The London School of Economics and Political Science

Social movement networks, policy processes, and forest tenure activism in Indonesia

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A thesis submitted to the Department of International Development of the London School of Economics and Political Science for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, London, September 2011
Declaration

I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the MPhil/PhD degree of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which case the extent of any work carried out jointly by me and any other person is clearly identified in it).

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Abstract

This thesis aims to answer the following question: How do environmental movement networks sustain collective action in order to influence forest tenure reforms in Indonesia?

In doing so, it expressly relies on a relational approach to social movement studies that recognizes the interaction between the social structure and agency and the role of culture in shaping social movement networks. It relies on a mixed methods research design to study the forms and features of networks as well as the context, the meaning and the ongoing social processes that underlie environmental networks.

The first paper provides a macro-level analysis of the changing political context and of the forces internal to the environmental movement that have led to reforms in forest tenure policies in the last decade in Indonesia.

The second paper presents the research design of the thesis and discusses how specific theoretical approaches to social movement networks affect the choice of analytical methods and how relational approaches call for the use of mixed methods.

The rest of the thesis analyzes meso-level features of inter-organizational networking among environmental movement organizations (EMOs) and between EMOs and state actors. The third paper examines the role communication networks among EMOs in coalition work and illustrates how environmental values and common discursive practices can be important coalescing forces.

The fourth paper investigates the role of external institutionalization, contention and cooperation in relational forms of activism with state actors. It analyzes how the environmental movement, despite the use of moderate tactics, has avoided co-optation.

The fifth paper investigates the contingency of political opportunities at the meso-level. It suggests that at the inter-organizational level access to the state is dependent on the type of actors involved, their behavior and experiences, and the issue of contention, and it shows that EMOs can in part shape political opportunities.
To my parents

Irmgard Angelika Rhoden & Giacomo Di Gregorio
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Introduction

1 Social movement networks and policy processes

In recent years much research has investigated the role of networking in social movement studies (Diani and McAdam 2003; Edwards and Crossley 2009). In many ways this is not surprising, since social movements themselves are defined as ‘networks of informal interactions’ (Diani 1992: 13). As such, the concept of networks is at the base of the very definition of social movements. The study of social movement networks and political processes has, however, rarely been integrated (Saunders 2009).

On the one hand, the analysis of social movement networks has predominantly focused on the inner workings of social movements, with less attention given to the political context in which they operate and how political forces external to the movement interact with movement networks and affect outcomes. Thus, social networks have been found to facilitate mobilization (Snow et al. 1980; McAdam 1986; della Porta 1988; Fernandez and McAdam 1988; Gould 1991; Gould 1995; Diani 2004) and the formation of collective identity (Bearman and Stovel 2000; Diani and Bison 2004). The importance of networking in social movement outcomes does not just refer to inter-personal networks but also to networking among social movement organizations (SMOs). Both are central to coalition work (Rosenthal et al. 1985; Diani 1995; Osa 2003; Staggenborg and Lecomte 2009).

Another development in the study of social movement networks has seen a shift from the study of networks as a ‘metaphor’ (Wellman 1988; Knox et al. 2006) to the empirical investigation of actual interactions through the use of social network analysis (Diani and McAdam 2003; Edwards and Crossley 2009). The development of exploratory and statistical quantitative techniques in social network analysis and of dedicated software packages has advanced tremendously in the last decades (Wasserman and Galaskiewicz
Such techniques have been predominantly applied to study the inner workings of social movements and in particular to investigate the forms and features of network structures.

On the other hand, the analysis of political processes has a long tradition in social movement research, starting from the pioneering historical work on Great Britain by Charles Tilly (1978; 1995). Work on political processes has mainly focused on political opportunities understood as the political conditions external to the movement (Kitschelt 1986; Kriesi et al. 1995; Tarrow 1998). Such research has substantially contributed to the understanding of the role of broader political systems and of the actions of elites in influencing social movement outcomes. Yet, while political process approaches largely recognize the role of organizational networks in the emergence of social movements, few studies have investigated such processes through the use of formal social network analysis techniques (Bearman and Everett 1993; Osa 2003; Mische 2007; Saunders 2009). This is particularly true for studies that investigate networking between SMOs and state actors and analyze how social movements use networking to affect policy outcomes (Saunders 2009).

At the same time, one key critique in social movement research applies equally to early political process approaches and to the application of social network analysis in social movement studies. They have been criticized for being purely structural approaches, with a predominant focus on the structural features of social life and network structures alone, while neglecting the role of culture and agency in social movements (Emirbayer and Goodwin 1994; Mische 2003; Crossley 2010).

Within the political process approach, scholars have been somewhat receptive to these critiques and today refer to political opportunities neither as ‘structures’ alone nor as necessarily stable features of societies. Instead, some dimensions of political opportunities are recognized as being contingent and volatile (Gamson and Meyer 1996; Rootes 2009).

Regarding social network analysis, the critique has led to a call for a revival and the re-development of ‘relational’ approaches to sociology (Emirbayer 1997; Crossley 2011).
The term ‘relational’ here refers to three inter-related aspects: first, relational approaches consider the most important unit of analysis to be ‘relations’ among people and not just people or entities alone. Second and most importantly, relational sociology recognizes the constant interaction and inter-penetration between actors and relations, and ‘substance’ and ‘processes’ (Emirbayer 1997, p. 281). As such, it recognizes the inter-penetration of structure and agency and understands social structures as being constantly ‘in-process’ (Crossley 2011, p. 126). Third, according to some scholars (Emirbayer and Goodwin 1994), ‘relational’ sociology also recognises more clearly the role of culture in shaping social outcomes, and in particular the strong link between culture and agency. Such a view then necessarily recognizes the constructivist nature of social life. Consequently, relational perspectives in the study of networking within social movement studies suggest that there are no pre-given and fixed ‘network structures’ – that is to say, the form and features that social networks take – and that networks are not just the expression of structural social relations, but are also shaped by the actions of social movements. These perspectives also recognize the important role of culture in the constructivist nature of networks. This thesis adopts such a relational perspective in the study of environmental movement networks.

The thesis investigates how environmental movement networks affect political outcomes in one specific policy domain in Indonesia. Broadly speaking, this thesis aims to answer the following question: How do environmental movement networks sustain collective action in order to influence forest tenure reforms in Indonesia?

In doing so, this study expressly relies on relational approaches that recognize the interaction between the social structure and agency of social movements, and the role of culture in shaping social movement networks (Emirbayer and Goodwin 1994; Passy 2003; Mische 2010; Crossley 2011). This study relies on both social network analysis and qualitative analysis to go beyond the study of social network structures that define the forms and features of networks (Crossley 2011). Instead, it aims to integrate in the analysis
of the context, the meaning and ongoing social processes that underlie environmental networks. In doing so, the thesis contributes both to the theoretical debates around environmental networks and to methodological discussions.

This study draws extensively on existing research on environmental movements (Rucht 1989; Dalton 1994; Diani 1995; Rootes 1999a; 2003a; Baldassarri and Diani 2007; Saunders 2007). While empirical analysis of networks has been prominent in environmental movement studies (Diani 1995; Ansell 2003; Broadbent 2003; Saunders 2007), and extensive research on environmental activism has been carried out with regards to developing countries (Guha and Martinez-Alier 1997; Haynes 1999a; Duffy 2006; Forsyth 2007), only in rare cases has the role of environmental networks been investigated in emerging and developing countries (Nomura 2007; Park 2008). In this respect, the thesis also contributes to expanding the knowledge on environmental networks in developing countries.

Before presenting the research questions and the organization of this thesis in more detail, I provide justification for my choice of specific policy domain and some background information on forest tenure activism in Indonesia.

2 Forest tenure activism in Indonesia

There are a number of reasons why environmental activism around forest tenure is particularly important and interesting to investigate in Indonesia. First, the vastness of forest resources makes them a key driver of economic development as well as a central asset for local livelihoods. Second, state control over forests has fuelled grievances and increased the number of local conflicts, which remain largely unresolved today. And third, the political changes since the fall of Suharto in 1998 have triggered a resurgence of advocacy on the part of environmental movements, which has brought the issue of forest
tenure reforms back to the political agenda. Below I discuss these developments and their historical context.

The sheer scale of forest resources in Indonesia makes them a key natural resource for the country’s development. With around 90 million hectares of forest cover, Indonesia has the third most extensive tropical forestlands in the world after Brazil and the Democratic Republic of Congo (World Bank 2001). It also has the fourth largest population in the world.

Since the late 1960s, state control over forests in Indonesia has served the establishment of large-scale commercial exploitation in order to fuel economic development and modernization, the two pillars on which the legitimacy of the Suharto regime rested. Consequently, forest exploitation and deforestation accelerated tremendously. Commercial logging was not just feeding the engine of growth, but also Suharto’s cronies (Barr 1998). Export of logs first, and of plywood and pulp later, made the forestry sector the country’s second largest source of foreign exchange after oil (Ross 2001). Logging operations were undertaken with little attention to environmental damage, within a development framework that privileged economic exploitation over environmental sustainability.

What facilitated such developments was the highly centralized property rights structure for forest resources that had been established since independence. Article 33 of the Indonesian Constitution, which is still in force today, justifies state control by portraying the Indonesian state as the keeper of the forest on behalf of its people. It states that ‘the land, the waters and the natural riches contained [in the country] shall be controlled by the State and exploited to the greatest benefit of the people.’

1 All translations from Indonesian are by the author.
‘state forest areas’ (Ross 2001). Today this figure remains at sixty-five percent (World Bank 2006). By the end of the 1970s the whole state forest estate had been divided into concession areas to be assigned for large scale logging operations (McCarthy 2000; Contreras-Hermosilla and Fay 2005). Through one of the most centralized systems of administration, which nonetheless filtered down to every village in the vast archipelago, the Suharto regime effectively controlled one of the most valuable natural resources in the country.

One clear result was the loss of customary rights of communities over forest resources (Colfer and Resosudarmo 2002; Contreras-Hermosilla and Fay 2005). The dispossession of local forest users in areas where logging operations were under way translated into an increase in the number of local conflicts over forest tenure control and forms of local resistance (Scott 1990; Peluso 1992; Barber 1998; Peluso and Harwell 2001). These mainly triggered repression on the part of the state, which condoned and at times contributed to the use of force and intimidation on the part of large-scale logging businesses. Such conflicts rarely reached the courts. With an estimated 30 million people in Indonesia relying on forest resources for part of their income, today these developments still impact some of the poorest and most marginalized sections of the population (Resosudarmo 2004). Over time however, the resulting grievances led to national-level mobilization and to the formation of an environmental justice movement with strong links to human rights groups.

During the Suharto era challenging forest tenure regulations and practices was very risky; even in political circles a mere discussion about property rights to forestlands was a taboo (McCarthy 2000). The environmental movement had to downplay its advocacy around forest tenure in the eyes of the state and instead focus on less politically contentious issues such as conservation and sustainable forest management. With the fall

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2 The definition of ‘state forest areas’ includes forested as well as non-forested land and is not just ecologically but also politically determined (Peluso 1992; Peluso and Vandergeest 2001).
of Suharto in 1998 and the democratization process triggered by *Era Reformasi*, things changed and advocacy on forest tenure reforms became more vocal. Open challenges by a growing number of environmental organizations – aided by the resurgence of the agrarian and indigenous movements – brought the issue of forest control back onto the policy agenda (Lucas and Warren 2003; McCarthy 2004; Afiff *et al.* 2005; Warren 2005; Nomura 2007).

The expansion of local rights, however, still threatens conservative elites’ key interests and bureaucratic structures, which actively resist change. Despite such resistance, the last decade has witnessed some important advances in forest tenure reforms (Colfer and Resosudarmo 2002; Contreras-Hermosilla and Fay 2005). This would not have happened without the extraordinary efforts of a growing environmental justice movement that has worked for decades within constrained political conditions, and in recent decades has openly engaged with the political establishment.

While a lot of research has been done on forest tenure reforms and on the development of the environmental movement in Indonesia (McCarthy 2000; Peluso and Vandergeest 2001; Colfer and Resosudarmo 2002; McCarthy 2004; Nomura 2008; Peluso *et al.* 2008; Nomura 2009), many questions remain unanswered. While the contribution of the movement to forest tenure reform is largely recognized (Peluso *et al.* 2008), what is less clear is how such policy changes were achieved in a country with a legacy of suppressed civil society and with an elite and administrative structure that retain many features of the previous regime (Robison and Hadiz 2004).

This thesis investigates how networking among environmental movement organizations (EMOs), as well as between EMOs and state actors, has led to such achievements.
3 Research questions

Broadly speaking, this thesis asks how the environmental movement has been able to sustain collective action in order to influence forest tenure reforms in Indonesia.

In answering this question it looks both at the broader political context (macro-level) and at the role of inter-organizational networks among EMOs and between EMOs and the state (meso-level). The analysis focuses on four areas of social movement research, which are: macro-level political opportunities, coalition work, external institutionalization, and meso-level political opportunities.

More specifically, the thesis addresses four research questions aimed at assessing new empirical evidence and advancing theory on environmental social movement research. The aim is to answer not just the what, but to gain some insights into the how and why of social movement networking in contentious politics (Gerring 2007).

The first research question refers to the macro-level analysis and investigates the political context in which the environmental movement operates. It looks at the broad processes that have led to the achievements of the environmental movement in the forest tenure domain in Indonesia. It asks:

1. To what extent have macro-level political opportunities influenced the achievements of the environmental movement in reforming forest tenure in Indonesia since the fall of the Suharto regime?

The other three research questions focus on the meso-level and look at three distinct aspects of inter-organizational networking among EMOs and between them and state actors. The empirical data are derived from a social organization survey of EMOs and semi-structured and unstructured interviews undertaken with EMOs and state actors.
The second question investigates the role of networking in coalition work and asks:

2. What drives coalition work among EMOs in this policy domain, and what role do communication networks play in coalition work?

The third research question examines the extent to which external institutionalization represents an advantage or a risk for EMOs and asks:

3. How do EMOs avoid co-optation when they interact closely with state actors?

The last research question considers the contingency of political opportunities at the meso-level and asks:

4. How do EMOs gain access to the state and to what extent can EMOs manage political opportunities at the meso-level?

The thesis is organized into five distinct papers. The first paper discusses the macro-level political context, the second paper presents the methods contribution of the thesis, other three paper address the meso-level investigation, each one focusing on a different aspect of inter-organizational environmental movement networks.

4 Organization and synopsis of the papers of the thesis

The first paper looks at the changing political context in which the environmental movement has operated in the last decade in Indonesia in order to advance the recognition of local rights to forest resources.
The paper first provides a theoretical discussion on political opportunities in social movement studies, juxtaposing political process approaches that consider political opportunities as exclusively externally driven (Tilly 1978; Tarrow 1998) with approaches that recognize the interaction between elites and social movements in shaping the political context in which they operate (Rucht 1988). The paper then analyzes some of the key achievements of the environmental movement in effecting changes in property rights arrangements for forest resources and how the movement not only recognized and exploited existing windows of opportunity, but also sought to expand existing ones. The paper concludes that such achievements resulted from the interaction between new and changing external forces, and the effective coalition work together with the strategic mix of both insider and outsider tactics on the part of the environmental movement.

The paper also illustrates how in Indonesia democratization has reshaped a political system that is today more open to the demands of civil society in general, and those of the environmental justice movement in particular. Yet, in the last decade the ability of environmental movement organizations to access elites has fluctuated over time in accordance with changes at the highest level of executive power, namely the Indonesian Presidency. This feature shows that although democratization has strengthened the role of the legislative power in Indonesian political affairs, the influence of the executive on political opportunities remains quite powerful.

The second paper presents the methodological contribution of this thesis to the study of networks in social movement studies. It first discusses the relationship between analytical methods and theoretical approaches to social movement networks and then shows how the overall research design of the thesis, which uses a mixed methods approach, improves its ability to achieve analytical depth.

The paper suggests that in the study of social networks, structural theoretical approaches to social movements tend to rely predominantly on quantitative social network
analysis. The reason is that this provides the abstraction and simplification needed to identify the forms and to measure the features of social networks (Crossley 2010; Edwards 2010), which is the main focus of structural analysis. Next, the paper highlights some of the limits of such approaches. It then shows why relational theoretical approaches that recognize the constructivist nature of social relations are drawn towards the use of mixed methods (Edwards and Crossley 2009; Edwards 2010; Mische 2010). Such approaches are not just interested in forms and features of networks but in studying their meaning and the processes and dynamics that underlie human interactions and social networks, be they at the individual or the organizational level. Qualitative analysis helps to explore the meaning people give to social relations and the processes that drive such interactions. It therefore contributes to explaining why networks look the way they do, why they emerge and why they change over time (Emirbayer and Goodwin 1994).

The theoretical discussion is followed by the presentation of the research design of this thesis, which combines exploratory quantitative social network analysis with qualitative analysis to study the role of inter-organizational networking in forest tenure activism in Indonesia. Mixed methods provide the tools for reaching greater analytical depth in the study of social movement networks, combining the strengths of quantitative and qualitative research methods while controlling for their respective pitfalls (Greene et al. 1989). While this paper demonstrates new ways of combining quantitative and qualitative methods in analyzing relational aspects of social movement networks, further research is needed to systematically analyze the variety of ways in which qualitative and quantitative methods can be more effectively combined in the research of social movement networks.

The third paper examines what underlies dense communication networks – operationalized as information and other resource exchanges – among EMOs in the forest tenure domain in Indonesia. It contributes to the existing literature on how networks and
coalitions work by introducing a new concept of ‘SMO discourse coalitions’ and providing new evidence on the role of environmental values and framing processes in coalition work.

While coalition work has long been recognized as a driving force behind mobilization (Staggenborg 1986; Gerharts and Rucht 1992; Coy 2008; Staggenborg and Lecomte 2009; Van Dyke and McCammon 2010), recent research has ascribed different functions in coalition work to communication networks among individual members (inter-personal networks), compared with those among social movement organization (inter-organizational networks). On the one hand, networking among individuals and overlapping individual membership in SMOs are seen as contributing to dense interactions that underlie the formation of collective identities, which can be the basis for robust and sustained coalition work. On the other hand, inter-organizational communication networks tend to be seen as only weakly connecting very distinct clusters of SMOs, leading to no more than short-term instrumental alliances which do not create any ideational bonds (Baldassarri and Diani 2007).

This paper argues that such a distinction between the micro-integration function of inter-personal networks and the macro-integration function of inter-organizational networks is too simplistic and overlooks that inter-organizational communication networks can have a much more fundamental role in coalition work.

By integrating cultural approaches to social movements in network studies, the paper shows how dense areas of inter-organizational communication networks are qualitatively different from less dense areas. Similarity in values and common discursive practices are characteristic of dense areas of interactions and reveal strong common concerns and ongoing framing activities aimed at forging robust coalitions and sustained collective action. The paper offers three propositions regarding the relationship between environmentalism, framing processes and communication networks from the empirical evidence.
First, communication networks are denser among EMOs that share the same variety of environmentalism compared to those that do not. Second, density of interaction in SMO discourse coalitions is driven by extensive framing processes to formulate and maintain a common discourse. Third, SMO discourse coalitions can bridge different varieties of environmentalism, bringing together EMOs that draw on distinct yet compatible environmental values. This study contributes to the existing research on social movement coalitions by suggesting a much more fundamental role for information and resource exchange networks than previously acknowledged.

The fourth paper investigates the role of contention and cooperation in relational forms of activism – or transactional activism (Petrova and Tarrow 2007) – with state actors. In particular, it analyzes how the environmental movement in Indonesia has avoided co-optation in its interactions with elites despite the use of moderate tactics.

In doing so, this paper questions social movement theories that suggest that external institutionalization – understood as regular and structured interaction with state actors – is necessarily an indication of co-optation and demobilization (Selznick 1949; Piven and Cloward 1971; van der Heijden 1997).

Rather, it argues that this can be an expression of strategic networking (Petrova and Tarrow 2007). This is particularly the case in political systems undergoing processes of democratization and that retain a legacy of limited individual participation by civil society in political decision-making. Consequently, the paper suggests that it is necessary to go beyond the simple distinction between contention outside of formal policy channels versus participation in policy processes, where the first is seen as challenging and the latter as accommodating state interests (Katzenstein 1998). Instead, regular interactions with state actors can be contentious, cooperative or a mix of the two. The latter has been increasingly observed in institutionalized movements in democratic polities and has been labelled as
‘conflictual cooperation’. Such strategies help to prevent co-optation (Evers 1990; Giugni and Passy 1998).

The paper then assesses the theoretical argument against the evidence of networking between EMOs and state actors in the policy domain related to forest tenure in Indonesia. After illustrating the breadth of the repertoires of collective action used by EMOs, which span from unconventional protest to lobbying activities, it looks at regular interactions between EMOs and state actors. Based on relational data and on EMOs’ own qualifications of the content of such interactions as either contentious, cooperative or featuring both qualities, this study assesses the degree of external institutionalization. While contentious interactions and conflictual cooperation denote the absence of co-optation, further analysis is needed to assess the degree and risk of co-optation of those EMOs that display cooperative behavior. In this case, the question becomes whether the original values and demands of EMOs are compatible with those of state actors or if instead they have been transformed by state actors to accommodate their own goals. The evidence from Indonesian forest activism shows that the environmental movement has largely been able to avoid co-optation. The variety of EMOs’ collective action repertoires, as well as their strategy of conflictual cooperation, provides them with a form of embedded autonomy vis-à-vis state actors.

The fifth paper in this study brings the analysis of political opportunities to the meso-level. It questions structural approaches to political opportunities because of their exclusive focus on macro-level conditions and their lack of attention to inter-organizational relations and dynamics. In so doing, this paper complements the first one, on macro-level structural political opportunities, by adding a second level of analysis. At the meso-level political opportunities have much more nuanced features.

The paper proposes an interactionist approach to studying political opportunities at the meso-level. Such an approach suggests that at the inter-organizational level access to
the state is contingent on the type of actors, their behavior and experiences, and the issue of contention (Rucht 1988; Meyer and Staggenborg 1996; Rootes 1999c; Saunders 2009). This is not to say that social structures do not matter, but that access to the state varies for different EMOs at different times. The recognition of the contingency of political opportunities does not only underscore their dynamic nature, but also highlights that EMOs themselves can in part affect political opportunities through changes in their strategies and framing activities.

This paper then shows how, in the forest tenure policy domain in Indonesia, EMOs and international actors manage and shape political opportunities at the meso-level. The paper first considers lobbying networks and in particular which state actors are targeted in lobbying activities and why. It then illustrates the role of international organizations in supporting the establishment of new modes of governance. In Indonesia new modes of governance venues are quite important and expand the opportunities of EMOs to access state actors. This study also examines the reactions of threatened state actors to challengers, thus underscoring how political opportunities are in fact evolving as opposed to being stable conditions. Finally, the paper advances the existing research on the contingency of political opportunities by developing six propositions from the Indonesian evidence regarding the contingency of political opportunities at the meso-level. It contributes to the study of environmental movements by showing how they can at least in part manage political opportunities, as well as adding to the literature on international development by highlighting the role of international actors in shaping political opportunities in developing countries.

A short conclusion follows the five papers and brings together and integrates the main findings, which together provide an in-depth analysis of the role of environmental movement networks in the forest tenure policy domain in Indonesia. The conclusion also illustrates how this thesis contributes to both the theory and the operationalization of
relational approaches to social movement studies. The thesis ends by outlining some policy implications and areas for future research.

The research design on which this thesis is based relies on a case study approach, where distinct features of environmental networks are studied with reference to a specific policy domain in Indonesia. The thesis is, however, organized in a paper format where each of the papers is a stand-alone piece of research and should be regarded as such. Each focuses on a specific study area in social movement research and aims to provide both a theoretical and an empirical contribution to the literature. One of the consequences of combining a case study approach with a paper format thesis is that at times there are some unavoidable repetitions in the papers. These refer in particular to the overall theoretical approach and some general features of the research design and methods in the single papers, which need to be fleshed out each time. I have tried as far as possible to keep such overlaps to a minimum and to highlight distinct aspects of the methods approach in each paper.

While the papers focus on different themes and use data referring to different networking interactions, two papers refer to data from the same network for a limited part of the empirical section. This refers to the ‘knowledge’ network which describes EMOs’ perception of the influence of state actors. The information from this network is, however, used in the two papers in conjunction with different evidence, to compare different networks and to discuss very distinct areas of social movement studies.
Forest tenure activism in Indonesia amidst changing political opportunities

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Abstract

This paper investigates how over the last decade the environmental justice movement has been able to advance its claims for increased recognition of local rights to forests in Indonesia, despite strong resistance from key elite actors. The paper argues that the answer lies in the interaction between expanding political opportunities, successful coalition work and the simultaneous use of both insider and outsider tactics on the part of the environmental movement. The relational approach used in this paper advances the effort of integration of political process approaches and framing approaches to contentious politics by recognizing the interpenetration of political opportunities and the agency of social movements in shaping policy outcomes.

Keywords: environmental social movements; political opportunities; framing; forest tenure; Indonesia
1 Introduction

This paper investigates how the environmental justice movement has been able to advance the causes of local forest resource users in the last decade of democratic rule in Indonesia, despite strong resistance from central bureaucratic actors.

There is no question that *Era Reformasi*, the period of political reform leading to and following the fall of the Suharto regime, presented an unprecedented window of opportunity for the environmental movement to bring the controversial issue of forest tenure back onto the policy agenda (McCarthy 2000; Nyman 2006). Since then, there have been some substantial advances towards increased recognition of local rights to forests. But how exactly were these achievement reached? Were favourable political opportunities the main force facilitating these changes? Or was the political agency of the environmental movement the main driving force?

A focus on political opportunities stresses the importance of external political conditions in affecting the emergence, the strategies and the successes and failures of social movements (Tarrow 1998). It risks, however, overlooking the role of decisions and actions on the part of the environmental justice movement (Goodwin and Jasper 1999). After all, social movements represent a social force that is not just able to take advantage of windows of political opportunity, but also reshapes its environment (Tilly 1978; Benford and Snow 2000). Agency of social movements is expressed in many ways: in the forms of strategizing, in how social movements frame policy problems, in the construction of movement identity and solidarity, and in the choice of repertoires of collective action (Tilly 1978; Goodwin and Jasper 1999; Snow 1999). In fact, in the last decade in Indonesia, the environmental movement has been particularly active in attempting to influence policy changes. It has been active in building broad-based movement coalitions, it has sought out elite allies, and has used a variety of repertoires of collective action that have in turn
affected the external political context (Moniaga 1998; Nomura 2007; Peluso et al. 2008; Nomura 2009).

This paper argues that in order to understand how the environmental justice movement was able to advance its claims for more inclusive forest tenure policies it is necessary to investigate the interactions between the dynamics of changing political opportunities and the expressions of agency of the movement.

After a short discussion of the shortcomings of focusing exclusively on either external or internal forces to explain social movement outcomes, the paper stresses the importance of combining these perspectives and suggests that focusing on relational approaches allows a better recognition of the interpenetration of these two forces which together explain the outcomes of the movement. Next, the paper analyses the processes that led to key achievements of forest activism on tenure reform in Indonesia. This is followed by the analysis of the distinct contributions of changing political opportunities, framing activities and repertoires of contention to these outcomes. The paper shows that progress on the inclusiveness of forest tenure policies is not just due to favorable political opportunities, but to effective framing activities and to the simultaneous use of both insider and outsider tactics on the part of the movement. The paper concludes by highlighting the importance of recognizing that external conditions and the agency of social movements interact in dynamic ways, and that the effects of one on the other contribute to the achievement of the environmental justice movement.

2 Explaining social movement outcomes

The impact of social movements is usually ascribed to two sets of forces. The first set is external to the movement and the second internal. Political process approaches to social movements stress the importance of external factors in explaining the emergence, the strategies and the impact of social movements (Tilly 1978; Tarrow 1998). Resource
mobilization theories highlight internal aspects such as the importance of tangible and intangible resources for effective mobilization and the advantages of institutionalization and professionalization (McCarthy and Zald 1977). Finally, cultural and framing approaches highlight how internal processes such as the formation of collective identity and solidarity contribute to the emergence of social movements and how social movements shape the very understanding of social problems (Melucci 1989; Benford and Snow 2000).

Each approach provides a piece of the puzzle that helps explain the outcomes of the complex interplay between social movements and their environment. The need for the integration of these approaches has long been recognized (Jenkins and Form 2005). And, despite the possible tensions between the approaches, there have been considerable efforts to integrate them (McAdam et al. 1996a; McAdam et al. 2001). While this paper does not aim to add to an elusive quest for a grand theory on social movements, it suggests that each approach contributes to explaining social movement outcomes. But in order to integrate these approaches it is necessary to reduce some of the tensions in the distinct explanations.

More precisely, to recognize the interpenetration of external and internal forces it is necessary to move away from overly structural approaches to political opportunities and recognize the interaction between structure and agency (Gamson and Meyer 1996; Emirbayer 1997; Emirbayer and Mische 1998; Goodwin and Jasper 1999). In other words, ‘opportunities may shape or constrain movements, but movements can create opportunities as well’ (Gamson and Meyer 1996: 276). At the macro-level, political opportunities are often operationalized as the level of openness of the political system, the stability of political alignment, the presence of elite allies and the propensity/capacity of the

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3 At the same time, the success of such achievements has also been criticized (Lichbach 1997; Selbin 1997).
state to repress or facilitate mobilization (Marks and McAdam 1999). Each of these can at least partly be affected by the actions of the movement itself.

Moreover, framing processes interact with political opportunities (Snow and Benford 1988; Gamson and Meyer 1996). How social movements frame claims affects the extent to which elites will resist or accommodate their demands. Frame alignment processes which link distinct interpretations to form new ways of understanding problems that subsume distinct beliefs, goals and interest are used to seek elite allies as much as to mobilize supporters and strengthen social movement coalitions (Snow et al. 1986). Claims can be recast in a very different light through frame transformation to overcome adverse political conditions (Benford and Snow 2000).

In addition, windows of political opportunity need not just exist, they need to be perceived as such (Sawyers and Meyer 1999). This implies that political opportunities are subject to interpretation and social movements’ decisions on strategies and tactics depend on such perceptions. The choice of tactics of social movements is affected by many factors apart from political opportunities and such choices have profound implications on outcomes (Tarrow 1998). In addition, these decisions are subject to debate within movements and responses do not need to be cohesive. Some social movement actors might decide to work within existing policy channels and use insider tactics, others might decide to focus on mobilization and organize protest activities. Some organizations might opt to work both within and outside formal policy channels (Giugni and Passy 1998; Saunders 2009). Argumentation and discursive practices internal to the movements therefore also affect outcomes (Tilly 1978; 1998; Mische 2003). Thus, political opportunities can at best mediate the impacts of argumentation and mobilization (Amenta et al. 1992; Hajer and Laws 2006).

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4 Political opportunities can be investigated at the macro (national polity) or at the meso-level (organizational level) (Meyer and Staggenborg 1996; Saunders 2009). This paper focuses on the first aspect alone, while meso-level dynamics are investigated in another paper (Di Gregorio 2011).
Having outlined some important ways in which external political conditions interact with internal dynamics including framing processes and strategic decisions about forms of contention, it is possible to combine the different explanations. Such logic in fact recognizes that political opportunities are structures ‘in-process’ (Crossley 2011, p.126), which are affected by the agency of social movements (Giddens 1984; Sewell 1992). One major implication is that in order to better understand social movements’ achievements it is useful to investigate the processes of interactions between external actors and social movements which lead to such outcomes (Emirbayer and Goodwin 1994).

The rest of the paper applies these insights to the analysis of how in the last decade the environmental justice movement was able to influence reforms related to forest tenure arrangements in Indonesia. The next section focuses on the dynamic processes of interaction among actors that led to three major achievements. This is followed by the analysis of specific roles of changing political opportunities, framing processes and forms of contention. The conclusion brings together these explanations and assesses them.

The information for this study was gathered through three fieldwork visits between 2005 and 2007, and is based on semi-structured interviews with 44 actors from among environmental movement organizations and key government agencies and on the analysis of documentation provided by interviewees.

3 Interactions between external and internal forces shaping forest tenure reforms

3.1 The New Forestry Law

The first policy development in forest tenure policy since the fall of Suharto was the ratification of the New Forestry Law in 1999. It represents only a minor achievement for the environmental movement, but is nonetheless a central policy event related to forest
tenure. The elaboration and ratification of this new law is usually ascribed to external political opportunities linked to the fall of Suharto (Colfer and Resosudarmo 2002). However, a closer look at the nature of the processes of interaction between the state and the environmental movement, reveal an important pro-active role of the latter.

The Suharto regime fell in May 1998 after three months of popular uprising and renewed attempts of repression (Budiman et al. 1999; Hadiz 1999). This period saw a flux in political alignments (Robison and Hadiz 2004) and a revival of civil society (Aspinall 1999; Eldridge 2005). In June 1998, the new Forestry Minister, Dr. Muslimin Nasution, called for a revision of forestry regulations (Fay and Sirait 2003). The move by the Ministry to redraft the forestry law, however, recalled the patterns seen during the establishment of the New Order, when shortly after the Suharto regime took power, most laws related to natural resources were redrafted by the relevant Ministries to secure state control over natural resources. Such a decision therefore could represent either a window of opportunity or a threat to the movement.

This time, however, the new Minister set up a special committee - the Forestry and Estate Crops Reform Committee - composed of reformists within the Ministry of Forestry, academics, non-governmental organizations and business sector representatives. The mandate was to provide recommendations through an extensive consultation process to the policy makers (Fay and Sirait 2002). Such broad consultations indicate a clear departure from the New Order period, and signal an expansion of the alliance system of the environmental movement in elite circles. This alliance was certainly facilitated by the fragmentation of existing political coalitions following Suharto’s fall (Robison and Hadiz 2004), indeed indicated an expansion of political opportunites.

But how did the environmental movement gain access to the revision process? The answer to this question resides in events and processes occurring prior to the unravelling of the crisis and resulted from the internal efforts of the environmental movement in conjunction with international influence. The late 1990s witnessed the introduction of new
modes of governance in Indonesia’s environmental policy arenas. International donors working on sustainable development issues supported a number of semi-independent multi-stakeholder forums led by environmental movement organizations (Di Gregorio 2011). The environmental social movement did not just take advantage of these new venues, but actively promoted them. As the new committee was formed, such forums activated themselves to seek access to it and were quite successful. Particularly involved in the new committee was the Indonesian Communication Forum on Community Forestry (Colchester et al. 2003; Fay and Sirait 2003). This multi-stakeholder forum was supported by the Ford Foundation and included civil society, business and reformist forces within the Ministry (Fay and Sirait 2003). After extensive consultations with local civil society organizations and local governments, the forum produced a number of recommendations to strengthen the forest tenure arrangements of local communities. On the basis of these, the committee itself produced a draft proposal for the New Forestry Law. Such development, however, triggered a series of responses.

Conservative groups within the Ministry led a counter-mobilization to seek support for a different draft of the bill proposal that explicitly maintained all forests under the control of the state. Prepared by the former Director General of Forest Utilization, Titus Sarijanto, the bill was submitted for ratification to the People's Representative Council in April 1999. In reaction, the environmental and agrarian movements organized a series of protests calling for the withdrawal of the draft, denouncing the lack of measures to empower local people and the disregard for international agreements on forests (Jakarta Post 1999). At the same time, the environmental movement was able to find allies within the political establishment. Two former Ministers of Forestry and of the Environment issued statements in support of the efforts of the environmental movement and called for the delay of the parliamentary debate until the new political elections in late September. The government, however, refused to delay the debate and the New Law on Forestry was ratified on September 13th (Jakarta Post 1999). Only two weeks later, the newly elected
members of Parliament were sworn in. These processes clearly show how the actions and re-action of different actors constantly reshaped the political conditions.

Despite the inability of the environmental movement to achieve community ownership of forests, the New Forestry Law in fact allows for devolution of substantial management rights over customary forest and in so-called forest zones with special purposes (Colfer and Resosudarmo 2002). This shows that, despite an effective counter-mobilization, the conservative forces within the Ministry had, in part, to accommodate the demands of the movement.

3.2 The Decree on Agrarian Reforms and Management of Natural Resources

The second and major achievement of the movement, the ratification of the legislative Decree on Agrarian Reforms and Management of Natural Resources, was led by internal processes of agency which opened up political opportunities.

In 1998, a coalition comprising over seventy environmental movement organizations called the Coalition for the Democratization of Natural Resources started to campaign in support of the revision of all natural resource management legislation. The coalition identified five major constraints to the democratic and equitable management of natural resources in Indonesia and called for their elimination. The first constraint is the supremacy of national interest over customary rights in Indonesia. All legislation on natural resources, starting from the Basic Agrarian Law (Art. 5), indicates that the state can ignore local rights to resources in the name of an undefined principle of ‘national interest’. This principle translates into insecure property rights for local people (HuMa et al. 2002). The second constraint is Indonesia’s sectoral approach to natural resource management, which leaves substantial space for discretionary decision making on the part of the bureaucracy. The other constraints are the unequal legal access to natural resources, the lack of
consideration of ecological and human rights in Indonesia’s development strategy, and the lack of participation and democracy in decision-making and policy formulation (Moniaga 1998). The demand for the revision of these five principles represents more fundamental changes than just a policy reform plan. Eliminating these constraints would affect future political opportunities as forest users become empowered to make their own management decisions.

Consultations and discussions with policy makers led to a legal proposal which was ratified in 2001 (TAP MPR IX/2001) by the People's Consultative Assembly, the main legislative body at the time. The decree addresses all five demands and instructs the Parliament and the President of Indonesia to implement agrarian reforms, to revise all natural resource management laws, and to set up an effective mechanism to address existing and future conflicts over land and natural resources. In relation to forest tenure, the proposal potentially opens the way for the recognition of community and individual rights to forest resources. What was at the base of such effective coalition work?

The passage of the decree was made possible by the simultaneous use of mass mobilization for unconventional protest and insider advocacy, and by the presence of key elite allies within the People’s Consultative Assembly. A successful framing process and tested repertoires of contention contributed to mobilize a very broad coalition. Mobilization for protest was primarily organized by the agrarian movements, while the environmental justice movement was predominantly involved in lobbying efforts. All these efforts and use of multiple tactics together expanded existing political opportunities and put substantial pressure on policymakers to ratify the decree.

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5 Ketetapan Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Republik Indonesia Nomor IX/MPR/2001 Tentang Pembaruan Agraria dan Pengelolaan Sumberdaya Alam, or People’s Consultative Assembly Decree on Agrarian Reforms and Management of Natural Resources (referred to as TAP IX from now on).
3.3 Addressing land conflicts

The internal efforts of the environmental social movement continued, through the interaction with policymakers, the search for elite allies, and a proposal for a new independent commission on land conflicts.

In May 2000, the environmental movement organized a high profile national conference on natural resource management to work on the recommendations for the implementation of the TAP IX decree. Government representatives were invited as well as civil society actors. After the meeting, some of the participating environmental movement organizations established a new working group – called the Working Group for the Management of Natural Resources - to translate the recommendations of the conference into an operational action plan for the movement. The working group later consolidated and formalized the alliance between the environmental and the agrarian movement and consequently changed its name to the Working Group for Agrarian Reform and the Management of Natural Resources. This alliance represented a crucial step toward the integration of different perspectives on land policies within civil society and substantially strengthened the coalition (Lucas and Warren 2003).

The search for elite allies continued outside the movement and led to the alliance with the National Commission on Human Rights. A joint team prepared a proposal for a Presidential Decree on the establishment of an independent National Commission for the Resolution of Agrarian Conflicts, which would operate on principles of transitional justice inspired by the South African experience. The justification for an independent commission was based on the suggestion that the Indonesian Court System was ill-equipped to deal with the accumulation of land disputes throughout Indonesia. A Committee would establish conflict resolution procedures and a special agrarian court to settle land disputes arisen since the New Order (Junaidi 2004; Tim Kerja Mengagas Pembentukan 2004).

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6 The commission is a semi-independent agency set up in 1993 by Suharto in the aftermath of East Timor massacres if 1991 in response to international pressure.
The environmental movement again directly engaged with policy makers. In 2004 the proposal was submitted to the Indonesian President (KomNasHAM 2004). Support within the government was low however, and although at the time President Megawati indicated that the state secretary would review the proposal, no further action was taken. With the election of President Susilo Bambang Yodhoyono lobbying resumed, which indicates a shift in political opportunities. The response of the new President to the proposal was to maintain existing state institutions instead of setting up an independent commission, but strengthen the existing agrarian conflict resolution mechanisms. These reforms accommodate in part the demands of the agrarian movement, but do not address forest tenure conflicts. This is no coincidence. The efforts of the movement triggered strong resistance from the Ministry of Forestry, which was able to successfully lobby the Presidency to leave forests outside the reform agenda. Again, actions of the movement and reactions of threatened elites shaped the outcomes.

3.4 The inclusion of forests in the National Agrarian Reform Program

All past efforts of the environmental movement to pressure, lobby and engage policy makers and other actors paved the way for the inclusion of forest resources in agrarian reforms. These changes were determined by both external conditions and internal action. This time the pressure of the environmental and agrarian movements for the recognition of local rights was met with a window of opportunity represented by the Presidential elections of 2003.

7 The exclusion of forest from wider reforms is not a new phenomenon in Indonesia. For example, all World Bank funded land tenure and titling sponsored programs in Indonesia have so far explicitly excluded state forest lands (World Bank 2004).

8 Since Reformasi, farmers’ union mobilization in particular was crucial to push for the inclusion of agrarian reforms in the government agenda. Contentious actions such as protests, demonstrations, and petitions forced the issue on to the policy agenda and later created the space for cooperation with government agencies (Fauzi 2003; Lucas and Warren 2003; Peluso et al. 2008).
The winning candidate and new President Susilo Bambang Yodhoyono (SBY) had promised in the presidential campaign to implement agrarian reforms. He announced the National Land Reform Program in September 2006, after a meeting requested by the head of the National Land Agency with various Ministers including the Minister of Agriculture and the Minister of Forestry\(^9\) (Jakarta Post 2006; Medan Bisnis 2006). Years of campaigning, lobbying and protesting affected the priorities the SBY’s campaign and helped to put pressure on the Ministry of Forestry to accept the inclusion of forests into the National Agrarian Reform Program.

The novelty of the Program is that, for the first time in Indonesian history, land reform involves the redistribution of both agricultural and forest lands. The redistribution of 8.2 million hectares of agricultural lands is administered by the National Land Agency, while the Ministry of Forestry is responsible for the devolution of management rights of over 6.9 million hectares of forest land. The latter plan involves the conversion of around 1.5 million hectares of ‘production forest’ in Java previously managed by the state forestry corporation into non-forest land and its redistribution to local farmers (Medan Bisnis 2006). It also includes 5.4 million hectares of production forest targeted at the Peoples’ Plantation Program\(^10\). The latter will allow 360,000 small farmers to undertake small scale tree planting and over 10 years and provide an average of 15 hectares of plantation forest per household (Departmen Kehutanan 2006b).

One important difference between the land reform administrated on agricultural land and on forest land pertains to the type of property rights arrangements. While the National Land Agency provides individual titles to agricultural land - the most secure type of property right in Indonesia - the scheme administered by the Ministry of Forestry provides leases of up to 100 years\(^11\), and therefore weaker rights. This is still quite

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\(^10\) The Peoples Plantation Program stands for Hutan Taman Rakyat or HTR. Another 3.4 million hectares are reserved for industrial plantation in forest lands (Hutan Tanaman Industri or HTI).

\(^11\) Note that the regulation states a maximum period of 100 years, but does not set a minimum limit.
remarkable, given that in the past social forestry projects provided at most five year long tenure rights for commercial tree planting activities. Such short-term tenure arrangements entail considerable uncertainty for farmers and therefore reduce the incentives for investment and management efforts, as they do not provide enough assurance of the ability to reap future benefits from management\(^\text{12}\) (Migot-Adholla et al. 1993; Meinzen-Dick et al. 2002). The agrarian reform program should provide investment contributions (8 million Rupiah per hectare), a guaranteed selling price and a credit and subsidy scheme (Departmen Kehutanan 2006a).

Although these reforms only in part accommodate the demands of the environmental movement for local recognition of local user rights to forests, it is quite remarkable that long term leases are included in the program.

At the same time, implementation has so far been slow, which denotes again resistance from bureaucratic actors to implement the program and a closing of political opportunities. There are two major obstacles to effective implementation: the uncertainty and overlap of land use categories in Indonesia and the weak and exclusively informal recognition of customary rights to forests. The contradiction and inaccuracy of the data on existing land tenure rights not only relates to the distinction between community versus state forest, but also to the distinction of land under the jurisdiction of the National Land Agency versus the Ministry of Forestry. For example, research based on ground-proofing of the peoples plantation planning maps of the Ministry of Forestry indicates that land allocated to the program in part falls outside the designated category of production forests and includes conservation areas, which should be excluded. It also includes land that falls

\(^{12}\)Community forestry schemes (HKM) can provide up to 25 year management rights agreements, but are usually signed for 5 years only. To the author’s knowledge there is only one location in Krui, Lampung in Indonesia that in fact was able to secure a 25 year long lease (personal communication Chip Fay, 31 May 2007).
under the category of ‘other land uses’ which lies outside of the Ministry’s jurisdiction (van Noordwijk et al. 2007). The second aspect that seems to be lacking and could trigger new conflicts, is a mechanism that recognizes existing collective customary rights to forests. The risk of resistance and of conflict at the local level is not to be underestimated. The environmental and indigenous movements are, however, actively working to lobby state agencies to pass legislation that recognizes community rights to forest more strongly (Fay and Sirait 2003). Efforts of the movement therefore occur on a different front, and the same is true for counter-efforts to slow down implementation, be this through action or in-action on the part of the elites.

Overall however, the opening of the Indonesian government to land reform has certainly been facilitated by the advocacy of the environmental movement, but policy progress would not have happened without a favorable response on the part of the political elite.

While the analysis above touched only on a few central developments in the forest tenure policy arena, progress seems due to the interplay of changing external political conditions and effective strategies adopted by the environmental movement. While Indonesia is far from providing secure rights to forest resources for local users, there are encouraging signs of change, which reveal longer term alliances between civil society and reformist elites.

In the next section, I investigate in more depth two features of political opportunities that have shaped these achievements.

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13 The land category called ‘other land uses’ is referred to as APL in Indonesian, which stands for Areal Penggunaan Lain.
4 Shifting political opportunities

4.1 The Indonesian Presidency and changing political opportunities

The degree to which the Indonesian Presidency influenced political alignments and consequently political opportunities for the environmental movement has been quite remarkable in Indonesia. Clear periods of opening and closing of windows of opportunity for the environmental movement and for civil society more broadly are very evident in the account that follows.

The three years from Suharto’s fall in 1998 to the replacement of President Wahid by President Megawati in 2001 presented important political openings for inputs from social movements in national policy processes. During this period the environmental movement found a number of strong supporters within central government institutions to reform natural resource governance. This process was in part also facilitated by the increased influence of the World Bank and IMF, who insisted on reforming the forestry sectors as a conditionality for relief loans following the financial crisis (Silva et al. 2002). These developments were accompanied by the emergence of new progressive elements within the bureaucracy, but also increased competition within and between government agencies to occupy the center stage in policy formulation (Robison and Hadiz 2004). Shifting political alignments and negotiations among dominant parties at the vertices of the polity resulted in swift political change, but also in the maintainance of weak opposition forces (Crawford and Hermawan 2002).

With respect to society-state relations, however, President Wahid was quite supportive of reforms that would expand public participation in politics. His attitude was reflected in government appointments. In particular, the new Minister of the Environment, Sonny Keraf, became an important ally of the environmental movement during this period. Despite occupying a very weak ministry, Keraf often took a stand against corporate

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14 Interview with Ade Mutaqin May 23, 2007.
interests in support of the environmental rights of local people (Nomura 2009). In addition, Nur Mahmidi Ismail, the first Minister of Forestry under the Wahid government, called for improvements in the sanctioning system for forest concessionaires violating environmental regulations (Jakarta Post 2000). His anti-corruption efforts contributed to the imprisonment of Bob Hasan, a long-term Suharto crony and timber tycoon (Barr 1998; Jakarta Post 2001b). Most importantly, in 2001, the newly appointment Minister of Forestry, Marzuki Usman, expressed concern about the excess of power held by own his own ministry and attempted to renew its management (Jakarta Post 2001a).

President Wahid’s support for the environmental movement and the protection of community rights was also demonstrated by his participation in the conference on natural resource management organized by the environmental movement in 2000, where he was the keynote speaker. While the ratification of TAP IX occurred four months after the dismissal of Wahid, the ground work was organized under his Presidency. While Wahid encountered substantial hurdles to implementing reforms, many other appointments in top government posts testify to his positive attitude toward reforms and towards a more inclusive form of politics (Robison and Hadiz 2004).

After Megawati came to power in 2003, the openings for civil society to inform and affect policies diminished substantially. In general, Indonesia experienced a slowdown in all reform efforts, starting from the revision of the regional autonomy law\textsuperscript{15}. President Megawati herself voiced concerns about a civil society that she found to be too vocal, referring in particular to human rights groups, which had been weary of the alliance of her government with the military (Imanuddin 2002). During this period, conservative groups in Ministry of Forestry found powerful allies within other state institutions to maintain central control over forest resources. The main economic paradigm within government of a development based on the exploitation of natural resources became even more dominant.

\textsuperscript{15} Under Megawati the 2004 the regional autonomy law (UU22/1999) was revised by law 32/2004, which included the recentralization of the allocation forest concessions.
than before. Crucial to this were also changes that occurred within the Ministry of Environment which became dominated by mining interests\(^\text{16}\). During this period lobbying efforts and networking between the environmental movement and the key bureaucratic agencies affecting forest tenure waned as environmental movement organizations redirected their lobbying efforts towards more receptive elite actors.

A new shift occurred with the election of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono in 2004. Political opportunities to engage in dialogue with government agencies opened once again for the environmental justice movement. The new President was willing to engage with the demands of the environmental and agrarian movements for the implementation of agrarian reforms and the need to create conflict resolution mechanisms to address land disputes. Although the President rejected the transitional justice approach and the creation of an independent conflict resolution body suggested by the national human rights commission, he did introduce a number of reforms.

The appointment of Joyo Winoto to the head of the National Land Agency in July 2005 opened the way for the first agrarian reform program since the Suharto era (Down to Earth 2007). Winoto posed two conditions to his acceptance to lead the National Land Agency. He demanded a clear sign of political will on the part of the government to engage in discussions about the politics and legislative aspects of agrarian issues in Indonesia and he demanded that the Basic Agrarian Law be maintained\(^\text{17}\). As the National Land Agency passed under the direct jurisdiction of the Presidency, Winoto also had more autonomy from Ministerial control (Lucas and Warren 2003). With these new powers, Winoto engaged the Ministries of Forestry, Agriculture, and Energy and Mineral Resources as well as the environmental movement in political discussions about land reforms (PBHI 2007). These developments led to the creation of the New Agrarian Reform Program.

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\(^{16}\) Interview with Iwan Nurdin of KPA, May 28, 2007.

\(^{17}\) Interview with Ade Mutaqin May 23, 2007.
Overall, the Presidency and related government appointments have considerably shaped the political access to elites for the environmental movement after Reformasi. The above analysis shows that key figures at the apex of the executive power exert substantial influence on state-society relations to this day.

4.2 New policy channels for political participation

The second way in which Reformasi has affected political opportunities for the environmental social movement is through the creation of new policy channels and institutions for political participation.

Access of social movement organizations to the legislative process has increased mainly through two mechanisms. First, the introduction of the Regional Autonomy Reform in 1999\(^\text{18}\) decentralized statutory legislative power from the national to the provincial, district and municipal levels. As a consequence, today civil society organizations can influence the formulation of legislation not only at the national, but also at the local level. Second, in 2004 a new law\(^\text{19}\) on the hierarchy and on the directives for the formulation, the discussion, and the dissemination of bills introduced a new mechanism by which civil society can participate in the legislative process. Article 53 states that ‘the entitled community gives oral or written input in the provisions or discussions of national and regional bills’\(^\text{20}\) at all territorial levels, from the national to the village level.

\(^\text{18}\)The regional autonomy law (UU22/1999) was designed to lead to extensive decentralization based on strong democratic principles. During Megawati’s term the law was revised and some functions were recentralized (UU 32/2004).

\(^\text{19}\)UU10/2004.

\(^\text{20}\) The explanatory notes indicate that the right of communities to participate in these provisions is carried out in accordance with the disciplinary regulation of the peoples representative council and of the regional representative council.
Today civil society organizations are also invited more often to participate in the formulation of bills by legislative commissions\(^{21}\) (Di Gregorio 2011). These invitations reflect the recognition on the part of state actors, that movement organizations possess valuable expertise and that they are authoritative representatives of key stakeholders. Since Reformasi, the invitation to environmental movement organizations to participate in the revision processes of bills has occurred quite frequently. Some examples are, the drafting of the new forestry law and the proposal for the TAP IX decree that were discussed earlier. But indigenous, agrarian and environmental movement organizations are also contributing to the draft for a new bill on customary community. Their aim is to obtain recognition for customary communities as legal entities, which is a prerequisite for state recognition of customary community rights.

A new venue that increases access to the state and the opportunity to influence the legislature is the Constitutional Court established in August 2003\(^{22}\). The court’s role is to uphold the constitution in ways that guarantee increased independence from political interference. It has jurisdiction over the process of judicial review of legislation and any legal entity can appeal to the court. The environmental movement took advantage of this new venue early on. It has so far filed numerous cases including requests for the invalidation of parts of the New Forestry Law, of the New Law on Water, and of the Presidential Regulation on Public Land Provision for Development, and the Government Ordinance in Lieu of Law on Mining in Protected Areas.

Despite allegations of the lack of impartiality, the establishment of the Constitutional Court marks an important step toward democratic decision-making. It provides an additional system of checks over the conduct of the legislature, the bureaucracy and the Presidency itself (Lindsey 2008). The appeal mechanism functions well and the

\(^{21}\) Personal communication executive director of HuMa, September 2005.

\(^{22}\) The establishment of the constitutional court was mandated by the legislative decree MPR/TAP III, 2001, which is part of the foundational state reforms brought by Reformasi.
judgment by the court has so far never taken too long. Despite the fact that the first two
appeals on laws on forestry and on water were rejected in 2005, environmental movement
activists consider this appeal mechanism an important tool for increased participation in
democratic life.

The above discussion illustrates how political conditions influenced by the highest
powers in the aftermath of Reformasi have often facilitated and at times constrained the
actions and claims of the environmental movement. Democratic Indonesia clearly presents
a much more sympathetic environment for the movement compared to the Suharto era,
but the power of the executive branch still has an overwhelming influence on state-society
interactions. However, the achievement of the movement cannot just be ascribed to
external conditions. Below I investigate how the environmental movement effectively used
framing activities and diverse repertoires of collective action to influence policy change
around forest tenure issues in Indonesia.

5 Collective action frames and insider and outsider tactics

5.1 Framing activities and the consolidation of a movement

The environmental movement was swift to take advantage of the window of opportunity at
the height of contention during Reformasi. It did so by successfully framing and reframing
forest tenure problems and their solutions, by engaging in coalition work to consolidate the
movement, and by actively contributing to the growth of the number and type of civil
society organizations.

In early 1998, the environmental justice movement was able to reframe its demands
under a broader meta-frame of democratization. The coalition for democratization of
natural resources brought together local and national environment justice organizations,
human rights and legal aid groups, and the incipient indigenous peoples advocacy network
into an alliance with the student movement (Moniaga 1998). Based on press releases of the coalition, the main demands of the coalition were to ‘democratize nature’ and ‘return natural resources to the people of Indonesia’. The blame for the previous three decades of ‘plunder’ of natural resources was pinned on an economic system and on state-business relations based on ‘corruption, collusion, and nepotism’ (Kudeta 1998). Thus, the two central themes of Reformasi, the call for democratization and for the end of corruption (Adnan and Pradiansyah 1999; Eklöf 1999) were subsumed in the framing activities of the environmental justice movement. This was a strong base on which a broad-based coalition for contentious action could be built.

Over the subsequent two years, the coalition translated these broad claims into a concrete proposal that formed the basis for the legislative decree TAP IX. This phase saw a shift from a diagnostic frame, which defines a problem, to a prognostic frame, which proposes solutions to the problem (Benford and Snow 2000). The novelty of the prognostic frame was the incorporation of the demands of the agrarian movement, which had by then joined the campaign. The bridging of the frames of the environmental and agrarian movements produced a broader master frame that directly challenged existing law in Indonesia that saw forest and agricultural land as separate domains under the jurisdiction of different state agencies. While TAP IX has not been fully enacted, the implementation of an agrarian reform program that encompasses both agricultural and forest lands testifies to the success of these framing efforts.

But the framing activities of the environmental movement did not just contribute to the formation of strong coalitions and broad frames that resonated with the public and reformist elites. They also contributed to the establishment of new civil society organizations. The formalization of the agrarian movement that for decades had operated underground was certainly facilitated by an increasingly open polity and the abolition of the legislation banning independent unions in 1998. This led to the emergence of a

23 The call for the end of Korupsi, Kolusi, dan Nepotisme of KKN was main slogan of Reformasi.
professionalized national agrarian movement heading a federated structure of farmers’ associations (Lucas and Warren 2003; Peluso et al. 2008). In 1999, the environmental justice, agrarian and human rights movements organized the first National Congress of Indigenous People in Indonesia. The outcome was the establishment of the first national representative body of indigenous people in Indonesia: the Indigenous Peoples Alliance of the Archipelago (AMAN).

This was in fact the result of years of efforts coalescing regional indigenous alliances and reframing environmental problems into indigenous rights problems. The project started in 1993 when the most prominent network of the environmental movement, Walhi - the national chapter of Friends of the Earth - organized a workshop leading to the formation of the Indigenous Peoples Advocacy Network, which subsequently worked for the establishment of a national secretariat representing all indigenous people of Indonesia (Down to Earth 1999). Overall, the years of 1998 to 2001 witnessed the fastest increase in the formation of new civil society organizations engaged in forest tenure issues.

This acceleration is clearly due to a more open institutional environment in democratic Indonesia, and new organizations only in part reflect the formalization of preexisting informal groups. Many new groups have been organized by other environmental movement organizations. Another such example, is the formation of the embryonic Green Party in Indonesia in 2007 called Serikat Hijau (Green Union), which reflects the vision of part of the environmental movement of Indonesia for more direct political involvement in the future.

\[^{24}\text{This was calculated from the data about the founding year of the environmental movement organizations interviewed.}\]
5.2 Contentious action

But internal efforts do not just relate to successful framing. The successful strategy was in fact composed of the simultaneous use of insider and outsider tactics. While earlier, the paper recounted how the environmental movement successfully engaged elites, here the focus is on forms of contention.

The main forms of contention that accompanied advocacy refer to joint press releases, petitions, demonstrations, and support and organization of other direct action such as land occupations (Fauzi Rachman and Bachriadi 2006). Interestingly, at times a number of environmental justice organizations provided funds for land occupation undertaken by agrarian movement organizations (Peluso et al. 2008). While during the height of Reformasi the movement took advantage of the peak in the cycle of contention and the alliance with the student movement, as the protest cycle was waning the movement needed a new strategy. It was the agrarian movement, which has a strong grassroots base in Java, that organized and led mass mobilization and land occupations (YLBHI 2007; Peluso et al. 2008). Demonstrations were organized for particular events, almost synchronized with parallel advocacy work. Two key venues for protest were the meetings of the second Commission of the People’s Consultative Assembly that led up to the special session for the ratification TAP IX and the 2001 special session itself (Lucas and Warren 2003; Fauzi Rachman and Bachriadi 2006). There is little doubt that demonstrations contributed to put pressure on legislators to pass the bill. But in the past, protest alone had not been enough to push for policy change, and without lobbying and cooperative efforts it is unlikely TAP IX would have been ratified (Afiff et al. 2005).

Subsequent demonstrations were also led by the agrarian movement. Starting in 2002, protests against the new plantation bill denounced the increases of protection of corporate control over land for plantation use, and the consequent threat to the rights of rural people and communities. Farmers, joined by workers and student groups, protested
the resulting criminalization of peasants without land titles, a common condition in Indonesia (Down to Earth 2004).

The attempts by the National Land Agency to revise the Basic Agrarian Law in May 2004, were also the object of protest on the part of a section of the agrarian movement (Kompas 2004). In the months preceding and following the submission, agrarian groups staged a number of protests gathering thousands of farmers to demand the rejection of the revisions (Kompas 2004; Tempo Interaktif 2004). The Basic Agrarian Law is seen by many as the pillar of Indonesia’s legal structure on land tenure relations. Although ambiguous and superseded by national interest objectives, it represents the legal source of the primacy of customary law in land relations in Indonesia and it also calls for the implementation of agrarian reforms. The fear of parts of the agrarian movement was that any revision would further water down these two legal pillars (Afiff et al. 2005). At the same time, advocacy organizations were lobbying elites in an attempt to influence possible revisions of the bill. While the joined efforts of lobbying and protest organizations engaged the national land agency in July 2005, with the arrival of Winoto as head of the agency, it was decided not to revise the law at all.

Overall, the simultaneous use of insider and outsider tactics is probably the single most effective aspect of the movement’s repertoire of collective action. This is not to say that the movement was necessarily always cohesive. In fact, there is evidence that in part progress was achievement through a radical flank effect, where protest of more radical groups enabled more moderate ones to advance their causes (Afiff et al. 2005; Peluso et al. 2008).

6 Conclusion

This paper has investigated how the environmental justice movement has been able to advance its claims for increased recognition of forest tenure rights in Indonesia over the
last decade. The movement has played an important role in a number of key achievements, including the increased access to forest resources, the ratification of the legislative decree calling for revisions to natural resource laws, and the implementation of the Indonesian agrarian reform program that includes forest resources.

The paper recognizes the importance of forces external as well as internal to the movement in explaining outcomes, but stresses that the two are not independent of each other. On the one hand it confirms the importance of macro-level political opportunities. In particular, the changes in the highest levels of government opened and closed windows of opportunity for the environmental justice movement. Yet, the environmental movement did not just take advantage of existing political opportunities. It contributed substantially to shape them. On the one hand, the movement was very effective in framing its claims in ways that led to the growth of a broader coalition and to a new understanding of land reforms that included forests. On the other hand, the simultaneous use of both insider and outsider tactics was very effective in breaching the resistance from parts of the elite.

While highlighting the achievements of the environmental justice movement, this paper does not suggest that progress has been easy and complete. Still today in Indonesia, most local forest users feel excluded and are marginalized by a state that maintains overwhelming control of forest resources. Conservative forces within the state are well organized and constantly attempting to reverse some of these achievements. But, the environmental movement has opened important doors for further struggles.

Overall, the paper raises important questions about the role of external conditions and internal forces in shaping the success of environmental movements. It suggests that these two forces constantly interact. As such it supports calls for more relational approaches to social movement analysis that recognize the constructivist nature of political opportunities.
Mixed methods to study social movement networks

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Abstract:

This paper argues that relational approaches to studying social movement networks that recognize culture and agency call for the use of mixed methods combining quantitative social network analysis with qualitative analysis. More generally the paper suggests that specific theoretical perspectives on networks affect the choice of analytical methods. Structural approaches privilege quantitative social network analysis, which provides the abstraction and simplification needed to identify the forms and to measure the features of social networks. Cultural approaches rely more on qualitative analysis, which helps to explore the content, the meaning and the underlying processes that explain the form, the emergence and the transformation of networks. The author then illustrates with an example from her own research on environmental activism, how a mixed methods research design provides increased analytical depth and avoids some of the pitfalls of structural social network analysis in the study of social movement networks.

Keywords:

Social movements, social networks, social network analysis, mixed methods
1 Introduction

This paper shows how distinct theoretical approaches to the study of social movement networks affect the choice of analytical methods. The dominant structural approach privileges quantitative methods, because they are particularly suited to investigating structural features of networks. As a consequence, however, agency, culture, and the constructivist nature of social relations are neglected, and so are qualitative methods. I argue that the call for a return to a relational sociology that recognizes culture and agency along-side structures (Emirbayer 1997; Saunders 2007; Crossley 2011) is best operationalized through a research design that uses mixed methods in data generation, collection and analysis.

Quantitative social network analysis was developed to aid structural analysis of social networks (Burt 1980; Wasserman and Faust 1994; Scott 2000; Freeman 2004). Quantitative methods are particularly suited to abstract and simplify complex social relations, and can easily reveal network features that are otherwise quite complex to organize (Crossley 2010). They provide a clear overview of network structures, by which I mean the abstract web of linkages between actors. Quantitative social network analysis can handle a vast array of interactions and summarize them both in mathematical and graphic form and produce precise measures of specific network features which can be compared (Wasserman and Faust 1994; Scott 2002; Crossley 2010). It is therefore particularly suited to investigating network structures.

As discussed by Emirbayer and Goodwin (1994), however, structural approaches provide an incomplete account of networks. They disregard cultural features of networks and the role of agency in the emergence and transformation of networks (Mische 2010). There are four key features associated with purely structural approaches to social movement networks. I argue that these characteristics of structural approaches lead also to privilege the use of quantitative methods over qualitative ones.
The first feature is the exclusive reliance on social relations (relational data) to explain network features (Emirbayer and Goodwin 1994). The consequence is that any role of the attributes of actors, be they structural or not, is neglected. The second feature is the exclusive focus on the form of networks as opposed to investigating the content of ties and what ties mean to social actors (White 1992; Crossley 2010; Edwards 2010; Crossley 2011). But without this we cannot understand why networks emerge and what they represent to social movement actors (Mische 2003). The third feature is the simplistic assumption of causality that social relations alone affect the values, attitudes and behavior of actors. It neglects a number of alternative explanations including that of reverse causality, but also of the co-production of social relations and features of actors. And finally, structural approaches tend to see social networks as stable and fixed, and consequently attention to dynamic processes is lost (Passy 2003). I show how all these four features also support the use of quantitative approaches to social networks.

I suggest that in order to investigate meaning and processes in social network analysis it is useful to relax some implicit assumptions of structural approaches. Such changes will also lead to more value being placed on the contribution of qualitative analytical approaches in social network analysis. One key strength of qualitative approaches is that they are best suited to exploring in depth the meaning of ties and networks and can help reveal ongoing processes that underlie network exchanges. This would not just lead to a more balanced approach to structure and agency (Giddens 1984) in social network studies, it would also highlight the value of using mixed methods that integrate qualitative analytical approaches with quantitative social network analysis. In fact, the above discussion has recently been revived from a methodological perspective (Crossley 2010; Edwards 2010). This literature suggests that the use of mixed methods in social network analysis would bring increased analytical depth in social network research (Mische 2003; Coviello 2005; Knox et al. 2006; White 2008; Crossley 2010; Edwards 2010). Edwards (2010: 2)
argues that it is the very nature of social networks that calls for mixed methods, because they ‘are both structure and process at the same time’.

This paper supports the call for a move toward a form of relational analysis that takes into account the role of culture and agency in social networks. The paper also shows why mixed methods are most suited to pursue such goals. While today many scholars agree on the advantages of using mixed methods in social network analysis, how to integrate quantitative social network analysis with qualitative analysis remains largely an ad hoc process: there are many empirical examples of mixing methods but there are few studies which expressly discuss research designs for mixed methods social network studies (Coviello 2005; Edwards and Crossley 2009; Edwards 2010; Jack 2010). This paper contributes to this literature by presenting the research design of the thesis of the author, which integrates qualitative and quantitative approaches to social network analysis in different ways in data generation, data collection and data analysis.

The paper first highlights the advantages and the limits of structural theoretical arguments and of the use of quantitative methods in the study of social movements. It then illustrates why relational approaches that recognize agency and culture call for the use of mix methods. Finally, the paper illustrates a mixed methods research design from the author’s own work on environmental social movements in Indonesia that shows how such an approach helps to reach increased analytical depth in the understanding of social movement networks.

2 Structural approaches to social networks and quantitative analysis

Do theoretical approaches influence the choice of methods? Crossley (2010) rightly suggests that research based on different theoretical assumptions can make use of the same methods and vice versa. It is also true, however, that specific theoretical approaches direct researchers towards the use of specific methods (Bulmer 1984). I argue that the dominant
structural approach to social networks leads scholars to privilege quantitative analysis\(^\text{25}\). I suggest four main reasons for such association, and indicates that these represent also unverified assumptions and some of the major limits of structural analysis (Emirbayer and Goodwin 1994). They are: the dismissal of attributes in explaining social network ties; the focus on the form of networks as opposed to the content of ties; the causality assumption that social interactions determine attributes and behavior; and the conviction that social networks necessarily represent stable structural features. I discuss each in turn.

The first key aspect is also referred to as the ‘anticategorical imperative’ (Emirbayer and Goodwin 1994: 1414, emphasis in original). It suggests that structural approaches reject the idea that the characteristics of individuals, social groups and norms (or ‘categories’ and ‘attributes’ in social network terms) alone explain social behavior (Wellman 1983). Instead, networks are explained exclusively on the basis of the pattern of social relations (Burt 1980). Consequently, such approaches are suspicious and often ignore and dismiss the role of attributes of actors (Emirbayer and Goodwin 1994; Bearman 1997). Such a view makes qualitative analysis superfluous, as quantitative techniques are sufficient to investigate network structures. Equally important, the imperative don’t consider a variety of alternative and complementary explanations that recognize the mutual influence of attributes and relations.

A second characteristic of structural approaches is that the exclusive attention given to patterns of relations also entails a predominant focus on the form of network patterns as opposed to the content of ties (Bearman 1993; Emirbayer and Goodwin 1994). While quantitative social network analysis provides the abstraction needed to investigate the form of networks it is not well equipped to analyze the content of social relations (Crossley 2010). For example, most network studies do not go beyond the distinction between types

\(^{25}\)Monsted (1995) warns of the opposite risk, that the choice of quantitative methodology directs attention towards structural features of networks, as opposed to the dynamic processes underlying social networks.
of ties (friendship, information exchange, collaboration, overlapping membership etc.) or between strong and weak ties (Granovetter 1973). The consequence is not just the simple loss of information linked to abstraction. What is often lost is the very meaning of the relations, which necessarily limits the understanding of human interactions (White et al. 2007). Since in-depth understanding of content and meaning is best investigated through qualitative approaches, the eminence given to form at the expense of meaning also leads to the neglect of qualitative methods in social network analysis.

A third critique of interpreting networks only as social structures derives directly from the anti-categorical imperative. The latter entails the implicit causality assumption that social relations alone determine attributes of social actors, such as behavior, values and beliefs (Burt 1986; Crossley 2009). Such a view precludes the possibility of the inverse causal link from attributes to social relations, of any feedback mechanism and of their co-production. Therefore, for structuralists the only way to explain the emergence of networks and current social relations rests on past social relations. Quantitative modeling in social network analysis is suited to investigate such simple casual chains (Wasserman and Galaskiewicz 1994), which leads to privileging quantitative over qualitative methods. There is also an associated weakness in such theoretical approaches. Simple causal models suggesting that past relations determine current relations present a limited if not tautological explanation of the emergence of social relations and of the transformation of networks (Emirbayer and Goodwin 1994).

The last feature of structural approaches is that they privilege a belief in the stability of networks. Much of the social network literature stresses that network structures represent stable features of social systems (Burt 1982; Scott 2002). Structuralists have little interest in more volatile interactions. Consequently, these scholars tend to reject the idea that networks might represent a snapshot of social relations at a specific point in time as opposed to long-lasting structural social features (Crossley 2010). While in the social network analysis literature the stability of networks is largely an implicit assumption, it is
also true that recently there has been an incredible expansion in quantitative longitudinal analysis of networks and related software as SIENA (Snijders 1996; Huisman and Snijders 2003; Snijders and Baerveldt 2003; Snijders et al. 2010). Yet, the focus remains on whether or not changes have occurred and not on the underlying processes that trigger such changes. For example, Rosenthal et al. (1985) in their pioneering work on the women’s movement, show how the network changed over time, but give little attention to the actual processes that produced these changes. The neglect of the in-depth analysis of transformational change in networks facilitates the use of quantitative methods which are best suited to investigate fixed phenomena, and makes qualitative analysis which is more relevant in the investigation of processes of change unnecessary.

3 Networks as meaning and processes

If structural approaches provide only a partial understanding of social networks, which approach can help to understand the meaning and content of ties and the processes underlying social networks? And what methodological implications would such an approach entail?

Those familiar with the social movement literature will recognize that underlying the above questions is the long-term debate between structural and cultural approaches which differ in their emphasis on structure versus agency. Emirbayer uses the term “‘relational’ perspective’ (1997, p. 281) to refer to an approach that recognizes the role of social structure in influencing action, but which suggests that social reality emerges from the simultaneous production and re-production of ‘substance’ and ‘processes’. A relational approach therefore, apart from focusing on social relations as the main building block of social life, recognizes the interpenetration of structure and agency (Somers 1994; Emirbayer and Sheller 1998; McAdam et al. 2001; McAdam 2003; Fuhse 2009; Crossley 2011). A relational approach to social networks therefore entails that the social relations
that bind actors and actors’ attitude, behavior and values reshape each other constantly (Emirbayer 1997; Mische 2010). What happens if we relax some of the constraining structural assumptions and focus on the investigation of meaning and processes? What are the likely consequences for the choice of analytical methods?

3.1 Relaxing the anti-categorical imperative

While structural approaches to social network analysis certainly have the merit of bringing the importance of social relations in affecting social life to the forefront, it is possible to question whether this should happen by dismissing attributes of actors altogether (Fuhse 2009).

After all, there is substantial evidence in the literature that attributes affect social relations as well. In fact, the principle of homophily, that similarity in attributes facilitates interaction, has been validated in many settings (McPherson et al. 2001). Research in the Balkans has shown that inter-organizational learning networks are facilitated by similarity in gender, tenure and seniority of individuals (Skerlavaj et al. 2010). Another study shows that intergovernmental organizations working in the development field tend to network more among themselves than with other types of organizations (Atouba and Shumate 2010). There is also evidence that similarity in environmental values lead to dense interactions among like-minded environmental movement organizations (Saunders 2007).

There is no reason then, apart from starting from a predetermined theoretical position, to dismiss any role of attributes in affecting social relations and social networks. In fact, White’s (2008 [1965]) concept of ‘catnets’, which is formed by the words ‘category’ and ‘networks’, suggests that the influence between categories (or attributes) and networks

To be precise, evidence also shows that the homophily principle does not always explain density of interaction among social movement organizations (Saunders 2007; Atouba and Shumate 2010; Di Gregorio 2012). Yet, it is a recurrent feature in social movement networks and therefore should not be dismissed without careful investigation.
goes both ways: belonging to a common category or sharing an attribute can facilitate networking and vice versa. How does such recognition of the interaction between attributes and categories affect the choice of methods?

Simple attributes are routinely elicited through quantitative data collection methods, but complex attributes are best elicited through qualitative analysis. This is certainly the case for subjective attributes such as beliefs, values, identity as well as discursive practices (Roe 1994; Melucci 1996; Johnson and Turner 2003; della Porta and Keating 2008; Greene 2008). Usually the sources of such data are qualitative, such as ethnographic field notes, semi-structured or unstructured interviews, focus groups and written documents. Qualitative sources are better suited to elicit rich understandings of such attributes. The generation of a ‘thick description’ of such data requires qualitative analytical methods such as content, frame, narrative and discourse analysis (Hajer 1995; Dryzek 1997; Benford and Snow 2000; Arvai and Mascarenhas 2001; Forsyth 2007). Coviello (2005) even suggests that qualitative data present an advantage over quantitative data, because they always provide a deeper understanding of a phenomenon, but can also be transformed into quantitative data if needed, and can be analyzed and interpreted through both qualitative and quantitative methods.

### 3.2 Networks of meaning

The most evident way in which qualitative analysis can complement social network analysis is in the investigation of the meaning of networks (Borch and Arthur 1995). In fact, White suggests that social networks are foremost ‘networks of meaning’ (White 1992, p. 67). The association of actors and meaning can be investigated through networks whose nodes are not necessarily physical actors but ideas, concepts or frames. These have been labeled as knowledge, cultural, narrative and semantic networks (Carley and Kaufer 1993; Mische 2003; Park 2008).
There is in fact substantial work on cultural networks in political and social movement studies. Through the analysis of autobiographical accounts Bearman and Stovel (2000), for example, investigate the features of being and becoming a ‘Nazi’ during the Third Reich. They use social network analysis and interpretative analysis of the discourse and practices of Nazi affiliates to analyze the process of identity formation itself.

In addition, communication networks are particularly important in the investigation of networks of meaning. In her research on Brazilian youth activism Mische (2007) is interested in understanding how young people make sense of their networks. She is able to trace the process of convergence of meaning using mixed methods that combine interpretative analysis of discourse and practices based on ethnographic techniques (in-depth interviews and participant observation) with structural analysis of relations. In social movement studies, systems of meaning are often elicited through frame analysis (Gerharts and Rucht 1992; Somers 1994; Benford and Snow 2000). My own research on environmental activism in Indonesia uses both attributes and frame analysis to explain density patterns of networks.

Today specialist software, such as the Discourse Network Analyzer (DNA) and Automap – can assist the investigation of cultural networks (Carley et al. 2008; Leifeld 2011). Examples of applications include the analysis of discourse coalitions in European policy networks (Leifeld and Haunss 2011) and of consensus building in climate change policy networks (Saunders et al. 2011).

Meaning is formed by the cultural and political discourse that is embedded in networks and is expressed in language, which is a ‘window to culture’ (Carley 1994). Consequently, in-depth investigation of meaning in networks requires qualitative data and analysis. Data sources include archive materials and documents, unstructured or semi-structured interviews and ethnographies (Crossley 2010; Edwards 2010). Open-ended questions and self-reports in interviews are particularly suited to eliciting subjective meaning in social relations (Fuhse 2009). The analysis of these data is necessarily qualitative.
and can help to investigate the motivation, values, or emotions that provide meaning to networks (Goodwin et al. 2001). This is how we can begin to understand the meaning of social networks, and consequently why they come into being (White et al. 2007).

### 3.3 Relaxing the stability assumption

Cultural approaches also draw attention to the processes by which meaning and networks are co-produced and reproduced socially (Emirbayer and Goodwin 1994; Emirbayer 1997). Networks, like cultural constructs are not pre-given but co-exist and co-evolve with processes of meaning formation (Fine and Kleinman 1983; Mische and White 1998; Knox et al. 2006). This view departs from the predominantly positivist approach that underlies quantitative social network analysis (Mische 2010). Instead, it brings to the forefront the post-positivist and constructivist views that recognize the interaction of structure and agency more strongly (Emirbayer and Goodwin 1994; Emirbayer 1997).

Two ways in which agency is expressed in social movements is through the process of the formation, maintenance and transformation of collective identity (Melucci 1989) and the framing processes that drive collective action (Benford and Snow 2000). Thus, frame analysis not only helps to assess meaning in networks, it also reveals ongoing discursive processes.

A process-driven approach to social relations also leads to interpret political opportunities as both structural and contingent (Rootes 1999c). There are few studies that use social network analysis to investigate the contingency of political opportunities. One such study analyzes the inter-penetration of social movement tactics and political opportunities (Saunders 2009). In this study the causality assumption that goes from structure to behavior is questioned in favor of a more relational view of social processes.

A stronger recognition of the role of agency in networks also questions the assumption of the stability of networks. Obviously, actions can become institutionalized
over time, but overall the focus on agency shifts attention from networks as stable structures to networks as dynamic processes (Crossley 2010; Edwards 2010). Consequently, network graphs used in social network analysis can also be viewed as ‘snap-shots’ of social processes (Mønsted 1995).

If we understand networks as formed by both structures and processes, or by structures ‘in-process’ (Crossley 2011, p.126), mixed methods are the most appropriate analytical approach, because of the advantages of quantitative methods in identifying structural features and of qualitative methods in investigating processes (Garton et al. 2006; Knox et al. 2006; Edwards 2010; Jack 2010). The use of mixed methods then facilitates a more complete analysis of social networks (Bryman 2008).

4 The strength of mixed methods

The above discussion illustrates why studies that start from a relational theoretical perspective that recognizes both the interpenetration of structure and agency and the role of culture in social relations are likely to use mixed methods research designs. But it is not only the theoretical perspectives which drive the use of mixed methods. There are also general arguments for the use of mixed methods that apply in the study of social movement networks as much as in other studies (Greene et al. 1989; Tashakkori and Teddlie 2003; Bryman 2008; Greene 2008).

Three general merits that have been ascribed to mixed methods are the following. First, they provide more ‘analytical density’ compared to exclusively quantitative or qualitative methods. Second, they bridge the long lasting divide between qualitative and quantitative research communities. In so doing, they try to overcome the epistemological and ontological differences between the two research traditions. And third, they broaden the choices of research strategies in the study of social problems. They provide a wider
A mixed methods research design to study environmental movement networks

The rest of the paper presents the mixed method research design from my own work on environmental movement networks in Indonesia, which combines exploratory social network analysis and qualitative methods. The data collection processes included a pre-fieldwork visit and eight months of fieldwork in Indonesia between 2006 and 2007.

The aim of the study was to investigate how environmental movement organizations (EMOs) use networking in contentious politics to form coalitions and to gain
access to state actors in the attempt to shape policy reforms related to forest tenure arrangements in Indonesia. Within this general aim four distinct aspects are investigated: 1) how changing macro-level political conditions and forces internal to the environmental movement contributed to the ability of the movement to influence forest tenure policies; 2) which forces and processes underlie dense communication networks among EMOs in coalition work; 3) how EMOs avoid co-optation in their interaction with state actors; and 4) how EMOs manage contingent political opportunities at the meso-level.

Creswell (2003) distinguishes six ideal types of mixed method research designs depending on whether methods are sequenced or concurrent, on how they are sequenced, on the stage in which the methods are integrated and on whether a theoretical perspective guides the choice of methods. In my case, the choice of using a mixed methods design was certainly guided by the theoretical perspective illustrated earlier, but otherwise it is difficult to categorize the whole research design according to one of the six ideal types mentioned by Creswell (2003). Instead it presents multiple features in terms of sequencing, concurrent use of methods and levels of integration. The general features of the mixed methods design are that it includes some form of combination of qualitative and quantitative methods in all stages of the research from the data generation and collection to the analysis and interpretation (Diagram 1). In the next three sections I illustrate how in each stage mixed methods contributed to avoiding the structural biases discussed earlier and enhance the analytical depth of the study.
Diagram 1: Research Design

**Boundary definition of policy domain actors (complete population)**
- Media reports, SMO and coalition documents, key informants
- Nominalist & realist approach

**Organization survey questionnaire structure and multiple choice answers**
- Key informant interviews
- Literature on networks & social movements
- Interviews & survey literature

**Unstructured interviews and semi-structured open-ended question guide**
- Literature
- Own design

**SMO and Coalition documents**
- SMOs and coalitions
- Collection of documents & key informant interviews

**Organization survey questionnaire**
- Relational data: dyadic relations & types, quality of ties
- Free recall & free choice
- Face-to-face survey interviews

**Semi- and unstructured interviews**
- Qualitative data
- Face-to-face interviews

**SMO & Coalition documents**
- Collected during interview visits

**Exploratory SNA & Network Visualization**
- Network and sub-network level
  - Network graph visualization
  - Network density
  - Average degree
  - Vertex Island

**Frame Analysis**
- Master-frame of coalition (processes underlying networks)

**Analytical Methods**
- Interpretative methods & measures and indicators

**Qualitative & Quantitative Analysis**

1. **Political Opportunities, Agency & Outcomes (Macro-level)**
   - Macro-level political context (political process analysis/context)
   - Framing and repertoires of contention

2. **Coalition Work (meso-level)**
   - Communication networks
   - Meaning and processes: Environmental values & density of networking
   - Discursive framing processes

3. **External Institutionalization (meso-level)**
   - Interaction network and types of ties (cooperation/contention)
   - Knowledge networks

4. **Contingent Political Opportunities**
   - Meso-level: lobbying networks and venue participation
   - Repertoires of domination (dynamics of contention)

**Qualitative Analysis**

**Quantitative Data Sources**
- Relational data
  - Closed-ended / multiple choice questions
- Face-to-face survey interviews

**Qualitative Data Sources**
- Literature review on:
  - Social movements, environmental movements, social networks literature
  - Literature on environmental movement activism and forest tenure reforms in Indonesia

**Preparation & Pre-fieldwork Visit**
- Data sources
  - Methods

**Fieldwork Data Sources**
- Type of data
  - Data collection methods

**Analytical Focus**
- Elements of the analysis
6  Context, analytical depth and qualitative analysis in the pre-fieldwork visit

One of the ways to employ mixed methods is in sequence, using one method to inform the other (Edwards 2010). During the pre-fieldwork visit I relied on an exploratory mixed method design where qualitative analysis was used in part to inform subsequent quantitative analysis (Creswell 2003). The main aim of the pre-fieldwork visit was to identify the boundary of the policy domain, finalize the social organization survey questionnaire, prepare a question guide for the semi-structured interviews, and situate the case study in its specific context.

In case study research the first step is the definition of the boundary of the research. As with most policy network analyses, this study focuses on one specific policy domain, and the first step is to identify the set of EMOs that constitute this policy domain (Knoke et al. 1996). This was done through a combined meta-theoretical approach composed of a nominalist approach applied during the pre-fieldwork visit followed by a realist approach used in the data collection phase (Laumann et al. 1989; Saunders 2007). The nominalist approach relies on the imposition of the researcher’s framework related to the focus of the study to identify the boundary of the policy domain. It therefore assumes that a policy domain is observable by an outsider. The realist approach relies on the perception of actors themselves and was applied in the survey during the main fieldwork.

The nominalist approach was used to draw an extensive preliminary list of 70 social movement organizations (SMOs) related to the policy domain from a variety of sources: media reports (print and web media), recent literature, documents from SMOs, and preliminary interviews with key informants. The key informants included researchers,

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27 A policy domain is defined as ‘a set of policy actors with a substantive focus of concern, which gather around policy initiatives and debates’ (Laumann and Knoke 1987, p.9-10).
28 The nominalist approach reflects what Kaplan (1964 cited in Laumann et al. 1989) calls the instrumentalist view of social theory.
practitioners, high-level activists and representatives of EMOs, international organizations and government agencies. The list was also ranked according to the number of mentions (from media and key informants) to provide an idea of the relevance of actors. The ranking and a second round of discussion with four key informants from EMOs helped to identify those organizations within the list that were actively involved in contentious politics and advocacy around forest tenure issues at the national level. The criterion used was that of ‘mutual relevance’ in the policy domain (Knoke and Laumann 1982). The validation resulted in a list of 31 organizations. All but one participated in the social organization survey in the successive phase.

The finalization of the social organization questionnaire and the preparation of the question guide for the semi-structured interviews were based on information from key informants, documents and publications of SMOs and existing literature. The questionnaire structure was based on similar network surveys used in social movement studies (e.g. Diani 1995) and was contextualized and adapted to the specific policy domain and the specific context. As an example, adaptation included the definition of multiple-choice answers for survey questions. The main pre-fieldwork sources used to investigate the context were documents and publications of SMOs and literature on forest tenure and on environmental social movements in Indonesia.

Thus, the value of qualitative analysis during the pre-fieldwork was to contextualize the study to the specific policy domain and make sure that the quantitative survey and the interviews would elicit information in a way that was appropriate to the context of Indonesia and of the specific policy domain.

Apart from data collection, the pre-fieldwork visit led also to preliminary data on which to build the qualitative analysis of the contextual political conditions in which the

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29 The only EMO that I was not able to interview was Yayasan Kemala (Kelompok Masyarakat Pengelola Sumberdaya Alam - the Community Natural Resource Managers Program) due to multiple cancellations of appointments.
social movement operated (Diagram 1, Analytical focus 1). The analysis of the macro-level political context relied exclusively on qualitative analysis and in part preceded the meso-level analysis of inter-organizational networks. The data source was the information gathered during the pre-fieldwork visit and fieldwork data from the semi-structured and unstructured interviews with key informants and the existing literature on forest tenure and environmental activism in Indonesia. Some of the follow up interviews with a few high-ranking representatives of EMOs were crucial in gaining an understanding of the unfolding of EMO-state relations and of events over time. The aim was to provide the background and a contextual investigation of the policy domain.

For the macro-level analysis, I relied on political process and cultural approaches to social movements (Tilly 1978; Snow et al. 1986; Tarrow 1998) integrating the analysis of structure and agency by investigating the dynamic relationship between changing political opportunities and environmental movement repertoires of contention and discursive processes. The analysis investigates the period from 1999, which coincides with the start of the democratization processes in Indonesia, to 2007.

The pre-fieldwork visit and the qualitative analysis of the interplay of broad political processes, mobilization strategies and framing processes is part of a sequential and multi-level mixed methods approach where macro-level qualitative analysis sets the stage for the subsequent social network analysis that is focused at the meso-level. The qualitative analysis recognizes that agency is expressed within broader political structures, but also shows how structures and agency constantly reshape each other as actors act, re-act and interact.

7 Avoiding the anti-categorical bias in the data generation and collection stage

One of the main features of the data collection phase was the explicit aim to overcome the anti-categorical bias characteristic of structural social network analysis approaches. The
broaden the scope to include information about network form, content and meaning of ties, underlying political processes and context to be used in the subsequent analysis.

This aim required the collection of a distinct type of data. These were: *Relational data* providing information on different types of relations among EMOs and between EMOs with state actors; *attribute data* on characteristics of EMOs, their subjective perceptions, values and meaning of ties; and qualitative *data on processes and context*.

In this phase methods were combined according to the specific research objectives and in a way that complemented the different strengths and compensated for the weaknesses of qualitative and quantitative methods (Johnson and Turner 2003). Such complementary purpose meant that data collection of quantitative and qualitative data largely occurred concurrently (Creswell 2003).

For the most part, relational data and simple attribute data were collected through a close-ended organizational level survey questionnaire. Qualitative data about subjective accounts on meaning such as beliefs and values and on policy processes were gathered through open-ended questions and a topic guide in semi-structured interviews and through unstructured interviews (see Appendix A).

The survey and the semi-structured interviews were undertaken with the 30 EMOs that were part of the policy domain. The survey, which took between 30-45 minutes, was administered before the semi-structured interviews which allowed for further clarification of survey responses. The semi-structured interviews varied in length depending on the EMOs interviewed. Unstructured interviews were also undertaken with a small number of representatives of EMOs and coalitions, some of which where interviewed more than once, to discuss in more detail past and current policy processes in the policy arena.
7.1 Relational data

Relational data were elicited through a number of questions in the survey about specific relations among EMOs and with state actors in the policy domain. Representatives of EMOs were asked about exchanges of information, advice and expertise, collaborations, financial resource exchanges, membership in coalitions and in domestic and international organizations and interactions with state and business actors.

There are two ways to derive relational data in a questionnaire. One way is to use the roster question format, which entails presenting the list of policy domain actors to the respondent and to ask about specific relations with these organizations. The second method, which I used in the study, is the ‘free recall’ technique. In this case respondents are asked to simply name the organizations without the use of a list (Wasserman and Faust 1994). Actors also had ‘free choice’ to nominate as many actors as they wanted, as opposed to a ‘fixed choice’ where the maximum number of nominations is indicated by the interviewer.

Although I had defined the boundaries of the policy domain in advance, the choice of free recall was preferred in the survey because of the relatively high number of network questions in the questionnaire (roster question responses require more time and can be tedious if there are many network questions). However, although I did not use the roster format, for the analysis I used only those responses that mentioned those EMOs that were part of my list. Thus, in fact the process is comparable to the roster question format in term of relating to a predefined policy domain.

7.2 Attribute data

A number of attribute data on EMOs were also collected through the survey, but some more complex attributes were derived from the qualitative analysis of the semi-structured interviews which I discuss later in the section on data analysis.
I used the survey question format to identify attributes such as, for example, year of foundation of the EMO, the main activities of the EMO, funding resources, membership numbers, and collective action repertoires and a number of other organizational characteristics of EMOs.

Through survey questions it is also possible to elicit simple qualitative data, as for example the strength or the quality of a relation. I used this technique, for example, to ask respondents to qualify the interactions of their organization with state actors. This was achieved through three consecutive questions. The first question asked if EMOs interacted regularly with state actors. In case of a positive response, the second question asked the respondent to name these state actors. This was followed by a third question asking the respondent to qualify these interactions according to the extent to which they were predominantly cooperative, contentious, or both cooperative and contentious\textsuperscript{30}.

The survey also contained some open-ended questions that provided qualitative data. For example, I asked respondents to provide a definition of three types of social movements (environmental, agrarian and human rights) and describe their major goals as well as provide a more detailed description of the main activities of their own EMOs.

\subsection*{7.3 Data on processes and context}

While semi-structured interviews provided some information about policy processes, a small number of representatives of EMOs and of coalitions also became key informants. They were interviewed more than once before and after the survey through less structured interviews to discuss, in particular, the history of the movement, and the political and policy context in which it operates.

\footnote{\textsuperscript{30} Although in the literature social movements are understood as expressions of social conflict, empirical evidence shows that state-movement relations are both cooperative and conflictual. Such an ‘ambivalent’ strategy, which combines conflict with cooperation, has been termed ‘conflictual cooperation’ (Giugni and Passy 1998, p.85).}
The interviews revealed information on policy events and the dynamics of policy processes including information that described in more depth the relationship among EMOs with state actors. This information helped to understand not just how EMOs interpreted and contributed to policy events and policy processes, but how they developed their tactics and strategies. But apart from the subjective account of policy dynamics, I was able to triangulate some of this information through the use of multiple key informants and secondary sources which resulted in a picture of ongoing policy process dynamics which went beyond subjective interpretations. The interviews generally lasted between one and two hours. Secondary sources such as literature, news articles and documents from EMOs and state actors completed the data gathering and were used in the qualitative analysis to provide contextual information and aid in the interpretation of the quantitative analysis. These secondary sources were particularly important to undertake further interpretation of quantitative results which not been anticipated in the data collection phase. For example, the analysis of multi-stakeholder forum and of repertoires of domination in the study on contingent politics opportunities (diagram 1, analytical focus 4) relies as much on interviews as on secondary document sources in particular evidence reported in newspapers.

Qualitative information about political processes allowed the network structures to be set within a broader context where structures continuously evolve (Crossley 2011), one which recognizes that the form and features of networks, while representing regular interactions, are in fact snapshots of ongoing processes.

Overall the data generation and collection phase used quantitative and qualitative data collection methods in a complementary way in order to collect information on relations, attributes, meaning and processes. It was preparatory to a subsequent analysis that could provide increased depth, compared to a quantitative analysis alone and avoid some of the pitfalls of overly structural approaches. In particular, the collection of both relational and
attribute data on EMOs was key in order to avoid the anti-categorical bias in the subsequent analysis and investigate how relational and attributes related to each other. Such data collection design also provided the basis for a form of triangulation in the analysis and interpretation phases which assessed the quantitative and qualitative information in an integrated way (Creswell 2003).

8 Integrating structures, meaning and processes in data analysis

With four distinct foci of analysis (Diagram 1, Analytical focus) the data analysis phase integrated methods in various ways. Below I highlight only some key features of such integration which refer to the quantitative methods used to investigate the form of networks (or network structure) and the mixed method approaches used to investigate the meaning of networks and the processes which underlie network formation.

8.1 Network structures

I used exploratory social network analysis to investigate the form and features of networks. Exploratory social network analysis refers to the use of visualization and manipulation of networks and of an array of network analytic techniques and measures that quantify features of social networks at different scales (Nooy de et al. 2005). The main objective is to detect and interpret patterns of social interactions among actors, but it neither relies on statistical analysis and hypothesis testing nor on modelling of networks.

It is particularly suited to investigating small networks where much can be learned from visualization. Graph theory, which is a central pillar of social network analysis, routinely uses visualization to illustrate concepts and theorems (Wasserman and Faust 1994; Gross and Yellen 2006). Visualization provides an abstract representation of networks which is useful to see complex relations and provides an intuitive understanding of the features of a network which can direct further analysis. I use visualization to
represent the structure of networks, represent visually quantitative measures of actors (e.g. through size of vertices) and qualitative characteristics (e.g. using different colors for different categories).

In addition, common social network analysis algorithms (Wasserman and Faust 1994; Scott 2000) provide quantitative measures of network form and features at the actor, sub-group and network levels (Borgatti and Foster 2003) (see Diagram 1, Analytical methods, Exploratory social network analysis and Analytical Focus 2, 3, and 4). Exploratory social network analysis provided the means to represent the different types and patterns of interactions of all major EMOs active in the policy domain in a legible way and to measure features of both patterns of exchanges and relational characteristics of single actors and of groups with precision. These data were, however, further analyzed and interpreted together with qualitative data.

8.2 The meaning of networks

The increased depth of analysis was mainly achieved by integrating quantitative and qualitative social network analysis, and qualitative analysis of related processes. One such aim was to investigate the meaning of ties and patterns of exchange in a bit more depth compared to that which can be achieved with quantitative analysis alone.

In the investigation of communication networks among EMOs I combine exploratory network analysis with content analysis of semi-structured interviews to elicit the meaning of dense areas of interaction. Such a procedure in fact uses mixed methods for a ‘development’ purpose where qualitative data collection and analysis is used to generate new data (Greene et al. 1989, p. 260, emphasis in original), in this case simplified attribute data, to be used in the application of the subsequent social network analysis (Coviello 2005). Transformed in ordinal or categorical variables such data can easily be analysed through quantitative techniques. This method was used to generate a simplified attribute
about environmental values (the variety of environmentalism) of EMOs, which were then used in social network analysis to characterize actors (vertices or nodes of networks) and identify sub-groups of EMOs to be analyzed together with the relational data.

Two open-ended questions from the semi-structured interviews provided information on how EMOs understand environmental problems, in other words on the variety or types of environmentalism that characterize different EMOs (Brulle 1996; Guha and Martinez-Alier 1997). The first question asked EMO representatives to indicate the main causes of environmental problems. It was aimed at assessing their diagnostic frame, which defines the causes of a problem and who is to blame. The second question asked about what was needed to solve these problems and refers to the prognostic frame of EMOs (Benford and Snow 2000). Given the small number of actors, the content analysis of the responses was done manually from the notes and recordings of semi-structured interviews. The results were used to cluster EMOs into four categories of environmentalism. The systematic comparison of social network measures of density patterns with categorization by variety of environmentalism provided interesting results on the role of homophily. This investigation also counters the anti-categorical bias and shows that ties in areas of dense communication are qualitatively different from and have different meaning for EMOs compared with sparse interactions.

Another way in which I integrated social network analysis and qualitative information is through the construction of a knowledge network. To assess the influence of single actors, social network analysis relies on centrality measures (Wasserman and Faust 1994). Unlike traditional social network analysis, which derives influence from networks of actual interactions, I used the subjective perception of EMOs to assess the influence of state actors. I constructed a network from the responses about which state actors EMOs considered most influential in affecting forest tenure policies. The responses provide the data for a knowledge network with two sets of nodes (a two-mode network) formed by EMOs and state actors. The ties, however, do not represent any actual relation between the
actors, instead they represent the perception of EMOs about the influence of state actors.
Social network analysis is then used to investigate the network. Using the network structure
derived from the subjective opinions of EMOs I can then measure the influence of state
actors independently from the interactions between EMOs and state actors. Such a
procedure allows me to compare the perceptions about the influence of state actor with the
actual interactions, through the comparison of the knowledge with the interaction network.
The analysis also underlines that the interpretation of network features is specific to the
meaning of the ties and nodes of each network.

8.3 Network processes

Qualitative data on processes was important not just to elicit the meaning of networks, but
to investigate how they are constituted by ongoing dynamic processes.

To detect if discursive processes shaped communication networks in coalition
work, I used frame analysis. Cultural and relational approaches that stress agency of social
movements suggest that SMOs are pro-active in framing problems and claims in order to
build alliances and mobilize people (Klandermans 1988; Snow and Benford 1988).
Communication networks among EMOs can therefore also be the expression of ongoing
framing processes.

Frame analysis is a form of interpretative research based on text analysis aimed at
understanding ‘the system of meaning’ embodied in the text (Gerharts and Rucht 1992, p. 574,
emphasis in original) and reveals the presence of ongoing processes of formation of
meaning. I used frame analysis to investigate two documents from the dominant EMO
coalition and reconstruct the argumentative logic of the frames. This can be represented in
a diagram that depicts the structure of how the different aspects of the argument are linked
to each other. These links can, for example, represent a causal chain of arguments that
provide a diagnosis of a problem, or a solution to a problem and/or can be aimed at
motivating people to act (Snow and Benford 1988). The structure of the frame is analyzed in terms of the degree to which it coalesces different EMOs together and is then compared to the social network results. In this case, the integration of methods, sheds light on the presence of discursive (framing) processes in areas of dense communication exchanges. I suggest that these discursive practices are in fact the building blocks of communication networks. They reveal the structure-in-process that relational approaches to social movements highlight (Emirbayer and Goodwin 1994; Crossley 2011).

9 Conclusion

This paper has sought to show that specific theoretical approaches can direct researchers toward the use of specific methods and that relational approaches to social movement networks are best operationalized through mixed methods research designs.

Structural approaches to social movement networks are very well served by the exclusive use of quantitative social network analysis, because of their focus on network structure and their assumption that relations alone determine behaviour. But such approaches are limited in the degree to which they can explain the meaning and processes involved in social relations. The main limits related to the anti-categorical imperative, restrictive causality models, the neglect of meaning in networks and of the dynamic processes underlying network structure (Emirbayer and Goodwin 1994).

In recent years, a number of scholars have sought to draw on and revise relational approaches to social movement networks that recognize the constant interplay of structure and agency, and recognize the role of culture (Emirbayer and Goodwin 1994; Emirbayer 1997; Tilly 2005; Saunders 2007; White 2008; Mische 2010; Crossley 2011). But, such ‘new’ approaches need ‘new’ methods. This paper supports existing literature suggesting that relational approaches to social movement networks are best operationalized through mixed methods research designs (Coviello 2005; Knox et al. 2006; Edwards and Crossley 2009;
Heath et al. 2009; Crossley 2010; Edwards 2010; Jack 2010). The integration of quantitative and qualitative social network analysis and the sequencing of quantitative and qualitative techniques in mixed methods research designs help to integrate the analysis of the forms and features of social movement networks with that of the meaning and processes embedded in these social relations. As such it fulfills the aim of an increased analytical density, characteristic of mixed methods (Bergman 2008).

The paper also presents an example of a mixed method research design used to investigate environmental movement networks in Indonesia. The research design shows how methods were used in sequence, side-by-side and integrated in different stages of the study to understand the role of networks in coalition work, external institutionalization, and in the shaping of political opportunities for EMOs attempting to advance reform agendas.

While more and more studies today use mixed method research designs, what has not yet fully developed is an extensive methodological discussion about the different ways to effectively combine quantitative and qualitative approaches in the research of social movement networks. This is a field for further exploration.
Appendix A: Questionnaire (English and Indonesian versions)

**Organization questionnaire**
(English version)

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**Dissertation title:**
Social Movement Networks and Policy Processes in the Forest Tenure Policy Domain in Indonesia

**Questionnaire focus:**
Networking and membership of EMOs in the forest tenure policy domain

**Purpose:** to investigate membership patterns and networking mechanisms linked to high level members of NGOs

The information in the questionnaire is maintained confidential, no information on individuals will be disclosed

**Dissertation Aim**
Since 1999 substantial changes toward a more democratic and decentralized state have been taking place in Indonesia. Both these developments have affected the growth and the work of the environmental social movements in Indonesia.

My research investigates how the environmental movement is affecting policies related to rights to forest resources. The main focus of this study is on advocacy and political contention at the national level. Particular attention is given to the efforts of civil society organizations to affect processes that relate to forest policies.
**Civil Society Organization questionnaire:**

Name of organization: 

Name of respondent: 

Position of respondent in organization: 

1.0 In what year was the organization founded? 

2.0 What is the number of:
   - Member organizations: 
   - Individual members: 
   - Paid staff: 
   - Regular activists: 

3.0 What are the main issues the organization is involved in?
   - Main issues: 
     1 = Environmental management, rights or conservation 
     2 = Agrarian rights 
     3 = Indigenous rights 
     4 = Human rights 
     5 = Democratization 

   Is the organization also involved in some of the other issues indicated above? (multiple answers possible)
   - Others: 

4.0 Does this organization have an office? 
   - Yes / No

5.0 If yes. How did you obtain it?
   - Through members personal connections 
   - Rental 
   - From public agencies 
   - From other voluntary organization 
   - Other

5.1 If no, where do members meet?

5.2 If yes, does it lend the office to other NGO/volunteer organizations? 

6.0 Does your org. give money or other resources to other civil society organizations? 
   - Yes / No

6.1 If yes, can you list them?

7.0 Does your organization receive money or other material resources from other civil society organizations? 
   - Yes / No

7.1 If yes, can you list them?

8.0 What are the sources of funding of your org.? (multiple answers possible)
   - International organizations 
   - National organizations 
   - Public funding 
   - Members 
   - Other voluntary associations/NGOs 
   - Professional activities run by the group 
   - Other, specify: 

If Int. Org.: Is the funding project based? 
   - Yes / No
9.0 Do any of the following media report with some regularity about your org's activities:  
1 = Local newspaper  
2 = Local radio stations  
3 = National television  
4 = National newspapers  
5 = National radio stations  

10.0 Has your org. released public statements or petitions?  
1 = yes / 2 = no  
10.1 If yes specify which ones:  
early reformasi '98-'99:  
during the last 12 months:  

11.0 Has it participated in public statements/petitions proposed by other orgs?  
1 = yes / 2 = no  
11.1 If yes specify which ones:  
early reformasi '98-'99:  
during the last 12 months:  

12.0 Has your org. organized public protests?  
1 = yes / 2 = no  
12.1 If yes specify which ones:  
early reformasi '98-'99:  
during the last 12 months:  

13.0 Has your org. participated in public protests organized by other orgs this year?  
1 = yes / 2 = no  
13.1 If yes specify which ones:  
early reformasi '98-'99:  
during the last 12 months:  

14.0 Does your org. have its own e-mail distribution list?  
1 = yes / 2 = no  
15.0 Does your org. have its own newsletter/magazine?  
1 = yes / 2 = no  
15.1 If yes: What type of material do you disseminate?  
1 = newsletter  
2 = periodical journal  
3 = other  
15.2 If yes: Do you send it to other NGO/voluntary organizations?  
1 = yes / 2 = no  
15.3 If yes: Can you list them?: (regular contacts only):
16.0 With which other civil society organizations does your organization exchange advice, expertise and information? (regular contact only)

17.0 Does your org. participate in any permanent co-ordinating bodies with other civil society organization?

1 = yes / 2 = no

If yes: Would you please list them?

18.0 Has your org. promoted campaigns and initiatives with other civil society organizations on a regular basis?

1 = yes / 2 = no

If Yes, would you please list them?

early reformasi '98-'99:  
during last 12 months:

19.0 How would you define the environmental movement?

20.0 In your view, what are the major goals of the environmental movement?

1  
2  

21.0 Which are the major civil society organizations involved in environmental issues?

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  

22.0 Do you feel your org. is part of the environmental movement?  

1 = yes / 2 = no

23.0 How would you define the agrarian movement?

24.0 In your view, what are the major goals of the agrarian movement?

1  
2  

25.0 What are the major civil society organizations involved in agrarian land issues?

1  
2  
3  
4  
5
26.0  Do you feel your org. is part of the agrarian movement?  
1 = yes / 2 = no

27.0  How would you define the human rights movement?  

28.0  In your view, what are the major goals of the human rights movement?  
1
2

29.0  What are the major civil society organizations involved with human rights issues?  
1
2
3
4
5

29.1  Do you feel your org. is part of the human rights movement?  
1 = yes / 2 = no

30.0  What are the main activities of your organization? (up to 3)  
1
2
3

31.0  What is its main decision-making body?:  

31.1  Is it elected or appointed?  
1 = elected / 2 = appointed / 3 = consensus (if it includes all members)
1 = yes / 2 = no

32.0  Does your org. maintain regular contact with government agencies/ bodies?  
1 = yes / 2 = no
32.1  If yes, indicate which ones:  
1
2
3
4
5

33.0  Is your org. part of umbrella organizations?  
1 = yes / 2 = no
33.1  If yes indicate which ones:  
1
2
3
4
5

34.0  Is your org. a member of international coalitions /NGO/civil society organizations?  
34.1  If yes indicate which ones:  
1
2
3
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5
35.0 Has your org. been part of temporary issue-based coalitions? 1 = yes / 2 = no

35.1 If yes indicate which ones:

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<tr>
<th>early reformasi period '98-'99:</th>
<th>in the last 12 months:</th>
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36.0 Has your org. participated in forums to interact with national policy level (working groups, commissions etc.)?

1 = yes / 2 = no

36.1 If yes, indicate in which you have participated:

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<th>early reformasi period '98-'99:</th>
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37.0 Does your org. lobby government agencies in order to affect policies? 1 = yes / 2 = no

37.1 If yes, indicate the names of these government agencies:

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38.0 Which are the major civil society organizations trying to affect forest policies (in terms of both environmental and land right/tenure issues?)

1
2
3
4
5

39.0 Does your organization interact with these regularly? 1 = yes / 2 = no

39.1 If yes: How would you characterize these interactions?

1 = cooperation
2 = contention
3 = both
40.0  Which are the government agencies active in shaping forest policies (in terms of both environmental and land rights issues)?

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</table>

41.0  Does your organization interact with these regularly?  1 = yes / 2 = no

41.1  If yes: How would you characterize these interactions?  
1 = cooperation
2 = contention
3 = both

42.0  What are the major organizations representing the private sector trying to affect forest policies (in terms of both environmental and land rights issues)?

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</table>

43.0  Does your organization interact with these regularly?  1 = yes / 2 = no

43.1  If yes: How would you characterize these interactions?  
1 = cooperation
2 = contention
3 = both

44.0  Could I get a copy of the list of your member organizations and the e-mail distribution list? (these are used to assess networking between civil society organizations)
Hal dissertasi: Pola-Pola lingkungan dan kebijakan pemanfaatan kehutanan
Penelitian ini tentang identifikasi jaringan aktor politik yang mempengaruhi kebijakan hak hutan (tanah dan sumberdaya).
Perhatian khusus diberikan kepada usaha organisasi masyarakat sipil dalam mempengaruhi proses kebijakan.

Dissertation title: The environmental movement and forest management policies
The study focuses on the identification of the political forces shaping direction and implementation of forest tenure policies.

Focus questionnaire: Networking and membership of NGO involved with right-based environmental movement

Translation:
informasi tentang individu tidak akan tersingkap
The information in the questionnaire is maintained confidential, no information on individuals will be disclosed

(www.lse.ac.uk/collections/DESTIN/whosWho/phdDiGregorio.htm)
7.1 Kalau ya, silahkan menulis nama organisasi:

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8.0 Dana ORNOP dari mana? [boleh lebih dari 1 jawaban]

8. Pilih jawaban:

1 = organisasi internasional
2 = organisasi nasional
3 = dana publik
4 = dari anggota
5 = dari ORNOP/assosiasi lain
6 = dari kegiatan profesional di ORNOP ini
7 = lain, sebutkan:

Kalau dana dari org. internasional: Dana beralask an proyek? isi: 1 = ya / 2 = tidak

9.0 Media yang mana sering melapor tentang aktivitas ORNOP ini?

9. Pilih jawaban:

1 = koran lokal
2 = radio lokal
3 = TV nasional
4 = koran nasional
5 = radio nasional

10.0 ORNOP ini terbit siaran pers atau petisi?

10.1 Kalau ya, silahkan menulis nama atau hal siaran pers/petisi:

Selama awal reformasi (98-99):

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Selama 2 tahun yang lalu:

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11.0 ORNOP ini ikut serta di siaran pers atau petisi teratur dari ORNOP lain?

11.1 Kalau ya, silahkan menulis nama atau hal siaran pers/petisi:

Selama awal reformasi (98-99):

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12.0 ORNOP ini mengatur demo?

12.1 Kalau ya, silahkan menulis nama atau hal demo:

Selama awal reformasi (98-99):

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13.0 ORNOP ini ikut serta di demo teratur dari ORNOP lain?

13.1 Kalau ya, silahkan menulis nama atau hal demo:

Selama awal reformasi (98-99):

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Selama 2 tahun yang lalu:

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14.0 ORNOP ini punya daftar distribusi e-mail (atau yahoo group)?

14.1 Kalau yaohogroup sebutkan namanya:

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</table>
15.0 ORNOP ini punya newsletter atau majalah? 

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isi: 1 = ya / 2 = tidak

15.1 Kalau ya, sebutkan: 

1. newsletter 
2. jurnal 
3. lain (e.g. buku...)

(boleh lebih dari 1 jawaban)

15.2 Kalau ya, itu dikirim ke ORNOP lain? 

| 1 | 2 |

isi: 1 = ya / 2 = tidak

15.3 kalau ya, menulis nama ORNOP: (hanya kontak yg tetap):

1
2
3
4
5

16.0 ORNOP ini mentukar nasehat, keahlian dan informasi dengan ORNOP yg mana?

Menulis nama ORNOP: (hanya kontak tetap):

1
2
3
4
5

17.0 ORNOP ini ikut serta di badan koordinasi yg tetap dengan ORNOP dan organisasi suka rela lain?

Kalau ya, menulis nama badan koordinasi ORNOP:

1
2
3
4
5

18.0 ORNOP ini mempromosikan kampanye atau peristiwa dengan ORNOP lain?

Kalau ya, silahkan menulis nama kampanye atau peristiwa:

Selama awal reformasi (98-99):  

Selama 2 tahun yg lalu:

1
2
3
4
5

19.0 Silahkan menulis satu definisi (menurut Anda) di gerakan linkungan di Indonesia:

20.0 Menurut Anda, paran-paran yg mana, paran-paran pokok di gerakan lingkungan?

1
2

21.0 Organisasi yang mana, yg dilibatkan sangat dengan hal-hal lingkungan di Indonesia?

1
2

22.0 ORNOP ini bagian gerakan lingkungan? 

| 1 | 2 |

isi: 1 = ya / 2 = tidak

23.0 Silahkan menulis satu definisi (menurut Anda) di gerakan agraria di Indonesia:
24.0 Menurut Anda, paran-paran yang mana, paran-paran pokok di gerakan agraria di Indonesia?

1

2

25.0 Organisasi yang mana, yang dlibatkan sangat dengan hal-hal agraria di Indonesia?

1

2

3

4

5

26.0 ORNOP ini bagian gerakan agraria? 

isi: 1 = ya / 2 = tidak 

27.0 Silahkan menulis satu definisi (menurut Anda) di gerakan ham di Indonesia?

28.0 Menurut Anda, paran-paran yang mana, paran-paran pokok di gerakan ham di Indonesia?

1

2

29.0 Organisasi yang mana, yang dlibatkan sangat dengan hal-hal ham di Indonesia?

1

2

3

4

5

29.1 ORNOP ini bagian gerakan ham? 

isi: 1 = ya / 2 = tidak 

30.0 Silahkan mendaftar aktivitas utama di ORNOP ini:

1

2

3

31.0 Badan yang mana, bikin keputusan lebih penting di ORNOP ini?

Menulis nama badan:

31.1 Badan ini dipilih seperti pilihan atau ditunjuk: 

isi: 1 = dililih, 2 = ditunjuk, kalau lain sebutkan 

32.0 ORNOP ini punya kontak tetap dengan bandan permerintahan? 

isi: 1 = ya / 2 = tidak 

32.1 Kalau ya, menulis nama bandan permerintahan:

1

2

3

4

5

33.0 ORNOP ini bagian organisasi umbrella? 

isi: 1 = ya / 2 = tidak 

33.1 Kalau ya, menulis nama organisasi umbrella:

1

2

3

4

5
34.0 ORNOP ini, anggota koalisi ORNOP internasional? [ ]
   isi: 1 = ya / 2 = tidak

34.1 Kalau ya, menulis name koalisi internasional:
   1
   2
   3
   4
   5

35.0 ORNOP ini ikut serta koalisi sementara? [ ]
   isi: 1 = ya / 2 = tidak

35.1 Kalau ya, menulis name koalisi sementara:
   Selama awal reformasi (98-99): [ ]
   Selama 2 tahun yg lalu: [ ]
   1
   2
   3
   4
   5

36.0 ORNOP ini ikut serta di forum kebijakan di tingkat nasional? [ ]
   isi: 1 = ya / 2 = tidak

36.1 Kalau ya, menulis name forum:
   Selama awal reformasi (98-99): [ ]
   Selama 2 tahun yg lalu: [ ]
   1
   2
   3
   4
   5

37.0 ORNOP ini melobi badan pemerintahan untuk mempengaruhi kebijakan? [ ]
   isi: 1 = ya / 2 = tidak

37.1 Kalau ya, menulis name bandan pemerintahan:
   Selama awal reformasi (98-99): [ ]
   Selama 2 tahun yg lalu: [ ]
   1
   2
   3

38.0 Nama ORNOP:
   1
   2
   3
   4
   5

39.0 ORNOP ini bergaul tetap dengan ORNOP di atas? [ ]
   isi: 1 = ya / 2 = tidak

39.1 Kalau ya: pergaulan seperti apa?
   1 = koperasi
   2 = lawan (contention)
   3 = kedua-keduanya (1 dan 2)
Badan permerintahan yang mana, yang lebih aktif menpengaruhi kebijakan kehutanan?
(linkungan dan tentang hak-hak)

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41.0 ORNOP ini bergaul tetap dengan badan pemerintahan ini?

Kalau ya: pergaulan seperti apa?

Kalau ya: pergaulan seperti apa?

Pilih jawaban:

1 = koperasi
2 = lawan (contention)
3 = kedua-keduanya (1 dan 2)

41.1

42.0

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42.1 ORNOP ini bergaul tetap dengan badan pribadi ini?

Kalau ya: pergaulan seperti apa?

Pilih jawaban:

1 = koperasi
2 = lawan (contention)
3 = kedua-keduanya (1 dan 2)

42.2
Appendix B: Key information list and interview guides

List of key informants:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Position and role</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Martua Sirait</td>
<td>World Agroforestry Center and Working Group on Tenure</td>
<td>Policy analyst, secretary of WGT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chip Fay</td>
<td>World Agroforestry Center</td>
<td>Senior policy analyst</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Noer Fauzi Rachman</td>
<td>Konsortium Pembaruan Agraria (KPA)</td>
<td>Founder and former head of the KPA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myrna Asnawati Safitri</td>
<td>University of Indonesia, and Leiden University</td>
<td>Lecturer and researcher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sandra Moniaga</td>
<td>ELSAM and Leiden University</td>
<td>Board member, researcher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivan Valentina Ageung</td>
<td>Pokja-Psda</td>
<td>Executive director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mas Achmad Santosa</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme, LBH</td>
<td>Senior advisor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wahyu Susilo</td>
<td>INFID</td>
<td>Program manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farah Sofa</td>
<td>Walhi</td>
<td>Deputy director of campaign</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asep Yunan Firdaus</td>
<td>HUMA</td>
<td>Executive director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iman Santoso</td>
<td>Ministry of Forestry, Center for Social and Economic Policy</td>
<td>Director general of Center for Social and Economic Policy and coordinator of Working Group on Tenure</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Semi-structure interview guiding questions

I would like to discuss a number of items related to the work and position of your organization, in particular in relation to natural resources, their management, degradation and access by local people.

1. Could you describe the main activities and interest of your organization?

Since 1999, democratization and decentralization have affected the opportunities and growth of civil society.

2. In your view, how have these changes affected your organization?

3. Could you describe your interactions with other environmental organizations?  
And have those developments affected, and if so, how have they affected the relations between your organization and other civil society organizations?

4. Could you describe your interactions with state actors?  
And how have the policy changes since 1999 affected these interactions?

Indonesia’s environmental movement has a long history and has grown in recent years.

5. In your opinion what are the main reasons for the birth and expansion of the environmental movement in Indonesia?

6. What are in your view the main causes of environmental problems in Indonesia today?

7. What is needed to solve these environmental problems?
List of items to discuss during semi- and unstructured interviews:

- History of organization
- Organizational structure
- Territorial structure
- Funding
- Effects of decentralization
- Effects of democratization
- Activities and policy developments
  - (contentious collective action, interaction with state actors, policy developments)
- Attitude towards government
- Attitude towards private sector
- Comments on TAP IX decree
Interest, values or discourse: What drives networking in SMO coalitions? Evidence from Indonesian forest activism

Monica Di Gregorio

Department of International Development, London School of Economics and Political Science, UK

(Accepted for publication in Environmental Politics, 23 August 2011)

Abstract
This paper argues that networks of information and resource exchanges between social movement organizations (SMOs) have a dual function. Whilst agreeing with Diani and Baldassarri’s (2007) suggestion that these networks can support instrumental alliances among very distinct and weakly connected SMOs, I show that they often support the formation of more tightly-knit social movement and SMO discourse coalitions. What distinguishes an instrumental from a more substantive alliance is the density of networking. The coalescing force in dense networks is not necessarily a collective identity, but the similarity in values (value homophily) or a shared discourse. The paper uses evidence from Indonesian environmental activism to draw three propositions on networking, value homophily and discursive practices in coalition work: 1) networks tend to be densest among environmental SMOs that share the same variety of environmentalism; 2) density of interaction in SMO discourse coalitions reveals ongoing framing activities; and 3) environmental SMO discourse coalitions bridge across SMOs with distinct yet compatible environmental values.

Keywords: social movements; homophily; SMO discourse coalitions; social network analysis; forest tenure; Indonesia
1 Introduction

The main aim of this paper is to show that information and resource networks have a much more fundamental role in coalition work among environmental social movement organizations (SMOs) than previously recognized. They do not just support instrumental alliances, but are often the basis of robust coalitions that are characterized by similarities in values and a common discourse. This paper then applies these insights to evidence from activism in Indonesia.

Recent research (Baldassarri and Diani 2007) argues that inter-organizational networks of information and resource exchanges connect very distinct clusters of SMOs. Their main function is therefore one of ‘macro-integration’. They support contingent and instrumental alliances, with SMOs instrumentally sharing resources in order to achieve specific goals. But they do not provide any long term legacy, they cannot link specific campaigns to broader frameworks, and when these coalitional processes end, everything dissolves and no ideational bond remains. However, this interpretation is problematic, because it underestimates the role of these networks in communication processes that are at the heart of coalition work. In particular, it limits the function of these networks to one of macrointegration among distant and fundamentally diverse SMOs.

Taking as a starting point Tilly’s (1998) suggestion, that it is through conversation that processes of contentious politics occur, this paper shows that these networks can have a much more fundamental role in communication among SMOs. Apart from the macrointegration function illustrated above, they also support communicative interactions which lead to compact and dynamic coalitions that can have a profound influence on the very understanding of policy problems. Communicative interaction in these coalitions can sustain long-term collective action and create a common vision. High density of interaction is what distinguishes networking within these more robust coalitions from purely
instrumental alliances. I identify two possible forms of such robust SMO coalitions: coalitions of SMOs that share similar values and broader SMO discourse coalitions. The latter coalesces SMOs around a common discourse, but these SMOs do not necessarily share a collective identity or worldview. Instead they hold distinct values that are, however, compatible enough to support robust coalitions. The concept of SMO discourse coalition also emphasizes the constructivist nature of coalition work and suggests that ideational bonds can form around relatively broad discursive frames.

The paper is divided into a theoretical and an empirical part. It starts by discussing the instrumental explanation and identifying its limitations. The next section addresses the first limitation: the neglect of the qualitative difference between more and less dense network areas. It then investigates possible reasons for the emergence of dense networks in coalition work: one explanation suggests that similarity in values facilitates dense interaction (value homophily); the second suggests that dense communication underlies discursive processes that support much broader SMO discourse coalitions. In the latter case, density of interaction sustains ongoing framing activities and discursive practices which redefine and advance claims, and possibly lead to convergence of meaning.

The second part of the paper uses new empirical evidence from environmental activism on forest tenure issues in Indonesia to assess these arguments. State forest lands still cover the vast majority of Indonesia, and conflict over access to and use of these resources is widespread. The capacity of social movements to affect political discourse and decisions is important in the advocacy for policy reforms aimed at mitigating these conflicts.

After a short description of the composition of the SMOs active in the policy domain related to forest tenure, I assess the degree to which homophily can explain density of interaction among different environmental groups. The paper then presents an

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31 A policy domain is defined as 'a set of policy actors with a substantive focus of concern, which gather around policy initiatives and debates' (Laumann and Knoke 1987: 9-10)
analysis of the dominant SMO coalition, which suggests that both framing and homophily contribute to density of interaction.

From the empirical findings the paper draws three propositions. The first suggests that there is a tendency for network interactions to be denser among SMOs that share the same variety of environmentalism. The second states that density of interaction in SMO discourse coalitions is predominantly linked to extensive framing activities aimed at the formulation and maintenance of a common discourse. The third highlights one of the main features of SMO discourse coalitions: the ability to bridge across varieties of environmentalism that draw on distinct yet compatible values.

The paper contributes to research on SMO coalitions by suggesting a much more fundamental role of information and resource networks than previously acknowledged. It also provides new evidence on processes shaping environmental networks and introduces the concept of ‘SMO discourse coalition’ in social movement studies. In terms of broader implications, this paper suggests that network analysts might consider incorporating some of the insights coming from cultural approaches to social movements in order to better understand the processes which underlie these networks.

2 The instrumental explanation

The very definition of social movement is based on the concept of network (Diani 1992). One of the features of social movements is that they are spaces where individuals, groups and organizations ‘engage in sustained exchanges of resources in pursuit of common goals’ (della Porta and Diani 1999: 21). However, there is considerable debate about which type of ties and which network characteristics are involved in the definition of a social movement and in different types of coalitions (Diani and Bison 2004; Saunders 2008b). This paper focuses on the role of networking in coalition work and asks: Does communication, in the form of information and resource exchanges among SMOs, simply
support the formation of instrumental alliances? Or can it also support deeper linkages and more robust coalitions?

Recent research suggests the former. Baldassarri and Diani (2007) see inter-organizational information and resource exchanges as mainly facilitating the bridging between SMOs of different orientation, or ‘otherwise disconnected clusters of organizations’ (Baldassarri and Diani 2007, p.768). They suggest that these network exchanges - termed simply as ‘transactions’ - tend to be purely instrumental in nature. They are only aimed at short-term objectives and narrowly defined incumbent policy issues. These exchanges can therefore only underlie so-called ‘conflictual coalitional processes’, which are purely instrumental in nature and lack any base of solidarity and reciprocity characteristic of ‘social movement processes’ (Diani and Bison 2004, p.283 and 285).

From a slightly different point of view, Saunders (2007; 2008b) suggests that exchanges of information build connections that are too weak to even imply that any substantive collaboration is taking place. This is certainly the case, but it should not lead to considering all inter-organizational information or resource exchange ties as purely instrumental in nature. Information is routinely exchanged both among organizations with very different interests, agendas, and perspectives as well as among closely collaborating organizations that share the same concerns, discourse, or collective identity.

The main problem with associating these networks with purely instrumental alliances is that it relegates communication in coalition work exclusively to superficial and inconsequential exchanges of information. In my view, the general interpretation that information, communication and resource exchange networks among SMOs do not facilitate or reflect shared agendas, similar values and concerns is problematic for two main reasons. First, it does not recognize the qualitative difference between more and less dense areas of networks. In this respect, I argue that a very low density of interaction is what distinguishes instrumental from more substantive and robust coalitions. And second, such

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32 Density here is defined as the general level of linkage among nodes of a network (Scott 2000).
an interpretation underestimates the role of communication and argumentation in coalition
work, neglecting the fact that (as mentioned above) it is through conversation that
processes of contentious politics occur (Tilly 1998).

3 Density matters

One of the main weaknesses of the instrumental explanation is that it neglects the
qualitative difference between more and less dense areas of interaction in networks. Instead
it focuses predominantly on the distinction between the types of ties. It suggests that some
types of ties, namely inter-organizational information and resource exchanges, lead to
instrumental alliances. Other types of ties, namely inter-personal ties among members of
different organizations (Diani 1995), lead to more robust alliances held together by
stronger social bonds (Baldassarri and Diani 2007). According to this view, information
and resource exchange ties among SMOs have the exclusive function of macrointegration,
connecting distant and intrinsically different organizations. They have only short-term
effects, do not entail either practical or ideational bonds, or a common vision. Conversely,
submerged (or latent) networks among individual members indicate the presence of
‘strong’ social bonds (bonding social capital) (Diani 1995). The argument then maintains
that only the latter type of tie is responsible for collaboration ‘within niches of intense
interaction’ (Baldassarri and Diani 2007, p. 768). This statement seems to suggest that
intensive interaction is only due to overlapping membership ties, but this is not necessarily
the case. In fact, inter-organizational collaboration can occur even in the absence of
overlapping membership (Saunders 2008b).

The main problem with the instrumental argument is that it implies that ties in
inter-organizational information and resource networks are quasi-random. In other words,
there is little selection of partners in exchanges of information and resources and
connections are mostly determined by chance. However, the majority of the evidence does
not support the claim that these ties are randomly distributed (Laumann and Knoke 1987; Saunders 2007; Luke et al. 2010). The empirical data from Indonesia also confirm this. The density is not uniform in these networks: some SMOs are much more connected than others and it is likely, that in the same areas of a network where informal social bonds are strong, inter-organizational exchanges are also very dense.

The lack of attention to density of interactions is indeed surprising, because it is one of the fundamental pillars of social network analysis. In his seminal work on the strength of weak ties, Granovetter (1973; 1983) recognizes important qualitative differences between ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ ties in terms of investment of time, emotional intensity, and reciprocity. What is crucial for our discussion is that strong ties tend to form dense networks, and weak ties less dense networks (Granovetter 1983). This becomes even more evident in multiplex networks, or networks which include different types of relationships simultaneously (Kenis and Knoke 2002). In other words, strong ties create closure of networks, while weak ties connecting different sub-networks provide reach and extension or macrointegration, bridging between different sub-groups (Granovetter 1973; 1983). Consequently, there is a qualitative difference between more and less dense areas in networks. Weak ties and sparse networks do indeed connect ‘distant and otherwise disconnected clusters of organizations’ (Baldassarri and Diani 2007, p. 768), but strong ties and dense areas of exchanges reveal more substantive linkages 33. I suggest that this applies to inter-organizational information, and resource exchanges as much as to other ties: sparse interactions – if they support coalition work at all – will tend to support instrumental alliances, while more robust coalitions are characterized by dense interactions. If this is the case, then density is a very good indicator of the presence of deeper linkages among SMOs.

Identifying an indicator of substantive coalition work does not, however, provide an explanation of why some coalitions are more robust and consequential, while others are

33 In social network analysis, density refers to ‘the number of lines in a simple network, expressed as the proportion of the maximum possible number of lines’ (Nooy de et al. 2005: 63).
purely instrumental. This leads to the second point of the critique. I suggest that the instrumental explanation underestimates the role of communication and argumentation in coalition work. My point here is that dense networks support communication processes which are crucial in coalition work. They reflect the presence and contribute to the formation of shared discourse and shared values. Dense interactions are therefore characteristic of more substantive coalitions which can have broader aims of effecting political and social change. These aspects are discussed in the next sections, where I also distinguish between two possible types of SMO coalitions that are likely to be characterized by strong ties.

4 Value homophily and coalitions

If these networks are not just instrumental, what lies behind dense communication, information and resource exchanges? One convincing explanation is that similarity in values facilitates dense exchanges among SMOs (Saunders 2007). In turn, coalitions among SMOs that hold similar values are likely to be quite compact, robust, and might aim at effecting social change beyond short-term policy improvements.

Substantial evidence indeed suggests that perceived similarity promotes intense interaction (Emirbayer and Goodwin 1994; McPherson et al. 2001). So far, this phenomenon called homophily (McPherson et al. 2001) has mainly been studied in relation to individuals. It affirms that people tend to interact more with people that are similar to themselves, who are perceived as having common socio-demographic characteristics, identities, and values. In particular, value homophily includes the numerous internal states which shape people’s orientation toward future behaviour, as aspirations and values (Lazarsfeld and Merton 1954; McPherson et al. 2001). Substantial overlapping membership, which is used an indicator of cohesive and robust ‘social movement coalitions’ (Diani and
Bison 2004; Baldassarri and Diani 2007), can also be explained on the basis of value homophily among individual members.

The principle of value homophily can also be applied to inter-organizational networks (Hovorka and Larsen 2006; Saunders 2007; Luke et al. 2010). I argue that in this case, communication networks can be understood as the very ‘locations for, or conduits’ of values, collective identities, and shared concerns, or of more broadly defined cultural formations (Mische 2007: 258). In fact, it is through communication that SMOs explore each others’ cultural foundation to identify potential allies. If SMOs engaging in coalition work are more likely to interact with other SMOs that share similar values, areas of high network density will reflect value homophily. I expect then, that in the policy domain related to forest tenure in Indonesia, density of information and resource exchanges will be higher among environmental SMOs that share the same variety of environmentalism (Guha and Martinez-Alier 1997; Forsyth 2007; Saunders 2007; Brulle 2008).

However, the suggestion that robust environmental SMOs coalitions and dense networks form around SMOs that adhere to the same variety of environmentalism is at best a partial explanation of coalition work. Foremost, it does not explain the formation of environmental coalitions that include SMOs that hold different environmental values (Diani 1995; Rootes 1999a; Saunders 2007). In contrast to the instrumental explanation, I argue that these networks can support very dynamic and relatively dense coalitions, whose unifying force is a common discourse that can accommodate different yet compatible values. In fact, in the forest tenure policy domain in Indonesia, the main formal and longest-lasting coalition includes both environmental justice and conservation SMOs.

34 A variety of environmentalism is a specific way to understand nature, which involves specific beliefs and values on the interaction between people and the environment (Brulle 2008).

35 In a similar way, Rootes (1997) and Saunders (2008b) suggest that coalitions and social movements themselves are based on shared concerns as opposed to collective identities.
5 Networks and SMO discourse coalitions

To conceptualize SMO discourse coalitions we need to recognize one further role of information and resource networks, which is neglected in both the instrumental and the homophily based explanations. As mentioned earlier, networks of information and resources play a crucial role in communication among SMOs. Communication networks are in fact governance networks or spaces in which actors argue, explain, justify themselves and try to influence each other (Hajer and Versteeg 2005). Through these networks SMOs reinterpret problems as well as their competing identities. Consequently, networks supporting inter-organizational communication are not just ‘locations for, or conduits of, cultural formation, but rather [they are] composed of culturally constituted processes of communicative interaction’ (Mische 2003: 258, emphasis in original).

The recognition of the importance of discursive practices in coalition work explains how very broad, dynamic yet robust coalitions can form among SMOs with distinct yet compatible values. In these coalitions the very redefinition of problems is an integral part of coalition work. I call these coalitions ‘SMO discourse coalitions’, where the term ‘discourse coalition’ is borrowed from argumentative policy analysis (Hajer 1995). Environmental SMOs in these coalitions do not share a collective identity, common values or worldviews, but they do share a much broader common discourse, a common understanding of specific environmental problems.

But how can we distinguish instrumental alliances from SMO discourse coalitions? The formation of such a coalition requires the development and the continuous elaboration of a master frame. This is a very broad frame or schemata of interpretation (Goffman 1974) in terms of scope, inclusiveness, and flexibility able to accommodate SMOs with distinct worldviews. In particular, there are two types of framing processes that support master frames: frame bridging and frame extension. Frame bridging entails ‘linking two or more ideologically congruent but structurally unconnected frames regarding a particular issue or problem’ (Benford and Snow 2000: 624). Frame extension entails extending a
frame beyond its primary interests to include issues and concerns that are presumed to be of importance to potential adherents (Benford and Snow 2000: 625). My argument here is that information and resource networks are composed of these very framing processes. Consequently, I expect SMO discourse coalitions to display relatively dense networks unlike purely instrumental alliances.

Therefore, I argue, that high density of interaction in interorganisational communication networks is due to two main forces: similarity in values and ongoing framing processes supporting broad SMO discourse coalitions. The degree to which density of interaction is explained by homophily or by framing activities is an empirical matter and needs to be analyzed in each instance. Still, coalitions based on similarity in values as well as those based on a common discourse should present denser interactions compared to purely instrumental alliances\(^{36}\) (cf. Baldassarri and Diani 2007).

One further point is that similarity in values is also likely to play a role in SMO discourse coalitions. Discourse coalitions are very unlikely to occur among SMOs which have opposite values, at least in the absence of major frame transformation (Benford and Snow 2000). Therefore, there needs to be some degree of compatibility in values among SMOs for a discourse coalition to form. Why? Because, the possibility of formulating a successful master frame is necessarily limited by the possibility of coalescing around a common discourse, without single SMOs giving up any of their fundamental values. This is unlikely to happen when value systems are in strong opposition.

At this stage a short digression is necessary. Two possible tensions can be detected in the above explanation. One is the theoretical tension between framing-analytic approaches (Goffman 1974) used in this paper, and the discursive turn which is at the base of the concept of discourse coalition and its focus on the analysis of narratives (Somers

\(^{36}\) A further consequence is that communication networks supporting SMO discourse coalitions are as dynamic as the discursive practices that shape them (Mische and White 1998).
1992; Ewick and Silbey 1995; Hajer 1995). The second refers to the possible tension between the explanations of coalition work based on values and discourse.

With respect to the first point, framing approaches tend to see framing processes as deliberate communication strategies aimed at the formation of solidarity and subsequent mobilization able to support sustained collective action (Gamson 1992; Benford and Snow 2000). They have however, been criticized for the lack of investigation of the ‘discursive foundations’ of framing, and of the ‘contentious process of meaning production’ (Steinberg 1998: 846). One key issue is the degree to which framing is a cognitive process alone or if agency might be limited in this process by a dominant discourse. Discursive approaches stress the contentious nature of the production of discourse itself, and how discourse can be constraining due to social conventions and limits to acceptable meanings (Wertsch et al. 1995). This paper does not aim to solve this tension. It does however, see framing processes as formed by discursive practices that are produced by interactions among actors, and therefore it addresses part of the critique to framing theory. At the same time, one limitation of this paper is that it does not investigate the degree to which agency in framing processes might be constrained by structural conditions.

With respect to the second point, it could be argued that there is a fundamental contradiction between the homophily and the discourse based explanation. I argue, however, that they are indeed compatible, if we recognize that signification processes underlie both social movement processes and SMO discourse coalitions. In other words, coalition work among SMOs undergoes constant frame transformation through communication (Somers 1992; Benford and Snow 2000). Still, this does not make

37 In fact, the very concept of discourse coalition was developed as a critique to value and belief-based explanations of coalitions (Hajer 1995). The aim of this paper, however, is not to discuss the ontological questions at the base of these explanations (Hajer 1995; Dryzek 1997; Forsyth 2003). The interest here is a more limited and pragmatic one: to see if there is compatibility between the suggestion that networking in coalition work is facilitated by similar values (McPherson et al. 2001) and that common discourse is at the base of broad discourse coalitions (Hajer 1995).
homophily irrelevant. The suggestion that organizations tend to form dense communication networks when their values are similar, holds also if we recognize that these values can be transformed through these communication exchanges. This statement is not necessarily contradictory. Simply, it recognizes a two-way relation between values and processes of signification underlying communication networks. Values are therefore not pre-given but evolve, and are shaped and refined by discursive practices (Mische and White 1998). This type of reasoning is not dissimilar to Melucci’s characterization of collective identity itself as a process of ‘interactive and communicative construction’ (Melucci 1996, p. 71).

Summarizing, this paper proposes a new understanding of communication networks that can be tested or investigated empirically. It suggests that researchers should consider the possibility that networks of information and resource flows that support communication processes among SMOs are not necessarily formed by instrumental ties. Instead, they may play a much more fundamental role in coalition work, both reflecting and affecting similarities in values among SMOs. It also suggests that robust coalitions might not just form around collective identities. Apart from these social movements coalitions, SMO discourse coalitions might emerge. The latter are broader alliances that link SMOs with distinct yet compatible values, but are not just instrumental in nature. Density of interaction should be a good indicator in distinguishing instrumental ties from ties supporting these more substantive coalitions. This paper also suggests that network density alone cannot be used to distinguish social movement processes from SMO discourse coalitions. To do that, we need to investigate the underlying framing processes.

The rest of the paper analyzes new evidence about SMO coalition work in the policy domain related to forest tenure issues in Indonesia. The aim of the empirical investigation is to assess the degree to which homophily or framing processes characterizes intense exchanges in coalition work. After some notes on the research design, the paper
presents the results and draws some propositions on the relation between networking, homophily and discursive practices.

6 Forest activism in Indonesia

There is more than one reason why environmental activism related to forest tenure issues in Indonesia provides an interesting opportunity to investigate the relationship between SMO networks and coalition work.

First, the role of SMOs in this domain has been of particular interest in the last decade. A fast-growing developing country, where 75% of the total landmass is still categorized as ‘state forest land’ (Contreras-Hermosilla and Fay 2005), Indonesia presents a widespread incidence of conflicts over land and natural resources (Peluso 1992; Colchester 1994; McCarthy 2000; Potter 2009). Since the onset of the democratization process starting in 1998, the environmental social movement has been at the centre of contentious political action aimed at reforming forest tenure policies (Di Gregorio 2006; Nomura 2007; Peluso et al. 2008). The capacity of social movements to challenge and engage policy makers is therefore central in order to avoid escalation and facilitate the resolution of these conflicts.

Second, forest activism in Indonesia also presents a good opportunity to explore how coalitions bridge across varieties of environmentalism and across SMOs with different social movement affiliation. Because of the vastness of state forest land, forest policies have a substantial impact on the national and local economy and affect not just environmental concerns, but local livelihoods and broader development strategies. Consequently, a variety of social movement organizations working primarily on different issues - environmental, human rights, agrarian and indigenous rights - are active in this policy domain (Lucas and Warren 2003; Nomura 2007; Peluso et al. 2008). Coalitions among SMOs necessarily need to bridge across different environmental orientations and different objectives.
Finally, assessing to what extent alliances are purely instrumental in nature, compared to being based on similar values or on a common discourse, can provide an indication of how robust coalitions really are. It can show if a deeper social transformation and reshaping of meaning are taking place in this domain.

There is a long tradition of research on both forest tenure (Colchester 1994; Li 1996; Padoch and Peluso 1996; Colfer 2004; Fay and Sirait 2004; McCarthy 2004; Resosudarmo 2004; Colfer and Capistrano 2005; McCarthy 2006) and environmental activism in Indonesia (Hardjono 1991; Potter 1996; Hirsch and Warren 1997; Manning and Van Diermen 2000; Afiff et al. 2005; Nomura 2007; Peluso et al. 2008; Potter 2009; Tuong 2009; Pye 2010; Bertrand 2011). However, only one of these studies explicitly investigates activism using a conceptual framework that refers to networking of environmental movement organizations (Nomura 2009). Most studies present either detailed analyses of single episodes of activism or broad historical and policy analyses. This study is the first that uses meso-level empirical evidence to investigate the role of communication networks in coalition work among environmental SMOs in Indonesia. It does this, by using a ‘mixed methods’ approach that integrates exploratory social network analysis with framing analysis. Such an approach provides the tools to investigate actual interactions in detail and at the same time analyze the complete policy domain.

7 Research design

The data for this study were collected during two visits between 2006 and 2007 in Indonesia’s capital city, Jakarta. This paper is based on the results from an organizational survey which included questions on networking and on semi-structured interviews with 25 representatives of environmental movement organizations. I also analyzed written

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38 While semi-structured interviews and an individual activist survey were also undertaken with 47 high ranking activists, the focus of this paper is at the organizational level.
documentation from organizations and coalitions. The qualitative information from semi-structured interviews and secondary sources is used to 1. interpret quantitative findings, 2. identify qualitative characteristics of SMOs and derive categorical data, 3. triangulate quantitative information. Four key aspects of the research design for this paper are: the boundary definition of the environmental movement actors working on forest tenure policy reform at the national level; the network relations (ties) investigated and the measures used; the assessment of homophily; and the frame analysis.

I followed a two step procedure that is common in network analysis to identify the SMOs that are part of this policy domain. It consists of using first a nominalist approach followed by a realist approach (Laumann and Knoke 1987; Saunders 2007). The nominalist approach relies on the researcher’s knowledge and interest for the selection of relevant organizations. I identified an initial list of SMOs\textsuperscript{39} that were involved in national level activism around forest tenure issues from existing literature, documentation of SMO activities, and recent newspaper articles. This list also provided a ranking of the relevance of the organizations according to the frequency of mentions. The list was validated using key informants, which led to the identification of 30 core organizations to which I administered a social organization survey as well as semi-structured interviews. The second step applies the realist approach, which defines the boundaries of a network based on the perception of the actor themselves. In the survey I asked respondents if they considered their organization as belonging to the environmental movement in Indonesia and if their organization was involved in national level activism related to forest tenure. Based on the responses, five out of the 30 organizations were dropped from the analysis: one did not define itself as part of the environmental movement, another was a multi-stakeholder forum and not an SMO, and three were not active on forest tenure issues at the national level. The remaining 25 core SMOs are part of the subsequent analysis.

\textsuperscript{39} In line with recent literature on social movements, actors include professionalised social movement organizations, membership-based grassroot organizations, and NGOs (Saunders 2007).
In terms of network relations the study focuses on a multiplex network\textsuperscript{40} derived from the organizational survey and formed by communication ties defined as regular exchanges of information, advice and expertise and regular material resource exchanges, where the latter were defined as financial and in-kind resource exchanges\textsuperscript{41}. The inclusion of the material resource exchanges is based on the premise that they provide material support to undertake communication activities and signal commitment, apart from supporting contentious collective action processes more broadly\textsuperscript{42}. It is a very similar definition to that used by Diani and Baldassarri (2007) for ‘transactions’ or instrumental ties.

To assess value homophily - if similarity in values determines a higher level of interaction - I used two measures of cohesion among SMOs and the attribute referring to the variety of environmentalism to which SMOs adhere. Cohesion is investigated through the systematic analysis of cohesive sub-networks\textsuperscript{43}. It is measured by density and average degree of vertex islands. Density of a network in social network analysis refers to the number of ties in a network, expressed as a proportion of the maximum possible number of ties (Nooy de et al. 2005). Average degree refers the average number of ties per vertex (number of ties divided by number of vertices). The higher the density and the higher the average degree, the more cohesive is the network. A vertex island is a connected sub-network whose

\textsuperscript{40} Multiplex networks are networks which include different types of ties (Kenis and Knoke 2002). In the figures network actors are represented through vertices (nodes or points), while the relations between actors are represented through lines.

\textsuperscript{41} The specific questions were: 1. ‘With which civil society organizations does your organization exchange advice, expertise and information? (regular contact only)’; 2. ‘Does your organization give money or other material resources to other civil society organizations?’ If yes, can you list them? ’ and 3. ‘Does your organization receive money or other material resources from other civil society organizations? If yes, can you list them?’

\textsuperscript{42} The information and resource exchange networks are very similar in terms of density pattern distribution, which further justifies investigating both relations together as a multiplex network.

\textsuperscript{43} Cohesive sub-networks or sub-groups are defined as ‘subsets of actors among whom there are relatively strong, direct, intense, frequent, or positive ties’ (Wasserman and Galaskiewicz 1994: 249).
vertices have greater values than the vertices in its neighborhood (Batagelj 2003). I assign to each vertex the value equal to the sum of all in-going and out-going ties of the vertex (degrees), so that the vertex island algorithm will identify the densest sub-network of a specific size. Network density and average degree measures are used only to compare density in networks of the same size, given that cross-size comparisons are subject to bias (Friedkin 1981). The algorithm used to identify vertex islands was developed by Batagelj and Zaveršnik (2004). All calculations of network measures and the visualizations of networks are undertaken with the Pajek software 44 (Batagelj and Mrvar 1998).

To assess the variety of environmentalism 45 held by SMOs I used the categorization developed by Brulle (2008) and identified four ideological blocks. Note that this variable refers to how SMOs understand environmental problems irrespective of their primary social movement affiliation. The categorization is based on the analysis of the qualitative information from the semi-structured interviews as routinely done in the literature 46 (Saunders 2007). This information was further validated by checking the consistency with individual survey responses.

In the survey I also asked about the main social movement affiliation. While all SMOs investigated in this study are part of the environmental movement, this is not necessarily their primary affiliation. Respondents were asked about the main issues which their organizations were involved in and could choose from the following categories determined during the pre-fieldwork visit: 1. environmental, 2. agrarian rights, 3. indigenous rights, 4. human rights and 5. democratization.

44 While all network measures take into account the direction of ties, in the figures the direction of ties is omitted for clarity of exposition.

45 The expression ‘variety of environmentalism’, corresponds to the ‘environmental values’ and is often just called ‘environmentalism’ in the literature (Guha and Martinez-Alier 1997; Rootes 2003a; Brulle 2008).

46 The organizations were asked: ‘Which are the main causes of environmental problems in Indonesia?’, and: ‘How could environmental problems be solved in Indonesia?’
Finally, the structure of the master frame of the formal coalition is investigated through frame analysis (Gerharts and Rucht 1992; Benford and Snow 2000) and is based on two of the central policy advocacy documents of the dominant SMO coalition\textsuperscript{47}.

8 Varieties of environmentalism and density of interaction

This section assesses the degree to which density of interaction reflects value homophily. It investigates to what extent SMOs sharing the same variety of environmentalism form denser networks. This is inferred from the systematic analysis of the composition of the densest sub-networks\textsuperscript{48} (vertex islands) of various sizes.

First however, I briefly sketch the main ideological groupings or varieties of environmentalism represented by the SMOs in the forest tenure policy domain. All 25 SMOs consider themselves part of the Indonesian environmental movement, albeit not predominantly. The aim here is to categorize the distinct understandings of environmental problems held by these SMOs (the variety of environmentalism to which they adhere). Qualitative analysis of the semi-structured interviews led to categorize the SMOs according to four different varieties of environmentalism, each one proposing a distinct frame to understand forest tenure problems. These groupings are: conservationists, environmental justice SMOs, anti-globalization green and anti-globalization agrarian SMOs.

The conservationist frame understands nature as a collection of components that work as a machine and suggests that humans need to manage nature through the use of expert technical knowledge. Predominantly focused on biodiversity and ecosystem conservation, livelihood concerns are often limited to the containment of conflict in order to increase support for conservation and assure global environmental services for future

\textsuperscript{47} The two documents are: ‘Prosiding Ringkas Konferensi Nasional Pengalolaan Sumberdaya Alam’ (Jakarta 23-25 May 2000) and ‘Ringkasan Konferensi Nasional Pengalolaan Sumberdaya Alam’ (2000).

\textsuperscript{48} Sub-networks are sub-sets of actors from the main network.
generations. Only two organizations, WWF and Greenpeace – both local chapters of international SMOs –, fall into the conservation group category.

In the forest tenure policy domain, the vast majority of SMOs (20) maintain values linked to an environmental justice frame, including the largest SMO, Walhi, which is the local chapter of Friends of the Earth. This injustice frame is based on a discourse of domination, which reflects the connectedness of environmental and human rights in the forest margins of developing countries. The frame suggests that solutions to environmental problems require local empowerment, recognition of local rights to natural resources, and broader social change.

A minority of SMOs (3) fall under the anti-globalization category. These SMOs interpret environmental problems through an openly anti-system frame, denouncing global capitalism as an exploitative system responsible for environmental degradation. I distinguish between two types of anti-globalization SMOs in Indonesia. The concerns of the first – which I call agrarian anti-globalization groups – reside primarily at the intersection of environmental justice and agrarian rights. Those of the second– the anti-globalization greens - relate to environmental justice and local access to natural resources.

Figure 1 illustrates the multiplex communication network, where the nodes (dots in the figures) represent the actors (environmental SMOs) and the ties (lines) represent regular exchanges of information, expertise, advise and material resources.

It is evident that all SMOs are linked to each other, either through direct ties or indirect paths. In other words, the network is cohesive and is constituted by one single component (Nooy de et al. 2005). This means that information and resource exchanges occur among organizations that might or might not share the same environmental concerns (Saunders 2007). This confirms similar findings in the literature in Indonesia (Lucas and Warren 2003; Nomura 2007; Peluso et al. 2008).
Note: See Appendix C for list of acronyms

Figure 1: Communication network and varieties of environmentalism

Legend:
- Environmental justice: environmental & livelihood concerns
- Conservationist: biodiversity and global environmental services
- Anti-globalization green: global capitalism and environmental sustainability are incompatible
- Anti-globalization agrarian concerns: global capitalism and respect of agrarian rights are incompatible
Still, as in most inter-organizational networks, it is visually evident that there are areas where interactions are denser. It is easy to see that both anti-globalization groups are only weakly connected to the rest of the network (in fact only one tie links these actors to the other groups). These weak ties are likely instrumental in nature and provide the macrointegration function that Baldassarri and Diani (2007) refer to. But our interest here is to investigate the densest areas of the network and their role in coalition work.

I use the island algorithm to identify sub-networks which are characterized by highest cohesion (Batagelj and Zaveršnik 2004). Formally, an island is a ‘connected small sub-network of size in the interval $k \ldots K$ with stronger internal cohesion relatively to its neighborhood’ (Batagelj 2003). In other words, a vertex island algorithm identifies a connected sub-network whose values of the vertices in the neighborhood of the sub-network are less than the values of vertices from the sub-network (Batagelj and Zaveršnik 2004). I assigned to each vertex the value equal to the sum of all in-going and out-going ties (degrees), so that vertex islands will identify the densest sub-networks within the network.

The vertex island algorithm identifies 14 islands in total, ranging in the size from 3 to 22 vertices. In this particular network, for each island size there is only one island, and each smaller island is contained in a bigger one, forming a concentric pattern (Figure 2). This indicates that the network has only one peak overall and is neither fragmented nor poly-centric (Baldassarri and Diani 2007).

For islands that include only SMOs that share the same environmental values, the homophily principle is necessarily satisfied. It is not, if ties across categories are more dense that within categories.

The analysis of the composition of the islands suggests that all islands up to the size of 16 vertices are formed exclusively by environmental justice SMOs (Figure 2 thick continuous black line). This is consistent with the principle of value homophily. However, the next biggest island of 20 vertices (Figure 2 thick broken line), contains 18
environmental justice and two conservation SMOs. Since overall there are 20 environmental justice organizations, this means that in this particular sub-network the homophily principle does not strictly hold. In other words, interactions between some environmental justice SMOs and the two conservation SMOs are denser than among some of the environmental justice SMOs. But this happens only for one very big island, meaning that it is a marginal phenomenon. The homophily principle is weakly restored for the islands of 21 and 22 vertices.
Figure 2. Vertex islands contour lines (islands size 3 to 22)
Table 1 presents the density and the average degree measures of the vertex island of size 20 and of the sub-network of size 20 formed exclusively by environmental justice organizations. The difference in the density and the average degree of the two networks is not extensive, and is due to the fact that the island has 8 ties more than the sub-network formed by the environmental justice SMOs. Only for this specific islands does the homophily principle not strictly hold.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-networks</th>
<th>Environmentalism of SMOs</th>
<th>No. of ties</th>
<th>No. of vertices</th>
<th>Network density</th>
<th>Average degree</th>
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<tr>
<td>Island of 20 vertices</td>
<td>Environmental justice &amp;</td>
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<td>0.3737</td>
<td>14.2</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conservationists</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Sub-network of 20</td>
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<td>20</td>
<td>0.3526</td>
<td>13.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>environmental justice SMOs</td>
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</tbody>
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Summarizing, the evidence shows that for all but one case, SMOs sharing the same environmental values network more intensely with each other than with other SMOs. Only at the margin, and only in one large island, is cross-communication among SMOs adhering to distinct varieties of environmentalism denser than within one single category. The evidence shows that some environmental justice SMOs interact more with conservation SMOs than strictly predicted by the homophily principle. Before investigating the reasons for this stronger link between environmental justice and conservationist groups, I draw some implications from this analysis. Overall, the empirical evidence suggests that homophily applies in 93% of all instances (in 13 out of 14 islands). Given the one exception it is possible to draw only a weak proposition on value homophily:

Proposition 1:
Communication and resource exchanges tend to be denser among environmental SMOs that share the same variety of environmentalism.

Yet, the exception suggests that similarity in values is an incomplete explanation of density of interaction in information and resource networks. On the one hand, there has to be a determinant of dense networks that is not exclusively based on value homophily. On the other, the ties between environmental justice and conservationists cannot just be instrumental in nature, because this would imply that these groups are only weakly connected, which is not the case (Diani and Bison 2004). The question then becomes: what determines the relatively strong cohesion between some environmental justice and conservationist groups? And what does this tell us about what drives coalition work? These questions are answered in the next section.

9 The alliance between the environmental justice and the conservation SMOs

The strong cohesion between environmental justice and conservation SMOs working on forest tenure issues is in fact a main feature of SMO advocacy in this policy domain in Indonesia. This aspect becomes clear when looking at the major formal coalition\(^{49}\) working on forest tenure policies in Indonesia.

\(^{49}\) I define a formal SMO coalition as a network of SMOs which has a clear membership, formal meetings, dedicated staff, public agreed goals and undertakes public collective action activities using the coalition’s name (Heaney and Rojas 2008).
9.1 The composition of the dominant SMO coalition

The main formal coalition active in this policy domain is the ‘Working Group on Agrarian Reform and Natural Resource Management’\(^{50}\). Established in 2000, new members have joined the coalition over the years\(^{51}\) (Moniaga 1998; Lucas and Warren 2003; Di Gregorio 2006; Peluso \textit{et al.} 2008). Its main purpose is to undertake advocacy and lobbying activities for the recognition of local property rights to land and natural resources and the implementation of land reforms. At the same time, it advocates for increased environmental sustainability in natural resource management practice\(^{52}\). The composition of this coalition suggests that it bridges environmental justice and conservationist concerns.

Out of the 25 SMOs in the forest tenure policy domain, 18 are part of this coalition (Figure 3). Figure 3 indicates that the coalition occupies a relatively large and dense area of the network and encompassed SMOs with distinct primary social movement affiliation. In terms of varieties of environmentalism it encompasses most environmental justice organizations active in this policy domain (17 out of 20), but also includes WWF, the major conservation SMO.

While this coalition bridges across varieties of environmentalism, it is too densely networked to suggest a purely instrumental character. Can we then describe the Working Group as a SMO discourse coalition? And if so, does the relatively high density of interaction reflect ongoing framing activities of SMOs involved in the coalition?

\(^{50}\) Kelompok Kerja Ornop untuk Pembaruan Agraria dan Pengelolaan Sumber Daya Alam (Pokja Pa-pxda).

\(^{51}\) This coalition evolved out of earlier mobilization activities which peaked during the Reformasi period in 1998-1999 under a much broader civil society coalition, called KUDETA. Since then, three major coalitions have followed, each focusing on successive steps of forest tenure advocacy. Starting with the demands for policy reform of tenure arrangement of natural resources, the coalition later integrated calls for the implementation of agrarian reforms in Indonesia. The Working Group today incorporates the efforts of these successive coalitions and represents the most extensive and sustained form of collective action in this policy domain.

\(^{52}\) As such, the coalition covers a broader policy domain compared to the forest tenure issues alone. However, policy issues around forest tenure are central to the coalition.
Figure 3. Members of the dominant SMO coalition that are active in the forest tenure policy domain
9.2 Framing processes

Recent literature would classify the Working Group as a form of ‘conflictual coalitional process’, purely instrumental in nature, as opposed to a ‘social movement process’ (Diani and Bison 2004). The main reasons are the diversity in values, and the lack of a unitary collective identity of the SMOs that are part of this coalition. This understanding would suggest that the underlying communication network does neither entail practical or ideational bonds, nor a common vision (Baldassarri and Diani 2007).

However, if we recognize that dense information and resource exchanges represent communication networks formed by signification processes, we would draw a different conclusion. The relatively high density of interaction between the environmental justice groups and conservation groups suggests that these ties could reflect ongoing framing activities aimed at formulating and maintaining a common discourse. These discursive practices would not just serve instrumental purposes, but would coalesce distinct organizations under a common master frame which reshapes the understanding of environmental problems and can lead to the convergence of meaning (Mische and Pattison 2000; Mische 2007). These changes are likely to have long term effects on policy advocacy. If that is the case, such a coalition is better understood as a SMO discourse coalition. To assess this, below I present and assess the frame analysis of the dominant SMO coalition.

The prognostic frame of the coalition is a predominantly rights-based justice frame that calls for agrarian reforms and policy reforms regarding natural resource management (Figure 4). It suggests that redistribution of land and recognition of local rights to natural resources should be accompanied by efforts to solve land conflicts and redefine the foundations of the legal system on natural resources. Among the principles that should serve as the base for reforms are: the unconditional recognition of customary law as the

53 The frame analysis is based on two key documents of the dominant coalition. For a detailed description on framing analysis see Gerharts and Rucht (1992).
foundation for both forest and agrarian land rights\textsuperscript{34}; and statutory property rights arrangements based on democratic participation.

In terms of frame extension this master frame coalesces SMOs with distinct concerns, represented here by the different social movement affiliations. Agrarian concerns (Figure 4 point [2]), forestry and environmental concerns (points [4] and [5]), human rights justice concerns [3] and democratic participation [5]. In other words, the master frame goes beyond the primary affiliations of SMOs to include a variety of concerns of diverse potential supporters. The alliance among SMOs with distinct social movement affiliation is largely recognized in the literature on Indonesia (Lucas and Warren 2003; Nomura 2007; Peluso \textit{et al.} 2008).

But less has been written on frame bridging between environmental justice and conservationist frames. In fact, the master frame justifies the call for increased recognition of local rights not just on right-based, but also on sustainability arguments. On the one hand, redistribution of land and recognition of local rights are considered important to address past injustices, and on the other hand, local people are portrayed as able and sustainable users [4]. This connects two ideologically distinct but congruent frames bridging across environmental justice and conservationists values.

In addition, the master frame suggests that agrarian and forest conflicts have a common cause – the lack of access and rights to resources and inadequate policies ([2],[4], and [5]) – and therefore need a common policy solution – an independent commission for conflict resolution and the harmonization of the legislation on natural resources ([3] and

\textsuperscript{34} The Basic Agrarian Law of 1960 recognizes customary rights in principle, but they are conditional on ‘national interest’, which de facto makes them residual rights subject to state priorities. The New Forestry Law of 1999 reiterates the primacy of national interest, but makes some minor concessions to increased recognition of community rights. The concessions have, however, not translated into substantial recognition of locally exercised rights at the national level (Marr 2008; Wallace 2008). The original demands of the coalition also include the integration of the management of forest and agricultural land, currently under the separate jurisdiction of the Ministry of Forestry and the National Land Agency (Di Gregorio 2006).
This reveals an understanding that agrarian and forest conflicts are part of the same problem, and indicates the convergence of meaning between agrarian and environmental SMOs.55

And finally, the call for redistribution of land from the state to local people - including concessions to private businesses - and the recognition of local rights of the prognostic frame challenges the dominant state discourse, which supports a development paradigm that entrusts the state with control over natural resources on behalf of the people (Peluso 1992; Dove and Kammen 2001).

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55 In all preceding major coalitions in the forest tenure domain, agrarian rights concerns were not included.
I argue, that the evidence of frame extension, frame bridging and convergence of meaning of the master frame indicates that the dominant coalition is better understood as an SMO discourse coalition, as opposed to a conflictual coalitional process (cf. Baldassarri and Diani 2007). It is not just a strategic alliance that is purely instrumental in nature. Instead, it is a coalition that has effectively developed a new discursive frame that reveals new ideational bonds among SMOs, a common vision and a new understanding of forest tenure problems.

The density of interaction among members of the dominant coalition is consistent with the argument that framing activities and discursive practices underlie dense communication networks (formed by information, expertise, advice, and material resource exchanges). This evidence supports similar findings about framing and the role of discursive practices in coalition work from Indonesia as well as other countries (Bulkeley 2000; Nomura 2007). Therefore, communication networks underlying SMO discourse coalition are neither necessarily transient, nor inconsequential (cf. Baldassarri and Diani 2007). They are the channels, as well as the products, of sustained and extensive framing efforts of SMOs aimed at forging new coalitions and new meaning for policy advocacy. I draw the following proposition from this evidence:

Proposition 2:

Framing processes underlie dense communication, information and resource exchanges in SMO discourse coalitions.

9.3 Compatibility of values

Although SMO discourse coalitions have flexible and porous boundaries (Hajer 1995; Bulkeley 2000), there are limits to their ability to successfully bridge and extend interpretative frames across distinct varieties of environmentalism. I argue that these limits
are set by the level of compatibility of the environmental values of the different organizations. I have shown earlier that the master frame of the Working Group has been successful in coalescing SMOs adhering to distinct varieties of environmentalism. The adoption of a common discourse however, as vague as it might be, requires at least some level of compatibility of values. I identify three main aspects of the compatibility between environmental justice and conservation values in the Working Group coalition.

First of all, unlike the anti-globalization organizations, the environmental justice and conservation alliance is willing to work within the existing statutory institutional and economic structures (Peluso et al. 2008). The common understanding is that changes in the property rights arrangements to forest resources can be achieved within the current institutional framework. Similarly, the demand for more attention to sustainability does not require any radical change of the existing institutional structures.

Second, the last decades have witnessed an expansion in the advocacy frames of a number of major conservation SMOs working in tropical forest areas towards the inclusion of local livelihood concerns. This change has largely been a response to debates associated with increased conflict around conservation areas. In this sense, the interpretative frames of some international environmental conservation SMOs have become more compatible with environmental justice concerns and values, despite retaining a primarily conservationist focus (Rootes 2006; 2007).

And finally, the rise of the concept of sustainable development (Adams 2001), which suggests that conservation and livelihood improvements can go hand in hand, has facilitated frame bridging between environmental justice SMOs and conservation organizations such as WWF (Rootes 2006; 2007). The meaning of environmental sustainability is characterized by a strong ambiguity and vagueness, and a reconciliatory win-win prognostic frame (Lélé 1991). This breadth of meaning can be problematic at times, but certainly facilitates the formation of extensive, broad and flexible master frames.
It has also achieved high frame resonance (Benford and Snow 2000) with major foreign funders and with reformist national elites.

A similar compatibility in values and shared understanding of meaning is absent between anti-globalization SMOs and other groups, and probably prevents their participation in this particular coalition under the current master frame. I draw the following proposition from the above discussion:

Proposition 3

*SMO discourse coalitions can bridge across varieties of environmentalism that draw on distinct yet compatible values.*

This is not to say that anti-globalization and environmental justice organizations do not or cannot collaborate in other coalitions and in other policy domains. Indeed they often do. Similarly, there is nothing to prevent the current SMO discourse coalition from including more radical organizations in the future. However, this would require a substantial transformation of the current master frame and a shift in the understanding of the causes, consequences and solutions to forest tenure problems.

10 Conclusion

This paper suggests that network density in SMO coalition work is predominantly driven by underlying communication processes among SMOs that share similar values and a common discourse. The empirical evidence from Indonesian activism confirms the dual function of communication networks formed by information and resource exchanges. The macrointegration function highlighted by Baldassari’s and Diani’s (2007) work is evident in the sparse linkages between the anti-globalization groups and the other SMOs. But dense areas of these networks reveal coalescing processes which are at the heart of much more robust and substantive alliances.
For the most part, dense networking occurs among SMOs that share the same variety of environmentalism. This supports the value homophily principle, that similarity in values facilitates interaction. But within a framework that recognizes the constructivist nature of social relations, values are also constantly reshaped, advanced and refined by discursive processes that constitute communication networks.

The evidence shows that the dominant SMO coalition in the land tenure policy domain is neither an instrumental alliance, unable to sustain collective action and devoid of long term legacies, nor a social movement coalition whose coalescing force is a collective identity (cf. Diani and Bison 2004). It is best understood as a SMO discourse coalition. The common discourse resulting from ongoing framing activities did not just create a bridge between environmental justice and conservationist values. It also redefined the environmental problems and the claims of SMOs in the forest tenure policy domain. Consequently, dense communication networks can create strong ideational bonds and can therefore have a much more important role in coalition work than previously recognized.

By highlighting the role of dense communication networks, this study provides new empirical evidence supporting Tilly’s (1998) suggestion that conversation is at the centre of contentious politics. This is not to say that interests do not matter, but that discursive practices can redefine interests (Bulkeley 2000), as seen in the convergence of meaning that occurred among different members of the coalition.

In terms of broader implications, I argue that incorporating some of the insights of cultural approaches to social movements can help to better understand the processes which underlie communication networks among SMOs. In particular, Mische’s (2007) suggestion that communication networks are not just conduits of meaning, but are constituted by discursive processes, reveals a much more substantial role of information and resource exchanges in coalition work than previously recognized by social network analysts.

Finally, this study also contributes to the literature on Southern environmentalism. First, it confirms that green activism in the South is predominantly framed around
environmental justice concerns (Guha and Martinez-Alier 1997). Second, it shows that strategic alliances between environmental justice and parts of the conservation movement are taking place. In fact, a move from purely conservationist objectives to broader environmental concerns on the part of some conservationist groups is also evident within Northern environmentalism (Rootes 2007), despite the fact that local conservation SMOs in the North tend to be quite isolated from reformists groups (Saunders 2007).

I suggest two main reasons facilitating such alliances in the South. In forest-rich developing countries, international conservationist organizations as WWF are crucial agents supporting state sponsored conservation programs, because they are able to channel much needed financial resources to underfunded state agencies. This makes them very influential social movement actors with privileged access to state actors, and therefore strategic allies for environmental SMOs involved in policy advocacy. At the same time, international conservation SMOs working on local conservation programs in the South have often been confronted with high levels of local resistance. This has led them to recognize the importance of forest resources for local livelihoods, which has facilitated the adoption of discursive practices that are more compatible with the environmental justice discourse (Rootes 2007).

While such a broad alliance might be strategic for policy advocacy, it might also reveal a dilemma for Southern environmentalism. If it entails being forced toward a more moderate conservation oriented Northern style of environmentalism (van der Heijden 1999) as opposed to maintaining a more contentious environmental justice agenda, this could lead to a form of co-optation. The consequence would be the inability to advocate for reforms that can effectively mitigate forest tenure conflicts. At present this does not seem to be the case, given that the master frame retains demands that are clearly dominated by a right-based environmental justice frame.
Appendix C: List of acronyms of organizations from figures and text

Policy domain actors:

AMAN - *Aliansi Masyarakat Adat Nusantara* - Indigenous Peoples Alliance of the Archipelago

BINA DESA - *Bina Desa Sekretariat* - *IndHRRRA* - Indonesian Secretariat for the Development of Human Resources in Rural Areas

DTE – Down to Earth

ELSAM - *Lembaga Studi dan Advokasi Masyarakat* - Institute for Policy Research and Advocacy

FSPI - *Federasi Serikat Petani Indonesia* – Indonesian Federation of Farmers’ Unions

FWI - Forest Watch Indonesia

Greenpeace – Indonesia chapter

HuMa - *Perkumpulan untuk Pembaharuan Hukum Berbasis Masyarakat dan Ekologis* – Association for Community and Ecology-Based Legal Reform

ICEL - Indonesian Center for Environmental Law

JATAM - *Jaringan Advokasi Tambang* - Mining Advocacy Network

JKPP - *Jaringan Kerja Pemetaan Partisipatif* - Network for Participatory Mapping

KEMALA - *Kelompok Masyarakat Pengelola Sumberdaya Alam* - The Community Natural Resource Managers Program

KPA - *Yayasan Konsorsium Pembaruan Agraria* – Consortium for Agrarian Reform

KpSHK - *Konsorsium Pendukung Sistem Hutan Kerakyatan* - Consortium Supporting Community-Based Forest Management Systems

KONPHALINDO - *Konsorsium Nasional untuk Pelestarian Hutan dan Alam Indonesia* - National Consortium for Forest and Nature Conservation in Indonesia

KSPA - *Kelompok Studi Pembaruan Agraria* - Study Group on Agrarian Reform

LATIN - *Lembaga Alam Tropika Indonesia* - Indonesian Tropical Environment Institute
PA-PSDA - *Pokja Pembaruan Agraria dan Pengelolaan Sumberdaya Alam* - Working Group for Agricultural Reform and Natural Resource Management

RACA – *The Rapid Agrarian Conflict Appraisal (RACA) Institute*

RMI - *Rimbawan Muda Indonesia* – Young Indonesian Foresters

SAWIT WATCH Indonesia

SKEPHI - *Sekretariat Kerjasama Pelestarian Hutan Indonesia* - The Secretariat for Forest Conservation in Indonesia

TELAPAK

WALHI - *Wabana Lingkungan Hidup Indonesia* - Indonesian Forum for the Environment – Friends of the Earth Indonesia

WWF – World Wildlife Fund - Indonesia chapter

Other acronyms:

KUDETA - *Koalisi untuk Demokratisasi Sumber Daya Alam* - Coalition for Democratisation of the Natural Resource Management

SMO(s) – Social movement organization(s)
Appendix D: Network data

Table D. 1: Data matrix of the information and resource exchange network

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Table D. 2: Metadata of the information and resource exchange networks

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Density2 [no loops allowed] = 0.2566667
island size: 3 arcs (multiple): 5(0) density: 0.8334 average degree: 3.3334
island size: 4 arcs (multiple): 9(2) density: 0.75 average degree: 4.500
island size: 5 arcs (multiple): 15(2) density: 0.75 average degree: 6
island size: 6 arcs (multiple): 22(3) density: 7.333 average degree: 7.333
island size: 8 arcs (multiple): 36 (4) density: 0.6429 average degree: 9
island size: 9 arcs (multiple): 49 (8) density: 0.6806 average degree:10.889
island size: 11 arcs (multiple): 66(12) density: 0.6 average degree: 12
island size: 12 arcs (multiple): 77 (12) density: 0.5833 average degree:12.833
island size: 13 arcs (multiple): 87 (14) density: 0.558 average degree:12.770
island size: 15 arcs (multiple): 105(18) density: 0.5 average degree: 14
island size: 16 arcs (multiple): 114(20) density: 0.4453 average degree:14.250
island size: 20 arcs (multiple): 142(25) density: 0.3737 average degree:14.2
island size: 21 arcs (multiple): 146(26) density: 0.3476 average degree:13.905
island size: 22 arcs (multiple): 148(26) density: 0.3203 average degree:13.455

(Note: The direction of the arrows is not displayed for clarity purposes)

Figure D. 1: Islands of the communication network (from size 3 to size 22) (multiplex directed network)
Walking a fine line: Forest tenure advocacy between contention and cooperation

Monica Di Gregorio

London School of Economics and Political Science, UK

Summary: This paper questions the commonly held belief that external institutionalization of environmental movements necessarily leads to demobilization and co-optation. It argues that environmental movement organizations (EMOs) can avoid co-optation through the use of a mix of contentious and conventional forms of action, and by maintaining a predominantly contentious attitude in their direct interactions with elites. The paper uses an innovative method based on exploratory social network analysis to investigate networking between EMOs and state agencies in the policy domain related to forest tenure in Indonesia. The evidence illustrates how strategies of conflictual cooperation allow EMOs to maintain a form of embedded autonomy with elites, and at the same time avoid co-optation.

Keywords:
Environmental movement, institutionalization, transactional activism, social network analysis, Indonesia
1 Introduction

This paper investigates how environmental movements avoid co-optation in their interactions with elites, and presents an innovative method for investigating evidence from activism around forest tenure in Indonesia. It asks to what extent external institutionalization – understood as regular and structured interaction with state actors - is a sign of either co-optation and demobilization (Selznick 1949; 1997) or an expression of strategic networking (Petrova and Tarrow 2007). In other words, are moderate tactics and networking with state actors signs that the environmental movement is weak? And how well do investigations focusing on individual participation reflect actual forms of activism?

There is little doubt that the Indonesian environmental movement has long affected forest policies and practices. Since the process of democratization that started in 1999, renewed environmental advocacy brought forest tenure issues back on the policy agenda. This led, for example, to the ratification of a decree calling for the revisions of all natural resource management laws, a renewed commitment to address forest tenure conflicts, and to a new program of land reforms involving both agricultural and forest lands (Moniaga 1998; Di Gregorio 2006; Peluso et al. 2008).

What is less clear however, is how the movement has been able to influence these outcomes, given the predominant use of moderate tactics and a relatively low level of individual activism as these characteristics are often interpreted as signs of co-optation that might lead to demobilization (Piven and Cloward 1971; van der Heijden 1997).

This paper questions the claim that external institutionalization of environmental movements necessarily leads to co-optation or demobilization. There is certainly evidence that sustained engagement with state actors constrains the ability of social movements to undertake disruptive direct action (van der Heijden 1997; Rootes 1999b; 2003a). However, external institutionalization also offers a number of advantages for social movements. The paper argues that environmental social movements that focus on relational forms of
activism which include direct interactions with state actors – or ‘transactional activism’ (Petrova and Tarrow 2007: 79) - can sustain moderate but robust contentious collective action and avoid co-optation.

This also means that measuring the strength of a movement only according to participation in unconventional protest, or according to membership of individuals in movement organizations, is limiting. It provides a distorted picture of forest tenure activism in Indonesia and fails to explain some of its major achievements. A better understanding is provided by the analysis of the different types of interactions between the movement and state actors and of the degree to which these are predominantly cooperative or contentious.

To address these issues, this article first discusses the concept of institutionalization. It then illustrates some of the advantages of external institutionalization and transactional activism, focusing in particular on the role of networking between environmental movement organizations (EMOs) and state actors. This is followed by the analysis of new evidence on the repertoires of collective action and on transactional activism among forest activists in Indonesia. This is the first study that traces actual networking patterns between EMOs and state agencies in Indonesia. Exploratory social network analysis is used to undertake an evidence-based and detailed analysis of the relational data. This method illustrates the complexity of relations and the nuanced features of external institutionalization. The evidence shows how the environmental movement exploits some of the advantages of institutionalization, but at the same time is able to avoid co-optation. Through a strategy of conflictual cooperation it maintains a form of embedded autonomy, while retaining the ability to challenge state actors. In the conclusion, the paper speculates about future challenges of forest advocacy in Indonesia and draws implications for Southern environmental activism in new democracies.
2 Institutionalization

In the past, scholars studying social movements have argued that institutionalized forms of activism, such as centralization, professionalization, and the predominant use of conventional forms of collective action, lead to co-optation or demobilization (Selznick 1949; Piven and Cloward 1971; Tarrow 1989; Kriesi et al. 1995; van der Heijden 1997). For example, writing about environmentalism in Europe, van der Heijden suggests that since the mid 1980s external institutionalization has continuously weakened environmental movements. It has led to more passive and less concerned constituencies, suggesting that they 'have lost their unique movement character' (van der Heijden 1997, p. 46).

This claim is based on the suggestion that institutionalization is incompatible with the very nature of social movements. Definitions that stress individual participation and disruptive forms of contention as the main features of social movements support this allegation (Giugni and Passy 1998). Broadly speaking institutionalization can be understood ‘as the process by which originally personal norms, expectations, goals and values tend to form a collective pattern, a pattern by which interactions and communications are regulated and structured’ (van der Heijden 1997, p.31). This would suggest that institutionalization includes a reduced capacity of movements to adopt disruptive and innovative repertoires of collective action. If, as it is often claimed, mass participation, contention and innovative forms of action are the only resources that social movements control and can use to mount challenges to opponents (Tarrow 1998), then institutionalization would necessarily lead to demobilization.

56 Tilly defines repertoires as ‘a limited set of routines that are learned, shared, and acted out through a relatively deliberate process of choice’ (Tilly 1995: p.42). He uses the term ‘repertoires of contention’ to indicate the ‘established ways in which pairs of actors make and receive claims bearing on each other’s interests’ (Tilly 1995: p.43). I prefer to use the related term ‘repertoires of collective action’ (Traugott 1994: p.2) to highlight that the contentious nature of collective action includes moderate forms of action as much as radical ones.
Widespread evidence of institutionalization in the last decades in the West has led to the development of more sophisticated analyses that question the above claims. In fact, external institutionalization can be understood as the consequence of the success of social movements and therefore as a strategy to avoid complete demobilization (Rootes 1999a; 2003a). Increased evidence of cooperation between environmental movement actors and the state, and the use of conventional policy channels can reveal the success of counter-discourse of movements and the influence of civil society on political elites (Bryant 2009; Bebbington 2010). In other words, the capacity to influence is not the exclusive domain of hegemonic policy actors and dominant discourse.

Increased institutionalization of social movements has also been attributed to how shifting worldviews reflect changes in the social and politico-economic environment (Inglehart 1997). Some scholars have suggested that ‘globalization’ and ‘postmodernization’ with their transnational features and the increased importance of mass media are transforming the character of environmental movements, whereby some forms of institutionalization might become more advantageous (Rootes 1999a). In addition, the globalization of environmental discourse and shifts towards ‘ecological modernization’ in the North and ‘sustainable development’ in the South, have facilitated understandings which underplay the role of contention, leading environmental movements to work more closely with state actors (Hajer 1995; van der Heijden 1999).

Other researchers have questioned that social movements necessarily follow a linear trajectory from mass participation to institutionalization and demobilization (Seippel 2001): it is well known that institutionalization of parts of the environmental movement coexists side by side with the formation of less organized radical activism (Doherty 1999; Rootes 1999a; 2003a).

In part due to these changing circumstances, scholars have also questioned definitions of social movements that place excessive emphasis on disruptive direct action and individual participation (Petrova and Tarrow 2007; Saunders 2007). Instead they
suggest that informal grass-root mobilization and organized public interest group activism are both integral parts of modern environmental movements.

While institutionalization is a multifaceted and complex phenomenon (Seippel 2001), the rest of the paper focuses on the risks and the advantages of external institutionalization.\(^{57}\)

3 External institutionalization and transactional activism

Traditional social movement theories consider external institutionalization detrimental to the ability of social movements to influence social and political change. In this respect, external institutionalization is understood as the propensity to use conventional repertoires of collective action and work primarily within formal policy channels (van der Heijden 1997). According to this approach, the decrease of unconventional forms of collective action such as demonstrations, disruptive, confrontational and violent public action, reveals the weakening of movements and their inability to mobilize substantial individual mass participation. Studies that assess strength of social movements exclusively in terms of individual participation suggest that such a shift necessarily leads to demobilization (Piven and Cloward 1971; Tarrow 1989; Kriesi et al. 1995).

The flipside of external institutionalization is, however, the increase in conventional forms of collective action which might include direct-democracy, the use of the mass media, press releases and petitions. It also includes more direct and sustained interaction with policy actors, which Petrova and Tarrow (2007) subsume under the term ‘transactional activism’ together with interactions amongst EMOs themselves. Transactional activism includes advocacy strategies such as lobbying, testifying in parliamentary hearings, participation in consultations and providing expert advice to policy makers (Marks and

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\(^{57}\) Van der Heijden (1997) distinguishes between three forms of institutionalization. The first is organizational growth which in turn influences the other two: internal institutionalization, which relates to the internal structure of social movements, and external institutionalization, which refers to how the social movements perform outside.
McAdam 1999; Rootes 1999a; 2003b). These are part of what are also called insider tactics (Saunders 2009; Mosley 2011). According to part of the literature, the use of predominantly moderate tactics and formal policy channels leads to co-optation, in which case political elites do not just engage but appropriate the movement frame, and assimilate and transform the movement goals, downplaying the original demands for social change (Coy and Hedeen 2005).

Over the last decades there has been growing evidence of external institutionalization of environmentalism in the West. Environmental as well as other social movements are increasingly using more moderate tactics and are interacting with policy makers in a routinized way through conventional policy channels, yet this has not always translated into demobilization or co-optation (Katzenstein 1998; Kriesberg 1998; Rootes 1999b; McAdam and Su 2002; Heijden 2006; Petrova and Tarrow 2007). These observations led to a more nuanced analysis that highlights some of the advantages of external institutionalization. Below, I discuss three critiques of the simplistic association of external institutionalization with co-optation. I also illustrate the advantages of transactional activism that are particularly relevant to forest tenure activism in Indonesia.

The first critique is that external institutionalization might not signal a process of co-optation, but might simply reflect a preference for transactional activism. What is key here, is the distinction that Petrova and Tarrow (2007) draw between individual participation and transactional participation. By transactional participation they refer to relational features of collective action such as building and maintaining inter-organizational networks among EMOs and between EMOs and state actors. The distinction between individual and transactional activism suggests that we should not necessarily see disruptive and conventional repertoires of collective action as indicators of respectively strong and weak social movements. They are instead simply two distinct forms of activism.

58 In fact, at times, institutionalization of a social movement leads to new radicalization of smaller sections of the movement (Rootes 2003b; Saunders 2007).
One of the factors that facilitates a preference for transactional activism is a limited history of associational life, which can be linked to past and present political conditions. This often happens in new democracies that retain a legacy of suppression of civil society (Petrova and Tarrow 2007). In these cases, the ability to mobilize individual participation remains limited, and transactional activism represents an alternative way to exert some influence on state actors. At the time of authoritarian rule in Indonesia, for example, mass-based organizations - with the exception of government controlled unions - were banned, leaving behind a legacy of low associational life and limited individual participation.

However, low capacity for mass mobilization depends also on the type of social movement and the policy domain in which it is active. The environmental justice movement in Indonesia, as elsewhere, is predominantly supported by a ‘conscience constituency’ formed by people engaged on the behalf of others, as opposed to people whose interests they promote (Rootes 1999a; Forsyth 2003). Policy advocacy aimed at strengthening forest tenure rights supports beneficiaries that are poor, marginalized and who live far away from centers of power and national decision making. Under these circumstances, mass mobilization in national politics is difficult. The inability to mobilize beneficiaries is compounded by a political legacy of low levels of middle class activism. This also means, however, that the advantages of transactional activism in terms of coalition building and participation in policy negotiation, might go along with problems of representation (Petrova and Tarrow 2007).

Second, the often used categorization of repertoires of collective action as either conventional or unconventional is too simplistic. It artificially dichotomizes behaviors that often coexist within movements. There is, for example, increasing evidence that EMOs maintain a multiplicity of repertoires, which include both insider and outsider tactics (Giugni and Passy 1998; Andrews 2001; Saunders 2009). As illustrated later, this is exactly the case in the forest tenure policy domain in Indonesia, where the vast majority of EMOs undertake both protest and lobbying activities. In other words, individual participation
coexists side by side with transactional activism. One of the advantages of maintaining multiple repertoires is flexibility. It allows EMOs to adapt and switch tactics in response to changing political circumstances and to engage in advocacy during periods of low mobilization (van der Heijden 1997; Rootes 1999a). A cautionary aspect needs to be mentioned here. It is not always easy to maintain diverse repertoires, as some constituencies have a preference for more or less direct action, but internal institutionalization reduces the constraints to use multiple repertoires of collective action, since constituencies of professionalized EMOs tend to be more passive (Stevens 2002). There is, however, substantial evidence that institutionalized environmental movements maintain the ability to mobilize their constituency for protest when necessary, although forms of protest become increasingly more routinized and moderate (Rootes 1997; 2003a). Insider and outsider tactics are employed at different times depending on the specific circumstances.

And third, there is another simplifying assumption in the view that equates external institutionalization to co-optation. In the words of Katzenstein (1998, p.196): ‘It is too easy to presume that what occurs on the streets is disruptive and what occurs within institutional contexts is accommodative.’ Equating interaction with policy actors - and therefore transactional activism - to full-scale cooperative behavior is largely incorrect (Giugni and Passy 1998). Instead, it is important to assess empirically the nature of the interaction with policy makers, and the degree to which contentious or cooperative interaction is the norm. In this respect, full cooperation can at times reveal that external institutionalization is leading to the watering down of the demands for social and political change. However, where ‘conflictual cooperation’ – or strategies and tactics that combine contention and cooperation (Evers 1990) – is the norm, it is more likely that social movements are able to maintain autonomy of decision-making, as well as the ability to use protests and work outside official policy channels when needed. In other words, when environmental social movements actively network with state actors, but at the same time
are also able to maintain their autonomy (Evans 1996), the risk of co-optation is low. In the rest of the paper I show how transactional activism allows forest tenure activists in Indonesia to walk the fine line of conflictual cooperation and avoid co-optation.

4 The study

While the achievements of the Indonesian environmental movement have long been recognized (Peluso et al. 2008), since the political turn towards democratization in 1999, environmental activism has brought the explicitly political and contentious issue of forest tenure reform back on the policy agenda (McCarthy 2000; Colfer and Resosudarmo 2002; Di Gregorio 2006). This has happened despite low levels of individual participation. The rest of the paper discusses the evidence of how transactional activism and partial institutionalization have substantially contributed to this achievement. It also shows how the movement has been able to engage with policy makers while maintaining its autonomy and avoiding co-optation.

4.1 The research design

Conceptually there is a distinction between external institutionalization and co-optation. However, some of the literature simplistically assumes that the first necessarily leads to the second, without analyzing actual interactions between social movements and elites (van der Heijden 1997). What is needed is a way to assess with more precision the degree to which external institutionalization occurs, and whether or not this leads to co-optation. To assess that, this paper uses two techniques.

The first technique expands previous methods and consists of mapping a wider variety of repertoires than is conventionally done. In the past, most studies have focused predominantly on unconventional repertoires as protest events, in part because of definitions of activism linked exclusively to forms of individual participation (Petrova and
Tarrow 2007), but also because of the ease of identification of protest activities through newspaper sources (cf. van der Heijden 1997; Rootes 2003b). This study instead uses survey data on both unconventional and conventional repertoires. This allows the investigation of a wider spectrum of repertoires and provides evidence not just about individual participation, but also about forms of transactional activism. Only by looking at the whole variety of repertoires is it possible to start assessing external institutionalization. For example, a strong predominance of unconventional repertoires of collective action as public protests would indicate a clear absence of external institutionalization (van der Heijden 1997). Conversely, evidence of more conventional and moderate repertoires and of transactional participation in the form of sustained engagement with state actors suggests the likelihood of external institutionalization. But detecting the likelihood of institutionalization is not sufficient to draw conclusions about the degree of institutionalization, let alone about co-optation.

This is where the second more innovative technique becomes relevant. The study uses exploratory social network analysis to undertake a detailed investigation of actual patterns of interactions between EMOs and state actors (Scott 2000; Zaveršnik et al. 2002). This is a method to operationalize the analysis of transactional activism in social movement studies (Saunders 2007). Exploratory social network analysis helps to assess in detail actual interactions between EMOs and state actors, and investigate their nature through visualization techniques and network measures. I use social network analysis to investigate both relational data (ties) and attribute data (characteristics of actors and ties). It is the nature of interactions - the degree to which these are predominantly contentious, or cooperative or present both features contemporaneously (an attribute data) - that allows for clear evidence-based conclusions on the level of external institutionalization and the risk of co-optation. If the nature of interaction of EMOs with the state agencies is predominantly cooperative, we can conclude that external institutionalization is extensive and co-optation might be occurring, although this would further depend on the degree to which elites have
been able to transform the goals and demands of EMOs. If interactions are predominantly characterized as contentious, or based on conflictual cooperation, this demonstrates that EMOs are able to maintain autonomy of decision-making. In this case, external institutionalization remains limited and co-optation is avoided.

The social network analysis is corroborated by information from the semi-structured interviews. Below I provide further details about the data, methods and measures used in this paper.

4.2 The methods

The study is based on data collected during two visits between 2006 and 2007 in Jakarta using a social organization network survey and semi-structured interviews conducted with EMOs working at the national level on forest tenure policy reforms. The identification of the EMOs that are part of this national policy domain followed a two-step procedure: a preliminary list of EMOs that are relevant in the forest tenure policy domain was drawn from secondary information and media reports and validated by key informants (Laumann and Knoke 1987). This led to the identification of 30 EMOs, which were interviewed. The second step consisted of the validation by EMOs themselves during the interviews. One of the questions in the survey asked organizations if they defined themselves as part of the environmental movement. After the interviews five EMOs were dropped from the analysis of this paper: one because it did not consider itself part of the environmental movement and was not engaged in forest tenure issues, one because it was a multi-stakeholder forum and not strictly speaking an EMO, and three because they were not active at the national level in the forest tenure policy domain.

Regarding the data on repertoires of collective action, in the survey EMOs were asked if in the previous twelve months they had: organized and participated in protest events (defined as gatherings in public places including demonstrations, sit-ins etc.);
participated in collaborative campaigns; released public statements or petitions; made use of media outlets and lobbied state actors. The sequence from the organization of protest to lobbying is taken as representing a continuum from more disruptive and contentious to more institutionalized and conventional repertoires of collective action.

The relational data analyzed in this paper refer to the network of regular interactions between these EMOs and key state actors in the forest tenure policy domain. The specific survey questions that provided the relational data are:

1. a. ‘Which are the government agencies active in shaping forest policies (in terms of both environmental and land use issues)?’
   
   b. ‘Does your organization interact with these regularly?’ Yes/No
   
   c. If yes: ‘How would you characterize these interactions?’ Respondents chose between these answers: cooperative / contentious / both.

The relational data are used to construct two two-mode networks (Scott 2000). Two-mode networks are usually used to represent affiliation networks, which for example link actors to events or to collectivities (Wasserman and Faust 1994). They have also been used to represent narrative networks linking actors to discursive practices (Bearman and Stovel 2000). The main feature of two-mode networks is that ties go only from one set of nodes (first-mode nodes representing actors) to a second set of nodes (second-modes nodes representing events, collectivities, discursive elements etc.). In this study the first-mode nodes represent EMOs and the second-mode nodes, state actors. The direction of the ties goes only from EMOs to state actors. The reason for this is that the study is based exclusively on interviews with EMOs and thus focuses on how EMOs describe their

59 Relational aspects related to coalition work among EMOs is the subject of another paper (Di Gregorio 2012). This paper focuses on external institutionalization in terms of state-environmental movement relations.
interactions with state actors\textsuperscript{60}. The networks are displayed as network graphs and visualized with the software Pajek. All network analysis measures are calculated with Pajek and UCINET software\textsuperscript{61} (Batagelj and Mrvar 1998; Borgatti \textit{et al.} 1999).

The first network (Figure 5) represents the opinions of EMOs about which state agencies shape forest tenure policies (question 1a). The second network presents the pattern of regular interactions between the two set of actors and the nature of these interactions (questions 1b and c).

The degree of institutionalization and the assessment of the presence or not of co-optation relies on the interpretation of the network graphs and on a measure of centrality of actors - the eigenvector centrality. Higher scores of eigenvector centrality identify central actors in the networks that have ties to other central actors in the network which is interpreted as a measure of influence (Scott 2000). Unlike other centrality measures, eigenvector centrality takes into account centrality effects of both sets of actors and it is therefore often more appropriate to use for two-mode networks (Borgatti and Everett 1997; Faust 1997). I calculate this measure for both networks. In the first network it is used to measure the influence of state agencies and in the second, it helps to assess the degree to which regular interactions are predominantly contentious, cooperative or based on conflictual cooperation. Compared to exclusively qualitative studies, this information leads to a much more precise assessment of the degree of external institutionalization and the level of risk of co-optation.

Qualitative information from semi-structured interviews is used in the paper to interpret and corroborate the findings from the quantitative analysis and to provide further

\textsuperscript{60} This does not mean, however, that attitudes of state actors toward EMOs are completely ignored, because the presence of regular interaction, for example, reflects both a choice on the part of EMOs but also the opportunities or constraints posed by state actors in fulfilling that choice.

\textsuperscript{61} While all network measures take into account the direction of ties, in the figures the direction of ties is omitted for clarity of exposition.
depth to the analysis that distinguishes between interaction, cooperation and co-optation. The latter is also partially informed by secondary sources.

4.3 **External institutionalization in forest tenure activism in Indonesia**

It is curious how little attention has been given to features of transactional activism in the study of environmental movements in the South\(^{62}\). Even among qualitative studies few have looked at forms of external institutionalization and at the interaction between EMOs and state actors at the national level in the South (Bebbington and Kopp 1998; Bryant 2009). The focus instead is often on disruptive action and forms of local resistance (Scott 1990; Peluso 1992). In part, this is because southern environmentalism is dominated by environmental justice frames (Haynes 1999b), which are notoriously more contentious than the traditional Northern preservation and conservation frames. Their strong focus on control over resources and territoriality (Escobar et al. 2002) and on the links between environmental and human rights often leads to an underestimate of the role of moderate and transactional activism.

Throughout its history, however, the Indonesian environmental movement has maintained relations with state actors. The early alliance with the Ministry of the Environment and the use of both unconventional protest and conventional policy channels are well documented (Eldridge 2005; Nomura 2007; Peluso et al. 2008). Recently for example, a group of EMOs collaborated with the Ministry in a litigation brought to the Constitutional Court against regulatory provisions which allow mining in protected forest (Down to Earth 2005; d'Hondt 2010).

But to what degree has external institutionalization occurred in the forest tenure policy domain? And has this translated into co-optation or have EMOs been able to maintain their autonomy? To answer these questions, in the next sections I investigate

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\(^{62}\) Transactional activism has mainly been studied with reference to social movements in Eastern Europe (Petrova and Tarrow 2007; Čisař 2010) and at the European Union level (Marks and McAdam 1999).
three features of EMO state interactions. First, I investigate the repertoires of collective action used by EMOs. Then, I analyse the pattern of regular interactions between core EMOs and key state actors, and finally I analyse the nature of such interactions.

4.3.1 Repertoires of collective action

Table 2 displays the diverse repertoires of collective action adopted by EMOs in the policy domain of forest tenure. They go from unconventional forms of collective action such as the organization and participation in protests, to more conventional actions such as petitions, release of public statements, and the use of the media. The last two categories refer to transactional forms of activism. One refers to collaborative campaigns, which represent a relational form of collective action among EMOs. The other is lobbying, also relational, and refers to the attempt to influence policies through direct communication with government officials\(^63\). In Table 2 the repertoires are broadly sequenced from left to right in descending order of degree of contention.

Table 2 shows that EMOs use a variety of different repertoires of collective action simultaneously, which span from individual participation in protest to transactional forms of activism including cooperative interaction with state actors (McAdam et al. 1996b; Burstein 1998; Andrews 2001; Andrews and Edwards 2004). In other words, EMOs use both outsider and insider tactics (Grant 1978; Marsh and Rhodes 1992; Grant 2000; Saunders 2009; Mosley 2011).

The contentious nature of part of the repertoires of collective action is evident in that all but two EMOs participated in protest events in the twelve months preceding the

\(^{63}\) The definition of ‘direct lobbying’ in the US political system is ‘any attempt to influence legislation through communication with legislators, staff persons, or any other government official who participates in the formulation of legislation’ (Vernick 1999: p.1426). I adopt a slightly broader definition, because of the evidence that lobbying in fact occurs in the bureaucracy as much as in the legislature (McKay 2011), and this is particularly so in Indonesia (Di Gregorio 2011).
survey, while around fifty per cent of them organized protests. In fact, more organizations participated in protests than released public statements or petitions. The time at which the survey was undertaken represents a period of relatively low mobilization\(^\text{64}\), suggesting that the repertoires of collective action have included contentious forms even during a slowdown in the protest cycles. In addition, EMOs make extensive use of the media. Sixty-eight per cent of EMOs claimed to have regular visibility in national or local media. Collaborative campaigning is widespread, involving 92 per cent of EMOs. Both protests and campaigns are usually organized and undertaken collaboratively.

What is quite interesting is that the vast majority of EMOs (92 per cent) stated that at the same time they were engaged in direct lobbying. On average, out of six repertoires of collective action investigated, EMOs adopted more than four in the twelve months preceding the survey, and almost all participated in protest events as well as being involved in lobbying activities. Overall, EMOs seem to have few difficulties in adopting a wide variety of repertoires of collective action that span from more contentious to more cooperative ones and that involve both individual participation and transactional activism.

\(^{64}\) The height of the protest cycle corresponds to the years 1998-1999, in concomitance with the pro-democracy movement which brought about the fall of the Suharto regime (Eldridge 2005; Di Gregorio 2006).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name/acronym of EMOs</th>
<th>Protest organizer</th>
<th>Protest participant</th>
<th>Release public statement and petition</th>
<th>Regularly reported in media*</th>
<th>Promote collaborative campaigns</th>
<th>Lobbying</th>
<th>No. of repertoires of collective action</th>
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% of yes average 48 88 56 68 92 92 4.4

*see Appendix F. for the complete list of names and acronyms.
*: includes national or local newspapers, TV, or radio
In the forest policy domain in Indonesia this is not a new phenomenon; EMOs have fine-tuned these strategies over three decades of activities (Eldridge 1995). As observed in other environmental social movements, single EMOs are quite diverse in terms of organizational forms and areas of specialization (Rucht 1989; Diani 1995; Saunders 2007). The EMOs investigated here are all part of the environmental movements but work on a variety of themes, covering agrarian, environmental, human rights and democracy concerns. With respect to the adoption of different repertoires of collective action, however, there is little specialization. These are repertoires which have proven effective in the past and have been diffused throughout the movement (Tilly and Tarrow 2007).

These findings support existing literature, which suggests that the use of multiple repertoires expands political opportunities, and likely provides EMOs with the flexibility to adapt if they change rapidly (Mosley 2011). Moreover, diverse repertoires of collective action allow them to mount multiple challenges to policymakers, which contributes to the salience of their demands and the effectiveness of their actions (Rootes 1999a).

National level environmental activism in Indonesia is also highly professionalized, and internal institutionalization facilitates and reduces the risks associated with adopting a variety of repertoires of collective action (van der Heijden 1997). There are at least two main reasons for this. First, professionalization leads to specialization of labor within organizations (McCarthy and Zald 1973), which facilitates simultaneous action within and outside of conventional policy channels. And second, the relative moderation of the environmental movement in Indonesia (Peluso et al. 2008) and its relatively small and only marginally activist constituency, translates to predominantly routinized protest activities, and subsequently to a low level of risk of alienating activist supporters that prefer more disruptive forms of action (Rootes 2003a).

There may be also a radical ‘flank effect’ at work, where more moderate groups gain access to the state thanks to protests organized by more radical groups (Herbert 1988), as has been observed in other environmental movements (Rootes 2003a; Saunders 2007).
The above analysis provides the first indication that EMOs in this domain are able to work both within and outside formal policy channels, which suggests that external institutionalization of forest tenure advocacy is at most partial. Many EMOs maintain the ability to mobilize support for protest activities while at the same time being engaged in transactional activism. But it is by analyzing in further depth transactional forms of activism, broadly defined as sustained interactions between EMO and key state actors, that more precise conclusions on how EMOs avoid co-optation can be drawn. In the next two sections, I first identify the set of state actors that are central to this analysis, and then investigate the nature of interactions between EMO and state actors.

4.3.2 Which are the influential state agencies in the forest tenure domain?

Before moving to the analysis of transactional activism and the assessment of the degree of external institutionalization, I need to define the boundary set of state actors. In this study I wanted to focus on key state actors in the policy domain of forest tenure, and restrict the investigation to interaction between EMOs and influential state agencies in this domain.

To do that, I asked EMOs to identify the state agencies active in the forest policy domain in Indonesia (question 1a). The responses provide the data to construct a network (Figure 5), which is not explicitly relational, in the sense that ties do not indicate any kind of interaction. In this case, the presence of a tie simply means that an EMO has indicated a specific state actor as active in the policy domain of forest tenure.

This allows me to do two things. First, I can define the boundary for the second-mode set of actors I am interested in, and second, it allows me to assess the influence of these key actors. Influence is measured by eigenvector centrality. Since ties indicate the perception of EMOs, we can attribute a status of ‘authority’ to those state agencies with
high eigenvector centrality. Eigenvector centrality is visualized in Figure 5 through the size of the nodes. The bigger the node, the more influential a state agency is.

From Figure 5 it is evident that the overwhelming influence on forest related policy decisions resides with the Ministry of Forestry. This is as expected, given that the mandate of the Ministry is to manage all state forests in Indonesia (Peluso 1992). Other important state agencies are, in descending order of influence, the Ministry of the Environment, the National Land Agency, the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources and the Ministry of Agriculture. However, these are much less influential than the Ministry of Forestry, which scores an eigenvector centrality three times higher than the Ministry of the Environment (see Appendix E, Table E.1 for the complete list of scores).

It is interesting to note, that the key state actors reside predominantly within the executive branch of government, while the national legislature – the People’s Representative Council (labelled Parliament in Figure 5) - is ranked only at sixth place. Line ministries, coordination ministries and implementation agencies together count for 92 per cent of the eigenvector centrality scores, while the legislative branch collects only 4 per cent of the scores (see Appendix E, Table E.2 for the complete list of scores). This result confirms the strong control over forest policy attributed to bureaucratic actors in Indonesia often indicated in the literature (Peluso 1992; McCarthy 2000; Contreras-Hermosilla and Fay 2005). The last step is to investigate actual patterns of interactions between EMOs and these twelve key state agencies, and assess the level of external institutionalization and the risk of co-optation.

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65 Eigenvector centrality of ingoing ties provides a similar measure of influence to what is called ‘authority weight’ in social network analysis (Zaveršnik et al. 2002).

66 These findings justify the use of the broad definition of lobbying used in the survey, where lobbying is not restricted to government official involved in the legislature.
Note: Size of vertices reflects eigenvector centrality

Figure 5: Influence of state agencies according to EMOs
4.3.3 Transactional activism: between contention and cooperation

From the analysis of the network of actual interactions between EMOs and state actors (Figure 6), it is possible to gain more precise information about the degree to which external institutionalization is occurring and if there is indeed a high risk of co-optation. This second network is in fact a sub-network of the first, and is constructed on the basis of the responses to questions 1b and 1c. Again, first-mode nodes represent EMOs (triangles), while the second-mode nodes represent key state actors (circles). In this network, the ties in the graph refer to regular interactions of EMOs with state agencies. The shades of the triangle nodes define the nature of the interactions: they display if EMO have characterized these interactions as predominantly contentious, predominantly cooperative or as based on conflictual cooperation. As in the previous figure, the size of the nodes indicates the measure of eigenvector centrality. The network presents the extent and the nature of transactional activism between EMOs and the key state agencies in the forest tenure policy domain.
Note: Size of vertices reflects eigenvector centrality

Figure 6: Nature of regular interactions with the most influential state actors
The network indicates that only about half of the EMOs active in the forest tenure domain interact regularly with the key state agencies (13 out of 25). A number of these EMOs are very important social movement actors. WALHI is the local chapter of Friends of the Earth, the biggest environmental movement network, which counts around four hundred and fifty local and national organizations from all over Indonesia among its members. WWF-Indonesia is another key EMO, and has been active in Indonesia for decades, contributing to the establishment and assisting the government with the management of many national parks. ICEL is also an important actor in natural resource management advocacy and focuses on issues related to environmental law. Telapak is a key environmental governance watchdog organization involved particularly in monitoring illegal logging activities. And finally, KPA and FSPI are two of the most important agrarian social movement network organizations, which count numerous farmers’ associations among their members. Also, ten of these thirteen EMOs are part of the dominant coalition active in this policy domain, called the ‘Working Group on Agrarian Reform and Natural Resource Management’ (Di Gregorio 2012).

Thus, despite the fact that only half of the core EMOs maintain regular contact with key state actors, they include very central players in this domain. Since regular interaction falls under the definition of external institutionalization as part of a ‘process where communications are regulated and structured’ (van der Heijden 1997, p.31), one might be tempted to conclude that external institutionalization is extensive. Some might argue that this reveals a condition of co-optation.

Two aspects, however, counter this interpretation. First, it is important to remember that all EMOs but two indicated that they routinely participate in protest activities. And second, the picture changes substantially when taking into account the nature of these regular interactions.

When asked how they would qualify these interactions, the vast majority of EMOs responded that they are at least in part contentious in nature (Figure 6). Six EMOs said that
interactions were based on ‘conflictual cooperation’, having both cooperative and contentious features (Evers 1990; Giugni and Passy 1998), while two, including WALHI, qualified them as predominantly contentious. Only four EMOs described regular interactions as predominantly cooperative. In addition, only three of the 25 EMOs routinely cooperate with the Ministry of Forestry, the most prominent state actor. In fact, all but one of the central EMOs players described above maintain a predominantly contentious attitude toward interactions with state actors, the one exception being WWF.\(^{67}\)

We can assess the degree to which EMOs cooperate with elites more precisely by measuring eigenvector centrality, which takes into account the relative importance of the single nodes in Figure 6 (see Appendix E, Table E.4 for the complete list of scores). The eigenvector centrality of the four EMOs that cooperate with state actors together amounts to 25% of total eigenvector centrality, and that of those engaged in contentions or conflictual cooperation amounts to the remainder, 75%. In addition, among the EMOs that interact with the most important state agency - the Ministry of Forestry - cooperation decreases to 22% of total eigenvector centrality. If we consider that about half of the EMOs in the forest domain do not interact regularly with key state agencies, only 12% of EMO display cooperative behaviour. The risk of co-optation then remains limited to this 12%.

Thus, if we take into account the nature of these regular communication processes and the fact that most EMOs also engage in protest activities, the risk of co-optation remains very limited. The vast majority of EMOs maintain their autonomy through the predominantly contentious nature of their interactions with state actors and their multiple repertoires of collective action.

\(^{67}\) Latin, Kemala and Konphalindo are the other three organizations that routinely cooperate with state agencies, but they are less influential than some of the other key actors in the forest tenure policy domain.
But going one step further, even evidence of cooperation, does not prove that co-optation has occurred. Co-optation depends on the degree to which cooperation results in accommodation on the part of EMOs of the interests of elites at the expense of their own values and objectives (Coy and Hedeen 2005).

The comparison between two of the most influential Indonesian EMOs, WALHI and WWF helps to assess this occurrence. The two EMOs are in fact at opposite ends of the spectrum in terms of the nature of their interaction with state actors. WALHI’s engagement is predominantly contentious. It also considers the Ministry of Environment - one of its few elite allies - as not very influential in forest policy decisions. On the other hand, WWF has a cooperative approach with both the Ministry of Forestry and the Ministry of Environment. Does this mean that WWF is co-opted by elites? Are there signs of accommodation of elites’ interests at the expense of WWF’s own worldview? I argue that the difference in the nature of the interaction of WALHI and WWF can be explained by the distinct environmental values they adhere to (Di Gregorio 2011). WALHI is the main environmental justice organization in Indonesia, while WWF is one of the key conservation EMOs. WALHI incorporates the traditional view of contentious environmental movements in the South, with their concerns about territorial and resources control, and the close connection they draw between environmental and human rights (Haynes 1999b; Escobar et al. 2002). WWF incorporates a Northern variety of environmentalism less politically contentious, more focused on biodiversity conservation, and warier about devolution of rights to local people. Consequently, the worldview of WWF is more in line with the frames of dominant state actors (Haynes 1999b; Rootes 2006; Brulle 2008). What facilitates the cooperation of WWF with the state is this less contentious frame (Giugni and Passy 1998). In others words, WWF does not need to adapt its worldview in any substantial way to cooperate with state actors on, for example, the management of conservation areas. In addition, WWF does not just provide expertise to the state, it also contributes resources for conservation through its involvement in the
projects related to the management of national parks. WWF is therefore better labelled a cooperative and at same time autonomous EMO, which indicates the lack of co-optation in this case too.

In the end, it seems that the vast majority of EMOs in the forest tenure policy domain are able to resist co-optation by maintaining a contentious attitude in their interactions with the state. Cooperation occurs predominantly with organizations that either do not have an explicitly political agenda, or have frames that by their nature can accommodate certain state interests without incurring excessive compromises. This is the case for some conservation organizations as WWF. Overall, EMOs have been able to maintain their autonomy to profess their environmental values through their more or less contentious engagement with state actors.

5 Conclusion

This paper has investigated how EMOs avoid co-optation in the forest tenure policy domain in Indonesia. To assess the degree of external institutionalization and the risk of co-optation, this study has used an innovative method based on exploratory social network analysis. The evidence shows that EMOs are able to maintain their autonomy despite sustained interactions with elites, a low level of individual participation and the predominance of transactional forms of activism. These findings question social movement theories that equate external institutionalization with demobilization and co-optation.

They also show that forest tenure advocacy makes use of both insider and outsider tactics to influence political elites. This suggests that EMOs are aware of the risk of co-optation and try to reduce it by engaging predominantly in conflictual forms of cooperation with state actors, especially with those who represent opposed values and interests. These tactics can be understood as a way to maintain a form of embedded autonomy, where interaction occurs without the need to excessively accommodate the interests of the
counter-part (Evans 1996). This is not to say that co-optation cannot occur, but that EMOs manage this risk strategically.

The paper supports Petrova and Tarrow’s (2007) view that transactional activism is not necessarily a sign of weakness of the social movement. Instead, it is a strategic choice that can be explained by the specific constraints that core EMOs face. This strategy allows EMOs in the forest tenure domain in Indonesia to overcome constraints posed by their limited capacity to mobilize substantive constituencies. Relatively low levels of individual participation in this domain are in part a legacy of thirty years of authoritarianism, and reflect the fact that these EMOs operate on behalf of marginalized beneficiaries. In addition, the dominant economic development paradigm in Indonesia provides little resonance to EMOs’ environmental justice frames. This is why EMOs focus much of their attention on using their expertise to lobby and interact directly with key elites.

That said, it is also true that EMOs are walking a fine line, since there are risks linked to the limited ability to mobilize individual participation. In particular for those that tend to cooperate with state actors there might be the risk of loss of legitimacy, and questions about representativeness might arise (Petrova and Tarrow 2007). It is also important that the movement retains the ability to use disruptive action when needed, otherwise even piecemeal social and political changes might become increasingly difficult to attain.

In the end, this study calls for a more nuanced analysis of external institutionalization, where institutionalized interactions are neither necessarily likened to full cooperation, nor to the accommodation of elite interests. It argues, instead, that researchers should take seriously Mary Katzenstein’s (1998, p.196) suggestion mentioned earlier, that ‘it is too easy to presume that what occurs on the streets is disruptive and what occurs within institutional contexts is accommodative.’

Finally, the importance of transactional participation in environmental activism should resonate among researchers studying environmental movements in the South, in
particular in those countries where democratization is a recent phenomenon, where policy
decisions around forest tenure are entrenched within inaccessible regulatory bureaucracies,
and where economic development agendas widely supersede environmental justice
concerns.
Appendix E: Network measures

Table E. 1: Eigenvector centrality of single state agencies in the influence network

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State agency</th>
<th>Eigenvector centrality</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Forestry</td>
<td>0.895</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Environment</td>
<td>0.238</td>
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<tr>
<td>National Land Agency</td>
<td>0.217</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ministry of Energy &amp; Mineral Resources</td>
<td>0.174</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ministry of Agriculture</td>
<td>0.159</td>
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<tr>
<td>National Development Planning Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>People's Representative Council (including legislative commissions)</td>
<td>0.094</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Industry &amp; Trade</td>
<td>0.082</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Government</td>
<td>0.072</td>
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<td>Ministry of Finance</td>
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<td>State Forestry Corporation</td>
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Table E. 2: Eigenvector centrality percentages by categories of state actors in the influence network

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<th>Categories of state actors</th>
<th>% of eigenvector centrality</th>
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<tr>
<td>National executive and bureaucratic agencies</td>
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<td>Legislative branch of government</td>
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<td>Local government</td>
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<td>State-owned enterprise</td>
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</table>

Table E. 3: Eigenvector centrality of state agencies in the interaction network

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<td>Ministry of Environment</td>
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<td>National Development Planning Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ministry of Industry &amp; Trade</td>
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<td>Ministry of Energy &amp; Mineral Resources</td>
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<td>State Forestry Corporation</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Table E. 4: Eigenvector centrality and nature of ties of EMOs in the interaction network

<table>
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<th>Name / acronym of EMOs</th>
<th>Eigenvector centrality</th>
<th>Nature of ties</th>
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Appendix F: List of acronyms of organizations from figures and text

Core environmental movement organizations:

AMAN - Aliansi Masyarakat Adat Nusantara - Indigenous Peoples Alliance of the Archipelago

BINA DESA - Bina Desa Sekretariat - InDHRA - Indonesian Secretariat for the Development of Human Resources in Rural Areas

DTE – Down to Earth

ELSAM - Lembaga Studi dan Advokasi Masyarakat - Institute for Policy Research and Advocacy

FSPI - Federasi Serikat Petani Indonesia – Indonesian Federation of Farmers’ Unions

FWI - Forest Watch Indonesia

Greenpeace – Indonesia chapter

HuMa - Perkumpulan untuk Pembaharuan Hukum Berbasis Masyarakat dan Ekologis – Association for Community and Ecology-Based Legal Reform

ICEL - Indonesian Center for Environmental Law

JATAM - Jaringan Advokasi Tambang - Mining Advocacy Network

JKPP - Jaringan Kerja Pemetaan Partisipatif - Network for Participatory Mapping

KEMALA - Kelompok Masyarakat Pengelola Sumberdaya Alam - The Community Natural Resource Managers Program

KPA - Yayasan Konsorsium Pembaruan Agraria – Consortium for Agrarian Reform

KpSHK - Konsorsium Pendukung Sistem Hutan Kerakyatan - Consortium Supporting Community-Based Forest Management Systems

KONPHALINDO - Konsorsium Nasional untuk Pelestarian Hutan dan Alam Indonesia - National Consortium for Forest and Nature Conservation in Indonesia

KSPA - Kelompok Studi Pembaruan Agraria - Study Group on Agrarian Reform

LATIN - Lembaga Alam Tropika Indonesia - Indonesian Tropical Environment Institute
PA-PSDA - *Pokja Pembaharuan Agraria dan Pengelolaan Sumberdaya Alam* - Working Group for Agricultural Reform and Natural Resource Management

RACA – *The Rapid Agrarian Conflict Appraisal (RACA) Institute*

RMI - *Rimbawan Muda Indonesia* – Young Indonesian Foresters

SAWIT WATCH Indonesia

SKEPHI - *Sekretariat Kerjasama Pelestarian Hutan Indonesia* - The Secretariat for Forest Conservation in Indonesia

TELAPAK - Telapak

WALHI - *Wabana Lingkungan Hidup Indonesia* - Indonesian Forum for the Environment – Friends of the Earth Indonesia

WWF – World Wildlife Fund - Indonesia chapter

**State Actors:**

DPR - People’s Representative Council (National Legislature)

MoAgriculture - Ministry of Agriculture

MoEnergy&MinResources - Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources

MoEnvironment - Ministry of Environment

MoFinance - Ministry of Finance

MoSocial Services - Ministry of Social Services

MoTrade&Industry - Ministry of Trade and Industry

NatDevPlanningAgency - National Development Planning Agency

NatLandAgency - National Land Agency

LocGov - Local Government

StateForestryCorporation - State Forestry Corporation

**Other acronyms:**

EMO(s): Environmental Movement Organization(s)
### Table G. 1: Data matrix of the network of influence of state agencies

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### Table G. 2: Metadata of the network of influence of state agencies

Basic information Influence Networks [2-Mode] (37)

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<th>Edges</th>
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</table>

Number of vertices (n): 37

Number of loops: 0
Number of multiple lines: 1

Density1 [loops allowed] = 0.0832725
Density2 [no loops allowed] = 0.0855856

2-Mode Network: Rows=25, Cols=12
Density [2-Mode] = 0.1900000
Table G. 3: Data matrix of the regular interaction network

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Table G. 4: Metadata of the regular interaction network

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Density1 [loops allowed] = 0.1041667
Density2 [no loops allowed] = 0.1086957

2-Mode Network: Rows=13, Cols=11
Density [2-Mode] = 0.20979

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Gaining access to the state: Managing political opportunities in forest activism in Indonesia

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Summary. - Structural approaches to political opportunities are increasingly being criticized for their inability to explain differential access of social movement organizations to the state. Interactionist approaches to social movements have been proposed as an alternative way to understand society-state relations and overcome these shortcomings. Using new evidence from forest activism in Indonesia, this paper illustrates how political opportunities are in part contingent, relative and dynamic. In doing so, it shows how environmental movement organizations try to negotiate access to the state, how international organizations contribute to shape this access and how state actors attempt to close political opportunities when they feel threatened. From the evidence, the paper presents six propositions on the contingency of political opportunities.

Keywords - social movements, political opportunities, social network analysis, forest tenure, Indonesia
1 Introduction

This paper investigates the contingent nature of access to the state experienced by the environmental movement working in the forest tenure policy domain in Indonesia. In the last decades, macro-structural approaches to political opportunities have come under increased criticism for focusing exclusively on very general features of political regimes (Rucht 1988; Meyer and Staggenborg 1996; Rootes 1999c). In their early work for example, Kitschelt (1986, p. 41) and Kriesi et al. (1992) argue that social movement behaviour and success depend on variables such as the degree of openness of the polity, its implementation capacity, and its dominant strategy toward challengers. Among the merits of these studies is the recognition that political conditions external to social movements affect their emergence.

But such broad approaches are not able to capture the complexities of patterns of access of environmental movement organizations (EMOs) to state actors within a single country (Saunders 2007). One of the main critiques is that purely structural approaches tend to obscure meso-level dynamics. By focusing exclusively on the big picture, they miss contingent aspects of political opportunities. Puzzles, such as why different EMOs experience differential access to state actors, remain largely unexplained (Rootes 1999a). Similarly, such approaches cannot fully account for how access to state elites changes over time in response to events or actions. Consequently, the purely universal and static nature that is often imposed upon the concept of political opportunity has been increasingly criticized. More and more scholars today recognize that many important features of political opportunities are contingent on the nature of actors, on their actions and past achievements, and on the issues at hand (Rucht 1988; Meyer and Staggenborg 1996; Saunders 2009).

In line with these critiques, this paper adopts an interactionist and dynamic approach to political opportunities (Meyer and Staggenborg 1996; Emirbayer 1997; Rootes 1999c).
The interactionist feature is reflected in the focus of the analysis on inter-organizational networking between single EMOs and single state actors. The dynamic feature is reflected in the focus on the meso-level dynamics of action, reactions and inter-action of actors. The paper also questions the assumption that social movements and the state are unitary actors (Saunders 2008a; 2009). Recognizing the diversity among distinct EMOs and different state actors allows me to explain differential access of EMOs to the state. It suggests that interests, strategies, and frames all affect political opportunities.

The paper draws attention to how actors themselves actively shape political opportunities. Through relational forms of collective action EMOs try to affect their opportunities to access the state. For example, they lobby elites to try to recruit allies in the hope of creating new windows of opportunity to access state institutions. In the same way, distinct state actors shape opportunities for access. In addition to EMO and state actors, this study also highlights how international actors influence political opportunities. It shows how in Indonesia international development organizations affect the political access of EMOs through the introduction of new forms of environmental governance. An interactionist approach to political opportunities brings McAdam’s (1982) reasoning one step forward. He suggested that, “any event or broad social process that serves to undermine the calculations on which the political establishment is structured occasions a shift in political opportunities” (McAdam, 1982, p. 41). This paper shows how dynamic changes in contingent political opportunities occur as state agencies react to EMOs’ strategies by either accommodating or hampering their efforts. When state actors feel threatened by the actions and claims of EMOs they use a variety of tactics to try to marginalize these specific challengers.

The paper contributes to the growing work on environmental social movements in development in three ways. First, it illustrates how the analysis of inter-organizational networks can be used to operationalize interactionist approaches to study social movements and political opportunities. Second, it contributes to expanding knowledge
about political opportunities in environmental activism in the South. And third, by going beyond the simple contraposition of social movements versus the state typical of studies on developed countries, it includes the role of international actors in shaping political opportunities.

This article begins by exposing the limits of macro-structural approaches and explains the need to use an interactionist approach to investigate the political opportunities faced by EMOs within one country. It then turns to a meso-level investigation of forest tenure advocacy in Indonesia, which illustrates why different actors face distinct political opportunities and how EMOs try to shape access to the political system. This is followed by an analysis of how the introduction of new forms of governance by international actors might alter political opportunities for EMOs. Finally, it turns to the strategies and tactics of state actors that feel threatened by the success of EMOs and investigates their responses aimed at reducing access to the political process. From the theoretical discussion and the evidence, I derive six propositions on the contingent features of political opportunities.

2 Political opportunities for whom?

Structural approaches to political opportunities suggest that the characteristics of the formal political system and the informal structure of power relations affect social movements’ emergence, organizational structure and success (McAdam 1996: 321; Xie and Van Der Heijden 2010). Typically, such approaches are used to explain the differences in social movement strategies and outcomes across different countries (Kitschelt 1986; Kriesi et al. 1995). They are also employed in longitudinal studies to investigate how major political changes affect the formation of social movements over time (Tilly 1978; McAdam 1982).

However, many dimensions usually associated with the concept of political opportunity structure, are not features of deep-rooted social and political structures. Out of the
five dimensions of political opportunities identified by Tarrow (1998), the one exception is the degree of openness of the political system of a country to the challenges from social movements. The other four are more correctly interpreted as contingent features (Gamson and Meyer 1996; della Porta and Diani 1999; Rootes 1999c; Saunders 2009) and they are: the stability of the political alignments, the presence or absence of allies, the existence of divisions among the political elite, and the strategies of repression or facilitation by the state (Tarrow 1998). Consequently, in the second edition of his book, Tarrow avoided the word *structures* and aligned himself with Gamson and Meyer (1996) definition of political opportunity as the “consistent – but not necessarily permanent, or national – dimensions of the political struggle that encourage people to engage in contentious politics” (Tarrow 1998, p.19).

Even so, macro-level approaches can’t explain differential access of EMOs to political elites within a country. For example, it is well-known that moderate social movement organizations and coalitions enjoy more extensive access to the state than radical ones (Rootes 1999a). In Indonesia, as in many other countries, some state actors facilitate conservation groups while at the same time restricting access to environmental justice groups. To explain these differences, it is necessary to focus on the meso-level, by which I mean the organizational level. Such an approach recognizes that social movements are loose aggregations of distinct actors with different interests. Social movement theories in fact define social movements as decentralized networks of actors (Diani 1992; Saunders 2009). In the same way, the state is formed by multiple state actors with diverse interests (Laumann and Knoke 1987; Marsh and Rhodes 1992; Marsh 2009; Saunders 2009).

What is needed to investigate meso-level political opportunities is an interactionist approach to political opportunities (Meyer and Staggenborg 1996). It allows me to investigate actual patterns of interaction between EMOs and state elites. State actors differ in their facilitation and resistance towards EMOs. These differences are due to the characteristics and behaviour of both EMOs and state agencies. Different EMOs often
have diverse identities, adopt diverse strategies, put forth distinct claims and frame problems in different ways. Similarly, while one state actor may perceive a challenge from EMOs as a threat, another may see an opportunity for alliance (Rucht 1988). The very structure of bureaucracy with its division into sectoral areas leads to such diverging interests. In Indonesia, for example, the Ministry of Environment supported the protest activities of environmentalists against mining in protected forest areas, while the Ministry of Forestry strongly resisted them (Di Gregorio 2006). In policy disputes, state agencies might also seek out allies among EMOs to try to strengthen their own position vis-à-vis other more powerful state actors. Existing power relations among state actors influence alliances and conflict systems (Kriese 2004), but how they do this depends on the dispute at hand (Meyer and Staggenborg 1996). In short, at the meso-level, political opportunities are contingent on the issue of contention, and on the different interests, frames, and strategies of actors (Rucht 1988; Meyer 1993b; Rootes 1999c; Saunders 2009).

3 Managing political opportunities

The contingency of political opportunities does not only imply that different actors face different opportunities at different times. It also suggests that within the constraints of more general and stable political opportunities, social movements themselves can alter access to the state (Tarrow 1993; Meyer and Staggenborg 1996). EMOs use collective action strategies to influence policies, change political alignments, and increase the salience of issues and events, which can all lead to changes in access to elites (Meyer and Staggenborg 1996). But the actions of state actors such as policy decisions or political realignments also open or close political opportunity windows for specific EMOs (Meyer 1993a; b). Far less attention has been given to the analysis of how international actors affect political opportunities (Reimann 2006). Most studies on international political opportunities for EMOs refer to Eastern Europe, but little work covers developing
countries (Carmin and Hicks 2002; Císař 2010). This paper focuses on three interactionist features illustrating how policy actors try to shape access to elites. These are, as I illustrate next: forms of transactional activism; new modes of governance supported by international development organizations; and repertoires of domination by the elites.

There is no intention to suggest that these are the only ways in which policy actors manage political opportunities (Rucht 1988; Meyer 1993b; a; Haynes 1999b; Rootes 1999c; Saunders 2009). They are, however, visibly important features in the context of forest tenure activism in Indonesia.

3.1 Transactional environmental activism

One way in which EMOs try to both reveal and alter political opportunities is through transactional activism. The term refers to relational forms of collective action in inter-organizational networks, or “the ties—enduring and temporary—among organized non-state actors and between them and political parties, power holders, and other institutions” (Petrova and Tarrow 2007, p. 79).

There are many forms of direct engagement with elites. One of these is lobbying. It is not just used to influence precise policies, but also to reveal and recruit new allies within state institutions (Concini 2002). In addition, as successful lobbying translates into policy changes, these might affect future political opportunities to varying degrees (Gamson and Meyer 1996). But how are allies recruited through lobbying? Ideological positions permitting, it is reasonable to assume that EMOs use the most direct means to lobby policymakers (Downs 1957; Meyer 1993a). This implies targeting the most influential state actors in the relevant policy domain. But EMOs also take into account past and current signals of openness to social movement claims and lobbying activities. After all, it would be wasteful to concentrate all resources where opportunities are most restricted or where past actions have not produced any result (Meyer and Staggenborg 1996). Therefore, in the case
of limited political opportunities to influence key elites, it might be more fruitful to divert lobbying toward less influential, but more receptive actors.

The degree to which the lobbying activities of EMOs aim to expand political opportunities themselves, depends also on the specific content of lobbying. It has been suggested that the environmental movement is predominantly instrumental in nature, and therefore focuses on influencing concrete policies and political decisions. In other words, lobbying by EMOs tends to focus on “what is to be decided” (Rucht 1988, p. 321). However, at times EMOs may challenge constitutional-choice rules (Ostrom et al. 1994) raising questions such as: Who is to decide what, and according to which rules? In the latter case, lobbying can directly effect the expansion of political opportunities, and result in increased access of EMOs or of their beneficiaries to decision-making processes. Thus, lobbying does not only aim to affect policies in a narrow sense, but also provides an avenue to expand existing political opportunities.

### 3.2 New modes of governance

Apart from lobbying, new institutional venues also provide EMOs with opportunities to gain access to the state. These represent additional formal or informal channels through which to exert influence and seek new elite allies (Meyer and Staggenborg 1996). In this respect, new modes of governance – which are diverse hybrid and semi-independent forums based on partnership principles (Héritier and Lehmkuhl 2011) – are of particular relevance. These multi-actor governance processes can have diverse functions, from expanding the inclusiveness of the policy dialogue and decision-making, to informing policy implementation and to self-regulation. They are usually not based on law and hierarchy (Radaelli 2011). Examples are the formation of independent agencies and commissions, independent working groups, multi-stakeholder processes and self-regulation bodies from the private sector.
In the last decades, new modes of governance have become part of environmental politics in the South. Multi-stakeholder processes in particular are central in environmental governance. First introduced within the UN global environmental regime following the Rio Summit, they have become a key governance template for international donors engaged in sustainable development issues (Murphy and Coleman 2000). In the last two decades multi-stakeholder processes have proliferated also at the national and local level and are in many instances linked by donor-led initiatives (Hemmati 2002). They can expand political access for social movements in two ways. First, given that they represent additional venues, they increase the opportunities for contact with like-minded state actors. And second, at the core of multi-stakeholder communication processes are principles of democratic deliberation, participation and equity and justice (Hemmati 2002). Clearly, these ground rules of engagement should favour traditionally weaker actors such as EMOs compared to traditional ‘top-down’ governance processes (Kern and Bulkeley in Forsyth 2009).

Given these potential advantages, EMOs that engage in transactional activism are expected to seek out participation in multi-stakeholder processes. However, as Meyer and Staggenborg (1996) argue, there is a curvilinear relation between political opportunities and specific venues. Consequently, EMOs would be expected to be most interested in participating in those arenas that are neither completely favourable nor strongly resistant to their goals. Participation is therefore also a function of past experiences and perceived current and future access to elites present in these forums.

In the developing world such processes have been both initiated and are still supported by major international donors (Hemmati 2002; Truex and Søreide 2010). This makes them a vehicle of influence for international organizations and donors. Obviously, their effectiveness will depend on the degree to which externally funded processes are being appropriated by national actors, civil society and the state. Apart from multi-stakeholder forums there are other new forms of governance in the forest tenure domain in
Indonesia, including independent commissions, issue-specific working groups and self-regulation bodies. Many of these are also subject to international influence.

3.3 Repertoires of domination

When analyzing the reactions of state actors to social movement challenges, the literature on political opportunities usually distinguishes between state strategies of repression and facilitation (Tarrow 1998). In most cases these strategies are studied in relation to macro analysis at country level. For example, broadly speaking authoritarian regimes tend to repress social movements while democratic regimes more often facilitate them (Tarrow 1998). To characterize different states Kriesi et al. (1995) use a classification of political systems based on the strength of the formal institutional structure (strong versus weak states) and the type of dominant strategies (exclusive versus inclusive). The choice between repression and facilitation is often seen as dependent on the level of centralization of the state and its strength (Tarrow 1998). This implies, however, that elite tactics apply uniformly across the social movement industry. At the meso-level it becomes apparent that such actions are targeted at specific campaigns or toward specific EMO actors. Political opportunities at this level of analysis are shaped by strategies adopted by elites. I use the term repertoires of domination (Poteete and Ribot 2011) for the reactions of threatened elites, to distinguish them from repertoires of contention enacted by social movement actors (Tilly 1978). This definition underlines the dynamic aspects of elite strategies as they respond to specific challenges. The interactionist approach highlights that repertoires of domination close political opportunities for specific issues at hand and for specific social movement organizations or coalitions (Rucht 1988; Meyer and Staggenborg 1996; Rucht 2004; Saunders 2009).

The closing of political opportunities represents a form of repression. Repression is often interpreted in terms of active policing behaviour in response to mass mobilization
and riots (della Porta and Reiter 1998; Bleich et al. 2010). It is, however, more broadly defined as any state action that “raises the contender’s cost of collective action” (Tilly 1978, p. 100). Kriesi et al. (1995) argue that exclusive strategies include repressive, confrontational and polarizing approaches. But, where social movements are engaged in transactional activism, repertoires of domination more often take the form of moderate tactical, policy, and cultural responses (Koopmans and Statham 1999; Petrova and Tarrow 2007). Cultural repertoires of domination affect the visibility, the level of resonance and the legitimacy of frames used by social movement actors (Koopmans and Statham 1999).

Because transactional activism uses moderate tactics it pre-empts violent repertoires of domination from elites. Yet, threatened elites can respond using a variety of tactics. In ascending order of the level of threat, the reactions of elites entail the withdrawal of support, taking a neutral stance, ignoring a challenge, or organizing active resistance which may include support to counter-movements (Meyer and Staggenborg 1996). Action can take different forms. Here I distinguish between three types of action: purely tactical, policy and discursive action.

A moderate tactical action can be the attempt to weaken a movement by straining its resources, for example by multiplying the venues of contention, or by establishing and supporting counter-movements (Meyer and Staggenborg 1996). Policy actions refer to policy decisions that can either directly counter or pre-empt movements’ claims. In the first case, elites enact policies that go against the demands of the movement in an attempt to discourage and demobilize it. Meyer and Staggenborg (1996) argue that this works only if it is interpreted as a complete defeat, otherwise it might trigger a surge in mobilization. In the second case, elites can ratify policies that partly accommodate the demands of the movement. The aim of such policy actions can be dual. It can form a compromise in which the policies incorporate the less threatening claims but marginalize the more radical demands, in effect splitting up the movement and co-opting part of it (Koopmans and
Statham 1999). Or, it can accommodate demands in an attempt to diffuse attention but retain sufficient ambiguity to prevent effective implementation.

With regard to new forms of governance, elites can also take action to dominate new institutional venues, marginalize them, or pre-empt them. Pre-emption in this case entails setting up an alternative authoritative institutional venue with the same function as an existing one.

Discursive practices aimed at countering movement demands include the formulation of a counter-discourse to weaken the resonance of EMOs’ frames (Benford and Snow 2000) and undermine their support base. Counter-discourse can also be used to delegitimize the movement itself, and to support the formation of counter-movements.

The rest of this paper applies the above theoretical arguments to discuss the evidence from forest tenure activism in Indonesia. It starts with the analysis of EMOs’ lobbying strategies. It then investigates the role of multi-stakeholder forums. And lastly, it illustrates some examples of repertoires of domination in this policy domain. From the evidence, the paper develops six propositions on the contingent nature of political opportunities.

4 Research design and methods

The data used in this paper are part of a broader study on the national level networking of EMOs in a specific policy domain in Indonesia. The case study focuses on environmental advocacy around forest tenure in Indonesia. The reason for limiting the analysis to one specific policy domain follows the logic explained earlier that political opportunities are contingent on the issue of contention. A second reason is simply that it facilitates the identification of links between actions and policy outcomes. While the scale of analysis is the meso-level, the policy domain under investigation is the national arena in which forest tenure policies are discussed and decisions are taken. Consequently, local actors and local
dynamics are not included in the analysis, although many local EMOs are represented indirectly through their membership in national level EMOs.

This paper operationalizes the interactionist approach to political opportunities suggested by Meyer and Staggenborg (1996) through the analysis of inter-organizational networking. In order to study differential access of EMOs to elites within one policy domain it is necessary to undertake such meso-level analysis, between the micro or individual level and the macro or state level. Focusing on inter-organizational networking means studying how EMOs and state agencies are linked and interact. This requires first that we identify the actors that make up the forest tenure policy domain. The procedure for this boundary definition is explained elsewhere and not repeated here (Di Gregorio 2012). It led to the identification of 25 core EMOs, which are part of the subsequent analysis.

The data for the study were collected between 2006 and 2007 in the Indonesian capital Jakarta using a quantitative survey on organizational networking and qualitative semi-structured interviews. The semi-structured interviews provided qualitative information about EMOs’ advocacy and supportive evidence to interpret the quantitative data. In addition, parts of the analysis of multi-stakeholder forums and examples of repertoires of domination are based on analysis of secondary literature subsequent to the data collection.

The survey collected data on characteristics of EMOs (attribute data) as well as data about relations of EMOs with state actors (relational data). The attribute data in this paper refer to the typology of new forms of governance. The relational data derive from the following questions related to the influence of state actors, lobbying patterns and participation in forums with state actors.

The question about influence reflects the perception of EMOs about the influence of single state agencies. The related survey question is:
1. Which are the government agencies active in shaping forest policies (in terms of both environmental and land use issues)?

While the responses to this question can be represented as a relational variable or ‘structural’ variable (Wasserman and Faust 1994, p.29) - a tie of a specific kind among two actors - the resulting network does not reflect any actual interactions, but rather the perception of EMOs about which state actors are important in the policy domain. Consequently, the network should be interpreted as a knowledge or cultural network (Mische 2003) and not as a network of actual interactions.

The two survey questions that provide the relational data about interactions refer to lobbying and participation in venues or forums. They are:

2. Does your organization lobby government agencies to affect policies? (Yes/No).
   If the response is ‘yes’:
   2.a. Indicate the government agencies that your organization has lobbied in the last 12 months.

3. Has your organization participated in forums to interact with national level state policy actors (working groups, commissions etc.)? (Yes/No)
   If the response is ‘yes’:
   3.a. Indicate those in which your organization has participated in the last 12 months.

The replies from 2.a. and 3.a. provide the data to construct two inter-organizational networks, one on lobbying activities and one on participation in forums with state actors. Both are two-mode networks (Wasserman and Faust 1994; Scott 2000), where EMOs represent one set of actors (first mode vertices) and state actors and forums respectively.
represent the second set of actors (second mode vertices). A two-mode network is used because the network data are based on interviews with EMOs alone. Consequently, the data reflect how EMOs describe their links with state actors (ties go from the first set of actors to the second, but not the other way around).

Exploratory social network analysis (Scott 2000; Nooy de et al. 2005) is used to investigate network interactions. This approach has increasingly informed studies on social movements (Rosenthal et al. 1985; Diani and McAdam 2003; Baldassarri and Diani 2007) as it allows me to investigate the meso-level features of social relations. It is used to study empirical data about actual interactions between organizations or individuals as opposed to studies which investigate social movements as single entities. It has, however, rarely been used to investigate political opportunities (but see Saunders 2009). The calculations of the social network analysis measures are done with Pajek (Batagelj and Mrvar 1998) and UCINET\(^68\) (Borgatti, Everett, Freeman 1999).

## 5 Lobbying and political opportunities

Which state actors do EMOs seek out as lobbying targets? Do lobbying patterns reflect the influence levels of key state agencies in the forest tenure policy domain or not, and why? And finally, what can we learn from lobbying patterns about political opportunities? This section aims to answer these three questions.

While in Indonesia EMOs engage in mobilization for unconventional protest (Stoler 1986; Nomura 2007; Peluso et al. 2008; Nomura 2009), they also undertake transactional activism like lobbying activities to seek access to the state. Finding elite allies and nurturing alliance systems is a crucial activity for EMOs. In fact, in this policy domain 92% of EMOs engage in lobbying (Di Gregorio 2012).

\(^{68}\) While all network measures take into account the direction of ties, in the figures the direction of ties is omitted for clarity of exposition.
But how do EMOs target elites in their lobbying activities? If political access to state actors were the same for all EMOs, lobbying would be directed to those state agencies that are most influential in shaping forest policies. After all, it is wasteful to divert resources to lobbying less influential state actors (Meyer and Staggenborg 1996). In contrast, a deviation towards other actors can reveal a lack of political opportunities. When influential state actors resist engaging with certain EMOs, it is better to seek potential allies elsewhere and lobby less influential but more receptive actors (Meyer and Staggenborg 1996).
Note: The size of vertices reflects in-degree centrality scores. All networks analyzed are directed networks and the direction of ties goes from EMOs to state actors. In the figures the direction of the ties is not displayed to improve readability.

Figure 7. Lobbying network
To assess if EMOs target primarily the most influential state agencies, I compare lobbying patterns with levels of perceived influence of state actors (see Appendix H for the Tables with all measures). Figure 7 illustrates the lobbying network. While EMO respondents indicated a total number of twelve state agencies as key actors shaping forest tenure policies in Indonesia, EMOs lobbied as many as 25 state agencies over the 12 months preceding the survey. The size of the vertices in figure 7 reflects the measure of in-degree centrality, which is the proportion of actual incoming ties of a vertex divided by all possible incoming ties (Scott 2000). Bigger size vertices for state agencies indicate that they are targets of lobbying for many EMOs. The Ministry of Forestry and the People’s Representative Council (the main Indonesian national legislature) are the most sought-after targets for lobbying, followed by the Ministry of Environment and the National Land Planning Agency. While these are all important state agencies in the forest tenure domain (see Appendix H Table H.1), a closer comparison between influence of key agencies and lobbying patterns reveals a discrepancy between the two.

The comparison of centrality measures of state actors in the lobbying network (figure 7 derived from question 2.a.) with those identified as key state actors (question 1a.) provides some useful insights about political opportunities. Centrality measures reflect the importance of actors in networks (Scott 2000). Therefore, a high centrality score for the lobbying variable of a state actor indicates that it is an important target for lobbying. Centrality measures of the most active states agencies – as perceived by EMOs – reveal the level of influence of key state actors. I calculated two different centrality scores, in-degree and eigenvector centrality (Appendix H Table H.1 and H.2), but relied on the latter to assess differences in centrality between lobbying and influence, since eigenvector scores provide a more nuanced differentiation of scores.69

69 This is because eigenvector scores in two-mode networks take into account centrality effects of both sets of first and second-mode vertices. They have been indicated in fact as most suited to describe influences in two-mode networks (Borgatti and Everett 1997; Faust 1997).
The results indicate that the Ministry of Forestry is both the most influential actor in the policy domain (with a percentage of eigenvector centrality of 89.5) and the main target of lobbying activities (percentage of eigenvector centrality 63.3). This is as expected given that it is the main bureaucratic agency mandated to manage state forestlands (Fay and Sirait 2004). But to assess the degree of openness of political opportunities, the relevant measure is the difference between these scores. Table 3 presents the eigenvector centrality scores for lobbying and influence, and the difference between the two in percentage terms (last column Table 3)\textsuperscript{70}. The differences in eigenvector centrality indicate a reduction in score for five state actors and an increase for five other actors (Table 3). This means that lobbying efforts do not strictly follow influence. There clearly is a diversion of lobbying from three central influential actors, foremost the Ministry of Forestry, but also the National Development Planning Agency and the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources, towards less influential ones. Conversely, the most striking positive difference pertains to the People’ Representative Council followed at a distance by the Ministry of Environment.

The discrepancy between influence and lobbying scores might reveal different political opportunities to access specific state actors. Thus, elite actors with positive percentage change scores might provide better political opportunities for EMOs while those with negative scores might prevent access. To assess this, next I look at whose interests are threatened or supported by the central demands and claims of EMOs in this domain.

To what extent does the demand for forest tenure reform of the environmental justice movement threaten single state actors? The main advocacy efforts are framed around the need for both increased recognition of locally exercised rights to forest resources and improved environmental sustainability in the management of forests (Stoler 1986; Nomura 2007; Di Gregorio 2012).

\textsuperscript{70} See Appendix H Table H.1 and H.2 for the complete list of scores of all state actors.
Table 3: State actors with highest positive and negative differences between lobbying and influence centrality scores

|更高影响力低于游说影响力| Ministry of Forestry | 63.30 | 89.50 | -26.20 |
| | National Development Planning Agency | 4.20 | 12.10 | -7.90 |
| | Ministry of Energy & Mineral Resources | 10.90 | 17.40 | -6.50 |
| | Ministry of Agriculture | 12.99 | 15.90 | -2.91 |
| | Local governments | 5.90 | 7.20 | -1.30 |

|更高游说影响力低于影响力| People’s Representative Council (DPR) | 55.00 | 9.40 | 45.60 |
| | Ministry of the Environment | 33.80 | 23.80 | 10.00 |
| | Ministry of Social Services | 8.20 | 4.00 | 4.20 |
| | Ministry of Industry & Trade | 10.80 | 8.20 | 2.60 |
| | National Land Agency | 22.20 | 21.70 | 0.50 |

*Note: All calculations are done with the UCINET software (Borgatti et al. 1999).*

Which state interests are most threatened by these frames? The call for the strengthening of local rights clashes most directly with key interests within the Ministry of Forestry, which has the mandate to manage and *de facto* control all state forestlands in Indonesia (Peluso 1992; McCarthy 2000; Contreras-Hermosilla and Fay 2005; Di Gregorio 2006). State forestlands are a vast resource covering a total area of 133 million hectares (World Bank 2006). The most powerful unit within the Ministry of Forestry is the Directorate for Forest Utilization. It controls the revenue flow from logging concessions and other forest
fees and contributes roughly 1% of the total revenue of the Indonesian Government. Its main priority is to advance large-scale forest exploitation for national development aims, and while sustainability standards do exist, they are very weakly enforced (Rametsteiner and Simula 2003). The demand of EMOs for greater rights of local users represents a major threat to the Ministry’s control over state forestlands. Because of this, opportunities to discuss and influence key units of the Ministry are very limited. Under such conditions, it is probably better to seek out other elite allies. This explains the much lower levels of lobbying for the Ministry of Forestry (-26%) compared to the influence attributed to it.

The second biggest negative difference pertains to the National Development Planning Agency. This agency and its local branches coordinate land use decisions (McCarthy 2004), which should take into account local rights to resources. While the formal procedures for the development of land use plans are formulated as a bottom-up exercise – thereby in theory respecting local rights to resources – in practice the process is reversed. In addition, the agency’s role is often relegated to negotiating disagreements between different bureaucratic agencies, as opposed to ensuring that local demands for access to forests are taken into account (Contreras-Hermosilla and Fay 2005). It is not surprising then, that EMOs find the National Development Planning Agency not very open to their claims 71.

Finally, the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources has a strong interest in mining activities in forest areas. The vast expanses of state forestlands contain very valuable minerals, which the Ministry is eager to exploit. The concerns of environmentalists relate primarily to the polluting and degrading consequences of commercial mineral exploitation, but also to the risk of dispossession of local people that mining often entails. One recent national level dispute was related to the issue of mining in protected areas. In this case, the Ministry of Forestry took sides with the Ministry of Energy and Mineral

71 There is however a lot of evidence of engagement of EMOs at the local level with the local branches of the National Development Planning Agency.
Resources in defending existing mining concessions against the alliance of the environmental movement with the Ministry of the Environment (Witular 2008; Simamora 2011).

More generally speaking, there is a clash of worldviews between EMOs and these three state actors on two levels. First, because EMOs act as the defenders of local forest dwellers who they believe can manage forests more sustainably than the state. This clashes with the attitude of part of the state bureaucracy, which adopts a paternalistic view of the state as the protector of nature threatened by peasants who destroy the forest with their unsustainable farming techniques (Peluso 1992; Forsyth and Walker 2008). Second, the worldview of EMOs that places a high value on environmental sustainability clashes with the dominant development paradigm of the Indonesian state that is based on accelerated growth through large-scale exploitation of natural resources (Peluso 1992; Dove and Kammen 2001).

And what explains the positive differences? The Ministry of the Environment has a higher lobbying score compared to its influence. This reflects a historical alliance system of the Ministry with the environmental movement (Peluso et al. 2008). This alliance is key to both parties. For the weak and underfunded state Ministry, it is a way to strengthen its position vis-à-vis more powerful ministries. For EMOs, the Ministry represents a key ally that can fight for many of their causes from within the palaces of power. But the highest differential between lobbying and influence scores pertains to the People’s Representative Council, the main legislative branch of government. This reflects both general and contingent political opportunities. First, since 2006 a legal provision allows non-state actors to participate in hearings in the legislative commissions, and EMOs have been quick to take advantage of this opportunity (Di Gregorio 2006). Second, it is easier to recruit allies among the vast variety of elected representatives from different parties and factions than it is to recruit them among civil servants, whose function and decision-making power is more

72 The Ministry of the Environment is a state ministry that has an exclusively coordinating role.
restricted by their institutional mandate (personal communication Ivan Ageung). The high levels of lobbying in the legislative branch of government reflect its general openness to civil society, as well as specific alliances with supportive political representatives on specific campaign issues.

Thus, in all major cases, lobbying patterns can be explained according to the level of threat posed by the claims of EMOs to single state agencies. I derive the following propositions from the above evidence:

Proposition 1:

*Political opportunities are open to those claims that support the interests of specific elite actors and are closed to those that threaten them.*

Proposition 2:

*When the most influential elites in a policy domain close access to EMO claims, EMOs direct lobbying efforts toward less influential but more receptive state actors in order to strengthen their alliance system.*

### 6 Multi-stakeholder forums and collaboration with the state

Having assessed that political opportunities vary according to different state actors and the specific demands of EMOs, the next question is: Which are the venues and forums that facilitate EMOs’ access to the state? And which actors facilitate such interactions? To answer these questions, I investigate a second network which represents the participation of EMOs in such venues. The first part of this section analyses the types of venues and the second part focuses in particular on one type of venue, namely multi-stakeholder forums. From the evidence I then derive the implications of this for political opportunities and for the role of international organizations in facilitating such access.
Figure 7 displays the network constructed from the responses to question 3: ‘Has your organization participated in forums to interact with national level state policy actors (working groups, commissions etc.)?’; and in case of positive response question 3.a: ‘Indicate those in which your organization has participated in the last 12 months’.

In the network graph EMOs are represented by triangles, and venues/forums by circles. The ties broadly stand for the relation ‘participates in …’, in the same way as other affiliation networks are used to represent membership in clubs for example.

The data show that sixty-five per cent of EMOs (16 out of 25) participated in venues/forums with state actors in the previous 12 months. But what types of venues are these and what does the network reveal about political opportunities? I have classified venues into traditional and new forms of governance. By traditional, I mean formal institutionalized policy channels (such as parliamentary hearings) and consultations with specific state agencies (generally initiated by state agencies to tap into EMO expertise). New modes of governance are represented here by multi-stakeholder forums, independent commissions and self-regulation bodies.

Out of the 25 venues 15 can be classified as traditional venues and 8 as new modes of governance, while two do not fall into either category\(^{73}\) (Figure 8). New forms of governance substantially expand opportunities to access state actors because they double the number of venues compared with traditional venues alone. All the new modes of governance have been introduced in Indonesia within the last decade. The increase in opportunities to meet state actors is not just valuable per se, it expands the portfolio of strategies and tactics that can be used for advocacy. It allows, for example, EMOs to shift focus and venue as political opportunities open or close. In addition, new forms of governance tend to involve venues that bring together a large number of actors compared

\(^{73}\) Of the two residual venues, one is a coalition predominantly formed by EMOs, which was indicated by respondents also as a venue for interaction with state actors; the second is an international conference on land tenure issues.
to one-on-one consultations. As a result, they allow for more interaction – including interaction among EMOs – and if EMOs are able to support each other and act as a coalition they have greater chances of success. I derive the following proposition from the evidence:

Proposition 3:

By increasing the number of institutional venues for transactional activism, new forms of governance expand political opportunities for EMOs. They facilitate the building of alliance systems both with elites and among EMOs, and enable shifts in strategies and targets.
Notes: See Appendix H Table H.3 for a complete description of venues and acronyms

Figure 8. Venue / forum network

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How can we identify the venues that provide better political opportunities for EMOs? I start by assessing the importance of venues. Kleinberg (1999) developed an algorithm for directed networks\textsuperscript{74} to calculate weights on vertices in order to assess their importance. He associated two weights with each vertex according to the direction of the ties: an authority weight (referring to incoming ties) and a hub weight (referring to outgoing ties). The underlying logic for assigning weights is the following: ‘If a vertex [a node representing an EMO in this particular network] points to many vertices with large authority weight, it should receive a large hub weight. If a vertex [a node representing a venue in this particular network] is pointed to by many vertices with large hub weights, then it should receive a large authority weights’ (Zaveršnik et al. 2002: 114). While Kleinberg developed the algorithm for one-mode networks and Zaveršnik et al. (2002) adapted the algorithm for two-mode networks such as the one used in this study. The difference in two-mode networks is that a set of vertices can be associated only with one weight: first-mode vertices can only be hubs (they only have outgoing ties), while second-mode vertices can only be authorities (they have only incoming ties).

One important aspect of our network is that the participation of an EMO in a venue reflects a positive judgement about the potential for political opportunities\textsuperscript{75}. The reason is that the relationship between participation and political opportunities is curvilinear (Meyer and Staggenborg 1996). In other words, it is more fruitful to access venues that are neither completely closed nor completely open to EMOs’ claims. Consequently, high authority weights should reflect good political opportunities offered by a specific forum.

\textsuperscript{74} A directed network is a network where the ties have a direction. In our case the ties reflects the concept of: ‘participates in’ and the direction goes from EMOs to venues.

\textsuperscript{75} A positive judgement does not necessarily entail that interaction will lead to successful achievement for the EMO. However, EMOs also make judgements about participation based on their past experiences, meaning that if a venue proves repeatedly disappointing, they are likely to withdraw from it.
In figure 9, the size of the vertices reflects authority weights for venues and hub weights for EMOs. The bigger the vertices the higher the authority or hub weight (Appendix H, Tables H.4 and H.5). Four out of the five multi-stakeholder forums have the highest authority weights, meaning that they provide the best available political opportunities for EMOs.

Why are multi-stakeholder forums so important? There are two plausible explanations. On the one hand, multi-stakeholder forums are particularly attractive to EMOs because of the inclusive communication principles that characterize them. These principles provide a more levelled playing field for EMOs vis-à-vis other actors. On the other hand, it could also be the case that political opportunities through conventional channels are extremely limited, which would make multi-stakeholder forums only relatively more attractive.

Thus, we can see that the importance of a venue does not necessarily coincide with its level of effectiveness. Here I do not suggest that multi-stakeholder forums are always more effective than other venues. In fact, there is substantial literature questioning this aspect (Truex and Søreide 2010). But the fact that they are the most sought-after venues, and are central to the network, means that they do provide important political opportunities at least in relative terms. I derive the following proposition from the evidence:

**Proposition 4:**

*In the forest tenure policy domain in Indonesia, multi-stakeholder forums provide the best political opportunities for EMOs.*

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76 One note of caution here is that the multiplication of venues can also be used to strain the limited resources of movements (Meyer and Staggenborg 1996). This, however, does not seem to be the case in the forest tenure policy domain in Indonesia, where the multi-stakeholder forums are not initiated by state actors, which are the main actors that could feel threatened by such venues.
Next, I take a look at the four venues with the highest authority score, and investigate possible international links. The highest score pertains to the Indonesian Communication Forum on Community Forestry (FKKM\textsuperscript{77}). It was set up in 1997 with the support of the Ford Foundation as a multi-stakeholder forum to facilitate dialogue on community forestry (Colchester et al. 2003). It was particularly active in the revision of the New Forestry law in 1999 and it focuses in particular on the resolution of conflicts over forestlands.

The second venue is the Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade Action Plan (FLEGT) funded by the European Commission and aimed at improving forest governance in Indonesia, particularly in relation to illegal logging, through a bilateral treaty called the Voluntary Partnership Agreement (VPA). A requirement of VPAs is for negotiations to occur through multi-stakeholder processes.

The third is the Indonesian Working Group on Forest Finance (IWFF), an independent working group first set up by the Centre for International Forestry Research, aims at increasing the transparency of the economic and financial decision-making in the forestry sector. It is open to all types of organizations and individual actors that share its concerns and it operates on multi-stakeholder principles. And finally, there is the Working Group on Forest Land Tenure, a multi-stakeholder forum which works specifically on land tenure conditions in the forestry sector. It was set up as part of the commitment of the Government of Indonesia to the Consultative Group for Indonesia (CGI), which includes all major international development donors, in 2000 and is funded by international sources although today it is hosted by the Ministry of Forestry and chaired by the Head of the Ministry’s Research Unit on Social and Economic Policies.

Thus, all venues that provide the best political opportunities for EMOs were set up with the support of international donors. They have introduced the very principles underlying multi-stakeholder processes in Indonesia and continue to support their work. The importance of these venues in the forest tenure policy domain today is however, also

\textsuperscript{77} Forum Komunikasi Kehutanan Masyarakat.
dependent on the strong commitment on the part of national actors to adopt these new forms of governance. While without the commitment of national actors these forums would likely remain empty shells, resources for the activities organized by these are still completely dependent on international funding. Then the question remains: if international funding were to disappear, would these political opportunities just dissolve?

Proposition 5:

*International organizations and foreign donors working on sustainable development issues are at present indispensable to sustaining the work of multi-stakeholder forums in the forest tenure policy domain. Their support is necessary but not sufficient to promote the effectiveness of these venues, which require in addition the active support of both domestic EMOs and state elites.*
Note: Size of vertices reflects authority weight for venue/forums and hub weight for EMOs.

Figure 9. Authorities and Hubs
7 Repertoires of domination

Through the recounting of a few key episodes, this section provides examples of different repertoires of domination used by elites in the forest tenure policy domain. It illustrates how threatened elites react to specific challenges in order to dissipate them.

I suggested earlier that the most restrained levels of reaction by threatened elites involved withdrawing support, taking a neutral stance or ignoring a challenge altogether. Given the controversial nature of forest tenure activism in Indonesia, there have been few episodes where elites have been neutral. Neither have there been many examples of their withdrawing support, in part because support has often been minimal to begin with. There are, however, examples of how elites have been able to effectively ignore the achievements of EMOs.

One such episode was the attempt to first ignore and then delegitimize a major victory of the EMO coalition. In 2001, thanks to very effective advocacy on the part of EMOs, the People's Consultative Assembly\textsuperscript{78} ratified a legislative decree (TAP MPR \textsuperscript{IX/2001\textsuperscript{79}}) requiring the implementation of agrarian reforms, the revision of all natural resource laws and the establishment of resolution mechanisms to address conflicts over natural resources (Di Gregorio 2006). In the wake of the victory, EMOs rallied to press for implementation. At the same time, however, national elites were able to de facto ignore the decree. Not only were natural resource laws not revised but since then new policies, laws and regulations have been ratified that completely ignore these requirements. Some major examples are the Presidential Regulations on mining in protected areas\textsuperscript{80} and on public land provision for development\textsuperscript{81}, as well as the new laws on water privatization\textsuperscript{82} and

\textsuperscript{78} The People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) was the highest legislative decision-making body in the country at the time.

\textsuperscript{79} Ketetapan Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Republik Indonesia Nomor IX/MPR/2001 Tentang Pembaruan Agraria dan Pengelolaan Sumberdaya Alam (referred to as TAP IX from now on).

\textsuperscript{80} (PerPres1/2004)

\textsuperscript{81} (PerPres36/2005)
plantations. Some elites also tried to delegitimize the EMOs’ success by questioning the legality of the decree (personal communication Asep Firdaus). To date the decree still stands, but has not been fully implemented. The proliferation of these new sectoral regulations also risks overstretching EMOs’ resources, as they have to fight all these separate provisions simultaneously.

Ignoring the achievements of EMOs can only work, however, for minor challenges or when their alliance system is weak (Meyer and Staggenborg 1996). But often, elites need to be more pro-active to counter threats from social movements. Evidence shows that in Indonesia elites’ reactions to challenges from EMOs has most often taken the form of pre-empting their demands. Pre-empting policy reforms and the establishment of new forms of governance has been the most visible and most used strategy. Here I give three examples that involve actors from the forum network stretching over a period of ten years.

The ratification of the New Forestry Law in 1999 is a classic case. While a multi-stakeholder commission, led by the FKKM and appointed by the Ministry of Forestry, worked on a draft bill that recognized substantial rights of local users, conservative members of the Ministry of Forestry obtained the ratification of another draft which maintained the control of the Ministry over all forestlands in Indonesia (Di Gregorio 2006). This action in fact nullified the work of the commission and wasted a great deal of resources and effort.

At other times, pre-emption has gone hand in hand with a limited level of accommodation of EMO demands. One such episode was the response of the government to the establishment of a national independent commission to address long-neglected disputes over agrarian and forestland in Indonesia. The request was submitted to the President of Indonesia by the National Commission for Human Rights that had worked closely on the proposal with a number of core EMOs. The President accommodated the
request in part, but assigned the duty to the National Land Agency that responds directly to
the President, instead of establishing an independent commission (Di Gregorio 2006). While in part this is a policy response that accommodates the demand to address land
conflicts, the National Land Agency has jurisdiction only over agricultural land and not
over forestlands. Such partial accommodation was aimed at splitting the movement and
pre-empting sustained collective action to demand more effective forest dispute resolution
mechanisms.

The most recent example of pre-emption in Indonesia pertains to the role of a self-
regulation body, the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO). In this case elites pre-
empted the actions of EMOs through the establishment of a new institution. The RSPO,
while being a self-regulation body from the industry, works in a multi-stakeholder fashion
and EMOs and international businesses have had substantial influence in enhancing
sustainability requirements for certification of palm oil. In 2010 the Indonesian
government, under pressure from lobbies by domestic palm oil producers (Jakarta Post
2010), established a rival institutional venue – the Indonesian Sustainable Palm Oil (ISPO)
scheme – that rejects some of the certification requirements of the RSPO, deemed too
restrictive for producers. The risk of such a development is that together with reduced
requirements for sustainability, the new scheme will further weaken respect for local rights
to land and resources.

The evidence suggests that forms of pre-emption seem to be the preferred – or
probably the only – choice for threatened elites to overcome severe challenges. This is
particularly true when EMOs’ demands are supported by other elite allies. While pre-
emption requires considerable resources on the part of elites themselves, it has effects
beyond nullifying the demands of EMOs. When successful, it also results in the waste of
considerable past investment of resources. This can considerably weaken EMOs’ ability to
mount new challenges. I derive two final propositions from the evidence:
Proposition 5:

Repertoires of domination can take various forms, from withdrawing support to ignoring claims, to taking a neutral stance or trying to pre-empt challenges.

Proposition 6:

The higher the threat the more likely elites will try to pre-empt challenges. Pre-emption is costly but it is the most effective repertoire for stopping EMOs from reaping the benefits of their successes.

This section has illustrated through some examples how the reactions of threatened elites target specific campaigns and specific organizations. At the meso-level, the closing of political opportunities is targeted toward specific threats and is supported by those elites that feel threatened by a specific challenge.

8 Conclusion

This paper has investigated the contingency of political opportunities using a new method to operationalize an interactionist approach in order to study how social movements gain access to the state. It has shown that features of political opportunities are contingent on the interests, claims and frames of the diverse actors involved. While the broad characteristics of the political system do affect the emergence of social movements and the form they take, at the meso-level, advocacy occurs through a dynamic exchange between challengers and single state actors. This implies that both social movement actors and single state agencies continuously shape social movements’ access opportunities to the state.

This paper contributes to the theory by showing that EMOs themselves shape political opportunities through transactional activism, as much as single state actors affect the access EMOs have to national policy makers. Only by analyzing meso-level dynamics is
it possible to delineate the trajectories of differential access to the polity. This calls for the use of definitions of social movements and of the state that are pluralistic and recognize that these are formed by a variety of actors with diverse interests, values and strategies.

This paper also introduces a new method to operationalize the interactionist approach to political opportunities. It uses exploratory social network analysis to show how networks of interaction between activists and elites in the forest tenure domain in Indonesia reveal the contingency of access.

The findings show that the diversity of interests among state agencies leads to differential access to the state for EMOs. While some agencies perceive specific challenges as a threat, others might consider them opportunities to seek out allies among social movement actors. Lobbying patterns illustrate how under conditions of limited political opportunities, EMOs divert lobbying from the most influential state agencies to less influential but more responsive ones in an attempt to strengthen their alliance system.

The investigation of the venues and forums that facilitate interaction among EMOs, and between EMOs and state agencies, shows how new forms of governance expand political opportunities for EMOs. Behind these new venues are worldviews that have developed in international arenas and are linked to the rise of the sustainable development paradigm. The influence of international organizations on these forums is still visible today, although their effectiveness depends more and more on domestic political relations.

Finally, this paper has also shown how threatened elites use different repertoires of domination to resist challenges by EMOs and counter their successes. Different repertoires are used in response to the actions of EMOs and are targeted toward specific actors. They differ according to the type and level of threat. When the level of threat is very high, elites take a pro-active stance to pre-empt EMOs’ plans. While pre-emption requires substantial effort and resources, it has proven successful in preventing EMOs from reaping the benefits of previous victories.
This paper has raised some important questions about the features of political opportunities and their constructionist nature. Within broader social and political constraints, social movement organizations have shown that they retain considerable ability to manage and shape their own access to the state, in the same way as state actors use their resources to facilitate or prevent access.
## Appendix H: Network measures

### Table H.1: Lobbying: In-degree and eigenvector centrality of state actors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of state agency</th>
<th>Normalized in-degrees</th>
<th>% Norm. degree</th>
<th>Eigenvector centrality</th>
<th>% Eigenvector centrality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Forestry</td>
<td>0.609</td>
<td>60.9</td>
<td>0.633</td>
<td>63.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People's Representative Council (dpr)</td>
<td>0.522</td>
<td>52.2</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of the Environment</td>
<td>0.261</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td>0.338</td>
<td>33.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Land Agency</td>
<td>0.261</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td>0.222</td>
<td>22.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commission for Human Rights</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Agriculture</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0.129</td>
<td>12.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Energy &amp; Mineral Resources</td>
<td>0.087</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>0.109</td>
<td>10.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Industry &amp; Trade</td>
<td>0.087</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>0.108</td>
<td>10.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>0.087</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>0.105</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
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<td>Ministry of Social Services</td>
<td>0.043</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>0.082</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
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<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
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<td>8.7</td>
<td>0.081</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>8.7</td>
<td>0.074</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Law and Human Rights</td>
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<td>4.3</td>
<td>0.063</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local government</td>
<td>0.087</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>0.059</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Internal Affairs</td>
<td>0.087</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>0.043</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attorney General</td>
<td>0.043</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>0.042</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Development Planning Agency</td>
<td>0.043</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>0.042</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-corruption Commission</td>
<td>0.043</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>0.042</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local level National Park head office</td>
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<td>4.3</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
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<td>Local People's Representative Council</td>
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Calculations in UCINET (Borgatti, et al., 1999)

### Table H.2: Perception of influence: In-degree and eigenvector centrality

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<th>Name of state agency</th>
<th>Normalized degrees</th>
<th>% Norm. degree</th>
<th>Eigenvector centrality</th>
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<th>Acronyms Fig. 2</th>
<th>Full name of venue / forum (issue)</th>
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<td>Attorney General</td>
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<td>cases</td>
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<td>Indonesian Agency for National Legal Development (customary rights)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Indonesian Agency for National Legal Development (Department of Law &amp; Human Rights)</td>
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<td>Invited to work on agrarian reforms by the National Land Agency</td>
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<td>People’s Representative Council (agricultural reform)</td>
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<td>Participation in People's Representative Council hearings on rice imports</td>
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<td>Department of Home Affairs (law on mass organizations)</td>
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<td>National Alliance for the Revision of the Penal Code</td>
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<td>natural resources as a possible source of violation of human rights)</td>
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<td>Member of the Indonesian Working Group on Forest Finance</td>
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<td>Collaboration with the National Forestry Board</td>
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(Continued on next page)
(Continued from previous page)

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<th>Fig. 2</th>
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Residual venues:

| Coalition for the revision of the New Forestry Law (to strengthen customary rights) | kpkk    |        | Coalition for Forestry Policy Reform |
| Participation in the International Conference on Agrarian Reform and Rural Development (ICARRD) | icarrd |        | International Conference on Agrarian Reform and Rural Development |

Table H. 4: Hub weights of EMOs

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Table H. 5: Authority weights of forums

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Calculations in Pajek (Batagelj and Mrvar 1998) and UCINET (Borgatti et al. 1999)
## Appendix I: Network data

### Table I. 1: Data matrix of the lobbying network

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Table I. 2: Metadata of the lobbying network

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Density1 [loops allowed] = 0.0616319
Density2 [no loops allowed] = 0.0629433

2-Mode Network: Rows=23, Cols=25
Density [2-Mode] = 0.1234783
Conclusion

This thesis has investigated how the environmental movement has been able to affect policies related to forest tenure in Indonesia. In particular it has analyzed the role of networking among EMOs and between these and state actors. In so doing, it has explored four key areas in social movement studies and has contributed to both the social movement literature and advances in methods in a number of ways.

In terms of the contribution to the methods debate, the thesis suggests that relational approaches to social movement networks that take into account the interpenetration of structure and agency as well as the cultural meaning of networks provide a more complete and better understanding of their role in social movement studies. It also argues that such approaches are best operationalized through mixed methods research designs because of the interest in the content and the processes underlying networks. As such, the thesis supports recent literature that calls for the use of mixed methods in social network analysis (Coviello 2005; Knox et al. 2006; Crossley 2010; Edwards 2010). The combination of quantitative social network analysis and qualitative analysis allows me to investigate empirical data about network exchanges in conjunction with qualitative data to assess the features, meaning and processes that underlie networking in social movements. This provides a much fuller picture of the role of networking compared to exclusively quantitative approaches.

The research design of the thesis illustrates a number of ways in which to combine exploratory social network analysis and qualitative analytical methods. While many different forms of qualitative analysis could be integrated I demonstrate how to combine frame analysis and content analysis of qualitative data (i.e. of EMO documents and interview material) with quantitative social network analysis at the data generation level, as well as at the analysis and interpretation levels. The thesis shows how such combinations offer
increased analytical depth in terms of gaining an understanding of the emergence of networks, the meaning of specific features of networks, and the processes that constitute EMOs’ networks. Compared to structural approaches, relational approaches in combination with mixed methods present a more balanced view of the interactions between internal and external forces in social movement networks and of the dynamic interactions between EMOs and state actors. I argue that overall, mixed method designs enable a more accurate, complete and nuanced analysis of the emergence and transformation EMO networks and their role in shaping policy reforms.

The other four papers of the thesis address four distinct and complementary aspects of the role of networking in the environmental movement in Indonesia. Together they provide a broad and in-depth understanding of the relational features of political contention in the forest tenure policy domain in Indonesia. All the papers rely to some degree at least on a relational (or interactionist) approach to political contention that: 1. stresses the importance of social relations as a basic unit of analysis; 2. recognizes that social relations and attributes (or categories) of actors do not exist in isolation, but affect each other, and are in fact socially constructed; 3. recognizes important cultural features of the agency of social movements, in particular that cultural processes often underlie physical exchanges and actual interactions.

The first paper provides a broad overview of the policy domain, and presents a macro-level analysis of processes of change in this domain since 1999. The aim is to assess to which degree, as often stated in the Indonesian literature, broad political opportunities alone can explain such outcomes. The findings indicate that political opportunities are important, but so is the interplay of actions of EMOs and state agencies. On the part of EMOs, coalition work and the effective use of diverse repertoires of collective action actively contribute not only to exploiting political opportunities but also to trying to reshape them.
In terms of political opportunities and contextual political conditions, the paper reveals that despite a robust democratization process in Indonesia, the influence of the executive power (exemplified in the Indonesian Presidency) and the high level of control of the bureaucracy over policy decisions remain dominant features in the forest tenure policy domain. This also suggests that resistance from conservative elites to forest tenure reform is still fierce, although the environmental movement has been able to expand its alliances with some of the more reformist sections of the elite. More than once the movement was able to create enough pressure to breach the resistance of parts of the elite, and this would not have been possible without a very effective strategic use of multiple repertoires of collective action and extensive coalition work both within the movement and together with reformist elites.

From the broad macro-level qualitative analysis, the thesis moves on to the meso-level and examines in much more detail three important aspects of networking in environmental activism. The focus of the analysis, thus, moves to inter-organizational networking. Taken together, these three papers investigate a variety of interaction among EMOs and between EMOs and state actors, ranging from communication networks to different types of interactions with state agencies including lobbying, participation in conventional policy venues and new modes of governance.

With respect to coalition work, the focus is on how communication networks among EMOs facilitate the formation of alliances. The findings suggest that on the one hand there is a qualitative difference between more and less dense areas of inter-organizational communication networks and, on the other, dense networking reveals common concerns. The paper shows that networking is facilitated by sharing similar environmental values and by ongoing framing activities. It introduces the concept of ‘SMO discourse coalition’ that describes robust and substantive coalitions that coalesce SMOs with distinct yet compatible values under broad master frames able to sustain collective
action over time, create ideational bonds and produce new understandings of environmental problems.

These findings advance research on coalition work in two ways. First, they suggest that coalition work does not occur through inter-personal networks alone (cf. Baldassarri and Diani 2007), but rather that inter-organizational exchange of information, advice, expertise and other material resources can be just as important in forming ideational bonds among EMOs. Second, the findings suggest that common values facilitate interactions reflecting the validity of the homophily principle against structural approaches that see relations as the source of value formation (cf. Harshaw and Tindall 2005).

From the evidence, the paper offers three propositions on the relationship between homophily and framing activities, and inter-organizational communication networks. These are: 1. Communication networks are denser among EMOs that share the same variety of environmentalism compared to those that do not; 2. Density of interaction in SMO discourse coalitions is driven by framing processes to formulate and maintain a common discourse; and 3. SMO discourse coalitions can bridge different varieties of environmentalism, bringing together EMOs that draw on distinct yet compatible environmental values.

After looking at networking among EMOs, the thesis turns to investigate the interactions between EMOs and the state. There has been limited research on EMO-state networking features to date, despite the evidence of increased institutionalization of the environmental movement in many parts of the world (Rootes 2003a). Two distinct but inter-related aspects of state-civil society relations are examined in the fourth paper: first, the links between external institutionalization and co-optation and second, the contingency of political opportunities and the resulting ability of EMOs to manage political opportunities.

Regarding the role of external institutionalization in contentious politics, the thesis questions the literature that necessarily associates institutionalization with co-optation (van
der Heijden 1997). Instead, it highlights some of the advantages that engagement with state actors (or transactional activism) (Petrova and Tarrow 2007) offers EMOs in particular political settings. By investigating in some depth not just the extent of the interactions between EMOs and state agencies, but also how EMOs themselves qualify those relations, it becomes apparent that engagement with the state does not necessarily mean cooperation, nor does cooperation necessarily entail co-optation. In this case, the qualitative information about the nature of the ties complements the quantitative information about networking and allows me to overcome the simplistic and often misleading conflation of engagement with state actors with accommodation of state goals at the expense of the original aims of the movement (Katzenstein 1998).

In fact, the thesis suggests that EMOs in the forest tenure policy domain in Indonesia are able to maintain – through engaging in both contention and cooperation with state actors (Giugni and Passy 1998) – a form of embedded autonomy with elites while at the same time avoiding co-optation. These findings have important implications for countries in which political conditions limit individual activism. The legacy of past authoritarian rule or simply the marginalization of poor people living in rural areas far from capital cities – along with the logistical obstacles that exist in mobilizing constituencies among them – are likely to make transactional activism an increasingly strategic choice for many environmental movements in the South (Petrova and Tarrow 2007).

One final aspect of state-environmental movement relations that I have considered in this thesis is the contingency of political opportunities. While another paper discusses macro-level political opportunities, here the focus is on the inter-organizational level or meso-level. There are reasons to suggest that political opportunities are much more likely to be contingent on features such as interests, claims and frames of the single actors involved at this level of analysis (Saunders 2009). This paper aims to explain the often-observed feature of differential access of EMOs to state actors. It shows that EMOs proactively try to negotiate access to the state and can thus affect this access to some degree.
The findings demonstrate that the diversity of interests among state agencies leads to differential access to the state for EMOs. While some agencies perceive specific challenges as threats, others might consider them opportunities to seek out allies among social movement actors. Lobbying patterns illustrate how under conditions of limited political opportunities, EMOs divert lobbying from the most influential state agencies to less influential but more responsive ones in an attempt to strengthen their alliance system. Indeed, EMOs attempt to manage political opportunities at this level, in the same way as threatened elites try to close windows of opportunity and organize counter-actions.

The thesis shows some of the dynamics of interactions of how EMOs attempt to manage political opportunities at this level while threatened elites use different repertoires of domination (Poteete and Ribot 2011) to resist their challenges and counter their successes. The last paper presents six propositions on the contingency of political opportunities, which contribute to exploring new meso-level relational features of environmental movement activism. This paper raises key questions about the features of political opportunities and their constructionist nature.

Overall, this thesis brings forward a relational theoretical discussion of environmental movements (Emirbayer 1997; Crossley 2011), finds new ways to operationalize such an approach, and derives some key propositions from the results of an innovative mixed-methods study on environmental movement networks in Indonesia.

Apart from the relational approach that permeates the whole thesis, there are two more features that characterize the thesis as a whole.

First, the starting point and in particular the meso-level analysis favors a definition of social movements and of the state as pluralistic entities that are formed by a variety of actors with diverse interests, values and strategies (Saunders 2008a). The study has
therefore incorporated the very definition of an environmental movement that is a decentralized network of interaction in-and-by itself (Diani 1992).

And second, as mentioned in one of the papers, the study adopts a broad definition of the environmental movement both in terms of the activities it is involved in and in terms of the diverse types of organizations labelled as environmental movement organizations, which span from mass organizations to networks of organizations, coalitions and environmental NGOs. These are included in this study, because the policy domain (the set of EMOs that are engaged in forest tenure issues) was in fact derived from the empirical evidence itself, and because my own research experience corroborated their central role in forest tenure activism in Indonesia. I have little doubt that they all form an integral part of the environmental movement in Indonesia. Notwithstanding, the question of to what degree some of these organizations are truly representative of the constituencies they allege to represent is a very relevant one and one which this thesis does not address, leaving this topic for further research.

Two further limitations of this study need mentioning. First, while at times the thesis discusses the role of international organizations in contentious environmental politics, such analysis is restricted to one specific aspect related to the expansion of meso-level political opportunities and there is no attempt in this thesis to explore their role in any comprehensive way. Development scholars might see this as a limitation of the thesis, which I accept. Likewise, business actors are not included in the analysis, although they also affect policy processes and the political conditions in which the environmental movement operates. More importantly, this study focuses exclusively on environmental movement organizations (EMOs) and thus on formal organizational entities. I am not suggesting that environmental movements are exclusively constituted by formal organization, far from it. As such, this should be considered a limitation of the thesis. However, what drew me toward studying EMOs was in fact the lack of attention of some of the social movement
literature toward formal organizations, while at the same time there is increasing evidence that they play an important role in contentious politics.

And finally, when highlighting the achievements of the environmental justice movement in Indonesia, this thesis neither suggests that progress has been easy nor that it has been complete. Still today, in Indonesia, most local forest users feel excluded and are marginalized by a state that maintains overwhelming control of forest resources. Conservative forces within the state are well-organized and constantly attempt to reverse some of its achievements, but the environmental movement has nevertheless managed to open some important doors for further struggles.
Complete List of acronyms

AMAN - *Aliansi Masyarakat Adat Nusantara* - Indigenous Peoples Alliance of the Archipelago

APL - *Areal Penggunaan Lain* — ‘other land uses’ (land category)

BINA DESA - *Bina Desa Sekretariat* - InDHRRA - Indonesian Secretariat for the Development of Human Resources in Rural Areas

BPHN - Indonesian Agency for National Legal Development

BPN - National Land Agency

DKN - National Forestry Board

DTE – Down to Earth

DPR - *Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat* - People's Representative Council

ELSAM - *Lembaga Studi dan Advokasi Masyarakat* - Institute for Policy Research and Advocacy

EMO(s) - environmental movement organization(s)

FKKM - *Forum Komunikasi Kehutanan Masyarakat* - Indonesian Communication Forum on Community Forestry

FLEGT - Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade Action Plan

FSPI - *Federasi Serikat Petani Indonesia* – Indonesian Federation of Farmers’ Unions

FWI - Forest Watch Indonesia

Greenpeace – Indonesia chapter

HKM – *Hutan Kemasyarakatan* - Community forestry schemes

HuMa - *Perkumpulan untuk Pembaharuan Hukum Berbasis Masyarakat dan Ekoogis* – Association for Community and Ecology-Based Legal Reform

HTI - *Hutan Tanaman Industri* - Industrial Forest Plantation

HTR - *Hutan Taman Rakyat* - The Peoples Plantation Program stands

IBSAP - Indonesian Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan
ICEL - Indonesian Center for Environmental Law
ISPO - Indonesian Sustainable Palm Oil scheme
IWGFF - Indonesian Working Group on Forest Finance
JATAM - Jaringan Advokasi Tambang - Mining Advocacy Network
JKPP - Jaringan Kerja Pemetaan Partisipatif - Network for Participatory Mapping
KEMALA - Kelompok Masyarakat Pengelola Sumberdaya Alam - The Community Natural Resource Managers Program
KKN - Korupsi, Kolusi dan Nepotisme - Corruption, collusion and nepotism
KPA - Yayasan Konsorsium Pembaruan Agraria – Consortium for Agrarian Reform
KpSHK - Konsorsium Pendukung Sistem Hutan Kerakyatan - Consortium Supporting Community-Based Forest Management Systems
KOMNASHAM - National Human Rights Commission
KONPHALINDO - Konsorsium Nasional untuk Pelestarian Hutan dan Alam Indonesia - National Consortium for Forest and Nature Conservation in Indonesia
KSPA - Kelompok Studi Pembaruan Agraria - Study Group on Agrarian Reform
KUDETA - Koalisi untuk Demokratisasi Sumber Daya Alam - Coalition for Democratisation of the Natural Resource Management
KUHP - National Alliance for the Revision of the Penal Code
LATIN - Lembaga Alam Tropika Indonesia - Indonesian Tropical Environment Institute
LocGov - Local Government
MA - Supreme Court
MEA - Multilateral Environmental Agreements
MFA (ICC) - Department of Foreign Affairs
MFP - Multi-stakeholder forestry programme
MHA (ORMAS) - Department of Home Affairs (law on mass organizations)
MoAGR / MoAgriculture - Ministry of Agriculture
MoEnergy&MinResources - Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources
MoENV / MoEnvironment - Ministry of the Environment
MoENV (EMA) - Ministry of the Environment (Environmental Management Act)
MoF - Ministry of Forestry
MoF (BPK-HR) - Ministry of Forestry (Production Forest Division working on People’s Forest)
MoF (PKTN) - Ministry of Forestry (Working Group on National Park Policies)
MoFinance - Ministry of Finance
MoSocial Services - Ministry of Social Services
MoTrade&Industry - Ministry of Trade and Industry
MPR - Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Republik Indonesia - People’s Consultative Assembly
NatDevPlanningAgency - National Development Planning Agency
NatLandAgency - National Land Agency
NGO(s) – Non-Governmental Organization(s)
PA-PSDA - Pokja Pembaruan Agraria dan Pengelolaan Sumberdaya Alam - Working Group for Agricultural Reform and Natural Resource Management
RACA – The Rapid Agrarian Conflict Appraisal (RACA) Institute
RMI - Rimbawan Muda Indonesia – Young Indonesian Foresters
SAWIT WATCH Indonesia
SBY - Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (current President of Indonesia)
SKEPHI - Sekretariat Kerjasama Pelestarian Hutan Indonesia - The Secretariat for Forest Conservation in Indonesia
SMO(s) – Social movement organization(s)
StateForestryCorporation - State Forestry Corporation
TAP IX - Ketetapan Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Republik Indonesia Nomor IX/MPR/2001 Tentang Pembaruan Agraria dan Pengelolaan Sumberdaya Alam - People’s Consultative Assembly Decree on Agrarian Reforms and Management of Natural Resources
TELAPAK
VPA Voluntary Partnership Agreement

WALHI - Wabana Lingkungan Hidup Indonesia - Indonesian Forum for the Environment – Friends of the Earth Indonesia

WGT - Working Group on Forest Land Tenure

WWF – World Wildlife Fund - Indonesia chapter
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