The London School of Economics and Political Science

The Limits of Social Mobility: social origins and career patterns of British generals, 1688-1815

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Abstract

Late eighteenth-century Britain was dominated by two features of economic life that were a major departure from previous eras, the economic growth of the Industrial Revolution and almost constant warfare conducted on a previously unprecedented scale. One consequence of this was the rapid expansion, diversification and development of the professions. Sociologists and economists have often argued that economic development and modernisation leads to increasing rates of social mobility. However, historians of the army and professions in the eighteenth-century claim the upper levels of the army were usually isolated from mobility as the highest ranks were dominated by sons of the aristocracy and landed elite. Some claim social status was more important for career success in the late eighteenth-century army compared to its earlier counterpart, which if true may have led to declining rates of social mobility for the upper levels of the army. This PhD thesis investigates the limits of social mobility during this period by examining the social origins and career patterns of the highest professional rank in the army, generals. This study finds that generals were not isolated from social mobility. Modernisation did lead to increasing rates of social mobility among generals. However, mobility was limited in some respects. The rates of social mobility for generals were much lower than ordinary officers. In addition, most moves up the social hierarchy were fairly shallow. Generals usually came from relatively high levels of society and hence they were generally only moving from a high social position to a slightly higher one.

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Chapter one: Introduction

I. Social mobility

Societies are usually arranged in a series of levels each indicating a different position in the social hierarchy determined by a combination of social status and income.[1] Social mobility is the movement from one of these levels to another either higher (upward mobility) or a lower (downward mobility).[2] The study of social mobility is one of the most important topics in economic and social history as levels of social mobility can affect a country's leadership, its political and social philosophies, and rates of economic development.[3] In a recent OECD report on social mobility, aimed at suggesting policy initiatives to increase rates of upward mobility, it was suggested the link between rates of social mobility and economic efficiency was twofold:

"…First, less mobile societies are more likely to waste or misallocate human skills and talents. Second, lack of equal opportunity may affect the motivation, effort and, ultimately, the productivity of citizens, with adverse effects on the overall efficiency and growth potential of the economy…."[4]

The views of this OECD report on the relationship between social mobility and economic development echo a wide-ranging literature from economic historians and sociologists that explicitly link rates of social mobility in a society with levels of economic development and modernisation. As Goldthorpe noted, it is generally

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[1] D.V Glass (Ed.), *Social Mobility in Britain*, (London, 1967), p. 5; P.A Sorokin, *Social and Cultural Mobility*, (New York, 1927), p.11.
[2] S.M Lipset and R. Bendix, *Social Mobility in Industrial Society*, (Los Angeles, 1959), p. 1-2.
[3] *Ibid.,* p. vii.
[4] OECD,"A Family Affair: Intergenerational Social Mobility across OECD Countries", Part II, Chapter 5, *Economic Policy Reforms: going for growth*, (OECD, 2010), p. 4.

believed that social mobility increases with economic development.[5] One of the most well-known proponents of this view, David Landes, argued that social mobility was important to economic performance as nations which are able to put the 'right people in the right place' should be more competitive in the international marketplace.[6] Lipset and Bendix claim that rates of social mobility increase with industrial growth.[7] They do concede there might be limits to this relationship as some countries have different rates of economic growth, but similar mobility rates. Thus, social mobility and industrial expansion rates may only be correlated until countries reach a certain level of industrialisation.[8]

In a similar fashion, some authors argue there was a close link between social mobility and modernisation. Sorokin notes since the eighteenth-century there have been high and increasing levels of social mobility in the transition from pre-modern to modern society.[9] Kingsley Davis argued a relatively high rate of social mobility was a necessary pre-condition for the emergence of modern society.[10] A long historical tradition has stressed the relative openness of the English governing class.[11] Cahill, who conducted a comparative analysis of the eighteenth-century French and English aristocracy, using published works by historians, also found there were relatively

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[5] J.H Goldthorpe, "On Economic Development and Social Mobility", *The British Journal of Sociology*, 36 (4), (December 1985), p. 549; O.D Duncan, *The American Occupational Structure, (*New York, 1967*)*, p. 429.
[6] D.S Landes, *The unbound Prometheus : technological change and industrial development in Western Europe from 1750 to the present*, (London, 1960), p. 546.
[7] Lipset and Bendix, *Social Mobility,* p. 27.
[8] *Ibid.,* p. 13.
[9] Sorokin, *Social and Cultural Mobility*, p. 381.
[10] Quoted in Goldthorpe, "On Economic Development", p. 550.
[11] The origins of this can be traced all the way back to Voltaire. See Voltaire, *Letters Concerning the English Nation*, (London, 1733).

high levels of social mobility in England.[12] This high degree of social mobility has long been seen to have positively affected many key developments in Britain's economic and social history.[13] It is claimed social mobility played a critical role in the agricultural sector's remarkable efficiency, early industrialisation and the absence of revolution.[14] Some sociologists have found that levels of social mobility in Britain were increasing during the Victorian and Edwardian periods, time periods important in the development of modern society.[15] Britain's relative economic decline since the late Victorian period has also been linked to rates of social fluidity.[16]

The close relationship between social mobility, economic development and modernisation, however, is disputed by some authors. In one of the more recent, and long-run, studies of social mobility economic historian Greg Clark claims England between 1200 and 2009 was a society without "persistent social class" and had in his view "complete" social mobility. He further asserts that since 2009 "persistent social class" has emerged, which is a reversal of the traditional

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[12] M.W McCahill, "Open Elites: recruitment to the French Noblesse and English Aristocracy in the eighteenth century", *Albion*, 30 (4), (Winter 1998), p. 601, Table 3, p. 621.

[13] G.E Mingay, *The Gentry: the rise and fall of a ruling class*, (London, 1976), pp. 5, 10; F.M.L Thompson, *English Landed Society in the Nineteenth Century*, (London, 1963), pp. 122, 126; H. Perkin, *Origins of Modern English Society, 1780-1880*, (London, 1969), pp. 17, 37, 56, 61, 63; P. Jenkins, *The Making of a Ruling Class: the Glamorgan gentry*, (Cambridge, 1983), pp. 38-39.

[14] L. Stone and J.C Fawtier Stone, *An Open Elite? England 1540-1880*, (Oxford, 1984), pp. 3-4; Perkin, *Origins of Modern English Society*, pp. 7, 17, 37, 56, 61, 63; F. O'Gorman, *The Long Eighteenth Century: British political and social history 1688-1832*, (London, 1997), pp. 108, 337; I.R Christie, *Stress and Stability in late eighteenth-century Britain: reflections on the British avoidance of revolution: the Ford lectures delivered in the University of Oxford 1983-1984*, (Oxford, 1984), pp. 56-59.

[15] A. Miles, "How Open was 19th-century British society? Social mobility and equality of opportunity, 1839-1914", in A. Miles and D. Vincent (eds), *Building European Society: occupational change and social mobility in Europe, 1840-1940*, (Manchester, 1993), pp. 18-39.

[16] M. Olson, *The Rise and Decline of Nations: economic growth, stagflation, and social rigidities*, (New York, 1982), pp. 82-3; A. Gamble, *Britain in decline: economic policy, political strategy and the British state*, (Basingstoke, 1990); H. Perkin, *The Rise of Professional Society: England since 1880,* (London, 1989), p. 516.

relationship between social mobility and modernisation.[17] In common with Clark, the

prominent sociologist Goldthorpe also refutes that there was a close relationship

between rates of social mobility and modernisation. In Goldthorpe's view, social

mobility in Britain over the long-run has been trendless and modernity has not

increased rates of social mobility.[18] He further contends that Britain's level of

openness or social fluidity is no different from other similar societies and its unique

development cannot be explained in terms of social mobility differences.[19] In a

similar fashion, some historians argue rates of social mobility were not increasing as

Britain industrialised nor was Britain more open than other societies. Historians of

the aristocracy claim European elites were more open than their English

counterparts because newcomers could directly purchase titles.[20] The limited

number of peerage creations during the eighteenth-century is often seen as

evidence of a closed aristocracy.[21] These findings on the English titled aristocracy

are sometimes extrapolated to the wider elite to conclude that:

"...There is little evidence here to suggest that the social elite was expanding vigorously in the eighteenth century and finding room for large numbers of new comers. On the contrary, it indicates a considerable narrowing of the commanding social heights...."[22]

However, as some other historians have noted there are problems in using the titled

aristocracy as a measure of mobility. Wasson pointed out it was dangerous to make

broad conclusions about the openness of the elite based on evidence solely from the

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[17] G. Clarke, "Regression to Mediocrity?: Surnames and Social Mobility in England, 1200-2009", unpublished paper, (June 2010), pp. 1-4.

[18] Goldthorpe, "On Economic Development", pp. 558-560; J.H Goldthorpe, C. Llewellyn and C. Payne, *Social Mobility and Class Structure in Modern Britain*, second edition, (Oxford, 1986), chapters 4 and 12.

[19] Goldthorpe, Llewellyn and Payne, *Social Mobility and Class Structure*, pp. 313-323.

[20] M.L Bush, *The English Aristocracy: a comparative synthesis*, (Manchester, 1984), pp. 8-9; J. Cannon, *Aristocratic Century: the peerage of eighteenth century England*, (Cambridge, 1984), p. 8.

[21] Bush, *The English Aristocracy*, p. 8; Cannon, *Aristocratic Century*, p. 24.

[22] Cannon, *Aristocratic Century*, p. 33.

titled aristocracy who were few in number.[23] The Springs argued peerage creations were not an appropriate measure of class attitudes as the peerage was neither a distinctive economic or social class.[24]

II. Modernisation and social mobility

There may be some disagreement over the relationship between social mobility, economic development and modernisation, but there are good reasons why modernisation may result in increased rates of social mobility. Firstly, modernisation often leads to an expansion in the number of professional vacancies. As Lipset and Bendix note, if the proportion of professional positions increases this should cause more upward mobility as long as the professions that expand retain their existing status and income levels.[25] Secondly, the performance requirements of particular occupations may rise due to increasing professionalisation. If the supply of those with the skills who can meet these new demands is limited rates of social mobility will increase. [26]

Modernisation in the eighteenth-century presented increased opportunities in professional occupations, such as law, the church, government and medicine, which

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[23] E.A Wasson, "The Penetration of New Wealth into the English Governing Class from the Middle Ages to the First World War", *Economic History Review*, 51 (1), (Feb 1998), p. 26.
[24] D. Spring and E. Spring, "Social Mobility and the English Landed Elite", *Canadian Journal of History*, 21 (3), (Dec 1986), p. 345.
[25] Lipset and Bendix, *Social Mobility,* pp. 57-60.
[26] *Ibid.,* pp. 2-3.

were important avenues of social mobility during this time.[27] The professions

expanded rapidly during the eighteenth-century and some of these vocations

experienced significant changes in the way they were organised. In addition to

numerical expansion, specialist branches emerged from traditional professions, such

as the law and the church, and completely new professions such as architecture

came to the fore. The growth of the professions was partly due to demand created

for professional services by economic growth. There was increased demand for

lawyers who serviced the legal requirements of expanding businesses. A rise in

disposable income of the middle and upper classes indirectly impacted the business

of professions such as medical practitioners.[28]   By the end of the eighteenth-century

many of these occupations bore some characteristics of modern professions, such

as specialisation and division of labour.[29] As Larson noted "... professional work was

becoming a *full-time* means of earning a livelihood, subject to the dictates of

capitalist competition for income and profit...."[30] However, they were still not fully

professions in the modern sense as entry into these occupations tended to remain

unrestricted until the nineteenth-century. The professions typically contained a

mixture of the middling sort intent on advancement and younger sons of the elite.[31]

The diverse social backgrounds of those practising the traditional professions - the

law, church, government and armed services – had important ramifications for their

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[27] G. Holmes, *Politics, Religion and Society in England, 1679-1742*, (London, 1986), pp. 272-275, 319, 349-350; P.J Corfield, *Power and the Professions in Britain 1700-1850*, (London, 1995), p. 223; Stone and Stone, *An Open Elite?*, p. 402.
[28] J. Rule, *Albion's People: English Society, 1714-1815*, (Harlow, 1992), pp. 55-84.
[29] M. Pelling, "Medical Practice in Early Modern England: trade or profession?", in W. Prest (ed.), *The Professions in Early Modern England*, (London, 1987), pp. 90-128.
[30] M.S Larson, *The Rise of Professionalism: a sociological analysis*, (London, 1977), p. 13.
[31] Stone and Stone, *An Open Elite*, pp. 229-231.

development. The social status of these professions increased and the highest professional ranks were allegedly dominated by the landed elite.[32]

Outside of wartime, law was probably the profession that acted as the main avenue of social advancement.[33]   However, the importance of law as an avenue for social mobility may have declined as the century wore on. Lucas found a significant drop in barrister enrolments between 1690 and 1800 and a notable rise in the numbers of barristers from elite backgrounds during the late eighteenth-century, which may have restricted opportunities for new men.[34] In contrast, the prospects for those entering the church seemed to improve during the eighteenth-century due to institutional innovations such as the Queen Anne's Bounty of 1704. The real income of the clergy increased 200% between 1700 and 1830, an increase that positively affected most levels of this profession. At the beginning of the eighteenth-century there were 5,600 clergy jobs paying an annual wage of £50 or less compared to only 1,000 by 1810. [35] The increase in social status of the church profession did not seem to attract more aristocratic candidates. It is estimated that 40% of the clergy came from business, professions and lower rural society backgrounds.[36]   Thus, the clergy appeared to remain a middling profession.

[32] G. Holmes, *Augustan England: professions, state and society, 1680-1730*, (London, 1982), p. 150; Corfield, *Power and the Professions*, pp. 225-227.
[33] Holmes, *Augustan England*, p. 123; Mingay, *The Gentry*, pp. 5-10; J.R Halliday, "Social Mobility, Demographic Change and the Landed Elite of County Durham, 1610-1819: an open or shut case?", *Northern History*, 30, (1994), pp. 58-60.
[34] P. Lucas, "A Collective Biography of Students and Barristers of Lincoln's Inn, 1680-1804: a study in 'Aristocratic resurgence' of the eighteenth century", *The Journal of Modern History*, 46 (2), (June 1974), pp. 235-237.
[35] R. O'Day, *The Professions in Early Modern England, 1450-1800*, (London, 2000), p. 102.
[36] *Ibid.*, pp. 110-111.

Growth also increased chances for businessmen to rise in this period. Expansion in trade and manufacturing created opportunities to advance for those entering business. One example of this was the career of Richard Arkwright. Richard Arkwright was the son of a tailor who rose to great wealth and was knighted for his work as a cotton manufacturer and inventor of cotton spinning machinery.[37] He was not alone in prospering through a business career as the work on the social backgrounds of MPs in this period shows. Christie's 'non-elite' MPs were dominated by businessmen throughout the eighteenth-century.[38] Wasson found there were significant numbers of new men from business serving in the Commons. The business share of MPs rose approximately 10% during the eighteenth-century to almost a third, which was a greater number than any other profession.[39]

Lawrence and Jean Stone have challenged this view that a business career was a good avenue to achieve social advancement in this period. In order to determine how open the elite was to newcomers they examined 2,246 owners of 362 country houses in Hertfordshire, Northamptonshire and Northumberland between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries.[40] They concluded that "...those who did move up were rarely successful men of business....", so the, "...idea that the fundamental cause of English political stability has been perennial openness of its landed elite to penetration by large numbers of newly enriched bourgeoisie is clearly no more than a hoary myth..."[41] The Stones' hypothesis found support from the research of Rubinstein into the very wealthy during the nineteenth-century. He contended new

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[37] ODNB, s.v. Arkwright, Richard (1732-1792).
[38] I.R Christie, *British 'Non-Elite' MPs 1715-1820*, (Oxford, 1995), p. 129, Appendix A, p. 246.
[39] Wasson, "The Penetration of New Wealth", pp. 36-44.
[40] Stone and Stone, *An Open Elite?*, pp. 452-453.
[41] *Ibid.*, pp. 402-403.

men of wealth purchased very little land and when they did it was not on a large scale. This led him to believe the landed aristocracy was a "...closed, caste-like group, hostile to new entries..."[42]

This rather controversial finding by the Stones has been challenged on three grounds.[43] First, the appropriateness of using country houses as a proxy of elite status has been questioned. Halliday examined Durham's hearth tax returns during the late seventeenth-century and found there was not necessarily a relationship between the size of houses and income.[44] Second, it was pointed out the counties chosen by the Stone's may not be representative of other counties or England's experience generally.[45] It may well be that social mobility varied greatly between different counties as Mingay once observed.[46] Certainly, studies of social mobility in non-Stone counties tend to refute the suggestion that the landed elite were closed to men of business during the eighteenth-century.[47] Third, there has been a great deal of disagreement between the Stones and other historians over what their figures mean. For Stone, the elite were closed to businessmen because only 93

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[42] W.D Rubinstein, *Men of Property: the very wealthy in Britain since the Industrial Revolution*, (London, 1981), pp. 213-222; W.D Rubinstein, "New Men of Wealth and the Purchase of Land in Nineteenth-Century Britain", *Past and Present*, 92, (Aug 1981), pp. 125-147.

[43] There has also been a vigorous debate between Thompson and Rubinstein over the validity of Rubinstein's methodology and conclusions. See F.M.L Thompson, "Life after Death: how successful nineteenth century businessmen disposed of their fortunes", *The Economic History Review*, 43 (1), (Feb 1990), pp. 40-61; W.D Rubinstein, "Cutting up Rich: a reply to F.M.L Thompson", *The Economic History Review*, 45 (2), (May 1992), pp. 350-361; F.M.L Thompson, "Stitching it together again", *The Economic History Review*, 45 (2), (May 1992), pp. 362-375.

[44] Halliday, "Social Mobility", pp. 50-51.

[45] Halliday, "Social Mobility", p. 51; E. Spring and D. Spring, "The English Landed Elite 1540-1879: a review", *Albion*, 17 (2), (Summer 1985), p. 150; Wasson, "The Penetration of New Wealth", p. 37.

[46] Mingay, *The Gentry*, pp. 9-10.

[47] Halliday, "Social Mobility", pp. 58-61; D. Rapp, "Social Mobility in the Eighteenth Century: the Whitbreads of Bedfordshire, 1720-1815", *The Economic History Review*, 27 (3), (Aug 1974), pp. 380-394; R.G Wilson, *Gentleman Merchants: the merchant community of Leeds, 1700-1830*, (Manchester, 1971), pp. 220, 232.

permanent newcomers from business rose to the elite between 1540 and 1880.[48]

Other authors place more significance on different statistics the Stone's produced.

The Stones showed 22% of families were newcomers to the elite, a reasonable

proportion of whom were businessmen, which may demonstrate the elite was in fact

relatively open to newcomers regardless of their background. [49]

Even if businessmen did not purchase many country houses it does not

necessarily mean the elite were closed to businessmen. The elite would only be

closed if businessmen had the opportunity and desire to purchase a large landed

estate, but were unable to do so. Research on eighteenth-century London

merchants tends to indicate many businessmen simply did not aspire to a large

landed estate and those that did were able to buy one.[50] This lack of aspiration to

purchase an estate was also found amongst many successful military contractors

who simply did not wish to enter landed society.[51]

III. The modernisation of the military

If modernisation does lead to increased rates of social mobility a military

career during the eighteenth-century may have been one of the best mechanisms for

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[48] L. Stone, "Spring Back", *Albion*, 17 (2), (Summer 1985), p. 171.

[49] H. Perkin, "An Open Elite?", *The Journal of British Studies*, 24 (4), (Oct 1985), pp. 498-499; Spring and Spring, "Social Mobility", pp. 338-339; Spring and Spring, "The English Landed Elite", pp. 153-155.

[50] N. Rogers, "Money, Marriage, Mobility: the big bourgeoisie of Hanoverian London", *Journal of Family History*, 24 (1), (Jan 1999), pp. 29-30. A similar view of sixteenth century London merchants land purchases is given by R.G Laing, "Social Origins and Social Aspirations of Jacobean London Merchants", *The Economic History Review*, 27 (1), (Feb 1974), pp. 28-47.

[51] G. Bannerman, *Merchants and the Military in eighteenth century Britain: British army contracts and domestic supply, 1739-1763*, (London, 2008), p. 134.

achieving upward social mobility. It is thought that during the early modern period modern warfare emerged due to key administrative, technological and ideological changes.[52] However, the relative importance of different periods in contributing to the emergence of modern armies has been a subject of much controversy. Michael Roberts, in a seminal paper, contended armies and navies were transformed into modern fighting forces by a military revolution between 1560 and 1660.[53] Perhaps most importantly in this view, the development of systematic drill improved the effectiveness of armies and their size was transformed through administrative reforms.[54] According to Roberts,

"...By 1660 the modern art of war had come to birth. Mass armies, strict discipline, the control of the state, the submergence of the individual, had already arrived; the conjoint ascendancy of financial power and applied science was already established in all its malignity; the use of propaganda, psychological warfare, and terrorism as military weapons was already familiar to theorists, as well as to commanders in the field. The last remaining qualms as to the religious and ethical legitimacy of war seemed to have been stilled. The road lay open, broad and straight, to the abyss of the twentieth century...."[55]

There were certainly important changes during this time and the origins of modern professional armies and navies can often be located in Roberts's period of military revolution. In Britain during the time of Oliver Cromwell there was a large standing army of 40,000 men, which was professional in many respects.[56] The main reason this is not regarded as the beginning of the modern British army is because Cromwell's army had a coercive political function as opposed to one solely of national defence.[57] The first publicly funded national navy was created by Charles I

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[52] C. Townshend, "Introduction: the shape of modern war", in C. Townshend (ed.), *The Oxford History of Modern War*, (Oxford, 2005), p. 3.
[53] M. Roberts, "The Military Revolution, 1560-1660", in C.J Rogers (ed.), *The Military Revolution Debate: readings on the military transformation of Modern Europe*, (Oxford, 1995), pp. 13-36.
[54] Roberts, "The Military Revolution", pp. 13-36.
[55] *Ibid.*, p. 29.
[56] R.F Weigley, *The Age of Battles: the quest for decisive warfare from Breitenfeld to Waterloo*, (London, 1993), pp. 60-61.
[57] J. Childs, *The Army of Charles II*, (London, 1976), p. 1.

with his ship money fleet.[58] A key administrative development for the British navy was a series of Navigation Acts between 1651 and 1662, which increased England's merchant marine, the main source for skilled navy personnel, by ensuring English trade could only be carried on English ships manned by British sailors.[59]

The argument for a military revolution between 1560 and 1660 is not without its problems.[60] More important technological and tactical changes may have occurred before 1560.[61] Parker argues these changes included the construction of quadrilateral angled bastions along fort walls, the emergence of gunpowder in battles, the invention of powerful siege guns and heavily armed sailing ships.[62] Not all authors agree with Parker's views; for example, Lynn downplayed the importance Parker placed on angled bastions.[63] Nevertheless, it does seem a valid point to consider the key military changes before 1560.   Bean and Rogers believed developments as far back as the fourteenth-century, when archers replaced cavalry as the most effective weapon of war, should not be neglected.[64] It also seems questionable whether the reforms that Roberts claimed transformed warfare significantly altered the nature of armed conflicts. Some historians contend the

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[58] Weigley, *The Age of Battles*, p. 139.

[59] D. French, *The British Way in Warfare 1688-2000*, (London, 1990), p. 3.

[60] J. Black, *A Military Revolution? Military Change and European Society, 1550-1800*, (London, 1991), pp. 8-9.

[61] G. Mortimer, "Introduction: Was there a 'Military Revolution' in the Early Modern Period?", in G. Mortimer (ed.), *Early Modern Military History, 1450-1815*, (New York, 2004), p. 3.

[62] G. Parker, *The Military Revolution: military innovation and the rise of the West 1500-1800*, 2nd Ed., (Cambridge, 1998), pp. 7-18, 43, 159.

[63] J.A Lynn, "The *trace italienne* and the Growth of Armies: the French Case", in C.J Rogers (ed.), *The Military Revolution Debate: readings on the military transformation of Early Modern Europe*, (Oxford, 1995), pp. 188-189.

[64] C.J Rogers, "The Military Revolutions of the Hundred Years War", in C.J Rogers (ed.), *The Military Revolution Debate: readings on the military transformation of Early Modern Europe*, (Oxford, 1995), p. 76; R. Bean, "War and the Birth of the Nation State", *The Journal of Economic History*, 33 (1), (March 1973), p. 220.

improved tactics, such as systematic drill, did not affect the outcome of battles.[65]

Nor did larger armies necessarily increase their effectiveness as the actual numbers involved in battles remained the same.[66]   Finally, much of the administration could still be described as pre-modern, such as the heavy reliance on private contractors to raise armies due to the financial incapacity of many states.[67]

In contrast to Roberts's period of military revolution, military change between 1660 and 1792 is often seen as limited.[68]   It is pointed out that technology and tactical change remained relatively static during this period.   There were only minor technological improvements, such as replacing pikes with bayonets, compared to earlier periods.[69]   Tactics also remained similar with few key improvements.   The British Navy's fighting instructions, for example, which were first issued in the 1650s, remained in place for most of the eighteenth-century even though they reduced tactical flexibility.   In consequence, battles and wars were indecisive as officers often

[65] D.A Parrott, "Strategy and tactics in the Thirty Years' War: the military revolution", in C.J Rogers (ed.), *The Military Revolution Debate: readings on the military transformation of Early Modern Europe*, (Oxford, 1995), pp. 228, 234; S. Adams, "Tactics or Politics? The Military Revolution and Hapsburg Hegemony, 1525-1648", in C.J Rogers (ed.), *The Military Revolution Debate: readings on the military transformation of Early Modern Europe*, (Oxford, 1995), pp. 256-268.

[66] Rogers, "The Military Revolutions", p. 76; Bean, "War", p. 211; Parker, *The Military Revolution*, p. 72; C. Jones, "The Military Revolution and the Professionalisation of the French Army under the Ancien Regime", in C.J Rogers (ed.), *The Military Revolution Debate: readings on the military transformation of Early Modern Europe*, (Oxford, 1995), p. 150; Parrott, "Strategy and tactics", p. 239; Adams, "Tactics or Politics?", pp. 256, 258.

[67] Parrott, "Strategy and tactics", pp. 240-245.

[68] D. Gates, "The Transformation of the Army, 1783-1815", in D. Chandler (ed.), *The Oxford Illustrated History of the British Army*, (Oxford, 1994), p. 138; J.R Western, "War on a New Scale: professionalism in armies, navies and diplomacy", in A. Cobban (ed.), *The Eighteenth Century: Europe in the age of Enlightenment*, (London, 1969), p. 213; Weigley, *The Age of Battles*, pp. xii-xvi, 74; Parker, *The Military Revolution*, pp. 147, 153; J.A Lynn, "States in Conflict, 1661-1763", in G. Parker (ed.), *The Cambridge Illustrated History of Warfare: the triumph of the West*, (Cambridge, 1995), p. 176; Black, *A Military Revolution?*, p. 1.

[69] C. Barnett, *Britain and her Army, 1509-1970*, (London, 1970), pp. 128-129; B.P Hughes, *Firepower: weapons effectiveness on the Battlefield, 1630-1850*, (Staplehurst, 1974), pp. 94, 169; B. Lavery, *Nelson's Navy: the ships, men and organisation 1793-1815*, (London, 1989), p. 21; W.H McNeil, *The Pursuit of Power: technology, armed force and society since AD 1000*, (Chicago, 1982), pp. 165, 179; P. Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: economic change and military conflict from 1500 to 2000*, (London, 1988), pp. 96-97; Black, *A Military Revolution?*, pp. 10-12; Weigley, *The Age of Battles*, pp. xiv, 269-270; Lynn, "States in Conflict", pp. 166-167.

tried to avoid defeat rather than seek victory, which usually resulted in wars ending once one side had been financially exhausted.[70]

This period of limited military change and indecisive warfare was seen to have ended with a second military revolution during the French revolutionary (1793-1801) and Napoleonic wars (1803-1815). Technology remained similar yet there were major tactical, ideological and administrative changes that appeared to alter the way wars were fought.   New offensive tactics made stalemate in battle less likely. The British navy during the 1790s used aggressive melee tactics that increased the probability of victory in sea battles.[71] Land forces also used more proactive tactics, such as the French army focusing on annihilating their enemies.[72] Perhaps even more importantly, the ideological nature of warfare changed. Previously wars had been contests between rival monarchs, but the French wars after 1793 were a competition between monarchy and republicanism. This engendered greater levels of nationalism and patriotism amongst rival armies.[73]   The scale of warfare was transformed by the French introduction of conscription, which widened the social composition of recruits.[74]

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[70] French, *The British Way*, pp. 2-3, 11-12; Barnett, *Britain and her Army*, p. 230; Gates, "The Transformation of the Army", p. 138; Weigley, *The Age of Battles*, pp. xii, 74, 542; Parker, *The Military Revolution*, pp. 43, 102-103; Western, "War on a New Scale", p. 203.

[71] French, *The British Way*, pp. 13, 99; J.A Lynn, "Nations in Arms, 1763-1815", in G. Parker (ed.), *The Cambridge Illustrated History of Warfare: the triumph of the West*, (Cambridge, 1995), p. 209.

[72] Gates, "The Transformation of the Army", p. 134; Western, "War on a New Scale", p. 216.

[73] A. Forrest, "The Nation in Arms I: the French Wars", in C. Townshend (ed.), *The Oxford History of Modern War*, (Oxford, 2005), pp. 59-62; Lynn, "Nations in Arms", p. 186; Western, "War on a New Scale", p. 216; Barnett, *Britain and her Army*, p. 230.

[74] Parker, *The Military Revolution*, pp. 151, 153; Gates, "The Transformation of the Army", p.134; McNeil, *The Pursuit of Power*, p. 192; L. Colley, *Britons: Forging the Nation, 1707-1837*, (London, 1992), p. 287; P. Paret, "Colonial Experience and European Military Reform at the End of the Eighteenth Century", *Bulletin of Institute of Historical Research*, 27, (1964), pp. 49-50.

The view that eighteenth-century warfare can be divided into a long period of limited change and indecisive conflicts, which ended with a second military revolution at the turn of the century does seem rather problematic.   For one thing, even if the probability of decisive battles was lower there were still decisive battles and even wars during this period of supposedly limited change and indecisive conflicts. Jeremy Black observes there were many decisive battles during the eighteenth-century, such as Minden (1759), but conceded wars may have been indecisive due to the 'umbrella nature' of conflicts.[75]   Yet, others claim the Seven Years War (1756-1763) was one of the most successful and decisive wars the British have ever fought.[76] The British achieved unprecedented territorial gains and emerged as the leading nation in the world as a consequence of their success in this conflict.[77] Brumwell argued the Seven Years War was an important watershed for the British Army as success in this war led to a dramatic expansion in the subsequent size of the peacetime establishment.[78]

There were also important administrative changes between 1660 and 1792, which were critical in the development of modern armies and navies.   In Britain the first sizeable standing army, without a coercive political function, only existed in the late 1680s when James II had a force of 34,000.[79] Nor was it until 1689, when the

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[75] Black, *A Military Revolution?*, p.27; J. Black, "The Military Revolution II: eighteenth century war", in C. Townshend (ed.), *The Oxford History of Modern War*, (Oxford, 2005), pp. 49-50.
[76] P. Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery*, 3rd Ed., (London, 1991), p. 113; Colley, *Britons*, p. 101; T. Hayter, "The British Army and the First British Empire, 1714-1783", in D. Chandler (ed.), *The Oxford Illustrated History of the British Army*, (Oxford, 1994), p. 121.
[77] Colley, *Britons*, p. 148; Black, "The Military Revolution II", p. 40; Lynn, "States in Conflict", p. 182; H.V Bowen, *War and British Society, 1688-1815*, (Cambridge, 1998), p. 7
[78] S. Brumwell, *Redcoats: the British soldier and War in the Americas, 1755-1763*, (Cambridge, 2002), p. 5.
[79] Barnett, *Britain and her Army*, pp. 115-120.

Mutiny Act passed, that the legal existence of the standing army was recognised. Before this time the army was not even able to punish deserters as it had no legal standing. Thus, the worst punishment the army could inflict on anyone before the Mutiny Act became law was dismissal.[80] In 1667 a new era in professionalisation began for the British navy with the requirement that potential officers must first pass qualifying exams and have served a minimum period of sea service – in 1677 this was three years, but gradually expanded over time so that by 1729 prospective officers had to serve six years - before they became an officer.[81] This ensured a minimum standard of professional competence for all navy officers. Perhaps the greatest challenge for early modern navies was posed in feeding crews, while keeping them disease free and able to remain at sea for lengthy spells.[82] During 1693, for instance, the British fleet only managed to remain at sea for two weeks before having to return home with its sailors in a 'sickly and starving condition'.[83] However, the quality of victualling was transformed between 1716 and 1757 so that by the Seven Years War Admiral Hawke was able to stay continually at sea for six months.[84] The introduction of half pay for officers has been seen as a watershed in the modernisation of the military as it helped to transform the nature of officership by encouraging long service and the tendency for some families to specialise in the military profession.[85] The purpose of half pay was to maintain a reserve of military

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[80] J. Childs, "The Restoration Army, 1660-1702", in D. Chandler (ed.), *The Oxford Illustrated History of the British Army*, (Oxford, 1994), pp. 53-54; Barnett, *Britain and Her Army*, p. 124.
[81] D.A Baugh, *British Naval Administration in the Age of Walpole*, (Princeton, 1965), pp. 95-101; French, *The British Way*, p. 33.
[82] French, *The British Way*, p. 13; J. Brewer, *The Sinews of Power: war, money and the English state, 1688-1783*, (London, 1989), p. 36.
[83] N.A.M Rodger *The Command of the Ocean: a naval history of Britain, 1649-1815*, (London, 2004), p. 291.
[84] Rodger *The Command of the Ocean*, pp. 291, 304-307.
[85] Brewer, *Sinews of Power*, pp. 56, 58.

personnel that could be called on when the state required their services.[86] Half pay

was given to some army officers as early as 1641 and provided half their salary less

any deductions when they were granted half pay.[87] Accordingly, a colonel of foot

received £1 4s per diem full pay and 12s half pay.[88] The navy first introduced half

pay in 1668, but it was not until 1714 that half pay was payable to all officers in the

navy and army. This greatly increased the security and stability of the military

profession as a viable full-time career option.

Finally, many of the 'revolutionary' changes of the second military revolution

can be located in earlier eighteenth-century wars. The aggressive melee tactics of

the British navy actually originated during the later stages of the American War of

Independence (1775-1783).[89] In contrast to earlier wars, this conflict saw a contest

for the political support of the American people, which resulted in unprecedented

levels of nationalism and patriotism.[90] The American army, in common with the later

French army, was drawn from a wider range of social backgrounds than the

personnel of ancien regime armies.[91]

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[86] M.F Odintz, "The British Officer Corps, 1754-1783", unpublished PhD dissertation, The University of Michigan, (1988), p. 348; A.J Guy, *Oeconomy and Discipline: officership and administration in the British Army, 1714-1763*, (Manchester, 1985), Chapter 4.

[87] The only on-going deduction from half pay was 2.5% of half pay for poundage. However, when army officers first transferred to half pay several deductions were made, as follows: 6d poundage, 6d Chelsea Hospital, 1d pells, 7s agency, 6s if an officer could not personally collect their half pay from the agent. See J. Williamson, *A Treatise of Military Finance; containing the pay, subsistence, deductions and arrears of the forces on the British and Irish Establishments; and all the Allowances in Camp, Garrison and Quarters, & C. & C.*, 2nd Ed., (London, 1795), p. 29.

[88] Williamson, *A Treatise of Military Finance*, 2nd Ed., pp. 27, 29.

[89] Western, "War on a New Scale", p. 216.

[90] J. Black, *Warfare in the Eighteenth Century*, (London, 1999), p. 127; French, *The British Way*, p. 85; Paret, "Colonial Experience", p. 58; Western, "War on a New Scale", p. 216; T. Hayter, "The British Army", pp. 128-129.

[91] French, *The British Way*, p. 87.

The scale of warfare certainly increased dramatically after 1793. However, the Seven Years War was the first conflict that saw war conducted on a significantly larger scale than previously. Seen in this light it could be argued the French revolutionary and Napoleonic wars continued the upward trajectory of larger scale warfare that began in 1756 albeit in a much more sustained fashion. This is most evident when expenditure on the British army during the eighteenth-century is examined. Figure 1 shows the annual nominal public expenditure on army services between 1692 and 1815.

Figure 1: Annual nominal public expenditure on the army, 1692-1815

Note: These figures were obtained from three different reports. Army expenditure until the Act of Union in 1801 was divided into two different establishments, the English and Irish. The statistics on army spending from 1692 until 1800 are taken from reports concerning the net public income and expenditure of the English and Irish establishments. For some reason the Irish expenditure on army services is missing for 1726. Therefore, the spending on army services in 1726 is only for the English establishment. The third report detailed the gross public income and expenditure for the British establishment and provides the figures from 1801 until 1815.

Source:
*Parliamentary Papers, Volume XXXV (*1868-1869), pp. 7-225, 231-355, 361-389.

The first significant increase in scale occurred during the Seven Years War (1757-1763). This is shown by peak expenditure on army services during war. Prior to the Seven Years War, the peak expenditure in any war year was £5.06 million in 1710, whereas in the Seven Years War expenditure peaked at £10.44 million. The wars after 1793 merely continued the larger scale spending on war that began in 1756, although this was at a greatly accelerated pace. The peak expenditure on the army during the eighteenth-century occurred in 1799 when £17.40 million was spent on the army. The Napoleonic Wars saw even greater expenditure as spending on the army reached as much as £42.4 million in 1814, although this latter figure is gross expenditure which consequently exaggerates the extent of spending. Another important point is, as Brumwell noted, expenditure on the army during peace remained at a much higher level than previously despite dramatic declines in peak wartime expenditure. Before the Seven Years War expenditure on the army during peace averaged £1.44 million per year, yet average peacetime expenditure between 1764 and 1792 increased to £2.48 million per year. It should be noted that expenditure on army services in this period may be exaggerated for two reasons. First, expenditure on army services is reported in nominal terms and does not take into account inflation. Second, the second report on public expenditure after 1801 only detailed gross expenditure and the information provided in the parliamentary papers does not make it possible to ascertain what an equivalent net figure for spending on the army would have been. This undoubtedly exaggerates the magnitude of spending on the army during the Napoleonic Wars. The extent of these problems can be clarified by comparing changes in the size of the British army during this period.

Estimating the size of the army during the eighteenth-century is difficult as there were differences between the numbers of men voted by parliament, the army establishment, and actual numbers serving.   Historians of the army typically account for this difference by reducing the size of the official army establishment by 20%.[92] In consequence, to allow for differences between the establishment and actual numbers serving the size of the army is estimated as the official army establishment after a reduction of 20% is made to compensate for any discrepancies. According to this method, the size of the army in 1746 was 62,132, which considerably increased in size to 96,507 in 1762, both peak years in these respective wars.[93] This was fairly similar to the increases in army expenditure for this period; the size of the army almost doubled, while net expenditure on the army more than doubled.   The size of the army then increased massively to 315,481 by the peak year of the Napoleonic Wars, 1814. [94] This increase was not as great as army expenditure, but was still a very significant increase as the size of the army more than tripled. These differences between army size and expenditure on army services were probably due to a combination of inflation and the fact that Napoleonic War expenditure was only reported in gross terms.

The number of officers serving during peace, in common with peacetime expenditure on the army, also saw more sustained increases after the Seven Years War. According to Houlding, the peacetime establishment of 1718-1739 contained 1,950 officers compared to 2,600 between 1763 and 1771.[95] The increased

[92] S. Conway, *War, State and Society in Mid-Eighteenth Century Britain and Ireland*, (Oxford, 2006), pp. 57-61.
[93] *Parliamentary Papers, Volume XXXV (*1868-1869), p. 699.
[94] *Ibid.*, p. 702.
[95] J.A Houlding, *Fit for Service: the training of the British Army, 1715-1795*, (Oxford, 1981), p. 99.

peacetime establishment after the Seven Years War owed much to the globalisation of warfare and expansion of Britain's empire that resulted from victory. These created more opportunities for army officers to be employed abroad than previously.[96] This was shown by the number of regiments permanently based in colonial locations significantly increasing; British regiments stationed in North America rose from two in 1738 to fifteen by 1764.[97] India only began to have regiments permanently based there from 1754 and by the 1780s there were often as many as nine regiments in this location.[98]

There were certainly some differences between army expenditure and the size of the army, which were probably caused by inflation and the reporting of Napoleonic War expenditure figures in gross terms. However, the main characteristics in the expansion of large-scale conflict remained the same whether viewed through army expenditure or the size of the army. The first significant increase in scale of conflicts occurred with the Seven Years War as the peaks of expenditure or the size of the army showed. This watershed was also evident in a much larger peacetime establishment than previously in subsequent periods of peace. The scale of conflict after 1793 greatly increased compared to the major mid-eighteenth-century wars, but the conflicts near the turn of the nineteenth-century accelerated the trend towards large-scale warfare that began with the Seven Years War.

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[96] P.J Marshall, "Empire and Opportunity in Britain, 1763-1775: the Prothero Lecture", *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 5, (1995), p. 124.
[97] Odintz, "The British Officer Corps", p. 46.
[98] R. Callahan, *The East India Company and Army Reform, 1783-1798*, (Cambridge, Mass., 1972), pp. 36-38.

The larger scale of conflicts affected the administration of the armed services, as Weber argued:

"…Only the bureaucratic army structure has allowed for the development of the professional standing armies which are necessary for the constant pacification of large estates of the planes as well as warfare against far distant enemies...."[99]

In other words, modernisation of the army was necessary to be able to conduct large scale warfare. Yet this was a very complex process and causality worked both ways. The increased scale of warfare and greater frequency of major wars also acted as a catalyst to intensify the pace of modernisation. Conway noted war helped to promote reform as attempts were made to make the armed services more professional in order to increase their efficiency and state control of them. [100] Thus, there were often important administrative developments near the end of major wars. For example, the War of Austrian Succession ended in 1748, and between 1747 and 1751 there were the following reforms: fictitious names banned from muster rolls of guards regiments, reform of musters, regulation of stoppages from soldiers pay, restrictions on captain's dividends, the introduction of a relief system for regiments posted abroad, regulations concerning uniforms provided to soldiers, the end of the custom designating regiments by colonel's names and the banning of placing personal coat of arms on regimental colours.[101]

Modernisation of the military did seem to produce increasing rates of social mobility for those using an army career to advance. Max Weber noted that the bureaucratization of armies brought with it increasing upward social mobility as there

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[99] H.H Gerth and C. Wright Mills (eds), *From Max Weber: essays in sociology*, (London, 1967), p. 222.
[100] Conway, *War, State and Society,* p. 301.
[101] Guy, *Oeconomy and Discipline*, p. 162.

was a "…transfer of army service from the propertied to the propertyless…."[102] This thesis investigates the social mobility of a key group of army officers during the eighteenth-century when this modernisation took place. It examines the social origins and career patterns of the highest professional rank in the army, generals. The study focuses on the social mobility of generals for two reasons. Firstly, despite increasing rates of mobility among officers it is often claimed social mobility was very limited at the top end of the army as the highest ranks were dominated by the landed elite.[103] This is in line with one of the dominant theories on social mobility, which Goldthorpe describes as the 'closure thesis'. According to the 'closure thesis', social mobility generally occurs between individuals holding similar positions in society. The closer a person is to the top or bottom of a hierarchy the more limited mobility is as most mobility occurs for those at intermediate levels.[104] Secondly, who became a general in the eighteenth-century had potentially important implications for military performance. The outcome of key battles, such as Waterloo, often depended on the quality of leadership displayed by commanding generals, which could be adversely affected if there was limited mobility among generals. The key questions this thesis addresses are closely related to these themes of limited mobility at higher ranks, and modernisation and mobility. In the first place, did the upper levels of the army remain isolated from social mobility?   In the second place, were the social origins and career patterns of generals different in the late eighteenth-century compared to their earlier counterparts?

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[102] Gerth and Mills, *From Max Weber*, p. 222.
[103] Corfield, *Power and the Professions*, pp. 225-227; Holmes, *Augustan England*, p. 150.
[104] Goldthorpe, Llewellyn and Payne, *Social Mobility and Class Structure*, p. 343.

In order to answer these questions the methodological approach is to examine the social backgrounds and careers of generals at two points in time during the eighteenth-century representing fundamentally different eras in the modernisation of the army. 1747 was chosen to represent the early eighteenth-century, a period that could be described as pre-modern, and 1800 represents the late eighteenth-century after most modernisation had occurred.

The thesis is structured in the following manner.   Chapter two surveys the literature on the army and social mobility and chapter three addresses what it meant to be a general in the eighteenth-century as the nature of generalship during this time was different from today. The next two chapters are concerned with establishing rates of social mobility. The chapter on family backgrounds measures mobility rates through the most common methodological approaches to measuring mobility, an intergenerational study of the family backgrounds of generals' fathers and the extent to which future generals were self-recruited. Apart from achieving upward mobility through career selection there are other mechanisms of mobility or what Sorokin terms "channels of social circulation".[105] In consequence, chapter four examines the role education and marriage, some of the most important "channels of social circulation" apart from careers, played in the future generals' mobility patterns. Two important aspects of an army career that were potentially affected by modernisation were the career patterns of officers, such as their career paths through the army, and rewards gained from service. This is because modernisation affected the way

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[105] Sorokin, *Social and Cultural Mobility*, p. 164.

officials in public bureaucracies were promoted and paid.[106] Career patterns and

rewards are particularly important topics in studying the mobility of British army

officers as these two aspects of an army career are often seen as ways mobility was

restrained.[107] Hence, chapters five and six analyse the career patterns of the future

generals and rewards gained from army service.

[106] Gerth and Mills, *From Max Weber*, pp. 199, 203.
[107] C.B Otley, "The Social Origins of British Army Officers", *The Sociological Review*, 18 (2), (1970), pp. 213-215; C.B Otley, "The Origins and Recruitment of the British Army Elite, 1870-1959", University of Hull, unpublished PhD thesis, (1965), pp. 19, 81, 100.

Chapter two: The army and social mobility

I. The army as a mechanism of social mobility

Non-military careers may have provided increased opportunities in the eighteenth-century to advance due to modernisation, but during times of war the army was probably one of the most important avenues of advancement.[1] The army has always been an important avenue of social mobility as it offers the opportunity of upward mobility to those from even humble backgrounds.[2] An army career gave relatively high status as historically officers were drawn from the aristocracy.[3] It is estimated, for example, that most British aristocrats of military age had taken part in the War of the Roses during the second half of the fifteenth-century.[4] The extent of this opportunity to advance through an army career greatly intensifies during periods of war, which was especially the case during the eighteenth-century due to the unprecedented expansion in the scale of warfare.

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[1] Stone and Stone, *An Open Elite?,* p. 197.

[2] It is one of Sorokin's main "channels of vertical circulation". See Sorokin, *Social and Cultural Mobility*, pp. 164-166. This was also shown by a recent study on the careers of doctors in the late eighteenth-century army medical service. See M. Ackroyd, L. Brockliss, M. Moss, K. Retford and J. Stevenson, *Advancing with the Army: medicine, the professions, and social mobility in the British Isles, 1790-1850,* (Oxford, 2006), pp. 16-19.

[3] C. Storrs and H.M Scott, "The Military Revolution and the European Nobility, c. 1600-1800", *War in History*, 3 (1), (1996), pp. 1-41; D. Ogg, *Europe of the Ancien Regime, 1715-1783,* (London, 1965), p. 154; M.S Anderson, *War and Society in Europe of the Old Regime, 1618-1789,* (London, 1988), pp. 118-121; Western, "War on a New Scale", pp. 188, 203, 211; N.L Dodd, "British Officer Recruiting", *Military Review*, 51 (7), pp. 37-42.

[4] I. Roy, "The Profession of Arms", in W. Prest (ed.), *The Professions in Early Modern England*, (London, 1987), p. 184.

Sorokin outlined some of the reasons why the army is a particularly attractive career for advancing during war:

"…This institution plays an especially important part in periods of militarism, or international or civil war. Whether intentionally or not, the service of a talented strategist, or a brave soldier, regardless of his social status, is highly appreciated at such periods. Besides, the war is apt to test the talent of the low born soldier or inability of a privileged noble. The great danger to the army and to the country imperatively urges the army and the country to put the soldier in the rank corresponding to his real ability. The services of the low born soldiers force rewards by promotion. The great losses among the commanding officers make it necessary to fill their places with people taken from the lower ranks. The war continuing, a leadership once obtained by a low born soldier is likely to grow, if he is a talented commander…."[5]

The assertion that the army during the course of the eighteenth-century increasingly became a mechanism through which individuals achieved social mobility can be supported by comparing various studies' findings on the social background of officers at different points in this period. At the foundation of the regular British army in 1661 most officers were 'gentlemen officers' who according to Childs were 'more politicians than soldiers'. A study of these officers serving between 1661 and 1685 revealed that 59.9% were related to peers, baronets and knights.[6] The social backgrounds of officers became more diverse over time in line with the expansion of warfare. Hayes' study of officers serving between 1714 and 1763 showed that in this period officers were now drawn from four different social groups: titled and untitled aristocrats, the middle class and professions, foreign officers and officers promoted from the ranks.[7] Odintz's study of four sample infantry regiments in the mid eighteenth-century also showed a socially diverse officer corps. Officers that could be traced came from the following social groups: aristocracy and baronetage (11%),

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[5] Sorokin, *Social and Cultural Mobility*, p. 164.
[6] Childs, *The Army of Charles II*, p. 37.
[7] J. Hayes, "The Social and Professional Background of the Officers of the British Army, 1714-1763", unpublished MA dissertation, University of London, (May 1956), pp. 64-67.

gentry (58%), middle-class (14%), foreign (15%) and working-class (2%).[8]   There is

little research on the social backgrounds of army officers in the late eighteenth-

century, but the research that has been done suggests officers came from an even

wider range of social backgrounds than previously. Taking a sample of 100 officers

drawn from the 1780 army list, Razell found that 60% of officers came from the

middle class, 16% from the gentry and 24% from the aristocracy.[9]   This finding was

supported by the qualitative assessment of other historians. Ward argued that

during the Napoleonic Wars:

"...The immense augmentation of the army in the years of the revolution and again after 1803, the temper of the time, and perhaps also the natural disposition of the Duke of York and his staff, had led the Horse Guards to accept officers from a class of persons which in ordinary circumstances would have been denied advancement in the service. Whatever the causes, the Horse guards at the period of the Peninsular War was prepared to promote officers without money or interest on a greater scale than in the days of the King's administration before the wars. Officially, the emphasis was upon merit, and the foundation of the Royal Military College had been an attempt, praiseworthy in its intentions, to give an effect to this policy...."[10]

Ward's view echoed Turner's argument that the Napoleonic Wars saw an

unprecedented widening of the social groups that officers were drawn from, even

including lower middling sorts such as butchers' and tailors' sons.[11]

The view that the army became an increasingly popular way of achieving

social mobility as it expanded is not necessarily an opinion universally held. Some

historians argue there was an adverse change in the social character of the army

between the early and late eighteenth-century, which if correct would probably

restrain levels of social mobility. Hayes claimed there was less 'social snobbery' in

the early army compared to the late eighteenth-century. Evidence of this was the

[8] Odintz, "The British Officer Corps", Chart II, p. 182.
[9] P. E Razzell, "Social Origins of Officers in the Indian and British Home Army, 1758-1962", *The British Journal of Sociology*, 14 (3), (Sept 1963), Table 7, p. 253.
[10] S.G.P Ward, *Wellington's Headquarters: a study of administrative problems in the Peninsula, 1809-1814*, (Oxford, 1957), p. 159
[11] E.S Turner, *Gallant Gentleman: a portrait of the British officer, 1600-1956*, (London, 1956), pp. 133-134.

emergence of crack regiments in the later period when social criteria seemed to matter more than merit. In contrast, merit allegedly mattered more than social background in the early army.[12] Similarly, Guy argued "… during the decades from the Regency to the outbreak of the Crimean War, the officer corps became charged with snobbery and elitism founded on the criteria of wealth and ostentation rather than military merit…."[13] Holmes and Christie asserted that there were more "rags to riches" stories during the early eighteenth-century than the later period.[14] Burton and Newman, in analysing the career of General Sir John Cope, claimed "... Cope made use of almost the last occasion when it was still possible for an officer to advance rapidly without money or political favour...."[15]

The extent of any increase in social status through an army career may have also been limited. The existing literature on the eighteenth-century British army often contends senior officers were isolated from any expansion in social mobility. Historians claim senior positions in the army were reserved for aristocrats.[16] According to Guy, colonels and generals were drawn from a minority of privileged officers.[17] Barker summed up the consensus view on the promotion prospects of eighteenth-century army officers succinctly when he said:

"...Irrespective of their ability, men of moderate means could not climb very high up the ladder of rank. So most of the regimental officers-the lieutenants, captains and majors-came from the middle ranks of

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[12] Hayes, "The Professional and Social Background", pp. 103-107.

[13] Guy, *Oeconomy and Discipline,* p. 164; A.J Guy, "The Army of the Georges, 1714-1783", in D. Chandler (ed.), *The Oxford Illustrated History of the British Army*, (Oxford, 1994), pp. 98-99.

[14] Holmes, *Augustan England*, p. 269; Christie, *British 'Non-Elite' MPs*, p. 135.

[15] I.F Burton and A.N Newman, "Sir John Cope: promotion in the 18th century army", *The Historical Review*, 78 (309), (October, 1963), p. 667.

[16] Guy, *Oeconomy and Discipline*, p. 89; Storrs and Scott, "The Military Revolution", pp. 14-16, 36-37; French, *The British Way in Warfare*, p. 5; Roy, "The Profession of Arms", pp. 210-211; A.J Barker, *Redcoats: the British soldier in America*, (London, 1976), p.22; I.Roy,"The Profession of Arms", pp. 212-213.

[17] Guy, "The Army", p. 102.

society, the rural aristocracy and the merchant classes in the cities, while senior officers-the colonels, brigadiers and generals-sprang from the nobility...." [18]

The strong connection between aristocrats and generals is noted in more recent works as well. Collins, for example, calculated that nearly two thirds of operational generals serving in Spain during 1808 had aristocratic connections.[19]

The findings of those who have examined the social backgrounds of senior officers in more detail seem to support these views. Hayes found two thirds of all regimental colonels came from the upper levels of society and claimed more than 50% of Scottish colonels were titled aristocrats.[20] However, Hayes' conclusions may have been unduly affected by the way he analysed his data. Hayes sliced up regimental colonels from the gentry into two distinct groups. The 'influential landed gentry' were included as part of his upper group along with noblemen and baronets. In contrast, the 'country gentry', professional classes and foreigners belonged to his lower group.[21] The justification for this was that the 'more influential landed gentry' were in the upper group because they had inherited or acquired estates of their own. Yet, there was no mention of the size of the estates or whether they would have provided sufficient income to live off. A professional income may have still been necessary for some of these officers to survive. Another important point is that the upper group was dominated by the gentry as it only included 73 sons of aristocrats and baronets.   It seems questionable to include the gentry and aristocracy as one social group because for the average member of these groups there were huge

[18] Barker, *Redcoats,* p.22.
[19] B. Collins, *War and Empire: the Expansion of Britain 1790-1830*, (Harlow, 2010), p.427.
[20] Hayes, "The Social and Professional Background", pp. 68-69; J. Hayes, "Scottish Officers in the British Army, 1714-1763", *Scottish Historical Review*, 37 (April 1958), p. 27.
[21] Hayes, "The Social and Professional Background", pp. 68-69.

differences in the economic and social resources they could draw on. Razzell also found that senior officers came largely from the upper classes. According to his data, 57% of those holding the rank of major general and higher in 1830 were aristocrats.[22] For a slightly later period, Otley demonstrated that 45.5% of generals had close connections with the landed elite, military elite or other elites.[23] Of course, the smaller nineteenth-century army made it more difficult to get promoted and so the situation may have been different before 1815.[24]

The aristocratic dominance of high command was not necessarily restricted to the British army, but has been seen to be generally applicable to military forces during this time. In the late eighteenth-century navy there were perhaps justifiable complaints that aristocrats were monopolising command appointments.[25] Certainly, the proportions of peerage and gentry serving in the navy seemed to increase significantly as the century progressed. Cavell showed both of these groups accounted for 5% of junior officers in 1761, but by 1801 this had risen to 17.6%.[26] Moreover, according to Wareham 61% of all frigate captains, one of the most popular command positions in the British navy, posted between 1801 and 1814 were

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[22] Razzell, "Social Origins of Officers", Table 9, p. 254.

[23] He defined the different types of elites as follows: (1) landed elite: "sons or sons-in-law of landowners who themselves owned, or whose direct ancestors owned 2,000 or more acres of land worth £3,000 per annum or more, or 3,000 or more acres of land worth £2,000 per annum or more in 1883"; (2) military elite: "sons or sons-in-law of army officers of the rank of major general and upwards, or of rear admiral and upwards"; (3) other elite: sons or sons-in-law of politicians, industrial directors, financiers, diplomatists, top civil service and colonial service administrators, etc". See C.B Otley, "The Origins and Recruitment", Table 17, p. 119.

[24] Ackroyd et al, *Advancing with the Army,* pp. 171, 186-8.

[25] N.A.M Rodger, "Commissioned Officers' Careers in the Royal Navy, 1690-1815", *Journal for Maritime Research* (online), (June 2001), p. 11, taken from http://www.jmr.nmm.ac.uk/server/show/conJmrArticle.52/viewPage/11; T. Wareham, *The Star Captains: frigate command in the Napoleonic Wars*, (London, 2001), pp. 94-95; C. Consolvo, "The Prospects and Promotion of British Naval Officers, 1793-1815", *The Mariner's Mirror*, 91 (2), (May 2005), p. 152, footnote 65 p. 158.

[26] S. Cavell, "A Social History of Midshipmen and Quarterdeck Boys in the Royal Navy, 1761-1831", unpublished PhD dissertation, University of Exeter, (2010), Table 12.2, p. 440.

titled aristocrats.[27] A comparison with the social backgrounds of foreign army officers is always difficult because definitions of nobility and proportions within each country can vary so widely. Nevertheless, studies of European fighting forces during this period also tend to indicate senior ranks were dominated by aristocrats.[28]

Two important aspects of an army career may have acted to constrain levels of social mobility. The first aspect of an army career that possibly constrained levels of social mobility was the methods of entering and advancing with the army and variables affecting promotion. Contemporaries, modern historians and sociologists have often claimed two characteristics of entering and advancing within the army negatively impacted social mobility and military competence of officers.[29] First, was the fact that many officers entered or advanced in the army through purchasing commissions. It was alleged the main factor in promotion was wealth, excluding men of moderate means and making the army the preserve of the upper classes.[30] Childs argued that purchase restricted careers of army officers to those that had wealth, patronage and place thereby denying advancement on merit.[31] Biddulph similarly found that promotion depended largely on "money and influential friends".[32] Otley claimed the system of nomination, purchase and low pay acted in unison to

[27] Wareham, *The Star Captains*, Table 3.4, p. 94.
[28] Storrs and Scott, "The Military Revolution", pp. 16-17.
[29] A. Corvisier, *Armies and Societies in Europe, 1494-1789*, (London, 1976), pp. 159-161; Turner, *Gallant Gentleman*, pp. 36-37; R. Grenfell, *The Men who Defend Us*, (London, 1938), p.6; Barker, *Redcoats*, p. 20; J. Childs, "The Army and State in Britain and Germany during the Eighteenth Century", in J. Brewer and E. Hellmuth (eds), *Rethinking Leviathan: the eighteenth-century state in Britain and Germany*, (Oxford, 1999), p. 68; Barnett, *Britain*, p. 138; Otley, "The Social Origins of British Army Officers", pp. 213-215; Otley, "The Origins and Recruitment", pp. 19, 81, 100.
[30] Corvisier, *Armies and Societies,* pp. 159-161; Turner, *Gallant Gentlemen*, pp. 36-37; Grenfell, *The Men who Defend Us*, p.6; Barker, *Redcoats*, p. 20.
[31] J. Childs, "The Army and State in Britain and Germany", p. 68.
[32] H. Biddulph, "The Era of Army Purchase", *The Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research*, 12 (48), (Winter 1933-1934), p. 226.

ensure the officer corps were socially exclusive and provided 'insuperable obstacles' to men of moderate means who wanted an army career.[33] In turn, purchase adversely affected the competence of officers as capital was more important than ability.[34] The problem, as many contemporaries saw it, was that:

"...Money and powerful relations will always procure them what they want; they have therefore no occasion to apply themselves to the knowledge of their duty. It is from this way of thinking that so many of them do so little credit to their place; not from the want of genius, but application...."[35]

Modern authors have often taken up the same theme of purchase ensuring the dominance of rich high born officers and leading to military incompetence. Dickson claimed "... Professional ability, energy and dedication to the job counted for little. If you were rich and well-connected you were in; if you were not, you were not...."[36] Cannon asserted purchase "... played into the hands of young men of wealth and connections and was an essential part of aristocratic control of the army...."[37] A similar view of officers generally was taken by Barnett. He asserted purchase divorced promotion from merit resulting in an officer corps of incompetents. This was made up for, in his opinion, by a minority of officers who were very good and competent non-commissioned officers.[38] Some authors contend this incompetence may have been even worse among those holding senior positions; many generals holding command positions it is argued were inadequate in the performance of their duties.[39] This low level of competence was strongly linked to

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[33] Otley, "The Social Origins", pp. 213-215; Otley, "The Origins and Recruitment", pp. 19, 81, 100.
[34] Grenfell, *The Men*, p. 6; Barnett, *Britain and her Army*, p. 138.
[35] H. Bland, *A Treatise of Military Discipline*, 8th Ed., (London, 1759), p. 34.
[36] N. Dixon, *On the Psychology of Military Incompetence*, (London, 1976), p. 172.
[37] Cannon, *Aristocratic Century,* p. 119.
[38] Barnett, *Britain and her Army,* p. 138.
[39] Gates, "The Transformation of the Army, p. 142.

the social positions of those becoming generals.[40] Gates argued promotion to higher

rank was not based on merit, but on monetary wealth allowing 'unsuitable and less

gifted' officers to acquire senior positions.[41]

An important part of this argument is an unfavourable comparison, in terms of

social origins and competence, with the military services whose officers did not enter

or were not promoted by purchase. In the artillery, engineers and navy, officer entry

was based on nomination and subsequent promotion depended on selection and

seniority.   One became an officer in the artillery or engineers by nomination from the

Master General of Ordnance. Most officers in the navy started their career due to

the patronage of a ship's captain. In contrast to the army's 'incompetent aristocrats',

the general impression of these services is of one whose officers were mainly drawn

from the middling sorts and who were more competent due to greater professional

training than the army.[42]

It is certainly true these services had higher standards of education. To

become an officer in the navy a potential officer first had to pass qualifying exams.

Likewise, in the artillery and engineers prospective officers had to attend an officer

training school, which taught amongst other things, mathematics, physics and

chemistry.[43] Of course, the nature of these professions probably required a higher

degree of technical ability than the army. However, research on engineers suggests

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[40] Dixon, *On the Psychology of Military Incompetence*, p. 172.
[41] Gates, "The Transformation of the Army", p. 142.
[42]This is implicit in Rodger's comparison of career options for young aristocrats. See N.A.M Rodger, *The Wooden World: an anatomy of the Georgian Navy*, (London, 1988), pp. 253-255.
[43] A. Clayton, *The British Officer: leading the army from 1660 to the present*, (London, 2007), p. 58.

the social backgrounds of these officers were fundamentally no different from the rest of army society.[44] Even though there was no purchase in the engineers many engineering officers also held commissions in the army and at least half of the engineers serving between 1741 and 1757 came from backgrounds that could afford to purchase commissions.[45]

Glover's detailed research on the role purchase played in promotion does cast some doubt on the view that purchase restrained social mobility. Glover examined the methods of promotion for 2,151 regimental promotions taken from *The London Gazette* that occurred at the height of the Napoleonic Wars (September 1810-August 1811 and March 1812-February 1813). He found that only 21% of promotions were purchased during this time.[46] Glover claimed wealth did not restrict one becoming an officer as it was relatively easy to gain a free commission due to the high demand for young officers. Instead, commissions were restricted to the literate.[47] The main effect of purchase seemed to be to accelerate promotion times and allow officers to increase their chances of gaining commissions in more desirable regiments. Even during wartime purchasing continued to remain a popular method of obtaining a major's commission and was more important the more prestigious a regiment. Glover calculated that only 17.7% of all infantry commissions were purchased compared to 45.1% of cavalry commissions between 1810 and 1813.[48] Purchase also accelerated the promotion process by lowering the time spent at each rank. For

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[44] D.W Marshall, "The British Military Engineers 1741-1783: a study of organisation, social change, and cartography", unpublished PhD thesis, University of Michigan, (1976), p. 196.
[45] *Ibid*., pp. 150-151.
[46] M. Glover, "Purchase, Patronage and Promotion in the Army at the Time of the Peninsular War", *Army Quarterly and Defence Journal*, 103, (1973), p. 362.
[47] M. Glover, *Wellington's army: in the peninsular 1808-1814*, (London, 1977), pp. 36-41, 44
[48] *Ibid*., Table A, p. 83.

example, an infantry lieutenant who relied on seniority would take on average seven years to become a captain compared to only four years if he purchased a captaincy.[49]

Of course, Glover's findings may only apply to the period of the Napoleonic Wars due to the massive expansion of the army. Indeed, other authors have claimed that the nature of promotion during the Napoleonic wars was totally different compared to previous periods. Barthorp alleged before the Napoleonic Wars the usual method of promotion was purchase compared to seniority, patronage and purchase afterwards.[50] Perhaps some perspective can be gained on Glover's results by comparing them with the research of Odintz, whose study of mid eighteenth-century infantry officers included a long period of peace (1764-1778), on methods of promotion for his sample infantry officers. Odintz found that the proportion of infantry officers in his sample who purchased was as low as 33% of their commissions for lieutenant or as high as 46% for captain.[51] These purchase rates were much higher than the Glover's findings, as only 22% of infantry captains in his samples purchased their commissions.[52] This suggests purchase as a method of promotion was far more important during peace, which is perhaps why Otley's research on generals for the nineteenth-century showed that for three different sample periods between 1816 and 1853, 66.7% of promotions in the guards, cavalry and infantry were purchased.[53] This comparison suggests the importance of purchase also depended on the rank being purchased; both Glover and Odintz show captaincies and majorities were the

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[49] Glover, *Wellington's army*, Table B, p. 84.
[50] M. Barthorp, *Wellington's Generals*, (Oxford, 1978), p.3.
[51] Odintz, "The British Officer Corps", Chart XI, p. 316
[52] Glover, *Wellington's army*, Table A, p. 83.
[53] Otley, "The Origins and Recruitment", table 14, p. 89.

main ranks purchased. Despite their differences the studies demonstrate that purchase may not have been as important as some authors think as most commissions were not purchased.

Second, the importance of social status in promotion was also seen to hinder social mobility and military efficiency. The negative effect of social status on military efficiency was first pointed out by Junius, the anonymous critic of eighteenth-century life, who claimed in 1769 that Granby while commander in chief used the army

"... to provide at the public expense for every creature that bears the name of Manners; and, neglecting the merits and services of the rest of the Army, to heap promotions upon his favourites and dependants..."[54]

This led to grave consequences for the army, Junius claimed, as "….Under such a system the army denigrated into a mere rabble, and was easily beaten by the Americans…."[55] Similar criticism has often been taken up by modern authors. In fact, there are some historians who regard social status as the only relevant factor in the promotion cycle. Clayton contended promotion had nothing to do with merit, but was solely dependent on gaining favour with the Secretary at War.[56] Robson argued "...entry into, and promotion in, the army, [was] a matter of favour rather than of merit...."[57] In Otley's opinion, the system of nomination provided an "aristocratic test of suitability" in order to continue "an aristocratic grip on the officer corps".[58]

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[54] G.E Mingay, "Landownership and Agrarian trends in the 18th Century", unpublished PhD thesis, University of Nottingham, (1958), p. 18.
[55] *Ibid.*, p. 28.
[56] Clayton, *The British Officer*, p. 54.
[57] E. Robson, "Purchase and Promotion in the British Army in the 18th Century", *History*, 36, (Feb 1951), p. 58.
[58] Otley, "The Origins and Recruitment", pp. 94-95.

A high level of social status may have been particularly important in accelerating promotion prospects. It was probably no coincidence that in Odintz's sample of British officers all those closely related to peers became generals.[59] Indeed, he claimed that in the British army there was a group of officers "…relatively immune to the ordinary determinants of regimental promotion by virtue of their social status…."[60]   Similarly, Hayes asserted members of the most prominent families generally secured more rapid promotion than others.[61] French also argues rich and well-connected officers were 'fast tracked' in promotion compared to normal officers.[62] The influence of social status on promotion may have also depended on the rank and time period. It has long been thought that the upper ranks were the preserve of those with the highest social status, particularly for the ranks of lieutenant colonel and higher.[63] In Houlding's view, the highest an officer could advance without a high social status was lieutenant colonel if he was lucky and major if he was unlucky.[64] The role social status played in career progression, however, may have been different depending on time period. Social status is often regarded as more important in career progression during the late eighteenth-century army compared to the earlier period.[65]

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[59] Odintz, "The British Officer Corps", pp. 334, 347.
[60] *Ibid.,* p. 346.
[61] Hayes, "The Professional and Social Background", pp. 53-54.
[62] French, *The British Way*, pp. 36-37.
[63] Ackroyd et al, *Advancing with the Army*, p. 137; Houlding, *Fit for Service*, p. 106; Odintz, "The British Officer Corps", p. 341; Hayes, "The Social and Professional Background", pp. 137-139; J.D Williams, "A study of an eighteenth century Nobleman, his House, Household and Estate: Sir John Griffin Griffin, fourth Lord Howard de Walden, first Lord Braybrooke of Audley End, Essex, 1719-1797", unpublished PhD thesis, University of London, (1974), p. 43.
[64] Houlding, *Fit for Service*, p. 106.
[65] Barnett, *Britain*, p. 226; Hayes, "The Social and Professional Background", pp. 103-109.

In summary, then, social status has been identified as the most important factor in army careers. The key attribute of social status affecting progression was whether an officer was an aristocrat. Aristocratic officers' promotions were fast tracked due to their superior social connections and wealth.[66] The aristocratic advantage in army careers, however, did depend on the rank and time period. One of the main implications for the effect of social status on army careers was the adverse impact on military efficiency. It is the main reason some historians claim the average British officer was worse than their French counterparts.[67]

Even though purchase and social status were the two most important factors in careers, historians have recognized there were other considerations influencing promotion prospects. War greatly enhanced promotion prospects by expanding the supply of officer commissions and creating many more "free" vacancies.[68] If an officer was born at the right time he might be well placed to take advantage of the promotion cycle during war. In fact, Rodger has argued the most important factor in navy promotion was being born twenty years before the outbreak of a major war.[69] The reason for this was that the navy promotion cycle took on 'feast and famine' attributes; rapid promotions during the early stages of conflicts and few promotions during peace.[70] The type of regiment served with may have also impacted on promotion prospects. Regimental mobility could accelerate promotion prospects, especially for guards officers who usually possessed a higher army rank than their

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[66] Odintz, "The British Officer Corps", pp. 334, 347; D. French, *The British Way*, pp. 36-37.
[67] Barnett, *Britain*, p. 238.
[68] Glover, *Wellington's army*, Chapter 6; Odintz, "The British Officer Corps", p. 299; Stone and Stone, *An Open Elite?*, p. 197; H.J Habakkuk, "English Landownership, 1680-1740", *The Economic History Review*, 10 (1), (Feb 1940), p. 10; S. Conway, *War, State and Society*, pp. 121-125.
[69] Rodger, *Command of the Ocean*, p. 381.
[70] Rodger, "Commissioned Officers' Careers ", p. 6.

regimental rank. Many early eighteenth-century captains in the guards were able to gain regimental colonelcies of foot regiments ahead of much older colleagues due to their higher army rank.[71] However, some authors contend this advantage may not have meant too much as promotion was also much slower in the guards and few guards officers changed regiments.[72]

Some historians also point out that merit may have counted in career progression.[73] Houlding, who regarded most British officers as generally competent, claimed experience and merit were important variables in promotion.[74] Brewer argued most promotions in the army reflected military experience and competence.[75] For Hayes, ability and enthusiasm often played a critical role in advancing.[76] Other authors have pointed out that promotion was generally determined by a mixture of competence and social status.[77] Corvisier, for instance, argued that promotion in eighteenth-century European armies was generally a result of merit, favouritism and luck.[78]

An examination of the promotion cycles of other military services also reveals that promotion depended mainly on social status and merit. When Townshend was Master General of Ordnance during the 1780s he wanted potential engineering

[71] Burton and Newman, "Sir John Cope", p. 661.
[72] Glover, *Wellington's army*, p. 86.
[73] Houlding, *Fit for Service*, p. 106; French, *The British Way in Warfare*, pp. 36-37.
[74] Houlding, *Fit for Service*, pp. 106, 116.
[75] Brewer, *The Sinews of Power,* p. 57.
[76] Hayes, "The Social and Professional Background", pp. 169-170.
[77] Brewer, *Sinews of Power*, p. 57; Western, "War on a New Scale", p. 211.
[78] Corvisier, *Armies and Societies*, p. 152.

candidates for the military academy at Woolwich to have the "proper birth and proper qualifications".[79] The navy is often held up as an example of a service where men of moderate means prospered and merit was rewarded.[80] Benjamin and Thornberg asserted navy command was given in the expectation of superior performance and long term retention of command depended on continued good performance.[81] Some saw the navy as a place to escape 'the tyranny of money' that officers needed to advance in the army.[82] It is often argued social status was not as important to navy careers. Baugh, one of the most eminent naval historians, claimed aristocrats did not dominate selection as there was a tendency for selection to be based on professional criteria. Having naval connections would advance anyone as far as other connections.[83] On the other hand, other authors contend social status played a key role in naval advancement.   Dandeker examining the late eighteenth-century navy claimed that 'favourable kinship and political connections' often overrode 'service' considerations.[84] As early as 1933 Richmond maintained that "... merit could obtain recognition, though recognition moved more slowly than a friend at court...."[85] The most recent study of the social backgrounds of midshipmen and navy officers noted there was an inverse relationship between social and naval influence on promotion, but when social connections were evident they were given priority.[86]

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[79] Marshall, "The Military Engineers", p. 116.

[80] D.K Benjamin and C.F Thornberg, "Comment: rules, monitoring, and incentives in the age of sail", *Explorations in Economic History*, 40 (2003), p. 208.

[81] *Ibid.*

[82] Corvisier, *Armies and Societies in Europe*, p. 161.

[83] D.A Baugh, "The 18th century Navy as a National Institution, 1690-1815", in J.R Hill (ed.), *The Oxford Illustrated History of the Royal Navy*, (Oxford, 1995), pp. 153-154.

[84] C. Dandeker, "Patronage and Bureaucratic Control – the case of the Navy Officer in English Society, 1780-1850", *The British Journal of Sociology*, 29 (3), (Sept 1978), p. 306.

[85] H.W Richmond, "The Navy", in T.S Tuberville (ed.), *Johnson's England: an account of the life and manners of his age, volume 1*, (Oxford, 1933), p. 60.

[86] Cavell, "A Social History", p. 438.

Advancing in the navy in reality probably depended on a mixture of social status and merit.   It was important to have good connections and to be competent officer. Navy patrons would not normally advance incompetent officers as it might damage their reputation, which would adversely affect their standing with the Admiralty.[87] Yet, even Anson, who had a reputation for advancing candidates on merit, when First Lord of the Admiralty, did not advance all deserving officers as he tended to help his friends and hinder his enemies even though some of his enemies were very able officers.[88]   This seems similar to the way connections were often used in the army medical service. Army doctors needed good connections to advance, yet it was rare for an incompetent doctor to be advanced.[89] Patronage, in the absence of internal examinations and staff assessments, was used to differentiate between equally able candidates.[90] Consolvo is the only author to have tried to quantitatively assess the impact of patronage and merit on military promotion. Using a sample of 225 lieutenants who entered the navy in 1790 he tested the influence of merit and patronage, defined in part by social status, on promotion to commander, captain and rear admiral.[91] He found patronage was the most important factor in promotion to commander and captain, but not to rear admiral.[92] Merit also had a positive effect on promotion, but was much less important than patronage.[93] According to Consolvo, it took 1790 lieutenants 25 years without patronage and eight years with patronage to become a commander.[94] The patronage advantage was surprisingly less for captains; officers possessing

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[87] Rodger, *Wooden World*, pp. 273-281; Baugh, *British Naval Administration*, p. 140; Rodger *The Command of the Ocean*, pp. 388-389.
[88] Baugh, *British Naval Administration*, pp. 139-141.
[89] Ackroyd et al, *Advancing with the Army*, pp. 155, 189-190.
[90] *Ibid.*, pp. 206-207.
[91] Consolvo, "The Prospects and Promotion", pp. 137-159.
[92] *Ibid.*, pp. 148-154.
[93] *Ibid.*, pp. 151-152.
[94] *Ibid.*, Figure 10, p. 152.

interest became a captain in ten years compared to fifteen years otherwise.[95] In any case, the advantage of patronage was far greater than for merit.   Consolvo found a meritorious lieutenant, defined as those officers who saw action in battle, took ten years on average to get promoted to commander compared to a mean of twelve years for all lieutenants.[96] Thus, merit provided an edge of 20%, which was much less than the advantage of patronage. The relative importance of these factors may have also changed over time. In both the army and navy there are historians who claim the relative importance of merit declined and the role of patronage increased as the century wore on.[97] However, this argument seems at odds with the increasing modernisation of the military during this time. For example, it was only during the Napoleonic period that the army introduced competency reports for officers and instituted minimum levels of service at different ranks.

The second important aspect of an army career that may have constrained levels of social mobility was the rewards and costs that resulted from serving in the army.[98] The current literature on the army usually contends that this profession was a losing concern for officers as the cost of army service consistently exceeded any gains even for the highest ranks.   Admittedly, those reaching the highest ranks benefited from generous incomes, which may have exceeded other income sources.[99] However, the costs of officership even exceeded these seemingly generous rewards. Guy argued that once the considerable expenses of officership

[95] Consolvo, "The Prospects and Promotion", Figure 10, p. 152.
[96] *Ibid.*, Table 3, p. 151.
[97] Hayes, "The Social and Professional Background", pp. 103-105; Wareham, *The Star Captains*, pp. 94-95.
[98] C.B Otley, "The Origins and Recruitment", pp. 213-215; Gates, "The Transformation of the Army", p. 142.
[99] Hayes,"The Social and Professional Background", pp. 131-132; S.J Park and G.F Nafziger, *The British military: its system and organisation, 1803-1815*, (Ontario, 1983), p. 77.

are taken into account generally, and command in particular, even a "... proprietary colonelcy without independent means to sustain it was a prize of startlingly little consequence...."[100] This view was echoed by Wellington who, while colonel of the 33rd foot, thought a colonelcy was a losing concern.[101] Certainly, the expenses of officership made it difficult for some officers to live off their pay.[102]

It should be noted these conclusions about the costs and rewards of officership are usually based on a few anecdotal examples. Guy, for instance, in examining the costs of senior officership used the evidence of three officers: the Duke of Cumberland, Richard Molesworth, and William Haviland.[103] As there has been no in-depth study examining the costs and rewards of senior officership, using a larger sample of officers, it remains to be seen whether these anecdotal examples are representative of senior officers generally. Indeed, a more optimistic picture of the rewards of army service is given by some authors. Marshall noted that most engineers left wealth at their death and some profited greatly from army service.[104] The recent research on army doctors found that:

"...Perhaps the most surprising finding of this study is how much money many of the cohort left that cannot be linked to any patrimony. A third left more than £5,000 net of the value of any real estate they may have owned. In present-day purchasing power this was an equivalent to a share portfolio of £350,000, an exceptional sum. It would not be an exaggeration to describe the richest – the Estes of this world – as plutocrats. Many made themselves rich through their civilian practice, but fortunes were also left by surgeons who had spent their whole adult life in the army. This suggests, contrary to the general impression, that army service, though expensive, could be lucrative...."[105]

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[100] Guy, *Oeconomy and Discipline,* p. 157; A.J Guy, "The Colonel's Advantage: regimental proprietors and the perquisites of command, 1714-1763", *National Army Museum Annual Report*, (1981), p. 36.
[101] Glover, *Wellington's army*, p. 19.
[102] A.J Guy, "This Insulting Misfortune: regimental officers and the problem of personal pay, 1714-1775", *National Army Museum Annual Report*, (1979-1980), pp. 10-21; Glover, *Wellington's army*, p. 43; Clayton, *The British Officer*, p. 55; Storrs and Scott, "The Military Revolution", p. 31.
[103] Guy, "The Colonel's Advantage".
[104] Marshall, "The British Military Engineers", pp. 182-193.
[105] Ackroyd et al, *Advancing with the Army,* p. 339.

This image of senior army officers struggling to make ends meet due to modest rewards and exorbitant expenses is, in common with the social origins of officers, contrasted with the situation in the navy. Senior officers in the navy, in a similar fashion to the army, were paid relatively low wages and had high expenses. The pay of admirals in 1793 was between £49 per month for a rear admiral and £98 per month for an admiral.[106] Admirals also needed to spend large amounts of money on their uniform and entertaining various guests.[107] When Admiral Lord Keith was commander-in-chief of the Mediterranean he spent £8,000 per annum between 1799 and 1801 keeping his table, which exceeded his salary many times.[108] The difference between the two services was that a senior officer in the navy was virtually guaranteed to make a fortune in prize money. [109] The navy paid prize money when warships were sunk (£5 per enemy sailor) or captured and for the seizure of merchant vessels.[110] Senior officers were able to make fortunes because they received most of the prize money. Captains gained a two eighths share of prizes, while admirals acquired one eighth in prize money from ships under their command even if they were thousands of miles away from the capture.[111] Further profits could also be made through carrying officially authorised freight, most commonly gold bullion, for which they typically received 1-2% commission, and, more dubiously, private commodities.[112]

[106]Lewis, *A Social History of the Navy*, p. 299.
[107] Wareham, *The Star Captains*, pp. 38-39.
[108] Rodger, *The Command of the Ocean*, p. 524.
[109] Lewis, *A Social History*, pp. 319, 321; J. Gwyn, *The Enterprising Admiral: the personal fortune of Admiral Sir Peter Warren*, (London, 1974), p. 15; Rodger, *The Wooden World*, p. 258.
[110] Lewis, *A Social History*, p. 331.
[111] *Ibid.*, p. 318.
[112] Rodger, *The Wooden World*, p. 258; Gwyn, *The Enterprising Admiral*, p. 9.

The compensation structure in the navy was important for some historians as it helped explain Britain's unprecedented military success during the eighteenth-century wars. The traditional arguments for British military success have focused on Britain's 'blue water' policy, her superior money and credit and the quality and quantity of British navy personnel.[113] In recent times economic historians have also used the navy's compensation structure to argue it played an important role in victory because prize money provided an incentive for British navy personnel to fight harder than their rivals.[114]

This incentives argument has even been extended to army officers. As long ago as 1960 it was claimed army officers may have received significant compensation from prize money. In his thesis on the purchase system Bassett argued there was an implicit link between purchase and earning a capital gain from prize money. He claimed the field commander would earn one eighth share of prize

[113] For more details on these arguments please see the following sources: J. Black, "Introduction", in J. Black and P. Woodfine (eds), *The British Navy and the Use of Naval Power in the Eighteenth Century*, (Leicestershire, 1988), p. 3; French, *The British Way*, pp. 13, 57, 60, 77, 99, 117, 226; Brewer, *The Sinews of Power*, pp. 31, 33, 177-178; B.H Liddell Hart, "Economic Pressure or Continental Victories", *Journal of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies*, 2 (3), (1979), pp. 486-503; A.T Mahan, *The Influence of Sea Power on History, 1660-1783*, (London, 1892), pp. 191, 200, 209; A.T Mahan, *The Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and empire: 1793-1812*, *Volume 2*, (London, 1892), p. 118; G. Modelski and W.R Thompson, *Seapower in Global Politics, 1494-1993*, (London, 1988), pp. 11-12, 22-21; Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery*, pp. 102-103, 141-142, 146-147, ; Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*, pp. 114, 151-153; D.A Baugh, "Why did Britain lose command of the sea during the war for America?", in Black and Woodfine (eds), *The British Navy*, p. 161; C. Knick Harley, "Trade: discovery, mercantilism and technology", in R. Floud and P. Johnson (eds), *The Cambridge Economic History of Modern Britain, Volume 1: Industrialisation, 1700-1860*, (Cambridge, 2004), p. 196; Rodger, *Command of the Ocean*, p. 200; R. Harris, "Government and the Economy, 1688-1850", in R. Floud and P. Johnson (eds), *The Cambridge Economic History of Modern Britain, Volume 1: Industrialisation, 1700-1860*, (Cambridge, 2004), pp. 205, 217; Lavery, *Nelson's Navy*, p. 295; Lynn, "Nations in Arms", p. 209; Baugh, *British Naval Administration*, pp. 145-146.
[114] D.W Allen, "The British Navy Rules: monitoring and incompatible incentives in the Age of Fighting Sail", *Explorations in Economic History*, 39, (2002), pp. 204-231; Benjamin and Thornberg, "Comment", pp. 195-211; D.W Allen, "Rules and rewards in the age of sail: a reply", *Explorations in Economic History*, (2003), pp. 212-220; D.K Benjamin and C. Thornberg, "Organization and Incentives in the Age of Sail", http://people.clemson.edu/~wahoo/Papers/Navy%20Pay.770.copy.pdf.

money and cited prize money gains from victories in India.[115] In a similar fashion,

Biddulph alleged that "...there was always the prospect of prize money on active

service...." and noted in a similar fashion to Bassett the gains from Indian service.[116]

More recently, Allen alleged there was a link between purchase, prize money and

British officer compensation. He argued purchase encouraged officers to self-select

according to ability and provided incentives to fight in line with overall strategic

objectives. In his view, the purchase system by paying officers with prize money

gave an incentive to engage the enemy in battle.[117] There is no question that some

army officers benefited from prize money. For instance, the general in charge of the

operation to capture Havana from the Spanish in 1762 reaped a bounty of

£122,697.[118] Likewise, in 1809 Wellington received £1844 2s 6d as his share of the

Copenhagen prize money.[119] However, it remains to be seen how frequently prize

money was gained by the average army officer. Allen argued that soldiers were

mainly paid "out of the spoils of war".[120] In contrast, Guy believed prize money was

extremely rare.[121] As there has been no systematic study of the rewards and costs

of officership it is difficult to know the extent to which officers were compensated by

prizes. There were many prizes available in India - and these gains are cited by

authors such as Allen - but the British army only had limited contingents of regiments

in India due to the English East India Company having a separate army.[122]

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[115] J.H Bassett, "The Purchase System in the British Army, 1660-1871", unpublished PhD dissertation, Boston University, (1960), pp. 45-46.
[116] Biddulph, "The Era of Army Purchase", pp. 229-230.
[117] D.W Allen, "Compatible Incentives and the Purchase of Military Commissions", *The Journal of Legal Studies*, 27 (1), (Jan 1998), pp. 45-66.
[118] Hayes, "The Professional and Social Background", p. 166.
[119] Lloyds TSB Group Archives, Cox and Co. (hereafter Cox), A/56/e/107.0. Agent's Ledger 33rd Foot, 1805-1813, f. 4.
[120] Allen, "Compatible Incentives", p. 56.
[121] Guy, *Oeconomy*, p. 105.
[122] Clayton, *The British Officer*, p. 61.

II. Conclusion

The current literature on social mobility is unclear on the relationship between modernisation and rates of social mobility. On the one hand, there is a substantial body of work that suggests social mobility increases with modernisation. On the other hand, many more recent works on social mobility, such as the work by Goldthorpe and Clark, seem to refute this view. The literature on the army is also ambiguous on how modernisation affected army careers. A comparison of different studies of army officers suggests that the army as a mechanism of social mobility was becoming increasingly popular over the course of the long eighteenth-century. Yet, there are historians who suggest there were fewer opportunities in the late eighteenth-century army due to the increasing importance of social status in army careers. In the case of the army it is difficult to know the effect of modernisation on army careers due to the nature of previous research on officers. There have been many different specific studies of officers, but most of these tend to concentrate on periods that end in the mid eighteenth-century or concern specific aspects of officership.[123] This thesis will make an important contribution to this debate on how modernisation affected social mobility by examining the social backgrounds and career patterns of British generals during a period when the army was transitioning from a pre-modern organisation to one that had many aspects of a modern profession.

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[123] For a recent review of the literature on the eighteenth-century army see W.P Tatum, "Challenging the New Military History: The Case of Eighteenth-Century British Army Studies", *History Compass*, 5 (1), (2007), pp. 72-84.

Another key contribution of this project will be to determine the extent to which the highest ranks of a profession were 'closed' or 'open'. One of the dominant theories of social mobility suggests the peak of any profession is probably relatively closed as most mobility occurs through intermediate levels. In a similar fashion, historians of the eighteenth-century army have often suggested the highest ranks in the army were isolated from any expansion in social mobility. However, these findings on the army have rarely been backed up by in-depth research on the social backgrounds and career patterns of senior officers. Most studies of senior officers are military histories focusing on their activities in battles.[124] There has only been one in-depth study of the social history of senior officers and this work by Otley on generals between 1870 and 1959 concerned a fundamentally different period of time. The contribution by Glover and Hayes on generals and regimental colonels in the eighteenth-century are of much value, but these were done as part of wider studies on officership generally.

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[124] See for example G.A Billas (ed.), *George Washington's Opponents: British Generals and Admirals in the American Revolution*, (New York, 1969); P. Le Fevre and R. Harding, *Precursors of Nelson: British Admirals of the eighteenth century*, (London, 2000).

Chapter three: What is a general?

I. Introduction

The 1800 army list specifies the names of 288 officers holding substantive general rank ranging from major generals to field marshals.[1] What did it mean to be a general and how did these officers become generals? In modern times a general is simply the highest active military rank in the army. However, this was not necessarily the case during the eighteenth-century as the nature of rank at this time created two different types of general. In a similar fashion to today, there were some generals who held general rank with high active military commands attached to their positions. On the other hand, there were other generals who were generals in name only. They held the army rank of general, but may have never held high military command or even seen active service for many years. The purpose of this chapter is to explain what it meant to be a general in the eighteenth century and how officers became generals. Some attention will then be given to explaining how the generals to be studied were identified and exploring their characteristics as a group.

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[1] National Archives (hereafter NA), WO 65/50, Printed Annual Army List, 1800.

II. Rank in the army

The reason two different types of generals existed in the eighteenth-century was due to the nature of rank at this time. All officers possessed two different ranks, a regimental and an army rank. The rank structure was almost identical for both army and regimental ranks. Ensign was the lowest rank of officer. After ensign ranks ascended in the following order: lieutenant, captain lieutenant, captain, major, lieutenant colonel and colonel. All of these ranks were both army and regimental ranks. The highest regimental rank was colonel, but army ranks continued after colonel into the various grades of general. In addition, the mid to late eighteenth-century saw a new regimental rank, called colonel commandant, between lieutenant colonel and colonel for some regiments. This was an honorary position and depending on the size of the regiment there could be different colonel commandants for each battalion.[2]

The lowest army rank of general was different depending on the time period. In the early eighteenth-century a colonel in the army was followed by a brigadier general. However, by the mid eighteenth-century the rank of brigadier general seems to have disappeared as an army rank. There were no appointments to brigadier general in the army after 1746 until this rank was reinstated in 1946 as a substantive general rank.[3] Instead brigadier general became a local rank. Local

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[2] Park and Nafziger, *The British Military*, p. 25.
[3] W.B.R Neave-Hill, "The Rank Titles of Brigadier and Brigadier General", *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research*, 47 (190), (Summer 1969), pp. 99-100.

ranks were temporary command appointments abroad given while on active service. This allowed the army to appoint officers to higher command appointments than their army rank in the event there were no qualified candidates holding the appropriate army rank. It was meant to be a temporary measure to aid the efficiency of the service. Accordingly, local ranks ended when the overseas appointment they were attached to was relinquished or promotion was gained to the same army rank. The first substantive general rank for mid-eighteenth-century officers, and the rank following brigadier general for their earlier period counterparts, was major general. Major general was followed by lieutenant general, general and field marshal. Field Marshal in a similar fashion to regimental colonel was a rank that was honorary and was not obtained through the usual promotion methods. Officers could only become field marshals by direct appointment from the King.

The rank structure for regimental and army ranks may have been almost identical, but there were important differences between these ranks. There were rather different responsibilities attached to regimental and army ranks. All regimental ranks apart from regimental colonel which was an honorary position had active military commands attached to them. Regiments were purely administrative organisations and were organised for fighting into battalions; most regiments consisted of one or two battalions.[4] The regimental lieutenant colonel was the commander of the battalion assisted by the major. Battalions were subdivided into smaller fighting units called companies. There were usually ten companies per battalion, although this could vary especially during wartime. Field ranks, that is to

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[4] Park and Nafziger, *The British Military*, p. 25.

say, those ranked captain and higher, were each in charge of a company and had sole responsibility for their company's administration and military management. The colonel's company in his absence was the responsibility of a rather odd rank called the captain lieutenant who was essentially an acting captain. Captain-lieutenant was a marginal rank as most officers in the army skipped this rank. For example, only 32% of infantry officers in Odintz's sample served as captain lieutenants.[5] In fact, some historians who have examined army careers entirely ignore this rank in their analysis.[6] The most junior officer ranks, lieutenant and ensign, assisted the captains in the management of their companies. Pay was in proportion to an officer's regimental rank and the number of officer places per regiment was consequently limited.

In contrast to regimental rank, an army rank did not necessarily entail any particular command responsibilities. It merely provided the opportunity for active command in the army if an officer could gain an appointment to an army job such as a major general commanding a brigade. Specific army appointments did carry extra pay, but there was no financial compensation *per se* for holding a particular army rank. Another difference for army ranks compared to regimental ranks was there were no limits on the number of officers that could hold army rank. One advantage of army rank was that it was only possible to become a commanding general through army rank and there were also some regimental benefits for those holding a high army rank. Seniority in the army entitled officers to the same regimental rank as their army rank in another regiment through the patronage of the commander in chief

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[5] Odintz, "The British Officer Corps", Chart XI, p. 316.
[6] Glover, *Wellington's army*, Table A, p. 83.

who had the right to appoint officers to regimental vacancies not caused by death in battle. Army rank also excused an officer from regimental duty except for the duties that pertained to his army rank.

Methods of promotion were also slightly different between regimental and army ranks. In both rank structures the standard method of promotion was promotion by seniority or what contemporaries termed "progressive advancement". Gaining regimental promotion through seniority was based on the date an officer joined his regiment. A new ensign would join his regiment at the bottom of the ensign list as the junior of his rank. As other ensigns died, were promoted or transferred he would gradually move up places until he became the most senior ensign in his regiment. Once he achieved regimental seniority for his rank he usually succeeded to the next non-purchase vacancy for the next highest rank. However, if officers transferred regiments they would go to the bottom of the regimental seniority list for the rank in the regiment they transferred to.

Seniority in the army worked in a similar fashion, except that seniority was based on the date an officer first obtained his commission. Accordingly, seniority in the army for each rank did not change and could be different than regimental seniority which varied depending on length of service with particular regiments. An examination of the seniority of different general ranks taken from the 1800 army list demonstrates how "progressive advancement" worked. In the army list of 1800 there were 79 lieutenant generals. The most senior lieutenant general was Harry

Trelawny, who became a lieutenant general in the army on 12 October 1781, while the most junior of this rank was James Pulteney whose commission dated 26 June 1799. When a vacancy occurred in the rank of general, the army commission above lieutenant general, Trelawny as the most senior lieutenant general in the army would automatically become a general and all lieutenant generals would move up one place. This would then create a vacancy for the most senior major general, Henry Pringle, whose major general commission was dated 20 November 1782, to become a lieutenant general. One consequence of the differences between regimental and army seniority was officers sometimes held different regimental and army ranks. For example, one of the late eighteenth-century generals featured in this study, Cornelius Cuyler, in 1782 held the regimental rank of lieutenant colonel in the 55th foot while he was a colonel in the army.

Army and regimental ranks could also be different as there were ways to accelerate promotion that did not rely on seniority. Regimental promotion could be accelerated without waiting for promotion through seniority by purchasing the next highest rank. This was subject to the approval of the commanding officer and secretary at war. Near the turn of the nineteenth-century additional conditions were imposed before purchase transactions were approved; minimum terms of service at different ranks were required before any promotion was possible.[7] It should be noted that purchase was not entirely divorced from regimental or army seniority. Potential purchasers had their name put on "the list for purchase" and deposited the regulation price of the next rank with their regiment agent. These names appeared

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[7] Glover, *Wellington's army*, p. 76.

in order of regimental seniority and a purchase vacancy would first be offered to the most senior officer on the list. However, regimental seniority could be usurped by army seniority at the discretion of the commander in chief. The commander-in-chief was able to offer any purchase vacancy to an officer that did not have regimental seniority provided the officer concerned had seniority in the army.

After officers became captains in the army promotion could be accelerated through brevets to the next two ranks. It was possible to become a major and a lieutenant colonel in the army without army seniority by brevet. Brevets were awarded to field officers for particular merit or long service to accelerate the promotion prospects of deserving officers so they could gain 'promotion to the higher ranks at an appropriate age.'[8] The origin of brevet promotion seems to date back to the period 1660 to 1700.[9]   In the early eighteenth-century brevets were originally awarded to individual officers by local commanders in chief, but over time brevet promotion evolved so that by the end of the eighteenth-century it was "...a general promotion, by which a given number of officers are raised from the rank of captain upwards..."[10] In May 1811, for example, Wellington recommended six majors and twelve captains for promotion by brevet as a reward for the meritorious actions they displayed in battle.[11]   A long service brevet was given to mark the King's birthday in 1813. This brevet promoted 71 long serving army captains to major for those who gained captaincies in the army between 1 January 1800 and 31 December 1802.[12]

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[8] W.B.R Neave-Hill, "Brevet Rank", *The Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research*, 48, (1970), p. 90; M. Glover, "Purchase", pp. 356-359.
[9] Neave-Hill, "Brevet Rank", p. 85.
[10] *Ibid*, p. 90.
[11] Glover, *Wellington's army*, p. 80.
[12] Glover, *Wellington's army*, p. 80.

The main advantage of brevets was to accelerate progress to general by enabling selected officers to make their way through the army ranks of captain and major much quicker than if they had waited for seniority. In 1806 another perk for those gaining brevets was introduced. For the first time some officers who held the brevet ranks of major and lieutenant colonel in the army were given an addition to their pay. Brevet majors and lieutenant colonels in the infantry and colonial corps gained an additional 2s per diem.[13] There were various changes to brevet promotion after 1815, but it remained an integral part of army promotion until finally abolished in 1967, a decision which was made to bring army promotion in line with promotion methods in the air force and navy.

Apart from brevets gained through merit or long service it was also possible to obtain a brevet promotion in the army through serving with the foot or horse guards (which was renamed the life guards in 1788). In 1687 regimental captains in the foot guards were granted the privilege of holding a brevet lieutenant colonelcy in the army. This privilege was extended in 1691 to foot guards' lieutenants who gained brevets as captains in the army.   Regimental commissions in the horse guards gave some officers even higher brevet ranks in the army than the foot guards. Cornets, the equivalent rank to ensigns in the cavalry, ranked as captains in the army with regimental lieutenants equivalent to army majors. Even some non-commissioned officers in the horse guards held higher army ranks. Corporals in the

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[13] Glover, *Wellington's army*, p. 80.

horse guards ranked with the "eldest lieutenant of horse" in other regiments of cavalry.[14]

Brevet promotion through merit, long service or serving with the guards only took officers so far up the army list. The highest brevet promotion was lieutenant colonel as the army authorities were unwilling to make officers colonel by brevet as it was "...not consistent with the organisation of this service to appoint to the brevet of colonel out of the usual mode of progressive advancement to that rank..."[15] Hence, once officers became lieutenant colonels in the army promotion to subsequent army ranks became solely determined by seniority. This meant that speed of promotion to general was based on the date an officer became a lieutenant colonel in the army. However, it was possible to accelerate the advancement of talented colonels within the confines of "progressive advancement" to general rank through a mass promotion of all colonels who were senior to the useful colonel in the service. Accordingly, in order to give Colonel Aylmer general command in 1813 it was necessary to promote 82 colonels to major general due to the dictates of "progressive advancement".[16] As there were no limits on the number of general officers all lieutenant colonels in the army who lived long enough, did not resign their commissions and were not dismissed eventually became general officers.

[14] C. Cooper King, *The British Army and Auxiliary Forces*, (London, 1894).
[15] Glover, *Wellington's army*, p. 145.
[16] *Ibid.*, p. 146.

III. Types of general

The system of army rank that resulted in all surviving lieutenant colonels eventually becoming generals inevitably produced two different types of general. The first types of generals were general officers that could most easily be described as 'passive generals' or non-operational generals. 'Passive generals' were simply regimental field officers who never gained any command appointments as generals, but became generals through 'progressive advancement'. Often 'passive generals' were officers who had retired, but remained on the army list because they never resigned their commission and eventually became generals through living long enough. Thus, it was not uncommon for a 'passive general' to only obtain a substantive general rank long after they retired or at an old age.

An example of a 'passive general's' career can be seen from the career pattern of Charles Vernon, who was listed as a general on the 1800 army list. Vernon entered the foot guards in 1741 as an ensign and served actively with both the first and second foot guards until he retired near the end of the Seven Years War in 1762. At the time he retired he held the regimental rank of captain in the guards and army rank of colonel. Shortly after retiring he became a major general in the army and eventually a general in 1783. He was still listed as a general on the 1800 army list because he never resigned his commission, was not dismissed from the

army and lived until 1810.[17]   There were other officers who became 'passive generals' without seeing any active service. Charles Moore, the 1st Marquis of Drogheda, even became a field marshal despite never having seen active service. The closest he got to battle was recruiting a regiment in return for the regimental rank of colonel. He raised the 'Drogheda Light Horse' in 1759 and remained colonel of this regiment through various name changes until it was finally disbanded in 1821. Edwards speculates that perhaps the King gave him the rank of field marshal as consolation for the loss of his regiment.[18]

Generals of the second type were the operational generals. They were given active military posts as generals and were compensated for their services with additional pay and allowances. The operational generals were the most successful officers in the British army. To be an operational general, officers usually had to be appointed to a specific role "on the staff".[19] This was by no means easy as there were significantly more army generals than appointments available. According to Glover, only two out of every five general officers had appointments "on the staff".[20]

Most staff appointments went to the most junior ranks of substantive generals. The Irish staff in 1749 consisted of one general, one lieutenant general, three major

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[17] NA, WO 25/134, Notification Books to the Secretary of State, 1740-1744, ff. 136, 375; WO 25/136, Notification Books, 1746-1755, ff. 337, 377; WO 25/137, Notification Books, 1755-1759, f. 277; WO 25/138, Notification Books, 1759-1761, ff. 215, 652; WO 64/13, Army Gradation List, 1775-1816, ff. 227-228; WO 65/5-7, 11-12, 50, Printed Annual Army Lists, 1758-1759, 1762-1763, 1800.
[18] T.J Edwards, "The Field Marshal's Baton", *Army Quarterly and Defence Journal*, 53(1), (October 1946), p. 103.
[19] Glover, *Wellington's army*, p. 147.
[20] *Ibid.*, p. 147.

generals and eight brigadier generals.[21] By 1812 the Irish staff had expanded with

the overall expansion of the army, but one thing remained constant: most

opportunities were available for the most junior grade of substantive generals. At

this time there was employment for six lieutenant generals and 23 major generals.[22]

Nor was this characteristic isolated to Ireland. Glover found that 59% of all major

generals held staff appointments compared to 25% of lieutenant generals and only

3% of generals.[23]

Staff posts were based in a variety of different locations.   In 1812, 59% of

staff appointments were overseas, while 26% were in Britain and 15% in Ireland.

The most significant overseas locations were Portugal and Spain with over a third of

generals, followed by the West Indies (23%), the East Indies (11%) and North

America (8%).[24] Within each country that had staff appointments general commands

were further divided into regional districts. In India there were different staff

appointments for the three presidencies. Likewise, Britain and Ireland was divided

into several military districts with general commands attached to each district.

The most important position on staff for generals was commander in chief.

National commanders in chief were responsible for all military matters in their

country and oversaw the work of local or regional commanders. The first set of *The*

King's Regulations (1837), outlining rules for the government of the army, set out in

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[21] *The Succession of Colonels to All His Majesties Land Forces from their Rise to 1749*, (London, 1749).
[22] Glover, *Wellington's army*, p. 147.
[23] *Ibid.*
[24] *Ibid.,* pp. 147-148.

precise detail the roles and responsibilities of local commanders in chief serving in Britain. A local commander in chief was firstly responsible for preparing and disciplining troops for active service. To this end, he was expected to ensure troops were regularly paraded and exercised in 'heavy marching order' at least once per week. A commander had to obtain accurate information concerning all military bodies and resources in his district with particular knowledge of the 'strong features' of his district, such as roads and bridges, and detailed knowledge of any defensive frailties. The local commander in chief was then expected to communicate information on the efficiency of corps discipline, equipment and preparation for active service to the national commander in chief. Many of his functions were supervisory in nature. This included monitoring the commanding officers of individual battalions to observe 'the indulgencies granted to soldiers, awards of minor punishments and the measures adopted to prevent drunkenness'. Furthermore, commanding generals were expected to ensure general orders and regulations were obeyed, check on the regularity of regimental hospitals and care of the sick and take precautions to prevent damage to local farmers from loss of game. Finally, commanders were expected to liaise regularly with magistrates and other civil authorities.[25]

Other staff appointments in Britain were usually focused on preparing troops for active service or ensuring the internal economy of the army was as efficient as possible. After commander in chief the other two main staff roles were adjutant general and quartermaster general. The adjutant general was responsible for

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[25] *The King's Regulations and Orders for the Army*, (London, 1837), pp. 29-34.

discipline and clothing troops and the quartermaster general concerned himself with housing troops and arranging operations. Another common job was to be commander of a training camp. There were also roles explicitly tasked with supervising the efficiency of army procedures such as Inspector General of the recruiting service. A small number of generals were appointed to serve on the Board of General Officers, responsible for financial regulations and its subcommittee the clothing board, who supervised clothing contracts entered into by regimental colonels.

Staff appointments based overseas had more active military responsibilities. Generals posted to staff positions abroad were frequently involved in fighting the enemy in battles and wars.   Depending on the particular circumstances of the engagement the person who had overall responsibility for a successful campaign was the national or local commander in chief. Alternatively, a commander-in-chief might be appointed for a particular mission or expedition. In battles the commander in chief in charge of overall strategy was assisted by several generals. For the purposes of fighting, regiments were organised into one or more battalions headed by a lieutenant colonel or a major. Between two and four battalions were then combined to make a brigade, the standard formation for operations.[26] Brigades were typically commanded by major generals and were the most common command positions in battles. However, at times generals also commanded even larger bodies of men. Brigades were often formed into separate divisions, consisting of two to four

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[26] F. Myatt, *The Soldiers Trade: British Military Developments, 1660-1914*, (London, 1974), p. 170; Barthorp, *Wellington's Generals*, p. 7.

brigades, which were usually commanded by lieutenant generals.[27]   As the scale of warfare increased over the course of the eighteenth-century divisional commands became more common. In 1813 it became necessary to organise troops within even larger formations. At this time the army was organised into two to three corps, each made up of two divisions.[28]

Another difference between overseas and other staff appointments was that those based abroad involved more active participation with civil authorities.   Many commanders in chief abroad were responsible not only for the military but also the civil administration of their jurisdiction.   Major General Lord Hugh Percy, a general on the 1800 army list, as commander in chief of Rhode Island in 1776 actively participated in the civil administration of Rhode Island making several civil appointments during his tenure.[29]

There were also commands given to generals that specifically combined civilian and military responsibilities as governors and lieutenant governors of overseas jurisdictions.   It was fairly common, especially after the Seven Years War, for senior British army officers to be appointed governor or lieutenant governor and commander in chief of overseas locations. A typical example of this was that the lieutenant governor of Jamaica was also the commander-in-chief for this area as well. Accordingly, these roles entailed responsibility for the civil administration and defence of these areas. Unlike governorships in Britain that were usually sinecures,

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[27] Barthorp, *Wellington's Generals*, pp. 7-8.
[28] *Ibid.*
[29] ODNB, s.v. Percy, Hugh (1742-1817).

many of the foreign governorships involved military responsibilities similar to local commands such as Percy's at Rhode Island. Indeed, battles with the French and other enemies often occurred in these colonies. For example, the lieutenant governor of Minorca, Lieutenant General William Blakeney, was responsible for resisting a French expedition sent to capture Minorca for 70 days in 1756 before he was finally defeated.[30]

IV. Selection of generals for the study

This study focuses exclusively on generals who at some point in their careers possessed operational roles as generals. The reason for excluding non-operational generals is the main concern of this study is to establish the limits of social mobility and the characteristics of the army elite so it is necessary to study only the most successful generals in the army. In addition, another area of interest is the efficiency implications of generals' mobility patterns and for this reason working exclusively on operational generals makes sense. An operational general for the purpose of this study is defined as an officer holding local or substantive general rank while serving "on the staff" or as a colonial governor with an active military command.   This focus on operational generals meant there was a two-stage selection process in deciding which generals to study: identifying all the general officers and then ascertaining which ones held operational commands during their careers.

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[30] ODNB, s.v. Blakeney, William (1671/2–1761).

A key part of this study is to assess whether the nature of generalship changed over time with the expansion and modernisation of the army. Hence, the first stage in the selection process was to choose two different groups of generals for study, one representing the early eighteenth-century and another representing the late eighteenth-century. Generals in 1747 were chosen to represent the early period as this was before the great expansion in the scale of warfare that began with the Seven Years War. It was also before many other notable aspects of modernisation, such as regiments no longer being called by their colonel's name, which occurred after 1748. The proxy year selected for the later period was 1800. Most of the expansion and modernisation of the army had occurred by this time. Indeed, many of the most important reforms of the army, such as minimum length of service in each rank before promotion, had occurred by 1795.[31] Comparing the careers of generals at these two time periods allows for an assessment of the impact modernisation had on army careers.

The selection of 1747 as the early sample year was also influenced by availability of evidence. Names of officers serving in the British Army, and their ranks, were published in army lists. However, the information contained in these lists, and the frequency they were published, was very limited before annual army lists began to be published in 1754. The first list of army officers was published in 1642, as a list containing 'cavaliers and brave commanders'. In the period from 1700 until 1740 there were only two lists published, the Blenheim Roll in 1704 and a list of half pay officers in 1714. Neither of these lists contained every officer in the

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[31] M. Glover, *Peninsula Preparation: the Reform of the British Army, 1795-1809*, (Cambridge, 1963), pp. 152-154.

army as only the officers who fought at Blenheim or were on half pay were included. From 1740 lists of army officers began to be published much more frequently. In 1740 the most comprehensive list of officers to date was published containing the names and ranks of all officers. However, the next army list containing all officers was not to occur until annual publication started in 1754. In the meantime, lists of senior officers were published titled *The Succession of Colonels* in 1742, 1745, 1747 and 1749. *The Succession of Colonels* only listed the names of generals, colonels and some field officers. Lists of senior officers were important at this time because regiments were still named after their colonel. As regiments were disbanded according to seniority, with the most junior regiments disbanded first, these lists which mainly listed 'successions of colonels', specifying every colonel of a regiment from each regiment's foundation until the list was published, were helpful in ascertaining the order of regimental seniority.[32] In deciding the proxy year to represent the early eighteenth-century *The Succession of Colonels* list for 1747 was selected as this was near the end of the last major pre-modern war providing a potentially larger population of operationally active general officers than the earlier army lists. After publication of annual army lists started in 1754, and particularly from 1766 when indexes were first available, it becomes much easier to research the career patterns of officers. This is because these annual lists provide not only the names of all officers from general to ensign, but also the dates of their army and regimental commissions. Accordingly, the selection of 1800 as a period was not influenced by the quality of evidence in any way.

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[32] A.J Guy, "The Limits of Administration: regimental organization, finance and personal responsibility in the British Standing Army, 1727-1763", photocopy of unpublished paper, National Army Museum, 7712-65, (1976), p. 13.

The names of generals, then, to be potentially used in this study were taken directly from the 1747 *Succession of Colonels* and the annual army list for 1800. Table 1 shows the total number of generals taken from these respective lists and their division between "passive" and operational generals.

It was a relatively straightforward task to clarify whether an officer from these lists was a general.   However, it was much more difficult to separate operational from "passive" generals.

Table 1: Population of generals, 1747 and 1800

	'Passive'	Operational	Total
1747	40	55	95
1800	160	128	288

Source:
List of generals: NA., WO 65/50, Printed Annual Army List, 1800; *The Succession of Colonels to All His Majesties Land Forces from their Rise to 1747*, (London, 1747).

 Command positions: NA, WO 65/113, Printed Annual Army List, 1846; NA, WO 64/13 Army Gradation List, 1775-1816; *The Succession of Colonels 1749*; ODNB; OCDB; C. Dalton (ed.), *George The First's Army, 1714-1727, Volumes 1-2*, (London, 1910); J. Phillippart (ed.), *The Royal Military Calendar, or Army Service and Commission Book, Volumes 1-5*, 3rd Ed., (London, 1820); http://www.westminster-abbey.org/our-history/people/thomas-trigge; J.J Howard (Ed.), *Visitation at England and Wales Notes*, 5, (1903), p. 81.

One reason army lists started to be published regularly was to assist regimental agents in the performance of their duties, such as recording purchase and sales of commissions, as agents needed accurate information on officers' regimental and army commissions. In consequence, army lists do not specify command or staff positions as these appointments were of little interest to regimental agents. This makes it rather difficult to clarify which generals had active operational roles. Thus, substantial additional research was required on each individual general officer to

ascertain whether particular generals were "passive" or operational. A number of different sources were consulted to do this.

The main type of source used to clarify whether generals held operational positions at any point in their career were biographical profiles of generals in the *Dictionary of National Biography* for both Britain and Canada. Operational generals were usually famous and well-known individuals so most operational generals had profiles in these sources.

As not every general holding a staff position necessarily had an entry in a dictionary of national biography contemporary publications that listed the career patterns of army officers were also consulted. For 1747 officers the volumes by Charles Dalton on *George The First's Army, 1714-1727* (1910) were useful. Dalton lists officers serving in different regiments for the period when there was a large gap in the army lists. Even more importantly, he also provides many biographical profiles of the officers mentioned, particularly the more high profile ones, in extensive footnotes to the lists. A close examination of these volumes usually reveals any command appointments general officers held.   For later period officers, an extensive analysis was conducted of Phillippart's third edition of *The Royal Military Calendar, or Army Service and Commission Book* (1820). This is a valuable source for researching late eighteenth-century officers' careers as it provides details of all regimental, army, local and command appointments for most field officers in the army.

There was also the occasional army list that mentioned details of command appointments. The 1749 *Succession of Colonels* included details of general officers appointed to command positions in Flanders during 1748 and general officers holding staff positions in Ireland. At the end of the annual army lists there is a section on the 'successions of colonels'. In later army lists other successions of some high profile roles are also published. The 1846 army list (WO 65/113) included successions for command appointments such as commanders in chief of England and the East Indies. A manuscript army list, called the army gradation list (WO 64/13), also provided useful information on command appointments. In common with other army lists, this source listed commission details of different officers. However, it also provided much more information because by each officer's name was a comments section, which sometimes included details of command positions.

Identifying operational generals through these sources inevitably has some strengths and weaknesses. The major strength is the various sources accurately clarify whether generals from the army lists held operational commands. Biographical profiles contain the highlights of an individual's life so for a military officer command appointments as generals are usually mentioned. However, there are two weaknesses of these sources. The sources do not necessarily capture all the command appointments a general may have held, particularly for the early eighteenth-century when the sources were not as good. Furthermore, there were few details mentioned on the nature of most staff appointments apart from for commander in chief. The sources usually specified that a particular general was "on the staff" without any details of his precise role. The research on generals'

command positions created a potential group of 55 early period and 128 late period generals that definitely held operational commands. Research was carried out on all of these generals or random samples taken from them depending on the topic.

V. Operational generals' commands

At the moment the operational generals appear as mere numbers, but in reality they were actual people who achieved significant success in their careers. They were the commanders at virtually every major battle fought with Britain's enemies during the course of the eighteenth and early nineteenth-century. The operational generals were some of the most famous people in Britain and often achieved not only fame, but also significant social and financial rewards as a consequence of their services. The 1747 operational generals included most of the main military commanders of a famous victory at Dettingen in 1743. Many of the late eighteenth-century generals also achieved notable success. For example, Gerard Lake, commander in chief of India, who achieved great military success during the second Anglo-Maratha War (1803-1805). According to his *ODNB* profile, he was a 'soldier's general' who achieved much on the battlefield by 'ferocious energy and tactical skill'. [33]   Another late period general who had an illustrious career was George Beckwith. In 1809 he led a force of 11,000 men in a successful expedition to capture Martinique. During the course of this campaign he captured French

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[33] ODNB, s.v. Lake, Gerard (1744-1808).

eagles, which were sent home to "great public acclaim" as they were the first seen in Britain.[34]

Of course, not all operational generals achieved desirable outcomes from their careers. Some generals never returned from the battlefield. General Ponsonby was killed at Fontenoy (1745), Abercromby in Egypt (1801), Moore at Coruna (1809) and D'Oyly during Waterloo (1815). Others ended their careers in disgrace or ignominy. Perhaps most notoriously, Eyre Coote was stripped of his knighthood and military offices for indecent conduct, it was reputed he paid boys from Christ's Hospital to be flogged, after what had previously been a notable military career.[35] Thomas Bligh retired in disgust at the criticism he received after leading a failed military expedition to the French coast in 1758.[36] Hew Dalrymple's career ended in ignominy when as Commander in Chief of Portugal he gave overly generous terms to the defeated French. He allowed the French army, with all its arms, equipment and loot gained in Portugal, to be repatriated using British ships. Glover claimed "...on Dalrymple's side it was a masterpiece of ineptitude…never has a victorious army with every advantage in its hands signed an agreement which gave so much to its defeated enemies with so little to itself...."[37] This caused Dalrymple's disgrace which resulted in a recall to London, a reprimand from the King and he was never given another command.[38] John Whitelock was to face an even worse fate as commander in chief of the failed expedition to take Buenos Aries in 1807. He was

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[34] ODNB, s.v. Beckwith, George (1752/3-1823).
[35] ODNB, s.v. Coote, Eyre (1759-1823).
[36] ODNB, s.v. Bligh, Thomas (1685–1775).
[37] M. Glover, *Britannia sickens: the convention of Cintra,* (London, 1970), pp. 138-9.
[38] R. Muir, *Britain and the Defeat of Napoleon 1807-1815*, (London, 1996), pp. 52-3.

dismissed from the army after being court-martialled for poor diplomacy, military incompetence, and negotiation of a shameful surrender.[39]

During the course of their careers most operational generals held a variety of different command positions as Table 2 shows.

Table 2: Command appointments of operational generals

	1747		1800	
	N	%	N	%
National commander	16	19	44	17
Local commander	8	10	49	19
Governor	8	10	25	10
Expedition commander	5	6	11	4
Division/Brigade	15	18	35	14
Staff	31	37	94	36
Total	83	100	258	100

Note: Each type of command appointment only counted once per general.

Source: NA, WO 65/113, Printed Annual Army List, 1846; NA, WO 64/13 Army Gradation List, 1775-1816; *The Succession of Colonels 1749*; ODNB; OCDB; Dalton, *George The First's Army*, *Volumes 1-2*; Phillippart, *The Royal Military Calendar, Volumes 1-5*, 3rd Ed; http://www.westminster-abbey.org/our-history/people/thomas-trigge; Howard *Visitation at England*, p. 81.

Over one third of operational generals in both periods held the top jobs as commander in chief of a country, region or expedition. Most appointments though were simply to the staff. There seemed to be more continuity rather than difference between the different periods. The proportion of generals in both periods, for example, appointed to "the staff" was almost identical. Imperial expansion did make some difference. The growth of empire provided the opportunity for an expansion in permanent national and local commander in chief positions in India, North America

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[39] ODNB, s.v. Whitelocke, John (1757-1833).

and the West Indies that did not exist for the early period officers. The proportion of generals who held the top commands of national or local commander or a governorship in the West Indies, India and North America increased from 7% for the early period to 35% by the late eighteenth-century. This led to an increase in the proportion and absolute numbers of appointments to local commander positions. Perhaps the largest surprise is the small number of 1800 generals who gained operational commands at the head of brigades or divisions. However, this is most likely due to the way appointments were reported in the sources consulted. Most of the sources usually mentioned when generals had commander positions or were on the staff, but only incidentally discussed command of brigades or divisions. Hence, command appointments to brigades or divisions are likely to be significantly understated in table 2.

Most appointments were wartime positions that usually disappeared during peace. For both periods, 90% of appointments to general command occurred during periods of war. There were always some appointments to general commands during peace. John Leslie, 10th Earl of Rothes and a 1747 operational general, held an appointment on the Irish staff during 1751. There might even be the occasional military action undertaken in a time when there were no global wars being conducted. In the later period Major General Musgrave commanded a brigade in India during 1790-1791 before the outbreak of the French Wars. However, it was rare for a general to have active military employment during peacetime. Employment during peacetime could also depend on the type and geographical location of the command. It was more common, for example, for generals to gain

employment as national commanders during peace than many other general commands. This was particularly so with appointments to Commander in Chief of Ireland, 33% of which occurred during peace for 1800 generals. Another common peace time appointment was as a foreign governor with active military command. In the early period 50% of these appointments were made in peace, while nearly 30% became governors outside of wartime for the later period.

An analysis of where generals served in operational capacities shows there was also much continuity between the two periods. There were three main geographical locations generals served in: overseas, Britain and Ireland. Most generals in both periods served overseas; over 70% of all generals held active command positions overseas. The high proportion of generals serving overseas was obviously related to the fact that most appointments occurred during war. The main difference was between generals who served in multiple locations and those that only served in one location. For the later period there was an almost even distribution between generals serving in multiple locations or one location. On the other hand, two thirds of earlier period generals only served in one location. This was due to a high proportion of 1747 generals, some 47% of all operational generals, who only served overseas.

It was relatively uncommon for an operational general to receive command appointments in all three geographical locations. Only 6% of 1747 and 14% of 1800 operational generals held appointments in the three different geographical locations. Serving in Britain, Ireland and overseas locations usually indicated a general who

was one of the most successful operational generals. Many of these highly favoured officers were constantly employed as generals. One of the most successful 1747 generals was George Wade. After becoming a local brigadier general in Spain during 1707 Wade continually held different command positions. During the remainder of the War of Spanish Succession he was frequently appointed to various brigade commands and acted as second in command on an expedition to Minorca. Then in the long period of peace that followed he held high profile staff roles as commander in chief of Ireland and then of Scotland. The next major war saw Wade employed as commander of the forces in Flanders before being appointed to home posts as commander in chief of North Britain in 1745 and then, briefly, commander in chief of England.[40] Thus, he was almost continuously employed in operational commands from 1707 until 1746. The later period careers of generals such as Ralph Abercromby and William Cathcart show similar patterns of success in gaining commands. The fact that few generals were employed in three different geographical locations was probably related to the supply of appointments; there were few appointments available during peace so only the most favoured generals could expect employment at this time.

It was far more common, especially in the later period, for generals to hold command positions in an overseas location and Britain or Ireland. The timing of these appointments was often quite different depending on the general involved. For some officers staff appointments in Britain or Ireland seemed to act as preparation for service abroad. The first command appointments of John Francis Cradock as

[40] ODNB, s.v. Wade, George (1673-1748).

general were on the Irish staff in the 1790s. In this capacity he played an active part in suppressing the Irish Rebellion of 1798, which probably acted as good preparation for subsequent active commands in the Mediterranean, Egypt and India. Many more staff positions in Britain or Ireland seemed to either act as a "rest" between more active command appointments abroad in the middle stages of a career or to round off a long and distinguished career. For example, James Henry Craig's period on the home staff came between more active commands abroad. He was commander in chief of the Cape of Good Hope and then held commands in India during the 1790s before coming home and serving as commander of the Eastern District in Britain between 1801 and 1805. This brief hiatus on the home staff was a prelude to him resuming more active commander in chief positions overseas as commander in chief of the Mediterranean in 1805 followed by North America in 1807. The final command of particularly successful operational generals was often Commander in Chief of Ireland, Scotland or England. These posts were the final command appointments of five 1747 and seven 1800 officers including such distinguished generals as Ligonier, Molesworth, Bland (1747), Baird, Beckwith, Cathcart, Dundas and Hewett (1800).

A notable aspect of where generals served in operational capacities was that a significant number of generals only served in one location. For the late eighteenth-century, 24% of operational generals only served overseas, while 15% had command solely in Britain. Perhaps the reason for this was that serving in one geographical area may have been the most efficient way for the army in many instances to manage the limited supply of operational generals. An operational

general required many different skills ranging from administration and organisation to fighting and tactical ability.   The significant numbers of generals serving in only one location may have resulted from the different skill sets and experience required of home and overseas generals. A general command in Britain required mainly efficient administrative skills, whereas fighting ability was critical for an overseas command. Local experience also mattered for overseas commands as the physical contexts of places such as India were vastly different than at home. In addition, there was large time costs involved in travelling from Britain to colonial locations. Often it could take months between appointment to a colonial command and actually arriving to take up the command. For instance, Thomas Carleton was sworn in as Governor of New Brunswick, Canada on 28 July 1784, but did not arrive to take up his appointment until November of that year.[41] Perhaps it is no surprise then that some late eighteenth-century generals such as Harris (India), Carleton (North America) and Melville (West Indies) only held general commands in one overseas area.

A proportion of generals also only served in one geographical location because they were highly privileged officers who had early command appointments abroad and then their career focus shifted away from active military command. George Townshend, an 1800 operational general, at first combined a military career with that of a parliamentarian holding active commands in North America and

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[41] ODNB, s.v. Carleton, Thomas (1735-1817).

Portugal during the Seven Years War. However, after this period he concentrated more on his political career and never held active military command again.[42]

VI. Conclusion

The focus of this study is to analyse the social backgrounds and career patterns of British generals in the eighteenth-century. In order to do this two samples of generals were chosen to facilitate an assessment of the impact modernisation had on generals careers. In the eighteenth-century army the existence of two types of rank, regimental and army, created two different types of general. Most officers holding general rank were not in fact operational or command generals. They were generals in name only from the fact that becoming a lieutenant colonel in the army and living long enough to make it to general rank on the army list were the only requirements for an army officer to become a general. The other type of general was operational generals who held at various points in their career local or substantive commands as generals at home, in Ireland and overseas. These were the officers tasked with organising, managing and leading the British army in battle. This study concentrates exclusively on operational generals as one of its central concerns is to assess the career patterns of the most successful active officers in order to clarify the degree of social mobility at the highest levels in the army and whether it changed over time.   The results of the sampling process yielded 55

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[42] ODNB, s.v. Townshend, George (1724-1827)

operational generals for 1747 and 128 operational generals for 1800 on whom the

rest of this study is based.

Chapter four: Family backgrounds

I. Introduction

Limits on the levels of social mobility in any profession is undoubtedly undesirable because low levels of social mobility can lead to misallocation of human capital and lower productivity.[1] Some contend this is what happened with many generals in the eighteenth-century. The limited levels of social mobility at the top end of the army led to the appointment of generals on the basis of their social status who were unsuited to their elevated positions, which in turn adversely affected military performance.[2] The competency of generals was certainly a constant cause of complaint for Wellington. In 1811 he complained to London that:

"… I am obliged to be everywhere, and if absent from any operation something goes wrong. It is hoped that the general officers will at last acquire that experience which will teach them that success can be obtained only by attention to the most minute details and by tracing every part of every operation from its origin to its conclusion, point by point, and ascertaining that the whole is understood by those who are to execute it…."[3]

A year later his generals' performance was still causing problems as they "...take alarm at the least movement of the enemy; and then spread the alarm and interrupt everything...."[4] Thus, establishing the levels of social mobility among generals is important as the extent that generals were upwardly mobile has important implications for military efficiency. To this end, this chapter examines the family backgrounds of the future generals to determine the extent to which generals were a 'closed' or 'open' social group. In other words, what were the rates of social mobility

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[1] OECD,"A Family Affair ", p. 4.
[2] Gates, "The Transformation of the Army", p. 142; Dixon, *On the Psychology of Military Incompetence*, p. 172.
[3] Quoted in Glover, *Wellington's army*, p. 144.
[4] Glover, *Wellington's army*, pp. 144-145.

amongst these officers and did future generals use military service to advance their social status? Two main measures of social mobility are used; an intergenerational study of generals' mobility through a comparison of the social status of their fathers and an analysis of the extent to which operational generals were self-recruited, that is to say, the degree to which future generals followed their fathers into the army.

The data used to ascertain details of family backgrounds are drawn from a wide variety of different sources. The main sources are hundreds of biographical profiles taken from the *Dictionary of National Biography* and *History of Parliament* of generals, their wives, fathers-in law, mothers, fathers, brothers, grandfathers, and uncles. These two main sources are supplemented by a variety of other source material including: genealogical studies of the peerage, baronetage, knightage and gentry, a number of personal family histories, wills, foreign dictionaries of biography and contemporary memoirs or accounts of generals' lives.

This source material should allow considerable improvements in the quality of data on senior officers compared to previous studies. Hayes work on regimental colonels used a wide variety of data sources including manuscripts from military officers, aristocratic records and some family histories. However, his study was completed as long ago as 1957. Since then there have been many improvements in the data sources available on eighteenth-century military officers. During 2004 the biographies contained in the *Dictionary of National Biography* were revised, which resulted in many improvements. There is also now much valuable data available on

the lives of military officers who served as MPs in *The History of Parliament* series. *The History of Parliament* for the eighteenth-century started to be published in 1964 and was only completed in 1986. This is a very useful source as 11% of all MPs were army officers by 1754-1790.[5] In contrast to Hayes, Razell's research on generals used only one source, Burke's genealogical records, for all his data. One problem with this is that using only one data source may mean the results are more subject to error than using multiple sources. This seems especially the case for the eighteenth-century as data from this time tends to be rather patchy to begin with.

The weakness of using biographical profiles as evidence is that social or career characteristics mentioned might differ depending on the background of the author and the purpose of the biography. Some of the *Dictionary of National Biography* profiles written by non-military historians, for instance, contained less information on operational generals' careers than those written by military historians. Likewise, most of the biographies in *The History of Parliament* series concentrate on the parliamentary activities of the officers concerned. However, this is balanced by the fact that before this analysis they provide a brief social and career summary. Data issues were usually not a problem in tracing generals' fathers' details as most biographical profiles mention these if they are known. An advantage of focusing on generals is that these officers were famous in their time and many details are known about their lives.   Accordingly, it was possible to trace the social status of 73% of 1747 and 1800 operational generals' fathers. In comparison, only 23% of junior

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[5] Brewer, *The Sinews of Power,* Table 2.4, p. 45.

naval officer social backgrounds could be traced for some sample periods in the recent study by Cavell.[6]

II. Measuring social mobility

Analysing the social mobility of any group presents great problems due to differences in what is meant by social mobility and how best to measure it. In society there exists a hierarchical structure of recognisable social groupings that are differentiated by social status or class.   Most authors tend to agree social mobility involves the degree to which individuals from these groups move up or down the different layers of society.[7] However, there is often disagreement on the classification of these different levels or social status groupings. Glass pointed out there were a number of different criteria that could be used to indicate social status including income, occupation, education, material possessions, self-assessed status, social behaviour and status judgements of others.[8]   Bourdieu argued social status was determined by the extent to which individuals possessed three different types of capital. The most important type of capital was economic capital as this could be used to purchase social or cultural capital.   However, social status was also determined by what he called social and cultural capital. Social capital was the benefits derived from personal networks, but cultural capital is a little more obscure. It might be a cultural good, such as a notable book, or could come in the form of

[6] Cavell ,"A Social History ", Table 6.12, p. 207.

[7] Glass, *Social Mobility*, p. 5; Goldthorpe, Llewellyn and Payne, *Social Mobility*, pp. 18-19; Lipset and Bendix, *Social Mobility*, pp. 1-2.

[8] Glass, *Social Mobility*, p. 30.

educational qualifications that conferred original properties on their owner.[9] The

problem with Bourdieu's analytical framework is it is very difficult to differentiate

between the different forms of capital. Take education for example. Education could

possibly be considered economic, social and cultural capital. Formal education often

requires an investment which is made in anticipation of economic returns in the

future through providing better work opportunities; it also facilitates the extension of

personal networks through contacts developed at educational institutions and has

cultural value as well.

The problem in measuring mobility is that social status or class is not easy to

define. There are usually no precise definitions of the criteria necessary to belong to

any particular social group. Nor is it often clear what the boundary between different

social groups should be as social groups often overlap. Hence, in measuring social

mobility it is necessary to adopt criteria that indicate social status or class, which

may be somewhat arbitrary. The selection of criteria is also complicated by the fact

that there is a high degree of inter-relationship between the different criteria used to

indicate social status. The criteria listed by Glass and Bourdieu to define social

status do suggest that although social status cannot be defined with any certainty it

is made up of two important elements. Social status partly consists of economic

resources, but also includes social characteristics. Considering either of these

elements of social mobility in isolation from each other can be problematic. Relying

purely on a socio-economic indicator such as income can cause problems as there is

not necessarily a relationship between income and social status and there is also the

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[9] P. Bourdieu, "The Forms of Capital", in J.E. Richardson (ed.), *Handbook of Theory of Research for the Sociology of Education*, (New York, 1986), pp. 241-258.

issue of regional variation to contend with.[10]   As Lipset and Bendix argued, it is

possible to be economically mobile, but not to increase one's social status.[11]

Similarly, using a social category to indicate social status may be problematic as

there can be a high degree of subjectivity in classifying different categories and there

is not always a strong relationship between wealth and different social categories.[12]

Hence, in assessing social mobility it is important to consider both of these elements

of social status.

Indeed, the most robust social mobility studies tend to use criteria to indicate

social status or class that capture both social and economic resources of the

individuals concerned. In one of the more recent studies of social mobility economic

historian Greg Clarke examines surnames as indicators of social mobility. This

seems an appropriate measure of social mobility because surnames were often "a

marker of economic and social status".[13]   Sociologists studying mobility in the

modern era invariably use occupation as the main indicator of social mobility

because modern occupations typically capture economic resources and are closely

related to social status.[14]   According to Glass, occupation is a particularly useful

indicator of social status as it not only captures economic resources, but many social

characteristics such as education as well.[15]   Goldthorpe, in a recent study of social

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[10] Mingay, *The Gentry*, p. 13; Rubinstein, *Men of Property*, 2nd Ed., (London, 2006), p. 252; Speck, *Stability and Strife*, p. 38.

[11] Lipset and Bendix, *Social Mobility*, p. 266.

[12] J.R Kearl and C.L Pope, "Wealth Mobility: the missing element", *Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, 13 (3), (Winter 1983), pp. 464-465; L. Stone, "Prosopography", *Daedalus*, 100 (1), (Winter 1971), p. 60; T.V Jackson, "Personal Wealth in Late Eighteenth Century Britain", *The Economic History Review*, 44 (2), (May 1991), p. 139; Corfield, *Power and the Professions*, pp. 227-228.

[13] G. Clarke, "Regression to Mediocrity?", p. 9.

[14] A. Miles, *Social Mobility in Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Century England*, (London, 1999); Goldthorpe, Llewellyn and Payne, *Social Mobility;* Glass, *Social Mobility*.

[15] Glass, *Social Mobility*, pp. 6, 30.

mobility in modern Britain, used occupation as an indicator of social class because "occupational order... now forms the back bone of class structure..."[16] The common method in all of these studies for measuring social mobility is to divide occupations into a number of different levels or classes. For example, Goldthorpe has seven class categories linked to occupation.[17] Mobility is then measured through the final occupation of an individual compared to his father's occupation to indicate changes in social status or class.[18] There are some studies going beyond the father-son dynamic to measure mobility, but they are much more uncommon. Bibalarz and his co-authors did a study of social mobility involving three generations, but even then focused on the nature of parent and child linkages across the different generations.[19] Clarke seems to be the only exception in producing a mobility study that extends beyond the parent child dynamic, although the results of his work are yet to be published.[20]

It is easier to measure mobility in the modern period than in some other historical contexts due to modern occupations providing closer links between economic and social status.   The link between economic and social status, and the different divisions within society, was not as clear-cut in eighteenth-century Britain.[21] One problem is that it does not seem appropriate to discuss the different social groups of eighteenth-century society in relation to class.   Class confers connotations

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[16] Goldthorpe, Llewellyn and Payne, *Social Mobility*, p. 29.
[17] *Ibid.*, pp. 40-42.
[18] Miles, *Social Mobility*, p. 107.
[19] T. Birbalarz, V.L Bengtson and A. Bucur, "Social Mobility across Three Generations", *Journal of Marriage and Family*, 58 (1), (1996), pp. 188-200.
[20] Clarke, "Regression to Mediocrity?".
[21] J. Barry, "Introduction", in J. Barry and C. Brooks (eds), *The Middling Sort of People: Culture, Society and Politics in England, 1550-1800*, (London, 1994).

of conflict between antagonistic national social groupings. However, class was not thought of in this way in the eighteenth-century. It was a generic term in a similar fashion to 'sort' that became popular to denote differing social and economic positions in a time of great social and economic change.[22] Terms such as 'class' and 'sort' replaced more traditional descriptions such as 'ranks' or 'orders' that were more related to birth. [23] During this time there were no particular class identities as local and regional differences tended to be more important than any national class categories.[24] National class identities only began to emerge during the Victorian period.[25]

Another problem is establishing the different social groups of eighteenth-century Britain, the criteria that needed to be met to be a member of one of these groups and the boundaries between groups. This is a problem not only for modern historians, but was a matter of some debate even among contemporaries. One of the earliest classifications of Britain's social structure in the eighteenth-century was articulated by Daniel Defoe in 1709. According to Defoe there existed seven main social categories in Britain:

"...the Great who live profusely, the Rich who live plentifully, the middle Sort who live well, the working Trades who labour hard but feel no want, The Country People, Farmers etc who fare indifferently, The poor that fare hard, The Miserable that really pinch and suffer want..."[26]

By the mid eighteenth-century it was far more common to classify the social structure of Britain into four or five different levels.[27] A typical classification was Nelson's of

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[22] P.J Corfield, "Class by Name and Number in Eighteenth-Century England", *History*, 72, (1987), pp. 38-61.
[23] For a history of these terms see K. Wrightson, "'Sorts of People' in Tudor and Stuart England", in Barry and Brooks (eds), *The Middling Sort*, pp. 28-51; Corfield, "Class by Name ", pp. 38-61.
[24] Barry, "Introduction", in Barry and Brooks , *The Middling Sort* , p. 12.
[25] *Ibid.*, p. 6.
[26] D. Defoe, *A Review of the State of the British Nation*, 6 (36), (2 June 1709).

1753. In his view, there was the "... Nobility, Gentry, Mercantile or Commercial People, Mechanics, and Peasantry...."[28] In most classifications examined the main social groups can be synthesised into five different levels: the aristocracy, the gentry, the middling sort, workers and the poor.

As membership of any social group during this time was defined in part by income and in part by social status an assessment of social mobility should centre on tracing movements up or down these different social groups. In common with other social mobility studies the method adopted to do this is to compare mobility based on fathers' backgrounds.

It is a far easier task to list the five main social groups than to establish the criteria that needed to be met to be a member of one of the different groups or where the boundaries that differentiated social status existed. Definitive boundaries can only be drawn for those at the very top or bottom of the eighteenth-century social hierarchy. The reason for this is that it is only at the very top or bottom of society that a clear correlation existed between economic and social status. Accordingly, many historians adopt social classifications for this period that divide society in a binary fashion such as the elite and people.[29] Thus, the main distinction made between social groupings to judge social mobility throughout this study is to first separate future generals into two distinct groups, aristocrats and non-aristocrats. In

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[27] Corfield, "Class by Name and Number".
[28] Quoted in Corfield, "Class by Name and Number ", p. 38.
[29] Barry, "Introduction", p. 1.

Defoe's words, this is the difference between the "Great who live profusely" and the rest.

Aristocrats were clearly differentiated from other groups based on their high social status and levels of income. Peers of the realm possessed distinct hereditary titles ranging from baron to duke. As members of the House of Lords, peers were the only group of individuals whose social position was defined legally. There were also considerable income differences between aristocrats and the rest of society. In the late seventeenth and eighteenth-century there were two contemporary authors who published estimates of the family income of different ranks in British society. Gregory King, who worked for the College of Arms and later became a government commissioner, published in the late 1690s a tract on the population and wealth of England. His analysis involved dividing up British society into various ranks and estimating not only the number of families that belong to each rank, but their yearly family income. Aristocrats were classified as "Temporal" or "Spiritual" Lords. He estimated their income at £2,800 and £1,300 respectively, which greatly exceeded the next ranks of baronets at £880 and knights at £650.[30]

The other main contemporary analysis of income in this period was conducted by Joseph Massie in the mid eighteenth-century. Massie's work was more polemical in nature as the title of his 1760 pamphlet suggests, *A Computation of the Money that hath been exorbitantly Raised upon the People of Great Britain by the Sugar*

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[30] Details of King's and Massie's figures taken from the analysis conducted by Mathias on these sources. See P. Mathias, "The Social Structure in the Eighteenth Century: a calculation by Joseph Massie", *The Economic History Review*, 10 (1), (1957), Table 1, p. 42.

Planters, in one year from January 1759 to January 1760; showing how much Money a family of each Rank, Degree or Class hath lost by that rapacious monopoly, after I laid it open. Despite this fact, as Mathias indicates in his analysis of this work, Massie's figures seem reasonably reliable.[31] Massie adopted an almost identical rank structure to King in his work. According to Massie, a "Temporal Lord" had a family annual income or expense of £20,000, while a "Spiritual Lord" earned £10,000. In a similar fashion to King's calculations, these aristocrats had much higher incomes than the next ranks in the social order, the baronets who earned £8,000 and knights at £6,000.[32] These contemporary calculations of income demonstrate that aristocrats clearly had higher income levels than even those relatively close to them in rank or social status. They were the only social group who were clearly delineated from other social groups based not only their social status, but also their income.

The only issue that arises in dividing operational generals between aristocrats and non-aristocrats is whether to include baronets as aristocrats or to consider them as part of the next social group, the gentry. Baronets are sometimes considered as part of the aristocracy, at other times part of the gentry and in some cases as a distinct social class below the aristocracy, but above the gentry.[33] From a purely legal perspective, baronets were part of the gentry as they had no legal right to sit in the House of Lords. However, if the high social status and income of many baronets is considered they seem more appropriately included as part of the aristocracy. The

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[31] Mathias, "The Social Structure", pp. 36-37.
[32] *Ibid.*, Table 1, p. 42.
[33] Corfield, *Power and the Professions*, p. 225; Lewis, *A Social History*, p.31; Wareham, *The Star Captains,* Table 3.4, p. 94; Hayes, "Scottish Officers", pp. 29-30; Bush, *The English Aristocracy*, pp. 3-4.

baronetcy shared with the aristocracy, and was dissimilar with other gentry, one central characteristic of nobility - a hereditary title. Moreover, the income of baronets and lower level aristocrats was often similar. As Mingay pointed out: "... the line between the more wealthy baronets and the less successful barons, earls, or even dukes, may indeed be difficult to draw..."[34] Finally, including baronets as part of the aristocracy will facilitate comparison with other studies of military officers who adopt a similar approach. Lewis, Wareham and Hayes include baronets with aristocrats as one titled group.[35] In the most recent study concerning the social backgrounds of eighteenth-century navy officers Cavell included the baronetage with the peerage as part of the aristocracy.[36] For these reasons baronets in this study are considered as aristocrats.

Moving beyond the bipolar division between aristocrats and non-aristocrats involves a great deal of uncertainty in establishing criteria that reflect the social status and income of the other two leading groups in English society, the gentry and the middling sort. It is difficult to say the exact criteria that differentiated, as Defoe put it, "the Rich who live plentifully" and "the middle Sort who live well". There are no precise social or income definitions for these groups.[37] In reality, there was considerable social and economic overlap between the gentry and the middling sort. Being a member of the gentry was not necessarily linked to income. It was possible to be poor and be considered a gentleman or to be rich and not to be genteel

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[34] Mingay, *The Gentry*, p. 4.

[35] Lewis, *A Social History,* p.31; Wareham, *The Star Captains,* Table 3.4, p. 94; Hayes, "Scottish Officers", pp. 29-30.

[36] Cavell, "A Social History ", pp. 47-48.

[37] For problems in defining the gentry see G.E Mingay, *English Landed Society in the Eighteenth Century*, (London, 1963), pp. 21-23.

through displaying unfashionable dress or manners.[38] The wide range of incomes between members of these groups meant it was possible for a successful member of the middling sort to earn substantially more than members of the gentry.[39] This lack of income correlation between the two different social groups is evident in the figures provided by King and Massie. Their calculations show the highest category of merchant often earned more than many gentlemen. For instance, the annual family income of King's "merchants and traders by sea" was £400 compared to £280 for "gentlemen".[40] There were also large differences as a result of considerable regional variations in both income and social status. As Speck noted, a yeoman farmer in Kent might earn significantly more than a gentry landowner in Cumberland.[41] Regional differences were also evident within the same social group. To be a member of the middling sort could require different social attributes in London compared to the provinces; the necessary genteel education and social behaviour in London might be quite different from that in a more regional location.[42]

It might be difficult to differentiate between the gentry and middling sort, but certain differences can be ascertained even if there is often considerable overlap at the margins. According to Heal and Holmes, there were three key attributes of gentry status; owning land, exercising Lordship and local acknowledgement.[43] Modern historians, such as Heal and Holmes, typically divide the gentry into three

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[38] P. Earle, "The Middling Sort in London", in Barry and Brooks, *The Middling Sort*, p. 146.
[39] Earle, "The Middling Sort in London", p. 149.
[40] Mathias, "The Social Structure", Table 1, p. 42.
[41] Speck, *Stability and Strife*, p. 38.
[42] Earle, "The Middling Sort", p. 153.
[43] F. Heal and C. Holmes, *The Gentry in England and Wales, 1500-1700*, (London, 1994), p. 7.

different groups; knights, esquires and gentlemen.[44] Knights can be identified by the award of a knighthood.

It is rather more difficult to establish criteria for distinguishing between the esquire and gentlemen categories of the gentry. Heal and Holmes suggests esquires were accorded this status from the fact they held local authority for the Crown and due to their wealth and family pedigree.[45] Certainly, there was often a link between holding office and wealth in this period. For example, to become an MP in the eighteenth-century, under the Property Qualification Act of 1711, any candidate needed to possess a landed income of at least £300 for borough MPs or £600 for county MPs.[46]   A senior official at the College of Arms in 1602 identified esquires as any "...who so can make proofe, that his Ancestors or himselfe, have had Armes, or can procure them by purchase, may be called Armiger or Esquier...."[47]   By the mid nineteenth-century esquires were defined as:

"...A rank next below that of Knight. Besides those Esquires who are personal attendants of Knights of Orders of Knighthood, this title is held by all attendants on the person of the Sovereign, and all persons holding the Sovereign's commission being of military rank not below Captain; also, by general concession, by Barristers at Law, Masters of Arts and Bachelors of Law and Physic...."[48]

The problem is there was never any fixed definition of who actually was an esquire or what criteria needed to be met in order to be one.

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[44] Heal and Holmes, *The Gentry*, p. 15.
[45] *Ibid.*
[46] P. Langford, *Public Life and the Propertied Englishman 1689-1798*, (Oxford, 1991), p. 54.
[47] W. Seger, *Honor Military and Civil,* (London, 1602), p. 602.
[48] C. Boutell, *English Heraldry*, (London, 1867), p. 120.

As one contemporary judge put it:

"...It is, indeed, a matter somewhat unsettled, what constitutes the distinction, or who is a real *esquire*; for it is not an estate, however large, that confers this rank upon its owner...."[49]

An identical problem can be found in distinguishing gentlemen. One late sixteenth-century definition of gentlemen emphasised studying at university, living idly and having the countenance of a gentleman.[50] Owning land was an important aspect of being a gentleman, but as Corfield showed holding land was not the primary occupation of most gentlemen.[51] Gentlemanly status was highly fluid and uncertain. It was not untypical for gentlemanly status to be determined by self-verification or social judgements of others based on dress, manners, consumption patterns and reputation.[52]

In common with the gentry, the 'middling sort' is not a social category that is easy to define by social status or wealth. A recent work on these 'sorts of people' defined them as follows:

"...The middling sort had to work for their income, trading with the products of their hands (for example, yeomen and husbandmen farmers and artisans) or with the skills in business or the professions for which they had trained, (for example, merchants, attorneys and apothecaries). Moreover, they were rarely employed by others in this-even the emerging group of government officials mostly depended on fees or viewed the offices as a property investment, as did the professions...."[53]

This is a similar definition to that adopted by Christie in his study of British 'non-elite' MPs in the eighteenth-century. He claimed the key characteristic of the 'non-elite' in

[49] R. Burn, G. Chetwynd and G. Wharton Marriott, *The Justice of the Peace and Parish Officer*, (25th Ed.), (London, 1830), p. 541.
[50] P.J Corfield, "The Rivals: Landed and Other Gentlemen", in N.B Harte and R. Quinault (eds), *Land and Society in Britain 1700-1914*, (Manchester, 1996), pp. 1-33.
[51] Corfield, "The Rivals".
[52] Earle, " The Middling Sort", p. 147; P. Wallis and C. Webb, "The Education and Training of Gentry Sons in Early-Modern England", *LSE Working Papers,* No. 128/09, (November 2009), p. 4.
[53] Barry, "Introduction", p. 1.

this period was that they work for a living.[54] Clearly, there were large social and

economic differences between those at the top and lower end of the middling sort.

This can be seen by returning to Massie's income estimates of 1760. According to

his calculations, a husbandman only earned £15 per annum compared to £600 for

the highest grade of merchant.[55] Barry acknowledged the middling sort could

probably be divided into one thousand different categories depending on the nature

of their occupations.[56] There is also a particular problem with categorising the upper

end of the middling sort. In practice, they could equally be categorised as gentlemen

or esquires as well as middling people. This can be seen by examining trade

directories of the late eighteenth-century. Corfield in a survey of sixteen British

commercial town directories of the 1770s and 1780s found that there were 1375

townsmen classified as gentlemen or esquires. However, the majority of these

individuals listed occupations in the professions or business indicating many of the

upper levels of the middling sort could equally be categorised as esquires,

gentlemen or from the upper echelons of the middling sort.[57]

Given these problems in categorising the gentry and the middling sort what

were the definitions adopted to differentiate between the gentry and the middling

sort? The historical reality was that there was no clear distinction between many of

the gentry and the upper middling sort. Inevitably, any border between these groups

is somewhat arbitrary and necessarily remains blurred. This border was drawn in

two ways. The first way was to ensure members of each group satisfied some basic

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[54] Christie, *British 'Non-Elite' MPs*, p.2.
[55] Mathias, "The Social Structure", Table 1, p. 42.
[56] Barry, "Introduction", p. 17.
[57] Corfield, "The Rivals".

characteristics of being a member of these groups. In the case of the gentry, this was to own land, exercise lordship or have local acknowledgement of their status. [58] The criteria of local acknowledgement may seem a little dubious due to its inherent subjectivity, but as Glass pointed out self-assessed status and the status judgements of others is a valid criterion in assessing the social status of individuals.[59]   Hence, it is perfectly reasonable to include generals' fathers as members of the gentry on the basis of their own or others' opinion of their status. The criteria adopted for being a member of the middling sort was simply that they worked for a living in accordance with previous definitions of this group by historians.[60]

There were many individuals that met criteria of the gentry and the middling sort.   Most of the upper middling sort would have owned land so could just as easily be classified as gentry given that some authors consider any landowners to be gentry.[61]   In addition, members of some professions could equally be described as members of the gentry.[62]   In consequence, a second differentiation had to be made between these groups. The second distinction was a subjective judgement based on what their main focus was in life and where they derived most of their income. If their main focus was living as a gentleman and they gained most of their income from land they were classified as gentry. On the other hand, individuals that derived most of their income from non-landed sources such as business or a profession were characterised as 'middling'. The last two social categories in England at this

[58] Heal and Holmes, *The Gentry*, p. 7.
[59] Glass, *Social Mobility*, p. 30.
[60] Barry, "Introduction", p. 1.
[61] Odintz, "The British Officer Corps", p. 183.
[62] Boutell, *English Heraldry*, p. 120.

time, workers and the poor, do not feature in this study as it was found no future operational general came from a social group lower than the middling sort.

Clarifying the social status future generals originated from, using their fathers social status as a proxy for this, is only part of the problem in measuring their mobility. Measuring mobility requires a beginning and ending social status. Hence, it is also necessary to classify the social status of operational generals, or in sociologists terms the destination social status, of where these individuals finished their careers.

The destination social status of operational generals is difficult to define as this was not defined in any contemporary publication. Moreover, their final social status was also highly individualised based on their level of career success as an operational general, a subject that will be dealt with in much more detail in chapter seven. On the one hand, the most successful operational generals' final social status was certainly on a par with many aristocrats as these select officers gained aristocratic titles and immense financial rewards from their service. On the other hand, some operational generals ended their career in disgrace and did not necessarily make large profits from their service. However, a judgement can be made on the minimum social status achieved by all operational generals. The lowest social status achieved by any operational general seemed to be somewhere between esquire and knight. Some definitions of esquire suggest that captains in the army were entitled to call themselves esquire thus generals would rank above

esquires. Many generals were awarded knighthoods as a reward for their service.

However, as not all operational generals were knighted their rank should be placed

somewhere below that of knights. Accordingly, as the final destination social status

of operational generals was at least between esquire and knight upward mobility is

defined as those whose fathers' social status was esquire or lower. The destination

social status of general also had one peculiar aspect to it compared to other

professions.   Seniority in the army was unusual in that it often lifted, but never

lowered social status. No aristocrat lost social status by becoming a general.

Consequently, there was no downward mobility for those becoming generals.

III. Generals' intergenerational mobility

Changes in social status were firstly determined by separating generals'

fathers into the two main groups in society, aristocrats and non-aristocrats.

Table 3: Social status of generals' fathers

	1747		1800	
	N	%	N	%
Aristocrats	24	60.0	41	43.6
Non-aristocrats	16	40.0	53	56.4
Total	40	100.0	94	100.0

Source: Appendix 4.1, Data Sources: Social Backgrounds

Aristocrats were the leading social group among 1747 generals and remained a

significant group for the later period. There was a shift in favour of non-aristocrats by

the late eighteenth-century as the relative proportion of non-aristocratic generals

increased at the expense of the aristocrats. Nevertheless, the absolute level of aristocrats that were operational generals still remained high considering the small numbers of aristocrats in the population compared to non-aristocrats. According to Massey's estimates of 1760, only 30 families were 'temporal and spiritual lords' with a further 40 classified as baronets. In contrast to these small numbers of aristocrats, there were 17,920 families described as knights, esquires and gentlemen and 65,000 families from professions such as the clergy, law, liberal arts, civil officers, naval and military officers.[63] The aristocrats can be divided into two main groups. The 'old' aristocrats whose families held aristocratic titles for many generations and the 'new' aristocrats whose generals' fathers or grandfathers were the first members of their family to possess an aristocratic title.

It was the 'old' aristocratic families that featured most prominently among aristocratic generals. In both periods, members of the Royal family held operational appointments as generals. Moreover, 42% of 1747 and 44% of 1800 aristocratic future generals' fathers held the ranks of earl or duke. Some of the oldest aristocratic families in England were featured among these generals. Perhaps the prime example of 'old' aristocratic families was the Dukes of Richmond. The second Duke of Richmond, Charles Lennox, was an operational general in the early period. Two of his sons, Charles, the third Duke of Richmond, and Lord George, both appeared as 1800 operational generals. In addition, there were many generals in both periods that held aristocratic titles that had been in their family for five generations or more such as the 10th Earl of Pembroke or the 10th Lord Sinclair.

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[63] Mathias, "The Social Structure", Table 1, p. 42.

There were also some 'new' aristocrats in both periods whose lineage was far more limited. A typical 'new' aristocrat story of advancement and consolidation in the early period was that of General James O'Hara's family. His father was 'a henchman and client of the Butlers, dukes of Ormond' who started life for them as riding master.[64] He entered the army, eventually becoming commander-in-chief of Ireland and was raised to the peerage for his military services on the campaign of 1706. A longer story of intergenerational mobility and subsequent consolidation was the case of the Fox family (1800). General Henry Fox's grandfather, Sir Stephen Fox, started life as a footman before entering government service. He was one of the most successful commoners of his day and eventually rose to such positions as First Lord of the Treasury and Paymaster of the Forces.[65] General Fox's father, in a similar fashion to Sir Stephen, entered government service serving as Secretary at War and Paymaster General for which he gained the title of first Baron Holland.[66]

Outside of these main two groups of aristocrats was a small group that has been excluded from the analysis due to difficulty in social classification. This comprised three 1800 generals who were the illegitimate sons of aristocrats. In the eighteenth-century relatively few people were born illegitimately. However, between the early and the late eighteenth-century there was a steep rise in the rates of illegitimate children. Wrigley speculated that by the end of the eighteenth-century one quarter of all births may have been illegitimate.[67] Pre-marital sex was limited between females of higher social groups and their unmarried male counterparts. In

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[64] ODNB, s.v. O'Hara, James (1681/2-1773).
[65] ODNB, s.v. Fox, Sir Stephen (1627–1716).
[66] ODNB, s.v. Fox, Henry (1705-1774).
[67] E.A Wrigley, R.S Davies, J.E Oeppen, R.S Schofield, *English Population History from Family Reconstitution, 1580-1837*, (Cambridge, 1997), pp. 194-195.

consequence, sexual contact frequently occurred between aristocratic men and women of much lower stations.[68] The aristocratic bastards who would become generals cannot be classified as aristocrats, but often received many of the advantages of being born legitimately. Two of the 1800 aristocratic bastards followed the same career path in the army as their fathers. The third bastard's father, the Earl of Fife, paid for his illegitimate son's education, army promotions and even a small estate for him.[69] The advantages these aristocratic bastards received were due to the fact it was common for illegitimate children to be supported financially by their fathers.[70]

A second level of analysis can be performed by dividing the non-aristocrats into the two main non-aristocratic social groups, the gentry and the middling sort. In addition, within these two social groups generals' fathers can delineated by the different categories of the gentry or the middling sort.   The data on the 1747 future generals is somewhat limited by the small numbers of officers who became operational generals and the extent to which their fathers' social origins could be traced. Nevertheless, two important points do emerge from the data. Non-aristocratic generals in the early period appear to be dominated by members of the gentry or the sons of army officers. These two groups account for 87.6 % of all non-aristocratic 1747 operational generals.

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[68] P. Laslett, K. Oosterveen and R.M Smith (eds), *Bastardy and Its Comparative History*, (London, 1980), p. 194.

[69] ODNB, s.v. Duff, James (1753-1839).

[70] Laslett et al, *Bastardy*, p. 75.

Table 4: Social status of non-aristocratic generals' fathers

	1747		1800	
	N	%	N	%
Knight	2	12.5	0	0.0
Esquire	6	37.5	19	35.8
Gentlemen	1	6.3	6	11.3
sub-total				
-Gentry	9	56.3	25	47.2
Army	5	31.3	10	18.9
Navy	0	0.0	1	1.9
Church	0	0.0	7	13.2
Law	0	0.0	1	1.9
Government	0	0.0	1	1.9
Business	1	6.3	6	11.3
Foreign	1	6.3	2	3.8
sub-total				
-Middling	7	43.8	28	52.8
Total	16	100.0	53	100.0

Source: Appendix 4.1, Data Sources: Social Backgrounds

A good example of a gentry general in this period was Thomas Bligh. He was the son of a landowner and MP who eventually became a member of the Privy Council in Ireland. As a second son Bligh pursued an army career, while his elder brother inherited the family estates and became a prominent politician.[71] It is not surprising the gentry were the largest non-aristocratic group in this period as studies of the social backgrounds of British officers in the eighteenth-century typically emphasise most officers came from the gentry. For example, in Odintz's study of British infantry officers he found that 57% of those with traceable backgrounds originated from the landed gentry.[72] Given the tendency of many professions to self-recruit, an important measure of mobility in itself and a subject that will be discussed in more

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[71] ODNB, s.v. Bligh, Thomas (1685-1775).
[72] Odintz, "The British Officer Corps", chart II, p. 182.

detail later, it is not unexpected that a key group of army generals came from the sons of existing army officers.

The social backgrounds of non-aristocratic 1800 generals show some similarities to the earlier period, but differences also emerge. In a similar fashion to 1747 generals, the two leading categories of future generals' fathers for the later period remain the sons of the gentry and army officers. However, the relative importance of both of these leading groups declines over time. There are fewer sons of the gentry becoming generals by 1800. By the late period the middling sorts overtake the gentry as the second leading social group behind aristocrats.

There is also a greater diversification in the professional backgrounds the middling sorts were drawn from. In the early period future generals from the middling sort came from only three types of professional backgrounds and the army accounted for most of the future generals from the middling sort. In contrast, by the late period the number of professional categories future generals were drawn from had doubled and the army share of the middling sort declined. Most notable were increases for those from church and business backgrounds. It should be noted that fathers from the later period middling sort were usually among the most successful members of their professions. Out of the seven churchmen whose sons became generals five of the church ranks held were Archbishop, Archdeacon, Dean, Cannon and Rector.

There were some future generals whose fathers achieved only modest professional success, but these were in the minority. For example, when David Baird's father, who had worked as a merchant, died it put his family in 'financial hardship'.[73] Far more typical of businessmen appeared to be the father of Banastre Tarleton who was one of the leading merchants in Liverpool and left him £5,000 in his will.[74] In both periods there were some foreigners who became generals, although their antecedents were different. In the early period foreigners were usually Huguenot refugees, whereas by the later period this changed to Americans. Foreigners who became generals may have possessed a lower social status than native Britons due to their foreign roots, but in common with their British counterparts they usually came from well-to-do families. The father of Ligonier, one of the most successful early eighteenth-century generals, was a landowner from France who possessed the title of Sieur de Moncuquet.[75] Likewise, the father of Staates Long Morris', one of the future 1800 generals from America, was a judge of admiralty court and a wealthy landowner in New York.[76]

How do these findings on operational generals compare to the previous research on the social status of eighteenth-century military officers? Comparisons of this kind are very difficult due to different samples, levels, periods, definitions and methodologies adopted. It seems a hazardous exercise to conduct this comparison through analysis of the three main social groups, aristocrats, gentry and middling sort given the definition difficulties and differences adopted by authors studying this

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[73] ODNB, s.v Baird, Sir David (1757-1829).
[74] *The Cheshire Sheaf*, 3rd series, 27, (1930), p. 62.
[75] ODNB, s.v Ligonier, John (1680-1770).
[76] ODNB, s.v Morris, Staates Long (1728-1800).

subject. However, this problem can be resolved by simply returning to the bipolar division between aristocrats and non-aristocrats, which removes many of these definitional issues.

Accordingly, table 5 compares the aristocratic share of different eighteenth-century military ranks.   This table makes clear that the extent to which aristocrats could be found in the different military ranks depended very much on the level of rank, the rank's social status and time period. Greater proportions of aristocrats were found among the senior ranks. This was particularly the case when the ranks involved lucrative command appointments such as operational generals or frigate captains. Thus, operational generals had some of the highest proportions of aristocrats in their ranks compared to other groups of officers. The social status of the military branch aristocrats served in also mattered. There were more aristocrats in the army than the navy for most of the period. It is notable in this respect that the engineers and East India Company army, which both had a lower social status than the regular army, had few aristocrats. Infantry regiments of the regular army, if Odintz's figures are any indication, had similar numbers of aristocrats serving to the navy.   There were also significant variations over time. The aristocratic share of operational generals and generals declined over the course of time, whereas the opposite could be said of frigate captains. In the case of the army this is surprising as historians often emphasise the late eighteenth-century army had enhanced social awareness at the expense of duty compared to its earlier counterpart.[77]

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[77] Burton and Newman, "Sir John Cope", p. 667; Holmes, *Augustan England*, p. 269; Hayes, "The Social and Professional Background", pp. 103-109.

Table 5: Aristocrats' share of military ranks, 1714-1815

	Senior officers		
	Period	%	N
Wood operational generals	1747	60	40
	1800	44	94
Hayes regimental colonels	1714-1763	31	325
Razzell generals	1780	30	155
	1810	27	390
Wareham frigate captains	Pre-1793	33	148
	1793-1800	34	148
	1801-1814	61	148

	Officers		
	Period	%	N
Marshall engineers	1741-1783	3	37
Odintz foot officers	1754-1783	11	268
Razzell E.I.C army officers	1758-1774	2	448
	1775-1804	3	626
Razzell army officers	1780	24	100
Conway army officers	1780	30	?
Cavell junior navy officers	1761	13	31
	1771	20	114
	1801	12	131
Lewis navy officers	1793-1815	11	1800

Note: E.I.C stands for East India Company. Wareham's sample size of 148 for frigate captains is the cumulative sample size for all his periods as he does not provide a breakdown of the sample size for the different periods. Razzell's generals figures define aristocrats as those with inherited aristocratic titles attached to their names. This is likely to significantly underestimate the number of aristocrats as it excludes many sons of aristocrats, such as sons of barons, who did not possess titles.

Source:
Operational generals: Appendix 4.1, Data Sources: Social Backgrounds.
Regimental colonels: Hayes, "The Professional and Social Background", pp. 68-69.
Frigate captains: Wareham, *The Star Captains*, Table 3.4, pp. 93-94.
Engineers: Marshall, "The British Military Engineers", pp. 137-142, 152-153.
Foot officers: Odintz, "The British Officer Corps", Chart II, p. 182.
Generals, army and E.I.C officers: Razzell, "Social Origins of Officers", Tables 1, 7, 9, pp. 249, 254.
Army officers: S. Conway, *The British Isles and the War of American Independence*, (Oxford, 2000), p.31.
Junior navy officers: Cavell, "A Social History", Appendix H, JO Charts.
Navy officers: Lewis, *A Social History of the Navy*, p.31.

Aristocrats may have held a higher share of operational general positions compared to other military ranks in the eighteenth century, but this did not preclude many future generals using military service to advance their social status. Even if the final social status of an operational general was only between esquire and knight this meant that many generals in both periods achieved upward social mobility. The beginning social status, measured by their father's social status, of 35 % of 1747 generals was esquire or lower indicating these officers increased their social status by becoming operational generals. The social status gains were even more impressive for the later period generals, 56% of 1800 generals had a beginning social status of esquire or lower. Hence, levels of social mobility among generals were relatively high and increasing as the century wore on. Admittedly, many of these mobile generals came from wealthy families, but they nevertheless managed to use the army to increase their social status.

IV. Self-recruitment

An important point to come out of the intergenerational analysis of generals' mobility was that a key group of future generals were the sons of army officers. This group has only been considered in respect of those officers who belonged to the middling sort. However, this underestimates the army connections of future generals' fathers as aristocrats and gentry fathers may also have served as army officers. It is important to consider the army connections of future generals' fathers in more detail because at the top end of a relatively closed social hierarchy self-

recruitment often plays a critical role in keeping outsiders from the top ranks.[78]

Succession owes something to the influence of family tradition encouraging the next generation to follow the father's calling and self-recruitment occurs when office holders give preferment to immediate family members or via networks. Accordingly, Bendix and Lipset noted that those with high status positions usually try to maintain them for their kin and heirs.[79]   Mobility studies that have shown high degrees of closure at the peaks of society also usually demonstrate high levels of self-recruitment.[80] Of course, within any social grouping there is likely to be a certain amount of self-recruitment regardless of how open they are to outsiders.[81]

The extent to which future generals were self-recruited thus seems another important measure to judge how open they were as a social group. Social mobility studies typically measure self-recruitment by the extent to which sons follow their fathers into the same professions.[82] Accordingly, a similar approach is adopted to measure the extent to which generals were self-recruited.   Self-recruitment is defined as the extent to which future generals, whose father's social status can be identified, followed their fathers into the army.

The focus is on father's experience in the army exclusively, rather than including the navy and analysing the military profession in general, for two reasons. First, few future generals' fathers were navy officers. Only one 1747 and three 1800

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[78] Goldthorpe et al, *Social Mobility*, pp. 18-19.
[79] Lipset and Bendix, *Social Mobility*, p. 2.
[80] Glass, *Social Mobility in Britain.*
[81] Goldthorpe et al, *Social Mobility*, p. 44.
[82] Glass, *Social Mobility,* p. 310.

future generals were the sons of navy officers. Hence, the sons of navy officers did not seem an especially important social group of future generals. Second, there is no evidence that high-ranking naval officers could more actively advance the careers of sons in the army than those from non-military professions.

In contrast, there is much evidence of army fathers using their positions in the army to actively advance the careers of their sons. This seemed particularly pronounced during the early eighteenth-century. Fathers using their influence to enable their sons to replace them as regimental colonels were relatively common in this period. Take for example the rapid advance of James O'Hara, a future 1747 operational general. His father, Charles, 1st Baron Tyrawley, was a regimental colonel and operational general.   James entered his father's regiment, the 7th foot, at the rank of lieutenant in 1703.   Two years later he was promoted to captain and replaced his father as regimental colonel in 1713. [83] From entry to regimental colonel in only 10 years was a remarkably quick rise even for the son of such an influential officer.   Another 1747 future general, Roger Handasyd, also replaced his father as a regimental colonel of the 22nd foot after previously serving as captain and then lieutenant colonel in the same regiment.[84]

Nor was the phenomenon of army fathers using their influence to positively advance the careers of their sons isolated to the early period. George Harris, an 1800 general officer, played a key role in advancing the career of his eldest son,

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[83] ODNB, s.v. O'Hara, James (1682-1773).
[84] Dalton, *George The First's Army, Volume 1*, p. 162.

William. William's active service was initially in India in the army commanded by his father. He also gained two of the hardest promotions to get, major and lieutenant colonel, in his father's regiment, the 73rd foot. William Harris initially transferred to this regiment from the 49th foot through purchasing a majority and then when a second battalion was raised in 1809 he became the second battalion's lieutenant colonel.[85] George Harris also made attempts to resign his regimental colonelcy in favour of his son. This was much more difficult to do in the later period and he was ultimately frustrated in his attempt to get his son to take over his regiment.[86] Nevertheless, Harris maintained that such succession had taken place on at least two other occasions in the late eighteenth-century.[87]

The extent to which future generals were self-recruited is shown by table 6. Self-recruitment occurred at two different levels. There were those fathers who served as officers between the ranks of ensign and lieutenant colonel. This may have brought some advantages for relatives of these officers, but any advantage was typically limited as these officers were not usually involved in appointments or promotions. Then there were the officers who could be considered part of the army elite, the regimental colonels and operational generals. Regimental colonels often had substantial power to influence the careers of those officers serving in their regiment. They had a significant say in regimental appointments as the way Generals O'Hara, Handasyd and Harris advanced the prospects of their sons demonstrated.

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[85] William Harris did ultimately become colonel of the 73rd foot, but not until eight years after his father's death. For details of William Harris' career see ODNB, s.v. Harris, William George (1782-1845).

[86] Centre for Kent Studies (hereafter CKS), U624 The Papers of George Harris, 1775-1844, Correspondence, C254 George Harris to Stephen Lushington, 1 February, 1824.

[87] *Ibid.*

Table 6: Self-recruitment of generals

1747
Social status (%)

		Aristocrat	Non-aristocrat	N
	Ensign-Lt. Colonel	*0*	*38*	6
	Operational General	*25*	*12*	8
	Regimental Colonel	*13*	*0*	3
Father's rank	*sub-total* -Self-recruited	*38*	*50*	17
	No army service	*62*	*50*	23
	N	24	16	40

1800
Social status (%)

		Aristocrat	Non-aristocrat	N
	Ensign-Lt. Colonel	*10*	*21*	15
	Regimental Colonel	*0*	*1*	1
	Operational General	*27*	*8*	15
Father's rank	*sub-total* -Self-recruited	*37*	*30*	31
	No army service	*63*	*70*	63
	N	41	53	94

Note: All rows (except N row) expressed as percentage of final row N.

Source: Appendix 4.1, Data Sources: Social Backgrounds.

Regimental colonels often also had free vacancies they could allocate to those they favoured. Consequently, it was not uncommon for several relatives of a regimental colonel to serve in his regiment as officers. John Dalrymple, the 2nd Earl of Stair, who commanded the 6th Dragoons from 1715 to 1734 and was an operational general, had at least eight of his relatives serving in his regiment at any one time.[88] At the army-wide level operational generals often had the power to exert significant influence on the career patterns of officers they favoured. One way of doing this was to appoint favoured officers as their ADCs, an army appointment that marked officers

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[88] Hayes, "Scottish Officers", p.25.

of promise or influence and took them away from regimental duty to work on the staff for the general who appointed them.

The overall rates of self-recruitment were respectively 43% for 1747 and 33% for 1800 future generals. This is perhaps less self-recruitment than expected given that hereditary recruitment, with many families specialising in particular professions such as the army or law, was a central characteristic of the professions in this period.[89] Odintz's study of foot officers found that 46% of officers' sons followed them into the army.[90] Cavell's six samples of junior officers between 1761 and 1811 showed those from navy backgrounds varied from 27% to 39%.[91] It is possible self-recruitment was more prevalent in the military than other professions as according to Lucas the percentage of the bar made up of attorney and barristers sons during the eighteenth-century varied from 6% to 22%.[92]

The proportion of generals which was self-recruited is even lower if the measure of self-recruitment is centred on the army elite, regimental colonels and operational generals. Only 28% of 1747 and 17% of 1800 future generals' fathers held these ranks in the army. The extent of self-recruitment by the army elite does not seem especially high if these numbers are compared with self-recruitment in other high occupational levels. Mitch conducted a study of occupational recruitment

[89] Lucas, "A Collective Biography", p. 233; P. Virgin, *The Church in the Age of Negligence: ecclesiastical structure and problems of church reform, 1700-1840,* (Cambridge, 1989), pp. 110-111; Corfield, *Power and the Professions,* p. 228; Holmes, *Augustan England*, p. 90.
[90] Odintz, " the British Officer Corps", Chart VII, p. 275.
[91] Cavell, "A Social History", Appendix H, JO Charts.
[92] Lucas, "A Collective Biography", Table A9, p. 255.

in Victorian society. The self-recruitment of his top occupational category, out of five occupational categories, had a self-recruitment rate of 61.4% for the period 1839-1843.[93] Even in modern Britain, in a place and time that should be more meritocratic than the eighteenth-century, Goldthorpe found that 25% of his highest occupational class were recruited from sons of this class.[94]

There were important differences in the self-recruitment of future generals between the different social groups and time periods. First, there was typically a large difference in the level of army connection between aristocrats and non-aristocrats. Aristocrats were usually connected to the army elite, whereas the average connection levels for non-aristocrats were ordinary officers. However, they were similar in the sense that many of these families, from both social groups, appeared to specialise in the army profession with sons of successive generations usually entering the army. A typical aristocratic family with a long tradition of military service was the Stanhope's, the earls of Harrington. Charles Stanhope, third Earl of Harrington and the eldest son from his family, was a general on the 1800 army list. His only brother Henry also served in the army becoming a colonel in 1794. Their father was a general and colonel of the horse guards. Charles's grandfather, William, was also a general in the army before gaining distinction at the highest levels of government and diplomatic service. The Wolfes appeared representative of professional army families during the early period. General Edward Wolfe's grandfather served as a lieutenant colonel in the Irish regiment of foot guards. He

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[93] D. Mitch, "'Inequalities which everyone may remove': Occupational Recruitment, Endogamy, and the Homogenity of Social Origins in Victorian England", in Miles and Vincent, *Building European Society*, Table 7.1, p. 143.
[94] Goldthorpe et al, *Social Mobility*, p. 44.

had one son, another Edward, who rose to the rank of major before his death in 1715. Both the future 1747 general, Edward, and his brother, Major Walter, followed their father into the army.

Second, changes in self-recruitment over time were different depending on social group.   Aristocrats who were to become generals were self-recruited to an almost identical extent in both periods. The only difference was the strength of their connections to the army elite weakened somewhat over time. In contrast, there was a significant decline in the numbers of non-aristocrats who were self-recruited. Non-aristocrats whose fathers did not serve in the army increased from 50% to 70% between 1747 and 1800. This phenomenon may have been a function of individual choice playing a greater role in career selection over time. In contrast to the earlier period, several late eighteenth-century future generals started their working life in different professions, but ended up changing careers to the army. James Grant studied for a career in law on the advice of Lord Elchies, his patron, but switched to the army because he preferred a military career.[95]   Other generals, such as Fawcett who "from his earliest youth" had the "strongest predilection for army", always intended to follow their chosen career.[96] The selection of the army as a career did not always meet family approval.

This was most evident in the career of William Goodday Strutt whose father acceded to his wishes of an army career most reluctantly:

"...When your Mother and I thought it was proper for you to leave School and turn to some Profession that might give you the Opportunity to pass through Life with Comfort and Reputation, we consulted

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[95] L. Namier and J. Brooke, (eds), *The history of parliament: the House of Commons, 1754–1790* (hereafter *HOP*), *Volume 2*, (London, 1964), Grant, James (1720-1806), p. 529.
[96] J. Lister, "Life and Letters of General William Fawcett, KCB", *Papers, Reports, & C., read before Halifax Antiquarian Society*, (Halifax, 1910) , p. 70.

your Inclinations. You wished the Army. It was then determined to send you to Mr. Lochee's Military Academy that you might learn the first Rudiments of the Profession, and that you might feel yourself and have time for Reflection and not be hurried into a situation in which most probably you was to spend your days. You *still* wished the Army. I then (seeing you fixed) after much Consideration and the best Information I was able to obtain from a little experience and from Communication with Gentlemen of that Line, procured you through the favour of Lord Barrington a Commission dated the 23rd May 1778 as an Ensign in the 61st Regt. of Foot..."[97]

Even after a few years in the army his father was trying to persuade him to pursue other career options:

 "...Your time of life being such that you might without much loss or any reflection on your conduct have turned from the profession of Arms to the more peaceable and less dangerous situation, I have given you the Option of the Church in which I had good preferment for you at Chignal, Mashbury, etc- but you having again and again declared that it was your fixed resolution to pursue your present line..."[98]

It is not clear whether this decline in service interest between the two periods was a characteristic that was shared by the other main professions. On the one hand, there seemed to be a similar decline in service interest in law. In 1755-1764 17% of barristers and attorneys' sons were admitted to the bar compared to only 6% by 1795-1804.[99] On the other hand, levels of self-recruitment in the navy appeared to remain relatively static over time. The navy share of junior officers was 29% in 1761, but only decreased to 27% by 1801 and then rose to 32% in 1811.[100]

V. Conclusion

Operational generals were dominated by the privileged groups in society. Aristocrats held a disproportionate number of positions given their small numbers.

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[97] John Strutt to William Goodday Strutt, 1778, in C. R. Strutt, *The Strutt family of Terling, 1650–1873* (London, 1939), p. 62.
[98] John Strutt to William Goodday Strutt, 1780, in Strutt, *The Strutt family*, p. 63.
[99] Lucas, "A Collective Biography", Table A9, p. 255.
[100] Cavell, "A Social History", Appendix H, JO Charts.

Indeed, a comparison of different military ranks showed that there were a far greater proportion of aristocrats who were operational generals than in other positions. However, this did not mean operational generals were a closed group inaccessible to those from below. In contrast, rates of social mobility amongst generals seemed reasonably high. The social status of an operational general can at least be equated to a rank between esquire and knight. The intergenerational study of 1747 future generals' fathers' social status showed that 35% of fathers were esquires or lower indicating a significant number of generals who increased their social status through military service. The analysis of self-recruitment also indicated operational generals were relatively open to outsiders. Nearly 60% of future 1747 generals had fathers who pursued non-army careers and the sons of generals only accounted for 20% of future generals, a number comparable to recruitment at the elite end of even modern-day professions.

There were also indications that over time operational generals' mobility was increasing. By the later period a lower proportion of aristocrats and gentry were operational generals as the middling sort gained ground at their expense. In consequence, the proportion of future generals' fathers who were lower than knights increased from 35% to 56% by 1800. This was also reflected in rates of self-recruitment. Nearly 70% of operational generals on the 1800 army list had fathers who did not serve in the army and the recruitment of generals' sons declined to 16%. However, these findings of relatively high mobility and openness have to be tempered by the shallowness of most moves for those that used the army to advance. Future operational generals did not advance from low levels of society up

to their present positions. They were overwhelmingly already drawn from privileged groups in society. In this respect they were merely advancing from a relatively high intermediate level in the social hierarchy to a very high one. In the early period this was usually from the gentry, whereas by the late eighteenth-century this had changed to those who had fathers of the most successful and wealthy middling sort. It is certainly notable that no future operational generals in either period came from either the workers or the poor. The extent to which upward mobility was increasing between the periods may also be slightly exaggerated due to changes in the size of the army relative to the pool of aristocrats during this period. As the number of operational generals increased over time if the number of aristocrats did not increase or increased lower than the rising demand for generals then a higher percentage of aristocrats would have to join the army just to ensure the proportion of aristocratic generals did not decline. Therefore, a declining proportion of aristocratic generals as the army increased in size would not be unexpected. Nevertheless, even if this accounted for 5% or 10% of social mobility increases it does not change the fact that rates of social mobility among generals still increased impressively between the early and late eighteenth-century.

Chapter five: Education and Marriage

I. Introduction

Apart from achieving upward mobility through career selection there are other mechanisms of mobility or "elevators" of social advancement.[1] Two of the most important mechanisms of social mobility aside from careers are education and marriage.[2] The purpose of this chapter is to examine how education and marriage affected the mobility patterns of future generals.   Did the level of education future generals received play a role in them becoming generals or facilitate their advancement? What part did marriage play in their mobility patterns? Education is important to mobility as occupational achievement is often related to previous educational success.[3]   In modern societies educational achievement positively affects mobility as there is a direct link between human capital and labour productivity.[4]   In Sorokin's words, education acts as a "social elevator moving from the very bottom of a society to its top".[5]   Of course, the extent that education can be used to achieve upward mobility depends on the accessibility of educational institutions to different members of society. Nevertheless, even in societies when education is only accessible to members at the higher levels of society there are

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[1] Sorokin, *Social and Cultural Mobility*, p. 164.

[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 169-172, 179-180.

[3] N.E Dunton and D.L Featherman, "Social Mobility through Marriage and Career", in J.T Spence (ed.), *Achievement and Achievement Motives: psychological and sociological approaches*, (San Francisco, 1983), p. 290.

[4] OECD, "A Family Affair ", p. 4.

[5] Sorokin, *Social and Cultural Mobility*, p. 169.

usually some from the lower levels who manage to use education to improve their status.[6]

Marriage may be an even more important mechanism in achieving upward mobility than through occupation.[7] There are two reasons for this. First, marriage patterns represent voluntary associations, whereas occupation is heavily influenced by labour market characteristics. Second, marriage choices are made much later in life than occupational ones and may be less subject to family influence, especially as fathers often take greater interest in their sons' futures than their daughters.[8] Accordingly, some historians have found that achieving upward mobility through marriage was easier than through career selection.   In Victorian England there was more openness in the social backgrounds of marriage partners than there was in occupational recruitment.[9]   Marriage is certainly a critically important mechanism of mobility as Thompson pointed out:

"…The social identities of marriage partners[...] are among the most sensitive and acute indicators of community or class feelings. Who marries whom, without courting alienation or rejection from a social set, is an acid test of the horizons and boundaries of what each particular social set regards as tolerable and acceptable, and a sure indication of where that set draws the line of membership…."[10]

The main sources used to gain evidence on the education and marriage patterns of the future generals were, in a similar fashion to the analysis of family backgrounds, biographical profiles taken from the *Dictionary of National Biography*

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[6] Sorokin, *Social and Cultural Mobility*, p. 169.

[7] Miles, *Social Mobility*, p. 145.

[8] Dunton and Featherman, "Social Mobility through Marriage and Career", pp. 297-298; Mitch, "Inequalities", p. 140.

[9] Mitch, "Inequalities", p. 144.

[10] F.M.L Thompson, *The Rise of Respectable Society: a social history of Victorian Britain, 1830-1900*, (London, 1988), p. 93.

and *History of Parliament* of generals, their wives and fathers-in law. These two main sources are supplemented by genealogical studies of the peerage, baronetage, knightage and gentry, a number of personal family histories and wills.   The advantage of using these sources for information on the educational and marriage patterns is that education and marriages are two of the most frequently reported social characteristics in biographical profiles. Nevertheless, some issues do arise in the quality and extent of information that can be gained from these sources.

The number of observations found on future generals' educational patterns was very limited for the 1747 operational generals. Information was only found on the education of 18 out of the 55 early eighteenth-century operational generals whose father's social background can be traced. Accordingly, more than half of the population of 1747 operational generals' education is 'unknown'. The very high number of 'unknowns' compared to 'knowns' could potentially affect the results. It is not clear the degree to which the 'unknowns' were educated.   However, a high number of 'unknowns' is an unavoidable problem in a study of this kind due to the nature of surviving data. Other studies involving the social backgrounds of military officers in this period have had similar problems tracing social characteristics. Cavell's 1761 sample of junior officers and quarter-deck boys, for example, only located the place of birth in 45 cases out of 572.[11]   A similar problem occurs for 1800 future generals with the number of 'unknowns' outnumbering 'knowns'. However, in the case of later period officers this does not present such a problem as there were so many more operational generals by 1800. Consequently, even though

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[11] Cavell, "A Social History", Table 6.12, p. 207.

most of the education of the 1800 population of operational generals is 'unknown' it was still possible to confirm the educational details of 51 different future generals whose father's social background could be traced.

Another data issue was in analysing the social status of marriage partners. The sources usually stated the general's father-in-law name, but often said nothing about their social backgrounds. A typical entry in this respect was General William Loftus's first marriage. The sources revealed that his father-in-law was Maccaret King, but say nothing about Mr King's social origins or occupation. Thus, in tracing the social background of fathers-in- law for future generals marriages there are also a great number of unknowns. Another problem with the marriage data is that often the date of marriage was not stated so there is a difference between the number of first marriages and date of first marriages. This is particularly a problem for early eighteenth-century marriages. The main impact of this difference is that for some generals it was difficult to clarify at what point in their career they got married.

II. Education

Education can positively affect upward mobility in two different ways. Firstly, attaining certain educational levels may be needed for entry or advancement in different occupations. This is particularly the case in professions, such as law or teaching, that require minimum educational standards to work in these fields.

Consequently, education levels are often closely related to career choice. Education may also facilitate progress as preferential access to high-level positions could be given to those with higher levels of education.[12] Secondly, attending formal education institutions may also provide social benefits that help advancement. Attending a prestigious school or university might provide the opportunity for making important social connections that contribute to future advancement.

The often close relationship between education and career choice may mean that the role education plays in mobility is dependent on the type of career selected and the time period involved. Some careers require more education than others due to their technical complexity. Barristers careers have always required a higher degree of education than many other career paths due to the nature of legal work. The level of education required can also be significantly different depending on the time period. In the early modern era education was often conducted on a more informal basis than today. Most early nineteenth-century army doctors, for example, attended university in some capacity, yet only 40% of these obtained degrees.[13]

Entering the army as an officer in the eighteenth-century did not require a high degree of formal education. An officer had to be literate. The ability to read and write was a fundamental requirement as officers needed to be able to read orders and communicate by letters with their superior officers. Some level of numeracy was also useful as the decentralised military administration meant regimental captains

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[12] Sorokin, *Social and Cultural Mobility*, pp. 170-171.
[13] Ackroyd et al, *Advancing with the Arm*y, p. 133.

played a role in the financial administration of troops under their commands. A link did develop later between becoming an officer in the army and attending public school. Most future officers by 1890 entering officer training school at Sandhurst were previously educated at public school.[14] However, this was a mid-nineteenth-century phenomenon. Studies of officers in the eighteenth-century have shown that officers were generally not educated at public school.   Odintz found only 21 of his 394 foot officers attended a public school.[15]   Similarly, Glover noted that in 1809 it was surprising how few officers had gone to public school. There were over 10,000 officers in the army at this time, but according to Glover's estimates only 283 had attended public school.[16]

Even though most officers may not have been highly formally educated this does not necessarily mean the role of education in the career success of future generals was limited. Table 7 shows the future generals as a group, whose education level is known, tended to be highly educated.   Most future generals were educated in formal settings, rather than informally by tutors. Indeed, more than one half of 1800 future generals whose education is known attended university.   It is difficult to read too much into any differences or similarities between the two periods due to the small number of observations for 1747 future operational generals.

[14] C.B Otley, "Public School and Army", *New Society*, (17 November 1966), pp. 754-755.
[15] Odintz, "The British Officer Corps", p. 221.
[16] Glover, *Wellington's army*, pp. 37-41.

Table 7: Education of generals

Type of education	1747			1800		
	Aristocrat	Non-aristocrat	Total	Aristocrat	Non-aristocrat	Total
Oxbridge	2	3	5	10	4	14
UK university	1	0	1	2	8	10
Foreign university	1	0	1	5	3	8
Inns of Court	1	0	1	2	3	5
sub-total						
-Higher	5	3	8	19	18	37
Military academy	1	0	1	2	4	6
Eton	3	1	4	10	6	16
Other public school	2	2	4	11	4	15
Tutors	5	1	6	8	6	14
Grammar	0	0	0	2	9	11
Civilian academy	0	0	0	2	0	2
sub-total						
-Secondary	11	4	15	35	29	64
Secondary & Higher	2	1	3	15	7	22
Total	16	7	23	54	47	101
Unknown	16	12	28	13	29	42

Note: A breakdown of the specific education by officer is available in Appendix 1, Social Backgrounds. Excludes education of illegitimate generals and whose father's social status could not be traced. UK university includes Scottish and Irish universities.

Source: Appendix 4.1, Data Sources: Social Backgrounds

Nevertheless, one difference does appear clear; levels of formal education appeared to be increasing over time. This is not unexpected as educational provision was expanding during this period and levels of education were also increasing in other professions. Barristers at Lincoln's Inn who were admitted to the bar and attended university increased from 45% in 1695-1704 to 70% by 1795-1804.[17]

Examining the educational institutions attended by the future generals from the later period does reveal a number of interesting characteristics about the

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[17] Lucas, "A Collective Biography", Table A7, pp. 251-252.

education received. In the first place, nearly half of all educational establishments attended were either Oxbridge or a public school. There seemed to be no particular difference between Oxford or Cambridge as almost equal numbers attended each institution. However, this was not the case for those attending public school. There was a clear preference for Eton over other public schools as half of those attending public school went to this institution. Most of the other public schools attended were also highly prestigious institutions; nine went to Westminster, four Harrow and one each to Rugby, Felsted, Charterhouse, King's School at Canterbury and Portarlington.

At public school or Oxbridge these future generals would have had an education concentrating on classical subjects such as French, German, Italian, Greek and Latin, and grammar.[18] A classical education was not necessarily important to an army career *per se*, but could provide indirect benefits. Knowledge of Greek and Latin was well thought of in this period and could be a useful skill as Latin was still widely used in official documents.[19] Moreover, future generals often used high levels of literacy later in their careers to publish books on military matters, which in some cases aided career progression. Humphrey Bland's publication of *A Treatise of Military Discipline* (1727) contributed to his rise by earning him royal favour and the friendship of the Duke of Cumberland.[20] Publication of similar military

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[18] W.B Stephens, *Education in Britain, 1750-1914*, (London, 1998), pp. 42-44; H.M Jewell, *Education in Early Modern England*, (London, 1998), pp. 41, 55-58.
[19] Ackroyd et al, *Advancing with the Arm*y, pp. 108-110.
[20] ODNB, s.v. Bland, Humphrey (1685/6–1763).

books on tactics seemed to help the careers of David Dundas and William Fawcett in the late eighteenth-century.[21]

The social benefits gained from attending Oxbridge or a public school could have helped careers. Social connections made at these prestigious institutions at times affected entry and progression in the army. George Harris' early progress in the army was helped by social connections his father, who became a curate in the church, made while at Westminster and Cambridge. Harris initially entered the army through the influence of Lord George Sackville, an operational general, who was at Westminster with his father. Then his appointment as lieutenant fireworker in the artillery, and subsequent transfer to ensign in the 5th foot, was arranged through the offices of Lord Granby, the lieutenant general of ordinance and future commander in chief, who was at Cambridge with his father.[22] Even if high social connections were not made while attending formal educational institutions the social value obtained from such education could be useful. Scottish officers in this period often emphasised the social value of an English education. Major Horsburgh, a Scottish field officer with the 39th foot, educated his children at an English institution and advised his wife that "... the utmost care ought to be taken to preserve the English accent they have..."[23]

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[21] ODNB, s.v. Fawcett (Faucitt), Sir William (1727-1804), Dundas, Sir David (1735?-1820).
[22] ODNB, s.v. Harris, George (1746-1829); A.M Oakley, "Introduction", Unpublished guide to U624, The Papers of George Harris, 1775-1844, (1960), p. 2.
[23] British Library Manuscripts (Hereafter BL), Add. MS 50260, Horsburgh Papers, Major Horsburgh to Mrs Horsburgh, January 1 1777, f. 131.

The significance of attending Oxbridge or public school to future career progression in the army should not be overstated. Matriculating at these institutions seemed to play a lesser role in reaching the peaks of the army compared to other professions. For example, attending Oxbridge or public school seemed far more important in becoming a government minister than an operational general; 87% of ministerial posts between 1775 and 1800 went to those who attended public school.[24] An important point in this regard was that there was a large difference in the social backgrounds of the future generals who attended Oxbridge or public school. Those educated at public school were mostly aristocrats, whereas non-aristocrats usually attended different educational institutions. The non-aristocrats studied to a far greater extent at grammar schools, which provided a similar education in classics, or non-Oxbridge British universities. As non-aristocrats did not need to go to public school or Oxbridge in order to become a general this may be suggestive of greater social mobility.

Another factor in the education patterns of future generals was the fact that many of the individuals attending university did so with the intention of pursuing other career paths requiring higher levels of education than a career in the army. Lord Cathcart studied law at Glasgow and Dresden and was admitted to the faculty of advocates in 1776 before changing his mind on career direction and joining the Army in 1777. This may have been related to his father dying in August 1776 and his inheritance that followed.[25] The phenomenon of future generals gaining a high degree of education to enter the law and then changing careers to the army seemed

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[24] J.V Beckett, *The Aristocracy in England, 1660-1914*, (Oxford, 1986), pp. 98-102.
[25] ODNB, s.v. Cathcart, William Schaw (1755-1843).

relatively common in the late eighteenth-century. William Villettes was another future general whose family intended him to follow a law career and was educated with this career path in mind. He went to St Andrews University and attended two or three terms at Lincoln's Inn before his father finally relented and allowed him to join the army, a career William was always set on.[26]

A final noteworthy characteristic of future generals' educational patterns was the tendency of a minority to attend military academies before embarking on an army career. In the late eighteenth-century three future generals attended Lewis Lochée's military academy at Chelsea and three others foreign military academies in Strasbourg and Turin. Lewis Lochée's military academy was founded in 1770 and was 'exceptional in providing a carefully conceived combination of theoretical and practical instruction'. The practical instruction included work on manoeuvres and digging fortifications.[27] Attending a military academy was perhaps an indication that these future generals were serious about pursuing a successful military career.

Education seemed to play only a minor role in becoming a general. It was necessary to be literate to be a general, but this did not require a high level of formal education. Certainly, generals appeared to be more highly educated than average officers, yet this was probably closely related to their different social backgrounds. The high level of education some generals possessed may have assisted them in rising through the ranks, but it was hardly a necessary requirement in becoming a

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[26] ODNB, s.v. Villettes, William (1754-1808).
[27] ODNB, s.v. Lochée, Lewis (*d.* 1791).

general. This is important because education can act as a mechanism to increase social closure.   A high level of education requires an investment, which may be beyond the means of the non-privileged thereby acting as a barrier to social mobility. Most generals attending Oxbridge or public school were aristocrats, whereas non-aristocrats were usually educated at grammar school or non-Oxbridge British universities. This may also indicate that education did not act to increase social closure of generals as it was not necessary to attend Oxbridge or public school in order to become a general. Furthermore, many of those attending Scottish or Irish universities did so with the intention of pursuing other careers that required higher levels of education most notably law. Finally, the high number of future generals whose education could not be traced may demonstrate most generals only received a modest education. These 'unknowns' probably had some education, but perhaps not at prestigious or formal education institutions.

III. Marriage

Apart from education, marriage is another important "channel of social circulation" that affects social mobility.   According to Sorokin "…marriage usually leads one of the parties either to social promotion or degradation..."[28] This may be overstating the impact of marriage on mobility somewhat. However, marriage is certainly an important characteristic to consider in analysing the mobility of any group of individuals. Studies have found marriage is often a key factor in

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[28] Sorokin, *Social and Cultural Mobility*, p. 179.

subsequent mobility for men. A Danish study in the 1950s showed that the most significant indicator of married men's social mobility was their wife's social status.[29] Mobility through marriage is important because marriage can act as a substitute to other mechanisms of mobility such as mobility achieved through occupation. In other words, those not able to achieve mobility through occupation may be able to do so through marriage.[30]   Marriage can also be complementary to those achieving upward mobility through their occupation. Occupational success may enable those advancing to consolidate and assimilate further into higher social groups through marrying wives whose fathers are higher in the social hierarchy than their own fathers.[31] Thus, it is important to consider how the marriage patterns of the future generals affected their mobility.

There are many different factors that can impact on the marital mobility patterns of individuals. These factors typically either facilitate increased mobility through marriage or greater social endogamy, that is to say, marrying someone from the same social group. Factors thought to facilitate mobility through marriage include: a modern labour market, means of transport and communication, adult mortality, economic independence at an early age and romantic love. On the other hand, factors such as parental control, community traditions and peer group control increase the likelihood that marriage partners will come from the same social backgrounds.[32]

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[29] Lipset and Bendix, *Social Mobility*, p. 47.
[30] Dunton and Featherman, "Social Mobility through Marriage and Career", p. 298.
[31] *Ibid.*, p. 316.
[32] M.H.D van Leeuwen and I. Maas, "Endogamy and Social Class in History: an overview", in M.H.D van Leeuwen, I. Maas and A. Miles (eds), *Marriage Choices and Class Boundaries: Social Endogamy in History*, (Cambridge, 2005), Table 1, p. 21.

It is often claimed the eighteenth-century saw the weakening of parental control and the rise of romantic love, factors that should result in greater mobility in both directions. This allegedly led to more marriage outside of social groups individuals were born into.[33] At the beginning of the early eighteenth-century, so the argument goes, most marriages between the middle and upper social groups were arranged as commercial transactions between families with little role for individual choice in marriage decisions.[34] As the Marquis of Halifax advised his daughter in 1688: "… It is one of the Disadvantages belonging to your Sex, that young Women are seldom permitted to make their own Choice…."[35] This situation changed by the mid-eighteenth-century due to the rise of 'affective individualism', which resulted in people marrying for love rather than money.[36] 'Affective individualism' stressed the importance of the individual over the male dominated family leading to more egalitarian relationships between husbands and wives. This was a fundamental shift in family life as patriarchal families were replaced by nuclear families. These changes were closely related to changes in property law as strict settlement protected the individual property rights of married women by legally limiting their husband's control.[37] Even for aristocrats close emotional bonds between partners became more important and kinship ties declined in significance.[38]

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[33] L. Stone, *The Family, Sex and Marriage in England 1500-1800*, abridged edition, (London, 1979), p. 183; E. Shorter, *The Making of the Modern Family*, (New York, 1975), p. 148; W. Moore, "Love and Marriage in eighteenth century Britain", *Historically Speaking*, 10 (3), (June 2009), pp. 8-10.

[34] Moore, "Love and Marriage", p. 8.

[35] G. Savile, Marquis of Halifax, *The Ladys New-year's Gift; or, advice to a daughter*, (London, 1688), p. 25.

[36] Moore, "Love and Marriage", p. 8.

[37] L. Stone, *The Family, Sex and Marriage in England 1500-1800*, (London, 1977), pp. 151-154, 239-246.

[38] R. Trumbach, *The Rise of the Egalitarian Family: aristocratic kinship and domestic relations in eighteenth century England*, (New York, 1978).

Recent research on the family does tend to cast some doubt on the extent to which 'affective individualism' dominated family life and marriage patterns in the period. According to Tadmor, the historical consensus on this is that there was more continuity in family life than divergence with past practices.[39] In some of the most recent research on the subject, Tague found that aristocratic families bore hallmarks of mostly continuity, but also noted some changes.[40]

A review of the somewhat limited literature on mobility, class and marriage in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries indicates a similar finding; much continuity with a limited amount of change. Most tended to marry people from the same social group in the eighteenth-century, but there was also some intermarriage between different social groups.[41] According to Rogers, 61% of mid-eighteenth-century London merchants married partners, whose social origins could be traced, from commercial or finance backgrounds.[42] This tendency to mainly marry people from the same social group even persists today. Glass found that in modern Britain 45% of partners marrying were matched by social status.[43] Nevertheless, there is some support for changes in marriage patterns between the early and late eighteenth-century. For instance, 'In-marriages' of the peerage dropped 4% between 1700-19

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[39] N. Tadmor, *Family and Friends in eighteenth century England: household, kinship, and Patronage*, (Cambridge, 2001), pp. 5-6.

[40] I. Tague, " Aristocratic women and ideas of family in the early eighteenth century", in H. Berry and E. Foyster, *The Family in the Early Modern England*, (Cambridge, 2007), p. 208.

[41] A. Macfarlane, *Marriage and Love in England: modes of reproduction 1300-1840*, (Oxford, 1986), pp. 256-7.

[42] Rogers, "Money, Marriage, Mobility", Table 3, p. 23.

[43] Glass, *Social Mobility*, p. 336.

and 1800-19.[44] These changes were perhaps a consequence of 'affective individualism'. Yet, the extent of this change is probably overestimated by some authors. A recent wide-ranging study on levels of social endogamy in European society during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries demonstrated that change over time was limited and the regional context was far more important. The six different regions examined did not show one consistent pattern of change over time in social endogamy rates. In some regions endogamy rates actually increased, whereas in others they remained stable or decreased.[45]

For those that were highly successful in their careers similarly to the operational generals, there is evidence of slightly more upward than downward mobility through marriage. In the case of London merchants, 25% married wives from the gentry or peerage, thus increasing their social status through marriage, whereas 14% married those from a category described as "other", which presumably captures downward mobility.[46]   An earlier study of seventeenth-century London businessmen showed slightly more of an equal division between upward and downward mobility through marriage. In a similar fashion to Roger's study of merchants, over 60% of businessmen married those from commerce or finance, but only 21% advanced through marriages to the gentry or peerage compared to 18%

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[44] D. Thomas, "The Social Origins of Marriage Partners of the British Peerage in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries", *Population Studies*, 26 (1), (March 1972), Table 3, p. 102.

[45] I. Maas and M.H.D van Leeuwen, " Total and Relative Endogamy by Social Origin: a first international comparison of changes in marriage choices during the 19th century", M.H.D van Leeuwen, I. Maas and A. Miles (eds), *Marriage Choices and Class Boundaries: Social Endogamy in History*, (Cambridge, 2005), pp. 285-290.

[46] Rogers, "Money, Marriage, Mobility", Table 3, p. 23.

marrying those described as "other".[47] A rather more wide-ranging study of British

marriage mobility in the nineteenth-century was conducted by Mitch. An important

part of his study involved examining the marriage patterns of those who were

upwardly mobile through career success. For those husbands that reached the top

occupational category, marriage acted as a further way for some to continue their

advance, whereas others married wives from the same or lower social backgrounds.

According to his data, 37% of grooms in his highest occupational category for the

period 1839-1843, who achieved their occupations through career success, married

into the leading occupational category as well. There were also a significant number

of grooms that married beneath themselves, 25% of category one husbands had

fathers-in-law from lower occupational backgrounds.[48]

There were two important aspects of marriage in the eighteenth-century that

potentially affected rates of marital mobility. A high proportion of people remained

unmarried and marrying relatively late in life was common.[49] In 1746 10% of those

aged between 40 and 44 were unmarried.[50] Particular social groups may have had

an even greater propensity to remain unmarried than the wider population.

According to Rogers, 17% of London merchants remained unmarried.[51] The

numbers of unmarried operational generals were even greater. Nearly one third of

[47] H. Horwitz, "Testamentary Practice, Family Strategies, and the Last Phases of the Custom of London, 1660-1725", *Law and History Review*, 2, (1984), p. 229.

[48] Mitch, "Inequalities", Table 7.6, p. 154.

[49] N. Voigtlaender, and H.-J. Voth, "Malthusian Dynamism and the Rise of Europe: Make War, Not Love", *American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings*, 99-2 (2009), p. 251.

[50] E.A Wrigley and R.S Schofield, *The Population History of England 1541-1871*, (Cambridge, 1981), Table 7.28, p. 260.

[51] Rogers, "Money, Marriage, Mobility", p. 21.

1747 operational generals did not marry, although this decreased to 18% by 1800.[52] The proportions of unmarried future generals were similar to other officers in the army. Almost one third of army officers who were MPs between 1715 and 1754, and who left the army before making it to general ('officer MPs'), never married. There was also a similar trend over time; the proportion of unmarried 'officer MPs' sitting in Parliament between 1754 and 1790 declined to 20%.[53]

Table 8 shows that people married relatively late in life. The average adult man in the eighteenth-century did not marry until his mid to late twenties. This was very late in life when life expectancy at age 25 varied from 27.8 to 36.6 years during this time.[54] The high cost of marriage was one reason so many people married late in life or not at all. Newly wed couples were expected to set up an independent household.   This entailed relatively high initial setup costs and on-going additional expenditure. One way a newly married couple might set up an independent household was through buying a small farm. Wrigley has calculated the initial setup cost for a pastoral farm of twelve acres was £65 5s. This would take ten years of joint saving if both future husband and wife were 'in service' and received no assistance from their parents.[55]   Consequently, marriage was often delayed until the necessary funds had been saved to meet this high expenditure.[56]

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[52] Appendix 4.1, Data Sources: Social Backgrounds.
[53] R. Sedgwick, (ed.), *The history of parliament: the House of Commons, 1715–1754* (hereafter *HOP*), *Volumes 1-2*, (London, 1970); Namier and Brooke, *HOP, 1754–1790, Volumes 2-3*.
[54] Wrigley et al, *English Population History*, figure 6.14, pp. 281-282.
[55] *Ibid.*, pp. 123-124.
[56] Wrigley and Schofield, *The Population History*, p. 421.

Table 8: Age at first marriage for different social groups

		Percent			Number	
	Age	0-24	25-34	35+	Mean age	N
Adult males	1700-24	41.0	48.4	10.6	27.3	1233
	1775-99	57.0	35.3	7.7	25.7	2121
Generals	1747	15.4	26.9	57.7	36.1	26
	1800	13.9	48.6	37.5	33.6	72
'Officer MPs'	1715-54	19.2	52.0	28.8	31.3	52
	1754-90	20.6	47.6	31.8	31.7	63
Peers	1725-49	34.0	46.3	19.7	?	356
Businessmen	1740-59	22.4	55.3	31.0	32.4	58

Source:
Adult males: Wrigley et al, *English Population History*, Table 5.4, p. 141.
Generals: Appendix 4.1, Data Sources: Social Backgrounds
'Officer MPs': Sedgwick, *HOP, 1715–1754, Volumes 1-2*, Namier and Brooke, *HOP, 1754–1790, Volumes 2-3*.
Peers: T.H Hollingsworth, "The Demography of the British Peerage: Marriage", *Population Studies*, 18 (2), (November 1964), Table 4, p. 14.
Businessmen: Rogers, "Money, Marriage, Mobility", Table 2, pp. 22-23.

The high cost of marriage was undoubtedly one reason why London businessman and army officers married so late in life. London businessmen, generals and 'officer MPs' on average delayed marriage until their thirties. Moreover, significant numbers of these individuals did not get married until much later. It was usual for one third of London businessmen, generals and 'officer MPs' to delay marriage until the age of 35 at least. In a similar fashion, army surgeons, even though they came from different social backgrounds than generals or 'officer MPs', also did not get married until their thirties.[57] One consequence of late marriage was that London businessmen and future generals usually only married when they had achieved senior ranks in their professions. Most businessmen married after they became partners or were about to secure a partnership.[58] Over 70% of future

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[57] Ackroyd et al, *Advancing with the Army*, p. 276.
[58] Rogers, "Money, Marriage, Mobility", p. 22.

operational generals in both periods did not marry until they had reached the rank of regimental major or higher. The most popular rank to marry at for late eighteenth-century future generals was lieutenant colonel, the most senior active rank in a regiment.[59] That marrying so late in a career persisted over time might appear a little odd as average marriage ages decreased between the different periods, but this is accounted for by the lower average entry ages of later period future generals.

High marriage costs do not seem a satisfactory explanation on their own to account for the particularly late marriage patterns of army officers compared to the general population. The nature of an army career may also help to explain this phenomenon. An army career usually required frequent travel and serving in many different locations both within Britain and abroad throughout a career. This could have affected the propensity for future generals to marry. It may have increased the likelihood of sexual encounters outside of marriage thus reducing the incentive to get married. There is certainly much evidence of unmarried operational generals having relationships outside of marriage. John Ligonier, for example, had a relationship with Penelope Miller of Southwark which produced a daughter.[60] Other generals also had children out of wedlock. Even though Sir James Henry Craig was unmarried, he made provision in his will for a natural daughter.[61] Likewise, it appears that one of the main beneficiaries of General Hawley's will, Captain Toovey, was probably his son.[62] The constant travelling could also have made it more difficult to find a suitable wife. Geography is an important factor in who people marry; most people tend to

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[59] Appendix 4.1, Data Sources: Social Backgrounds; Appendix 4.2, Data Sources: Careers.
[60] ODNB, s.v Ligonier, John (1680-1770).
[61] ODNB, s.v Craig, Sir James Henry (1748-1812).
[62] ODNB, s.v Hawley, Henry (*bap.* 1685, *d.* 1759).

marry those that live close to them.[63]   As generals were only stationed in locations usually for short periods of time it may have made it harder to find a suitable long-term partner. From a wife's perspective, an army husband may have had many disadvantages. Long absences from their husband would be the norm and there was also the possibility of financial hardship if their husbands died in battle. There were many cases of officers dying on the battlefield without leaving their family adequate financial support.[64]

In the case of future operational generals, career success could also be a factor in why they married so late in their careers. An officer generally received some degree of financial independence when he gained a captaincy.[65] Hence, if marriage was delayed due to high costs it should have been possible for most captains to get married. Indeed, nearly 80% of 1754-1790 'officer MPs' married when they were captain.[66] In contrast, only 27% of 1800 operational generals married at the rank of captain or lower.[67] A high level of career success may have affected the rank at which generals married in two ways. The future generals could have been more focused on their careers than other officers and so may have delayed marrying and having families. The demands of operational commands could also have made a difference in marriage patterns. Operational command usually involved more overseas postings and greater travel requirements than simply being an officer on regimental duty. There were a higher proportion of operational general posts based

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[63] van Leeuwen and Maas, "Endogamy and Social Class in History", pp. 9-10.
[64] ODNB, s.v Hawley, Henry (*bap.* 1685, *d.* 1759).
[65] S. Conway, "British Army Officers and the American War for Independence", *The William and Mary Quarterly*, 41 (2), (April 1984), p. 275.
[66] Namier and Brooke, *HOP, 1754–1790, Volumes 2-3.*
[67] Appendix 4.1, Data Sources: Social Backgrounds; Appendix 4.2, Data Sources: Careers.

abroad than regiments in these locations.[68]   It was also likely generals based overseas spent longer in these locations than regiments as regiments rotated home on a regular basis from the 1760s, but there was no specific rotation policy for generals. Many generals only left overseas operational commands when they requested leave to come home or be replaced.

The tendency of future operational generals to marry late or not at all has important implications for the role of marriage in their social mobility. As generals were well advanced in their careers by the time they married this may have meant marriage was only a minor factor in becoming an operational general.   However, marrying after achieving substantial career success may facilitate better matches in the marriage market. Historians have found a correlation between age of first marriage and the size of fortune left behind, with those who marry later in life leaving larger fortunes.[69] Army surgeons who married before the age of 31 left an average estate value of £3,950 compared to £6,142 for those who married later and £6,922 for those that did not marry.[70] Consequently, operational generals who married late may have been able to leverage their career success, and wealth gained through their career which was probably increased by not marrying earlier, in the marriage market by marrying those from higher social groups or brides that brought with them significant financial resources. Thus, marriage could have provided a mechanism to continue their advance beyond the parameters of their career success.

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[68] Odintz, "The British Officer Corps", pp. 45-46; Glover, *Wellington's army*, pp. 147-148.
[69] P. Earle, *The Making of the Middle Class: business, society and family life in London, 1660-1730*, (London, 1989), p. 182.
[70] Ackroyd et al, *Advancing with the Army*, p. 277.

IV. Marital mobility of generals

In order to explore this latter implication in further detail it is necessary to assess the marital mobility of operational generals. The method used to measure marital mobility is in common with other mobility studies a comparison between the social group the operational generals' fathers belonged to and the social group they married into as represented by the social status of their fathers-in-law.[71] The future generals are divided into the two main social groups of the period, aristocrats and non-aristocrats. The reason for this bipolar division of social groups is twofold. Firstly, as discussed in the chapter on family the distinction between the gentry and the upper middling sort is difficult to draw. Consequently, it is difficult to be certain that upward mobility occurred in marriage if a future general from the middling sort married a wife from the gentry. Often they were probably marrying a partner from a similar social background. On the other hand, marrying a member of aristocracy for a non-aristocrat was a clear case of upward social mobility in the marriage market. Secondly, there is the practical problem that the number of observations on gentry or middling marriages is so small that it makes more sense to combine them into one category of non-aristocrats. A second measure of mobility is also examined to expand the number of observations by assuming those fathers-in-law whose names are known but whose social background cannot be traced were from the same social group as their sons-in-law. The assumption that fathers-in-law came from the same background as their sons-in-law seems reasonable based on the fact that most

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[71] Miles, *Social Mobility*, p. 146; Mitch, "Inequalities", p. 151; Glass, *Social Mobility*, pp. 322-323; Maas and van Leeuwen, " Total and Relative Endogamy by Social Origin", p. 284.

people married those from the same social groups. This second measure is used to see if it would change the main findings materially.

To put the results of generals in some perspective, the marital mobility of a second group of army officers is also considered in some detail. This second group of army officers can be described as 'officer MPs'. 'Officer MPs' were MPs listed in *the History of Parliament* who pursued army careers, but unlike the operational generals only achieved moderate success in their careers. Moderate success is defined as only achieving at best the regimental rank of lieutenant colonel and leaving the army before making it to general.   As 'officer MPs' came from relatively similar social backgrounds to the future generals, but achieved a much lower level of career success a comparison between the marital mobility of these two groups should reveal much about the impact of career success on mobility through marriage. In order to aid comparison between the periods the marriage patterns and careers of two different groups of 'officer MPs' are considered; those who sat as MPs in the period 1715-1754 and MPs sitting in the Commons between 1754 and 1790 who served in the army.

The tendency of army officers to marry late in their careers and the literature on the family, social mobility and marriage in this period allows the specification of three hypotheses regarding the marital mobility of army officers. First, most officers will probably marry those from the same social group. Second, there should be differences in the marital mobility patterns of army officers over time. The rise of

'affective individualism' should result in a declining rate of social endogamy among aristocratic army officers between the early and late eighteenth-century. Third, a significant minority of non-aristocratic officers should continue their advance through marrying aristocrats. The extent of this marital mobility should be greater for generals than 'officer MPs' due to their higher levels of career success.

The first measure of marital mobility is presented in table 9. This excludes wives whose father's name is known, but whose social background could not be traced. Interpreting the marital mobility of army officers in the eighteenth-century presents some problems due to the small numbers of observations in many instances. Consequently, it is very difficult to comment on the marital mobility of non-aristocratic 1747 operational generals.

The first hypothesis that most army officers would marry those from the same social groups seems well supported. For the social groups that have at least fifteen observations rates of social endogamy in all cases exceed 60% and go as high as 71% for later period 'officer MPs'. This appears to be a relatively high level of endogamy and even exceeds that of London merchants.[72] Data limitations constrain judgements on how endogamy changed over time. In the case of 'officer MPs' there is no evidence to suggest 'affective individualism' altered the patterns of marriage over time. The number of aristocratic 'officer MPs' marrying fellow aristocrats

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[72] Rogers, "Money, Marriage, Mobility", Table 3, p. 23.

remained essentially static, while rates of endogamy among non-aristocrats seemed to increase.

Table 9: Marriage mobility of army officers by first marriage

	1715-1754 Wife			1754-1790 Wife		
'Officer MPs'	Aristocrat	Non-aristocrat	N	Aristocrat	Non-aristocrat	N
Aristocrat	*67*	*33*	30	*68*	*32*	28
Non-aristocrat	*40*	*60*	15	*29*	*71*	17
N	26	19	45	24	21	45

	1747 Wife			1800 Wife		
Generals	Aristocrat	Non-aristocrat	N	Aristocrat	Non-aristocrat	N
Aristocrat	*85*	*15*	13	*63*	*37*	27
Non-aristocrat	*50*	*50*	6	*33*	*67*	18
N	14	5	19	23	22	45

Note: All rows (except N row) expressed as percentage of final column N. Excludes marriages of illegitimate husbands or wives and whose father's social status could not be traced.

Source:
'Officer MPs': Sedgwick, *HOP, 1715–1754, Volumes 1-2*; Namier and Brooke, *HOP, 1754–1790, Volumes 2-3*.
Generals: Appendix 4.1, Data Sources: Social Backgrounds

As hypothesised earlier, becoming a general allowed a significant proportion of non-aristocrats to continue their upward mobility achieved through their army career by marrying aristocrats. An upward mobility rate of 33% for 1800 operational generals in the marriage market was similar to Mitch's top occupational category in Victorian England and exceeded the 25% of mid-eighteenth-century London merchants who married into the gentry or peerage.[73] Army officers using marriage as a means of mobility in this period seemed fairly common. It has been suggested that army surgeons chose their wives in order to seek social advancement by

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[73] Rogers, "Money, Marriage, Mobility", Table 3, p. 23; Mitch, "Inequalities", Table 7.6, p. 154.

establishing themselves in 'respectable professional families'.[74] Many non-aristocratic 'officer MPs' also advanced socially through marrying aristocrats. The hypothesis that generals would have higher rates of marital mobility compared to 'officer MPs' due to their different levels of career success does not seem well supported by the data.   Admittedly, 1800 non-aristocratic generals' marital upward mobility was slightly higher than 'officer MPs'.   However, the similarity of these rates of upward social mobility through marriage suggests career success was not as important as family background in the marriage market.

One problem with this conclusion is that it does not consider the fact that gains through marriage were not only achieved by non-aristocrats marrying aristocrats. Another way non-aristocratic operational generals could take advantage of their career success in the marriage market was by marrying wives with significant financial resources. This is difficult to measure quantitatively due to lack of information, but there were several instances in both time periods of generals gaining substantial financial resources from their marriages. Typically these marriages occurred after obtaining senior positions in the army. When Phineas Bowles, a 1747 operational general, married the heiress of Samuel Hill he had already been regimental colonel of the 12th dragoons for several years. He gained from this marriage a large Irish estate portions of which were settled on him absolutely at marriage. Bowles's financial gains through marriage may have accounted for much of his £200,000 fortune left at his death.[75]   James Oglethorpe's marriage, who was another 1747 general, to the only surviving daughter of the

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[74] Ackroyd et al, *Advancing with the Army*, p. 275.
[75] ODNB, s.v. Bowles, Phineas (*bap.* 1690, *d.* 1749).

wealthy Sir Nathan Wright only occurred after he was already a major general in the army. Oglethorpe in a similar fashion to Bowles gained substantial financial resources from his marriage; he settled at his wife's family home, Cranham Hall in Essex, and lived in some style on the £1,500 yearly income she possessed.[76] These financially rewarding marriages were not isolated to the early period. When he was a lieutenant colonel the future 1800 general John Simcoe married the wealthy heiress Elizabeth Gwillim which gained him a 5,000 acre estate in Devon.[77] Near the end of David Baird's career, after he obtained a baronetcy for his military service and was a lieutenant general in the army, Baird married a wife with an estate at Perthshire where he was to spend the remainder of his life.[78]

Another way of measuring marital mobility through fathers and fathers-in-law social status is by including a number of the fathers-in-law whose social status remains unknown by making an assumption about their probable social status. As most people married partners from the same social backgrounds it seems reasonable to assume that those fathers-in-law whose names are known but whose occupational background is unknown came from the same social background as their sons-in-law. Table 10 recalculates marital mobility on this basis. The main implication of this method is to increase endogamy and to decrease mobility in both directions. The extent of these changes depends on the number of observations and how many of these had known fathers-in-law with unknown social backgrounds. Mostly this assumption shifts endogamy in the region of ten percentage points,

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[76] ODNB, s.v Oglethorpe, James Edward (1696-1785).
[77] ODNB, s.v. Simcoe, John Graves (1752-1806).
[78] ODNB, s.v.Baird, David (1757-1829).

although this does vary with some larger or smaller moves in groups that generally have more limited numbers of observations.

Table 10: Marriage mobility of army officers by first marriage

		1715-1754 Wife			1754-1790 Wife		
		Aristocrat	Non-aristocrat	N	Aristocrat	Non-aristocrat	N
'Officer MPs'	Aristocrat	*72*	*28*	36	*79*	*21*	44
	Non-aristocrat	*24*	*76*	25	*19*	*81*	26
	N	32	29	61	40	30	70

		1747 Wife			1800 Wife		
		Aristocrat	Non-aristocrat	N	Aristocrat	Non-aristocrat	N
Generals	Aristocrat	*94*	*6*	18	*71*	*29*	34
	Non-aristocrat	*25*	*75*	12	*21*	*79*	28
	N	20	10	30	30	32	62

Note: All rows (except N row) expressed as percentage of final column N. Fathers-in-law whose occupational details could not be traced were assumed to have come from the same social group as their sons-in-law. Excludes marriages of illegitimate husbands or wives and generals whose father's social status could not be traced.

Source:
'Officer MPs': Sedgwick, *HOP, 1715–1754, Volumes 1-2*, Namier and Brooke, *HOP, 1754–1790, Volumes 2-3*.
Generals: Appendix 4.1, Data Sources: Social Backgrounds

One question that may be asked is whether this procedure makes endogamy rates unrealistically high for army officers? An endogamy rate of at least 71% is certainly high relative to many other studies. For instance, Mitch found endogamy for all members of his top occupational group was 48%, which declined to 41% when considering only upwardly mobile grooms.[79] On the other hand, there were some historical precedents in Europe during this period for such high endogamy rates. The peak endogamy rate in Rendalen, Norway, for instance, during the nineteenth-

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[79] Mitch, "Inequalities", Table 7.2, p. 144, Table 7.6, p. 154.

century was 76%.[80] Moreover, as most studies calculate marital mobility with

unknowns excluded it may not be valid to compare results in table 10 with other

studies without any adjustment. This point can be clearly made by recalculating the

marital mobility rates of London merchants using the same assumption as in table

10. If this was done for London merchants in Roger's eighteenth-century and

Horwitz's seventeenth-century studies this would make their endogamy rates 75.5%

and 72.7% respectively.[81]

A far more important point is whether using this assumption changes the main

findings. This assumption does not change the findings. There was still no sign of

'affective individualism' impacting on the marriage patterns of 'officer MPs' and a

significant number of non-aristocratic generals still used the marriage market to

advance their social position. There is also little difference between the marriage

mobility of the generals and 'officer MPs'. The new assumption only affected the

degree to which these things happened.

Using this assumption does allow for an assessment of changes in future

generals marital mobility over time due to the expanded number of observations for

aristocrats in 1747. Table 10 shows there was a significant increase in the

downward mobility patterns of aristocratic generals between 1747 and 1800. The

extent of this shift may be exaggerated due to the small sample size, but it does

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[80] Maas and van Leeuwen, "Total and Relative Endogamy by Social Origin", p. 285.
[81] Rogers, "Money, Marriage, Mobility", Table 3, p. 23; Horwitz, "Testamentary Practice, Family Strategies", p. 229.

seem probable that downward marital mobility of aristocratic generals increased over this period. There is certainly qualitative evidence to support this contention. Lord Herbert, the future Earl of Pembroke and 1800 operational general, originally wanted to marry Caroline, relation of Lord Charles Spencer, but was rejected because

"... she has not that *kind* of *liking* for *you*, without which she is determined not to marry any man; she has made no resolution not to marry, but does not think marrying at all necessary to her happiness, unless some man should offer, for whom she feels herself inclined to have the sort of attachment which she thinks essential to make her happy. She has no feelings of this kind towards you and is sure she never shall have, though she likes you very well, but not as a Lover...."[82]

Likewise, Charles Cornwallis, eldest son of fifth Baron and first Earl Cornwallis, married Jemima Jones, who had no dowry and was the daughter of an army captain, for love.[83]

One notable difference in the marriage mobility of generals compared to 'officer MPs' was significant differences in aristocrat downward mobility over time. The downward mobility of generals who were aristocrats increased markedly over time, whereas there was no sign of a corresponding increase for 'officer MPs'. This may suggest a combination of two factors were important in determining rates of endogamy, time period and local context. The difference in endogamy rates between aristocratic 'officer MPs' and generals may be related to career success. Perhaps a greater level of career success provided more freedom of choice in selection of marriage partners for operational generals than 'officer MPs' due to the financial independence from their family that career success may have brought them. Thus, this different group characteristic may have had a greater impact on rates of endogamy than any time period considerations *per se*. This is possibly why

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[82] Lord Charles Spencer to Lord Herbert, 10 October 1786, in S. Herbert (ed.), *The Pembroke papers: letters and diaries of Henry, tenth earl of Pembroke and his circle, volume 2: 1780-1794*, (London, 1950), p. 316.
[83] ODNB, s.v Cornwallis, Charles (1738-1805).

studies of nineteenth-century European marital mobility have found local context far more important than time period.[84]

V. Conclusion

This chapter has addressed the role two important mechanisms of social mobility, education and marriage, played in operational general's mobility patterns. The education level of future generals did not seem an especially important factor in them becoming a general. A minimum level of education was required for all officers due to the necessity of literacy in performing their administrative functions. However, it was not necessary to have a high level of formal education in order to become a general.   Those who attended public school were mostly aristocrats and many generals attending university only did so with the intention of pursuing a law career before belatedly changing career paths. Consequently, education did not act as a social closure mechanism in becoming a general. It was not necessary to attend public school or Oxbridge to progress in the army. A high level of education may have helped some careers as many future generals published books on military tactics, which often aided their careers by gaining favour of higher ranking officers. Nevertheless, the level of literacy required to publish a book did not necessitate attendance at a prestigious educational institution.

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[84] Maas and van Leeuwen, "Total and Relative Endogamy by Social Origin", pp. 285-290.

Nor did marriage seem to play a major part in becoming a general. The future generals typically married late in life when they were already well established in their careers. Over 60% of late eighteenth-century generals married at the regimental rank of lieutenant colonel or higher and nearly half of these delayed marriage until they were regimental colonel or general.[85] When they did marry the future generals typically married wives from the same social groups and this high rate of endogamy meant marriage did not play a role in the mobility of most generals. However, there were always a significant minority of operational generals who seemed to use their career success to continue their social advance through marriage. Depending on the assumptions made in calculating marital mobility, approximately one quarter to one third of non-aristocrats appeared to continue their advance by marrying aristocratic wives. These rates were very similar to the upward mobility of 'officer MPs' who were not as successful in their careers as generals suggesting career success was not as important as family background in marriage patterns. Nevertheless, career success did play a role in marriage. It probably allowed greater freedom of choice in selection of marriage partner and provided the opportunity for some non-aristocratic operational generals to gain in the marriage market either socially or financially.

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[85] Appendix 4.1, Data Sources: Social Backgrounds; Appendix 4.2, Data Sources: Careers.

Chapter six: Career patterns

I. Introduction

The literature on the army in the eighteenth-century identifies a number of important factors that affected entering and advancing with the army. Social status and money were the most important factors in career success, but war, merit and regimental mobility also played a role in army careers.[1] These may have affected the mobility patterns of those who became generals and had implications for military efficiency. If status and money overrode service considerations levels of social mobility might be restrained and the competency of generals adversely affected. Hence, the focus of this chapter is to analyse the entry and career patterns of the future generals to determine the extent to which social status, money, war, merit and regimental mobility played a role in becoming an operational general.

The roles money and social status played in army careers was possibly very important due to the nature of entry and promotion within this period. Money at times played a key role in entering and advancing with the army as two thirds of regimental ranks in the eighteenth-century army were purchased.[2] The origin of purchasing commissions in the British army can be traced back to the fourteenth-century when groups of adventurers invested money in free companies taking the

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[1] Conway, *War, State and Society*, pp. 121-125; Burton and Newman, "Sir John Cope", p. 661; Brewer, *The Sinews of Power,* p. 57; French, *The British Way*, pp. 36-37.
[2] Houlding, *Fit for Service*, p. 103.

rank and reward in proportion to the sum invested.[3] All active regimental officer ranks were open to purchase from ensign to lieutenant colonel. Royal warrants of 1720 and 1722 fixed the price of commissions, obligated the selling officer to sell only to an officer who held the rank below his own and subjected all transactions to crown approval.[4]

Money could also be used to buy regimental rank by officers offering to raise bodies of men at their own expense. Once an officer had met this initial expense of raising troops through private means the subsequent running costs were then taken over by the government. The government provided no levy money for the raising of regiments or companies that were recruited in exchange for commissions and only paid troops serving once the corps had been fully completed.[5] 'Recruiting for rank' as it was known was a popular option for senior army officers to gain regimental colonelcies, usually a sinecure appointment by the King.[6] Thus, there were many examples of regimental officers offering to recruit a regiment in return for their first regimental colonelcy. One such example was Lieutenant Colonel Morgan of the foot guards who proposed to raise a regiment of 240 dragoons at his own expense in return for command of that regiment and the authorisation to sell his commission.[7] However, there was a downside to gaining a regimental colonelcy in this way as regiments were disbanded in the reverse order they were created.[8] Consequently,

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[3] Turner, *Gallant Gentleman*, p. 29; Roy, "The Profession of Arms", p. 197.
[4] Houlding, *Fit for Service*, p. 100.
[5] R. Middleton, "The Recruitment of the British Army, 1755-1762", *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research*, 67, (1989), p. 236.
[6] J. Hayes,"The Purchase of Colonelcies in the Army, 1714-1763", *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research*, 39, (1961), pp. 5-8.
[7] NA, WO 34/167, Baron Jeffrey Amherst, Commander in Chief, Papers, 1780, Lieutenant Colonel Morgan to Jeffrey Amherst, in Lord North's note, 15 September 1780, f. 187.
[8] Odintz, "The British Officer Corps", p. 35; Guy, "The Limits of Administration", p. 13.

many new regiments created in wartime were often disbanded when peace came. Another rank sometimes gained by raising troops was a captaincy. In wartime new companies were raised to augment battalions and some of these companies were recruited by gentlemen at their own cost in return for a captaincy.

Social status was even more important to an army career than money. All commissions were subject to approval of the Secretary at War or Commander in Chief for England. During wartime local commanders in chief also had the power to appoint to vacancies. These powers might be restricted and could vary over time. In early 1776 William Howe, the commander in chief of America, could only grant commissions below major, but later that year he was given approval to authorise appointments as high as lieutenant colonel except in the case of the guards who were still appointed from London.[9] Gaining approval from these high ranking officials was usually dependent on proving gentlemanly status. Accordingly, when Sam Fairltough wrote to the Commander in Chief in 1780 seeking an ensigncy he emphasised that:

> "...Captain Maguines, (who is in this town), who can inform you, that I am a young gentleman of good character; and if necessary, I can procure, a certificate, signed by the Mayor, and corporation of Drogheda, certifying that I am a gentleman of good character..."[10]

Money and social status were not the only important factors in obtaining commissions. War was also a critical factor in entering or getting promoted in the army. There were simply many more vacancies for officers during war than peace,

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[9] Robson, " Purchase and Promotion", pp. 62-63.
[10] NA, WO 34/167, Baron Jeffrey Amherst, Commander in Chief, Papers, Sam Fairltough to Jeffrey Amherst, Commander in Chief, 18 September 1780, f. 240.

particularly at the most junior ranks. This point is aptly demonstrated by table 11

showing officer places available in the 27th foot during two different periods, one

representing peace and the other war. There were fifteen additional officer places in

the 27th foot available during war compared to peace.

Table 11: Officer places in the 27th foot

	1767 (peace)	1800 (war)
Colonel	1	1
Lt. Colonel	1	2
Major	1	2
Captain	7	9
Captain Lt.	1	1
Lieutenant	10	22
Ensign	9	8
Total	30	45

Source:
NA, WO 65/17, 50, Printed Annual Army Lists, 1767, 1800.

Most of this expansion was at the most junior ranks. The number of lieutenants

serving in the 27th foot more than doubled between periods of peace and war. War

was also important in becoming an operational general as most general commands

only existed during wartime.

Another important aspect of war was that most non-purchase, or 'free'

vacancies, could only be obtained in wartime. 'Free' vacancies for officers generally

occurred through death in battle. In the event of an officer's death it was the custom

for his commission to automatically be given to the most senior regimental officer in

the rank immediately below him.[11] Vacancies for ensigns, the lowest rank of officer,

often went to gentleman volunteers. Gentleman volunteers entered the army with

the aim of gaining promotion to an ensign vacancy resulting from death in battle by

performing bravely on the battlefield.[12] However, even gaining a 'free' vacancy was

not entirely divorced from social status.   Apart from death, 'free' vacancies occurred

through sickness, shipwreck, accident, court martial, and creation or augmentation of

regiments. These latter 'free' vacancies were subject to the patronage of the King,

the Secretary at War, the Commander in Chief of England and regimental colonels.

Some account was supposed to be given to merit in the distribution of this

patronage. Newly created commissions, for example, were usually awarded to

officers who had displayed merit.[13] The Duke of York, after he became Commander

in Chief in 1795, was known to keep a list of meritorious officers for vacancies

subject to his patronage.[14] Nevertheless, it is hard to imagine that social status did

not also play some role in who gained a vacancy through patronage. Merit was also

recognised in promotion through the army ranks via the awards of major and

lieutenant colonel brevets.

Promotion was also affected by the type of regiment officers served with and

the extent they were willing to change regiments. Serving with the artillery,

engineers or marines might facilitate entry into the army as these branches of the

army had no purchase, but entry was still subject to social status.[15]   Changing

[11] H.C.B Rogers, *The British Army of the Eighteenth Century*, (London, 1977), p. 54; Conway, "British Army Officers", p. 275.
[12] Houlding, *Fit for Service*, p. 103.
[13] Glover, *Wellington's army*, p. 21; Glover, *Peninsula Preparation*, pp. 144, 159.
[14] Barnett, *Britain and her Army*, pp. 240-241.
[15] Marshall, "The British Military Engineers", pp. 150-151.

regiments might lead to faster promotion. Serving in the guards could accelerate promotion prospects if officers were willing to change regiment due to the guards' higher army rank. Their higher army rank provided the possibility that guards' officers could trade up their regimental rank to an equivalent army rank if they held seniority in the army and could gain patronage. Regimental captains in the guards, who ranked as lieutenant colonels in the army, sometimes used this advantage to become regimental lieutenant colonels or even colonels in foot regiments.[16] However, there was a trade-off between promotion speed and career stability. Staying with the guards or a non-purchase regiment often resulted in slower promotion times, but could provide greater career stability as many of the newer foot regiments that enabled faster promotion were quickly disbanded when peace came.[17]

Modernisation of the army may have affected the relative role these different factors played in promotion over time. Some historians have argued social status and money was less important in promotion in the early period compared to the late eighteenth-century.[18] Certainly, social status may have become more important in gaining a regimental colonelcy over time. In the early period these ranks were able to be directly purchased, but this practice was gradually phased out so that the last purchase is believed to have taken place in 1762.[19] This may have meant that social status was more important in gaining a regimental colonelcy in the absence of

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[16] Hayes, "The Social and Professional Background", pp. 167-168.

[17] A.J Marini,"The British Corps of Marines, 1746-1771 and the United States Marine Corps, 1798-1818: a comparative study of the early administration and institutionalisation of two modern marine forces", unpublished PhD thesis, University of Maine, (May 1979), p. 195; Guy, "The Limits of Administration", p. 13.

[18] Hayes, "The Professional and Social Background", pp. 103-107; Burton and Newman, "Sir John Cope", p. 667.

[19] Hayes,"The purchase of Colonelcies", pp. 5-8.

purchase. There is also some evidence to suggest that modernisation may have made promotion slower than in the early period. In the early eighteenth-century brevet promotions were at least twice suspended due to abuse of this system.[20] In addition, the late eighteenth-century saw the introduction of minimum levels of service and confidential reports on officers' competence; both of these hurdles had to be overcome before promotion could be gained. From 1795 promotion to captain required two years army service, while promotion to major took at least six years. These requirements were extended to three years and seven years respectively in 1809.[21]

Establishing entry profiles and career paths of the future generals, and the extent to which different factors affected these, did present some difficulties. Comprehensive career patterns of officers are not readily available as biographical profiles only mention career highlights. In order to establish the dates at which individual officers gained commissions substantial primary research needed to be undertaken involving extensive analysis of the various army lists and war office papers relating to commissions. For most late eighteenth-century officers this can usually be done with accuracy due to the high quality of evidence after army lists began to be published annually in 1754. There is not a problem in having a high number of 'unknowns', but this is a time intensive process.

[20] W.B.R Neave-Hill, "Brevet Rank", p. 90.
[21] Barnett, *Britain and her army*, p. 240; Glover, "Purchase", p. 355; Glover, *Peninsula Preparation,* pp. 152-154; Glover, *Wellington's army*, p. 22.

The accuracy of career patterns for early eighteenth-century officers, and the time it takes to establish these, is more problematic due to the quality of evidence on army careers before 1754. The army list of 1740 and *The Succession of Colonels* from 1742 to 1749 provide useful information on careers for officers after they reached colonel. However, most early career patterns can only be clarified by examining the manuscript army lists that exist for 1702, 1709, 1715, 1736, 1745 and 1752 (WO 64). The early manuscript army lists provide a much more limited range of information than the later period army lists. These sources usually only give the date of an officer's current regimental appointment and at times a summary of dates he gained the various army ranks up to colonel. The gaps in dates between lists also mean that inevitably there are often considerable gaps in career history. Another problem is the great variability in the extent to which individual officers details are recorded. For some officers the summary dates of their army ranks are simply left blank, whereas for others every different rank has a date in it. In consequence, for many early eighteenth-century future generals the regimental or army rank they held at different stages of their careers could not always be identified. In addition, there were often significant gaps in the regiments some early period officers served with. In the absence of this information on regimental rank it is assumed for non-guards officers that their regimental rank was the same as their army rank. This seems a reasonable assumption as regimental and army rank for officers before colonel was mostly the same, except when they received brevets or promotion in their regiment was particularly slow. This can be seen by examining any army list for the later period. In any event, this only affects a handful of 1747 future generals usually for certain portions of their career. An additional problem was that some sources only mention the regimental rank for guards' officers and not

their army rank. In these cases the army rank of guards' officers is based on what their army rank should have been relative to their regimental rank. There is no reason to believe that there were any exceptions to these equivalent army ranks for the corresponding regimental ranks. Indeed, in researching the future generals no exceptions have been found in either period when both regimental and army rank have been located for those who served in the guards.

A particular problem in researching the careers of early period officers was that many of these officers seem to have frequently skipped ranks. If a commission cannot be located does this mean the officer never served at that rank or do the sources consulted simply not record it? This problem was dealt with in two ways. Gaps in career histories were firstly checked against the sources that contained biographical profiles of the officers and contemporary publications that listed the career patterns of army officers, a discussion of which is found in chapter three. After this process was complete the notification books (WO 25) for individual commissions were examined. The notification books record letters sent by the Secretary at War to the Secretary of State informing him of commissioned officers and the details of their commissions. This should fill in any remaining gaps as officers registered their commissions with the Secretary at War.

The method for establishing the role of money in promotion was simply to clarify the extent to which commissions were bought. This is defined as the sum of commissions either purchased directly or recruited for. It is almost impossible to

ascertain the extent to which officers bought their commissions for the early period as the way officers gained their commissions is not usually mentioned in most biographical sources.   However, the evidence of the role money played in obtaining commissions improves significantly for the later period. In the 1760s *The London Gazette* began to publish promotion lists from the War Office, which specify whether commissions were directly purchased. Accordingly, Glover used *The London Gazette* to systematically analyse the extent to which ranks were purchased for the Napoleonic wars.

There are some potential problems with using *The London Gazette* in this way. Is it likely non-purchase vacancies were more widely reported than those purchased?   If this was the case it would downplay the significance of purchase. Yet, there is no indication non-purchase appointments were more or less likely to be published in *The London Gazette* compared to purchase ones so the data do not seem biased in this respect. The second problem is that there was no distinction between non-purchase vacancies that were gained freely and those that were bought by recruiting for rank. Moreover, it has not been possible to locate any sources that systematically state the extent to which non-purchase ranks were recruited for rank. In consequence, it is possible the extent to which ranks were bought by recruiting for rank is significantly understated.   This issue, however, may not be such a problem as it first appears. The reason for this is that apart from regimental colonel, a rank that was regularly recruited for and where there is more information on, it was not usual to gain many other ranks by recruiting for them. Buying commissions through recruiting for them did happen for other ranks,

especially when they had companies attached to them, but seemed relatively rare compared to the extent to which ranks were gained through other means. Research on mid eighteenth-century infantry officers indicates that only ten captaincies were gained by recruiting for them out of 177 whose origins could be traced and only one or two other commissions were ever recruited for.[22]   Finally, it is possible that some promotions published in *The London Gazette* that do not state they were purchased were in fact purchased. In order to ascertain whether this was a problem some spot checks were carried out to confirm the accuracy of the data in *The London Gazette* against more modern sources. In every case it was found the data in *The London Gazette* agreed with that published in the *Dictionary of National Biography*.

Apart from *The London Gazette*, muster records (WO 12), the regimental attendance records for army personnel, were also consulted to clarify the extent to which commissions were bought as they sometimes included details of promotions. Consulting *The London Gazette* and muster records produces valuable information in considering the role of money in army promotions, but again is a very time intensive process. A problem that remains in tracing how commissions were obtained is that there still remained a large number of 'unknowns' and they outnumbered the 'knowns'. This could possibly distort the results and for this reason the results must remain tentative.

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[22] Odintz, "The British Officer Corps", Chart XI, p. 316.

The London Gazette was also used as a supplementary source to *the Dictionary of National Biography* and Phillippart's third edition of *The Royal Military Calendar* to establish whether the future generals were wounded in action, one of the proxies for merit. In the mid eighteenth-century *The London Gazette* began to publish lists of casualties from battles and skirmishes fought by the British army abroad. These lists included numbers of officers, NCOs and men killed and wounded for each regiment and overall losses of the army. For example, the battle near Alexandria, Egypt in 1801 resulted in the second battalion of the 54th foot having one officer and three 'rank-and-file' killed and two officers and 39 'rank-and-file' wounded. In this engagement the army lost ten officers who were killed and 60 wounded, while the numbers for 'rank-and-file' were 224 killed and 1082 wounded. The casualty lists also provided the names of officers killed and wounded. The two officers in the second battalion of the 54th foot who were wounded, for instance, were Lieutenants Conror and Predam.[23] Thus, these lists are a good way of establishing whether particular officers were wounded in action.   However, before these lists appeared biographical sources have to be relied on to establish whether the future generals were wounded. Consequently, the extent to which early period future generals were wounded may be underestimated as not all generals had biographical profiles and injuries were not necessarily recorded in them.

The labour intensive nature of researching officers' careers, and the consequent high quality of data that can be obtained from such research, meant a slightly different approach was adopted for researching careers compared to some

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[23] *The London Gazette, 15364,* (15 May 1801), pp. 3-4.

other chapters. Random samples of 50 officers were taken from the population of

1747 and 1800 operational generals. The selection process involved taking all

generals listed in the population and picking 50 generals at random for each sample.

A sample size of 50 officers was selected as this provides a sample large enough to

make reliable observations about the characteristics of generals. This sample size is

also in line with the samples taken for previous research on generals. Razzell's

samples of general officers for 1830, 1912, 1930 and 1952 all had sample sizes of

50 officers.[24] Otley's research on nineteenth-century general officers respectively

had sample sizes of 80 (1870), 63 (1897), 58 (1913), 48 (1926), 45 (1939), 36

(1959).[25] The highest sample size, then, is only 80 officers and indeed only three

samples exceed the sample sizes used for this chapter.

In previous chapters social status has usually been analysed in terms of the

difference between aristocrats and non-aristocrats based on the social status of the

future generals' fathers. In this chapter social status is analysed slightly differently.

Social status is considered more broadly as a division between aristocrats and

'others'. Historians emphasise aristocrats had a significant advantage in army

careers.[26] Hence, it is important to make a distinction between the careers of

aristocrats, defined by their fathers' social background, and other individuals. The

random sampling process produced a significant number of individuals who could

not be classified as non-aristocrats based on their fathers' social status. Their

fathers' social background was either unknown or in one case they were the

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[24] Razzell, "Social Origins of Officers", Table 8, p. 253.
[25] Otley, "The Origins and Recruitment", Table 1, p. xii.
[26] Odintz, "The British Officer Corps", pp. 334, 347; Hayes, "The Social and Professional Background", pp. 53-54.

illegitimate son of an aristocrat. It was decided to include these individuals with the sons of non-aristocrats in a group called 'others'. The reason for this was that in some cases there was some information available on their family background that indicated they were probably non-aristocrats and in other cases where no family information was available their career patterns were very similar to non-aristocrats.

The 'others' group for 1747 operational generals includes twelve whose fathers social status was unknown. Family information contained on eight of these individuals indicated they probably were non-aristocrats, while the remainder of 'unknowns' all served at the rank of major. In the early period this was one clear sign that they were probably also non-aristocrats. In the later period there were five 'unknowns' and one illegitimate son of an aristocrat. Two of the 'unknowns' seemed to be non-aristocrats based on their general family background and the other three all seem to have had careers that were similar to non-aristocrats. Out of the three 'unknowns', whose family background could not be traced, two of them entered non-purchase regiments and the other 'unknown' served at all the different army ranks, even including captain lieutenant, and only gained his regimental colonelcy after becoming a general. The illegitimate aristocrat's career also seemed similar to non-aristocrats. He gained his captaincy and colonelcy in the army slower than the average aristocrat. In addition, his first regimental colonelcy was obtained through recruiting for rank, whereas most aristocrats gained this rank through appointment by the King.

II. Entering the army

The starting point in considering the careers of the future generals is their profile upon entering the army. This is important as entry into the army could have been affected by social status, money and war.   There are five basic entry characteristics that are considered: (1) date of entry, (2) age at entry, (3) rank at entry, (4) the role of money in entry, (5) entry by regiment type. Analysis of these five different entry characteristics enables an assessment of the extent to which social status, money and war affected the future generals' entry into the army.

The different dates the future generals entered the army are shown by figure 2. War certainly seemed to affect the years in which the future generals chose to enter the army. Most of the future generals in both periods entered the army during wartime. Figure 2 shows that the entry years with the most number of future generals entering the army occurred during war. This is not surprising as there were simply many more officer places available in war. There was a slight variation in entry patterns between time periods; 68% of 1747 future generals entered during war compared to 58% for the later period. One explanation for these differences is that pursuing an army career became a more attractive option outside of wartime in the later period as the peacetime establishment grew larger, the army's image improved and opportunities of serving in imperial locations increased.   There were also other factors that could account for these differences. Speed of promotion, a

factor to be discussed in more detail later, and the different distribution between war and peace years may have also played a role in differences between time periods.

Figure 2: Date of entry

Note: N=100. 1747 future operational generals entered the army between 1678 and 1738, while the range of entry dates for 1800 generals was from 1741 to 1782. The 1747 generals who entered the army on more than one occasion after leaving the service previously are only counted by their first entry.

Source: Appendix 4.2, Data Sources: Careers

There were also differences between the two periods in the age at which most future generals entered the army. The average age of entry for the future operational generals was 19.6 years for 1747 generals and 16.5 years for 1800 generals, a difference of three years. Moreover, as figure 3 shows the range of ages that future generals entered the army was far more concentrated for the later period compared to the early eighteenth-century.

Figure 3: Age at entry

Note: 1747 generals N= 44, 1800 generals N= 46. The date of birth of six 1747 and four 1800 generals is unknown. Age at entry from first entry only.

Source: Appendix 4.2, Data Sources: Careers; Appendix 4.1, Data Sources: Social Backgrounds

Entry into the early eighteenth-century army seemed more individualised than the later period as some future generals entered the army either very early or late in life. A number of early eighteenth-century future generals only entered the army in their thirties, while at the other extreme 14% of 1747 future generals entered the army between the ages of six and eleven. Other studies of officers have shown particularly early entry in this period was not uncommon as children were sometimes given commissions before they could serve.[27] This may have been related to lack of regulation in the early period. Age of entry did not seem to be regulated until 1711 when Regulations for the Better Government of the Forces introduced a regulation

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[27] Williams, "A study", p. 102; Robson, "Purchase and Promotion", p. 59.

that commissions should not be given to anyone under the age of sixteen.[28] Most

1747 future generals were not subject to this regulation as they had already entered

the army by this time. However, the entry ages of the late period future generals'

careers were affected by this regulation, which may account for the greater

uniformity in entry ages over time.

Did social status play any role in the ages future generals entered the army?

Social status did not seem to affect the age at which future generals entered the

army. For those entering the army after thirty or before twelve there was an almost

equal distribution between 1747 aristocrats and 'others'. Nor did modernisation

change the effect of social status on entry age. Late eighteenth-century aristocrats

who would become generals entered the army on average at an age of 16.8 years

compared to 17.0 years for 'others'. The results of my research are similar to

Odintz's findings in respect of mid-eighteenth century infantry officers. Nearly 85%

of future 1800 general officers had entered the army by the age of nineteen

compared to 74% of mid eighteenth-century infantry officers. The range of ages was

also fairly similar; the earliest entry for a mid-eighteenth-century infantry officer was

twelve years old and the latest in their late twenties.[29]

There were differences in the entry ranks of the future operational generals

between the two periods. The early period future generals entered the army at a far

wider range of ranks than their later counterparts.

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[28] R.E Scouller, "Purchase of Commissions and Promotions", *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research*, 62 (252), (1984), p. 220.
[29] Odintz, "The British Officer Corps", Chart VI, p. 258.

Figure 4: Army rank at entry

Note: 1747 generals N= 50, 1800 generals N= 50. Cadet was the entry rank for future officers in the artillery while they completed their training. Figure 4 excludes the subsequent entry ranks of 1747 future generals who entered the army on more than one occasion.

Source: Appendix 4.2, Data Sources: Careers

The most common entry rank for 1747 future generals was ensign, but there was also the opportunity to enter at much higher ranks. One third of early period future generals entered at the army rank of at least captain. In contrast, entry rank was much more uniform by the later period. The highest entry rank for 1800 future generals was ensign and 90% entered at this rank. In a similar fashion to age, the entry rank of later period generals was almost identical to officers. Accordingly, Odintz found 87% of mid-eighteenth-century foot officers also entered at ensign.[30]

Social status appeared to play a role in entering the army at the higher ranks in the early period. Eleven out of fifteen future generals, who entered at the ranks

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[30] Odintz, "The British Officer Corps", Chart XI, p. 316.

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captain or higher, were the sons of aristocrats. The extreme example of this was Charles Spencer, third Duke of Marlborough, who began a military career at the age of 32 by entering the army as regimental colonel of the 38th foot. Marlborough entered the army at such an elevated position as a reward for abandoning opposition to the government in parliament.[31] The particularly high entry rank of Marlborough, however, was probably unrepresentative of other officers. Some other officers did enter at the army ranks of major or lieutenant colonel, but this was because these were guards' officers who had higher army ranks due to brevets. Hence, if Marlborough is excluded as an outlier the highest regimental entry rank was captain. This was definitely an advantage, but the extent of this should not be overestimated. It may not have affected mobility much because rate of progression is not dependent on point of entry.

Did money affect entry into the army? It is almost impossible to assess the role money played in entering the army for 1747 future generals. The only evidence on this is that four of the future generals entered the army as volunteers and as such would not have paid the costs of their first commission. The evidence on the impact of money on entry is rather better for the later period. It has been possible to locate the way 29 future 1800 generals entered the army. Five entered through joining non-purchase regiments in the artillery, engineers and marines, while two served as volunteers before gaining commissions. Another eleven officers did not buy their commissions. Thus, only eleven officers or 38% of future generals bought ensign commissions directly in order to enter the army. Interestingly, the role money played

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[31] ODNB, s.v., Spencer, Charles (1706-1758).

in entering the army for mid-eighteenth-century infantry officers was almost identical. Odintz found that out of 336 first infantry commissions he managed to trace only 38% of commissions were purchased and 1% recruited for.[32] This is perhaps not surprising as most officers entered the army during war when it was relatively easy to obtained commissions without purchasing.[33] Accordingly, most of the ten commissions purchased by the future generals occurred during peacetime. In the middle of a major war it could often prove quite difficult to find purchasers for junior commissions as the correspondence of George Harris, one of the leading 1800 operational generals, shows.   In 1809 he advised to his son who was serving as an officer in his regiment:

"...You have not mentioned the young man whose friend's *[sic]* want to purchase for in the 73 so I suppose you have not enquired about him. In the present situation of the army purchasers are not easily found and in your distress for <u>officers</u> it might be worth your while to look after the offer..."[34]

Hence, money seemed to only play a relatively minor role in entering the army due to the ease with which most officers could obtain entry through non-purchase.

The final entry characteristic to be considered is the types of different regiments the future generals entered. This is important because social status may have influenced the type of regiment joined. In the literature on the army it is often emphasised that there were social distinctions between some regiments. The main distinction drawn is between the guards and other regiments. Glover has argued officers serving in the guards were usually well-connected aristocrats.[35]   Moreover,

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[32] Odintz, "The British Officer Corps", Chart VIII, p. 299.
[33] *Ibid.*
[34] CKS, U624 Harris, Correspondence, C233 Letter Book, 1788-1810, George Harris to William Harris, 21 August 1809.
[35] Glover, *Wellington's army,* p. 86.

the high proportion of aristocrats serving in the guards may have expanded over time.[36] Indeed, Razzell has argued this trend was a consequence of aristocrats trying to maintain their social exclusivity at a time when they were losing monopoly of high rank.[37] In contrast to the guards, the non-purchase regiments of the army may have had a lower social status as few aristocrats served in these regiments. According to Razell, British officers serving in 1810, who possessed inherited aristocratic titles, only accounted for between 0.5% and 1.5% of all artillery, engineering and marine officers.[38] Similarly, a study of mid-eighteenth-century engineering officers showed that only 2.7% of these engineers were aristocrats.[39]

Another factor possibly influencing entry regiment was geography. Historians of the navy have shown the geographical origins of navy officers played a role in their recruitment. During the late eighteenth-century two thirds of navy officers were recruited from England and these were drawn from a narrow range of counties.[40] Middlesex, Devon, Hampshire and Kent dominated navy recruitment.[41] This seemed to be related to these counties having prominent ports in their vicinity. There was Plymouth at Devon and Portsmouth at Hampshire, for example. Indeed, half the officers recruited from Devon and Hampshire where born within close

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[36] Hayes, "The Social and Professional Background", pp. 103-107; Razzell, "Social Origins of Officers", Table 10, p. 255.
[37] Razzell, "Social Origins of Officers", p. 255.
[38] *Ibid.*, Table 10, p. 255.
[39] Marshall, "The British Military Engineers", pp. 137-142, 152-153.
[40] N.A.M Rodger, "Devon Men and the Navy, 1689-1815", in M. Duffy, S. Fisher, B. Greenhill, D. J Starkey, J. Youings (eds), *The New Maritime History of Devon, Volume 1: From Early Times to the Late Eighteenth Century*, (Exeter, 1992), Tables 30.1, 30.2, pp. 210-211.
[41] Rodger, "Devon Men and the Navy", Tables 30.1, 30.2, pp. 210-211; Cavell, "A Social History", Appendix I.

proximity of the local dockyards at Plymouth and Portsmouth.[42]   This may suggest that place of birth had an impact on military recruitment.

In the army recruitment for different regiments was usually concentrated in certain geographical areas. The late eighteenth-century saw infantry regiments become known by county names related to where they were most commonly recruited. In 1782 the 33rd foot was also known as the first Yorkshire West Riding regiment because according to its regimental colonel "...the 33rd Regt. of Infantry has always recruited in the West Riding of Yorkshire, and has a very good interest & the general goodwill of the people, in that part of the country…."[43] Local connections often influenced the regiments soldiers or officers joined. This is shown by the original muster of the 73rd foot, a new regiment formed by Lord MacLeod of the Mackenzies in 1778. Only 3% of the 73rd foot's soldiers were not Scottish and three quarters of the Scots were Highlanders like their regimental colonel. Moreover, most of its officers were members of Lord MacLeod's clan.[44]

Did social status and regimental hometown, defined as entry regiment being based in the same county as place of birth, have an impact on the regiments the future generals joined? There is strong evidence to suggest that social status did impact the regiments the future generals entered the army with. In both periods the dominant type of entry regiment for aristocrats was the guards.

[42] Rodger, "Devon Men and the Navy", pp. 210-211.
[43] Quote taken from http://www.33rdfoot.co.uk/history.htm.
[44] A.H Haley, *Our Davy: General Sir David Baird, 1757-1829*, (Liverpool, 2002), pp. 12-15.

Table 12: Type of entry regiment

Entry regiment	1747			1800		
	Aristocrat	'Others'	N	Aristocrat	'Others'	N
Foot guards	*30*	*13*	9	*47*	*10*	12
Horse guards	*25*	*0*	5	*0*	*0*	0
Infantry	*35*	*70*	23	*37*	*45*	23
Cavalry	*10*	*9*	4	*16*	*26*	10
Artillery	*0*	*4*	1	*0*	*13*	3
Engineers	*0*	*0*	0	*0*	*3*	1
Marines	*0*	*4*	1	*0*	*3*	1
Unknown	-	-	7	-	-	0
N	22	28	50	19	31	50
Hometown	*31*	*0*	5	*11*	*29*	5
Rest	*69*	*100*	19	*89*	*71*	18
Unknown	-	-	26	-	-	27
N	22	28	50	19	31	50

Note: All rows (except N rows) expressed as percentage of known N. Hometown defined as entry regiment being based in the same county as place of birth. Rest is a residual category for those that entered regiments not based in their regimental hometown. First entry only.

Source: Appendix 4.2, Data Sources: Careers; Appendix 4.1, Data Sources: Social Backgrounds

Over half of early period aristocrats entered either the foot or horse guards, while nearly half of later period aristocrats began their careers with the foot guards. In contrast, the 'others' usually entered the army by joining a regiment of infantry. Another notable difference between aristocrats and the 'others' was the tendency to join non-purchase regiments. No aristocrats in any period joined a non-purchase regiment, whereas a minority of the 'others' joined the artillery, engineers or marines. It is very difficult to make any comments on the extent to which any change over time occurred due to the small number of observations per regiment type. Geography did not seem to have any impact on the regiments the future generals joined. The future generals usually joined regiments that were located in different places to where they had been born. There were occasional exceptions to this. George Don, who was born in Edinburgh, joined and remained with the 51st foot for much of his career, a new Scottish regiment. This may have been related to the 51st foot being raised

close to his birthplace. Nevertheless, it was far more common for the future generals to join regiments that had no geographical relationship to their birthplace.

War, money and social status affected the entry characteristics of the future generals to varying degrees. War and money seemed to have an inverse relationship with entry. During times of conflict it was relatively easy to enter the army through non-purchase as war facilitated entry by dramatically increasing the number of officer places available. Accordingly, most of the future generals entered the army during war, which meant money only played a minor role in entry. Money was mainly important during peacetime when dramatic reductions in the size of the army meant far greater competition for officer places. Social status also did not seem to overly affect the entry characteristics of the future generals. Age of entry was similar regardless of social status and aristocrats only had a slight advantage in entry rank for the early period. The only entry characteristic social status seemed to have an important effect on was the type of regiment joined. Aristocrats usually entered the guards, whereas the 'others' entered the army through joining infantry regiments. Modernisation affected the entry characteristics by reducing individual variations in entry patterns between the two periods. This was most evident in the greater uniformity in entry ages and ranks. In the early period the future generals entered the army at a much wider variety of ages than the later period. In a similar fashion, there was a considerable narrowing in the range of entry ranks by the late period. In the early eighteenth-century it was possible to enter the army at regimental captain, whereas by the late eighteenth-century almost all future generals entered at ensign.

III. Career paths

Social status and money may not have affected entering the army too much, but it could be a different story for advancing with the army. The reason for this is simply supply and demand. There were fewer officer places available at the higher ranks and great competition to gain them. Thus, social status and money may have played a significant role in getting promoted to the higher ranks of the army. The role of social status in promotion is considered first and then the effect of money on promotion is examined. In respect of social status the key question seems to be was there a significant difference in the career paths and average promotion times of aristocrats compared to the 'others'?

Examining the career paths of individuals is often a difficult thing to do because of the multiplicity of roles followed in careers. A clear sense of career moves, however, can often be seen through a career transition matrix. Overall career transition matrixes for the army ranks of 1747 and 1800 operational generals by social group are shown in tables 13 and 14. Each row in these transition matrixes shows all exits from every rank and where they go next. Old rank" is the current rank held and "new rank" is where the future generals moved to when they were promoted, left the army or moved to a lower rank. Let us take the example of 1747 lieutenants in the army. According to table 13, 4% of "others" entered the army at this rank and 27% of "others" held this army rank at some point in their career. Where did the "others" who held the rank of army lieutenant move to next? The

table shows, according to the "new rank" of lieutenants, that 14% of the lieutenants became captain lieutenants and 86% were promoted to captain. Thus, these career transition matrixes show the extent to which the future operational generals skipped ranks or move in odd ways.

The overall transition matrix for the army ranks of 1747 generals shows that career paths in the early period were highly individualised. In consequence, there were often great differences between aristocrats and the 'others' as social status played a key role in career path. Aristocrats skipped ranks far more often than the 'others' and consequently spent less time serving in the junior officer ranks. Not even half of the aristocrats served at the rank of ensign and none served as lieutenant or captain lieutenant. If aristocrats served at ensign their next promotion was usually captain and some even became lieutenant colonels. There were also few aristocrats who served at the rank of major. The tendency to skip ranks was not isolated to aristocrats; it was a general feature of the early period. Only a minority of 'others', for example, served at lieutenant or captain lieutenant. Nevertheless, far more aristocrats skipped the junior officer ranks or the rank of major compared to the 'others'. Most future generals, who can be classified as 'others', became army majors compared to only 19% of aristocrats.

Table 13: Overall transition matrix for army ranks of 1747 generals

Aristocrats
% moving to new rank:

Old Rank	Vol	Ens	Lt	C.Lt	Cpt	Maj	Lt.C.	Col.	BG	MG	LG	G	FM	N
Entry	10	38	-	-	29	14	5	5	-	-	-	-	-	21
Vol	-	-	-	-	-	-	50	50	-	-	-	-	-	2
Ens	-	-	-	-	88	-	12	-	-	-	-	-	-	8
Lt	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0
C.Lt	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0
Cpt	-	-	-	-	-	8	77	15	-	-	-	-	-	13
Maj	-	-	-	-	-	-	100	-	-	-	-	-	-	4
Lt.C.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	100	-	-	-	-	-	17
Col	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	95	5	-	-	-	21
BG	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	100	-	-	-	20
MG	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	10	90	-	-	21
LG	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	26	74	-	19
G	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	71	29	14
FM	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	100	4
% holding rank	10	38	0	0	62	19	81	100	95	100	90	67	19	

'Others'
% moving to new rank:

Old Rank	Vol	Ens	Lt	C.Lt	Cpt	Maj	Lt.C.	Col.	BG	MG	LG	G	FM	N
Entry	8	73	4	-	8	-	8	-	-	-	-	-	-	26
Vol	-	-	50	-	50	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2
Ens	-	-	26	16	47	5	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	19
Lt	-	-	-	14	86	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	7
C.Lt	-	-	-	-	100	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4
Cpt	-	-	-	-	-	68	27	5	-	-	-	-	-	22
Maj	-	-	-	-	-	-	100	-	-	-	-	-	-	16
Lt.C.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	100	-	-	-	-	-	25
Col	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	100	-	-	-	-	26
BG	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	100	-	-	-	26
MG	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	12	88	-	-	26
LG	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	78	22	-	23
G	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	60	40	5
FM	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	100	2
% holding rank	8	73	27	15	85	62	96	100	100	100	88	19	8	

Note: All rows (except N column) expressed as percentage. The table shows all transitions between army ranks as a percentage of movements from the old rank held to the new rank. Exits are indicated by numbers in the cells where the old rank and new rank are the same. Temple, Gooch and Oglethorpe are excluded from this analysis as they entered the army on more than one occasion.

Source: Appendix 4.2, Data Sources: Careers

Skipping ranks became rarer once the future generals had achieved the rank of lieutenant colonel, yet this still did happen occasionally. There was also another advantage aristocrats seemed to have. They left the army at much higher ranks on average than the 'others'. Aristocrats usually exited the army at the rank of general compared to lieutenant general for the 'others' and many more also made it to field marshal. Only 8% of 'others' who were to become generals made it to the rank of field marshal compared to 19% of aristocrats.

The ability of many future generals to frequently skip ranks was the result of a time when promotion was highly individualised and even somewhat irregular on occasion. This individualised nature of promotion meant those with social influence or army interest could advance especially rapidly. For example, Thomas Fowke, one of the 'others' who came from an army family, was able to skip the junior officer ranks and advance directly from ensign to captain through his father, who served as a captain in the same regiment, swapping positions with him. The elder Fowke became an ensign, while Thomas advanced to captain.[45] Fathers using their influence to advance their sons in slightly irregular ways was not uncommon in this period. Another example of this was the number of sons who replaced their fathers as regimental colonels. Handasyd and O'Hara, two other 1747 future generals, were promoted swiftly to regimental colonels by their fathers resigning in their favour.

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[45] Dalton, *George The First's Army, Volume 2*, pp. 215-217.

The irregular nature of army promotion in this period is also demonstrated by the careers of future generals who entered the army on more than one occasion. The most extreme example of this was Richard Temple, the future Viscount Cobham, who entered the army on three different occasions. Temple first entered the army as an ensign at the age of nine in 1685, but within a year of joining up was dismissed for disobeying a superior officer. A year later he was then re-commissioned, again as an ensign, in the same regiment. Then in 1733 Temple lost his army rank of lieutenant general and his regimental colonelcy for not supporting the government in parliament. He was reinstated in 1742 at the army rank of field marshal and also regained a regimental colonelcy.[46] William Gooch and James Oglethorpe both entered the army on two different occasions. They re-entered the army after previously resigning their commissions. Gooch was the son of an alderman who entered the army as an ensign in 1700 and made his way up to major by 1715. However, his *Dictionary of National Biography* profile states he resigned his commission shortly after becoming a major because he was frustrated at the speed of promotion during peace. After this time he became lieutenant governor of Virginia in 1727.[47] Gooch then appears to re-enter the army at the army rank of colonel in 1740.[48] Guy also mentions an officer serving in Colonel William Gooch's American regiment in 1741.[49] Gooch's re-entry to the army appears to be related to his role in the expedition to Cartagena in 1741 as he commanded the colonial troops in the expedition, possibly as a local brigadier general.[50] Oglethorpe resigned his lieutenancy in the guards in 1715. Subsequently he was involved in founding the colony of Georgia. To this end, he recruited a regiment to aid in the defence of the

[46] ODNB, s.v., Temple, Richard (1675-1749).
[47] ODNB, s.v., Gooch, William (1681-1751).
[48] *The Succession of Colonels 1747.*
[49] Guy, *Oeconomy and Discipline*, Chapter 4.
[50] ODNB, s.v., Gooch, William (1681-1751).

colony, the 42nd foot. In return for recruiting this regiment he was granted firstly a captaincy in June 1737 and later a regimental colonelcy in August of the same year. It is noteworthy that there were no examples of 're-entry' with the 1800 cohort which suggests that this irregularity also disappeared were over time.

Table 14 shows the nature of career paths were quite different for late eighteenth-century future generals compared to their earlier period counterparts. The later period future generals appeared to follow a more regular and structured career path.   Both social groups served more often at the different ranks, especially for the ranks that were often skipped in the early period. In the early eighteenth-century only seven future generals served at the rank of lieutenant compared to 39 officers by the late period.   Aristocrats in the later period had some of the same advantages as their earlier counterparts. They skipped ranks more often and usually exited the army at a higher army rank than the 'others'.

This advantage in career paths for aristocrats, and the extent to which it changed over time, can be assessed by comparing the relative difference between the percentage of aristocrats and 'others' that served at the different ranks. For example, in the early period none of the aristocrats and 27% of 'others' served at the army rank of lieutenant giving a relative difference of 27% between aristocrats and 'others'.

Table 14: Overall transition matrix for army ranks of 1800 generals

Aristocrats
% moving to new rank:

Old Rank	Ens	Lt	C. Lt	Cpt	Maj	Lt.C	Col	MG	LG	G	FM	N
Entry	100	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	19
Ens	-	58	-	42	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	19
Lt	-	-	10	90	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	10
C.Lt	-	-	-	100	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
Cpt	-	-	-	-	53	47	-	-	-	-	-	19
Maj	-	-	-	-	-	100	-	-	-	-	-	10
Lt.C	-	-	-	-	-	-	100	-	-	-	-	19
Col	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	100	-	-	-	19
MG	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	100	-	-	19
LG	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5	95	-	19
G	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	89	11	18
FM	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	100	2
% holding rank	100	53	5	100	53	100	100	100	100	95	11	

'Others'
% moving to new rank:

Old Rank	Vol	Cadt	Ens	Lt	C.Lt	Cpt	Maj	Lt.C	Col	MG	LG	G	FM	N
Entry	6	13	81	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	31
Vol	-	-	100	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2
Cadt	-	-	100	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4
Ens	-	-	-	84	3	13	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	31
Lt	-	-	-	-	19	81	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	26
C.Lt	-	-	-	-	-	100	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6
Cpt	-	-	-	-	-	-	84	16	-	-	-	-	-	31
Maj	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	100	-	-	-	-	-	26
Lt.C.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	100	-	-	-	-	31
Col	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	100	-	-	-	31
MG	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	97	-	31
LG	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	16	84	-	30
G	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	94	6	26
FM	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	100	2
% holding rank	6	13	100	84	19	100	84	100	100	100	97	84	6	

Note: All rows (except N column) expressed as percentage. The table shows all transitions between army ranks as a percentage of movements from the old rank held to the new rank. Exits are indicated by numbers in the cells where the old rank and new rank are the same.

Source: Appendix 4.2, Data Sources: Careers

This can then be compared to the later period relative difference to see if the effect of social status on career paths changed over time. In the case of lieutenant the relative difference for the 1800 generals was 31% indicating the effect of social status on promotion through the junior ranks remained similar regardless of time period, a finding supported by the fact that the relative difference in captain lieutenant between the periods was almost identical. The relative difference for some of the higher ranks, however, appeared to be narrowing over time. The aristocratic advantage in skipping major compared to 'others' declined 9% between the two periods, while the percentage of 'others' relative to aristocrats making it to the highest army rank of field marshal increased 6%. This indicates the role social status had in careers may have diminished between the early and late eighteenth-century.

The career paths of the future generals, however, cannot be understood fully in terms of army rank only. It is important to consider their regimental ranks as well, especially given so many officers benefited from a higher army rank than their regimental rank due to brevets. Viewing the career paths of the 1747 future generals in terms of regimental rank instead of army rank does not change the main findings. Career paths still seemed highly individualised with most future generals skipping at least some ranks. Aristocrats still had significant advantages over the 'others' in their ability to skip ranks. On the other hand, it does narrow the extent of this advantage in some respects. More aristocrats served at the most junior regimental ranks, but they still skipped these ranks far more often than the 'others'. An analysis of regimental rank also shows most future generals served at the rank of captain

regardless of social background. The next regimental promotion after captain was quite different and seemed to depend greatly on social background. Aristocrats typically advanced to regimental colonel, whereas the 'others' had to serve at regimental major and lieutenant colonel before becoming colonels of a regiment.

Table 15: Overall transition matrix for regimental ranks of 1747 generals

Aristocrats

% moving to new rank:

Old Rank	Vol	Ens	Lt	C.Lt	Cpt	Maj	Lt.C.	Col.	N
Entry	10	48	14	-	24	-	-	5	21
Vol	-	-	-	-	50	-	-	50	2
Ens	-	-	10	-	90	-	-	-	10
Lt	-	-	-	-	100	-	-	-	4
C.Lt	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0
Cpt	-	-	-	-	-	21	16	63	19
Maj	-	-	-	-	-	-	50	50	4
Lt.C.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	100	5
Col	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	100	21
% holding rank	10	48	19	0	90	19	24	100	

'Others'

% moving to new rank:

Old Rank	Vol	Ens	Lt	C.Lt	Cpt	Maj	Lt.C.	Col.	N
Entry	8	73	4	-	15	-	-	-	26
Vol	-	-	50	-	50	-	-	-	2
Ens	-	-	26	16	58	-	-	-	19
Lt	-	-	-	14	86	-	-	-	7
C.Lt	-	-	-	-	100	-	-	-	4
Cpt	-	-	-	-	-	73	19	8	26
Maj	-	-	5	-	11	-	79	5	19
Lt.C.	-	-	-	-	5	-	-	95	22
Col	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	100	26
% holding rank	8	73	27	15	100	73	85	100	

Note: All rows (except N column) expressed as percentage. The table shows all transitions between army ranks as a percentage of movements from the old rank held to the new rank. Exits are indicated by numbers in the cells where the old rank and new rank are the same. A reduction in regimental rank, which occurred in the case of four different 'others' future generals, is seen by new rank being lower than old rank. Temple, Gooch and Oglethorpe are excluded from this analysis as they entered the army on more than one occasion.

Source: Appendix 4.2, Data Sources: Careers

Four of the 'others' who made it to regimental major or lieutenant colonel also suffered a reduction in regimental rank before continuing their advancement in regimental rank. This appeared to happen for two reasons. First, the end of the war in 1713 seemed to result in two of the future generals losing their regimental places with foot regiments. Both Wynyard and Bragg held positions as regimental major and lieutenant colonel respectively in 1710, but then turned up as captains of different foot regiments in 1715, a period of peace. Presumably they lost their places due to reductions in the size of the army during peace and could only regain a regimental captaincy of another foot regiment. Second, two regimental majors serving in foot regiments appeared to be willing to accept a lower regimental rank in return for a transfer to the foot guards. Blakeney went from major in the eighteenth foot to lieutenant in the first foot guards. Wolfe transferred from major in an infantry regiment to captain in the third foot guards, which gave him a promotion in the army to lieutenant colonel.

In a similar fashion to the 1747 future generals, analysing career paths in terms of regimental rank for the later period does not change the overall picture much. It merely increases the numbers of aristocrats serving at the ranks of lieutenant, captain lieutenant and major. However, a few notable points emerge. Perhaps most importantly, there was little difference between the future generals of both social classes who held the regimental rank of lieutenant colonel compared to their army rank. The 1747 future generals who were aristocrats tended to use their higher army rank of lieutenant colonel to advance from regimental captain to colonel and only 24% of these officers served at regimental lieutenant colonel. In contrast,

95% of 1800 aristocrats who were to become generals served at the regimental rank of lieutenant colonel before gaining a regimental colonelcy giving them greater military experience of high command.

Table 16: Overall transition matrix for regimental ranks of 1800 generals

Aristocrats
% moving to new rank:

Old Rank	Ens	Lt	C.Lt	Cpt	Maj	Lt.C.	C.Com.	Col.	N
Entry	100	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	19
Ens	-	63	-	37	-	-	-	-	19
Lt	-	-	25	75	-	-	-	-	12
C.Lt	-	-	-	100	-	-	-	-	3
Cpt	-	-	-	-	68	27	5	-	19
Maj	-	-	-	3	-	82	8	7	13
Lt.C.	-	-	-	10	-	-	5	85	18
C.Com.	-	-	-	-	-	-	33	67	3
Col.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	100	18
% holding rank	100	63	16	100	68	95	16	95	

'Others'
% moving to new rank:

Old Rank	Cadt	Vol	Ens	Lt	C.Lt	Cpt	Maj	Lt.C.	C.Com.	Col.	N
Entry	6	13	81	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	31
Vol	-	-	100	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2
Cadt	-	-	100	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4
Ens	-	-	-	91	3	6	-	-	-	-	31
Lt	-	-	-	-	25	72	3	-	-	-	28
C.Lt	-	-	-	-	-	100	-	-	-	-	8
Cpt	-	-	-	3	-	-	77	7	3	10	30
Maj	-	-	-	-	4	-	-	96	-	-	25
Lt.C.	-	-	-	-	-	3	-	7	10	80	28
C.Com.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	33	67	9
Col.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	100	25
% holding rank	6	13	100	90	26	97	81	90	29	81	

Note: All rows (except entry column) expressed as percentage. The table shows all transitions between army ranks as a percentage of movements from the old rank held to the new rank. Exits are indicated by numbers in the cells where the old rank and new rank are the same. A reduction in regimental rank is seen by new rank being lower than old rank.

Source: Appendix 4.2, Data Sources: Careers

On the other hand, it appeared harder for the 'others' to become regimental colonels as only 81% of the 'others' attained these positions compared to all of their 1747 counterparts. Part of this difference can be explained by the additional regimental rank of colonel commandant, which like a regimental colonelcy was a sinecure position, and became the final regimental rank of a minority of later period generals. There was a similar tendency for some officers to trade down their regimental rank in return for a commission in the guards, although this phenomenon was more evenly distributed between aristocrats and the 'others' in the later period. Again, this appeared to be closely related to peace as three out of four of these transfers to the guards occurred during peace and the other one was due to Cathcart suffering poor health on active duty in America and having to return home.

A comparison of the relative difference between the different social groups for regimental ranks tends to indicate the advantages aristocrats had in skipping ranks was in a similar fashion to army rank narrowing between the time periods. Five out of seven regimental ranks saw the aristocratic advantage in skipping ranks decline over time. Admittedly, it was slightly harder for the 'others' to secure the sinecure position of regimental colonel. However, the largest relative changes were in the positions of major and lieutenant colonel. Many more aristocrats relative to the 'others' were serving in these regimental command positions in the later period than the early eighteenth-century.

A comprehensive assessment of the effect social status had on the careers of the future generals should not only be limited to the career paths taken in advancing through the army. It is important to also consider the speed of career progression as having to ascend more steps on a career ladder might be offset if the time between steps is shorter than previously. Table 17 measures the speed of promotion by examining the length of time it took the future generals to obtain key ranks in the army and their regiment. Promotion in the later period was slower to most ranks. There were only two exceptions to this. First, the 'others' became generals much faster, while promotion to general for aristocrats was almost identical in the later period. This may be another indication that the importance social status in obtaining high command was narrowing between the periods. Second, promotion to regimental major was also faster for aristocrats in the later period, which may have been related to so many more aristocrats serving at this rank than previously. A decrease in promotion time may have compensated for not being able to skip the rank of major as frequently as before.   One of the strangest results was that it took less time for 1747 aristocrats to reach army major than captain or lieutenant colonel. This was simply a function of outliers affecting averages for what was a small sample to begin with. There were only four 1747 aristocrats who were majors and three of these entered at the rank of major due to the higher army rank in the horse guards.

Table 17: Speed of promotion

	1747			1800		
Army	Aristocrat	'Others'	N	Aristocrat	'Others'	N
B.Gen./M.Gen.	25.0	35.1	50	24.5	29.6	50
Colonel	13.9	23.5	50	18.5	24.9	50
Lt. Colonel	6.6	13.7	42	10.7	16.9	50
Major	1.5	12.5	21	9.1	13.7	36
Captain	2.4	5.5	38	4.3	6.6	50
N	22	28	50	19	31	50

	1747			1800		
Regiment	Aristocrat	'Others'	N	Aristocrat	'Others'	N
Colonel	17.2	28.2	49	24.0	31.2	43
Lt. Colonel	7.4	18.4	27	14.5	20.9	46
Major	17.8	13.5	24	14.5	15.6	38
Captain	3.6	5.4	48	6.1	8.0	49
N	22	28	50	19	31	50

Note: All rows (except N row) expressed as average length of time in years from entry. The table shows speed of promotion expressed as average length of time in years from entry to the ranks specified. Speed of promotion to general rank was measured by the time it took the future generals to obtain the first substantive general rank. For 1747 future generals this was brigadier general and major general for the later period.

Source: Appendix 4.2, Data Sources: Careers

In both time periods aristocrats had a significant advantage over the 'others' in the length of time it took them to be promoted. For every army and regimental rank, with the exception of regimental major in 1747, aristocrats were promoted faster than the 'others'. Social status thus seemed a key factor in promotion prospects. However, the advantage social status provided in getting promoted was narrowing between the periods. The relative difference in promotion times between aristocrats and the 'others' for almost all ranks decreased from the early to late eighteenth-century. The largest reductions were for the army ranks of general and colonel, but this was a general process for most ranks. Even for regimental colonel it took the 'others' less time to gain these positions relative to aristocrats in the later period. For 1747 future generals it took aristocrats 17.2 years and the 'others' 28.2 years to

become regimental colonels, a relative difference of 11 years. By the later period it took the 'others' slightly longer to obtain this rank, yet the relative difference had narrowed to 7.2 years.

Social status may have played a significant role in getting promoted for aristocrats, but was this a similar story for the effect of money on promotion? Did money play an important part in becoming a general? This is more difficult to assess than social status due to the nature of the surviving evidence. There is little evidence available on the means by which early period officers gained their commissions so it is difficult to say much about the role money played in becoming a general for the early period or the extent to which change occurred over time.

The role money played in becoming a general for the 1800 future generals is shown by table 18. This demonstrates the extent to which various types of mid to late eighteenth-century officers bought commissions from lieutenant to lieutenant colonel by either purchasing them directly or recruiting for rank.

Table 18: Promotions bought

	Period	Lieutenant	Captain	Major	Lt. Colonel	N
Generals	1800	*27.3*	*42.4*	*37.0*	*19.3*	112
Infantry officers	1754-1783	*43.5*	*65.5*	*54.5*	*41.1*	574
Officers	1810-1813	*17.6*	*28.9*	*31.1*	*15.9*	1884

Note: All rows (except N row) expressed as promotions bought as a percentage of total promotions. Officers includes infantry, cavalry and life guards or what were previously known as horse guards. Recruiting for rank not included in officers.

Source:
Generals: Appendix 4.2, Data Sources: Careers
Infantry officers: Odintz, "The British Officer Corps", Chart XI, p. 316.
Officers: Glover, *Wellington's army,* Table A, p. 83.

The results seem similar regardless of the officer group or time period. A significant number of officers bought their commissions and thus money played an important role in advancing with the army. The importance of this did vary depending on many different factors. The type of commission being purchased played a key role in the extent to which commissions were bought. The most popular commissions to be purchased for the three groups of officers were captain followed by major. One third to one half of all officers purchased these commissions. On the other hand, lieutenant colonel was the promotion least likely to be purchased.

The large variation between the different groups of officers in the extent to which individual ranks were purchased was quite notable. The most popular rank to be purchased, captain, was bought by as few as 28.9% of Napoleonic war officers compared to as many as 65.5% mid-eighteenth-century infantry officers. This large variation seemed to be a function of two different factors. First, it illustrated the importance of war in reducing the role of purchase in promotion. The Napoleonic war officers purchased the lowest proportion of commissions, a point in time at the height of the largest scale conflict in the eighteenth-century. In contrast, the mid-eighteenth-century infantry officers and 1800 generals both purchased their commissions during periods of peace and war. These differences between the groups of officers were related to the supply and demand of commissions. Non-purchase commissions were widely available in war so it was not necessary to purchase to gain promotion unless an officer wanted to serve in a specific regiment. Thus, the proportions of commissions purchased were naturally lower for the Napoleonic war officers. A similar rate of purchase would be found for the other two

groups if only wartime purchases are considered. If peace purchases were excluded, 30% of 1800 future generals' captaincies were purchased, an almost identical proportion to the number of captaincies purchased by Napoleonic war officers. The importance of money in promotion was less than expected in part due to the key role war played in gaining promotion. Most promotions for the future generals occurred during wartime and few of these were purchased. For example, the majority of captaincies were gained during wartime; 73% of 1747 and 58% of 1800 future generals became captains during war. Even though a captaincy was the most common rank to be purchased two thirds of future generals who gained captaincies during war managed to obtain this commission without purchase.

Second, social status may have affected the extent to which officers purchased their commissions. The future generals purchased less often than mid-eighteenth-century infantry officers. This may have been related to the different levels of social status between these two groups.   An examination of the social backgrounds of future generals who purchased shows it was relatively rare for aristocrats to purchase commissions. Only one third of all the commissions purchased by the future generals were bought by aristocrats. Moreover, 70% of these aristocratic purchases occurred at the rank of captain. This suggests a paradoxical relationship between purchase and social status. Aristocrats rarely purchased as they had the social connections to obtain vacancies 'free'. Thus, purchase may have actually been a device that helped to increase mobility by giving those with money, but limited social connections the opportunity to advance.

War and the high social status of some future generals may have reduced the importance of money in promotion, but its significance should not be underestimated. Money facilitated advancement by ensuring promotion came more speedily to those who bought their commissions.   It took future generals only 7.2 years to gain a regimental captaincy through buying their commission compared to 8.3 years for those that did not buy this rank, a time saving of over one year. In a similar fashion, Glover found that purchasing a commission significantly reduced promotion times for almost all ranks.[51]   In addition, the ability to buy a commission was particularly important for some officers. There was a minority of future generals who mainly advanced through buying commissions. Henry Fox, for example, purchased his ensigncy, lieutenancy, captaincy and majority. Similarly, the only promotion between ensign and lieutenant colonel William Goodray Strutt did not purchase was his lieutenant commission.

Social status and to a lesser extent money provided clear advantages in advancing with the army. Irrespective of time period future generals who were aristocrats advanced much more quickly than the 'others'. They were able to skip more ranks on the way to becoming generals and advanced more speedily. However, the extent of this advantage seemed to be declining over time.   Money played a less important role in promotion as most promotions occurred during war when they were usually obtained without the need to purchase. Nevertheless, one third of all promotions were purchased and buying a commission was particularly important during peace time. Money also reduced the length of time promotions took

[51] Glover, *Wellington's army*, Table B, p. 84.

and played a key role in the careers of some future generals who bought most of the promotions.

The advantage aristocrats had in promotion may have had important implications for military performance. If privilege, that is to say, aristocratic status, led to over promotion then aristocratic senior officers should be more prone to experience defeat than their non-aristocratic counterparts. This can be examined by comparing the extent to which aristocratic commanders of major battles in the eighteenth-century experienced losses compared to their non-aristocratic peers. Appendix 2, table 2.8, provides individual information on the commanders and outcome of 52 of the major battles that occurred during the eighteenth-century ranging from Blenheim in 1704 to Waterloo in 1815.[52] This again illustrates the aristocratic advantage in the army as aristocrats were more likely to be the main commanders in these engagements. Aristocrats commanded in 29 battles compared to sixteen for non-aristocrats with the remainder being commanded by foreign allies of the British. However, there is no indication this adversely affected military performance. Perhaps surprisingly the aristocrats won proportionately more battles than the non-aristocrats. This was achieved in part by concentrating command in the hands of few aristocrats. Only eight aristocrats had overall command for the 29 different battles. Moreover, most of the aristocrats who held the highest command positions, such as the Duke of Marlborough, the Duke of Cumberland, William Howe and Arthur Wellesley, had good reputations as fighting

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[52] Information for this was taken from the following sources: J.W Fortesque, *A history of the British Army, volumes I-X,* (London, 1899-1930).

generals of ability.[53] This suggests that aristocrats were not usually given important operational commands unless they also possessed some skill at being generals. There were of course other factors involved in winning battles than merely the ability of the generals involved. For example, success in the 52 battles generally went to those who had larger armies. Nevertheless, generalship usually played an important part in victory. Another important factor limiting any negative aristocrat impact on military performance was that throughout the eighteenth-century operational failure by those generals in charge typically resulted in removal from subsequent commands regardless of their social status. Generals that were dismissed from the army or not appointed to subsequent commands due to operational failures included Lord Sackville, Thomas Fowke, Sir Hew Dalrymple and Richard Whitelock. This is not to say that over promotion of aristocrats did not lead to some performance problems for the army. Lack of talent as military commanders among some generals was probably an issue as the correspondence of Wellington alludes to.[54] However, this problem was minimised through the tendency of only appointing aristocrats who were also talented generals to the top command in major battles.

IV. Merit

If aristocratic commanders of major battles were generally meritorious officers does this mean merit played an important role in becoming a general? There is often some disagreement among historians about the role of merit in an army career. There are some historians who claim merit played little role in advancing with the army due to the importance of social influence. In this view, professionalism and

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[53] ODNB, s.v., Churchill, John (1650-1722), William Augustus, Prince (1721-1765), Howe, William (1729-1814), Wellesley, Arthur (1769-1852).

[54] Glover, *Wellington's army*, pp. 144-145.

experience counted for little as promotion was solely dependent on social connections or purchase.[55] Consequently, the average British officer was sometimes regarded as worse than their French counterparts.[56] Yet, this is not a universal view. Other historians stress that experience, professionalism and merit did matter in promotion.[57] Brewer argued most promotions in the army reflected military experience.[58] For Hayes ability and enthusiasm often played a critical role in advancing.[59]

Assessing the role of merit in army promotion is rather problematic for many reasons. Merit is difficult to define. There could be many different aspects of merit that were important for generals including courage on the battlefield, administrative skills and strategic ability. Moreover, a competent general at one level, of say a brigade, might be found wanting at a higher level of a division or an army. Considering only the role merit played in the careers of future generals is also problematic. These were the most successful officers in the army and as only the 'winners' in army promotion are considered it is difficult to draw too many conclusions about the role of merit in promotion for less successful officers. There are also some issues with the sample size and measurement of merit, which could affect the results. Even though two different measures of merit are used the sample size of meritorious officers compared to non-meritorious officers remains small. This

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[55] Dixon, *On the Psychology of Military Incompetence*, p. 172; Robson, "Purchase and Promotion", p. 58; Childs, "The Army and State in Britain", p. 68; Barnett, *Britain*, p. 138.
[56] Barnett, *Britain*, p. 238.
[57] Houlding, *Fit for Service*, p. 106; French, *The British Way in Warfare*, pp. 36-37.
[58] Brewer, *The Sinews of Power,* p. 57.
[59] Hayes, "The Social and Professional Background", pp. 169-170.

is particularly the case for the first proxy of merit, major and lieutenant colonel brevets.

Merit is measured using two proxies to indicate meritorious officers. The first proxy establishes merit by the award of major and lieutenant colonel brevets excluding those that were awarded for serving in the guards. There was a clear link between the award of these brevets and merit. Brevets were explicitly awarded to field officers, those ranked captain and higher, on the grounds of merit or long service.[60] This mechanism allowed the army to accelerate the promotion prospects of deserving officers so they could gain 'promotion to the higher ranks at an appropriate age.'[61] Accordingly, this proxy should capture many of the different aspects that were needed to be a meritorious officer from skill at battle to organisational ability. An examination of the careers of the future generals who gained these brevets showed they were often awarded for merit. For example, George Beckwith was given a brevet to army major for "…his spirited assistance in the assault on fort Griswold…."[62] The only problem with this proxy is the small number of future generals who gained major and lieutenant colonel brevets outside of the guards.

The second proxy used assesses merit in a more limited fashion.   Courage is undoubtedly one quality needed for a meritorious officer. Throughout history the most able generals, from Alexander the Great to Napoleon or Wellington, have

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[60] Glover, "Purchase", pp. 356-359.
[61] Neave-Hill, "Brevet Rank", p. 90.
[62] ODNB, s.v., Beckwith, George (1752/3-1823).

displayed courage on the battlefield. Admittedly, they had many other qualities that made them great generals, but courage was certainly one of them. One way that courage is represented on the battlefield is through wounding. Wounding typically results from exposure to a fierce part of battle, which contemporaries viewed as proof of courage. The relationship between courage and wounding has often been formally recognised by various armies. In the United States army, soldiers and officers killed or wounded in action are awarded the Purple Heart in recognition of their courage. At different points in history various other armies have recognized soldiers wounded in battle as deserving special mention. For instance, all Allied soldiers during World War I were awarded a wounded stripe if they were wounded in action. Hence, the second proxy of merit is whether the future generals were wounded. This should represent one important aspect of a meritorious military officer, courage. The only study of eighteenth-century military officers that systematically analysed the role of merit in promotion adopted a very similar proxy to represent merit. Consolvo's study of late eighteenth-century naval lieutenants used action in battle to represent merit.[63] Action in battle merely seems a different way to represent courage.

A close examination of the actions in which the future generals were wounded also demonstrates many of these occurred through courageous action. In 1794 John Moore was wounded in action and was later commended in dispatches during this time by his commander, Lieutenant General Sir Charles Stewart, as Moore had "... distinguished himself upon this Expedition for his Bravery, Conduct and Military

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[63] Consolvo, "The Prospects and Promotion", pp. 147-151.

Talent...."[64] Ligonier came close to death at the battle of Malplaquet when during an assault on a French position it was said his clothes were shredded by at least twenty different musket balls.[65] In 1780 David Baird's regiment was part of a relief force sent to Madras after the ruler of Mysore, Haidar Ali, attacked a British ally. Unfortunately, on the way they were surrounded by enemy forces and destroyed. Baird's corps fought with 'heroism and determination' in this engagement from which he sustained sabre wounds to his head, a pike wound in his arm and a ball in his thigh.[66] In January 1796, William Gooday Strutt was wounded three times when his force of only 200 men attacked a French army of 1200, which eventually resulted in him having to get his leg amputated.[67]

The best approach to measuring merit is to measure it from the point it is observed. In other words, measuring the effect of being wounded for instance on subsequent career progression. However, in the case of the future generals this is impractical. The main interest in analysing merit is to establish what role it played in becoming a general. Analysing merit from the point it was observed would result in a small sample size becoming much smaller as many officers were only wounded after they became generals. Moreover, in order to establish differences between meritorious and non-meritorious future generals it would be necessary to compare the subsequent progress of the meritorious future generals to those holding the same rank at the same time who did not display merit when the meritorious future generals displayed their merit. As the future generals entered the army at a myriad

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[64] H. C. Wylly, *History of the King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry*, Volume 1, (London, 1926), p. 156.
[65] ODNB, Ligonier, John (1680-1770).
[66] ODNB, Baird, Sir David (1757-1829).
[67] ODNB, Strutt, William Gooday (bap. 1762, d. 1848).

of different dates, and merit was often only observed at senior ranks, this would reduce any comparable group of non-merit officers to single figures in most cases further intensifying the small sample size problem. For these reasons it is impractical to measure merit from the point it was observed. Thus, merit is measured by assuming that if merit was displayed at some point in the careers of the future generals they were generally meritorious officers. This is far from ideal, but given the sample size constraints seems to be the only practical way to measure merit. Merit is therefore measured by comparing speed of advancement to general for future generals who displayed some aspect of merit at any point in their careers compared to those that did not.

The two proxies used for merit indicate that the role of merit in becoming a general was somewhat limited. However, this did vary between time period and social group. For many future 1747 generals displaying merit through brevets or wounding did not usually lead to faster promotion. Only in the case of wounding for the 'others' did promotion to general come slightly faster than for their non-meritorious counterparts. Merit seemed to matter more for the later period officers, but the extent of this varied with social group. The promotion time of aristocrats to general did not seem affected by whether they were meritorious officers. Promotion to general was slower for those aristocrats holding brevets and there was hardly any difference in promotion times for those displaying courage on the battlefield through wounding. In contrast, merit did seem to have an effect on the promotion times to general of the 'others' regardless of the proxy for merit. The 'others' who gained brevets to major or lieutenant colonel became generals one year sooner than those

that did not receive these distinctions. This advantage was even greater for the 'others' who displayed courage on the battlefield through wounding. These latter future generals became major generals after 27 years in the army compared to 31.8 years for the 'others' who were not wounded on the battlefield. There are a number of important implications from these results. Promotion in the army was not divorced from merit, but the part it played may have depended on time period and social group. It may not have been an important factor in the promotion of aristocrats. However, for those not coming from aristocratic backgrounds merit could have played an important part in promotion. The relative difference in the role merit played between the two periods for both social groups may be another indication that over time the role social status played in promotion to the highest levels experienced a relative decline due to the modernisation of the army.

Table 19: The role of merit in promotion

	1747			1800		
	Aristocrat	'Others'	N	Aristocrat	'Others'	N
Brevet						
Merit	37.0	43.0	4	28.5	28.7	10
Non-merit	24.5	37.0	46	23.4	29.9	40
N	22	28	50	19	31	50

	1747			1800		
	Aristocrat	'Others'	N	Aristocrat	'Others'	N
Wounded						
Merit	26.9	32.3	17	24.0	27.0	19
Non-merit	24.0	33.1	33	24.6	31.8	31
N	22	28	50	19	31	50

Note: All rows (except N row) expressed as length of time in years from entry to brigadier general (1747) or major general (1800). Brevet counts major and lieutenant colonel brevets except those given for serving in the guards.

Source: Appendix 4.2, Data Sources: Careers

V. Regimental mobility

It has become clear that social status, money, war and merit were all factors that to a greater or lesser extent played a role in becoming a general. Another factor that may have been important was regimental mobility. Officers might change regiments to try and accelerate their promotion prospects. Hayes noted foot guards' officers often used their army seniority to trade up to higher regimental ranks.[68] There seem to be two important questions regarding the way in which regimental mobility may have affected future generals' career progression. First, did regimental mobility lead to faster promotion in regimental rank? Second, did the type of regiment served in affect speed of promotion?

In order to answer the question of whether regimental mobility led to faster promotion table 20 analyses the speed of promotion to the main regimental ranks, that had active military commands attached to them, for the future generals by the number of regiments they served with. The extent that regimental mobility affected speed of regimental promotion seemed to depend very much on time period and social group. In the early period most future generals only served in one or two regiments. However, the extent of this also varied depending on social group. It was far more likely for the future generals to serve in more regiments if they were not aristocrats. Changing regiments during this time did not seem to lead to faster promotion. For the 'others', serving in one regiment brought the fastest promotion

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[68] Hayes, "The Social and Professional Background", pp. 167-168.

time to captain, while those serving in two regiments gained their regimental majorities and lieutenant colonelcies sooner than those serving in more regiments. This seemed to be a function of the more individualised career paths for early eighteenth-century future generals when skipping ranks was commonplace and it was not necessary to serve in many regiments to secure speedy promotion.

Table 20: Regimental mobility

Average number of years taken to reach different regimental ranks from entry:

1747	**Aristocrat**			N	**'Others'**			N
	Captain	Major	Lt. Colonel	N	Captain	Major	Lt. Colonel	N
Total	3.7	17.8	6.5	19	5.4	13.5	18.4	28
- number of regiments served with from entry to Lt. Colonel:								
1	3.5	14.3	8.5	8	4.4	13.5	23.2	8
2	5.1	28.0	-	7	4.8	9.5	15.0	6
3	1.75	-	4.5	4	5.1	15.0	15.8	7
4	-	-	-	0	7.2	12.4	17.5	5
5	-	-	-	0	7.0	17.0	20.5	2

1800	**Aristocrat**			N	**'Others'**			N
	Captain	Major	Lt. Colonel	N	Captain	Major	Lt. Colonel	N
Total	6.1	14.5	14.5	19	8.0	15.6	20.9	31
- number of regiments served with from entry to Lt. Colonel:								
1	12.0	24.7	29.5	3	13.8	29.7	33.8	4
2	12.5	20.5	22.0	2	6.7	19.5	27.3	9
3	4.5	13.5	15.0	2	8.1	13.8	16.7	11
4	3.7	8.0	9.9	10	6.0	11.7	20.0	4
5	4.0	7.0	14.5	2	8.0	15.6	20.9	3

Note: This analysis excludes three 1747 aristocratic future generals. Marlborough and Montagu are not included as they never held any of the regimental ranks of captain, major or lieutenant colonel. It has not been possible to trace the regiments Kerr served with before he became a regimental colonel so he has also been excluded.

Source: Appendix 4.2, Data Sources: Careers

With the slowing of regimental promotion times for the ranks of captain, major and lieutenant colonel over time, regimental mobility for the late eighteenth-century future generals appeared to play a far greater role in securing speedy promotion

than previously. The later period future generals generally served in more regiments than their 1747 counterparts. There was a particularly dramatic shift in the number of regiments aristocrats served in; 78% of the 1747 aristocratic future generals served in one or two regiments compared to only 26% by 1800. Slower regimental promotion times meant it was now a better career strategy to serve in more regiments in order to gain speedier promotion. For all the regimental ranks, regardless of social group, promotion was much slower if the future generals decided to serve in only one or two regiments. Thus, most future generals served in three or four regiments, which generally brought them quicker promotion.

The speedier career progression facilitated by regimental mobility was illustrated by the career of Henry St John, an 1800 aristocratic general. He entered the army as an ensign with the second foot guards in 1754. In order to gain his captaincy St John then moved to the 18th foot in 1758. Only two years after this he was able to gain a majority by switching to the 91st foot and then his lieutenant colonelcy in 1767 by again moving regiments, this time to the 67th foot. Thus, serving with four different regiments facilitated St. John's career progression in the army. However, serving in three or four regiments was not common for most late eighteenth-century officers. Studies of mid-eighteenth-century infantry officers and late eighteenth-century army surgeons show that most officers served in only one or two regiments.[69] The difference between the future generals and these other groups of officers may have been due to career success, different career lengths or perhaps a combination of these two factors. This difference in the number of regiments

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[69] Odintz, "The British Officer Corps", Chart XIII, p. 332; Ackroyd et al, *Advancing with the Army*, Table 4.11, p. 168.

served with implies that a willingness to change regiments may have had a positive effect on future career progress for the later period future generals.

Speed of career progress may have also been affected by the type of regiment the future generals served with. In the literature on the army the main distinction in regimental type is drawn between those who served in the guards and other officers.[70]   The reason for this is most officers in the guards had a higher army rank than their regimental rank. Particularly favoured in this respect were guards captains who ranked as lieutenant colonels in the army. The fact these officers had a regimental rank that was two ranks higher in the army possibly produced a number of advantages in promotion. In terms of regimental promotion, a regimental captain in the guards as a lieutenant colonel in the army could become a regimental lieutenant colonel in another regiment or even gain promotion directly to regimental colonel. As general was an army rank the higher rank of guards captains in the army may have allowed them to become general sooner compared to non-guards officers.

In order to assess the effect of regimental type on promotion speed a simple dichotomy is drawn between those future generals who held commissions as regimental captains in the guards and those that did not. Did holding a regimental captaincy in the guards lead to faster promotion? Where guard's captains promoted to regimental lieutenant colonel or colonel faster than their counterparts? Did their higher army rank allow them to become generals sooner?   The evidence is mixed

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[70] Hayes, "The Social and Professional Background", pp. 167-168.

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on the difference regiment type provided in promotion. In some instances holding a

regimental captaincy in the guards did lead to quicker promotion. For the 'others'

who were generals in 1747 serving as a regimental captain in the guards led to

quicker promotion for all of the regimental and army ranks analysed. On the other

hand, the advantage of regimental type was not as clear cut for the early period

aristocrats. It allowed these future generals promotion to regimental lieutenant

colonel faster, but made no difference in the promotion times to regimental colonel

and general. Most advantages of regimental type in securing quicker promotion

appeared to disappear by the late period.

Table 21: Regiment type

		1747			1800		
		Guards	Non-Guards	N	Guards	Non-Guards	N
Aristocrat	B.Gen./M.Gen.	26.2	23.2	21	22.6	25.8	19
	Colonel	19.0	12.5	21	24.1	23.9	18
	Lt. Colonel	5.3	10.0	4	19.0	11.6	18
	N	15	6	21	8	11	19

		1747			1800		
		Guards	Non-Guards	N	Guards	Non-Guards	N
'Others'	B.Gen./M.Gen.	34.5	36.9	28	32.3	29.1	31
	Colonel	27.3	28.6	27	29.2	30.5	25
	Lt. Colonel	16.0	18.9	22	28.5	18.9	28
	N	8	20	28	7	24	31

Note: All rows (except N row) expressed as average length of time in years from entry to obtaining stated rank. Guards are defined as those generals who at some point in their career held a commission in the guards as a regimental captain. Colonel and lieutenant colonel are regimental ranks not army ranks. This analysis excludes one 1747 aristocratic general as it has not been possible to trace the regiments Kerr served with before he became a regimental colonel.

Source: Appendix 4.2, Data Sources: Careers

In most cases, whether a future 1800 general was an aristocrat or 'other', spending

time as a regimental captain in the guards did not produce faster promotion. The

only advantage seemed to be that later period aristocrats were able to become

generals quicker if they served in the guards. In summary, regiment type seemed to produce a small advantage in promotion times for a minority of officers that served as guard's captains, but this was highly dependent on time period and social group. The 'others' who served as regimental captains in the guards in the early period were promoted more quickly on average than those that never held this position. In the later period the only advantage was for aristocrats serving in the guards who became generals sooner than their counterparts that did not serve in the guards.

VI. Conclusion

This chapter has revealed that to a greater or lesser extent social status, money, war, merit and regimental mobility all played a role and affected the timing in becoming an operational general. Social status regardless of time period triumphed at almost every turn. Aristocrats entered at higher ranks, skipped ranks more often and were promoted much faster than their untitled colleagues. The importance of social status was so great that the other factors affecting promotion often played only a limited role in the career progression of aristocrats. Thus, aristocrats gained most of their promotions without paying for them and merit did not affect their promotion speed. The role money played in promotion was slightly less than expected due to the influence of war. Most of the future generals entered the army and gained promotion during wartime when non-purchase commissions were readily available so it was not necessary to buy commissions directly. However, purchase of commissions did produce faster promotion times. It was very important during peace

due to the limited supply of officer places, and played a key role in the careers of a minority of officers who brought most of their commissions. In common with money, the role non-social status factors played in promotion was more important for the 'others'. Merit or serving as a regimental captain in the guards produced faster promotion times for the 'others' depending on the time period.

Social status may have triumphed at almost every turn, but its importance appeared to decline over time as the army became more professional. The relative difference between the promotion times of aristocrats and the 'others' narrowed over time. In the early period promotion was more individualised and this often led to greater advantages in promotion for aristocrats. A significant minority of aristocrats entered at regimental captain and it was not uncommon for aristocrats to jump straight from their entry rank to regimental colonel. In contrast, the career paths of later period aristocrats were far more similar to the 'others'. Both social groups tended to enter the army at ensign and served in most regimental ranks apart from captain lieutenant. This more structured career path led to slower promotion times for the main regimental ranks, although the army rank of general was attained sooner. There was also greater uniformity in other areas, such as entry age, between social groups.

One implication of the substantial advantage aristocrats had in promotion was that it may have had an adverse effect on military performance as aristocrats were over promoted.   This probably happened at times, but any negative impact on

military efficiency was minimised as the army usually only gave the key commander

positions in important battles to those who also had talents as military commanders.

Accordingly, an analysis of 52 of the major battles during the eighteenth-century

showed that the aristocratic commanders had better records in producing victories

than their non-aristocratic colleagues.   Moreover, poor performance in an

operational capacity was usually dealt harshly with by the army authorities who often

did not give subsequent commands of importance to those that failed or in extreme

cases even dismissed them from the army. It should also be noted that the

advantage aristocrats had in army careers may not have been too different from

other careers in the eighteenth-century.   Consolvo's study of late eighteenth-century

navy lieutenants showed that interest or patronage, defined in part by social status,

was the dominant factor in navy promotion and was far more important than merit.[71]

In a similar fashion, Cavell in the most recent study of navy officers found that

 "...in years when fewer positions were available for young gentleman, particularly in times of peace or when there was a marked surplus of officer aspirants, social influence of one form or another generally triumphed..."[72]

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[71] Consolvo, "The Prospects and Promotion", pp. 151-152.
[72] Cavell, "A Social History", p. 434.

Chapter seven: Rewards of army service

I. Introduction

An integral part of the argument for those claiming social mobility in the army was limited was that army officers received meagre rewards for their services. [1] It is often claimed the army was a losing concern for officers even if high rank was obtained.[2] This seems rather puzzling. Why would anyone enter a profession that produced financial losses for them? The answer to this question this chapter argues is primarily related to the timeframe considered. In the short term an army career did mostly produce losses for officers, but over the long-term the rewards from an army career outweighed short-term losses. Long-term service in the army allowed officers to sell their commissions, the gains from which exceeded any short-term losses even for relatively unsuccessful officers. If officers were very successful and became operational generals the financial and social gains could be large. The rewards army officers gained from service are analysed in three main sections. In the first part an overview is provided of the rewards and costs of army service. The second part considers evidence for the short-term rewards and costs of army officers and the third part analyses long-term gains.

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[1] Otley, "The Social Origins", pp. 213-215; Otley, "The Origins and Recruitment", pp. 19, 81, 100.
[2] Guy, "The Colonel's Advantage", p. 36; Glover, *Wellington's army*, pp. 43, 149; Clayton, *The British Officer*, p. 55; Storrs and Scott, "The Military Revolution", p. 31; Guy, "This Insulting Misfortune", pp. 10-21; Odintz, "The British Officer Corps", p. 261.

Analysing the rewards and costs resulting from entering any particular career in the eighteenth-century is challenging due to the nature of surviving evidence. Some historians focus on the financial outcomes of careers through evidence of wealth left at death taken from probate valuations in wills. This is the approach a recent study on British army surgeons adopted.[3] It was notable that many officers in the surgeons' sample, more than 100 doctors by my calculations, died after 1837.[4] This is important because 1837 was the point at which civil registration was adopted in England and Wales. It was only after this happened that historians have been able to use a wealth at death approach due to the improved quality of evidence resulting from the adoption of civil registration.[5] The outstanding historical contribution using this approach is the work by Rubinstein on the wealthiest individuals in Britain during the nineteenth-century.[6] For officers from slightly earlier time periods it becomes impractical to use a wealth at death approach for two reasons.[7] First, even when wills in this period contain estimates of wealth at death these are at best only general figures. For example, according to the will of General Lord Fitzroy, an 1800 operational general, his wealth was "under £100,000" when he died in 1829.[8] Second, even the estimates tend to be inaccurate as probate returns during the early modern period excluded realty and debt. Wealth estimates contained in wills were based on the value of personal property excluding any landed property and debts that may be owed. As land was typically the most important financial asset and debts were commonplace excluding these items could drastically

[3] Ackroyd et al, , *Advancing with the Army*, pp. 255-294.
[4] *Ibid.*, Appendix 2, List of Doctors in the Sample.
[5] For the problems in using a wealth at death approach for measuring wealth of the educated classes before civil registration see P. Lindert, "Unequal English Wealth since 1670", *The Journal of Political Economy*, Volume 94 (6), (December, 1986), p. 1132.
[6] Rubinstein, *Men of Property*, 2nd Ed..
[7] For the difficulties in using probate records to assess wealth in the early modern period see C. Shammas, "The Determinants of Personal Wealth in Seventeenth Century England and America", *The Journal of Economic History*, 37 (3), (Sept 1977), pp. 675-689.
[8] ODNB, s.v. Fitzroy, Lord Charles (1764–1829).

alter the financial picture of individuals, a fact that might not be evident from probate

records.   This can be seen from the financial records left behind by General Harris.

His probate estimate of wealth at death was "under £90,000", whereas a statement

of his concerns left with the intention of guiding his executors a few years before his

death placed a value on all of his assets at £221,270 in 1812, including landed

property in excess of £34,000. [9]

Another approach is to examine the income and expenditure of officers

through their personal accounts. This seems more promising for eighteenth-century

officers, but finding personal accounts of these individuals is extremely difficult.[10]

Perhaps this is why most historians do not attempt any but the most cursory

examination of the rewards and costs of military officers.[11] In the most recent

research on the social origins of navy officers there was no assessment of their costs

and rewards from primary sources because the data was thought to be

unavailable.[12]   Only one historian, Alan Guy, has conducted an in depth analysis of

military officers' rewards and costs. Guy tries to overcome these data problems by

using a wide range of evidence including correspondence, official pay rates and

contemporary publications specifying probable expenses. Evidence drawn from

personal accounts is limited to a single lieutenant colonel's personal account for one

year and several 'stock purse' fund accounts which shed light on part of captains'

rewards.[13]

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[9] CKS, U624 Harris, Accounts, A67 Statement of My Concerns for the Guidance of Executors, 1812.

[10] Guy, *Oeconomy and Discipline,* Chapter 4.

[11] For the army see Glover, *Wellington's army,* pp. 149-151; Odintz, "The British Officer Corps", pp. 261-262.

[12] Cavell, "A Social History ", pp. 190-191.

[13] Analysis of sources Guy used is based on Guy, *Oeconomy*, Chapter 4: Personal pay and private perquisites.

This chapter is a major departure from previous contributions on the rewards and costs of British officers by utilising previously unused data sources allowing a more in-depth analysis of officers' personal financial affairs. Most of the data is drawn from the account ledgers of the leading late eighteenth-century regimental agent, Cox and Co. Richard Cox began this business with the agency of the first foot guards in 1758. This business grew over the years and by 1811 Cox and Greenwood, as it later became known, accounted for 55% of all government payments to regimental agents.[14] The account ledgers of Cox and Co. are organised by regiment and time period from the foundation of the business up until the early nineteenth-century. Within each different regimental ledger there are several accounts relating to the pay of the regiment as a whole, such as the subsistence account, and personal accounts for most officers serving with the regiment.

The personal accounts of officers contained within these regimental ledgers are analysed at two different levels. To provide some perspective on the future generals' accounts, the overall rewards and costs of 137 non-sample officers' accounts who served at a similar time period and in the same regiments as the generals are analysed. In order to ascertain whether future generals had surviving accounts with Cox it was first necessary to know what regiment they served in and when. This information is only available for the sample officers whose career patterns were researched in detail. In consequence, the analysis of rewards using the Cox evidence is based on the samples of generals drawn from the chapter on

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[14] "An Account of the Annual Sums of Money paid, or due, to each and every of the Army Agents in Great Britain and Northern Ireland from 25th December 1810 to 24th December 1811", *Parliamentary Papers, Volume XII*, (1812-1813), pp. 179-185.

careers. This allows for more detailed analysis on the personal accounts of fourteen different future generals at various stages of their careers from ensign all the way up to general.

In order to appreciate the strengths and weaknesses of the main data source it is necessary to understand something of the business of regimental agents. Regimental colonels in the eighteenth-century were responsible for paying, feeding, clothing and providing weapons for their regiment. In order to effectively accomplish these tasks regimental colonels appointed in their stead, by a personal power of attorney, a regimental agent to organise the financial administration of their regiment.[15] The primary responsibility of a regimental agent was to receive pay from the pay office and distribute it to the regiment. In addition, agents organised the delivery of clothing, weapons and any other items that were needed. [16]

Officers held personal accounts with their regimental agents mainly to receive their pay, but also because agents often acted for them in a private capacity. The Deputy Secretary War noted in 1778:

"…The latter branch of the business which the agents transact partakes more of the nature of that of private agents to the several individuals of the regiment, whose interests and convenience their situation particularly enables them to promote…."[17]

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[15] C.M Clode, *The Military Forces of the Crown; their administration and government, Volume 1*, (London, 1869), p. 74.
[16] J. Hayes, "The Military Papers of Colonel Samuel Bagshawe (1713-1762)", *Bulletin of John Rylands University Library of Manchester*, 39 (1956), p. 361; A.J Guy, "Minions of Fortune: the Regimental Agents of Early Georgian England, 1714-1763", *National Army Museum, 6307-31*, (1985), p.31; A.B Wood, "British Army Regimental Agency, 1721-1783", unpublished MSc dissertation, London School of Economics, (2007).
[17] *Parliamentary Papers, Volume V*, (1808), p. 334.

One of their main private roles was to act as private bankers to officers.[18] In common with other professional groups, such as attorneys, regimental agents were ideally placed to perform private banking functions due to their good credit and close connections to the officers they served.[19] It is not possible to know exactly how agents managed their private business due to lack of surviving evidence, yet it seems probable they adopted similar policies to other private banks in this period.

During this time private banks lent to their customers small amounts of money charging little or no interest. Some 23% of all loans by C. Hoare, a leading London private bank for aristocrats and the gentry, in the early eighteenth-century were charged no interest.[20] Another important practice was to have an extremely concentrated loan portfolio. Hoare's focused on lending large amounts of money usually at the usury rate of 5% to a few customers who could provide good levels of collateral and were well known by the bank.[21] During 1705-1709, 69% of all money lent was allocated to the top twenty clients of the bank.[22] Attorneys also often loaned small amounts interest free to many people with most of their lending by value concentrated in a few mortgages at the rate of 5% to well-known local individuals.[23]

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[18] A. Bruce, *The Purchase System in the British Army, 1660-1871*, (London, 1980), p. 62.
[19] Good credit and close personal connections to clients were the primary requirements for acting as private bankers in this period. See F. Crouzet, "Introduction", in Crouzet, F. (ed.), *Capital Formation in the Industrial Revolution*, (London, 1972), p. 53, J. Hoppit, "The Use and Abuse of Credit in Eighteenth Century England", in N. McKendrick and R.B Outhwaite (eds), *Business Life and Public Policy: essays in honour of D.C Coleman*, (Cambridge, 1986), p. 77; B.L. Anderson, "The Attorney and the Early Capital Market in Lancashire" in Crouzet, F. (ed.), *Capital Formation*, pp. 223-256.
[20] P. Temin and H-J Voth, "Private borrowing during the Financial Revolution: Hoare's Bank and its Customers, 1702-1724", *Economic History Review*, 61, 3 (2008), p. 547.
[21] *Ibid.*, pp. 544-558.
[22] *Ibid*, p. 547.
[23] Anderson, "The Attorney", pp. 223-256.

The evidence on regimental agents seems to suggest a similar mode of operation. Many agents appeared to loan small amounts to officers at no or little interest against future pay. For example, when Lieutenant Philip Thicknesse, who squandered over £12 on a drunken night out in London, was left with only a penny to his name his agent advanced him six months' pay.[24] It is noticeable that the personal accounts of officers with Cox do not show any interest charges for small debts. However, there were limits to the amount of interest-free credit agents advanced officers. On one of the bills of Charles Harris with Cox in 1811, who was a cavalry officer and the son of General George Harris, it was requested that "…you [Charles Harris] will not draw upon us [Cox] again until the balance of £44.17.0 is liquidated…"[25] Large loans were made to some officers, but in a similar fashion to Hoare's these seemed concentrated among a few wealthy individuals. Calcraft, the dominant agent of the Seven Years War (1757-1763), lent as much as £5,000 for mortgages, but mostly to aristocrats.[26] Likewise, loans appearing in the sample future generals' personal accounts belonged to officers who were already very wealthy in their own right, such as Earl Ligonier, or the sons of wealthy individuals most of whom were aristocrats such as Ludlow, the son of an earl who had repeated loans from Cox. One consequence of this was that Cox's accounts of higher ranking officers were often more in-depth and contained greater detail than for other ranks.

Even though Cox's policies may have been similar to private banks, the nature of the evidence drawn from regimental ledgers is different in two respects

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[24] P. Thicknesse, *Memoirs and Anecdotes of Philip Thicknesse, Late Lieutenant Governor of Land Guard Fort, and unfortunately Father to George Touchet, Baron Audley*, (London, 1788), pp. 67-69.
[25] CKS, U620 Harris, Accounts, A15/2 Charles Harris Account with Cox, 19 November 1811.
[26] BL, Add. MS 17496. Private Letter Book of J. Calcraft, 1763 to Dec 1764, volume 4, John Calcraft to The Earl of Sandwich, 27th May 1764, f. 36.

from private banks. Firstly, regimental agents and private banks had different types of client. Private banks concentrated on only the wealthiest individuals. [27] Consequently, few private bank accounts for the sample officers were found at Drummonds, a leading London private banking that had close connections to the army, when they were junior or even middle ranking officers. Apart from one aristocrat, only lieutenant colonels or higher seemed to have private bank accounts. Thus, at best private bank accounts represent only a limited slice of military society. In contrast, personal accounts of officers with their regimental agents were not limited to only the wealthiest. Virtually every officer with the regiment had an account with their agent. This can be shown by comparing the quantity of officers' accounts contained in particular ledgers with corresponding army lists for the same year. There were 83 officers listed in the 1772 army list for the first foot guards, all of whom had personal accounts in the corresponding Cox ledger. In a similar fashion, 28 out of 29 officers for the 10th foot in 1793 had accounts with Cox.[28] Availability of accounts was limited by the development of Cox's regimental agency business. As Cox's first agency was the first foot guards, and his business developed gradually over time, the surviving evidence, particularly for the mid eighteenth-century when many future generals were beginning their careers, is primarily drawn from guards' officers. As the guards served half their time at home few personal accounts remain for officers serving in colonial locations where the rewards of service were different.

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[27] D.M. Joslin, "London Private Bankers, 1720-1785", *The Economic History Review*, 7 (2), (1954), pp. 176-179.
[28] *A List of the Officers of the Army and Marines,* (London, 1772, 1793); Cox A/56/e/86. Agent's Ledger 10th Foot, 1790-1798, ff. 1-104, Cox A/56/e/70. Agent's Ledger 1st Foot Guards, 1770-1774, ff. 1-200.

Secondly, the quality of information contained within each personal account with regimental agents is quite different to similar accounts for private banks. Most of the private bank accounts of officers examined contain little information on the nature of incomings and outgoings. The majority of entries merely mention the name of the individual concerned who paid or received money without any indication as to the nature of the transaction. In cases where this does not occur usually the transaction is merely listed as cash. Therefore, it is only possible to get a broad sense of military income or expenditure through identifying payments or receipts from the officer's regimental agents. The accounts with Cox, especially on the income side, contain far more information as to the exact nature of transactions. For instance, the different types of salary, subsistence and arrears, are individually identified as are most other income sources. On the expenditure side the quality of information is less revealing. It is not possible to identify the details of most expenditure. Many of the entries are of a general nature and do not specify the expense they relate to. A common practice was to have expenditure descriptions, such as subsistence or arrears, the two parts of an officer's salary, the opposite to the same income descriptions. Another general expenditure descriptor used was expenditure on 'himself'. Moreover, the largest amounts of expenditure in the accounts were usually classified as payments to particular individuals, most of whom cannot be identified, without any indication of what these expenses related to. Some of the extraordinary expenditure, such as recruiting expenses or fees paid for commissions, can be precisely identified, but these were for amounts much less than those that cannot be identified. Thus, it is highly probable that any estimate of extraordinary expenditure is understated.

Another weakness of the accounts is that at best they provide a snapshot of the military rewards and costs officers at a particular point in time, but they say very little of career returns.

Many officers would have had personal accounts with different financial institutions that were separate from their regimental agent. Hence, an important question is to what extent did accounts with officers' regimental agents capture the total military income and expenses of individual officers? One way of assessing this is to examine the flows of military income for officers whose financial affairs survive in great detail. One such officer was General George Harris. In 1816 he managed his military affairs through his account with Cox and his private finances through two bank accounts, one with his local bank in Faversham, Wright and Hilton, and the other with Coutts. An examination of these various accounts shows that although military payments could be and were occasionally received through private banks the vast amount of military income flowed through his regimental agent. In 1816 only £400 out £6,099 in military income was not deposited with Cox.[29] Therefore, if Harris's financial affairs were representative of officers generally, accounts with regimental agents should capture most military income and expenditure, except perhaps if the officers were based abroad in which case some military income would only show up with their local agents where they were serving. There are inevitably other aspects of officers' financial affairs that are not contained in these accounts. The accounts are missing most non-military income, which only appears incidentally

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[29] CKS, U624 Harris, Accounts, A73 Account Books with Thomas Coutts and Co., Bankers, 1800-1821, A74 Account Books of General Harris with Wright and Hilton, Bankers of Faversham, 1815-1819; Official Papers, O807 Accounts of General Lord Harris as Colonel of the 73rd Foot with Messrs Greenwood, Cox & Co., 1813-1831.

in them, and stocks of wealth. For the more successful officers, the military side of their financial affairs may have not been as important as other revenue streams. Returning to Harris's accounts, his non-military income exceeded £37,000 in 1816, a sum far greater than his military income.[30]

The main source on officers' rewards and costs of service, the personal accounts of officers located in the regimental agent ledgers from Cox and Co., are supplemented by two different types of sources.   Firstly, private bank accounts of officers held at Drummonds, a London private bank, are utilised. The Drummonds accounts concern three different future generals whose accounts contain details of their army income when they were lieutenant colonels.   Secondly, the surviving personal papers of Generals Harris and Lindsay, two 1800 operational generals who gained colonial command appointments, are used to shed light on rewards gained when serving abroad. This is only possible because both of these generals left behind large collections of documents pertaining to their personal financial affairs, including much detail on the financial returns of their army service. Details drawn from Harris's correspondence, official papers, legal documents, personal accounts of his army pay and of the property he brought back from India are used to get a sense of the capital gains he made from serving in the army. The surviving accounts of Lindsay's Jamaican agent and his regimental agent in England, John Carstairs, allows analysis to be conducted of Lindsay's military rewards and costs received when he served as lieutenant governor of Jamaica between 1796 and 1799. It is

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[30] CKS, U624 Harris, Accounts, A73 Account Books with Thomas Coutts and Co., Bankers, 1800-1821, A74 Account Books of General Harris with Wright and Hilton, Bankers of Faversham, 1815-1819; Official Papers, O807 Accounts of General Lord Harris as Colonel of the 73rd Foot with Messrs Greenwood, Cox & Co., 1813-1831.

also possible to get a sense of the indirect profit opportunities high command provided officers serving in the colonies in two ways. In the first place, the accounts Lindsay had with Adams, Robertson and Co., detailing the profits he made from his part in a government military contract, are used to show one type of indirect profit opportunity from serving in the colonies. In the second place, it was popular for officers based in the colonies to make capital gains or provide additional income streams through the acquisition of cheap property. Lindsay's manuscript volumes on his Jamaican plantations are used to illustrate the extent that some officers gained from the acquisition of cheap property while serving in the colonies.

Together the personal papers of Harris and Lindsay provide a valuable insight into the gains from army service of those who held colonial command appointments as profits from service abroad are not always included in the accounts of officers' regimental agents in England. These sources of evidence are also not without their own weaknesses.   They only provide a snapshot of the returns of service at various points in time, rather than allowing an assessment of the net gains from army service over the course of a career. For both Harris and Lindsay these snapshots are inevitably when they had already obtained very senior positions in the army and say nothing about the early and middle stages of their careers. In a similar fashion, the bank accounts at Drummonds are only for officers who were already lieutenant colonels, a rank most officers never reached. Moreover, details of the individual transactions flowing through the bank accounts are very limited to say the least.

II. Rewards and costs of army service

The origins of army compensation can be traced back to medieval times when Kings raised armies by sub-contracting this work out to knights. Financial compensation was given to knights in return for raising and maintaining a specified force of men.[31] Thus, most early regiments and companies became entrepreneurial undertakings for those officers in charge of them. Officers were paid a low basic wage, but were in return able to extract legitimate profits and rents from the management of their companies or regiments. This system continued into the eighteenth-century, but there was gradually a transition away from pre-modern proprietary soldiering to a system based on fixed salaries and allowances within a hierarchical structure.[32] Officers were compensated for their labour in a number of different ways that reflected these early origins and the subsequent move away from proprietary soldiering to a more bureaucratic payment structure.

The main way officers were rewarded was through a salary set by the government consisting of two different payments, subsistence and arrears. This salary only varied according to rank, regiment type and establishment. Higher ranks earned a greater salary, but payments to the same rank could also be different depending on the type of regiment served with and whether it was based on the

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[31] Grenfell, *The Men Who Defend Us*, p. 2.
[32] For more information on this process for European armies generally see F. Redlich, *The German Military Enterpriser and his Workforce: a study in European economic and social history, Volumes 1-2*, (Wiesbaden, 1964-1965).

English or Irish establishment.[33] As table 22 shows, officers in the cavalry and guards were paid more than other officers. This was due to the extra expenditure these officers were expected to undertake, such as in the maintenance of horses for cavalry officers. There was also a difference in salary between English and Irish establishment officers. Officers on the Irish establishment typically received a slightly lower salary than for the English establishment. For example, a captain in the foot on the English establishment was paid 7s 6d per diem in subsistence compared to 7s 1d for his counterpart on the Irish establishment.[34]

Table 22: Annual payments of subsistence and arrears to officers on the English establishment, 1795

	Dragoons		Foot Guards		Foot	
	Subsistence	Arrears	Subsistence	Arrears	Subsistence	Arrears
	£.s.d	£.s.d	£.s.d	£.s.d	£.s.d	£.s.d
Colonel	483.12.6	112.12.3	547.10.0	126.14.3	328.10.0	80.7.0
Lt. Colonel	337.12.6	79.14.10	392.7.6	100.6.5	237.5.0	52.7.0
Major	283.17.6	66.7.0	337.12.6	85.13.5	209.17.6	45.13.10
Captain	209.17.6	54.3.5	228.2.6	56.17.6	136.17.6	33.9.7
Lieutenant	127.15.0	25.11.4	109.10.0	24.10.6	63.17.6	15.12.5
Ensign/Coronet	109.10.0	26.15.8	82.2.6	17.13.7	54.15	7.14.3

Source: Williamson, *A Treatise of Military Finance* 1st Ed., pp. 17, 19, 2nd Ed., pp. 25-27.

Another aspect of officers' compensation evident in table 22 is that most of the salary paid was in the form of subsistence. This was to cover daily food and drink and subsistence payments were supposed to be received every two months.[35] There was a much longer delay in receiving the balance of pay, called arrears. This should have been remitted every six months, but there could be even more

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[33] The Irish establishment was considered entirely separate from the English establishment, even had its own budget, and acted as a 'strategic reserve' for the main body of troops based on the English establishment. It was amalgamated with the English establishment to form one British establishment under the Act of Union in 1801. For further information on the Irish establishment see A.J Guy, "The Irish Military Establishment, 1660-1776", in T. Bartlett and K. Jeffery (eds), *A Military History of Ireland*, (Cambridge, 1996), pp. 211-230.

[34] Williamson, *A Treatise of Military Finance*, 1st Ed., (London, 1782), p. 19, 2nd Ed., p. 27.

[35] Guy, *Oeconomy and Discipline,* chapter 3.

substantial delays as payments were held back until regimental accounts were closed at the end of a financial period to act as an insurance policy against fraud or incompetence.[36]   These salary scales were established early in the eighteenth-century and remained essentially unchanged for most of the century: officers on the English establishment received the same salary in 1785 as 1725. This was a constant cause of complaint by officers as some living costs rose substantially during this time. As one officer put it:

"...Butcher's meat and bread, are at present four times the prices they were when the pay was first established; and every absolute necessity of life in the same proportion, from the decrease of the value of money, the extensive commerce, and riches of the kingdom, and the great taxes which have since been laid on every article of universal consumption...."[37]

There were some changes in salaries paid during the eighteenth-century, but considering the interval of time they remained relatively minor. The pay of junior officers and captains on the Irish establishment increased 2d and 6d per diem respectively in 1754 and in 1797 subalterns gained an extra 1s a day. From 25 June 1806, the salaries of all officer ranks rose; the per diem salary a captain received, for example, increased from 9s 5d to 10s 6d. Widows' pensions also rose and for the first time lieutenants with more than seven years' service gained a higher salary than other lieutenants and brevets also received additional pay. [38]

Officers could also earn additional salaries through appointments to military jobs within their regiment and the wider army. Each regiment had vacancies for an

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[36] Guy, *Oeconomy and Discipline,* chapter 3.
[37] By the Honourable *** - an Officer, *Observations on the prevailing abuses in the British Army, arising from the corruption of civil government with a proposal to the officers towards obtaining an addition to their pay,* (London, 1775), p. 22.
[38] CKS, U624 Harris, Official Papers, O722 Circular regarding increased pay, 15 July 1806.

adjutant who was responsible for discipline and clothing, a quartermaster who looked after housing and operations and a paymaster. However, most military jobs were only available at the army level and were usually reserved for experienced officers. For middle ranking officers the most common job was as aides-de-camp (ADCs), personal assistants to generals who they assisted with administrative tasks such as writing letters and delivering messages.[39] By the Napoleonic wars, general officers were allowed one ADC, divisional commanders two and the commander of the forces four.[40] Once officers had obtained the most junior general rank on the army list they were eligible to be selected for general command or staff positions. [41] The salaries for general appointments were standardised by the type of job and geographical location. For instance, in 1762 a major general on the Irish staff received an extra income of £547, while a lieutenant general was paid £1,095.[42] All lieutenant generals on staff in Europe thus received the same salary, but the salary of a lieutenant general in another geographical location might be different. Most general appointments were only available during war and so income from these positions disappeared during peace. Officers could also be appointed to governorships and lieutenant governorships.

The second way officers were compensated for their labour was through the payment of allowances intended to compensate for extra expenses incurred as a consequence of military service. The two most common allowances that officers received were for baggage and forage. Baggage money was used to finance the

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[39] Glover, *Wellington's army*, p. 143; Ward, *Wellington's Headquarters*, p. 36.
[40] Park and Nafziger, *The British Military*, p. 77.
[41] Rogers, *The British Army*, pp. 54-55.
[42] Hayes, "The Social and Professional Background", p. 129.

purchase of horses needed to carry officers' equipment on active service, while forage provided money to feed these horses. As with salaries, allowances were graduated according to rank. Each rank was allocated a certain number of horses on active service and allowances were paid in proportion to the number of horses they were allowed. During 1794 the number of horses each officer was allowed in an infantry regiment varied from one for every two junior officers to nine for a colonel. Officers were granted a baggage allowance of £18 18s per horse and their forage allowance for 100 days ranged from £8 8s for two junior officers to £27 10s for a colonel.[43] Officers usually received 200 days of forage every year, if they were on active service, in two half yearly payments.[44] Apart from payments for baggage and forage, there were a whole host of other allowances officers might also receive including for servants, travel, lodging, cost of 'fire and candle' in quarters, losses of equipment or camp necessaries.[45] In addition, for every company the regimental colonel was entitled to a 'colonel's man' to cover the loss of clothing from deserters. This allowance was worth approximately £73 for regiments of horse, £45 12s 10d for dragoon regiments and £21 5s 10d for foot.[46] Allowances paid also varied with geographical location. Officers posted to India received different allowances to home officers as they were paid the same allowances as their East India Company counterparts. The main allowance officers received in India, called Batta, was given as

"... the climate of India, and several customs that cannot easily be altered, expose European officers to some articles of expense, which are not indispensably requisite in other parts of the world where British troops are stationed..."[47]

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[43] Williamson, *A Treatise of Military Finance*, 2nd Ed., pp. 69-70.
[44] Guy, *Oeconomy*, chapter 4.
[45] Guy, *Oeconomy*, chapter 3; Williamson, *A Treatise of Military Finance,* 2nd Ed., pp. 56-59.
[46] Guy, *Oeconomy*, p. 30.
[47] Marquis Cornwallis to the Right Honourable Henry Dundas, November 7 1794, in G. Forrest (Ed.), *Selections from the State Papers of the Governor General of India, Lord Cornwallis, Volume 2: Documents*, (Oxford, 1926), p. 151.

Officers could receive half, full or double Batta. The levels of Batta payments, however, were not wholly related to expenses, but rather to the ability of the local government where they were stationed to pay.   Batta allowances were highest in Bengal where living costs were the lowest, whereas Bombay had higher costs but lower allowances.[48]

A final income stream available to officers was profits derived from their command positions.   The origin of these profits dates back to the Middle Ages when commands were entrepreneurial concerns for officers. Within every regiment, each company (infantry) or troop (cavalry) had a 'stock purse' or 'non-effective' fund to pay for the cost of recruiting, supplying horses and any unforeseen contingencies that may arise. According to Guy, these contingencies included:

"... allowances to riding masters or rough-riders in the horse and dragoons, payments to the surgeon to enable him to maintain his medicine chest, the cost of treating the sick and burying the dead, the hire of storehouses and parade grounds, gratuities attending the alteration of consignments of new clothing or compiling muster rolls, the printing of furlough and discharge warrants, the cost of advertizing and taking up deserters, fees charged on warrants, postage and regimental stationery...."[49]

The income for the "stock purse" or "non-effective" fund was derived from subsistence payments to non-effective personnel. All companies were allocated the subsistence of two "warrant men" to finance recruiting and also usually benefited from one to four "contingent men" to increase wartime strength. These latter "fake men" were created by not recruiting regiments to full strength and a regulation of 1743 reserved £5 per man in the non-effective accounts to bring companies up to full

[48] Callahan, *The East India Company*, pp. 28-29.
[49] A.J Guy,"Oeconomy and Discipline: regimental officers and the perquisites of command, 1714-1768", *National Army Museum Annual Report*, (1980-1981), p. 34.

strength if ordered.[50] Originally these allowances appeared in the subsistence rolls

under fake names.   However, from 1716 the "fake men" had to be entered

separately on regimental ledgers.[51] Additional income was generated from the

subsistence payments for personnel that needed to be recruited. There was usually

a difference between pay received from the war office based on the established

strength of a regiment and its actual numbers. For example, the full establishment of

the 73rd foot in 1823 was 650, but there were only 618 effectives as 33 were

"wanting to complete".[52] The 'stock purse' received extra income for the subsistence

of these men. Supplementary income was also possibly gained through rent-

seeking activities. Captains were responsible for making various deductions from

soldiers pay. Many of these were legitimate, such as stoppages made for the

Chelsea Hospital, but there were probably illegal stoppages as well. When musters

of troop strength were taken every two months there was an incentive to falsify

returns so that the actual strength matched the established strength in order to retain

surplus pay. [53] This vacant pay was frequently retained by the colonel.[54]

The captain of each troop or company, who was responsible for managing the

'non-effective' fund, often received a cash dividend if this fund generated a yearly

surplus. This was supposed to benefit the captains of companies "...partly in aid of

their extraordinary expenses, and partly as a reward for their care and diligence in

[50] Guy, *Oeconomy*, chapter 3.
[51] *Ibid*., p. 33
[52] CKS, U624 Harris, Official Papers, O809 State of the 73rd Regiment, 23 December 1823.
[53] Clayton, *The British Officer*, p. 55; Turner, *Gallant Gentleman*, p. 37.
[54] Guy, "Oeconomy", p. 30.

completing their companies...."[55] However, if the fund generated a deficit the captain might be forced to make up the balance with part of his personal pay or have a negative balance carried forward.[56] It is difficult to know the extent of profits generated for captains through the management of the 'stock purse'. Guy estimated captains received a cash dividend of £20 on average for managing an infantry company during the 1740s, while Hayes asserted dividends were limited at best and at worst no profits were made.[57] Guy's estimate was derived from testimony given to a parliamentary enquiry, which may have resulted in underestimating the income gained from these sources. An assessment of the cash dividend during the early eighteenth-century, a slightly earlier period than for Guy's estimate, claimed captains earned on average 10% of the total subsistence or a cash dividend of £60 a year for infantry officers.[58] Not all captains of companies received this dividend. The regimental colonel's 'non-effective' dividends were usually paid to or at least shared with the captain lieutenant, who in the colonel's absence administered their company.[59] European armies followed similar systems with one notable difference; captains in European armies generally earned more than their British counterparts. The reason for this was that captains in European armies managed the procurement of items such as clothing, which was the responsibility of the regimental colonel in the British army. This important difference meant that a captain in the Prussian army could earn twenty times the pay of a first lieutenant.[60]

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[55] "Warrant for Regulating the Non effective fund of the Several Regiments of Infantry, 19th February 1766", taken from Williamson, *A Treatise of Military Finance,* 2nd Ed., pp. 48-52.
[56] Guy, "Oeconomy", p. 32.
[57] Guy, "Oeconomy", p.34; Hayes, "The Social and Professional Background", p. 164.
[58] Burton and Newman, " Sir John Cope", p. 661.
[59] Guy, "The Colonel's Advantage", p. 29.
[60] B.R Kroener, "The Modern State and Military Society in the Eighteenth Century", in P. Contamine (ed.), *War and Competition between States*, (Oxford, 2003), p. 204.

Management of clothing procurement was one of the main profits regimental colonels derived from their positions. They received a dividend, deducted from soldiers' pay, for providing the regiment's clothing and equipment. Colonels usually made a profit from this enterprise as clothing payments received from the war office were based on the full regimental establishment rather than the actual numbers serving. However, making profits from clothing was complicated by delays in payments. There were usually lengthy delays between delivery of clothing and payment from the pay office, which often reduced profits. The payments for clothing, called 'net off reckonings', were not received until the end of a clothing cycle, usually a year for the infantry and up to three for the cavalry, and during war there could be further delays of up to twelve months in receiving payment. These delays meant colonels either had to pay for clothing out of their own capital or on credit with high interest rates.[61] Guy estimates colonels made between £550 for the foot and £908 for the horse guards every year from 1733 to 1758.[62] Originally colonels also arranged for the provision of weapons. This role was superseded by the Board of Ordinance in 1740 for the infantry, but in the cavalry colonels continued to enter into private contracts for pistols and swords until the 1780s.[63]

Returns from clothing and equipment could increase if colonels decided to behave opportunistically to raise their profits from this enterprise. This was usually done by reducing the quality or quantity of articles supplied. From the few frauds that became public knowledge it is evident this occurred. One such case was when Lieutenant General Robert Dalzell, a 1747 operational general, was found guilty in

[61] Guy, "The Colonel's Advantage", pp. 33-34.
[62] *Ibid.*, p. 33.
[63] Guy, *Oeconomy*, p. 146.

the early 1750s of only supplying 300 suits for an establishment of 500. This kind of abuse was supposed to be prevented by a general officer from the clothing board confirming the quality and quantity of clothing being delivered and the regiment's lieutenant colonel certifying delivery. However, in the Dalzell case it was discovered the supervising general only examined 50 or 60 suits before passing the inspection and the certificates of delivery were falsified. [64] Similar cases of abuse occurred in the private supply of highland pistols to cavalry regiments during the Seven Years War. An allowance of £1 15s per pistol pair was given to colonels for the supply of these weapons, but it was later discovered that some colonels were buying poor quality pistols at only 18s a pair.[65]

There were also other rent-seeking activities colonels could profit from. As regimental agents were appointed by the colonel often he would receive some monetary compensation for this favour. In return for executing his public duties the regimental agent was usually paid two customary allowances. An agent's man, the equivalent of a private's subsistence allowance, was deducted from the subsistence of every troop or company in the regiment.[66] There was also an agency allowance of two pence in the pound from the remaining pay of the regiment.[67] It was common for agents to hand over the return for the agent's men to their colonel or receive both allowances with the proviso they would pay a fixed yearly amount to the colonel. An example of this was when William Adair paid Major General Huske £60 per annum

[64] Guy, "The Colonel's Advantage", pp. 34, 36; Guy, *Oeconomy*, pp. 151-152.
[65] Guy, *Oeconomy*, p. 146.
[66] A Member of Parliament, *Abstracts of the Number and Yearly Pay of the Landforces of Horse, Foot and Dragoons in Great Britain, for the year 1718*, (London, 1718), p. 3.
[67] A Member of Parliament, *Abstracts of the Number*, p. 4.

for his agency of foot.[68] Some agencies were also purchased from the colonel, yet

this seems to have only happened in a minority of cases.[69] Colonels might also

obtain payment from clothiers for dispensing clothing contracts. It is reputed that in

1686 clothiers were offering colonels £600 for contracts.[70] In addition, it was

possible for colonels to sell junior commissions or their recommendation. A

regimental agent testifying before parliament in 1746 revealed that his colonel had

sold an adjutant's commission for £300 and two chaplaincies for £400 and £500

respectively.[71]

Officers' salaries may not have changed much during the eighteenth-century,

but there were nonetheless important changes related to the modernisation of the

army that impacted on rewards received. On the one hand, the globalisation of

warfare and expansion of Britain's empire that resulted from victory in the Seven

Years War created more opportunities for army officers to be employed abroad as

the number of regiments permanently based in colonial locations expanded

significantly.[72] Consequently, officers were more likely to remain on full pay during

peace than their earlier eighteenth-century counterparts and prize money

opportunities increased as most prize money was gained in India. On the other

hand, other aspects of the modernisation of the army may have adversely affected

the rewards of army officers. The move away from the entrepreneurial model of

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[68]"Report from the Committee Appointed to Confider The State of His Majesty's Land Forces and Marines, so far as relates to the Distribution of the Money Granted by Parliament for the Pay, - to the Number of Effective Men, and the Methods of Mustering, and Recruiting, the said Land Forces and Marines: Made upon Friday, the 6th Day of June 1746", reprinted in S. Lambert (ed.), *House of Commons Sessional Papers of the Eighteenth Century, Volume 16: George II Army 1739-1749*, (Wilmington, 1975), p. 187.
[69] Wood, "British Army Regimental Agency", p. 55.
[70] Grenfell, *The Men who Defend Us*, pp. 38-39.
[71] Guy, *Oeconomy*, p. 143.
[72] Marshall, "Empire and Opportunity", p. 124; Odintz, "The British Officer Corps", Chart I, p. 46; Callahan, *The East India Company*, pp. 36-38.

soldiering to more professional structures meant the crown increasingly tried to restrict profits derived from command. The legitimate profits captains derived from the management of their companies were restricted. A series of regulations between 1749 and 1766 reduced most flexible dividends to fixed annual allowances.   By 1766 captains' 'profits' were limited to an annual allowance of £20 for those in the infantry and £30 for the cavalry.[73]   Further reforms were to follow in the 1780s when 'warrant' and 'contingent' men were replaced by an annual allowance to the captain. Guards' captains, however, were exempt from these reforms and continued to receive flexible dividends. There were also attempts to eliminate some of the more dubious profits officers made. A number of regulations were introduced concerning the stoppages from soldiers pay (1717, 1721, 1732, 1749) and musters (1747) to prevent illegal stoppages and the falsifying of musters.[74]

The rewards officers gained from their service were used to meet several expenses. The most immediate costs for officers were daily living expenses which included breakfast and dinner, wine and beer, new clothing such as shirts and stockings, basic stationery and other miscellaneous items like hair powder and a soldier who acted as a servant. According to Simes, who wrote a contemporary guide for young officers, an ensign's yearly subsistence in the infantry of £54 15s should have been sufficient to cover these expenses of £46 11s 8d.[75]   Most junior officers did seem able to finance their daily living requirements through their salary.[76] John Moore, an 1800 operational general, remarked that the salary he received

[73] Guy, *Oeconomy*, Chapter 3.
[74] Guy, "The Army of the Georges", pp. 98-99.
[75] T. Simes, *The Military Medley: containing the most necessary rules and directions for attaining a competent knowledge of the art*, 2nd ed., (London, 1768), p. 197.
[76] Glover, *Wellington's army,* p. 42.

when he was a lieutenant was "... not more than enough to make me live with some little degree of comfort...."[77]

The problem for officers was not so much in meeting their daily living expenses, but rather in paying for what officers termed 'extraordinary expenses'.[78] The largest extraordinary expense was purchasing commissions. A 1765 regulation set out the prices at which commissions should be bought and sold. The full purchase prices, which essentially remained unchanged for the remainder of the period, varied from £400 for an ensign in an infantry regiment to £6,700 for a lieutenant colonel in the foot guards.[79] Serving officers buying a commission sold their existing commission which meant it was unusual to pay the full purchase price for commissions, except in the case of first commissions. The price paid for commissions therefore was the difference between the price of the new commission and the return gained from selling the old commission. These differences, or what contemporaries called 'succession prices', based on the regulation prices ranged from £150 for a lieutenant in the foot to £2,800 for a major in the foot guards.[80] However, it was not unusual for the actual market prices paid for commissions to be different from official prices. Depending on a number of demand and supply factors - such as desirability of where the regiment was stationed, the availability of non-purchase commissions and the price demanded by the seller - the market price could either be cheaper or more expensive than the regulation price.[81] For instance,

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[77] Captain John Moore to Dr John Moore, 3 May 1781, in G. Heath (ed.), *Records of the Moore Family,* (London, 1912), p. 45.
[78] Guy, "This Insulting Misfortune", p. 12.
[79] Williamson, *A Treatise of Military Finance,* 2nd Ed., pp. 41-44.
[80] *Ibid.*
[81] Odintz, "The British Officer Corps", pp. 314-315.

according to some authorities during peace time it was common for officers who purchased promotion to "almost always" pay more than the regulation price.[82]

Another major extraordinary expense arose from the fact officers were expected to supply their own regimentals, that is to say, military dress and equipment. This was a relatively large setup cost at the beginning of a career.   The initial clothing and equipment list of a new officer joining the third dragoons in 1811 included the following items:

1 regimental camlet coat
1 regimental great coat
2 regimental jackets
2 pair overalls
2 white regimental waistcoats
3 white waistcoats for evening dress
2 pair refs blue pantaloons
3 pair white pantaloons
1 regimental saddle and bridle
1 marching collar
1 coat case
1 valise
1 pack saddle
1 regimental hat
A set of regimental buff belts
A black patent leather sword belt
1 sabre
1 parade sword
1 parade sword knot
Pair of pistols
Pair of large regimental spars (sic)
2 Pair of small spars (sic) [83]

In 1799 Coronet Richard Jones wrote to Major General George Harris, a friend of his uncle's, requesting a loan of £100 as he did not have the means to buy the

[82] Otley, "The Origins and Recruitment", p. 101.
[83] CKS, U624 Harris, Correspondence, C41/2 Charles Harris to George Harris, 22 September 1811.

equipment necessary for a cavalry officer and could not join his regiment without it.[84]

Similarly, it has been estimated the initial equipment required of a new ensign cost as much as £100, nearly double an ensign's full year salary.[85] In addition, certain types of regiments, such as the cavalry or guards who had higher salaries, also entailed greater extraordinary expenses. In the cavalry some of these additional costs related to working with horses. Officers may have had to spend money on the purchase or breaking of horses.[86] The expense of regimentals was not limited to new officers alone. Most officers embarking on active service abroad usually required some additional equipment.[87] When Ensign Lister was ordered to America with the 10th foot in 1771 he spent £36 on equipment for colonial service.[88]

Apart from purchasing commissions and equipment, officers were faced with many other extraordinary expenses. Officers may have received allowances to recompense them for military duties involving extra expense, but these often proved inadequate. Additional expenses not covered by government allowances were fairly common for officers on recruiting duty or other activities requiring travel.[89] Officers recruiting paid new soldiers a bounty to enlist, but any losses accruing from bounty jumpers were the personal responsibility of the officer.[90] Further losses for recruiting officers could also result from the rejection of new soldiers by field officers back at the regiment, personnel lost in travelling to the regiment and the necessity of paying

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[84] CKS, U624 Harris, Official Papers, O633 Coronet Richard Jones to George Harris, 13 October 1799.
[85] Odintz, "The British Officer Corps", p. 262.
[86] CKS, U624 Harris, Accounts, A15/2 Charles Harris Account with Cox, 1811.
[87] James Wolfe to Edward Wolfe, 21 March 1743, in B. Wilson, *The Life and Letters of James Wolfe*, (London, 1909), pp. 42-43.
[88] Guy, "This Insulting Misfortune", p. 14.
[89] Guy, *Oeconomy*, chapter 5.
[90] *Ibid.*

a bounty during wartime that exceeded the official allowance in order to gain sufficient recruits. Officers who had frequent changes of location were also put to some personal expense.[91] Other extraordinary expenses were a direct result of the army's drinking and gambling culture.[92]   This was especially the case in foreign locations; as Moore remarked in 1781 about Gibraltar, "... a spirit for play prevailed in this garrison..."[93] Indeed, Conway notes that gambling ruined many officers stationed in America during the American war and led to some leaving the army.[94] The mess bills of the 73rd foot demonstrate this also entailed extra expense for those at home. Junior officers often had bets with higher ranking field officers for one or two bottles of wine. There were also a variety of fines levied on ensigns and lieutenants for such things as spilt wine or not wearing the proper uniform on duty.[95]

Levels of extraordinary expense typically increased with promotion. Captains of companies faced additional expenditure in managing their company. Company commanders arranged the supply of soldiers' necessaries or equipment, which were paid for through deductions from current pay or debited against future pay. Consequently, many troops were in debt to their captains, but it was not always possible for these debts to be paid off. Soldiers transferred from one regiment to another, called drafting, usually went with their necessaries, which might result in

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[91] CKS, U624 Harris, Correspondence, C106 Mrs Elizabeth Dyer to George Harris, 1 August 1782.
[92] Clayton, *The British Officer*, p. 64; A recent paper on Thomas Pitt provides an interesting account of the gambling and drinking culture that occurred while Pitt was serving as an officer in the Spanish War of Succession. See L. Neal, "Lord Londonderry (The Money Pitt), John Law and the Mississippi Company and South Sea Bubbles", *Paper for Seminar at the Institute for Historical Research, the Economic and Social History of the Pre-Modern World*, (1 Feb 2008), pp. 3-4.
[93] Captain John Moore to Dr John Moore, 3 May 1781, in Heath, *Records*, p. 44.
[94] Conway, "British Army Officers", p. 272.
[95] CKS, U624 Harris, Official Papers, O776/5 Book of Mess Fines 1811-1815.

losses for their captains. As Lieutenant Colonel Edward Windus complained in 1760:

"... Our Captains suffer greatly by giving these drafts... all are obliged to send them complete in necessaries, even those which are greatly in debt, which is so much loss to each captain..."[96]

Apart from drafting, losses from necessaries resulted from desertion. Senior regimental army officers, those ranked major and above, were subject to even higher extraordinary expenses caused by increasing social, regimental and paternal obligations. A colonel's expenses included entertainment, assisting unlucky troops and providing the bulk of the regiment's funds for music and horses.[97] A general had to provide a mess for his immediate staff and to entertain visiting senior officers and their staff. Moreover, if a general wanted to employ additional ADCs he had to pay for them from his private funds. This was particularly problematic if a general of modest means succeeded to the command of a rich aristocrat as he inherited his predecessor's pay roll. This happened to General Hope during the Peninsular War when he succeeded to the most expensive command, Graham's corps. In consequence, even though he received pay of £1,861 this was not able to cover his annual expenses of £2,140.[98]

III. Short-term rewards

The historical background to the rewards and costs of officers seems to suggest that an army career was a losing concern. Does the evidence drawn from

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[96] Lieutenant Colonel Edward Windus to Colonel Samuel Bagshawe, 23 November 1760, quoted in Guy, *Oeconomy*, Chapter 5, Footnote 55.
[97] Guy, *Oeconomy and Discipline*, p. 157; Guy, "The Colonel's Advantage", p. 36.
[98] Glover, *Wellington's army*, p. 149.

officers' personal accounts with their regimental agents support this hypothesis? The answer to this question is examined in two parts. In this section the "short-term" rewards and costs of army service are analysed. The term "short-term" is used as a frame of reference for the rewards and costs of army service at the beginning or middle stages of an army career, examining the returns of officers between the regimental ranks of ensign and lieutenant colonel. Then in the next section "long-term" rewards are analysed. These are defined as rewards and costs at the end of a career or after becoming general officers. They are "long-term" in the sense that these rewards could only usually be realised after twenty years' service in the army.

The first measure of the "short-term" rewards and costs of army service is the overall rewards and costs of the non-sample officers who were contemporaries of the future generals and served in the same regiments. These accounts provide a good comparative yardstick for the future generals' accounts because they are based on a much larger sample size and give a means to assess how representative future generals' accounts were for army officers generally, as the experience of future generals may have been different from officers who did not rise so high in the service. In addition, these accounts should also help to shed light on whether there was any difference between regiments. Differences in regiment type are hard to capture for the future generals because the only data on balances for generals when they held junior ranks was for those serving in the guards.

Table 23 shows the overall rewards and costs of the non-sample officers who held the regimental ranks from ensign to lieutenant colonel in the first foot guards, 12th and 20th foot regiments between 1765 and 1774.   The most reliable conclusions about the rewards and costs of these officers can be drawn for the ranks of ensign, lieutenant and captain. The reason for this is that these ranks contained the most number of officers and annual observations that were analysed. For example, in the Guard's ledger for this period there were accounts relating to 33 different ensigns covering 85 annual observations. On the other hand, it is very difficult to read too much into the major and lieutenant colonel accounts of foot officers as these covered so few individuals and annual observations. Moreover, it was also not possible to compare foot majors and lieutenant colonels to their guards' counterparts as all the majors and lieutenant colonels in the guards were also generals in the army and as such were not comparable.

Table 23: Annual rewards and costs of non-sample officers, 1765-1774

	Ensign		Lieutenant		Captain		Major	Lt. Colonel
	Guards	Foot	Guards	Foot	Guards	Foot	Foot	Foot
	£	£	£	£	£	£	£	£
Mean rewards	105	82	225	134	527	327	263	1499
Mean costs	103	78	209	132	503	291	218	935
Mean balance	2	4	16	2	24	37	45	564
% in credit	38	43	38	28	44	35	64	60
Standard deviation	28	26	212	84	108	243	56	1373
No. of officers	33	18	27	20	25	11	2	1
No. of years	85	80	78	97	95	54	11	5

Note: Standard deviation is the standard deviation of balances.

Source: Cox, A/56/e/70.0. Agent's Ledger 1st Foot Guards, 1770-1774, ff. 1-208; Cox A/56/e/89.0. Agent's Ledger 12th Foot, 1763-1768, ff. 1-177; Cox A/56/e/99.0. Agent's Ledger 20th Foot, 1763-1768, ff. 31-190.

The first conclusion that can be drawn is that these accounts clearly show that it was a struggle for junior officers, ensigns and lieutenants, to survive financially on the meagre rewards of their service. The average balance of ensigns was only £2 for the guards and £4 for the foot, while the mean balance as lieutenants for foot officers seemed to decline slightly. A rather odd finding was that lieutenants in the guards had a mean balance of £16, which was strikingly different to their balance as ensigns or for foot lieutenants. Further investigation reveals the unexpected mean balance for lieutenants in the guards was simply a case of an outlier affecting the mean values. This was a consequence of William Fauquier's 1771 account registering a credit balance of £1803 15s 9d, which was strikingly different to any other balance for guard's lieutenants. The next highest credit or debit balance was only £392 and after that £97. If this account was taken out and the data reworked without Fauquier's 1771 account guards' lieutenants would have registered a mean balance of minus £7. This adjusted mean balance for guards' lieutenants probably closer reflected the actual experience of most lieutenants in the guards. The financial challenge facing subalterns was also reflected in the percentage of balances that were in credit. Only one third of the time were ensigns or lieutenants accounts in credit. There seem to be two important points from the ensign and lieutenant accounts. First, the early stages of an army career posed many financial challenges for junior officers and for some it may have been a losing concern. Second, the first early promotions did not necessarily lead to greater financial rewards. Lieutenants in both the guards and foot seemed to be worse off than the ensigns. They had slightly lower mean balances and their accounts were not in credit as often as ensigns.

The struggle junior officers faced financially improved markedly once they obtained a captaincy. The mean balance of regimental captains in the foot and guards was significantly higher than junior officers. The average credit balance of captains was £24 for the guards and £37 for the foot. This was by no means a large sum, but was a significant improvement compared to junior officers. It provided officers with a more comfortable existence and perhaps the opportunity to save a small amount for the first time in their careers. Certainly, the future General John Moore anticipated being able to save some money after gaining a captaincy as he assured his father:

"…you have mistaken me very much when you imagined I thought it unbecoming a gentleman to save money, if he can do it out of his pay, and I hope in a very short time to convince you that nothing is so distant from my way of thinking…."[99]

However, captains did often have to cope with more variations in annual returns compared to junior officers. The percentage of accounts in credit did not necessarily improve for captains and there was a sharp increase in the standard deviation of account balances. Accordingly, ensigns in the foot had a higher proportion of their accounts in credit than captains.   Another point that emerges from a comparison of the captains and junior officer accounts is that serving in the guards may have bought lower rewards when costs are taken into account than serving in a normal infantry regiment. The average balance for those officers serving in the guards at the ranks of the ensign, lieutenant and captain was lower if outliers are excluded than their counterparts in the foot. Guards did receive higher income, but this did not compensate for the higher expenses they had to maintain as guards officers.

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[99] Captain John Moore to Dr John Moore, 3 May 1781, in Heath , *Records of the Moore Family*, p. 45.

It is difficult to draw too many conclusions from the accounts of the two infantry majors and one lieutenant colonel due to the small number of accounts and officers involved. One striking feature of these accounts is that there seems to be an improvement in the proportion of accounts that were in credit. For both the majors and lieutenant colonel their accounts were much more frequently in credit than the other officers. However, there did not seem to be much difference in the average balances of the majors vis-a-vis captains; majors' average balances were only £45 compared to £37 for captains.   Thus, it remains unclear whether advancing to major or lieutenant colonel resulted in a significantly improved financial position compared to captains.

How did the short-term rewards of the future general officers compare to these findings for the non-sample officers?   Table 24 sheds some light on this by providing a detailed breakdown of the rewards and costs the future generals had when serving from the ranks of ensign to lieutenant colonel during the mid to late eighteenth-century. This comparison is limited by the small sample size of the future generals' accounts. Nevertheless, the average balances and percentage of accounts in credit appear similar for the future generals compared to the non-sample officers. Most future generals when they were ensigns and lieutenants struggled to balance their accounts. A substantial improvement was then seen once these officers became captains, although the extent of this is different depending on regiment type. Serving in the guards was relatively more expensive than the infantry. One difference was that the future generals' accounts as lieutenant colonels did reveal promotion to this rank did not necessarily bring improved rewards

due to the high costs involved in maintaining this position. The largest loss in any one year was experienced by a lieutenant colonel.   In addition, the percentage of accounts in credit did not always improve for lieutenant colonels. In the infantry the proportion of accounts in credit for lieutenant colonels were the same as captains.

Table 24: Average annual rewards and costs of future generals, 1761-1793

	Ensign	Lieutenant	Captain		Major	Lt. Colonel	
	Guards	Guards	Guards	Foot	Foot	Dragoons	Foot
Rewards	£	£	£	£	£	£	£
Salary	89	132	274	168	204	462	284
Allowances	0	1	51	10	0	15	11
Profits	-	-	166	8	0	30	6
Appointments	0	29	32	0	0	0	192
Extraordinary	0	2	60	131	448	38	12
Private income	0	13	£23	36	75	0	114
sub-total							
-Rewards	89	177	606	353	727	545	619
Costs							
Himself	5	60	308	6	150	0	280
Salary	87	67	0	46	0	0	8
Extraordinary	0	6	108	32	43	21	178
Private bills	0	48	179	147	407	524	251
Other	0	5	0	0	0	0	113
sub-total							
-Costs	92	186	595	231	600	545	830
Balance	(5)	(9)	11	122	127	0	(211)
Balance ex private income	(5)	(22)	(12)	86	52	0	(325)
Private income % of rewards	0	7	4	10	10	0	18
% in credit	40	50	40	50	100	50	60
Standard deviation	34	76	61	382	-	14	850
No. of officers	2	3	2	2	1	1	3
No. of years	5	22	5	8	2	2	5

Note: Standard deviation is the standard deviation of balances. The account for the major covers two years, but it was unable to be separated into individual years and thus there is no standard deviation. Private bills are payments to unidentified civilian individuals.

Source: Appendix 4.3, Data Sources: Rewards

A detailed examination of the rewards and costs of the future generals that made up the average annual balances reveals some of the reasons for these

characteristics. A problem for officers in balancing their accounts, and one that was particularly acute for ensigns and lieutenants, was the delays in receiving their income. The accounts show most subsistence payments were received on time or in advance. However, the balance of salary, arrears, was received with substantial delays. Most arrears payments to ensigns were only received two years after they were due. Nor did the frequency of these payments improve with time or promotion, as most lieutenant colonels still only received their arrears several years after they were due. For instance, Lieutenant Colonel Musgrave received his 1783 arrears in 1785. This made it much more difficult for new officers to survive off their salary as in the early years they would only receive subsistence payments, whereas officers who had served for a few years could at least expect to receive back payments of arrears on a regular basis even though their current arrears were also delayed. The receipt of allowances also seemed highly uncertain and subject to great delays. The allowances appearing in the accounts were usually for baggage or forage, but the amounts received were less than would be expected under the rules of pay. Drummond as a lieutenant in the foot guards only received 100 days forage allowance for 1778 instead of the 200 days due to him. This seemed a common problem for many income streams, such as payments for equipment losses sustained during battle. Ludlow and Drummond, two future generals serving in the guards, did not receive compensation for equipment losses sustained on the continent in 1794 until 1797.

Apart from delays in receiving their salary and allowances, junior officers also suffered from lack of diversification in their income streams. Ensigns and lieutenants

were typically in receipt of only subsistence on a regular basis. Ludlow was the exception to this. He obtained an appointment as equerry to the Prince of Wales, which was a significant supplement to his income. However, there were few officers who obtained such appointments and thus his experience cannot be regarded as typical. In contrast, field officers, those ranked captain and higher, had many more income opportunities, which probably played a role in their improved balances. Captains, majors and lieutenant colonels had the possibility of receiving profits from the management of their company's 'stock purse'. In line with previous research on this topic, the accounts show infantry and cavalry officers gained little from this income source.[100] Indeed, the profits of infantry officers show that many captains did not even receive the statutory limit of £20 for their efforts. There was one exception to this rule. Guards officers profited nicely from the management of their companies as their dividends remained unrestricted. The average profit from this source for guards' captains of £166 vastly exceeded even the statutory limit for cavalry officers of £30. Field officers were also able to more frequently than junior officers augment their salaries with other appointments. Some of the lieutenant colonels acted as ADCs to generals or governors.

If the two main issues for junior officers were delays in payments and lack of income diversification, the challenges in balancing accounts senior officers faced were rather different. The problem for senior regimental officers was that promotion brought increased expense that far outpaced income growth. This is shown by comparing the income and expenses of captains in the foot to lieutenant colonels.

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[100] Hayes, "The Social and Professional Background", p. 164; Guy, *Oeconomy*, p. 34.

The average annual income of a captain was £317, if private income is excluded, which increased to £505 for lieutenant colonels, a rise of 59%. However, expenditure more than doubled creating a funding problem for most lieutenant colonels.

The increased expenses of lieutenant colonels were the result of different obligations compared to other officers. Many of the expenses in their accounts are not found in the accounts of middle ranking officers such as captains. To cite one example, two lieutenant colonels contributed annually sums ranging from £3 to £21 to help finance the regimental band. Another common expense for high ranking regimental officers was loans to junior and middle ranking officers. Cuyler as a major in the 55th foot received a payment for £199 10s from Lieutenant Charles Cathcart of the 23rd foot for money advanced him. In a similar fashion, Harris as a lieutenant colonel was repaid £13 14s in 1787 for money he had loaned to officers of his regiment. Bills made out to other officers could also be an indication of loans or debts with other officers. This category of extraordinary expenditure first occurs in the accounts of lieutenants and appears to escalate with each rank, although there are few observations. The aggregate cost to lieutenants of this item was only £2 11s 6d, which rose to £52 10s for captains, £77 2s for the major and £701 8s 1d for lieutenant colonels.

The financial difficulties faced by officers were also shown by flows of private capital.   The first point to note is that all ranks except ensigns supplemented their

military rewards with private income, which was an indication of the difficulty officers had in balancing their accounts. This was not a large amount; most officers only supplemented their military rewards between 4% and 10% of their total income. However, there was a difference in the private capital contributions lieutenant colonels and other officers made to their accounts. Lieutenant colonels deposited almost double the amount of private income into their accounts compared to other officers. This suggests that to become a lieutenant colonel more was required than merely military expertise. A sufficient level of private liquidity may have also been necessary to maintain the position of lieutenant colonel of a regiment.

This point can be further shown by an analysis of the accounts some of the future generals held with Drummonds bank when they were lieutenant colonels. Table 25 shows the three lieutenant colonels that had accounts with Drummonds in which military income can be identified. The income they received from their regimental agents was often substantial, as much as £1,500 per year. Yet, even this income would not have been sufficient to meet their expenses, and the bulk of income flowing through these accounts came from private sources. Even taking into account all sources of income, some of the time these accounts registered annual deficits. It may be that these accounts missed items of military income or were used for different purposes than a standard current account. Even so, the income and expenditure contained in these accounts suggest it might have been difficult for lieutenant colonels to maintain their positions without substantial private funds.

Table 25: Annual income and expenditure of future generals as lieutenant colonels with Drummonds

	Stanhope		Tarleton	Musgrave	
	1778	1781	1783	1785	1786
Income	£	£	£	£	£
Army salary	0	0	0	0	200
Regimental agent	1500	1000	449	150	0
Cash	0	2708	550	100	100
Private income	0	9830	0	239	220
sub-total					
-Income	1500	13538	999	489	520
Expenditure					
Himself	0	0	150	277	15
Family	0	0	0	15	0
Private bills	1500	13873	857	0	435
sub-total					
-Expenditure	1500	13873	1007	292	450
Balance	0	(335)	(8)	197	70
Balance ex private income	0	(10165)	(8)	(42)	(150)
Private income % of income	0	73	0	49	42

Note: Private bills are payments to unidentified civilian individuals.

Source: R.B.S Group Archives, Drummonds Customer Account Ledgers (hereafter DR), 427/78, 1778, f. 1397; DR 427/89, 1781, ff. 881-882, 899; DR 427/99, 1783, f. 1548; DR 427/106, 1785, f. 1129; DR 427/110, 1786, f. 1129.

The personal accounts of the non-sample officers and future generals suggest an army career in the short term was a losing concern for most officers. Even though some officers showed modest surpluses on their accounts these probably would have turned into deficits once private income contributions are taken into account. However, the short-term returns of service depended on rank and regiment type. The greatest financial challenges were for junior officers or senior officers in the regiment; whereas, captains, the middle ranking officers, typically seemed on average better off than both of these groups. In addition, the guards were more expensive to serve with than other regiments. These findings are broadly in line with the conclusions of other authors who have studied the eighteenth-century British

Army in great detail. Conway, for example, noted a captaincy for struggling junior officers gave them financial security.[101] The problems for these two groups of officers were different. Junior officers had to cope with delays in receiving an already modest income and lack of alternative income opportunities, while the problem senior officers faced was demands on their expenditure grew far greater than any rise in income.

The short-term losses of an army career would have created a near perpetual debt for many officers. Why were officers' bankers, the regimental agents, and more to the point the officers themselves willing to tolerate a career that seemed only to generate short-term losses? For most officers the debit balances were rather small. The average balance for the future generals who were lieutenants in the guards was only a debt of £9. Given the economic circumstances of the time it was not unexpected for businessmen to finance small short term deficits of their clients. It was common practice for private bankers to lend small amounts interest free to their clients.[102] One explanation for this was that England was an economy based on credit due in part to a scarcity of specie. Thus, it was not unusual for payments to be received with large delays as many people's wages were received substantially in arrears.[103] The regimental agents managed their risk by only advancing substantial amounts of money to officers from wealthy backgrounds. In the generals' accounts, for the ranks of ensign to lieutenant colonel, the only personal loan from the

[101] Conway, "British Army Officers", p. 275.
[102] Temin and Voth, "Private borrowing", p. 547.
[103] C. Muldrew, "Hard Food for Midas: cash and its social value in early modern England", *Past and Present*, 170 (Feb 2001), pp. 78-120; C. Muldrew, "Wages and the Problem of Monetary Scarcity in England", in J. Lucassen (Ed.), *Wages and Currency: global comparisons from antiquity to the 20th century*, (Bern, 2007), pp. 391-410.

regimental agent was to Ludlow, the son of an earl. The risk agents were taking on

in advancing small sums to officers appeared to be limited. Credit would be cut-off

and no further monies advanced if these sums became too large. Moreover, agents

had collateral against any loans through the receipt of future pay and purchase

transactions. As most officers purchased at least some of their commissions, loans

advanced to officers had additional collateral apart from future pay because ranks

had economic value.[104] Purchase also help to smooth liquidity issues and generated

an additional return for agents. Sellers of commissions would register substantial

surpluses in their accounts, which the agent could match against other accounts that

happened to be in deficit. This was particularly the case as the business of

regimental agents in this period was concentrated among few agents. Returns were

generated for agents on purchase transactions as agents received interest on sums

deposited for purchase until commissions were signed. This typically amounted to

several weeks' interest on sums usually in their thousands.[105]

IV. Long-term gains: officers

Officers tolerated the short-term losses of an army career for two reasons.

Firstly, for most officers financial gain was not the primary motivation in entering the

army. For some glory was more important than monetary rewards.[106] Indeed, it was

not unusual for officers to give up their share of prize-money or not take full financial

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[104] Bruce, *The Purchase System*, p. 62.
[105] Bruce, *The Purchase System*, p. 62; Captain Philip Browne to Thomas Browne, Letter No. 41, 23 April 1745, in J.H Leslie, "Letters of Captain Philip Browne", *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research*, 5 (20), (April-June 1926), p. 146.
[106] CKS, U624 Harris, Correspondence, C25 William Harris to George Harris, 14 June 1799.

advantage of their position.[107] For other officers the social benefits of being an

officer in the army may have compensated for any monetary losses. An army career

provided an outlet for those seeking status and honour. Officers often felt the high

status of an army career was important. Alexander Lindsay, for example, attributed

his army career a key role in transforming his fortune:

"...I succeeded to my family title before I was 21 years of age having soon after attained high military rank I got early access to the best circles of society and fashion in London. My patrimony was the estate of Balcarres the yearly gross rent of which did not exceed £1100 sterling charged with two jointures many thousand pounds of debt and 10 brothers and sisters whose interests it lay with me to protect and to forward in their several careers of life. With these disadvantages, I did not enjoy as a peer of the realm £150 yearly income; classed with the gay world and associated with the rich and brilliant I found myself exposed to every mortification. Under such a great weight I must have sank had I not felt and placed a due confidence on the great advantages of youth, rank and high military situation. My youth and title was one string to my bow, my rank in the army furnished another. The first I presume in some degree forwarded my suit with your mother and gave me the estate of Haigh. The other placed me in the government of Jamaica...."[108]

Nicholas Delacherois, a junior officer in the 9th foot during the mid-eighteenth

century, was aiming to "…gain empty titles at the risque of my life and separation

from all my friends…" which he thought preferable to his brother's career who

worked at home in the family business as a linen manufacturer.[109] A commission in

the army during the eighteenth-century gave every officer the status of a

gentleman.[110] This status was institutionalised by the army who made it a serious

offence to socialise with those lower down the social hierarchy. Two officers found

this out to their cost in 1761 when they were court martialled for "not getting up and

leaving when they discovered the nature of the company they were dining with".[111]

Officers' high status was closely related to the fact that originally they were drawn

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[107] ODNB, s.v. Medows, William (1738-1813), Abercromby, Robert (1740-1827); Bassett, "The Purchase System", p. 47.

[108] The National Library of Scotland (hereafter NLS), Account 9769 Papers of Alexander Lindsay, 6th Earl of Balcarres, Manuscript Volumes, 23/14/14 Aggrandising Fund, Earl of Balcarres to Lord Lindsay, 11 January 1818, ff. 5-6.

[109] Quoted in Guy, "This Insulting Misfortune", p.20.

[630.] A.N Gilbert, "Law and Honour among 18th century British Army Officers", *The Historical Journal*, 19 (1), (Mar 1976), p. 75; Odintz, "The British Officer Corps", p. 178.

[111] Gilbert, "Law and Honour", p. 85.

from the aristocracy.[112] In addition, the status of officers may have also increased over time with Britain's military success. In the early eighteenth-century there was always some public discontent about the threat to civil peace of having a standing army. However, success in the Seven Years War transformed the image of the army in the eyes of the public. This was shown by the immortalisation of the heroic deeds of generals who had participated in this war. Thus, two of the best-selling mid eighteenth-century pieces of art were Edward Penny's painting *The Marquess of Granby Relieving a Sick Soldier* and Benjamin West's *Death of General Wolfe.*[113] By the Napoleonic wars one manifestation of this public support was that street celebrations often followed news of victories.[114]

Secondly, a long career in the army generated long-term rewards that outweighed short-term losses. In the eighteenth-century army there were no pensions for long service, but officers could fund retirement through selling their commissions. The long-term rewards of 'selling out' depended on a variety of factors including: exit rank, sale prices of commissions, short-term losses generated from army service and the number of commissions gained through purchase. Nevertheless, 'selling out' usually resulted in a capital gain and thus provided a financial incentive for entering the army.[115] According to Park and Nafziger, this financial incentive attracted many new officers who otherwise would not have normally considered an army career.[116]

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[112] Storrs and Scott, "The Military Revolution", pp. 1-41; Roy, "The Profession of Arms", p. 184.
[113] ODNB, s.v. Manners, John, Marquess of Granby (1721–1770).
[114] Clayton, *The British Officer,* pp. 88-89.
[115] Ackroyd et al, *Advancing with the Army*, p. 217; Houlding, *Fit for Service*, p. 100; Williams, "A study", pp. 101-102; Park and Nafziger, *The British military*, p. 13; Glover, *Wellington's army*, p. 21.
[116] Park and Nafziger, *The British military*, p. 13.

It is possible to estimate the long-term returns from 'selling out' if some assumptions are made regarding the factors that affected the long-term rewards of such transactions. In order to calculate the long-term rewards of 'selling out' the following assumptions were made:

(1) Short-term returns: Table 23 showed the average annual balances of infantry officers' accounts for ensigns, lieutenants, captains and majors were respectively £4, £2, £37 and £45. However, these were gross and not net returns as no account was taken of private capital contributions. This is an important point as the future generals' accounts showed most ranks supplemented their military pay with private capital. Private capital contributions were usually up to 10% of total income. Hence, the annual net short-term returns are assumed to be gross returns less a deduction of 10% of total gross income as an allowance for private capital. This produces average net annual returns of minus £4 for ensigns, minus £12 for lieutenants, £4 for captains and £19 for majors. The short-term return over the course of a career also depends on the length of time spent at each rank. This is taken from Glover's work on the length of time it took to be promoted by seniority, the slowest method of regimental promotion, during the Napoleonic wars. According to Glover, an officer promoted by seniority spent the following duration at the various ranks: ensign (two years), lieutenant (seven years), and captain (nine years).[117] It could also be argued a discount rate should be applied to calculate compound interest on losses. However, the regimental agents did not typically charge interest on the small losses that accrued in

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[117] *Glover, Wellington's army,* Table B, p. 84.

most accounts. In the accounts examined interest was only charged on long-term loans to officers for relatively large amounts usually exceeding £100.

(2) Market prices of commissions: It is difficult to estimate the actual market prices that officers paid for purchasing their commissions as this information is usually only available in personal correspondence or private accounts. Using a combination of these sources, appendix 5 details the market prices paid for 23 different commission transactions for lieutenants, captains and majors at various points in the eighteenth-century. This is a small sample size to base the market prices of commissions on as there were only either six or eleven transactions per rank. Nevertheless, it does provide a sense of the prices officers paid for commissions at this time. The market prices officers paid for each rank varied greatly depending on the rank and whether it was war or peace. The most junior commissions were usually bought at their regulation price, except on occasion during wartime when it appeared possible to gain a substantial discount to these prices. In contrast, captaincies and majorities seemed to be most commonly purchased at a significant premium. For many officers this was in the region of 30%, although this premium could double during peace. War did provide some opportunity to get these highly sought-after vacancies much more cheaply. It was possible at this time to sometimes purchase near the regulation price or perhaps at best at a 10% discount.   The assumed market price for the purchase or sale of commissions is the average premium paid per rank plus the regulation price of that rank in a foot regiment plus an allowance for transaction costs as buyers and sellers paid 5% of the transaction cost to the Chelsea Hospital.[118]   The average premiums paid for

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[118] Scouller, "Purchase of Commissions", p. 220; Guy, *Oeconomy and Discipline,* Chapter 4.

the different ranks were as follows: lieutenant -7%, captain 24% and major 38%.

(3) Ranks purchased: It is assumed priority of ranks to be purchased were firstly captain, followed by major and then lieutenant based on table 18.

(4) Length of career: It is also assumed officers stayed in the army for twenty years. Officers could only 'sell out' for three reasons according to regulations introduced in 1711: with Her Majesty's permission under the Royal Sign Manual, officers with twenty years' service or disabled officers.[119] Thus, it is unlikely officers would have sold their commissions until they had served at least twenty years.[120] In addition, Odintz's research on infantry officers showed officers typically had long careers. Nearly half of the officers serving in his sample regiments stayed in the army for at least fifteen years.[121] This was particularly the case for officers who made it to the rank of captain or major as "…holders of captaincies and majorities showed no great disposition to leave the service, except when elderly…."[122]

(5) All officers gained at least one 'free' vacancy before leaving the army. It is thought that one third of all commissions in the army were obtained through non-purchase methods.[123]   Hence, it would have been a rare officer who did not obtain at least one of their commissions without purchase.

[119] Scouller, "Purchase of Commissions", p. 220.
[120] Glover, *Wellington's army*, p. 21.
[121] Odintz, "The British Officer Corps", Chart XII, p. 330.
[122] Glover, "Purchase", p. 356.
[123] Brumwell, *Redcoats,* p. 84.

The long-term returns of three ranks are calculated, lieutenants, captains and majors. These three ranks were the final destinations of most officers serving in the army. Odintz found 70% of the eighteenth-century officers he studied exited at the ranks of lieutenant, captain and major.[124] Most infantry officers left the army at captain and if relatively successful major.   As Odintz put it:

"...the average gentry officer could probably expect to reach the rank of captain if he survived and if he was willing to stay in long enough, and, with a bit of luck, a majority was hardly out of the question...."[125]

On the other hand, the unsuccessful officer usually left the army at lieutenant. The lack of success for those retiring at lieutenant was signified by the fact that most officers raised from the ranks, who were usually from lower social groups than other officers, generally retired at the rank of lieutenant.[126]

Table 26 shows officers who served for twenty years in the army should have been able to generate a long-term capital gain through selling their commission. This would have more than compensated for any short-term career losses and allowed them to leave the army with some profit. The extent of this gain did vary depending on levels of career success. The unsuccessful officers retiring at lieutenant only generated a small long-term return from their careers; this was approximately equivalent to one and half years full-time pay as a lieutenant on the English establishment. Yet, most officers left the army at captain, a rank which would have provided a retirement fund of at least £857.

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[124] Odintz, "The British Officer Corps", Chart XV, p. 340.
[125] *Ibid.,* p. 341.
[126] Hayes,"The Social and Professional Background", p. 100.

Table 26: Estimated long-term returns of mid to late eighteenth-century infantry officers

	Commissions purchased:			
Exit rank:	0	1	2	3
Lieutenant	£	£	£	£
Short-term loss	(224)	(224)	-	-
Commission profit	485	339	-	-
Long-term return	261	115	-	-
Captain				
Short-term loss	(48)	(48)	(48)	-
Commission profit	1767	1051	905	-
Long-term return	1719	1003	857	-
Major				
Short-term loss	(18)	(18)	(18)	(18)
Commission profit	3408	2692	1098	952
Long-term return	3390	2674	1080	934

Source:
Short-term loss: Table 23; Glover, *Wellington's army*, Table B, p. 84.
Commission profit: Appendix 5, Market Prices of Commissions.

This was equal to five years full-time pay, a decent retirement pot. If an officer made it all the way to major the profit made on retiring by selling their commission could even be as much as three times the amount of captains.

How did a captain gain a profit of at least £857 from selling his commission? At the end of his career the captain would have sold his commission at a 24% premium to the regulation price of £1,500 receiving £1,767 for the sale after deductions were made for the Chelsea Hospital. His commission profits were not only determined by this final sale price, but also by the prices he paid for the commissions he purchased during the course of his career. As the captain making the least amount of profit purchased two commissions, it is assumed he purchased his captaincy and lieutenancy and gained his ensigncy 'free' based on the most popular ranks officers purchased. After initial entry to the army officers promoted by

purchase did not pay the full regulation or market price, but a succession price. This was the difference between the value of their current rank and the value of the rank they were promoted to. The succession price for a lieutenancy was £150, but as the future captain was able to purchase this at a 7% discount he only paid £139, which increased to £146 as a 5% contribution was made to the Chelsea Hospital on the market price. To purchase his captaincy he had to pay a 24% premium to the succession price of £550 entailing an overall cost of £716 including contributions to Chelsea Hospital. His net profit from these commission sales was the £1,767 he gained from 'selling out' less £862, the succession costs of his lieutenancy and captaincy, resulting in an overall gain of £905. However, over the course of his career he also had to sustain short-term losses from serving in the army. Prior to becoming a captain, he spent two years at ensign and seven years at lieutenant resulting in cumulative losses of £8 and £84 respectively. The remaining eleven years of his career at captain he was able to make up some of these losses and reduced the overall loss from his career to only £48. The £48 career loss reduced his overall profit from the sale of his commission to £857.

Even if an officer gained a captaincy it was not guaranteed he would make a long-term capital gain from 'selling out' as an army career involved some risk. Many officers lost their lives in the course of their service through being killed in action, disease and accidents. A study of 394 officers based on four mid-eighteenth-century infantry regiments showed that during the American war 31 of these officers died of disease, seventeen from action, three from accidents and one from a duel.[127]   If

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[127] Odintz, "The British Officer Corps", p. 301.

these figures are representative of the army generally this provides a fatality rate among officers of approximately 15%. Of course, there were significant variations between fatality rates of regiments depending on where regiments were based and how much active of service they saw. On the one hand, regiments based in the colonies often had extremely high mortality rates. In the 1790s the 13th Light Dragoons spent 30 months in the West Indies and out of the 31 officers that served with them there only twelve returned alive.[128] On the other hand, the guards' regiments spent half their time in England. In the event of an officer's death the sums invested in commissions were lost. However, this was not a total loss for many officers as their widows received pensions. For a captain in 1717 this was £30 per year, which increased to £40 in 1806.[129] Service could also result in injury leading to early retirement. In the event of injury most officers were able to 'sell out' as disability was one of the three conditions under which officers were permitted to sell their commissions.[130]

Another option for injured officers was to retire on half pay instead of selling their commissions. Half pay literally gave officers half their yearly salary. Captains received £86 per annum, lieutenants £40 and ensigns £31.[131] The purpose of half pay was not to fund retirement as it was meant to be for "…maintaining gentleman in the navy and army until the necessities of State required their services…."[132]

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[128] Glover, "Purchase", p. 356.
[129] "Report from the committee appointed to consider the distribution of the money, 1746", taken from S. Lambert (ed.), *House of Commons Sessional Papers of the Eighteenth Century, Volume 16: George II Army 1739-1749*, (Wilmington, 1975), p. 151; CKS, U624 Harris, Official Papers, O722 Circular regarding increased pay, 15 July 1806.
[130] Scouller, "Purchase of Commissions", p. 220.
[131] Williamson, *A Treatise of Military Finance*, 1st Ed., p. 25.
[132] Quoted in Odintz, "The British Officer Corps", p. 348.

However, exceptions were made for officers forced to retire due to injury or age. According to *The King's Regulations* of 1837, officers could request to retire on half pay if they were unfit for active service due to wounds, illness or infirmity caused by age. This request had to be authorised by their regimental colonel and the regiment's doctor. In addition, retiring on half pay due to age required at least 25 years' service.[133] In return for receiving half pay retiring officers forfeited all future claims to further employment, rank and widows pensions.[134] Half pay was a useful supplement to other income streams, but did not provide a sufficient amount of money to live off. One lieutenant complained half pay was "…much too hard to live on, having a wife and family to maintain out of the small pittance of £40 per annum…."[135] In exceptional cases it was possible for some officers to retire on full pay. This depended on making private financial arrangements with the remaining officers of the regiment who benefited from the officer retiring. One such scheme was having the junior officers giving a portion of their pay to support the retiring officer or the most recent ensign serving without pay.[136]

V. Long-term gains: generals

The long-term gains from an army career were potentially much greater for the very successful officers in the army who made it all the way to operational general. Generals who gained command or other appointments could be given

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[133] Biddulph, "The Era of Army Purchase", p. 228.
[134] *The King's Regulations*.
[135] Quoted in Odintz, "The British Officer Corps", p. 348.
[136] Guy, *Oeconomy and Discipline*, Chapter 4.

opportunities to make large profits either directly or indirectly from their military service. These long term rewards, however, were by no means certain. For one thing, most officers did not become generals with command appointments. In the Napoleonic period there were over 10,000 officers serving in the army, but only 200 posts on the staff as generals.[137] Thus, it was only 2% of officers at any one time that served as operational generals.   For another thing, even obtaining prestigious command appointments did not necessarily produce a profit for the generals involved. In addition, the gains from generalship could only be realised through very long careers as it took the average operational general between 25 and 35 years to gain the first substantive general rank (see table 17).

   The variability of returns among general officers is shown by table 27 outlining the average annual rewards and costs of general officers.   Generals serving in the dragoons and life guards had accounts that registered average annual deficits and many of the other generals only balanced their accounts through large contributions of private capital. The percentage of accounts in credit indicated some generals had accounts less often in credit than junior officers. In a similar fashion to lieutenant colonels, promotion to general at times resulted in a worsening short term financial position due to the extra costs involved in command.

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[137] Glover, *Wellington's army*, pp. 36, 147.

Table 27: Average annual rewards and costs of generals, 1758-1810

	Field officer		Colonel			
	F. Guards	Dragoons	F. Guards	Foot	L. Guards	Dragoons
Rewards	£	£	£	£	£	£
Salary	362	462	913	528	606	812
Allowances	57	0	476	301	508	53
Profits	267	0	1427	475	1115	687
Appointments	355	0	2062	630	399	513
Extraordinary	71	159	143	108	59	0
Private income	12	0	714	210	708	496
sub-total						
-Rewards	1124	621	5735	2252	3395	2561
Costs						
Himself	196	0	2261	404	0	33
Salary	4	0	0	0	0	0
Extraordinary	120	9	1754	447	209	97
Private bills	601	583	887	1275	3154	2926
Other	8	0	299	38	63	0
sub-total						
-Costs	929	592	5201	2164	3426	3056
Balance	195	29	534	88	(31)	(495)
Balance ex private income	183	29	(180)	(122)	(739)	(991)
Private income % of rewards	1	0	12	9	21	19
% in credit	71	50	75	60	39	33
Standard deviation	543	219	1145	1620	1879	2990
No. of officers	3	1	1	4	1	1
No. of years	17	2	8	15	13	6

Note: Standard deviation is the standard deviation of balances. Private bills are payments to unidentified civilian individuals. Field officer and colonel were the regimental ranks of the different generals. The life guards were known as the horse guards until 1788.

Source: Appendix 4.3, Data Sources: Rewards

Profitability seemed to vary depending on the type of regimental appointment the generals held. Generals who were field officers in their regiment consistently produced better financial returns from their service than those who were regimental colonels. This was particularly the case for those serving in the foot guards. They had a higher average annual balance; more often had accounts in credit and lower volatility of yearly returns as measured by the standard deviation of balances. This seemed to be the result of income growth for once outpacing the growth of

expenditure. Generals who were field officers in the foot guards experienced significant income growth through command appointments as generals and the flexible profits that guards officers benefited from. The guards' generals gained almost as much reward from command appointments as from their salary. In addition, changes in the scale of warfare increased their profits from their companies due to the benefits of flexible dividends. This allowed officers such as Drummond to gain as much as £891 from company profits in 1800 when infantry captains were still restricted to £20 at most. Their improved financial position was demonstrated through the flows of private capital and debt repayments. 1800 operational generals serving in the guards as field officers and generals in the army only supplemented their military income on average with £12 of private capital, the lowest contribution for any rank. Their improved financial position also allowed the only field officer with a personal loan from his regimental agent, Ludlow, to pay off his debt.   Before Ludlow was a general he was only able to meet the yearly interest repayments of £100 on his loan of £2,000, but by 1801 he had completely repaid the principal and interest of his loan.

In contrast, promotion did not necessarily produce profits for many generals that were also regimental colonels. Hayes claimed that some regimental colonels with landed property received as much income from the military as they did from their estates.[138] This may have been true for the generals who were regimental colonels as well. They certainly had large incomes; their annual rewards averaged between £2,252 and £5,735. Yet, these high incomes from the army did not usually

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[138] Hayes,"The Social and Professional Background", p. 131.

produce a profit. There were, however, exceptions to this. Fox, as regimental colonel of the 10th foot, showed profits in his accounts for three out of four years, a cumulative net gain that exceeded £1,000. The reason many regimental colonels who were generals struggled to balance their accounts was due to expenditure increasing at a far greater rate than income. This was shown by the dramatic rate of expansion in the cost of private bills and extraordinary items. Take the expenditure on these items, for example, for generals that served in the foot. The cost of private bills and extraordinary items to lieutenant colonels in the foot was £251 and £178 respectively (table 24), which increased to £1,275 and £447 as generals, a far greater rate of increase than any similar income growth. The greater obligations of regimental colonels meant these officers spent far more on similar items of expenditure compared to other ranks. Moore as colonel of a foot regiment spent three times more on the band than any lieutenant colonel.

There were also many more categories of expenditure the generals who were regimental colonels were subject to. Some of this expenditure may have been discretionary depending on the generosity of the particular colonel. Ligonier for one, as colonel of the foot guards, paid an annual gratuity to the sergeant majors of his regiment. However, much of the expenditure probably resulted from a funding gap between government subsidy and actual requirements for running the regiment. The payments by many of the general officers for 'regimental charges' was probably one such example of this. Another example of this funding gap was that colonels had to finance the excess transport costs of sending clothing to regiments as official

allowances were not always sufficient to cover the entire cost of transport.[139]

Finally, regimental colonels as proprietors of regiments took on additional risks. They personally appointed the regimental agent and paymaster to handle the financial administration of their regiment. In the event that any losses resulted from these appointments colonels were personally liable to make good any shortfall. This happened most commonly in the event of death, but also occurred through fraudulent activity. In 1758 Ligonier's regimental agent, Henry Taylor, died leaving the subsistence of officers and companies unpaid. Ligonier was only able to meet the pay shortfall by depositing £3,000 of private income into his account. Taylor's executors were supposed to repay the subsistence, but Ligonier's accounts only show him receiving £620 out of £4,101 owed leaving him with a large loss. Another of the 1747 sample generals, Lieutenant General Philip Anstruther, lost the majority of his wealth when his regimental agent, Captain Wilson, went bankrupt in 1751.[140] This problem was not entirely isolated to 1747 generals. Alexander Lindsay suffered a similar problem when the regimental paymaster of the 63rd foot, Zeller, died owing debts to the government of £1,200.[141] His regimental agent attempted to recover these losses without success from the government leaving Lindsay out of pocket.[142]

Appointment to regimental colonel may have brought greater expenditure, but it also provided opportunities to make large profits on occasion. This is not

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[139] NLS, Account 9769 Lindsay, General Business Correspondence, 23/9/284 Thomas Fowlis to Earl of Balcarres, 9 May 1820; CKS, U624 Harris, Official Papers, O812 Messrs Greenwood Cox to Lord Harris, 24 March 1827.

[140] Guy, "The Colonel's Advantage", p. 31.

[141] NLS, Account 9769 Lindsay, General Business Correspondence, 23/9/255 Thomas Fowlis to Earl of Balcarres, 1 December 1810.

[142] NLS, Account 9769 Lindsay, General Business Correspondence, 23/9/256 copy of letter from Mr Merry, Deputy Secretary at War, to Thomas Fowlis, 7 December 1810, enclosed in Thomas Fowlis to Earl of Balcarres, 8 December 1810.

surprising as Park and Nafziger maintain the main benefit of a colonelcy was the financial gains to be made from it.[143] One such area of potential profitability came from the management of their regiment's clothing and equipment provision. The colonel's dividend from managing clothing varied greatly due to the length of the clothing cycle and delays in payments. In consequence, some colonels only gained income from the management of clothing on an irregular basis. The accounts of General Fox as colonel of the 10th foot, for example, show him only receiving profits from clothing in his personal account one year out for four. Even given these difficulties many colonels made as much money from the management of their clothing as from their salary as the high level of income from profits in table 27 shows.

Other potential command profits, some of which were only quasi-legitimate at best, that increased colonel's income included pocketing officers' vacant pay and selling offices. These activities were probably more widespread for 1747 generals compared to their later counterparts who were subject to greater levels of regulation. Ligonier's accounts, the only 1747 general featured, who was regimental colonel of the foot guards, show him pocketing vacant pay every year from 1758 to 1762 with amounts ranging from £12 to £243. Vacant pay was public money and if colonels were caught with money received from this source they were either required to repay it or if fraud was involved they might even be court martialled.[144] When it was discovered that Lieutenant General Wolfe, another 1747 general, had increased his income over several years through vacant pay, a discovery which was only made

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[143] Park and Nafziger, *The British Military*, p. 25.
[144] NA, WO 4/47, War Office: Secretary at War Out Letters, 1749-1751, Henry Fox to Lieutenant-General Wolfe, 5 February 1751, 7 February 1751, ff. 399, 407.

due to the complaints of his late agent's executor, the war office insisted he repay the £1,217 in vacant pay he had received.[145] Brigadier General Jefferys was dealt with even more severely as his gains from vacant pay also involved fraud. He obtained the pay of a second lieutenant who never actually served or even joined his regiment of marines by falsifying muster rolls, which led to his court martial and cashiering from the army.[146] In contrast to the early period, it has not been possible to locate any evidence from either the Board of General Officers or court martial proceedings linking 1800 generals to similar activities.[147] Of course, the absence of evidence does not necessarily mean there was no opportunistic behaviour. However, the increasing number of regulations aimed at preventing rent seeking (see regulations on stoppages from soldiers pay 1717, 1721, 1732, 1749 and musters 1747) probably meant gains from these activities were reduced.[148]

Another advantage early period officers may have had was to do with inflation. Guy, commenting on the financial difficulties of many officers, claimed "...The inflationary torrent could only be ridden with confidence only by men who had already enjoyed access to a private income..."[149] The impact of inflation on the operational generals, however, was probably not as great as Guy's statement would suggest. There are two important points here. Firstly, for most of the eighteenth-century real prices were trendless apart from a marked acceleration in inflation

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[145] NA, WO 4/47, Secretary at War Out Letters, Henry Fox to Lieutenant-General Wolfe, 26 January 1751, 5 February 1751, 7 February 1751, ff. 393, 399, 407.

[146] NA, WO 4/42, War Office: Secretary at War Out Letters, 1746, Henry Fox to Judge Advocate General, 25 August 1746, f. 207; NA, WO71/19, General Courts Martial, 1746-1747, Court-martial of Brigadier Jeffreys, 22 August 1746, , ff. 180-188.

[147] NA., WO 71/10-12, Proceedings of the Board of General Officers, 1759-1807; WO71/20-33, General Courts Martial, 1746-1796. No evidence was found of this from either the Cox ledgers or in the extensive collection of military and personal documents from George Harris and Alexander Lindsay.

[148] For more on these regulations see Guy, "The Army of the Georges", pp. 98-99.

[149] Guy, *Oeconomy and Discipline,* p. 163.

during the 1790s. This increase in inflation did not last and real prices had almost recovered to pre-1790 levels by 1810.[150] Secondly, the effect of rising prices on the middling sort or the more affluent members of society such as generals may be overestimated. Many studies focus on measuring inflation mainly through changes in the prices of staple foods.[151] Certainly, it is true that prices of staple foods rose between 1740 and 1815. However, middle income groups spent more on servants, clothing and other luxuries than food. The top 20% of households in 1688 spent only 37% of their income on food compared to 48% on clothing and servants alone. In contrast, the bottom 40% of households for the same period spent 69% of their budget on food.[152] This is important because while food prices rose between 1740 and 1815, the cost of other goods such as clothing and servants tended to decline.[153] Hence, a high income lifestyle was becoming cheaper. Consequently, the fall in prices of other goods that army officers consumed may have to some extent offset any rises in food prices.

Apart from profits, generals gained financially from appointments to general command and governorships. All the generals in table 27 with one exception received income from holding a general command position. The level of command and income generated from these roles varied quite significantly between the generals. At the peak was Ligonier who as Commander in Chief of the English establishment earned a salary of £3,375 in 1760 alone. At the other end were

[150] G. Clark, "The Condition of the Working Class in England, 1209-2004", *Journal of Political Economy*, 113 (2005), Figure 9, p. 1319.

[151] See for example the basket of goods Phelps Brown and Hopkins use in E.H Phelps Brown and S. Hopkins, "Builders' Wage-rates, Prices and Population: some further evidence", *Economica*, 26 (101), (1959), pp. 18-37.

[152] P.T Hoffman, D.S Jacks, P.A Levin and P.H Lindert, "Real Inequality in Europe since 1500", *The Journal of Economic History*, 62 (2), (June, 2002), Table 1, p. 326.

[153] *Ibid.,* pp. 329-335.

generals such as Moore whose salary as major general amounted to £615 in 1804. One drawback of these roles was that they usually only lasted during wartime so peace could bring a dramatic reduction in general's income. Thus, Garth earned £558 in 1783 as a brigadier general in North America, but was not to receive a similar addition to his income for general command until 1795.

The other main income stream from appointments was derived from gaining a role as a lieutenant governor or governor within Britain or abroad. The nature of governorships varied widely, ranging from governor of large districts or even countries to small forts. This was reflected in the income paid for the different positions. The army list of 1740, which detailed the different annual income received from 38 governorships and 27 lieutenant governorships, showed the average annual income for these positions was respectively £419 and £233.[154] There was a wide range of variation in income from governorships; the generals' accounts showed annual income from governorships ranging from £136 for a lieutenant governorship of Stirling Castle to £1,212 as Governor of Plymouth.

Responsibilities of different governorships also varied greatly. Many of these governorships were sinecures that did not require the holders to even visit their posts. For instance, Strutt was appointed Governor of Quebec in 1800 after 'selling out' and remained in this post until his death in 1848 despite never visiting Canada. Other governorships were genuine military appointments requiring attention to duty.

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[154] *A List of the Colonels, Lieutenant Colonels, Majors, Captains, Lieutenants and Ensigns of His Majesty's Forces*, (London, 1740).

James Henry Craig as Governor in Chief and Captain General of British North America played an active part in the political and military life of Canada. A governorship was a reasonably certain income stream for an operational general as only a few commanding generals were not rewarded with governorships. Moreover, many operational generals held these appointments for very long periods of time. Strutt was the extreme example of this, but it was common for generals to hold governorships for decades. Burrard, for instance, held the governorship of Calshot Castle, between 1787 and 1813.[155] Generals from both periods held a similar number of appointments as governors, but the geographical distribution of appointments was quite different. The governorships of 1747 generals were usually in the UK and Europe, whereas the globalisation of warfare resulted in more opportunities for appointments to be located abroad in the later period. In addition, most of the foreign governorships held by generals in the 1800 sample were in active military commands.

One problem in gaining an accurate measure of the rewards that generals gained from active command and governorships is the bias of Cox's accounts towards the guards, who were frequently stationed at home, and the fact that income from foreign appointments probably flowed through the hands of local agents on the spot, rather than regimental agents. It therefore seems likely that the income contained in Cox's accounts underestimates actual gains for those stationed abroad. This was especially the case as income while stationed abroad could be derived through private as well as public activities. This problem can be overcome

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[155] ODNB, s.v. Burrard, Harry (1755-1813).

somewhat by examining the few surviving accounts with their local agents of those who served abroad. The accounts of George Harris, who was commander in chief of the Madras army in India during the 1790s, and Alexander Lindsay, 6th Earl of Balcarres, who held the position of lieutenant governor of Jamaica between 1795 and 1801, revealed that generals holding command or governorship appointments in the colonies could generate substantial profits from their positions.

Active service in the colonies could certainly bring greater financial rewards than serving in Europe.   The correspondence of officers stationed in places such as India places strong emphasis on the financial motives for accepting such positions or staying in often hostile climates. As Major Floyd stated in 1781:

"...I don't expect to die in India, & I am persuaded I shall make a fortune. The climate of Madras, where we go, is exceedingly fine & favorable. My rank will be very considerable in India, & I hope to return & enjoy many social hours with you & some others of my friends. Staying at home offered me no chance of rising above the crowd, or of ever overcoming that miserable penury, myself & my family have hitherto been exposed to. I appear'd contented because it was in vain to complain, but I felt my situation, & was determined to seize the first opportunity that offered of changeing it."[156]

Harris calculated serving in Bengal would at least double his capital compared to staying in Europe. [157] In contemplating his return to India after spending some time at home he looked forward to the "...princely income and great command..." his rank gave him.[158]

The salary and allowances of command positions for many locations in the colonies were much higher than in Europe. As commander of the forces in North

[156] Major J. Floyd to Lord Herbert, 17 October 1781, in Herbert, *The Pembroke papers*, p. 167.
[157] CKS, U624 Harris, Correspondence, C1/2 George Harris to Anne Harris, June 30 1789.
[158] CKS, U624 Harris, Correspondence, C233 Letter Book, 1788-1810, George Harris to Anne Harris, June 1792.

Britain, Cathcart received an annual salary of £1,210 for 1808 compared to £500 per month for Harris and Clarke as local commanders in chief in India at the turn of the nineteenth-century.[159]   There were also additional profit opportunities. Commanding officers in India benefited from profits derived from bazaars, the main means of victualling the East India Company's army in India, and field officers in Bengal shared revenue money.[160]   In the early nineteenth-century bazaar and revenue profits were abolished suggesting officers were obtaining excess profits from these sources.

Serving overseas also provided opportunities to receive prize money from successful campaigns. These gains very much favoured the highest ranks. It was the custom to allocate one eighth of any prizes taken to the commanding officer, who was usually, although not always, a general.[161]   The army had no formal rules for the division of prize money gains and so prize divisions, as an 1803 report by the Board of General Officers noted, "... instead of being the result of a preconceived and well digested plan, has been entirely accidental..."[162]   The exact division of prize money was left up to the commanders of operations and as most operations were joint affairs with the navy or East India Company army prize divisions were usually shared

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[159] Cathcart salary taken from Cox A/56/e/2, Agent's Ledger Second Life Guards, 1802-1811, ff. 1-3, 130-131, 228; For the salary and allowances given to Harris and Clark as local commander in chiefs in India see CKS, U624 Harris, Accounts, A11 Abstract of Pay, 1800; Official Papers, O53, Extract from Minutes of a Consultation on the Pay and Allowances to be given to Major-General Sir Alured Clarke as Commander in Chief, Madras, 5 April 1795. Harris' salary based on pay received for January 1800, Clarke on pay agreed 1795; Indian salary figures originally quoted in star pagoda, which for comparison purposes were converted into contemporary British sterling at the rate of 8s per star pagoda. Star pagoda currency rate taken from A.W Mason and G. Owen, *The East India Register and Directory for 1823*, 2nd Ed., (London, 1823), p. 370.

[160] Callahan, *The East India Company*, pp. 30-32.

[161] CKS, U624 Harris, Legal Papers, L14/2-3 Memorandas of Former Divisions of Prize-Money with Remarks, 1807-1808, L22/2, Grant of Prize-Money, Dutch Property, Cochin, Malabar, 1804.

[162] NA., WO 71/12, Proceedings of the Board of General Officers, 1789-1807, Plan for the Future Distribution of Prize-Money, 7 July 1803, f. 397.

along navy lines. Harris certainly made a vast fortune from prize money and other profits accumulated during his military service in India. On returning permanently to England in 1800 he brought back £112,867 gained as his share of prizes taken in India and a further £36,788 that Harris classified as his 'private fortune from savings in India'.[163] These were absolutely mind boggling gains as it would have taken a captain 880 years to make a similar amount from his salary! Officers serving abroad might also be able to take advantage of private profit opportunities such as trading commodities, profiting from army supply contracts or acquiring cheap property.

The career of Alexander Lindsay in the West Indies suggests commanding generals in colonial locations outside of India were also able to make substantial profits through high emoluments and prize money. Lindsay's accounts between 1796 and 1799 show he made an annual profit of at least £6,000 per year from his military pay. This was a very large sum and it would take a captain 35 years to make an equivalent amount to this salary. Most generals based in Europe made losses because the extra income they derived from their positions were exceeded by far greater expenses. A comparison of Lindsay's expenses to the other generals shows they were rather similar. Lindsay's annual average expenditure between 1797 and 1799 ranged from £1,734 to £2,870, whereas the average annual expenditure of 1800 generals in Europe who in common with Lindsay were colonels of foot regiments was £2,164 (table 27).

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[163] CKS, U624 Harris, Accounts, A67 Statement of Property bought from India, 1800.

Table 28: Annual rewards and costs of Alexander Lindsay as Lieutenant Governor of Jamaica

	1796	1797	1798	1799	% share
Rewards	£	£	£	£	
Governor's salary	4482	4500	3228	5225	31.6
General's salary	0	2621	1314	983	12.0
Allowances	0	730	338	467	3.7
Prize-money	2033	88	1996	842	12.1
Extraordinary	1966	98	35	698	6.8
Private trade	37	361	15	0	1.0
Colonel's salary	329	328	0	1006	4.2
Colonel's allowances	266	109	0	0	0.9
Colonel's clothing profits	3578	2000	2000	341	19.3
Private income	256	1178	844	1142	8.4
sub-total					
-Rewards	12947	12013	9770	10704	100.0
Costs					
Food and drink	337	62	827	92	18.0
Transport	13	9	19	140	2.5
Plantation	0	463	122	868	19.7
Extraordinary	0	1065	594	0	22.6
Private bills	89	116	1209	636	28.0
Regiment	2	3	16	3	0.6
Other	137	16	83	401	8.6
sub-total					
-Costs	578	1734	2870	2140	100.0
Balance	12369	10279	6900	8564	
Balance ex private income	12113	9101	6056	7422	

Note: Jamaican income and expenses originally priced in Jamaican pounds. In order to convert Jamaican pounds to contemporary pounds sterling the procedure Lindsay himself used was adopted (see Earl of Balcarres to Lord Lindsay, 17 January 1818, NLS, Account 9769 Lindsay, 23/14/14, Aggrandising Fund, 1818-1824, ff. 46-47). Lindsay's method for converting his Jamaican assets into English pounds was as follows: £Jamaican *5/7= difference in currency to pounds sterling – 10% average loss on exchange rate. This procedure was followed for all of his Jamaican accounts.

Source: NLS, Account 9769 Lindsay, Manuscript Volumes, 23/14/4 Jamaican Accounts, 1795-1802; Military Accounts, 23/3/84-87 John Carstairs, General, 1796-1799, 23/3/96-100 John Carstairs, Clothing, 1796-1799.

The key difference for Lindsay was his colonial service produced many more and greater military income streams than a similar general based in Europe. In a similar fashion to regimental colonels who were generals based in Europe, he received pay and allowances for his role as colonel of the 63rd foot, made large

profits from clothing and through his command position as major general on the staff. Unlike the other generals, however, he was also able to gain substantial rewards through his role as lieutenant governor. He received a large salary for his governorship, more allowances and regular opportunities for prize money. His salary as lieutenant governor alone exceeded £4,000 in most years. Lindsay also benefited from regular prize money. In both 1796 and 1798 he made approximately £2,000 from prize money gains. These prizes included such items as mules and a schooner seized at Port Antonio. This was a significant income stream equivalent to his salary as a general, which amounted to 12% of his military income during this period. Thus, the multitude of military income streams, and the extent of these, allowed Lindsay to make healthy profits from his military service in the West Indies.

Nor were Lindsay's profits limited to the savings he made from his official roles in the West Indies. Lindsay's personal involvement in the contract given to merchants to raise a Negro corps of pioneers, soldiers responsible for the physical labour and light engineering tasks of the army, was an example of how official roles in the colonies could generate officers' private financial benefits. Merchants profited from this contract as they were paid a capital sum for each Negro raised and a portion of their pay and clothing allowance. [164] Lindsay as lieutenant governor was responsible for allocating the contract to a partnership of merchants including his Jamaican agents.[165] It is unclear Lindsay's exact role within this partnership, but his accounts show him receiving one third of the annual net profits generated from the

[164] NLS, Account 9769 Lindsay, Jamaican Papers, 23/10/1167 Pioneer Corps, Report to the War Office on the Subject of the Negro Pioneers attached to Several regiments in Jamaica, 13 September 1800.
[165] NLS, Account 9769 Lindsay, Jamaican Papers, 23/10/1170 Pioneer Corps, Pioneer Contract Atkinson, Hanbury, Cathcart, Bogle with Balcarres as Lieutenant Governor, 20 June 1799.

contract. This was a significant addition to his income.   Lindsay's accounts with his local agents in Jamaica show him receiving £27,343 profits from this contract between 1801 and 1823, an annual average income from this contract alone of £1,923.[166]

Lindsay was also active in the property market during his time in Jamaica. He purchased three properties in Jamaica; "Government pen", so named as this was where the governor tended to reside, and two plantations – Martins Hill and Balcarres Plantation. On paper at least these properties gave Lindsay impressive capital gains. He purchased the three properties for the combined sum of £50,000 and by 1809 their valuation had risen to £100,000.[167]

Apart from capital gains, his Jamaican properties also produced some income. Both plantations generated income from the sale of coffee crops. The nature of growing coffee, with weather playing such a vital role, did mean returns were volatile. Nevertheless, a healthy profit was made over the long run. Taken collectively, the average annual net gain from both properties, in years where both sets of figures are available, averaged £1,276 between 1806 and 1824.[168] Another good income producing investment was "Government pen". Lindsay rented it to

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[166] NLS, Account 9769 Lindsay, Jamaican Estates Accounts, 23/8/373-436 Adams, Robertson and Co., 1806-1824.
[167] NLS, Account 9769 Lindsay, Manuscript Volumes, 23/14/8 Jamaican Plantations, 1807-1822, ff. 105, 108, 110-111.
[168] NLS, Account 9769 Lindsay, Jamaican Estates Accounts, 23/8/367-434 Adams, Robertson and Co., 1806-1824.

subsequent governors as their official residence at the rate of £300 per annum.[169] This was an advantageous arrangement for Lindsay as his rent was paid in English sterling to his London bank account and was a reliable income stream. This generated him an average annual income of £312 between 1808 and 1824.[170] Based on the 1809 valuation, which included repair costs, "Government pen" yielded 10%, a much greater rate of return than he could have expected for a similar investment in England.[171]

The limited surviving evidence of the financial affairs relating to other generals indicates the large gains that Harris and Lindsay derived from their military service were not isolated cases. Cathcart's *DNB* entry claimed he shared £300,000 prize money with his navy counterpart for capturing Copenhagen in 1807.[172] In a similar fashion to Lindsay, James Grant while governor of East Florida acquired local property. When East Florida was returned to the Spanish in 1783 Grant sold his slaves and later obtained £3,327 compensation from the government in lieu of his estate there.[173] The cost basis of his property in East Florida is unknown, but it seems likely this was a substantial capital gain. The acquisition of cheap property was a fairly common way for profiting from army service abroad. After the Seven Years War, British officers serving in America were given land grants, ranging from 2000 acres for the most junior officer to 5000 for field officers, to encourage

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[169] NLS, Account 9769 Lindsay, Manuscript Volumes, 23/14/16/1 Jamaican Plantations, 28 October 1807.
[170] NLS, Account 9769 Lindsay, Jamaican Estates Accounts, 23/8/373-436 Adams, Robertson and Co., 1806-1824.
[171] NLS, Account 9769 Lindsay, Manuscript Volumes, 23/14/8 Jamaican Plantations, ff. 105, 110.
[172] ODNB, s.v. Cathcart, William Schaw (1755-1843).
[173] ODNB, s.v. Grant, James (1720-1806).

settlement in the colony.[174] Marshall noted that many British officers originally

stationed in North America bought land, which may have resulted in large capital

gains.[175] The wills of non-aristocratic generals who served as colonial governors or

commanders in chief, which probably underestimate their wealth, indicate they left

substantial estates. Sir James Henry Craig left between £40,000 and £50,000 and

Sir Alured Clarke £258,000.[176] It seems likely that a significant portion of these

estates were acquired in common with Harris's during their time in the colonies. An

important implication of these high rewards for those holding commanding general

roles in the colonies is that the rewards operational generals gained over time may

have increased significantly with modernisation as there were many more

opportunities to serve as local commanders or governors of colonies where the

rewards from army service were the greatest. Rubinstein's research on the very

wealthy in the nineteenth-century certainly seems to suggest the late eighteenth-

century provided good opportunities for those reaching the peak of professions such

as the army to make fortunes from their service. Rubinstein noted that 23% of those

leaving between £150,000 and £500,000 during the years 1809-1829 came from the

professional classes, yet this declined significantly after this period.[177]

        Generals could also gain significant social rewards from a long-term career in

the army. It was common for successful operational generals to receive knighthoods

or even aristocratic titles in recognition of their success in the army. The social value

of titles was that they conferred on their holders a high degree of social distinction

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[174] Conway, *War, State and Society*, p. 125; Marshall, "Empire and Opportunity", pp. 115-117.
[175] Marshall, "Empire and Opportunity", pp. 116-118, 124.
[176] ODNB, s.v. Craig, Sir James Henry (1748–1812), Clarke, Sir Alured (1744–1832).
[177] W.D Rubinstein, "The End of 'Old Corruption' in Britain 1780-1860" *Past and Present*, 101, (1983), pp. 55-56.

and prestige by setting them apart from the non-titled. Evidence of the high value of titles was that at various points in English history monarchs raised money through the sale of titles. The sale of peerages between 1603 and 1641 doubled the number of lay peers sitting in the Lords.[178] Even for those who did not buy titles receiving them also entailed an economic cost which was not insignificant. After George Harris became a baron for his military services in 1815 he also received a GCB in 1820 as a further social reward. His correspondence shows that accepting this award cost him £333 17s 2d in fees attached to his knighthood. Harris's GCB fees included payments for officers of the order, the Secretary of State's office, servants and officers of the Kings household, the Lord Chamberlain's office for the insignia, and the College of Arms for requesting the pedigree.[179] Thus, the fees for accepting a GCB knighthood exceeded one year's pay for a lieutenant colonel of foot. The relatively high economic cost of accepting titles further demonstrates their social value to the recipients of these awards.

There were various types of titles that could be awarded. Knighthoods were divided into a number of different orders with slightly different levels of status and prestige. The oldest order, and most prestigious, was Knight of the Garter (1348), followed by Knight of the Thistle (1687) and Knight of Bath (1725). Then in 1815 the Knight of Bath was split into three separate orders, Grand Cross (GCB), Commander (KCB) and Companion (CB). Above knighthoods were titles of the aristocracy. The lowest title of the aristocracy was a baronetage. Baronets in this study are counted as part of the aristocracy as they had a similar social standing and income level to

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[178] D. North and B. R. Weingast, "Constitutions and Commitment: the Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth Century England", *Journal of Economic History*, 49 (1989), p. 811.

[179] CKS, U624 Harris, Correspondence, C20 J. Pulman to G. Harris, 30 September 1820.

many peers. In a similar fashion to peers, baronets possessed hereditary titles.[180]

Other members of the aristocracy were called peers and were split into five main

ranks.   At the top was a duke, followed by marquis, earl, viscount and baron. These

titles were also separated by country of origin. The most prestigious were English

titles as they gave the holder the right to sit in the House of Lords. In 1707, with the

Act of Union, all English and Scottish titles were combined to form the peerage of

Great Britain. Under this act, Scottish peers chose sixteen representative peers,

who were entitled to sit in the English House of Lords for one parliament. Irish

peerages conferred the least status, at least for the early period. They had the right

to sit in the Irish House of Lords, but were excluded from the English House of Lords

until the Union with Ireland Act 1800 when all peerages became United Kingdom

peerages and 28 Irish representative peers were chosen to sit in the Lords for life.[181]

        A significant number of operational generals were awarded titles in

recognition of their military achievements. Table 29 shows 29% of 1747 and 38% of

1800 operational generals gained titles for military services performed. There did

seem to be a ceiling on the type of title received.   It was common to receive a

knighthood, but few generals gained peerages and even those awarded were usually

the lowest type of peerage.   Moreover, some of the increase in titles given to 1800

generals may have also been due to an expanding supply of titles. The number of

knighthoods awarded did double between 1750 and 1800, yet baronetcies in

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[180] Beckett, *The Aristocracy*, Appendix, p. 484.
[181] T. Erskine May, *The Constitutional History of England Since the Accession of George III, 1760-1860, Volume I*, 11th edition, (London, 1896), pp. 281-290.

existence essentially remained static despite far more being awarded to generals in the later period.[182]

The effect on the status of individuals receiving titles was dependent on the distribution of titles between aristocrats and those not possessing titles as it was common for many titles to be awarded to those that already possessed titles.[183] Naturally, the social value of a title given to someone without a title would be far greater than titles awarded to members of society that already had a title. An analysis of highest titles received by social background indicates many generals not possessing a title were able to increase their status through gaining titles.

Table 29: Highest titles awarded to generals for military service

Type of title	1747			1800		
	Aristocrat	'Others'	N	Aristocrat	'Others'	N
Marquis	0.0	0.0	0	2.4	0.0	1
Earl	4.2	3.2	2	2.4	0.0	1
Irish Earl	0.0	0.0	0	2.4	0.0	1
Viscount	4.2	0.0	1	0.0	1.1	1
Baron	0.0	0.0	0	9.8	5.7	9
Irish Baron	4.2	3.2	2	0.0	1.1	1
Baronet	0.0	3.2	1	2.4	12.6	12
sub-total -Aristocracy	12.6	9.6	6	19.4	20.5	26
Knight of the Garter	8.3	0.0	2	9.8	0.0	4
Knight of the Thistle	8.3	0.0	2	0.0	0.0	0
Knight of Bath	16.7	6.4	6	12.2	16.0	19
sub-total -Knights	33.3	6.4	10	22.0	16.0	23
No title	54.1	84.0	39	58.6	63.5	79
N	24	31	55	41	87	128

Note: All rows (except N row) expressed as percentage of N.

Source: Appendix 4.1, Data Sources: Social Backgrounds

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[182] Beckett, *The Aristocracy,* Table A5, p. 491.
[183] *Ibid.,* p. 27.

In the eighteenth-century 16% of 1747 and 36.5 % of 1800 generals who were not members of the aristocracy gained titles. Moreover, there was a noticeable shift in favour of 'others' generals receiving titles between the two periods. In the early period there was a large difference between the numbers of 'others' and aristocrats not gaining a title for military service; 84% of 'others' did not receive a title for military service compared to 54% of aristocrats. During the late eighteenth-century the aristocratic share of military titles remained fairly constant as 58% of aristocrats did not receive titles related to their career. However, the 'others' received many more titles for military service than previously as only 63% of 'others' were without an honour for their military service. This suggests the high status a title conferred was a major long term reward for later period generals from the 'middling sort' who entered the army. In fact, many of the 'middling sort' generals who gained titles were the first members of their family to be honoured in such a fashion. The chance of gaining a title, even if it was a low probability event, certainly seemed to act as an incentive to enter the military. Cavell noted the possibility of gaining a title in the navy acted as an incentive to enter this profession and encourage the perception that it was a career open to all with merit.[184] Thus, the increasing share of 'others' gaining titles was perhaps an indication that merit became more important over time.

[184] Cavell, "A Social History", p. 456.

VI. Conclusion

The current literature on the rewards and costs of British officers in the eighteenth-century focuses on the poor financial returns of military service. Guy, the foremost authority on the rewards and costs of British officers, argues that many officers gained little from their service apart from the honour of serving King and country.[185] In the short-term this was undoubtedly true for many ranks. The analysis of officers and future generals personal accounts showed that once private income is taken into account most ensigns and lieutenants had on average small annual net deficits. This was due to delays in receiving payments and lack of income diversification. Senior officers, such as lieutenant colonels or generals who were also regimental colonels, were also often faced with great financial challenges as mounting expenditure increased far more rapidly than any income growth. Nevertheless, even in the short term not all ranks necessarily made a loss from their positions. Captains and majors typically had accounts that were usually in credit.

The short-term losses of an army career, however, were usually more than compensated for by long-term returns. A reasonable profit from army service was gained by an officer who served in the army for twenty years and then retired at captain, the most common retirement rank, through selling his commission. This should have resulted in a long-term gain at least equivalent to five years full pay. Admittedly, not all officers gained these rewards as army service always brought the

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[185] Guy, "This Insulting Misfortune", p. 11.

risk of premature death. In addition, only a small return from army service was gained for the relatively unsuccessful officers who retired at lieutenant. A lieutenant with twenty years' service could probably expect a return equal to approximately one and half years pay.

Even greater long-term gains could be had by those few officers who made it to operational general. Obtaining the rank of general opened up the possibility of substantial long term financial rewards through appointments to command, governorships or profits derived from the colonelcy of a regiment. The rewards of generalship were slightly different depending on time period. Early eighteenth-century generals may have been able to make large returns from the colonelcies of regiments when more quasi-legitimate rewards were available, whereas colonial expansion, and an increase in prize money opportunities in the later period, provided more opportunity for late eighteenth-century period generals obtaining high command positions in the colonies. As the greatest long-term financial rewards could be gained through obtaining a high command position in the colonies modernisation probably led to increasing rewards for generals.

An army career also provided the opportunity to increase social status for officers from the 'middling sort'. Status and honour was an important part of eighteenth-century life and by entry into the army officers immediately gained the status of a gentleman in an honourable profession. It was even possible for very successful officers to gain knighthoods or aristocratic titles in recognition of their

military service. Entering the army was one of the best ways to obtain a knighthood. Long-term social rewards also seemed to be increasing over time as a higher proportion of 'others' relative to aristocrats gained knighthoods and aristocratic titles for military service than in the early eighteenth-century.

For a young gentleman seeking a career that combined status, honour and wealth the army was a good career choice. Law perhaps brought larger long term financial gains, but the short term financial costs were even greater. Even in 1718 it cost a potential barrister £200 per year to train at the Middle Temple.[186] Moreover, the probability of a successful law career may have been even more uncertain than a career in the army. When Patrick Agnew, the son of Sir James Agnew, switched from the law to an army career during the eighteenth-century it was because he was

"...very much discouraged... by reason that there are already too many of that profession; for there is not one-third of that employment that are able to gain their bread by it, and even of that number the most part are such as have good estates, and are able to live upon their own till such time as they come into business; and indeed they cannot propose coming into business for good many years after entering...."[187]

The church was another alternative, but this usually required a university education prior to entry and promotion may have been slower due to lack of purchase and the more peaceable nature of the profession. In consequence, a church career probably not only required academic ability, but also influence to smooth career progression to a greater extent than in the army.[188] A navy career was probably more financially rewarding due to the greater frequency of prize money, but the social status of navy officers was much lower than the army until the 1780s when the royal family started

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[186] Rodger *The Command of the Ocean*, p. 253.
[187] Quoted in Hayes,"Scottish officers", p. 27.
[188] Rodger *The Command of the Ocean*, p. 253.

sending their sons to sea.[189] This was also a career that required a private income.

It is estimated that in 1807 initial setup costs for joining the navy as a volunteer may

have been as much as £80.[190] In addition, new recruits needed private funds to

supplement their military pay ranging from £20 to £60 per year, depending on the

time period.[191] The costs of a navy career were lower than the army, but still

problematic for a recruit of modest means. There were also greater technical

requirements for navy officers and the conditions of service at sea may have been

harsher than for those on the land. Indeed, the civilised nature of an army career

was one of its great attractions as the father of Lord Herbert reminded him when he

was considering quitting the army:

"...To quit a profession, & have none, I always held a very silly thing, but every line of life carries
some constraint with it, & so it ought to do; none is so little, I sincerely believe however, upon my
honor, as the military one in England...."[192]

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[189] Cavell, "A Social History", p. 180.
[190] Cavell, "A Social History", p. 309.
[191] Rodger *The Command of the Ocean*, p. 388.
[192] Lord Pembroke to Lord Herbert, 4 September 1783, in Herbert, *The Pembroke papers,* p. 232.

Chapter eight: Conclusion

I. Introduction

The aim of this thesis was to answer two important questions on the nature of the army in particular and professions in general as a mechanism of social mobility in the eighteenth-century. Did the upper levels of the army remain isolated from social mobility? Were the social origins and career patterns of generals different in the late eighteenth-century compared to their earlier counterparts?   These questions relate to the extent to which social mobility was limited for those managing to reach the upper levels of professions and the effect of modernisation on levels of social mobility. A survey of the literature on the eighteenth-century army and social mobility generally indicates the following answers to these questions. It would be expected that generals remained mostly isolated from social mobility. Officers may rise as high as major if they were lucky, but advancement above this level presented great difficulties due to the nature of army service in this period. The importance of social status and money in promotion restrained progress to the higher ranks. Furthermore, the rewards and costs and service would have assisted in placing a ceiling on the advancement of officers as no matter how high officers rose the army remained a losing concern as expenditure outpaced income growth. These findings are given theoretical support by the 'closure thesis' of social mobility. Modernisation, in line with the recent research of Clark and Goldthorpe, would not have improved this situation. The 'social snobbery' of the late eighteenth-century army meant social status became more important in promotion resulting in declining rates of social

mobility to the highest ranks. The actual findings of this study, however, are rather different from these expectations.

II. The limits of social mobility

The first important finding is that the upper levels of the army did not remain isolated from social mobility. Operational generals as a social group remained relatively open. The measures of social mobility examined clearly indicate this. The social status of generals' fathers show that 35% of 1747 future generals' fathers were esquires, gentlemen or members of the middling sort. If the destination social status of an operational general was at least somewhere between esquire and knight, which would seem a reasonable assumption given that army captains were entitled to call themselves esquire, this would indicate a relatively high level of social mobility among generals. The extent of this upward social mobility was even greater for some of the generals who advanced. This was because their military service rewarded them with hereditary titles or facilitated marriages to aristocrats enabling some generals to assimilate into the aristocracy. Ligonier became an earl, Blakeney a baron, Gooch a baronet, while three other generals married the daughters of baronets. Accordingly, by the end of their careers six of the generals that advanced in social status or 15% of all generals were the social equivalent of aristocrats.

Apart from the social backgrounds of future generals' fathers there were other signs that operational generals were open to those from below. Levels of self-recruitment, a key measure of mobility, were not especially high. Nearly 60% of future 1747 generals had fathers who pursued non-army careers and the sons of generals only accounted for 20% of future generals. Given that 54% of mid-eighteenth-century officers' fathers pursued non-army careers it may be that the self-recruitment of generals was not overly different from that of regular officers.[1] Self-recruitment of generals may have also been lower than similar ranks in comparable occupations. The self-recruitment of the top occupations in Victorian society, in a period within close proximity of many later period generals' careers, was over 60% between 1839 and 1843, a much higher level than the self-recruitment of operational generals.[2] Education, in common with self-recruitment, is another facet of mobility that can help to increase social closure to the highest positions. For example, to become a government minister in the late eighteenth-century it seemed a requirement to attend public school.[3] However, there was no evidence that a particularly high level of education was necessary to become a general. Those who attended public school were mostly aristocrats and many generals attending university only did so with the intention of pursuing a law career before belatedly changing career paths. Consequently, education did not act as a social closure mechanism in becoming a general. It was not necessary to attend public school or attend university to progress in the army.

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[1] Odintz, " the British Officer Corps", Chart VII, p. 275.
[2] D. Mitch, "Inequalities", Table 7.1, p. 143.
[3] Beckett, *The Aristocracy*, pp. 98-102.

Outsiders may have had the opportunity to advance to general, but this did not mean there was anything close to equality of opportunity or "complete" social mobility. In both periods aristocrats were a very important social group, especially given the small number of aristocrats in the population. This meant that rates of social mobility among generals were always substantially less than for army officers. According to the research of Odintz and Razell, the number of aristocrats serving as officers in the army may have been between 11% and 24%.[4] A slightly higher estimate is provided by Conway who suggests in 1780 30% of army officers were aristocrats.[5] As the lowest proportion of aristocrats in any period was still as many as 44% of all generals this means that rates of social mobility among general officers were significantly lower than that of officers. Social mobility was also limited as even generals who originated from the middling sort generally came from families that were fairly well-off. In both periods there were no stories of operational generals rising from poverty to command. The most dramatic move was probably the sons of relatively unsuccessful members of the middling sort who became operational generals. Even these stories were rare. Most of the middling sort who became generals were the sons of fathers who had achieved great success in their professions; for example, the future General Clarke who was the son of a judge. This characteristic of generals' backgrounds does lend support to the 'closure thesis', that it is relatively difficult to ascend too many steps in any social hierarchy as most moves concern people holding relatively similar positions.

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[4] Razzell, "Social Origins of Officers", Table 7, p. 253; Odintz, "The British Officer Corps", Chart II, p. 182.
[5] Conway, *The British Isles*, p.31.

The reason for this large difference in the rates of social mobility between generals and other officers was indeed related to the way social status constrained social mobility in rising to the highest ranks. The analysis of generals' careers showed that social status was the most important factor in promotion and triumphed at almost every turn. Aristocrats entered at higher ranks, skipped ranks more often and were promoted much faster than their untitled colleagues. The importance of social status was so great that other factors often only played a limited role in the promotion of aristocrats. Non-social status factors, however, did play an important role in the advancement of future generals who were not aristocrats. In the later period being a meritorious officer or serving as a regimental captain in the guards for the early period produced faster promotion times for these non-aristocratic officers. Money was less important than expected in promotion as future generals purchased relatively few commissions. In large part this was due to the opportunity war provided in securing promotions at relatively low cost. Most of the future generals entered the army and gained promotion during wartime when non-purchase commissions were readily available so it was not necessary to buy commissions directly. This was also related to the high proportion of generals who were aristocrats; most of these officers obtained promotions without purchase, which was probably a function of their high social status. Of course, money did help promotion prospects. During periods of peace the situation was reversed and most promotions were purchased, which was an especially important method of promotion for non-aristocrats. Money also accelerated speed of promotion; buying a commission decreased promotion times, especially for the sought after ranks of major and captain.

The role the rewards and costs of an army career played in constraining levels of social mobility was much more limited than social status. This study has shown that officership was not a losing concern, despite the current literature on the rewards of the army stressing the losses officers made. Returns from army service depended on the rank and the timeframe of analysis. The junior ranks, ensign and lieutenant, did mostly produce short-term losses. However, as these losses were relatively small and agents did not charge interest on small debts this probably did not affect mobility patterns. In contrast, captains and majors regularly produced net credits in their accounts. Moreover, if officers managed to stay in the army long-term, which most did, and sell their commissions to fund their retirement this would have produced a reasonable long-term return from army service. An officer retiring at captain after twenty years' service probably would have been able to generate a retirement fund equivalent to five years' full-time pay.

The rewards and costs of lieutenant colonels, regimental colonels and operational generals may have slightly impacted on levels of mobility. On the one hand, these positions did require greater financial resources than other ranks, which in some respects may have limited mobility. Some of the personal accounts of the generals holding these positions showed large losses on occasions as expenditure outpaced income growth. Thus, the private capital contributions required of lieutenant colonels and generals were much higher than other ranks. On the other hand, there were also opportunities to make large financial gains from their positions, which would more than balance previous losses. The operational generals serving in the guards, for instance, consistently made healthy profits in their accounts. Even

some regimental colonels who were generals made significant financial gains from their positions. Fox showed profits in his accounts for three out of four years, a cumulative net gain that exceeded £1000. In addition, many generals made substantial gains while on active service abroad as the personal accounts of Harris and Lindsay demonstrated. Thus, the effect of the rewards and costs of army officers in restraining mobility was probably limited at best.

III. Modernisation and social mobility

The second major finding of this study is that modernisation did matter to social mobility. The modernisation of the army in this period increased rates of social mobility among operational generals.

The social origins and career patterns of generals in the late eighteenth-century were quite different to their earlier counterparts in many respects. Rates of social mobility measured by future generals' fathers' social origins and self-recruitment were clearly increasing between the periods. General's fathers who were esquires, gentlemen or members of the middling sort increased from 35% for 1747 generals to 56% for their 1800 counterparts. Thus, 56% of 1800 generals increased their social status through a successful army career. However, the extent to which upward mobility was increasing between the periods may be slightly exaggerated due to changes in the size of the army relative to the pool of aristocrats

during this period. As the number of operational generals increased over time if the number of aristocrats did not increase or increased lower than the rising demand for generals then a higher percentage of aristocrats would have to join the army just to ensure the proportion of aristocratic generals did not decline. Therefore, a declining proportion of aristocratic generals as the army increased in size would not be unexpected. Nevertheless, even if this accounted for 5% or 10% of social mobility increases it does not change the fact that rates of social mobility among generals still increased impressively between the early and late eighteenth-century. In addition, the depth of the social mobility was not overly different compared to the earlier period officers. An almost identical number of operational generals assimilated into the aristocracy through gaining hereditary titles or marrying aristocrats; 17% of 1800 operational generals whose beginning social status was at best esquire joined the aristocracy in this way. More did make it to the slightly higher level of knight than their 1747 counterparts; 13% of late eighteenth-century generals achieving upward mobility became knights compared to 7% for the early period . There were similar directional moves in self-recruitment, although the magnitude was much less than for fathers' social backgrounds. The number of future generals joining the army whose fathers pursued non-army careers rose 10% between the periods and the sons of generals declined 4%.

Social status was still a critical factor in promotion for the later period officers, and as such acted to restrain mobility, but its influence clearly declined over time due to the impact of modernisation on army careers. Aristocrats had greater advantages in promotion during the early eighteenth-century due to the more individualised

career patterns at this time. This allowed aristocrats to enter at higher army ranks than most other officers and skip ranks which the 'others' generally served at. However, modernisation brought more uniformity in career patterns. Regardless of social group, late eighteenth-century future generals entered at the same ranks and age and served in most of the regimental ranks. This reduced the aristocratic advantage in army careers as the narrowing relative difference in promotion times between aristocrats and the 'others' showed. Greater uniformity also affected the impact of regiment type on promotion prospects. The advantage some future generals gained from serving in the guards in the early period, which often allowed them to skip regimental ranks, disappeared by the late eighteenth-century as even those serving in the guards with higher army ranks still served in most regimental ranks. Promotional times for most regimental ranks slowed, which meant that changing regiments or regimental mobility became increasingly common. Accordingly, later period future generals tended to serve in many more regiments than their earlier counterparts. The more professional army of the later period also led to merit playing a greater role in promotion than previously. The proxies used for merit indicated that merit for the 'others' only gave a slight advantage in promotion during the early period, but this significantly increased over time as modernisation occurred.

The rewards operational generals gained from their service most likely increased over time with the expansion of warfare and empire, which may have had a positive effect on rates of mobility. In the later period an increasing number of commands were located in colonial jurisdictions providing greater opportunities for

wealth creation from an army career. The proportion of generals who held the top commands of national or local commander or a governorship in the West Indies, India and North America increased from 7% for the early period to 35% by the late eighteenth-century. Of these later period commands, 12% of operational generals held commands in India which provided the most opportunity in building fortunes due to the easy availability of prize-money. However, even colonial commands outside of India, such as the West Indies, as the accounts of Lindsay showed provided the opportunity to make a fortune in army service. The long-term social rewards non-aristocrats gained from army service also seemed to increase over time. There was a noticeable shift in favour of 'others' generals receiving titles between the two periods. In the early period there was a 30% difference between the numbers of 'others' and aristocrats not gaining a title for military service, but this declined to only 4.9% by the later period.

Another factor in the increasing rates of social mobility for operational generals was that the social status of an army career in this period remained high despite increasing numbers entering the profession. In fact, it could even be argued the social status of army officers increased over time. In the early eighteenth-century the army was often seen in a less than favourable light due to concerns about internal order and it was generally not a popular institution.[6] However, success in the Seven Years War in many ways transformed the image of the army in the eyes of the public. High status was also maintained due to the continuing aristocratic connection with the army.

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[6] Guy, "This Insulting Misfortune", p. 18.

IV. Implications of this study

What are the implications of this study for our understanding of the eighteenth-century army and professions and social mobility generally?

It has become evident that the most important factor in advancing through a professional career in this period was social status and the closeness of aristocratic connections. Other factors did matter in promotion, but they were mainly important for those who were not aristocrats. Given the importance of social status it might be expected this led to the over promotion of aristocrats, which in turn negatively affected military performance. There were probably some instances when this happened. However, for the most part military performance did not seem significantly affected by the high proportion of aristocratic commanders as the key commands in important battles usually went to generals who had abilities as commanders even if they were also aristocrats. For instance, Wellington commanded in most of the key engagements of the Napoleonic wars.

This thesis challenges the view that officers were poorly rewarded for their services and that the importance of social status in professional advancement increased during the eighteenth-century. The research showed the long-term returns of army service for even average or unsuccessful officers would have outweighed the costs of an army career. Moreover, operational generals had the

opportunity to make significant gains from their service. It has also been clearly shown that the importance of social status in advancing with the army declined over time. Modernisation mattered and the greater uniformity in career patterns by the late period served to make advancement more equal than previously. This challenges the impression that the early eighteenth-century army was more meritocratic than its later period counterpart and the recent work on social mobility by Clark and Goldthorpe suggesting economic growth and modernisation does not affect rates of social mobility. Modernisation for future generals led to higher rates of social mobility. The greater uniformity of career patterns for later period future generals also has important implications for military efficiency. One result of this was to slow regimental promotion times, which meant the future generals gained more experience at intermediary ranks before gaining high command. This may have been helpful in improving performance levels as experience often counts in performing any role well.

The findings of this research also show the depth of mobility to the highest positions is limited and thus provides support for the 'closure thesis'. Operational generals were not isolated from increases in social mobility, but their rates of mobility were far less than for officers. In addition, the extent of movement up the social hierarchy for most operational generals achieving upward mobility was fairly limited. They were usually already at high levels in society and merely moved to a slightly higher social level. One common outcome for future generals who used the army to advance in the later period was to rise from the wealthy middling sort to become a knight. The limits of mobility were demonstrated by the fact that even though rates

of social mobility clearly increased over time the numbers of generals from the middling sort or gentry who managed to assimilate into the aristocracy through the award of hereditary titles or marriage remained almost constant.

Table 1.1. Family origins of 1747 generals

	MGFather	GFather	Father	SG1	SG2	SG3		MGFather	GFather	Father	SG1	SG2	SG3
Anstruther	-	Knight	Knight	Naristocrat	Gentry	Knight	Borgard	-	Foreign	?	?	-	-
Bowles	Merchant	Merchant	Merchant	Naristocrat	Middling	Business	Blakeney	-	Gentleman	MP	Naristocrat	Gentry	Esquire
Bland	-	-	?	?	-	-	Bligh	Colonel	MP	MP	Naristocrat	Gentry	Esquire
Bragg	-	-	?	?	-	-	Byng	-	Gentleman	Viscount	Aristocrat	-	-
Campbell	-	MP	Baronet	Aristocrat	-	-	Cholmondeley	-	Viscount	Earl	Aristocrat	-	-
Churchill	-	-	?	?	-	-	Cope	-	-	Lt. Col.	Naristocrat	Middling	Army
Dalzell	-	-	?	?	-	-	Dalrymple	Knight	Viscount	Earl	Aristocrat	-	-
de Grangues	-	-	?	?	-	-	Fowke	-	Gentleman	Major	Naristocrat	Middling	Army
Gooch	-	JP	Alderman	Naristocrat	Gentry	Knight	Graham	-	-	?	?	-	-
Guise	-	Gentleman	Gentleman	Naristocrat	Gentry	Esquire	Handasyd	-	-	General	Naristocrat	Gentry	Esquire
Hargrave	-	-	Captain	Naristocrat	Middling	Army	Hawley	-	-	Colonel	Naristocrat	Middling	Army
Honywood	-	-	?	?	-	-	Howard, C.	Earl	Earl	Earl	Aristocrat	-	-
Howard, T.	-	Knight	?	?	-	-	Huske	-	-	?	?	-	-
Irwin	-	-	?	?	-	-	Keppel	Foreign	Foreign	Earl	Aristocrat	-	-
Kerr	Marquess	Earl	Marquess	Aristocrat	-	-	Lennox	Lord	Illegitimate	Duke	Aristocrat	-	-
Leslie	Marquess	Earl	Earl	Aristocrat	-	-	Ligonier	-	-	Foreign	Naristocrat	Middling	Foreign
Lindsay	Lord	Earl	Earl	Aristocrat	-	-	Molesworth	Lord	Merchant	Viscount	Aristocrat	-	-
Montagu	Earl	Baron	Duke	Aristocrat	-	-	Mordaunt	Baronet	Viscount	Hon.	Aristocrat	-	-
Murray	Earl	Marquess	Earl	Aristocrat	-	-	O'Farrell	-	-	?	?	-	-
Oglethorpe	-	Colonel	Knight	Naristocrat	Gentry	Knight	O'Hara	-	-	Baron	Aristocrat	-	-
Parker	-	-	?	?	-	-	Philips	-	-	Gentleman	Naristocrat	Gentry	Gentleman
Ponsonby	-	Knight	Viscount	Aristocrat	-	-	Preston	Lord	-	Baronet	Aristocrat	-	-
Rich	Baronet	-	Baronet	Aristocrat	-	-	Spencer	Duke	Earl	Earl	Aristocrat	-	-

Note: In all appendix tables Naristocrat is an abbreviation used for non-aristocrat. MGFather stands for maternal grandfather and SG social group.

Source: Appendix 4.1, Data Sources: Social Backgrounds

Table 1.1. Family origins of 1747 generals (continued)

	MGFather	GFather	Father	SG1	SG2	SG3		MGFather	GFather	Father	SG1	SG2	SG3
St Clair	Baronet	Viscount	Lord	Aristocrat	-	-	St George	-	-	?	?	-	-
Temple	-	Baronet	Baronet	Aristocrat	-	-	Wade	-	Major	?	?	-	-
Wentworth	-	Baronet	Baronet	Aristocrat	-	-	West	Merchant	Baron	Baron	Aristocrat	-	-
William	Foreign	King	King	Aristocrat	-	-	Wolfe	-	Lt. Col.	Major	Naristocrat	Middling	Army
Wynyard	-	-	Esquire	Naristocrat	Gentry	Esquire							

Source: Appendix 4.1, Data Sources: Social Backgrounds

Table 1.2. Birth origins of 1747 generals

	DOB	DOD	Birth Order	POB	RPOB	CPOB		DOB	DOD	Birth Order	POB	RPOB	CPOB
Anstruther	1678	1760	1	Airdrie	Fife	Scotland	Borgard	1659	1751	-	Holbaek	Jutland	Denmark
Bowles	1687	1749	3	Eastcheap	London	England	Blakeney	1672	1761	1	Blakeney	Limerick	Ireland
Bland	1686	1763	2	-	-	Ireland	Bligh	1685	1775	2	Brittas	Dublin	Ireland
Bragg	-	1759	-	-	-	-	Byng	1701	1750	2	Southill	Bedfordshire	England
Campbell	1665	1752	1	-	-	-	Cholmondeley	1709	1775	2	Malpas	Cheshire	England
Cope	1690	1760	1	Icomb	Gloucestershire	England	Dalzell	1662	1758	-	-	-	-
Dalrymple	1673	1747	2	Edinburgh	Edinburgh	Scotland	Fowke	1690	1765	-	-	-	-
Gooch	1681	1751	2	G. Yarmouth	Norfolk	England	Guise	1683	1765	-	Sandhurst	Gloucestershire	England
Handasyd	1684	1763	1	-	-	-	Hargrave	1672	1751	-	Westminster	London	England
Hawley	1685	1759	-	-	-	-	Honywood	1677	1752	2	-	-	-
Howard, C.	1696	1765	2	-	-	-	Howard, T.	1684	-	1	-	-	-
Huske	1692	1761	-	-	-	-	Keppel	1702	1754	1	Westminster	London	England
Kerr	1676	1752	-	-	-	-	Lennox	1701	1750	1	Goodwood	Chichester	England
Leslie	1698	1767	1	Leslie	Aberdeenshire	Scotland	Ligonier	1680	1770	-	Castres	Toulon	France
Lindsay	1702	1749	1	-	-	-	Molesworth	1680	1758	-	Swords	Dublin	Ireland
Montagu	1690	1749	3	Boughton	Northants	England	Mordaunt	1697	1780	1	-	-	-
Murray	1685	1752	2	Westminster	London	England	O'Farrell		1757	-	-	-	-
Oglethorpe	1696	1785	5	The City	London	England	O'Hara	1682	1773	1	-	-	-
Ponsonby	1695	1745	2	Ashgrove	Kilkenny	Ireland	Preston	1659	1748	2	-	-	Scotland
Rich	1685	1768	2	Beccles	Suffolk	England	Spencer	1706	1758	2	Westminster	London	England
St Clair	1688	1762	2	-	-	-	Temple	1675	1749	1	West End	London	England
Wade	1673	1748	3	Killavally	Westmeath	Ireland	Wentworth	1693	1747	3	-	-	England
West	1693	1766	1	-	-	-	William	1721	1765	3	Westminster	London	England
Wolfe	1685	1759	-	York	Yorkshire	England	Wynyard	1682	1752	-	Westminster	London	England

Source: Appendix 4.1, Data Sources: Social Backgrounds

Table 1.3. Family origins of 1800 generals

	MGFather	GFather	Father	SG1	SG2	SG3		MGFather	GFather	Father	SG1	SG2	SG3
Abercromby, Ra.	-	MP	Gentleman	Naristocrat	Gentry	Esquire	Abercromby, Ro.	-	MP	Gentleman	Naristocrat	Gentry	Esquire
Asgill	Diplomat	-	Baronet	Aristocrat	-	-	Baird	-	-	Merchant	Naristocrat	Middling	Business
Balfour	-	-	?	?	-	-	Barclay	-	-	?	?	-	-
Beckwith	-	-	General	Naristocrat	Gentry	Esquire	Borthwick	-	-	General	Naristocrat	Gentry	Esquire
Bowyer	-	-	Baronet	Aristocrat		-	Burrard	Lawyer	MP	Gentleman	Naristocrat	Gentry	Esquire
Campbell, A.	Law	Army	MP	Naristocrat	Gentry	Esquire	Campbell, J.	Lord	Hon.	Duke	Aristocrat	-	-
Carleton, G.	-	Sheriff	Gentleman	Naristocrat	Gentry	Esquire	Carleton, T.	-	Sheriff	Gentleman	Naristocrat	Gentry	Esquire
Cathcart	Lord	Lord	Lord	Aristocrat		-	Cavendish	Steward	Duke	Duke	Aristocrat	-	-
Christie Burton	Foreign	-	Foreign	Naristocrat	Middling	Foreign	Clarke	Major	Gentleman	Judge	Naristocrat	Gentry	Gentleman
Coates	-	-	?	?	-	-	Coote	-	-	Dean	Naristocrat	Middling	Church
Cornwallis	Viscount	Baron	Earl	Aristocrat	-	-	Cowell	-	-	?	?	-	-
Cradock	-	-	Archbishop	Naristocrat	Middling	Church	Craig	-	-	Judge	Naristocrat	Middling	Law
Cuninghame	-	-	Officer	Naristocrat	Middling	Army	Cuyler	-	Merchant	?	?	-	-
Dalrymple, H.W	-	Baronet	Captain	Aristocrat	-	-	Dalrymple, W.	Baronet	-	Hon.	Aristocrat	-	-
Davies	-	-	?	?	-	-	de Lancy	-	Merchant	General	Naristocrat	Gentry	Esquire
Despard	-	-	?	?	-	-	Don	-	-	Merchant	Naristocrat	Middling	Business
D'Oyly	-	-	Archdeacon	Naristocrat	Middling	Church	Drummond, A.J	-	Viscount	Viscount	Aristocrat	-	-
Drummond, D.	-	-	?	?	-	-	Dundas, D.	-	-	Merchant	Naristocrat	Middling	Business
Dundas, F.	Judge	Judge	Judge	Naristocrat	Gentry	Gentleman	Duff	-	Illegitimate	Illegitimate	Illegitimate	-	-
Edward	-	Prince	King	Aristocrat	-	-	Fanning	-	-	Captain	Naristocrat	Middling	Army
Farrington	-	-	Lt. Col.	Naristocrat	Middling	Army	Fawcett	Gentleman	-	Gentleman	Naristocrat	Gentry	Gentleman
Fraser	-	-	Tacksman	Naristocrat	Gentry	Esquire	Frederick	-	Prince	King	Aristocrat	-	-
Fitzroy	-	Lord	Duke	Aristocrat	-	-	Forbes	-	-	?	?	-	-

Source: Appendix 4.1, Data Sources: Social Backgrounds

Table 1.3. Family origins of 1800 generals (continued)

	MGFather	GFather	Father	SG1	SG2	SG3		MGFather	GFather	Father	SG1	SG2	SG3
Fox	Duke	Knight	Baron	Aristocrat	-	-	Floyd	Rector	-	Captain	Naristocrat	Middling	Army
Gardiner	-	MP	MP	Naristocrat	Gentry	Esquire	Garth	-	Lt. Col.	MP	Naristocrat	Gentry	Esquire
Gordon	Earl	Duke	Duke	Aristocrat	-	-	Grant	MP	-	Laird	Naristocrat	Gentry	Esquire
Green	-	-	?	?	-	-	Grenville	MP	-	MP	Naristocrat	Gentry	Esquire
Grey	-	-	Baronet	Aristocrat	-	-	Gwyn	-	-	?	?	-	-
Harcourt	-	MP	Earl	Aristocrat	-	-	Harris	-	-	Curate	Naristocrat	Middling	Church
Hastings	Earl	Baronet	Baron	Aristocrat	-	-	Herbert	Duke	Earl	Earl	Aristocrat	-	-
Hewett	-	-	Major	Naristocrat	Middling	Army	Howe	Baron	Viscount	Viscount	Aristocrat	-	-
Hulse	Merchant	Baronet	Baronet	Aristocrat	-	-	Hunter	-	-	Laird	Naristocrat	Gentry	Esquire
Hely Hutchinson	-	-	MP	Naristocrat	Gentry	Esquire	Irving	Captain	-	Lt. Col.	Naristocrat	Middling	Army
Johnson, H.	-	-	?	?	-	-	Johnson, W.	-	-	?	?	-	-
Lake	Merchant	-	?	?	-	-	Lambart	Navy	Hon.	Earl	Aristocrat	-	-
Leland	-	Tradesman	?	?	-	-	Lennox, C.	Lord	Duke	Duke	Aristocrat	-	-
Lennox, G.	Lord	Duke	Duke	Aristocrat	-	-	Lindsay	Knight	Earl	Earl	Aristocrat	-	-
Lloyd	-	-	?	?	-	-	Loftus	-	Colonel	Captain	Naristocrat	Middling	Army
Ludlow	Earl	-	Earl	Aristocrat	-	-	Luttrell	Knight	General	Earl	Aristocrat	-	-
MacLeod	Judge	Clan Chief	?	?	-	-	Manners	-	Duke	Lord	Aristocrat	-	-
Martin	-	-	?	?	-	-	Medows	Duke	Knight	Ranger	Naristocrat	Gentry	Esquire
Melville	Advocate	-	Minister	Naristocrat	Middling	Church	Mercer	-	-	?	?	-	-
Moore	Professor	Minister	Surgeon	Naristocrat	Middling	Army	Morris	Foreign	Foreign	Foreign	Naristocrat	Middling	Foreign
Morse	-	-	Rector	Naristocrat	Middling	Church	Morshead	-	-	?	?	-	-
Morrison	-	-	?	?	-	-	Munro	-	-	Merchant	Naristocrat	Middling	Business
Musgrave	-	Baronet	Baronet	Aristocrat	-	-	Needham	-	Viscount	Viscount	Aristocrat	-	-

Source: Appendix 4.1, Data Sources: Social Backgrounds

Table 1.3. Family origins of 1800 generals (continued)

	MGFather	GFather	Father	SG1	SG2	SG3		MGFather	GFather	Father	SG1	SG2	SG3
Nicolls	-	-	?	?	-	-	Nugent	-	Illegitimate	Illegitimate	Illegitimate	-	-
Percy	Earl	Haberdasher	Duke	Aristocrat	-	-	Phipps	Baron	-	Baron	Aristocrat	-	-
O'Hara	-	Illegitimate	Illegitimate	Illegitimate	-	-	Pigot	-	-	MP	Naristocrat	Gentry	Esquire
Pitt, J.	MP	MP	Earl	Aristocrat	-	-	Pitt, W.A	-	MP	MP	Naristocrat	Gentry	Esquire
Prescott	-	-	Officer	Naristocrat	Middling	Army	Rainsford	-	-	Alderman	Naristocrat	Gentry	Esquire
Roberts	-	-	?	?	-	-	Ross	-	-	?	?	-	-
Simcoe	-	-	Captain	Naristocrat	Middling	Navy	Sloper	-	-	?	?	-	-
Somerset	Admiral	Duke	Duke	Aristocrat	-	-	Stanhope	Duke	Earl	Earl	Aristocrat	-	-
Steuart Denham	Earl	Baronet	Baronet	Aristocrat	-	-	Stevens	-	-	?	?	-	-
St John, F.	Duke	Viscount	Viscount	Aristocrat	-	-	St John, H.	Baronet	Viscount	Viscount	Aristocrat	-	-
St. Ledger	Hon.	-	?	?	-	-	Strutt	Reverend	Gentleman	MP	Naristocrat	Gentry	Esquire
Stuart, C.	Hon.	Earl	Earl	Aristocrat	-	-	Stuart, J.	Earl	Judge	Gentleman	Naristocrat	Gentry	Esquire
Tarleton	-	-	Merchant	Naristocrat	Middling	Business	Tonyn	-	-	Colonel	Naristocrat	Middling	Army
Townshend	MP	Viscount	Viscount	Aristocrat	-	-	Trigge	-	-	?	?	-	-
Villettes	-	-	Diplomat	Naristocrat	Middling	Govt.	Vyse	Bishop	-	Canon	Naristocrat	Middling	Church
Walker	-	-	?	?	-	-	Warde	-	-	?	?	-	-
Wemyss	Earl	Earl	Hon.	Aristocrat	-	-	Whitelocke	-	-	Steward	Naristocrat	Middling	Business
Wilford	-	-	?	?	-	-	William	-	King	Duke	Aristocrat	-	-

Source: Appendix 4.1, Data Sources: Social Backgrounds

Table 1.4. Birth origins of 1800 generals

	DOB	DOD	Birth Order	POB	RPOB	CPOB		DOB	DOD	Birth Order	POB	RPOB	CPOB
Abercromby, Ra.	1738	1801	2	Tullibody	Clackmannanshire	Scotland	Abercromby, Ro.	1740	1827	3	Tullibody	Clackmannanshire	Scotland
Asgill	1762	1823	1	The City	London	England	Baird	1757	1829	5	Newbyth	Haddingtonshire	Scotland
Balfour	1743	1823	-	-	-	-	Barclay	1741	1823	-	-	-	-
Beckwith	1752	1823	2	-	-	-	Borthwick	1760	1820	1	-	-	-
Bowyer	-	-	-	Denham	Buckinghamshire	England	Burrard	1755	1813	1	Vinchelez	St. Helier	Jersey
Campbell, A.	1750	1832	1	-	-	-	Campbell, J.	1723	1806	1	-	-	-
Carleton, G.	1724	1808	3	Strabane	County Tyrone	Ireland	Carleton, T.	1735	1817	4	-	-	-
Cathcart	1755	1843	1	Petersham	Surrey	England	Cavendish	1729	1803	3	-	-	-
Christie Burton	1758	1835	1	-	-	America	Clarke	1744	1832	-	-	-	-
Coote	1759	1823	2	-	-	Ireland	Cornwallis	1738	1805	1	Grovesnor Sq.	London	England
Cradock	1762	1839	1	Dublin	Dublin	Ireland	Craig	1748	1812	-	Gibraltar	Gibraltar	Gibraltar
Cuninghame	1728	1801	1	-	-	-	Cuyler	1740	1819	-	Albany	New York	America
Dalrymple, H.W	1750	1830	1	Ayr	Ayrshire	Scotland	Dalrymple, W.	1736	1807	2	-	-	-
de Lancy	1749	1822	2	New York	New York	America	Despard	1744	1829	-	Dublin	Dublin	Ireland
Don	1756	1832	2	Edinburgh	Edinburgh	Scotland	D'Oyly		1815	3	-	-	-
Drummond, A.J	-	-	2	-	-	-	Dundas, D.	1735	1820	3	Edinburgh	Edinburgh	Scotland
Dundas, F.	1759	1824	2	-	-	-	Duff	1753	1839	1	Keith	Aberdeenshire	Scotland
Edward	1738	1820	4	Westminster	London	England	Fanning	1737	1818	5	Long Island	New York	America
Farrington	1742	1823	-	-	-	-	Fawcett	1727	1804	1	Halifax	Yorkshire	England
Fraser	1737	1813	-	-	-	-	Frederick	1763	1827	2	Westminster	London	England
Fitzroy	1764	1829	2	-	-	-	Fox	1755	1811	3	-	-	-
Floyd	1748	1818	1	-	-	-	Gardiner	1748	1806	2	-	-	-
Garth	1733	1819	2	-	-	-	Gordon	1726	1801	4	-	-	-

Source: Appendix 4.1, Data Sources: Social Backgrounds

Table 1.4. Birth origins of 1800 generals (continued)

	DOB	DOD	Birth Order	POB	RPOB	CPOB		DOB	DOD	Birth Order	POB	RPOB	CPOB
Grant	1720	1806	2	Ballindalloch	Banffshire	Scotland	Green	1725	1811	-	Westminster	London	England
Grenville	1742	1823	2	-	-	-	Grey	1729	1807	4	Howick	Northumberland	England
Harcourt	1743	1830	2	-	-	-	Harris	1746	1829	1	London	London	England
Hastings	1754	1826	1	Dublin	Dublin	Ireland	Herbert	1759	1827	1	Wilton	Wiltshire	England
Hewett	1750	1840	1	-	-	-	Howe	1729	1814	3	Langar	Nottinghamshire	England
Hulse	1748	1837	2	-	-	-	Hunter	1746	1805	-	Longforgan	Perthshire	Scotland
Hely Hutchinson	1757	1832	2	-	-	-	Irving	1749	1828	-	Waterford	County Waterford	Ireland
Johnson, H.	1748	1835	-	-	-	-	Lake	1744	1808	-	-	-	-
Lambart	1763	1837	1	-	-	-	Leland	-	1808	-	-	-	-
Lennox, C.	1735	1806	2	Westminster	London	England	Lennox, G.	1737	1805	3	Westminster	London	England
Lindsay	1752	1825	1	Kilconquhar	Fife	Scotland	Loftus	1752	1831	-	-	-	-
Ludlow	1758	1842	2	-	-	-	Luttrell	1737	1821	1	Cranford	Middlesex	England
MacLeod	1754	1801		Forres	Moray	Scotland	Manners	1758	1823	1	-	-	-
Medows	1738	1813	3	-	-	-	Melville	1723	1809	-	Monimail	Fife	Scotland
Moore	1761	1809	1	Trongate	Glasgow	Scotland	Morris	1728	1800	2	New York	-	America
Morse	1742	1818	2	-	-	-	Munro	1726	1805	1	-	-	-
Musgrave	1738	1812	6	Hayton	Cumberland	England	Needham	1748	1832	3	-	-	-
Nugent	1757	1849	-	-	-	-	Percy	1742	1817	1	Hanover Square	London	England
Phipps	1755	1831	3	-	-	-	O'Hara	1740	1802	-	-	-	-
Pigot	1750	1840	1	-	-	-	Pitt, J.	1756	1835	1	Hayes	Kent	England
Pitt, W.A	1728	1809	4	-	-	-	Prescott	1727	1815	-	-	-	-
Rainsford	1728	1809	2	West Ham	Essex	England	Ross	1742	1827	-	-	-	-
Simcoe	1752	1806	3	Cotterstock	Northants	England	Somerset	1767	1831	2	Badminton	Gloucestershire	England

Source: Appendix 4.1, Data Sources: Social Backgrounds

Table 1.4. Birth origins of 1800 generals (continued)

	DOB	DOD	Birth Order	POB	RPOB	CPOB		DOB	DOD	Birth Order	POB	RPOB	CPOB
Stanhope	1753	1829	1	-	-	-	Steuart Denham	1744	1839	1	Goodtrees	Edinburgh	Scotland
St John, F.	1765	1844	2	-	-	-	St John, H.	1738	1818	2	-	-	-
St. Ledger	1756	1800	-	-	-	-	Strutt	1762	1848	3	Springfield	Essex	England
Stuart, C.	1753	1801	4	Kenwood House	London	England	Stuart, J.	1741	1815	3	Blair Hall	Perthshire	Scotland
Tarleton	1754	1833	2	Water Street	Liverpool	England	Tonyn	1725	1804	-	-	-	-
Townshend	1724	1807	1	London	London	England	Trigge	1742	1814	-	-	-	-
Villettes	1754	1808	2	Bern		Switzerland	Vyse	1746	1825	2	Lichfield	Staffordshire	England
Warde	1725	1803	-	-	-	-	Wemyss	1760	1822	1	-	-	-
Whitelocke	1757	1833	-	-	-	-	William	1743	1805	3	Westminster	London	England

Source: Appendix 4.1, Data Sources: Social Backgrounds

Table 1.5. Father's army rank of 1747 generals

	SG1	Father's army rank
Blakeney	Naristocrat	Captain
Cholmondeley	Aristocrat	General
Cope	Naristocrat	Lt. Colonel
Fowke	Naristocrat	Major
Handasyd	Naristocrat	Major General
Hawley	Naristocrat	Captain
Hargrave	Naristocrat	Captain
Howard, C.	Aristocrat	Regimental Colonel
Keppel	Aristocrat	Lt. General
Lindsay	Aristocrat	Lt. General
Mordaunt	Aristocrat	Lt. General
Murray	Aristocrat	Regimental Colonel
Oglethorpe	Naristocrat	Brigadier General
O'Hara	Aristocrat	Major General
Ponsonby	Aristocrat	Regimental Colonel
William	Aristocrat	King
Wolfe	Aristocrat	Major

Source: Appendix 4.1, Data Sources: Social Backgrounds

Table 1.6. Father's army rank of 1800 generals

	SG1	Father's army rank		SG1	Father's army rank
Beckwith	Naristocrat	Major General	Borthwick	Naristocrat	Lt. General
Campbell, A.	Naristocrat	Officer	Campbell, J.	Aristocrat	General
Cathcart	Aristocrat	Lt. General	Christie Burton	Naristocrat	General
Cuninghame	Naristocrat	Officer	Dalrymple, H.W	Aristocrat	Captain
de Lancy	Naristocrat	Brigadier General	Edward	Aristocrat	King
Fanning	Naristocrat	Captain	Farrington	Naristocrat	Lt. Colonel
Floyd	Naristocrat	Captain	Frederick	Aristocrat	King
Grant	Naristocrat	Lt. Colonel	Harcourt	Aristocrat	General
Herbert	Aristocrat	General	Hewett	Naristocrat	Major
Irving	Naristocrat	Lt. Colonel	Lambart	Aristocrat	Lt. General
Lennox, C.	Aristocrat	General	Lennox, G.	Aristocrat	General
Lindsay	Aristocrat	Captain	Loftus	Naristocrat	Captain
Manners	Aristocrat	General	Moore	Naristocrat	Surgeon
Needham	Aristocrat	Captain	Pitt, J.	Aristocrat	Cornet
Prescott	Naristocrat	Officer	Stanhope	Aristocrat	General
Tonyn	Naristocrat	Regimental Colonel			

Source: Appendix 4.1, Data Sources: Social Backgrounds

Table 1.7. Education of 1747 generals

	SG1	Tutors	Public school	Military academy	Inns of Court	University
Cope	Naristocrat	-	Westminster	-	-	-
Dalrymple	Aristocrat	✓	-	-	-	Leiden
Gooch	Naristocrat	-	-	-	-	Oxford
Guise	Naristocrat	-	-	-	-	Oxford
Handasyd	Naristocrat	-	Westminster	-	-	-
Irwin	?	✓	-	-	-	-
Keppel	Aristocrat	✓	-	-	-	-
Lennox	Aristocrat	✓	-	-	-	-
Lindsay	Aristocrat	-	-	Vaudeuil, Paris	-	Glasgow
Molesworth	Aristocrat	-	-	-	Middle Temple	-
Montagu	Aristocrat	✓	-	-	-	-
Oglethorpe	Naristocrat	-	Eton	-	-	Oxford
O'Hara	Aristocrat	-	Westminster	-	-	-
Spencer	Aristocrat	-	Eton	-	-	-
Temple	Aristocrat	-	Eton	-	-	Cambridge
Wentworth	Aristocrat	-	-	-	-	Oxford
West	Aristocrat	-	Eton	-	-	-
William	Aristocrat	✓	Westminster	-	-	-

Source: Appendix 4.1, Data Sources: Social Backgrounds

Table 1.8. Education of 1800 generals

	SG1	Tutors	Grammar school	Public school	Military academy	Civilian academy	Inns of Court	Oxbridge	UK university	Foreign university
Abercromby, Ra.	Naristocrat	-	Alloa	Rugby	-	-	-	-	Edinburgh	Leipzig
Asgill	Aristocrat	-	-	Westminster	-	-	-	-	-	Gottingen
Baird	Naristocrat	-	-	-	Lewis Lochée's	-	-	-	-	-
Campbell, J.	Aristocrat	-	-	Westminster	-	-	-	-	-	-
Carleton, G.	Naristocrat	✓	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Cathcart	Aristocrat	✓	-	Eton	-	-	-	-	Glasgow	Dresden
Clarke	Naristocrat	-	-	Eton	-	-	-	-	-	-
Coote	Naristocrat	-	-	Eton	-	-	-	-	Dublin	-
Cornwallis	Aristocrat	-	-	Eton	Turin	-	-	Cambridge	-	-
Cradock	Naristocrat	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	Dublin	-
Cuninghame	Naristocrat	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	Edinburgh	-
Dalrymple, W.	Aristocrat	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	Glasgow	-
de Lancy	Naristocrat	✓	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
D'Oyly	Naristocrat	-	-	-	-	-	-	Cambridge	-	-
Duff	Illegitimate	-	-	-	-	Keith	-	-	Aberdeen	-
Edward	Aristocrat	✓	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Fanning	Naristocrat	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	Harvard, Yale
Fawcett	Naristocrat	-	Bury	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Fitzroy	Aristocrat	-	Mr Newcomb's	Harrow	-	-	-	Cambridge	-	-
Fox	Aristocrat	-	-	Westminster	Strausbourg	-	-	-	-	-
Floyd	Naristocrat	✓	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Gordon	Aristocrat	-	-	Eton	-	-	-	-	-	-
Green	?	✓	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Grenville	Naristocrat	-	-	Eton	-	-	-	-	-	-
Harris	Naristocrat	-	-	Westminster	-	-	-	-	-	-
Hastings	Aristocrat	-	-	Harrow	-	-	-	Oxford	-	-
Herbert	Aristocrat	✓	-	Harrow	-	-	-	-	-	-

Source: Appendix 4.1, Data Sources: Social Backgrounds

Table 1.8. Education of 1800 generals (continued)

	SG1	Tutors	Grammar school	Public school	Military academy	Civilian academy	Inns of Court	Oxbridge	UK university	Foreign university
Hewett	Naristocrat	-	Wimborne	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Howe	Aristocrat	✓	-	Eton	-	-	-	-	-	-
Hely Hutchinson	Naristocrat	-	-	Eton	Strausbourg	-	-	Oxford	-	-
Irving	Naristocrat	-	-	King's, Canterbury	-	-	-	-	-	-
Lake	?	-	-	Eton	-	-	-	-	-	-
Lennox, C.	Aristocrat	✓	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Lennox, G.	Aristocrat	✓	-	Westminster	-	-	-	-	-	Leiden
Lindsay	Aristocrat	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	Gottingen
Luttrell	Aristocrat	-	-	Westminster	-	-	-	Oxford	-	-
MacLeod	?	✓	-	-	-	-	-	Oxford	St Andrews	-
Manners	Aristocrat	-	-	-	-	Caen	-	-	-	-
Medows	Naristocrat	-	-	Eton	-	-	-	-	-	-
Melville	Naristocrat	✓	Leven	-	-	-	-	-	Glasgow, Edinburgh	-
Moore	Naristocrat	-	Glasgow	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Morris	Naristocrat	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	Yale
Nugent	Illegitimate	-	-	Charterhouse	-	-	-	-	-	-
O'Hara	Illegitimate	-	-	Westminster	-	-	-	-	-	-
Percy	Aristocrat	-	-	Eton	-	-	-	Cambridge	-	-
Phipps	Aristocrat	-	-	Eton	-	-	Middle Temple	-	-	-
Prescott	Naristocrat	✓	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Simcoe	Naristocrat	-	Exeter	Eton	-	-	Lincoln's Inn	Oxford	-	-
Somerset	Aristocrat	-	-	Westminster	-	-	-	Oxford	-	-
Stanhope	Aristocrat	-	-	Eton	-	-	Inner Temple	-	-	-
Steuart Denham	Aristocrat	✓	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	Tubingen
St John, F.	Aristocrat	-	-	Westminster, Eton	-	-	-	Oxford	-	-
St John, H.	Aristocrat	-	-	Harrow, Eton	-	-	-	-	-	-

Source: Appendix 4.1, Data Sources: Social Backgrounds

Table 1.8. Education of 1800 generals (continued)

	SG1	Tutors	Grammar school	Public school	Military academy	Civilian academy	Inns of Court	Oxbridge	UK university	Foreign university
St. Ledger	?	-	-	Portarlington, Eton	-	-	-	-	-	-
Strutt	Naristocrat	-	-	Felsted	Lewis Lochée's	-	-	-	-	-
Stuart, C.	Aristocrat	✓	-	-	-	Dr. Graffiani's	-	-	-	-
Stuart, J.	Naristocrat	-	Dunfermline	-	-	-	-	-	Edinburgh	-
Tarleton	Naristocrat	-	-	-	-	-	Middle Temple	Oxford	-	-
Townshend	Aristocrat	-	-	Eton	-	-	-	Cambridge	-	-
Villettes	Naristocrat	-	Claverton	-	-	-	Lincoln's Inn	-	St Andrews	-
Wemyss	Aristocrat	-	Edinburgh	-	-	-	-	Oxford	-	-
Whitelocke	Naristocrat	-	Marlborough	-	Lewis Lochée's	-	-	-	-	-
William	Aristocrat	-	-	-	-	-	-	Cambridge	-	-

Source: Appendix 4.1, Data Sources: Social Backgrounds

Table 1.9. First marriages of 1747 generals

	SG1	Marriage status	Marriage age	Rank at marriage	Father-in-law	Wife SG1		SG1	Marriage status	Marriage age	Rank at marriage	Father-in-law	Wife SG1
Anstruther	Naristocrat	Unmarried	-	-	-	-	Borgard	?	Married	44	Captain	Bradshaw	?
Bowles	Naristocrat	Married	37	Colonel	Hill	?	Blakeney	Naristocrat	Unmarried	-	-	-	-
Bland	?	Married	69	Lt. General	Hon.	Aristocrat	Bligh	Naristocrat	Married	52	Lt. Colonel	Bury	?
Byng	Aristocrat	Married	35	-	Daniel	?	Campbell	Aristocrat	Married	-	-	Campbell	?
Cholmondeley	Aristocrat	Married	-	-	Earl	Aristocrat	Cope	Naristocrat	Married	22	Lt. Colonel	Duncombe	?
Dalrymple	Aristocrat	Married	35	Brigadier General	Earl	Aristocrat	Dalzell	?	Married	36	Captain	Knight	Naristocrat
Fowke	Naristocrat	Married	31	Lt. Colonel	Baronet	Aristocrat	Gooch	Naristocrat	Married	33	Captain	Gentleman	Naristocrat
Guise	Naristocrat	Married	40	Major	Foreign	Naristocrat	Handasyd	Naristocrat	Married	26	Lt. Colonel	Baronet	Aristocrat
Hawley	Naristocrat	Unmarried	-	-	-	-	Honywood	?	Unmarried	-	-	-	-
Howard, C.	Aristocrat	Unmarried	-	-	-	-	Howard, T.	?	Married	-	-	Bishop	Naristocrat
Huske	?	Unmarried	-	-	-	-	Irwin	?	Married	-	-	?	?
Keppel	Aristocrat	Married	21	Captain	Duke	Aristocrat	Kerr	Aristocrat	Unmarried	-	-	-	-
Lennox	Aristocrat	Married	18	Pre-entry	Earl	Aristocrat	Leslie	Aristocrat	Married	43	Brigadier General	Howard	?
Ligonier	Naristocrat	Unmarried	-	-	-	-	Lindsay	Aristocrat	Married	45	Brigadier General	Duke	Aristocrat
Molesworth	Aristocrat	Married	-	-	Lucas	?	Montagu	Aristocrat	Married	15	Pre-entry	Duke	Aristocrat
Mordaunt	Aristocrat	Unmarried	-	-	-	-	Murray	Aristocrat	Unmarried	-	-	-	-
Oglethorpe	Naristocrat	Married	49	Brigadier General	Baronet	Aristocrat	O'Hara	Aristocrat	Married	42	Colonel	Viscount	Aristocrat
Philips	Naristocrat	Married	-	-	Gentleman	Naristocrat	Ponsonby	Aristocrat	Married	-	-	Earl	Aristocrat
Rich	Aristocrat	Married	29	Colonel	Colonel	Naristocrat	Spencer	Aristocrat	Married	26	Pre-entry	Baron	Aristocrat
St Clair	Aristocrat	Married	57	Brigadier General	Baronet	Aristocrat	Temple	Aristocrat	Married	40	Lt. General	Merchant	Naristocrat
Wade	Naristocrat	Unmarried	-	-	-	-	Wentworth	Aristocrat	Married	27	Lt. Colonel	Lord	?
West	Aristocrat	Married	28	Lt. Colonel	Earl	Aristocrat	William	Aristocrat	Unmarried	-	-	-	-
Wolfe	Naristocrat	Married	38	Major	Thompson	?	Wynyard	Naristocrat	Married	-	-	Maxwell	?

Note: 'Father-in-law' lists social status of generals' fathers-in-law. Where this is not known the surname of the father-in-law is listed instead.
Source: Appendix 4.1, Data Sources: Social Backgrounds

Table 1.10. First marriages of 1800 generals

	SG1	Marriage status	Marriage age	Rank at marriage	Father-in-law	Wife SG1		SG1	Marriage status	Marriage age	Rank at marriage	Father-in-law	Wife SG1
Abercromby, Ra.	Naristocrat	Married	29	Captain	Captain	Naristocrat	Abercromby, Ro.	Naristocrat	Unmarried	-	-	-	-
Asgill	Aristocrat	Married	28	Captain	Baronet	Aristocrat	Baird	Naristocrat	Married	53	Lt. General	Preston	?
Balfour	?	Unmarried	-	-	-	-	Barclay	?	Married	-	-	?	?
Burrard	Naristocrat	Married	34	Major	Merchant	Naristocrat	Campbell, A.	Naristocrat	Married	-	-	Menzies	?
Campbell, J.	Aristocrat	Married	36	Major General	Gunning	?	Carleton, G.	Naristocrat	Married	48	Major General	Earl	Aristocrat
Carleton, T.	Naristocrat	Married	48	Colonel	van Horn	?	Cathcart	Aristocrat	Married	24	Major	Foreign	Naristocrat
Cavendish	Aristocrat	Unmarried	-	-	-	-	Christie Burton	Naristocrat	Married	26	Lieutenant	General	Naristocrat
Clarke	Naristocrat	Married	26	Captain	MP	Naristocrat	Coote	Naristocrat	Married	27	Major	Rodbard	?
Cornwallis	Aristocrat	Married	30	Colonel	Captain	Naristocrat	Cradock	Naristocrat	Married	36	Major General	Earl	Aristocrat
Craig	Naristocrat	Unmarried	-	-	-	-	Cuninghame	Naristocrat	Married	26	Captain	Captain	Naristocrat
Cuyler	?	Married	-	-	Major	Naristocrat	Dalrymple, H.W	Aristocrat	Married	33	Lt. Colonel	General	Naristocrat
Dalrymple, W.	Aristocrat	Married	47	Major General	Baronet	Aristocrat	de Lancy	Naristocrat	Married	-	-	?	?
Despard	?	Married	49	Lt. Colonel	Hesketh	?	Don	Naristocrat	Married	26	Captain	Illegitimate	Illegitimate
Dundas, D.	Naristocrat	Married	72	General	General	Naristocrat	Dundas, F.	Naristocrat	Married	41	Major General	Knight	Naristocrat
Duff	Illegitimate	Married	32	Captain	Merchant	Naristocrat	Edward	Aristocrat	Married	51	Major General	King	Aristocrat
Fanning	Naristocrat	Married	48	Colonel	Burns	?	Farrington	Naristocrat	Married	24	Captain	Foreign	Naristocrat
Fawcett	Naristocrat	Married	22	Ensign	Brooke	?	Fitzroy	Aristocrat	Married	31	Captain	MP	Naristocrat

Note: 'Father-in-law' lists social status of generals' fathers-in-law. Where this is not known the surname of the father-in-law is listed instead.
Source: Appendix 4.1, Data Sources: Social Backgrounds

Table 1.10. First marriages of 1800 generals (continued)

	SG1	Marriage status	Marriage age	Rank at marriage	Father-in-law	Wife SG1		SG1	Marriage status	Marriage age	Rank at marriage	Father-in-law	Wife SG1
Fox	Aristocrat	Married	31	Lt. Colonel	Clayton	?	Floyd	Naristocrat	Married	43	Colonel	Merchant	Naristocrat
Frederick	Aristocrat	Married	28	Lt. General	King	Aristocrat	Gardiner	Naristocrat	Married	31	31	Baronet	Aristocrat
Gordon	Aristocrat	Married	41	Colonel	MP	Naristocrat	Grant	Naristocrat	Unmarried	-	-	-	-
Grenville	Naristocrat	Unmarried	-	-	-	-	Grey	Aristocrat	Married	33	Lt. Colonel	Grey	?
Harcourt	Aristocrat	Married	35	Lt. Colonel	Reverend	Naristocrat	Harris	Naristocrat	Married	33	Major	Dixon	?
Hastings	Aristocrat	Married	50	Lt. General	Earl	Aristocrat	Herbert	Aristocrat	Married	28	Lt. Colonel	Hon.	Aristocrat
Hewett	Naristocrat	Married	35	Major	Johnson	?	Howe	Aristocrat	Married	36	Colonel	MP	Naristocrat
Hely Hutchinson	Naristocrat	Unmarried	-	-	-	-	Irving	Naristocrat	Married	37	Lt. Colonel	Earl	Aristocrat
Johnson, H.	?	Married	34	Lt. Colonel	Foreign	Naristocrat	Lake	?	Married	26	Lieutenant	Diplomat	Naristocrat
Lambart	Aristocrat	Married	19	Lieutenant	Knight	Naristocrat	Leland	?	Married	-	Major	E.I.C	Naristocrat
Lennox, C.	Aristocrat	Married	25	Lt. Colonel	Duke	Aristocrat	Lennox, G.	Aristocrat	Married	22	Lt. Colonel	Lord	Aristocrat
Lindsay	Aristocrat	Married	28	Lt. Colonel	Hon.	Aristocrat	Loftus	Naristocrat	Married	26	Captain	King	?
Ludlow	Aristocrat	Unmarried	-	-	-	-	Luttrell	Aristocrat	Married	39	Lt. Colonel	Boyd	?
MacLeod	?	Married	22	Captain	Mackenzie	?	Manners	Aristocrat	Unmarried	-	-	-	-
Medows	Naristocrat	Married	32	Lt. Colonel	Hammerton	?	Melville	Naristocrat	Unmarried	-	-	-	-
Moore	Naristocrat	Unmarried	-	-	-	-	Morris	Naristocrat	Married	28	Captain	Earl	Aristocrat
Morse	Naristocrat	Married	43	Captain	Godin	?	Munro	Naristocrat	Unmarried	-	-	-	-
Musgrave	Aristocrat	Unmarried	-	-	-	-	Needham	Aristocrat	Married	39	Lt. Colonel	Fisher	?
Nugent	Illegitimate	Married	40	Major General	Foreign	Naristocrat	O'Hara	Illegitimate	Unmarried	-	-	-	-
Percy	Aristocrat	Married	22	Lt. Colonel	Earl	Aristocrat	Phipps	Aristocrat	Married	40	Major General	Maling	?
Pigot	Naristocrat	Married	-	-	?	?	Pitt, J.	Aristocrat	Married	27	Captain	Viscount	Aristocrat
Pitt, W.A	Naristocrat	Married	35	Lt. Colonel	Viscount	Aristocrat	Prescott	Naristocrat	Married	-	-	?	?
Rainsford	Naristocrat	Married	47	Lt. Colonel	Miles	?	Ross	?	Married	53	Colonel	Baronet	Aristocrat
Simcoe	Naristocrat	Married	30	Lt. Colonel	Lt. Colonel	Naristocrat	Somerset	Aristocrat	Married	21	Colonel	Viscount	Aristocrat

Note: 'Father-in-law' lists social status of generals' fathers-in-law. Where this is not known the surname of the father-in-law is listed instead.
Source: Appendix 4.1, Data Sources: Social Backgrounds

Table 1.10. First marriages of 1800 generals (continued)

	SG1	Marriage status	Marriage age	Rank at marriage	Father-in-law	Wife SG1		SG1	Marriage status	Marriage age	Rank at marriage	Father-in-law	Wife SG1
Stanhope	Aristocrat	Married	26	Lt. Colonel	Baronet	Aristocrat	Steuart Denham	Aristocrat	Married	28	Major	Blacker	?
St John, F.	Aristocrat	Married	23	-	Marquis	Aristocrat	St John, H.	Aristocrat	Married	33	Lt. Colonel	MP	Naristocrat
St. Ledger	?	Unmarried	-	-	-	-	Strutt	Naristocrat	Unmarried	-	-	-	-
Stuart, C.	Aristocrat	Married	25	Lt. Colonel	Lord	Aristocrat	Tarleton	Naristocrat	Married	44	Major General	Illegitimate	Illegitimate
Townshend	Aristocrat	Married	27	Lt. Colonel	Earl	Aristocrat	Villettes	Naristocrat	Unmarried	-	-	-	-
Vyse	Naristocrat	Married	-	-	Reverend	Naristocrat	Wemyss	Aristocrat	Married	28	Major	Baronet	Aristocrat
Whitelocke	Naristocrat	Married	26	Lieutenant	Merchant	Naristocrat	William	Aristocrat	Married	23	Colonel	Knight	Naristocrat

Note: 'Father-in-law' lists social status of generals' fathers-in-law. Where this is not known the surname of the father-in-law is listed instead.

Source: Appendix 4.1, Data Sources: Social Backgrounds

Appendix 2, Careers

Table 2.1. Regimental ranks of 1747 generals

	Pre-Ensign	Ensign	Lieutenant	Captain Lieutenant	Captain	Major	Lt. Colonel	Colonel	Exit
Anstruther	-	-	-	-	1709, 1fg	-	-	1720, 26f	1760, death
Borgard	1692, Volunteer, Artillery	-	1693, Artillery	-	1695, Artillery; 1698, Engineers	-	1706, Artillery	1722, Artillery	1750, retirement
Bowles	-	-	-	-	1710, 27f; 1713, 3fg	-	-	1719, 12d; 1740, 6dg	1749, death
Blakeney	-	1695, 18f	1701, 18f; 1708, 1fg	-	1704, 18f; 1712,1fg	1707, 18f	1718, 31f	1737, 27f	1761, death
Bland	-	1704, ?	1705, ?	-	1706,?	1709, Sibourg's foot; 1715, 11d; 1717 1d	1718, 2dg	1737, 36f; 1741, 13d; 1743, 3d; 1752, 1dg	1763, death
Bligh	-	-	-	-	1717, 5dg	1718, 5dg	1719, 5dg	1740, 20f; 1746, 12d; 1747, 5dg	1758, retirement
Bragg	-	1702, 1fg	-	-	1704, 24f; 1715, 24f; 1727, 3fg	-	1709, 36f; 1732, 31f	1734, 28f	1759, death
Byng	-	1708, 3fg	-	-	1721, 3fg	1741, 3fg	-	1742, 4th Marines; 1749, 48f	1750, death
Campbell	-	-	1704, 4hg	-	1708, 4hg	1708, 4hg	1711, 4hg	1715, 9f; 1717, 2d	1745, death in battle
Cholmondeley	-	1725, 3hg	-	-	1731, 3hg	-	-	1741, 48f; 1742, 34f; 1749, 12d; 1749, 6dg; 1750, 6d	1775, death

Note: ? indicates where the regiment/date is unknown. In all tables f stands for foot, fg foot guards, d dragoons, dg dragoon guards, hg horse guards and lg life guards.
Source: Appendix 4.2, Data Sources: Careers

Table 2.1. Regimental ranks of 1747 generals (continued)

	Pre-Ensign	Ensign	Lieutenant	Captain Lieutenant	Captain	Major	Lt. Colonel	Colonel	Exit
Cope	-	1707, 1d	-	-	1709, 33f; 1710, Stanhope's dragoons; 1710 3fg	-	1712, McCartney's foot; 1712, Wynne's foot	1730, 30f; 1732, 5f; 1737, 9d; 1741, 7d	1760, death
Dalrymple	1692, Volunteer, 26f	-	-	-	1702, 3fg	-	-	1706, 26f; 1706-14, 2d; 1715-34, 6d; 1743, 6d	1747, death
Dalzell	-	1682, 21f	-	-	1694, 28f	-	1704, 28f	1709-12, Dalzell's foot; 1730, 33f; 1739, 38f	1750, retirement
de Grangues	-	1695,?	-	1715, 13d	1707, Waleffe's dragoons	1712, de Borle's dragoons; before 1727, 8d	1731, 14d	1741, 60f; 1742, 30f; 1743, 9d; 1749, 7dg	1754
Fowke	-	1704, Lepell's foot	-	-	1707, Lepell's foot; 1711, 27f	1716, 13f	1720, 7d	1741, 43f; 1741, 2f; 1755, 14f	1756, dismissal
Gooch	-	1700,?	-	-	1704, 16f; 1715, Irwin's foot	1715-?,?	-	1740, Gooch's foot	1749, retirement
Guise	-	-	-	-	1706, 1fg	1724, 1fg	1735, 1fg	1738, 6f	1763, retirement
Handasyd	-	1694, 28f; 1702, 22f	-	-	1703, 22f	-	1709, 22f	1712, 22f; 1730, 16f	1763, death
Hargrave	-	1701, 36f	1702, 36f	-	1703, 36f	1710, 36f	1718, 36f; 1720, 13f	1737, 9f; 1739, 7f	1751, death
Hawley	-	1694, 19f; 1702, Temple's foot; 1704, Royal hg	-	-	1706, 4d	1711, 4d	1711, 4d	1717, 33f; 1730, 13d; 1740, 1d	1759, death

Note: ? indicates where the regiment/date is unknown. *Source:* Appendix 4.2, Data Sources: Careers

Table 2.1. Regimental ranks of 1747 generals (continued)

	Pre-Ensign	Ensign	Lieutenant	Captain Lieutenant	Captain	Major	Lt. Colonel	Colonel	Exit
Honywood	-	1694, Stanley's foot	-	-	1696, 7f; 1702, 33f	1703, 33f	1705, 33f	1709-11, 68f; 1715, 11d; 1732, 3d; 1743, 2dg	1752, death
Howard, C.	-	1715, 2fg	-	-	1717, 16f; ?, 9d	-	-	1734, 19f; 1748, 3dg	1765, death
Howard, T.	-	1703, Evan's foot	-	-	1704, 33f	1710, ?	1710, Evan's dragoons; 1715, 33f	1717, 24f; 1737, 3f	1749, retirement
Huske	-	1708, Caulfield's foot; 1709, 5dg; 1709, 2fg	-	-	1715, 2fg	1734, 2fg	-	1740, 32f; 1743, 23f	1761, death
Irwin	-	1689, 1f	1691, 1f	-	1695, 1f	1704, 1f	1737, 1f	1737, 5f	1752
Keppel	-	-	-	-	1717, 2fg	-	-	1731, 29f; 1733, 3hg; 1744, 2fg	1754, death
Kerr	-	-	-	-	1693, ?	-	1704, ?	1712, 29f; 1725, 13f; 1732, 11d	1752, death
Lennox	-	1721, 1hg	-	-	1722, 1hg	-	-	1750, 1hg	1750, death
Leslie	-	-	-	-	1715, 9d; 1717, 3fg	-	1721, 21f	1732, 25f; 1745, 2hg; 1745, 6d; 1750, 2d; 1752, 3fg	1767, death
Ligonier	1702, Volunteer, foot	-	-	-	1703, 10f	1706, 10f	1711, 12f; 1716, 3dg	1720, 7dg; 1749, 2dg; 1753, Royal hg; 1757, 1fg	1770, death
Lindsay	-	-	-	-	1726, Campbell's dragoons; 1734, 3fg	-	-	1739, 42f; 1740, 4hg; 1746, 25f; 1747, 2d	1749, death
Molesworth	-	1701, 1f	-	-	1704, 1f; 1707, 1fg	-	-	1710-13, Molesworth's foot; 1715-18 Molesworth's dragoons; 1725, 27f; 1732, 9d; 1737, 5d	1758, death
Montagu	1706, Volunteer	-	-	-	-	-	-	1715-21, 1hg; 1737-37, 1hg; 1740, 2hg	1749, death
Mordaunt	-	1721, 3fg	1724, 3fg	-	1726, 3d; 1731, 3fg	-	-	1741, 58f; 1742, 18f; 1747, 12d; 1749, 7dg; 1749, 10d	1780, death
Murray	-	1703, 3fg	-	-	1705, 1f	-	-	1713, 3fg	1752, death

Note: ? indicates where the regiment/date is unknown. *Source:* Appendix 4.2, Data Sources: Careers

Table 2.1. Regimental ranks of 1747 generals (continued)

	Pre-Ensign	Ensign	Lieutenant	Captain Lieutenant	Captain	Major	Lt. Colonel	Colonel	Exit
O'Farrell	-	1692, 9f	-	-	1714, 9f	1717, 9f	1722, 9f	1741, 22f	1757, death
Oglethorpe	-	1707, ?	1713-15, 1fg	-	1737, 42f	-	-	1737, 42f	1715, resigned; 1748, retirement
O'Hara	-	1703, 7f	-	-	1705, 7f	-	-	1713, 7f; 1739-43, 4dg; 1746, 10f; 1749-49, 14d; 1752, 3d; 1755, 2fg	1773, death
Philips	-	-	1678, Morpeth's foot	-	1689, Morpeth's foot; 1692, Kirke's foot	1707, Kirke's foot	1710, Kirke's foot	1712, 12f; 1717, 40f; 1750, 38f	1751, retirement
Ponsonby	-	-	-	-	1705, 27f	1711, 27f	1715, 27f	1735, 37f	1745, death in battle
Rich	-	1700, 1fg	-	-	1704, 24f; 1708, 1fg	-	-	1710-13, 18f; 1715-17, dragoons; 1722, 13d; 1725, 8d; 1731, 6dg; 1733, 1h; 1735, 4d	1768, death
Spencer	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1738, 38f; 1739, 1d; 1740, 2hg; 1742-4, 2fg	1744, resigned
St Clair	-	1694, 1f	-	-	1708, 1f; 1714, 3fg	1722, 3fg	-	1734, 22f; 1737, 1f	1762, death
St George	-	1688, ?	-	1691, ?	1692, 17f; before 1702 Irish foot	1708, Slane's foot	1711, 20f	1737, 20f; 1740, 8d	1755, death
Temple	-	1685-6, Prince George's foot; 1687, Prince George's foot	-	-	1689, Prince George's foot; 1695, Columbine's foot	-	-	1702, Temple's foot; 1710-13, 4d; 1715, 1d; 1721-33, 1dg; 1744 5dg; 1745, 10d	1686, dismissal; 1733, dismissal; 1749, death
Wade	-	1690, 10f	1693, 10f	1694, 10f	1695, 10f	1703, 10f	1703, 10f	1705, 33f; 1717, 3dg	1748, death
Wentworth	-	-	1715, 4hg	-	1715, 1fg	-	1718, 23f	1732, 39f; 1737, 24f; 1745, 5dg	1747, death

Note: ? indicates where the regiment/date is unknown. *Source:* Appendix 4.2, Data Sources: Careers

Table 2.1. Regimental ranks of 1747 generals (continued)

	Pre-Ensign	Ensign	Lieutenant	Captain Lieutenant	Captain	Major	Lt. Colonel	Colonel	Exit
West	-	-	1715, 1hg	-	1717, 1hg; 1730, 1fg	-	-	1737, 1hg	1766, death
Wolfe	-	1702, Marines	-	-	1717, 3fg	1710, 20f; 1715, Dubourgsay's foot	-	1739, Marines; 1745, 8f	1759, death
Wynyard	-	1703, Elliott's foot	-	1703, ?	1707, ?; 1715, Orrery's foot	1710, ?	1718, 35f; 1729, 17f	1739, 4th Marines; 1742, 17f	1752, death

Note: ? indicates where the regiment/date is unknown. *Source:* Appendix 4.2, Data Sources: Careers

Table 2.2. Regimental ranks of 1800 generals

	Pre-Ensign	Ensign	Lieutenant	Captain Lieutenant	Captain	Major	Lt. Colonel	Colonel Commander	Colonel	Exit
Abercromby, Ra.	-	1756, 3dg	1760, 3dg	-	1762, 2dg	1770, 2dg	1773, 2dg	-	1781-3, 103f; 1790, 69f; 1792, 6f; 1795, 7dg; 1796, 2d	1801, death in battle
Baird	-	1772, 2f	1778, 2f	1778, 73f	1777, 73f	1787, 73f	1790, 73f	1799, 2b 73f	1800, 54f; 1807, 24f	1829, death
Barclay	-	1755, Marines	1756, Marines	-	1762, Marines	1791, Marines	1794, Marines	1798, 2nd Marines; 1803 1st Marines	-	1815, retirement
Beckwith	-	1771, 37f	1777, 37f	1777, 37f	1778, 37f	-	-	1806, 6th Garrison battalion	1809, 2WI; 1818, 89f	1823, death
Bowyer	-	1767, 68f	1772, 68f	-	1778, 66f	1787, 66f	1789, 66f	-	1797, 89f; 1797-1808, 16f	?
Burrard	1768, Cadet, Artillery	1772, Cadet, Artillery	1776, 60f	1777, 60f; 1789, 1fg	1779, 60f; 1792, 1fg	1786, 14f; 1798, 1fg	1804, 1fg	-	-	1813, death
Carleton, T.	1753, Volunteer, 20f	1755, 20f	1755, 20f	-	1759, 20f	1772, 20f	1776, 29f; 1788, 5f	1792-3, 1b 60f; 1794, 2b 60f	-	1807, retirement
Cathcart	-	1777, 7d	1777, 17d	-	1777, 17d; 1781, 2fg	1779, 38f	1779, British Legion; 1789, 29f	-	1792, 29f; 1797, 2lg	1843, death
Clarke	-	1759, 50f	1760, 50f	-	1763, 50f; 1767, 5f	1771, 54f	1775, 54f; 1777, 7f	1791, b 60f	1794, 68f; 1794, 5f; 1801, 7f	1832, death
Coates	-	1755, 66f	1757, 66f	1761, 66f	1762, 66f	1766, 66f	1775, 19f	-	1794-1822, 2f	?
Coote	-	1776, 37f	1776, 37f	-	1778, 37f	1783, 47f	1788, 70f	1799, 17f	1802, 89f; 1806, 62f; 1810, 34f	1816, dismissal
Cornwallis	-	1756, 1fg	-	-	1759, Crawford's foot; 1759, 85f	-	1761, 12f	-	1763, 33f	1805, death
Cradock	-	1777, 7dg; 1779, 2fg	1781, 2fg	-	-	1785, 12d; 1786, 13f	1789, 13f; 1794, 127f	-	-	1839, death

Note: Baird's appointment as captain was backdated *Source:* Appendix 4.2, Data Sources: Careers

Table 2.2. Regimental ranks of 1800 generals (continued)

	Pre-Ensign	Ensign	Lieutenant	Captain Lieutenant	Captain	Major	Lt. Colonel	Colonel Commander	Colonel	Exit
Craig	-	1763, 30f	1769, 47f	-	1771, 47f	1777, 82f	1781, 82f; 1783, 16f	-	1795, 46f; 1804, 86f; 1806, 22f; 1809, 79f	1812, death
Cuyler	-	1759, 55f	1761, 55f	-	1764, 46f	1776, 55f	1777, 55f	-	1793, 86f; 1794, 69f	1819, death
Dalrymple, H.W	-	1763, 31f	1766, 31f	-	1768, 1f; 1783, 1fg	1777, 77f	1781, 68f; 1796, 66f	-	1797, 81f; 1798, 37f; 1810, 19f; 1811, 57f	1830, death
de Lancy	-	1766, 14d	1770, 14d	-	1773, 17d	1778, 17d	1794, 17d	-	1795, 17d	1822, death
Don	-	1770, 51f	1774, 51f	-	1780, 51f	1783, 71f; 1784, 59f	1789, 59f	-	1799, 9WI; 1805, 96f; 1818, 36f; 1829, 3f	1832, death
Drummond, A.J	-	1773, 1fg	1777, 1fg	1782, 1fg	1782, 1fg	1797, 1fg	1799, 1fg	1801-2, 2b 5f; 1807-14, 11th Veteran battalion	-	?
Dundas, D.	1750, Cadet, Artillery	1755, Artillery	1755, Engineers; 1756, 58f		1759, Engineers; 1759, 15d	1770, 15d	1775, 12d; 1781-3, 2h	-	1791, 22f; 1795, 7d; 1801-13, 2d; 1809-20, 95f; 1813-20, 1dg	1820, death
Fawcett	1740s, Volunteer, foot	1748, 33f; 1749, 38f; 1751, 3fg	1757, 3fg	1767, 3fg	1767, 3fg	-	-	-	1778, 15f; 1792, 3dg	1804, death
Fitzroy	-	1782, 3fg	-	-	1787, 43f; 1789, 45f; 1794, 3fg	-	-	1804, b 60f	1805, 48f	1829, death
Fox	-	1770, 1dg	1773, 1dg		1774, 38f	1777, 49f	1778, 38f	-	1793, 131f; 1795, 10f	1811, death
Floyd	-	1760, 15d	1763, 15d	1770, 15d	1778, 15d	1779, 21d	1781, 23d	-	1800, 26d; 1804, 8d	1818, death
Garth	-	1755, 1fg	1758, 1fg	-	1772, 1fg	1782, 1fg	1789, 1fg	-	1792, 17f	1819, death
Grant	-	1741, 1f	1742, 1f	-	1744, 1f	1757, 77f	1760, 40f	-	1775, 55f; 1791, 11f	1806, death
Grenville	-	1759, 1fg	1760, 1fg	-	1760, 1fg; 1761, 24f; 1772, 2fg	-	-	-	1786, 23f	1823, death
Grey	-	1744, 6f	1752, 6f	-	1755, Independent co.; 1755, 20f	-	1761, 98f	-	1777, 28f; 1789, 7dg; 1795, 8d; 1799, 3d	1807, death

Source: Appendix 4.2, Data Sources: Careers

Table 2.2. Regimental ranks of 1800 generals (continued)

	Pre-Ensign	Ensign	Lieutenant	Captain Lieutenant	Captain	Major	Lt. Colonel	Colonel Commander	Colonel	Exit
Harcourt	-	1759, 1fg	-	-	1759, 16d; 1760, 3d	-	1764, 31f; 1765, 4d; 1768, 16d	-	1779, 16d	1830, death
Harris	1759, Cadet, Artillery	1762, Artillery; 1762, 5f	1765, 5f	-	1771, 5f	1777, 5f	1780, 5f; 1787, 76f	-	1800, 73f	1829, death
Herbert	-	1775, 12f	-	-	1778, foot; 1778, 1d;	1782, 22d	1782, 2dg	-	1797, 6d	1827, death
Hewett	1761, Cadet, Artillery	1762, 70f	1764, 70f	-	1775, 70f	1781, 43f	1787, 43f	1793, 92f; 1799, 2b 5f	1800, 61f	1840, death
Howe	-	1746, 15d	1747, 15d	1750, 20f	1750, 20f	1756, 60f	1757, 58f	-	1764, 46f; 1775, 23f; 1786, 19d	1840, death
Hulse	-	1761, 1fg	1769, 1fg		1776, 1fg	1789, 1fg	1794, 1fg	-	1795, 56f; 1797, 19f; 1810, 62f	1837, death
Lake	-	1758, 1fg	1762, 1fg	1776, 1fg	1776, 1fg	1784, 1fg	1792, 1fg	-	1794, 53f; 1796, 76f	1808, death
Lambart	-	1779, 2fg	1781, 2fg	1790, 2fg	1793, 2fg	1800, 2fg		1801, b 68f	1805, 2WI; 1808, 77f; 1811, 58f; 1823, 45f	1837, death
Lindsay	-	1767, 15f	-	-	1771, 42f	1775, 53f	1777, 24f; 1782-3, 2b 71f	-	1789, 63f	1825, death
Loftus	-	1770, 9d; 1770, 17d	1776, 17d; 1777, 3fg	-	1776, 44f; 1784, 3fg	-		-	1794, 24d; 1821, 2dg	1831, death
Ludlow	-	1778, 1fg	1781, 1fg	-	1790, 1fg	1800, 1fg		-	1801, 96f; 1805, 38f; 1836, 3fg	1842, death
Luttrell	-	1757, 48f	1759, 34f	-	1759, 16d	-	1765, 4dg	-	1788, 6dg; 1789, 2nd Irish Artillery; 1797, 1st Irish Artillery	1801, retirement
Medows	-	1757, 50f	1757, 50f	-	1764, 3dg	1766, 3dg	1769, 5f; 1773, 12d; 1775, 55f; 1777, 5f	-	1780, 89f; 1786, 73f; 1796, 7dg	1813, death
Mercer	-	1759, Engineers	1762, Engineers	-	1772, Engineers	-	1787, Engineers	1805, Engineers	-	1815

Source: Appendix 4.2, Data Sources: Careers

Table 2.2. Regimental ranks of 1800 generals (continued)

	Pre-Ensign	Ensign	Lieutenant	Captain Lieutenant	Captain	Major	Lt. Colonel	Col. Commander	Colonel	Exit
Moore	-	1776, 51f	-	1778, 82f	1780, 82f; 1785, 100f	1785, 102f; 1788, 60f; 1788, 51f	1790, 51f	1799, 2b 52f	1798, 9WI; 1801, 52f	1809, death in battle
Musgrave	-	1754, 3f	1756, 3f	-	1759, 64f	1774, 64f	1776, 40f	-	1787, 76f	1812, death
Nugent	-	1773, 39f	1775, 7f	-	1778, 57f; 1790 2fg	1782, 57f	1783, 97f; 1787, 13f; 1789, 4dg; 1793, 85f	-	1794, 85f; 1805, 62f; 1806, 6f	1849, death
Pitt, W.A	-	1744, 10d	-	-	1749, 10d	1755, 10d	1755, 59f; 1759, 10d	-	1770, 12d; 1775, 6dg; 1780, 10d; 1796, 1dg	1809, death
St John, H.	-	1754, 2fg	-	-	1758, 18f	1760, 91f	1767, 67f	-	1778, 36f	1818, death
Stanhope	-	1769, 2fg	-	-	1773, 29f; 1778, 3fg	-	1779, 85f	-	1783, 65f; 1788, 29f; 1792, 2lg	1829, death
Strutt	-	1778, 61f	1779, 61f	-	1779, 91f; 1782, 97f	1787, 60f	1790, 60f; 1792, 54f	-	-	1800, retirement
Tarleton	-	1775, 1dg	-	-	1778, 79f	-	1782, British Legion	-	1799, Prince of Wales Cavalry; 1802, 21d; 1818, 8d	1833, death

Source: Appendix 4.2, Data Sources: Careers

Table 2.3. Higher army ranks of 1747 generals

	Captain	Major	Lt. Colonel	Colonel	Local General	Brigadier General	Major General	Lt. General	General	Field Marshal
Anstruther	-	-	1709	-	-	1735	1739	1745	-	-
Borgard	-	-	-	1705	-	1726	1735	1739	-	-
Bowles	-	-	1713	-	-	1735	1739	1745	-	-
Blakeney	-	-	1712	-	-	1743	1745	1747	-	-
Bland	-	-	-	-	-	1743	1745	1747	-	-
Bligh	-	-	-	-	-	1745	1747	1754	-	-
Bragg	-	-	-	-	-	1742	1743	1747	-	-
Byng	-	-	1721	1741	-	1745	1747	-	-	-
Campbell	-	1704	1708	1711	-	1735	1739	1742	-	-
Cholmondeley	1725	-	1731	-	-	1745	1747	1754	1770	-
Cope	-	-	1710	1711	-	1735	1739	1743	-	-
Dalrymple	-	-	1702	1702	-	1706	1709	1710	1712	1742
Dalzell	-	-	-	1706	-	1711	1727	1735	1745	-
de Grangues	-	-	-	-	-	1745	1747	-	-	-
Fowke	-	-	-	-	-	1745	1747	1754	-	-
Gooch	-	-	-	1740	-	1745	1747	-	-	-
Guise	-	-	1706	1724	-	1739	1742	1745	1761	-
Handasyd	-	-	-	-	-	1735	1739	1743	-	-
Hargrave	-	-	1708	1711	-	1735	1739	1743	-	-
Hawley	1704	1707	-	1712	-	1735	1739	1743	-	-
Honywood	-	-	-	1705	-	1710	1727	1735	1743	-
Howard, C.	-	-	1719	-	-	1742	1743	1747	1765	-
Howard, T.	-	-	-	1711	-	1735	1739	1743	-	-
Huske	-	-	1715	1734	-	1742	1743	1747	-	-
Irwin	-	-	1711	-	-	1743	1744	1747	-	-
Keppel	-	-	1717	1727	-	1739	1742	1745	-	-
Kerr	-	-	-	1706	-	1711	1727	1735	1743	-
Lennox	1721	-	1722	1724	-	1739	1742	1745	1745	-

Note: Army ranks are only noted if they were higher than the regimental rank held. *Source:* Appendix 4.2, Data Sources: Careers

Table 2.3. Higher army ranks of 1747 generals (continued)

	Captain	Major	Lt. Colonel	Colonel	Local General	Brigadier General	Major General	Lt. General	General	Field Marshal
Leslie	-	-	1717	-	-	1739	1743	1747	1765	-
Ligonier	-	-	-	1711	-	1735	1739	1743	1746	1757
Lindsay	-	-	1734	-	-	1744	1745	1747	-	-
Molesworth	-	-	1707	-	1739- Lt. General, Ireland	-	1735	1742	1746	1757
Montagu	-	-	-	1710	-	1735	1739	1746	-	-
Mordaunt	1724	-	1731	-	-	1745	1747	1754	1770	-
Murray	-	-	-	-	-	1719	1735	1739	1745	-
O'Farrell	-	-	-	-	-	1746	1754	-	-	-
Oglethorpe	1713	-	-	-	-	1743	1745	1747	1765	-
O'Hara	-	-	-	1712	-	1735	1739	1743	1761	1763
Philips	-	-	-	-	-	1735	1739	1743	-	-
Ponsonby	-	-	1712	-	-	1742	1743	-	-	-
Rich	-	-	1708	1709	-	1727	1735	1739	1745	1757
Spencer	-	-	-	-	-	1743	1745	1747	1758	-
St Clair	-	-	1714	1722	-	1739	1741	1745	1761	-
St George	-	-	-	-	-	1743	1744	1747	-	-
Temple	-	-	-	-	-	1706	1709	1710	-	1742
Wade	-	-	-	1704	1707- Brig. General, Spain; 1708-Major General, Spain	1708	1714	1727	1739	1743
Wentworth	-	1715	1715	1722	-	1739	1741	1745	-	-
West	-	1715	1717	-	-	1743	1745	1747	1765	-
Wolfe	-	-	1717	-	-	1744	1745	1747	-	-
Wynyard	-	-	-	-	-	1744	1745	-	-	-

Note: Army ranks are only noted if they were higher than the regimental rank held. *Source:* Appendix 4.2, Data Sources: Careers

Table 2.4. Higher army ranks of 1800 generals

	Captain	Major	Lt. Colonel	Colonel	Local General	Major General	Lt. General	General	Field Marshal
Abercromby, Ra.	-	-	-	1780	1795, 1797-General, WI; 1799-General, Foreign Service	1787	1797	-	-
Baird	-	-	-	1795	-	1798	1805	1814	-
Barclay	-	1777	1783	1794	-	1796	1803	1813	-
Beckwith	-	1781	1790	1795	-	1798	1805	1814	-
Bowyer	-	1781	1782	1793	1805- General, WI	1795	1802	-	-
Burrard	-	-	1789	1795	-	1798	1805	-	-
Carleton, T.	-	-	1776	1782	-	1793	1798	1803	-
Cathcart	-	-	1781	1790	1793- Brig. General, Continent	1794	1801	1812	-
Clarke	-	-	1775	1782	1783- Brig. General, America	1790	1797	1802	1830
Coates	-	-	1775	1782	1775- Brig. General, America	1790	1797	1802	-
Coote	-	-	-	1795	1796- Brig. General, Ireland	1797	1805	1814	-
Cornwallis	-	-	-	-	-	1775	1777	1793	-
Cradock	1781	-	-	-	1797- Brig. General, Ireland; 1804- Lt. General, India	1798	1805	1814	-
Craig	-	-	-	1790	1805- General, Mediterranean; 1807- General, Canada	1794	1801	-	-
Cuyler	-	-	-	1782	1782- Brig. General, WI	1793	1798	1803	-
Dalrymple, H.W	-	-	-	1790	-	1794	1801	1812	-
de Lancy	-	-	1781	1790	-	1794	1801	1812	-
Don	-	-	-	1795	-	1798	1805	1814	-
Drummond, A.J	1777	-	1782	1793	-	1795	1802	1812	-
Dundas, D.	-	-	1775	1782	-	1790	1797	1802	-
Fawcett	1757	-	1760	1772	-	1777	1782	1796	-
Fitzroy	-	-	1794	1795	-	1798	1805	1814	-
Fox	-	-	-	1783	-	1793	1799	1808	-
Floyd	-	-	-	1790	1794- Brig. General, India	1794	1801	1812	-
Garth	1758	-	1772	1779	1779- Brig. General, America	1782	1796	1801	-

Note: Army ranks are only noted if they were higher than the regimental rank held. *Source:* Appendix 4.2, Data Sources: Careers

Table 2.4. Higher army ranks of 1800 generals (continued)

	Captain	Major	Lt. Colonel	Colonel	Local General	Major General	Lt. General	General	Field Marshal
Grant	-	-	-	1772	-	1777	1782	1796	-
Grenville	1760	-	-	1779	-	1782	1796	1801	-
Grey	-	-	-	1772	1777-Major General, America; 1793-General, America	1777	1782	1796	-
Harcourt	-	-	-	1777	-	1782	1793	1798	1821
Harris	-	-	-	1790	1796- Lt. General, Madras	1794	1801	1812	-
Herbert	-	-	-	1793	-	1795	1802	1812	-
Hewett	-	-	-	1794	-	1796	1803	1813	-
Howe	-	-	-	1762	-	1772	1777	1793	-
Hulse	1769	-	1776	1782	-	1793	1798	1803	1830
Lake	1762	-	1776	1781	-	1790	1797	1802	-
Lambart	1781	-	1790	1795	-	1798	1805	1814	-
Lindsay	-	-	-	1782	-	1793	1798	1803	-
Loftus	-	-	1784		-	1796	1803	1813	-
Ludlow	1781	-	1790	1795	-	1798	1805	1813	-
Luttrell	-	1762	-	1777	-	1782	1793	1798	-
Medows	-	-	-		1778- Brig. General, WI	1782	1793	1798	-
Mercer	-	1783	-	1794	-	1796	1803	1813	-
Moore	-	-	-	1795	1795- Brig. General, WI	1798	1805	-	-
Musgrave	-	1772	-	1782	1782- Brig. General, America	1790	1797	1802	-
Nugent	-	-	-		1794- Brig. General, Flanders	1796	1803	1813	1846
Pitt, W.A	-	-	-	1762	-	1776	1777	1793	-
St John, H.	-	-	1762	1776	-	1779	1787	1797	-
Stanhope	-	-	1778	1782	-	1793	1798	1803	-
Strutt	-	-	-	1795	1795- Brig. General, WI	1798	-	-	-
Tarleton	-	1779	1781	1790	-	1794	1801	1812	-

Note: Army ranks are only noted if they were higher than the regimental rank held. *Source:* Appendix 4.2, Data Sources: Careers

Table 2.5. Methods of promotion for 1800 future generals, ensign to captain

	Ensign			Lieutenant			Captain Lieutenant			Captain		
	Purchase	Recruit	Non-purchase	Purchase	Recruit	Non-purchase	Purchase	Recruit	Non-purchase	Purchase	Recruit	Non-purchase
Abercromby, Ra.	✓	x	x	✓	x	x	-	-	-	✓	x	x
Baird	✓	x	x	x	x	✓	-	-	-	x	x	✓
Barclay	x	x	✓	x	x	✓	-	-	-	x	x	✓
Beckwith	✓	x	x	-	-	-	x	x	✓	x	x	✓
Bowyer	x	x	✓	x	x	✓	-	-	-	-	-	-
Burrard	x	x	✓	-	-	-	-	-	-	x	x	✓
Carleton, T.	x	x	✓	-	-	-	-	-	-	x	x	✓
Cathcart	✓	x	x	-	-	-	-	-	-	x	x	✓
Coates	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	x	x	✓
Coote	-	-	-	x	x	✓	-	-	-	x	x	✓
Cornwallis	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	✓	x	x
Cradock	x	x	✓	x	x	✓	-	-	-	-	-	-
Craig	-	-	-	✓	x	x	-	-	-	-	-	-
Dalrymple, H.W	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	✓	x	x
Don	-	-	-	x	x	✓	-	-	-	x	x	✓
Drummond, A.J	✓	x	x	x	x	✓	-	-	-	x	x	✓
Dundas, D.	x	x	✓	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Fawcett	x	x	✓	✓	x	x	-	-	-	x	x	✓
Fitzroy	x	x	✓	-	-	-	-	-	-	x	x	✓
Fox	✓	x	x	✓	x	x	-	-	-	✓	x	x
Floyd	x	x	✓	x	x	✓	x	x	✓	x	x	✓
Garth	✓	x	x	-	-	-	-	-	-	✓	x	x
Grenville	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	x	✓	x
Grey	✓	x	x	✓	x	x	-	-	-	✓	x	x
Harcourt	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	x	x	✓
Harris	x	x	✓	✓	x	x	-	-	-	✓	x	x
Herbert	x	x	✓	-	-	-	-	-	-	x	x	✓

Source: Appendix 4.2, Data Sources: Careers

Table 2.5. Methods of promotion for 1800 future generals, ensign to captain (continued)

	Ensign			Lieutenant			Captain Lieutenant			Captain		
	Purchase	Recruit	Non-purchase	Purchase	Recruit	Non-purchase	Purchase	Recruit	Non-purchase	Purchase	Recruit	Non-purchase
Hewett	x	x	✓	x	x	✓	-	-	-	✓	x	x
Hulse	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	✓	x	x
Lake	-	-	-	x	x	✓	-	-	-	x	x	✓
Lambart	x	x	✓	-	-	-	x	x	✓	-	-	-
Loftus	-	-	-	x	x	✓	-	-	-	-	-	-
Lindsay	✓	x	x	-	-	-	-	-	-	✓	x	x
Ludlow	x	x	✓	x	x	✓	-	-	-	x	x	✓
Medows			✓	x	x	✓	-	-	-	-	-	-
Mercer	x	x	✓	x	x	✓	-	-	-	x	x	✓
Moore	x	x	✓	x	x	✓	-	-	-	✓	x	x
Nugent	x	x	✓	-	-	-	-	-	-	x	x	✓
Stanhope	x	x	✓	-	-	-	-	-	-	✓	x	x
Strutt	✓	x	x	x	x	✓	-	-	-	✓	x	x
Tarleton	✓	x	x	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

Source: Appendix 4.2, Data Sources: Careers

Table 2.6. Methods of promotion for 1800 future generals, major to lieutenant colonel

	Major			Lieutenant Colonel		
	Purchase	Recruit	Non-purchase	Purchase	Recruit	Non-purchase
Baird	✓	x	x	✓	x	x
Barclay	x	x	✓	x	x	✓
Bowyer	x	x	✓	x	x	✓
Carleton, T.	-	-	-	x	x	✓
Clarke	-	-	-	x	x	✓
Coates	✓	x	x	✓	x	x
Coote	x	x	✓	x	x	✓
Cornwallis	-	-	-	x	x	✓
Cradock	✓	x	x	x	x	✓
Craig	-	-	-	x	x	✓
Cuyler	x	x	✓	x	x	✓
Dalrymple, H.W	-	-	-	x	x	✓
de Lancy	-	-	-	x	x	✓
Don	x	x	✓	✓	x	x
Drummond, A.J	x	x	✓	-	-	-
Dundas, D.	✓	x	x	✓	x	x
Fawcett	-	-	-	-	-	-
Fitzroy	-	-	-	x	x	✓
Fox	✓	x	x	-	-	-
Floyd	x	x	✓	x	x	✓
Garth	x	x	✓	x	x	✓
Grant	x	✓	x	-	-	-
Grenville	-	-	-	-	-	-
Grey	-	-	-	x	x	✓
Harcourt	-	-	-	-	-	-
Harris	-	-	-	x	x	✓

Source: Appendix 4.2, Data Sources: Careers

Table 2.6. Methods of promotion for 1800 future generals, major to lieutenant colonel (continued)

	Major			Lieutenant Colonel		
	Purchase	Recruit	Non-purchase	Purchase	Recruit	Non-purchase
Herbert	x	x	✓	x	x	✓
Hewett	✓	x	x	x	x	✓
Hulse	x	x	✓	x	x	✓
Lake	x	x	✓	x	x	✓
Lambart	x	x	✓	-	-	-
Loftus	-	-	-	-	-	-
Lindsay	✓	x	x	x	x	✓
Ludlow	x	x	✓	-	-	-
Medows	x	x	✓	-	-	-
Mercer	x	x	✓	x	x	✓
Moore	✓	x	x	x	x	✓
Musgrave	x	x	✓	-	-	-
Nugent	x	x	✓	-	-	-
St John, H.	-	-	-	x	x	✓
Stanhope	-	-	-	x	✓	x
Strutt	✓	x	x	✓	x	x
Tarleton	-	-	-	x	x	✓

Source: Appendix 4.2, Data Sources: Careers

Table 2.7. Generals wounded in battle

	1747			1800	
	Date of first wound	Rank when wounded		Date of first wound	Rank when wounded
Borgard	1710	Colonel	Abercromby, Ra.	1801	Lt General
Blakeney	1704	Captain	Baird	1780	Captain
Bland	1710	Major	Coates	1770s	Lt. Colonel
Gooch	1741	Colonel	Coote	1798	Major General
Hawley	1715	Colonel	Cradock	1794	Lt. Colonel
Honywood	1715	Brig. General	Craig	1775	Captain
Howard, C.	1743	Major General	Drummond, A.J	1794	Colonel
Huske	1743	Major General	Floyd	1791	Colonel
Keppel	1743	Major General	Grey	1759	Captain
Kerr	1707	Lt. Colonel	Harris	1775	Captain
Ligonier	1709	Major	Lambart	1793	Lt. Colonel
Lindsay	1739	Colonel	Lindsay	1777	Lt. Colonel
Molesworth	1691	Ensign	Loftus	1776	Captain
O'Hara	1707	Captain	Ludlow	1794	Lt. Colonel
Ponsonby	1745	Major General	Medows	1777	Lt. Colonel
Rich	1704	Captain	Moore	1794	Lt. Colonel
Wade	1706	Colonel	Pitt, W.A	1760	Lt. Colonel
			Strutt	1796	Colonel
			Tarleton	1781	Lt. Colonel

Source: Appendix 4.2, Data Sources: Careers

Table 2.8. Major battles involving the British army, 1702-1815

Battle	Year	Commander	Commander's social status	Size of Allied army	Size of Enemy army	Result	Battle	Year	Commander	Commander's social status	Size of Allied army	Size of Enemy army	Result
Blenheim	1704	Marlborough	Aristocrat	56,000	60,000	Win	Ramilles	1706	Marlborough	Aristocrat	62,000	60,000	Win
Oudenarde	1708	Marlborough	Aristocrat	80,000	95,000	Win	Malplaquet	1709	Marlborough	Aristocrat	100,000	100,000	Win
Dettingen	1743	Stair	Aristocrat	50,000	70,000	Win	Prestonpans	1745	Cope	Naristocrat	2,300	2,500	Loss
Fontenoy	1745	Cumberland	Aristocrat	50,000	56,000	Loss	Roucoux	1746	Ligonier	Naristocrat	80,000	120,000	Loss
Falkirk	1746	Hawley	Naristocrat	7,000	5,000	Loss	Culloden	1746	Cumberland	Aristocrat	8,000	7,000	Win
Lauffeldt	1747	Cumberland	Aristocrat	60,000	80,000	Loss	Monongahela	1755	Braddock	Naristocrat	1,500	600	Loss
Triconderoga	1758	Abercromby	Naristocrat	15,000	3,600	Loss	Louisburg	1758	Amherst	Naristocrat	11,200	6,000	Win
Minden	1759	Ferdinand	Foreign	41,000	51,000	Win	Quebec	1759	Wolfe	Naristocrat	8,000	5,000	Win
Warburg	1760	Ferdinand	Foreign	16,000	20,000	Win	Kloster Kamp	1760	Brunswick	Foreign	20,000	25,000	Loss
Vellinghausen	1761	Brunswick	Foreign	65,000	92,000	Win	Wilhelmstahl	1762	Brunswick	Foreign	50,000	70,000	Win
Lexington	1775	Smith	Naristocrat	1,800	?	Loss	Bunker Hill	1775	Howe	Aristocrat	2,400	1,500	Win
Quebec	1775	Carleton, G.	Naristocrat	1,200	1,200	Win	Long Island	1776	Howe	Aristocrat	20,000	10,000	Win
White Plains	1776	Howe	Aristocrat	4,000	4,000	Draw	Fort Washington	1776	Howe	Aristocrat	8,000	2,900	Win
Princeton	1777	Cornwallis	Aristocrat	8,000	7,000	Draw	Triconderoga	1777	Burgoyne	Naristocrat	7,213	3,000	Win
Hubbardton	1777	Fraser	Naristocrat	1,000	1,000	Win	Brandywine Creek	1777	Howe	Aristocrat	6,000	8,000	Win
Freeman's farm	1777	Burgoyne	Naristocrat	6,000	14,000	Draw	Paoli	1777	Grey	Aristocrat	1,700	2,500	Win
Germantown	1777	Howe	Aristocrat	8,000	11,000	Win	Saratoga	1777	Burgoyne	Naristocrat	5,000	12,000	Loss
Monmouth	1778	Clinton	Aristocrat	10,000	11,000	Draw	Camden	1780	Cornwallis	Aristocrat	2,000	3,000	Win
Cowpens	1781	Tarleton	Naristocrat	1,000	1,100	Loss	Guildford Courthouse	1781	Cornwallis	Aristocrat	1,900	4,400	Win
Yorktown	1781	Cornwallis	Aristocrat	6,000	16,600	Loss	Assaye	1803	Wellesley	Aristocrat	6,500	40,000	Win
Vimeiro	1808	Wellesley	Aristocrat	20,500	14,000	Win	Corunna	1809	Moore	Naristocrat	35,000	153,000	Loss
Douro	1809	Wellesley	Aristocrat	18,000	20,000	Win	Talavera	1809	Wellesley	Aristocrat	50,000	46,000	Win
Busaco	1810	Wellesley	Aristocrat	50,000	65,000	Win	Fuentes de Onoro	1811	Wellesley	Aristocrat	37,000	48,000	Win
Barossa	1811	Graham	Naristocrat	15,000	7,000	Win	Albuera	1811	Beresford	Foreign	32,000	23,000	Win
Salamanca	1812	Wellesley	Aristocrat	50,000	52,000	Win	Vitoria	1813	Wellesley	Aristocrat	80,000	60,000	Win
Waterloo	1815	Wellesley	Aristocrat	67,000	74,000	Win							

Source: J.W Fortesque, *A History of the British Army*, Volumes I-X, (London, 1899-1930).

Appendix 3, Rewards

Table 3.1. Annual balances of non-sample ensigns in the 1st foot guards

	1770	1771	1772		1770	1771	1772
	£.s.d	£.s.d	£.s.d		£.s.d	£.s.d	£.s.d
Bayly	(34.13.0)	(18.0.0)	0.0.0	Irby	13.14.6	0.0.0	0.0.0
Dewar	(17.6.6)	29.4.0	(0.1.6)	D'Oyly	0.0.0	20.14.0	6.19.6
Pye	(6.15.0)	0.0.0	(30.0.0)	Duffe	40.16.6	0.0.0	0.0.0
Lee	(91.8.0)	(12.18.0)	1.15.6	Deane	(4.5.6)	0.0.0	0.0.0
Pratviel	0.0.0	0.0.0	0.0.0	Hughes	0.0.0	-	-
Leaves	20.14.0	0.0.0	9.6.0	Campbell	-	0.0.0	6.19.6
Ascough	(0.14.0)	0.0.0	(30.14.0)	Nugent	27.9.0	(31.15.0)	0.0.0
Frederick	(6.15.0)	(33.10.6)	(28.8.0)	Talbot	47.16.0	(6.15.0)	0.0.0
Fitzpatrick	93.5.0	(56.16.0)	(35.7.1)	Whittington	(6.15.0)	(6.15.0)	(6.15.0)
Bellew	6.19.6	4.6.0	16.19.6	Evans	20.14.0	20.14.0	52.5.0
Thomas	(4.16.0)	(33.17.6)	(22.10.0)	Edmondstone	-	7.4.0	0.0.0
Collins	(23.4.11)	(19.6.0)	0.0.0	Strickland	41.8.0	122.16.6	23.10.3
Jones	(6.15.0)	(6.15.0)	(22.11.5)	Fanshawe	14.15.0	27.2.0	26.15.3
Scawen	(17.14.4)	(2.1.9)	5.18.3	Hanger	-	69.1.0	24.19.1
Milbanke	-	17.3.0	22.6.6	Heywood	-	(4.16.0)	-
Turner	-	6.17.6	7.1.0	Richardson	-	-	(7.15.6)
Boyfield	-	-	0.0.0				

Source: Cox, A/56/e/70.0. Agent's Ledger 1st Foot Guards, 1770-1774, ff. 153-200.

Table 3.2. Annual balances of non-sample ensigns in the 12th and 20th foot

	1765	1766	1767	1768	1769	1770	1771
12f	£.s.d	£.s.d	£.s.d	£.s.d	£.s.d	£.s.d	£.s.d
Cooke	-	-	0.0.0	(10.5.0)	(14.9.11)	(14.9.11)	(6.15.7)
Willoe	-	-	2.12.0	-	0.0.0	-	-
Sweetenham	-	-	0.0.0	-	0.0.0	(11.15.7)	34.18.9
Cotes	-	-	0.0.0	136.5.0	(5.5.0)	(12.19.0)	0.0.0
Stisted	-	-	6.3.0	-	6.13.2	-	-
Winthorp	-	-	0.0.0	-	0.0.0	0.0.0	8.8.0
Freeman	-	-	0.0.0	0.0.0	0.0.0	29.1.0	0.0.0
Torch	-	-	0.0.0	2.9.0	(0.3.0)	0.3.0	0.0.0
Bate	-	-	(4.1.0)	0.0.0	(0.5.3)	(0.5.4)	(9.3.0)
Spilsbury	-	-	9.3.0	4.15.0	2.0.0	11.7.0	40.19.4
20f							
Power	0.0.0	0.0.0	8.14.10	-	-	-	-
Stenhouse	0.0.0	0.0.0	-	(50.4.0)	(92.1.10)	8.5.6	(8.5.6)
Dowling	10.2.4	0.19.4	0.0.0	(27.6.0)	(10.17.4)	32.6.11	(32.6.11)
Wood	0.0.0	-	6.12.0	65.2.4	14.10.10	-	-
Gaskill	(9.18.0)	(52.3.8)	5.10.8	0.0.0	16.17.4	15.9.1	12.8.7
Maxwell	54.0.0	-	3.9.2	38.15.6	61.2.0	28.13.7	0.0.0
Meggs	0.0.0	-	8.13.0	7.4.4	-	-	-
Reddin	0.0.0	-	0.14.4	-	-	-	-

Source: Cox A/56/e/89.0. Agent's Ledger 12th Foot, 1763-1768, ff. 22-172; Cox A/56/e/99.0. Agent's Ledger 20th Foot, 1763-1768, ff. 50-133.

Table 3.3. Annual balances of non-sample lieutenants in the 1st foot guards

	1770	1771	1772		1770	1771	1772
	£.s.d	£.s.d	£.s.d		£.s.d	£.s.d	£.s.d
Hasler	(9.0.0)	0.0.0	-	Wollaston	(77.10.8)	(75.14.8)	2.7.11
Cox, T.	0.0.0	9.0.0	24.14.4	Fauquier	(2.16.0)	1803.15.9	0.0.0
Fielding	0.0.0	0.0.0	0.0.0	Meyrick	(6.16.0)	0.0.0	-
Howard	0.0.0	0.0.0	0.0.0	West	0.0.0	7.12.0	9.0.0
Edmondes	(9.0.0)	(9.0.0)	0.0.0	Byng	8.10.0	0.18.0	63.0.4
Hervey	27.12.0	0.0.0	0.0.0	Dodd	(16.5.0)	(9.9.0)	(77.19.4)
Cox, M.	(13.10.0)	(13.10.0)	0.0.0	Cottrell	0.18.0	0.0.0	-
Gordon	(97.13.10)	86.14.10	6.2.0	Stewart	36.6.0	(32.7.9)	0.0.0
Keith	(9.0.0)	(9.0.0)	0.0.0	Hotham	(68.1.7)	14.3.6	40.12.4
Madan	(32.17.0)	5.11.4	(10.4.0)	Woodford	49.4.0	(68.8.8)	(392.11.3)
Wentworth	13.4.5	37.18.9	(59.4.1)	Skeffington	(9.0.0)	(9.0.0)	0.0.0
Turton	(43.12.4)	(22.14.8)	1.13.8	Horton	18.6.0	27.12.0	87.18.10
Bertie	(9.0.0)	9.6.0	0.0.0	Iremonger	6.19.6	0.0.0	0.1.6
Fawkener	3.3.0	24.6.6	-				

Source: Cox, A/56/e/70.0. Agent's Ledger 1st Foot Guards, 1770-1774, ff. 153-200.

Table 3.4. Annual balances of non-sample lieutenants in the 12th and 20th foot

	1765	1766	1767	1768	1769	1770	1771
12f	£.s.d	£.s.d	£.s.d	£.s.d	£.s.d	£.s.d	£.s.d
Kay	-	-	0.0.0	(5.12.0)	0.0.0	12.8.0	139.9.8
Walcott	0.0.0	(15.16.6)	0.0.0	(5.12.0)	0.0.0	(5.12.0)	0.0.0
Gape	-	-	(11.6.4)	(11.6.5)	(11.0.4)	(11.0.5)	(19.10.0)
Ormsby	-	-	(3.18.0)	610.3.0	(7.19.3)	0.5.9	137.10.3
Perryn	-	-	0.0.0	15.18.6	(18.5.0)	(18.5.0)	(2.12.6)
Cotterill	-	-	(1.6.4)	(10.11.4)	0.0.0	0.0.0	5.12.6
Ledbetter	-	-	0.0.0	-	0.0.0	-	-
Collings	-	-	(0.0.3)	10.13.3	0.0.0	0.0.0	15.15.0
Montgomery	-	-	16.2.0	(52.11.6)	(0.8.2)	(18.7.8)	62.2.8
Pleydell	-	-	0.0.0	(10.13.6)	0.0.0	0.0.0	77.4.7
20f							
Denshire	(14.18.9)	-	(8.12.4)	6.3.10	(2.19.4)	-	-
Pringle	0.0.0	-	(61.13.5)	(37.0.10)	(7.11.11)	7.11.11	-
Sponge	0.0.0	-	1.10.0	80.14.6	140.6.0	0.0.0	-
Wemys	(11.2.9)	-	0.0.0	11.6.6	0.0.0	0.0.0	-
Dent	0.0.0	-	0.0.0	-	-	-	-
Loftus	-	0.0.0	-	5.4.6	(44.11.6)	(13.5.8)	13.5.8
Renton	0.0.0	0.0.0	15.12.6	18.2.6	12.11.2	0.0.0	-
Dalrymple	(15.2.4)	(36.16.10)	(18.3.6)	0.0.0	0.0.0	1.18.2	(1.18.2)
Rollinson	0.0.0	0.0.0	-	15.14.0	27.8.6	0.0.0	-
Thompson	21.7.0	-	(46.14.8)	(273.19.2)	(258.6.8)	(259.0.4)	0.0.0

Source: Cox A/56/e/89.0. Agent's Ledger 12th Foot, 1763-1768, ff. 13-177; Cox A/56/e/99.0. Agent's Ledger 20th Foot, 1763-1768, ff. 41-162.

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Table 3.5. Annual balances of non-sample captains in the 1st foot guards

	1770	1771	1772	1773	1774		1770	1771	1772	1773
	£.s.d	£.s.d	£.s.d	£.s.d	£.s.d		£.s.d	£.s.d	£.s.d	£.s.d
Lambart	(65.11.10)	(65.10.1)	0.0.0	28.16.4	-	Style	(67.10.0)	(69.0.4)	(9.19.0)	28.16.4
Baugh	100.9.7	2.11.7	(124.10.0)	0.0.0	28.16.4	Graham	(72.2.8)	(70.3.2)	0.0.0	-
Tryon	(49.8.3)	(47.17.5)	0.0.0	28.1.8	-	Lindsay	99.5.10	190.12.4	0.0.0	28.16.4
Ligonier	(18.15.0)	194.15.6	251.8.6	35.4.7	-	Jones	(17.19.0)	11.18.5	0.0.0	-
West	(73.6.3)	(71.3.3)	56.13.0	142.6.4	-	Cowper	(68.3.3)	(67.17.6)	(12.0.6)	28.16.4
Perceval	64.2.2	(14.0.4)	0.0.0	14.15.1	-	Miles	289.19.5	(5.7.7)	1.5.6	94.12.10
Pownall	(69.4.0)	0.0.0	0.0.0	-	-	Wollaston	-	(22.7.4)	0.0.0	28.16.4
Nugent	54.14.3	95.5.11	(43.5.11)	39.11.6	-	Craig	(109.18.10)	(317.15.5)	0.0.0	29.9.4
Thornton	68.14.8	(69.0.4)	0.0.0	28.16.4	-	Amherst	(65.10.8)	262.14.5	449.10.10	0.0.0
Howard	(29.0.0)	244.9.5	360.5.0	28.16.4	-	Allen	(48.8.3)	(68.16.5)	0.0.0	0.0.0
Hervey	39.1.4	201.11.0	38.8.1	123.17.5	-	Hudson	(68.13.5)	(69.0.4)	0.0.0	28.16.4
Hyde	(61.19.9)	24.10.5	0.0.0	0.0.0	-	Johnson	(70.12.4)	(70.7.2)	0.0.0	-
Mordaunt	119.6.2	189.14.2	222.17.6	-	-					

Source: Cox, A/56/e/70.0. Agent's Ledger 1st Foot Guards, 1770-1774, ff. 22-118.

Table 3.6. Annual balances of non-sample field officers in the 12th and 20th foot

	1765	1766	1767	1768	1769	1770	1771
12f	£.s.d	£.s.d	£.s.d	£.s.d	£.s.d	£.s.d	£.s.d
Captain Dunbar	-	-	(0.11.0)	45.4.0	45.15.0	1476.9.1	(20.0.0)
Captain Ruthven	-	-	11.2.9	(4.19.7)	(21.11.7)	(78.9.9)	(88.2.6)
Captain Parkhill	-	-	0.10.6	(9.13.4)	86.13.1	(0.7.2)	(0.11.6)
Captain Trigge	-	-	0.0.0	0.0.0	0.0.0	20.0.0	22.6.6
Captain Campbell	-	-	0.0.0	(19.17.6)	32.14.4	-	-
Captain Barlow	-	-	0.0.0	(21.0.0)	12.11.11	(4.16.2)	38.3.0
Major Campbell	-	-	0.0.0	(15.4.6)	115.5.10	0.0.0	45.13.2
20f							
Captain Parry	-	(73.5.3)	(95.14.5)	(124.19.8)	(12.9.9)	(17.11.3)	15.18.3
Captain St George	(18.5.0)	(30.4.6)	3.4.7	71.6.1	0.0.0	-	-
Captain King	(19.3.6)	-	(69.5.11)	(4.5.9)	(11.5.5)	0.0.0	-
Captain Stuart	(76.5.0)	-	(238.18.8)	46.16.9	(44.11.11)	0.0.0	-
Captain Conyngham	91.10.0	-	193.4.7	909.3.8	151.0.2	0.0.0	-
Major Parr	50.2.9	21.7.6	35.6.2	78.13.0	167.8.9	0.0.0	-
Lt. Colonel Maxwell	-	-	3.2.0	(150.9.9)	(48.15.6)	3018.10 .1	0.0.1

Source: Cox A/56/e/89.0. Agent's Ledger 12th Foot, 1763-1768, ff. 5-174; Cox A/56/e/99.0. Agent's Ledger 20th Foot, 1763-1768, ff. 32-190.

Table 3.7. Rewards and costs of Drummond and Ludlow as ensigns in the 1st foot guards

	Drummond			Ludlow	
	1774	1775	1776	1779	1780
Rewards	£.s.d	£.s.d	£.s.d	£.s.d	£.s.d
Subsistence	82.2.6	82.2.6	82.2.6	82.2.6	82.7.0
Arrears	-	6.11.10	17.6.6	-	10.16.10
sub-total -Rewards	82.2.6	88.14.4	99.19.0	82.2.6	93.3.10
Costs					
Himself	-	-	-	25.5.0	-
Subsistence	87.8.0	95.17.11	54.18.0	90.6.6	86.8.10
Arrears	19.18.5	26.14.3	-	-	-
sub-total -Costs	107.6.5	122.11.3	54.18.0	115.11.6	86.8.10
Balance	(25.3.11)	(33.16.6)	45.1.0	(33.9.0)	6.15.0

Source: Appendix 4.3, Data Sources: Rewards

Table 3.8. Rewards and costs of Garth as lieutenant in the 1st foot guards

	1761	1762	1763	1764	1765	1766	1767	1768	1769	1770	1771
Rewards	£.s.d	£.s.d	£.s.d	£.s.d	£.s.d	£.s.d	£.s.d	£.s.d	£.s.d	£.s.d	£.s.d
Subsistence	108.10.0	109.10.0	108.10.0	109.16.0	109.10.0	109.10.0	109.10.0	109.16.0	109.10.0	109.10.0	109.10.0
Arrears	49.8 .0	24.14.4	12.7.11	24.14.4	24.14.4	24.15.4	-	24.14.4	24.14.4	24.15.10	24.14.4
sub-total											
-Rewards	157.18.0	134.4.4	120.17.11	134.10.4	134.4.4	134.5.4	109.10.0	134.10.4	134.4.4	134.5.10	134.4.4
Costs											
Himself	-	-	-	-	45.18.0	-	-	-	20.0.0	61.0.0	71.0.0
Subsistence	141.14.0	139.4.4	109.10.0	158.9.11	124.18.4	45.6.0	104.12.0	91.10.0	93.4.4	33.18.0	69.4.4
Arrears	-	-	-	24.14.4	-	-	-	24.14.4	-	24.15.10	-
Military	-	-	-	-	-	10.10.0	-	-	-	-	-
Fees	7.18.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Recruiting	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	30.0.0	-	-
Private bills	-	-	-	-	-	30.6.0	10.10.0	-	-	-	-
sub-total											
-Costs	149.12.0	139.4.4	109.10.0	183.4.3	170.16.4	86.2.0	114.12 .0	116.4.4	143.4.4	119.13.10	140.4.4
Balance	8.6.0	(5.0.0)	11.7.11	(48.13.10)	(36.12.0)	48.3.10	(5.2.0)	18.6.0	(10.0.0)	14.12.0	(6.0.0)

Note: 'Military' costs are miscellaneous extraordinary expenses.   Private bills are payments to unidentified civilian individuals.

Source: Appendix 4.3, Data Sources: Rewards

Table 3.9. Rewards and costs of Drummond and Ludlow as lieutenants in the 1st foot guards

	Drummond				Ludlow						
	1777	1778	1779	1780	1782	1783	1784	1785	1786	1787	1788
Rewards	£.s.d	£.s.d	£.s.d	£.s.d	£.s.d	£.s.d	£.s.d	£.s.d	£.s.d	£.s.d	£.s.d
Subsistence	107.9.0	109.10.0	109.10.0	109.16.0	109.10.0	109.16.0	109.16.0	109.10.0	109.10.0	109.10.0	109.16.0
Arrears	17.6.6	17.6.6	23.3.9	24.14.4	17.6.6	23.3.9	24.14.4	24.14.4	24.15.8	24.14.4	24.14.4
Appointments	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	213.15.0	142.10.0	285.4.0
Baggage/forage	-	8.15.0	9.2.6	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Recruiting	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	38.13.3
Military	-	-	-	2.2.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Private income	-	175.0.0	-	120.0.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
sub-total -Rewards	125.5.6	311.1.6	141.16.3	256.12.4	127.6.6	132.19.9	134.10.4	134.4.4	348.0.8	276.14.4	458.7.5
Costs											
Himself	-	33.0.0	153.10.9	45.0.0	30.0.0	-	-	50.0.0	310.0.0	330.0.0	170.0.0
Subsistence	129.2.9	18.6.0	-	-	-	-	91.4.0	-	-	28.2.0	69.4.4
Arrears	-	24.0.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Military	-	4.6.0	-	-	-	-	57.4.5	-	-	-	-
Bills to officers	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1.1.0	1.10.6
Military charity	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.10.6
Fees	7.18.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Recruiting	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	12.18.3	-
Private bills	-	196.17.6	48.0.0	136.12.0	352.10.0	-	-	-	-	-	274.8.0
Private income	75.0.0	30.0.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
sub-total -Costs	212.10.9	306.9.6	201.10.9	181.12.0	382.10.0	0.0.0	148.8.5	50.0.0	310.0.0	372.1.3	446.9.0
Balance	(87.5.3)	4.12.0	(59.14.6)	75.0.4	(255.3.6)	132.19.9	(13.18.1)	84.4.4	38.0.8	(95.6.11)	11.18.5

Note: 'Military' rewards and costs are miscellaneous extraordinary income or expenses.   Private bills are payments to unidentified civilian individuals, while bills to officers are payments to other officers.

Source: Appendix 4.3, Data Sources: Rewards

Table 3.10. Rewards and costs of future generals as captains

	Carleton, 20f				Tarleton, 78f				Garth, 1fg		Ludlow, 1fg		
	1766	1767	1768	1769	1778	1780	1781	1782	1780	1781	1795	1796	1797
Rewards	£.s.d	£.s.d	£.s.d	£.s.d	£.s.d	£.s.d	£.s.d	£.s.d	£.s.d	£.s.d	£.s.d	£.s.d	£.s.d
Subsistence	273.15.0	136.17.6	136.17.6	136.17.6	125.2.6	137.5.0	136.17.6	135.7.6	228.15.0	228.2.6	228.2.6	228.15.0	228.2.6
Arrears	-	-	33.9.7	33.9.7	-	32.3.10	33.9.7	33.11.5	56.13.0	56.13.0	56.13.0	56.13.0	-
Company profits	-	-	-	-	-	40.0.0	20.0.0	-	170.14.10	40.0.0	219.4.1	140.0.0	260.0.10
Appointments	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	159.10.8
Allowances	-	-	-	-	52.10.0	30.0.0		-	-	-	80.0.0	-	
Campaign losses	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	160.0.0	-	-	-	16.1.10
Military	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1050.0.0	-	-	-	-	301.2.6
Private income	-	100.9.2	183.11.2	-	-	-	-	-	-	115.9.7	-	-	-
sub-total													
-Rewards	273.15.0	237.6.8	353.18.2	170.7.1	177.12.6	239.8.10	190.7.1	1218.18.11	616.2.10	440.15.1	583.19.7	425.8.0	964.18.4
Costs													
Himself	-	50.0.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	400.0.0	400.0.0	150.0.0	180.0.0	410.0.0
Subsistence	273.15.0	45.7.6		45.15.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Paymaster	-	27.8.7	11.17.7	-	32.10.0	12.10.0	30.0.0	-	-	-	-	-	-
Company losses	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	37.1.8	0.12.8	-
Military	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6.6.6	-	-	-	-	0.3.4
Bills to officers	-	-	-	-	-	-	52.10.0	-	-	-	-	-	-
Loan	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	100.0.0	100.0.0	100.0.0
Regimental club	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1.11.6	-	3.3.0
Campaign losses	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	160.0.0	-	-	-	-
Fees	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4.12.6	-	24.18.0	4.7.6	2.2.0
Equipment	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	84.0.0	-	-	-	-	-
Private bills	-	130.0.0	350.0.0	133.12.0	16.0.0	452.0.0	-	95.0.0	98.15.0	-	304.9.0	144.9.7	346.16.0
sub-total													
-Costs	273.15.0	252.16.1	361.17.7	179.7.0	48.10.0	464.10.0	82.10.0	185.6.6	663.7.6	400.0.0	617.19.4	429.9.9	862.4.4
Balance	0.0.0	(15.9.5)	(17.19.5)	(8.19.11)	129.2.6	(225.1.2)	107.17.1	1033.12.5	(47.4.8)	40.15.1	(33.19.9)	(4.1.9)	102.14.0

Note: 'Military' rewards and costs are miscellaneous extraordinary income or expenses.   Private bills are payments to unidentified civilian individuals, while bills to officers are payments to other officers.

Source: Appendix 4.3, Data Sources: Rewards

Table 3.11. Rewards and costs of future generals as majors and lieutenant colonels

	Cuyler, 55f		Musgrave, 40f		Harris, 76f		Herbert, 2dg	
	1776-7	1778	1784	1785	1787	1793	1792	1793
Rewards	£.s.d	£.s.d	£.s.d	£.s.d	£.s.d	£.s.d	£.s.d	£.s.d
Subsistence	408.5.0	240.3.6	198.5.0	237.5.0	280.0.3	237.5.0	338.11.0	337.12.6
Arrears	-	43.3.1	-	54.10.0	22.2.3	109.0.0	82.3.10	164.12.2
Company profits	-	-	10.0.0	-	19.8.7	-	30.0.0	30.0.0
Appointments	-	163.15.0	383.11.9	351.7.10	-	60.0.0	-	-
Allowances	-	-	19.2.6	38.5.0	-	-	-	30.0.0
Loans to officers	199.10.0	-	-	-	13.14.0	-	-	-
Military	696.14.6	-	-	-	29.13.3	-	-	76.6.6
Family	-	-	-	-	9.17.2	4.11.6	-	-
Private income	148.18.10	373.10.0	-	-	26.7.7	169.0.0	-	-
sub-total								
-Rewards	1453.8.4	820.11.7	610.19.3	681.7.10	401.3.1	579.16.6	450.14.10	638.10.14
Costs								
Himself	300.0.0	250.0.0	901.16.3	125.0.0	70.0.0	53.7.11	-	-
Subsistence	-	-	-	-	40.6.0	-	-	-
Paymaster	-	-	-	172.10.0	-	-	-	-
Military	-	-	-	-	-	1.5.8	-	-
Bills to officers	77.2.0	-	701.8.1	-	-	-	-	-
Band	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	10.10.0
Recruiting	-	-	-	-	-	-	21.0.0	-
Family	-	-	563.15.0	-	-	10.10.0	-	-
Fees	8.12.0	1.18.6	1.5.0	0.18.0	9.10.0	-	-	10.13.0
Equipment	-	-	2.18.6	-	-	-	-	-
Private bills	814.7.6	89.8.0	125.0.0	378.15.0	71.0.0	590.10.0	440.4.10	606.18.2
sub-total								
-Costs	1200.1.6	341.6.6	2296.2.10	678.3.0	190.16.0	655.13.7	461.4.10	628.1.2
Balance	253.6.10	479.5.1	(1685.3.7)	4.4.10	210.7.1	(75.17.1)	(10.10.0)	10.11.0

Note: 'Military' rewards and costs are miscellaneous extraordinary income or expenses. Private bills are payments to unidentified civilian individuals, while bills to officers are payments to other officers. All ranks are lieutenant colonels, except Cuyler's accounts for 1776-7 when he was a major. Cuyler's accounts for 1776-7 contain two years income and expenditure. *Source:* Appendix 4.3, Data Sources: Rewards

Table 3.12. Rewards and costs of Garth as army general and regimental field officer with the 1st foot guards

	1783	1784	1785	1786	1787	1788	1789	1790	1791
Rewards	£.s.d	£.s.d	£.s.d	£.s.d	£.s.d	£.s.d	£.s.d	£.s.d	£.s.d
Subsistence	337.12.6	228.15.0	228.2.0	228.2.0	271.2.0	338.18.7	380.16.6	392.7.6	392.7.6
Arrears	56.13.0	56.13.0	56.13.0	56.16.1	56.13.0	56.13.0	85.9.1	85.9.7	96.16.6
Company profits	50.0.0	147.0.9	203.15.4	69.10.4	120.4.3	27.7.7	95.8.9	99.18.10	113.6.6
General command	558.10.11	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	167.16.6
Baggage/forage	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	40.0.0	-
Campaign losses	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	174.2.3
Bills to officers	-	-	-	-	-	-	210.5.0	-	-
Military	-	-	140.0.0	-	-	-	20.12.6	396.15.0	84.0.0
Private income	-	35.14.5	-	47.16.2	-	-	-	0.6.3	-
sub-total									
-Rewards	1002.15 .11	468.3.2	343.15.4	401.6.6	447.4.3	421.7.7	792.6.3	1014.0 .1	1028.5.3
Costs									
Himself	180.0.0	250.0.0	350.0.0	293.10.10	127.10.0	342.0.0	414.0.0	231.0.0	517.6.6
Subsistence	45.6.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Arrears	-	-	-	-	-	-	17.12.0	-	-
Bills to officers	-	18.0.0	10.0.0	50.17.6	-	-	-	10.0.0	-
Company losses	-	0.12.4	4.10.5	-	-	3.14.6	-	-	-
Military	-	-	-	-	-	1.10.0	-	-	22.11.6
Loans to officers	150.0.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Fees	11.15.0	9.6.0	-	-	-	-	10.4.0	-	11.3.0
Equipment	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	174.2.3	-
Family	-	-	-	-	30.0.0	50.0.0	16.0.0	-	-
Private bills	256.13.3	93.0.0	272.10.0	31.10.0	255.17.0	63.10.0	269.7.6	450.11.4	475.10.10
sub-total									
-Costs	643.14.3	120.18.4	637.10.5	375.7.6	412.17.0	460.5.6	727.3.6	865.13.7	1025.4.6
Balance	359.1.8	347.4.10	(293.14.3)	25.19.0	34.7.3	(38.17.11)	65.2.9	148.6.6	3.0.9

Note: Garth's regimental rank was major 1783-1788 and lieutenant colonel 1789-1791. 'Military' rewards and costs are miscellaneous extraordinary income or expenses.
    Private bills are payments to unidentified civilian individuals, while bills to officers are payments to other officers. *Source:* Appendix 4.3, Data Sources: Rewards

Table 3.13. Rewards and costs of generals as army general and regimental field officer

	Herbert, 2dg		Drummond, 1fg					Ludlow, 1fg		
	1795	1796	1796	1797	1798	1799	1800	1798	1799	1800
Rewards	£.s.d	£.s.d	£.s.d	£.s.d	£.s.d	£.s.d	£.s.d	£.s.d	£.s.d	£.s.d
Subsistence	337.12.6	338.11.0	228.15.0	254.10.6	168.7.0	511.1.7	392.7.6	228.2.6	228.2.6	297.2.6
Arrears	-	246.11.6	56.13.0	-	-	56.16.1	149.0.11	56.16.1	-	113.6.0
Company profits	-	-	140.0.0	239.16.2	-	681.16.10	891.2.1	480.0.10	714.9.2	466.7.8
Appointments	-	-	-	616.17.6	1311.16.0	981.12.0	655.0.0	-	1081.1.7	655.0.0
Allowances	-	-	38.18.0	-	-	573.13.2	58.16.0	-	-	264.19.10
Campaign losses	-	-	-	18.18.0	-	-	-	-	-	-
Bills to officers	317.2.5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	15.0.0	-
Military	-	-	-	-	-	56.12.0	89.17.4	-	-	-
Private income	-	-	-	-	-	98.15.0	-	-	-	30.0.0
sub-total										
-Rewards	654.14.11	585.2.6	463.18.0	1128.11.8	1479.16.0	2959.13.11	2236.3.10	764.19.5	2038.13.1	1826.16.0
Costs										
Himself	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	280.0.0	180.0.0	161.0.0
Paymaster	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	30.2.5	453.7.2
Bills to officers	-	-	-	-	-	-	30.0.0	21.0.0	-	-
Company losses	-	-	70.13.2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Military	1.16.0	0.1.2	1.11.6	45.19.1	12.0.0	0.10.6		9.6.10	2.2.0	6.16.6
Loan	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	100.0.0	594.4.4	75.0.0
Fees	15.0.0	-	-	18.18.0	48.1.6	3.3.0	-	12.12.6	1.10.0	-
Equipment	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	19.8.8	-	-
Family	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	44.13.2
Private bills	766.13.3	399.9.6	724.5.11	971.18.0	1672.0.0	2470.0.0	150.0.0	388.10.7	649.7.1	1022.3.8
sub-total										
-Costs	782.19.3	399.10.8	796.5.11	1035.18.0	1732.1.6	2473.13.6	180.0.0	830.18.7	1456.16.10	1763.0.6
Balance	(128.4.4)	182.11.10	(332.7.11)	92.13.8	(252.5.6)	486.0.5	2056.3.10	(65.19.2)	581.16.3	63.15.6

Note: The regimental ranks held were as follows: captain (Ludlow 1798-1799), major (Drummond 1796-1798; Ludlow 1800) and lieutenant colonel (Herbert 1795-1796; Drummond 1799-1800) . 'Military' rewards and costs are miscellaneous extraordinary income or expenses. Private bills are payments to unidentified civilian individuals, while bills to officers are payments to other officers. *Source:* Appendix 4.3, Data Sources: Rewards

Table 3.14. Rewards and costs of Ligonier as army general and regimental colonel of the 1st foot guards

	1758	1759	1760	1761	1762	1763	1764	1765
Rewards	£.s.d	£.s.d	£.s.d	£.s.d	£.s.d	£.s.d	£.s.d	£.s.d
Subsistence	489.18.0	839.8.0	770.10.0	771.0.0	770.10.0	908.10.0	772.16.0	839.10.0
Arrears	496.19.6	71.6.8	-	253.11.0	126.11.0	63.10.8	126.14.2	-
Clothing	2556.14.9	-	1914.16.3	242.4.10	6367.12.7	-	-	336.18.6
Appointments	3525.15.8	1491.3.0	426.4.0	3614.0.0	3721.3.0	3721.3.0	-	-
Allowances	332.10.0	1307.5.3	515.9.3	597.8.0	287.13.8	767.0.0	-	-
Vacant pay	71.9.6	15.1.6	243.5.0	76.2.0	12.14.0	-	-	-
Military	661.16.0	52.13.3	-	-	-	-	10.16.0	-
Private income	3000.0.0	502.11 .4	1448.16.6	60.4.0	525.1.8	70.0.0	101.11.6	-
sub-total								
-Rewards	11135.3.5	4279.9.0	5319.1.0	5614.9.10	11811.5.11	5530.3.8	1011.17 .8	1176.8.6
Costs								
Himself	2386.18.4	3293.9.7	3195.10.8	3476.0.10	2584.9.7	2954.1.2	200.0.0	-
Clothing	203.10.5	-	108.12.0	371.17.4	4402.16.6	172.2.0	157.19.0	178.5.6
Gratuity	30.0.0	30.0.0	31.10.0	63.0.0	-	63.0.0	31.10.0	31.10.0
Bills to officers	4101.14.8	14.6.4	236.15.0	-	478.16.6	100.0.0	-	-
Loan	-	-	60.0.0	60.0.0	20.0.0	40.0.0	40.0.0	40.0.0
Military	442.17.0	20.19.6	58.6.0	54.9.0	25.5.0	144.1.6	108.12.0	18.15.0
Loans to officers	27.3.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Fees	7.17.0	102.15.0	4.10.0	289.9.6	3.0.0	443.4.6	-	0.5.0
Equipment	-	279.18.9	930.13.2	-	-	-	-	-
Family	160.0.0	45.0.0	60.0.0	110.0.0	215.5.0	803.2.6	395.0.0	600.16.2
Private bills	599.10.10	788.19.5	497.14.0	418.9.2	4527.13.2	128.4.0	26.7.0	110.5.2
sub-total								
-Costs	7965.11.3	4575.8.7	5183.10.10	4843.5.10	12257.5.9	4848.15.8	962.17.0	979.16.10
Balance	3169.12.2	(295.19.7)	135.10.2	771.4.0	(445.19.10)	681.8.0	49.0.8	196.10.8

Note: 'Military' rewards and costs are miscellaneous extraordinary income or expenses. Private bills are payments to unidentified civilian individuals, while bills to officers are payments to other officers. *Source:* Appendix 4.3, Data Sources: Rewards

Table 3.15. Rewards and costs of Cathcart as army general and regimental colonel of the 2nd life guards

	1798	1799	1800	1801	1802	1803	1804	1805	1806	1807	1808	1809	1810
Rewards	£.s.d	£.s.d	£.s.d	£.s.d	£.s.d	£.s.d	£.s.d	£.s.d	£.s.d	£.s.d	£.s.d	£.s.d	£.s.d
Subsistence	492.15.0	492.15.0	492.15.0	492.15.0	492.15.0	492.15.0	494.2.0	492.15.0	492.15.0	492.15.0	494.2.0	492.15.0	492.15.0
Arrears	-	-	179.6.2	-	259.4.0	129.12.0	259.4.0	-	129.19.1	259.4.0	129.12.0	-	129.19.1
Clothing	700.0.0	600.0.0	1200.0.0	1200.0.0	1200.0.0	1200.0.0	1200.0.0	1200.0.0	1200.0.0	1200.0.0	1200.0.0	1200.0.0	1200.0.0
Appointments	-	166.18.0	-	218.10.0	-	-	309.16.6	-	-	818.19.11	1220.10.5	1210.6.1	1245.10.5
Allowances	116.0.0	-	-	722.15.9	22.14.6	13.13.0	135.8.0	-	1152.7.6	1028.9.0	256.10.0	128.5.0	3028.8.8
Bills to officers	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	24.10.9	-	-	-	-
Military	-	600.0.0	58.1.5	-	-	-	-	-	5.5.0	81.18.0	-	-	-
Private income	7225.1.11	-	-	-	-	-	-	1473.12.5	-	500.0.0	-	-	-
sub-total													
-Rewards	8533.16.11	1859.13.0	1930.2.7	2634.0.9	1974.13.6	1835.15.7	2398.10.6	3166.7.5	3004.17.4	4381.5.11	3300.14.5	3031.6.1	6096.13.2
Costs													
Tax	-	-	-	-	-	-	91.2.0	91.2.0	113.18.0	35.14.0	49.8.6	120.0.0	-
Regiment charges	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	21.0.0	-	21.0.0	10.10.0	10.10.0	10.10.0
Military	65.6.9	-	-	-	-	1.1.0	2.2.0	1.1.0	1.1.0	14.8.0	2.14.0	2.4.0	2.3.0
Bills to officers	-	-	-	-	-	6.6.0	-	10.6.0	0.10.6	0.10.6	0.10.6	0.10.6	0.10.1
Loan	356.8.1	-	-	-	-	188.13.4	188.13.4	-	-	400.0.0	200.0.0	200.0.0	401.19.8
Horses	36.7.5	-	-	-	-	29.7.11	2.2.0	2.2.0	4.2.8	9.7.0	3.3.0	-	2.2.0
Military charity	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	249.6.0	21.17.6	23.9.9	23.10.3	19.10.0	26.6.3
Fees	22.14.6	-	-	-	-	30.15.6	-	22.9.6	9.17.0	47.4.6	3.5.0	-	6.14.0
Family	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	266.14.7	49.4.7
Private bills	2558.6.6	2523.19.6	1854.2.8	2775.4.9	2092.12.1	2309.17.8	1806.12.6	1800.0.0	2524.10.9	5550.0.0	3400.0.0	4400.0.0	7400.0.0
sub-total													
-Costs	3038.3.3	2523.19.6	1854.2.8	2775.4.9	2092.12.1	2566.1.5	2090.11.10	2197.6.6	2675.17.5	6102.13.9	3693.1.3	5019.9.1	7899.17.7
Balance	5495.13.8	(664.6.6)	75.19.11	(141.4.0)	(117.18.7)	(473.9.4)	307.18.8	969.0.11	328.19.11	(1721.7.10)	(392.6.10)	(1988.3.0)	(1803.4.5)

Note: 'Military' rewards and costs are miscellaneous extraordinary income or expenses. Private bills are payments to unidentified civilian individuals, while bills to officers are payments to other officers. *Source:* Appendix 4.3, Data Sources: Rewards

Table 3.16. Rewards and costs of Moore and Pitt as army generals and regimental colonels

	Pitt, 10d						Moore, 52f						
	1790	1791	1792	1793	1794	1795	1802	1803	1804	1805	1806	1807	1808
Rewards	£.s.d	£.s.d	£.s.d	£.s.d	£.s.d	£.s.d	£.s.d	£.s.d	£.s.d	£.s.d	£.s.d	£.s.d	£.s.d
Subsistence	503.3.7	388.17.6	777.15.0	775.12.3	921.12.6	921.12.6	796.2.6	501.17.6	503.5.0	501.17.6	376.15.0	614.9.9	452.18.6
Arrears	116.8.7	116.2.3	116.2.3	116.2.3	116.8.7	-	-	-	54.10.0	-	-	-	-
Profits	4122.19.8	-	-	-	-	-	-	837.2.0	21.13.4	-	3539.15.1	29.0.0	-
Appointments	-	-	-	-	1198.14.8	1881.5.4	-	1434.9.10	615.13.6	757.10.9	998.18.3	-	-
Allowances	-	-	-	142.10.0	173.4.0	-	-	122.1.4	457.0.5	833.1.5	822.8.1	738.9.10	982.10.2
Prize-money	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	476.15.15	224.9.1	189.12.5	-	-	-
Military	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	24.6.8	-	35.9.10	-
Private income	494.7.3	772.11.6	1542.6.8	5.5.0	159.19.2	-	413.12.0	631.10.0	-	-	140.4.0	120.0.0	-
sub-total													
-Rewards	5236.12.1	1277.11.3	2436.3.11	1039.9.9	2569.18.11	2802.17.10	1209.14.6	4003.16.1	1876.11.4	2306.8.9	5878.0.5	1537.9.5	1435.8.8
Costs													
Himself	-	-	-	-	-	200.0.0	1500.0.0	200.0.0	-	1950.0.0	300.0.0	-	1100.0.0
Tax	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	60.0.0	60.0.0	31.6.6	-	-
Paymaster	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	52.10.0	-	59.5.10	30.9.0	-	-
Military	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	221.10.6	12.15.8	-	57.18.0	-	-
Clothing	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	48.9.7
Bills to officers	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	300.0.0	-	200.0.0	-	156.9.6	1.0.0
Prize-money	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	272.8.10	-
Loan	25.0.0	25.0.0	25.0.0	25.0.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Band	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	26.5.0	152.1.0	50.0.0	-	150.0.0
Military charity	-	-	21.0.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Fees	-	-	366.19.0	31.19.0	13.13.0	46.4.0	11.0.6	12.12.0	4.4.0	20.13.0	28.14.6	45.19.6	83.13.6
Family	-	-	-	-	-	-	50.0.0	-	-	-	-	103.13 .0	269.3.0
Private bills	414.8.6	3420.0.0	2982.0.0	4600.3.0	1669.4.5	4470.17.5	9.19.4	2098.15.1	1267.4.0	2363.14.0	1277.4.0	3822.5.10	94.10.0
sub-total													
-Costs	439.8.6	3445.0.0	3394.19.0	4657.2.0	1682.17.5	4717.1.5	1570.19.10	2885.7.7	1370.8.8	4806.2.10	1775.12.0	4400.16.8	1746.16
Balance	4797.3.7	(2167.8.9)	(958.15.1)	(3617.12.3)	887.1.6	(1914.3.7)	(361.5.4)	1118.8.6	506.2 8	(2499.14.1)	4102.8.5	(2863.7.3)	(311.7.5)

Note: 'Military' rewards and costs are miscellaneous extraordinary income or expenses. Private bills are payments to unidentified civilian individuals, while bills to officers are payments to other officers. *Source:* Appendix 4.3, Data Sources: Rewards

Table 3.17. Rewards and costs of Grant, Garth and Fox as army generals and regimental colonels

	Grant, 55f			Garth, 17f	Fox, 10f			
	1777	1778	1779	1795	1795	1796	1797	1798
Rewards	£.s.d	£.s.d	£.s.d	£.s.d	£.s.d	£.s.d	£.s.d	£.s.d
Subsistence	894.0.0	438.0.0	218.8.0	438.0.0	218.8.0	657.12.0	438.0.0	501.17.6
Arrears	-	80.11.5	80.7.0	113.16.1	-	-	-	41.18.10
Clothing	-	-	1165.14.1	-	-	-	-	1525.11.10
Appointments	931.16.1	828.3.5	-	877.11.6	-	655.0.0	1146.14.0	1204.0.0
Allowances	-	-	-	180.7.0	-	114.0.0	114.0.0	144.0.0
Bills to officers	-	-	-	-	-	-	9.10.0	-
Recruiting	-	-	-	-	-	-	63.10.9	-
Military	-	-	56.12.12	-	-	544.9.9	-	-
Private income	42.19.4	150.0.0	500.0.0	1156.7.5	-	-	-	-
sub-total								
-Rewards	1868.15.15	1496.14.10	2021.2.1	2766.2.0	218.8.0	1971.1.9	1771.14.9	3417.7.4
Costs								
Himself	-	-	-	581.0.0	85.0.0	95.10.0	-	240.10.0
Clothing	-	1039.19.0	-	453.8.8	-	-	-	-
Paymaster	-	403.18.0	-	-	-	-	-	-
Bills to officers	360.0.0	-	-	97.6.0	40.5.6	256.16.4	183.19.0	-
Regiment charges	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2.5.0
Military	11.4.10	-	1530.0.0	-	22.19.0	0.2.0	0.2.0	200.0.0
Fees	-	8.14.0	-	28.7.0	24.6.0	3.15.6	29.8.0	6.6.0
Private bills	400.0.0	1100.0.0	400.0.0	1355.1.8	527.14.5	1364.18.6	1024.16.3	2024.9.8
sub-total								
-Costs	771.4.10	2552.11.0	1930.0.0	2515.3.4	700.4.11	1721.2.4	1238.5.3	2473.10.8
Balance	1097.10.7	(1055.16.2)	90.7.3	250.18.8	(481.16.11)	249.19.5	553.9.6	943.16.8

Note: 'Military' rewards and costs are miscellaneous extraordinary income or expenses. Private bills are payments to unidentified civilian individuals, while bills to officers are payments to other officers. *Source:* Appendix 4.3, Data Sources: Rewards

Table 3.18. Governorships and the highest titles of 1747 generals

	Lt. Governor	Governor	Highest title		Lt. Governor	Governor	Highest title
Anstruther	Minorca 1733-7	South Carolina 1736, Minorca 1737, Kinsale	-	Bowles	-	Limerick 1739, Londonderry 1740	-
Blakeney	Stirling Castle 1742, Plymouth 1746-8, Minorca 1747-56	-	Irish Baron 1756	Bland	Gibraltar 1749	Fort William 1743-52, Edinburgh Castle 1752-63	-
Cholmondeley	Chester Castle 1731-70	Chester Castle 1770-75	-	Cope	-	-	KB 1743
Dalrymple	Minorca 1742	-	KT 1710	Fowke	-	Gibraltar 1754-6	-
Gooch	Virginia 1727-49	-	Bt 1746	Handasyd	Minorca 1737-42, 1743-47	Berwick 1745	-
Hargrave	-	Gibraltar 1740-9	-	Hawley	-	Inverness 1748, Plymouth 1752	-
Honywood	-	Duncannon 1728, Berwick 1735, Plymouth 1740	KB 1743	Howard, C.	Carlile 1725-49	Carlile 1749-52, Fort George 1752-65	KB 1749
Howard, T.	-	Berwick	-	Huske	Hurst Castle 1721	-	-
Keppel	-	Virginia 1737-54	KG 1749	Kerr	-	Guernsey 1740, Berwick 1745, Edinburgh Castle 1745	-
Lennox	-	-	KG 1726	Leslie	-	Stirling Castle 1722, Duncannon 1754	KT 1753
Ligonier	Minorca 1713-16	Kinsale 1739-40, Guernsey 1749-52, Plymouth 1752-59	Earl 1766	Lindsay	-	-	KB 1743
Molesworth	-	Kilmainham Veterans Hospital	-	Montagu	-	St. Lucia 1722, IOW 1733-4	-
Mordaunt	-	Sheerness 1752-78, Berwick 1778-80	KB 1749	Murray	-	Plymouth 1745	KB 1743

Source: Appendix 4.2, Data Sources: Careers

Table 3.18. Governorships and the highest titles of 1747 generals (continued)

	Lt. Governor	Governor	Highest title		Lt. Governor	Governor	Highest title
O'Hara	-	Minorca 1747, Gibraltar 1756, Portsmouth 1759, Chelsea Hospital	Irish Baron 1722	Parker		Cork, Kinsale	-
Philips	-	Nova Scotia	-	Preston	Edinburgh Castle 1715	-	-
Rich	-	Chelsea Hospital 1740	-	Spencer	-	-	KB 1741
St Clair	Berwick 1733	Cork	-	Temple	-	Jersey 1723-49	Viscount 1718
Wade	-	Berwick 1732, Fort William 1733	-	West	-	New York 1737, Tilbury 1747-52, Guernsey 1752-66	Earl 1761

Source: Appendix 4.2, Data Sources: Careers

Table 3.19. Governorships and the highest titles of 1800 generals

	Lt. Governor	Governor	Highest title		Lt. Governor	Governor	Highest title
Abercromby, Ra.	IOW 1795-9	Inverness 1798-1801	Baron 1801	Abercromby, Ro.	-	Bombay 1790-2, Edinburgh Castle 1801-27	GCB 1815
Baird	-	Kinsale 1819, Inverness 1827	Bt 1809	Beckwith	-	Bermuda 1797, St Vincent 1804-8, Barbados 1808-14	KB 1809
Burrard	-	Calshot Castle 1787-1813	Bt 1807	Campbell, J.	-	-	Baron 1766
Carleton, G.	Quebec 1766-8	Quebec 1768-78, 1786-93, Nova Scotia 1786-93	Baron 1786	Carleton, T.	-	New Brunswick 1784-1817	-
Cathcart	-	Hull 1830	Earl 1814	Christie Burton	Upper Canada 1799-1802		-
Clarke	Jamaica 1784-90, Quebec 1790, Lower Canada 1790-5	India 1797	KB 1797	Cornwallis	-	India 1786-97, 1805	GCB 1815
Cradock	Cape of Good Hope 1811	-	Baron 1831	Craig	-	Cape Colony 1795-7, North America 1807	KB 1797
Cuninghame	-	Kinsale 1770-1801	Irish Baron 1796	Cuyler	Portsmouth 1794-7	Kinsale	Bt 1814
Dalrymple, H.W	Guernsey 1796, Gibraltar 1806	Gibraltar 1806, Blackness Castle 1818	Bt 1815	Dalrymple, W.	-	Chelsea Hospital 1798-1807	
Despard	-	Cape Breton 1800-7	-	Don	Jersey 1806-14, Gibraltar 1814-30	Scarborough Castle 1831	GCB 1820
D'Oyly	-	-	KCB	Drummond, A.J	-	Dumbarton Castle	-
Dundas, D.	-	Landguard Fort 1800, Fort George 1801, Chelsea Hospital 1804	KB 1804	Dundas, F.	-	Carrickfergus 1817, Dumbarton Castle	-

Source: Appendix 4.2, Data Sources: Careers

Table 3.19. Governorships and the highest titles of 1800 generals (continued)

	Lt. Governor	Governor	Highest title		Lt. Governor	Governor	Highest title
Edward	-	Gibraltar 1802	-	Fanning	Nova Scotia 1783-6, Prince Edward Island 1786-1805	-	-
Farrington	-	-	Bt 1815	Fawcett	-	Pendennis, Tilbury, Chelsea Hospital 1796	KB 1786
Fox	Minorca 1799, Gibraltar 1804	Portsmouth 1810	-	Floyd	-	Tilbury 1813	Bt 1816
Gardiner	Kinsale 1801	-	-	Garth	Placentia	-	-
Gordon	-	Tynemouth 1778, Edinburgh Castle 1796-1801	-	Grant	-	E. Florida 1763-73, Dumbarton Castle 1782, Stirling Castle 1789-1806	-
Green	-	-	Bt 1786	Grey	-	-	Baron 1801
Gwyn	-	Sheerness	-	Harcourt	-	Fort William 1794-5, Hull 1795-1801, Sandhurst 1802-11, Portsmouth 1811-26, Plymouth 1827	GCB 1820
Harris	-	Dumbarton Castle 1824	Baron 1815	Hastings	-	India 1813-22, Malta	Marquess and Earl 1817
Herbert	-	Guernsey 1807	KG 1805	Hewett	-		Bt 1813
Howe	IOW 1768-95	Berwick 1795-1808, Plymouth 1808-14	GCB 1820	Hulse	Chelsea Hospital 1806	Chelsea Hospital 1820	GCH
Hunter	Upper Canada 1799-1805	British Honduras 1790-1	-	Hely Hutchinson	-	Stirling Castle 1806-32, Londonderry 1806	Baron 1801
Irving	-	-	Bt 1809	Johnson, H.	-	-	Bt 1818

Source: Appendix 4.2, Data Sources: Careers

Table 3.19. Governorships and the highest titles of 1800 generals (continued)

	Lt. Governor	Governor	Highest title		Lt. Governor	Governor	Highest title
Lake	Berwick 1793-4	Limerick 1794-7, Dumbarton Castle 1797-1807, Plymouth 1807-8	Viscount 1887	Lambart	-	Calshot Castle 1813-37	-
Leland	Cork 1796-1808	-	-	Lennox, C.	-	Hull 1813-14, Plymouth 1814-19, North America 1818-19	KG 1812
Lennox, G.	-	Plymouth 1784-1805	-	Lindsay	Jamaica 1795-1801	-	-
Ludlow	Berwick	-	Baron 1831	Medows	IOW 1798	Bombay 1788, Madras, Hull 1808	KB 1792
Melville	Guadeloupe 1759-61	Guadeloupe 1761, Grenada & others 1762-71	-	Moore	-	-	KB 1804
Morris	Quebec 1797-1800	-	-	Morrison	Jamaica 1809	Chester	-
Munro	-	-	KB 1779	Musgrave	Stirling Castle 1780	Tilbury 1796	-
Needham	-	-	Irish Earl 1822	Nugent	Jamaica 1801-6	-	Bt 1806
Percy	-	-	KG 1788	Phipps	-	Scarborough Castle 1796-1831	Baron 1794
O'Hara	Gibraltar 1792	Gibraltar 1795	-	Pigot	-	-	GCMG 1837
Pitt, J.	-	Plymouth 1805-7, Jersey 1807-20, Gibraltar 1820-35	KG 1790	Pitt, W.A	-	Portsmouth 1794-1809	KB 1792
Prescott	Lower Canada 1796	North America 1796-1807	-	Rainsford	-	Chester 1776-96, Tynemouth 1796-1809	-
Ross	-	Fort George	-	Simcoe	Upper Canada 1791-6	San Domingo 1796-7	-
Somerset	-	Cape of Good Hope 1813-27	-	Stanhope	-	Windsor Castle 1812	-

Source: Appendix 4.2, Data Sources: Careers

Table 3.19. Governorships and the highest titles of 1800 generals (continued)

	Lt. Governor	Governor	Highest title		Lt. Governor	Governor	Highest title
Strutt	-	Stirling Castle 1796, Quebec 1800-48	-	Stuart, C.	-	Minorca 1798-1801	KB 1798
Trigge	Portsmouth 1790-4, Gibraltar, Chelsea Hospital 1804	-	KB 1801	Tarleton	-	Berwick 1809-33	Bt 1816
Tonyn	-	E. Florida 1774-85	-	Townshend	-	Hull, Jersey	-
Villettes	Jamaica 1807	-	-	Whitelocke	Portsmouth 1799	-	-

Source: Appendix 4.2, Data Sources: Careers

Appendix 4.1, Data Sources: Social Backgrounds

1747 generals

Anstruther, Philip

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Borgard, Albert

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Bragg, Philip

ODNB, s.v. Bragg, Philip (*d.* 1759) ; PCC wills, PROB11/851.

Byng, George, 3rd Viscount Torrington

ODNB, s.v. Byng, George (1663-1733), Byng, John (1704-1757); Cokayne et al, *The Complete Peerage, Volume XII/1*, pp. 789-793.

Campbell, Sir James

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ODNB, s.v. Dalrymple, John (1673-1747), Dalrymple, James (1619-1695), Dalrymple Eleanor (d. 1759), Dalrymple, John (1648-1707), Dalrymple, Sir James, of Borthwick (1650-1719), Dalrymple, Sir David (circa 1665-1721); Sedgwick, *HOP, 1715–1754, Volume 1,* Dalrymple, Hon Sir David (circa 1665-1721), pp. 600-601, Dalrymple, Hon William (1678-1744), p. 602; PCC wills, PROB11/756.

Dalzell, Robert

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Chester, *The Marriage, Baptismal, and Burial Registers*, p. 380; PCC wills, PROB11/787.

Hawley, Henry

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Honywood, Sir Philip

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Leslie, John, 10th Earl of Rothes

ODNB, s.v. Leslie, John (1698?-1767), Leslie, John (1679-1722), Hay, John (1645-1713), Langton, Bennet (bap. 1736, d. 1801); Sedgwick, *HOP, 1715–1754, Volume 2,* Leslie, Hon Thomas (circa 1701-1772), p. 210.

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ODNB, s.v. Lindsay, John (1702-1749), Murray, James, (1690-1764); Cokayne et al, *The Complete Peerage of England, Volume I,* pp. 318-322, *III*, pp. 521-522; Mosley, *Burke's Peerage, Baronetage & Knightage,* (107th Ed.), *Volume 3*, p. 3384, (106th Ed.), *Volume 1*, p. 134.

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Preston, George

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Rich, Sir Robert

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Coates, James

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Cornwallis, Charles, 1st Marquess Cornwallis

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Don, Sir George

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Fraser, Simon

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ODNB, s.v. Howe, William (1729-1814), Howe, George Augustus (1724?-1758), Howe, Richard (1726-1799), Manners, John (1721–1770), Conolly, Thomas (1738-1803); Sedgwick, *HOP, 1715–1754, Volume 2,* Howe, Emanuel Scrope (circa 1699-1735), p. 154, Howe, George Augustus (?1724-1758), pp. 154-155; Namier and Brooke, *HOP 1754–1790, Volume 2*, Howe, Richard (1726-1799), pp. 647-648, Howe, George Augustus (1724-1758), p. 647 Howe, Hon Thomas (circa 1728-1771), p. 649 Howe, Hon William (1729-1814), pp. 649-650; Henning, *HOP, 1660-1690, Volume 2*, Howe, Sir Scrope (1648-1713), pp. 611-612; G.N.B Huskinson, 'The Howe family and Langar Hall, 1650–1800', *Transactions of the Thoroton Society*, 56 (1952), pp. 54–59; Mosley, *Burke's Peerage, Baronetage & Knightage,* (107th Ed.), *Volume 2*, p. 1986; PCC wills, PROB11/1558.

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Leland, John

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Mercer, Alexander

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Morse, Robert

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ODNB, s.v. Pigot, Henry (1750-1840), Pigot, Hugh (1722-1792).

Pitt, John, 2nd Earl of Chatham

ODNB, s.v. Pitt, John (1756-1835), Pitt, William (1759-1806), Pitt, William (1708-1778), Pitt, Thomas (1653-1726); Cokayne et al, *The Complete Peerage of England, Volume III*, pp. 143-147.

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Byng, George, 3rd Viscount Torrington

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de Grangues, Henry

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Irwin, Alexander

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Lennox, Charles, 2nd Duke of Richmond

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O'Farrell, Richard

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Wentworth, Thomas

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West, John, 1st Earl de la Warr

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Appendix 4.3, Data Sources: Rewards

1747 generals

Ligonier, John , 1st Earl

Cox A /56/e/31. Agent's Ledger 1st Foot Guards, 1758-1760, ff. 1-4, 77, 106, 123, 149, 185; Cox A/56/e/32. Agent's Ledger 1st Foot Guards, 1760-1762, ff. 1-2, 138, 147-148, 192, 202; Cox A/56/e/33. Agent's Ledger 1st Foot Guards, 1762-1763, ff. 1, 137, 181, 213; Cox A/56/e/34. Agent's Ledger 1st Foot Guards, 1763-1767, ff. 3, 137, 175, 194.

1800 generals

Carleton, Thomas

Cox A/56/e/99. Agent's Ledger 20th Foot, 1765-1785, ff. 35, 136.

Cathcart, William Schaw, 1st Earl

Cox A/56/e/1. Agent's Ledger Second Life Guards, 1797-1803, ff. 1-6; Cox A/56/e/2. Agent's Ledger Second Life Guards, 1802-1811, ff. 1-3, 130-131, 228.

Cuyler, Sir Cornelius

Cox A/56/e/126. Agent's Ledger 55th Foot, 1775-1779, f. 15.

Drummond, Andrew John

Cox A/56/e/39. Agent's Ledger 1st Foot Guards, 1772-1777, f. 189; Cox A/56/e/41. Agent's Ledger 1st Foot Guards, 1777-1781, ff. 147, 166; Cox A/56/e/45. Agent's Ledger 1st Foot Guards, 1791-1802, ff. 398-399.

Fox, Henry, Edward

Cox A/56/e/86. Agent's Ledger 10th Foot, 1790-1798, ff. 3-7.

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1747 generals

Ligonier, John , 1st Earl

Cox A /56/e/31. Agent's Ledger 1st Foot Guards, 1758-1760, ff. 1-4, 77, 106, 123, 149, 185; Cox A/56/e/32. Agent's Ledger 1st Foot Guards, 1760-1762, ff. 1-2, 138, 147-148, 192, 202; Cox A/56/e/33. Agent's Ledger 1st Foot Guards, 1762-1763, ff. 1, 137, 181, 213; Cox A/56/e/34. Agent's Ledger 1st Foot Guards, 1763-1767, ff. 3, 137, 175, 194.

1800 generals

Carleton, Thomas

Cox A/56/e/99. Agent's Ledger 20th Foot, 1765-1785, ff. 35, 136.

Cathcart, William Schaw, 1st Earl

Cox A/56/e/1. Agent's Ledger Second Life Guards, 1797-1803, ff. 1-6; Cox A/56/e/2. Agent's Ledger Second Life Guards, 1802-1811, ff. 1-3, 130-131, 228.

Cuyler, Sir Cornelius

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Drummond, Andrew John

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Fox, Henry, Edward

Cox A/56/e/86. Agent's Ledger 10th Foot, 1790-1798, ff. 3-7.

Garth, George

Cox A/56/e/32, Agent's Ledger 1st Foot Guards, 1760-1762, f. 55; Cox A/56/e/33, Agent's Ledger 1st Foot Guards, 1762-1763, f. 47; Cox A/56/e/34, Agent's Ledger 1st Foot Guards, 1763-1767, f. 76; Cox A/56/e/35. Agent's Ledger 1st Foot Guards, 1765-1768, f. 45; Cox A/56/e/41. Agent's Ledger 1st Foot Guards, 1777-1781, ff. 54, 308; Cox A/56/e/42. Agent's Ledger 1st Foot Guards, 1782-1799, f. 11; Cox A/56/e/43. Agent's Ledger 1st Foot Guards, 1783-1788, ff. 10, 102; Cox A/56/e/44, Agent's Ledger 1st Foot Guards, 1788-1792, ff. 10, 65, 94; Cox A/56/e/69. Agent's Ledger 1st Foot Guards, 1768-1770, f. 99; Cox A/56/e/70. Agent's Ledger 1st Foot Guards, 1770-1774, ff. 40; Cox A/56/e/97. Agent's Ledger 17th Foot, 1788-1798, ff. 23, 41, 141, 194, 232.

Grant, James

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Pitt, Sir William Augustus

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Tarleton, Sir Banastre

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Appendix 5, Market Prices of Commissions

Market prices of commissions, 1709-1805

Purchaser	Year	Rank	Regiment	Regulation £	Market £	Premium %
John Christopher	1758	Ensign	Foot	400	162	-59.5
Alexander Lindsay	1767	Ensign	15f	400	408	2.0
Francis Le Maistre	1760	Lieutenant	98f	550	315	-42.7
Cavendish Lister	1768	Lieutenant	3fg	1500	1500	0.0
John De Burgh	1770	Lieutenant	1fg	1500	1500	0.0
Chalmers	1776	Lieutenant	12f	550	550	0.0
Thomas Picton	1777	Lieutenant	12f	550	550	0.0
Henry Smith	1805	Lieutenant	95f	550	550	0.0
John Cope	1709	Captain	33f	1500	300	-13.3
Philip Browne	1745	Captain	3hg	2700	3100	14.8
Lewis Duffe	1762	Captain	8f	1500	2100	40.0
Alexander Lindsay	1771	Captain	42f	1500	2550	70.0
George Harris	1771	Captain	5f	1500	2050	36.7
George Garth	1772	Captain	1fg	3500	4600	31.4
John Moore	1780	Captain	82f	1500	1295	-13.7
Charles Merry	1782	Captain	79f	1500	2000	33.3
?	1790	Captain	8f	1500	2000	33.3
?	1790	Captain	8f	1500	2000	33.3
Correvant	1797	Captain	20d	3150	3166	0.5
Alexander Lindsay	1775	Major	53f	2600	3500	34.6
James Cockburne	1776	Major	35f	2600	2600	0.0
Lewis Duffe	1776	Major	8f	2600	2725	4.8
Edward Drewe	1778	Major	35f	2600	4200	61.5
Andrew Parke	1793	Major	8f	2600	5000	92.3
William Harris	1805	Major	73f	2600	3500	34.6

Source:

Odintz, "The British Officer Corps", pp. 305, 314-315, 324-327; Glover, "Purchase", p. 360; Burton and Newman, "Sir John Cope", p. 660; Oakley, "Introduction", p. 3; Captain John Moore to Dr John Moore, 3 May 1781, in Heath, *Records of the Moore Family*, p. 45; Captain Philip Browne to Thomas Browne, Letter No. 41, 23 April 1745, in Leslie, "Letters of Captain Philip Browne", p. 146; NLS, Account 9769 Lindsay, Family Papers, 23/1/401, Accounts of James, 5th Earl of Balcarres; NLS, Account 9769 Lindsay, Manuscript Volumes, 23/14/4 Jamaican Accounts, 1797; CKS, U624 Harris, Accounts, A67 Statement of My Concerns for the Guidance of Executors, 1812; CKS, U624 Harris, Correspondence, C233 Letterbook, George Harris to Messrs Latour, 24 April 1805; Cox A/56/e/62. Agent's Ledger 3rd Foot Guards, 1767-1769, f. 68; Cox A/56/e/70. Agent's Ledger 1st Foot Guards, 1770-1774, ff. 40, 125, 149; Cox A/56/e/90. Agent's Ledger 12th Foot, 1772-1783, ff. 9, 10, 62; Cox A/56/e/143, Agent's Ledger 79th Foot, 1778-1819, ff. 20, 25.

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