TOWARDS A THEORY OF THE GLOBAL EVENT

The cases of 11 March 2004 and 7 July 2005 terrorist bombings

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**Declaration**

I declare that this thesis is my own original work, conducted under the supervision of Prof. David Held. It is submitted for the degree of Master of Philosophy at the Department of Government at the London School of Economics and Political Science.

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January 2008
Abstract

How can we understand the major contradiction that seems to exist between the unilateral global strategies of certain actors and a world which is now, for the first time, largely interdependent? This question has undoubtedly been among the key themes of the globalization debate in the post 9/11 world. While writers on globalization have tended to focus their attention on the incoherencies and eventual failures of the Bush Administration’s policies, the structural role that the 9/11 terrorist attacks played in the whole process has been largely overlooked by systematic scholarly research. This Master’s dissertation attempts to explore the mechanism of social change that is implicit in the latter perspective. Building on Anthony Giddens’ methodology of episodic characterization, global events are defined and studied as starting points of contingent, unpredictable and highly strategic sequences of structural transformation. The exploratory framework is applied to the study of the realization and aftermath of the Madrid 2004 terrorist bombings in order to give a flavour of how global event episodes can be individually characterized. The London 7/7 terrorist attacks episode is also explored, with the aim of outlining a program of comparative research towards a possible theory of the ‘global event’.
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Preface

Towards a Theory of the Global Event
This research aims at being a modest contribution to the globalization literature, and more specifically, to the globalization debate in the post-9/11 world. I propose the idea that the development of the 9/11 episode (the event itself and its political responses) is interwoven in fundamental ways with a broader mechanism of power and institutional transformation that was neglected in previous analysis of globalization, and that can now be identified and studied systematically in this and other cases.

This perspective, I argue, could advance our understanding of the nature of power in the global age, which is undoubtedly at the core of the ongoing conversation about globalization. I also believe that the analytical model I will put forward in the following pages could contribute to the key arguments of the globalization debate in the post-9/11 world. As the reassertion of geopolitics dominated the immediate international responses to 9/11, many realist authors took the opportunity to conclude that globalization, if ever existed, had reached its historical limits. Still in the aftermath of 9/11, such conclusion was contested by globalization scholars by studying how the very responses to the events were being increasingly constrained by globalization: the Bush Administration's unilateral strategies were at odds with conditions of globalization, and this is what was creating the instability in world affairs.

However, few globalization scholars offered extended, systematic work dedicated to understand the ways in which the events and its responses were in fact a product of globalization - this approach, I will argue, is precisely the one that reveals the mechanism of power studied in this research, and the one that demands the full elaboration of the notion of global event.

My primary concern is then to build an analytical framework to fill this gap. To do it, I combine two perspectives that are apparently contradictory: the institutional analysis of the social disruptions generated by global events, and the analysis of the strategic conduct observed during global events episodes. The reasons for having to embark in such a complicated theorization are philosophical, but also plainly inductive: the 9/11 terrorist attacks were important because they created an acute sense of crisis both nationally and
globally, but there is also a wide consensus among writers on globalization that the Bush Administration took strategic advantage of this situation in order to advance its agenda. In this research I offer a plausible version of a theoretical framework that helps combine these perspectives in a unique, coherent project, with the aim of a better understanding of this and other global event cases, and of the phenomenon as a whole.

The dissertation is organized in a sequence of chapters that concludes with the systematic exposition of this framework. All the previous work is aimed at justifying the plausibility, coherence and interest of the theoretical model. This explains a certain change to the normal ordering of chapters. In Chapter One I start with a discussion of the globalization debate and its trajectory in the post 9/11 world. This discussion provides clues for understanding the existing gap in the globalization literature with regard to the problems addressed in this research. In Chapter Two I build on Anthony Giddens' work, and on the work of some international crisis and global risks analysts, in order to set up an exploratory framework which is sensitive to both the institutional and the strategic elements of global events, and which is useful in organizing the great quantity of data that each global event episode generates. Next, I mobilize this framework in a full characterization of the Madrid 2004 al Qaeda bombing episode, an exercise that is useful not only for the primary aim of this research, but also for providing specific knowledge about the strategic particularities of the Spanish case. In order to clarify some of the general implications emerged in the previous chapter, and to start exploring the comparative possibilities of a theory of a global event, I also investigate, in Chapter Four, the political aftermath of the London bombings of 7/7, 2005. This will finally lead me to propose what I hope will be a solid framework, and a research program, for the study of the political consequences of global events.
Chapter 1

The Globalization Debate in the Post 9/11 World
The exploratory analysis presented in the following pages presupposes a definition, and a theory, of globalization. It is necessary, then, to start with a brief discussion of the concept, the scholarly debate of which is vast, complex and heterogeneous. Consequently, one can find in the literature many different ways of clustering the existing theses on the meaning and causes of the phenomena, none of which has acquired the status of orthodoxy. There are different reasons for this disagreement, but probably the most important one refers to the complex, overlapping relations that the theory of globalization has developed with distinctive academic disciplines such as Sociology, International Relations, Economics, International Political Economy, Cultural and Communication studies and Political Sciences. Each of these academic standpoints brings its own classification, definition and research agenda to bear in such a way that common agreement on a unique categorization of the debate is difficult to establish. This dissertation simply builds on the classification that Held and McGrew (2004) presented in the introduction to "The Global Transformations Reader". For the purposes of this short introduction, it will be useful to sketch the general explanatory outlines of this classification before entering into more analytical considerations concerning the trajectory that the debate has taken since 9/11.

According to the authors, two schools of thought can be identified in the globalization debate, the "globalists" and the "sceptics". On the one hand, the "globalists" claim that globalization is indeed a distinctive and important development in contemporary world history (Giddens, 1990; Held, 1995). In contemporary societies, they argue, there is an increasingly blurring of the distinction between international and domestic, external and internal affairs, which denotes nothing more than a deep structural change in the scale of modern social organization (Rosenau, 1990, 2003; Dicken, 1998). A set of global interrelated processes bypassing traditional territorial boundaries are now operating across all the primary domains of social power, including the economic, military, political and cultural (Held et al., 1999). The global economy is now living historically unprecedented levels of integration and interconnection (Castells, 2001). The state has become a
fragmented policy-making arena, permeated by transnational networks—such as terrorist networks—as well as by domestic agencies and forces (Sassen, 1996, Mann, 1997). Contemporary military globalization, defined by new global arms dynamic and a new military order, is now contributing to the reconstitution of national sovereignty (McGrew et al., 1992). Cultural flows are transforming the politics of national identity and the politics of identity more generally (Tomlinson, 2000; Sen, 2006). States are increasingly unable to control the migratory flows that characterized contemporary societies. In sum, all these processes define the changing scope of human organization linking distant communities and expanding the exercise of power across the world’s regions in a new, unprecedented way.

At the opposite extreme, the “sceptics” have strongly denied the existence of all these trajectories in particular, and of globalization more generally (Hirst and Thompson, 1996). The globalization process is not only a great exaggeration, but also an articulated myth (Navarro, 2000). “Internationalization” or “regionalization” are much more valid terms to capture the contemporary trends under way that by no means prefigure the end of territoriality as a critical component for understanding social reality (Ruigrok and Tulder, 1995; Payne, 2003). States maintain their full sovereignty and the capacity to choose appropriate forms of political, economic and social development (Gilpin, 1987, 2003). By comparison with the last part of the XIX century both the magnitude and geographical scale of flows of trade, capital and migrants are currently of a much lower order. Multinational companies are deeply embedded in their respective countries, and their logic is largely national (Garrett, 2003). The deeply rooted patterns of inequality we are currently confronting do not differ from those of previous epochs; many “Third World” countries are living a growing process of marginalization that reinforces preceding trajectories. There is not such a thing as cultural globalization (Huntington, 1996). In fact, world politics is increasingly determined by a clash of civilizations, with the nation-state playing still a fundamental role in the cleavage. In sum, globalization is simply a myth which obscures social inquiry.

Although some reviews defend that they are complementary, it seems that globalists and sceptics have very distinctive accounts of the current reality of the world order. However,
a different but related matter is what they actually tell us at the theoretical level. In most of the literature, the globalist and the sceptic perspectives indeed function as a descriptive measure of how far and in what ways certain historical processes had developed, so many authors participating in the globalization debate could be indeed speaking of different instants of the very same process. Other authors work at a more analytical level, and it is within their theories that one could identify a pattern of distinctive theoretical standpoints. The main characteristic of these authors is that they build on a different relation between the theory of power and the theory of the state. A brief analysis of the relationship between these two theoretical standpoints can perhaps shed some light on the underlying contentions in the globalization debate:

Table 1.1 The Globalization Debate: Power and Domination

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of analysis</th>
<th>Theoretical Paradigm</th>
<th>Sceptic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nation-state:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power</td>
<td>The Theory of Power overtakes the Theory of the State</td>
<td>Theory of State overtakes the Theory of Power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Impacts of multidimensional global networks over the autonomy and sovereignty of the nation-state</td>
<td>The nation-state rules and maintains the same levels of sovereignty and autonomy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Significant grades of autonomy of global networks over nation-state</td>
<td>State-supported, state-controlled global networks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Global Security State: security as a collective or multilateral affair. Unilateral behaviour as irrational strategy or contradictory with structural constrains.</td>
<td>National Security State: pursuing national interests unilaterally as a reasonable strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>System:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domination</td>
<td>Structural Domination diffused in multidimensional, global networks and flows, being the state just one part of this structure.</td>
<td>Structural Domination determined by the prevalence of the nation-state, the distribution of material power and the current unipolarity of the international system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Structure determined by complex interrelation of allocative and authoritative resources. Importance of Global Informational Capitalism</td>
<td>Structure determined by material means: Importance of military resources.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The globalist argument, which will constitute the main backdrop of this study, is usually understood as the antithesis of the sceptic's statist, power-political understanding of
international system structure, and it is often accused of underestimating the role that power plays within the system. Yet, the perspective outlined above suggests that this is an oversimplification that conditions and obscures the explanatory capacity of the globalists' paradigm. The real difference between both schools seems to be precisely the opposite: in contrast to the sceptic position, the theory of power overtakes the theory of the state in the most sophisticated variants of the globalist perspective. This important difference between the two schools has not been yet elaborated in the literature, but it contributes to clarify many substantive as well as disciplinary difficulties in which the globalization theory is involved. The reason of this theoretical stratification is simple: the theory of globalization puts a lot of emphasis in stressing the interplay of flows, forces and networks that cross-cut many realms of social power, not just the political. As many globalists argue, power is no longer fully concentrated in institutions, organizations or symbolic controllers, but diffused in multidimensional global networks with different levels of institutionalization. For these authors, the world order can no longer be conceived as purely state-centric or even primarily state governed, as authority has become increasingly diffused among public and private agencies at the local, national and regional level. Therefore, since states are units of a broader network of power, the theory of the state in the globalists' perspective is a subunit, albeit a fundamental unit, of the theory of power.

The key importance of the theory of power can be easily identified in the works of some of the most prominent globalist authors. For Michel Mann (1986, 1997) the power of nation-states has always been exaggerated: human societies are constituted by networks of power of different type that, more often than not, cross-cut traditional nation-states. Among other expressions, this can be seen analyzing the different impacts that globalization has on different nation-states in different regions. Anthony Giddens (1984, 1990) main theoretical project departs from the idea that no coherent theory can leave aside the knowledgeable nature of human agents, a perspective that situates the reflexive exercise of power at the core of any social scientific explanation. Prominent among Giddens own explanations is his study of the emergence of contemporary nation-states (1984), where knowledgeable agents play a key role in their constitution. In this sense, globalization is for Giddens both a constraining and enabling phenomena, which limits the nation-state's intervention in some areas and increases it in others. David Held (2004)
defines globalization as the exercise of power at distance. Contemporary globalization has historically unprecedented extensity, intensity, velocity and impact propensity of global flows, interactions and networks embracing different sites of power. Manuel Castells (2000, 2004) maintains at the core of his theories the traditional distinction between power and domination, and situates the core dynamics of contemporary societies in the conflictual relation between the domination exercised by global structural networks, both public and private, and the power mobilized by identity-based social movements. For James Rosenau (1990, 2003), there is a crisis of domination (or authority structures) of both nation-states and corporations due to the increase in the analytical capacities of citizens: what he calls ‘skills revolution’.

This broader, more complex theory of power of the globalist school allows the development of two levels or dimensions of the theory of globalization that cannot simply be thought within the sceptic framework. These dimensions can also be easily traced in the globalist literature, and they are important because they allow the generation of the key premises from which the theory of globalization can be further improved:

(a): The first dimension concerns the impacts of globalization over the nation-state: the instrumental capacity and autonomy of the individual nation-state is undermined by the globalization of core economic activities, by the globalization of media and culture, by the globalization of crime and terrorism, by military globalization, by the globalization of human migrations and by the globalization of legal and political decisions.

(b): The second dimension concerns the administrative and political responses as well as constrains of the nation-state to the previous impacts: what we can provisionally call, following Clark’s (1999) definition, the global state. Given a changing global order (or a globalist theory of power), the form and functions of the nation-state are having to adapt as governments seek coherent strategies of engaging with a globalizing world.

The interrelation of this new political formation and the globalization process takes the shape of a new global political structure, characterized by the plurality of sources and centres of authority, being the nation-state just one of these centres. Therefore, the agents
at the heart of this political formation, be it nation-states, global, local and regional institutions, NGO's, multinational corporations or global banks are locked into a variety of overlapping communities, political relations and jurisdictions which constrain as well as amplify their individual political capacities. There are different conceptualizations in the globalist literature that try to capture this phenomenon: global governance, multilayered governance, structural multilateralism, network state, global state, disaggregated state, new medievalism, shared sovereignty etc. In all cases, they constitute, for the globalists authors, the relevant unit of analysis to understand and analyze the current political action under the conditions of globalization.

From the point of view of the investigations presented in this research, the theory of globalization emerged from the globalization debate, and seen under the analytical perspective proposed above, offers three important premises:

(1) Global, systemic coordination among states is a must under global conditions: any long term process that would show that states can go alone to defend their individual interests within the new global order would question the stability of significant patterns of globalization.

(2) Power does not disappear from this coordination: it is transformed in a more complex, systemic phenomenon. The globalist literature tends to focus on the complex, overlapping system of national and global interests which are strategically bargained between states and other actors. Yet, a more decisive element of the transformation of power seems to be the generation of new sources of power: a system of overlapping systems generates new, interrelated sources to which actors can draw upon to advance their global or national projects.

(3) The democratic nature of structural coordination is not only an open question; it is also a political field in itself that defines the transitional period form the nation-state to some sort of global state.
9/11 AND GLOBALIZATION

9/11 and its aftermath has put a test to the explanatory power of both globalist and sceptic schools, and has animated the debate around the political nature of globalization\(^2\). The sceptic school has mobilized the empirical record of the events of 9/11 and its immediate aftermath to attack argument (1) of the previous section, that is, that structural multilateralism is the only available strategy to cope with globalization. Waltz (2002), Gray (2002), Kagan (2003) and Cox (2004) among others have focused on the USA as the main objective of the attack as well as the respondent to it. In response to the event, they argue, state power, in its new imperialistic incarnation, has come to dictate, without any further cosmetics, the new tendencies in international politics, even calling into question the international system of governance built in the aftermath of World War II (Rahman 2002). Political globalization, if ever existed, comes to an end with the US unilateral foreign policy, which in fact was already well established before the attacks (Singh 2003). Most of the globalization theorists’ expectations about the worldwide pursuit of national security remain unfulfilled in the post 9/11 world: the frequency of interstate wars, the level of military spending and the challenge of state-sponsored terrorism are on the rise instead of declining (Paul and Ripsman, 2004). Other arguments had also been put forward in connection to the theory of globalization. For example, some argued that 9/11 was largely a consequence of the unbalanced unipolarity that dominates international relations: the frustration at the periphery had its expression with the terrorist atrocity. The world, realist argued, is definitely moving towards a “clash of civilizations” in which fundamental political conflicts will emerge from the impossibility of dialogue among cultures. However, the resurgence of territorial politics, the realigning relationships amongst great powers and the increasing amount of border and security measures.

Globalist theorists have not been particularly interested in responding to these attacks, which, for the most part, underlie a rather deterministic conception of social and international structure that globalization theories simply do not share. Rather, the focus of analysis of the globalist school has been placed, for the most part, in the global nature of the attack (see for example Hoffmann, 2003) and the terrorist group that perpetrated it. al

\(^2\) The four best edited books about the globalization debate after 9/11 are Booth and Dunne (eds, 2002), Held and McGrew (eds. 2003), Buckley and Fawn (eds. 2003) and Held and Archibugi (eds. 2004)
Qaeda, globalist argued, is in itself an example of the new modes of transnational social organization characteristic of contemporary globalization (Gunaratna, 2003; Kurth 2003; Benhke 2004). Among other things, it shows that the control of the means of force are no longer just in the hands of states, but also of many other types of non-state actors organized in a global scale; global terrorism and its causes are in fact another systemic layer of the complex globalization structure, and as such have to be analyzed and responded. Analyses and responses to global terrorism that only take into account the dynamics of power of nation-state system, such as the ones proposed and prescribed by the sceptic school, are either mistakes or pretexts for other purposes. The velocity with which terrorism became a global issue right after the events of 9/11 indicates not only the disconnection between physical settings and political issues, but also a clear example of the political consequences of the technological infrastructure sustaining the contemporary cultural globalization. The interdependencies of the world informational economy became evident after the attack (Granville, 2003). On 9/11, global financial markets went into panic, stock prices plummeted all over the world while the prices of oil and gold soared overwhelming the control capacity of any state or existing political system.

Obviously, the perspectives of 9/11 and its aftermath reflect the terms and positions of the previously existing debates on globalization. The post-9/11 world has been largely depicted according to the theoretical starting point and a particular conceptualization of power, and no theory seems to be neither clearly invalidated nor evidently tested after these events: the authors have simply concentrated in the key set of evidences that best fitted their particular theoretical schemes. The intersection of both schools, however, seems to be more loaded in theoretical implications when it’s focused on the Bush’ administration policies. And, as we have already said, more than in any other ground, the epistemological differences between both schools seem to dominate this intersection.

On this particular theoretical ground, globalist authors\(^3\) have tended to mobilize the following argument. Although the US unilateralism since 9/11 might be in contradiction with the multilateral nature of the new global order, and might have been a critical shift in the geopolitical situation of the world, the consequences of this policy can only be

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\(^3\) Mann (2003: Introduction); Held (2004: Introduction); Castells (2004: Chapter 5)
understood in the framework of an interconnected world perturbed by the unilateralist strategies of the Bush Administration. A unilateral political project is simply not feasible in the long run under the conditions of contemporary globalization, and the consequences of this major contradiction are becoming clearer now. Moreover, as 9/11 episode continues to unfold, is becoming clearer that, due to the dense networks of global interconnection, even an American administration with a highly unilateralist agenda has eventually come to depend on cooperation to achieve its aims. “The one thing that did most to give modern nation-states a focus and a purpose, that is, national security, can now be realized effectively only if nation-states come together and pool resources, technology, intelligence, power and authority”\(^4\). Therefore, the real key question for the globalist authors would be how the nature, political forms and organizational modes of global cooperation have in effect suffered intended and unintended changes during and after the episode.

As interesting and revealing as this globalist perspective might be, however, it actually implies a problematic shift in the epistemological philosophy underlying the theory of globalization: agency prevails over structure in the first part of the explanation, and a constraining, deterministic conception of structure is immediately mobilized in the second part. This approach, that concentrates the analysis on the structural problems of Bush’s policies, might have obscured the wealth of information about the political nature of globalization that is buried in the specific and complex mechanism of power that was revealed by 9/11 and its political aftermath.

\(^4\) David Held (2004: 86)
Michael Mann is to my knowledge one of the two globalist authors that has dedicated a whole volume to study the theoretical and empirical problems that the Bush's strategy poses to the theory of globalization. Moreover, his political sociology exemplifies some of the strengths and limitations of the globalist school that we have identified above, so the discussion of his latest book will also be useful to introduce our own epistemological position. Incoherent Empire (2003) builds on Mann's seminal analytical framework, which is important to put forward before entering into the analysis of the results of this particular work.

Mann's theoretical framework, which is based on Weber's ideal types method, constitutes one of the most sophisticated theories of power. The author elaborates the framework in the first pages of his ambitious study of the history of the sources of power. In this study Mann also provides a substantive sociological analysis of several historical episodes that shows the utility of his framework. Mann's theory is deductive, and begins with two clear statements that, according to his own view, constitute the best way to summarize his approach. Firstly, Mann states that, "societies are constituted of multiple overlapping and intersecting sociospatial networks of power" (Mann 1986:1). Using this conception of society, Mann wants to react against those sociological traditions of thought that conceive society as systems or structures with patterned proprieties. Functionalism, structuralism and their major sub-disciplines, he argues, tend to conceive societies as unproblematic units of analysis, thus assuming the false premise that individuals have a need to create society. What the "human nature" actually needs, according to Mann, is to enter into social power relations to struggle for certain human goals, being the institutionalization of...
these power relations just a secondary explanatory element for the understanding of history (1986:14). Thus, in Mann’s individualistic approach, agents are active human beings who find themselves situated within complex, overlapping networks of conflictual power which are constantly negotiated and transformed according to their goals.

The second key statement that summarizes Mann’s approach follows from his interest in what is ultimately “determining” of society. Mann argues that “a general account of societies, their structure, and their history can best be given in terms of the interrelations of what I will call the four sources of social power: ideological, economic, military, and political relationships” (1986: 2). Implicit in this statement is a rejection of the sovereign state or any other social phenomenon as meaningful determinants of history. Rather, all institutions of society, including of course the state, but also the church and economic institutions are “functionally promiscuous”: they cannot be defined in terms of any single power source. In practice, they are fully penetrated and even constituted by complex networks of power sources that link one agent to the other. The most important networks are, in Mann’s conceptualization, those of ideological, economic, military and political power.

From these two statements follow a methodology for the study of the history of the transformations of these networks, which, in the end, will be the history of crucial elements that constitute the “ultimate primacy” in society (1986:3). Yet, for articulating this methodology, Mann explains that the selection of “major structural determinants”, “patterns”, “trends”, and “institutional proprieties” is unavoidable. And it is here when he shifts the emphasis of his theoretical model towards a structural account of domination. First, he finds several structural laws to draw on. The sources of social power become effective resources only when they are organized. In mobilizing resources, actors reorganize social life using alternative means of social control. What determines dominance in any specific system is the ability of people to “organizationally outflank” each other. Thus, the key to successful domination lies in the “organizational superiority” that certain networks obtain over other networks of power as well as over social masses.

For example, in the transition from classical feudalism to the predominance of centralized
state, the dense masses of infantry pikemen, better sustained by centralized states, organizationally outflanked all the other social networks thanks to its overwhelming superiority against feudal armies. In practice, however, this superiority was not simply manifested by the victory of one particular source of power over the others in a purely competitive and deterministic game, but by the reorganization or regrouping of all networks of society (and social life, more generally speaking) around the social characteristics enhanced by the new dominant one, in this case the military. The history that Mann writes is the history of these outflanking episodes in wherever happens to be the cutting edge of power sources (starting in Mesopotamia).

However, Mann argues, these critical episodes do not depend ultimately on the superiority of one source of power over the other. They depend on the struggle between “ways of life” (for example, feudalist social networks vs. towns and free peasants communities), which are able or not to generate key innovations (in our case the pick phalanx) that finally enable this “moments” of outflanking.

Thus, Mann’s theoretical model tries to undertake the arduous job to overcome the dualism between the structural conceptions of large-scale social change and the empirics of individual action. Yet, the key connecting element that Mann’s framework offers to transcend the dualism is a rather problematic “unavoidability”, which he does not elaborate much further. Among other analytical consequences, these problems impact on Mann’s characterization of the concept of network, a central theoretical element of the globalist school. Mann does not provide a formal definition of what he primarily understands by “network”, but it seems plausible, taking his first definition of society or summarizing statement, to say that he uses the term network precisely as an antidote against a unitary conceptualization of societal orders. Thus, social networks are, in Mann’s interpretation, alternative instrument of analysis for the general study of social sciences. In other words, tools at the service of methodological individualism. This is clear enough in this statement; “social life is always more complex than its dominant institutions because, as I have emphasized, the dynamic of society comes from the myriad social networks that humans set up to pursue their goals” (1986:19). Thus, from these words we have to assume that individuals form networks in Mann’s terminology. A
further logic assumption is that those networks do not have constraining or enabling structural proprieties beyond the simple adherence of the proprieties of the individuals that set them up.

The globalist school in general, an Michel Mann in particular, have tended to mobilized this agency-based characterization of social networks in the analysis of the post 9/11 Bush Administration's policies. The first key question is then whether or not Mann's general account of this networks of power follows the rules of its implicitly methodological individualism:

The first and most important premise is problematic in Mann's analyses. Aims, goals or ends at the individual level, or at least at the level of the networked collective agency, would need at least a general explanation. If we do not know what leads individuals to act, we simply do not know why they want the power for. Sometimes, Mann sees these goals as "too complex to be theorized". Others, Mann presupposes objectives which are very difficult to prove.

The second element is the necessity of a certain delimitation of the social network. There is an inherent difficulty of drawing clear boundaries to social networks. But Mann's definition of human societies as "formed by multiple, overlapping and intersecting networks of interaction" (Mann 1997: 495) poses clear difficulties in testing clear hypotheses of power relationships.

A third element is that there must be justified reasons for sustaining that the analytical importance of the individually determined goals of social networks are ultimately more relevant than the external social factors which influence these goals. Mann is not interested in providing an argument in this direction.

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8 Mann's "methodological individualism" is analyzed by Jacoby (2004: 407)
9 See for example Elster (2003). Underlying this condition there is an assumption which I consider useful to put forward here: admitting that human agency can be defined in more ways than just relaying on its intentions, as many sociologists and philosophers have pointed out, does not necessarily mean that such intentions are to remain fully opaque in a useful explanatory analysis. There is a simple methodological reason for remaining suspicious about alternative definitions of agency; if the presumed causal explanation of change, that is, the agents' intentions, is out of the scope of the analyst, what's the point of the analysis?
10 Mann confuses me here accepting as a key scaffold of his inquiry the complicated notion of "human nature" and attaching to it the predatory characteristic of the eternal pursuing of power.
The fourth premise is that all the critical elements involved in the power relationships, such as the resources of power, can also be explained exclusively in terms of simple aggregation of human interests. Steve Lukes correctly advise us that purely individualist explanations tend to “build crucial social factors or features of society into the allegedly explanatory individuals”, and he goes on concluding that “the social phenomena have not really been eliminated; they have been swept under the carpet” (Lukes, 1968: 18).

And fifth, and probably the most important in terms of the objectives of this study, the dynamics of these social networks of power must provide causal explanations for social change. Mann’s analyses do provide us with interesting explanations of social change. But I would argue that these explanations are achieved only at the cost of certain epistemological problems: although Mann departs from a radical individualistic conception of society, all the premises raised above are addressed using structural/societal arguments. This is clear for example in his first empirical example on the rise of the European pike phalanx (above) to see that, ultimately, what triggers social change are not social networks themselves, but the build-inn structural elements of the distinctive “ways of life” present in feudalism. These structural explanations are the only available arguments, in Mann’s analysis, to understand the innovation process of the pike phalanx, which in turn is the critical element leading to the reorganization of social networks. Eventually, the lack of interest in acknowledging the constraining and empowering solidity of social structures produces, rather paradoxically, a rather deterministic explanation of the deep complexities embedded in the causal elements conducting to social change.

“Has globalization ended the rise and rise of the nation-state” (1997) is one of Mann’s first articles on globalization, which provides and insightful reflection about the nature of nation-state. However, it also exemplifies some of the limitations of his approach. Mann first affirms that global networks “do not contain any singular, relatively systemic principle or integration”. That is, they are instruments for the study of individual agencies. Yet, immediately after this definition, he describes these global networks as “segmented”

11 I would extend these elements to general conceptions of networks as tools for methodological individualism; especially the modeling of social networks and policy networks analysis.
by "the particularities of nation-states, especially the more powerful ones of the North". So these global social networks are actually separated by authoritative, nationally-bounded, structural network that transmits "social particularities" to nation-states.

One can now address Mann’s work on the post 9/11 world, which illustrates the key theoretical and empirical dilemma that this research tries to deal with. Mann’s preface is clear enough about his analytical intention. The empirical problem that he sets out to study is how the uneven configuration of resources (economic, military, ideological and political) of the United States of America actually restrains (or will restrain in a near future) the manifested intentions of its ruling elite to transform the country into an effective Empire. His general argument is that, because of this unevenness, the American imperialism is in fact a new and ineffective militarism, for the only real source that the US actually controls is the military one. Mann follows his theoretical scheme mobilizing two distinctive conceptions of social networks. The first one, social networks as virtual substitutes of society, is used to offer a documented analysis of the interests, intentions and objectives of the US administration. The individuals (namely George W. Bush, Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, Perle and co.) who collectively make up the imperialistic strategy, according to Mann, are concerned mainly with a "unilateralist and militarist vision of how to overcome world disorder" (2003:2). A profound neo-conservative agenda, backed by the media and several academics and think tanks, is actually behind them. Thanks to two "accidental or near-accidental" triggers (Bush 99 election and his political inexperience) and one unqualified further trigger (9/11), Mann argues, these views were put into action. Among other policies, Bush Administration used four "wars" that Mann investigates, following his scheme, in four different chapters: the war in Afghanistan, the war against (Muslim) terrorism, the war against rogue states and North Korea and the Iraq attack.

Mann’s second understanding of social networks, the structural one, is mobilized in order to show the structural position that the US has in his four major sources of power. In terms of military power, the US is "gigantic", by which we have to understand that the US enjoys an "authoritative" power within the network. However, this assertion is immediately qualified in three substantive epigraphs: new threats such as weapons of mass destruction in the hands of Rogue states, guerrillas and terrorists groups are
contradicting this hegemonic power of the US (2003: 29-45). In the other structural networks (the political, the ideological and the economic), Mann finds important structural constrains to the US unilateralism. For instance, the US is only a “back seat economic driver”, Mann argues, because it cannot directly control either foreign investors or foreign economies (2003: 74).

In conclusion, according to Mann’s account, the social networks or collective agencies of the beginning (Bush and company) of his narration will not be able to further advance their imperialistic interests because they are part of four broader structural networks three of which constrain their intentions. Mann’s book finishes with a number of predictions about what can happen if this contradictory dynamic is moved beyond the current situation: the new militarism will bring more resistance, will increase terrorism, and will be incapable of consolidating his domination because of the lack of economic, political and ideological resources.

Mann’s theoretical approach to 9/11 political aftermath illustrates some of the strengths as well as defects of his ideal typical academic method based on networks of power. Three theoretical problems can be identified.

First, Mann’s style of theorizing network of power is highly visible in this book. Mann approaches to the problem of structure/agency mobilizing conflicting notions of network in a manner that the explanations generated can only be understood in terms of the irrationality of the actors or tortuous theorizations on “contradiction”. The social networks in the Bush Administration, making use of their effective agency, decide to advance an imperialistic agenda. Yet, at the same time, they do not to realize that are severally constrained because they are part, or they use to be part of four (political, economic, military and ideological) structural networks that virtually determine their future failure. Mann’s main difficulty is precisely not recognizing the paradoxical character of this interesting albeit contradictory explanation. Secondly, Mann’s use of the terms “military giant” is an example of the inherent problems in mixing hierarchical connotations with network structures. The explanatory capacity of both concepts is mixed in the first chapter of the book, but the analytical consequences are clearer in the conclusion; despite
being only hierarchically dominant in the military networks, the main conflicts that the US will have to confront in a near future are of a violent nature, such as more terrorism and resistance. And thirdly, Mann’s account of the structural power of the networks is empirically and theoretically insufficient to consistently argue both how the US is actually constrained and enabled by it and how the overall domination that this global networks exercise constrains or enables the peoples and communities which are virtually excluded from them.
Acknowledging from the beginning that globalization and its global networks are structural phenomena which impose both enabling and constraining forces on the agents has important consequences for the ways that one can approach the analysis of the post 9/11 world from a globalist perspective. Figure 1.1 indicates the type of view developed by Mann: a given political project (Empire) is interpreted as purposeful action. This reveals the first problems of such an analysis, both empirically and theoretically, since by its very nature this approach generates a tendency to develop some kind of conspiracy theory around political situations of global magnitude, such as global events realizations. The structural properties of globalization are then mobilized in order to show the limits of such action, and we encounter here the opposite problem: the second part of the analysis falls into a rather deterministic analysis of the feasibility of certain projects. Finally, the predictability of the analytical model has necessarily to be tested against the rationality of the agents involved, and it is simply problematic to assume absolute conditions of bounded or erroneous knowledgeability of powerful subjects (although George W. Bush could, in effect, be a dramatic exception).

An alternative to this approach is the one represented in Figure 1.2, which defines a rather different set of research problems. Seeing globalization as a structural phenomena (or an structuration process) from the beginning allows the definition of the institutional settings within which actors are interwoven in complex ways. There are two main structural conditions: (1) structural coordination and multilateralism is a must under globalization conditions, and (2) some actors have more power than others within the system, an
analysis that could be perfectly based on Mann’s characterization of sources of power. The key research problem then becomes that of studying the modes by which certain actors mobilize certain sources of power, thus overcoming, intentionally or unintentionally, temporally or permanently, certain structural conditions of globalization. Political projects become a secondary element of the analysis in relation to the modes by which these political projects are mobilized, and to the identification of new sources of power intimately connected to the global system. The question becomes the following: how can we understand the major contradiction that seems to exist between the unilateral policies of certain actors, especially the US, and this first truly interdependent world? Globalist theorists coincide in identifying 9/11 as the key sources of power that the Bush’s Administration mobilizes in order to advance its policies. Mann defines it as a “trigger”, but does not attend to the possibilities of theorizing it as a source of power. The approach that could be developed in (2) would place its focus precisely within this theorization, and would presume that the immediate policies are a direct consequence of this process. Initial specification of the structural conditions of globalization (structural coordination) also allows the analyst to identify the key political arenas in which the agents’ activities impact in relation to globalization. The problem is no longer to study the restrictions of certain projects, but the intended or unintended impact that such projects have on the nature of the structural coordination of states. Therefore, approach (2) allows the identification of the key mechanisms of power that the 9/11 episode revealed, thus allowing the extension of the analysis to other cases. But it also allows us to account for what the most recent empirical record of the 9/11 world seems to have revealed: that the “War on Terror” seems to be shifting from a unilateralist military policy to a project of informal coordination among states that bypasses international organizations, having in fact a more durable and profound impact on International Law structures than its first phase.

In sum, the approach represented in Figure 1.2 concentrates attention upon attributing power ramifications to 9/11 in relation to globalization structure. It is then plausible to find an analytical category for the event, and see if this can be extended to other cases. From the point of view of the globalist school, a theory of global events can potentially advance our understanding of power within the globalist framework because: (a) It directly addresses the crucial conceptual point which is common to many globalist
authors: power is an expandable quantity in relation to divergent forms of systems. In other worlds, power is not given, but generated. The theory of the global event is in part a theory of power generation that can potentially explain why and how the globalization system is not a zero-sum power system. (b) The political process triggered by global events has a dual spatial nature, both national and global, that generates abundant data that can help us understand how actors that operate at the interface of these two spatial dimensions exercise power. Implicit in this position is the classic globalist claim that the structuring of opportunities for political action is no longer defined by national/international dualism but is now located in the “glocal” area. (c) The theory of the global event, like the theory of the global risk society, combines in a single analytical framework different dimensions or sites of power such as the violent, the economic or the ecological. This property is especially relevant to understanding such a complex concept. In this respect, both the previous discussion and the following framework provide the intellectual foundation for addressing the exploratory questions that animate this dissertation:

• What is a global event? How should it be conceptualized and studied?

• What is the relationship between the global event and power?

• Who are the key actors who play a significant role in the political process generated by the global event? What strategies do they utilize?

• Can global events be associated with patterns of domestic and international conditions? Can the identification of these conditions help to explain the different intensity and the different scope of the immediate political action borne out of global events?
Chapter 2

Globalization, Power and the Global Event: An Exploratory Framework
In this chapter I shall seek to develop the alternative approach to the political sociology of the post 9/11 world that I have identified in the previous discussion, an approach that turns upon questions of how actors mobilize what we will try to characterize as global events. However, it would be obviously misleading not to recognize the multiple types of literature and arguments that relate one way or another to the concept of global event. First of all, I shall discuss some basic conceptual and epistemological problems posed by this approach. I shall then move to relate these problems with the relevant literature. This will lead directly through to an elaboration of a systematic research strategy (or an exploratory framework) that will help us organize the empirical material of our cases, and explore the political relevance that global events have for the global system, thus contributing to move their study beyond the 9/11 case.

The first and most important starting consideration is the premise that global events, or at least the most important ones, must have some kind of connection with social change and power. This, we think, is a very plausible link supported by the available evidence. Many phenomena that we can intuitively label as global events have been followed, almost immediately, by new policies, organizational changes, alternations in the dynamics of reputation, economic disruptions, waves of global solidarity, wars, etc. that have significantly altered a given state of affairs. There is no need to develop a full conceptualization of global events - a task that we will undertake in the concluding part of this study - in order to argue this. However, as this research will try to show, the connection of global events with some sort of institutional change is more complex that a mere superficial or intuitive outlook on the phenomena reveals.

Any useful framework for the study of global events must be able to trace the mechanisms and agencies that operate between the systemic realization of the event and the occurrence of minor or major (but in any case significant) institutional changes in the global system. Before developing this framework, it must be specified what do we mean by social change and what types of accounts have room in this project. We also have to briefly account for that literature that has analyzed phenomena that have some sort of
connections with the preliminary notion of global event that has been exposed in the previous chapter.

A purely structuralist, functionalist or evolutionist approach to social change can be dismissed on the same empirical grounds that give rise to the study of global events. Reducing their study to the analysis of systemic contradictions, institutional crisis and the subsequent mechanisms of adaptation would imply a rather outdated project of 'law discovery' that would go against the very empirical record that we have observed on the previous section. 9/11 and its political aftermath, specially the war in Iraq, show that global events are intrinsically connected to the agency of certain actors, and to the intrinsic openness of the global system, at least to the global system as analysed by the authors of the globalist school. The analysis of the political aspects of global events has thus more to do with human agency than with the structural parameters of their realization, and we will have to bear this in mind thought the whole investigation.

This imperative, however, does not mean that the study of global events has to be undertaken under a constructivists or postmodernist perspective. It could be that certain practical versions of postmodern theories have been incorporated into the strategic conduct of certain actors - but this is a different matter than the general approach to the study of global events episodes. There’s no need to go over the epistemological and empirical problems of postmodernism to be suspicious about their utility in the specific terms of our analytical aims; postmodern standpoints have already been tested mainly against the backdrop of 9/11, and they don’t seem to provide a coherent corpus of knowledge of the phenomena, if such is their objective. For example, a set of papers applying the notion of “sublime” to the study of global events has been recently published. The definition that the editors give of the sublime is “phenomena of stupendous size or overwhelming beauty [...] that relates to [...] the experience of this things as well as their external characteristics” (Editors 2006: p. i). As interesting as this definition can be, it is then barely maintained in the individual papers, that tend to focus only on developing the psychological aspects of “sublime events” and leave totally unattended those “external characteristics” of it, which refer to relevant elements of

12 Among them, the most relevant papers for this study are: Bousquet (2006), Bleiker and Leet (2006), Weber (2006), Debrix (2006)
structural causation involved in the process. Both parts deserve not only a detailed analysis, but also an account of their complex relation. Furthermore, in most of the papers events are said to trigger a "range of powerful emotions". Yet the definition and the political consequences of these emotions are then vaguely defined. On a similar vein, but more explicitly inclined towards a postmodernist standpoint, Der Derian (2001) outlined what he calls a "Virtual Theory of the Global Event", a project which is, to our knowledge, the only in the social sciences that has developed the concept of global event as such. He defines it as "a state of affairs in which the interaction of multiple state actors, complex military systems, and networked information technologies produce the image of a security crisis" (p. 669). It is worth noticing that although he uses the word "global" to describe his concept, he defines it in almost exclusive statist terms. Der Derian follows his definition with a postmodern elaboration of the concept, in which he argues that global events are challenging war as the main rationale behind the national security state. Yet little or no indication is given about how and why this has come to be the case.

The very notion of global event must necessarily presume stability, structure or order, either national, international or individual, with the global event being understood in terms of the conditions which give rise to serious disruption or instability, and that can be related to eventual social change. If not, the mobilization of the concept is in fact rather gratuitous. Again, this consideration does not mean that we can generalize about hypothetic mechanisms of social change operating throughout human history. But it does imply that a meaningful notion of global event must be developed in relation to the particular social systems that they disrupt. This opens up not only more sophisticated notions of events applicable to more concrete aspects of social change. It also justifies the exploration of the relation between significant events and the new global order, a central element for the globalist theory.

Two sets of literature have explored phenomena that are closely related to global events, and that tend to follow a modernist perspective which is similar that the one outlined above. The concept of "international crisis" is perhaps the most closely connected to purposes of this study. Most definitions of crisis stress the relative perception of threat

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13 The concept of international crisis has been widely applied to the analysis of empirical phenomena that has at least the potential of being characterized as global events. For example, Crotty (2003) compares the decision-making approaches of John F. Kennedy during the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1963 and George W. Bush in 9/11. This approach, I believe, is
by public and policy-makers and the expectation of possible violence and war. Richard N. Lebow (1981) developed a classic study of a large number of cases in which he demonstrates that, in opposition to those theories that exclusively focus on the underlying, structural causes of war, crisis and their patterns of conditions play a crucial autonomous role in the course of conflicts, and that the perceptions, interests and anxieties of policy-makers during the crisis have a decisive influence in its outcome. Lebow’s studies of international crisis always build on an explicit account of the international system of states, and it seems obvious that, although there is literature which tries to use the concept for the analysis of different phenomena, the author is right in anchoring the notion of international crisis to study of conflicts between states. The key issue is then to recognize that states are just one part of the global system as understood by the globalist theory, although the identification of types and patterns of international crisis, especially in those studies emerged under Lebow’s approach, provide an important background that must be taken into account.

The other type of literature that is relevant for this study is the one on risk management, social construction and sociological analysis of risk and most especially the literature on the world risk society, with Ulrich Beck at the forefront of this perspective. These approaches depart from an ambitious theoretical project: the explanation of the contemporary transformations of modernity in terms of the current incapacity of the nation-state system to manage the de-bounding, uncontrollable risks that are intrinsic to the globalization process. In this project, risk-related events play an alleged subordinate role, either as a unit for collecting certain evidences or as an undemanding factor that simply reinforces widespread consciousness of global risks. This perspective, we think, covers the potential of the area of sociological inquiry around the notion of global event: while world risk society studies might help to understand a hypothetical dominant mechanism of social change in contemporary societies, its very ambitious approach contribute to overlook the manifold contributions that a more restricted theory of the

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16 Cvetkovich (1999); Blaikie (2003); World Economic Forum (2006)
17 Luhmann (1993); Lofstedt (1998); Perrow (1999); Adam (2000).
18 Beck (1992, 2002)
global event can bring to our understanding of the particularities of the phenomena, and the transformation of power in contemporary societies. There’s no simpler argument to support this claim than the one already explored: there are solid evidences that show that many significant global policies and other transparent realizations of global power are borne out of global events rather than global risks. This is at least how the political dynamics triggered by the 9/11 terrorist attacks are understood in the globalist literature, as we have seen in the previous chapter. Moreover, this perspective is also consistent with the hypothesis, widely supported by psychological experiments, that people tend to increase their estimates of the probability of an outcome once it has occurred. Yet a theory of the global event and the theory of the global risk society are, by definition, complementary. Ulrich Beck is the key theorist of the world risk society, and it has to be pointed out that his book *Power in the Global Age* (2006) he addresses some of the issues investigated in this dissertation, and succeeds in creating a framework for the study of the contemporary reconfiguration of power that bears multiple connections with the objectives of this work. There’s no need to agree with all the themes covered by Beck’s analysis to realize that it achieves an important milestone not only for the risk society approach but also for the general understanding of power within the globalist framework. He does so by stressing not only the political strategies observed in the context of the global risk society, but also conceptualizing some of the manifold ways in which the generation of power takes place within global interconnected spheres, a process that, as we will try to argue, is closely connected to the realization of global events. Although we will take a different position regarding the role of national actors, his book will be a constant reference for this work, so there’s not need to explain its central theorems at this point. Suffice is to say that its principal aim is not the study of global events, and its analytical ambitions are far beyond our purposes, so we think that the theoretical part of this research does not incur on unnecessary repetitions.

In sum, both international crisis studies and the world risk society studies provide many elements to inform an exploratory framework for the study of global events. These perspectives will be used as both an agenda-setting device and as a field for collecting already elaborated variables and premises to better frame and facilitate the analysis that will follow in other chapters. But given the previous considerations, it is reasonable to
seek to ascertain if an approach that gives analytical priority to global events rather than global risks and international crisis yields further theoretical and empirical results for our understanding of the political dimension of the phenomena. There is not such an approach in the literature, and the subsequent pages offer a way of thinking about how this absence might be addressed.

THE EPISODIC CHARACTERIZATION OF GLOBAL EVENTS

Global events are intrinsically connected to power and human agency. Yet, an attempt to construct an exploratory framework for the study of the political aspects of global events has to include both a coherent conception of social change and theoretical room for the globalist account of the global system. Anthony Giddens proposed methodology for the study of social change[^19] satisfies these two conditions and will be the main theoretical backdrop of this study.

Giddens’ approach to the analysis of social change is closely connected to structuration theory. This theory has already been analyzed in many works[^20], so there’s no need to fully explain its general epistemological and ontological position again. Giddens’ theoretical standpoint explicitly rejects the idea that some sort of general mechanism that can be found and applied across history governs social change. There cannot be such mechanism not only because the “unit of evolution” is unclear in social sciences, but also because the reflexive nature of human social life is far more important than the unconscious motivational impulses which would be necessary to support such theories. As a reaction to these problems, Giddens develops an analysis of social change which is in many ways particular according to variation of context in which this change takes place. Within the framework, social or individual change is treated as a process that can be circumscribed within a particular span of time. In these particular sequences, a number of acts and events with specifiable beginnings and ends take place, thus generating optimal circumstances for reflexive human agencies to bring on intended or unintended institutional transformation. Giddens calls this strategy “episodic characterization”, an approach that

[^19]: Giddens (1984: 244-262). An recent attempt to build and mobilize an analytical theory of social change based on Gidden’s framework is Liu (2006)
consists, first of all, in the identification and analysis of certain elements as marking the
opening of a sequence of change and then in tracing through that sequence the factors and
political agencies that lead to a process of institutional transmutation. He applies it to
large-scale episodes of social change, such as the nation-state formation characterization.
But Giddens also acknowledges that his framework can be mobilized to study smaller,
less critical transitions that do not imply the break up of societal totalities.

A study of global events drawing on this model could focus on the cumulative analysis of
the following issues. First of all, it should establish the structural relevance of global
events as power generators within the global system, thus identifying them (or not) as an
specifiable beginning of a sequence of institutional change. The second characterization
problem becomes one of identifying the conjunctions of structural factors that arguably
affect the process and the amount of power generated. These factors can in principle be
compared with the factors occurring in other cases. Thirdly, it analyses the strategic ways
in which the relevant agents draw upon the power sources generated by global events in
order to affect the political direction of the sequence of social change. This denotes the
strategic nature of every relevant event. And fourthly, it establishes clear criteria for the
identification of the type of institutional transformation eventually involved in the
episode, an analysis that can also be approached in a comparative fashion. We’ll elaborate
on these fourth stages to get a clearer understanding of the exploratory framework they
provide.

1) Global events as origins of a sequence of change
Global events are only politically relevant as long as they open a sequence of institutional
transmutation, be it national or global. From this it follows that the study of particular
global events must proceed leaving a substantial amount of time between the event
realization and the empirical research, although this requirement is not as temporally
constraining for the researcher as historians normally assume. Seeing events as starting
points of a sequence of change also has certain theoretical advantages in relation to other
perspectives. For instance, in defining global events exclusively as the product of
systemic contradictions within the global order, one could easily fall into deterministic
approaches, although it would be a mistake to ignore the multiple connections between
global events and globalization. Therefore, the first question is to establish the relation
between global events and the globalization structure. The second primary concern, which
is in fact more analytically relevant than the former, is to address why a certain
phenomenon acquires or does not acquire the status of "origin" in a particular episode, a
problem to which Giddens' framework does not attend.

What is then the relation between the global event and globalization? "Globalization
concerns the intersection of presence and absence, the interlacing of social events and
social relations 'at distance' with local contextualities". Global events are constitutive,
both cause and effect, of the globalizing tendencies of modernity, although pursuing the
implications of this view would lead us into serious methodological problems. For
analytical purposes, then, we shall adopt a different perspective which works out this
definition assuming the subordination of the "social event" to the "social relation". We
will understand globalization as the "shift or transformation in the scale of human
organization that links distant communities and expands the reach of power relations
across the world's regions". Global events are then understood as a sub product of this
relational processes, which, taken together, represent the structural aspects of the new
global order. It might be useful to outline some of the multiple connections that this
perspective reveals.

(a) According to the theory of globalization, the world order today is characterized by
both the persistence of the sovereign state system and the development of plural authority
structures which involve several global, non-state actors. Global events are symptomatic
of this complex new global order not only because they are the systemic product of
parallel authority structures, but also because they manifest the structural incapacity of the
nation-state system to deal with their causal dynamics. In this sense, a broader theory of a
global state formation can be injected with an explanatory theory of the global event in a
manner that will be explored in the concluding part of this thesis.

(b) Global events are the product of global processes, although the extend and the
relevance of this has to be addressed as a critical political arena in itself. However, it is
quite clear that the symbolic/perceived character of global events is product of the
worldwide communication infrastructure that has radically facilitated globalization across

21 Giddens (1991: 21)
22 Held (2004: 1)
every domain of social activity (Manuel Castells). There would not be global events without global networked media.

(c) Global events are in fact global events: both global and local. Although their physical occurrence is either local (terrorist attacks) or global (global financial markets crisis), they always acquire almost instantaneous global consequences. In this respect, they represent a sudden realization of globalization understood as an spatial phenomena, and a sudden realization of the principle of “globality” (Albrow, 1996), understood as the growing consciousness of global interconnections.

But why can global events contribute to engender a sequence of institutional change in the global system? While the theoretical connections of global events with globalization is to a great extend a simple conceptual adaptation of the globalist framework, the conceptualization of the specific nature of global events as origins of change requires further effort.

Lakoff is a fashionable researcher in the United States, both in academia and political circles, because he has provided an interesting (but not verified) theory explaining this phenomenon. In Moral Politics (2002), this author outlines a theory of cognitive framing that explains both, the generation of power after an event and the strategic behaviour that accompanies it. During exogenous crisis, Lakoff argues, citizens instinctively draw upon the narrative of heroes and villains to explain the situation: they fear the villain, and search for the protecting hero. Under these circumstances, political speech is most effective when it evokes metaphors that activate certain mental frames in the audience, encouraging the subscription to one policy choice over another. Father’s mental framework – strict and protecting, in Lakoff’s description- is immediately activated after a global event situation, and the manipulation of the sentiment of fear by political leaders explain the increasing opportunities for their reflexive exercise of power. As relevant as Lakoff’s hypotheses are, they not only lack sophistication in social theoretical terms, but also overestimate the emotion of ‘fear’ by implying a functional connection between it and the components of his theory. Fear, one could argue, is only one among the constellation of emotions that a global event can generate, and that political leaders can mobilize – this, at least, seems much more consistent with the empirical record (see
Our working hypotheses would start with the contention that global events generate power with implicit transformative capacity. There are two interrelated dimensions that need to be analytically separated: the first one is the inherent property that global events have of breaking the circular stability of zero-sum power systems. The second refers to the political reflexivity that they invariably generate.

The globalists authors maintain that power needs to be understood as an expandable quality of social systems: “The national zero-sum game of sovereignty that exists in many people’s heads is proving to be historically false: interdependence can and must be created and understood as a plus-sum game in which all the parties involved make power gains” Beck (2005: xv). However, what is the logical system sustaining these claims? The zero-sum perception of power is premised upon the tacit assumption that power is simply given. But power, some globalist authors argue, is created by society, a theoretical claim that would be easily justified if taken through the lenses of contemporary constructivist social theorists.

Yet the globalist scholars do not take a constructivist tack. On the contrary, the intuitive idea underlying most of the globalist authors’ claims is that power works in a similar evolutionary logic that the one attributed by modern economic orthodoxy to market relations: if economic gains by some are not necessarily at the expenses of others, so work power gains. This parallel with the economic system, however, is problematic in a number of ways, so we need to depart from other views and work out an operative strategy to mobilize the transformative aspect of power. Therefore, how power is created in society? Modernist social theorists such as Talcott Parsons (1963), Anthony Giddens (1984) and Barry Barnes (1991) have explored this problematic from different perspectives and having very different theoretical projects in mind. We shall adjust and combine their ideas for the exploratory purpose of this project in a way that here we only announce:

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23 Talcott Parsons (1963) adopted a similar position, and received a considerable number of attacks which are also valid for this perspective.
Power must be indeed an expandable quantity of social systems - a different view is simply not consistent with historical evidence. The problem is then how is it created within the system reproduction process. What we will argue is that the crucial need is to draw a distinction around the circumstances that create different temporal dispositions of the consensual/conflictual character of power. Rather paradoxically, conflictual periods in the system, when power is at its most visible point, tend to be dominated by the generation of power in a slowly incremental way, in the manner that is generally assumed by the globalist theorists. However, to understand the theoretical significance of this pace, conflictual periods have to be grasped in connection with consensual phases within the system, when the tempo of power generation is accelerated in an almost revolutionary way. The crucial connecting point between the micro and the macro is the contention that the creation of power can only happen if a significant part of the collectivity and its members become ready to assume new binding obligations over and above those previously in force. In consensual periods, this takes place in a very circumscribed period of time, and this is what makes them highly relevant periods. What’s the relation of this with global events?

Global events induce a sudden discontinuity of norms that shape national practices by exposing the nation-state system incapacity of managing global processes. The global event transforms the widespread rational expectation that something needs to be done in relation to globalization into a commitment to implement this rational demand by positive action, including coercive sanctions if necessary. Thus, global events break through the relative circular stability of power in conflictual periods, which, if considered in connection with consensual periods, tend to represent a zero-sum power system. How this mechanism is exactly articulated?

Global events are constituted by physical, observable facts that are fundamental to understand the generation of power within a common transnational context. However, it can be argued that global events’ consensual effect is mainly based on their perceptual dimension, or what Giddens calls "the intrusion of distant events into everyday consciousness."24 Both cultural and biological elements intervene in this perception, but

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24 Giddens (1991: 27)
global events can only be considered global to the extent that they affect universal parameters of human existence. Broadly speaking, these parameters are the cognitive (Barry Barnes) and the emotional (Antonio Damasio) framework that any human being has. Global events always generate a widespread rational demand for action (a consensus), but rationality, as recent investigations have revealed, is always assisted by some sort of emotion. Our working hypothesis, adapted from an Ulrich Beck’s and Lakoff’s idea, is that during global events episodes, emotions take a highly visible role in the rationalization process, being empathy and fear the two main, mutually exclusive emotions that could assist the rational consensual phenomena. If either political reflexivity (empathy) or risk perception (fear) triggered by global events are made to endure a significant span of time, they can generate a tendency for the rational consensus to strengthen as time passes by virtue of its very persistence. This is the process where political agents mainly act. However, the transition of consensual periods to conflictual ones is the very normal process, and we think that the causes and the political consequences of this transition are of great importance to understand social change. The specific workings of this mechanism have to be specified in relation to specific episodes, such as the one that we will analyze in the next chapter.

2) Conjunctures of Factors

Giddens considers "conjunctures" to mean the interaction of factors which, in a particular time and place, have relevance to a given episode, and we will follow this position for our characterization of global events episodes. However we shall not adopt all the implications that Giddens injects to this definition: the themes discussed in the previous section, we think, allow us to elaborate a position which is more consistent with the aim of achieving some kind of generalization about social change. Seeing events as power generators offers the possibility of considering such "conjunctures" of factors as influences that decisively affect the "amount" of power generated, an idea which is also relevant not only for establishing the "type" of event under study, but also for addressing the study of global events in a comparative fashion. This, however, does not necessarily mean that the power is effectively translated into change, a process which will be explained in the following section. Thus, the conjunctures of our exploratory model are

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25 Damasio (2003, 2007)
those factors that might or might not be present and that might have different levels of intensity both in the event itself and in the political process triggered by it. Adopting central elements of the international crisis and risk studies schools, we will list in the following paragraphs certain factors that are relevant to explain the political power generated by the event. Two important considerations: (a) It has to be stressed again that the aims of this dissertation are exploratory; this implies that the identification and the systematic questioning of the relevant variables is in fact one of the aims of our work. The relevance of the listed factors, then, will be evaluated in the light of the evidences obtained in the two case studies. (b) Nevertheless, the proposed factors are the product of a careful consideration of the relevant literature. Some of these factors have admitted connections with each other, but this is not a major problem given the epistemological position implicit in Giddens' framework: all these elements should provide a robust starting point for organizing a systematic collection of the evidences of the Spanish and the UK cases.

(a) Firstly, we can consider the scale of the event, which might be high, medium or low. All structural models explaining risk perception deal with a variable that measures the scale of particular risks (Burns, 1998). They refer to purely objective information connected to the event rather than perceptions or predictions of its scale. We can define the scale of an event exploring the following parameters: Casualties: The number of people injured, killed or materially affected by a hazard; Economic impact: Degree to which a hazard generates economic impacts (damage to property, loss of sales, increased costs due to regulation); Chronological position: Order of occurrence of the event in the proper chronological list. All this factors can be analyzed with official statistics.

(b) Secondly, we can consider the power location of the nation-state or nation-states mainly affected by the event. They can be weak powers, middle power, great powers or hyper powers (only in the case of the US). Events occur, or at least have physical consequences, within the boundaries of particular nation-states that have distinctive political systems and distinctive locations in the global power hierarchy. This factor is important not only because it directly affects the quantity of new power that enters into the system. It is also relevant in terms of the structural location of the agents that can eventually mobilized the power of the event (see below).
Thirdly, we can consider the _national and global mass media attention_ generated by the event, which again can be measured through a simple scale of high / medium / low attention. The importance of the media in risks and events representation has obviously generated several hypothesis and conceptual angles in academic research. For instance the "social amplification of risk" theory is based on the thesis that events pertain to hazards interact with psychological, social, institutional and cultural processes in ways that can heighten or attenuate individual and social perceptions of risk and shape risk behaviour (Kasperson et al, 1988). The social amplification process itself is made possible by the occurrence of a risk-related event (an event of physical nature) which is selected by the mass-media and subsequently further transmitted by institutions within society, generating a number of systemic effects (such as anti-technology feeling or decline in tourist activity). Another relevant perspective for this variable is the theory of "agenda setting", whose main finding in terms of the relationship between media and events is the claim that negative public reactions are not the result of critical reporting or negative bias in news coverage, but rather of the sheer amount of coverage of the media (Mazur and Lee, 1993). In order to define and measure this variable, one can refer to: _Stories_: The number of follow-up news stories reporting on the event; _Duration_: The number of days between the first and last news stories. _Half-life_: The number of days until half the news stories appeared. In order to measure these elements, one can refer to the data obtained from automatic search of national and global media (CNN, New York Times, Al Jazeera, etc.) indexes for coverage of the event.

Fourthly we can consider the _global and national causality debate_, which can take values of agreement / uncertainty / disagreement. Global events have multiple causes and developing an accurate understanding of what these are and how the may interact to cause or exacerbate the events is not a concern of this study. In what we are interested is in the political dimension of the debate around causality, which will constitute a critical variable for the model. The collective reflexivity of modern social life consist in the fact that social and natural events are constantly examined and tackled in the light of incoming information about those very events, thus constitutively altering their character. The political dimension of this epistemological position are multiple and complex, but we will be especially interested in studying the ways in which a particular value of the causality debate constrains the power generation process of global events, which, as we have
already discussed, is partly based in emotional or psychological issues. In the case of terrorism, for example, the extend to which al Qaeda has or has not significant connections with nation-state actors is not only a critical source for justifying particular policies, but it also could reveal particular ideological understandings of globalization. The global agreement or the global disagreement around this clearly constrains the opportunities for power. A qualitative assessment of this factor can proceed through the study of the debate generated at IGOs, academic circles and global public opinion polls.

(e) Fifthly we can consider the occurrence and political direction of *popular mobilizations* explicitly linked to the event. There is also a social scientific background for the study of this factor. Some structural models on risk studies use a variable measuring the political response to risk. For example, they measure the political involvement by means of the degree to which the public is willing to become actively involved to reduce future risks posed by a hazard. Here, we are more interest in spontaneous or quasi-spontaneous mobilizations that take or not take place after the event, their social composition, and their political overtone in terms of the nationalist/cosmopolitan axe. All these can be qualitatively evaluated using secondary materials.

**Table 2.1: Preliminary Variables**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scale</th>
<th>Nation-State Location</th>
<th>Media Attention</th>
<th>Causality Debate</th>
<th>Popular Mobilization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Definition</strong></td>
<td>Event's magnitude</td>
<td>Power location of the nation-states affected</td>
<td>Event's news availability in time and space</td>
<td>Collective reflexivity on the causes of the event</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Assessment</strong></td>
<td>Qualitative data: Casualties, economic impact, chronological position</td>
<td>Middle, great and hyperpowers</td>
<td>Stories, Duration, Half life.</td>
<td>Agreement, Uncertainty, Disagreement</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

55
3) Political Agencies

Agency refers not to the intentions people have in doing things but to their capability of doing those things reflexively and in the first place, which is why agency implies power. In the previous sections we have listed some variable factors connected to the systemic realization of global events, and have constructed the working hypothesis that they mainly have an effect on the quantity of transformative power generated by the event. Under this specific framework, to study the agency of crucial actors means to analyze who they are and why and how this transformative power is mobilized. In other words, we aim at studying both the effective capabilities that certain structurally located actors have of advancing their interests and values in the political process generated after the occurrence of a global event, and the unintended consequences that this actions have for the system. Accordingly, the identification of the key actors must proceed in terms of their structural position during the episode, and must take for granted that the key power mobilizers are aware of the factors and elements of the power generation process. The interests and values of the identified actors must then be studied in detail\(^{26}\).

Implicit in this perspective is the decision of holding in relative suspension the theoretical causes of the global event as the main motivation for actor's subsequent action. Rather, as we have discussed in the previous section, our exploratory model focuses on the debate around the causes of the event as an independent factor affecting the episode -in doing so, the theoretical causality is considered to be more a constrain to the actor's reflexive action than a motivation of it.

This position is only sustainable for analytic purposes. However, we consider it to be the key element of our exploratory framework because it defines the specific analytical area that this study will hopefully contribute to identify. The theoretical causes of a particular event are the terrain of the traditional academic debate around the phenomena, and they obviously have to be the core of the scientific preoccupation. However, where these causes are specified with some degree of precision by competing schools, the study of the political consequences of events immediately derive into either absurd conspiracy theories.

\(^{26}\) This position is aligned with the work of Friedman and Starr (1997), which also contains a summary of the agency-structure debate in International Relations.
(usually adopted by those whose theories are implicitly dismissed by the implemented policies) or inadequate evolutionary notions of social change. This situation is obvious in many episodes - each time a global event has occurred, innumerable political fantasies and dramatic discourses arise. And they do so within a span of time when opportunities for global transformative power are generated. A research on the political consequences of global events can also be considered a reaction to this dangerous combination. The systematic study of global events pursued in this research aims at identifying, for purely analytical purposes, something of a middle space that avoids the common extremes of the debate: those that assume full responsibility and those that assume full indulgence of the actors involved in the process. The analysis of such space should shed some light on the political process and the political strategies which are invariably connected to global events while taking very seriously all the structural elements that surround their occurrence.

This does not imply, however, that the logic of causality that leads to the occurrence of particular events does not have room in the model. It has room indeed, but it is subordinated to the debate around causality, and it is relevant in connection with the modes and forms that actors draw upon it. Certain ‘styles’ of power mobilization might focus public attention on the evidences generated by the debate than others, and this is precisely what the agency part of the study will try to investigate. Fundamental for this aim is the distinction between the opportunity that global events generate, and the modes into which it is mobilized. Global events, we have argued, are intrinsically connected with the generation of opportunities for reflexive transformation of given institutional alignments. These opportunities can be mobilized in different directions and to very different ends, and are always connected with social ‘consensus’. The agency in global events episodes, we shall argue, is played around the emotional basis of this consensus. In this project we will explore two mobilization modes:

Political opportunism is a particular style of opportunity mobilization where actors seek to make political capital out of fear as a mean for expanding the consensual period. The rational debate around global events is assisted by fear, and the solidity of evidences become less important that its emotional impact — in order to articulate this strategy,
actors tend to abandon the coherency of certain political principles. Opportunism is closely connected to Machiavelli’s theorems, and from the International Relations point of view is inherently linked to unilateralism and state-centric policies\textsuperscript{27}. For all this we will call this particular style ‘postmodern Machiavellianism’. Consensual republicanism or Empathic Realism (see below) is another style of opportunity mobilization where actors seek to make political capital out of ‘empathy’ as a mean for expanding the consensual period. Rationality is assisted by dialogue, and a modern, inductive standpoint is mobilized in the debate around the event causality.

4) Modes of Institutional Change

In referring to the modes of institutional change connected to a global event episode we mean to indicate both how intensive and how extensive this change is – that is to say, how profoundly the impacts of the political action disrupts or reshapes an existing alignment of institutions and how wide-ranging such changes are. Once again, it needs to be repeated that the political actions studied in this dissertation are not a product or a mere determination of independent factors. The factors determine the intensity of the opportunity (the new “stock” of power which enters into the system reproduction), which is then mediated by the reflexive intervention of the relevant collective agencies and transformed into action directed towards particular directions. However, opportunities can be analyzed much more clearly when they are effectively transformed into effective changes, and that’s why we can momentarily hold in suspension the agency part of the model in order to study the transformative dynamics of global events.

Power and social change are very contested concepts the analysis of which presents serious empirical difficulties. We will confront this practical issue in the concluding part of the dissertation, where we will put forward a proposed analytical model for the development of a theory of the global event that will include a proposal of this assessment. Strictly taken, the assessment strategy should be rather expansive, and many variables could and should be analyzed in order to capture the complexities of social structures’ disruption. However, it seems plausible to simplify this study taking as

\textsuperscript{27} Kane (2006)
empirical references the specific policies which are arguably connected to the particular
global events. While this simplification might imply the lost of some information, it
should help to provide a clearer framework for the identification and assessment of certain
elements, like for example the relation between the objectives of the policy and their
actual realization. Moreover, it is important to bear in mind that the studied policies can
ultimately have intended and unintended consequences over the social structure, although
the intensity of both modes of impact must have some sort of connection with the power
generation process of the given episode. The planned qualitative analysis of the policy
making process, implementation and impacts of the “Alliance of Civilizations” policy, as
well as the exploration of the Terrorism Act impacts (see below), should help us explore
the variables upon which these policies have had a clear impact.

FRAMEWORK SUMMARY

In order to mobilize this framework for the empirical section of this Master’s dissertation,
it is necessary to condense its analytical implications in relation to the theory of
globalization:

1- Global events have to be analyzed as starting points of certain small-scale episodes of
social change. The central hypothesis, informed from a political sociological point of
view, would be that, in global event episodes, agencies take precedence over the global
structural forces of this transformation, thus amplifying both the intended and the
unintended consequences of their strategic activities. The first analytical section of a
global event analysis should provide plausible explanations of why this is so. In terms of
our framework, this means studying the systemic alternation of the consensual/conflictual
character of societal totalities, both national and global, that ‘naturally’ occurs after an
event realization.

2- Conjunctures of circumstances are empirically and theoretically relevant: they help to organize the episode's data and explain, at least in theoretical terms, the strength of the episode's political consequences. However, what is more relevant from the point of view of episodic characterization is that these circumstances converge and interact to form a unique process: the generation of transformative power, that is, the generation of a new source of power. Consequently the key, and simplified, question becomes how certain agents strategically mobilize this new source of power. The focus has then to be placed upon the modes whereby these agents draw upon the generative power of the event, and eventually lead to the design and implementation of certain policies, and their strategic activities focused upon the emotional basis of the episode's consensus. These modes or 'styles' can be broadly simplified into two categories, both expressing a package of principles and theoretical standpoints underlying the actor's strategies: postmodern Machiavellianism and empathic realism.

3- The third and last section of the framework demands an analysis of the impact of the key policies of the episode. As we have discussed in the previous section, and will address again in the conclusion, this strategy necessarily involves a certain loss of information in relation to the objective of analyzing social change, but at the same time becomes a much more feasible research strategy for the exploratory aim of this dissertation.

METHODOLOGY

In the following paragraphs we will outline some basic methodological considerations of the thesis. The general, most important point is our intention to take very seriously all the theoretical and empirical implications of Giddens' epistemological position, which is neither individualistic nor deterministic. Since the main aim of this thesis is in fact the development of a coherent analytical framework, and a research program, for studying global events, the question of the duality of structure will be further elaborated in the concluding part of the thesis.

However, it is necessary to advance here some methodological implications of this
approach. According to Giddens’ structuration theory, and by extension according to our epistemological and methodological position, two types of methodological perspectives are possible in global events research. In the institutional analysis of global events the focus is placed upon the ways in which global event episodes disrupt a given social system. Some characteristics of these disruptions, what we have previously referred as the “quantity” of power, and their impact trajectories over the global system, are in principle generalizable: they can be reduced to a general, testable statement that applies to different cases. The development of this perspective needs to be eminently comparative, involving the analyses of a relatively high number of cases. This perspective will be addressed mainly at the end of the thesis.

The other type of perspective is the analysis of strategic conduct during global event’s episodes. In this analysis the focus is placed upon modes in which actors draw upon the power generated by global events. It gives primacy to discursive and practical consciousness of the structural disruptions generated by particular events, and to the creative, self-generated strategies that relevant actors deploy during the episode. These strategies are particular to each episode, and can only be generalized in an ideal typical fashion. In this second perspective, then, the characterization of particular global events becomes an exercise that has an interest in itself, and which is in principle capable of generating particular knowledge of each episode.

The selection of the 2004 Madrid bombings (“11-M”) as the central qualitative unit of the thesis responds to criteria mainly connected to the agency part of our exploratory framework. The event was mainly mobilized by two different collective agencies, the Spanish Socialist Party and the People’s Party. As we will see below, both actors applied different styles of mobilization, and these styles coincide with the ideal characterization that we have proposed earlier. The significant presence of both modes of mobilization in a single episode makes 11-M a highly relevant case. Moreover, the main policy that came out of the episode, the “Alliance of Civilizations”, provides a marked contrast with the

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28 In this research we will use “11-M” to refer to the 11 March 2004 Madrid’s terrorist bombings, which is how the event is known in Spain. For similar reasons, we will use 7/7 to refer to the London’s case. Les Back (2007: 124) has detected the seriousness of global events nomenclature: “this kind of naming is more than merely a line through time; it is the temporal alignment of geopolitics. It results in a kind of political longitude that designates a historical moment, yet at the same time comes to occlude historical perspective […] It is impossible to speak of the events in London without first situating them relative to the primer meridian of US geopolitical time”. This will be reflected in chapter 4.
political consequences of the 9/11 episode, which is the global event that inspires this research. This is useful because it contributes to show the highly contingent nature of global events' episodes.

Since an example of episodic characterization is already provided by 11-M case, the study of 7/7 is only intended to provide a comparative reference to the previous case. This should help our progress towards the global event theory's comparative research program, which will be outlined in the conclusion of the dissertation. 7/7 and 11-M represent a good comparative pair for exploring the institutional analysis of global events, as they are similar in terms of the type and scope of the event and the position that the involved nation-state occupies in the global power hierarchy. At the same time, the political actions that can be associated to the cases show very different levels of intensity and extensity, and different political trajectories. This also raises comparative questions about the strategies and modes of political mobilization. As we will study in Chapter Four, while the 7/7 style of mobilization is intimately connected to the 9/11 case, 11-M constitutes a very interesting and relevant object to study the richness of alternatives of strategic conduct in the post 9/11 world.

The 2004 Madrid train bombings were a series of coordinated bombings against the commuter train system of Madrid on the morning of 11 March 2004, which killed 192 people and wounded 2,050. The well know political controversy regarding the responsibility of the attack was accompanied by a number of highly relevant social, political, judicial, media and international responses that culminated, among other power expressions, with the "Alliance of Civilizations" policy. The "Alliance of Civilizations" is, officially speaking, a United Nations Secretary-General initiative intended to galvanize collective action across diverse societies in order to combat extremism, and overcome cultural and social barriers between mainly the Western and predominantly Muslim world. It was officially introduced by Spanish Prime Minister José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero at the 59th General Assembly of the United Nations and co-sponsored by Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

To research the case we will use all the available quantitative and qualitative materials
about the political process circumscribed between the terrorist attack and the implementation of the “Alliance of Civilizations” policy. This exercise should bring our understanding of the case beyond the mere assessment of the variables described in the previous section, and should help us design a better analytical framework for an eventual theory of the global event. At the same time, according to our approach, the case study has an independent interest. It can help, for example, to understand the effect that 11-M terrorist attack had in the peace negotiations with ETA, an important topic within the Spanish political debate.

The focus will be placed upon studying the mechanisms in which the key actor of the case draw upon the structural opportunities generated by the global event in the constitution of significant political actions observed in the 11-M political process. The Spanish president José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero is the key agency of the case, the leader of the relevant collective agency and the crucial symbol mobilizer, so he will be the main focus of the qualitative study. All his speech acts, academic and journalistic books about his personality and political philosophy and other relevant documentation will be analyzed to study his agency during the episode. Besides Zapatero, other national actors, such as political parties, civil society organizations and media groups, will also be explored through relevant documented sources. We will put an especial emphasis in studying the strategic conduct deployed by People Party actors during the episode. The ‘Alliance of Civilizations’ policy will also be analyzed using books, reports and other documentation. In the methodological appendix we provide a list of all the consulted documents.

The 7 July 2005 London bombings were a series of coordinated suicide bombings that struck London's public transport system during the morning rush hour. Fifty-six people were killed in the attacks and about 700 injured. The incident was the deadliest single act of terrorism in the United Kingdom since Lockerbie and the deadliest bombing in London since the Second World War. It can be argued that the “Terrorism Act 2006”, which was drafted in the aftermath of the bombings, condenses the main political action emerged from this event. It is a UK Act made law on March 30, 2006, after being introduced on October 12, 2005. The Act creates new offences related to terrorism, and amends existing ones. In spite of the difficult progress of the Bill through the parliament, the government
considers the Act a necessary state-based response to an unparalleled terrorist threat; Tony Blair personally argued for the Bill, in its full form, in the strongest terms. In particular, he refused offers to compromise on a shorter period of detention, arguing that the 90 day figure was a direct recommendation of the police and that no lesser period would provide adequate protection. The Bill was finally given a Second Reading, and that 16 Labour MPs opposed to the first version (a relevant issue for our characterization of the relevant collective agency). The law encounters opposition from many sectors of the British society who feel that it is an undue imposition on civil liberties, and could convince members of Britain's Muslim community to turn to violence.

The British Primer Minister, Tony Blair, is the key agency of the case and will be the main focus of the qualitative study. Moreover, Tony Blair’s strategic conduct is especially interesting in the context of the post 9/11 world. He played a crucial role in the political process triggered by 9/11 and aligned with the Bush Administration policies after the attack, a situation that we will also have to take into account in the study of the episode. Speech acts, books and other relevant documentation will be analyzed. Similar to the Spanish case, we will also analyze other agencies around Blair’s power mobilization, but this time the analysis will be much more concise. The research will focus on the policy-making process and implementation of the Terrorism Act, and its comparison with the Alliance of Civilizations. All the documents and data sources utilized to research the case will be detailed in Chapter Four.
Chapter 3

11 March 2004 Episode Characterization:
From the Madrid bombings to the Alliance of Civilizations
The political process triggered by the global event, as experienced in the aftermath of the Madrid bombings on 11 March 2004, offers an interesting case for exploring the implications of the previous framework. After the March 11 bombs, the worst terrorist attack in Europe since Lockerbie, two coalitions of interest, mobilized around the two main Spanish political parties, draw upon the transformative power of the event in a diversity of ways. Intensively and formally different political actions, all of them having direct but distinctive connections with the attack, were implemented. Many details of the event and its immediate consequences have already been described in some academic books and articles, so we can skip the descriptive details and focus on the elements that are relevant to our framework, especially those concerned with the strategies followed by the main actors, but also those structural forces that contribute to explaining the transformative character of the 11-M episode.

**MARCH 11 AND THE GENERATION OF SOCIAL CONSENSUS**

Global events are starting points of a sequence of reflexive social change in so far as they generate a consensual period within the social system, and the first task of the case analysis must be to trace the empirical evidence that reveals the factors and mechanisms that could make this claim plausible for particular episodes. Given the intensity of the Spanish episode, it might seem strange for some analysts of the Spanish political system to characterize the situation generated after 11-M as consensual, but the key analytical element is to distinguish the structural phenomena generated after the event (the ‘natural’ reaction of society) and the strategic activities of certain actors, which according to our working hypothesis are in fact played out around the consensual phenomena. Precisely because of the highly strategic tone of the episode, the elements of consensus formation
are more clearly visible in 11-M. I will first advance the general arguments of this section and then describe the empirical material from the Spanish case which makes the consensual hypothesis plausible.

Consensus is always generated around a particular objective that frames all the new binding obligations and commitments over and above those previously in force, although consensus is generally extended and mobilized to aims that have different levels of relation with the central goal: it is then a social phenomenon that must involve a complex combination between emotion and rational cognition. In this research we will follow this definition, which tends to characterize consensus as an individual emotional-rational state which is shared by a significant part of the community.

The 11-M episode is characterized by the presence of two consecutive phases where consensus was generated around two interrelated objectives. (1) ETA terrorist group was the first national objective, and the global ramifications of the first consensual phase were concentrated around the notion of ‘terrorism’ as a general phenomenon of global connotations in the post 9/11 world. This was a short phase, very particular to the Spanish case, and very relevant from the point of view of the analysis of strategic behaviour. However, these contingencies also help to clarify the powerful ‘natural’ consensual effect of the global event, for even when certain evidences of the case were deliberately hidden to public opinion, the reaction was consensual in character during a significant span of time around the ‘official’ version of what occurred in the attack.

(2) The second phase is much more relevant in terms of the power ramifications of the episode – the national level kept a consensual character in the first stage, but in certain key themes, specially ETA’s implication in the attack, the consensus fluctuated towards conflict as a consequence of the penetration of the ramifications of the strategic behaviour of the first phase. At the global level, the consensus of the first phase was immediately transported to the second, and reinforced by the generation of new evidences of the mechanisms and consequences of the post 9/11 world, specially the dramatic failure of the Iraq war, therefore creating new additions to the total supply of power of the global system. This new supply of power together with the power generated by the global event allowed the key agent of our case, who was the president of only a middle-power state, to
design and implement the highly ambitious cosmopolitan policy of the Alliance of Civilizations.

Rational consensus around a particular topic inevitably has an emotional substratum, and this can also be empirically analyzed in the Spanish case. This substratum, I shall argue in the following sections, is where the key strategic conduct can be observed, but the very realization of an event also reveals information about the societal predispositions to sanction or engage with certain strategies. The 11-M episode is consensual, as all global events are if the theory is correct, but it is also 'empathic' at least in its national character, and this is significantly different than other episodes where 'fear' has been the main emotion assisting the rationalization process.

Societal Consensus

In this section I will discuss the evidence that suggest the existence of a consensual period in the social system emerged from 11-M terrorist attack. Evidences will be presented in three interrelated sections: the media, political actors and institutions and society in general.

1 Media: The media transmits events, globally and nationally, and makes them experienced in a cognitive unitary framework which is increasingly unitary in other respects. Therefore, the media, printed and electronic, has to play a central role in the very definition of what constitutes a global event. It is, with no doubt, one of the key strategic fields and a source of power for certain actors (see below) but it is also structurally tied to 'credibility' and 'immediacy', and it maintains a relative autonomy from political power. This makes it both a social institution highly susceptible to be impacted by the consensual force of the global event and a structural vehicle for broader consensus generation after a global event realization, although its role can change as the episode advances. March 11 event had indeed two successive kinds of coverage, both of them characterized by the centrality of the message instead of the medium, but with different mediums leading each period, and with dramatic differences in the homogeneity of the message. The following evidence is from the first period, which is the most revealing of the effect we are looking
to test in this section.

- *Visual/Linguistic Consensus.* Shocking, contradictory and repetitive images of the trains and the victims and emotive, strong language dominate the first coverage, which was essentially Television-centred, and had a strong level of similarities within all media corporations. The dominion of TV over other kind of media was strongly determined by the type of available information rather than any strategic decision: TV is best suited to transmit casual events, thus amplifying the emotional impact in the viewer. The dominium of the message over the medium, however, set the stage for the majority of communicative processes of other traditional media – newspapers and radio.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Injured Victims</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Y</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Y</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Y</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dead Victims Uncovered</td>
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Table 3.1: Pictures Content on Spanish National Front Pages
Source: Castanos and Muñoz (2005)

According to one study, on the main newspapers headlines on March 12 there were more emotive than informative expressions, with terms like ‘massacre’, ‘carnage’ and ‘hell’ highlighted in both Spain and the US. The victims of the attack were the protagonists in most of the front pages, which included much bigger pictures than usual - most of the paper’s editors agreed to show the real

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29 Castanos and Muñoz (2005) have studied March 11 coverage, both local and global.
30 This is a very common research result in media studies.
aspect of the attacked area, although they also agreed, it seems that through a closed debate, that they would not show the worst images. Rather than transmitting new information, these images tended to recall and reinforce the psychological impact of the type of audiovisual material previously absorbed in the viewing of the TV images. Similar phenomena were also observed in the global media, from Al-Jazeera to the CNN, which focused their lenses on Spain with significant intensity. For example, on March 12, 80% of the US newspapers dedicated their front page to the attack.

- **Message Consensus.** Another significant evidence of this first stage of event coverage was that many of headlines of the Spanish and some international papers called for the ‘unity’ of people against the attack: the right-wing paper La Razon and the financial paper Expansion, for example, coincide in the headline “Todos unidos contra el terror”.

- **Authorship Consensus.** As it has been shown later on, ETA was initially blamed for strategic purposes, and, obviously, with very little evidence pointing towards its guilt. But this is precisely what makes the initial media agreement towards the ETA’s authorship hypothesis one of the most significant evidence of the consensus generative capacity of global events: albeit with different levels of intensity, ETA’s authorship hypothesis was not contested, and in general terms spread by the main Spanish media.

As the timeline of the episode went on, media played a much more strategic role, but the important fact for the generative character of the event is that, according to the available studies, at the very beginning of the episode the event ‘impacted’ the media, both global and national, in a rather homogenous way: there was consensus in the media agents around the ways and the information to be transmitted, which in turn contributed to start a broader systemic alternation of the otherwise regularized dynamic of consensus and conflict to other institutions of society.

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31 Casaña (2004)
32 "All united against Terror".
2 Political Actors and Institutions: they are certainly impacted by events, forcing immediate public declarations that, in many respects, have a binding character because they create future expectations of certain institutional change. Global events force a consciously emotive account of the event by national and global leaders which, analytically speaking, supply the moral and normative grounds whereby further action is justified in relation to the particular event. In other words, they invariably create a consensual normative obligation to action, which is then internalized in various degrees by broader social actors, and tends to be global in its character, but they also tend to supply the emotional and moral background that justifies this action. The second part is to a great extent an indicator of strategic behaviour, and will be addressed below.

- **National and Global Leaders Unanimous Condemnation.** All the most relevant political leaders around the world immediately and unanimously condemned the attack in a very similar tone.

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Table 3.2: Content Analysis of the Speeches of National and Global Leaders at Madrid blasts (all speeches were made on March 11 2004. UN, United Nations Secretary General; UN2, United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights; NATO, Secretary General; US, United States President; US2, US Ambassador to the EU; A, Australian Foreign Minister; IS, Israeli Prime Minister; PH, Philippine President; IN, Indonesian Foreign Minister; EC, European Commission President; EP, European Parliament President; IRL, Irish Prime Minister; F, French President; UK, United Kingdom Prime Minister; D, German Foreign Minister; P, Portuguese Prime Minister; VA, The Vatican Spokesman; PL, Palestinian Minister; R, Russian President; SY, Syrian President)

Source: BBC, El Pais and Official Institutional Websites. Elaborated by the author (see Methodological Appendix)

- **International Organizations Resolutions.** They express in formal terms the consensus achieved by the global governance system of institutions. The most
illuminating of these resolutions was again advanced is spite of the lack of solid evidence about the attack: it was the Security Council Resolution 1530, that unequivocally attributed responsibility for the bombings to ETA. The consensual force of global events was exemplified by a senior French official reported as saying: ‘Under the circumstances, nobody wanted to say no’ 33

- **Symbolic Consensus.** The European Parliament declared March 11 as the day “of the victims of terrorism”. In France, Portugal, Romania among others as well as in the official buildings of the European Union, all flags were down at the middle. Poland and Portugal declared March 12 as day of luto. Romano Prodi, Silvio Berlusconi, Jean-Pierre Raffarin and Joschka Fischer among others assisted to the demonstrations to condemn the attack.

- **National Political Opposition.** During the days that went from the attack to the March 14 national elections, the Socialist Party remained significantly silent, although they had evidence that Popular Party was deliberately manipulating the episode. Only

3 **Society:** the study of systematic distortions in social life is what ultimately matters in global events episodes characterization, although the majority of indicators in this respect are relatively superficial in relation to the importance of the phenomena. The systemic alteration of its consensual/conflictual character of society in connection to global events can be studied through opinion polls, but they must be specifically designed to capture this specific alteration. In absence of this, we can partially relay in other observable evidence:

- **Public demonstrations.** The day after the attacks, 11’4 million people—a quarter of the Spanish people- came onto the streets to demonstrate. It was the second largest demonstration ever organized in Spain, and the first time that members of the monarchy and the Spanish Catholic hierarchy, one of the most

33 Quoted in O’Donell (2007)
reactionary institutions in Europe, demonstrated. Before that, silent, massive concentrations of students took place in all Spanish Universities. The majority of shops and business closed at 18:30. Several demonstrations took place in other European and American cities, being

- Condemnation of the Spanish Muslim Community. The Muslim community in Madrid and elsewhere joined with all other social actors in condemning the attacks.

In sum, there are evidences that 11-M actually impacted the media, the political and the social systems: taken together, this impacts suggest the plausibility of the hypothesis that global events disrupt the consensual/conflictual character of social systems, both globally and nationally: ‘power over situations’ are outflanked by ‘power to situations’, thus increasing the system effectiveness at realizing certain goals. Parson’s analogy between money and power has been widely and correctly criticized, but, since global events also tend to impact the economic system, which is much more easily quantifiable, the analogy still provides a good way of visualizing the systemic impact that global events might have on the political system: On March 11, for example, European financial markets dropped between 2 and 3% as a direct consequence of the attacks; Dow Jones felt 1.6%.

However, what are the goals that are necessary to explain the alternation of the global and national power system? The particularities of the Spanish case, and the disparities of the evidences analyzed above, precisely suggest the hypothesis that ‘the sentiment that something needs to be done’ is in fact more important than the rationalization of these very goals: during the pick of the consensual period in 11-M episode, ETA was strategically blamed without any significant evidence, and the majority of the political actors unite around this hypothesis, even when it was contradictory to their particular interests. Emotions seem to take a very firm role during global events episode, and this will be analyzed below. However, as the timeline of the episode went on, the ETA’s authorship hypothesis was eventually dismissed by the social system, a fact that suggest that, in spite of the centrality of emotions, these goals cannot be programmed at will and irrationally, as certain versions of postmodern theories would defend.
The generation of power in 11-M episode eventually converged around the Al-Qaida’s authorship hypothesis through a very ‘modern’ and rational process, what in turn reinforced the global character of the event. Long, tedious and expensive judicial, police, journalistic and academic investigations took place, and all of them confirmed without a shadow of a doubt that March 11 was perpetrated by an Islamist group connected to *Al-Qaida*[^1], and that no domestic terrorist group had any kind of involvement with it. March 11 was then seen as product of the contradictions and complexities of the global system. It’s important to take a closer look to the terms of this contradiction in relation to the evidences generated during the episode.

Al-Qaida is widely analyzed by the academic community as a global violent network that has demonstrated to be significant for the global system March 11 was a product of their operational capacity at the global level. For example, it seems that 11-M was prepared in different states. Some of the suspects in the Madrid bombing had been of interest to the French and Spanish police in 2001 for movements in both countries. Two of the formally accused individuals were on a list of suspects issued by the Moroccan police for a series of café bombings in Casablanca, and retrospective information has turned up further information on their connections in Germany and Norway. Judge Juan del Olmo’s indictment identified the criminals: a group of fourteen (five of whom died in a suicide-blast in the Madrid suburb of Leganés on 3 April 2004 when the police surrounded their hideout) politically affiliated to the Islamic Combatant Moroccan Group (GICM) that has links in France, Belgium, Iraq and Italy. In sum, al-Qaida is a global network, and 11-M was perpetrated by a significant section of it.

From the point of view of the political institutions, the very occurrence of March 11 provided evidence that the instrumental capacity and autonomy of the individual nation-state to assure their security was decisively undermined by the globalization of terrorism. It also signalled the crisis of instrumental and political legitimacy of the current configuration of international institutions, which by mere geometrical principle are the best institutions to cope with the actual causes of global events. Some analysts situated the

[^1]: The indicators are now overwhelming, and all point towards Al-Qaida linkage with the attack. From the academic perspective, see Brynjar and Thomas (2004)
failure to stop 3/11 at the European level\textsuperscript{35}, and in fact the management of crisis moved to the centre of the European Union's political agenda after the attack. For example, European political leaders revoked the EU solidarity clause and called for strong anti-terrorist measures right after the event. Also, an EU terrorism 'Czar' was appointed to coordinate such measures. Other analysts situated the failure at the global institutional level. This position is usually accompanied by the expansion of the conception of security (see below). But some researchers also stay at the national security state framework to argue that "the traumatic events of 11 March 2004 in Madrid underlined the opportunities offered to terrorists and criminals by hesitant or partial intelligence exchange"\textsuperscript{36}. For these analysts, there's a growing tensions between a global networked world, which is ideal terrain for the operation of criminal and violent groups, and the current bureaucratization of public, national and international, institutions.

But regardless of what analysis bears more explanatory power, what is relevant is that the connections of the attack with the global system, made of both the global state system and other, more flexible authority structures, became clearer as the timeline of the episode went on, thus exposing the systemic contradictions of globalization and framing the rational terms of the consensual period.

**Emotional Basis of Rational Consensus**

Global events, especially those of violent nature, tend to be analyzed in terms of the 'fear' they awake. Scientist have shown that in many circumstances of our life as social beings, our emotions are triggered only after an evaluative, voluntary mental process, and for many political scientists, sociologists and risk theorists, the evaluation of global events trigger 'fear', an emotion which is normally attached to survival and to the quality of that survival. The previous sections has tried to show that, at least in the Spanish case, the relevant phenomena from a political point of view which is 'naturally' triggered by global events is a 'rational consensus' in connection to the event and the agent or element that produced it, that is, in connection to globalization. Emotions, however, play a crucial role both as strategic fields of action and, indeed as semi-automatic emotional responses to the

\textsuperscript{35} Ekengren and Groenleer (2006)
\textsuperscript{36} Aldrich (2004,732)
event. The Spanish case suggest the hypothesis that “fear” is not necessarily the emotion that underlies the political reaction and strategies of particular global events episodes. First of all we’ll detail some evidence that seriously question the ‘fear’ hypothesis in the Spanish case. Then, we’ll discuss the hypothesis that ‘empathy’ was the predominant emotion of the episode.

- **Street mobilizations.** The massive demonstrations that took place the day after the attack are testimony of the lack of sentiment of fear in Spanish society: a rational process assisted by the emotion of fear would have immediately build the hypothesis that the terrorists would take advantage of the situation and attack such large, planned and announced concentration of people. Although not so revealing, other spontaneous public demonstrations of the episode provide also evidence against the fear hypothesis.

- **Train traffic.** The day after the attack, there were four times as many train travellers as usual in Spain. This increase in train passengers is explained by the massive attendance to the demonstrations against terrorism, but it also reinforces the questioning of the fear hypothesis, as Spaniards choose the transport which was the object of the attack. López-Rousseau (2005) has studied the data on train travel for the months immediately following 11-M. He observes that Spaniards briefly reduced their train riding the immediate weeks following the attack (approximately 5% less train travellers), but they also reduced their car drive, hence preventing the dramatic extra highway fatalities that were observed after the airplane attacks of September 11.

These evidences question the fear hypothesis. What is then the key emotional state that assisted the rationalization process of the episode? A qualitative assessment of the 11-M demonstrations suggests that empathy, rather than fear, was the central emotion of the episode, at least in the first part of it. Three elements must be differentiated to document the political character of these demonstrations. The first one was obviously their internal diversity: there’s no point in trying to characterize the internal cacophony of the origin of
the demonstrators, which came from all ideologies, genders and ages. The second element is strategic, and will be further discussed below: People’s Party tried to deliberately unify the demonstration message towards the ETA’s authorship hypothesis forcing the motto “With the victims, with the constitution and for the defeat of terrorism”. The third and most important element was the relative unity of the spontaneous messages of the demonstrators, which showed a marked empathic tone with the victims: in Madrid, for example, the key spontaneous motto was ‘Not everyone is here, 191 are missing, we will never forget you’; in Barcelona, it was ‘Today I’m also from Madrid’. There are, however, other evidences sustaining the empathy hypothesis. People across Spain flocked to hospitals and mobile blood donations units in such numbers that the need for blood for transfusions was totally satisfied by 10:30 am on March 11. Furthermore, there were no significant reported racist incidents directly connected to the terrorist attack in Spain.
According to the proposed methodology, the analysis of strategic conduct must be carried out by focusing attention on the modes by which structurally relevant actors draw upon the transformative power of the event, that is, the rational consensus and its emotional basis, for the design and implementation of certain policies. In the context of global event episodes, an analysis of the strategic conduct of key actors requires giving primacy to the discursive modes and activities by which they draw upon the distinctive elements and factors that intervene in the generation of a consensual period. Taken together, these factors constitute an institutionalized property of the global system: a source of power within the institutions of globalization.

We will focus our analysis on two significantly distinct types of agents in the mobilization
Zapatero

‘There’s life beyond orthodoxy;
What’s more, the great majority of life is outside all forms of orthodoxy’

José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero

Before addressing the arguments presented above, it will be useful to introduce very briefly the intellectual origins and the stated political philosophy of the key actor of the case. This should provide a sophisticated account of motivation, an analysis that Giddens considers to be crucial for any study of strategic conduct (1983: 289). Zapatero’s political philosophy seems to be rather inductive in its nature and origins: he does not show any type of uncritical adherence to theoretical postulates, ideological schemes or ‘great men’ fore-fathers, and declares to have construct a great deal of his political practice and theoretical standpoints on the basis of his personal experience and certain key contemporary theoretical works. He grew up intellectually under Franco’s dictatorship, when, as he has described, participated in long night conversations with his father and brother about politics, law and literature. Moreover, he entered politics in a time when the Socialist Party was fully addressing the debate on renouncing Marxism as its ideological base: ‘Marx,’ Zapatero has declared ‘is an extraordinary thinker and excellent analyst of capitalism. But he lacks reflection about democracy’. Zapatero’s marks at the university weren’t especially brilliant, but he was very active in youth organizations of divers origin, both cultural and political. He left unfinished his PhD studies in Law at the University of Leon, where he nonetheless had the opportunity to learn from a number of very strong political personalities within the Spanish academia, and get in touch with some political theories that would be then crucial for his political doctrine. The theory of Republicanism as presented by Phillip Pettit (1999) and a particular adaptation of the

37 There is not much academic literature on Zapatero. There are however two books addressing his biography and political figure: Campillo (2004) and Calami (2006). I found them particularly useful, but given the obvious bias of both books, they cannot be considered an academic, balanced analysis of his figure, a task that is still to be done. All the major newspaper’s websites contain descriptive profiles of the Spain’s socialist leader. The BBC News website also has a shorter but interesting profile. Some good international articles on Zapatero’s philosophy and personality are Graff (2004), Millas (2005), The Economist (2006). In chapter one I detail all the speech acts which I consulted for this section. There’s also a plethora of media reports on the Zapatero’s role during 11-M, which I will not cite unless I find it necessary to refer to specific information. Since most of this is in public domain, and this Master’s thesis do not pretend to add new information on this topic, I have constructed the analysis of Zapatero’s agency during the episode by combining different sources, without specifically referring to the source used for each particular point.
Third Way political programme (what Zapatero calls the 'New Way') are the two theoretical references that he often quotes. Both Republicanism and the Third Way have intimate connection in Zapatero’s practice. The New Way political programme, which is indeed a very important reference for understanding his agency on global events episodes, will be addressed in the following chapter in relation to Tony Blair’s strategic conduct during 7/7, so we can focus this section on the Zapatero’s adaptation of Pettit’s political philosophy.

‘Pettit’, Zapatero has declared, ‘was for us the ordered expression of many intuitions, of many values.’ At the centre of Pettit’s theory is a conception of political liberty as ‘non-dominination’, an expression that Zapatero often uses in his political speeches. According to this conception, we are free to the extent that we do not find ourselves under the domination of others, subject to their will and exposed to their arbitrary use of power: the role of political power and public law must be to actively intervene in the conditions, the rules of the game, which are thought to diminish our possibilities of action and free expression. Only universal suffrage and the widespread participation of citizens in political life can ensure that the laws will be just, instead of serving particular interests and private or bureaucratic concentrations of power. Freedom from domination by others is not equivalent to being one’s own master, since in itself it is a condition which people may enjoy in a variety of ways, as much by letting themselves be influenced by particular emotions and creative behaviour as by bringing themselves under the stable rule of just social institutions.

Although with certain reservations and libertarian overtones, Zapatero’s political philosophy and practice clearly endorses the concept of ‘non-dominination’ in Pettit’s theory, which, on the other hand, does not seem to offer a much deeper inside into the nature of freedom than the one that Max Weber already advanced few decades ago. Much of Zapatero’s work in domestic policy has been on social issues which clearly involve situations of arbitrary domination, including gender-violence and discrimination, divorce, same-sex marriage and children rights. One of the policies that better expresses the non-dominion philosophy is the Dependency Law, a plan to regulate help and resources for

38 In Z8bis Zapatero reflects about the connections between his political philosophy and Pettit’s theory.
people in dire need of them, and who cannot provide for themselves and must rely on others on a daily basis.

Ambitious economic and educational 'non-domination projects' are yet to come on Zapatero’s domestic policy, but one can easily think about policy projections on these fields of action that could depart rather directly from Pettit’s theoretical root. And yet Pettit’s postulates do not seem enough to capture all Zapatero’s philosophical ‘intuitions’. Especially in his more theoretical speeches and interviews, Zapatero expands and injects a substantial epistemological connotation to the rather limited role that democracy plays in Pettit’s theory (ensure the justice of laws). This injection wouldn’t probably pass a rigorous test for its consistency, but it is ultimately fundamental to understand Zapatero’s consensual style of event mobilization. Institutions live in the past: they are memory traces, and can be studied scientifically, thus providing important knowledge about the conditions that impose situations of domination. But politics, Zapatero argues, addresses all those things to which we don’t have a technical or scientific response because they are projected into the future: ‘That’s why politics has to be democratic, because nobody can have the true response. However, all of us, together, can and have to achieve the highest level of possible support for the solution we believe in.’ Therefore, real, effective democracy isn’t an institution to which ‘one arrives with established positions’. Political decisions about the future of social institutions are only improved when they come from true and substantial dialogue. To do this, citizens have to be strong: they have to have rights, economic resources, education and cultural knowledge that allow them to overcome ‘systemic forces’ and thus participate in the process of building a strong democracy. ‘From this emerges our deep democratic faith and our rejection to the abdication of responsibilities implicit in leaving politics in the hands of technocrats or populists. For all these reasons the left cannot be mainly scientific, it has to be democratic. We don’t have an orthodoxy to offer’.

Zapatero’s political philosophy has been qualified as ‘weak’ by some academics (Santos Julià and Fernando Savater among others) and innovative and desirable by others (Salvador Giner being one of the key intellectuals supporting Zapatero’s republicanism). In analytical terms, it seems that the key element is the ontological and epistemological
role reserved to democracy and dialogue: true, informed dialogue provides, within the very same simultaneous processes, the best possible transparent (rational) knowledge about the institutions of the past, and the strongest possible (emotional) implication about the avenues of the future. The pragmatic articulation of a coherent discourse and practice between both elements (what we call empathic realism) is what penetrates Zapatero’s global events mobilization, and his strategic conduct when Machiavellianism is confronted.

Globalization and the Third Way (see next chapter) politics seem to provide the empirical basis from which Zapatero’s own institutional analysis depart: ‘It is not that globalization is inevitable. It has already taken place. And the answer to globalization cannot be the reconstruction of walls and boundaries’. Zapatero not only accepts without hesitation the existence of globalization, he also understands its multidimensional nature: ‘Not even the Adrian wall, nor China’s Great Wall is going to protect us from global terrorism’. ‘Politics’ Zapatero argued, ‘is the only response to the contradictions of globalization. Politics is the only thing that can force us to overcome our local identities and liberate ourselves from all the harm that afflict us’. Zapatero’s political practice, especially his very positive relation with the Catalan and Basque nationalisms, shows that he’s in a political plane, not cultural, when he speaks of local identities: he’s thinking about the nation-state. To my knowledge, there is not a single president or prime minister in power that has stated something similar, that has reflexively and clearly renounced to draw upon what has been the key emotional source of power since the rise of the nation-state. ‘The united Europe is a good political response, a response which is close to the size of the systemic forces of globalization that we all have to face’.

Having briefly introduced Zapatero’s political philosophy, it is necessary to separate these theories from his reflections about ‘power’ and his way to it, two elements that are intrinsically connected in Zapatero’s evolution as a political leader. Zapatero’s political speeches are replete of theoretical reflections about power that would seem naïve to some, and that tend to pass totally unattended by the media and political analysts because they seem to lack substance. However, both the intensity and the moment when he intensified his discourse about power, which was, precisely, the immediate moment when he took
office, seem to be two extraordinary relevant elements of Zapatero’s strategy. ‘I promise this especially to the young: power won’t change me’ was his key statement on the day of his election; ‘Democratic power is the only voice most citizens have. The corporations and the media don’t need power; they already have it. I don’t want to be a great leader. I want to be a good democrat’ was one of his statements in the first interview as Spanish president for the international press, following many others with a very similar message: ‘The greatest satisfaction to me does not come from public or media praises, but from seeing others happy. A man in power isn’t a man facing his destiny. What’s important is the destiny of the country he serves’; ‘My passion is politics, not power. Citizens rule’; ‘My intention is to take power away from the powerful and give it to the citizens’; ‘Power is a tireless hunter for excuses to delay the solutions to difficult tasks. I will not fall into this vice’; ‘It consists in the exercise of power with transparency, constantly opened and accountable to the citizens’; ‘The people that better exercise power are those who don’t love it, those who don’t feel anxiety to have it, those who don’t feel an unhealthy attachment for it, those who want to use it in order to change things’.

Anxiety, dynamics of trust and betrayal, and everyday routines of social interactions in the cabinet office seem to be the elements that operate in the transformation of rulers’ attitudes and emotions once in power: we can readily understand Zapatero’s unusual interest to publicly state his distance from power as a personal, initiatic ritual to cope with the transformative mechanisms of the exercise of power, and to dissuade, by means of a deep commitment with radical transparency, the application of professional, rationalistic strategies by his immediate collaborators. But we can also read these statements as a powerful emotional strategy to construct a direct, non-mediated link with the citizens – to stimulate deep, empathic social awareness about the mechanisms of power, including the media ones, and construct an intimated and honest connection with the constituency based not on seduction or acting performances, but on basic trust: on the inherent connections which exist between learning the institutional and strategic circumstances that the ruler has the face, and the major axes of ontological security described by Anthony Giddens (1991). Zapatero had to face a ‘Machiavellic Moment’ during the legislature when ETA broke the cess fire: this test to Zapatero’s relation with power will be briefly addressed in the following chapter.
Zapatero rise to the Socialist Party power is also highly relevant to understand the opportunity to effectively deploy his strategic conduct during the global event. This is so mainly because the episode, as described by academic and journalistic reports, seems to be more a product of chance, of an instinctive and brilliant reading of political timing, of the existence of a generational gap in the Spanish society, and of the last resorts of internal party democracy, than to the bureaucratic manoeuvres and the subscription of long term, capturing deals which are so important to understand the reproduction of the institutional constrains of all political systems. The electoral defeat of the Socialist Party in 1996, after 14 years in power, confronted the party with the challenge to replace the charismatic leadership of Felipe Gonzalez. The process was extraordinary complex and turbulent: the PSOE had four different leaders until July 2000, when Zapatero was elected. All these leaders came from mainstream currents of the party apparatus and defended a programmatic and formalistic continuity to defeat the Peoples Party government. The bad results for the Socialist Party in the 2000 general elections opened up a critical threshold in the evolution of the party that was admitted and institutionalized in the Party Congress that took place in July 2000, which was mainly organized to elect a new leader. The candidate best placed to win the election to become Secretary-General, and the one that had the support of most of the party elite, was José Bono, a strong Spanish nationalist with a confrontational political style and authoritarian personality who was very respected by the Church and even certain sections of the Spanish political right. Zapatero was only the fourth contender in line, who was unknown to the public and even to the party. Zapatero made a speech based almost exclusively on the question of generational change, what in rationalistic terms seemed more a political suicide than a clever move: as most Spanish organizations, the Socialist Party was highly hierarchical and gerontocratic, and most of the elites of the regional delegations supported Bono. But many of the lower-rank party members were much younger, and the block vote by regional delegations had been removed in a previous Congress and replaced by a secret individual ballot. Zapatero won 41.7 per cent of the vote to Bono’s 40.8. Zapatero found the critical support to rise as the Party’s leader not in internal political pacts or a solid bureaucratic career, but within the relatively powerless younger generation of the

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Méndez-Lago (2005) offers a good analysis, in English, of the Socialist Party recent period of changes.
Socialists, who, through a new electoral mechanism that the party machinery hadn’t had time to process strategically, found the way to express their differences in values and attitudes. As we will see below, the existing generational gap within the Spanish society is also crucial to understand Zapatero’s mobilization of the power of the global event.
Structural Factors and Strategic Conduct

It is a basic premise of our theoretical framework that the reality and intensity of a particular consensual period observable during a global event episode is a direct consequence of a complex interaction of factors. These factors, we have argued, are empirically discernible and in fact comparable to other cases (see Chapter One and Conclusion). However, the generation of transformative power does not mean that this power is automatically translated into change: agents have to discursively mobilize this power. The purpose of this section is to analyze the mobilization of the power of the global event by means of the study of the strategic conduct of the key actors of our case in relation to each generative factor. For each factor, we will study: (1) What mechanisms would explain how each one of these affects the generation of power, that is, how they contribute to generating a consensual period; (2) How they are discursively mobilized by the key agent in our case (Zapatero), and (3) How Zapatero’s strategic conduct interacts with People’s Party strategies.

Scale

11-M was a big terrorist attack. The number of people killed were 191, and 2,057 people were injured – the attack was the second most lethal in terms of deaths and the first in terms of injuries suffered in Europe to date (only before the Lockerbie attack in 1988). It wasn’t as deadly as 9/11, which had 10 times more deaths, but it was the first al Qaeda’s (or al Qaeda’s inspired) attack perpetrated in European soil. 11-M revealed the vulnerability of Europe, and reinforced the perception that Western societies were confronting a new style of terrorism which was much more ruthless in the violent means that is prepared to use. The scale of 11-M revealed emotional indiscrimination and vulnerability: an absolute lack of empathy in the rationalization process of those who perpetrate it, and this, I argue, was the main mechanism that generated transformative power at the European and global level.

At the national level, another more specific mechanism activated the generation of transformative power in relation to national terrorism. Diego Muro, an Spanish analyst of
Basque nationalism and ETA’s terrorism, wrote five days after the attack an article entitled “ETA after Madrid: the beginning of the end?” (2004). In it, Muro argued that ETA’s “activities and character will remain associated in people’s minds with the irruption of international, mass terrorism in Spanish soil”. In a similar argument, Moreno (2004) wrote that “the deep shock produced by the Madrid bombings and the change in the Spanish government may have produced the least propitious political and societal circumstances for the maintenance of political violence and terrorism in the Basque Country”. Similar arguments were abundant in the journalistic and academic investigations on the attack, but the mechanisms underlying the hypothetical cause-effect relationship between March 11 and the generation of a negative political climate for the continuation of ETA’s terrorism were much less investigated. A working hypothesis on this issue would suggest that the competence for media attention and for space in the political agenda and the activation of empathic mechanisms among ETA’s social supporters, and perhaps certain sections of ETA’s activists, could be two plausible connecting mechanisms. In any case, the link between March 11 and the transformation of the political climate around ETA was later supported by the beginning of a peace process which, nonetheless, was interrupted later on (see below).

Zapatero’s strategic conduct in relation to the political mobilization of the scale of the event employed a combined use of quantitative and qualitative data: qualitative information infused an empathic overtone to the quantitative information of the scale of the event. And this was so in both national and global interventions. In his speech acts (Z1, Z2 for example) numbers were used always in direct connection with certain personal details of the victims. These details included names and nationalities, and were mixed with an emotive discourse that sometimes incurred in clichés, but that also showed an innovative approach to the combination of rational and emotional information in one single narrative: neither the quantitative nor the qualitative dominated the discursive mobilization of the scale of the event – they interacted and reinforced each other. Emotional ideas were never detached from its quantitative counterpart, nor used in a demagogic way to connect two unrelated elements. However, although the coherency of the rational discourse was always maintained, emotional ideas seemed sometimes aimed at increasing the salience of certain premises and, in so doing, incline the conclusion of
the information transmitted in favour of certain interpretations of the event. This was especially clear when Zapatero made reference to the nationality of the victims in both global and national discourses (there were 51 foreigners killed in the attack). The core of the Zapatero’s treatment of the episode scale was in fact expressed in the commemorative statue that was later situated next to the Atocha’s train station: all the victim’s names were inscribed in a solid, arid monument, painted in blue.

The event’s scale and its analysis did not take a substantial place in the People’s Party strategy, an element which is significant because it seems to suggest that the scale factor is only beneficial to those that hold the best structural position during the episode. However, a circumstantial element might also be intervening here: the scale of 11-M was in fact an indicator that the attack was perpetrated by an Islamist terrorist group, a fact that was systematically questioned by People Party’s agents during all the episode. When the scale of the event is directly mentioned, such as in PP2 (p.1), it is immediately attached to a theoretical statement that is not necessarily connected to it, but has important implications for the general strategy (in the referenced speech act, the dimension of the event was directly connected to the theory that the blasts had a direct effect on the elections). Thus, the strategic interaction concerning the scale of the event seems to offer no points of direct confrontation, but it is significant to the extend that the actors that hold power during the episode seem to have a clear structural advantage in relation to the mobilization of this specific factor. Under these circumstances, the application of Machiavellian Postmodernism in relation to the scale is in fact forced to the extreme of evident demagogy.

Nation-State

11-M physical occurrence took place within the boundaries of Spain, a middle power that has never been part of the European core despite its size as the second-largest country in the EU-15. At the same time, Spain has a close proximity to North Africa, with the cultural and economic ties that have build over the history, and an intimate connection with Latin American countries. Under these structural elements, the generation of episodic power throughout the ‘nation-state factor’ was rather limited in terms of the
opportunities opened to lead a military/realist policy out of the attack (like in the 9/11 episode for example), but the level of consensus generation within the cultural realm seem much more relevant. However, we have to place these elements within the context of the political situation of Spain before and after the attack to understand the strategic conduct that derives from it.

Aznar’s support for the United States in the post 9/11 ‘War on Terror’ placed the country in opposition to the rest of the European Union and the vast majority of states across the Arab world and Latin America, as well as the United Nations and its Security Council. His decision had consequences for relations with traditional allies within the European Union, and in particular with France and Germany. By fixing upon the American global strategy, and distancing himself from ‘old Europe’, People’s Party actors broke both the internal and the global consensus that had been established in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 attacks. As Aznar himself admitted, the Spain’s alignment with the US responded to a strategy to raise the international influence of nation-state and its particular interests. 11-M was first mobilized by the People’s Party’s actors, and other nation-state actors (see Table 3.2) to try to reconstruct this consensus along the lines of the American strategy against terrorism: along the lines of a rational policy assisted by the emotion of fear. This was clear, for example, in the ‘sorry tale’ of Security Council Resolution 1530 (2004) analyzed by O’Donnell (2007). We don’t have elements to doubt that had People’s Party won the elections, the mobilization of the global event transformative power would have followed this strategic path, thus reinforcing the US preventive, statist strategy.

But the electorate cast its vote in disapproval of the way that the Aznar administration had responded to the attacks. Zapatero’s strategic conduct switched from a pro-US stance to several actions and styles aimed at transferring the consensus generate by the global event to the core of European Union, and to mobilize the structural impact of the event towards a sustained improvement of the relations with Arab countries.

Relations with the European Union took a dramatic turn, as the Zapatero government announced a change of strategy and declared its support for finding an agreement on the draft EU constitution. The first visit of Zapatero as the new Spanish president was in
Germany. In the following press conference (Z4), Zapatero showed a conspicuous thankful attitude towards the condemnation of the attack and the solidarity expressed by the German government and its people. This discourse was mixed with a strong commitment with the European project. It is significant that he chose to use the new American narrative about the European Union to express this position: “there’s not an old Europe, there is only a big, united Europe”. Zapatero also expressed a commitment with to the multilateralist tradition in international relations: both leaders articulate the argument that any further action in Iraq should be conducted within the framework of international law and with the approval of the United Nations Security Council. Similar ideas were put forward in Z5.

However, Zapatero’s first official visits and joint interventions after the attack were connected to Arab countries (Z6 – Morocco; Z7- Palestinian National Authority; Z8 – Algeria). It is very significant that in none of this speeches Madrid’s blasts were mentioned, although the very chronological position of the visits constructed an implicit association with them that, in principle, did not have any specific content. Within this ambiguous epistemological context, Zapatero concentrated in deploying a very consensual discourse, revealing himself as a dextrous non-zero sum power theorist when he commented, in his Morocco’s visit, that he wished a “dialogue sustained in reciprocal loyalty, in permanent understanding and in constant communication. A positive relation between Spain and Morocco makes Spain grow, and makes Morocco grow”. In his immediate visits to Arab countries, Zapatero did make explicit mention to the most predominant conflicts on the regions, such as the Sahara conflict, and always expressed the position that they had to be solved building a progressive consensus through the United Nations institutions. Moreover, he always portrayed the Spanish nation-state as an historical place of cultural confluence, especially between the Western and the Arab countries. To counterattack this argument, Peoples Party’s actors had to go as far and absurdly as putting forward the theory that to understand the causes of 11-M it was necessary to revisit the theories of the
Media Attention

From the national point of view, the events of March 11 still occupy, more than three years after their occurrence, a primary position in the Spanish media. A superficial analysis of the quantity of media information about the Madrid blasts is enough to measure this variable as high. At the global level, we have already discussed some studies that suggest that the initial media attention was also high. However, there are no studies that measure the evolution or the temporal consistency of this attention. We have performed an automatic search of three prominent global media Internet databases: CNN, New York Times and Al-Jazeera. The results obtained suggest that 11-M still has a significant presence on the global media. If we look closely to this data, however, we see that, more often that not, 11-M is only mentioned in connection with al Qaeda terrorism or other terrorist attacks, and that new information about the attack and its political and judiciary consequences is scarcely present.

We have already commented that the role that media plays during a global event episode seem to vary in relation to its timeline: the first phase seems more tide to the structural elements of the medium and the second seems to be more suitable as an strategic field of action. The second, consecutive stage of the 11-M coverage was led by radio and newspaper information, more than TV images. This shift in the media seems to be a consequence of both the type of message (content) generated by the very development of the episode and the societal demands naturally emerged from the circumstances of the episode. After the first impact, simple analytical questions arise in society: the who, the how, and the why took precedence over other elements in the episode’s mediation process, and it is an established fact in media studies that print and radio favours a more systematic and analytical type of message. Many distinctive institutional settings, both global and national, reframed the questions in relation to their context. Global networked media participated in this debate, interacting with national media and the Spanish population, and a sub-episode of popular mobilization, involving new media such as mobile phones and the Internet, took place the day before the elections. But despite the relevancy of these facts, it was in Spain, and it was through the national radio and newspapers, where the strategic conduct around 11-M media coverage took a more
relevant path.

Peoples Party’s actors used the natural media attention around the event to provide coherent strategy that would have been much more successful had not intervene the globalization of media⁴⁰, and the social diffusion of the instruments of the Information Society. The changing institutional rules are more visible in the first part of the episode. President Aznar personally telephoned the editors of all major Spanish newspapers and TV channels putting his personal credibility on the line in affirming ETA’s guilt. All media followed his view because they believed that he actually had privileged information on the attack pointing to that direction. Also, the state-run TVE-1 made an unannounced change to its Saturday night schedule and broadcasted the film ‘Asesinato en Febrero’ about the murder of a politician by ETA. However, ETA’s guilt hypothesis was questioned from the beginning by the global media (CNN, New York Times, etc.), which was obviously beyond any institutional and strategic national influences. Many people in Spain had access to these sources through the Internet, and transmitted the information to other parts of the population, giving rise to public anger against the People Party’s management of information during the episode.

After the elections, a second stage of this strategy emerged. Rather than assuming the previous strategic mistake, journalists from the radio network Cadena Cope (belonging to the Episcopal conference of the Catholic church), the newspaper El Mundo, some talk-show commentators, and members of the Popular’s Party insists that 11 March was the result of a plot between ETA, members of the Moroccan and Spanish intelligence services and al Qaeda. There were, and still are, multidimensional newspaper investigations, but the agenda of the debate was mainly set around this theory, a theme that occupied the political headlines until very recently, when the judiciary investigations have completely cleared any doubt about the issue. Different data and political files were leaked, discovered, manipulated or invented and published in the press. Most of the pro-ETA hypothesis elements were first published in El Mundo, a conservative newspaper that became notorious during the 90s for revealing several corruption scandals of the PSOE, eventually leading to their defeat in the 96 national election. El Mundo lead the

⁴⁰See Held at al. (2001: Chap. 7)
'investigations', but weekly tabloids and radio talk shows, especially in the Cadena Cope spread a simpler and more direct message among the audience that reinforced the emotional component of the more analytical information presented by El Mundo. This was an strategic victory for the Popular Party's actors: it caused huge uncertainty and doubt among the population, and more than 50% of the Spaniards believed that ETA could have had some kind of involvement in the attack. The Postmodern Machiavellic strategy was the responsible for draining the consensual power of the event at the national level.

At the global level, another type of narrative was also spread with the help of People Party's actors and conservative media outlets, although its force and character was much less powerful and successful than the national one. There were two ways of presenting the argument depending on the perspective: (a) Zapatero's party had rise to power on Al-Qaida's help, and returned the favour by withdrawing Spanish troops from Iraq or (b) Spanish people's vote was decided out of fear, knowing that the Socialists would withdraw the Spanish troops from Iraq thus reducing the risk for more attacks. The arguments were propounded, with singular vehemence, by military analysis and political commentators in conservative media outlets, from the Wall Street Journal and the Daily Telegraph to Fox News. Off-the-record remarks by leaders of People Party were widely employed.

Both strategies, the national and the global, were obvious forms of Machiavellic Postmodernism, where narratives targeting certain emotions where imposed over any kind of serious institutional analysis of the situation. Globalization conditions contributed to dismiss the first ETA narrative, thus showing the structural limits of postmodern strategies when they are exclusively based on media control. However, in the second strategy, the combination of media games and the concentration on exploiting the limitations of institutional analysis converged in a conspiratorial narrative that impacted on significant sections of the Spanish society. The national strategy was especially successful in draining the consensual power of the global event and this, I shall argue below, had an important effect on the evolution of the peace process with ETA initiated after 11-M. Yet to understand the evolution of this strategy we have to place it in relation
to its tactic counterpart.

Instead of engaging in a combat of competing media narrations (a strategy which is in fact the one advised by Lakoff to the US Democrat Party), Zapatero and the Socialist Party deployed a defensive, realist tactic aimed at counterattack People Party's conduct. Zapatero entered power with the electoral commitment to introduce measures to guarantee the impartiality of public sector's media, and both radio and TV public broadcasters indeed kept a rather distant position on this particular debate. However, Grupo Prisa, a private media group close to the Socialist party, engaged in the debate through the newspaper El País, the radio station Cadena Ser and the TV channel Cuatro. The investigations were focused on providing evidences to falsify the ETA hypothesis narrative. It is interesting to note that every minute of 11-M trial, where most of the evidences were systematically presented, and where the ETA narrative was definitely dismissed, were broadcasted over the Internet by the digital edition of El País, which also kept a detailed analysis of the judicial process. Thus, the ETA hypothesis marked the agenda in the media terrain, and as we have already argued, it contributed decisively to drain the initial national power generated by the global event. However, Zapatero's strategic perseverance in deploying a realist, modern approach to media tactics seems to be currently paying its benefits, as the Socialist Party has regained a comfortable distance in the pre-electoral polls.

**Debate on Evidences**

Madrid's blasts were perpetrated by an Islamic terrorist group close to al Qaeda. As we have seen above, however, the strategic use of the media attention generated by the event, specially in the national front, was mainly marked by the PP strategy of constructing a narrative around the ETA's hypothesis. But Zapatero's empathic realism in the sphere of evidence also took a more constructive tack, which was especially significant at the global level, where the postmodern strategies deployed by the PP actors were simply ignored. 11-M generated power in terms of evidences at the global level because it provided new incoming information about the nature of the new global terrorism and about the effectiveness of the 'War on Terror'. The debate around both issues remained uncertain,
but 11-M contribute to move this uncertainty towards a consensus (agreement), explicit and implicit, on the hypothesis that the ‘War on Terror’ was a political failure and that al Qaeda had a new, global structural configuration that didn’t need significant connections with particular nation-states to be fully operative.

Zapatero’s strategic conduct around the debate on evidences simply consisted in financing and empowering the autonomous academic research and political dialogue around the nature of the new global terrorism. In March 2005 the association of former heads of state and government known as the Club of Madrid organised, supported by the Spanish government, a distinctive meeting where the nature of new global terrorism was widely discussed. The purpose of the International Summit on Democracy, Terrorism and Security was to commemorate the victims of the attack (empathy) and to formulate practical strategies to counter the threat from terrorism. It was the largest gathering of terrorism and security experts ever held. Among the participants were twenty-three current and thirty-four former heads of state and government; the heads of the United Nations, NATO, the European Union, Interpol, and the league of Arab states, and 500 representatives form NGOs and civil society. Moreover, in the approach to the summit, more than 200 scholars engaged in a four-month-long process of debate and reflection in which the key dilemmas of democracy, terrorism and security were discussed through a system of password-protected weblogs. In the opinion of its content director, the summit produced ‘a high degree of consensus in relation to the way in which terrorism should be fought’ According to the director, there are certain areas where the widespread agreement at Madrid is notable. For example, the working group on intelligence, in which prominent intelligence practitioners from the United States and Britain participated, emphasised that methods such as extra-legal detention were of no practical value to the secret services. It was also agreed that the imperative of improving international cooperation was fundamental because the rise of international terrorist networks like al Qaeda means terrorism has become a global challenge. International police, intelligence agencies and the judicial authorities need to collaborate more closely. Also, the Madrid conference recognized the need to strengthen and deepen democracy as the only viable long-term response to terrorism. The assembled experts were clear that while open

41 Neumann (2005)
societies make it easier for terrorist to operate, they are also less likely to see terrorist achieve their political objectives in the long run. People Party actors refuse to participate in the summit.

*Popular Mobilization*

11-M events were contingent in many ways, but the elections and the intensity of the immediate popular mobilizations were the two most relevant circumstances that affected the episode process of development, and the conduct of its key actors. Their structural impact in terms of their relevance for the episode is probably one of the highest that can be found in any other global event episode. The mechanism connecting the event to the generation of societal power is simple and important: the mobilizations expressed and reinforced the political sentiment that the Spanish public was willing to become actively involved to reduce future risks posed by the global terrorist threat.

Both the demonstrations and the elections were, in essence, respected by Zapatero as autonomous expressions of the public will. The strategic conduct of People Party's actors was much more interventionist. For example, in the massive demonstrations that took place in the aftermath of the attacks, they tried to unify the front message towards the ETA's authorship hypothesis forcing the motto "With the victims, with the constitution and for the defeat of terrorism". Postmodern Machiavellianism was also deployed by People Party actors in order to drain legitimacy from the 14 of March elections, which provided a formalized mechanism of popular mobilization after the event. The chosen narrative was that the attack, and not the politics involved in the management of its information, had a direct effect on the electoral results. This time, it was academic sections close to the Socialist Party that mobilized a modern counterstrategy, writing specific papers analyzing the electoral results as a test to People Party arguments. Turnout at the election rise to 77 percent, the highest in a democratic election in Spain, but the question was if this increase in participation was due to 'fear' or to a social reaction to PP strategies. According to official statistics, 16% of the voters declared that

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42 See for example Lago Peñas and Montero (2005)
that their electoral decision was mainly driven by the mismanagement of the information that the Peoples Party government did about the authors of the attack. Many Spaniards attributed a logic of causality between the People Party foreign policy and al Qaeda attacks, and that was a decisive electoral mechanism that influenced the vote, too (some studies say that around 19%). Only 6% of the voters recognized that they decided to vote for their party after the attacks – otherwise they would have stayed home. Most of these new voters were young people, and the majority of them voted for the Socialist Party, thus rewarding the emphatic realistic strategy deployed by Zapatero during the whole episode, and throughout all the generative structural factors. PP received about the same number as in the previous election: but 2.5 million more people had voted, most of them young people.
Drawing Together the Threads: From 11-M to Political Action

In the preceding section we have discussed the strategic, circumstantial mobilization of a variety of structural factors by the key agents of the episode. Research has been undertaken in order to attempt to clarify the strategic implications of different issues that would otherwise appear to be simple, ‘natural’ reactions to an event. However, we have also studied how each and every one of these factors is indeed a structural contribution to the generation of a consensual phase in the social system, the existence of which has been explored in the first part of this chapter.

Zapatero’s empathic realism mobilized the power implicit in this consensual phase by invoking, in a precise style, the different alterations to the institutional order produced by the event. He combined a commitment to institutional analysis, even when the structural and strategic circumstances for this were not optimal (such as in the mobilization of media attention), and a language and discourse aimed at stimulating empathy as the emotion leading future institutional orientations. However, the existence of a generative phase of power and the deployment of certain styles is only relevant (analytically and politically) to the extent that a relevant realization of this power obtains some sort of visibility.

It is perhaps still too soon to analyze the final impact of this strategic conduct at the national level. But I will introduce into the argument the results of my observation as in October 2007. First, the national level: Under globalization conditions, there aren’t many political issues that maintain an essentially national character, but one of this could be precisely the conflicts connected with the ‘old’ national terrorism such as ETA. As we have seen in the previous section, 11-M contributed, it seems that quite decisively, to open up a sequence of change on this particular issue: global event’s consensual phase was reflexively extended by the key episode’s actors towards the design of a consensual resolution. To a great extend, Zapatero risked an important part of his political capital, and the power gained by the global event occurrence, in the peace process opened up with the terrorists, which for a long time seemed to be going towards a successful resolution. People Party was against a negotiated peace process from the beginning, and different strategies, always under the stylist mark of postmodern Machiavellianism, were deployed
to stop it. And they did it. However, it is plausible to sustain, in the light of the theory explored in this research, that the key strategic factor that eventually drained the possibility of a successful resolution of the peace process was the conspiratorial narrative around 11-M, which was only one among the many pressures strategically designed by PP’s actors to achieve this particular aim.

However, Zapatero chose to keep a modern approach to his strategic conduct, keeping the facts up front of the political analysis of the situation, and of his communication strategy, and giving his unconditional support to the judicial process. This escalated PP’s actors’ strategy. They were forced to design, in order to maintain the coherency of their approach, and to drain the consensual phase generated at the national level, a postmodern narrative that was so absurd, so remotely obscure and detached from reality, and so connected to negative emotions, that although it had a successful impact in the short term, probably at the cost of the mental wellbeing of many old generation Spaniards, it might have execute, at least among the younger generation of the Spanish society, the social credibility and tacit acceptance of those strategies borne out of the Florentine author’s theorems. Chief among the causes of this effect were the final results of the 11-M trial. After 21 months of investigation, Judge Del Olmo ruled Moroccan national Jama Zougam guilty of physically carrying out the attack, ruling out any ETA intervention. The trial of 29 accused began on 15 February 2007. According to many analysts, the Court dismantled one by one all conspiracy theories, and demonstrated that any link or implication of the bombings with ETA was either misleading or without any foundation.

The global sphere did not have the institutional and cultural requirements to be impacted by such conspiratorial narrative, and it is precisely within this sphere that the key policies of the episode emerged. The relevancy of these policies can be measured precisely against the structural constrains imposed by globalization conditions. Globalization, as studied by the globalist school, obliges structural coordination among political actors to achieve objectives in at least eight spheres of power (see Global Transformations), and it is precisely this rule that was subverted by the Bush Administration in the 9/11 episode, when it managed to effectively ignore the position of the majority of global political actors to advance its strategy. But Globalization also implies asymmetrical relationships
within the conditions marked by structural coordination: globalization does not preclude the existence of political inequalities among nation-states and their governments. Spain is what international theorists might call a middle-power in many important dimensions such as the economic and the military, and by its very situation in the power hierarchy there are some policies that would appear structurally unattainable under the stable rule of the traditional sources of power. However, the reflexive, global mobilization of 11-M allowed Zapatero’s government to overcome these structural constrains. It did so with the withdraw of the Spanish troops in Iraq, a complex policy that will be addressed in the following chapter, since it connects precisely with the parameter framing the strategies of the 7/7 case: the kind of power of the US under globalization conditions, and the erroneous perception of it by other actors. But more importantly, the structural constrains of the global system were also overcome by the design and implementation of the Alliance of Civilizations policy - a political project of such magnitude, so ambitious, and so beyond the realistic capacity of a country like Spain, that can only be understood through the mechanism of power that we are trying to explore and illuminate in these pages.

However, the plausible connections between 11-M and the Alliance of Civilizations design an impact could only be possible as a result of the rise of an specific political culture in civil societies around the world, but especially in the Spanish society. In other words, the mobilization of global events for political purposes which are beyond mere national interests both signal and require that people experience a ‘transformation of consciousness’ (to put it in a Habermasian way) and reward the policies in electoral terms, even before its reasonable results are delivered. We have already observed in a previous section that the ‘natural’ emotional basis of the 11-M episode was empathic, and this sole element makes more feasible that the utilization of the global event’s energy could be directed towards cosmopolitan policies. But there’s another structural element that to my view is more relevant and interesting to analyze, although here we will only be able to approach it rather superficially.

This element is the generational gap that we can observe in the Spanish society, and in societies all over the world. The post-materialist theory developed by Ronald Inglehart
(1997) presents the argument that pervasive structural trends are transforming the basic values of the younger generation: with the new result that intergenerational population replacement is producing cultural change. The identity component of this change is empirically explored in Norris (2003) using the World Values Survey data. The results of this study confirm the generational gap thesis at the global level: the youngest cohort (1965-78) displays by far the strongest sense of global identification. The study also shows that the world's youngest generation gives a stronger support to the UN and is more pro-migrants and more pro-free trade.

Similar trends can be observed in the Spanish society. For example, the data of the last survey of Fundación Santa María (4,000 interviews) about the Spanish youth confirm that there's a sustained declining of the Spanish identity among the 18 to 25 year olds. Between 1981 and 2005, this sentiment went down seven points in favour of both local and cosmopolitan identities, but kept similar numbers among the older generations. These differences in identification are also accompanied by changes in the level of trust in national and global institutions, and both trends are also observable in public opinion official surveys. But there are also other elements, much less analyzed in the studies about the question, that seem to contribute to define decisively the generational gap, and that are relevant in relation to the type of political styles observed in our episode. The younger cohorts of the Spanish population seem more sceptic and reluctant to accept traditional strategies of political practice. This is reflected for example in the attitudes towards political leaders. In the last CIS’ survey (2007), over two thirds of the younger Spanish citizens (18-34) believed that anyone holding national political power is always looking for his personal interests (this was six points above the total) and 32 percent expressed 'mistrust' as the main feeling inspired by politics (three points above the total of citizens). However at the same time the youngsters expressed a deeper level of trust in people in general, a much more marked optimism about the economic and political future of Spain and a stronger confidence about alternative ways of political participation beyond the democratic vote.

The Spanish data, as well as the data at the global level, suggest that it would be greatly

4 For example, see the survey Globalización y Relaciones Internacionales elaborated by the CIS (Sociological Investigation Center) – May 2005.
exaggerated to depict an scenario where support for nationalism and Machiavellic Postmodernism has been displaced in favour of other stylistic and substantive political projects. Prudence is also needed in analyzing the apparent future direction in public opinion. However, what 11-M episode shows is that the very evolution of certain political situations, and global events are positively one of them, can create mechanisms where cosmopolitan and 'empathic' attitudes take a more relevant strength than their opposites, thus empowering the political projects that show a direct affinity to them. The demonstrations that took place hours after the event, and hours before the elections, were basically spontaneous, but they were structured by SMS messages over mobile phones sent by many young Spaniards. The most popular motto in these demonstrations was very simple: 'we want the truth'. It was an explicit sanction, globally broadcasted, of those tactics based on the assumption that power is always prior to reality. Young Spaniards were the ones that went to vote massively for Zapatero in the March 14 elections, thus inclining decisively the final result. And the youngest members of the Socialist Party were the ones that, unexpectedly, gave Zapatero the General Secretary of their bureaucratic organization.

While the generational gap seem to be the key of Zapatero's success, there are other reasons that could explain the growing support of the Spanish society for cosmopolitan policies, and that also could have been influenced by the specific circumstances of the episode. For example, according to two recent CIS surveys, there is already a widespread awareness of globalization as a multidimensional phenomenon. 62.5% of the Spaniards have heard about globalization, and 38.1% think that in 10 years time globalization will have contribute to build a better world (25.7% hold the opposite perception). The Spaniards also believed that International Institutions, multinational companies and national governments (in this order) are the institutions that contribute more decisively to the growing interconnection between world regions, and that the main advantage of this will be the growth of cultural interchanges (which, by the way, is the second most cited definition of globalization). Events that take place in other parts of the world have a lot, or quite a lot influence in their everyday lives according to 72% of Spanish people. When asked about what institutions should decide about certain

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44 Ugarte (2005: Chapter 6)
45 Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (2004, 2005)
problems, the majority of the Spanish people declared that international institutions should address questions such as environmental problems, human rights violations, epidemics, and terrorism (56.7% hold this view). These studies also found that 67 per cent of the Spanish people believe that globalization has positive effects in the fight against terrorism (only 12.4% thought that these effects were negative).
From the mobilization of the empathic-based consensus of 11-M rose the national and global political support for the Alliance of Civilizations policy. Dialogue became the paramount concern in Spanish foreign policy and the overarching principle for Zapatero’s government, also in domestic affairs - the richness of communication with others and its capacity for expression and resolution of conflict was put at the service of addressing world imbalances and the existence of extremisms. Within this strategic context, the key objective of the current conception of the Alliance of Civilization policy is to build a powerful communicative matrix between all cultures in the world, developed on the basis of a common belief in equal respect and in the value of cultural exchanges and critical discussion. The Alliance is an institutional innovation, highly flexible, and traditional policy analysis models, especially the linear ones, might not provide enough theoretical room to understand the complexity of its very nature. To begin, however, we can indeed detect an agenda and decision phase as the initial step of the Alliance, the very developing of which shows how the realization of a new global event contributed to blurring the distinction between the design and implementation processes of the policy.

The Alliance’s Formal Beginnings

The design phase of the Alliance of Civilizations policy was clearly penetrated by 11-M attack and its strategic mobilization. It was finally co-sponsored by the Turkish Prime

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46 The analysis of the Alliance of Civilizations is mainly based on the documentation detailed in the methodological appendix.
Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and was officially proposed at the 59th General Assembly of the United Nations in 2005. The initial aim was to identify the principles and the aims of the policy, and to produce actionable, time-bound recommendations by the end of 2006 for UN member states to adopt, two tasks that were undertaken by a tightly knit group of elite experts. It seems that this method was the optimal to legitimate the policy among the UN system of institutions, the relation with which was considered crucial from the beginning. The UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan assembled a ‘High-level Group’ consisting of an epistemic community of 20 eminent persons drawn from policy making, academia, civil society, religious leadership, and the media. As we will see below, the Alliance developed into something more complex and open. But despite that it was a relatively closed and small number of people, the diversity of the group provided a mechanism of openness and inclusion of the policy network to a full range of actors from different religions and civilizations backgrounds. For example, among the members were former Iranian President Mohammad Khatami, who proposed the Dialogue Among Civilizations initiative, Archbishop Desmond Tutu, South African Nobel laureate, Prof. Pan Guang, who obtained the Saint Petersburg-300 Medal for Contribution to China-Russia Relations, and Arthur Schneier, who is the founder and president of the “Appeal of Conscience Foundation” and who gained the "Presidential Citizens Medal”. The epistemic community met personally 5 times between November 2005 and November 2006, and produce a report that provided some of the key principles of the Alliance.

The first meeting of to design the principles and projects of the Alliance occurred in Spain in November 2005. The second meeting was in Doha, Qatar from 25 to 27 February 2006. This meeting took place precisely in the context of another global event episode: the cartoon crisis between West and Islamic world. The very development of the meeting shows that even in the very first design phases of the Alliance, the actors were able to activate the policy in order to achieve particular objectives. Kofi Annan used this meeting to push a consensual statement between relevant international actors about the crisis. Spain and Turkey as the official promoters of the Alliance, the United Nations General Secretary, the Arab League, and the Organization of the Islamic Conference signed this statement, which affirmed the necessity to protect freedom of expression, but also mutual respect and understanding. The European Union was first expected to attend the meeting,
but it finally refused to sign the statement due to its internal divergences, specially the opposition of the Netherlands. But despite this setback, the Alliance of Civilizations, with its internal fluidity, became the only International institution to officially address the cartoon crisis, and contribute to calm it, a fact that reinforced its firmness and the interest of other countries and actors. Moreover, the episode forced the compromise of the European Union to write a declaration of support to the Alliance and, probably more important, it also contribute to the letter that Condoleezza Rice wrote, on behalf of the US, to the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressing the American support to the initiative.

The third meeting took place in Dakar, Senegal from 28 to 30 May 2006 and at the fourth meeting in November 2006 in Istanbul, the members presented their final report outlining the agreed strategic principles of the Alliance. The organizational structure and leadership were also decided. The Secretariat of the Alliance of Civilizations office are based at the United Nations headquarters in New York, and it is relatively small in terms of personnel but very intense in technology (from what we can assume that its organizational structure is quite horizontal). The office provides support to the "High Representative for the Alliance of Civilizations", which is the title of the primary leadership position of the Alliance. The representative functions as political facilitator and lead spokesman, and consults directly with the United Nations Secretary General. In April 2007, the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon appointed the position of High Representative to Jorge Sampaio, former president of Portugal. The strategic implications of this appointment will be discussed below.
The Alliance Strategy

The components of the Alliance strategy, as stated in the key documents of the institution, can be summarized as follows. First, to promote a consensual and holistic educational system around the world, with emphasis on knowledge of other cultures and human rights, mobility and the active, autonomous use of the Internet for educational purposes. Second, to expand opportunities for youth independent mobilization and the overcoming of social-economic and cultural alienation in their respective societies. The policy also proposes the establishment of a “Global Youth Alliance” as a mechanism of policy implementation. Third, to establish proactive strategies for addressing migration in a coordinated way among states, stressing the positive opportunities open up by contemporary human flows. And fourth, to encourage traditional media actors to serve as a bridge between cultures and societies, and to promote the use of the Internet as a network for social interactions to exchange ideas and information.

There is a long-running debate about multiculturalism in the academic world that, among other things, shows the complexity of the issue. The Alliance political project inherits some of the contradictions that are intimately connected with the complexity of all cultural concepts and policies. Some intellectuals for example have strongly attacked that the concept of ‘Civilization’ was chosen as the unit for organizing the policy objective and principles. Some political groups, such as PP’s actors, have qualified the policy as simply naïve and unfeasible. But given the complexity and ambition of the task, the political project seem to have a strong internal coherence, especially because it appeals to the value which is unquestionably shared by all cultures in the world: the value of open communication, which not only gives consistency to the overall strategy, but also minimizes the grey areas where different principles can collide. To some analysts this is a sign that the policy lacks accurate content, a perception that is reinforced by the fact that its contents are only outlined in the different documents and statements made by the Spanish government and the UN secretary general. However, this seems to overlook the complex nature of the policy, that for the moment has received the support of public

47 For example, the former Spanish president, José María Aznar, said in a conference in the Hudson Institute in Washington (September 2006) that “for me, the Alliance of Civilizations is an stupidity. It is absolutely impossible. Our Alliance must be the Atlantic Alliance, and we need it to be stronger. Because if they attack, we will be able to defend ourselves”. For another conservative critique of the Alliance see Schaefer (2006).
opinion around the world and of the governments of more than 60 countries, with more
countries expected to joint the policy in the short term. However, how can be asses the
observable consequences of the policy? To assert this we must first confront an analysis
of the coherency of its principles, especially the ones that are implied in the very design
and implementation of the policy, but not always stated in its formal documentation.

The first principle that seems to be fundamental for the development of the Alliance of
Civilizations is the principle of interdependency: an increasingly globalizing world order
can be regulated only through stable collaboration within an effective multilateral system,
and the first task to establish this collaboration is the recognition of interconnectedness,
which is precisely what extremist dramatically fail to do. Interdependence implies
diversity of cultures, which is one of the most important driving forces for human
progress. Within this multicultural context, interdependency is understood as both a top-
down condition imposed by contemporary globalization conditions and as the
empowerment of an empathic emotional state through the exercise of free dialogue and
understanding. The Alliance is a communicative policy set to operate at the interface of
both forms, connecting a modern, institutional analysis of the globalizing tendencies of
our world with an empathy-assisted widespread rationalization of this process. However,
despite this late modernity approach, it is also acknowledge that the moral-ethical
principle of compassion that exists in all religions can also play a critical role in
promoting an appreciation of other cultures.

The second principle is that the enactment of positive emotions can only be achieved if
world’s major material inequalities are addressed. Poverty leads to despair, a sense of
injustice, and alienation that, when combined with political grievances, can foster
extremism that obscures by definition the rational recognition of the principle of
interdependence. The only way of addressing such inequalities is to further advance the
institutionalization of the multilateral decision-making system in the context of the United
Nations system and the rule of Human Rights.

Third, the world major political actors must have a viable alternative to the ‘War on
Terror’ policy and the ‘clash of civilizations’ theory. This is because, in absence of an
alternative institutional and political discourse, the eventuality of new global events, especially terrorist attacks, will feed the support for this policies and theories. In this respect, there are in fact several similarities between these policies that are worth analyzing. One, both of them are in fact institutional infrastructures designed to scale in terms of power and significance every time that a global event occurs. This characteristic will be further addressed below. Two, the Alliance tacitly accepts the institutional analysis that highlights the current visibility of identity-based conflicts connected to contemporary patterns of globalization. However, it strongly denies the inevitability of these conflicts, and in fact attributes them, among other issues, to the ‘anxiety’ and ‘confusion’ caused by the very ‘clash of civilizations’ theory. Therefore the Alliance policy aims at mobilizing similar analytical grounds than the ‘clash’ theory for totally different future oriented projections, which both require and stimulate radically different emotions. And third, both of them have democracy, and democratic governance, at their core. But the Alliance sustains that, in order to be successful, democratic systems must emerge organically from within each society’s culture. In principle, the Alliance is not based on a pacifist theory, but any ‘war’ that stimulates national and global sentiments of fear and injustice is radically rejected because it blocks the very possibility of democracy.

Fourth, identity-based conflicts are only the most visible part of a new, rising global order that is mostly based on cooperation and cultural understanding. These are expressed through, and encouraged by, multiple political projects that aligned with the core components of the Alliance policy. The Alliance does not aim at replacing any of these existing plans or political channels, but to facilitate their visibility through partnership operations among a variety of existing groups. It is, more than anything else, a communicative device with the emotional and epistemological ambition to unite and project these evidences (the sites of confluence and understanding) towards particular future outlooks. The power generated by 11-M gave the energy to articulate the Alliance of Civilizations as the communicative frame for other projects, a strategy that also requires a correct reading of the political tempo of the project (see below).

The fifth principle connects directly with the 11-M strategic mobilization described in the previous section. There’s a growing generational gap in societies around the world, and
two key parameters of this gap are reflexive awareness of political identities and interconnection and the growing disapproval among the young generations of certain modes of political behaviour. In this context, the Alliance aims at encouraging the parameters of this transformation promoting certain educative measures. It also aims at expanding the opportunities for youth mobilization and their incorporation to relevant structural positions in societies around the world. However, the Alliance is also aware that the generational gap is to a great extend an elite-driven gap, and that elites are too intimately linked to pragmatism. More often than not, this discards them as significant agents of social change. That is why one of the primary concerns of the Alliance is to promote and to provide proper funding for extended-stayed exchanges between youths of different countries who are part of strata of society other than elite populations.

And sixth, the Internet is a crucial instrument to increase the level of socio-political autonomy of people and civil society in relation to the institutions of the nation-state and big corporations, including media corporations. The Internet is also a privileged tool for peoples around the world to initiate bottom-up, non-coercive processes of cultural communication and interchange, and to become media producers and disseminators. And at the same time, the Internet is also a privileged ground to disseminate complex, innovative and interesting audiovisual materials that can truly engaged a mentally concentrated audience in a reflexive debate about the consequences of cultural and political conflicts in interdependent settings. Nation-states and big media corporations tend to focus on the negative aspects of the Internet, and the Alliance aims at being the first policy to truly concentrate its efforts in giving visibility and use to the opportunities opened up by the widespread, autonomous utilization of information and communication technologies.
The Alliance and the Global State

This strategy seems to have a strong internal coherency, at least if we measure this coherency against the key themes identified and researched by globalist theorists: there are no grounds for assessing the policy as irrational, nor for affirming with far-sighted rotundity that it is unfeasible. In other words, if globalization theory is correct, the Alliance of Civilization’s success is in fact more plausible than that of the ‘War on Terror’. However, it would be against the premises of this research to venture into predictions based on deterministic considerations of global society. Global event episodes contribute precisely to showing that history is not pre-determined, but lived and created by human agents equipped with proper sources of power. The characterization of global event episodes that we have proposed in previous pages does, however, require an assessment of the intended and unintended consequences of the key policies which emerge from this case – an assessment that, if we take the globalist theory as a frame of reference, implies analyzing the impact of the policy on political globalization structures and on the emerging form of some sort of global state (see analytical framework, page 60). We can further simplify this point in order to study the impact of the policy on the United Nations system of institutions.

As we have seen above, the implementation phase of the policy took place from the very beginning of its introduction, a fact that gives a measure of its complex nature. The Alliance contributed to calm the “cartoon crisis” in a moment when the conflict could have escalated very dangerously. The Alliance idea was also mobilize during different global events such as the World Cup in Germany, where no racist or identity-related incident was reported. Moreover, in May 2007, the Alliance released its implementation plan that proposed a series of more concrete measures that are currently under way. However, it is obvious that the Alliance is only in the very beginning of its implementation process and that, due to its ambitions aims and its complex nature, a proper assessment of its impact requires not only a significant laps of time, but also an innovative analytical effort that transcends the current limits of the policy evaluation models. In sum, in order to pursue the aims of this exploratory research, we do have to

48 For an academic analysis of the cartoon crisis see Albrow and Anheier (2008: 9)
venture in an analysis of the potential intended and unintended consequences of that the policy might have for the current structures of political globalization.

The observable trends of the policy suggest that there are four interconnected areas where it can have a significant impact: human security conception and implementation, legitimacy, organizational structure and legal transformation of the United Nations system. First of all, the Alliance can contribute to expand the conception of security. It’s important to bear in mind that, according to this investigation, the Alliance proposal emerges from the political power generated by 11-M, and that this invariably links it to the problems of global security as one of its key justifications. The Alliance conception gives priority to address the social and political causes of sympathy for terrorism – this is too obvious to comment. It also gives priority to the application of international law enforcement measures over global terrorists, always under a scrutinized respect to human rights laws. However, there is a more dynamic and complex issue that is worth mentioning, and that we can call ‘imperative shift’. In absence of a flexible, communicative policy ready to scale at the global level under the proper circumstances, and that transmits the perception of coordination and efficacy, the realization of security threats of global magnitude will tend to reinforce the advocates of narrow securitization strategies, especially if they hold a relevant structural position within the power structures of particular nation-state. The security imperative could indeed condition the Alliance proposal and remove their new and different elements. But, as we have seen in the cartoon crisis, the Alliance proposal seems more likely to reverse this situation to condition the securitization imperative, nationally and globally, drawing on particular global events to reinforce its epistemic principles, and perhaps draining the legitimacy of postmodernist tactics. There could be, however, unintended consequences within the security sphere. For example, Barreñada (2006:103), reflecting on the risks of the Alliance, thinks that, by its very global nature, and its use of the concept of civilization, the policy could in fact ‘reinforce the confrontational perception [between West and Arab and Muslim countries] that the proposal universality seeks to address’.

Second, the Alliance policy could contribute to make arise a new type of political

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49 See for example the investigations of the Copenhagen School of International Relations: Buzan et al. (1998)
legitimacy that can be used to reform the United Nations system. It would be based on three principles: the fresh and direct appeal that the policy can have to the world's younger generation, the increasing role of the Internet as a tool for reinforcing institutional autonomy, knowledge and coordination of people and civil societies around the world, and a shared disposition for and value of communication between all cultures and peoples. All these principles have been discussed above separately, but it seems that they converge in what would probably be the key of this new legitimating process: the transformation of the rationalization process of global interdependency. Globalization brings interdependency among communities, as the globalist authors have contributed to clarify. However, the mobilization of the concept by the United Nation’s actors is usually attached to a particular rationalization process assisted by the emotion of fear – the UN system reform is justified by means of the necessity to address the inherent risks of interdependency. The main problem with this approach is precisely that it plays in the very same emotional, utilitarian grounds where nation-states seem to justify their contemporary raison d'être. On the contrary, the Alliance advocates for an empathic-base rationalization of interdependency, stressing its opportunity site and exploring the positive effects that an increasing interdependent world can have over the emotional infrastructure of individuals. That is, it combines Kant with Spinoza. But while this can indeed contribute to create a new, and probably longer, legitimacy process for a world’s based public intervention, it can also have dramatic unintended consequences if the final forms of political actions conflict with the key premises of the process, especially the principle of individual autonomy.

Third, a crucial element of the Alliance proposal is its aim at combining and coordinating different actors and political projects. The proposal is to bring together governments, actors from the civil society, multiple UN agencies (UNESCO and UNDP among others), as well as other international organizations and regional bodies, including the European Union, the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Council of Europe, the Organizational of the Islamic Conference, the League of Arab States, the Islamic Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization, United Cities and Local Governments and the World Tourism Organization. The Alliance current organizational conception

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50 Mestres and Soler (2007)
implies very little bureaucracy. And, if properly articulated, the network of partners can indeed transform the proposal in one of the biggest networked policies at the global level ever designed, able to address a particular problem or global event from different positions, flexibly configuring and reconfiguring its structure in relation to its shared aims, and not to the individual interests of its partners. That the initial organizational conception of the Alliance tends to the network structure opens up the possibility that the policy could impact on the highly bureaucratic structure of the United Nations system, for example introducing a more networking culture among its employees. It could also happen, however, exactly the opposite: the Alliance can easily become a bureaucratic structure, especially if its leaders and members interpret it as an objective in itself, instead of a system of reconfigurable means. When and how Zapatero's government and other crucial actors substitute their active guidance for a greater openness of the policy will probably be crucial to determine the final organizational structure of the Alliance.

And four, as a cumulative result of all other three impacts, and in fact as the more relevant political result of the overall 11-M episode, the Alliance of Civilizations can impact on the enforcement of international legal rules, and on the rethinking and creation of new types of rules at the global level that might help regulating those forms of power which compromise, disrupt or undermine fair and sustainable conditions for global cooperation and coordination.

**CONCLUSION: THE 11-M EPISODE**

The global event episode analyzed in this chapter is complex, and some of its consequences are still unfolding as I write these words. And yet, the exercise has been useful to explore the explanatory power of the episodic characterization approach to the political dynamics of the post 9/11 world. The general methodological lessons learned
from the exercise will be discussed in the dissertation’s conclusion. It is important to bear in mind that, according to our framework, general theoretical statements cannot be derived from single episodic characterizations. But we can extract several analytical results for the specific development of the case. They relate directly to the cumulative parts of our framework.

The 11-M terrorist bombings were a global event first of all because globalization, understood as the exercise of intended and unintended power at transnational distance and within a highly interconnected political setting, was a plausible cause. And it was a plausible cause from different perspectives: from the perspective of the global terrorist group that perpetrated the attack, and from the perspective of the current configuration of global political institutions and policies that were unable to stop the realization of the event. On March 11, both Spanish and global societies were indeed deeply affected by the attack. The data suggests that a consensual period was triggered by the event, thus generating a substantial quantity of power within the political system: 11-M generated power to do things; transformative, non-zero sum power. The data presented also suggests that the emotional basis of the consensual period was mainly empathic, and this is important because it naturally predisposed both Spanish and global societies to accept certain policies that were perhaps impossible before the attack. A crucial observation is that this consensual period was obviously connected to the plausible causes of the event, that is, the operation of global terrorism on Spanish soil, but it also had a general political effect that was beyond this connection. This is why it is plausible to analyze the mobilization of energy following 11-M as a broad phenomenon, with general political ramifications, both national and global.

Treating global events as sources of transformative power help to disclose the characteristics of distinctive strategic conducts. This is perhaps the key value added of the episodic characterization methodology. In this chapter, Zapatero’s strategic conduct during the 11-M episode has been studied by means of the analysis of the ways in which he mobilized the specific power of the event. Since 11-M is the key source of power of this period, it offers a very bounded research object that reflects with particular clarity key characteristics of agent’s strategic conduct. We have been able to study Zapatero’s strategic principles, and their mobilization, as an ideal type strategy, and we have seen
that they coincide with what we have characterized as empathic realism: a combination of a modern approach to the institutional analysis of the causes and consequences of the event, and a deliberate exploitation of the positive emotion of empathy in order to extend, within both time and space coordinates, the consensual phase that was generated in the social system after the event occurrence. We have also been able to study the strategic conduct of the People's Party actors, and observed how postmodern Machiavellianism contrasts very substantially with Zapatero's political conduct. It does so especially in the ways in which it subordinates the attainment of power to any type of truth seeking over the causes and consequences of the attack. At the same time, we have been able to prove that the major emotions exploited by this latter strategy are fear and anger – two emotions that lied beneath a conspiratorial narrative widely diffused during the episode's development.

The conspiratorial narrative of PP actors managed to drain the consensual phase at the national level. In our episodic characterization we have been able to prove the plausible link between this and the failure of the peace process with ETA, which was the key national objective towards which Zapatero’s government mobilized the power of the global event. However, the global sphere did not have the institutional and cultural characteristics to be impacted by the PP's strategy. This helps to explain the relative success of the design and implementation process of the Alliance of Civilization policy, which is the key political outcome of the episode. The relevance of the Alliance can be assessed against the structural constraints imposed by globalization conditions. Measured within the terms of 'traditional' sources of power, Spain simply did not have a strong enough structural position in the global system to implement this policy. The mobilization following 11-M within the terms of Zapatero’s empathic realism, and the support of the Spanish and the world’s younger generation, explains the possibility of the Alliance of Civilizations, and its potential impact on the global system.

It is tempting to conclude by comparing the potential effects of the Alliance of Civilizations with those of the 'War on Terror', but the comparison is unnecessary if one simply consults Sands’ (2005) powerful narration of the consequences that the 9/11 episode had for the international legal system. Less evident is the comparison between the 11-M and the 7/7 episodes, an exercise that we will briefly explore in the next chapter.
Chapter 4

London 7 July 2005 and 11 March:
Key Aspects and Comparison
The main aim of this chapter is to identify more clearly some of the key ideas contained in the preceding characterization, and compare these elements with those observable in the 7/7 global event episode. These ideas represent some of the aspects that a possible theory of the global event, and any of its episodic characterizations, must necessarily address. Short analytical ideas will clearly prevail over empirical description in this section. The 7/7 and 11-M episodes had substantially different political trajectories: if 11-M resulted in the development of a policy with the potential to enforce legal international rules, the 7 July bombings mainly resulted in mobilization to advance a law, the Terrorism Act 2006, which implies not only the recession of civil liberties in the UK, but also the reinforcement, at least within UK foreign policy, of the old realist understanding of international relations; whilst the Alliance could inaugurate a new period of innovations in international law, the Terrorism Act legislates against the European Human Rights Convention, thus weakening international law. The exploration of some of the obvious differences between the two episodes, always within the disciplinary boundaries of political sociology and within the terms of our analytical framework, might help to clarify some of the key aspects of global event episodes. Three elements will be briefly presented in the following pages: the importance of ‘emotions’ in the political analysis of global events, the strategic loop effect that risk theories of globalization might have had on the behaviour of certain actors, and the current nature of American power. We will dedicate more attention to this last, since it seems to be the key factor underling Tony Blair’s strategic conduct during the 7/7 episode. In the concluding part of the chapter we will put forward some ideas on the compatibility between the Alliance of Civilizations policy and the Terrorism Act 2006.
GLOBAL EVENTS AND EMOTIONS

Interest in "the emotional" has burgeoned in the last years, not only in sociology and political sociology studies, but in psychology, philosophy, history, international relations and media studies. A concern to understand the role of the emotional in personal, social and political life has developed in response to a number of factors, including the realization of global events and the strategic activities around them. The past overlook of emotions in orthodox social scientific approaches, especially those associated with objectivism and structuralism, responded to the view that they occupy a relegated place in political life, and hence is seen as relatively uninteresting and inaccessible to the methods of sociological analysis. What has come to be known as the 'politics of fear' of the Bush Administration is undoubtedly among the key reasons that explain this renewed interest in emotions. Moreover, as we have seen in the previous chapter, during the peak moments of global events episodes, emotions clearly transcend the personal realm, providing a wealth of evidences to which the social analysts can draw upon. Interpretative approaches to social science have tended to monopolize the renaissance of the field: society and particular social phenomena are seen to function as constructed situations in which emotions dominate one way or another. We have already discussed the limitations of this approach (see Chapter One), so we can here concentrate in outlining an alternative to this view, one that has been mobilized in the empirical analysis of the previous chapter:

Recent psychological and neurological experiments suggest that emotions are an intrinsic neuronal event operating in any cognitive process developed by normal individuals: love and hate and anguish, envy, fear and empathy are all part of the 'rational', and in fact part of the body. All social actors are knowledgeable agents: they possess a complex knowledge about the institutional circumstances to which they are part of. But such knowledge about social reality keeps a chronic, bidirectional relation with their emotional state, which is in turn alterable by both structural and strategic phenomena. However, this

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51 Albrow (1997); Bendelow and Williams (eds.1998); Tumer (2008)
52 Oates (2006);
53 Lebow (2006)
54 Cho et al. (2003)
55 See for example the collection of papers edited by Millennium Journal around the notion of sublime (2006:34).
56 Koenigs et al. (2007); Damasio (2007)
tremendous discovery is hardly taken into account in most of the current social scientific approaches to the study of emotions, which tend to treat them as something preventable, sharply separated from reason. Moreover, after the recent advances in the neuroscience, we can be quite sure that the plethora of emotions that all human beings are in principle able to experience can in fact be divided between 'negative' and 'positive', and that they tend to exclude each other. However, a simplistic hypothesis connecting 'good' emotions with an intrinsically 'truthful' rationalization of reality must be avoided. We have also to be very cautious with the opposite hypothesis. Although we know that negative emotions such as fear are intimately connected with automatic survival mechanisms, and that this mechanisms tend to highlight certain premises of the cognitive processes involved in the rationalization of a particular event, we also know that fear or anger can indeed save lives, at least when actors are physically present in the realization of a violent global event.

What the chronic connection of emotion and cognition seems to reveal is another, more complex situation: the generation of proper institutional circumstances for the exercise of transformative power must have an emotional basis. Social consensus demands getting things done, and power is the means of getting those things done. However, a significant section of the members of a society can achieve the very same rational conclusion about the need for action under radically different emotional states. This in principle has two political consequences. One, it inclines the final action towards certain political options. Two, it provides a key field for strategic behaviour. Global events 'natural' emotions, be they negative or positive, can be made to endure a significant span of time, and to transcend contextualities of co-presence, as means for certain political actions. But in principle positive or negative emotions emerging from the experience of an event can also be strategically confronted by its negative or positive natural counterpart.

London bombings provoked instant domestic and global political unity, a consensus that was even more visible, robust and free from strategic interferences than the one generated by the Madrid’s bombings (see section one of Chapter One). However, we can observe considerable differences in some of the indicators that we have used to assess the emotional basis of this consensus. Public response to the attacks, for example, was significantly different. Fred Halliday, reflecting about the differences between 7/7 and 11-M few days after the London attack, wrote in an Open Democracy article (2005): “Much
is made, with reason, of the calm dignity and resilience of British people after 7 July. The remarkable contrast is by no means with a confused or excessively emotional Spain after 11 March, but with the political response of its people, its parties, and its civil societies. [...] After the Madrid bombings, 12 million people demonstrated in the streets of Spain’s cities and towns, denouncing violence and upholding the values of democracy. [...] The contrast with London – where the Trafalgar Square gathering on 14 July is so far the only sizable collective response – is notable.” Rubin et al. (2005) conducted a cross sectional telephone survey to a representative sample of Londoners to assess the impact of the bombings on stress levels and travel intentions. The study showed the presence of substantial stress among Londoners, a 32% of whom reported an intention of travel less on tubes, trains and buses, or in central London, once the transport network had returned to normal. In a 7 months follow-up study published in 2007, Rubin and his colleagues found that substantial stress and reduction in travel because of the bombings persisted at a slightly reduced level, that 43% of Londoners perceived a terrorist threat to themselves and that a more negative world view connected with the attack was common. One has to be very prudent in comparing these evidences with the ones presented in the characterization of 11-M57. We would need a much more systematic and profound study to undertake a deeper comparison and to understand its underlying cultural and institutional causes58. Moreover, any Londoner knows that London is still a vibrant city, with multitudes gathering on the streets every time that the weather allows it. But the available data on the issue do seem to suggest that 7/7 triggered more fear than the terrorist attack in Spain, and that this emotion seems to persists. Again, we have to remind ourselves that fear could indeed provide positive, rational consequences for survival. But neither should we forget that fear is a negative emotion, that, when accompanied by the idea of an external cause, can provide assistance to broad political process of consensus generation, thus immediately biasing the future outcome of the process towards certain political options and to the successful application of certain political strategies.

57 For example, I haven’t been able to find serious studies about the psychological and behavioral impact of 11-M.
58 It is interesting to note that while Madrid has only 24 public surveillance cameras, London has 42,000.
The analysis of Tony Blair’s strategic conduct in the post 9/11 world poses one of the greatest puzzles for political commentators and social scientist alike. Many have already met this intellectual challenge, and this is not the place, nor the person that can address this issue in all its complexity. So a simplified question, which connects specifically with our analytical framework, would be: did Tony Blair use postmodern tactics and the politics of fear in the 7/7 episode?. On 5 August 2005, Blair did a very significant press conference59 with the main purpose of outlining the political project that emerged from the July attacks. The introductory sentences are remarkable: “Of course, there is anxiety and worry, but the country knows the purpose of terrorism is to intimidate, an it’s not inclined to be intimidated. Of course too, there have been isolated and unacceptable acts of racial or religious hatred. But they have been isolated, by and large Britain knows it is a tolerant and good natured nation […] However, I’m acutely aware that alongside these feelings is also a determination that this very tolerance and good nature should not be abused by a small but fanatical minority, and an anger that it has been.” The way that Blair mobilizes positive and negative emotions, evidences of social behaviour after the attack, national identity and assumed political demands of the citizens clearly contrasts with Zapatero’s speech acts that we have studied in the previous chapter. Most of the academics that have written about this particular speech have focused on the Blair’s stark warning of his plans: “Let no one be in doubt, the rules of the game are changing”. While it is true that the expression transmits only a slightly deeper sophistication that some of the Bush’s memorable sentences after 9/11, it’s interesting to notice that Blair used the notion of ‘game’ to refer in very vague terms to something that we have to assume has to be ‘society’. The formulation that Blair chose is interesting because it bears with it an emotional content that has traditionally been quite overlooked. Games are utilitarian, social systems that can be stated abstractly and studied mathematically, but that have a problematic relation with the actual conduct of social actors. It has always been quite plausible that the missing premise in game’s abstractions of society is the unavoidable emotional nature of human beings. But a new study has proved this scientifically: the utilitarian behaviour that is presumed in ‘games’ abstractions bears a strong negative

59 www.number-10.gov.uk/output/Page8041.asp (last access: July 2007)
correlation with the normal capacity of individuals to experience positive emotions. Therefore, in the light of these new, solid evidences, treating society, or any social relation for that matter, as a 'game', contains a substantive but provably unintended structuration capacity, especially when the Prime Minister of a nation mobilizes the metaphor during a period when the social foundations for transformative power are being generated. Reflecting about the social and legal implications of Blair’s sentence, Walker writes (2007: 427): “One might deprecate the implication that solemn legal process determining vital individual rights and societal interests should be viewed as no more sacrosanct than a ‘game’. One might also comment on the agenda highlighted for reform – in other words, the diminution of individual rights rather than possible intelligence and administration fallings. A subsequent refusal to allow any form of inquiry into the latter beyond the production of a ‘narrative’ confirms the official determination to manage the policy agenda.”

According to the available studies, the construction of postmodern narratives by Blair’s government seemed to be a constant element of the strategy after 9/11. Taylor and Archetti have studied speeches and press conferences given by the ex-Prime Minister, and the relation of these with media discourse, connected to four recent terrorism-related events (a Heathrow airport alert in 2003, İstanbul bombings directed to British targets in 2003, several flight delays between 2003 and 2004 and Madrid’s March 11). The authors find that the government’s communication during the crisis saw a constant repetition of the same uninformative messages (for example that the public should be ‘alert but not alarmed’; that the threat of ‘international terrorism is ‘real’ and ‘serious’; etc.) and abundant inconsistencies between the course of action and the chosen narrative. Although the British government never used the expression ‘War on Terror’, the study finds that the terrorist threat was always described in very vague terms, employing expressions such as ‘extremists and rogue states can strike at any time, across any national boundary and in pursuit of a cause with which there can be little or no rational negotiation’. Interestingly, one of the findings of this study is that, despite the general claim that media create hype, sensationalism and could encourage public panic, the actual routes followed by information on terrorism show that the great majority of alarmist statements reported by

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60 Koenigs et al. (2007)
the British media originally come from officials. For example, on 28 February 2005 the Prime Minister told the audience of BBC Radio 4’s Women’s Hour programme that “there are several hundred of them [terrorists] in the country who we believe are engaged in plotting or trying to commit terrorist acts”. However, I would be inclined to place the key element of the logic of alarmism more than on the vagueness or exaggeration of the message, on the constant demand for people’s implication in the government’s strategy against terrorism, a policy that I have not observed in the study of the Spanish episode, nor in the everyday life in the Spanish cities. The psychological costs of encountering a reminder of the existence of global terrorism and the necessity to be ‘alert but not alarmed’ every time that one enters into the public transport system are very likely to be significant.\textsuperscript{61}

Although the focus of our inquiry is 7/7 aftermath, we do not have to forget that the major focus of media management during Blair’s second term was on the war on Iraq, where Blair misinformed the public in presenting the case of war. The only open question about this is if he did it knowingly or not. On a basis of a detail research of this particular episode, and on Blair’s government media management tactics (spin), Kuhn (2005: 111) concludes that: “some of the news management techniques employed by New Labour under Campbell pushed up against and sometimes transgressed the boundaries of reasonable behaviour the public expect of politicians and their close advisers”. This, accordingly to the author, lead to a breakdown of trust in the process of postmodern political communication, and by extension a crisis of popular trust in the current configuration of political system, a results which is very similar than the one we have observe in the 11-M case.

But it seems that New Labour wasn’t always like this. Many analysts seem to identify a shift in Blair’s substantial and communication strategy regarding security policies, international law and the fight against terrorism after 9/11\textsuperscript{62}. Much has been made about Blair’s interpretation of the ‘special’ relation of the UK and the US as the main cause of

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\textsuperscript{61} London’s climate of fear is also produced by what Les Back (2007: 124) calls “the soundtrack” of the “War on Terror”, something which is also less present in Spain according to my observation. As this sociologist writes “part of the work that the sirens do in our time is to maintain the constant sense of war and emergency and amplify fear. The phobicity is not created by the bombers alone, rather it is created by politicians and journalists who are concerned with the thought of them and trade on people’s fears”

\textsuperscript{62} For example see Gearty (2007)
\end{footnotesize}
this shift. I will address this in the following section in relation to the 11-M episode and the withdrawn of the Spanish troops from Iraq. But this apparently highly constraining ‘relation’, which was in fact tacitly blamed by Tony Blair himself as the main cause of his erratic conduct, cannot be the only reason of his strategic behaviour during the 7/7 episode: there must be other, more profound causes that allowed him to shift the strategy without entering into flagrant epistemological and ideological contradictions with the New Labour political program. A comparison between Blair’s version of the Third Way and Zapatero’s ‘New Way’ ideology (see Chapter One, section 2) provides the following two clues on this issue: First, global risks and their socio-psychological consequences play a much larger role in Blair’s understanding of globalization. While the New Way program lacks the powerful theoretical basis that derives from the study of the impacts of global risks, it is surely more aligned with a much simpler theory of social emotions. Given the analysis presented in the previous chapter, it is plausible to think that this theory provides an alternative theoretical scaffold for the design of political strategies within globally interconnected settings. By principle, these strategies avoid any Hegelian exploitation of negative emotions, but do not necessarily downplay or overlook the necessity to address certain risks. Second, civil liberties play a pivotal role in the New Way political program and in Zapatero’s stated political convictions. This has obvious effects regarding the election of certain domestic political options, but it can also have more interesting ramifications, for example a complex connection with a genuine intention to comply with international law, no matter what situation or what interests would be at the stake. Despite his obvious inconsistencies, it seems that Tony Blair had always been a strong proponent of international law and multilateralism, so it would be worth analyzing this contradiction in the light of his much less enthusiastic defence of civil liberties.
TRAJECTORIES AND PERCEPTIONS OF THE GLOBAL AMERICAN POWER

Few analysts doubt that Tony Blair built much of his foreign relations strategy after 9/11 upon the conviction that Britain needed to stay close to the US. This would explain, at least partially, not only his strategic shift and erratic conduct in security policies, especially Britain’s participation in the Iraq war, but also some of his domestic decisions. In fact, if this is correct, the 7/7 episode could be interpreted as a 9/11 sub-episode, revealing some of the complex mechanisms that connect foreign policies with national strategies under globalization conditions. 7/7 took place in a political context where Blair had already positioned himself as the key fundamental ally of the United State’s ‘War on Terror’ principles, and he could not simply turn to another set of principles, or pick and choose different strategies around similar global events, if he did not want to lose his government’s coherence (because postmodern tactics are also dependant on coherence).

This perspective would reinforce the globalist idea that foreign and national polices are intrinsically connected, in highly interdependent contexts, where many issues are global, but democratic accountability mechanisms are exclusively local.

The key, unanswered question would be then what specific reasons lead Blair to became the key George W. Bush’s ally in the “‘War on Terror’”, the strategic principles of which were simply applied nationally, and reinforced globally, once the opportunity came by. Three sets of arguments have been mobilized in the literature to explain this situation. One, Tony Blair was convinced that Britain could act as the bridge between the US and Europe, and that he could use this position to lead a consensual strategy in the Middle East and in other affairs. The new Republican administration policies had created tensions between Europe and the United States over several issues. The most prominent ones were the missile defence, the US intention to withdraw from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the denunciation of the Kyoto agreement on climate change and the US opposition to the proposed International Criminal Court. Blair, some observers argue, wanted to minimise these differences and act as a link between Europe and the United States; this strategy was simply reinforced after 9/11, specially when the revival of the Franco-

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63 See for example Riddel (2005). Blair made this clear on a speech in January 2007, when he declared that British foreign policy 'has as its foundation, two alliances, with America on the one hand and Europe on the other'.
German alliance became clearer. Blair rejected as destabilising the vision of a multipolar world advocated by President Chirac and other European leaders in which a united Europe acts as a counterweight to the 'hyper-power' across the Atlantic. The British prime minister believed in a strong Europe acting in cooperation, not competition, with the US, and 'deluded' himself (an expression often used by the advocates of this argument) that he could provide this bridge, and exercise real influence in the White House's policies.

Two, there is a historical, structural connection between Britain and the US, and Blair's decision to ally with Washington was a mere reflection of this unconditional relation. Blair, some observers argue, simply behaved as a very traditional British prime minister, unwilling to jeopardize the structural Atlantic alliance, and all that implied in military, intelligence, cultural and economic structural links. After the Second World War, successive governments have made the relationship with the US a central focus of UK foreign policy, a commitment that has been even stronger in the last twenty-five years, as Tony Blair himself made clear in March 2001: "I've been as pro-America a Prime Minister as it is possible to have. There is not a single issue I can think of in which we haven't stood foursquare with America"  

Three, the US is in the process of building a new global empire, and it is obviously better to be with them than against them. After 9/11, Blair became a de facto Bush's ambassador, covering more than 40,000 miles in the eight weeks after the September 11 attacks while having 54 meetings with other leaders. When the differences over Iraq war between the United States and Europe became irreconcilable, Blair became an advocate for the US side, thus exposing the contradictions of his foreign policy (and by extension the problems of the 'bridge hypothesis'). Some versions of the specific content of the 'special relationship' are in fact aligned with this argument. Winston Churchill, who was the first Prime Minister to structure the notion of a special relationship between the United Kingdom and the United States, linked this relation to the aspirations of the UK to keep his status as a great power. For him, the special relationship was one in which the US, because of its greater power sources, would now play the leading role in shaping

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64 Hill (2005: 388)
world affairs, with the UK acting as a junior partner in this endeavour.65 Nevertheless, the three arguments are not necessarily connected, nor exclusive in their explanatory power. But they do underlie the very same prediction about the evolution of the new world order: the US, due to its overwhelming military and economic power, and the mobilization of 9/11 and further global events, is in the process of placing itself at the very centre of the international system.

Is this an erroneous perception or a real trajectory? For the moment, as many observers have detected, the development of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the current strength of global terrorism, have made it plain the existing limits of the Bush Administration project when confronted with the complexities of a global, multilayered system of power. Yet the post 9/11 world seems to be indeed a transitional world, full of power opportunities, and dominated by the selection of strategic options more than by its structural constrains. A new American administration could recommit to the ideal of multilateralism, and perhaps adhere to the ideas of the Alliance of Civilizations. But a new American administration could also refresh and modernize the "War on Terror" project, this time having learned from previous strategic mistakes. In terms of the relation with the United States power, it is clear that Tony Blair bet much of his international and domestic political capital on the second prediction, on the plausible continuation of the "War on Terror" by other means, and this seemed indeed to be a rather good utilitarian option when George W. Bush was elected for a second term.

Zapatero’s government, on the other hand, designed its 11-M episode tactics not only in terms of the former prediction, that is, the conviction that a new American administration would have a different political agenda, but also explicitly assuming that if the exercise of hard power had some sort of continuity, the decline of American overall power, which for some analysts was already taking place66, was going to be sharp and sustained. Zapatero’s decision to withdraw the Spanish troops from Iraq was the fundamental expression of this

65 The notion of special relationship was first elaborated in the Churchill’s famous Fulton Speech. Investigating the circumstances of this event, Callaghan (2007: 169) concludes that “more than 100 Labour MPs condemned the speech in a House of Commons motion. But more important, the Labour Government had arrived at the same conclusion as Churchill, who probably spoke with its silent support”.

66 For example see Wallerstein (2003)
strategic vision. Immediately after his election, Zapatero had vowed that he would fulfill his electoral promise to withdraw the troops unless they came under UN command by 30 June when their mandate expires. The final decision was announced on March 14, and was simultaneous to Zapatero’s promise to double the number of Spanish soldiers in Afghanistan, where there was a UN mandate. Spain had only about 1,300 troops stationed in southern central areas of Iraq, so Zapatero’s decision was largely symbolic: it was set to denounce the illegality of Iraq war and the “War on Terror”, and to reinforce his commitment with the Spanish people. Many analysts have considered the withdrawn of the Spanish troops as one of the most important setbacks of the “War on Terror” policy, a perception that was very intense during the immediate days of the decision. The United States officially condemned the resolution to bring the troops to Spain, saying it was giving in to terrorism. A number of American conservative commentators further elaborated this narrative in media outlets such as the Washington Post (see previous chapter). President George Bush gave a chilly reception to Spain’s new leader, and the relations between governments were particularly cold for three years. Asked by the American press how he could ever hope to charm Mr. Bush, Zapatero replied, "Just by telling the truth." However, this situation seemed to change when officials from both countries, in the 2007 Condoleezza Rice’s official visit to Spain, declared that they hoped to put aside their differences on Iraq, emphasize strong cooperation on counterterrorism issues and try to find common ground in their strategies in Latin America.

The contrast between Zapatero and Blair’s strategic conduct in relation the United States reveals some clues about their distinctive conceptions of the world order. First, Zapatero’s position shows a more agency-based conception of international relations. His strategy presumes that a change in the US government could indeed mean a very significant change in the US foreign policy, even when the sub-episodes of the “War on Terror” had already started generating structural effects. Zapatero’s electoral victory was parallel to the Socialist Party’s emphatic support to John Kerry’s candidature to the Presidency of the United States. This is an important fact because it uncovers a complex understanding of contemporary sovereignty mechanisms, one that would have been politically unacceptable under pre-globalization conditions. Some commentators observed that the development of 11-M episode and Zapatero’s endorsement to the Kerry’s candidature
could indeed have had significant effects on the November 2004 elections.

And second, Zapatero’s strategy demonstrated a more sophisticated conception of the world order, one where the US is not simply at the head of the international system, able to punish any actor who doesn’t comply its unilateral interests. The US is indeed a powerful agent in Zapatero’s strategic vision, but it is embedded in complex ways into a web of state and non-state actors that have constantly changing and overlapping relations of autonomy and dependence. In fact, as some commentators have pointed out, the US can no longer hope to achieve even the kind of primacy in the international economic sphere: forecasts indicate that the Chinese, Indian and Brazilian economies will rival those of most western powers. And although the United States will continue to have an overwhelming power in the military sphere, the rise of global organized terrorist violence seriously questions the current efficiency and efficacy of military power to maintain national security.

Only the evolution of the key undergoing global event’s episodes, and the analytical characterization of the new ones, will reveal which understanding of the global system is better suited for the elaboration of global strategies. Undoubtedly, Blair carried the weight of the ‘special relationship’ arguments: he did, according the historical records, nothing that most of his predecessors did not do. Zapatero’s choices came from a different historical legacy, and a different structural location in the power system. However, as we have tried to show in this chapter, the role that the United States had in both episodes underlie different conceptions of the global order, and different understandings of the ways that the ‘national interests’ are defended within this context. Moreover, it is also quite plausible to consider the idea that Blair himself honestly shared a great amount of the “War on Terror” principles with its main sponsors: how could be otherwise?

The global anxiety instigated by Blair and the US policies allow the US-UK relationship and the future direction of UK policy to be rethought; at least this is what Gamble and Kearns (2007) and other political analysts envision. According to these authors, the UK

67 Gamble (2003: Chapter 5)
government needs to develop and publish a new and genuine national security strategy that includes inputs from non-government as well as government experts. This should be used to provide a new basis for policy discussion between London and Washington, and establish the limits of cooperation and disagreement between both countries. The cooperation of the US must be constructed on the evidence that certain US administrations have in the past been committed to multilateral solutions, and have delivered positive results to the global system. And this cooperation must also be constructed in terms of the elaboration of a forward-looking and credible policy alternatives to Bush "War on Terror". As we have seen in the previous chapter, Zapatero's mobilization of the power of the global event was mainly aimed at generating one of these possible alternatives. However, as we will see in the following section, the evolution and the structural impact of 7/7 episode casts serious doubt about the short-term actual possibilities of this shift.

**CONCLUSION: EPISODE'S OUTCOMES AND THEIR RELATION.**

Arguably, the Terrorism Act 2006 concentrated most of the political energy generated by 7/7: Tony Blair and the British Government used the power generated by the event to limiting the rights of suspects and extend the powers of the police force. However, the legal background suggests, as does the strategic evolution of the episode, that the aftermath of 7/7 is to a great extent a sub-episode of 9/11: Blair's government was already empowered by a panoply of new authorities under the Terrorism Act 2000, the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 and the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005. For instance, the figures released by the Home Office showed that, up to 30 September 2005, 895 people had been arrested under the Terrorism Act 2000. Only twenty-three of those arrested were subsequently convicted of a terrorism offence. London's transport police stopped 6,747 people between June and August 2005. The ethnic profiling of these stops reveals some of the political consequences of 7/7 episode: 2,390 of those stopped were Asian and 2,168 were white people.

But besides bringing the powers of detention significantly beyond, the Terrorism Act 2006 penetrates in the realm of communication: it provides for new offences relating to speech which might be construed as encouraging terrorism, other broad offences
concerning preparatory measures and training, wider grounds for the proscription of organisations, and the extension of detention without trial upon arrest from 14 days to 28 days. It is in the realm of communication that the Terrorism Act seems to be at odds with the Alliance of Civilization policy. Walker (2007: 457) defines this apparent contradiction very clearly: “In view of the need to understand much more of this ‘new reality’, one wonders at the wisdom of measures which seek to regulate places of worship and religious leaders (an idea later dropped) or seek to stifle debate by criminalising political speech and political groups. The sacrifice of rights to expression and liberty in the Terrorism Act 2006, the official endorsement of the intolerance of offensive speech, and the devaluation of the humanity of outsiders may ultimately become part of the problem rather than the solution, for it is dialogue and honesty between individuals, communities and cultures which gives hope of an alternative to political violence.” The Blair government has also a ‘soft power’ strategy against terrorism, one that includes, among other specific policies, an explicit support to the Alliance of Civilisations\(^6\). However, the Terrorism Act is largely dependent on physical, coercive measures, and aims at affecting the process of socialized communication in ways that clearly differ from the Alliance. The question of their compatibility is an open one, but it seems plausible to think that the encouragement of a free, global communication process as the key means for institutional change suffers enormously when certain parts of this communication are officially criminalised by the state, taken away from the realm of personal and social responsibility, and thus excluded from the socialization of empathy.

However, these two policies seem to collide in the medium more than in the message. The Internet has already been a key field of application of the Terrorism Act 2006, and will probably increase its importance in the future. This is simply because under contemporary conditions of communication, the policy is very likely to produce a mechanism of adaptation from physical encounters to virtual, anonymous realities. Every sentence

\(^6\) The UK is part of the Alliance’s Group of Friends. Moreover, on the 27th July 2005 Tony Blair said at a joint news conference with Zapatero that “We discussed the proposal that the Spanish prime minister has made for what he called an alliance of civilizations, which is the idea that we join together, our countries with Muslim countries. Turkey is particularly involved in this - to form a coalition of civilised people from whatever race or religion to combat the barbarity of terrorism. I think this is a proposal with possibilities in it that we can develop over the month”.

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written in a political web log could become a source of prosecution, thus providing a new source of power for global terrorists, and for the politics of fear. Moreover, it is very likely that with the official prosecution of new cases, the Internet will constantly appear in the media not as an opportunity to develop global communication processes, but as a source of global terrorism. This effect could obviously be devastating for the rationalization of the multiple opportunities opened up by the Information Society, which is precisely the main area where the Alliance of Civilizations policy directs its implementation process.
Conclusion
Towards an Analytical Model for the Analysis of Global Events Episodes
This is the general conclusion of this Master’s dissertation, where we have explored the possibility and interest of a theory of the global event. We have framed the exploratory research within the disciplinary boundaries of political sociology, and the key themes and approaches of the globalist school, especially those recently developed in order to explain the politics of the post 9/11 world. We have argued that the political responses to 9/11 revealed a mechanism of power that was mistreated in previous analyses of globalization. The 9/11 terrorist attacks were important because they created a sharp, unprecedentedly particular sense of crisis both nationally and globally, and there is a wide consensus among globalization authors that the Bush Administration mobilized around this situation in order to advance its political agenda. Yet the globalization literature does not offer a systematic analytical framework for studying the ways in which this process took place. After the analyses presented in the previous chapters, we are now in a position to set up a research agenda to fill this gap, and to argue that the development of the 9/11 episode is interwoven in fundamental ways with a broader mechanism of power and institutional transformation: a mechanism that, as we have seen, can indeed be detected and explored in cases other than the 9/11 episode.

Therefore, the primary concern of this conclusion is to put forward a coherent analytical framework for identifying and systematically studying the mechanism of power that operates throughout all global event episodes. We shall address this in three main sections. First we will address the primary epistemological and methodological concern of the theory of the global event: the duality of structure. In this section we will establish the general guidelines for individual characterizations of global event episodes. Second, we will put forward the definition and the key proposition of the theory of the global event, and outline an analytical framework to test its implications while respecting the guidelines of structuration theory. And third, we will outline a research program for the theory of the global event, and propose a number of case studies for further investigations.
DUALITY OF STRUCTURE IN THE THEORY OF THE GLOBAL EVENT

As discussed in Chapter Two, it is of fundamental importance for our approach to maintain the key epistemological, ontological and methodological imperatives of structuration theory. Chief among these is the question of the duality of structure. The key idea behind the duality of structure is that the structural proprieties of social systems do not exist outside of action but are part of this very action. This idea is contained in the episodic characterization methodology that we have deployed during our research; a methodology which is useful for the aims of both individual and comparative characterization of global events.

But perhaps the best way to express the consequences of structuration theory for the theory of the global event is by separating the two types of methodological approach which are subsequently possible in the study of social change: a) the study of strategic conduct and b) the institutional analysis of societal transformations. Although these mainly involve a shift in emphasis, they have important implications in terms of the possible generalization of outcomes, and of methodological requirements in terms of the number of case studies that are necessary to produce knowledge. In other words, the analysis of strategic conduct delivers knowledge even if the analyst only deals with single cases, but the institutional analysis of global events requires a substantial number of case studies in order to increase our understanding of the phenomena. The theory of the global event requires the intersection of both approaches, because they deliver knowledge about particular aspects of global events episodes:

A) STRATEGIC CONDUCT

In the analysis of strategic conduct observed during global event episodes the focus is placed upon modes by which actors draw upon structural proprieties in the constitution of social relations. The characterization of the 11-M episode presented in Chapter Three has shown the promising results of an approach that treats global events as a structural proprieties one that is particularly important during the episode's time-line. In the analysis of the strategic conduct of the key actors of our case, we have given primacy to discursive and practical consciousness, and to substantive and stylistic (emotional) strategies of control of the several structural disruptions produced by the realization of a violent event.
Structuration theory has a contingent conception of social reality, so the study presented in the previous pages not only offers certain guidelines for orientation of the episodic characterization of global events. It also provides specific knowledge about the transformative consequences that 11-M had for the national and global social system. These exclusive analytical results have already been presented in the conclusion of Chapter Three, so we can now concentrate on outlining five general lessons that can be derived from our characterization.

(1) Global event episodes are essentially strategic in character. They do generate global and national structural disruptions, but these are less relevant than the different political tactics that are adopted in the immediate aftermath of global event realizations: no result, no theory, can be derived from global event episodes without taking into account the unpredictable outcome of specific dynamics of power. There is nothing inevitable in global event episodes, and the analyst must be extraordinary sensitive to this fact.

(2) Many actors attempt to draw power from global event realizations: it is not an exclusive source of power for members of a particular political apparatus. Episodic characterizations could in principle include sectional analyses of the discursive mobilization around particular events by different actors, who can be situated in different social systems, and thus instigate structural impacts in different contexts. Nevertheless, nation-state governments seem to be the most empowered agents during global event episodes, so any episodic characterization must include the specific analysis of their strategic conduct in relation to the event. Moreover, global event episodes seems to be periods of highly personalised policy-making, with presidents and prime ministers driving through their mobilization towards relevant policies. This simplifies very significantly the focus of analysis.

(3) Global events episodes are indeed emotion-intensive, but this must not be treated by the analyst as something that causes automatic havoc in the process of reasoning. Existing characterizations of global event episodes invariably start with something similar to this: “In the weeks after 9/11 ordinary rational calculations did not apply. Emotions were running high and there was a widely shared feeling of living through a cataclysmic event.” Traditional wisdom and scientific investigations of the normal reasoning process
reveal the potentially harmful influence of certain emotional biases. But recent investigations have shown that the absence of emotion and feelings is no less damaging, no less capable of compromising the rationality of social systems. The real issue is not the counterpoising of emotion and reason, but the systematic study of those evidences that reveal the predominant emotion during an episode’s sequence.

(4) Actor’s strategic behaviour is performed at both the emotional and the rational level, and both are necessary to understanding the process of consensus generation during global event episodes. Emotions and reason are a duality, not a dualism, and that is why hybrid concepts are useful for characterizing certain strategic behaviours. Within this characterization methodology, the combinations of emotions and epistemological approaches with reason and reality are many, so the analyst must put a substantial effort into finding the concept that best describes the creative combination deployed by an actor during an episode.

(5) The analysis of empathy and fear is of fundamental importance to the characterization of both the strategic conduct of actors and the structural disruptions of social systems during violent global event episodes. However, there is nothing intrinsically new in this, apart from the global nature of global events, and therefore the global nature of the source of power employed. Machiavelli wrote over 400 years ago that a prince ought to inspire fear in such a way that, if he does not win love, he avoids hatred. And empathy is an emotion that has sometimes been exploited, manipulated and, most of all, bureaucratized by religious apparatuses all through history. These two emotions have serious compatibility problems, and from this we can derive the hypothesis that, under globalization conditions, strategic modes that employ empathy as the key emotional source are more likely to be ‘successful’ in the mid/long term, this success implying that the event episode generates a smaller and less dramatic number of unintended consequences and a longer consensual period. Under conditions of global media transparency and plurality, and with social transformations taking place more rapidly than in any other period, there seem to be serious costs in trying to expand consent through fear. There are costs for the strategic actor who deploys it, because people and democratic institutions tend to rise up against these tactics. And costs for the social system, because it tends to unleash and reinvigorate negative social attitudes such as racism, therefore
spoiling the ground of truly multicultural encounter.

B) INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS

In the analysis of strategic conduct, institutionalized disruptions of the national and global settings of interaction were assumed to be given. Therefore, the extensity and intensity of an episodic change appears to have an immediate connection with the activity of key agents. This implies the loss of some promising information which can only be obtained if the study of global events proceeds in a comparative fashion. This is because it is plausible that the level of impact of a particular global event can have a direct effect on the quantity of power generated in the social system. This quantity is then mobilized by agents in order to manufacture social change: but this social change will always be limited by the institutional power generated by the global event. Therefore, in the institutional analysis of global events structural disruptions are treated as comparable features of social systems, and the emphasis shifts towards the study of how the characteristics of these features impact on the quantity of social change. Since this is a difference of emphasis, there is no clear-cut line that can be drawn between these. This means that the development of the theory of the global event has to proceed in the intersection of both methodologies, combining them in a coherent and unique research program. In the next sections we outline how a plausible but untested theory of global events would look if we integrate both perspectives, and if we give systematic form to the lessons learned through this dissertation.
THE THEORY OF THE GLOBAL EVENT

Both the strategic and the institutional analysis of global event’s episodes are necessary to fully confront the research questions that we have set up to explore at the beginning of the dissertation:

• What is a global event? How should it be conceptualized and studied?

• What is the relationship between the global event and power?

• Who are the key actors who play a significant role in the political process generated by the global event? What strategies do they utilize?

• Can global events be associated with patterns of domestic and international conditions? Can the identification of these conditions help to explain the different intensity and the different scope of the immediate political action borne out of global events?

The following non-tested, systematic proposition is informed by the research presented in this dissertation, and constitutes a plausible, integrated response to the previous inquiries:

A) WORKING PROPOSITION

Global events are circumstances of radical and global disjuncture of an unpredictable kind, involving the fundamental participation of global, non-state actors and forces, with a logic of causality potentially connected to the globalization process, that affect a considerable number of people. They generate and legitimate a particular kind of political power that breaks through the circular stability of the otherwise relative zero-sum global power system. This power is mainly based on sudden changes in political and emotional reflexivity around globalization, and lasts only as long as the consensus lasts, ultimately achieving a variable level of institutionalization. This institutionalization mainly depends on the agency of certain national and global actors. Due to their structural location, these are potentially able to draw upon the specific political power of the global event in order
to successfully overcome and sometimes even regulate specific structural determinants of national and global political action, the impact of the unintended consequences of such actions also being a direct function of the event. However, for a global event to be effectively translated into relevant global power opportunities, it is plausible to affirm that five necessary conditions must concur in the political process generated by the crisis. (a) The scale of the event in terms of objective information must prove to be medium or high. (b) There must be substantial global agreement around the globalization causality. (c) It must generate sustained global mass media attention. (d) A significant popular mobilization must take place after the event and the relevant national actors (especially national political parties) must have sustained, legitimate access to the institutions of the nation-state directly affected by the event. Given these conditions, it is plausible to argue that global events always generate significant opportunities for global action, a process which is independent of other variables such as the direct implication of the United States national power bloc, the type of global event or the potential effectiveness of risk elimination. The intensity and political direction of the resulting global and national action will ultimately depend on the agency of the relevant actors and the specific values that the mentioned variables might take. If the global event’s political process does not generate relevant values in at least two of the mentioned conditions, the opportunity for political action is restricted to the nation-state boundaries. If the event lacks at least four conditions, it has no relevance in terms of power.

B) ANALYTICAL MODEL

In this section we put forward all the elements of the proposed analytical model prior to interaction with data. This model should test the previous proposition. The presentation begins with the figure below. The figure shows the general intuition behind the theory of global events. It also specifies the key hypothetic relationships among its constructs. In the next section, we will address the key conceptual part of the model, the main aim of which is to establish the logical connections between the occurrence of global events and the generation of power within the global system. The institutional part of the theory requires the discussed abstract variables be tied to measurable phenomena. The description of these variables and its proposed measurement is outlined in Chapter One. However, it is necessary to stress that this Master thesis is only exploratory. Therefore,
the model presented below is by no means definitive.

Let me reiterate the key epistemological logic of this research in relation to the presented model. The theory intends to respect the duality of structure, which requires both structural and ethnographic research. This breaks with the most conventional view of the social science methodology. It is especially interesting to point out that the duality of structure can be better represented in this model due to the particular dynamics of global events as power generators. Thus, this framework is intended to facilitate the formulation of theorems of structural causation that explain the determination of *opportunities* for social action in general, but not social action itself. For purposes of this study, quantitative analyses are intended to uncover these hypothetical “universal laws” of opportunity, but not how and to what ends these opportunities are mobilized, if they are mobilized at all. These questions are reserved to specific episodic characterizations. However, opportunities of power do not manifest themselves unless they are effectively exercised: this is why we can eventually hold in suspension the conscious agency of the relevant actors in order to systematize the evaluation of the model.
GLOBAL EVENT (Nature of the Political Power Generated)

Rational Causality is Exogenous to the Model (But Not the Debate around It)

Independent Variables
- Scale: (S)
- Global Causality Debate: (CD)
- Power Location Nation-State: (NS)

Intervening Variables
- Global Mass Media Attention: (MA)
- National Popular Mobilization: (NM)
- National Power Blocs: (NP)

Global Event
- Economic, Violent, Environmental

Triggers "Consensual Period"

Expression of Successful Mobilization

Generation of Political Power
- (Invariable)

Structural Shift Opportunity

Institutional Reform Opportunity

National Empowerment Opportunity

No Opportunity

Global and National Political Action with **High** Structural Impacts (CL or TR)

Global and National Political Action with **Low** Structural Impacts (CL or TR)

National Political Action (CL or TR)

No Political Action

Empathic Realism (Cosmopolitan-Left)/ Postmodern Machiavellianism (Transnational-Right)

Particular Configuration of Temporary Coalitions, Interests and Values are Exogenous to the Model

- (a) Circumstances of radical and global disjuncture of an unpredictable kind
- (b) Affecting a considerable number of people
- (c) Involving global, non-state actors or processes
- (d) With a logic of causality potentially connected to globalization process
- (e) Which generates global political reflexivity and global media attention.

- (a) Breaks through the circular stability of a zero-sum power system (something needs to be done)
- (b) Reinforces risk-based autonomous source of global political legitimation for domination (FEAR)
- (c) Triggers perception of globalization and "overlapping community of fate" (EMPATHY)
- (d) Conflictual Periods / Consensual Periods: Political power lasts only as long as the political reflexivity connected to the global event lasts
In relation to this figure:

1. The model cannot support alternative interpretations that do not accept the basic findings and premises of the globalist framework. It can, however, be used to accept or reject alternative hypotheses.

2. The proposed functions (x, y and z) define the necessary and sufficient conditions for a global event to be translated into power opportunities. A research program on Global Events would necessarily involve a coherent definition and exploration in relation to the theory of globalization.

3. (1) requires both an empirical analysis of the strength of the consensus and its emotional basis. The analysis of strategic conduct focuses on the study of the blue and red lines. The institutional analysis of global events explores the plausibility of the relations (2), (3), (4) and (5).

4. The "impacts" of the dependent variables do not directly coincide with the actor's agencies: they are the sum of intended plus unintended consequences of these actions. However, the intensity of both elements must have a direct connection with the correspondent structural function.

5. The four levels of political action must be precisely identified in relation to the theory of globalization.

6. Global events' causality and the determination of interests and values of the relevant actors are part of the episodic characterization of particular events.
C) THEORETICAL SPECULATION

In the following table we condense the variables of the model, provide a list of global events that are susceptible of being studied through the proposed interpretative framework and present the observed values of three cases, two of which have been explored in this research. This exercise is only useful because it provides some systematically organized material that can contribute to both clarify the elements of the analytical model and speculate about its specific hypotheses. Accordingly, we have named “structural functions” three specific conjunctions of variables: events that generate an *structural shift opportunity* (9/11), an *institutional reform opportunity* (11/3) and a *national empowerment opportunity* (7/7). We propose the following indicators to fully assess the model’s dependent variable:

Effects on the Nation-State:

- Changes in the Scope and Depth of the Nation-State Enmeshment in the Global System (indicators: Global Transformations)
- Changes in the National Political System: (qualitative assessment)
- Changes in the National Values System: (e.g. security vs. freedom – Opinion Polls)

Effects on the Global System:

- Changes in Networked Global Processes: transformation of the extensity and intensity of global processes: (e.g. economic openness, terrorist activity, etc. – all of them have specific measures in the relevant literature).
- Changes in the Geopolitical and International Law System: (traditional measures; for example number of new regulations connected to the event or increase in conflicts between state actors)
- Changes in the Soft Power System: (classic soft-power studies, measured through global opinion polls)
Table 5.1: Summary of the Model Variables and Expected Relations (see below for list of events)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Structural Dimensions</th>
<th>Global Events</th>
<th>Intervening (Operators)</th>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Control Variables</th>
<th>Type of Political Action</th>
<th>Nation-State</th>
<th>Global System</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Event</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>CD</td>
<td>NS</td>
<td>NM</td>
<td>NP</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US9/11</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>CD</td>
<td>NS</td>
<td>NM</td>
<td>NP</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>T</td>
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<td>Ist03</td>
<td>Violent</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cas03</td>
<td>Violent</td>
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<tr>
<td>Egy05</td>
<td>Violent</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oil Price Shock (73)</td>
<td>Market</td>
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<tr>
<td>Energy Crisis (80)</td>
<td>Market</td>
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<tr>
<td>A. Fina Crisis (97)</td>
<td>Finance</td>
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<tr>
<td>Stock Mark (02)</td>
<td>Finance</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chern (86)</td>
<td>Environ</td>
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<td>Mitch (98)</td>
<td>Environ</td>
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<tr>
<td>Exx (89)</td>
<td>Environ</td>
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<td>Prest. (02)</td>
<td>Environ</td>
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<td>Tsuna (04)</td>
<td>Environ</td>
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<td>KasErt (5)</td>
<td>Environ</td>
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<tr>
<td>Katri (06)</td>
<td>Environ</td>
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</table>
Structural Function X/Y (US9/11 and Mad11/3)

For a global event to be effectively translated into relevant global power opportunities, it is plausible to affirm that at least six necessary conditions must concur in the political process generated by the crisis. (a) The scale of the event in terms of objective information must prove to be medium or high. (b) There must be a substantial global agreement or at least a consensual uncertainty around the globalization causality. (c) It must generate a sustained global mass media attention. (d) The nation-state directly affected by the event must rank high in the global power hierarchy. (e) The relevant national actors (especially national political parties) must have a sustained and legitimate access to the institutions of this nation-state. And (f) a significant popular mobilization showing the same ideological inclination (CL or TR) that the national actors holding state power must take place immediately after the event. Given these conditions, it is plausible to affirm that global events always generate significant opportunities for global action, a process which is independent from other variables such as the direct implication of the United States national power bloc, the type of global event or the potential effectiveness of risk elimination. The intensity of the resulting global and national action will ultimately depend on the specific values that the mentioned variables might take. The political tone of this action will result from the type of national power bloc affected by the event, which behaves as an active (non-neutral) power transmission belt towards the structurally and ideologically related global power bloc.

Structural Function Z (Lond7/7)

If the global event’s political process does not generate relevant values in at least two of the mentioned conditions, the opportunity for political action is restricted to the state boundaries. This situation was for example the one that presumably occurred in the Lond7/7 case. On the one hand, the chronological position of the event in relation to their proper list (third relevant Islamic extremist terrorist attack in Western countries) makes the event to rank relatively low in the “scale” variable. But even beyond this variable, Lond7/7 took place when the national and international debate around the causality of the
Islamic extremist acts was in a very conflictive point, which was in fact exacerbated by the event itself. This in turn had restrictive effects in terms of power generation not only at the level of international organizations but also at the level of global public opinion. Furthermore, no popular mobilization that would have potentially reinforced or even released the political action at the global level was observed after the event occurrence. Although we still have not explored any cases of this sort, it is plausible to affirm that if the event lacks at least 4 conditions, it has no relevance in terms of its generative power.

RESEARCH PROGRAM

These are very demanding propositions, which can only be explored through the comparative analysis of a significant number of cases. If the propositions were true, all the listed events would have to show logically coherent values according to what we have characterized as the “structural functions” of the model. If the particular combination of independent variables constitutes a “Structural Function X”, the expected values of the dependent variable would have to correspond to what we have characterized as “Global and National Political Action with High Structural Impacts”. And the same should be true for the other logically possible functions and for any possible new global event that might take place in the future.

However, given the epistemological position that we have already outlined, the predictive capacities of the model are by definition restricted. In short, the model is not deterministic, since the relevant agencies can reflexively decide about and mobilize towards particular ends the power of the global events. This has a methodological expression in the episodic characterization of global events. However, we have already argued why we can hold in suspension the agency part of the model for the structural analysis. How should we then connect the two parts if we observe significant variation in the expected values of the dependent variables? This fundamental question has a clear answer from the institutional point of view: Any significant variation in the expected values will have to be clearly explained through the specific analysis of the accounts that the relevant agencies offer in order to justify why they have reflexively decided not to use
the power of the global event. If such accounts do not exist, the model would have to be modified or simply discarded.

Therefore, the theory of the global event has a necessarily cultural, or anthropological aspect. Some sort of individual episodic characterization, and analysis of strategic conduct, will always be necessary for each case, although if the focus is placed in the institutional analysis, the analysis of the strategic conduct can indeed be very bounded. A comprehensive set of global events must necessarily be analyzed and compared. To this end, a more specific taxonomy of events can be elaborated adapting the classification of "global sites of power" and the distinctive periods of globalization suggested by Held et al. (1999). Accordingly, only those events that fit into the previous definition, and that occurred in the period since 1945, should be taken into account. This is because 1945 is considered by these authors as the starting point of the contemporary period of globalization. Therefore, the following events could be part of a systematic research program of a possible theory of the global event:

**Organized Violence**
- 9/11 US
- 2003 Istanbul
- 2003 Casablanca
- 11-M Madrid
- 7/7 London
- 23/7/05 Egypt

**Global Trade, Global Markets**
- Oil Prices Shock (1973-1974)
- Energy Crisis (1979-1980)

**Environmental**
- Chernobyl Disaster (1986)
- Hurricane Mitch (Central America 1998)
- Exxon Valdez (1989)
- Prestige Oil Spill (2002)
- Tsunami (Asia - 2004)
- Kashmir Earthquake (2005)
- Hurricane Katrina (US 2006)

**Global Finance**
- 1997 Asia Financial Crisis
- 2002 Stock Market
Methodological Appendix
List of Documents: Spanish Case

Main Website Resources

http://www.elpais.com/comunes/2004/11-M/portada.html contains a lot of audiovisual and journalistic data on 11-M. The material has been compiled by GrupoPrisa Group, a media corporation close to the Socialist Party.

http://www.elmundo.es/documentos/2004/03/espana/atentados11-M/ (last visit July 2007) contains also a lot of information on 11-M. El Mundo is a general newspaper close to the Popular Party.

http://uk.youtube.com/user/3daisdemarzo (July 2007) is a very good source of original audiovisual material of the 11-M case.

http://www.youtube.com/user/znerven (June 2007) Contains audiovisual interviews the Alliance of Civilizations experts.

List of Principal Documents

Alliance of Civilizations: International Security and Cosmopolitan Democracy. Conclusions of the seminar organized by the InstitutoComplutense de EstudiosInternacionales (ICEI)


Alliance of Civilizations Implementation Plan (2007-2009)

First and Second Meeting of High-level Group of the Alliance of Civilizations working papers (2006)

Commissioned Reports Alliance of Civilizations: Civilizations: Truth or Tool (Bulliet) / Western Historiography and the Problem of “Western” History (Pocock)
Speech Acts


Zapatero (Complete List):

Z1: 18 April 2004: "Declaration in relation to the withdrawn of Spanish troop from Iraq"

Z2: 27 April 2004: "Press conference at the end of President's official visit to Morocco".

Z3: 27 April 2007: "President's intervention before the Congress to inform about the withdrawn of Spanish troops from Iraq"

Z4: 28 April 2004: "Joint press conference of the President of Spain and the Germany's Cancellor".

Z5: 29 April 2005: "Joint press conference of the President of Spain and the President of the French Republic".

Z6: 24 of April 2004: "Press conference of Zapatero at the end of the official visit to Morocco".

Z7: 19 of May 2004: "Press conference of the President of Government and the Prime Minister of the Palestinian Authority".

Z7bis: 3 of June 2004: "Zapatero’s Press Conference with Tony Blair".

Z8: 14 of July 2004: "Press conference of the President of Government after his official visit to Argelia".

Z8bis: 19 of July 2004: "Speech at 'Circulo de BellasArtes' with Philip Pettit"


Z10: 11 of November 2004: Discourse of the President before the General Assembly of
the European Youth Forum.


Z12: 22 of March 2005: “Zapatero’s Discourse at the Arab League Meeting”


Z14: 7 of July 2005: “Zapatero’s declaration after London’s terrorist Attacks”


Z16: 15 of September 2005: “Press Conference after the meeting of the United Nations General Assembly”

Z17: 27 of November: “Joint Press Conference with the Turkish Prime Minister after the first meeting of the Alliance of Civilizations”


Peoples Party’s Members’ Main Speech acts:

PP1: 29 of November 2004: “Intervención de D. José María Aznar ante la Comisión de Investigación sobre el 11-M”.

PP2: 28 of July 2004: “Comparecencia del Sr. Ex Ministro del Interior AcebesPaniagua ante la Comisión de Investigación sobre el 11-M”.
The values in Table 3.2 have been calculated with a simple content analysis methodology. The selection of the global political leaders was based on a reading of mainstream newspapers and magazines in the aftermath of the 11-M terrorist attack: BBC News, El País, La Vanguardia and El Mundo. Once the global leader was identified, we searched for the condemnation’s full text online. We found most of them in official web pages. Declarations were considered to be action-based when the biggest amount of manifest content of the speech refer to action or to need for action against terrorism. Key quotes:
Bibliography


