resolution in 2005 which was based on the recommendations of the Cardoso Panel. Any paragraphs relating to the expansion of the rights of NGOs and their participation were met with resistance. Relationships with delegations often depend on political considerations and if there are common interests that can be pursued.

There are no major changes in the state-society relationship, if one takes the relationship between NGOs and member states at the UN as an indicator. The decision-making power of states and their sovereignty is largely intact. Successful NGO campaigns or protests did not change these structures or took away from the decision-making power of states in any way. The limitations in state power through NGOs or other civil society actors are minimal and hardly tangible at the UN.

Assumptions in the literature that states have lost some of their sovereignty and power to NGOs cannot be confirmed for the UN. There were a few instances (for example the campaign to ban landmines, or the initiative for the creation of the International Criminal Court) when the influence of NGOs

and civil society was particularly strong, but it did not change permanently the relationship in favour of NGOs. Talking about states as residuals (Cerny 1995) or fundamentally transformed is simply inaccurate. If anything, there seems to be a resurgence of the state and evidence from the UN seems to support the state-centric paradigm of realism. Lipschutz (1992) sees states as limited by global civil society. The difficulties of the global civil society concept were discussed above, and even if one tried to aggregate activities of NGOs and other civil society organisations at the global level, with the UN as an example, it would be hard to find any examples of how states are limited. If one looks at international organisations and how they are structured and governed there is no authority above the state.

Accordingly, Luck (2002: 7) states that "it is time to return the state to a more central place in our research and in our understanding of the purposes, workings, and potential of international organisations, especially the United Nations". The relative neglect of the state had distorting effects on the analysis of the work of the United Nations and NGOs, and on the development of the concept of global governance. He therefore suggests caution when assessing the role of civil society and international organisations. While he concedes that NGOs are very active and sometimes influential, he maintains that the powers of non-state actors are derivative, their operational capacities limited, and their legitimacy compromised by their lack of accountability, sovereignty, and democratic structures. He concludes that "they cannot substitute for the state or for the domestic political processes that ultimately determine policy choices" (Luck 2002: 9).

## **6.5 The Use of Social Network Analysis in IR**

Given the higher level of international connectedness a social network analysis can help describe and analyse the emerging connections. It provides a tool to systematically describe the actors, how they are linked and what the nature of their relationships is. It allows for a broader analysis than a policy network analysis since it does not limit itself to policy-making or the

influence on policies. It is especially useful when there are multiple actors and groups involved.

With the emergence of new issues and new actors in the international community, a social network analysis can help to obtain systematic relational and structural data on developing trends.

Growing interdependence in a globalised world is difficult to trace with classical research methods, but a social network analysis can provide a systematic picture of these emerging linkages.

Such an analysis is particularly useful when informal relations are particularly important, as in diplomacy or terrorist networks, or when linkages between actors and/or organisations are particularly relevant, as in multinational corporations or international organisations. It also helps to identify key actors in any kind of organisation.

Examples from other social sciences abound: First and foremost in anthropology and sociology for the study of social capital, social movements, the family, and spread of knowledge and diseases. In political science it is being applied to complex governance issues and policy networks. In business studies it is used for the analysis of dissemination of knowledge, knowledge creation, organisational change, and managerial development and strategies. This is just a small selection of the fields in which social network analysis has been applied.

Beyond its broad application in a number of disciplines, there are other indicators which point to the importance of social network analysis, as for example is the high ranking in terms of citation reports of the journal *Social Networks*. The journal ranked eight (out of fifty-one) in the anthropology category and nine (out of ninety-four) in the sociology category (Thomson Scientific: Journal Citation Reports 2005). There are specific research programmes dedicated to social network analysis, for example the University of California at Irvine offers a PhD programme with an emphasis in social network analysis,<sup>106</sup> and Harvard University uses the social network analysis approach for its Program on Networked Governance.<sup>107</sup>

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<sup>106</sup> For more information see <http://aris.ss.uci.edu/socnet/socnet.html>.

<sup>107</sup> For more information see:

[http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/netgov/html/colloquia\\_complexity\\_courses\\_dgo2006.htm](http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/netgov/html/colloquia_complexity_courses_dgo2006.htm).



International relations as a discipline should be more open to this, relatively new, and innovative approach, and use it for its own purposes, as appropriate, to advance the discipline and to catch up with other social sciences. Some IR scholars (most prominently Keck and Sikkink 1998 and Weiss and Gordenker 1996) already recognised the value of social network analysis, and future research, especially on NGO networks and international organisations, which have important relational and informal features, will likely see further application of this approach. Data collection might be more complex, but the pay-off in terms of insight and potential contribution to the development of concepts and theories increases accordingly.

## **6.6 Conclusion and Suggestions for Future Research**

Despite the rhetoric of partnerships between the UN and NGOs, the empirical reality shows that there are no ongoing, influential partnerships. The term is often used for selective cooperative efforts, as for example the Financing for Development process, the implementation of Agenda 21 or the campaign for the creation of the International Criminal Court, which have hardly any effect on the overall structure of the relationship.

After a few very visible and successful campaigns (e.g. on landmines), it seems that the influence of NGOs has been overestimated and inflated in the literature. Core organs of the UN as the General Assembly and Security Council still have only very limited participation by NGOs, and there are hardly any signs that this will change in the near future.

The intergovernmental nature of the UN is still intact and fully functional which leaves states on top of the UN hierarchy with the power to expand or limit NGO participation at their will. At present the trend is to try to limit the participation of external actors. As discussed earlier, the reasons for this development lie in the different roles of states and NGOs, lingering mistrust and a latent sense of threat, but there are also broader societal reasons which contribute to this development. After 9/11 civic engagement in the US is seen with more suspicion than before, especially regarding international affairs. In addition, NGOs seem to have a more difficult time to mobilise the population than they had in the late nineties. The absence of major UN

conferences and the frustration of NGOs with the UN are two factors which explain these difficulties.

UN summits in 2000 and 2005 with hardly any civil society participation, the lack of an intergovernmental discussion of rights and responsibilities of NGOs at the UN, and the decision against major UN conferences in the future, show a reversal of earlier trends of an increase and deepening of NGO participation. It also shows that the roles and influences of NGOs are not as consolidated and institutionalised as one might think and as they are often presented in the literature (Reimann 2006). They have to be maintained and continuously lobbied for to be kept alive.

In addition, it seems that a new form of engagement with NGOs and civil society emerged. Hearings are now often used to interact with NGOs and they are often seen by the UN as a replacement for UN conferences. Recent hearings were held on migration and development, least developed countries, HIV-Aids and in the run-up to the 2005 summit.<sup>108</sup>

Although the organisation of hearings was one of the recommendations of the Cardoso report and meant to open up the organisation for a stronger civil society participation and to make it more outward-looking, many NGOs did not welcome this development.<sup>109</sup> Hearings are often seen by NGOs as top-down and highly selective processes which do not adequately reflect the interests of NGOs. When compared to UN conferences, hearings have less potential for NGO input and influence. There is no preparatory process as for the conferences for example which allowed NGOs to influence the process from the beginning. In the view of NGOs hearings can be one way to complement the dialogue and interaction with the UN, but they should not replace more extensive and effective forms of NGO participation.

This trend of a reversal of achievements and progress in UN-NGO relations by extension means a setback for the applicability of the concepts of global governance and global civil society which both call for and include a strong role of NGOs and civil society.

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<sup>108</sup> More information on UN hearings with NGOs, civil society and the private sector can be found at <http://www.un-ngls.org/>.

<sup>109</sup> A statement by a small group of NGOs on this matter can be found at <http://www.globalpolicy.org/ngos/int/un/access/2006/0901ngoresponse.htm>.

If one accepts that NGOs are needed at the UN for the design and implementation of programmes and policies, to bring their expertise to UN fora and add a participatory, open and democratic dimension to the work of the UN, one will have to find a way to reconcile the intergovernmental with more participation through the slow expansion of rights for NGOs and other civil society actors. It will be interesting to see what the future brings for the UN- NGO relationship. Right now neither member states nor UN senior management show any particular interest in such an expansion.

An expansion of NGO participation would also be needed to give the concepts of global governance and global civil society more substance and weight.

As could be seen in the fifth chapter NGO participation across different UN processes varies greatly. A harmonisation of practices and arrangements across the UN system would facilitate the involvement of NGOs considerably. It would make it easier and less costly for NGOs to participate and for the UN it would make the administration and organisation of involving NGOs easier and more efficient.

The development of a system-wide database could be helpful in this respect. UN entities would have easy access to information on NGOs and their expertise. If made available to member states as well, it could also help to alleviate some of the still existing mistrust of states towards NGOs and their work. The analyses, results, and experiences from both scholars and practitioners could be used for such a database and thus build on each other.

In order to obtain a more complete picture, it would be useful to analyse more NGOs and NGO networks and how they interact not only with the UN, but also with other international organisations.

Different approaches are conceivable: (a) A thematic approach which looks at a group of selected organisations which are particularly relevant to a specific issue, e.g. the United Nations Environment Programme, the Division for Sustainable Development of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs, and the United Nations Human Settlements Programmes for sustainable development. (b) A collection of best practices and a

comparison of practices across organisations. The International Labour Organization and the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/Aids can serve as examples for best practices for their inclusive arrangements and an analysis could show if and how they could be applied to other UN entities. (c) A comparison of regional and specialised organisations with global organisations in terms of their arrangements with NGOs and civil society at large. One would expect that regional and specialised organisations were able to develop more participatory practices while global and bigger organisations are less inclusive due to their size and a high degree of politicisation.

Weiss and Gordenker (1996: 221) conclude in NGOs, the UN and Global Governance that “far too little useful statistical information or even basic descriptive information exists about the phenomenon of NGOs that are active in the milieu surrounding the United Nations system”. In their conclusion this makes theory-building difficult, if not impossible, and thus no well-tested models exist. To allow for modeling or theory-building more data would have to be gathered and analysed. This would include, but is not limited to, the number of NGOs, their size, structure, geographic scope and activities, networks of NGOs around the world which interact with the UN on different levels (national, regional and international), and the involvement of other civil society organisations and the private sector and their relationship with NGOs.

The availability of more empirical data could be used to substantiate or refute existing concepts. It could also help to add some clarity to the current debate where a multitude of different terms and concepts describing the same phenomena only serve to confuse matters and add no value to the analysis. This is reflected in an article on global governance as a perspective on world politics by Dingwerth and Pattberg (2006: 185) who state that “the current disarray [of concepts] is a hindrance to more fruitful discussions and to the goal of developing more coherent theories of global governance”. The broad use of a concept and application to a wide range of problems and observations make it virtually meaningless. Dingwerth and

Pattberg also introduce an important distinction between two general uses of a concept: (a) as the description and analysis of a set of observable phenomena, and (b) as a political program. Both serve different purposes and involve different actors and should therefore be kept separate. In addition, the latter can compromise the independence and explanatory power of the first. The first should be primarily concerned with the description and analysis of problems and emerging issues in a scientific and objective manner, while the latter is mostly concerned with formulating subjective desiderata of what a world should be like in the perception of groups of people with a certain world view. The first can only be achieved when sufficient, quantitative and qualitative, data is made available. They conclude with a call for conceptual clarification (Dingwerth and Pattberg 2006: 196).

The partnership concept also deserves more scrutiny in terms of its aims and purposes. One question which needs answering is if there can be a partnership between actors with a significant power differential between them. Intuitively given the intergovernmental nature of the UN one would have to reject the concept altogether for UN-NGO relations at large. However, partnerships with NGOs are possible and implemented at project and field level.

At the UN the term partnership is also often used when referring to relations with the private sector (e.g. at the Global Compact). The power relations between the UN and the private sector are for obvious reasons very different from those with NGOs and civil society. The resources of many companies exceed by far the budget of the UN. They also play a more important role in development and investment than NGOs do. The UN has no concrete regulations or arrangements for the private sector as a whole while there are different arrangements for NGOs. In the absence of arrangements for companies and as a show of good will towards the private sector the concept of partnerships has been introduced. The ten principles of the Global Compact provide some guidance for the involvement of the

private sector at the UN and its conduct<sup>110</sup>, but they are by no means comparable to the consultative mechanisms for NGOs which are much more specific.

There is still a lack of empirical information and data on the work of NGOs at the UN and other international organisations (Weiss and Gordenker 1996, Reimann 2006). Only a more detailed description of NGO activities and the collection of more data can lead to a better understanding of the role and influence of NGOs. A combination of the expertise of political science on international politics, government and governance with methodologies and theories from other disciplines such as sociology, economics and anthropology could potentially lead to a more comprehensive conceptualisation and operationalisation of the NGO phenomenon and its interaction with international organisations.

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<sup>110</sup> These principles cover such issues as human rights, labour, the environment, and anti corruption (<http://www.globalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/TheTenPrinciples/index.html>). They are not binding and involvement of companies in the Global Compact is connected with reporting by the companies on how they are doing with regard to the ten principles and corporate social responsibility.

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## Annex

- (1) ECOSOC Resolution E/1996/31
- (2) Guidelines for Submission of Quadrennial Reports for Nongovernmental Organisations in General and Special Consultative Status with the Economic and Social Council
- (3) Questionnaire
- (4) List of Interviewees
- (5) Quantitative Data
- (6) NGO Working on the Security Council (Members and Steering Group)

## **A1. ECOSOC Resolution E/1996/31**

ECOSOC resolution 1996/31 governs the consultative relationship of the United Nations' Economic and Social Council with NGOs. It is unique in a sense that it sets out detailed rules, regulations and instructions for the relationship with NGOs.

### **ECOSOC Resolution E/1996/31**

**July 25, 1996**

#### **Consultative relationship between the United Nations and non-governmental organizations**

The Economic and Social Council,

Recalling Article 71 of the Charter of the United Nations,

Recalling also its resolution 1993/80 of 30 July 1993, in which it requested a general review of arrangements for consultation with non-governmental organizations, with a view to updating, if necessary, Council resolution 1296 (XLIV) of 23 May 1968, as well as introducing coherence in the rules governing the participation of non-governmental organizations in international conferences convened by the United Nations, and also an examination of ways and means of improving practical arrangements for the work of the Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations and the Non-Governmental Organizations Section of the Secretariat,

Recalling further its decision 1995/304 of 26 July 1995,

Confirming the need to take into account the full diversity of the non-governmental organizations at the national, regional and international levels,

Acknowledging the breadth of non-governmental organizations' expertise and the capacity of non-governmental organizations to support the work of the United Nations,

Taking into account the changes in the non-governmental sector, including the emergence of a large number of national and regional organizations,

Calling upon the governing bodies of the relevant organizations, bodies and specialized agencies of the United Nations system to examine the principles and practices relating to their consultations with non-governmental organizations and to take action, as appropriate, to promote coherence in the light of the provisions of the present resolution,

Approves the following update of the arrangements set out in its resolution 1296 (XLIV) of 23 May 1968 :

#### **ARRANGEMENTS FOR CONSULTATION WITH NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS**

I. Principles to be applied in the establishment of consultative relations

II. Principles governing the nature of the consultative arrangements

III. Establishment of consultative relationships

IV. Consultation with the Council

V. Consultation with commissions and other subsidiary organs of the Council resources

VI. Consultations with ad hoc committees of the Council

VII. Participation of non-governmental organizations in International Conferences convened by the United Nations and their preparatory process

VIII. Suspension and withdrawal of consultative status

IX. Council committee on non-governmental Organizations

X. Consultation with the secretariat

XI. Secretariat support

## **Part**

**I**

**PRINCIPLES TO BE APPLIED IN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF CONSULTATIVE RELATIONS** The following principles shall be applied in establishing consultative relations with non-governmental organizations:

1. The organization shall be concerned with matters falling within the competence of the Economic and Social Council and its subsidiary bodies.
2. The aims and purposes of the organization shall be in conformity with the spirit, purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.
3. The organization shall undertake to support the work of the United Nations and to promote knowledge of its principles and activities, in accordance with its own aims and purposes and the nature and scope of its competence and activities.
4. Except where expressly stated otherwise, the term "organization" shall refer to non-governmental organizations at

the national, subregional, regional or international levels.

5. Consultative relationships may be established with international, regional, subregional and national organizations, in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles and criteria established under the present resolution. The Committee, in considering applications for consultative status, should ensure, to the extent possible, participation of non-governmental organizations from all regions, and particularly from developing countries, in order to help achieve a just, balanced, effective and genuine involvement of non-governmental organizations from all regions and areas of the world. The Committee shall also pay particular attention to non-governmental organizations that have special expertise or experience upon which the Council may wish to draw.

6. Greater participation of non-governmental organizations from developing countries in international conferences convened by the United Nations should be encouraged.

7. Greater involvement of non-governmental organizations from countries with economies in transition should be encouraged.

8. Regional, subregional and national organizations, including those affiliated to an international organization already in status, may be admitted provided that they can demonstrate that their programme of work is of direct relevance to the aims and purposes of the United Nations and, in the case of national organizations, after consultation with the Member State concerned. The views expressed by the Member State, if any, shall be communicated to the non-governmental organization concerned, which shall have the opportunity to respond to those views through the Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations.

9. The organization shall be of recognized standing within the

particular field of its competence or of a representative character. Where there exist a number of organizations with similar objectives, interests and basic views in a given field, they may, for the purposes of consultation with the Council, form a joint committee or other body authorized to carry on such consultation for the group as a whole.

10. The organization shall have an established headquarters, with an executive officer. It shall have a democratically adopted constitution, a copy of which shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and which shall provide for the determination of policy by a conference, congress or other representative body, and for an executive organ responsible to the policy-making body.

11. The organization shall have authority to speak for its members through its authorized representatives. Evidence of this authority shall be presented, if requested.

12. The organization shall have a representative structure and possess appropriate mechanisms of accountability to its members, who shall exercise effective control over its policies and actions through the exercise of voting rights or other appropriate democratic and transparent decision-making processes. Any such organization that is not established by a governmental entity or intergovernmental agreement shall be considered a non-governmental organization for the purpose of these arrangements, including organizations that accept members designated by governmental authorities, provided that such membership does not interfere with the free expression of views of the organization.

13. The basic resources of the organization shall be derived in the main part from contributions of the national affiliates or other components or from individual members. Where voluntary

contributions have been received, their amounts and donors shall be faithfully revealed to the Council Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations. Where, however, the above criterion is not fulfilled and an organization is financed from other sources, it must explain to the satisfaction of the Committee its reasons for not meeting the requirements laid down in this paragraph. Any financial contribution or other support, direct or indirect, from a Government to the organization shall be openly declared to the Committee through the Secretary-General and fully recorded in the financial and other records of the organization and shall be devoted to purposes in accordance with the aims of the United Nations.

14. In considering the establishment of consultative relations with a non-governmental organization, the Council will take into account whether the field of activity of the organization is wholly or mainly within the field of a specialized agency, and whether or not it could be admitted when it has, or may have, a consultative arrangement with a specialized agency.

15. The granting, suspension and withdrawal of consultative status, as well as the interpretation of norms and decisions relating to this matter, are the prerogative of Member States exercised through the Economic and Social Council and its Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations. A non-governmental organization applying for general or special consultative status or a listing on the Roster shall have the opportunity to respond to any objections being raised in the Committee before the Committee takes its decision.

16. The provisions of the present resolution shall apply to the United Nations regional commissions and their subsidiary bodies *mutatis mutandis*.

17. In recognizing the evolving relationship between the United

Nations and non-governmental organizations, the Economic and Social Council, in consultation with the Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations, will consider reviewing the consultative arrangements as and when necessary to facilitate, in the most effective manner possible, the contributions of non-governmental organizations to the work of the United Nations.

## **Part II PRINCIPLES GOVERNING THE NATURE OF THE CONSULTATIVE ARRANGEMENTS**

18. A clear distinction is drawn in the Charter of the United Nations between participation without vote in the deliberations of the Council and the arrangements for consultation. Under Articles 69 and 70, participation is provided for only in the case of States not members of the Council, and of specialized agencies. Article 71, applying to non-governmental organizations, provides for suitable arrangements for consultation. This distinction, deliberately made in the Charter, is fundamental and the arrangements for consultation should not be such as to accord to non-governmental organizations the same rights of participation as are accorded to States not members of the Council and to the specialized agencies brought into relationship with the United Nations.

19. The arrangements should not be such as to overburden the Council or transform it from a body for coordination of policy and action, as contemplated in the Charter, into a general forum for discussion.

20. Decisions on arrangements for consultation should be guided by the principle that consultative arrangements are to be made, on the one hand, for the purpose of enabling the Council or one of its bodies to secure expert information or advice from organizations having special competence in the subjects for which consultative arrangements are made, and, on the other



hand, to enable international, regional, subregional and national organizations that represent important elements of public opinion to express their views. Therefore, the arrangements for consultation made with each organization should relate to the subjects for which that organization has a special competence or in which it has a special interest. The organizations given consultative status should be limited to those whose activities in fields set out in paragraph 1 above qualify them to make a significant contribution to the work of the Council and should, in sum, as far as possible reflect in a balanced way the major viewpoints or interests in these fields in all areas and regions of the world.

### **Part III ESTABLISHMENT OF CONSULTATIVE RELATIONSHIPS**

21. In establishing consultative relationships with each organization, regard shall be had to the nature and scope of its activities and to the assistance it may be expected to give to the Council or its subsidiary bodies in carrying out the functions set out in Chapters IX and X of the Charter of the United Nations.

22. Organizations that are concerned with most of the activities of the Council and its subsidiary bodies and can demonstrate to the satisfaction of the Council that they have substantive and sustained contributions to make to the achievement of the objectives of the United Nations in fields set out in paragraph 1 above, and are closely involved with the economic and social life of the peoples of the areas they represent and whose membership, which should be considerable, is broadly representative of major segments of society in a large number of countries in different regions of the world shall be known as organizations in general consultative status.

23. Organizations that have a special competence in, and are

concerned specifically with, only a few of the fields of activity covered by the Council and its subsidiary bodies, and that are known within the fields for which they have or seek consultative status shall be known as organizations in special consultative status.

24. Other organizations that do not have general or special consultative status but that the Council, or the Secretary-General of the United Nations in consultation with the Council or its Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations, considers can make occasional and useful contributions to the work of the Council or its subsidiary bodies or other United Nations bodies within their competence shall be included in a list (to be known as the Roster). This list may also include organizations in consultative status or a similar relationship with a specialized agency or a United Nations body. These organizations shall be available for consultation at the request of the Council or its subsidiary bodies. The fact that an organization is on the Roster shall not in itself be regarded as a qualification for general or special consultative status should an organization seek such status.

25. Organizations to be accorded special consultative status because of their interest in the field of human rights should pursue the goals of promotion and protection of human rights in accordance with the spirit of the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action.

26. Major organizations one of whose primary purposes is to promote the aims, objectives and purposes of the United Nations and a furtherance of the understanding of its work may be accorded consultative status.

#### **Part IV CONSULTATION WITH THE COUNCIL**

### Provisional agenda

27. The provisional agenda of the Council shall be communicated to organizations in general consultative status and special consultative status and to those on the Roster.

28. Organizations in general consultative status may propose to the Council Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations that the Committee request the Secretary-General to place items of special interest to the organizations in the provisional agenda of the Council.

### Attendance at meetings

29. Organizations in general consultative status and special consultative status may designate authorized representatives to sit as observers at public meetings of the Council and its subsidiary bodies. Those on the Roster may have representatives present at such meetings concerned with matters within their field of competence. These attendance arrangements may be supplemented to include other modalities of participation.

### Written statements

30. Written statements relevant to the work of the Council may be submitted by organizations in general consultative status and special consultative status on subjects in which these organizations have a special competence. Such statements shall be circulated by the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the members of the Council, except those statements that have become obsolete, for example, those dealing with matters already disposed of and those that had already been circulated in some other form.

31. The following conditions shall be observed regarding the submission and circulation of such statements:

(a) The written statement shall be submitted in one of the official languages;

(b) It shall be submitted in sufficient time for appropriate consultation to take place between the Secretary-General and the organization before circulation;

(c) The organization shall give due consideration to any comments that the Secretary-General may make in the course of such consultation before transmitting the statement in final form;

(d) A written statement submitted by an organization in general consultative status will be circulated in full if it does not exceed 2,000 words. Where a statement is in excess of 2,000 words, the organizations shall submit a summary which will be circulated or shall supply sufficient copies of the full text in the working languages for distribution. A statement will also be circulated in full, however, upon a specific request of the Council or its Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations;

(e) A written statement submitted by an organization in special consultative status or on the Roster will be circulated in full if it does not exceed 500 words. Where a statement is in excess of 500 words, the organization shall submit a summary which will be circulated; such statements will be circulated in full, however, upon a specific request of the Council or its Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations;

(f) The Secretary-General, in consultation with the President of the Council, or the Council or its Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations, may invite organizations on the Roster to submit written statements. The provisions of subparagraphs (a), (b), (c) and (e) above shall apply to such statements;

(g) A written statement or summary, as the case may be, will be

circulated by the Secretary-General in the working languages, and, upon the request of a member of the Council, in any of the official languages.

#### Oral presentations during meetings

32. (a) The Council Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations shall make recommendations to the Council as to which organizations in general consultative status should make an oral presentation to the Council and on which items they should be heard. Such organizations shall be entitled to make one statement to the Council, subject to the approval of the Council. In the absence of a subsidiary body of the Council with jurisdiction in a major field of interest to the Council and to organizations in special consultative status, the Committee may recommend that organizations in special consultative status be heard by the Council on the subject in its field of interest;

(b) Whenever the Council discusses the substance of an item proposed by a non-governmental organization in general consultative status and included in the agenda of the Council, such an organization shall be entitled to present orally to the Council, as appropriate, an introductory statement of an expository nature. Such an organization may be invited by the President of the Council, with the consent of the relevant body, to make, in the course of the discussion of the item before the Council, an additional statement for purposes of clarification.

### **Part V CONSULTATION WITH COMMISSIONS AND OTHER SUBSIDIARY ORGANS OF THE COUNCIL**

#### Provisional agenda

33. The provisional agenda of sessions of commissions and other subsidiary organs of the Council shall be communicated to organizations in general consultative status and special

consultative status and those on the Roster.

34. Organizations in general consultative status may propose items for the provisional agenda of commissions, subject to the following conditions:

(a) An organization that intends to propose such an item shall inform the Secretary-General of the United Nations at least 63 days before the commencement of the session and before formally proposing an item shall give due consideration to any comments the Secretary-General may make;

(b) The proposal shall be formally submitted with the relevant basic documentation not later than 49 days before the commencement of the session. The item shall be included in the agenda of the commission if it is adopted by a two-thirds majority of those present and voting.

#### Attendance at meetings

35. Organizations in general consultative status and special consultative status may designate authorized representatives to sit as observers at public meetings of the commissions and other subsidiary organs of the Council. Organizations on the Roster may have representatives present at such meetings that are concerned with matters within their field of competence. These attendance arrangements may be supplemented to include other modalities of participation.

#### Written statements

36. Written statements relevant to the work of the commissions or other subsidiary organs may be submitted by organizations in general consultative status and special consultative status on subjects for which these organizations have a special competence. Such statements shall be circulated by the

Secretary-General to members of the commission or other subsidiary organs, except those statements that have become obsolete, for example, those dealing with matters already disposed of and those that have already been circulated in some other form to members of the commission or other subsidiary organs.

37. The following conditions shall be observed regarding the submission and circulation of such written statements:

(a) The written statement shall be submitted in one of the official languages;

(b) It shall be submitted in sufficient time for appropriate consultation to take place between the Secretary-General and the organization before circulation;

(c) The organization shall give due consideration to any comments that the Secretary-General may make in the course of such consultation before transmitting the statement in final form;

(d) A written statement submitted by an organization in general consultative status will be circulated in full if it does not exceed 2,000 words. Where a statement is in excess of 2,000 words, the organization shall submit a summary, which will be circulated, or shall supply sufficient copies of the full text in the working languages for distribution. A statement will also be circulated in full, however, upon the specific request of the commission or other subsidiary organs;

(e) A written statement submitted by an organization in special consultative status will be circulated in full if it does not exceed 1,500 words. Where a statement is in excess of 1,500 words, the organization shall submit a summary, which will be circulated, or shall supply sufficient copies of the full text in the working languages for distribution. A statement will also be circulated in

full, however, upon the specific request of the commission or other subsidiary organs;

(f) The Secretary-General, in consultation with the chairman of the relevant commission or other subsidiary organ, or the commission or other subsidiary organ itself, may invite organizations on the Roster to submit written statements. The provisions in subparagraphs (a), (b), (c) and (e) above shall apply to such statements;

(g) A written statement or summary, as the case may be, will be circulated by the Secretary-General in the working languages and, upon the request of a member of the commission or other subsidiary organ, in any of the official languages.

#### Oral presentations during meetings

38. (a) The commission or other subsidiary organs may consult with organizations in general consultative status and special consultative status either directly or through a committee or committees established for the purpose. In all cases, such consultations may be arranged upon the request of the organization;

(b) On the recommendation of the Secretary-General and at the request of the commission or other subsidiary organs, organizations on the Roster may also be heard by the commission or other subsidiary organs.

#### Special studies

39. Subject to the relevant rules of procedure on financial implications, a commission or other subsidiary organ may recommend that an organization that has special competence in a particular field should undertake specific studies or investigations or prepare specific papers for the commission. The



limitations of paragraphs 37 (d) and (e) above shall not apply in this case.

#### **Part VI CONSULTATIONS WITH AD HOC COMMITTEES OF THE COUNCIL**

40. The arrangements for consultation between ad hoc committees of the Council authorized to meet between sessions of the Council and organizations in general consultative status and special consultative status and on the Roster shall follow those approved for commissions of the Council, unless the Council or the committee decides otherwise.

#### **Part VII PARTICIPATION OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES CONVENED BY THE UNITED NATIONS AND THEIR PREPARATORY PROCESS**

41. Where non-governmental organizations have been invited to participate in an international conference convened by the United Nations, their accreditation is the prerogative of Member States, exercised through the respective preparatory committee. Such accreditation should be preceded by an appropriate process to determine their eligibility.

42. Non-governmental organizations in general consultative status, special consultative status and on the Roster, that express their wish to attend the relevant international conferences convened by the United Nations and the meetings of the preparatory bodies of the said conferences shall as a rule be accredited for participation. Other non-governmental organizations wishing to be accredited may apply to the secretariat of the conference for this purpose in accordance with the following requirements.

43. The secretariat of the conference shall be responsible for the

receipt and preliminary evaluation of requests from non-governmental organizations for accreditation to the conference and its preparatory process. In the discharge of its functions, the secretariat of the conference shall work in close cooperation and coordination with the Non-Governmental Organizations Section of the Secretariat, and shall be guided by the relevant provisions of Council resolution 1296 (XLIV) as updated.

44. All such applications must be accompanied by information on the competence of the organization and the relevance of its activities to the work of the conference and its preparatory committee, with an indication of the particular areas of the conference agenda and preparations to which such competence and relevance pertain, and should include, inter alia, the following information:

- (a) The purpose of the organization;
- (b) Information as to the programmes and activities of the organization in areas relevant to the conference and its preparatory process and the country or countries in which they are carried out. Non-governmental organizations seeking accreditation shall be asked to confirm their interest in the goals and objectives of the conference;
- (c) Confirmation of the activities of the organization at the national, regional or international level;
- (d) Copies of the annual or other reports of the organization with financial statements, and a list of financial sources and contributions, including governmental contributions;
- (e) A list of members of the governing body of the organization and their countries of nationality;
- (f) A description of the membership of the organization, indicating

the total number of members, the names of organizations that are members and their geographical distribution;

(g) A copy of the constitution and/or by-laws of the organization.

45. In the evaluation of the relevance of applications of non-governmental organizations for accreditation to the conference and its preparatory process, it is agreed that a determination shall be made based on their background and involvement in the subject areas of the conference.

46. The secretariat shall publish and disseminate to Member States on a periodic basis the updated list of applications received. Member States may submit comments on any of the applications on the list 14 days from receipt of the above-mentioned list by Member States. The comments of Member States shall be communicated to the non-governmental organization concerned, which shall have the opportunity to respond.

47. In cases where the secretariat believes, on the basis of the information provided in accordance with the present resolution, that the organization has established its competence and the relevance of its activities to the work of the preparatory committee, it shall recommend to the preparatory committee that the organization be accredited. In cases where the secretariat does not recommend the granting of accreditation, it shall make available to the preparatory committee its reasons for not doing so. The secretariat should ensure that its recommendations are available to members of the preparatory committee at least one week prior to the start of each session. The secretariat must notify such applicants of the reasons for non-recommendation and provide an opportunity to respond to objections and furnish additional information as may be required.

48. The preparatory committee shall decide on all

recommendations for accreditation within 24 hours after the recommendations of the secretariat have been taken up by the preparatory committee in plenary meeting. In the event of a decision not being taken within this period, interim accreditation shall be accorded until such time as a decision is taken.

49. A non-governmental organization that has been granted accreditation to attend a session of the preparatory committee, including related preparatory meetings of regional commissions, may attend all its future sessions, as well as the conference itself.

50. In recognition of the intergovernmental nature of the conference and its preparatory process, active participation of non-governmental organizations therein, while welcome, does not entail a negotiating role.

51. The non-governmental organizations accredited to the international conference may be given, in accordance with established United Nations practice and at the discretion of the chairperson and the consent of the body concerned, an opportunity to briefly address the preparatory committee and the conference in plenary meetings and their subsidiary bodies.

52. Non-governmental organizations accredited to the conference may make written presentations during the preparatory process in the official languages of the United Nations as they deem appropriate. Those written presentations shall not be issued as official documents except in accordance with United Nations rules of procedure.

53. Non-governmental organizations without consultative status that participate in international conferences and wish to obtain consultative status later on should apply through the normal procedures established under Council resolution 1296 (XLIV) as updated. Recognizing the importance of the participation of non-governmental organizations that attend a conference in the

follow-up process, the Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations, in considering their application, shall draw upon the documents already submitted by that organization for accreditation to the conference and any additional information submitted by the non-governmental organization supporting its interest, relevance and capacity to contribute to the implementation phase. The Committee shall review such applications as expeditiously as possible so as to allow participation of the respective organization in the implementation phase of the conference. In the interim, the Economic and Social Council shall decide on the participation of non-governmental organizations accredited to an international conference in the work of the relevant functional commission on the follow-up to and implementation of that conference.

54. The suspension and withdrawal of the accreditation of non-governmental organizations to United Nations international conferences at all stages shall be guided by the relevant provisions of the present resolution.

#### **Part VIII SUSPENSION AND WITHDRAWAL OF CONSULTATIVE STATUS**

55. Organizations granted consultative status by the Council and those on the Roster shall conform at all times to the principles governing the establishment and nature of their consultative relations with the Council. In periodically reviewing the activities of non-governmental organizations on the basis of the reports submitted under paragraph 61 (c) below and other relevant information, the Council Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations shall determine the extent to which the organizations have complied with the principles governing consultative status and have contributed to the work of the Council, and may recommend to the Council suspension of or exclusion from consultative status of organizations that have not

met the requirements for consultative status as set forth in the present resolution.

56. In cases where the Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations has decided to recommend that the general or special consultative status of a non-governmental organization or its listing on the Roster be suspended or withdrawn, the non-governmental organization concerned shall be given written reasons for that decision and shall have an opportunity to present its response for appropriate consideration by the Committee as expeditiously as possible.

57. The consultative status of non-governmental organizations with the Economic and Social Council and the listing of those on the Roster shall be suspended up to three years or withdrawn in the following cases:

(a) If an organization, either directly or through its affiliates or representatives acting on its behalf, clearly abuses its status by engaging in a pattern of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations including unsubstantiated or politically motivated acts against Member States of the United Nations incompatible with those purposes and principles;

(b) If there exists substantiated evidence of influence from proceeds resulting from internationally recognized criminal activities such as the illicit drugs trade, money-laundering or the illegal arms trade;

(c) If, within the preceding three years, an organization did not make any positive or effective contribution to the work of the United Nations and, in particular, of the Council or its commissions or other subsidiary organs.

58. The consultative status of organizations in general

consultative status and special consultative status and the listing of those on the Roster shall be suspended or withdrawn by the decision of the Economic and Social Council on the recommendation of its Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations.

59. An organization whose consultative status or whose listing on the Roster is withdrawn may be entitled to reapply for consultative status or for inclusion on the Roster not sooner than three years after the effective date of such withdrawal.

#### **Part IX COUNCIL COMMITTEE ON NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS**

60. The members of the Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations shall be elected by the Council on the basis of equitable geographical representation, in accordance with the relevant Council resolutions and decision 1/ and rules of procedure of the Council. 2/ The Committee shall elect its Chairman and other officers as necessary.

61. The functions of the Committee shall include the following:

(a) The Committee shall be responsible for regular monitoring of the evolving relationship between non-governmental organizations and the United Nations. With a view to fulfilling this responsibility, the Committee shall hold, before each of its sessions, and at other times as necessary, consultations with organizations in consultative status to discuss questions of interest to the Committee or to the organizations relating to the relationship between the non-governmental organizations and the United Nations. A report on such consultations shall be transmitted to the Council for appropriate action;

(b) The Committee shall hold its regular session before the substantive session of the Council each year and preferably

before the sessions of functional commissions of the Council to consider applications for general consultative status and special consultative status and for listing on the Roster made by non-governmental organizations and requests for changes in status, and to make recommendations thereon to the Council. Upon approval by the Council, the Committee may hold other meetings as required to fulfil its mandated responsibilities. Organizations shall give due consideration to any comments on technical matters that the Secretary-General of the United Nations may make in receiving such applications for the Committee. The Committee shall consider at each such session applications received by the Secretary-General not later than 1 June of the preceding year, on which sufficient data have been distributed to the members of the Committee not later than six weeks before the applications are to be considered. Transitional arrangements, if possible, may be made during the current year only. Reapplication by an organization for status, or a request for a change in status, shall be considered by the Committee at the earliest at its first session in the second year following the session at which the substance of the previous application or request was considered, unless at the time of such consideration it was decided otherwise;

(c) Organizations in general consultative status and special consultative status shall submit to the Council Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations through the Secretary-General every fourth year a brief report of their activities, specifically as regards the support they have given to the work of the United Nations. Based on findings of the Committee's examination of the report and other relevant information, the Committee may recommend to the Council any reclassification in status of the organization concerned as it deems appropriate. However, under exceptional circumstances, the Committee may ask for such a report from an individual organization in general consultative



status or special consultative status or on the Roster, between the regular reporting dates;

(d) The Committee may consult, in connection with sessions of the Council or at such other times as it may decide, with organizations in general consultative status and special consultative status on matters within their competence, other than items in the agenda of the Council, on which the Council or the Committee or the organization requests consultation. The Committee shall report to the Council on such consultations;

(e) The Committee may consult, in connection with any particular session of the Council, with organizations in general consultative status and special consultative status on matters within the competence of the organizations concerning specific items already in the provisional agenda of the Council on which the Council or the Committee or the organization requests consultation, and shall make recommendations as to which organizations, subject to the provisions of paragraph 32 (a) above, should be heard by the Council or the appropriate committee and regarding which subjects should be heard. The Committee shall report to the Council on such consultations;

(f) The Committee shall consider matters concerning non-governmental organizations that may be referred to it by the Council or by commissions;

(g) The Committee shall consult with the Secretary-General, as appropriate, on matters affecting the consultative arrangements under Article 71 of the Charter, and arising therefrom;

(h) An organization that applies for consultative status should attest that it has been in existence for at least two years as at the date of receipt of the application by the Secretariat. Evidence of such existence shall be furnished to the Secretariat.

62. The Committee, in considering a request from a non-governmental organization in general consultative status that an item be placed in the agenda of the Council, shall take into account, among other things:

(a) The adequacy of the documentation submitted by the organization;

(b) The extent to which it is considered that the item lends itself to early and constructive action by the Council;

(c) The possibility that the item might be more appropriately dealt with elsewhere than in the Council.

63. Any decision by the Council Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations not to grant a request submitted by a non-governmental organization in general consultative status that an item be placed in the provisional agenda of the Council shall be considered final unless the Council decides otherwise.

#### **Part X CONSULTATION WITH THE SECRETARIAT**

64. The Secretariat should be so organized as to enable it to carry out the duties assigned to it concerning the consultative arrangements and the accreditation of non-governmental organizations to United Nations international conferences as set forth in the present resolution.

65. All organizations in consultative relationship shall be able to consult with officers of the appropriate sections of the Secretariat on matters in which there is a mutual interest or a mutual concern. Such consultation shall be upon the request of the non-governmental organization or upon the request of the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

66. The Secretary-General may request organizations in general

consultative status and special consultative status and those on the Roster to carry out specific studies or prepare specific papers, subject to the relevant financial regulations.

67. The Secretary-General shall be authorized, within the means at his disposal, to offer to non-governmental organizations in consultative relationship facilities that include:

(a) Prompt and efficient distribution of such documents of the Council and its subsidiary bodies as shall in the judgement of the Secretary-General be appropriate;

(b) Access to the press documentation services provided by the United Nations;

(c) Arrangement of informal discussions on matters of special interest to groups or organizations;

(d) Use of the libraries of the United Nations;

(e) Provision of accommodation for conferences or smaller meetings of consultative organizations on the work of the Economic and Social Council;

(f) Appropriate seating arrangements and facilities for obtaining documents during public meetings of the General Assembly dealing with matters in the economic, social and related fields.

#### **Part XI SECRETARIAT SUPPORT**

68. Adequate Secretariat support shall be required for fulfilment of the mandate defined for the Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations with respect to carrying out the wider range of activities in which the enhanced involvement of non-governmental organizations is envisaged. The Secretary-General is requested to provide the necessary resources for this purpose and to take steps for improving the coordination within the

Secretariat of units dealing with non-governmental organizations.

69. The Secretary-General is requested to make every effort to enhance and streamline as appropriate Secretariat support arrangements, and to improve practical arrangements on such matters as greater use of modern information and communication technology, establishment of an integrated database of non-governmental organizations, wide and timely dissemination of information on meetings, distribution of documentation, provision of access and transparent, simple and streamlined procedures for the attendance of non-governmental organizations in United Nations meetings, and to facilitate their broad-based participation.

70. The Secretary-General is requested to make the present resolution widely known, through proper channels, to facilitate the involvement of non-governmental organizations from all regions and areas of the world.

*Notes*

*1/ Council resolutions 1099 (XL) and 1981/50 and Council decision 1995/304.*

*2/ Rule 80 of the rules of procedure of the Council.*

## **A2. Guidelines for Submission of Quadrennial Reports for Nongovernmental Organisations in General and Special Consultative Status with the Economic and Social Council**

Non-governmental organizations in General and Special consultative status with ECOSOC must submit to the Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations, every fourth year, a brief report of their activities, in particular regarding their contribution to the work of the United Nations.

Non-compliance with the reporting requirements can lead to the suspension of the consultative status. The details of the instructions also show the highly politicised nature of this arrangement.

### **GUIDELINES FOR SUBMISSION OF QUADRENNIAL REPORTS FOR NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS IN GENERAL AND SPECIAL CONSULTATIVE STATUS WITH THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL**

In accordance with Economic and Social Council resolution 1996/31, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in General and Special consultative status *“shall submit to the Council Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations through the Secretary-General every fourth year a brief report of their activities, specifically as regards the support they have given to the work of the United Nations.”* (paragraph 61-c)

The consultative relationship is reciprocal. NGOs are granted the privilege of participating in a wide variety of United Nations-sponsored meetings and activities and in return they are expected to contribute in some way to furthering the development aims of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and the United Nations at large. Similarly the quadrennial review presents the opportunity for non-governmental organizations to make their activities in support of the United Nations more widely known to Member States and at the same time to receive valuable feedback on their programmes of work and official acknowledgment of their contribution as partners to global development.

The quadrennial review exercise serves as an important management tool in monitoring the increasingly complex relationship between the United Nations and the steadily growing number of NGOs seeking and receiving consultative status with the Economic and Social Council.

## **I. SCHEDULE FOR SUBMISSION**

Quadrennial reports are due for submission according to the following table:  
A report for the period: should be submitted in: by NGOs that received status in:

1998-2001 2002 1946, 1950, 1954, 1958, 1962, 1966, 1970, 1974, 1978, 1982,

1986, 1990, 1994, 1998.

1999-2002 2003 1947, 1951, 1955, 1959, 1963, 1967, 1971, 1975, 1979, 1983,

1987, 1991, 1995, 1999

2000-2003 2004 1948, 1952, 1956, 1960, 1964, 1968, 1972, 1976, 1980, 1984,

1988, 1992, 1996, 2000

2001-2004 2005 1949, 1953, 1957, 1961, 1965, 1969, 1973, 1977, 1981, 1985,

1989, 1993, 1997, 2001

The reporting cycle begins in the year the organization was granted status. In the case of reclassification from the Roster to the Special category or from Special to the General category, the year of the reclassification marks the beginning of the quadrennial reporting cycle.

Reports should be submitted to the Secretariat (NGO Section/DESA) no later than 1 June of the year following the last year of the reporting period i.e. a quadrennial report covering the years 2002-2005 should be submitted no later than 1 June 2006.

The completed Quadrennial Report must be submitted electronically. It should be sent by email attachment in MS Word format (.doc) or as RTF document (.rtf) to the NGO Section at [desangosection@un.org](mailto:desangosection@un.org). Please note, only the submissions received via this address are recorded on the

official database.

## II. FORMAT

1. The report must be written in either English or French.
2. The following information should be clearly set out **at the upper left-hand corner of the first page of the report:**

- The name of the organization and its acronym, if any
- Consultative category (General or Special)
- The year in which consultative status was granted

e.g: **American Association of Jurists – AAJ (Special Consultative Status granted in 1989)**

3. The printed report must not exceed five pages of **double spaced text**, using regular style Times New Roman 12 point font.

4. The report must be submitted on **plain paper** (no letterhead, graphics etc.); standard letter size

8.5" x 11" (21.6cm x 27.9cm).

5. Please note that the entire report must be written as running text. Information presented in frames, boxes, columns, tables or graphs will not be accepted and cannot be processed.

6. **Please note that all pertinent information must be presented in the body of the report**

**itself.** Your report will be submitted to the Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations in an official United Nations document containing the texts of several quadrennial reports for the same period. **No annexes are attached to this document.** The Committee members, therefore, will not have any appended material (e.g. official documents, informational/promotional material, financial statements, etc.) before them when they review your report.

Organizations should, however be prepared to make copies of all material (publications, texts of statements, updated financial statements, updated membership lists, etc.) cited in the report available to the members of the Committee upon request.

## III. UPDATED CONTACT INFORMATION

The following information should be clearly set out **on a separate page**

- The name of the organization followed by its acronym, (if any)

- Headquarters' address – including **both postal and street address (if different)**
- Telephone; fax; email; website
- Consultative category (General or Special)
- The year in which consultative status was granted
- The years covered by the report
- The name, title and contact information of the person submitting the report (this is very important – more than one contact person familiar with the report contents is recommended)

#### **IV. CONTENTS of the REPORT**

##### **PART I. Introduction**

A brief introductory statement should recall:

- i. The aims and purposes of the organization and its main course of action.
- ii. Any change that may have had a **significant impact** on the organization vision and/or functions in terms of its orientation, its programme, the scope of its work, etc. Such changes might include, but are not limited to:
  - a) An amendment to the constitution or by-laws. It is a standing rule that the Secretariat of the Committee on NGOs, (the NGO Section/DESA) must be officially informed of any amendment to the constitution originally submitted by the NGO in question, when first it applied for consultative status with the Economic and Social Council.
  - b) A substantial increase or significant change in the geographical distribution of the membership or any substantial change in the amount and/or sources of funding
  - c) Any new organizational affiliations or mergers with programmatic or other implications
  - d) A reclassification of consultative status with the Economic and Social Council

##### **Please note:**

- Administrative changes through routine electoral processes need not be mentioned;
- If an important change is noted, the report should provide a **brief** description of how the indicated change has affected the organization.



**For example:**

**Change in Constitution:** "While the Organization's aims and purposes remained the same, an amendment, approved by GCR's General Assembly and by the Legal authorities here on 20 July 2001, extends the possible geographical coverage of its activities beyond Greece. This allows GRC to cooperate with NGOs with similar objectives in other countries and to operate beyond Greece...."

**Expanded Areas of Activities:** "While its broad aims and objectives, as well as the nature of its activities remain much as described in the submission of 27 May 1999, GCR has expanded their range in Greece. It has also strengthened significantly its cooperation with non-Greek NGOs and extended its operations to other countries. Furthermore, its advocacy role has been strengthened." *(i.e. the scope of operations has grown from national to international)* **If there have been no significant changes during the reporting period section (ii) should be omitted.**

**PART II. Contribution of the organization to the work of the United Nations**

This portion of the Quadrennial Report is most important. NGOs are encouraged to take part in the appropriate intergovernmental fora so that the work of the Economic and Social Council and the United Nations at large might benefit from their specialized input.

Moreover, NGOs are expected to undertake specific activities to advance the achievement of the United Nations Millennium Development Goals. Your report should, therefore, chronicle activities pertaining to the following:

**i) Participation in the work of the Economic and Social Council and its subsidiary bodies and/or major conferences and other United Nations meetings.** Contribution might include: oral and/or written statements; proposal of agenda items; organization of parallel NGO meetings, side events, etc..

**PLEASE NOTE:** Each reference to a conference or meeting attended or organized by the NGO should indicate the venue (city and country), date, official title, and session if appropriate. In addition, **the nature of your participation** or other role should be indicated and the title or theme of any

document, visual presentation, written or oral statement presented by your organization at the event in question, or derived from the proceedings as an output, should be cited.

**For example:**

1) "The Summit of the African Union 11 July 2003, Maputo, Angola. The IAC attended and lobbied for the adoption of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa."

2) "**2001:** Representatives attended the following meetings in Europe, all related to the health and status of women: Basque Region, 31 May – June; Brussels, 24 September; Geneva, Switzerland 21 May; Madrid, Spain 19-23 November; Strasbourg, France 16 May; Vienna, Austria 8-9 May ; Oslo, Norway 13 September."

ii) **Cooperation with United Nations bodies and/or specialized agencies in the field and/or at Headquarters.** This might include: preparation of, or contribution to, research papers and studies; joint sponsorship of meetings; humanitarian or operational social/economic development activities; financial assistance received from or given to the United Nations, etc.

**For example:**

- "Project in collaboration with UNICEF to create meeting points and contexts which promote adolescent education in Bolivia, Paraguay and Perú, 2000-2001.

- Technical assistance to United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) and Programa Internacional de las Naciones Unidas para la Fiscalización

Internacional de las Drogas (PNUFID) and United Nations Office on Drug and Crime (UNODC) in 2002."

iii) Initiatives undertaken by the organization in support of internationally agreed development goals, in particular, **the Millennium Development Goals**, which now form the basis of the global agenda for the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

**For example:**

**i) Activities in line with the Millennium Development Goals**

The organization contributed to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in the following four geographical regions: Central America, South America, Africa and Asia. Major actions have been undertaken the following:

**§ Goal 1. Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger**

o Target 2. Halve the proportion of people who suffer from hunger

**ACTIONS:**

§ Children fed or given nutritional care = 162,079

§ Expectant mother given prenatal care = 7,950

§ Nutrition training for mothers = 7,772

§ Implementation of school kitchens = 327

**· Goal 2. Achieve universal primary education**

o Target 3. Ensure that children everywhere, boys and girls alike, will be able to complete a full course of primary schooling.

**ACTIONS:**

§ School material packs delivered = 2,408,697

§ Classrooms built or renovated = 2,270

§ Children registered in Intervida centers = 6,197

§ Teachers trained = 16,279

**· Goal 5. Improve maternal health**

o Target 6. Reduce by three quarters the maternal mortality ratio.

**ACTIONS:**

§ Provision of general medical care = 1,586,285

§ Training for community midwives = 376

**· Goal 7. Ensure environmental sustainability**

o Target 10. Halve the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe drinking water and sanitation.

**ACTIONS:**

§ Drinking water systems established = 179

§ School sanitary services established = 406

§ Integral community healthcare systems established = 25"

**ii) Activities in Support of Global Principles**

World Human Rights Day was observed in 1999 by the organization. In December 2000 as well, the day was marked in form of symposium and Award of Excellence presentation to exemplary Activists and Human Rights Crusader, Dr. Beko Ransome-Kuti. The symposium lecture tagged "Military Regime: Signpost of Human Rights Violations" was delivered by the award recipient who also was the Executive Director of Centre for Constitutional

Governance, Lagos. The Day was also observed in year 2001, 2002 and the occasion witnessed impressive turnout of people comprising scholars, members of academic, Human Rights crusaders, NGO Representatives and Students among others. Reports of the proceedings were featured in television, radio and national dailies for wider coverage.”

***If your organization has not participated as fully as might be expected in the work of the Economic and Social Council:***

**For example:**

1. “The organization has not participated in the work of the Economic and Social Council and its subsidiary bodies, in major conferences or other United Nations meetings in this period because it has focused its activities in the development and implementation of programmes of education for drug abuse prevention and in social awareness campaigns, as well as in expanding its knowledge on the matter, working mainly with governmental and local organizations in Spain as well as in Latin America.”
2. “The organization would have performed much better in the implementation of UN programmes if not for the following problems:
  - Information about international meetings and conferences is very sparse and generally arrives too late to be included in plans and budgets.
  - Scarce funds and few representative staff (all volunteers) make attendance at international meetings very difficult.
  - Poor national communications infrastructure makes it difficult to keep abreast of opportunities for collaboration through local United Nations offices.”

**Instructions for finding information about United Nations conferences and events from the United Nations website [www.un.org](http://www.un.org):**

1. From the UN homepage: click the “welcome” in the appropriate language
2. From the welcome page: in the left hand column, click “Conferences and Events”
3. From the Conferences and Events page: in “Background Information” click the bullet point entitled “Past Conferences and Special Sessions”. This will give you a list of all of the past conferences and sessions from 1994 to 2006.
4. Click on the name of the Conference that you wish to find details about.

From this page you may access information about the specific conference including agendas, round-table discussions, and written and oral reports that were presented, etc.

### **Information about past meeting of the Economic and Social Council and its Subsidiary Bodies**

1. From the United Nations homepage: click the “welcome” in the appropriate language
2. From the welcome page: in the left hand column, click “Main Bodies”
3. From the Main Bodies page: clicking on the “Economic and Social Council” hyperlink will lead to the Economic and Social Council homepage.
4. From the Economic and Social Council homepage: click on the “Meetings” link found in the top right hand corner of the page and drag your cursor down to “ECOSOC”. This will lead you to a links to meetings of the Council, its functional commissions and other bodies.

### **III. Editorial Guidelines**

Quadrennial reports are issued as official United Nations documents without formal editing. Authors of the reports are, nevertheless, requested to observe certain broad editorial guidelines to ensure that their documents will be in conformity with generally accepted United Nations policy and practice. The report should be drafted using the third person (i.e. “the executive director attended...” OR “The organization’s representative attended...” and NOT “I attended...”)

With the exception of certain public figures of unquestioned international renown, please try to avoid the use of proper names. Individuals should be identified by their official or functional titles wherever possible.

The use of non-parliamentary language that might be construed as being offensive should be scrupulously avoided.

References to United Nations documents or publications should cite both the title and indicate the relevant symbols. Quotations should be carefully referenced.

### **ABBREVIATIONS and ACRONYMS**

#### **General guidelines**

Abbreviations and acronyms (words formed from the initial letters of other words, e.g. UNESCO) should always be explained. The name or title should be written out in full the first time it occurs in a document, followed by the abbreviation in parentheses.

Abbreviations and acronyms are not used for names or titles that occur only once or twice in a text, except when the entity referred to is better known by the abbreviation or acronym, as in the case of UNICEF. In such cases, it may be preferable to give the abbreviation first, followed by the full name in parentheses. In rare cases, the full name of an entity is almost never used, e.g. Interpol.

The most common units of weight and measure, such as cm<sup>2</sup>, kg and km, need not be written out.

“United Nations” should not be abbreviated in English. The form “ONU” is acceptable in French.

In United Nations style, abbreviations and acronyms are written without full stops:

UNDP, not U.N.D.P.

Acronyms or abbreviated forms should not be used in running text for the following (although short titles may be used where appropriate):

- Principal organs and major offices of the United Nations:
  - o General Assembly, Security Council, Economic and Social Council
  - o United Nations Office at Geneva/Vienna/Nairobi
- Titles of senior officials:
  - o Secretary-General, Under-Secretary-General, Special Representative of the Secretary-General
- Conventions, treaties, plan/programmes of action
- Funds, programmes and the like that are not established as organizations
- **Names of Member States**
  - The World Tourism Organization and the World Trade Organization, to avoid confusing (but International Trade Centre UNCTAD/WTO)
  - The International Criminal Court (to avoid confusion with organizations such as the International Chamber of Commerce)
  - The International Court of Justice, the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and other courts

and tribunals

- Military or police forces
- Military terms, such as:
  - o ASZ (air safety zone), GSZ (ground safety zone)
  - o EAF (Entity Armed Forces), JSF (Joint Security Forces)
  - o COMKFOR (Commander of KFOR or KFOR Commander)
  - o DDR (disarmament, demobilization and reintegration) and variations thereon
- Obscure titles or names mentioned only once or twice in a document

**Exceptions to the general rules set out above include the following :**

- Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
- Office on the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR)
- (both to be used in reference to the Office only, not the High Commissioner)
- United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS)

### **Short Titles**

A short title may be used to replace a name or title that occurs several times in a document, provided that the full name is used the first time it occurs and that there is no risk of ambiguity; the Assembly (the United Nations General Assembly), the Council (the Economic and Social Council), the Committee (The Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations), the United Kingdom (the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland), the United States, (the United States of America).

### **AVOIDING AMBIGUITY**

#### **Dates**

The day should always be followed by the month and year: 21 April 2004.

Months should be written out in full.

#### **Seasons**

As the designations of the seasons relate to different times of the year in the northern and southern hemisphere, they should be used with care. A phrase such as "a meeting to be held in the spring" is ambiguous; a precise date (or month or quarter) should be given, if this can be ascertained

**Biannual, biennial etc.**

- biannual means occurring twice a year
- biennial means occurring every other year (every two years)
- bimonthly, biweekly and biyearly are ambiguous: they mean either “occurring twice a month/week/year” or “occurring every other month/week/year”

It is best to avoid these words entirely, and write “twice a month/week/year” and “every other month/week/year” (or “every two months/weeks/years”) as appropriate.

### **This year, next year**

Non-specific references to “this year”, “next year” or “last year” should be avoided. The specific year should be written, thus: “In 2004, the Secretary-General reported...”; “The number of peacekeeping operations in 2005 was...”; “Beginning in 2006...”

## **Country Names**

**All documents must adhere to the accepted United Nations terminology with respect to the names of Member State countries and territories.**

Country names and currencies are listed in the United Nations Multilingual Terminology Database (<http://unterm.un.org>). After you start your search, enter the name of the country in the “search” field. Under “subject”, click on the down arrow and choose “country name”. Both the short and formal country names are given. The short form is used for most purposes in the United Nations. The formal names I generally used in legal texts, such as treaties. The country name is normally given after the name of a city, unless the city is the capital.

### **For example:**

“The organization’s representative held discussions with officials of the International Labour Organization (Geneva, 5 May 2004) and later presented the outcome of that meeting to the membership at the Organization’s Annual General Meeting ,(11-13 August, Sergipe, Brazil).”

### **PLEASE NOTE THE FOLLOWING:**

#### **Use of the term “Persian Gulf” and “Gulf”:**

1. The term “Persian Gulf” is used as the standard geographical area



surrounding or adjacent to the sea area between the Arabian Peninsula and the Islamic Republic of Iran. The full term “Persian Gulf” is always used to designate that sea area when it is first referred to in a text and is repeated thereafter whenever necessary for the sake of clarity.

2. The term “Gulf” is used to identify or refer to the general geographical area surrounding or adjacent to the sea area referred to in paragraph 1 above or to refer to the situation around that sea area. The terms “Gulf area”, “Gulf region” and “Gulf States” are examples of such usage.

**Use of the term “the Falkland Islands (Malvinas)”:**

1. In accordance with a decision of the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly at its 1560<sup>th</sup> meeting, on 18 November 1965, of which note was taken by the General Assembly at the 1398<sup>th</sup> plenary meeting on 16 December 1965, the name to be applied to the Territory of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas) in all United Nations documents is the following:

- a. In English, “Falkland Islands (Malvinas)”
- b. In Spanish, “Islas Malvinas (Falkland Islands)”
- c. In all languages other than English and Spanish, the equivalent of “Falkland Islands (Malvinas)”

**Please note also the correct United Nations terminology for the following :**

1. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela [Venezuela]
2. Hong Kong, Special Administrative Region of China [Hong Kong SAR of China]
3. Macau, Province of China
4. Taiwan, Province of China
5. Tibet, Autonomous Region of China
6. Democratic Republic of Congo
7. Republic of Congo
8. Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea)
9. Republic of Korea (South Korea)
10. Kosovo (Serbia)
11. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [The FYR of Macedonia]
12. Palestine [territory under the administration of the Palestinian Authority]
13. The Occupied Territories of Palestine [areas under the administration of

the Israeli government]

**Source:** <http://www.un.org/esa/coordination/ngo/>

### **A3. Questionnaire**

#### **First part**

**N 1 How important is networking in your opinion? (open)**

**QC 1 How often do you have contact with representatives from**

**1 once a week (or more often, please specify)**

**2 once a month**

**3 several times per year**

a) NGOs

b) Permanent Missions

c) UN Headquarters

**QC 2 How does the contact take place in most cases (>50%) with**

**a) NGOs**

**b) Permanent Missions**

**c) UN Headquarters**

**1 face-to-face**

**2 through a phone call**

**3 by e-mail, fax, letter**

**QC 2.1 → if 1 face-to-face**

**How would you describe the meeting/face-to-face contact with the representative from**

**a) NGOs**

**b) Permanent Missions**

**c) UN Headquarters**

**1 formal**

**2 informal**

**3 personal**

**QC 5**

**Which side initiates the contact in most cases (>50%) (Please specify for relations with NGOs, Permanent Missions and UN Headquarters.)**

**QC 6**

**Why do you meet with representatives from**

**a) NGOs**

**b) Permanent Missions**

**c) UN Headquarters**

**1 official obligation**

**2 exchange of information**

**3 exchange of experiences**

4 to prepare a project together

5 other, please specify

**QC 6.1 Could you please describe what kind of**

1 official obligation

2 exchange of information

3 exchange of experiences

4 to prepare a project together

5 other, please specify

**QC 6.1.1 Please indicate also if these contacts specified above are**

1 formal

2 informal, or

3 personal

**QP 7 How many of the persons you have contact with do you know personally**

a) NGOs

b) Permanent Missions

c) UN Headquarters

**QP 8 How many of the contacts would you characterize as informal (% , last 3 months. Please exclude meetings like informal consultations of the Security Council.)**

a) NGOs

b) Permanent Missions

c) UN Headquarters

**QP 9 Are good relations (with your colleagues) important for your daily work?**

1 yes

2 no

**QP 10 Do you think personal relations are (also) important when working with**

a) NGOs

b) Permanent Missions

c) UN Headquarters

(Read out.)

1 very important

2 important

3 not so important

4 not important at all

→ Q 6, 2 exchange of information

**QE1 11 How often do you exchange information with representatives from**

- a) NGOs**                      **b) Permanent Missions**                      **c) UN Headquarters**
- 1 once a week  
2 once a month  
3 several times per year (Please specify.)

**QEI 12 Would you say that information are exchanged on a regular basis with**

- a) NGOs**                      **b) Permanent Missions**                      **c) UN Headquarters**
- 1 yes  
2 no

**QEI 13 Who provides the information in most cases (>50%)?**

- 1 you  
2 the other side  
3 both

→ QEI 13, 2 the other side

**QEI 13.1**

**Do you offer some sort of compensation for the provider of information?**

- 1 yes  
2 no

→ QEI 13.1, 1 yes

**QEI 13.1.1**

**What do you generally offer in return? (Read out.)**

- 1 information  
2 support  
3 cooperation  
4 other

Please specify.

→ QEI 13, 1 you

**If you are the provider of information, do you expect something in return?**

- 1 yes  
2 no

→ QEI 13.2, 1 yes

**If so, what do you generally expect in return? (Read out.)**

- 1 information

2 support

3 cooperation

4 other

Please specify.

**QEI 14 What kind of information do you exchange? (open)**

→ Q 6, 4 to prepare a project together

**QPRO 15**

**You are working together with**

**a) NGOs**

**b) Permanent Missions**

**c) UN Headquarters**

**on certain projects?**

1 yes

2 no

→ QPRO 15, 1 yes

**QPRO 15.1 Please give a brief description of up to three projects which you would consider as most significant and name important participants if possible (in chronological order, starting with the most recent, from the last two years).**

**QPRO 15.2**

**Who initiated the project(s)?**

**QPRO 15.3 What is your input to the project(s)? (Read out.)**

1 time

2 information

3 office space

4 contacts

5 money

6 other (Please specify.)

**QPRO 15.4 What is the input of the other actors involved? (Read out.)**

1 time

2 information

3 office space

4 contacts

5 money

6 other (Please specify.)

QPRO 16

**According to your impression, is the project/are the projects dominated by any participating actor(s)?**

1 yes

2 no

→ QPRO 16, 1 yes

**QPRO 16.1 Who is then the dominating actor in your opinion?**

QAD 17

**Would you consider asking somebody for advice who is working for a**

**a) NGOs**

**b) Permanent Missions**

**c) UN Headquarters**

→ QAD 17, 1 yes

**QAD 7.1 What kind of advice would you ask for?**

1 professional

2 personal

3 both

QAD 18

**Is there somebody at a**

**a) NGOs**

**b) Permanent Missions**

**c) UN Headquarters**

**who you ask for advice?**

1 yes

2 no

→ QAD 18, 1 yes

**QAD 18.1 Do you consider this person/these persons as**

1 colleague(s)

2 acquaintance(s)

2 friend(s)

**QTR 19 In your opinion, how trustworthy in general are people who are working for a) NGOs                      b) Permanent Missions                      c) UN Headquarters ?**

**(Read out.)**

1 very trustworthy

2 trustworthy

3 not so trustworthy

4 not trustworthy at all

**QTR 19.1 Is your opinion on trustworthiness based on your own experiences?**

1 yes

2 no

→ QTR 19.1,1 yes

**QTR 19.1.1 Could you give an example and describe this briefly? (open)**

**QCO 20**

**Who do you think is in control of the relations between NGOs, Permanent Missions and UN Headquarters?**

1 NGOs

2 Permanent Missions

3 national governments/member states

4 UN Headquarters (staff)

5 press

**QCO 20.1 What are the reasons for your opinion? (open)**

**QGA 21 Do you think that exchange and cooperation with**

**a) NGOs**

**b) Permanent Missions**

**c) UN Headquarters**

**are beneficial for your own work? (Read out.)**

1 very beneficial

2 beneficial

3 not so beneficial

4 not beneficial at all, or even

5 harmful

→ QGA 21; 1,2,3,4

**QGA 21.1 Are you interested in an exchange and cooperation with**

**a) NGOs**

**b) Permanent Missions**

**c) UN Headquarters**

**only because it is beneficial for your own work?**

1 yes

2 no

→ QGA 21.1, 2 no

**QGA 21.1.1 What are the other reasons for exchange and cooperation? (open)**



QIN 22

**How would you judge the influence coming from the cooperation with**

**a) NGOs                      b) Permanent Missions                      c) UN Headquarters?**

1 very strong

2 strong

3 not so strong

4 no influence

→ QIN 22; 1,2,3

**QIN22.1 Could you please give an example where the influence becomes clear? (open)**

→ QIN 22; 1,2,3

**QIN 22.2 What kind of influence do you experience mostly? How would you describe the influence? (Read out.)**

1 positive and supportive

2 negative and restrictive

## **Second Part**

QIM 23

**Which NGOs/ Permanent Missions/UN Departments are especially important for you/your work? Please name them.**

QIM 24

**Please explain in which respect they are important for you? (open)**

QIMPER 25

**Is there/are there persons whom you are cooperating with that are particularly important for you and your work? Please consider all the people you have thought of before when we talked about exchange of information, projects, advice and so on. Please name this person/these persons.**

Since we would like to learn more about networking and cooperation around the UN, we would like to speak with the persons you mentioned above. Therefore, it would be very helpful if you could indicate the field in which they work and give us their contact information.

(Provide interviewee with core list of contacts to check and add.)

#### A4. List of Interviewees

- 1) James Paul, Global Policy Forum
- 2) Catherine Dumait-Harper, Medecins sans Frontieres
- 3) Iain Levine, Amnesty International
- 4) Peter Davies, Oxfam
- 5) Joanna Weschler, Human Rights Watch
- 6) Jack Patterson, Quaker UN Office
- 7) Lucy Webster, ECAAR
- 8) Mia Adjali, United Methodist Office for the UN
- 9) John Burroughs, Lawyers' Committee for Nuclear Policy
- 10) Dennis Frado, Lutheran Office for World Community
- 11) Jeffrey Laurenti, UNA-USA
- 12) Jim Olson, UNA-USA
- 13) Gail Lerner, CCIA/World Council of Churches
- 14) Vernon Nichols, NGO Committee on Disarmament
- 15) William Pace, World Federalist Movement
- 16) John Rempel, Mennonite Central Committee
- 17) Sandra Tully, CARE International
- 18) Tracy Moavero, Peace Action International
- 19) Robert Smylie, Presbyterian Church
- 20) Afaf Mahfouz, CONGO

#### Additional contacts mentioned:

Barbara Adams, NGLS

Esmeralda Brown, NGO Committee on the International Decade of the World  
Indigenous Peoples

Roberto Bissio, Social Watch

Martin Khor, Third World Network

Earth Action

CICC Coalition for the International Criminal Court

Techeste Ahdenom, Bahai International Community

Danielle Bridel, Zonta International (women's organisation)

International Federation of University Women

International Psychoanalytical Association, Committee for the UN

## A5. Quantitative Data

### Frequency of Contact

	NGO	PM	UN
More than once a day	2	0	0
Daily	18	1	2
Once a week	0	18	17
Once a month	0	1	1

### Exchange

	NGO	PM	UN
Official obligation	0	3	10
Exchange of information	20	15	10
Exchange of experiences	0	2	0
To prepare a project	5	0	0

### Trustworthiness

	NGO	PM	UN
Very trustworthy	20	1	5
Trustworthy	0	3	15
Not so trustworthy	0	16	0

## **A6. Membership of the NGO Working Group on the Security Council**

**(As of October 2006)**

**Mia Adjali**

Director

United Methodist Office for the UN

**Doug Hostetter**

Director, UN Liaison

Mennonite Central Committee

**Görel Bogarde**

UN Representative

Save the Children

**Michelle Brown**

Senior Advocate

Refugees International

**John Burroughs**

Executive Director

Lawyers' Committee for Nuclear Policy

**Sam Cook**

Program Associate

Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF)

**Elizabeth Cousens**

Vice President

International Peace Academy

**Steve Crawshaw**

UN Advocacy Director

Human Rights Watch

**Peter Davies**

UN Representative

Saferworld

**Nicole Deller**

Program Advisor

World Federalist Movement

**Joseph Donnelly**

International Delegate to the UN

Caritas Internationalis

**Fabien Dubuet**

UN Representative

Médecins Sans Frontières

**Michelle Evans**

Deputy UN Representative

International Service for Human Rights

**Christopher Ferguson**

UN Representative

CCIA/World Council of Churches

**Catherine Fitzpatrick**

UN Representative

Physicians for Human Rights

**Dennis Frado**

Director

Lutheran Office for World Community

**Felice Gaer**

UN Representative

Jacob Blaustein Institute for Human Rights

**Joel Hanisek**

UN Representative

Presbyterian UN Office

**Jessica Huber**

UN Representative

Quaker UN Office

**Kate Hunt**

UN Liaison

CARE International

**Tanya Karanasios**

Program Director

Coalition for the International Criminal Court

**Ann Lakhdir**

President

NGO Committee on Disarmament

**Gerald Martone**

Director of UN Relations

International Rescue Committee

**Paul Mikov**

UN Representative

World Vision

**James Paul**

Executive Director

Global Policy Forum

**Michael Perry**

UN Representative

Franciscans International

**Nicola Reindorp**

UN Representative

OXFAM International

**Yvonne Terlingen**

UN Representative

Amnesty International

**Rhianna Tyson**  
Program Officer  
Global Security Institute

**Cora Weiss**  
President  
Hague Appeal for Peace

**Joanna Weschler**  
Director of Research  
Security Council Report

**June Zeitlin**  
Executive Director  
Women's Environment and Development Organization (WEDO)

Source: <http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/ngowkgrp/members.htm>

**Steering Group of the NGO Working Group on the Security Council**  
(As elected in July 2006)

**James Paul**, Co-Chair (Executive Director, Global Policy Forum)

**Kathleen Hunt**, Co-Chair (UN Liaison, Care International)

**Catherine Fitzpatrick**, Vice-Chair (UN Representatives, Physicians for Human Rights)

**Michelle Brown** (Senior Advocate, Refugees International)

**John Burroughs** (Executive Director, Lawyers' Committee on Nuclear Policy)

**Tanya Karanasios** (Program Director, Coalition for the International Criminal Court)

**Yvonne Terlingen** (UN Representative, Amnesty International)

**Joanna Weschler** (Director of Research, Security Council Report)

Source: <http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/ngowkgrp/steering.htm>